Aziz, Haris and Paterson, Michael S. (2008) Variation in weighted voting games. Coventry: University of Warwick. Department of Computer Science. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition of agents is winning if and only if the sum of weights of the coalition exceeds or equals a specified quota. Tolerance and amplitude of a weighted voting game signify the possible variations in a weighted voting game which still keep the game unchanged. We characterize the complexity of computing the tolerance and amplitude of weighted voting games. We give tighter bounds and results for the tolerance and amplitude of key weighted voting games. We then provide limits to how much the Banzhaf index of a player increases or decreases if it splits up into sub-players.

Item Type:	Report
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Science > Computer Science
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Voting -- Mathematical models
Publisher:	University of Warwick. Department of Computer Science
Place of Publication:	Coventry
Official Date:	February 2008
Dates:	Date Event February 2008 Available
Date of first compliant deposit:	28 July 2016
Number of Pages:	11
DOI:	CS-RR-437
Status:	Not Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Unpublished
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	University of Warwick. Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications, Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC), Pakistan
Related URLs:	Organisation

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