Chater, Nick and Oaksford, M. (Mike) (2013) Programs as causal models : speculations on mental programs and mental representation. Cognitive Science, Volume 37 (Number 6). pp. 1171-1191. doi:10.1111/cogs.12062 ISSN 0364-0213.

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Abstract

Judea Pearl has argued that counterfactuals and causality are central to intelligence, whether natural or artificial, and has helped create a rich mathematical and computational framework for formally analyzing causality. Here, we draw out connections between these notions and various current issues in cognitive science, including the nature of mental "programs" and mental representation. We argue that programs (consisting of algorithms and data structures) have a causal (counterfactual-supporting) structure; these counterfactuals can reveal the nature of mental representations. Programs can also provide a causal model of the external world. Such models are, we suggest, ubiquitous in perception, cognition, and language processing.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Cognitive Science
Publisher:	Psychology Press
ISSN:	0364-0213
Official Date:	August 2013
Dates:	Date Event August 2013 Published
Volume:	Volume 37
Number:	Number 6
Page Range:	pp. 1171-1191
DOI:	10.1111/cogs.12062
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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