THE GENDER OF ETHICS: SEXUAL AND MORAL IDENTITY IN
ROUSSEAU, FREUD, AND KIERKEGAARD

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SUMMARY

This thesis argues that questions of ethical life, moral identity, and gender are inextricably involved, and that an appropriate conception of each is necessary for the thinking of the others. In particular it seeks to demonstrate that the way in which freedom is conceived in its relation to moral identity and ethical life has profound implications for the thought of gender relations. It is further argued that the writings of Kierkegaard open up a way of relating freedom and the finite that offers the possibility of re-thinking gender.

The writings of Rousseau and of Freud are examined to show the interdependence of their philosophical anthropology and the systematic subordination and exclusion of women that operates in each of them. In each case it is shown that, despite the very different, and even opposed ways that they construe the nature of moral identity and its relation to ethical life, a parallel gender polarity is at work.

In Rousseau male moral identity rests on independence from society and infinite, excessive freedom. This is brought into relation to the mundane world of ethical life through gender. Women are denied independence and moral identity and made responsible for social being. Their subordination is such that dependence on them does not destroy the integrity of men. The crisis of this unstable structure is demonstrated through a reading of Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle Heloise, the death of whose heroine is shown to be the moment of collapse of the Rousseauean synthesis.

In Freud moral identity is achieved through the identification of the self with social authority. The finite freedom that can be thought in psychoanalysis rests on a fusion of ethical and moral life. The "depersonalisation" of the super-ego is the road to liberation. Through the gendered experience of the Oedipal drama this path can only be taken by men. Woman are again excluded from moral identity, being allowed only a "masochistic" relation to the Law. The crisis of this structure is found in the notion of the "archaic heritage", which it is argued, represents a collapse of Freudian thought.

Finally both Freud and Rousseau are brought into relation with the psychological writings of Kierkegaard, whose distinctive notion of freedom and faith is held to address the limitations of both sets of writing. Infinite freedom is made to co-exist with finitude. The implications of these writings for the thought of gender is briefly explored through other of the writings of Kierkegaard.
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This thesis argues that the ethical subject is necessarily a gendered subject, and that the notions of gender and ethics have deep implications for one another. In particular it argues that the way in which the social dimension of ethical life interacts with the moral integrity and autonomy of the subject is profoundly involved with the way in which the relations between and respective natures of the sexes is conceived. Central to this complex of problems is the conception of freedom, and especially the meeting of freedom and limit, the limit imposed by human finitude.

This argument is made through a reading of the texts of Rousseau and Freud, two outstanding thinkers of sex, love, and ethics in modernity. Their sharply opposed ideas on freedom, ethics, and the constitution of the subject are examined in connection with their correlated theories of the sexual difference and the connections between these areas made clear. It is shown that in each case a systematic subordination of women answers needs found in the thinking of the possibility of masculine freedom, even though the nature of that freedom is profoundly different in the two cases.
It is shown that there is in Rousseau an idea of integrity and independence that finds expression in both the idea of the "natural man" in immediate and simple touch with himself and nature, and the "free soul" which forms the centre of Rousseau's religious thought. This idea is at the heart of the Rousseauean conception of freedom, and can only be brought into touch with an organic sociality through the sexual relation. The nature of femininity is social and this provides the basis for the synthesis of independent and integral masculinity and the social order.

The first chapter exposits the character of masculinity in this system of ideas, while the second concentrates on the nature and role of the feminine in its subordinate relation to the masculine. The essential character of this relation in displacing problems inherent to masculinity is stressed here.

The third chapter turns to the contradictions of this constructed femininity, through a reading of Rousseau's novel Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloise. Here, as nowhere else, Rousseau makes femininity the focus of his attention, and in the career and death of Julie its impossibility is made clear. With the collapse of Julie comes the collapse of Rousseau's sexual synthesis.
The next two chapters are devoted to Freud, whose work has dominated thinking on sex and sexuality for at least the last half century. In contrast to Rousseau, whose thought is characterised by attempts to find stability in a flight from contradiction, Freud argues for the acceptance of and adjustment to ambivalence, the dual nature of human beings. The instincts of death and life are inextricable and their conflict can only be lived and suffered, not evaded. The resigned maturity of Freud's writing expresses itself also in a limited and finite notion of the self and its possibilities. Freedom in Freud has a very different character to Rousseau's infinite excess.

The first chapter develops this contrast, beginning from a comparison of Rousseau's idea of the conscience as the locus of moral autonomy and its Freudian equivalent in the superego. It is shown that where Rousseau posits an opposition between the conscience and the social determination of ethical idea Freud sees the superego as the internalisation of a socially imposed law. In Freud liberation becomes the rationalisation and "owning" of the social law rather than its rejection.
The second chapter on Freud looks at the limits of ambivalence and of the liberation offered by analysis. As in the reading of Rousseau this is centrally concerned with the sexual difference. In Freud the engendering of the self in the experience of the Oedipal drama is also the moment of the acquisition of the moral sense, of the formation of the superego. The superego is formed in response to the threat of castration, which is identified, by the Oedipal infant, with feminisation. It is the first moment in a "repudiation of femininity".

A result of the sexual difference is that the girl never really leaves the Oedipal position or forms a strong superego. It is shown that these, exclusively masculine, achievements are necessary to the process of maturation and winning of autonomy at the service of which analysis is placed. Women are assigned a "masochistic", passive relation to the law of the father condemning them to infantile subordination.

The necessity of the terror of the Oedipal drama, in which the sexual positions are established and the denigration of women rooted, is traced to the limit of ambivalence. This is found in an external opposition of desire (instinct) and authority. The figure of this opposition is the primal horde, and
the primal murder the beginning of the process of internalisation of authority through which Freud seeks to overcome it. However, the idea of the "archaic heritage", the inheritance of the guilt of the murder figures the impossibility of this overcoming, re-enacted in every child's life.

The final chapter turns to the work of Kierkegaard to indicate a way out of this impasse. The inability to overcome the externality of desire and authority is argued to be a result of Freud's refusal of the transcendent moment of freedom, of spirit. This is interpreted as a "clinging to the finite", as anxiety in the terms established in Kierkegaardian psychology. The Freudian finite ego, unable to free itself of its position (the heteronomous social law) and take responsibility for itself clings to the finitude of its posited sexual identity in face of the anxiety this entails.

In the final chapter this Kierkegaardian freedom is contrasted also to the escapist excess of Rousseau and its nature and relation to sex and to love briefly considered. It is argued that the Kierkegaardian concept of faith (of risk of faith) and of the relation to the finite, provide a starting point for the rethinking of gender that is necessary.
PART I: ROUSSEAU

Introduction

The first three chapters of this thesis are concerned with Rousseau, and argue that his theory of gender is an essential part of his attempt to resolve two intimately connected polarities that occupy the centre of his thought. These are: first that of an excessive and infinite freedom limited by the possibilities of the finite body, which is dramatised as the problem of passion, of insatiable desire; and second that of a primitive and necessary need for integrity and the systematic dependency imposed by social life, which expresses itself in the most important of the passions, amour propre.

The first two chapters present an introduction to these issues in the writings of Rousseau. It is argued that in his teaching of the necessary difference between the sexes Rousseau resolves these tensions by means of a displacement into the field of sex. Freedom and integrity are made characteristic of men, while women are held to be the bearers of a natural sociality, with its roots in maternity. Through the "moralisation" of the sexual relation men are socially "bound" without thereby surrendering
their integrity. Since men are accorded the dominant role in the relation women's social nature is incorporated, while held apart. This is reflected in the different moral codes proposed for the sexes. Men are responsible only to conscience, while women are to place the opinion of others at the centre of their ethical life. This is justified by their responsibility to give men reason to respect the social order, this reason being paternity.

The habitual conjugal love that, in the family, is to provide the natural foundation of the social order comes into conflict with a passionate love. This, through the play of imagination, represents the return of the problem of freedom, of the transgressive essence of the spirit, in the field of sex. Infinite satisfactions are posited that no finite relation can provide. The management of this problem is again feminised. Women are so to manage romantic love that it can be made compatible with the order of the familiar.

The third chapter traces the working out of these issues in the text of La Nouvelle Heloise. It is argued that in this text Rousseau follows through the complex and difficult relations between his philosophical anthropology, his doubled ethics, and
his thought of love. In the figure of Julie he presents the struggle of woman to reconcile the passionate force of love with the stable order of the family. In this struggle the central importance of the problem of humanity's dual nature becomes clear, in its relation to issues of sex and sexuality. The dichotomy of conjugal and romantic love is complicated by the addition of a tension between a bodily, sexual and a spiritualised love.

There is moreover a profound ambiguity over the character of this latter, spiritual love. The intimate connection between spirit and imagination can be read both ways. It can be asserted that the imagination is a faculty of the spirit, but equally it can be suggested that spirit is a figment of the imagination. While there can be little real doubt that Rousseau believed in the reality of the soul there is a strong and increasing tendency to read him in terms of a naturalism or materialism. This ambiguity is irreducible and is central to the continuing relevance of Rousseau's writing.

In Julie's death these difficulties are crystallised. The attempt to synthesise the tensions inherent in Rousseau's thought through displacement onto femininity collapse. Julie's passion does not allow
the stabilisation of a social order. It exceeds this order, but crucially this excess is a religious one. While it is true that sex plays a role, and one often stressed to the exclusion of all else, Rousseau has in fact demonstrated the possibility of a reconciliation of sex with the order of the family. What cannot be contained is spirit, or imagination.

Equally, and this is a common theme in recent readings, feminine passion is too explosive. This cannot be understood only in terms of "patriarchy". What is here argued is that this patriarchal order must be understood in terms of a fundamental problem with the nature of human freedom, the impossibility, in Rousseau of reconciling it with any stable order. In Part II these themes will be traced through a reading of Freud, who, it will be argued develops an account of the relation to the law of the father which makes identification with that law the precondition for the limited liberation that analysis offers.

The first chapter argues that at the heart of Rousseau's thought is the problem of human freedom. In the second the working out of this problem is traced through his account of sexual difference and sexual relation, which is shown to be inextricably
bound up with it. It is shown that his notorious
double standard in ethics can only be understood in
terms of the dialectic of freedom, and that in it
woman is made responsible for the conditions allowing
an essentially irresponsible male freedom. Finally it
is shown that this resolution is an unstable one
which breaks down over the difficulty of female
desire.

Rousseau's concept of freedom, working itself out
through the imagination, is an excessive one,
breaking through whatever limitations it comes up
against. In particular this is expressed through the
insatiable desire he calls passion. Here the finite
and hence satiable physical needs of the body are
transformed by imagination into infinite and hence
insatiable desires. One passion stands out above all,
amour propre. Passionate self love is the
transformed, social form of the natural amour de soi,
which being self contained is content. Amour propre,
recognising others, becomes a passion for mastery and
condemns the social man to a ceaseless war of all
against all.

This perspective on Rousseau, which understands his
thought as centred on the problem of passion as an
expression of the transgressive power of imagination,
as the foremost faculty of freedom, is then used to illuminate the meaning of his political thought and of his teaching on compassion and conscience. In particular the focus is on Emile, the work where his "system" is brought together. It is argued that the social contract sets out the conditions of a "republican" resolution of the problem of amour propre but that both there and in Emile it is shown that this possibility is closed for the modern bourgeois European.

The response to this is the idea of the creation of the "natural man in the state of society" the centre piece of which is the education of amour propre to self-dependency. This is the meaning of the turor's teaching of Emile to adhere to a morality of conscience. Any man who inhabits the social state, and Rousseau recognises that all men must, that any "return" to the fictional state of nature would involve a dehumanisation, will relate to themselves in the mediated form of amour propre. The correct training of this passion, and of its relation to compassion, will free it of dependency in this mediation, and hence of the struggle for mastery, by making this mastery internal. The compassionate conscience is satisfied with itself and thus free from the need for the regard of others.
This teaching on conscience is to contrasted with that of the Savoyard Vicar. Here the conscience is not related to compassion and amour propre, but rather derived directly from freedom. It is this doctrine that was to influence the development of German idealism through its reception by Kant. Unlike Kant's though the Vicar's morality is essentially sentimental. God, or Nature has made the free heart such that it wills the good immediately. The passions are the voice of the body and oppose that of the conscience. Here a dualistic account, which derives the problems of human existence directly from the co-existence of a free soul and a finite body, is placed alongside the more mediate one traced above, which indeed the Vicar derives from his own.

What emerges, therefore, is that the manipulation exercised upon Emile's sentiments is a process comprehended by the Vicar, and by implication by the tutor, but not by Emile and not in the main body of the text. There the concept of freedom is principally the negative one of lack of external restraint, and conscience is thought of as sentimental. The concept of freedom is hardly invoked even in its negative meaning. By contrast the Vicar makes a positive doctrine of freedom, as unrestrained conformity with an essentially non-material nature the ground of the
sentiments of conscience. Where in the education of Emile artifice overcomes the problems of sociality in the thought of the Vicar this artifice is expounded as the return or recuperation of a buried freedom.

The relation between these two accounts, and the meaning of their discrepancy has been the subject of much debate, under the topic of "Rousseau and religion". This thesis argues that those who have put forward the interpretation that gives priority to the natural religion of the Vicar are fundamentally correct, as opposed to those who have argued for a naturalistic account of Rousseau's thought, seeing the Vicar as the spokesman for a religious belief that his author has rejected. This stance will be defended when the Vicar's thought is discussed below.

The first chapter is brought to a conclusion with the observation that the onset of sexual desire is the force that precipitates Emile's movement from the self-enclosure of childhood into the social being that necessitates the education of nascent amour propre.

The second chapter, which exposit Rousseau's doctrine of sexual love as mediating excessive freedom and the limits opposed by the necessities of
social life, begins with the role of sexuality as socialising force. The first chapter has suggested that conscience as a morality of self sufficiency is Rousseau's response to the problem of amour propre as the drive to assert integrity and freedom through mastery. The difficulty with conscience remains that it cannot provide a stable basis for a social order.

The social order that corresponds to conscience is that of the republic, but even here it is not sufficient. Because men are to be psychologically independent of one another they cannot experience the intense affective bonds that are formative of the republic, and it is for this reason that Rousseau gives such prominence to femininity and maternity in such texts as the Dedication of the Second Discourse and the proposals for Corsica and Poland, where the figure of the nation as mother is central. In modern Europe, where republican patriotism and legitimate law are impossible conscience is of necessity opposed to the social reality of competitive civil society. The masculine morality of conscience requires completion by a feminine ethic of responsibility. It is for this reason that Emile needs the carefully prepared supplement of Sophie.
The pattern reproduced in this marriage can be traced in the Second Discourse, where a natural sociality of woman is derived from the fact of maternity and made the basis of the first stable social order, that of the family. Men are attached to the mother-child unit by sexual desire and this is the nucleus for further social development. This closely parallels Emile's propulsion into social existence at puberty. Naturally independent men are socialised by their sexual attachment to naturally social women. The natural independence of men can be retained through careful education, but depends, since it can only be thus developed in society, on the sociality of women.

This basic dichotomy is expressed in the positing of a fundamentally different ethical principle for women. Where men should depend only on their judgement of themselves women must make that of others the centre of their conduct. It is their foremost duty to win the good opinion of others. Where self-relation is the centre of the lives of men other-relation dominates for women.

This doubling is then brought into the heart of the relation of marriage. Men must, if they are to remain free in their relation to the women to whom they are bound, have authority over them, but Rousseau is
insistent that this authority must overlie the real control of men by women. The latter are to manipulate the former in order to get their own way without ceasing to obey. Male autonomy is thus preserved without its asocial principle undermining the stability of an order opposed to it. The principles of moral autonomy and social conformity are reconciled through familial love.

At this point the freedom which has apparently been domesticated returns through its primary medium, imaginative desire, in this case specified as sexual in passionate love. The basis of the family is a calm love, which does not depend on imagination but only on habit. This was the force in operation at the dawn of the family as set out in the Second Discourse and the Essay on the Origin of Language and it is the ideal end point of family life. It is succeeded in this case and preceeded for the modern (like Emile) by passionate love. Here the object of desire is transformed by the action of imagination into a uniquely satisfying one that will still the restless play of imaginative desire. Since this illusion cannot be sustained in reality this desire becomes a disruptor of the calm of family life.
In this return of the excessive moment of freedom the sexual difference is again deployed to reconcile it with the enduring social order. Through the virtue of modesty women are to preserve the illusion of passion for as long as possible in order that its place may be taken by habit when it finally passes away. No similar action is to be taken in respect of female passion, since women have a natural interest in sustaining marriage. Where desire is the ground of attachment in the case of men, a natural sociality based on maternity fulfills this role for women. The manipulation of men by women noted above thus gains another dimension in the realm of sexual desire.

Male autonomy has been shown to depend in Rousseau on its manipulation by non-autonomous female sociality. The third chapter is a reading of Rousseau's novel La Nouvelle Heloise, which shows that not only do all the themes developed in the present chapter appear in particularly clear form in this text, but that the contradictions of a freedom that depends on its manipulation are exposed in the collapse of the heroine. Julie's death concentrates the difficulties of Rousseau's attempt to reconcile an excessive freedom with the limits of human social existence.
CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM.

This chapter argues that Rousseau's political thought and his teaching on conscience must be understood in relation to the problem of freedom. This problem is a controversial one in the interpretive literature, with Horowitz, who gives an excellent summary of the debate, arguing that Rousseau's "conscience" should be interpreted as a proto-Freudian internalisation of repression. In general much of the recent literature has emphasised Rousseau's political writings to the extent that the ontological problem of freedom, made central here, is neglected. Dent's careful study notes this tendency and sets out deliberately to combat it. In a spirit close to that of this thesis he argues that Rousseau's central preoccupation is with the difficulty of reconciling freedom and order, to which he gives a wide meaning, extending it into psychology.

In the older literature the problem of freedom was made central in the neo-Kantian interpretation of which Cassirer is the foremost exponent. This line suffers, however, from a tendency to over-rationalise Rousseau's distinctive position in the direction of a pre-Kantianism. This leads to a distortion of
Rousseau's thought and especially a neglect or exclusion of the importance of affective factors, which will be the focus of the second chapter.

Starobinski's classic study identifies a radical freedom as crucial to Rousseau but does not trace this through the problem of passion as is done here. This is a consequence of the primarily personal-psychological orientation of that work. It is in the work of Derrida, who brilliantly extends Starobinski, and of De Man, that the problems of the transformation of need through imagination, and of radical freedom receive the profoundest attention, and to the former in particular this thesis is deeply indebted. Derrida's attention to the centrality of gender in relation to the question of moral identity, and De Man's to the radicality with which the notion of freedom in Rousseau questions the integrity of the subject are of the greatest importance in the reading of Rousseau.

**Power and desire.**

Near the beginning of Book II of *Emile* Rousseau discusses the conditions for human happiness and unhappiness. This polarity is at all times the guide in his investigations and this statement at the
beginning of his consideration of Emile "as a moral being" is crucial to the understanding, not only of the project of this text, but of Rousseau's writing as a whole.

He begins with the proposition "Always more suffering than enjoyment; this relation between the two is common to all men. Man's felicity on earth is, hence, only a negative condition; the smallest number of ills he can suffer ought to constitute its measure." The reason for this is to be found in the conception of man's existence on earth as a compound and divided state, riven with tensions and to be contrasted with two fundamental sources of antagonism: the strain of freedom constrained in a finite body; and the problem of individual and society. These are specified by Rousseau through the doctrine of passion, and most particularly through that of the most important of the passions, amour propre, self love mediated through others.

The idea of unhappiness, which has been given priority over that of happiness, a relation that will be reversed in the context of a consideration of nature, is analysed in terms of the proportionality of desire and power.
Every feeling of pain is inseparable from the desire to be delivered from it; every idea of pleasure is inseparable from the desire to enjoy it; every desire supposes privation, and all sensed privations are painful. Our unhappiness consists, therefore, in the disproportion between our desires and our faculties. A being endowed with senses whose faculties equalled his desires would be an absolutely happy being.6

This ideal of a balance of power and desire is recurrent through all of Rousseau's writing. Human wisdom is in "diminishing the excess of the desires over the faculties and putting power and will in perfect equality"7 As he notes in the passage under consideration there are two ways in which this might be achieved, diminishing the desires or extending the powers. In mapping out a strategy for achieving his end Rousseau must offer some suggestion as to how this might be achieved. This will involve accounts both of the formation of desire and of the development of human power, and of the relation between these. The key to this is the distinction between the natural and the artificial.

The natural in Rousseau has the status of a reductive ideal. The natural man is integral, simple, and
happy. His opposite is the social man, partial, complex, and unhappy: "Natural man is entirely for himself. He is numerical unity, the absolute whole which is relative only to itself or its kind. Civil man is only a fractional unity dependent on the denominator." The education of Emile is intended to recreate this natural man in the modern world. But: "There is a great difference between the natural man living in the state of nature and the natural man living in the state of society." It will be necessary below to return to the latter case, but to understand it, it is necessary first to grasp the distinction between the natural man in the state of nature and "civil man".

[N]ature, which does everything for the best .. in the beginning .. gives [man] with immediacy only the desires necessary for his preservation and the faculties sufficient to satisfy them. It put all the others, as it were, in reserve in the depth of his soul, to be developed there when needed. Only in this original state are power and desire in equilibrium and man is not unhappy. As soon as his potential faculties are put in action, imagination, the most active of all, is awakened and outstrips them. It is imagination which extends for us the measure of the possible, whether for good or bad, and which consequently excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of satisfying them ... [O]ne exhausts oneself without getting to the end, and the more one gains in enjoyment, the further happiness gets from us.

In this paragraph Rousseau expresses the essence of the doctrine of the state of nature as developed in the 'Discourse on the Origins of Inequality'. In that
work he develops an extremely radical version of the state of nature hypothesis that distinguishes it sharply from that of a liberal like Locke. Rousseau breaks with a liberal and individualistic state of nature argument by effectively identifying the human and the social. The natural "man" is in fact a proto-human, incapable of thought, of language, of recognising others like himself as such, even of the continuous existence through memory that constitutes the identity necessary for moral being. "His soul, which nothing disturbs, is wholly wrapped up in his present existence, without any idea of the future, however near at hand." 

For this simple forest creature power and desire are, as indicated in the passage quoted above from *Emile*, perfectly balanced: "The produce of the earth furnished him with all he needed, and instinct told him how to use it." There is an immediacy here and a finitude, which prevents the opening of the space of desire, of the privation presupposed by desire. Equally this precludes the gap between self and world in which labour exists. Instinct, either his own or that of other creatures appropriated in imitation, was sufficient. This pre-human lives in undisturbed harmony with himself and with his world. He is finite
and capable of the kind of complete satisfaction that his modern successors can never know.

He is, however, to be distinguished from the animals by the possession of certain faculties "in reserve in the depth of his soul":

I see nothing in any animal but an ingenious machine. I perceive exactly the same thing in the human machine, with this difference, that in the operations of the brute, nature is the sole agent, whereas man has some share in his own operations in his character as a free agent. The one chooses and refuses by instinct, the other from an act of free will: hence the brute cannot deviate from the rule prescribed to it, even when it would be advantageous for it to do so; and, on the contrary, man frequently deviates from such rules to his own prejudice.

It is this freedom of the human even in his primitive state where: "To will and not to will, to desire and to fear, must the first, and almost the only operations of his soul" which allows him first to imitate other animals and later to develop labour processes and the dormant faculties of his soul. It is expressed in the possibility of transforming himself and his world that Rousseau calls his "perfectibility."

Crucial in this is the transformation of the nature of desire. The simple physical wants of the human animal are acted upon by the imagination to produce
the passions. "As soon as his potential faculties are put in action, imagination, the most active of all, is awakened and outstrips them. It is imagination which extends for us the measure of the possible, whether for good or bad, and which consequently excites and nourishes the desires by the hope of satisfying them." 19

This contrast between natural need and imaginative desire is drawn especially clearly in the 'Discourse on the Origin of Inequality', where the mutual action of reason and passion is spelt out, "The passions... originate in our needs, and their progress depends on that of our knowledge... [S]avage man being destitute of every species of enlightenment... his desires never go beyond his physical needs." 20

It is imagination that opens the gap between desire and power with which this section began, and does so necessarily. "The real world has its limits; the imaginary world is infinite." 21 Once the soul is activated a tension is set up between its freedom, most particularly its freedom to imagine, and the finitude of the "real world". This tension is felt most acutely as insatiable desire, since it is in the nature of the passions, driven as they are by
imagination, that human power will not be able to satisfy them.

The Primary Passion: Amour-Propre and the Desire for Mastery.

Of the passions one stands out; amour-propre, passionate self love, "the first and most natural" of them which is to be distinguished from amour de soi-meme, the natural love of self:

Amour-propre is a purely relative and factitious feeling, which arises in the state of society, leads each individual to make more of himself than of any other, causes all the mutual damage men inflict on one another, and is the real source of the 'sense of honour'. This being understood, I maintain that, in our primitive condition, in the true state of nature, amour-propre did not exist; for as each man regarded himself as the sole observer of his actions, the only being in the universe who took any interest in him, and the sole judge of his deserts, no feeling arising from comparisons he could not be led to make could take root in his soul.

Amour-propre is the most natural, and the most social of the passions. In the structure of amour de soi-meme it is possible to distinguish two distinct moments, both of which are involved in the transformation of need into passion. First there is that part of it which may be seen as the "instinct for self preservation", the bridge between a felt need and action. It is that which unifies the self
sufficiently for it to survive: "Since each man is specially entrusted with his own preservation, the first and most important of his cares is and ought to be to watch over it constantly. And how could he watch over it if he did not take the greatest interest in it?" This self-preservative function is distorted by the corruption of need, so that men consume what is bad for them, a theme Rousseau often returns to.

Even more serious, though, is the fate of the second component of amour de soi-meme. In the famous footnote to the Second Discourse, quoted above, Rousseau establishes an immediate relation to self, of observation, interest, and judgement. This might be called a naive self-satisfaction. The primitive man is held to be unaware of the existence of others like himself, and certainly incapable of distinguishing between them. He does, however, compare himself to the animals he encounters, and finds himself superior. "Thus, the first time he looked into himself, he felt the first emotion of pride; and at a time when he scarce knew how to distinguish the different orders of beings, by looking on his own species as of the highest order, he prepared the way for assuming pre-eminence as an individual."
With the development of the social order the primitive unity of amour de soi is disrupted. It is no longer possible to regard oneself as one's sole observer and judge. Others are seen and compared, and this leads to competition, to the desire to recover the pre-eminence of original self-love, which, as Emile makes clear, we all experience as children. "This sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands others to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible." The logic of amour-propre leads to a struggle for mastery, which seeks not merely obedience and servitude, but adoration. No power can be sufficient. This is the origin and motor of the process of increasing inequality traced in the discourse, the outcome of which is despotism, the maximum concentration of power.

Savage man, when he has dined, is at peace with all nature, and the friend of his fellow creatures. ... The case is quite different with man in the state of society, for whom first necessaries have to be provided, and then superfluities; delicacies follow next, then immense wealth, then subjects, then slaves. He enjoys not a moments relaxation; and what is yet stranger, the less natural and pressing his wants, the more headstrong are his passions, and, still worse, the more he has it in his power to gratify them; so that after a long course of prosperity, after having swallowed up treasures and ruined multitudes, the hero ends up by cutting every throat till he finds himself, at last, sole master of the world. Such is in miniature the moral picture, if not of human life, at least of the secret pretensions of the heart of civilised man.
The primitive nature of passion as the imaginative extension of need into desire is now compounded by a dynamic of competition. As people come to associate together, abandoning the isolation of the state of nature, comparisons become possible, "Each one began to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a value came to be placed on public esteem." This is a necessary consequence of the interaction of the self love of social individuals. Each demands that others esteem him as he does himself. There is a drive to despotism that seeks to recreate in the social setting the closed and contented economy of natural amour de soi. In the above passage Rousseau traces out the effects of this on more conventionally desiring passions. It is necessary to own and to enjoy all that there is, given that for the socialised individual possessions are an extension of the self.

It now became the interest of men to appear what they really were not. To be and to seem became two totally different things; and from this distinction sprang insolent pomp and cheating trickery, with all the numerous vices that go in their train. On the other hand, free and independent as men were before, they were now, in consequence of a multiplicity of new wants, brought into subjection, as it were, to all nature, and particularly to one another; and each became in some degree a slave even in becoming the master of other men.
Thus as men come in their association to develop both their mutual interdependence and the mental apparatus with which to grasp it, two interconnected psychic processes take place. On the one hand the self, with its primal preference for its own interest undisturbed, sees that as one among many it must subordinate the rest to itself if it is to enjoy the mastery that is its original state; secondly it comes to realise that this aim cannot be openly stated and pursued, since no other will accept this subordination without a struggle. From the beginning of the division of labour it is postulated that each joins in their own interest. Thus each new development has to appear at least as if it is in the common interest.

From this follows a bifurcation of the self. It becomes necessary to adopt a public persona at variance with the private one, and formed by the demands of public acceptance. These two become at once absolutely different and completely intertwined, since the private egoism, more and more drained of content by the public, is the only reason for the existence of the latter. This reaches its outcome in the modern metropolitan man who adopts and casts off roles in pursuit of a success which the affectless shell that is thus formed cannot enjoy. In becoming
more and more competitively self seeking the self becomes less and less substantial: "The man of the world is whole in his mask. Almost never being in himself, he is always alien and ill at ease when forced to go back there. What he is, is nothing; what he appears is everything for him." 31

Amour-propre is thus condemned to agonising failure for a series of reasons: first the general one that the infinite desire of imaginative passion is incapable of fulfilment in the finite world, no matter what is achieved, more can be dreamt of; secondly, it is the drive to subordinate others to the self, which all are feeling, this mutual struggle defeats all; finally, in the struggle the self is changed, and divided into an inner self, which must disguise its nature, its desire for mastery, and a "mask" of benevolent interest in others. Hence even if mastery is achieved it is that of the mask, which the inner self is at a distance from. To this dilemma Rousseau announces a solution, the denaturing that creates the citizen.

Denaturing: man and citizen.

In the social order self love becomes amour-propre and the happy isolation of the natural state is
replaced by the agony of the struggle for mastery. There is a contradiction between natural individuality and the social state. Thus: "Forced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same time." From this it follows that:

Good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of a unity and no longer feels except within the whole.

The impossible desire for mastery that characterises amour propre is to be defused by the creation of the republic as an artificial individual. Each citizen will participate in the mastery of the state and thus be spared the struggle to overcome all others in the arena of civil society. If each freely surrenders his rights to the sovereign state and receives in return freedom from domination except by the state then the war of all against all can be brought to an end.

Rousseau's political writings are dedicated to outlining the character of such institutions and exploring their possibility. There are two essential conditions that must be fulfilled if this creation of the citizen is to succeed: a national consciousness
must be created that leads to the identification of the self with the Republic: "Every true republican has drunk in love of country .. along with his mother's milk. This love is his whole existence .. when he is solitary he is nothing." This passion is not only fierce but exclusive, a true nation will give the souls of its citizens, "a national physiognomy which will distinguish them from other peoples, which will prevent them from mixing, from feeling at ease with those peoples, from allying themselves with them."35

Secondly this passionate unity, which by identifying its citizens with their nation allows them to feel a unity of purpose is to be expressed in the rule of law. This is the subject of the Social Contract, which cannot be fully understood without grasping the importance of patriotism as the affective ground of the general will. Rousseau sets out the way that the nation, created by the great legislator, Moses, Lycurgus, Numa, or Solon, governs itself. The key to this being "the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community."36

The community, bound passionately by patriotism and rationally by the contract acquires a general will,
which expresses the common interest of the nation. The acts of this will are laws, equally binding on all citizens. The nature of law demands that it have the form of abstract universality and hence the creation of the institution of "government" to enact particular decisions under the law. This latter necessity undermines republican institutions in such a way that all political entities, no matter how well constituted, are doomed to decay.

This fatality in the nature of the state is spelt out in the often neglected Book III of the Social Contract which deals with the problem of government. The necessity of executive acts mean that the government must be separated from the sovereign, whose nature forbids particularity in its decisions. This requires a new body that will, "serve as a means of communication between the State and the Sovereign, and do for the collective person more or less what the union of soul and body does for man."37 The distinction of State and Sovereign refers back to the chapter on the social contract in Book II where it is stated that the Republic, the public person created by the contract is called the "State when passive, Sovereign when active,"38 which recalls the dual nature of the single person set out above, which will receive greater attention below.
The duality of active will and passive body is replicated within the corporate person of the state and leads to the necessity of government as the agency that will mediate between them. This in turn leads to the decline and destruction of the legitimate political order of the contract. Chapters 10 and 11 of Book III are entitled, 'The Abuse of Government and Its Tendency to Degenerate', and 'The Death of the Body Politic'. Rousseau argues that the concentration of will in the executive or "prince" creates a powerful particular will which exerts itself against the general will of the sovereign. "[S]ooner or later the prince must inevitably suppress the Sovereign and break the social treaty. This is the unavoidable and inherent defect which, from the very birth of the body politic, tends ceaselessly to destroy it, as age and death end by destroying the human body." 39

While this is inevitable it is possible to prolong the life of a republic by the creation of the best possible institutions. However all states die as a result of this inbuilt tendency, inherent in the very nature of the political entity.

In the modern world, however, this problem does not arise. Modern Europe is inhabited by "these men of
our days" the bourgeois, who are neither men, nor citizens. The most fundamental cause for the bourgeois malaise is Christianity, which by stressing the universal humanity has rendered impossible the particular loyalties of the patriotic citizen. As the tutor proclaims to Emile after their travels through Europe, "One aspires in vain to to liberty under the safeguard of the laws. Laws! Where are there laws and where are they respected? Everywhere you have seen only individual interest and men's passions reigning under this name."

These bourgeois are entirely in the grip of amour-propre. The modern world is inhabited by men who are neither naturally independent, nor politically subsumed, but caught in the trap of the struggle for mastery.

From these contradictions is born the one we constantly experience within ourselves. Swept along in contrary directions by nature and by men, forced to divide ourselves between these different impulses, we follow a composite impulse which leads us neither to one goal nor the other.

Thus the modern man is doubly compound. The soul's infinity presses against the limits of the real, while the universalism of the social and the particularism of the individual cannot be brought to rest at either pole. This double contradiction is
felt above all in the ceaseless and impossible striving for "mastery of the world". In Emile Rousseau seeks a way out of this painful situation through the education of a modern natural man.

Masters acutely observes that this disability of the bourgeois is mirrored by the natural man, whose education is the subject of the next section. His amour propre is extended and educated to create a universal human sympathy. This makes it impossible for him to participate in a political unity like the Republic of the Social Contract, since that rests on a fierce and exclusive attachment, but avoids the difficulties that follow from the competitive self love of the bourgeois. Moreover this escape is available to an individual while the political solution is possible only collectively. Emile represents the best chance for the modern European.43

Recreating Integrity: Compassion and The Education of Conscience.

Since politics is impossible in modern bourgeois Europe Rousseau sets out an alternative way to achieve his end. As argued at the beginning of this chapter this is to promote happiness, primarily by minimising pain. The central source of this pain is
the insatiable desire of passionate man, and above all the desire for mastery generated by amour propre. Amour propre is to be managed in such a way that it no longer leads along this path. The key to this is the understanding that its problem is its dependence on others. If some way could be found to satisfy amour propre without relying on the opinion of others, socialized man could recover a large part of the independence of natural man.

The way that this is to be attempted is through the education of conscience. In the Second Discourse Rousseau identifies "two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death." These are the amour de soi which is transformed into amour propre and the compassion which is to balance it.

The problem of conscience is another deeply controversial one in the literature. Again the best summary of recent debates is to be found in Horowitz, although this is marred by the author's own somewhat eccentric Freudian (or Marcusean) reading. In general it can be said that there is a
neglect of the problem of conscience, and a
downplaying of its importance in the politically
oriented interpretations, while the readings which
give more weight to the psychology and to religious
belief\textsuperscript{46} give this problem a central position.

The education of Emile is to make him free of
dependence, and above all dependence on the opinions
of others. "[T]he eternal laws of nature and order do
exist. For the wise man they take the place of
positive law. They are written in the depth of his
heart by conscience and reason. It is to these that
he ought to enslave himself in order to be free."\textsuperscript{47}
This statement, put by Rousseau into the mouth of the
tutor at the closing stage of Emile's education,
summarises its purpose. Since positive, political law
is impossible in modern Europe, its place is to be
taken by inner morality. The integrity of the natural
man is to be replicated in the good conscience of his
civilised counterpart. This is a preservation and
enhancement of mere natural goodness, which is to
become virtue.

In Book IV of \emph{Emile} Rousseau gives two distinct and
complementary versions of his teaching on conscience.
First, in his own voice he sets out the way in which
imagination, compassion, and amour-propre are to be
manipulated to make Emile conscientious. Second, the Savoyard Vicar sets out the way in which the conscience is "natural" to the soul, as instinct is to the body. A consequence of this to which the Vicar gives great prominence, is that, just as instinct would retain its purity if the body were not joined to the soul, conscience would be unchallenged if the soul could free itself from the body.

There is a significant difference, although not necessarily a contradiction between the two derivations of conscience. Emile's tutor aims to create a self-satisfaction founded on a conviction of the superiority enjoyed by he who is independent. The Vicar teaches that conscience is natural to the soul and lost touch with due to the passions, "the voice of the body". In one case conscience, the inner voice, is the voice of an assured superiority, in the other it is simply the voice of soul. As argued in the introduction the position of the Vicar is the basis for the practice of the tutor.

The conscientious man is free from reliance on the opinion of others and judges his own worth, as did the man in the state of nature. This makes him integral and self-sufficient and allows a happiness secure from all outside influence. It is this
happiness that provides the ground of Rousseau's argument. he does not. as Kant would later, make the principle of morality one of duty. For Rousseau right action is based on a realisation that it and only it can make one happy. If the strongest desire is to act according to the dictate of conscience then power will always be adequate. Given the belief that the acquisitive actions of the bourgeois are driven by amour-propre, the passion for mastery, the replacement of the respect of others by self-respect, which is the essence of conscience, is liberating.

This is to be achieved by teaching Emile to feel so superior to the men that he encounters that he may "pity them and not want to resemble them." This cannot be achieved by direct communication of the truths set out in the writings of Rousseau, the young would not be capable of understanding them, and by the time they did it would be too late, corruption would be irreversible. Hence this pivotal moment in Emile's education must, like others before and after it take the form of deception and manipulation.

In the course of his outline of the way in which this may be achieved Rousseau writes that:

It is man's weakness which makes him sociable; it is our common miseries which turn our hearts to humanity; ... A truly happy being us a solitary
being. God alone enjoys absolute happiness. ... 

[Our common needs unite us by interest, our common miseries unite us by affection.50

It will be shown below that one weakness above all is responsible for sociability, and is the precondition for the birth of the amour propre which is here to be manipulated, this being the need for a sexual partner. In the meantime it is important to note that the compassion that is to lead to conscience is to become an "affection" founded on psychic independence.

It is noticeable that the "natural" derivation of this independence largely avoids the use of the term conscience, which figures prominently both in the 'Profession of Faith' and in the confessional texts, as well as La Nouvelle Héloïse. This reinforces the view adopted here that it is to be thought of as subordinate to its philosophical comprehension in the Vicar's lengthy statement, from which it nevertheless maintains a certain independence.

Emile's education in compassion begins by exposing him to the suffering of others: "If the first sight that strikes him is an object of sadness, the first return to himself is a sentiment of pleasure."51

Because pity is felt only for those seen to be "more
pitiable" than ourselves the return from the imaginative projection of pity is to a situation rendered more attractive. The key to the moral significance of pity is that by pitying others Emile learns to be satisfied with himself.

This theme in Emile recalls other texts, most notably the Second Discourse, which accord pity a crucial position as the natural basis of morality. The classic discussion of the "economy of pity", and one to which the present study is much indebted is in Derrida's Of Grammatology. There Derrida marks the centrality of imagination in Rousseau's account of pity, linking it to freedom and perfectibility, and further traces the connections between this theme and that of sexual difference, stressing the importance of maternity. Derrida does not, however, accord sufficient importance to the excessive and uncontainable moment of freedom in Rousseau, and indeed reverses the hierarchy of concepts suggested here. For Derrida imagination is given priority as the "condition of .. liberty."

The first stage in Emile's education is to expose him, when he first becomes interested in the world beyond his immediate environment, to scenes of poverty and want. Provided this is done carefully and
moderately it will lead to a self-satisfaction that expresses itself in benevolent concern about those less fortunate. 57

The next stage is the study of history 58 which aims to show that the rich and successful are no less miserable than the poor. They are driven by inflamed amour propre into a restless and insatiable quest for glory, which can end only in failure. History is the chosen medium for this lesson because the careers of these men are both finished and disclosed. This allows the tutor to show Emile the dissatisfaction behind the public show. The pity Emile feels for the great is based on his own self-satisfaction, which he contrasts with their other-directed search for completion through the domination of others.

Nurtured in the most absolute liberty, he conceives of no ill greater than servitude. He pities these miserable kings, slaves to all who obey them. ... He would pity even the enemy who would do him harm. He would say to himself. 'In giving himself the need to hurt me, this man has made his fate dependent on mine.' 59

This independence of the opinions of others is the core of Emile's moral education, from which Rousseau excludes religion. He believes that children are not ready to understand the import of religious teaching and that they will of necessity distort them. "The great evil of the deformed images of the divinity
which are drawn in the minds of children is that they
remain there all their lives". Now that Emile's
moral character has been formed it is possible to
introduce the philosophical religion that grounds it.
This is accomplished in the 'Profession of Faith of
the Savoyard Vicar'.

The status of this text has been a matter of some
dispute, since many interpretations of Rousseau.
basing themselves on the political critique of
Christianity in the Social Contract, see him as being
an opponent of religion. This accords with a general
tendency to concentrate exclusively on the political
dimension of Rousseau's thought. It is argued here
that Rousseau sees the republican denaturing of man
as impossible in modern Europe and that the nurturing
of individual conscience is offered as an
alternative. What is more it is argued that the
religious philosophy of the Vicar is the necessary
ground of this possibility. The arguments in favour
of an identity between Rousseau's views and those of
the Vicar are admirably summarised in Masters and
developed at greater length by Hendel.

The core of the philosophy of the Vicar consists
first in the affirmation that there is a Being
responsible for the creation and ordering of the
universe, to which must be attributed intelligence, power, and will and which is to be called God and about which further speculation is useless. 64

Secondly it embraces an anthropology:

In meditating on the nature of man, I believed I discovered in it two distinct principles: one of which raised him to the study of eternal truths, to the love of justice and moral beauty ... while the other took him basely into himself, subjected him to the empire of the senses and to the passions which are their ministers ... I said to myself, "No, man is not one. I want and I do not want; I sense myself enslaved and free at the same time." 65

Having introduced this dualism of the human being the Vicar discusses the views of the materialists:

[They are] deaf to the inner voice crying out to them ... Something in you seeks to break the bonds constraining it. Space is not your measure; the whole universe is not big enough for you. Your sentiments, your desires, your uneasiness, even your pride have another principle than this narrow body in which you sense yourself enchained. 66

The Vicar offers as proof of this duality the sense of one's freedom: "No material being is active by itself, and I am. One may very well argue with me about this; but I sense it, and this sentiment is stronger than the reason combatting it ... [M]y will is independent of my senses." 67

Later he makes clear that all evil and suffering are to be ascribed to this dual nature of the human
being: "[W]hen .. delivered from the the illusions given us by the body and the senses ... then the voice of conscience will regain its strength .. the pure delight of satisfaction with oneself" 

This account has two moments to which attention must be drawn here: the contrast between the expanding and uncontainable nature of the soul and the limits imposed on it by the body; and the way in which, when free of these limits the soul can listen to the voice of the conscience and thus achieve the "pure delight of satisfaction with oneself".

Conscience is the voice of the soul; the passions are the voice of the body. Is it surprising that these two languages are often contradictory? And then which should be listened to? Too often reason deceives us ... But conscience never deceives; it is man's true guide. It is to the soul what instinct is to the body.

It might seem that this account of conscience as the "voice of the soul" conflicts with the morality of self-satisfaction. However it is more reasonable to see each as the condition of the other. The "natural man in the state of society" is taught to be independent of the opinions of others, but the moral core of his self-judgement is provided by conscience. Compassion itself, which provides the ground for Emile's moral education depends on the working of imagination, which is a faculty of freedom.
Emile's One Passion: Sex and Sociality.

Emile has been taught to rely on his own judgement instead of that of others for self-satisfaction. This might seem to make him absolutely independent. However there is one natural need that involves him with others and which even Emile continues to feel. This is the sexual urge. Moralised as love this is to be Emile's one passion. Speaking to his tutor shortly before his marriage to Sophie he says:

If I were without passions, I would, in my condition as a man, be independent like God himself; for I would want only what is and therefore would never have to struggle against destiny. At least I have no more than one chain. It is the only one I shall ever bear, and I can glory in it. Come, then, give me Sophie, and I am free.

Emile's unification with Sophie at the end of Book V is the end of a long detour begun at the beginning of Book IV, which this exposition has suppressed. It was the onset of sexual desire at puberty that introduced Emile to the social passion of amour propre, and the education of this passion into independence was always predicated on this. His sexuality was what made him social, and the finding of a wife for him is the core of the second half of the book.
CHAPTER TWO: SEX AND SOCIALITY.

The second chapter of this thesis argues that sexuality and maternity are the core of sociality and develops the implications of this. In particular it covers the sharp distinction made by Rousseau between the morality of conscience and independence, outlined in chapter one, and feminine ethics. Women are held by Rousseau to be properly dependent on men. For them the opinions of others must be a prime consideration. This he traces to the necessity of ensuring the identity of fathers.

There is another dimension to this. In the state of nature both sexes experience the sexual need, and one must see puberty as having the same implications for girls as those for boys. The outcome of sexual activity is, though, very different in the two cases. Pregnancy and maternity make it much more serious for women, and in this one should identify one of the origins of the social order in Rousseau. It is possible to see him as claiming that women are naturally social. This is a deeper meaning of his double ethical standard.
What is more this doubling allows him to make marriage a mediating institution, that goes some way towards closing the gap between individuality and sociality. At the end of Emile, as outlined at the close of Section One, Emile's education is completed with the birth of his first child. In this marriage there is a complex interplay between the sexes of domination and influence. Rousseau establishes a mutual interdependence of the sexes that allows each to be one half of a unity that brings the poles of the social and the individual into harmony.

The tensions, between soul and body and between individuality and social life, dealt with in Section One are masculine. Femininity is conceived of quite differently by Rousseau. Women are defined in his thought by maternity, which he sees as making them "naturally" social, and loving, and as imposing an entirely different ethic upon them. Where men are to obey the voice of conscience, which speaks from the soul, disdains the opinions of others, and must put aside the body and its passions, women are to obey the dictates of opinion and of men...

From .. habitual constraint comes a docility that women need all their lives, since they never cease to be subjected either to a man or to the judgements of men and they are never permitted to put themselves above these judgements.
The key here is the joining of the two sexes into the unity of the marriage while accentuating the differences between them. In this way the poles of the oppositions can be mediated by marriage while held apart by sexual difference. The basic unit of society becomes the family. The nature of marriage, the differences between the sexes, and the ill effects of the erosion of this difference are treated in a large number of texts with slightly different emphases. There is the myth of origins in the Second Discourse; the sketch of the ideal preparation for and beginning of adult married life in *Emile*; the description of the household of the Wolmars in *La Nouvelle Heloise*; the dissection of the problems of contemporary metropolitan life there and in the 'Letter to d'Alembert'.

From these emerge the following conclusions: first that the homogenisation of the sexes leads to a decline in morality that threatens the very existence of society; second that the difference between the sexes has a natural basis in maternity but must be carefully cultivated; third that femininity is the bearer of sociality in its passive and emotive dimension, while autonomy and individuality are the preserve of men.
CHAPTER TWO

This division can only be effective if the means of mediation is. Here Rousseau invokes the force of habit. The family has this habitual attachment as its core and ontogenetic origin as is spelt out in the Second Discourse, but there is also the force of virtue and duty. The family is the most fundamental institution of society for reasons already explained and the "instinct for recognition of the good" that is conscience reinforces the habitual attachment whose origin in self love is set out in Emile.

In the case of women there is a third force, and they carry most of the burden of this preservation. This third force is public opinion. For men the legitimate notion of honour is an autonomous one resting on conscience but women, for reasons again derived from maternity, must also conform to the judgements of others. Thus a notion of honour detached from, or at least added to, that of conscience expresses the social character of femininity, and as sexual honour which is its chief component, is the key to the stability of the family, since it allows the attachments of paternity.

All of this is possible only through marriage. Men and women can become the very different beings they should be only if they are joined to form a new
whole. The ethical and moral principles have been polarised along lines of sex and then joined by conjugal love. The two poles of this relation can then complete one another in their complementarity.

There has been much work, most of it feminist, on Rousseau's doctrine of sexual difference in the last fifteen years, and the present study is indebted to this research. Susan Okin's book on Women in Western Political Thought has been especially influential as an early entrant to this field, and Carole Pateman's Sexual Contract is another important contribution. There is an emergent consensus around the view, put forward by Okin, that Rousseau naturalises women's sociality and hence excludes them from both citizenship and the possibility of Emile's "natural" autonomy. This view has been contested by Joel Schwartz in his influential The Sexual Politics of Rousseau. There he argues that those who see Rousseau as misogynistic fail to see the complementarity of the sexes in his thought and the extent to which this is artificial. Rather than naturalising masculine domination Rousseau is said to argue for the creation of an artificial difference that mediates the natural and the social.
In response it must be said that in his attempts to show the complementarity of the sexes and the complexity of the patterns of authority between them in Rousseau's work, Schwartz ignores the extent to which these are organised in light of a goal of securing certain goods for men, and the naturalisation of this aim. In general this thesis may be said to accept the essentials of the feminist analysis of Rousseau, and to argue that this should be understood in relation to his philosophical anthropology.

Sexuality and the Socialisation of Men.

In the first chapter of this thesis the socialisation of the independent man was assumed rather than explained. In both versions of this process, that from the radical state of nature, and that of the adolescent, the force that drives it is sexuality. This is the need that breaches the independence and self-enclosure of the male.

To follow Rousseau's argument concerning the character of sexual relations in the state of nature one must first recall the distinction he makes between passions and needs [besoins]. The latter are the simple demands of the body while the former,
originating in them have been transformed by the action of the understanding and the imagination. "Now savage man, being destitute of every species of enlightenment, can have no passions save those of the latter kind: his desires can never go beyond his physical wants. The only goods he recognises in the universe are food, a female, and sleep: the only evils he fears are pain and hunger."73

The remaining problem for Rousseau to dispose of is the nature of the relations between these creatures. Briefly stated his contention is that they "maintained no kind of intercourse with one another."74 Each was self sufficient and had so little to do with others of his kind that he was hardly aware of their existence.

That this is so is a necessary consequence of Rousseau's conception of man in the state of nature. This man is reduced to the status of an animal, of the body. In the course of this reduction Rousseau distinguishes between "the physical and moral ingredients in the feeling of love" and attributes to man in the state of nature only the physical part which is "that general desire that urges the sexes to union with each other."75
The sexual encounters resulting from this desire lead to no more permanent union and the children that result from it are cared for by the mother alone until they are old enough to leave, forget and be forgotten by her. A more settled family unit is the outcome of a process of development whereby the isolated individuals of the state of nature in cooperating with one another developed their latent faculties and became enlightened and industrious. Finally they learn to construct a dwelling place for themselves and "This was the epoch of a first revolution, which established and distinguished families, and introduced a kind of property." Despite first appearances the state of nature does contain the potentiality for the development of society, and this potentiality inheres in the difference between the sexes. There are just two moments in the radical state of nature where the absolute self-sufficiency of amour de soi breaks down, these are sexual desire and infancy. In each case it is need for a woman that makes the breach.
Habit, Sexuality, and the Family.

Return to the second Discourse and look more closely at the origin of the family as set out in that work. There the "unromantic" nature of the family is given less prominence than it is in the 'Essay on the Origins of Language'. Conjugal love is mentioned as one of the expansions of the heart consequent on the new way of life inaugurated by the hut building. What is crucial is the way in which the family emerges. The "habit of living together" produces the feelings that form the basis of the family, but what accounts for the habit?

Rousseau does not spell this out but in the radical state of nature there are some clues, and the conclusion they lead to will be supported by evidence from elsewhere. In the state of nature it is need for a woman which causes the only temporary associations, and when, in this context Rousseau distinguishes the physical and moral in the feeling of love he adds; "It is easy to see that the moral part of love is a factitious feeling, born of social usage and, and enhanced by the women with much care and cleverness, to establish their empire, and put in power the sex that ought to obey."
Although the immediate cause of the development of the family and the consequent "expansions of the human heart" is the building of the huts, there are deeper roots of this new sociality in the preceding stage. Femininity is social in itself.

Sexuality first. In the First Part Rousseau recognises that his pursuit of the absolute limit means that the family must be excluded as artificial. The natural man lives without even this intimate and apparently natural society. Sexual union must be thought as fleeting and accidental, the result of the momentary pressure of an unmodified bodily need. This need is specifically separated from any passion or emotion and made an entirely general and non-personal matter. Any member of the other sex will meet the requirements of the primitive human being.

The male thus avoids any involvement in the reproductive process beyond the act of sexual intercourse and the integrity of his self-enclosure is nearly maintained. For the female the matter cannot be quite so simple, and it is in maternity that the first real breach in isolation occurs. The mother is thought of as standing in a relation of mutual dependence with her offspring, as she must if it is to survive. Not only does it need her
protection and nourishment but she must be given some motivation for providing it. A maternal instinct or need is posited that will be the core of the first human societies. The identification of femininity and sociality will be a central theme in this reading of Rousseau. Love it must be noted is an essentially feminine phenomenon.

This feminine principle can only operate on the basis of advances in the labour process. Under the influence of new difficulties the human beings begin to discover the advantages of cooperation and from this develop new techniques and abilities. The first great technological development is the artificial shelter and from this follows a new and settled way of life. The change from a wandering to a fixed way of life in turn allows the operation of the feminine social principle. Men and women, specifically fathers and mothers, share a hut and this promotes the "first revolution in the human heart", the creation of the feelings of conjugal and paternal love.

There is some slight ambiguity in Rousseau's work at this point. The Second Discourse is the only text where Rousseau goes to the limit of the radical state of nature. A number of other writings, especially the 'Essay on the Origins of Language' take up the story.
The fundamentals are common however. The first families are the product not of passion and desire but of habit. In the context of the story so far this is clear. If these feelings are artificial they cannot be present at the origin of the society of which they are a product.

This first family is thus a closed unit, founded on habit and bound together in stable and peaceful coexistence by a love that is the product and not the cause of the ties between its members. This remains the picture of the family that Rousseau presents in all his subsequent writings, with the difference that a new kind of emotion, brought into being by the further development of this new mode of life will intervene between one family and that formed by the succeeding generation.

The "age of huts" that follows from this first revolution is characterised by the independence and self-sufficiency of the family units. "Every family became a little society" 79 From remarks later in the Discourse it appears that these families are to be thought of as subsisting by hunting and gathering with the men going into the forest while the women stayed with the hut and children. This simple life required and involved no contact between families and
in the Essay Rousseau suggests that;

There were marriages but there was no love at all... Each family was self-sufficient and perpetuated itself by inbreeding. Children of the same parents grew up together...; natural inclination sufficed to unite them. Instinct held the place of passion; habit held the place of preference.81

Thus these first families, although they caused "The first expansions of the human heart", the habit of living together giving rise to "the finest feelings known to humanity, conjugal love and paternal affection", did not arise from or generate romantic love. The next stage in the story, found in both the Discourse and the Essay is the birth of this passion.

This "age of huts" is most properly thought of as the last phase of the state of nature and not as part of the state of society, as is made particularly clear in the 'Essay on the Origins of Language'. At this point amour propre and the passions are yet to be born, instead we have small units, bound by ties of habitual and gentle affection. The family of the age of huts is the archetype for an ideal family which forms a society so intimate that it can properly be thought of as private, as of a fundamentally different nature from the public space where amour propre is necessary.
Maternity, the Sociality of Women, and Feminine Ethics.

In the state of nature there is one small society that forms the nucleus of the proto-society of the age of huts, that of the mother and child. Rousseau makes it quite clear that we are regard the new loves of the first revolution as a female stratagem intended to bind the father to this unit. A form of maternal love is introduced in the account of "natural" childcare and it is this that forms the germ of all the subsequent social development. The socio-cultural development has as its ultimate ground maternity. This may seem a large claim to make on such thin evidence so the next stage is to establish that Rousseau explicitly and consistently has two ethical codes, for men and for women, and that the key to this difference is that men are autonomous and independent and women social by nature.

Although never spelt out it can be argued that in women the route of derivation of the passions from amour de soi passes through maternal feelings rather than amour propre. The key to Rousseau's ethics for women is that the opinion of others is and should be the governing principle of their actions. This is not, however, as it would be for masculine amour
propre, in order to regain a mediated satisfaction with themselves, but rather in order that doubt should not be felt as to the paternity of their children. Paternity is the cement of the family.

The fullest and most explicit discussion of Rousseau's views on the place of women and the proper rules of their conduct comes at the beginning of Book V of *Emile*, in the passage 'Sophie, or the Woman'. Here Rousseau sets out the ends and means of the creation of Sophie, the woman who is to complete *Emile*.

After having tried to form the natural man, let us also see how the woman who suits him ought to be formed. She is the female counterpart of the "natural man in the state of society". She is to be, from the first considered in her relation to man: "In the union of the sexes each contributes equally to the common aim, but not in the same way. ... One ought to be active and strong, the other passive and weak ... it follows that woman is made specially to please man."

Where man was in the beginning independent and became related to woman only with puberty, she is defined by that relation, and by its consequence for her in
maternity:

There is no parity between the two sexes in regard to the consequences of sex. The male is male only at certain moments. The female is female her whole life, or at least during her whole youth. Everything constantly recalls her sex to her; and to fulfil its functions well she needs care during her pregnancy; she needs rest at the time of childbirth; she needs a soft and sedentary life to suckle her children; ... She serves as the link between them and their father; she alone makes him love them and gives him the confidence to call them his own.85

This recalls the socialisation of men from the state of nature. The man is attached to the primary unit of mother and child by links of affection fostered by the woman in order to provide the care set out in this passage. What Rousseau now emphasises is that paternity is guaranteed only by the strict sexual fidelity of mothers. The control of sexuality is the key to his feminine ethics. The unfaithful woman "dissolves the family and breaks all the bonds of nature. In giving the man children who are not his she betrays both."86. Not only must she actually be faithful, but, in order for the conviction of paternity to be strong, her husband must believe that she is.

It is important, then, not only that a woman be faithful, but that she is judged to be faithful by her husband, by those near her, by everyone. It is important that she be modest, attentive, reserved, and that she give evidence of her virtue to the eyes of others as well as to her own conscience. ... To maintain vaguely that the two sexes are equal and that their duties are the same is to
From all these considerations it follows that:
"Opinion is the grave of virtue among men and its throne among women."88

If this doubling of ethics is compared to the analysis of masculine morality in Chapter One what emerges is that in the private morality of Emile Rousseau has duplicated some of the key factors in the primary distinction he made between "man and citizen". The natural man is wholly independent, while the citizen is given up to the social. If Emile is to react to the dilemma of the bourgeois exclusion of the political possibility by replicating in the social the independence of the natural, Sophie is to complement this by a private version of the social bond. Feminine dependence on opinion is the expression of a female sociality, which is rooted in maternity.

Men, brought into the social by their sexual desires and held in a social unit by paternity and the habit of conjugal love, are thus socialised by femininity. This allows them to be both social and independent. This is further facilitated by the way in which
CHAPTER TWO

women, while dependent on men are to govern them. In this way masculine independence can be domesticated.

In this new entity created by the unity of the sexes, men are to have the authority, as they must if the moral autonomy at the heart of Emile's education is to be preserved. But women are also to play their part. Love is described in the Second Discourse as a feminine invention designed to secure dominance over men. In Emile he makes clear that this is to continue to operate in his naturalised modern marriage.

"Woman, who is weak ..., estimates and judges the forces she can put to work to make up for her weakness, and those forces are men's passions. ... She must have the art to make us want to do everything ... necessary or agreeable to her."89

The art that allows this is "guile", the ability to manipulate men's passions, through the superior understanding of the heart and of the way to guide it. "Guile is a natural talent with the fair sex,"90 which should be developed by them. "She must .. make a profound study of the mind of man .. learn to penetrate their sentiments .. know how to communicate to them .. the sentiments she wishes .. without appearing even to dream of it."91 "It is by means of
this superiority in talent that she keeps herself his equal and that she governs him while obeying him."92

A new moral being is created through this dialectic of obedience and government.

The social relationship between the sexes ... produces a moral person, of which the woman is the eye and the man is the arm, but they have such a dependence on one another that the woman learns from the man what must be done and the woman learns from the man what must be done. ... Each follows the prompting of the other; each obeys and both are masters.93

The Two Loves.

This section is concerned with the further complications that arise with romantic love, which represents nothing less than the repetition at a new and higher level of the dialectic that the mediation of sex and marriage seemed to have brought to a close. This theme is excellently treated in Schwartz' book on The Sexual Politics of Rousseau, which however suffers from two major defects. First it ignores problem of freedom, although it gives much prominence to that of the imagination, and secondly, in its concern to defend Rousseau from feminist attack it ignores the extent to which women are subordinated to men by its subject.
Conjugal love was the habitual attachment to a regular sexual partner, it was a consequence and not a cause of the cohabitation of the man and woman of the age of huts. The next important development is the creation of a new kind of love in which the imagination plays the crucial role. This may be called romantic love. Here the definitive characteristic is an over-valuation of the object of desire preceding sexual union.

It should be stressed that this creation of an ideal object which is superimposed on the real is, to a greater extent than conjugal love, a characteristically male love. Its birth is described both in the origins myth of the Discourse and the Essay and the education myth of Emile. The former describes its creation as a stage in the development of the species, the latter the assumption of it by a subject who is history's heir.

There is a crucial difference in the two cases, which is the difference between the state of nature, the naturally natural, and the state of society in which Rousseau wants to create an artificially natural man. In this latter case romantic love comes before its natural basis. "Nature's instruction is late and slow; men's is almost always premature. In the
former case the senses wake the imagination; in the latter the imagination wake the senses". 94

Amour propre has no place in the intimate society of the age of huts. The birth of romantic love and of this new relation to self take place together, since each is the product of a process of comparison. The families living close together are held to share some resource, such as a water hole, and the young people gathering there in the course of their chores form the first public space.

They are presented with a variety of possible sexual partners and are able to form preferences. This in turn leads to a competitive display of talents in the "fete", in singing and dancing. The self begins both to compare others and to regard the self as an object to be judged by them. Love, amour propre, and art are all born together in this moment.

The relationship between the two forms of love is from the very start a difficult and even a conflictual one. The peaceful and contented life of the age of huts is destroyed by this new passion which is powerful, competitive, and creates attachments outside the family. This pattern is repeated in the case of Emile, which closely
resembles the foregoing. Before puberty he is free from amour propre and dwells entirely within the private world created for him by his tutor. The onset of sexual desire makes it necessary that he go out from here into the "world" and creates amour propre by giving him a new relation to the opinions others have of him.

Again an independent male is brought into society by sexual need for a woman, and again he is bound in the end by his attachment to his partner, in Emile and Sophie's marriage which puts an end the former's wandering and rootless existence, fixing him spatially and morally. The marriage of Emile and Sophie is to reconcile the two forms of love.

Romantic love depends on the creation of illusions about its object. She is held to be unique and incomparable. Indeed she ceases to belong to her sex, becoming the only possible sexual object, the sole source of satisfaction. The problem with this love as a mediator in the way that conjugal love has been seen to be is that these illusions are by their nature fragile and temporary. They cannot survive the intimacy of the married state and a marriage founded on them can only be a member of a series. Unless the habitual conjugal love can replace passion then a new
passion will. This process of replacement is the responsibility, as one would expect, of women.

Conjugal love is feminine as romantic love is masculine. The former is "ethical", at its root is the stability and responsibility at the core of society. If romantic love is the "bait" that draws men into the social field familiar love is the hook that holds them there. The way in which the transition is to managed by women is spelt out by Rousseau, or by Emile's tutor, at the end of that book in his advice to the newly married Sophie. By the exercise of the feminine virtue of "pudeur" or modesty she is to hold Emile at sufficient distance sexually to keep his desire for her and illusions about her for as long as possible. This will hold his attention and allow the habit of affection to grow in order to replace passion when it inevitably passes away. The mediation of the loves is to be modesty, which will allow habit to conquer passion.

The Natural Origin of Romantic Love.

In each case it is romantic love that disrupts a familial scene. Begin with the Discourse. In the state of nature there is no family organisation at all. Each individual is self-sufficient and self-
enclosed. The only contact between these individuals is occasional and fortuitous sexual encounters, in which they respond only to the weak and momentary impulsion of the body's needs. The identity of the sexual partner is a matter of indifference, it is the sex only that matters.

Love and competition are born together in the same moment. In the Discourse the "fete", the communal exhibition of the talents that the competition for approval gives rise to is "the first step towards inequality, and at the same time towards vice. From these first distinctions arose on the one side vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy". In keeping with the general pessimistic tone of the Discourse, which Rousseau would later ascribe to the influence on him of his then friend Diderot, the breaking of the closed family by love is the first step on the social road to ruin, introducing the amour propre responsible for the woes of the human condition.

In the Essay by contrast, although this dark outcome is hinted at the tone is very different. It is the joys of the festival that are given prominence, the singing and dancing are ascribed not to the competitive urge but rather seem to be the outpouring
of the pleasure and desire that the first feeling of love brings with it. Of course this is true, if less directly in the Discourse account but here competition drops out of sight, as it does in the related passage in the 'Letter to d'Alembert' where Rousseau recalls the spontaneous festivities of his Genevan youth.

To sum up, the disruption of the family by romantic love is given a prominent place in Rousseau's myth of the origin of society. The first society of human beings is a closed family, without connection to its neighbours and perpetuating itself through inbreeding. Only later and in consequence of the settled way of life of this family does the comparison necessary to love develop. When it does so, so too does competition and jealousy, the first cause of conflict between human beings. On the other hand this passion also brings with it the development of the first arts and the widening of the social sphere.

This new passion is a modification of sexual desire. Its essence is the fixation of this desire on a single individual to the exclusion of all others, but this is only a first characterisation of it. This fixation comes about through a process of comparison
which results in one individual being elevated above all others. This elevation has far reaching consequences.

The comparative character of love is a two way force. The elevation of the object of love implies the demand to be so elevated by it. Thus there arises the desire to shine in the eyes of others that transforms the relation to self and the relation to others. This new desiring relation implies jealousy and competition and the need for admiration if one is to be content with oneself. A new kind of dependence comes into being in the self regard Rousseau calls amour propre.

Romantic Love in the Education of Emile.

The boy child, protected by his tutor is able to replicate the self absorbed independence of the "savage". At the beginning of Book Four of Emile Rousseau tells us that; "We are so to speak born twice: once to exist and once to live; once for our species and once for our sex." This second birth occurs at puberty and its cause is the onset of sexual desire.
First of all from love derive all other passions; "All his relations with his species, all the affections of his soul are born with this one." In fact the infant has been attached already to those who cared for it, but this is described as an instinctual rather than a passionate attachment. It derives from the habit of feeling pleasure in connection with the presence of those who meet the infant's needs and thus is comparable to familial affection. It derives from the primitive feeling of amour de soi, having no cause to feel the need to attract the attention of others and thus to compete. This new passion, though entails a desire oriented towards a person independent of us whose love must therefore be won.

The second characteristic of Rousseau's account of sexual love is that it is not natural, and that in the ways that one would expect from the account of natural sexuality in the Second Discourse. "Far from arising from nature love is the rule and bridle of nature's inclinations. It is due to love that, except for the beloved object, one sex ceases to be anything for the other." The natural urge to union is controlled by that moral part of love that fixes desire to a specific object. This involves the operation of the imagination, which embellishes the
loved object with all kinds of excellences most of all one presumes as the source of pleasure that no other could provide. This imaginative aspect of the feeling of love is exaggerated in Emile's case by the creation of a love object without the existence of a real object as its referent. Emile is caused to fall in love with a girl he has never met.

Third, and here again the individual repeats the history of the species, competition originates in this particularised desire. "One wants to obtain the preference that one grants. Love must be reciprocal. To be loved, one has to make oneself more lovable than another, more lovable than every other, at least in the eyes of the beloved object. This is the source of the first glances at one's fellows; this is the source of emulation, rivalries and jealousy." 100 From this comes the amour propre which will henceforth be the dominant force in the individual's life.

Here again an initial enclosure in the family circle, untroubled by the passions, by love or by amour propre, is disrupted by a desire that gives rise to the need to compete, to stand out. It is in Book Four that under the impact of adolescence and the need for a companion that Emile is introduced to the society which only now can offer him anything.
Emile is caused to fall in love with a purely imaginary object, rather than project onto a real one. This is effected before his entry into society, which is itself driven by the emergence of the need for a partner at puberty. That he is clearly aware of the instrumentality of his social contacts, in the search for the match of his wife-image, protects him from the force of amour propre. He does not lose himself in the striving for the recognition of the crowd since the one whose recognition is to suffice is already present to his imagination. This has its dangers in that he might lose all contact with reality, a possibility Rousseau spells out in the story of the "girl like Sophie" with her fatal love of Telemachus. In the case of Emile and Sophie this does not happen because they have been prepared for one another.

In this crucial moment Emile's tutor does everything he can to delay the birth of love. This is in order to gain time to work on Emile's compassion in the way outlined above, but also in order to limit the part played by imagination in the origin of love, and the weight of other, less violent passions in Emile's character. Finally this method has the further advantage that it allows the manipulation of Emile's imagination in such a way that he does not project
his ideal on to a real person but has it created for him without reference to anyone. "One must use a great deal of art to prevent social man from being totally artificial."102

Rousseau maintains "that if one waits, .. if one then expounds the laws of nature in all their truth;"103 it is possible to instill along with the first idea of love its moral dimension. This is held, by intensifying the passion to increase the pleasure. Finally the object of this love is described to Emile. In creating an imaginary object the tutor succeeds in preventing attachment to real ones.

It is unimportant whether the object I depict for him is imaginary: it suffices that it make him disgusted with those that could tempt him. ... And what is true love itself if it is not chimera, lie and illusion? We love the image we make for ourselves far more than we love the object to which we apply it.104

Thus far it would appear that Rousseau is an enemy of sexual love, that he admits its inevitability and the necessity of managing it to cause as little harm as possible but that he can see nothing good in it. From the perspective of the natural man this is indeed the case. After all "Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. ... A truly happy being is a solitary being."105 But Emile cannot be such a being, he is a "someone", a man of the state of society and "I
cannot conceive how someone who needs nothing can love anything. I do not conceive how someone who loves nothing can be happy"106

Further Emile's morality is to be reinforced by his love for Sophie. This is because love builds up an image of perfection: "There is no true love without enthusiasm, and no enthusiasm without an object of perfection, real or chimerical, but always existing in the imagination. ... But what is real are the sentiments for the truly beautiful with which love animates us and which it makes us love."107 The passion of love, if correctly guided, plays a vital role as the origin of images of perfection created by the imagination but passionately believed in and desired.

The honour of women is strengthened in turn by their awareness of its effect on men. The knowledge that men will be inspired to honour them and to act accordingly is an important motive in acting so as to be able to have this impact. Sophie is "devoured" by the need to love.108

Turning to Sophie the first point of note is that for Rousseau love defines, and is defined by, women. This is a constant in his work. It appears in the Second
Discourse, in the 'Letter to d'Alembert' and in the section of *Emile* devoted to Sophie. Love, the fixation of desire, and hence society itself are essentially feminine. It is of the nature of femininity to be other-directed. The self-sufficiency of the infant Emile is alien to the infant Sophie. For this reason the experience of love does not make a revolution for women as it does for men.

There is a story told in connection with Sophie that illustrates the dangers of the imaginary in love. A young girl, "just like Sophie", has fallen in love with Telemachus in Fenelon's novel. She finds that no real lover can match her imaginary one and the way is blocked for her to find happiness in marriage.

Passionate love of this kind with its imaginative basis has its pleasures and dangers. It has a relation to time fundamentally different from that of family attachments. Its illusions are dispelled by the duration that nourishes the other's habit. Further as a quest for intensity of experience it validates the exceptional moment over the duration that is the foundation of marriage.

A crucial task is therefore the management of romantic love after marriage to ensure that it lasts
long enough for the formation of the habitual attachment that is to replace it. This is the responsibility of women: "men are generally less constant than women and grow weary of happy love sooner than they do."109 In order that men not grow tired of them before habit has grown they must exercise the art of modesty, which by preventing too great a familiarity to arise maintains the illusions necessary for passionate desire.110

Conclusion.

This chapter and the one before have related Rousseau's anthropological ontology to his teaching on sex and love. It has argued that he begins from the proposition that there are fundamental conflicts in the constitution of men that condemn them to suffering. These centre on the irreconcilability of the infinite nature of the soul, especially as experienced in passionate desire, and the limits of the body. In particular the social state, if it cannot be politicised, leads to the passion of amour-propre, with its desire for a priority that absolutely subordinates other to self. This is the condition of modern bourgeois man.
Woman, however, is different. She does not have the same ontological integrity, is in fact naturally social, by reason of maternity. This means that amour-propre, as the socially distorted form of natural self love, does not have the same force for her. She is the bearer of the natural and non-political social principle. From this follows the ethical principle that places opinion at the centre, in contrast to the masculine equivalent that must exclude it.

In this way the sexes come to represent the two poles of individual autonomy and social cohesion and responsibility. From this it follows that the creation of a new moral entity in marriage, in which these two principles can be mediated by love can represent a resolution of the problems of the human condition. In this way conjugal love, which excludes imagination, can reconcile it with finitude. The problem here is this exclusion. Love itself has a strong imaginary dimension, which acts as a threat to the stability of the family. This problem is to be overcome by the female management of male desire.

The conflicts that arise from the compound nature of man have been twice displaced into the relation between the sexes and made the responsibility of
women. First, sociality has been feminised. Independent men are domesticated by dependent women. Male integrity is guaranteed by their relationship with women who tie them to society in the course of being subordinated to them. When imaginative desire intrudes on this formation women are given the task of managing it in order to defuse its threat. In all this Rousseau makes woman a supplement to man.

These chapters have only sketched these ideas. The next will examine the text where the are given their fullest expression. In *La Nouvelle Heloise* Rousseau explores the complexities of love in great depth, and unifies love in the figure of a woman. This makes this text the richest of all of his writings on this subject, especially since in *Emile*, the other location of an extensive discussion of love, the structure of the pedagogy imposes certain limitations. Emile and Sophie are so extensively manipulated that they do not experience many phenomena crucial to Rousseau's analysis of the modern.
In Chapters One and Two it was shown that a dominant theme in Rousseau's thought was the difficulty of managing masculine freedom, which appeared particularly in the form of amour propre. This passion for mastery was interpreted as the resultant of the action of imagination as the primary faculty of the free soul on the centre of men's existence, primitive self love. Conscience was shown to be a form of free moral self determination that allowed transformed self love to be returned to the independence lost in the struggle for mastery.

In the second chapter it was demonstrated that one form of "dependence" was acknowledged as necessary and indeed as not essentially compromising male integrity. This was the "need for a woman", which as essentially bodily left the self-identity of conscience intact. This "need" which in the state of nature is intermittent and weak can become the habit of conjugal affection without lessening the spiritual independence of men. This allows the mediation of free moral conscience with a social ethic through a "sexual division of labour" in the ethical field.
This mediation is disturbed by the phenomenon of romantic love, which in bringing imagination into the sexual relation disrupts the calm of the familial basis of a social order that can accommodate morally self-determining men. Women are then made responsible, through the teaching on modesty, for the manipulation of masculine desire so that romantic love can be domesticated.

In this movement women have been made responsible for the preservation of a social framework within which masculine freedom may be expressed. Apart from the clear difficulties with the idea of a freedom dependent on a less than free other for its conditions, a dependence involving a manipulation of illusions, this has left unexplored the character of femininity. Woman has been invoked as a "supplement", to borrow a term of Starobinski's taken up by Derrida, but her own being has not been defined. Sophie, for example is explicitly educated with the needs of Emile uppermost. Indeed as was noted in the section on feminine ethics in Chapter One, the essence of femininity, in direct opposition to masculinity must be its other-directedness.

The present chapter turns to the problem of femininity in Rousseau's thought, through his novel
La Nouvelle Héloïse, which is unique in taking a woman as its centre and organising itself around her. This novel has as its themes the nature of love, which is defined here, as elsewhere, as the key to the nature of woman. It will be shown that the structure of masculinity has a correlate here.

Chapters One and Two argued that the soul, through the action of imagination, repeatedly exceeded the bounds set by first the body and then the social. Here it will be shown that where self-love was both, as amour propre, the source of, and as conscience, the solution to, this problem in masculinity, the feminine "need to love" is both the solution (for masculinity) and the problem (for femininity). The first was the conclusion of Chapter Two, femininity as need to love was the supplement necessary for masculine freedom. This will be shown again, from the feminine perspective, by Julie as centre of the community of Clarens, where two men who are otherwise without social ties are bound tightly to this most social of households by their attachment to Julie.

Julie's death is the culmination of a process by which she spiritualises love until it can no longer be contained on earth or in life. Julie's need to love eventually exceeds the possibilities offered by
the finite. Argument is possible here, as it is in the case of conscience, as to whether this is not a return to nature rather than an excess in the direction of spirit. Indeed this has been perhaps the dominant, and even assumed interpretation of Julie in recent years. A Freudian inspired criticism has seen in Julie's death the return of the repressed rather than the excess of the spirit.

This line of argument begins from Julie's affair with her tutor and argues that her mysticism in the last part of the book represents a consolatory illusion which sublimes the repressed sexual energy that the social prohibition of her desire has repressed. What this reading has neglected is the struggle over the definition of their love between the couple at the beginning of the novel. Julie's love has always been soulish rather than sexual and she sees sex as an intrusion. It divides her from herself and has its source outside the core of her being. While her lover's passion has its roots in the body, in sexual desire, hers is an emanation of her essence, of her need to love. The beginning should be read from the standpoint of the end rather than vice-versa.

This is the position adopted by Starobinski in his classic study. "Julie's death, and her profession of
faith, open up a new ideological dimension and indicate a radical departure from the ideal embodied in Clarens, that of a balanced human society. All human order is called into question. " Julie's death is an opening, not a closure, it represents a new beginning, not a defeat at the hands of the law of the father. What it does indicate a failure of is Rousseau's synthesis as presented in Chapter One. The need for love has itself exploded the social order it was to guarantee.

Masculinity cannot rely on the feminine to resolve its problems. Later it will be suggested that in Rousseau there is in the end no hope for the masculine, and that Rousseau's own claim for himself, that he embodies both the masculine and the feminine principles is the only response available to him. Why this response involves the flight from humanity represented by the Reveries will be considered in the last chapter of this thesis. The present chapter will confine itself to setting out, in the context of a reading of La Nouvelle Heloise, the way in which femininity exceeds the social.

This will involve following Julie's story as the development of her need to love, and her struggle to meet it. It will be shown that it proceeds from her
soul and that it partakes of the characteristics of the soul substance, most particularly of its tendency to exceed any limit, and to be incompatible with those imposed both by the body and by the social. It is to be distinguished sharply from the masculine passion experienced by her lover. This distinction is clear from the beginning, as they struggle over the way in which they are to manage the conflict between their love and Julie's position in her family, and it becomes clearer in the different ways in which their loves react to the manipulations of Wolmar. Saint-Preux' love can be made compatible with the order of Clarens, Julie's, despite being, or perhaps because it is, the core of that order, cannot.

The first section of the present chapter examines the course of the affair between the lovers, showing that a struggle over the nature of their love is its dynamic. This allows an analysis of the differences between Julie's love and masculine passionate love. It also involves a discussion of the relation between love and social-familial responsibility for Julie. This is a complex matter, and a fuller account becomes possible in the second section. This covers the "rebirth" of Julie which follows her marriage to Wolmar. Here an extremely complicated tangle of duty, virtue, family love, and religion, allows Julie to
cure herself of the sexuality contracted during her affair and to create a new balance which combines the familiar and the mystical to enable her to meet her need to love at a higher level than previously.

The third section examines the way this structures the life of the Wolmar household at Clarens, and Julie's role in holding this community together. This allows a deeper understanding of the character of the feminine social ethic, in particular of its relation to time. The imperative of Julie at Clarens is duration, the repetition of the present in the future. This is contrasted to both the romantic love that dominated the first part of the book, which emphasises the ecstatic moment, and to the religion that underpins and comes finally to overwhelm the ethical Julie, which presses towards the infinite.

Finally the fourth section of the chapter turns to this, examining the last part of the book in which the collapse of Clarens comes with Julie's willed, or at least welcomed death. The relations of religion, love, and ethical life are examined here and the dynamic of spiritual excess that destroys the synthesis embodied at Clarens spelt out.
La Nouvelle Heloïse begins where Chapter Two ended, with the conflict between romantic love and the order of the family, and the mediation of this conflict by a woman. Here this mediation does not take the form of the manipulation of desire to prolong it, since marriage is closed off. Instead it becomes an attempt to desexualise love to evade the social sanction of illicit liaisons. This is a sacrifice for Julie's lover, but for Julie is a preservation of love from a danger posed to it by consummation. She argues that her involvement in a sexual relationship involves not a change in her mode of loving but an annihilation of herself and the taking on of a shadow existence through her lover. This means that she takes on his definition of love but it is not taken into herself.

This is preceded by a period in which he accepts her idea of love as congruence of souls and at this stage Julie is already expressing love as a need of her soul, a theme that will acquire more prominence later. The emphasis in this section is first on the difference of the two lovers' understandings of what love is, how it relates to social life, and the results of Julie's accepting the terms set by her lover.
This contrast between two forms of love demands consideration of two differences between the lovers. Julie as eminently social while her lover is almost entirely excluded from the social world, and their attitudes to the necessity of social sanction reflect this. On the other hand there is a rhetoric of the soul that also divides them radically. She is "celestial", while he "creeps upon the earth." She insists that their love could only be sullied and demeaned by sex, while he argues that this is a natural part of it. It is tempting to reduce this to the ideological veil for the social, especially when the social for Julie is reducible to love for her father. This is the strategy of Freudian readers.

This ignores the term which unites the two by tracing them back to Julie's need to love, and its feminine nature. For Rousseau femininity functions as the natural ground of social life, acting on men through the transformation of sexual desire. The ground of this function is the need to love, which must, therefore be seen as as natural, and as definitive as self-love is for men. This love is not a passion, as is that of men, and it has a fundamentally different nature from passionate love. It is inclusive rather than exclusive, it is realistic rather than driven by illusion, and it lasts unlike temporary male love.
This section will demonstrate that the loves of these two exemplary individuals exhibit these differences.

This will be achieved first by an analysis of their relationship during the period of their love affair, and then by examining the way in which Saint-Preux' love is manipulated to make it compatible with the order of Clarens. This prepares the way for the analysis of the very different process that "purifies" Julie's love, allowing her transformation into the mistress of Clarens.

The beginning of the affair with a mutual declaration of love is regarded by Julie as the end of her life and the destruction of her honour. It disrupts the peaceful flow of her "industrious simplicity." She is right about its catastrophic implications, but the initial despair is premature. There is a long period in the early stages of their relationship when she is able to impose her conception of honour on her lover and hence to allow the reader a vision of it. Its essence is the idea of a love freed from the body.

After her terror at a love she feels dooms her she finds that its character is such that she is safe, "my too tender heart hath need of love, but my senses have no need of a lover." This statement is a
crucial one. Rousseau excludes reference to passion, and to contrast the need of the heart for love to the need of the "senses" for lover, which as was shown above is the basis for masculine love. Despite his respect for Julie her lover has pressed for them to progress towards the "natural" outcome. In accord with the asocial nature of his sex he is disdainful of all considerations deriving from her position. As he notes she is securely embedded in her community while he is an outsider without roots.

[You are surrounded by people who cherish you and who adore you: the cares of a tender mother, and a father of whom you are the only hope; the friendship of a cousin who seems to breathe only for your sake; a whole family of which you are the ornament; an entire town proud to have seen you born: these all occupy a part of your sensibility; and what is left for love is but a small part compared with what is ravished from you by blood and by friendship. But I, alas! a wanderer without family and almost without country, have no one but you on earth, and love alone must take the place of all.]

It was noted above that he acknowledged that his love was inseparable from sensual desire, now he stresses the extent to which it forms his only connection, the one breach in his isolation. It is clear that his love conforms to the pattern traced in the previous chapter, while hers is of a radically different kind.

He imposes his kind of love on Julie through the violence of his sufferings. At crucial junctures he
threatens suicide to extort from her that she will not cede voluntarily.\textsuperscript{11} She regards the sacrifice of her honour as equivalent to her own destruction, as worse than death,\textsuperscript{12} but is willing to make this sacrifice to preserve his life.\textsuperscript{13} Julie's love is asexual, but the logic of their relationship is such that intimacy becomes inevitable. His desire overcomes her reticence through the combination of his threats and her knowledge, withheld from him, of the impossibility of its legitimation by marriage.

Julie's claim is that the consummation is the result of her compassion for her lover, not of her own desire. Her father's promise to his friend Wolmar has meant that she must "either .. kill my parents, discard my lover, or ruin myself;" Her decision is, by sacrificing her honour effectively to end her life, as she believes: "if I am to live, it is only to be miserable".\textsuperscript{14} This contention, that for her sexual desire is subsequent to love, and that its birth is artificial is one Julie insists upon at all stages, including her reconsideration of their affair after her marriage and return to social virtue.

The effect of the consummation is Julie's destruction as an independent moral entity and subsumption into her lover. He makes this an alternative to social
being: "Why cannot I .. collect my whole soul into thee alone, and become, in turn, the universe to Julie?"  

She, while unwilling to go so far, regards her moral identity as lost through her "fall", but reborn through identification with him: "Since I am no longer any thing, be thou my whole existence. The only honour I have left is wholly centred in thee."  

In the affair two distinct and opposed experiences and forms of love are being mediated. On the one hand there is that of the tutor, a distillation of the nature of male passion, on the other that of Julie, the first sketch of the quite different female love that the rest of the book will develop. In each of the two stages their relationship passes through one is dominant with the other as a subordinate moment.  

At first Julie is able to resist consummation and can enjoy a calm and asexual love in which she can find fulfilment and happiness. This she remembers as a period of the greatest possible happiness. Her lover, though accepting her definition of love insists that their love cannot be complete without sexual union. In accepting her terms he is making a sacrifice.  

When he has his way this structure is reversed. Julie has sacrificed herself, having now to find her moral
identity in him. When sexual satisfaction is finally available, on the "night of love", the "putting to sleep of desire" returns them to something very like the pure love of the first stage. The tutor is now able to experience something like Julie's spiritual love, and acknowledges its superiority.

A masculine romantic love, founded on sexual desire, exclusive and full of the illusions of its passionate, imaginative character is asocial, except in so far as it binds a man to a woman rooted in the social field is also impatient of the flow of shared, human, social, time, privileging the ecstatic moment of sexual pleasure, an experience that returns the lover to the instant of the state of nature. This is contrasted with a feminine love that is calm and lasting, free of illusion, and compatible with life in a community. This love, the essence of Rousseauean femininity, is a need of the soul, comparable to the self identity of masculinity, figured in amour de soi, and finding its expression in the moral autonomy of the man of conscience. The next section will examine the development of this latter love through Julie's marriage, conversion, and rebirth in virtue.
Return to Virtue

In this section the process by which Julie returns to herself, recovering the honour and ethical existence she has sacrificed is analysed for the light it throws on the nature of her, of feminine, love. Here the entanglement of ethical duty, familial love, and the question of the opposition of body and soul will become somewhat clearer, even if the balance between these cannot, finally, be sustained.

Her recovery has three stages. A crisis occurs that causes the exile of her lover. The possibility of fleeing with him is raised for Julie in the most attractive way. Edouard Bomston, the English noble who has befriended them, offers refuge, and a fortune. They are to marry and establish themselves as an exemplary couple on an estate that he will give to them. This offer Julie refuses.

With her marriage impending Julie develops smallpox, and on hearing of this her lover rushes to her bedside, deliberately infecting himself with the disease he believes will kill her. When she recovers and learns of his action the last bastions of her resistance to him give out. She swears undying love to him, despite having already agreed to marry the
man of her father's choice. She now feels that an absolute annihilation of her honour has taken place. She is even ready to contemplate the possibility of adultery, the very core of feminine wickedness.

Finally, during the wedding ceremony itself a total reversal takes place. Having sunk (almost) as low as she could go (after all she has not committed adultery), she suddenly feels herself reborn. A religious conversion experience takes place and Julie is able to see herself as beginning afresh as a respectable married woman. This extends to a purification of her love for her former tutor, which is now said to be such that she need not feel ashamed of it. Julie has "returned to herself".

It will be shown that in this process Julie's duty is reduced to the love for her father that is its basis. Although the Oedipal dimension of this is undeniable it cannot be reduced to this. Rather it must be seen in the context established in Chapter Two as the particular expression of a general priority of the family in feminine existence. This is shown also in the way in which Julie, after her marriage, argues that the love of the first part of the book could not form the basis for a marriage. The conflict between passionate and familial love is worked through
Julie's love of her father and its role in preventing her elopement and enforcing her marriage.

This process of interaction between social duty and family love also involves further developments in the definition of Julie's love on the body/soul axis. A remarkable reversal takes place. When Julie's fall reaches its limit, where she prepares to marry one man while bearing love for another in her heart, her lover has her heart while her father disposes of her body. Her obedience is confined to externals while her interior is plunged into vice. Her escape from this lies in a new intensification of soulfulness. A religious conversion allows Grace to penetrate these innermost recesses of her heart and to purify them. Her love for her former lover remains but is now free of the sexual element that makes it difficult. She further acquires a new and immediate relation to God. This will be of increasing importance later. At the time of her conversion it is pushed into the background and her religion is an ethical one. God becomes the guarantor of her social duty.

The process by which Julie the lover becomes Mme. de Wolmar has involved the intervention both of family love and of religion to rescue a social virtue that has nonetheless retained its prime place. Indeed as
the next section will demonstrate sociality becomes the very essence of Julie as mistress of Clarens, subordinating to itself religion, and even the lovingness that makes it possible.

The crisis that marks the break between the novel of love of the first half and the ethical experiment of the second is precipitated by the Baron's getting a hint of the connection between his daughter and the commoner who was formerly her tutor. This leads to a scene of extraordinary violence within the family that culminates with the Baron beating Julie senseless, causing her to miscarry the child she is carrying. The father intervenes to destroy the relationship and its unborn fruit. What is even more striking is the reconciliation that follows. Julie sits on her father's knee and an embrace follows whose incestuous overtones are unmistakable and the subject of a good deal of Freudian comment.

Following this it becomes clear that Julie's lover must flee if catastrophe is to be avoided. This sets the scene for the first stage of Julie's rebirth, her refusal of the offer of sanctuary. It is significant that the proposal of elopement and the establishment of a new family, which represents an attempt to domesticate the illicit passion, comes from Edouard
rather than from Julie's lover. He represents a love that rejects the basic premise of Julie's argument, the value of duration, of the continuing social stream. When he has earlier urged elopement they were to "swear to live and die for each other", with no reference to anyone else. For him the unity of their souls, their passion, is alone to justify and form the substance of their life. Edouard, by contrast, sees them as living a public life, which, "the people .. will be proud to imitate." 

The domestic idyll presented by Edouard belongs to a vocabulary alien to the lover. His version of their future puts them in isolation, free of the ties of community that Edouard's letter stresses. For Julie this turning away from the universal has never been an option. Her willingness to enter into an illicit relationship was always temporary, a holding action while she tried to make it legitimate. With the realisation of the impracticality of this attempt she has only one choice. That dimension of their difference that pits duration against the ecstatic moment, the universal of society against the absolute individual expresses itself in her decision to stay.

Edouard has offered her the chance, by breaking with her own family, to establish a new one. However, she
is prevented from doing so by the thought of the anguish this would cause her parents, and in one particularly powerful passage demonstrates a contradiction between dereliction of her duties as a daughter and taking on those of a mother. "Oh if [my parents] could be witnesses to the manner in which I would fulfil in my turn the duties which they have fulfilled towards me! ... and yours, ungrateful daughter; who will discharge them while you forget them?" Duty she insists, cannot be rationalised in this context: "Since when has virtue .. weighed up the rights of blood and of nature? ... Is it not already to be guilty to want to go to the point where one begins to be so, and why would one seek so scrupulously the limit of one's duties, if one were not tempted to pass it."

In this stage she continues to associate love and duty without working out the relationship between them to the end. The core of her argument must be the impossibility of re-establishing the order of the family while disrupting its continuity. The theme of duration, which is to be so central to her at Clarens begins to appear. The question of priority between her filial duty and filial love does not arise, since these are bound seamlessly together. The nature of duty itself is ruled out of bounds, the questioning
of duty is already its dereliction. This self-denial will collapse in the next stage in which love comes to exceed and destroy the last refuge of virtue.

After his exile they maintain a clandestine correspondence in which their love continues to be given expression, while Julie stands by her decision to stay and obey her father. She continues to regard herself as nothing and to place her real life in him. Further she gives him her promise that she will not marry another without his consent.24

This situation persists for a time until it meets with a triple crisis that intensifies the contradiction Julie has created between the obedience she gives her father and the continued love she feels for her lover. Her mother discovers their letters and shortly afterwards falls ill and dies. She blames the discovery for this death, although Claire assures her lover that this is not the case. Secondly M. de Wolmar returns and her father demands that she marry him. Finally, immediately after she has been forced to write to her lover asking him to release her from her promise Julie falls ill herself with smallpox. When her lover hears of this he rushes back from Paris and deliberately contracts her illness.
Following her mother's death Julie has written to her lover asserting the end of their connection. After the "inoculation of love" and the smallpox which they both survive she writes: "It is too much! the victory is yours ... This sorrowful heart which, cost you so dear, is yours without reserve; it will remain yours to my dying breath." This surrender sweeps away, she says "chimerical virtue ... What are the vain duties it prescribes in opposition to a passion which Heaven itself inspired? Surprisingly, the next paragraph tells him not to:

imagine that to follow you I will ever quit my father's house. ... Duty, honour, virtue, all these considerations have lost their influence, but yet I am not a monster: ... Let a father, tenacious of his word, and jealous of a vain prerogative, dispose of my hand according to his promise; but let love alone dispose of my heart;

In response to this letter she receives one that puts forward arguments vindicating adultery, of which she later says "My heart was so far depraved that my reason could not withstand your plausible philosophy." This she represents, after her recovery, as the nadir. "Thus all my noble sentiments were utterly extinguished; all my faculties were altered; guilt was no longer horrible in my sight;"

What keeps her from flight now has nothing to do with duty. It is simply the clash of her love for her
lover with her filial love. With Wolmar's return imminent her father has extorted her agreement to write to her lover by threatening her with his own death. Where both the idea of virtue and her father's violence fail, this succeeds. Julie agrees. As she writes at the time of this crisis:

[S]he whom he expects to be his only comfort hereafter will not increase the affliction of his soul, already oppressed with disquietude: ... Duty, honour, virtue, all these considerations have lost their influence but yet I am not a monster: I am frail but not unnatural.

Julie is not being fair to herself. She has not lost hold of "duty, honour, virtue," she has discovered their essence. For her, as a woman, love, and crucially the socially legitimated love that remains within the family, is the ethical imperative. In forcing her into marriage this residual ethical being saves her from passion. Having taken the decision to marry Julie is in a contradictory position. The two forces of filial and sexual love, are involved in a struggle over of her. "At the very moment I was about to swear eternal fidelity to another my heart still swore an eternal love to you".

In the story she tells of her wedding there is a disjunction of cause and effect. What she experiences is twofold, a new kind of relation to the divine,
that true inner religion which will come to dominate her more and more, and as a consequence of this a purification of her feelings about her lover. These are transformed so that they no longer conflict with her duties as daughter and wife. Her conversion produces an inner piety which by reforming her in a virtuous mould has desexualised her love.

The cause of this transformation is the realisation of the "purity, dignity, and sanctity of marriage expressed in so lively a fashion in the words of Scripture, the chaste and sublime duties so important to the happiness, order, peace and duration of the human race". This is the subordination of religion to marriage as a social institution and the list of goods it brings with it. Her lover in his role as advocate of natural sexuality stresses the instant over duration, pleasure over happiness and the connection between this and his role as outsider in the communal life of Vevey. Here marriage is praised as the core of that, and of all, communal life.

Transformed by this revelation Julie makes the marriage vows "not only with my lips but with my heart". When she makes the experiment of examining her feelings about Saint-Preux she finds that "I
still loved you as much, if not more than ever; but I felt my affection for you without a blush." 36

In the church Julie has either seen that to make any sense of her commitment to her father she must be a good wife and has found the inner strength to do this in a heightened piety, or she has undergone a conversion, brought about as she seems to believe by Grace, which subordinates the spiritual to a social ethic. The ambiguity between these two readings is irreducible. Each also is a moment in a developmental process, Julie is either repressing/sublimating or she is passing from a less to a more adequate expression of her essentially loving nature.

This section thus concludes with Julie having succeeded, with the help of religion, in purifying her love in the way she had long been attempting to and allowing herself to return to the social and familiar. It is at here that her spiritualisation of love comes to prominence. Until her wedding Julie has felt that what she was doing was doubly wrong, she was betraying her lover and was defiling the marriage ceremony. She was dividing herself in two, her love for her former lover was unchanged but driven inwards, while she surrendered her body to another. She is able to look with new insight on her decision
not to marry her lover. She feels that this was the right thing to do even in terms of her own happiness, and Claire adds that this is true of her lover too.

She summarises with new clarity the contrast between passionate love, which creates an exclusive relation between the lovers and fosters indifference to all else and a conjugal attachment that has as its essence the fulfilling of the duties of parent and member of society. "The intent of matrimony is not for man and wife to be always taken up with each other, but jointly to discharge the duties of civil society ... Lovers attend to nothing but each other; ... and all they regard is how to show their mutual affection."37

The lovers have no guarantee that they would have been able to fulfil these duties. Love must pass and when it does there are few people who are "not ashamed of having loved each other."38 M. de Wolmar a phlegmatic and rational man makes a far better balance to her own loving nature. The working out of this balance in the creation of the community of Clarens depends on both his dispassionate reason and her loving nature to sustain a form of life that will exemplify the family as ethical alternative to the denaturing of the Republic.
Clarens and Julie's Ethics

There are interpretations of La Nouvelle Héloïse in which the novel becomes an experiment in utopianism, with the opening and closing sections warnings or explorations of limits. Where Clarens is seen by the Freudian inspired interpreters as a grim and repressive tyranny it is here seen as Rousseau's ideal. These two are not mutually exclusive of course, with Shklar's version combining them in her picture of Rousseau as an authoritarian dreamer. Schwartz gives a more favourable judgement on Clarens, Jones see the failure of this utopia as a crisis that leads from Rousseau's earlier, socially oriented texts towards the inwardness of the Reveries. These have in common that they regard Clarens as the definitive moment of the novel with the the beginning and end to be seen as explained in relation primarily to it. 39

This type of reading has much to be said for it. What weakens them is a failure to integrate this insight with the nature of Julie's death, and the relation between this and her love. Schwartz in particular, while recognising the importance of the text in synthesising Rousseau's teaching on sex and love fails to give any weight to the collapse of Clarens,
while Shklar ignores the crucial question of femininity. Furthermore Shklar and Schwartz, who have produced two of the most influential accounts of Rousseau in recent years have both neglected the crucial matter of Rousseau's religion, and are hence blocked from grasping Julie's essence.

Here Clarens is interpreted as setting out the nature of the feminine ethic which has thus far been alluded to without being exposited. The key is inclusiveness and continuity, founded on a calm and enduring love, expressed in the family. Indeed endurance becomes of central importance to Julie at Clarens.

Wolmar is an exemplar of one form of masculinity. His independence is that of reason as that of Saint-Preux is that of passion. His relations to others are essentially those of an observer without emotional engagement. 40 He is thus an excellent judge of character and organiser of structures, but would find it impossible on his own to generate the irrational, affective dimension crucial to social cohesion. Julie has the capability to supply this lack, she has the ability to inspire love in all who encounter her.

Wolmar provides the masculine reason and authority while Julie binds the community together with ties of
love. Their marriage represents the Rousseauian ideal of sexual complementarity in difference. This can be seen in the way the organisation of the household is carefully constructed to make all relationships "pass through" a relationship to Julie, who is able to act as its centre by virtue of this ability to inspire.

She plays the classic female role of binding men to social being. Wolmar has previously been detached, wandering and observing, not participating. His love of Julie changes this involving him as the master of Clarens. Similarly her lover was isolated and attached only to her. His love was his only real social bond, and in combination with Wolmar's remarkable psychological insight it will resume this function. Julie will bring him too into the fold.

Wolmar's nature is hinted at from his first introduction, and emerges in full clarity when he gives an account of himself on the occasion of the "profanation" of the grove. The key to it is his lack of passion: "Being but little susceptible of pleasure or grief" he is immune from the impulses of the passions. If he has any ruling passion "it is that of observation". He was born into a high position, but bored by court life detached himself from it, and from all fixed position in society. "I successively
threw myself into all the different situations in life," becoming an unattached wanderer. In the course of his observations in this rootless existence his "only active principle .. a natural love of order" is reinforced, and given a new turn. He gains "a new relish for virtue" by the pleasure of contributing to order. This "attached me somewhat more to myself, and from a natural progress I perceived that I was alone."

By this curious process where a love of order has unified him to the degree that he requires a companion he "found the want of some connection" troublesome for the first time. His friend the Baron d'Etange, on hearing of this offered Julie as Wolmar's wife. Julie, whose extraordinary ability to inspire love is a frequently remarked characteristic, "gave me the first, or rather the only emotion I ever experienced in my life." This passion is weak, as one would expect, but it is irresistible. "How is it possible", Wolmar asks, "to restrain a passion, be it ever so weak, when it has no counterpoise?" This one passionate force that makes itself felt in Wolmar's heart is able to transform him from the detached observer to the patriarch of Clarens.
In Wolmar Rousseau presents a variation on the theme of the independent male brought into the social by his attachment to a woman. This also gives him the opportunity to give another version of the complementarity of the sexes in the new entity thus formed. As Julie writes just after their wedding: "We are each of us exactly made for the other; he instructs me, I enliven him; the value of both is increased by our union, and we seem destined to form but one soul between us; to which he gives the intelligence, and I direct the will."47

In this union no delusion is necessary: "we see each other in a true light; the sentiment which unites us is not the blind transport of passionate desire, but a constant and invariable attachment between two rational people".48 Her "tenderness" is balanced by his "composure", to form an entity perfect for the married state. The end of this state is to "discharge the duties of civil society",49 and for this love is not necessary. The product of their union is the community of Clarens.

The Wolmar household and family is a very different entity to that of the Baron d'Etange. Wolmar's dispassionate rule, underpinned by Julie's field of love, is benign and rational. When she is first
encountered after her marriage she has been established three years at Clarens, and stressing her "dislike of the town, [her] taste for the country" she announces a change of venue, all the more marked, given the long series of letters devoted to the critique of city life that made up her correspondence with her lover after his exile.

Equally, Clarens, a country house where they have "converted to use every thing which served only for ornament" is contrasted to the chateau of Etange, "old, inconvenient, and gloomy". The Wolmars have taken their distance equally from the bourgeois modernity whose epitome is Paris, and the backward looking noble prejudice of Julie's father. Their household represents the project of Emile, the withdrawal from the modern world, not into the past but into a controlled nature.

In this Julie's garden, the Elisee, is a most apt symbol. It represents a break from the world of her father, the reintroduction of nature into the world of the Ancien Regime. In this it is one moment in the Wolmars' project at Clarens, also expressed in their farming their land themselves, and general placing of the "useful in the place of the agreeable" in which the really agreeable gains.
The aim of Wolmar in his management of the family finances and the estate is a balance that allows of as few changes as possible. "Order and regularity, .. are alone capable of converting the enjoyment of [riches] into felicity." Given this the Wolmars "applied themselves .. rather to improve their present, than to acquire a greater fortune" They aim at an equilibrium between expenditure and income that leads neither to increase or decrease. Further they try to achieve the greatest degree possible of self-sufficiency in the estate. In this the Clarens community reproduces the characteristics of independence and limitation of desire that is Rousseau's prescription for the natural man in Emile.

In this context the dimension of temporality, which has so far been noted without being thematised acquires a new importance. The defining feature of the ethics of Clarens, which is typical of Rousseau's feminine ethics, is its validation of the enduring. Julie's outlook in this phase is described as an "Epicureanism of the wise". She and her husband organise their life and their pleasures with a constant view to the long term. Moderation and caution are practised in order that all may be preserved unchanged.
Continuity could almost be named as the central imperative of their ethical system. In this way the everyday passage of human time becomes the privileged temporal mode. Life is short, Julie says, "which is reason for enjoying it to the end, and managing its duration in such a manner as to make the most of it. ... It sometimes happens that I break up a party of pleasure for no other reason than that it is too agreeable; and, by repeating it another time, have the satisfaction of enjoying it twice." 56

To this end she pursues a general regime of restraint and moderation, which severely rations all her pleasures, not because she is opposed to pleasure, but in order that it may be enduring. "She will have it that everything which pleases the sense, and is not necessary to life, changes its nature, whenever it becomes habitual; that it ceases to be pleasant in becoming needful." 57 This "voluptuous temperance", 58 the principle underlying the whole way of life at Clarens, could not be more starkly opposed to the viewpoint of passion. This, as shown in the course of the love affair in the first part of the novel, prefers the moment to duration.

At Clarens, all is so organised that the present is like the past, and the future will repeat the
present. The order of Clarens endures, because it is well modulated. As Saint-Preux says in the midst of the labour of the wine harvest: one "goes to bed, content with a day passed in labour, cheerfulness, and innocence, which he would willingly begin again the next day, the next after that, and every day to the last of his life".

Here is the "simple and industrious life" that was Julie's desire before the corruption of her heart by love, before she "drank the fatal poison" of passion. She has returned from the ecstasy of passion to the mundane and domestic, and with the help of her husband will domesticate her former lover. Wolmar "cures" Saint-Preux, making his love compatible with Clarens.

The cure of Saint-Preux carried out by Wolmar involves not the purification that Julie both at the time of her wedding and later in her correspondence with Saint Preux claims as her own, but a dissociation of two distinct experiences of love. Wolmar works to persuade Saint Preux that Julie de Wolmar is a different person from Julie d'Etange and that he would be mistaken if he imagined he had the same feelings for these two women. Saint-Preux' love for Julie is not altered but is displaced into memory.
and imagination where it belongs, leaving a space in the present, in perception and action, for a different, a quasi-familial love. Wolmar is Saint Preux' father as well as a divine being, Julie is Saint Preux' sister, both she and Claire are his mother.

Saint-Preux' love is an extreme case of romantic passion, and has its natural home in the imaginary. Wolmar's procedure is to exploit the pastness of the love to force it into memory and to dissociate it from the present. When Saint-Preux returns Wolmar stages a series of scenes the purpose of which is to dramatise the difference between the contemporary Mme. de Wolmar and the remembered Julie d'Etange.

This latter is the imaginary product of the passionate love of the past. Her image would have been tarnished and destroyed if compared to the real Julie, but since she no longer exists to be compared to her ideal image, love of her cannot be disillusioned. Wolmar's aim is to separate this vanished girl from Mme. de Wolmar in Saint-Preux' mind. His love is to be preserved in memory, and severed as far as possible from any real referent. By this means Saint-Preux' love can be sustained and defused.
When his cure is complete Saint-Preux sees himself as morally reborn, as Julie did after her conversion experience in Church. He writes to Wolmar: "I was dead to virtue, to happiness, and owe to you the moral life, to which you have raised me." Like Julie's parallel collapse and rebirth this has taken the form of a progressive demoralisation, which at the moment of crisis reverses itself and leads into a new birth. The differences are vital, chief among them being; first, that Julie has no help, she is alone and sees God alone as intervening in her salvation, while Saint-Preux is guided, or even manipulated by Wolmar; second, Saint-Preux accepts entirely Wolmar's version of what has happened to his love, while Julie rejects it and substitutes a more spiritual and refined account.

The first stage is the episode of the Elisee, the enclosed garden in which Julie has created the illusion of nature. Saint-Preux is reminded that the groves are tied to the past by the memory of the first kiss the lovers exchanged in them. The difference between the grove and the Elisee is the difference between the two Julies. The Elisee "has been planted by the hands of virtue."
Wolmar's plan is based on the violent separation from the past imposed by the nature of the end of the relationship. Saint-Preux must be made to recognise this in order that this separation can be the means by which his love is preserved and yet made safe. This is to be achieved by forcing him to face the changes that have taken place. Julie continues to occupy the central place in his heart:

You have always exerted the same sovereign power; but its effects are now different from what they were: a peaceful serenity has succeeded to the storm of the passions; my heart, modelled by your's, loves in the same manner, and becomes tranquil by your example. But in this transitory repose I enjoy only a short truce with the passions; and, though I am exalted to the perfection of angels in your presence, I no sooner leave it than I fall into my native meanness.

His attachment to virtue still depends on his love for her, but now mediated by a complex system whereby his imaginary love is restrained by the effect of her real influence. He is still tied to the body and its forces, but now, through the process of driving his passion entirely into the imagination, it is able to take on some of her "celestial" properties.
Julie's Path To Death.

This final section of the present chapter argues that in Julie's death the contradictions of Rousseau's teaching on femininity become clear. Where the contradictions of masculinity were displaced onto women, no escape is possible for Julie, for Woman. In her death and the collapse of Clarens it becomes clear that Rousseau's anthropology is incompatible with any social, or human, order. It will later be argued that this is a problem with the kind of freedom he ascribes to human beings, and the relation between body and soul it establishes.

To demonstrate the significance of Julie's death this section reprises her story, with the emphasis on the way in which it has this death immanent in it from the beginning. In earlier sections Julie's feminine nature was still being defined largely through a contrast with masculinity. This preparation now allows a closer focus on femininity itself.

In the first phase the struggle between a pagan soulfulness and a romanticised "natural" sexuality is the reflection within romantic love itself of a series of conflicts. Love asserts itself against a repressive social order. The struggle within the
relationship of the lovers is determined by gender; Julie, as woman, is bound by the social regulation of sexuality while her lover is not. Julie has, under the influence of this code, to contend with her own sexual desire. All of these conflicts are expressed in terms of the dualism of body and soul. Sexual love is rejected in favour of a "pure" spiritual love. This was traced in the first part of the present chapter. Here the emphasis is on Julie's struggle with herself and the conception of love expressed by her in it. This romantic love prefigures the course of the rest of her life. The rejection of sex and affirmation of a community of souls is closely related to her dispassionate marriage and passionate religion.

The earliest phase of her relationship with her tutor is marked by an initial panic on her part, followed by a new confidence in herself. She writes that her "passions can rest satisfied without a lover." Even when reviewing this stage from the safe haven of marriage she still contends that at first her desires were "innocent" and that her heart was "corrupted" only after the first kiss in the grove at Clarens.

In her state of innocence she "can conceive of no paradise on earth equal to the union of love and innocence." She believes that their love is born of
a likeness of souls, of which bodily attraction is only a sign: "The love I felt could not arise but from a mutual conformity and harmony of souls." Her lover compares to an angel: "it would seem that your soul is too sublime for human passions". This is taken by Julie to be the natural state for her soul. No one doubts the force of sexuality in the love of the young man, but Julie is initially without desire, this is not the origin of her love.

Desire is born in her heart as the result of the first physical intimacy between them, which like every new stage in their affair is ascribed to her compassion for him. She rewards his restraint with a kiss and: "One moment, one single moment, fired me with a desire which nothing could extinguish; and if my will still resisted, my heart was from that time corrupted." From now on Julie has to resist not only her lover, but also her own desire.

Her lover too has been affected by the kiss. The impetuosity of his love increases and it seems she must either yield to him or discard him. Thus: "It seems that my fatal passion wished to cover itself, in order to seduce me, with the mask of all the virtues." Her passion disguises itself as virtue, first by using her pity for her lover's suffering,
and then presenting her "fall" as a self sacrifice in which she ruins herself in preference to harming her lover, or, by running away with him as he wants her to, causing grief to her parents.

In this she acknowledges that there is an element of self-deception, or rather that the alien passion, using the mask of virtue, deceives her. Julie is divided against herself. In the long letter written after her marriage she writes that the lovers "forgot themselves in their transports" after the kiss, and that her marriage tie has "extricated me from a slavery much more dreadful; and my husband becomes dearer to me for having restored me to myself." This separation from herself is not the result of her love but of its deformation into passion, into sexual desire. In Julie's case the senses are awoken, not by imagination as on civilised man, but by physical intimacy. Her love does not proceed from the body. This love can be made compatible with her duties as a daughter and hence does not involve separation from herself. This comes with consummation. When Julie enters into a sexual relationship she loses her "honour", her sexual integrity is essential to her moral integrity. The separation from herself that her marriage heals is quite literal, in that her moral
being comes to inhere in her lover. She can recover her moral being only by surrendering herself to him.

Her analysis of this phase of their love comes to be centred on its necessary impermanence. At the time she writes that their "enjoyments were formerly both temperate and lasting" in contrast to the brutish transports of sex. Later she sees this as a time when "Heaven and nature authorised the ties which united them; .. they were less corrupted than debased". This could only be temporary; love alone could not guarantee constancy, lovers would have succeeded one another, "one deviation from virtue would have led to another; and vice grown habitual, would no longer have appeared horrible in my sight. .. from a seduced virgin I would have become an abandoned woman".

In stepping outside the bounds of duty Julie both loses her integrity and exposes herself to the danger of a fall from all virtue, for which her love can temporarily stand in. She has exposed herself to this disintegration, and to this danger because it is her nature first to attempt to mediate the opposing claims on her rather than to choose ruthlessly between them, and then to take on herself the costs of this mediation.
This internalisation of the opposition between her love and her duty is further intensified after her lover has gone into exile. It is impossible for Julie's honour to be recovered. Her sexual activity can only be justified by the love that moralises it, while her duty to her father means that she cannot bring that love into conformity with the social ethic through marriage. As a result her heart, the inner self, becomes the property of love, while her body is to be surrendered to the family in marriage.

This surrender is not even motivated by duty. It is only her father's evocation and manipulation of her love for him that induces her final agreement to marry Wolmar. Julie is even ready to contemplate adultery, which she regards as the most fundamental of all ethical transgressions.

The marriage ceremony itself is a moment of crisis. As Julie goes to the church she is in despair. She "could have beheld the preparations for my funeral with less horror than those for my marriage." The contradiction between her heart and her conduct intensifies, and, she writes to her lover: "At the very time that I was prepared to swear eternal constancy to another, my heart still vowed eternal love to thee; and I was carried to the temple as a
polluted victim, which defiles the altar on which it is sacrificed."79

This profound conflict reaches a climax during the ceremony which is the hinge between the novel of love in the first half, and that of moral instruction in the second. Julie undergoes a conversion experience in which she feels that the grace of God acts to transform her love and to return to her her lost moral integrity: "I felt a thorough revolution within me. An invisible power seemed suddenly to rectify the disorder of my affections, and to settle them according to the laws of duty and nature."80

Two things are identified by Julie as contributing to this: she is strongly impressed with the "purity, the dignity, the sanctity of marriage; .. which are so important to the happiness the order, the peace, the being of human nature",81 which she says it is the "first and most sacred" duty of mankind to respect. Second, she feels that God "reads the bottom of my soul"82 and compares her deeds and her thoughts. "Eternal providence ... You have recalled me to that goodness that I was made to love!83 The action of God erases the effects of the fatal kiss and its successors and returns Julie to her native state.
This does not destroy her love but restores its purity: "I was sensible that I loved you as much, if not more than ever; but I felt my affection for you without a blush."\(^{84}\) Equally, as Wolmar recognises, she does not and cannot love him: at the time of their marriage he recognised, he later tells her, that "Your heart was worn out for love: I therefore counted for nothing a disproportion of age that took from me the right to pretend to a sentiment which he who was its object could not enjoy, and which was impossible for any other to obtain."\(^{85}\) As Julie makes clear in the letter on her marriage quoted above, this is an ethical undertaking, not founded on passion. She comes to love Wolmar, but this is the love of habit opposed to passionate love by Rousseau, which follows from cohabitation.

The nature of Julie's situation in her marriage is delineated in the letter with which the book resumes, after a space of some years. She writes to Claire demanding the presence of her cousin at Clarens. She has need of Claire because she seems to be losing all the warmth of love from her life and her "sensitive heart" responds to the chill by collecting "around it all its natural warmth. The more it loses the more it attaches itself to what is left."\(^{86}\) She lists the connections she has and has lost. Love is "wholly
extinguished, .. and has left a vacancy in my heart which will never be filled up again."87 while her mother is dead and her children too young to return the love she gives them. Significantly her husband appears in this list only as being insufficiently intoxicated with love for the children to meet Julie's need for response.

Despite the place she occupies as the centre of the field of love sustaining Clarens, Julie is unsatisfied because love flows from, but not to her. While she is loved by all at Clarens this is devoid of the kind of mutuality that she needs. She writes: "one perishes by degrees, till at length, loving no-one but oneself, one ceases to feel and to live before one ceases to exist."88 Although the reader will be told repeatedly that Julie loves her husband and is happy in her life at Clarens this introduction to that life remains as the foundation of what follows. She is clearly not fulfilled.

Julie has desexualised herself to the extent that access to the ecstatic moment that is the temporal expression of the body, as represented by her lover, is closed to her. However, through her personal relation to God, centred on private prayer, she participates in the eternal. The mundane banality of
Clarens absorbs her time, but her passions belong to God. She is quite clear that Clarens allows no outlet for her need for intense loving relation and that she can find this only in religion.

Into this unstable and dangerous situation comes her returned lover. His love is the normal imaginative-passionate formation and is rendered safe as such. What Wolmar cannot, and knows he cannot, operate on in this way is Julie's loving nature. Her love is of a quite different kind as one would expect, given the masculinity of illusory passionate love. She has explained this earlier, telling Saint-Preux that while he has illusions about her she loves him in knowledge of his truth. Her love is an expression of the very essence of her being, in fact is the paradigm of femininity and feminine love.

When Saint-Preux returns the conflict between her nature and her life is intensified. She continues to hold to the ethics that make central and are necessary to the continuity of social life, but their repression of the very aspects of Julie's nature that they rely on for their effectiveness becomes less and less sustainable.
This is expressed in the correspondence she conducts with her former lover after he has spent the winter at Clarens and set out on a trip to Italy with his mentor and protector, Edouard. She attempts at this time to engineer a marriage between him and Claire, which she describes as offering him another Julie to take the place of the one he has lost. She argues that this marriage is desirable because it would render him harmless, where otherwise he would be a sexual threat to the women of the community. Her perseverance in this project, against the objections of both the proposed spouses, indicates its importance to her.

This correspondence is notable for the way in which this theme becomes entangled with a dispute between the two over the nature of Julie's religion. He accuses her of becoming a "devotee", implying that her religion is beginning to take over the centre of her life. Her response is to deny this, arguing that religion is compatible with, and subordinated to, her duties as wife and mother.

Julie first raises the idea of the marriage in a letter to Claire, whom she believes to be in love with Saint-Preux. In pressing Claire to face up to this and to marry him, she shows that she remains
uneasy about the state of her own feelings: "Yes, Claire, you will serve your friend by indulging your love, and I shall be more certain of my own sentiments, when I shall no longer make a distinction between him and you."89

This repeats a theme that has often appeared in Julie's letters since her ex-lover's return. As Wolmar has noted: "A veil of wisdom and honour makes so many folds about her heart, that it is impenetrable to human eyes, even her own."90 The state of her heart is unknown, even to Julie, and it is "wisdom and honour" that guarantee her against a new fall. In this she is different from her lover whose heart has been open to the gaze of Wolmar, and subject to is manipulation. It is Julie who has been active in her struggle against love.

This struggle, invisible except in the signs of Julie's unease, has been discounted by those around her. Claire, for example admonishes her when she confides that she is afraid of what may happen during her husband's absence on the occasion of the trip to Meillerie: "Your gentleness and devotion have given you a taste for humility ... you are an extravagant devotee."91 When she puts her suggestion to Saint-
Preux he repeats these arguments: "This extreme timidity is as dangerous as excessive confidence."

Claire and Saint-Preux are united in dismissing the possibility of Julie being tempted as the product of an imagination which takes its fears from an overly severe interpretation of her duties. This is linked by them both to a religious devotion that exceeds the limits that should be set for it. They cannot contemplate the idea of real passion remaining in Julie's heart, for if they did, as Claire points out, the substance of their world would be under threat.

They have underestimated the costs to Julie involved in the life she lives at Clarens. They have not appreciated the extent to which love is necessary for her, despite the frequent references to it. This becomes clear in the second letter she writes to Saint-Preux in Italy, that known as her "swansong". Here she describes her situation as one in which all that she could desire on earth has come about. All those she loves have been brought together in a harmonious community with her as its centre. Love flows freely to and from her within the confines of Clarens and no greater earthly happiness is conceivable: "I am replete with happiness, and satisfied with life: come death when thou wilt."
Yet Julie does not feel herself fulfilled: "A secret languor steals into the bottom of my heart; .. all my attachments are not sufficient to fill it."94

The reasons she gives for this state of affairs reprise the problem of the passions traced in Chapter One. It is worth quoting her at some length:

We enjoy less that which we obtain, than that which we hope for, and are seldom happy but in expectation. In fact, man, made to desire everything and obtain little, of boundless avarice, yet narrow capacity, has received of Heaven a consolatory aid, which brings to him in idea everything he desires, displays it to his imagination, and in one sense makes it his own; but to render it such imaginary property still more flattering and agreeable, it is even modified to his passion. But this shadow vanishes the moment the real object appears; the imagination can no longer magnify that which we actually possess; the charms of illusion cease where those of enjoyment begin. The world of fancy, therefore, the land of chimeras, is the only world worthy to be inhabited; and such is the inanity of human enjoyments that, except that Being which is self-existent, there is nothing delightful but that which has no existence at all.95

This is familiar from the material examined above, with its contrast between infinity of imaginative desire and the limits of possible pleasure. What is remarkable is its ascription to Julie. In particular her disdain for the "inanity of human enjoyments" is a rejection of all that she has stood for up to this moment in the novel. Apart from her temporary "corruption" in the first part, and the "devotion"
which she has insisted is subordinate to the mundane, Julie has been a spokeswoman precisely for those finite human pleasures she now seems to reject. When in the next paragraph she goes on to say, "I am too happy; happiness bores me." Rousseau adds a footnote: "What, Julie! more contradictions! Ah! I fear, charming devotee, that you are no longer in accord with yourself."

At Clarens Julie has championed the finite as that which endures. Suddenly in this "swansong", as Rousseau's footnote calls it, she reveals that this no longer convinces her. As the name given this letter indicates, this is the last letter she will write before the accident that leads to her death, a death she has already invited: "come, death, when thou wilt! I no longer dread thy power:" The analysis of the significance of this death forms the concluding part of this chapter, and of the first part of this thesis.

There are three interpretations of her death that are offered to the attentive reader. This section will consider all three, and the relations between them, in the light both of the novel and of Rousseau's thought as set out in the previous chapter. The first is that it is a sacrifice of Julie in which she is
absorbed in the spirit of the community she leaves behind, an apotheosis of Mme. de Wolmar, the moving spirit of Clarens. The next is that which can be drawn from the swansong; Julie has come to experience the "inanity of human pleasures", in contrast to the plenitude promised by her mystical religion, and sheds her animal encumbrance in order to pass over to God's side.

Finally there is the woman fearful for her virtue, who flies from the temptations of the flesh. This last has elements in common with the other two, as will emerge in the course of the exposition. Indeed in most recent readings of Julie this last absorbs the others, but this is a serious distortion of Rousseau's thought, which suppresses themes which, it is argued here, are at the centre of his work.

Immediately after the swansong comes the announcement of the accident. Julie's youngest child has plunged into the water from a dike on the lake, during an expedition mentioned in her last letter. She has thrown herself in after him. While both were pulled out, the mother has fallen into a condition from which she will not recover. Julie's death is the result of an action determined by her maternity. She has sacrificed herself for her child. In the letter
from Wolmar to Saint-Preux describing her last days this theme is developed and expanded.

The singularity of the story, Wolmar writes, is the way Julie employed her last days: "she foresaw, she said, that [her illness] would prevent her from discharging her part" in the education of her children, "and charged us with dividing it amongst us". As she lies dying her first thought is to ensure that her place as mother be filled. Then her concern is to ease the grief of the others.

In addition to these marks of her sacrificing herself to children and husband she also writes that after her death she will continue to live in the community at Clarens: "my friend, my children, think not that I shall leave you; I will remain with you, will reside amongst you;" and in writing to Saint-Preux she urges him: "Come and join [my] family, in the midst of whom Julie's heart will still be found. Let every one that was dear to her unite to give her a new being."

One thread is thus the idea that Julie sacrifices herself for the good of those that remain and that she who has been the spirit of the community, now becomes that alone. This coincides with the idea
alluded to earlier, that Julie after her marriage gives up her own desires to an ethic that demands her love as its substance without returning anything to her. Here that gift becomes the gift of her life. This general idea, expressed so far in Julie's sacrificing herself for the life of her child and the salvation of her husband can be specified further in way that introduces a new element. In her final letter to Saint-Preux, written on her death bed and sent after her demise by her husband she writes:

Long have I indulged myself in the salutary delusion, that my passion was extinguished; the delusion is now vanished, when it can no longer be useful ... who could have answered for my future years? ... That virtue, which separated us on earth, will unite us for ever in the mansions of the blessed. I die in that peaceful hope; 102

This letter, and the explanation she gives her husband in entrusting it to him 103 indicate that Julie's passion was not only not cured but was still dangerous in a way that Saint-Preux' was not. Julie's love was always only incidentally sexual but here is evidence that the danger of it "awakening the senses" was always inherent. After repressing it so long Julie comes to recognise the danger posed, and hence is "content to die". Moreover her love, being concerned with the spirit, can regard death as a way of realising itself.
This in turn connects with the third line of interpretation. Earthly love, with the limitations imposed by finitude and embodiment, is one of the "inane" human pleasures. In discussing her religious belief Saint-Preux has written:

no terrestrial object being equal to the need to love that devours her, that excess of sensibility is forced to re-ascend to its source. This is not, like Saint Theresa, an amorous heart, which changes its object and wishes to deceive itself; this is a truly inexhaustible heart which neither love nor friendship can drain, and which carries its superabundant affections to the sole being worthy to absorb them.104

In distinguishing Julie's inexhaustible heart, with its need to love, from an "amorous" heart, which deceives itself as to the nature of its passion, Rousseau reminds the reader of the character of Julie's love. This is an expression of the essence of the feminine, like Sophie's corresponding need, and not the product of imagination. It is a need, not a passion. Like the passions, though, it cannot be satisfied with merely human and finite pleasures. In this it corresponds to the love Julie felt during the epoch of her love affair. This was at its best before the corruption of her heart by physical intimacy.

Her "devotion" can therefore be seen as a development of a characteristic present from the beginning, and the difficulty she finds in reconciling it with the
mundane as closely related to the conflict between her love and her family in the first part of the novel. This is spelt out in the "swansong". There she seeks to justify her "devotion" against criticisms made by Saint-Preux. A passage was quoted above from this letter that staged her problem as being that of the contrast of the imaginary and the real. A little later she restates it in slightly different form:

finding nothing in this world capable of giving it satisfaction, my desiring soul seeks an object in another world; in elevating itself to the source of its sentiment and existence, its languor vanishes; it is re-animated; ... obtains a new existence independent of corporeal passions, or rather it exists no longer in me, but in the immensity of the supreme being; and disencumbered for a while from its terrestrial shackles, returns to them again with patience, consoled with the expectation of futurity.105

Julie returns to a familiar theme. Just as the Vicar has suggested that the conscience is an instinct of the soul, with which the body interferes so Julie claims about her love. She suggests that the love which she has felt for her lover was a form of this love, whose real object is God. In writing of the shackles of the corporeal passions she reminds Saint-Preux of the way in which sexuality interfered with their love. This would suggest that her death might be interpreted as the final freeing of her soul from her body, as her reflections on her death bed, her "profession of faith", might also indicate.
In her discourse with the pastor as she lies dying she says: "In a few days my soul, freed from its mortal form, will begin to pay [God] more worthily that immortal homage that will be my happiness through all eternity." Her soul can look forward to death as not only a release but as a movement to a higher form of satisfaction, in union with God.

It is tempting to regard this as wish fulfilment, that Julie has retreated from the threat to her order posed by her passion into a fantasy of purity and compensation founded on the myth of the soul as an entity independent of the body. On the other hand there is the possibility that Julie is right in her own assessment of what has happened. Her passion has proved incompatible with the social, but her end is not an escape from it, but an accession to it. In this case her end is the telos of her beginning, her devoted death is the truth of her version of love.

In either case the project of Clarens has failed, but in one case it has been a detour imposed by a repressive ethic and leading nowhere; while in the other it is a stage of purification that has freed Julie from sexual passion, given her back her moral being and prepared her for her death as triumph.
Conclusion

This chapter has argued that through a reading of *La Nouvelle Héloïse* it is possible to bring out a feminine essence that elsewhere is invoked as the site of the resolution of the problems of the masculinity that occupies the centre of attention. When this is worked through it becomes clear that those problems are replicated in a new excess, this time not of self-love, but of the need to love, and be loved by, others. Freedom, as transgression of any limit, is again at work, this time on this feminine need, which thus corresponds to the need for integrity of men. The soul has again proved resistant to integration with the limits imposed by human existence, but this time displacement is impossible.

In addition to the contradiction within the structure of Rousseauean masculinity, that freedom and self-determination depend on unfreedom, it now appears that freedom cannot be denied to women. Julie's death claims that freedom in the only way available to her. That many would regard that way as illusory should not disguise the fact that Rousseau himself did not. As the *Reveries* make abundantly clear his own way was also to lie in a flight from the social towards a self-sufficient mysticism.
CONCLUSION TO PART I

The chapters on Rousseau have argued that his thought has at its centre an attempt to reconcile self-determining conscience with an ethic of social responsibility, and that this attempt is made through the medium of sexual difference. The duality that is to be reconciled has been traced to his philosophical anthropology, and the way in which this recurs as a theme through a dialectical development of forms of love set out. Finally it has been argued that the excessive character of the freedom he makes the essence of the soul proves incompatible with any kind of social, and of human, existence.

In the first chapters the nature of masculinity, which is consistently made into a norm in the works considered there, was analysed, and shown to depend on a displacement of unresolved difficulties into the sexual field, where they were made the responsibility of women. This was carried out through the ascription of a natural sociality to women, which was to complement the primary independence of men. To this end a dual ethic was developed, with marriage creating a single moral being, which could synthesise them. In this synthesis men were given absolute mastery, as they must if their independence were to
be preserved, but it was necessary for women to actually control them through "guile", as they must if the men were to be socialised.

The third chapter turned to femininity, through a reading of *La Nouvelle Heloise*. Here, it was argued, the nature of feminine sociality could be discovered in the form of a "need to love". This need corresponds to the primitive "amour de soi", which was the bedrock of masculine psychology. Where self-identity was the absolute value of masculinity relatedness was the essence of femininity. It is this that makes women social and men asocial in Rousseau.

It was shown through a careful consideration of Julie's story that this need to love, no less than the male need for self-containment, was subject to the excessive logic of the free soul. In sociality it can receive only partial expression and satisfaction, and ultimately breaks through into a mystical religion, whose telos is death as release and as movement to God. Femininity has nowhere else to go, having already acted as the receptacle of the problems of the masculine. The full significance of this structure will be set out in the final part of the thesis, where the relations of sex, gender, and freedom will be reconsidered.
PART II: INTRODUCTION

The second part of this thesis begins by developing a critique of Rousseau in the context of an exposition of the thought of Freud. This has two main elements: Rousseau's dualism is contrasted to Freudian ambivalence, and these are held to correspond to, respectively, an escapist and a responsible or resigned attitude to the necessity of suffering; secondly, and correlative, Freud's thought is shown to reject the opposition of conscience and social ethics, and to make these continuous. This approach to ethics is shown to undermine the Rousseauean position of natural goodness and natural independence. The Freudian subject is constituted in relation, and is never integral.

This argument is developed particularly through a consideration of the nature of conscience. It is shown that the development of conscience in Rousseau depends on the idea of an original independence from and indifference to others. This is clear from the education of Emile, and from the structure of the contrast between the forms of self love in the Second Discourse. The Freudian positing of infantile sexuality, and the role of this in the formation of "conscience", of the super-ego, means that morality
becomes the resultant of relation to other, which can only become self-determining in a limited sense, and as the result of a difficult struggle.

This discussion of the origin and nature of morality in Freud leads to a consideration of the nature of freedom or autonomy in the psychoanalytic project. It has often been noted that there is a tension in Freud on this question. On the one hand he insists on his attachment to a doctrine of scientific determinism, and the "hermeneutic of suspicion" dethrones the self-legislating subject through the interpretation of unconscious and pathological motivation. On the other the therapeutic practice is dedicated to the liberation of the I through the dissolution of repression, and the pushing back of the barriers of the id.

This liberation can be seen to have two main elements, that come to the fore in different texts, but should not be thought of as contradictory. First there is the liberation of the ego from the excessive repressions imposed by the super-ego. This involves Freud in a distinction between a rational and an irrational element in morality, a distinction that reaches its fullest expression in Moses and Monotheism. There he makes more explicit the
difference between the repressive and terroristic law of the father and a rational "law of the brothers", implicit at least since Totem and Taboo. This rational, contractarian social law is to be freed from its entanglement with the Oedipal violence to allow the creation of the utopia of The Future of an Illusion.

The second element of the liberation offered by analysis is that from the excessive demands of the id. The ego, freed from the restraints of the irrational super-ego, can negotiate the currents of instinctual desire in such a way that instinct is integrated into the self and brought under the sway of the reality principle, "where id was ego shall be". Where the critique of religion expresses the struggle of the ego against the super-ego, the work of science as the completion of the project of the reality principle is directed to the id, the second of the "stern masters". (Of course it is not so straightforward as this, science and the critique of religion are inextricable, as are rational sociality and the rationalisation of desire. However it is convenient to separate them for purposes of exposition.)
The exposition of analysis as science of liberation, as the scientific struggle to free the ego from its two internal masters in order to strengthen it in face of the external world, the third and most recalcitrant, concludes by returning to the comparison with Rousseau. Where Rousseau posited an infinitely excessive freedom, which he could not then reconcile with the finite possibilities of actuality, Freud begins with this finitude and teaches freedom as resigned acceptance of it. The excessive demands both of the super-ego and of the id are to be exposed as pathological and the realistic ego placed in charge. The autonomy of the ego is the victory of a rationality that has recognised its limits. This concludes the first chapter on Freud.

The second chapter turns to the unresolved tensions of the Freud's position, and particularly to gender. As in Rousseau sexual difference is essential to the formation of the ethical subject, and as in Rousseau this is obscured texts that take masculinity as the norm, suppressing its dependence on femininity. In Freud this becomes clear in those texts from the mid 1920s on that turn their attention to the feminine. This is accompanied by a deeper understanding of the nature and import of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, and the role of sexual difference in it
This theme can be usefully approached through the 1937 article 'Analysis terminable and Interminable'. Freud discusses as the most intractable of analytic problems the "repudiation of femininity". It is suggested that both men and women are in flight from the position of woman, and that this flight is the source of many of the most difficult pathological formations encountered by analysts. Freud stresses the necessity of the analyst overcoming this and enforcing the feminine in the case of women.

With this he makes explicit his complicity with a rigid system of gender identity the nature of which may be traced through his writings on femininity in particular, and which, it becomes clear, is essential to the system of his thought. This is one limit to the liberation of the ego, that it cannot be extended to women. The apparently casual and unsystematic passages scattered through Freud's writings on the irrational, amoral, and antisocial nature of women can be seen, through a careful consideration of the role of sexual difference and of the flight from femininity in forming the characters of the two sexes in the Oedipal drama, to be indispensable.

This problem in regard of gender is connected to another, which is most notably analysed in Ricoeur's
Freud and Philosophy. This is his denial of the possibility of the ego's transcending its position in relation. No ego morality is possible, and hence the imposition of compulsive super-ego morality through the terror of the Oedipus complex has as its main alternative the return of the terror of the primal horde. This is the fear that haunts the pages of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and of Civilisation and its Discontents. The utopian vision of The Future of an Illusion, with its replacement of compulsion with rational assent, is a fleeting one. More typical is Freud's famous pessimism, which sees as the only alternative to the unleashing of the terror of the death instinct its turning against the self through the action of the super-ego.

This problem in Freud must be seen in the context of the place of the idea of ambivalence in his thought, with which the first chapter on Freud began. There are two fundamental ambivalent relations in Freud. There is the primal ambivalence between eros and death, in which the two great instinctual formations are inseparably bound together; and there is the ambivalence of desire and authority, in which the structures of the super-ego are put in place by and as desire. The second limit of psychoanalytic liberation is figured in the way in which this second
ambivalent relation can never become fully internalised. There remains an element of pure externality in the relation of authority and desire, and Freud's attempt to deal with this leads to the absurdities of the "archaic residue" and of the myth of the primal murder.

Civilisation, culture, is ultimately imposed on the self, and cannot become unified with it. Despite the placing of relation at the heart of the formation of the subject the externality is not overcome, the cultural cannot be owned and hence terror remains necessary. Moreover this terror cannot be sublimated by women as it can by men. In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', in many ways the most profound of all Freud's reflections on the place of the feminine in his thought, a feminine morality of desire is posited. Women can never experience the full terror of castration, and thus can never overcome it. They can never identify with the father but only desire him. For them morality must remain external and their relation to it is the desire to be punished.

'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' must be read with this in mind. Because cultural imperatives can never fully be rationalised, never be owned, even by men, the masochistic feminine identity must be
enforced. Freud not only describes but polices a misogynistic system of rigid gender identity. The next chapter introduces the writings of Kierkegaard to suggest that a relation to freedom that rejects both the flight from actuality of Rousseau, and the resigned acceptance of Freud, offers the possibility of transcending the rigid and hierarchical sexual systems they have both described and enforced.

In 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' Freud suggests that the "repudiation of femininity" is a barrier beyond which analysis cannot pass. It forms a limit to the liberation offered by analytic therapy. The pathology of gender is an absolute. This late insight, flowing from the sustained attention to questions of gender, is intimately connected with the other great project of the last period of Freud's life, the analysis of culture and of religion. Central to the argument of this thesis is the idea that the tragic account of culture that received its summation in Civilisation and its Discontents is inseparable from the place given to gender. That engendering is the key moment in acculturation and that the violence of this act is both too awful to contemplate (the limit of analysis) and essential to the very existence of culture (the tragedy of culture) is the tragic terminus of Freudian thought.
As in the case of Rousseau it is important to hold this dialectic of gender in its specificity while examining the anthropology that is its counterpart. The account of sexual difference must be framed by its ontological assumptions without being reduced to a mere expression of it. The key to this here is the comparison with the works of Kierkegaard, where sexuality is recognised and given importance, while also, and shudderingly, erased in the movement of faith. Before God, but only before God, sexual difference recedes. In that difficult moment where the ethical is suspended, and in the present context all the connotations of that word are necessary, the sexual, definitive of the ethical, is also suspended.

Because Freud can only conceive of this suspension as the analytic situation or as the terror of the primal horde, reborn perhaps as fascism, the ethical, and gender, can never achieve suspension. The analytic encounter enforces rather than transcends gender and the analysis of culture tends towards a hypostasis of the social as a (male) personality. It is this that leads to the absurdities of the "phylogenetic residue", of the cultural latency period and of the myth of the primal murder. These speculations convey the magnitude of the Freudian endeavour, and its fate without the transcendent moment of spirit.
This chapter argues that in Freud may be found an ethic of resignation, of acceptance of the necessity of suffering and the limits of actual existence that contrasts sharply with the escapism of Rousseau. This is deeply connected to the thought of ambivalence. Where Rousseau's dualism allowed the poles to be separated, and in their simplicity to come to rest, in Freud no such reduction of the compound nature of human being is countenanced. This comes to fullest expression in the synthesis of Civilisation and its Discontents, where the mutual entanglement of the instincts of life and death provides the ground for a profound integration of Freud's accounts of individual and of cultural development.

This contrast is traced out through the notion of conscience, and in particular of its relation to social-ethical life. In Part One it was shown that Rousseau opposed the self-determining morality of conscience to a social ethic of continuity and solidarity. Conscience was the agency of the assertion of the self against the domination of a sociality that disrupted its primitive and natural integrity. This possibility rested on the natural independence of man. Further it was opposed to the
passions, to desire. Conscience was the moral sense of an integral and independent man, free from desire and immediate in his relation to self.

Freud rejects this view of the origin and nature of conscience in every particular. Conscience, or the superego whose voice conscience is, internalises external authority. The superego is the aspect of the self which most inexorably subjects it to the the social, to civilisation. It is the "garrison" within the self of culture. It divides the self, the ego, against itself: far from offering the possibility of a return to a lost integrity, as did conscience in Rousseau, the superego turns the fantastic desire for such a return into the occasion for intensifying the division that the ego has disguised through its attempts to centre the libidinal instincts on itself.

Finally the origin of the superego lies not in a lost self-sufficiency but in far-reaching dependence. In positing infantile sexuality and the drama of the Oedipus complex Freud makes the constitution of the self and its acquisition of a moral sense the result of the powerful object relations of the pre-oedipal child. Desire far from being a late and disruptive addition to the self, as passion was in Rousseau, is what makes the it possible.
From this results a radically different concept of freedom. Psychoanalysis holds out the possibility, in alliance with the ego, of freeing it from the domination of its stern masters, the id and the superego. In this the location and nature of liberation is transformed. Where Rousseau situated an infinite and excessive freedom in the conscience Freud aims to strengthen the ego, the bearer of the reality principle. It is the blind desire of the id and the unyielding dutifulness of the superego that are to give way to the finite calculation of the ego.

Freud rejects illusion and urges that one face and accept the division of the self from itself, which as its most fundamental is the duality of life and death instincts. In comprehension he suggests lies victory. Sublimation of instinct provides a way of easing the pain of the "war of the giants" that is waged in the innermost constitution of each of us. From a resigned embrace of truth comes the only freedom we can know.

This chapter seeks to expoit the various dimensions of this notion of conscience and to explore psychoanalysis as a science of liberation as a preparation for examination of the limits of analysis in the next chapter. In this it draws chiefly on what might be called the "classic texts" of philosophical
interpretation of Freud. By this is intended chiefly the work of Ricoeur, within the phenomenological tradition, and Marcuse within the Hegelian (Marxist). In addition the more sociological writings of Rieff, and to a lesser extent Brown have been influential.

These texts have formed the basis for a "mainstream" anglo-american reading of Freud within which the present study largely falls. In more recent years Lacan has been increasingly important in forming images of Freud, but is not extensively utilised or discussed here because the intention is to engage directly with the Freudian text, and for this purpose Lacan is not very helpful. His work, fascinating and suggestive though it often is, provides an extremely tendentious interpretation of Freud.

It is argued that the strength, and the weakness, of Freud is his identification with the finite ego. This lies counter to the main thrust of Lacan's work. Since limitations of space preclude any substantive discussion of this difference Lacan has largely been excluded. It should be clear, however, that the conclusions drawn have important resemblances to Lacanian criticisms of the "imaginary ego", which in other context could usefully be developed.
Conscience and Superego

This section begins from a critical review of the Rousseauian doctrine of conscience, which examines its presuppositions in the light of the Freudian account of the formation and nature of the agency of conscience, the superego. This argument contrasts the original independence and simplicity of the Rousseauian subject, which is the precondition of conscience, with the compound and dependent formation first of the ego and then of its special agency the superego. It is shown that in both these movements the self is unified and structured through its relation to other. In this relation it emerges from the chaos of the neo-natal auto-erotic instincts through the imposition of authority.

The Freudian superego as the agency responsible for the moral sense corresponds to Rousseau's conscience. These two stand in a very different relation to social being. The first part of the present section explores this difference in the context of a comparison of the formation of Emile's conscience and of the superego. It is shown that the possibility of conscience in the former case rests on Emile's independence as a child, and on the related notion of "natural goodness". Freud's analysis of infantile
sexuality, and of the fundamental opposition of Eros
and the death instinct stand in contradiction to
these crucial Rousseauian ideas. The Freudian subject
has no ground outside relation of the kind to which
Rousseau, in his accounts of childhood and of the
state of nature, posits as the foundation of the
morality of the man of conscience.

In the account of the formation, and nature, of the
superego (explanation and description are always
genetic in Freud) it is further shown that moral
authority, the structures that oppose and limit
instinct, are themselves desirous. This is true both
of the ego, and of its "differentiating grade" \( \textit{\textit{1}} \) the
superego. In Rousseau, as in his great inheritor,
Kant, conscience is opposed to desire. This
opposition is more complex in Rousseau than in Kant,
given the "sentimental" dimension of his moral
thought, but is real nonetheless. This is clearest in
the account of Law in the Social Contract, but is
also to be found in his other writings. Conscience
returns desire to its origin in self-love, in which
the space of desire cannot be opened up. The divided
self-love of amour-propre, in which desire interposes
between the self and itself, is what is to be
overcome in conscience. The presence of desire in the
formation of the self, and of its moral identity, is one of the most revolutionary of Freud's discoveries.

In Rousseau the conscience, the agency of morality, has as its essence its independence of the judgement of others. As was shown in the first chapter of this thesis this characteristic is closely related to the problem of desire, or to use Rousseau's own term, of passion. Conscience, by returning the passion of amour propre to the closed economy of the self, in which it originates as amour propre, closes the space of desire. In this it reproduces the characteristics of the man of the state of nature who exists in a closed moment of need and satisfaction. In this sense conscience is opposed to, and prevents, the emergence of desire.

This opposition is taken further in the doctrine of law in the Social Contract, where the universality of law is designed specifically to exclude the intrusion of individual desire and secure indifference in the act of legislation. It is this side of Rousseau's thought that was so to influence Kant. The opposition of conscience, and of the natural man, to desire can be found also in the Reveries of a Solitary Stroller. In the famous fifth walk Rousseau describes the most
complete and perfect happiness of which he can conceive. He asks:

What is the source of our happiness in such a state? Nothing external to us, nothing apart from ourselves and our own existence; as long as this state lasts we are self-sufficient like God. ... But most men being continually stirred by passion know little of this condition. ... [I]t cannot be experienced by every soul or in every situation. The heart must be at peace and its calm untroubled by any passion.2

Crucially the heart must not be troubled by a bad conscience, which disturbs its peace with itself. As Rousseau writes in Emile; "take away the pains of the body and the remorse of conscience, all our ills are imaginary."3 The pains of conscience are real because they divide the self against itself. In this way the doctrines of conscience and of the state of nature unite against desire.

This is reflected in the education of Emile. In childhood he is absolutely independent. He is "almost only a physical being"4 "He considers himself without regard to others and finds it good that others do not think of him."5 Although, as shown above, at the end of the first and in the second chapters of this thesis, this state of being "alone in human society", of having "a heart that is free and without passions."6 cannot last, it is the necessary preparation for the education of his conscience.
Freud's analysis of the role of infantile sexual desire in the formation of the self flatly contradicts the Rousseauian idyll of free and independent childhood. In the Oedipal drama the child is placed in a relation of desire and not just of need to the mother from almost the beginning. Desire is formative. Conscience, the agency that rescues from desire in Rousseau is in Freud a precipitate and an agency of desire.

Desire is crucial to the two differentiations that Freud distinguishes in the formation of the self. First the ego emerges from the id, and then later the superego from the ego. In each of these processes desire, the cathexis of an object plays the leading role. The self emerges as and is then transformed by the creation within it of an object of desire, and in each case this object is defined by desire. In this way the relation to self is fundamentally different from the immediate love of self in the primitive man or child posited by Rousseau, where desire, the space of non- or suspended satisfaction, is excluded.

The first of these processes, the narcissistic positing of the primitive ego, will be examined first. In this will become clear the second, and concomitant, difference between Freud and Rousseau,
the role of the other in defining the self. In Rousseau, as has been shown above, it is crucial to the essence of masculinity, its independence, that the self should have a ground outside relation. This cannot be the case for the Freudian self. Even the narcissistic "pleasure-ego" comes into being in relation to an object.

One dimension of Freud's theory of the ego makes of it the representative of the external world, the bearer of the reality principle and hence of rational evaluation of real possibility. This moment in his ego-psychology will be considered below, when the idea of psycho-analysis as science of liberation is discussed. Another crucial moment, though, is that of the ego as narcissistic object.

The two classic statements of this are in 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' from 1914, and in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' from 1915, but the terms "reality ego" and "pleasure ego" can be found, for example, in 'Negation' from 1925, and in the discussion of narcissism and the formation of the ego in the first chapter of Civilisation and its Discontents from 1930. It is thus clear that although Freud often stressed the role of the ego as representative of the external world this did not
preclude his continued recognition of the role of libidinal forces in its creation. Indeed there is a close relationship between the two sources of origin of this agency.

The first stage in the establishment of the ego from the "undifferentiated ego-id"\textsuperscript{11} is the distinction between inside and outside. "The antithesis ego-non-ego is... thrust upon the individual organism at an early stage by the experience that it can silence external stimuli by means of muscular action, but is defenceless against instinctual stimuli."\textsuperscript{12} This first moment of differentiation leads to the establishment of an original "reality ego", which distinguishes "internal and external by means of a sound objective criterion".\textsuperscript{13}

Even at this early, and apparently realistic, phase of its development desire plays a role. The distinction of inside and outside is made on the basis of the difference between sense stimuli and the pressure of the instincts for satisfaction. At the next stage the pleasure principle, the postulated fundamental guide to mental activity, intervenes to redefine the ego on its own terms. The pleasure principle, in the pure form in which it here appears, can be identified with the "primary process", in
which the mental apparatus takes a "short cut" to satisfaction through wish-fulfilling phantasy.  

This principle transforms the initial "reality ego" into a "purified 'pleasure-ego', which places the characteristic of pleasure above all others. For the pleasure-ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it."  

This "primitive pleasure-ego cannot escape rectification through experience" so that a new and more developed reality-ego is then re-established. On this account, drawn from 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' the operation of the pleasure principle merely interferes with the establishment of an ego fundamentally leaning on a realistic separation of self and other.

There is, however, a different and more complex account to be discovered in other texts, which while it does not contradict this reality-pleasure-reality sequence disturbs it by the introduction of the concepts of narcissism and of identification. The classic statement of this is in 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' where Freud writes that "a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The
auto-erotic instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be something added to auto-erotism - a new psychical action - in order to bring about narcissism."\textsuperscript{17} This new action is identification.

At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in process of formation or is still feeble. The id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger, tries to get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id as a love object. The narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects.\textsuperscript{18}

As is made quite clear in the paragraph preceding the one just quoted the mechanism for this is identification. The unity of the ego is established at least partly through its taking on the identity of the object and thus recreating itself as an erotic object. Narcissistic cathexis is a moment of the definition of the self. The ego emerges as desired, and models itself after the objects it finds cathected. This allows Freud to speculate that "the character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the history of those object choices."\textsuperscript{19}

Of these identifications one above all stands out. This is the identification with the father which is to explain the origin and nature of the agency of
conscience, the superego. The examination of this explanation is the main task of the present section. The preceding discussion of the role of desire in the formation of the ego is only a preparation, here as in Freud, for the more profound part it plays in the creation of the moral sense, of the possibility of guilt. This in turn can only be fully explained once the critique of culture is grasped, a task which is here delayed, for reasons of expository clarity.

To understand the theory of the super-ego it is necessary first to make clear the structure of the Oedipus Complex. This has three essential elements, all of them vital to the formation and dissolution of the "nuclear complex". These are the narcissistic relation to self; the "anaclitic" object cathexis of the mother; and the identification with the father. (It should be made clear here that, as in Part I, this exposition follows the example of its object text in taking the masculine case in isolation first, the feminine case will be extensively discussed in the next chapter. In Freud this delay was, of course, chronological. Femininity only became a major concern of his in the 1920s.)

The self-cathexis has been outlined, it remains to consider anaclitic object choice and identification.
The first of these is most extensively dealt with in 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', where it is contrasted with the choice of the self as object. "We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects - himself and the woman who nurses him". The term "anaclitic type" is the English translation of the German "Anlehnungstypus" or "leaning-on-type". Its significance is explained in the text:

The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts and only later do they become independent of these, and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the persons who are concerned with a child's feeding, care and protection become his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her.

This first sexual object is introduced through the medium of the "ego-instincts". This is the attachment that is referred to, of the libidinal to the self-preservation instincts. This is, in the context of the discovery of narcissism, not altogether surprising, since the differentiation of these groups of instincts was, as shown above, undermined by this. This type of attachment is modelled after the ego-instinct that gave it its object so that its aim is to "have" the object, to own it and to use it to complete a self essentially independent of it.
In a footnote added to the *Three Essays on Sexuality* in 1915, after the introduction of the theory of narcissism, Freud posits a sharp distinction between anaclitic and narcissistic object choices as seeking to return to the two elements of the pre-Oedipal situation that have so far been considered. What disrupts the dyadic structure and makes necessary this attempt to return is the drama of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, a drama whose third element must now be put in place.

This is identification with the father, who will act in phantasy to force the infant out of the position he has been in. The mechanism of identification remained obscure to Freud but its importance was not in doubt. The most extensive discussion of it is in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, where it is described as the "earliest expression of an emotional tie with another person." It is given priority over the "object-cathexis towards [the] mother according to the attachment [anaclitic] type." Identification is held to be;

ambivalent from the very first; it can turn into an expression of tenderness as easily as into a wish for someone's removal. It behaves like a derivative of the first, oral phase of the organisation of the libido, in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such.
It is clear that this type of object relation stands in a close relation to the anaclitic object choice in this oral origin, and indeed Freud notes elsewhere that: "At the very beginning, in the individual's primitive oral phase, object cathexis and identification are no doubt indistinguishable from each other." The difference that later asserts itself is that identification acts on the ego to transform it, placing the object inside it, while object-cathexis seeks to enjoy the object while leaving the self unchanged. The formula in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego states this as the difference between wanting to be and wanting to have.

The case of identification that Freud most often invokes is that between the boy and his father, but in his discussions of the "complete Oedipus complex" identification with the mother is also discussed along with object cathexis of the father. The three elements of the Oedipal scene are now in place. In particular the characteristic relations to the two parents are established.

In consequence of the irresistible advance towards a unification of mental life, they come together at last; and the normal Oedipus complex originates from their confluence. The little boy notices that his father stands in his way with his mother. His identification with his father then takes on a
hostile colouring and become identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother as well. 32

The drama of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the establishment of the superego will involve this interplay between these two forms of desire, and what will be decisive is the intervention of the third, narcissism. Out of this conflict of desires will emerge the special agency of the ego that will return this section to its starting point in conscience. In the moment of unification the primitive oral stage in which the two object relations are indistinguishable leads to a doubling in which desire and authority fall apart. Desire is localised in the mother and authority in the father. She promises pleasure and he figures power, a power that becomes increasingly threatening.

In considering the relation between the narcissistic ego and the father one comes up against a puzzling phenomenon that is of the greatest significance in assessing the nature of identification and of its subsequent transformation. The pre-Oedipal narcissistic ego "is [its] own ideal". 33 The ego at this stage exists in a state of the profoundest self-satisfaction, resulting from the exclusion from the self of all that is unpleasant and the corresponding inclusion of all that is pleasant. Yet the
CHAPTER FOUR

identification with, the desire to be, the father is present from the very beginning. The conclusion can only be that the father who is to be "introjected" in the course of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex can only be a projection of the self. This is not quite so simple, since the pleasure ego is, as outlined above, altered by the pressure of reality, but it is important nonetheless.

The child's desire to possess the mother is from the beginning doomed to failure. The inevitability of this does not, as the observer can see, actually result from the prior claims and superior strength of the father. "[T]he Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its lack of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility."34 The father not only is not responsible for the infant's disappointments but he is also figured by the infant in a form determined by the megalomania of the narcissistic ego. The implications of this for the Freudian doctrine of authority and hence of morality will figure largely in the next chapter.

However this may be the formation of the Oedipus complex complicates and intensifies the identification with the father. "[T]he ambivalence inherent in the identification from the beginning
[has] now become manifest."35 At this point the narcissistic attachment to the ego becomes of central importance. The hostile wishes directed at the father activate the fear of castration, of a severe narcissistic loss. The castration complex leads to the smashing of the Oedipus complex and its replacement by the superego formation.

The mechanism by which this becomes powerful enough to have such a powerful impact on the structure of the ego becomes intimately bound up with the question of sexual difference in Freud's later work, and this will be discussed below in that connection. For the present it is sufficient to stress that this fear does not necessarily originate in a threat uttered by the father, indeed typically the threat will come from the mother or nurse.36 Despite this he comes to fear that the continuance of his dual Oedipal wishes, to possess the mother and to do away with the father, will result in his being punished in this way.

If the satisfaction of love in the field of the Oedipus complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound to arise between his narcissistic interest in that part of his body and the libidinal cathexis of the parental objects. In this conflict the first of these forces normally triumphs: the child's ego turns away from the Oedipus complex.37
The way in which the narcissistic ego-cathexis resolves this conflict is by an intensification and transformation of the identification with the father and the changing of the object-cathexis of the mother into "aim-inhibited affection", with the sexual aim abandoned: "By means of identification [the boy] takes the unattackable authority into himself. The authority now turns into his superego and enters into possession of all the aggressiveness which a child would have liked to exercise against it." 38

The previously external authority is now set up within the self, or more accurately, the ego alters its perceived relation to authority. This latter formulation returns to the suggestion above that the father of the Oedipus complex is a projection of the self. This cannot be said to be the dominant line in Freud, and its relation to a more "realistic" account will be examined below.

In either case the identification with the father takes its place as a modification of the ego, but one with a peculiar character. It is split off from the main body of the ego and passes into the unconscious, where it becomes an independent agency over against the main body of the ego. The ego is now divided into an actual and an ideal ego, a position implicit in
the earlier, pre-Oedipal, distinction between narcissistic ego-cathexis and the identification with the father. Although new influences can alter the superego the source of its power remains this origin in the most important formative moment.

It will be seen in the next chapter, in the context of the critique of religion, that Freud believes that overcoming this infantile relation to authority is one of the most important of human tasks. This cannot be understood until the relation of the superego to the process of civilisation is grasped, which is the task of the next section.

This section has shown that other relation has been definitive of the self, both in the formation of the ego and of the agency within it responsible for the moral sense. The centrality of infantile sexuality is opposed to the asexual independence of the infant Emile and means that the relation of individual morality to social regulation is fundamentally altered. This placing of desire at the ground of conscience also undermines the Rousseauean opposition of self-determining morality and passion. The next section will develop these arguments further through the consideration of Freud's culture-critical texts.
The Critique of Culture

This section passes from the formation of the individual ego and superego to the closely related critique of culture. From Totem and Taboo to Moses and Monotheism Freud worked out a critique of culture centred on an account of the origin and history, and a critique of religion. This and the late topography and instinct theory became inextricably intertwined so that no one of these three great elements of late Freudianism is fully explicable in isolation. It is in Civilisation and its Discontents that the late system is laid out most clearly, and in Moses and Monotheism that it reaches its climax, in a speculative history of civilisation as the remembering of a forgotten origin.

The purpose of this section is to summarise this movement. In particular the mutual dependence of Freud's accounts of individual and cultural formation is shown to stand in relation to the theme of the ambivalence of authority and desire. This will be more fully explored in the next chapter.

From the beginning Freud makes instinctual renunciation a task to be carried out in the service of "civilisation". (eg "Civilised" Sexual Morality)
1908) In this respect it is outside the economy of the instincts and indeed can be seen as explaining the futility of Freud's recurrent attempts to reduce his hermeneutic procedure to a science of energy flows. The existence of culture depends upon and demands a system of authority that cannot be accounted for economically, and indeed the central concept of cultural transmission, identification, proved absolutely impervious to any economic reduction.

Given this it would seem natural to seek the origin of this self-perpetuating cultural authority, especially given the genetic character of explanation within psychoanalysis. This is the context within which Totem and Taboo should be read, the need to explain the deus ex machina of civilisation. This becomes clearer as Freud's thought develops, especially with the late turn to the theory of culture, and reaches its climax in Civilisation and its Discontents and Moses and Monotheism, where the theory of culture is returned to the instinct theory, with what effect will be shown below.

In effect the theory of the primal horde allows the re-unification of instinct and authority in the person of the primal father. This is clearest in the
Group Psychology, a crucial text for Freudian politics. For present purposes the vital moment is that in which Freud recalls the theory of the primal horde, distinguishing between group and individual psychology.

The father is unconstrained by any impediment to the realisation of his desires, other than those of reality. Of the "three stern masters" one can say his ego knows nothing of the super-ego and hence is spared serious conflicts with the id. Only the pleasure principle, modified as the reality principle controls his actions. "[T]he father of the primal horde was free. His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in isolation, and his will needed no reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved no one but himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs. To objects his ego gave away no more than was barely necessary." 39

This image of the strong ego is one to which the succeeding chapter will return. For the present its resemblance to, and differences from, Rousseau's natural man should be noted. Like him the primal father is strong and independent, but unlike him this strength is exercised to dominate others. He
"prevented his sons from satisfying their directly sexual impulsions; .. He forced them .. into group psychology."  

If the ego is always a differentiated part of the id we can say that in this case it is able to remain in close and harmonious contact with it. Freud describes this figure as the Nietzschean overman, but it would be more accurate to see him as the "blond beast" operating before rather than beyond good and evil. The father is thus the archetype of the "strong ego". In the Group Psychology his is described as "individual psychology" as opposed to the group mentality of the brothers/sons. 

If the father represents the union of authority and desire his sons represent their total separation. They are completely under the sway of the strong individual. In this state of enforced instinctual frustration they are driven to an identification with one another that leaves their egos impoverished. This whole scene is most instructive if it is read back into the Oedipal scene. Given that it cannot claim any validity as the anthropology it appears to be. It is here read in a twofold way. On the one hand the externality that is achieved between repressive authority and repressed desire is to be seen as a key
to understanding a difficulty in Freudian theory, on the other it can be seen to throw new light on the Oedipal drama that it projects.

The primal father is the father as he appears within the Oedipus complex, that is he is the object of the child's ambivalent identification. He is what the child fears, but also what he dreams of being, and it is difficult to say which of these aspects of his being is primary. The father after all is the powerful narcissistic ego, the narcissist unrestrained by his weakness. In this respect he is the creature of the primitive ego, and may be seen as a reaction to the recognition of dependence that must dawn in the course of the Oedipal struggle.

In the story of the transition from the horde the replacement actually takes place, the father is murdered. At this point there is no internal compulsion that prevents it and if the sons feel strong enough they simply butcher and devour their father, returning their identification to the orality that is suggested as its model.

The two outstanding accounts of the murder and its aftermath appear in Totem and Taboo and Civilisation and its Discontents. In both ambivalence is made
central to the instantiation of the taboo structure that is the ancestor of the modern superego. In this story the role of this ambivalence is much clearer than in that of the individual Oedipus complex, where as outlined above, narcissistic attachment to the penis is more prominent, and ambivalence about the father subordinate to it.

_Totem and Taboo_ introduced Freud's hypothesis of the origin of society in the acting out of the Oedipus complex. In this text the term "ambivalence" has a very prominent place, but is given a sense somewhat at variance from that which it has in the account of the Oedipus complex given above. In _Totem and Taboo_ ambivalence is defined in terms of the conscious/unconscious distinction, and as concerning an act rather than a person. In this way this original ambivalent conflict, which is held to be common to obsessional neurotics and to the originators of taboo, is between authority and desire, rather than between desires.

This reflects the state of Freudian theory at the moment of this text (1913). The theory of narcissism was just emerging. The ego-instincts, with their intimate connection with the unifying and authoritative agency, as yet undifferentiated, stand
over against the libidinal instincts, the representatives of unruly desire. Ambivalence in this context is concerned above all with temptation and transgression, as concerning "both a wish and a counter-wish." This leads Freud to his definition of taboo as "a primaeval prohibition forcibly imposed (by some authority) from outside, and directed against the most powerful longings to which human beings are subject. The desire to violate it persists in their unconscious; those who obey the taboo have an ambivalent attitude to what the taboo prohibits." These most powerful longings are those found in the Oedipus complex, to kill the father and to possess the mother.

This first definition of ambivalence as standing close to the pressure of a repressed impulse is soon supplemented with another, although the difference between them is not registered in the text. This second ambivalence concerns the dead, and is held to be "the classical example, the prototype, of the ambivalence of human emotions." In this "prototype" "behind the tender love" that is felt towards a deceased person "there is a concealed hostility in the unconscious" that wished for and welcomed their death. From the conflict that arises after a death, between the conscious affection and unconscious
exulting, calls forth a defence, first of projection of the hostility onto the dead person, so that the dead become hostile spirits, and then into a taboo on the dead. "The taboo upon the dead arises .. from the contrast between conscious pain and unconscious satisfaction over the death that has occurred."47

From these considerations Freud goes on to speculate that conscience has the same origin as that he has ascribed to taboo. That it "arose, on a basis of emotional ambivalence, from quite specific human relations to which this ambivalence was attached; .. one of the opposing feelings involved [is made] unconscious and kept under by the compulsive domination of the other one"48 This is the key to the critique of civilisation that was to culminate in Civilisation and its Discontents and Moses and Monotheism. Freud postulates that morality is a social phenomenon that is instantiated in each individual through the fantastic repetition of its founding moment, the primal murder.

This story of this act is outlined in Totem and Taboo as follows. Freud accepts a hypothesis of Darwin's that the earliest humans lived in a "primal horde". This horde is said to have consisted of a single dominant male with "as many wives as he could support
and obtain, whom he would have jealously guarded against all other men." The younger males that are borne to the wives are expelled from the horde when they reach an age when they could be a threat to their father.49

One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their father and made an end to the patriarchal horde. United, they had the courage to do and succeeded in doing what would have been impossible for them individually. ... Cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured their victim as well as killing him. The violent father had doubtless been the feared and envied model of each one of the company of brothers: and in the act of devouring him they accomplished their identification with him, and each one of them acquired a portion of his strength. The totem meal, which is perhaps mankind's earliest festival, would thus be a repetition and a commemoration of of this memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of so many things - of social organisation, of moral restrictions and of religion.50

These far reaching consequences result from the mechanism of resolution of an ambivalent conflict already observed in connection with the dead.

They hated their father, who presented such a formidable obstacle to their craving for power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired him too. After they had got rid of him, had satisfied their hatred and had put into effect their desire to identify with him, the affection which had all this time been pushed under was bound to make itself felt. It did so in the form of remorse.51

This story, wherein the primal father is murdered and devoured and the remorse felt by the sons leads to
his internalisation in taboo, the forerunner of the modern superego, and his veneration as the totem, the prototype of religion, forms the basis of all Freud's subsequent cultural writings. What is stressed here is that it also provides the foundation for the theory of the Oedipal drama each of us passes through. The primal murder is the condition of possibility for every individual's superego. This will be more extensively discussed in the next chapter, where the "phylogenetic residue" will be shown to be indispensable to the structure of Freudian theory.

In *Civilisation and its Discontents* this theory of the origin of culture was combined with the late theory of the instincts in a powerful synthesis that brings together the various strands of Freudian theory. Before examining this it will be necessary to set out that instinct theory.
Instincts and Ambivalence

In the Three Essays on Sexuality (1905) and in the essay 'The Psychoanalytic View of Psychogenic Disturbance of Vision' (1910), in which the term ego-instincts is introduced, may be found the outline of the first "pre-narcissism" theory of the instincts. The best summary of the middle period is in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915), which shows Freud grappling with the implications for his instinct theory of the idea that the ego itself can be a libidinal object. Finally the late theory is set out in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in The Ego and the Id, and in Civilisation and its Discontents.

In the Three Essays on Sexuality Freud's attention is directed to the force of sexuality and to the deformations due to its repression. This is ascribed primarily to "shame, disgust, pity, and the structures of morality and authority erected by society." Much emphasis is laid on the fragmented character of the sexual instincts, with component instincts arising from discrete "erotogenic zones" and only subsequently being unified under the dominance of the genitals.
In the 1910 essay he introduced the term "ego-instincts", and this marked a clarification of the duality between instincts of "hunger and love" posited in the Three Essays. He now sees "undeniable opposition between the instincts which subserve sexuality, .. and those other instincts which have as their aim the self-preservation of the individual - the ego instincts." The process of repression is still held to be in the service of "civilisation" but now the mechanism is focused on the conflict between instincts. "The sexual and ego-instincts alike have in general the same organs and systems of organs at their disposal." This "is bound to lead to pathological conflict if the two fundamental instincts are disunited and if the ego maintains a repression of the sexual component instinct concerned." 

Symptoms are now traced to the problems of "an organ with a double claim on it - its relation to the conscious ego and to repressed sexuality". Freud remarks in the 1923 article on 'The Libido Theory' that: "The nature of the ego-instincts remained for the time being undefined and, like all the other characteristics of the ego, inaccessible to analysis." The pathological conflict of instincts seemed accidental, and it stood in an uncertain
relation to the conflict of the sexual instincts with "civilisation" which the 1908 "Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness" makes clear is at the centre of Freud's thought.

The next development of the instinct theory took place as part of the shift towards interest in the ego in the papers on narcissism and on narcissistic disorders. The consequences of these developments are summarised in 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' (1915).

In 'On Narcissism: an Introduction', (1914) Freud put forward the idea that libido can take the I as its object, can be independent of external objects. This "antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido", reinforcement of one implying diminution of the other, means that that between sexual and ego-instincts needs to be rethought. In that same essay Freud stresses the connection between the duality of the instincts and a distinction between a "two-fold existence of the individual", who is at once a self-centred entity and an "appendage of his germ plasm" the "mortal vehicle of an .. immortal substance".

This situation in which instinctual dualism was stressed, but at the same time undermined by
developments in the theory of the ego was recalled in

Civilisation and its Discontents:

Since the ego-instincts, too, were libidinal, it seemed for a time inevitable that we should make libido coincide with instinctual energy in general, as C.G. Jung had already advocated earlier. Nevertheless, there still remained in me a kind of conviction, for which I was not as yet able to find reasons, that the instincts could not all be of the same kind. 63

His response to this is to appeal to the origin of the dual instinct theory in the observation of the transference neuroses, and to say that: "Since then we cannot give it up." The new extension of the libido theory, by which this instinct can be transformed from ego- to object-libido and vice versa, is limited by the idea that "libido remains libido ... and never turns into egoistic interest, and the converse is also true. This thesis ... is equivalent to the separation between the sexual and ego-instincts ... which we shall continue to hold for heuristic reasons until its possible collapse." 64

Instinctual monism was the heresy that was at the centre with Freud's painful break with Jung. The denial of the specifically sexual nature of libido was the core of Jung's departure from orthodoxy. The collapse of dualism in his own theory was troubling, and a new form of dualism, safe from the difficulties
posed by narcissism was soon developed. This was the "mythological" system of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

This has one of its roots in Freud's long-standing interest in the place of aggression in the economy of the instincts. In the Three Essays on Sexuality sadism had already been the subject of a discussion in which the place of aggressiveness as a component of sexuality was mentioned. This was described as "a desire to subjugate; the biological significance of which seems to lie in the need for overcoming the resistance of the sexual object by means other than wooing." 65 In this stage aggressiveness was considered principally as a component of the sexual instinct. However in the second essay of the group an independent origin of aggression is also suggested. 66

In the course of Freud's development this situation, where aggressiveness was seen either as a libidinal component instinct or as derived from the group of ego-instincts was further complicated by the hypothesis of narcissism. The resolution to the problem was found in the positing of the death instinct, from which the aggressive instincts were held to derive. Before moving on to a brief consideration of the concept "instinct" it will be
useful to summarise this brief of the history of the
instinctual classification in relation to
ambivalence.

The first distinction between ego- and libidinal
instincts was an essentially external one. Their
conflict was accidental, due to their struggle to
control the "organs" of the body. The necessity of
repression was traced to the action of "civilisation"
of which the organised ego acted as the
representative. In this struggle the self-
-preservative instincts were to provide the force for
the ego.

Once the distinction between these two groups was
thrown into question a new possibility of an immanent
struggle between them was opened up. This is
reflected in the increasing importance of the concept
of ambivalence in Freud's thought, borrowed from
Bleuler in 1912 Ambivalence is central in the
argument of 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes', in
which the possibility of transformations of love into
hate is traced to the libidinal process of ego-
formation, the central insight of the theory of
narcissism.

The hate which is admixed with the love is in part
derived from the preliminary stages of loving
which have not been wholly surmounted; it is also in part based on reactions of repudiation by the ego-instincts, which, in view of the frequent conflicts between the interests of the ego and those of love, can find grounds in real and contemporary motives.69

Since the ego and libido are now inextricably intertwined their conflict becomes an ambivalent and internal one. This process is further developed in the late synthesis in which ambivalence is internalised as an intrapsychic relation.

The model is of a mental field into which the pressure of the instincts introduces a disturbance that the action of the pleasure principle seeks to remove. The instincts are a source of mental energy, or stimulation. The statement in the Three Essays on Sexuality is typical: "By an 'instinct' is provisionally to be understood the psychical representative of of an endosomatic, continuously flowing source of stimulation, as contrasted with a 'stimulus', which is set up by single excitations coming from without"70

'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' spells this out in relation to the processes of the mind. Having considered the contrast between the instincts and external sources of stimulus Freud concludes that their "essential nature" can be derived from "their
main characteristics - their origin in sources of stimulation within the organism and their appearance as a constant force - and from this we deduce one of their further feature, namely that no actions of flight avail against them."71

In relation to this the nervous system is defined as: "an apparatus which has the function of getting rid of the stimuli that reach it, or of reducing them to the lowest possible level".72 Freud does not differentiate between the pleasure and constancy principles, as he would later. The pleasure principle is rather contrasted to its modification, the reality principle, which takes note of obstacles and difficulties to take round about routes to satisfaction.73

In this general account of the nature of the instincts and of their relation to the mental apparatus the different instincts are traced back to a common ground: "the instincts are all qualitatively alike and owe the effect they make only to the amount of excitation they carry."74 The instincts are seen as essentially active: "[The ego] is forced by its instincts onto a quite special degree of activity towards the external world .. [it] is passive in
respect of external stimuli but active through its own instincts."75

Having established the essentials of the pre Beyond the Pleasure Principle theory of the instincts it is now possible to read that text. In terms of the development of the classification of the instincts Freud indicates that the theory of Eros may be regarded as the intensification of the tendency to identify libidinal and self-preservatory instincts:

"it is all the more necessary to lay stress on the libidinal character of the self-preservative instincts now that we are venturing upon the further step of recognising the sexual instinct as Eros, the preserver of all things".76 The argument that follows returns to the problems of sadism and of aggressiveness.

He suggests that in sadism may be discovered "an example of a death instinct", which has been directed outwards as aggressiveness.77 In this way he makes possible the appearance of a smoother transition to the death instinct theory than would otherwise present itself. This has been taken up in the expository literature originating within Freudian psychoanalysis itself, where a transitional concern with the problem of the independent origin of
aggression is inserted as a "third stage" in the development of Freud's theory between the adoption of the theory of narcissism and the appearance of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 78

By contrast a much greater emphasis on a second problem is common to the interpretations offered from outside psychoanalysis 79 and to those writing within the Lacanian tradition, where the death instinct has a great prominence, and where philosophical concerns are often important. 80 This cites the idea of the compulsion to repeat and the new attention to the fundamental nature of instinctuality as such marked by Freud's discussion of it.

A third strand in the argument of is the biological speculation that re-appears in it concerning the "germ-plasm" and the dual biological existence of any living thing. 81 The idea is that the individual is both itself, and concerned with its own survival, and the bearer or vehicle of a potentially immortal species identity. This idea had long been associated in Freud's mind with instinct theory, and is now invoked in connection with this new version of it. 82

The first three sections of Beyond the Pleasure Principle are devoted to bringing forward a number of
phenomena, from the war neuroses, children's play, and the typical events of analysis, which indicate the operation of a primitive compulsion to repeat events from the past even, or particularly, those that have no possibility of giving pleasure. The first explanation of this compulsion that Freud offers is that it acts to "bind" or to master experiences. This is a "function of the mental apparatus which, though it does no contradict the pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure." 

From this Freud passes to the idea that the compulsion to repeat has an "instinctual character" and that this has put him "on the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general ... [A]n instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces". As the next paragraph notes: "This view of instincts strikes us as strange because we have become used to see in them a factor impelling towards change and development, whereas we are now asked to recognise in them the precise contrary - an
expression of the *conservative* nature of living
substance."}

From this comes the idea of the place of death in
instinctual life.

The attributes of life were at some time evoked in
inanimate matter by the action of a force of whose
nature we can form no conception. ... The tension
that then arose in what had hitherto been an
inanimate substance endeavoured to cancel itself
out. In this way the first instinct came into
being: the instinct to return to the inanimate
state."}

The compulsion to repeat, to return to an earlier
state, can find its terminus only in this return to
the inanimate. While the first dramatic introduction
of this hypothesis seems to bring even the sexual
instincts under it these soon assert their
difference. They too are conservative, but they are
"conservative to a higher degree in that they are
peculiarly resistant to external influences; and they
are conservative too in another sense in that they
preserve life itself for a comparatively long period.
They are the true life instincts."}

From this Freud goes on to posit a "sharp distinction
between the 'ego instincts' and the sexual instincts,
.. the former exercise pressure towards death and the
latter towards a prolongation of life."}

Libido is
transformed by this theory from a somatic sexual desire, originating in the "erotogenic zones" into "the Eros of the poets and philosophers which holds all living things together."\textsuperscript{90}

From an initial position where ego and sexual instincts were opposed to one another, but apparently only accidentally, there developed the opposition of ego and object libido, where opposition existed in that these were involved in what games theorists would call a "zero sum" relationship, to this final theory where the instincts are opposed in their very essence. In this last case ambivalence becomes a primary fact of instinctual life.
Culture Critique and Instinctual Ambivalence

In Civilisation and its Discontents Freud brings the various elements discussed in this chapter together. The theory of the instincts, of the origin of the superego, and of civilisation are synthesised. To begin with the implicit relation between the sense of guilt, the Oedipus complex and the primal murder is much more clearly set out: "man's sense of guilt springs from the Oedipus complex and was acquired at the killing of the father by the brothers banded together." 91 Secondly this sense of guilt is analysed in terms of the economy of the instincts in a new way. "[T]he sense of guilt is an expression of the conflict due to ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between Eros and the instinct of destruction or death." 92

The relation of the individual Oedipus complex and the primal murder will be considered at more length in the next chapter, in the context of Freud's critique of religion. Here the synthesis of the theories of the superego and of the instincts will be analysed. Again this will recur in the next chapter, where its importance for the accounts of religion and of femininity will be explored.
The problem from which Freud begins his discussion of this relation is that of a peculiarity of the superego: "the more virtuous a man is the more severe and distrustful is its behaviour, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness [Heiligkeit] furthest who reproach themselves with the worst sinfulness." This is because of the particular relation that subsists between the superego and aggressiveness.

The internalisation of the feared father is now understood in terms of the redirection of the aggressive impulses felt towards him. This was briefly mentioned above in the section on the Oedipus complex. It is now possible to go more fully into it, and in particular to see the connection between it and the theory of civilisation that makes Freud state that "the price we pay for our advance in civilisation is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt." In the formation of the superego the aggressive feelings, the representatives of the death instinct, are localised in the superego: "every piece of aggression whose satisfaction the subject gives up is taken over by the super-ego and increases the latter's aggressiveness (against the ego)."
way aggressiveness is neutralised by being directed inwards, and what is more every such redirection provides the possibility of further renunciation of aggression.

The importance of this in the context of the argument of *Civilisation and its Discontents* is that Freud has previously cited instinctual aggressiveness as the most fundamental obstacle to the process of civilisation.\textsuperscript{96} He can therefore see the process of civilisation as a process in the service of Eros and as a continuation on a grand scale of the dialectic established between life and death by the disturbance of the calm of the inanimate by the coming into being of living substance.

As he summarises his thesis in *Civilisation and its Discontents*:

> the inclination to aggression is an original, self-subsisting instinctual disposition in man, and ... it constitutes the greatest impediment to civilisation. ... [C]ivilisation [is] a special process that mankind undergoes ... in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples, and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this has to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this.\textsuperscript{97}

The price to be paid is the increasing sense of guilt, brought about by the direction against the ego
of the aggression that is denied expression against others. The external authority of the father, first the primal father and then each individual's father, is internalised as the punishing agency of the superego. Superego, civilisation and the instincts are brought together in a theory of guilt, or rather of the sense of guilt, as the essence of morality.
Psychoanalysis as a Science of Liberation

The sense in which psychoanalysis is a science of liberation can be seen both in the theory of therapy and in the culture critique. One of the clearest and most succinct statements of the goals of analysis is in the late 'Outline of Psychoanalysis'. It is worth quoting at some length.

The ego is weakened by internal conflict and we must go to its help. The position is like that of a civil war which has to be determined by the assistance of an ally from outside. The analytic physician and the patient's weakened ego, basing themselves on the real external world, have to band themselves together into a party against the enemies, the instinctual demands of the id and the conscientious demands of the superego. Our knowledge is to make up for [the patient's] ignorance and to give his ego back its mastery over lost provinces of his mental life.

The aim of analysis is to strengthen the ego, and this in two directions, against both the id and the superego. Repression, the exclusion of instinctual forces from the integrated structures of the self, is the response of an ego too weak to deal with them. It is for this reason characteristic of the earliest period of life, when the ego has not had time to develop sufficient strength to cope with the instincts in less drastic and more integrative ways, such as sublimation.
The dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the superego form a limit case of repression. Freud hesitates indeed as to whether it should be called repression at all, since it is so far reaching as to transform the ego and the material repressed is so powerfully driven from the ego-structures as to exclude any possibility of its return. In this case the strengthening of the ego takes place through the "depersonalisation" of the superego, the erosion of the link between this agency, which is permanent, and the subject's father. This allows the separation of one, rational, element of morality, from another, derived from its origin.

The two movements, of the integration of repressed instinctual forces into the self and the transformation of the superego are to strengthen and liberate the ego. The nature of the second of these, the transformation of the superego, will be the central theme of the next chapter, which will argue that it is here that the limits of Freud's idea of freedom become clear.

In Rousseau the phenomenon of conscience was to be understood in terms of an originary goodness and integrity. In Freud, by contrast, the essence of conscience is a guilt that reflects the essential
dividedness of humankind. Like Rousseau Freud sees civilisation as the root of guilt, but he does not posit a time of peace before it. Guilt emerges as the alternative to the unrestrained rule of the strongest in the primal horde. In this sense Freud makes guilt original, where Rousseau sees it as secondary, positing an original innocence.

The fundamental discovery of infantile sexuality, and the displacement of integral subjectivity also have profound implications for the conception of freedom. This is not, as in Rousseau, infinitely transgressive, but rather concerned with the freeing of the self from infinite demands. Freud makes the ego the self-limiting central institution of the self, and morality one of the demands against which it must rebel.

In this the vision of fundamental and inescapable ambivalence is of the greatest significance. The very existence of life calls forth the instincts of death so that these must be contained. In Civilisation and its Discontents he argues that the destructive urges can only be tamed by turning them inwards. It does not seem that sublimation can be effective on these instincts; ambivalence means that guilt and civilisation are inseparable. There are texts, and
again this will be dealt with in the next chapter, where alternatives are raised, but in general this "pessimistic" view dominates.

This rejection of illusion and of excessive hope must be seen as more and not less life affirming than Rousseau's embrace of imagination. In Rousseau the excessive freedom came to its terminus in Julie's death and the collapse of Clarens. Even where its fragile existence could be sustained it was only at the expense of the repression and exploitation of a femininity rigorously subordinated to masculine freedom.

In Freud the resignation and realism are the core of maturity as it is achieved through the strengthening of the ego. These allow the self to free itself through the overcoming of the deformations imposed by instinctual ambivalence. The Freudian response to the tensions of human existence is not flight but the negotiation of what autonomy can be won through the application of reason, of the reality principle of which the ego is the bearer. The next chapter will examine the mechanisms of this more closely and discover that here too woman must be sacrificed, and that the limits of liberation are drawn in such a way that a reappraisal of freedom is demanded.
CHAPTER FIVE: LIMITS OF ANALYSIS

The previous chapter set out a reading of Freudian psychoanalysis as a science of liberation. It stressed the importance of the idea of ambivalence and the consequent limited character of the freedom offered by analysis. The strengthening of the ego is the victory of a realism that accepts the boundaries of finitude. There is no escape from the suffering imposed by the conflict between the instincts and between the instincts and the actually possible. The task of the ego is to "tame", to constrain and to redirect the instincts in order to make this conflict bearable. In the struggle to achieve this a crucial moment is the overcoming of compulsive super-ego morality, with its origin in a pre-rational relation to the authority of the father, and its prototype in the obedience to the will of the primal father.

The reinforcement of the ego is the victory of reason over both desire and authority. It is this victory that makes analysis a science. For Freud his life work was a moment in the scientific extension of the reality principle, of the growth of ego-syntonic methods of control of nature and above all of internal nature. The recognition of the limits of this, as of all human endeavour was an important
aspect of his message. It is this that makes the contrast between Freud and Rousseau instructive.

This second chapter turns to the unresolved tensions of the Freudian position, and particularly to the problem of gender. It is argued that while the stress on limit and realism is an integral and self-conscious moment of Freud's thought a careful analysis of the limit as drawn in this dimension exposes a weakness in Freudian thought. In particular it is argued that the ambivalence that is the distinctive and crucial centre of this thought fails here. The relation between desire and authority is never made an internal one and this leaves Freud in the position of having to find authority outside the economy of desire. It is this that accounts for the eccentricity of his anthropology and of the closely related absurdity of the "archaic heritage", on the genetic transmission of memory. The same difficulty is shown to be bound inextricably to the misogyny of his thought, its placing of a rejection of femininity at the heart of the formation of the subject, and its affirmation of this rejection.

Both in Freud and in Rousseau sexual difference is essential to the formation of the ethical subject, and in both this is obscured in many texts that take
masculinity as the norm, suppressing its dependence on the feminine other. In Freud this dependence becomes clear in those texts from the mid 1920s on that turn their attention to the feminine. This turn is accompanied by a deepening of the understanding of the nature and import of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, and of the role of sexual difference in it.

This theme can be usefully approached through the 1937 article on 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. There Freud discusses as one of the most intractable of analytic problems the "repudiation of femininity". It is suggested that both men and women are in flight from the position of woman, and that this flight is the source of many of the most difficult pathological formations encountered by analysts. What is more, Freud stresses the necessity of the analyst overcoming this and enforcing the feminine in the case of women.

In this article he makes explicit his complicity with a rigid system of gender identity the nature of which may be traced through his writings on femininity in particular, and which, it becomes clear, is essential to the system of his thought. This attitude to gender is one limit to the liberation of the ego, that it
cannot be extended to women. The apparently casual and unsystematic passages scattered through Freud's writings which refer to the irrational, amoral, and antisocial nature of women can be seen, through a careful consideration of the role of sexual difference and of the flight from femininity in forming the characters of the two sexes in the Oedipal drama, to be indispensable.

This problem in regard of gender is connected to another, which is most notably analysed in Ricoeur's *Freud and Philosophy*. This is his denial of the possibility of the ego's transcending its position in relation. No ego morality is possible, and hence the imposition of compulsive super-ego morality through the terror of the Oedipus complex has as its main alternative the return of the terror of the primal horde. This is the fear that haunts the pages of *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, and of *Civilisation and its Discontents*. The utopian vision of *The Future of an Illusion*, with its replacement of compulsion with rational assent, is a fleeting one. More typical is Freud's famous pessimism, which sees as the only alternative to the unleashing of the terror of the death instinct turning this terror against the self through the action of the super-ego.
This problem in Freud must be seen in the context of the place of the idea of ambivalence in his thought, with which the first chapter on Freud began. There are two fundamental ambivalent relations in Freud. There is the primal ambivalence between eros and death, in which the two great instinctual formations are inseparably bound together; and there is the ambivalence of desire and authority, in which the structures of the super-ego are put in place by and as desire. The limit of psychoanalytic liberation is figured in the way in which this second ambivalent relation can never become fully internalised. There remains an element of pure externality in the relation of authority and desire, and Freud's attempt to deal with this leads to the absurdities of the "archaic residue" and of the myth of the primal murder.

Civilisation, culture, is ultimately imposed on the self, and cannot become unified with it. Despite the placing of relation at the heart of the formation of the subject the externality is not overcome, the cultural cannot be owned and hence terror remains necessary. What is more this terror cannot be sublimated by women as it can by men. In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', in many ways the most profound of all Freud's reflections on the place of
the feminine in his thought, a feminine morality of desire is posited. Women can never experience the full terror of castration, and thus can never overcome it. They can never identify with the father but only desire him. For them morality must remain external and their relation to it is the desire to be punished.

'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' must be read with this in mind. Because cultural imperatives can never fully be rationalised, never be owned, even by men, the masochistic feminine identity must be enforced. Freud not only describes but polices a misogynistic system of rigid gender identity. The next, and last, chapter introduces the writings of Kierkegaard to suggest that a relation to freedom that rejects both the flight from actuality of Rousseau, and the resigned acceptance of Freud, offers the possibility of transcending the rigid and hierarchical sexual systems they have both described and enforced.
Gender and Ethics.

In this section it is argued that the "repudiation of femininity" discussed in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' is an essential element of the formation of the superego, and of masculine ethics. The corollary of this is that there must be a different ethics for women, a feminine ethics for those who can and must not repudiate femininity, or rather who must learn to live with that repudiation as a rejection of themselves. Such a form of ethical existence is described in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism', where moral masochism is described. This is not explicitly made the form of relation to morality proper to the feminine but this connection can be traced through Freud's account of the femininity and is implicit in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' where masochism is a feminine trait.

The masculine relation to ethics may usefully be contrasted to this masochism. The superego was above discussed as a limit on the freedom of action of the ego. In the present context it becomes clear that it itself is also a liberator. Through the dual processes of sublimation and of depersonalisation of the superego the internalisation of the father's authority opens the possibility of freeing the
constraint essential to social life from its compulsive and blindly authoritarian character. The social imperative of controlling the instincts in order to avoid conflict with others and allow the smooth functioning of a cultural order can be rationalised only through its "owning" by the medium of the formation and subsequent transformation of the superego, and through the sublimation of instinct of which this identificatory process is the prototype.

When the role of gender is examined it emerges that this liberation is available only to men and that the motive force behind it is misogyny, or more correctly misophobia. The fear which drives the masculine subject out of the Oedipal position and brings into being the superego is specifically fear of becoming (like) a woman. It is necessary that the boy has seen the female (lack of) genitals in order for the threat of castration to be sufficiently dreadful. For this reason girls never emerge from the Oedipus complex and never form strong superegos. It is arguable, and will be briefly argued at the end of the present chapter, that this does not necessarily exclude the possibility of a feminine ethic other than a masochistic desire for punishment but it is important that in the Freudian schema it does have this effect.
The full reasons for this are to be discussed in the next section of this chapter and are crucial to the argument of the next and last chapter wherein a critique of Freud drawing on the work of Kierkegaard is developed. Here it suffices to say that the central point is the impossibility of an "ego ethics". Rational calculation of interest is the closest the Freudian ego can come to an ethical principle and Freud is rightly sceptical of the power of this to contain the "destructive instincts". For this reason the terror of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex remains necessary as do its misogynistic consequences. Only a rethinking of the relation of ego to ethics and hence of the nature of freedom can offer an escape from this melancholy conclusion, the core of Freud's famous pessimism.

The Repudiation of Femininity as the Possibility of Culture.

In beginning the assessment of the relation of gender to ethics in Freud it is necessary to return to the dissolution of the Oedipus complex and the putting in place of the superego. In the previous chapter this process was discussed in terms of the joining together of the three pre-Oedipal currents: of narcissism; of "anaclitic" object choice directed to
the mother; and of identification with the father. It was shown that a narcissistic fear of castration resolved the ambivalence of the identification with the father, which was intensified by rivalry over the mother, by means of internalisation. The ambivalent relation to the external object is replaced by a dynamically unconscious alteration of the ego.

In this the instinctual forces can be expressed and "released" through an intrapsychic relation between agencies. The superego punishes, or conversely offers love to, the ego. The relation with its mixture of hostility and narcissistic affection replicates the ambivalent identification. In addition it enforces a transformation of the object choice of the mother into an "aim inhibited affection", thus allowing the defusing of the real situation of conflict with the father, which has now been internalised as the relation between ego and superego. What was not spelled out there was the nature of the narcissistic terror that played the crucial role in taking the identification to the point of decisive alteration of the ego. This is known as the castration complex and is the point at which sexual difference becomes part of the structure of Freudian thought.
The key texts here are 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' (1924) and 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes' (1925). These marked a new concern with femininity, and with the different paths taken by the sexes through the Oedipus complex, something previously neglected. Their implications were further developed in 'Female Sexuality' (1931) and in the essay in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1933) on 'The Psychology of Women'. In these essays and in others like 'Medusa's Head' (1932) sexual difference, and specifically the "repudiation of femininity" came to play an increasing role in Freud's explanation of masculinity. Where the early texts had made femininity merely a mirror image of masculinity it became clear that masculinity itself was founded on flight from the feminine.

The decisive development was the new attention to the mechanisms of the end of the Oedipus complex that followed from the new topography and the super ego in particular. As early as 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' in 1914 the connection between the moral agency that was just coming into view and the castration complex had begun to emerge. In this essay Freud indicates that the castration complex is an
important determinant of the suppression of infantile sexuality and that it works through the medium of a narcissistic attachment to the penis.\textsuperscript{1}

This in turn leads to the setting up of an ego ideal which can be the haven of the disrupted narcissism.\textsuperscript{2}

This early stage in the development of the new topography is summed up thus: "The development of the ego consists in a departure from primary narcissism and gives rise to a vigorous attempt to recover that state. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido onto an ego ideal imposed from without; and satisfaction is brought about from fulfilling that ideal."\textsuperscript{3}

At this stage the details of the castration complex are neglected and the role of identification much less prominent. This was to be the route through which, in 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1915) the final theory was approached, with the new understanding of the importance of mechanisms of identification and introjection, but the detail of the castration complex was neglected until after the elaboration of the topography in \textit{The Ego and the Id} (1923).

As late as this last text Freud continued to suggest that the dissolution of the Oedipus complex in girls
was a kind of mirror image of that in boys. Having stressed that in boys an identification with the father is the "normal outcome" of the end of the Oedipus complex (as outlined in the previous chapter) Freud goes on to write: "In a precisely analogous way the outcome of the Oedipus attitude in a little girl may be an intensification of her identification with her mother (or the setting up of such an identification for the first time) - a result which will fix the child's feminine character." 4

This indicates that he had not thought through the implications of the importance of the castration complex in this connection. It is clear that a girl cannot be driven by the possibility of the loss of the penis, unless one were to ascribe to her belief that she possesses one, an extension of the theory of the "phallic period" Freud never made. This "disavowal" of the absence of the female penis is a feature of the boy's perception of the world, but is explicitly not also held to be the same in girls. 6

The essays in which finally the importance of sexual difference in the ending of the Oedipus was recognised were 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex', and 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes' (henceforth
'Anatomical Sex Distinction'), of, respectively, 1924 and 1925. The importance of this development is usually, and rightly, held to be the new insight it allowed into femininity, but what this sometimes obscures is what is here stressed, that this implies a new understanding of masculinity. Where this had previously been self-definitive, with femininity as an obscure deviation, now the two sexual identities are explicitly created by reference to one another. Indeed if anything femininity is the positive of which masculinity is the negative, or more properly the negativity of femininity acquires priority. Masculinity is now a flight from femininity, its positivity the negation of a negation.

This can be seen in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', where the last section deals with the repudiation of femininity. The basis of this "remarkable feature in the psychical life of human beings" may be traced in the essays referred to in the previous section. Its essence is the way in which it is the absence of the penis in the female that forces the boy out of the Oedipal phallic sexual organisation and into the latency period, via the "smashing" of the Oedipus complex.
In 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' Freud makes clear that "what brings about the destruction of the child's phallic genital organisation is [the] threat of castration." This threat, Freud believes usually to be made in connection with masturbation, but he also states that even if not actually made it will be imagined. The significance of this point will be returned to when the "archaic heritage" is discussed. In the present context what is important is the role played by the observation of the female genitals in the effectiveness of this threat.

This had long been recognised, along with the universal attribution of a penis in the phallic phase of development. The first mention of it appears in 1908 in 'On the Sexual Theories of Children', and it also occupies a prominent place in the "Little Hans" case history of 1909. But it is only after The Ego and the Id that the full story is spelt out, in connection with the new interest in the mechanisms that bring to an end the Oedipal-phallic period.

Sooner or later the child, who is so proud of his possession of a penis, has a view of the genital region of a little girl, and cannot help being convinced of the absence of a penis in a creature who is so like himself. With this, the loss of his own penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of castration takes its deferred effect.
It now becomes clear that it is precisely the existence of women, and the fear of becoming like them that drive the "more than a repression"\textsuperscript{13} that destroys the Oedipus complex. The various effects of this, the turning away from the mother, the identification with the father and the establishment of the superego are attempts to become masculine, and even more to avoid becoming feminine. As Freud writes in \textit{Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety} (1926):

"precisely in the interests of masculinity (that is to say, from fear of castration), every activity belonging to masculinity is stopped."\textsuperscript{14}

The formation of the masculine character, and of the superego are the result of the terror of becoming a woman. It is this that expresses itself in the masculine repudiation of femininity as set out in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', and in the attitude to women that is left as a precipitate of this period. This mixes fear, derived from the reminder of castration, with contempt for this incomplete and mutilated creature.\textsuperscript{15}

As Freud put it in his essay 'Female Sexuality': "it is the discovery of the possibility of castration, as proved by the sight of the female genitals, which forces on [the boy] the transformation of his Oedipus
CHAPTER FIVE

complex, and which leads to the creation of his super-ego and thus initiates all the processes that are designed to make the individual find a place in the cultural community.  

Masculinity is defined by flight from the feminine. It is this that opens up the possibility of the cultural process, the nature of which will be more extensively considered below. What is now clear is that this process can only be understood in its relation to the other on which it depends, on femininity. The girl child must react to the castration complex in a different way. For her the penis cannot be protected, but must rather be desired. The meaning of this difference in relation to the interaction of gender and moral identity is explored in the next section.

Femininity and (lack of) Ethics.

The following very striking passage occurs in the 'Anatomical Sex Distinction' essay.

In girls the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus complex is lacking. ... Thus the Oedipus complex escapes the fate in meets with in boys: it may be slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or its effects may persist far into the woman's normal mental life. I cannot evade the notion (though I hesitate to give it expression) that for women the level of what is ethically
normal is different from what it is in men. Character-traits which critics of every epoch have brought up against women - that they show less sense of justice than men, that they are less ready to submit to the great exigencies of life, that they are more often influenced in their judgements by feelings of affection or hostility - all these would be amply accounted for by the modification in the formation of their super-ego which we have inferred above.17

This discovery must have been comfortable for Freud, since even before he had a theoretical basis for it this judgement of women came naturally to him.18 Now the reason for the non- or anti-cultural essence of the feminine could be explained it was possible for him to examine it more closely. In this context this is interesting primarily for the light it throws on masculinity, since the Freudian account of femininity itself is now well worked. It will, however reappear at the end of the present chapter where its contrast to the Rousseauean will be examined.

For the purposes of the present argument the key text, often neglected in the account of Freud and femininity is 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' (1924). The significance of this text is usually sought in its development of the implications of the theory of the death instinct through the positing of a "primary masochism". It has not often been seen that it is of great importance in understanding the way in which the feminine character, with its weak
superego and inadequately dealt with Oedipus complex, relates to the moral law. This provides new insight into the importance of the super-ego, which allows a grasp of its role as liberator of the ego, usually overshadowed by its persona as "harsh master". This in turn will lead to the limit of freedom in psychoanalysis, and thence both back to femininity and misogyny, and forward to Kierkegaard, faith, and the "suspension" of the ethical and of gender.

In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' three forms of masochism are discussed: erotogenic, feminine, and moral masochism. These three correspond to the realms of instinct theory; history of the formation of the subject as gendered; and topographical account of ethical identity, respectively. Here it will be necessary briefly to survey the first two before turning to a more extensive discussion of the third.

Freud takes feminine masochism first. Characteristic of his refusal to naturalise sexual identity is it that this is found by Freud in men. It is equally typical that he none the less adheres to a view of the feminine as masochistic. Freud indicates that to be victimised and to be feminine may almost be equated. Where masochistic fantasies are "richly elaborated .. they place the subject in a
characteristically female situation; they signify, that is, being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby."21 This accords to a view that defines femininity through castration.

This brief account leads to the longer discussion of "erotogenic" masochism. This holds that unlike in Freud's earlier discussions of the topic, where masochism was held to be the turning round on the self of a primary sadism,22 it represents a portion of the death instinct never externalised.23 This point, the connection of masochism and the death instinct is an important one that is elaborated through the concept of "moral masochism".

In this an "unconscious sense of guilt" that derives not from the active, sadistic super-ego, but from the desire for punishment of a passive, masochistic ego is posited. "Conscience and morality have arisen through the overcoming, the desexualisation, of the Oedipus complex; but through moral masochism morality becomes sexualised once more, the Oedipus complex is revived and the way is opened for a regression from morality to the Oedipus complex"24 Before looking more closely at the consequences of this "regression" and the light they throw on the role of the super-ego in freeing the ego it is necessary to recognise the
links between this masochism and the feminine experience of the Oedipus complex.

At the beginning of this section a long passage from 'The Anatomical Sex Distinction' was quoted that indicated that due to the absence of the fear of castration the female Oedipus complex was never dealt with as adequately as the male and consequently women had weaker super-egos and a number of consequences followed. Already this seems to indicate that moral masochism might be the typical ethical formation in women. When one follows the course of the effects of the castration complex in women this feeling is greatly strengthened. Women come not to identify with their father but to desire him in a passive manner.

A late, and representative, discussion of this may be found in 'An Outline of Psychoanalysis' one of the last things Freud wrote and published posthumously. "In males .. the threat of castration brings the Oedipus complex to an end; in females .. on the contrary, it is their lack of a penis that forces them into their Oedipus complex."25 This goes on to renew the discussion of the repudiation of femininity met with in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable', a topic to which this thesis will return below.
The great problem of female development for Freud was the passage from an early, pre-Oedipal stage in which her attachment to the mother is identical to that of a boy, "the little girl is a little man", to the female Oedipus complex proper in which her affection is transferred to her father. "How does she pass from her masculine phase into the feminine phase that has been biologically marked out for her?" It is here that the castration complex intervenes.

The details of this process are complex, and need not be fully set out here. In brief there is a twofold development. On the one hand the ambivalence that is assumed to be present in all "primitive" attachments means that there is a current of hostility toward the mother in the pre-Oedipal stage. This is massively reinforced by the reproach directed toward the mother that she did not give the girl "a proper penis", and this is "the girl's strongest motive for turning away from her". On the other hand the lack of the penis becomes a reason for desiring the father.

One line of development for the girl is to cling to the wish for a penis. This line holds to the repudiation of femininity, and in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' and in the 'Outline' Freud makes quite clear that a practical task of
analysis is to break this "masculinity complex" in women patients. This will be returned to in due course. The main line of "normal" female development renounces this wish, and adopt a feminine character. "She gives up her wish for a penis and puts in place of it a wish for a child: and with that purpose in view she takes her father as a love object." 30

This wish for a child has a number of implications. First it accepts the "fact" of castration and gives up the wish for the completion of a penis. Instead there is a displacement to the wish for a child. That the substitute is inferior is shown by the difficulty of replacing the masculinity complex by the proper feminine attitude and by the importance ascribed to penis envy in the normal feminine character. 31

Secondly, and here the theme of moral masochism returns, it involves turning round the active sexual desire of the pre-Oedipal desire for the mother into a passive desire to be "copulated with", to recall a phrase from the discussion of "feminine masochism".

It is central to Freud's account of the development of infantile sexuality that the sexual act is seen as an aggressive act, that the male attacks and the female is victimised in the child's vision of intercourse. 32 This means that in order to complete
the turn from the mother to the father that sets up the Oedipus complex a turn round from activity to passivity is necessary. Further, as was noted above this Oedipal attitude to the father is not done away with as is its masculine equivalent. It lives on to form the nucleus of the feminine character.33

Thus in women instead of an internalised agency, introjected through identification, taking the place of Oedipal desire this desire itself remains in place. This situation corresponds precisely to the state of affairs in moral masochism, as described in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism'. Women do not "regress" to this state of affairs, since they can never, not being exposed to the educative terror of the fear of becoming women, escape from it. Freud makes some interesting remarks about the consequences of the two relations to morality, with which the next section will be concerned.

The Superego as Liberator: the Depersonalisation of Authority.

In 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' Freud writes that the "regression from morality to the Oedipus complex" that is represented by moral masochism "is to the advantage neither of morality nor of the
person concerned." This section examines the nature of the disadvantage referred to for the light it throws both on sexual difference in the ethical sphere and on the liberation offered by the superego.

In a passage preceding and serving as a preliminary to that just quoted Freud considers the way the superego develops from its origin in the Oedipus complex.

The course of childhood development leads to an ever-increasing detachment from parents, and their personal significance for the superego recedes into the background. To the imagos they leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, self chosen models and publicly recognised heroes, whose figures need no longer be introjected into an ego which has become more resistant. The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the dark figure of Destiny, which only the fewest of us are able to look on as impersonal. All who transfer the guidance of the world to Providence, to God, or to God and Nature, arouse a suspicion that they still look on these ultimate and remotest powers as a parental couple, in a mythological sense, and believe themselves bound to them by libidinal ties.

It is clear from this, and from the negative comparison with moral masochism, that the introjection of the authority of the parents, principally the father, as the superego allows a process of development that is impossible otherwise. This process, of the depersonalisation of morality, is indispensable to the creation of an autonomous
moral identity. The alternative is an "unconscious sense of guilt" that seeks punishment. The phenomenon that Freud brings forward to exemplify this need to be punished is the "negative therapeutic reaction", wherein the desire to suffer blocks the possibility of recovery in analysis.36

This makes only a brief appearance in 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' but is more extensively discussed in 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'. There it is more explicitly linked to the problem of the death instinct and of the primary masochism derived from it.37 This raises again the question of the role of the superego in constraining and "taming" the death instinct, considered above. It now emerges that the problem of aggressiveness, that was most prominent in this connection in Civilisation and its Discontents, is joined by that of primary masochism, the death instinct directed against the self. The superego acts in the economy of the instincts to divert and to render safe this instinct.

Why it is the superego that plays this role will be considered in the second half of the present chapter. At present the focus is on the way in which it achieves this and the implications of the exclusion of women from possession of a strong superego.
There are two mechanisms that allow the superego to free the ego from instinctual binds and to engage in a progressive acculturation. One is the freeing of authority from its dependence on the influence of the parents allowing its rationalisation; the other is its importance in the sublimation of libido, which allows displacement from the directly sexual to "higher" forms of expression. For the argument of this thesis the first of these is the more important, but the second should not be lost sight of.

The process of depersonalisation has already been touched on. 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' is one of the texts where it is most explicit, and it is telling that this occurs in the context of comparison with moral masochism, which is typically feminine. The key point is that: "[The superego] came into being through the introjection into the ego of the first objects of the id's libidinal impulses - namely, the two parents. In this process the relation to those objects was desexualised; it was diverted from its direct sexual aims." 38

The superego draws upon the enormous and undiluted strength of these instinctual impulses, but diverts them into a new avenue. The external authority becomes part of the self, and a part deep within the
id and able to draw upon its power. "[T]his super-ego is as much a representative of the id as of the external world." What is more this taking inside of the parents (the father, Freud sometimes equivocates on this but the logic of the theory demands that the father is the central figure) is extremely radical.

There is a striking and perplexing passage in Civilisation and its Discontents that illustrates this point. Having restated the derivation of the superego from the Oedipus complex and identification with the father Freud goes on to write: "By means of identification [the son] takes the unattackable authority into himself. The authority now turns into his super-ego and enters into possession of all the aggressiveness which a child would have liked to exercise against it. The child's ego has to content itself with the unhappy role of the authority - the father - who has been thus degraded."

The play of identification has become extraordinarily complex in this account, which is directed towards the instinctual economics of the process of superego formation. The ego separates a part of itself to play the role of the authority figure and then shifts its primary locus of selfhood to this special agency in order to leave the remainder available to play the
role of whipping boy. This is made more puzzling by
the way in which this remainder then becomes the
external authority that was the model for the over-I
which now seems to be the self's primary location.

Unravelling the details of this dizzying play of
identification and displacement is unnecessary to the
grasping of the essential point. The extremely
powerful agency of control formed by the dissolution
of the Oedipus complex is part of the self as well as
a division of it. The passage just considered
demonstrates that the superego is just as much "I" as
the ego. This means both that the subject has had its
unity fractured, a point stressed in the previous
chapter in the comparison with Rousseau; and that the
internalised authority has had its links to the
father figure who was its basis weakened to the point
where the possibility of breaking them emerges.

This is the process traced out in the passage with
which the present section began. The development of
the moral personality, by adding new influences to
the parental core of the superego depersonalises it.
This is the indispensable precondition of the
rationalisation of morality that is the central
meaning of the Freudian critique of religion. This is
quite impossible if the relation to the ethical remains at the masochistic, feminine level.

Because this masochism has as its core a passive relation to the father-authority figure the emphasis falls on punishment. The superego retains from its original form, the ego ideal of 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' the characteristic of a positive striving, an attempt to match a model. (This aspect, for example is prominent in so late a work as Moses and Monotheism. There, in the context of a discussion of the ethical rigour of Judaism Freud contends that this may in part be due to satisfaction to be gained from pleasing the superego.) As a result of this difference the superego has the potential to free authority from dependence, to make it the possession of the self and to rationalise it.

Masochistic feminine morality has no such potential. It is fixated on the figure of the father, to whom it is turned by the desire for the child as substitute penis. This late, and passive, masochistic Oedipal formation has as its ethical component a desire to be punished and equally to be directed which corresponds to that dimension of religiosity that the critique of religion most decisively rejects. Femininity has been correlated by Freud with that
regressive, father fixated psychic formation that psychoanalysis aims to free the ego from. The next section will examine why the superego, with its roots in terror, of the father and of (becoming a) woman, is so necessary.
Ethics and Ambivalence.

The second part of this chapter examines why it is that the superego is so indispensable to the liberation of the ego. This returns to the theme of ambivalence, so prominent in the first chapter on Freud. There it was argued that the theme of ambivalence, of the inseparability of apparently opposed emotional or instinctual forces, was the core of Freudianism. It was this insight that allowed him to break from the escapist idealism of which Rousseau is here the representative. Freud is resigned in face of the suffering ambivalence makes inevitable.

The present argument is that the misogyny discovered and analysed above is a symptom, in a sense close to that of the psychoanalytic usage, of the failure of the thought of ambivalence. It was argued that in Freud not only are the instincts ambivalent but that there is also a structure of ambivalence between the instincts and the authority that stands over against them, unifying the self and enforcing ethical, civilisational, renunciations. Here it is shown that Freud never came fully to grips with this. Authority remained external to the self, and especially to the economy of the instincts, despite some indications of a possibility of overcoming this.
In the next chapter it will be argued that this externality is inevitable if Freud's materialist assumptions about the possibilities of freedom are accepted. For the present the point is the impossibility of an "ego morality", the consequences that would flow from the failure of the formation of the superego in males, and the meaning of this for the relation of desire and authority.

That the unfettered ego is an object of lurking, usually unexpressed fear in Freud, leads to the necessity of enforcing bounds on its behaviour through the terror of the castration complex. The last section of the present section will consider the alternative that is not raised in Freud's work, but which emerges from the comparison with Rousseau, that of the affirmation of femininity, of an ego neither modelled on the primal father nor burdened with the terror of him. Freud, through the analysis of moral masochism has excluded this; Rousseau found in maternity the ground of a different morality from that of the conscience.
The Primal Horde and the Archaic Inheritance.

In *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* there occurs a passage, briefly discussed in the previous chapter, that describes the primal father, and his relations to his sons. Freud has been discussing the psychology of groups, which he finds to be marked by dependence on others, inhibition of the intellectual functions, and the dominance of primitive emotion. He turns in Chapter X of the work to his hypothesis of the primal horde and finds that the group revives this horde.

The psychology of groups is the oldest human psychology; what we have isolated as individual psychology, by neglecting all traces of the group, has only since come into prominence out of the old group psychology, by a gradual process which may still, perhaps, be described as incomplete. ... Further reflection will show us in what respect this statement requires correction. Individual psychology must, on the contrary, be just as old as group psychology, for from the first there were two kinds of psychologies, that of the individual members of the group and that of the father, chief, or leader. ... [T]he father of the primal horde was free. His intellectual acts were strong and independent even in isolation and his will needed no reinforcement from others. Consistency leads us to assume that his ego had few libidinal ties; he loved no one but himself, or other people only in so far as they served his needs. To objects his ego gave away no more than was barely necessary.44

This picture of the primal father as the possessor of a strong and unrestrained ego was analysed in the previous chapter in terms of the projection of the
pre-Oedipal narcissistic ego. Here it must be stressed that this is only one aspect of its importance. It is essential to the structure of Freudian theory that the primal father really existed in the pre-history of the race, and what once existed might, perhaps, do so again. In considering this the limit of the project of liberation is reached, the castrating primal father cannot and must not be brought back into existence. In the 1930s the implications of his return would be all too clear.

In the terms established here the possibility of the ambivalence of authority and ambivalence is, in this original moment, excluded. On the one hand there is in the father the immediate unity of desire with authority; on the other, in the case of the sons there is an external opposition of the two poles. It is only the primal murder and the setting up of taboo, the primitive form of the superego that the two terms come into an internal relation. This latter moment will be re-examined below. First it is necessary to look at the two positions in the primal horde.

The father, as described in the passage quoted at the beginning of the present section, knows no restraint on his behaviour other than those of the ego's
assessment of reality. He is a pre-moral being, a character described erroneously by Freud as coinciding with the post-moral Nietzschean superman.\textsuperscript{45} His social relations are confined to a total domination of those who surround him. He has disposal of the females of the horde and ruthlessly and brutally represses the males.\textsuperscript{46} He is totally free, except in so far as his finite strength limits him. There cannot arise a conflict between authority, domination, and desire for him since his desire is the nearest thing to law the horde knows.

The sons' situation is the polar opposite. The reality of the primal horde is essentially structured by an absolute opposition between their desire and the domination of the father. He prevents their "satisfying their directly sexual impulsions",\textsuperscript{47} he drives them away as soon as they grow up,\textsuperscript{48} he castrates them.\textsuperscript{49} For them desire impels them into a fatal conflict with unrestrained authority, that will punish them to the limit if it is suspected. There can here be no more question of an ambivalent relation than in the opposite case of the father, although here the ambivalence is resolved in the opposite direction.
It is out of the sons' position that development issues, although only in relation to that of the father. The primal murder and its aftermath bring together the group psychology of the sons with the individual psychology of the father to begin the process whose endpoint is the rational Utopia of *The Future of an Illusion* and the cultural recollection of *Moses and Monotheism*. Taboo is the incorporation into the id of what will be made ego by the fulfilment of the analytic project. What is in question here is why it is necessary to exclude women from this project, which as argued above, is in turn the question of the necessity of the superego, of the indispensability of the educative terror of the castration complex.

This necessity can be approached through a consideration of the role played in Freudian theory of the myth of the primal murder as origin of the cultural process. It is tempting to see the outmoded and highly speculative anthropology as an illegitimate projection of an otherwise empirically grounded and independent theory, that of the Oedipal origin of the moral sense. In Freud, however, the relationship between the two is not as tidy as that.
It is clear that in *Totem and Taboo* Freud was bringing to his study of anthropology insights into the Oedipal drama derived from his previous work on modern individual psychology. He is quite unembarrassed by this, and has arguments to validate this procedure. Having established the theory of the primal murder, however he shows an increasing tendency to use it to explain features of modern psychic formation, most particularly through the ideas of the primal fantasies, the archaic heritage, and the inheritance of acquired characteristics. These, and particularly this last, it is again tempting simply to ignore or to dismiss. The argument of this thesis is that to do so is to ignore vital symptoms of what is repressed within Freudianism, the bringing of which into the light will be the particular task of the next chapter.

The archaic heritage is an idea that appears in a number of texts, but which receives its fullest treatment in *Moses and Monotheism*. In it Freud develops the idea that the events of the primal murder are transmitted not only by their restaging within the personal history of every son, but genetically. This is suggested as the reason that the threat of castration need not be uttered to be heard.
I have behaved for a long time as though the inheritance of memory-traces of the experience of our ancestors, independently of direct communication and of the influence of education by the setting of an example, were established beyond question. When I spoke of the survival of a tradition among a people or of the formation of a people's character, I had mostly in mind an inherited tradition of this kind ... My position, no doubt, is made more difficult by the present attitude of biological science, which refuses to hear of the inheritance of acquired characters by succeeding generations. I must, however, in all modesty confess that nevertheless I cannot do without this factor in biological evolution.\textsuperscript{51}

In the context in which this confession occurs Freud needs the assumption to buttress the far reaching claims he is making about the history of religion, but the same idea recurs in texts dealing with individual development, where it appears in the guise of the "primal fantasies". These are treated at length in the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, of 1915-17, thus much predating the last passage, although not the first elaboration of the theory of the primal horde in Totem and Taboo.

In Lecture 23 'The Paths to Symptom-Formation' Freud raises the difficulty of the uniform appearance of certain fantasies in every case. He lists as universal a series of these fantasies and claims that they are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item a phylogenetic endowment. In them the individual reaches beyond his own experience into primaeval experience at points where his own experience has been too rudimentary. It seems to men quite
possible that all the things that are told to us today in analysis as phantasy - the seduction of children, the inflaming of sexual excitement by observing parental intercourse, the threat of castration (or rather castration itself) - were once real occurrences in the primaeval times of the human family, and that children in their fantasies are simply filling in the gaps in individual truth with prehistoric truth.\textsuperscript{52}

With this theoretical leap of faith, his own absurd belief Freud has cancelled the very insight with which analysis began. The power of fantasy was the decisive idea that allowed him to break with the seduction theory and begin the exploration of the unconscious. His new science was founded on the insistence that events did not have to be real to be really effective, to decisively shape the lives in which they may not have happened. With this doctrine of the archaic heritage and the primal fantasies, which tellingly recurs in 'The Anatomical Sex Distinction',\textsuperscript{53} the fantasy events are turned back into reminiscences of real events, as more generally the theory of the primal horde makes the Oedipus complex that of a real murder.

The Failure of Ambivalence and the Necessity of the Superego.

In Totem and Taboo the primary usage of the term "ambivalence" refers to a contradiction between the coherent ego structures and repressed instinctual
desire. The ambivalent attitude is described as one in which a desire encounters a prohibition, where:

the conflict between these two currents cannot be promptly settled because - there is no other way of putting it - they are localised in the subject's mind in such a manner that they cannot come up against one another. The prohibition is noisily conscious while the desire is unconscious and the subject knows nothing of it. If it were not for this psychological factor, an ambivalence like this could [not] last so long.54

In the previous chapter the case of instinctual ambivalence was examined, and was shown to rest on the fundamental strain of life, on the necessary presence in life of death and the desire for death. This second dimension of ambivalence is different. The previous section examined the primal horde, and showed both that its real existence is an inseparable part of Freudian theory, and that in it desire and authority are not involved in an ambivalent relation. Rather they are immediately identified in the case of the father and absolutely opposed and separated in the case of the sons. It is only with the primal murder and the putting in place of taboo, the ur-phenomenon of the superego, that their relation begins to become an internal, an ambivalent one.

This is important because every (male) individual is doomed to repeat the struggle of the sons. The passage into culture repeats the drama of the primal
murder, and this drama, through the phylogenetic residue, is inescapable. Why this is so is explained by the nature of the primal father. His freedom was the freedom to appropriate, to dominate, to castrate. In the economics of Freudian theory there is no other way than the creation of the superego, the turning of terror against the self, for to restrain the ego. The free ego recognises no authority other than necessity, the limits imposed by natural finitude.

There are passages in Freud's work where it is intimated that this might be an inadequate conceptualisation of the relation of desire, freedom, and the moral law, but these are subordinated to the main line of the theory, which through the notion of the primal horde, the primal murder, and the archaic inheritance, insists on the original externality of restraining authority and desire.

These hints of another view concentrate on the internality of limit and desire, and the implications of this for the development of the self. In particular it sometimes appears that the impossibility of satisfaction opens up the self to a process that might have as terminus a self-reflective relation both to desire and to the object of desire. This alternative exit from the Oedipal narcissistic
union with the mother is most clearly outlined in 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex'.

At the beginning of the essay Freud discusses the Oedipal position, he speculates that typically it is the arrival of a new baby that disabuses the boy of his illusion that his mother belongs to him alone.

Reflection must deepen our sense of the importance of these influences, for it will emphasize the fact that distressing experiences of this sort, which act in opposition to the content of the complex, are inevitable. Even when no special events occur the absence of the satisfaction hoped for, the continued denial of the desires baby, must in the end lead the small lover to turn away from his hopeless longing. In this way the Oedipus complex would go to its destruction from its lack of success, from the effects of its internal impossibility.

The pathos of this passage is reinforced by two features of the development of the desire for the mother. These are its origin in "anaclisis" and its fate, its continual repetition. The first of these was dealt with in the previous chapter. The cathexis of the mother as a libidinal object begins by following the path of oral/nutritive satisfaction. The mother is desired in a fashion modelled on ingestion of milk. This is central to the contrast between anaclitic and identificatory cathexis on which the theory of the Oedipal drama depends.
The desire for the mother is the desire to "have" her, to incorporate her to complete the self, as the "pleasure ego" incorporates whatever gives it pleasure. Since the real achievement of this would be catastrophic, both in the sense that the infant would die, and in the more important psychic sense that it would prevent any further experience of satisfaction, anaclitic attachment is predicated on frustration. Freud indeed explicitly recognises this:

Childhood love is boundless; it demands exclusive possession, it is not content with less than all. But it has a second characteristic: it has no aim and is incapable of obtaining complete satisfaction; and principally for that reason it is doomed to end in disappointment and to give place to a hostile attitude.56

Further material for reflection on the tragic character of the relation to the mother is provided by the thought of its repetition in the adult search for an object. In the three 'Contributions to the Psychology of Love' (1910 - 1918) this theme is teased out. The first two, in particular, explore the implications of the idea that: "The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it."57

In the first 'A Special Kind of Object Choice Made by Men' Freud investigates a type of pathological love, whose essential characteristics are centred on a need for the object simultaneously to be sexually involved
with someone else, but which has a long list of regular features. The full range of these are held to have a single source and moreover: "The object choice that is so strangely conditioned, and this very singular way of behaving in love, have the same psychical origin as we find in the loves of normal people. They are derived from the infantile fixation of tender feelings on the mother, and represent one of the consequences of this fixation." 

Of course, in the type discussed here by Freud the Oedipal drama is being replayed, which displaces it from the main path of the present argument, but in working out its implications he makes the following remarks: "We have learnt from psychoanalysis in other examples that the notion of something irreplaceable, when it is active in the unconscious, frequently appears as broken up into an endless series: endless for the reason that the surrogate nevertheless fails to provide the desires satisfaction." 

It is thus clear that the sexual instinct is incapable of satisfaction for two reasons: first that it in its original and prototypical form has no aim, or perhaps no aim that could in any circumstance be reached; second because all subsequent forms compound this insatiability with the additional factor of the
impossible attempt to resurrect a specific love with a different object. The way out of this impasse suggested by Freud is sublimation, which itself depends on the superego for its mechanism, but it might be possible to construct an argument that a non-repressive alternative to the morality of the superego would have its beginning here.

An insight, at whatever level, into the impossibility of the incorporative infantile desire, might lead to a new relation to desire, and to its object. It depends on the ability to transcend the self, to go beyond the ego without establishing another super-ego as a stable entity. This ability is what is variously described as freedom, or in its primitive form, irony, by Kierkegaard. This chapter will end by returning to the comparison of Freud with Rousseau with which it began, this time with the focus on ethical femininity.

Rousseau, Freud, and Ethical Bisexuality.

Rousseau, it has often been noticed, claimed to transgress the rigidly defined sexual identities he was usually so keen to enforce. In writing of his childhood he suggests that the early influence of romantic literature gave him a strong imaginative
"insight . into the passions." 62 The action of his strong imaginative facility, when combined with early influences both of this sort and of a more masculine political kind, 63 led him to develop: "a heart at once proud and affectionate, and a character at once effeminate and inflexible". 64

The free imagination, in Rousseau's case as in any individual in whom it is allowed, or is strong enough, to do so, exceeds the bounds of gender identity. Often Rousseau notes this possibility as the great danger of modernity, as in the Letter to d'Alembert, one of the great themes of which is the danger to the demarcation of sexual roles in Geneva posed, narrowly, by the possibility of Voltaire's projected theatre, and more generally by the importation of metropolitan mores.

This critique of life in the city, and especially in Paris, and contrast to the more traditional Swiss, reappears in La Nouvelle Heloise in the series of letters Julie exchanges with Saint-Preux during his stay in Paris. The feminisation of men, it must be noted is the focus of Rousseau's anxiety, while the masculinisation of women is decried chiefly as leading to this emasculation.
However, the position adopted by Rousseau as author itself transcends masculinity and incorporates elements of the feminine. Some preliminary reference has been made to this above, in its confessional appearance. It is also thematised, as integral to Rousseau's activity as an author in the Preface to *La Nouvelle Heloise*.

"Great cities require public theatres, and romances are necessary to a corrupt people. I saw the manner of the times, and have published these letters. Would to heaven I had lived in an age when I ought rather to have thrown them in the fire." The poison of sensibility, taken in by Rousseau as a child from romances, results in a romance offered by him as remedial. It has required his bisexual nature to create a book which from its position beyond the polarisation of the sexes strives to put that polarity back in place.

Rousseau's going beyond does not rest there, however. In the late *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* he puts forward, more explicitly than elsewhere, the possibility of a position outside society and hence beyond gender. This position is possible only for the exceptional, like himself, but for them should be regarded as higher than the limited and compromised
position necessary to sustain social life. This has already been briefly analysed in the first chapters on Rousseau. Here it necessary only to remark that Rousseau's sexual dialectic has implicit in it the possibility and even necessity of its excess, of the going beyond sex into bisexuality, which makes Rousseau's authorship possible.

In Freud the situation is entirely different. 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable' specifically commands the analyst to enforce the proper sexual identity in the case of women, and as has been argued in previous sections of this chapter the contrast between masculine morality, with its roots in the superego, and moral masochism, implies that masculinity is preferable in every dimension to femininity.

Science, the completion of the project of the reality principle; moral autonomy gained through the depersonalisation of the superego; and sublimation, the continuation of the desexualisation of libido begun with the smashing of the Oedipus complex; are all masculine. Femininity is marked by the dominance of wish-fulfilment; continuation of dependence on the father; and the lack of capacity for sublimation
resultant from the failure decisively to dissolve the Oedipus complex.

Thus Freud, while acknowledging, and indeed stressing, constitutional bisexuality can find no positive moment in adult, ethical bisexuality. In Chapter Two above it was shown that in Rousseau an ethico-sexual complementarity was central to the possibility of ethical life, while in the present section it was argued that Rousseau's own position within his work is a bisexual one and that the infinite freedom he posits necessarily transgresses sex-roles. This chapter has argued that in Freud by contrast there is a privilege accorded to masculinity that means that the achievement of this position is the essential preliminary to any ethical or cultural advance.

Further, this development of masculinity out of an initial bisexuality depends on a negative impulsion from femininity. Freudian thought is structurally misogynistic in that the "repudiation of femininity" is definitive of all that it values most. There is in Freud, as in Rousseau, a sexual dialectic at the heart of moral identity, but in Freud this is marked by a placing in masculinity of all moral worth. This is a necessary consequence of his conflation of the
values of moral autonomy and cultural solidarity that in Rousseau were so sharply distinguished.

The only possibility of autonomy in Freud lies through the identification with the social constraint transmitted through the Oedipal drama. Authority is to be first internalised and then depersonalised and made rational. In men one of the sources of pathology is a refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the authority of the father.

This forms the sharpest of contrasts to Rousseau, for whom autonomous conscience is defined by its rejection of social determination. It is for this reason that he is able to, or must, find an ethical role for women as the guardians and representatives of collective ethical life.

Freud having reduced the two dimensions, (which one might, following Hegel call the ethical and the moral) to one, cannot find such a role. It has been argued (for example by Judith van Herik in her *Freud, Femininity and Faith*) that an "extra moral" value is still placed on women as the representatives of a satisfaction excluded by the austerity of Freud renunciatory ethico-moral view, but if this is present it is very much as a subordinate theme.
Conclusion.

This chapter has examined the limits of analysis, in the profoundly connected dimensions of moral autonomy and sexual identity. It has shown that the terror of the institution of the superego is a necessary moment of the development of the subject, and that this entails a structural misogyny at the core of Freudian thought.

The place of the superego in Freud has been traced to the nature of the "strong ego" without internalised moral authority. This was shown to be represented by the primal father, the narcissistic ego writ large, whose relations to others can only be structures of dominance and whose complementary other is found in the group psychology of his sons. This pairing, with its echoes of fascist politics, can only be overcome in the bringing together of the two psychological types via the putting in place of the superego.

The mechanism for this, the castration complex, depends on the masculine terror of being feminised. This means both that masculinity becomes the bearer of a civilisation predicated on flight from femininity, and that women, since the castration complex acts so differently on them, are excluded
from the process of civilisation. This is so especially since the superego is the locus not only of a moral autonomy dependant on its depersonalisation, but also of the parallel process of sublimation.

This constellation of ideas has been held to centre on the impossibility of an "ego-morality" a moral identity founded within the self rather than on internalisation of constraint. It has been suggested that the Freudian rejection of transcendent freedom in favour of a materialism expressed in the ambition to reduce psychology to an economics of instinctual forces and thence to physiology, is the source of the impossibility of such a morality. In this sense it forms a polar opposite to the unbounded freedom posited by Rousseau, the consequences of which were examined in the first three chapters.

In the next chapter it will be argued that in the difficult relations of self, freedom, faith, and the finite, that may be discerned in the writings of Kierkegaard lies the possibility of overcoming these problems, or at least of opening them up. In Kierkegaard can be traced the outline of an alternative treatment of moral, and of sexual identity.
CHAPTER SIX: BEYOND FREUD AND ROUSSEAU

This chapter reads some writings of Kierkegaard with and against those of Freud and of Rousseau to begin the work of comprehending the limitations in their ethical and moral thought. These limits have been found particularly in the way in which they have placed gender and love in their work, and so the chapter ends with a brief consideration of the appearance of these themes in the writing of Kierkegaard.

Freud, it was argued in the previous chapter, relies on the engendering of the self in the Oedipal drama to overcome the externality of desire and authority. The "flight from femininity" is the mechanism for the creation of the superego. This in turn is the agency which allows the internalisation of the social law, and its integration with the self and rationalisation through "depersonalisation" of the superego. The necessity for this terror, and the consequent exclusion of women from moral identity, was traced to the absolute opposition of desire and authority figured most strikingly in the myth of the primal horde and the primal murder.
Finally it was argued that the idea of the "archaic heritage", of the inheritance of the guilt of this original event was the cancellation of psychoanalysis and exposed the weakness occasioned by the limit of ambivalence. The failure to integrate desire with any structure of authority was the key moment in this reading of Freud. The present chapter begins here, by arguing that this failure can be understood within the Kierkegaardian psychology as anxious.

In *The Concept of Anxiety* the fall into guilt follows from the anxiety of the infinite freedom that dissolves the boundaries of the constituted self. Sin emerges from an anxiety that is made dizzy be the abyss of freedom. The attempt to deny this abyss, to cling to finitude can only make the anxiety worse. In developing this idea through the various, and increasingly developed forms of anxiety Kierkegaard analyses the ideas of fate and guilt which have particular relevance to the reading of Freud offered here. It will be shown that the idea of freedom and its relation to guilt that is found in *The Concept of Anxiety* allows a way out of the impasse of the control of desire encountered in psychoanalysis.
The second section reads The Sickness Unto Death in relation to Rousseau. In doing so it demonstrates that the infinite freedom that Kierkegaard explores differs essentially from the imaginative flight from the finite that was shown in Rousseau. Kierkegaard places the spirit, the locus of freedom, in necessary relation to finitude. The self is a particular, embodied and determined self, and cannot escape from this. The attempt to do so is a form of despair, of loss of self and of freedom.

Finally the third section briefly indicates lines of thought found in Either/Or, Fear and Trembling, and Works of Love that rethink some of the themes of this thesis in ways that allow for a recognition both of the dissolution of differences and of identities in the movement of infinite freedom, and of their necessity for the ethical subject. Such a recognition, it is being suggested, is of particular importance in reflecting on issues of gender. Gender identity is an essential moment in the constitution of any ethical subject, but must and can be renegotiated to escape the restrictive and exclusive determinations it has hitherto had.
Freudian Anxiety: Clinging to the Finite

The first section of this chapter considers Freudian psychoanalysis in the context of the psychology of Kierkegaard and specifically of *The Concept of Anxiety*. There many of the themes of the chapters concerned with Freud reappear. The limitations found in Freud are overcome through Kierkegaard's psychology of freedom and faith. Drawing on *The Concept of Anxiety* it is argued that in Kierkegaard's, or Vigilius Haufniensis', concept of anxiety is to be found the internal, ambivalent, relation of desire and authority that was lacking in Freud. In the notion of anxiety as presentiment of freedom may be seen the possibility of overcoming the limits to liberation encountered in Freud.

Further this tracing of the origin of sin and of guilt allows a reappraisal of the place of guilt in Freud. In Freud guilt is decisively separated from responsibility. Guilt is the primary phenomenon from which all other aspects of moral life are derived. In the idea of the archaic heritage guilt even becomes an inherited residue from the past. In *The Concept of Anxiety* this idea of being "guilty by fate" is considered and rejected in favour of the idea of the
fall from innocence as taking place through freedom. This contrast will be developed below.

The place of sexual difference is correspondingly changed. In Freud the imposition of the sense of guilt depended on that of the sexual difference, which accordingly became rigid and inescapable. In The Concept of Anxiety the fall and the sexual difference are closely associated, but the sequence is reversed. In the fall are opened up the spaces of the ethical and of history, and these are the place of the sexual. What is more the place accorded to these does not have the absolute character ascribed to them by Freud. The famous "suspension of the ethical", the nature of which will be briefly explicated in this context, also suspends the sexual.

This requires also that attention be given to the difference, so important to Kierkegaard, between repetition and recollection. This problem will be approached through a comparison between Moses and Monotheism and Chapter III of The Concept of Anxiety which like Freud's great work on the origin and significance of Judaism is centred on the relation to the lost origin of guilt. Where Freud sees the development as a "repetition backwards" a regression
to the primal crime, which can be broken only through a comprehension that recalls it, Kierkegaard sees the possibility of breaking out of the grip of the past through the leap of faith, a repetition forwards.

This last point opens the way to the conclusion of this first section of the present chapter which argues that Freud's work can be understood as anxious in the terms established in *The Concept of Anxiety*. The Freudian ego, without the transcendent moment of freedom, is a finite ego. In Kierkegaard's terms this is of necessity an anxious position, which "clings to the finite" when confronted with the abyss of its own freedom. The gives a perspective on the nature of the moral imperative in Freud and on the imposition of sexual roles traced in the previous chapters. The finite ego both needs these limits to avoid collapsing into the pit of possibility, and is in terror of what may emerge out of that collapse, either in itself or in others. All of these points will be reprised and their significance reconsidered in the third and last section of this chapter.

In Freud there was an irreducible externality of authority and desire, which could be overcome through their identification in the strong ego, of which the
primal father was the model. Despite the intimations of an alternative conception that were referred to in the later part of the previous chapter authority, the imposition of structures of limitation on desire was never made an internal feature of its development. In origin desire is blind and indifferent to all except its own urgent demand for expenditure.

In The Concept of Anxiety is found an account of the origin of desire and its relation to authority, that is very different, with similarities to Rousseau's notion of a time before desire, but acknowledging the difficulty of pre-lapsarian innocence. Where Rousseau has imagination, as the primary organ of freedom, create desire, passion, through the creation of its object, in Kierkegaard freedom itself, as possibility, or the possibility of possibility, posits desire as the outcome of the fall.

Desire emerges out of anxiety, and: "Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy." Anxiety is defined by its ambivalence, by this doubly doubled relation to its object. Anxiety in turn is "concentrated" by the word of prohibition, by the primitive encounter with authority. The explanation of this emergence of desire out of the ambivalent
relation of anxiety to its as yet undefined object through the encounter with the word of prohibition is essential to the understanding both of *The Concept of Anxiety* and the interpretation of Freud on the basis of that work which is to be offered here. It is essential, therefore, to read closely the relevant pages of this extremely difficult and profound analysis of the psychological ground of sin.

Kierkegaard's starting point is with the problem of original sin. This has a twofold character in the work under consideration: the way in which Adam's relation to the "subsequent individual" is to be thought; and that in which the transition from innocence to the state of sinfulness is to be conceived. It is with this latter, the dominant theme of *The Concept of Anxiety*, with which this chapter is principally concerned.

Central to the approach of this "psychologically oriented deliberation" is the insistence that sin must be the result of an act of freedom, although not properly a free act. There is a "leap", a break in the chain of causality where sin comes into the world. Furthermore sin is a matter with which each has to face his, or her, own responsibility. For this
reason: "The concept of sin does not properly belong in any science;" Psychology cannot deal with sin, to do so would falsify it by fixing it as "a state. However, sin is not a state. ... As a state (de potentia [according to possibility]), it is not, but de actu or in actu [according to actuality or in actuality] it is, again and again."

The object of psychology is the "abiding something out of which sin constantly arises, not by necessity (for a becoming by necessity is a state .. ) but by freedom - this abiding something, this predisposing presupposition, sin's real possibility .. ." This state is the ambivalent state of anxiety, and is the presupposition, the "real possibility", of sin, from which actual sin is posited by freedom.

The first sin, which brings sinfulness into the world, both for Adam and for the "subsequent man" comes about "through anxiety". Innocence is a state in which "there is peace and repose, but there is simultaneously something else that is not contention and strife, for there is indeed nothing against which to strive." This "something else" is anxiety the object of which is nothing. It is essential to the
definition of anxiety that it is differentiated from fear by this having of "nothing" as its object. 12

Anxiety is a "sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy" towards an undefined possibility, or is "freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility". 13 The understanding of this demands consideration of Kierkegaard's notoriously difficult idea of the self, or the spirit, 14 as the "synthesis of the psychical and the physical" 15 where the synthesis is itself a third term, spirit.

The development of this cannot be pre-empted by a definition, since the impossibility of conceptual thought's grasping the self is central to Kierkegaard's writing. The self is each person's existence and task. The authorship strives towards the confrontation of each individual with this responsibility and the psychological works are circle around the evasion of it. Anxiety is the presentiment of the freedom that has yet to emerge, and hence of the selfhood that this freedom posits through faith.

"In innocence, man is not qualified as spirit but is psychically qualified in immediate unity with his natural condition. The spirit in man is dreaming." 16
This recalls Rousseau's man in the state of nature, but where Rousseau evaded the difficulty of the transition out of this state through the idea of "latency" and of external catastrophe as driving it, Kierkegaard makes innocence anxious. "Anxiety is a qualification of dreaming spirit... Awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming it is an intimated nothing."\textsuperscript{17}

In innocence freedom and the spirit, the third that is the "relation to the relation" of psyche and soma:\textsuperscript{18}

is present, but as immediate, as dreaming. Inasmuch as it is now present, it is in a sense a hostile power, for it constantly disturbs the relation between soul and body, a relation that indeed has persistence and yet does not have endurance, inasmuch as it first receives the latter by the spirit. On the other hand, spirit is a friendly power, since it is precisely that which constitutes the relation. What, then, is man's relation to this ambiguous power? How does spirit relate itself to itself and to its conditionality? It relates itself as anxiety.\textsuperscript{19}

In innocence thus conceived, as distinct from Rousseau's state of nature, there is an immanent restlessness. There is an undefined something, or properly "nothing", about which innocence is anxious. This nothing is the "possibility of possibility" and is the form in which spirit, which is to constitute
the synthesis, to give it "endurance", first disturbs the immediate unity of the two poles that are to be related. This anxiety is not yet able to bring forth a "something" to fill the place it creates. For this to occur the encounter with authority, with the "word of prohibition" is required. "Innocence still is, but only a word is required and then ignorance is concentrated. Innocence naturally cannot understand this word, but at that moment anxiety has, as it were, caught its first prey. Instead of nothing, it now has an enigmatic word." 20

This is the crucial moment for the present argument. The innocent man, "Adam", finds that anxiety, the ambivalent mixture of sympathy and antipathy is activated through the relation to the prohibition. Although the "word" cannot be understood, it provides a point of crystallisation for anxiety. This allows a sharper definition of anxiety, the outcome of which will be the fall, and thence desire as such. There is, though, a most important warning attached to this passage: "When it is assumed that the prohibition awakens the desire, one acquires knowledge instead of ignorance, and in that case Adam must have had a knowledge of freedom, for the desire was to use it."
The prohibition induces in him anxiety, for the prohibition awakens in him freedom's possibility."

By the prohibition and its counterpart, the equally ambiguous threat of punishment, "innocence is brought to its uttermost." The final refinement of Kierkegaard's interpretation of the Genesis narrative is his suggestion that "Adam talked to himself", or that "the speaker is language". This indicates that the relation to prohibition and punishment, to authority, in the terms employed here, is an immanent one, that it does not need to be brought to innocence from without. The disturbing influence of spirit, of freedom, of the "possibility of possibility" is present as anxiety in the state of innocence itself.

What remains after this stage has been reached is the fall, the moment at which sin is actualised. The nature of sin is developed more in The Sickness Unto Death, with which the next section will be concerned. In The Concept of Anxiety the focus is on the precondition of sin, anxiety, both in the state of innocence and "as a consequence of sin". Kierkegaard insists that in psychology it is illegitimate to ask how sin comes into the world. It is necessary though to exclude two ways of thinking it. First it does not
come into the world through necessity. This would be "a contradiction", nor by the act of "an abstract liberum arbitrium (which no more existed in the world in the beginning than in a later period .. )".25

When spirit posits itself, through the exercise of freedom, and sins, there is a double consequence: "that sin came into the world and that sexuality was posited; the one is inseparable from the other. ... If [man] were not a synthesis that reposed in a third, one thing could not have two consequences."26 The actuality of spirit, even the "unwarranted actuality"27 of sin, posits not only itself but the synthesis, and to do this it must "pervade it differentiatingly, and the ultimate point of the sensuous is precisely the sexual."28 As in Freud, and in Rousseau, the entry to ethical life and to history depends on the positing of the sexual difference.

"[W]ithout sin there is no sexuality, and without sexuality, no history. ... First in sexuality is the synthesis posited as a contradiction, but like every contradiction it is also a task, the history of which begins at the same moment."29 The positing of sin is the moment at which responsibility, and a self-reflective relation to freedom come into the world
through the decision to grasp the undefined possibility of possibility felt as anxiety. At this same moment the immediate, animal, unity of soul and body is disrupted. It is this that makes the physical into the sinful, a fall that can only be annulled through repentance.

This summary of the account of the Fall in *The Concept of Anxiety* provides the necessary background for the first stage in the comprehension of Freud, drawing on the next development of Kierkegaard's argument. In Chapter II: 'Anxiety as Explaining Hereditary Sin Progressively', he turns his attention from the Fall, from Adam, to the "subsequent individual", for whom the history of the race, and the sexuality that is its precondition, are already posited.30 The effect of this is that: "Anxiety in a later individual is more reflective".31 The individual whose first sin is committed in the context of the history of the race has a "more" in his or her anxiety. "Nevertheless, his anxiety is not anxiety about sin, for as yet the distinction between good and evil is not, because this distinction first comes about with the actuality of freedom."32

In discussing this the following passage occurs:
Anxiety may be compared to dizziness. He whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But what is the reason for this? It is just as much in his own eye as in the abyss, for suppose he had not looked down. Hence anxiety is the dizziness of freedom, which emerges when the spirit looks down into its own possibility, laying hold of finiteness to support itself. Freedom succumbs in this dizziness.33

The argument presented here is that this anxiety is present in the writing of Freud, and is the secret of the difficulties, limitations, and absurdities discussed in the previous chapter. When considering the relations of freedom, authority, and desire, freedom succumbs. The abyss of possibility presents itself in Freud in the awful figure of the primal father, and the finitude that is grasped expresses itself most clearly in the rigidities of the sex roles he describes, and most especially the passive, masochistic femininity which he prescribes in a text such as 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable'.

The "something that the nothing of anxiety may signify in the subsequent individual"34 is above all sexuality.35 "[S]pirit is found at the extreme point of the difference of the synthesis in such a way that that spirit is not merely qualified as body but as body with a generic difference."36 Anxiety is present in the erotic not because it is sinful but because "spirit cannot participate in the culmination of the
erotic."37 Sexuality is the moment when the synthesis comes closest to its extreme, and when spirit, as the relation to the relation is displaced. Hence it is anxious.38

In Freud the key locus of anxiety, as argued in the previous chapter, is the castration complex. This was shown to be the terror of feminisation. In the terms established in the present chapter this is the moment when identity, established through the accident of the generic difference, is put into question. Possibility and contingency are concentrated by the encounter with the father's word of prohibition, and by the positing as real and as threatening of the generic difference, of the extreme of the synthesis as *The Concept of Anxiety* expresses it. In this moment spirit is confronted with the abyss, grasps at the finite, its sex, and succumbs in anxiety.

This is the first expression for the diagnosis of Freudian anxiety offered here within the frame of Kierkegaardian psychology. Below it will be more fully developed through a closer consideration of the problem of guilt, so central in Freud, and so closely tied to the problem of sin. This will be approached through a reading of Chapter III of *The Concept of*
Anxiety 'Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin'.

In the third chapter of The Concept of Anxiety an account is given of the types and objects of anxiety proper to different shapes of spirit: of modern "spiritlessness"; of Greek paganism; and of biblical Judaism. In each of these a form of anxiety is present, although none is innocent. In modern spiritlessness, which is not of great concern here, spirit has been excluded, and anxiety is "waiting".39

It is with the second and third that the further comprehension of Freudian anxiety begins. These deal with paganism and Judaism under the headings: 'Anxiety Defined Dialectically as Fate' and; 'Anxiety Defined Dialectically as Guilt'. These sections form an equivalent to the history of religion presented in Moses and Monotheism, where the event that posits guilt is recalled, brought into the present, so that its power may be cancelled. The differences in them allow insight into the way Kierkegaard's insistence on freedom and responsibility in relation to sin and guilt, and the different notion of freedom involved in this, allow an overcoming of Freud's limits.
As the chapter title 'Anxiety as the Consequence of that Sin which is Absence of the Consciousness of Sin' indicates, it turns its attention away from the first sin to the state from which new sin emerges. It examines the state of anxiety to be found after spirit is posited as "an unwarranted actuality". In this situation the relation of anxiety is still to nothing, but to a nothing that is still "more" than it was for the subsequent individual in the previous chapter. "[W]hat does the nothing of anxiety signify more particularly in paganism? This is fate."

"Fate is a relation to spirit as external. It is a relation between spirit and something else that is not spirit and to which fate nevertheless stands in a spiritual relation." Fate is at once the necessary and the accidental, and thus the pagan "cannot come into a relation with fate, because in the one moment it is the necessary and in the next it is the accidental." The profound moment of expression for this is the oracle. In the ambiguous word of the oracle fate is brought into relation with the individual, but in the impossibility of comprehension remains out of reach. The pagan does not dare to forbear consulting the oracle, but: "Even in the
moment of consultation, he stands in an ambiguous relation to it (sympathetic and antipathetic)."44

Having introduced the idea of fate those of guilt and sin emerge. "The concepts of guilt and sin in their deepest sense do not emerge in paganism. If they had emerged, paganism would have perished upon the contradiction that one became guilty by fate."45 The relevance of this to Freud is immediately apparent. In the story of the Oedipus complex, especially when the "archaic heritage" is recalled in the central importance he accorded to it, this "contradiction" emerges. Through the dissolution of the Oedipus complex the individual takes on the guilt inherited from the history of the race and re-enacts it.

At the end of this section this point will be reiterated in the context of the anthropology developed in The Concept of Anxiety, where each individual is "simultaneously both himself and the whole race".46 This idea, intimately bound up with the concept of repetition, will be contrasted with the Freudian anthropology, and their different concepts of the relation to history examined.
The importance of guilt is clearer in the concluding section of Chapter III of *The Concept of Anxiety*, 'Anxiety Dialectically Defined as Guilt.' This takes as its object biblical Judaism, and the claim is made that 'The anxiety found in Judaism is about guilt.' While it may be that Kierkegaard has misunderstood Judaism, or has anachronistically brought biblical Judaism into the present, it should not be forgotten that this section of *The Concept of Anxiety* is not concerned exclusively with Judaism. The lengthy discussion of the "genius who is religious" makes clear that the anxious relation to guilt has a much more general scope.

As Kierkegaard notes, it may seem "paradoxical" to make guilt the object of anxiety. It would appear to be a "something" in too strong a sense. His answer to this is that precisely the relation of anxiety to it makes it a nothing. If guilt is actually entered into a relation with then the relation is repentance, and not anxiety. Anxiety maintains its characteristic ambiguity: "while anxiety fears, it maintains a subtle communication with its object, cannot look away from it, indeed will not, for if the individual wills it, repentance is there."
The genius who is religious has turned inward and found freedom. "To the degree he discovers freedom, to that same degree the anxiety of sin is upon him in the state of possibility. He fears only guilt because guilt alone can deprive him of freedom." This is so because of the way freedom is conceived. As before it is distinguished from the negation of necessity, which is said to be a "category of reflection", and from "force", "something entirely different".

Freedom, in this form, is still related anxiously to guilt: "The relation of freedom to guilt is anxiety, because freedom and guilt are only possibilities." This anxiety is also "ambiguous" or ambivalent in its relation to its object. Its anxious preoccupation is also a fascination. Comparing this to the anxiety experienced by Adam Kierkegaard writes:

Guilt is a more concrete conception, which becomes more and more possible in the relation of possibility to freedom. At last it is as if the guilt of the whole world united to make him [the genius who is religious] guilty, and, what is the same, as if in becoming guilty he became guilty of the guilt of the whole world.

In this way the relation to guilt as external becomes an intolerable burden. The very possibility of being guilty, in this objective sense, leads to the crushing of the individuality by the total possible
guilt. In this form of anxiety: "when freedom fears guilt, what it fears is not to recognise itself as guilty, if it is, but rather it fears to become guilty", guilt is conceived as belonging to an objectified reality. Becoming guilty in this sense destroys the freedom which regards it as a possibility and thus the relation of anxiety is established. The secret of the nemesis of this religiosity is the nothingness of the objective guilt. The real relation of repentance, through which the freedom sacrificed in sin can be reclaimed, cannot be achieved. Repentance is possible only if the guilt is made actual through the recognition of the immediate responsibility of the individual.

The further explication of the nature of the freedom that is at question here will be delayed until later in this chapter, when The Sickness Unto Death, the indispensable companion to The Concept of Anxiety, has been addressed. Before moving on to that, which will involve a comparison with Rousseau, the present section concludes with a reconsideration of Freud.

In Moses and Monotheism Freud presents a history of religion, which begins with the primal murder, and is dominated by it. This event is repeated, in the
murders of Moses and Jesus, and repressed through their denial and the distortion of their meaning. A progressive dimension of this history is found in the increasingly transparent centrality of these events in Judaism, which reinstates the primal father as the one god, and Christianity, which acknowledges the murder, albeit in distorted form. The end point of the process is the Freudian recognition of this meaning of religion, and consequent demystification.

If the overthrow of the Oedipus complex and the freeing of the individual from the domination of the father, ultimately of the primal father is not possible, then some progress is. The recognition of the paternal origin of the superego is a moment in the "depersonalisation" that allows the mature man to rationalise his moral identity, and to separate the necessary from the regressive in it. While the educative terror of the Oedipal drama is inescapable, it can be worked through and made manageable.

The structure of the determinations of anxiety, from Adamic innocence through to the 'Anxiety of Sin', in the fourth chapter of *The Concept of Anxiety*, offers instructive parallels to this story. At each stage freedom, spirit, is anxious about a possibility, the
core of which involves a relation to an authority. This authority stands in a deeply difficult relation to the self, apparently external, but "actually" internal to the very structure of spirit.

It is through the anxious relation to this object, first the "word", secondly fate, thirdly "guilt",57 that the possibilities of freedom are "concentrated" and its actualisation made possible. From this anxious relation emerge, on the one hand desire, and on the other prohibition. These are refined until in the exquisite self-lacerations of the "genius who is religious" they are recombined in the "ambiguous" relation to guilt, conceived as an abstract state.

The release from this regressive repetition is repentance, or faith, as in the final chapter of The Concept of Anxiety 'Anxiety as Saving Through Faith'. Here the central theme is that: "Anxiety is freedom's possibility, and only such anxiety is through faith absolutely educative, because it consumes all finite ends and discovers their deceptiveness."58 In plunging into this anxiety, the anxiety that takes the possibility of freedom as its object and exhausts its infinity, the original positing of an external object can be overcome. This anxiety will always
over-reach the finite: "possibility is absolutely educative. In actuality, no man ever became so unhappy that he did not retain a little remnant ... But whoever took possibility's course in misfortune lost all, all, as no one in actuality lost it."\(^{59}\)

This anxiety plumbs the depths of the soul plunging the individual into the abyss in face of which anxiety clung to the finite.\(^{60}\) "[W]hen the individual through anxiety is educated unto faith, anxiety will eradicate precisely what it brings forth itself. Anxiety discovers fate, but just when the individual wants to put his trust in fate, anxiety turns around and takes fate away".\(^{61}\) The anxiety that runs through the finite destroys the trust in fate by confronting the individual with "the trump card of infinity".\(^{62}\)

"So it is also in relation to guilt, which is the second thing anxiety discovers."\(^{63}\) The infinite anxiety that lets go of the finite and faces the possibility of freedom reorients itself in respect of guilt. Anxiety with its insistence on the infinite discovers the truth in the word, already given in Chapter III, that the opposite of guilt is freedom; "guilt alone can deprive of .. freedom."\(^{64}\) For the anxiety that took guilt as an external object this
led to the hopeless flight from guilt. For the infinitely educative anxiety it leads to repentance.

In recognising that the infinite demand of duty is impossible, but that through a repentant faith a new ethics can be posited, the individual is enabled to rise again from the abyss of anxiety. This repeats the act of freedom through which sin came into the world, but in such a way that sin is annulled. The education to the infinite accomplished by infinite anxiety allows a renewed recognition of and repentance over the fall. In this way the development of anxiety has led back to its beginning in that that beginning, in which freedom posited its other as standing over it, can be reclaimed for freedom.

This is possible only because freedom is conceived of as infinite, and that its freeing of itself from entanglement with the finite involves its recognition of its responsibility for itself. The fall into sin has to be free in order that repentance can gain purchase on sin. This responsibility derives from the action of spirit in creating the relation, that is the separation of body and soul. This section closes with an outline of the relevance of this conception of freedom to the reading of Freud presented above.
In Moses and Monotheism Freud too has set up a Fall, which posits as external an object of anxious subjection. This object is reincorporated into the self through its repetition and recollection. The self is thus freed from the posited object, religion and the image in it of the primal father. In this can be seen a parallel to the relation of anxiety, freedom, the fall, and repentance outlined here. The difference is in the impossibility of repentance in Freud, and the impossibility on which this depends, the impossibility of taking responsibility.

In the previous chapter of this thesis it was demonstrated that there is a limit to the liberation that analysis offers. The superego may be depersonalised but it cannot be transcended. This limit is encountered most centrally in the enforcement of gender identity. The key to this was found in the externality of desire, the drives, and authority, which is archetypically another person. In the idea of the archaic heritage this limit of Freudianism, it was argued, turns into a collapse.

In the notion of the archaic heritage Freud makes of the most formative experience a re-enactment of a complex of events whose relation to the individual is
a non-personal one. The Oedipal drama is simply repeated, "repeated backwards". Kierkegaard's excessive notion of freedom allows him to conceive of the fall as "repeated forwards", as being radically new for each individual, and hence as made proper to each. It is this that allows the resurrection of freedom in repentance. The anthropological expression for this repetition that is equally origination is that each is "both himself and the race".65

Every individual finds herself in a historical situation, the fall for every subsequent individual occurs within the context of sinfulness. The nothing of their anxiety is a "more". It remains the case however that only freedom can posit sin. Sin remains the responsibility of the individual despite the historical context and the common structures (of which anxiety is the expression) that condition it.66 In this sense each is both himself and the race. This relation of freedom to the finite and determined will be further explored in the final section of this chapter. The next examines The Sickness Unto Death and the light it throws on the reading of Rousseau in the first part of this thesis.
Rousseau in Despair: The Flight From the Finite

The first section of the present chapter argued that the notion of freedom as bursting the bounds of the finite ego illuminates the limits of Freudian analysis. It was suggested also that this freedom allows the founding of a moral identity that does not depend on the terroristic imposition of social imperatives. This second argument will be made more clearly in the next and last section of this chapter. Before this it is necessary to return to the relation of freedom and the finite. This section approaches this by reading The Sickness Unto Death in order to develop an understanding of the difficulties outlined in Rousseau in the first chapters of this thesis.

It was argued that in Rousseau freedom is excessive and intimately bound up with the imagination. The telos of freedom was a flight from the finite, expressed in Julie's death. It was this excessive notion of freedom that required the balance of a bound social femininity. Moral identity became utterly self-defining and ultimately incompatible with social, indeed any merely human, existence. This notion of freedom is rejected in The Sickness Unto Death as decisively as the "clinging to the finite"
is in *The Concept of Anxiety*. By following the contours of this argument a closer approach can be made to the idea of freedom, which will be pointed towards in the last section of this chapter.

The sections of *The Sickness Unto Death* in which this movement occurs are Part One, Section C, a, a and b, a.67 These are entitled 'Infinitude's Despair Is to Lack Finitude', and 'Possibility's Despair Is to Lack Necessity'. In these it is argued that the self loses itself in an infinitude or possibility that is not concretised through an affirmation of the given finitude from which it cannot leap free. This argument then can be followed through into those about choice and repentance that mark the decisive developments into the two ethical or moral identities recognised in Kierkegaard's writings, "first" and "second" ethics. In *The Sickness Unto Death* a definition of the self is offered:

A human being is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation's relating itself to itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation's relating itself to itself.. A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the eternal, of freedom and necessity, in short a synthesis. A synthesis is a relation between two. Considered in this way, a human being is still not a self. ... If .. the relation relates itself to itself, this
relation is the positive third, and this is the self. 68 

The various polarities in this passage are to be held through the act of overcoming designated as "relating the relation to itself". This establishment of selfhood is to bring into being a synthesis that goes beyond the coexistence or conflict of the poles. The self is related to "another" which establishes the relation. 69 "Despair", the central focus of the text is the failure properly to establish the relation. "The misrelation of despair is not a simple misrelation, but a misrelation in a relation that relates itself to itself and has been established by another, so that the misrelation in that relation that is for itself also reflects itself infinitely in the relation to the power that established it." 70

Here two forms of misrelation are to be considered. These are the denial of the finite in favour of the infinite, and of necessity in favour of possibility. These represent the characteristic positions adopted by Rousseau in his conception of the infinitely excessive soul, with its imaginative freedom and transcendence of the limits of human existence.

"The self is composed of infinitude and finitude. However, this synthesis is a relation, and a relation
that, even though it is derived, relates itself to itself, which is freedom. The self is freedom. But freedom is the dialectical aspect of the categories of possibility and necessity. This statement at the beginning of 'The Forms of This Sickness (Despair)', Section C of The Sickness Unto Death, encapsulates the notion of freedom that, this thesis argues, offers the possibility of transcending the thought of both Freud and of Rousseau. The way in which the relation of the self to itself goes beyond the finite self of Freudianism has already been set out. In reading two of the sub-sections of Section C the escapism of Rousseau will be considered.

To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete is neither to become finite nor to become infinite, for that which is to become concrete is a synthesis. Consequently, the progress of the becoming must be an infinite moving away from the self in the infinitizing of the self, and an infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process.

It is with the second of these that the present section is concerned, the importance of the infinitizing of the self having been argued in the previous section on Freud. The "infinite coming back to itself in the finitizing process" is the subject of the sub-section 'Infinitude's Despair Is to Lack Finitude'. This form of despair is closely linked in the text to imagination:
As a rule, imagination is the medium for the process of infinitizing ... Imagination is infinitizing reflection ... The self is reflection, and the imagination is reflection, is the rendition of the self as the self's possibility. ... The fantastic is generally that which leads a person out into the infinite in such a way that that it only leads him away from himself and thereby prevents him from coming back to himself. 74

This admirably captures a process traced in Chapter One of this thesis in the work of Rousseau. Rousseau conceived of freedom and imagination as almost identical. For Rousseau imagination was the primary faculty of freedom. The finite became a mere limit to the free soul, for which the unlimited possibility of imagination was the real stuff of existence beside which the limits of the actual became a pale and insubstantial realm. The two texts in which this process reached a climax were on the one hand the relatively early La Nouvelle Heloise and on the other the very late Reveries of a Solitary Stroller.

In the Reveries Rousseau returns repeatedly to the impossibility reconciling his imaginative nature and his independence with the constraints of social and of merely human life. He aspires to the condition of Godlike independence which he ascribes to the disembodied soul and sees this prefigured in the perfected state of reverie. The clearest statement of this is to be found in the celebrated Fifth Walk.
It was argued above in Chapter Three that in *La Nouvelle Héloïse* this tendency in the thought of Rousseau reaches a climax in the flight of Julie from the everyday, of which she has the status of supreme spokeswoman and exemplar, into the life of the soul. Her death is figured as the liberation of her exceptional soul from the limits imposed by the finite. In Julie the soul, with its imaginative freedom bursts the bonds of the earthly, having first explored their outer limits in Julie's experience of sexual love and of family and community.

It is this logic of excess that Kierkegaard, through *Anti-Climacus*, attacks and undermines in the sections of *The Sickness Unto Death* under consideration. Having argued that to reject finitude is a form of despair the text returns to a similar theme in the polarity necessity/possibility:

> Just as finitude is the limiting aspect in relation to finitude, so also necessity is the constraint in relation to possibility. Inasmuch as the self as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude is established, is *kata dynamin* [potential], in order to become itself it reflects itself in the medium of imagination, and thereby the infinite potential becomes manifest. The self is *kata dynamin* [potentially] just as possible as it is necessary, for it is indeed itself, but it has the task of becoming itself. Insofar as it is itself, it is the necessary, and insofar as it has the task of becoming itself, it is the possible. 75
This becoming itself is the task of every self. The accident of being precisely the individuality that it is is essential to the essence of that individuality, despite the infinitising action of reflection. True freedom can only be won through the recognition of this necessity, of the impossibility of beginning elsewhere than where one is, of jumping out of this position. To refuse this movement, which in other of Kierkegaard's texts is the movement of faith,76 or in a limited form is the act of "choosing oneself",77 is to despair, to refuse to be oneself.

[I]f possibility outruns necessity so that the self runs away from itself in possibility, it has no necessity to which it is to return; this is possibility's despair. This self becomes an abstract possibility, it flounders around in possibility until it is exhausted, but it neither moves from the place where it is nor arrives anywhere, for necessity is literally the place where it is. To become is a movement away from that place but to become oneself is a movement in that place.78

If Julie was the exemplar of the despair of the infinite, a despair none the less despairing for not recognising itself as such,79 her lover is the epitome of the despair of abstract possibility. As noted in the discussion of their affair above, he is without connection, without necessity. It is for this reason that Julie assumes such overwhelming importance for him. He is the paradigm of the
isolated and rootless masculinity that is normative in Rousseau, as in the Second Discourse and the autobiographical and introspective writings. He is defined by the abstract possibility of his imaginative freedom, but has nothing on which to act.

This despair surfaces repeatedly in the course of the novel. The most striking occasions are the scene at Meillerie, when his threat of suicide finally breaks Julie's resistance, his discussion of killing himself after his exile from Switzerland and Julie's marriage to Wolmar, and finally his collapse after Julie's death. On each of these occasions the dependence on Julie for attachment to the world is acutely and explicitly set out. Kierkegaard's notion of the self, and of freedom as synthesis allows the diagnosis of this as despair, as the misrelation that stresses one pole to the exclusion of the other.

The final section of this chapter will examine certain other of Kierkegaard's writings in order to begin to fill in the concept of faith without which those of anxiety, despair and freedom cannot be understood, and to examine briefly the implications of this for the understanding of the ethical and especially of the significance of sexual difference.
In the Judge's writings on marriage, especially that in *Stages on Life's Way*, is demonstrated an account of the relation of love, freedom, and ethical life which offers a starting point for going beyond the opposition of Rousseau and Freud, escapist imaginative freedom and resigned acceptance of limits. In arguing for the action of will in the either/or which transforms romantic love into conjugal love the Judge breaks with the sterile counterposition of freedom and the given and allows an understanding of the ethical as the beginning from the given in freedom. Since he puts such stress on marriage and thus on the sexual relation this is particularly valuable in the context of this thesis.

However it is important to recall that the Judge is not his own author and to place his writing in the context of the authorship. This is to be achieved by setting out some of the criticisms of his position that are possible from the points of view of other of the pseudonyms. These will centre particularly on the relation of the ethical and the religious, but there are implications of this for his account of the
relation of the sexes in marriage that are crucial for the argument of this thesis.

The Judge identifies himself firmly as a spokesman for the "ethical" as opposed to the "aesthetic". For him the transition from the latter into the former is essentially the either/or in which the individual asserts his freedom in the act of choice, the absolute choice that brings into existence good and evil. In discussing this the Judge invokes the category of despair, which has already appeared above in the discussion of The Sickness Unto Death, and which the Judge too argues can only be overcome through faith.

The Judge's faith though is essentially an ethical faith, and for this reason falls under the category of despair in the text of Anti-Climacus. His primary category is not faith but choice, the will and not grace is to extricate the individual from despair. To quote him: "in choosing absolutely I choose despair, and in choosing despair I choose the absolute, for I myself am the absolute, I posit the absolute and I myself am the absolute; but in complete identity with this I can say that I choose the absolute which
chooses me, that I posit the absolute which posits me".80.

This absolute self is freedom, as in The Concept of Anxiety. The absolute in the self cannot be anything finite, it must be the absolute (not, be it noted the infinite, as in The Concept of Anxiety) of freedom. Thus far the Judge is at one with the pseudonyms already considered, except for the use of the terms "choice" and "the absolute". This conformity continues when he notes that this absolute choice is nonetheless necessarily choice precisely of oneself:

that which is chosen does not exist, and comes into existence with the choice; that which is chosen exists, otherwise there would not be a choice. For in that case what I chose did not exist but absolutely came into existence with the choice. I would not be choosing but creating; but I do not create myself, I choose myself.81

In the awkwardness of this passage is expressed the difficulty of the Judge's position, a difficulty posed in the 'Ultimatum' of Either/Or 'The Edification Implied in the Thought That As Against God We Are Always in the Wrong', and which works
itself through in *Stages on Life's Way* as the slackening of the tension of his thought in the direction of an accommodation with the aesthetic. This difficulty is in the conception of the relation of man and God, the ethical and the religious. The "choice" in which the individual is to posit himself is an act of the individual himself. In essence it is the act of creation that the Judge disclaims. His position in *Either/Or* is one where the individual posits himself out of nothing. It is a divinisation of the self.

This is in contradiction with the emphasis on the ethical that is equally prominent in that text. The resolution of this difficulty, so similar to that encountered in Rousseau, is parallel to that of the earlier writer. The Judge's wife is the guarantor of the grounding of his "absolute" self. It is for this reason that the first of his two contributions to *Either/Or* is concerned with the 'Aesthetic validity of Marriage'. The choice especially of love, of the object of love, and of a woman as that object are to give his absolute choice finite "validity".

This is expressed particularly in his wife's silence, her invocation only as object, as "supplement" to the
judge. In both the 'Aesthetic Validity' and the 'Reflections on Marriage' in Stages on Life's Way the crucial importance of his wife to the Judge's image of himself as living an ethical life is clear:

"Through her I am Man, for only a married man is an authentic man; compared with this any other title is nothing and actually presupposes this." 82

In his stress on the "act of choice" as positing the self, and the distinction between good and evil, the Judge comes close to an appreciation of the real significance of the religious, but stops short of it. A first glimpse of this shortfall can be gained from a comparison of his writing with that of Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling. Here the ethical and the religious are put into an opposition so complete that an exorbitant "teleological suspension of the ethical" is declared. This throws into stark relief the complacency and limitation of the ethics of the Judge, with his confidence in the realisability of the contradictory self-positing of his act of choice.

The silent one observes faith and suffers its difference from any act of will. It is this that makes him establish such a gulf between the ethical universal, which is comprehensible and the religious
universal, which is comprehensible and the religious
to the absolute, which is not. He sees
Abraham's faith in terms of a supreme act of
strength, of a willing beyond the limits of will. It
is this which inspires such awe in him. The
possibility of such a singular and immediate relation
to the divine seems to him so overpowering that it
cancels the merely human obligations of community,
the foundation for ethical life.

Here he stands at once close to and infinitely far
from the Judge. Like him Johannes has seen faith, his
equivalent of the act of choice as a (the) human
achievement. He has gone beyond him in recognising
the explosive force of the absolute. For the Judge
the absolute stands guarantor for the universal
(echoes of Julie), for Johannes it cannot be
contained by, and destroys it (echoes of her lover).

_Fear and Trembling_ is predicated on this inability of
Johannes to grasp the nature, the possibility, of
faith, and hence of real freedom. As shown above
this freedom cancels, annuls, sin through the
movement of repentance. The condition of repentance
is faith and Johannes' wrestling with this allows an
exploration of its paradoxes, and especially of its relation to the ethical.

For Johannes faith is an exceptional achievement which makes Abraham great. He is right that Abraham's case is exceptional, but by taking it as at once this and as the archetype of faith he exposes himself to a temptation which may be compared to that of Abraham, the nature of which he sets out so clearly. In making faith so difficult Johannes makes possible his own remaining at the point of resignation.

Johannes is right to see faith as exceeding the ethical, understood in the Judge's way, in terms of duty and of the merely human, but in making faith an exceptional act of a "hero" he makes it seem as if many, or most are condemned to either the merely ethical, or to the standpoint of resignation. What is more the nature of "second ethics" of religious ethics" is obscure. Johannes makes clear that Abraham receives Isaac again, but the return to the ethical from its suspension in the movement of faith is unclear, despite the insistence on the difference between faith and resignation. It appears that this
The text in which these difficulties are, if not resolved, at least comprehended, is the great *Works of Love*, arguably the summation of the religious, acknowledged, works. Here the excessive action of divine grace appears as the necessary corollary and support of faith, a movement that can be divined in the profound irony of the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. In *Works of Love* the element of surrender in faith is clear, as opposed to the view of faith as achievement that dominates *Fear and Trembling*.

*Works of Love* is concerned with the "second ethics": the ethics of the commandment to love. Section II reflects on the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself", and in the course of this reflection throws light on faith and on love that illuminates many of the problems of this thesis. The great paradox of this commandment is the bringing together of love and command. Love in its "immediate" or erotic manifestation can recognise no authority above it. However "only when love is a duty, only then is love eternally secure".

This fusion of duty and inclination is the secret of the second ethics, and can be brought about only through the double movement of faith, observed but
This fusion of duty and inclination is the secret of the second ethics, and can be brought about only through the double movement of faith, observed but not comprehended in Fear and Trembling. In Works of Love the weakness in the idea of faith as achievement, prominent in Johannes’ account is spelt out in its connection with love: "if someone wished to test whether he has faith, or tried to get faith, then this will really mean that he will hinder himself in acquiring faith; he will become a victim of the restless craving where faith is never won, for 'thou shalt believe'". This position is that of Johannes, who sees faith as there to be won.

Faith is, as is here indicated, submission to the commandment, "thou shalt believe", or "thou shalt love", it is not victory but surrender. This echoes the Judge, with his insight that one must choose oneself but displaces the act of choice. The positing of oneself through the act of choice is, rather, a free acceptance of the self. Freedom, human freedom, is infinite only in relation to the absolute, an idea that echoes Fear and Trembling, with the difference that this relation is there and need only be acquiesced in.
Kierkegaard is quite clear that Christianity has displaced earthly love, that the selfless commanded love of the neighbour is to be given priority. The truly ethical love cannot be the partiality of any earthly love, even the Judge's apparently dutiful and "infinitely reflected" marital love. It must be love of the neighbour, the love that gives up the self.

It might be thought that this love, in refusing all partiality destroys the specificity of the loved one, reduces him or her to anonymity. This is the reverse of the case found if its relation to erotic love is examined closely. In both Freud, the scientific analyst of Eros, and Rousseau, his effusive spokesman, love is essentially dependent on illusion and projection. In Kierkegaard 'Love Believeth all Things - and Yet is never Deceived'. The love that is prepared to love despite all need not distort and mis perceive the loved object. That object can, in this love, be as he or she is. This love can love its object without illusion.
Conclusion

In Freud the finite ego was subjected to the Law through the terror of the Oedipal drama. The denial of the excessive moment of freedom, of the necessary excess of any such self, led to the impossibility of conceiving of the immanent relation to morality which has been designated here by the notion of an ambivalence of authority and desire. Such an ambivalence has been shown to exist in Kierkegaard's psychology of anxiety. Here desire and authority both emerge out of an original relation to a self which is definable only in terms of freedom.

This notion of the self further allows a rethinking of the nature and significance of guilt. Guilt, as primary phenomenon of morality and of civilisation has a prominent place in Freud's thought, but is decisively separated from responsibility. The self becomes guilty as part of its education, but cannot be held accountable for that guilt. This thought underlies the resigned acceptance of renunciation as the dynamic of civilisation.

In Kierkegaard the idea of the infinite movement of freedom, and of spirit as synthesis, leads to an idea
of history as task. In its profound connection to sexuality and the generic difference this also implies the notion of gender as a task. This thought is suggested also through the going beyond the Judge that is necessitated when the "suspension of the ethical" is considered seriously.

The "ethical stage" of which the Judge is the representative, is not erased by the religious, but rather is taken into it and transformed. All the stages are coexistent. This means that marriage and family as the transformation of the erotic into the ethical remain important, but that they are transformed in turn by faith and by the commanded neighbour love.

Sexual and moral identity are both thrown into question by this movement and become a task for which each individual is (absolutely) responsible. As history provided the context for anxiety so it does here, but as there each must take up what they are and own it. This perspective, it is argued here, provides a framework within which the necessary renegotiation of gender, ethics and moral identity may take place.
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that if the conception of the self falls into either of the poles of the "misrelation in the synthesis" that run systematically through _The Sickness Unto Death_ then this will express itself in the thought of the sexual difference. If the self falls into despair in its relation to itself then this fundamental dimension of ethical identity will show it. The false conception of the self will call up its dialectical partner in its sexual other. Rousseau's masculinity, flying into the ether of infinite possibility posits bound and heteronomous femininity; Freud's masculine ego, finding a finite identity in the internalisation of social law reflects itself in amoral and anti-social Medusa.

In the difficult and risky notion of faith, of a self grounding itself unthinkably on a paradox, is an alternative to these thoughts. It has been argued here that through a reading of Kierkegaard an approximation may be found to this notion, but, with Kierkegaard, this thesis finds that this movement cannot be stated. Whether it can be made is a question beyond its bounds.
Some indications have been given of the direction in which a thought that turned from Kierkegaard to gender could proceed. The reality and importance of the sexual difference, its absolute necessity in constituting an ethical subject, would be recognised, but "suspended". Spirit takes a relation to its gender, is not defined by it. Sex becomes a task, not a fate. The concrete expression of this change from fate to task is an existential and historic question, in which reflection has its part but cannot legislate for or preempt experience.

Central to this must be a reflection on and a transformation of desire, love, and their relation. In the reading of Freud it was suggested that an ego which went beyond itself would of necessity desire in ways that could not be thought within Freudianism. In the final chapter some approach was made to the idea of the commandment to love and its implications. These would be the starting points for any thought of how to assume the task of gender. This thought, however, would be nothing without the faith to embark upon it.
The following abbreviations are used in the footnotes.


Eloisa I - Eloisa IV the four original volumes of Eloisa, or a series of original letters 1989 (facsimile reprint of 1803 translation of La nouvelle Heloise by William Kendrick) Oxford: Woodstock


Julie: Julie ou La Nouvelle Heloise 1967 Paris: Garnier


Chapters One and Two

1 Horowitz, Asher 1987 Rousseau, Nature, and History Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press. ch 1
4 E 78
5 E 80
6 ibid.
7 ibid.
8 E 39
9 E 205
10 E 80-1
11 Rousseau's relation to liberalism was the topic of considerable debate in the earlier part of the century, especially with regard to the accusation of totalitarianism sometimes made against him. It is now the concensus view that he is a critic of or "defector from" the liberal camp, with a view at once more individualistic and more communal than liberalism. There is a useful summary of the arguments in Melzer 108-13
12 SCD 62
12 SCD 84
14 SCD 53
15 E 80
16 SCD 59
17 SCD 61
18 SCD 60
19 E 81
20 SCD 61
21 E 81
22 E 208

This topic is crucial to the understanding of
Rousseau and is touched on in most of the secondary
literature. A particularly full treatment is to be
found in Charvet, J. 1974 The Social Problem in the
Philosophy of Rousseau London: Cambridge University
Press which makes it the centre of attention.

23 SCD 73
24 E 213
25 SCD 86
26 E 214
27 SCD 120
28 SCD 90
29 SCD 95
30 E 230 Starobinski makes some characteristically
insightful remarks on this (p27-8)
31 E 39
32 E 40
33 CPP 176
34 CPP 169
35 SCD 191
36 SCD 230
37 SCD 193
38 SCD 257
39 E 40
41 E 47 a text that spells all this out very clearly
is Letters Written From the Mountains eg
"Christianity .. is very advantageous to society ..
but it weakens the force of the political spring" p33
Works of J. J. Rousseau Vol 9
42 E 41
43 Masters R.D. 1968 The Political Philosophy of
44 SCD 47
45 Horowitz 139-146
46 eg Grimsley, Ronald 1973 The Philosophy of
Rousseau London: Oxford University Press,
Starobinski, Dent, N.J.H. 1988 Rousseau: an
Introduction to his Psychological Social and
Political Theory London: Basil Blackwell recently
47 E 473
48 E 236
49 E 244
50 E 221
51 E 220
52 E 223
FOOTNOTES

53 Derrida, J. (trans. Spivak) Of Grammatology
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press 171-192
54 Derrida 183
55 Derrida 173-180
56 Derrida 183
57 E 229-232
58 E 236-244
59 E 244
60 E 259
61 E 266
62 Masters 54-8
63 Hendel C.W. 1934 Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Moralist
London: Oxford University Press 124-62
64 E 277
65 E 278
66 E 280
67 ibid.
68 E 283-4
69 E 286
70 E 445
71 E 472-3
72 E 371
73 SCD 61
74 SCD 76
75 SCD 77
76 SCD 65
77 SCD 87
78 SCD 77
79 SCD 88
80 SCD 93
81 EOL 45
82 E 357ff
83 E 363
84 E 358
85 E 361
86 ibid
87 E361
88 E 365
89 E 387
90 E 370
91 E 387
92 E 371
93 E 377
94 E 215
95 SCD 90
96 E 211
97 E 214
98 E 213
99 E 214
100 ibid
101 E 410-412
102 E 317
103 E 324
104 E 329
Chapter Three

1 Emile 358
2 Tanner, Kamuf, Miller, and Horowitz all offer versions of this thesis.
3 Starobinski 113
4 Eloisa I 80-1
5 cf. n 2
6 Eloisa I 57
7 Eloisa II 234-5
8 Eloisa I 76 Julie 24 (trans. modified)
9 eg Eloisa I 80
10 Eloisa I 112 Julie 41 (trans. mod.)
11 Eloisa I 55-6, 147
12 Eloisa I 56
13 Eloisa I 153
14 Eloisa I 153
15 Eloisa I 128
16 Eloisa I 167
17 Eloisa I 290
18 Eloisa I 290-99 This scene has been the subject of much comment Tanner and Kamuf in particular accord it great significance.
19 Eloisa I 294
20 Eloisa I 146
21 Eloisa I 333
22 Eloisa I 338
23 Eloisa II 2
24 Eloisa II 35
25 Eloisa II 190-3
26 Eloisa II 223
27 Eloisa II 224
28 Eloisa II 224-5
29 Eloisa II 225
30 Eloisa II 254-5
31 Eloisa II 249
32 Eloisa II 225
33 Eloisa II 259
34 Eloisa II 259
35 Eloisa II 260
36 Eloisa II 261
37 Eloisa II 293
38 Eloisa II 294
39 Schwartz ch5
40 Eloisa III 166-7
41 Eloisa III 166
42 Eloisa III 169
43 Eloisa III 167
44 Eloisa III 169-70
45 Eloisa III 170
46 Eloisa III 171
47 Eloisa II 295-6
48 Eloisa II 295
49 Eloisa II 293
50 Eloisa III 12
51 Eloisa III 78
52 Eloisa III 79-82
53 Eloisa III 123
54 Eloisa III 233
55 Eloisa III 270-3
56 Eloisa II 257-8
57 Eloisa III 256
58 Eloisa III 274
59 Eloisa IV 44-5
60 Eloisa IV 45
61 Eloisa III 132-161
62 Eloisa III 157
63 Eloisa III 200-201
64 Eloisa II 203
65 Eloisa IV 166
66 Eloisa I 77
67 Eloisa II 238
68 Eloisa I 77
69 Eloisa II 235
70 Eloisa I 80
71 Eloisa I 85
72 Eloisa II 238
73 Eloisa I 153, Julie 59 trans. mod.
74 Eloisa II 256
75 Eloisa II 279
76 Eloisa I 165
77 Eloisa II 256, Julie 259 trans. mod
78 Eloisa II 263, Julie 262
79 Eloisa II 258
80 Eloisa II 259
81 Eloisa II 159
82 Eloisa II 164, Julie 262 trans mod.
83 Eloisa II 264, Julie 262 trans. mod.
84 Eloisa II 261
85 Eloisa III 172-3, Julie 370-1 trans. mod.
86 Eloisa III 2, Julie 297 trans. mod.
87 Eloisa III 3
88 Eloisa III 2
89 Eloisa III 86, Julie 480
90 Eloisa III 199-200
91 Eloisa III 184
92 Eloisa IV 173
93 Eloisa IV 185
94 Eloisa IV 194
95 Eloisa IV 192-3
References to the writings of Freud are given either to the Penguin Freud Library (PFL and volume number) or the Standard Edition (SE and volume number).

1 From the title of chapter 11 of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego which treats of it.
2 Reveries of a Solitary Stroller 89
3 Emile 81
4 Emile 187
5 Emile 208
6 ibid.
7 eg in Ch 2 The Ego and the Id p363
8 It is this that is given greatest prominence in Lacanian theory, where the idea of the "imaginary ego" is so important.
9 PFL11 439
10 PFL12 254-5
11 An Outline of Psychoanalysis PFL15 381 cf Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 254
13 ibid 133-4 cf 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911) ibid. 40
14 cf eg 'A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams' PFL11 239. Again Ricoeur is good on this, pp261-81.
15 'Instincts and Their Vicissitudes' PFL11 134
16 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 254
17 PFL11 69
18 The Ego and the Id PFL11 387
19 The Ego and the Id PFL11 368
20 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL11 81
21 ibid. editor's note.
22 ibid 80-1
23 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12 135
24 PFL7 145n.1
25 see eg New Introductory Lectures 86
26 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
134
27 ibid.
28 ibid 134-5
29 The Ego and the Id PFL11 368. Brown N.O. Life
Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of
History London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959, 46f is
perceptive on the tensions in this distiction. cf,
however, fn 57 below.
30 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
135
31 eg The Ego and the Id PFL12 373
32 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego
PFL12 134
33 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL12 88
34 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 315
35 The Ego and the Id PFL11 371, cf Group Psychology
and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12 134
36 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 316
37 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 318
38 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 322
39 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12
156
40 ibid.
41 ibid. 154-6
42 Totem and Taboo PFL12 83
43 ibid. 90
44 ibid 89
45 ibid. 192
46 ibid. 116
47 ibid. 117
48 ibid. 125
49 ibid. 185-6
50 ibid. 203
51 ibid. 204
52 PFL10 110
53 Accounts of the development of Freud's theory of
the instincts can be found in Bibring E. 'The
Development and Problems of the Theory of the
Instincts' International Journal of Psycho-analysis
22 (1941) and in the Nagera volume.
54 PFL7 155
55 PFL7 82-4
56 PFL7 45
57 PFL10 110-12. This thesis argues that ambivalence
is the key to Freud's thought, and thus rejects
arguments such as Brown's (eg 56-7, 76f) that argue
for an instinctual monism in the interest of a
Utopian politics.
58 PFL7 112
59 PFL15 153
60 see particularly PFL12 38-9
61 PFL11 68
62 PFL11 70-1
63 PFL12 309
64 PFL1 469-70
65 cf eg PFL15 123
66 PFL7 71
67 PFL7 11n.1 The editor's introduction to Civilisation and its Discontents in the Penguin edition (PFL12 247-9) gives a useful summary of this issue, which is more extensively covered by Bibring
68 PFL11 n2
69 PFL11 130-38
70 PFL11 137
71 PFL7 82-3
72 PFL11 116
73 ibid.
74 As in 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (1911)
75 PFL11 120
76 PFL11 132
77 PFL11 325
78 Bibring would seem to be the first to have put forward this schema, which is, eg, followed by those contributing to Nagera's volume on the instincts.
79 such as those of Marcuse, Brown, Ricoeur and Rieff
80 Boothby's recent book on the death instinct is a good example of this.
81 PFL12 318-20
82 cf. 'Instincts and their Vicissitudes' PFL11 122
83 and Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis PFL1 463.
84 ibid. 304
85 PFL11 308 Freud's emphasis
86 ibid. 309 Freud's emphasis
88 PFL11 313
89 PFL11 316
90 ibid. 323
91 Civilisation and its Discontents PFL12 324
92 ibid. 325
93 ibid 318
94 ibid 327. cf Marcuse Ch 4 on civilisation and the superego.
95 ibid. 321
96 ibid. 302
97 ibid. 313
98 PFL15 406 Abramson, in his The Limits of Liberation, takes up this theme, but develops in the direction of politics rather than, as here, towards an ontology of freedom. These approaches should be seen as complementary rather than opposed alternatives.
Chapter Five

1 'On Narcissism: an Introduction' PFL11 86
2 ibid. 88
3 ibid. 95
3 The Ego and the Id PFL11 371-2
5 'The Infantile Genital Organisation' (1923) PFL7 310
6 ibid 309
7 SE23 250-3. Since the 1970s there has been a growing body of work, most of it feminist, that has explored and criticised the Freudian theory of femininity. The classic work remain Juliet Mitchell's Psychoanalysis and Feminism, although it has been criticised, notably, from a more rigorously Lacanian position, by Jane Gallop in her Feminism and Psychoanalysis. This thesis does not depart radically from the consensus interpretation that has grown up, but it makes connections to the ethical that have not previously been developed.
8 ibid. 250
9 PFL7 317
10 Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis PFL1 416
11 PFL7 193-5 and PFL8 268 and 288
12 'The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex' PFL7 318
13 ibid 319
14 PFL10 269
15 'Female Sexuality' PFL7 376
16 PFL7 375
17 PFL7 342
18 cf eg "Civilised" Sexual Morality' (1908) where the lack of capacity for sublimation of women is mentioned (PFL12 47)
19 PFL11 415
20 ibid. 416
21 ibid.
22 references to these are given in the Editor's introduction in the PFL edition. The most important previous treatment was in "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919) PFL10 163ff
23 ibid 418
24 ibid. 424
25 PFL15 429
26 New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 151
27 ibid 152
28 ibid 382
29 ibid 381
30 ibid 382
31 eg New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis 161
32 eg Three Essays on Sexuality PFL7 114-5 'The Sexual Theories of Children PFL7 198-200
33 eg 'Female Sexuality PFL7 376-7
34 PFL11 424
35 ibid. 423
FOOTNOTES

36 ibid. 420-1
37 SE23 242-4
38 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' PFL11 422
39 ibid.
40 PFL12 322
41 'The Economic Problem of Masochism' PFL11 424
42 PFL11 88
43 PFL13 364
44 PFL12 155-6
45 ibid. 156
46 Totem and Taboo PFL13 202
47 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego PFL12 156
48 Totem and Taboo PFL13 202
49 Moses and Monotheism PFL13 325
50 Totem and Taboo PFL13 187-193
51 Moses and Monotheism PFL13 345
52 PFL1 418
53 PFL7 334, cf also 'A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Disease' (1915) PFL10 154, 'The Question of Lay Analysis' (1926) PFL15 312, and 'An Outline of Psychoanalysis' PFL15 399 amongst others.
54 PFL13 83
55 PFL7 315
56 'Female Sexuality' PFL7 378
57 Three Essays on Sexuality PFL7 145
58 The full description will be found on PFL7 235
59 ibid.
60 ibid 236
61 Schwartz gives a good account of this 107-108 In Spurs, Derrida makes a similar claim for Nietzsche, in a profoundly interesting study of femininity and the question of style.
62 Confessions 20
63 Ibid.
64 ibid 23
65 La Nouvelle Heloise I 1

Chapter Six

1 The Concept of Anxiety 42 Kierkegaard's emphasis
2 ibid 44
3 ibid 25-35
4 from the subtitle to The Concept of Anxiety
5 The Concept of Anxiety 32
6 ibid 21
7 ibid. 15
8 ibid. 21
9 ibid. 33
10 ibid. 43
11 ibid. 41
12 ibid. 42
13 ibid.
FOOTNOTES

14 cf The Sickness Unto Death 13
15 The Concept of Anxiety 43
16 ibid 41
17 ibid 41-2
18 ibid 41
19 The Concept of Anxiety 43-4 emphasis added.
20 ibid 44
21 ibid
22 ibid 45
23 ibid
24 ibid 47
25 ibid 49
26 ibid 48
27 ibid 111
28 ibid 49
29 ibid
30 ibid 52
31 ibid
32 ibid
33 ibid 61
34 ibid 62
35 ibid 67
36 ibid 68
37 ibid 71
38 ibid 72
39 ibid 96
40 ibid 111
41 ibid 96
42 ibid
43 ibid 97
44 ibid
45 ibid
46 ibid 28
47 ibid 103
48 ibid 104
49 This argument is forcefully made by Gillian Rose in The Broken Middle
50 ibid 107-110
51 ibid 108
52 ibid
53 ibid
54 ibid 109
55 ibid
56 ibid 108-9
57 This summary simplifies a much more extensive structure, but for present purposes is adequate
58 ibid 155
59 ibid 158
60 ibid
61 ibid 159
62 ibid 160
63 ibid 161
64 ibid 108
65 The Concept of Anxiety 28
66 ibid 52-4
67 pp 30-3 and 35-7
68 The Sickness Unto Death 13
69 ibid
70 ibid 14
71 ibid 29
72 ibid 30
73 ibid
74 ibid 30-1
75 ibid 35
76 especially in Fear and Trembling where the movement of faith is incomprehensible in its isolation from grace.
77 in the writings of Judge William in Either/Or and Stages on Life's Way, which, like Fear and Trembling, present a misunderstanding of the movement by ascribing it to man alone.
78 ibid 35-6
79 cf ibid 42 f.
80 eg Fear and Trembling p36-7
81 ibid 16-17
82 ibid 59-60 It might be argued that Kierkegaard himself succumbed to this temptation in his late attack on Christendom.
83 ibid 34
84 Works of Love p25-7
85 ibid 27 SK's emphasis
86 ibid 28 SK's emphasis
87 ibid 37
88 ibid
89 ibid 43
90 ibid 45
91 ibid 182
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'Medusa's Head' 1955 (trans Riviere) (In SE 18) London: Hogarth


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'My Views on the Part Played by Sexuality in the Aetiology of the Neuroses' 1979 (trans unspecified) (In PFL 10 ) Harmondsworth: Penguin

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'Psychogenic Disturbances of Vision according to Psycho-Analytic Conceptions' 1979 (trans Mayne) (In PFL 10) Harmondsworth: Penguin


'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes' (trans. Strachey) (In PFL 7) Harmondsworth: Penguin

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