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Programs as causal models : speculations on mental programs and mental representation
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Chater, Nick and Oaksford, M. (Mike) (2013) Programs as causal models : speculations on mental programs and mental representation. Cognitive Science, Volume 37 (Number 6). pp. 1171-1191. doi:10.1111/cogs.12062
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12062
Abstract
Judea Pearl has argued that counterfactuals and causality are central to intelligence, whether natural or artificial, and has helped create a rich mathematical and computational framework for formally analyzing causality. Here, we draw out connections between these notions and various current issues in cognitive science, including the nature of mental "programs" and mental representation. We argue that programs (consisting of algorithms and data structures) have a causal (counterfactual-supporting) structure; these counterfactuals can reveal the nature of mental representations. Programs can also provide a causal model of the external world. Such models are, we suggest, ubiquitous in perception, cognition, and language processing.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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| Journal or Publication Title: | Cognitive Science | ||||
| Publisher: | Psychology Press | ||||
| ISSN: | 0364-0213 | ||||
| Official Date: | August 2013 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | Volume 37 | ||||
| Number: | Number 6 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 1171-1191 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1111/cogs.12062 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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