Stewart, Neil, Chater, Nick and Brown, G. D. A. (2006) Decision by sampling. Cognitive Psychology, Vol.53 (No.1). pp. 1-26. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003

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Abstract

We present a theory of decision by sampling (DbS) in which, in contrast with traditional models, there are no underlying psychoeconomic scales. Instead, we assume that an attribute’s subjective value is constructed from a series of binary, ordinal comparisons to a sample of attribute values drawn from memory and is its rank within the sample. We assume that the sample reflects both the immediate distribution of attribute values from the current decision’s context and also the background, real-world distribution of attribute values. DbS accounts for concave utility functions; losses looming larger than gains; hyperbolic temporal discounting; and the overestimation of small probabilities and the underestimation of large probabilities.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Psychology
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Decision making -- Mathematical models, Sampling (Statistics), Probabilities
Journal or Publication Title:	Cognitive Psychology
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0010-0285
Official Date:	August 2006
Dates:	Date Event August 2006 Published
Volume:	Vol.53
Number:	No.1
Page Range:	pp. 1-26
DOI:	10.1016/j.cogpsych.2005.10.003
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Economic and Social Research Council (Great Britain) (ESRC)
Grant number:	L328253039 (ESRC), RES-000-22-0918 (ESRC)

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