PRODUCING CHINA
The Politics of Space in the Making of Modern China

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Declaration

I declare that this dissertation is my own work and that it has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

This thesis entails an analysis of the relationship between space and politics in the construction and legitimisation of modern China. The thesis argues that the production of space has since the onset of modernity in China, in itself very much a spatial process, played a substantial yet, largely unexplored and academically unacknowledged role in both the construction of the nation state and the legitimisation of political ideologies. I wish to show that the production of modern space has since the mid-17th century played an increasingly vital role in the abstract concretisation and the everyday diffusion of the geographic imagination of the Chinese nation state. The state, in other words, legitimises its existence through the reification of space. This thesis contributes to a historical and spatial understanding of the role of geographies of power in creating an alternative understanding of what China is and how it is (re-)produced spatially. Such an understanding problematises the realised abstraction of the Chinese nation state and politicises the production and representation of space in China. The thesis thus questions notions of Chinese essentialism, Chinese history, Chinese architecture and other expressions of state spaces. The position that this thesis takes is that the production of space gives form and meaning to the political. The thesis looks at a variety of spatial techniques of power by analysing the politics of cartography, urban planning, architecture and other forms of production of space. By emphasising the politics of space, this thesis is a work of political geography on the subject of modern Chinese state space. This thesis comprises six chapters, an introduction and a conclusion.
List of Abbreviations

- Chinese Architectural Society (CAS)
- Cultural Revolution (CR)
- Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
- First Five year Plan (FFYP)
- Five year Plan (FYP)
- Great Leap Forward (GLF)
- Guomindang (GMD)
- International Monetary Fund (IMF)
- International Political Economy (IPE)
- International Relations (IR)
- National People's Congress (NPC)
- One City, Nine Towns (OCNT)
- People Republic of China (RPC)
- Republic of China (ROC)
- Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
- Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)
- State Owned Enterprise (SOE)
- Transnational Corporation (TNC)
- World Bank (WB)
- World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Note on Referencing and Transliteration

In this thesis, pinyin is the primary form of transliteration. Chinese characters are used selectively to describe important concepts. The footnotes for each respective chapter are located at the very end of this thesis.
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the historical formation and development of the Chinese nation state through the medium of the production of modern space. I will argue that the production of space has since the onset of modernity in China, in itself very much a spatial process, played a substantial yet, largely unexplored and academically unacknowledged role in both the construction of the nation state and the legitimisation of political ideologies. This thesis therefore wishes to contribute to discussions of the role of geographies of state power, in an effort to begin an alternative, spatial understanding of how China established itself as a modern state. This is not merely of historical relevance. It is also, and arguably more importantly, relevant for understanding the politics of the Chinese nation state today. Questions of what China is today cannot be answered without first asking in, Foucauldian fashion, what it is that makes China possible at all. I argue that the production of modern space (in architecture, mapping etc.) has played and continues to play an important role in the concrete abstraction of China’s state space. This thesis shows, more specifically, how the historically informed formation of the Chinese state space has come to dominate productions of space and experiences of everyday life in contemporary China. The historical production of space remains therefore, I argue, at the forefront of what ‘the political’ entails in China. The emphasis is therefore not on the searching for what is ‘political’ about space. The position that this thesis takes is rather that the production of space gives form and meaning to the political.

A genealogical framework allows me to challenge conventional International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) analyses that merely take the Chinese nation state for granted. Research that engages with China, without sufficient
sensitivity for the historical interplay between the production of space and politics, risks taking for granted several assumptions. The first is the often-assumed natural sovereignty of national space. The territory of the state becomes consequentially a statically bounded and ‘timeless’ ‘container’. The name and territory of ‘China’ congruously interlink to transform retroactively into a perennial and immutable ideal. The second is a denial of the embedded ontological power in the production of state space. Nation states are representations of space in which identities of the Self (often against the Other) are constructed. The historical production of a modern world has ontologically led to the establishment of a uniform and universal system of national identities.

The third assumption has to do with the performative powers in the taking for granted of the abstract state as a fixed container. Society, culture, the national political economy and other social relations are in that way nationalised and subsequently cut-off from the rest of the world. This is especially problematic when considering the idea of a national economy vis-à-vis the global logic of capital. The fourth and final consequence has to do with the effects of assuming the naturalness of a world order comprised of nation states. Writing about China, while failing to spatially and historically question its material form, easily leads to a further series of reifications of the abstraction of the state. Leaving the problem of the politics in the production of space unaddressed, carries for these reasons the risk of an ever-amplifying process of depoliticisation. Understanding that “there is a politics of space because politics is spatial” (Lefebvre 2009 [1970]: 419) means, in other words, that we need to tread very carefully to avoid falling into a world of abstractions. This is especially urgent at a time in which state-centric realist geopolitics has become the norm in many IR analyses on the effects of China’s ‘rise’.
Avoiding the ‘territorial trap’ means taking history not just seriously, but also critically. History needs to be *problematised*. That means that we need to break state space out of its teleological straightjacket and engage with the powers that led to its acceptance as truth. This means, more concretely, to understand how geographies of state power historically led to the concrete abstraction of China, and how the production and reproduction of state spaces have strengthened this project ever since. This thesis will look, in other words, at how the state production of modern space has historically led to the emergence of the abstract Chinese nation state. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that the state-led production of modern space has since the mid-17th century played an increasingly vital role in the abstract concretisation and the everyday diffusion of the geographic imagination of the Chinese nation state. The state, in other words, legitimises its existence through the reification of space. The thesis has one primary, and several secondary research questions.

**Primary research question:**

- What was the role of the state-led production of space in the formation of modern China?

**Secondary research questions:**

- How did that space differ from the preceding one?
- What made that space ‘modern’?
- What were the processes and techniques used that led to and helped strengthen its abstraction?
- How did different modes of production and ideologies affect its evolution?
- And finally, how is the abstract Chinese state able to survive at a time of global capitalism?
This thesis will look at each of these questions historically. This means, first of all, that I will argue that modern China is the result of a transformation in the way space was conceived (Chapters two and three). Space came to be geometrically rationalised as a tool for governance. The thesis will empirically demonstrate this according to the various spatial forms and techniques of power (e.g. ethnography, mapping, planning, architecture and even landscape painting) that the Chinese state deployed to legitimise its very existence. The transferring of the concept of legitimacy from the so-called ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (Tianming) to a territorial politics based on lines drawn on a map was made possible, in other words, by the deployment of techniques of power that disciplined everybody into accepting and believing in the dominant, modern understanding of space. The later introduction of ideologies, underpinned by different modes of production, had a profound effect on the material reality of everyday experiences (Chapters four to six). The core idea of a unified Chinese state space remained, however, largely unchallenged during this time. The production of state space during this period rather intensified, modern space begun to infiltrate and dominate all aspects of social and everyday life. The thesis shows that the inception of global capitalism constitutes perhaps the historically biggest challenge to the integrity of the Chinese state space. I argue in (Chapters one and six) that the territorialised state, on the one hand, relies on the anti-territorial laws of capitalism, while, on the other hand, is threatened by the alienating logic of a rootless, global capitalism.

**Theory of the Thesis**

This thesis has a heavy theoretical emphasis. The theoretical framework is laid out in the first two chapters of the thesis. As will be discussed in much more detail in chapter one, I will rely mainly on Henri Lefebvre’s (e.g. 1991) Marxist-Heideggerian
synthesis for coming to terms with the production of the modern Chinese state space. The reasons for this decision are plural. The first has to do with the ‘thing’ of space itself. Chapter two will show why space as such does not exist. Space only becomes accessible and malleable by our knowledge of and relation to it. Space is concurrently always, in Heideggerian terms, ‘ready-at-hand’ (zuhanden) and ‘present-at-hand’ (vorhanden). Space is, in other words, always concealed and simultaneously always revealed. No matter how hard we try philosophising about space we never will be able to grasp what space an sich actually is. Our understanding of it is rather the limited and limiting product of the knowledge that we have produced about it. Our knowledge of space encloses and delimits space. It is this Heideggerian (1996a) ‘enclosure’ (Geschlossenheit) that makes it political. Heidegger has conventionally been labelled as the philosopher of time. He is however also, and arguably more so, a philosopher of space. Lefebvre was perhaps one of his earliest protégés to realise this.

I follow Lefebvre in linking Marx to Heidegger for the reason that Marx is the great theorist of abstractions and contradictions. His dialectical method reveals how so-called ‘concrete abstractions’ govern people in capitalist states in very real ways. Space (translated into the city, the factory, the state etc.) is for Marx primarily a force of production and surplus accumulation. This has led him to become the primary source of inspiration for geographies of uneven development (see e.g. Harvey 1989c; Harvey 2003a; Smith 2008). China’s post-1976 economic modernisation (Chapter 5) and the country’s post-1992 integration into the global capitalist world (Chapter 6) are not merely characterised, but driven by uneven development. This makes Marx an obvious choice for studying the influence of capitalism on the production of state space in China.
The production of space is the creation of Lefebvre. Lefebvre borrows Marx’s notion of capital’s production and reproduction of abstractions (in commodities, value, labour, money etc.) in order to formulate his own theory of the production of space. Marx was primarily interested in the movement of history as the product of the social relations of production. Space for Lefebvre, however, takes on a very concrete and performative form in the development of capital. For Lefebvre concrete abstractions are in fact spatial abstractions. The abstract space that Lefebvre refers to is historical. A certain form of knowledge of space, Lefebvre refers to a Cartesian notion of space, has come to dominate our thinking about space. The problem of the concealed nature of space was, as Lefebvre explains, ‘resolved’ by Descartes and subsequently turned into a thing in itself. The abstract way space is conceived has had a direct impact on the way space is now perceived and experienced. The concrete abstraction of space is in Lefebvre’s work linked to the logic of capitalism that pervades and takes over the lived spaces of everyday life.

This thesis takes on a similar genealogical and conceptual approach to the question of space. I separate the theoretical framework however somewhat from Lefebvre’s original emphasis on capitalist production, to be able to analyse how a modern conceptualisation of space has historically allowed for the production of the Chinese state space. This is not to deny the importance of the workings of capitalism for the production of space. Lefebvre acknowledges, after all, that every set of social relations has its distinctive mode of production of space. Every production of space embeds a particular form of politics, and every form of politics transcends a particular production of space. Using the concept outside its capitalist context grants me the leeway to apply it to the production of modern space in the historical formation of the
modern Chinese state (chapter three). It also allows me to come to terms with the specifically communist production of space (chapter four).

**Situating the Thesis**

This is to my knowledge the first work that deals with the Chinese modern production of state space in a historically comprehensive manner. This does not mean that there has not been similar work done on other geographical areas. Thongchai’s (1997) highly influential *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation* studies, for example, the emergence of nationhood in Thailand. A more recent work by Goswami (2004) demonstrates in a similar vein how 19th century colonial and native discourses were responsible for spatially ‘producing’ India. Research on the historical production of state space has especially fared well in analyses on ‘Western’ countries (e.g. Konvitz 1987; Petto 2006; Petto 2009). The increasing amount of attention on the production of state space has translated into the first comprehensive account of the emergence of territory in the Western context. Elden’s (2013a) *The Birth of Territory* sets the bar (high) for future research on the spatial foundation of the modern nation state.

Little of these academic achievements have until now however resulted in comprehensive studies on the historical emergence of modern state space in China. This is not to deny the importance of the great number of rich explorations on productions of space in specific periodic and geographic contexts. The thesis relies, in fact, on a great number of such accounts to explore the politics embedded in the production of state spaces. The older pioneering work on late imperial cities of Skinner (1977), Mote (1977) among others (e.g. Wright 1977) has been taken up by a more recent and theoretically more engaged generation of scholars (e.g. Heng 1999; Xu 2000). Lewis (2006) *The construction of space in early China* was particularly
useful for understanding the relationship between space and politics in early Chinese cities (Chapter two). Steinhardt’s (1986; 1990; 2002) work is in this regard similarly of great importance for coming to terms with what I in this thesis call ‘non-modern’ productions of space.

The introduction of critical theory has led also to a rich literature on later productions of urban space (e.g. Esherick 2000). Bray’s (2005) wonderful Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System From Origins to Urban Reform played, for example, a crucial influence in research on the political importance of work units for the Chinese state. Duanfang Lu (2006) temporally and conceptually elaborates on Bray’s discussion on work units to show how the relationship between urban form and society developed in the communist and reform period. While Lu and Bray’s work relies mostly on the insights of Foucault, more and more attention in analyses on the politics of space is given to the contributions of Lefebvre. The work that comes perhaps first to mind is Li Zhang’s (2001) empirically in-depth study on the relationship between rural migrants and productions of social space. The work of David Harvey similarly receives increasing attention for coming to terms with the many contradictions and modes of uneven development that haunt the built environment of post-1976 China. The important academic labours of Fulong Wu (2000a; 2000b; 2002) deserve special mentioning here.

Despite the inception of critical theory and growing spatial sensitivity, few studies focus exclusively on the development of the historical production of state space in China. The subject of state space is in other words, largely only addressed indirectly. Attention on the importance of the historical production of space did translate, however, into various, well-researched publications on specific geographic locations. The city of Beijing has especially received much attention. Wu Hung’s

Such temporally and geographically contextual work on the politics of space matches the impressive amount of specialised scholarship on the different forms of productions of space. Zhu’s (2009a) work on the history of modern Chinese architecture is for my purposes arguably the most interesting among this recent strand of research. Zhu shares a similar historical premise as this thesis. His emphasis on the importance of the “introduction of the Renaissance linear perspective” (Zhu 2009a: 11) in early 18th century China is particularly insightful. Zhu’s account unfortunately, however, does little to substantiate why this modern projection of space became dominant, how it developed and, arguably most importantly, what such a reconceptualisation meant and means in political terms. Other histories of modern Chinese architecture (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001; Rowe and Kuan 2002; Xue 2006) limit themselves to more recent times and focus less explicitly on the politics of space. Research on Chinese mapping is, in contrast, still in its infancy and is largely devoid of political analyses (see e.g. Yee 1994c; Yee 1994d; Smith 1996; Yee 2008; Smith 2009). Historic ethnographic approaches have recently started to pay attention to the importance of space for the emergence of the cosmopolitan Chinese state. The work of Hostetler (2000; 2001) and Teng (1999; 2004) on Qing China is of special relevance here. Such research is however primarily historical in orientation and tells us
subsequently little on how the production of a state space informs the politics of the Chinese nation state today.

This thesis instead takes the modern space of the state as the starting point. This means that the thesis finds itself at the junction of several disciplines and many strands of literature. This is not necessarily disadvantageous. Harvey (1989c: 5), after all, admits that “the question of space is… too important to be left exclusively to geographers”. I think, more generally speaking, that the very, totalising nature of space compels a great number of, if not all, disciplines to confront its complexity either implicitly or explicitly. The main disciplines I have engaged with during the course of this thesis are (in non-specific order): Political Geography; History; Philosophy; China studies; IR; IPE; and Architectural Theory. The final product is, however, first and foremost, a work of political geography on the subject of modern Chinese state space.

This thesis should therefore also be seen in light of the still on-going spatial and post-disciplinary turn that characterises the post-Cold War writings of a new generation of critical politics theorists, which includes authors, such as: David Campbell (1992), Michael Shapiro (1997), Nick Vaughan-Williams (2009) and especially Rob Walker (1993; 2009). The problematisation of the question where politics takes place is, I believe, one of the core tenets of their labours. The questioning of modern space, as a historically constructed political abstraction, also characterises this thesis. I rely especially in chapters one and two on the works and labours of critical political geographers that have written about or are taking cue from Marx and/ or Heidegger. The political geographers I relied on include authors such as Brenner (1999; 2000; 2003), Elden (2004b; 2006; 2010), Smith (1992; 2008), Agnew (1994) among others. I also rely on a number of ‘philosophers’ (I use that noun with advisement) that have dealt with the question of space. The most important ones are
Henri Lefebvre (1991; 1996), Michel Foucault (1984a; 1986) and Edward Casey (1997b; 2009). Their work is (or was) inspired by and is largely compatible with the thoughts of Heidegger and Marx.

This thesis has, besides its theoretical weight, also a strong historical emphasis. Chapter three relies heavily on the so-called ‘new Qing’ historians (see e.g. Hostetler 2001; Elliott 2002; Perdue 2005) to contextualise the spatial modernisation of China during the Qing period (1644-1911). This small, but highly influential group of authors has unfortunately largely been left ignored by the studies on the politics of space in China. Most of such work (with notable exceptions, such as Dutton 1998; Wu 2005) remains instead committed to an ahistorical approach. The new Qing’s historiographical research on an earlier modernity in China has also gone unnoticed by the still very Eurocentric discipline of political history.

This thesis makes also use of the valuable work of political scientists and political historians working on China. The works of Wang Hui (2003; 2009), Shaun Breslin (1998; 2007) and Frederick Teiweis and Warren Sun (2004; 2007; 2011) have especially proved to be useful for the analysis of post-1976 China (chapters five and six). Their analyses are in especially the last two chapters of this thesis complemented by the fertile efforts of political geographers working of the effects of China’s contemporary urbanisation project (Wu 2000a; Wu 2000b; Shin 2009; Shin 2012; Wu and Gaubatz 2013 among others).

**Contributions of the Thesis**

The thesis provides a number of contributions. The arguably five most significant ones are listed below. First, I believe that this thesis is, as mentioned before, the first of its kind to comprehensively and historically analyse the emergence and
development of the modern production of state space in China. This work relies on a rich number of methodological and theoretical resources to demonstrate how a certain understanding and production of space has shaped and continues to give form and meaning to politics in China. The thesis therefore wishes to contribute to a renewed understanding of what China is by looking at the relationship between politics and space. It also, and relatedly, wishes to stress and emphasise the central role that space has played in the legitimisation and continuity of the (concrete abstraction of the) Chinese state.

Second, the analysis of modernity in China has since the Macartney Mission and the onset of the Industrial Revolution been a highly political endeavour. The result is that analyses have strongly suffered from teleological lines of argumentation. This thesis attempts from the beginning to refute the idea of a linearity of history. I instead tried (and hopefully succeeded) to avoid relying on temporal linearity. The thesis provides instead an account of how knowledge and production of space play an active role in the unfolding of history. The thesis therefore hopes to contribute to the challenging of earlier work on China’s modernity, and to negate the wider image that arose (in China and outside of it) of a pre-modern, feudal China before its encounter with the ‘West’.

Third, the thesis shows that the territory of China and the logic of territoriality has largely remained unchanged since the mid-18th century. The thesis argues that China gradually endorsed the logic of modernity, a spatial development in itself, at around the same time as European powers did. The state enjoyed a level of modern sovereignty, bordered its frontiers and transformed subjects into citizens. This development has been acknowledged by modern historians, it remains however unexplored in the political sciences. This thesis wishes to make a modest contribution
to the growing discontent about the Westphalian origins of modernity. I wish to demonstrate that critiques of 1648 should however, not be limited to questions of sovereignty within Europe. I instead wish to offer a more global and spatially sensitive perspective on the locus and historical workings of modernity. This argument falls largely in line with recent work done by world historians (see especially Lieberman 2009) who have started to stress the occurrence of so-called ‘strange parallels’ across the Eurasian continent in the early formation of states.

Fourth, this thesis shows how important and central the production of space is and has been for the dissemination and legitimisation of political ideologies in China. This thesis looks into the productions of state space of at least four separate forms of social organisation: The imperial Qing state; the national Guomindang (GMD) state; the communist state; and the capitalist state. The production of space performed a central role in the continuation of all these forms of states. The social relations underpinning these forms of state had however, each a unique impact on the production of state space. This thesis makes a modest attempt to demonstrate how the different social organisations affected the production of space and how space, in return, helped to constitute and reinforce those social relations.

Fifth and finally, avoiding the territorial trap means engaging with its historical leftovers. This thesis wishes to repoliticise notions of Chinese essentialism that has resulted into categories, ideas and concepts such as its presumed 5,000 (or 3,000) year-old history. The idea of uniqueness has also come to infiltrate the discourse of a distinctive ‘Chinese’ architecture and has led, more generally, to a growing number of things and spaces with so-called ‘Chinese characteristics’. Emphasising the importance of space for the concrete abstraction of modern China could help to both explain and challenge the rising tide of nationalism in the country. Bringing attention
to the historical trajectory of abstract modern also challenges accounts (starting at least from Hegel until after Foucault⁴) that continue to presume a uniquely unique and enigmatic China.

**Methodology of the Thesis**

The production of space is in this thesis explored through various spatial interventions undertaken by the Chinese state. These ‘elite’ attempts to reconstruct and influence the quotidian helped to give form and meaning to the abstraction of state space. The choice for these case studies should, in other words, be seen as symptomatic of the ways in which the state-led production of space in China has come to shape both national and ideological subjectivities. The case studies were selected for various reasons. Some of these reasons are admittedly more contingent than others.

The maps discussed in chapter three belonged, for example, among the first of attempts to scientifically demarcate the territorial extent of modern China. The case study of the GMD capital city of Nanjing, mentioned in the same chapter, is included to describe how the state-led entry of an urban modernity affected the organisation of city space. The reason for studying Tiananmen Square should similarly be evident. Tiananmen Square belongs to one of the world’s most influential public spaces for the internalisation of a national subjectivity.

The choice for some of the other examples is admittedly less obvious. The ‘One City, Nine Towns’ project, discussed in the last chapter, provides us with a rather illustrative insight into the aesthetic ‘post-modernisation’ of the Chinese landscape. The project is just one among many others that have recently started to mushroom across the country. I chose to specifically study this project given the widespread media and academic coverage it has received both inside and outside of China. The
mega event buildings discussed in the same chapter provide material illustrations of how capitalism and globalisation, on the one hand, complement each other and, on the other hand, are in conflict with each other. Other examples, which similarly characterise a broader trend, include the different housing projects during the communist period (1949-1976). These housing developments, discussed in chapter four are not so much unique as exemplary for the infiltration of a socialist subjectivity in the private sphere during the early period of communist rule. The examples provided in this thesis are, of course, not exhaustive for the long period under investigation. Neither do the conclusions drawn from them reflect an absolute reality. The thesis instead attempts to incorporate a rich number of case studies to identify broader trends that have characterised the role of the state in the historical dissemination of specific geographical knowledge.

This thesis employs a number of different or perhaps ‘trans-disciplinary’ methodological instruments. I have relied, for example, on the British Museum for many of the maps listed and mentioned in chapter three. I also have made use of the extensive and rare collection of Chinese atlases, gazetteers, books and other sources of the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. I have also explored old texts in various languages in, for example, my analysis on the Jesuits. Many of these texts have recently been published in the open domain. Others I have gathered through Warwick’s inter-library loan system or through European and Chinese libraries.

I have also made use of Tsinghua’s online ‘China National Knowledge Infrastructure’ database (Zhongguo xueshu qikan wang) to gain access to sources (such as the formidable ‘Journal of Architecture’ (Jianzhu xuebao) for my analysis of communist architecture and urban planning in chapter four. The later chapters in this thesis relies partly on information I gathered from local and national Chinese news
reports and official government websites on subjects covering architecture, urban planning and other contemporary productions of space.

I am finally, also indebted for a good number of insights and information in chapters five and six to my experiences in China. Before my PhD, I worked on sustainable ecological city planning in Yangzhou and Changzhou (Jiangsu). I spent an additional year in Shanghai (2008-2009) where I was employed at the University of Shanghai (Shanghai daxue). I used this year also to study Chinese, to conduct field visits and to explore various urban settings in Chinese cities. A lot of the information in the section on the ‘On City Nine Towns’ project (Chapter six) project is the result of field visits, and my cooperation in an edited volume on the site (Hartog 2010). I have furthermore interviewed several Chinese academics, urban planners and international architects to gain also a top-down understanding of how market forces affect the built environment.

**Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the abstract state at a time in which some say it is ‘withering away’, while others simply take its existence for granted. The first group, identified as ‘globalisation theory’, epitomises an ‘end of geography’, while the second, especially prevalent in theories of IR, dehistoricises and reifies the abstraction of the state. This chapter attempts to avoid the ‘territorial trap’ by looking at the role of capitalism in sustaining and consolidating the ‘geographical unconscious’ of the state. The chapter introduces both Marx and Lefebvre to emphasise the importance of the modes of production for sustaining both the state and capitalism. It also exposes the contradiction between the global laws of capitalism and the territorial, rooted nature of the state. This theme is of special importance in the last two chapters.
The second chapter provides a short genealogy of modern space. It historically argues for its depoliticising effect and its relevance for understanding the emergence of the modern territorial state. *Space, and more specifically the (re)production thereof, is in this thesis argued to be the stuff that moves history.* The triumph of a modern, isometric and homogeneous understanding of space over the concept of a heterogeneous notion of place is, in this chapter, argued to be one of the defining features of modernity. The circulation and accumulation of capitalism thrives precisely because of the standardisation of space (and time). The second half of the chapter returns to the national political economy of the state. The section shows how the capitalist production of space helped create and maintain the concrete abstraction of the state.

The third chapter looks at the early evolution of modern space in China. The analysis commences at the historical advent of modern territorial mapping in China. It provides an account of the evolution from an ethnocentric, universal understanding of space to the endorsement of a modern form of knowledge and production of space. The chapter, which roughly covers the long period from 1644 to the early 1930s, relies on a number of spatial practises (e.g. cartography, ethnography, architecture, urban planning etc.) to demonstrate why and how China transformed from a ‘non-modern’ to a ‘modern’ state. The last section of the chapter, covering the rule of the Guomindang (GMD), shows how ideology became an increasingly important component in the production of state space.

The fourth chapter looks at the period from 1949 to 1976. Here we see an intensification of the influence of ideology in the production of space in the spheres of everyday life. The Party State used the production of space to strengthen the abstraction of a socialist state and to accelerate further the modes of production. I have
roughly divided the period into two phases that are characterised by two distinct uses of state space. The first phase (1949-1961) demonstrates the importance of space for the creation of a socialist subjectivity and everyday life. The production of space had, more specifically, a profound impact on the experience and biorhythm of everyday life. The second phase (1962-1975) is characterised by a revolutionary transformation in the questioning of the role of the state and state space. The period of the Cultural Revolution was primarily characterised by the questioning and, therefore, the (re-) politicising of space.

The fifth chapter, starting from the period of Hua Guofeng’s leadership and ending in 1989, shows how the Communist Party gradually started to depoliticise the production of space. Politics were withdrawn from the experience of everyday life, while the party became, at least initially, inadvertently preoccupied with the search for a new form of state. The transformation from a ‘Party State’ to a ‘State party’ meant that the communists increasingly shifted their attention to the economy. A contradiction arose between the party’s legacy (and name) and its embrace of so-called ‘objective economic laws’. This tension would ultimately culminate in the Tiananmen Square incident. The depoliticisation of the economy had a profound impact on the urban landscape. The city gradually transformed from a place of production to a spectacle of consumption.

The sixth and final chapter of the thesis deals with the ensuing changes that followed the violent crackdown of the Tiananmen protests. The period after Deng’s Xiaoping’s, now legendary, ‘Southern Tour’ is characterised by an unprecedented transformation of the urban environment. The result has been an acceleration of the depoliticisation of the production of space and the overall ‘over-production’ of space. The spreading of capital, uneven development and the subsequent process of urban
alienation has led to a resurgence of nationalism in the country. The desire and pressure to create a nationalist spatial form is analysed in the second section of the chapter. The Chinese state faces, in other words, one of the primary contradictions of capital. The project of the concretisation of the abstract state relies, on the one hand, on the global logic of capital, yet, on the other hand, its territorial nature forces it to give form and meaning to the concrete abstraction of the national local. This contradiction eventually finds its translation into abstract things and spaces with ‘Chinese characteristics’.

The conclusion then, reiterates the main points and contributions of this thesis. The conclusion will close with an overview of some of the implications of the findings of this thesis.
1. Chapter One: Rethinking State Space

Introduction

This chapter theoretically discusses the abstract reality of the state. I will do this by exposing how conventional IR and IPE accounts either deterministically ‘overmine’ or hastily undermine the geographic nature of the state after the inception of globalisation\(^1\). The exposing of the ‘misplaced concreteness’ of modern (state) space will theoretically be elaborated on in chapter two. This two-part theoretical framework will then be deployed in a historical analysis of the development Chinese state from chapter three onwards. This dissertation is arranged in such a way so as to demonstrate how a particular historical conception of space has given form and continues to inform the development of the Chinese nation state from its founding principles in the 17\(^{th}\) century to its supposed ‘rise’ in an abstractly imagined global world\(^2\). The uncovering of the spatial abstraction of the state (and the globe) is therefore also of timely relevance. Discussions on China’s presumed ‘rise’ have led to an increasing acceptance of the geography of the Chinese state in a so-called globalised world.

This is not to deny that China’s post-reform development has as much an effect on the world as the world has an effect on China. The Chinese landscape has, as shown in chapters five and six, radically transformed since Hua Guofeng inadvertently started to ‘open-up’ the economy to the world in 1976. The ‘biggest construction boom in human history’ is only paralleled in magnitude by the corresponding ‘destruction bust. “Since the 1980s, China has built more skyscrapers; more office buildings; more shopping malls and hotels; more housing estates and gated
communities; more highways, bridges, subways, and tunnels; more public parks, playgrounds, squares, and plazas; more golf courses and resorts and theme parks than any other nation on earthy - indeed, than probably all other nations combined.” (Campanella 2008: 14). Campanella (2008: 180) writes that “[i]n 1950 about 17 per cent of the total national population lived in cities; by the 1990s this number was up to 27 per cent, and today [2008] it exceeds 40 per cent”. The number of people living in cities recently overtook that of those living in the rural areas (Juan 2011). Friedmann (2005: IX) anticipates that “within another thirty years, nearly two-thirds (60 per cent or more) of China's citizens will live in cities…”.

This state-sponsored (over-)production of space has not evenly been distributed, as not all parts of the country have equally benefited from the country’s integration into what commonly is called ‘globalisation’. Marxists know very well that capitalism is unable to develop without contradictions. The understanding that capitalism, in fact, thrives precisely because of its uneven mode of development is often less emphasised. “Uneven development is the hallmark of the geography of capitalism… Uneven development is the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions inherent in the very constitution and structure of capital” (Smith 2009: 4). The geography of capitalism is distinctive from previous and other sets of social relations. The geography of capitalism is, as Smith (2008: 134) argues “more systematically and completely an integral part of the mode of production than was the case with any earlier mode of production”. The inherent contradictions of capitalism compel the state to constantly intervene in the process of capital accumulation in an effort to police and govern, but never to resolve, its uneven mode of development.

The post-1989 state relies however on the global capitalist mode of production to provide it the legitimacy it needs for its existence (Chapter six). Capitalism thrives
under the aegis of the state, which regulates the social bodies and spaces that it needs to expand, accelerate and circulate. The same set of social relations, however, also undermines the coherence, unity and stability of the abstract state. The capitalist production of space has since the ‘critical turn’ in geography led to the falsification of the belief that we can simply take space for granted. This chapter wishes to expose the myth of the flattened surface space that silently haunts discussions on the state and the globe.

Discourses on ‘globalisation’ implicitly or explicitly refer to the global and even distribution of space and time. The process of globalisation is said to bring together all places, peoples and cultures into a single, flattened orbit. Globalisation is hence argued to ‘hollow-out’ the nation state. Globalisation disempowers the state’s capacity to govern over its sovereign territory. Territory suffers from a ‘slow death’ and is replaced by a notion of ‘supraterritoriality’. “The proliferation and spread of supraterritorial - or what we can alternatively term 'transworld' or 'transborder' - connections brings an end to what could be called ‘territorialism’, that is, a situation where social geography is entirely territorial. Although... territory still matters very much in our globalising world, it no longer constitutes the whole of our geography.” (Scholte 2000: 46). Other accounts (e.g. Friedman 2005) are less hesitant and declare the ‘end of geography’ and the beginning of a ‘flat world’. This chapter will argue against the idea that the state and notions associated to territory (state space) have somehow suddenly become obsolete. Geography is far from dead and is, as the unevenness that stems from the capitalist modes of production spread, actually of increasing importance.

Globalisation theory fails, in other words, to provide a conceptual analysis of both time and space. Theories of globalisation instead more often than not take these
categories for granted. Globalisation has subsequently become (or maybe always was) a discourse in itself. Hegelian political theory took the abstract nation state, some two hundred years earlier, similarly to be ‘the endpoint of history’. The abstract nation state has not withdrawn, however, in the creation of new, global ‘end of history’. The state has rather played an important part in concretising the idea of an abstract and homogenous globe. A historical analysis of the development of a certain (homogeneous and isomorphic) understanding of space is what is needed to problematise illusive and depoliticised geographic and temporal traps. The theme that this chapter addresses is how this modern interpretation of space has come to concretise the spatial abstractions of the globe and the state. I will use globalisation theory as the metaphorical springboard to ‘reopen’ and politicise the question of space.

This more conceptually and historically grounded approach to the relationship between space and politics will, in turn, allow for a more genealogical approach to the introduction and development of modern space in China. The question of modern productions of space in China cannot be answered on the basis of the present, but need to be answered historically, if we wish to understand the role and evolution of geography in the construction and development of the modern Chinese state. What led to the emergence of the modern Chinese territorial state? How was the production of space ‘sinified’? What purpose does this serve? These and other questions deserve a historically grounded analysis to understand how their answers have come to transcend and inform the politics of today.

This chapter will first, however, problematise the abstraction of both globalisation and the state. There is a need to explore the role of these abstractions to understand the importance of geography for China’s historical development. Modern China is the product of a certain universal understanding of space that, as described in
chapter three, has since the 17th century been deployed to legitimise and strengthen the abstraction of the Chinese nation state. The concretisation and societal deepening of this abstraction is what has kept the state busy ever since. The production of space has been of constant importance for the state. This is especially true after the contradictions of capitalism have since 1976 become more palpable (Chapters five and six).

The first part of this chapter will critically engage with the conceptualisation of space in globalisation theory. Such accounts are, more often than not, grounded in a dehistoricised framework which argues for the onset of a historically unique spatiotemporal momentum that fundamentally breaks with the linear trajectory of history and the geography of a bordered world. I will instead argue for the continuous importance of the state (and its space) for the governance and policing of capitalism. This does not imply a return to state-centric realism. The state is instead historically conceptualised as an abstract production of modern understanding of space. The space of the state is consequentially in perpetual need of constant reification. The second part of this chapter will show that modern space (and time) embodies therefore also an ontological dimension. Marxists show that social relations create their own geography. A more ontological approach reveals, however, that human beings not merely create, but are also ‘thrown into’ a world that for a large part is already geographically constituted. Space is, therefore, a social relation, but also responsible for reinforcing the dominant special relations. The world around us has meaning and gives meaning to us. The second section will attempt, in other words, to bring Marx and Heidegger together in an attempt to repoliticise space and overcome the problems in globalisation theory and conventional IR accounts. The conclusion will summarise the main discussion points of this chapter: the continued importance of the abstract state; the
contradiction between capitalism and the abstract state; and the importance of modern understandings of space for the creation of the abstract state and the abstract globe. This chapter contributes, to summarise, to the exposing of the concrete abstraction that is the state. The following chapter will explain, in more historical terms, its emergence and spatial functioning. The chapters following chapter two will use this theoretical framework to identify the spatial techniques used for the establishment of the Chinese state.

**Globalisation**

**Situating the Debate about Space**

A large pool of literature from a variety of disciplines argues for a world that has fundamentally changed after the fall of the Soviet Union (Giddens 1990; Ohmae 1990; Scholte 1997; Mann 2001; Scholte 2002; Wolf 2004 among many others). The underpinning idea behind such thought is nicely summarised in the words of Jean-Marie Guehenno:

1989 marks the close of an era that began not in 1945 or 1917, but that was institutionalised thanks to the French Revolution, in 1789. It brings an end to the age of the nation-states (Guehenno in Dirlik 2002: 16)

The collapse of a communist alternative not only signified the final climax of an already long tainted ideology but also, and perhaps more importantly, characterised a new age in which the world was thought to have been united from Moscow to Brussels to Washington. The “end of the twentieth century” (Hobsbawm 1994) had already long been anticipated by intellectual crises of Marxism and the rise of postmodernism in the 1970s, but the incident in Tiananmen Square delivered it its decisive push. The break-down of world bipolarity allowed for the zenith of
globalisation, an era of in which everything became possible. Robertson (in Robertson 1995: 40) goes as far as to argue for “a compression of the world as a whole”. Some (Giddens 1990; Giddens 2000) have argued for a “transformation of time and space” that led to the “emptying of space [and time]” and ultimately to the “disembedding of social systems”.

The celebration of liberal democratic capitalism provided the fatal blow to the Marxist alternative (cf. Hobsbawm 1992; Gamble 1999; but also Therborn 2007). The protagonist of the last great alternative, Mao or Maoism, was almost overnight turned from the Great Helmsman into a spectacle and insignia of the fashion industry. The End of History marks the “the definitive exorcism of spectres and spectrality, the beginning of a market universe which is a perpetual present, as well as the instauration of truth...” (Jameson 1995: 108).

The idea of globalisation is however not value-free in itself. The sentiments attached and characteristics attributed to it carry, especially in the ‘West’ (and I use that word with the necessary caution), a degree of liberal euphoria. Globalisation is, in fact, a political discourse in and of itself. Its spatial-political message carries the “the freedom of imagining a new world that is radically different from the old one.” (Bartelson 2000: 192). Bartelson’s ontologically inclined interpretation of globalisation finds support in Sloterdijk’s (2009) genealogical reading of the term. His so called ‘spherology’ shows how humanity was already preoccupied with thinking about the globe before its actual terrestrial domestication. The globe is for Sloterdijk, therefore, not only an ontological category, but also a symbol of power. Globalisation understood in the contemporary context is symbolic for liberal domination of global space. The year 1989 symbolises, therefore, perhaps less of a paradigm shift and more
of a liberal ‘told you so’, which reinstates a dominant way of thinking about space and time.

Whether to be welcomed or not, globalisation was, at least until the financial crisis in 2008, widely taken to be a new historical phase. It was (and continues to be) characterised by the thought that capitalism is unbeatable, inevitable and the only economic and political system fit for humanity. Embracing the global capitalist system meant endorsing the idea of an ‘end of history’ in which the pact between a parliamentary form of democracy and market capitalism was considered to be the “‘end point of mankind's ideological evolution’ and the ‘final form of human government’” (Fukuyama 1992: XI). The opening of the eschatological “gates of the Promised Land of Liberal Democracy” (Fukuyama 1992: 134) was believed to unlock the keys to the “heydays of happy globalisation” (Holmes in Outhwaite and Ray 2005: 19) and “usher an amazing era of prosperity, innovation, and collaboration, by companies, communities, and individuals.”(Friedman 2005: 8).

A whole new area of studies emerged from the ashes of the Cold War. ‘Globalisation theory’ (Rosenberg 2000; Rosenberg 2005) was established with the purpose of coming to terms with the post-1989 world. Many of such analyses have been criticised for being overly enthusiastic in their portrayal of globalisation as a new social, economic and cultural phenomenon, while downplaying historical precedents (see e.g. Kiely 2005; Albert 2007). Other critics and sceptics have gone further and argue that “the ‘age of globalisation’ is over” (Rosenberg 2005: 3) and claim that “[a]ny attempt to provide a concise overview over globalisation research must necessarily fail… [T]here never has been - and probably never will be - an uncontested and shared understanding of what ‘globalisation’ is.” (Albert 2007: 166). Notwithstanding these critiques, it is clear that globalisation theory helped in bringing
the concepts of space and time back onto the agenda of traditional disciplines within the political sciences. “The dissolution of the Cold War, the increased velocity and volatility of the world economy, the emergence of political movements outside the framework of territorial states (arms control, human rights, ecological, etc.), all call into question the established understanding of the spatio-temporal framing of ‘international relations’.” (Agnew 1994: 55, 56).

The ‘spatial turn’ has in conventional IR accounts however, unfortunately, led to a return to obsolete traditions within geographic scholarship. Robert Kaplan’s neorealist Revenge of Geography is, for instance, profoundly influenced by the work of the colonial apologist Halford Mackinder. The increasing attention given to Carl Schmitt, a Nazi legal geographer, is another example of the persistent influence of geographic determinism on IR theories and analyses. Much of IR remains, in other words, trapped in what Agnew (1994) famously called the ‘territorial trap’. Realist, neorealist and liberal IR theories all, to various degrees, theorise the territorial state as a ‘timeless space’. Both geography and history remain, in other words, under-theorised or are simply taken for granted entities in IR literature. This thesis wishes to undo the existing imbalance by looking through Marxist-Heideggerian lenses at the role of modern space in the formation and development of the Chinese state. The territorial state is in this thesis therefore instead conceptualised as the product of a specific form of knowledge from which universal representations of space and time gave rise to a distinct form of governance.

Let us, therefore, first focus our attention on the role of the state in the debate on globalisation. After all, the abstract state is the sole responsible political entity for the production and organisation of space within its territory. In what follows, I will first critically introduce globalisation theory and provide an analysis of its
understanding of space. I will then shift my attention on the role of the capitalist state and its production of space. This section will especially be important for the later chapters (five and six) of this thesis that explicitly deal with the importance of space for the legitimacy of the post-1976 Chinese state. The emphasis on the state will also be used, furthermore, to delve deeper into the relationship between space and state in the more historical chapters that follow this one. The ensuing discussion will allow me, in other words, to centralise the role of the abstract state and help me start building a foundational theory for engaging with the politics of the more contemporary developments in China’s urban landscape.

This chapter, and the thesis more generally, identifies how the production of state space has led to abstractions that are relentlessly depoliticised and taken for granted in the way IR accounts conventionally think, write and talk about politics. This thesis, in contrast, starts from the Lefebvrian premise that there is a politics of space, because space is inherently political. The thesis therefore argues that we cannot think about politics in space without acknowledging that space is what actually helps constitute the political.

**Globalisation Theory**

The first and core question that should arise in an analysis of globalisation theory is that of the similarities that characterise and shape the reasoning of this stream of thought. The vast majority of globalisation theories share a common belief that globalisation is a novel concept which finds its catalyst in an increased global interconnectedness on a political, economic and cultural level (e.g. Scholte 1997; Held and McGrew 2000; Sassen 2007; Scholte 2007). Indeed, Giddens (1990: 64) argues that globalisation is “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring
many miles away and vice versa.” The idea of interconnectedness as a central component for globalisation takes, of course, many different forms. Many globalisation scholars argue, however, that “the global is generally conceptualised as overriding or neutralising place and as operating on a self-evidently global scale” (Sassen 2007: 11). The breaking down of borders, the ‘hollowing-out’ of the state and the loss of local traditions has led many to argue for a nightmarish existentialism of flux and multitudes which reminds Doreen Massey of “the nervousness of the male modernist, nearly a century ago, when faced with the big city.” (1992: 74). The popular observation, among globalisation thinkers, that demarcated space is a thing of the past leads them to conclude that a resolute rethinking and reorganisation of geographic territorialities, nation states, cultures and even identities is necessary to enable a coming to terms with the complexities and hybridity of the so-called ‘post-modern condition’.

The spatial anxiety is expressed by writers such as Scholte (2002: 4, see also; Scholte 2007) who argue that globalisation is established as “the spread of transplanetary – and in recent times more particularly supraterritorial – connections between people...”. This results, he argues, in a “shift in the nature of social space” (Scholte 2002: 14). For Scholte (2002: 22) it seems obvious that what is needed is a “significant reconfiguration of social geography”, or as he writes: “The spread of supraterritoriality requires a major reorientation of approach”. The trend towards the “supraterritorial” and “transborder” relations” is, in Scholte’s (1997: 429) wording, the result of surplus accumulation. It operates “through the pursuit of: (a) larger market range; (b) lower costs of labour, taxation, and regulation; and (c) new opportunities for accumulation through intangible items such as information, telephone conversations, and mass media productions that circulate in global space itself.” Held and others are
more cautious in their assumption over the uniqueness of globalisation. They argue for a more historical “process which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and transactions – generating, transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interactions, and the exercise of power.” (Held in Kumar 2005: 9-10).

More sceptical accounts of globalisation have curbed the enthusiasm over the supposedly unprecedented extent of the economic, cultural and political transnational interconnectedness of globalisation. Thompson and Hirst (1992; see also Hirst and Thompson 2002b) already early onwards argued, for example, that global foreign trade as a percentage of GDP in the post WWII period were similar (if not smaller) to those of pre WWI levels. Other findings in their research suggest that most trade in the 1990s occurred in regional trading blocs and that increases in trade outside such blocs were only marginal. The fact that capitalism creates and relies on an uneven mode of development similarly raises questions as to the ‘global’ dimensions of globalisation.

Hirst and Thompson’s (2002a: 263) analysis demonstrates that there are “inherent limits to the growth of international trade, that borders do matter and that we may be approaching those limits”. Their scepticism about a borderless world has been echoed by others working in different disciplines. Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1999: 143) argues, for example, that “[t]he development of borderless worlds does not contradict but actually hastens the simultaneous development of ever more bordered worlds characterised by stark inequalities and digital divides”. Borders not only continue to matter “even in today’s ‘turbulent’, post-Cold War world” (Starr 2006: 9) but are increasingly “no longer at the border” (Balibar in Vaughan-Williams 2009: 6). The emergence of ever-greater securitisation and migration controls has given the impetus
for renewed understandings of what borders are and do. Vaughan-Williams (2009: 10) demonstrates how globalisation and global politics have, in fact, led to a new and different set of borders which are “vacillating and not necessarily where they are supposed to be in contemporary political life”.

A lot of the globalisation theory suffers, in other words, from a static understanding of space and territory. Another, not unrelated, problem of globalisation theory, which is of special relevance for Marxists, is the allegedly unprecedented historical nature of globalisation. The lack of historical inquiry has led globalisation theorists to fail to answer the question of what globalisation actually is. Rosenberg (2000) shows how this leads to a circular logic which confuses the effect of globalisation with its cause. Globalisation theorists, in other words, use the phenomenon of globalisation to explain the effects of globalisation. What is needed is a more structural and historical conceptualisation to explain what globalisation entails. The eminent Chinese New Left thinker Wang Hui (2000: 95) indeed notes that globalisation “is not a new phenomenon but simply the latest phase of a long history, which could be defined as the whole process of the development of capitalism from the colonial and imperialist epochs onwards”. The state has obviously played an important role in the geographic development of capital. Theories of the historical and territorial foundations of the Chinese state are, as mentioned earlier in the introduction, hard to come by. Chapter 3 will provide a more historical analysis of the territorial state. Chapter 4 will use expand on the establishment of the Chinese state by looking at the spatial techniques that were deployed in its making. Let us, however, first return to the role of the modern state in debates on globalisation so as to ensure that we know what is at stake when referring to these inherently complex spatial categories.

*The State and Globalisation*
It is not a coincidence that the historical novelty of globalisation has especially vigorously been criticised by Marxists. The geographically expansive nature of capital had, in fact, already been foretold in Marx’s own work. Indeed, “Marx himself may be seen as the ‘first significant theorist of globalisation’, whose theory of capitalism ‘had no necessary national reference’.” (Bromley in Lacher 2003: 530). The state was for Marx an abstraction from the universalising relations of production. Talks about the ‘end of history’, Marx and the need to historicise globalisation bring us automatically to Hegel and especially his idea of the modern state. Hegel argued, similarly to globalisation theorists, for an end of history on the basis of geographic determinism.\textsuperscript{10}.

For Marxists there exists a certain sense of irony in the claim of the withdrawal of nation states in discussions on globalisation. “The paradox of this is that the concepts of nation-state and national economy have never been so widely and uncritically accepted as at the time of their (alleged) passing.” (Cameron and Palan 1999: 53). Globalisation theorists are, therefore, responsible for affirming no less than two spatial abstractions. Both globalisation theorists and conventional IR theorists share a particular static and unhistorical reading of space. The key difference between the two strands is that while state-centric epistemologies reify the state, “globalisation theorists embrace an inverse position, in which territoriality is said to erode in the face of globalisation.” (Brenner 1999: 68). What is needed is, as pointed out earlier already, is a more historical conceptualisation of the relationship between politics and space. This evokes us to critical investigate the historical formation and reification of both the state and the global.

Globalisation theorists (Ohmae 1990) have throughout the 1990s and 2000s systematically marginalised the potency of the territorialised political state. It is, however, important to stress that states instead continue to play a decisive and resilient
role in the preservation and legitimisation of the spreading of capitalism around the
globe. This rings especially true for the Chinese state which, in fact, benefitted greatly
from its opening-up to the world (see chapter six). Wang argues in opposition to the
idea of a withdrawing state to show how the Chinese state has instead internalised the
contradictions inherent of global capital. This development, he notes, marks a
transition with great ramifications for the functioning of the state. The Chinese state,
he argues, has not stopped existing but has rather come to rely on the ideology of the
market for the country’s “economic policy and developmental trajectory” both of
which are “locked into the process of capitalist globalisation” (Wang 2006b: 40). The
same is argued by Mary Gallagher (2002: 340) who writes that “economic
development amid increasing openness has contributed to the stability of authoritarian
rule in China” and that by “opening its borders to large flows of foreign capital,
China's communist leaders have made growth and globalisation work for them”. The
opening up of China and the subsequent flooding of both state and private foreign
interest has, in other words, not led to the weakening of the Chinese state, but instead
to the further strengthening of its abstraction. The country’s changing (urban)
landscape, which are discussed in later chapters of this thesis, are not the products of
footless globalisation, but are first and foremost the consequences of the decisions
made by the territorialised capitalist state. The state transformed from being a political
actors to a node in the global capitalist modes of production. This is shown in chapter
five in which we see how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) transformed from
being a Party State to a State party.

The mistake that many globalisation theorists make is to analyse the nation
state as a rigid and static territorial entity that is threatened by a fluid capitalist system
that by definition is global in its outlook. The state is, in other words, conceptualised
as a container which is being perforated by flows of capital, communication technologies, and culture among other extraterritorial forces that have forced the state’s territory into redundancy. The contemporary nation state must rather be historically analysed as the consequence of a production of space that is continuously and consistently reconfigured and retransformed according to the social relations by and through which it is constituted. Such a mode of analysis is better equipped to escape the (Westphalian) ‘territorial trap’ and provides a more fertile ground for theorising the relationship between space and politics. State space, in other words, has never been static. It is forced to constantly evolve to reconcile the contradiction between its territorial, rooted essence and its embrace of borderless, global capital. It is, therefore, especially under more advanced stages of capitalism that state space is increasingly reorganised.

The Westphalian state system is, according to conventional Marxism, the territorial embodiment and regulator of the social relations of production (ie. capitalism) that govern the everyday life of the state’s inhabitants. The two Westphalian treaties are in conventional IR theories taken as the starting point for the ‘bundling’ of state sovereignty and state territoriality. Although Marxists (see especially Teschke 2003) have shown an acute awareness of the myth of the origins of Westphalia, there has been relatively little discussion on how the “naturalisation of state space” (Brenner, Jessop et al. 2003) was achieved historically. The claim that “[m]en make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please” (Marx 1963: 15) rings equally true for geography. Geography is man-made but, as hinted at already earlier, its alienation from nature has proved to be most advanced under a regime of capitalist accumulation (see also Smith 2008).
The next chapter will provide an analysis of the historical development of the relationship between the modern state and territory. I posit there the argument that the rise of globalisation has to be linked to a specific way of thinking about and presenting territory. The emphasis on the production and representations of state space does not so much entail a departure from historical materialism, but is rather an attempt to complement Marx with the metaphysics of Heidegger in Lefebvrian fashion. We will first, however, discuss the more technical relationship between space and capital. This will prove to be especially relevant to come to terms with the changes in China’s urban landscape after 1976 discussed in chapters five and six.

**Capitalism and State Space**

The so-called “emptying of space and time” (Giddens 1990) is in globalisation theory widely considered to be the direct effects of events that took place in the 20th century. Such a crude periodisation is, however, deeply problematic given that the path that modern history has taken has proved to be much dependent on the historical development of capitalism itself. That is, after all, why Marx placed ‘Hegel on his head’ and turned to materialism rather than idealism for explaining the dialectical course of history. In accepting globalisation as a historically unique era, one which asks for a new stream of thought, conventional globalisation theorists automatically reject the dialectic depth of Marxism and ignore the evolutionary history of the capitalist modes of production in its materialised and instrumental form. The state-led production and reproduction of space become, as a result, dehistoricised and consequentially depoliticised. The space of and the spaces in the state are subsequently simply taken for granted.

The strength of Marxism lies, in contrast, in its ability to build a systematic understanding of the dynamic and dialectic relationship between space and
capitalism. This goes back to Marx’s own concept of the ‘annihilation of space by time’. In this connection, I quote, at some length, from Marx’s *Grundrisse*:

*Circulation time thus appears as a barrier to the productivity of labour* = an increase in necessary labour time = a decrease in surplus labour time = a decrease in surplus value = an obstruction, a barrier to the self-realisation process *[Selbstverwertungsprozess]* of capital. Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time. (Marx 1993: 539, original emphasis).

The concept was later adopted and revised in the works of Lenin, Luxemburg and Mandel (1975) to explain the geography of capitalism in greater detail. Harvey’s (see e.g. 1989a; 2003a) relatively recent adaptation has been one of the main catalysts for the qualitative turn in human geography. Harvey argues that the crisis of overaccumulation inherent to capital forces the system to geographically expand through a process of ‘accumulation by dispossession’\(^12\). This occurs through so-called ‘spatial fixes’ (or ‘spatio-temporal fix’) which allow capital to circulate and to circumvent the downward spiral of surplus value. The effect of this system leads, according to Harvey, to so-called ‘time-space compressions’\(^13\) that “[incessantly] drive towards the reduction if not elimination of spatial barriers, coupled with equally
incessant impulses towards acceleration in the turnover of capital.” (Harvey 2003a: 98). The over-production of space in post-1992 China, discussed in chapter six, is an example of capital’s need for spatial fixes.

It is no coincidence that under this new, oft-mistakenly called ‘neo-liberal’ regime of flexible accumulation, production shifted towards aggressively time conscious production strategies and spatially optimised production chains. Globalisation theorists argue, however, that the increasing ‘flexibilisation’ of production and labour grants capital a footless dimension which overrides the interests of the territorialised nation state. The greater spatial freedom, enjoyed by TNCs is for Dicken (2004: 12), for example, “the major reason why TNCs possess potentially greater power than either states or labour, both of which tend to be territorially circumscribed”. The conclusion is, despite the power that such non-state actors admittedly possess in the producing of space, for several reasons perhaps somewhat too hastily drawn. Capital has always been global. Its mobility and rootless nature is, in fact, one of its defining characteristics. The most urgent problem for our analysis is, however, that of the false dichotomy between international capital and the capitalist state or, as some Marxists (e.g. Burnham 2001) would have it, between the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’. The state and global capitalism cannot independently exist from each other. They are both forms of the same sort of social relations of production. The state is both sustained by and responsible for ensuring the functioning and expansion of the modes of production.

Capital would not be able to circulate (and to such an effective extent) if there would not have been governance and policing over national bodies from above and state-provided infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity systems, communication channels etc.) from below. The fact that the abstract state is a necessary component to ‘manage’
the contradictions within capitalism is, therefore, especially relevant if the geography of capital expands to increasingly complex and global levels. The abstraction of the state has, as capitalism expanded and the contradictions within capital intensified, actually strengthened (and not weakened). The state is the “realised abstraction” that is “endowed with effective power which is ever more real.” (Lefebvre 1991 [1958]: 209, original emphasis). This is also confirmed by Holloway (2006) who argues that national states do not end with the drawing of national boundaries. “On the contrary”, he (2006: 32) argues, “all national states are engaged in a constantly repeated process of decomposing global social relations: through assertions of national sovereignty, through exhortations to ‘the nation’, through flag ceremonies [etc.] ...”. The central role of space in this state territorialisation process is perhaps nowhere as visible as in contemporary China, where the state owns all the land and governs the production of space and the everyday life therein.

The territorialisation of the state leads to the fact “that each state has a different relation to the global relations of capitalism.” (2006: 33). This territorial process of nation-state formation is, of course, historical. This means that analyses on the contemporary meaning of the Chinese state have to start from a point in history in which the idea of modern China was first coined. The nation state is, however, also dialectically the creator of History (written with capital H). This means that it selectively appropriates traditions and cultures that existed before its own establishment. This led in China, for example, to the selective appropriation of Confucianism and selective dynastic histories. Chapters three to six of the thesis discuss the territorialisation of the Chinese state. The next section will, however, first further our discussion on the relationship between capitalism and space. This will provide us the opportunity to build a conceptual bridge between the Marxist concept
of alienation and Heidegger’s idea of representation. This is necessary to understand how territorialisation, as the geographic act of making the abstract look real, has had consequences for both capitalism and the ontological framing of the world. The next chapter will use this framework to provide an understanding of how modernity has been shaped by the particular way we have come to perceive, present and think about space.

Space, Time and Capitalism

Introduction

Space and time are ontologically defining and essential characteristics for human experience. They define and make possible events that unfold in a particular place and at a particular moment. Lefebvre understood that the production and reproduction of space, as the outcome of the social relations of production, also have a fundamental impact on the everyday life. His work is ground-breaking precisely because it sought to combine Marxist concepts such as the modes of production and alienation with Heideggerian (1996a) ideas about Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) and everyday life (Alltäglichkeit). Indeed, as Elden (2004a: 91) argues, “[f]or Lefebvre, Heidegger’s theory needs to be related to practice, to material conditions. Like Hegel, Heidegger needs to be stood on his feet.” There are, in fact, an increasing number of thinkers (Casey 1997b; Harman 2011; Sloterdijk 2011) that in various ways and for different purposes look to Heidegger for questions of space. This section covers a transition from the previous Marxist critique of space in globalisation to a more Heideggerian-inclined reading of space.

The last section described how the logic of capitalism affects the experience of space by reducing the amount of time necessary to travel from point A to point B. The
role of technology in this process was recognised by Heinrich Heine, admired by Marx, who, in 1843, wrote the following on the opening of railway lines between Paris to Rouen:

What changes must now occur, in our way of looking at things, in our notions! Even the elementary concepts of time and space have begun to vacillate. Space is killed by the railways, and we are left with time alone… Now you can travel to Orleans in four and a half hours, and it takes no longer to get to Rouen… I feel as if the mountains and forests of all countries were advancing on Paris. Even now, I can smell the linden trees; the North Sea's breakers are rolling against my door. (Heine in Schivelbusch 1978: 34).

The experience of time and space depends, in other words, on the historical development of the modes of production. Harvey (1989a: 204) writes that each historical specificity inherent in the stages of “[e]ach distinctive mode of production or social relation [which]… embody a distinctive bundle of time and space practices and concepts”. This was earlier already acknowledged by Harvey’s mentor, Henri Lefebvre (1991: 46), who wrote that “each mode of production has its own particular space, the shift from one mode to another must entail the production of a new space.” The influence that Heidegger has on Lefebvre’s makes his work arguably a more fertile ground for this more historical dissertation than that of Harvey’s more political economic interpretation. The idea of integrating Heidegger’s thought into Marxist dialecticism permits Lefebvre to recognise that the world is already made, based on Heidegger’s notion of ‘thrownness’ (geworfenheit), but also allows him to explain the forces that historically have constituted the making of the world. This is, in fact, one of the keys strengths of Lefebvre’s distinctive historical materialism. Lefebvre (1991:}
writes that “[e]ach period, each mode of production, each particular society has engendered (produced) its own centrality: religious, political, commercial, cultural, industrial, and so on. The relationship between mental and social centrality must be defined for each case.” This means, in other words, that our contemporary understanding and experiencing of space and time are the products of a historical change in the modes of production. Lefebvre explicitly refers to this change as the interlude to ‘capitalism’ and argues for its historical spatial analogy. “This modern space has an analogical affinity with the space of the philosophical, and more specifically the Cartesian tradition.” (Lefebvre 1991: 200).

The historical merger between a form of knowledge about space and the politics transcendent in this new space will be explored somewhat further in this section and forms one of the bedrocks for the next chapter. The modern conceptualisation of space is argued to have played an essential historical role in the establishment and development of the abstract Chinese nation state. The remainder of this section will first, however, investigate further how the production of space has an ontological effect on the way we experience the world around us.

**The Folly of Global Space**

Henri Lefebvre has not been the only theorist who has taken an interest in the spatial effects of the economy on the phenomenology of being (‘in-the-world’). Globalisation theorists (e.g. Giddens 1990; Giddens 1991; Lash 2003) have argued that temporal accelerations and spatial expansions have had strong ontological effects on the human consciousness. Giddens reading seems to have especially been inspired by a reading of Heidegger. The human experience of place has, according to his account, been transformed as a result of what he calls ‘the separation of time and space’. This separation, which he says to be the characteristic element of modernity,
has led to the “disembedding [or ‘lifting out’] of social relations… from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space... Modernity is inherently globalising.” (Giddens 1990: 21, 177).

Giddens argues that the concepts of place, space and time were in non-modern time, in contrast, intrinsically interconnected. The arrival of modernity meant that the binary spatial-temporal relationship was disengaged and that social relations came consequentially to be ‘disembedded’. He (1990: 19, 140) argues that modernity “displaces” in the sense that “place becomes phantasmagoric… that is to say, locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them.”

This results for Giddens, however, not in alienation. Instead he posits the already discussed idea of ‘global interconnectedness’ in which a world is envisaged where there is no ‘Other’, since the ‘Other’ is influenced by the same layers of the social web that the Self is part of and affected by. Giddens (1990: 143) argues that “[w]e live in a peopled world, not merely one of anonymous, blank faces, and the interpolation of abstract systems into our activities is intrinsic to bringing this about.”

Ideas and concepts on globalisation (from ‘flux’ to ‘flows’, from ‘reflexive modernity’ to ‘hyper-modernity’ and so forth) expressed by Giddens among others seem to entail a cancellation of spatiotemporal ‘presentness’. The result is the idea of instantaneous moments of gratification. History is made redundant because, as Giddens (1990: 178) argues, “[i]n a [utopian] post-modern world, time and space would no longer be ordered in their interrelation by historicity.” Bauman (2000: 177) shares a similar sentiment and argues that the current age of “light ‘software’ modernity” (in contrast to the previous period of “heavy ‘hardware’ modernity”) is exemplified by “[t]he near-instantaneity of software time [which] augurs the
devaluation of space… space counts little, or does not count at all.” Events seem to dissolve into a temporal maelstrom in which both history and geography are made superfluous by technology. The result is a historically ‘emptied’ spatiotemporal lens that is constantly set on the very near (or instantaneous) horizon. This mode of being prevents the subject from experiencing a historically and geographically constructed here and now. The resultant, so-called ‘post-modern condition’ has consequently been characterised as paranoid, schizophrenic, illusive etc. I argue, in chapters five and six, however that it would be rather more constructive to see post-modernism as the result of the depoliticisation of space by the state.

Engagements by globalisation scholars often suffer from a very narrow conceptualisation and definition of space. The prevalence of a strong technological determinism in such writings seems to prevent globalisation theorists (including a good number of Marxists) to come to terms with the complex ontological dimension embedded in the production of space. Space seemed in the social sciences for a long time to have forestalled the fact space (and time) is relative. Space can, in other words, not be limited to notions of ‘duration’ or ‘distance’\textsuperscript{17}. Such notions, which are often used in a negative sense, belong instead to as much a Cartesian as a capitalist world outlook. Neither space nor geography can simply be ‘overcome’ (as many liberals would have it) or ‘annihilated’ (as certain Marxists think it can). The problem in globalisation theory lies, therefore, in its understanding of space as an a priori perceived “‘zero-sum’ conception of geographical scale – the notion that scales operate as mutually exclusive rather than as co-constitutive territorial frameworks for social relations.” (Brenner 2000: 364). The places that globalisation says are dwindling are not merely scalar entities. Place is instead an inherently performative social relation.
Place and Space

The relationship between time, space and place is admittedly a complex one. While there is no space to go into the details, it is necessary to set out how these concepts are treated in this thesis. Place is in this thesis described as being carved-out of space at a particular moment in time. “If time is conceived as a flow or movement then place is pause” (Tuan 2003: 198). “Space is what place becomes when the unique gathering of things, meanings, and values are sucked out” (Gieryn 2000: 465). The difference between space and time, on the one hand, and place, on the other, is for that reason phenomenological (Casey 1997b). This means that place is particularistic and differentiating. Time and space are, in contrast, at their core ‘undialectic’, autonomous concepts to be found in and thought about in their universal, abstract form alone. They only gain meaning in their transformative production into place. Place is, in other words, a deduction of space and time framed according to the principles of the social relations that are responsible for its production. The concept of place is in this thesis thus understood as an organised space of meaning. That meaning is historically constructed through the social relations that provide it its particularity.

The production of space shares, therefore, a deeply ontological dimension necessary for being (in-the-world). Space presents itself never as a whole, but is always already parted into different places. “We do not live in ‘space’. Instead we live in places.” (Gibson in Casey 1997b: XIII, original emphasis). It is perhaps also for that reason why globalisation and post-modern theorists express such anxiety over a world comprised of one single global space. A space without places is an undifferentiated mass, a timeless (indeed, ‘flat’) void and barren of life. “If we see the world as a process, constantly changing, we should not be able to develop any sense of place” (Tuan 2003: 179). There is nothing worse than a world devoid of places.
It is instead the production of space that gives the world meaning. It was in recognition of thought that Lefebvre sought to combine Heidegger’s ontology with Marx’s theory of the modes of production. Heidegger described, after all, the “world as a matter of concern, acting with and reacting to objects within it in a lived, experiential way, instead of abstracting from them in a Cartesian grid of coordinates.” (Elden 2004a: 92). Lefebvre borrowed Heidegger’s critique of the mechanic Cartesian understanding of space, which continues to haunt globalisation theory, to argue for a space that is produced both physically and mentally. He argues that modern knowledge ‘engendered’ an instrumental (mental) space which has come to dominate social life. Lefebvre (1991: 397-400) wrote, in other words, a genealogy of space in which he distinguished ‘true space’ (ie. ‘the mental space constructed historically’18) and the ‘truth of space’ (ie. ‘the space of social practice’). “‘True space’”, he shows, “was thus substituted for the 'truth of space', and applied to such practical problems as those of bureaucracy and power, rent and profit, and so on, so creating the illusion of a less chaotic reality; social space tended to become indistinguishable from the space of planners, politicians and administrators, and architectural space, with its social constructed character, from the (mental) space of architects.” (Lefebvre 1991: 300).

The strength of Lefebvre’s historical accounts shows how epistemology influences how we think about space. “[S]pace itself”, in other words, “has a history in the Western experience…” (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986: 22). My dissertation will, in chapters three to six, show that space also has a history in the ‘Chinese experience’.

**The Production of State Space**

The last question worth discussing, before theoretically engaging further with the genealogy of modern space, is how Lefebvre connected Heidegger’s ontology of space with the Marxist historical materialist conceptualisation of production. Lefebvre
deployed Heidegger, after all, only to become a more-rounded Marxist. Engaging with Lefebvre’s Marxist framework will be of special importance for the later chapters (five and six) on the production of space in post-1976 China. These chapters show how the production of space has ever since China’s ‘opening-up’ continued to play an ever more prominent important role in the legitimisation of the concrete abstraction of the state.

Heidegger’s ‘undialectic’ notion of being (in-a-place) was in Lefebvre’s writings on space brought into a constructive dialogue with the dialectic modes of production. The theoretical synthesis led to a theory of a production of space that was, as hinted at earlier (and discussed in chapter 2 in greater detail), constituted by a historically specific form of knowledge (ie. modern geometry), and driven by the dominant relations and mode of production (ie. capitalism). Lefebvre thus argues that “[s]pace needs to be understood in the context of the mode of production of a particular epoch.” (Elden 2004b: 184). Heidegger’s ontology is by Lefebvre therefore contextualised in the historicity of the social relations that govern being. “Space is no longer an ‘accident of matter’ but a direct result of material production.” (Smith 2008: 107)

Lefebvre’s (1991) production of space rests on his famous dialectic three-dimensional understanding of space. It bears remembering that the concept of production for Lefebvre is strongly influenced by the younger Marx of Grundrisse. This means that the concept refers to material things, non-material information and knowledge (on specifically time and space). Space is for Lefebvre, therefore, both a physical as well as a mental construct. This becomes clearer in his three dialectic dimensions that refer to ‘spatial practice’, ‘representations of space’ and ‘spaces of representation’ (or ‘representational space’). They mirror respectively the ‘perceived’
(material), ‘conceived’ (mental) and the ‘lived’ (social) space. The physically perceived space is the material space that is produced and reproduced\textsuperscript{19}. The mentally conceived space is the abstract representation of space in maps, urban plans and grids that is constructed on the basis of codes, signs and symbols (ie. semiosis)\textsuperscript{20}. The socially lived space is the produced space filled with meaning and experience\textsuperscript{21}. Space was for Lefebvre, in other words, abstract as well as concrete, but first and foremost a social relation.

This framework allowed him to both demystify abstract space and to expose the underlying politics in the production of space. The inherent political nature of space is for Lefebvre, therefore, the reason why there is a politics of space. His spatial sensitivity allows him to unravel the ‘concrete abstraction’ of the state and question what has caused its citizens to obey it and to appropriate it as their own. Lefebvre forestalled Anderson’s \textit{Imagined Communities} when he argued that the “[t]he state produces the nation within a territory; political action produces a nationality as an ideology formed from various sources - ethnicity, myths and legends, religion and morals, linguistics and semantics.” (Elden 2004b: 224) The nation is therefore shaped by the state which gives it form and meaning by way of a new, modern form of governance with is intrinsically related to a particular (Cartesian) form of knowledge about space and time. Lefebvre writes that modernity is characterised by the fact that “the state replaces ‘man’ as the measure of things and the world, through the notion of number for time and space.” He (2003: 85, original emphasis) refers to the state of the space (ie. territory) when he argues that “each state has its space;... [but] each state is [also] a social space.” Lefebvre (2003: 85) goes on to argue that “the state occupies a mental space that includes the representations of the state that people construct… This mental space must not be confused with physical or social space; nor can it be fully
separated from the latter. For it is here that we may discern the space of representations and the representation of space.”

This dissertation deals with the space of representation (ie. lived space) and representations of space (ie. conceived space) and spatial practise (ie. perceived space) in (and of) China. The historical development of a mentally conceived space will theoretically be discussed in the second chapter and empirically in the third chapter. Chapter three will, more specifically, discuss the processes that inspired the ‘concretisation’ of the abstract Chinese nation state. The chapters four to six will provide greater emphasis on the built environment of the perceived and lived space. This dissertation is arranged in such a way as to demonstrate how a particular historical conception of space has given form and continues to inform the development of the Chinese nation state from its founding principles in the 17th century to its supposed ‘rise’ in an abstractly imagined global world.

**Conclusion**

Globalisation theory has successfully managed to place space at the centre of the academic agenda in the political sciences. The question of space itself remains in such accounts, however, largely unaccounted for. Globalisation theory and conventional International Relations scholarship have treated space for too long in a static Cartesian manner in which the notion of distance seems to have mistakenly been taken to mean space. The outcome is either a supposed ‘withering away’ of the territorialised state or the idea that “the space occupied by states is timeless” (Agnew 1994: 72). Theorisations of the space of the state have consequentially taken over the political imagination disseminated and transcended by the abstract state itself. A timeless image of a modern world composed of sovereign states has arisen.
Space is removed from its historicity and detached from its inherently political nature. This chapter has challenged the notion that space can simply be taken for granted. Space is not absolute. It is concurrently abstract and concrete as well as mental and social. Space has, therefore, a history. Analysing this history should provide us with a better understanding to a range of questions that political geographers have only recently started to uncover. What do we mean by territory? How has territory come about? How are these borders historically drawn? What do those borders mean? Why do we take both territory and borders for granted? How does the production of space (e.g. in architecture, urban planning etc.) fit into this? These are the questions which this dissertation discusses with reference to the case of the Chinese state.

The confusion about the meaning of space has led to calls for a new epistemological framework to come to terms with the supposedly interconnected world. The process of globalisation is shown, however, as discussed in Marxist analyses on time-space annihilation, to be deeply linked to the capitalist modes of production. The mode of production challenges both material and mental perceptions of space. The mode of production can, therefore, not be limited, as some have claimed\textsuperscript{22}, to its material form alone. The capitalist mode of production is rather “a definite form of activity of… individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce” (Marx and Engels 1965: 42)\textsuperscript{23}. What production achieves is, in other words, the remaking of the world ‘after its own image’ (Marx 1988). The dialectic process means that nature (ie. that which lies outside the mode of production) is not merely appropriated for production. It rather means that it is transformed into
something that it is not. Heidegger (1976: 353) famously concluded that “[t]he basic process of modern times is the conquest of the world as picture.”

Alienation takes in Lefebvre’s account a distinctive, proto-Foucauldian, historical turn to show that the way we perceive space is deeply influenced by the way space has (for the last 400 years) epistemologically been conceived. Truth of space is never identical to the knowledge of it. Knowledge of space therefore entails power. Marx’s historical materialism is in Lefebvre’s work consequentially brought into a constructive dialogue with Heidegger’s ontology to show that the way we think about and experience space is a product of the historical development of how we have come to conceive and relate to space. The next chapter engages with this historical development and how it has come to inform the territorialisation of the nation state. Chapter 3 will in turn use this historical and theoretical framework to show how this project has influenced the transformation of China from an imperial empire into a modern nation state.
2. Chapter Two: A Short Genealogy of Modern Space

**Introduction**

The discussions of the previous chapter have outlined how the modes of production influence the way we have to come to relate to the world. The process and subsequent theory of globalisation were used as examples of how a specific, modern reading of space has led to the marginalisation of other understandings of space. We now speak of ‘flux’, ‘flows’, ‘instantaneousness’ and the ‘emptying’ of time and space. There is, however, very little discussion on the ways we relate to and exist in space. The dialectic effect of the calculative way we have come to understand space (and time) has led to a process of alienation which, more generally speaking, characterises modernity. The process of production and reproduction of modern space deserves careful analysis to understand how its functioning has led to the historical emergence of the modern state. This understanding will, in turn, be applied to discuss the ways in which its development has informed the abstract formation of the modern Chinese nation state in the 17th century (Chapter 3) and its subsequent evolution in the 20th century (Chapters 4 to 6).

This second chapter has, therefore, the purpose of expanding the discussion that was started towards the end of the last chapter. It will serve the objective of providing a historical understanding of how the introduction and (re)production of modern space relate and helped constitute what is now known as ‘modernity’. Modernity will, therefore, be introduced as a spatiotemporal category that is characterised by a universal and universalising form of knowledge. The proposed analysis of the ways in which notions of space, time and place relate to modernity will
not rely, in other words, on the teleology of linear time. The approach taken in this chapter will instead look at the ways in which a certain understanding of space has been used by the state to govern the everyday life of its citizens. This is not to say, however, that time is irrelevant in this regard. A certain understanding of linear time has at least since Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* translated into a particular understanding of successive time. One could argue that it is, in fact, the bifurcation of time and space\(^1\) that allowed for the emergence of a particularly modern understanding of space (and time). Knowledge of both time and space were and has, since the onset of the nation state, increasingly been instrumental for modern governance. Such a mode of governance, characterised by successive time and homogeneous space, continues to inform and shape the everyday life in China today. This will empirically be demonstrated in chapters four to six which cover the period from 1949 till today.

This chapter has two broad strategies. The first is to come to terms with modernity as the historical outcome of a certain way of thinking about and relating to space. This is done by looking at the ways societies were historically governed through the medium of geometric space. The argument posited here focuses on the non-linear development of a spatial form of governmentality. I do not mean to argue for a return to the idea of a Westphalian concept of the modern nation state. I rather and instead wish to argue that the process towards a territorial form of governance was much more contingent, complex and much less Eurocentric than is often assumed in the IR literature. The second strategy comprises, therefore, an attempt to understand how the representations and production of a modern form of space have translated into modernity and the territorial nation state. The analysis of space as a political category in and of itself will allow us to avoid Agnew’s ‘territorial trap’ and uncover the
politics embedded in the production and representation of space in modern China discussed in the remainder of this dissertation.

The modern representations of space (and time) are in this chapter, in other words, conceptualised as the social abstractions of geographies of power that are mediated and transcended through everyday life. The embrace of such a radical form of spatial politics helps me in the later chapters to uncover the oft taken for granted and depoliticised politics existent in the different sites of everyday life in China. The goal of this chapter is therefore, in yet other words, not so much to historically analyse space but to understand how a particular understanding of time and space has been constructed historically. This is very much in opposition to the conventional theories of globalisation and IR that merely seem to take space for granted. The repoliticisation of space allows me to retrieve the politics of space, so as to enable to come to terms with the importance of space for the governance of the Chinese nation state.

I will now briefly outline how I will structure this chapter. The first section of this chapter is dedicated to drawing a direct relationship between space and politics. This will be done by looking at the governance of the Greek polis and the ancient Chinese city. I do not wish to downplay the differences in the form of governmentality between the Chinese experience and the Greek one. I instead wish to emphasise the ontological similarity in both the Chinese and Greek experiences. This similarity, which I deem to be of a universal category, rests on the idea that space and time were both in Greece and in China used for political purposes. The principle proposed here is that the direct relationship between politics and space is characteristic of both forms of governance. The introduction of early modern polities was in both environments inspired by a reconceptualisation of the way space came to be conceived.
This subsequent ‘rooting’ of individuals in a particular polity helped the construction of a spatially contained (or ‘bordered’) history and societal identities.

The second section of this chapter will provide a universalising critique of how the production of space relates to the political discourse of modernity. Modernity is in this thesis taken out of its periodising context and instead presented as the triumph of a particular understanding of space (and time) over place. The label ‘modernity’ is too often placed in a teleological and politicised context which privileges linear time and subordinates the impact of a particular change in the way space came to be conceived. The legacy of hundreds of years of (capitalist) ‘progress’ continues to haunt academic and popular vocabularies, temporalities and imagined geographies (e.g. ‘developing’, ‘backwards’, ‘primitivism’, ‘modernisation’ and, of course, ‘globalisation’). At the heart of this discourse lies the spatial abstraction of the state. It is, after all, the state which has appropriated time and transformed it into History (with capital H).

I argue that rather than taking the state (or the globe) as the teleological endpoint of history, it is more rewarding to understand how the state (as the global described in the last chapter) was imagined spatially. Modernity is in this thesis, in other words, presented as the universalisation of both space and time. This means, to be absolutely sure, that I do not think it is possible to historically pick a date to underpin its sudden emergence. Modernity is rather a non-linear process in which space and time are attributed independent powers over place. The social relations of capitalism have consequentially come to intensify the infiltration and global spreading of this understanding of space. This approach will, subsequently, be used in the third chapter to empirically construe an understanding of how a change in the mental conceptualisation of space allowed for the introduction of the abstract state in 17th century China. This is not to deny the differences in the formation of states in Europe.
and China, or to deprive China of its supposedly distinctive cultural character, but to argue that the introduction of an abstract conception of space were similar and, in fact, historically concurrent across multiple geographical locations.

**Being in Place, Being in Politics**

**Introduction**

I have shown in the last chapter, via Lefebvre, that space not actually refers to space *an sich*. Space is rather a discursive concept. What we understand space to be is determined by *how* we have historically come to perceive and conceive space. This understanding forms the link between our knowledge of space and the politics of space. The contemporary geometric outlook on space has lured conventional political science into thinking of space as merely the container in which politics happens. Space is, in such an account, ‘political’ because it is said to be where politics takes place. Laclau writes, for example, that “[p]olitics and space are antinomic terms. Politics only exist insofar as the spatial eludes us.” (originally in Laclau 1990: 68, but also in; Massey 1992 : 66; Massey 2005: 44).

For Laclau and many others before and after him that means that space “is the realm of statis, of fixation and closure, lacking the necessary (temporal) dynamics for any possibility of politics.” (Dikeç 2005: 179). A dehistoricised society would in this understanding be one in which space has given a definitive meaning and form to politics. That means that space would effectively have subordinated time to history. Time has at least since the onset of capitalist modernity been conceptualised, *contra* space, as the locus of change and the possibility of politics. Massey summarises that in such a view “[t]here is, in the realm of the spatial, no true temporality and thus no possibility of politics.” (Massey 1992 : 67). Space has been depoliticised.
Space was in the last chapter, however, shown to be much more than the geometric container it is taken to be in conventional IR accounts. That is to say, the relationship between space and the political is not only about relations of power in a fixed spatial form. The emergence of the state similarly did not bode the end of history; neither did the onset of global liberalism. Space does not cancel out politics. Space is a means of control, a technique of governance, but also an instrument of resistance⁴. Space takes on a performative role in all spatial political orderings (e.g. the city, the state etc.). It creates political subjectivities. It is, however, also a means to dislocate and thus to enact alternative forms of politics.

If we would follow Foucault and Rancière (1999) and argue that what we conventionally understand politics to be, namely policing or governance, space actually becomes the instrument through which such politics are challenged. Space therefore both depoliticises and politicises. This thesis is mainly interested in the space that polices and governs. That is not to say that China does not have a tradition of a space that politicises ‘the political’. Mao’s spatial reorganisation, discussed in chapter 4 in this thesis, shows, for example, how his production of space called “into question the structural principles of the established order” (Žižek in Dikeç 2005: 184). Mao’s politics of dislocation prevented the definitive enclosure of form and meaning. Indeed, as Dikeç , shows, “[p]olitics [as ‘the political’] implies a disruption of the established order through a reconfiguration of the system of partitioning.” (2005: 186). The establishment of the Chinese state is, like any state project, primarily a story of the use of a space that is enclosed. The state is, after all, as pointed out in the last chapter, an abstraction of social relations. State space is depoliticised and is organised in such a fashion as to produce depoliticised subjects.
This form of politics of space, however, only starts with the establishment of a bounded political-spatial entity. The Chinese establishment of the modernity’s characterising entity (ie. the state) commenced, as I will show in chapter three, with the cartographic bordering of its territory. The manner in which this was done could only have been achieved through a radical transformation in the way space was conceived. Cartographic projects on the basis of geometric calculations occurred across the Eurasian continent. A universal mode of knowledge of space replaced older ethnocentric ideas of space (see chapter three).

The notion of space as fixed and static is, however, not something that we can simply attribute to the modern European enlighteners. The meaning of the political has ever since Plato and Confucius (551–479 BC) increasingly taken on the idea of a perfect, timeless and, indeed, depoliticised space. Both thinkers were preoccupied with the building of a society that would function on the basis of governance or ‘good rule’. The qualification that proved for both to be essential for good rulership was that of being in possession of knowledge that enabled governance on the basis of the distinction between good/evil and just/unjust etc. Rancière (2001: 9) writes that Plato “is the founder of the anthropological conception of the political, the conception that identifies politics with the deployment of the properties of a type of man or a mode of life”. Confucius and the Confucian thinkers after him was, however, no less interested in the creation of the good, moral man. The Analects starts, in fact, almost immediately with questions of governance and the virtuosity of the rulers, teaching and father figure. Politics and morality, symbolised in for example “the three principles and five virtues” (san gang wu chang), lie at the heart of Confucianism. It is, I believe, not unreasonable to suggest that Plato and Confucius’ thinking and writing were both inspired by the founding of what Rancière (2001: 9) calls the “community
on the basis of a univocal partition of the sensible.” Rancière (1999: 6) writes that “[t]he partition of the sensible is the cutting-up of the world and of 'world;' it is the nemeîn upon which the nomoi of the community are founded. This partition should be understood in the double sense of the word: on the one hand, that which separates and excludes; on the other, that which allows participation.”

Both Plato and Confucius’ writing are characterised by attempts to end or, at least, limit the possibilities for (an antagonistic form of) politics. They both tried to do so by calling for the establishment of a spatial order that would stabilise politics and allow for ‘good governance’. The production of space proved to be a necessary component to realise the creation of a community that was guided by its identification with the state. The state would consequentially transform from the abstract to the concrete.

*The Polis*

The meaning and the concept of the word *polis* (πόλις) has fundamentally altered in the process of the Romanisation of the Greek language. Heidegger showed that “whereas the Greek polis had been the place at which the truth was disclosed, in Rome politics became identified with the search for power” (Zuckert 1996: 58, original emphasis). As a result of this change, a vast majority of writers, past and present, now describe the *polis* in a highly Romanised manner as an abstract ‘city-state’. “The only thing left of Greek in the word political is its sound.” (Heidegger in Elden 2000: 414). The concept and space of the *polis* is more or less unproblematically translated as the terrain for a certain mode of governance or policing. The *polis* is simply translated as either state or politics. The former is, as shown earlier, an abstract entity; the definition of the latter is, however, equally problematic.
Heidegger contests such modern interpretations of the *polis* and insists that the *polis* is neither political nor a state or a city-state. He explicitly writes that the *polis* “cannot be determined politically…, for whatever [we think] the πόλις [polis] is must ‘naturally’ be determined with respect to the ‘political’” (Heidegger 1996b: 80, original emphasis). The argument that the political derives from the *polis* does, in other words, not help us to come closer in understanding what the *polis* is. “The polis is not a political concept, just as the ethical is not a moral concept but refers to man's essential dwelling. Rather, the political belongs to and follows essentially from the *polis*, not the reverse, as the ethical and the logical belong to the essence of ethos and logos”. (Blitz 2000: 184). The *polis* is, Heidegger argues, instead ‘pre-political’. The ‘Pre’ prefix refers here to the condition of possibilities. It leaves open what it is. It is, he argues, neither the state nor the city, both of which are descriptive, ontic concepts that are already filled with meaning and power. The *polis* is instead, to follow Heidegger’s philosophy ontological; disclosed (*erschlossen*); and unconcealed (*unverborgen*).

The pre-political essence of the *polis*, he instead argues, “makes possible everything political in the originary and in the derivative sense… [Its essence] lies in its being the open site of that destining [*Schickung*] from out of which all human relations towards beings... are determined”. (Heidegger 1996b: 82). He argues, in other words, that the essence of the *polis* “therefore always comes to light in accordance with the way which beings as such in general enter the realm of the unconcealed; to keeping with the expanse of those limits within which this occurs, and in keeping with the way in which the essence of human beings is determined in unison with the manifestness of beings as a whole.” (Heidegger 1996b: 82, 83)
Heidegger introduces the Aristotle’s idea of a Lebewesen (zoon politikon) as the foundation for the existence of the polis. The zoon politikon is not a political animal, as the term has often been translated, but a being that because of its Being (capitalised with B to distinguish it from being in the ontic sense) and through its relations with other beings is capable of becoming political. In Heidegger’s analysis it is, it is on other words, not the polis that is political, but the relationships between human beings which are intrinsically political and allow the polis to become political. 

The polis allows for the transformation from space to place. It is the “‘where’ in which the history of a humanity is gathered.” (Blitz 2000: 186). The polis is thus “determined through its relationship to human beings, and therefore man is that being capable of belonging to the πόλις [polis]” (originally in Heidegger 1996b: 83; in Elden 2000: 413).

Heidegger (in Elden 2000: 68) argues that, because of its indeterminate essence, the polis was for the “Greeks that which was absolutely worthy of question”. Yet in modern times “the ‘political’ is unquestioned: not in terms of its contents, but in terms of its essence”. In accepting and reifying the idea of the polis to a concrete, ontic concept, which is detached from history and thus its social, political connotations, we risk presupposing it as the static container in which politics (almost randomly) occurs. When considering the polis, as we do with the modern state, we risk presupposing the political; and vice versa; when we consider the political we presuppose the polis.

Heidegger’s understanding of the polis to an ontological level of ‘being-in-place’ allows us to repoliticise all products, categorisations and representations of space. Elden follows Lefebvre’s (2009 [1970]: 419) famous dictum that “there is a politics of space because politics is spatial” and adds that “there is a politics of space because politics is spatial”. This does, of course, not imply a return to Laclau’s earlier
mentioned statement. It illustrates instead that space is the condition from which ‘the political’ takes place. The questioning of space allows, in other words, for an acknowledgment that space embeds a particular form of politics. The emphasis of politics should no longer be focused on looking for what is political about space. The emphasis should rather be focused on the question how a particular production of space gives form and meaning to the political.

The question of the relationship between the political and the spatial is inevitable. A set of social relations has to occur somewhere. The *polis* will, in other words, at some point have to refer to a particular location. Sallis (1999: 139), discussing Plato’s *Timaeus*, argues that “[d]iscourse on the city [*polis*] will at some point or other be compelled, of necessity, to make reference to the earth; at some point or other it will have to tell of the place on earth where the city is - or is to be – established and to tell how the constitution (πολιτεία [*politeia]*) of the city both determines and is determined by this location.”. The production of space is, therefore, from the start enclosing. It provides, to follow Heidegger, meaning to the world through which we can be in the world. The production of space allows for politics, but it also, as shown earlier in the introduction of this section, delimits the possibilities for politics. It is both the site for subjectivity and resistance to subjectification.

In *Plato’s Sophist*, Heidegger (in Malpas 2006: 69) makes full circle when he argues that “the place [*Platz*] pertains to the being itself….every being has its place [*Ort*]…. *The place [*Ort*] is constitutive of the presence of the being.*” What is immediately useful in Heidegger’s argument is that it helps to understand that humans give meaning to space by Being-in-it. Space and human existence are interdependent. The production of space gives meaning and gives form to politics. What perhaps is less clearly pronounced in his philosophy, however, is that Being-in-the-world also
means that being is always outside of space. The production of the *polis* delimits politics. This is something which Lefebvre maybe understood better than Heidegger did himself. Space never actually refers to space *an sich*. Heidegger fails to acknowledge that human *Dasein* is unable to come to terms with space itself. It rather gives form and meaning to a particular conception of space.

The meaning of space is, as mentioned earlier already, constructed historically. This means that the origins of the production of space are not merely of interest for historians. They have instead a direct ontological relevance on the question of who we are. Space is full of knowledge, and that knowledge serves a political agenda. Tiananmen Square is, as analysed in chapter four, the heart of Maoism. The Expo 2011 pavilion is, as discussed in chapter six, the embodiment of a modern, global China which legitimises authoritarian capitalist state. The territorialisation of China, which is discussed in the subsequent chapter on the formation of the Chinese state, allowed for the onset of all ensuing productions of space in modern China. Such productions and representations of space define, in other words, what it means to be in China or to be Chinese. The partitioning of space is, as mentioned earlier, already a political act. Space informs us, in other words, about who ‘we’ and ‘they’ (whoever that may be) are and that, that knowledge is historically constructed. The remainder of this section will provide a short comparative analysis on the non-modern formation of the city in China and Greece. This will enable me to demonstrate that the *polis* was not unique in its relationship between space and politics. The formation of the early Chinese city was no less political than the *polis* was. Both projects were driven by an idealised form of governance and embodied a particular form of knowledge that was inscribed in space and allowed for the governance over space. The next section will, then, proceed to the particular form of modern knowledge of territory.
Urban space in non-modern China

The history of non-modern Chinese cities has since Weber’s attempt to explain the differences between Occidental and Oriental cities in his The City (1966) received a lot of attention in the ‘West’. Such analyses often underpin the influence of Confucian, Taoism and Legalist schools in the production of urban space in imperial and pre-imperial China. The assumptions taken from such analyses, more often than not, start from a premise that the birth of the Chinese city was different from that of the Western city. The almost taken for granted notion that China is de facto different is, in fact, a prominent feature in a lot of the literature on the country and has in the last decades, as discussed in chapter six, been taken up by Chinese nationalists to justify and promote both cosmopolitan and ethnocentric forms of nationalism.

Heikkila and Griffin (1995: 274) argue, for example, “that [urban] planning in the Western world is an attempt to impose a rational order on urban land use patterns” and that it is this, they argue, which “strikes at the very core of and is wholly incompatible with what has traditionally been the Confucian ideal”. They continue and argue that “hierarchy [in the old Confucian city] is omnipresent in social relations in the East. In contrast, the Western ideal is an egalitarian one with respect to social relations. The phrase all men are created equal is implicit in most public discourse on social relations in the West…” (Heikkila and Griffin 1995: 275). The position that hierarchy is somehow inherent in the Chinese city, while lacking in the Western tradition of city building, is problematic for the reason that hierarchies, as traditions of power and discipline, operate in a variety of ways. The argument that the ‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ city are substantially different should, besides the fact that such observations already from the onset engage with incomparable geographic scales, be viewed with suspicion.
The birth and construction of the Chinese and Western urban space is indeed different, but perhaps only in as far as their morphologically different urban layouts are concerned. The essence of both cities rests, in contrast, on the same relationship between space and being. The organisation of both urban spaces is intrinsically political. In an excellent, but fairly neglected, publication on ancient conceptions of urban space in China, Mark Edward Lewis (2006) underlines the crucial importance of social relations for the construction and evolution of space in China.

His analysis (Lewis 2006: 4, original emphasis), which stretches from the Shang dynasty (ca. 1600 - ca. 1046 BC) to the early imperial period (206 BC - ), rests on the idea that the “the units of spatial order were never naturally given. The bodies, households, villages, cities, states, and worlds in the lists [of spatial units in classical Chinese texts] were entities that had to be maintained by the conscious effort of a set of principles of some agent. This is indicated by the repeated used of verbs such as ‘controlled’, ‘arranged’, ‘governed’, ‘fashioned’, or ‘cultivated’. The units [of spatial orders] themselves were never unitary; they were multiplicities that had to be held together. This [was] a direct consequence of the… origins of the world and human society out of chaos.”

Many of the classic Confucian texts refer explicitly to the importance of building a Confucian social order through the use of space. The Confucian order was however, preceded by a spatial order that was characterised by less political enclosure and greater political freedoms. There exist some interesting similarities between these early urban centres and those of the pre-Platonic polis. Tu Cheng-Sheng (in Nienhauser 2006: 404, fn. 241) notes for, example, that citizens or guoren (translated as “people who dwell within city walls”) in the Spring and Autumn period (770 to 476 BC) played an important political role. Lewis (2006: 145) notes “that [t]he increasing
power of the citizens led to the emergence of a new type of political actor, which in some ways resembles the tyrants in ancient Greece… At the end of the Spring-and-Autumn period the citizens played a key role in establishing the power of several rising noble lines that took the lead in creating the Warring States forms of government.” Cities were similarly relatively small which meant that “political activity was conducted on a face-to-face basis.” (2006: 146). Public squares and markets, functioned similarly as Greek agora, as platforms to discuss the dealing of the “day-to-day business of politics and major crises… by either small groups of interested individuals or by the assembled citizenry.” (2006: 146, original emphasis)\(^\text{10}\).

The importance of policing and governing the populace became, as a result of the creation of much vaster macro-states in which cities were integrated, an increasingly urgent matter during the Warring States Period (475 to 221 BC)\(^\text{11}\). The new mode of governance was no longer centred on the political involvement of the citizenry, but was instead much more focused on the administrative powers of a centralised bureaucracy. This meant a radical departure in the way urban spaces were structured and organised. The enclosure and partitioning of space ran parallel to the centralisation of power and the introduction of moral virtues. The depoliticisation of space was strongly linked to the emergence of a new form of governmentality. “Whereas in the old, smaller cities of the Spring-and-Autumn period the entire male population participated at some level in politics, and in times of emergency were assembled to fight or swear loyalty, in the new cities those involved in politics and administration were physically separated from the rest of the population, which was treated purely as the object of registration and control.” (Lewis 2006: 152). This was also the period from which we start to witness the early emergence of the walls that would later come to characterise the urban Chinese landscape.
While citizens and the nobles lived together in the old city-states, the new cities contained inner-walls from which a social division between the proto-bureaucracy (士 or shi) and the citizenry emerged\(^\text{12}\). The new social division split the city, both spatially and legally, into two parts (a bureaucratic part or ‘palace city’ and a commercial and residential part). In short, the city now came to be divided between an administrative part and a commercial part. The changing physical contours of cities corresponded to a new model of governance inspired by Confucian thinking. The Han period (206 BC– AD) was also the time that we start witnessing an early form of a political economic system\(^\text{13}\).

The new spatial politics gave rise to China’s first urban plan. The *kaogongji* (‘Craftsmen’s Records’ or 考工记) was appended to the ‘Rites of Zhou’ (*zhou li*) which ranks among the most important of Confucian texts\(^\text{14}\). The layout of capital cities (*wangcheng*) is in the *kaogongji* (Figure 1a and 1b) characterised by its hierarchical and geometrically rectangular design (see Biot 1851 for the only Western translation; see also Zhang 2004 for a modern reprint in Chinese). The text of the *kaogongji* describes in detail how the space of the city is meant to be partitioned on the basis of the new division of labour\(^\text{15}\). The markets, which in the previous city-states were the centre for political participation, were shuffled away in the extreme north of the city (a little honourable position according to traditional Chinese cosmology). The palace of the prince (or the ‘palace city’) instead occupies the centre of the city and faces south (the most venerable place in traditional Chinese cosmology) (Wright 1977; Steinhardt 1990). The partitioning of the city resulted in a withdrawal of politics and an emergence of what Rancière describes as policing. A parallel can be drawn to the Greek *polis*.  

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\(^{12}\) The emergence of the social division between the proto-bureaucracy and the citizenry in the new cities.

\(^{13}\) The Han period marked the advent of an early form of a political economic system.

\(^{14}\) The *Rites of Zhou* is one of the most important Confucian texts.

\(^{15}\) The division of labour is a fundamental concept in *kaogongji*. The space of the city is partitioned based on this principle.
The so-called ‘Hippodamian urban grid’ (Burns 1976; Paden 2001) looks at first glance, in fact, analogous to the Chinese kaogongji model. Both urban grids propose a division of (urban) land. Hippodamus does, Aristotle (in Burns 1976) writes, this on the basis of three classes (artisans, husbandmen and armed defenders of the state) and three types of land (sacred, public and private). The model mentioned in the kaogongji, in contrast, seems to do this on the basis of two classes (i.e. aristocrats and commoners) and a dual division of urban space, consisting of an imperial city and a residential wards system (Figure 1b).

The demarcated nature of the spatial organisation came to embody the inherent political nature of the new Chinese city. While the earlier city characterised itself by the presence of a thick outer wall and a relatively unorganised inner city, the new city was an intensification of many different walls which transformed the city into a giant check board. Central to this new spatial organisation was the nobility and the administrative apparatus, which were surrounded by a rigid system of residential wards (里 or li) that were controlled by ward supervisors (里正 or lizheng). Yinong Xu informs us that “it is very possible that urban residents were segregated in different wards by class and by profession” (2000: 68). Wu Jing notes that “[n]ot only the city's size and its number of palaces but also the layout and number of streets, the height of its wall, and even the colour followed a strict code, corresponding to their [i.e. the cities and the inhabitants’] rank, in order to demonstrate the importance of political power and social order” (1993: 21).
Figure 1a: Abstract plan for ideal ruler’s city (Wangcheng) in Steinhardt (1990)

Figure 1b: Layout of the ruler’s city according to social divisions (translated from Biot 1851: 557). Index: 1) Alter room, 2) Ancestral room.

Figure 2-1: Visualisations of the early ‘ideal’ Chinese city

According to the ‘Book of diverse crafts’ (Kaogongji).

The two-dimensionality of the plans above fails to stress the political importance of the verticality of the new urban space. With the coming of the city a whole new architecture came into existence, consisting of raised platforms (台 or tai), pillar gates (闕 or que), towers (觀 or guan) and terrace pavilions (閣 or ge), all of which were soon to cover the skies of the new urban landscape. The “politics of verticality”, a phrase which was only recently coined by the architect Eyal Weizman (2003), introduced “a power based on visibility and vision, with ties to the celestial spirits and natural powers supplanting those to ancestral ghosts” (Lewis 2006: 153). The visibility of the towers, however, also allowed the invisibility of the urban rulers, who gradually but steadily became mythically invisible from the public sphere. It bears almost no mentioning that Foucault’s (1979) reinterpretation of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon finds its echo here.\(^\text{16}\)

The result of such inventive organisations of space in embryonically modern cities in China allowed the state to legitimise itself through cosmological principles and rituals. The venerated position of the emperor or imperial ruler, as the
cosmological link between heaven and earth (天下 or tianxia), was to a great extent the result of an effective, politically motivated (re)organisation of space. We can now perhaps start to understand why the assertion that China’s relation to (urban) space is different or even unique is inherently problematic. Rather than starting from an analysis of culture to explain a situation of difference, which in itself is perhaps already a contradiction in terms, it would perhaps be more informative to take serious the argument that policing and governance “[are attempts] to make the political order neatly correspond with the spatial order.” (Dikeç 2005: 186).

The new geometric organisation of the new city helped achieve the gradual institutionalisation and normalisation of a new mode of social relations. It was only after the gradual interweaving of politics and space from the period of the Warring States to the Han Dynasty (206 BC– AD 8) that the establishment of Confucianism as the state ideology could be realised. The state required Confucianism for its social stability and bureaucracy (the opposite is not necessarily true) and effectively embedded its reasoning in space. The old Chinese city-states were instead, similar to those of the pre-Platonic cities, ‘pre-political’. Chinese city-states lacked, as shown above, the grand narratives that characterised Confucian thinking. It was only through the introduction and gradual expansion of a new form of geometric spatial organisation and enclosure that governance through Confuciian morals and virtuous behaviour could be achieved. Political philosophy was established through later Confucian figures, such as Mengzi (372-289 BC) and Xunzi (312-230 BC), and rose to prominence during this period to further clear the way for the institutionalisation of Confucianism as state ideology. The new spatial order in the city similarly helped further develop and inscribe the legal principles of Confucianism and the Legalism (fa jia). The spatial order similarly brought about a shift in mathematics from basic
arithmetic to more complex geometric thinking (see e.g. Martzloff 2006). Such forms of knowledge were in China, as described in chapter three, also employed in cartography and land surveying. Knowledge of space and politically inscribed in space became, in other words, similarly to the above described production of space, powerful techniques of governance.

Throughout the whole of the dynastic period, Chinese rulers time and again employed similar spatial (re)organisations to serve their political needs. The production of space helped legitimise those in power to stay in power. The state’s monopoly on the production and organisation of space was, however, never one-directional. Other agencies continuously challenged the existing organisation, production and reality of space. The place of the market in the city, for instance, had already been contested in times of the Warring States and ultimately forced cities to expand into rural areas during the Song dynasty. The conclusion one could draw is that the tensions existent within society are played out through the medium of space, which transforms itself according to the struggle that underpin its social reality. It was only with the arrival of a universalising modernity (and the abstract territorial state) during the Qing period that this struggle over the production of space temporarily came to be resolved. This formation of state-led modernity in Qing China and the role of space therein will be discussed in the next chapter. It is, however, now of importance to further the discussion, which I started in the previous chapter, on the question how this early modern form of knowledge of space led to the emergence of the territorialised state.

Modern Space

Introduction
Casey (2009) argues that the concept of ‘place’ was until the European high Middle Ages considered to enjoy a relational and inherently distinctive quality. Place was in non-modern times, as we have seen, closely intertwined with being and disclosure. The sentiment that ‘place should come first’ in discussions on being was echoed perhaps most characteristically by the pre-Socratic philosopher Archytas of Tarentum who argued that place “is the first of all things, since all existing things are either in place or not without place.” (in Casey 2009: 14). “[T]here is”, according to Archytas, “no surrounding space that is not itself of the nature of place.” (Casey 2009: 15). Place is indispensable for being. “To be is to be place… there is no being without place”. (Casey 2009: 14, original emphasis). It bears mentioning here that Archytas makes no distinction between human and other entities. Later writers such as Saint Augustine, who searched for (the meaning of) time in place\textsuperscript{18} and Neoplatonic thinkers such as Plotinus of Lycopolis and Simplicius of Cilicia followed the Archytian line of reasoning. Early Taoist thinkers, such as Zhuangzi, similarly attached great importance to the phenomenological world (see e.g. Xiaodong 2002). The number of thinkers that dealt with place from a relational and primordial perspective started, however, to dwindle with the arrival of more complex forms of governance. The introduction of the modern state is characteristic of how questions of place and space were gradually eliminated and replaced by a specific politicised understanding of space. I argue that this is both visible in (what later would become) the West and in China.

\textit{Paving the Foundations of Modern Space}

This ontological relationship between place and being was perhaps most radically altered with the arrival and development of Platonic and Confucian thinking. Their civilising projects resulted in the mastering of nature and the earlier described
social ordering and partitioning of space. These projects were intrinsically related to a transformation in the way space and place were conceived and perceived. Plato (in Casey 2009: 176) changed the Archytian axiom in *Timaeus* and famously argued that “space… is everlasting, not admitting destruction; providing a situation [hedra] for all things that come into being…[for] anything that is must needs be in some place”. The necessity of place meant for Plato, in other words, that humanity is only through the production of space able to be. Space was instead considered to be absolute, without structure and pre-geometric. “For Plato empty space is viewed as an undifferentiated material substratum, leading the way towards his reduction of matter to space, a theme which lives on today.” (Smith 2008: 97, emphasis added). Platonic space (*chora*) is, in other words, homogenous and constitutive for building “room (that is, space to be occupied) for what becomes” (Casey 2009: 352). It translated thereby as an ontological necessity (*ananke*). The production of space starts here to refer to the mastering of nature (conceived as absolute empty space).

Aristotle took this project in a different direction and attempted to reduce Plato’s space (*chora*) to place (*topos*). His notion of place was centred on the question of ‘where’. This allowed place to become delimited, directional, locational and, most important of all, *relative* to matter. The emphasis on physics, rather than mathematics, led Aristotle to conclude: “That is what place is: the first unchangeable limit (*peras*) of that which surrounds” (in Casey 1997b: 55). The introduction of boundaries to describe the idea of an immobile ‘place-as-container’ means that place gradually starts to be translated by Aristotle as an “active source of *presencing*” (Casey 1997b: 63, emphasis added). Place starts in Aristotle’s work to enjoy a metaphysical quality (ie. ‘being-in-place’) which would later come to inform Heidegger’s concepts of being-in-
the-world and *Dasein*\(^20\). Place is, in short, defined and differentiated by the things that it contains.

This view also opened the door, however, for neo-Platonic figures to argue against the Aristotelian idea that things define place. These proto-modern thinkers, who later strongly influenced renaissance thought, claimed instead that “place empower things from (and as) their boundaries” (Casey 2009: 355). The supposed incorporeal quality of place led it, in other words, to be considered more important than the thing(s) it hosted\(^21\). Place would soon become viewed as “a certain extension in three dimensions, different from the bodies that come to be in it, bodiless in its own definition - dimensions alone, empty of body.” (Philoponus (490 to 570 AD) in Casey 1997b: 94). Place became, in other words, ambiguously and increasingly conflated with space.

Aristotle’s idea of space as place was turned on his head. Place was no longer relative to matter, but became instead a three dimensional spatial extension of matter. Space became what Newton would later call ‘absolute’: homogeneous, unchanging, isotropic and stable. Space could, therefore, be said to be both relative and absolute. It constituted matter and was concurrently thought to be without boundaries. This thought was, approximately one millennium after the early neo-Platonic thinkers, famously reiterated by Descartes’s *res extensa* which held substance to be a physical extension in “the spatial indefiniteness of the universe” (Casey 1997b: 166)\(^22\).

Cartesian “[s]pace was”, as Lefebvre (in Elden 2004b: 186, 187) explains, “formulated on the basis of extension, thought of in terms of coordinates, lines and planes, as 'Euclidean' geometry.” Lefebvre (1991) points out the Cartesian division of mind (*res cogitans*) and substance (*res extensa*) is contradictory when it comes to space. He shows that Descartes, on the one hand, *conceives* space mentally (*res
cogitans) and thought of it abstractly in numbers. The idea of spatial extension allowed for the development of a particular quantitative understanding of space. Geometry became “the glue that [stuck] space to matter” (Smith 2008: 97). The world came to be ‘geometricised’, or, to put it differently, geometry came to be considered to be the essence of space. Humanity would soon be able to carve out its own geometric abstract space, the territorialised state. This modern ‘representation of space’ led to a detachment (or alienation) of being from place and would allow space to become governable. Space was, on the other hand, perceived as a material dimension (res extensa). This was the so-called concrete space that constitutes reality. The contradiction of the existence of a ‘perceived’ (matter or object) and ‘conceived’ (mind or subject) space would, as we have seen before, be reconciled by Lefebvre who argued for the plurality of space. He personally added the lived (phenomenological) space to complete his tripartite schema23. All these spaces, he showed, overlap and help produce reality. The conceived, perceived and lived space translated, as we will see in the next part, respectively in distinctive representations of state space (ie. territory); and state space (ie. territorial) practises and the state space (ie. territories) of representation.

Modernity is, to summarise, thus characterised by the historical development from the primordial position of place, to the idea of place’s relative link to matter, to become conflated with space and to eventually become subordinated as a mere location in infinitive and homogeneous space or a site for the purpose of policing and governance. The role of geometry therein compelled place to be translated in modern times as a positional coordinate in what Lock identified as “infinitive space” (Casey 1997b). The mental abstraction of space translated in historically unprecedented modes of governance, which helped produce cities, states and eventually conquered
the globe only transform it into an abstract picture of reality. Sloterdijk (2009: 31) argues that “it is the cosmological enlightenment of the Greek thinkers who, [combined] ontology with geometry” to bring about the mastering of the globe. Such an inchoate statement is, however, perhaps somewhat too crude and simple to account for the spatial experiences in China which would not have been possible without the conceiving of space in a particular, geometric manner. The enclosure of urban space in both the Chinese and the Greek experience was set in motion at the moment abstract space started to be perceived as concrete and real. This was the moment in which place was gradually made redundant and (urban) space became governable through geometric measurement, partitioning and separation. The conquering of space as a picture did, in other words, not commence after the Middle Ages, as Foucault (1986) among others would want us to believe, but actually started before that. The process was neither a purely Greek experience, as Sloterdijk (2009) argues, but was much more geographically dispersed in its development. Its global spreading, which Heidegger (1976) defined as “the basic process of modern times”, was, however, indeed intensified after its linking with the emergence of the territorial state and the subsequent advent of a national political economy.

*From Place to Space*

The effects of revolutions require time to become noticeable. They unfold in unforeseen ways and at unexpected moments. Sometimes they amount to nothing, while at other times change only occurs millennia later. History can therefore not be confined to either temporal linearity or rigid periodisation. The renaissance modernists did much to conceal their indebtedness to their inspirers and “deliberately erased the traces of these past influences and anticipations.” (Lachterman 1989: 25). The onset of geometry is, of course, much older than both the Greek poleis and Confucian urban
planning. Geometry and time keeping were already used in Babylonia and Egypt for purposes of productivity and governance (see for example Smith 2003). It is not my intention to now give an honest and detailed genealogy of modern space and time. My task in this and the forthcoming subsection is much more modest. I wish to show how the unfolding of the embryonically modern episteme of rational space was accelerated with the arrival of the abstract state. This acceleration drastically affected the perceived and lived experience of space.

The non-modern worldview, which Foucault (1986) aptly describes as “the space of emplacement”, was characterised by a plurality and hierarchy of places. There were: “sacred places and profane places; protected places and open, exposed places; urban places and rural places (all these concern the real life of men).” (Foucault and Miskowiec 1986: 22). This gradually changed with the spreading of a homogeneous, isometric representation of space. Knowledge about modern space had admittedly always been available and was effectively applied, as we have seen earlier, for purposes of governance. It was, however, only after the emergence of the modern territorial state and the establishment of political economy that places were demoted and that space was rationalised on a global scale. Place became gradually ‘museumified’ as the curious art of antiquity and was consequentially ‘demoted’ to the realm of novelists and painters. Reality became confined to the metric. Foucault (1984b: 39), pondering on Kant’s 1784 What is Enlightenment, notes in a similar vein: “I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by ‘attitude,’ I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task.”
The worldview that was conceived and perceived to be real before the emergence and development of the modern territorial state was founded on ethnocentrism and principles of universalism. This translated in China, as discussed in chapter three, in the reified centrality of the Emperor and in Europe in the equally absolute sovereignty of the Holy Roman Emperor. Geometry was in the Chinese case empirically deployed, as mentioned earlier, in the layout of cities and, as discussed in the next chapter, in hierarchical cosmograms. The Catholic Church relied similarly on cartographic representations to emphasise its central space in the cosmos. God was at the time of Plato already considered to be the Great Architect (*Demiurge*) or the Geometer and continued to be so long after Descartes. Confucianism attributes a similar form of (moral) rationality to the cosmos. The Han Empire (206 BC - 220 AD) translated “Confucianism from a moralistic system to ‘a universalistic and holistic view providing inescapable sanctions for the deeds of men and the ordering of society, and a place in the cosmos for the imperial system’”. (Twichett and Loewe in Yao 2000: 83) Both the Roman and the dynastic Chinese Empires ruled, in other words, in name of a spatially organised universalism. “The core of universalism was that some high authority ought to hold sway over the whole of mankind or at least the civilised part of it.” (Anderson 1996: 17). Geometry was deployed in service of a higher authority. The later secularisation of space and the emergence of a political economy allowed geometry (and rational knowledge in general) to mediate directly with politics without intervention from such an authority.

The signing of the Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, leading to the Westphalian Peace agreement, are in conventional IR theories generally understood as the decisive historical event which “legitimised ideas of sovereignty and dynastic autonomy from hierarchical control. It created a framework that would sustain the
political fragmentation of Europe” (Holsti in Osiander 2001: 261). Morgenthau, Osiander (2001: 261) continues, “asserts that certain ‘rules of international law were securely established in 1648’; more specifically, ‘the Treaty of Westphalia… made the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern state system.’” The myth of 1648, as the abrupt onset of the state system, has widely been discredited on historical grounds (Osiander 2001; Teschke 2003).

The 1648 treaties had little to do with a sudden historical onset of the state’s supreme authority and control within and over a territory. The issue of jurisdiction over territory has as a history which goes further back than 1648. The evolution of the concept of sovereignty is, in fact, far more ambiguous than often presumed in conventional IR accounts. The Treaty of Augsburg (1555) had granted states, for example, the right to choose their own religion (cuius regio, eius religio). This right was, as Krasner (1993) shows, actually restricted in the 1648 Peace Treaties. Krasner (1993: 253) writes that in 1000 AD “more than two hundred cities on the [Italian] Peninsula [already] enjoyed effective de facto control of their own affairs”. City-states with early forms of political self-organisation chose to gradually detach themselves from the Roman Empire as a consequence of the rivalry between the Papal Rome and the Roman Empire. These city-states were characterised by their “republican [form] of government and territorially demarcated authority” (Krasner 1993: 256).

Kantorowicz’ (1997) political theology, in another vein, famously describes how the European kings were equipped with the concept of a dual body. One body was natural and mortal and the other, more importantly, constituted a timeless and spiritual ‘body politic’. The latter was attributed with immortal and spiritual symbolisms from which the king could draw the legitimacy to rule supremely over his territory. The temporal order of the system allowed for the Church and the kings to
secure permanent rulership through the means of divine governance. The famous maxim ‘The king is dead, long live the king’ came to demonstrate the mythical perpetuity of rulership over territory. State territory was represented as an organised and timeless body with the king as its head. The form of local rulership in Europe eventually came to juxtapose the idea of universal rulership under the Holy Roman Empire. It would, therefore, only be a matter of time before the Church started losing its control over European Kings and Princes. This process was accelerated by legal reforms in the Italian city-cities.

We can perhaps draw a parallel here with the strongly Confucianist-influenced concept of the Mandate from Heaven (tianming) which the ‘Son of Heaven’ (ie. the Emperor) received in China. The Mandate, which was arguably less unconditional than the Divine Rights of Kings, was understood as “‘Natural Law’ and thus automatically provided legitimacy to the ruler and granted temporal stability to the Empire (see e.g. Yao 2000). The arrival of the non-Han Chinese Qing dynasty in 1644 proved, however, to be difficult to justify through the old principle of the Mandate. Confucianists argued and protested for most of the almost 300 year of the dynastic period against Qing rule, and constantly attempted to undermine the legitimacy of the Qing Empire. The Qing rulers saw themselves, similarly to their European counterparts, compelled to legitimise their rule through different means. The next chapter will show how they not merely succeeded in their modernising efforts, but actually surpassed the colonial achievements of all previous dynasties. Let us first, however, return to the territorial foundations of the modern state.

**The Foundations of the Territorial State**

The work of medieval legal thinkers such as Bartolus of Sassoferrato (1313-1357)\(^{25}\) and Baldus de Ubaldis (1327–1400)\(^{26}\) helped to legally secularise claims over
territory in the Italian city-state. Their attempts were among the earliest to forge a relationship between jurisdiction and space. The significance of their work can be considered to have been among the earliest efforts in linking jurisdiction to territory. The early legal accounts were, as Elden (2010: 758) shows, responsible for the transformation “from the personality of law to the territoriality of law”. It took, however, hundreds of years before their views came to be adopted by political thinkers, such as Jean Bodin (1530–1596) and Giovanni Botero (c.1544–1617).

The question of sovereignty became as a result of such developments less temporal and increasingly spatial. “The plurality of hierarchical bonds was replaced by an exclusive identity based upon membership in a common territorial space with a singular centre and established territorial boundaries defined by the sovereign powers and recognised as such within a developing international state system.” (Neocleous 2003: 410). Territory was that bounded state space which formed the connection between politics and space. Sovereignty translated as uncontested rulership within and over that state space. The establishment of a world made by men led rulers to gradually stop governing people. Governance became instead increasingly preoccupied with the policing of territory (Foucault 2009). Sovereignty came to be embedded in territory or, as Foucault showed, “equated with territory” (Elden 2013b). The transformation of space or land into a specific notion of territory meant, in other words, that the relationship between the ruler and the ruled was now mediated through territory. The geometric understanding of space came to be the primary instrument for transforming a world that was no longer policed by a higher authority, but one, as Kant’s philosophy became famous for, in which man became the measure and centre of everything. Knowledge of space and politics over space worked in tandem without intervention from above.
One of the central figures in the reorientation in the way space came to be politicised in the form of the modern state was, according to Foucault (2009), the former Jesuit Giovanni Botero. The fact that Botero was a Jesuit is, as I will show in the next chapter, of crucial importance for the territorialisation of the Chinese state. Jesuits enjoyed access to the most advanced form of knowledge in Europe and were granted access to the highest echelons of power in Europe (and later also in China). They form the academically unexplored, but crucial link in the establishment of the modern state system. Botero (and many Jesuits with him) was deeply inspired by China which he considered to be the “nation with the greatest cities” and among the most advanced in the world (Lach 1994). The advanced bureaucratic form of Ming Chinese governance and the high level of Chinese urbanisation had, in fact, a great influence on Botero’s writing on the state (Botero 1956 [1589]; 1956 [1606]). Foucault leaves this however, unacknowledged. The possibilities of a modern Chinese ‘reason of state’ have at least to my knowledge, never been explored.

Foucault’s (2009: 314) relies, however, strongly on Botero for his genealogy of the modern state. He quotes directly from Botero to show that he saw the “state [as] a firm domination over peoples.” (2009: 314). The reason of state (Ragione di Stato) “is the knowledge of the appropriate means for founding, preserving, and expanding such a domination.” Foucault (2009: 314) adds that Botero “makes raison d’État the type of rationality that will allow the maintenance and preservation of the state once it has been founded, in its daily functioning, in its everyday management.” Botero writes elsewhere in his treatise, in a manner which anticipates Hobbes’ salus populi suprema lex (“the wellbeing of the people is the supreme law”); “he who wishes to keep his subjects contented and quiet should procure for them plenty, justice, peace, and a certain virtuous [honesta] liberty” (in Malcolm 2010: 117).
The politics of Botero’s everyday life seemed to have deeply influenced by Jean Bodin’s *The Six Books of the Republic* (1576)\(^{28}\) which argued nearly 200 years before Smith’s *Wealth of Nations* for the importance of the economy in the act and art of governance. His political economic approach to the *raison d’État* is grounded in the notion that the “reason of state is little else than reason of interest” (in Malcolm 2010: 94)\(^{29}\). The wellbeing of the general populace was, in other words, gradually shifted to become more important than the transcendence of the monarch in Europe and (as we will see in the next chapter) the Chinese Emperor for sustaining the abstraction of the state.

Foucault, in his *Security, Territory, Population* lecture series, suggests that that the shift from the Machiavellian Prince to the economic pasturage of Botero is illustrative for the transformation of governance in service of “the safety of the Prince and his territory” to the securitisation of individual subjects\(^30\). Although there admittedly are significant differences between Botero’s political economic liberalism and Machiavelli’s *interest in preserving the Prince*, I think it would be wrong to suggest that the discrepancy between these two thinkers is strong enough to have caused the rupture necessary to periodically break feudalism from modernity. Elden (Holden and Elden 2005) and Bishai (2007), note for example, that Machiavelli actually scarcely coins the word ‘territory’ in his works\(^31\). Foucault moreover seldom discusses (and never in detail) what is so central (and yet perhaps so ambiguous) in Machiavelli’s work, namely the notions of *Virtù* (often wrongly translated as Christian virtue) and *Fortuna* (see also Walter 2008 for a similar criticism). Perhaps it is for this neglect that Foucault writes that “[w]hat Machiavelli sought to save, to safeguard, is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which he exercises his domination” (Foucault 2009: 320). He (2009: 320) makes his point even clearer when
he notes that “it is a matter of saving the principality as the Prince’s relation of power to his territory or population”. In other, briefer, words, Foucault (2009: 320) argues here that there is no “art of government in Machiavelli”.

This idea can be and has been contested in different accounts (Pocock 2003; Fontana 2010) which attempt to save Machiavelli from the Machiavellians in IR and (in a rather different way) the Foucauldians. Machiavelli deserves to be understood in the historical context in which he wrote. This context was characterised by a crumbling of the legitimacy of the structure of the body politic and the emergence of an increasingly secular science of time and space. Fontana (2010: 354) describes Machiavelli as the “re-discoverer of the mass” who are the “legitimating force and as the basis for the modern state”. Machiavelli understood, as did Bodin and Botero after him, that “force and authority [were] no longer the ground of social and political life” (Fontana in Femia 2004: 10)32.

The problem of Foucault seems to stem from a need for a distinctive system of historical periodisation. It would perhaps be more fruitful to analyse how continuities in the evolution of the relationships between governance, the economy and the creation of political territories have been stimulated and inspired by the development of a particular thinking about space. To take serious such continuities would involve a broader and historical examination of the interdependence between space and politics. A careful rereading of legal medieval theorists such as Baldus and Bartolus would, for instance, be welcome to better understand how jurisdiction and space became intertwined. This thesis takes, in contrast, a more ontological approach to the historical interplay between politics and space. Modernity in this dissertation is, therefore, more characterised by the gradual and historically contingent triumph of space over place. That does not mean, however, that I think we should throw out the baby with the bath
water. Foucault (and Lefebvre) set the precedent in thinking about how a particular way of thinking about space (and time) encourages a form of policing which from the onset is meant to inspire governance and limit politics. The modern territorial state is, in that regard, the epitome of modernity.

**Space and the State**

Descartes argued, as earlier discussed, that the laws of geometry are factual because God wanted them to be so. Lefebvre criticised Descartes for the paradox of a conceived *res extensa* and a perceived *res cognita*. Lefebvre provided, as we have seen, instead a tripartite understanding of space. His criticism of the Cartesian paradox was, however, preceded a couple of centuries earlier by the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) who, in an attempt to resolve the paradox, demonstrated that geometry is factual precisely because it is man-made (*Geometria demonstramus quia facimus. Si physica demonstrare possemus, faceremus*). The authority of geometric space was now without rivals and helped open the doors for the European rediscovery of Ptolemy’s latitude and longitude. The timing of these developments was crucial and by no means accidental, for this was also the time in which the territorial foundations of the modern state were laid. The reintroduction of geometry was, as we will see in the next chapters, also warmly received also in Qing China (1644-1911), where the new, non-Han dynastic rulers sought for alternative forms of legitimacy.

Geometry allowed for a new, ‘calculative’ form of governance in which the space of the world was effectively distributed, ordered, measured and demarcated on the principles of an isometric and homogenous understanding of space. The great 16th and 17th mapping projects of the Qing, the Romanovs and the Bourbons would not have been possible without the modern introduction of ‘geometry as fact’. The
popularisation of geometry in such historically unprecedented projects cannot, however, be understood independently from the, earlier described, political and historical context. Cartographers and geographers were, in fact, in the 17th century directly commissioned by both the Chinese and European courts to help rationalise the governance of the state.

The bordering of the state in the 17th and 18th centuries were as much meant to retain the status quo in the balance of power between states, as it was deployed as a means to regulate the interiority of the state. Borders were thus equally important for the exteriority as they were for the interiority of states. The territory is to a large extent the raison d'être of the state, because its very function is to govern the population therein and to protect the borders thereof. It is important to remember at this point that the map ‘engenders’ as much as it ‘precedes’ the territory (Pickles 2004). ‘The map is certainly not the territory’, but is not totally disconnected from it either. Maps mirror, in Heideggerian fashion, a particularly rich political worldview in which identities are imagined anew. The form of geometric knowledge used in modern mapping “applies itself to the immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power which makes individual subjects…” (Foucault in Gregory 1994: 297, 298). The map constituted, therefore, a form of knowledge which portrays itself as a permanent, rational and truthful depiction of reality. The cartographic standardisation of space forcefully detached places from their social and temporal contexts and replaced them with abstract, dehistoricised and ordered containers of space. It was the brutal calculative organising of space in these “instruments of power” (Foucault 1984a;
Harley 1988) that also would give rise and meaning to the modern territorialised Chinese nation state.

The mapping of space has a direct effect on the governance of bodies. Foucault introduced the concepts of a biopolitics (a concept which he started to develop in the course of his *College de France lectures*) to explain how the use of power gradually transformed from coercive rule over people to a more internalising power for societal control. The concept of biopower anticipated the rise of the “population as the correlate of power and the object of knowledge” (Foucault 2009: 110). Foucault argued that “the sovereign of territory became an architect of a disciplinary space” but he equally showed how “the architect also became the regulator of a milieu where he or she did not so much fix the limits and frontiers, or the sites [within the territory], but allowed circulation [in it]” (in Elden 2007: 565).

The rise of geometric ordering of society was reinforced by the parallel rise of a national political economy (see e.g. Gregory 1994). Bio-power in the “calculated management of life” was, as Foucault (1978: 140, 141) argues, “without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism”. The concept was integral to the art of government “which essentially [is] concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy - that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortunes prosper - how to introduce this meticulous attention of the father towards his family into the management of the state” (Foucault 1994: 207)\(^{35}\).

Negri and Hardt’s more explicitly Marxist\(^{36}\) reading of biopower is based on the idea that it “is a form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it.” (2000: 23, 24). Their version of
the term is to a greater extent centred on its productive and reproductive functioning in service of the (capitalist) state. Biopower, they argue refers to a “situation in which what is directly at stake in power is a production and reproduction of life itself” (2000: 24). The production and reproduction of life occurred through the representation of geometric space from which spatial practises were able to produce and reproduce the lived social reality. Foucault argues, in a very similar vein, that “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power.” (Foucault 1984a: 252).

The embracing of a geometric understanding of space enabled, in other words, the permeation of both nationalism and capitalism in the everyday life. The territorial creation of the abstract nation state allowed, on the one hand, for the possibility for strangers to become fellow national citizens. The production of the new national subjectivity was, as we have seen, visualised on maps, but also in modern architecture (see e.g. Leach 1997) and town planning (see e.g. Lefebvre 1996; Benjamin 1999)\(^\text{37}\). The production and reproduction of space in China helped, as discussed in the forthcoming chapters, to produce a national sentiment of collective belonging to the abstract territorialised nation state.

The production of national space, on the other hand, also helped establish a national economy. The wish to order, arrange and quantify places to accelerate the process of, what we called earlier, ‘time-space compression’ reached its apex in the modernisation of cities. The rationalisation of space in Chinese cities in the 1920s and 1930s, discussed later in greater detail, is an—often neglected example of how the state attempted to rationalise the Chinese economy. The emergence of more rational forms of architecture was, as described later, also visible in Shanghai’s *lilong* houses in the 19\(^\text{th}\) century. Leon Dufourny’s famous aphorism written in 1793 that “[a]rchitecture
must regenerate itself through geometry” (Dufourny [1793] in Collins 1968: 311) has become only more relevant in today’s China. Theories of geometric architecture were, however, not limited to capitalist development. The highly functionalist theories of the famous Swiss architect Le Corbusier were throughout the first half of communist period (1949-1961) popularly received and applied in China.

The triumph of space over place translated as much into the closing off of the possibility of politics as it allowed for an ever increasing abstraction of space. The state, itself only second to the globe in terms of size of spatial abstractions, has become the primary vehicle of the dominant form of social relations to enforce a modern subjectivity. The emergence of the state can hence not solely be explained as the historical re-emergence of a certain mode of thinking about space. Political geometry has, as shown earlier in this chapter, been around since (at least) Confucian and Socratic times. The emergence of the modern state cannot, however, be understood without the product of a mode of production that helps concretise the state’s abstract territorial nature (Holloway 1994a). The ossified state played an active role in enforcing a reality according to “the logic of an absolutist system of ‘states’” (Teschke 2006: 539). The transferring of the concept of legitimacy transcended subsequently from the authority of Heaven or God to a territorial politics based on lines drawn on a map is, in other words, enabled by the creation of a political economic system in which everybody is disciplined into accepting and believing in the dominant understanding of space.

The universalising process of conceiving and perceiving space only in geometric terms forced the concept of place into a long process of flattening and hollowing-out. The effects of this inevitably led to a concentration of abstract spatial classifications (e.g. the rational Occident, the mythic Orient, the developed West, the
communist East, the poor South etc.) that functioned as mere containers to rationalise the world and accelerate the functioning of the modes of production. Spatial categories have continued to transcend an economic hierarchical order in which some bodies count more than others (e.g. First world, a Second and Third world, developed, developing etc.) (see also Lewis and Wigen 1997). The spatial differences that emerged from this abstract invention of territorial (e.g. regional and national) histories were brought together into a Darwinian model of teleological evolution. The modernisation discourse meant that “beyond Europe was henceforth before Europe” (McGrane in Gregory 1994: 27, original emphasis). China similarly changed from being the source of inspiration for Botero’s ‘Reason of State’ to a feudal, semi-colonial backwater. The converting of the ‘Other’, from being ‘exotic’ to ‘primitive’, was, as described in the next chapter, not only a European experience. The island of Taiwan and China’s colonial western provinces went through a very similar process of (internal) orientalisation.

The transformation of place from a priori requirement for being, as described earlier in this and the preceding chapter, to a naturalised abstraction of space (and time) was employed by the abstract state for the purpose of its legitimisation. The arrival of a state-led modernity transformed our conceptualisation of what it meant to ‘be in place’ and provided the impetus for the dissemination of a cognitive modern understanding of both time and space. The production of space has, in other words, an immediate effect on the dialectics of everyday life. The layers upon layers of abstraction, which started to develop as soon as space and time were divided and privileged over the phenomenology of place, have helped to give form to a modern politics that is characterised by its commitment to calculability and “its unconditional failure to question itself” (Heidegger 1996b: 94).
Conclusion

The homogenisation of (bifurcated) space and time provided for the process of what Marxists describe as ‘time-space compressions’. This observation lends, however, too much credence on a particular understanding of space (and time) and grants too little attention to the spatial and temporal metaphysics of being. This chapter has alternatively provided a historical account on how a particular understanding of space has older roots than the rigid conventional schemes of periodisation (e.g. feudalism > modernity) normally permit. Modernity has, for that reason, been presented as the result of a hegemonic way of conceiving and perceiving space. Modernity can, in such terms, be understood as the gradual emergence of a means to classify, order, categorise and catalogue sites on the basis of a universal representation of geometric space (and linear time). Identities have consequentially and increasingly been “fixed in space” (Foucault 1979). The homogenisation of space had allowed for disciplinary “spaces that provide fixed positions and permit circulation; they carve out individual segments and establish operational links; they mark places and indicate values; they guarantee the obedience of individuals, but also a better economy of time and gesture.” (Foucault 1979: 148).

It was this particular form of knowledge of space (and time) in combination with an emergent political economy which provided also the impetus for the concretisation of the abstract sovereign state. The territorialised state was not merely the passive creation of a geometric territorialisation project on a global scale. The state instead actively pursues and takes part in the project of the homogenisation of both time (and space) and the territorial fixing of identities. The nation state is, in this regard, the most powerful product of this universalising and disciplinary process. The state-led partitioning and classification of space also means that it is the most active
agent in the dissemination of the spatial techniques of power (e.g. urban planning, maps, architecture etc.) that prevent alternative forms of space. The depoliticised space of the state endorses geometric thinking and the mode of capitalist production as its *raison d'être*.

The result of this is a process of alienation from place and politics which paradoxically gives modernity its objectifying self-certainty in the wake of the disappearing authority of Heaven. Heidegger (1976: 349) writes that truth since (at least) Descartes has “been transformed into the certainty of representation”. The idea of the “world as picture” (*Weltbild*) is what defines the modern age (Heidegger 1976: 353). This detachment from place, as the site of the possibility for politics, was enforced through a state-led permeation into the everyday life (in dwelling, language, politics etc.) of a depoliticised understanding of space and time. The alienation of being-in-place was as much a result of the introduction by the clock and the workday, as it was the consequence of the partitioning of space according to geometry.

The combination of a capitalist mode of production and modern knowledge of space led to ever-greater levels of abstractions. It permitted “the economic to be integrated into the political” (Lefebvre 1991: 321) and led Marx and Heidegger’s to shake hands and agree that the “estrangement of man has its roots in the homelessness of modern man.” (Heidegger 1993 [1949]: 258). The collaboration between Marx and Heidegger will be utilised in the forthcoming chapters that will take a more empirical and historical look at the development of modern space in and of China.
Introduction

The discussion in the previous chapters showed how conventional thinking in the political sciences has failed in grasping the complexity of the politics embedded in modern space. The consequence is a ‘territorial trap’ which takes the space of the abstract state and the globe for granted. I have instead offered a historical analysis for understanding the development of modern space and its relationship to politics. We have seen how ‘representations of space’ (ie. conceived space), ‘spatial practises’ (ie. perceived space) have helped to create and shape a new mode of being that later came to be translated as modernity. The modern production of space and the resulting political reality has led to a new interpretation of how we have come to relate and identify ourselves with what Lefebvre calls socially ‘lived space’ (ie. spaces of representation). The nation state is in this respect arguably the most salient and instructive example of the historical transition to the ‘fixing’ of the problem of space. The objective of this chapter is to use this historical and conceptual understanding of space in order to reinterpret and reconstruct the historical evolutionary characteristics that gave rise to the specific modernity that is the Chinese nation state.

The ascendance of modernity in China has inside and outside of the country often been described and analysed in a spatially fixed and temporally static manner. The official line adopted by the Chinese Communist Party has placed modernity, for example, in the aftermath of the British Opium Wars. Analyses of immanent sinologists such as Needham, Hsü, Fairbank and so many others have similarly contextualised Chinese modernity in the (forced) entry of Western ideas, concepts and theories either before or after the infamous Macartney Mission (1793). The
understanding that China was not modern before its confrontation with the ‘West’ has unconsciously become a taken for granted notion in much of the past and present literature on China’s history. The vast majority of such literature ignores or underestimates the changing nature of the representation of space and spatial practices (e.g. architecture, urban planning, landscape paintings etc.) that emerged in the period heralding the coming of what many now (falsely) call ‘Western’ modernity.

The contribution of outside influences in the construction of modern representations of space and time in China should, of course, not be underestimated. The diffusion of external influences provided without a doubt the means necessary for a faster adaptation of a new mode of spatial development. The local endorsement of modern concepts of space and time is, however, not merely a matter of a radical ‘outside-inside’ interaction. A definition on the basis of a ‘Western’ infiltration of Chinese values runs not only the risk of bypassing and overlooking local historical developments, but also forces us to accept and thus reinforce the abstract pictures that modernity bases itself on. The risk also lies in the taking for granted of the ‘Western-Eastern’ divide (with all its loaded culturalist and nationalist sentiments). Most problematically, it allows modernity to become analogous with the discursive term ‘Westernisation’. This chapter will, contrary to simply assuming such spatial abstractions, attempt to analyse why and how modern knowledge of space became politically deployed to serve a new, modern form of governance.

The seeds for modernity were, as I will contend, already planted before the first ‘external-internal’ interactions took place. I will argue that the introduction of modernity in China was a historically contingent development that was as much internally necessitated as it was externally induced. The transformation to modernity in China will thus neither be considered to have been isolated from the developments
in the rest of the world, nor will it be understood as the result of a Western colonial project. The proposed alternative conceptualisation of the emergence of modernity will instead argue that the foundations of the modern Chinese state should be understood as the consequence of a rethinking of the relationship between space and politics during the Qing period. The Qing rulers thereby acted upon domestic as much as global developments.

This method should allow us to theoretically uncover the abstract spatial-political construct known as ‘China’. This will subsequently permit analyses to challenge the way we think about and relate to the politically charged imagery of the socially lived space (e.g. in architecture, urban planning etc.) in and of China. Chapters four to six will spatio-chronologically show how such state spaces of representation have evolved and intensified as a consequence of the different modes of production. This chapter will primarily focus first, however, on the transition from a cultural geography to a modern form of cartography. Chinese cartography was, after all, the first modern spatial technique of power in China from which other representations of spaces and spatial practises started to become meaningful. It allowed for the transition from an ethnic and culturalist imperial worldview to a modern territorial nation state.

The first section of this chapter will analyse how early representation of space in the cartographic works of post-Han China came to inform a collective identity. By analysing the development and characteristics of Chinese maps in a conceptual manner, rather than descriptively emphasising the distinctive cultural particularities of Chinese cartographies, it becomes possible to identify the universal ways in which representations of space are filled with performative knowledge. The production of geometric space, which gives a shape to the abstract state space, exploits the
ethnocentric sentiment that we feel to (‘our’) place and fixes the spaces and peoples that surround and inhabit that place\(^3\). This sentiment was during the introduction of modern, geometric space transformed to the ideal of territorialised nation state. The universal modern conceptualisation of modern space, exported to China by the European Jesuits from the late 16\(^{th}\) century onwards\(^4\), was I believe not an historical anomaly. The introduction of modern space came at a time in which a new, non-Han Chinese dynasty was looking for new ways to legitimise itself. The modern way of conceiving space, which triumphed over the earlier described universal knowledge of space, performed an important functional purpose in the formation and development of the Qing Empire.

The second section will continue the discussion of how the making of empire depended and was constituted by new representation of spaces and spatial practises in the period prior to the Opium Wars. The chronology employed in this chapter should not be seen as a teleological demarcation of history. I rather wish to offer a spatial analysis of the development of the geographies of power in China. The inaccurately named ‘opening-up of China’, discussed in the third section, should in this light not be understood as the beginning of modernity, but rather as the continuation of earlier historical developments in the formation of the Chinese nation state. This third section, which follows the spatiotemporal changes after the Opium Wars and the establishment of the Republic of China (henceforth ROC), will primarily focus on the diffusion of modernity into the everyday life. The turbulent events and radical movements, which were so characteristic of the early Republic of China (ROC) period, are in this section understood to be less the signs of failure and more the symptoms of success of the dissemination and adaptation of the spatial-temporal modernity that the Qing by then had instigated some 250 years earlier.
Early Modernity in China

Non-modern Representations of Space

The introduction of modernity was, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the gradual outcome of a revolution in the way time and space came to be reconceptualised. The catalyst which furthered this development was driven by a struggle over the metaphysical control of space. The evolution from a stage in which God or Heaven presumed ultimate command over all earthly places, to a gradual unfolding process of a secular understanding of space translated into (and assisted) the rise of a modern, universalising form of science.

The control over the representation and production of modern space has similarly stood central in the development of modern China. One needs to stress here that the name of this abstract geographical construct (i.e. China) should not be taken at face value. This is not only for the reason that its etymology cannot be traced back much further than the writings of the Jesuit Martino Martini (1614-1661), but also because of its inherent modern resonance. The spatial nature of the phrase ‘Middle Kingdom’ (Zhongguo, 中国) became, in fact, only during the Qing dynasty politically associated with the modern nation state (Zhonghua minguo, 中华民国). A characteristic example of the spatial-ethnic revision of the term by the Qing (and of the Qing state project in general) is visible in the Qianlong Emperor’s pronouncement in 1775.

There exists a view of China (Zhongxia), according to which non-Han people cannot become China’s subject and their land cannot be integrated into the territory of China. This does not represent our
dynasty’s understanding of *China*, but is instead that of the earlier Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties (in Zhao 2006b: 4, original emphasis)

The term signifies therefore, an entirely different spatial-political category in the period before the Qing’s nation state enterprise in the 17th and 18th centuries. The Qing were, in other words, responsible for redefining of what it meant to talk of ‘China’ and to be ‘Chinese’. The latter (being Chinese) implies, I will argue, a shift from a Han centred ethnic construct (*hanren*) to a multi-ethnic and territorially bordered national consciousness (*Zhongguo ren* (Chinese person) or even *zhonghua minzu* (Chinese ethnicity)).

In the period before the Qing the term *zhongguo* instead usually referred to strong ethnocentric sentiments. After the Qing it came to refer to more racially oriented attitudes (see also Dikotter 1994). The ethnographic hierarchical nature of space in the term ‘middle kingdom’ (or ‘central kingdom’ as others have called it) finds its historical correspondences, for example, in the urban planning of the aforementioned *Kaogongji* (*考工記*) and the Tribute of [the Great] Yu (*禹貢*). The below image, taken from the ‘Book of Documents’ (*Shujing*), is, similarly to the urban grid in the *Kaogongji*, a spatial conceptualisation of space which borders and empowers some places over others.
Figure 3-1: The five dependencies in the Yu Gong

The five dependencies in the Yu Gong (a chapter in the Shujing) in Needham (2008 [1954]-b)

The partitioning of space leads in the cosmograms to a number of concentric rings that radiate outwards from the inner imperial rectangular domain. The map organises space in a non-modern, ethnographic manner. The centrality of the imperial centre, which carries extra political weight due to its self-proclaimed vertical relationship with heaven (tian, 天下), legitimises itself as being at the centre of the (square) earth and of humanity (cf. Tuan 1990; Dikotter 1994; Needham 2008 [1954]-b among others). The privileging of a certain political place through its centralisation in space is, however, not something uniquely Chinese. Similar spaces of representation can also be found in especially late medieval European cartographic representations which, in a similar fashion, placed the Holy Land (and later Rome) at their centre (Figure 2).

The political centralisation of space is, of course, also visible in more contemporary forms. The choice for Greenwich as the site of the world prime meridian,
from which the whole world could and still is mapped, was, in fact, an entirely politically determined decision (see for example Zerubavel 1982). The hierarchical centring of one place over others seems, in fact, to embody the very centrality that was given to the idea of what it means to ‘be in place’. The location of the Mediterranean (the Mare Mediterraneum or literally the ‘sea in the middle of the earth’) played, for example, a dominating role in the majority of Greco-Roman and medieval cartographies which primarily placed Rome or Greece at their respective centres. With the coming of the first Crusades this geographical midpoint came to be challenged in the Hereford, Psalter and the Ebstorf maps which placed Jerusalem at their centre (Crone 1965; Alington 2000).

Figure 3-2: The Hereford Mappa Mundi (ca. 1290)

The view that non-modern Chinese cartography culturally distinguished itself for its “striking lack of precision” (Dorofeeva-Lichtmann 1995: 61; and Dorofeeva-Lichtmann 1996: 10), or the idea that the Chinese tradition differed from non-
modern European map making for its emphasis on pictorial presentations of space (Yee 1994e) tells us only one side of the story. It also dangerously risks exaggerating the historical differences and commonalities of (the functions of) non-modern representations of space. The number of mythical, classical and biblical references in, for example, the *Hereford Mappa Mundi* (figure 2) were similarly as those described by Cordell Yee (1994e), in his extensive study on pre- and post-Jesuit Chinese maps, full of pictorial and historical references. Brincken argues, for example, that medieval *mappae mundi* should be “seen as a syncretic pictorial chronicles parallel to the textual chronicles from St. Jerome to Hartmann Schedel” (in Woodward 1985: 514). The objective of such maps was, similar to early Chinese maps, not a matter of locational precision, but represented rather a much broader and inherently political worldview (*Weltanschauung*).

It would in a similar vein also be somewhat crude to argue that the lack of locational positioning in medieval European cartography represented a cartographic stagnation in the period between Ptolemaic and Renaissance mapmaking, something which Needham (2008 [1954]-b), in his otherwise formidable *Science and Civilisation in China*, seems to imply. The idea of the ordering of places along temporal patterns of progress, which is (as we have seen in the previous chapter) a product of a modern mind (spurred especially by the advent of the Industrial Revolution), reduces our capacity to understand the political reasons underlying cartographic representations of space. The idea then that China was lagging behind in modernity’s concept of evolutionary time (i.e. ‘progress time’), a view still popular until this day (see for example Landes 2000: especially chapter 1), actually depoliticises the historical role of space in politics.
The idea that Chinese cartography, prior to the arrival of Matteo Ricci and Michele Ruggiero\(^\text{11}\) (who were the first Jesuits to visit mainland China) fundamentally differed from the ‘Western’ experience, a venture point which has been used in most of literature on the topic, creates an unnecessary and unwanted geographic divide\(^\text{12}\). The cartographic experience of space in maps is in fact always a structural representation of the underlying social relations. Gottdiener (1993: 132) paraphrases Lefebvre to argue that “[e]very mode of social organisation produces an environment that is a consequence of the social relations it possesses… [S]pace is both a medium of social relations and a material product that can affect social relations.” The control over the production of space is as such the outcome of a political struggle of ideas, interests and power.

The shift away from cosmically or religiously inspired representations of space to more geometric cartographic representations of space was, in fact, a historical development that was observable in both China and Europe. The transformation of space in the unfolding of rational modernity symbolises, as the previous chapters have shown, a universal belief that Cartesian space was quantifiable, scientifically rational and supposedly politically neutral. This ‘neutrality of space’ in the making of empire was the defining feature by which the Qing came to distinguish themselves from previous imperial dynasties. The spatio-political revolution that occurred as a result of the neutralisation of non-modern connotations to place compelled the Chinese to redefine themselves in relation to the new nation state. The overthrow and substitution of older representations of space required, in fact, a complete reinterpretation of what it meant to be-in-place. It was this project, inescapably linked to the formation of the nation state, which started in the early Qing and evolved from the establishment of the ROC in 1911 to Mao’s use of *danwei* (chapter four). The post 1976 period has, as
chapters five and six describe, continued to struggle over the representation of space in and of China.

The view that its universal implementation in China was seriously delayed until the Opium Wars has been the subject of a heated debate ever since Needham’s (2008 [1954]-a) somewhat overcompensating thesis that underwrote that China was earlier ‘modern’ than renaissance Europe\textsuperscript{13}. The ‘competition’ between ‘East’ and ‘West’, as to who developed what (e.g. capitalism, modern science etc.) first, is a direct result of (the competing) modern representations and conceptualisations of space. The early traces of modernity in China should instead be searched for in a more global historical and conceptual framework. The analysis of modern space and its impact on the formation of the Chinese state should, in other words, be analysed though the universalising lens of modern space. I will in the forthcoming fragments trace its emergence without losing sight of the more global context which helped incentivise the state to adapt a modern knowledge of space.

\textit{Embryonic Modernity in China}

The Jin cartographer and Minister of Public Works Pei Xiu (224–271 AD) is believed to have been among the first to employ a geometric grid to accomplish a greater degree of spatial accuracy in the scaling, surveying and measuring of space in maps (compare Yee 1994c; with Needham 2008 [1954]-b)\textsuperscript{14}. Pei is often cited as an example of the political awareness that more mathematical knowledge of territories gradually became more important for the governing of territories (Hsu 1978; Hsu 1993; Yee 1994d; Yee 2008; Needham 2008 [1954]-b). The two known maps produced by Pei, i.e. the \textit{Yu gong diyu tu} (‘Regional Map of the Lands According to the [Shangshu Chapter] Tributes to the Great Yu’’) and the \textit{Fangzhang tu} (‘One Zhang [i.e. ca. 3 m] Square Map) are unfortunately no longer extant (Yee 1994e; Needham 2008 [1954]-b).
The influence of his six cartographic principles and the two known maps he had produced are, however, said to have had a substantial influence on the famous Tang cartographer Jia Dan (730-805) (Needham 2008 [1954]-b). The latter’s oft-cited, but now lost, *Hai Nei hua yi tu* (‘Map of Chinese and Barbarian Lands within the [Four] Seas’, 海内華夷圖), was requested by the Tang emperor Daizong (唐代宗) to chart the territory of the whole empire, formed one of the foundations for what is now known as one of the most ‘remarkable’ achievements in cartographic history (Soothill 1927). The *Yu Ji Tu* (‘Map of the Tracks of Yu’, 禹迹图) is believed to have been produced in or around the year 1137 and illustrates that Chinese cartographers were more than “capable of following Pei’s principles quite rigorously” (Yee 2008: 1285).

![Figure 3-3: Yu Ji Tu (Map of the Tracks of Yu)](image)

On the left a satellite image from Google Maps (taken on 1 July 2011) and on the right a rubbing of the *Yu Ji Tu* (Map of the Tracks of Yu). Each grid increment of the *Yu Ji Tu* measures 100 Chinese Miles (*li*) or approximately 33 English miles (Yee 1994c).

The impact of the grid format on the evolution of Chinese cartography is an academically contested subject. Elman argues that after Pei’s introduction of a scientific method of mapping, “cartography in China was often [with notable
exceptions] based on the grid tradition” (2005: 123; 2007: 31). Yee argues, however, that there was “little interest in developing quantitative technique further, after the twelfth century” (2008: 1287). These seemingly diametrically opposed views stem from the fact that only a small number of maps of the period before the arrival of the Jesuits in the late 16th century have survived. The most famous among the still existing grid maps is Luo Hongxian’s *guang yu tu* (Enlargement of the Terrestrial atlas, ca. 1555\(^{17}\)) (Figure 4) which finds its origins in Zhi Siben’s no longer extant *Yu Tu* (Terrestrial atlas, ca. 1320). The *guang yu tu* was published a few decades before Matteo Ricci’s arrival in China. The fact that the scale of map such as this one is (by far) not as precise as that of the *Yu Ji Tu* map, the grid increment varies somewhere between 40 to 500 li (Needham 2008 [1954]-b), forms one of the reasons for Yee (1994c) to argue that scientific spatial approximations were not necessarily a priority for Chinese cartographers. His analysis, which hypothesises that Chinese maps were non-mathematical and often an extension of artistic expression, seems instead to dangerously depoliticise the development of Chinese cartography.

Yee’s static understanding of what he thinks constitutes cartography leads him to several untenable views and statements. “Chinese mapmaking was resistant to the idea that space should be homogenised to aid quantification” (Yee 1994b: 228); “[a] Western model of scientific cartography”\(^{18}\) (1994c: 65); “Chinese cartography…[did not] became a ‘science’ in the Western sense of the word” (Yee 1994e: 170); “the distinction between word and visual image, so strong in the Western [cartographic and the arts] tradition, is not nearly as sharp in China” (Yee 1994a: 128). Elsewhere Yee reifies Chinese maps to a great extent and notes that “it is hard to speak of Chinese cartography as becoming more scientific in the Western sense when [i.e. during the Qing dynasty] maps still had religious and magical functions” (Yee 1994e: 191). The
problems with such assertions are manifold and we only have time and space here to shortly tackle the most urgent and relevant ones. First, the imagined scientific quantitative unity in mapmaking, which is supposedly characteristic of a ‘Western’ form of cartography, was until the renaissance largely absent. Second, the idea of a ‘Western’ unity demands answers as to whom the geographical connotation ‘Western’ refers to. Third and most important for this discussion is Yee’s reification of Chinese maps to a ‘museumified’ status, detached from the political reality of its time.

Figure 3-4: Guang yutu atlas

General map of China from the 1555 edition of the Guang yutu atlas (Fuchs 1946)

The argument that cartographic representations of national territories predominantly served as mere pictorial imagery, something which Yee at times seems to suggest, unnecessarily disengages the representation of space from its underlying political purpose. Maps are inextricably connected to the territory. They represent a particularly rich political worldview in which identities are imagined anew and
subsequently rooted and fixed to a particular space. What these early cartographic experiences teach us is that although Chinese scholars were technically able to chart accurately topographical locations, the political situation did not encourage such developments to progress to more ‘advanced’ levels. The situation in which a social-spatial transformation could occur had to wait until the political situation required such a development to take place. In other words, despite the technological advanced state of Chinese cartography, older models of hierarchical, universalistic representations of space seemed to have better served political purposes. This was to change significantly during the colonial endeavours of the Qing dynasty\textsuperscript{20}. The next section will show how and in what ways modern knowledge was deployed in pursuit of a new governmentality.

\textit{Early Modern Knowledge}

Analysing the development of representations of territorial China is crucial for understanding how early scientific forms of spatial organisation came to inform, constitute and legitimise new political identities. In the sections after this one, I will show how the timely arrival and skilful introduction of Jesuit cartographic and geographic knowledge in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and the 18\textsuperscript{th} century technically helped Qing rulers to embark on a modern form of politics. I think that it would be incorrect, however, to understand Qing modernity solely through a Eurocentric lens. It would equally be mistaken to discuss the rise of modern China as an experience isolated from developments elsewhere. An analysis of the introduction of modernity deserves also to be placed outside the context of geographically fixed containers. The spatial container is, after all, as discussed earlier, itself the instrument and product of modernity. I propose, therefore, to conceptualise modernity in China as the result of a new way of thinking about the relationship between space and politics. This relationship was as
much the result of outside forces, as it was the consequence of already existing, domestic knowledge.

The impetus that gave rise to a modern form of knowledge on space is, I believe, to be at least threefold. The first factor is geopolitical and contextual in nature. It is important to analyse Qing’s territorial growth in a global context of imperial expansion. The second, albeit related, factor can be traced back to the Qing’s state building and colonial project. The Qing actively supported the emergence of a modern form of knowledge. The third and interrelated reason for the rise of modern knowledge in China has a lot to do with the non-Han Chinese origins of the Qing rulers. I will use most of the space here to discuss the first and second factors. The third reason will be explored in detail towards the end of this section.

Let us start with the first factor. The “seventeenth and eighteenth centuries comprise the great epoch of enclosure” (Maier 2000: 817). The territorialisation of the globe was made possible by the introduction of modern knowledge on homogenous space and time. Most of the literature on colonialism has thus far focused on Western experiences. Little attention has, however, been granted to experiences elsewhere. The Qing actively pursued a colonial project to both expand the Chinese Empire and to securitise its borders. It was around the same time that China established its contemporary modern frontiers and built the foundations of its modern ‘geobody’ (Winichakul 1997). The Qing Empire controlled at its height “a land area of over 11 million square kilometres, larger than all of Europe to the Urals, and its population of about 300 million in 1800 was approximately the same as Europe’s.” (Perdue 2005: 524). These achievements would have been impossible without the installation of a new form of knowledge. It allowed the Qing rulers to more effectively govern
territories and the people therein. How this was achieved ethnographically and cartographically will be discussed in the next sections.

The second factor is for this dissertation perhaps the most relevant. Knowledge of space to build a modern nation state was not merely passively adapted from foreign sources. There existed prior to the arrival of the Jesuits, in fact, a rich historical tradition of thinking about the meaning and origin of things. Elman (2005) translates this intellectual development as ‘Evidential Learning/ Research’ (kaozheng or 考證) and dates its beginnings back to the late 17th century. The debate was, however, the result of a much older debate between Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) concept of gewu zhizhi or gezhi (‘investigating things and extending knowledge’) and Wang Yangming’s morally inclined notion of liangzhi (‘knowledge of the self’). A thorough analysis of the differences between these two strands of thought falls unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis. It is, however, important to show how the more materialist tradition of enquiry became more dominant than the moralism of the latter. ‘Evidential Learning’ strongly influenced the relationship between science and politics in China.

The rise of a material worldview and philosophy “made verification a central concern for the emerging empirical theory of knowledge” (Elman 2002: 225; Elman 2005: 191), and gradually positioned mathematics, geography and astronomy at the centre of Chinese learning. This development eventually came to challenge traditional organisations and representations of space. Elman notes for example that “[s]cholars who used empirical methods in their geographical research during the late Ming-Qing period rejected the symbolic geography in cosmograms and magic squares” (Elman 2005: 197; Elman 2007: 44). Elman continues and argues that “[t]he leading Qing literati-scholars turned historical [and descriptive] geography into a precise field of evidential enquiry. Place-names were historicised as a sign of their time and
specific location” (Elman 2005: 198; Elman 2007: 44). Space was, in other words, gradually organised and partitioned on the basis of a taxonomic order. The compatibility of evidential leaning with renaissance *scientia* was later utilised by the Jesuits to form a theoretical and theological bridge between the two metaphysical lines of enquiry.24

The departure from earlier modes of representations of space was brought to full speed as a result of the Qing’s state building and colonial projects. The Qing, it bears remembering, was a non-Han Chinese Empire which, therefore, could not adhere to the principles set out in the earlier discussed diagrams that were inspired by a Confucian worldview. The Empire’s particular form of legitimacy instead focused on a new governmentality in which “concerns relating to territorial location and to administrative jurisdiction [were central]” (Hostetler 2000: 649). Qing colonialism rested on the successful integration of a form of knowledge which, with great care, taxonomically classified hundreds of cultures and ethnicities within the empire without privileging one group over another. These ethnic identities were, however, most of the time not self-assumed, but often skilfully constructed and imposed. Orientalism was, therefore, not unique to the European colonial enterprise but a mode of perception which also took place within the ‘Orient’ itself.25 The transformation to a new conceptualisation of space translated itself, therefore, both cartographically, but also ethnographically. The transition to modern knowledge of space had, in other words, a strong impact on the Qing’s identity politics.

The rise of modern knowledge had a profound impact on the way in which the Chinese state governed society. I will first show how the introduction of ethnography inspired the Qing’s ‘art of government’. The use of cartography will be discussed in
later sections. Cartography and ethnography were, however, not the only means through which modern knowledge on space was utilised.

The introduction of modern demographics played, for example, an important role in the so-called Eight Banner system (*baqi zhidu*). The characteristically Qing system was a state imposed social and military classification that had its origins in the early stages of the Manchu conquest of the Ming. It would later allow Qing rulers to fix different ethnic groupings to specific spatial locations and consequentially help the Empire to strengthen militarily the collective unity of the state.

The *baojia* household registration system, which originated from the Song dynasty, but considerably expanded during the Qing period, similarly aided the Qing to control the mobility of the (mainly rural) population. The administrative system, which came to be reemployed in the post-1911 period, effectively “tagged all villagers with their place of residence in an attempt to make them collectively responsible for one another’s crimes and tax payments” (Perdue 2005: 411). The *baojia* system functioned, in other words, as a spatial-political instrument of power to help local governments to better police the mainly rural population. The system (now as ‘household registration permit’ (*hukou*)) remains, as we will see in the later chapters, to be an important spatial instrument for the governance and policing of contemporary China. Many of these spatial ‘techniques of power’ are, in fact, still in use in contemporary China. Ethnographic representations and classifications, one of the techniques used of the Mao and post-Mao regime, similarly find their roots in Qing China (see especially Mullaney 2011).

Hostetler’s investigation of the ethnographic description of the Miao albums during the mid-Qing period shows, for instance, that there was an increasing trend “to better understand, to more thoroughly identify and to better anticipate the natures and
customs [of peoples in the south-western located territories] for administrative purposes.” (2000: 644; 2001: 209). The prominent employment of maps in such records, in which people became gradually more geographically bound to fixed locations on maps, allowed the Qing Emperors to gain access to vital strategic information for the strengthening of its control over territory and the people in it.

The ethnographic development of ever more accurate representations of people, also observable in the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* (‘Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples’), and the increasing need to gain more knowledge of things and people ‘in space’ were “part of a much more widespread process of state building in that period” (Deal and Hostetler 2006: XXIII). Hostetler notes that the singling out on the basis of ethnographic differences instrumentally constructed a notion of a collective (and multi-ethnic) ‘we’ that later “came to constitute the multi-ethnic nature of the Qing dynasty and later the People’s Republic of China” (Hostetler 2001: 179).

Teng (1999; 2004), whose analysis investigates the Qing incorporation of Taiwan into China, comes to similar conclusions. She describes the growing popularity among Qing ethnographers to employ different classifications to describe Taiwan’s indigenes. These categories consisted of ‘raw’ or ‘unfamiliar’ ‘savages’ (*shengfan*) and ‘cooked’ or ‘familiar’ ‘savages’ (*shufan*). The latter marked a group that had submitted to Qing rule, while the former were considered to be raw, uncultivated or perhaps better ‘stateless’. The process of incorporation of raw savages was legitimised either through a ‘rhetoric of privation’ in which the savages were being depicted as culturally inferior or through a ‘rhetoric of primitivism’. By the latter Teng refers to the idea that savages “were romanticised as the preserver[s] of an ancient righteousness lost among the moderns” (1999: 448; 2004: 62)\(^{29}\). This ethnographic classification, a process which Schein (in Ong 1997: 334) conceptually
identifies as ‘internal orientalism’, eventually became institutionalised and territorially demarcated in 1722 in the creation of the so-called ‘savage boundary’ (shengfan jie) (Teng 2004; Chang 2008). This temporal-spatial divide, between the mountainous underdeveloped savages and the more advanced indigenes living in the plains, helped assimilate ‘cooked savages’ into state subjects and excluded those behind the border from statehood30.

The construction and consequential incorporation of ethic and cultural differences into a single coherent unity, now known as ‘China’, was a process that begun during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor (ruled from 1661-1722). It was, in other words, an attempt to forge a sense of national belonging by bringing together the new colonies with their diverse traditions, ethnicities and languages into a coherent national unit under Qing rulership. The same strategy has ever since remained paramount for the consolidation and strengthening of the Chinese nation state. This modern form of governance formed, as we have seen, a radical departing from earlier worldviews. Previous, universalistic worldviews were grounded, as seen earlier, in a clear separation between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘barbarians’. The Qing spurred a development of allowing non-Han Chinese that were previously thought to be outside the empire to become an integral and equal part of the empire. This allowed the Qing, non-Han themselves, to expand their empire to a historically unprecedented territorial scale. The idea that morality or good rule was now less dependent on a radical culturally inclined interior/exterior dichotomy formed, in other words, the bedrock on which sovereign rule became synonymous with territorial governance.

The colonisation of new lands and peoples through the means of ethnographic taxonomy, population registers (baojia) and other techniques of policing and control was made possible through the emergence and deployment of a modern empirical
epistemology. Many of the colonial techniques used by the Qing Empire have remained popular devices by the Chinese state long after the dissolution of the Empire. The use of cartography, discussed in more detail below, is one of particular importance here given that modern maps are characterised by claims to state sovereignty. Modern maps based on methods of triangulation were drawn to engender the Chinese territory and used to introduce the empire’s first modern sovereign borders. The territorial legitimacy and territorial sovereignty of the later ROC and the contemporary People Republic of China’s (RPC) rely, therefore, in essence on the Qing’s earlier colonial enterprise. The next section will explore in greater detail how modern science in maps helped establish the early territorial contours of the abstract Chinese nation state.

**Early Modernity and Jesuit Cartography**

The idea of early modern nationhood is also visible in the importance that the Qing granted to accurate depictions of its state’s territorial frontiers. The importance of territorial mappings was a practise that in Europe culminated in the Westphalia Treaty and eventually gave rise to the giant cartographic projects of Louis XIV and the Russian Romanovs (e.g. Konvitz 1987; Petto 2006; Petto 2009). The evolution of Chinese mapping during the Qing should, therefore, be placed in an early global context which saw the emergence of a new, modern way of thinking about the relationship between politics and space. The early ‘territorialisation of the globe’ led and was made possible through a process of homogenisation and standardisation of measurements of space. Governance became, as described in the last chapters, a ‘calculative’ exercise in which land was effectively distributed, ordered, measured and demarcated on the principles of a modern form of governmentality.
The advent of such modern mapping techniques should be seen in light of a gradual and global process of encroaching in and enclosing of formerly autonomous places in the 17\textsuperscript{th} and 18\textsuperscript{th} century that had the effect and purpose of neutralising and standardising the original heterogeneity of places into what Maier (2000) calls a collective ‘identity space’. The modern process of colonising space into an abstraction of a spatially bordered national unity has theoretically already been discussed in the previous chapter and, to a modest degree, ethnographically in the last section. The “invention of the frontier” (Foucher in Maier 2000) for the formation and unity of the Chinese nation state is, however, perhaps most visible on the map itself.

The famous ‘Kangxi Atlas’ (\textit{huangyu quanlan tu}) (Figure 5 and 6) is an excellent example of the early Qing ruler’s desire to similarly officially formalise its territorial space on an unprecedented scale. French Jesuits were responsible for the surveying and mapping of China’s expanding territory between 1707 and 1717. They conducted this project on the basis of land surveys and existing local and foreign (primarily Russian and Mongolian) sources. The extraordinary scale of this enterprise was parallel to its unprecedented scientific achievement. It was the “world’s first systematic application of a trigonometric survey… to an entire state” (Foss in Millward 1999: 72). The Kangxi Atlas was also “until the early twentieth century, the basis for almost all later Western maps of China.” (Elliott 2000: 621). Its scientific sophistication was admired by both Europe’s intellectual elites and its courts. The maps incorporated the territorial consequences of the Nerchinsk Treaty of 1689, the relevance of which is discussed in greater detail below, and allowed Qing rulers for the first time to identify and formally integrate their original northern-eastern homelands into a unified territorial state.
Figure 3-5: Kangxi huang yu quan lan tu

‘Atlas of the Empire of the Kangxi Era’ (1943[1721]) (Library of Congress (G7820.L8) in Li Xiaocong (2004: 12-13), see also Li Xiaocong (Li 1996: 160-167) for locations in Europe of other versions and see also Walter Fuchs (1943, location: British Library: Maps 37.e.28) for useful reproductions of the first 1717 map. Finally, see the British Library for Matteo Ripa’s splendid 1719 version of the map32.
The impact of the Kangxi Atlas has for a long time been downplayed by Yee (1994e) among others (e.g. Smith 1996) partly for the reason that the map was not widely distributed among the general population. The supposedly marginal effect it had on successive cartographic practises in China is often used as another argument to disengage the atlas from the wider political context of the 17th and 18th century. I feel that the depoliticising sentiments embedded in such interpretations are in many ways problematic. The atlas and its reproductions in the gazetteers and encyclopaedias that followed (the *Da Qing yitong zhi* (1746) and the *Da Qing Huidian* (1684, 1732, 1764)) had, in fact, a dramatic effect on the formation of the early Chinese nation state\textsuperscript{33}. The atlas maps were the first of their kind to politically facilitate the state’s legitimacy over
its entire national territory and population. The maps also helped to formalise the
Treaties of Nerchinsk (1689) and Kiakhta (1727) and divided the previously
ambiguous territories between the Russian and Chinese empires. It also and
simultaneously enabled and legitimised the suppression of the autonomous Zungar in
Mongolia and Tibet.

The marginalisation of the atlas undermines, in other words, its importance for
understanding the historical context. Perdue writes that “[t]he compilation of the
[Kangxi] atlas was one component of a broader project to systematise and rationalise
the ruler’s knowledge of space and time. An edict of 1713, for example, ordered the
synchronization of the calendar, regulating times of sunrise and sunset and the twenty-
four hours of the day in the Khorchin region of Mongolia, based on the Jesuits’ new
measurement techniques” (Perdue 2005: 449). The Qing actively used modern
representations of time and space to create and enforce a new, national subjectivity.

The triumphing of modern space (and time) over alternative spatialities and
temporalities is also visible in the series of maps were ordered by the Qianlong
emperor (ruled from 1735-1796). This collection of maps, which is better known
under its common name as the ‘Qianlong atlas’ (Qianlong shisanpai tongban ditu)\(^{34}\)
(Figure 7), was meant to better chart the newly conquered areas (Xinjiang, Tibet and
Qinghai) that were at that moment militarily brought under control or in the process of
being of being so\(^{35}\). Millward (1999: 76) notes that “Qing expansion to the northwest
parallels European state-building and expansionism in its concern with measurement
and the ‘scientific’ gathering of geographic and ethnographic data to undergird
national and imperial control”. Shortly after the publication of these works, Xinjiang
became officially integrated as a full-fledged province in China. Waley-Cohen notes
that the Jesuit work “was almost certainly the basis for maps that appeared in
published gazetteers of Xinjiang from the 1770s on and in works on Tibet of the same period” (2000: 114).

![Figure 3-7: Qianlong nei fu yu tu](image)

Photographic fragment of a reproduced (copperplate) version of the 1775 Qianlong nei fu yu tu (‘Complete map of the Qianlong Er'a). Shown is the border region around Tengri in Tibet (1932 [1775] British Library, location: Maps 27.c.24). See also the rediscovered original 4 rolls of the map in the BL (location: Tab.1.b.(1-4) (1775)).

The accurate mapping and representation of territories and borders served, in other words, several purposes. First, it protected state sovereignty along its territorial borders against those outside its frontiers. The naming of frontier cities in maps, in both Manchu and Chinese (to strengthen a Manchu sense of identity and enhance Qing legitimacy), also helped to geopolitically demarcate Qing territory. The second function of maps, especially true for the maps made during the Qianlong rule, was the need to better understand and control the newly colonised regions in the northwest. Millward (1999: 76) notes for examples that through “the production and collection of geographical knowledge about Altishahr and Zungharia, they [i.e. Qing rulers] asserted that the newly conquered territory was a part of the Qing realm.” Such scientific endeavours were often conducted through Evidential Learning scholars who
historically rectified (and consequentially nationalised) place names and their histories in local gazetteers and maps (see Newby 1996; Millward 1999)\textsuperscript{37}.

The third objective of the maps, which overarches the earlier two purposes, is that of the creation of an abstract national unity and identity. The cartographic endeavours not merely served to demarcate the extent of the empire, but similarly as in 18\textsuperscript{th} century Europe, also formed the basis for China’s geobody. This mode of territoriality resolves, according to Winichakul (1997: 16), around “three basic human behaviors: a form of classification by area, a form of communication by boundary, and an attempt at enforcing”. These modes of behaviour do not exclude each other, but are actually interdependent and mutually reinforcing in establishing a national sense of identity. The modern representation of space (and time) allowed, as we have seen in the last two chapters, for the emergence of the nation state. I have in this chapter thus far attempted to show that this was not an experience unique to Europe. Experiences in China seem to suggest a similar mode of development. Analyses of the formation of the sovereign territorial state would therefore perhaps benefit from a more global approach. The next section will, therefore, attempt to further contextualise experiences in China in light of its exposure to experiences and developments elsewhere.

\textit{Global Modernity in China}

The possibility that the onset of modernity was geographically not confined to Europe alone has only recently started to be entertained. Modernity is in this thesis argued to be the triumph of a homogenous understanding of space (and time) over the heterogeneous concept of place. This means that I have followed the position taken by Heidegger (1976; 1977) in arguing that modernity is the basic process from which the world is transformed into an abstract picture. It is, therefore, important to understand how a particular form of knowledge on space (and time) came to be employed on a
global scale. Hostetler (2000: 627) argues that there exist strong “parallels between the Qing's relationship to its internal frontier and how European powers were relating to their own internal, as well as colonial, territories.” The importance that the Qing attached to national unity in the face of outside threats is visible in the writings of Kangxi (recorded by the Jesuit Antoine Gaubil, who served the Beijing court from 1722 to 1759). He describes in the following his awareness and anxiety for other empires.

The Oross [Russians], Hong mao [Dutch] Fou lan ki [Portuguese], like other Europeans can accomplish anything they undertake, no matter how difficult the task, they are brave, skilled, and find a benefit in anything [profitent de tout]. As long as I reign there is nothing to fear from them for China; I treat them well, they love me and appreciate me, and attempt to make me happy. … [B]ut if our government [were to] become weak… if there would arise division among [us],… if the Tartars Eleuthes [Eleuths] our enemies... [were to from an allegiance with] the Tartars Syhay ([of the] Kokonor country), the Mongou [Mongols] and the Calca [Oirats] which are our tributaries, what would become of our empire? The Oross [Russians] in the north, the Fou lan ki [the Portuguese] to the east of Luzon, the Hong mao [Dutch] in south China could do whatever they want [with our country] (Kangxi in Gaubil 1970: 711, own translation)38

It is clear from such geopolitical anxieties that maps and other spatial-political practises should be seen in light of a more global transition towards modernity. This early globalising form of state formation is historically parallel to and influenced by modern maritime trade networks which spanned across the Eurasian continent and
incorporated the Americas. The unification of territorial China and the harmonisation of differences for the sake of nation state formation are, in other words, synchronous to developments that are linked to a much broader political economy outside the country’s newly demarcated frontiers. This reconceptualising of history provides us with the chance to question the all-too-comfortable ideal of dynastic cycles or the embedded cultural ritualism and essentialism that seem so rigidly rooted in China studies. Engaging with China from a historical and global starting point also frees us from the academic traditions that adhere to the idea of a dominant Western form of modernity that, after the Industrial Revolution, was simply imposed onto China. A global approach ultimately “allows us to identify the source of modern China’s geographical self-perception in the boundary shifting that took place under the aegis of the Qing enterprise” (Elliott 2000: 637).

The deconstruction and detaching of modern China from older theoretical and historical paradigms opens the path to generalise modernity on the basis of a shifting reorientation in the representation, production and experience of space. The standardisation of territorial space and the production of abstract geographic imaginations, which came to constitute the nation state, are the defining characteristics of a modernity that produces uniform spaces rather than being the geographical product of them. This is often said to have characterised the Westphalian Peace Treaties. I have already shown in the last chapter how accepting the myth of 1648 carries certain risks. Most of the critique has questioned the historical relevance of the two treaties. The geographical origins of the concept of the modern state have subsequently firmly remained rooted in the European experience. This seems unreasonable given the historical relevance of similar treaties elsewhere. What about,
for example, the treaty of Nerchinsk that similarly was based on both the recognition of equality among powers and territorial sovereignty?

The Nerchinsk Treaty⁴⁰ (and the subsequent Kiakta Treaty of 1727) between the Chinese and the Russian Empires is based on the premise of territorial integrity and sovereign equality, which are the two notions said to have distinguished the Westphalian peace treaties. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was written in 5 different languages (Manchu, Latin, Chinese, Russian and Mongolian) and remains until today the historical basis for the geopolitical bordering between the Chinese and Russian state. The Nerchinsk and Kiakta Treaties, Perdue (2005: 523) writes, made “possible the closure of the steppe” and played a crucial role in the later elimination of the Qing’s northern ‘nomadic rivals’ which eventually helped the Qing to establish “the largest empire in Chinese history.”

The fact that the Russians and the Chinese endorsed the principles of the ‘law of nations’ (droit des gens), which lay at the foundation of the treaty, is illustrative of the general withdrawal of ethnocentrism as a basis of statecraft. The Treaty is by some (e.g. Perdue 2005: 161-173; Perdue 2010b) considered to be an example of China’s territorial sovereignty before the Macartney mission (1792 to 1794) and the subsequent Opium Wars (1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860). Zhao (2006b: 8, original emphasis) notes how the Qing in the Treaty’s text “was clearly equated with [a territorial] China”. People on one side of the border were after the signing of the Treaty now considered to be Chinese, while those on the other side of the border were labelled Russians⁴¹.

The settling of the border with the Russian Empire helped the Qing Emperors subsequently to turn their attention to the conquest of the territory that became known as Xinjiang (which translates as ‘New Frontier’ or ‘New Domain’). The conquest of
the region and the violent annihilation of the local rulers, primarily Zunghar Mongolians, in the 1750s meant that the previously amorphous *terra incognita* became a mapped and ‘inalienable part of China’. Millward (1999) shows how scientific mapping of the territory and ethnographic studies of the indigenous populations became a priority of the Qing in their conquest of the region. The resultant and earlier discussed ‘Qianlong Atlas’ harbored similarly as in the French and Russian cartographic experiences “a vision for… a systematic survey and map of … the Qing monarchs’ realm” (Millward 1999: 72).

The careful integration of territories into a constructed unified whole anticipated the arrival of a national consciousness which makes the experience in China little different from the experiences of and in most other countries. I believe that China is for that reason not a civilisation, as many continue to argue, but the result of a territorial colonial conquest that brought with it a national project. This section has shown how Chinese became a territorialised state. This development cannot, I think, be separated from developments elsewhere. The 17th and 18th century brought with it a revolution of novel and rediscovered ideas and forms of knowledge. In what follows, I will show how these ideas translated architecturally. The Qing rulers, who felt compelled to look for other forms of governance, warmly welcomed the arrival of these ideas. The onset of modern governance was, however, not merely a process of importation of new ideas. Homogenous representations of space are not Western or Chinese; they are instead, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the product of a particular historical and political context. The introduction of modernity was, as I have argued, much more global in scale. We need, as Hostetler (2001: 2) argues, “to see the Qing during this period [between 17th and 18th centuries] as part of, rather than isolated from, the early modern world.” The next section will analyse how architectural spaces
of representation or lived space similarly were used to crystallise a new national identity. I will pay special attention to the imperial ‘Lofty Pavilion Palace’ (yuan ming yuan, completed in 1744) and the Qing Summer Palace (bishu shanzhuang, built between 1703 and 1792).

The establishing and cementing of the territorial contours of the modern Chinese nation have over the course of history helped to constitute and strengthen the foundation of an imagined collective identity that is vested in the emotional belonging to the abstract nation state (zhongguo). This sentiment came to greater fruition in the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries which saw the arrival of the appropriation of a national form of architecture that still dominates Chinese identity until today.

Global Architecture in the Qing

The integration of foreign architectures into the Chinese landscape, as happened as a result of the later discussed Treaty Ports, was by all means not a historically unprecedented phenomenon. The Qing’s adaptive and accommodative approach to architecture was, for example, symbolised in the yuan ming yuan (圆明园 or ‘Lofty Pavilion Palace’). Imperial architecture was used as a spatial means to underline and strengthen the modern state’s earlier discussed territorial unity. The pastiche of architectural styles from around the country translated into an early national form of expression. It was equalled in diversity by the Qing’s impressive display and mastery of foreign styles that illustrated the global extent of its influence. George Kates, an American who lived in Beijing during the 1930s, describes his astonishment after visiting the Lofty Pavilion Palace in Beijing’s north-western suburb.

In all history of the transfer of architectural styles I had never come across any more intriguing singularity than this experiment in
'Européerie’... which here in the tranquil countryside beyond Peking constituted an eighteenth-century Chinese counterpart to the Chinoiserie at this very time flourishing exuberantly in all the courts of Europe (Kates 1952: 198)

Figure 3-8: Yuanming Yuan

Bird’s eye view of the Yuanming Yuan in its heyday, facing south (from the Yuanming Yuan Guanli chu in Wong 2001)

The yuan ming yuan, which served besides its function as the favourite residence of the Qianlong emperor also as a manufacturing site for clock and glassmaking in the 18th century, represented an important spatial metaphor for Qing universal imperialism. The gardens hosted numerous reproductions of famous buildings from across the country and were additionally home to several European inspired rococo baroque and renaissance palatial buildings (Xiyang Lou). Elman (2008: 74, 75) describes the complex as being representative of an “eclectic architectural style that the Manchu court favored as part of their efforts to create a universal vision of their power in Asia and beyond.” Waley-Cohen (2006: 127, fn. 6) similarly described the gardens as “a kind of theme park of possession or domination”, and raises the question as to what the extent bourbon Versailles might have influenced the
construction of the gardens. The yuan ming yuan gardens were, in other words, constructed with the intent of representing and symbolising the extent and widespread influence of the Qing Empire in a miniature form.

The reproduction of buildings and architectural styles was not limited to the yuan ming yuan, but is also characteristic of the Qing’s ‘Summer Palace’ (bishu shanzhuang) in Chengde. Here several southern influenced pagodas and numerous Tibetan Buddhist temples and even regional landscapes were constructed, most of which were directly influenced by places from across the newly conquered territories, to display the grandeur, legitimacy and territorial magnitude of the Qing court. The choice for the location of Chengde, on the northern fringes (and thus outside the Great Wall) of the Qing Empire (bordering Manchuria and Mongolia), was similarly a carefully weighted political decision. The location posed a radical break from earlier Chinese traditions that had placed capitals in more centrally located sites. Forêt explains the decision as being an integral part of the “urban fulfillment of the ‘Great Enterprise’ that aimed at establishing the legitimacy of Manchu power in East and Central Asia” (1995: 327; 2000: 18). It is no wonder, then, that the politics underlying the production of such spaces have been compared, and are even historically interconnected, to that of the palaces of Versailles in France.

The fact that the politics of such complexes were global rather than local is underwritten by Thomas (2009: 116, 117), who notes that France’s involvement in the project was one of the country’s “biggest encounters with non-Western civilisations before its military interventions in Egypt and Algeria following the revolution”. The yuan ming yuan, the bishu shanzhuang and the palaces in Versailles all embodied the legitimacy of the new modern rulers and provided a substantial break with past forms of architectural centralisations of power. The later demise of both the French and
Chinese palaces, which occurred almost concurrently, symbolises the success and completion of the political modernisation projects they had launched themselves.

The experiences of the yuan ming yuan and the bishu shanzhuang provide us telling examples of the way in which the productions and reproduction of space have contributed to the establishment of a modern Chinese state. The gardens performed a constitutive symbol for the central sovereignty of the Qing and its expansive spheres of global influence. They were then (and are still today) used as a space of representation to help construct a form of legitimacy. That legitimacy became after the Opium Wars, as we will see later, translated in a reinterpreted idea of national tragedy.

The park is today part of a large attraction park where the wounds of yesterday are consumed in joyful fashion. The paradox of this is, of course, that the temporality of modernity is not teleological. Both history and geography, the domains responsible for the spaces and times of representation, are politically malleable according to the political interests of the modern state. This has a direct impact on the lived dimension of everyday space and time. “The spaces and times of representation that envelop and surround us as we go about our daily lives… affect both our direct experiences and the way we interpret and understand representations.” (Harvey 2004: 8).

The gradual unfolding of modernity as a picture, which is an process that is directly linked to the gradual depoliticisation and internalisation of its spatial products, concepts and metaphors (e.g. the nation, the citizen, national cultures etc.), rests on the successful concretisation of the state. I have earlier shown how this was achieved through the integration of a particular modern understanding of space. I have in this section started to uncover how spaces and times of representations have allowed for the gradual coming into existence of a particular national consciousness. The appropriation of place is, therefore, not only realised through the one-dimensional lens.
of *conceived* space, but also by the particular way places come to be *perceived* as belonging to the state. All places, as the sites of possibility and difference, risk being absorbed by the state. Strangers become, as Anderson (2006a) argues citizens, but places similarly become parts of the singular state space. A collective whole is produced, as everyday life and everyday space become nationalised, for the endless purpose of concretising the territorial abstraction of the state. This was a process that started at least 250 years earlier than conventional academic accounts on China’s modernity claim. The next section will start by refuting the claim that China only became modern after Western colonialism. The section will then show how spaces and times of representations and representations of time and space contributed to the further embedding of the geographic imagination of the state.

**Modern China**

**Introduction**

The territorial contours and unity of the Chinese geobody were seriously put to the test as a result of the two Opium Wars (1839-1842/ 1856-1860), the Sino-French War (1883-1885), the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1995) and the numerous rebellions and domestic wars that arose throughout the 19th century. The sovereign territory of the Qing was despite these incidents, unlike the fragmentations of other contemporaneous empires (e.g. Ottoman, the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the French Bourbon), still largely intact when it transformed into a republic in 1912 (Figures 8 and 9). The resilience and strength of China’s territorial contours and social-political integrity are testimony to the success of the modern formation of the state that had commenced under the Qing some 250 years earlier. It should bring pause to the still very popular idea that China was the ‘sick man of East Asia’ (*dongya bingfa*)\(^{47}\), or that it was a “corpse ready to be dismembered” (Paul Claudel, VC in
The belief that China’s national geobody was deeply sick proved to be a very effective nationalist discourse and was utilised by respectively the nationalists, communists and the contemporary regime. The belief that China was somehow backward before the Macartney Mission continues to be reiterated in academic discussions over the founding of modernity in China, but also in nationalist discourses over China’s ‘century of humiliation’ (bainian guochi). Such accounts either disregard or (intentionally) neglect that Qing China had been and was at the time itself a (highly successful) colonial modern state.

If anything, the experience of Qing colonialism in, for example, Taiwan (kaishan fufan or ‘opening the Mountains and Pacifying the Savages’) should have taught us that the Qing state was still an active and “energetic [participant] in the late nineteenth-century global scramble for colonies” (Vickers 2008: 77).

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Figure 3-9: The General Map of the Qing Dynasty

The General Map of the Qing Dynasty Period in 1820 (Tan 1996)
The view that China became only modern and sovereign after the Opium Wars and the establishment of the ROC in 1912 is academically not only questionable, but is politically also opportunistic. The Opium Wars would have been difficult to justify, if China would retrospectively already have been sovereign in the 19th century. The historical significance of the century of humiliation (bainian guochi), caused by the destruction of the yuan ming yuan gardens, the British occupation of Hong Kong and the forced entry of Western forces in the two Opium Wars, were not so much tragedies of human proportions. They were (or are) instead violent infringements upon the sovereignty of an early modern and territorially integrated nation state. Taking modernity seriously, and thus outside the conventional teleological ‘modern-pre-modern’ discourse, compels us to reconsider and scrutinise what has for long been considered as the defining historical moment for the onset of Chinese modernity. The Macartney Mission (1792-1794) has long been characterised as the confrontation on the basis of a divide between ‘modernity and traditionalism’. This widely accepted and unproblematically taken for granted view has ever since the event dictated and
informed the dominant Chinese and foreign discourse on the development of modern China. The following subsection will refute the claim that China was not modern at the time of the Macartney Mission. A revision of the Mission and the subsequent Opium Wars will help to strengthen my earlier posited argument that China’s modernity cannot be fixed to a teleological moment in history.

Macartney and the Qianlong: Agents of Imperialism

The preceding sections have demonstrated that China was at the time of the Macartney Mission neither the enigmatic, nor the backward civilisation many people continue to think it was. It also did not adhere stubbornly (or ‘wrongly’) to a so-called static system of ‘tributary customs’. China did neither suffer from cultural isolationism. It was instead a dynamic territorial state that for centuries already was a part of a strongly interconnected world economy (see e.g. Frank 1998; Zhao 2013). The infamous koutou (‘kowtow’) controversy have together with the Qianlong’s infamous letter to King George III played a central role in the academic and popular essentialising of China (Fairbank and Teng 1941; Fairbank 1942 among others). The transformation of the country from being Botero’s source of inspiration to a feudal backwater has also helped to reaffirm the view of teleologically more advanced (and thus a superior) West against a primitive and backward China (see e.g. Landes 2006).

The acceptance of such a teleological understanding of modernity has recently, on its own terms, been scrutinised in the works of Waley-Cohen (1993), Hevia (2002) among others (e.g. Perdue 2010a). Waley-Cohen refutes the idea of a naïve Qing China and convincingly shows that the Qianlong Emperor was well-informed about the fact that the Macartney represented a sovereign and territorially expanding empire. Hevia (2002) has, in turn, at great length elaborated on the infamous confrontation of 1793 and refutes the long enduring myth that the confrontation was based on a
supposedly realist Western modernity and a mythical Chinese traditionalism. His analysis and that of Waley-Cohen (1993) both argue that the confrontation was essentially one between two expansive, early modern empires. Purdue (2010a)\textsuperscript{53} similarly counters the troubled view of a static, depoliticised understanding of Chinese ritualism and sees in the Macartney Mission similar patterns as in earlier bilateral treaties with China’s Russian and Kazakh neighbours\textsuperscript{54}. Considering the illustrious Macartney Mission as a confrontation between two temporalities (the modern vs. traditional, the coloniser vs. the colonised, the Orient and the Occident etc.) might, in other words, be convenient to form a neat teleological history of development. It ultimately neglects the fact, however, that the conflict of interest was one between two expanding empires. Such dehistoricised understanding also denies the possibility of an on-going modernity project in China and excessively undervalues the importance of relations of power and political interests (while overvaluing and reifying the import of a non-explanatory cultural variable).

**The Opium War**

The changes that occurred in China after the Opium War should similarly to the Macartney Mission not be seen as the wholesale introduction of a form of modernity, but rather as the continuation of the modern processes which were initiated some 200 years earlier. The literature on the treaty ports, in which modernity is often perceived to have been transcended through the spreading of a modern urban everyday life, is vast and broad. Neither time nor space allows us to elaborate in great detail on this point. There is, however, little doubt that the influence of these Treaty Ports helped to shape and internalise a modern consciousness into the everydayness of the Chinese population. The standardisation of time and space, a process which started
during the 17th and 18th century, were through these early settlements imposed upon the lives of those living in the coastal areas.

The extensive spatial reorganisation of Chinese cities resembles the experiences of those that were so characteristic of the modernisation that Haussmann brought about in 19th century Paris. The liberation of spatial mobility, which was seriously prevented in older Chinese cities, was primarily accomplished through the destruction of walls and the infiltration of deregulated capitalism. The possibility for more mobility forcefully changed the face of treaty port cities and allowed for the centralisation of capital in them.

The supposedly harmonious relationship between the city and the rural areas came to be disturbed, while an emergent process of uneven spatial development became apparent in its aftermath. The tendency of international capital to concentrate and accumulate in cities, fuelled by the prospect of lucrative rents, challenged a long surviving ‘urban-rural continuum’ (Mote 1977) and would eventually create the fertile condition for Mao’s revolutionary struggle.

The wild circulation of capitalism and the subsequent changes in the urban landscape have in a lot of the literature been perceived as a direct challenge to a supposedly uniform ‘Chinese identity’. A good example, which illustrates this essentialising of modern cities, is that of the city of Shanghai. Old (and new) Shanghai has in much of the literature been perceived as an entirely, non-Chinese, Western city. The city came to be compared during the late Qing and early republican era with cities as diverse as Baghdad, Paris, New York, Chicago, Liverpool, (the city-state of) Venice and even classical Babylon and Alexandria (Wasserstrom 2007). Shanghai was portrayed to have been everywhere and at any time, but not in China. China was instead considered backward, and hence incapable of being modern.
Shanghai was seen as a novel city and differed fundamentally from the conventional ‘Chinese city’. Even now (and perhaps more than ever before) the city is hailed as a symbol for a new, modern China. What is often forgotten in such accounts is that Shanghai was, in fact, not a new city at the time of its glamour and fame. The city was in the period between 1832 and 1834 (years before the first Opium War) hailed as “one of the leading ports of the world, with a volume of shipping equal to or greater than that of London in the same period” (Murphey in Johnson 1993: 176). The idea that Chinese cities were uniformly similar and thus uniquely ‘Chinese’ is similarly an inherent problematic assertion. The trend of a diversification of cities with different qualities, shapes and functions emerged already in the late Tang period (618-907) and had ever since witnessed a steady development (see for example Skinner 1977, among others). The idea of a distinctive traditional Chinese form and architecture is, as we will see in the forthcoming sections, instead something of modern inventions. The state relies on such spaces and times of representation to legitimise its concrete abstraction.

The myth of novelty, which is historically and conceptually incorrect, seems to stem from the different patterns of production and reproduction of space that came to inform Shanghai and other such treaty port cities. The entry of this modern capitalist production of space, which finds its first embryonic form in the thirteen factories at Whampoa in Canton (Farris 2007), is to a large extent still left unexplored in the literature on modernity in China. These places differed from the, already previously described, early modern sites of the yuanming yuan and bishu shanzhuang in that they challenged the experience of time and space in Chinese everyday life. The challenge was one that based itself on the contradiction between a production of space that found its roots in a more advanced, global form of capitalism versus a production of space
that was still tightly linked to the Qing’s national project of a cosmopolitan territoriality. This was the first, but not the last, time the tension between the rooted state and a global form of capital had come to the fore. The calculable abstract, modern form of space, which in the preceding centuries had territorially shaped and united the country, now came to inform the lives of those that lived in these cities.

**Modern Everyday Life in Shanghai**

Shanghai’s opening to foreign trade, which was contractually agreed on November 17 1843, as a direct consequence of the 1942 Nanking Treaty, paved the foundation from which a modern production of urban space was made possible. The British concession in Shanghai, for which the borders were negotiated on and signed for on November 29 1845 by the British consul (George Balfour) and the local daotei (Gong Mujiu), was succeeded by a French concession in 1849. The original British concession was 138 acres large and occupied an area which ran from Suzhou Creek in the east to the Huangpu River in the south and Defence Creek in north. The area expanded substantially in the period after that.

![Figure 3-11: International Concessions in Shanghai](image-url)
The growth of the International (formerly British) and French concessions in the Treaty Port years (1845/46-1914) (Fairbank 2008)

The first signs of modern urban planning in Shanghai occurred in 1846, as a result of the foundation of the ‘Committee on Roads and Jetties’ (superseded by the ‘Shanghai Municipal Council’ in 185461). The Committee, comprised of foreign land renters, acted to improve the mucky state of the site. The committee was responsible for paving the towing path along the Huangpu River (now commonly known as the Shanghai Bund), several drainage projects and for the straightening out and widening of curvy roads to allow for a better circulation of merchandise from and to the port. This early and seemingly insignificant reproduction of space were the first means to facilitate a more effective form of commercial urban infrastructure and formed the bedrock on which modern Shanghai was established.

The Chinese population in the British concession grew significantly as a result of the Small Swords Uprising (xiao daohui) in the early 1850s and the Taiping Rebellion that lasted from the 1850s to the mid-1860s62. The built environment of the concession witnessed dramatic changes as consequence of the arrival of thousands of refugees that were fleeing the Chinese city. The foreign settlement found itself in distress and space within the area became subsequently scarce and polluted. The influx of refugees was believed to hinder the circulation and growth of commercial activity and trade63. The crisis of space in the concession spurred the construction of so-called lilong houses (里弄) in the 1850s and 1860s.

These early modern dwellings resembled a domesticated variation of the European styled urban row house building of the 17th and 18th centuries. The new form of housing changed the very nature of the foreign concessions, which initially were intended to function as remote trading outposts of foreign imperial powers, and paved the fertile ground for the spreading of a modern, capitalist production of urban space.
and everyday life. The influx of residents and the generally laissez faire attitude of the SMC\textsuperscript{64} led foreign trading companies (such as the Sassoon family, the Jardines and others that used their opium earnings to invest in property) to increase the production of urban space and to boost real estate speculation\textsuperscript{65}. In the early 20th centuries lilong buildings also came to follow “an organisation of dwelling space based on Western rationality and logic, the house was divided in such a way that each room/area became associated with a specific function and activity so that space was thus fixed or solidified” (Zhao 2006a).

Shanghai gradually transformed into the modern economic heart of China. The accumulation of capital paved the way forward for grand infrastructural and communication projects. The inhabitants of the settlements in Shanghai soon started to enjoy the modern wonders of gaslight (1865), electricity (1881), running water (1882) and telephones (1881) (Lee 1999). The increase of the population, stimulated by the demand for labour and the concentration of capital, compelled the construction of more urban settlements. The need for standardised urban housing was fulfilled by the construction of new lilong (now renamed shikumen). The standardisation of housing proved to be the cheap answer to accommodate the growing labour force that was employed by foreign and (later) domestic factories\textsuperscript{66}. The modern capitalist production of space translated into high levels of uneven development and fundamentally altered the dynamics of city life. The “earliest type of mass commodity housing in Chinese history” (Qian 1996: 1) occupied 60 to 80 per cent of residential Shanghai by 1949 (Lu 1995; Qian 1996; Lu 1999: Especially chapter 4). The unprecedented expansion of standardised housing left a deep imprint on the city’s spatial form and urban everyday life.
The reproduction of space and the changing dynamics that these forces brought about in the everyday life of urban citizens led both to the adoration of and hatred for the city. The uneven production of space inspired the emergence of Chinese Communism for which ‘the city’ became the breeding place for the bourgeoisie. Shanghai became (and remains until today), in other words, quite literally both the ‘Whore of Asia’ and the ‘Pearl of the Orient’ (Wasserstrom 2001).

The dichotomous urban space of representation rests on the common perception that ‘Westerners’ aggressively introduced and imposed an alien form of modernity onto China. Such a sentiment only matured with the arrival of more treaty ports and new urban forms that came to dominate older space of representation. The Qing rulers seemed, in contrast to foreign capital, incapable of articulating a vision of their own for an urban China. The fact that China was already an early modern nation state, well integrated into the global economy and engaged in a long process of colonisation along ethnic, historical and territorial lines, is as a result of the emphasis on industrial capitalism often implicitly denied or left unexplored in accounts on China’s modernity.

The space that the treaty ports produced admittedly challenged the carefully constructed spatial-political unity that the Qing had so diligently constructed over the previous 300 years. China became, however, never a colony. The state performed a too important nod in global trade to simply be dispensed with. It instead remained territorially intact, and an intense national consciousness thrived under, and perhaps precisely because of, alien intervention. The Opium Wars, the unequal treaties and the subsequent urban changes did little to threaten the territorial unity of the state. These events instead could and have been argued (e.g. Elliott 2002 among others) to have helped strengthen and intensify the national consciousness which the Qing had
stimulated in the 250 years of its carefully crafted architecture, cartography and ethnography. The communists and the nationalists in the 1920s and 1930s were to tap into and compete with each other over the same nationalist discourse. The techniques the nationalist Guomindang (GMD) used will be discussed in the next section. The following chapter will instead look at the production of space under communist rulership.

**The Nationalists’ Production of Modern China**

**Introduction**

The foreign threat to the Chinese geobody and the danger that was posed to the territorial integrity of the nation state led it to commit wholeheartedly to a modernisation agenda. The challenges that the new capitalist productions of space in the treaty ports posed to older spaces and times of representation translated into the need for a renewal of China’s identity. This was visualised by, for example, the advent of a newly interpreted form of ‘Chinese architecture’. The search and investigation as to what constituted ‘things Chinese’ was analogous to the fall of the Qing Empire and the political establishment of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911. The same system of state that had formalised the production of space into a single unit of identity had during the Republican period no other option but to (re)invent the characteristics that could give it legitimacy.

The influence that led to the revaluation (or reinvention) of Chinese spaces and times of representation is inseparable from the overall challenges that were posed to the territorial sovereignty of the state at the Versailles Conference in 1919. The outrage that was displayed as a result of the Versailles Peace Conference, which proposed to transfer the German concession rights in Shandong province to Japan, was
embedded in the firm belief that China was a coherent and united sovereign nation state. The Treaty was believed to symbolise a direct assault on China’s territorial unity and sovereign integrity. The strong awareness that China existed as a nation state came to be crystallised in early twentieth century movements. These movements, such as the famous May Fourth (wusi yundong), were the evidence of the success, rather than the failure, of the nation-state enterprise that the Qing had commenced some three hundred years earlier\textsuperscript{67}.

There exists ample evidence that the challenge of foreign productions of space were met with an equally strong (if not stronger) Chinese desire to consolidate and strengthen the abstraction of the Chinese nation state. The New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong), which flourished mostly in those places where the reproduction of space was felt most intensively\textsuperscript{68}, constituted arguably the loudest voice for national renewal. This calling was answered not only through a rejuvenation of architectural means and urban forms, two topics which I shortly will embark upon, but also in the cartographic mapping of China during that period. The so-called ‘Humiliation Maps’ soon found a place in scholarly curriculums and popular geographic imaginations. These maps were (and continue to be) utilised as representations of a China that suffered immensely during its ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1949). The period of Republican China (1912-1949) was, in other words, characterised by spatial and temporal efforts that were focused on the consolidation and further strengthening of the abstract Chinese nation state.

\textit{Inventing a Nationalist Architecture}

The struggle for a national representation, between the older and the newer times and spaces of representation, was initially resolved by the incorporation of ‘Chinese’ elements (e.g. tiled and pitched roofs, extended eaves etc.) into
geometrically modern structures. This trend was later disseminated, however, to become part of a wider discourse as to what Chinese architecture actually should refer to. The tension (or contradiction) between nationalist and capitalist forms of representation continues, as we will see in chapters five and six, to haunt popular Chinese geographic imaginations.

The interest in Chinese architecture, as a means to give form and meaning to urban everyday life, was further and elaborately broadened by the establishment in 1929 of the Chinese Architectural Society (zhongguo yingzao xueshe, CAS) which was founded by Zhu Qiqian. The society and its members (most notably Liang Sicheng, the son of the prominent reformer Liang Qichao) played a decisive role in reviving social awareness of and interest in older forms of ‘Chinese’ architecture. The success of the society (and Liang Sicheng influential role in it) is a result of the fact that it coherently converted a melange of historical architectural styles from different geographic places into one coherent and recognisable national architectural tradition.

The starting point that the society used to legitimise the idea of a common origin of all Chinese forms was a thousand year old document named the yingzao fashi (‘Treatise on Architectural Standards’). The monumental study of Liang Sicheng’s A Pictorial History of Chinese Architecture (1984), primarily based on an interpretation of the yingzao fashi, consequentially divided China’s architectural history into 3 chronological periods (dating from 850 to 1912). Liang later elaborated further on the idea of a common past and offered a classification of nine common features that, he said, constituted traditional Chinese architecture. The underlying hypothesis that Liang and the first generation (and succeeding generations) of Chinese architect scholars proposed was that there were common technical and architectural details that justified the concept of a collective and unified ‘Chinese’
architectural history. The incorporation and successive colonisation of diverse architectural styles (han and non-han Chinese) led Liang (and many with him) to the conclusion that “[t]he language and writing of a nation adopt codes and rules [wenfa] which are commonly used and observed… [This also applies] to [its] architecture” (Liang in Ng 1991: 61, emphasis added).

The reinterpretation of older architectural traditions helped to the harmonisation of differences. The ROC’s attempt to establish identifiable Chinese spaces of representation resemble the earlier cartographic, ethnographic and architectural efforts by the Qing. The actions by early Chinese Republic in effort to harmonise and standardise its histories and places should, therefore, be analysed as a continuation (rather than a rupture) of those earlier undertaken by the Qing.

**Humiliation Maps**

The establishment of modern printing presses in the early 20th century helped the spreading of maps to an unprecedented scale. The content of a great number of such maps, which besides their commercial function were also used for public educational purposes, demonstrated a strong inclination to link the territorial extent of the state with historical territorial claims. The use of scientific understandings of space in the making of such maps served two purposes. The use of a scientific representation of ROC was first of all an authoritative mechanism to validate the territorial integrity of the state. The map concretised the abstract territory for a large audience. The modern conceptualisation of space in such maps also helped, however, to arouse a nationalist sentiment over the territories that were said to be ‘lost’ at the hand of ‘foreign aggressors’. This genre of maps, which Callahan (2009; 2010: especially chapter 4) aptly describes as ‘national humiliation maps’ 76, historically overlap
different cartographic versions of territorial China. They emphasise the great extent of
China and the ensuing humiliation that was inflicted upon the national geobody at the
hand of foreign powers. The state in such maps not only appropriated history, but also
assimilated the ethnic differences which the Qing previously had identified and
constructed. There was, according to the nationalist Guomindang government,
logically only one encompassing Chinese nation (*zhonghua minzu*) (see e.g. Figure
12).

![Figure 3-12: Zhonghua guochi ditu](image)

*Zhonghua guo chi ditu* (中华国耻地图 (国耻國中地)) or ‘Map of Chinese national humiliation’) 
Published by the Department of Trade and Industry (Hebei Province) (1929)

The territorial frontiers of the map below (Figure 13) show that early twentieth
century humiliation maps went beyond the inclusion of foreign settlements. This map,
which appeared in 1920s and 1930s school books, also incorporated former ‘vassal
states’ (such as Korea, Vietnam, Thailand and even North-Eastern Afghanistan) and
maritime territories (e.g. sea of Japan, East China Seas, South China Sea) into its
sovereign borders.
The following maps (Figure 14, 15) are based, similarly as the two above, on an imagined geography. The concentric lines (based on spheres of influence) are reminiscent of the earlier described ethnocentric universalistic representations. They describe a hierarchical order that is based on degrees of sovereignty. The concentric circles seem to want to inform the reader that the territorial influence of the Middle Kingdom has significantly suffered from foreign aggression and sovereign independence claims of former vassal states. The message of the maps seems, therefore, to convey an event of tragedy based on the loss of influence that had characterised the earlier ethnocentric representations. The colouring of humiliation maps is normally very modest and the detailed information and ornamental decorations that had characterised earlier maps are left out. The maps, in other words, articulate a similar sort of tragic (but politically empowering) loss that one witnesses in contemporary accounts of the, earlier described, yuan ming yuan gardens.
Figure 3-14: 'Map of China’s National Humiliation'

‘Map of China’s National Humiliation’ (1927) (in Callahan 2009; and 2010)

Figure 3-15: Zhong hua guochi tu

*Zhong hua guochi tu* (中华国耻图, 1936 Map of China’s humiliation) (Published in Minguo ditu: Zhonghua dili tushuo or ‘China atlas illustrated Chinese maps’)

In providing a politicised reinterpretation of history, one in which politically contestable territories are incorporated into a territorially unified Chinese history, the imperial legacy of China is effectively transformed from a position of (a highly
effective) coloniser into one in which the nation state is displayed as the humiliated colonised other. The cartographic knowledge in these maps (and the wider discourse of which it is a part) is, in other words, reworked to serve the legitimacy of the territorial Chinese State. This development resembles that of the Qing enterprise which, as described earlier, incorporated foreign territories into a coherent cartographic, ethnographic and architectural unity so as to legitimise its sovereignty over the places and people in its territory.

After the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, humiliation maps started to be reprinted and reappeared in popular collections such as the *Jindai Zhongguo bainian guochi ditu* (近代中国百年国耻地图 or ‘Modern China’s century of national humiliation maps’ (1997)\(^9\)). The atlas (published by the Maps Department of the People’s Press in Beijing) should be considered as part of the much broader post-1991 ‘Patriotic Education Campaign’ (see Wang 2008). Figure 16 provides a graphic detail with the map’s detailed information on Japanese movement during WWII. Such maps are, however, also included in more official publications such as the influential ‘Historical Atlas of China’ (1996: 64, 65), which in English named its adaptation ‘Some of the Chinese Territories Forcibly Occupied by the Foreign Powers in Qing Dynasty Period’. The distinctions between conventional representations of space and imaginary geographies of loss and tragedy are in such instances intentionally blurred to strengthen the legitimacy of the abstract Chinese state.
The confusing historical revisionism that such maps display, demonstrate that the standardising and rationalising of modern time and space are, as argued before, far from the objective truth they claim them to represent. Modernity is instead employed in a dialectical manner to justify the reality of the abstraction that is the Chinese nation state and the global system of nation states more generally. The production of spaces with different temporalities, displayed here in maps and architecture, is not merely a symbol of national nostalgia. It is rather a search for historical evidence (and the reconstruction thereof) that helps strengthen China’s legitimate right to territorial unity and national integrity. This basic process of the producing of the world as a picture occurs through both the reconceptualisation of space and transcendent socially lived space. The following subsection will demonstrate how this was, besides architecture...
and cartography, also achieved through the reproduction of the urban environment itself.

**The ‘Renaissance’ of the Chinese Built Environment**

The production of an identifiable state space in architecture and cartography was analogous to rebuilding and modernisation of the built environment in the 1920s. Here, similarly as in the case of the humiliation maps, the authority and doctrine of progress and science were strategically deployed in an attempt to concretise the abstract territorial state. The Qing, as mentioned earlier, proved largely ineffective to modernise Chinese cities when confronted with the laws of industrial capital. The urban production of space became, instead, one of the main focal points for the GMD government. The movement of ‘national renewal’ or ‘national revival’ (**minzu fuxing yundong**) in the urban production of the built environment became as much a national as an international endeavour. These projects, similarly to the infamous modernisation projects in 19th century Europe, effectively imposed a rational and objective organisation of isometric space onto the heterogeneous places that comprised the existing urban landscape.

The objective of this project, which combined rational architectural planning methods with so-called national forms (**Zhongguo guyou xingshi/guyou zhi xingshi**), was represented as the materialisation of a Chinese architectural ‘renaissance’. The project had earlier been instigated by the architectural theories of Liang Sicheng (and SAC). The enterprise was, however, an integral part of a much broader political modernisation project (see for instance Li 2002; Kögel 2008). The new ‘national form’, which was meant to ‘look like China’, was visualised in building projects such as Lu Yanzhi’s Sun Zhongshan Mausoleum (1926-1929) on the outskirts of Nanjing, the
Shanghai City Hall by Dong Dayou, the Master Plan for Greater Shanghai (*da Shanghai*) (1927-1932) and the prominent, but unfinished, New Nanjing city plan. The underlying principle of such projects was “that a building must express the life, tradition, national spirit and dominating ideal of the period in which it is built” (Chaund [1919] in Rowe and Kuan 2002: 76).

The idea of national rejuvenation through the reproduction of space in the built environment was, during the republican years, nowhere as lucidly presented as in the plans for the new national capital in Nanjing. If republican Shanghai symbolised the material transformation of quotidian urban life (see for instance Lee 1999; Lu 1999; Dikötter 2007), Nanjing characterised “the industrial metamorphosis of national life, planned by a central and centralizing-government” (Kirby 2000: 137). Sun Yat-sen imagined the new capital to “become an exemplar for the modern China to come, combing modern technology and materials with the best of Chinese architecture and aesthetics… The new capital of China, would hearken back to the ‘time of her greatest past glory’, instilling patriotism in the hearts of all Chinese people” (Musgrove 2000: 139).

The city’s reconstruction was, similarly to contemporaneous cities such as Ankara, Brasilia and New Deli, used as an example of the government’s adaptation of a ‘Haussmannian’ form of modernity. Lipkin (2006) and Kirby (2000) show how this reorganisation of urban space (through the creation of broad boulevards, sewer systems, urban zoning and the reallocation of tens of thousands of people) symbolised a vast plan for the remodelling of Chinese society. Ernest P. Goodrich (in New York Times 1929: 6), an American civil engineer involved in the Nanjing project, was reported as saying that “the plans call for more than 350 miles of streets and boulevards as well as modern government and capitol buildings, a grand central
railway station, municipal government structures and other improvements... The cost will run into millions of dollars”.

The leadership of the GMD performed a central role in the creation of a new Chinese citizenship (yi dang zhi guo). Sun Yat Sens theory of minsheng (‘people’s livelihood’), later radicalised and popularised by Dai Jitao, translated into a responsibility on the part of the state to provide for its disenfranchised citizens. The Nanjing municipal government committed subsequently itself to an agenda of political tutelage and economic pasturage. “[T]he municipality’s duties included extending services to all Chinese people, subjects-now-turned-citizens.” (Lipkin 2006: 64). The modernisation of the city meant that hygiene and punctuality became the hallmarks of the GMD’s rule. The introduction of an ordered spatial environment and stringent time management, which especially after the establishment of the New Life Movement became characteristic components of the GMD’s wider social engineering project (see e.g. Dirlik 1975), had a profound impact on everyday life of urban citizens.

The efforts to stimulate the political economy and to inspire a modern sense of national consciousness were spatially translated in the urban plans for the reconstruction of the city. All the participating plans in the competition emphasised the central role of the GMD government in the creation of what was termed by the New York Times (Messelwitz 1929: XX11) as the ‘Capitol Hill of China’. The new administrative area was meant to provide the GMD Central Party Office’ a site (see Figures 16, 18 and 19) that would help position it “as the dominant element, uniting all under its gaze” (Musgrove 2000: 139). The importance of an imagined united national past in the architecture of the built environment was not downplayed, but exploited to further boost the legitimacy of the ruling GMD (see figure 17).
‘The National Government Centre’ proposed by Henry K. Murphy was comprised of “three groups of buildings, one for the Guomingdang’s congressional offices, a government house for China’s head of state, and a ‘Five Houses (Yuan) and Ministries Group’ for the executive branch” (Murphey [1929] in Cody 1996a: 360).

Close-up of “the Layout of the ten Ministry Buildings, the Ten Yuans (sic), and the Government House” (Murphy in Misselwitz 1929). Visible in these buildings is the importance that was devoted to the creation and incorporation of what has been labelled as a ‘Chinese Renaissance’ style. The plan for the administrative district was later further extended to the South (Murphy [1929] in Cody 1996a: 361).
Figure 3-19: Plan for administrative zones (Nanjing)

Two plans drawn by Huang Yuyu and Zhu Shenkang for the administrative zone in 1928 and 1929 which were used as a reference for the final 1929 *shoudu jianshe* plan (首都建設) (left is Musgrove 2000; right is Wang 2001).86

The historical and symbolic centrality of the new administrative district was further boosted by the decision to build it on the Purple Mountain (*zijin shan*) which already hosted a great number of historically laden sites (such as the Ming Tombs, the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum, and later the Linggu Pagoda that was built to commemorate the victims of the Northern Expedition).

The desire to create a new China was also felt in the modern rationalisation of space that characterised the organisation for the rest of Nanjing and numerous other Chinese cities (Nanchang, Tianjin etc.). The GMD planners intended to utilise the production of space as a means to reshape the way people lived so as to create a new
Chinese citizen. Building permits were introduced; public housing projects were launched; streets were widened and modern waterworks were engineered. Li (2012) shows, in his study on Nanchang, how the production of modern space was deeply intertwined with the GMD’s wider social engineering project. “The GMD urban planners and officials deployed urban reconstruction as an instrument of national consolidation through a scientific sort of rational calculation, through social engineering and rational planning, and through the institutionalisation of social disciplines and regulations.” (Li 2012: 110).

The new urban everyday life was, in other words, aimed at the creation of a sense of greater responsibility towards the nation (Musgrove 2000: 145-147). The design of Nanjing city (Figure 20) was strongly influenced by the orderly categorisation in the different uses of space. Such a rational use of ‘urban zoning’, which at that time still was in its infancy in most parts of the world, was employed to control and regulate the flow of capital and urban mobility, and to optimise the use of land.
Figure 3-20: Map of zoned district (Nanjing)

Map of zoned district for 1) port activities, 2) industrial purposes, 3) military bases 4) commercial aviation, 5) governmental functions, 6) three kinds of residential forms of housing (worker housing, poorer class housing and villas) (shoudu ji hua (Master Plan, 首都計畫) [1929], reproduced in Wang 2001). The total plan of the city comprised over 850 square kilometres and was meant to host two million inhabitants.

Figure 3-21: Aerial Sketch of a government workers district

Aerial Sketch of a government workers district (shoudu ji hua [1929], reproduced in Wang (2001))
The plan for the expansion of Shanghai in 1929 was of equal enormity and has been described by MacPherson (1990: 59) to only have been surpassed conceptually by the plans proposed for Paris in the 1850s by Napoleon III and Baron Haussmann. So important was the Greater Shanghai Plan, that even during the turbulent years of the 1930s the newly established City Government continued to spearhead urban redevelopment on its agenda. MacPherson (1990: 58, 60) argues that the projects’ importance and the monumental scale on which the Greater Shanghai Plan was projected were not only a declaration of the “Nationalists’ confidence in the stability of their power” to the Chinese and to the world, but also “a declaration of a new China; carefully planned, sensible in its eclecticism, yet essentially Chinese, bold, proud to arrogance, and, like the Great Wall or the Imperial City larger than life”.

Figure 3-23: The conceptual plan for the Civic Centre (Shanghai)

The conceptual plan for the Civic Centre (from Campanella 2008) which was to become the showpiece of a newly united Shanghai. The Centre was, besides the prominent Mayor’s House, designated to host a number of other important public buildings (a Pagoda, malls, the (now former) Shanghai Municipal museum, the (now former) Shanghai Municipal Library, a hospital and a sizeable auditorium). Similarly as the buildings that were conceptualised for the Nanjing Plan, most of the buildings in the Shanghai plan were drawn on the basis of a ‘Chinese Renaissance’ style.

The fact that neither the Shanghai nor the Nanjing plans were fully implemented (mainly due to the political upheavals of the 1930s) does not curtail the importance of the modern production of urban space for the dissemination and
internalisation of a nationalist consciousness. The urban plans and architectures of the
time, shared the same common objective that was visualised in the humiliation maps
of the 1930s. The consolidation and strengthening of the abstract nation state is, in fact,
central to all such early techniques of power. The later communist use of spatial
techniques of power, described in the next chapter, shows certain commonalities with
that of the GMD’s. The space produced during both the GMD and CCP’s rule,
embodied a certain form of knowledge that helped arouse, regulate and administer a
national subjectivity. The state-led discourse of a national subjectivity remained, in
both the nationalist and the communist production of space very much the same. This
is not to deny that the production of space and the experience of everyday life changed
with the arrival of a different set of social relations. It was however only during the
Cultural Revolution when nationalist subjectivities and consciousness were for the
first (and the last) time seriously questioned in the production of space.

The nationalisation of space in cartographic, planning and architectural
projects started in the early 20th century to triumph over alternative forms and
conceptualisations of urban space. The potentiality and the politics of place were in
this modernising process subjugated and replaced by depoliticised sites that belonged
to and transcended the state space. The endemic modern need to create “a
homogeneous environment, a totally modernised space, in which the look and feel of
the old world have disappeared without a trace” (Berman 1983: 68), was, as we have
seen, not merely an imported product of 20th century China. Modernity was rather the
outcome of a long process of a state-led production of modern space that by the end of
the Qing had commenced some 250 years earlier. The Qing would prove themselves
unable to reconcile the contradiction between a rooted nation state and the global
dynamics of capitalism. The next chapter shows how communist rule in its initial
phase (1949-1961) did little to challenge the concrete abstraction of China. A reworked form of nationalism performed instead a significant role in the CCP’s quest for legitimacy. The different set of social relations of the modes of production had, however, a profound impact on the state-led production of space and time in especially the urban areas.

**Conclusion**

I have throughout this chapter attempted to reappraise the development of modernity in China by taking the concept of space as a performative and active component in the creation of a national subjectivity. The result of this short analysis over a long period of history has primarily focused on the spaces of representation in architecture and the representation of space in cartography. It has led to the dismantlement or, at least, the challenging of several often taken for granted ideas. The attempt to avoid the ‘territorial trap’, first of all, translated in the challenging of the view that imperial China developed independently from the politics of the rest of the world. I have demonstrated that the result of the Qing’s frontier and colonial politics made it increasingly aware of the global context it was part of. This was one of the factors which helped China to introduce and strengthen a reason of state that no longer was solely based on a cultural distinctiveness and top-down rule. The Qing art of government became instead increasingly territorial and spatial.

The effect of this transition, noticeable for example in the universalising architecture of the Qing, challenges also the idea that the features of China’s historical development were fundamentally dissimilar to those of the ‘West’. The long standing notion of distinctive (cultural) difference, which in itself is the very product of modern nationalism, has undermined our understanding of what has constituted (and continues
to constitute) modernity. I have argued in this and the previous chapters that modernity is a change in the ways we conceive, perceive and live in space (and time).

I have challenged, furthermore, the teleology of modernity. The accepted linearity of time has, as a result of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, forced China to be demoted from the mystifying model for development to the primitive and backward Other. The temporalisation of China has since (and perhaps because of) the Macartney Mission led to the still omnipresent view that the state building project of the Qing was somehow a non-nation state affair. China became labelled as a land so different than others that it came to be described as a distinct civilisation that required incorporation into modernity. This view continues to persist until today and seriously hinders the many comparative studies that could be made between other contemporaneous empires. I have attempted to move away from this linear construction and have instead emphasised the parallels that can be found in the production and representation of space in the formation of the Chinese nation-state. The confrontation between the ‘West’ and ‘China’ was therefore, I believe, not a conflict between modernity and feudality, but rather one between colonising states that each had their own (but equally modern) agendas.

The fact that the territory of the Chinese state not only ‘survived’, but flourished in the aftermath of its ‘century of humiliation’ is not so much a ‘wonder’ of history (as is often silently implied or suggested). It is, rather, a testament to the strength and effectiveness of the early state project which the Qing had commenced some 300 years earlier. This alternative understanding of China’s history transfers China from the category of ‘victims’ of imperialism, to one of the great victors. The historical stability of its territorial integrity and sovereignty demonstrates that the Chinese state has been one the most enduring nation-states since the 17th century. I
have argued that the production of modern state space was one of the central components in its successful art of government.

The use of political-spatial strategies, such as maps, architecture and urban planning, were not curtailed or radically altered in the period after 1912. The spatial techniques of governance were instead redeployed and intensified during the republican years. The GMD soon proved itself more able than the Qing to reconcile contradiction between the rooted nature of the state with the autonomous and borderless logic of capitalism. There exist however, as shown, strong signs of continuity between the pre- and post-1912 period. This means that we also here need to be careful in relying too easily on rigid forms of historical periodising.

The dissemination of knowledge in the space of cartography, architecture, ethnography and urban planning is not more or less unique to pre-1912 China, as it is to the period after that. Post 1949 Communist China employed similar spatial techniques to sometimes break with history and at other times mend with it to legitimise both the rightful position of the Party and the Chinese nation state as such. The production of space was during the period of the 1950s until the onset of the Cultural Revolution, similarly as in the pre-1949 period, used to arouse a feeling of national belonging and collectiveness. The success of this process of spatial legitimisation became so successful that the CCP gradually came to be synonymous with that of the nation-state. This development would ultimately lead to the antagonistic Cultural Revolution.

The next chapter will show how such continuities in the production of urban space helped to establish a link between the Communist Party and the built environment. The continuities were paralleled by ruptures. Every set of social relations has, after all, its own, specific and historic mode of production. What is necessary,
then, is an understanding of how space was conceived, perceived and experienced after the communists came to power. What changed and how did these changes affect the politics of everyday life?
4. Chapter Four: The Production of Chinese Communism

Introduction

The previous chapter has described how modernity took shape and evolved from Qing to Republican China. The Chinese state space concretised in a gradual transition that was characterised by the way the state managed the conceptualisation and perception of a national state space. The spatial strategies employed in this endeavour consisted, but were not limited to, cartographic, architectural and ethnographic productions and representations of the Chinese nation state space. This project encompassed, as we have seen, a long process of politically induced spatial practises through which local histories were rewritten and the heterogeneity of places was absorbed. The objective was an attempt to move gradually towards an ever more concrete abstraction of collective national unity.

The subsequent modern consciousness, which translated itself in the early idea of citizenry (ie. the belonging to the nation state) and a collectively shared past, came later to be challenged by the introduction of a commercial and industrial form of capitalism which altered the organisation and shape of (especially the urban) space. The permeation of this new production of space into the everyday life was not internalised without a nationalist backlash. The earlier nation building efforts of the Qing proved, however, to be too strong enough to eventually accommodate and integrate the new production of space into the national Chinese identity. The revising of history in, for example, the Republican humiliation maps and the urban plans of Shanghai and Nanjing urban, helped strengthen the legitimacy of the abstract nation state. The new communist regime did not give up the nation building efforts, but
similarly experimented in finding ways to strengthen the abstract nation state project and the idea of a national geobody.

This chapter will provide empirical examples from the built environment to demonstrate that there exist patterns of strong continuity in the production and reproduction of space between the pre- and post-1949 period. This was particularly visible in the Communist Party’s (CCP) tendency to homogenise the spaces of representation in urban planning and architecture. The creation of so-called ‘work units’, ‘urban communes’ and other such productions of space, to which I will dedicate later more attention, had an unprecedented effect on the production of a unified nation. The imagined unity of the Chinese state space was until at least the Cultural Revolutions (CR) left unquestioned. The spaces of representation, in for example Tiananmen Square, were in similar terms often reinvented to provide greater historical legitimacy to the Chinese communist state. The party became, through the medium of space, increasingly linked to the state. This linkage was only challenged during the CR.

There were, however, radical breaks with historical productions of space. This was particularly visible in the CCP’s troubled relationship with the city. The lived experience in space changed fundamentally with the arrival of a different set of social relations of production. This became visible in the urban planning of Chinese cities. Cities transformed from spectacles of early consumerism into industrial powerhouses.¹ This had, of course, a great effect on the everyday experience of space. The changing nature of the city provides us with important insight as to how the changed experience and perception of space informed political subjectivities. The contradiction (between continuity and rupture) is, then, illustrative of the need to expand and deepen the
concrete abstraction of the territorial state, on the one hand, and the change in political ideologies and the mode of production, on the other.

This chapter wishes to address the question as to how the production of space helped and changed with the arrival of a new political ideology. A renewed understanding should cast light on the question how space (and the (re)making thereof) constituted an important, but often underestimated and unexplored, factor in the politics of the CCP. This centrality of space for the CCP is crystallised in Mao’s utopian and unembellished dictum: “We are not only good at destroying the Old World, we are also good at building the new” ([1949] 2007 [1949]-a). The production of this new world compels certain questions. What was new about it? What was the function of space in its production? How was space perceived and lived?

This chapter will demarcate the 1949-1976 period into two phases that are roughly characterised by two different uses of space. The first phase (1949-1961) launched a Soviet inspired physical production of space to give form and meaning to the new socialist environment. The purpose of space served the means to cultivate the new socialist man (shehui zhuyi xinren) for a new socialist China. The production of space was organised in such a way to affect the everyday life and biorhythm of the population. This adaptation of Soviet planning was chronologically marked by the years of rehabilitation (1949-1952); the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) (1953-1957); and the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961). The second phase, which effectively ran from 1962 to 1976, started at the time of the so-called ‘period of recovery’ (1962-1965) that would ultimately culminate in the Cultural Revolution (CR) (1966 to 1976). This phase was characterised by a growing emphasis on the superstructure of space. The state-led physical production of space came to a halt, while the politics of space started to take on a more representational dynamic. The use of space in the CR, perhaps the
only true communist revolution in China, explicitly targeted the spaces of the state. This chapter will show, in other words, how the Party first cemented the state through the production of space and the production of everyday life. The second phase is characterised by the radical negation of the state-led production of space.

The layout of this chapter is, however, not chronological. I have instead decided to write the chapter more thematically. This allows me to underline the importance of space for the evolution of everyday life. It also helps more effectively to identify the politically motivated changes in the productions of space. A thematic framework of analysis, finally, also avoids temporal determinism, by focusing on the production of space rather linear development. The first section of this chapter will shortly explore the CCP’s ambivalent relationship to the city. The section argues that urban space was of paramount importance for the politics of the CCP. The second section shows how such spatial politics transcended into the urban everyday life. This empirically inclined section will spend a lot of text to describe how the communist production of space influenced the lived experience of urban everyday life. The third section will empirically look at the politics of space in the political heart of the new Chinese state. Few sites in the world have historically played such a politically potent and radical role as Tiananmen Square. The Square’s space of representation symbolises and makes China what it is today. The fourth section will briefly look at the Cultural Revolution (CR) as a fundamental break in the production of space. The CR meant the breakdown of the state and its monopoly on the production of space. The CR is characterised by a struggle over the meaning of state space. The summative conclusion will reiterate the main points made.

**Urban Space**

*The Anti-urban Sentiment*
There exists a longstanding debate on the question as to how the CCP set out to achieve its objective of a communist society. The initial deployed practice was to endorse and closely follow a Soviet-modelled form of industrialisation. The strong influence that the Soviet developmental model had on China’s first decade of modernisation was best exemplified in its conceptualisation of the city. It was in the city in which the transformation of space, in service of the politics of utopia, was best made visible during these early years. In the first decade of the newly created People’s Republic of China (PRC), levels of urbanisation rivalled those of the Soviet experience. This seemingly obvious premise of an urban-led national industrialisation project was, however, countered by the populist rhetoric of the same Party that endorsed it.

The underpinning objective of Mao’s industrialisation project was, in fact, centred on the idea of industrialising “the country without incurring the heavy costs of urbanisation” (Friedmann 2007: 267). The ‘costs’, to which Mao referred to, were not merely financial in nature. They instead resolved around the ‘social ills’ of capitalism that had sprung from GMD and semi-colonial rule. Murphey similarly notes that “Western-style and modern cities - notably the former treaty ports but increasingly most growing cities - were seen as soul-destroying, anti-peasant, and tilled with corruption, crime, hypocrisy, suffering, squalor, and pollution” (Murphey in Ebanks and Cheng 1990: 36). The city was considered to be a bourgeois space. The CCP’s industrialisation of cities was meant to counter this conception of the city. The city was instead meant to serve as the medium to achieve an economically more balanced pattern of national development.

This so called anti-urban sentiment which the Party allegedly and seemingly expressed was not entirely unfounded. Cities provided, after all, the uneven mode of
development that provided the fertile breeding ground for the establishment of both bourgeois and radical ideologies. The energetic nature and the polemic history of post treaty port Shanghai, “a heaven built on hell” (Mu Shiying in Boyer 2002; Macdonald 2004), is perhaps of particular importance for understanding the CCP’s ambivalent relationship with the urban city. Shanghai functioned first as the primary hotbed for bourgeois capitalism and later, as a result of the uneven mode of development, as the principal site for socialist resistance. The founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1921 in Shanghai was, in fact, only one of many examples of political entities that flourished in the urban Chinese setting.

Shanghai played, however, not only an important role in antagonising class struggle. The city later also helped to maintain and strengthen the economic base of the Party’s political legitimacy. The gross value of Shanghai’s industrial output almost ten-folded between 1952 and 1980 and constituted on average close to 16 percent of China’s total output (Mok 1996). Jun Zhang and Yong Fu (2009) have similarly stressed Shanghai’s economic importance for the CCP. They note that despite occupying only 1/1500 of the country’s landmass and housing a mere 1/100 of the population, the city “contributed [between 1949 and 1976] about one-sixth of the [national] fiscal revenue” (2009: 134). Other research (e.g. Kirkby 1985; Chan 1994) has similarly shown that the CCP economically depended on the city. This group of writers argued, in contrast to the prevailing rural bias of earlier periods, for the importance of urban space in the modernisation project of the CCP.

This short overview demonstrates the ambivalent attitude of the CCP towards urban space. It also sheds some light on the recognition that cities not merely functioned as obstructive elements in the path towards rural modernisation. Urban space was instead a significant and intrinsic part of the CCP’s modernisation project.
This raises the question as to what we should extract and disregard from the supposedly anti-urban sentiment of the CCP.

*The New City*

I do not think that the role of the city in the early years of the CCP’s rule can be understood as having been merely ‘auxiliary’ to the countryside. Mao made it from the start, in fact, clear that he intended the city to perform as “the centre of gravity of the Party's work”. He wished the city to be “leading the village” (Mao 2007 [1949]-a[1949]: 361-75). The propagation of ‘even development’ is also prominently visible in, for example, Mao’s influential ‘On the Ten Great Relationships’ (2007 [1956]) where he dedicates the second relation to that between “industry in the coastal regions and industry in the interior”. These thoughts found currency in the heavily Soviet inspired First Five Year Plan (1953-1957) (FFYP) in which the city was officially granted the role of industrial catalyst. The increasingly collectivised countryside performed instead the role of agricultural provider for the industrialising cities. The expansion of cities and the parallel increase of its populations led to a significant growth of Chinese cities (see e.g. Chang 1976).

This process of urbanisation was not accompanied, however, by a greater diversity in the production of urban space. The industrialisation project did not automatically translate, in other words, into a new communist city as such. “In 1953, the central government in its report to the [central CCP] stated: ‘… factories are constructed according to our plans, but cities are not; factories are managed well but cities are not’” (Yeh and Wu 1999a: 177). The CCP was, in other words, aware that the cities should be more than industrial centres of production. Leaving the everyday life of the city untouched could potentially lead to social mobilisations that could threaten the Party’s ruling position and challenge its socialist ideology. The
configuration of possible alternative uses of urban space was, therefore, already from the outset strongly discouraged by the CCP. Cities had subsequently also to embody and represent a socialist everyday life and subjectivity.

The CCP adopted initially a number of institutional arrangements to contain the supposed dormant urban threat. These institutional changes were believed to provide a greater degree of social administrative control. They also were attempts to limit the risk of unexpected formations of social (counter) collectives. Salaff (1967) documents how in the early 1950s the relatively large detachment between the urban social reality and the communist ideology led to a range of politically initiated institutional changes which were imposed to both strengthen social control and arouse a socialist consciousness. The regulations consisted of the formal appointment of Street Offices (jiedao banshichu) in cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin, and the establishment (in 1951) of informally elected Residents’ Committees/ Neighbourhood Committees (linli/ jumin weiyuanhui).

These Residents’ Committees (RC) followed the earlier informal “public security committees” which had the purpose of assisting “the people's government in eliminating counter-revolutionaries, guarding against traitors and spies and safeguarding [the country’s] national and public security.” (Mao 2007 [1951]: 52). The RC became additionally responsible for enforcing a strict household registration system (hukou) which ensured that immigration and emigration was controlled within the confinements of the neighbourhoods (Cheng and Selden 1994; Cheng and Selden 1997).

Many of the tasks of the RCs were with the arrival of a more industrialised society delegated to urban work units (danwei). The reproduction of urban space helped, as we will discuss shortly, to transform both the built environments of cities
and their very function as centres of consumption. Cities were to become the foundation of China’s industrial modernisation. They were, as we will see shortly, also to perform as the cornerstone of the nation’s transformation towards a socialist subjectivity. The uniformity that these changes brought about helped formalise a socialist collectiveness that characterised both the environment and the everyday life of its users.

**The Production of Space and Everyday Life**

*Introduction*

The reproductions of urban space were meant to contribute to the construction of a new socialist city and, therefore, to the realisation of the new socialist man. The strategy to transform the spatial surrounding was, similarly to the experiences of the Qing and the GMD, intrinsically linked to the essence of a national subjectivity and political legitimacy. The influence of the changing production of urban space was literally noticeable at people’s doorsteps. The reconceptualisation of space in the socialist city transformed the everyday relationship between people’s dwelling and working place. The changing relationship of space and time subsequently also had an immediate effect on both the social and people’s own biorhythms.

The function and place of dwelling or residence in Chinese cities, to which we will turn now, received a significant reorganisation after the implementation of the FFYP in the early 1950s. The transformation of urban neighbourhoods were gradually transformed and divided to serve as specialised work units (*danwei*) that later were to become the cornerstones of Mao’s spatial urban politics. The term *danwei* is, in fact, a generic term to describe a large range of social-spatial constructions that are situated in or around the confinements of the city. The social-spatial construct of the work unit
can, according to Lu (2006: 52), be identified and described by a number of common characteristics: “(1) a walled and gated enclosure; (2) a well-integrated internal circulation system; (3) close association of work and residence; (4) a high level of provision of social facilities; and (5) rationalist architectural layout and style”\(^\text{11}\). The practical functions of the *danwei* can be grouped into three categories: (1) industrial units (*qiye danwei*), (2) public units (*shiye danwei*) meant for hospitals, universities etc. and (3) governmental ones (*jiguan danwei*). The ownership of *danwei* comes either in collective form (*jiti danwei*) or in nationalised form (*guoying danwei*).

![Figure 4-1: Plan for a residential compound](image)

Plan for a residential compound (*danyuan*) within a *danwei*. Legend: 1-kindergarten, 2-public bathhouse and laundry, 3-children’s play areas, clothing, drying etc., 4-sports ground (*Ye and Ye [1958] in Bray 2005: 152*)
University *danwei* are good examples to illustrate the impact of the production of *danwei* on everyday life. This is Jiangnan University in Wuxi (a *danwei*-based university). Legend: 1-Gates (with security), 2-Dormitories, 3-Sport facilities, 4-Academic staff apartments, 5-Colleges, schools, lecture theatres etc, 6-Library, 7-Canteens (Jiangnan University 2009, index added). *Danwei* life can in some ways be compared to life in American-styled campuses.

The planning of community-based housing was, similarly to the GMD cities, a state-led development. The underlying motive for the production of *danwei* space was, however, very different from the urban plans of the republican period. Urban dwellings during the 1949-1978 period were intrinsically linked to the CCP’s much
broader political strategy of transforming cities into productive industrial centres. The work unit became, through its intertwinment with the Party’s industrialisation project, quite literally the very motor of the CCP’s distinctive model of urban socialist industrialisation. These structures performed, as mentioned earlier, therefore, also an important role in the creation of a socialist everydayness.

The transformation to communal living was brought to speed during the First Five Year Plan (FFYP). The measures proposed in the FFYP, which was dedicated to the idea that ‘everything should be learned from the Soviet Union’, were truly gigantic in scale. The plan proposed to construct urban housing over an area of 46 square million meters (Bray 2005: 134). The plan, which was characterised by a strong emphasis on rapid and heavy industrialisation, emphasised the need to industrialise urban space on an unprecedented scale. The establishment of some 694 industrial construction projects, 156 of which headed by the Soviet Union, were designated to a number of small and medium sized cities in 17 of China’s more inland-situated provinces. The combination of an emphasis on heavy industry and the en masse construction of standardised urban housing became an important vehicle for both the transition to socialism and the transformation of China’s built environment. At the heart of this marriage between industrial modernisation and housing standardisation lay the work unit.

The influence of Soviet planners, thousands of which had arrived in the early 1950s to lead the industrialisation project, soon materialised in the construction of standardised housing blocks that came to be known under their generic term danyuan (or basic dwelling unit) (Bray 2005). The integration of these standardised housing units with local industries in danwei compounds was influenced by Soviet microdistricts (mikrorayon or less accurately as xiaoqu in Chinese) and superblocks.
(dajiefang) (Lu 2006). The greater integration of work and dwelling was, however, a very gradual process and took its first shape in the smaller distancing between working and dwelling place.

The map below (Figure 3) of Caoyang Xin Cun (1951) in Shanghai represents one of the first attempts to create a socialist inspired production of space. The site, Yu (2010: 242) notes, “became a landmark and indicator of workers’ liberation… and a showcase and obligatory stop for foreign guests to visit.” The residential neighbourhood, almost 95 hectares in size (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001), was planned for an initial 1,000 household and was intentionally located in close proximity of an industrial base in Shanghai’s Putao district. The area hosted a number of public facilities, ranging from schools, a postal office, kindergartens, shops, which were all readily accessible within walking distance for the residents.

Figure 4-4: Caoyang New Village (Shanghai)
Caoyang New Village in Shanghai (1953)
Legend: (1): Housing management, (2) Communal amenities, (3) communal space (newly indexed map, originally by (Fujita 2010).

Figure 4-5: Caoyang New Village (Shanghai)
Caoyang New Village in Shanghai (1953-1985)
The fact that the project was located in an area outside the industrial centre of Shanghai, which was uneconomic according to Soviet experts and thus an unfavourable urban planning method, was soon after its construction used to criticise Caoyang and its design. The relatively low density of the residential houses, especially when compared to the much higher density in successive housing projects, was negatively described as unproductive and unnecessary luxury. As a result of such criticisms, the project came to be labelled as a capitalist enterprise and a symbol of a bourgeois form of urban planning and aesthetic sentiment (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001; Zhao 2007). The later phases in the development of Caoyang were as a result of the preference for higher density characterised by a much more intensive form of land usage (Figure 4).

The rationale for the demand of a more standardised and intensive form of housing was motivated by both ideological and economic reasons. Zhou Enlai was one of the first to openly criticise the ‘wasting of state resources’ in urban construction in 1954 at the First Session of the First National People's Congress (NPC) (Bray 2005). Residential dwellings were soon thereafter considered to be ‘non-productive’ and construction costs were consequentially meant to be kept to a minimum. The priority given to productive projects was later repeated in the famous dictum “putting production first, standards of living second” (xian shengzhan, hou shenghuo) (Chan 1994).

 Production of Intensified Space

In a move towards a further intensification of land use, housing requirements for floor area per capita were lowered from the minimal standard of 6 to 9 meters to 4 to 5 square metres per capita in 1955. This new requirements signalled a more general departure from earlier, Soviet influenced urban forms. An early example of the new
urban form is the Baiwanzhuang Residential District in Beijing which was built in the mid-1950s. The streetscape is symmetrically more rationally organised, and the architectural enclosure of the district compelled it to become detached from the rest of the city. Susanne Stein (2009) notes that the districts enclosed nature (Figure 5) and its intentionally spatial and infrastructural distance from the city were symbolic for the new relationship between the ‘ideal new city’ and the economy. “The newly built structure and its users functioned within an ‘organic unity’ that guaranteed an efficient functioning between the city and society under the banner of the ’socialist industrialisation of the country’” (Stein 2009: 295, translated from German).

![Figure 4-6: The Baiwanzhuang Residential District](image)

The Baiwanzhuang residential district saw the early emerge of three-storey residential housing blocks which were based on a much higher floor space density (Xu 2010 [1958]: 125).

![Figure 4-7: Model of Baiwanzhuang (Li 1956)](image)

The Baiwanzhuang residential district was still planned according to the Soviet superblock but its design revealed strong signs of localised requirements (e.g. higher density, reduced floor space per capita) (Lu 2006[1956]: 33).
The later years of the 1950s saw the gradual introduction of much bigger urban districts (microdistricts or xiaoqu) which enjoyed an even greater number of facilities (schools, nurseries, libraries, canteens, shops etc.). The administrative tasks of such districts was similarly expanded to four bureaucratic levels: “the neighbourhood committee (63,400 people), the village committee (8,000-10,000 people), the work area (2,000 people) and the small group (300-500 people)” (Zhang and Wang 2001: 138).

Figure 4-8: Layout of Xizhaosi (Beijing)
Layout of Xizhaosi (Beijing). Legenda: 1) secondary school, 2) primary school, 3) nursery, 4) canteen, 5) shops, 6) boiler house, 7) special use, 8) four-storey house (Pan 2002: 8)

Figure 4-9: Xizhaosi residential area (Beijing)
The Xizhaosi residential area in Beijing was one of the earliest microdistricts in China. The area is comprised of 3 to 8 storey houses (Zhang and Wang 2001; Carmannini 2008).
The linking of production with residential housing also politicised the role of the architect who came to facilitate the Party in its objective of emancipating the workers and to assist it with the spreading and evolution of a socialist everydayness\textsuperscript{26}.

\textit{The Urban Everyday Life}

The nationalisation and collectivisation\textsuperscript{27} of private enterprises and land in the period from 1953 to 1956 together with the concurrent elimination of private home ownership meant that the state now enjoyed a “virtual monopoly on urban housing” (Cheng and Selden 1997: 36). The work unit became for the majority of urban dwellers the most common form of urban housing in the 1950s. By the 1960s it provided residence and work to 90 per cent of the urban population (Campanella 2008)\textsuperscript{28}. It soon became clear that “[t]he quality of life”, as Lu argues, “had to be sacrificed to achieve industrialisation” (2007: 130).

The growing spatial compression of leisure and work resulted in the gradual shifting of the identity of urban residents who increasingly felt forced to identify themselves with their work unit. The spatial demarcation of urban social relations also restricted the physical mobility of urban residents and limited social interaction outside people’s walled work units. The containment of residents within the confinement of their work units was further bolstered by what Holston (2005) and Scully (1963) described in another context as the “slow death of the street” as the “sparse network of wide roads… provided scant space for public gathering or consumption” (Abramson 2008: 235). This process started reached its climax during the time of the Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) during which literally everything had to be sacrificed for higher levels of production (see for example Dikötter 2010).
From the late 1950s onwards, bathrooms and kitchens were often removed from individual danyuan and replaced by communal facilities. The introduction of common corridors, which linked the different residential dwellings in the work units, formed another space-saving and economical method to house workers and their families. The result of this development was a further intensification of space, which eventually resulted in the creation of the people’s communes in 1958. These communes will receive attention in the next section. It is perhaps first worth considering how such relatively autonomous spatial island affected the urban space as a whole.

The growing significance of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), in terms of employment and contribution to GDP and the growing intertwining of labour and housing, put incredible pressure on the role and purpose of municipal governments. The municipal government, which initially had been responsible for supplying public utilities (such as water, electricity, housing, schools, infrastructure etc.), came to be undermined by the new spatial organisation. The confusion over the allocation of responsibilities was temporally resolved in 1954 in a regulation on the division of investment by the State Planning Commission which granted SOEs responsibilities for the allocation of investment for public services and infrastructure within the confines of their enterprise (Bray 2005). The result was similar to the experience in other communist countries (see for example Maxim 1996) in that collectively and state owned danwei transformed into “islands or small kingdoms within the city, with almost complete control over their own spatial realm and with a source of funding independent of city authorities.” (Bray 2005: 143).

These developments allowed Chinese work units to increasingly become self-sustaining, demarcated clusters within a larger (and progressively less coherent) urban
setting. The units also increasingly came to perform of what were previously state functions (insurance, pensions, security etc.) which made them centres of both ‘maternity’ (welfare or bao) and ‘paternity’ (control or kong) (Dittmer and Lu 1996: 248). Bray similarly notes that “within the highly ordered walled compounds… almost all aspects of work-unit members' lives are organised, arranged and policed” (Bray 1997: 36).

It is important to note, however, that despite their detachment from older spatial-political unities and growing self-governing functionality, work units acted in strict accordance with the political and economic objectives set by the central government. One must thus be careful in granting these units too much of an autonomous, decentralised status since their responsibility continued, first and foremost to be determined by the economic objectives set out in the centrally orchestrated production plans provided by the central authorities. Feng (1998: 57) describes the process of political and economic top-down decentralisation as a “need to strive [towards a model of] State patronage.”

The rationale for the work units was, to summarise, twofold. The political-economic dimension focused on achieving the targets listed by the central authorities in the Five Year Plans. The social-political underpinning rationale behind the increasingly rigidly formatted spatial demarcations in the city was, in turn, comprised of three objectives: 1) to discourage social interaction with individuals outside the residential work site, 2) to strengthen a socialist consciousness and subjectivity and 3) to direct the social formation of identities into models of collective self-governance. The last factor referred to the production of self-controllable bodies that could perform with (too much) orchestration from above. The city under Mao transformed consequentially into a walled urban microcosm that almost accidentally happened to
be located in a bigger urban space. The disciplined homogeneity which was enforced and engineered by the changes in the production of space consequently helped to give form to a “productive-place identity” (Bjorklund 1986: 21). The relationship between space and politics helped to create a socialist subjectivity that in different ways (both economically and socially) helped legitimise the CCP and the concrete abstraction of the nation state. The conforming of the everyday life to these two objectives further intensified during the Great Leap Forward (GFF). The GFF period was characterised by an obsession for ever-greater levels of production. This would eventually result into the discovery and popularisation of so-called ‘urban communes’.

The Urban Communes

The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) was in the cities meant to intensify the ideological underpinnings of the spatial-political reproduction in urban everyday life. This was visible in the rise of the already briefly mentioned communes. The communes were significantly larger than the previous work units were, and even to an even greater extent self-reliant for their subsistence. The objective of communes was to increase production and even out the mode of national development by ‘ruralising the urban’ and ‘urbanising the rural’\textsuperscript{32}. The first of the Great Leap Forward years saw nearly the entire rural population organise into almost 24,000 of such communes. There was initially not an official campaign for urban communes, which meant that they were few in number and organised by locals (mainly housewives). This changed, however, after the CCP’s formal and official acceptance and endorsement of the urban communes in 1960\textsuperscript{33}. The urban communes came by the Party considered to be “tools for transforming the old cities and building new ones” (The Sixth Plenum Of The Eighth Central Committee in Wang 2011: 384). Schurmann (1968) estimates that the number of urban residents living in communes subsequently increased from about a
million in late 1959 to over 52 million (or about 80 per cent of the total urban population) in the summer of 1960.

The urban communisation project was, however, because of the increasingly apparent economic ineffectiveness of the rural communes, never as strictly orchestrated as in the countryside. The urban communes were compared to their strictly organised rural counterparts more generically defined and enjoyed a greater sense of liberty in their spatial organisation. The more flexible attitude towards the later urban communes was the result of the growing awareness that the earlier urban communes had proven to be highly ineffective in their economic performance.

The perhaps first and most well-known example of the urban communes was the Zhengzhou (Henan province) Textile Factory Commune. It later changed its name into the ‘Red Flag Commune’. The commune was among the first of the 173 urban communes that were established later in 1958 throughout Henan (Salaff 1967). The commune was visited in August 1958 by an impressed Mao (Salaff 1967). Figure 9 shows another proto-commune in Tianjin which was planned in 1958 to similarly become a ‘big socialist family’ (*Shehui zhuyi da jiating*)\(^{34}\) and to serve as an inspiration source for the communes of the later 1950s and early 1960s (Zhao 2007).
Figure 4-11: Hongshun Li People’s Commune (Tianjin)

Hongshun Li People’s Commune (Tianjin) layout. The urban commune was built in the period 1958-1962 and covered an area of 16,000 square meters (37 percent of which had a residential purpose). Legend: 1) danyuan, 2) communal dining hall and kitchen, 3) shop, 4) bank, 5) bathrooms (female), 6) bathrooms (male), 7) toilets, 8) laundry rooms, 9) lobby and reception, 10) day-care facilities 168 (plan from Huang [1958] 1983, numbering added)

The majority of these early urban communes were, as stated before, of an experimental nature. The construction was motivated initially by social-economic reasons. They allowed women and the elderly, for example, to integrate more effectively in the production process. They also allowed for an optimised distribution of resources among the inhabitants. The production process in the urban communes was often based on less technologically advanced and more labour intensive types of work. The priority given to production during the GLF meant that many of these communes started to facilitate an ever-wider range of social functions (e.g. schools, workshops, residences etc.).

The lived space in communes had, in other words, strong sociological and ideological ramifications. Dutton’s (in Weidong 1995) insightful analysis of social control in China’s urban territories shows us, for example, how the annihilated spatial
and psychological distance between work and dwelling resulted in a mode of socialist production (jiti shenghuo) which furthered the earlier discussed formations of a collectivist consciousness and socialist subjectivity. The production of a socialist everyday life also informed the creation of public canteens, dubbed ‘bastions of socialism’, which became the only places where commune members could dine. Private kitchens were left abandoned. The public canteens were established “in an attempt to level differences in consumption and completely shift household preparation and eating to the collective” (Chang and Wen in Klein 2010: 55). The urban communes and their ‘bottom-up’ orientation were, considered as a solution to the closing of the gap between the ideology of the Party and the consciousness of the people. This process of decentralisation allowed the Party, in other words, to better transfer its ideas to the local population and within the disciplinary confinements of the commune’s walled compound. The urban communes took over the responsibilities of the earlier mentioned Residential Committees as the CCP’s spatial instruments for the distribution of knowledge and power.

The urban commune experiment ultimately failed for its economic and organisational ineffectiveness (see e.g. Salaff 1967). The underlying concept of the urban communes and other such urban housing projects (ie. a strict linkage between work and dwelling) was, despite its shortfalls, never entirely abandoned. It was instead reconceptualised in 1961 after the Minister of Labour (Ma Wen-jui) publicly delegitimised the project by openly raising doubts over the economic efficiency of the communes. The period after the GLF did not diminish, or fundamentally alter the firmly embedded spatial relationship between the site of work and dwelling. Naughton (1994) shows that the period after the GLF, in fact, witnessed the completion of such urban housing projects. The previous bottom-up approach to urban development was,
however, transformed into an approach with a more hierarchical top-down orientation. The increased control over rural-urban migration granted the state virtually total domination over the allocation of employment and the distribution of resources. This was particularly visible in the rigid integration of the earlier mentioned *hukou* registration system during the period of national recovery (1961-1965)\textsuperscript{36}. The strict enforcement of the *hukou* system effectively banned newcomers, who were without proof of membership of a *danwei*, from coming to the cities. These changes effectively immobilised the entire rural Chinese population, which earlier had migrated in large numbers to the cities, and transformed urban areas into remote and disconnected islands. The forced immobilisation of citizens effectively separated the urban from the countryside.

*National Recovery (1961-1965) and the Beginnings of the Cultural Revolution*

The same year (1961) that the urban communes were criticised was also the beginning of a readjustment programme that would overturn the increasingly visible catastrophic consequences of the GLF. The plan intended to recover the health of the national economy\textsuperscript{37}. The recovery project was also meant to alter the industrial and social makeup of the city. The Sino-Soviet split, however, almost immediately reversed the planned spatial reorganisation of urban areas. The split led the CCP to decide to reallocate many of the national industries to more remote areas. The ‘Three Fronts (or Lines) construction’ (*sanxian jianshe*)\textsuperscript{38}, as the project came to be known, was at its heart meant to protect industrial development from the dangers of geopolitical threats (mainly from the Soviet Union and from the US’ presence in Vietnam).

The project had also strong social and economic consequences. Naughton (1988: 353) argues, for instance, that the project received top priority and came to
“dominate Chinese industrialisation efforts for the next seven years [1964-1971]”\textsuperscript{39}. Schoenhals and Macfarquhar (2006) note that the Third Front absorbed over 55 per cent of total national investment in 1970. Factories in formerly industrial cities were dismantled and reallocated to new cities remote areas, while entirely new rail networks were constructed to feed these new urban spaces. These novel urban spaces were, in other words, effectively produced from scratch, or completely rebuilt from earlier urban foundations. The construction of many of these cities failed, however, to materialise due to the chaos that occurred in the advent of the Cultural Revolution. Those sites that were, in fact, finalised (later on in the 1970s) soon fell into disarray to finally become ghost towns or so-called ‘diseased cities’ (Chen 2007).

Figure 4-12: General factory of asbestos


Figure 4-13: Workers Dormitory

‘Workers Dormitory’ (2004)\textsuperscript{40}

The withdrawal of Soviet-led urban planning and the repatriation of thousands of Soviet experts at the height of the Sino-Soviet crises further affected existing city planning. Soviet experts abandoned urban planning during the first half of the 1960s. China’s most respected architecture journal, \textit{jianzhu xuebao} (or journal of architecture), established by the new ‘Chinese Architecture and Engineering Society’, published its last article in 1966, before it finally recommenced publishing in 1973.\textsuperscript{41} The ‘up to the mountains and down to the villages’ campaigns (\textit{shangshan xiaxiang}) provided the last blow to China’s impressive urban project\textsuperscript{42}. It did not take long for urban landscapes in the East to deteriorate, while cities in the western regions
gradually started to transform into industrial rust belts or military complexes (cf. Lin 2002).

The 1960s witnessed how urban construction virtually came to a standstill. City life increasingly confined itself to compound walls. “[T]he concept of the main street, of shopping precincts, and of city life as we know it began to fade into memory, and as these things waned the work unit spread into most areas of life.” (Dutton 1999: 76). The slow ‘death of the street’, a phrase taken from Scully (1963), was followed by the gradual ‘de-urbanisation’ of Chinese cities in the 15 years after the GLF. Developments such as these have led some to regard especially this period as symbolic of Mao’s embedded anti-urban ideology. This is perhaps somewhat premature. The spaces of and the everyday life in the city were, as we have seen, of great importance for the effective functioning of the CCP. The city became through the intense partitioning and production of space an effectively policed and disciplined space for the CCP’s art of governance. This strategy successfully depoliticised and neutralised possible forms of urban spatial resistance. This was, however, to change with the coming of the Cultural Revolution (CR). The CR is, I believe, to have been the only period, during the communist era, in which the legitimacy of the space of the state and the Party state-led production of space was seriously challenged.

**Reproducing and Reimagining Beijing**

The reproduction of space, according to changes in social organisation, is not unique to communist China. There exist countless examples from around the world in which architectural forms, past and present, have been used to transcend new political paradigms. These transformations are often epitomised in the capitals or the politically most important cities of a state. This was true for Hitler’s ‘Welthauptstadt Germania’ in Berlin, Mussolini’s nostalgic *Terza Roma* and, of course, for Franco’s Falangist...
Plan Bigador in Madrid. The production of new space meant, however, also that older spaces had either to be destroyed or at least fundamentally altered in their ideological representation. This form of ‘creative destruction’ intends to both symbolise and legitimise the arrival of a new social-political system. The specific spatial (and ideological) struggle over China’s national identity, a direct consequence of the political transition between the nationalist and the communist production of space, was most visible in the country’s political epicentre.

A political struggle emerged immediately after the Party’s decision to make Beijing the nation state’s official capital (September 1949). The argument was between those that wished to preserve the city (led by the architect earlier mentioned Liang Sicheng and Chen Zhangxin) and those (headed by the Soviet planner M.G. Barannikov) that wanted to reconstruct the old centre of Beijing and turn it into the new CCP headquarters. Chairman Mao’s personal involvement in favouring the plan proposed by the latter group, which wanted to locate the new government of the PRC inside Beijing’s old imperial quarters, is symbolic of the CCP’s self-appropriated vanguard role. The plan and the CCP attached great significance to political (temporal and spatial) centrality. The plan endorsed the medium of creative destruction that would help to both legitimise the arrival of a new state and ideology and to forget what came before it. It was clear to the Party that there could not be two spatially adjacent centres rivalling for political and historical legitimacy. It became evident that the old centre had to be destroyed.

The Soviet argument that Beijing was “a consumption city, where most residents are merchants, not labouring people” and that there was “hence the need for work to industrialise the city” (Barannikov in Wang 2011: 104, 105) provided the Party another impetus to prefer the Soviet plan (see Figure 13). This preference was
echoed by Mao who had made it no secret that he wanted forests of factory chimneys to mushroom in Beijing (Wang Jun in Gu 2004)\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure_4-14.png}
\caption{Barannikov’s plan for Beijing’s urban reconstruction}
\end{figure}

Barannikov’s plan for Beijing’s urban reconstruction (1950) (in Gu, Yuan et al. 2010)

The decision to reproduce the space of the Forbidden City was also influenced by the earlier Soviet experience. The restructuring of the old centre of Moscow had similarly compelled the demolition of the old ‘Cathedral of Christ the Saviour’ (\textit{Khram Khrista Spasitelya}) in 1931. The Soviet plan had followed the principle of a reconstructed centre over the construction of an entirely new political heart. The Moscow Master Plan (1935) served as an excellent roadmap for Party officials in the drafting of their own proposal for restructuring Beijing\textsuperscript{47}. Liang and Chen continued to protest and provided their own plan (figure 11). Their counter proposal, was, however rejected by the Soviet experts who argued that Stalin had considered the idea of preserving the old Moscow as an “unpractical bourgeois fantasy” (Hu 2006: 11)\textsuperscript{48}.
The Liang-Chen plan (‘Proposal on the Location of the Central Administration District of the Central People’s Government’) based on a division of the old city (the blue encircled (right) is the old imperial city and in red (left) encircled the new administrative centre) (reproduced from the original Liang [February 1950] plan in Wu 1999: 21; see also Hung 2010: 28, 29; and Wang 2011: 112, 113). A similar, yet functionally different, plan had been proposed by the Japanese imperial forces in December 1938.

In a last attempt to save their proposal and their vision of the city, Liang and Chen sent two letters to Premier Zhou Enlai asking him to reconsider their proposals for preserving the Forbidden City. Zhou had made it, however, earlier already apparent that he wanted “Tiananmen Square [to be] the center of mass activities and entertainment for the people of Beijing, nay, for the people of the entire country” (Zhou in Wang 2011[1949]: 42, 43). The Liang-Chen plan was by other party officials similarly said to “negate the importance of Tiananmen as the national political center, which the entire Chinese people love” (Wang 2011: 131).49

The ultimate rejection of the ‘second-centre plan’ came after the Party’s endorsement of a proposal drafted in 1953 by exclusively party members and Soviet experts (known as the ‘Changguanlou Team’) 50. This plan (‘Key Points in the Draft
Plan for Renovation and Expansion of Beijing’) made it explicitly clear that that it was considered to be essential “to designate the core area of the city as home to the leading organs of the Party Central Committee” (in Wang 2011: 159). It also stated that it “attached paramount importance to industrial development, in order that urban construction in the city will serve the needs of the city’s industrialisation” (Wang 2011: 159).

One could perhaps argue that the fate of the Liang-Chen plan had already been sealed in 1949 when Mao appropriated Zhongnanhai, which previously had been used as a place of residence for the imperial family, as his own residential compound. Beijing went through a long and extensive process of ‘creative destruction’. The primary reason why the CCP’s administrative centre ultimately never managed to integrate itself fully into the old city was of a mere financial nature (Wang 2011: 164-172). The reproduction of space was simply too costly and production instead focused on the ‘empty space’ in front of the old city.

**People’s Space**

The authority granted to Tiananmen Square, which only decades before was known as the “empty space outside Tianan Gate” (Strand 1985: 412), is a good example of the CCP’s strong awareness of the importance of space for governance. The square soon came to symbolise the legitimacy and unity of the new socialist state\(^5\). The CCP’s specific preference for Tiananmen Square, as the national midpoint of ideological legitimacy, was by no means a coincidence. The preference was instead the result of a carefully weighted decision to deploy the historically laden site as the spatial visualisation of a new, modern China. Mao (2007 [1939]) identified himself here as a legitimate heir of the May Fourth movement which had earlier transformed
the formerly empty space in front of the Forbidden City to “a representational space of people’s action” (Lee 2008: 39).

The location of the square, in front of the Forbidden City, physically and ideologically challenges the older spatial-political authority. The authority which resided in the spatial organisation of the Forbidden City was destroyed, disregarded and sequentially forgotten or tamed (through a process of ‘museumification’) (Watson 1995). The marginalisation of the splendour that was the Forbidden City contrasted sharply with that of the view held by the GMD which previously had attempted to colonise and incorporate the history of the Forbidden City into a nationalist narrative. The communists attempted instead to undermine and consequentially relegate the site to the past by emphasising the importance of the square in front of it.

“The old architectural complex of the Forbidden City, which settled along the central axial line, … receded to a place resembling the ‘backyard’ of the square; it had been relegated to a secondary status” (Hou and Wu in Hung 2001: 459). The destruction of buildings around the old square was not only meant to create the vast space necessary for political gatherings, but was also “considered a symbolic gesture to destroy the past” (Wu 2005: 23). The demolition of the old buildings along the square resulted in an open space that measured more than 200,000 square meters, sufficiently large to accommodate 160,000 people. Alongside and on the square itself, architecturally new structures arose to represent and constitute the arrival of both the new state and a new ideology. Many of these new buildings embedded a socialist realist style that was to sometimes substitute and, at other times, overlap the architecture and legitimacy of the older buildings. The reproduction of space inspired perceptions and sentiments of a new, socialist China.
The Monument to the People’s Heroes (renmin yingxiong jinianbei xingjian weiyuanhui), for which the location was already decided upon before Mao’s actual proclamation speech in October 1949, was symbolically placed on the central axis that connected the square with the Forbidden City. The provocative location of the structure gained political weight by its untraditional northern orientation. It challenged Tianan Gate as the port to the Forbidden City and broke the traditional Chinese South-North axis of orientation.

The anonymous heroes displayed in the low reliefs of the structure similarly show an attempt to forge a rupture with the past. There is no historical reference from before the First Opium War. The depictions exclusively focus on post 1840 events such as the May 4th Movement (1919) and the infamous Nanchang Uprising (1927). Such times and spaces of representation illustrate both the appropriation and annihilation of history. The consequences of the denial of the Qing efforts to introduce modernity to China, discussed in the last chapter, find their source here. The CCP cognitively and popularly presented the year 1949 as the historically definitive rupturing moment between the period of liberalisation (jiefang hou) and pre-liberalisation (jiefang quan). The radical breaking with previous space and time performed, however, also the very cornerstone on which a new utopian future could be materialised.

**People’s Time**

The monument and its location convey not only an important spatial-political message, but also a temporal-political one. The structure, in other words, spatially challenges the authority of the Forbidden City, and temporally embodies and offers an alternative ordering of history. The message embedded in the reliefs and location of the monument compels a reorientation in the relationship between the subject and the
state. The CCP appropriated time in name of and for the state. The CCP, as the author of History and the Architect of state space, gradually transforms into the state. It does this by altering the perceived and lived space of its subjects. This becomes even clearer when we analyse the monument’s reliefs in more detail.

The unidentified heroes in the reliefs are portrayed fighting historical battles against the enemies of the People. They are, in the process, of overcoming the tragedy and humiliation of the time before their liberation. The representation transcends a message to the People who ought to “remember that collectively it is they, the masses, who make history” (Dutton, Lo et al. 2008: 21). They are the heroes. The reflective theme of identification with the state and the CCP was, at least until the Cultural Revolution, repeated in the hundreds of statues that sprung up across the country in the 1950s and 1960s. The spaces and times of representation delimited and reorganised subjectivities according to the logic of a collective memory, a kind of memory that served the legitimacy of the party and, therefore, the state.

The anonymous identities and monotonous faces in depictions of people as heroes on reliefs and in statues finds its equivalent in the cenotaphs dedicated to Unknown Soldiers that similarly portray the surrender of individuality in support for an abstract and anonymous nation state identity. The memory that survives after the struggle is not the identity of the heroes, but the historical significance of ‘their’ sacrifice for the nation state. To paraphrase Anderson (2006b: 10, original emphasis): *Who else could they be but Chinese?* The Monument to the Heroes is, however, definitely not without a signature. The structure exposes the potent and supposed vanguard role of the CCP and especially the almost deified role of Mao in it. The schism between the anonymous People and the unconcealed visibility of the Party, as
the representation of the state, would later contribute to the underlying reason for the, later discussed, antagonistic Cultural Revolution.

The spaces of representation in and of Beijing and Tiananmen attempt to link the state with the nation and the Party with People. Beijing was spatially at the centre of this effort and Tiananmen Square stood at the heart of the centre. The centralisation of the state not only presented itself through spaces of representation. The CCP also attempted to do this through a centralised representation of time. The Party decided to abandon the five time zones that the GMD had established during the Republican years. It instead endorsed a new universal ‘Beijing time’ (*Beijing shijian*)\(^{58}\) (Beijing Time is technically not set according to the actual longitude of Beijing). The standardisation of time was thought to be of such importance that its integration was established before Mao’s 1949 declaration speech (Dutton, Lo et al. 2008). The CCP realised that time zones work as geographically demarcated temporalities. Their unification therefore offers the means to unify different geographies into one unified temporality. The new national time embodied a unified, revolutionary temporality that negated the logic of imperial Greenwich Time.

The representation of time as centred on Beijing also had a profound effect on the everyday life (and biorhythms) of the Chinese people. People were forced to arrange their lives to the spatial heart of the state.\(^{59}\) The consequences of the universalisation of time\(^{60}\) on the everyday life were therefore similar as the effects of the production of space in the earlier discussed work units. Lived space and time changed, in other words, according to the state-led production of time and space. The experience of both time and space in work units was, to put it yet differently, centred on the interest of the state. The production of time and space presented and embedded a form of political knowledge (and thus power) to which the body and mind of
individuals were forced to adjust to, both spatially and temporally. It was through this knowledge that the party was able to create a socialist subjectivity which allowed the CCP to receive legitimacy. The abstract space of the state, in return, received a very concrete meaning in the form of the everyday life.

The CCP’s reproduction of space and time resulted, however, not in a complete tabula rasa of time and space. Existing spaces and histories were rather re-inscribed with new meanings to serve the present (gu wei jin yong). The name Tiananmen Guangchang (‘Heavenly Peace Square’), which it received after the May Fourth demonstration, was adopted, for example, by the CCP. Mao and Zhou explicitly refused to alter the name even during campaign to ‘destroy the old and foster the new’ (tui chen chu xin) at the height of the Cultural Revolution (Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006: 115, 116).

Wu’s (2005) discussion on Mao’s eternalised presence on the rostrum of Tiananmen gate is another example which shows how the authority embedded in the old is reinterpreted to serve the political paradigm of the new. Wu shows how Mao’s ‘authoritative gaze’ is similar in intent and action to the imperial gaze briefly discussed in chapter two with reference to the urban planning of the kaogongji. He (2005: 96) argues that just “like the ‘extraordinary scene of prosperity’ displayed… at the emperor’s front door, the colourful pageantry in the new Tiananmen Square has continued to help forge symbolic ties between the ruler and the subjects (now called the leader and the people).” The government used the historically latent symbolism of Tianan Gate, in other words, as the material space and time of representation that would serve the interest of state. The state relentlessly reproduced the space of representation (on banknotes, coins, photos, paintings emblems, stamps etc.) as a national symbol of imagined national unity.
The reproduction of space, such as Tiananmen Square among others\textsuperscript{61}, led to a spatial reorganisation of history for the creation of a new national identity, history and socialist consciousness. The production of time and space worked, to summarise, in tandem to allow for the legitimisation and concretisation of a new socialist nation state.

**Tiananmen Square during the Leap Forward**

The Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) brought about a further intensification in the use of space and time by and for the state. This was architecturally in Tiananmen Square made most visible in the construction of the famous ‘Ten Great Buildings’ (*shida jianzhu*)\textsuperscript{62}. The structures, built in a ten-month (1958 to 1959), celebrated the tenth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. The buildings and the vast extension of the square symbolised and reinforced the position of Beijing as the political heart of the state. It also reaffirmed the role of the Party as the vanguard of the People. The buildings meant to “[honour] the present by demonstrating the achievements that a spirited people had made in merely a decade since their liberation” (Wu 2005: 108).

The immensity of the structures (640,000 m\textsuperscript{2}), the thousands that were involved and the tight deadline underlined the message the state wished to convey. The People make their own history (through the production of space).

This message echoed earlier already in the Heroes Monument, but is here repeated and more meant to emphasise the importance of the People for the creation of the future. The location of the structured was also here politically and symbolically determined. The location of the two politically most important buildings (the Great Hall of the People\textsuperscript{63} and the Museum of Chinese History), which are also the two biggest in size, are closest in proximity to the Tianan Gate. The underlying objective of the buildings was meant to symbolise “China's emergence as a modern state” (Andrews 1994: 228).
The representational space of a new future was ideologically, however, as important as the destruction of the old space. The production of a new space for a new future meant, in other words, that the old space of the past had to be destroyed to enable a decisive break with history. This was, as we have seen, a selective process. Some spaces were re-inscribed. The GLF was a period, however, that was mostly marked by destruction. The state destroyed almost all of Beijing’s 40 kilometres of outer city walls and city gates. Many other ancient structures were during the GLF either dismantled for industrial purposes, or transformed into factories to increase production to ever-higher levels. Tiananmen Square witnessed the biggest transformation from the old to the new China. In a period of a mere month, 10,129 houses were dismantled to allow enough space for the aggrandisement of the Square (Wang 2011). Mao was personally involved in the reconstruction, and had instructed Peng Zhen (then Mayor of Beijing) “that Tiananmen should be extended from the former Chang’an Left Gate and Chang’an Right Gate southward to the city wall at Zhengyangmen” (figure 14). The result was a Square which fitted to the “dimensions of ‘political man’ and the great collectives required by ‘man of the new society’” (Liang in Wang 2011: 379).

Figure 4-16: Tiananmen Square (1950)
The emphasis on enormity, which the CCP placed in all its building endeavours, is also visible in the Great Hall of the People. The Hall occupies 170,000 m² intended to “show the people the great accomplishments of the party and also to tell the world that the Chinese could perform miracles... perhaps even surpassing that of their Western counterparts” (Hung 2010: 65). The building hosts an equally grandiose (5.5 by 9 meters) painting, which Wu (2005: 124) describes as the “focal image of the entire building”, inspired by a poem (Qin yuan chunxue or ‘Snow’) from Mao’s hand. The subject of the painting is a representational landscape of China over which an overlooking red sun (located in the east) shines. The watchful presence of Mao or the Party over the territory of the state is not a unique theme. The same kind of representation has been reproduced (especially during the Cultural Revolution) in numerous forms.
Figure 4-18: This Land So Rich in Beauty (1959)

‘This Land So Rich in Beauty’, painted by Fu Baoshi and Guan Shanyue in 1959.

Although the painting instils many traditional features (e.g. calligraphy, thick brush strokes and poetic connotations), its location in the Great Hall, its impressive size and politicised themes leave the observer with little confusion about the painting’s message of modern nationhood (Andrews 1994). The representational space serves, in fact, the same rhetorical and persuasive purpose as the early Qing maps that very similarly depicted the grandeur and the natural unity of state and territory, people and rulership. The production of space provides the abstract state with meaning and legitimacy. The popularity of landscape painting traditionally symbolises a certain desire to identify and transcend principles of natural order, human virtuosity and timeless beauty (see e.g. Mitchell 2002). The same logic equally applies here to the Chinese experience. The space of representation is not merely the dialectic outcome of the social relations underlying them. Such paintings also inform these social relations. Representational space in painted form, therefore, not only unifies contested territories,
but also reifies the political nature of unity into a sense of a beautiful and historical belonging.\textsuperscript{68}

The painting does not, however, instil or convey a message of a nostalgic past, but in fact offer the promise of a utopian future. This future, represented during many of the spaces in the GLF, is characterised by the knowledge of a unified socialist nationhood under the watchful leadership of the CCP. This feeling of national identity and consciousness was in the late 1950s not only strengthened in representational form of paintings, architectures and public squares, but was, as we have seen, also felt in the everyday life of the work unit. The utopian ideal of a unified people’s nation under the leadership of an omnipotent Party ended during the Cultural Revolution in which the relationship between the People and the Party came to a fundamental rupture.

**The Cultural Revolution**

**Introduction**

The origins of the Cultural Revolution (CR), which took place from approximately 1966 to 1975, stems from Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin and the subsequent Soviet revising of Marxist-Leninism. The revision would later forge a rift between China and the Soviet Union. The rift can, however, not be explained without reference to the rise of Mao and Maoism before and during the Cultural Revolution. Maoism’s effective and distinctive dialectic integration of theory and practise could ideologically not be reconciled with Soviet revisionism. Maoism is the total negation of the state and Party.

The historical sequence of events that led to Mao’s infamous August 1966 appearance on Tiananmen has extensively been discussed by Macfarquhar and Schoenhals (2006). Their account illustrates and emphasises the overwhelming
influence that Mao had on the unfolding of the CR which sequentially evolved into what Mao personally defined as a “nationwide all-round civil war” (Mao in Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). Their analysis, rich in detail, explains, however, little about the actual purpose of the CR. The C, generally speaking, is too often portrayed as the individual project of a deluded zealot. This section will instead commence from the view that the intention of the CR primarily focused on the politicisation of Chinese citizens in an effort to overcome the ‘statification of the party’ (Wang 2006b)69.

The production of space that ensued from the RC’s revolutionary overturning of the institutions of the state was not so much characterised by the intensification of new state spaces. The CR marked itself rather by the (oft-violent) destruction, reconceptualisation and reinterpretation of state spaces. Space was politicised. The CR was therefore as much a cultural as a spatial revolution. The spatial revolution should here, however, not be understood as the static consequences of Maoism’s revolutionary politics. Space acted instead as the constitutive medium for realising the objective of mass politicisation. The trademark ideal of the CR was the production of a revolutionary consciousness for the overturning of the state. Narratives of the CR granted space therein a central role.

The world is yours, as well as ours, but in the last analysis, it is yours. You young people, full of vigour and vitality, are in the bloom of life, like the sun at eight or nine in the morning. Our hope is placed on you. *The world belongs to you. China's future belongs to you* (Mao 1966 (original in 1957, but reprinted in the 'Little Red Book': 288, own emphasis)
The creation of a new world and the birth of a new revolutionary subject presented themselves as two intertwined concepts. Production of space and the political, as understood in chapter two, were therefore symbiotic and reinforcing. Space no longer referred mainly what Marxists have identified as the economic ‘base’. Maoism upgraded the status of space to the level of ‘superstructure’. Space became the means to transform the economic base through the politicisation of subjectivity. Mao’s astute awareness of the importance of the superstructure, is arguably his biggest contribution to Marxist theory. The privileging of superstructure in the CR marked a transition from a period in which with the emphasis lay on the physical production of space (e.g. danwei, communes etc.) to a period in which those spaces of representation were questioned and challenged.

This became immediately noticeable at the official start of the CR in 1966. The grand ceremony that celebrated Mao’s return to politics in front of hundreds of thousands of Red Guards was in its size paralleled by the historical precedence it set. The heralding of a new era and a new utopian space for a new people meant that old spaces and old people first needed to be destroyed (or criticised) and reconceptualised (or re-educated). The revolutionary politicisation of space was announced first in a People’s Daily editorial in June 1966 before it spread like wildfire through the country.

The dictum that “[t]here is no construction without destruction” (Mao 2007 [1940]: 369) had in 1966 become the officially adopted mantra of the CR. The dictum of ‘destroying the four olds, establishing the four news’ (po si jiu, li si xin)’ was mainly targeted at superstructural architectures and sites that some decades prior to the CR had been ‘sinicised’ to legitimise the unity of the Chinese nation state and GMD. The Cultural Revolution was therefore, I believe, primarily an attempt to negate the
state spaces of representation in an attempt to eventually bring down the Party and the abstract state itself.

**After the First Negation**

The destructive elements of the Cultural Revolution had an earlier precursor in the so-called ‘Architectural Design Revolution’ that was launched in 1964. The objective of this state-led initiative was to force planners and architects alike to abandon ‘bourgeois ideologies’ and to break with Soviet urban planning traditions. Planner and urban designers were subjected to the general will of the people. Many architects and urban planners were compelled to write self-criticisms and were later ‘sent down to the countryside’ for ‘re-education’ purposes. Professors and teachers of architecture and planning were required to assist in and learn from the construction of rural communes; architectural departments in universities and design institutes closed down and established planning practitioners were forced into admitting past ideological errors.

Urban housing during the 1960s followed a conservative cost-saving rationale, while design was kept as simple as possible. The primitive *gandalei* houses (composed of clay), in the settlements surrounding the oilfield of Daqing, were presented as models for urban reproduction during the fourth conference of SAC in late March 1966 (Figure 19). “The low, egalitarian living quality associated with this construction was believed to help suppress the bourgeois lifestyle, and thus made gandalei a symbol of proletarian ideals.” (Fan 1998: 38). The direct result of the lowering of housing requirements was that construction expenditure and living space per capita dropped significantly in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Architectural drawings of an early gandalei house, composed of two apartments (1 room, 2 kitchen, 3 kitchen) (adopted from Fan 1998: 36).

The physical (re)production of space was during the CR kept to a minimum. Urban construction instead focused on the negation of existing places. The struggle that arouse between the different factions of the CR accordingly centred on the spaces of representation. The radicals attempted to politicise the spaces of the state. The ‘moderates’ instead kept to the depoliticised mode of state-led development which emphasised production. Radicals emphasised the importance of superstructure in depictions such as, the latter discussed, village of Xiaojinzhuang. Moderates, on the other hand, stressed more the need for an economic base and supported the Dazhai and Daqing development models.

**Representational Space during the Cultural Revolution**

The production of a ‘new world’ necessitated not only a physical destruction of state sites, but also an ideological negation of the representational sites of the state. People’s Communes, modelled on the earlier Parisian experience, were set up across the country to challenge the Party and its territorial control over the state. In Shanghai, for example, workers and rebels from 38 rebel factions chased out party and military officials so as to autonomously manage the ‘Shanghai people’s commune’ (*Shanghai renmin gongshe*) (Perry 1999). The experience in Shanghai set the precedent for other
parts of the country (e.g. Qingdao and Harbin). Soon proposals emerged to transform Beijing itself into a commune\textsuperscript{77}.

The attempt to overthrow the central state meant that representational spaces of the state were also re-imagined so as to activate a process of repoliticisation of space. Sites went subsequently through a transformation in their perceived representation. The objective was, similarly as in the experience of the Shanghai Commune, focused on the changing of the relationship between politics and space. Representational space acted as the performative medium for the production of a new subjectivity. That meant that the representation of sites became, however, also the battlefield for the competing factions in the CR.

The rural Dazhai Commune (Shanxi province) became, after Mao’s ‘In agriculture learn from Dazhai’ (\textit{nongye xue dazhai}) campaign\textsuperscript{78}, one of the most nationally celebrated political sites. The commune was widely celebrated for being the symbol of China’s new revolutionary subjectivity. The commune is a good example of how representational space gradually became more important than economic productivity. This development marked a departure from the emphasis on ‘base’ to ‘superstructure’ in the early embryonic stages of the CR.

Dazhai became during the early stages of the CR the embodiment of Mao’s call to introduce a revolutionary politics into the rural countryside. “Armed with this powerful ideological weapon [Maoism], it was claimed, they [i.e. local peasants] could terrace steep rocky mountains and recover farmland from rivers and lakes, often with only the most primitive of tools” (Shapiro 2001: 97). The commune transformed into a pilgrim destination for thousands of Red Guards who flooded the site on a daily basis to learn from the hard physical labour of the peasants. Later visitors included numerous foreign representatives of state (including Pol Pot, the Dutch Princess

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Beatrix and Lee Kuan Yew) and high ranked party delegates (Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping etc.).

The Dazhai frenzy led to the dictum: “[W]hatever Dazhai does, the rural areas of the whole country must do” (Chen and Cui in Shapiro 2001: 100). As the CR progressed, radicals intensified the message of Dazhai and spread it across the country. The representational space of the commune featured on thousands of posters (Figure 20) and post stamps that celebrated the revolutionary ideal. The uniqueness of Dazhai was, to sum up, not merely the product of its admittedly impressive productive output. The kind of politics that Dazhai promoted focused instead on the transformation of people’s subjectivity.

![Figure 4-21: Dazhai Propaganda Posters](http://chineseposters.net) (Posters from http://chineseposters.net, last accessed in February 2012)

The oilfield of Daqing (Heilongjiang province), or perhaps rather the political representational space of Daqing, similarly contributed an important part in the spreading of a revolutionary consciousness. The site, in 1963 believed to be one of China’s largest oilfields, was the industrial counterpart of Dazhai, and provided as much symbolically as literally the means for and evidence of China’s self-reliance. The ideological importance of self-sufficiency was also reflected in the site’s social-spatial organisation which was centred on a “series of worker-farmer villages each with a number of living quarters built around them” (Hama 1980: 203). Daqing was organised “as if it were a large commune” (Hama 1980: 186) which combined
industry, education, agriculture and other public services to serve the purpose of self-efficiency.\textsuperscript{80} Wei (2010: 5) notes that “[s]elf-reliance had evolved to become a value system in Daqing” which came to known and praised as the ideology of ‘Daqing-ism’.

As the Cultural Revolution unfolded and its underlying political dynamics shifted in favour of the radicals (headed by Jiang Qing and Wang Hongwen) at the expense of the moderates (Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping), spatial imagery changed with it. The radicals supplanted the ethos of self-sufficiency and hard work, crystallised in the experience of Dazhai and Daqing, and replaced it with an even greater emphasis on cultural production and the transformation of consciousness. The perhaps most prominent site, employed by the radicals, to counter the representational spaces of Daqing and Dazhai was the village of Xiaojinzhuang (Tianjin municipality). After Jiang Qing’s visit in June 1974, the village transformed from an unknown dot on the map into “into a repository of urban imaginings of the countryside” (Brown 2006: 156). Jiang and the radicals politically appropriated the village for their own radical political agenda. Jiang (in Friedman 1978: 876) made it clear that the village was to be considered as the “model of revolution in the superstructure”. The site transformed into a national centre of cultural production which hosted hundreds of theatre plays, poetry sessions and opera performances.

The struggle between the moderates and the radicals was, as the CR intensified, increasingly conducted in representational spaces. The fact that the physical (re)production of space reached a historical low during the later stages of the CR period does not mean that social space became irrelevant. The perception of space was, as shown, instead a crucial element in the unfolding of the CR\textsuperscript{81}. The climax of the struggle between the radicals and the moderates, and hence the outcome of the CR, could, perhaps somewhat unsurprisingly, be nowhere else than in Beijing’s Tiananmen
Square. The site performed as the final showdown between two rivalling factions, and played an important role in the events that followed.

**The Decisive Battle for the Central State Space**

In the midst of the traditional day of mourning (*qingming*) on April 4 and 5 in 1976, hundreds of thousands of people voluntarily assembled in Tiananmen Square to commemorate the death of the popular Premier Zhou Enlai. What was at first a commemorative ceremony, soon turned out to be the start of the end of the group that later was illustriously named the ‘Gang of Four’ (*siren bang*). The radicals interpreted and presented the assembly on Tiananmen Square as a strategically orchestrated attempt by the ‘capitalist roader’ Deng to take hold of power. The subsequent political repression of the radicals worked, however, against their agenda, as anti-Politburo and pro-Zhou slogans and posters started to be heard and to appear on the square. Public discontent on the square intensified after the Politburo’s decision (instigated by Jiang Qing) to clear the square on the night from April 4 to April 5. The violent repression of the demonstrators came to a close after Mao’s personally permitted to use “’fists’ when ‘mouths’ no longer worked” (Mao in Teiwes and Sun 2004: 229).

The significance of the two days of demonstrations stems mainly from the historical and political centrality of the location in which they took place. Before the ‘Tiananmen Incident’ there had been similar demonstration in Nanjing, Wuxi, and Changzhou among other cities that similarly expressed discontent over the way the radicals attempted to disregard Zhou’s legacy. None of these demonstrations, however, fundamentally challenged the superstructural essence of the CR. The earlier discussed centrality of Tiananmen proved, in contrast, a too sizeable obstacle for the radicals to ignore. The square, the central site of legitimacy for the foundation and maintenance
of the PRC, was appropriated, removed from its linkage to the party and used against those that earlier had seized power. The site was repoliticised after its twenty long years of depoliticisation.

The earlier mentioned Heroes Monument performed as the central platform for the demonstrators. Demonstrators laid down wreaths of paper on and around the monument to both commemorate Zhou and to criticise the Gang of Four. This radically transformed the representation of the monument, which now belonged to the People instead of the Party (Figure 21). The appropriation of the site, the heart of the Square and metaphorically of the country, was something the radicals could not tolerate. They impatiently intervened, removed the wreaths and violently crushed the demonstration/commemoration ceremonies. The meaning of the demonstrations was subsequently revised from being a ‘counter-revolutionary’ event to a genuine party-headed revolution (Goodman 1985).

*Figure 4-22: Tiananmen Square*

From the Renmin de daonian pictorial book (人民的悼念) (1979)
Half a year the crushing of the demonstration, the newly appointed Chairman, Hua Guofeng, arrested the ‘Gang of Four’. The fact that the movement had shared many authentic elements (voluntary, superstructural and spatial) characteristic to the ideology of the Cultural Revolution is an ironic piece of history that testifies to the ultimate success of the CR. A few months after Mao’s death in 1976, Hua Guofeng, now effectively paramount leader of the state, approved of the construction of the gigantic Chairman’s Memorial Hall in the very centre of Tiananmen Square. The building initially meant to eternalise Mao’s legacy, but spatially came to undermine the very principles (grounded in permanent class struggle and superstructure) that the CR had stood for. The memorial hall facing the place where Mao had earlier proclaimed the birth of the PRC in 1949 and the place where the Cultural Revolution had begun in 1966 visualised the death of the CR. The monument was the last building constructed on the now final square. The final spatial enclosure represented as such the metaphorical final nail in the coffin of an alternative politics. It would later become again a site of surveillance.
Conclusion

This chapter has described how the production and representation of space played a crucial political role during the first 28 years of the PRC. I have divided the period into two phases based on two distinct political perceptions and uses of space.

The first phase (1949-1961), from the establishment of the PRC to the end of the GLF, was characterised by a strong reliance on an orthodox Soviet development model that emphasised the importance of production. The model transformed formerly ‘consumption cities’ into ‘production cities’. This state-led initiative witnessed a reorganisation of space that altered the subjective experience of space. The rise of work compounds, at the heart of this transformation, gradually came to dominate the Chinese cityscape, and fundamentally challenged the urban everyday life and rhythm of its citizens. The produced space changed the way people lived. I have
conceptualised this transformation as the arrival of a production of space, which in its architectural practise and urban planning, helped to legitimise the new, abstract socialist state. The party appropriated the space of the state and filled it with new meanings, experiences and forms of identification.

The remodelling of Beijing and Tiananmen Square followed in this regard a destruction of the old and the endorsement of the new. Tiananmen became the core space of representation for the new, socialist nation state. The Party appropriated the site and filled it with new temporal and spatial meanings. This did not mean that older forms of space were only physically destroyed, but, and for me more importantly, that history was stripped from its previous past. The Party reconstituted the past by a new version of state history. The physical production of space played an important role in this process. Tiananmen Square was where history begun and where the state would take the People to the future.

The second phase (1966 to 1976) marked a spatial departure from the economic base model. The Cultural Revolution, perhaps the only period when we got a glimpse of pure Maoism, characterised itself by a radical emphasis on superstructure. The change had a profound impact on the deployment of space as a political category. The radicals brought the production of state spaces to an absolute minimum. Spatial politics targeted instead the state-led production of space. This process of negation, perhaps historically unprecedented in communist countries, led to both destruction as well as competition over the meaning of the built environment. The completion of the CR in Tiananmen Square could arguably be said to have symbolised the ‘success’ of the negation and politicisation that characterised the CR. The period ended through the mass appropriation of the central site of state and party power. It marked the end of the Party’s legitimacy and symbolised People’s appropriation of history and space.
The two phases in this chapter have, to shortly summarise, been analysed spatially. That means that I have argued that it was the production of space, in its lived and perceived form, which has performativity influenced the subjectivity and experience of the everyday life of the users of this social space. The first phase is, I believe marked, by a political use of space that was organised in such a manner in order to emphasise the centrality of the party state. The purpose of the production of space was therefore similar to the regimes discussed in the previous chapter, albeit through different means, to concretise the abstract space of the state. The second phase formed a historically radical departure in that regard. The use of space functioned against the spaces of the state (and the state space itself).

The production of space provided the state a right of existence and lent the party the legitimacy to govern. Space and time were produced in such a way so as to become identifiable with the CCP and the revamped Chinese state. The closing of the CR left consequently a void in the representational space of the state. How did the abstract space of the state legitimise itself after the demise of the CCP’s communism? This question, remaining until today at the forefront of discussions on China’s raison d’État, begs us to look at the production of space in the post-1976 period. The next chapter will provide an account of how space in post-1976 China has come to inform and help constitute a new set of social relations. These capitalist social relations, on the one hand, legitimise the state and, on the other hand, by their very (global) nature undermine the space of the state. This tension had earlier proved to be destructive for the ill-fated Qing dynasty. The paradox (or contradiction), touched already upon theoretically in chapter one, will be at the centre of discussion in the remaining two chapters.

Introduction

The arrival of a communist politics in China led, as described in the previous chapter, to an alteration in the way space was perceived, represented and lived. This change was explained and discussed as the consequence of the arrival and integration of a new set of the social relations of production. The spatial transformation that occurred did, however, not merely reflect a political transformation from one form of state (early republicanism) to another (communism), but played instead an important and active role in the legitimisation of the ruling political apparatus and its ideology. I have provided a number of spatial practises (urban planning, architecture, representational imaginations) to illustrate how space was centrally and continuously present and performative in the everyday life of citizens. The presence of politics in the built environment transcended, in other words, the values and norms that constituted the ideology of the CCP.

The reform period (1976-1989) under discussion in this chapter will extend the analysis of Chinese politics to enable an understanding of how space was employed in the period directly after China’s so-called ‘opening-up’ (kai fang) in 1976. Locating temporal points of changes in the production of space is admittedly a risky enterprise. Old forms of production continue to survive and overlap newer ones. The demarcation used in this and all the other chapters trace the origins of historical changes in the organisation and production of space. Locating changes in production of space in time helps me to explain the emergence of new sites and the destruction of old ones. I have
decided to situate the onset of China’s reform process to the year 1976, in which Hua Guofeng was informally appointed by Mao to take over the role of Chairman and Premier. I believe that this political transition marked the beginning of the closing of the Maoist years and the gradual arrival of a new sort of spatial politics. The transition marked, at first unquestionably unintended, the end of a revolutionary politics and the gradual start of a new set of social relations based on the capitalist mode of production. The contradictions that consequentially emerged from this shift ultimately led to the Tiananmen Protests in 1989 that provided the fertile ground for the full-scale implementation of market reforms and the country’s reintegration in the world economy in the 1990s (chapter 6).

This reintegration into the capitalist world economy would have been impossible, however, without the ‘opening-up’ of the country in 1976. The metaphor of ‘opening up’ naturally carries inherent spatial connotations. The metaphor does not refer to only a conventional economic or political process of ‘extra-nationalisation’ or ‘inter-nationalisation’, but also has a strong materialist dimension. Cities, for example, were ‘opened-up’ both spatially in their layout as well as morphologically through the incorporation of ‘foreign’ forms. The opening-up of cities, therefore, also implied a reorganisation of the experience of everyday life. Work units walls were destroyed; high-rises were installed; and capitalist urban planning was institutionalised. Underlying such changes in the production of space are shifting orientations in the social relations of production that find their origins in or around the year 1976.

The central argument proposed in this chapter focuses on the relationship between the economic reforms of the post-1976 regime and the spatial transformations visible in the contemporary Chinese landscape. I will argue that the political reliance (in the wake of a weakened communist ideology) on the circulatory and expansive
logic of Hua Guofeng’s so-called ‘objective economic laws’ (*keguan jingji guilu*) led to a new regime of production of space. These spatial processes functioned in a similar way as the ‘Anti- Spiritual Pollution’ campaigns (*fandong jingshen wuran yundong*) and the Cultural Fever (*wenhua re*) discussions, mentioned in first section of this chapter, in that they led to the depoliticisation and internalisation of China’s capitalist modernisation project. The Party stopped questioning the role of the state, withdrew the politics of everyday life, to unquestionably adopt the path of economic modernisation as the *raison d’être* of the state.

To remain committed and true to the dialectical principles of Lefebvre, mentioned and substantiated in the first and second chapters of this dissertation, the relationship between space and politics will not be analysed one-dimensionally. The production of space will instead be conceptualised to be of a mutually constitutive nature. The experience of space is, to put it crudely, conceptualised as the consequence of social relations, while social relations are, in turn, reinforced by the production of space. This is to reaffirm that changes of the production of space affect the politics of everyday life, as much as politics influence the production of space.

The first section of this chapter will provide an historical analysis of the early years of reform (1976-1980) to allow for a more detailed understanding of how a largely bloodless transformation of the role of the state enabled the relatively smooth transition from a revolutionary to an early capitalist form of economics. The section will then discuss how a conceptually irreconcilable contradiction arose between a communist regime, on one the one hand, and a capitalist economic system, on the other. The last part of the section will provide an account of how a process of depoliticisation process attempted to reconcile this contradiction. This second section will begin to address how the process of a capitalist modernisation was normalised and
ideologically accepted as natural. The second will then provide an overview of how this depoliticisation process has materialised itself in the spaces of the everyday life. This section will, to put it more concretely, analyse a number of empirical examples from the built environment to demonstrate and analyse how (re)productions and space of representations helped serve the political purpose of state and regime legitimacy. The final section of this chapter will summarise the main findings and reiterate the argument noted above to conclude with the closing of China’s short twentieth century in 1989.

**Objective Economic Laws, Contradictions and the Process of Depoliticisation**

*Revising History*

The last chapter closed with the construction (1976-1977) of Mao’s Mausoleum which, on the one hand, attempted to commemorate and eternalise Mao and, on the other hand, spatially symbolised the climax of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. The person responsible for the construction, Hua Guofeng, hoped that the authority of the tomb and its imposing architectural enclosure would help him gain the confidence and approval of his political peers and the Chinese people at large. The fact that the construction of the mausoleum was built against the CCP’s own principles, seemed of little concern to Hua. He hoped instead that his dedication to Mao would allow him to become identifiable as the legitimate heir of the Great Helmsman. The Mausoleum (officially: ‘The Chairman Mao Memorial Hall’ or *Mao zhuxi jiniantang*) functioned as a political-spatial medium to help pass on the authority of Mao.

The manner in which the Mausoleum was built, involving thousands of people working day and night, brought back memories of the Great Leap Forward. The
Mausoleum’s central location on the square, facing the previously mentioned National People’s Congress (Chapter Four), helped to stimulate further an air of historical continuity and political legitimacy. Wakeman (1985b: 171) notes that the construction was indeed similar to projects of “the Great Leap Forward, charged with images of militant political struggle..., devoted to the daily reading and discussion of Chairman’s Mao’s new Selected Works…, guided by model worker-heroes… and inspired by the revolutionary spirit of the Long March”. There were few signs that Hua would bring about a new form of politics. The stigma of Hua as a post-Mao doppelganger remained, in fact, with him until after his anonymous passing in 2008. The predominant strand in the literature argues that it was that not Hua, but the allegedly more liberally inclined Deng Xiaoping who was destined to lead the country to economic reform.

The period between the death of Mao and the so-called economic ‘opening-up’ (gaige kaifang) of China forms a historically important, but largely academically unacknowledged and misunderstood period. Hua Guofeng is in most accounts of this period portrayed as a tragic Gorbachev-like figure that set in motion a gradual, but largely smooth transition from the radical programme of the CR to the implementation and realisation of Deng’s economic pragmatism. This ‘soft landing’, for which the ‘temporary scapegoat’ (Weatherley 2010: 173) Hua served his purpose, is said to have allowed the liberal faction within the CCP (and Deng in particular) to carefully distance itself from the havoc caused in the CR and the GLF. The two to three year-long interregnum, from the dictum of the so-called ‘Two Whatevers’ (liang ge fanshi) to the ethos of the ‘Seek Truth from Facts’ (shi shi qiu shi), is believed to have helped level the ground for a more reformist approach to China’s political economy. The conventional academic interpretation of Hua’s politics, as a shallow reiteration of radical Maoism, has with the release of new archival material come under strong
attack (Teiwes and Sun 2007; Teiwes and Sun 2011). The argument that it was Hua (and not Deng) who initiated many of the economic reforms, has consequences for China’s recent history and could possibly challenge the Deng-inclined legitimacy of contemporary CCP leaders.

This historical revaluation would help explain how the end of the Cultural Revolution brought about an end to revolutionary appropriations space. It would hence also help us better understand how the initial economic reforms unintentionally helped the party to find a new way to legitimise its existence after the death of communism (either state-led or Maoist). The progressive reforms of Hua, which in difficult political times were, in fact, more far-reaching than those later implemented by Deng, did more than just level the ground for the opening-up reforms in the 1980s. They helped normalise a new set of social relations of production, and allowed for the creation of a new political subjectivity. The ideological transformation that Hua instigated helped reshape the spaces and sites that have come to define post-Mao China.

Before addressing these spatial changes and the new political subjectivity that came with it, I first wish to provide a shortened analysis of how incremental reforms inadvertently led the CCP to embrace a new production of space. What is relevant here is how Hua’s introduction of early market principles led to the violent bursting of the untenable contradictions in China’s contemporary political economic system. The state’s subsequent reconciliatory attempts to depoliticise these contradictions are later in this chapter conceptualised to have materialised in the production of space. Hua was in that regard perhaps more Gorbachev than Gorbachev himself. He acted as the unacknowledged, yet accidental, ‘Great Architect’ (zongshe jishi) of post-1976 China.
Hua started the gradual depoliticisation of politics in China, and was responsible for the early withdrawal of revolutionary politics in the everyday life of its citizens.

An important element in Teiwes and Sun’s (2007; 2011) reassessment of Hua’s is the ‘learn from Dazhai in agriculture’ report to the Dazhai Conference in September-October 1975. The report, on the one hand, severely weakened the radical agenda of the Gang of Four and, on the other hand, “laid down the direction for agricultural modernisation” (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 308). What becomes abundantly clear from their reappraisal of the Dazhai Conference is the economic emphasis of Hua’s Dazhai proposal. Deng initially only hesitantly gave his endorsement for Hua’s plan for rural mechanisation and capital construction. In the report, Hua actively supported the primacy of the ‘theory of productive forces’ for which Deng normally receives credit for. These policy preferences exemplify Hua’s broader “effort to use modernisation to negate revolutionisation” (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 500).

Hua’s engagement and emphasis on modernisation led the Dazhai model to increasingly became “a rallying symbol for anti-radical forces” (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 363). The reinterpretation and political emphasis on Dazhai came, because of Hua’s efforts, to outweigh the experience of Xiaojinzhuang village which, as discussed in the previous chapter, was the political home ground for radical politics. It is, in other words, clear that Hua made a decision to support modernisation (as pronounced by the so-called ‘moderate camp’) well before Mao’s famous last words ‘with you in charge, I'm at ease’ (ni ban shi, wo fang xin) (cf. Weatherley 2010).

Calls for higher living standards, greater decentralisation and SOE reforms were made already as early as 1976 and audible throughout 1977 (see for example Watson 1980; Solinger 1982; Teiwes and Sun 2011). Housing reforms were, as discussed in section three of this chapter, similarly already announced in 1977.
Discussions and experiments on the establishment of the later Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) were moreover, already long underway before the illustrious Third Plenum of late 1978 during which Deng is often credited for having ‘opened-up China’ (see e.g. Reardon 2002).

The wish to reform the economy replaced the emphasis on the superstructure that previously had characterised CR. The role of the state similarly shifted from the domain of politics to the economy. Hua argued in June 1978 (six months before the Third Plenum) for the need to “firmly and properly reform that portion of the superstructure and the productive relations that do not correspond to the development of the productive forces” (in Halpern 1985: 1002, fn. 10). Hua’s experimental reforms translated into an early (yet admittedly ambiguous) version of ‘market socialism’ at the first session of the Fifth NPC in early 1978.

[T]he law of value [which applies to using economic criteria, such as price and profit, to direct economic activity rather than just following politically determined directives] must be consciously applied under the guidance of the unified state plan (Hua in Solinger 1982: 1248).

Hua’s intentions were even more revealed at the ‘Conference on Learning from Daqing and Dazhai’ of July 1978 (Solinger 1982). His proposal to work on the basis of ‘objective economic laws’ meant that “finance and trade, commodity circulation, distribution of capital, foreign trade, prices, taxes and credit policy should be actively used to stimulate development” (Watson 1980: 106, 107). Hua, in other words, no longer merely rejected the radical policies of the Gang of Four, but now also started to challenge “the nature of the planning system itself” (Watson 1980: 107). Hu Qiaomu (Mao’s former secretary) clarified Hua’s position later that “‘politics in command’ was not in conflict with ‘objective economic laws’. Instead, they formed a unity, with
the function of politics being to raise the quality of economic management.” (Teiwes and Sun 2011: 19).

Hu Qiaomu echoed Hua’s market socialism unambiguously when he in July 1978 (at the State Council Economic and Planning Meeting) argued that “economic laws [are] like objective natural laws which apply independently of human will... In order to understand the laws properly, it [is] necessary to learn from ‘modernised, highly efficient planning and other managerial functions carried out in today's big (capitalist) corporations’” (in Watson 1980: 108). It had by then already become clear that Hua did not intend to return to Maoist Thought, but supported an entirely different mode of development. This was not a mere policy change, but an inadvertent attempt to reform radically the role of the state, from being a planning entity to a regulatory economic agency in service of economic modernisation.

**Contradictions**

Hua’s policies symbolised the inadvertent start of a transformation from a ‘party state’ to what Wang Hui (2006a) describes as a ‘state-party’. The CCP increasingly immersed itself as a component into the abstract state. This meant that the Party stopped functioning as the political agitator for public debates surrounding the economy, the reason of the state etc. The Party instead adopted, integrated and normalised market reforms under the aegis of the state. The consequence was a process of depoliticisation that replaced the revolutionary form of engagement of the previous periods. This new political paradigm, in other words, effectively depoliticised socialism through a tactic and gradual distancing from the concept of class struggle.

A model of national economic development was adopted gradually with the purpose of serving the entire nation instead of (only) the working classes. Prominent
CCP members suggested to rehabilitate the old bourgeoisie, rich peasants and landlords, and to return their lost economic assets. Calls were also made for political alliances between the national bourgeoisie and the CCP to enable the formation of a stronger ‘socialist’ China. Hua justified such contradictory developments by echoing sentiments expressed earlier at the eighth People’s Congress (1956). During the second session of the Fifth NPC (June-July 1979) he stated that “exploiting classes had vanished in China as of 1956 with the socialist transformation of property ownership... [and that] capitalists themselves had been redeemed and transformed into working people who earn their living in a socialist society” (in Dirlik 1981-1982: 637). The proclamation that class was now officially repudiated and that objective economic laws were to be followed accordingly was accompanied by the launching of policies that adhered to the new reality of the ‘Four Modernisations (sige xiandaihua)’15. The exact manner in which the ‘Four Modernisations’ programme16 was to be integrated or followed remained, however, largely left ambiguous. It became nevertheless evident that Hua intended the modernisation to depart from the economic disaster of the GLF and to rewind the superstructural politics of the CR. The result seemed a return to the policies set out, especially by Chen Yun, during the Eight Party Congress and in the second FYP in 1956. The focus of the state, in other words, re-centred on the economy. This form of politics is, to be precise, one in which the objective economic laws were gradually deployed to consequentially take over and transform social subjectivities that had formerly stood at the very centre of revolutionary politics.

The Party’s gradual distancing from the politics of the CR and the steady introduction of market principles had a direct effect on the way the economy functioned and the role of the state in it. The Party discarded planning system not
entirely, but targets became instead increasingly more flexible. The decentralisation and depoliticisation of SOEs led them to enjoy greater financial freedoms in the retention of their profits and in the budgeting of revenues. The Party lifted the longstanding ban on wage increases; non-state forms of ownership were encouraged (while the state sector continued to play the dominant role); and more material and financial benefits were used as incentivises to stimulate greater economic output.

The reforming of SOEs and the gradual implementation of market principles in commercial and industrial relations soon also had an effect on society. The second half of the 1980s witnessed the gradual disappearance of the ‘iron rice bowl’ (tie fan wan) principle, while the political function of the earlier described self-sufficient danwei system was dismantled and replaced by a decentralised system in which SOEs shifted their focus on creating surplus value. “The essence of this gradual transformation of state factories, from being danwei (cells of the party/state) to being gongsi (corporations), marks a transformation of state-owned enterprises from political institutions to depoliticised economic entities.” (Ji 1998: 7). SOE reforms and the introduction of private property rights meant that SOEs were no longer the sole provider of housing. A fragmentising of society into different classes (a never resolved issue during the Maoist period) soon emerged. The slow introduction of market economics led, in short, to the gradual inception of uneven development.

The overall result was, however, not so much a full-fledged integration of capitalist principles, but a system which “combined central planning with local initiative and market mechanisms to form a blend of capitalist and socialist structures” (Hsü 1990: 113). The opening-up reforms resulted in strong and seemingly unbridgeable contradictions which undermined (and continue to challenge) the basic principles of Chinese socialism. The preposition of a classless society (crystallising the
completion of socialism) challenged, for example, the right of existence of the
Communist Party. It also ideologically weakened the urgency and even the need to
‘unleash the forces of production’. The rehabilitation and re-emergence of a bourgeois
class (and with it economic inequality), deemed by the Party necessary to rejuvenate
economic development, was similarly in ideological terms hardly justifiable (see also
Dirlik 2011). The appearance of class differences and the increasingly visible disparity
between the rural countryside and the industrialising cities equally begged for some
form of reconciliation.

Deng announced the ‘upholding’ of the so-called ‘four cardinal principles’
(六项基本原则) in 1979 to quell discussions on the meaning of Chinese
socialism at a time of growing calls for democratisation. The Cardinal Principles were
later institutionalised (principally through the 1982 Party Constitution which officially
subordinated the Party to state law) and effectively empowered the state to discipline
and conform citizens according to economic modernisation. The four principles
symbolised, in other words, the onset of a careful channelling of political participation
through initially proto (and later fully) legal means which would depoliticise the
political subjectivity of individuals. It restricted, if not prevented, political debates
within and on the party (Peerenboom 2002, especially chapter three). The introduction
of an embryonic rule of law legitimised, in other words, the path towards what became
the official mantra of the CCP: ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ (you
zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi). The belief that capitalism could be controlled by the
state to strengthen its concrete abstraction.

The implementation of law strengthened, however, not only the legitimacy of
economic modernisation, but also provided citizens with greater individual rights and
freedoms. In a process of ‘opening up’, this translated in not only greater access to
foreign products, but also to ideas. The contradiction of a weakened and authoritarian Party ideology and the concurrent marketisation of the economy soon turned out to be too great and ‘anti-spiritual pollution campaigns’ (*jingshen wuran*) were launched in October 1983. The campaigns were intended to put a halt to the importation of ‘deadly poisons’ (e.g. pornography, violence, prostitution etc.) and, more importantly, to avert the rising popularity of ‘bourgeois intellectualism’ (referring mainly to critical and humanist approaches to Marxism). The two ‘evils’ were considered and treated as threats to the legitimacy of the CCP (Li 1995a).

Intellectual opposition and critique of the party and its growing capitalist dependency became synonymous to pornography. Intellectuals and artists were, under the Central Directive No. 7, in February 1981 forced to openly declare their “support [for] the Four Cardinal Principles, emphasise the [benefits of the] Four Modernisations…, provide a balanced view of the CCP history, [told] not to harm the image of the Party, [to] avoid supporting illegal publications [and accept] criticism… from the Party leaders” (Lee 1996: 108). Theoretical debates outside, but also within the CCP, were, because of repressive and ideological methods of depoliticisation, increasingly dominated and eventually replaced by practical concerns over material modernisation and the urgency of economic reform.

Such repressive and ideological means shared a common objective of replacing the revolutionary subjectivity with a pro-market reform one. The silencing of debates (surrounding topics such as democratisation and the meaning of socialism) in combination with the Party’s resort to calls for higher ethical and behavioural standards were, in other words, not only focused on the integration of a new mode of social relations. They were, and more importantly, intended to allow for the societal internalisation of the effects of that integration. The Party similarly made no attempt to
conceal the growing contradictions and social ills (corruption, inequality and social discontent) that increasingly had risen to the surface, but regarded and presented them rather as the unavoidable by-products of modernisation. The CCP interpreted such societal ills, in fact, often as confirmations of the successful implementation of its economic modernisation programme.

The project of capitalist modernisation became the sole objective and responsibility of the Party and increasingly compelled the state to transform itself to accommodate and legitimise the necessity of economic reform. This practice, which Wang (2009: 17) defines as ‘de-statification’, refers to a “process of identification with a different hegemonic form”. The repressive and ideological silencing of debate on modernity and democracy illustrated that the formerly socialist state was in the process of reconfiguration, to become socially instrumental to the spreading of the logic of capitalist modernisation. The CCP instead adopted Thatcher’s infamous dictum that there simply was no alternative, and accepted the view that ‘truthful modernisation’ effectively meant that a linear mode of capitalist development was, at best, logically preferable and, at worst, inevitable. ‘Modernisation for the sake of modernisation’ became the Party’s new mantra.

Depoliticisation

The employment of ideological and repressive means to reconcile the growing contradictions of China’s Party-led capitalism (dubbed ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’) proved only temporarily and superficially to resolve the deadlock of a modernisation project that was supposedly, concurrently both capitalist and socialist. A changing social structure requires, as seen in the previous chapters, a reformulation of social identities. What was required was, therefore, not only a change in the ideology of the state, but also an ontological transformation in the collective
consciousness of society. The tool arguably most employed (but surprisingly least discussed as such) to achieve this is the production of space. The physical production of spaces of representation is, as discussed theoretically in chapters two and three, meant to create a new life world through which everyday life aligns itself with the interest of the state. The production of space reconstitutes social identities to provide the abstract state with concretised legitimacy. The depoliticisation of space (a topic dealt with in the next section and in the last chapter) was in the post-1976 period deeply intertwined with the reconstruction of cultural identities, which similarly as the production of space, went through a process of modification based on the newly integrated capitalist modes of production.

The material opening-up of China to the outside world also meant that the country had to be reinvented (both spatially and culturally) to enable its successful incorporation in a capitalist world. The reasons underlying the need to transform the collective consciousness were therefore twofold. An ontological transformation was firstly required to resolve the violent contradictions embedded in the country’s socialist market economy, and secondly intended to help integrate China better into the global capitalist paradigm.

The so-called ‘Great Cultural Debates’ (wenhua da taolun or wenhua re) that arose (between 1985 and 1989) mainly among China’s intellectuals, academics and artists constituted the first major ideological reaction to the material modernisation and opening-up of China. The purpose of the discussions (in films, literature, architecture etc.) was, at least at first, meant to help construct a utopian vision for a new, modern Chinese identity. The ontological reinvention of China at a moment of opening-up to the capitalist world compelled the discussions to engage as much with the past, as with the future of the country. Expectations and hopes of an alternative to what participants,
all-too-often, confusingly labelled as ‘Westernisation’ were however soon shattered. The Cultural Fever (*wenhua re*) prevented opportunities for repoliticisation, and instead (inadvertently) helped legitimise the marginalisation of discourses on the meaning of socialism, modernisation and modernity.

Cultural debates centred, in other words, not so much on the formulation of direct critiques of the political-economic developmental model, but were instead complicit in the reconfiguration of culture so as to fit with China’s modernisation model. The concept of ‘culture’ was, to be precise, analysed and reinterpreted based on the interest of the state. This led, for example, to the rediscovery and subsequent incorporation of Confucian values (i.e. neo-Confucianism) into the CCP’s economic modernisation policies. The wedding of the Party and Neo-Confucianism was hoped to grant “moral and spiritual values [to] play a constructive role in the rectifying of Western material culture” (Wang 1996: 73). It however also bolstered nationalism and legitimise China’s allegedly distinctive development model.

The employment of culture in the modernisation of the economy (‘cultural modernisation’) meant that the concepts of development and progress had now permeated into the realm of culture. Culture consequently became a utopian ideology and the ‘spiritual’ arm of the Party in facilitating the on-going economic modernisation. At the roots of this development lies a complicated change in the organisation of the superstructure of Chinese society. Consciousness was no longer determined and formed by political participation, as it was in times of the Cultural Revolution, but shaped by the ideals of linear progress. The result was an ideological departure from the revolutionary superstructure and the collective consciousness, and an acceptance of the effects and contradictions of capitalism (e.g. social inequalities, uneven mode of development, class fragmentation etc.). The instrumental rationality
of the economy was in Cultural Fever discussions explained as the norm and guiding principle for the whole of society.

The process of depoliticisation occurred, to summarise briefly, in three different overlapping and interdependent phases. The first phase is marked by the introduction of Hua’s ‘objective economic laws’ which set out the material and ideological principles for the specific form of developmentalism (‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’) that the Party gradually adopted as its official mantra. The second phase is characterised by the gradual, yet unplanned, linking of the Party with the state. The Party disengaged itself from politics, and internalised and supported the logic of market-led modernisation. The subsequent State Party and its gradual detachment from wider social-economic realities was an important component in the process of depoliticisation. The state and the economy came to be perceived as two separate realms. The economy was left unquestioned and unchallenged. The third phase embodied a process of normalisation of the contradictions of socialist marketisation. The state-led mode of economic development became the socially accepted norm and guiding principle for both cultural and economic modernisation.

The period between 1976 and 1989 marks itself by a shift in which economic modernisation increasingly replaced (a revolutionary) politics. The CCP subsequently subordinated itself to the abstract state. The CCP legitimised the emphasis on economic pragmatism (or ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’) through a process of a depoliticisation of the Party, the abstract State and the collective consciousness. At the heart of this transformation in the legitimacy of the CCP was a shift in the orientation of the ‘primary contradiction’ from class struggle, now said to have resolved itself, to the underdeveloped nature of the Chinese economy (see Deng 1979). The depoliticisation of society would not have been possible, however, without the
production of a new life world. The role of the production of space in the formation of a depoliticised subjectivity in service of economic modernisation is the subject of discussion of the next section.

**Depoliticising Space for Socialism with Chinese Characteristics**

**Reconceptualising the Chinese City**

The adaptation of the principle of obeying ‘objective economic laws’ meant that a consumer oriented mode of development replaced the earlier dictum ‘first production, livelihood later’ (xian shengchan, hou shenghuo). The planning of cities, which during the RC had become an abandoned practise, was taken up to help materialise an economic paradigm that favoured consumerism over productivism. The wish to transform urban space from a means of production to a sphere of consumption was not restricted to the abstraction of the city but translated itself also in the places of the everyday. Living space requirements\(^{24}\) were, for example, raised as early as 1977 and again in 1978 and 1981 (Lu and Shao 2001).

The Third National Conference on Urban Work (held in March 1978) was characterised by Hua’s reforms which a direct effect on the new role, function and nature of cities. Authorities allowed cities to expand gradually again, while the previous emphasis on rural industrial was reassessed. The 1978 conference and the 1980 Urban Planning Conference endorsed a proposal “to control the size of large cities and [to] develop small [and medium sized] cities” (White, Wu et al. 2008: 118). The proposal “required cities to restore the urban planning system to meet the needs of foreseeable rapid economic growth” (Yeh and Wu 1999b: 178). Fiscal decentralisation was also put into place for 50 cities through which “city governments’ powers in housing and other public facility developments were increased dramatically” (Wang
This process of decentralisation was expanded in 1980 by a planning promulgation which “specified that the municipality was responsible for preparing urban plans.” (Yeh and Wu 1999b: 178). “By the end of 1986, 96 per cent of the designated cities and 85 per cent of the county towns had prepared their urban master plans. The number of urban planners increased to 15,000.” (Ng and Wu 1997: 159).

The reforms set out the contours for what later would be described as the ‘entrepreneurial city’. The entrepreneurial city is, to be sure, primarily concerned with the shaping of the built environment and the distribution of resources to attract ever higher levels of capital (Harvey 1989b; Harvey 1990).

The anticipated reconceptualisation of cities demanded, however, an equally radical transformation of the urban economic planning structure. The National Conference on Urban Planning proposed (in October 1980) the foundation of so-called ‘Urban Construction and Comprehensive Development Companies’ (UCCDCs) which were meant to organise and manage urban construction on the local level (under the auspices of the Bank of Construction and the municipal capital construction branches). The legal entity of these companies was in a 1984 planning reform transformed from being semi-autonomous to “enterprise [status] with [an] independent legal qualification and… an independent accounting unit [which is] responsible for its own operations” (Lu and Shao 2001: 200). The sixth NPC in May 1984 confirmed the CCP’s wish for more commercialisation and marketisation (without privatisation) of land and housing. The NPC (in Lu and Shao 2001: 226) noted that “[f]ees and taxes should be collected for the use of land according to its locations and value in the city”. Zhu (1998: 15) argues that from that moment onwards “real estate developers emerged, though [still] dominated by SOEs, and began to participate in urban redevelopment and regeneration.”25
Such events, unfolding as a direct consequence of the pronouncement of a new set of social relations of production, symbolise the start of a new regime of production of space. Space was, to put it more concretely, conceptually and materially transformed from a political product for revolution to a depoliticised ‘neutral’ instrument for the implementation of the ‘objective economic laws’. Changes were soon also felt in the urban everyday life which similarly had to be reconceptualised and reproduced to accommodate and make way for the modernisation model.

**Housing**

Housing, which during the previous period had been said to be an unproductive (or ‘non-productive’) necessity, was because of the reconceptualisation of the (urban) space increasingly redefined as a site for and of consumption. The poor state of housing in Beijing (and other cities), after the CR, was brought in relationship with the need to improve living conditions in a 1980 issue of ‘Population and Economy’ (*Renkou yu jingji*). One of the contributors (Sheng Lang in Kirkby 1985: 169) noted that “‘man is a consumer and not merely a product… [and that what is needed] is electricity, heating, grain, clothing, transport, culture, recreation, health, and, above all housing’”. The transformation of the city into a site of consumption and urban citizens into consumers meant that sites of dwelling had to be remodelled.

The early economic reforms provided, as discussed earlier, greater economic freedoms to SOEs. These deregulations incentivised them to expand urban construction significantly. Individuals were similarly encouraged to own, buy, build and invest in urban housing which they (for a subsidised price) could purchase from their work units. Capital investment in housing increased dramatically as a result. The share of housing in capital construction grew from 5.7 per cent in the period 1971 to 1975 to 11.8 per cent for the period 1976 to 1980. The large increase helped boost
the average yearly urban floor-space which during the same period grew from 25.2 to 47.0 million m² (Kirkby 1985; Badcock 1986; Li 1998). The share of ‘non-productive’ investments (as a percentage of all state capital construction capital) similarly rose from 18.8 per cent in 1976 to 45.5 per cent in 1982 (Kirkby 1985). To underline the dramatic turn of events, it is “estimated that between 1979 and 1981, [state owned] enterprises and city governments had rehoused the equivalent to the entire populations of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Shenyang” (Unger 1993: 68).

Private ownership of houses was for the first time incentivised in 1979 in Xian and Nanning and was in 1982 expanded when the Chinese government launched pilot schemes in Changzhou, Zhengzhou, Shashi and Sipeng which allowed residents to buy (strongly subsidised) houses directly from SOEs and governmental authorities (Wang and Murie 1996). The scheme was soon expanded to 80 other cities with the purpose of “commercialising housing to reduce the burden on the state treasury and ease the acute housing shortages in cities” (Xinhua 1984: 1). The project was more or less abandoned in 1986 and replaced by the more marketised ‘Yantai reform plan’ which “was gradually to commercialise the entire process of housing production, distribution and consumption” (Wang and Murie 1996: 976). Because of lower subsidies and increased privatisation, the price of housing and rental fees started to increase, while the quality of dwelling consequentially became analogous to affordability (i.e. price). The National Housing Reform (1988) and the Urban Housing Reform Resolution (1991) marked the end of the pilot period and the start of the national implementation of the marketisation of housing in all urban areas (Wang and Murie 1996).

The gradual privatisation of ownership in the 1980s had initially, however, only a limited effect on home ownership. Most citizens preferred to continue to rent
public forms of housing against strongly subsidised tariffs. The growing need for new dwellings, as a consequence of unprecedented urbanisation levels and the generally poor condition of existing houses, compelled municipal housing bureaus and SOEs to construct new housing facilities.

Governmental budget constraints in the early years of reforms limited the possibilities for different architectural designs and compelled architects to adopt instead standardised designs based on low-cost and high-rise principles. Housing in the early reform years focused, in other words, on rational, cost-saving planning methods that translated in a high floor area ratio (FAR), low building density and an increase of medium and high-rise residential areas. Examples of such structures, of which the construction was initially still largely under the control of the local and central layers of government, were predominantly situated in Beijing (Figure 1).

![Figure 5-1: Jinsong xincun](image)

Jinsong xincun (1978) in Beijing (in Xue 2006: 90)

New residential areas replaced accommodation in work units while existing work units were expanded and ‘opened-up’, as was the case in the new districts of Quyang and Yichuan (both in Shanghai). New building standards (later formalised in the National Housing Design Regulation in 1986) recommended (and later required) that new buildings should provide each household with separate kitchen and bathroom facilities, a living room and lower household density per staircase. The growing degree
of household autonomy within the formerly politically conscious work units led to a process of depoliticisation in which economic modernisation and consumption were favoured over revolutionary consciousness.

Space was ‘liberated’ from its former work unit walls and incorporated into the urban plans of the newly empowered municipal governments. Local authorities reproduced urban space to stimulate greater circulation and mobility of people and capital. The state party, in its turn, withdrew its political influence from the everydayness of its urban citizens. The ‘objective economic laws’ of profit and progress subsequently filled the political void after the withdrawal of politics. The reorganisation of space transformed urban citizens from producers, to revolutionaries, to become eventually consumers. The socialist city itself turned into an entrepreneurial one.

This development found its echo in the influential ‘Decision of the Central Committee of the CPC on Reform of the Economic Structure’ (1984) in which the government “made it clear that one of the key objectives of reform was to relieve the danwei of its wide-ranging welfare functions. The danwei would then be free to pursue its core business…” (Bray 2005: 181, original emphasis). The process of ‘decentralisation of economic interest and power’ to SOEs and local governments (fangquan rangli) meant that SOEs gradually took over the role of the central authorities in housing investments, while local governments were made responsible for the top-down orchestration of the distribution of economic resources. The fact that some SOEs were more successful in retaining higher profit levels inevitably resulted in an uneven mode of spatial development. Citizens in richer SOEs were better off from those in poorer ones.
This uneven development occurred at the same time as the (later discussed) land and housing reforms of the mid-1980s. The gradual rise of the real estate sector, the growing importance of non-public ownership and the gradual implementation of the transfer of land use rights starting in 1988 produced a more diversified (albeit unequally distributed) urban landscape. The uneven mode of development, which characterises and optimises the capitalist modes of production, was then well underway, and was considered to be a sign of progress and development. The organisation of space on uneven principles lies, as argued in chapter one, at the very heart of urban planning. Urban planning under a regime of capitalist modes of production is compelled to organise space on the basis of an efficient circulation and uneven allocation of capital. Some sites have and attract a higher surplus value than others have and do. It is therefore not without reason that the planning of SEZs was given such political precedence in the opening-up of the economy.

Special Economic Zones

The opening-up of cities occurred simultaneously with the economic ‘opening-up’ of China. Early Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and economic reforms allowed cities to be reconceptualised and new ideas on architecture and urban planning soon emerged to enforce materially the transformation of the city. The 1984 City Planning Ordinance (promulgated by the State Council) serves as a potent early example of the growing marketisation of cities. The urban planning regulation demanded “that every city should prepare a masterplan [chengshi zongti guihua], which supposedly took command within a definite spatial boundary” (Yeh 2005: 78) 39. The 1984 promulgation was officially enacted by the NPC in the now famous City Planning Act in 1989 which “set up a comprehensive urban planning system by law for the first time in China” (Yeh and Wu 1999b: 178). The emphasis on urban planning forged a
historical break with the contained and self-reliant work units that previously had played the dominant part in the breaking, making and shaping of Chinese cities. The new holistic approach to urban planning treated the city, in contrast to the fragmented urban model discussed in chapter 5, as a totality. The production of the pro-reform city compelled former work unit walls to ‘open up’ to allow the objective economic laws to take effect. The method of urban planning (with the urban master plan at its core) was driven by the logic of economic growth and modernisation and served, as such, as a means for local governments to guide, stimulate, organise and control the production of space for capital accumulation.

The responsibility for the integration of urban plans was left to the municipal authorities, rather than the multitude of layers (municipal, provincial, national and SOEs) that previously fought for control over spatial organisation. The actual approval of master plans followed, in contrast, a strong top-down delegation. Municipal authorities, incentivised by the central state, soon started to exercise the control they had on urban planning to stimulate economic growth and quicken modernisation. The planning of cities became detached from politics and replaced by the urge to modernise on the basis of the capitalist modes of production.

The new set of relations of production changed, in other words, the nature, shape and function of cities. The increasingly entrepreneurial city provided, in turn, the means for economic reforms to be successful. The reorganisation of the city led to a radical alternation in the experience of the everyday life of urban citizens that was now set on accommodating and accelerating the capitalist modes of production. Authorities no longer produced and reproduced space according to a change in social-economic relations. The production of space also started to help to make that change possible.
The arguably most dramatic example in which this became visible were the so-called ‘Special Economic Zones’ (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. SEZs were “both products and producers of China's new economic identity” (Crane 1994: 76). The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) in particular enjoyed the same representational function as Daqing and Dazhai had played in the CR period. The city transcended, similarly as its politicised forerunners, the national representational space of the country’s new modernisation model. Shenzhen became, like its precursors, also the urban embodiment of a person (Deng Xiaoping41) and an ideology (state-planned capitalism or Socialism with Chinese Characteristics). Deng personally appropriated the city (and what it stood for) as his own when he travelled to Shenzhen at the height of the earlier mentioned spiritual pollution campaign in 1984 to echo the ethos of the initiator of the Shekou Industrial Zone “Time is Money, Efficiency is Life” (Vogel 2011: 418). He visited the zone again on his Southern Tour in 1992 to reaffirm China’s determination to abide and follow the objective economic laws42.

The SSEZ transformed, in other words, from sparsely inhabited villages to the central space of representation for and of the new China. This specific post-1978 spatial representation of nationhood differed from its political precursors. Shenzhen was instead a depoliticised site in which the construction of identity was not based on a superstructure. Shenzhen was the materialisation of the ‘objective economic laws’. The S in Shenzhen’s SEZ underwrites that it was also the original and exemplary ‘site of exception’ for the future of the rest of China. The production of space that resulted in the SSEZ was therefore more than the spatial consequence of the new modes of production. The SSEZ was consciously chosen by Deng to spread his ‘to get rich is glorious’ message across China. The site symbolised the arrival and would define the character of the new China.
The urban master plan of Shenzhen, one of the earliest of its kind in China, was uncompromising about its objective to create a “perfect environment for investment” (Campanella 2008: 42). The vast majority of capital construction in the built environment during the first years originated mainly from non-state domestic investors and accounted for 1.03 billion RMB (Zhu 1996). The depoliticised and entrepreneurial character in the shaping of the city was soon, however, put to a halt because of the strict existing land regulations that prohibited the leasing of land by non-SOEs. The ban on land leasing was for the ‘exception of Shenzhen’, however, lifted in 1982. This new regulation stated that “the private sector could legally take up land plots by paying annual land use fees” (Zhu 1996: 190). This, to underline Shenzhen’s exceptionalism, occurred roughly six years before the implementation of the earlier mentioned 1988 reform of land use rights, for which the SSEZs similarly played a pioneering role. The latter regulation provided private investors with long-term investment incentives and characterised the start of a commercial real estate market. The contribution of local and central government as a share of total capital investment construction decreased consequential further, while the share of domestic and foreign investment grew significantly (Zhu 1996).

The built environment, to conclude, altered dramatically with the arrival of market capital. This representational space of progress and economic modernisation translated into the kind of architecture that symbolised the unity and economic strength of the Chinese state. Shenzhen was as much as a symbol of the new China as it was a model for it. The SSEZ model was soon replicated in other cities (e.g. Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai etc.), after which it was pioneered in regions (e.g. Pearl River Delta, the Yangtze River Delta etc.) to finally encapsulate the whole country. The opening-up of the built environment to outside influences was a consequence of ‘objective
economic laws’ and helped to spatially expand those laws. This twofold logic functioned, however, also dialectically since the practise of architecture and planning also shapes the phenomenological experience of urban everyday life. The built environment, as the space of representation, is the thus the locus from which the production of space is translated and internalised into lived space. It is therefore of little wonder that architecture, the practise of vitalising, representing and personalising physical space, came to play such a fundamental role in the modernisation of China.

**Architecture**

The opening-up of China had not only an abstract economic resonance, but was a deeply material and tangible spatial experience. The new and foreign forms embodied a dialectic logic, which, as a whole, constituted a new type of (consumer) city. The production of space came to be detached from the politics that in the previous periods had attempted to inscribe its emancipatory meaning in space. This process started theoretically with discussions on ‘objective economic laws’ that eventually translated into the need of foreign investment. Hua decided to promote tourism as the first means to lure foreign investment into the country. The CCP placed Beijing at the forefront of this development. Before Shenzhen, it was Beijing that was labelled ‘China’s window to the world’.

The decision to promote tourism as one of the first steps towards ‘opening up’ had profound spatial consequences. Tourism implies the act of selling representational space to those located outside the place they wish to visit. Opening-up in this case literally refers to the sending out of invitations to others to come and visit the place (rather than the people) that is China. The invitation to visit a place implies a process of selling a representational space which is convincing enough for tourists to see or experience. The built environment, which makes the nation as a place a rational whole,
plays therefore a crucial role in this process. It is therefore no wonder that the modernisation of the built environment in China started with the designing and construction of the place where tourists spend most of their time, the hotel.

The eminent American architect I.M. Pei was among the first foreign architects to be invited by the party in 1977/1978 to “teach China’s leading architects how to design and construct the modern, high-rise office and residential buildings that dominated city skylines in the United States and other Western countries” (Slavicek 2010: 78). The government extended Pei a second invitation in 1978 to design a number of high-rise buildings alongside the Forbidden City on Chang’an Avenue, which in the previous period had been widened to boost the political-spatial centrality of Tiananmen Square. The Party envisaged that the celebrity architect, who earlier had been part of the 1972 Nixon delegation, could elevate the international reputation of the country. His buildings and their political centrality would provide a visual affirmation of China’s wish to pursue its reforms. Pei declined, however, to build high-rises so close to the Forbidden City and proposed instead to build a hotel on the Fragrant Hill (Figure 2) which already hosted the Summer Palace (see chapter 3).

Figure 5-2: Fragrant Hill Hotel (Beijing)
Fragrant Hill Hotel (in Rowe and Kuan 2002: 147)
The Fragrant Hill Hotel, which later came to be described as ‘postmodern’ for its neo-traditionalist design (dubbed ‘new vernacularism’), characterised a radical departure from the earlier idea that architecture ought to subordinate itself to economic principles and conditions (Li 2000). The structure set the precedent for a gradual depoliticisation of architecture (see chapter 6). The result of its incorporation of traditional Chinese (Suzhou) elements was neither modernist nor ‘Western’, but a romanticised attempt to stimulate a sense of nostalgia for a non-modern era. This architectural method - dubbed the ‘Third Way’ (combining modernism with Chinese vernacularism) - was, however, received only tepidly by its commissioners who had preferred the Hotel to be more explicitly ‘modern’ and less traditionally ‘Chinese’. A number of buildings were later built in a similar vernacular style, but they ultimately “failed to provide a convincing formal language suitable for a modernising society” (Li 2000: 397). What was desired was a more radical break with history and a more visual representation of the opening-up of the country.

The Jianguo Hotel in central Beijing (Figure 3) was one of the first architectural developments which successfully accomplished both objectives. The Hotel was planned and constructed around the same time as the Fragrant Hill Hotel and the earliest Sino-foreign invested and designed hotel after the opening-up (Xue 2010). The Beijing Municipal Government approved 77 similar foreign invested hotel throughout the 1980s (Bo 2000). The Jianguo proved not only a very lucrative project, but was similarly to Fragrant Hill Hotel also a politically important venture. This was underlined by the fact that the proposal was initiated by the newly established Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, while the final construction required approval of all vice-premiers and a vice-chairman of the NPC (Xue 2010).
Figure 5-3: Jianguo Hotel (Beijing)

The architecture of the Hotel, a near replica of the architect’s earlier built Hilton Hotel in Buffalo (New York, now ‘Adam’s Mark Hotel’), had strong modernist dispositions that soon served as inspiration for later architectures. Examples soon followed in Kunming (Worker’s Cultural Palace, ca. 1983), Shenzhen (International Foreign Trade Center, 1985), Nanjing (Jinlin Hotel, 1983) and in other parts of the country. Many of these buildings were complete or near exact replicas of existent foreign built structures.

Foreign architects however also built themselves in the 1980s in China. Xue et al. note that the period between 1978 and 1989 saw the construction of “twenty-two buildings designed by foreign architects” (2010: 525). Modernist architectural theories, such as those of Le Corbusier and Mies van der Rohe, started similarly to dominate academic curricula of architectural departments that only just before had reopened their doors. Universities and designs institutes invited Foreign architects (such as I.M. Pei, Kisho Kurokawa etc.) to give guest seminars as early as 1978. The earlier discontinued ‘Architectural Journal’ (Jianzhu xuebao) resumed its publications in 1973 and numerous other architectural journals soon appeared (e.g. Architects or Jianzhu shi in 1979 and World Architecture or Shijie jianzhu by Tsinghua University in 1980). The wealth of newly accessible ideas and information on foreign architecture...
and styles had a dramatic spatial effect on the opening-up of China’s built environment.

Foreign structures introduced new modern forms to China and were integrated into the built environment to “symbolise progress to the world at large” (Rowe and Kuan 2002: 152). The implementation of objective economic laws in China was, therefore, not only a static product of economic reform, but also had a profound impact on the urban everyday experience. At the vertical centre of this spatial-economic development was Shenzhen’s International Foreign Trade Center. The tower was China’s largest building at the time of its construction in 1985. It was therefore hardly by chance that Deng chose it as the location to enunciate his appreciation of the free market in his call for more reform in January 1992 (Campanella 2008).

The spreading of modernist architecture, during the liberalisation of housing regulations and a decentralisation of planning authorities, led to an increasingly monotonous urban pattern and the spreading of an anonymous architectural style. The unsystematic unfolding of spatial productions also lay bare how politics had increasingly become detached from spatial processes. Architecture did no longer have to revolve around politics, be emancipatory or even needed to “have some artistic merit” (Chen Chongqing in Rowe and Kuan 2002: 143). The detachment of form from content ended in a depoliticisation of architecture. Architecture instead increasingly aligned itself with the objective economic laws of supply and demand.

The emphasis on the capitalist modes of production in the modernisation (then increasingly dubbed as ‘Westernisation’) of space inevitably resulted in a nationalist backlash which found its outlet in the earlier mentioned Great Cultural Discussions. Calls for a reorientation to more traditional forms soon dominated architectural debates, which despite arguing for the incorporation of more traditional forms, never
successfully critiqued the capitalist context in which these spaces of representation were built. The struggle between capitalist and nationalist forms of architectural expression is a topic which the next chapter will discuss in more detail. The two forms of expressions share, however, a common economic logic that is embedded in economic thinking. Critiquing of the state or capitalism in general was avoided. The focus was on the difference between national and ‘Western’ forms of expression or on accommodating that difference in so-called postmodern fashion.

The reincorporation of Chinese elements in modern buildings occurred at a time in which postmodern ideas were gaining ground in architectural theory. The influx of postmodern thought provided the theoretical justification needed by architects to build without having to focus too much on the restrictions normally imposed by context and narrative. The result was similar to the earlier mentioned reintroduction of Confucianism, in that architects anticipated that they could detach form from content and thus reinvigorate old ideas through random cherry picking. The idea that capitalist productions of space could be altered morphologically through an incorporation of ‘Chinese’ characteristics was believed to enable a distinctive and meaningful ‘Chinese modernism’ (Figure 4).
Figure 5-4: National Form (Wuxi)

An example of ‘national form’ architecture at the entrance of Jiangnan University (Wuxi, Jiangsu province)

The opposite was true as the incorporation of “indigenous characteristics of modernism… simply [referred and led to a] modern version of Chinese cultural nationalism”. (Wang 1996: 174). Economic modernisation remained, in other words, unchallenged, while the strengths of its modern subjectivity (defined by nationalism and capitalism) and its logic (based on progress and rationality) only intensified. The process of localisation of modernity reflects older experiences earlier described in this dissertation, and is in fact a defining characteristic of modernity and modernisation.

Wang Jing notes that the emergence of this depoliticised postmodernism “fulfilled the quest of those indigenous theorists who were engaged in a mental game that placed China in a continual catching-up race with the West” (1996: 234). ‘Architecture with Chinese characteristics’ referred to the same logic as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Both concepts referred to a process of localisation or nationalisation (minzuhua). The production of space represented a ‘national form’ with the consequence that rather than opposing modernism, the ‘traditional’ characteristics actually helped justify the principles of modernisation.

Conclusion

This chapter has covered the period between Mao’s passing in 1976 to the late 1980s. I have started this chapter by emphasising the large, but often neglected, role of Hua Guofeng in the transformation of modern China. This emphasis pushed the reform period back to the immediate aftermath of the arrest of the Gang of Four. The economic decisions made during this short period provided the inadvertent withdrawal of politics from everyday life. The subsequent series of contradiction culminated to the Tiananmen Protests of 1989.
I have then provided an analysis of the process of depoliticisation that ensued as a result of the growing contradictions in society. I have discussed how the contradiction of a ruling ‘communist’ party which promoted and instigated progressive market reforms was able to avert a seemingly unbridgeable deadlock. I have initially examined how the party deployed ideological and repressive methods of depoliticisation to silence discourses on modernisation and the desirability of economic reforms. The corrosion of politics set in motion the “unlimited expansion of the market economy into the political, cultural, domestic and other spheres… as an apolitical, ‘natural’ process” (Wang 2009: 12).

The second section has analysed how the production of space in the 1980s furthered and deepened the process of depoliticisation into everyday life. The changing of everyday life occurred at first through a reconceptualisation of the city. The exceptional site of the SSEZ served as the future for the new Chinese city. The economic laws transformed the city from a fragmented site of productivity to an opened-up site for and of consumption. The CCP similarly stopped considering the production of urban housing as an unproductive or bourgeois of space. Housing became instead a tradable commodity. The disintegration of work units and their walls also meant that labour now received the mobility and flexibility necessary for the economic laws to take effect. The experience of space was further depoliticised by the production of architectural space. Architecture no longer contained a political consciousness, but dialectically transcended the new truth of economic modernisation.

The processes of depoliticisation came to an abrupt halt when pro-reform demonstrators and those affected by the uneven mode of development joined forces during the Tiananmen Protests to criticise China’s modernisation trajectory. The event is until this day mainly remembered as a pro-reform demonstration. Analyses have
consequentially contextualised the event as an integral part and logical consequence of
the fragmentation of the Soviet Union and the eschatological triumph of liberal
capitalism⁵⁵. The depoliticised interpretation of the event symbolised the dashing of
the last bastion of hope for a revolutionary politics and helped legitimise the means for
a further ‘naturalisation’ of the economic logic. The period following 1989 and Deng’s
1992 Southern Tour to China’s ‘economic miracle’, Shenzhen, marked the onset of a
full-fledged integration of China into the ‘global’ world. The last chapter will discuss
how this led to the further depoliticisation of the production of urban space.
6. Chapter Six: The Production of Space after Tiananmen (1989 - )

Introduction

The Tiananmen Square incident marked the definitive ending of China’s search for an alternative, socialist modernity and the beginning of the country’s economic integration in the capitalist world order. China’s short twentieth century left the CCP without an alternative. China and the world at large reached an end of history in 1989. This chapter therefore ends this dissertation on the same subject, from which the first chapter begun: globalisation. Capitalism is, as has been described in chapter one, inherently borderless, yet it not evenly global. Its characteristic and enabling unevenness exposes the inherent crisis tendency of the system of production. It also demonstrates the equally integral need to conceal, or depoliticise, that tendency. The depoliticisation of the Chinese State Party led, as described in the previous chapter, to the everyday permeation and internalisation of the ‘objective economic laws’ of the global market. The production of space (and time) plays a crucial role in this process.

The period after Mao’s death and the onset of reforms under Hua and Deng was, in the last chapter, described as a period of repressive and ideological methods of depoliticisation in which the Party attempted to find an art of governance that would allow it to remain in power. This led to a balancing-out of the irreconcilable contradictions that stemmed from the troubled relation between the embrace of pro-market reforms and the Party’s ideological legacy. The experimental phase ended in 1989 with the exploding of that primary contradiction. If the Party still had any doubts about which path to take to remain in power, the Tiananmen incident eliminated them. Deng’s ensuing sea-changing Southern Tour (nan xun) had a dramatic effect on the economy and the country as a whole. Dirlik (2001: 1) talks about a “second cultural
revolution” which is “incomparably more far-reaching and deep-seated in its consequences than the failed Cultural Revolution of the 1960s…”. SOEs were throughout the 1990s privatised; prices were deregulated; accelerated trade liberalisation opened doors to foreign direct investment; and the economic law of surplus value replaced the state planned allocation and distribution of resources.

Such effects have oft popularly been described as the consequence of the emergence of ‘neo-liberalism’. The Chinese state however did, arguably unlike experiences elsewhere, not withdraw from the economy, but instead redefined its role in the economy. The state embedded itself as part of the economy. The gradual and careful process of economic reform was, under the auspices of the state, replaced by an all-out marketisation of the economy. The authority of the market was at no point during this process questioned. The role of the state became instead one of facilitator and regulator of global capital. An “unwritten social contract” (Breslin 2004) was signed between the Party and the people. The former promised to deliver economic growth, while the latter agreed to comply with the new rules of the game.

The social-political stability of the Chinese state primarily relies, however, not on one, but on two main factors that at times coincide and, at other times, collide. The depoliticised CCP stimulates both these factors to remain in power and to concretise the abstract state. The first factor draws, as mentioned, from the growth of the economy. The depoliticised, entrepreneurial state decentralised state control to lower levels of governance and subsequently stimulated municipalities to compete on the basis of GDP growth. The result was a ‘pro-growth coalition’ of state and private actors that led to a historically unparalleled transformation of the built environment. This transformation manifested itself in the depoliticisation of the production of space and the over-production of space.
The second factor from which the CCP leadership draws legitimacy is the form of nationalism from which the Chinese state has historically sprung. Chinese nationalism has since the death of an socialist alternative been on the rise and finds its popular outlet in numerous ways (e.g. the national re-education campaign (see chapter two, but also Zhao 1998), the 100 years of humiliation paradigm, territorial disputes such as those in the South China Sea, the East China Sea etc.). This chapter will look specifically at the built environment as the representational and material expression of the territorial state. The production of the built environment transforms places into national spaces. The result is a capitalist production of space with so-called ‘Chinese Characteristics’.

This chapter will demonstrate how perceptions and everyday day conceptions of state spaces developed in light of China’s integration in global capitalism. I will show that rather than being the passive product of social relations, space is, as we have seen in the previous chapters, itself a performative social relation. The production of space aided, on the one hand, to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP and, on the other hand, became the *modus operandus* for the widespread dissemination of global capitalism. The state profited from both the former (nationalism) and the latter (capitalism) in that they both helped reify the abstraction of the territorialised state.

There exists, however, a tension (or contradiction, if you like) between the territorialised logic of the nation state and the globalising nature of the laws of capital. The contradiction of grounded nationalism and groundless capitalism finds its material expression in China’s built environment. Here we witness how the production of space (and time) displaces and alienates subjects. We witness here, however, also how the state roots its citizens to the soil and to history itself. The abstract state appropriates space and time. Capitalism, on the one hand, challenges the borders of the nation state,
while it, on the other hand, relies on those same abstract borders (and the sites in it) for the disciplining of the bodies that it needs for capital to accumulate and circulate. Capitalism exists and can only thrive because of such spatial abstractions. The state-led management of this contradiction has, as we will see in this chapter, since 1992 increasingly been played-out in the built environment.

This chapter is roughly thematically organised in two main sections that cover the period from 1989 until today. The sections are organised in such a manner to demonstrate how the post-1989 relationship between space and politics provided the impetus for a rise in nationalist and capitalist expressions in the built environment. The result is a landscape of contradictions, alienation and uneven development. The first section will first deal with the rise of what I would like to call ‘depoliticised architecture’ and the ‘over-production of space’. The culmination of the experimental 1980s symbolised the definitive bursting of dreams about an alternative modernity. Capitalism became allegorically the ‘only game in town’. The CCP played an active role in its dissemination and (uneven) development in an effort to stabilise its rule over the state and to accelerate further the modes of production. This section will specifically look at the decentralisation of the state and the production of space in the so-called One City, Nine Towns (OCNT) as an example of a development towards greater depoliticisation and over-production. The second section discusses the parallel rise of a new form of nationalist architecture. The loss of national (real or imagined) identity became after the unleashing of the capitalist modes of production a topic of intense discussion among architects, urban planners and the Chinese population at large. A re-emergence of a ‘national form’ in the architectural production of space was both a reaction to the depoliticisation of the built environment and a product of China’s (re)integration into the global capitalist order. The crisis of representational
space, one that is mirrored by a much wider identity crisis in Chinese society, is empirically analysed by the reaction to the permeation of foreign architectures in China’s so-called ‘mega-spaces’ (e.g. Olympics, the EXPO 2010). I end this discussion by summarising how the state attempts to reconcile the contradiction between contemporary nationalism and global capitalism through the production of spaces with ‘Chinese characteristics’. The result is, I argue, a continuous attempt to balance-out a contradictory development logic that is concurrently both capitalist and nationalist. The inherent contradictions in capitalism remain, however, unresolved.

The Postmodern and the depoliticised Production of Space

The crackdown of Tiananmen Square in 1989 marked the beginning of a long process of depoliticisation that, since China’s last great popular uprising, has not merely steadily spread across the country, but actually has accelerated in both pace and scope. The spatial transformations in the heart of revolutionary China, Tiananmen Square, are a telling example of a widening trend towards greater depoliticisation in China’s built environment. Grass and trees were ten years after the closing of the 20th century planted to ‘soften’ the historical radicalism of the square, while signs were put up asking visitor not to step on the lawn. This marked however only the beginning of the transformation of the meaning of the square. Official sources now annually celebrate the impressive flowerbed in Tiananmen Square on national Independence Day as “the [country’s] grandest and most beautiful” (Shanghai News and Press Bureau 2011). The recent Olympic Greening of the area north of the Square shifted attention further from the history and politics of the square. The extensive\(^1\) greening of the square has subsequently become a national representation of the state’s attempt to depoliticise space and the everyday experience of space.
The unspoken agreement between Party and ‘People’ forms the backbone of political legitimacy in post-1989 China. The context in which this social contract has historically materialised grants us, as the previous chapters have shown, an insight into the political importance of space. The reengineering of society through spatial means remains in the Chinese case, however, still largely unexplored. Most of the existing analyses on China’s spatial governmentality are not in the same manner historically grounded as this dissertation is. One of the key arguments of this thesis is that we can find a historical continuum in the deployment of modern space from the early beginnings of a territorially demarcated Chinese nation state, to the endorsement of nationalism and global capitalism by the contemporary Chinese state. The depoliticisation of contemporary productions of space would not have been possible without the modern invention of the abstraction of the state in the 17th century. The contemporary state itself would not even exist. It is in the interest of the state to continue to produce abstract spaces.

The national celebrations that annually take place in Tiananmen Square are famous for the overwhelming qualities of flowers and temporary installations. Such temporary phenomena contrast sharply with the communist utopian buildings discussed in a previous chapter. These productions of space, and the CR demonstrations that followed, meant to give rise to a socialist consciousness. Wu (2005) employs the term ‘soft monuments’ to illustrate how the omission of a utopian temporality in such installations signifies a government agenda which instead of mobilising the Chinese people for revolution is now focused on subtly depoliticising the square. He writes that the images of the Square “now express citizens’ happiness and unification” (Wu 2005: 243). The transformation in the meaning of Tiananmen Square allowed cities across China to imitate and reproduce the space (e.g. in Linfen,
Huaxi Cun, Yinchuan, Chongqing Zhongxian etc.). Jameson has in different contexts (see for instance Jameson 1992: 149) likened events of instant gratification and loss of historical temporality to the “the waning of larger historical perspectives and narratives”.

One of the earliest theorists of postmodernism in architecture theory, Charles Jencks (1986: 371), argued already in the 1970s and 1980s that an increasing number of architects shared the belief that faith in technological process and the “idea of social engineering through [modernist] architecture” had been “thrown into doubt”. Jencks (1986: 373), described the new postmodern architects “as a group of architects who have evolved from the preceding movements because they have seen the inadequacy of Modernism both as an ideology and [as a] language. It [ie. modernism] failed to transform society in a positive, or even intended, direction (except in rare instances) and its major language, the International Style, was almost exhausted as a rich and urban medium by the sixties”. Many of such early postmodernists felt discontent with the paternalistic, progressive and utopian tone of the modernists. Venturi et al. (1977) famously celebrated instead the idea of ‘learning from Las Vegas’ as a symbol of ready-at-hand enjoyment. Architecture shifted its focus from emancipating the people to an ideal of architecture as wit, enjoyment and commercial persuasion.

The emergence and popularity of postmodernism, both as a theory and as a distinctive style, was perhaps nowhere else as much celebrated as in China. Prominent theorists and critics of the ‘postmodern condition’, such as Charles Jencks and Fredric Jameson, started already in the mid-1980 to give talks and lectures to welcoming crowds of students and academics. Works of Jencks were swiftly translated into Chinese (see for instance Zhao 1986; Li 1987) and articles on the possibilities of a postmodern architecture in China were discussed in the earlier mentioned Jianzhu
Xuebao (e.g. Zhang 1986; Zhou 1991) and in newly founded journals such as Shijie Jianzhu (World Architecture journal) (e.g. Zeng 1987) and Shidai Jianzhu (Contemporary Architecture). Xuefei Ren (2011: 48) argues, however, that postmodernism was little understood at the time and that its adaptation consequentially resulted “in direct imitations of imported iconic images and the uncritical pursuit of novelty designs”. Similar critiques of the lack of a more critical integration of postmodernism can also be found elsewhere. Jianfei Zhu (2009a) writes about an “anything goes” mentality in Chinese architecture, while Rowe and Kuan (2002) lament the commodification aspect of Chinese architecture in the 1990s. It is doubtful, however, if postmodernism ex post facto was (and is) understood any better in the ‘West’. The fact remains, nonetheless, that postmodernism entered China at a time in which the ‘objective laws’ of productivity were unleashed onto the environment. The result was an overproduction of outlandish architectural projects in an effort to attract investment and tourism.

Zhengzhou’s Ronchamp Chapel

A Dutch architect operating in Shanghai mentioned during an interview the replica of the Ronchamp Chapel (Notre-Dame-du-haut, originally built in 1954) in Zhengzhou (Jiangsu) as an ironic example of the practise of ‘copy-paste architecture’ in 1990s China. The church was originally built in the 1950s by Le Corbusier and symbolises a departure from le Corbusier’s earlier utopian functionalism, it is illustrative of his approval of a more organic and vernacular architecture. Jencks (2002: 173) describes the structure, which according to him is adorned with significations, metaphors and different meanings, as “that seminal opening of post-modernism”.
Both the original and the copy are said to be the product of postmodernist architecture, yet both represent different meanings and constitute different political objectives. The original must be understood within the historical context of Europe’s post-War disappointment with earlier modernist styles. The building is consequentially often associated with what is known as ‘architectural brutalism’. Brutalism is an architectural style which critiqued the functional architectures of the pre-War period and attempted to revitalise the ideologically drained modernist tradition by returning to a purer form of modernism with less polished materials and unfinished endings. It rejected the older rational order and incorporated the cultural diversity that started to spread across Europe in the post-War period\(^3\).

The Ronchamp in Zhengzhou (planned by the Zhengzhou Planning and Design Institute with local universities in the first half of the 1990s), in contrast, is detached from an immediate political and historical context. The building is merely a copy of the original and is alienated from both a temporal and a geographic meaning. The building does not represent a form of critique of history, but rather transcends an existing political-economic reality. The production of space seems to serve here a more explicitly capitalist motive.
The Zhengzhou local government decided in 1993 to construct a number of foreign architectures (popularly called ‘World Architecture Museum’ or *Wanguo jianzhu bowuguan*) of which the chapel was only one⁴. Other imported designs include a miniature of St Mark’s Campanile, a Japanese styled Tō Pagoda (*gojū-no-tō*) and an adaptation of the *Erechtheion* (based on the original in Athens) among numerous other architectural landmarks from around the world. The initial objective of the site was to lure both tourists and investment into the otherwise anonymous city. The condition of the buildings, however, quickly deteriorated and visitor numbers dropped rapidly. A reporter of the *Architectural Record* (Elsea 2004) wrote that the buildings had outlived their novelty already a few years after their construction. A local official told him that “[m]ost of the street is deserted, and there is no one in charge of it now” (Elsea 2004: 38).

Zhengzhou municipal authorities recently decided to intervene in this downwards spiral and invested 500 million yuan in a radical renewal/ revitalisation project (*Rainbow Garden* or *Caihong huayuan*). The plan set out to transform the site into a “luxurious business services district” (chief engineer in Guo 2011) to serve what has academically become known as ‘place promotion’. The new site will only retain some of the original architectural buildings and is, as exemplified in the promotional video that buttresses the lucrative prospects for high-end retailers and real estate agents, mainly focused on expressing a more outspoken form of consumerism.

**One City, Nine Towns**

Zhengzhou’s experience is, however, in no way unique in China. Many Chinese cities went through a wave of ‘post-modernisation’ in especially the 1990s and early 2000s. The arguably most discussed example has been the ‘One City, Nine Towns’ (*yi cheng jiu zhen*, henceforth OCNT) project in the suburbs of Shanghai.
which even received attention from celebrity philosopher Slavoj Zizek. He describes the site to signify a trend of an emerging global class that in the Chinese context has “built secluded communities modelled upon idealised ‘typical’ Western towns… The whole area is isolated from its surrounding by an invisible, but not less real, cupola” (Zizek 2009: 4, 5). The observation that rootless capital results in the importation of transnational architectural forms and meanings is, of course, valid. It however only tells one side of the story. What is needed to come to terms with the reasons why sites such as the OCNT arise is, instead, an understanding of the strong role of the state and the political motive for its decision to introduce ‘alien’ forms to dominate or, at least, alter the built environment. This compels us to take serious the strong role of both the local and central Chinese state in the transformation of China’s landscape. We therefore first need to look at the working of the state in urban politics, before going into greater depth in identifying how the state contributed to the establishment of the OCNT.

The Decentralisation of the State

The central state has historically been the sole proprietor of land in China. The Land Administration Law (1998) granted municipal governments however, control over the ownership of land. The earlier City Planning Act (1989) had already permitted municipal governments the right to issue development permits. Local governments subsequently enjoyed increased freedoms to capitalise on the already briefly mentioned ‘land-use rights’ (tudi shiyong quan). Municipalities started, in other words, to transfer land use rights, varying in length from 40 to 70 years, to both state entities and commercial users in an effort to stimulate economic growth. The fees from land use rights have since decentralisation reforms become one of the primary sources of local revenues. Sales of land-use rights in the early 2000s accounted, according to
Ding (2003), for 25 to 50 per cent of a city’s total revenue. Qu and Liu (2012: 292) similarly write that “land lease revenue [in 2008] accounted for over 40% of the total revenue generated by local municipalities”. Other sources are more conservative in their estimates, but there is a general consensus in the literature that the fee from land use rights “has proved to be a major source of local revenue” (Ma and Tian 2009: 605). A 2013 budgetary report from the Ministry of Finance (2013) shows, for example, that fees from land use rights funded more than 80 per cent of the spending of local government funds. Municipalities have consequentially accelerated the process of land appropriation to boost further economic growth.

The gradual commodification of land (in absence of absolute land property rights) from the 1980s onwards and the state’s on-going fiscal centralisation, as outlined in, for example, the 1994 tax-sharing system reform (fenshuizhi), are arguably the most important drivers of China’s vast urbanisation and economic modernisation process. The central state withdrew itself from local economic development, while local layers of government could now retain certain revenues, which incentivised them to undertake grand developmental projects in an effort to further economic growth. The city has consequentially become an ‘entrepreneurial’ entity that competes with other cities over investment flows. Urban architecture has become a ‘unique selling proposition’ in the practise of what in the 1990s has become known as ‘place-based promotion’.

The OCNT project was, in that context, the immediate consequence of the Shanghai government’s decision to lure investment into the primarily undeveloped areas of the municipality. Planning in Shanghai performs, however, more than merely a local function. Shanghai is of national importance. The 14th CCP congress in 1992 designated Shanghai to become the proverbial ‘dragon’s head’ in China’s
(re)integration into the global capitalist order. The CCP envisaged Shanghai to become a 21st century global city and wished it to perform as an example for other developing Chinese cities. The first step in promoting Shanghai as the benchmark for other Chinese cities and the new global China was, of course, the development of a financial district in Pudong. The government planned the Lujiazui Central Finance District not only “after the success of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone” (Wu 2000a: 1368), but wished to outperform it. It was, as Olds (1997: 120) informs us, “designed to be China’s most important functional and symbolic tertiary sector zone”.

The development of the new district of Pudong was, however, only the beginning of Shanghai’s redevelopment. Wu (2000b: 351) writes that the city’s “floor space under construction increased from 38 million m² in 1990 to 107.3 million m² in 1996 and the completed floor space increased from 21.4 to 32.5 million m² in the same period”. The conversion of rural counties into urban districts dramatically also expanded the physical dimensions of the city, which at the time of writing is approximately 6,300 square kilometres in size. The strong role of the state, at the municipal as well as at the central level, is unmistakeably visible in the countless forced displacements and the rigorous planning and orchestration of the dramatic expansion and radical transformation of the city.

The exponential growth of the city led to constant readjustments in the planning of its physical development. There arose, consequently, an agreement among policy makers that the planning of the city required further decentralisation (see for example Wu 2002). Urban master plans published in the 1990s mirrored this trend and increasingly shared the view that carefully planned administrative and political decentralisation was necessary. The decentralisation of powers within the municipality granted district governments significantly greater sway in the planning and
development of land. The objective of urban decentralisation, which since the early 1990s enjoyed an increasing emphasis, was to release pressure from the urban core and meant to spur economic development along multiple poles (ie. districts). Districts governments were throughout the 1990s given greater powers in the administration of FDI, land development and the planning of infrastructure. The role of the state is therefore not merely one which is characterised by a passive top-down process, but one in which all levels of the state are actively involved in the coordination and promotion of capital accumulation. The result is an opaque, non-transparent and oft-failing form of urban management that primarily pursues a short-term agenda of capital accumulation.

The 1-9-6-6 Plan

The 1999-2020 Master Plan for the Shanghai metropolitan region was sent for approval to the central government in 2000 and was authorised by the State Council in the year thereafter. The plan forms an important part of the state’s wider objective to develop the city “into one of the world [sic] economic, financial, trade and shipping centres” (Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Research Institute 2001: 10). Such a developmental path led to a decentralised urban organisation in which the municipal government laid out the overarching planning strategy and the subordinated districts enjoyed a level of autonomy in the implementation of the plan.
This was the political-economic context in which the OCNT project was originally planned in the late 1990s. The OCNT plan served as a pilot of what in the Shanghai’s urban master plan (1999-2020) has been described as a ‘1-9-6-6’ urban planning system (Chengzhen tixi guihua gongzuo). The model constitutes a hierarchic, but multi-layered urban system compromised of a central city primarily dedicated to fulfil functions in the tertiary sector, nine smaller, administrative cities (300,000 to 1,000,000 inhabitants), sixty sub-towns (of 50,000 to 150,000 residents) and six hundred central villages (with approximately 2,000 residents). The new towns are meant to bolster economic growth and reduce urbanisation pressure on the central city. Polycentric urban planning or ‘decentralised concentration’ embodies a quasi ‘hub-and-spoke’ strategy which, on the one hand, reduces population pressure on the urban core and, on the other hand, stimulates economic growth in designated sub-centres.
The anticipated result is that the central city gradually moves towards deindustrialisation to transform eventually into a service-providing centre. The towns are in their turn expected to industrialise on the basis of pre-planned paths of industrial specialisation. District governments, in which new towns were planned, retained however a level of autonomy in the location and planning of such towns.

Shanghai’s 1-9-6-6 planning strategy was introduced in Shanghai’s 11th five year plan. The nine towns refer to: Baoshan, Jiading, Qingpu, Songjiang, Minhang, Nanqiao Fengxian, Jinshan, Lingang xin chengzhen (now Nanhui xin chengzhen), Chongming Chengqiao. The total area reserved for construction is 600 KM². The plan projects around 5.4 million inhabitants to live in the new towns (CCP Central Government 2006).

Foreign Forms

The OCNT project served until 2006 as a pilot for the larger 1-9-6-6 plan, but the central focus of attention was, more than in the 1-9-6-6 plan, primarily targeted towards consumption. The central city in the OCNT plan is the earlier mentioned satellite town of Songjiang and the nine new towns are Anting New Town (Jiading), Fengjing New Town (Jinshan), Gaoqiao New Town (Pudong), Buzhen (Chongming), Luodian New Town (Baoshan), Pujiang New Town (Minhang), Fengcheng New Town (Fengxian), Zhujiajiao (Qingpu) and Zhoupu New Town (Nanhui) (Figure 3, 4). The OCNT was officially adopted in Shanghai’s tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) and most of the towns have, at the time of writing, largely been constructed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Style</th>
<th>Architect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Songjiang New City</td>
<td>Songjiang</td>
<td>British</td>
<td>Atkins (UK)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(Thames Town) | Anting New Town | Jiading | German | Speer & Partner (German)
---|---|---|---|---
Fengjing New Town | Jinshan | Canadian | Six Degrees (Australian), Corban and Goode (Canadian), EDA International Inc. (US)
Gaoqiao New Town | Pudong | Dutch | Kiiper Compagnons (Dutch), Atelier Dutch (Dutch)
Buzhen/ Baozhen new town | Chongming | Australian |
Luodian New Town | Baoshan | Swedish | Sweco Architects (Swedish), KTH (Sweden)
Pujiang New Town | Minhang | Italian | Vittorio Gregotti (Italian), Ove Arup (UK)
Fengcheng New Town | Fengxian | Spanish | Codinachs Architects (Spanish)
Zhujiajiao Town | Qingpu | Chinese Water Town | Ben Wood Studio (US)
Zhoupu New Town | Nanhui | European-American | Uncompleted

**Figure 6-5: Towns, locations and architecture of the OCNT**

To bolster the attractiveness of the new towns and to lure investment into the project, the Shanghai’s municipal government decided to introduce European architectural styles in most of the towns. An international competition was organised and members of the different district government were given a large role in the jury. Almost all of the towns were planned by renowned international architectural firms which “were invited more for their international fame than their professional capacity” (Shen and Wu 2011: 267).
Figure 6-6: Location 'One City, Nine Towns'

Arial view of municipal Shanghai with the locations of the new towns (den Hartog 2010b; Muynck 2012). The red coloured towns have been built or have at least started the construction phase. Zhoupu has never materialised and the construction of the town of Chenjiazhen was cancelled. The Lingang Harbour City (designed in 2002) and the Dongtan Eco-City (designed in 2005, but left unconstructed as of yet) were not officially part of the original OCNT project.

‘Place promotion’ was a key strategy in the planning of all of the towns. The plan for Thames Town in Songjiang was, for example, praised by the jury for “not only having the flavor of old historic towns of Oxford and Bath, but also the new garden cities as Milton Keynes” (Xue and Zhou 2007: 24, 25). District governments continued, however, also to play an important role in the financial planning of the new sites. The organisation and financing of the project is illustrative of the dynamic interplay between state and private actors and is, more generally speaking, characteristic for the post-1989 entrepreneurial state.

Thames Town (completed in 2006) performed the role of the ‘one city’ and was for that reason given preferential treatment by the government. The fact that the
The development of the project was overseen and financed by the state helped gained the confidence of private developers who were eager to lease land use rights (Shen and Wu 2012). Private and government agencies, in fact, collaborated “in order to attract businesses to rent properties and together they made great efforts to market Thames Town” (Shen 2011: 144). The branding of the town is given central importance on the town’s website which repeatedly makes reference to its British qualities.

Not France, nor Switzerland or Greece, but the United Kingdom is perhaps the most romantic place in the world… Romance is a natural rural tranquillity; a Victorian town in the afternoon… The comprehensively British town hosts architectural features from the Tudor, Georgian and Victorian traditions… to compromise an enclosed atmosphere which is genuinely and harmoniously British (Own translation, http://www.thamestown.com/travel1.htm last accessed in December 2012)\(^9\).

Most of the approximately 2,000 mansions were at the time (2009), according to local real estate agents, sold out. The high demand for the project is confirmed by den Hartog (2010a: 124) who writes that, despite of the high prices\(^{10}\), some of the buyers were so enthusiastic that they “brought huge amounts of money in cash [to real estate agents]”. Housing prices in Thames Town, (approximately 45 km from Shanghai centre) subsequently increased\(^{11}\) as a consequence of the circulation of what is known as ‘hot money’ (re qian). They now approximate those in areas closer to the urban core of Shanghai (Figure 4 and 5).
Figure 6-7: Average housing price per square meter (Shanghai)

‘The average housing price per square meter from August 2009 to May 2010 in Chinese Yuan’. The data is assembled from http://shanghai.sskk.com (last accessed January 2013); a website dedicated to real estate developments in China. The average housing price in the urban centre of Shanghai was during the period on average around 60,000 Yuan per square meter (Figure 5). Shanghai’s monthly minimum wage for workers has, one should bear in mind, recently increased to only 1,450 Yuan (Xinhua News 2012). Urban labourers and (especially) rural migrants subsequently move away to live in increasingly more remote parts of the city.

Figure 6-8: Average Residential Sales Price by Area in square meter (Shanghai)

‘Average Residential Sales Price by Area in square meter (Shanghai)’. Data comes from a recent report by a renowned international real estate services agency (Colliers International 2013). Many of the sites of the OCNT are geographically close to or outside the Suburban Ring Road (see also Figure 3). The closest to the urban heart is Pujiang Town (approx. 15 km).

When visiting Thames town one is, however, immediately struck by the lack of people in the streets. Many of the towns are remotely located and lack public
infrastructure. The explanation for the deserted cityscape has according to the residents I met, however, less to do with accessibility and more to do with the purpose the houses serve. Many of the residences serve as a second or even third home. Many of the residents seem to have acquired houses exclusively for speculation purposes. Those that do decide to live in the OCNT belong to the affluent class who fled the inner-city centre to live comfortably within the walled and policed compounds of the new towns. Many of these new towns surround themselves, however, by poorer, much denser populated quarters (xiaogu) in which rural migrants and displaced residents live. Their low-incomes (and Hukou status) prevent them from acquiring expensive properties. The characteristic mode of uneven development of capitalism translates subsequently into an equally uneven mode of production of space that has come to taint China’s built environment. Real estate speculation has become the primary vehicle for the materialisation of a highly unbalanced landscape.

**The Over-Production of Space**

The perhaps most characteristic example of the unevenness (and unsustainability) of China’s development model is Huaxi Village (Jiangsu). The proclaimed richest model community in contemporary China has since 1992 been promoted by central state authorities as “the pinnacle of rural achievement under the ‘Reform and Opening-up’ policy.” (Flagg 2012: 20). The commune, since 1998 listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange, took over the earlier discussed ‘Learn from Dazhei’ model as the representational model space for the development of ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’. The representational shift characterises a historical transformation from the emphasis on spaces of production and political subjectivities to spaces of consumption and, more importantly, the display thereof. The village hosts replicas of the Great Wall, Tiananmen Square, the Arc de Triomphe, Sydney
Opera House among other prominent sites. The tiny village, with just over 2,000 inhabitants\textsuperscript{15}, built in 2011 also one of the tallest skyscrapers in the world (the ‘Long Wish Hotel International’) (Tan 2011).\textsuperscript{16}

The outlandish production of space in Huaxi, the OCNT among other locations is inspired by and stimulated under the speculative presumption of infinitive growth. The reality of the recent slowdown of the international economy meant however, that demand for Huaxi’s traditional iron and steel industries dropped. The value of space subsequently stagnated. The town now suffers from a lack of investment and visitors. Residents have by the municipality been given spending coupons and are, according to the South China Morning Post (Luo 2013), “asked to stay at its luxury five-star hotel to ‘drive consumption’”.

The model of China’s development of spatial overproduction has increasingly come under distress. The spatial effects of capital’s mobility is the result of, what I have described in chapter one as, ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in which capital requires ‘spatial fixes’ to circumvent the downward spiral of surplus value. The result in China has been an ethos of production for production’s sake (the logic of over-accumulation of capital). A crisis arises, however, at the moment capital flows start to falter and move to financially more lucrative destinations. The value of space tends to decrease. Municipalities witness a fall in land-use revenues and consequently take on more loans to invest in new productions of space in a dire attempt to avoid the downward spiral of capital. Income levels are, however, generally too low for housing to ever become affordable for the majority of the population\textsuperscript{17}. The consequence, besides the danger of local debt crises, is the arrival and increasing number of so-called ‘ghost towns’.
Most, but not all, of the other towns in the OCNT project face problems of low occupancy. The houses in the Dutch town in Pudong are, for example, all sold-out, but the streets were here as well empty.\textsuperscript{18} Reports from elsewhere confirm the idea that consumption is no longer the primary motive for the production of space. A local real estate specialist suggests that “commercial vacancy rate is [close] to 50% [in Beijing]” (Chu 2010), while others (Liu 2010) write about “64 million apartments and houses that have remained empty during the past six months”. The high risk of such speculative investments becomes apparent when one considers that the majority of construction work in China deploys cheap materials. Some of the buildings in the Dutch town show already signs of dilapidation. The average lifespan for constructions is, according to interviewed local architects and urban planners, limited to only 20-25 years. The combination of inflated real estate prices with physical deterioration leads to a potentially volatile economic situation.

Speculation not only flourishes in the real estate sector, but also takes place on yet to be fully developed land. Land speculation, known colloquially as \textit{chao de}, (literally referring to the ‘stir-frying of land’), has resulted in an increasing number of unfinished projects. A notorious example is the ‘Wonderland Amusement Park’ (\textit{Wo de lan leyuan}) in Beijing’s Changping District which initially was planned as “the largest amusement park in Asia”, but has for years already remained unfinished\textsuperscript{19}. A perhaps more widely known example is the ORDOS100 project in Inner Mongolia, which was conceptualised by the architects of the Beijing National Stadium (also known as the ‘Bird’s Nest’) and architecturally realised by 100 international architects. The fact that construction of the project should on paper have been finished by 2010 did not deter the developer (Jiang Yuan Engineering Ltd.) to already sell the land use rights before the completion of construction to the Forbes listed tycoon Liu Manshi.
The city has become a stark icon of China’s over-production of space. The fact that the city has remained largely unoccupied did, however, not discourage further production. A new series of production of space is underway in an attempt to postpone the process of devaluation.\(^{20}\)

The speculative practice known as ‘pre-selling’\(^{21}\), which in the bigger cities constitutes for about 80 to 90 per cent of residential properties transactions (Chau and Ho 2009), has caught the government’s attention and led to new regulations (including tax adjustments, banking regulations and a credit crunch). The government is however reluctant to structurally tackle the problem of over-production, given that a slowdown in the sector would automatically trigger a decrease in land value. Land lease rights, as stated earlier, contribute more than any other source of fiscal revenue to municipal budgets. It also bears mentioning that the influence of domestic financial institutions has significantly grown in the real estate sector. Chen et al. (2011: 29) write that by “the end of 2009, real estate loans issued by major domestic financial institutions had reached 2.52 trillion RMB, accounting for 6.3% of the total loans”. A decrease in the value of land could therefore easily trigger a debt crisis.\(^{22}\) The importance of the real estate sector is further underlined by the fact that it accounts for at least 10 per cent of national GDP. A recent IMF report (2012: 11) warned that “disorderly decline in real estate investment could have significant implications for growth in China and the global economy” (cf. Ahuja and Myrvoda 2012).

With such risks and economic growth being of vital importance for the political legitimacy of the post-1992 regime, outlandish ‘postmodern’ architectural productions of space such as the OCNT are likely to have an increasing impact on the Chinese landscape. The continuous over-production of space seems almost inevitable. The latest projects include a bigger version of Manhattan in Yujiapu (Tianjin), an
Austrian inspired town in Huizhou (Guangdong), the London Tower Bridge in Suzhou (Jiangsu) and the new district in Chenggong (Kunming, Yunnan)\textsuperscript{23}. The last is said to have “a hundred-thousand new apartments with no occupants” (Kramback 2010). Construction work in Yujiapu, meant to be “the world’s largest financial centre” (Schmitz 2013), has recently been put on halt after developers ran into debt problems.

**International Architecture**

The high rate of capital circulation and the subsequent emphasis on production have drawn the attention of international designers who are attracted by the prospects of working in an environment characterised by a relative lack of architectural and financial restrictions. I met numerous Western architects looking for jobs in China. Several of them argued that big construction projects in Europe have become increasingly rare because of strict building regulations and a general lack of funding. The celebrated architect Zaha Hadid (in Jakes 2004) portrayed China, in contrast to the West, as “an incredible empty canvas for innovation”. International renowned architects or so-called ‘starchitects’ are received with open arms by the state and are given an unprecedented extent of freedom in their architectural planning and financial budgeting\textsuperscript{24}. An internationally celebrated architect is by government officials considered a good means to add value to the land and to attract national and international attention to the city.

The decision to invite the famous Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas to design the headquarters of the state’s mouthpiece, the iconic CCTV Headquarters in Beijing, is not merely another example of city-branding, but also symbolises the “evolving” nature of Chinese propaganda” (Ong 2011: 219). Koolhaas is according to some not only the most famous architect, but also the most outspokenly depoliticised one (e.g. Koolhaas, Graaf et al. 2009). Koolhaas, the architectural critic Michael Sorkin (Sorkin
2002: 2) writes, “holds the concept [of branding] in high esteem, elevating it to the core of his architectural ideology, something capable of subsuming all other values, including the political.” It was therefore perhaps only logical that the architectural protagonist of “anti-utopian cynicism” (Mau 2011) would submit the winning proposal to a jury which comprised besides state officials and the Japanese architect Arata Isozaki, also the aforementioned apologist of architectural post-modernism, Charles Jencks. Sudjic (2006: 60), commenting on the competition, argues, that Jencks, “tried to depoliticise what some see as an essentially political process.”

The lack of a critical or autonomous architecture in China - perhaps also the primary incentive for Koolhaas’ decision to compete for the CCTV project rather than for the Ground Zero project in New York (e.g. Koolhaas, Graaf et al. 2009) - has serious ramifications for China’s national identity.

Ong looked at the interplay between state-led capitalism and state-sponsored nationalism in Beijing. She (2011: 224) writes that “the stunning hyperbuilding has established Beijing as a global stage, a hyperspace that is dominated by Chinese sovereignty”. Ren (2008: 176) correctly argues that “[a]rchitecture is a major vehicle employed by territorial elites to negotiate national identity and express national ambitions.” What happens, however, if the spaces of representation get stretched too far from the local context and historical circumstances? What are the effects of alienation on everyday life experience of space?

A famous, albeit extreme, example, which drew little academic, but a lot of local attention, was the infamous ‘English Town’ or ‘No Chinese town’ in Caijiawa Cun (Miyun County, Beijing). The plan for the construction of the town covered an area of more than half the size of the Thames Town and followed similarly European architectural premises. It went however, one step further. “Under the [planning]
proposal, the area would be walled off from the rest of the county and visitors would be given a souvenir passport upon entry. Visitors would also be penalised for not speaking English within its boundaries” (Global Times 2011). An academic from Beijing’s Foreign Studies University depoliticised the construction arguing that “[s]peaking English is only a selling point” (Hou Yiling in CCTV 2011). A good number of both public and private investors proved to be willing to finance the project. The project was, however, officially cancelled in December 2011 after having caused great public outcry on popular Chinese internet forums (Nanfang Daily 2011).

This extreme example of a much broader trend towards ever-greater architectural depoliticisation, discussed in this section and the last chapter, raises challenging questions as to how the production of space in post-Tiananmen China relates to political concepts such as territoriality, nationhood, nationalism and citizenship. The next section deals with the post-1989 emergence of a nationalist architectural discourse that not coincidentally runs parallel to the trend of the depoliticised architecture explored above. There exists an irreconcilable and complex contradiction between these forms of governmentality. The Party’s legitimacy relies, on the one hand, on an apathetic and global form of social relations and promotes, on the other hands, reified spatial expressions of the territorialised abstract nation state. The resultant crisis of representation is at no point, however, challenged or even recognised by the CCP. The problem is in discussions rather downgraded to a mere technical matter of simply integrating more or less ‘Chineseness’ to achieve an optimum modern space with ‘Chinese characteristics’.

**Nationalisation of Space**

*Nationalist-inspired, Capitalist-driven Architecture*
The contradiction between nationalist and capitalist forms of architectural expressions was perhaps brought to its climax during the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The incentive for organising the Olympics served arguably two broad purposes. The first, *global* objective was to both counter and reshape the negative image of an isolationist, threatening China and to attract international and domestic capital to Beijing (and to China more generally). The second, *national* objective was to bolster a sense of national identity and unity among the Chinese population. Shin (2009: 128) similarly notes that the driver of the state for hosting the 2008 games was “to secure both domestic and global endorsement of China’s economic success, and obtain legitimacy of the state and the Communist Party that guided this achievement.” The production of time and space both performed important state tools to achieve these two objectives.

The image that the state wished to exhibit nationally was one that centred on the self-orientalising notion of a linear and continuous 5,000-year-old Chinese national history. This self-orientalising effort parallels the occurrence of ‘internal orientalism’ that we saw earlier in the Qing’s colonial endeavours in Taiwan. National identities were under the umbrella of the unified nation state exotically reified in cosmopolitan fashion. Indeed, de Kloet et al. (2008: 8) show that the Games were “used by the state to educate and discipline its citizens and to present a revamped yet rooted China to the world”. A Chinese journalist (in Haugen 2005: 223) explains the decision to hold the games in Beijing: “Beijing [is] more appealing to others because we have such a long history; we have something you have never seen, something very native, something very Oriental”. The state, in other words, appropriated representational time for its own national legitimacy. It similarly attempted to produce a mentally unified state space. Shin (2012: 729) notes elsewhere that mega events such as the games “are
promoted as a means to create [what Debord called] ‘unified space’ for the purpose of both capital accumulation and socio-political stability for further accumulation.”

The second objective, securing global endorsement, focused on the representation that China belonged now to the responsible international liberal community. The historically unprecedented torch relay (‘The Journey of Harmony’), crossing five continents, was as such symbolic for China’s global integration. The Olympics were with its emphasis on harmony, high-tech, hygiene, the environment and modern rationality, also inherently teleological. The authorities portrayed the Games (analogous to China) as being more than sufficiently modern to be worthy of global endorsement. “Organisers vowed to make Beijing’s air as clean as Paris by the beginning of the Games.” (Marvin 2008: 235). “The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions reported that about 1.5 million people [probably excluding the number of migrants] would have been displaced during the nine years… leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games.” (Shin 2012: 738). Protests against the displacements and the poor treatment of especially migrants were quelled to kindle the image of a socially ‘harmonious’, politically ‘unified’ and, above all, a ‘peaceful’ China.

The two discourses, one focused on nationalism and the second on global capitalism, intersected at the Games slogans. One of the official domestic slogans read: “For the Glory of the Motherland, for the Glory of the Olympic Games” (Shin 2012). State-sponsored slogans, in general, followed largely a national territorial logic. The official global slogan for the Games, ‘One World, one Dream’, characterised, instead an abstract global geography. The world to which the slogan referred was a post-1989 one, in which universal liberalism was global and hegemonic. This paradox of a territorialised Olympics for the benefit of the nation, on the one hand, and a liberal global Olympics, on the other hand, was not only observable in representations of
space. The spaces of representation in the built environment witnessed similar clashes between abstract nationalist and abstract global discourses.

*The Production of the Olympics*

Central government agencies and local layers of governance collaborated closely and carefully in the planning of ‘flagship architectural projects’ which were intended to boost the overall impact of the spectacle. Fierce debates soon erupted, however, over the nationality of the involved architects in the planning of some of the Olympic project. The literature has especially granted a lot of attention to the construction of the National Stadium (or the so-called ‘Bird’s Nest’) for which two prominent international architects (Herzog and Meuron) were chosen by a jury composed of six international renowned architects (including Rem Koolhaas), three government officials and four Chinese engineers from CAS. The international character of the stadium was strongly criticised by a collective of cultural conservatives (referred to in the literature as ‘experts’), headed by the eminent architect Wu Chen (2005), who in the national media blamed the opportunism and extravagance of foreign architects for the loss of Chinese culture. A petition was submitted to Minister Wen Jiabao, and the construction of the stadium was consequently temporarily halted in 2004. This had not been, however, the first case that conservatives attempted to frustrate and question the capitalist-driven internationalisation of architecture in China.

Two earlier and larger petitions, underwritten by over a hundred Chinese architects and dozens of members of CAS, were sent to China’s leadership to protest against the construction of Paul Andreu’s National Theatre in Beijing. The grounds on which the petitions based themselves were very similar to those opposing the National Stadium. The criticism of Alfred Pei-gen Peng, a Professor of Architecture at
Beijing University, was particularly damning. “His [ie. Andreu's] proposal is extremely incongruous with the surroundings. What Andreu did was not new, but something outdated that has been abandoned by the mainstream of Western architects… Even by Western architectural standards, the proposal is a flop…” (Peng in China Daily 2000). Broudehoux (2004) notes that the consternation was not limited to academic circles. The broader public soon engaged in an intense discussion, which led debates to move rapidly far beyond the architectural credentials of the building.

“The project became portrayed as an expensive folly commissioned by demagogic leaders more interested in national prestige, image, and personal gain rather than the well being of the nation.” (Broudehoux 2004: 232). The government felt subsequently forced to suspend construction twice, while plans were, similarly to the case of the National Stadium, radically modified to accommodate public and academic concerns over the gigantic proportions of the required investment for the structure.

Such criticisms about ‘foreign’ forms and influences have since the depoliticisation of architecture become increasingly widespread in both public and academic discourses on questions over the meaning and evolution of ‘Chinese architecture’. Liu et al. (2011) discuss what they see as the “Loss of Traditional Culture in Modern Architecture”. They (2011: 42, paraphrased) argue that some of the international architects represent Chinese culture well, while others have no clue about Chinese heritage, and the designs fall into an ‘internationalism’ which is just a ‘morass of imitation and copying’. Kanjian Yi (in Marvin 2008: 246) laments, more generally, that “our cities are now becoming the same. Why? Because we neglected the natural environment, we neglected the cultural heritage, and we destroyed too much… Sometimes it looks like you’ve just dumped an American city in the middle of China.”

The OCNT constructions have been called ‘rubbish foreign imitations’ (Jianzhu yang...
lese) (Lei 2006). An editorial commentary (Ma 2009) on the website of the State Council’s China Internet Information Center similarly warned that “some foreign architects use China as an experimental site for designs which would not be authorised in their own country, or designs which violate the principles of international sustainable development, basic structure, and safety norms.” Even Charlie Xue (2006: 26), whose writing is otherwise sensitive on the relationship between politics and architecture in China, pensively notes: “Perhaps someone who is not Chinese can never fully understand the spirit of Chinese tradition.”

34

The Production of National Form

The alternatives offered to the internationalisation of architecture in China are, however, rarely critical of capitalism per se. They instead seem largely to rely on nationalist imagined aesthetics to the growing internationalisation of the built environment. The previous chapter already started to explore the 1980s revival of what is known as ‘national form’ in Chinese architecture. The incorporation of ‘fragments’ of Chinese architecture led to buildings which attempted to bridge nostalgic sentiments of an invented Chinese history with an alienating capitalist modernity. The result was an overlapping of one abstraction, the national state, with another abstraction, global capitalism. Early attempts of this trend were, as discussed in the previous chapter, criticised for their postmodern pastiche. The orthodox idea of a ‘national form’ gradually phased out in the mid-1990s (Xue 2006). More recent attempts, such as Wang Shu’s Ningbo History Museum (completed in 2008), have received significantly more praise from the architectural academy. A ‘critical regional’ architecture is said to have emerged which, in contrast to the more sweeping ‘national form’, is believed to be more appreciative of local conditions.
Tao Zhu (2010: 89) recently argued, however, that the “problem [of incorporating traditional elements] is that the fragments still remain as isolated items, they are not recomposed to form a new kind of unity. They still remain as fragments.” The notion and meaning of criticality as such remains therefore similarly fragmented. The question of an alternative production of space, contra modern capitalist space, remains unaddressed. Architecture remains, in other words, politically non-committed. Michael Speaks (2009) argues that there is, in fact, little inherently critical about critical regionalism. Architects within the critical regionalist school do not enjoy autonomy from the market, but benefit from it and perform an integral part in it. Speaks (2009) sees for that reason an overlap in the market-driven rationalities of both the critical regional school and international ‘post-critical’ architects, such as Koolhaas. The element of negation necessary for any critique is, in other words, lost in the critical regionalist traditions. The discourse of a unified Chinese national identity remains consequentially, also tightly linked to the market and the role the state plays therein. The question of what a Chinese architecture could look like (or, indeed, even could exist) beyond the market remains equally unanswered. The late-2000s saw a re-emergence of a more aggressive, culturally assimilating form of national architecture that runs parallel to a more general, societal trend of intensified nationalist sentimentalism.

The Production of the Expo 2010

Expressions of an alternative Chinese architecture vis-à-vis a delocalised, global architecture are more often than not Han-dominated. Minority architecture is oftentimes excluded from such debates, or is alternatively compelled to perform behind the coulisses of the Han narrative of the state. The practise of architectural assimilation reinforces the existing and dominating Han-centred vision of the abstract
state. This, in turn, influences the idea of what it means to be Chinese. The image of a Han-specific China was recently crystallised at the Shanghai World Expo 2010. The Expo was, similarly to the Beijing Olympics, meant to both unify the state space and to promote China as a leading example “of future global development with a particular emphasis on technology and innovation.” (Barr 2012: 85). But while discussions in the Beijing Olympics centred on depoliticised landmark architecture, the Chinese Pavilion embodied a strong political message.

The huge Chinese National Pavilion (popularly dubbed the ‘Oriental Crown’ or the ‘Crown of China’) was packed with Confucian aphorisms. It paternalistically housed 31 smaller provincial (minus Hong Kong and Macau) Chinese pavilions that dedicated themselves to celebrate China’s ethnic minorities. “This promotion of Chinese ethnic minorities through their regional pavilions lies at the heart of Expo 2010, a base from which the Chinese national pavilion rises.” (Nordin 2012: 112). The conservative architect of the building, He Jingtang, deployed a great number of clichéd symbols in the building’s exterior to convey the image of a confident and unified Chinese nation.

Some say it looks like an old Chinese official's cap. Some say it’s a kind of ancient Chinese cooking vessel. Some even say it’s a grain barn. No matter what they think the image is, they all think it is very Chinese.

That's what I wanted (He in Yuan 2010).

The architectural expression of China’s identity was in the Chinese Pavilion very similar to its presentation in the Qing’s Summer Palace. The latter equally attempted, as discussed earlier, to imagine and celebrate national unity through a recognition (if not celebration) of ethnic diversity in the production of space. The question of China’s identity is in the architecture of the Pavilion similarly dominated
by a strong state-led narrative. The account of an uninterrupted 5,000-year-old national history was, for instance, during the EXPO exemplified in the equalising of Chinese civilisation with the idea of civilisation itself. “Throughout the Chinese national pavilion and dozens of Chinese regional pavilions, China is described as the origin of the world, echoing wider media and academic discourse in China. Various Chinese regional pavilions tell us that this is where the first bird flew and the first fire burnt”. (Nordin 2012: 111). This extremely linear interpretation of history allows the Chinese territorial state to appropriate all places that existed before its own modern, territorial arrival. All that originally was temporally anterior (and spatially exterior) to the Chinese state is in a Hegelian fashion absorbed and integrated to become eventually an inherent component of the abstract Chinese state.

This conception of the State’s temporal centrality was, in combination with the Han-centeredness architecture of the Pavilion, accompanied by a cartographic and geopolitical centrism. The experience of walking through the exhibition revealed a cartographic imagining of how the planners of the exhibition park mentally conceived the location of the state in the world (Figure 6).
Figure 6-9: A rescaled and indexed map of the Expo 2010 Park

A rescaled and indexed map of the Expo 2010 Park: 1) China, 2) Pakistan, 3) Taiwan, 4) Hong Kong, 5) Macau, 6) US, 7) India, 8) Japan, 9) S-Korea, 10) N-Korea.

The locations of the Pavilions of Taiwan and Hong Kong were carefully positioned in close proximity to the Chinese pavilion. The Chinese Pavilion itself stood at the centre of the park. Winter (2013: 11) makes a similar observation and argues that “if China positioned itself at the centre, then its choice of who to put on the global margins was indeed revealing. On the other edge of the Asia zone stood Japan, with the United States positioned right at the other end, on the outer limits [of the Park]”. The cartography of the EXPO reveals an otherwise hidden Chinese geopolitical worldview. It also shows that representational space does not involve only a project of unifying domestic time and space. The production of spaces of the state is deeply intermeshed with the project of identifying productions of space that are exterior to the abstract state.

The Production of the West

Representations of the Self automatically involve, also in the Chinese context, discourses over the Other. The process of ‘Othering’ is often used to justify, substantiate and legitimise the idea that China is both a unified entity and uniquely different from the rest of the world. The result is a rivalry of spatial abstractions which, in its most common form between the ‘West’ and ‘China’, resolves around false, albeit politically charged, dichotomies. One of the central arguments of this dissertation, however, explicitly and implicitly counters such reified abstractions and false dichotomies. The argument of a self-orientalising uniqueness is a result of the denial of the historical trajectory of modern space. Modern space was and continues to be instrumental for the production of the Chinese state space. The historical approach of
this thesis emphasises, in contrast, the parallels and similarities in the historical formation and development of the modern Chinese state.

The idea of a homogenous and unified ‘West’ is in just as many ways a socially and historically constructed geographic entity as is the modern nation state of China\(^{38}\). These modern categories are spatially imagined into existence and are, consequently, in constant need of consolidation so to remain true in the popular (geographic) imagination. This is not to say that there was not a production of space before the previously discussed Qing’s creation of a modern Chinese state. The reality is rather, as posited earlier in this thesis, that what came before the modern Chinese state was not Chinese in the modern sense of the word. The modern state rather appropriated the diversity of places to taxonomically label, describe and ontologically internalise them as being ‘Chinese’. The concretisation of the abstract state does therefore not develop merely domestically. The construction of the Self is instead interdependent to the project of producing and imaging the space of the (non-Chinese) Other.

Essentialist theories of China have subsequently led to the popular belief that geographic determinism can be used as a legitimate force to explain any kind of difference that emerges from comparisons between China and (any) other geographic abstraction. The state-led appropriation of place leads, in other words, to the tautological conclusion that China is different, because it is not in Europe or popularly considered part of the West. China is different because it is not the same as the West. The quest for ‘things and spaces with Chinese characteristics’ is, subsequently, presented and placed in direct opposition to the West and Westernisation.

The ontological void that communism left behind spurred, as we have seen, the post 1989-development of a crude form of nationalism that subsequently creates and
stimulates the need for difference in light of the everyday permeation of global capitalism. The divide between China and an imagined West (analogue to modern) replaced, in other words, the previous capitalist-socialist duality. China’s unique difference is subsequently, as mentioned earlier, framed in discourses over ‘Chinese characteristics’ in an attempt to reconcile the contradiction of a national state and global capital. The logic of a system of global capitalism remains, however, in such discussions unchallenged. The state-led nationalism of Chinese characteristics instead selectively appropriates history to apply it to modern capitalism (i.e. market ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’). The pictorial reifying of ‘things’ with ‘Chinese characteristics’ (e.g. modernity, socialism, capitalism, architecture etc.) does, however, neither come to terms with nor negate the logic of borderless capitalism. It instead offers little more than assimilation through different means. The need to legitimise the abstract space of the Chinese state has recently made its entry into debates in architectural theories on the supposedly unique pragmatism that characterises Chinese spaces of representations.

The notion of criticality, which currently receives a lot of attention in theories of architecture and in the social sciences in China more generally, is said to be a distinctive category of the geographic entity of Europe. Zhu (2005) argues, in an influential article, that European architecture is ‘critical’ and Chinese architecture is ‘post-critical’. Zhu uses the term ‘post-critical’ to describe what he sees as the transition in architecture from criticality to efficacy and from ideology to pragmatism. He argues that this trend is mediated by architects, such as Koolhaas, who apply their market-oriented approach to architecture in China and transfer their ‘post-critical’ architecture’ from China to the West. This static geographic understanding partitions the world into demarcated and isolated units that contain particularistic forms of
knowledge and behaviours. Such an essentialist and geographically determinist reading of the world fails to acknowledge for the historical development that led to the abstraction of these geographic categories. The analysis consequentially merely reiterates the existing spatial abstractions to descriptively only reify them further. China is pragmatic and ‘post-critical’, because it is pragmatic and post-critical’.

Such a geographic partitioning of the world, which in itself is already problematically premised on uneven geopolitical categories (e.g. West, East, Europe and China), also bypasses the fact that both the West and the Chinese state conform and function on the basis of the same, interlinking capitalist logic. Capitalism is a universal mode of social relations that historically, as discussed in chapters one to three, gives rise to a specifically modern production of space. The objective of the production of modern space is (in the West, as in China) meant to depoliticise space and annihilate the diversity of place in an effort to reinforce the dogma of the single nation state space.

Tao Zhu (2009b: 91-92), an influential Chinese architectural critic, argues that “[t]he market forces in China have not transcended the ideology, but have instead been utilised by the authoritarian regime as a major force to suppress, or bypass, the intense ideological struggle in the country”. There is no room for critical negation in the production of space by the state. There is therefore neither a structural difference between the production of space in China and the West. The only difference is that of the form which the state takes. The Chinese context is characterised by the presence of an authoritarian state, which merely dispels the false belief that liberal freedom and democracy are either necessary or a ‘natural’ components of capitalism. It does certainly not follow that capitalism functions systematically any different in China than it does in the West. It is therefore, as Ren (2011: 163) writes, “an exercise in
futility to try to distinguish criticality in China from that in the West”. The choice between a national or an international expression of space is a mere decision between two layers of abstraction that conform and reinforce the same dominant mode of social relations. The enactment of this false choice between two spaces of representation is, however, crucial for the survival of the concrete abstraction of the state. The fundamental of over-production and uneven development remains, in the meantime, unresolved.

**Conclusion**

The contradiction that stems from the CCP’s communist legacy and its role as the regulator and facilitator of global capital has had a historically and geographically unprecedented impact on the urban landscape in China. The death of a socialist alternative has led the state party to embrace a mode of production that characterises itself by a depoliticisation of the lived experience of space. The transformation of the state and the subsequent permeation of capitalism in its urban form spurred a definitive break with a previous socialist consciousness. A ‘Make-Most-Of-It’ (Xiangning 2008) architecture has come to replace ideological (and critical) forms of representational expressions. The production of space now solely serves a logic of ever-accelerating capital accumulation. The ethos of production for production’s sake has left tens of millions of houses unoccupied in a country where hundreds of millions cannot afford to buy them. The spatial fixes, required for capitalism to constantly revitalise itself, have moreover led to an increasing number of alienating landscapes.

The tension that exists between a territorialised nation state and the anonymous laws of global capitalism has given rise to an identity crisis in the built environment. The state has since the opening-up of the economy played an active role in the spreading of a nationalist sentiment to strengthen its own legitimacy and to overcome
the gradual effects of the country’s capitalist integration. This is however not merely a
top-down process. The alienation of everyday life has led to an active nationalist block
of resistance comprised of architects, urban planners and the general public at large,
which acts against the intensifying internationalisation of the built environment.
Continuous claims are made to give meaning and form to the abstract state project that
the Qing launched now some 350 years ago. The subsequent rise of spaces (and things)
with ‘Chinese characteristics’ are dedicated to reconcile the contradiction between
global capitalism and the abstract nation state. The abstraction of Chinese
characteristics does, however not fundamentally oppose the logic of global capitalism.
The state is, after all, an integral part of global capitalism. Capitalism can only
function under its aegis.

Capitalism has the tendency to batter down walls. The modes of production
challenge therefore also the borders of the nation state. This chapter has demonstrated
how this primary contradiction has affected the production of space in China. It aided,
on the one hand, in the bolstering of the legitimacy of the CCP and, on the other hand,
became the modus operandus for the widespread dissemination of global capitalism.
The result is, I argued, a continuous attempt on the part of the state to balance-out a
contradictory development logic that is concurrently both capitalist and nationalist.
The inherent contradictions of capitalism remain ultimately, however, not only
unresolved, but actually accelerate in both pace and scope.
Conclusion

The intention of this thesis was to provide a historical account of the formation and development of the Chinese nation state through the medium of the production of modern space. The thesis showed how the production of space has historically played an essential role in the concretisation of the abstract Chinese nation state. I demonstrated, more specifically, how the historically informed formation of the Chinese state space has come to dominate productions of space and experiences of everyday life in contemporary China. The thesis discussed a number of case studies to illustrate how state-led (or ‘elite’) spatial interventions affected life on the ground. The selection of these examples are admittedly not exhaustive, but are instead meant to identify a broader trend towards historical state formation and state space consolidation. The approach taken in this thesis was therefore not centred on the question of what is ‘political’ about space. I have instead rather argued that the production of space constitutes ‘the political’.

The thesis concludes with a summarising and chronological account of how this argument translated in my analysis of the production of modern China. The last section of this conclusion lays out the implications of this research and offers potential venues for future research.

Modern Space

The first two chapters of this thesis paved the theoretical foundations of the analysis of the production of space in China. The chapters problematised the notion of space in conventional accounts of IR and IPE literature. The first chapter introduced the abstract space of the state at a time of so-called ‘global’ interconnectedness. The chapter exposed the underlying politics underneath the spatial abstractions of both the
state and the globe. Marxist geographies were deployed to come to terms with the capitalist modes of production responsible for the reification and ensuing consolidation of a certain abstract understanding of space. The chapter subsequently exposed the contradiction between the territorialised nature of the nation state and the global, deterritorialising functioning of capitalism. This contradiction was more empirically analysed in the last two chapters of the thesis. The need, then, to historicise modern space for understanding how it has come to constitute ‘the political’ was stressed through the later incorporation of Heidegger and Lefebvre’s more ontologically inclined approaches to the question of space.

The second theoretical chapter provided subsequently a short genealogy of modern space. The chapter provided a historical account of the interplay between space and the political. It did this initially through a comparative assessment of the Greek polis and early Chinese city formation. The chapter showed how a specific isometric and homogeneous understanding of space has historically come to triumph over a more ontological and heterogeneous notion of ‘place’. This defining and constitutive component of modernity gradually left the politics of space unquestioned. The transformation in and integration of a new form of knowledge of space was shown not to have been of a linear nature. The dissemination of modern space is analogous to and was spurred by the birth and evolution of a national economy. The now depoliticised essence of modern space helped constitute the abstract nation state through mapping, urban planning, architecture and other spatial-political techniques of power. The result is a specific ‘territorial trap’ and a more general ‘spatial trap’. The production and naturalised nature of state space is taken for granted and its underlying politics are subsequently left unquestioned. This thesis took up the challenge of
exploring how a modern conceptual, perceptual and lived notion of space is politically used in the case of the modern Chinese nation state.

**The Early Modern Chinese State**

The third chapter problematised the natural coming into existence of the space that is the Chinese nation state. The chapter stressed the importance of the gradual intensification between modern space and politics for the production of China. The Qing Empire, like other contemporaneous Eurasian empires, felt compelled to search for a new form of state legitimacy. The Qing endorsed and pursued a territorial mode of politics that effectively helped shape the cartographic demarcating of its territory. The Qing’s cartographic explorations provided the impetus for the establishment of a sovereign inside. This was especially visible in the Nerchinsk Treaty in which the Russian and the Chinese sides mutually recognised each other’s sovereign claims on respective territories and borders. The Qing also performed an important role in the creation and consolidation of a national geobody. It accomplished this through the adaptation of multiple forms of modern knowledge and spatial techniques of power. The chapter analysed ethnography, architecture and mapping in the establishment and development of a conscious and unified Chinese identity. By the time the GMD took over power, the idea of China was already firmly rooted in the popular geographic imagination. The transition from an imperial to a modern nation state was for that reason much more fluid than is usually given credit for. The provided analysis problematises and exposes the limits of the accepted idea of a ‘pre-modern’ China at the time of the Macartney mission. It also challenges pre-modern/ modern dichotomies more generally. I have instead shown that the introduction of a modern and universal conception of space foreshadowed and actively stimulated the formation of the modern Chinese state. The China that we know today finds its roots in the nation state project.
that the Qing had initiated some 350 years earlier. Analyses of China’s state space therefore need to be historicised.

**State Space under Chinese Communism**

The arrival of Chinese communism, discussed in chapter three, did initially not radically challenge the concrete abstraction of the Chinese state. The communists instead consolidated and deepened the state’s spatial abstraction in an effort to link the CCP with the state. The symbolism of Tiananmen Square was shown to expose a complex overlapping of both temporal and spatial representations that ultimately were meant to reinforce the legitimacy of the party state. The production of space was however, not only felt at the spatial heart of the state. The transformation of the mode of production had a profound impact on the experience and biorhythms of everyday life. The chapter provided an empirical analysis on the work units that gradually and characteristically transformed the urban landscape of China. Work units would come to perform an instrumental role in the construction of a socialist consciousness and identity. It was, in other words, through the production of space that the politics of the state transformed in the spaces of representation of everyday life. The CCP’s deepening role in the project of the state would later provide the imperative for the radical negation of the state during the Cultural Revolution. The CR delivered the historically greatest challenge to the concrete abstraction of the Chinese state space. The superstructural revolution provided the ammunition to repoliticise the production and meaning of state spaces. Antagonistic forces outside the apparatus of the state questioned, negated and subsequently appropriated state spaces. The revolution’s catastrophic failure to delink the Party from the state would later deliver the deathblow to Maoism as a utopian, stateless project.

**Contradictions and Depoliticisation with ‘Chinese Characteristics’**
The fifth and the sixth chapter demonstrated how the Party lost its capital ‘P’ and gradually transformed from a ‘Party state’ into a ‘state party’. Hua Guofeng’s policy to return to a pre-GLF developmental model inadvertently translated into the gradual marketisation of the economy. The role of the party subsequently shifted from being a political agitator to a protagonist of the economy. The need to reform led, at first, to an ‘experimental’ acceptance of a developmental model that had its eyes on the validity of the market and the authority of economic progress. The chapter exposed the growing contradiction that subsequently emerged from the legacy of the CCP, which was still communist in name, and the party’s increasingly unquestionable acceptance of the market. This contradiction became gradually depoliticised through a production of space that no longer was set on the objective of productivity or class struggle. The production of space targeted now instead the consumption of space. Housing subsequently became a commodity and architecture stopped to perform a strictly socialist, ideological purpose. The material space of everyday life transcended the arrival of a new consciousness that was devoid of politics. The party curtailed resistance against this trend through so-called ‘Anti-Spiritual Pollution Campaigns’. The final blow to an alternative socialist modernity was struck during the infamous Tiananmen Square Incident.

The post-Tiananmen period, elaborated on in the sixth chapter, saw the emergence of the end of a socialist modernity. The party signed an unspoken political-economic agreement with the population. The former would commit itself to deliver economic growth, while the latter agreed to accept the political authority of the CCP and the validity of the laws of the market. The result was a vast transformation of the urban landscape. The arrangement translated into an acceleration of the spreading of depoliticised productions of space and an overall ‘over-production’ of space. I have
demonstrated how the acceleration of capital has led to ‘spatial fixes’ in architectural simulacra and the construction of large uninhabited cities. The permeation of capital into the urban environment subsequently led to experiences of alienation and uneven development. The nationalist backlash that followed exposes the contradiction between the territorial rootedness of the state and the global and deterritorialising forces inherent within capitalism. The chapter analysed several sites as the material basis for understanding how the interplay between the state and globalising capital gave way to the growing contradiction. The chosen case studies were not argued to be unique. They are rather symptomatic material consequences of this contradiction.

The contradiction is equally complex as it is historical. The state is, as discussed theoretically and empirically in chapters one to three, the product of a competitive and interconnected global context in which different imperialisms fought for greater and more expansive territorial control. The gradual formation of a national political economy relied, as discussed in chapter one, on the birth of modern state territory to enable and enhance both capital circulation and accumulation. The relation between the formation of a state (and nation-state subjectivity as its logical extension) and rootless capital was shown to be dual. Capital, on the one side, strengthens the state, while capital also relies on the state’s mode of governance for its effective geographic dissemination in the global system of territorial states. The relationship between capital and territory is, on the other side, also inherently prone to crises. Chapter six shows how global flows of capital are not restricted to the abstract borders of the state. Capital cannot be contained within the territorial confinements of the state. Neither does its deterritorialising logic conform to the nationalist image that the state wishes to promote for its own consolidation and legitimacy. Capital instead flows to places where surplus value is highest and produces spaces that do not necessarily
correspond to the state-inspired geographical imagination. It is forced to do so, as explained in chapter one, to escape the falling rate of profit.

Chapter six has shown how this volatile relationship has led to a thriving architectural discourse in post-1992 China. The rapid integration of the state into the world economy has led to so-called post-modern architectural style that does not adhere to the nationalist geographical imagination that the state attempts to instil in the popular consciousness. The abstract state finds temporary relief from this contradiction by the growing number of spaces and things with so-called ‘Chinese characteristics’. The abstract labelling of spaces with Chinese Characteristics does, however neither challenge nor oppose the logic of global capitalism. The state is, after all, an integral part of global capitalism and subtracts legitimacy from its functioning.

**Implications and Venues for Future Research**

This thesis focused on the importance of space for understanding what we mean when referring to ‘the political’ in the case of China. The problem of modern space is rarely acknowledged, let alone discussed, in conventional IR and IPE analyses on the Chinese state. The critical turn in geography allowed instead geographers, led by Fulong Wu (2000a; 2000b; 2002) and Anthony Gar-On Yeh (1999a; 2005) among others, to introduce the subject of the politics of space in contemporary, post-reform China. Their fertile labours translated in a rich body of literature on different aspects of China’s uneven mode of development, mega events, urban gentrification, suburbanisation, gated communities etc. These analyses are more often than not set in a specific period. This thesis has instead adopted an ‘atemporal’ approach and asked itself the question how the inception and state-led production of modern space has affected the formation and development of the modern Chinese state. The thesis centralised space, in other words, as the primary locus for the development of politics
in the state space that is China. I argued that the production of modern space has played an instrumental role (through a variety of spatial techniques of power) in the establishment, concretisation and consolidation of the abstract nation state. The thesis highlighted the need to problematise temporality and emphasised the necessity to historicise modern space for understanding how its logic created an abstract territorialised world of pictures. The different chapters in this thesis demonstrated that far from being neutral, modern space and the production thereof is inherently political.

These observations resulted in the earlier provided list of contributions (see introduction) that this thesis offers. The thesis wished to offer an alternative reading of why and how China became a modern nation state, and how the state produced and imagined its concrete abstraction into existence. A more spatially sensitive reading of the Chinese state helps us to centre our attention on the role of space in the formation of national identities and the workings of power structures in experiences of everyday life. Further research on the role and working of space would subsequently shed light on the question how different forms of state have historically relied on the workings of modern space to legitimise a uniformly imagined existence of a Chinese state space. The production of state space is, as shown in this thesis, of historical origins, but is continuously re-enacted in the lived reality of the spaces of everyday life. The taken for granted ideas and timeless ideal of national unity and identity need to be problematised if we wish to acknowledge and question the politics embedded in space. Insight on the logic of modern space would expose the infinite number of power structures in the experiences and biopolitics of everyday life. Research on the historical motivations of the abstract state would help, in other words, to introduce the politics of space within IR and IPE analysis on the Chinese state. Research in this field would enrich and possibly even challenge many conventional accounts that either
overemphasise state-centrism or overplay the permeation of the state by global flows of deterritorialised capital.

This thesis also reached out to discussions beyond the China-specific context. Challenging the origins of China’s linear roadmap to modernity exposes the weaknesses of the teleological line of thinking that emerged especially strong after the unevenness that stemmed from the Industrial Revolution became more apparent. The reasons that led to the Revolution continue to be a hotly debated subject among historians. The growing attention for developments prior to the event has led, more specifically, to a growing body of literature (see e.g. Frank 1998; Pomeranz 2000), which has made it increasingly clear that many states seemed to have developed more or less evenly before the industrialisation of Britain. The need to ‘globalise’ the reasons that led to the revolution has consequentially made its entry into academic debates (see e.g. Horn, Smith et al. 2010). There is, in other words, a need to depart from both temporal linear explanations and treatments that analyse the revolution in isolation from developments outside of Britain.

This thesis avoids essentialising local conditions and challenges temporal chronologies that unproblematically serve as a roadmap for teleological modernity. I have instead taken the position that modernity has very much been a spatial process. Relying on the development of modern space in the creation of the modern Chinese state, I have rejected a linear mode of development and instead adopted a historical materialism that looked at how the material production of modern space informed the specific trajectory of history. This mode of analysis problematises the politicised temporal ruptures between feudalism and modernity and questions the geographical divides between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ that continue to haunt debates on Chinese history specifically and discourses on development in the social sciences more
generally. Future research with a more global historical outlook on the emergence of a specific way of understanding and relating to modern space could help us further debates on the problem and meaning of ‘modernity’.

The transnationalism of 16th and 17th Jesuits, as the mediators of modern forms of knowledge, is perhaps of particular research interest here. Chapter two already briefly mentioned the name of Giovanni Botero and the importance that Foucault attached to his ‘reason of state’. Matteo Ricci, whose name was coined in chapter three, similarly paved an instrumental, yet less explicit, role in the dissemination of a new form of territorial governmentality in 17th century China. Further research on the role of Jesuits could shed valuable light on how modern rationality replaced earlier forms of universal knowledge. Such research would form an important key in demonstrating why the adaptation of a universal mode of knowledge needs to be globalised. The emergence of the Chinese state needs, in other words, to be placed in less of an isolationist context and more set in a globally, interconnected environment.

A global outlook would also thus help us to reopen discussions on the Eurocentric origins of IR and IPE accounts. Discontent about the Westphalian Treaties has already led to a rich body of debate on the history of territory and the specifics of its sudden historical rupture with older forms of governmentality (Teschke 2003; Teschke 2006; Elden 2013a, among others). This thesis argued for a radical opening-up of a geographically broader debate on the meaning of modernity by looking at it through a spatial lens.

The discussion on modern space is, as shown in the later chapters, not merely of historical relevance. The modern state appropriates all what came before it to enable a historical narrative written with a capital ‘H’. The state selectively integrates all places and things that existed before its own existence. The state however also
appropriates all that takes place within its territorial borders and names it ‘Chinese’ or labels it with ‘Chinese Characteristics’. Contemporary places fare little better than past ones. All is absorbed in the linearity of a 5,000-year-old civilisation and timeless state space. The state therefore not only seizes different temporalities in an effort to streamline a uniform linearity, ie. State time, but does the same with alternative geographies, ie. State space. This thesis has emphasised the importance of the unique homogeneous nature of modern state space that ‘containerises’ all entities which exist and have existed prior, during and even after its reality today. Future research on the politics of space in China would do well in avoiding the ‘territorial trap’ and would have to start by historicising how the state concretises and naturalises alternative geographies in an effort to secure its own legitimacy. Rather than accepting, and thus essentialising, the idea of ‘Chinese Characteristics’ as an ‘explanans’ for the existence of a specific form of architecture, economic model, socialism etc. there is a need to problematise and, indeed, politicise by what we mean when referring to ‘Chinese’ in the first place. If not, we risk falling into the ‘territorial trap’ that the state has set for us. This is especially urgent at time in which we see a rising tide of nationalism coupled with realist scenarios that depict ‘China as a threat’ (see e.g. Bernstein and Munro 1997) and international ‘fears’ about the problematically historicised ‘re-emergence’ of a powerful China.

One final remark would be to suggest that the thesis offers also opportunities to look at how the production of modern space relates to China’s position as a global trading hub throughout the period of the early and mid-Qing period. It was at around this time that the country opened its maritime borders most liberally. Zhao’s (2013) recent analysis, for example, focuses on the Qing’s 1684 maritime policies which led to the establishment of dozens of overseas Chinese ports where no difference was
made between tribute or non-tribute countries. In the ports an unprecedented ‘spirit’ of free trade flourished. The development of a national economy, recognition of equal sovereignty and the analogous introduction of modern territory provides fertile ground for interesting comparative research projects on the interplay between geography and political economy.
Notes

Introduction

1 I will avoid the use of the term ‘pre-modern’ to prevent the risk of falling into a teleological, deterministic line of analysis and reasoning.

2 Nationalism and racism in China intertwined, like elsewhere, with the embedding and spreading of state-led nationalist sentiments in the late 19th and 20th centuries (see Dikötter 1994; and Sautman 2001 for a historical analysis). The fact that the Chinese Communist Party have recently, in the wake of its post-1989 ideological vacuum, started to use paleoanthropology in biological research for nationalistic purposes is alarming (see for example Sautman 2001).

3 In his book The Analytical Language of John Wilkins, Borges (1984) offers a fictitious taxonomy of an imagery Chinese encyclopaedia (Entitled The Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge). The order of things : an archaeology of the human sciences (Foucault 2005) is inspired by the book’s classification of space. In one of Foucault’s weaker moments he relies on Borges’ imaginary Chinese encyclopaedia to argue that China is characterised by a “culture entirely devoted to the [Western] orderings of space, but one that does not distribute the multiplicity of existing things into any of the categories that make it possible for us to name, speak, and think” (2005: XXI). For a critique of Foucault, see Zhang Longxi (1988).

Chapter One: Rethinking State Space

1 This excludes, as mentioned earlier, the work of a more critical generation of political scientists and geographers (e. Walker 1993; Agnew 1994; Shapiro 1997; Walker 2009).

2 China’s post-1976 ‘rise’ to increased economic and political influence occurs at a time of so-called ‘global interconnectedness’. This rise is said by many to be historically “unprecedented”. Shenkar (2005), for example, anticipates that within 20 years, and possibly even sooner, China will be the world’s largest economy. Fishman similarly exuberantly writes how the world has changed after China’s surge, which has, according to him, “no equal in history” (Fishman 2006: 12). In an 2004 edition of Fortune, Sachs argued that by the year 2050 “China’s GNP would be about 75% larger than that of the U.S.” (Sachs 2004). There exists, however, also an equally large pool of literature (e.g. Segal 1999; Breslin 2007) which is more hesitant and sceptical about the presumed idea of “rise” in discussions on China’s development. The country faces a serious number of extraordinary environmental, political, societal and economic challenges (Sun 2004; Lindelöw and Wagstaff 2005; Nolan 2005; Breslin 2007 among many other accounts). Breslin (2005: 736) reminds us, for example, that “even after two decades of double-digit growth, China’s per capita income is still only around half of Russia’s, whichever form of calculation is used”.

3 The coastal provinces, for example, have enjoyed significantly greater growth than the Western provinces. Intra-urban and inter-urban economic and social development has similarly been unbalanced. Rural migrants, whose numbers run in the tens of millions, live without a residence permit and live anonymously in peripheral urban villages (chengzhongcun). New urban development has compelled millions of urban citizens (and rural migrants) to relocate, more often than not without adequate financial compensation. Class divisions have, as a result of the uneven mode of production, become an increasing threat to political and social stability.

4 For critical discussions of the globalisation school see, for example, the existing work of:(Douglas (1997); Rosenberg (2000); Rosamond (2003); and Rosenberg (2005)).

5 “The development of "empty space" may be understood in terms of the separation of space from place... The advent of modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between ‘absent’ others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction.” (Giddens 1990: 18)

6 “By disembedding I mean the "lifting out" of social relations from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space.” (Giddens 1990: 21)

7 A great number of liberal thinkers (e.g. Wolf 2000; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Wolf 2002; Dollar and Kraay 2004) celebrate the great social, economic, political and cosmopolitan benefits of globalisation. They argue, for instance, that the “1980s and 1990s were decades of declining global inequality and reductions in the proportion of the world's population in extreme poverty” (Wolf 2002: 21). Wade (2004)
falsified these findings in his work, in which he questions the empirical validity of the figures and the conclusions that were drawn from them. Wade (2004: 578) argues, for instance, that China’s “surging inequality is now greater than before the Communists won the civil war in 1949, and inequality between regions is probably higher than in any other sizable country.” The case of China’s socio-economic development has, in fact, drawn the attention from a wide variety of literatures (e.g. Zhao 1997; Breslin 2005; Nolan 2005; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2007; Reddy 2007). Although the amount of writings on social-economic inequality is immense and still growing, the impact of global capitalism on China’s development remains one of ambiguity. While Reddy (2007: 49) argues, on the one hand, for “a formidable achievement in world historical terms, the World Bank and the UN (2005), on the other hand, calculated that the Gini Coefficient rose from 0.30 in 1982 to 0.45 in 2002. A more recent report (Xinhua 2013) shows that the Gini Coefficient rose further to over 0.47 in 2012.

Amin (2003), among other dependency theorists, confirms the validity of such findings and adds that most of the trade in the post WWII period occurred in the so-called “Triad areas” and that most of the developing world was left behind.

“[T]he attempt to constructs ‘globalisation’ as an explanans leads to conceptual inflation of ‘the spatial’ which is both difficult to justify ontologically and liable to produce not explanations but reifications.” (Rosenberg 2000: 13)

“World history travels from east to west; for Europe is the absolute end of history, just as Asia is the beginning... Among all the phenomena of history, our true object is the state. As the state is the universal Idea and universal spiritual life to which individuals react from birth with trust and habit, in which they have their being and reality, their knowledge and volition, and through which they acquire and preserve their worth, two basic determinations are involved. Firstly, there is the universal substance of the state, the one inherently valuable spirit, the absolute power, the independent spirit of the nation; and secondly, there is individuality as such, the realm of subjective freedom.” (Hegel 2002: 197).

The term dialectic is often taken for granted and misused in the literature. I find it therefore necessary to remind the reader (and myself) that Marxists see the world not in formal logic but in contradictions. That means that understanding social reality requires that one “sublates “(what Hegel calls Aufheben) the contradiction.

Overaccumulation within a given territorial system means a condition of surpluses of labour (rising unemployment) and surpluses of capital (registered as a glut of commodities on the market that cannot be disposed of without a loss, as idle productive capacity and/or as surpluses of money capital lacking outlets for productive and profitable investment). Such surpluses can be potentially absorbed by (a) temporal displacement through investment in long-term capital projects or social expenditures (such as education and research) that defer the re-entry of capital values into circulation into the future, (b) spatial displacements through opening up new markets, new production capacities, and new resource, social, and labour possibilities elsewhere, or (c) some combination of (a) and (b).” (Harvey 2003a: 119)

The term “time-space compressions” plays an important role in Marxist geographies of capitalism, and perhaps deserves further contextualisation and clarification. Luxemburg’s (1951) analysis (form which Harvey (2003a) starts his own analysis) traces the spatial development of capitalism in the dialectical assertions in the crises of over-accumulation. These crises in her analysis are said to be embedded processes within the capitalist logic. Luxemburg considered the development as an unavoidable stage in the evolutionary process of accumulation of capital surpluses in any given territorial system. In very simple words, she argues that for the sake of capitalist development, capital has to depend on its exterior, non-capitalised space. This historical process finds its acceleration, according to Harvey (2003a), in the technological upgrading of the means of production, enabling the capitalist system to overcome (or fix) its problems of over-accumulation.

This is, in fact, not all too different from what Marx (1993: 410) himself wrote: “[C]apital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and constantly revolutionises it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces.”

The state, then, is a rigidified (or ‘fetishised’, to use Marx’s term) form of social relations. It is a relation between people which does not appear to be a relation between people, a social relation which exists in the form of something external to social relations. This is the starting point for understanding the unity between states: all are rigidified, apparently autonomous forms of social relations.” (Holloway 1994b: 27)
“Time was still connected with space (and place) until the uniformity of time measurement by the mechanical clock was matched by uniformity in the social organisation of time.” (Giddens 1990: 18). This process of the so-called “emptying of time” is characterised by an ontological loss of other forms of temporality. Time is universalised and only expressed by the ticking of the clock. Giddens elsewhere observes that “[t]he global map, in which there is no privileging of place (a universal projection), is the correlate symbol to the clock in the ‘emptying’ of space” (Giddens in Giddens 1991: 17; Cassel 1993: 290).

The problems inherent in the quantifying space are, as observed by the Russian sociologist Pitirim Sorokin already in 1943, also apparent in discussions on time. “We try to replace socio-cultural time by a purely quantitative time, time becomes devitalised. It loses its reality, and we find ourselves in an exceedingly difficult position in our efforts to orient ourselves in the time process, to find out ‘where we are’ and where are the other social phenomena on ‘the bridge of time’” (Schivelbusch 1978: 34, own emphasis).

The spatial practice of a society secretes that society’s space; it propounds and presupposed it, in a dialectical interaction; it produces it slowly and surely as it masters and appropriates it.” (Lefebvre 1991: 39).

Representations of space: conceptualised space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived.” (Lefebvre 1991: 39).

Representational space (or spaces of representation) is “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’…” (Lefebvre 1991: 39, original emphasis).

“Expressed bluntly, it is that Marx was wrong to regard human beings as above all tool-making and using animals, and to treat this as the single most important criterion distinguishing the ‘species being’ of humanity from that of the animals. Human social life neither begins nor ends in production.” (Giddens 1981: 155-156)

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it… According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase… I cannot exempt many of the more recent "Marxists" from this reproach, for the most amazing rubbish has been produced in this quarter, too…” (Engels 1890).

The original German text reads: “Der Grundvorgang der Neuzeit ist die Eroberung der Welt als Bild.” (Heidegger 1977: 94).

This could have been the result of Lefebvre’s engagement with the Frankfurt School who similarly as Lefebvre (and Foucault) were deeply influenced by the writings of Nietzsche. Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) enlightenment target was, however, not so much Descartes but rather Bacon.

**Chapter Two: A Short Genealogy of Modern Space**

1 “The bifurcation of time and space, and the privileging of time over space, was perhaps”, Grossberg ponders (in Massey 1999: 263), “the founding moment of modern philosophy.”

2 The Chinese name for city has in time changed, according to the purpose and shape of the city. The following names are the most common: *cheng* (城, traditionally “walling a city” and now commonly interchangeable with the noun “wall”), *du* (都, capital city or imperial city) and *jing* (京, denoting a direction spatial location), *shi* (市, market or market town).

3 I take notice of the fact that the use of “China” and “Greece” is conceptually and historically inappropriate to describe geographies that existed prior to both the birth of the modern Greek and Chinese state. I instead use these terms loosely to describe the events that occurred in these places.

“Merleau-Ponty (2004: 50) notes, for example, that “everything changes if, with the advent of so-called non-Euclidean geometry, we come to think of space itself as curved and use this to explain how things can change simply by being moved”
“The human being is ζῷον πολιτικόν [zoon politikon] because the human being, and only the human being, is a ζῷον πολιτικόν – a living being that has the word, which means: that being that can address beings as such with respect to their being” (Heidegger 1996b: 83, original emphasis).

6 “Man translates πόλις [polis] as State and City State; this does not accurately depict the full meaning of the word. Rather [being a State (Staat) or a City-State (Stadtstaat)] the πόλις is the site [Stätte], the Da, in which and as which the Da-sein as the historical is. The πόλις is the history-site [Geschichtsstatt], the Da in which, out of which and for which history happens [Geschichte geschieht]” (Heidegger 1983: 161, translation with original emphases).

7 Heidegger writes “The pre-political essence of the πόλις [polis], that essence that first makes possible everything political in the originary and in the derivative sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting [schickung] from out of which all human relations towards being - and that always means in the first instance the relations of beings as such to humans - are determined” (Heidegger 1996b: 82, original emphasis).

8 Heidegger writes: “For the Greek, the πόλις is that which is altogether worthy of question. For modern consciousness, the ‘political’ is that which is necessarily and unconditionally without question” (Heidegger 1996b: 94).


10 Lewis (2006: 149, 150) provides four explanations to the question why three centuries of city-states in China did not result into the arrival of an alternative forms of government,

11 While cities in the Spring and Autumn Period had populaces of a few thousand, those of the Warring States Period inhabited tens and sometimes hundreds of thousands of inhabitants.

12 The importance of spatial demarcations has perhaps rightfully been said to be one of the most striking differences between Western and Chinese cities. The following comes from a Chinese architecture entry in the Encyclopaedia Britannica “There is no real city in China without a surrounding wall, a condition which is indeed expressed by the fact that the Chinese used the same word cheng for a city and a city wall; there is no such thing as a city without a wall. It would be just as inconceivable as a house without a roof” (Turnbull and Noon 2009: 5, original emphasis). It should also be noted that the word for city and wall were in fact identical (see footnote 5).

13 “This, in turn, contributed to the development of an orderly and hierarchical system of towns and cities which served to facilitate the administration of the [state] monopoly system.” (Wu and Gaubatz 2013: 39).

14 The kaogongji was composed during the Warring States period and became a complementary part of the Rites of Zhou (zouli). The book provides building instructions for the perfect or ideal capital. The city that came closest to this ideal was Yuan and Ming Beijing. It is somewhat ironic that the design of the city was not started by a Han Emperor, but by the Mongol Khubilai Khan. For a reproduction of the original text (in Chinese) see Zhang (2004) and for contextual analysis see Steinhardt (1986; 1990) and Lewis (2006).

15 The chief carpenter [jiangren] constructs the capital as a square of nine li per side. Each side has three gates. In the capital there are nine north-south boulevards and nine east-west. The north-south ones are nine carriage tracks wide. On the left is the ancestral temple, on the right the altar of the soil, to the front the court, and to the rear the market.” (in Lewis 2006: 177).

16 “The Panopticon is a machine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheral ring, one is totally seen, without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being seen 201,202… He who is subjected to the field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own self.” (Foucault 1979: 201-203).

17 This is not the space to provide either a detailed description of Confucianism or a comparative analysis between Aristotelian and Confucian ethics. It is not my intention to provide an analysis of the many differences that exist between the Greek and Chinese relation between power and morality. My argument is rather focused, as mentioned explicitly and implicitly earlier, on the interplay between governance and space. The relation between morality and politics in Confucian thinking is, however, neatly described in Mencius’ oft-cited dictum: “If only everyone loved his parents and treated his elders with deference, the Empire would be at peace.” (in Yao 2000: 33).

18 “If the future and the past do exist, I want to know where they are…” While we are measuring [time], where is it coming from, what is it passing through and where is it going?” (in Casey 1997a: 20). Aristotle similarly acknowledged the importance of place in time. This becomes especially evident
when he defines the notion of time in the *movement* between *before* and *after* (1996: especially book IV).

19 Presencing [*Anwesen*] is actually a term coined first by Heidegger. Heidegger uses the term, in contrast to Casey, in a more temporal sense to refer to Being (Sein) in the present (“the here and now”). “From the early period of Greek civilisation to the recent period of our century, “being” [*Sein*] has meant: presencing [*Anwesen*].” (Heidegger in Malpas 2006: 10, original emphasis)

20 Being in place (or being-in-the-world) does for Heidegger not refer to the act of making sense of place, but is actually a constitutive and performative act in which place itself comes to be conceived and perceived (by Dasein) as a thing.

21 Casey (1997c: 277) summarises lamblichus’ as follows: “Rather than things defining places - as occurs on any strict container model, since the container has to take its cue from the contained - places empower things from (and as) their boundaries.” 277

22 Malpas (2006: 70, original emphasis) explains: “Whereas Aristotle treats topos as tied to the bounding inner surface of a container, Descartes takes “l’espéce” [space] to be identical with the area or volume enclosed within the container and “le lieu ”[place] to be just a matter of the container’s position, with both notions tied to the concept of an extended body.

23 The three dimensions of space would allow for his earlier discussed the completion of his three-dimensional understanding of space.

24 The importance of place survived, however, in the distinctive style of traditional Chinese paintings. The lack of perspective in such painting contrasted with the geometric obsession of painters such as Jacopo de Barbari and Albrecht Dürer in 16th century Europe. The introduction of geometric representations of space in maps and paintings in 17th century China will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

25 Bartolus revolutionary reinterpretation of Roman laws strengthened the *de facto* governing rights of Italian cities and empowered the rights of its politicians against the *de jure* Emperor through what Bartolus called *civitas sibi princeps* (the city as its own ruler). This law directly challenged the earlier Roman concept of *Lex regia* which Justinian reinterpreted in his *Corpus Juris Civilis* as follows “… all right [sic] and all power of the Roman people have been transferred to the imperial power… (Ryan 2000: 66, 67). God’s divine right to rule the land (or the Pope’s right to act on His behalf), *Deus in terris*, was thus legally challenged by Bartolus who instead of the Godly authority over territory argued for a legal jurisdiction over territory (see Skinner 2002, especially: 10-12). Bartolus “provides a juristic justification for the legal sovereignty of the independent Italian cities as it actually existed” (in Ryan 2000: 66; originally in Canning 2002: 97). Law became territorially bound.

26 Baldus, a student of Bartolus, is a much lesser known figure than his teacher. Despite his neglect and absence in modern political thought, Canning notes that his writings were of equal (if not greater) significance as those of Bartolus’. Baldus starts from Bartolus’ concept of *de facto* independent cities and similarly argues that the autonomy of Italian cities from the emperor is territorial in nature. In other words, “territory defines as much as it limits a city's sovereignty” (Canning 2002: 127). To illustrate this in empirical terms Baldus analyses the case of banishment (exportatio). Banishing someone, he argues, means something different than the deportation and/or excommunication of someone, as the banished person does not lose the common rights as Roman citizens (Canning 2002). Neither, he continues, is extradition without legal agreement possible, because equal sovereign cities cannot have authority over one another. These cases underline that jurisdiction is limited territorially (*jurisdiction coheret territorio*) or, put in other words, “the people [*populus*] possesses jurisdiction because it possesses the territory [*territorium*]” (Canning 2002: 130). Canning speaks of the significance of Baldus’ contribution “since whole theory of city-sovereignty … ranks as one of the most important contributions which medieval jurisprudence made to political thought: the elaboration of the concept of territorial sovereignty, an idea fashioned first in the context of kingship, given impetus by papal support… (Canning 2002: 131). Baldus’ analysis does look beyond Bartolus’ earlier purely territorial definition of the legal legitimacy of the (city) State and observes how it is the political men that have come constitute political territory.

27 In another translation Botero writes “The ruler should seek to enforce this jurisdiction by the use of his authority, power, money, and personal intervention, for the more virtuous and devout his subjects, the readier they will be to obey their ruler” (Botero 1956 [1589]: 69).

28 The influence of Bodin on Botero is visible in their common condemnation of usury. This denunciation has a religious roots in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, who argued that usury leads to “double charging” (i.e. being charged for both the thing and the use of the thing itself), which was by Thomism considered to be morally wrong. Bodin and Botero both shared a fear that legalised usury could disrupt trade and industry and bring social unrest and instability to the state. Botero writes prophetically that “[i]t is not wise [for a prince in need] to borrow at interest except in case of extreme
need, because to pay interest is to bring ruin upon the state” (Botero 1956 [1589]: 137). The reason to abolish usury is therefore linked to the *salus populi* which if threatened (by usury) could destabilise the Prince’s legitimacy. (see also Bobroff 2003).

29 The centrality of interest of the early capitalist logic became even clearer pronounced when Botero argues that “in the decisions made by the prince interest will always override every other argument; and therefore he who treats with princes should put no trust in friendship, kinship, treaty nor any other tie which has no basis in interest” (Malcolm 2010: 94).

30 Foucault (2009: 93) writes: “far from thinking that Machiavelli opens up the field of political thought to modernity… he marks instead the end of an age, or anyway that he reaches the highest point of a moment in which the problem was actually that of the safety of the Prince and his territory”. The period after Machiavelli, Foucault continues, is “[n]o longer [about] the safety (sûreté) of the prince and his territory, but [concerns] the security (sécurité) of the population and, consequently, of those who govern it” (2009: 93, original emphasis). I tried to show you that the art of government that was so eagerly sought after in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries could not be found in Machiavelli for the excellent reason that it was not there, and it was not there precisely because Machiavelli’s problem is not the preservation of the state in itself… What Machiavelli sought to save, to safeguard, is not the state but the relationship of the Prince to that over which he exercises his domination, that is to say it is a matter of saving the principality as the Prince’s relation of power to his territory or population.” (Foucault 2009: 320)

31 Elden and Holden note that “[i]f indeed territory is essential to Machiavelli, it is only in a very loose sense of the term, as akin to terrain or domain, rather than the more specific sense that emerges only later in Western political thought and practice.” (Holden and Elden 2005). Bishai notes that there is a big discrepancy between what Machiavelli meant by territory and what we understand territory to constitute today. “Territoriality in the twentieth century arises from a specific conception of territory that links it to the identity of citizens, and it thus depends upon the rise of a nationalist sentiment and popular sovereignty” (2007: 63). The concept employed by Machiavelli on the other hand, she argues, is one in which “territory is a source (and symbol) of power, but not of identity or legitimacy” (2007: 63).

32 “Man, as Machiavelli and Hobbes see him, is neither a political animal in the Aristotelian sense, nor a creature marked from birth by sin and to be saved only by the grace of God. Man is not moral by nature; [instead] he is a material being programmed to maximise his personal utility, and in conditions of scarcity this will naturally lead him into conflict with other men. The purpose of government, therefore, is purely an instrumental one of allowing men to pursue their ambitions for wealth and reputation in relative safety.” (Femia 2004: 97, 98).

33 “Geometry is fact because we can demonstrate it, to demonstrate that the physical is fact, we would have to make it.”

34 Strandsbjerg (2010: 15) notes that although “cartography did not invent territory..., it changed the ways of producing territory, and in that respect cartography conditioned and facilitated the formation of states, empires and a global space during the early modern era.”

35 Foucault elaborates and makes it clear that he believes that “the essential issue in the establishment of the art of government [is the] introduction of economy into political practice. And if this is the case in the sixteenth century, it remains so in the eighteenth (1994: 207)”.

36 Marx never used the term biopower, but the importance of production and reproduction for the internalisation of capitalism is definitely visible in his understanding. Marx wrote in the first volume of Capital that “[t]he advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, tradition and habit looks upon the requirements of that mode of production as self-evident natural laws. The organisation of the capitalist process of production, once it is fully developed, breaks down all resistance” (Marx 1982: 899). Read (2003; 2008) goes into great detail to describe the relationship between Foucault’s “production of subjectivity” and Marx’s largely uncompleted “production of subjectivity”. Read convincingly argues that “every mode of production is inseparable from a mode of subjection, which [for Marx] is not added on as a supplement or a simple effect, but immanent and necessary to its existence” (2008: 141, original emphasis). Elsewhere Read substantiates and repeats this argument: “The conditions and limits of a mode of production, everything that causes the dissolution of one and the formation of another, necessarily pass through the production of subjectivity” (2003: 62).

37 The trend towards the rationalisation of space was, however, already visible in the writings of early spatial modern utopianists such as Fourier (see Beecher 1986) and Howard (see Fishman 1977) and in the projects of 18th century architects such as Lequeu, Ledoux and Boullée (Tafuri 1976). One can in such a short space not do justice to the work produced on the role of architecture and town planning in

44 “Geometry is the foundation... It is also the material basis on which we build those symbols which represent to us perfection and the divine” (Le Corbusier in Agrest 1998 [1974]: 205). Le Corbusier went further than any of his predecessors in arguing that “geometry is the language of man”. According to him man created order in the world “by means of his measurement”. “By imposing the order of his foot or his arm, he has created a unit which regulates the whole work; and this work is on his own scale, to his own proportion... to his measure. It is on the human scale” (Corbusier 1986: 71, 72, original emphasis).

40 “By the late eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century, the Other’s difference was located at one of a linear-temporal, evolutionary scale; the Other was no longer the ‘exotic’, but the ‘primitive’.” (Li 2006: 4).

41 Heidegger writes: “Because modern thought grasps all beings in terms of consciousness, modernity conceives of all history “historiographically,” that is, according to the manner and way in which it is established in (investigative) human consciousness. As self-consciousness, however, such consciousness is intent on being unconditionally certain of itself and thereby of all beings that can be experienced. The fundamental guise of such certainty that provides its measure is the surveyability and indubitability of everything that can be calculated and planned. That consciousness that wishes to be certain of history must therefore be a consciousness that plans and acts. The fundamental modern form in which the specifically modern, self-framing self-consciousness of human beings orders all beings is the state. For this reason, the “political” becomes the definitive self-certainty of historiographical consciousness... The “political is the way in which history is accomplished. Because the political is thus the technical and historiographical fundamental certainty of all action, the “political” is marked by an unconditional failure to question itself. The failure to question the “political” belongs together with its totality” (Heidegger 1996b: 94)

42 “The fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age [der Neuzeit]... The word "picture" [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of man’s producing which represents and sets before... [Being in the world] is placed in the realm of man’s knowing and of his having disposal, and that it is in being only in this way... Man becomes the representative [der Repräsentant] of that which is, in the sense of that which has the character of object” (translated from Heidegger 1977: 91, 94, original emphasis)

43 Biggs (1999: 378) notes that “[c]artography differentiates the form of knowledge from its content. A map can represent ocean or land, the entire earth or one parish. Such abstraction, objectification, and differentiation are characteristically modern.” He then quotes Anderson to state that “[c]artographic space is analogous to the modern apprehension of time, a quantity measured by the tick of the clock.” (in Biggs 1999: 378)

44 Heidegger writes “What Marx recognised in an essential and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of the human being has in roots in the homelessness of modem human beings. This homelessness is specifically evoked from the destiny of being in the form of metaphysics, and through metaphysics is simultaneously entrenched and covered up as such. Because Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts” (Heidegger 1993 [1949]: 258, 259).

Chapter Three: The Production of Modern China
This has since 2009 started to change somewhat with the CCP’s new search for an alternative modernity. This alternative modernity is framed in a dehistoricised, developmentalist discourse which takes the Chinese state for granted.

Understanding what constitutes China and by deconstructing what is meant when referring to China, we not only repoliticise notions such as that of race, ethnicity and nationality, but are also able to better confront the on-going essentialising tendencies in our own (Chinese and non-Chinese alike) understandings of what is meant by things Chinese.

The primordial importance of place has already been theoretically analysed in the previous chapter. Tuan (1990: 31) notes similarly that the “illusion of superiority and centrality is probably necessary to the sustenance of culture”. Chinese ethnocentrism (or the will to dominate space and transform it into place) is, in fact, a common trait among all human groupings.

We should not forget the earlier Islamic scientific ventures that were exported into China during the Yuan and introduced “celestial and the terrestrial globes, for measuring the time when the sun crosses the equator, and to ascertain the beginning and end of the four seasons” (Gladney 2002: 272). The importance of Islamic thought, generally considered to have been so fundamental for the development of European science and enlightenment, is underlined by Huff (2003: 63), who argues that “Arabic science did contribute a very significant amount of original mathematical, methodological, and scientific knowledge to the development of what we today may call universal modern science…”.

Needham (2008 [1954]-a) gives a more elaborate account of the dual interaction between Muslim and Chinese scholars and provides a succinct overview of the contributions of Islamic science to the overall progress of Chinese scientific development. His hypothesis with regards to China’s cartographic development is particularly fascinating. Here (Needham 2008 [1954]-b: 561-565) he plays with the interesting idea that Chinese and Arab ‘grid maps’ (mentioned later in this chapter) could have influenced the establishment of Mediterranean ‘Portolan charts’ and stimulated the revival of Ptolemaic maps renaissance Europe.

The name was later adopted as the official name for the Republic of China (ROC). I will, however, use the abbreviation to identify events before the establishment of Taiwan as a separate polity.

Jerusalem was interestingly enough still considered in 1884 as a possible location for the prime meridian. One only has to imagine what would have happened if not Britain, but China (or any other nation for that matter) would have been the dominant maritime power at that specific moment in history.

For an history overview of Greenwich, see (1980) and for a more philosophically inclined analysis on its relation to place, see Casey (2009: especially the first chapter).

The history of centring the ‘European world’ on the Mediterranean has a long history. The idea of centrality can be found by the name the Greeks gave it (he kath ’hemas thalassa or ‘the sea in our part of the world’, he hemetera thalassa or ‘our [i.e. sum of parts] sea’) and by the Romans (mare nostrum ‘our sea’) (Rickman 2003; Harris 2005: 15). In both cases one notices the importance that was given to ‘being in place’.

The centre in medieval European maps has elaborately been discussed by David Woodward (1985; 1987).

Dorofeeva-Lichtmann (1995: 61; 1996: 10) argues that “distortions” in Chinese maps, “before the influence of European science”, are “considered to result from their intention to transmit more a certain spatial idea or viewpoint than geographical facts”. Such a statement only reifies further the concept of modern space.

A lot has been written on Ricci and his followers (see Pfister 1932; and Pfister 1934 for an alphabetically arranged account of the biographies of over 450 Jesuits in the period 1552-1773 ; see Spence 1988 on Ricci; see Mungello 1989 for an analysis of the complexity of the ‘accommodation’ strategy conducted by the Jesuits from Matteo Ricci to Joachim Bouvet; see Brockey 2007 for a chronological overview of the Jesuit enterprise from the early Jesuit Francis Xavier to the Yongzheng’s Sacred Edict in 1724).

The discussion that takes place between those that stress the influential role the Jesuits played and those that marginalise their impact is as vast as it is crucial for understanding the development and dissemination of modern science in China. The position I take in this debate is based on an understanding that both the ‘Chinese’ and ‘Western’ sciences during this time (c. 1600-1840 and the immediate aftermath) competed on a similar basis for obtaining a dominant position of their respective worldview. The fact that Ricci was able to decentre his worldview in his early 1603 (and successive) mappa mundi, despite the fact that most other European maps at that time showed Rome at their centre, symbolises his capacity to secularise his religious endeavour (which still had Christian Rome at its centre) from his scientific, geometric efforts (see Mignolo 1998, especially chapter 5 for a similar argument). This ability to distinguish religious centring from scientific decentering similarly aided the
capacity of successive Jesuits to adjust themselves to local traditions of representations of space. The adaptation of this ‘secularisation’ between geometry and ethnicity by Qing emperors and the kaozheng xue (or ‘evidential learning’) tradition, which will be discussed at a later stage, provided a fertile condition for the onset of modernity.

The mentioning of Europe among other continents are in Needham’s work often cited for the purpose of comparison on the basis of a ‘who was first’ principle. The idea that “China has the longest unbroken history of progress in science and technology (over 4,000 years in) of any nation in the world” (Finniston et al. in Needham 2004 [1954]: 224) is in many of Needham’s accounts linked to the problematic concept of a Chinese ‘civilisation’ which for one reason or another was more or less endowed than other ‘civilisations’. Such analyses depoliticise abstract constructions of space (regions, continents etc) and unintentionally naturalise the differences of histories and geographies that exist within these spatial territories. The same can of course also be said for the concept of European civilisation(s) that is compared to African civilisation(s) (see for example Landes 2000).

Needham notes Pei’s dissatisfaction with earlier cartographic tradition and shows how he found that “none of them [i.e. earlier, especially Han maps] gives anything like a complete representation of the celebrated mountains and the great rivers; their arrangement is very rough and imperfect, and one cannot rely on them. Indeed some of them contain absurdities, irrelevancies, and exaggerations, which are not in accord with reality, and which should be banished by good sense” (see also Hsu 1978: 56; in Needham 2008 [1954]-b: 519). De Weert informs us that the (re)emergence of the need for more “accurate” mapping was not accidental since “[t]he court in which Pei worked was engaged in a process of unification modelled on Han precedent” (de Weerdt 2009: 150).

Pei Xiù’s 6 cartographic principles are “proportional measure (fenlit), standard or regulated view (zhunwang), road measurement (daoli), leveling (or lowering) of heights (gaoxia), determination of diagonal distance (jiangxie), and straightening of curves (yuzhi)” (Yee 1994e: 110). “At the same time, he connected measurement, reliability and the Jin Dynasty’s maintenance of empire (de Weerdt 2009: 150).

Soothill notes that the map, which allegedly measured 33 feet high and 30 feet wide and had a scale of 100 li to the inch, would “have describe[d] an area in English miles of about 11,000 miles from north to south and 10,000 miles from east to west” (1927: 544). His observation that the map could therefore have covered “nearly half of the globe” (Soothill 1927: 544) is perhaps somewhat exaggerative. The idea that the map covered great parts of Asia is less outlandish and has been confirmed by others (Yee 1994c; Smith 1996; Elman 2007; Needham 2008 [1954]-b; see especially de Weerdt 2009).

Timothy Brook (2005, especially chapter 2) notes that the original atlas (printed in 1555) went through 5 sequential editions (1558, 1561, 1566, 1572 and 1579). The map is thought to have been later used by Matteo Ricci for his now extant 1584 mappa mundi (Szcześniak 1954). The first Ricci map was named Yudi shanhui quantu (“Complete geographic map of the mountains and streams”) (see further Yee 1994e, also for a later rendition). For an introduction to Ricci’s cartography and its (disputed) contribution to and influence in China, see Baddeley (1917), Ch’en (1939), Wallis (1965), Yee (1994e), Day (1995) and Smith (1996: chapter 4).

The full sentence is illustrative for Yee’s geographical confusion. “A Western model of scientific cartography has been pursued too rigorously in previous work on Chinese maps; its relevance even for Western cartography has come to be questioned” (Yee 1994c: 65).

The question whether Chinese cartography during the Qing was based on non-quantitative principles is similarly a statement open for debate. The famous Qing scholar Dai Zhen (1724-1777) (in Elman 2005: 198) noted for example that “[t]hose who produce maps should emphasise exact scholarship. Upon examination, maps that do not [accurately] represent direction and distance or differentiate names are like not having maps at all. Even worse, they perpetuate errors.”

The history of the intertwining of representations of space and politics is also visible in the experience of other empires (e.g. Ottomans, Habsburg etc.). The cartographic traditions of these empires similarly changed fundamentally in the process of their colonial quest for greater territory.

The term geobody refers to “the operation of the technology of territoriality which created nationhood spatially” (Winichakul 1997: 16). Winichakul argues furthermore that the “geo-body of a nation is a man-made territorial definition which creates effects-by classifying, communicating, and enforcement-on people, things, and relationships” (1997: 17).

The notion of liangzhi, which Elman defines as ‘moral consciousness’, “dismissed the tedious search for principles in things out there”(Elman 2005: 7) which had characterised Zhu’s material interpretation of gewu (‘investigation of things’). Elman notes that Wang Yangming (1472-1528) considered liangzhi to be “essential for moral cultivation and the inner repository of universal principles” (Elman 2005: 7).
Wang argued, in other words, that only through human consciousness (and not through the principles of the material world) was one able to grasp the principles of things.

The idea of mathematical accuracy is contested by Smith who argues that “until the twentieth century, mathematical precision was never considered a cartographic end in itself” (2009: 8). According to Smith Chinese cartographers “found no compelling reason to conceive of the world as spherical, nor did they see any special merit in drawing all maps ”to scale.” (After all, the eunuch-admiral Zheng He made his way to the coast of Africa in the early fifteenth century without much difficulty.”) (2009: 8). The experiences of the Kangxi and Qianlong atlas, both of which will be analysed later in this chapter, refute such assertions and argue that scaled maps were, in fact, employed as a political means to geographically help to China.

Elman notes for example that the “Jesuits in late Ming China saw the "investigation of things” and “exhaustively mastering principles” (qiongli) as a necessary way station to the doctrinal transmission of the experience of God to the Chinese they hoped to convert” (2002: 217; 2005: 116).

Orientalism featured also in different places within the “Orient”. The case of, for example, the Ottoman “orientalisation” of religious, ethnic and cultural minorities is, similarly as in the case of the Qing, increasingly explored to understand how non-Western empires governed their populations and paved their early foundations of the modern nation state (e.g. Makdisi 2002 among others).

The Eight Banner system (jakun guisa or baqi in Chinese) was originally founded in the first decades of the 1600s. The system later came to known as the “root [or foundation] of the nation” (guojia zhi gengben [Chinese]/ gurun-i fudehe da [Manchu])” (Elliott 2001: 12, original emphasis). The foundation of the separation between and within the eighth banners (which were comprised of so-called ‘companies’ or niru (Manchu) or niuslu (Chinese)) was based on a discursive idea of ethnicity which was defined on the basis of “shared myths, belief in common descent and geographical origin, and similar cultural markers” (Elliott 2001: 88). Each banner division was, in other words, ethnically composed of Manchu, Mongolian or Chinese (Hanjun).

The onset of the baojia system was historically concurrent with the establishment of the lijia system which similarly was enforced on a local household level but was primarily assigned to the task of tax collection. The baojia system later came to incorporate the functions of the lijia system but ultimately fell victim to corruption and came to be abandoned as a means for social control in the 19th century. For an introduction to the workings and functions of the baojia registration system, see the still very relevant work of Xiao (1972: especially chapter 3) and the more contemporary writings of Dutton (1992).

The Miao albums do not merely refer to the Hmong ethnicity, but compromises a number of text that are dedicated to a much larger group of peoples that were located in the south-western region of the Qing empire.

The former, i.e. the rhetoric of privation, has its resemblance in European colonial campaigns in which the colonised were considered to be backward savages that urgently needed to be educated or ‘christianised’. The rhetoric of primitivism is not unheard of in the European experience, but is more related to contemporary debates on authenticity than to colonial enterprise.

Teng (2004) notes that the spatial-temporal border later also came to be known as the ‘subject-savage boundary’. Chang similarly notes that the border functioned as “the embodiment of [the] Qing quarantine doctrine in Taiwan” (2008: 6). The boundary also helped to closer link place to ‘civilisation’ as raw savages were increasingly being considered as products of their (wild) environment. The territorialisation of people and the linking of their place to an underdeveloped environment culminated in the kaishan fujuan (‘Open the Mountains and Pacify the Savages’) in the late nineteenth century which aimed to formally integrate the island within Chinese territory (see especially Chang (2008)) on the transition from quarantine to sovereign integration).

The geologist Weng Wenhao (1889-1974) noted that although “the earth measurement had not started or completed in Europe [in the 17th and 18th century], yet [sic] in China the completed map of [the] whole of China had [already] been finished. It was really a great achievement. Although it was through the efforts of foreign experts yet we can see the grandness of the scope of the plan” (in Zhang 2006: 78).

The map was published in three different versions. The first version in 1717 included 28 maps. The second map was produced in 1718 and the third in 1721, both contained 32 maps (Elliott 2000: fn. 21). Matteo Ripa’s spectacular map was presented to George 1 (Gray 1960) and its beautifully copper-engraved rolls can now be found at the British Library (Maps K.Top.116.15, 15a, 15b). For the difficulties that he encountered during the engraving process, see his personal memoirs (Ripa 1849).

The map also served as the basis for the influential Qianlong shisanpai ditu (‘Comprehensive map of the Qing period’, 1760) and the Huangyu shipai quantu (‘Comprehensive map’, 1726-29).
This atlas consists of the Qingdai yitong ditu, Qianlong neifu yatu, Qianlong shisan pai ditu and the Huangyu xiege quantu. The maps also appeared in the contemporaneous gazette (Huangyu xiyu tuzhi).

The importance that the Qianlong emperor attached to more detailed knowledge is also observed by Lauren Newby who writes that the Qianlong emperor was “personally concerned by the dearth of geographical knowledge of the region and laid particular stress on the need to correct inaccuracies and standardise the transliteration of proper names” (from the qingdeng huangyu xiyu tuzhi in Newby 1996: 68). The fact that the Qianlong granted special emphasis to transliteration is also visible in the Xiuyutongwen zhi (‘Unified language gazetteer of the Western Regions’) which “was intended to standardize Chinese and Manchu transcriptions of Mongolian, Zunghar, Eastern Turki (Uyghur), and Tibetan names as an aid to the compilation of the Huangyu Xiyu tuzhi, and the Pingding Zhunga’er fanglue (Imperially commissioned military history of the pacification of the Zunghars)” (Millward 1999: 74, 75).

There were only 100 copies printed at the time (1775). The 1932 edition is a direct reproduction of a surviving copy of one of the original maps. The original map is produced on a 1: 1.500.000 scale and covers an area from Odesa in the far west, to Korea in the east, the Taymyr Peninsula in the north and the Malay Peninsula in the south (BL Maps 27.c.24 and BL Tab.1.b.(1-4)). See also Mills (1953)

This was often done by associating local place names with names that were previously used during the Tang and Han period. Through such philological means Qing rulers justified their authority over such places by reconstructing the past.

The original text reads: “Les Oross, Hong mao, Fou lan ki, comme les autres Européens viennent à bout de tout ce qu'ils entreprennent, quelque difficulté qu'il y aye, ils sont intrépides, habiles, et profitent de tout. Tant que je régnerai il n'y a rien à craindre d'eux pour la China, je les traite bien; ils m'aiment et m'estiment, et cherchent à me faire plaisir. Les roys de Foulan et de Porotouka (France, Portugal) ont soin a m'envoyer de bons sujets, habiles dans les sciences et les arts, ils servent bien notre dynastye, mais si notre gouvernement devient faible, si on manque d'attention sur les Chinois des provinces du midi et sur le grand nombre de barques qui en partent tous les ans pour Lucon [Manilla], Calapa (Batavie), Japon et autre pays, si la division se met parmi nos Mantcheou et les princes de ma famille, si les Tartares Eleuthes nos ennemis viennent à bout d'attirer a eux les Tartares de Syhay (Pays de Kokonor) et les Calca et Mongou nos tributaires, que deviendra notre empire? Les Oross au nord, les Fou lan ki de Luçon à l'orient, les Hong mao au sud feront de la Chine ce qu'ils voudront. Vous, Princes de ma famille, grands, mandarins, faîtes réflexion sur ce que je dis; et, dans des placets marques moy en detials ce que vous pensez; faisons attention a ce qui peut arriver dans la suite.”(Gaubil 1970: 711; see Hostetler 2000: 655, 656 for another translation).

Zhao (2013) argues, for instance, against the still prevalent ethnocentric idea of a stagnant and isolationist Qing China (1644-1911). His analysis focuses on the Qing’s 1684 marine policies which led to the establishment of dozens of overseas Chinese ports where no difference was made between tribute or non-tribute countries. In the ports an unprecedented “spirit” of free trade flourished (e.g. Kang 2010). Lieberman (2009: 335) stressed the importance of silver (coming from the Americas) for the internationalisation of the world economy and estimates that China “between 1560 and 1800... absorbed 25 to 50 percent” of the world production of silver. The emergence of an interconnected trading network can, in other words, hardly be understood as a domestic (European) affair, but needs to be contextualised and placed within a more global point of view. The riches that the maritime trade brought forth impacted both European and Chinese colonial campaigns. The authority of teleology, born from the Industrial Revolution, prevents us, however, from appreciating the identifiable commonalities in the emergence of a global modernity in the 16th and 17th centuries. There is a need to break away from European particularism and the authority that the Industrial Revolution has had on the concept of modernity.

“Before the treaty, authority over the region rested on the ability to exact tribute from native tribes, allowing the tribal chieftains to profit from ambiguity, flexibility, and mobility” (Perdue 1998: 271).

Other accounts (e.g. Naumov 2006) have, therefore, on similar grounds stressed the importance of the Treaty for the territorial formation of the Russian Empire which after the signing of the agreement formally could claim Siberia as part of its imperial territory.

Zhao (2006) shows that the idea of a united multi-ethnic zhong guo only grew more fiercely among Han litterati as a result of foreign settlements and influence. He quotes Kang Youwei (1858-1927), a famous reformer who led the constitutional monarchy movements in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, who argued for a “greater China” (da zhongguo), development that laid the groundwork for a “new China” (xin zhongguo) (in Zhao 2006: 21, original emphasis).

The Puning Si temple was for example modelled after the bSam-yas (Samyé) Temple in Tibet, the Putuo Zongcheng Miao was reproduced after the original Potala Palace in Lhasa and the architecture of
Forêt's mapping of China's landscape enterprise (2000) offers a significant move away from the nationalist Chinese view of a homogenous Chinese body. The two courts were known to have exchanged their respective cultures. The introduction of Chinoiserie architecture in Versailles dates back to the Treaty of Porcelaine in 1670. The building, located in the park at Versailles, was in fact the first known piece of Chinoiserie architecture in Europe (Thomas, 2009). The Qianlong Emperor’s fascination with the European arts was, in turn, visualised by the 16 large scale battle paintings (8 meters wide and 4 meters high) of his military campaigns in Xinjiang (known as the shi quan wu gong or the “Ten Great Campaigns”) which he commissioned to the Jesuits Sallusti, Attiret, Sichelbarth and the famous Italian court painter Giuseppe Castiglione (Sullivan, 1989: especially chapter 2; see also Szrajber, 2006 for a chronological overview). The paintings were later, on request by the Chinese emperor Qianlong, sent for engraving and production to France. Waley-Cohen notes that an important reason for sending the paintings to France was the Qianlong’s wish “to make his own military might known in those quarters” (2006: 41).

The ruins that remained are now part of a theme park (yuàn mìng yuàn yìzhì) which provides visitors the pleasures of “joy rides, souvenir shops, food stalls, restaurants, exotic exhibitions, and endless jingdian (scenic spots) for composing snapshots” (Lee, 2006: 23). Lee’s description of this political rendering of history (in an equally apt chosen article title: The Ruins of Yuanmingyuan: Or, How to Enjoy a National Wound (2009)) illustrates how the seemingly incompatible contradictions embedded in China’s contemporary capitalism thrive and are capable of reshaping history. The portrayal of China as a ‘sick man’, a phenomenon which started first to occur in the late 19th century, became metaphorically and politically intertwined with the foreign ‘injection’ of Opium into the Chinese (geo)body. Dikötter, Laaman and Zhou (2004: 109) show how imperial reformers used the “demonisation of ‘opium’ as the principal cause of ‘racial’ decline and ‘moral’ turpitude…” . The term was, in other words, used to describe the weak condition of the Chinese nation and race as a result of Western imperialism. The purpose of such popular rhetoric was meant to arouse a sense of nationalism. The term ‘Chinese colonialism’ is by many considered to be a contradiction in terms and is still in its academic infancy. A short search query for the term on Google Scholar only returned 135 results, while a search of on Baidu.com (Chine’s main search engine) for the term “中国殖民主义” returns mostly links to Western forms of colonialism in China (May 15, 2011).

The ‘Opening the Mountains and Pacifying the Savages’ campaign was initiated in the mid-1870s as a result of growing Sino-Japanese tensions after the killing by Taiwan aborigines of a number of Japanese mariners that had earlier shipwrecked on the coast of Taiwan (known as the Mudan or Mudanshe incident). The Japanese authorities held the Qing responsible which only held limited territorial sovereignty over Taiwan. The imperial Qing Commissioner Shen Baozhen noted that “The territory of Taiwan extends more than a thousand Chinese li [kilometres]. However, the officials only govern one-third of the island in the coastal plains. The rest is all aboriginal territory” (in Chang, 2008: 18).

The tension over who was responsible was furthered by a Japanese expedition to the island in 1874. The Sino-Japanese tensions were temporarily resolved by the Qing who paid indemnities to the Japanese. The Qing rulers were however as a consequence of such events (see also the Rover incident of 1867) determined to colonise and fully integrate the island to prevent future territorial disputes. The aggressive colonial Qing policies that were undertaken, which formed a break from the earlier passive annexation strategy, legally granted Han Chinese access to the entire territory of the island. The perception of Taiwanese aborigines was similarly altered since they became labelled as ‘morally reprehensible’ (Teng, 2004). Taiwan was subsequently fully integrated as a province into the Qing Empire while aborigines were successfully ‘pacified’. The signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 eventually forced the Qing to surrender the island to the Japanese Empire. The ceding of Taiwan was seen as a “severance of a limb from the national [geo] body” (Teng, 2004: 29) and its effects can be noticed until the present day.

This false interpretation has both allowed Chinese nationalists to justify their sentiments over foreign humiliation and provided Eurocentric observers the means to categorise China’s development along
lines of temporal progress. The fact that the confrontation was one between empires has in most accounts been completely ignored.

Fairbank (1942: 134, 135) writes that “it should not be forgotten by the egalitarian westerners (who invariably did forget) that the kotow was merely a part of the universal order of Confucian ceremony which symbolized all the relationships of life. The emperor performed the kotow to Heaven and to his parents, the highest officials of the empire performed it to the emperor, and friends or dignitaries might even perform it mutually to each other. From a tribute envoy it was therefore no more than good manner.”

The revisionist interpretation by these authors of the event has caused an academic polemic and has shaken the conventional traditional-modernist temporarilities. Landes (2000; 2006) a self-proclaimed Eurocentric, strongly disagrees with revisionist understandings of the Macartney Mission. He has described the interaction as evidence of “China’s assertive superiority and self-imposed autarky” (2006: 44) and elsewhere notes it as signs of “cultural defensiveness and introversion” (2000: 19). The criticism posed by Esherick (1998a; 1998b) is more of a methodological order and acknowledges that “[i]t should be possible to study this eighteenth-century attention to ritual without recourse to pejorative connotations that dichotomise ritual and rationality as symbolic of traditional and modern forms of social intercourse-connotations (1998a: 148). In the same article he however notes the fundamental importance of the “cross-cultural misunderstanding” between the two empires. Hevia (1998: 325).warns of such interpretations and writes that they might make conflict (between different ‘cultures’) seem inevitable and potentially “excuse aggressive European military actions in nineteenth-century China” (thus enabling an apologetics for imperialism).”

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Purdue notes that Qing ritualism “was not an empty mask for power and economic relations, but the expression of politics itself” (2010a: 352). Qing rituals were by no means standardised and statically performed without political consideration. They instead transcended knowledge about the context and parties involved and were consequentially applied in a strategic manner to realise the most favourable political outcome.

The conventional Chinese city before the forced implementation of modern planning was characterised by its adherence to a rigidly defined hierarchical socio-spatial structure, in which the urban commoners (shu) were spatially amassed into living quarters (fang or li) that separated them from the more centrally located bureaucrats and aristocrats. The commoners were as a result of this spatial detachment forced to play a subordinated role towards centrally located administrative authorities. The importance given to the centre (wang cheng), in cosmological-spatial and political terms, and the subordination of the outer city (guo) translated in an urban structure which a priori helped to eliminate the risk of social unrest or possible political counter formations.

The material product of this highly authoritarian practise of city building has been described as a “four-sided enclosure with brick wall, gates at each side, clearly articulated and directed space, defensive projections, cardinal orientation, and a cardinal axis” (Cheng 2008: 64). The rigid mode of spatial organisation, which already had characterised the capital cities (du) of the Zhou and Qin dynasties, intensified both in number and in form during the Han period (see for example Xu 2000). The spatial developments unleashed by Han unification were characterised by a growing number of cities, towns and (inner and outer) city walls, symmetric building constructions and a higher level of spatial-political centralisation (Wu 1993).

The later Sui and Tang cities followed a similar pattern of spatial organisation. Heng (1999) in his account of social-spatial organisations in Chang’an, for example, vividly describes the city’s carefully allocated and tightly controlled residential wards, its stringent spatially contained markets (on the market system, see especially Twitchett 1966), the impressively high palace walls that were designed to
separate the aristocrats and bureaucrats from the commoners and its wide avenues that divided the urban districts like a ‘chocolate tablet’ for different land uses.

The transformation of Song cities was caused by the growing importance given to trade and commerce (Frank 1998: especially chapter 2) and the relative decline of government control in the appropriation and organisation of urban space (Heng 1999). The process of commercialisation during Song period, at least partially caused by Zhu Xi’s inspired objectivist tradition of the “investigation of things” (gewu zhi xue) (Elman 2005), led to the increase of the number of cities and the spatial enlargement of cities outside their original city walls (Twitchett 1966; Mote 1977) and eventually gave rise to an urban merchant class (Xu 2000). The late Ming dynasty, which profited from the “dramatic monetarisation of the Chinese economy during the Silver Age of 1550–1650 and unleashed the commoditization of things into objects of desire and affection” (Elman 2005: 15), furthered the Song precedent and incorporated the rural countryside into the country’s economic circuit (Hamilton and Chang 2003).

56 In fact, the area which is now Shanghai Municipality had a population in excess of 1 million throughout most of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), more than 2 million people in the eighteenth century and over 3 million as early as 1816” (Jacobs 1997: 164). See also Mark Elvin’s (1977) analysis on the city and its surrounding area in the period 1480 to 1910.

57 William C. Hunter (1938 [1882]), who was an American trader, gives a historical account of his daily life in the hongs. Charles Toogood Downing (1938), an English physician, provides another interesting account of his stay in Whampoa (and Macao).

58 Next to Shanghai and the existing port at Canton, the other ports were situated at Xiamen, Fuzhou and Ningbo. The establishment of the bund in 1953 in Xiamen (Amoy) and the reasons for the relatively small and delayed expansion of its foreign concession are discussed by Yu (2008). The evolution of the bund and foreign concession in Fuzhou has only scarcely been researched in English. A detailed analysis of the city’s transformation between 1844 and 1949 has been provided in a Chinese Master thesis by Wu Wei (2008b). A more historical account of 18th and 19th century Ningbo and its merchants can be found in Shiba (1977). En-Sai Tai provides an early and general account of the coming into existence all 5 treaty ports in the period 1842 - 1858 (1918: 8-45; and see Fairbank 2008 for a more contemporary overview).

59 The relatively liberal land regulations that constituted the English concession meant that the English settlement was from an early stage onwards widely accessible to others nationalities. The French concession, on the other hand, initially compelled “persons of other nations [that] wish[ed] to acquire land and build within the above limits… [to] first apply to the French consul” (Chinese Repository in Tai 1918: 11). Although such a provision was also in place in the British concession, the law never came to be strictly observed (Tai 1918). In the 1854 land regulations, the possibility to rent property inside the concessions was further extended.

60 The area expanded to an area of 470 acres as a consequence of a revised land regulation in 1849 and expanded again due to the integration of the American settlement (‘Cinderella concession’) in 1863 (Pratt 1938). The last spatial extension of the concession occurred in 1899 and expanded the territory to 5583 acres (Pratt 1938). The French concession was in comparison relatively small. The area comprised only 66 hectares in 1849 (Bergère 2009).

61 Three land regulations were issued in 1845, 1854 (in which the SMC was formed) and 1866/1869. These regulations came to constitute the embodiment of the strong grip that the richest foreign land renters had on the decision making process in the English (and later international) concession. The 1854 land regulation officially allowed Chinese to rent property in the British, French concession and the American settlement. In the last land regulation of 1869 the SMC, already under strong influence of these landholders, imposed a new voting requirement that prevented both Chinese living in the concession and most foreigners from voting in the SMC. The provision was to form the basis of electoral voting into the 20th century.

“Every foreigner, either individually or as a member of a firm, residing in the Settlement, having paid all taxes due, and being an owner of land of not less than five hundred taels in value, whose annual payment of assessment on land or houses or both, exclusive of all payments in respect of licenses, shall
amount to the sum of ten taels and upwards, or who shall be a householder paying on an assessed rental of not less than five hundred taels per annum and upwards, shall be entitled to vote in the election of the said Members of the Council and at the public meetings.” (Shanghai Municipal Council (SMC) 1907, article XIX: 7,8; see also Haan 1982: 41).

62 Lu (1999: 36) notes that by the end of the Taiping Rebellion, well over 100,000 Chinese had moved into the foreign settlements.

63 An early historian noted that the old streets “in the settlement were at that time in a condition almost inconceivable to residents of the present day. After a few hours' rain they became ordinary Shanghai mud. Those people whose business obliged them to go about wore boots which reached half way up the thighs, as ordinary boots and shoes would have been dragged off the feet by sticky tenacious mud. The streets were lit by little oil lamps far apart; the river, which supplied all the drinking water of the Settlement, often bore corpses from the districts where fighting or beheading was going on... So bad were things in Municipal in and about 1862 that I find the Model Settlement, as some one had called it, described in the newspapers as a hotbed of every conceivable abomination, a large portion of it being unfit for human habitation” (Macellan 1889, 84). The draconic measures that were undertaken to solve the hygienic problems that the city faced are discussed by Macpherson (2002).

64 An interesting account of a dialogue between a British merchant and the British consul Rutherford Alcock describes the process that influenced the decision to open up the foreign concession to Chinese renters.

“No doubt your [Alcock’s] anticipations of future evil have a certain foundation, and, indeed, may be correct enough, – though something may be urged on the other side as to the advantages of having the Chinese mingled with us, and departing from the old Canton system of isolation; but, upon the whole, I agree with you. The day will probably come, when those who then may be here will see abundant cause to regret what is now being done, in letting and subletting to Chinese. But in what way am I and my brother landholders and speculators concerned in this? You, as H. M.’s [Her Majesty’s] consul, are bound to look to national and permanent interests – that is your business. But it is my business to make a fortune with the least possible loss of time, by letting my land to Chinese, and building for them at thirty or forty per cent. interest, if that is the best thing I can do with my money... You must not expect men in my situation to condemn themselves to years of prolonged exile in an unhealthy climate for the benefit of posterity. We are money-making, practical men.” (see also the original text in Alcock 1863: 59, 60, original emphasis; Alcock in Lu 1999: 34). Alcock felt tempted by this argument and wrote that he "was losing time in any effort to stem the tide of land-jobbing and house-building for Chinese tenants, who could be found to repay the capital of land and house by a two or three years' rent” (1868: 60, original emphasis). He continues and concludes “and so ended my desire to continue the struggle, too evidently hopeless” (1868: 60, original emphasis).

65 Bergère (2009) notes that the English and British concessions by 1960 (merely 15 years after the establishment of the concession) already contained 8,740 lilong buildings.

66 The increase of the population also had an effect on the shape of lilong buildings. The number of floors of newly built lilong increased from 2 to 4 and the overall width of the buildings’ bays and yards significantly decreased as demands for labour increased (see ZhaoS 2004; see Zhao 2006a for a contextual analysis; and Ge 2008 for visualisations of the historic development of lilong). The 20th century (up to the early 1950s) saw a further development of lilong quarters (renamed as xinshi lilong). The width of the general lanes, which connected the different neighbourhoods and the public streets, were widened to allow for better vehicle circulation and improved sanitation. The later changes reflected and constituted broader social-economic concerns with economic functionality, hygiene and a general reduction of the average household size (and the increase of nuclear families).

67 Elliot (2002) provides a similar understanding with reference to the Boxer War (1899-1900) and shows how the Chinese state, despite of its supposed lack of national identity, was “not only intact but with sufficient cultural, economic, political and military life to continue to exist as a nation despite the dire predictions and burdensome reparations inflicted by the "civilised" West” (2002: 114).

68 It bears remembering that the reestablishment of the Guomindang (GMD) in 1919 and the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party (1921) both occurred in Shanghai.

69 The reasons that were most often given among contractors for the lack of an incorporation of Chinese architecture in treaty ports were: 1) the high costs involved, 2) the impracticable nature of Chinese style architecture and 3) their undesirability among Chinese citizens (Bergamini in Cody 1996c). Another important reason for the lack of traditional architectural forms was the influence of the Self Strengthening Movement (1861–1894) which emphasised the importance of practicality and functionality over tradition. A final, yet very important, reason was the fact that architecture was until the 19th century taught and considered as a craft rather than an art (see for example Ruan 2002).
The influence of Chinese architecture in the built environment was during the 19th century limited to structures such as the Jiangnan Arsenal (jiangnan jiqi zhizao zongju) in Shanghai (1865), which was an historical influential project led by two of the main proponents of the Self Strengthening Movement (Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang), and St. John's College (later renamed to St. John's University) also in Shanghai. The earliest structures to actually fully integrate Chinese forms into the design of new buildings were the Yale-in-China campus at Changsha (1914), Peking Union Medical College (1916-1919) and the even earlier Nanxiakou Station (c. 1911) and Dezhou Station (c. 1912) (Cody 1996b; Cody 2001; Li 2003). The underdeveloped state of 'Chinese architecture' started to alter after the May 4th movement.

Zhu was employed as the head of Beijing Municipal Council and also worked as the director in charge of the Department of Internal Affairs under Yuan Shikai in the 1910s.

Liang is considered to be the ‘father of modern architecture in China’ (Steinhardt 2002: 540) and to have been one of the major figures in reshaping the course of Chinese architectural form. He belonged to the first generation of Chinese architects (among them were also Chen Zhi, Lin Huiyin and others) that were sent to the US, as part of the Boxer Rebellion Indemnity Scholarship Program, to study Western architecture at the University of Pennsylvania (which at that time was strongly influenced by a modernised interpretation of the Beaux-Arts). Liang is also responsible for the founding of the Department of Architecture at Tsinghua University (Shanghai), which is until today still the most influential architecture centre in China, in 1946. For more on Liang, see especially Fairbank (1994).

Zhu Qiqian, who served as the Director of the Department of Internal Affairs under Yuan Shikai, was the first modern researcher to revitalise interest in the yingzao fashi (‘Treatise on Architectural Methods’). The book, which originally was written during the Song Dynasty (Li (2003) traces the publication back to 1103) by Li Jie, went into several reprints in the early 1900s and became the main text for studying Chinese architectural origins. Needham (2000 [1954]) (2000) finds no comparable text in Europe that describes architectural drawings as clear as the yingzao fashi. He argues that there is "[n]o work by another individual [in China’s dynastic history which] ever took the place of the Ying Tsao Fa Shihi” (2000 [1954] 85, original emphasis). Li (2003) goes as far as contrasting the yingzao fashi to the famous Ten Books of Architecture written by Vitruvius in order to demonstrate the distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Chinese’ traditions of architecture’.

The other document, albeit of lesser influence, was the gongbu gongcheng zuofa (a building document which dates back to the first half of 18th century).

Liang’s interest in the yingzao fashi was a result of his father (Liang Qichao), who had sent him a reprint of the text during his son’s academic stay in the US. In the accompanying letter Liang Qichao wrote: “A thousand years ago to have a masterpiece like this... what a glory to the culture of our race” (in Fairbank 1994:29). The popularity of the yingzao fashi among Chinese architects at that time can also be explained as a consequence of its compatibility with Beaux-Arts architecture, which similarly as the yingzao fashi, emphasises the importance of ornamental details (Ruan 2002; Li 2003).

The references to ‘Chinese traditional architecture’ or ‘characteristics of Chinese architecture’ in popular and academic literature are too many to list here (some examples are, but not limited to, Ye 1976; Liu 1980). The history of a national architectural form is so much taken for granted by Chinese and Western sources alike that Chinese architecture (or any art for that manner) has become synonymous with one particular (and highly ambiguous) style. Xue understands this national ambiguity and criticises “Liang's summary of "national form"” as “the orthodox official form of the Han nationality, [which] mainly [can be found] in central China”. Liang, he argues, denied the “fact that there are fifty-three minorities located in the periphery of the country” (2006: 14).

The term also appeared in official Japanese documents in the 1930s, see for instance (Gaimushō (Foreign Affairs Department) 1932).

The idea of GMG nationhood was predicated on the principle of the Five Races under One Union (Wu zu gonghe) These were: Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui (a generic label given to Muslims) and Tibetans. These ethnicities were by the GMD, however, not considered to be of an ethnic category, but instead imagined to have been the consequence of mere regional and religious differences. The GMD’s minority politics took a definitive turn towards greater assimilation after the split with the communists in 1927.

The vassal states are either partially or whole located in present-day: Vietnam (1885), Korea (1895), Thailand (1890), Myanmar (1896), Nepal, Bhutan (1890), Pakistan (1890), Afghanistan (1879), Kazakhstan (1840), Ryukyu Islands (1879), Kyrgyzstan (1840), Tajikistan (1840), Uzbekistan (1840). The years refer to the political independence of the several vassal states.

The synopsis of the book reads “by looking at the maps the people and especially the younger generations will learn from history and from the painful lessons that can be drawn from it. The maps
will make them aware of the domestic reaction that was aimed at preventing the vain attempts of foreign countries to split up the motherland and stopping the foreign anti-Chinese current. The people should defend the country and fight for the nation’s independence and unity, to build a modern socialist country and to struggle for the development of a socialist and spiritual civilisation”.

(Original text: “Kan zhe ben ditu, jiushì yao renmin quanzhong tebie shì qing shaonian yidai yihweijian, lãojì lǐshì de tèzhòng xiaoxùn. Guodu jìngti guonei wangtu fenlie zuguo de fandong shili de chundong he guowai fanhua niliu de dongxiang, yongyuan hanwei guo he mínzu de duli ti hongyi. Wei jianshe yige xiandaihua de shenhui zhuiyu qiangguo, fazhan shenhui zhuiyu wuzhi wenming de jingshen wenming er fendou”)

80 The late Qing in 1901 launched an agenda of so-called “New Policies” in an ultimate effort to master and regulate industrial capital in Chinese cities. These policies obviously failed, but influenced the later urban policies of the GMD.

81 The relatively smooth amalgamation of foreign beaux-arts architecture and China’s new national form has partly to do with the fact that almost all of the Chinese architects were foreign-educated and partly with the compatibility between beaux-arts architecture and the ornamental architecture propagated as being distinctively Chinese by Liang. Another reason for the adaptation of beaux-arts methodology in Chinese form is that of the historical legacy of Chengde and the yuanning yuan gardens that similarly contained or shared similarities with the Beaux-Arts tradition. Ruan’s discovery of the many similarities between the two architectural traditions leads him to conclude that the foreign model of the École des Beaux-Arts was rarely contested and at some point even naturalised in the architecture of republican China (cf.Ruan 2002; Kögel 2008).

The incorporation of Chinese elements was in the early republican years (before Chinese architects became more dominant) mostly propagated by the influential American architect Henry Murphey. Murphey was in the 1920s already provided a significant role in the drafting of the Guangzhou renewal plan and in 1928 was assigned to the position of chief architectural adviser to the nationalist government for the famous Nanjing Plan (Cody 1996b; Cody 2001). Cody (1996c) elsewhere notes how, during the republican period, Jesuits similarly attempted to incorporate Chinese features into their designs of churches and colleges.

82 The term ‘renaissance’ was intentionally used - also by Liang Sicheng’s father (to denote a common cultural Chinese tradition) - to mystify and reinterpret the greatness of China for the political purpose of the present.

83 The building later came to be criticised by Liang Sicheng for not being ‘Chinese’ enough (in Rowe and Kuan 2002: 84).

84 It is perhaps worth quoting Chaund, who was a Cantonese architect, at some greater length: “To-day China is standing on the threshold of a national renaissance which has great and vital impulse. Old tradition is breaking and the new has not been formulated. This is, at present, the crucial fact in our national life. China is facing the greatest constructional problems of its history, probably that it will ever face. The moment is at once significant and critical… We, all of us, are gravely conscious of the portentous changes, and fully awake to the fact that China was never so consciously alive to the stimulating influence of Western achievement… While thus open to influence, we naturally will select and adopt only that which will fill our requirements and strengthen us… Hence while we admire the western achievements we should not imitate them slavishly… Our native characteristic qualities and artistic accomplishments should be recognized and accentuated, not discarded--they should be conserved, developed and exalted in every possible way” (Chaund [1919] in Cody 1996c: 17,19).

85 It bears mentioning that the city was actually the first planned project (according to international requirements and standards) in China.

86 The plan on the left is numbered as follows: 1) Central Party Headquarters, 2) main square with a fountain at its centre 3) national government building, 4) Chairman’s official residence, 5) Yuan and ministries surrounding the main square, 6) the Executive Yuan, 7) navy and war departments, 8) proposed airport (in Musgrove 2000: 145; see also Rowe and Kuan 2002).

87 The priority that was given to the Great Shanghai Plan is illustrated by the fact that the construction of a number of buildings (the Mayor’s House, the Municipal Library and the Municipal Museum) was actually already realised on the eve of the Japanese bombardment of Shanghai in 1937 (Campanella 2008).

88 Immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Shanghai municipal government pushed for a remodelled urban Master Plan that was meant to “be implemented in successive stages over a 25-year period, with a 50-year planning of the entire region as the final goal” (MacPherson 1996: 512). Lu notes that while the old Shanghai plan primarily “emphasised the Beaux-Arts concern for formal grandeur, the new plan stressed universalistic standards of functionality and efficiency” (Lu 2006: 27).
Master Plan was until the very arrival of the first detachments of the People’s Liberation Army in the city in May 1949 still being adjusted by local authorities and urban planning specialists. Soon thereafter however, the city’s grand plans were sacrificed to serve the purpose of creating a socialist city.

Chapter Four: The Production of Chinese Communism

1 “Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people’s political power be consolidated.” (Mao 2007 [1949]-b: 365).
2 Mawdsley (2003) describes how Stalin’s emphasis on urban modernisation led to an unprecedented level of urbanisation which went hand in hand with the nationalisation of the Russian population. He writes that the urbanisation rate had “increased from 18 per cent [a percentage similar to China before the establishment of the Republic of China in 1949] in 1926 to 33 per cent in 1939 and 48 per cent in 1959” (Mawdsley 2003: 66). The implementation of an official national language and culture was in cities as a result much easier and swifter accomplished than in rural Russia. This eventually helped to formulate a much stricter and more universally accepted territorial definition of the Russian nation state.  
3 A lot of the anti-urban rhetoric is also visible in Engels’ later writings (1970; Engels [1894] 1996) in which he seems to part ways with Marx to emphasise the antagonistic relationship between the rural and the urban. The anti-urban sentiments in such works proved to be fertile ground for the CCP which portrayed cities as reminders of ‘foreign imperialism’, bourgeois capitalism and the centres of GMD rule.

4 The suspicion that Mao and the CCP expressed concerning the ‘costs’ of the city found currency in the writings of later observers. The anti-urban rhetoric of the CCP was by some (Meisner 1971; 1982) thought to resemble the writings of Rousseau and the Russian Populists of the early 20th century, and helped others (Salaff 1967; Ma 1976) to argue that the Party intentionally frustrated the natural evolution of cities in order to pursue an agrarian form of socialism (Jameson and Wilber 1981). Many adopted the idea that “Mao viewed city life as too soft, lacking revolutionary vigor and labeled urban bureaucrats and intellectuals as ‘lords and masters’ (chengshi laoye) whose bodies and minds should be toughened” (Ma 2002: 1558, original emphasis).
5 Dirlik (1985: 262) notes for example that “[i]n the immediate years after the May Fourth Movement, [an urban phenomenon in itself] there were anarchist societies in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Changzhou in Fujian, Hankou, Chengdu, and Changsha…”

6 In his 1949 report to the Central Committee he demonstrated the desired functions of cities: “From the very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention to restoring and developing its production. We must not go about our work blindly and haphazardly and forget our central task, lest our comrades do their utmost to learn the techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as other closely related work such as commerce and banking. Only when production in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidated (Mao 2007 [1949]-a[1949]: 361-75).

Mao explicitly warned the “urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie” that “[w]hoever sides with the revolutionary people is a revolutionary. Whoever sides with imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism is a counter-revolutionary” (Mao 1977a[1950] : 38). Capitalism was in this and many of such accounts equated with the space of the city. The space of the rural was instead glorified as being revolutionary and emancipated.

7 The former functioned as an administrative (semi)state agency to keep records of approximately 2,000 to 10,000 households. The latter, which only served around 800 households, was dedicated to organise mass mobilisations for political campaigns and aided in the local promotion of politically inspired community involvement to inspire a stronger socialist consciousness.

8 The *hukou* system, which initially was implemented to restrict rural-urban migration, was a household registration that was based on urban (*chengzheng/ chengshi hukou*) and rural (*nongcun hukou*) citizenship. The system has already been discussed earlier, but will be discussed later again in more detail. 

9 A *danwei* can literally be translated as a spatial unit or as “a people [sic] place set apart” (Bjorklund 1986: 21). Although often translated as a simple industrial or administrative work unit, the term refers to a much broader scale of social sites, such as hospitals, universities etc.
One should, however, be careful in judging these spatio-political demarcations as unique to the Maoist organisation of space. Friedmann notes for example that city gates in Chengdu during imperial times “were [similarly] installed at both ends of each street and were closed at night and guarded by a gatekeeper (zhafa) or night watchman hired by the street head” (2006: 444). The design of danwei is also believed to be similar to the Soviet mikrodistrict (sotskapital’ or mikrorayon) which comprised “several apartment complexes and [had] a total population in the 8000-12000 range [and similarly was] supposed to have all of the consumer, cultural and social services required to meet the needs of this number of people” (Bater, Degtyarev et al. 1995: 678). Bray’s (2005) attempt to come to terms with the origins of the Danwei is perhaps the most elaborate among contemporary analyses. His analysis takes us back to the kao gong ji, already discussed at some length earlier, the traditional Chinese courtyards (siheyuan) and the emergence of the ‘proto-Danwei’ during the so-called ‘Yan’an period’. On the question whether the Chinese Danwei is then a novel modern phenomenon, he answers: “the danwei is certainly an entirely modern institutional formation. The point [however] is that what is ‘modern’ invariably bears many traces and influences from all those practices that preceded it” (2005: 7).

The idea of employing the authority of the past for the legitimacy of the present, which was also visible in many of the productions and organisations of space discussed earlier, is shared by Bjorklund (1986). He similarly notes that “a traditional principle [i.e. walled enclosure]” was used “to create [a] personal identity, productive-place identity, and a sense of social belonging”. This sentiment of belonging, characteristic of danwei, was in turn employed to legitimise a socialist mode of production and to strengthen public discipline towards the political centre.

The investment in housing during the first three years of the CCPs rule (1950-1953) amounted to well over 10 percent of total public investment (State Statistical Bureau [1982] in Han 1994: 190).

Not all of the 156 projects were implemented, in fact only 150 of the projects received Soviet assistance. Despite this shortfall, the projects “absorbed about half of the total industrial investment during the period of the “First Five Year Plan” (Zhang, Zhang et al. 2006: fn. 10).

Beijing was first designated to become a major industrial city, but this idea was later dropped. The idea of focusing on the smaller cities in the inland territories, instead of the bigger cities in the coastal areas, has to do with the overarching objective of a more even form of national development.

The construction of new, standardised housing flourished in 1953 and comprised 34 percent of the total construction in the country (Zhang and Wang 2001).

For an excellent and in-depth discussion of the similarities between Soviet and Chinese industrialisation and the role and purpose of the Danwei therein see Walder (1986).

Lu notes that the danyuan served as either simple dormitories with shared bathroom and kitchen facilities or as more spacious apartment buildings with a shared entrance and stairway.

Lu notes that the superblock “consisted of a grouping of four- to six-storey blocks of flats arranged around a quadrangle with public facilities in the centre” (Lu 2006: 31). In the Soviet Union the block was meant to accommodate between 1,000 and 1,500 people and was sometimes integrated into larger microdistricts. In the Romanian case, Lazarescu defines the superblock as “as a clearly delimited part of a residential area, which accommodates a tightly-knit and relatively autonomous collectivity” (in Maxim 1996: 48). The super blocks came later to be criticised as they proved to be unsuitable for the Chinese context or were integrated into larger microdistricts. One of the earlier of such microdistricts is Xizhaosi which was built in 1957 in Beijing (figure 6). Other examples include: Beiyangcun (Beijing, 1963) Hepingli (Beijing, 1959-1961 and Puqianzhen in Changzhou (1959).

Most of the planners responsible for the first two phases (1951-1953) of the project had also served as planners under the GMD government.

The municipality of Shanghai describes Caoyang as the first worker’s workers village (gongren xincun) after the liberation of the city in 1949 and stresses the historical ideological importance of the town (http://www.archives.sh.cn/docs/200803/d_185187.html). According to the site, “Caoyang opened a window to the world of the lives of ordinary Chinese people” (http://www.archives.sh.cn/docs/200803/d_185187.html). The 60 year anniversary of the foundation of the village was recently celebrated (http://www.dfdaily.com/html/21/2011/5/19/607127.shtml).

The area expanded significantly in the period after the foundation in 1951-1953 and covered an area of approximately 180 hectares in the 1970s.

The People’s Daily ran a special article in March 1955 with the title; “Against the waste in construction” (Fanlui jianzhuchongde langfei xianxiang). The paper also featured other articles that similarly criticised the architectural style of earlier constructed buildings (eg the Dianmen complex in Beijing of 1954). The ideologically motivated “Anti-Waste” campaign (fan langfei) of the mid 1950s was another political instrument to enforce a greater intertwínement of industry with housing.
23 ‘Living’ became in other words “a personal interest” (Zhang 1997 442) and subordinate to the interest and needs of the state.
24 A 1955 appraisal meeting on the standard design of residential buildings and housing designs, facilitated by the Bureau of City Construction, focused on the “dogmatic emulation of plans from Soviet design” and “its excessive emphasis on thrift” (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001: 132).
25 The district was planned for approximately 1500 households and covered an area of around 22 hectares. The building material used was cheap and consist of red bricks, while the overall layout of the block was symmetrically organised. The site is today, similar to Caoyang in Shanghai, considered to be a historical model of the country’s socialist urban planning tradition (Ditu 2010 [2009]).
26 The function of the architect was further politicised through the transformation of all significant design and architecture institutes into industrial design institutions. The purpose of and emphasis in Chinese architectural education similarly came to be standardised according to Soviet experience and principle.
27 Close to all land was by 1958 either state- or collectively owned. The state held most ownership in the urban areas, while the rural areas were more collectively owned.
28 The number of urban workers that belonged to a danwei was by the late 1970s as high as 95 percent (Bray 2005; Lu 2006).
29 The use of cheap and materials and standardised construction methods is another way in which the CCP attempted to save costs and time in the construction process. The use of block masonry became for instance increasingly popular in Beijing (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001).
30 Lu Xiaoobo (1997) shows that the idea of self-reliance for the welfare in work units was not unique to the 1950s. He instead convincingly argues that the need to effectively distribute scarce resources was the reason for the CCP to integrate its functionality during the difficult war period. The self-reliant work units were for their vulnerability for corruption however never an uncontested entity.
31 The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries deployed a comparable approach towards spatial-social identity engineering. They adopted a ‘microdistrict’/ ‘superblock’ approach to foster a ‘sense of’ neighbourhood, and to bolster the feeling of “a new city within the city” (Maxim 1996: 49). Former Yugoslavia, Hungary and other countries also adopted features of both the microdistrict and the superblock structure. There is, however, little research done in the English literature on the connections between these different architectures of power.
32 The idea of an even mode of development was, as mentioned earlier, an intrinsic ideological element of the Party and had already been promoted by Mao during his speech ‘On the Ten Major Relationships’ (2007 [1956]).
33 This initiative was already approved in December 1958 at 6th Plenary Session of the 8th CPC Central Committee but was only officially propagated at the National People’s Congress in April 1960 in which a joint declaration was signed between the Party Secretaries of Beijing, Shanghai, Wuhan, Guangzhou and Tianjin. The declaration read: “Now to begin with, we are operating people's communes with the street population as object; at the same time we are gradually getting underway people's communes centered on factories, mines, schools, and offices; this way we shall gradually realise communisation of all the cities” (in Schurmann 1968: 385).
34 The term might be derived from the Russian equivalent Sodruchestvo (Содружество or literally ‘commonwealth’) to denote the unity among socialist countries
35 According to the local authorities, Liu Shaoqi visited the Hongshun Li in 1959 which inspired him to consider the famous urban communes of the early 1960s (http://www.hw01.com/316/561/20080610134150.htm).
36 The gradual conceptualisation of the household registration system (hukou) was initially set in the period between 1955 and 1958. It later came to be more rigidly implemented as an instrument for the tightening of state control over socio-spatial urban mobility and as a spatial mechanism to halt rural-urban migration (Zhang 1997). The hukou system allowed planners to more restrictively distribute resources (foodstuffs, cloths etc.) to citizens and helped the Party to control the vast urbanisation that had taken place in the 1950s and specifically during the period of the GLF. Solinger (1999) and Chan (1994) argue and show that the changes in 1961 led to the gradual unfolding of an irreversible superiority of the city-born over those born in rural areas. The extreme division between rural and urban citizenship and agricultural (nongye) and non-agricultural (fei nongye) occupation, which the hukou system brought about, denied access to welfare facilities for rural non-urban hukou dwellers. The system ultimately became antagonistic to the objective (i.e. an even mode of development) for which it was initially designed. The city with its chances for employment was the favoured destination, while the rural areas were soon to become degraded as unfavourable locations of residence. Upward mobility from rural hukou to urban hukou (nongzhuanfei) was strictly curtailed. Chan (1994) notes, for example,
that in the period from 1961 to 1963 approximately 18 million urban workers were forced to return to their home towns and villages. The system was arguably the most effective regulation (among many others) of the CCP for curtailing rural-urban migration. Neither space nor time allows a more elaborate overview of the historical background and evolution of the *hukou*, instead see the following sources for a more in-depth analysis of this demobilising concept. On the historical and contextual background of the *hukou* during the 1949-1978 period, see Cheng and Selden (1994; 1997). On its development since 1949 with reference to rural-urban migration, see Zhang and Chan (1999); for an analysis of the relationship between social mobility and the *hukou* system in the period 1949 to 1996, see Wu and Treiman (2004) and on its significance in the post-Mao period, see Chan and Buckingham (2008) and Chan (2009).

37 The readjustment policies focused four basic principles: 1) readjustment, 2) consolidation, 3) rectification and 4) improvement. The underlying idea of the project was to resolve the dire situation in the overcrowded cities and to recover economic growth after the economic slowdown during the GLF. The policies, for example, restricted migration to urban areas, which was hoped to decrease the stress on urban infrastructures and resources. A great number of rural workers were similarly sent back to the countryside (*hui xiang*). The infamous ‘up to the mountains and down to the villages campaign’ (*shan xian xiang*), which were initially meant to compel the urban youth to educate themselves in the countryside, was additionally employed to bolster employment opportunities in the cities and to allow for a more effective distribution of resources. The stress on cities was further lessened by granting municipal governments a greater extent of freedom in the allocation of collected taxes. This allowed them to support local infrastructural projects. The heavy industries that had been so important during the GLF came to be discouraged, while light industries received instead support. Greater social economic freedoms were also handed down to rural and urban inhabitants. Farmers were, for example, given greater liberty in making decisions on the distribution of their crops, while urban workers were provided with material rewards for their work.

38 As the terms suggests, cities were categorised into three demarcated geographical areas: 1) cities along the coast that already were industrially important before 1949 (e.g. Shanghai, Qingdao etc), 2) the cities mentioned in the First Five Year Plan (Wuhan, Lanzhou etc.) and Western interior cities (located in Gansu, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Guizhou and Qinghai province).

39 Naughton (1988: 379) argues that the immense costs of the project had “a negative impact on China's economic development that was certainly more far-reaching than the disruption of the Cultural Revolution” (1988: 351). He estimated in 1988 that “China's annual industrial output is currently 10-15 per cent below what it would have been if the Third Front had never been undertaken”.

40 The photographs are taken by Chen Jiagang (2007) who works as an independent artist and observer of what he calls China’s “diseased cities”. The location of where the photographs were taken is in his work often seemingly intentionally left unknown. The effects of the Third Front on existing industrial centres are artistically also exhibited by Wang Bing in his impressive cinemagraphic work *Tiexi Qu*.

41 An otherwise little known fact, however, is that most of the construction in existing cities instead turned underground, as thousands of tunnels (providing shelter for 60 per cent of the population of the 75 largest cities) were built in anticipation of an intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the later 1960s and early 1970s (Smith 2001). Local government have recently started to re-appropriate the space in the tunnels for commercial purposes (e.g. hotels, shops etc.).

42 The ‘up to the mountains and down to the villages’ campaigns were originally (in the early 1960s) initiated by Liu Shaoqi (Vice Chairman of the CCP) to lighten the pressure on the infrastructure and the distribution of resources in the overcrowded cities in the aftermath of the GLF. The later campaigns during the Cultural Revolution were, in contrast, meant to re-educate the urban population. The result of such campaigns was that urbanisation growth rates stagnated in 1960 and 1970s. (Ebanks and Cheng 1990; Zhang Li 2002). Bernstein (1977) estimates that 12 million urban citizens were sent off to rural areas during the Cultural Revolution. Ebanks and Cheng (1990) imagine this number to be even higher if one would consider and include the preceding campaigns (of the late 1950s and early 1960s) which were also meant to transfer urban officials to the countryside (*ganbu xiafang*)

43 The decision was made before the foundation of the PRC in October 1949, during the first plenary session of the National People’s Political Consultative Conference in Zhongnanhai, The place in which this meeting was held is symbolic for the fate that befell the Forbidden City.

44 It is somewhat unclear how much Mao was involved in the favouring of the so-called ‘Zhao-Zhu Plan’. Wu (2005: 8) follows Wang Jun (2011) in arguing that “Mao Zedong personally decided to locate the government in the old city.” Chang-tai Hung (2010: 31) relies on a speech given by P.V. Abramov
The great height of the Monument (ca. 38 meters) in fact overshadowed both the height of the gates to the Forbidden City and the Forbidden City itself.

The reliefs on the monument in fact periodised history into demarcated three periods: the feudal period before the Opium War, the period before liberation (jiefang qian) and the period after liberation (jiefang hou). The eight reliefs consist of depictions which all portray carefully chosen historical events from the onset of the Opium Wars to the founding of the PRC. In chronological order these are: 1) The Opium War, 2) The Taiping Uprising, 3) The Revolution of 1911, 4) The May Fourth Movement, 5) The May Thirtieth Movement, 6) The Nanchang Uprising, 7) The War of Resistance Against Japan and 8) The Yangzi Crossing. For a detailed analysis of the Monument, see Hung (2001).

The individual being is sacrificed for the geographic abstraction that is the nation state. The individual, his (more often than her) identity and entire being now belong to the spatial confinement of the territorial nation state. The fact that the nation state came to appropriate the identity of the body runs counter to religion. The British Catholic Herald, for example, argued that the cenotaph for the Unknown

There were however also more pragmatic reasons to favour the old imperial centre as the new CCP headquarters. The Liang-Chen plan was based on the construction of a new city, west of the imperial city, which would have required a significant amount of investment that the new state could hardly afford. The rebuilding of the old city was also necessary considering the deplorable condition of much of its houses. Finally, the idea and importance of conservation was relatively unknown at that time in China (Wu 1999).

The original source of this quote comes from Peng Zhen (First Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee) who argued that Mao had told him this while the Chairman looked down on Tiananmen Square out from Tianan Gate. This was in fact a sentiment Mao already shared in his report to the Second Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (source) and was a view widely expressed at the time by local authorities (see for instance Wang 2011: 84 - 86).

The competition for the planning of Moscow’s governmental district (the never realised ‘Palace of the Soviets’) was an international event and numerous renowned architects and urban planners (e.g. Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius etc) took part in it. A disregard for preservation was also visible in Hitler’s urban plan for Berlin. For a comparison between Stalin’s Palace of the Soviets and Hitler’s New Chancellery, see van der Wusten (2000).

The Soviet planner M.G. Barannikov, who presented the ‘Plans for the Future Development of Beijing’ in December 1949, compared Beijing to Moscow and proposed the idea of concentric rings around the governmental centre. This meant that the city could only have one centre and therefore provided further ammunition to refute the Liang-Chen proposal.

Liang, whose research, we have seen, had previously helped create the historical unity of Chinese architecture, argued: “Beijing epitomises the traditional architectural methods of the Chinese nation and its wisdom and boldness as manifested through city planning... The city has no match in this world.” (Wang 2011: 143). He soon became irritated after it gradually had become clear that his efforts to preserve the city were in vain. Wang Jiqi, Secretary General of the SAC, argued that Liang had attacked the Chairman. Liang supposedly wrote that Mao was not “in a position to supervise over construction because he knows nothing about architecture” (Wang Jiqi in Wang 2011: 148). Mao responded to the Liang’s discontent and “complained there was a professor who wanted to drive him out of Beijing” (in Hu 2006: 15). In the same account Mao is believed to have “once shouted angrily ‘why emperors could live in Beijing, but I cannot?’” (Wang in Hu 2006: 15).

Hua Lanhong and Chen Zhanxiang delivered in 1953 two counter proposals that both complied largely with the official preference for a more industrial city. The proposals were, however, soon sidelined in favour of the 1953 proposal drafted by Party members and Soviet experts.

The image of the square can, for example, be found on stamps, bags, coins etc. It also featured as the official seal of the new state. The decision to incorporate the image of Tianan Gate into the official national emblem was made in 1950 by Zhou Enlai and Liang Sicheng (Wang 2011).

The square was, according to the 1958 plan, expanded in 1959 to host a crowd of almost half a million and was again expanded after Mao’s death to 440,000 square meters to accommodate 600,000 people (Wu 2005).

Traditional cosmology, as mentioned in the second chapter, ordained that all structured must face south.

(vice mayor of Moscow) which “revealed that Peng Zhen [Mayor of Beijing]… told Soviet Advisors that the mayor had “consulted with Chairman Mao [on the issue], and that the chairman maintained that [key] government offices had to be set up inside the city, whereas offices of lesser importance could be located in the new district.”“
Soldier in Westminster Abbey was “nothing more or less than a pagan memorial [which was] a disgrace in a so called Christian land” (Gregory in Johnson 2004: 324).

37 At the head of the Party stood the figure of Mao, who personally appropriated the Monument through his calligraphic inscription on the front side of the stele like structure which he could see from his presence on the balcony of Tianan Gate. “When he stood above Tiananmen he faced his own words in his own calligraphy, and when he was not there his huge portrait stared down at them [ie. the People’s Heroes] (Wu 2005: 34). Wu argues that Mao’s personal involvement with the construction of the monument and its ideological and spatial centrality are evidence of the structure’s celebratory (and less commemorative) meaning. It represented the establishment of a new China which found its personification in Mao himself. The monument marked, therefore, both the beginning of a new China and, almost eschatologically, demarcated the history that led to its foundation. The strong influence of Mao had in this project allowed him to “create both the past and the present of the people's history, [as] he stood for both past and present, the people and history (Wu 2005: 34).

38 It is perhaps interesting to note here that the Soviet Union never entirely conformed itself to a standardised Moscow Time. Although the Bolsheviks changed the former Julian calendar into a Gregorian one, the integration of a Moscow time or ‘All-Union Time’ was limited only to railroad and air traffic. The everyday life of Soviet citizens instead followed a regime based on local time zones (see Neidhart 2003: chapter 7). The resulting problems of living in two-time zones (or temporalities) were comparable to those that are now visible in Xinjiang where an official Beijing time and a local time exist in the space and at the same time. The still very relevant nature of the politics of time was in 2010 made visible by the local reaction to the former President Medvedev’s proposal to cut the time difference between Moscow and Eastern Russia.

39 The results of the change were manifold. These are only some: the time of Islamic prayers (set historically according to the movement of the sun); agricultural yields; biorhythms of humans and animals, etc. The consequences of the time changing and the political ramifications are, to my knowledge, only rarely discussed in the literature.

40 The political motivation for a reconceptualisation of time echoes that of the experience in revolutionary France during the 1790s. Here, arguably even more than in Communist China, the reformers “attempted not only to gain social control by imposing a new reference rhythm of collective life, but also to bring about a total symbolic transformation of the standard temporal reference framework, as became an age pronouncedly devoted to total regeneration” (Zerubavel 1977: 870-871, original emphasis).

41 The formerly infamous racetrack in Shanghai was in 1951 for example changed into People’s Square (renmin guangchang). For more examples and experiences in numerous other cities, see Schinz (1989).

42 The buildings were constructed in three eclectic styles Three of the buildings were built on the basis of the traditional big roof (the Beijing Railway Station, the People’s Cultural Hall and the National Agricultural Exhibition Centre), three other ones subscribed to a socialist realist style (the Great Hall of the People, the Museum of Chinese Revolution and History and the Military Museum of the Chinese Revolution), three were modernist in style (the Beijing Workers’ Stadium, Minzu Hotel and the Overseas Chinese Mansion) an the last building (the Diaoyutai State Guest House) followed a loose traditional architectural style (Lu, Rowe et al. 2001).

43 The Great Hall of the People (Renmin Dahuitang, a name given to the structure by Mao himself) is 171,800 meters in size and consists of 34 Regional Halls which are designed and decorated by artists and architects from each respective region. The building as such “symbolise[s] the unity and unification of the Chinese nation” (official tour guide in Wu 2005: 122). This idea of unity was not only geographical but also carried strong historical resonance. The Ministry of Culture asked the artists to ensure that their work reflected the “nation's ancient cultural and artistic tradition” (Xi Xiaopeng in Andrews 1994: 228). This experience is illustrative (and similar to those of the Qing and the Republic) of the Party’s much broader project of appropriating history for purposes of national legitimacy. The idea of temporal unity is also visible in the Grand Central Hall, through which all regional delegates have to pass if they wish to enter the main auditorium, that hosts two large clocks which are both set to show Beijing time (Wu 2005).

44 The Beijing cultural Relic Work Team estimated that from 1958 to 1962 “22,000 square meters of 426 temple rooms had been vacated for use by factories, government institutions and schools; 5,381 pieces of metal cultural relics, weighing about more than 500 tons were used to support industrial development” (Wang 2011: 359).

45 Zhou Enlai was personally involved in supervising the drawing of what was to become one of the largest paintings ever drawn in ‘China’.
The contradiction between the wish to break with the old and the urge to embrace the new, visible for example in the discussed making of Tiananmen Square, does not deter but allow the viewer from instantly recognising and identifying the painting to be ‘essentially Chinese’. Schein writes with reference to the American cultural landscape paintings that “[a] cultural landscape can be racialized, and a racialised landscape serves to either naturalise, or make normal, or provide the means to challenge racial formations and racist practises” (Schein 1999: 189). This former observation begs the question whether the same can be said about Chinese landscape paintings. This dissertation cannot provide the amount of space necessary for answering the question if or to what extent artistic depictions of the national landscape embed racial connotations. The transformation of historically authoritative elements (such as the use of calligraphy, poetry and the sun) to render the painting recognisably ‘Chinese’ does however make it difficult to find reasons to object to the idea of a correlation between the painted nation and a racial nation. The negation of the old, Schein’s second hypothesis, has similarly received little academic attention, but numerous Chinese artists seem to have commenced to negate the meaning of Chinese essentialism (e.g. Ai Weiwei).

There exists admittedly a longstanding debate about the question of Mao’s motives for starting and advancing the Cultural Revolution. Zizek (2007) argues, for example, that Mao’s Cultural Revolution was grounded in a vulgar form of Hegelianism which attempted to ‘negate the negation’, but ultimately failed to bring about a constructive new beginning. This is an interpretation not very dissimilar to that of Shaun Breslin who concisely and convincingly argues that “point of the cultural revolution... is to bring about a fundamental change in the way that people view the world – to change their mode of thought. [In other words,] to cast off old feudal or other attitudes and replace them with new socialist modes of thoughts and attitudes...” (1998: 102). This view is, however, different to those authors (e.g. Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006) who tend to argue that the Cultural Revolution was mainly instigated with the purpose of bringing Mao back in power. This argument is taken to its extreme by Chang and Halliday in their notorious ‘Mao: the unknown story’ (2005). Here they argue that the CR was Mao’s intent to become ‘the [sadistic] leader of the world revolution’. It must be noted that Chang and Halliday’s controversial reasoning and at times polemic assertions (with regards to the politics of Mao and the person he was) have received a lot of critique (see for instance Benton and Lin 2010). I take the position that Mao’s reasons for starting the revolution are a combination of both personal (especially with hindsight of the failure of the GLF) and ideological motives. This argument falls in line with that of Breslin’s words: “Mao wanted the people to participate spontaneously and take the reins of the revolution back into their own hands. But he [also] wanted and expected their participation to be along his own clearly defined lines for the revolution” (Breslin 1998: 132).

Mao himself specifically addressed the lack of superstructure in Stalin’s economism: “Stalin’s [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR] from first to last says nothing about the superstructure. It is not concerned with people; it considers things, not people…. [He speaks] only of the relations of production, not of the superstructure or politics, or the role of the people. Communism cannot be reached unless there is a communist movement” (Zizek 2007: 7).

In an oft-cited quotation of ‘On Contradiction’ (Mao 2007 [1937]; 336) writes that: “When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.) obstructs the development of the economic base, political and cultural changes become principal and decisive. Are we going against materialism when we say this? No. The reason is that while we recognise that in the general development of history the material determines the mental and social being determines social consciousness, we also — and indeed must — recognise the reaction of mental on material things, of social consciousness on social being and of the
superstructure on the economic base. This does not go against materialism; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical materialism and firmly upholds dialectical materialism.” 336

The article (‘Sweep Away All Monsters and Demons’), which appeared on the first of June 1966 in the People’s Daily, was instructed and revised by Chen Boda. The text noted that: “The Proletarian revolution is aimed not at demolishing all the old ideology and culture and all the old customs and habits, which, fostered by the exploiting classes, have poisoned the minds of the people for thousands of years, but also at creating and fostering among the masses an entirely new ideology and culture and entirely new customs and habits - those of the proletariat” (Li 1995b). Lin Biao (in Lu 2004: 61) thereafter famously crystallised the intention of the CR: “We must thoroughly strike down the old ideology, old culture, old customs, and old habits left by the exploitive class. We must reform any superstructures not suited to the socialist economic base. We must establish the authority of the proletariat, as well as establishing the new proletarian ideology, new culture, new customs, and new habits” (source)

Many of the sites considered to be of historical value in Beijing were destroyed (including temples, rites, monasteries) and what had remained of the Forbidden City was only saved after Zhou Enlai’s personal intervention. In 1967, Zhou is by Murphey (1995) said to have helped instigate the 1967 “State Council Opinion Concerning Protection of Cultural Relics and Books in the Cultural Revolution” (Guanyu zai wuchanjieji wenhua da geming zhong baohu wenwu tushu de jidian yijian). The organisation might well have prevented the total annihilation of the site.

The immanent and already discussed academic Liang Sicheng was one of the many architects that fell victim to the antagonists of the Cultural Revolution. They labelled him a counter-revolutionary in 1966; he passed away in 1972.

The Spartan policy of cost-saving housing was revised in a proposal drafted by the State Construction Commission in 1973. Urban housing standards gradually improved as a consequence of the revision, while multi-storey buildings were promoted to overcome the housing crises that resulted from the policies undertaken in the first phase of the Cultural Revolution (Zhang and Wang 2001).

Better constructed buildings, such as the Capital Stadium in Beijing (finished in 1968), served mainly to act as façades to conceal the increasingly devastating nature of the CR to the outside world (Rowe and Kwan 2002). The period immediately after Lin Biao’s sudden death and China’s improved relations with the US saw the re-emergence of a more international modernist architectural style in buildings such as the Nanjing Airport (1972) and the Beijing Hotel (1972). The choice for such international modernist buildings was quite remarkable, given the political climate at the time.

Mao would later paradoxically intervene into the events that he had earlier himself set in motion (Macfarquhar and Schoenhals 2006). I think that this intervention was the decisive turning point in the course of the Cultural Revolution. The paradox whose name is Mao wanted, on the one hand, to negate both the party and the states but, on the other hand, was unable to relinquish power (see also Badiou 2005).

Mao’s praise was presented by Zhou Enlai at the Third National People’s Congress in 1964.

In the Second National People’s Congress Zhou Enlai, (held in 1963) noted that it was “[b]ecause of the discovery and construction of the Daqing oilfield, our country’s economic construction, the oil needs of defence and civilian applications which had depended on foreign imports in the past, are now basically self-reliant, whether in volume or in variety…” (Tai Wei 2010: 4). This message was 15 years later repeated by Chairman Hua Guofang: “[Daqing transformed into] one of the world’s few huge oilfields at high speed, thus ridding China once and for all of backwardness in the petroleum industry and ending the days when China had to depend on imported oil” (in Tai Wei 2010: 6).

This was a radical departure from the experience of Soviet oil-cities. These had previously entirely focused on oil extraction. The dispersed nature of settlements around Daqing was, in contrast, as much the outcome of a conscious preference for a shortened distance between the site of work and dwelling, as it was an economic decision to avoid the potentials costs of building an entirely new city. The construction of gandalei housing also provided the necessary means for self-sufficiency to the inhabitants. This form of cheap housing (the basic materials of which were composed of small amounts of timber and mud) heralded the arrival of the earlier mentioned ‘Design Revolution’.

The short period (1975) in which Deng Xiaoping attempted to restore some form of economic order and state stability led Xiaojinzhuang, for example, to fall back into obscurity. This short-lived adjustment phase was, however, soon again eclipsed by the emergence of the Gang of Four which morphed the “rural cultural utopia” into “an anti-Deng Xiaoping model” (Brown 2006: 177). Deng had previously endorsed the Dazhai model and belittled the relevance and accomplishments of Jiang’s Xiaojinzhuang (see for example Friedman 1978: 879). Dazhai in turn was, of course, also the preferred model for Zhou Enlai who integrated the commune’s later agricultural mechanisation in his support for
his ‘Four Modernisations’ in 1975. The rise of the Gang of Four in late 1975 meant however that the Dazhai commune, now synonymous to Deng and Zhou, became an easy target for Jiang and the other radicals who started to accuse the village for its revisionist emphasis on production.

82 Zhou died in 8 January 1976 from a bladder cancer and was officially commemorated in a strict state orchestrated memorial service on January 15.

83 The background of and the series of events which led to the ‘First Tiananmen Incident’ have been discussed by Teiwes and Warren Sun (2004). They note that the first paper wreath to commemorate Zhou on Tiananmen Square already appeared on March 19, but that public mourning was both actively discouraged and strongly politicised as “sever class struggle”. Their analysis of a long series of events, which started with the “Nanjing Incident” on March 24th, weakens the idea of a supposedly ‘spontaneous’ commemoration that until recently dominated analysis of the event. They instead convincingly propose the idea of a long sequence of political repressions that ultimately led to the Tiananmen demonstration on April 4 and 5.

84 The Gang was comprised of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. Its name was only popularised after their arrest on 6 October 1976.

85 The employment of force occurred on the night of April 5 after Wu De’s repetitive warnings (to the demonstrators) to evacuate the square. There exists debate over the question who was and who was not responsible for the decision to undertake force. The fact that Jiang Qing initiated the idea of coercion is commonly agreed upon. It is also known, albeit more contested, that other politburo members (including the radicals Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen) were hesitant about the use of force. The extent to which Mao could be held responsible is however admittedly much more problematic since he is recorded to have said not to oppose but to explicitly approve of the use of force. The question over the responsibility of the Tiananmen crackdown is however complicated by Mao’s deteriorating mental state of health and the possibly distortive communication between him and the Politburo. The latter was almost entirely organised by his radical cousin and acting liaison officer, Mao Yuanxin.

86 The wreaths of paper were removed from the monument. It was from this moment onwards that the legitimacy of the Gang of Four officially started to crumble. In the following days, thousands of ‘counter-revolutionaries’ were rounded-up and compelled to march and denounce Deng around and on the square. In the months between then and the arrest of the gang of four, radicals continued with no avail to portray Deng and Zhou as rightist and bourgeois elements in the Party.

87 The pictorial book renmin de daonian (People’s mourning) was the first unofficial form of Chinese photography which did not resolve around glorified, socialist realist styled pictures of Party members and Party-led events. The hundreds of photos illustrated in the book were instead all taken by individuals and presented an alternative form of realism. The pictures were therefore, similarly to the appropriation of Tiananmen Square, characteristic of an unprecedented voluntary turn against the existing ideology of the ruling leadership. The book, which was published in 1979, was dedicated to the person that a few month after the event was responsible for the imprisonment of the Gang of Four; the new Chairman Hua Guofeng. “The volume thus helped Hua gain public support and legitimised his mandate” (Wu 2008a: 94)

88 The geomantic north-south axis of Beijing runs mathematically through Mao’s embalmed body. His effigy, differently than the imperial emperors of the past, faces south and is thus forced to painfully face the much large imperial palaces of the Forbidden City.

89 Wakeman similarly argues that “Visually, the anticipated sweep of space - the accepted scope of charismatic political authority, so to speak-was abutted by this placement. Symbolically, the unending flow of temporal change - Mao's own vision of permanent revolution - was blocked and then truncated. The mausoleum seemed to seal off history rather than to enlarge it” (1985a: 175).

Chapter Five: The Production of Space with Chinese Characteristics (1978-1989)

1 The term as gaiye kaifang was introduced only later.

2 This is not to argue for radical ruptures since the new always has to inherit something from the old. China’s supposedly post-Mao Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have for example had precedence in Mao’s China. In 1972 the “State Council approved a Ministry of Foreign Trade plan to revive the Specialised Loan Programme for trial Export Production” (Reardon 1998: 487) and in 1964 a 600 million yuan loan programme was launched to “expand export production of industrial goods” (Reardon 1998: 485; see also Reardon 2002).

3 The CCP leadership signed an official decree in April 1956 that 160 of its members were to be cremated upon death. This was a political act given that the old (superstitious) traditions were
considered not only to be too expensive but also ideologically inconsistent with the principles of socialism. Mao however “not only failed to request cremation for himself before dying, but had also acquired a family gravesite at Babaoshan cemetery” (Cheater 1989: 112).

The fact that Hua was a Maoist loyalist did not deter him from holding several meetings with Thatcher to announce the economic reforms in Guangdong. The high level meeting in Britain, attended by Hua, Yu Qili (Vice-Premier), Zhang Wenjin (Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs) to improve British-Chinese relations and strengthen trade relations, was the first meeting of a Chinese premier to the United Kingdom. The meeting helped level the ground for the eventual ‘Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong’ in 1984 (CC 79 1979). Hua was in the British and other meetings with European leaders positively describe. “He performed impressively. He was well prepared (he referred to no briefs), careful and watchful, and scarcely put a foot wrong.” (Cradock 1979).

It bears mentioning that Hua remained in charge as Premier until 1980 and was the official Party Chairman until 1981. His positions were later filled by respectively Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang.

The concept of the ‘Two Whatevers’ (Liang ge fanshi) was grounded in the adherence that whatever Mao said or decided upon was to be blindly followed. This credo is accredited to Hua Guofeng who sponsored an article by Wang Dongxing which coined the term in February 1977. Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping from late 1978 onwards employed the term to attack those considered to be so-called ‘whateverists’. The meaning that Deng ascribed to the whateverists carried however little ideological weight and was rather a mere means for Deng to gain greater political control. Teiwes and Sun note that “[i]n sharp contrast to his caricature as a “whateverist” rigidly bound to Mao’s programs, Hua was fundamentally pragmatic and policy-oriented” (Teiwes and Sun 2011: 4).

The ‘Seek Truth from Facts’ phrase is accredited to Mao but was later employed by Deng Xiaoping to counter Hua’s ‘Two Whatevers’. The exact ideological meaning of the term is however very ambiguous since Deng used it to both credit the developmental model of Daqing and the liberalised SEZs. The phrase is often, however, misappropriated to underline Deng’s dedication to economic and political pragmatism.

One could therefore go as far as posing the provocative question as to whether Deng’s reforms would have even been possible without the preceding reforms of Hua. It seems that this question will be the topic of discussion in Sun and Teiwes’ forthcoming book on the legacy of Hua Guofeng, tentatively titled ‘The Post-Mao Transition in China: From the Ashes of Revolution toward Reform, 1976-1978’.

The oft-heard claim that Hua was more of a radical revolutionary than an economic pragmatist runs counter to the fact that “the radicals viewed the Dazhai emphasis on production, capital construction, and mechanization as carrying out the reviled “theory of productive forces’” (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 361).

Hua’s report, which removed many of the leftist recommendations from local country leaders, in fact “stipulated a step-by-step transition to brigade accounting, but emphasised that in the main current arrangements were still in harmony with the growth of rural productive forces” (Teiwes and Sun 2007: 359).

Hua’s enthusiasm of Yugoslavia’s decentralised economic system (after Tito’s visit to China in 1977 and his visit in 1978 to Belgrade) led in fact to the Sichuan experiment which, as discussed later, helped pave the way forward for the implementation of the SOE profit retention schemes.

Hua’s calls for the introduction of “profit as a measure of performance” and “reliance on market forces” at the conference were echoed by Li Xiannian who complained that those managing the economy failed to “make full and correct use of the law of socialist commodity production and the law of value” (in Watson 1980: 107).

The speech was published in October 1978 under the title ‘Observe Economic Laws, Speed Up the Four Modernisations’ which “developed the rationale which Hua had articulated at the Daqing-Dazhai conference and subsequently elaborated on at the economic forum” (Teiwes and Sun 2011: 19).

These conclusions are indeed rather different from those pronounced by Hua only months earlier: “Political revolution [in the form of the Cultural Revolution] will take place many times in the future. We must follow Chairman Mao’s teachings and continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat to the end, gradually eliminate the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, bring about the triumph of socialism over capitalism and eventually realize our ultimate goal – communism” (Political Report to the Eleventh National Party Congress, August 1977 in Myers, Domes and Yeh, cited by Weatherley 2010). The difference in priority and tone must be viewed in the context of a shifting and ambiguous political climate which increasingly favoured economic reforms over revolutionary conduct.

The ‘Four Modernisations’ was the brainchild of Zhou Enlai who first mentioned the term after the GLF in 1964 (at the Third National People’s Congress) and then again in 1975. The Four
Modernisations refer to the modernisation of industry, agriculture, scientific/technology and national defence. The concept was during Mao’s lifetime never developed in detail. It was in 1977 inscribed in the party constitution and was later (in 1978) integrated into the state constitution (Hsiü 1990).

16 The focus of the Four Modernisations was formalised in Hua’s progressive (albeit formally unpublished) Ten-Year Plan for Developing the National Economy (1976 to 1985). The Plan was (under pressure of rivaling factions and political instability) hastily put together in 1977 and presented and approved by the Central Committee at the First Session of the Fifth NPC in early 1978. It reemphasised the crucial importance of Dazhai (for agriculture) and Daqing (for industry) as proto models for a national modernisation project which took 1980 as a yardstick. Weatherley argues that the report envisaged that by 1980 a third of all industrial enterprises would imitate the Daqing model and that another third of all counties would follow the Dazhai model (2010: 149). The final objective (somewhat misguided dubbed the ‘Great Leap Outward’ or ‘Western Leap Forward’) is therefore portrayed to have been reminiscent of the GLF since it similarly pursued a radical plan to catch-up with the ‘developed world’. The underlying strategy and policies were, however, very different than the GLF since Hua’s modernisation plan was rooted in an import-substitution development model which adhered (less to top-down organisation and more) to the earlier ‘objective economic laws’.

17 Most SOEs stopped providing free housing to employees altogether in the late 1990s.

18 The four principles (enunciated by Deng Xiaoping in March 1979) were defined as follows: 1) the need to follow the socialist road, 2) upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) upholding of the leadership of the Communist Party and 4) the upholding of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (Deng 1979). The concept was later (in 1987) adopted by Zhao Ziyang in the so-called ‘one centre and two basic points’ (yige zhongxin, liangge jibendian) approach in which the former referred to the centrality of economic reconstruction and the latter symbolised adherence to the four cardinal principles and the implementation of economic reform.

19 Deng Xiaoping (in Gold 1984: 952) defined “the substance of the spiritual pollution as disseminating all varieties of corrupt and decadent ideologies of the bourgeoisie and other exploiting classes and disseminating sentiments of distrust towards the socialist and communist cause and tof the Communist Party Leadership.”.

20 Deng’s announcement for the ‘anti-spiritual pollution campaign’ (during the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee) was preceded by the call for a “socialist spiritual civilization” (jingshen wenming, made in the Twelfth NPC in 1982) which was consequentially followed in February 1983 by a “Socialist Ethics and Courtesy Month” “which sought to mobilise the population for mass behavioral improvement” (Dirlik 2011: 35).

21 The ‘three-year party rectification’ campaign launched in late 1983 is often used to exemplify how the Party attempted to conform and rectify its cadres to reject the old social revolutionary theory and to accept the market rationale underpinning the new ideology. The campaign was, in more precise terms, meant to “ideologically unify all party members with the Central Committee,… [to] rectify party work style by acting in the interest of the masses; strengthen party discipline… ; and expel those party members who do not achieve the first three goals” (Dickson 1990: 174-175). Cadres were educated on the principles of Deng Xiaoping’s theory and the early works (up to the GLF) of Mao while Marx was left undiscussed (Dickson 1990). The effects of the campaign were however unsuccessful in preventing or even punishing the ‘unhealthy tendencies’ (e.g. nepotism, corruption, extortion) that increasingly became visible as a result of the economic reforms.

22 Or as Deng himself in 1983 argued on the topic of building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: “Some people in rural areas and cities should be allowed to get rich before others. It is only fair that people who work hard should prosper. To let some people and some regions become prosperous first is a new policy that is supported by everyone. It is better than the old one” (Deng 1983, n.p.)

23 The purpose of the ‘Cultural Fever’ is similar and shares commonalities with the earlier (1910s, 1920s) ‘New Culture Movement’ (xin wenhua yundong) described earlier.

24 Lu and Shao (2001: 210) write that the standards in 1977 were set by the state “‘for inhabitants of walk-up apartments associated with newly built factories or mines [at] twenty-eighth to thirty-sixth floor of forty square meters per household (thirty-six to forty square meters in cold areas)... For employees of old factories or mines, the average construction area per household was thirty-nine to forty-two square meters, because the size of families was normally larger, although the average housing area per family was kept at no more than forty square meters (forty-two square meters in cold areas).’”

25 In the early stages of economic reform, orders for market-oriented urban construction could only be supplied by the state and SOEs.

26 Prior to the so-called ‘building houses for private use with state-assistance’ reform, SOEs distributed housing in work units on a cost-free rental basis as welfare provision.
“Floor space completed in 1977 amounted to 28 million square meters and in 1978 to 37 million square meters... Compared with the average annual figure for the period of 1966-76, this represents an increase of 52, 2 per cent for 1977 [and] more than 100 per cent for 1978... Such speed and achievement in housing construction have been rare since the founding of the People’s Republic.” (Zhou 1979: 26).

Badcock underlines this radical shift and notes that “[w]ith the shift in national priorities, the investment in urban construction over the four-year period 1979-83 accelerated to 83% of the total sum committed in the previous 30 years!” (1986: 151).

Non-productive investment refers here mainly to “urban utilities, cultural, educational, and social service installations... housing, public buildings, commercial enterprises, and transport and communications” (Kirkby 1985: 171)

The price of such houses was strongly subsidised, the costs of which were shared by the buyer, the state and the SOE. The project ultimately failed given the high costs of the subsidies for the SOE and the government. The salary of potential buyers was similarly not sufficient to expand the experiment.

Murie and Wang (1996) inform us that the project was expanded to 160 cities and 300 county towns in 1985. In that year alone, 200,000 units were sold.

The Tiananmen Square events of 1989 compelled decision maker to shelve the reform for three years.

Homeownership, Huang and Clark (2002) write, constituted less than 20 percent in the early reform period. The most cited reason for the greater popularity of renting (vis-à-vis homeownership) has to do with its lower economic costs. Wang and Murie note for example that “[i]n most cities , the monthly rent of a typical flat [in the 1980s] cost less than a pack of cigarettes (1996: 973).

Li and Yi in fact note that “[p]er capita housing consumption in cities and towns increased from 3.6 m² in 1978 to 6.7 m² in 1990” (Editorial Board of China Real Estate Market Yearbook in Li and Yi 2007: 346)

The Chinese State started in 1979 to incentivise SOEs to invest in public housing for employees. This was done mainly by allowing enterprises to retain their profits which in turn were budgeted in housing funds. The effect was that the state, which was still responsible for 90 percent of all investment in 1979, was gradually detached from its former housing responsibilities and by 1988 only contributed to a meagre 22 percent of total investments (World Bank 1991). The share of SOE rose in contrast to 52 percent in 1988 (World Bank 1991).

A third mode of urban renewal was accomplished through the renovation (i.e. enlargement) but mostly the demolition of pre-1949 houses (e.g. hutong, lilong etc.).

Local governments in turn were, as mentioned earlier with reference to urban planning, responsible for the orchestration of planning within the municipal borders. Wang argues that “[i]t was hoped that fangguan rangli would motivate enterprises and local governments to pursue greater efficiency; greater efficiency would generate more profits; more profits would enlarge the tax base; and eventually the enlarged tax base would bring about a higher level of revenues for the central government” (Wang 1999a: 96, original emphasis).

The 1988 regulation replaced the earlier 1953 law on private ownership and the 1982 constitutional law which both confirmed that all urban land belonged to the state. The 1988 NPC promulgation changed this and stated that the “right of land use can be transferred in accordance with the law” which replaced the 1982 constitution which read that “no organisation or individual may appropriate, buy, sell, or lease land, or unlawfully transfer it in other ways” (in Zhu 1996: 1982).

Costa and Xie (1993: 104) note that “[b]y the end of 1984, there were 241 completed city master plans [prepared by either the central or the local government] (82.5% of municipalities) and 1071 completed county master plans (51.64% of counties).”

The purpose of urban planning in the 1989 Act is in its first article described as “to define the size and economic orientation and structure of a city, to realise the goal of economic and social development of the city, to prepare ‘rational’ city plans and carry out constructions to meet the needs of development for socialist modernisation.” (Yeh and Wu 1999a: 182).

The document (79.50, signed in July 1979) which allowed for the eventual establishment of the SEZs was preceded by earlier pilot schemes (the earliest of which was in Sichuan) that meant to ‘expand enterprise autonomy’ and experiments such as that of the Shekou zone in early 1979 (Reardon 2002). Hua was in fact “the first leader to give concrete approval to measures that would develop into the SEZ policy in 1979... well before the Third Plenum” (Teiwes and Sun 2011: 16).

The fact that it was not Deng but Hua who was responsible for the foundation of Shenzhen or SEZs (or ‘Special Export Zones’ as they were called in 1978) more generally is illustrative of the larger role that Deng has played in undermining the legacy of Hua. Hua mentioned Shenzhen (then still known as Baoan county) to Thatcher in 1979 and argued that that the cities (or counties) of Shenzhen (or Baoan) and Zhuhai “would have powers to develop [China’s] own foreign trade” (policy documents).
42 Deng’s appropriation of Shenzhen is also noted by Cartier (2002: 1514) who writes that “Shenzhen is Deng Xiaoping’s city”. [The city] is envisioned by him and, at precarious economic moments, promoted and defended by him.

43 Deng (2009: 124) writes that Shenzhen was the “first city in China to give a statutory status to urban design in local planning legislation.”

44 The share of the central and the local government in the capital construction in Shenzhen amounted in the period between 1980 and 1990 to respectively 1.4 and 13.1 percent of the total (Zhu 1996).

45 A SSEZ Land Management Regulation was agreed upon in early 1982 and developers (such as the SSEZ Development Company) were put in charge in the allocation of land. The regulation proved however at times unsuccessful when it became increasingly clear that the interests of the government and private developers diverged (see for example Zhu 1996). The fact that the liberalisation of land lease rights resulted into demand/ supply economics (with ever higher higher land values) meant furthermore that land lease contracts needed constant readjustments and that urban planning was in a constant flux of modification.

46 The Shenzhen was the first municipality which implemented the reforms in 1987 “when the Shenzhen municipality sold the use right of a plot with an area of 5000 m² to a local company at a price of 200 yuan per square metre for a lease term of 50 years” (Zhu 1996: 192).


48 The value of land in Shenzhen skyrocketed as a consequence of the land reforms. It did not take long before the city transformed from being a fishing village to a ‘global city’. The population rose from roughly 30,000 in 1979, to over 7 million in 2001, to approximately 10 million in 2010.

49 Tourism played an important part in the Ten-Year Plan for Developing the National Economy (1976 to 1985). The tourism sector was seen as an important component for luring foreign direct investment into country (Reardon 1998; Reardon 2002).

50 Zhuyue Bo (2000) writes that the Central Committee of the CCP in 1980 decided to reconceptualise Beijing. The focus of the city shifted from an emphasis on heavy industrialisation to the promotion of tourism. Bo (2000: 479) notes that the tourist industry was, in fact, “regarded as one of the high priorities for the city of Beijing.”

51 Xue (2006) described the structure as an example of a revived version of the “national form” that was popular in the 1920s and 1930s.

52 Bo (2000) writes that the Chinese part of the investment (approximately 11 million USD) 8-folded within only the first seven years after the opening of the hotel. The high economic returns of the hotel industry inevitably resulted in corruption at even the highest levels of local government.

53 The Jingguo hotel was financed through a venture between the State Tourism Bureau and Clement Chen who owned several Holiday Inn hotels in California (Xue 2010). There had earlier been six other hotels (in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou) for which the State Council had approved foreign investment but the Jiangguo Hotel in Beijing was the first Sino-foreign joint venture hotel in China. The hotel was constructed within the old centre of the city.

54 Most of the constructions which shared modernist elements (built in those early years after the onset of the economic reforms) were joint ventures between different agencies of the Chinese government and foreign firms. The arguably most famous or at least the earliest exponents of this form of architecture, which although largely modernist in form still hosted traditional element, are the White Swan in Guangzhou (built in 1983, by She Junnan and Mo Bozhi), the Great Wall Hotel in Beijing (built in 1983 by Ellerbe Beckett) and the Jinling Hotel (built in 1983, designed by Palmer & Turner). For a general introduction to modern architecture in China after the opening-up see Rowe and Kuan (2002) and Xue (2006; 2010).

55 Wang Hui (2003; 2009) has famously analysed the 1989 Tiananmen Protests in a similar manner which arguably forms the most critical account on the subject. His analysis underlines the fact that the 1989 protests did not merely reflect the call for more liberal democracy (and less authoritarianism) but also and perhaps more importantly symbolised a “spontaneous protest against the proliferating inequalities spawned by market expansion [and the role of the state therein]” (2009: 30).

**Chapter Six: The Production of Space after Tiananmen (1989 -)**

1 “Roughly three times the size of New York's Central Park, the 2,684-acre expanse incorporates the China National Garden and the Olympic Forest Park, the latter an ecological sanctuary for the city featuring a 300-acre Olympic Lake and an artificial mountain made of 140 million cubic feet of fill.
Also in the Green are the Olympic Village; Media Village; a 2.8 million-square-foot hotel and convention centre; extensive shopping, entertainment, and cultural facilities; and four new subway stations.” (Campanella 2008: 131).

2 International renowned architects see their work increasingly being ‘copy-pasted’ (sometimes even repetitively) into the Chinese landscape. Design theft is according to interviews I had with Chinese architects a common practise. Dealers of stolen designs simply walk in architectural firms to offer their latest ‘acquisitions’. The result is that constructions sometimes have to compete in terms of speed with their pirated copies (see e.g. Platt 2012; Wainwright 2013).

3 “Brutalism”, to be sure, “tries to face up to a mass-production society, and drag a rough poetry out of the confused and powerful forces which are at work. Up to now Brutalism has been discussed stylistically, whereas its essence is ethical.” (Smithson and Smithson 2011 [1957]: 37).

4 The Ronchamp Chapel was accordingly built in cooperation with the architectural department of Henan University. The “Fondation Le Corbusier”, which holds the property rights over Le Corbusier’s buildings, as informed about the structure and soon managed to close the site.

5 “Li Yan, a designer with China’s largest real estate developer, China Vanke, estimates that in 2008 the firm built approximately two-thirds of its residential properties in a European theme.” (Bosker 2013: 5).

6 Wuxi, a city in Jiangsu province, has adopted, for example, the name ‘small Shanghai’ (xiao Shanghai).

7 The idea to create new towns to decrease the pressure on the urban heart was initially dropped by the British planner Ebenezer Howard who led the so-called “Garden city movement”. There is however a qualitative difference between Garden Cities and the new town development that we increasingly witness in mostly developing countries with high urbanisation rates. The objective of the former was utopian in nature and thus meant to constructively influence inhabitants while the latter is explicitly focused on bolstering economic growth.

8 The greater level of autonomy received by districts led to severe inter-district competition and a loss of control by city governments. Municipal government officials in Changzhou told in the mid-2000s about a similar development and grumbled about the lack of transparency and the knowledge of the situation on local levels.

9 The English version of the website is since late 2010 no longer accessible. The original English welcome page read:

“Embraced by lush greenery and beautiful scenery, the English church is an exclusive living space to begin a life of happiness and bliss. The kindergarten located on the south of the revetment wall, is easily [sic] accessible and provides an ideal environment for studying. The Cultural and Leisure Centre, a great place for relaxation during free time, has facilities distributed along the river bank, a layout typical of English urban landscaping. Varied kinds of contemporary English designs add modernity and style to living.

Here, in Thames Town, the authentic English learning style is assiduously promoted and cultivated, the supermarket stocks goods and supplies of greater variety and appeal, and the hotel gives everyone a chance to enjoy panoramic views as well as experience for themselves the unique flavor of the English way of life. Complete with the personalised services of the clinic, and the provision of a wide range of commercial facilities, all these bring about a different and refreshing living experience for all.”


10 The mansions in Thames Town sell for approximately 1 million USD.

11 According to a local real estate agent: “The houses were sold out quickly and the average price per square meter has risen from 6,000 yuan (762 euros, $942) in 2006 to around 17,000 yuan…” (Jing 2012)

12 An independent Chinese economist argued that “The Huaxi model is actually the China model” (Wen Kejian in Anderlini 2013).

13 “Per capita GDP in Huaxi stood at 88,000 yuan in 2012, while the national per capita GDP averaged 38,354 yuan, according to official statistics.” (Dan and Liqiang 2013). The majority of the wealth was until the late 2000s accumulated in the iron and steel industry. The global downturn had led the village to invest increasingly in tourism and real estate speculation.

14 The town is a popular tourist destination and is widely reported about in the media (Wen and Zhang 2009). “Visitors must be impressed; they must not only be in approval of the displayed lifestyle within Huaxi, but must also come to desire that lifestyle themselves. The space within Huaxi sculpts its buildings and visitors to create an exposure in which wealth, productivity, and the countryside are redefined.”

15 This excludes the over 20,000 migrant workers that are employed in its industries.

16 Tour guides and labourers in the city, many of whom are migrants from China’s Western provinces, in contrast “do not receive any share in the village’s collective holdings apart from their meagre wages.
and live in dormitories separate from Huaxi’s prized ‘villas’.” (Flagg 2012: 20-21). Former agricultural residents, in turn, received compensation for their displacement “which they were in effect forced to spend buying low-quality villas built by Huaxi Group.” (Anderlini 2013). The compensations do, however, not cover the cost of the inflated housing prices, which has meant that residents were compelled to take out extra credit.

Housing prices are simply not affordable for the majority of the population. The average “housing price-to-income ratio” in notoriously expensive cities such as London is 6 to 8, but are “even [in] the second-tier cities in China… close to 10, [the ratio in] first-tier cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou are close to or even above 20” (Chen, Ma et al. 2011: 29).

The director of Dutch Atelier, one of the two Dutch companies responsible for the design of the town, was quoted saying: “These kind of special projects are bought by rich Chinese as investment or speculation objects. Such people anticipate an appreciation of the value of such houses” (van der Velden in Welling 2012).

The project was a partnership between the municipal government and the Reignwood Group (A Chinese investment company also known as Huabin International). It was cancelled after the former Party Secretary and mayor of Beijing (Chen Xitong), one of the proponents of the plan, was jailed on charges of corruption in the mid-1990s. The latest new reports (Beijing Daily 2012) suggest that demolition is underway and that the site will be transformed into a luxury shopping mall.

A Bloomberg (2013) report shows that Ordos “[a]uthorities are planning construction for residents to see green spaces every 300 meters and a park every 500 meters…”. Huaxi similarly envisaged building a second, larger tower (Huaxi Dragon) during the construction of the first tower. The project, meant to be the tallest in China, has recently been put on halt.

Presales help investors to recoup returns faster on investments. The price of pre-sold residential properties is generally 10 to 15 percent lower than the price of completed projects (see also Chau and Ho 2009).

Low interest rates have furthermore, led households to look increasingly for alternative investment opportunities. One of the directions that households look at is real estate and property markets. Breslin notes that this is perhaps one of the “[explanations] for the boom in [real estate] prices and what looks like bubbles that might burst in some places.” reference

For an in-depth and recent overview of such architectural ‘duplicates’, see Bosker’s (2013) impressive Original Copies: Architectural Mimicry in Contemporary China.

A Chinese architect confided to me that there are two ways to successfully compete for big projects in China. The first strategy, deployed often by Chinese architects, resolves around the importance of maintaining good connections with developers and government officials. The second has to do with the international exposure of renowned international architect.

Jencks (in Sudjic 2006: 60) recalls the jury’s consultations: “Though height was not mentioned, they clearly wanted a landmark… I am here for architecture independent of any other consideration.” He, Sudjic writes, “described the design in terms of its evocation of Chinese tradition—issues that Koolhaas had never mentioned in his presentation.” (in Sudjic 2006: 60). Arata Isozaki (in Corkill and Isozaki 2008) similarly recalls his position at the meeting “They [ie. CCTV delegates and Beijing city officials] had the opportunity to create an example of what I called ‘iconic architecture.’ That is what I said. The building itself will symbolise CCTV, like a giant corporate logo.”

The event served, in other words, as a national “symbolic showcase” which “represented to the world China’s rise as a new global power” (Ren 2011: 145).

They are spatially depoliticising events in that they “attempt to pacify social and political discontent rising out of economic inequalities, religious and ethnic tensions, and urban-rural divide.” (Shin 2012: 729).

The glorification of the motherland in sport propaganda has a long tradition in China. Slogans such as ‘strive for the best and win glory for the nation’ (yong pan gao feng, wei guo zheng guang) feature as “the first article in the athletes’ handbook issued by the sport authorities” (Xu 2008: 313, fn. 66).

Liu Qi, chairman of the Beijing Organising Committee for the Olympic Games and Beijing city’s Communist party boss, claimed… [that the slogan] conveys the lofty ideal of the people in Beijing as well as in China… to create a bright future, hand-in-hand, with people from the rest of the world.” (Xu 2008: 260)

Article 113 of the Regulations on Administration of Foreign Investment Construction Enterprises (2002) allowed foreign design firms for the first time to open branches in China.

Huaxi village promptly replicated the building.

The Theatre was the “first big project for which an international competition was held when the public were invited to participate in the planning process” (Xue, Wang et al. 2010: 518). Andreu’s
design was chosen over 44 Chinese and international proposals. Among the Chinese proposals was that of the country’s largest design firm, the China Architecture Design and Research Group (CAG). The CAG participated also in the competition for other prestigious projects, including the earlier discussed National Olympic Stadium, the National Museum (Beijing) and the National Library (Beijing). The fact that the state-owned CAG, which since 1949 has been responsible for many of China’s most prominent buildings, lost many of such important competitions is illustrative of the rapid internationalisation of design that took place in China after 1989.

A lot of the critique was targeted towards the lack of transparency and the elite’s general apathy towards the public’s involvement. The selection of the winning scheme is, for example, shrouded in a cloud of secrecy. Xue et al. (2010: 526) note “that no one [actually] knows how this scheme was selected”. A commentary in the South China Morning Post, aptly titled ‘National Theatre or national joke?’, hinted at the rumour that President Jiang Zemin could personally have played a decisive role.

Archy, a prominent popular website for architecture in China, holds every year a competition for China’s ugliest buildings. Many of these buildings are based on ‘Western’ designs (see: http://www.archcy.com/votes/).

Zhu (2005; 2009a) identifies a number of architects working in this tradition: Liu Jiakun, Wang Shu, Qingyun Ma and Yung Ho Chang. Michael Speaks (2009) among others (e.g. Ren 2011) argue against the very existence of a critical regionalist school.

The reality underlying this unified image is quite different indeed. Ren and Weinstein (2013) note that the Expo 2010 construction project forced nearly 20,000 people to resettle elsewhere. This number very likely excludes the thousands of unregistered migrant workers in the area. Migrants, many of which are from diverse ethnic backgrounds, are consequently forced to leave the city, or move to increasingly remote urban villages (chengzhongcun). Tickets to the event were, moreover, only for registered hukou citizens free. Those without a residence permit (migrants from all parts of China) were forced to pay 160 yuan which for many is more than a full day’s work. This raises questions about the actual audience for events such as the Expo.

The site was after its construction replicated in cities and villages across China (e.g. Funing in Yancheng, Jiangsu). The question of what is referred to when talking about the ‘West’ and things ‘Western’ is at best ambiguous. Indeed, as Latouche (in Dirlik 2001: 17) writes, “the West is much more of an ideological than a geographical concept”, subject to different interpretations in different locations.”

Discussions over and proclamations of an explicitly non-Western modernity have especially since the 1990s been framed in a manner similar to Weber’s argument for the compatibility between protestant values and capitalism. The re-emergence of Confucianism, mentioned in chapter 5, is especially important to stress here. The return of Confucius, whose philosophy had only a decade earlier been reviled for its reactionary outlook, was hailed as the protagonist of capitalist development. The return to Confucianism later would inspire debates on the so-called “Asian values” and had a knock-on effect on the later “Beijing Consensus”.

The state-led narrative insists that “capitalism is a system that (should) strengthen state control, not undermine it” (Ong 1997: 358).
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