Expectations without content
Luntley, Michael, 1953-. (2010) Expectations without content. Mind & Language, Vol.25 (No.2). pp. 217-236. ISSN 0268-1064Full text not available from this repository.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01387.x
In this paper I show how the way experience presents things to us can be treated without attributing a representational content to experience. The basic claim that experience can present us with more things than the range of things available to us in thought is neutral with respect to the choice between a content account of experience and a naive content-free account. I show how Meyer's theory of expectations in accounting for our experience of music supports the naive account. Expectations provide an account of the conditions that enable things to be salient in experience as targets for attention. Expectations do not provide a content to experience.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Experience, Content (Psychology)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Mind & Language|
|Publisher:||Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc|
|Number of Pages:||20|
|Page Range:||pp. 217-236|
|Access rights to Published version:||Restricted or Subscription Access|
|References:||Brewer, B. 1999: Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Brewer, B. 2006: Perception and content. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 165–81. Brewer, B. 2007: Perception and its objects. Philosophical Studies, 132, 87–97. Campbell, J. 2002: Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Campbell, J. 2004: Reference as Attention. Philosophical Studies, 120: 265–76. Crane, T. 1992: The nonconceptual content of experience. In T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 136–57. Cussins A. 2002: Experience, thought and activity. In Y. Gunther (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. DeBellis, M. 1995: Music and Conceptualisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans, G. 1982: The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ginsborg, H. 2006: Empirical concepts and the contents of experience. European Journal of Philosophy, 14, 349–72. Heck, R. 2000: Nonconceptual content and the ‘space of reasons’. The Philosophical Review, 109, 483–523. Kelly, S. 2001: The non-conceptual content of perceptual experience: situation dependence and fineness of grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII, 601–15. Kelly, S. 2004: Reference and attention: a difficult connection. Philosophical Studies, 120, 277–86. Luntley, M. 2003: Nonconceptual content and the sound of music, Mind & Language 18, 402–26. McDowell, J. 1994: Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Meyer, L. B. 1956: Emotion and Meaning in Music. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Peacocke, C. 1998: Nonconceptual content defended. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LVIII, 381–88. Peacocke, C. 2001a: Phenomenology and nonconceptual content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 609–15. Peacocke, C. 2001b: Does perception have a nonconceptual content? Journal of Philosophy, 98, 239–64. Schantz, R. 2001: The given regained. Reflections on the sensuous content of experience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXII, 167–80. Taylor, C. 2002: Foundationalism and the inner-outer distinction. In N. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell. New York: Routledge, 106–19. Tye, M. 2006: Nonconceptual content, richness and fineness of grain. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 504–30. Wrathall, M. 2005: Motives, reasons and causes. In T. Carman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 111–28.|
Actions (login required)