Berg, Erland, Ghatak, Maitreesh, Manjula, R., Rajasekhar, D. and Roy, Sanchari (2013) Motivating knowledge agents : can incentive pay overcome social distance? Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Volume 2013 (Number 134).

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Abstract

This paper studies the interaction of incentive pay and social distance
in the dissemination of information. We analyse theoretically as well as
empirically the e ect of incentive pay when agents have pro-social objectives,
but also preferences over dealing with one social group relative to
another. In a randomised eld experiment undertaken across 151 villages
in South India, local agents were hired to spread information about a
public health insurance programme. Relative to at pay, incentive pay
improves knowledge transmission to households that are socially distant
from the agent, but not to households similar to the agent.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Alternative Title:
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Public health administration -- Research -- India, Incentive awards -- India, Social classes -- India, Communication -- India
Series Name:	CAGE Online Working Paper Series
Publisher:	Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Place of Publication:	Coventry, UK
Official Date:	June 2013
Volume:	Volume 2013
Number:	Number 134
Number of Pages:	44
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Funder:	Great Britain. Department for International Development, International Growth Centre

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