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Strategic lobbying and taxation choice : a political economy of trade policy analysis
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Tien, Hung-Hua (1999) Strategic lobbying and taxation choice : a political economy of trade policy analysis. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.
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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b1365710~S1
Abstract
In this thesis, I use a political economy of trade policy approach to analyze
the issues of strategic lobbying and taxation choice. The thesis contains 4
papers together with an introduction, literature review and conclusion.
In Chapter 3, a lobbying-influence model is presented to discuss how the
outcomes of trade policy is influenced by lobbying activities during the policymaking
process. A comparison of the welfare-maximizing model and the
lobbying-influence model under a game theory framework is undertaken.
Chapter 4 provides a new explanation on the issue of asymmetric lobbying
from the view point of the impact of external environment. Since the incentive
of the domestic firm to engage in lobbying activities varies with its marginal
costs, the outcomes of lobbying performance are different. This argument holds
for both complete and incomplete information settings.
Chapter 5 considers whether there is a positive role for lobbying activities
in an incomplete information setting when the foreign entry is incorporated.
The results suggest that the social welfare under the pooling equilibrium is
higher than that under the separating equilibrium. As a result, there is no
positive role for lobbying activities in this two-period model.
Chapter 6 provides a political economy model to explain why trade taxes
rather than more efficient income taxes might be adopted and what links the
taxation choice and the economic development. In general, people prefers to
pay less tax to the government. In a democratic society, a policy, which yields
a higher utility to the majority of voters, is supported through majority voting.
Therefore, the choice of taxation instruments depends on the tax payments,
which are determined by the tax method, the income level, and the movement
of income distribution over time.
Item Type: | Thesis (PhD) |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Economics , Economic policy, Commercial policy , Lobbying , Fiscal policy |
Official Date: | July 1999 |
Institution: | University of Warwick |
Theses Department: | Department of Economics |
Thesis Type: | PhD |
Publication Status: | Unpublished |
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: | Hviid, Morten ; Dhillon, Amrita ; Perroni, Carlo |
Sponsors: | Republic of China (Taiwan). Ministry of Education |
Extent: | 163 leaves |
Language: | eng |
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