The Poetic Image

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1. Romantic Image

The unpurged images of day recede;
The Emperor’s drunken soldiery are abed;
Night resonance recedes, night-walkers’ song
After great cathedral gong;
A starlit or a moonlit dome disdains
All that man is,
All mere complexities,
The fury and the mire of human veins.

Astraddle on the dolphin’s mire and blood,
Spirit after spirit! The smithies break the flood,
The golden smithies of the Emperor!
Marbles of the dancing floor
Break bitter furies of complexity,
Those images that yet
Fresh images beget,
That dolphin-torn, that gong-tormented sea.

W. B. Yeats’s great celebration of the human imagination, ‘Byzantium’,\(^1\), of which these are the first and last verses, is concerned with the tension, reconciliation and movement between two types of sensibility, the sensual and the spiritual, that of natural life and that of transcendent symbol, in this poem imaged as ‘the fury and the mire of human veins’ and as ‘bird or golden handiwork . . . of changeless metal’. In it, as Richard Ellmann puts it, ‘the teeming images, “that dolphin-torn, that gong-tormented sea”’, flood up to the marbles of Byzantium itself, where they are at last brought under control by “the golden smithies of the Emperor” – himself,\(^2\) inter alia, an image of (one sort of) poet.

We are here in the world of what Sir Frank Kermode memorably designated that of the ‘Romantic Image’, of a vision of the creative imagination capable of begetting works of art with ‘lives’ of their own, each with all its parts in some organic-like relation. The Byzantine Emperor is a multifaceted and resonant image, far from a mere allegorical figure, encompassing civilizing and cultural as well as distinctively poetic control, yet also transcendence of the temporal, with the context determining which facet or facets have priority. But also a problematic image; however multifaceted, the Emperor would hardly be recognizable as a kindred spirit from the perspective of Yeats’s Crazy Jane with her ‘unpurged images’, or of Shakespeare’s ‘poet’s eye, in a fine frenzy rolling’.

Two of the key emblems of Kermode’s Romantic Image are to be found united in Yeats: the organic Tree and the movement with a kind of stillness of the Dancer. For such poetry meaning and form are united as are dancer and dance, with the resulting poetic force being indissolubly connected with and through internal reference, like blossom on a tree. Kermode notes that ‘the Image, indeed, belongs to no natural order of things. It is out of organic life; but it is easier and less dangerous to talk about it in terms of the organic than in terms of the mechanical.’ The latter mode of discourse had led in the eighteenth century to the analysis of poetic images in terms of the ‘association of ideas’ understood in terms of deterministic psychology such as that of Hartley, which seemed to leave no room for the creative imagination championed by the leaders of the Romantic movement for whom the most powerful poetic thought is through images which possess organic vitality, like the tree and the dancer.

In England one thinks of Coleridge and Wordsworth, and a little earlier of Blake, while in Germany of A. W. Schlegel’s distinction (developed by Coleridge) between allegory and ‘the personification of an idea’ on the one hand and the ‘independent reality’ of the symbol on the other. And in France, half a century or so later, the

F. A. C. Wilson, drawing on Yeats’s ‘heterodox mysticism’, takes the Emperor to symbolize God and interprets the passage from natural life to transcendent symbol as that from this life to the next. (W. B. Yeats and Tradition, London: Victor Gollancz, 1958; 231–243, esp. 242; also 15). On my account this ‘mystical’ dimension of the poem images a form of human creativity. ‘Byzantium’ contains both aspects; it is the nature of the Romantic Image to be multifaceted in such ways.
Symboliste poetry and theorizing of Baudelaire and Mallarmé provide influential parallels; as Kermode remarks, ‘The Symbol of the French is . . . the Romantic Image writ large’. This points to a delicate terminological problem, that of sorting out some of the different uses of the terms “image” and “symbol”, to which I shall return, but brings out that in their opposition to the realisms and naturalisms of their day the Symbolistes sought to move by means of evocation from the discursive towards the autonomous Image.

Baudelaire’s importance, T. S. Eliot maintained, lay ‘not merely in the use of the imagery of the sordid life of a great metropolis, but in the elevation of such imagery to the first intensity – presenting it as it is, and yet making it represent something much more than itself’, such elevation being related to the poet’s use of language. While for Mallarmé ‘to name an object’ is radically to reduce a poem’s power; rather, ‘to suggest it, that is the dream. It is the perfect use of this mystery that constitutes the symbol, displaying or evoking a state of soul [état d’ame].’ Further, when the imagery which represents ‘something much more than itself’ symbolizes not simply the poet’s emotions, ideas or states but an ideal which transcends them, the poet may juxtapose apparently incongruous images so that the mind will not rest on any single one, but see through all of them to what lies beyond; in somewhat similar fashion words may be detached from their normal referents and have their senses modified by their relationships with those which surround them. Mallarmé uses the analogy with music, which can suggest without tying the mind to irrelevant particularities, hence Arthur Symons’s famous description of Mallarmé’s best poetry: ‘every word is a jewel, . . . every image is a symbol, and the whole poem is visible music’. And out of these imagistic and symbolical traditions emerged the characteristic twentieth century (especially Modernist) conception of the poem as an autonomous complex image, or coordinated set of images, liberated from ordinary discourse, with form and meaning interdependent.

6 Romantic Image, op. cit., 5.
9 The Symbolist Movement in Literature, op. cit, 129.
But caution is necessary here. Not everyone influenced by these traditions put a premium on gradual accumulation. Ezra Pound’s Imagist and *haiku*-like ‘In a Station of the Metro’ gains its power from compression:

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;  
Petals on a wet, black bough.\(^{10}\)

Nor did they all seek delicate evocation or oppose all forms of literary realism. The classic Imagist poem by William Carlos Williams, ‘The Red Wheelbarrow’, which also owes something to the Japanese *haiku* model, presents a single visual image (*not* a symbol) very directly, focussing on the concrete representation of an object, and in place of the juxtaposition of multiple images we have the curious disposition of stresses and hesitations suggesting a continually failing attempt to reach for a completed pattern in the experience with which we are presented:

so much depends  
on  
a red wheel  
barrow  
glazed with rain  
water  
beside the white  
chickens.\(^{11}\)

This image is relatively static, more Tree than Dancer, but when the Dancer begins to move – expressing perhaps ‘the fury and the mire of human veins’ – we typically find not merely movement but also multiplicity, and here our philosophical consciences should begin to stir if they have not done so already. What sort of understanding is properly involved when we seek to relate to the poetic ‘movement’ of images which are said to possess organic vitality which ‘it is murder to dissect’, with a different kind of life from that of prose propositions, since here meaning and form are united? And when the words through which we engage with the images may be detached

\(^{11}\) *The Collected Poems of William Carlos Williams, Volume I 1909–1939*, ed. A. Walton Litz and Christopher MacGowan (Manchester: Carcanet, 1987), 224. For convenience, I on occasion refer to this poem using its conventional designation, as above, but strictly it is untitled.
from their normal referents, with their senses modified by their relationships with those which surround them, in what appears to be a more radical manner than that conceived in terms of Paul Grice’s rules for conversational implicature? Or, considered from a different perspective, when we engage with ‘Those images that yet / Fresh images beget’, how are we to understand images poetically begetting images? In France, one notes, the Symboliste movement found its final form through the work of Valéry with the focus shifting from the achieved poem as an end in itself to the poetic process as the proper object of poetic contemplation, while in England Pound abandoned ‘Imagism’ for ‘Vorticism’, seeking to find a term that would encompass the Image in, as it were, ‘movement’.

Introducing his translation of St.-John Perse’s Anabase which he declared, despite its apparently being written in prose, to be a poem, T. S. Eliot maintained that ‘the sequence of images coincides and concentrates into one intense impression of barbaric civilization’, arguing that ‘there is a logic of the imagination as well as a logic of concepts’ and that it is in these terms, together with the pattern of ‘stresses and pauses’, at least as much as by reference to versification, that poetry may be distinguished from prose. This appears to suggest at least one type of response to the concern I expressed about how we are to understand the poetic ‘movement’ of images. Kermode, writing in the mid-twentieth century, identifies Eliot’s notion of a ‘logic of the imagination’ as characteristic of the ‘modern’ as distinct from the ‘Metaphysical’ poet, so before engaging with these issues directly we might do well to widen our historical perspective, in the course of which it will prove useful to clarify some key terms.

2. Image and Symbol

‘Imaging is, in itself, the very height and life of Poetry’ affirms Dryden, setting himself combatively against critics for whom

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13 Kermode’s word, Romantic Image, op. cit., 85.
15 Romantic Image, 152.
imagery, even in poetry, was mere decorative illustration, while retaining a broadly mimetic orientation. He invokes Longinus in support, who maintained that ‘images’ (φαντασίαι) contribute greatly to weight, grandeur and energy in both poetry and oratory; Longinus glosses “φαντασίαι” as “ειδωλοποιίαι” (mental pictures), and the word as being appropriate when ‘you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your hearers’.¹⁷ Dryden reads this as poetry making ‘it seem to us that we behold those things which the poet paints’. But the poet is not confined to visual images. John Clare combines hearing with sight as he presents the ‘solitary’ crane: ‘Cranking a jarring melancholy cry / Thro’ the wild journey of the cheerless sky’ (‘March’), and Tennyson combines smell and hearing (with suggestions of warmth and taste) in ‘And many a rose-carnation feed / With summer spice the humming air’ (In Memoriam § CI). Further, as C. Day Lewis remarks, in the case of Shakespeare’s ‘Finish, good lady; the bright day is done, / And we are for the dark’ (Antony and Cleopatra V ii), ‘although it presents no picture to the eye, it speaks in the language of sight’.¹⁸

With this move we conveniently reach a conceptual boundary, that which separates what Sir Peter Strawson characterized as two ‘areas of association’: in the first imagination is ‘linked with image and image is understood as mental image – a picture in the mind’s eye or (perhaps) a tune running through one’s head’; in the second ‘imagination is associated with invention . . . or insight’.¹⁹ The example also indicates that and how this boundary is porous; to see this it will be useful to make a philosophical detour.

Claims about the poet making ‘it seem to us that we behold’ something points to Strawson’s ‘mental imagery’ in a manner that may tempt us into the snares of psychologism. Visualization is an unevenly distributed capacity and the same appears to be the case with respect to the aural, tactual and other dimensions of the imagination; this led E. J. Furlong to speculate that some of those ‘ill-disposed to imagery . . . [who] write off “mental imagery” in any form’ might lack such capacities.²⁰ Douglas Hedley identifies Gilbert Ryle as one with such an ill disposition: ‘Ryle’s theory of imagination as principally propositional pretending, and his

¹⁷ On the Sublime xv. §§ 1–2.
expulsion of mental images, is an instance of a sophisticated theory banishing rather mundane facts of common human experience.\textsuperscript{21} But Ryle’s notorious dictum, ‘Roughly, imaging occurs but images are not seen’, is not ‘expelling mental images’ in this sense; rather, as he says, ‘visualising . . . is a proper and useful concept, but . . . its use does not entail the existence of pictures which we contemplate. . . . I do have tunes running in my head, but no tunes are being heard’\textsuperscript{22} Images, that is, are not literally seen because the concept of “seeing” is being used in an extended or figurative sense when it is used in the context of visualization, not because mental imagery is to be somehow ‘written off’. As Hidê Ishiguro put it, ‘Ryle’s point is that when I picture something, what I am doing does not satisfy the ordinary accepted concept of seeing’.\textsuperscript{23} It may be that Dryden would not dissent; he claims not that in imaging ‘we behold those things which the poet paints’ but rather, imaging in poetry ‘makes it \textit{seem to us} that we behold those things which the poet paints’.

This is not to say that Ryle’s analysis is beyond criticism. Ishiguro argues that it is distorted by the ‘implicitly assumed dogma that there are no occurrences of mental acts . . . which are not in some \textit{de facto} way connected with publicly observable phenomena’, and that this arises from mistakenly supposing that recognizing that ‘the meanings of words expressing mental activities are connected with certain patterns of behaviour’ commits one to such a claim.\textsuperscript{24} Wittgenstein, like Ryle, insists on the interpersonal, public, status of criteria for the use of mental words and expressions, that they cannot be given solely in terms of our having certain inner experiences, but this does not disable him from using the concept of imaging in exploration of noticing aspects. He lists a number of ways the line drawing of a triangle might be seen, as a triangular hole, as a solid and so on, and remarks ‘it is as if an image came into contact, and for a time remained in contact, with the visual impression’, later concluding that ‘The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In other words: the concept “I am now seeing it as . . . .” is akin to “I am now having \textit{this} image”.’ He goes on, ‘Doesn’t it take imagination to hear something as a

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Living Forms of the Imagination} (London & New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 46.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{The Concept of Mind} (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 247–8.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 177, 172.
variation on a particular theme? And yet one is perceiving something in so hearing it.’

The notion of “imagination” covers a family of meanings, only some of which imply the use of mental imagery, but these latter, together with Wittgenstein’s account of “seeing as”, are crucial to two of the most impressive analyses of the role of imagination by contemporary philosophers, those of Mary Warnock and of Roger Scruton. Mary Warnock gives priority to approaching ‘the concept of the imagination as that which creates mental images’, declaring Wittgenstein’s claim that ‘seeing an aspect is akin to having an image’ to be an essential ‘clue’ to understanding how it is that ‘at least part of our perceptual experience must be described in terms of the significance which we attach to what we perceive’. She concludes: ‘Imagination is our means of interpreting the world, and it is also our means of forming images in the mind. The images themselves are not separate from our interpretations of the world; they are our way of thinking of the objects in the world.’ This conclusion has a familiar ring; as Strawson puts it:

The thought of something as an x . . . is alive in perception of it as an x . . . just as the thought of an x . . . is alive in the having of an image of an x . . . . This is what is now sometimes expressed in speaking of the intentionality of perception, as of imaging. But the idea is older than this application of that terminology, for the idea is in Kant.

Roger Scruton similarly argues that while there is indeed a variety of phenomena ‘grouped under the heading of imagination’, there are ‘links of an important kind’ between them and that, ‘in effect, there is only one concept expressed in the use of this term’. Wittgenstein’s probings play a significant role in Scruton’s account of these interrelations, for which ‘imagination involves thought which is unasserted’, and ‘imagining is a special case of “thinking of x as y”’; later Scruton notes that the phrase ‘seeing X as Y’ can in certain contexts substitute for ‘thinking of X as Y’.

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27 Imagination, op. cit., 192, 194.
29 Art and Imagination, op. cit., 91, 97–8, 117.
respect to images, he maintains that if we wish to know what an image is, ‘looking inwards’ is liable to put us on the wrong track; rather, ‘we must ask “What is it about another that enables us to say of him that he has images?”’ In this context he notes, ‘an image is always an image of something – imagery has the intentionality characteristic of thought’; also that imagery ‘is an object of immediate knowledge’ and, further, that ‘the principal criteria for saying that a person is having an image, or picturing something, are verbal – they consist largely in descriptions he would be prepared to offer of an absent or non-existent thing’, though he concedes that ‘a man might express his image by drawing or pointing to a picture’. These criteria together ‘place imagery in the category of thought’. However, ‘all our ways of referring to images seem to suggest an element of experience over and above the constitutive thought’. This experiential element is conceptually important because when one refers to an image that one has, one ‘describes it in terms of a genuine experience, the publicly observable form of which is familiar to us all’; one will describe one’s ‘visual image of X in terms that are equally appropriate to the experience of seeing X’. The ‘connection between imagery and its verbal expression’ helps ‘explain the formal (conceptual) properties of imagery’. This implies ‘an analogy between the two processes of imagery and sensory experience’. However, for Scruton, the analogy is ‘irreducible’: ‘A man will be unable to indicate in what way his image is “like” a particular sensory experience, although he will feel that to describe his image in terms of a sensory experience is appropriate, and indeed inevitable.’

We are back, it seems, with Longinus and Dryden. In deploying a pictorial rather than descriptional approach to images, maintaining that imaging in poetry ‘makes it seem to us that we behold those things which the poet paints’, Dryden is drawing on that analogy between imagery and sensory experience which grounds one’s propensity to envisage one’s image of a rose as the seeing (and/or smelling or even feeling the petals) of a rose, and hence to describe one’s ‘visual image of X in terms that are equally appropriate to the experience of seeing X’. And here we may begin to see how it might be that ‘Imaging is, in itself, the very height and life of Poetry’, for the verbal criteria for images can be significantly different from those for concepts.

Concepts, of course, have both a subjective (psychological) and an objective (linguistic) side; they play a role in human thinking as constituents of the propositions we entertain, but are identified, as well as

30 Ibid., 94, 100–101, 103, 104.
being conveyed or expressed, through language – an essentially public phenomenon – thereby enabling us to determine their application to the world (though, if we follow Quine, never uniquely). Those images that are the concern of poetry are similarly Janus-faced. But here one may distinguish two stages of analysis. As Scruton notes, there is a criteriological level at which we can describe (or draw or point to a picture of) the image we are entertaining, and where description is involved standard conceptual relations may obtain, though perhaps with significant dependence on implicature and taking note of the poverty of non-technical language in describing features of ‘olfactory and gustatory images’. Williams does, in a sense, describe his image of a red wheelbarrow, glazed with rain water beside the white chickens.

But at what one might call the properly imaginative level, whereas concepts are identified by their inferential relations and truth conditions when embodied in propositions or sentences, with images such criteria may not be applicable; here evocation and resonance may take the place of inference, and truth conditions give place to a notion such as “appropriateness”. To stay with the red wheelbarrow, the opening words (‘so much depends / upon’) – at once open-ended and inviting scrupulous attention at once to the image and the text –, the distinctive arrangement of stresses and pauses suggesting a continually failing attempt to reach for a completed pattern, the impression of precision, particularity and immediacy, together with the use of the curiously appropriate word “glazed” with its aesthetic undertones, all help intensify the effect of entering into a moment of perception, focussed in an image, resonating with a greater order of which it is a part.

The ‘Red Wheelbarrow’ resists analysis in terms of ‘seeing X as Y’ at any but the criteriological level, but with our other Imagist poem, Pound’s ‘apparition of these faces in the crowd; / Petals on a wet, black bough’, it is otherwise. An image of faces in the Paris Metro is fused with the perception of beauty in the midst of bleakness, as found in the delicacy of petals on a wet, black bough, under the rubric of that ambiguously resonant word “apparition”. We have here the evocation of an image coming into contact with a visual impression (it seems indeed to have been the representation of an actual experience), conveying a distinct emotion through an unexpected similarity. And through this evocation we, the readers, are invited to imagine what it would be like to have such an experience, sharing that emotion. Such ‘imagining what it is like’, notes

31 Ibid., 105–6.
Scruton, has closer affinities with ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ than it does with ‘knowledge by description’,\(^{32}\) hence presumably our sense that poetry is capable of conveying a distinctive form of immediacy.

The significant role of ‘seeing X as Y’ in certain forms of poetic imaging casts light on Aristotle’s contention that for the poet ‘the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of genius [‘ευφυία, a gift of nature], since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars’ (De Poetica, 1459a5–8). Pound’s image is not strictly a metaphor (‘giving the thing a name that belongs to something else’; 1457b6–7), but it also gains its force from an original perception of the similarity in dissimilars. And so too, we should note, does Shakespeare’s ‘Finish, good lady; the bright day is done, / And we are for the dark’ which, although metaphorical, is not in the strict Drydenesque sense imagistic. Both, to use C. Day Lewis’s expression, ‘speak in the language of sight’ but, as we have seen, poetic images range across all our senses, and Lewis goes further. In Meredith’s ‘darker grows the valley, more and more forgetting’ (Love in the Valley, l. 37) we have again the language of sight but, crucially,

The poet’s re-creation includes both the object and the sensations connecting him with the object, both the facts and the tone of an experience: it is when object and sensation, happily married by him, breed an image in which both their likenesses appear, that something “comes to us with an effect of revelation.”\(^{33}\)

Adequate expression in words of what one sees, hears or otherwise senses often requires precision not only with respect to the object perceived but also to the associated feelings, tone and attitude, and it is this concern ‘for expressing the relationship between things and the relationship between things and feelings, which compels the poet to metaphor’;\(^{34}\) Lewis adds that it also ‘demands that within the poem

\(^{32}\) Ibid., 105.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, 25. Compare Anthony O’Hear, The Element of Fire: Science, Art and the Human World (London and New York: Routledge, 1988), 104–5: ‘A literal description of a feeling or attitude I have will not precisely delineate it, nor will it bring out the way in which it is not an object for me, but
the images should be linked by some internal necessity stronger than the mere tendency of words to congregate in patterns’. In Thomas Nashe’s ‘Brightness falls from the air; / Queens have died young and fair’ (‘In Time of Pestilence’) the two lines are tied together, he suggests, by ‘emotional logic’; ‘the sadness of evening and the sadness of untimely death illuminate each other reciprocally’, leading him to designate the whole complex a single ‘image’.35

It should be clear that in being driven to metaphor in such a way, or to ‘breed an image’ that unites ‘both the facts and the tone of an experience’, the poet needs insight and even creativity; the freshness of an image can be an integral part of its capacity to convey vivid conviction to the reader – hence Aristotle’s belief that mastery of metaphor is not something that can be gained at second hand. The need for such insight, of course, is at the very least not diminished when the experience presented is invented rather than ‘recreated’. In poetry, therefore, the boundaries between Strawson’s two ‘areas of association’ for the imagination, that of mental imagery and that of inventiveness or insight, are porous.

Further, because poetic images are apt for presenting objects in the context of an experience, and hence as part of a relationship, the boundary between image and symbol is in poetry also porous. For Mallarmé, it will be recalled, displaying or evoking a ‘state of soul’ is ‘the dream’ of poetry, and ‘it is the perfect use of this mystery that constitutes the symbol’, for an image may represent much more than itself, whether an emotion, state, idea, or ideal, particularly when juxtaposed with other – perhaps at first sight incongruous – images. And when such incongruous images are thus united so that they reciprocally point beyond themselves, as through Nashe’s ‘emotional logic’ to symbolize a distinctive form of sadness, the whole complex is often not unreasonably called an “image”, in an extended use of the term. It is a development of this line of thought that lies behind Kermode’s identification of both Tree and Dancer, each something I feel, something constitutive of what I am. It is at this point that one can have recourse to metaphor or symbol, transferring certain terms from the public realm to indicate the nature of one’s inner state. . . . [T]he metaphor, precisely because it is not literal, awakens intimations and a free flow of associations, where the literal closes and confines one’s thought. . . . [T]he criterion of success will be to produce a metaphor which evokes the right sort of experience in one’s audience.’

35 The Poetic Image, op. cit., 25, 35. If, as some suppose, Nashe’s “air” is an error for “hair” this does not weaken the point; the received line has stood the test of time in a manner the proposed alternative could hardly have done.
of course a Drydenesque image in itself, as emblematic of what he designates ‘the Romantic Image’.

“Symbol” is a term no less problematic than “image”. Glossing with some freedom a distinction drawn by Nelson Goodman, David Novitz discriminated between ‘purely referential symbols’, and ‘literary symbols’; while the former simply represent or refer, to say of a word or phrase that it is a literary symbol ‘is to say that it is being (or has been) used in a highly suggestive way to inform or even arouse an audience by conveying a certain insight, a certain mood, a certain feeling’; he notes that many literary works contain symbols of both sorts. On this account, any literary symbol can be regarded as a ‘juxtapository metaphor’, defined as ‘the stark and incongruous verbal juxtaposition of two or more subjects and their associated ideas without any explicit predicative relationship between them’ (one notes that on this account, unlike Aristotle’s, Pound’s two lines count as a metaphor), and ‘any juxtapository metaphor can be regarded as a literary symbol’ when it involves ‘the transference of ideas and feelings from one subject to another’. Where analogous literary devices work ‘iconically – with the help of similarities or resemblances’, depending for their effect ‘on their congruity rather than their incongruity’, we should regard them ‘as juxtapository similes, not metaphors; hence as literary images rather than literary symbols’.37

Novitz’s idiosyncratic distinction between literary image and symbol has not caught on, but it is worth considering his contrast between two types of symbol in relation to the opposition of symbol to allegory to be found in those influenced by Blake, Schlegel and Coleridge. Schlegel, for example, contrasts the symbolic, which has a reality independent of the conceptual, and the allegorical which is ‘invented’ with an ‘idea’ in mind.38 While for Coleridge ‘a Symbol . . . always partakes of the Reality which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living part of that Unity, of which it is the representative’ (the symbol, that is, is a form of synecdoche), whereas ‘an Allegory is but a translation of abstract notions into a picture-language’.39

36 Ways of Worldmaking (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester, 1978), 58.
38 A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature, op. cit., 88.
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There is, that is, a well-established tradition for which allegory is seen as primarily ornamental, with its elements standing referentially for what could be said otherwise (on the pattern of Novitz’s ‘referential symbol’), whereas the symbol functions in the manner of Novitz’s ‘literary symbol’ (or ‘image’) by means of (to use his terminology) ‘suggestion’ to ‘convey a certain insight, mood or feeling’. On the Coleridgean synecdochal model the symbol participates in the reality it renders intelligible so that one directly apprehends that which is symbolized in the act of perceiving the symbol; in this very specific sense, insight or vision gained through symbol is ‘unmediated’ whereas ideas conveyed through allegory are ‘mediated’. One notes that Kant draws what is verbally almost the opposite moral; it is schematic representation that is said to ‘directly’ exhibit the concept, whereas symbolic representation does so ‘indirectly’, being mediated by analogy.\(^{40}\) In this context it should also be noted that the terminology has been complicated by Charles Williams’s influential preference, in the context of a Coleridgean reading of Dante’s *Commedia*, for ‘the word image to the word symbol, because it seems to me doubtful if the word symbol nowadays sufficiently expresses the vivid individual existence of the lesser thing’.\(^{41}\)

That the images of good verse ought ideally to operate symbolically, in some quasi-Coleridgean sense, is of course a contested claim, and not one that would be accepted by, for example, Alexander Pope for whom ‘True wit is nature to advantage dress’d, / What oft was thought, but ne’er so well expressed’ (*An Essay on Criticism*, l. 297); one is reminded of Coleridge on allegory, translating ‘abstract notions into a picture-language’. To bring the issue into focus it may be useful to return to Aristotle on metaphor, for metaphor is a flower of wit and also, as we have seen, deeply implicated in poetic imagery. Pope is echoing Aristotle’s suggestion that metaphor can ‘save the language from seeming mean and prosaic’ (*De

\(^{30}\) Paul and Princeton UP, 1972), 30. Compare: ‘The allegorist leaves the given . . . to talk of that which is confessedly less real, which is a fiction. The symbolist leaves the given to find that which is more real.’ C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love: A Study in Medieval Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 45.


\(^{41}\) *The Figure of Beatrice: A Study in Dante* (London: Faber and Faber, 1943), 7. Williams’s use of “image” appears to have significant affinities with that later proposed by Novitz.
Poetica, 1458a33–5), giving metaphor and imagery a primarily ornamental role. But elsewhere Aristotle remarks that ‘it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something fresh’ (Rhetorica, 1410b13–14), and here we are closer to the Romantic Image. Of course these two conceptions of the role of metaphor can be held together, as they were by Aristotle, for elegantly exemplary expression can enlighten the mind and move the heart, but the (English) Augustan poets were typically much more at home with ‘inventing’ an image with an idea in mind than were the Romantics.

The so-called ‘Metaphysical Poets’ provide an instructive intermediate case, for with them the, often startling, image (such as John Donne’s lovers as ‘stiff twin compasses’) is typically concept driven (one remembers Samuel Johnson’s ‘the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together’)\(^{42}\), but in such a way as to be open to imagistic development which is itself conceptually rewarding; their images ‘often create the argument of the poem or at least direct its course’.\(^{43}\) There is a remarkable finessing of this technique with the initial image of ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’ (Eliot of course being a champion of the Metaphysicals). ‘Let us go then you and I, / When the evening is spread out against the sky / Like a patient etherised upon a table’.\(^{44}\) Here we have indeed ‘the stark and incongruous verbal juxtaposition of two or more subjects and their associated ideas’ but there is no visual resemblance between the subjects, save perhaps through a distant echo of the luminiferous aether; the connection is, rather, ‘emotional, one of mood’\(^{45}\), a mood of extreme passivity and disconnection from reality, to which the very word ‘patient’ contributes. It is not so much that the resistance to imagistic ‘likeness’ forces recourse from image to concept as that the reader is forced into passively awaiting illumination from what follows as when, for example, the passivity and disconnection of the ‘you and I’ of the first line (‘Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”’) seems fittingly matched by the personification of the image of the evening’s ‘yellow fog’ which ‘Curled once about the house, and fell asleep’. The poem is initially read sequentially but, once familiarity is achieved, in subsequent readings the later images inform one’s readings of the earlier; the significance of each image is modified


\(^{43}\) C. Day Lewis, The Poetic Image, op. cit., 57.


\(^{45}\) C. Day Lewis, The Poetic Image, op. cit. 93.
through its relationships with those which surround it. Mallarmé’s analogy with music is in place here. As with so much poetry touched by Symboliste poetics, ‘Prufrock’ can only be adequately comprehended in retrospect.

3. Imagery and ‘Movement’

Let us look a little more closely at what I termed the “movement” of poetic images, though from Eliot’s post-Symboliste perspective for which the poet may aspire through words to ‘The stillness as a Chinese jar still / Moves perpetually in its stillness’ (‘Burnt Norton’ V) a better word might be their “interrelationships”. A particular poetic image may be said to ‘move’ in a number of interconnected senses: by being presented as changing location or context, through transformation, and since many images can, as it were, reverberate, with new dimensions and possibilities becoming apparent in different readings, a single instance of an image may also be said to ‘move’; the distinction between this sort of movement and that from one image to another can be a fine one. There are, nevertheless, clear cases of the latter and, as should already be apparent, with these there are a variety of possibilities, while in any given case more than one of them may be operative. I shall be primarily concerned with change of context and the way in which a poem may ‘move’ from one image to another, but it would be artificial to make sharp separations here. It is worth recalling F. R. Leavis’s warning that the relation of images to a poem is not at all, like that of ‘plums to cake’: ‘they are foci of a complex life, and sometimes the context from which they cannot be even provisionally separated . . . is a wide one.’

As a preliminary, it is worth distinguishing between intra- and inter-textual transitions, between the movement of images within a poem and movement from one work to another (bearing in mind that the identity conditions for a work may sometimes be problematic). Here the main difference seems to be that whereas understanding a work of art as having all its elements, including its

47 ‘Imagery and Movement: Notes in the Analysis of Poetry (ii)’, in his A Selection From Scrutiny, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 231. He adds that in considering certain types of poetic effect ‘we find “imagery” giving place to “movement” as the appropriate term for calling attention to what has to be analysed’. (237)
images, in some organic relation is often normative for poetry, when one poet echoes or otherwise evokes an image from the work of another, a law of diminishing returns can soon set in if one seeks to bring the whole pattern of the earlier poem into relation with the later. For example, in the third of Eliot’s *Four Quartets* Tennyson, whose famous ‘haven under the hill’ has already been evoked in the second poem and thereby established as a ‘presence’ in the sequence, appears to return in a more subtle form. We are introduced to ‘a voice descanting (though not to the ear / The murmuring shell of time, and not in any language)’ (‘The Dry Salvages’ III); the image, part auditory part visual, of the ear as a shell within which one still appears to hear the past rhythms of a distant sea, is powerful in itself, but is given further temporal resonance if one’s own ear is also attuned, through the striking word “murmuring”, to Tennyson’s ‘moan of doves in immemorial elms, / And murmuring of innumerable bees’ (‘The Princess’ VII). ‘Inmemorial elms’ may well be within the ambit of ‘The murmuring shell of time’, but the rest of Tennyson’s ‘Sweet Idyl’ does not bear pressing.

Given this preliminary distinction, if we use as our primary model the movement of images within a single poem, a further set of discriminations may be made. First, there are those forms of poetry whose images seem to be governed by the development of emotion, whether or not ‘recollected in tranquillity’, and here one can well understand how Hartley’s associationist psychology could seem so appropriate. Second, we have those images, often associated with the Augustan satiric poets, which are invented ‘with an idea in mind’ the development and movement of which are often concept or even argument driven; as Lewis puts it, the images ‘are strung together. . . on a thread of logical argument spun out of the centre of the subject’. Third, at least as far back as Homer and Aeschylus we find poetry that, with its images, is shaped by narrative; such narrative need not be understood primarily either conceptually or in terms of emotion but rather in terms of Aristotelian μυθωος; Schlegel characterizes the *Oresteia* as symbolical rather than allegorical, to be understood in ‘emblematic’ terms, but its development,

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48 From Tennyson’s ‘Break, break, break’; compare Eliot’s ‘The dancers are all gone under the hill’ (‘East Coker’ II).
50 *The Poetic Image*, op. cit., 65.
51 *A Course of Lectures on Dramatic Art and Literature*, op. cit., Lect. VI, 87–8.
indeed transformation, of images such as the Eumenides is nevertheless more governed by narrative than by imagistic logic.

So what of that imagistic logic? This might be thought to provide us with a fourth category, that of ‘Those images that yet / Fresh images beget’, apparently out of their own substance, but here care is necessary. If the teeming images are but the expression of ‘the fury and the mire of human veins’, undisciplined by any cultural smithies, then their movement or even development is best understood in psychological terms and it is the business of poetry to transmute their restless energies linguistically into ‘golden handiwork . . . of changeless metal’. We are back with a variant of our first category. The underlying fact to be reckoned with here is that ‘those things which the poet paints’ are necessarily painted with words, and hence poetic images cannot escape the linguistic dimension, even if only at the criteriological level. This is why any aspirations, whether Mallarméan or Pateresque, poetry may have towards the condition of music must always be that of the moth for the star; poetry is essentially conceptually contaminated in a way that music is not.

Jonathan Kertzer’s critique of Eliot’s proposed ‘logic of the imagination’, seen as distinct from the ‘logic of concepts’, is relevant in this context. “Logic” Kertzer understands in terms of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* such that it is ‘impossible to represent in language anything that “contradicts logic”‘52, and ‘since logic is the law of all thought, whether rigorous or wayward, valid or invalid, there can be no escape from it’.53 Any form of intelligible language can be logically analysed, and such analysis is conceptual. Interpreting Eliot’s claims for a ‘logic of the imagination’ to be about argument, he maintains that ‘As dramatic displays of thought and speech, the arguments of poetry must “second” reason’.54 ‘Reason’, so understood, has a primary status to which the ‘arguments of poetry’ are at once subordinate and, indeed, rhetorical, capable of influencing reason’s ‘persuasiveness’. Poetic wit, in other words, is ‘nature to advantage dress’d’. The issue is whether, given that poetic imagery must always be conceptually contaminated, there can be an imagistic logic that does not collapse poetry into rhetoric, subordinating it to Tractarian ‘reason’.

54 Ibid., 51.
I shall mention just two possibilities. The first, very traditional, move takes us back to the poetic image understood as symbol. We find in human experience, it is suggested, certain primordial or archetypal patterns of imagery, these being either intimations of a Divine order or else — or as well as being — derived from universal or widespread human, biological or, more generally, natural phenomena, from a supposed ‘collective unconscious’, or otherwise. In different ways human culture has developed what have been somewhat loosely termed “languages” of symbolic analogy, grounded in these images, the symbols typically exemplifying their archetypes synecdochally. Poetry that draws on them — from Blake to Yeats to Kathleen Raine — is shaped by those traditional relationships. Those ignorant of the relevant traditions may well have had their imaginations shaped by literature that has been so informed. One’s imagination is not a tabula rasa, and the field of archetypal or inherited images provides controls on their patterning which an individual poet’s vision may transmute or, indeed, challenge. Such a move is in some ways reminiscent of our third category, with the development of images shaped by μῦθος, though here the term is not primarily to be understood in terms of narrative but rather of symbolic structure.

Birth, love, nature and death do indeed look remarkably like cultural universals — they are, one notes, perennial preoccupations of poets — and no doubt cultural tradition profoundly affects how poet and reader engage with the movement of poetic imagery. Nevertheless, construal in terms of a symbolic ‘language’ of the primordial is far from universally accepted. One of the most influential, if perhaps not wholly convincing, critiques is that of Paul de Man who argued more than forty years ago that such a prioritizing of the symbol in a Coleridgean manner seeks to place human experience sub specie aeternitatis in a manner that is no longer credible, a ‘defensive strategy that tries to hide from . . . the truths that come to light in the last quarter of the eighteenth century’, most importantly the self’s ‘authentically temporal predicament’. It is not that there are no such


C. Day Lewis’s list, The Poetic Image, op. cit., 141.
traditions of symbolic analogy on which poetry has drawn, but that they are no longer in good conscience open to us. This takes us into areas of metaphysics and theology beyond the scope of this paper.

For an alternative possibility let us return to Eliot’s proposed ‘logic of the imagination’. This logic he characterizes in terms of ‘arrangement’, ‘order’ and, by implication, ‘movement’. Yvor Winters objected early on that ‘the word logic is used figuratively’ here, indicating nothing but ‘qualitative progression’, ‘graduated progression of feeling’, but the objection is widely thought to have missed the point; as Frank Kermode pointed out, ‘It indicates no progression of any sort. Time and space are exorcised; the emblem of this

58 A vigorous response to de Man’s essay has been mounted by Douglas Hedley (Living Forms of the Imagination, op. cit., 136–40). For de Man ‘the prevalence of allegory always corresponds to the unveiling of an authentically temporal destiny’, where ‘self’ and ‘non-self’ can never ‘coincide’ (‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, 206–7), and he downplays the contrast between allegory and symbol as being of ‘secondary importance’, arguing that Coleridge implicitly allows figural language as such to be understood in terms of ‘translucence’ (192–3). Hedley replies, with some plausibility, that this in effect collapses a crucial distinction, pointing out that for Coleridge there is an ‘ontological’ link between symbols and the reality symbolized [which] becomes transparent in the image’, but that with allegory there is ‘a different relationship between the means of expression and the objects of that expression’ (Living Forms, 138–9). De Man’s rejection of any such ontological link, and hence resistance to claims for a symbolic, synecdochal, ‘translucence’ of the eternal through and in the temporal, appears to be in part a consequence of his accepting the self’s ‘authentically temporal destiny’ as being crucial to the ‘truths’ supposed to have ‘come to light in the last quarter of the eighteenth century’, and coming close to implying that the associated ‘secularized thought’ . . . no longer allows a transcendence of the antinomies between the created world and the act of creation’ (‘The Rhetoric of Temporality’, 206–7). Such a position is, of course, incompatible with Coleridgean panentheism. De Man’s assault on ‘this symbolical style’ as lacking ‘an entirely good poetic conscience’ (208) looks suspiciously like a form of petitio in the guise of analysis.

“logic” is the Dancer’, that image which is ‘all movement, yet with a kind of stillness’, the coalescence of ‘meaning and form’.\(^6^1\) Eliot, it will be recalled, introduced his notion in relation to his translation of Perse’s *Anabase*. In a note on the poem by Lucien Fabre to which he draws our attention it is remarked how ‘symbol [may lead] to symbol, linked allusively, throughout an entire stanza’,\(^6^2\) and Eliot himself maintains that any obscurity of the poem, on first readings, is due to the suppression of ‘links in the chain’, of explanatory and connecting matter, and not to incoherence, or to the love of cryptogram. The justification of such abbreviation of method is that the sequence of images coincides and concentrates into one intense impression of barbaric civilization. The reader has to allow the images to fall into his memory successively without questioning the reasonableness of each at the moment; so that, at the end, a total effect is produced. Such selection of a sequence of images and ideas has nothing chaotic about it.\(^6^3\)

Three features of Eliot’s account are worth noting. First, though this ‘logic of the imagination’ is distinguished from the ‘logic of concepts’ they are not set in opposition, as Kertzer supposes; Eliot, after all, implies that ‘incoherence’ here would be a fault, and putting the supposed fault alongside ‘love of the cryptogram’ suggests that we may read “incoherence”, at least in part, conceptually. The sequence is, we are told, one of ‘images and ideas’. As we have seen, poetic images necessarily have a conceptual element, and this needs to be taken into account in considering their ‘movement’. Second, the criterion of ‘coherence’ goes beyond the purely conceptual to the imaginative; this is the force of the emphasis on producing a ‘total effect’ which is glossed as ‘one intense impression’. We are back with that double meaning of “image” such that it can designate both a particularized scene (as in the opening line of *Anabasis*, ‘Under the bronze leaves a colt was foaled’) and that complex ordered arrangement of such items, here by ‘allusive’ linkage of ‘symbols’, we call a poem. Finally, as mentioned earlier, Eliot suggests that it is in these terms, together with the pattern of ‘stresses and pauses’, at least as much as by reference to versification, that poetry may be distinguished from prose.

\(^{6^1}\) *Romantic Image*, op. cit., 152, 85.
\(^{6^2}\) In *Anabasis*, op. cit., 94.
In *Anabase*, claims Eliot, Perse, by using such ‘exclusively poetic methods’ has been able ‘to write poetry in what is called prose’ for, ‘although it would be convenient if poetry were always verse, . . . that is not true’; he goes on to remark that the term “poetry”, when it is applied to works in verse, ‘introduces a distinction between good verse and bad verse’. Putting these claims together we have the suggestion that, as well as competence in versification, where appropriate, and analogues where not, poetry worth the name displays a form of ordering in its images productive of ‘one intense impression’ as an aspect of its ‘total effect’. Elsewhere Eliot offers a note of caution on such claims, remarking that a poet, in his critical writing, ‘at the back of his mind . . . is always trying to defend the kind of poetry he is writing, or to formulate the kind that he wants to write’. One suspects this may apply here. But we may nevertheless treat as worth consideration the claim that this is true of poetry as conceived in terms of the traditions Kermode associates with the ‘Romantic Image’, providing a rationale, at once imagistic and conceptual, for the ‘movement’ of its images.

4. ‘The Poetic Image’

So what may we conclude concerning ‘The Poetic Image’? Ultimately, I think, that the designation only makes sense in the context of a certain tradition, or set of related traditions, of poetry and of understanding poetry, but that teasing out why this is so can be illuminating. Dryden’s designation of imaging as ‘the very height and life of Poetry’ invokes Longinus, but the latter was considering poetry and rhetoric together, and bringing what you seem to see ‘vividly before the eyes of your hearers’ is characteristic of both, though for different purposes. Dryden’s gloss, making ‘it seem to us that we behold those things which the poet paints’, could similarly be applied to the orator. We do not here have an account of imaging that is distinctively poetic. The same applies when we move, on this model, to non-visual images and even, via a network of analogies, to non-sensory ones, where a mental image appears to be little more than the accusative in what we might call ‘direct’ imagining (or remembering, or so on), as distinct from ‘imagining that’. The analogy between imagery and sensory experience gives point to

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64 Ibid., 10.
modelling the mental images evoked by the poet in terms of pictures (and their analogues) though, as we have seen, there are pitfalls to be avoided, and also to modelling at least some of such images in terms of ‘seeing \( X \) as \( Y \)’ – hence the association of these images with metaphor. But such considerations apply, once again, well beyond poetry. In all these cases we conceive of images independently of poetry, the latter being identified primarily in prosodic terms, as items which the poet can use to suit his or her own purposes, ‘to point a moral or adorn a tale’ or perhaps, as Longinus suggests, to enthral or amaze (\( \varepsilon\kappa\pi\lambda\eta\xi\iota\varsigma \)).\(^{66}\) On such an account poetic images are simply those images we encounter in poetry; some no doubt are more suitable than others for the various and contested ends that have been proposed for poetry, but this does not warrant the designation of a coherent class such as seems to be implied by the definite article of ‘the poetic image’.

It is when we turn to those traditions associated with what Kermode termed the ‘Romantic Image’, and specifically to those forms of poetry and discourse about poetry associated with it, that such a classification comes into focus, and may be seen even as having application to poetry outside such confines as far back as Homer and as far afield as the haiku. Poetry is most fully itself, according to this tradition, where concept, emotion and image are internally related, in the sense that they are not fully identifiable apart from each other, the prosody informs and is informed by this complex, and in those cases where narrative or other forms of \( \mu\upsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma \) drive the movement of the whole the images are to be conceived symbolically, seen as in some way integrally related to that wider range of experience or reality they in this way render partially intelligible or otherwise available to us. Moments of poetic intensity, from whatever period or tradition, gain their effect by their approximation to this ideal, and since prosody is only one factor in the identification of poetry in this full sense, poetry can in principle be written, as Eliot puts it, ‘in what is called prose’, so long as there are quasi-prosodic analogues of verse.\(^{67}\) Where this is not the case we find non-poetic works, novels and short stories for example, which through their own specific uses of imagery enact or otherwise engage with analogous ideals, as in Thomas Hardy, James Joyce or Virginia Woolf. When a complex of such images are united so that they reciprocally point beyond themselves, gaining imaginative and emotional force through their interrelationship, the senses of those words through

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66 On the Sublime xv. §2.
67 In terms of genre, Anabase is plainly epic.
which we engage with them being thereby modified by their relationships with the words which surround them, then the whole complex may be termed an “image”, and the designation “The Poetic Image” comes into its own as picking out images and image complexes in poetry, so understood, possessing the sort of vitality the Romantics termed ‘organic’, prompting such questions as those of Yeats:

O chestnut-tree, great-rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?

(‘Among School Children’, final lines)\textsuperscript{68,69}

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\textsuperscript{68} The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats, op. cit., 245.

\textsuperscript{69} My thanks to my brother, the poet Francis Warner, for comments and reminders.