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Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies?

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Redoano, Michela (2010) Does centralization affect the number and size of lobbies? Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol.12 (No.3). pp. 407-435. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x

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Abstract

Previous research has shown that the effect of fiscal centralization is to reduce lobbying. However empirical evidence suggests that this is not always the case. This paper attempts to explain the empirical evidence in a two-jurisdiction political economy model of endogenous lobby formation and policy determination. We measure lobbying in two ways: (i) the number of lobbies formed under the two settings and (ii) their impact on policy decisions. We show that, contrary to the predictions of the preference dilution effect, the effect of centralization on lobbying are ambiguous with respect to both measures of lobbies.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Public Economic Theory
Publisher: Blackwell
ISSN: 1097-3923
Official Date: June 2010
Dates:
DateEvent
June 2010Published
Volume: Vol.12
Number: No.3
Number of Pages: 29
Page Range: pp. 407-435
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2010.01459.x
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Data sourced from Thomson Reuters' Web of Knowledge

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