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Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth A.. (2010) Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice, Vol.144 (No.1-2). pp. 1-36. ISSN 0048-5829
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the "constitutional moment". First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
| Item Type: | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics |
| Journal or Publication Title: | Public Choice |
| Publisher: | Springer |
| ISSN: | 0048-5829 |
| Date: | July 2010 |
| Volume: | Vol.144 |
| Number: | No.1-2 |
| Number of Pages: | 36 |
| Page Range: | pp. 1-36 |
| Identification Number: | 10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5 |
| Status: | Peer Reviewed |
| Publication Status: | Published |
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
| Funder: | Hoover Institution, National Institute of Aging (NIA) |
| Grant number: | RO1 AG021181 (NIA) |
| URI: | http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/5879 |
Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge
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