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The Presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger's
The Fundamental Concepts of
Metaphysics: a Philosophical
Auseinandersetzung

Thesis submission for the qualification of PhD in Philosophy

Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick

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### Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort, and that it has not been previously submitted anywhere for any award. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged. No prior work submitted for other degrees has been included in this thesis, and no elements of this thesis have been published elsewhere.

### Abstract

It is my contention that the presence of Nietzsche in *FCM* is of central importance for both reading this text, and for understanding the stakes of Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. This thesis will, therefore, endeavour to re-locate *FCM* within the Heideggerian corpus via a reading of the text “as a whole”. The focus of this re-location, and indeed the locus of this reading as a whole, is the contention that *FCM* is part of a Heideggerian *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. This task is a response to the majority of existing readings of the 1929/30 lecture course that regard it as a fragmented work, and subsequently focus on its two most novel elements in isolation (namely Heidegger’s analysis of boredom and the supposed “theoretical biology” that comprises the majority of 'Part Two'). When read out of context, and as a fractured project, *FCM* appears to straightforwardly reassert the primacy of man in western metaphysics, thus succumbing to the pitfalls of a “metaphysics of subjectivity”. On the basis of a reading of Nietzsche’s presence in *FCM*, I will situate 'Part Two' within a philosophical and hermeneutical context not established in other readings heretofore. This opens the space for the genuine philosophical trajectory of the text to emerge, namely the grounding of a confrontation (an *Auseinandersetzung*) with Nietzsche as the site of contemporary philosophising. Taking up this trajectory allows for a re-invigorated understanding of the development of Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading, and a deepening of the case regarding the centrality of Nietzsche for Heidegger’s own thinking.
List of Abbreviations

I will use the following abbreviations when referring to Heidegger's works:


I will use the following abbreviations when referring to Nietzsche's works:


Thesis Introduction

... the most monstrous danger in philosophy is cheating... but where the greatest danger of cheating is, there is also the ultimate possibility for the genuineness of thinking and questioning. The meaning of doing philosophy consists in awakening the need for this genuineness and in keeping it awake.

*Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, §26c*

It is my contention that the presence of Nietzsche in *FCM* is of central importance for both reading this text, and for understanding the stakes of Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. This thesis will, therefore, endeavour to re-locate *FCM* within the Heideggerian corpus via a reading of the text “as a whole”. The focus of this re-location, and indeed the locus of this reading as a whole, is the contention that *FCM* is part of a Heideggerian *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche.¹ This task is a response to the majority of existing readings of the 1929/30 lecture course that regard it as a fragmented work, and subsequently focus on its two most novel elements in isolation (namely Heidegger's analysis of boredom and the supposed “theoretical biology” that comprises the majority of 'Part Two'). The most dominant readings of *FCM* are those dedicated to 'Part Two', where the bulk of interpreters accuse Heidegger of abject anthropocentrism in his response to the question of the genuine essence of life. When read out of context, and as a fractured project, *FCM* appears to straightforwardly reassert the primacy of man in western metaphysics, thus succumbing to the pitfalls of a “metaphysics of subjectivity”. On the basis of a reading

¹ This term and the multiple avenues for interpretation that it presents will be the focus of the opening section of Chapter 1.
of Nietzsche's presence in FCM, I will situate 'Part Two', and thus "life" in FCM, within a philosophical and hermeneutical context not established in other readings heretofore. This context will allow me to make the claim that "life" in FCM is a subsidiary matter.

At stake in the text taken as a whole is a genuine confrontation with philosophy, and the manner in which this can be achieved. I will present the major themes of FCM as grounded in the under-examined 'Preliminary Appraisal', allowing for a reassessment, and indeed a reduction, of the status of "life" in FCM. This opens the space for the genuine philosophical trajectory of the text to emerge, namely the grounding of a confrontation (an Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche as the site of contemporary philosophising.

Correlatively, FCM provides the ground for Heidegger’s later, extended reading of Nietzsche as found in the Nietzsche Lectures. It is my contention that the Nietzsche Lectures mark the high-point of Heidegger’s dealing with “life”, and only then as a continuation of the tasks of FCM. FCM calls for an approach to philosophy that can overcome its lostness amidst the history of a confusion of the relationship of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics. This overcoming must move beyond an all-pervading contemporary boredom with mankind, wherein all investigations into the nature of man fail to genuinely confront the structures of subjectivity. Heidegger’s presents this as the covering over and forgetting of an underlying and originary experience of φύσις as the ultimate jointure of its two divergent aspects: beings as a

2 "Life" has a number of different meanings relevant to its usage, in BT it is considered to be a 'designation' that engenders 'form' in a field of phenomena [see §10 of BT and Chapter 4 of this thesis]; in FCM it refers to the opposite aspect of spirit when understood in relation to Kulturphilosophie [see §18 of FCM and Chapter 3 of this thesis]; in relation to the life-sciences it is defined as 'the specific manner of being pertaining to the animal and plant' [see FCM §45 and Chapter 4]; in NIII it is read within the context of Nietzsche’s philosophy as a translation of the Greek φύσις [see chapter 5]; prior to BT it refers to facticity. There are other possible interpretations and various meanings, but the term is never fully disambiguated by Heidegger. As this project unfolds the reasons why shall become evident.
whole and being as such. Guided by his reading of Nietzsche's conception of life, in *NI* Heidegger aligns himself with Nietzsche, and offers up a reinvigorated conception of philosophy as the project of the “new interpretation of sensuousness”. In so doing, he sees the possibility of opening a space within which we can once again take ourselves up as subjects for genuine investigation under the aegis of “life” as the polemic jointure of the Apolline and the Dionysiac.

In *NIII* Heidegger's seemingly reverses his position, and suggests that Nietzsche's interpretation of “life” as “Being” falls foul of the confusion of being as such and beings as a whole. Situated within the context of my reading of *FCM*, I will show that, for Heidegger, Nietzsche presents a *metaphysics* of life, wherein the essence of life is thought on the basis of a certain projection of man's relation to world. This represents a continuity with the history of metaphysics as presented in *FCM*, where Heidegger suggests that the possibility of an ontology of life – access to life's essence – must respect an essential division between the world relation of man, and the world relation proper to life, lest it fall foul of anthropomorphism.

This aspect of the thesis is forwarded in response to wide debate that continues to assess the status of the presence of Nietzsche in Heidegger's work, with recent years having witnessed something of a resurgence of Heidegger-Nietzsche scholarship.\(^3\) This

\(^3\) Driven by the recent publication of a volume of seminars on Nietzsche conducted by Heidegger [Heidegger, M. *GA 46: Nietzsche's II. Unzeitgemässe Betrachtung*. 1938 (Klosterman, Frankfurt am Main: 2004) and *GA 87: Seminar: Nietzsche. Übungen SS 1937. Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung. Sein und Schein* (1937). [The content of the two volumes is largely the same], the prevalence of Nietzsche throughout the also relatively recently published middle-period monographs [Heidegger, M. *Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning)*. (GA 65). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999), and *Mindfulness*. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (London, Athlone: 2006)], and the work being conducted on the historical context and origins of Heidegger's thought [The main exponents being Bambach, Taminiaux, Babich, Haase, Colony, and Zimmerman, as exemplified by the *Heidegger Jahrbuch*, A. Denker und H. Zaborowski (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 2005) and the translations of *GA86*. See also my review of more minor recent materials on
movement in Heidegger’s Nietzsche-reading has been interpreted by various commentators as a shift in Heidegger's response to Nietzsche, and indeed one that is indicative of Heidegger’s ability to step outside of his own anthropocentric readings of life. It is only on the basis of a reading of both Auseinandersetzung as it appears in FCM, and also the problem of life as it is formulated in FCM, that a genuine grasp of the stakes of Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche can be grasped.

These two correlative aspects of this thesis thus examine Heidegger’s understanding of the character of philosophy as metaphysics as it unfolds between FCM and NIII, and offer a reading of the role of history in this process. The specific concept of historical relationship that Heidegger forwards as necessary in order to confront ourselves, begin to philosophise for ourselves, and indeed “to become who we are”, is Auseinandersetzung. In investigating the roots of this conception of Auseinandersetzung as found in its first appearance together with Nietzsche (its direct object) in FCM, this thesis offers a meditation on the philosophical ground of, and thus the stakes of Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche. I will posit these stakes as founded in FCM, and therefore motivated by a need to avoid the ‘fatally contemporary’, which ultimately emerges as a need to understand Nietzsche as a metaphysician of life, devoid of biologism. This claim itself provides the basis for my own attempt to read Heidegger in a similar manner, that is, away from an understanding of his own engagement with “life” as being an attempt to positively determine its essence. In understanding the

NB. These recently published volumes are seemingly highly relevant to this thesis, given that they focus on Nietzsche’s UMII, and specifically the concept of life presented therein. However, these volumes are very much in note form, and do not present a cohesive approach to the matter. Where commentators have approached this material (see my discussion of Bambach's reading in Chapter 5 of this thesis) they have set their readings back into a larger analysis of NI and NIII, which constitute a more sustained handling of life in Nietzsche. To focus on these texts would thus constitute an exercise in sheer novelty.
genuine goals of FCM, and subsequently reading it within the wider context of the Nietzsche Lectures, I will present Heidegger's reasons for not attempting to conduct an ontology of life, suggesting that he would consider this endeavour to be at once untimely, and at the same time captivated by the fatally contemporary.

*Clarification of the project from within studies of FCM*

Recent years have seen a renewed focus on FCM. As aforementioned, the focus of these texts is upon Heidegger's examination of the organism in the sections devoted to a comparative analysis of world in 'Part Two'. Arguably, this interest has less to do with the philosophical issues raised in FCM, and more to do with the centrality of questions of “life” in the modern day. As Thacker puts it:

> If the question of being was the central issue for antiquity (resurrected in the twentieth century by Heidegger), and if the question of God, as alive or dead, was the central issue for modernity (Keirkegaard, Marx, Nietzsche), then perhaps the question of “life” is the question that has come to define our contemporary era...\(^4\)

Derrida turned to FCM in his later years in order to pursue the question of the animal other as it appears in Heidegger's philosophy, a topic most thoroughly examined by Krell. Krell himself has lead the way in FCM interpretation, presenting 'Part Two' as a theoretical biology that re-establishes transcendent structures of meaning in the face of the naturalising powers of life.\(^5\) This Krellian interpretation of FCM divorces 'Part Two'

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4 Thacker, E, *After Life* (UCP, Chicago: 2011). Thacker does not provide a direct reading of FCM, but does discuss Heidegger's approach to the ontology of life. For a discussion of this see the evaluation section in chapter 5.

5 In *Derrida and Our Animal Others* Krell suggests that he introduced Derrida to the lecture course, specifically 'Part Two', after its publication as part of the Gesamtausgabe., thus adding credence to the
from the remainder of the lecture course, raising the status of Heidegger's comments on the organism beyond what was intended. This reading has structured the majority of responses to the text.\(^6\) Where Krell's reading is challenged, i.e., Heidegger is not repudiated for his supposed response to the question of the essence of life, it is only done so on the basis of a disconnected and close reading of 'Part Two'.\(^7\) Along these lines, a recent resurgence of interest in the philosophical character of 19\(^{th}\) century German biology has resulted in FCM being taken up on the basis of Heidegger's discussion of contemporary biological approaches to life in 'Part Two'.\(^8\) Those interested in developing philosophical-ethical relationships to the environment or to issues of animal welfare have also turned to 'Part Two'.\(^9\) These readings of FCM have some commonalities, they consider FCM to stand out from the rest of the Heideggerian corpus as a result of 'Part Two', and they read 'Part Two' in isolation from the rest of the text. In response to this, I want to rehabilitate FCM and present a reading of the lecture course as a whole that locates 'Part Two' within the broader themes of the lecture course.

My motivation for this reading is not merely to counter the findings of these various investigations, but rather to relocate the position of FCM in the corpus in order to allow for its genuine philosophical contributions to emerge. Namely, the contribution FCM makes to Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. Understanding the character and scope of this *Auseinandersetzung* allows for a deeper understanding of Heidegger's idea that Krell introduced FCM to the academy. As I shall show in Chapter 1, Krell’s interpretation of this part of FCM is the most prominent.\(^6\) See Chapter 1.

\(^7\) McNeill’s reading being the most prominent. See Chapter 4 of this thesis for further detail.

\(^8\) See Buchanan, B. *Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexkull, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze* (SUNY, New York: 2009)

conception of historical rigour to emerge. This will, in turn, allow for a re-framing of Heidegger's response to the question of life. Motivated by the overlooking of the presence of Nietzsche in FCM, I intend to tackle the concerns of these engagements with “life” in 'Part Two', without becoming absorbed by them. Whilst primarily focused on FCM and its possible inclusion within, and deepening of, Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, this is a project that must nonetheless consider the centrality of the concept of life within these approaches to FCM. I, like the Heidegger that I will present, am not looking to develop a positive conception of the essence of life (the structure of being that distinguishes the living as living) from within his work. Rather, where I engage with this matter, I am looking to distinguish Heidegger's approach from existing readings, thus reducing the status of life as found in FCM. In this sense, in my handling of “life” I seek to view it through the lens of Heidegger's philosophy, rather than view Heidegger's philosophy through the lens of “life”.

Clarification of the project from within studies of Heidegger's Nietzsche-reading

Earlier engagements with Heidegger's Nietzsche encounter sought to draw his interpretation under critical scrutiny, assessing the veracity of his reading, and generally seeking to show the manner in which Nietzsche's thought still operated in excess of Heidegger's. In this sense comparative analysis held sway in this emergent field. Characterisable in terms of its primarily Heideggerian concerns, in what can be seen as something of a second-wave, a more contemporary trend for Heidegger-Nietzsche studies was set. The general aim of many of these engagements is to grasp

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10 The most notable being C. Scott, Krell, and Haar.
the role that Nietzsche plays in the development of Heidegger's thought in order to generate a greater understand of the context and development of Heidegger's philosophy. Foremost amongst these readings, in terms of its scope, is that of Taminiaux. Rather than approach Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche from within a schema that affords Being and Time a central position, Taminiaux thinks Being and Time in terms of its location within the Heidegger-Nietzsche debate. He caveats this attempted reorientation of the classic approach to Heidegger studies by pointing out that 'there is no indication in Heidegger of an explicit debate with Nietzsche either in the lecture courses which paved the way to Being and Time or in the book itself and the lecture courses and papers delivered by him directly after its publication.' In this regard I will suggest that a recognition of Nietzsche's presence in FCM provides privileged philosophical access to the Nietzsche encounter at large.

The specific site of this access is the aforementioned alteration in Heidegger's relationship to Nietzsche's own project between his alignment therewith in NI to his distantiation in NIII. There are a number of commentators who recognise a shift in Heidegger's Nietzsche reading, and posit their own schema for understanding this seeming change. One of the key thinkers in this regard is Zimmerman. Zimmerman maps this change according to Heidegger's political concerns, identifying a shift in Heidegger's relationship to Nazism as a political movement capable of realising his aims for the future of philosophy. The thrust of Zimmerman's argument suggests that Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is never direct, and is always motivated and caught

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up with non-philosophical concerns.\textsuperscript{13} This type of reading is mirrored in Nietzsche scholarship, where there is a trend (led by Conway) to dismiss Heidegger as an interpreter of Nietzsche.\textsuperscript{14} For the purposes of this thesis, Krell is a more directly informative commentator on this shift in Heidegger's Nietzsche reading, as he takes Heidegger seriously as a reader thereof. Krell sees this movement away from Nietzsche's conception of "life" as a decline in Heidegger's thought, seeing it as indicative of Heidegger's ability to engage with the grand Other of life.

As Heidegger states in \textit{WCT}, 'If we wish to go counter to a thinker's thought, this wish must have minimised beforehand what is great in him'.\textsuperscript{15} My understanding of Heidegger's method of \textit{Auseinandersetzung} will deny this idea that he fabricates his Nietzsche, offering in its a place a reading of Heidegger that shows that he understands the necessary violence that a reader has to perform to those that he wishes to learn from. I wish to take up the type of developmental framework and approach that Taminiaux suggests. However, Taminiaux is only capable of \textit{sketching} the basis for an understanding of Nietzsche's presence within Heidegger's work. Where he posits

\textsuperscript{13} Zimmerman, M. 'The Development of Heidegger's Nietzsche-Interpretation', p3 "[In NIII], Heidegger had at least two motives. First, he wanted to show that he could draw out his own fundamental ontology (with the notable exception of the —truth of Being) from Nietzsche's thought, thereby rescuing it from the clutches of Nazi ideologues. Second, he wanted to demonstrate the abyss lying between the reductionistic Nazi interpretation of art (e.g., as the —expression of the Volk's racial essence, or as formless intoxication [\textit{Rausch} à la Wagner], on the one hand, and the sublime view of art available in an ontologically informed interpretation of Nietzsche's works, on the other […] At times, Heidegger strains his readers' credulity. Could Nietzsche's frequent references to physiology, blood, and organic degeneration be so readily transformed into Heidegger's ontological concepts?.”

\textsuperscript{14} In his essay on the relationship of Heidegger to Nietzsche, ‘Heidegger, Nietzsche and the Origins of Nihilism’ (\textit{INS} 3. Spring 1992), Conway describes Heidegger's understanding of the history of Western thought as providing a 'meta-narrative'. [p11] He claims that Nietzsche's thoughts (on Nihilism in particular) are subsumed within this meta-narrative, and subsequently ameliorated and \textit{incorporated}, into Heidegger's own work. Conway understands this to be a move which at once \textit{reduces} Nietzsche to the position of 'Last Metaphysician' and at the same time distances Heidegger's interpretation from its object; Conway believes that Heidegger is following his own agenda when reading Nietzsche, causing it to be inaccurate “…his [Heidegger's] own agenda, which requires him to figure Nietzsche as the 'last metaphysician', crowds his own interpretive project. Translating Nietzsche into the Procrustean categories of his own philosophical project.” [p22] “Heidegger fails to appreciate the self-referential implications of Nietzsche's diagnosis of modernity.” [p37]

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{WCT}, p77
the earliest explicit engagement as *NI*, I posit it as *FCM*. Constituting a sustained and concentrated effort to highlight the explicit character of Nietzsche's presence in the 1929/30 lecture course, this thesis will fully elucidate the implications of this presence for the way in which *FCM* has been interpreted, the way *FCM* has been incorporated into the Heideggerian corpus, and for the way in which the *Nietzsche* lectures themselves are read. As Taminiaux states, Heidegger elevates Nietzsche to a central role in his philosophy. To grasp the importance of Nietzsche for Heidegger one has to enter into Heidegger's position, and not merely have eyes for his reading as an extant piece of criticism. In this sense, whilst I suggest that Heidegger reads Nietzsche well, I will not be engaging with him as a Nietzsche scholar as such. I am primarily concerned with *Heidegger’s Nietzsche* and the role Nietzsche plays in his philosophy, rather than the veracity of Heidegger's claims. I will provide extensive justifications of this claim throughout the thesis.

I intend to map the philosophical contribution of *FCM* on to the deeper reading of Nietzsche that the text demands. This will provide the basis for understanding the development of Heidegger's Nietzsche reading as hinging upon the promise of Nietzsche's concept of “life”. In light of both the major themes of *FCM*, and the articulation of the problem of “life” contained therein, I offer a reading of the *Nietzsche Lectures* that clarifies Heidegger's position, and defends him from the Krellian inspired accusation. This reading, as I show in Chapter 1, stems from the idea that “life” remains unthought throughout Heidegger's work. This idea originates from Heidegger's discussion of life in *FCM*, but with Krell, becomes read into his larger engagement with Nietzsche. In Chapter 1 I will identify this philosophical thread and suggest the ways in which it can be disrupted.
In addition to exploring these two lines of investigation as clarified above, and on the basis of these two chiefly archival contributions to Heidegger scholarship (which constitutes the main focus of this work), I hope to explore the challenges faced by academic philosophy in the contemporary world. Seemingly the current trends in philosophy are to favour *speculation* over *exegesis*,\(^\text{16}\) to value pragmatics over historical reflection, and to mine philosopher's works for the resources they offer to existing problematics, often shakily established, rather than engage with them on their own terms. Where it is purely motivated by curiosity, historical work in philosophy is in danger of falling away from a “living philosophising”, as Heidegger would name it. This is to say, that history loses its relevance to the present day, cutting itself off from current debate. However, the process of determining what is relevant “today” cannot have recourse only to the salient and everyday character of what *seems* to be the necessary tasks for thinking. Ignoring the, often daunting, demands of historicising runs the risk of deciding the modern day relevance of philosophy from a position that has never had access to philosophy itself. Examining Heidegger’s own attempt to read Nietzsche in a way that does not succumb to the fatally contemporary offers space for reflection on what it would take to extend Heidegger, or any philosopher for that matter, the same treatment.

*The structure of the project*

Chapter 1 draws out a working conception of *Auseinandersetzung* in order to flesh out

\(^{16}\) As advocated by those effecting a “speculative turn” in philosophy, see [http://fracturedpolitics.com/2011/06/29/interview-levi-bryant.aspx](http://fracturedpolitics.com/2011/06/29/interview-levi-bryant.aspx) for example.
the technical character of this term. Indicating the initial profundity of presence of this term in *FCM*, I will draw out a philosophical thread from amongst key commentators that highlights the effects of misconceiving the location of *FCM* within the Heideggerian corpus. This chapter will therefore serve to specifically orientate the thesis with regards to both existing readings of Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche on the subject of “life”, and the major philosophical treatment of *FCM* that this thesis seeks to counteract. This orientation will ground the need to read *FCM* as a whole.

Chapter 2 comprises the first part of my reading of *FCM*. In analysing the 'Preliminary Appraisal' I will draw out the major themes of *FCM*, highlighting its historical intent and its methodologies. In the 'Preliminary Appraisal' Heidegger will establish the need to find a mode of engagement capable of accessing philosophy itself, rather than remaining within a discussion about philosophy. This mode of engagement is understood as a confrontation, an *Auseinandersetzung*. Chapter 3 establishes the manner in which this concept of *Auseinandersetzung* is operative in framing Heidegger's analysis of *Boredom*, establishing the presence of Nietzsche as the site of the contemporary in *FCM*. I will then conduct a reading of the historical character of the boredom analysis, and prepare for the projection of the major historical themes of *FCM* out onto 'Part Two' (which houses the supposed “theoretical biology”).

Chapter 4 establishes the specific context within which Heidegger approaches life in *FCM*, and subsequently conducts a reading of the sections devoted to a comparative analysis of world from within a heightened understanding of its historical intent. This reading establishes the need for a direct reading of Nietzsche in order to bring the ideas initiated in *FCM* to a conclusion. Chapter 5 maps the connections between *FCM* and the *Nietzsche Lectures* which acts a basis for a reading of *NI* and *NIII* that allows for
an understanding of the internal necessity of the alteration in Heidegger’s position regarding Nietzsche’s conception of life. This chapter also evaluates the findings of this thesis.
Chapter 1: FCM - Grounding an Engagement with Heidegger's Reading of Nietzsche and Life

Introduction

It is my contention that the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* represents Heidegger’s first sustained and explicit engagement with Nietzsche. I do not intend this opening contention to function as a heuristic principle, a (hypo)thesis which provides a lens through which the contents of the 1929/1930 lecture course can be refracted in order to suit an overarching goal which has itself been derived from extra-Heideggerian concerns. Heidegger explicitly provides us with the resources to interpret his lectures on the concepts of World, Finitude and Solitude as being founded in an engagement with Nietzsche. Contemporary scholarship on *FCM* has ignored its inclusion within Heidegger’s larger reading of Nietzsche, and accordingly, misconstrued the context of *FCM* as well as its status within Heidegger’s work. Reading *FCM* closely, and as a whole, shows it to point directly toward Heidegger’s later, more intense Nietzsche interpretation. On this basis the standard categorisation of *FCM* as a high-point of Heidegger’s reflection on life and biology can be challenged.

In this chapter I will present the basic reasons for my claim regarding the status of *FCM* as forming part of Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, and how this notion establishes a need to read *FCM* in a different manner from the most prominent readings already conducted within Heidegger scholarship.
1. Auseinandersetzung

The closing sections of the first chapter of 'Part One', namely §18,a), provides the first piece of evidence in support of the claim that *FCM* is indeed founded in an engagement of some kind with Nietzsche. Here Heidegger is conducting the groundwork for, and clearing a path toward, the task of *awakening* 'a fundamental attunement in our philosophising'.\(^1\) Heidegger takes a brief moment to lay out four interpretations of the contemporary situation for man from within which this task of awakening will operate.\(^2\) For Heidegger, these interpretations are fundamentally characterisable in terms of their understanding of the play between life and spirit. On these grounds Heidegger states the following:

...we can easily see that what is at issue here is not some theoretical elucidation of the relation between spirit and soul [*Seele and Leben* both designate the opposing concept to *Geist*], but what Nietzsche means by the terms *Dionysian* and *Apollonian*. ... All four interpretations are only possible given a particular reception of Nietzsche's philosophy. This hint is not meant to put the originality of the interpretations into question, but is merely intended to indicate the place and source where the confrontation proper must occur.\(^3\)

From this quote the following provisional conclusion can be made: the task of awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophising must come about, in some manner, even if only minimally, from a 'confrontation' with the contemporary situation, where this contemporary situation is bound up with the thinking of Nietzsche (namely his account of the Dionysian/Apollonian).

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1. How this is to be done and moreover what this even means shall be taken up in a larger context and in greater detail in the following chapter.
2. Those of Spengler, Klages, Scheler and Ziegler.
3. *FCM*, p 71. The clarification of these opening comments will the task of this Introduction, the associated concepts will dealt with in detail in the later sections concerned with producing a reading of *FCM*. 
1.1. Issues in Translation

A closer examination of the closing sentence of this quote highlights the genuine importance of this claim for generating an understanding of the philosophical context of FCM. By turning to the original German we are instantly opened onto the depth of this statement:

[...] die Stelle und Quelle zu zeigen, an der die eigentliche Auseinandersetzung zu geschehen hat.⁴

McNeill renders “Auseinandersetzung” as “confrontation”. There is nothing immediately problematic about translating the term in this fashion. As with almost all key words in the Heideggerian lexicon there is no straightforward possibility of rendering a term stable, fixed in a singular meaning that stretches immutably across his entire corpus. Confrontation, debate, exposition, deconstruction, dissociation: all these terms give us purchase on the possible meanings that this term comprises.⁵ With such an apparent depth of meaning, and clear potential for diversity in interpretation,

⁴ Heidegger M, Gesamtausgabe 29/39. (Klosterman Frankfurt am Main), p107
⁵ Emad and Kalary forward a characteristically daring interpretation of Auseinandersetzung as it is found in Mindfulness: “dissociating exposition”. They justify their efforts with recourse to a claim that standard renditions such as ‘debate’, ‘confrontation’ and ‘coming to terms with’, have been conceptually surpassed with the technical-conceptual meaning that the term takes on in the course of the private monograph from 1938. Taking the components of this word ‘auseinander’ as ‘apart, dissociated’ and ‘setzung’ as ‘setting, positioning’, the translators here divorce the term from the vernacular and offer it as a strict term for those responses to the question of being that are being-historical, as opposed to metaphysical. “Dissociating exposition”, in its movement, surpasses its metaphorical conceptual counterparts (refutation and refusal) which seek to confront previous philosophical endeavours in a direct fashion. A “dissociating exposition” does this by moving in the manner akin to that of an overcoming, a particular path of confrontation that is unavailable to Auseinandersetzung’s philosophically inferior metaphysical counterparts. De Beistegui takes issue with this translation, providing further insight into the possibilities of the term, his comments are worth quoting at length: “With Auseinandersetzung as "dissociating exposition" we reach etymological mania, and total absurdity: contrary to what the translators want us to believe, it is a question of engaging with, and confronting, the major philosophies and systems of our tradition, in the way that Heidegger has done from the start, that is, by bringing out the unthought of the thought of system in question, with the question of the truth of being as his guiding thread. It’s a matter of Aufbau, deconstruction or destructuring, I fail to see what’s dissociative about this enterprise, and why it should be defined as an exposition.” [De Beistegui, M, Notre Dame philosophical reviews - http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=9484]
it does not suffice to merely point out that *Auseinandersetzung* has a multivalent character.

### 1.2. Philosophical Implications – Rodolphe Gasché

Gasché presents a treatment of the character of the term *Auseinandersetzung* regarding its status as a method of philosophical approach of the order of critique (in all its broad forms) and deconstruction. In this direction he considers it to relate to matters of self-determination and heteronomy in such a manner that it itself refuses translation in anything other than a problematic fashion.⁶ Discussing its origin, Gasché says the following:

*Auseinandersetzung* is a term that, in the mid-thirties, abruptly appears in Heidegger's work, in particular in his lectures on *Nietzsche* and *Introduction to Metaphysics*.⁷

Gasché is not alone in ignoring the presence and importance of this term in *FCM*. At best this is an oversight, and at worst it is symptomatic of the general treatment of *FCM* by readers of Heidegger, which is to say, that of exclusion and isolation.⁸ This oversight poses fundamental problems for classifications and readings of *FCM*.

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⁶ Gasché himself will not venture a translation, but points toward the paucity of similar terms, or indeed the lack of correctness of terms such as critique, confrontation, debate etc. [Here he is not engaged in the business of translation, merely explication, so he ultimately is not required to comment on translators approaches. It should be pointed out that I am not here, or at any other point, attempting to disparage McNeill’s translation; in the practice of translation it is necessary to translate – if every term that houses specific, and indeed novel philosophical meanings in Heidegger’s lexicon were to remain untranslated or rendered neologistically we would be left with either the German text alone, or worse, something incomprehensible that leads the English reader to conclude that the text itself is incomprehensible as such.]. Gasché seeks to determine the specific conceptual content of the term such that he can ‘confront its current use with its strict definition’ and ‘set conditions for fruitfully putting this term to work’ [Towards and Ethics of *Auseinandersetzung*, 315].

⁷ Towards and Ethics of *Auseinandersetzung*, 316

⁸ Gasché is not, however, guilty of a pernicious oversight, indeed *Auseinandersetzung*’s earlier appearance does not drastically disrupt his claims.
Equally it is problematic for readers who, themselves, seek to problematise certain Heideggerian positions regarding his relationship to Nietzsche and the various philosophical issues that this relationship incorporates. Gasché claims that Auseinandersetzung is devoid of any anterior philosophical meaning, has legalistic origins which are known and evoked by Heidegger, and actually 'functions as a terminus technicus'. This strengthens the notion that there is something important about the appearance of this term within FCM. Having, albeit mistakenly, pointed out that the term abruptly appears in the mid-thirties, Gasché identifies the textual site where Heidegger explicitly deals with the concept in depth:

The Nietzsche lectures advance the term in question as the philosophical and hermeneutic mode of relating to the subject matter of a philosopher's thought. The term serves to conceptualize the relation to that which, in a thinker's thought, resists access, by its very nature, to any extraneous approach, namely, that which "cannot be determined anywhere else than from within itself."

Returning to §18 of FCM, Heidegger's task of awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophising is bound up in a 'confrontation' of some order with Nietzsche and the contemporary situation. Following Gasché, we can no longer consider this confrontation to obtain from an exterior, ultimately heteronomous perspective (i.e. Heidegger vs. Nietzsche). In this sense, the task of FCM can now be considered to be that of determining the ground of philosophising (in this case awakening a fundamental attunement) from within the matter of Nietzsche's thought itself.

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9 Ibid, 316
10 It may be the case that the entire depth of Heidegger's philosophical-conceptual understanding of Auseinandersetzung as expounded in the later works (the Auseinandersetzung with which Gasché is concerned) cannot be pinned to §18; this is something that must be established within the body of my reading of FCM at large. However, that there are concrete grounds for investigating §18 as a piece of evidence in support of the opening contention is clear.
11 Ibid, p316
Whilst resistant to heterogeneity, *Auseinandersetzung* does not admit direct repetition, this would not have the character of relation but simply of re-iteration. If not confrontation, then in what does this relation consist? It is not repetitive, nor is it extraneous. It is of the order of, but not identical with critique or deconstruction. A 'hermeneutic mode of relation': this implies distance; the distance of interpretation. Gasché turns to the opening sections of *NI* to expand upon the origin and character of this implied distance that itself is something akin to an immanent stance. Gasché quotes Heidegger himself:

> Nietzsche's thought and speech are still too contemporary for us. He and we have not yet been sufficiently separated (*auseinandergesetzt*) in history; we lack the distance (*abstand*) necessary for a sound appreciation of a thinker's strength.\(^{12}\)

The contemporary frustrates our ability to achieve the necessary distance and separation from which the strength of Nietzsche's thought can be encountered. The terminology and the thrust of such a statement bares striking resemblance to §18 of *FCM*: the task of awakening a fundamental attunement in our philosophising requires the setting back of the contemporary into its source, such that the *'eigentlich Auseinandersetzung'* can occur. Such a task, if it is proper, authentic *Auseinandersetzung* (i.e., that of a *terminus technicus*) internally necessitates the appreciation of the as yet unappreciated strength of Nietzsche's thought. Gasché supports this comparison by pressing the point that this is not just a mode of interpretation for the sake of interpretation (i.e., supposing that we want to read Nietzsche, conducting an *Auseinandersetzung* would simply be the best manner), rather, it is *the* philosophically responsible response, pertaining to the highest order of intellectual conscience:

\(^{12}\) *NI*, p4
Auseinandersetzung is the exclusive relation to that which, in a thinker's thought, is "true philosophy", that is, to what in his thoughts obeys the law of thinking, thinking's own law. As such, it dictates a bracketing of anything that in thinking is of heteronomous origin...\(^{13}\)

Gasché turns to Heidegger himself, whose comments here are not just akin to those of §18 of FCM, but as I aim to make apparent throughout my dealings therewith, speak of an identical concern.

In confrontation we undertake to reflect on his [Nietzsche's] thinking and to trace it in its effective force, not in its weaknesses. To what purpose? In order that through the confrontation we ourselves may become free for the supreme exertion of thinking.\(^{14}\)

My argument, introduced here and then justified and sustained throughout this thesis, is that FCM is explicitly concerned with cultivating a proper appreciation of Nietzsche, such that the philosophically authentic and most intellectually conscionable relation to the contemporary can be achieved, whereby philosophising proper can begin.\(^{15}\)

In his relation to Nietzsche, Heidegger is seeking to generate the resources for his own original thinking, his own philosophising. This process of generation is not the

\(^{13}\) Towards and Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, 316+317, Gasché quotes from the opening of Nietzsche Vol.1.

\(^{14}\) NI, p4-5

\(^{15}\) The scope of such a movement of self-becoming is broadened when Gasché points towards Heidegger's chosen, Greek, grounds of Auseinandersetzung, namely Heraclitean Polemos, (Gasché here references Introduction to Metaphysics, which appears 5 years later than FCM. Whether or not this has implications for the meaning of Auseinandersetzung prior to this text is not something that can be dealt with here. That Heidegger sets his discussion of Nietzsche in FCM directly after a discussion of the reception of Heraclitus' fragments concerning φύσις lends credence to the notion that there is no clear separation, despite a potential lack of an indisputable identity between the terms usage in 1929/30 and 1930.) which he further relates to the original Greek understanding of Critique (Κρίνειν). Drawing from Heideggerian accounts of their originary meanings, Gasché makes the the following assertions: "Rather than a severing of one thing from another in pure difference and free from all contamination, critique, in the authentic sense, serves to raise what is separated into its proper rank precisely by contrasting it to what it is separated from. Critique secures propriety and property as it locates its possibility in the other ... Auseinandersetzung understood in this way is as much characterised by the setting apart as by the intimate interrelation of what occupies the respective sides of the division." (Towards an Ethics of Auseinandersetzung, p320)
refinement of a pre-established position, or extrinsic movement of (heteronomous) self-
determination. Rather, it speaks of an attempt at achieving historical immanence, a
mode of access to the movement of thought throughout history. But what of this
history? Are we to understand this as the movement of a history? Just a mode of access
to thought’s own movements? Gasché asks, ‘[i]s it a relation valid for all dialogue, or a
model with only one application? He contends that it is a model ‘cut to fit the debate
with Nietzsche’ for reasons of distance. The distance sought by Heidegger is not the
distance of one man to another, not a simple chronological-temporal distancing, but a
historical (Geschichtlich, not Historisch) one. The distance that Nietzsche traverses and
the distance that Heidegger wants to take up anew, to determine anew, is distance from
the question of Being – distance from the first beginning.

Auseinandersetzung seems to be limited to a debate in the name of the other
beginning.

Auseinandersetzung, in Gasché’s eyes, is the immanent philosophical method of
obtaining an authentic historical relation to the first beginning, in the name of an other
beginning, a method that is specifically designed to engage with Nietzsche who is
inextricable from any engagement with the past in the name of the future, and thus the
main, if not sole object of Auseinandersetzung.

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16 Ibid, p323
17 Ibid, p325
18 I am not directly concerned with Auseinandersetzung in itself, for its own sake – unlike Gasché. I am,
here, engaged in preliminary work. As such I am only concerned with what Heidegger claims with
regard to the term, and how the field has interpreted these claims. This means that for the time being
any critical engagement will be avoided. To venture justifications and provide a more complete
analysis of Auseinandersetzung across Heidegger’s corpus would not assist in the goal of achieving a
suitable context within which to read FCM. I would also be forging nothing new, Gasché, and indeed
others, have already broken this ground. If successful my reading of FCM will, under its own
immanent movement, come to shed light on the grounds and structures from out of which the explicit
accounts of Auseinandersetzung in the mid-thirties. (Namely in IM, Contributions, and the Nietzsche
Lectures. There are additions to this, most importantly the 1961 authors foreword to all editions of the
Nietzsche lectures) come to be articulated.
Indeed, as Heidegger would have it, what counts in this debate is not the person “Nietzsche”, or even “Heidegger” for that matter, but the essential Yes that both share, the Yes to the essential question [...] In the confrontation with the first beginning, this first beginning – metaphysics in other words – is not denounced as error.\(^{19}\)

Here then we are given some indication of the type of relationship to metaphysics that Heidegger is forming in his earlier lectures on it: we will find no straightforward attempt to achieve a position outside metaphysics and metaphysical thinking.\(^{20}\) To herald Nietzsche, and claim that FCM is a book that has the matter of Nietzsche at its heart, is not to say anything that Heidegger himself does not say in the 1929/30 lectures themselves.

2. Implications of my Preliminary Reading and Guiding Contention within the Field

On the basis of §18 and an elucidation of the meaning of \textit{Auseinandersetzung}, there are

\(^{19}\) Towards an Ethics of \textit{Auseinandersetzung}, p326

\(^{20}\) If the above correctly characterises the thrust of Heidegger's thought between the sixth and twelfth year after the 1929/30 lectures were written, and the appearance of \textit{Auseinandersetzung} is not simply coincidental (given the specific philosophical content of \textit{Auseinandersetzung} the burden of proof regarding coincidentality lies in the opposite direction), then The entire contents of FCM can be productively contextualised within the framework of Heidegger's later attitude toward both metaphysics and Nietzsche. Covering over Nietzsche's centrality, and thus removing the historicality that Heidegger gives his 1929/30 lecture course, belies the attempt by Heidegger to move within the history of thought as metaphysics via an \textit{Auseinandersetzung}. It belies his attempt to gain access to thought's essential movement, whereby the resources for thinking's own self-determination can be generated. There is too great a specificity of philosophical content attributed to the term \textit{Auseinandersetzung} for there to be something arbitrary about its mobilisation in the FCM, especially given its location within the text at the end of an extended historical contextualisation that seeks to introduce and frame Heidegger's subsequent engagement with metaphysics within the lecture. To dare a quote from the Contributions: “The return to the first beginning is precisely a distancing [\textit{Entfernung}] from it.”
grounds for further inquiry into the role of Nietzsche in FCM, as long as this task is conducted with a careful eye and is prepared, to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche, to read *lento*. In the following I will identify a philosophical thread that alienates FCM from it given context, and at the same time structures an understanding of the potential paucity of Heidegger's relation to Nietzsche around the issue of “life”. This will provide the context for, first, my reading of FCM as a whole, and secondly, my subsequent estimation and exploration of the philosophical importance of this reading.

### 2.1. Charles E. Scott

My first point of orientation comes in the form of Charles E. Scott's chapter on Heidegger and his potential re-inscription of the Ascetic Ideal:  

> ... many commentators [...] fail to see that Heidegger is working from within the values and thought that he puts in question and that he recognizes that the question arises from within the values and thoughts, not from outside them or by virtue of the originality of his own thought. But we shall also find that one of the major formations in Western ethical thought and practice, which Nietzsche described under the name of the ascetic ideal, functions unquestionably in Heidegger's thought and leads him to weaken considerably the question of ethics. He re-inscribes a quasi-ethical piety within 'the rule of being' ...  

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21 I am not looking to expand the biographical-chronological horizons of recent work on the genealogy of Heideggerian concepts [See recent work by Kisiel and Sheehan, a list of relevant titles appears in the bibliography to this work]. It is needful to show that my proposed reading is necessitated in response to the text itself, but also in response to contemporary interpretations and critiques of Heidegger's thinking on Nietzsche.

22 Scott, C.E. *The Question of Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger*. (Indiana University Press: Indiana: 1990). For the sake of brevity and maintaining a narrow focus I will not be able to do full justice to Scott's broader reading of Heidegger in this text. Unlike myself, Scott is not primarily intent on reading Heidegger from within a context and a historicality that has been determined by Heidegger himself – he is not highly sensitive to the Auseinandersetzung. Accordingly, I will not claim to fully problematise, critically disrupt or surpass his project on its own terms. From the outset of his text, Scott is concerned with showing the contribution and position of Heidegger within the history of thinking on ethics.

23 *Ibid*, p2
Here we see that Scott is sympathetic to one aspect of Heidegger’s historicality which has already been raised, namely the method of Heidegger’s relation to heritage: that of internal self-determination, the movement described by an *Auseinandersetzung*. However, Scott intends to show that Heidegger fails to generate a relationship to, and an understanding of, the full scope of Nietzsche’s critique of the movement of western thought as most strongly characterised in the ascetic ideal. Scott attempts to articulate what he sees as the unthought ambiguity in Heidegger’s intellectual conscience.

The withdrawal of being and the non-essence of its event are interpreted in the language of mystery under the aegis of bestowal in this aspect of Heidegger’s thought. He speaks of chaos only in relation to the dispersions of life that has forgotten its essence. It seems in essence that the bestowal of essence is *the* thought. There appears to be a continuing triumph of being over chaos, and for Nietzsche that is the ascetic ideal.24

Scott is claiming that Heidegger unjustifiably, and perhaps unwittingly, moves outside of the Nietzschean formulation of the human condition (itself nothing other than a conditioning of life and its chaotic forces). Thus, Heidegger becomes subject to a pitfall of western metaphysics identified by Nietzsche. When face to face with life’s chaotic forces of becoming, Heidegger is only capable of putting his head back under the parapet of history, of turning away, back to a potentially pre-Nietzschean safe-haven of the mystical excesses of meaning.25

Scott asserts that in his appeal to the centrality of the ecstatic constitution of human

24 *The Question of Ethics*, p181

25 “The issue between Nietzsche and Heidegger at this point rests with quasi-historical claims: for Heidegger, human history is constituted by the claim of being, its manner of thought, and its being forgotten; for Nietzsche, human history is constituted by a conflict between those who can live fully in the meaninglessness of life and those who must hide from chaos in order to survive it [Ibid, p182].”
Dasein (wherein man and man alone is claimed by being and is, as such, implicated in the bestowal of meaning), Heidegger separates man off from animality, and thus “life”, in a manner that allows him to place chaotic meaninglessness at a safe distance. Perhaps the most simple way to describe this move is to say that Heidegger seeks to (re)establish a moment of man’s transcendence with regards to other beings, namely those beings that maintain themselves in the domain of ’living’ being, such that, when viewed from a macro perspective, there is an essential, qualitative differentiation between the being of man and the being of, say, animals. Scott is correct when he tells us that, for Heidegger, man is not straightforwardly subject to the same processes of life whereby he can be said to exist on something more akin to a quantitative scale of differentiation, i.e., man is not one living being amongst others, distinguished from animals but ultimately categorisable with them. For Heidegger there exists an abyssal bodily kinship.

As Heidegger shifts the terrain of thought from a mind-body dualism, he puts the meaning of animality in question just as he has already put thought in question. It is not a question of adding qualities to animality; it is a question of rethinking human being in the singularity of its essence. The biological sciences, medicine, and psychology are also put in question... The human body is not an animallike [sic] object.26

This contention brings Scott to ask his most important question.

Have we moved beyond the ascetic ideal by shifting the provenance of thought from its traditionally dualistic mind-body character? Probably not, because undwellable chaos has been consumed in an assurance of dwelling that, no matter how mysterious and questionable, elevates our cries and our laughter by an ecstasis that finds its fulfilment in a re-conceived thinking and saying of

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26 Ibid, p183
being. Is animality rethought, or merely lost?  

Scott ultimately forwards the following answer to the above quoted question, which is seemingly a case of Nietzsche vs. Heidegger:

Nietzsche's account of the ascetic ideal is right in this, that whatever in our tradition saves and preserves seriousness concerning truth and meaning saves and preserves the very elements that are taken to be overcome by truth and meaning in their seriousness.  

Heidegger's is never interrupted by the serious consideration that the essential thought of being is an error, that our philosophy has its origin in an error whose only 'value' is the negative one of interrupting the experience and life of the senses. Rather, Heidegger's thought means that humans exist in an openness that has no disruption in its mystery. Its disruption of ordinary life is at once a calling of human life to its totally nonordinary and nonsensuous essence  

I do not want to claim that Scott poorly characterises Heidegger, or is salaciously unfair in his reading, as he does investigate and accurately describe the conceptual structures within which he considers this ultimate failure in Heidegger's ability to cope with Nietzsche to occur. I do however, want to raise a question regarding his choice of text and his selection of Heideggerian positions, thereby destabilising his ability to make the above critical claims really stick. In FCM Heidegger furnishes us with arguments to combat the above conclusions. These topics, along with a discussion of the biological sciences, the transposability of man into the realm of the animal, the nature of man's location within/without the nexus of living beings are all found together in FCM, along with Nietzsche. Scott does not discuss FCM in relation to these

27 Ibid, p183  
28 The Question of Ethics, p187  
29 Ibid, 188
claims. Perhaps we could hope for a discussion of Heidegger’s understanding of Nietzsche on truth, error and value, such as that found in \textit{NI} or \textit{NIII}?\footnote{In Chapter 5 of this thesis I will provide a reading of the connections between \textit{FCM} and \textit{NI} and \textit{NIII} and challenge these claims made by Scott.} No. Instead Scott opts for a discussion of \textit{Letter on Humanism} and an analysis of Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus from 1942, where special attention is paid to Heidegger’s reading of \textit{φύσις}. This particular tack is problematic as neither of these texts represent an explicit engagement with Nietzsche, and as such are not the best resources for bringing Heidegger to bear in the light of Nietzsche’s thought.\footnote{Heraclitus, \textit{φύσις}, and the origins of philosophy are indeed the subjects of the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ of \textit{FCM}, which then gives way to a discussion of Nietzsche, life and historicality. This ultimately leads (via a phenomenological account of boredom) to Heidegger’s extended analysis of the question of the essence of life (on animality, life, and the biological sciences), which can be found in his comparative analysis of world.}

In my discussion of Gasché, I asserted that a lack of recognition of the earlier appearances of \textit{Auseinandersetzung} were either the result of an oversight, or symptomatic of the general exclusion and isolation of \textit{FCM}. The same can be said of Scott: the presence of \textit{Auseinandersetzung} in his discussion of Heidegger, Nietzsche and life is, here, clearly lacking, as is the presence of \textit{FCM} as a potential locus for these ideas.\footnote{Scott considers Heidegger in a space opened by an independent reading of Nietzsche, one not particularly attentive to Heidegger’s own engagement therewith. Scott uses a reading of ascetic ideals to construct a problematic: the opening of the space of ethics and our ability to maintain an intellectual conscience in our engagement with it, i.e., remaining conscious of the achievements of Nietzsche’s analysis of the ascetic ideal and it’s deadening impact on the prospective positing of the transcendence, or non-moral origins of thought. Within this problematic Heidegger is not taken up as a reader of Nietzsche, that is to say, as someone who has a position that is itself explicitly caught up in a continuation of this Nietzschean struggle [Heidegger takes his own account of Nietzsche’s translation of \textit{dike} as justice (\textit{Gerechtigkeit}) to be precisely this – a Nietzschean inspired effort to overthrow the history of a Platonic, ethical reading of the relationship of world and essence. See Chap 5.] Heidegger’s account of the central importance of Nietzsche to any understanding of life (an understanding that requires distance, proximity, letting stand and extrication in equal parts) is not recognised. Instead Heidegger’s position with regards to this, now externally/extra-Heideggerianly formed, historical problematic is assessed \textit{against} Nietzsche’s.} Scott concludes that in his responses to life and its chaotic forces, Heidegger is fatally captivated by the thinking of Nietzsche and maybe even surpassed by it.

Ultimately, Nietzsche is seen to be more successful and have a higher level of
intellectual probity than Heidegger: he can confront the problematic character of human life in a way Heidegger cannot. Here, Scott takes Nietzsche and Heidegger to be two separate interlocutors both directed toward something that can be located as a common (or more dangerous still, general) problematic.

If Heidegger's claim in §18 is profound, then Nietzsche is central to any contemporary philosophising, and the matter of life is thus at the heart of the contemporary situation, and any attempt to extricate oneself from it. Any genuine engagement with Heidegger and “life”, let alone one that explicitly seeks to collect thoughts on Heidegger, life and Nietzsche, has to therefore be attentive to the movement of Auseinandersetzung, has to recognise (as Scott does go some way toward doing) that Heidegger is engaged in an attempt to think metaphysics from within its own structures and language. From the perspective of my comments on Auseinandersetzung, to situate Heidegger within an externally determined notion of who Nietzsche is and how he structures the contemporary situation for thinking is unstable. External, here, meaning without recourse to the intricacies and rigours associated with Heidegger's own reading of Nietzsche, ultimately assessing his thoughts using criteria heteronomous to them. It does not attend to the subtlety of Heidegger's accounts of his own relation to the origins of philosophy, and more importantly his immediate heritage, which, as has been shown, he considers to be nothing other than Nietzsche. To think the problematic of life in Heidegger externally to Heidegger's own historical delimitation/determination, is to form the problematic in Nietzschean terms,

The following issues come immediately to the forefront: What is life? What does Heidegger take it to be in Nietzsche? What does Heidegger himself takes this to be? What characterises the interplay of these ideas? These questions are indeed of high importance to this thesis and are too complex to be tackled without the context that I am attempting to provide here in this chapter. As such, I am trying to establish the point that the connection of “life”, whatever this turns out to be, and Nietzsche in FCM is in need of further investigation.
positioning Heidegger in relation to a problem that he himself approaches in a
different manner, with different criteria for success. To wit, Nietzsche will always
surpass Heidegger when the two figures are compared within specific problems of
history that Nietzsche highlights as his own.\textsuperscript{34}

2.2. David Farrell-Krell

With Scott, the subject of life was touched upon without ever being brought to the fore
in such a manner that justice could be be done to Heidegger. With Krell’s \textit{Daimon Life}
Heidegger and his conception of life are put front and centre.

However much Heidegger inveighs against life-philosophy his own
fundamental ontology and poetics of being thrust him back onto
\textit{Lebensphilosophie} again and again; and, finally, that the most powerfully
"gathering" figure of his thinking during the years 1928 to 1944, the figure that
"plays a role in holding the world together," is that of the daimon \textit{daimon life}.\textsuperscript{35}

Krell contends that life-philosophy is something which returns for Heidegger, and that
“life” is of central importance in the formulation and determination of Heidegger’s
thinking. Given my argument so far, this is not a point of contention.
\textit{Auseinandersetzung} has been shown to be a process of self-becoming that has Nietzsche
as the central figure, a figure who, according to §18 of \textit{FCM}, is bound up with
contemporary thinking, which itself is characterised by its focus on life. Krell
recognises the historical centrality of life for Heidegger (albeit not in the form of the

\textsuperscript{34} This is not to say that reading Nietzsche necessitates a reading of Heidegger, which is not necessarily
the case. I am only claiming here that attempting to read the encounter between the two (i.e. reading
one in light of the other) must take place first and foremost from within the structures of Heidegger’s
thought. How Nietzsche can be productively put to work against his “master interpretor” is a matter
that exceeds this thesis, see chapter 5 for more.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Daimon Life}, preface xi. Despite its length, scope, and importance within Heidegger scholarship, this
text is not \textit{exhaustive} of the subject. Krell’s opening statement of intent is enough to show that space for
my project, as elucidated so far, yet remains:
Finally, the great daimon of life should enable us to expand the horizons of our interrogation of Heidegger back to Plato, then forward to German Idealism, on through Nietzsche and Freud, and onward (beyond Heidegger) to Derrida and Irigaray.36

Krell is contending that positioning Heidegger within the history of Western philosophy (a history which also unfolds after Heidegger) requires a recognition of his stance toward life, even if it is a stance that attempts to stand outside life in some manner (‘however much Heidegger inveighs against life philosophy’).37 The point where my moment of departure from Krell’s project becomes clear is in his description of FCM (and thus the Heidegger-Nietzsche-Life connection):

[...]For the most part, this book is a close reading of a number of Heideggerian texts, principally from the late 1920s through the mid-1940s, including Being and Time (1927), Contributions to Philosophy (Of Propriation) (1936-1938), and the lecture courses of 1928 (on Leibniz, logic, and the daimon), 1929-1930 (on theoretical biology)

FCM is directly characterised as a lecture course on theoretical biology.38 I want to resist the straightforward notion that these lectures are characterisable as being ‘about biology’. With Scott we saw that it is in Heidegger’s account of the singularity of man’s essence that the biological sciences are put into question.39 If this holds, then we would expect an account of theoretical biology, or a lecture on biology to be situated within an

36 Daimon Life, xii
37 Ibid, xi
38 The stated close reading of the lectures on “theoretical biology” occurs in chapter three ‘Where Deathless Horses Weep: The 1929-1930 Biology Lectures’. This chapter is defined by its author as being a response to the Scott essay engaged with above, securing its status a development of the philosophical concerns held therein.
39 The Question of Ethics, p183
account of the singularity of man's essence. Which is the case with FCM, as highlighted by Krell:

Heidegger seeks a third way to pose the "world question." [...] The third will involve a fundamental duplicity, the dual or double position occupied by human beings in the world: man has a world, but is also a piece of the world; man is both "master and slave of the world" [...] Heidegger begins not with metonymic stones but with the presumably essential distinction between human beings and animals in the sphere of what we call, vaguely enough, *life*. His inquiry is not intended to solve any puzzles about evolution or the origin of species: the ape reappears for an instant, but is soon banished (264). Rather, the object of the inquiry is "the essence of the animality of the animal and the essence of the humanity of man".40

In the case of Gasché and in Scott, a general tendency to exclude and isolate FCM from its intended context begins to emerge. It is difficult not to take Krell's titling as being indicative of the same tendency. Why is biology prioritised here? Krell is not stating that he is reading the sections on Biology from a 1929/30 lecture course which has other concerns; he clearly states that he is reading the Biology lectures. With this line of argument I do not seek to repudiate the content of Krell's reading; his is a reading too complex to allow such a simplistic characterisation. What I wish to show is that Krell does not exhaust his given topic, namely FCM and the question of life, but instead demands that we pay further attention, and conduct deeper enquiry. Krell does not overlook the intimate connection, the triadic relationship, of Heidegger, Nietzsche and life. The triad is given, but it is not fully realised, once again due to the lack of concern for, or perhaps even the overlooking of, the historicality of FCM. This is to say, its status as intra-*Auseinandersetzung*, as concerned with the possibilities of an authentic determination of the contemporary and a coextensive extrication/self-determination of

40 *Daimon Life*, pp112 - 113
At this point that we can see both the potential power and the limit of Krell’s meditation. He at once provides the connection with Nietzsche that I have uncovered as being needful, locates the problem of historicality in Heidegger (i.e., the difficulty of separation, distancing, and thinking-from-out-of), and immediately overlooks the profundity of their presence together in *FCM* in the discussion of life.

When in 1929-1930 Heidegger once again takes up the question of life by examining the comparative world-relations or access to beings of stone, animal, and Dasein, he is, I suspect, oppressed by the sense of his earlier failure to confront the problems of *Lebensphilosophie*. The quandary will continue to afflict him throughout his lectures on Nietzsche in the late 1930s. For no recourse to the categories of body and soul, matter and form, sense and spirit can come to the aid of existential analysis. If Dasein is some body who is alive, its life will be a matter of care, time, and death, we are perhaps at the very nerve of Western ontotheology. When Heidegger tries to separate Dasein from the animal, or to dig an abyss of essence between them, he causes the whole of his project to collapse back into the congealed categories and oblivious decisions of ontotheology.  

The claim is that Heidegger, at least in *FCM*, is unable to sustain a distance from the ‘oblivious decisions of ontotheology’. On this point I will not disagree. That these decisions have their very nexus in the philosophical confrontation between Heidegger (albeit here positioned as a champion of ontotheology) and *Lebensphilosophie* is also a point that I will maintain. In order to prepare my own extrication from Krell’s account

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41 Ibid, p104-105
42 “Onto-theology” is a Heideggerian term (with Kantian origins) that refers to the conflation of ontology and theology, wherein all ontology aims toward an understanding of the the Theon (the first cause, the divine etc.). Krell is using this term against Heidegger, indicating that he is ultimately guilty of the same sin that he charges against the rest of Western Thought. Heidegger provides an account of history of this concept in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. For my reading of these sections see chapter 2.
let us first return to the guiding claim of his project in *Daimon Life*.

My thesis is that these themes and issues all touch on the phenomenon of life as it appears in Heidegger's thought from the very outset of his path; further, that however much Heidegger inveighs against life-philosophy his own fundamental ontology and poetics of being thrust him back onto Lebensphilosophie again and again. In my reading of *Auseinandersetzung* and the clarification and preliminary justification of my opening contention, this thesis has been shown to be Heidegger's, not Krell's. A confrontation with life has as its proper place and source a confrontation with Nietzsche. Heidegger does not think that a confrontation of the order of *Auseinandersetzung* contains a moment of heteronomy. If, to take up Krell's classification of Heidegger's thought, “a poetics of being” is an essential determination of thinking that has a genuine historicality, then on Heidegger's account, there is no possibility of straightforwardly positioning it as being fully independent of, absolutely extricated from, heteronomous to, life, as Heidegger sees this term at the heart of Nietzsche's thinking. To say that Heidegger has simply re-inscribed particular decisions of ontotheology, is to think outside Heidegger's thought.

Far from being a re-inscription, the movement of *Auseinandersetzung* follows a peculiar pattern of recall, one that, as the mutual self-determining movement of non-identical yet nonetheless non-heterogeneous determinations of thought, requires a great deal of philosophical work to fully understand. Work that takes place in part in *FCM* and in greater detail throughout the *Nietzsche* volumes. To characterise, from the very start, Heidegger's work in *FCM* as a re-inscription of onto-theological decisions in the face of

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43 Ibid, xi
an inability to move outside Lebensphilosophie, is, as I have begun show, not to give 
Heidegger’s own account of his historicality, his connection to Nietzsche, its own 
space. It does not therefore take Heidegger’s argument on its strongest showing. 
Ultimately, this means not having the intellectual response to Heidegger that 
Heidegger himself wishes to have in relation to Nietzsche. Which is to say, that of 
allowing the thinkers own thought to be determined from within its own laws, such 
that our relation to this thought achieves hermeneutic proximity, historicality and 
maintains a solid intellectual conscience. This is my aim. It is narrower than Krell’s in 
its initial inception: I do not immediately seek to move beyond Heidegger, nor seek to 
show the unthought in Heidegger’s thinking (the Daimon of life on Krell’s reading). I 
am not concerned with deconstruction. I am, to a certain extent with Gasché in 
preparing to give Auseinandersetzung its space as the philosophical response.

2.3. Ansell-Pearson

If the story with FCM so far is one of exile from Heideggerian scholarship within its 
context as an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, then Keith Ansell-Pearson’s 
discussion of FCM in Viroid Life44 highlights the impact that this exile has had on extra- 
Heideggerian scholarship. He is the final philosopher explicitly connected and 
engaged in this Scott-Krell thread. In “Nietzsche Contra Darwin”45, Ansell-Pearson sets 
out the reasons for his investigation into the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Darwin in a manner that immediately brings Heidegger, explicitly, into the heart of his 
questioning.

44 Ansell-Pearson, K. Viroid Life: Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition (Routledge, 
45 Chapter 4 of Viroid Life.
... [Nietzsche's] engagement with Darwin has not received the kind of attention it merits. Where it has been treated, it has been so cursorily, without any serious effort being made by commentators to render comprehensible Nietzsche’s ‘philosophical biology’

1. The connection between Nietzsche and Darwin is touched upon by Heidegger in his 1930s lectures on Nietzsche, but the treatment of Darwin is perfunctory and cavalier. See Heidegger 1961, volume 1:72; 1979:60. Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s ‘biologism’ and Heidegger’s own engagement with modern biology will be examined in the final section of this chapter. 46

He introduces Heidegger as an interlocutor.

In the final part of this chapter I want to show how it might be possible to read Nietzsche’s will-to-power — and a ‘contra Darwinism’ position — in non anthropomorphic terms so as to be able to begin to map non-human becomings of life. To do this it is necessary to engage with Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, in particular his examination of the vexed issue of Nietzsche’s ‘biologism’47

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46 Viroid Life, p85. The reading of Darwin that Ansell-Pearson wishes to mobilise is, like my intended reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger, not one that seeks to pit the thinkers against each other in a straightforward fashion, with only a single thinker remaining intact. It is instead concerned with the manner in which the two can be brought into a productive relation; where productivity is not necessarily the possibility of gaining a perspective where one thinker can refute the other, but moreover, the production of ‘novel insights into the difficulties of Nietzsche's thinking’: ‘...what is decisive is the critical perspective which Darwin's thinking on natural selection brings to bear on Nietzsche's Lebensphilosophie, since it is able to show the extent to which it rests on an untenable anthropomorphization of nature, life, and evolution.' That there is an extent to which Nietzsche is guilty of maintaining within his life-philosophy an anthropomorphic account of nature and life is a guiding claim of this chapter. The opening sections follow this guiding claim by pointing out the ways in which Nietzsche fails to fully take into account the full depth of Darwinian notions of evolution. Ansell-Pearson shows that where Nietzsche considers himself to be thinking beyond a history of the anthropomorphisation of nature, thus achieving a position where he can propose ‘a new task for thought - that of de-defying nature so as [quoting Nietzsche] ‘to begin to “naturalize” (vernaturlichen) humanity in terms of a purely, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature’, he is in fact potentially guilty of re-inscribing the very structures he seeks to overcome. Whilst Ansell-Pearson believes Nietzsche to be guilty of pernicious anthropomorphic thinking with regards to life in the places where he believes himself to be thinking outside of anthropomorphic models, he does not consider Nietzsche’s thought on the matter to be a curate’s egg. He will use his initial account of the prospective failure of Nietzsche’s thinking to come to terms with the genuinely non-anthropomorphic elements of Darwinian evolutionary theory and to show the potential ways in which Nietzsche’s thinking can indeed be successful in its attempt to naturalise man and de-anthropomorphise nature and life.

It is interesting that when talking of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche within a 
investigation that seeks solely to deal with issues of anthropomorphism in Nietzsche's 
reading of life and biology, the term 'necessity' is invoked. I do not take this lightly, 
Ansell-Pearson is claiming that Heidegger plays a necessary role in our ability to read 
Nietzsche at his fullest. The question of 'Biologism' is now at the fore.

The term 'biologism' can refer to two things. One is an unfounded extension 
and transfer of concepts from the field 'proper to living beings' to that of other 
beings; the other, and much more important, is the failure to recognize the 
metaphysical character of the propositions of the science of biology.\textsuperscript{48}

Ansell-Pearson suggests that we need to critically engage with Heidegger's claim that 
to read Nietzsche biologically is to 'not read him at all', suggesting that Heidegger 
may be too caught up in the metaphysicality of Nietzsche to not think that he indeed 
shares ground with someone like Darwin.\textsuperscript{49} In other words, we must be careful not to 
divorce Nietzsche, or indeed his specific philosophical communications from their 
specific contemporary contexts and connections. Heidegger, we are informed, does 
consider Nietzsche and Darwin to share ground in that they are both caught up in 
varying degrees of anthropomorphism (given that they are both located within the 
history of subjectivism named by Occidental metaphysics). Ansell-Pearson presents 
flaws in this particular stance on Nietzsche, showing that there is both a heightened 
scientific intent within Nietzsche's thought, but also, more importantly for Ansell-
Pearson, a depth to Darwin that Heidegger has overlooked. In spite of this he considers 
there to be something productive about this non-biologist, or rather non-biological 
(given the denigrative tone of 'biologism') reading.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid, p109
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid
On Heidegger's terms, it is in biologically reading Nietzsche that his metaphysical intent is lost and a philosophically naïve understanding of man’s relation to the animal, (which as a rubric generally concerns how man stands in relation to his origins), is superimposed onto a vastly richer intellectual landscape. Of course, for Heidegger, this is at heart, an issue of historicality.\(^{30}\)

\[\text{For Heidegger [...] Nietzsche’s project of thinking the will-to-power only makes sense and becomes meaningful when read in the context of the history of Occidental metaphysics. This is a history that has to be rendered ‘historical’ since it is not simply given.}\(^{31}\)

It is in the manner in which Heidegger opens up the metaphysical intent of Nietzsche that Ansell-Pearson considers Heidegger to set Nietzsche in a position that renders him philosophically 'provocative', in spite of the underplaying of Nietzsche's scientific context. Here Ansell-Pearson is moving in proximity to the type of methodological rigour that I have elucidated and argued for. Ansell-Pearson recognises that first and foremost Nietzsche presents himself to Heidegger as a problem of history, he is a thinker that must be \textit{set} into a history that is not immediately given, where this setting is indeed a philosophical act that relates to thinking metaphysics itself. Further, within this historical problematic the question of life (in this essay seemingly a rubric for animality and prospective non-human origins), and the nature of Nietzsche's insight into it, is a central concern. Ansell-Pearson turns to \textit{NIII} where the issue of biologism is most extensively discussed.

\(^{30}\) As it is for Nietzsche with his genealogical analysis.

\(^{31}\) Ibid
He [Heidegger] is adamant that in the explicit or tacit characterization of his [Nietzsche's] metaphysics as biologism ‘nothing is being thought, and all Darwinistic thought processes must be extruded’. Moreover, while conceding that Nietzsche does indeed view man and his world in terms of the perspective of the body and his animality, in no way, he contends, does Nietzsche decide that man simply ‘originates’ from the animal—or ‘more precisely from the “ape”’—since he maintains that such a doctrine of origin is able to say little about man.  

For Heidegger, in being separated off from scientific inquiry (the type of inquiry that continually remains peculiarly sealed off to its own grounds, namely the metaphysical decisions that open a realm of questioning, such that questioning itself is suspended in the name of answering) Nietzsche penetrates further into the essence of life than any straightforward biology can. Heidegger maintains that “life” is central to Nietzsche and his ‘metaphysics’, but that life is never thought from a biological perspective. Ansell-Pearson first locates Heidegger’s reductive claims regarding Nietzsche’s anthropomorphism as follows:

[Nietzsche's thinking] does not pose the question of being free of anthropomorphic reasoning but instead installs a subjectivism through the positing of the self-assertion and self-expansion of the will-to-power that speaks of a desire for constant self-overcoming on the part of ‘life’.

In spite of this accusation regarding a re-inscription of subjectivism, Ansell-Pearson suggests that in showing Nietzsche not to be guilty of biologism, Heidegger manages to relate to Nietzsche's thinking in a manner that puts all things pertaining to “life”,

\[\text{Viroid Life, p112. In chapter 5, I will suggest that Heidegger comments are not so much directed towards questions of origin, but of methodology. His concern is, following FCM, how Nietzsche understands the essential constitution of that which lives, namely, the essence of life. In conflating life and world, Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be guilty of metaphysical anthropomorphism, which is effectively the direct opposite of a radical extension of the world of the animal: it precisely covers over the animal itself.}\]

\[\text{Viroid Life, p 110}\]
i.e., notions of the biological, the animal, man as animal etc. into question in a profound manner. Thus engaging with Heidegger’s non-reductive claims as regards Nietzsche and anthropomorphism.

In this passage what is ‘biological’ and ‘non-biological’ and what is ‘human’ or ‘non-human’ are cast into question, and not only in regard to Nietzsche’s speculations on life. For the most part, however, Heidegger finds Nietzsche stuck within the iron cage of anthropomorphism. However, for him this is not to hold a charge against Nietzsche but to open oneself up to his provocation.\(^5^4\)

In Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, the question of life is raised in a manner that stretches beyond the mere page of Nietzsche’s text: Nietzsche’s provocation holds everything that pertains to anthropomorphism (and life: here, the body; evolutionary origins; man’s animality) out in a decisive space. For Heidegger, the limit of Nietzsche’s thinking is reached where any response to this holding-out-into-question of life is ventured. Nietzsche is simply incapable of achieving the type of historicality with regards to his own heritage that he would need in order to think outside of life-like, thus subjectivist (on Heidegger’s terms), determinations.\(^5^5\)

Ansell-Pearson recognises that Heidegger constructs something of a historical impasse when it comes to Nietzsche. This configuration of the Heidegger/Nietzsche encounter is very strong. For Ansell-Pearson, the impasse only becomes complete if you look to move beyond Nietzsche in a manner that rejects life as being the central concern, i.e., look towards Being instead, or misread Darwin in the way that both Heidegger, and Nietzsche himself, did. It is as a result of Heidegger’s inability to read Darwin outside of his prejudices regarding biology and, and thus recognise his potential to offer non-

\(^{5^4}\) Ibid, p114-5. Ansell-Pearson is here commenting on page 122 of Heidegger’s third Nietzsche volume.

\(^{5^5}\) Heidegger argues this in \textit{NIII}. This matter is the subject of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
anthropomorphic accounts of life (or at least create the grounds for such accounts),
that Ansell-Pearson considers Heidegger to have an equally reductive reading of
Nietzsche, and therefore history.\textsuperscript{56}

Here, Ansell-Pearson may not take full account of the specificity of \textit{Auseinandersetzung},
i.e., the way in which Heidegger is attempting to read. He begins his detailed criticism
of Heidegger’s reading, his attempt at moving beyond the impasse created by it, with
the following claim, which is worth quoting at length, because it fully represents the
type of reading of \textit{FCM} that I am attempting to draw into question:

A move beyond the impasse of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche— the impasse
of anthropomorphism and animalism which then leads to a devotional
mourning of the question of Being in Heidegger’s later work, to waiting for a
god—is possible by questioning the anthropocentric prejudices of Heidegger’s
own determination of biology as biologism. It is classic anthropocentrism on
Heidegger’s part to assume that the animal is firmly defined and closed in its
rapport with the ‘environment’, that it is, as he maintains, ‘poor in the world’
(see Krell 1992:121). It is also bad biology. The problem, I want to argue, is that
Heidegger, along with the modern German tradition of thought that he is
working within (notably Kant and Hegel), is trapped within an ‘organismic’
conception of life (and death), and so is unable to articulate the kind of
‘machinic’ conception of evolution that is necessary to free the logic of life from
anthropocentric naivety and blindness.\textsuperscript{57}

The task of moving beyond this impasse is characterised as a process in which the

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Viroid Life}, p 115.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. The merits of this machinic conception are beyond the scope of this thesis, however, this
characterisation of Heidegger’s view of the animal in terms of openness and closedness rests on
Nietzsche’s understanding of the differences. In \textit{NIII} Heidegger repudiates Nietzsche’s account of the
animal precisely because he understands Nietzsche to represent man as an undefined animal. As I will
show in my engagement with \textit{FCM} the abyssal nature of man’s bodily kinship with the animal is not
measured in terms of determination/ non-determination or autopoiesis etc. But is posited precisely as
an abyss of essential origins. To this end I present Heidegger as mounting a defence against the over-
determination of the living that he witnesses in Nietzsche. See Chapter 5.
'logic of life' is freed from its trappings within the subjectivist history of organismic thinking. Thus, Ansell-Pearson is laying the same claim at Heidegger's door as Heidegger himself laid at Nietzsche's. For Ansell-Pearson there is a particular historical tradition that has been incapable of perceiving its own trappedness within the operative conception of living things: (that they are organisms).  

For Ansell-Pearson, Heidegger is incapable of dealing with life as presented by Nietzsche (and Darwin) and in the face of the force of biology's potentially disruptive powers, Heidegger blindly repeats the history of the German tradition, failing to stand strongly within a decisive space for the history of anthropomorphism-subjectivism-metaphysics that he created. Throughout this thesis I will argue that Heidegger's account of the essence of “life” in FCM is not as straightforwardly determinate as Ansell-Pearson (and Krell and Scott) claims. There is a specificity and a context to his

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58 He considers this impasse to be directly related to the possibilities that both thinkers offer for thinking techne and technicity. Indeed Ansell-Pearson wishes to move beyond both thinkers in his own exploration of this theme, wishing to explore non-human (hence 'machinic') techics. It is in the thinking of techics that nature, life, the artificial – essentially all the issues held within the rubric of life – are decided about. Such a move is inextricably linked with the achievement of some type of authentic historicity: such is true for Heidegger (as we have seen in my dealings with Auseinandersetzung), for Nietzsche's in his genealogical method, and so too for Ansell-Pearson: “The question is whether techics itself is to be treated as intrinsically and irredeemably anthropomorphic...While recognizing that any firm and fixed opposition between nature and technology, between art and artifice, is deeply problematic, one must be careful not to collapse the distinction too quickly or hastily. One can posit the evolution of life in terms of an originary technicity, but this should not be at the expense of serious historical labouring. The danger of neglecting the formation and deformation of these notions, of constructing a 'history' of them in some sense, is that of mystification and reification.” [Ibid, p114]

59 Returning to the opening claims of Ansell-Pearson's criticism, the tessellation of these various yet contemporary (to each other) readings becomes fully apparent. Ansell-Pearson's reference to the lack in Heidegger's thinking animality is not taken from the thinker directly, but from Krell's Daimon Life, indeed precisely the same chapter that came under analysis in the previous section. This is, of course, not to point out that there is nothing original or idiosyncratic about Ansell-Pearson's reading, just that there is a collective form of interpretation prevalent amongst disparate interpreters, i.e., precisely the type of uniformity that one would expect to form as a result of a particular dominance of taking FCM outside of its aforementioned deeper context. However, there is something ultimately more compelling and challenging about Ansell-Pearson's reading as he takes Nietzsche's role in Heidegger's own historical self-determination seriously, locating this for himself as a question of the wherefore of technicity, and as the question of life/animalism in Heidegger. There is, still, a dislocation of FCM from its (prospective) context as an explicit engagement with Nietzsche, but it is, here, ostensibly figured as an account of life and animality that seeks to offer itself up as a mode of thinking beyond the historical impasse of Nietzsche. It is not possible to simply point out that a reading of Auseinandersetzung would destabilise Ansell-Pearson's account and move on, as there is an implicit recognition of the pervading
comparative analysis of world that opens up a different perspective on Heidegger's handling of “life” in FCM. Accordingly, following Ansell-Pearson's line of thought, this opens a space to understand this “impasse” of life in a different manner.\textsuperscript{60}

**Final Preliminary Remarks**

Thinking the nature of Heidegger’s determination of the Nietzsche impasse, and moreover, its potential overcoming, remains open. In this manner Ansell-Pearson remains a provocative Interlocutor, whose grand challenge to Heidegger remains intact and informative, but not conclusive, thus precisely worthy of further investigation. It is my intention to extend the same courtesy to Heidegger that he attempts to extend to Nietzsche, which is to say, I intend to 'learn how to read well'. Reading well in this manner, means to take Heidegger seriously as an interpreter of Nietzsche, to understand how he considers himself to have opened up to Nietzsche’s provocation. Heidegger saw precisely this provocation at the heart of his Auseinandersetzung – his polemos, his war – with Nietzsche.

Heidegger contends that any attempt to grasp the contemporary situation and develop or open up a potential ground for philosophising anew (thus truly coming to terms with the movements of and fundamental concepts of metaphysics), must first locate itself within the proper site of the contemporary, wherein it must engage in a confrontation of sorts, in an Auseinandersetzung, with this as yet incompletely-formed presence of Nietzsche and thus life in the thinking at work in the 1929/30 lecture course. The notion that what is at stake is an opening up to Nietzsche’s provocation is indicative of a recognition of the stakes for Heidegger.

\textsuperscript{60} In chapter 5 I will present my own account of the nature of this impasse in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, based on my reading of *NI* and *NIII* as contextualised by FCM
contemporary. In the earlier sections of *FCM* the task of determining this contemporary is clearly defined by Heidegger as being bound up intimately with Nietzsche. In the later sections of *FCM*, Heidegger goes on to deal with the contemporary trends in, and the situation of, the Biological sciences, ostensibly leaving Nietzsche behind. However, where he initially structures the contemporary as having its ground in, and being an inability to properly think through, Nietzsche in general, he more specifically locates this site as nothing other than the repercussions of Nietzsche's notions of the Dionysian and Apollonian.

The reason why Heidegger takes time to present a number of quotations pertaining to Nietzsche's mature understanding of Apollo and Dionysus, takes the time to explicate these ideas in any depth at all, is, as yet, unclear. That this is a deliberate step, that it is not meaningless, is, for serious readers, indubitable. It would be too much, even for someone with a keen eye for the presence of Nietzsche, to make such an allusion towards this connection were it not for the fact that Nietzsche is seemingly lost in these later sections, only to reappear in the very last instance, at a point where, by way of conclusion and indeed provocation, Heidegger himself suspends the last words of his lecture. He remains silent, allowing only Nietzsche to speak, as though the entire lecture course had been steps along the path to understanding a portion of the profundity of the last voice of metaphysics. By way of conclusion to what some have forwarded as his attempt at “theoretical biology”, one that supposedly considers itself to have surpassed Nietzsche, Heidegger simply forwards the “intoxicated song” of Zarathustra.

The subject of life has been forwarded as the source of an impasse between Heidegger
and Nietzsche, and equally forwarded as the subject matter of *FCM*. The remainder of this thesis will attempt to examine these claims, and established their veracity. As established in this chapter, the stakes of reading *FCM* are high. The incorporation of *FCM* within an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche offers potential resources to both re-conceive the contents of that lecture course, and reciprocally to re-conceive the structure of Heidegger’s relationship to Nietzsche. This calls for a close reading of *FCM* itself as a whole, one that has the course’s own meaning/aims/context as a goal, and not an imported, grander, critical schema. Given the stakes for the history of philosophy that both Scott and Krell have outlined, this endeavour clearly has a potential impact that spans out further into the Heideggerian corpus and beyond.
Chapter 2. FCM’s 'Preliminary Appraisal': Towards a philosophical Auseinandersetzung

Introduction

Seeking to provide an orientation for the remainder of the lecture course, Heidegger, in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', attempts to generate the context for, and a sense of the necessity of, the two tasks that will come to constitute the majority of the lecture course, namely, a phenomenological analysis of boredom and an investigation into world which takes the form of an engagement with contemporary biology.\(^1\) As such, it constitutes a propadeutic for these later tasks in a proper sense: it does not simply house a series of clarifications and definitions of concepts to be used in the main body of the lecture course, but rather, it teaches the rigours and logic demanded by the lecture course as a whole.\(^2\) As a process of securing a fundamental orientation, it cannot be dismissed in terms of its importance as a context for the following two parts.

The 'Preliminary Appraisal' of FCM primarily deals with issues in methodology regarding how to move beyond mere opinions about metaphysics, and out towards an encounter with metaphysics itself, such that its fundamental concepts can be appropriately grasped. Starting with the character of metaphysics, as the “master

\(^1\) This is of course contemporary to 1929/30, as De Beistegui suggests in De Beistegui, M. Thinking With Heidegger (Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 2003), certain advancements in varying biologies provide a more advanced view.

\(^2\) Whilst §1 of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' of FCM immediately sets to work in the pursuit of the latter aim stated in its general subheading, namely seeking ‘a General Elucidation of the Title and Course’, the overall sweep of the opening section as a whole is forwarded as concerning ‘The Task of the Course and Its Fundamental Orientation Starting with a General Elucidation of the Title and its Course’. The sections headings, chapter titles and titles of parts (indeed the very division into paragraph, sections, chapters and parts) are editorial additions. However, the titles are all phrases taken from the sections to which they refer.
discipline” of philosophy, Heidegger asks if ‘it were a prejudice that metaphysics is a fixed and secure discipline of philosophy’, suggesting that it may be an ‘illusion’ that philosophy can be taught and learned in a manner akin to the sciences.³ Heidegger contends, that in striving toward itself as an ‘absolute science’ (something supreme, that not only concerns everyone but is itself capable of being understood by all that it concerns) philosophy remains closed to its own essence.

Rejecting the possibility of a productive comparison of philosophy with science, the lecture course becomes devoted to maintaining the sovereignty of philosophy by finding a way to think the essence of philosophy (as metaphysics) from “within itself”.⁴ This encounter, Heidegger contends, requires the rejection of (mathematical) certainty as the ‘measure of knowledge and ideal of truth for philosophy’.⁵ Such an ideal projects philosophy onto a goal (that of providing and securing knowledge with absolute certainty) that lies outside of its authentic possibilities, one that precludes philosophizing from openly relating to its ultimately uncertain, turbulent ground. As such, philosophy has, hitherto, remained estranged from itself.

The nature of this ground structures the entirety of the lecture course. In this manner, FCM as a whole can be thought of as an attempt at retrieving philosophy itself: encountering the essence of philosophy such that it can once again be brought into a relationship with itself and accordingly with ‘us’, whoever we may be. This movement of retrieval and self-determination is, in FCM, ultimately characterised as being based in the establishment of a genuine confrontation with Nietzsche. As such, there is both

³ *FCM, §1 C*)
⁴ Religion and art are also rejected as comparatives, although these disciplines are suggested as being in essence closer to philosophy than science: they are sisters.
⁵ Ibid.
an historical intent and an historical methodology that is explicitly, lengthily, and forcefully espoused within the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. This manifold historicality has heretofore been overlooked in favour of the two modes in which this historical task was taken up within the remainder of the text. As such, the discontinuity of this work with regard to what follows in the Heideggerian corpus has been emphasised, i.e., the unique character of the focus on a single mood, or the singular nature of the engagement with the specificities of the life-sciences.

Overlooking the 'Preliminary Appraisal' results in an misunderstanding of the ultimately historical direction in which the remainder of the FCM moves. This has the dual effect of dislocating FCM from its proper context and disorientating Heidegger's later meditation on Nietzsche and life. This point is not merely archival: establishing the philosophical importance of Auseinandersetzung within FCM, allows Heidegger's subsequent thoughts regarding Nietzsche, life, the Sciences and the possibilities of metaphysics, to be framed as consequent thoughts of matters explicitly formulated in FCM. Thus providing a platform for a more accurate understanding of Heidegger's relationship to Nietzsche and life.

In order to pursue this thesis goal, in the following chapter, in §1, I will justify and flesh-out the claim that FCM is aimed towards a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung)

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6 Namely, first as a phenomenological examination of boredom – an attempt at awakening a fundamental attunement from out of which philosophising can occur, and secondly as an examination of the phenomenon of world via the comparative analysis of three beings that have varying modes of access to world (namely Dasein, animals and stones) – an attempt to philosophise via one of the three fundamental concepts of Metaphysics. It is my claim that the orientations of these particular engagements have become dissociated from their context in such a way that their historical intent has been forgotten.

7 The direction of which was suggested at the close of the previous chapter. My overriding claim is, therefore, that FCM does not represent a high-point of Heidegger’s meditation on life as a possible horizon for thinking. How and why this is the case will be most strongly argued for in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.
with philosophy, establishing the genuine goals of the text. §2 will focus on the manner in which this *Auseinandersetzung* is understood to be historical, establishing both the historical *context* that Heidegger gives for his lecture course, and the historical *intent* thereof. The opening of chapter 3 will take these matters up as they appear in 'Part One' of *FCM*, examining the Nietzschean character of this philosophically essential, historical *Auseinandersetzung*, establishing not only Nietzsche’s role in *FCM*, but also the manner in which life first emerges as a central matter in the text. These two chapters constitute my reading of the, heretofore under-examined, opening of *FCM*.

1. Approaching Metaphysics

1.1. The Futility of Negative Determinations

Attempting to establish an inquiry into the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, Heidegger adopts the most salient starting point: a comparative analysis of metaphysics and other academic disciplines. He suggests that it could be possible to account for the distinct lack of concord amongst philosophers by considering it to simply be less mature than the other sciences: 'philosophy moves on an inferior level'. The path forward for philosophy, when confronted with this discord in its findings, would be to carry on regardless and continue to pursue parity with the sciences. In assuming the 'secure path' of a science it would only be a matter of time before philosophy (and thus metaphysics as its central discipline) can be clearly and adequately determined. Heidegger suggests that such a comparison with science

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*As aforementioned, there is remarkably little written about the opening itself. Krell selects certain claims from these sections, as does Beistegui (see sections on Boredom), but little in the was of detailed analysis is to be found.*

*FCM, §1. a).*

might in fact be erroneous in its entirety.

What if it were a *prejudice* that metaphysics is a fixed and secure discipline of philosophy, and an *illusion* that philosophy is a science that can be taught and learned?\(^\text{11}\)

This thought naturally opens up a further question:

Yet if philosophy in general and fundamentally is *not* science, then what is it doing?\(^\text{12}\)

Heidegger's response is to state that comparisons with other disciplines and sciences can only result in a *negative* determination of philosophy,\(^\text{13}\) as all that can be said positively of it is that it 'cannot be fitted into such frameworks'. If this is the case, then the task confronting any endeavour that seeks to learn what philosophy is is that of tackling the *incomparability* of philosophy itself, wherein it must be understood not as an *absolute science* (which Heidegger claims is characteristic of philosophy's own self-relation throughout its modern inception with Descartes) but as *absolute*.\(^\text{14}\) In order to understand the *fundamental concepts* of metaphysics, we first have to understand what *metaphysics is*. As Heidegger puts it, 'how are we to experience what philosophy itself

\(^{11}\) Ibid.

\(^{12}\) Ibid.

\(^{13}\) Negative determinations return when Heidegger, in the later sections on world, asks after the essence of life. Here, as I will show, Heidegger offers up the same problematic, attempting to grapple with the possibility of moving beyond a privative, or negative determination of the world of the animal, and the essence of the living. I will ultimately claim that Heidegger does not achieve this latter task, as he never attempts to genuinely enter into an encounter with the essence of life, but rather is attempting to show that such an encounter must first involve an encounter with metaphysics itself.

\(^{14}\) The possible productivity of a comparison with something other than science is also forwarded. Heidegger points out that the comparison with science functioned in a more fundamental manner, as it took the form of an attempt 'to determine it [philosophy] as science'\((§1,b)\). It would seemingly always constitute a 'debasement' of philosophy's essence for it to be defined not just negatively, but privatively as a lesser science. On the other hand, it can generally be taken as being clear that art and religion are not held as maintaining the same structures and concerns (at least in terms of approach) as philosophy. However, Heidegger forwards two problems with this approach. The first is that equality and parity do not equate to identity, and following from this, a comparison amongst equals would still require an initial positive definition of philosophy if it were to yield anything other than a negative description.
1.2. Allowing the Question of Metaphysics to Unfold: From Everyday Awareness of Philosophy to Philosophy itself

The intended result of the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ is not the provision of a functional definition of metaphysics, but rather, a way of seeing the matter with regards metaphysics in an appropriately philosophical light. Throughout, Heidegger adopts the standpoint of his students, which is to say, a non-philosophical standpoint from out of which he seeks to develop an understanding of what philosophising is. Heidegger continually refers to what everyday consciousness and everyday opinion initially take philosophy to be. Along these lines, and purely for the purposes of illustration, it could be said that Heidegger is conducting his own form of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit.*

In the preface to the *Phenomenology,* Hegel forwards his text as a description of the path that ordinary (natural) consciousness takes in its internally driven progression to the standpoint of ‘Science or knowledge in general’, wherein philosophy can begin. This progression is self-driven because, for Hegel, ordinary consciousness, on the basis of its possession of an immediate and unconditioned relation to being, has the right to demand that philosophy itself provide ‘a ladder to this standpoint’. In this way, philosophy is taken to be the end point of a logical unfolding of the structure of ordinary consciousness, such that the movement of ordinary consciousness up the

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15 Ibid.
16 See esp. FCM, §5, where Heidegger examines the ambiguity of a lecture course itself being capable of instigating philosophy.
17 Hegel, G.W.F, *Phenomenology of Spirit* trans. Miller, A.V (OUP, Oxford: 1977). Preface, paragraph 26 – ‘Pure self-recognition in absolute otherness, this aether as such, is the ground and soil of Science or knowledge in general. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or requires that consciousness should dwell in this element’
18 Ibid.
ladder to philosophy is not taken to be something extant to philosophy, but the very 'movement of its becoming'. For Hegel, this initiation into philosophy is necessary for the following reasons.

When natural consciousness entrusts itself straight away to Science, it makes an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk on its head too, just this once; the compulsion to assume this unwanted posture and to go about in it is a violence it is expected to do to itself, all unprepared, and seemingly without necessity.

Here we see the relevance of Heidegger's reference to the “inverted world” of philosophy in §7 of FCM, and the true similarity of his efforts in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' to those of the Phenomenology. The task of entering into philosophy, for both thinkers, requires a particular mode of preparation which is first and foremost a matter of grasping the necessity of philosophy, and becoming oriented within the seemingly upside-down world thereof. For Hegel, this orientation starts by taking the most basic and immediate form of consciousness and allowing it to progress under its own volition, rung-by-rung, up the ladder to philosophy until it has become something of the order of philosophical consciousness. If this progression does not remain 'immanent', i.e., is not purely ordinary consciousness' becoming philosophical consciousness, then the tasks of preparing for, and orientating oneself within philosophy will not have been achieved. In seeking to open a path to philosophy itself by first allowing a preparatory definition of metaphysics to unfold under the power of

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19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 In this section Heidegger, when analysing Plato and Heraclitus' use of the language of sleeping and waking, suggest that Hegel was right when he claimed that philosophy presents an “inverted world”, as philosophical awareness demands a peculiar readiness and relation to the world that appears completely foreign to everyday awareness. Heidegger emphasises this stark division between everyday awareness and philosophy, and yet the easy hanging together of everyday awareness and scientific awareness throughout both FCM and NIII.
its own failure to fully grasp what it initially takes philosophy to be, Heidegger's attempt to prepare for an encounter with philosophy is equally as committed to a notion of immanence as Hegel's, and thus potentially equally as open to criticisms regarding the purity of his immanent method.\textsuperscript{22}

Heidegger is not committed to the same starting point as Hegel, namely consciousness in its most \textit{immediate} form. He consistently states that consciousness (either of the self or as intentional), does not constitute the basic character of man's relationship to being. As such, that philosophising pertains to consciousness (that a fundamental attunement can be ascertained by consciousness for example) is taken to be one of the positions that overcome themselves along this path to philosophy. Heidegger cannot rest his own ladder to philosophy on the bedrock of certainty (sense-certainty, self-certainty or other). His starting point is the very possibility of certainty itself, drawing philosophy's status as knowledge of any order into doubt.\textsuperscript{23} In taking up doubt in this renewed and heightened manner Heidegger is commandeering the language and procedures of

\textsuperscript{22} Such criticism would point out the places where the immanent unfolding of the question is violated, thus highlighting any interruption of the progressive process of philosophy's own becoming by means of recourse to a pre-established determination of philosophy itself. If it were the case that an interruption of this order was in evidence, then it would indicate one of two things, either that the task of entering into philosophy is \textit{completely} hermetically sealed, or that Heidegger has committed himself to an erroneous path, and thus generates an improper understanding of how to prepare for philosophising itself. This is what Hegel refers to as the 'path of doubt' and 'the way of despair' in paragraph 78 of the \textit{Phenomenology}, where doubt is not taken to be a mere distraction on the way to maintaining a belief in what was originally the subject of doubt, but to be the process whereby what was originally taken to be the case is transformed and uncovered as that which it is in truth. This is an area of great debate: whether the Phenomenology does indeed unfold immanently, or is, alternatively, teleological. There are multiple places where pressure can be put on Heidegger's adherence to this method of allowing the question of metaphysics to unfold of its own accord. The circumstances of his derivation of the fundamental concepts themselves (world, finitude, solitude) is one such place. Whilst the explication of the concepts themselves is relatively salient, the source from which they are first encountered, namely Novalis' poetic pronouncement on philosophy, is distinctly arbitrarily selected. However, this criticism – that Heidegger is arbitrarily selecting an initial definition of philosophy that will grant him grounds to further determine what philosophy itself is without having genuinely argued for either the necessity of this determination, or its development from out of the question of metaphysics itself – only has purchase if Heidegger is committed to the exact same type of immanent methodology as Hegel.

\textsuperscript{23} Heidegger characterises modern metaphysics, from Descartes onward as a philosophy of doubt that does not doubt certainty itself, as it is always grounded in the certainty of a knowing subject.
modern metaphysics in order to generate an understanding of metaphysics’ own internal confrontation and oscillation between certainty and uncertainty.

Heidegger’s commitment to the path of philosophy initially involving the unfolding of the question of metaphysics is not the same as a commitment to an *immanent* derivation of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics themselves. Where the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ mirrors the *Phenomenology*’s progressive movement from ordinary consciousness to philosophical consciousness, it also mirrors Hegel’s *Science of Logic* in as much as it attempts a derivation of (rather than just a clarification of) the fundamental concepts of philosophy. Houlgate provides an informative description of the aim of the *Logic* which will help to shed light on precisely what is going on in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’.

Hegel’s philosophy proper begins with the *Logic* which seeks to provide an immanent, presuppositionless derivation of the basic categories of thought and being. This derivation of the categories is ‘presuppositionless’ because it takes for granted no specific rules of thought and, indeed, is preceded by the act of setting aside all our familiar determinate assumptions about thought and being.

Whilst, in *FCM*, Heidegger clearly seeks to unfold the ’basic categories of thought and being’ in some manner (providing we replace the word categories with concepts), he does so in a way that takes up ‘our familiar determinate assumptions about thought and being’, rather than setting them aside. He is not doing this as a matter of

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24 Houlgate, S. *An Introduction to Hegel, Freedom, Truth and History*. (Blackwell, Oxford: 2005) pp. 106-8. To reiterate: these comparisons with Hegel are by no means intended as a commentary on, or an evaluation of Hegel’s contribution to the matter. They are simply intended as brief illustrations of the originality and philosophical intent of Heidegger’s embarkation into the matter of the fundamental concepts of philosophy “from the ground up”, so to speak. If successful the comparison will serve to provide a previously unrecognised context for this ‘Preliminary Appraisal’.
ignorance. Rather than attempting to be presuppositionless, Heidegger's derivation of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics is entirely based upon (and is thus only possible following the acceptance of) the idea that philosophy is not a trivial enterprise, and thus has a character of its own. This presupposition is both the ground of his account of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics and also the starting point of his attempt to access the inner essence of philosophy from a standpoint outside of philosophy itself. The 'Preliminary Appraisal' can thus be understood to pursue two matters at the same time: becoming oriented to philosophy itself and deriving the fundamental concepts of philosophy.  

In FCM Heidegger is not attempting an entirely original task with regards to philosophy. Rather, he attempts to stage an encounter with philosophy itself from out of the way in which it stands with regard to philosophy here and now. This requires a commitment to engaging with philosophy in a way that both accesses its essential character, but at the same time recognises and operates from out of its situatedness within determinate and pre-established rules of thought and assumptions about thought and being. Heidegger's efforts in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' constitute an orientation towards the peculiarly historical and hermeneutically problematic status of philosophy, namely, that philosophy is at once essential, and therefore a seemingly a priori activity, and yet at the same time it is concretely determined by its historical provenance. It concerns man in as much as man exists as man – not limited to factical

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25 Both of these enterprises accept the difficulty and uncertainty of their task, that is, as I shall show, Heidegger does not permit himself recourse to certain grounds, as this would relinquish philosophy's claim to its own unique essence. Despite his starting point being somewhat arbitrary in both matters, it is not the case that philosophy is completely hermetically sealed or inaccessible. Rather, it is not straightforwardly accessible in the Hegelian manner: on Heidegger's terms, one does not have the right to demand that philosophy itself provide a ladder to itself. The task of preparing for philosophy involves a readiness, but this readiness is not something that can be lightly assumed.
provenance, yet at the same time inextricably caught up in historicality. Initially this appears to be a simple problem, as all that we need do is extricate analysis from its factual-historical situation and concentrate on the ontological/essential level. This move, indeed, the desire to conduct a move of this order, runs counter to the problem at hand. It repeats a problem identified by Heidegger in section §12, wherein some more originary grasp of metaphysics must be attained prior to establishing what it is that is precisely arbitrary, contingent or merely factual about metaphysics/philosophising as “we” find it today. As Heidegger points out in the opening sections of ‘Part One’, figuring out exactly who this “we” is, is not as straightforward as it may seem.

A similar issue is raised in §14, this time regarding philosophical novelty. Here Heidegger will claim that an understanding of the peculiarity of modern metaphysics relies on the recognition of something “new” emerging from within metaphysics today. This, itself, requires an initial understanding of metaphysics’ essence in order to grasp the key moments of historical continuity and discontinuity that allow for a recognition of the “new” as that which is different from, yet connected to, that which has gone before. Accordingly, Heidegger does not consider his task to be the eradication of the matter of philosophy’s provenance in order to access its a-historical grounds: he is not seeking to do something new.
1.3 Facing up to metaphysics

1.3.1. Homesickness

The 'Preliminary Appraisal' appears to address the same problem of history which the mature notion of *Auseinandersetzung* was designed to address: how to generate an appropriate method of approach to the history of philosophy. This is not a mere matter of coincidence: where *Auseinandersetzung* was posited as a mode of engagement that adopts the very movement of thinking itself, *FCM* is directed toward precisely the same problem. In asking how to face metaphysics directly, without detour, Heidegger is attempting to prepare for a confrontation of sorts, a-facing up-to metaphysics itself. Initially, an historical approach is presented as potentially capable of providing a path towards philosophy, but is ultimately rejected for the same reasons as other 'detours', namely that it will only operate at the level of 'opinions about metaphysics', remaining on the outside of 'metaphysics itself'.\(^{26}\) In the 'Preliminary Appraisal', Heidegger maintains that an alternative route towards an encounter with philosophy itself must be sustained. I will follow this route in order to fully bring into view the manner in which the 'Preliminary Appraisal' does not maintain a purely external likeness to the issues associated with *Auseinandersetzung* as a technical term, but in fact directly points towards and calls for a deeper understanding of the fundamental character of philosophy as confrontational. As *Auseinandersetzung* is “cut” for an engagement with Nietzsche, this endeavour will begin to draw out Nietzsche’s presence in *FCM*.

Whilst the appraisal of comparative analyses as a way into an investigation of the character of metaphysics has produced no *positive* definition of metaphysics itself,
Heidegger contends that it has furnished his investigation with 'perhaps [an] essential insight into what is peculiar about metaphysics: that we ourselves avoid confrontation with it'.\footnote{FCM, §2. a) } The nature of this avoidance is ambivalent, it is initially unclear whether it is the case that metaphysics is elusive or that 'we' are not prepared to 'look metaphysics in the face'.\footnote{Ibid. } If philosophy itself allows no comparison and needs to be understood from out of itself, then it can only be understood as accessible when in operation: 'philosophy is philosophizing'.\footnote{Ibid. } If philosophy only is as philosophising, then it is clearly essentially a human activity. As such, it seems impossible for philosophy to withdraw from those to whom it is bound. Directly responding to this quandary, Heidegger picks a guiding statement from Novalis, wherein philosophy is proclaimed to be a 'homesickness, an urge to be at home everywhere'.\footnote{Ibid, §2.b). In his translation notes McNeill suggests that this quote has special prominence because the use of Trieb (urge) and its cognates holds an important position throughout the text. However, this selection is curious, and appears for seemingly no other reason than for its illustrative power (i.e., it is not somehow internally necessitated by what has gone before in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'), however, Heidegger attributes this to two matters, first, the essential ambiguity of all genuinely philosophical beginnings, and secondly, the intimate relationship between art and philosophy that allows for art to illuminate philosophies path in some respect. } It is through this proclamation that Heidegger for the first time unfolds a positive determination of metaphysics in terms of its fundamental concepts. This determination unveils the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, but only in as much as they are the fundamental questions that structure metaphysics as a human enterprise.

1.3.2. Derivation of the Fundamental Concepts

In wanting to be at home everywhere it follows that man must first be taken as not being at home. Heidegger takes “everywhere” not to mean a continuous series of
discrete places, but to be all places taken “as a whole”. All places, when taken as a whole, constitute world. As such, philosophy is a desire to constantly be within the whole; to ask after world as being as a whole. Hence the first concept as a question: 'What is that – World'? Accordingly, in being driven towards being as a whole, man is neither fully within the world nor fully outside it, else there would be no homesickness: man is in transition between the two positions. For Heidegger, this oscillation constitutes finitude. Finitude as transition is not “worldly”, but rather on the way toward the world. As such it is not some-where to be occupied, and therefore not something which contains other beings in some way: it is a way of being. Philosophy and its concepts speak from out of and about man's essence. Thus finitude is not one way of being amongst others but is 'our fundamental way of being', hence the second concept/question: 'What is that – Finitude'.

Finitude, properly understood as our fundamental way of being, is not a fixed position but some sort of process. Rather than being a process which realises our genuine character in a resolution of its movement in one of the aspects between which it is stretched (in either becoming somehow fully at home in the world, i.e., as a being of the same order as those we find ourselves amidst, or as fully transcending beings as a whole in the direction of pure individuality), finitude 'only is in truly becoming

31 Ibid.
32 Later I will examine Heidegger's etymological account of the concept of world – the movement from κόσμος to mundus, which he presents in On the Essence of Ground. Here, via an engagement with Kant, he shows that there has been a form of metaphysical confusion wherein finitude and world have been conflated, i.e., to be finite is to be of the world, and to be of the world is to be finite. In what remains of the “preliminary appraisal”, Heidegger expands upon this problem at length. Ultimately, his above mentioned Kant analysis is forwarded as a companion to the comparative analysis of world presented in Part Two of FCM.
33 Ibid. §2. b).
34 These two alternate possibilities could perhaps be envisioned as the promise of a philosophy of life in the first instance and a promise of the pure origins of the subject on the other (e.g., Fichte's I=I ). This is clearly an attempt to ward off the notion that Heidegger is establishing a dichotomy of possibilities for the investigation of the essence of man: the embodiment, so to speak, of man (man as fully part of the whole as or the same order as the beings it finds itself amongst), or the pure self-identical subjecthood.
finite'. In becoming truly finite we are becoming truly who we are (Heidegger himself uses this peculiarly Nietzschean terminology): we are individuated. Heidegger clarifies this by pointing out that this individuation is not thought in terms of an ego in confrontation with the world, but moreover as a 'solitariness in which in which each human being first enters into [...] a nearness with world', hence the third concept/question 'What is that – Individuation?'.

The fundamental concepts of metaphysics (world, finitude, solitude) are thus presented as questions. They are fundamentally interrelated, such that each in its own way inquires into the whole, but nonetheless maintains an internally necessitated relationship to the others. Throughout FCM, Heidegger will return to this structure. His boredom analysis and his comparative analysis of world are fully understandable only from within an understanding of this structure and the technical way in which Heidegger is deploying the words “world”, “finitude” and “solitude”. Heidegger suggests that the rigour required for the comprehension of these questions and concepts necessitates a different attitude from that of the sciences, where indifference and impartiality are demanded. For Heidegger, 'it is not sufficient for us to know such questions. What is decisive is whether we really ask such question, whether we have the strength to sustain them right through our whole existence'. In what then does this difference consist? According to Heidegger, we first have to have 'been gripped by

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35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. Once again it is clearly the case that these concepts have not been derived from a pure unfolding of the question concerning metaphysics, but have been derived from the statement by Novalis. Heidegger does not try to avoid the obvious problem regarding 'the authority and significance of this witness', but he also does not provide any further justification beyond the cryptic thought that 'art is the sister of philosophy'. As discussed above this would only constitute a problem for Heidegger if he were attempting some *purely* immanent unfolding of the question “What is Metaphysics”.
37 Ibid.
whatever they [the concepts] are supposed to comprehend’.\textsuperscript{38} This term and its cognates will be employed in order to describe the appropriately philosophical activity that can be undertaken in the face of a need to be (in some way) passively gripped, namely, philosophy must concern itself with awakening ‘such being gripped’.

Heidegger goes on to clarify that all such “being gripped” has its ground in an attunement, and a “fundamental attunement” at that.\textsuperscript{39} A fundamental attunement is precisely what its name suggests, it is an all encompassing attunement that operates at an even more basic level than an individual attunement, wherein it has the character of ‘constantly, essentially and thoroughly’ attuning human beings. Philosophy necessarily happens from within a fundamental attunement as, given philosophy is an essential activity of man, it is the most fundamental way in which we are gripped. Thus, it locates philosophy at the most appropriate level, which is ‘in the ground of human Dasein’.\textsuperscript{40}

We ask anew: What is man? [...] We do not know. Yet we have seen that in the essence of this mysterious being, philosophy happens.\textsuperscript{41}

Facing up to metaphysics thus involves a certain a confrontation with ourselves.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. As McNeill points out in his translation gripped [ergriffen] constitutes a play on the German term for Concept [Begriff] and comprehend [begreifen]. This is a theme which is repeated and expanded throughout the text.

\textsuperscript{39} The concept of attunement [Stimmung] (also commonly translated as mood) has a rich philosophical background, having been a central component of Division I of \textit{BT}. Whilst this exegetical account of \textit{FCM} is intended to operate independently of readings of other Heideggerian texts, some knowledge of the significance of this term and also of the basic character of attunement/mood as it appears in \textit{BT} must be assumed if sufficient ground is to be made. A deep analysis of precisely what is meant by attunement would constitute a divergence from the thrust of the text, i.e. Heidegger is seemingly happy to simply mention the ontological structure of attunement and suspend a deeper analysis until later on in the text (and in a less technical way than might expected). Chapter 3 of this thesis will focus on ‘Part One’ of \textit{FCM}, and will therefore examine attunement in greater detail.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{FCM}, §2, a).

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
1.4. Philosophy as Readiness

A fundamental concept occurs within a fundamental attunement. As such, it does not function in the same manner as standard concepts of logic. Standard concepts (Begriff), i.e., not fundamental, but universal, general, particular etc., function according to a representative schema whereby we present “individual items” before us according to their common aspects, always representing and determining a particular thing according to its identity with, or difference from, other things with which it shares properties. The difference between the concepts of logic and fundamental concepts of metaphysics lies in the different comportments that pertain to that which is comprehended therein: in being gripped 'we do not represent before us that which we conceptually comprehend (begreifen)'. Fundamental concepts of metaphysics are comprehensive rather than determinately representative: they relate to the singularity and uniqueness of that which they comprehend, rather than functioning as tools for categorisation and identification. That which the fundamental concepts of metaphysics comprehends, as has been expounded, is the whole. Comprehending the whole, in being a non-representational affair where an object or field of objects is not 'represented before us', is comprehensive in a further direction:

[T]hey also in each case always comprehend within themselves the comprehending human being and his or her Dasein- not as an addition, but in such a way that these concepts are not comprehensive without there being a

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42 Once again assuming some knowledge of Division I of BT where attunements/moods are shown to operate at a pre-theoretical, pre-representative level. They are disclosive of Dasein as much as they are of entities.

43 FCM, §3

44 Ibid. Heidegger uses the term Inbegriff to name the type of concept that fundamental concepts are. Inbegriff, most commonly translated as epitome or embodiment – as in “he was the epitome/embodiment of physical perfection” - according to its standard German usage, can also be translated as “incept” in order to maintain its proximity to “concept” (Inbegriff – Begriff). For a discussion of the varying possibilities of translation as well as the notion itself see Polt, R, The Emergency of Being: on Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy. (Cornell University Press: 2006).
comprehending in this second sense, and vice. No concept of the whole without the comprehending of philosophizing existence.\textsuperscript{45}

For Heidegger, the matter of metaphysics is therefore not fixed and stabilised in the same manner as scientific fields. Whereas zoology has fundamental concepts that identifies the field of \textit{objects} that it will relate to (i.e., it will have a concept of what constitutes an animal as opposed to some other thing), the matter of metaphysics is non-objective, not representable and therefore un-categorisable.\textsuperscript{46}

In identifying a different matter for metaphysics, Heidegger is identifying an alternative rigour. Heidegger confirms that the task of understanding philosophy from the inside, so to speak, must first start with a wholesale remove from the standpoint of the sciences. This constitutes an utter rejection of the ultimately 'indifferent expectation of something that can be more or less penetratively acquired as knowledge'.\textsuperscript{47}

Philosophy then, or at least entering into philosophy, 'is a matter of a certain readiness'.\textsuperscript{48} At this point the investigation is not only lacking a positive definition of philosophy, but has now, under its own steam, completely rejected the need and/or desire for a definitional determination of philosophy and its activity. Rather, the task is now as follows:

\begin{quote}
[... to summon up enthusiasm for the adventure of human existence, an appetite for the entirely enigmatic nature and fullness of Dasein and of things, an independence from schools of thought and learned opinions, and yet in all
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{45} FCM, §3

\textsuperscript{46} I return to this idea in the latter sections of Chapter 5 of this thesis, where Heidegger discusses the “field propositions” of the sciences in relation to the interpretations of being that metaphysics conducts. In chapter 4, I discuss the notion that “life”, as a potential designation that can sustain philosophising, is, in Heidegger’s understanding, ultimately a term which engenders form in relation to a field of phenomena. Philosophy, at its heart, does not relate to a field in this way.

\textsuperscript{47} FCM, Chapter Two, opening statement.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
This readiness involves a remove from its identification as a science: a distancing that must include the rejection of the 'exterior form of science' within which philosophy remains. This process of distancing from the sciences is taken up as being constitutive of philosophy as a human activity, itself belonging to 'the positive essence of metaphysics'. Being initially taken as a science, but requiring differentiation from it, Heidegger proclaims this “dissimulation” as characteristic of the essential ambiguity of philosophy itself. As essentially ambiguous, it is impossible to provide a positive definition that would allow the production of a rule by which philosophy and non-philosophy could be identified, thus reaffirming the necessity of a “certain readiness” as 'philosophy can be recognized only by whoever becomes intimately acquainted with it, i.e., takes trouble over it'.

Continuing his methodological commitment to allowing the question of metaphysics to unfold from within its own situated presuppositions, Heidegger contends that “everyday awareness” takes philosophy in its most minimal and unproblematic form to be 'an extreme ultimate pronouncement and interlocution'. As such, 'philosophy is something that concerns everyone'. As concerning everyone, it is not purely a personal matter, 'our general awareness tacitly concludes that what concerns everyone

49 Ibid. Whilst the term “enthusiasm” is not repeated throughout FCM, it does make an appearance at the close of the text, where Nietzsche is forwarded as “the last of the great philosophers”, as someone who spoke with ἐνθουσιασμός.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Whilst this statement may seem like a psychological understanding of philosophy – an essentialisation of the factual appearance of philosophy without any reference to a possible deeper origin and form – it is intended to be the most minimal and therefore basic presupposition regarding philosophy; inasmuch as philosophy is something worthy of investigation whatsoever. Were one to reject philosophy as ultimate or as concerning everyone then it would be the case that this question would no longer be able to unfold, however, if this were the case then Heidegger’s response may be to ask why philosophy would be of any interest at all.
must be understood by everyone'.\textsuperscript{54} As mathematical knowledge is straightforwardly accessible, clear and indubitable (being of the order of "supreme certainty"), Heidegger suggests that it is initially recognised by everyday awareness, and later confirmed by philosophers themselves, as being knowledge of the highest order.\textsuperscript{55} This raises the following question:

What does it mean to uphold mathematical knowledge as the measure of knowledge and as the ideal of truth for philosophy? It means nothing less than making that knowledge which is absolutely non-binding and emptiest in content into the measure for that knowledge which is the most binding and richest in itself, i.e., that knowledge which deals with the whole.\textsuperscript{56}

Heidegger is at pains to show that his rejection of this mathematical ideal is not performed on the basis of philosophy's inability to generate truth of this order, as, in principle, it is possible that this type of certainty may be attained in the future. Rather,

\textsuperscript{54} FCM, §6. a)

\textsuperscript{55} Here Heidegger quotes Plato's, Descartes' and Leibniz's attestations regarding the primacy of mathematics with regards to metaphysics and truth. Heidegger returns to this very same topic when discussing Nietzsche's "alleged biologism" in NIII. There he claims that the movement between everyday awareness and scientific knowing comes by way of a smooth transition, whereas the movement from both everyday awareness and indeed scientific knowing to metaphysical questioning requires a leap. Equally, for everyday awareness, Philosophy, as concerning everyone, 'must be accessible for everyone \textit{straight-away}' (§6). The most common example of something that is easily graspable in this manner is basic arithmetic, e.g., that $1+1=2$. In general such a statement lies fully within the calculative powers of anyone and everyone, requiring little effort or education to understand. Whether or not everyone can indeed grasp this is of no consequence, what is important is that the standard for philosophical truth (as that which is immediately graspable by everyone) is determined according to how little work is required for an understanding thereof: an understanding for which 'no expenditure of human substance is required' (§6). In conclusion to this discussion, Heidegger points out that a direct implication of this "everyday criterion" is that 'what concerns everyone contains in itself the manner and way in which it is understood by everyone' (§6). As a result this "everyday criterion" dictates what counts as truth, in advance of philosophy's own activity. This is precisely the bone that Nietzsche wishes to pick with Plato, so to speak. Here in FCM we find the same issue that, as I will show in Chapter 5, persists throughout NI and NII, namely, the problem of truth's subordination to the mathematical ideal (or later the platonic ideal, where this ideal, as non-sensuous certainty is initially formulated as precisely that of Platonism and not necessarily that of Plato himself). In (Heideggerian-)Nietzschean terms this is the issue of the non-sensuous, or here the non-finite, becoming the measure for the sensuous, or finite. Whilst this has not yet become an explicit problem of history, it is clear that Heidegger is wrestling with the same issue – how to think the finite independently of the mathematical/platonic ideal of truth as certainty. At this stage in FCM, as has been shown, it turns on the matter of generating a readiness for fundamentally metaphysical questions. See Chapter 5 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{56} FCM, §6. b), α)
the rejection is based upon the discoveries of the investigation so far: philosophy (essentially) dissimulates as a science, yet at the same time it requires a different rigour due to the demands of its proper subject matter, namely the whole. Concepts that attempt to grasp the whole do not operate within the same conceptual schema as standard concepts of logic, as they do not function in a representational manner. As a result, grasping the fundamental “being gripped” by the whole demands the utmost expenditure of human effort, and grips and binds man at the most fundamental and essential level. As such, non-binding, non-essentially determinative knowledge cannot provide the ideal for philosophy, unless philosophy itself becomes something trivial and unworthy of investigation.

1.5. Putting Man into Question – Toward an Auseinandersetzung

Heidegger thus concludes that ‘We are uncertain about philosophizing’.57 This uncertainty must be taken as belonging to philosophy itself. Heidegger expands on this thought as follows:

Philosophy has a meaning only as a human activity. Its truth is essentially that of human Dasein. The truth of philosophising is in part rooted in the fate of Dasein. This Dasein, however, occurs in freedom. Possibility, change, and predicament are obscure. Dasein stands before possibilities it does not foresee. It is subject to a change it does not know. It constantly moves in a predicament it does not have power over. Everything that belongs to the existence of Dasein belongs just as essentially to the truth of philosophy.58

Determined to follow the implications of this re-location of the ideal of truth for philosophy, Heidegger is keen to move the investigation beyond its current operation

57 FCM, §6. b), α)
58 Ibid.
at the level of ‘apodictic propositions’. As such, the above statement is forwarded as being merely probable, rather than certain. However, “probability” only has meaning within an understanding of the mathematical ideal of truth as absolute certainty, i.e., as its “conceptual counterpart”. According to the uniqueness of philosophy’s (and man’s) vacillation between certainty and uncertainty is only mitigated, and never expressed, in reference to probability. The ideal of truth for philosophy, then, cannot be thought to lie within the schema of certainty-probability-uncertainty. Referring to this schema as the ‘illusion of apodictic propositions’, which elides the ambiguous movement of philosophy by securing it as knowable according to these easily understandable (everyday) concepts, Heidegger forwards the following description of how it stands with philosophy’s if we are to no longer be deluded:

Philosophy is the opposite of all comfort and assurance. It is turbulence, the turbulence into which man is spun, so as in this way alone to comprehend Dasein without delusion. Precisely because the truth of this comprehension is something ultimate and extreme, it constantly remains in the perilous neighbourhood of supreme uncertainty. No knower stands so close to the verge of error at every moment as the one who philosophizes. Whoever has not yet grasped this has never yet had any intimation of what philosophizing means.60

Without this readiness and recognition of the ‘intrinsic perilousness of philosophy’, Heidegger claims that no ‘confrontation that is a philosophizing’ can occur. The original German reads as follows.

Solange diese elementare Bereitschaft für die innere Gefährlichkeit der Philosophie fehlt, so lange wird nie eine philosophierende Auseinandersetzung geschehen.61

60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
Heidegger is, here, consistent with his later reading of *Auseinandersetzung*, and indeed the notion of philosophy that he will espouse in the later sections of *FCM*, where he will claim that philosophy is only ever preparatory. In this sense what philosophy prepares for is the very possibility of a philosophical *Auseinandersetzung*: philosophy is a matter of readiness. But readiness for what? It is clear that in *FCM* philosophy is a readiness for a face to face confrontation with metaphysics. In Chapter 1, I claimed that *Auseinandersetzung*, as a *terminus technicus*, names the movement of thinking itself. This movement was shown to take in the whole of metaphysics, as it involves a confrontation with the very “beginnings” of all thinking. This confrontation was not a matter of repudiation, but of overcoming from within. As confrontational, philosophical *Auseinandersetzung* is a mode of relation that does not stand fully within those beginnings, but is also not freed from them. It remains intrinsically bound to it, but also operates in the name of another beginning. In this sense, *Auseinandersetzung* was taken to name the very movement of the self-becoming of thought. This is precisely the case with *FCM*.

On my reading, *FCM* is entirely engaged in a critical process of overcoming the everyday, historically pervasive “prejudices” that bind philosophy to the mathematical ideal of certainty. Heidegger himself continually indicates that this movement is aimed at generating a genuinely philosophical *Auseinandersetzung*. As my reading progresses through the *FCM* I aim to show that throughout, Heidegger unfolds a presentation of philosophy as an essentially historically rooted activity, which at the same time realises an essential freedom.\(^{62}\) Expounding upon this notion in order to show the intimate

\(^{62}\) In this regard my interpretation of these opening sections requires a certain familiarity with the remainder of the lecture course. The full weight and importance of these sections is perhaps only
connections between this text and the *Nietzsche Lectures* will bring to light the deep-rooted centrality of *Auseinandersetzung* with regard to Heidegger's notion of philosophy, showing that being cut to fit Nietzsche does not undermine its scope: it remains the philosophically responsible response to the contemporary situation for philosophising.

Philosophy can now be understood as a readiness for an *Auseinandersetzung*: a confrontation whereby the Dasein of man is thrown back into its originary state of terror and agitation in the face of its finitude. This is to say that the task of *FCM* as a whole is initially set out as aiming towards a confrontation with man's finitude that must, according to an essential necessity, avoid all the 'comfort and assurance' afforded by the mathematical ideal of truth as certainty. Any effort at sanitising the daunting task of philosophy will miss out on something that is essential to philosophising. Heidegger puts it as follows:

Thus man in the ground of his essence is someone in the grip of an attack, attacked by the fact 'that he is what he is', and already caught up in all comprehending questioning. Yet being comprehensively included in this way is not some blissful awe, but the struggle against the insurmountable ambiguity of all questioning and being.63

How this task is to be achieved, and indeed that it even can be achieved is yet to be determined within *FCM*. What remains equally as ambiguous is the relationship of this particular notion of *Auseinandersetzung* to the historical *Auseinandersetzung* that has Nietzsche at its core. It is to these questions that I now turn, via a continued

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63 *FCM*, §7.
engagement with the 'Preliminary Appraisal'.

2. The History of Metaphysics

2.1. The whole of the FCM

Heidegger initially suggests that attempting to determine the essence of metaphysics via an historical approach would constitute a detour. Without having confronted philosophy itself, such an endeavour would forever be dealing with 'opinions about metaphysics and never with metaphysics itself'. Contending that the initial understanding of philosophy generated by the 'Preliminary Appraisal' can provide the basis from which the word can be first given its meaning, Heidegger returns to the possibility of an historical approach.

Musing on the manner in which ambiguity regarding the essence of philosophy has played out in the history of philosophy itself, Heidegger claims that, with Descartes and the post-Cartesian epoch, the pursuit of philosophy as absolute science has been undertaken with increased tenacity and explicitness. Whilst this movement has sought the removal of ambiguity from the essence of philosophy, the entire project 'begins with doubt, and it seems as though everything is put into question'. For Heidegger, Descartes presupposes that everything can be absolutely grounded, yet therefore only doubts knowledge itself. That in which everything is grounded (man as subject) is

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64 FCM, §1. c), i.e., first inquiring into the original meaning of the word “metaphysics”, then moving from a definition of the term to a definition of what is defined as metaphysics, and consequently pushing through ‘to the matter itself that is named therein’.
65 Ibid.
66 FCM, §6. b), γ)
never genuinely put into question.\textsuperscript{67} Contrasting this modern metaphysical impulse with the story Heidegger has told thus far opens up the following question:

Yet with what right do we then still claim the title ‘metaphysics’ for comprehensive questioning thus characterized?\textsuperscript{68}

The opening sections of the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ focus on revealing contemporary presuppositions regarding metaphysics as it is here and now, thus showing the need for a more circumspect and authentic approach to philosophy. Heidegger has, thus far in \textit{FCM}, attempted to free metaphysics from its presupposed association with the sciences. In the following sections, he attempts a similar task: to free the originary Greek terms from the flattening effect of their romanization.\textsuperscript{69} Here, Heidegger will articulate the problem of both measuring philosophy and accessing philosophy in historical terms. In what follows he provides an account of the origins of philosophy as “metaphysics”, at once opening up a path for philosophy as the continued practice of metaphysics, but also putting in peril all thinking that operates from within a title that, as he will show, has ostensibly trivial origins.

From the perspective of \textit{Auseinandersetzung}, the history of metaphysics is not conceived as having been in error, so that metaphysics will never be used by Heidegger as a

\textsuperscript{67} “A fundamental Cartesian stance in philosophy cannot in principle put the Dasein of man into question at all; for it would thereby destroy itself at the outset in its most proper intention. It, and with it all philosophising of the modern era since Descartes, puts nothing at all at stake.” \cite{Ibid}

\textsuperscript{68} \textit{FCM}, Chapter 3 introduction.

\textsuperscript{69} By this I mean that the process of the romanization of Greek terms opens up a certain distance, which is often negotiated using concepts that have atrophied in their original ground. When it comes to exegesis, aiming to generate certainty regarding whether or not he is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in his interpretation is of little importance. In order to begin to understand Heidegger’s thoughts on life in \textit{FCM}, my exegesis will remain precisely that: I will not endeavour to evaluate the veracity of Heidegger’s claims regarding the word of the Greeks, but rather generate an understanding of what Heidegger takes them to say.
straightforwardly derogatory term. In FCM Heidegger does not attempt to “do metaphysics”: he is not engaged in an out and out attempt to redeem the word. Rather, he is attempting to access the essence of metaphysics from within its own historical determinations. In this regard he is neither optimistic nor pessimistic about the prospects of the term, rather, he is aiming to illuminate the situation as it stands with metaphysics in such a way that we can hold its promise as a continued title for philosophy out for decision. This point holds throughout FCM.

On my reading, the key thought for the whole of FCM, is that where it names a meditation upon the originary unity of fundamental orientations towards φύσις, “metaphysics” is still capable of being a title for genuine philosophising. An understanding of the structure of philosophy that Heidegger establishes in these sections of the 'Preliminary Appraisal' is indispensable when attempting to generate a proper understanding of the later tasks. His analyses of boredom and world (where he discusses life and animality) simply repeat the structures elaborated here, albeit from different perspectives. Where the majority of scholarship focuses on these individual parts, identifying the global theme of FCM allows for the unification of these ostensibly independent components of the lecture course into a whole. Reading the text as a whole will generate a more appropriate understanding of the position of FCM within the

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50 This ostensibly presents a different case from the Nietzsche Lectures, where Heidegger has been understood to use metaphysics as a term of repudiation for all thought that thinks being on the basis of beings. However, as I will argue in chapter 5, this is not straightforwardly the case. In NIII Heidegger will come to a decision about the possibility of continuing the Nietzschean project of philosophy, which he conceives of as being within the history of metaphysics in as much as he takes Nietzsche to be attempting restore certain meanings of φύσις. Therefore, Heidegger’s final decision regarding metaphysics as a fruitful title for philosophising is to be found, as I will argue, in the concluding sections of NIII. There, at what I will claim is the high-point of his meditation on life, Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche closes down all possibilities of thinking φύσις under the title of metaphysics. He considers this to be the case precisely because Nietzsche ultimately interprets φύσις as life (NIII, p156-7). In order to even begin to understand both the connections between FCM and this notion, and further, the fundamental profundity of this statement for Heidegger, it is necessary to first understand how Heidegger understand things to stand with the origins of metaphysics as an interpretation of Φύσις.
Heideggerian corpus, challenging those readings that consider it to be aberrant, or internally piecemeal. In turn, this will form the ground of a more appropriate projection of the core themes of FCM out into Heidegger’s subsequent work.71 This chapter will focus on the identification and elucidation of this remaining productive possibility of metaphysics.

2.2 The Breadth of Nature as φυσικά - φύσις

Heidegger starts his analysis of “metaphysics” by stating that as a title it is a foreshortening of the phrase τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, and is not an Urwort. The various components of this original phrase-form become the subject of enquiry, starting with φυσικά. Within the word φυσικά lies φύσις, which is normally translated as “nature”. “Nature” comes from natura-nasci which means to be born, to arise, to grow. This meaning is closer to φύσις, which Heidegger takes to be ‘that which is growing, growth, that which itself has grown in such growth’.72 In order to capture the broader sense of this term (i.e., to move away from the narrow, modern sense of growth as ‘an isolated process’ associated with plants and animals), Heidegger translates φύσις anew as “self-forming prevailing of beings as a whole”.73

Joining his pursuit of metaphysics’ essential ambiguity with this historical orientation, Heidegger intends to show that, for the Greeks, φύσις is fundamentally ‘ambivalent in

71 I will argue that a major promontory of FCM is a renewed interest in life, but not as a result of the possibilities presented by the sciences for thinking life anew, but rather as an investigation of the possibility of following Nietzsche who is the supreme representative of life, and the key figure for contemporary philosophising.
72 FCM, §8, a)
73 Ibid.
This fundamental ambivalence takes the form of φύσις maintaining two distinct meanings which are, nonetheless equiprimordial, and non-hierarchically related. As that which prevails, φύσις refers to both 'that which itself prevails' and also the 'prevailing of what prevails'. Φύσις emerges as a “regional concept” when it is first wrested from unconcealment, when 'that which itself prevails' first becomes manifest. As this is 'a consequence of the incisive confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with whatever prevails', that which is manifest is positioned in opposition to a counterpart meaning, namely τέχνῃ ὄντα, as a region of what is. In this sense φύσις means “nature” as we would understand it in opposition to what is artificial or man-made. Accordingly, that which is man-made is still entwined with what is natural, and what is natural is not taken to have been created; is not understood as having a similar structure to man-made things. In this sense Heidegger wishes to show that it is broader than a modern notion of nature.

The second distinct meaning of Φύσις present in Heidegger's translation is 'prevailing as such'. In this sense φύσις means “nature” not as a region of beings but as essence, what we would understand as being “the nature of something”, e.g., human nature. The key point here is that that which prevails (nature taken as everything that is, or beings-as-whole) and prevailing as such (nature taken as essence, or being-as-such) are distinct senses of Φύσις which are contained within it in such a way that neither is fully expressive of it, such that the concept (or originary Greek experience) “Φύσις” remains in excess of either of them.

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74 FCM, §8. d), α)
75 Ibid.
76 To this end Heidegger quotes Heraclitus' Fragment 30 “neither a god nor human created it ... this φύσις always was, always is and always will be".
As a broader concept than “nature” thought of as the object of the natural sciences, φύσις, as the prevailing of beings as a whole, fully incorporates and permeates man: The events which man experiences in himself: procreation, birth, childhood, maturing, ageing, death, are not events in the narrow, present-day sense of a specifically biological process of nature. Rather, they belong to the general prevailing of beings, which comprehends within itself human fate and its history.\textsuperscript{77}

In belonging to the general prevailing of things, the life of man is entwined with φύσις. This means that when φύσις is taken at its broadest, it encompasses all of man’s own possibilities (both in terms of his relations with things and his own self-relations). Heidegger goes on to say that man, ‘insofar as he exists as man, has always already spoken out about φύσις, about the prevailing whole to which he belongs’.\textsuperscript{78} This, for Heidegger, constitutes man’s proper place within φύσις. What man speaks out, is the ‘prevailing of the prevailing whole’ - which means the manner in which beings are, or what Heidegger refers to as 'their ordering and constitution'.\textsuperscript{79} Speaking (the verb) in Greek is λέγειν, and what is spoken out (what has ‘become manifest in speaking’) is the λόγος.\textsuperscript{80} These three aspects of φύσις (beings as a whole, being as such, and their ordering) represent the ur-form of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, world, solitude and finitude. How and why this is the case will emerge as my analysis of FCM progresses.

Heidegger therefore points out that, when understood in an originary way, the λόγος
belongs to and occurs within φύσις. This point is effectively pre-empting the idea that man occupies a region of being that stands outside of, or opposed to nature in some way, whereby the essence of man, what is properly human, is something derived from extra-natural resources. Equally, Heidegger is resistant to the idea that nature is merely a region, a privative dimension of an overlying realm. This point goes some way toward contextualising precisely what Heidegger is claiming when, later in FCM, he ostensibly defines the essence of life in a privative fashion. This move (as discussed in Chapter 1) is taken to be a re-inscription of the transcendent structures of ontotheology, wherein Heidegger fails to come to terms with man’s ultimate finitude and worldliness. For Heidegger, the key to thinking man’s relationship to life, nature, the world etc. is to understand the manner in which this entire discourse sits within the history of various flattenings of the originary Greek experience of φύσις. This is precisely the task that he pursues in the latter sections of FCM.

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81 Heidegger turns to Heraclitus in order to justify these claims about φύσις. Heidegger does not limit the power of this testimony to what we might understand as “Heraclitus’ view”, but rather, to what can be tentatively called “the Greek world”. In fragment 93 (“The master whose oracle is at delphi, neither speaks out, nor does he conceal [κρύπτει] but gives a sign [signifies]”) the oppositional concept to λέγειν can be found, namely the verb κρύπτειν (from which we get cryptic and crypt etc.), which is, according to Heidegger ‘keeping concealed and in concealment’ [FCM, §§ b). Accordingly, λέγειν, as speaking-out or ‘bringing to word’, can be first taken to mean ‘taking out of concealment’, resulting in the λόγος being further clarified as the site where ‘the prevailing of beings becomes revealed, becomes manifest’ [FCM, §§ b]. Heidegger presents Heraclitus’ fragment 112 in order to show that the Greek concept of truth emerges from within this relation of speaking out and concealing. Heidegger’s translation is as follows: “The highest that man has in his power is to meditate [upon the whole], and wisdom [lucidity] is to say and to do what is unconcealed as unconcealed, in accordance with the prevailing of things, listening out for them.” [FCM, §§ c)]. From this fragment Heidegger draws the fundamental relationship between philosophy, as pursuit of wisdom, and truth. Truth, here, is not presented as ‘the business of proving propositions’, but as ἁλήθεια. Philosophy (wisdom – σοφία), which represents the highest possibility for man, speaks out about φύσις within the λόγος. In so doing, φύσις is brought out of concealment and into ἁλήθεια, which is to say spoken as truth (as unconcealment). On this basis Heidegger claims that ἁλήθεια can be understood to be stolen from, or wrested from φύσις, wherein it lays primordially covered over. To this end he quotes Heraclitus’ fragment 54, “Higher and more powerful than the harmony lying open to the day is the harmony which does not show itself.” [FCM, §§ c]. Ἀλήθεια, however, is not wrested from φύσις in a way that takes what is revealed (i.e., the truth/ἀλήθεια) away from or outside of φύσις by means of recourse to some other realm or region of being.

82 One of the key connections I will subsequently draw out is the direct contextualisation of Heidegger’s comparative analysis of world (wherein he discusses animality and life) within his historical account of world as presented in OTG. Here he specifically attempts to define the finite in a way that does not reduce it to a privative realm of the infinite: for Heidegger man is not other to nature (understood as φύσις), or in excess of it as a result of a capacity of transcend the finitude of the world. This takes the
2.3. Aristotle’s Founding Interpretation of φύσις

Heidegger considers Aristotle’s thinking regarding the separation and unity of these two meanings of φύσις to be the pinnacle of Greek philosophising. From within questions of the whole there emerge further avenues of questioning regarding that which has been taken from concealment. As Heidegger puts it, ‘[b]eings impose themselves as a whole in their manifold character and fullness and attract investigation’. These investigations result in particular areas and domains of beings being divided up and delved into with an increased focus. Each of these individual investigations into particular and specific domains of being come to be understood as sciences, but in their inception they are developments of philosophies and philosophy itself (rather than being the converse as is the modern prejudice). They only become understood, and even named as, sciences with Aristotle. As sciences, or more properly ἐπιστήμη, these investigations are, as with the concept of φύσις, broader than the modern sense. The science of physics, the ἐπιστήμη φυσική, ‘has as its object everything that in this sense [φύσις as a whole] belongs to φύσις’. As such, those investigations that become developed from within ἐπιστήμη φυσική, e.g., those pertaining to the question of what life is (biology) etc., are initially developed according to the “supreme question” that asks ‘of what this whole of φύσις is in itself as this whole’. This question – the central question of Aristotle’s Physics – is forwarded as being the question of the prime mover. Prime mover, here, means the character of

form of an analysis of Kant’s understanding of how matter, form and their totality operates. These are further modes of the structure of φύσις that Heidegger is expounding in FCM.

83 FCM, §9
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
movement in terms of what movement is, what that which moves is as a whole (rather than that which created movement from nothing, it concerns 'the ultimate determinant' of φύσει ὄντα). Heidegger states that Aristotle names this determinant θείον. Accordingly, what has been taken to be Aristotle’s natural philosophy, a physics, is in some manner a theology.\(^{87}\) Physics then, can be understood as an investigation into φύσις understood in its first sense, as that which prevails, as nature taken as beings-as-whole. This is the origin of “onto-theology”.

The second sense of φύσις, as essence, or being as such, is not lost with Aristotle. Aristotle names the essence of a being (being as such – 'that which makes beings beings') οὐσία.\(^{88}\) According to Heidegger, οὐσία is not thought against φύσις, or outside of it, but indeed as φύσις within Aristotle’s philosophy. In fact, he argues that the two senses are ‘explicitly amalgamated by Aristotle […] there are not two disciplines’, which means that they are retained as distinct meanings that are somehow unitary.\(^{89}\) Heidegger explains:

> Philosophizing proper asks after φύσις in this dual sense: after beings and after being.\(^{90}\)

Philosophy thus conceived is termed πρώτη φιλοσοφία, which Heidegger translates as “First Philosophy” (philosophy proper).\(^{91}\) According to Heidegger, the intrinsic

\(^{87}\) That there is a fundamental recognition of the origins of onto-theology (i.e., the origins of thinking ontology as theology) at the heart of Heidegger’s appraisal of φύσις in its Aristotelian conception, slightly problematises Krell’s criticism of Heidegger unthinkingly repeating the decisions of onto-theology. As Heidegger’s understanding of, and relationship to, Aristotle’s account of φύσις unfolds (both in FCM but also in the Nietzsche Lectures as I shall show in Chapter 5) we can take it that his understanding of onto-theology is also unfolded.

\(^{88}\) FCM, §9

\(^{89}\) Ibid.

\(^{90}\) Ibid.

\(^{91}\) Ibid. Heidegger points out the following: “Philosophising proper is for Aristotle this dual questioning: concerning the ὄν καθόλου and concerning the τιμωτάτον γένο.” In recognising the originary task of
connection and relation between the two different senses of φύσις is not developed any further by Aristotle. Heidegger takes there to be no 'Aristotelian system', but rather, a series of 'ever new approaches and attempts at philosophizing proper'. In this regard the project of πρώτη φιλοσοφία went unrealised in the Aristotelian corpus. Returning to the origin of the word "metaphysics", Heidegger claims that when scholars first became concerned with the actual texts of Aristotle (the 1st century BC, after some 200 years of the decline of Greek thought) the disciplines of logic, physics and ethics had become firmly established. Therefore, when ordering the remaining materials of Aristotle's work, the texts where Aristotle deals with what he calls πρώτη φιλοσοφία could not be included within the three disciplines. As Heidegger puts it, 'what is essential in philosophy cannot be accommodated'. Due to a certain similarity to the foundational work of physics as a discipline, the meditations on first philosophy were categorised as being alongside and behind physics. The Greek for behind, or following after is, of course, μετὰ.

What we call 'metaphysics' is an expression which arose from being at a loss as to what to do, the title for an embarrassment, a purely technical title which says nothing at all as regards content. τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ are πρώτη φιλοσοφία.  

metaphysics (inasmuch as there is any such thing) as the hanging together of ontology as ontotheology, and ontology as a categorial project, Heidegger problematises (in advance) attempts by Heidegger scholars to determine his endeavours as ultimately being of the order of one of these types of ontology alone. This is equally important for the issue of Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics, as it potentially disrupts readings that see FCM as a continuation of attempts to conduct metaphysics in the name of the latter (determining the ὄν καθόλου), or, alternatively those that characterise his later attitude toward the overcoming of metaphysics as being associated with some type of straightforwardly ontotheological response to the presumed failure of earlier attempts at continuing the categorial projects of Brentano and Husserl, i.e., a turning away from prior, differentiable concerns.

FCM, §10.

The matters with which Aristotle's philosophy was concerned, namely, φύσις; man (whose stance in its distinction to nature is termed ἦθος); and their speaking out in the λόγος, became scholastically conceived. This means that the scientific character of each distinct investigation was pursued to the detriment of their philosophical character (where both notions are still conceived in an Aristotelian sense, not as modern divisions). Living questioning thus became fixed as scientific investigations - ἐπιστήμη λογική, ἐπιστήμη φυσική and ἐπιστήμη ἦθικη, which later developed into three distinct disciplines – logic, physics and ethics.

FCM, §11. a)

95 Ibid.
2.4. Metaphysics and the Suprasensuous

This phrase-form of metaphysics, as a technical title referring to the doctrinal position of work pertaining to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, becomes contracted with time. The contraction does not occur in Greek, but in its Latin translation – metaphysica. In this translated form, the technical meaning of μετὰ, as it refers to a categorisation of textual materials, becomes transformed into a title for the content of those textual materials. This is founded on the multivalent character of μετὰ, which in other forms (Heidegger uses the example of μεταβολή – changeover) connotes a 'turning away'. Heidegger draws the distinction between “meta” as meaning “post”, in the first instance, and “trans” in the second. This contraction and shift in meaning results in πρώτη φιλοσοφία becoming understood as “metaphysics”, where metaphysics is a 'turning away' from one domain of being (namely those understood as being natural [φύσει ὄντα]) and toward another. As such, being is first divided up into distinctly separate realms and a domain beyond (trans) the natural is posited.

Metaphysics becomes the title for knowledge of that which lies out beyond the sensuous, for the science and knowledge of the suprasensuous [...] This changeover is by no means something trivial. Something essential is decided by it – the fate of philosophy proper in the West.\footnote{On Heidegger's understanding, the exact moment and the circumstances surrounding this compression are unknown.}

The initial titling was based on a misunderstanding, and this second meaning of title “metaphysics” incorporates the central character of this mistake; philosophy proper is positioned as a discipline alongside others. Without an understanding of history generated 'from out of a living problematic of metaphysics', the same problem of

\footnote{FCM, §11. b) }
\footnote{Ibid.}
treatting philosophy as one discipline amongst others would remain. A productive and properly philosophical philosophising is bound up with the generation of a certain historical attitude which itself must first be somehow oriented toward history. In terms of the investigation at hand, this marks the limit of historical orientation, but also the limit of a non-philosophical historicising. If metaphysics is to remain a title for philosophising, then it must first be shown that an understanding of the originary meaning of πρώτη φιλοσοφία can be developed. This is problematic for the following reasons:

We can show the first [that an originary understanding of πρώτη φιλοσοφία can be developed], however, only if we ourselves have already developed a more radical problematic of philosophy proper. Only then do we have the torch with which to illuminate the concealed and unexcavated foundations of πρώτη φιλοσοφία and thus ancient philosophy, so that we may decide what is fundamentally happening there. Yet, we are supposed to first enter such philosophizing proper via these lectures.  

Heidegger’s way around this hermeneutic conundrum is to show that the traditional concept of metaphysics, rather than being an interpretation of πρώτη φιλοσοφία according to its content in any way, remains locked throughout history (at least up to Kant) in an engagement with the arbitrary word-formation of the title “metaphysics”.

In this way Heidegger can show the deficiencies of the traditional concept of metaphysics without having to offer his own fully fleshed out “philosophical” reading of Aristotle.

In summation, Heidegger offers up three points regarding the deficiency of the

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99 FCM, §12

100 Heidegger does this in a brief and minimal fashion, as a result of the demands of the task rather than a lack of space. Hence my own lack of detail regarding this sketch of history.
traditional concept of metaphysics. The first point is that metaphysics becomes *trivialised*. In pursuing First Philosophy as a theology, medieval metaphysics posits the divine as both occupying a different domain of being to that of nature/the sensuous, and as being *a being*, albeit one of a different order, namely supra-sensuous. Pursued as a doctrine, metaphysics is thus developed as the science that pursues knowledge of the suprasensuous. In this way the intent and profundity of both Aristotle's conception of the divine and First Philosophy is trivialised in a way that characterises the whole of the history of the West's relationship to the Greeks up until Nietzsche. This trivialisation is constituted by First Philosophy (and accordingly the divine) being brought alongside all other sciences, the divine being reduced to the status of a being, and the suprasensuous becoming both a separate domain and a matter of knowledge.

The second point concerns the *confusing* of the two directions of questioning laid out in Aristotle's First Philosophy. Citing Aquinas, Heidegger claims that the second mode of questioning – regarding essence, the being of beings - was also taken up by medieval metaphysics. This line of thinking took *μετά* up in terms of its supposed reference to content, but this time in terms of the development of the *unsensuous*. When considering the being of beings the natural step is to consider beings in general – 'to pass over beyond each individual being', 'to the most general determinations of beings'. The beyond associated with beings in general (general concepts like unity, difference etc.), is clearly of a different order of the beyond of the divine. These two different senses of the beyond, the unsensuous (as most general being) and the suprasensuous (as supreme being), are not properly separated off and recognised in distinction to one another. As a result, what constituted the original problem of “metaphysics”, namely

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101 *FCM*, §12. b)
102 See footnote 28 above.
the unity/relation of these two ways of questioning, is confused. The third point is a direct continuation of the second: due to the trivialisation and confusion of Greek philosophy in its uptake by medievals, what was originally a problem within “metaphysics” is rendered unproblematic. This results in the failure of modern philosophy up to Kant to 'make metaphysics itself a problem'.

2.5. Contemporary Possibilities for Metaphysics

The 'Preliminary Appraisal' closes by questioning where “we” stand with metaphysics, asking what it might mean to continue to conduct philosophy in the name of metaphysics given the arbitrariness of its origins. There is a sense in which Heidegger wishes to retain the notion of μετὰ as it pertains to πρώτη φιλοσοφία, in spite of the complete rejection of its traditional meaning. If μετὰ indicates the peculiar turning that is demanded by philosophy proper, the type of turning that results in the world of philosophy appearing as though inverted, then there is a sense in which it grasps and names something of philosophy's essence. However, taken as a title representing Aristotle's First Philosophy, a title for that philosophising itself, it represents a levelling down of the problem that was raised in that philosophising. Regardless, “First Philosophy” does not necessarily provide a more apt name for philosophy. This is the case for two reasons, the first being that Heidegger does not consider his initial encounter with Aristotle to be born from a “living questioning”.

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103 FCM, §12. c)

104 Heidegger, by way of conclusion to the 'Preliminary Appraisal', conducts brief analyses of a number of moments in the history of traditional metaphysics in order to provide “historical evidence” for his claims. This takes the form of an interpretation of certain concepts in Aquinas and Frank Suarez. His analysis of Aquinas shows how the “limit-concepts” from both modes of questioning taken from first philosophy – the most general being and the supreme being – are fused in a ‘the vague concept of the universal’. The Suarez analysis is designed to show how this structure of thinking was secured and passed on to “modern metaphysics”. As I am focused on laying out precisely what it is that Heidegger is intending with the lecture course as a whole, I will not engage with these analyses.
such that it would allow for a genuine encounter with Greek thought. Secondly, because '[s]o far as we know, Aristotle did not become aware of the disharmony and the problem that lies in this dual orientation of philosophising',\textsuperscript{105} which is to say, the matter of the ὀν καθόλου and τιμιώτατον γένο are pursued in distinction to one another, with only a latent implication of their unity. There is no explicit problematisation of their (dis)unity, but also no confusing of their difference.

A further reason why Heidegger retains the title of metaphysics for philosophising, or at least refrains from fully rejecting it, is because of the situation as it stands with modern metaphysics. In spite of the direct continuation of the misinterpretation of Aristotle's First Philosophy and the subsequent arbitrariness of the pursuit of metaphysics, Heidegger considers modern metaphysics to have a character of its own. Its own peculiar and fundamental trait is as follows:

Modern metaphysics is determined by the fact that the entirety of the traditional problematic comes under the aspect of a new science, which is represented by mathematical natural science.\textsuperscript{106}

His claim is that the investigation into the most general meaning of beings and thus the ultimate being undergoes a turn, wherein it is demanded that the grounds of the investigation itself are 'commensurate with what is asked about'.\textsuperscript{107} Which is to say, the type of knowledge being pursued is knowledge of the highest order, namely absolute certainty. Heidegger posits the result of this thus:

[... in modern metaphysics a quite specific comprehensive questioning

\textsuperscript{105} FCM, §13
\textsuperscript{106} FCM, §14.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
manifests itself, an inclusive comprehending of the questioner in the negative sense, in such a way that the I itself becomes the foundation for all further questioning.\textsuperscript{108}

On this note Heidegger ends the historical orientation and turns directly to the issue currently being treated, why still maintain metaphysics as a title? In directly addressing this question, his main answer is clear.

We are taking over the expression 'metaphysics' as the title of a problem, better, as a title for the fundamental problem of metaphysics itself, which lies in the question of what it, metaphysics, itself is. This question: What is metaphysics what is philosophizing?, remains inseparable from philosophy and is its constant companion. The more properly philosophy happens, the more incisively this question is posed.\textsuperscript{109}

The result of Heidegger's initial historical investigation of “metaphysics” is thus an elucidation of the originary problematic that “metaphysics” denotes. Heidegger indicates that this originary problematic refers to the dual character of philosophy as a meditation on the unitary structure of two two different aspects of \(\phi \nu \sigma \iota \zeta\); two different ways in which being is unconcealed. This dual character of philosophy itself, perhaps the fundamental ambiguity of metaphysics can be characterised as follows:

- “Beings as a whole”: that which prevails; living things, natural things, physical things, namely \(\phi \nu \sigma \iota \iota \alpha \).  
- “Being of beings” - the prevailing of that which prevails, essence, the nature of things, namely \(\omega \nu \sigma \iota \alpha\).

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. In his historical orientation so far, Heidegger has only alluded to the matter of metaphysics in modernity by way of Frank Suarez’s re-engagement with Aristotle at the end of the scholastic period and his subsequent influence on Descartes (the founder of modernity in Heidegger’s eyes).

\textsuperscript{109} FCM, §15.
According to Heidegger’s account of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics the first aspect of being, beings as a whole, is associated with the fundamental concept “world”, and the second, being of beings is associated with the fundamental concept “individuation”.

There is an extreme-point associated with (metaphysical) investigations into each separate aspect. Investigations into beings as a whole have achieved a point of metaphysical confusion wherein a supreme being, an ultimate source of all movement and change, is posited as the goal of enquiry into φύσις. When φύσις is interpreted solely in terms of this aspect, we come to determine all things in accordance with the source of their movement, as theology in a quasi-Aristotelian sense. In this regards as I will attempt to show throughout the thesis, this type of investigation into “φύσις” as “nature”, or as “life” produces various notions of what constitutes the living, i.e., what constitutes “beings as a whole” qua φύσι ὄντα, e.g., vitalism, organicism or mechanism. In his comparative analysis of world, Heidegger will attempt to show how these accounts of life rest in various interpretations of “world”, given their emphasis on merely one of the dual aspects of φύσις. It is toward a deeper, more metaphysically informed reading of this that this thesis is working.

The oppositional counterpart to these types of investigation are those that seek to uncover the highest category of being, in order to pursue οὐσία to its farthest point. In this sense, these accounts enquire into “individuation” in terms of metaphysical abstractions formed on the bases of the logical structures of subjectivity.

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110 As aforementioned φύσις means something like growth, or change in its standard translation.
It is Heidegger's clear contention that both of these endeavours posit an ultimate end point to the “terrifying” nature of the human condition: they cover over the originary ambiguity of their origins and offer respite in the form of a fixed position; a certainty of either the highest possible being or the highest possible category of being. The ground of the terror of the human condition is, in Heidegger's terms, “finitude” thought as a fundamental concept of metaphysics, i.e., Dasein’s oscillation between world and individuation/solitude; or the peculiarity of the unitary structure of world and individuation; or classically thought, the unitary structure of beings as a whole and being as such. These claims, raise a number of issues regarding the ontological character of Dasein, (e.g., does this mapping of metaphysical concepts onto the ontological character of Dasein indicate an irreducible anthropocentrism on Heidegger's part, or this practice merely partaking in the necessary completion of the historical trajectory of metaphysical interpretations of the Greek experience of φύσις?) issues that need to be further established and contextualised in order to not only understand the philosophical intent of Part Two of FCM and FCM as a whole, but equally to assess Heidegger's response to the confusions of metaphysical responses to the Greek experience of φύσις as that which holds together two distinct and opposed senses. Suffice it to say that at this stage, wherever metaphysics is at stake, the underlying matter is the future (and history) of meditations on this dual aspect of φύσις, namely the ambiguity and duplicity of being.

To recall chapter 1, this provide an in initial insight into why Nietzsche's account of Apollo, Dionysus, and their relationship may be so informative for contemporary philosophy. Given that this is clearly Heidegger's aim for the whole of FCM, it is
towards a greater clarification of this point, and a deepening of this newly interpreted philosophical vocabulary of world, finitude and individuation that this thesis will now move.
Chapter 3. 'Part One': Nietzsche, History and
Fundamental Attunements.

Introduction

Heidegger concedes that the result of his 'Preliminary Appraisal' is not clarity regarding what metaphysics itself is. He recognises the ambiguous way in which this preliminary appraisal has come to a close, re-iterating the problem that he started out with, claiming that 'we have shirked in the face of philosophy', have not yet begun to speak 'from out of it' and still remain at the level of speaking about philosophy. Where then, does this leave the lecture course? Heidegger's attempt to orient the lecture course has resulted in a distinct disorientation regarding how to proceed. We have the central questions: What is world? What is finitude? What is individuation? Yet, as it stands, they have not been raised such that they press on us in the requisite manner, as Heidegger states, 'they appear arbitrary'. To counteract this, he considers it necessary to 'set about awakening a fundamental attunement of our philosophizing', such that these questions first 'arise in their necessity and possibility'.¹ Thus the task for 'Part One' is forwarded as the direct continuation of the 'Preliminary Appraisal'.

The 'Preliminary Appraisal' shows that philosophy must become ready for a philosophical Auseinandersetzung. Philosophy, as metaphysics, is stuck within a historical problem, wherein it has become lost and confused in relation to its origin and essence. In this regard, Heidegger pursues philosophy as it is “here an now;” how it stands for philosophising within the contemporary situation. Within this context

¹ FCM, §15.
Nietzsche and his thought are explicitly raised. Heidegger posits Nietzsche as the arch thinker of the contemporary epoch. In, what I argue is, an attempt to first open up a space within which Nietzsche, as the epochal thinker of the contemporary, can be properly encountered and confronted, Heidegger forwards his famous analysis of boredom (awakening a “fundamental attunement” from out of which we can begin to philosophise). In this regard, Heidegger clearly indicates that Nietzsche is the place where a genuine Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary situation must occur. The profundity of this statement cannot be overlooked. It is only via a reading which has a heightened sensibility for the importance of the ’Preliminary Appraisal’, and thus a keen eye for the importance of both history and Auseinandersetzung within FCM, that the profundity of the comments on Nietzsche provided in the opening sections of ’Part One’ can be understood. Equally, only on the basis of a prospective Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche can the remaining tasks of the FCM be understood to be directed toward a unified goal, and consequently be understood in their genuine philosophical intent.

This chapter will focus on three tasks. First, mapping the trajectory of the ’Preliminary Appraisal’ into the sections devoted to Heidegger’s boredom analysis in order to follow the central thread of enquiry followed therein, establishing Nietzsche as a central figure. Secondly, to take up this historical context for the boredom analysis in order to emphasise the historical nature of said analysis. Thirdly, to identify the manner in which a comparative analysis of world is called for by the boredom analysis. These “three bridges” will carry this thesis out toward the supposed “Biology Lectures” in a manner that will dissipate their perceived extancy. Re-incorporating ’Part Two’ will thus allow for the philosophical trajectory of FCM to be more distinctly understood,
and accordingly, more appropriately projected beyond itself in the direction of Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading.

1. Who are we? The possibility of self-determination for

Contemporary Man

1.1. Sleep and Awakening

The first step that Heidegger takes in approaching an analysis of a fundamental attunement itself is a justification of the use of the language of “awakening”.

These sections on waking have been entirely overlooked regarding their importance for situating Heidegger’s infamous “three theses”, wherein he seemingly speculates regarding the essential being of animals, stones and men. Heidegger shows that it is only on the basis of there being a specific historical interpretation of \( \phi \nu \sigma \varsigma \) in play throughout the history of metaphysics that any categorisation of different forms of life can be advanced. Here, in ‘Part One’, Heidegger first gets to grips with the issue of anthropocentrism and life that will persist throughout ‘Part Two’ of FCM, as he seeks to undermine the anthropological/psychological conception of man that posits him (and his moods) as objectively ascertainable alongside other living entities. With his account of attunement Heidegger seeks to reclaim forgotten resources within the history of metaphysics for both an understanding of the essence of man, and accordingly, an understanding of how man stands in relation to other living things.

\( FCM, \S 7 \) - For Heidegger, the language of waking and sleeping has a philosophical precedence and profundity – both Heraclitus and Plato specifically use the concepts of waking and sleeping to distinguish the philosophical person from the non-philosophical person. This is something of an underlying theme throughout the text, as to be capable of sleeping indicates a certain relationship between two structures: the individual and the world. I will elaborate on this point in this first section of chapter 3 and at staged throughout chapters 4 and 5.

\( 3 \) This question of life reaches its zenith in NIII, as Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche simply ignores...
Heidegger forwards “awakening” as opposed to “ascertaining” as the suitable goal for an inquiry into fundamental attunements, because the character of attunement itself demands a peculiar approach. Seeking a fundamental attunement in “our” philosophising, Heidegger is points out that he does not take there to be only one possible way of being fundamentally (comprehensively and philosophically) attuned. If there are multiple possible attunements then it would appear as though an element of choice were in play. However, if this were the case then attunements would be understood as a matter of whimsy, rather than a way in which we are taken over or find ourselves. As such, an investigation into fundamental attunements cannot bring about the attunement in the first instance and cannot subsequently grasp it in an “objective” way; attunements are not objects to be observed:

'[I]t pertains to ascertaining an attunement not merely that one has the attunement, but that one is attuned in accord with it'.

This thought leads Heidegger to suggest the following:

Thus we shall not speak at all of ‘ascertaining’ a fundamental attunement in our philosophising, but of awakening it. Awakening means making something wakeful, letting whatever is sleeping become wakeful.

Heidegger expands upon his characterisation of an attunement as “sleeping” by stating that, as such, it confutes the law of non-contradiction - sleeping indicates that it

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4 FCM, §16.a)
5 Ibid.

is in one way there and another way not there, which, according to the ‘venerable principle of metaphysics’, means it is ‘intrinsically impossible’. In order to press home the distinct lack of binding power that the law of non-contradiction has over matters associated with man, Heidegger points out that man does not experience himself in this objective, at-hand [vorhanden] manner.

A stone either has a property or does not have it. We, on the contrary, can have something and at the same time not have it, that is, not know of it. We speak, after all, of the unconscious.

Heidegger is here offering us an explanation of his point from within existent and operative notions, he is not positing the difference between a stone and a man on the basis of his own philosophical systems and ontological structures. His comparison at this point is not between Dasein and a stone, but simply between an ordinary notion of consciousness and non-consciousness. This recourse to basic and salient divisions (to the concepts of everyday awareness) at once opens up the deeply embedded everyday distinction between the being of man and the being of a stone and draws the matter of sleeping and awakening into tighter focus. Heidegger suggests a parallel between the notions of consciousness/unconsciousness and waking/sleeping in terms of their peculiar being-there and not-there, but is quick to dismiss the matter of sleeping as operating at the level of consciousness:

[...] sleep is not simply the absence of consciousness. On the contrary, we know that a peculiar and in many cases extremely animated consciousness pertains precisely to sleep, namely that of dreams [...] Waking and sleeping are not equivalent to consciousness and unconsciousness.

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6 Ibid.
7 FCM, §16.b)
8 Ibid.
Heidegger's analysis of sleeping and waking has, as he will say of Aristotle's meditations on the matter, a "metaphysical intent". This has two implications, the first is that his investigation does not seek to become conscious of, and in this matter merely aware of an attunement: it will not be a matter of pointing out how they operate. The second is that the manner of man's difference to other entities is not a matter of having consciousness or self-consciousness. As he will point out explicitly, he is not establishing an investigation wherein man is studied according to his distinction from other animals, yet nonetheless grasped as a living being alongside them, which is to say as being "alive" in the same way. This would fall foul of Heidegger's classic objection to the straightforward acceptance of the definition of man as a rational animal:

The conception of man as a living being, a living being that in addition has reason, has led to a complete failure to recognise the essence of attunement.

The question concerning sleep (and thus its counterpart, awakening) has a similar structure to the question concerning metaphysics, namely, that in order to understand the fundamental character of these phenomena, they 'cannot be addressed extrinsically as one particular question'. This is because the prevalent concepts of traditional metaphysics do not have the capacity to grasp the phenomena of sleep and waking in an essential way (the matter as it stands with the law of non-contradiction is an example of this). Repeating the method of the 'Preliminary Appraisal', Heidegger

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9 The difference between consciousness/unconsciousness and waking/sleeping lies in the form of exclusion that operates within each schema. That which is unconscious is merely that of which we have not become aware, we have not brought to our consciousness: this is psychological because it posits the relationship between what is absent and what is present purely in terms of our perceptions. Waking and sleeping are intended to operate at a different, more fundamental level, such that what lies dormant is there in a way that that which we are unconscious of is not.

10 FCM, §16.b)

11 Ibid.
maintains that the method required to grasp awakening in its essence must also start with everyday awareness. Here, Heidegger provides a clear rationale for the subsequent generation of the “three theses” that have caused so much controversy, and served to destabilise subsequent attempts at incorporating FCM into the Heideggerian corpus.

Rather, such clarification can occur only on the presupposition that we possess a fundamental conception of how a being must be structurally determined such that it can be asleep or awake. We do not say that the stone is asleep or awake. Yet what about the plant? Here we already are uncertain. It is highly questionable whether the plant sleeps, precisely because it is questionable whether it is awake. We know that the animal sleeps. Yet the question remains as to whether its sleep is the same as that of man, and indeed the question as to what sleep in general is. This problem is intimately bound up with the question concerning the structure of being pertaining to these various kinds of beings: stone, plant, animal, man.

This categorisation is not performed on the basis of a prior systematic investigation into the causes of differentiation in ‘kinds of beings’; Heidegger is not performing a theoretical-biological or onto-biological taxonomy of living entities. He is taking up the pre-existent, everyday divisions that persist for us, here and now. This is precisely the same procedure that he uses in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ to approach the question of metaphysics. His approach is premised upon, and only possible on the grounds that, we are already grasping beings in an essential manner (according to their being) when we experience them as waking and sleeping in various modes.

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12 Ibid. Interestingly enough this is the only place that Heidegger will discuss the plant as a peculiar form of what lives. In ‘Part Two’ he only returns to man, animal and stone. As I will show (esp. Chapter 4), Heidegger is not attempting to provide a positive, determinate account of the essence of life, therefore his later non-inclusion of plants in his comparative analysis of world does not indicate a paucity in his work. These comments here are enough to show that he is aware of the plants interesting position within the world of living things.

13 Rather than tackle sleep head-on, Heidegger intends to go down “another path” towards an understanding of awakening, citing ‘fundamental metaphysical reasons’. Heidegger claims that
This point is relevant for *NI*, where Heidegger reads Nietzsche as having completely undermined an anthropocentric notion of the essence of life that would posit differences between beings according to the representational schemas of consciousness/non-consciousness, animate/inanimate, organic/inorganic. In *NI* Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche provides a notion of life that includes stones as living entities (a thought which modern biological and zoological sciences could not incorporate). In prefacing his engagement with boredom with these comments on the underlying historical issue of sleep, I take Heidegger to be explicitly establishing the overall orientation for *FCM*. That these comments on anthropocentrism, anthropology, and life frame the coming phenomenological analysis of boredom has most certainly been overlooked. This has resulted in the continued reading of *FCM* as a fractured text.

1.2. Letting Be

Discussing the specificities of investigating a fundamental attunement, Heidegger dismisses the possibility of accessing such an essential phenomenon as though it were presentable 'at hand'.

Using the example of someone who is overcome with grief, Aristotle's account of sleep [*On Sleeping and Waking, (περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως (peri hypnou kai egregoroseos)] penetrates further than the consciousness/unconsciousness distinction, as here, sleep is considered to be a peculiar way in which both our perception and essence are bound, such that they 'cannot take in other beings which [they themselves] are not' [Ibid]. This would imply that being awake involves taking in (being open to) other beings. Accordingly, how we understand sleep directly pertains to the fundamental manner in which an entity maintains an openness to other beings in such a way that it at once relates to other beings and at the same time maintains its own essence, that is, holds fast to its essence in terms of being what it itself is.

Re-iterating the paucity of the distinction between 'awakeness as conscious life in contrast to unconscious life (sleep)', Heidegger points out that the phenomenon of consciousness does not fully encompass the possibilities of man's being-there and being-not-there [*FCM, §16. c]*. He claims that there is a manner in which one can be not-there, but still be operating consciously: 'think of the extreme case of madness, where the highest degree of consciousness can prevail and yet we say: The person is de-ranged, displaced, away and yet there'. Heidegger extends this analysis to attunements: 'if indeed attunement belongs to the essence of man', they cannot be taken as though they are ascertainable (via consciousness) at-hand [Ibid.]. Taking up the thread of the paucity of psychological analysis, and aligning attunements with “feelings”, Heidegger points out that an analysis of feelings has always
Heidegger points out that it is possible for someone to be entirely present in the same manner as always, yet, as a result of their mood – their grief – they become “inaccessible”:

The manner and way [Art und Weise] in which we can be with him, and in which he is with us, has changed. It is the grief that constitutes this way (the way in which we are together). He draws us into the manner in which he is, although we do not necessarily feel any grief ourselves.\(^{15}\)

In thus describing attunements and their effect, Heidegger shows that attunements, further than not being at hand (simply there or not there), are not confined to someone’s interior, nor are they distinctly external, i.e., merely for others. Moreover, ‘attunement imposes itself on everything’. Far from being of the order of experience, namely something external or internal towards which we turn our conscious awareness, the basic character of attunements is that they are ways of being. The particular way in which we are may fluctuate and be subject to change, but nonetheless we are always in some way or another attuned.

As being attuned in this way or that is the fundamental way in which Dasein is (negatively conceived as not merely at hand), it cannot be a matter of directing consciousness towards particular attunements, observing them and thus gaining knowledge of their properties. Rather, the specific grasping of attunements named by

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\(^{15}\) Ibid.

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“awakening” is understood by Heidegger to be operating in-situ. He puts it as follows:

[...] awakening attunements is a manner and means [...] of grasping Da-sein as Da-sein, or better: of letting Da-sein be as it is, or can be, as Da-sein.\textsuperscript{16}

The task of awakening an attunement, a fundamental attunement, is that of letting Dasein be as Dasein. It is not a matter of simply describing the properties of man and his affects. In attempting to speak from out of metaphysics, rather than about metaphysics, Heidegger’s task has transformed itself into an attempt to let Dasein be. This is not presented as speaking from out of an attunement, but more so as acting in accordance with one.

\textbf{1.3. Becoming (Who We Are) – First presentation of Nietzsche}

\textit{1.3.1. Nietzsche and the Contemporary Situation}

As the direction of the course has now been concretely ascertained, the only remaining question, prior to going out towards an attunement itself, is 'which attunement?'. This is clearly not a straightforward matter of choice, as though the awakening of an attunement were 'like picking a flower', and Heidegger’s initial phrasing of the demands of “acting in accordance” points out the first difficulty: \textsuperscript{17}

[...]which attunement are we to awaken, or let become wakeful in us. An attunement that pervades us fundamentally? Who, then, are we?\textsuperscript{18}

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\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{FCM}, §18.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{FCM}, §18. a)
There is a clear ambiguity regarding the “we” to whom Heidegger refers, he suggests that “we” could refer to either the class gathered to hear the lectures, or to any other collective all the way up to the whole of the West and perhaps even beyond. The first issue to be dealt with, then, is the process of the demarcation and delimitation of the situation within which “we” are, such that “we” can be understood situationally as “we ... Moderns” or “we... Westerners” etc. This twofold process of delimitation and demarcation inevitably involves a pay-off between inclusivity and determinacy.

The broader the perspective we have on this situation, the fainter our horizon becomes, and the more indeterminate the task.¹⁹

In order to interpret the contemporary situation (“our situation”), from within which a fundamental attunement can become wakeful, Heidegger takes up four contemporary (to the late 1920s) interpretations of the situation as it stood, namely Spengler, Klages, Scheler and Ziegler.²⁰ In summarising each of these four thinker's interpretations,

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¹⁹ Ibid. Heidegger phrases this play in terms that, as I show in Chapter 5, will later become of key importance to his reading of Nietzsche. The interaction and relationship of a perspective and a horizon is taken up by Heidegger as being one of the fundamental structures of Nietzsche’s metaphysics in NIII. It is, according to Heidegger, how Nietzsche himself understands life, and thus all beings, to delimit and demarcate themselves, such that they remain open to other entities that they themselves are not, and at the same time determine themselves as that which they are. This resonates with the Aristotelian language of sleep as Heidegger sees it. In NIII Heidegger will align perspectives and horizons with the notions of chaos and fixation, art and truth and ultimately life and spirit. His analysis of these matters in relation to anthropocentrism, and as I have previously suggested, the ultimate direction of metaphysical interpretations on φύσις is clearly presaged in these sections of FCM.

²⁰ There is a clear, yet only implicit, selection process. Whilst he admits that there is an arbitrariness to his selection, he does not see this as being a problem, claiming that ‘in such cases the choice is never free from arbitrariness’. [FCM, §18. a] Barring Spengler, each of the other thinkers published the texts that Heidegger refers to in the year that he composed the lecture course.[Heidegger refers to these thinkers in relation to their following works: Klages, L. Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele (Leipzig: 1929); Scheler, M. Philosophical Perspectives Trans. Haac, O.H. (Beacon Press, Boston: 1958). Originally published in 1929; Spengler, O. The Decline of the West. Trans. Werner, H. (OUP, New York: 1991). Originally published between 1918 and 1922; Ziegler, L. Der Europäische Geist (Darmstadt: 1929)] Also, each of the thinkers explicitly formulates their interpretations of the modern world in terms of a play between life and spirit – which is of major interest for Heidegger. Whether or not he is being ‘selective’ in the sense that he is only looking at thinkers who fit the bill so to speak, and working within a pre-established understanding of how the contemporary is understood, is not important. The matter of Heidegger's historical-intellectual integrity is not at stake in this section, as he is not directly concerned with these thinkers’ influence on modern thought. This is at once taken for granted (that they are influential) and
Heidegger is keen to emphasise two matters. First, that they each provide an historical interpretation that thinks the contemporary in terms of its location within the play of particular historical processes, and secondly that they all think the contemporary situation in terms of 'a relation between life and spirit'. Heidegger takes the prevalence and centrality of this opposition between life and spirit to be indicative of something fundamental and unitary lying at the heart of what he considers to be “stereotypes” of modern ways of thinking. If life and spirit are taken as being “fundamental orientations” of man, and if the source of these interpretations is correctly located, then, according to Heidegger:

All four interpretations are only possible given a particular reception of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Rather than attempting to denigrate the four thinkers and suggest that they might be passing off Nietzsche's thought as their own, Heidegger states that his claim 'is merely intended to indicate the place and source where the confrontation proper must occur'. The exact character of 'a confrontation proper' (eigentliche Auseinandersetzung) remains ambiguous, but it is clear that it pertains to an historical Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary. This indicates that Nietzsche is the proper place to confront the contemporary, not these four thinkers, and that a confrontation with the whole that philosophy itself is, is somehow caught up with Nietzsche's concepts of life and spirit

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21 FCM, §18. a). He considers Spengler to think the contemporary in terms of decline, where life – represented by culture – has been forced into decline at the hands of spirit – represented by reason’s promotion of technology and economics. Klages is taken to consider life and spirit to be adversaries, and thus sees spirit as a sickness. Here life is ‘taken in the sense of the simmering of obscure drives’ and ‘grasped as the breeding ground of the mythical’. Alternatively, Scheler does not consider there to be a decline, and thinks life and spirit in terms of balance, rather than strife. Finally, Ziegler takes there to be a current struggle between life and spirit that requires a mediating period wherein the struggle will attain a balance.

22 Ibid.
(Dionysus and Apollo) as “fundamental orientations”.

In this sense the overarching task for FCM as a whole is left under-determined. It could be figured as a propaedeutic on the basis of which a more authentic interpretation of, and relation to history will be undertaken. Equally, in an effort to minimise the borderline aporetic nature of historical orientation in all its hermeneutic circularity, it could be figured as an attempt to put historical issues on hold in favour of conducting positive work from within metaphysics. Regardless of this initial under-determination, as a result of the importance of Auseinandersetzung and the clear historical intent of FCM from the outset, these sections regarding Nietzsche must be understood as having a proper place within the lecture course, rather than as merely constituting an aside.

1.3.2. Apollo and Dionysus as Fundamental Orientations

Heidegger moves onto a brief clarification of Nietzsche’s position with regards to Dionysus and Apollo. These comments show that Heidegger takes Nietzsche’s own position on the dominant contemporary concepts of life and spirit to be a fundamentally metaphysical one, as they approach life and spirit as dual orientations towards the whole that are at their highest when thought in their unity. Understood in the context of the unrealised original project of metaphysics (the meditation on the dual aspects of \( \phiυςις \), beings as a whole [what is that World?] and being as such [what that Individuation?], in terms of their unity [what is that Finitude?]), as shown in chapter 1, the deep philosophical importance of Heidegger elaboration of the structure of

\[23\] Which I will show becomes fully determined as a need to understand Nietzsche’s word regarding world
Nietzsche's thought becomes clear.\footnote{Which takes the form of a series of long quotations taken from The Will to Power. Heidegger recognises the incomplete, or rather non-intended, form of this text, but nonetheless cites exclusively from the fourth book thereof. This is consistent with his later, more intense reading of Nietzsche, which focuses heavily on WP whilst recognising the problematic nature of the collection.} First, Heidegger shows that towards the end of his productive life, Nietzsche posited the Dionysus/Apollo opposition as being determinative for his thought. Heidegger quotes aphorism 1005 of WP:

\begin{quote}
I understood that my instinct was headed in the opposite direction to that of Schopenhauer: toward a justification of life, even in its most frightful, most ambiguous, and most deceptive aspects: for this I held the formula 'Dionysian' in my hands.\footnote{Ibid, 1005. As these translations quoted here differ from those found in the above referenced English translation of WP, these translations are seemingly McNeill’s own translations of the quotes as they appear in the original manuscript of FCM. I will cite McNeill’s translations for the sake of continuity with the English text of FCM. All quotes appear in FCM, §18. b)}
\end{quote}

This offers up the notion that the Dionysus/Apollo opposition is a matter that pertains to a justification of life and indeed an engagement with life that seeks to grasp it as it is, on its own terms, i.e., in all its ambiguity. He goes on to quote another aphorism from the same section:

\begin{quote}
Apollo's Illusion: the eternity of beautiful form; aristocratic legislation 'thus it shall be always!'

Dionysos: sensuousness and cruelty. Transitoriness could be interpreted as enjoyment of productive and destructive energy, as constant creation.\footnote{Ibid, 1049.}
\end{quote}

Here, Heidegger is forwarding Nietzsche’s most basic understanding of the character of each pole in terms of their opposition. On the one side order and eternity, and on the other chaos and transience. By way of a development of this thought, Heidegger then forwards an aphorism wherein Nietzsche further determines each pole, but also characterises their interrelation. In WP 1050 the Dionysian is conceived of as expressing
'an urge for unity' wherein the forms of individuation ('the person, the everyday, society, reality' and even death) are reached beyond in the direction of more lingering, pre- and un-individuated states. Rather than a denigration of life, this striving is a revelling in life's creative and destructive powers. In distinction to this, the *Apollonian* is understood as 'the urge for complete being-for-oneself', wherein the individuated and unambiguous is sought after, this is further understood as 'freedom under the law'. These two oppositional urges are understood, together, to form the *fundamental opposition* of nature and art, wherein their unity and interrelation relation represents their highest possibilities. This unity is described as being 'The fullness of power and moderation'. This clearly shares the structure of metaphysical homesickness, where the desire to be at home everywhere, this urge for unity, necessitates an equiprimordial solitude as the source of not being at home.

Following the presentation of these thoughts on the nature of the components of the opposition and the character of the opposition/antagonistic unity of Dionysian/Apollonian divide, Heidegger interrupts the aphorism to point out that its next part offers a word on the Greek origins of Nietzsche's interpretation, and, as such, represents 'his most profound analysis of the Greek world'.\(^27\) The most important part of this quote is as follows:

\[\text{[...]} \text{the Dionysian Greek needed to become Apollonian: that is, to shatter his will for the immense, for the multiple, the uncertain, the horrifying, upon a will for measure, for simplicity, for classification in rules and concepts [...]} \text{the courage of the Greek consists in the struggle with his Asiatic nature: beauty is not bestowed upon him, just as little as logic, or as the naturalness of moral, -it is captured, willed, fought for - it is his \textit{conquest}.}\(^28\)\]

\(^27\) FCM, §18. b)  
\(^28\) WP, 1050.
Nietzsche presents the peculiar unity of these two aspects, once again not components but fundamental orientations of man, as consisting of the maintenance of a strife-like interrelation of measure and classification on the one hand and the horrific, multiple and uncertain on the other. The Dionysian urge for unity is an embracing of the horrific and the multiple, representing life/nature. The Apolline urge for complete being-for-self is an embracing of measure and law, representing spirit. The “conquest”, the product of this struggle and the highest point of its interrelation “the fullness of power and moderation” is not forwarded as being an expurgation of one, or the domination of one over the other, but as a holding of the two orientations together in both their fullnesses. This is the precise structural relation that Heidegger seeks to explore throughout FCM. In order to come to an understanding of Nietzsche’s word, to encounter philosophy itself, we first require situating.

In his comments here, in FCM, Heidegger is not yet engaging with Nietzsche by way of an Auseinandersetzung, and is therefore not holding Nietzsche’s thoughts out for decision. Rather, he is pointing toward the historical profundity of Nietzsche’s meditation on life and spirit, and at the same time indicating that a full examination of it, indeed a proper Auseinandersetzung with them is not yet possible. For this to occur the more proximal tasks of FCM must first be undertaken, namely negotiating an

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29 This is the precise thought (the way in which Apollo and Dionysus, truth and chaos, spirit and life are joined) that both NI and NIII attempt to grasp. In NI Heidegger pursues this from the perspective of art, and in NIII from the perspective of truth (or knowledge). In both cases Heidegger posits the stakes of his meditation as being a decision regarding Nietzsche’s ability to overcome the dominance of the history of truth as certainty.1 Between these two lecture courses, as I will show in chapter 5, Heidegger will present the strongest possible case for establishing life as the horizon for thinking in his commitment to the “new-interpretation of sensuousness” at the close of NI, and also the strongest possible case for its rejection in his closing comments of NIII as mentioned above. I will argue that this is the very hub of his Auseinandersetzung – the point at which he is both closest to Nietzsche and at the same time most starkly confronting him.
initial encounter with philosophy on the basis of which a more genuinely historical confrontation with metaphysics can be established.

Rather than simply project an understanding of Nietzsche to come, this analysis gathers the force of the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. Therein, φύσις in its most philosophically originary sense was forwarded as the structural unity of two aspects of its own unconcealedness: Beings as a whole (associated with the question of world as that which we find ourselves within and amongst); and the being of beings (οὐσία, the classification of essence, seeking the highest category, and is associated with individuation in the fundamental metaphysical sense). With the Apollo/Dionysus division, we are furnished with an indication of the possibility of the structural relation of two fundamentally opposed, fundamental orientations towards the whole: the two find their ultimate strength together, in their opposition. This relation is precisely that which is promised by Aristotle's unfulfilled metaphysical project: thinking the unity of two aspects of being that have heretofore been confused and ordered according to a structure of subjugation. In this regard, Heidegger is presenting Aristotle-Nietzsche as a transect in history within which we have to take up our own position. It is my contention within this thesis that FCM establishes the need for this task from multiple angles (which are not separable), and that, ultimately NIII concludes this task.

1.3.3. Nietzsche and History

Heidegger states that his aim in presenting these Nietzsche quotes was not to generate a superior understanding of Nietzsche within which the four interpretations of the contemporary situation could be assessed with regards to their veracity. Whether or not
these interpreters are right about Nietzsche or the contemporary is neither here nor there, as 'in such cases most things always tend to be correct'. What Heidegger is more interested in is their diagnostic character. In presenting a diagnosis (in these cases a diagnosis of how it stands with modern culture) these interpretations, and any other diagnostic proclamations, seek to 'pass through and beyond world history in a single stroke'. This is an idiosyncratic, yet prevalent historical methodology whereby the contemporary is situated within 'world-historical determinations' that posit a movement of history or underlying cultural-historical force, as operative and determinative for the present. These interpretations conduct a symptomatic assessment of history, wherein a “correct” grasp of the current situation is achieved, and the present is thus understood in terms of its factual coherence with a preceding series of factual events. As a symptomatology, diagnosis is only concerned with the outward appearance, of prior events, i.e., concerned with “what actually happened”. An implicit extension of and counterpart to this diagnosis is, of course, prognosis, wherein the future situation is projected as being equally as determined by the past as the present is. Once again, Heidegger points out that correctness and accuracy are not the rigours that he associates with a proper grasp of Auseinandersetzung with, the present.

This philosophy of culture does not grasp us in our contemporary situation, but at best sees only what is contemporary, yet a contemporaneity which is entirely without us, which is nothing other than what belongs to the eternal yesterday.

Later, in NIII, Heidegger will suggest that learning to read Nietzsche well consists in

30 FCM, §18. c)
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
avoiding everything “fatally contemporary” in his thought.\textsuperscript{33} This postponement, yet clear framing, of the importance of the issue of history, positions the matter of generating an authentic historicality at once at the heart of FCM, and, at the same time, outside of the immediate concerns thereof. What can be said with certainty at this point is that Heidegger is not looking to generate a diagnosis and subsequent prognosis of how it stands, has stood and will stand with regard to metaphysics. The relation to history, and thus to time, that Heidegger is seeking in FCM is not calculative in this manner.

Heidegger states far from being an essential grasping of man, this type of historical analysis (what he would come to designate as Historie rather than Geschichte) does not grip us, involve us, and, most importantly, does not 'attack us'.\textsuperscript{34} This results in a peculiar situation, wherein there is a correct and accurate determination of the contemporary that, nonetheless, fails to grasp man essentially, that is, fails to grasp Dasein as Dasein, but merely grasps man as a symbol, and in terms of the 'eternal yesterday' (Hence “symptomatology”: 'a philosophy of culture concerned with expression, with symbol, with symbolic forms'). These diagnostic methodologies only manage a “setting-out” of man.\textsuperscript{35} In order to articulate his own approach to the contemporary, in answer to the question “who are we?”, Heidegger once again invokes

\textsuperscript{33} This peculiar form of reading, which takes the form of historical Auseinandersetzung, is clearly prefigured here, yet not fully carried through.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. At this point it is worth re-iterating that Heidegger is not engaging with Nietzsche in any meaningful fashion – he is not attempting to genuinely read Nietzsche, but rather showing that there are a series of tasks that must be conducted before the profundity of Nietzsche's word can be accessed. This itself comprises the problem of the contemporary situation, namely that it finds itself too deeply bound up in a trivial conception of history. Nietzsche cannot appear as a resource unless, as Heidegger emphasises in his comments in NIII regarding the danger of only seeing that which is fatally contemporary in Nietzsche, he is first approached from out of a readiness for the genuinely philosophical.

\textsuperscript{35} The term Heidegger uses is Dar-stellung, which, as Darstellung, means to depict, to describe, to illustrate, to portray.
the notion of semblance and ambiguity, stating that there cannot be any certainty with
which his investigation is differentiated from a setting-out. This problem, rather than
an impasse, is taken as essential.

The more proper our beginning is, the more we shall leave this ambiguity in
play, and the harder the task will be for each individual to decide for him- or
herself whether he or she understands or not.36

Beginnings are ambiguous according to their very essence. Where this ambiguity and
possibility for some form of self-relation in philosophising is removed, philosophy (or
that which dissimulates as philosophy) ‘unties us from ourselves in imparting us a role
in world history […] unties us from ourselves, and yet does so precisely as
anthropology’.37 In making “man” the centre of a meditation on world-history, wherein
history is understood from within the calculative stance of diagnosis and prognosis,
man is not grasped in essential terms, but only through the filter of and by dint of, his
role in that world history. Heidegger characterises such a relation to both world,
history, and man as being determinative of, and located within ‘our flight and
disorientation’ and our 'lostness’.38 Heidegger takes this lostness itself, and the desire to
counteract it by locating man’s meaning and significance in non-manly determinations,
as an indication of the direction of his own investigation.

Must we first make ourselves interesting to ourselves again? Why must we do
this? Perhaps because we ourselves have become bored with ourselves? […] Do
Thus Heidegger draws in focus the fundamental attunement that he seeks to awaken, or prepares to let become awake in us, via a phenomenological investigation. Prior to taking boredom up in this way, Heidegger offers a few last words on the matter of the orientation of this forthcoming task.

Yet how are we to find ourselves? - in some vain self-reflection, in that repugnant sniffing out of everything psychological which today has exceeded all measure? Or are we to find ourselves in such a way that we are thereby given back to ourselves, that is, given back to ourselves, so that we are given over to ourselves, given over to the task of becoming who we are?

Becoming who we are is bound up with letting Dasein be as Dasein (accessing this fundamental attunement). The task of becoming who we are is not one which stands before us as virgin territory. Moreover, it is configured as arising from being given back to ourselves, finding ourselves again. There is a peculiar element of return, a form of repetition, which lies at the heart of what is, in other terms, expressed as an a priori matter, a matter of uncovering and relating to the essence of man. If we set all of this back into its most immediate context, and of course pay attention to the unmistakably and decidedly Nietzschean turn of phrase, this return to ourselves as 'becoming who we are' finds its most proper place in a philosophical Auseinandersetzung (ultimately with Nietzsche).

This Auseinandersetzung must first come about as a result of an awakening of a

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
fundamental attunement. This fundamental attunement is no longer unknown, it is an attunement wherein our flight, disorientation, and lostness are brought into view. As such, the task ahead has the character of preparing the way for a reorientation with regards to ourselves that has its immediate source and location within an engagement with Nietzsche, and beyond this, an orientation with regards to the matter of first philosophy, the Greeks. Heidegger will take this lostness as characteristic of the contemporary situation to such a deep extent that he will suggest that indicates our having become bored with ourselves. It is this direction that he will take up boredom as the fundamental attunement of our times, a time that is epochally formed by the thought of Nietzsche.41

1.4. Toward the remainder of FCM

As I have shown, Heidegger is operating from within familiar determinate assumptions about metaphysics. In fact it is only on the basis of these familiar determinate assumptions that an investigation into philosophy can begin. This does not detract from the idea that metaphysics can operate in excess of its trivial and mistaken origins. Heidegger is trying to formulate a conception of metaphysics that is sustained by its historically determinate character and yet still takes up this determinacy in a manner that projects itself beyond its origins. He is not straightforwardly continuing the work of metaphysics, but has not yet generated (or predicted the generation of) any resources for the complete rejection of this term. This displays a commitment to thinking the circularity, or reflexive complexity, of metaphysics as a distinctly human endeavour: one which is always underway. To

41 Boredom, I will argue in more detail in chapter 5, is an ur-form of the “nihilism” as it is formulated in Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading.
return to the earlier Hegel comparison and a general comparison with modern philosophy, Heidegger is not advocating an endpoint for philosophising, metaphysics will never achieve absolute certainty and will not effect its own dissolution. This does not mean that it becomes a trivial enterprise which must be rejected on these grounds.

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In this way, the 'Preliminary Appraisal' provides the most fundamental point of orientation for the forthcoming tasks (especially 'Part Two' and the comparative analyses of world). In 'Part Two' Heidegger does not present an ontology that starts from the most basic possible point of enquiry, i.e., it seeks neither a priori grounds nor a presuppositionless starting point: the three theses are not presented as representing basic ontological categories. As his comments regarding sleep in Aristotle are designed to imply, there are already determinations of thought and being that are in play, and, in so being, they are not confused, but are expressive of the manner in which contemporary metaphysics has grasped the whole, and are thus fully determinative for how “we” relate to phenomena. These determinations cannot simply be eradicated or reified by means of a corrective to the history of philosophy. 43 To do so, or wish to do so, would constitute a movement away from the essence of philosophy as heretofore espoused, a movement that would be operating in accordance with a mathematical

42 This marks the point of greatest difference between FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures, as, as I will show in Chapter 5, Heidegger considers Nietzsche to ultimate bring a complete closure to the possibilities of conducting philosophy as metaphysics. Rather than being a “different opinion” I will argue that this is merely a decision made upon the basis of the decisive spaces opened in FCM.

43 What is intended here is not to ultimately find a determination of being upon which the task of dividing being up, or classifying being can be undertaken. Heidegger presents the narrow vision of this type of task in his account of the traditional concept of metaphysics, claiming that this is only one way of taking up the whole, namely ousiology, or the pursuit of the highest category. As a non-categorial task, Heidegger’s intention with his analysis of the phenomena of sleep and waking is not to provide a richer conceptual structure upon which he can more securely, certainly, and correctly divide beings up. Rather, he intends to come to a deeper understanding of the structures within which we already divide beings up according to type. Heidegger is not concerned with deriving pure categories of being.
ideal of absolute certainty, rather than the properly metaphysical ideal that Heidegger is seeking. It is only from within these metaphysical determinations that an attempt at retrieving a properly philosophical attitude and philosophical grasp of philosophy and its historicality can begin and proceed.

The 'Preliminary Appraisal' of the FCM must be understood as propaedeutic to the later tasks wherein both the proper structures and rigours of thinking philosophically, and the path into philosophising itself are laid bare. The remaining tasks of the lecture course are framed as attempts to follow this path and delve further into the possibility of philosophising here and now (Part One), and subsequently the possibility of philosophically engaging with one of the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, i.e., world (Part Two). These endeavours are further determined as attempts to first encounter the essence of metaphysics, such that a proper confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with the present situation can be entered into. On my reading, the site of this confrontation is Nietzsche, who is understood as the philosopher of “life”, not in terms of “life philosophy” (i.e. philosophy as meditation on lived experience) but in terms of conceiving of “life” as a fundamental orientation of being.\footnote{Heidegger, whilst not explicitly pointing this out at this stage, is clearly presenting Nietzsche as a thinker of life. It is important that this not taken to mean that Nietzsche is a life-philosopher, i.e., concerned with promoting philosophy as meditation on “lived-experience”. Deeper than this, Heidegger is laying the foundations for erecting Nietzsche as the supreme representative of life: the thinker who, in NIII, he will claim ‘advances [φύσις] through the extreme point of the fundamental position of modern metaphysics’ when he interprets φύσις, and thus being, as life.[NIII, p156.] In order to fully grasp both the magnitude of these statements, and indeed the reasoning behind the decisions contained therein, one has to understand the specific grounding that these thoughts have in the matters dealt with in FCM - both in 'Part Two' where the possibility of an ontology of life is dealt with, but also in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' where, as I have shown, the originary possibilities of metaphysics as a title for an interpretation of φύσις are laid out.} The projected result of these tasks is the generation of the capability to conduct a philosophical relation to the originary character of philosophy – to shine light upon the origin of metaphysics. As such, the 'Preliminary Appraisal' posits FCM as a peculiar
form of historical engagement, one that paves the way for a philosophical-historical attitude. This attitude becomes fully realised as the so-called historical “turn” that Heidegger effects in the mid-thirties. On my reading of *FCM*, this is not so much as turn as a completion of the historical tasks laid out therein.

In thus representing the *FCM*, it can be understood as engaging in the same practice as Heidegger’s broader Nietzsche reading, namely attempting to historically engage with the contemporary situation for philosophising in a manner that does not fall foul of what is merely “fatal contemporary”.45 *FCM* proves to be only preparatory for this encounter, whereas the *Nietzsche Lectures* genuinely hold metaphysics out for decision. In this regard *FCM* is directly preparatory for the confrontation with Nietzsche and, through him, metaphysics, conducted in *NI* and *NIII*. That these later lecture courses and the *FCM* both contain central meditations on “life” is no accident. Precisely what the connection is, and precisely how *FCM* prepares for, what I take to be, the high-point of Heidegger’s meditation on “life” will be the subject of the remainder of this thesis. This chapter has, thus far, provided the basis upon which *FCM* can subsequently be read in this fashion.

2. Boredom and History

Heidegger explicitly states that the site of an authentic *Auseinandersetzung* is the

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45 The main difference between the two endeavours is the status of the “genuinely philosophical confrontation”. In *FCM* *Auseinandersetzung* is not determined through and through as an historical confrontation (in this regard it remains under-determined). In some instances, e.g. §6, Heidegger uses the term to name the most essential and innermost relationship that Dasein has with world/beings as a whole, thus using *Auseinandersetzung* as an ontological notion. Elsewhere, most notably in §18, it is used as a name for a distinctly historical-philosophical mode of relation to the contemporary. In this sense it takes on the entirety of its later meaning. Accompanying both these meanings is the sense that the entirety of the *FCM* is aimed towards a confrontation with metaphysics itself.
philosophy of Nietzsche, as Nietzsche's thoughts on life and spirit govern modern thought, but are at the same time never genuinely conceived therein. This was shown to be due to the anthropological stance of modern Kulturephilosophie (a series of world-views that resemble as philosophy), which posits the fundamental orientations of life and spirit as world-historical forces, wherein Man is merely “set-out” as a symbolic entity. Counter to this, in an effort to grasp man in his essence, Heidegger seeks to awaken a fundamental attunement for philosophising. Within this context, boredom comes forward as the fundamental attunement of the contemporary precisely because the modern Dar-Stellung of man fails to even attempt to grasp the essence of man: it represents a fundamental boredom with man himself. Boredom is therefore deeply connected to Nietzsche, perhaps even as the ur-form of Nihilism, because it underlies, or is perhaps the product of, the fatally contemporary response to Nietzsche's fundamentally metaphysical thought. I intend to show that the analysis of boredom operates as a philosophical mode of access to an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche himself.

46 By “anthropological” I mean, investigating the species “man”, drawing on resources (methodological as well empirical) of the sciences (as an amalgam of psychology, biology, history etc.). For Heidegger this will always fall within the “worldview” category, and will always operate at the level of a “setting out” of man.

47 Nietzsche’s thought is considered, by Heidegger, to be metaphysical through and through – this should not be taken to be disparaging, or even counter to Nietzsche’s own self-conception. In being fundamentally metaphysical, I am claiming that Nietzsche’s thought is genuinely philosophical, as it functions as an interpretation of φύσις that meditates on the originary unity of its dual aspects. I will greatly expand on this notion in chapter 5.

48 As has been suggested throughout this thesis, the general treatment of FCM has been one of neglect. However, where work on FCM has been undertaken, the most popular topic is attunement and thus Heidegger’s analysis of boredom (This is not to say that it has been forwarded as the characteristic and essential part of FCM - that position is almost universally reserved for the analyses contained in ‘Part Two’). Much of the work on this topic has been sufficiently scholarly, but, in a similar manner to that of the treatments of ‘Part Two’, operates from within an alternative philosophical agenda to that presented in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’. Generally, in the secondary literature, Heidegger’s analysis of boredom is approached in order to further flesh out the account of attunement, provided in BT. As such, FCM is seen as an addition to previous philosophical contributions (from both Heidegger and the tradition in general) to the problem, or matter, of affectivity. This has resulted in Heidegger’s thoughts on boredom being read according to a number of cross-disciplinary interests, and within the context of issues developed in his earlier writings. These angles of reading ignore both the specific context within which the account of boredom first arises, and the matter to which it directly gives way. There are a number of readings which stand out from this generally philosophically (or at least hermeneutically) uninteresting collection (see especially Michel Haar and Parvis Emad), the most illuminating of which
In suggesting that there is an historical dimension to attunement, my reading resonates with that of Beistegui, which, as I will show, captures the historical tensions present in Heidegger’s boredom analysis, but does not emphasise the role that Nietzsche has to play. In this regard, the boredom analysis is once again read as something extant within *FCM* as a whole. Accordingly I will establish the intended role of the boredom analysis within *FCM* as it has been forwarded in my reading thus far. In so doing, the necessity of Heidegger’s subsequent comparative analysis of world will emerge, thus establishing the genuine intent of his investigation into the essence of life.

2.1. Beistegui

Beistegui concentrates on ‘one of the two original aspects’ of the text, the first being the account of boredom in terms of its potential to unveil ‘the truly existential soil’ of possible philosophising, and the second being ‘the question of metaphysics as the radicalisation of fundamental ontology.’\(^{49}\) Having set the limits for his engagement with *FCM*, Beistegui further orientates his discussion with an initial comparison between the analysis of boredom (and thus mood in general) in *FCM* and that of anxiety in *BT* and “What is Metaphysics”. He establishes the basics of Heidegger’s account of mood by taking up his analysis of disposition (*Befindlichkeit*) in *BT*, staking out the following:

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\(^{49}\) *Thinking with Heidegger*, p62.
First of all, disposition discloses Dasein in its facticity; then disposition discloses being-in-the-world as a whole; finally, disposition discloses world from a specific angle.  

Beistegui explains that anxiety stands out amongst other moods because ‘what is disclosed is the sheer facticity of existence, the raw fact of human existence.’ What initially emerges from this account is the *individualising* power that Heidegger ascribes to anxiety, wherein anxiety refers Dasein 'back to itself as a *solus ipse*, but only inasmuch as, in so doing, it also always refers Dasein 'back to the world within which it is thrown'. Whilst this anxious moment of individualisation is disclosive of the throwness of Dasein, and thus disclosive of Dasein’s temporal structure, it remains just a moment. As such, Beistegui offers the following thought:

[... ] Heidegger will reproduce this thesis in his analysis of Boredom – the phenomenon of disposition provides the ground from out of which the resolution and the instant can emerge, but in itself does not suffice for Dasein to become transparent to itself and assume its own being.  

In the terminology of *FCM*, the individualising power of a mood provides a moment wherein the matter of becoming what we are can be glimpsed, but not fully sustained. Having suggested this commonality amongst the accounts of anxiety and boredom, Beistegui sets about identifying the differences between accounts. Anxiety in *BT* is investigated as a part of the larger investigation into the ontological structure of Dasein. In 'What is Metaphysics', anxiety is once again taken up, but is approached in a

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50 *Thinking with Heidegger*, p64  
51 Ibid. Famously Heidegger suggests that in anxiety, one is anxious without regard to a specific being (which would more properly constitute fear). As such one comes face-to-face with being-in-the-world as such. As aforementioned earlier in this thesis I will have to assume that the reader has prior knowledge of Heidegger’s analysis of mood in general.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid, p65
manner similar to that of boredom in *FCM*, which is to say, 'it is developed not with a view to investigating further one of Dasein's existentials, but with a view to providing an access to the question concerning the nature and essence of metaphysics'. The difference between these two orientations yields a different relation to the matter of fundamental ontology in general. The first orientation approaches anxiety from within the clear tasks of fundamental ontology, whereas in the second, 'anxiety is inscribed within the problematic of fundamental ontology'. This “problematic of fundamental ontology” - revealed in anxiety - is understood to be Dasein's 'confronting beings as a whole in the very withdrawal of beings', or, 'Dasein's existence as transcendence, or as metaphysics'.

Moving to *FCM*, Beistegui frames the account of boredom within a problematic of history. He does this by laying-out the meaning of boredom's distinct characterisation as not just a *Stimmung*, but as a *Grund-stimmung*. As a fundamental, or indeed a grounding attunement, “ground” maintains three senses. The first has been touched upon – 'the *Stimmung* is fundamental in that it reveals the ground of Dasein who, as transcendence, is its own groundlessness, its own abyss'. The second sense 'coincides with the explicit intention of the first part of Heidegger's lecture course [the Preliminary Appraisal], which concerns the rootedness of philosophizing itself within a *Stimmung*. Clearly, Beistegui is also concerned with the historical implications of this sense of the fundamentality of a fundamental attunement.

In principle, many more attunements [other than profound boredom] could

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54 Ibid, p66  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.
claim to open onto metaphysics. Yet, in fact [...] it would seem that we are always historically disposed, that the dispositions of existence are themselves primarily rooted in the history of Dasein, and that the possibility of a turn to beings as a whole is always a matter for decision that has exceeded that of existence. 58

Beistegui lays out the third sense of ground, which he considers the most important. The direct implication of the rootedness of philosophizing itself within a fundamental attunement is the seeming necessity and inevitability of 'recourse to a philosophy of history'. 59 Anxiety was shown to radically individualise each and every Dasein on the basis of the disclosure of its 'concrete and singular' existence, which is to say that in BT, disposition was grounded and understood from out of the ecstatic, horizontal temporality of Dasein, or what Beistegui terms "the time of existence". 60 Reformed from within an alternative orientation toward fundamental ontology, one wherein it is first and foremost experienced as a problem, being attuned potentially refers this radical individualisation back to a 'deeper time and more originary ground', namely, history. In further deepening the ground of Dasein's attunement, the matter of individualisation becomes subject to a 'more general and shared context', which is, of course, the 'epoch'. 61

In identifying the distinct character of attunement in FCM as bound up with an implicit philosophy of history, Beistegui has clearly recognised the specific context

58 Ibid, p67
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid, p68
61 Ibid. Beistegui summarises this point and brings it to its apex as follows: “We are indeed always concretely caught up and situated in the world. We always relate to it in a particular way. But this relation, this situatedness, are they of Dasein's own doing, or is Dasein always thrown and disposed on the basis of a foundation other than that of its own transcendence, and which determines its destiny? Is this not what we need to understand by "epoch": this world configuration that happens to us, this presence of the world that is our share and that we inherit, this inheritance that delimits and limits the field of possibilities for us?”

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within which the analysis of profound boredom arises. In further clarifying the epochal character of profound boredom, Beistegui suggests that a potential failure of Heidegger’s account lies in the nature of his approach to the identification of the contemporary situation.

In the end we shall have to wonder the extent to which the identification of profound boredom as the attunement that is proper to “our today” differs from this philosophy of culture which Heidegger is so eager to overcome, and the extent to which anthropology is simply avoidable, when, leaving the neutral descriptive shores of fundamental ontology, it becomes a question of venturing into the turbid waters of historical diagnosis.

In transitioning from an orientation wherein the task of philosophy is purely descriptive (namely BT), to one wherein the path of philosophy becomes fully embroiled in the potentially crippling problematic of history, Heidegger opens himself up to failure. Failure would constitute a brute repetition of the structure of historical worldviews. The question at the heart of FCM must then be understood as this: in what manner, on what grounds and in which direction does the investigation in FCM achieve a distance from other historical analyses or analyses of the problematic of history? What is, and what is the strength of Heidegger’s philosophy of history as it arises in, and is projected out from, FCM?

For Beistegui ‘the decisive question then becomes: Where does it [boredom] all come from?’ In response to this, he suggests that Heidegger postpones this question, and, perhaps in preparation for a response, analyses “boredom for itself”. My contention is

62 Although he does not offer a detailed account of the nature of the Preliminary Appraisal, or its direct relation to this matter, due to the object of his inquiry.

63 Thinking with Heidegger, p69

64 Ibid, 70
that Heidegger directly answers this question as he identifies the proper source of the contemporary situation as Nietzsche. The task of becoming who we are within this epoch has its proper place within an *Auseinandersetzung* therewith. This possibility is overlooked by Beistegui. In a footnote on the matter of his analysis of what constitutes the contemporary situation, he states the following:

One can only remain perplexed before Heidegger’s choice of references which he captures, all too easily perhaps, under the name “philosophy of culture”: Why these? Why only four? Why only German? True, if Heidegger considers thus *Kulturephilosophie*, it is only to dismiss it instantly, precisely as that type of philosophy which is unable to distinguish between *Zeitgeist* and *Grundstimmung*. Yet it is precisely this “philosophy” that provides him with his clue, and ultimately with his diagnosis, concerning the *Stimmung* of the time.65

As I have indicated, Heidegger recognises the arbitrary character of his selection. He recognises the possibility that what he says can be taken as being merely correct (or incorrect), i.e., of the order of factuality, and thus diagnosis, wherein man is taken up in terms of his being caught up in the concrete unfolding of history. He fully recognises the inessential character of his engagement with *Kulturephilosophie*, and in its stead, he posits a more originary engagement and relationship to Nietzsche, one that requires a *distance* from the fatally contemporary. Rather than being a point where Heidegger allows an implicitly historical problematic to ambiguously unfold into a purely descriptive, phenomenological account of boredom, there is an explicit situating of this analysis within a formulation of a historical problematic that recognises contemporary lostness in relation to Greek origins – a lostness which has Nietzsche at its centre. Beistegui points to a key issue in *FCM* as a whole, recognising the tension between the

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65 Ibid, p 69, footnote 13 (found on p 191).
“trans-historical” and “historically rooted”. Beistegui sees this in terms of the problematic transition from an analysis of the purely individualising nature of attunement (the trans-historical), to its communally and epochally binding nature (the historically rooted), which is the movement from the analysis of attunement in BT to that of FCM.

As indicated in my reading of the 'Preliminary Appraisal', Heidegger is explicitly attempting to lay out the peculiar historical problem of reconciling the a priori character of philosophising and its historical origins or situatedness. Beistegui himself concludes his dealings with boredom by suggesting that the more complete response to these issues raised in FCM will be formulated under the title “truth and history” as the centrality of an analysis of everyday existence comes to be replaced by an analysis of 'the great metaphysical and poetical texts'.

Heidegger, on my reading, has this movement fully in view in FCM. The confrontation of the a priori and the rooted is one such iteration of the oppositional structure of metaphysics itself, where metaphysics has been presented as the unfulfilled meditation of the unitary structure of divergent meanings of φύσις in light of Aristotle's pronouncements. According to Heidegger, and §18 of FCM, with Nietzsche our epoch becomes characterised by Apollo and Dionysus. Rather than seek an a priori account of

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66 Thinking with Heidegger, 74

67 Beistegui claims – in my opinion correctly – that the analysis of boredom in FCM confirms that of BT inasmuch as it reveals time as the meaning of meaning of being. The difference in orientation lies with the ultimate deployment of the analysis in FCM, namely the framing of this revelation of the fundamentality of temporality as being the ground of “us” “today” (p 74).

68 Ibid, p80. Beistegui, despite his claim that this tension is the central matter of the account of boredom, recognises that this tension remains unresolved throughout FCM. In fact, he goes as far as to suggest that this tension is ‘the source of transformation of Heidegger’s thought’ [Thinking with Heidegger, p74]. The central issue of my own thesis can be understood as an examination of both the extent to which this is true, and in what manner this is true, i.e., in what way this is explicitly the case, and how the matters raised in FCM are explicitly taken up and resolved in the Nietzsche Lectures.
history that *escapes* historical rootedness, or vice-versa, Heidegger will attempt to group this dichotomy in a deeper way (as Beistegui points out in his analysis of time and boredom). In terms of fundamental attunements, this is born out when (as I shall show in what follows) boredom reveals itself to be structured in the same oppositional manner, revealing world and individuation to have a structural unity which cannot be grasped via investigation into one side of the opposition alone.

Following this thread, and further grasping the position of Nietzsche within *FCM*, identifies it as part of Heidegger’s broader Nietzsche reading. As such, the concerns of *FCM* will be shown to *persist* throughout Heidegger’s readings of the “great metaphysical texts”, rather than give way to them. This is the aim of this thesis: the continued establishment of *FCM* as a part of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche. Or, an examination of how the *FCM* explicitly calls for a deeper engagement with Nietzsche, such that this eventual Nietzsche reading offers a completion of the tasks begun in *FCM*. 
3. Boredom

3.1. Profound Boredom

For Heidegger, the aim of interpreting boredom is to render its essence clear, thus generating transparency regarding its possible status as the fundamental attunement of our times: one which is characterised as standing within a lostness and removal from the questionableness of Dasein in its ground. This transparency is necessarily a questioning of Dasein, a being open to the very ground of Dasein itself, such that, in conducting this questioning itself, Dasein can “become what it is”. This ultimate questioning of Dasein, which is essentially philosophical (i.e., not essentially determined by the ideal of truth pertaining to that of the sciences), must be sustained by a fundamental attunement. In order to await the awakening of a fundamental attunement, a particular “questioning attitude” has to be achieved. Ultimately, the purpose of the boredom analysis is, as Beistegui shows, not merely descriptive, as was the case with the analysis of anxiety in BT. Rather, it is directed toward the generation of an essentially philosophical, questioning attitude, which is a disposition that represents a readiness for a philosophical Auseinandersetzung.

Read in this light, the philosophical product of Heidegger’s analysis of boredom is not merely a deepening of our understanding of attunement. Access to the underlying structure of metaphysics, indeed of all possible contemporary investigations into φύσις itself, is also at stake. In my reading of these sections, I seek to clarify Heidegger’s conception of the relationship between world and solitude. In so doing, the specific context for his comparative analysis of world will be provided, and the
philosophical soil from out of which his broader Nietzsche reading grows will also be established. By this last point I mean that the basis for an understanding of the specific structure and content of his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche will be established, such that it can be subsequently explored in chapter 5.

3.1.1. The “forms” and “moments” of boredom

Boredom is not approached as though it were an object to be examined, but taken up phenomenologically, in terms of 'the way we move within it'.69 The investigation into boredom takes up the way in which we first and foremost grasp boredom itself, i.e., as something to be driven away. As such, there are two distinct elements of boredom phenomenologically grasped, namely 'the reaction and that which it reacts against'. Heidegger treats these two elements as the initial “forms” of boredom, naming them “becoming bored by” and “being bored with”.

The first form of becoming bored by something comes to meet us from the outside as it were, while the second points to the fact that boredom arises out of Dasein itself.70

The main point of difference between “becoming bored by” and “being bored with” is how we stand in relation to passing the time (our manner of driving these types of boredom away). “Being bored with” is marked out by the intertwining of being bored and passing the time,71 whereas in “becoming bored by” there is a clear distinction

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69 FCM, §22.
70 Ibid, §29.
71 Heidegger gives the example of being bored during an evening’s social engagement in order to illustrate the matter. He claims that during such an engagement, it is nothing specific that comes forward as being that which bores us: none of the particular activities, like polite conversation, that we undertake, or the social engagement itself, despite our being bored with it. Heidegger puts it thus: 'the individual details of the situation are of no consequence; they are only coincidentally that with which
between what is boring and how passing the time might counteract this boredom. In passing the time we are not occupied with time itself, as this would mean bringing time before us as “at hand” in some manner, but rather the dragging of time. This objectless dragging of time is identified as the first “structural moment”, or characteristic, of boredom and referred to as “being held in limbo”. As Heidegger puts it ‘becoming bored is a being held in limbo by time as it drags over an interval of time’. The effect of being held in limbo is some form of paralysis, in being held in limbo we attempt to pass the time in order to counteract the paralysing effect of this dragging of time. The second structural moment, “being left empty”, is experienced as the desire to pass the time by occupying ourselves with something. Being “occupied” is 'a way in which [...] we deal with things', wherein our ‘activities and exploits’ are given ‘direction and fullness’. As such, 'being left empty is eliminated when things are at hand, at our disposal', accordingly, being left empty can be understood as a moment wherein nothing is at hand.

Being left empty thus involves a peculiar absence of things, because, as factically existing, we are always in the world in such a way that we are surrounded by other beings at hand. Rather than an “annihilation” of things at hand, in becoming bored by something, and being left empty by something, 'things must be at hand such that they

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72 In its first form, boredom is encountered as being driven away in passing the time. Giving the example of waiting for a train, it is not the train itself that causes boredom, but rather the waiting for the train. In this manner boredom itself, and what we are specifically bored by, come to rest on a peculiar relationship to time – namely the desire to move time on.
73 Ibid, §23, c).
74 Ibid, §23, d).
75 Ibid.
leave us empty’. In this way, being left empty means being abandoned to ourselves by that which we are becoming bored by. This abandonment is in fact a refusal of things at hand: in being left empty by something, we project an expectation of the things at hand that we are becoming bored by that is not fulfilled by them. This refusal is not disappointment, because when disappointed with something we are no longer concerned with it and therefore leave it alone. By contrast, in becoming bored by something we are continually occupied by it in a way that leaves us empty. In being left empty by something that is at hand, yet somehow at hand in a way that it itself refuses us any dealings with it, we remain occupied by whatever is at hand, neither disappointed nor satisfied, but held in limbo in being left empty.

This connection indicates that the two structural moments of boredom are not fully separated in their distinction from one another, but are indeed “structurally interwoven”. This structural interweaving, or the nature of the unity of these two distinct structural moments, is unclear at this point, but Heidegger concludes from an initial analysis of the first form of boredom that ‘what is at issue here in the possibility of boredom is an as yet obscure relation of the dragging along of time to the things that refuse themselves’. The two moments sustain each other and are thus mutually interdependent. As structural moments of boredom itself, these characteristics ‘must in themselves accord with one another from out of the essence of boredom’. Heidegger is concerned with ‘seeing the original link [Fuge] between these two moments’, such that the “intrinsic unity” and “whole structure” of becoming bored can be brought into

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76 Ibid.
77 Note that Heidegger is not concerned with the manner in which this refusal or inability to meet our expectations is caused, i.e., if we are to blame of the situation is to blame, but rather, investigating what it is that bores us in a boring situation. As such, causes are not of concern.
78 FCM, §23, d).
79 Ibid.
3.1.2. The meaning of “profundity”

The next step along the path toward rendering the essence of boredom transparent, and thus properly generating this questioning attitude, is to interpret profound boredom: a third form of boredom that constitutes the ground of the the previous two as their most essential form. This profound boredom is, of course, the fundamental attunement of boredom that has been forwarded as the grounding attunement of our epoch. This marks a change in the nature of the interpretation. The previous two, “superficial”, forms of boredom were taken up as particular attunements wherein particular situations were disclosed. What marks out this third form of boredom in terms of its increased profundity is its indeterminacy with regard to a specific situation – it does not arise within or as a response to a particular situation or occasion, but rather, “irrupts” into situations ‘whenever we do not expect it at all’. Heidegger names this form of boredom “it is boring for one”.

The movement of increased profundity, then, can be understood as the movement from a more determinate form of boredom into an indeterminate form, wherein what

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80 Ibid, §24, a).
81 Through his analysis of the initial forms of boredom, the path to this questioning attitude shows itself to lie in the direction of an engagement with the essence of time. In this way the account of boredom overcomes itself in the direction of time, as it is now time that becomes the object of investigation and not boredom as such. This does not mean that boredom becomes left behind, as ‘the essence of time cannot be illuminated at all in any other way, i.e., it cannot be illuminated by speculating about time’ [Ibid, §29.]
82 “It is boring for one” is McNeill’s translation of Es ist einem langweilig. This is one of his more inventive translations as he is attempting to convey something of the etymology, and thus inherent temporal references of langweilig lost in English. Langweilig is literally “long while”. “It is a long-while” would make no sense in English, neither would “it is a boring”.
83 The previous forms being determinate as they relate to determinate situations, first form being the type of boredom experienced in waiting for a train, and the second form the type experienced in being bored at an evening dinner party.
comes to the fore is the deep embeddedness of the structural moments of boredom within the time of Dasein itself, or 'the manner in which our own temporality temporalizes itself'.\textsuperscript{84} The structural unity of “being left empty” and “being held in limbo” is the manner in which Dasein 'has its time', but this connection is not satisfactorily elucidated merely as a result of a recognition of where the essential unity lies. Where the first division in the character of boredom was structured according to action and reaction, this third form of boredom places this opposition into question. As Heidegger claims, when it comes to gaining access to “original time”, 'the essence of subjectivity must be put into question in advance'.\textsuperscript{85}

3.1.3. The disclosive power of profound boredom

Divorced from any determinate situational reference point, the self involved in this third form of boredom cannot be recognised as maintaining the same determinate character: the “it” (the self that bores) is not “myself” ‘of this particular standing and age, with this name and vocation and fate’, but rather, myself as an 'undifferentiated no one'.\textsuperscript{86} The abstraction from a particular situation and the resulting lack of possible exemplification of this form of boredom, is reflected in the absence of any passing of the time. Rather, we respond by not permitting such activity, and thus allow our response to 'manifest the character of boredom itself', such that there is no counteraction of boredom, but a letting be of it. Heidegger characterises this as 'being compelled to listen' to what boredom has to say, whereas in the other forms of boredom we pass the time in order to avoid listening to, and experiencing, boredom as such.

\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{85} FCM, §30
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
Given the factual absence of any passing the time in this third form of boredom and thus the indeterminate character of the situation, “being left empty” (the 1st structural moment) is neither constituted from a particular emptiness that arises in relation to the unfulfilling character of a situation (as in the first form), nor a self-forming emptiness that arises from a letting go of oneself to be fully given over to whatever presents itself in the situation. In this “it is boring for one”, Heidegger claims that we are ‘relieved of our everyday personality’; ‘elevated beyond the particular situation’; and also ‘beyond the specific beings surrounding us there’.87 In this moment of undifferentiatedness, there is an indifference in relation to the situation, both in terms of the things at hand, and ourselves. Heidegger puts this as follows:

Beings have – as we say – become indifferent as a whole, and we ourselves as these people are not expected. We no longer stand as subjects and suchlike opposite these beings and excluded from them, but find ourselves in the midst of beings as a whole, i.e., in the whole of this indifference.88

Upon initial investigation, this “indifference as a whole” does not seem to be graspable in terms of an emptiness, as ‘being left empty is always possible only where there is some claim to be fulfilled, where the necessity of a fullness exists’.89 When divorced from the specific fullness or emptiness of a situation wherein various determinate possibilities for acting and doing are offered up, it must be the case that we are indeed indifferent to whether or not we are satisfied or left empty at all. Rather than denying specific possibilities of acting and doing for the determinate everyday personality (the

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87 FCM, §31, a).
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
“I” that is me with this specific history and name etc...), in profound boredom ‘the beings that surround us offer us no further possibility of acting and no further possibility of doing anything’.\textsuperscript{90} In offering up no possibility of any practical engagement whatsoever, Heidegger takes the situation to be defined by a “telling refusal” of beings as a whole.

What is being told?\textsuperscript{91} In this form of being left empty, Dasein is ‘suspended among beings’ in such a way that beings as a whole are pointed toward, but only in terms of their refusal. In so doing they do not refuse dealings (possible acting and doing) in a determinate way, i.e., obstruct a particular endeavour, or dissatisfy with regard to a specific expectation, but rather ‘indicate indeterminately the possibilities of Dasein’.\textsuperscript{92}

What is told in this telling refusal then, is that there are ‘possibilities of Dasein left unexploited’: there is an implicit reference to a fullness of possibilities that is in some manner interrupted in the refusal (qua breakdown) of beings as a whole. This is an indication that the first structural moment (“being left empty”) 'has in itself a structured relation to something else on account of the reference contained in such telling refusal.'\textsuperscript{93} This “something else” is of course “being held in limbo”(the 2nd structural moment). Here we find the most profound presentation of the relationship between world and solitude presented in FCM thus far.

The telling refusal of beings as a whole does not point to any arbitrary and determinate

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} It should be noted that Heidegger uses Versagen, the substantive form of the verb versagen, which connotes refusal in the sense of a breakdown, or a refusal to work, rather than, say, the refusal of an invitation. McNeill translates this as “telling refusal” because of the status of Versagen as a cognate of sagen – to tell. It is only by recognising this connection to telling [sagen] that it makes sense for Heidegger to continue his interpretation by asking about what is being told in this telling refusal.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid, §31, b).

\textsuperscript{93} Ibid. §31, a).
possibilities of Dasein, but to the very ground of all possible determinations of Dasein.

Whatever is utmost and primary in making possible all possibilities of Dasein as possibilities, whatever it is that sustains Dasein's potentiality for being [Seinkönnen], its possibilities, is affected by this telling refusal of beings as a whole.⁹⁴

In so being attuned there is nothing particular that emerges, there is no content as such to point to, but rather the singular character of Dasein is pointed toward. It is this being “impelled” in the direction of Dasein's potentiality for being, this contentless, indeterminate relation to the ground of all potential determinate relations, that constitutes “being held in limbo” in this third form of boredom.

“Being held in limbo” and “being left empty” cannot be understood as fully distinct in their specific determinations belonging to this third form of Boredom. Their structural interweaving is not merely external, but also contains internal references to the other. As such, Heidegger defines boredom in its most profound form as being an “expanse” into the “limit of beings as a whole” that intensifies ‘the extremity of Dasein in the direction of what is originally singular in whatever makes Dasein itself possible’.⁹⁵ In thus understanding boredom as ultimately attuning Dasein as an oscillation between beings as a whole and the singularity (solitude) of what makes Dasein itself possible, its metaphysical importance becomes clear. The fundamental concepts of metaphysics have now been presented with greater clarity through this interpretation of boredom: World: enveloping limit of beings as a whole; Solitude: the singular extremity of whatever originarily makes Dasein possible; Finitude: being attuned.

⁹⁴ Ibid.
⁹⁵ Ibid.
3.2. The metaphysical structure of boredom

The structural moments of boredom have been detailed and 'made [...] visible in their structural unity', but their precise relationship to time has not yet been established, thus the nature of this unity requires further elaboration. In order to bring this aspect into view, Heidegger points toward the temporal ramifications of the refusal of beings as a whole: 'everything – in every respect, retrospect and prospect, beings simultaneously withdraw'. These “perspectives” are clearly connected to the present, past and future, indeed, Heidegger states that they “distribute themselves” out as these temporal dimensions. However, their temporality is initially experienced as a perspective on, or aspect of, 'all doing and activity of Dasein', rather than as theoretical dimensions, or elements of perception. Heidegger defines these perspectives as a “simultaneous totality” in which Dasein constantly moves – there is never a point at which one of these aspects, one of these ways of seeing, is isolated

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96 Ibid, §32
97 Ibid, §32, a).
98 McNeill translates Sichten as “perspectives”. “Aspects” might have been more fitting with his rendering of Hinsicht etc. I point this out because “Perspektive” has separate connotations of its own – an important one being a seemingly inexorable connection with Horizont, which is a matter that will be investigated in the later stages of this thesis.
99 FCM, §32, a). Whilst Heidegger does not need to import his previous analysis of time and equipmental horizontality from Being and Time, it is worth noting that this thought is developed at length therein - in part as a development of and response to Husserls notion of time-consciousness. As such, Heidegger is concerned with the non-perceptual basis of time – to be phenomenological is not to start with perceptions but dealings etc.
100 Ibid.
101 In his own book Mcneill, M. The Time of Life (SUNY, New York: 2007), McNeill focuses heavily on the role of sight - conceptually, historically and etymologically – in FCM, yet he loses this aspect of seeing and sighting by using “perspective”. Perspective carries with it a particular relation to a viewpoint or a state, whereas Sichten has no point – it would just be “view”. Whilst I intermittently use “aspect” I recognise that the existence of both “ansicht” and indeed “aspekt” mean that it is by no means a perfect translation of this term, nor an improvement, but rather a way of drawing out a connotation that is more appropriate for this project.
from its counterparts; they are only ever maintained in varying configurations wherein one aspect may be dominant over the others. As such, 'these three perspectives are not lined up alongside one another, but originarily simply united in the horizon of time as such'.

102 Heidegger takes this temporal elaboration to point toward the ground (in terms of that which makes it possible) of the refusal of beings as a whole. It is only on the basis of there being a “simultaneous totality” and “originarily simple unity” of the three aspects of Dasein's dealings, that a refusal as a whole (which is to say in every respect, retrospect and prospect) can occur. This is not to say that the three aspects are unified in a way that dissolves their identity.

With the refusal of beings as a whole, comes the withdrawal of beings as a whole. In this withdrawal the everyday dimensions of time lose their determinacy and their distinction, their non-theoretical, proximal determinations in the everyday dealings and activities of Dasein (respect, retrospect, prospect) withdraw along with beings as a whole. This is characterised as a being left empty, but, as Heidegger states, 'this telling refusal as a whole arises on the side of beings'.

103 This means that there is no longer a specific situation, activity or context which determines the ground of this boredom, as Heidegger puts it: there is 'nothing, in the telling refusal of beings as a whole, which could “explain” this entrancement to it.'

104 Here, a certain distance becomes manifest between Dasein and beings as a whole, one which allows this emptiness of any determinate relationship to beings “a space in

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102 FCM, §32, a).
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid. As Heidegger states: – “[Dasein is] accustomed to being acquainted and concerned only with beings, and indeed this or that being in each case.”
which to play”. The temporal ramification of this space and emptiness is that Dasein is no longer anchored within time by reference to “determinate time-points” which occur within the dimensions of time as experienced with the activities of Dasein. Rather than being ‘specifically articulated or delimited according to past and future’, in this profound boredom the “time of Dasein” maintains itself in an “unarticulated unity”. The key aspect of this unarticulated unity is that, in boredom, the dimensions of the time of Dasein (not the dimensions of time itself) are not amalgamated or dissolved into a higher order unity, but held in 'the simplicity of this unity of their horizon all at once'. Precisely how this is so, and precisely what this means are, at this stage, given over to the “enigmatic and concealed” power of the entrenchment of the horizon of time.

In the telling refusal of beings as a whole Dasein is given over to what is 'uncircumventable if [it], in keeping with its possibilities, is to be what it can be as it can be'. In telling of the uncircumventable, this refusal must also tell of the freedom of Dasein, such that it points to the ground of Dasein’s possibilities for being, the very possibilities that are refused when beings as a whole refuse themselves. This dual orientation, in profound boredom, is shown to be maintained in some form of unity, as it is nothing other than “entrancing time” itself that 'essentially makes Dasein possible'.

Delving deeper into this notion of “that which properly makes possible”, Heidegger states that what time ‘tells of’ as being refused (i.e., what it ‘gives to be known [...] as

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105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 FCM, §32, b).
108 Ibid.
something possible' and, as such, 'gives to be free') is the 'freedom of Dasein as such'.\textsuperscript{109} In this profound boredom, the movement of the analysis “beyond the public individual subject” has been shown to be a movement beyond the level of self-cognition: the investigation is now asking after the selfhood that underlies all (situationally) determinate instances of “me”.

Mirroring the mechanics of anxiety’s disclosive powers as laid out in \textit{BT}, Heidegger forwards the idea that the freedom of Dasein as such is not given by an external entity, rather it is a mode of “self-liberation”[\textit{Sichbefreien}], wherein Dasein frees itself from its factical and specifically situational determinateness by disclosing ‘itself for itself as Dasein’.\textsuperscript{110} The hyphenation of Dasein here emphasises the there character of Dasein, where Dasein is not simply ‘present-at hand alongside other things’, but in the midsts of beings. Being “amidst”, but not \textit{alongside}, indicates that man maintains an essential difference from those beings that he finds himself amongst.\textsuperscript{111} This is the key point regarding the relationship of the fundamental concepts. This difference is what Heidegger will refer to as the “abyss of essential origins” in \textit{NIII}. 'Part Two' will constitute an advanced elaboration of this point. In \textit{NIII} Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche’s extreme anthropomorphism arises from his ignoring this abyss. For Heidegger, in mistaking the world of Dasein for the world of life, Nietzsche universalises the unique ontological position of Dasein. In this regard the essential

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} This difference is what Heidegger will refer to as the “abyss of essential origins” in \textit{NIII}. 'Part Two' will constitute an advanced elaboration of this point. In \textit{NIII} Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche’s extreme anthropomorphism arises from his ignoring this abyss. For Heidegger, in mistaking the world of Dasein for the world of life, Nietzsche universalises the unique ontological position of Dasein. In this regard the essential otherness and discontinuity of life (the \textit{abyssal} bodily kinship of man and animal), is erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of “life” as a translation of "}\textit{φύσις}” in its most originary form. Life must remain other, else the \textit{finite} tension that constitutes Dasein is released, in which case the terror of existence, and attack of being, are mitigated in favour of comfort and assurance.
otherness and discontinuity of life (the abyssal bodily kinship of man and animal), is erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger’s rejection of “life” as a translation of “φύσις” in its most originary form. Where “life” names those other beings which we find ourselves amongst in the world, what essentially constitutes “life” must remain other, else the finite tension that constitutes Dasein is released, in which case the terror of existence, and attack of being, are mitigated in favour of comfort and assurance.

The self-disclosure of Dasein does not involve an opposition to beings as a whole, or a movement beyond them, but rather, occurs within the very ground of the manifestness of beings as whole: the horizon of time, in binding Dasein to itself, presents the uncircumventability of beings as a whole at the same time as allowing Dasein to disclose itself for itself as the ground of its own possibility for being. In profound boredom the entrancement of time presents an emptiness of all possible dealings, a suspension of all temporal dimensions of engagement, thus announcing the essential jointure of Dasein to beings as a whole. But, at the same time, this emptiness speaks of unexploited possibilities, of the freedom of the possibility to be there, as maintaining a threefold perspective as a simple unity within the full horizon of time, rather than the threefold perspective as seemingly divided within concrete situations.

This is a clear repetition of the structure of Aristotle’s notion of first philosophy, and indeed the structure of Nietzsche’s meditation on Apollo and Dionysus. This identity is not trivial. The task of the self-becoming of Dasein has been shown to lie in a meditation upon the fundamental unity of the opposed orientations of what would classically be taken to be freedom and determinacy, self and other, man and nature, but
in Heidegger's thought comes to be world and individuation.

3.3. The movement of Philosophy: A reprise.

3.3.1. Conclusion of the boredom analysis

What has been achieved by this examination of boredom as a fundamental attunement is not some form of definition that can be 'taken as an assertion in which something is supposed to be established', but rather, 'a more incisive direction for questioning'.\(^{112}\) Whilst the task is still to question the manner in which the two structural moments of boredom are structurally linked, Heidegger states the following:

[This] proves to be something we will correctly understand only if we comprehend boredom in the *unity of its essence*, if we comprehend that which is structurally linked in terms of the *linkage belonging to this structural link*.\(^{113}\)

Prior to genuinely understanding the peculiar, idiosyncratic, and most proper nature of a matter, we must understand what it would mean for something have an essence, we have to know what we are looking for.\(^{114}\)

If philosophy is knowledge of the essence - and this is what it is in the correctly

\(^{112}\) FCM, §34

\(^{113}\) Ibid. “*aus der Fügung der Fuge das Gefügte begreifen*” - this is an important phrasing for the comparison of FCM to the later Nietzsche Lectures. Bambach will focus on the manner in which Fug becomes Heidegger's translation of the ancient Greek *Dike* (Justice), which he opposes to Nietzsche's more subjective translation as *Gerechtigkeit*. See chapter 5.

\(^{114}\) Heidegger still collects the insights of his analysis of boredom under a definition of sorts: 'Boredom is the entrancement of the temporal horizon' [FCM, §34]. As a definition, this summary of the investigation does not grasp boredom in an “empty” manner, such that the most universal account of boredom is developed in order to match all three different forms equally as essentially. This definition is clearly tailored towards the third form at the expense of the others. This does not mean that it is not an essential definition, it simply means that essentiality is not, here, understood in line with universality. The notion of essence operative within philosophy is not guided by the ideal of certainty – an investigation into the essence of a matter does not seek the 'emptiest as the sole and most proper essence' [ibid]. In order to “get close” to the essence of a matter, we first need to grasp its essentiality.
understood sense – then its possibility is grounded in the first instance, and decisively where everything is concerned, in the essentiality of its questioning and in the power of its questioning to be essential.\textsuperscript{115}

This is not a matter of method, but one of engagement \textit{[Einsatz]} and of the \textit{possibility of engagement pertaining to a philosophizing existence}.\textsuperscript{116}

In thus attempting to conclude his extended analysis of boredom, Heidegger has returned to the initial issue confronted at the beginning of the text: what is philosophy and how does it proceed? What is the absolute character, the essence, of Philosophy. The whole of \textit{FCM} thus far can be understood to be a meditation on the manner in which philosophy itself can begin. Heidegger points to a fundamental issue faced by all attempts to come face to face with the essence of philosophy itself: ‘we are never sparing enough with such talk about philosophy, never active enough in philosophising’.\textsuperscript{117} This is a clear word of warning for those who would see the question regarding the essence of philosophy as in some way “metaphilosophical”. Heidegger is not concerned with getting toward a definition of philosophy, but with philosophising itself: ‘only if we experience its essence from out of philosophizing itself will we become intimate with the essence of philosophy’.\textsuperscript{118}

Heidegger progresses this matter beyond the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. Following from the previous quote, he states that the essence of philosophy cannot be experienced by ‘reading and reviewing philosophical literature,’\textsuperscript{119} we must, first, be attempting to philosophise. At the closing stages of the account of boredom, an account which

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
opened with an indication of the importance of Nietzsche thought for modernity, Heidegger returns to the thoughts he started his boredom analysis with: the movement of philosophy in relationship to philosophers and their work. Following this rejection of philosophy as mere reading and reviewing, he does not reject the idea that philosophising is essentially caught up with those philosophers than have gone before. Indeed, as an effort to philosophise for ourselves, Heidegger claims that 'this must bring us to the point where we can understand a philosopher better than he understood himself'.

Echoing both his earlier comments on Nietzsche’s standing, Heidegger states the following:

This does not mean, however, that we should rebuke him and point out to him which precursors he is dependent upon, but that we are in a position to concede him more than he himself was in possession of. If someone does not summon up the inner freedom as a philosopher to be such a person to whose essence it necessarily belongs to be better understood than he understands himself – then philosophy has passed that person by, in spite of all philosophical erudition. Philosophy is only there to be overcome.

On my reading this is a direct reference to the 'last of the greats', as Heidegger calls him in §76. The implicit regard for Nietzsche, and further, the basis for Heidegger's later formulation of Auseinandersetzung is evidenced not only by the preceding and succeeding references for a need to read Nietzsche, but also by the remainder of this meditation on philosophy:

Yet it [philosophy] can only be overcome if it stands in the first place, and can be overcome all the more essentially the more profound the resistance is that it

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120 Ibid.  
121 Ibid. Italics are mine.  
122 As indicated by the closing statement of FCM in §76.
summons up through its being there. Overcoming, however, does not occur through refutation in the sense of demonstrating mistakes and things that are incorrect. Whether we regain this intrinsic freedom of philosophical confrontation [philosophischen Auseinandersetzung] and discussion, to what extent it can ever be realised in this era: this no one can say objectively.\textsuperscript{123}

The concept of Auseinandersetzung is here presented as relating to the intrinsic freedom of the movement of philosophy itself: the movement of overcoming. The movement of philosophy it is always one's own (it is an essential activity of Dasein after all), but equally it requires an internal relationship to that which it overcomes: there is necessarily something other that is overcome in all overcoming. With philosophy, that which is overcome is philosophy as it stands, it is philosophy itself: it is a self-overcoming. If my reading is correct, then the self to be overcome is that of philosophising in the contemporary epoch: precisely the epoch of Nietzsche. The task of FCM thus remains the preparation for a philosophical encounter, an Auseinandersetzung, with history... with Nietzsche.

The analysis of boredom ends in similar position to where it began, with the thought that 'essential knowledge is possible only from out of and in an originary questioning'.\textsuperscript{124} This originary questioning must operate from within the “intrinsic freedom of philosophical confrontation [Auseinandersetzung]”. However, prior to working from within this freedom, the type of engagement needed to enter into philosophy requires a certain response to the varying prejudices of a non-philosophical attitude or disposition. Philosophy is not the removal of all prejudice, as there is no possibility of a purity of beginnings at any level. Starting philosophy anew, without

\textsuperscript{123} FCM, §34  
\textsuperscript{124} FCM, §37
being caught in a response to how its stands/stood with philosophy is to think of philosophy in a non-philosophical way, namely, as a perfectable science seeking absolute certainty. Heidegger is not advocating a presuppositionless, a-historical, non-prejudiced stance toward philosophy. On the contrary, *Auseinandersetzung* as an authentic mode of philosophical engagement, must come to stand in a particular way with regard to its prejudices and history, it must identify them and locate them, perhaps even overcome them, but it cannot become freed from them.

### 3.3.2. Repetition of the structure of metaphysics

This “historical rootedness” of Dasein, as Beistegui puts it, is not something to be left behind or to become detached from: overcoming the matter of how it stands with philosophy is not directed towards a trans-historical position. The tension between the historically rooted and the trans-historical is structured in the same manner as the two structural moments of boredom, the two orientations toward ὕσσις in Aristotle’s first philosophy, and the fundamental orientations of Apollo and Dionysus. They are fundamentally opposed, yet their struggle is not a struggle for independence, but moreover a vital struggle that represents a certain unity.

The recurrence of the basic structure of metaphysics as originally and authentically conceived by Aristotle, and the subsequent relevance of Nietzsche’s thought as the genuinely contemporary (thus epochal) repetition thereof, has been overlooked in other readings of *FCM*. As Heidegger explicated in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’, when thought as *Prote Philosophia*, metaphysics is a meditation on the unity and interrelation of a dual orientation toward ὕσσις. This dual orientation (on the one hand ὕσσις as
beings as a whole, and on the other thinking φύσις as the being of beings) has been trivialised and confused by traditional metaphysics to the point where one aspect is explicitly subjugated to the other, or the distinction between the two is missed entirely. The unfulfilled task of Aristotelian philosophy was the elaboration of the structural unity of these two orientations. Rather than specifically take up the possibility of thinking this unity from out of a direct engagement with Aristotle. An historical engagement was in fact suspended in the name of first acquiring the proper philosophical disposition from within which the genuinely philosophical intention and profundity of Aristotle could be recognised.  

Surveying the continuity between 'Preliminary Appraisal' and 'Part One' in this way allows for the recognition of the importance of Nietzsche with regard to boredom and its epochal character. When defining the contemporary situation, Heidegger pointed toward Nietzsche as the ‘place and source where a the confrontation proper [with the contemporary] must occur’. In his, albeit brief, elaboration of this point, Heidegger suggested that this was the case because Nietzsche’s notions of Apollo and Dionysos were essentially and explicitly thought as fundamental orientations of man. In distinction, contemporary thinkers thought these very concepts as world-historical determinations, wherein the historical-methodologies of diagnoses and prognoses “set man out” in an inessential manner, only grasping him in an extrinsic, “symbolic” manner. This itself was taken as indicative of the deep-rooted boredom with which “we”, as

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125 Interestingly, Heidegger does not point to the potential accomplishment of this task in other texts or lecture courses of his own, e.g., he does not refer to his reading of Aristotle in the Basic Problems of Phenomenology, which was written during the same period. Where he does take there to be a strong connection with his other endeavours he does not shy away from cross reference – such is the case at the opening of ‘Part Two’ where he directs the student/reader to his historical examination (note not Auseinandersetzung) with the concept of world as conducted in On the Essence of Ground.

126 FCM, §18.
contemporary, approach ourselves: the main idiosyncrasy of modernity is the persistent lack of questioning regarding the essence of man. Rather than mediate the word of Nietzsche, Heidegger allowed Nietzsche to speak for himself by presenting quotes with minimal supplementary interpretation (this is also how Heidegger will draw *FCM* to a close). The crux of these thoughts was that the high-point of Greek civilisation (and therefore also humanity) was the drawing together in opposition of these two fundamental orientations – on one hand the eternal, individuated, beautiful form of Apollo, and on the other the unindividuated, creative, chaotic excess of Dionysus, described as the “fullness of power and moderation”. Heidegger understands Nietzsche to have thought the manner in which the two orientations are fundamentally and essentially unified. He points to the epochal character of this thought, and hints toward its identity with the unfulfilled project of Aristotle, yet holds back from elaborating and interpreting it fully because of the historically-hermeneutically circular problems elaborated in the 'Preliminary Appraisal'.

3.3.3. The trajectory of Heidegger's boredom analysis

On my reading, one aspect of the task of *FCM* as a whole is the attempt to understand what it would mean to properly question the essence of man in his *boudedness*. This is what the question of *finitude* asks: how is it that man, as pure *Seinkönnen* can be

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127 Ibid, §18, b) – Nietzsche, N. WP 1050.

128 The importance of such a statement for the overall task of the *FCM* is deepened when referred back to Heidegger’s claim that the metaphysical intent of Aristotle’s treatise on sleep has not yet been ascertained. If we recall, Heidegger states that this intent lies in the direction of the generation of an understanding of how it is that a being can be bound in such a way that it either refuses other things that it is not (sleeps), or opens itself up to other things that it is not, whilst remaining that which it is (wakes). In these comments it is clear that the questioning unfolding in the *FCM* is developing a deeper grounding for the full opening of the question of the essence of time and man’s essential relationship to it. The development of this task within the account of boredom is the claim that Dasein, when fundamentally attuned by boredom, is somehow *bound* to the horizon of time. Further, Dasein is bound to the horizon of time in such a manner that it cannot access beings as a whole in order to have any dealings with them.
understood to be bound to beings? Heidegger is attempting to ask after finitude in a way that does not equate the finite with world alone (beings as a whole), but rather, sees finitude as the originary horizontal structure of beings and being, or as ontological difference. This represents the same terminal point as the comparative analysis of world, namely that an analysis of the structure of the differentiated manifestness of beings as a whole (world) maintains within itself an intrinsic, yet enigmatic, relationship to undifferentiated manifestness as such (Individuation or truth as the truth of essence). In this regard Heidegger would not consider his world analysis to surpass his boredom analysis in terms of its penetration into the fundamental concepts of metaphysics, as the latter represents an approach to finitude from the perspective of world alone. The central stakes of this matter – thinking finitude itself – becomes clearer at the close of the analysis of boredom, and in this regard, elaborates upon the basic conceptual structure within which Heidegger will come to evaluate the appropriacy of “life”, as word, a rubric, and a mode of interpretation of this originary unitary structure of beings as a whole and being as such.

Heidegger will examine this matter in great detail under the rubric of the *Grand Style* in *NI*, and further, in *NIII* in terms of the mode of interrelation of perspectives and horizons. It is my contention that this *NIII* reading represents the culmination of the thoughts contained here in *FCM*. Heidegger will ultimately consider Nietzsche’s thought to bring to a close the possibilities of interpreting φύσις as “life”, because life will be considered as inescapably caught up in the history of metaphysic’s confusion of beings as a whole (world-life) and being as such (individuation-spirit[truth]). At the very point at which it looks as though Nietzsche will come to repeat the originary Greek experience of φύσις in an essential way (the “new interpretation of
sensuousness” in *NI*) Heidegger understands him to ultimately think being on the basis of beings: he will conflate beings as a whole and being as such. This is the high-point of Heidegger’s meditation on the possibility of taking life as the horizon of thinking: life ultimately cannot bring to word the originary experience of φύσις. The bases for Heidegger’s reasoning - the conceptual structures that he will use to establish this claim, and ultimately demarcate the space for this decision regarding “life” as a translation of φύσις – are formed where he lays out the fundamental problem of attempting to think the originary unity of world and individuation in his analysis of boredom. The end-point is Heidegger’s insistence that perspectives and horizons are peculiarly human, as they are part of the ontological structure of Dasein, not life, which will constitute the main thought of ‘Part Two’. This metaphysical thread must be followed from its inception in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’, through its development both in ‘Part One’ and ‘Part Two’, to its completion in *NIII*.

4. Conclusions - The Repetitive Tasks of Philosophy: the Fundamental Concepts and History

At the close of the sections on boredom, we are left with the question of the underlying unity of two orientations towards being. These two orientations themselves form the following questions:

- *What is world?* In response to ‘the expanse of this “as a whole”, which manifests itself in profound boredom, as world [...] we must ask: what is world?*129

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129 *FCM, §39*
What is Individuation? The moment of vision is 'the look of resolute disclosedness of Dasein for its Da-sein, a Da-sein that in each case is as existing [...] which is always singular and unique'.

As experienced from within profound boredom, these two questions are maintained in their opposition and original unity (ursprungliche einheit) by a “structural link” (Fuge): they are internally referred to each other. These aspects were shown to be essentially graspable only in terms of their linkage: 'what kind of “and” is it that links these terms?' The character of this link, the oscillation between the extremity of what makes Dasein possible and the expanse of beings as a whole within Dasein finds itself, is the ground of the third fundamental question of metaphysics, 'What does finitude mean?'

Returning to a discussion of these fundamental concepts, Heidegger points out that the introduction of these metaphysical questions in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' was 'arbitrary and violent'. In so doing, he is not belatedly justifying their initial inclusion, but rather, pointing toward the impossibility of their being understood in their essential importance without the development of an appropriate context and mode of approach. Regarding their origin, he claims the following:

These questions do not arise from books, they have not been culled by adaptation from a variety of philosophical schools, nor have they merely been repeated in obeisance to a trivialised metaphysical tradition.
From whence do they arise then? Heidegger provides the following account:

Only when these questions are rooted in the place from which we now see them arising, and only when they remain rooted there, do they represent genuine questions. Yet if they are genuine in this way, then they are not new. However if they are not new, they are not old either. Neither old or new these questions are essential questions.

What is genuinely philosophical is not novel. In being “rooted in place” within the fundamental attunement of boredom, the questions are seemingly placed back into the transhistorical, ontological structures of Dasein. Boredom is the fundamental attunement of contemporary man, and as such, it is epochal and therefore not a transhistorical ground for thinking, but an historically rooted one. Boredom ultimately implicates the temporality of Dasein, which means that underlying the three metaphysical questions developed from boredom is the question of the essence of time: ‘the question concerning the essence of time is the origin of all the questions of metaphysics and of their potential unfolding.’ Whilst this may seem to suggest that it is in fact a transhistorical matter, Heidegger states the following:

Whether in fact the problematic of metaphysics must always be developed on the basis of the temporality of Dasein, however, cannot be objectively decided for the whole of world history, as it were. The possibility of a different kind of

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135 It should be clear from the work of Beistegui, presented in the previous chapter, that, in emerging from within the account of boredom, these questions have a peculiar historicity. Initially, and perhaps without this background of Beistegui’s reading, it would appear as though Heidegger were presenting these questions as thoroughly transhistorical - as, following from the negative account of their origin. 136 FCM, §39.

137 Whilst this is to some extent true, it is clear from Beistegui’s analysis that it is not the whole story. The major difference between previous phenomenological analyses in Heidegger’s œuvre and that of boredom in FCM was shown to be the manner in which history comes to the fore. 138 Ibid.
necessary grounding for metaphysics must remain open.\textsuperscript{139}

This is a recognition of the historical embeddedness of the attempt to open essential questions. In this sense, metaphysics operates from within an entirely different and more profound temporality than simply “transhistorical” or “historically rooted”. Philosophy can at no point posit itself as capable of producing, or engaging with, universally valid knowledge. How then are we to understand its peculiar historicality, temporality and indeed identity?

In repeating the demands and directions first expressed at the end of ‘Part One’, Heidegger continues to use a language of repetition and recall:

Man must first resolutely open himself up to this demand \textit{again} […]

[...] this liberation [of the Dasein in man] is the task laid on us to assume \textit{once more} our very Dasein as an actual burden.

It is a matter of Dasein \textit{first} becoming transparent to itself \textit{again}.\textsuperscript{140}

This is what is at stake in asking questions of a genuinely metaphysical nature: repeating something essential, repeating the Dasein in man. Heidegger returns to the theme of the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ and suggests that the task of philosophy itself is ‘\textit{not to describe the consciousness of man but to evoke the Dasein in man}’. Philosophy, according to its own rigours, is primarily concerned with ‘\textit{sober conceptual questioning}’, but only ever with an eye to maintaining a particular openness – the openness of an “interrogative space”. In thus defining philosophy, Heidegger delimits

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. Italics are my own. My emphasis.
its powers, stating that it is not philosophy as such which can take up this burden of existence and transform it. Philosophy can only be preparatory: it is the questioning process through which Dasein is gathered and projected onto the 'brink of possibility, the possibility of restoring Dasein to its actuality, that is, its existence'.

Heidegger does not expand upon precisely what this means, he merely indicates that in being properly “penultimate” in this sense, philosophy has to project itself onto, and begin to form an understanding of, what it is preparatory for. The actual activity of moving beyond philosophy, so to speak, is described by Heidegger as “individual action itself”, wherein the line between philosophy as preparation and that which it prepares for cannot be navigated in another manner than a leap. This is the precise matter of Auseinandersetzung: the process of self-determination as it is caught up in a confrontation with its unrelenting identity with that which went before. In Auseinandersetzung the preparation, and that which is prepared for, are brought together. To Auseinandersetzung there belongs a critical movement which serves to identify the initial lying together of that which confronts and that which is confronted. It is only on the basis of this initial togetherness that a separation can be effected. This line of separation and identity is the central matter of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation. As such, the line of thinking developed in FCM achieves its fruition in this engagement.

Heidegger develops his notion of the historicity of the history of philosophy as

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141 FCM, §40.

142 In my reading of the movement of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation between NI and NIII, on the matter of life, I will show how Heidegger fleshes out the thought raised here in FCM In this regard I do not consider FCM to house a pre-figuration of later thoughts, but to be intentionally opening up issues that will be directly taken up in later, more directed readings of history.
repetition, again, turning to the absolute character of philosophy (separate from the rigours of the sciences and thus from the ideal of certainty). Returning to the opposition between the demands of “everyday awareness” (alltäglichen Bewußtsein) and those of philosophy, Heidegger suggests that everyday awareness, using its counterpart “common sense”, considers the activity of philosophy to be secondary, trivial and self-evident. On this basis, the activity of philosophy throughout history (the history of philosophy itself) appears to common sense to be ‘perennially the same’. This representation of philosophy as “philosophia perennis” denotes common sense’s inability to properly grasp the self-sameness of genuine philosophising, thus its attempt at organising ‘the history of philosophy from a standpoint outside philosophy itself’. It is indeed the case that ‘all great and genuine philosophy moves within the limited sphere of a few questions’, however, these questions are in fact ‘necessarily different in every instance of philosophizing’.

\[Different\] not in any merely external sense, but rather in such a way that the self-same is in each case essentially transformed once more [...] This transformation lends a properly primordial historicity to the occurrence of the history of philosophizing, a historicity which makes its own demands (sacrifice, being overcome).

Philosophy is not a purely transhistorical enterprise, but one which takes place from within its own historical occurrence, but always with recourse to a primordiality and an essentiality (an ownmost difference). The identity of any occurrence of philosophising itself is only maintained within a certain relation to that which is self-same in all philosophising. In this sense the originality of any philosophy has to be

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143 FCM, §41
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
understood in terms of its reproduction of the originary character of philosophy: a repetition of the same, that nonetheless, involves essential difference. Philosophy is not engaged in a process of self-surpassing, wherein it moves outward toward the goal of its own perfection. Self-overcoming posits a different model, one which discounts a straightforward concept of progress, a concept which is salient and evident within the history of the sciences. The character of philosophical-historical interactions is thus not posited by Heidegger as being based on oppositions, refutations and supersedings. Such a view of the history of philosophy remains trapped within common sense's conception of philosophy as subordinate to the ideal of certainty.\textsuperscript{147} The matter of philosophy's relation to itself, the matter of starting to philosophise for ourselves rather than merely effect a brute repetition or destruction of that which went before, is a matter of confrontation, overcoming and transformation, but not a matter of going merely contra to that which has come before, or offering a corrective to those thoughts that precede our own.

\textsuperscript{147} Unable to understand the essential difference between various occurrences of genuine philosophy, and yet unable to successfully gather all philosophy under a single idea (i.e., as a result of an inability to neither understand the identity nor the difference), common sense is forced to 'regard the history of philosophy as a kind of madhouse in which everyone attempts to obliterate his opponent and produce some new opinion of his own'. \textit{FCM}, §41.
Chapter 4. FCM Part Two: The Comparative analysis of World

Introduction

The treatment of FCM by Heidegger scholars has been one of exclusion. Those that posit FCM as an exception in the Heideggerian corpus do so on the basis that it contains an attempt at “theoretical biology”. Having established the philosophical context for the latter parts of this text, in this chapter I aim to further develop my reading of FCM as a whole, establishing the position of FCM within Heidegger’s movement toward an intense engagement with the matter of history itself, specifically as an encounter with Nietzsche.

In chapter 1, “life” was established as a rubric beneath which various problems associated with anthropology, anthropomorphism and the animal other were collected. Krell, took ‘Part Two’ of FCM as defining the being of living entities in a privative manner on the basis of a prior working out, and subsequent privileging, of the being of Dasein. Krell, and those he has influenced, consider this to be an unthinking return to onto-theological structures of man's transcendence in the name of rescuing meaning from the nihilistic, chaotic and meaningless forces of life. Heidegger is understood to resist the possibility that Dasein is a being of the same order as all others in nature, in order to retain an inviolable ground for meaning. Here, there is an implicit historical challenge presented to Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s response to Nietzsche’s breaking-down of the transcendent foundations of thought is represented as the brute
repetition of, and thus return to, these very structures. In this sense, Heidegger is positioned as directly, simply *contra* Nietzsche.

I will not claim that Krellian inspired critiques are wrong. Heidegger does make recourse to the structures of Man’s transcendence in order to combat the manner in which contemporary “philosophy” ‘unties us from ourselves’, and does so ‘precisely as anthropology’. However, it is my contention that this is not the result of ignorance regarding the power of the challenge that the problems of life pose. Rather, it arises from an account of the manner in which thinking man under the rubric of life is itself grounded in deeply problematic interpretations of world, finitude and solitude. Read in context, the sections on animals and stones are clearly not attempts at surpassing the problems of life in the direction of a better, and as yet unrealised, ideal for thinking (i.e., Being vs. Life), but rather, an attempt to gather these problems in a way that will access the more vital tensions covered over by, what Heidegger terms, the anthropological approach. Rather than representing a forgetting, or side-stepping, of the deeply profound challenge of Nietzsche regarding both history and life, *FCM* explicitly *demands* an engagement with Nietzsche, and, as such, can be understood to be propadeutic for precisely this most philosophical of tasks.

This chapter will proceed by first showing that Heidegger’s comparative analysis of world (which contains his claims about life) is an overriding historical exercise. By this I mean that he is at once doing history, and at the same time aware of the historical

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1. *FCM*, §18, c).
2. Beyond its archival relevance, in eradicating the exceptionality of this intense engagement with life, I will present *NIII* as the ultimate culmination of the project of *FCM* as a whole, thus providing a privileged point of access to the matter of life between Nietzsche and Heidegger. Allowing for a deeper understanding of Heidegger’s Nietzsche, and thus a deeper understanding of Heidegger’s discussion of life in *FCM*.

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status of his own claims. To this end, I will indicate the specific notion of history that Heidegger is working within, as established in FCM and chapter 3 of this thesis. Once this methodological context has been determined, I will provide an exegetical account of his historical analysis of world in OEG in order to further deepen the specific context within which the comparative analysis of world arises. This will serve to disrupt the connections between BT and FCM, thus allowing for Heidegger’s thoughts regarding the status of a potential ontology of life/theoretical biology to be more genuinely grasped. Finally I will examine his comparative analysis of world and establish its genuine nature as contextualised within FCM as a whole. This potential reconfiguration of ideas and contexts will allow for an alternative trajectory of Heidegger’s handling of life to emerge from my reading of his comparative analysis of world.

1. The History of ‘Part Two’: Repeating the question of World.

It is evident that FCM, along with BT is an unfinished project. ‘Part Two’ is devoted to the question of World, but also, later, to developing the remaining two questions. Asking after one aspect of metaphysics (i.e., the question of world), cannot involve an abstraction from the other aspects with which it is intrinsically connected. In taking the first question first, asking “What is world?”, the other two questions “What is Individuation?” and “What is finitude?” must not be left behind. However, these remaining two questions are not forwarded in their own right within the confines of FCM. They are only accessed via a foray into “world”. This does not indicate a hierarchy.
Our questions were posed in the following order: [1.] What is world? [2.] What is finitude? [3.] What is individuation? We have developed them in such a way, however, that finitude emerged as the third and pressing question. Yet third in what sense? As the unifying and original root of the other two [...] however, we shall only be able to engage with this one in third place.

World is not privileged over and above its counterpart: there is no intention to separate the question of world off from its ultimate realisation in a subsequent questioning of its structural linking with its structural counterpart (its jointure and that to which it is joined). In the “Editor’s Epilogue” there is no mention of the unfinished nature of the project. There is, however, a strangely direct connection made between ‘Part Two’ and §12 of BT. In BT Heidegger states the following with regard to the biological notion of environment (Umwelt):

Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can ‘life’ as a state of Being be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner.

In pointing to this section, Herrmann claims that ‘Part Two’ is an attempt ‘to determine the essence of life’ that seeks to take up and fully expound the above claim. Using McNeill, I will show that this is not the case. The efforts of ‘Part Two’ directly problematise the above statement rather than pursue its same ends. This point is the crux of Krellian criticisms of Heidegger’s handling of life. As Beistegui showed, there are profound differences between the scope and approach of BT and FCM. In thinking ‘Part Two’ as continuous with the thoughts of §12 of BT, the intent, and indeed content,

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3 by F.-W. v. Herrmann.
4 BT, §12 (p84-85)
5 FCM, “Editor’s Epilogue”, p372
of Heidegger’s world analysis is characterised from a standpoint outside of that which it tries to develop. Heidegger does make direct reference to his efforts in BT at the outset of his world analysis in FCM, but, the connection he makes is not as strong as Herrmann maintains. Heidegger points toward his attempt to think world from our everyday world in BT, claiming that, following this everyday analysis of world, ‘the task is to press on and point out the phenomenon of world as a problem’, a problem that re-invokes the metaphor of the inverted world.\(^6\) In this sense, what has preceded the prospective world analysis of FCM (i.e., the 'Preliminary Appraisal' and 'Part One') can be understood as a process of its differentiation from the mode of analysis of BT as, precisely, its problematisation. The seeming claims towards universality and a priori methodologies of BT must be suspended accordingly. In the conclusive sections of this chapter I will return to §10 and §12 of BT in order to fully articulate the difference in stance with regard to an “ontology of life”.

Aside from BT, in FCM Heidegger also points toward a less problematic, more contemporary engagement with world, that of OEG Heidegger indicates that the analysis contained therein focused on the history of the term “world”, suggesting that it is necessary to be familiar with this text in order to clearly understand what the problem of world is, such that it can be properly understood as a fundamental problem of metaphysics. As such, it is important to understand FCM as in some way a continuation of the work of OEG rather than BT.

\(^6\) FCM, §42. With regard to the inverted world metaphor Heidegger says the following in order to distance the methodological approach taken by Division One of BT from the efforts of FCM: That which is so close and intelligible to us in our everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally remote and unintelligible to us [...] It never occurred to me, however, to try and claim or prove with this interpretation that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.’ From.....
2. Approaching World in FCM – Section II of OEG

2.1 The History of “World”

By means of a summary of OEG Heidegger gives ‘a very general indication’ of how the ‘problem of world initially arises’.\(^7\) Here Heidegger indicates the depth of his indebtedness to Nietzsche.\(^8\) He informs us that the notion of world as passed down from the Greeks through the Christians locates man in a specific position:

man is not simply regarded as a part of the world within which he appears […]
man also stands over against the world.\(^9\)

The character of this “standing over” maintains man in a position of *servitude* but also *masterhood* of the world. Heidegger states that it is precisely this “ambivalent position” which is named by the term “world”, and suggests that his historical analysis brings these positions into ‘sharper focus’. One of Heidegger’s major concerns regarding Nietzsche is the extent to which, when attempting to re-naturalise man, he maintains a call for *mastery* over nature itself, a move which bolsters the conception of finitude as a mere privative form of the infinite. The manner in which world is bound up with this confusion of what properly constitutes finitude is tackled in *OEG*, which in turn clears a path toward a deeper understanding of Heidegger’s claims about world and finitude in *FCM*.\(^10\)

\(^7\) *FCM*, §42.
\(^8\) And of course the whole history of German philosophising of which Nietzsche marks the latest and highest point
\(^9\) *FCM*, §42.
\(^10\) To re-iterate, this is the connection and the context that Heidegger himself points toward at the opening of ‘Part Two’. 
2.2. Transcendence

Arising within an analysis of the “essence of ground”, i.e., what constitutes the proper being of a ground (Grund), Heidegger addresses the most basic and broad sense of λόγος: that it is an ontological concept. It is an understanding of being that 'guides and illuminates in advance all comportment towards beings', but in so doing, is neither a 'categorical-metaphysical' grasping of being, nor a conceptual understanding of whatever is in fact grasped/unconcealed by this initial comportment.\textsuperscript{11} This unconcealment is the ground of all ontic truth (predicative truth). Rather than being merely the ground of ontic truth at an ontological level, unconcealment is 'always truth of the being of beings'. It is truth of a particular order, and therefore points toward the essence of truth. In this sense ground and truth are brought together. Here, Heidegger is claiming that there are two distinct and diverse aspects of truth which 'belong essentially together on the grounds of their relation to the distinction between being and beings (ontological difference)'.\textsuperscript{12} The ground of all truth then (and the truth of all ground), is the originary unity of two orientations towards being:

The essence of truth in general, which is thus necessarily forked in terms of the ontic and the ontological, is possible only together with the irruption of this distinction.\textsuperscript{13}

The nature of this irruptive distinction between being and beings (ontological difference itself) is formulated as a problem of ground and of truth for the following reasons:

\textsuperscript{11} OEG, 104.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 105.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 105-106.
The ambiguous nature of this distinction: in terms of what has gone before, a step toward its overcoming, and yet a fateful link back to it that obstructs every path toward the originary “unity” and hence also to the truth of the distinction

The ground of this moment of the grounding of ontic truth is the *transcendence* of Dasein, as the λόγος itself is not a part of that which is cleared, but the movement of clearing itself. In line with this the question of the essence of ontic truth (the essence of ground), the question of ontological truth (the essence of truth) and the question of ontological difference (transcendence) lie together in the same manner that world, individuation and finitude do in *FCM*, which is to say, two diverse aspects and their unity. To question one aspect of this triad is to question all of them. Committing the remainder of his treatise (*OEG*) to an examination of the question of the essence of ground as the *problem of transcendence* (and thus the matter of the unity/conjunction of truth, ground and transcendence), gives rise to the discussion of World towards which Heidegger points in *FCM*.

Heidegger turns, first of all, to a terminological analysis. Transcendence, as an occurrence, is a surpassing: passing from something to something; passing towards something and away from something. As *transcendence* and not merely “the transcendent” or “the transcended”, Dasein cannot be thought of as a surpassing in spatial terms. Thinking Dasein in terms of a boundary or a gap becomes methodologically problematic, as ontic-spatiality is dependent upon ontological-spatiality, wherein the concepts of boundaries, horizons and gaps remain ambiguous.

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14 Ibid, 105.
15 Ibid, 106.
and indistinct. Reducing the issue of transcendence to an intentional problem that focuses on the character of the 'subject-object relation' covers over ontological difference by only ever referring to ontic structures. If we accept that the \( \lambda \delta \gamma \omega \zeta \) is the ground of ontic truths (facts), an investigation into the \( \lambda \delta \gamma \omega \zeta \) cannot begin within the divisions which it grounds. To think *transcendence* in opposition to *immanence*, is, on Heidegger's terms, to misunderstand the ontological character of transcendence as an occurrence of Dasein's essence. If structured by such a schematic opposition, the truly positive character of transcendence will not be grasped, and, accordingly, as an essential activity of Dasein, nor will the essence of Dasein as transcendence. This is the precise issue that faces Heidegger at the end of the boredom analysis: how to access the *essential* unity of two diverse aspects, how to understand transcendence as a unifying rather than surpassing or separating movement.

It is only when thought in terms of the subject-object divide that Dasein's transcendence would either be constituted by the surpassing of a boundary (wherein "immanence" would be to remain inside this boundary) or the production/pre-existence of a gap that separates it from objects. This distinction holds true for that towards which Dasein transcends as well as that which it is transcendent of: objects are not that which is transcended, rather it is 'precisely and solely *beings themselves*, indeed every being that can be or become unconcealed for Dasein, thus *including precisely* that being as which "it itself" exists.'\(^{16}\) Heidegger goes on:

> In this surpassing, Dasein for the first time comes toward that being it is, and comes toward it as it "itself." Transcendence constitutes selfhood.\(^{17}\)

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\(^{16}\) Ibid, 108. In the language of *FCM*, this would be beings as a whole that Dasein transcends.

\(^{17}\) Ibid.
Only from within this peculiar form of self-transcending/surpassing can those beings which Dasein is not (as well as the being that it is) be distinguished. This distinction does not occur as an epiphenomenon of a pure self-relation that is transcendence, but occurs equiprimordially, meaning that Dasein does not first exist within beings as one alongside others (immanence).

Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them, Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature.  

2.3 World as a Transcendental Phenomenon

2.3.1 The meaning of “World”

Nature is not an 'aggregate' of beings (or a specific region of beings such as 'natural' beings) that Dasein transcends, but rather, beings as a whole. Transcendence, then, is further clarified as surpassing occurring as a whole, which is to say, it is never a surpassing of this or that, and never a surpassing that occurs at certain times and not others, but a having always already surpassed in advance. Heidegger names this structure (the structure of transcendence) being-in-the-world. World is understood as that towards which Dasein transcends and that which it transcends, 'world co-constitutes the unitary structure of transcendence'. Attempting to draw out, and draw upon Kant’s establishment of the transcendental as an expressly ontological problematic rather than a purely epistemological one, Heidegger sets the agenda for his ensuing examination of world, by pursuing an account of its 'transcendental'

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19 Ibid.
Continuing the discussion of why being-in-the-world would be not just constitutive, but distinctive of Dasein’s essence, Heidegger clarifies the meaning of “world”. If “world” were to designate the totality of beings, and thus indicate that Dasein’s being-in-the-world was as a being that happens to ‘crop up’ amongst other beings that are ‘already there as present-at-hand’, then it could not be said to be an essential (and therefore distinctive) ontological characteristic of Dasein, as it would also hold for all other beings that are present within this totality. Such an understanding would be operating at the factual level, i.e., taking as its “decisive criterion” ‘whether factual Dasein exists or not’. Taking the issue of transcendence to persist at the ontological level, Heidegger states that Dasein’s transcendence is not grounded in its factual existence: its ontological character does not derive from its occurrence alongside other beings, but moreover, its ability to exist in varying ontic situations is itself grounded in its essential constitution as a transcendence. Seemingly moving in circles, Heidegger summarises his progression by claiming that he has shown the issue of transcendence to be a problem that requires a more originary/ontological understanding of the phenomenon of world, as the path of assertion and statements relating to ontic states of being has proven to be ungrounded. By inquiring into ground in such a manner, the meaning of “world” becomes expressly taken up in order to set the context for the discussion of world as a ‘transcendental phenomenon’. 

This examination starts with brief references to Melissus and Parmenides in order to show that κόσμος (the original Greek term for “world”) does not refer to a totality of

20 Ibid, 110.
21 Ibid 111
objects as a distinct realm that stands opposed to a realm of entities of another order. Rather, world denotes a certain structuring of beings, or way of being, namely, world-order (eon as kata kosmon). “World”, in its broadest and most primordial sense, denotes a state of affairs, i.e., how beings, and indeed beings as a whole, are. World itself exists prior to any delimitation, it is not opposed to or limited by beings in some manner, it is itself a limit and measure of beings. Any delimitation, ordering, or fragmentation of world does not pertain to anything outside of itself (another being or set of beings) and does not indicate a state of decay from a pre-established, pure unity. Rather, any fragmentation is grounded in this ‘how as a whole’.

Whilst recognising that these dimensions of κόσμος are present in its Greek conceptual instantiation, Heidegger turns to a narrower meaning of the word. Most often used as the term for those beings that are experienced from out of this underlying state of affairs (i.e., world as the sum total of worldly beings), the specific way in which the relation between man and world is thought in this narrower manner is considered with reference to Christianity’s uptake of the term as denoting a specifically human mode of existence. According to Heidegger, “world”, with The Gospel according to St John, is reduced to an anthropological concept that places worldly being opposite godly being.

22 Ibid. – this is taken from Parmenides Fragment 4 not 2 as indicated in the text.
23 Such is the teaching of Anaximander according to Heidegger.
24 Ibid. In an interesting turn for my claim that Heidegger is specifically attentive to, and attempts to think from within, Greek thought regarding waking and sleep, the discussion turns to Heraclitus in order to show how world is essentially relative to man. To those who are awake there belongs a single and therefore common world, whereas whoever is asleep turns toward a world of his own. [Ibid, 112. Original: ὁ Ἡράκλειτος φησὶ τοῖς ἐγρηγορόσιν ἕνα καὶ κοινὸν κόσµον εἶναι, τῶν δὲ κοιµωµένων ἕκαστον εἰς ἰδίον αποστρέφεσθαι. More common translation: The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own]. Once again, the two basic modes of Dasein’s relation to world are forwarded as being waking and sleeping, where sleeping is a mode of being in which the world becomes entirely relative to each particular Dasein, echoing the previously mentioned Aristotelian notion of sleep being a form of boundedness wherein other entities that we are not cannot be encountered. The key connection here is the continued relevance of sleep and waking to the structures within which beings as a whole are limited and given measure, i.e., the interconnectedness of the concepts of waking, sleeping, world and limitation.
thus instantiating “world” as a term which designates a region of being (that of being merely human). Through Aquinas and into Baumgarten, Heidegger tracks the manner in which this contradistinction of world and God becomes sharper. Quoting Baumgarten’s definition of world as ‘that series of actually existing, finite things that is not equivalent to anything else’, the concept of world becomes 'dependent upon an understanding of the essence and possibility of proofs of God.'\(^{25}\) In this manner, investigations into world become subordinate to classical ontology and theology (hence ontotheology), and world is limited to the status of a regional term that designates the 'highest unity of association in the totality of created beings.'\(^{26}\) It is only with Kant that the term’s originary meaning attains something of a conceptual articulation within metaphysical investigations once again. Accordingly, Heidegger conducts a brief examination of Kant’s thoughts on this matter.\(^{27}\)

### 2.3.2. Kant’s metaphysical interpretation of world

Heidegger starts by picking out an early definition of “world” from Kant's 1770 ‘Dissertation’, where world is determined as something akin to a synthesis of the following moments: Matter, Form and Totality. These are understood transcendentally (in a Kantian sense) as substances, their coordination and the absolute totality of their conjoining. Kant, himself, notes that the perspicacity of this totality is deceiving, and, upon closer inspection, is problematic. In the ensuing analysis of how this problem is both articulated and resolved in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger concentrates on

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\(^{25}\) OEG, 114

\(^{26}\) Ibid, 115

\(^{27}\) Heidegger’s examination of Kantian metaphysics in *OEG* is grounded in his lecture course of 1927/8, [Heidegger, M. *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason* (GA 25). Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1997)] allowing him to present his thoughts in *OEG* in a more thematic fashion.
the manner in which the transcendental is continually referred to as the totality of all finite entities that does not itself partake in finitude, which is to say, the unconditioned condition of all conditions. In explaining the formation of ideas, Heidegger shows that the unity of finite objects (world) is not derived from the character of their ontic actuality, but ontologically, according to the principles of ground (i.e., according to the structures of the finite knowing which determines finite objects in their finitude, as appearances). The concept of the unity of all appearances is only conceivable as itself complete (as the unity of a manifold of appearances) if no longer referred to finitude, i.e., not considered to be empirically knowable where it would be reduced to being factically contingent. This generates a notion of world as the whole of appearances as provided by reason alone: world is not arbitrarily or contingently determined, but is as a result of its very nature. This means that world, eventually defined as the idea of the unity of all appearances, relates to the entirety of understanding, but as its higher unity, its transcendental unity, and thus as the condition of possibility of there being any givenness. Ideas are inferential (purely operating from out of the procedure of inference), whereas the understanding is always referential, caught in the movement of incompleteness that characterises givenness/contingency.

With the establishment of “world” as an idea of reason, it still refers to a transcendental state of affairs rather than an ontic relating of things, but it no longer denotes a coordination, as was the case with the κόσμος of Parmenides, but a subordination: 'the increasing series of conditions of synthesis, up to the unconditioned'.\(^{28}\) The remaining unity of both matter and its ordering is no longer undetermined and lacking perspicacity, but is 'determined as an idea [...] and is

\(^{28}\) OEG, 118
distinguished from concepts of the understanding.\textsuperscript{29} In the *Dissertation*, Kant ascribed a universality to this unity: as a totality it spoke of the totality of the universe (i.e. *mundus* thought as *κόσμος*), but with *CPR* this character is passed over to a yet higher order of ideas: the transcendental ideal. Heidegger claims that, ultimately for Kant, the concept “world” sits between possible experience and the transcendental ideal, as the transcendental ideal is completely divorced from givenness/finitude, whereas world is still related to finite objects as their non-finite totality.

Transcendence is ambivalent, as, in the context of world, it represents the transcendence of experience from ‘within experience, exceeding that which is given within it as such, namely the manifold of experiences’. Yet from the context of the transcendental ideal, it means ‘stepping out of experience as finite knowledge altogether.’\textsuperscript{30} The overarching result is the presentation of world as the totality of human knowledge, understood in contradistinction to, and as the restriction of, infinite knowing. Accordingly, knowledge of the world (thought as a secondary existentiell) is, for Kant, not knowledge of man’s physiological being (his appearance alongside other living beings), but knowledge of ‘what he makes, or can, or ought to make of himself as a freely acting being’ (governed by ideas). As such, worldly knowledge does not pertain to abstract relations, but seeks to grasp man as anthropological, as he exists as a player within the “game of life”.\textsuperscript{31}

In thinking world in this way, Kant recalls the originary meaning of *κόσμος* with a renewed, and arguable more perspicacious, conceptual articulation. Kant’s

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 118
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid, 119
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid, 120
understanding of world pertains to both the totality of natural things, and the personal world of the human being.\textsuperscript{32} Kant shows that 'world belongs to a relational structure distinctive of Dasein as such' and that investigations into the meaning of the term "world" are 'directed toward an interpretation of human existence in its relation to beings-as-a-whole.'\textsuperscript{33} In this sense, as indicated in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', the comprehender is comprehended in the comprehension of the whole. Hence Heidegger's perception of Kant as \textit{metaphysical} in a non-derogatory manner.

The issue of subjectivity and transcendence is, by way of conclusion to the Kant exegesis, further clarified. Whilst an analysis of world is bound up with thinking about transcendence, the relational structure of Dasein and world does not pertain at the level of subjectivity as conceived in terms of a subject-object schema, as world is not a being to which Dasein as another being relates. This does not remove the peculiarly subjective status of world, i.e., the fact that it is bound inextricably to Dasein, but it does dismiss the idea that world is subjugated to a purely internal sphere of Dasein. The task at hand is to elucidate this issue of transcendence/world, in such a manner that subjectivity itself is more thoroughly determined.

With Kant, on the basis of the certainty of knowledge grounded in the subject, knowledge of the human becomes sufficient for knowledge of the world. World becomes, in all aspects, grounded in the subject, at the transcendental level and the anthropological level. This means that all other entities within the world are thought on the basis of the structures of subjectivity and the specific manner in which the

\textsuperscript{32} But he does not fall foul of Heraclitus' teaching in Fragment 89: world is not restricted to being one or the other.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, 121
subject transcends, which, in Kant is the complete transcendence of the finite. Within the recognition of ontological difference, transcendence, for Heidegger, cannot be thought of as a transcending of world from out of world, but transcending within it. Kant subordinates the matter of world to the manner of its ordering, thus installing the structure of transcendence as that which moves away from a boundary. Heidegger is clearly aware of the dangers of re-establishing onto-theological structures of transcendence, i.e., thinking the finite as a restricted mode of the infinite.

2.4. Return to FCM

In FCM, Heidegger’s discussion of “life” emerges within his investigation of what constitutes world. The essence of life is raised as matter of establishing the manner in which other entities have world, yet not perhaps in the same way as Dasein. Krellian critiques of FCM accuse Heidegger of thinking “life” (as the realm of other living entities that we find ourselves with in the world) privatively as a result of the re-inscription of the structures of the transcendence of the subject. If Heidegger is offering an interpretation of the living as a domain of beings thought simply privatively in relation to Dasein in terms of a hierarchy of world, it would be farcical, as he would be simply re-inscribing this Kantian position that he goes to great pains to recognise. If FCM is to remain at all interesting, there must be a way of reading it that problematises Krellian-style criticisms. Such a reading has to have an eye for life-philosophy not as the perpetually unthought in FCM (wherein it structures the entire argument and seeps in unwanted), but as being the explicit subject of an attempt at philosophically thinking the essence of life as it is forwarded within the contemporary.
FCM operates from within the peculiar movement of philosophy's historicity (as overcoming), which retains an ambiguity in relation to the prospective completion of metaphysics. Rather than thinking life privatively, in an anthropocentric manner, Heidegger, in FCM, presents life (and our privative grasping of it) as a problem, one that he does not claim to be capable of resolving. I will contend that it is precisely because of the perceived impoverishment of contemporary scientific conceptions of life, and beyond them, the anthropocentric character of their ultimate metaphysical source (Nietzsche), that Heidegger does not conduct his philosophy in the name of life. He refuses to bring life under the structures of anthropocentrism. In short, to interpret φύσις as “life”, is to conduct a metaphysics of life, never an ontology thereof. I will show that this recognition of the problematic nature of life-ontology lies at the heart of 'Part Two'.

'Part Two' of FCM is an attempt to show how contemporary accounts of the essence of life operating within the sciences remain within the confused divisions of the history metaphysics: they can never provide a genuine insight into what world is. Heidegger will conduct this task as an examination of the life-sciences because it is precisely there that world, and subsequently life, have been most exactingly thought, albeit in an inessential manner. Precisely how and why the question of the essence of life emerges

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34 Beistegui claims in Thinking with Heidegger (esp. p 118) that Heidegger turns to the sciences in order to open up a dialogue therewith. In so doing, Heidegger posits a certain proximity with the life sciences (which represents a unique moment in Heidegger’s oeuvre). Whilst it is most assuredly the case that Heidegger goes into great detail with regard to the findings of biology and zoology, I consider this not to be a dialogue in the sense of a conversation, but more so the sense of “working through”. Heidegger will come to show the necessity of a deeper meditation on world and life for the life-sciences, but will not consider the life sciences to be somehow generating knowledge which outstrips the metaphysical structures on which they are based. The detail of his engagement with the sciences can be viewed as an attempt to enter into their position regarding life. At no point does he accept the notion that they are capable of doing the work of philosophy. Indeed I take Heidegger to consider the work of philosophy to be perennially the “as yet to come” of FCM. I analyse this matter further in chapter 5 in reference to Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s alleged biologism.
via an analysis of world, as well as how this account of life plays out, will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

3. World Analysis - Comparative Analysis

Taking an alternative approach to the matter of world from that of OEG and BT, Heidegger opts for comparative examination. Along with Herrmann, McNeill and Walker, in their translator’s preface, suggest that this comparative examination is directed toward the grounding of an ontology of life, as an examination of the essence of life itself. As I have shown, albeit briefly, this is not Heidegger’s express intent. Whilst the possibility of an ontology of life is raised as an issue, the analysis of world is not primarily directed toward this matter. ‘Part Two’ is the most famous, and thus most thoroughly examined, element of FCM. 35

3.1. The Three Theses

The comparative analysis takes the form of a comparison between the varying ways in

35 Where excellent scholarship has been conducted in relation to FCM I seek to stand on its shoulders as it were. McNeill’s reading in the The Time of Life is around 45’000 words in length, and concentrates on merely 20 sections (around 100 pages) of FCM. It would be impossible for this thesis to replicate the depth of this analysis generated therein. As such, I will forego much of the detail of Heidegger’s account of the organism, and attempt to discuss the more general and essential thoughts contained therein. Equally, this is not the decisive issue, I am not expressly concerned wit unpacking a positive conception of life from within FCM. In this regard, my thesis is not intended to exhaust all possible engagements with FCM, but rather, open up possible modes of reading. See The Time of Life and McNeill, W. Heidegger: Visions of animals, Others and the Divine. (CRPL, University of Warwick: 1993). McNeill simply seeks to follow the arguments in their subtlety and complexity, as opposed to engaging from within a seemingly pre-established horizon of critique. Derrida is also interesting on the matter of Heidegger’s comparative analysis, but he is less textually thorough. See Derrida, J. Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question trans. Bennington, B (UCP, Chicago: 1991). He also returns to FCM in order to compare it with Deloe’s Robinson Crusoe in a posthumously published seminar entitle The Beast and The Sovereign (UCP, Chicago: 2011). I briefly examine this analysis at the close of Chapter 5 of this thesis.
which other beings which are also part of the world (those which we find ourselves amongst), “have” world. To structure this investigation, Heidegger generates three guiding theses. These theses are designed to provide an initial characterisation of the manner in which we take entities to have world. The theses are as follows: The stone is worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is world-forming. The choice of these entities in particular is based upon the basic divisions between entities that presides throughout the history of metaphysics. Heidegger points out the most salient problem with attempting such a comparative examination:

In order even to negotiate the problem we must accordingly have at our disposal certain essential distinctions between these three realms.

As essential distinctions are being sought, one cannot have recourse to the continuity between man and animal, ‘whether or not man is descended from the ape’ is not of interest, as such a question does not grasp the individual essence of either animal or man, but thinks the two together as an amalgam. In this respect, the matter of world-comparison becomes a meditation directed toward ‘a fundamental conception of life’, as the stone is a material object which is not alive, and man is considered to be a living being through and through. At this point “life” or “the living” are broadly

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36 This itself is a remarkable occurrence, as, to my knowledge, nowhere else in his entire corpus will Heidegger offer up a thesis. As I attempt to show, this is precisely not his thesis, but the underlying thesis that structures all metaphysical investigations into world and indeed life.

37 When, in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', Heidegger suggests that sleep is not a matter of consciousness, but a matter of boundedness of essence, his first reference was to the manner in which we would ascribe an ability to sleep to other entities, Animals, plants and stones. Interestingly enough the plant seems to have been left out of the comparative analysis. Perhaps this indicates that its having no status of its own, as living, aside from that of the animal. Alternatively it could be a result of Heidegger’s wishing to only engage with Biology and Zoology. Generating the depth of knowledge in the botanical sciences that Heidegger displays regarding biology would constitute a large effort, one that would not seemingly offer up greater insight into how contemporary scientific investigations think world.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 On this issue Heidegger will never come to say that the matter of man’s belonging to life is resolved. The “abyssal bodily kinship” is continually conceived as problematic.
conceived as animals and plants (and indeed, in some way, ourselves). Precisely what animates all “life”, any deeper or positive definition of this term remains as yet under-determined.

Here Heidegger recognises the circularity of his projected examination: the divisions which are to be sought from an essential standpoint do not have their ground in anything outside of the salient character of the divisions themselves. There is nothing other than these theses themselves to guide an investigation into “life”, as the matter of life’s accessibility, the manner in which its essence is graspable, is precisely what is in question. This circularity is, of course, a hermeneutic circularity, wherein the manner in which one enters into the circle is less important than the accomplishment of ‘an insight into the centre of the circle as such’. This notion of the hermeneutic circle repeats the insights of the 'Preliminary Appraisal', wherein there is no possible position of entry into the matter of essences without prejudices and presuppositions of varying distinctions. The hermeneutic circle is not something to be left behind, but something to be embraced. As a meditation on life (that which lives), rather than an attempt to eradicate all possible presuppositions and prejudices with regard to the matter, Heidegger is proposing an investigation that starts with a recognition of its own arbitrariness. As such, the investigation maintains a constant openness to its opening prejudices, maintains a heightened sense of intellectual conscience with regard to its own operation.

3.2. Problematising the Seeming Hierarchy of Life

McNeill provides a detailed account of why Heidegger mobilises these controversial
theses and how they operate.

Only if one isolates the analyses of animal Being from their proper context, as tends to happen in contemporary debate, does the thesis that the animal is “poor in world” appear to merely reinscribe a fundamentally traditional, metaphysical “theory” distinguishing the animal from the human.41

He begins his exegetical account of the theses by focusing on the manner in which they construct divisions between the human, animal and stone. Divisions which commentators like Ansell-Pearson (drawing from Krell) consider to be ’carved’ by Heidegger and fraught with unthinking repetitions of anthropocentric mysticism.

The three theses recall the possibility and perhaps even the necessity of distinguishing between humans, animals, and inanimate objects as fundamentally different kinds of entity.42

The grounding of these divisions in a thesis, rather than an axiom or statement must be taken seriously. Correctly, McNeill does not see these theses as new-found divisions created by Heidegger in order to expound his understanding of what makes a human a human or an animal an animal etc. They are not first thought of as endeavours in “theoretical biology”. Limiting himself to this initial production of a certain ambiguity surrounding the wherefore of the theses, McNeill takes up the content of the animal thesis. Krell was shown to have interpreted the animal-regarding thesis (poor in world) as a denigration, a setting the animal world apart and below. McNeill clouds this somewhat simple depiction.

41 The Time of Life, p50
42 Ibid, p19
Yet may we simply understand poverty here as being intrinsically of lesser significance with respect to richness? Is the human a higher being than the animal? The reverse might well be true, notes Heidegger...All of which initially indicates only that “the criterion according to which we talk of height and depth in this connection is obscure” (286).\footnote{Ibid, p19 (McNeill’s reference is to p300 of his and Walker’s translation of FCM.)}

McNeill makes the point that these theses are, intentionally, not clear and determinate. From the outset, they are maintained in proximity to their own obscurity and impossibility. This obscurity of division and positioning is purposive, and clearly sets up (or knowingly repeats) a classic form of insurmountable perspective-bound anthropomorphism (the impasse that Ansell-Pearson maintains lies unthinkingly at the heart of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche on the matter of life). However, at the same time, such a division still seeks to engage with the distinct otherness of the animal other, which is to say, an otherness that nonetheless operates from within a minimal sense of identity, what Heidegger would later define as our ‘scarcely fathomable, abyssal bodily kinship with the animal’.\footnote{Heidegger, M. Letter on Humanism, in Basic Writings. Edited by David F. Krell (Harper & Row, New York: 1977).} The thesis itself borders on the ridiculous, not, as Krell would have it, because it is a simplistic account of the impoverishment of the animal perspective, but more-so because it seems to contradict itself.

Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, let alone the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality. At best it is a proposition that follows from the essential determinations of animality, and moreover one which follows only if the animal is regarded in comparison with humanity […] if these considerations are unassailable, however, then in the end we must not only substantially reduce the significance of our thesis, but must repudiate it altogether. For the thesis is misleading precisely with respect to the essence of animality itself, i.e., it encourages the mistaken view that the being of the animal in itself is
intrinsically deprivation and poverty.\textsuperscript{45}

This structure characterises Heidegger's engagement with life and the animal: there is an ineliminable separation in the ways in which animals and humans have a world. This separation speaks of two things, first, that there are different ways of being: any engagement with animals and stones etc. cannot start out with the notion that these entities are all identical in structure, i.e., all present at hand; and secondly, that there is no possibility of a distinct hierarchy: taking the manner in which these beings are separated to be hierarchical is (saliently) problematic. McNeill points out that, ultimately, there is no 'homogeneous order of living things' within Heidegger's thought, thus rendering any determination and subsequent comparison of the human and animal on a scale of perfection or complexity impossible.\textsuperscript{46} Whilst this clearly has destabilising repercussions for Krellian inspired criticisms, my aim here is not to provide an account of how Heidegger's thought overcomes the problems of anthropomorphism. Rather, I aim to show that understanding Heidegger's response to the challenges of life requires an engagement with the full depth and power of his thinking on these matters. In order to say anything meaningful about Heidegger's intellectual conscience, for Krell, Heidegger's avoidance of a head-on encounter with life, we must first generate a genuine intimacy with his thinking. In this sense I am neither siding with Krell nor Heidegger on the matter of the latter's engagement with life, but merely pointing toward the richness and subtlety of his thought.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{45} FCM, §63. Or, as McNeill puts it, “When we say that the animal “has world” then we mean world as the accessibility of beings, as some kind of openness for encountering other beings in general. This sense of world would therefore encompass both humans and animals as living beings. When we say that the animal does not “have world,” we mean that it does not have access to other beings in the way that humans do or in the way that “we” do. Yet this makes it highly problematic as to whether the thesis that the animal is poor in world can be a coherent thesis at all.” (Time of Life, p26).

\textsuperscript{46} The time of Life, p26

\textsuperscript{47} To re-iterate the quotation with which this thesis started, ‘the most monstrous danger in philosophy is cheating’, in this case, the danger is taking a philosopher on their weakest showing. Krell, and perhaps
In response to the problematic and potentially incoherent thesis regarding the possibility of engaging with animal otherness via the mode of comparative analysis, McNeill asks the most obvious question:

> From what perspective do we make such comparisons?

The question of our perspective upon each of the beings referred to in the three theses is primarily concerned not with the danger of anthropocentrism, [...] but with a question of principle regarding transposability.\(^4\)

How then, is the question of transposability structured such that it is not simplistically anthropocentric? McNeill continues:

> Insofar as we ourselves are human beings, and exist in our own particular manner of Being, the question is whether we are able to transpose ourselves in each case into an entity that is other.\(^4\)

McNeill seems to suggest that this discussion of transposability, a concept which is determined by Heidegger to mean something more along the lines of "going along with" in a way that allows the other to maintain itself as other, is more fundamental than a discussion of anthropocentrism, in that it engages with and challenges the very grounds of possibility of an anthropocentrism by setting into question classic representational understandings of world and the individual that has world. McNeill even more-so Ansell-Pearson, raise genuine question marks with regard to the power and the intent of Heidegger's response to the problems of life. Pointing out the paucity in Krell's reading of this matter does not dismiss his challenge, but rather, provides a more challenging opponent. Summarily, my intention here is to flesh out the manner in which McNeill's reading throws the question of anthropomorphism and life back into the matter of Heidegger's thought, rescuing it somewhat from the criticisms and potential historical dead-ends laid out in Chapter 1.

\(^{4}\) Ibid, p21
\(^{4}\) Ibid, p21
The very term transposition is misleading because it suggests that the beings in question are in the first instance isolated spheres, each with their own interiority, between which a relation of access and mutual interaction would subsequently have to be established. Among other things, such a model—essentially a variant of the subject-object schema so central to modern representation—leaves unthought the possibility that a relation to the Other (however the latter is determined) may precede and even be co-constitutive of the so-called self and the possibility of its relation to itself.

This point is salient when set against the discussion of world as a transcendental phenomenon as presented in OEG.\textsuperscript{50} In the same way in which the account of “falleness” in BT, for example, was not intended to have disparaging connotations, but simply be a way of describing a particular ontological structure within a new-found philosophical framework that lies outside the classic prejudices and quasi-moral evaluations of representational understandings of self (and world), McNeill is suggesting that the language of poverty or poorness of world does not function within a structure that admits of any moral or evaluative discrimination.

There remains a mode of anthropocentric prejudice at play in Heidegger’s theses. From the perspective of a reading, such as Ansell-Pearson’s, that looks to ‘map out the non-human becomings of life’\textsuperscript{51} within Nietzsche (wherein Heidegger is figured as an interlocutor who can help release this perspective from anthropomorphism) the continual re-affirming of a polarity, or at least the reinscription of the problem of polarity, comes to light as evidence of a limitation in Heidegger’s thinking rather than

\textsuperscript{50} Aristotle’s formulation of the fundamentally metaphysical question of sleep is also recalled, as thinking the animal’s (or indeed stone’s) world is a matter of drawing and opening up a horizon such that we can let the other in.

\textsuperscript{51} See Chapter 1.
evidence of an insurmountable problematic within thinking itself. However, Heidegger's thesis-analysis does not emerge straightforwardly as just an account, namely his account, of the structural divisions between beings, i.e., one that forwards itself as a theory, designed to do head-on battle with all other possible and pre-existent accounts, surpassing each in turn. The historical standing of these theses means that they cannot be dismissed as impoverished in the face of less anthropocentric accounts of life where anthropocentrism is defined in line with extra-Heideggerian concerns, intentions and historicisings. As has been shown throughout this thesis, FCM is explicitly directed toward the production of, or at least the preparation for, a philosophical historicity. 'Part Two' is no exception in this matter.

The thesis-analysis is forwarded as an account that stands within a specific historical rootedness. In this manner, its configurations are historically determined outside of, and in advance of, Heidegger's thought: these polarities and divisions are deeply embedded throughout the history of metaphysics. This thought provides Heidegger with a peculiar hermeneutic space: that of allowing particular determinations of history to come to be as they are, that is, to explore the divisions that are ever-present in metaphysics from a more fundamental perspective. On this account, the opposition of “anthropocentrism vs. life” itself stands within a series of particular historical determinations. Heidegger is not advocating a structured division, or even forwarding one, he is simply formulating it in its most philosophical and indeed properly historical configuration.
3.3. The Three Theses and History

Initially, Mcneill presents Heidegger's discussion of the theses as though they were a direct engagement with an ever-present problematic. The entire account is one that is seemingly speculative and the product of a particular analysis of "principles of transposability". McNeill's reading thus echoes the way that Krell has presented Heidegger's arguments.

Can we go along with the way in which the animal sees and hears things? It is self-evident for us in asking this question that the animal indeed relates to other things such as its food, its prey, its young, and so on. When we ask this, Heidegger remarks, we are assuming without question that “in relation to the animal something like a going-along-with, a going along with it in its access and in its dealings within its world is possible in general, and does not represent an intrinsically nonsensical undertaking” (299).

That we can ask after the possibility of transposition in the case of the animal requires no great deal of justification. Heidegger assumes the phenomenally salient nature of thinking the connectedness of the two ways of being. Such an assumption is not simply made on the basis of there being self-evident divisions between types of beings, where the grounds of this self-evidence lie in some type of 'real' or trans-historical division. That this is the case becomes more explicit when McNeill approaches the matter of transposition and the stone: 'Can we transpose ourselves into a stone? The answer quite clearly seems to be ‘no,'” The answer is only “seemingly” no because the impossibility of going-along-with the stone is not absolute and clear cut. Heidegger introduces a caveat, one that is critically important for my conception of the historicality of FCM:

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52 Time of Life, p22 (pagination in brackets refers to FCM)
53 Ibid.
Note that Heidegger adds a qualifier: there are nonetheless ways in which we are able to regard purely material or “inanimate” things not as such, but rather to “animate” them, namely via myth and art ... The current investigation, we are reminded, is to remain within the bounds of the possible truth belonging to “scientific and metaphysical knowledge” (300).  

This is something that has gone unconsidered by Krell. There is a specific context to the task at hand within Heidegger’s lecture course: the limits of scientific and metaphysical knowledge. Heidegger is not commenting on, and attempting to add to, the scientific theories of the time. Rather, he is attempting to think within them in a manner that puts on hold other possibilities of thinking beyond them, i.e., myth and art. Heidegger is conducting a specific task that he considers salient within, and indeed proper to, a specific mode of thinking (that of metaphysics and science). McNeill takes this thought up with regard to the animal thesis:

But first let us pause to consider, within a somewhat broader perspective, the implications of this characterization of the Being of the animal ... Heidegger’s analyses appear to be conducted at a certain limit of scientific and metaphysical inquiry; more precisely, they appear to take such inquiry regarding this theme to a certain limit. In so doing, they not only problematize the mechanistic and physicalist conceptions of life, which reduce life to mechanistic or purely material processes, but also complicate a certain naivity in prevailing Darwinist and neovitalist approaches.

It is clear that Heidegger is not engaged in a direct setting out of current debate, showing how it is erroneous in order to subsequently add his own musings as a form of corrective. He is, moreover, engaging with contemporary scientific knowledge

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54 Ibid, p22 (pagination in brackets refers to FCM)
55 Ibid, p27. Italics are mine.
pertaining to the field of theoretical biology in a manner that seeks to problematise it and take it to its limits from within its own given horizons. In these specific chapters on world, Heidegger is staging a confrontation with the prevailing modes of metaphysical and scientific thought.

On its own terms, separate from any contextualisation within the lecture course as a whole, the chapters on world explicitly deploy a peculiar or particular methodology. McNeill develops this point, but does not set it back into the context previously given within the lecture course itself. The importance of Nietzsche as the historical figure who is under consideration in the confrontation between Heidegger and the contemporary has no space to emerge. As such, McNeill presents a picture of the sections under examination that cannot fully avoid the thrust of Ansell-Pearson’s criticism that Heidegger doesn’t fully open himself up to Nietzsche’s agitation. The historical situation for Heidegger, as forwarded by McNeill, involves modern debate (which is divided into neo-vitalism and mechanism) being delineated, then set back into, and eventually superseded by lost facets of Aristotelianism.

[T]he present inquiry is “for the moment” to remain within the bounds of scientific and metaphysical truth—kinds of truth that, he adds, “have together long since determined the way in which we conceive of truth in our everyday reflection and judgement” (300). In the 1929–30 course, Heidegger not only engages with contemporary scientific theory of animal life, but seeks to ground such theory philosophically: on the one hand, showing some of the fundamental presuppositions of such theory (ontological presuppositions concerning the very concept of biological life, and which are not accessible to the science of biology as such, but only to philosophizing); and on the other hand, grounding such presuppositions in a more fundamental experience of “world”. In so doing, however, the 1929–30 course not only retrieves in a
critical and transformative manner a fundamentally Aristotelian, ontotheological framework; it also problematises the foundational primacy attributed to theoretical contemplation as our originary mode of access to the world.56

In presenting the argument from Heidegger as always “for the moment” and within a specific context, McNeill provides space for moving beyond Ansell-Pearson's criticism. However, his straightforward characterisation of the manner in which Heidegger resolves his historical problematic immediately closes this space down as it relies too straightforwardly on the notion that Heidegger seeks to set history back against a lost notion of Aristotelian organiscism. The charge that this, albeit methodologically peculiar, engagement with life is still representative of a straightforward anthropomorphism is strong, but not fully convincing if we look beyond McNeill’s reading. Ansell-Pearson is right in claiming that Heidegger thinks that there exists an impasse when it comes to both Nietzsche and the possibility of non-human horizons, i.e., attempting to have life as the horizon of thought, as opposed to being. McNeill echoes this, albeit in different terms:

If the animal is truly other, will not any attempt on our part to define its Being necessarily reduce and erase its otherness? The question of access to the animal and to living beings that are non-human thus proves uncircumventable; moreover, the prospect of our knowing what it is like to be an animal seems doomed from the outset. Yet perhaps such objections, which raise themselves repeatedly in contemporary debate, are themselves historically conditioned by the epoch of subjectivity … Not only are these presuppositions historically determined, they are also phenomenologically and ontologically reductive with respect to the essence of life in general, whether human, animal, or other.

56 Ibid, p35
57 Ibid, p17-18
McNeill is suggesting that Heidegger does not close down the possibility of thinking the being of animal/life from a non-human perspective (or, perhaps more accurately, the possibility of accessing being outside the specific structures of human being [Dasein]). The point that Heidegger makes is that this is a task that cannot leap outside of the history of subjectivity with any clear ease or lack of historical-methodological labouring. For Heidegger, without setting the predominant modes of thinking life back into their proper historical determinations, such that their limit can be thought and thus their reductive phenomenological and ontological positions brought out into the light, there can be no overcoming of their seeming polarity. McNeill is convinced that Heidegger is not simply affirming his position as superior to all of history heretofore, but is instead, pursuing the problem of life in a manner that properly understands its own historicity. McNeill takes this historicity to have merely one protagonist, Aristotle. However, given my reading of FCM so far, McNeill's story does not quite fit. The type of historical methodology being discussed, but never fully analysed by McNeill, fits perfectly with my account of Auseinandersetzung: an account which shows that FCM is a work directed toward an historical, genuinely philosophical Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary. McNeill, too, is guilty of treating Auseinandersetzung in the same manner as the other critics dealt with in Chapter 1, he excludes it.

4. How World Analysis Calls for a Reading of Nietzsche

4.1. A Note on Life in FCM

Life comes forward in a very specific way in FCM. When biology seeks the essence of
the living/the organism as a mechanism or as an expression of an inner vitalism (two modern scientific trends which are subtly juxtaposed in Heidegger’s analysis of the organism), it conducts its task from within the structures world as previously established by varying metaphysical enterprises. Thinking life in this manner, modern science does not generate the appropriate attunement to/method of inquiring into, life. Life remains a determination of the other, of the other that Dasein itself is in as much as it shows up as a biological entity. The relation to otherness itself must be thought before this relation of identity. Within these fundamental tasks of metaphysics, if life emerges as an issue at all (as a concept capable of bringing about meditation on beings as a whole) it does so in a broad form that corresponds to original Greek determination of φύσις, not in terms of its modern determination as Bios, a regional concept. As has been suggested, the issue of life/otherness is dealt with through Heidegger’s analysis of the concept of world. In determining (in a trepidatious manner and always aware of the methodological pitfalls) the animal as self-refusing, Heidegger is seeking a way of relating to the otherness that it represents. A way of seeing it, encountering it and relating to it, that does not operate from within the subject-object schema so grounded. This means that Dasein’s identity with other entities becomes problematic, as its own self-identity as a transcendence is itself problematised as subject to a line of history, subject to prejudices. Where FCM attempts to understand world, and thus enter into metaphysics, by attending to that which appears as other (the animal), it ultimately returns to the otherness upon which this

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58 At least modern science as contemporary to Heidegger in 1929/30. For an interesting discussion of this see Thinking With Heidegger chapter 3.

59 This is not to say that the met-ontological or fundamental-ontological structure of inquiry as laid out in BT still holds sway. On my reading Heidegger does not actually postpone an ontology of life, but rather points to its essentially abyssal status.

60 Of course, in a move which does not get discussed, bios originally connotes a different sense of life (See chapter 5), a more human notion of life – it is the bio of biography etc. Zoe would more appropriately render life in the sense of a region. However, zoology is seen as a subset of biology rather than the inverse, which would appear to more appropriately be the case.
4.2. What World Analysis Points Towards

The conclusion of Heidegger’s comparative analysis of world relations is that the major line of separation between the merely living and Dasein is the “as structure” of Dasein. The culmination of his analysis of the world of animals is the idea that the animal is bound to other beings in such a way that it conducts a wholly other relationship to them. Not necessarily one of brute impoverishment, but a qualitatively different relationship. In comparison to this Dasein is not characterised by a freedom, he is not unbounded, but rather seen to be bound to beings in a different manner. The animal world is an environment in the sense of a habitat, Heidegger calls this a “disinhibiting ring”, wherein the animal has a certain proximity of relation to those things that go to make up its environs. Not forgetting that Heidegger takes his leave from scientific thought, this proximity can be understood in terms of the animal’s comparative sensory acuteness (in Darwinian terms the animal’s sharpened adaptation to its environment). Within this ring, the animal is at once close to its habitat in a manner that Dasein has no access to (cannot transpose itself into), but is also locked into its environment in such a way that it is incapable of circumspection. In so far as it is locked into this environment, it is precluded from the possibility of experiencing something as something. What Heidegger is essentially pointing to with the as structure is the ability of Dasein to experience something with regard to its possibilities for being. The animal, by comparison, operates in accordance with a set of drives which propel it into particular and fixed world-relations. The as structure, the essential structure of Dasein’s world relation, ultimately points toward Dasein’s being able to
point things out, to make assertions – to say and experience “this rock as a rock” etc. This point of differentiation provides the basis for a more fundamental investigation into world. The world of the animal is left behind in pursuit of the world of man. Accordingly, Heidegger’s investigation into world, forms itself into, and necessitates, an analysis of the λόγος, the place where Dasein speaks out about beings.

As McNeill points out in his Foreword to FCM, this ‘concluding analysis of the apophantic λόγος’ represents a major contribution to Heidegger’s work on discourse. In essence the λόγος refers to the wrestling of beings from their concealedness (repeating the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ analysis). Heidegger recapitulates his analysis of boredom in order to draw out a ‘provisional delimitation of the concept of world’. In this recapitulation Heidegger emphasises the concept of world as pertaining to the specific “being borne out” to the manifestness of “beings as whole” such that ‘we are manifest to ourselves as disposed in the midst of these beings’. The investigation into boredom failed to fully articulate this phenomenon. Equally, this “problem of world” persists through the comparative analysis. The comparative analysis considers world from the perspective of man as a world-forming being, revealing world-formation to be an activity involving man from the bottom up. Herein, the problem of world persists in the following formation:

How can man even come to a subjective conception of beings, unless beings are already manifest to him beforehand? How do things stand concerning the manifestness of beings as such? If the ‘as a whole’ indeed already belongs to

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61 The details of this section have to be foregone in order to generate the breadth of investigation intended in this thesis, once again I will attempt to glean the most general and essential components of Heidegger’s analysis, and do not posit my account as a terminal one.
62 FCM, §68.
63 Ibid.
this manifestness, is it not then withdrawn from the subjectivity of man, and that means here from his momentary caprice in each case?

In posing these questions Heidegger considers his world analysis to have operated in parallel with that of Boredom. By way of conclusion to the entire project, Heidegger suggests that he attempted a “dual approach” to metaphysics, wherein the attempt at awakening a fundamental attunement comprised an open approach, not subject to 'any particular metaphysical question', and the examination of world approached the same matter from within the metaphysical question “What is World”. Both these paths are considered to have merged at the point at which a preparedness to enter into philosophy comes into view. With regard to the latter, this preparedness is drawn into view via an analysis of the manner in which the λόγος’ rootedness in the “pre-logical manifestness of beings” has come to be suppressed by the traditional interpretation of λόγος as ratio (the effect of which is similar to the analysis of OEG). In this regard, both boredom and the analysis of world point in the direction of the need for a “liberation” from the tradition. This liberation is understood as an 'ever new appropriation of its newly recognised strengths', and is, as such, as much a return to and redemption of philosophy as metaphysics, as it is a departure from it. In this regard, philosophy is not just having to negotiate its history in one direction, i.e., surpassing it, but also has to find a point of entry into the depths of history. It has to hold the contemporary situation out into a confrontation with itself and what went before, such that “we” can open onto ourselves, and open ourselves up to ourselves - we can become what we are.

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64 Ibid, §74. The sections on λόγος, which are described as a detour, were no different in this regard.
65 Ibid, §74.
66 Ibid.
As with boredom, the problem of world shows itself to persist in the division between
the ground of the possibility of the manifestness of beings, the undifferentiated pre-
logical manifestness, and the 'manifold and differentiated comportment to beings' that
goes to make up beings as a whole.\textsuperscript{67} The former is precisely what Heidegger takes to
be \textit{οὐσία}, being as such. In this regard, the conclusion returns to the determinations of
the 'Preliminary Appraisal'. In thinking world as beings as a whole, its relation to its
seeming opposite can never be reduced or removed from the scene, as being as such
has to be thought alongside and within the concept of beings as a whole. The matter of
their unity, their "originary" unity, that is the way in which both aspects of \textit{φύσις}
participate in 'intrinsically forming and sustaining this articulated unity', remains
unarticulated at the close of \textit{FCM}, but nonetheless stands as that which must be
thought in a confrontation with the tradition.\textsuperscript{68} This is the central problem of
Heidegger's entire corpus: the articulation of the difference between being (being as
such) and beings (beings as a whole), or ontological difference itself.

As a confrontation with the whole of history via the contemporary, this must be
understood as a demand to confront Nietzsche's thought. \textit{FCM} does not maintain an
exceptional status, as life does not disappear in Heidegger's corpus. Rather than as the
life of the sciences, life as \textit{bios} or \textit{zoe}, Nietzsche thinks life (and world) metaphysically,
not on the basis of a prior metaphysics but precisely as metaphysics thought as the as
yet unfulfilled promise of Aristotelian first philosophy. Nietzsche will come forward as
the supreme representative of life for Heidegger, because Heidegger will claim that
Nietzsche thinks life as the \textit{originary unitary structure} of beings as a whole and being as
such (world and individuation), and not simply as \textit{a region of φύσις}. On these grounds I

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid, §75.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid, §76.
will claim that *NIII* marks the high-point of Heidegger’s meditation on life, not *FCM*. Only on the basis of a close reading of *FCM* as a whole can the genuine matter of life as it stands for Heidegger become clear.

4.2. Nietzsche's Conclusive Appearance

At the close of *FCM*, the inner connection of world, finitude and solitude has not been articulated, and world is the only concept of the three fundamental concepts of metaphysics to be treated. The precise relationship to be established with history, and indeed *FCM*’s status as part of an *Auseinandersetzung* with the contemporary remains under-determined. The full completion of these philosophical tasks remains yet to come. If *FCM* defers its own tasks, in what direction does it ultimately point? For Heidegger, it looks out towards the supreme representative of life, the genuine place where contemporary thinking is located, the thinker within whose thoughts world is experienced from out of a wakeful manner: Nietzsche.

In what remains of this thesis I will show how these tasks are not replaced by other concerns in Heidegger’s Nietzsche engagement, but go to make up the context from within which this engagement must be thought. Where *FCM* is classifiable as a text concerning biology, it is so only on the basis of its concern with thinking the boundaries between the human and the animal: the horizons from out of which an other can be both encountered and refused. This is beyond the very limit and ground of biology itself, at best, in line with Heidegger’s claims regarding biologism it is the basis for biology transform itself into metaphysics. The comparative analysis which drew on scientific notions proved to be incapable of generating concepts fundamental
enough to ground an essential understanding of its constituent parts: life, world, Dasein. As such, FCM represents the very exhaustion of an attempt to think life from within philosophically atrophied divisions and classifications of what constitutes life. When discussing Nietzsche's alleged biologism in *NIII*, Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche's thinking is precisely not biological but metaphysical, because in his conception of life, as an interpretation of φύσις, the very ground of the biological is itself determined. This is the fundamental difference between the approaches of FCM and *NIII*: FCM precludes a genuine philosophical decision regarding a determination of the essence of life via thinking life from within the biological sciences, whereas *NIII* decides with regard to life's possibility of bringing φύσις to word from out of an Auseinandersetzung with the very metaphysical ground of the biological itself.69

The last words of the lecture course, reserved for Nietzsche, reveal his contemporary importance when it comes to life and metaphysics. McNeill recognises the proper place of Nietzsche amidst this debate, but only in a glancing fashion:

[T]he ultimate issue is to understand what language is, how it allows for recognition of otherness, how to understand the sameness that opens up and accesses otherness. We are reminded of what Zarathustra asks his animals: 'are words not illusory bridges [Schein-Bruecken] between things eternally separate?'70

Elucidating upon this in the passage’s corresponding footnote:

What is the eternity that the animals point to? The eternity, Heidegger

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69 For example, the world structure of the stone is not taken to be a matter for biology as it has no world. In *NIII*, Heidegger will show that Nietzsche’s interpretation of life eradicates the taxonomical power of the organic/inorganic (animate/inanimate) division to the extent that the stone is part of what lives as it maintains world-relations of the same order as all other living entities.

70 *Heidegger: Visions of animals, Others and the Divine*, p42.
emphasizes (NI), of the Augenblick. The Augenblick of world, of a world ‘deeper than day’, a world of desire [Lust]. (GA 29/30, p.532).\textsuperscript{71}

In concluding FCM, Heidegger allows Nietzsche to speak without mediation. He does so because he, as the last of the great philosophers, achieved a “wakefulness” that opens up a space for us to 'experience what world is', a task which Heidegger considers to have gone unfulfilled in FCM.\textsuperscript{72} Throughout his engagement with Nietzsche, Heidegger takes up the essence of the work conducted in FCM, whilst rejecting its substance as a treatise concerning modern science and animality: for him life must be thought metaphysically, not biologically if an Auseinandersetzung with the contemporary is to be achieved. Life as a name for φύσις in its broadest sense is not taken up in FCM. As such Heidegger’s meditation on life, and life's potential as a term which can bring the whole of φύσις to word, has not been addressed.

Leading to the closing words of FCM, Heidegger proclaims that man is a transition, a transition between the throwness of possibilities and subjection to the actual. It is man, as Dasein, that is 'transition as the fundamental essence of occurrence', where occurrence is the genuinely finite. Heidegger once again recalls his 'Preliminary Appraisal' when he states that, as this transition between the actual (the world, the past/having been, beings as a whole) and the possible (solitude, the future/yet to be, being as such), Dasein is subject to an attack of being, he is 'seized by terror' in the face of the world. Having merely brought the historical situation as its stands with regard to metaphysics (its possible redemption or overcoming) to the edge of our view, where the path of history remains in need of proper illumination, Heidegger only points in the

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid. This reference is to the closing words of the lecture course: Zarathustra’s roundelay.

\textsuperscript{72} FCM, §76.
direction in which the light lies. In this regard, he is unable to speak for himself, and so turns to Nietzsche to announce Zarathustra's roundelay. In that song, Nietzsche suggests that the world, experienced in wakefulness, in the light of day, and therefore turned outward to beings, is pure transience: 'The world is deep [...] deep is its woe [...] woe says: fade! Go!'. In contrast to this, the night (sleep as that boundedness such that others that we are not are not let in) brings joy, and with it the yearning for eternity. In these words Heidegger points back toward his earlier analysis of Dionysus and Apollo as two fundamental orientations of man: the differentiated, manifold, transience of life and the individuated/solitudinous, singular, eternity of spirit. In Heidegger’s Nietzsche this metaphysical forgetting of the genuine activity of philosophy, namely the posing of the question of being as the originary unity of being and beings (which is to say their ontological difference) is brought to a point of culmination in the conflict of becoming and being as articulated from within the thought of their very unity: life. This will form the subject matter of NI and NIII, and accordingly that of the final chapter of this thesis.

5. Evaluation of Heidegger's Account of Life in FCM: What, for Heidegger, is the possibility of an Ontology of Life post FCM?

The aim of this thesis is not to draw out a conception of life from within Heidegger’s thinking. However, it would constitute a act of ressentiment to ignore the thrust of the majority of work done on FCM. As such it is needful to address the question “What broader conclusions we can draw on the basis of Heidegger's account of life in FCM?”.

73 Ibid.
In attempting to awaken a fundamental attunement from out of which a genuine confrontation with the contemporary could be undertaken, Heidegger turned to the question of world. The basic logic of this comparative investigation is as follows: In order to understand what “world” is, we can look towards other things which not only go to make up our world, but appear to have a world themselves.\textsuperscript{74} What else does this? Things that we would say are alive. Stones expressly don’t have a world, animals do seem to have a world: they relate to other entities, make decisions, they sleep. But is their world the same as ours? What is it that we share that allows us to share in world? Life. We and animals are classifiable together in some way as, living, as “life”. As such, an attempt to grasp the essence of that which lives, to understand the ontological structure of “life”, will tell us something about world; will tell us what world is. It was in this light that life, and our ability to grasp its essence, came into view. Read as a whole, FCM is not an attempt to develop a positive definition of “life”.\textsuperscript{75} ‘Part Two’ houses an engagement with the life-sciences wherein their particular mode of thinking is pushed to its limit using its own resources.\textsuperscript{76} The aim of this exercise is not to ground an ontology of life, but to show the paucity of thinking man in terms of life (as

\textsuperscript{74} FCM, §42. “But then what about the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world: the animals and plants, the material things like the stone, for example?”

\textsuperscript{75} I am not alone in thinking this. Buchanan, in his excellent Onto-Ethologies [Buchanan, B. Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environment of Uexkull, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. (New York: SUNY, 2008)], is following Heidegger’s account of animal life- it is his express interest. Despite his aim of developing an understanding of the different ontologies of life (or bases for them) presented in various thinkers, he is capable of recognising the fact that he is attempting to extract something from Heidegger’s work, rather than follow its intention. He states, “The time for animals had arrived […] We must recall that his primary focus is on the concept of world, especially in relation to finitude and temporality. His focus is not on animal life specifically; it is of interest only insofar as it fits into the bigger picture.” [pp62-63].

\textsuperscript{76} As Buchanan states, there is “a bigger picture” regarding Heidegger’s engagement with Animal life. This equally means that there is “a little picture” which houses a great deal of interesting detail: The manner in which Heidegger takes mechanism and vitalism to interact; the veracity of Heidegger’s reading of Uexkull; the precise account of entelecheia drawn out by Heidegger and its relation to pre-existent understandings of the organism; the accuracy of Heidegger’s invocations of Aristotle; etc. These topics are of great interest, but are mostly of relevance to investigations that seek to develop a concept of life and look towards Heidegger for assistance. I am concerned with the big picture as regards FCM, and the big picture as regards Heidegger’s engagement with life therein. As such, I point towards McNeill and Buchanan as the best readers of Heidegger regarding the “little picture” of life in FCM.
conceived by the life-sciences) and not in terms of Dasein.

This represents a repetition of the claims made regarding the possibility of an ontology of life in *BT*. There are key differences between Heidegger’s positions in *BT* and *FCM*, differences that, when unheeded, serve to limit the nuances of the comparative investigation into world. In §10 of *BT* Heidegger discusses the value of investigating Dasein via “Scientific Theory”, namely anthropology, psychology and biology. He understands the paucity of these disciplines to lie in their inability to access “ontological problematics”. Their designations, such as “spirit”, “life”, “man”, all relate to ‘definite phenomenal domains which can be “given form”: but they are never used without the notable failure to see the need for inquiring about the Being of the entities thus designated’.77 Hence his rejection of any of these terms as a rubric for the investigation of Dasein.

Rejecting these terms as the bases for ontological investigations does not mean that the forms that they relate to are dismissed, or that their importance is played down:

In their turn “body”, “soul”, and “spirit” may designate phenomenal domains which can be detached as themes for definite investigations; within certain limits their ontological indefiniteness may not be important.78

Out of all of these terms Heidegger’s sees the importance of further clarification regarding the inability of “life” to sustain an analytic of Dasein.79 Heidegger briefly

77 *BT*, §10.
78 Ibid.
79 Initially Heidegger proceeds with a critical analysis of Dilthey’s conception of life. Dilthey’s use of the term “life” is clearly not the same as a biological determination thereof, but Heidegger’s, in this section, treats their usages in a similar manner. This provides an indication of the hermeneutic character of Heidegger’s relation to the term, he is not using “life” in any single determination; there is no positive content to the use of this term. This type of usage does not change as we enter into *FCM*, throughout
assesses the possibility of constructing a “general biology” by indicating that any such
eendeavour is always ‘founded upon the ontology of Dasein’. The following statement
provides the basis for the majority of criticisms and unfavourable readings of ‘Part Two’ of FCM.

Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being [eine eigene Seinsart]; but essentially it is
accessible only in Dasein. The ontology of life is accomplished by way of a
privative interpretation; it determines what must be the case if there can be
anything like mere-aliveness [nur-noch-leben].

These comments are clearly the basis for thinking that all of Heidegger’s engagements
with “life” as a phenomenal domain that refers to those other entities that are part of
our world, and thus as a foundational concept for an understanding of world, function
privatively. Equally, the language of “poverty” does not initially indicate a break with
this mode of thinking. In BT an ontology of life is presented as possible, but only on
the basis of a prior working out of the structures of being pertaining to Dasein (a full
understanding of the essence of life was conceivable as grounded in an analytic of
Dasein). On my reading, Heidegger did not straightforwardly retain this view in FCM.

In FCM, any genuine determination of the essence of life was shown to lie beyond the
grasp of the life-sciences, as the world of the animal entailed a refusal of man’s powers

his comparative analysis of world this term is mobilised in the same way in this passage: as a an open
term that allows for a domain of phenomena to be “given form”. Hence the openness and
indeterminacy of the terms usage throughout ‘Part Two’. In this regard it should be noted that “life”
does not retain the same character for Heidegger in BT and beyond as it did previously. There has been
a great deal of work done on Heidegger’s early thinking, where the “facticity of life” was a central
theme [see Kisiel, T. The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: UCP, 1993) especially Chapter
3]. These sections in BT represent a determinate split from that mode of thinking, and a “de-reification”
of the term “life” in Heidegger’s thought.

80 BT, §10
81 Ibid. Heidegger repeats this claim in §12: “Yet, even as an a priori condition for the objects which biology
takes for its theme, this structure itself can be explained philosophically only if it has been conceived beforehand
as a structure of Dasein. Only in terms of an orientation towards the ontological structure thus conceived can
‘life’ as a state of Being [Seinsverfassung] be defined a priori, and this must be done in a privative manner.”
of transposition. This refusal is precisely that: man’s inability to transpose himself into
the world of the animal is not seen a failure on behalf of his powers of transposition
(the infinite power of thought), but a limit. In the same way that a refusal of world was
experienced in boredom as telling, so too the refusal of the world of the animal. They
both tell of the finite structure of Dasein: Dasein as in transition between beings-as-a-
whole and being as such. This is a direct return to, and furthering of, the idea
presented in the 'Preliminary Appraisal', that man is constituted by a homesickness: man
is never fully at home in the world, but equally never capable of being apart from it. In
this regard, the comparative investigation of world repeats the lessons of boredom.
This means that man, by dint of his essence, stands out within beings-as-a-whole and,
thus, that realm of beings demarcated by the term “life”. This is his transcendence, it is
the transcendent structure of world; or world's internal unity with solitude: the yoking
together of the two as finitude itself.

This transcendence must not be taken in a metaphysically confused sense. As shown
between the 'Preliminary Appraisal' and OEG, to think of the world as a privative
realm of infinite knowing, is to think world within the confines of the history of a
confusion of the meaning of “metaphysics”. This confusion constitutes the blurring of
the distinction between beings and being, or ontological difference itself. By thinking
being as such that which is beyond beings, being as such is always thought on the
basis of beings as a whole: Φύσις becomes understood as “nature” in the sense of the
world, at the expense of “nature” thought as being as such (οὐσία). The genuine
difference of the two, and indeed the nature of their interrelation is covered over. The
originary meaning of φύσις, and the originary task of metaphysics as meditation on
the originary structural unity of beings-as-a-whole/world and being as
such/individuation thus becomes covered over. Seen in the light of this “forgetting of being”, the notion of transcendence pertaining to Dasein is not a statement of Dasein’s *higher order* of being, is not evaluative, but merely descriptive. Heidegger’s comments regarding the “abyssal bodily kinship” of animal and man should not be taken as a suggestion that man is degraded by such a comparison.\(^\text{82}\)

In summary, Heidegger’s position is that man is not capable of constructing an ontology of life because of an essential division, and, whilst potentially problematic, the language of poverty is not intended to indicate a hierarchical, thus privative, relation to life (understood as those entities that also partake in world in some way). This leaves an ontology of life in a precarious position. Much like the boredom analysis, Heidegger retains an historical ambiguity. There are seemingly \(a\ priori\) structures and divisions that are presented (boredom seemingly points to the \(a\ priori\) structure of temporality, whilst attempting to indicate the deep-rooted historical situatedness of philosophising, and the comparative investigation of world indicates an \(a\ priori\) division between “life” and Dasein), but these structures are presented as being the findings of determinately historically situated investigations (boredom is an epochally idiosyncratic attunement, and the conclusions drawn about life emerge from within an investigation into life as it is “given form” by the life-sciences, i.e., as it is presented from within a very specific history).\(^\text{83}\)

This historical ambiguity is one which, as I have shown, plays out continually in FCM, from its establishment as the subject of the text as a whole in the ‘Preliminary

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\(^{82}\) These claims are clearly going contra to these expressed by my selected interlocutors in chapter 1 of this thesis.

\(^{83}\) Heidegger’s discussion of the *mythos* of the stone represents one way in which these claims about life are bound to the specific history within which they arise.
Appraisal'. The central problematic can be conceived as how to understand the relationship between the historical and the trans-historical. Genuine conclusions regarding these matters lie not in the direction of the purgation of anything historically situated in order to retain merely that which is trans-historical, but rather, in the direction of an engagement with that which is not fatally contemporary. This is precisely what Auseinandersetzung is designed for, hence its continual presence in FCM, and hence the call for a reading of Nietzsche at its close.

In his ambiguous conclusion to his engagement with the life of the life-sciences, Heidegger is clearly guilty of conducting negative biology, so to speak. On the basis of a positive laying-out of the potentially metaphysical conclusions that can be drawn on the basis of biological accounts of the essence of life, Heidegger draws a large caveat by presenting a possible in-itself of the world of the animal, that lies potentially beyond our powers of determination.

If the world is essentially closed to the animal then we can talk of a not-having, but we are never permitted to understand this as a deprivation [...] Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is accordingly far from being a, let alone the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality. At best it is a proposition that follows from the essential determinations of animality, and moreover one which follows only if the animal is regarded in comparison with humanity [...] if these considerations are unassailable, however, then in the end we must not only substantially reduce the significance of our thesis, but must repudiate it altogether. For the thesis is misleading precisely with respect to the essence of animality itself, i.e., it encourages the mistaken view that the being of the animal in itself is intrinsically deprivation and poverty.\footnote{FCM, §63.}
If seeking clarity with regards to what life is, and what the fundamental character of our relationship to this domain of beings is, then Heidegger’s account of the essence of life is unsatisfactory. He presents something of a philosophical aporia to the question “what is life?”, which is understandably interpretable as an evasion of the demands of understanding the phenomenon of life (e.g., as this other that we somehow are). However, Heidegger is at no point conducting a general, or a theoretical biology. He is not attempting to fulfil the unfulfilled promise of the ontology of life as suggested in BT. Moreover, he is still attempting to do the work initially promised therein, i.e., grasp the world of Dasein. Returning to the claims of chapter 1 of this thesis, if we approach Heidegger from within an historical problematic that is not his own, then it should come as no surprise that his resources for overcoming such a problematic are lacking.

This is not to say that all criticisms relating to Heidegger’s anthropocentrism can be dismissed because he has historically caveated his claims about life here in FCM. If one desires to follow this line of thinking, as so much of the secondary literature on FCM does, then, on my reading, then Heidegger can still be brought to bear on these

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85 The claim, as previously expounded, is that the animal has world by way of not having. That this “poverty” is somehow other. This presents a raft of problems for Heidegger. Either there is a unity, at which point there is a relationship, i.e., we both have world, or there is a dis-unity, and the animal is genuinely and wholly other; i.e., “world” describes man’s relationship to entities not the animals. The two cannot pertain at the same time. The latter is not maintainable for Heidegger less the animal begin to operate in a manner akin to certain understandings of Kant’s conception of the noumenal, i.e., “life” becomes the name for that which in itself provides the conditions for subjecthood, but cannot be experienced as such. Equally, if there is a relationship, how can this be described in non-hierarchical terms if world clearly reaches a certain fullness in the world of Dasein? I maintain that Heidegger is aware of this tension, hence his attempt to retain a possible richness of world that persists within the enclosed ring of the animal (the animal’s heightened sensory acuity, the enhanced memory of the squirrel etc.). Ultimately Heidegger, in FCM, reserves the logos for Dasein, and presents the animal as undivided/unseparated from its world. In this sense, the animal can be described as at home in the world, as fully contained within beings-as-a-whole in a way that Dasein, by dint of essence, can never be. In this sense, whilst augmenting his position in BT, a fundamental element is preserved, namely the paucity of conducting an analytic of Dasein on the basis of the determinations of field-dependent investigations.
matters, but only at the high-point of his meditation on life. In NIII, Heidegger will present the full force of the term “life” to bring to word the originary Greek experience of \( \phiυσις \) (the foundation of metaphysics). In this sense, Heidegger offers the ontologist of life scant assistance. From the perspective of this particular engagement with the essence of animality, and thus the essence of life, Heidegger offers the path of displacement: progressing beyond this anthropocentric and non-metaphysically penetrative conception of the animal world requires, first, a metaphysical engagement with the world of Dasein in order to escape the anthropocentric circle of comparison.

The crux of this matter, is whether or not this displacement comes in the face of the profound refusal of the animal, i.e., if in the face of man's efforts to determine the essential structure of the animal (to access the animal’s world) the animal withdraws in such a way that it speaks of something philosophically essential. On my reading, this point itself is under-determined, but not as a result of a weakness of analysis. The refusal of the animal and the withdrawal of its world do not arise from out of a deeply philosophical engagement therewith, but from within a staged analysis of the proceedings of the life sciences. The basis for the theses are everyday distinctions, so to speak, but the investigation of them takes the form the uptake of these everyday distinctions by the life sciences themselves.\(^{86}\) Accordingly, the terminal point of his analysis of the animal says more about his thoughts regarding the ability of the sciences to open up and penetrate into metaphysical problems, than it does about his notion of philosophy’s ability to think the essence of life. This notion would account for the absence of any explicit discussion about the practice of, or the grounding of an

\(^{86}\) This is indicated in the historical contextualisation of these sections, but equally the manner in which Heidegger structures his investigation of the organism, which is to say, he follows contemporary biological approaches and attempts to build up a picture of the field from within varying approaches.
“ontology of life” in FCM. Read in this light, Heidegger does not postpone an ontology of life, and neither does he meaningfully displace the concerns of an ontology of life in the direction of a further analytic of Dasein.\textsuperscript{87} These were not the stakes of his engagement. What is postponed, displaced, and called for, is a genuine engagement with “life” as it is \textit{metaphysically} in play within the contemporary, not as it is presented in its fatal contemporaneity. This is to say, what is called for is a return to the metaphysical source of contemporary thought, namely Nietzsche, lest our boredom with ourselves continue to attune us in silence. In the \textit{Nietzsche Lectures}, especially \textit{NIII}, Heidegger will explicitly present this case, firstly in his discussion of biologism, and conclusively in his discussion of “justice” as the 'supreme representative of life' Nietzsche's thought.

\textbf{Final Comments}

\textit{FCM}, is a text centred around the production of an encounter with metaphysics and not expressly a text that meditates on life. \textit{FCM}, therefore, whilst still unique with regard to the intimate presentation of various strands of scientific knowledge, does not constitute an aberrant entry into the Heideggerian corpus. This is not merely an archival point. Because the presence of Nietzsche has been overlooked, and some misconceived notion of an attempt to ground an ontology of life (or worse still

\footnote{For Thacker, an Ontology of Life has traditionally occupied a position where, given its original formulation in Aristotle, it sits between biological reductionism and theological sublimation. As such he claims that within philosophy, including contemporary philosophy, 'the structure of the concept of life is most often that of negative theology [...] the issue is that Life as a concept must always presume a further question concerning Being. The infamous question 'What is Life?' appears to be always superseded by the question of 'What is Being?' And yet the very idea of Life-without- Being would seem to be an absurdity for philosophy'.['Nine Disputations on Philosophy and Horror' in Collapse IV (may 2008)]. As such he does not repudiate Heidegger on this matter, but sees his approach as sitting, philosophically, alongside others who take “life” up as a question (where he considers Heidegger to not articulate it as such). See Thacker's \textit{After Life} (UCP, Chicago: 2010) for his account of the history of philosophy's treatment of the ontology of life. Also see the conclusion to this thesis for a brief discussion of Thacker's claims regarding Heidegger.}
theoretical biology) has been so dominant, the genuine philosophical contribution of
*FCM* to Heidegger’s thought has been overlooked. As a propadeutic to an
*Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, Heidegger’s presentation of the problem of life in
*FCM* foreshadows his reason for resisting Nietzsche’s interpretation of life. He thinks
Nietzsche falls-foul of the lessons of *FCM*, ultimately projecting the world of Dasein
onto life itself, not heeding the abyssal nature of the kinship of man and animal.
Chapter 5. FCM and The Nietzsche Lectures

Introduction

In his extensive Nietzsche reading, Heidegger continues to pursue the goals set by FCM; he continues his attempt to confront metaphysics head on. I will substantiate my claim that FCM operates as a propadeutic for Heidegger’s reading of life in the thought of Nietzsche, rather than comprising the high-point of his meditation on life. In this regard, reading FCM as a whole will provide privileged access to the matter of life in Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading. Investigating their connection allows for an enhanced understanding of Heidegger’s response to the issue of anthropocentrism in philosophy.

In FCM (contrary to the claims of Krell et. al), the essence of life was not taken up as a central issue in philosophy: the problem of life emerged within one way of approaching the question of world. In NI and NIII, “life” will emerge as the central matter of philosophy itself, as Heidegger will consider Nietzsche’s conception of life to be the final moment of a metaphysical interpretation of φύσις. When viewed through the lens of FCM, the justification of Heidegger’s resistance to “life” as a genuinely philosophical translation of “φύσις”, and rejection of life as the horizon of thinking will be deepened.1

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1 Recapitulating the arguments of my introduction, a study of the interplay of these crucial moments allows the very matter of life between Heidegger and Nietzsche to come forward. In this regard, the omissance of a close reading of Heidegger’s thoughts in the years between FCM and NI is not motivated by merely practical concerns, i.e., the allotted length of a thesis. I have philosophical reasons for the absence of, say, a reading of life and Nietzsche in IM, or a more detailed account of Heidegger’s movement toward historical thinking: an understanding of the trajectory of Heidegger’s thought on life and it historical position is most starkly brought into view between FCM (where life is first presented as a matter that, in its Nietzschean conception, exceeds the levelling effect of lebensphilosophie and kulturphilosophie’s) and NI and NIII (where life is thought at its metaphysical heights). On the basis of a mapping out of this trajectory, the spaces in between the starting point and point of termination of this thesis are not excluded. Rather, they are set back into context from out of which the presence of Nietzsche and life within this period of Heidegger’s thought can be re-examined. As such, I present this thesis as groundwork for a more extensive engagement with the matter of life between Heidegger
Heidegger’s engagement with Nietzsche, his *Auseinandersetzung* therewith, is nothing other than a confrontation with life as the horizon for thinking. In this sense, the high-point of Heidegger’s meditation on life (on the viability of life as the basis for thinking the essence of man; the possibility of thinking the essence of life; the possibility of thinking φύσις as life) coincides with the most intensely agonic moment in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, which is the matter of justice. As such, Nietzsche comes to the fore in Heidegger’s work of the late thirties as the supreme representative of life. The centrality of life in Nietzsche’s thought necessitates this confrontation, as claimed in *FCM*, the modern notions of life adopted by *lebensphilosophie* are only effusions of Nietzsche’s genuinely epochal thoughts. With the concept of life as encountered in modern life-sciences, Heidegger not only intimated their metaphysical paucity, but also hinted at their Nietzschean character with his surveying of the field as caught between mechanism and vitalism, or life and spirit. In Nietzsche, a genuine encounter with the contemporary will be attained, and on Nietzsche’s terms this is an encounter with the philosophical possibilities of life.

As intimated throughout my reading of *FCM*, Heidegger identifies in Nietzsche a more profound site for a confrontation with life itself than in the life-sciences. This is because of his understanding of life in Nietzsche as caught within the interrelation of two orientations to Being (Dionysus/life and Apollo/spirit). In *NI* we find a justification of this initial advocacy of Nietzsche’s deep meditation on life, whereas *NIII* houses a

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2 In calling Nietzsche the supreme representative of life for Heidegger, I am directly borrowing the phrase that Nietzsche uses to describe justice itself in a note of 1844. The note from *KSA* volume 11, pp140-1, is quoted and interpreted by Heidegger on p142 of *NIII*. 

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rejection of this thinking. In order to conclude the project of understanding Nietzsche’s presence in FCM, I will engage with these two moments and forward my own understanding of their connection. This will establish the profundity of my claims regarding the role of FCM in Heidegger's Nietzsche reading, and equally of Nietzsche's role in FCM.

FCM does not call for a further engagement with life. In this sense, the connection between FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures does not lie in their shared examination of life, but in their shared pursuit of a genuine Auseinandersetzung with metaphysics. That this confrontation regards the matter of life is not the result of the failure or incompleteness of FCM. Heidegger's engagement with life is necessitated by its centrality in the thought of Nietzsche. This was equally the case in FCM, despite being less explicit. In this chapter I will follow Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's thoughts on life in NI and NIII, where it takes its most substantial form. In his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, rather than as a subsidiary concern, the possibility of establishing “life” as the very horizon for thinking itself is held out into a decisive space. With Nietzsche, understanding life becomes the very space for a confrontation with metaphysics itself, as, for Heidegger, Nietzsche thinks life as the originary unitary structure of being and beings. He interprets “φύσις” as “life”, thus thinking life prior to its regionalised biological conception. For Heidegger this represents the highest possible anthropomorphic conception of life, and metaphysical conception of φύσις (where metaphysics is no longer thought as capable of sustaining a genuine interpretation of φύσις). Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche completes this metaphysical interpretation of φύσις as the crowning moment of the confusion of beings and being. In this respect, I intend to draw out the manner in which life emerges as the matter between
Heidegger and Nietzsche, but also the mater for contemporary thinking according to Heidegger.

1. NI

1.1. Nietzsche and Prejudice

In his analysis of NI, Krell identifies the emergence of Nietzsche from within 'Heidegger's “turn out of need” to the poetry of Hölderlin'. In this regard, for Heidegger, Hölderlin represents the possibility of a new “dawn”, and Nietzsche represents the 'outermost point in the history of the Occident or evening-land from which he descries the dawn'. In this context, Krell suggests that Nietzsche’s point of emergence in the early 1930s is shrouded in ambiguity: 'even if we reduce matters to biography there is no obvious reason why the name “Nietzsche” and no other must appear here'. Building on this idea of Nietzsche as a 'figure of dusk and dawn' (yet overlooking the significance of his appearance in FCM as just such a figure who tells of the night and day), Krell suggests that only a deeper analysis of the Nietzsche Lectures themselves can open up the proper understanding of the necessity of the emergence of

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3 NI, Krell’s ‘Analysis’, p250. Throughout this thesis, Krell’s account of Heidegger's relationship to life-philosophy has been presented in opposition to the reading that I myself have aimed to conduct. That this is the case should not be misinterpreted as a claim that Krell, as a reader of Heidegger, is perennially on the outside. It is more the case that Krell directly points toward the deepest moments of historical conflict that arise within Heidegger’s body of work, and on this basis, attempts to generate the type of reading of Heidegger that Heidegger himself attempts of other philosophers. This far-reaching task is, by its very nature, both controversial and potentially flawed. However, such a grand undertaking is not based in ignorance regarding Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, on the contrary, it is grounded in seminal work on this matter: Krell’s brief analyses of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation that accompany each volume of the English translations of the Nietzsche Lectures contain more depth than their length would imply.

4 Ibid – The German for “Occident” is Abendland, which literally translates as evening land. In this sense Heidegger is discussing a purely European History where Nietzsche, as he did in FCM, represents the most contemporary moment – he represents the place where “we” as Europeans can find our identity and locate ourselves within our most essential historical movement.

5 Ibid, p251.
the name "Nietzsche" and no other. With this necessity noted, Krell hints at the reasons for Nietzsche's emergence, Heidegger suggests that in the face of the history of thinking truth as correctness (the Platonic tradition), Nietzsche's revaluation of all values, whilst representing a certain extreme permutation of this tradition, nonetheless operates in a way that is "less prejudicial" as a result of having adopted the 'standard of "life" itself for the revaluation'.

In what sense is this a matter of "prejudice" for Heidegger? According to Krell, 'in Nietzsche he found the keenest eyewitness to that collapse [of the meaning of being]', which lay concealed in 'the very meaning of "body" and "soul", "matter" and "spirit", "sensuous" and "supersensuous".' This notion is supported by the presence of Nietzsche in FCM as the thinker who pushes a certain mode of thinking regarding the dual aspects of ϕύσις to its limit under the banner of a justification of life, and in the figures of Dionysus and Apollo. In Heidegger's world analysis in FCM the refusal of the animal tells of an abyssal joining, in turn, the seeming opposition of will and command with respect to boredom was shown to overcome itself in the direction of a need to grasp that which joined them together, namely the horizonality of time. Krell suggests that, for Heidegger, 'Nietzsche's fundamental experience of the death of God implies the collapse of the ontotheological interpretation of Being'. NI, therefore, takes up Nietzsche's notion of art as a counter-movement to truth that seeks to rescue the

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6 This notion further justifies my concentration on the interplay of FCM and the Nietzsche Lectures at the expense of a closer reading of the work in between. In FCM Nietzsche's emergence as the site of the contemporary is, although only briefly, explained and justified. It is only through an understanding of his critique of Nietzsche's conception of life that his importance for Heidegger, and thus his persistent appearance in his work of the intervening period between FCM and NI, can be assessed.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.
“sensuous world” from its platonic denigration. This is the direction in which Nietzsche is less prejudiced.

As I have argued, it is not a case of removing prejudices in order to philosophise or historicise in some “pure” fashion. Purity, thought in this manner, is precisely the type of prejudice that Heidegger is thinking about. Rather, prejudice appears as a particular relation to the situatedness and rootedness of any philosophical system or investigation. In this instance, prejudice, or Nietzsche’s lower level of prejudice, is understood in relation to the platonic tradition of the forgetting of the body, the schematic separation of binary opposites, and the subsequent repudiation of the world (as witnessed, for example, in the Kantian concept of mundus). From within this context, Krell posits the potential moment of Heidegger’s emergence from Nietzsche’s thought as arising within his uptake and furthering of the Nietzschean project of “a new interpretation of sensuousness”. Thus, for Krell, at certain moments, Heidegger’s “war” with Nietzsche operates within Nietzsche’s battlefield, as a fight over how best to fulfil Nietzsche’s own promise. Krell understands NI to be the place where the deepest unity (or community as Krell terms it) between the two thinkers is established. In this regard, commenting on the progression from a discussion of Nietzsche’s metaphysics through to his aesthetics, Krell states the following:

Heidegger tries to pinpoint Nietzsche's uncertain location on the historical path of metaphysics. That is the only way he can estimate his own position, the only way he can discern the task of his own thinking.\(^\text{10}\)

If prejudice is understood to concern an openness to the situatedness of

\(^{10}\) Ibid, p232.
philosophising, as either historical situatedness, or perhaps bodily situatedness (in Heideggerian terms the recognition of the comprehensiveness of philosophy with regards to the manner in which the comprehender in comprehended in the comprehension of the whole), then Heidegger’s efforts in the Nietzsche Lectures, as the historical locating of both himself and Nietzsche, are clearly preparatory for philosophising in much the same manner as his efforts in FCM. When properly understood as a meditation on the preparation for philosophy, via the investigations of everyday awareness’s stance (i.e., philosophy and prejudice); the need for a grounding attunement (as some kind of relation to the thought of Nietzsche);\footnote{Haase points to a section of Heidegger’s posthumously published monograph of 1938/39, Mindfulness, wherein Heidegger elaborates further upon the movement of Auseinandersetzung. The dissociating exposition [Auseinandersetzung] displaces into a foundational, and in each case, unique attunedness by the grounding-attunement [Grundstimmung]. Grounding-attunement is not a diffused feeling which additionally envelopes thinking, but is the silent attuning into the uniqueness of the one particular basic thought […] [d]issociating exposition, therefore, is never the same as calculating the correctness and incorrectness of doctrines and opinions’. This 1938/39 account of Auseinandersetzung has clear connections to the overriding task of FCM. Here Auseinandersetzung is explicitly presented as the historical movement through which a fundamental attunement is awoken via an engagement with other thought. This is the precise structure that Heidegger was working within in FCM. There, it was shown that the efforts of FCM were directed toward the awakening of a fundamental attunement wherein the a living philosophising could be undertaken, and the possibility for a genuine confrontation with the contemporary opened up.} and an investigation of world and the essence of life, then it is clear that the work of FCM reaches its culmination in the Nietzsche Lectures. This connection between the two texts remains trivial however, if it is purely a rough thematic identity. In identifying the precise terms of Heidegger’s work of historical locating in NI, the deeper connection between the two will begin to emerge.

1.2 Art and the Ideal of Truth as Certainty

In FCM Heidegger explicitly stated that the general aim of the text was to achieve a position from out of which Greek beginnings could be illuminated. Heidegger did not
decide the fate of the term metaphysics, but rather, attempted to open a space for its
decision, attempted to prepare for the opening of a space for this decision. The manner
of Heidegger’s handling of the term “metaphysics” does not represent a caesura of the
seemingly redemptive project of FCM. Rather, it marks the point of decision, where,
arguably, the possibility of a redemption of the history of metaphysics is exhausted. In
NI Heidegger will not repudiate Nietzsche’s thought as metaphysical. This is the clear
crux of Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading. What is not so clear, is why this train of
thought culminates in a reading of Nietzsche on life. I will turn to the last few chapters
of NI in order to show how and why this is indeed the case.

The situation as it stands with NI does not involve a radical dislocation from FCM, in
fact, it follows directly from that project. In the latter half of NI Heidegger elaborates
upon his understanding of the relationship between the first name of metaphysics
(Plato), and the last (Nietzsche). Whilst he does not think that the question of the
essence of truth is genuinely posited by Nietzsche, he maintains that through
Nietzsche the history of truth thought as correctness can be brought to a close.
However, Heidegger will ultimately consider Nietzsche to remain trapped within a
“metaphysical” interpretation of truth. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s metaphysical
interpretation of truth represents the very limit of metaphysics itself. In FCM this limit
was shown to be the problematic manner in which the history of metaphysical thinking
approaches its fundamental concepts, namely, World, Finitude and Solitude. The major
issue was shown to be the misinterpretation and mistaking of the “meta” in
“metaphysics” as relating to the content of philosophy as such, rather than being a
classification of the position of certain texts within Aristotle’s corpus.
With regard to the first of these concepts, world (which is by no means the primary or most important, that is the role of finitude), this mistake played itself out in a denigration of the term κόσμος, where its Latin counterpart, mundus, came to stand for that which lay beneath the transcendent. “Worldly” knowledge, or finite knowing, was thought as the privative form of infinite, transcendent, supersensuous knowing. This model has not changed from FCM to NI. However, what has altered, is the use of the term “metaphysics”. In FCM Heidegger was tacitly engaged in an attempt to redeem the word metaphysics, to find a mode of philosophising whereby the original “metaphysical” intentions of Aristotle could be understood for the first time. It was hinted that this historical project would need to come to an understanding of the manner in which Aristotle understood sleep and waking to be that which bounded an entity, the horizon which both opens up and at the same time refuses other entities that it itself is not. In laying out the historical ground of the misappropriation of the term “metaphysics” for Aristotle's first philosophy, Heidegger did not reject the term outright, but rather, sought to push the word, and thus the entire history that it stands for, to its limit.

Krell points out the deep connection between Nietzsche and Plato as being the centralising of viewing within the essence of truth. This once again raises the matter dealt with in the 'Preliminary Appraisal' - certainty. Heidegger begins his examination with a caveat: at this stage he is not directly presenting the case of Plato, but rather Platonism, i.e., 'the conception of knowledge that corresponds to that term.' According to Heidegger, for Plato, genuine knowledge pertains to ideas, i.e., the eternal form of an entity. Heidegger understands this to be a matter of looking, a matter

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12 NI, p151. Heidegger will present a more detailed reading of Plato himself in subsequent sections of NI.
of apprehension, but 'not with the sensory eye of the body, but with the eye of the soul'.\textsuperscript{13} The idea of a thing is the basis upon which any sensuous perception of it can occur. It is the idea of a table that makes it a table, not its spatio-temporal properties. In this regard, the nonsensuous “stands above” the sensuous:

Knowledge must measure itself against the supersensuous, the Idea.\textsuperscript{14}

Heidegger approaches Nietzsche through his claim that he offers an “inverted Platonism”\textsuperscript{15}. He denies that Nietzsche offers a simplistic inversion of this Platonic theory of knowledge. A direct inversion, on Heidegger's account, would be positivism, which inverts the relationship between the sensuous and the supersensuous whilst maintaining knowledge as a process of measurement. Here, the standard of measurement is ‘what is constantly placed before us, the \textit{positum}, ‘the latter is what is given in sensation, the sensuous’.\textsuperscript{16} Whilst positivism may initially appear to favour apprehension over and above a more metaphysically abstract understanding of knowledge, Heidegger maintains that the two are identical with regard to their structure:

Here too measurement is an immediate presenting or putting forward (“sensing”), which is defined by a mediating interrelation of what is given by way of sensation, a judging.\textsuperscript{17}

Both of these theories of knowledge centralise the mode of viewing of the subject, they involve a process of presentation, understood as a mediating relation (either that

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, p154.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, p152.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
which 'derives from what is represented', the idea, or the process of sensing itself). Further to this, on the bases of their accounts of knowledge, they both project a structurally identical notion of truth. Platonism teaches that 'the idea, the supersensuous, is the true, true being':

\[...\] the sensuous must be measured upon the supersensuous; nonbeing possesses the shadow and the residues of Being which fall from true being.\[18\]

The similarities between this basic Platonism and the relation of finite and infinite knowing in Kant (as presented by Heidegger in OEG) are apparent. The world is seen as a privative, fallen form of the infinite, transcendent, supersensuous realm of being. Positivism reverses this “standard relation”:

The sensuous becomes being proper, i.e., the true, i.e., truth. The true is the sensuous.\[19\]

Whilst this is the direct inversion of Platonism, qua reversal, and whilst Nietzsche can in some senses be understood to be/have been a positivist, Heidegger suggests that Nietzsche's inversion of Platonism, as an overturning, has to be thought in a more radical direction. It has to be thought from out of the “fundamental experience” [Grunderfahrung] of nihilism. It is only on this basis that the historical intent of Nietzsche's thinking, and thus a genuine understanding of his thoughts regarding truth, can be grasped. FCM is once more recalled as Heidegger repeats his analysis of the need to investigate boredom when discussing nihilism. Where profound boredom was seen to arise from within a distinct lack of a collective or pressing need for

\[18\] Ibid, p154.
\[19\] Ibid.
contemporary man, Heidegger understands nihilism in Nietzsche to operate in the same manner, saying of nihilism for Nietzsche:

There is no longer any goal in and through which all the forces of the historical existence of peoples can cohere and in the direction of which they can develop [...] no goal of such power that it can [...] conduct Dasein to its realm in a unified way and bring it to creative evolution.\(^{20}\)

The connection is clear: boredom, with its relation to historical lostness, a lack of need, and more importantly its location within a contemporary as defined by Nietzsche (which is explicitly the case in FCM), is nihilism thought under a different name. Boredom opened up the need to once more take Dasein up as burden, whereby we can start to philosophise for ourselves and become who we are via a confrontation with the contemporary. At this point in his Nietzsche reading, contra Nihilism, the main task opened up is, once again, a confrontation of a certain order - an *Auseinandersetzung*.

The establishing of goals is in itself confrontation\(^{21}\)

Standing in the balance in this confrontation with history as nihilism, as the devaluation of the “uppermost values”, is man’s ability to generate the power of self-mastery, to gather the ‘basic force that is needed to in order to attain a creative stance in the midst of being’.\(^{22}\) This is precisely the same dislocation of man from the “basic force of Dasein” that was experienced in profound boredom. The difference between nihilism in this sense, and boredom, does not lie in their historical character, but in the resultant relation to life. The problem of world delimited and opened up through

\(^{21}\) Ibid, p158.
\(^{22}\) Ibid, p159.
Heidegger's investigation into boredom was pursued in the form of a comparative analysis. This comparative analysis initially opened onto the question of the essence of life. The question of the essence of life was thought upon the basis of certain scientific understanding. Life was always positioned as the Other of Dasein: from the very beginning the possibility of thinking the essence of Dasein from within life was disregarded. The “abyssal bodily kinship” was maintained at a certain distance.  

The ultimate finding of the comparative analysis was that no comparison as such could be maintained. There was a refusal on the side of the animal, whereby we could no longer access its essence. This refusal was precisely that, a refusal. It was not on the side of a limitation of man’s powers of reasoning, it was not a problem of knowledge in that sense. When contextualised with the account of world in OEG, the problem of world exceeds the problem of life. Life as encountered in FCM is regional, field dependent, it is the life of bios and zoe, and thus displaced into the overriding problem of world. The problem of life understood in the sense of the abyssal bodily kinship, was suspended in the direction of a more fundamental thinking of world. Life itself was not presented as a fundamental concept as such. This is an indication of Heidegger’s insistence that life cannot be thought, or begin to emerge in its full power, from within the trammels of scientific-metaphysical thinking. It can only attain its true power at the very limit itself of scientific and metaphysical thinking. In his analysis of biologism Heidegger will further discuss this limit.

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23 FCM, §63: “Our thesis that the animal is poor in world is far from being a, let alone the, fundamental metaphysical principle of the essence of animality, and moreover, one which follows only if the animal is regarded in comparison with humanity.”

24 With Nietzsche, as a translation of φύσις, and thus an interpretation of man’s finitude, life is forwarded as a fundamental concept of metaphysics – is thought fundamentally metaphysically. This is not a derogatory statement – it is thought as a repetition of the origins of metaphysics, and thus pushes metaphysics to a certain limit.
What Nietzschean nihilism presents, is the problem of a lack of pressing need for Dasein as a problem of life itself:

The major debility of the basic force of Dasein consists in the calumniation of the fundamental orienting force of “life” itself.25

This calumniation is grounded in the ‘fact that things are posited above life, which make negation of it desirable [...] [t]he desirable, the ideal, is the supersensuous’.26 As such, Heidegger states the following:

It is not the simple, almost mechanical exchange of one epistemological standpoint for another, that of positivism. Overturning Platonism means, first, shattering the pre-eminence of the supersensuous as the ideal.27

This is the new interpretation of sensuousness. Heidegger concentrates on Nietzsche’s proclamation that art is ‘the greatest stimulans of life’,28 thus providing the genuine counter-movement to truth. However, as a counter-movement, art cannot be dislocated from its discordant relationship to truth:

Art and truth, creating and knowing, meet one another in the single guiding perspective of the rescue and configuration of the sensuous.29

At this point it is worth recalling the brief treatment of Nietzsche in FCM. There, Heidegger claimed that the manner in which Apollo and Dionysus are thought as

25 NI, p159.
26 Ibid, p159.
27 Ibid, p160.
28 Ibid, p75, Heidegger quoting from WP 808.
29 Ibid, 161.
fundamental orientations to being, and the manner in which they, as opposing orientations, are brought together and held in their opposition, are the most important of Nietzsche's thoughts. In *FCM* Heidegger points to Nietzsche's claim that this thought (the justification of life through the figures of Apollo and Dionysus) sustained his entire life's work. Heidegger by no means abandons this notion. Regarding the confrontation of art and truth, the confrontation between knowing and creativity which houses the power to overcome nihilism, Heidegger forwards the following idea:

> [...] the genuine struggle is the one in which those who struggle excel, first the one then the other, and in which the power for such excelling unfolds within them.\(^{30}\)

*Auseinandersetzung* is 'the initiation of struggle',\(^{31}\) and therefore deeply implicated in the above. In his analysis of “The Grand Style”, presented earlier in the text, Heidegger indicates the grounds for such a claim.

### 1.3. The Grand Style- Return to the Original Conflict of Life

For Heidegger, the Grand Style represents the 'supreme form' of all 'artistic actuality' within Nietzsche's thought, and is, as such, considered to be 'that in which art comes to its essence'.\(^{32}\) The Grand Style, as 'triumph over the plenitude of living things', where 'measure becomes master', is fundamentally structured by the relation of two opposing forces:

If art has its proper essence as the grand style, this now means that measure

\(^{30}\) Ibid, p158.  
\(^{31}\) Ibid.  
\(^{32}\) Ibid, p126.
and law are confirmed only in subjugation and containment of chaos and the rapturous.\textsuperscript{33}

This statement represents a direct repetition of Heidegger’s presentation of Nietzsche’s thought in \textit{FCM}. In this oppositional structure, the two fundamental aspects of man are brought into view. On the one hand, art as counter-movement to nihilism, where new goals and new standards of valuation are to be set (measure and law). On the other, art as ‘physiological aesthetics’ where the plenitude of life is most primordially experienced in rapturous states brought about in artistic activity. Thus we find a direct connection to Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship that pertains between world, solitude and finitude. Here, “world” can be understood as the rapturous being-together with the plenitude of life, “solitude” as measure and law, and thus “finitude” as the grand style itself: the unity of these two oppositional orientations to being. Nietzsche is the source of Heidegger’s understanding of the history of metaphysics. Clearly then, Heidegger’s own thoughts on metaphysics are Nietzsche’s reformed. This is the true extent of the idea that Heidegger needs to undergo some process of self-emergence, as it is the location of his initial \textit{standing together} with Nietzsche. In \textit{FCM} these orientations were presented as originating in the dual aspect of \textit{φύσις}. This thought is directly repeated in the discussion of the grand style:

Where art is to be grasped in its supreme form, in terms of the grand style, we must reach back in the most original states of embodying life, into physiology. Art as counter-movement to nihilism and art as state of rapture, as objects of physiology (“physics” in the broadest sense) and as object of metaphysics – these aspects of art include, rather than exclude one another.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p126.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, p126.
This statement figures as a centre-piece of Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s aesthetics, as it is on the grounds of thinking the physiological as “physics in the broadest sense” that Nietzsche’s thought can be opened up in its historical importance. This historical importance is covered over when the physiological in Nietzsche, and therefore nature and indeed life, are thought from the angle of the biological.\textsuperscript{35} To read Nietzsche’s physiology in any other way, i.e., to see Nietzsche as a simple positivist and “naturalist”, would represent an inability to ‘see beyond everything that is fatally contemporary in Nietzsche’.\textsuperscript{36} The question still remains, how does Nietzsche understand physics in this broad sense? Heidegger considers him to see it in precisely the same terms as he himself does in the ‘Preliminary Appraisal’ of FCM.

\[\text{[He]} \text{ wants to put in relief the original conflict of life [...] The “natural” to which Nietzsche’s aesthetics refers is not [...] something accessible to and calculable for a human reason which is apparently unruffled and quite sure of itself [...] On the contrary, Nietzsche means what is bound to nature, which the Greeks of the Golden Age call } \textit{deinon} \text{ and } \textit{deinotaton}, \text{ the frightful } \textit{[das Furchtbare]}.\textsuperscript{37}

At the end of FCM, Nietzsche was called forward as the last great witness to have opened themselves up to, to have become wakeful to, this terror, to have truly experienced world. In NI, with regard to his fundamental interpretation of ϕύσις itself,

\textsuperscript{35} As so many of his interpreters have. Here, and again in the sections on the overturning of Platonism Heidegger references Klages and various other “philosophers of culture” who read Nietzsche with an eye only for his world-historical importance. This is a direct repetition of Heidegger’s analysis of Nietzsche’s epochal presence and subsequent misunderstanding within the contemporary. The claim is that Nietzsche was not read philosophically.

\textsuperscript{36} NI, p127.

\textsuperscript{37} NI, p128. The main difference between the analysis of FCM and NI is the terminology used to describe man’s ultimate being-bound to nature (ϕύσις). In FCM it was the terrifying [Schrecken], here it is the frightful. In FCM the terrifying element of finitude was not a direct translation of deinon as it is here in NI, but rather Heidegger’s own phrasing for what he considers to be the ground of philosophising, or at least the condition of being seized by terror from out of which fervour for philosophy itself, namely \textit{enthousiasmos}, can arise.
Heidegger once again forwards Nietzsche as a witness to the original and frightful conflict and ambiguity of life. At this juncture two paths open up for further investigation:

a. What becomes of this interpretation of nature, especially with regard to boundedness?

b. What are the implications of the grand style?

I will come to the matter of \( \phiυσις \) last, as this will be the key move from \( NI \) to \( NIII \).

1.3.1. The Grand Style as unspoken Meditation on dual aspect of \( \phiυσις \)

Rather than one style of art amongst others, the grand style is (as a configuration of will to power) “a basic structure of Dasein”. It represents the very condition for the generation of any other style which would constitute a certain discernible period of artistic production. In this regard, it is not historically conditioned. Heidegger provides the following description of the grand style at its most lucid:

[...] the fundamental condition is an equally original freedom with regard to extreme opposites, chaos and law; not the mere subjection of chaos to a form, but that mastery which enables the primal wilderness of chaos and the primordiality of law to advance under the same yoke, invariably bound to each other with equal necessity.\(^{38}\)

The yoke is the structural joint between law and chaos, between the formal

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\(^{38}\) Ibid, p128.
individuation and eternity of Apollo as spirit and the rapturous excess and transience of Dionysus as body and life. The equal necessity with which each is bound, the interrelatedness of the oppositional elements, means that neither is favoured as the underlying reality, condition or ground of the other.

For this “physiology” is not something to which everything essential in art can be traced back and on the basis of which it can be explained. While the bodily state as such continues to participate as a condition of the creative process, it is at the same time what in the created thing is to be restrained, overcome and surpassed.\(^{39}\)

This process of surpassing without abandonment, the maintenance of a mutually heightening opposition, is the movement of will to power at its height, as ‘such states are what they essentially are when, willing out beyond themselves, they are more than they are’.\(^{40}\) Hence art’s position as the greatest stimulans to life, but also the highest point of law giving. In the grand style, spirit and life both achieve their greatest heights in and through being bound to each other in contest. Contra the more Wagnerian and Schopenhauerian embracing of the purely rapturous power of art, wherein all law is abolished, art must be a free movement of law giving. Heidegger points to WP 846, where Nietzsche claims that ‘the cause of creativity is longing after immobility, eternity, “Being”, or longing after destruction, change, Becoming’. He takes this statement to be the metaphysical pinnacle of the notion of the grand style, indicating the ultimately metaphysical intent of Nietzsche’s aesthetics due to the idea that art, in this configuration, is the highest expression of will to power. By “metaphysical” Heidegger means precisely what he meant in FCM, namely a meditation on the whole

\(^{39}\) Ibid, p129.  
\(^{40}\) Ibid, p130.
(beings as a whole and being as such) that comprehends the comprehender. At this “far-flung border” of his aesthetic thought, Nietzsche’s thinking is transformed into metaphysics as ‘for Nietzsche art is the essential way in which beings are made to be beings’.\footnote{Ibid, p131.}

In *FCM*, Apollo and Dionysus were presented by Heidegger as two fundamental orientations. Essentially, they were presented as the most contemporary form of the original Greek experience of \( \phi ν\sigmaις \): \( \phi ν\sigmaις \) as a realm of beings (life, nature, becoming) and \( \phi ν\sigmaις \) as nature, qua essence (\( \omegaι\sigmaια \)). This thought is directly repeated as Heidegger maps being and becoming onto the notions of spirit and life, Apollo and Dionysus, Law and Chaos.

The grand style is the active will to Being, which takes up becoming into itself.\footnote{Ibid, p135.}

Via this mapping, the grand style is presented as a meditation on the two fundamental orientations toward \( \phi ν\sigmaις \) thought at their individual heights, and at the same time thought together, as neither one is separated from the other. The movement of “taking becoming into itself” is not that of negation wherein being ‘remains dependent upon, and lets itself be led by, what it repudiates’.\footnote{Ibid.} Rather, this high expression of will to power is described by Heidegger as follows:

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[...] \text{only what assimilates its sharpest antithesis, and not what merely holds that antithesis down and suppresses it, is truly great; such transformation does not cause its antithesis to disappear, however, but to come to its essential}\]

\[\]
Nietzsche's metaphysics takes on the precise form of metaphysics as proposed, but never realised, in Aristotle’s first philosophy. This “juxtaposition” between being and becoming (their structural relationship), is presented by Heidegger as the absolute limit of Nietzsche’s thought, but in an unusual way. Heidegger makes two clarificatory statements regarding his relationship to Nietzsche, and thus Nietzsche’s historical position. The first statement is issued in two stages:

Our sole concern is to know the basic position of Nietzsche’s thought

and

[...] every great thinker always thinks one jump more originally than he directly speaks. Our interpretation must therefore try to say what is unsaid by him.

Heidegger presents his task as bringing that which was thought yet unsaid in Nietzsche's work to word. This exegetical project is identified as understanding Nietzsche's position with regard to art. As has been seen, art implicitly references truth/knowledge. In this respect, and still concerning this juxtaposition, Heidegger makes a second statement:

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44 Ibid.
45 Ibid. Interestingly Krell points this out in a footnote to the translation, referencing IM section four, where being and becoming are presented as having to be thought together as φύσις. Rather than take this an indication of the need for a reading of IM, it confirms my stance regarding the necessity of first understanding the interplay of FCM, as genuine start-point of the call for an Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche on the grounds of a need to enter into a historical relation with metaphysics as φύσις interpretation proper, and the Nietzsche Lectures as the Auseinandersetzung itself.
(...) aesthetics is by no means overcome. Such overcoming requires a still more original metamorphosis of our Dasein and our knowledge, which is something that Nietzsche only indirectly prepares by means of the whole of his metaphysical thought.\(^48\)

Nietzsche also needs to be taken up with regard to what he prepares for, rather than thinks: a radical rethinking of the relationship between knowing and creating. How being and becoming (law and chaos, spirit and life, Apollo and Dionysus) are interrelated, marks the point where Nietzsche's thought moves out beyond itself and opens up the ground for Heidegger's own thinking to emerge. The first, exegetical, task regarding how Nietzsche understands the grand style as the fundamental condition of the event of the overcoming of nihilism (releasing aesthetics and the sensuous from Platonism) is concluded with the “new interpretation of sensuousness”.

1.3.2. Life as Perspectival and the equation of Being and life

As the centre-piece of his “physiological aesthetics”, for Heidegger, the grand style and its structure lies at the heart of Nietzsche’s meditation on the event of nihilism and its potential opposition. In this regard, the matter of overturning Platonism was shown to be key. This overturning, up until the final section of NI, has only been determined in a negative fashion. On the basis of the grand style, and resultant notion of confrontation and struggle, it is clear that art and knowledge (becoming and being) must be thought together and not in terms of a relation of negation, abolition, or brute suppression. Heidegger returns to the physiological aesthetics in order to establish ‘his interpretation of the sensuous in its principal direction’.\(^49\) This direction takes it leave

\(^{48}\) Ibid, p131.
\(^{49}\) Ibid, p211.
from the quashing of the Platonic distinction between the true and the apparent world, i.e., true-being and mere appearances. On Heidegger's reading, in Nietzsche's aesthetics 'the “physiological” (sensuous-corporeal) in itself possesses this beyond itself: chaos moves towards form and form affirms chaos. Heidegger suggests that from within this aesthetic phenomenon (given its metaphysicality) the essence of the sensuous can be grasped in the direction of its constituting “reality proper”. The key is the internalisation of that which was positioned outside, i.e., the inner relationship between chaos and law that goes to make up the sensuous, or life itself.

Within Platonism, the idea (the ideal of truth) is a matter of vision, but not of sensory, bodily vision. True-being is apprehended by the soul, the ground of knowledge is thus the nonsensuous. To explain how Nietzsche thought his overturning of Platonism, not in terms of a reversal, but as a complete “twisting free” of Platonism, Heidegger turns to two concepts: Nietzsche's perspectivalism, and his notion of incorporation. Quoting his claim that 'The perspectival [is] the basic condition of all life', Heidegger's draws into view the entirety of Nietzsche's historical profundity. For Heidegger, Nietzsche understands “what lives” to be constantly exposed to and confronted by “other forces”. In this strifely chaos, forces and organisations of forces (hence the “organic”, as that which lives is an organisation of forces) strive against each other in such a way that they 'estimate them [each other] in relation to possible incorporation or elimination'. This relation and estimation is understood as a way of looking, an “angle of vision”, wherein the “living creature” interprets everything in terms its “capacity for life”. This discussion of capacities mirrors FCM, where the organism itself

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80 Ibid, p212.
82 Ibid, p212.
was understood to be a collection of organs that expresses its capacities as an organism.\textsuperscript{53} Continuing this train of thought, Heidegger offers the following explanation of self-formation in Nietzsche:

> The angle of vision, and the realm it opens into view, themselves draw borderlines around what it is that creatures can or cannot encounter. For example the lizard hears the slightest rustling in the grass but it does not hear a pistol shot fired close by.\textsuperscript{54}

This perspectival play of interpretation as incorporation and rejection is the “fundamental process of life itself”. The broadness of this conception of life is evident in the manner in which it offers a conception of the sensuous that allows for the division of organic and inorganic to be thought as internal to the play of life. Heidegger explains that it is the ‘manifold of perspectives which distinguishes the organic from the inorganic’. An organic entity contains and organises a number of forces, each of which has its own perspective (it literally embodies them in the process of incorporation), the inorganic also has its perspective, but one which operates according to “fixed power relations”.\textsuperscript{55} As such, the notion of mechanism in nature, i.e., the idea that that which is “inanimate” is not living (the stone has no world...), is rejected as being an essential way of grasping entities. This is the direction in which Platonism is thus overturned as ‘all being is in itself perspectival-perceptual’, is sensuous.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} This was the basis of McNeill’s claim that Heidegger was seeking a reformed Aristotelian notion of the organism based around \textit{entelecheia}. Also, Mcneill focuses on the role of vision in ‘Part Two’. For an in-depth account of why this is the case see McNeill, \textit{Time of Life}, Chapter One.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{NI}, p212.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, p213.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid, p213. In Chapter 2, I highlighted the importance of \textit{FCM §16.c} for understanding the direction in which Heidegger was trying to think. There, sleeping and waking comprised the fundamental categories that allowed for differentiation amongst classes of beings – they were the categories of nature so to speak. On this basis, philosophically-historically, Heidegger presented the basic division between man, plants, animals and stones. Enhancing the ambiguity of this categorisation, without explaining in clear detail, Heidegger suggested that the notions of sleep and waking as found in Aristotle had not been understood in their full “metaphysical intent”. He suggested that sleep was a form of boundedness wherein an entity cannot let in others that it itself is not. Nietzsche, in this
In Nietzsche the concept of life thus broadens to include the inorganic. In this sense, life, the essence of the living, is thought beyond FCM. There, life was thought from the perspective of world, and world was approached according to the historically pre-established divisions between entities. Equally, indeed on this basis, it was “field dependent”, seeking an understanding of the essence of life that operates from within a pre-established conception thereof, i.e., the organism. Stones did not live in FCM, they had no world. In NI the stone lives. However, this does not represent a repudiation of FCM. On my reading, FCM was an investigation into the limits of the history of a particular mode of scientific knowledge, and a particular metaphysical history. As such, “life” was thought from within certain divisions, it was not thought in its metaphysical fullness. From the outset life was not entertained as a possible name, or indeed matter, that could sustain all thinking as such. In NIII it is precisely this possibility which is held out for decision.

What does this mean for the relation between art and truth? In Platonism, that which constituted true-being, was that which was fixed, constant and eternal. The nonsensuous was the measure of the sensuous, where the sensuous, as ephemeral, was posited as being of the order of “appearances”, where what appears resembles true-being. Within perspectivalism, truth in the platonic sense is itself considered to be semblance, as the fundamental process of life is striving, strife and fluid power relations. Truth, in this sense, emerges from within the movement of life itself, as part

context, is presented both as having repeated and reinterpreted the original conception of metaphysics, and also brought the thoughts of sleep and wakefulness to a certain fullness, not only under the auspices of noontide and dawn (as suggested above), but also in his drawing out of the metaphysical fundamentality of boundedness in a quasi-Aristotelian form.

This does not mean that claims about the animal and its world are fully rejected. These comments on the lizard show that Heidegger’s understanding of the products of biology are still operative. The correctness of Scientific understandings of the organism are not at stake, merely the ability of these fields to penetrate into the essence of things.
of the play of perspectives:

Being, the true, which logic “firmly locates” (petrifies), is but semblance; a semblance, an apparentness, that is essentially necessary to the creature as such, which is to say, a semblance that pertains to his survival, his establishment of self amidst ceaseless change.58

As the petrification of a perspective, truth is not the negation of the perspectival, but just a form of it. Heidegger turns back to the grand style in order to draw into view how life now fully constitutes the play of being and becoming. In art in the grand style, both art as creation and becoming, and knowledge as fixation and being, were yoked together by necessity and for their own mutual heightening. The movement toward being comes from the overflowing power of the incorporation of a perspective, which seeks to maintain itself in constant relation to the chaos of becoming. Thus art, as including both creation and fixation in their heights, is life enhancing. It allows for the play of life to continue without abandoning either one of its fundamental elements (i.e., perspective and its drawing a “line of horizon” through which it encounters things which it is not). Truth, taken as an unrestrained desire for being “immobilises” life, and seeks to reject the perspectival ground of its origin. In this new interpretation of the sensuous, truth is not abandoned, but drawn back within life itself. The relation between being and becoming is thus, from the point of view of life, the relation between creation and knowledge as the play of perspective and horizon:

In order for the real (the living creature) to be real, it must on the one hand ensconce itself within a particular horizon, thus perduring in the illusion of truth. But in order for the real to remain real, it must on the other hand simultaneously transfigure itself by going beyond itself [...] and that means it has to advance against the truth.59

58 Ibid, p214.
On Heidegger’s reading in *NI* (which is as I have claimed, an exegetical text devoted to bringing Nietzsche’s thought to word, and not to examining that which lies beyond his thought), Being and life are equated. “Life” is the name for being, but a name which also houses beings traditional opposition, becoming: “life” is the term for Being in its new interpretation according to which it is becoming’, as being in the grand style incorporates becoming without suppressing it. At its heart, life itself is nothing but will to power. The historical importance of this concept for Heidegger, given my reading of *FCM*, is most apparent in the following statement:

> In that way Nietzsche in will to power attempts to think the original unity of the ancient opposition of Being and Becoming. 60

Nietzsche conducts metaphysics as it was conceived but never realised in Aristotle, i.e., thinking the unity of φύσις as life (living being, φύσει ὄντα) and φύσις as essence (οὐσία), or becoming and being. In this sense, Nietzsche attempts to bring the original Greek experience of φύσις to word in the concept of life. For Heidegger, in *NI*, Being’s equation to life ‘is not some sort of unjustified expansion of the biological’, but rather, the biological is interpreted and transformed from the perspective of life. How this is the case, and how this involves φύσις is a matter which is brought fully into view in *NIII*.

1.4. The Postponement of the New Interpretation and Return to Epistemological Concerns

In presenting Nietzsche’s physiological aesthetics, Heidegger separated out two
matters: that which is unsaid but thought in Nietzsche, namely the metaphysical profundity of art in the grand style, and that which was indirectly prepared for by Nietzsche, namely “a more original metamorphosis of our Dasein and our knowledge”. If interpreted as pointing beyond NI, where art is the focus, and out toward NIII, where knowledge is the focus, then the latter comment informs us with regards to the development of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation.

Krell points out that in NI Heidegger ignores knowledge in order to focus on art, postponing an account of the consequences removing “the true” from the realm of knowledge to the domain of art'.\(^61\) In his 'Analysis' of NIII, Krell suggests that NI marks a high water mark, not just of his Nietzsche interpretation, but also his “grand livre”.\(^62\)

The obvious implication of this statement is that there is a division between NI and NIII. NI concludes with a sense of optimism and community, the new interpretation of sensuousness is by no means presented as merely “Nietzsche’s thought that was”, which is to say, as something concluded. Rather, it was presented by Heidegger as the future of philosophy. This project is, as Krell is quick to point out, “postponed” by Heidegger, ‘who constantly invokes some body who is alive, yet never pursues the matter’.\(^63\) If NI is a high water mark, then NIII must represent a decline, either as an impoverishment of interpretative proximity, or perhaps as distance from Nietzschean community. For Krell, it is precisely this lack of community that constitutes the difference between the two moments in Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation. On my interpretation of Heidegger’s statements regarding knowledge in NI, it is seemingly the case that life, between NI and NIII, stakes out both the site for a decision and

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\(^61\) Ibid, p236, Krell’s ‘Analysis’.

\(^62\) NIII, p274, Krell’s ‘Analysis’. This suggestion is made in the form of a rhetorical question.

\(^63\) Ibid, p275.
perhaps even a decision itself, as it marks the community and the starkest difference between the two. Krell is aware of this, and at the close of his NIII analysis, he suggests that the position we are left in at the end of NIII is to return to the whole of Nietzsche and ask, 'Can we [...] envisage self-preserving, self-enhancing life at that mysterious threshold where fixation becomes petrification rather than a fulguration of form-engendering force?'. Whilst he will come to think that Heidegger is incapable of such an activity, at this moment, Krell presents the situation as it stood with life for Heidegger, which is to say, in the balance. It is towards life in NIII that I now turn.

2. NIII

2.1. Biologism – Philosophy and the Sciences

In NIII, Heidegger directly picks up his interpretation of truth in Nietzsche as developed in NI. There, in closing, he suggested that the equation of Being and life was not a radical extension of biological thinking, but the other way round, that the biological would have to be thought anew from out of Nietzsche's concept of life. Heidegger extends, and focuses on this thought that 'interprets all appearances as an expression of life'\(^{64}\) in a discussion of “Nietzsche's alleged biologism”. For Heidegger, the term “biologism” denotes the transferral of concepts generated from the examination of 'the realm of plant and animal life to other realms of beings'.\(^{65}\) This represents a certain 'unfounded violence of thinking', and 'transgression of boundaries', wherein the sovereignty of philosophy is cast aside in lack of recognition 'that biological thinking itself can only be decided and grounded in the metaphysical

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\(^{64}\) NIII, p39.

\(^{65}\) Ibid, p45.
Heidegger asserts that approaching Nietzsche's thought through the lens of biologism and biology poses the “main obstacle” to genuinely grasping his thought. He turns to a brief examination of the key term for both biology, and for this thesis – βίος. Biος, according to Heidegger, is the Greek term for 'life, the process of life, and the course of life'. As such, “biology” can be understood as the “study of life” or “study of living beings”:

The name now means the scientific investigation of the appearances, processes, and laws of living beings that are determined for the realms of plant, animal, and human life.

In FCM the origin of the sciences was understood to be founded in the original Greek experience of φύσις as interpreted by Aristotle, with each branch of knowledge (episteme) dealing with separate domains initially delineated by a more foundational meditation on the whole – first philosophy (metaphysics). Heidegger's understanding of the structure of the sciences has thus not changed between FCM and NIII. In being directed toward living beings, 'all biology already presupposes a more or less explicitly drawn essential delimitation of appearances', which means that there is an underlying “preconception” of what 'distinguishes and sets apart living beings as such'. In the language of FCM: the question of the essence of life is already thought and remains unquestioned, and also unquestionable, from the perspective of biology. Rather than originally opening up the realm for questioning itself, the sciences, as branches of knowledge, can only presuppose, adopt and confirm their guiding “metaphysical

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66 Ibid.
67 The translation of these passages suggests that biologism is a hindrance to a “discussion” of Nietzsche's thought, yet the term is indeed Auseinandersetzung, which can be taken to mean that the very confrontation between Nietzsche and Heidegger rests on the matter of biologism.
68 NIII, p39.
69 Ibid, p41.
70 Ibid.
propositions”. This is not to say that the sciences cannot progress their investigations to the point at which they indeed pose the need for metaphysical questions or at least recognise the importance of metaphysical grounding. It is just that when they do the biologist, for example, no longer speaks as a scientist, but as a metaphysician. Heidegger maintains that as a result of the difficulty and “alien” character of the transition from science to metaphysics, those scientists who overcome their perspective and “speak as metaphysicians” are not just rare, but also fated to being misunderstood.

In grasping the issue of Nietzsche’s “alleged” biologism, Heidegger hopes to draw into view the nature of these transitions, and indeed the ground of the modern separation and confusion of metaphysics and the sciences. In this regard, NIII directly deals with the same issues as FCM. The following statement provides some clarity on this matter:

Science and reflection on the scientific are both historically grounded on the actual dominance of a particular interpretation of being.\(^\text{71}\)

My reading of FCM showed that Heidegger’s engagement with the question of life (his alleged theoretical biology) was located within a particular interpretation of Being, one which had already decided about the division of the living, and on this basis worked backwards and upwards toward an understanding of the essence of the living. At no point were stones understood to be alive, but they were nonetheless thought to take part in “world” by means of an absence. When pushed to it limits, this mode of thinking, as historically grounded without being historical itself, proved incapable of founding an ontology of life. This was seen to be the result of this dependency of the underlying conception of life on a realm of phenomena already distinguished and

\(^{71}\) NIII, p44.
formed by an operative conception of that term itself, i.e., the organism. In this way, we ourselves were always hovering in the background, yet in a way that could not be fully determined within the confines of this comparison.\textsuperscript{72} This was the status of the anthropocentrism in play in FCM.

This conclusion regarding contemporary science can either be interpreted as being a productive endeavour (a foray into the sciences on Heidegger's behalf, an attempt to push them toward their own metaphysical potential), or a merely critical one (an effort to show the impossibility or perhaps even perpetual difficulty of transitioning from scientific knowledge to metaphysical thinking). On the latter reading, rather than an abortive attempt, 'Part Two' of FCM necessitates a reading of Nietzsche by way of a display of the need to approach the living, (βίος or zoe), from out of philosophy itself, and not the other way round: the question of the essence of life can only be approached from out of a genuine confrontation with philosophy.

For Heidegger, as hinted at in NI, in thinking both beings as a whole and being as such together as "life", Nietzsche 'grounds this apparently merely biological worldview metaphysically'.\textsuperscript{73} Heidegger suggests that, in reversing the polarity of biologism:

The metaphysical foundation of the pre-eminence of life has its ground not in an eccentric, far-fetched biological view of Nietzsche's, but in the fact that he brings the essence of Western metaphysics to completion on the historical path that is allotted to it, the fact that he can bring to words what was preserved unspoken in the primordial essence of Being as φύσις.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{72} To recall FCM: "[...] our own proper essence has emerged in contrast, even if not in any explicit interpretation [...] for we ourselves have been in view all the time, whether we wanted to be or not."

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid, p46.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
Nietzsche, or rather Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* therewith, fulfils the promise of *FCM* in a way that that text could not achieve. In looking back toward the original Greek experience of φύσις, in attempting to awaken a genuine, living philosophising from which to shed light on the path from φύσις to the contemporary, Heidegger's efforts in 'Part Two' of *FCM* fell short because as a comparative analysis of world failed to move within metaphysics when it engaged with life. Life in *FCM* 'Part Two' was not that of φύσις, but βίος. Life, as living qua organic, was already divided, was already regional and thus narrowed. The stone was not living, it was worldless, but on Nietzsche's interpretation the stone would be part of life in the broadest sense, the stone would partake in life, rather than be included by way of absence. This means that the essence of life thought as βίος is more akin to the question of the animal Other as experienced from within the trammels of the history of scientific and a particular mode of metaphysical thinking. Deeper metaphysical questions could be sighted from within Heidegger's investigation into the essence of life via an analysis of the animal world, but not fully articulated, as the original otherness, the foundational distinction upon which the otherness of the animal is based (namely the distinction between being and beings) was not articulated with regard to its originary unity. With Nietzsche it is life as φύσις, as “physics in the broadest sense”, which comes into view, thus offering a genuinely metaphysical and philosophical possibility of interpreting φύσις, rather than operating from within a pre-existing one. In this sense life emerges as the very horizon for thought itself.

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75 As aforementioned there is a certain ambiguity regarding this point. I use bios because Heidegger is concerned with biology, but, perhaps there is room to think that this could indeed be zoe – a question regarding the pre-eminence of biology over and above zoology could be raised in conjunction with this issue.
As *FCM* began with a meditation on the fundamental separatedness of the sciences and philosophy, yet concluded with a detailed foray into the life-sciences, it may have appeared as though Heidegger considered the sciences to be both productive of, and productive with regard to, philosophical problems. This was absolutely not the case. His examination of the sciences represented merely one way of *approaching* philosophy itself, alongside his analysis of boredom. In this approach, he posed a single metaphysical question – what is world? In using the world of the animal, and thus the varying products of the life-sciences, Heidegger's investigation into world was, nonetheless, propelled in the direction of world's fundamental unity and thus interrelation with individuation/solitude. In this regard, it was thrown back to questions regarding the character of the difference between being and beings – the fundamental question of all philosophising. In *NIII*, Heidegger states that he considers the sciences to be incapable of generating their own “field proposition”. This is not a statement about the inability of a scientist to philosophise:

> [...] if the biologist as this specific person makes a decision about what is to be addressed as living, he nonetheless does not make this decision *as a biologist*, nor with the means, the forms of thought, and the proofs of his science; here he speaks as a metaphysician, as a human being who, beyond the field in question, thinks beings as a whole.\(^{76}\)

Heidegger is clearly not disparaging the sciences or, for that matter, scientists. Rather, this passage directly repeats the wisdom of *FCM*, wherein philosophy was shown to be absolute, entirely separated in the sense that it gives itself its own wherefore. In *FCM* Heidegger was engaged in a struggle to *begin* to philosophise – he did not have immediate recourse to a “ladder to philosophy” that would allow ease of access to

\(^{76}\) *NIII*, p42.
philosophy’s “inverted world”. The same thought is repeated here, in *NIII*, where the distance between everyday awareness and philosophy is once again problematised, and correspondingly, the proximity of everyday awareness and the science (their continuity) is emphasised.

The transition from scientific thinking to metaphysical reflection is essentially more alien and thus more difficult than the transition from pre-scientific, everyday thinking to the kind of thinking we do in the sciences. The transition to metaphysics is a leap.\(^77\)

The movement presented in *FCM* as proper to philosophising was confrontation, confrontation with the narrowing and beleaguering effects of the history of philosophy and science: *Auseinandersetzung* proper. The proper mode of this confrontation as historical, was not clearly laid out, but was projected in the direction of Nietzsche at the text’s close. Here, in *NIII*, the importance, and centrality, of an *Auseinandersetzung* within Heidegger's engagement with life is made apparent in the closing sentence of the section on “Nietzsche's Alleged Biologism”. In order to move beyond the fatally contemporary economy of biologism (which reduces Nietzsche-interpretation to affirming or denying his biologism) and out toward the genuinely historical and profound thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger suggests that ‘we must learn to read’. Thus confirming that, for Heidegger, the task of thinking “life” as the bringing to word of φύσις is intimately bound up (just as it was in *FCM*) with overcoming the obstacles that stand between him, and a genuine confrontation (as *Auseinandersetzung*) with Nietzsche.\(^78\)

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77 Ibid, p43.
78 Ibid, p47.
In line with the findings of *FCM*, the path of philosophy does not appear to lie, or at least to easily lie, with the path of scientific investigation. In *FCM*, when read properly, Heidegger is not effecting or attempting to effect a “productive” relationship with the sciences, as though one could engage with the sciences and thus “push through” to philosophy. *FCM* tells the same tale as the majority of Heidegger’s thinking regarding the sciences. It does not mark a difference in relation, but stands out in terms of *detail*. In this sense, there is quantitatively *more* science, but there is no qualitatively different understanding of the possibility of engagement with the sciences being espoused.

2.2. The Limit of Life

Art in the grand style presented the case for Nietzsche’s physiological aesthetics to be considered an *ultimate* meditation on the dual aspect of *φύσις*. Given the closing statements of *NIII*, this thought does *not* persist in Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation. To understand why this is the case I will turn toward Heidegger’s account of life and justice in *NIII*. For Heidegger the history of metaphysics has been the history of the forgetting of the question of being. This is the covering over of the proper question of philosophy, namely, meditation on the originary unity of beings as a whole and being as such (effectively a meditation on finitude as the occurrence of this structure). Finitude was presented as a matter in need of further investigation, but was also presented as the horizon of philosophising itself, in the sense that the very problem of entering into philosophy is the problem of approaching the question of finitude from within the appropriate disposition. In *FCM*, Heidegger presented this as an issue of the prominence of beings: as a result of our everyday proximity and concern with the specificity of the world of differentiated beings (the busyness of life),
the question of the originary undifferentiated manifestness (being as such) becomes
lost. I will examine why it is that, given what has thus far been said about the demands
of philosophy, and the seeming appropriateness of Nietzsche’s response to these
demands, Heidegger maintains the following at the end of *NIII*:

> In this interpretation of Being, the primordial thinking of Being as \( \varphi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \varsigma \) advances through the extreme point of the fundamental position of modern
metaphysics, thus coming to its completion [...] the question as to where the
truth of this first and last metaphysical interpretation of Being is grounded, the
question as to whether such a ground is ever to be experienced within
metaphysics, is now so far away that it cannot be asked as a question at all. For
now the essence of Being appears to be so broadly and essentially grasped that
it is also equal to whatever becomes, to “life”, indeed as its concept.\textsuperscript{79}

The key to understanding this passage lies in Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche not
only conflates life and Being, but effects an ‘equation of the basic words *world* and *life*,
both of which name beings as a whole’.\textsuperscript{80} On the basis of my reading of *FCM* it should
be clear why this would be problematic. The initial equation of life and being in *NI* is
not problematic, but rather emblematic of the grand scale of Nietzsche’s efforts as an
attempt at interpreting \( \varphi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \varsigma \) free from, and in opposition to, the whole of history (at
least of history as nihilism). In *FCM*, metaphysics was left open as a possible term for
philosophy, for the essential activity of man’s comprehending of \( \varphi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \varsigma \). Due to the
unfulfilled promise of Aristotle’s first philosophy, a meditation on \( \varphi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \varsigma \) itself that
remained open to both its fundamental aspects could still emerge under the title
metaphysics. In the above passage, Heidegger sees the history of metaphysics come to
an end in terms of a completion, such that it is closed down as a possible term and also

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p157.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, p39.
path for philosophising. In the continuation of the above passage, Heidegger explains this point.

In the consummation of Western metaphysics through Nietzsche, the all sustaining question of truth, in whose essence Being itself in its various metaphysical interpretations essentially unfolds, not only remains unasked – as was previously the case – but also is totally buried in its character as worthy of question. For this reason the consummation of metaphysics becomes an end.

This seeming reversal of positions is indicative of “life” having achieved its acme in Nietzsche's thought. The very point of its height represents the point at which it must fall, as it represents the site of Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s greatest proximity (as the interpretation of \( \Phiυσις \) as originary unity of becoming and being / world and individuation), yet at the same time the point of their greatest difference (as the impossibility of thinking being as “life” – the rejection of “life” as a capable of bringing the originary experience of \( \Phiυσις \) to word, and thus as a horizon for thinking).

Historically speaking, with this rejection, the question of how this transitional, horizontal, originary unity is constituted, remains open. Heidegger's transition from an investigation into time as fundamental occurrence of Dasein to his later concentration on the event and history of being, is most often understood as the result of a constant war against the anthropomorphism of the history of philosophy, the history that Heidegger himself finds himself within, and recognises throughout his earlier work. Heidegger considers Nietzsche's understanding of justice (as “supreme representative

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81 The essence of truth as the truth of essence is precisely the question regrading the original undifferentiated manifestness of beings-as-a-whole, it is this “individuation” which propels us toward the differentiated world of beings-as-a-whole a in the fundamental occurrence of our Dasein, our finitude.

82 NIII, p157.
of life”) to be the zenith of anthropomorphism, accordingly Nietzsche lies at the very heart of Heidegger’s struggle with anthropomorphism. Through Nietzsche, it is “life” as a name for φύσις, perhaps even φύσις as a word for Being in its originary unity, that comes to the fore in this battle: where life is so often invoked as the word most capable of annihilating anthropomorphism, for Heidegger, it is indeed a word most deeply bound to an anthropomorphic meditation on being.

Where metaphysics (as the overshadowing of being by beings) ends, so too does the “primordial thinking of Being as φύσις”. This marks the point at which Nietzsche is to be left behind, where the separation of Auseinandersetzung must occur, thus concluding the open ended project of FCM. In that regard the “unexcavated” path of history has indeed been illuminated, yet in such a way that it reaches a crisis, as the original Greek experience of φύσις was projected back beyond the beginning of metaphysics, beyond even Plato.83 What lies beyond the history of the metaphysics of life, remains an Auseinandersetzung between Heidegger and Nietzsche, where emphasis must be placed on the separation of the two, rather than their lying together. However, if we endeavour to think their differences without recognising the depths of their togetherness, then the stakes of this attempt at leaving Nietzsche behind remain obscured. In as much as Heidegger stresses the need to view Nietzsche through the lens of biologism, and invokes our need to “learn how to read”, the same must be demanded of us as readers of Heidegger himself. To this end, it would be remiss to view Heidegger through the lens of anthropomorphism and present him as a mere

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83 Heidegger used Heraclitus to open up a discussion of φύσις in FCM. Bambach claims that philosophy’s task, post Nietzsche, remains thinking the horizontal “juncture” of being and beings, but no longer from within a metaphysics of φύσις, life and subjectivity. These two ideas are thought, by Bambach, to be conjoined with Nietzsche’s notion of justice as supreme representative of life. This is discussed further at the end of this chapter.
nay-sayer to life and the problems gathered under that term. Rather, he seeks to maintain a distinction between life and Dasein, in this respect he lets life go. Once elaborated and justified, I will evaluate this claim at the close of this chapter.

Mapping this struggle with life and with anthropomorphism in Heidegger's work without reference to its engine (namely Nietzsche as the supreme representative of life) for Heidegger) results in the direction and the context of the movement of Heidegger's thought being mistaken as discontinuous and as a matter of turning. In truth, it is a fully continuous twisting and turning within the grasp of the thought of Nietzsche. That this is explicitly the case has been the subject and the achievement of this thesis. What now remains is to understand why it is that Nietzsche's meditation constitutes both “the overshadowing of Being by beings” and the highest possible form of anthropomorphism (or, why justice and life?).

2.3. Life and Anthropomorphism

The conflation of “world” and “life” was a matter taken up and overcome by Heidegger in FCM. In his comparative analysis, Heidegger, using the life-sciences as his guide, moved from an analysis of the world of the animal as capable of presenting what world is, to that of man. In this regard, he maintained a constant division between “world” and “life”; life was not a concept capable of explaining world

Zimmerman maps the difference in Heidegger’s thinking between the first and third Nietzsche Lectures in terms of a shift in Heidegger's understanding of the transformative powers of the political, offering Jünger as an engine of change; the movement from an analysis of time to an analysis of history is seen as a turn in the mid-thirties; Krell is left pondering the change in heart that Heidegger seemingly has regarding life. There are discontinuities and heterogeneities that are incorporable within an understanding of Heidegger's work if the presence of Nietzsche is genuinely understood. This is a radical claim as it seemingly centralises Nietzsche in Heidegger's thought. However, the evidence in terms of the quantity of work as well as what, is indicated throughout, is plentiful.
(Equally world was not a concept completely capable of positively grasping the essence of life). World, as the whole of beings, as the “differentiated manifestness of beings”, is constantly maintained by an internal relationship to the individual, the undifferentiated singular occurrence of Dasein, which nonetheless maintains the undifferentiated as distinct. It cannot maintain a relationship of subsumption: world cannot be thought separately from solitude/individuation. Turning to WP 507, Heidegger further investigates Nietzsche’s claims that knowledge is in fact organic (as established in NI) and thus at the service of life. In claiming this, Heidegger takes Nietzsche to be suggesting that the world is chaos and becoming, and that “being” emerges from within becoming as its fixation. Fixation is once more understood to be a process at the service of life, it remains necessary for survival, for “our preservation”.

Nietzsche's perspectivalism is key to understanding this matter. The relationship between art and truth (creation and fixation etc.) is founded upon Nietzsche's understanding of the perspectival as the condition for all life. In NI Heidegger approached this matter through the perspective, the horizon itself remained somewhat ambiguous. In NIII the situation is reversed, and the analysis focuses on the horizon. The horizon is understood to be that which 'stabilizes and limits'. It is not a limit imposed on a living entity from “without”, and thus not a limit in the sense of an impediment to growth. Indeed the vitality of a living being requires a limited scope as its very condition. As such, 'forming horizons belongs to the inner essence of living beings themselves’, as the establishing of an entity amidst chaos. Chaos, here, is not jumble and flux, but the very character of world itself, it is the structure of becoming

85 On the subject of this relation between being and becoming, Krell considers Heidegger to “vacillate” in his regard for the ability of the grand style to maintain the discord, i.e., yoke together art and knowledge in striely unity.

86 NIII, p86.
and striving to dominance. Horizon, whilst being a form of boundedness, is not a boundary qua “wall of separation”, because it is “translucent”: it fixes and stabilises in a way that brings the possible, that which can become, into view. A ‘horizon always stands within a perspective’, as it is always the fixing of and stabilisation of that which looks through to the possible – it requires something chaotic to stabilise. The opposite is also the case, as chaos, the world of becoming as pure possibility, is only ’itself as such on the transparent basis of something stable’. The two moments, perspective as that which moves toward chaos as the looking toward possibilities, and horizon as the securing of the possible, are thus fundamentally intertwined. According to Heidegger, for Nietzsche, this intertwining is the very occurrence of life itself. In this sense, “life-occurrence” names the ’more original commencement’ of the ‘essential unity’ of what becomes and what is stable.

Here, a number of issues arise for Heidegger, and the limit of “life” as a concept is brought sharply into view. For Heidegger, “The essential constitution of life” is rendered ambiguous due to an oscillation regarding what it names. Moving between “life” as a term for beings as a whole, living beings, and then just human life, introduces a certain level of ambiguity, especially because Nietzsche does not ‘expressly heed the boundary between animal and man’. Life as a problem itself, namely as a question regarding the essential otherness of the animal, is not heeded, and man is thus ’posited as animal in essence’, but one that is not yet defined. This directly contradicts Heidegger’s view in FCM, where he attempted to describe how the animal and man are not hierarchically related, such that man was a higher form of that

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87 Ibid, p88.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, p86.
which lives. Heidegger attempted to understand how the animal had world in an other way from man, or at least, he attempted to show that there was a refusal of the animal, and thus an ambiguity surrounding our ability to penetrate into the essence of life free from anthropomorphism. Heidegger understands Nietzsche's commitment to reading this interplay of becoming and stability as set back into the movement of chaos' own self-becoming due to his emphasis on the bodily origins of knowledge. As in NI, the process of life's embodying movements are writ large as the character of beings as a whole, but equally as 'the projection of world from the perspective of the animal and animality'. Contrary to the seeming biologistic character of this thought, Heidegger maintains that it is a metaphysical proposition, and thus not subject to the pitfalls of thinking life as bios. As such, it represent thinking life anthropomorphically, as it does not overwrite the essential structure of man in terms of the animal, but works in the opposite direction determining the essential constitution of the animal and life from meditation on the 'bodily' perspective of man.

Alongside this problematic conflation of various meanings of “life”, the terms “perspective” and “horizon” are not clearly determined and separated by Nietzsche on Heidegger's count, and are generalised beyond their being founded in 'a more original essential configuration of human being (in *Da-Sein*)'. In this sense, the conclusions of *FCM*, its insight into world, and the danger of conflating it with life are brought to bear on Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. In *FCM* meditation on the essential difference in

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90 In *FCM* the animal is continually presented as having world by way of not having. This is to say that it does not maintain the same type of openness to a world as man, but that this is not a indication of an essential privation. it is, on my reading, an indication of a essential boundedness, which is to say a boundedness of essence. The extent to which this boundedness of essence must essentially refuse man thus becomes the very matter of the problem of life, and the axis of anthropocentrism.

91 On page 80 of *NIII* Heidegger points that Nietzsche 'represents the world as a gigantic body as it were, whose bodying and living constitutes beings as a whole and thus lets being appear as a becoming'.

92 *NIII*, p80.

93 Ibid, p87.
animal and human world structures, whilst initially operating within the confines of a particular interpretation and division of being, brought two matters to light: first, the essential and abyssal otherness of the animal, of life, and secondly, the necessity of thinking world (as manifestness of beings-as-a-whole) as internally related to Solitude (undifferentiatedness of being as such).  

That thinking “life” in this manner relates to a fundamental problem regarding the essence of truth, as established at the end of FCM, is the precise direction in which Heidegger pursues Nietzsche’s thoughts on knowledge. With the abolition of the distinction between true and apparent worlds, the project of the new sensuousness represents a fundamental change in the essence of truth. No longer bound to the idea, truth is no longer a matter of the adequation of the nonsensuous and sensuous; the nonsensuous is no longer the measure beings. Heidegger asks after the direction in which the essence of truth has changed, and concludes that it is ‘in the direction that is determined by the guiding projection of life’. Accordingly, the new standard, the new measure for truth and knowledge, is precisely the occurrence of life itself, it is ‘life-occurrence’ as the original commencement of becoming and stability. Here, “justice” is forwarded as the supreme representative of life, and thus the new measure of truth.

2.4 Justice: the Supreme Representative of Life in Nietzsche

The introduction of justice is described by Krell as 'an unexpected movement'. 

Previously, I indicated Heidegger’s claim that, on the matter of knowledge, Nietzsche

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94 The latter is, of course, understood as the need to think ἁλήθεια as the essence of truth, to think the original undifferentiatedness of being on its own terms, not purely on the basis of beings.

95 Ibid, p131.

96 Ibid, 258 Krell’s ‘Analysis’.
indirectly prepares for the coming of that which he cannot think. Heidegger also indicated that perspective and horizon must be understood as essential configurations of Dasein, rather than life itself. In this regard, the introduction of justice is, as Heidegger admits, a form of necessary violence which brings out that which was prepared for but never fully thought in Nietzsche's work. The thoughts on justice towards which he turns are not directly connected to the essence of truth in Nietzsche's thinking itself, but these connections are nonetheless “made visible” by Heidegger. Here, on the grounds of a certain fabrication of Nietzsche's position regarding truth and justice, Heidegger seeks to find grounds to leave Nietzsche behind: to complete the Auseinandersetzung.

In *NIII*, Heidegger forwards a definition of justice by claiming that, for Nietzsche, 'the just is the unified nexus of what is right, [...] what makes sense, what fits'. Further, the just is what points in the direction of what is right. When heralding justice as the 'supreme representative of life itself', on Heidegger's reading, Nietzsche presents justice as the fundamental occurrence of life itself, and thus the guiding direction and movement of the commencement of the original unity of becoming and stability. As such, Heidegger claims that "justice" is the *metaphysical* name for the essence of truth. Justice is thus the new standard for truth as it provides truth its direction. This direction, established as the direction of “that which fits”, as that which is right and just, is understood by Heidegger to be a directing of the interplay of perspectives and horizons back toward world as Nietzsche understands it, i.e., back toward chaos. In the highest mode of will to power, the artistic and transfiguring play of becoming and

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98 Ibid, p141.
99 Ibid.
stability constantly move over themselves, as Heidegger explains:

Transfiguration creates possibilities for the self surpassing of life at an given point of limitation. Knowledge in each case posits the fixated and the fixating boundaries so that there can be something to surpass.

In this movement, whilst presented as a continual self-overcoming and mutual heightening, and whilst both aspects 'require each other reciprocally in their essence', Heidegger considers 'art to retain its higher necessity'.\textsuperscript{100} The two are joined together, yet knowledge is always translucent, as that which looks toward what can become, looks through a horizon. In their unity they go to make up 'the assimilation and direction of human life to chaos'.\textsuperscript{101} This results in the thought of \textit{dike}, the obscure joining of the two fundamental aspects of being, being brought under the language of rights and rectitude, but more importantly, being understood (on Heidegger's terms) as \textit{ὁμοίωσις}. \textit{Horaíwei} means something akin to "likeness", to a certain harmony and indeed accord. In thus presenting the role that knowledge plays within the “flowing stream of life” as in \textit{harmony} with chaos, the essence of truth is placed firmly within the world. This directly contravenes the wisdom of \textit{OEG}, where Heidegger presented the historical problem of world as being that of the reduction and conflation of the world and the finite, where finitude (the originary structural joining of world and solitude/individuation) is onto-theologically conceived as a privative form of an infinite, higher order of knowing. From this angle, it begins to become clear why Heidegger considers Nietzsche to remain within, yet bring an end to, the platonic structuring of truth. In this regard, Heidegger interprets Nietzsche as ultimately being

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, p140.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid
incapable of twisting free of Platonism. To clarify further, in overthrowing the onto-theological, broadly platonic understanding of truth (wherein finite knowing is set beneath its infinite counterpart), Nietzsche has effected a reversal of positions, as it appears as though the jointure of two distinct elements has been closed down and the sensuous, embodying flow of life (the world) has been forwarded as effectively subsuming truth. To this end Heidegger claims that ἁλήθεια, being as such (the original undifferentiated manifestness of beings) remains unthought:

The thought of “justice” is the occurrence of being’s abandonment of beings within the thinking of beings themselves.102

Heidegger reads justice as the metaphysical elevating of the peculiarly human mode of living: it is the highest possible way of living for man and at the same time life in its highest mode (because of its harmonious character, but also for the same reasons as stated in regard to the grand style NI, namely that it furthers life as life's most vital movement). In this sense Nietzsche's understanding of truth is anthropomorphic as it understands world on the basis of man's world relation. He still posits a difference between man's world relation and that of the animal, which means, as Heidegger claims, Nietzsche's world is not the inductive expansion of man's region of the world to all others, but rather a deeper metaphysical reading of world. Man thought from within the world of life represents the final thought of metaphysics. In bringing about an overcoming of the notion of man as the rational animal, i.e., as something living, but distinct from life as a result of its relation to that which lies beyond life (the infinite, nonsensuous), φύσις is no longer thought in relation to its beyond. However, it equally

102 Ibid, p141.
represents a final and ultimate anthropomorphism, as being is thought on the basis of
world, the essential constitution of φύσις as life, is read off from man's world relation.
As such, continuing the history of metaphysics as elaborated in the 'Preliminary
Appraisal', the subject is placed beyond question as the ground of truth:

This ruthless and extreme anthropomorphizing of the world tears away the
last illusions of the modern fundamental metaphysical position; it takes the
positing of man as subjectum seriously.\textsuperscript{103}

In thus rejecting "life" as fully interpreting and explaining the concept of world,
Heidegger still allows for the animal's refusal, in a sense, he lets life be. Invoking the
essence of man as living extends a fundamental orientation of man out towards the
essence of life: it is pure anthropomorphism. "Life" is rejected as the horizon for
thinking, not because its potential threat to onto-theological grounds of meaning, but
precisely for the opposite reasons. Viewed from the historical position of Nietzsche,
life-philosophy represents the most profound confrontation with the terror of being:
the refusal to flee from the face of being into the certainty of the nonsensuous. Viewed
from within Heidegger's projected accomplishments of Nietzsche, what he prepares for,
"life" (as a horizon for thinking) represents the direct opposite. In Heidegger's eyes,
through Nietzsche, "life" has come to stand for the ultimate flight into beingness, into
the haven of thinking being on the basis of beings, as the subject is no longer held out
into question. "Life", for Heidegger, is too metaphysical a concept, it is too tightly
bound to thinking being on the basis of beings, and thus represents a closure of the
historical binding of thought to φύσις.

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, p155.
This opens a potential new historical commencement of the binding of thought to *dike*. In this sense, *dike*, not translated as justice, represents the possibility of, beyond Nietzsche, thinking the originary Greek experience of φύσις not as life or nature or any other of its metaphysical cognates, but as jointure, the joining of ontological difference. With *dike*, the path beyond and before Nietzsche becomes hazily determined, and the matter of “life” as the between of Heidegger and Nietzsche is seemingly collapsed. The matter of life between Heidegger and Nietzsche is thus equally a matter of anthropocentrism, and intellectual conscience: at its heart, as Ansell-Pearson points out, it is the most profound issue of attempting to meet life's agitation head on, without baulking. For Heidegger, the task for philosophy is to find a path toward, and maintain an encounter with the agitation of man's mode of distinction from life, namely his abyssal kinship and abyssal separation from it. This path, from the moment of its articulation in *FCM*, to *NIII* and even out beyond is the path of an *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, who stands for Heidegger as life's supreme representative, but also perhaps life's supreme shroud.

By this I mean that, for Heidegger, the history of philosophy has not yet reckoned with the metaphysics of subjectivity in such a way that life, as a rubric for meditation on the Otherness and identity of Dasein and the living, can sustain philosophising. The question of the essence of the living is thus caught up within the trammels of this metaphysical history which finds its culmination in Nietzsche. As such, there are other, more historically salient and pressing tasks that present themselves for Heidegger as primary. There is certainly an inability on Heidegger's behalf to provide deep insight into the problem of life itself, as long as the suspension of an ontology of life is considered to be a shunning, and forgetting of the problem of anthropocentrism. Here
Heidegger offers a solid dismissal of the language of “life” as a means of overcoming the ruthless anthropomorphism that lies at the heart of the metaphysics of subjectivity, and thus displaces the metaphysical concerns that persist in the face of the animal. I will evaluate this as a response to “Nietzsche’s agitation” at the close of this chapter.

3. Evaluations: Justice, Auseinandersetzung and Life

By way of a conclusion to this chapter I will evaluate a number of points relating to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, and indeed my own reading of Heidegger. As a result of the scope of these evaluations, I offer this final section of Chapter 5 as something of a conclusion to the entire thesis. Three questions remain in need of elaboration: Is Heidegger justified in his use of justice in his Nietzsche reading? Am I justified in not reading Nietzsche in a chapter devoted to Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading? Is Heidegger’s handling of life justifiable as a response to the agitation of Nietzsche?

3.1. Justice

Bambach takes OEG to be the starting point of the particular interpretation of history that culminates in, or at least moves steadily towards, the Nietzsche Lectures. On my
reading of FCM, the emergence of Nietzsche as the key figure standing between Heidegger and history is explicitly called for. Much of my reading of FCM attempted to show that it can be included in the body of work which goes to make up Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche. Part of *Auseinandersetzung*’s movement is to find a mode of approach that lets a text be, rather than seek to leave it behind. As a historian of philosophy, perhaps Heidegger’s most powerful gift and message is the demand to return to the philosophers themselves, as Bambach puts it with relation to Heraclitus, to get ‘beneath the palimpsest of [...] doxography’.106 As such, my focus has been on the pathways that Heidegger provides for doing precisely this, which means that, within this project, I have not attempted to jump ahead and read Nietzsche “for myself”. I am interested in first approaching Heidegger’s representation of Nietzsche; understanding who *Heidegger’s* Nietzsche is. This matter comes to a head in the issue of justice between the two.

Bambach outlines his own investigation into justice by drawing a sharp line of distinction between the classical notion of justice and Heidegger's. The difference between the two lies in their translation of the Greek *dike*. Bambach points toward Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche chooses to translate *dike* in Heraclitus as *Gerechtigkeit* [justice] as a result of the concept's 'ethical moorings in Plato'.107 Heidegger, alternatively, chooses to translate this term (where he deems translation possible) as *Fug* [jointure], in an effort to retrieve the pre-platonic, and thus pre-metaphysical determination of *dike* as it was for Heraclitus. For Bambach, this constitutes an effort to break the ties that bind justice to 'a deep metaphysical reading of the ethical',108 a

106 *Translating Justice*, p145.
107 *Translating Justice*, p143.
108 Ibid.
movement which begins both with Nietzsche’s “master interpreter” (Heidegger), but also, indeed, with Nietzsche himself. At stake in this retrieval and alternative translation is the notion of justice as the ‘very structure of being within and against which all things are measured’. As this structure, justice as *dike* shows itself to be, originally, neither ethical nor juridical, but rather, ‘that which joins all beings together in a peculiar jointure’.

In the ethical reading of justice, that which joins all beings together, and therefore stands as “the measure of all things”, is man. Bambach points toward *IM* where Heidegger states that *dike*, translated as “fugal jointure”, is a word for Being. In this sense, *dike* comes to replace *φύσις* as the word for the original Greek experience of Being as the originary unity of being as such and beings as a whole. According to Heidegger, it is the case that *dike* adopts this role for Nietzsche. However, as a result of his unrecognised *ethical* reading of justice, Nietzsche’s *dike* is caught up within the history of the metaphysics of subjectivity: is too anthropocentric. In this manner, Heidegger presents the history of metaphysics as the history of the ‘notion of subjectivity as the measure for beings in their truth’. This chimes directly with *FCM* and Heidegger’s presentation of certainty as the ideal for philosophical truth, wherein the absolute certainty of all knowledge is grounded in the subject, where it lies unquestioned throughout modernity. According to Bambach, for Heidegger, with Nietzsche, justice [*Gerechtigkeit*] becomes the metaphysical name for the essence of truth, i.e., the *truth* of beings as a whole, or being as such. In its ethical mode, this represents an ultimate pronouncement regarding the position of the subject within the

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109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid, p144
whole, a pronouncement that, for Heidegger, constitutes the *end* of metaphysics. As always, “end” has to be read with a certain subtlety and regard for its multivalence: Nietzsche's return to justice (his unthought securing of the subjective as the measure for all things), represents the final possible permutation for metaphysical thinking, the culmination and highest achievement of all metaphysical thinking, and, as closure, the end-point from which an other commencement can potentially be sighted.

Bambach claims that Heidegger critiques 'Nietzsche's concept of justice as something built on the scaffolding of a metaphysics of “life” [...] in thinking life as the measure for being as becoming'. In so doing, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche takes an ultimately anthropological stance with regard to life and being, which is to say, 'Nietzsche will think of justice from a wholly anthropological perspective.' These are the precise stakes of Heidegger's engagement with Nietzsche, the matter of life and anthropomorphism as the unrecognised repetition of the confused conceptual determinations of the history of metaphysics. In assessing Heidegger's relationship to the history of metaphysics, either as a history of subjectivity and anthropomorphism, or as a history of onto-theology, the central matter is clearly that of Nietzsche. This is not merely attested to by the work of the mid-thirties, but as I have shown, by the very work which is so often promulgated as the high-point of Heidegger's meditation on life, and therefore, the acme of his anthropomorphism, namely, *FCM*. Where Krell suggested that Heidegger's demand to think man in “*daseinmässig*” terms is indicative of an inability to fully come to terms with Dasein's living character, Bambach points toward Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche is *limited* to understanding the division between being and beings in terms that are “*lebensmässig*”, he is restricted by the

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112 Ibid.
113 Ibid, p145.
notion of life. For Heidegger, this boils down to an interpretation of φύσις according to only one of its two aspects. As I have shown, Heidegger understands Nietzsche to think the essence of life purely on the basis of man's world structure, he does not heed the lessons of FCM regarding world and life. This leads to a metaphysics of life in two senses, first, the essence of life is thought from within metaphysical confusions, and secondly, φύσις itself is thought according to a conception of being as such as “beingness”: οὐσία is subsumed under beings-as-a-whole.

Here, the division between being and beings is thought in precisely the same direction as FCM, namely as a meditation on the horizon from within which, and out of which both man and beings can be measured. In this regard, Bambach points toward the precise place where this project finds its point of culmination:

Nietzsche's notion of measuring life is in the end, according to Heidegger, a measuring by life in its subjective form [...] in this sense, horizon will be thought in a subjective way as “perspective” [...] Heidegger would find in this Nietzschean reading of horizon a limit that was wholly anthropological and determined by the metaphysics of Cartesian self-positing.

On the matter of Nietzsche's perspectivism and understanding of horizons and perspectives, and accordingly Heidegger's meditation on Nietzsche as the supreme representative of life and thus last metaphysician, the thinking undertaken in FCM reaches it culmination. As Bambach suggests, around the notion of Nietzsche's interpretation of φύσις as life, and justice as Gerechtigkeit, the ultimate possibility of life as the horizon for thinking comes into view. Heidegger's vision of the potential of

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114 Ibid, p152.
115 Ibid, p152.
“life” as a focus for the retrieval of the possibilities of “metaphysics” as a title for genuine philosophising only becomes clear once it understood from within the context of the connections between FCM, NI and NIII. This triad establishes a transect of Heidegger's thought that incorporates FCM into Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche, and reflexively maps the movement of this Auseinandersetzung as it unfolds across Heidegger's major Nietzsche reading. In turn, the product of this incorporation is the recognition that Heidegger's handling of “life” does not represent a flight from its challenges, but a continued attempt to face the challenges of philosophising head on.

3.2. Auseinandersetzung

These thoughts account for Heidegger's understanding of Nietzsche, but equally, do not allow Nietzsche to respond to Heidegger on this matter. As a reading of Nietzsche, and indeed when assessing Heidegger as a reader of Nietzsche, the question regarding the fairness of this reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought needs to be explicitly addressed. In so doing I will build upon my analysis of Auseinandersetzung as expounded throughout this thesis and ask if Heidegger does justice to Nietzsche.

Haase, in his essay on justice, addresses Heidegger's Nietzsche interpretation from the perspective of an evaluation of Heidegger's choice of “historial Auseinandersetzung” over “Hermeneutic Generosity”. “Hermeneutic generosity” is the classical hermeneutic method of presenting a text on its strongest possible reading, pointing out the manner in which it either fails or succeeds in completing its own tasks, and subsequently

offering either correctives or ways to build upon the work. Moving beyond or away from the text is straightforward, as a certain stance, or distance, is maintained from the text at all times. The counter concept to this, *Auseinandersetzung*, attempts to ‘force the text into an opposition from out of which one can find one’s first steps’.\(^{117}\) Both the thought contained in the text, and the reader’s thought are placed in question, both are put in peril. Haase claims that ‘the Nietzsche volumes cannot claim to settle the stakes of this *Auseinandersetzung*: Heidegger is not offering the final word on Nietzsche, but rather, when interpreting Nietzsche, preparing to think for himself.\(^{118}\) This notion allows Haase to present a convincing account of the differences which persist regarding varying moments of Heidegger’s Nietzsche-interpretation.

From here the development of the Nietzsche lectures from 1936 to 1940 and beyond appears in a different light: no longer as a progressive distantiating from Nietzsche on the part of Heidegger, but as the progressively clear intuition that the aim of this *Auseinandersetzung* is disappearing from view, which is to say, that Heidegger cannot find a meaningful distance from Nietzsche’s thought.\(^{119}\)

Haase does not think that generating the appropriate distance from Nietzsche is straightforward, nor does he believe that Heidegger forwarded his reading as fully decisive regarding the matter of Nietzsche’s thought, it is always preparatory. Haase draws out an important implication of the notion of *Auseinandersetzung* with regard to distancing, namely, that '[w]hen speaking of an Auseinandersetzung, that is, literally, about a setting apart, we have to presuppose a common starting point.'\(^{120}\) He does not

\(^{117}\) Ibid, p21.  
\(^{118}\) Ibid, p22.  
\(^{119}\) Ibid, p23. Cf. Zimmerman’s straightforward (and generally philosophically impoverished) understanding of the development of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation as movement from an optimistic to a pessimistic standpoint. This also challenges the more sophisticated and question based meditations of Krell on the same matter, as expounded in his Analyses to the *Nietzsche Lectures*.  
\(^{120}\) Ibid, p24.
identify a common starting point between the two, but rather, frames his essay as an attempt to create one:

the notion of truth as justice is thus to serve first of all as a preparation towards an *Auseinandersetzung* between these two thinkers, in that I will try to make them speak with one voice.\(^{121}\)

For Haase, justice comes forward as the concept around which the initial standing together of Heidegger and Nietzsche can most be most successfully secured and elaborated. In 'Translating Justice: Heraclitus Between Heidegger and Nietzsche', Bambach locates the richest point of the *Auseinandersetzung* as their translations the Greek *Dike* as they receive this term from Heraclitus:

I want to locate a profound contest, struggle, or agon between Heidegger and Nietzsche over the "proper" way to read Heraclitus and, through him, "to do justice" to the power of early Greek thinking as a way of entering into confrontation with the history of the West and the nihilistic epoch of modernity.\(^{122}\)

There is a reflexive element to Bambach's efforts: the notion of what “doing justice” to a reading would constitute is a matter which cannot be determined outside of the specific reading itself. For Heidegger the matter of justice is itself determined from within a reading of Nietzsche, Heraclitus and history. This reflects Haase’s aim of assessing Heidegger’s deployment of a “historical *Auseinandersetzung*” in favour of the pre-established methodology of classical hermeneutics. The initial stance of both of these readers is one that does not pit Heidegger against Nietzsche according to an

\(^{121}\) Ibid.

\(^{122}\) 'Translating Justice: Heraclitus Between Heidegger and Nietzsche', P143.
objectively realisable historical problematic. Neither is looking to “do justice” to
Heidegger, or Nietzsche (or Heraclitus for that matter), rather, they aim to uncover the
stakes of an Auseinandersetzung such that hermeneutic proximity, justice and indeed
historicising itself can be productively questioned.123

Bambach and Haase are genuine readers of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation,
readers who have an understanding of this matter alone as their target. They are solely
interested in first grasping the stakes of Auseinandersetzung, attempting to understand
both the grand aims of this mode of confrontation, and the internal machinations of the
movement itself. Unlike other readers, they do not fall foul of the precise problem that

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123 This method of approach is quite the opposite of those examined in chapter 1, where Scott was shown
to locate the problem of life as a rigid problem, towards which Heidegger and Nietzsche both offer
competing solutions – Krell was also seemingly in this camp. A second camp of readers rigidify the
encounter between Heidegger and Nietzsche in a different manner, exemplified by Zimmerman.
Zimmerman identifies Nazism and Jünger as the engines of the development Heidegger’s Nietzsche
interpretation. In this context, Zimmerman’s aim is to ensure that justice is done to Jünger: “Heidegger
was not entirely fair to Jünger [...] In regard to many thinkers to whom Heidegger was greatly indebted, he had
the tendency either to discount their influence upon him or to show that he had thought more deeply than they
had about a given topic. His treatment of Jünger was no exception in this respect.”[Zimmerman, M.
Haase’s terms, this constitutes a demand for Heidegger to be hermeneutically generous in his approach
to readers of the history of philosophy, which is, in effect, a demand for Heidegger to entirely abandon
his understanding of history and indeed the historicity of philosophy. Zimmerman is not alone in
thinking Heidegger’s encounter with Nietzsche to be in need of justification, or to be lacking in justice.
A brief examination of recent literature on the matter of Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretation shows a
broad array of different demands for justice to be done[For a more in-depth analysis of these works see
my review in JNS 43:1, Spring 2012]: Blond calls for justice to be done to the ‘thorough-goingly
philosophical nature of the engagement’ [Blond, L.P, Heidegger and Nietzsche: Overcoming Metaphysics
(London, UK: Continuum, 2010), p4]; Catanu calls for justice to be done to Nietzsche’s philosophy in
the face of Heideggerian misappropriation [Catanu, P. Heidegger’s Nietzsche: Being and Becoming
(Montreal, Canada: 8th House, 2010)]; Faye (referring to Heidegger’s Nazistic thought and writing
which directly involves his Nietzsche reading) calls for justice to be done to the survivors of the death-
camps [Faye, Emmanuel. Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished
Seminars of 1933-1935. Trans. Michael B. Smith (Yale UP: 2009)]. The most productive approaches from
these recent works, come in the form of Hemmings’ response to Faye, and Hodge’s invocation to attain
a certain sensitivity to the practise of reading. Hemming suggests that real justice would be provided
for victims of l’affaire Heidegger only if we avoid attempts to contrive a terminal point in a discussion of
Heidegger and the political, and attempt to genuinely engage with his texts. In this regard, Hodge
points out, learning to ‘read well’ is determined as an ultimate act of justice, or, reading is itself a matter
of ethics [Laurence Paul Hemming, Bogdan Costa and Kostas Amiridis, eds. The Movement of Nihilism:
Heidegger’s Thinking after Nietzsche. (London, UK: Continuum, 2011), p 5]. On my reading,
Auseinandersetzung is not a response to an ethical call to read well, but rather to the call of intellectual
conscience: it is a response to the demands of thinking, and attempt to face up to the its genuine
challenges.
Heidegger is attempting to address, namely, operating from within certain prejudices that are themselves left behind, unquestioned and unexamined. In much the same way as Heidegger considers metaphysics to fundamentally place the questioner in question, so too does Auseinandersetzung. In this movement of historical interpretation, it is demanded that the reader (by this I mean Heidegger) suspend their own secure positions and methods of reading, and perhaps even risk becoming entirely lost in the circular, ambiguous movement of philosophising. Haase is clear about these stakes:

Insofar as for Heidegger the future of his own thought as well as that of Nietzsche is at stake in this Auseinandersetzung, we should be more careful when reading Heidegger on Nietzsche, not in order to salvage Nietzsche’s reputation, but in order not to have nothing left of philosophy.

In this extreme direction one can begin to consider what it might mean to come to philosophise for oneself. If read in any other manner, Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche cannot be attributed its full power: when separated from its historical position as the very moment of Heidegger’s self-emergence from within the trappings of the history of the metaphysics of subjectivity, the genuine philosophical and hermeneutic force of the reading is lost. Approaching his interpretation of Nietzsche with an eye for Heidegger’s contribution to an overriding philosophical problematic, or with an eye turned toward the tessellation of Heidegger’s thought with other thinkers of his time, decides in advance regarding the stakes of the interpretation, it determines the character of the engagement from an external standpoint. This itself constitutes an unthinking repetition of the precise problem that Auseinandersetzung is designed to address, namely, how to start philosophising from within a historically rooted stance:

124 Meaninglessness in Scott’s case, the neo-Kantian problem of transition in Blond...
how to get on the *inside* of philosophy.\(^{125}\)

My reading of Heidegger’s *Auseinandersetzung*, with its roots in *FCM*, offers an understanding of life as the engine of change in his broader reading of Nietzsche, wherein his reading of justice can also be figured. My reading of the connections between *FCM* and the *Nietzsche Lectures*, provides the context for the specificity of this encounter, especially regarding the different types of engagement with the term “life” that are explicated therein (namely one which is all too contemporary and one which attempts to think the essential in the contemporary). Accordingly, this seeming shift between *NI* and *NIII* no longer reads as a shift or a change, but as components of a genuine confrontation with the history of philosophy, where philosophising itself is, nonetheless, at stake. My understanding of Nietzsche’s presence in *FCM*, and thus the clear emergence of the centrality of the need to generate an appropriate methodology to tackle history for the sake of philosophising for oneself, equally draws out the genuine philosophical, rather than merely historical, intent of this *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche.

In looking to philosophise for himself, and move beyond his Nietzschean *community*, Heidegger must inherently conduct violence upon Nietzsche. This violence is the violence of the movement of philosophy itself, as expounded in *FCM*: the repetition of fundamental questions that repeats what was essential in a philosopher, but ultimately (if successful) does so via a confrontation that overcomes. Overcoming cannot be

\(^{125}\) Haase’s intent is more humble than Bambach’s, he simply wishes to attain something of a starting point from which to enter into a more detailed engagement with the *Auseinandersetzung*. Bambach is looking to get to the heart of the movement itself. My aims are somewhat more on the side of Haase, as I am concerned with how and why life emerges with such force during the time of the *Nietzsche Lectures*, my project is more critical in this sense.
arbitrary, i.e., merely a piece of novelty placed in opposition, and cannot be understood to obtain from any genuine heterogeneity. On Heidegger's terms, it must spring forward from that which is thought by a philosopher, and that which is prepared for by them. As I have shown, Heidegger takes Nietzsche to think the metaphysical height of "life", and in so doing, manages to be genuinely *epochal* in a manner that very few have managed. What is prepared for in this high-meditation, is the overcoming of the metaphysics of subjectivity via a rejection of the potential for the language of life, and indeed φύσις (as closed down by "life" and its association), as maintaining philosophy. In its place is offered meditation on justice itself, freed from its location as a representative of life, and as an matter of the ethical. In conclusion to this issue of justice, perhaps Nietzsche's own thoughts regarding the teacher and the student can be seen to reach fulfilment here in Heidegger's reading:

The man of knowledge must not only love his enemies, he must also be able to hate his friends, One repays a teacher badly if one always remains only a pupil. [...] now I bid you lose me and find yourselves.\(^{126}\)

Heidegger repays the debt he owes to Nietzsche, which is as Heidegger points out in *FCM*, the debt owed to the genuine teacher who offers a *spur* to philosophising, and equally the debt owed to Nietzsche as the last of the greats, as Heidegger's *orientation* in philosophy. The debt is repaid in first attempting to speak from out of Nietzsche, and present his philosophical mentor at his highest, and subsequently moving beyond the haven of this community, out to his own thought.

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\(^{126}\) *TSZ*, Part One, *On the Bestowing of Virtues*. 

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3.3. Life (Recapitulation of the evaluation of Heidegger's response to the problem of life)

Having fleshed-out my understanding of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's thoughts on life as a metaphysical meditation, it is necessary to return to FCM and reflect on the connections between the two engagements with life as found FCM. In so doing I will further evaluate Heidegger's own response to the problem of “life” as viewed from perspective of contemporary scholarship.

3.3.1. “Life” and philosophy for Heidegger

Focusing on the movement from FCM to the Nietzsche Lectures, I earlier claimed that we could identify a potential displacement and deferral of decision regarding “life” as a philosophical rubric. Once the non-biologicist character of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche is understood, this deferral is that of a decision regarding Nietzsche as a thinker capable of returning philosophy to its fullness amidst the prevalent boredom of our times. It is not the deferral of an ontology of life as such. Only a fatally contemporary reading of “life” identifies its challenge as that posed by the contemplation of the essence of the organism. This was the lesson of FCM: a comparative analysis of world, one based on the procedure of the life sciences, is not capable of metaphysical insight, as the genuine metaphysical stakes of such an engagement (transposability, the structure of world etc.) are not articulated therein. Heidegger's engagement with the sciences in FCM only points in the direction of boredom, as it is in the forgetting of man's centrality in the discussion of world that the essence of life becomes forwarded as a central component in said discussion. This was
shown to work both ways, i.e., it tells us something about boredom, but equally warns of
the dangers of attempting to essentialise about life from within pre-existent
metaphysical prejudices. Clearing a path to an ontology of life is not the central aspect
or object of these meditations.

In Nietzsche, Heidegger finds resources to move beyond the structuring of the essence
of life according to the division of organic and non-organic. The ordering of forces that
go to make up any entity, the self-retention and power for self-realisation that is
contained in every perspective, including that of the stone (the in-animate/in-organic),
exceeds the organic schema. As such, “life” understood as a rubric for a confrontation
with our abyssal bodily kinship with the animal, is no longer a matter that contains any
clarity or determinacy. It is subject to the movement of boredom, as realised in Nihilism
perhaps, which is to say, that positing “life” as a rubric capable of grasping Dasein in
its fullness is part of the lostness of history amidst the confusion the fundamental
concepts of metaphysics. For Heidegger, far from being the horizon of a meditation
that holds us out into the terror or φύσις, it is one more safe haven along the path of a
face to face encounter with ourselves. Only a renewed meditation on ontological
difference itself can bring about an other beginning, beyond the flattening effects of
this history of this confusion of being and beings (as expounded in FCM). Where, for
Heidegger, Nietzsche sees “life” writ large in justice, Heidegger himself sees jointure,
and ontological difference: he sees a new conceptualisation of finitude as the governing
fundamental concept of metaphysics. This represents an repetition of what was
essential in Nietzsche, but remained merely prepared for. It is the movement of
Auseinandersetzung itself, as delineated in FCM.
For the sake of clarity, were we to continue to pursue a positive conception of the essence of life within Heidegger’s work, or perhaps even attempt to extract the resources for doing so, in what direction could we look? Is there any more clarity at this point of closure regarding an ontology of life? What can we say of Heidegger’s response to the agitation of Nietzsche, if this agitation is represented by the problem of resurrecting ontotheological structures of transcendence in the face of life’s threat to meaning?

I have clarified Heidegger’s response and defended him from the claims that he conducts a theoretical biology (at most he can be accused of conducting negative theoretical biology). There is more subtlety in ‘Part Two’ of FCM than Krell or Scott would allow, given that they ignore the historical character of the text. The “impasse of life” as projected by Ansell-Pearson has also been shown to stand as regards the continuation of Nietzschean community, but to be dissolved in the face of achieving what was prepared for in that community, i.e., the overcoming of Nietzsche. To move beyond the boredom we have engendered, to counteract nihilism in this way and attempt to spring out of the philosophically reductive sway of the metaphysics of subjectivity Heidegger insists that we have to continue to confront history and read well in order to come face to face with the philosophical prejudices that structure all our engagements. We have to focus on ourselves. So what of the animal? On this matter Heidegger remains, characteristically, silent, never returning to this question in as much detail. On my reading this silence is not an attempt to escape the pressing nature of the “abyssal bodily kinship” but is an indication of the entanglement of that thought within a history that offers more immediate questions, those concerned with first untangling the problem of the difference between being and beings. Is this
acceptable for those wishing to do an ontology of life? No. Is it a powerful conception of
the difficulty of shrugging off the history of anthropocentrism? Yes. Heidegger will
make claims about the animal – in his *Parmenides* lectures he will claim that animals do
not have hands, in *Letter on Humanism* he indicates the “scarcely fathomable abyssal
bodily kinship”, but he does not pursue this as a primary problem in contemporary
philosophy, hence its “scarce fathomability”. Where he does speak on the matter, in
this sense, it is only to repeat the claims made in *FCM* in relation to the self-regarding
character of our pursuit of the animal. In a letter to Medard Boss in 1952, Heidegger
explicitly repeats his analysis in *FCM* indicating the veracity of my reading, and
showing that, when confronted with the issue of accessing the essence of animality, he
considers *FCM* to be a problematisation of this issue, rather than an attempt at
dissolution of the ’difficult question of “Animal and Man”?’. It is worth quoting at
length:

> Once again, the task of this work is not to clarify this question. After long
> consideration, I found a way out which is not an escape but rather corresponds
> only to what is worth questioning in a sufficiently adequate determination of
> the unfolding essence of the human being, animal, plant, and rock. […] an
> animal merely is insofar as it moves within an environment open to it in some
> way and is guided by this environment which itself remains circumscribed by
> the nature of the animal. The animal’s relationship to this environment, which
> is never addressed [by the animal itself], shows a certain correspondence to the
> human being’s ek-sistent relationship toward the world. Thus, in a certain way
> the human being in his ek-sistent Da-sein can immediately participate in and
> live-with the animal’s environmental relationship without ever coming to a
> congruence [decken] between the human being’s being-with and the animal, let
> alone the other way around. Linguistic usage, according to which one speaks
> of human and animal ”behaviour” indiscriminately, does not take into account
> the unfathomable, essential difference between the relationship to a ”world”
[Weltbezug] and to an "environment" [Umgebungsbezug]. According to its own proper and essential relationship to the environment, the animal's situation makes it possible for us to enter into this relationship, to go along with it, and, as it were, to tarry with it. [...] It does not matter thereby that the immediate apprehension of the environment proper to the animal and, thus, also the genuine apprehension of the animal's relationship to the environment remain inaccessible to our knowledge. The strangeness of the unfolding essence of animals is concealed in this inaccessibility (or something like that).127

The essence of the animal world is not presented as capable of determining the essence of life itself. The animal world, and our access to it, remains an issue for Heidegger, as he does not consider himself to have collapsed this “difficult question”. He clearly holds 'Part Two' of FCM to have clarified the reasons for his lack of engagement with said difficult question, i.e., that the phenomenon of world is one which has to be approached and understood on the basis of our own relationship therewith, one which is covered over by history, lest we “project” ourselves onto the animal. We are not yet beyond this boredom with man, such that we could begin to articulate the question of our relationship to the animal in anything other than a confused and anthropocentric manner.

3.3.2. FCM and Life

Heidegger's self-conception of FCM, and my own reading, are recognised by Derrida. Of all the readers of FCM he best understands the intent of this lecture course, but does not pursue his own response to it in line with Heidegger's intentions. Krell describes Derrida's later reflections on FCM thus:

127 ZS, pp243-4. Heidegger indicates, by way of an asterisk, that he is referring to FCM.
Heidegger’s “comparative method” may have a far less confident intention behind it than we might suspect […] He situates the Heideggerian inquiry quite carefully, especially with regard to the Grundstimmung, the fundamental mode and mood of ontology, and in so doing he avoids all naïve accusations of biologism. Above all, he realizes that Heidegger’s “comparative method,” […] is designed not to be unkind to stones or animals but to show that we really do not comprehend the meaning of “world” for human beings. If the human being shapes a world, is weltbildend, this is not a solution, Derrida suggests, but the designation of a problem.\textsuperscript{128}

Derrida offers a similar reading of the status of the “theses” in \textit{Of Spirit}. Whilst he recognises their methodological idiosyncrasy, and understands that they are not directly aimed at a theoretical biology as Krell will insist (even in this later work Krell maintains his understanding of \textit{FCM} as generated in \textit{Daimon Life}),\textsuperscript{129} he cannot access their true intent. Derrida retains the notion that this is indeed some positive account of the animal being forwarded in such a way that it is determinative for our own understanding of our world relation.

Derrida confesses that what bothers him most about Heidegger’s “comparative method,” to repeat, is less what Heidegger claims concerning the essence of animality, though that is troubling enough, than what he confidently asserts about human being.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{128} Krell, D.F. \textit{Derrida and Our Animal Others}, Section 3.

\textsuperscript{129} Krell is, however, critical of Derrida on the same grounds as I am. He says, “Derrida’s principal complaint is that Heidegger is all too confident that human comportment—toward its vision, language, world, and death—is separated from animal behaviours (in the plural) by an abyss of essence. Derrida’s complaint will never, by any reading of Heidegger, be made superfluous”[Ibid.], before offering up a reading of the notion of essence from \textit{BT} that seeks to problematise this position. My own approach to this matter clearly posits the idea that Heidegger attempts to head-off this criticism by appealing to the historical entrenchment of our notion that we can identify anything of the animal essence via a comparison, or indeed identification of our modes of comportment to the world with “animal behaviour”. As quoted, the letter to Medard Boss states precisely this.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. Section 4
Heidegger is clear that the path of comparison is shot-through with anthropocentrism, and thus incapable of providing metaphysical insight into the problem of world. Derrida's response is interesting, but still ascribes too much importance to the confrontation with the animal. Ike Krell, he considers Heidegger to place this encounter at the heart of an investigation of “world”, and to render this particular engagement with life at the heart of his investigation of φύσις. Both Krell and Derrida recognise the centrality of a conception of φύσις in FCM, and indeed in Heidegger's thought in general. However, both thinkers pursue this line of thought in FCM via world and not finitude, in this sense, and on Heidegger’s terms, they would pursue φύσις via its constant confusion with one of its two aspects, namely world. Krell himself indicates that this is a minor issue in Derrida's reading:

[…] even though finitude, Endlichkeit, is proclaimed by Heidegger the underlying and integrating question of the three (world, finitude, solitude), Derrida apparently follows Heidegger in pursuing above all the question of world.

In so doing, Krell considers the accomplishment of Derrida's critique of Heidegger, and his own engagement therewith, to be as follows:

It demands that we think of the ways in which our animal others—indeed, all living things—are essential to what Heidegger called “the worldhood of the world,”\textsuperscript{131}

Here “life” and the world of the animal are conflated. Further, the development of Heidegger's thoughts on these matters as found in his Nietzsche Lectures are

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid, Introduction.
overlooked. The path of comparison is not seen by Heidegger as essential for an understanding of world, but, is rather, seen as a rubric that obfuscates as it sits within metaphysically entrenched and confused divisions. To centralise the question of the animal in Heidegger's philosophy, is to centralise a concern generated from without. The issue then is whether Heidegger's seeming evasion of this question is indicative of a lack in his own thinking, or indicative of a prejudice on our part – a lack of awareness of the problem of accessing philosophy in the first place such that we can decide that the animal question sits at its heart and demands a more positive response from Heidegger. My response to this question, as evidenced by this thesis, is clearly the latter.

Derrida is concerned with the homogenisation of animals (contra the “immense multiplicity of other living beings”), considering Heidegger to run roughshod over the multiplicity of the animal world. He claims that they cannot be limited to their character as accessed via a comparative analysis, such that they can be reduced to a homogeneous whole via a claim that they have a single essence (posited by their poverty of world). This, as I have shown, is not the case for Heidegger, the abyss of essence says nothing, initially about the essence of the animal Other, it holds no claims on it, only ever speaking out about us. The deep-founded intention of accessing the prejudices that underlie the distinctions within which the comparative analysis emerges is not witnessed by Krell or Derrida. They do not recognise the trajectory of life as a matter of contention between Nietzsche and Heidegger in a battle for contemporary philosophising. As such they miss the macro issue with regards life in Heidegger's thinking, and thus his account of the paucity of a micro investigation into

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it via an analysis of the animal world. By this I mean that Heidegger is aware that the animal is never truly engaged with, or capable of being accessed via an analysis of its essence via an engagement with the life sciences. The more pressing concern for Heidegger in FCM and beyond, is not the manner in which we can learn about world via a confrontation with the animal, but what we can learn about world and finitude via a confrontation with philosophy itself. This is eventually borne out in Heidegger's metaphysical reading of life in Nietzsche. The absence of a reading of Heidegger's Nietzsche reading on this topic is evident in Krell's statement below.

Heidegger would surely rather pray at the shrine of the nothing than to a stone. Yet Derrida would observe that if the stone—like the beast and God—is without world-relation, it is doubtless equally difficult to worship at the shrine of the nothing.\textsuperscript{133}

This once again takes seriously the positing of the theses, sees them as Heidegger's own attempts at theoretical biology, and does not recognise Heidegger's own understanding of Nietzsche's heightened, metaphysical conception of life that exceeds \textit{Bios}, but ultimately cannot bring the originary experience of \textit{φύσις} to word. It is as a result of Krell's and Derrida's pre-occupation with the animal, that they posit this “difficult question” as an ever-present unthought in Heidegger's work. As such they fail to see Heidegger's reasons for moving in a different direction with regards the problem of life. This does not mean that Heidegger's articulation of this problem is satisfactory, but such an articulation is not his goal. To demand that he satisfactorily deals with a problem that he does not consider immediately pressing speaks more of our prejudices than it does of his.

\textsuperscript{133} Derrida and Our Animal Others, Section 4.
Perhaps surprisingly, given his interest in ontologies of life, Thacker offers support for this line of thinking. As quoted in the introduction to this thesis, Thacker considers 'the question of “life” [to be] the question that has come to define our contemporary era'. He suggests that Aristotle's conception of the ontology of life structures all subsequent attempts to philosophically pose the question of the essence of life. His entire book is therefore focused on drawing out the ways in which all subsequent attempts at an ontology of life fall within certain Aristotelian decisions. He does not present Heidegger as attempting such a feat, and does not offer a detailed reading of *FCM*. Heidegger does feature as a figure in the history of the ontology of life. In his discussion of this history, Thacker suggests that Heidegger is not directly articulating the basis for an ontology of life, neither does he think that, for Heidegger, “life” can be adequately thought on the basis of “being”. In this regard, he reads Heidegger well, citing §10 of *BT*, where he reads Heidegger’s as providing a description of the need for all potential philosophies of life to get to grips with the being of life prior to their investigations, noting that within the life-sciences there is a fundamental lack regarding any problematisation of life itself.

He does not consider Heidegger to reduce life to being. This, in Thacker’s view, sets him aside from philosophers like Bergson and Whitehead, who, in their process and life philosophies, he considers to ‘reach a zone in which ‘Life’ becomes convertible with Being – even if the name of Life is process or becoming.’ This is, of course, precisely

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134 *After Life*, preface xiii.
135 Interestingly, Thacker uses Heidegger’s description of φύσις in *FCM* in order to establish the structure and character of Aristotle’s presentation of the ontology of life in *De Anima*. In recognising Heidegger’s reading of the centrality of φύσις for philosophy, Thacker does not pick up on the thread of his thinking on this matter as it moves from *FCM* into the Nietzsche reading.
136 *Nine Disputations*, p87.
Heidegger's position as elaborated in *NIII*. Whilst he does not see the full resources of Heidegger on this point, having not seen the connection between *BT*, *FCM* and the culmination of this thread in *NIII*, Thacker considers Heidegger to operate in excess of these positions in a certain regard. He considers Heidegger's analysis in §10 of *BT* to have achieved the following recognition of the issue of approaching life itself:

This ‘missing ontological foundation’ is itself what grounds these fields. The question that Life is, is displaced by the question of what Life is – or, more accurately, what the domain of the living is. The anthropological category of man, the psychological category of mind, and a general biology of the organism all presume a Being of Life.  

In his following comments, Thacker indicates the space within the field that this thesis takes up:

Where Heidegger leaves off, however, is at the question of whether Life is a species of Being, or whether the ontology of Life in effect transforms Life into Being. His last words on the topic are at once suggestive and opaque: ‘Life has its own kind of being, but it is essentially accessible only in Da-sein.’

I have shown that this is precisely not where Heidegger “leaves off”. There is certainly an opacity to Heidegger’s comments in §10 of *BT*, but in light of the findings of this thesis the reasons for this opacity have been clarified, and indeed, a great deal of this opacity removed. After *FCM* and *NIII*, Heidegger can be seen to “leave off” this subject in any great detail, precisely because he considers this question, to a certain degree alongside Thacker, to be incapable of being articulated with any real force from within

137 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
the history of metaphysics as caught up with Aristotle's understanding of φύσις.

Relocating *FCM* within its broader context has allowed for Heidegger's entanglement with the question of life (a non fundamental entanglement which has been generated most forcefully by Krell rather than emerging from within Heidegger's thought itself) to be untangled; it is not the *unthought* in Heidegger as Krell and others would have it.

When the movement of *Auseinandersetzung* is understood as it unfolds from *FCM* to the *Nietzsche Lectures*, Heidegger has clear reasons for not taking up the question of life as a central issue in his thinking.

As such this is a stark warning to those who, in contemporary philosophy, are concerned with everything “Bio”, such that Heidegger's thinking on this matter be assessed in line with his ability to provide resources for a philosophical endeavour that he himself has abandoned, having never really attempted in the first place (I am referring here to the comments on an ontology of life in *BT* that serve to structure readings of Heidegger’s thoughts on the matter). As I have shown, then, as now, there is a danger that this angle of thinking is captivated by the fatally contemporary, and is representative of a profound *boredom* with Man himself, rather than an attempt to profoundly grasp our nature as a living entity.
Thesis Conclusion

There are two correlative ways in which this project could be seen to contribute to Heidegger studies. The first contribution is a reading of \textit{FCM} that rehabilitates its supposedly disparate character, relocating it within the wider context of Heidegger's \textit{Auseinandersetzung} in light of the overlooking of Nietzsche's presence within the text. In so reading, I counteract the trend of positing \textit{FCM} as a text that stands out from the Heideggerian corpus as an aberrance, and adjust the over-emphasis placed on Heidegger's discussion of "life" therein. The second contribution takes up the genuine philosophical product of \textit{FCM}, which is a staking out of the demands of an historical approach that can recover the essence of philosophy from within an epoch characterised by our boredom with ourselves. This approach, identified as the need for an \textit{Auseinandersetzung} with philosophy, is intimately bound up with Nietzsche from this point of its emergence. In mapping the trajectory of the ideas developed in \textit{FCM} onto the \textit{Nietzsche Lectures}, the two projects offer reflexive moments of contextualisation. Philosophy as first philosophy, as a meditation on the peculiar jointure of two diverse aspects of being clearly emerges as the centre point of Heidegger's engagements with history. Nietzsche's understanding of art as a justification of life is there from the start, operating in the background of \textit{FCM} as that which is in need of confrontation. That \textit{NIII} houses this confrontation, and specifically on the grounds of the capability of Nietzsche's non-biologicist, metaphysical conception of "life" to guide philosophy back to itself, shows that "life" is not thought at its philosophical peak in \textit{FCM}. That this confrontation occurs on the basis of the
appropriacy of a translation of φύσις, contextualises the Nietzsche Lectures with FCM in a way that allows for a renewed understanding of the development of Heidegger’s Nietzsche reading, one which centralises Nietzsche in the process of Heidegger’s own attempt to philosophise for himself.

Through these endeavours two distinct formulations of “life” were identified in Heidegger's work. The first, found in 'Part Two' of FCM is understood as the ‘specific manner of being pertaining to animal and plant’. This is the meaning of “life” as it emerges from within the life-sciences, and as such it carries the philosophical tenor ascribed to it in §10 of BT, namely that it is a designation that engenders form in a field of phenomena. In this iteration “life” is subject to a field of phenomena as already disclosed; the matter of life is determined in advance and is thus not capable of sustaining genuine metaphysical meditation. The second form, as developed across NI and NIII is a non-biologistic, metaphysical conception presented by Nietzsche. In this iteration, “life” is offered up as a name for φύσις, as a concept capable of articulating the jointure of being as such and beings as a whole. Whist both conceptions are indicative of a boredom that allows for anthropomorphism to hold silent sway, the metaphysical concept handled in NIII closes down a certain path of history that would offer “life” as a rubric for philosophising, and as a concept that can articulate the essence of man. Here Heidegger rejects metaphysics outright, thus wrapping up the thread started in FCM. In its place he offers a renewed conception of justice, one freed from the ties to “life” that Heidegger sees in Nietzsche’s formulation.

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1 These are by no means exhaustive of all the varying connotations of life across Heidegger’s oeuvre.
2 FCM, §45
In light of this Heidegger has little to offer to modern scholars looking to conduct an ontology of life, other than to provide words of warning and an indication of the deep entrenchment of anthropocentricity in the history of, and this situation of, philosophising. Contra to the major readings thereof, *FCM* does not represent a concerted effort to explore the positive essence of life, and does not offer a determinate enough articulation of the question of life to support further investigation. More important to this thesis, however, than assessing Heidegger's success in relation to the production of a positive conception of life, is a clarification of the possible success of Heidegger as a reader of Nietzsche. A central theme of *FCM* is the notion of prejudice (a concept equally close to Nietzsche's heart). Throughout this investigation, in my account of *Auseinandersetzung*, I have expounded Heidegger's attempt to construct a heightened mode of philosophical relation to those genuine thinkers that came before him. In his *Auseinandersetzung* with Nietzsche, Heidegger attempts to assess Nietzsche's capability of restoring philosophy amidst its lostness in history. Heidegger's only available mode of access and orientation to this history is the thought of Nietzsche, precisely because it is epoch making. At the start of his own path in philosophy, on Heidegger's estimation, they stand together. Thus, Heidegger tries to leave Nietzsche behind and think for himself only on the basis that he is realising something unrealised in Nietzsche's thinking — that which is prepared for by his thought. Understanding the complex philosophical context that underlies Heidegger's movement away from Nietzsche allows for a recognition that he is not attempting to redeem Nietzsche, but simply to follow him. Heidegger is not correcting Nietzsche, but attempting to philosophise for himself using Nietzsche as his spur, and taking up his agitation.
In my investigation Nietzsche's presence in Heidegger's philosophy has been assessed, and deemed to be central in his relationship to metaphysics, but at no point has Nietzsche himself been present in my investigation outside his presentation in Heidegger. However, if Heidegger is in any way right about the genuine power of Nietzsche's philosophy, we cannot construct our own position regarding Nietzsche with any ease. In this regard, I see Heidegger's *Auseinandersetzung* as an example of the philosophical effort required to do Nietzsche's thought justice. In his claims that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician, Heidegger offers a polemic to readers of Nietzsche. At no point does he consider his own characterisations to be definitive, indeed this is merely one way in which Heidegger realises his *Auseinandersetzung*, he continues to engage with Nietzsche's thought throughout his later work. As such, he offers a return to Nietzsche, but not a return that would see him read alongside his contemporaries, as set back within a cultural milieu. Heidegger would ask that we read with an eye for the manner in which Nietzsche is untimely in a sense, constructive of the world that he occupied. The context that he must be read within is that of philosophy, which, according to *FCM*, repeats itself in an essential way via the movement of its own self-overcoming.

This call for a thoroughly philosophical reading of Nietzsche is no more timely than in the present day, where problematics are being divorced from the manner of their production, and individual thinkers are being mined for resources relating to matters that were not of their concern. Self-reflexivity in modern engagements with

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3 See especially *Uber die Linie*, and *WCT*, not to mention *NIV*.
4 For example a reading of Nietzsche own conception of life and history as formulated in *UMII* could provide an interesting foil to Heidegger's reading. Placed back within the context of this thesis, Nietzsche’s opening claim that animals have forgotten how to speak may reverberate with Heidegger's own offering of the potential *mythos* of the stone. Such projects, of which there are many possible, lie outside the immediate scope of this thesis, but could be seen as following directly on from it.
philosophers for whom intellectual conscience and historical rigour were the highest concern is oftentimes lacking. In line with this, and on the basis of these two threads of investigation, I have attempted to explore some of the challenges that face philosophical activity in the modern world. Heidegger may agree with Thacker that “life” is the question that defines the modern age, but he does not consider it to be one which could sustain philosophy in the contemporary situation. Demanding of Heidegger that he place the problematic of “life” at the heart of his philosophy, and in such a way that he deals with the biological or even metaphysical nature of the animal, rather than take up this problematic in his own way, determines the matter for his philosophy from outside of it. This is certainly a problem for those of us who wish to take seriously Heidegger’s claims about the history of philosophy itself.

This question of life may well be one of the most salient for the modern world, but, as this thesis has shown in relation to FCM, moving from everyday concepts to fundamental concepts of philosophy is by no means easy. Perhaps, in a world dominated by everything biological (biopolitics, bioethics, naturalism, environmentalism etc.), philosophy as viewed through Heidegger's lens may then seem like the “inverted world”. This is not a problem for Heidegger, but rather for us, insofar as we are as potentially caught up in the fatally contemporary concerns of modern life. At its most successful, this idea, if it holds any weight, casts the glance of philosophy back in the direction of those who philosophise, and asks that we put ourselves at stake in every moment of our philosophical endeavours. Leaving a philosopher behind and advancing beyond their thought is the genuine goal of all philosophising, but, if Heidegger's Auseinandersetzung has anything to teach us, this achievement comes at a great cost, and can only be won on the back of a profound
apprenticeship to the rigours of the history of philosophy itself.
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