Harrison, Mark (2013) The economics of coercion and conflict : an introduction. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Volume 2013 (Number 151).

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Abstract

This chapter introduces the author’s selected papers on the economics of
coercion and conflict. It defines coercion and conflict and relates them. In
conflict, adversaries make costly investments in the means of coercion.
The application of coercion does not remove choice but limits it to options
that leave the victim worse off than before. Coercion and conflict are
always political, but a number of key concepts from economics can help
us understand them. These include rational choice, strategic interaction,
increasing and diminishing returns, scale and state capacity, surplus
extraction, and Type I errors. The chapter concludes that the economist’s
toolkit, although not complete, is useful.

Item Type:	Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Alternative Title:
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	War -- Economic aspects, War, Cost of , War finance
Series Name:	CAGE Online Working Paper Series
Publisher:	Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Place of Publication:	Coventry, UK
Official Date:	September 2013
Volume:	Volume 2013
Number:	Number 151
Number of Pages:	33
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published

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