Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Freedom of association : it's not what you think

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Brownlee, Kimberley (2015) Freedom of association : it's not what you think. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35 (2). pp. 267-282. doi:10.1093/ojls/gqu018 ISSN 0143-6503.

[img]
Preview
PDF (Creative Commons : Attribution Non-Commercial 4.0)
WRAP_Oxford J Legal Studies-2014-Brownlee-ojls-gqu018.pdf - Published Version - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (221Kb) | Preview
[img] PDF
WRAP_Brownlee_Freedom of Association - final version (3).pdf - Submitted Version
Embargoed item. Restricted access to Repository staff only - Requires a PDF viewer.

Download (20Mb)
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqu018

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

This paper shows that associative freedom is not what we tend to think it is. Contrary to standard liberal thinking, it is neither a general moral permission to choose the society most acceptable to us nor a content-insensitive claim-right akin to the other personal freedoms with which it is usually lumped such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion. It is at most 1) a highly restricted moral permission to associate subject to constraints of consent, necessity, and burdensomeness, 2) a conditional moral permission not to associate provided our associative contributions are not required, and 3) a highly constrained, content-sensitive moral claim-right that protects only those wrongful associations that honour other legitimate concerns such as consent, need, harm, and respect. This paper also shows that associative freedom is not as valuable as we tend to think it is. It is secondary to positive associative claim-rights that protect our fundamental social needs and are pre-conditions for any associative control worth the name.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: K Law [Moys] > KM Common Law, Public Law
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > School of Law
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Civil rights, Freedom of association, Freedom of religion, Freedom of expression
Journal or Publication Title: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISSN: 0143-6503
Official Date: 1 June 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
1 June 2015Published
22 August 2014Available
Volume: 35
Number: 2
Page Range: pp. 267-282
DOI: 10.1093/ojls/gqu018
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Open Access (Creative Commons)
Date of first compliant deposit: 27 December 2015
Date of first compliant Open Access: 27 December 2015
Funder: Leverhulme Trust (LT), Independent Social Research Foundation (ISRF)

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

View more statistics

twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us