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Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies?
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Redoano, Michela (2010) Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies? Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.12 (No.3). pp. 407-435. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x
Abstract
Previous research has shown that the effect of fiscal centralization is to reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the empirical evidence in a two-jurisdiction political economy model of endogenous lobby formation and policy determination. We measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and (ii) their impact on policy decisions. We show that, contrary to the predictions of the preference dilution effect, the effect of centralization on lobbying are ambiguous with respect to both measures of lobbies.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Public Economic Theory | ||||
| Publisher: | Blackwell | ||||
| ISSN: | 1097-3923 | ||||
| Official Date: | June 2010 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | Vol.12 | ||||
| Number: | No.3 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 29 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 407-435 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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