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Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements
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Muthoo, Abhinay and Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2010) Information, institutions and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice, Vol.144 (No.1-2). pp. 1-36. doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5 ISSN 0048-5829.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the "constitutional moment". First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Public Choice | ||||
Publisher: | Springer | ||||
ISSN: | 0048-5829 | ||||
Official Date: | July 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Vol.144 | ||||
Number: | No.1-2 | ||||
Number of Pages: | 36 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 1-36 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||
Funder: | Hoover Institution, National Institute of Aging (NIA) | ||||
Grant number: | RO1 AG021181 (NIA) |
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