Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

External pressure on alliances : what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal?

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Binner, Jane, Fletcher, Leslie, Kolokoltsov, V. N. (Vasiliĭ Nikitich) and Ciardiello, Francesco (2013) External pressure on alliances : what does the prisoners' dilemma reveal? Games , Volume 4 (Number 4). pp. 754-775. doi:10.3390/g4040754

[img]
Preview
PDF
WRAP_stats_games.pdf - Published Version - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (426Kb) | Preview
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g4040754

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

Prompted by a real-life observation in the UK retail market, a two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma model of an alliance between two firms is adapted to include the response of a rival firm, resulting in a version of a three-player Prisoners’ Dilemma. We use this to analyse the impact on the stability of the alliance of the rival’s competition, either with the alliance or with the individual partners. We show that, while strong external pressure on both partners can cause Ally-Ally to become a Nash equilibrium for the two-player Prisoners’ Dilemma, weak or asymmetric pressure that plays on the partners’ differing objectives can undermine the alliance. As well as providing new insights into how allies should respond if the alliance is to continue, this also illustrates how a third party can most effectively cause the alliance to become unsustainable. We create a new game theoretic framework, adding value to existing theory and the practice of alliance formation and sustainability.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HF Commerce
Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions: Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Statistics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Prisoner's dilemma game, Strategic alliances (Business) -- Mathematical models
Journal or Publication Title: Games
Publisher: M D P I AG
ISSN: 2073-4336
Official Date: 10 December 2013
Dates:
DateEvent
10 December 2013Published
18 November 2013Accepted
15 September 2013Submitted
Volume: Volume 4
Number: Number 4
Page Range: pp. 754-775
DOI: 10.3390/g4040754
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access
Funder: Sweden. Vetenskapsrådet [Research Council]
Grant number: 2009-20474-66896-29 (SRC)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us