Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements
Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth A.. (2010) Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice, Vol.144 (No.1-2). pp. 1-36. ISSN 0048-5829Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5
This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the "constitutional moment". First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Public Choice|
|Official Date:||July 2010|
|Number of Pages:||36|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-36|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
|Funder:||Hoover Institution, National Institute of Aging (NIA)|
|Grant number:||RO1 AG021181 (NIA)|
Actions (login required)