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Collective rationality and monotone path division rules

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Stovall, John E. (2014) Collective rationality and monotone path division rules. Working Paper. Coventry, UK: Department of Economics, University of Warwick. Warwick economics research papers series (TWERPS), Volume 2014 (Number 1035).

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Abstract

We impose the axiom Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on division rules for the conflicting claims problem. With the addition of Consistency and
Resource Monotonicity, this characterizes a family of rules which can be described in three different but intuitive ways. First, a rule is identified with a fixed monotone path in the space of awards, and for a given claims vector, the
path of awards for that claims vector is simply the monotone path truncated by the claims vector. Second, a rule is identified with a set of parametric functions
indexed by the claimants, and for a given claims problem, each claimant receives the value of his parametric function at a common parameter value, but
truncated by his claim. Third, a rule is identified with an additively separable, strictly concave social welfare function, and for a given claims problem, the
amount awarded is the maximizer of the social welfare function subject to the constraint of choosing a feasible award. This third way of describing the family
of rules is similar to Lensberg's (1987) solution for bargaining problems applied to conflicting claims problems.

Item Type: Working or Discussion Paper (Working Paper)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Economics -- Mathematical models , Claims
Series Name: Warwick economics research papers series (TWERPS)
Publisher: Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Place of Publication: Coventry, UK
Official Date: January 2014
Dates:
DateEvent
January 2014Published
Volume: Volume 2014
Number: Number 1035
Number of Pages: 26
Institution: University of Warwick
Status: Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
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