Expectations without content
Luntley, Michael. (2010) Expectations without content. Mind & Language, Vol.25 (No.2). pp. 217-236. ISSN 0268-1064Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01387.x
In this paper I show how the way experience presents things to us can be treated without attributing a representational content to experience. The basic claim that experience can present us with more things than the range of things available to us in thought is neutral with respect to the choice between a content account of experience and a naive content-free account. I show how Meyer's theory of expectations in accounting for our experience of music supports the naive account. Expectations provide an account of the conditions that enable things to be salient in experience as targets for attention. Expectations do not provide a content to experience.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Experience, Content (Psychology)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Mind & Language|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc|
|Official Date:||April 2010|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 217-236|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
Brewer, B. 1999: Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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