Nietzsche and Social Change

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Acknowledgements

To packs in the North and dancing star friends in the South.

I acknowledge the earth and all ideas as a common treasury for all, and nothing as the work of any one person. The declaration below should be read in light of this acknowledgement.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.
ABSTRACT

This thesis develops a radical Nietzschean approach to social change. Its subject area is how social entities – for example, institutions, practices, norms, values, cultures – are reproduced or transformed. Its ethical and political starting point is one of resistance to capitalism. Its philosophical starting point is the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. Its approach is eclectic, reading Nietzsche with post-Nietzschean philosophy and work in developmental psychology, evolutionary biology, anthropology, feminist theory, and more.

The thesis starts with Nietzsche's conception of history in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. Nietzsche sees social transformation resulting from multiple contingent encounters of bodies with diverse ‘modes of valuation’ and forms of life. This view opposes the universalist approach Nietzsche calls ‘English Genealogy’, which runs from Hume through Darwin down to contemporary liberal ‘cultural evolution’ theories.

The middle part of the thesis investigates Nietzsche's views on social processes following two main strands: the ‘psycho-physiology’ of sub-individual drives he develops in *Dawn* and other texts of the ‘free spirit’ period; and his encounter with Darwinism. These chapters offer accounts of mimetic and performative incorporation of values; of normalisation and subjectivation; and an ‘ecological’ approach to social evolution drawing on multi-dimensional accounts of heredity, Developmental Systems Theory, and Felix Guattari's conception of ‘the three ecologies’.

The last part of the thesis applies these ideas to today's social struggles. It uses Nietzsche's *Genealogy* to understand technologies of domination at work in contemporary capitalism, alongside Foucault's work on power and Judith Herman's study of psychological trauma. The concluding chapter looks at how Nietzsche's thought can help develop projects of resistance to capitalism, drawing on James Scott's study of the ‘weapons of the weak’, and feminist debates on identity. Working with Nietzsche on resistance both brings out the power and takes us to the limits of his philosophy of self-transformation.
Introduction

How do social entities – for example, institutions, practices, norms, value systems, cultures and shared forms of life – change? Conversely, how are they maintained and held fixed? How do values and practices – for example, ways of dividing up the world as property, or ideals of freedom that inspire people to fight – spread or fade, invade or get swept away? And so how can human beings, acting individually or in groups, act most powerfully to transform the social worlds around us?

In this vast field, I have two more specific starting points. The first is my own guiding ethical and political perspective. My aim is to develop conceptual tools that will help me think about how to act most effectively in concrete struggles against forms of domination I face today, living in contemporary capitalism. The second is a particular philosophical aim: to explore a Nietzschean approach to processes of social change. I think that Nietzsche's work offers many powerful tools for thinking about social processes quite generally, and about contemporary social struggles in particular. Although I also believe that Nietzsche's thinking has significant limits, some of which I will try to identify in this thesis.

As that term ‘Nietzschean approach’ may signal, I don’t see this thesis as primarily a work of Nietzsche scholarship. I would like to think that my readings of Nietzsche stand up as such. But I approach Nietzsche's ideas as resources to put to work for my own purposes, which are purposes that Nietzsche himself would
very largely despise. So my ‘Nietzscheanism’ is selective: I pick up some elements from his work, and reject others – although trying to take some care to see how these ideas are connected in the wider scope of Nietzsche's thought. My focus is on a limited set of texts: I start with On the Genealogy of Morals (published in 1887); then, to understand further the psycho-political dynamics of that book, I investigate the psychological approach that Nietzsche develops in Dawn (1881) and the other works of his ‘free spirit’ period – from Human, All Too Human (1878) to The Gay Science (1882). I also put Nietzsche into a conversation with other writers. These include later Nietzschean thinkers, notably Michel Foucault, and other philosophers dead and alive. But I also bring in recent research in psychology, biology, social sciences, gender studies, and other fields. Nietzsche worked in engagement with the science, history, literature, etc., of his day, and I think it makes a lot of sense to follow this interdisciplinary spirit when looking at his work today.

So, here are what I take to be some key features of a Nietzschean approach to processes of social change, as I follow them in the eight chapters of this thesis:

In Chapter 1 I look at how Nietzsche uses the method of genealogy to trace the development and transformation of social (and other) entities, most notably in On the Genealogy of Morals. As he practises genealogy, Nietzsche develops a view of social and historical processes, which he contrasts to that of earlier ‘English genealogists’. He sees entities – ‘things, customs, or organs’ – as formed and transformed by multiple contingent encounters, which he thinks are very largely clashes of domination and resistance. To help draw out key features of Nietzsche's approach I compare his story of the birth of the state in the
Genealogy's second essay with Hume's very different 'English' (or British) account.

In Chapters 2 to 6 I investigate Nietzsche's views on social processes by following two main strands. The first is the psychology – or, as Nietzsche sometimes writes, *psycho-physiology* – of drives that he develops in the 'free spirit' period. The second is his encounter with Darwinism. In Chapter 2 I look at how Nietzsche thinks of individual 'souls' and bodies as themselves 'social structures' (BGE12, BGE19), individual assemblages composed of multiple *drives* (*Triebe*). I interpret drives as patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting, working with a close reading of key passages in *Dawn*. In using drives as building blocks of this kind, my account is influenced by John Richardson's readings of Nietzsche (1996, 2004).

Chapters 3 and 4 I look further at some crucial aspects of drive psychology. In particular, my interest is in how our values, desires and activity patterns are formed within social worlds. Nietzsche thinks that human beings largely 'adopt' (D104) their values from others. He investigates various processes of 'incorporation' (GS11, GS110), including processes of mimesis or unconscious imitation, and of performative repetition that turns initially superficial or forced actions 'natural'. I look at these in Chapter 3, bringing in some ideas from recent developmental psychology. Another aspect of the psycho-social formation of bodies of drives involves what I call *ordering processes*, through which (a) bodies are regularised or 'made calculable' by the 'social straitjacket' (GM2:2); but also (b) bodies thus become subjects who start to order – and, perhaps, transform – themselves. Key Nietzsche texts here are the presentation of the 'sovereign
individual’ in the *Genealogy*, and the theory of ‘morality of custom’ that it refers back to in *Dawn*. In Chapter 4 I bring these together with recent philosophical and psychological discussions of *norms*, and with Foucault’s ideas on *subjectivation*.

In Chapters 5 and 6 I look at the psycho-political processes of the *Genealogy* as *evolutionary processes*. Linking Nietzsche to Darwinian evolutionary theory gives us access to further ways of thinking about social transformation as the outcome of contingent encounters, across disciplines from biology to anthropology to cognitive science to feminist theory. But at the same time as Nietzsche is strongly influenced by Darwinism, he is also a virulent critic. In Chapter 5 I look at how Nietzsche’s thinking of evolution anticipates live debates in today’s evolutionary theory, referring to “Developmental Systems Theory” and to Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb’s (2005) multi-dimensional account of inheritance. Nietzsche’s position is broadly Darwinian, but not ‘Neo-Darwinian’. It opposes organism/environment and nature/culture dichotomies and, in particular, narrow views of ‘cultural evolution’ that we can see in recent versions of ‘English genealogy’.

I continue to develop a Nietzschean approach to evolution in Chapter 6. One of Nietzsche's main points ‘contra Darwin’ insists that we need to think not only about transmission and selection, but about how new variations initially emerge. Nietzsche has two main, somewhat contrasting, ideas here about the ‘creation’ of values: in one, values are created ‘spontaneously’ by the ‘active’ ‘form shaping force’ (GM2:17) of the ‘strong’; in the other, first developed in *Human, All Too Human*, values are transformed as ‘weak’ bodies respond to hostile or blocking encounters. The latter idea, in particular, helps us to frame
some key Nietzschean dynamics. Borrowing from Felix Guattari's (1989) notion of three ecologies, I look at how drives, and the social assemblages they compose, transform and evolve in response to encounters of blockage and of agreement in psychic, social, and material ecologies.

The two final chapters put these ideas to work in thinking about social struggles of domination and resistance. I draw on Foucault's discussions of power to see how our psychic, social and material ecologies are shaped by power relations. In Chapter 7 I look at technologies of domination in the *Genealogy*: not only the violent conquest of the masters, but also the priests’ pseudo-therapy, and the value-contagion of the slaves. I use Judith Herman's (1997) work on psychological trauma and captivity to further bring out the psycho-politics of domination. I then look at contemporary capitalism as a cultural assemblage of ‘noble’, ‘priestly’ and ‘slavish’ technologies.

Nietzsche thinks that to understand ‘the “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ’ we have to study both the processes of ‘subduing’ that shape its history, and also ‘the resistances they encounter’ (GM2:12). Although he himself usually sides with the powerful, he creates conceptual tools we can use for projects of resistance to domination. Chapter 8 introduces some of these. We can relate Nietzsche's thinking to Clausewitz' image of war as a duel between two enemies (discussed in Howard Caygill's (2013) recent work on resistance); but we also need to see that resisting (and dominating) bodies do not have fixed identities, and many resistance projects are also projects of self-overcoming. I read Nietzsche on the ‘dark workshop of the slave revolt’ (GM1:14) with James C. Scott's (1990) work on hidden transcripts to develop a theory of base resistance to the
incorporation of voluntary servitude. Then, also drawing on feminist debates, I think about how we can bring Nietzsche's ideas of individual self-transformation (focusing on The Gay Science) together with collective resistance projects.

I think that working with Nietzsche on resistance both brings out the power of his philosophy of social change and makes us confront some of its limits. Focused on domination, Nietzsche only makes uneasy moves towards a philosophy of alliances. And his prejudiced social perspective blocks him from seeing possibilities for affirmative collective struggles of the dispossessed. A radical philosophy of social change, while it can take further leads from some of his discussion of ‘friendship’, for example, then needs to move beyond Nietzsche on these points. But that's as far as I go in this thesis.

**Social and political**

It wasn't easy to settle on a title for this thesis. In particular, the term ‘social change’ caused some head-scratching. ‘Change’ highlights the focus on dynamics, although strictly speaking the processes I examine also include forces that fix. The toughest choice was the adjective ‘social’. The Nietzschean processes I look at certainly involve what we can straightforwardly think of as social relations, but they also involve psychology, physiology, biology – and indeed “chemistry” and “physics”.\(^1\) Nietzsche does not respect customary boundaries of material, mental,

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1 Identifications of his philosophical approach with chemistry and physics bookend the first and last books of Nietzsche's ‘free spirit’ period. The first aphorism of Human, All Too Human is titled ‘Chemistry of concepts and sensations' (HH1), and contrasts ‘metaphysical philosophy’ with ‘historical philosophy [...] which can no longer be separated from natural science' (HH1). A central passage in Book Four (the last book of the original edition) of The Gay Science is called ‘Long live physics!': ‘we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world, we must become physicists [...]’ (GS335). An interesting reading here is that of Assoun (2000:70-74) on ‘psycho-chemistry’ in both
individual and social domains. He jumps between ‘customs’ and ‘organs’, states and organisms, instincts and religions, values and cultures. I do give a restricting definition of the social in this thesis (see Chapter 6): social relations are relations between bodies of drives. But then a body of drives can’t necessarily be tied down to a human (or non-human) ‘individual’: we might also think of sub-individual or super-individual assemblages of drive patterns that deserve the name ‘body’. Ultimately, I think Deleuze’s reading is right on this: ‘Every relationship of forces constitutes a body – whether it is chemical, biological, social or political.’ (1962:37). But then, every encounter is physiological. And then, every encounter is also social, as ‘our body is only a social structure composed of many souls’ (BGE19), while it may also be possible to think of the ‘soul as a social structure of the drives and emotions’ (BGE12). And, as I argue in Chapter 2 that drives are themselves evolving assemblages, it could then be said that everything in Nietzsche is social, all the way down.

The other main option I considered was ‘political change’. There is a lively debate on ‘Nietzsche and the political’ which, as I didn’t take that road, I will only reference in passing. Nietzsche once called himself ‘the last anti-political German’, and if by politics we mean a restricted sphere of human activity connected to the state or the *polis*, then this description seems apt.² For example, his project to create a secluded ‘community of friends’, which I touch on in Chapter 8, can certainly be presented as anti-political, opposing friendship to citizenship, the proposed alpine ‘cloister for freer spirits’ (*Kloster für freiere

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¹ Nietzsche and Freud. Assoun suggests, following unpublished notes through this period, that Nietzsche moves from an idea of psychology as chemical analysis towards a Boscovitchian physics of forces as he develops the idea of “will to power”.

² He wrote this in the original edition of *Ecce Homo* (EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 3), but then removed the line from a revised edition. On Nietzsche and anti-politics see Cominos (2008), van Tongeren (2008), and the introduction and other essays in Siemens and Roodt (2008).
to the German Second Reich. And, on other occasions where he advocates a new aristocratic state form based on slavery, a key point is that such ‘politics’ must be subordinate to the higher call of ‘culture’. On the other hand, I think a strong case could be made for Nietzsche as an important ancestor of a broader conception in which politics means the dimension of power relations that runs through all social life, micro to macro. Take Kate Millet’s (1970) classic second-wave feminist definition:

The term ‘politics’ shall refer to power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another. By way of parenthesis one might add that although an ideal politics might simply be conceived of as the arrangement of human life on agreeable and rational principles from whence the entire notion of power over others should be banished, one must confess that this is not what constitutes the political as we know it, and it is to this that we must address ourselves. (1970:22-3)

In this sense Nietzsche is very much a political thinker. Indeed, in this sense, just as Nietzschean life is social all the way down, so for Nietzsche everything is thoroughly political. And, more particularly, we can read Nietzsche as a key figure for anti-liberal political thought. Nietzschean politics has little to do with the ‘ideal’ of ‘agreeable and rational principles’, or consensus and compromise, and everything to do with ‘the political as we know it’, given that for Nietzsche the

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3 Nietzsche’s most sustained discussion of the need for an aristocratic social ordering based on ‘slavery in some sense or other’ (BGE257) is in Book 9 of BGE. See Keith Ansell-Pearson (1994) for an overview of Nietzsche’s political thought that centralises his opposition between culture and politics: ‘From first to last Nietzsche is concerned with what he regards as the permanent conflict between culture and politics: what are the goals of art and culture? Should the organisation of society serve the ends of politics (justice) or those of culture?’ (1994:3). I will look briefly at Nietzsche’s idea of culture in Chapter 5, there in the context of the relationship between ‘culture’ and ‘nature’.

4 As David Owen (1995) amongst others brings out.
whole ‘organic world’ (GM2:12) is characterised by domination.

If everything is both social and political, then either choice of name could at least claim to be comprehensive. My choice then comes down to about what features of ‘everything’ I want to highlight. My main positive reason for going with ‘social’ relates to the point made by Felix Guattari in his *The Three Ecologies*, which I discuss in Chapter 6: ‘it is quite simply wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius, and the environment as separate’ (1989:134). It is important to emphasise this point in working with Nietzsche, because Nietzsche can well be read as a philosopher of ‘heroic individualism’ (as Leslie Paul Thiele (1990) calls him). And it is a particularly important point for a radical reading of Nietzsche, remembering that much of Nietzsche's early reception by anarchist thought tended to place him alongside Stirner's egoism.

I don't want to dispute the strong individualist lines in Nietzsche's thought, but I do want to insist that individualist strategies, such as Nietzsche's solitary programmes for self-transformation, can, and at least sometimes must, work alongside collective ‘action [...] on the socius’. Nietzsche's psycho-physiology brings out how individual psyches are formed and ordered within social (and also environmental or material) ecologies. Against this background solitude (alone or in ‘cloisters’) appears as one particular way of organising a social world in order to work on the psyche. But solitary action is not the only such strategy, or necessarily the most powerful. These are some of the points I want to put into relief by highlighting the social.
Chapter 1. Genealogy: Nietzsche vs. Hume

I will start with two stories about social change, in this case about the development of one of the most powerful institutional complexes in the life of almost all human beings today – the state. These stories and their comparison will introduce a whole bundle of themes and ideas that I will keep revisiting through this thesis. Both stories can be understood as *genealogies*, to introduce the term that Nietzsche gives to his method in *On the Genealogy of Morals*. The first, which is David Hume's story of property and the state from the *Treatise of Human Nature*, is an example, indeed I think one of the main prototypes, of what Nietzsche calls an ‘English’ genealogy. Comparing it with Nietzsche's own story of the state will help to highlight Nietzsche's very different view of history and social processes, and to frame his critique of his genealogist predecessors. This is particularly relevant because, as I will argue in later chapters, the Humean lineage of ‘English genealogy’ continues to thrive in today's forms of evolutionary liberalism.

1.1 Two stories about the birth of the state

*Hume's story*

Hume's story begins with private property. The state, as well as other key institutions, develops to support an existing property regime as society grows larger and more complex. The reason Hume gives for the centrality of property
concerns the problematic passion that he variously calls ‘interest’, ‘self-interest’, or ‘avidity’ – i.e., the desire to accumulate economic wealth, transferable ‘external’ goods (T489). He writes:

All the other passions, besides this of interest, are either easily restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious consequence, when indulged. … This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive of society. (T491)

The passion of interest thus poses the key problem for social order, a problem which must be overcome by every human community. But it also turns out to offer the only solution. No other passion is strong enough to restrain avidity; but there is a way in which interest can be made to control itself ‘by an alteration of its direction’:

I observe that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. (T490)

So, the first step in the establishment of social order simply involves observing that our existing economic self-interest can be pursued better if we establish a property convention: an agreement, which need not be explicitly framed, to establish and respect rights of possession over goods. The convention is an invention, but one that comes easily to all human groups: in fact, Hume says, there is nothing ‘more simple and obvious’ and so ‘tis utterly impossible for men to remain any considerable time in that savage condition, which precedes society’
The establishment of the property convention is the first step along a path of social, and at the same time moral, development leading from ‘savagery’ to state society. The next move comes when, partly as a result of the success of the convention in facilitating social expansion, a new problem arises:

when society has become more numerous, and has encreas’d to a tribe or nation, this interest is more remote; nor do men so readily perceive, that disorder and confusion follow upon every breach of these rules, as in a more narrow and contracted society’ (T499).

As individual pursuit of self-interest is no longer able to secure social order in large scale groups, other forces must be marshalled to bolster the convention. Central among these is the moralisation of ‘justice’ (that is, of respect for property). As Hume puts it, we now ‘annex the idea of virtue to justice, and of vice to injustice’ (T498); and so the ‘natural obligation’ of self-interest is bolstered by a further ‘moral obligation, or the sentiment of right and wrong’ (ibid).

I am not going to look at Hume's own account of how this moralisation takes place through a process in which ‘sympathy with the public interest’ plays

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1 As Annette Baier (2010:37) puts it, Hume’s story is ‘a conjectural history, in which conventions arise in a definite order’ and where ‘each artifice remedies inconveniences the previous one had helped create.’ See Baier’s book for a much more detailed account of the various stages in Hume’s story, and also of how Hume’s stories develop over his philosophical and historical writings.

2 Hume’s use of ‘justice’ in the Treatise is strangely narrow. Rachel Cohon (2008: chapter 6), for one, prefers to use Hume’s alternative term ‘honesty’ (with respect to property). Baier (2010: Chapter 4) argues that Hume enlarges the scope of his understanding of justice in later writings.

3 Hume’s talk of obligations in this context raise a number of issues. I will just note two. In this passage obligation appears to mean no more than a ‘sentiment’, but at least some commentators read Hume as having a fuller theory of normativity – see, e.g., Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). And note that here Hume takes un-moralised self-interest to already involve what he calls a ‘natural obligation’.

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the leading role (T499-500). The key point for my purposes is to see that this
development is, like the establishment of the convention in the first place, a
human, historical, construction: as Hume puts it, justice is an ‘artificial virtue’ (T:
Book II section 1). It is not entirely clear in Hume's account whether all human
societies reach this further stage; but wherever they do, this ‘progress of the
sentiments’ is not ‘accidental’, but ‘natural, and even necessary’ (T500). All the
same, it can certainly be helped along by a number of factors including the
‘artifice of politicians’, ‘private education and instruction’, and the concern for
‘reputation’ (T500-501). And, in another important theme which runs through
Hume's story though is not foregrounded, by processes of accustomisation or the
development of ‘habits’.

In the final stage of the story, social scale and complexity again
overwhelm the ordering ability of existing institutions, and a further solution is
called for. This is where government comes in (T: Book II Section 7), as an
institution primarily established to further safeguard property – although it can
later take on additional roles such as providing public goods (T539). In a number
of respects, Hume's account of government directly reprises the origin of property.
Again, it is ‘an invention by men’ (T542) which initially arises to serve existing
interest. And again, the new institution then becomes moralised – in this case,
with the emergence of the further artificial virtue that Hume calls ‘allegiance’ (T:
Book II section 8).

There is, though, an important twist in the tale. Hume is well known in
political philosophy for his acknowledgement that governments are not typically

4 There is also now a further problem caused by the introduction of promising, which allows
great accumulations of wealth through contractual exchange. The institution of promising is
another important step in Hume's story, but one I will not discuss here.
established by any form of consent, whether explicit or tacit. Hume does not say much in the *Treatise* about just how human societies might have come to invent and institute states, other than to suggest that governments are likely to have started with powerful figures whose authority originally applied only ‘in time of war’ (T540-541).\(^5\) He revisits the question in his late essay ‘On the Original Contract’ (1758).\(^6\) While we cannot rule out the possibility of consensual origins for ‘ancient’ governments lost in the mists of time, it is clear that ‘conquest or usurpation, that is, in plain terms, force, by dissolving the ancient governments, is the origin of almost all the new ones, which were ever established in the world’ (para 19).

The violent birth of states has implications for the dynamics of their development as institutions. Hume asserts that ‘when a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation’ (para 22). We could add: fear and necessity also count more, in this stage, than any recognition by subjects of a government's role in supporting property. Indeed, subjects here may well rebel or resist government – princes ‘must carefully guard against every beginning or appearance of insurrection’ (ibid) – despite the fact that rebellion will harm their economic interest.\(^7\)

However, if the ruler can hang on long enough: ‘Time, by degrees,

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\(^5\) Thus the famous line that ‘camps are the true mothers of cities’ (T540-1).


\(^7\) In Hume's examples in the essay, subjects are likely to resist because they are moved by loyalty to a previous regime. We might say: this loyalty involves a passion that can, initially but not eventually, outweigh the passion of interest. Hume does not discuss resistance of non-state societies to conquest, but we could tell a story on Humean lines: e.g., groups resist conquest because they are moved by anti-state passions to defend their autonomy and previous way of life.
removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family which at first they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors’ (ibid). Subjects will eventually come to see any government that does successfully uphold property rights as a legitimate object of allegiance, and Hume thinks that the large majority of governments fall into this category. (I will return to this last part of Hume's story in Chapter 8). There is, then, a difference in the dynamics of how property conventions and states develop and win acceptance. But in both cases agreement, when it comes, is secured and maintained on the same basis: first, because it is observed to further existing motivations (interest); and secondly, by the consequent development of a new artificial virtue, which adds a further moral motivation.

**Nietzsche's story**

Nietzsche also thinks that the state is born of violence. In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, it all begins with a war of conquest (GM2:17) in which a ‘noble’ tribe – the infamous ‘pack of blond beasts of prey’ (GM2:16) – overpowers a weaker tribe. Rather than destroying the defeated group, the conquering group merges with it to create a new hierarchically ordered society. The noble tribe now becomes a ‘ruling caste’, the weak tribe a subordinate caste of slaves.

Also like Hume, Nietzsche has an involved account of pre-state social organisation. In ‘primeval times’ or ‘prehistory’ (GM2:2), humans lived in ‘the original tribal community’ (GM2:19). This period, in terms of psychology and value structures as well as of social organisation, is characterised by what
Nietzsche calls the *morality of custom*. As analysed in depth in the earlier book *Dawn*, pre-state communities are bound together, their social order maintained, by traditional norms or customs (*Sitten*). Nietzsche sees customary society as largely non-hierarchical: its key relationships involve the individual and the community (or ‘herd’) as a whole, rather than power relations amongst individuals or sub-groups. There are figures of status: ‘medicine men’, prophets, and martyrs create new values (D14, D18); individuals imitate and adopt the values of those who are esteemed for ‘their intellect, station, morality, exemplarity or reproachability’ (D104). But these relationships do not lead to the establishment of stable hierarchical authority, which happens only with the clash of two separate custom-ordered communities.

To understand Nietzsche's genealogy of domination and resistance, it can help to start with a limit case in which the conquest is total and the masters succeed fully in creating an idealised aristocratic polity. Here we can also draw on Nietzsche's more extensive remarks on aristocracy in Part Nine of *Beyond Good and Evil*. In BGE257 Nietzsche sees the original state as a social body characterised by strict hierarchical ‘rank ordering’ (*Rangordnung*). The conquered are fully *instrumentalised*: they are ‘subjects and instruments’ (ibid); ‘suppressed and reduced to imperfect men, to slaves and instruments’ (BGE258). Crucially, this means that they are no longer free to set their own values: ‘in no way accustomed to positing values himself, [the common man] also accorded himself no other value than that which his master accorded him (it is the intrinsic right of...

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8 Forms of customary morality also remain strong in us to this day: as Nietzsche puts it ‘this prehistory is in any case present in all ages or may always reappear’ (GM2:9). I will discuss these points, relating Nietzsche's discussion of custom to the concept of a *norm*, in Chapter 4.

9 The second essay of GM is largely a development of themes in Part Nine of BGE; in particular, the account of state formation in GM2:17 directly expands on remarks in BGE 257.
masters to create values)’ (BGE261). While the ruling caste creates values, the subordinated simply receive instructions from above. We see the conquering ‘nobles’ in a number of lights in the Genealogy: destructive ‘beast[s] of prey’ or ‘triumphant monster[s]’ (GM1:11); respectful friends and equals amongst their own peer group (ibid); and state-building ‘artists’ who create ‘a ruling structure that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and co-ordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not been assigned a “meaning” in relation to the whole’ (GM2:17).  

10 In this ideal case the conquerors' work of art is a social assemblage that is indeed a social organism, in which the subordinated castes are mere organs, dependent functional parts: an image that Nietzsche explores in a number of unpublished notes. And this social body exists ‘only as foundation and scaffolding upon which a select species of being is able to raise itself to a higher task’ (BGE258).  

11 In Chapter 7 I will look at the technologies and practices the masters use to create states that approach, to some extent, this ideal of total domination. But the Genealogy is largely about how this limit case fails. In short, to paraphrase

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10 I will look briefly at the nobles’ internal relations as a community of equals in Chapter 8. With regards to their external dealings with the conquered, one question for Nietzsche’s story concerns the relation between their connection between roles as destructive ‘monsters’ and as creative ‘artists’. Deleuze (1962) see both roles as aspects of the same ‘active’ will to power. Daniel Conway (1998; 2008) sees a historical shift between these two aspects: beasts of prey are transformed into organising masters as a result of their encounter with an ‘unusually resilient and pliant populace’ (2008:52). See also Ridley (1998: Chapter 4) on the ‘artistry’ of the masters.  

11 Nietzsche pursues this image of conquest as incorporating and turning formerly free elements into ‘organs’ in a number of notes including those collected as WP640-658. I will say some more about social assemblages and organisms in the last section of this Chapter.  

12 The precise nature of Nietzsche’s ‘higher task’ is a fascinating question, but not one I will address in this thesis. In BGE257 Nietzsche identifies it with the ‘enhancement … of the human type’, in his (infamous) statement that every such enhancement through human history has required ‘slavery in some form or another’. To quote Conway (2008), Nietzsche sees the higher task or goal of politics as ‘the production and advancement of culture, which alone can justify human existence’. Just what Nietzsche means by ‘culture’, and how he thinks it justifies existence, are issues that I will touch on very briefly in Chapter 5.
Foucault, domination is always accompanied by a continuing resistance.\(^\text{13}\)

Initially, the independent life of the weak survives by going underground – a turn that includes, notably, the internalisation of blocked aggressive drives, so creating an expanded ‘inner world’ GM2:16) of mental life in latter day humans.\(^\text{14}\)

Eventually, these ‘subterranean’ (GM1:8, GM3:14) valuings will erupt in the ‘slave revolt in morality’, which Nietzsche associates with Judeo-Christian morality of humility and self-sacrifice.

However, Nietzsche rarely imagines that the oppressed can organise, or otherwise acquire, the power to rise and directly confront the masters. The forms of resistance discussed in the Genealogy, including the ‘slave revolt’, instead involve undermining the masters' power whilst avoiding open challenges. The revolt works, successfully, by breaking down the hierarchical structure created by the masters, and spreading debilitating values to the ruling caste. Nietzsche most often appears to deplore resistance as a weakening, unhealthy, force. It weakens not only the social body as a whole, but also individuals within it: the ‘sicknesses’ of bad conscience, ressentiment, and the ascetic ideal, which form the main subjects of the Genealogy, are its symptoms. And yet there is a vital ambiguity in Nietzsche's evaluation of resistance: for all its painful psychic consequences, it is only through this struggle that humanity has evolved psychologically and culturally and become ‘an interesting animal’ (GM1:6). I will look at these points about resistance in greater depth in Chapter 8.

\(^{13}\) Nietzsche is clearest about the ubiquity of resistance in unpublished notes, such as this one from 1885: ‘... resistance is present even in obedience: individual power is by no means surrendered. In the same way, there is in commanding an admission that the absolute power of the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. “Obedience” and “commanding” are forms of struggle’ (WP642).

\(^{14}\) I will look at internalisation, and the psycho-physiological processes that underlie it, in Chapter 2.
1.2 Genealogy

In *On the Genealogy of Morals*, Nietzsche sets out to unravel the complex assemblage of values and practices that we can broadly identify as ‘Christian morality’, but which also includes post-religious forms – for example, Nietzsche identifies both socialism and ideologies of 19th century science as outgrowths of this same value complex. As part of this project, Nietzsche looks at the development of a wide range of phenomena from major political institutions, through social norms and practices, to psychological ‘instincts’ and drives. As Foucault writes in his essay ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, Nietzsche looks historically even at ‘what we tend to feel is without history […] sentiments, love, conscience, instincts’ (NGH:321). However, as Christopher Janaway observes, a genealogy is not just any kind of historical account, but has a quite specific focus: ‘those aspects of the past that causally terminate in our specific present-day states’ (2007:10). The relevant historical features, as Foucault points out, are the thing’s lines of ancestry or descent (*Herkunft*) – its lineages.

To summarise, a genealogical investigation is a historical account of the development of an entity (‘a “thing”, an organ, a custom’ (GM2:12)) which works by tracing that entity's multiple causal lineages and showing how they have interacted to make it what it is. So in the *Genealogy*, to quote Raymond Geuss,

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15 After Nietzsche, Michel Foucault is the best known writer to describe himself as doing genealogy, extending and developing Nietzsche's approach to 19th century morality to systems of justice and discipline, to sexuality, and indeed to the ‘genealogy of ethics’ – which is how he describes his ongoing project in 1983 (EW1:254-280). I will refer to Foucault's thoughts on genealogy, particularly in his essay NGH, and his development of Nietzschean ideas with respect to relations of domination and resistance, throughout this thesis.
Nietzsche's investigation ‘reveals Christian morality to arise from the historically contingent conjunction of a large number of [...] separate series of processes’ (2001:325) which include: the earlier ‘morality of custom’ of pre-state communities; tribal institutions of punishment, debt, and ancestor worship; with the beginnings of state society, the development of shared psychological structures of bad conscience and ressentiment that result from the internalisation of aggressive drives; the ‘ascetic ideal’ of priestly castes; the particular moral teachings of Jesus himself and their re-interpretations by Paul and other priests. Modern European value systems are products of the interaction of these various lineages and more.

Lineages are always multiple – and, indeed, so numerous and complex that no genealogical investigation can ever do more than capture a few hopefully important lines. Furthermore, no genealogy can ever trace lineages ‘all the way back’, if such an idea even makes sense. So, as Foucault stresses (NGH:342-3) a lineage has no one point of ‘origin’ (Ursprung), but only a starting point that has to be chosen more or less arbitrarily by the genealogist.

However, a genealogy in Nietzsche’s sense does more than just draw up a family tree: it also tell us how these lineages, individually and in combination, have contributed to make the thing what it is. To pursue the image of genealogy a step further, one way to approach this ‘how’ question is by identifying what an entity has inherited from its ancestors – or, to put it another way, what properties, traits, patterns have been transmitted along and across lineages. But we may also

16 In a postcard to his friend Franz Overbeck, quoted and discussed by Matthias Risse (2001) and David Owen (2007), Nietzsche writes that in the Genealogy ‘for the sake of clarity, it was necessary artificially to isolate the different roots of that complex structure that is called morality’ (Owen 2007:67). Each of the three essays deals with one root or ‘primum mobile’, the others are ‘missing’ in the book as it stands.
ask how these properties have been *transformed* as they have been passed on – combined, “shuffled” mutated, and otherwise varied. Thinking of lineages in terms of transmission and transformation brings out an important connection between Nietzsche's genealogical approach and Darwinian thinking about evolution, which I will explore in depth in Chapters 5 and 6.

What is genealogy for? Why look at how things have become what they are? For Nietzsche, uncovering the lineages of modern European values is really only the initial stage of a bigger project. This is how Nietzsche presents this project in the preface to the *Genealogy*:

> Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves must be called in question – and for that there is needed a knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed […] (GM:P6)

So, first of all, Nietzsche introduces genealogical investigations, and the histories they uncover, as tools for a critique – or indeed, as Nietzsche subtitles the *Genealogy*, a ‘polemic’. And this critique itself has the further aim of clearing the way for the overcoming of the existing value complex in a new ‘revaluation of all values’. There are important, and much debated, questions about just how, and how well, the method of genealogy works within Nietzsche's broader critical and...

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17 This idea of critique brings up the question of the relationship between Nietzsche's project and that of Kant. Deleuze (1962) brings out this point in depth, arguing that Nietzsche takes up and radicalises Kant's incomplete critical project. David Owen (1994) also reads Nietzsche, and Weber and Foucault too, with reference to Kant, and approaches 'genealogy as a form of immanent critique' (1994:1). Aaron Ridley similarly argues that 'Nietzsche's project is structurally identical' to Kant's account of immaturity and enlightenment (in 'What is Enlightenment?') in his (1998: introduction).
evaluative projects. However, I am not going to pursue these in this thesis.\textsuperscript{18}

My interests in genealogy are somewhat, although not entirely, different from Nietzsche's own. As well as weapons and ammunition for polemic or critique, genealogies can also provide what we might think of as more “constructive” tools. Genealogical investigations can uncover (relatively general or local) principles and patterns of how things change, come together, and become what they are. And, by uncovering the historical make-up of a thing and how it has been formed, genealogical investigations can – in conjunction with an understanding of applicable principles and patterns – also help identify that thing's future possibilities. As David Owen (1995:40) puts it, genealogy can then help us understand not just ‘what are we?’ and ‘how have we become what we are’ but also ‘given what we are, what might we become?’ In this respect, genealogy plays the role of what in earlier texts Nietzsche called ‘chemistry’ (HH1) and ‘physics’ (GS335): to paraphrase GS335, we have to study genealogy in order to learn how we can ‘become human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves’.\textsuperscript{19} For Nietzsche, this “constructive” use of genealogy may be secondary to its critical use – at least, in the \textit{Genealogy}; however, it is my primary concern in this thesis. I want to think about how the lessons of genealogy can help create more powerful projects of social and individual transformation. Although my own projects of becoming are in many ways quite different to those Nietzsche himself endorsed.

\textsuperscript{18} The role of genealogy in Nietzsche's critique of European morality, and in the 'revaluation of all values', is discussed in depth by writers on Nietzsche including Aaron Ridley (1998), Bernard Williams (2000), Raymond Geuss (2001), Brian Leiter (2002), David Owen (2007), Christopher Janaway (2007), and many more.
\textsuperscript{19} On 'physics' and 'chemistry' see footnote 1 in the Introduction.
English genealogy

Nietzsche does not see himself as the first genealogist of morals, but he thinks he is the first to do it right. In three separate sections of the book he goes to some length to distinguish his version of genealogy from the attempts of predecessors. His targets are first introduced in the preface to the *Genealogy* as the ‘English genealogists of morality’. At the start of the first essay they are labelled ‘English psychologists’, who have made ‘the only attempts hitherto to arrive at a history of the origin of morality’ (GM:1.1), but have ‘bungled their moral genealogy’. In GM2:12 he refers to ‘previous genealogists of morals’ who have proceeded ‘Naively, as has always been their way’.


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20 There are also ‘English biologists’ in the Note at the end of GM1. Their offence is to consider ‘the well-being of the majority’ as ‘a priori of higher value’ to ‘the well-being of the few’.

21 Nietzsche explicitly identifies Rée as just one of a greater number: ‘Dr. Rée, like all English moral genealogists’ (GM:P.4).

22 Of all of these sources Redding goes deepest into Nietzsche's relationship to English genealogy, investigating the role of this critique in Nietzsche's position within and against Enlightenment thought. And yet, particularly for my purposes, Redding's account is quite incomplete in that it doesn't look at all at the role of Darwinism or even utilitarianism within
Darwin and Darwinism. I don't have anything new to add to scholarship on this point, but I suggest that Nietzsche's criticisms of ‘English genealogy’ can be applied to a lineage of moral thinking that we can trace back through British empiricism, in which Darwin comes to play an important role, and of which Rée is a pertinent immediate example.\(^23\) Along with Craig Beam (1992) and David Couzens Hoy (1994), I identify Hume as at least important grandfather of this line. I will turn to Darwin in Chapter 5, and also argue that the lineage of English genealogy still thrives in contemporary evolutionary approaches to liberal moral and political philosophy.

The central issue Nietzsche raises against the English Genealogists concerns the lack of a ‘historical spirit’ (GM1.2).\(^24\) In Nietzsche's example in this passage, which is basically Rée's theory in summary, English genealogists set out ‘to investigate the origin of the concept and judgement “good”’ (ibid). Their answer is that evaluations of moral ‘good’ have developed from primary evaluations of ‘utility’ (importantly, from the perspective of ‘those to whom “goodness” was shown’) that became transformed by basic psychological processes of habituation and of forgetting. This explanation fits the genealogical approach as I characterised it above: a new historical ‘thing’, moral evaluation of goodness, emerges from the conjunction of three previously existing things, in this case, basic psychological structures. So the problem is not so much with the form of the English genealogical investigation as with the content, with the specific lineages it identifies.

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24 This is not his only line of criticism. Nietzsche makes a number of points against English genealogy, and I won't try to disentangle all of them here. Some are tied closely to his criticisms of Darwinism, which I will discuss in Chapters 5 and 6 – for example, his sallies against what he sees as its ‘blind and chance mechanistic hooking-together of ideas’ (GM:1.1).
Nietzsche notes that the psychological structures posited by this explanation contain ‘all the typical traits of the idiosyncrasy of the English psychologists’ (ibid). The ahistoricity of these genealogists consists in their speculatively retrojecting their own modern – and idiosyncratically ‘English’ – psychological traits back into a past historical age. He makes the same critique in GM2:12, this time dealing with genealogies of punishment: naïve genealogists, starting from their own contemporary understanding of punitive institutions, ‘seek out some “purpose” in punishment, for example, revenge or deterrence, then guilelessly place this purpose at the beginning as causa fiendi, and – have done’.

‘Naivety’, here, consists in assuming that your own contemporary traits (or those identified by contemporary psychologists) are not themselves historical productions, that the humans who first developed early moral stances and punishment practices were moved by the same ‘utilitarian’ values and purposes attributed to 19th century ‘English’ people.

Nietzsche keeps returning to this critical point, I think, because it is about more than just a ‘naïve’ mistake. Within the overall polemical scope of the Genealogy, the English genealogists form an important subsidiary target, because they present a danger. They are using genealogy for a purpose directly opposite to Nietzsche's – not to undermine Christian values, but instead to defend and entrench them. To see this point we can look again at the preface to the Genealogy. After stating that we need to acquire knowledge of the conditions under which moral values ‘evolved and changed’, Nietzsche goes on to observe that this means:

25 This highlights a point that may be obscured by our familiarity with Nietzsche's (and Foucault's) critical uses of genealogy: genealogical arguments can be positive as well as negative.
a knowledge of a kind that has never yet existed or even been desired. One has
taken the value of these values as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one
has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing “the
good man” to be of greater value than the “evil man”, of greater value in the
sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general (the future
of man included). (GM:P6)

Previous ‘English’ moral genealogists have not uncovered, or even desired, the
necessary knowledge because, just like non-genealogical moral theorists, they
have never questioned their own moral starting point, the values that they have
inherited from Christianity and that they take as an unquestioned standard for
human ‘advancement and prosperity’. As Dirk Johnson puts it with reference to
Darwin, Nietzsche thus ‘reveals’ Darwin's moral ‘naturalism’ as an attempt to give
Christian morality ‘an alternative theoretical framework and grounding’ (2010:
171). English Genealogy, while ostensibly uncovering historical development, in
fact takes its own basic valuing stances as timeless, and so uses them
retrojectively to create pseudo-historical explanations that come up with the
“right” answer. Nietzsche's ‘historical sense’, by contrast, demotes Christian
valuing to just one contingent evaluative stance amongst others: there have been,
are, and will be other quite different moral perspectives.

**Nietzsche and Hume**

Now it's time to return to the two stories about the state. Both Hume's and
Nietzsche's stories are genealogies that start with a contemporary institution, trace
back (some of) its multiple lineages, and see how these interacting processes have
produced the institution in its present form. There are important parallels in their stories. Both see state societies replacing stable pre-state communities held together not by laws but by norms: normalised property conventions supported by artificial virtue; or the morality of custom. For both, the move to state society begins with conquest. An obvious difference is what happens next. For Hume, conquest is a temporary moment of conflict: over time, subjects – all, or almost all of them – come to consent to government as any rebellious passions are gradually overcome by a coalition of the basic passion of interest, the artificial virtue of allegiance, and further forces including accustomisation and education. For Nietzsche, in contrast, resistant passions (or drives) are not dissipated but only pushed underground, where they will transform to re-emerge in unpredictable and potent ways.

Another substantial difference concerns the necessity or contingency of the genealogical conjunctions identified. For Hume the property convention (and later the state) is a ‘human invention’, and the new moral motivations of justice and allegiance emerge with specific historical developments. But while these new phenomena are ‘artificial’, they are not ‘accidental’: all human societies follow the same ‘natural, and even necessary’ (T500) path to private property-owning civilisation. In Nietzsche's account, conversely, state institutions, property relations, systems of justice and punishment, and the value systems that support these, are contingent developments that have been, could have been, and will be

26 To make this clearer with respect to Hume's story, the entities and lineages that interact to produce the state include: the basic passion of interest, which plays a guiding role throughout different stages; the invention of the property convention; the moralisation of property as the artificial virtue of justice; various forces of accustomisation, education, and the artifice of politicians; the growth of social scale and its threat to order; temporary pre-state institutions of war leadership; military conquests; and the moralisation of obedience to the state as the artificial virtue of allegiance.
otherwise. Furthermore, Hume's genealogy is not only necessary but universal: the progression is the same for ‘all men’ (T493), wherever they may be. While Nietzsche does write in the singular about ‘the state’, his story is situated within the specific context of his focus on European, Christian, moral institutions. In other texts Nietzsche often emphasises the diversity of what he sees as distinct European, Asian, and other ‘cultures’ – although, certainly, often within a racist framework.

Hume’s and Nietzsche's contrasting stances on the necessity and universality of political institutions connects to their very different views on the psychology behind ‘human inventions’. For example, in *The Gay Science* Nietzsche stands aghast at the ‘immense field for work’ that faces researchers who want to understand ‘how differently men's instincts have grown, and might yet grow, depending on different moral climates’ (GS7). By contrast, Hume believes that ‘Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places’ that we can ‘know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans’ by ‘Stud[y]ing] well the temper and actions of the French and English’, and so that the ‘chief use [of history] is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature’ (EHU:IV.1). In the context at hand, necessity and universality are grounded on a psychological given: the ‘insatiable, perpetual, universal’ passion of interest or avidity. It is precisely because ‘all men’ are driven alike by

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27 Of course, Nietzsche is famous for his inconsistency – or, perhaps, the ability to adopt and explore many diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives. There are other passages that emphasise fixed and common human traits. E.g., in HH2, he both (a) argues against thinking of ‘man as an aeterna veritas’ and then (b) maintains that ‘mankind may not have altered much’ in the last 4000 years. I think that he certainly does not maintain the latter view in the *Genealogy*, which traces major ruptures in human value systems in the relatively recent history of states and Judeo-Christian religion. (I discuss this point further in Chapter 5). In any case, Nietzsche's own views on human history and anthropology aside, I think that his very important contribution is to open a philosophical path for us to think about social change in terms of diverse and transforming forms of life and modes of valuation.

28 Craig Beam (1992) develops this contrast between Hume's and Nietzsche's views of history.
the same motivational structure of economic interest that ‘all men’ will universally agree on the property convention and the state.\textsuperscript{29} As this concept of interest plays a key role not only in Hume's theory but also (as I will argue in Chapter 5) in later English genealogies, it deserves a bit of attention. Like other writers of the 17th and 18th centuries, Hume saw human beings as impelled to action by a diversity of motivating ‘passions’ or ‘affects’.\textsuperscript{30} In Book II of the \textit{Treatise} Hume gives a diverse catalogue of passions, from pride to the amorous passion, benevolence to contempt. Economic avidity, interestingly, does not feature in this list. The term ‘interest’ does appear in Book II, but only in the more general sense of an individual's calculated long term ‘advantage’ or ‘greatest possible good’. We then find a double shift in Book III, published a year later, in that (a) the idea of interest as calculated advantage becomes identified with the idea of interest as economic gain and (b) economic avidity suddenly appears on the stage not just as one more passion, but as the one passion to rule them all.

This move in Hume's \textit{Treatise} is more, I think, than a textual curiosity. It illustrates exactly the conceptual shift studied by Albert Hirschman in his intellectual history of \textit{The Passions and the Interests} (1977).\textsuperscript{31} Hirschman analyses the transformation of the concept of interest in 17th and 18th century thought from an earlier ‘wide’ idea connected to calm or reasoned calculation in general,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item In fact there is a further assumption in Hume's account: not only do all humans fundamentally value the accumulation of property; but the avidity of all is served by the property convention and the state. This ignores the possibility – or rather, the reality, in Hume's time as in our own – that people may have very different property allocations, and that the access of many to material goods is not served but blocked by the property regime.
\item See Schmitter (2010) for an introduction to passion psychologies of this period.
\item Amongst recent readers of Hume, Till Gruene-Yanoff and Edward Mclellan (2007) also note these two distinct senses of interest in Hume. However, as they don't spot the distinct pattern of how Hume's usage changes across Books II and III of the \textit{Treatise}, they take this distinction to undermine rather than support Hirschman's reading.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
which had itself recently emerged from the 16th century discourse of the
governmental interest of states (as in the idea of ‘national interest’), to a new
‘narrow’ sense of interest tied tight to economic gain.\(^{32}\) Hirschman connects this
genealogy to the development of new political discourses accompanying the rise
of capitalism: the beginning of political economy as a discipline; the growing
moral and social acceptability of commerce (including charging ‘interest’ on
loans); and, attendant on these, a general ‘economising’ of politics. Previous to
these developments the idea of economic self-interest barely appeared in political
thought, and certainly not as a universal driving force.

In Nietzsche’s view, there is no such fixed and dominant motivational
substratum, whether of ‘self-interest’ or otherwise. Rather, as I will discuss in the
next chapter, the motivating forces and passions of human life – which Nietzsche
often calls drives (\textit{Triebe}) – are both (a) highly diverse across individual bodies
and social groups; and (b) continually evolving. To be clear, Nietzsche does think
that certain drives can dominate, and become relatively stable, in given times and
places; but where this occurs, it is because contingent developmental processes
have been at work. And these processes are within the scope of our study, they are
moving rather than fixed parts of history. For example, as I will discuss in Chapter
4, the morality of custom involves such stabilising processes, its rigid normativity
working to create motivational ‘narrowness’ centred on a few drives. The strong,
conquering, tribe is in fact one which has been subject to a particularly tight
homogenising regime with a focus on aggressive drives: this is what allows the

\(^{32}\) Michel Foucault, writing at much the same time as Hirschman, discusses very similar historical
themes in his 1977-8 and 1978-9 lecture courses on \textit{Security. Territory, Population} (STP), and
\textit{The Birth of Biopolitics} (BP) – which introduces an idea, with reference to Hume, of the
“subject of interest”.

30
‘noble’ tribe to organise effectively for war.

In the Genealogy, Nietzsche highlights a number of historically significant drives or passions including the aggressive ‘form-creating’ and ‘artistic’ drives of the masters, the ressentiment of the slaves, and the ascetic ideal of the priests. The passion of avidity is not one of them. It does feature elsewhere in Nietzsche's texts, for example in his horrified analysis in Dawn of the recent emergence of ‘a culture of commercial beings’ (D128). For Nietzsche (as for Hirschman) that this passion comes to play a central role in human social life is a peculiarly modern phenomenon, specific to the recent history of capitalism, involving norms and values which are starkly distinct from those prevalent in other cultures: ‘commerce is just as much the soul [of this emerging culture] as was individual contest for the ancient Greeks and war, victory, and law for the Romans’ (ibid). If the passion for economic accumulation has come to the fore in recent times this is an outcome of new lineages – involving processes of education, forceful imposition, imitation, and much more – which are historical, traceable, mutable, and are effects as well as causes of political institutions.

As I discussed above, Nietzsche accuses the ‘English psychologists’ of taking Christian values as ‘given, as factual, as beyond all question’ (GM:P), and so retrojecting their own evaluative stances into their genealogies. We can apply this same point to Hume's genealogy of the state: a core evaluative stance familiar in modern capitalism is retrojected to provide a purpose for developing institutions of property and the state. If Hume was one of the first to make this move in genealogies of political and economic institutions, he certainly has not been the last. In later chapters of this thesis I will look at how this aspect of
English genealogy continues to play out in contemporary liberal theories.

1.3 Nietzsche's view of history

Nietzsche's critique of English genealogy connects to a particular conception of history. In GM2:12, after identifying the naivety of previous genealogists of punishment, Nietzsche sets out what we might consider a manifesto of his own view of historical – and also ongoing – patterns and processes of social change. Here I will just highlight a few key points, which I will develop in greater depth through the thesis.

The first is the idea I have been looking at above: ‘the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual purpose lie worlds apart; whatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed […]’ (ibid). Thus the naivety of a genealogy that tries to see practices or institutions (e.g., punishment) as developing to serve fixed ends. The purposes and values that shape history are themselves mutable and continually transforming.

Second, values are not just changing over historical time, but at any given time they are diverse across – and also, as I will discuss in the next chapter, within – human bodies. English genealogists of “goodness” make a double universalising mistake: not only do they take their own values to extend across time; but they fail to see in history the existence of opposing ‘slave’ and ‘master’ modes of evaluation. Multiple valuing perspectives may at any time be ‘competing’ to reinterpret and transform practices.
Third, historical developments result from the *encounters* of different forces and bodies, with their different valuing perspectives. For example, a punitive institution is transformed as it is taken over and ‘redirected by some power superior to it’ (GM2:12); the values of slaves are fundamentally transformed as the result of their encounter with the masters; the teachings of Jesus are given new meanings as they are reappropriated by priests, etc.33 Nietzsche's thinking of social change is thus a thinking of encounters, of how bodies, drives, and other forces transform as they meet each other: whether as friends or as enemies, or in more ambivalent and complex relationships. I will develop some ideas about evolutionary encounters in Chapter 6.

Fourth, these encounters that form and transform entities are *contingent*, and in many cases *unpredictable*. Nietzsche writes:

> the entire history of a “thing”, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another but, on the contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with one another in a purely chance fashion (GM2:12)

So Foucault writes that the genealogist needs to ‘cultivate the details and accidents that accompany every beginning’ (NGH 344), to ‘recognise the events of history, its jolts, its surprises, its unsteady victories and unpalatable defeats’ (ibid:355). Or as Geuss puts it: ‘it will be contingent which wills encounter and try to interpret/master Christianity at what times under what circumstances, and it will be contingent how much force, energy, and success they will have’

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33 A complication with this point is that Nietzsche also discusses the ‘spontaneous’ creation of values by ‘form-giving forces’, which may seem to ‘create’ new values *ex nihilo*, as it were. I will discuss this point in Chapter 6.
Fifth, and as a corollary of these points, an entity has no fixed meaning, identity, or ‘essence’ [Wesen]. Nietzsche writes: ‘Only that which has no history is definable’ (GM2:13). We can’t pin down the definition of a thing that is continually being re-interpreted and re-made. Foucault claims that if the genealogist ‘listens to history’ he discovers ‘the secret that [things] have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms’ (NGH:343). If an essential property is one that a thing has by definition, then Foucault's statement directly follows from Nietzsche's. And yet Nietzsche does use ideas of essence and nature [Natur], in ways that I will explore in Chapters 3 and 5. We can perhaps accommodate this point by following Foucault's idea of an essence made ‘piecemeal’ [construite pièce à pièce]. A non-naive genealogist may define a thing at a given point in time, or over a limited period, but should not lose sight of the fact that any such identification must be provisional and temporary, as the entity continues to transform through further contingent encounters. To define a thing, we might say, is to extract or abstract it from history, and abstractions are methodological devices that can be as dangerous as they are powerful.

34 In the conclusion to his study of Nietzsche and genealogy Deleuze makes the famous polemical statement that ‘there can be no compromise between Nietzsche and Hegel’ (1962:184). For Geuss, we can understand this point with reference to the contingency of encounters in Nietzsche's view of history: ‘A process can be described as “dialectical” if it unfolds endogenously according to an inherent logic. For Nietzsche the “wills” that come to struggle over a form of life characteristically come from outside that form and their encounter is contingent in that no outcome of it is more inherently “logical” than any other’ (2001: 333, fn.). In the next section I will develop this point further by making use of the Deleuzian idea of assemblages: we can see a drive, body, or other entity that has a genealogy as an assemblage—that is, to draw on Manuel DeLanda's presentation, as a grouping of elements brought together contingently, and held together temporarily by ‘relations of exteriority’.

35 And indeed, a few lines further on in GM2:13, he does talk about ‘the meaning’ of punishment, albeit in scare quotes and in the course of showing ‘how uncertain, how supplemental, how accidental “the meaning” of punishment is [...]’
Sixth, Nietzsche makes a further more specific claim about the nature of

the encounters that shape history. They are power relations and, more specifically

still, relations of domination and resistance: ‘all events in the organic world are a

subduing, a becoming master’ (GM2:12). As Nietzsche summarises:

The “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ, is thus by no means its

progressus toward a goal, even less a logical progressus by the shortest route and

with the smallest expenditure of force – but a succession of more or less

profound, more or less mutually independent processes of subduing, plus the

resistances they encounter, the attempts at transformation for the purpose of

defence and reaction, and the results of successful counteractions. (ibid)

I will look at domination and resistance in depth in Chapters 7 and 8 – and also

question Nietzsche’s view that all relations involve subduing and mastery.36 For

36 Nietzsche’s thinking of domination and resistance is closely tied to his thought of ‘will to

power’, which he comes to see as central in his later work. Just to cite two examples, in

BGE13 ‘Above all, a living thing wants to discharge its strength – life itself is will to power’,

and in GM1:12 will to power is the ‘essence’ of life. Nietzsche develops his “theory” of will to

power (if it is such) still more extensively in unpublished notes. Any relatively comprehensive

account of Nietzsche’s ideas on social change, and on politics, would look in depth at will to

power. But in this thesis I will only make fleeting references to this concept. Here are a few

summary points to justify this:

(1) The underlying psychology of drives I work with comes from ‘middle period’ texts such as

Dawn where Nietzsche does not yet talk about will to power. Will to power will become more

of an issue when we come to Nietzsche’s relation to Darwinism and the creation of new

evolutionary variations (in Chapter 6), but there again I will turn to an earlier view (in HH) of

the value-creation of ‘weak’ free spirits.

(2) Nietzsche’s conception of will to power is open to multivalent broader and narrower

readings, which (arguably) he may move between. I largely follow John Richardson’s (1995:

Chapter 1) interpretation, in which we can see drives as the ‘units’ that are ‘willing’ or ‘striving

for’ ‘power’. In a broad reading, the ‘power’ that drives strive for is the ability to act in their

characteristic ways, in accordance with their valuations (I will discuss these terms in Chapter 2),

and so not be blocked by other drives or other bodies. That is, in the terms I use in Chapter 7,

power as ‘potentia’. In a narrower reading, drives strive not just for the ability to act, but more

specifically for power over other drives or bodies. That is, in the terms of Chapter 7, for

domination – or, at least, ‘potestas’. (It could be that these two senses are related by an

underlying view, which Nietzsche develops from Boscovichian physics and explores in

unpublished notes, of drives and other forces as engaged in a zero sum struggle for finite

energetic resources: thus a force can only increase its own potentia by destroying or

incorporating other forces.)

(3) If we take will to power in the broader sense, it does not in fact add anything substantial to

the ‘psycho-physiological’ account of drives I develop in this thesis, but just gives us a further

layer of terminology. I do not have space to argue directly for this claim; but I hope it will be
now, I want to end with this question: if historical encounters are contingent, accidental, and often unpredictable, does this mean that we cannot predict or understand their consequences? Throughout the *Genealogy*, and other works, Nietzsche identifies *patterns* of relations between bodies, forces, and values, of how their encounters shape and re-shape things and their values and meanings. Without such recurring patterns, indeed, there could be no genealogical investigations. We could at most identify lineages, but not understand *how* their conjunctions shape the development of entities – let alone say anything about how genealogies shape the possibilities of future becomings. My aim in this thesis is to draw out some of these Nietzschean patterns of encounter and transformation, in order to put them to work as tools for thinking about the present and future.

### 1.4 Genealogy and assemblages

To conclude this chapter, I want to introduce one further concept that will be helpful throughout this thesis. This is the idea, developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (2004), of an assemblage. I will also draw here on Manuel DeLanda's (2004) reworking of assemblage theory. To see why this concept is

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(4) If we take will to power in the narrow sense, then we see Nietzsche moving in his later work to a new view in which all encounters of drives are always relations of struggle. I think that Nietzsche does make this move. But I think it is a move that limits rather than adds to his thinking of social change. We can draw out the important dynamics I want to look at without following him along this path, and so also leave open possibilities for exploring non-dominating relations of alliance and affinity. I will touch on some of these issues in Chapters 6 and 8.

(5) Issues of power and domination will certainly be crucial for this thesis. However, as the above points indicate, I think that Nietzsche's understanding of power is prone to serious ambiguities. I will turn to Foucault instead as a main reference point for looking at power relations in Chapter 7.
useful, we can ask: just what are the ‘things, organs, customs’ that we see being transformed and resignified, forming lineages and transmitting characteristics, dominating and resisting, etc.? Nietzsche's genealogical investigations seem to move freely between many ‘scales’, from micro-level psycho-physiological forces (e.g., aggressive instincts) up to macro-level social institutions (e.g., states), with a whole range of drives, practices, customs, communities and institutions in between. To help to understand this interplay, I will make two main moves. First, I consider all entities as assemblages of various scales. Second, I give a privileged focus to one particular kind of sub-individual assemblage, the drive pattern, and then look at how assemblages of other (larger) kinds are composed by processes involving drives.  

Drives are the topic of the next chapter; I will look at various other kinds of assemblages including social groups throughout the thesis; here I will just say a few first words about assemblages in general.

Following DeLanda, an assemblage is an entity made up of multiple components or elements connected by ‘relations of exteriority’ (2006:10). A relation of exteriority is a contingent relation between elements in which an element may be ‘detached from [an assemblage] and plugged into a different assemblage’ (ibid). To illustrate, we can follow DeLanda’s opposition of assemblage theory to the pernicious ‘organismic metaphor’ in social ontology, in which individuals or classes, etc., are seen as organs within a social body. To break with the habit of organismic thinking, Deleuze and Guattari often turn towards imagery of machines or of biological symbioses: machines are made of components that can be dismantled and re-assembled to form new machines; a

37 To be clear: although through most of this thesis I will think of drives as the lowest-scale elements of bodies and social assemblages, this does not mean that drives are indivisible “atoms”. Indeed, in the next chapter I will look at drives as themselves evolving assemblages.
wasp and an orchid have lives and identities outside of their symbiotic assemblage. But there is really no ontological dichotomy between organisms and symbioses: some entities may well depend on symbiotic relationships for their existence, and new technologies now allow the removal and re-assembly of organs, or the creation of animal-machine cyborgs with artificial limbs and organs. Assemblage theory thus substantially challenges the organismic metaphor by arguing that organisms are themselves assemblages. The key point is that while symbioses, organisms, and all other assemblages may be held together by dependencies, such relations are, as DeLanda puts it, ‘contingently obligatory’, but not ‘logically obligatory’ (ibid:11). Revisiting Nietzsche's image of the aristocratic state as an organism in this context, note that (i) this social organism is precisely a contingent formation brought about by ‘form-shaping’ processes of conquest; and (ii) in practice the ‘organs’ are not fully incorporated, but continue to resist.

Assemblages may be more or less temporary or enduring, loose or dense, made up of elements that are relatively homogeneous or heterogeneous. Deleuze and Guattari develop a number of concepts for thinking about the structuring of assemblages, such as those of virtuality and actuality, territorialisation and deterritorialisation, coding and overcoding. I will not follow these ideas: it could be very fruitful to relate the Nietzschean drive processes I look at to these Deleuzian concepts, but that would be a whole other thesis.\footnote{Keith Ansell-Pearson brings together Nietzsche’s thinking of evolution and will to power with Deleuze and Guattari on organisms and assemblages in his (1997). John Protevi in his \textit{Political Affect} (2009a) studies areas that closely overlap many of my concerns in this thesis using a Deleuzian approach that draws on DeLanda and also on research in biology, psychology, and complexity theory.}

One theme that will be important throughout this thesis is that of the stability – or, to think
dynamically, the stabilisation and destabilisation – of assemblages, their liability to continue and repeat in current forms, or to transform into new kinds of things. Again, the key point is that stability or instability are always outcomes of contingent processes: for example, particular evolutionary processes, such as those to which we owe the beginnings of multicellular life forms, may fix a symbiotic assemblage into a more stable organismic form. DeLanda writes: ‘The identity of any assemblage at any level of scale is always the product of a process […] and it is always precarious, since other processes […] can destabilise it.’ (ibid:28).

The affinity between assemblage theory and Nietzsche's genealogy should be apparent. The basic point, which I will develop further through this thesis, is that we can see genealogy as tracing how ‘things’ are assembled and re-assembled as they interact with other assemblages. The transmission of characteristics along lineages, and the transformation of lineages through encounters, are then two facets of assembly processes. These processes are contingent and concrete, and to understand them we need to look at them in action. To do this Nietzsche starts right down at the micro-level, in the sub-personal psycho-physiology of drives, which is where we head now.
Chapter 2. Psycho-Physiology I: Drives as Evolving Assemblages

In this chapter, and the two that follow it, I want to look at how Nietzsche's genealogical investigations of patterns of social change are grounded in his approach to psychology – or, as he sometimes puts it, emphasising a materialist and anti-dualist outlook, to psycho-physiology. Nietzsche develops his psychological thought in the three books of his middle or ‘free spirit' period: *Human, All Too Human* (1878-80), *Dawn* (1881), and *The Gay Science* (1882). In particular, I will focus on *Dawn*, the book in which he develops in greatest detail and clarity his core theory of drives (*Trieben*). As Graham Parkes (1994:2) writes, ‘while Nietzsche does not undertake a systematic presentation of his psychological ideas, they nevertheless have a “logic” of their own’. I think that we can best draw out this “logic” by following Nietzsche's discussion of drives.

Section 1 highlights a crucial starting point for Nietzsche's psychology: we are radically ignorant about the bodily processes that he thinks actually direct our experiencing and acting. What we can do, by closely observing recurring patterns, is create better ‘images’ (D119) to help us understand and take control of our lives.¹ In Section 2 I look at how Nietzsche uses his images of drives to develop new understandings of evaluation and of action. The drive approach allows him to move beyond a traditional understanding of valuing and acting as deeds of a unified ‘ego’ or ‘subject’. Instead we need to think of the psyche as a *dividual*.

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¹ On this point I also follow Parkes, who studies Nietzsche's psychology as ‘a discipline practised in images rather than concepts’ (1994:7).
body, a ‘social structure’ (BGE12) composed of multiple, diverse and often clashing drives.

In Section 3 I move on to the dynamics of Nietzsche's psycho-physiology: how drives are transmitted across bodies, and develop and change as they do so. To sum up, I think of drive patterns as themselves *evolving assemblages*. Finally, in Section 4 I begin to look at how the drive approach underpins the dynamics of *On the Genealogy of Morals*. These two final sections give outlines that I will develop in more depth in the subsequent chapters. My understanding of drives in this chapter is influenced by John Richardson (1996, 2004). But I also depart from his view in some important respects: I make these clearer in the appendix to this chapter.

2.1. Our ignorance

Nietzsche's investigation of the drives starts with a radical admission of ignorance. His most complete presentation of his drive theory, in *Dawn* section D119, opens with this line: ‘No matter how hard a person struggles for self-knowledge, nothing can be more incomplete than the image of all the drives taken together that constitute his being.’ This section follows closely on a run of passages (D115-D118) exposing fundamental errors in our common sense understanding of perception, thought and action. Subsequent sections, such as D129, develop further implications of our lack of self-knowledge.

I will just touch lightly on Nietzsche's reasons for this view. D115 claims that ‘language and the prejudices upon which language is based hinder in many
ways our understanding of inner processes and drives’. We do not have words for most of our inner experience, and language is a coarse net that catches only ‘superlative degrees’ or ‘extreme states’. Nietzsche will extend this analysis in The Gay Science, notably GS354 which understands reflective consciousness as that part of our psychic world that we can grasp in communicable, linguistic, and so highly limited terms. A further problem is ‘the age-old delusion that one knows, knows just exactly in every instance how human action comes about’ (D116). We maintain a dubious belief in a unitary volitional ‘subject’ as the root cause of action rather than face the ‘terrifying truth’ that ‘all actions are essentially unknown’ (ibid).

Very summarily, we can identify a number of levels of ‘erroneous’ categorisation. Most superficially, there are some gross psychological fallacies, such as the belief in transcendental subjects, which can be recognised and undone. But these are rooted in linguistic structures that inescapably shape all conscious thought. And then, to make things worse, Nietzsche also thinks that we are prone to some ‘primary errors’ (HH18) that lie well beneath reflective consciousness. The crudeness of linguistic categorisation is then only an acute case of a more general problem of atomism (BGE12), the inevitable but ‘arbitrary division and

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2 Nietzsche’s scepticism about common sense notions of will and agency is supported by recent research in psychology and neuroscience, such as that presented by Daniel M. Wegner in his The Illusion of Conscious Will (2002). Although Wegner doesn’t cite Nietzsche, some of his conclusions are strikingly similar. E.g.: ‘The unique human convenience of conscious thoughts that preview our actions gives us the privilege of feeling we willfully cause what we do. In fact, however, unconscious and inscrutable mechanisms create both conscious thought about action and the action, and also produce the sense of will we experience by perceiving the thought as cause of the action.’ (ibid:98). Brian Leiter (2009:122–4) discusses some of Wegner’s findings in relation to Nietzsche.

3 I will look further at Nietzsche’s account of language and consciousness in Chapter 3, and at his critique of the subject in Chapter 4. As Nietzsche develops these ideas in later texts, notably GM, he further brings out their interconnection: for example, in GM1:13 our customary conception of the ‘subject’ is also embedded into language. See also Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming b) for a further discussion of what he describes as ‘inner opacity’ in Nietzsche, and of the particular role played here by language.
dismemberment’ (GS112) of the flux of becoming by human understanding, which is embedded even into basic structures of perception.\(^4\)

Given all this, we are faced with a situation where ‘our moral judgements and evaluations are … mere images and fantasies stemming from a physiological process we know nothing of’ (D119). I want to make three notes on this statement. First, in fact there is no reason why it should apply only to moral judgements and evaluations.\(^5\) Second, Nietzsche’s identification of the underlying unconscious processes behind our evaluations as physiological fits with his strong and repeated insistence on the embodiment of the psychic throughout Dawn and other books, spelt out perhaps most famously in Z ‘On The Despisers of the Body’. In Beyond Good and Evil he uses the adjective ‘psycho-physiological’ (BGE23) to emphasise an anti-dualistic and materialist approach.\(^6\) In line with this, through this thesis I write of drives as acting within, and composing, bodies.

Third, if our judgements and evaluations are just ‘images and fantasies’, is this not equally true of the psychological judgements Nietzsche is now making

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\(^4\) In HH18 Nietzsche claims that ‘it is from the period of the lower organisms that man has inherited the belief that there are identical things’ and that ‘belief in the freedom of will is a primary error committed by everything organic’. Our linguistically shaped folk psychology, and still later scientific understanding of causation, are recent particularly human developments of this ancient ‘organic’ necessary erring. These ideas are developed through the first book of HH, and again in GS103-115.

\(^5\) Dawn is subtitled ‘Thoughts on the Presumptions of Morality’. With this focus, Nietzsche is at pains to emphasise that his analysis of valuing takes in moral valuing. But his basic observations and arguments are about valuing per se. I look further at the meaning of ‘value’ in Nietzsche in the next section.

\(^6\) In his emphasis on the primacy of ‘physiology’ Nietzsche is strongly influenced by strands of 19th century German ‘materialism’, including those he encountered through intense reading of Friedrich Lange’s 1866 History of Materialism. This materialism is a strong theme in Dawn, and remains constant throughout Nietzsche’s work in the middle and later periods. To note just a few examples: in GS39 he connects differences in powerful individuals’ ‘tastes and feelings’ to ‘lifestyle, nutrition or digestion, perhaps a deficit or excess of inorganic salts in their blood or brain; in brief, in their physis.’ In the third essay of the Genealogy he treats ressentiment as a physiological condition (GM3:15). In Twilight of the Idols he understands ‘sympathy’ as an expression of ‘physiological overexcitability’ (TI IX:37). In Ecce Homo he studies in detail the physiological factors behind his own philosophical career, addressing questions of ‘place’, ‘climate’ and ‘nutrition’ (EH ‘Why I am so clever’ 2).
about drives? Nietzsche readily admits this point: as he develops his detailed account of drives in D119, he interjects that it is all just ‘a matter of speaking in images’ (ibid). He had written in an unpublished note some years earlier: ‘In general the word drive is only a convenience and will be used everywhere that regular effects [regelmässige Wirkungen] in organisms are still not reducible to their chemical and mechanical laws.’ (KSA 8.23[9] [1876–1877]), and this remains fundamentally his view in Dawn. Drives are images, fantasies, ‘conventional fictions’⁷ that we can use to describe our psychological states and patterns, whilst we remain radically ignorant about the actual ‘physiological processes’ or ‘laws’ that produce them.⁸

My starting point, then, is that we should not read Nietzsche’s drive theory as an attempt to identify any “true” causal nature behind psychic life. However, to carry over some terms from a related Nietzschean discussion of causal understanding in science: although we cannot reach ‘beyond the image or behind it’ to give actual ‘explanations’, what we can do is make it so that ‘our descriptions are better’ (GS112).

In what sense ‘better’? Specifically, Nietzsche maintains that drive imagery is better than the images – of subjects, wills, reasons, agents, etc. – employed by traditional psychology, in both its “folk” and philosophical forms. And it is better for the guiding projects that Nietzsche pursues in Dawn and the other books of the ‘free spirit period’. These include, as we will see, the ‘therapeutic’ project of understanding our own recurring psycho-physiological

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⁷ To carry over a term that Nietzsche applies in BGE21 in a different context, there referring to ascriptions of causes.
⁸ It might be asked: is this truth of psycho-physiology only currently unknown, given the state of 19th – or 21st – century science, or is it in principle unknowable? This is a fascinating question, but not one I will explore in this thesis.
patterns in order to effectively pursue projects of self-cultivation; and the connected project, which will develop into the genealogy of morals, of exposing the ‘presumptions of morality’ (the sub-title of Dawn). Similarly, my own interest in pursuing Nietzsche's images of drives is that I think they may give us more powerful tools than traditional psychological constructs for understanding psycho-political dynamics of social change.

On what basis can we judge the efficacy of drive imagery? The basic method that Nietzsche employs in the ‘free spirit’ texts is that of close ‘psychological observation’ (HH35-8), in which he largely sees the French moralistes as his models. He sets out to pay attention to ‘the closest things’ (WS5-6, WS16), to embark on an honest and meticulous study of everyday psychophysiological life, which means not only introspective phenomenology of perceiving, desiring, feeling, valuing, acting and interacting, but also recording and analysing conditions of diet, climate, etc., and always with a regard for history.9 The claim is that through such fieldwork we can identify some basic patterns of how we – or the processes working through our bodies – perceive, interpret and value the world, and how these evaluative interpretations shape our

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9 Nietzsche first calls for a turn to close ‘psychological observation’ in Human, All Too Human, notably in the sequence HH35-8. Some points to note here are that:(i) psychological observation is a difficult and time-consuming, ‘modest labour’ requiring ‘perseverance in labour that does not weary of heaping stone upon stone, brick upon brick’ (HH37) – a theme he continues to develop throughout this period, for example in the preface of Dawn; (ii) psychological observation is ‘necessary’ (HH38) for the project of what in HH Nietzsche calls the ‘history of moral sensations’ – and which will evolve into the genealogy of morals; (iii) Nietzsche associates this approach with the French moralistes: in HH35 he cites La Rochefoucauld, whom he follows through HH in uncovering hidden egoistic impulses behind moral masks; Montaigne and Pascal are also regularly referenced throughout the free spirit trilogy. On Nietzsche and the moralistes see Pippin (2009). Nietzsche expands on this message with the call to turn to ‘the closest things’ in the Wanderer and His Shadow (WS5, WS6, WS16), which ties psychological observation to concern for physiology and everyday matters of diet and climate – a point Nietzsche develops right through to the detailed physiological self-analysis of Ecce Homo. But we should also remember in this context Nietzsche's warning in AOM223: ‘direct self-observation is not nearly sufficient for us to know ourselves: we require history, for the past continues to flow within us in a hundred waves [...]’. Genealogy and psycho-physiology are companion methods.
desires and move our bodies to action. If we have the patience and honesty to
stick at it – the integrity or ‘Redlichkeit’ that Nietzsche praises in passages such as
GS335 – then we can get past customary psychological errors to construct new
images that provide more productive and powerful handles on psycho-
physiological patterns.

Before delving into the imagery of drives, one final note. Terminological
consistency is not one of Nietzsche's values. In Dawn and other works he uses
terms including ‘drive’ (Trieb), ‘instinct’ (Instinkt), ‘desire’ (Begierde), ‘affect’
(Affekt), ‘will’ (Wille), ‘impulse’ (Antrieb) and more in interchangeable or
overlapping ways. In giving all the spotlight to ‘drive’ I am overlaying, and for
not the only time in this thesis, a consistency of my own on Nietzsche. As I
proceed it will be important to pay attention to some of the nuances of Nietzsche's
language; but also, and I think more so, to look for patterns that he describes in
various ways.

2.2. What are drives?

In Dawn, Nietzsche moves between two main schemes of images for thinking
about drives. On the one hand, he looks at drives as organisms with their own life-
cycles and nutritional needs. On the other, as patterns of activity of individual

10 Similarly, I view Nietzsche's use of intentionalistic or agential language in reference to drives –
as when he says that drives themselves desire, value, interpret, etc. – as his employing another
image schema, one closely related to the imagery of drives as organisms. Some commentators
read Nietzsche more literally as viewing drives as actual ‘homuncular’ mini-agents. See, for
‘homuncular’ readings as part of a wide-ranging survey of the secondary literature on
Nietzsche's drives.
human psyches/bodies. In this section I will first quickly run through the basic features of the first picture, then zoom in on the second.

Seeing drives as organisms, we can look at their ‘life’ over a number of time-spans. Most immediately, we see them in the moment of ‘greedily seizing’ and feeding on their ‘prey’ (D119) – this prey being human ‘experience’. At any moment, one drive is ‘feeding’ by taking charge of our experiencing – but there are always other hungry drives ‘lying in wait’ for their chance. In the picture of D119 only one drive is active at a time, a temporary ‘tyrant’ (D109) running the psyche. Other passages suggest a more complex picture in which psycho-physiological activity emerges from the interaction of multiple drives: e.g., in D129 bodily action results from a largely unconscious ‘clash of motives’ involving numerous drives; later in BGE36 ‘thinking’ is the ‘relationship of these drives to one another’. I suggest that we can take the simpler one ruling drive model as a handy simplification, but need to keep the more complex picture in mind.

Moving to longer time frames, drives that go ‘unfed’ become ‘thirsty and starving’, and so grow more insistent in their efforts to ‘seize’ control (D119). But a drive that starves for too long ‘withers up like a plant without rain’ (ibid). It is against this longer horizon that Nietzsche develops what we might call – here following Michael Ure (2008) and Keith Ansell-Pearson (2010) – a therapeutic account of how we can work on ourselves by ‘cultivating’ or ‘gardening’ (D560, D382) our drives. In D109 Nietzsche lists six main drive-therapeutic methods. The simplest techniques are direct corollaries of a basic principle of nutrition (which I will examine more closely in the next chapter): drives that are nourished
with activity tend to strengthen, becoming more likely to appear again in future; we can thus intervene in the development of our drives by giving or withholding opportunities for them to become active. Although there are some subtleties to pay attention to: for example, a drive can also be ‘overstuffed’ (ibid).

If drives are organisms, then a human being is a super-organism composed of many drives. In an unpublished note from 1883 Nietzsche writes: ‘As cell stands beside cell physiologically, so drive beside drive. The most general picture of our being is an association of drives, with ongoing alliances and rivalries with one another.’\(^{11}\) This thought will lead, in *Beyond Good and Evil*, to the suggestion that we can develop a new view of the ‘soul’ as a ‘social structure of the drives and emotions’ (BGE12). The social structuring of a body of drives can be more or less ordered and coherent, or chaotic and contradictory. In D119 Nietzsche compares a typical body of drives to a ‘polyp’ made up of many ‘polyp arms’, which grow independently and contingently. The overall composition is a messy ‘work of chance’, and ‘as a consequence of this chance nourishment of parts, the whole, fully grown polyp, will be just as accidental as its growth has been’. But self-cultivation can help us to order our drives and achieve more coherent psychic structures. Also, a theme that Nietzsche develops further in the *Genealogy*, ordering can be imposed on bodies of drives from without – for example through the ‘social straitjacket’ of the normative *morality of custom* that makes human

\(^{11}\) KSA 10.7[94] [1883] On the dividual psyche/body see also this note from 1881: KSA 9.11[7] [1881]: ‘We are buds on a single tree – what do we know about what can become of us from the interests of the tree? … Stop feeling oneself as this phantastic ego! Learn gradually to jettison the supposed individual! Discover the errors of the ego! Realize that egoism is an error! But not to be understood as the opposite of altruism! No! Get beyond “me” and “you”! Experience cosmically!’ Cited by Parkes (1994:300) who discusses this as part of an illuminating series of 1881 notes in which Nietzsche develops his thinking of drives. Also: note that if drives are organisms, they are themselves assemblages with multiple components, rather than any kind of basic psycho-physiological “atoms”.
beings ‘calculable’ (GM2:2). I will pick up these points in Chapter 4.

The values of drives

About half way through D119, Nietzsche switches from talking of drives as independent organisms to seeing them as organising principles of human psycho-physiological activity. He makes this switch in the course of an extended example.

Walking in the marketplace, you hear someone laugh at you, and:

... depending on whether this or that drive happens to be surging in us at the moment, the event will assume for us this or that meaning – and depending on the type of person we are, it will be a completely different event. One person takes it like a drop of rain, another shakes it off like an insect, one tries to pick a fight, another checks his clothes to see if there's a reason to laugh … [etc.] … – and in every case it is a drive that is being gratified, be it the drive for anger or truculence or reflection or benevolence.

The story starts with an encounter between two human individuals: you, and the laughing person. But to understand your response, we have to go down a scale to look at the sub-individual composition of your body of drives: what drives are in you, and what are their relations. Staying, for the moment, with the simplified model in which one drive is active at a time, what exactly is this drive doing? The first aspect of a drive's activity, on which Nietzsche mostly focuses in Dawn, is interpretation: it will ‘interpret nerve impulses and ascribe “causes” to them’

12 Following John Richardson (1995: Chapter 1.5), we can think of a ‘type’ (of person) as a typical formation of drives. Richardson uses this idea to study classic Nietzschean ‘types’ such as masters, slaves, etc. Brian Leiter (2002) also concentrates on the idea of physiological ‘types’ in his reading of Nietzsche's moral psychology; although I question his insistence on the ‘immutability’ of Nietzschean physiological types.
It is worth noting the scare quotes around the word ‘causes’. Immediately before the passage I just cited, Nietzsche develops the theory of dreaming that became a major influence on Freud. In dreams, drives create a ‘fantastical commentary’ of ‘images and fantasies’ from ‘movements of blood and intestines’, or ‘sounds from the bell tower, weathercocks and moths’ (D119). And in waking life, Nietzsche concludes, their activity is in principle no different, only the quantity of external stimulation makes drives less ‘free’ and ‘unbridled’ in their daylight fantasising. In short, the drives assign not just ‘causes’, but meanings in a much richer sense. Furthermore, and crucially, this interpretation or meaning-giving always involves an evaluation. The meaning assigned to an event (e.g., the laughter in the marketplace) is never neutral but always judged in some way, positively or negatively, as good, bad, right, wrong, harmless, dangerous, beautiful, repellant, etc.

“Value” is clearly a central idea for Nietzsche, who will later come to define his project as the ‘revaluation of all values’. I will follow Nietzsche’s emphasis on valuing in this thesis: we can think of political and social assemblages in many ways, but I think much of the power of Nietzsche’s approach lies in bringing out the sense in which they are instances, complexes, systems, etc., of evaluation. However, Nietzsche’s understanding of values differs in a number of respects from some standard approaches in philosophy, and particularly

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13 See also the account of dreaming in HH13. Assoun (2000) studies the Nietzsche-Freud relationship and compares their ideas of drives and instincts (especially 51-95).
14 See Parkes (1994:289-305) for an extended discussion of drive activity as ‘phantastic projection’, brought out further by studying Nietzsche’s unpublished notes of this period.
15 The Antichrist (A) is the first volume of a work to be titled ‘The Revaluation of Values’, and throughout Ecce Homo Nietzsche uses this term to describe his life’s project. David Owen (2007) discusses how Nietzsche comes to formulate this project of revaluation of values leading up to the Genealogy, and sees Dawn as marking its ‘initiation’ (Owen 2007:27)
in contemporary analytical ‘metaethics’. Without attempting to discuss philosophical ideas of value in general, it will be necessary to identify some distinguishing characteristics of Nietzsche's view. In a number of respects here I follow the readings of both John Richardson (1996, 2004) and Paul Katsafanas (2012) – although I will also make clear how I differ from them.

First we need to distinguish: (a) an activity or attitude of valuing that assigns or identifies value; and (b) the value that is assigned to or identified in a thing, event, feature of the world, etc.\(^\text{16}\) Perhaps Nietzsche's most basic thesis on valuing is that, as Richardson puts it, ‘value is always “for” a valuing’ (2004:72). As Nietzsche writes in The Gay Science: ‘Whatever has value in the current world, has it not in itself, from nature — nature is always valueless — but one has once given it a value, as a gift’ (GS301).\(^\text{17}\) A second key point concerns what is

\(^\text{16}\) John Richardson stresses this distinction and notes: ‘Nietzsche observes this difference in his terminology. For the most part, he refers to values-as-valuings using a family of terms built upon schätzen (Schätzung, Abschätzung, Geringschätzung, and so on). … On the other hand, Nietzsche usually refers to values-as-valueds using Werthe’. However, as ever, Nietzsche's terminology is never entirely consistent: ‘He also uses Werthe, however [for values-as-valuing]’. (2004:71)

\(^\text{17}\) Also Z ‘On the Thousand and One Goals’: ‘Verily, men gave themselves all their good and evil. Verily, they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from heaven. Only man placed value in things […]’ WP259 [1884]: ‘all evaluation is made from a definite perspective […] a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives.’

There are a couple of tricky issues raised by these citations that I need to address. First, despite the above citation from Zarathustra, Nietzsche does not – or at least, not always – think that valuing is unique to humans. This is particularly clear in later texts, where he repeatedly affirms fundamentally evaluative ‘will to power’ as the principle of all life – or even, sometimes, also of non-living matter. The point with respect to values is made more explicit in unpublished notes: E.g., ‘Valuations [Werthschätzungen] lie in all functions of the organic being’ (11.26[72] [1884]), cited in Richardson 2004:72)); or WP505 [1885-6] where Nietzsche attributes value judgements (built into colour perceptions) to ants and other insects; or WP567 [1888] where values are ‘viewpoint[s] of utility in regard to the preservation and enhancement of the power of a certain species of animal.‘

The key point here, for my reading, is that there are no values without ‘valuers’, whether these are human or non-human. So what does Nietzsche then mean by the valuelessness of ‘nature’? I am not able to give anything like an adequate account of Nietzsche's (transforming) conception of nature in this thesis. But here is one small suggestion – see also the related discussion regarding nature and culture in Chapter 5. In early texts, notably SE, Nietzsche personified nature as an ‘artist’ with its own values, goals and purposes. He makes a decisive break from this approach in the ‘free spirit’ books, now calling for nature's ‘de-deification’ (GS109). I think we have to read GS301 in this context: it is crucial to break with the ‘mystical’ (or ‘pneumatological’ – see HH9) view that nature “as a whole” has a set of
often called Nietzsche's perspective: valuings are always from particular perspectives or evaluative stances. And there is no universal evaluative perspective, no view from nowhere, only diverse and contingent perspectives localised in time and space. Bringing these two points together: things do not have ‘objective’ values, but only perspectival values assigned from localised valuing stances. Furthermore, the same ‘thing’ may have multiple values ascribed to it from multiple perspectives.

The next point is that the basic evaluative perspectives we need to look at are those of drives. Nietzsche closely connects values and drives. Drives are Nietzsche's fundamental motivating forces, and ‘all actions may be traced back to evaluations’ (D104). He is still more explicit in HH32, where: ‘a drive to something or away from something divorced from a feeling that one is desiring the beneficial or avoiding the harmful, a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist in man’—although Nietzsche does not always think, in later texts, that drive evaluations are knowing. As Richardson writes, Nietzsche ‘takes the role of valuing away from a central ego-will-mind, and disperses it among a multitude of drives’ (2004:74). 18

Suppose that a person hears laughter in the marketplace and evaluates this laughter, e.g., as a threat. What do we gain by thinking of this as the valuing of a drive, rather than of a whole person? One important answer is that it allows us to identify and investigate multiple, diverse, and perhaps contradictory patterns of valuing within the same individual. In particular, we may see this diversity along purposes, values, meanings – or, indeed, ‘laws’ (see AOM9, where Nietzsche rejects the ‘superstition’ of ‘laws of nature’). This does not mean that we cannot see nature as the site of multiple ‘organic’ and ‘material’ valuings from many partial perspectives – which is I think the position Nietzsche is moving towards.

18 KSA 12.1[58] [1885] ‘From each of our basic drives there is a different perspectival assessment of all events and experiences’
two dimensions: (a) different valuing patterns may be active in an individual over time; but also (b) they may be at work in the same individual simultaneously. The first of these two issues comes across clearly in D119. We interpret and value the world and particular features of it – things, events, etc. – very differently depending on which drive is ‘surging in us at this moment’. I will come to the second issue, the possibility of simultaneous conflicting drive evaluations, in a moment.

Nietzsche's view of valuing clashes with the philosophical mainstream in an important respect: he radically dissociates valuing from reason or deliberation, or even from conscious thought. Some evaluations may ‘rise to consciousness’ (GS354), and be subject to reflection, deliberation, reason and justification. But many others are not conscious ‘thoughts’ [Gedanken] but rather ‘feelings’ [Gefühle], or the deep unthinking habits that Nietzsche sometimes calls ‘instincts’ [Instinkte]. One illuminating passage here is D34, where Nietzsche distinguishes

19 Not all readers of Nietzsche agree. For example, Peter Poellner (2009) maintains a stronger and narrower sense in which a value, in contrast with a ‘mere desire’, must be ‘grounded’ by possessing ‘some kind of objectivity’ (2009:157-8). Poellner then argues that non-reflective affective stances can give ‘minimally objective’ groundings for values insofar as they involve ‘a constraint upon impulses which make these intelligible to the subject and to others as preferences’ (ibid:158). This implies, amongst other things, (a) that there can be no fully unconscious valuations and (b) that valuations are ‘for’ (i.e., from the perspective of) subjects rather than drives. Both of these points are at odds with my reading of Nietzsche, as I think there are plentiful references (many cited in this chapter) in which Nietzsche ascribes valuations to sub-personal drives and to bodies that are not ordered as conscious subjects (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of subjectivity). If Nietzsche sometimes understands ‘values’ in the narrower sense suggested by Poellner, this is not his only or, I think, most common usage.

20 As I noted at the end of Section 1, Nietzsche often uses his psychological language quite loosely, and ‘Instinkt’ at least sometimes appears as a general synonym for ‘Trieb’. However, ‘Instinkt’ often does seem to refer more particularly to deeply embodied and unconscious drive patterns, and it is this sense that I am picking up here, and will develop further in Chapter 3. See for example one of Nietzsche’s first sketches for genealogy of morality in HH99: ‘Morality is preceded by compulsion, indeed it is for a time itself still compulsion, to which one accommodates oneself for the avoidance of what one regards as unpleasurable. Later it becomes custom, later still voluntary obedience, finally almost instinct; then, like all that has for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with pleasure – and is now called virtue.’ Also GS333: ‘Your judgement ‘this is right’ has a pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of experiences.’
and traces the development of two kinds of moral evaluations: ‘moral feelings’, and ‘moral concepts’. Moral feelings do the real work, whereas ‘moral concepts’ or justifying reasons are secondary add-ons:

only later in life, when they find themselves inundated with these acquired and well-practised affectations, they consider it a matter of decency to establish a why, retroactively, a type of justifying foundation in order to authorise these sympathies and antipathies.

Another related point, which Katsafanas picks up, is that Nietzsche sees values as embedded right into perception. This is already strongly suggested in D119, and comes out in passages such as GS114: ‘All experiences are moral experiences, even in the realm of sense perception.’ The point is made still more succinctly in unpublished notes such as WP505: ‘there is no doubt that all sense perceptions are wholly permeated with value judgements’. Katsafanas expands nicely:

Nietzsche’s point is that we experience the world in evaluative terms. The world does not present itself as an indifferent array of inert facts. The world tempts and repulses, threatens and charms; certain features impress themselves upon us, others recede into the periphery, unnoticed. Our experience of the world is fundamentally value-laden (2013).

However, and here I depart from Katsafanas, in fact valuing need not always involve any perceptual or affective experience. Drives, says Katsafanas, are ‘dispositions that generate evaluative orientations’ (ibid), and these orientations

21 Also WP260: ‘The extent of moral evaluations: they play a part in almost every sense impression. Our world is coloured by them.’ And WP565 [1886]: ‘all our sensations of value (i.e., simply our sensations)’. In a number of notes Nietzsche also discusses ‘physiological value judgements’: e.g., WP388 [1888] where he traces ‘the altruistic mode of valuation’ down to ‘the absence of the great affirmative feelings of power (in muscles, nerves, ganglia).’
are ‘affectively charged, selective responses to the world, which incline the agent
to experience situations in evaluative terms’ (ibid). They ‘structur[e] the agent’s
view of his environment’, and in doing so ‘influence an agent’s behaviour’ (ibid).
I think these points characterise very well many drives, but they miss some others:
there may also be drive values that are entirely unconscious, embodied in
physiological structures of which we do not even have non-reflective ‘primary’
forms of awareness. This point will come out in the discussion of motivation in
D129 that I will look at in a moment: we can be affected simultaneously by
numerous drive-motives, and these we ‘in part do not recognise at all and in part
recognise only very dimly’. We may also see it in unpublished notes where
Nietzsche attributes valuing even to ‘our muscles’ and to ‘the lowest organisms’.22

So if evaluations are commonly not reflective, and sometimes not even
conscious at all, just what are they? In the most general sense, a valuing or
evaluation is a positive or negative attitude or stance towards a thing, event,
feature of the world, etc. It is this very broad idea of value that I take Nietzsche to
be using, and I take it to be basic in Nietzsche's thinking. It may be that we can't
analyse it any further, and in any case I am not sure that Nietzsche does – nor will
I try to myself in this thesis. We can see evaluative attitudes instantiated in a range

22 ‘Our most sacred convictions, the unchanging elements in our supreme values, are judgements
of our muscles.’ (WP314 [1887–1888]). ‘Valuations [Werthschätzungen] lie in all functions of
the organic being’ (11.26[72] [1884]). “Higher” and “lower,” the selecting of the more
important, more useful, more pressing arises already in the lowest organisms. “Alive”: that
means already valuing — In all willing is valuing — and will is there in the organic.’
11.25[433] [1884]: The last two quotes cited by John Richardson (2004:73).

We may find another kind of unconscious drive evaluation in GM3:24 where Nietzsche
argues against the very idea of a ‘science without presuppositions’, claiming that modern
philosophers and scholars remain guided by a ‘faith in the ascetic ideal itself, even if as an
unconscious imperative’. The ascetic ideal, the genealogy of which Nietzsche studies in the
third essay of GM, has become so incorporated in contemporary culture that its values are now
unnoticed presuppositions. Certainly, no one needs to reflect upon them, or give justifying
reasons for holding them. But their unconsciousness may go still further: no one even feels,
senses, perceives them any more, they have become so much part of the ‘common sense’ frame
of scholarly inquiry.
of structures and processes. For example, some valuations are manifested in conscious judgements, others in affective experiences, whilst yet others may be fully unconscious embodied ‘inclinations’ or ‘disinclinations’ (‘judgements of our muscles’ (WP314)). The same drive pattern may value in various ways, reflectively, affectively, dispositionally, or otherwise. But one point is that evaluations of drives always involve, amongst other things, a disposition to action. This is the point I turn to now.\footnote{One path to follow in further developing ideas of psycho-physiological valuing could be that of ideas of ‘sense-making’ in biology and enactive cognitive science, developed by writers including Francisco Varela (1991) and Evan Thompson (2007). There are many leads in John Protevi's discussion (2009a:16-18) which, referring to Nietzsche and Spinoza, looks at this approach to ‘the biological basis of the judgements “good” and “bad” ’ (ibid:16). Varela holds that all ‘autonomous systems’, right down to single-celled organisms, are perspectively interpreting or giving meaning to their environments. A question would be how to bring this approach together with the Nietzschean idea of a body as a social structure of multiple drive-patterns.}

\textit{The ‘clash of motives’}\footnote{Nietzsche's main focus in \textit{Dawn} is generally on the interpretive and evaluative role of drives, and as a consequence their motivational role is sometimes left implicit. It is clearer in other texts – particularly in the preceding \textit{Human All Too Human}, where drives are primarily understood as motive forces (e.g., HH32, HH34). It may be that in \textit{Dawn} Nietzsche now presupposes the basic motivational operation of drives, and turns his attention to the way in which action flows out of evaluation. It may be useful here to look at the historical development of the drive concept both in Nietzsche's own writing and in the scientific and philosophical literature he drew on: Parkes (1994) is indispensable on both; Katsafanas (2013: section 2) also surveys the second. Katsafanas connects Nietzsche's focus on the link between interpreting and acting in drives back to Schopenhauer's account of ‘The Metaphysics of Sexual Love’, in which ‘as in the case of all instinct, truth assumes the form of delusion, in order to act on the will’ (1969:540).}

A drive pattern does not stop at passively assessing and interpreting the world, it then leads the body to action. In the example of D119, depending on how you interpretively evaluate the stranger's laughter, you may check your clothes, or move to start a fight.\footnote{To look more deeply at the motivational role of drives I turn to D129, perhaps Nietzsche's clearest positive account – as opposed to his}
many critical debunkings – of the causes of action.\textsuperscript{25}

D129 does open with a critique, of how we commonly suppose that an action results from a deliberative process in which ‘the consequences of all the different actions we believe ourselves capable of undertaking march across our reflective consciousness one after the other, and we compare these consequences’. We may then rationally decide on the correct course, and resolve to act. This decision and the conscious process that produces it is not entirely epiphenomenal: it can have an effect on the coming action. But it is only ‘one motive’ amongst others that have to fight it out in the true ‘clash of motives’ that ensues:

At this point there comes into play the way we customarily expend our energy, or a slight provocation from a person whom we fear or honour or love, or indolence … or the excitation of our imagination brought on by whatever trivial occurrence comes our way at the decisive moment; completely incalculable somatic factors come into play, the surge of some distress or other …

From habits to fantastic imaginings, these are exactly the kinds of interpretive and evaluative attitudes and experiences – and also non-experiences – that Nietzsche described in D119. These motives or evaluations may take a range of more or less reflective forms, but all can play their parts in the actual motivational process that leads to action:

\textsuperscript{25} Although the word ‘drive’ doesn’t appear in this section, it makes a lot of sense to read it together with D119. In D119 Nietzsche looks at a largely ‘unknown, perhaps unknowable’ interplay of physiological processes that shape our interpretations and evaluations. Now in D129 he turns to the interplay of a host of ‘unconscious processes’ involving ‘motives that we in part do not recognise at all and in part recognise only very dimly, motives that we can never compare with each other and take account of in advance’. (See also GS111: ‘The course of logical thoughts and inferences in our brain today corresponds to a process and struggle of drives that are individually all very illogical and unjust, we ordinarily experience only the result of the struggle: so quickly and so secretly does this primeval mechanism now play itself out in us.’) If we bring this together with the statement of D104 that ‘all actions stem from evaluations’, then the motives of D129 are, or are closely tied to, evaluations. And, following the discussion above, our evaluations are the evaluations of drives.
In all likelihood, a clash takes place among them as well, a pressing to and fro, a balancing and counterbalancing of the various parts – and this would be the actual “clash of motives”: something completely invisible to us of which we are equally unconscious […] the clash itself, and likewise the victory, as victory are hidden from me: for even though I do indeed learn what it is I end up doing – I do not learn which motive actually was thus crowned victorious.

To sum up: an action is an outcome of an unknown psycho-physiological process. We may be aware of some of the evaluations that input into this process; but others we may not be aware of at all; and in any case we are entirely unaware of how they interact with each other to produce an action. Bringing together D119 and D129, then, we have a double ignorance: first, of how our interpretive evaluations emerge; second, of how those evaluations then shape actions. All we can really know, and even then incompletely, is that we have some evaluations, and later (or simultaneously, or maybe even before) some actions. As Nietzsche writes in D121, in a very Humean vein, our ‘intellect’ attributes cause and effect where really all it can grasp are conjunctions – no ‘connection more essential than that of plain succession!’ What such regularities can do, however, is allow us to identify patterns of succession in which certain typical patterns of valuing are often accompanied by certain typical patterns of acting.

The last point I want to make here is that in D129 we see Nietzsche moving away from the simple ‘one ruling drive’ model of D119 to a more complex picture in which multiple drives are active simultaneously. A number of drive evaluations – the conscious decision, the habit, my indolence, the provocation, etc., – are in play all at once. Note also that Nietzsche rejects any (positive) correlation between strength of awareness and motivational force: it
may be that the evaluation I am most urgently aware of, say a hard-deliberated conscious decision, is beaten in the ‘clash of motives’ by a ‘somatic’ force I never even notice. In fact – I will look at this in the next chapter – he often seems to think that less conscious motive forces typically prove stronger.\textsuperscript{26}

\textit{From valuing to acting}

I now want to bring together evaluating and acting to give a general outline of drive patterns. To do this I will extrapolate somewhat from Nietzsche's texts, to offer what I hope is a reasonable reconstruction of a workable drive theory. To make the presentation simpler, I think of a number of steps leading from the activation of drives to action. This is quite a crude simplification: in real life these steps are neither discrete nor clearly sequential.

Nietzsche says that our being is ‘constituted by a number of drives’ (D119). But we can distinguish between those drives that are ‘active’, currently operative patterns of valuing and acting, and those that are latent, ‘waiting their chance’. So the first step is the activation of some of these drives. Although a drive may be ‘lurking in wait’, ‘on the average, [it] finds nothing for itself’ in a situation. The activation of drives is a psycho-physiological process – once again, very largely unknown to us – that involves both the make-up of my “repertoire”, as it were, of drives (which drives are latent in my body, how strong or hungry

\textsuperscript{26} These points are further reinforced in D133, where Nietzsche discusses ‘compassionate’ acts. Here also he argues that ‘we never do something of this sort from one motive’ – a range of thoughts, impulses, sensations are at work simultaneously. And he emphasises the strength of unconscious motivations: ‘we are thinking about ourselves, no longer consciously, to be sure, but very \textit{powerfully unconsciously}’ (italicised in original). On that last point one key statement is GS11 where Nietzsche claims that consciousness is the ‘last and latest development of the organic and hence what is most unfinished and unstrong’; there are similar formulations in GS333 and GS354.
they are, etc.), and stimuli from the environment (the ‘nerve impulses’ of D119). Certain situations may stimulate certain drives; but ‘internal’ relations between the drives of my body are also at issue.

The second step is evaluation or valuing: that is, my body interpretively evaluates the situation according to the valuing patterns of its active drives, perhaps in a number of ways simultaneously. Although I am focusing on valuing, we can also see evaluation as one aspect of a broader interpretive activity of ‘meaning-giving’.

The third step is that the evaluation of a drive leads to a disposition to action – or, as I will put it, a form of desiring. I need to say a bit more about this point. First, although, as I noted above, Nietzsche sometimes seems to use ‘desire’ (Begierde) and ‘affect’ (Affekt) almost interchangeably with ‘drive’ (Trieb), we can largely trace a distinction between (a) a drive and (b) an affect or desire as an element of the overall drive pattern. Following Christopher Janaway (2009:55), ‘a drive is a relatively stable tendency to active behaviour of some kind, while an affect, to put it roughly, is what it feels like when a drive is active inside oneself’. And the affect in question is not just any kind of affective state; it is, at least in part, a feeling of desiring. That is, it involves the particular kind of affective experience of being disposed or moved towards action – to quote Katsafanas, an ‘affective orientation’, a felt directedness; or, to recall Spinoza's classic definition, an ‘appetite together with consciousness of the appetite’ (Ethics III.p9.schol).²⁷

²⁷ In D119 Nietzsche uses a range of images to describe the desiring of drives. He writes that a drive ‘desires gratification – or the exercise of its energy, or the discharge of it, or the satiation of an emptiness – its all a matter of speaking in images’. These images of discharge, hunger, preying, etc., recur through Nietzsche's discussions of drives and motives. Beyond Dawn, they come to play a key role in the Genealogy, where the efforts of drives and instincts to ‘discharge’ or ‘vent’ their energy (e.g., GM2.4, 2.5, 2.18, BGE13), and the obstacles they meet in doing so, are central to the dynamics of transforming value systems.
However, as I argued above, some drives may not involve any experiencing or feeling at all. So when I say that a drive pattern involves desiring, I understand desire in a broad sense, to include also desires which may not be felt at all, dispositions of which we may be entirely unaware.\footnote{I don’t have space here to discuss philosophy and psychology of desire in any depth, but would make the following suggestion. It may be that the first, affective, concept of desire is in some ways more basic and immediate; perhaps we typically develop an idea of desires as dispositions only after developing an understanding of what it is like to feel a desire. But we can then abstract or analogise from this to think about desires that may never be felt. We might also pursue the same thought with respect to values, and indeed to drive patterns as a whole: perhaps our first-personal experience of valuing and other drive elements typically plays an important role in allowing us to frame the very idea of valuing, and of drives; but once we have developed these concepts, we are then able to think about wholly unconscious values, and drives, whose activity in our own or other bodies can only be inferred.}

The fourth step is that drives, through the unknown ‘clash of motives’, move the body to action. Here I want to make a number of points. The first is that, reading Nietzsche, we need to think of ‘action’ in a broad way. For example, in GS335 Nietzsche tells us that at least certain sorts of thoughts are actions: e.g., an observation or decision, ‘your deciding, for instance, that [something] is right, is also an action’, as is an ensuing deliberative inference “therefore it must be done’’. I will employ a somewhat crude distinction between ‘external’ and ‘internal’ actions. By ‘external’ actions I mean movements of a body that impinge on the world beyond, and so may immediately affect other bodies: for example, when in the Genealogy Nietzsche tells us that ‘noble’ natures can respond to attacks with ‘the true reaction, that of deeds’ (GM1:10). By contrast, an internal action is one that is enacted within an ‘inner world’ (GM2:16) and does not directly impinge on others. Internal actions can include thoughts, dreams, fantasies, etc.

Secondly, we need to leave aside any idea of distinguishing an ‘action’, in the strong sense of an intentional or volitional act, from a mere movement of the
body caused by an ‘instinct’, habit, motor response, etc. Nietzsche’s discussion of
the ‘clash of motives’ makes such a distinction untenable. If I can in fact never
identify ‘which motive’ (or combination of motives) caused the action, then I can
never identify whether an action was the result of, e.g., a consciously formed
intention, or a ‘somatic factor’.  

We can tie both these points to Nietzsche’s materialist insistence on
‘psycho-physiology’. When you hear the man laughing in the marketplace, you
might ‘shake it off like a drop of rain’, ‘check [your] clothes’, or ‘try to pick a
fight’. The second two certainly involve physical movement. The first, seemingly,
does not – unless, that is, you literally ‘shake’ your body in response. But often, in
fact, our bodies do move, shake, shrug, slump, etc. as expressions of feelings and
evaluations. For example, having angry thoughts about a person, or feeling your
cheeks flushing, your blood ‘boiling’, or noticing your fists clenching, or striking
someone in ‘hot blood’, or making a calculating plan for revenge, are all
enactments of an ‘aggressive drive’. On the one hand, there is no clear dividing
line between actions and mere ‘thoughts’; or, on the other, between actions and
‘motor’ responses or other mere bodily ‘events’. All are psycho-physiological
outcomes of complex bodily processes of which we are largely unaware; and we

29 For a different view defending a Nietzschean distinction between a stronger sense of action and
mere bodily events see Ken Gemes (2009). On Gemes’ reading, ‘most humans, being merely
members of the herd, are merely passive conduits for various disparate forces already existing
and operating around them’ (2009:42). Such individuals would not ‘act’ in a strong sense. But
there are some individuals, those whom Nietzsche in GM Essay 2 calls ‘sovereign individuals’,
who have ordered their drives in such a way that they ‘deserve the honorific person, who by
imposing their strong will exercise a form of free will and genuine agency’ (ibid). I will look at
sovereign individuals in Chapter 4. I will not investigate Gemes’ claim that (some of) their
activity amounts to (strong) action but, in principle it could be compatible with my reading.

30 We can also connect this thought back to the discussion of dreaming. The reason a drive can
play out in dream or in ‘fantasy’ as well as in embodied action is that imagination and action
are fundamentally of a type. Although, again, we might want to insist that dreamers’ bodies are
also physiologically active, taking in information from the world (“neural impulses”) and,
indeed, responding, as they move, breathe, sweat, pulse, cry out, etc.
can think about all of them in terms of drive patterns.\textsuperscript{31}

The final point is that drive patterns may be more or less flexible in terms of just how they play out in action. For example, in the account of dreaming in D119, Nietzsche expresses his ‘suspicion’ that ‘our dreams have precisely the value and meaning of compensating to a certain degree for that contingent absence of “nourishment” during the day’.

why in one dream do I enjoy the indescribable, variform beauty of music, why in another, blissful as an eagle, do I fly and soar up and away to the distant mountain tops? These sorts of make-believe […] give discharge and free rein to our drives for tenderness or playfulness or adventure, to our desire for music or mountain ranges

The idea of ‘compensation’ suggests that these drives would rather ‘discharge themselves’ in waking external activity. But activated drives are often not able to express themselves as they most desire. There may just be no physical opportunities, e.g., to climb up, let alone soar over mountain ranges. Or it may be that they lose out to other drives in the ‘clash of motives’. However, the valuing and desiring of these drives may still be able to play out in an activity of some form: for example, in an internal activity of dream or fantasy. Or perhaps they can find some other, less desirable but still external, form of expression.

In two recent papers, Mark Alfano (2010, 2013) has noted how this idea runs as a common thread through much of Nietzsche's psychological thinking. Alfano describes it as the ‘tenacity of the intentional’, which he formulates thus:

\textsuperscript{31} Which is not to say that there may be other ‘descriptions’, not in terms of drives, that are more suitable and helpful for thinking about psycho-physiological phenomena in some cases. Nietzsche suggests that we can think of our body as constituted by drives; but there may still be other ways of thinking about it as well.
‘(T) When an intentional state loses its object, a new object replaces the original; the state does not disappear entirely.’ (2013:462). He expands with this image:

For Nietzsche, intentional states are vectors. They have both a magnitude and a direction. They have momentum. Just as a careening projectile does not evaporate when its target disappears or shields itself, but smashes something else, so intentional states do not dissipate when their objects are inaccessible. (ibid:466).

Although the details of Alfano’s formulation and language are rather different from my drive approach, I think we are noticing the same basic point. I will express it by thinking of drives as flexible, variform patterns. Some drives may be more rigid, for example, perhaps some basic physiological needs, or obsessive compulsions. But in general, drive patterns may have a number of possible ways of enacting their valuing and desiring, which I will call their ‘activity paths’. Some paths may be more valued and desired than others, and will be followed where possible: I will call these (more) ‘primary’ activity paths. Others are followed only as ‘compensation’ when primary paths are blocked: I will call these (more) ‘secondary’ activity paths. These ideas will become important as we look at the dynamics of the life of drives.

One difference of my approach from Alfano’s, and also from Richardson’s, is that I think that we don't need to see all activity paths of drives as involving ‘targets’, ‘objects’, or goals. For example, drives' activity paths could also involve more “impulsive” or “automatic” responses of various kinds such as involuntary imitative movements (which will be a major theme of Chapter 3); or trained

32 Alfano also relates this point to Nietzsche's discussion of internalisation and throughout the Genealogy (see Section 4 below); as well as giving a number of further examples from later texts including The Antichrist (A).
reactions of athletes, fighters, dancers; or many everyday habitual and unreflective
activities; or actions following impulses or ‘urges’ without any forward-looking
goal. One of the powers of Nietzsche's drive approach, I think, is that it
encompasses what is traditionally thought of as ‘purposive’ and ‘non-purposive’
behaviour within the same psycho-physiological framework. (The appendix to this
chapter discusses this point, with reference to Richardson's reading, in more
detail.)

To sum up, drives are patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting that we can
identify in ourselves and others.33 We can think of interpretive and evaluative
stances, desiring affects and dispositions, and activity paths as three kinds of
elements that come together to make up drive patterns. In the sections and
chapters that follow, I will often look at these elements more or less
independently: for example, at how particular activity paths may change, or
valuing stances be transmitted; and I will suggest that we can think of a drive as
itself an assemblage made up of, and continually re-assembled from, multiple
elements. However, for all this mutability, the basic structure of the drive pattern
stays the same: valuing leads to desiring and so to acting, whether along more
primary or secondary activity paths. ‘All actions may be traced back to
evaluations’ (D104), and on the other hand all evaluations move, or at least
dispose, their body towards some kind of action. I will refer to this core claim as
the unity principle of Nietzsche's psycho-physiology: wherever we find a valuing,
we will also find a desiring and acting of some kind, and vice versa.

33 Raymond Geuss (2001:331) uses a similar formulation in his essay on ‘Nietzsche and
Genealogy’ when he writes of (Christian) ‘forms of acting, feeling, judging’.
Summary

As I have covered a number of complex points in this chapter so far, it may be worth pausing to recap some ideas. Nietzsche begins his account of drives by observing our radical ignorances of the unknown causal processes that move our psyches/bodies. In the face of this ignorance, what we can do is use ‘close observation’ to identify important patterns of psycho-physiological life. The basic patterns that Nietzsche identifies are what he calls the drives. Drives are composite patterns which always involve sub-patterns or elements of valuing, desiring, and acting.

Nietzsche's investigation of drive patterns brings out various phenomena, some of which involve radical departures from traditional psychological approaches. Here are just five points that I want to highlight as key Nietzschean ‘findings’. First, the unity of drive patterns: the observation that valuing, desiring and acting are bound together throughout human psycho-physiological life. Second, the ‘nutrition principle’ that drive patterns are strengthened by their repeated activity. Third, the multiplicity of drive patterns: there are many diverse and often conflicting patterns of valuing, acting and desiring at work in a body, sequentially and simultaneously. Fourth, the mutability of drive patterns: particular patterns of valuing, desiring and acting, and their composition and relations within bodies, are continually open to transformation. Fifth, the transmission of drives: drives are shared and spread across bodies within social worlds. I now want to turn to these last two points.
2.3. How drives change

At least in some uses, the term *Trieb* or drive can invoke the image of a largely fixed, constant motivational structure, perhaps something like a Freudian *Libido* unfolding in an inexorable progression of stages from birth. Nietzsche's drives do not work in this way. Nietzsche does not identify a hierarchy or panoply of fundamental drives common to all humans. Throughout his work he lists numerous examples of psycho-physiological patterns that he calls drives – and even more that he calls affects, wills, desires, instincts, habits, etc. These range from common ‘animal’ drives such as sex or hunger instincts, to sophisticated drives for knowledge or self-knowledge or asceticism or philosophy, to quite idiosyncratic drives such as the ‘desire for music and mountain ranges’ (D119).

What unites all of these as drives, I suggest, is that they follow the same basic structure of valuing-desiring-acting discussed above, however long-lived or fleeting or common or rare they are.

As drives are mutable and contingent, they are also *historical*. We can trace their genealogies over the lives of individuals, or of social groups or cultures, and also over the longer time frames of ‘species’. Looking historically,
we can see drives spreading across individuals and cultures. We can see *new* drives appear: ‘new and deviant thoughts, evaluations, drives erupted again and again’ over the history of morality (D14). And we can see long-standing drives changing their nature – as in D38 entitled ‘drives transformed by moral judgements’. In *Dawn*, one of Nietzsche's main critical interests is to trace the historical development of moral drives that he sees as typical of his time: e.g., the anti-individualist ‘drive to form bodies and limbs and its abetting drives’ that underpins ‘the basic moral current of our age’ (D132). It is this dynamic, historical aspect of Nietzsche's psychological ‘close observation’ that particularly distinguishes his approach, and underpins the movement towards genealogy.

**Transmission processes**

Why do we have the drives we have? One big part of Nietzsche's answer is that, for the most part, we pick them up from other people. He explores this theme – what I will call the *transmission* of drives and their elements – in a number of key passages in *Dawn* including D104, where he writes that ‘all evaluations are either one's own or adopted – the latter more often by far’; D30, where he discusses the ‘inheritance’ of habits and feelings; D34 where he claims that ‘moral feelings’ are ‘transmitted’ through imitation; and D35 where he says that ‘behind feelings there are judgements and valuations, which we have inherited in the form of feelings (sympathies, antipathies)’. I am going to look at this topic in greater detail in chapters 3 and 5; here I will just highlight some main features.

Although Nietzsche never gives a systematic outline, we can identify at
least three main ‘routes’ of transmission or inheritance. Of these Nietzsche gives most attention, particularly in *Dawn*, to what I will call *mimetic* transmission: unconscious and ‘almost automatic’ (D34) imitation, which works particularly in childhood but also throughout life. Nietzsche explores the workings of imitation processes in some depth in passages including D34, D142 and HH216, which I will discuss in the next chapter. For example, in D34 he looks at how ‘moral feelings are transmitted through a process whereby children perceive strong sympathies and antipathies toward certain actions and, as born apes, imitate these inclinations and disinclinations’. As I discussed above, this section establishes a distinction between ‘moral feelings’ and ‘moral concepts’. The point I want to highlight now is that while ‘feelings’ are transmitted mimetically, ‘concepts’ are not: they have to be added in ‘retroactively’. Nietzsche also makes a closely connected distinction in his discussion of the ‘drive for distinction’ – that is, the drive to look down on others from a position of moral superiority – in D30, where he writes: ‘when some distinguishing act or other becomes an inherited habit, the underlying thought is not part of the inheritance (no thoughts are hereditary, only feelings): … assuming it is not smuggled back in through education’.

I take ‘education’, here, to involve ways of transmitting information and values through linguistic or otherwise symbolic communicative practices. If this is right, and reading together D30 and D34, then we can identify the following duality:

*Thoughts [Gedanken] – which include intellectual evaluations – must either be added ‘retrospectively’) by the individual, or can be transmitted through education (involving symbolic communication).*
Feelings [Gefühle] – which include affective evaluations – are transmitted through ‘mimetic’, and perhaps other, largely unconscious ‘inheritance’ processes.

In later work, most notably Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche also discusses a third transmission route – values, desires, practices can also be inherited ‘in the blood’, as he puts it. I will leave off discussing this idea until Chapter 5. For now I make just two brief points. First, in Dawn, Nietzsche does not discuss processes of ‘blood’ transmission, but looks in depth at transmission through imitation; this suggests that it makes sense to read ‘inheritance’ in passages such as D30 and D34 at least largely in ‘cultural’ rather than ‘biological’ terms. Second, when Nietzsche discusses ‘blood’ transmission in passages such as BGE213 and BGE264, it is also in the context of contrasting strong processes of ‘inheritance’ from weaker processes of ‘education’. One of his main concerns in BGE, as in Dawn, remains to show how we overestimate the power of linguistically-shaped consciousness as against ‘unknown’ or unconscious physiological processes.

Exactly what is inherited in mimetic or other transmission? Nietzsche does not explicitly write about the transmission of drives, but of what I am calling their elements: for example, evaluations (D104, D35), judgements (D35), ‘inclinations and aversions’ or ‘sympathies and antipathies’ (D34, D35), feelings (D30, D34, D35), acts or habits (D30). Drives clearly can be transmitted or inherited: that the same historically contingent drive turns up in numerous bodies is no coincidence. But drive patterns need not be transmitted in their entirety. Although drives, when active in a body, always feature a unity of valuing, desiring and acting, their various elements can come apart in transmission: for example, we see various
affective and intellectual evaluations, desiring affects and dispositions, activity paths, being inherited more or less independently. This suggests the idea of drive patterns as *assemblages* made up of numerous elements, sub-patterns, and variations. The transmission of a drive pattern in its entirety then involves the re-construction or re-assembly of the overall pattern, within a new body, from these various transmitted elements.

*Transformation processes*

But when a drive pattern is re-assembled in a new body – or even in the same body – will it be assembled in just the same way? Will it be just the ‘same’ drive copied across, or perhaps a new ‘version’ of the old drive, or even a ‘new’ drive altogether? It may be that the assembly and re-assembly of drive patterns involves *transformation* as much as it does transmission: for example, bodies mimetically ‘inheriting’ drives may imitate a range of different ‘models’, and combine their values and practices in new ways.

Nietzsche discusses a number of cases of drive transformations in *Dawn*. In D38, titled ‘Drives transformed by moral judgements’, we read that ‘the same drive may develop into either a painful feeling of cowardice: or … into the pleasant feeling of humility’ depending on whether it develops within e.g., a ‘Greek’ or a Christian moral culture. A drive ‘per se’ has no ‘moral character nor name whatsoever nor even a definite accompanying feeling of pleasure or displeasure.’ These attributes are added on as a ‘second nature, only once it comes into relation to drives previously baptised as good or evil or else marked as a
property of beings whom a people has already identified and evaluated as moral.’ Here, by becoming associated or combined with an existing moral drive, the drive acquires an additional valuing pattern: e.g., its action paths are now valued in two (or more) ways, both as ‘pleasurable’ and as ‘moral’. Similarly in D136 we see a case where a pattern towards ‘feeling compassion’ can ‘acquir[e], in the long run, a new value as a life-preserving power that makes existence bearable’.

In these examples drives are strengthened by adding new positive valuing elements. On the other hand, one of the techniques of D109 for ‘combating the intensity of a drive’ is to set up a negative association: ‘yoke that gratification as such so tightly to some extremely distressing idea that, after a little practice, the idea of gratification will itself be experienced, always and immediately, as distressing’. Here, if the association is successfully established, when the drive pattern is activated its original positive evaluation will clash with a second negative evaluation that undermines it.

In D110 we can see both positive and negative value associations at work. When a new desire appears ‘somewhere inside us’ it may be blocked and disvalued by existing ‘moral’ value patterns that clash with it. Alternatively, it may itself be labelled as moral and so reinforced:

> everything depends on what sets itself in opposition to this desire: if it is matters and considerations of minor consequence and also people who count for little in our esteem – then the new desire's goal is cloaked with the sentiment “noble, worthy of praise and sacrifice” and the whole bequeathed moral predisposition now receives it into its rank and adds it to its store of goals that are felt to be moral [...] which greatly enhances the self-assurance of our striving.
In these cases, we can think of new moral (and other) valuations giving a kind of secondary layering to drive patterns: new elements are added to an existing assemblage. But drives can also lose elements. For example, if the moral environment shifts – say, with the Christianisation of a Greek city – a drive might lose its moral character and become beset by opposition.\textsuperscript{35} Or perhaps a drive can lose one valuing pattern but gain another: indeed, it may lose its ‘original’ valuing pattern but keep more recently acquired ‘second natures’. Nietzsche gives an example of this kind of compound process in D30, tracing the genealogy of the ‘drive for distinction’ back to its ‘ultimate foundation […] the pleasure in refined cruelty.’ The claim is not that we still revel in the pleasure of cruelty every time we show our moral worthiness: this pleasure was the original desire of the drive back in its ‘first generation’; but this desiring later drops out, to be replaced instead by a new kind of moral valuation, and also fortified by a further ‘pleasure in habit’.

Another kind of transformation involves particular elements within a drive assemblage becoming weaker or stronger. Recall here the nutrition principle of D119, where a drive is (unless overstuffed) strengthened as it is nourished, or weakened if it ceases to be activated. We might perhaps disentangle a number of notions of ‘strength’ of drives. First of all, ‘nutrition’ strengthens a drive in the sense that it makes the drive more likely to recur, to be activated again. Second, we can talk about the motivational strength of drives: their efficacy in the ‘clash of motives’ of D129. Thirdly, we can think about the strength of drives or their

\textsuperscript{35} One of the main historical themes in \textit{Dawn} involves the shift between Greek or Hellenistic to ‘selfless’ Christian moral drives and evaluations. E.g., D131: ‘What a shift there has been in moral judgements! Those greatest marvels of antique morality, Epictetus for example, had no concept of the now common glorification of thinking about others or of living for others; according to our moral fashion, we would have to brand them downright immoral’.
elements in transmission: how likely they are to be inherited, to spread to new bodies. These forms of strength are clearly related in a number of ways. For example, the first sense is a necessary condition of the second: a drive cannot move a body to action unless it is activated in the body. And the second sense, at least in the case of mimetic or educational transmission, is necessary for the third: a drive cannot pass on elements unless it is not only activated in a body, but also manages to cause an external action of that body that can be observed by others. I will look further at the strengthening and weakening of drives in the next chapter, where I discuss how drives can become ‘incorporated’ (GS11, GS110) and made part of the ‘nature’ of a body (D104, D248). The important point for now is that, again thinking of drive patterns as assemblages, we can also look at strengthening and weakening not just of the drive as a whole, but also of particular elements and sub-patterns. For example, particular activity paths may strengthen or weaken (in all three senses) over the life of a drive: I will look at an important example of this kind of transformation in the next section.

So, bringing these points together, here are a few ways that a drive can transform: (i) it can gain new elements via transmission from other drives and bodies; (ii) it can strengthen its existing elements, through ‘association’ or ‘nutrition’ or other processes; (iii) its existing elements can weaken, or even drop out altogether. All of these processes can reshape the overall composition of the drive-assemblage. A further possibility is that drives can also transform through somehow developing entirely ‘new’ elements, rather than adopting them from other drives and bodies: perhaps we see this, for example, in the masters' ‘creation of values’ of the Genealogy (GM2:17, also BGE261). I will look at this issue in
Chapter 6.

Given this continual mutability of drive-assemblages, we might ask: how do we identify a drive? When, for example, does a drive to ‘refined cruelty’ turn into a ‘drive for distinction’ (D30)? Is Christian humility just Greek cowardice under a different name (D38)? And is the drive to self-knowledge a drive in its own right, or just a subsidiary pattern of the drive to knowledge in general? What is the relation between the drive called hunger and my particular craving for rice or pepper?

Here we have the same underlying issue: there are really no clear boundaries to delimit one drive from another, but just how, in our ignorant graspings, we pick out patterns and resemblances through applying psycho-physiological and historical observation as best we can. Drives are assemblages of component sub-patterns that are always open to being re-assembled in new ways: no components make up a fixed essence. And, given this constant potential mutability of components in a drive-assemblage, we can ultimately identify drives, rather like biological species, only with reference to their lineages or genealogies.36

36 In evolutionary ‘population thinking’ there is no cut off point which marks the transformation of one species into another. Humans are descended from pre-hominid apes, but there was no particular generation in which we can say that the last pre-hominid gave birth to the first human. Similarly, following D30, we might trace the genealogy of the ‘drive to distinction’ back to a ‘drive to cruelty’. But this does not imply we can locate a specific point at which the transformation was achieved. As Nietzsche writes in an 1887 note: ‘the species is a mere abstraction from the multiplicity of these chains and their partial similarity’ (WP682). Richardson discusses this point and concludes that ‘the basic units are … chains of drives’ (2004:44).
2.4. Drives in the *Genealogy*: the case of internalisation

It is not hard to see, I think, how Nietzsche's investigations of drive transformations in *Dawn* points to the discussion in the *Genealogy* of how an assemblage – in the example of GM2:12, the practice of punishment – can acquire and lose numerous new valuations, ‘meanings’ and significations, over the course of its history, so that ‘... the entire history of a “thing”, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations ...’

I now want to look in more depth at one important example of the “logic” of drive transformation as it becomes applied in the *Genealogy*.

In Section 2 above, I suggested that we can think of many drive patterns as involving a range of (more) primary and (more) secondary activity paths, and that where an active drive pattern is blocked from following a primary activity path, it may be redirected onto a secondary path. We see an example of this in D119, where a drive that cannot find external ‘nourishment’ in waking life turns to the inner path of compensatory dreaming. In the *Genealogy* this idea grows into one of Nietzsche's most powerful and influential psycho-political thoughts:

All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call the internalisation [Verinnerlichung] of man: thus it was that man developed what was later called his “soul”. The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. Those fearful bulwarks with which the political organisation protected itself against the old instincts of freedom – punishments
belong amongst these bulwarks – brought about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy and persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction – all this turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the “bad conscience”.

(GM2:16)

Here the ‘instincts of freedom’, long standing drives of pre-state humans, are blocked by the ‘bulwarks’ imposed on the new society. The blocking is so effective that the only activity paths left open are waking versions of the dream compensation of D119. Indeed – a point I will pick up in Chapter 6 – here the blocked drives are not just redirected onto existing secondary paths, but forced to create entirely new ones, so hollowing out ‘the entire inner world’. This major redirection requires not just a substantial and traumatic blockage, but a sustained one. If the blocking and redirection of a drive pattern is only occasional or short-lived, it may not have any major implications for the long term pattern of the drives.  But a prolonged, repeated, redirection of a drive will substantially transform it. This is certainly the case here: the ‘ineluctable disaster’ (GM2:17) of conquest and imposition of the state by the tribe of masters traps subordinate humans in a ‘cage’ (GM2:16) from which they cannot escape.

We can see this, again, in terms of the nutritional principle of D119. The general pattern is: a drive is repeatedly or continually blocked from its primary

37 Nietzsche suggests that noble or strong bodies can display occasional bouts of ressentiment without their drives being substantially changed. Ressentiment ‘if it should appear in the noble man, consummates and exhausts itself in an immediate reaction’ (GM1:10). We might imagine ressentiment as involving a kind of storage or charge of aggressive energy. So long as this holding state is only short-lived, the charge soon discharged, it has no long-lasting effects on the drives and bodies involved. But when ressentiment is prolonged and compounded it takes on a new life of its own, and can start to transform or create values. Again, it is state society that creates the conditions for this transformation. The unfreedom of the slave caste means continual, repeated and compounded, blockage of aggressive drives. And the expanded ‘inner world’ (GM2:16) dug out by the internalisation of bad conscience provides the space in which these drives will play out along new paths.
action path and redirected onto a secondary path; i.e., the primary path becomes inactive, the secondary path active; and so the primary path weakens, and the secondary path strengthens (is ‘nourished’) so that it is now more likely to be enacted in future, and the primary path less likely. Eventually, the rerouted path becomes the primary enactment of the drive, whilst the old path becomes overgrown, forgotten. The drive has been transformed: e.g., if someone laughs at you in the marketplace you now habitually, even ‘naturally’, look away and mutter curses, rather than replying with the ‘true reaction, one of deed’ (GM1:10).

As I read the Genealogy, internalisation plays a key part in the formation not only of the bad conscience, but also of the sickness of ressentiment, analysed in the first essay.\(^38\) Ressentiment begins where those who are blocked from outwardly enacting their aggressive drives instead ‘compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge’ (GM1:10). That is, just as in bad conscience, an aggressive drive is blocked from external activity, and finds an ‘internal’ path, with an alternative target. There is a difference in the nature of this new target. In bad conscience aggressive drives turn against ‘man himself’ – or, perhaps, against other drives within the body.\(^39\) In ressentiment, aggressive drives turn against a kind of substitute, a fantasy target that is contained, as it were, within the ‘inner

\(^38\) The state-induced internalisation of GM2:16 is not the only, or even necessarily the first, instance of internalisation in human psychic life, though it is one that is particularly extreme, ongoing, and portentous.

\(^39\) Nietzsche writes: ‘the instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself’ (GM2:16). But given the multiplicity of drives and forces within a body, we don't have to read this as saying that the aggressive drive turns against ‘itself’ – if we could make sense of such an idea. Rather, we can say that the drive turns against other drives or forces within its body. The internalisation of bad conscience is then a new move and an escalation in the internal war of drives which Nietzsche thinks is in any case a constant of human psychic life. When we emphasise this multiplicity, Judith Butler’s (1997:63) question about the ‘psychic life of power’ in Nietzsche looks less cryptic. She writes: ‘the will is said to turn back on itself. But what are we to make of this strange locution …?’ Actually, that is not Nietzsche’s locution: he writes of a multiplicity of ‘instincts’ (so, not one but many wills) turning against the composite body of their human “possessor”.

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world’. In D119 ‘make-believe’ compensation was confined to dreaming; in the
Genealogy a wider range of mental phenomena come to play this role including
revenge fantasies, resentful daydreams, and eventually the eschatological myth-
making that goes on in the ‘dark workshop’ of the slave revolt (GM1:14).

What is particularly interesting about the discussion of ressentiment is that
we clearly see not only the activity paths of drives transforming, but also their
patterns of valuing. This is Nietzsche's account of the ‘slave revolt in morality’,
where ‘ressentiment … becomes creative and gives birth to values’ (GM1:10).
First the repressive blocking of aggressive instincts by state society redirects them
onto new ‘internal’ paths; later, this change in activity paths leads to a
corresponding change in values, as slaves find ways to moralise their own
passivity. The original ‘aggressive instincts’ are now doubly transformed – both
redirected, and resignified – until they are changed beyond all recognition. At this
point, if not long before, we can say that slavish drives have become something
entirely new: the ancestor patterns of bad conscience and ressentiment were once
aggressive movements towards external requital; their descendants are something
altogether different. Now we can see the force of one of Nietzsche's
characterisation of his psycho-physiology in Beyond Good and Evil, as a ‘theory
of the derivability of all good drives from bad’ (BGE23).
Chapter 3. Psycho-Physiology II: Incorporating Values

In the last chapter I looked at how Nietzsche understands the psycho-physiology of human (and other) bodies in terms of drives, recurring and transforming patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting. We also began to see how drives are not just patterns of ‘individual’ bodies, but are shared and spread across bodies in social worlds. This is the point I will develop in this chapter. Again, I will start with *Dawn*, where Nietzsche maintains that an individual’s values and desires, including those that become part of ‘our nature’, are largely ‘adopted’ from others.¹ He writes:

> All actions may be traced back to evaluations, all evaluations are either one’s own or adopted – the latter more often by far. Why do we adopt them? Out of fear – that is to say: we consider it more advisable to pretend as if they were our own – and we grow so accustomed to this pretence that it ends up being our nature. (D104)

Packed into it this passage are a number of central Nietzschean themes including the close connection between valuing and acting; a central role of fear – and pain, violence, domination – in constituting individuals; and also an idea of values that

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¹ The adoption of values may involve forceful imposition: in the *Genealogy*, ruling elites strive to instrumentalise the subordinated by imposing new values upon them, a movement which always meets at least some degree of resistance. Or adoption may appear less conflictual (though still taking place within a framework of power relations) – e.g., where children adopt the values of adults around them. In both cases, the same processes of incorporation are at play. See also HH99: ‘Morality is preceded by compulsion, indeed it is for a time itself still compulsion, to which one accommodates oneself for the avoidance of what one regards as unpleasurable. Later it becomes custom, later still voluntary obedience, finally almost instinct; then, like all that has for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with pleasure – and is now called virtue.’ At this point Nietzsche, greatly influenced by Paul Rée, still works within a *hedonic* and *associationist* framework. Later on he will drop these points, but the basic structure remains.
are somehow autonomous or 'one's own'. Here my focus is on the majority of more heteronomous values, those we take from the social worlds around us.

Nietzsche writes in an unpublished note from 1880: ‘we have transposed “society” into ourselves, in miniature [...] We take into ourselves not only God but all beings we recognise [...] Olives and stones have become a part of us: the stock exchange and the newspaper as well.’ (KSA 9.6[80] [1880]). To use a term that Nietzsche introduces in *The Gay Science*, we **incorporate** Gods and stock exchanges and newspapers, the values of religions and markets and media, so that they become part of our bodies, and even our very ‘nature’.

In this chapter I want to look closer at how this incorporation happens. In particular, I will look at two processes that Nietzsche identifies in *Dawn*. The first, which I call **mimetic transmission**, involves an involuntary, generally unconscious, adoption of values from others through imitation. Nietzsche here anticipates thought including Gabriel Tarde's microsociology of imitation, René Girard's account of mimetic desire, and theories of cultural evolution and 'memetics'.

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2 I looked at the relation between valuing and acting in the last chapter. I will look at the role of fear in the next. Unfortunately I just don't have space to grapple with the third point, the important and intriguing question of how Nietzsche understands those rare evaluations of ‘one's own’.

3 Cited in Parkes (1994:325-6), who discusses the full note in greater depth.

4 Lawtoo briefly notes Nietzsche's possible influence on Tarde (2008:691); Tarde uses the Nietzschean phrase ‘action at a distance’ (GS60) in defining imitation in his *Laws of Imitation* (1903 – original French publication 1890), and also makes reference to themes from BT. My use of the term ‘mimesis’ is in part intended to draw out the parallel with René Girard's theory; although unfortunately I lack space here to directly compare Nietzsche's ideas with those of Girard or the other writers mentioned. Very briefly, Nietzschean mimetic incorporation parallels Girardian mimetic desire in so far as both hold that desires are directly taken on from others through imitation, and where this imitation is not conscious or intentional but springs from an underlying faculty or disposition that is basic and automatic in all (or almost all) humans. Nietzsche does not share Girard's further thesis of 'mimetic rivalry', in which mimetic desire necessarily leads to conflict over scarce objects of desire (and nor do I). The other influence on my use of the term mimesis is Katherine Nelson's account of 'mimetic cognition', which I discuss in Section 3 below. Although Nelson and Girard work in quite separate traditions, the two uses of mimesis can be connected. As Girard's collaborator Jean-Michel Oughourlian puts it, mimesis denotes a 'fundamental force' (2011:42) or underlying psychological faculty; for Nelson, mimesis denotes basic characteristics of particular non-symbolic psychological processes. Mimesis, then, refers to the faculty underlying certain acts
Although Nietzsche does not develop a systematic theory of mimesis in the same detail as these writers, I think that his various remarks, read in the context of his broader psychological theory, offer substantial insights. The second process, alluded to in the quote above and to which Nietzsche returns in a number of passages, I call *performative incorporation*. In this route, if we repeatedly act as if we have certain values for long enough, eventually we really do have them. Here Nietzsche picks up an old philosophical idea, perhaps most famously associated with Pascal, but which goes back at least to Aristotle. To be clear, these may not be the only routes by which we acquire values, but they are important ones. Also, they are closely connected, and will often be found working together. Mimetic adoption passes values from one body to another, but it does not by itself make these new values ‘our nature’; this requires the further work of performative incorporation.

In the first section I look at Nietzsche’s idea of incorporation in general. Section 2 looks at Nietzsche’s thoughts on mimesis and performativity, and shows how they are grounded in his basic psycho-physiological observations. In Section 3 I turn to recent research in developmental psychology and the study of imitation to further develop these ideas. In the concluding Section 4, I finish with some brief remarks about what an understanding of mimetic and performative processes may imply for philosophical thinking about human agency.
3.1. Incorporation

In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche writes of initially intellectual judgements becoming ‘incorporated or made instinctive’ (*einzuverleiben und instinctiv zu machen*). He tells us that humans have so far incorporated only errors, and asks how we can come to now ‘incorporate truths’ (GS110). Similar imagery recurs through that book: a name attributed to a thing ‘gradually grows to be a part of the thing and turns into its very body’ (GS58); species ‘translate’ moralities ‘into their own flesh and blood’ (GS134). We can also identify similar movements in *Dawn* and other texts, for example in D104 and D248, where initially superficial or even ‘dissimulatory’ practices and attitudes become ‘natural’. To be clear, in using the term incorporation to cover all of these cases – of naturalisation, internalisation, embodiment, etc. – I impose a terminological unity of my own on Nietzsche. I do this because I think there are core similarities in the processes Nietzsche describes in these various passages, and that developing the idea of incorporation can give us a good grasp on them.

The German word *Einverleibung*, like the English *incorporation*, suggests two main possible senses. The first is that of a body taking in something external, perhaps by swallowing or ingestion. The second is of something becoming embodied, made bodily. In the first sense we have a movement, a change in place

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7 In recent literature Judith Butler also uses ‘incorporation’ in a similar way (1990: 171-174; see also 1997: chapter 2) – although she associates it with Foucault rather than Nietzsche, and in fact sets up an opposition between Foucauldian ‘incorporation’ and Nietzschean ‘internalisation’. I read Nietzsche’s account of internalisation differently to Butler: the incorporative processes I am discussing here are distinct from the specific process of internalisation that Nietzsche famously discusses in the *Genealogy* (see my discussion in Chapter 2). Nietzsche also uses ideas of incorporation as transformative ingestion across a range of contexts that go wider than the processes I am looking at here: for example, he discusses forms of dominating will to power in which a stronger body incorporates (or appropriates GS118) a weaker body and turns it into an ‘organ’ or ‘function’ of its own body.
from outside to inside; in the second, a transformation, a change in form or type.
The two senses can be combined: in being taken inside the body, the incorporated
element is made part of the body, and so both ingested and transformed. We can
read this double meaning in passages such as GS58:

The reputation, name, and appearance, the usual measure and weight of a thing,
what it counts for – originally almost always wrong and arbitrary, thrown over
things like a dress and altogether foreign to their nature and even to their skin –
all this grows from generation to generation, merely because people believe in it,
until it gradually grows to be a part of the thing and turns into its very body.
What at first was appearance becomes in the end, almost invariably, the essence
and is effective as such.

We can find incorporative processes in Nietzsche's texts working over different
scales and timespans. On the one hand, incorporation can involve evolutionary
changes in species over multi-generational biological timeframes – as in the above
quote, ‘from generation to generation’. But incorporation can also occur within
individual lives and bodies, it can be ontogenetic as well as phylogenetic. The fact
that Nietzsche moves freely between these species- and individual-level processes
can be related to his notorious evolutionary Lamarckism: or, to put it more
charitably, to the way in which he challenges nature/culture divides. I will look at
these points in Chapter 5. For now I restrict my focus to ontogenetic incorporation
within bodies.

Reading GS58, we can see incorporation as a transition characterised by a
number of pairs of poles: outside to inside; surface to body; and appearance to
nature or essence. Don't at least some of these contrasts set off Nietzschein alarm
bells? Nietzsche is known for his relentless critique of appearance/reality distinctions. And in the last chapter I claimed that Nietzsche's ‘psycho-physiology’ of drives opposes mind/body distinctions. Can we understand incorporation in a way that doesn't return us to such problematic dualisms?

**Becoming unconscious**

Actually I think a further contrast pair can help us here: conscious / unconscious. One of the main themes of GS11 and GS110 is that the element that becomes incorporated starts out belonging to ‘consciousness’ (GS110) or ‘intellect’ (GS11). At least one core form of incorporation involves a value, desire or practice then moving to unconsciousness: for example, an initially deliberative intentional action becomes a trained habitual or ‘instinctive’ response that we now perform, as it were, without thinking.\(^8\) To follow this point we need to go a little bit deeper into Nietzsche's view of consciousness, for which GS354 offers a good starting point. Nietzsche begins here with the idea that:

> [...] we could think, feel, will and remember, and we could also “act” in every sense of the word, and yet none of all this would have to “enter our consciousness” (as one says metaphorically). The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a mirror.

Indeed, as discussed in the last chapter reading passages such as D119 and D129, Nietzsche thinks that very much of our thinking, feeling, and acting etc. not only could but *does* go on unconsciously. Furthermore, the conscious part of psychic

\(^8\) In this and succeeding chapters I will explore a number of parallels between Nietzsche and more recent thinkers. One more that jumps out here, but which I am not going to pursue, is with Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of *habitus* as learnt or trained embodied practice.
life is relatively ‘weak’. He writes in GS354: ‘the thinking that rises to consciousness is only the smallest part of all this – the most superficial and worst part’. Similarly in GS11: ‘Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and least strong.’ And GS333: ‘by far the greatest part of our spirit's activity remains unconscious and unfelt … Conscous thinking, especially that of the philosopher is the least vigorous and therefore also the relatively mildest and calmest form of thinking.’

The question Nietzsche then asks in GS354 is: so why, if consciousness ‘is in the main superfluous’, is any psycho-physiological activity conscious at all? His answer, to summarise, is that humans developed consciousness, alongside language, as a communicative tool. Being weak herd animals, early humans needed to express mental states, primarily of ‘distress’; to do this they needed words and other ‘signs’; but also, they needed to be able to identify the states to be communicated. So: some thinking (and feeling, etc.) is conscious because our ancestors developed, and we have inherited, a capacity to reflectively track or monitor mental states in order to talk about them. But this tracking capacity is highly limited, because it captures only those states that are able to be identified and expressed using linguistic ‘signs’. And many aspects of our psychic life cannot be captured by language: as we read in D115, language can at best grasp only the ‘superlative degrees’ or ‘extreme states’ of our drives. Or as Nietzsche now writes: ‘the world of which we can become conscious is only a surface and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner’ (GS354). It misses what is ‘altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual’ (ibid).

Even if we query the “just so story” of GS354, the connection Nietzsche
makes between consciousness and communication is important. Mattia Riccardi (forthcoming a) expresses the central point nicely:

_Nietzsche seems to hold that we re-interpret our own mental states in light of a socially developed “theory of mind”: we attribute to ourselves the same type of mental states we have learnt to attribute to others. … In Nietzsche’s eyes, however, by so doing we re-translate the content of our own inner states in terms of public representations and thereby distort their very nature._

I will just add one further suggestion: it could be rewarding to explore the linguistic formation of consciousness genealogically, but through a study of its ontogeny. Here the twentieth century developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky's (1976) work on the internalisation of language springs to mind. Very summarily, Vygotsky's idea is that reflective consciousness begins with social interactions where children are faced with ‘complicated tasks’ (1976:27) that they cannot solve alone, and so use linguistic signs to call on adults for help. They then ‘internalise’ (in a slightly different sense than Nietzsche’s) these speech patterns through what starts out as ‘private speech’ (babbling and talking to oneself). ‘[I]nstead of appealing to the adult, children appeal to themselves; language thus takes on an intrapersonal function in addition to its interpersonal use’ (ibid). Finally, private verbalisation becomes silent inner monologue (or dialogue, as the voice of consciousness may play more than one part). In GS354 Nietzsche concludes that ‘consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but rather to his social or herd nature’. In Vygotsky’s words, language users ‘organise their own activities according to a social form of behaviour, they succeed in applying a
social attitude to themselves’ (1976:27).

In GS354, and other passages, Nietzsche talks about ‘consciousness’, *per se*, as linguistically shaped. However, and drawing on Riccardi’s much deeper discussion, I will think of consciousness in this context more specifically as a *reflective self-consciousness*. That is, very roughly, a form of consciousness in which a mental event or state is identified in communicable terms as a thought of mine, as belonging to a ‘self’. That is: there is not only (a) an awareness of a mental content but also (b) a ‘higher order thought’ tagging this content with a self-ascription. It is this second step of identifying, and so potentially communicating, that requires linguistic structuring. But there are also forms of thinking, feeling, sensing, etc., in which we are aware, but without this awareness having this structure of reflective ascription. We can think of forms of consciousness that are not reflective, and so need not be linguistically structured or communicable.

I won’t develop these ideas further here, but I want to suggest that more

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9 There are also broader parallels between Nietzsche’s genealogical method and Vygotsky’s developmental approach that would be interesting to explore. For Vygotsky, the human psyche is a permanent building site, where reconstruction is a ‘complex dialectical [though I would prefer to say – genealogical] process characterised by periodicity, unevenness in the development of different functions, metamorphosis or qualitative transformation of one form into another, intertwining of external and internal factors, and adaptive processes which overcome impediments’ (1976:73). This implies that the study of development is the key to the understanding of psychological processes, not only in children but in adults: if we want to understand any currently active psychological function or process we need to study its historical formation, where ‘by a developmental study of a problem I mean the disclosure of its genesis, its causal dynamic basis’ (ibid:62).

This is no small task. For one thing, because ‘as yet, the barest outline of [the internalisation] process is known’ (ibid:57). For another, because of the complex over-layering of many processes. And if these obstacles aren't enough, also because psychological investigation gets still muddier when we dig down to ‘so-called automated or mechanised psychological processes’ which, ‘owing to their ancient origins, are now being repeated for the millionth time and have become mechanised. They have lost their original appearance, and their outer appearance tells us nothing whatsoever about their internal nature’ (ibid:64). This could almost be a quote from Nietzsche about incorporation. And compare, once again, Nietzsche’s classic statement of genealogical principle in GM2:12, where ‘... the entire history of a “thing”, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations ...’
generally we can think of a spectrum of forms of consciousness. At one end we have strongly reflective self-consciousness, as found in deliberation and introspective thought. At the other end are phenomena such as ‘motor’ impulses of which we may be entirely unaware. Somewhere in the middle come more ‘primary’ forms of sensory and affective awareness – consciousness in a broader sense – including ‘felt’ experiences that perhaps we can't easily describe in words. I bring in here the discussion in the last chapter about ‘thoughts’ (Gedanken) and ‘feelings’ (Gefühle). To use a contemporary piece of jargon from cognitive science, feelings are ‘hot cognitions’ rather than ‘cold’ pieces of deliberative reasoning; they may also be less amenable to identification, description and communication.

The last thing I want to take from GS354 is its imagery of depths and surfaces. Nietzsche presents reflective consciousness as ‘superficial’: it lies at the ‘surface’ of the mind or body, to which some drive activities may ‘rise’. To extend this image: others move unseen in the depths of the psyche/body. Incorporation then means an element – a judgement, evaluation, practice, etc. – moving along the spectrum of consciousness-unconsciousness. To use the imagery of GS354, this is a movement downwards, in which an element that starts out on the surface, which is where a body meets the social world, then sinks or digs deeper into the body.

To sum up: we can see incorporation not in terms of a jump between two distinct domains of mind and body, but of a slide down a consciousness-unconsciousness continuum, where evaluations move from deliberative through affective to instinctive. If incorporation goes far enough, the element may
eventually become what Nietzsche sometimes calls an instinct (*Instinkt*). He writes in an unpublished note from 1881: ‘I speak of instinct, when some judgement (taste in its lowest stage) is incorporated, so that it now moves itself and no longer needs to wait on a stimulus’.\(^\text{10}\) It now moves, we might say, from ‘within’, rather than as the result of a stimulating contact between the body and the wider world. In a less complete case, an initially intellectual judgement may become an embodied evaluative stance that is not thought but felt. And so ‘teachings that we no longer believe’ can continue to guide us as feelings (D99).

And here we can see the meaning of Nietzsche’s key piece of advice for ‘deniers of morality’: ‘we have to learn to think differently – in order at least, perhaps very late on, to achieve even more: to feel differently’ (D103).\(^\text{11}\)

*Transforming natures*

That may help with the mind/body dualism, but what about appearance vs. nature? We can start by looking again at the connection of consciousness and weakness.

This is the main theme of GS11: consciousness is ‘unfinished and unstrong’, whereas ‘the conserving association of the instincts’ is ‘very much more powerful’ (GS11). But what does this relative strength or power consist in? Developing a point from the last chapter (Section 2.3), we can identify a number of relevant forms of ‘strength’. First, incorporated elements are strengthened as they become

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\(^\text{10}\) KSA 9.11[141] [1881]. Cited in John Richardson (2004:102). This use of ‘Instinkt’ is not fully consistent, and sometimes we can read ‘Instinkt’ as synonymous with ‘Trieb’ more generally. See also Section 2.2 footnote 20 on this point.

\(^\text{11}\) See also D30, in which only feelings, not thoughts, are ‘inherited’; also GS179 ‘thoughts are the shadows of our feelings – always darker, emptier, simpler’. As ever, Nietzsche is not systematic in his use of terms, and also makes similar points with different language. In GS21, for example, he talks about a process of ‘conditioning’ by which a ‘way of thinking or behaving’ becomes a ‘habit, instinct, and pattern’.
‘knowledge’ (GS110): that is, they are less open to doubt or questioning, they are taken for granted. Second, they become stronger as motivations, generally having more power than conscious judgements to move the body (see D129, and Section 2.2 above). Third, ‘feelings’ are more likely to recur as constant habits of a body. Finally, they are also more likely to be inherited or transmitted across bodies (D30).

Ultimately, if incorporation goes far enough, an element becomes what Nietzsche calls a ‘condition of life’ (GS110), part of the ‘basic endowment of the species’ (or, in ontogenetic processes, of an individual body). One obvious interpretation is that a ‘condition of life’ means a survival condition, something that a body cannot exist without. But I think there is also another possible reading: ‘conditions of life’ refer to elements that have become necessary to a body if it is to retain its current form. This idea allows us to connect embodiment with essence or nature. To be part of something's essence or nature is, on a quite classical philosophical understanding, to be a necessary property of a thing with a given identity or definition. For example, the incorporated ‘necessary errors’ Nietzsche discusses in The Gay Science are part of human nature in this sense: a being (individual or species) that could overcome them by incorporating new ‘truths’ would no longer be human. But this does not mean that it would disappear altogether: it would become something else, with an altogether different nature – and here we are on the road to the idea of the Übermensch.12

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12 We can note Nietzsche's earlier presentation of the 'all too human' atomising errors as errors that are 'necessary' and 'fruitful' in HH29-33. In GS110, these errors became so deeply part of the human organism that 'all of its higher functions, sense perception and every kind of sensation worked with these basic errors'. However, we may perhaps note a shift in Nietzsche's thinking between HH and GS: a further point made in GS110 is that despite this foundational centrality of errors, the human species was in the past able to develop certain practices of knowledge that once appeared impossible; furthermore, it may be possible in the future for humans to incorporate new 'truths'. While the first reading seems to best fit Nietzsche's earlier
In short, we can distinguish appearance from nature, but not if we take these as fixed categories: the essence or nature of a thing is mutable in so far as the thing itself is open to transformation or ‘overcoming’ (GS54, GS58). Essential properties themselves start out as mere appearances; over time they become incorporated and make up part of a thing's nature; they can then themselves be supplanted with the arrival of new appearances that eventually remake the structure of a body or species. Again, we can see such essentialisation or naturalisation processes at work on different timescales, over the development of species and of individuals. While GS11 and GS110 focus on phylogenetic species-time, the relevant passages in Dawn take the same approach to transforming bodies: an individual body changes its ‘nature’ as it incorporates new values, desires, and practices. And this idea certainly continues through The Gay Science, as in GS290 where we can work on ourselves artistically so that ‘Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it.’

An important corollary is that even our deepest feelings and instincts, even those that seem most ‘natural’ to us, do not arise from some pure internal source. If instincts may be initially ‘weak’ superficial judgements that have been dug deeper into our bodies, then distinctions between thought and feeling, surface and depth, appearance and nature, are really only matters of history. This has both critical and positive implications. It leads to Nietzsche’s critique of moral or other

discussion of ‘necessary errors’ in Human, All Too Human, the second connects to the post-humanism of his thought in Zarathustra and later works. We might say: certain ‘errors’ are conditions of life for the human species; if the incorporation of certain new truths is possible, it could require such a radical restructuring of the human organism that it ceases to be recognisably human. On Nietzsche and post- or trans-humanism see Ansell-Pearson (1997).

D248: ‘The long-standing practice of dissimulation turns into, at last, nature: in the end dissimulation cancels itself out, and organs and instincts are the hardly anticipated fruits in the garden of hypocrisy’.
evaluative claims based on ‘conscience’ or intuition. But it also opens the possibility for interventions through which we can transform our very natures.

I conclude this section by restating this last point in the context of a contemporary political discourse. Looking back on her influential book *Gender Trouble*, Judith Butler writes that ‘my effort was to combat forms of essentialism which claimed that gender is a truth somewhere there, internal to the body, as a core or an internal essence, something that we cannot deny, something which, natural or not, is treated as a given’ (2004: 212). She sums up such a position as a ‘natural essentialism’ (ibid). We have seen Nietzsche saying that incorporation leads to values becoming internal, natural and essential. And yet this does not make him a natural essentialist in Butler's terms: nature/essence here is not *given*, does not emerge from any *pre-existing* or stable core within the body, but is constructed in the body through interactions with the ‘outside’. And at least many of these interactive processes, as we will see, are those that Butler identifies and calls *performative*. The ‘reality’ of the body, in Nietzschean incorporation, is indeed ‘produced as an effect of … performance’ (ibid:218).

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14 This is the basis of Nietzsche's attack on trust in the claims of ‘conscience’ in GS335: see Chapter 8 for a discussion of that passage. Also telling is D35: ‘To trust your feeling – that means obeying your grandfather and your grandmother and their grandparents more than the gods in us: our reason and experience’.

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3.2. Nietzsche on mimesis and performativity

Mimesis

In D34, Nietzsche maintains that we largely adopt moral values through imitation during childhood: ‘children perceive in their parents strong sympathies and antipathies toward certain actions and, as born apes, imitate these inclinations and disinclinations’. But we also continue to imitatively absorb others’ values and judgements throughout our lives: in HH371 Nietzsche asks ‘Why are inclination and aversion so contagious, that one can scarcely live in the proximity of a person of strong feelings, without being filled like a barrel with his For and Against’?15

Another illuminating passage is HH216:

Older than language is the mimicking of gestures, which takes place involuntarily and is even now, when the language of gesture is universally restrained and control of the muscles has been achieved, so strong that we cannot see a mobile face without an innervation of our own face

These themes are further developed in D142, where Nietzsche discusses two ways in which human individuals come to understand another person or ‘in other words, to reproduce his feeling in ourselves’. One is to consciously apply what might be called a theory of mind: we ‘return to the reason for his feeling one way or another and ask, for instance: Why is this person depressed’? But he argues that there is a ‘much more common’ (ibid) and more direct route. It is worth quoting

15 HH371 continues: ‘[W]e gradually accustom ourselves to the way of feeling of our environment, and because sympathetic agreement and accommodation is so pleasant we soon bear all the marks and party colours of this environment.’
this passage at some length:

[we] produce the feeling in ourselves according to the effects it exerts and
displays on the other person, in that we reproduce with our body (or at least we
approach a faint similarity in the play of muscle and in innervation) the
expression of his eyes, his voice, his gait, his bearing (or even their reflection in
word, painting, and music). Then there arises in us a similar feeling, as a result
of an age-old association between movement and sensation, which have been
thoroughly conditioned to move back and forth from one to another. We have
come a long way in developing this skill for understanding other people's
feelings, and in the presence of another person we are, almost automatically,
always employing it […]

I will highlight a number of points. Imitation, for Nietzsche, is an embodied
phenomenon, beginning with gesture and bodily movement. It is an innate
response phylogenetically incorporated in the human species – children are 'born
apes'. But it continues past childhood: we learn to control the impulse to imitate
to some degree, but not entirely. And it happens involuntarily, ‘almost
automatically’. We can also add that imitation that generally happens
unconsciously. Although Nietzsche doesn't explicitly mention the unconsciousness
of imitation in the passages just quoted, it is implied not only by his emphasis on
automaticity but by the point that imitation is ‘age-old’ and pre-linguistic: recall
that Nietzsche sees consciousness as a late development tied to verbal
communication in the herd. However, the above passages from Dawn and HH
make clear that linguistic consciousness is not the only communicative structure
of human ‘social or herd nature’ (GS354). Imitation is a form of human social
communication that is older than language (both ontogenetically and
phylogenetically), and also ‘much more common’ (D142), at least in certain contexts.

So, how exactly does imitation lead to the adoption of evaluations? Following D142, we might break the whole process down something like this: (i) you have a feeling; (ii) this feeling leads to a movement of your body; (iii) I observe the movement of your body; (iv) I reproduce the movement in my own body; (v) a feeling arises in me that reproduces your feeling. The feelings that are reproduced, or transmitted, may include the ‘moral feelings’ or ‘inclinations and disinclinations’ of D34. And for Nietzsche, as I argued in Chapter 2, a feeling always embeds an evaluation: every affect is an interpretive and evaluative stance to the world that leads, in some way, to motivation and action. So when we adopt or reproduce feelings from others, in doing so we take on their patterns of valuing.

We can now see how this mimetic process is grounded in Nietzsche's underlying drive psycho-physiology. Specifically, it is an application of what in the last chapter I identified as the unity principle of Nietzsche's drive theory: a drive's patterns of evaluation, desiring, and acting come together. In mimesis we see this unity principle working both ways. On the one hand, we have a movement (in you) from values to action: your feeling, an affective evaluation, leads to a movement of your body. And then we have a reverse movement (in me) from action to evaluation: reproducing the movement with my body causes the corresponding affective evaluation to arise. There are certainly quite a few gaps and questions here. How does the imitation of movement actually work: how is one body able to reproduce just the same bodily movement as another? And even if the same movement is reproduced, how do we know that the imitator
reproduces the same feeling or evaluation as the other? The only further help
Nietzsche gives us on this latter question is to refer us to a supposed ‘age-old
association’ (D142). In Section 3 I will look at whether contemporary research on
imitation can take us any further.

Performativity

According to D104 we adopt evaluations ‘Out of fear […]: we consider it more
advisable to pretend as if they were our own – and we grow so accustomed to this
pretence that it ends up being our nature.’ Similarly in D248, Nietzsche argues
that

for the most part, goodness has been developed by extended dissimulation that
sought to appear as goodness … The long-standing practice of dissimulation
turns into, at last, nature: in the end dissimulation cancels itself out, and organs
and instincts are the hardly anticipated fruits in the garden of hypocrisy’

Nietzsche devotes at least four sections to this theme in Dawn. But a passage from
*Human All Too Human* gives his most detailed and general account of the process.
HH51, entitled ‘How appearance becomes being’, opens with one of Nietzsche's
all-too-honest human close observations: ‘Even when in the deepest distress, the
actor ultimately cannot cease to think of the impression he and the whole scenic
effect is making, even for example at the burial of his own child […]’. It then cuts
to the main point that

16 Nietzsche quite often associates dissimulation with fear, as in D104, or with weakness.
However a number of his examples of performative incorporation belie this: so in D248
dissimulation is not a response to fear a strategy of the powerful to increase their power. In any
case, whatever prompts the dissimulation, the naturalisation process is just as effective. See
also HH51. D367 D325
the hypocrite who always plays one and the same role finally ceases to be a
hypocrite; for example, priests, who as young men are usually conscious or
unconscious hypocrites, finally become natural and then really are priests
without any affectation […]

Nietzsche also uses a similar example in *Dawn* (D325), where he cites ‘advice
given to Wesley by Böhler, his spiritual mentor’ to ‘preach belief until you have
it’.¹⁷ But HH51 makes clear that the process applies quite generally:

> If someone obstinately and for a long time wants to appear something it is in the
> end hard for him to be anything else. The profession of almost every man, even
> that of the artist, begins with hypocrisy, with an imitation from without, with a
> copying of what is most effective. He who is always wearing a mask of a
> friendly countenance must finally acquire a power over benevolent moods
> without which the impression of friendliness cannot be obtained – and finally
> these acquire power over him, he is benevolent.

To tie some of these thoughts together, we can understand these dissimulations,
pretences, and sermons as *performances*. Here are a few points related to this idea.
First, as we see clearly in HH51, the ‘actor’ is performing *for* someone, an
audience: she seeks to make an impression, to convince someone of something.
Certainly, not all of Nietzsche's examples involve an actual audience of other
people: the actor may be trying to convince no one but herself. But even in such
cases, there is something necessarily, if derivatively, social and communicative
involved: the actor attempts to present an appearance that would convince others,
even if there are no others watching at this time.

¹⁷ Also D22, which summarises all these thoughts into some pithy advice: ‘First and foremost
works! Meaning do, do, do! The appurtenant “faith” will turn up into the long run – of that you
may be sure!’
Second, her performance is a performance of something: a particular role (a ‘profession’), or a particular attitude or state (happiness, goodness, etc.). Tying this point to the previous, the roles and attitudes that are performed are socially intelligible, they come from a shared repertoire: both performer and audience know how a priest or a friendly person should act. The actor starts out by playing a role that she takes from elsewhere: specifically, at least in HH51, she imitates or copies it from others, perhaps from role-models or exemplars (e.g., veteran priests).

Third, we have (at the beginning) a contrast between appearance and reality. For example, in HH51, we can contrast the actor's ‘mask’ of friendliness with her hidden real feelings. Or in D325 (as in Pascal's famous discussion), an apparent, performed, faith contrasts with an inner scepticism. In a successful performance, the actor presents an appearance that convincingly conforms to the role or attitude she is performing. In the beginning, this performance is a dissimulation: she does not ‘really’ have the values, attitudes, etc. she appears to. But over time, the performance becomes sincere: not only does she appear to have the values and attitudes of the role she performs, but she really has them.

Finally, perhaps the most obvious point about performative incorporation is that it takes time – maybe ‘a long time’. But not simply the bare passing of time: values and other attitudes can also become disused or forgotten over a stretch of time. What matters is that the performance recurs or continues over a long enough period: that it is repeated.

18 This point also applies more generally to other incorporative processes that I am not examining here, such as the longer term evolutionary processes Nietzsche discusses in GS. Incorporated errors were ‘continually inherited, until they became almost part of the basic endowment of the species’ (GS110); the name or meaning given a thing ‘grows from generation to generation [...] until it gradually grows to be a part of the thing’ (GS56). Also GS106 where a ‘doctrine’ starts out a seedling and becomes a tree if it ‘is believed for a long while'.

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Again, I think that Nietzsche's underlying drive theory can help us understand what is going on here. My starting point is the idea that we can think of the split between appearance and reality in a dissimulatory performance as a clash of rival drives. To simplify somewhat, and using the Pascal/Böhler example, I will think of a tension between two distinct drive-patterns: on the one hand, a “public” drive-pattern involving a set of religious values and desires, enacted in religious practices and in expressions of belief; on the other hand, a “hidden” drive pattern with its own set of sceptical evaluations, desires, and activities. When the doubter dissimulates religious belief, these two drive-patterns are both active in her, albeit in distinct ways. On the one hand, she may deeply feel the sceptical values and desires of the hidden drive, but if the dissimulation is to be successful, they cannot be observably enacted. On the other hand, in order to give a convincing performance, she needs not only to “go through the motions” of enacting the public drive, but must appear to really be moved by its values and desires.

We can now bring in the unity principle again: if one component of a drive is activated, for example its evaluations or desires, the others, for example its activity patterns, will also be activated in some way. If we apply this principle to the two drives in play, then we have two points to make. First of all, if the actor manages to block the values and desires of the secret drive from being enacted observably, they will instead be redirected into some ‘compensatory’ form of unobservable activity – perhaps in the internalised ‘inner world’ of fantasy that Nietzsche explores in the Genealogy. Secondly, taking the unity principle in the other direction, the ostensible activity of the public drive will not remain mere
behaviour, but corresponding values and desires will also come alive in the actor.

We can also add a further point here: in order to successfully sustain a convincing performance, particularly if it is repeated – in HH51, to ‘finally acquire a power over benevolent moods without which the impression of friendliness cannot be obtained’ – the actor may need to do more than just imitate external motions associated with the role she performs. She may need, in a kind of method acting, to actively *simulate*, in some way, values and desires of the role within her – e.g., to actively produce benevolent moods within herself in some kind of controlled way. But it may prove difficult for her to maintain this control – ‘finally these acquire power’ over the actor.

We can see this eventual shift in power in terms of the *nutrition principle* of Nietzsche's drive theory: a nourished drive strengthens, whereas a drive that is not fed will eventually ‘wither away’ (D119). Less poetically: in general, the more drive patterns are activated, the more they are strengthened. That is, the more likely they are to become active again in relevant situations, relative to other ‘competing’ drives and forces. So: the more that an actor performs the outward drive, the more this performance reproduces and strengthens not only the drive's ‘external’ activity, but also its desiring and valuing. Conversely, the less opportunities she has to enact the secret drive, the less this drive can ‘nourish’ and maintain its life.¹⁹ The outward drive will strengthen, and the hidden drive will weaken. The actor now feels, and is motivated by, the values and desires of the once merely apparent drive more strongly than those of the drive they supercede.

¹⁹ More exactly: the hidden drive is still enacted in some way, for example in an ‘internalised’ activity pattern such as fantasising or ruminating within the ‘inner world’. This however does not ‘nourish’ it sufficiently to resist the incorporation of the public drive. Also, the hidden drive, in so far as it survives, will be redirected and *transformed*. I look at these points in more detail in Chapters 6 and 8.
This process is not inevitable: it can be resisted and blocked. For example, there may be ways in which the actor can keep alive the hidden drive, so that its values and desires continue to resist the incursion of values and desires from the dissimulatory outward drive. Again, we can look at Nietzsche's accounts of dreaming and internalisation in this light: a drive that cannot be outwardly enacted is able to keep itself alive by going ‘underground’, into an ‘inner world’. I will develop this idea at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 8. One other point we should note concerns how mimetic and performative processes interconnect. In HH51, and perhaps also D104, we find both working together. First, we adopt new attitudes, values, practices, by imitating those around us, performing social roles for which these others are exemplars, mimetic models. Then, as we repeat these performances – absent resistance – the imitated values and desires strengthen until they overcome and replace previous patterns: they have become ‘our nature’. Mimesis temporarily transmits drive patterns across bodies: it is the first ‘ingestion’ moment of incorporation. But performative repetition is needed to stabilise patterns: to ‘dig’ them into bodies, to incorporate them in the second sense.

Again, we can note serious gaps in this account. I think that Nietzsche's account of performative incorporation, rooted in his drive theory, gives us a useful schema for identifying and investigating important patterns in valuing, desiring, and acting. But the unity and nutrition principles on which it rests are effectively still “black boxes”: just how, or why, do they work in these situations? I don't think we can find the answers to these questions in Nietzsche's texts. I now want to see whether recent developmental psychology can help fill any of these gaps.
3.3. Some ideas from developmental psychology

(i) Developing the unity principle: imitation and the ‘shared manifold’

Nietzsche thinks that imitation is innate, automatic, largely unconscious, and central to the formation of values. Recent research offers considerable support for these views. The contemporary evidence for innateness comes largely from the pioneering work of Meltzoff and Moore (1985), who observed newborn babies of even a few hours old mimicking movements of tongue and lips.\(^{20}\) As for ‘automaticity’, there seems no reason to attribute any intentional or instrumental motivation to this activity: infants don’t copy movements as means to any further ends, imitation is just what small children do. Further evidence comes from the well-documented studies of the ‘delayed imitation paradigm’ featuring infants of a few months old (Meltzoff and Moore 1999; Bauer et al. 2000; Nelson 2007:94).

Here the psychologist presents to the child, usually with a number of repetitions, a series of three- or four-step action sequences, e.g., moving a number of toys in order. Some time later, the baby is brought back to the laboratory and given the same toys to play with. She may be encouraged to play, but is not prompted into any particular activity pattern. Nine month old children tend to repeat some part of a sequence they were shown a month ago, but not if the gap is three months long. However, children who were 20 months old at the start of the experiment can still repeat a sequence they observed two years ago. It seems unlikely that any conscious recall is involved in these repetitions: they do seem to be cases of

\(^{20}\) Not all researchers accept these observations as evidence of newborn imitation – see, e.g., Cecilia Hayes’ (2005) alternative associationist account of the development of infant imitation.
unconscious mimesis becoming incorporated over time.

Facial imitation, which appears to be the first imitation of all, poses a particular puzzle to traditional psychological accounts of perception and action. Imitation involves translating, as it were, a perception of the movements of another's body into a relevantly similar bodily performance of my own. But how is this translation effected? It might be thought that imitation involves a sequence something like the following: I observe another's movement (e.g., a hand gesture, or an utterance); I attempt to reproduce it; I can compare the model performance with my copy; I can refine my copy in light of this comparison; through a series of repetitions, copy converges on model. But, in the case of infant facial imitation, there is no basis for perceptual comparison: the baby cannot see her own face.

This ‘correspondence problem’ has prompted both a wave of empirical research on imitation mechanisms, and the development of theoretical approaches which strongly recall what I have called Nietzsche's *unity principle*.\[^{21}\] For instance, Meltzoff and Moore (2005) argue that imitation is underpinned by a deep cognitive mechanism for what they call ‘active intermodal mapping’ (AIM). In this mechanism, activity across different ‘modes’ – including visual perception (seeing), auditory perception (hearing), and motor activity (doing) – are cognitively equivalent, processed as the same.\[^{22}\]

Encouragement for this approach comes from both observational experimental psychology and from recent neuroscience. The neurological backing

\[^{21}\] Much of this research is represented in the two volume collection ‘Perspectives on Imitation’, edited by Susan Hurley and Nick Chater (2005); the editors’ introduction gives a comprehensive review, which I draw on here.

\[^{22}\] In the standard language of cognitive science, we might say that these activities are *represented* in the same way in the information processing system of the infant brain. As Wolfgang Prinz (2005) puts it: the different modes share a ‘common coding’. I am trying to avoid these locutions because I don’t want to assume that we must think of minds (especially infant minds) as representational or information-processing.
is the discovery of what are called mirror systems (see Hurley and Chater (2005).)

‘Mirror neurons’ are observed to fire both when a) an individual performs a particular action or movement pattern; and when b) she observes someone else performing the same activity. Although this research – which, I want to make clear, is based on forced experimentation on captive monkeys – has prompted considerable debate and various interpretations which I can’t begin to discuss here, the general suggestion is that mirror neuron systems instantiate cognitive systems in which actions are not distinguished from perceptions of actions.23

Further support comes from a copious literature in adult experimental psychology on phenomena such as ‘priming’, ‘interference’, ‘perceptual induction’, and ‘chameleon effects’. Observing another perform an activity can have many noticeable, but unconscious, imitative or quasi-imitative effects on your own actions. These effects are widespread in ‘low level’ micro-actions – as in ‘imitative interference paradigms’, where performance of simple gestures is affected by how you are ‘primed’ by previous observations of others' actions (Wolfgang Prinz 2005). And also at ‘higher’ or more complex levels of social cognition as, e.g., in experiments conducted by Ap Dijkstra and colleagues where ‘youthful participants who are subliminally primed with words associated with the elderly, such as “gray”, “bingo” or “sentimental”, subsequently walk more slowly, perform worse on memory tasks, and express more conservative attitudes than age-matched participants’ (Hurley and Chater 2005: volume 1, 36).

Pulling some of these ideas together, we can in fact identify two dimensions of unity in such imitative mechanisms. The first is intermodality,

23 One issue is whether the mapping is between bare movement patterns, or patterns that are identified as, in some sense, intentional or goal-directed activities (Meltzoff 2005).
proper: such a mechanism makes (or finds) an equivalence between (a) bodily movement that is enacted by the perceiver's body, and (b) movement that is perceived. As Vittorio Gallese, one of the researchers involved in the identification of mirror neurons, puts it, such systems identify an ‘essentially intertwined character of action, perception, and cognition’ at a pre-intentional level (2005:109). The idea of intermodality here draws on the tradition in cognitive science that emphasises ‘embodied cognition’, or ‘enactive perception’.24

The second is (for want of a better term) intersubjectivity: the mechanism identifies (a) movement of an individual's own body with (b) movement of other bodies.25 Gallese conceptualises this equivalence with his hypothesis of a ‘shared manifold’. He writes: ‘the physical space occupied by inanimate objects and bodies of adult others is connected to the body of the infant to compose a blended, shared space’ (ibid:106). In this ‘space’, just as no distinction is made between perception or activity modalities, there is no attribution of self or others as the doers of deeds. Such cognitive processes do not ask “‘who did it”, “who is it’” (ibid), but realise ‘a thinner content state, which specifies what kind of interaction or state is at stake’ (ibid).

I should make clear that what we are talking about here are very largely hypothetical mechanisms. Ideas of intermodality, and the shared manifold hypothesis, certainly do not answer all the questions raised by the correspondence problem.26 Indeed, they raise further questions. For example, just how does a

24 Now classic statements of ‘embodied’ or ‘enactive’ approaches to cognitive science include Hendricks-Janssen (1996) and Clark (1997). I should also note, intertwining with this lineage, Hubert L. Dreyfus' (1990) reading of Heidegger, and development of the idea of ‘coping’.
25 Such infant bodies would not be subjects in the Nietzschean view I develop in the next chapter.
26 Gallese gives a functional explanation of the shared manifold, arguing that it ‘provides an incredibly powerful tool for detecting and incorporating coherence, regularity, and
human infant recognise movements (e.g., pushing out the tongue) of various bodies – its own, and others’ – as activities of a kind? If such equivalences are made only across similar bodies, how does an infant identify the bodies that matter? Imitation researchers do not currently have answers to these questions. In short, they do not (as yet) fill in all the gaps in Nietzsche's account of drive unity and imitation.

(ii) The nutrition principle: scripts and script memory

Bringing together Nietzsche with contemporary psychology must involve relating quite distinct terminologies and conceptual apparatuses. One guiding concept from recent psychology, the script, can provide a useful bridge, and will also play other valuable roles in this thesis. The script framework stems from the broader concept of a cognitive schema, largely developed by the psychologist Frederic Bartlett (1932) in his work on memory. Bartlett argued that people recognise, categorise and so understand figures, pictures and stories by organising elements in schematic patterns. A script, sometimes also called an ‘event schema’, is a particular kind of schema for social interactions. Developmental psychologists were some of the first to apply the script framework in the 1970s. One pioneer of this approach, whose work I draw on in this chapter and the next, is Katherine Nelson.

predictability in the course of an individual's interaction with his or her environment’ (2005:106.). It may well make sense that ‘the shareable characters of experience and action are the earliest constituents of our life’ (ibid:107). But such a functional presentation cannot tell us about the ‘mechanisms’ that work the process.

27 The term was first used in this way by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) theorists Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977), before being picked up in developmental and child psychology by Katherine Nelson and others – see Nelson and Gruendel (eds.) (1986), Nelson (2007) – and by social cognition theorists such as Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor (1991:119).
Although it involves a considerable simplification, it can be helpful to use the following basic cognitive psychology picture of how scripts work. An individual has a memory store or ‘repertoire’ of scripts. As an individual navigates social worlds she perceives cues which lead her to (however consciously or unconsciously) categorise the situations she finds herself in as exemplars of known types. Once the context is categorised, an appropriate script from her repertoire is then ‘cued’. For example, we can think of children as learning, rehearsing and varying scripts for familiar events such as ‘bedtime’, ‘dinnertime’, etc. Most basically, a script is a sequence or pattern of activity: first you wash your hands, then you sit down, then you eat, etc. Roles may be identified, and activities in the sequence assigned to different roles: parent, child, etc. But we can also see a script as more than merely behavioural: it also contains cognitive elements, such as beliefs and expectations about what different actors occupying different roles will do, etc. Furthermore, we can also think of scripted motivations and affects. Learning and following a script then means adopting not just role-defined activity patterns, but also attitudes and dispositions. This is where we can make a bridge with Nietzschean drive psycho-physiology, as we can see scripts as embedding drive patterns of valuing and desiring as well as acting.

One reason why the script framework has proved particularly popular with developmentalists has to do with the nature of infant memory. Until the 1980s, psychologists commonly believed that infants had no long term memory stretching over months. Research using methods such as the delayed imitation paradigm (discussed above) overturns this view, and also brings out some particular features of early long term memory. First, it seems that infant memory
is focused not on objects but on ‘action programs’ and ‘the dynamics of events’ (Nelson 2007:90): before children develop a long-term memory for particular objects, they are able to recall and reproduce event sequences (see Nelson 2007:90). Second, researchers think of infant memory as *implicit*, that is, ‘not accessible to voluntary recall out of context’ (ibid). An implicit memory is one that ‘comes back’ to us unbidden and in context, perhaps triggered by environmental features that repeat from a previous experience. Such implicit memories need not involve any conscious *representation* of the remembered event: they might, for example, involve unconscious keyings of movements or dispositions.

A third feature is the role of repetition in infant memory. Nelson points out that infant event memory decays if it is not re-called or put to use over ‘relatively short periods of time’ (ibid:89). If an event is to continue being ‘stored’ in memory, it must be repeated; singular events, according to Nelson, are not generally remembered. Delayed imitation experiments show stronger recall over time when the initial sequence is repeated. This last point is particularly relevant because it could provide some support for a form of Nietzsche's *nutrition principle*. Script patterns that are ‘nourished’ by repetition are implicitly remembered – that is, more likely to be activated and enacted in future. Patterns that are not repeated are, eventually, forgotten. Early memory is largely

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28 Nelson relates this point to her further claim that infants not only remember, but also *perceive* the world as a dynamic flow of events and activity patterns – it is only later in cognitive development that they begin to ‘dismember’, as Nietzsche might say, event sequences into discrete objects and actors.

29 Though it is hard to think how this claim could be falsified.

30 Indeed, although this is to touch on big debates, Nelson (2007:91) further argues that they need not be thought of as involving representation in any form.

31 Nelson surmises (2007:89; also (1993)) that ‘such decay is no doubt functional for a rapidly changing organism in a world that is also changing in its physical conditions as well as its social offerings […] single or non-repeated experiences should be overridden by updated constructions of what is of significance to the organism.’

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constructed by building up, and unconsciously reproducing activity patterns learnt through repetition – i.e., scripts. For Nelson and colleagues one of the places to best study the continuing formation and development of scripts is in the play, and later storytelling, of young children. One important aspect of such play is the rehearsal, and exploration, of social scripts: in play children alternate roles; they observe (often, insistently) rules and sequence orderings; and they explore variations. In Nietzschean terms: as they playfully re-enact scripts, children ‘nourish’ and so strengthen patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting.

We can also use the script idea to reformulate some Nietzschean thoughts on incorporation. Note that, on the one hand, a script is a feature of individual psychology: scripts are learned, ‘stored’ and reproduced by individuals. But a script is also necessarily social: it is shared by a number of actors – it is this that allows interpretation and recognition, and the regularity of patterned interaction. To put it another way: scripts are stored both in an individual’s memory repertoire, but also in a shared ‘social repertoire’. To a large extent, individuals adopt their values, desires, and activity patterns – that is, their drives – by learning social scripts. We can then think of the adoption or transmission of drive patterns in terms of a transfer from social to individual repertoires. However, the process is not just passive or one-directional. Individuals refine and vary the scripts they use, and so constantly develop and transform social as well as individual repertoires.

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32 With the proviso that here, contrary to many cognitive science accounts of script memory, we may not want to think of scripts as representational structures. See Nelson (2007:90-92) for a discussion of this point.
33 See Nelson and Gruendel, eds. (1986), for more on script-based approaches to children’s play and learning.
(iii) Developmental layers

The research I've looked at so far in this section does not fill in all the gaps in Nietzsche's accounts of mimetic and performative incorporation. But it at least suggests that processes of these kinds are at work in early childhood. Infants do appear to be mimetically adopting drive patterns, and performatively incorporating them through play as well as ‘real life’ interaction. This research supports Nietzsche's claim in D34 that children adopt (moral) values ‘as born apes’. But Nietzsche also thinks that unconscious mimesis and performative repetition continue to shape our values throughout adult life. At least some developmental psychologists, including Katherine Nelson, would agree: as we develop what Vygotsky calls ‘higher psychological processes’, for example involving linguistic consciousness, early unconscious processes are transformed, but they don't stop working in us.

We can here set up a comparison between two godfathers of developmental psychology, Piaget and Vygotsky.\(^34\) Piaget understands cognitive development as the unfolding ‘construction’ of new processes and capabilities as the child interacts with the world. But while this construction requires environmental materials, a fixed inner architecture directs it, and development unfolds following a set hierarchical sequence of stages. For example, in terms of the development of moral values, Piaget identified two key stages which are claimed to follow a universal pattern across cultures and environment. The

\(^34\) Piaget's theory on moral development is found in his (1932). For a philosophical introduction to Piaget's thought see Boden (1979). Vygotsky emphasises the complexity of internalisation processes: they involve ‘long series of developmental events’ (57), in which different internalisations interact and overlay each other.
influential Piagetian moral development theorist Lawrence Kohlberg (1981), expands his approach with a six stage model: but again, the stages and their sequence are universal.

In Vygotsky’s approach, too, almost all humans experience a number of common major shifts, including the internalisation of language. But in contrast to Piagetian thinking, the contingent specificities of local social environments, and of culturally shaped physical environments, undermines any attempt to identify universal developmental sequences. I want to highlight a further point on this, one that is emphasised by Nelson. Like Piagetian colleagues, Nelson identifies an age-linked list of six typical levels – or layers – of socially embedded cognitive development. But in a Vygotskian vein, she insists that ‘there is no implication that one moves on from one level to another’ (2007:26); in fact ‘rather than forming a clear sequence, they [appear] to be developing more or less simultaneously’ (ibid:50). ‘Lower’ level processes do not stop being active as new layers are added.

To make things more concrete, I will zoom in on one step in Nelson's account. Although babies imitate from the start, imitative activity really takes off slightly later (usually in the second half of year one) once infants have the perceptual and motor faculties necessary to recognise other humans around them, to ‘share attention’ with others, to observe and copy physical movement patterns, and to use communicative gestures and cries. Nelson uses the term ‘mimetic cognition’ to describe the characteristic intermodal and intersubjective processes of this level – her ‘Level 2’. Speech, and its internalisation to form linguistic

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35 Nelson's use of ‘mimesis’ derives from Merlin Donald (1991. Donald presents an influential hypothesis about the phylogenetic development of the human brain. He claims that early hominids, before the development of language, had a ‘mimetic culture’ based on gesture and
consciousness, then initiates a new layer (‘Level 3’) of cognitive processes characterised by *symbolic* representation. The child still uses and stores many of the ‘same’ event scripts, as well as adding new ones. But these scripts are now thickened, as it were: additional dimensions are added or overlaid on existing scripts. For example, a bedtime script still involves patterns of embodied action, gestures, and affects but can now also be conceptualised symbolically, with word labels attached to particular actions or sub-events in the sequence, and (later) to particular atomised objects and roles abstracted from the event context. A further thought here is that the thickening or layering of scripts may often involve introducing new *distinctions*. For example, Level 2 scripts may be largely intermodal and intersubjective in many respects; in Level 3 they become overlaid with new perception/action and self/other distinctions. Still later layers involve, amongst other things, the development of a sense of temporal flow across events, and of a persisting self (Nelson 2007: Chapter 7).

On this account of layering, unconscious mimetic and performative processes are, as Nelson puts it ‘*characteristic*’ of ‘Level 2’. This does not mean that they only work at this age, but that this is where we see them most strongly and clearly, before further processes overlay and interact with them. For example, mimetic transfer here appears as a particularly free flow of drives from social to individual worlds. Later, ‘higher’ processes involving linguistic consciousness may at least partially block mimesis, but they can also interact it with it to create performance.

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36 Note that Nelson thinks that mimetic cognition also involves representation: in these processes, children *represent* (scripted) events by performing or indicating them with bodily mimes and gestures. But she sees such ‘mimetic representation’ as non-symbolic. Unfortunately I don’t have space here to elaborate on Nelson’s distinction between mimetic and symbolic representation, which I think merits further philosophical discussion: see Chapter 4 of her (2007).
new forms of imitation involving language and thought. Phenomena such as priming and chameleon effects seem to show unconscious mimesis in action throughout life. For example, in a conversation with another person we process and respond to their words; but we also, if largely unconsciously, respond to body language, intonation, etc. As mimetic processes remain largely unconscious, we are very often unaware of their activity. Due to this unawareness, Nietzsche thinks, we tend to overstate the power of conscious, deliberative, processes in our psycho-social lives, and exaggerate the extent to which we acquire conscious control over the mimetic processes at work in us.

(iv) Performative incorporation revisited

I now want to revisit Nietzsche's story of performative becoming by making a parallel between the Pascalian religious dissimulator and Nelson's child at play. Both repeatedly perform, and so come to incorporate, socially scripted roles. We might note three forms of repetition involved in the performative incorporation of scripts. Children repeatedly observe others performing scripts. They repeatedly enact these scripts ‘for real’ in earnest encounters. And they also repeatedly rehearse these observed scripts themselves in play. All of these three kinds of repetition may work towards incorporating values, desires and practices by helping fix them into script memory. Like imitation, play-rehearsing of scripts seems to be a pretty much universal phenomenon, perhaps about as close to an

37 We might also pursue the idea that in internal thought and ‘decision-making’, too, many layers of processes may be operative at once. We can relate this thought to Nietzsche's key point about motivation in Dawn (D123): the conscious ‘deliberation’ we apprehend by introspection (internalised dialogue) is but one partial strand in motivational processing, and often one of the weakest. He holds that much of the motivational ‘inner’ activity that leads to external action happens on deeper levels of which we are generally unaware.
innate drive as we can find. It may be that infants not only have an ‘automatic’
tendency to imitate (repeat for themselves) present models, but also to then carry
on repeating, further exploring and varying, these imitations even when the
original model is no longer present.

I want to add one other relevant developmental finding. According to
Nelson, another key distinction that only develops with ‘Level 3’ symbolic
cognition is that between ‘real’ and ‘pretend’ (2007:97-102). One of Nelson's key
sources here is the experimental work of Judy De Loache (2004), who shows how
toddlers frequently treat toy versions of objects as ‘real’: e.g., they try to sit in too-
small toy chairs, climb into miniature toy cars, etc. Another is A. S. Lillard's
(1993) studies of small children's unexpected uses of the word ‘pretend’. 38 Nelson
takes these results to support Huttenlocher and Higgins' (1978) interpretation of
toddler play: when a toddler plays with a toy car, she is not viewing the toy as a
representation or stand-in for a real car; rather, toy cars and full-size working cars
are equally ‘real’ versions of the same category of thing. The suggestion is that in
early childhood real and play events are grouped using the same scripts: getting
into a real car, and playing with a toy car, involve following one and the same car
journey script. Only later are such scripts ‘thickened’ by distinguishing some
events as real and others as pretend. 39

38 According to Lillard, small children often labelled ‘real’ actions as ‘pretend’, e.g., if someone
was seen ‘hopping like a rabbit’ this might be categorised as pretence whether or not the person
was intending to imitate a rabbit, or just happened to hop that way. See Nelson (2007:169-70).
39 Nelson's view is that ‘many early play routines appear to be externalised versions of
internalised event schemas’ (2007:101): e.g., the child remembers (‘internalises’) the car
journey script from ‘real’ enactments with adults, then replicates (‘externalises’) it herself with
(toys. Nelson stresses how in much of this form of play small children are insistent on re-
enacting the pattern accurately: such play routines ‘are no more to be tampered with than are
the actual routines themselves’ (ibid.)
This discussion also brings up a further point of difference between Piaget and Vygotsky.
Piaget (1962) believed that in the second year of life children start engaging in ‘symbolic play’:
that is, they use toys or other objects to stand in for, symbolise real life actors and objects, and
so ‘play out’ real-life scenarios in the mode of pretence (see Nelson 2007:98). On this view,
I suggested in the last Section that we think of the Pascalian dissimulator as having two competing ‘hidden’ and ‘public’ drive patterns, both of which are active in her body in different ways. We can also think of these two drives as embedded in two learned social scripts. In performing the public script, the dissimulator is doing something similar to the child who rehearses and explores a script by playing. In the case of the infant, this performative repetition has an incorporative effect: that is, it fixes the script in her implicit, embodied, event memory and so strengthens a disposition to further repeat the script in future situations. This incorporative effect is automatic and unconscious.

Unlike the infant at play (on Nelson's account), the dissimulator knows that she is only pretending. This knowledge may take the form of a ‘high level’ conscious judgement: she can think to herself, “I am playing this part, but I know that my real values and desires are quite different”. It may also involve a more affective, felt, experience: “I am playing this part, but it feels wrong, unnatural”. The point of the Pascalian story is that while these judgements – which express the valuing and desiring patterns of the hidden drive – may resist, slow or impede the incorporation process, they are often not ultimately successful. This is because the same ‘low level’ processes of performative repetition still work, unconsciously and automatically, in adult bodies too. They are overlaid by other processes which may act against them, but they have not gone away. Performatively repeating a

small children are, at least implicitly, already working with some form of a distinction between reality and playful pretence: they can distinguish between the world of play, populated by symbolic objects, and the real world that is represented in play. Vygotsky (1978) questioned the view of toddlers as symbol manipulators, arguing that the ability to distinguish and manipulate real and apparent worlds is a later development that comes about only with the internalisation of linguistic structures. Thus Nelson writes that “there is a good deal of evidence that young children have difficulty keeping two things in mind simultaneously, as is allegedly necessary in maintaining action in pretence and in the real world simultaneously” (2007:98). (See also De Loache (2004), and further references in Nelson (2007:97-102).)
script will still tend to dig it into embodied event memory in adults. Other drive processes may or may not be strong enough to block this tendency.

The overall dynamic is that of a clash of drives, which can play out in a number of ways. For example, one outcome is that the dissimulator may keep on consciously telling herself that the hidden script embodies her ‘real’ values and desires, even as unconsciously and affectively the values, desires, and practices of the performed role become increasingly strong in her. The dissimulator may become ‘good’, friendly, religious, etc., in her actions and also in her ‘feelings’ (Gefühle) and ‘instincts’ (Instinkte), even if she denies it in her conscious thoughts (Gedanken).

It is not impossible that this dissonance persists: we can certainly find plenty of cases of self-ignorance where our conscious judgements of our own motivations are far off the mark. Or perhaps conscious judgements also shift to reflect the make-up of unconscious drives: the self-reflecting individual herself now sees how her ‘nature’ has changed.

### 3.4. Agency and resistance

In the account above, the individual may appear to be a passive victim of unconscious forces. If she is exposed enough to others' social scripts, she will mimetically adopt them. If she repeats them enough, she will performatively incorporate them, even against her conscious ‘better’ judgements. These mimetic and performative processes are largely beyond conscious control. What scope is left for agency?
Here I only make some very brief suggestive remarks: I will develop these points further as this thesis continues. The key point is that mimetic and performative processes only work to the extent that they are not blocked or resisted. Resistance can come, in different ways, from ‘rival’ drive processes. Just to give one example: if an individual is exposed to a dense and homogeneous social environment like Nietzsche's custom-bound herd, in which everyone she encounters shares the same values and desires, then mimetic and performative effects will be particularly strong. On the other hand, if she encounters diverse and conflicting values, desires, and practices, then processes working in a number of directions may play against each other. We could say: the mimetic and performative processes furthering the incorporation of one drive resist the incorporation of other conflicting drives.

But ‘higher’ level conscious judgements and techniques can also be set against unconscious processes. As I read him, Nietzsche does not hold that conscious judgement – as he sometimes puts it, the ‘intellect’ – is entirely epiphenomenal to unconscious valuing and desiring. What he does maintain is that conscious deliberation is a considerably weaker force than we often like to think. One aspect of this weakness is motivational: in the ‘clash of motives’ (D124), unconscious desires will often overpower consciously framed intentions.

This view of the limited efficacy of conscious judgement has important implications for how we think about individual agency. Very roughly, I read Nietzsche as criticising a view of strong agency in which a conscious ‘will’ has an ultimate power to command or overrule (unconscious) desires. In *Dawn*, Nietzsche offers instead the image of a gardener who learns to ‘cultivate’ her
various drives (D592). We can learn how to nourish and tend to them, or trim and prune them, manage their exposure to light, water, etc., within the limiting conditions of the soil, the climate, we inhabit. Similarly, we can learn how to understand the working of mimetic and performative processes in us and so, for example, develop techniques to strengthen or weaken our mimetic openness or the incorporative power of our repeated acts. One necessary, but not sufficient, condition for practices of self-cultivation is the ordering of a body of drives into a self-conscious subject, or ‘sovereign individual’ (GM2:2) – which is the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 4. Psycho-Physiology III: From Norms to Subjects

Bodies of drives are formed within social worlds. In the last chapter I looked at one basic part of this: individuals ‘adopt’ and incorporate values, desires and practices from those around them. Now I want to look at two further phenomena: how social norms regulate our actions and interactions, and so further shape our values and desires; and how norms also play a crucial role in forming us as self-conscious subjects who become self-shaping and self-regulating. In terms of Nietzsche's psycho-physiology, we can see ‘normalisation’ and ‘subjectivation’ as two important kinds of ordering processes that organise individual bodies of drives— and, at the same time, also organise individuals into social groups.

The first part of this chapter looks at Nietzsche's account of the morality of custom [Sittlichkeit der Sitte] in Dawn, and at its role in creating the ‘sovereign individual’ discussed in On the Genealogy of Morals. Section 2 brings these Nietzschean ideas together with recent work in philosophy and developmental psychology to give an account of the nature of normativity. Section 3 outlines a Nietzschean conception of subjectivity and looks at the role of norms in forming subjects.
4.1. Nietzsche on the Morality of Custom

In *Dawn* Nietzsche tells us that, most often, the composition of the psyche is a messy ‘work of chance’ (D119). A body of drives grows irregularly, chaotically and ‘as a consequence of this chance nourishment of parts, the whole, fully grown polyp, will be just as accidental as its growth has been’ (ibid). However, it is possible to work on our selves, ‘cultivating’ our drives like gardeners (D592; see also GS53) to make a more coherent individual. This self-ordering involves the use of the ‘intellect’, self-conscious reason, to guide therapeutic techniques such as those Nietzsche discusses in D109. But what is not so clear in these passages is just who is this subject that can work on itself. In D109 Nietzsche concludes that ultimately ‘our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive’, a tool that can fall into the hands of whichever drive is strongest ‘whether it be the drive to restfulness, or the fear of disgrace and other evil consequences, or love’.

This is not his last word on the matter. By the *Genealogy*, at least, Nietzsche has more to say about the nature and formation of individual subjectivities, and about the pivotal role of self-consciousness in transforming bodies of drives. The key references here are the opening sections of the *Genealogy's* second essay, in which Nietzsche tells ‘the long story of how responsibility originated’ (GM2.2) with the construction of a ‘sovereign individual’ (ibid). This individual is primarily presented in terms of a new social ability to make and keep promises to others. But that also implies the ability to make long-term commitments to oneself, and so the possibility to embark on projects of self-transformation. I will come back to the nature of the sovereign
individual at the end of this section. First I want to look at what Nietzsche says about how such individuals come to be. To answer this question Nietzsche refers us back to another central idea of *Dawn*, ‘morality of custom’:

The tremendous labour of that which I have called “morality of custom” (*Dawn*, sections 9, 14, 16) – the labour performed by man upon himself during the greater part of the existence of the human race, his entire prehistoric labour, finds in this its meaning, its great justification, notwithstanding the severity, tyranny, stupidity, and idiocy involved in it: with the aid of the morality of custom and the social straitjacket, man was actually made calculable. (GM2:2)

Morality of custom is a ‘primitive’ form of morality common to early human communities before the ‘ineluctable disaster’ (GM2.17) of state civilisation. While the shifts studied in the *Genealogy* transform morals, many features of this earlier form are still with us today.\(^1\) Its ‘chief proposition’ is as follows:

morality is nothing other (therefore no more!) than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may be; customs, however, are the traditional way of behaving and evaluating. In things in which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality (D9)

Customs are traditional patterns of valuing and acting (and desiring). We can understand a tradition to have both a temporal and a spatial or social aspect: it is a

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\(^1\) The relationship between this ‘primitive’ form of morality and contemporary morals is not always entirely clear in *Dawn*. Certain passages, including parts of D9, appear to suggest that morality *per se* is morality of custom – thus we now live in a less *moral*, i.e., less customary, age. In *GM* it becomes clearer that morality of custom is a particular form of morality characteristic of pre-state communities; ancient slave morality, and 19th century Christian morality, etc., are more recent historical forms of morality. These moral systems continue to work with key features of customary morality, but also assemble them together with new elements. I take this *GM* view to represent Nietzsche’s most developed thinking on the subject.
historical pattern, established in the past and that continues to be repeated today; and it belongs to a particular social group, a community. Nietzsche claims, and so all human life including ‘all education and care of health, marriage, cure of sickness, agriculture, war, speech and silence, traffic with one another and with the gods belonged within the domain of morality’ (ibid). Different communities may have very different customs, and Nietzsche particularly emphasises their arbitrariness. Although in many cases there may have been reasons for which customs first became established, perhaps even relating to social ‘utility’ (D19), these reasons may long since have ceased to hold. And some customs are ‘fundamentally superfluous stipulations’ (D15) – such as ‘among the Kamshadales forbidding the scraping of snow from the shoes with a knife’ (ibid): if these have any rationale at all, it is simply ‘to keep continually in the consciousness the constant proximity of custom, the perpetual compulsion to practice customs’ (ibid).

In the morality of custom, customs carry the force of moral obligation. Furthermore, moral rectitude consists not just in following the customs of the community, but also requires following them just because they are customs:

… if an action is performed not because tradition commands it but for other motives (because of its usefulness for the individual, for example), even indeed for precisely the motives which once founded the tradition, it is called immoral and felt to be so by him who performed it: for it was not performed in obedience to tradition. What is tradition? A higher authority that one obeys, not because it

2 ‘Everywhere that a community, and consequently a morality of custom exists’ (D9).
3 This point is later developed in the famous section of the Genealogy focussing on the resignification of the custom of punishment, and of other practices more generally, GM2.12.
4 These inhabitants of Kamchatka apparently also forbid ‘the impaling of a coal on a knife, the placing of an iron in the fire – and he who contravenes them meets death!’ (D15).
commands what is useful to us, but because it commands. (D9)

It is no coincidence that customary obligations here look like Kantian categorical imperatives. As Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter show, the above passage ‘clearly follows Kant's description of reverence [for the moral law]’ (1997:xxx). Furthermore, where Nietzsche’s terminology departs from Kant's, this is ‘traceable to Schopenhauer’s criticism of Kant’ (ibid). Schopenhauer's influence is also evident in Nietzsche's next point:

What distinguishes this feeling in the presence of tradition from the feeling of fear in general? It is fear in the presence of a higher intellect which here commands, of an incomprehensible, infinite power, of something more than personal – there is superstition in this fear (ibid).

Moral feelings

I will return in a moment to the striking claim Nietzsche makes here about fear. First, I want to think about the general idea of a ‘feeling in the presence of tradition’ (Gefühl vor dem Herkommen). What directly motivates obedience in an adherent of morality of custom is a moral feeling (Gefühl). We can use this point to situate the power of traditional authority within Nietzsche's broader account of evaluation and motivation. As I discussed in the last two chapters, feelings are how we experience the valuing and desiring patterns of relatively deeply

5 Kant's formulation, as identified by Clark and Leiter, is as follows: ‘What I recognise immediately as law for me, I recognise with reverence, which means merely subordination of my will to a law without mediation of external influences on my senses’ (G401/69). Schopenhauer's relevant points are two: one concerns the nature of reverence [Achtung] vs. obedience [Gehorsam]. The other, more substantial, is his argument that there must be some further motivating force that causes humans to obey the moral law – namely, fear.
incorporated drives, as opposed to mere ‘thoughts’ of more superficial drives. So: the ‘feeling in the presence of tradition’ is what someone experiences when one or more drives become active in her body that are relatively deeply incorporated, and whose evaluative stances and activity paths are directed towards following the custom. If these drive patterns are not blocked by other forces, they will lead the individual to obey the custom and act in the traditional manner. We can also recall here D34, where Nietzsche specifically addresses the early mimetic acquisition of moral feelings (moralische Gefühle), and makes an important distinction between moral feelings and post hoc rationalising moral concepts (moralische Begriffe). If we read D9 and D34 together, then we can identify at least a main source of the ‘feeling in the presence of tradition’: like other kinds of moral feelings, and feelings in general, it may be acquired through childhood mimesis.

One difference between these two passages is that in D34 Nietzsche writes of moral feelings in the plural and in the particular. These evaluations are linked to certain objects: e.g., I might develop a focused moral aversion towards scraping snow off my shoes with a knife. The moral feeling of D9, on the other hand, is a more general evaluative stance that arises whenever I am in the presence of any tradition. Nevertheless, there seems no reason to think that such general moral feelings could not also be acquired through the same kinds of mimetic and performative processes. Children living in custom-bound communities can acquire, mimetically and otherwise, not just inclinations and aversions towards particular practices, but also broader evaluative stances towards following the customs ‘of my community’, whatever these happen to be.

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6 Similarly in D19 Nietzsche identifies, in the singular, ‘the feeling for custom’, discussing how ‘this feeling acts to prevent one from having new experiences and correcting old mores’.
This implies that, to be inducted into a community's customary morality, an individual does not have to learn a comprehensive list of customs in early childhood. It will suffice if she develops (a) a general stance of obedience to custom along with (b) the ability to recognise which values, practices, etc., count as traditional for her community, even if she is not familiar with particular situations. What would such an ability involve? Here we can link up Nietzsche's discussion of customary morality with his idea of herd instinct (*Heerden-Instinkt*). Following John Richardson, I understand the herd instinct, or at least a key aspect of it, as ‘a drive to copy, i.e., a disposition to imitate others, to want to do the same as they do … the “meta-habit” of learning habits by copying others’ (2004:86). It also involves ‘many sub-habits that cultivate copying — beginning with the habit of being pleased to be in agreement with others’ and ‘the habit of blaming and suppressing other people who refuse to copy, who desist from common practices’ (ibid:87).

However, my reading is somewhat narrower than Richardson's: the herd instinct is a drive to imitate and agree with not just anyone, but specifically with those identified as other members of one's own ‘herd’. For Nietzsche, the herd is not the human species as a whole but a more local social group: ‘as long as there have been humans, there have also been human herds (clans, communities, tribes, peoples, states, churches)’ (BGE199). We can see a key ingredient of this idea in

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7 See GS1, GS116, GS117. Nietzsche's idea of ‘herd instinct’ develops through his work. In later texts such as *Beyond Good and Evil* the herd is contrasted with the ruling elite, slaves and masters: e.g., in BGE199 the herd instinct is an instinct of obedience ‘a kind of formal conscience that commands: “thou shalt unconditionally do something …”’. Because of this instinct the herd ‘accepts whatever is shouted into its ears by someone who issues commands’. This ‘thou shalt’ is clearly related to the traditional imperative of D9, but there is a difference: in *Dawn* people obey ‘the community’ as a whole and its traditions, more than ‘commanders’ or elites. On my reading: ‘primitive’ herd society is conformist but egalitarian; but the herd instinct is transformed into a prop for new forms of hierarchical social ordering following state conquest and the creation of the slave caste.
D104, where Nietzsche writes that ‘we are, throughout our lives, dupes of the way we learned in childhood to judge our neighbours (their intellect, station, morality, exemplarity or reproachability) and to deem it necessary to pay homage to their evaluations.’ That is: humans may be ‘born apes’, but we also learn early on to imitate and agree with some people more than others. In contemporary parlance, we learn how to distinguish ‘in groups’ and outsiders. One way we can see the tight interplay of herd instinct and morality of custom is this: a more or less effective way to recognise the customs of my community, particularly if I am a young or new member, is to copy other members, and respond to their positive and negative reactions to my behaviour. If, in general, other community members follow custom, then I will follow custom if I follow the others. And even more so if, as in D104, I learn to identify particularly reliable moral authorities and take these as preferential mimetic models.\(^8\)

**Primeval terror**

How and why is the moral ‘feeling in the presence of tradition’ an instance of ‘the feeling of fear’? Nietzsche seems to take up this view (from Schopenhauer) without discussion. He also ascribes other important roles to fear throughout *Dawn*. Notably, fear is cited (in D104) as the driving force behind performative incorporation: we initially pretend to share others’ evaluations ‘out of fear’. And yet there are many other passages that seem to belie the centrality of fear. It is not

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\(^8\) This idea will feature as one of Gabriel Tarde's key ‘extra-logical’ principles in his *Laws of Imitation* (1903). It is also a staple theme of contemporary social psychology and cultural evolutionary theory. See, as just a few examples, Henrich and Gil-White (2001), Boyd and Richerson (2005), Chudek et al. (2011), Andrews (2012).
mentioned at all in D34: children mimic and adopt moral values not because they are afraid, but just because they are ‘born apes’. In fact, in the various case studies in *Dawn*, fear appears to be just one motive amongst others that may lead to mimicry, performance, adoption and incorporation.\(^9\) Given that, it is not clear that the moral feeling ‘in the presence of tradition’ must stem from fear either. In principle, it could develop through a combination of motives and influences, or just through early ‘automatic’ mimesis.

But even if the link between customary morality and fear is not psychologically basic, it may signal a very important historical conjunction. Nietzsche sees prehistory as a time where weak and trembling early humans live in ‘perpetual fear and precaution’ (D18).\(^10\) There are three main sources of prehistoric fear. Firstly, fear of very real and present dangers – wild animals, harsh environments, enemy tribes, etc. Secondly, superstitious fear of unknown forces: according to Nietzsche, prehistoric humans believed that failure to observe customs will bring down unexplained disaster on the community as a whole (D9).\(^11\) Thirdly, there is the more mundane fear of being punished by other group members if you break the customs.\(^12\)

Nietzsche particularly emphasises the supernatural or superstitious form of

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\(^9\) Despite the claim of D104, none of the various examples of performative repetition in *Dawn or Human, All Too Human* actually involve fear. See HH51, D248, D325, D367. For example, in D367 philosophers perform happiness in order to make a philosophical point, and because they ‘believed that their happiness was the best refutation of other ways of life’.

\(^10\) Also D23: ‘the feeling of powerlessness and fear was in a state of almost perpetual excitation for so long a time’. And D5: ‘The greatest achievement of humankind to date is that we need no longer be in constant fear of wild animals, barbarians, the gods, and our dreams’.

\(^11\) Nietzsche appears to connect this state of superstitious fearfulness to humans’ weakness faced with a deadly world. It may also be a consequence of early humans’ propensity to read will into everything, to ‘imagine themselves into nature’ (D17, also D23).

\(^12\) In *Dawn*, the material punishment of individuals is an offshoot of the primary fear of supernatural collective punishment: the community takes ‘revenge on the individual because owing to him and the alleged after-effect of his deed, the storm clouds of the gods have gathered over the community’ (D9).
fear in *Dawn*. Mundane forces of human violence come more to the fore in the *Genealogy*: Nietzsche now sees traumatic and bloody *punishment* playing the crucial role in creating the ‘animal with a right to make promises’ via ‘an increase in fear, a heightening of prudence, mastery of the desires’ that ‘tames men’ (GM2:15).\(^{13}\)

**Ordering and strength**

To sum up, the motivational force of morality of custom is manifested in the moral ‘feeling in the presence of power’. This feeling can be underpinned by a number of component structures including (i) the ability to recognise members and customs of the herd community, along with (ii) a broad evaluative stance towards following practices identified as custom. In concrete, (iii) this evaluative stance is experienced by the individual as an imperatival command, an authority demanding obedience. And, furthermore, (iv) this demand comes with a strong affective experience, a feeling of fear. In Section 2 I will look at these components further within a more general account of normativity.

The effect of morality of custom is to order both communities and individuals. Morality of custom creates *herds*, social groups sharing limited and slow-changing sets of values and practices. These herds are populated by ‘herd man’ (BGE199) – tame, uniform, average and flat (BGE201), ‘like among like’,

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13 Although superstitious fear certainly also continues to play a role in GM: in particular, in GM19-20 Nietzsche expands on his account of the role of superstitious terror in the ordering of communities, now seen to involve the personification of ancestors and the debts believed due to them. I should perhaps say at this point that I consider Nietzsche’s speculations on prehistoric beliefs and institutions to be among the weakest aspects of his work. For example, see David Graeber (2011) for a detailed anthropological and historical study that quite soundly dismisses Nietzsche’s views on early institutions of debt in the *Genealogy* (GM 1.8).
regular, calculable (GM2.2), fearful, other-regarding, etc. Custom is a ‘social straitjacket’ (ibid). It restrains difference and newness, allowing only a restricted set of values and practices to be repeated and inherited; all non-conforming valuing and desiring is condemned as ‘evil’ (D9).

As becomes clear in the *Genealogy*, there is a crucial double aspect to the role of customary regulation. On the one hand, morality of custom is a force of ‘stupidity and idiocy’ (GM2:2). On the other, it is a necessary and positive force. I want to draw out two particular positive (in terms of Nietzsche's overall evaluations) roles played by custom-ordering: (i) it makes bodies strong; (ii) it creates the conditions for individual self-transformation.

Nietzsche thinks that, very largely, a strong body is one that has a simple and rigid structuring of drives. This idea is developed in *Human, All Too Human*: strength in individuals comes from a ‘narrowness of views, through habit become instinct … When someone acts from a few but always the same motives, his actions attain to a great degree of energy’ (HH228; see also HH229, 230). We can frame this point in terms of the drive psycho-physiology of *Dawn*: a body is liable to be weak, in terms of its ‘energy’ or directedness, if it is the site of multiple rival drives clashing against each other. A body whose drives are harmonious, consistent, ordered, is likely to act more concertedly. One way, although perhaps not the only one, to “engineer” a strong body is then to restrict and constrain the diversity of its drives, as a simpler body will be subject to less internal conflicts than a more complex one. An important question that Nietzsche grapples with in

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14 There is a particularly clear statement of this idea in this later note from 1888: ‘The multitude and disaggregation of the impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them results in a “weak will”; their coordination under a single dominant impulse results in a “strong will”: in the first case it is the oscillation and lack of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of direction’. (WP46).
Human, All Too Human is then how a ‘free spirit’, a body breaking free of the shackles of custom, might become strong enough to survive despite the weakening effect of its diverse and fluid composition of drives (see HH230). Can there be bodies that are both complex and resilient?

Nietzsche also applies the same analysis to super-individual bodies, to ‘cultures’ or ‘peoples’: a strong culture is one where people share ‘habitual and indiscussable principles’ (HH224). In the Genealogy, an important example is the strength of the noble tribe. Morality of custom is responsible for creating not only herds but also the packs of ‘blond beasts’ that become their conquerors. The noble tribe is a group that is particularly ‘sternly held in check inter pares by custom, respect, usage, gratitude’ (GM1:11), and particularly fearful of its ancestors (GM2.19).\(^\text{15}\) Nietzsche develops this point in part nine of Beyond Good and Evil. Far from being free from custom, the ‘nobles’ have a ‘deep reverence for age and the traditional’ (BGE260). A conquering group gains its strength precisely ‘by virtue of its hardness, uniformity and simplicity of form’ (BGE262, which requires a strict customary moral code of ‘intolerance’ (ibid). It is only later, after dominion is established and life gets easier, that ‘the bond and constraint of the old discipline are torn’ (ibid) allowing innovation, variation and individuality to flourish.

There are a number of interesting tensions in this theory of strong and weak bodies, some of which I will pick up again in Chapter 6. But now I want to move on to the second positive role of custom. Suppressing individuality is what

\(^\text{15}\) Related to this, the strong tribe’s superstitious fear is greater: ‘the fear of the ancestor and his power, the consciousness of indebtedness to him, increases … in exactly the same measure as the power of the tribe itself increases, as the tribe itself grows ever more victorious, independent, honoured, and feared’ (GM2.19)
morality of custom does. And yet, it is precisely by ordering bodies of drives that custom lays the ground for individual autonomy. How does this switch take place?

**The sovereign individual**

Nietzsche's character portrait of the sovereign individual is complex, tangled with ambiguity and a dash of irony. I am not going to give anything like a comprehensive account here. My specific interest in the sovereign individual concerns her ability to ‘know herself’, and so make commitments over time, both to others and to herself. It is not entirely clear how widespread Nietzsche takes the ‘right to make promises’ to be: on the one hand, GM2.1 suggests that ‘man’ as a whole has developed such an ability; but a little further on in GM2.2 such ‘responsibility’ appears exceptional. One way we might reconcile these passages is to understand the full-blown sovereign individual as an ideal type whose faculties actual humans may develop to varying degrees.

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16 In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche tells us that each of the three essays of GM have ‘Every time a beginning that is calculated to mislead: cool, scientific, even ironic, deliberately foreground, deliberately holding off’ (EH ‘Genealogy of Morals’). It is also worth noting that in EH Nietzsche describes this essay as an examination of the ‘conscience’ – without distinguishing the ‘bad conscience’ developed by slaves from some more positive conscience of the sovereign individual. This may also suggest that the sovereign individual is not radically removed from the negatively portrayed human of ‘ressentiment’.

17 For the notion of an ideal type (*Idealtypus*) see Max Weber (1997), and also Manuel DeLanda (2006:30) who argues that Weber's concept can be separated from any essentialist connotations. Ken Gemes (2009) understands the sovereign individual as the possessor of what he calls ‘agency free will’, which involves the ability to ‘act’ as opposed to merely being passively moved by internal and external forces. This reading is not necessarily incompatible with mine, although I will not pursue it here. (See also footnote 29 in Chapter 2 above). Gemes (2009:41-2 fn.11) allows that a more ‘nuanced’ Nietzschean account could allow varying degrees of agency (or ‘sovereign individuality’) amongst human bodies; however, he argues, Nietzsche's rhetorical aim to ‘awaken his audience from their complacent assumptions’ leads him to present the sovereign individual as a rare and distinct creature.

Some other recent commentators, for example David Owen (2009) and Aaron Ridley (2009), argue for a more substantive distinction between the kinds of commitments made by a full-blown sovereign individual and just any human who is able to make promises. For example, Ridley writes that: ‘sovereign promising … amounts to whole-hearted commitment to someone or something, to executing the relevant intention come what may’ (2009:187). If that
To make and keep a commitment involves a relationship between two events:

Event (1): I say, whether to myself or another, that I will do x.

Event (2): some time later, I do x.

It is important to note that both of these events are actions of my body. Nietzsche makes this point clear in GS335: a conscious observation or decision, ‘your deciding, for instance, that this is right, is also an action’, as is an ensuing deliberative inference “therefore it must be done”. As we saw in Chapter 2, an action of a body is an outcome of a complex interaction of multiple drives, a ‘clash of motives’ which is to a large extent ‘something quite hidden to us of which we would be quite unconscious’ (D129). This analysis must apply both to ‘external’ actions, observable movements of a body that impinge on the world beyond, and to ‘internal’ actions that take place in an introspective ‘inner world’. Verbal, written, mimed, etc., statements made to other people are ‘external’ actions caused by drive processes. Conscious observations and decisions, moments of reflection and deliberation, statements made to oneself, etc., are ‘internal’ actions, also caused by drive processes.

So we have a sequence of two actions – a statement (Event 1), and later a deed (Event 2) – both of which are caused by largely unknown psycho-physiological interactions. A key point that Nietzsche makes in D129, GS335, and elsewhere is this: there is not necessarily any direct causal link between these two actions. The drive processes that produce Event 1, and the drive processes that

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is right, then my discussion describes only the more minimal and general capabilities of the ‘human with the right to make promises’.

18 As he puts it in a note from 1887: “what becomes conscious is subject to causal relations which are completely withheld from me’ (KSA 12.11[145] [1887]).
produce the later Event 2, may or may not be connected. The ‘right to make promises’ is, therefore, not something that can be taken for granted: where it exists, it is grounded in contingent relationships of drives in a body over time. Specifically, Nietzsche thinks, it has several pre-requisites which have evolved or developed during human (pre)history. Here are some of them:

(1) *Regular bodies.* The most basic requirement is a form of motivational consistency or continuity over time. As Nietzsche puts it, ‘Man himself must first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary’ (GM2.1). I ‘will’ x when I state my intention (Event 1), and I still (or again) will it in the future when I actually do the deed (Event 2). In drive terms, this means: a motivational complex of ‘ruling’ drives wins out in a clash of motives and so causes Event 1; and, later, a complex of ‘ruling’ drives similarly causes Event 2. This consistency, if it is not a coincidence, can come about because the same (or similar) complex of ruling drives persists ‘in power’ in the body over time. That is: ‘man’ becomes calculable because the motivational drive composition of the body becomes stable.19

(2) *Self-identity.* Even if ‘primitive’ people or non-human animals can be motivationally regular, this in itself doesn't give them ‘the right’, or even the ability, to make promises. To make a commitment one must not only be calculable in fact, but also know oneself as calculable: as Nietzsche puts it, man has become regular ‘even in his own image of himself’ (ibid). To put this another way: the individual forms a self-identity, comes to recognise and identify herself as a persisting subject with a stable core of values and desires.

(3) *Reflective consciousness.* Self-identity in turn has a number of further

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19 In principle it could be the statement and the deed are produced ‘coincidentally’ by quite separate and independent complexes of drives, but I suppose that this is not always the case.
pre-requisites. One of these is the ability to consciously reflect on my motivations and actions. That is: it requires some form of the reflective consciousness I discussed in Chapter 3. There I looked at Nietzsche's (and also Vygotsky's) thoughts on the co-development of consciousness and language use. Roughly put, reflective consciousness involves the internalisation (in Vygotsky's sense) of dialogic speech and of its grammatical structures, so that at least some mental states can be isolated and identified in communicable terms.  

(4) Memory of the will. Self-identity requires not only identifying momentary states of valuing, desiring, etc., but also connecting these up over time, ascribing them to a motivationally consistent self. In GM2.1 Nietzsche understands this process to involve a new kind of human memory, ‘memory of the will’. In the last chapter I suggested that we can see early drives as formed through performative repetition that incorporates them into early event memory. This basic form of memory is implicit: that is, to recall something means that a psycho-physiological disposition is cued, which may happen entirely unconsciously. In contrast, memory of the will is a new faculty of explicit memory that holds together in consciousness a temporally extended sequence of events ‘between the original “I will”, “I shall do this” and the actual discharge of the will, its act’ (ibid). This sequence can then be identified as a series of actions of a persisting self, united by a ‘long chain of will’ (ibid).

(5) Theory of Mind. Nietzsche identifies a further list of pre-requisites which underpin memory of the will: ‘man must first have learned to distinguish necessary events from chance ones, to think causally, to see and anticipate distant events’. 

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20 As I noted in Chapter 2, Nietzsche argues that fundamental distortions are built into this linguistically structuring: however he noticeably downplays this point in the positive portrayal of the sovereign individual in GM2:2.
eventualities as if they belonged to the present, and in general be able to calculate and compute’ (ibid). I am not going to look at all of these ideas here. I will just suggest one way we can think about them that connects with recent philosophy and psychology. In contemporary terminology, Nietzsche is talking about individuals coming to apply a *theory of mind* to themselves: that is, attributing desires and beliefs – or more generally a range of mental states, or cognitive and conative attitudes – that are identified as causes of actions and so used to explain and/or predict.

Now I would like to get a bit clearer about one tricky issue surrounding the sovereign individual. Throughout his work Nietzsche attacks conceptions of a ‘subject’ possessing a ‘free will’. For example, in GM1.13 he famously critiques the idea of a ‘neutral independent “subject”’, claiming that “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed’, and links these errors to the *ressentiment* of the weak. And yet the sovereign individual clearly is a subject, a ‘doer’ behind deeds that it commits to and follows through on, and is even labelled ‘this master of a free will’ in GM2.2. How can we reconcile these positions?

As Christopher Janaway argues, in his discussion of the sovereign individual Nietzsche is not concerned with ‘the global, metaphysical question whether absence of necessity is possible in human agency’ (2007:117). The sovereign individual's ‘autonomy’ or ‘free will’ does not indicate a noumenal escape route from the causal chains of drive formation and the ‘clash of motives’, but more modestly a degree of self-understanding and self-control operating within these causal processes. Also, I would add, we might remember Nietzsche's remark in *Ecce Homo* about his use of irony in the opening passages of the three
essays of the Genealogy. This should perhaps warn us against reading GM2:1-3 as a straight panegyric of the ‘autonomy’ of the sovereign individual. The interesting question, I think, is then: what kind of limited autonomy is possible within the causal framework of drive motivation? To answer this, we can start by distinguishing two kinds of self-predictive statements:

(i) I say ‘I shall do x’ (Event 1), based on knowledge of my own ruling drive patterns, but making this statement has no causal impact on my actually doing x or not (Event 2). For example, think of a statement like ‘I know that if I see you I will do something I will regret’. This, if we can take it literally, is an act of predictive self-observation that differs little from a prediction I might make about the activity of another person over whom I have no influence. It is epiphenomenal with respect to the causal processes that shape my future action.

(ii) I say ‘I shall do x’ (Event 1), and the act of making this statement helps shape, alongside other factors, my future composition of drives in such a way that I become disposed to do x (Event 2). This statement also draws on self-knowledge – at least, if it is to be effective or accurate. However it is not merely an observation, but an intervention in causal processes that shape my future action.

Just how can making such a statement of intent causally effect the future composition of my drives? Much in the same way that any other kind of action can. For example, I can act in ways that stimulates the activation of drives in myself or others. I might stimulate a drive in myself by setting an alarm, writing myself a note, tying a knot in my handkerchief, berating myself, walking past the open door of a coffee shop, moving to live in a new environment, ordering the crew to sail past the sirens as I am tied to the mast, reading rousing literature,
listening to Bizet, conjuring up images in my mind, or in a myriad of ways. Both ‘external’ acts and also wholly ‘internal’ acts of monologue and reflection can work.

Here is one suggestion for how a statement of intent could be effective. Suppose that I have a strongly incorporated drive, perhaps acquired in childhood, which values and desires keeping commitments. When I make a statement of intent or commitment, this stimulates the activation of this ‘drive for upholding commitments’. In principle, the stimulating act could involve writing the statement and signing it with blood, saying it aloud in front of witnesses, saying it aloud to myself, or just ‘saying’ it to myself in an internal event of reflective consciousness. Once this drive is active in my body, it will then be a factor in a ‘clash of motives’ that shapes my future actions. If this drive is strong enough and wins out in the clash, I will then follow through on my statement of intent: I will keep my promise.

So, the sovereign individual is a body of drives composed in such a way that its conscious statements of intent will be efficacious. This is not because it possesses a noumenal free will, but because it has developed certain drives and faculties structured in such a way that conscious expressions of intent will influence its future actions. Nietzsche's view is not that statements, promises, observations, introspections, decisions, deliberative judgements, and other such self-reflexive conscious actions are always epiphenomenal. They can be causally efficacious, although less often than we commonly tend to think. Where they are, it is not because they have magical properties as expressions of ‘the will’, but because they have causal influences on future drive processes, in just the same
ways that very different kinds of actions can have.21

We can now see how Nietzsche's discussion of the sovereign individual relates to self-ordering or self-cultivation. What the sovereign individual is doing when she makes an effective commitment is intervening in the future composition of the drives that compose her body. And that is exactly what is meant by ‘self-cultivation’. Her intervention makes use of what we can call, using Foucault's term, a ‘practice of the self’: in this case, the practice of making commitments. But I think we can also see the pre-requisites of the sovereign individual more generally, as requirements for any individual who is able to engage in conscious work on the self, using a potentially wider range of techniques. On that note I want to outline one more requirement:

(6) Practices of the self. Commitments made by the sovereign individual

21 What is epiphenomenal for Nietzsche, I think, is ‘the will’ – or, more exactly, the conscious ‘feeling of willing’, as Brian Leiter (2002, 2009) argues. Leiter brings out Nietzsche's claim, made notably in BG19 and TI ‘Four Great Errors’, that ‘the phenomenology of willing systematically misleads us as to the causation of our actions’ (2009:122): experiences or sensations of apparently ‘willing’ an action (to the extent that there are such experiences) do not in fact point to any event or process that causes action. And, as Leiter notes, there is substantial evidence from empirical psychology and neuroscience, as surveyed by Wegner (2002) to back up Nietzsche's views on this point. The kind of causally efficacious conscious events I am talking about – e.g., reflective statements of intention – are quite distinct. They need not involve any experience of willing; or if they do feature this experience, it is not by virtue of this that they influence action.

Katsafanas (2005) and Riccardi (forthcoming a) make some further points relating to how conscious states can have causal impacts within Nietzsche's drive approach. Katsafanas notes some other key places in Nietzsche where particular conscious processes have major repercussions for an individual's future life: for example, one is consciously thinking the thought of 'eternal recurrence'. Riccardi argues that although we need conscious linguistic processes in order to first 'acquire' some powerful thoughts such as that of eternal recurrence, still it is ultimately unconscious processes that do all productive work. ‘[R]epresentations and beliefs we acquire socially can work as causally efficacious mental states only once they have been internalized and thus integrated into the relevant psycho-physiological mechanisms. More specifically, Nietzsche holds that the content of conscious mental attitudes—like my conscious desire to quit smoking—needs to be reshaped so as to figure as the content of the unconscious and intentionally structured drives which actually determine my agency.’ The points I made in the last two chapters go against Riccardi on this. Self-conscious thought processes already are psycho-physiological drive processes, in just the same way as are more deeply incorporated affective processes, or entirely unconscious ‘instinctive’ processes. Incorporation (see Section 3.1) does strengthen values and desires: so, for example, an embodied habitual feeling of disgust at smoking may be a more powerful motivator than a mere ‘conscious desire to quit’; but even more ‘superficial’ conscious desires can also play some causal role in the ‘clash of motives’ (D129).
contribute to shaping her future drive motivations. There may be various causal mechanisms at work here. For example, stating a promise may stimulate the activation of a ‘drive to uphold commitments’. More generally, I will think of practices of the self as conscious interventions in the composition of drives in one's own body, which may be underpinned by a range of efficacious processes. In all cases these practices, and the drive processes that underpin them, need to be developed, imitated, learnt, incorporated, etc.

So, what is the role of morality of custom in creating the sovereign individual? Most obviously, Nietzsche identifies custom as the force behind the first pre-requisite, the creation of a motivationally consistent body. This is ‘the preparatory task that one first makes men to a certain degree necessary, uniform, like among like, regular, and consequently calculable’ (GM2:2). I am not able to begin to calculate, or influence, my future actions unless this most basic prerequisite is in place. But the role of customary morality does not end here, it is also at work in shaping the further pre-requisites: in forming individuals' self-identities; in shaping language and linguistic consciousness; and in forming and regulating the practices through which we understand, explain, predict, and also transform ourselves. To investigate these points further, I will move now beyond Nietzsche's specific discussion of custom, and look more generally at the working of norms.
4.2. Norms and normativity

In this section I will draw on the Nietzschean ideas discussed above to give an account of social norms: what they are, how they regulate our actions, and how they work to shape our values and desires. I will first give a quick outline of the general structure of social norms. This will enable us to see Nietzschean moral customs as a particular class of this more general phenomenon. Then I will focus in on one particular issue: norms can have power over us not just because we fear punishment for disobedience, but because we ourselves come to feel them to be right, or to bind or oblige us in some sense.

Roughly speaking, I understand a social norm to be a practice or rule of a social group with some or all of the following features:

(i) Normality. A social norm is a practice that is normal – or common, regular, expected, etc. – for a group. I am not going to try to pin down just what this ‘normality’ consists in here. One way to pursue it could involve the idea of expectations: members of a group expect each other to follow a norm in relevant situations. Christina Bicchieri (2005) takes such an approach. I will just highlight two general points. First, normality is relative to a group: different groups may have very different norms. The group in question might be a ‘community’ or ‘society’, or a group identified by gender, race, class, sexuality or other characteristics (identities which may themselves be normative), or by affinity or

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22 The term ‘norm’ is broad, diverse, and subject to much debate. Philosophers discuss aesthetic norms, linguistic norms, mathematical norms, moral norms, personal norms, and more. I am not going to attempt to give a full account of all of these. My main interest is in what I will call social norms, which may well include or overlap with other categories. I think that the three features I list here capture much of what is commonly understood by social norms.

23 Although it may be defined only on limited, special occasions – e.g., norms for rituals that are performed only very occasionally or in unusual circumstances. e.g., in times of crisis.
voluntary membership, etc. Nor do we need to think that only humans have norms: there is a growing field of study on the norms of other social animals (Andrews 2009). Second, a norm is relative to a time: norms change.

(ii) Sanctions. At least many social norms are enforced by sanctions or punishments. These may take many forms from, e.g., mild expressions of disapproval, to extreme violence. Sanctions may be meted out widely by other group members, or they may be in the hands of particular individuals and subgroups, who are perhaps recognised as specialist ‘authorities’ of some kind, perhaps accorded some sort of ‘monopoly on violence’.25

Sanctioning practices may involve further layers of norms. For example, think about a norm that prescribes certain ways for people to act depending on their gender, race, class status, property ownership, etc. If people break this norm, others may punish them by shunning, mocking, threatening, beating, calling the police, etc. Such sanctioning practices may themselves be norms: that is, it is expected and in some way obligatory to show disapproval of deviant behaviour, and failure to do so may itself be punished. We might call these ‘second order’ norms – or as Robert Axelrod (1986) puts it, ‘meta-norms’.26 There may also be ‘third order’ norms about how to respond to those who fail to follow second-order norms, and so on.

Sanctions are usually taken to be negative responses to those who break

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24 I will return to the issue of group identities in Chapter 7.
25 Here I do not follow Weber’s (2002: 34) distinction between laws and norms (or, to use his term, conventions (Konventionen)), in which a law is a rule enforced by a specialist organisation.
26 One big difference between Nietzsche and recent cultural evolutionary theorists: whereas writers such as Axelrod see it as difficult or ‘costly’ to enforce sanctions, Nietzsche believes that humans typically enjoy punishing (and more generally, hurting) others. It is then very easy, in a Nietzschean picture, for such punishment meta-norms to get started. See GM2.6: ‘To what extent can suffering balance debts or guilt? To the extent that to make suffer was in the highest degree pleasurable ...’ Also D15, D18, D30.
norms, reactions that hurt or punish in some way. But norms are also supported by positive responses: those who follow them may be rewarded with approval, inclusion, status, favours, material and economic security, or just the unspoken calm of not being under threat. There is a case to be made for thinking of all social interaction as normative, to varying degrees, and perhaps for seeing all interactive responses as involving ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ sanctions, whether or not people intend or view them this way.27

(iii) Normativity. Social norms are felt or held, at least by some group members, to bind or oblige. They are practices or rules that these people feel that they (and/or others) ought to follow. As Christine Korsgaard puts it, normative standards ‘do not merely describe a way in which we in fact regulate our conduct. They make claims upon us: they command, oblige, recommend, or guide’ (2004:8). I will say that social norms carry, to varying degrees, normative weight or force for some or all members of a group. I see this last feature, which I will also call normativity, as particularly important in distinguishing social norms from other kinds of social rules, conventions, laws, etc. And I think it is an important factor in thinking about how norms work on us: why we obey them, and how they come to shape our psyches. Certainly, much of the power of many norms lies more obviously in the grid of punishments and rewards that surround them. But the perceived or felt rightness, legitimacy, naturalness, morality, etc., of normative systems are also crucial in maintaining them.

Two important clarifications here. First, I am not interested here in whether any norm ‘really’ conveys obligations, duties, responsibilities, etc., moral or

27 The sociologist Talcott Parsons was a famous proponent of the view that ‘all social action is normatively oriented’ (1991: 170) and also of the notion of ‘positive sanctions’. 143
otherwise, on anyone. Rather, I am interested in the nature of what I will call *normative evaluations* – that is, in what it means for someone to believe, feel, sense, judge, etc., that a norm has a normative weight on her or on someone else.²⁸

For example, I am interested in what it would mean to take the custom of not scraping snow off boots with a knife as binding, whether or not any philosophical observer decides it ‘really should’ have such a force. Second, although I started by talking vaguely about a social norm as a ‘practice or rule’, we need to remember that many norms may be deeply embodied practices. If such norms are rules, they are implicit or tacit rules that no one need ever spell out explicitly. I will look further at this point below.

The script framework, introduced in the last chapter, can help us further explore social norms. Here I take a lead from Christina Bicchieri’s account of script-embedded norms, although I do not follow it in all details. A script or event schema, to quote Bicchieri, ‘describes a stylised, stereotyped sequence of actions that are appropriate in [a given] context, and it defines actors and roles’ (2006:94). Simplifying, we can think of individuals as developing (with variation and innovation) their own individual repertoires of scripts, at least in large part, by picking up and incorporating scripts from the social repertoires of groups. I also suggested that we can see scripts as embedding Nietzschean drive patterns: that is, scripts cue not just actions and expectations but patterns of valuing and desiring. We can think of norms as elements of scripts, or at least in some cases as whole scripts. If a script is a norm then this means: (a) the script is normal for a social group, i.e., it is commonly cued for members of that group in certain contexts; (b)

²⁸ Borrowing terms usually applied to discussions of legitimacy (see Fabienne Peter 2010): I am interested here in ‘descriptive normativity’ as opposed to ‘normative normativity’.
deviation from the script will lead to sanctions; and (c) group members evaluate it as having normative force. Or it may be that only some of the elements embedded within a script, e.g., some particular actions within the sequence, have these features.

The script framework helps draw out some points that are not always noted in discussions of norms. First, not only observable actions may be norms: values, desires, and other script elements, may also be recognised as normal, be subject to sanctions, and be evaluated normatively. E.g., someone may be judged and punished not just for how they act but for having the wrong kinds of desires. Second, it emphasises the interconnectedness of norms – a norm is not a ‘stand alone’ prescription but comes embedded in interlocking systems of further rules, practices, values, desires, etc. Third, it helps us think about how normativity is tied to social roles. Whereas much of the literature treats norms as patterns that are shared, uniform within groups, many normative structures or systems are highly asymmetric, and work to help reinforce dominating hierarchies. We can think of normative scripts that assign very different roles to different individuals, with very different prescribed actions, expectations, values, and desires.

We can now see Nietzsche's moral customs as social norms, with some special features connected to the key roles of tradition and of fear. Customs are traditional ways of behaving and evaluating that are defined as normal for a certain group at a certain time in its history. Breaches of custom are punished by sanctions. Customs are normatively evaluated, felt to be right – and to be commanded by traditional authority. It is this last point, the nature of normative evaluation, that I now want to examine in more detail.
In general terms (see Chapter 2), an evaluation appraises something positively or negatively, identifying it as good or bad, desirable or undesirable, attractive or repulsive, tasty or noxious, etc. My question now is: just what distinguishes normative from other evaluations? There may be various kinds of normative evaluations, and these may or may not be reducible to one or more ‘primitive’ form.\(^{29}\) I do not claim to capture all kinds of normative evaluation, but will look at what I think are a number of prevalent aspects or forms. I think that these can be found independently, and have their own (connected) developmental paths; but often come conjoined to form complex normative attitudes. The first, perhaps most basic, I think of as an evaluation that something is \textit{correct}. The second is the experience of norms as \textit{commanding}. The third is a further emotional experience – of \textit{fear}, in Nietzsche's discussion, but more generally what Shaun Nichols (2004) calls an ‘affective backing’, where a range of affects may increase the power of normativity.

\textit{Normativity as correctness}

One basic form of normativity involves identifying something as correct, appropriate or right in some sense. This applies not only to \textit{social} norms but in a wide range of settings: we can judge solutions to mathematical problems, the grammar of sentences, moves in games such as chess, logical or practical inferences, and many more things, to be correct or incorrect.

\(^{29}\) In analytical philosophy at the moment a common view is to take the concept of ‘reason’ as in some way basic or primitive. E.g., Joseph Raz: ‘The normativity of all that is normative consists in the way it is, or provides, or is otherwise related to reasons.’ (1999:67). Simon Robertson (2009) gives a good introduction to these contemporary debates and the role ascribed to reasons. I will follow a rather different line here.
In at least some of these cases, correctness is defined within a particular context: an utterance may be syntactically correct in one language but not in another; kicking the ball is allowed in some sports but not in others; an inference is correct given premises and, perhaps, the rules of a particular logical system. To identify something as correct or incorrect we need to know which context we are in (e.g., which game we are playing), and we need to know what counts as correct or incorrect in this context. To be clear, I will refer to this form of context-relative correctness as ‘local correctness’. Categorising something as locally correct does not, by itself, amount to a normative evaluation: I can identify a practice as a norm of a social group, but not feel any obligation to follow the norms of this group. The idea that I will develop in this section is that we can think of a ‘basic’ (social) normative evaluation as made up of two components: (i) categorising a norm as locally correct within a form of life of a social group; and at the same time (ii) affirming, positively valuing, that form of life. This idea generalises the approach discussed in Section 1, in which I suggested that the core of morality of custom involves (i) categorising practices as customs of my community and (ii) broadly valuing the traditions of my community.

We can use the script framework to think about local correctness in social norms. Firstly, a given script may provide the context in which its elements – actions, values, desires, etc. – are categorised as correct or incorrect. If an actor performs an action which is expected for her role, at the right time in a scripted sequence, etc., then this action is correct (given the script). Secondly, scripts as a whole can also be evaluated as correct or incorrect. One way to think about this is

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30 In the following discussion I will mainly talk about actions, but we can make the same points with respect to other kinds of script elements such as values or desires.
to see one script as a sub-script nested within another. For example, within a ‘bedtime’ script there may be a ‘reading a story’ sub-script, while the bedtime script might itself be part of a bigger ‘normal day’ script (perhaps, as opposed to other scripts for holidays, emergencies, and other kinds of days where bedtimes go differently). Drawing on Richard Schacht’s (2012) usage in his account of Nietzschean normativity, I will use the Wittgensteinian term ‘form of life’ to indicate a broad background of scripts, schemas, values, norms, practices, etc. shared by members of a social group.\textsuperscript{31} We can see forms of life as broad meta-scripts within which particular scripted interactions may be cued. A script may then be (locally) correct or incorrect with respect to a given form of life. A correct script is one that it is normal, expected in a particular context, within a form of life; an incorrect script is one that is unexpected, anomalous, ab-normal for a form of life.

Another way to understand local correctness could be in terms of rules – and here the idea of a game, famously explored by Wittgenstein, comes into its own: following a socially normative script (within a broader form of life) is like playing a ‘language game’ – or a ‘social game’. However, it is important to note that people may follow scripts, and feel that they are acting correctly in doing so, without having any explicit understanding of rules: they may not be able to identify, conceptualise or explain the rules – or, the scripts – involved.

\textsuperscript{31} Wittgenstein uses the term ‘form of life’ (or Lebensform) five times in the \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, beginning with (1958 s.23) where: ‘… the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life’. Here a language game plays a role rather similar to a script in my account of social norms: a script/language game frames particular acts/utterances, but is itself framed within a broader context including non-normative and non-linguistic activity. Schacht directly relates ‘forms of life’ (FOL) to social norms writing that ‘Forms of life are the contexts that make the establishment, development, and continuation of [normative] situations possible’ (2012:250). They are the frames within which norms develop and shape activity; they are themselves also largely made up of norms. ‘Values are FOL-relational, norms are FOL-contextual, and normativity is FOL-structural. Normativity is internal to FOL norm-systems’ (ibid:251).
To clarify this point I will turn to Hannah Ginsborg’s (2011) concept of primitive normativity – that is, ‘normativity which does not depend on conformity to an antecedently recognised rule’ (2011: 233). For example, a child may know to continue a sequence such as ‘34, 36, 38, 40 ...’ with ‘42’, and may react ‘with surprise and puzzlement to the suggestion that she should have said “43” instead’ (ibid:234), and be convinced that 42 ‘“came next” in the sequence, or “belonged” after 40, or “fit” what she had been doing previously’ (ibid). As Ginsborg puts it, the child may ‘[claim] that “42” is appropriate, or what she ought to say’ (ibid) without being able to cite any rule of addition to explain this normative evaluation. If we want to say that this child is following or ‘grasping’ a rule, we must understand such rule grasping in a tacit or pre-theoretical sense that amounts to being (a) ‘reliably disposed’ to behave in the way expected of rule-followers, where (b) ‘one's [...] behaviour involves the consciousness of its primitive appropriateness to the context’ (ibid:248). In the context of social norms, we can think of primitive normativity in terms of a ‘grasp’ of social scripts.

Does Ginsborg’s ‘consciousness of a primitive appropriateness to context’ refer, in my terms, to a categorisation of local correctness, or to a full-blown normative evaluation? While in fact she has something more like the latter in mind, we could read her main point either way. That is: without recognising

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32 Ginsborg primarily discusses mathematical and linguistic norms. She develops her account as an answer to Kripke’s (1982) sceptical problem of rule-following.

33 Ginsborg uses the word ‘appropriate’ here and reserves ‘correct’ for a more specific and less basic kind of normative claim. As she uses these terms, to deny correctness is to ascribe incorrectness, the breaking of a rule; the contrary of appropriate is a more general ‘lack of appropriateness’ which may include ‘not only behaviour we may later classify as mistaken but also behaviour which is not subject to normative evaluation at all’ (ibid:243 fn. 21). I am not going to explore this distinction here, and will use correctness as a more general term.

34 Indeed, she thinks that her account can also ground a still stronger sense of actual ‘legitimate’ normativity: ‘I am committed not merely to the truth of the anthropological claim that human beings are disposed to take “42” to be appropriate in the circumstances described, but to the legitimacy of the normative attitude it ascribes’ (ibid:240).
rules, individuals are able both to (a) make categorisations of script-following correctness, and so identify the presence of social norms, and (b) take these norms to have normative force for them. Note that while these two components are conceptually distinct, their development may be tied tightly together: for example, it could in fact be that small children first of all grasp only norms that bind for them and move them to action, and only later come to identify norms that do not have force for them.

Another distinction, which Ginsborg does highlight, is that between being ‘disposed to’ act in a certain way, and normatively evaluating that practice (feeling it to be appropriate, for Ginsborg). Consider these three scenarios:

(i) someone follows a script, but without normatively evaluating it as correct;
(ii) someone normatively evaluates a script as correct, but does not follow it;
(iii) someone follows a script, and normatively evaluates it as correct.

In the Nietzschean view, ‘all actions can be traced back to evaluations’ (D104). So in scenario (i), there will be some kind of evaluation at work behind the action or disposition, just not a normative evaluation. For example, I may value a script-following action instrumentally, as a means to a valued goal: perhaps I follow a norm in order to avoid punishment, or to get rewards of ‘sustenance and honours’ (GS335), even whilst holding the norm to be wrong. Or perhaps I value it “intrinsically” or independently, approaching it as something good “in itself”.35 For example, think of someone who has deeply incorporated a

35 By an independent evaluation or desire I mean one that is not dependent, instrumentally or otherwise, on the existence of other evaluations or desires. That is, the individual would be just as likely to make this evaluation even if her other evaluative stances changed. Some writers use the term ‘intrinsic value’ (or ‘intrinsic desire’) in a similar way — although this concept is not to be confused with another use of ‘intrinsic’ value to mean a value based on properties intrinsic to a valued object (as in Moore (1922:159)). See, e.g., John O'Neill (1992), Michael J. Zimmerman (2010) on ideas of intrinsic value; and Robertson (2009) for a different use of this idea in reading Nietzsche. Ultimately, I think that all evaluative stances are likely to depend, in
normative behaviour so that it has become a deep personal desire, or maybe an unquestioned habit – what she “always does”, part of her ‘nature’ (D104). She is now deeply disposed to follow this norm, but we might say that she does not follow it *qua* norm: she no longer needs either the threat of sanctions or any normative evaluation to bind her to it. Normativity may have played a key part in shaping this disposition but now, as it were, its work is done.  

In scenarios (ii) and (iii), the individual does take the script to have a normative force for her, and this force features in the ‘clash of motives’ that move her body to action. However, as in scenario (ii), it may not be an effective motive: it may be outweighed by other drives with conflicting evaluative stances. These competing evaluations may be ‘independent’, or instrumental, or indeed conflicting normative values, or perhaps fall into none of these categories. Similarly, in scenario (iii), a normative evaluation may be just one of the motivating factors that leads to a norm-following action. Where social norms are effective, it will often be that deeply incorporated desires and habits, fears of punishment, prospects of reward, normative evaluations of rightness, and other drive patterns work together in a dense reinforcing motivational complex.

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36 Another example: tastes in foods amongst humans and other animals start to form before birth as a developing foetus is exposed to food substances in its mother’s amniotic fluid. We may think that a foetus or indeed a newborn baby does not yet have normative evaluations: she does not yet identify and affirm norms of social groups. And so, we might think, amniotic taste transmission is at least one way in which we form non-normative evaluative stances – e.g., for particular foods, tastes, smells, etc. However, consider that the mother’s diet may be strongly influenced by the norms of her social world. While such ‘tastes’ are not normative evaluations as defined here, they are formed within an environment strongly shaped by norms.
The development of basic normativity

I say that the normative evaluation in terms of correctness is a basic form of normativity. It may be that not all forms of normativity (in the context of social norms) involve correctness, but at least the other two forms I will look at in a moment both presuppose it. And there is good reason to think that it is at least a very early form of normativity to develop in typical human ontogeny.

Olivia Sultanescu and Kristin Andrews (2013) bring Ginsborg's analysis together with evidence from developmental psychology and primatology to look at social normativity both in human children and in non-human apes (observed in the wild). They write: ‘at a very young age, children are already learning about how things ought to be done, or what is appropriate, without necessarily coming to grasp normative concepts or principles that they could use to justify or explain appropriateness’ (2013:62). For example, Hamlin et al. (2007) claim to find children from 6 months old preferring (e.g., observing, following with gaze) others based on previously observed actions towards others. Chow et al. (2008) find 14-month-olds preferentially following those who had ‘a prior reasonable response to a perception’ (Sultanescu and Andrews 2013:62). Henrich and Gill-White see infants imitating individuals who receive more attention from others, and Chudek et al. (2011) identify preferential imitation of those to whom other learners also preferentially attend. Schmidt et al. (2010) identify preferential learning amongst three-year-olds from adults who appear confident in solving tasks. Sultanescu and Andrews take these studies to show that infants develop Ginsborgian primitive normativity before they begin to use language, and before
they develop a conscious ‘theory of mind’. 37

But do these studies in fact show normative evaluations? What we immediately see in this research are dispositional patterns: children become disposed to watch, follow, imitate, etc., certain kinds of actions and people more than others. We do not explicitly see signs of normative evaluation – for example, none of the displays of ‘consciousness of a primitive appropriateness’, or shows of ‘surprise and puzzlement’ at an anomaly mentioned by Ginsborg. That said, I think there are reasons to think that this early activity either already involves normative evaluation, or at least lays the ground for it. First, what we are seeing are precisely the kinds of social categorisations that come to be at the heart of normative evaluations. In Nietzsche's terms, we are seeing the development of a kind of ‘herd instinct’, or how ‘we learn in childhood to judge our neighbours (their intellect, station, morality, exemplarity or reproachability)’ (D104). For instance, to be disposed to imitate some kinds of people is to form social

37 Sultanescu and Andrews accept the position that infants usually begin to ‘mindread’ around 4 years old. A key step in the argument for this position is that this is when children typically start to pass ‘false belief’ tests. As the authors note, this conclusion is debated by other developmental psychologists.

A further hypothesis of Kristen Andrews (2009) is also interesting here. She argues that human beings do not commonly use, or need to use, ‘theory of mind’ (which Andrews understands fairly narrowly to mean ‘the ability to attribute to an agent her primary reason for acting, consisting of both her belief and pro-attitude’ (2009:434)) in order to understand normal behaviour. Most of the time we predict and explain peoples' activity by drawing on our experience of a range of regular or recurring patterns – e.g., persisting character traits of known individuals, and characteristic sequences of familiar situations (i.e., scripts). Andrews’ suggestion is that rationalisation using beliefs and desires develops specifically in response to the need to explain anomalous activity – situations where normal, familiar, patterns break down. This position fits with the empirically supported view sketched here. Basic normativity provides what Andrews calls ‘a background expectation about normal behaviour’ (ibid:440); against this background of normality, script-breaking actions stand out as anomalous; at least some such anomalies call for explanation, which is where belief/desire ascription comes in. Andrews also offers a further hypothesis concerning the nature of those anomalies that call for rationalisation. One particularly important role of rationalisation, she suggests, is that citing reasons allows us to justify deviant actions of group members – we might say, to excuse norm-breaking behaviour. Such an ability, she argues, may have had an evolutionary value in allowing groups to embrace innovations. Note however that, as Nietzsche tends to stress, reason ascriptions can be used not just to excuse but also to blame.
categories of preferred and non-preferred mimetic models. This is not by itself to normatively evaluate these models and their actions, or even to categorise them as locally correct, but is a necessary part of it.

Second, infants do start to make more explicitly normative claims at this early stage. As Sultanescu and Andrews put it, this research ‘reflects what developmentalists, educators, and parents have long observed, namely that between two and three years of age, children become concerned with proper behaviour, sometimes to the point of obsession’ (2013:62). If this point does not come across so strongly in the experimental literature they cite, there is other developmental research that investigates it. In particular I think here of the studies of Katherine Nelson and colleagues on children’s play and narrative speech. Nelson claims that ‘many early play routines appear to be externalised versions of internalised event schemas, and they are no more tampered with than are the actual routines themselves’ (2007:101). Children observe and remember (‘internalise’, in the Vygotskian sense) social scripts, then rehearse and enact (‘externalise’) them in play. In doing so they are often insistent on following observed scripts correctly, without deviations from sequence, roles, etc. They may show not just surprise and puzzlement but anger and frustration at deviations. Perhaps bringing together this kind of close observation of script-like play with the literature discussed by Sultanescu and Andrews could be fruitful for further understanding the development of norms.

In Section 1 I suggested that in Nietzsche's morality of custom children

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38 Sultanescu and Andrews also argue that we can find forms of primitive normativity amongst primates. The evidence here is less developed, but suggestive. In particular, the research of Rudolf Von Rohr, Burkart, and van Schaik (2011) argues for chimpanzee norms concerning special treatment, and community defence, of infants.
develop (i) abilities to identify the customs of their community and (ii) a broad evaluative stance, acquired mimetically as a ‘moral feeling’, which affirms these customs. This account of basic normativity generalises that idea. As we saw in the last chapter, humans begin to learn social scripts from early infancy, incorporating them through mimesis, performative repetition, and perhaps other processes. Children also come to identify at least some of these scripts as ‘correct’, appropriate, fitting, in the context of forms of life of social groups they inhabit. This need not involve learning comprehensive lists of correct actions and scripts, as there are other ways to recognise what belongs to a form of life. For example, we may learn who to categorise as models for appropriate behaviour, members of ‘in-groups’, etc. At least very often, what is considered correct for a form of life is the same as what is recognised as normal within it. The right is ‘what one does’, ‘what is done’. At the same time as learning to categorise scripts, children are typically also incorporating broad evaluative stances that affirm forms of life of their social groups. What is normal to a form of life then also becomes normative.

In Nietzsche’s picture of the age of custom, people live in small homogeneous communities with narrow repertoires of social scripts. All scripts are either normative or ‘evil’: the ‘domain of morality’ encompasses all aspects of life (D9). Individuals belong to one social group with an all-encompassing form of life. For most humans today social worlds are more fragmented and fluid. We may grow up exposed to a myriad of scripts, values, and norms, within more or less overlapping or disparate groups and forms of life. Normative incorporation processes may be more various, and work with and against each other in complex ways; but they have certainly not gone away.
Normativity as command

For Nietzsche, tradition is a force that commands, demands obedience. For Korsgaard, norms ‘command, oblige, recommend, or guide’. I want to leave open the possibility of normative evaluations that are cold judgements, and of others that are perhaps not consciously experienced in any way. But it seems that where we do feel norms, they often have this character of an imperatival voice speaking as if from without or from above. This sense of normativity as commanding does not immediately flow from the basic form of normativity as correctness. Just how does the normal come to be experienced as a command? Here I will suggest a hypothesis that involves the relationship between norms and subjects. It takes up and develops this point from Richard Schacht: ‘The first-personal “I ought” is a derivative internalization of a third-personal “One ought”’ (2012:252). I understand this idea by thinking about three stages in the experience of a normative command:

(i) Other people in a social group tell (and show) me what is normal and correct – what ‘one ought’ to do and not do. The normative command is an external third personal command.

(ii) I internalise – or, incorporate – these commands (and recommendations, etc.) from others. They appear as commands that come from a ‘third personal’ voice or perspective that is ‘within’ me, and yet is not fully my own. The normative command is an internal third personal command.

(iii) I affirm the normative command for myself, identify it as my own will: ‘one ought’ now becomes ‘I ought’. The normative command is now a first
personal command from myself to myself. (Alternatively: I may reject the
normative command, refuse to affirm it in the first person.)

What exactly does this talk of first and third personal voices or stances
amount to in a Nietzschean picture? In looking at the sovereign individual in
Section 1, I discussed Nietzsche's view of how regularised human bodies can
come to develop a self-identity or ‘image of self’. One key prerequisite of this is
the internalisation of language, including grammatical structures, to form self-
reflexive consciousness. My further suggestion here is that the individual who
develops in this way may come to label some of her drives, the multiple
evaluative perspectives within her body, as ‘belonging’ to this identity – as
Nietzsche might say, to ‘my will’. These evaluations ‘enter our consciousness’
(GS354) in the first person: ‘I want this’, ‘I ought to do this’, ‘I think this is right’,
etc.

But not all evaluative stances within a body of drives appear to reflective
consciousness in this way. Literally ‘hearing voices’, including those of
commanding gods or other authorities, is an extreme case of a different kind of
conscious experience of evaluations. More commonly, a wide range of drive
evaluations may be identified as in some sense ‘other’ to my will – compulsions,
instincts, nagging doubts, various more metaphorical inner ‘voices’ of conscience
or reason, etc. One such structure that particularly interests Nietzsche is
conscience, discussed in various passages including WS52 and GS335. Moral (or,
more broadly, normative) judgements (‘this is right’) may often appear to issue
from the ‘voice of conscience’, an inner voice that claims an authoritative force.

39 See here Julian Jaynes' (1977) speculative but fascinating theory of the “origin of
consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind”, which argues (to put it roughly) that
until the iron age humans commonly experienced volition as hearing voices.
Just like other evaluations, judgements of conscience are contingent products of incorporation and other drive processes, they have ‘a pre-history in your instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences and lack of experiences’ (GS335). Nietzsche is at pains to argue that their claims to authority are unfounded: ‘What compels me to listen to [conscience]?’ (ibid).

To sum up, I am making two suggestions. First, once a conscious self-identity is formed within a body of drives, evaluations within the drive body may be categorised as ‘first personal’ (belonging to my self-identity) or ‘third personal’ (belonging to other ‘voices’ within me). Second, many normative evaluations, at least initially, are experienced as belonging to the latter (third personal) category. I am not claiming that all normative evaluations are experienced in this way, just that it is a common feature of much human phenomenology, and one that has shaped common ways of thinking and talking about norms. In this experience, norms are felt as commands coming from an internalised other. These commands may take harder or softer tones: they may impose, bind, weigh, constrain, or urge, recommend, suggest, etc. ‘I’ can then respond to them, either by accepting, affirming, obeying, or by rejecting, refusing, etc. ‘In short, there are a hundred ways in which you can listen to your conscience’ (GS335).

If this analysis is correct, it implies that this form of normativity as command is a later developing structure than basic normativity. Basic normativity is developmentally prior to, and a prerequisite of, self-identity. Normative command is a way that normativity can appear only after the constitution of a self-identity – and its prerequisites including linguistic consciousness, ‘memory of the will’, and ‘theory of mind’. This also means that the ‘primitive’ humans of
Nietzsche's age of morality of custom are already along the road to being ‘sovereign individuals’. The experience of custom as a command from ‘higher authority’ implies the possibility of disobedience, or at least of failing to listen. There are individuals who refuse the commands of tradition and instead follow their own subjective goals and reasons. Although they are few, Nietzsche's discussion in *Dawn* suggests that the possibility of individuality is in principle open to all: as is further highlighted by the fact that custom needs to be enforced by extreme sanctions, and above all by fear.

*Affective normativity*

The above ideas suggest that, at least in principle, normative evaluations are not necessarily connected to fear or other particular emotional states. There is nothing in the basic normativity of correctness, or in the phenomenology of command, that implies terror, or any other particular affects of guilt, shame, disgust, etc. On the other hand, it may often be the case that normative evaluations are in practice tightly linked to certain affective experiences, and that these affects substantially increase the felt force of normativity.

I will quickly note some contemporary research on this point. Steve Nichols' (2004) theory of ‘sentimental rules’ or ‘affect-backed norms’ broadly fits with the Nietzschean view I am taking. Nichols argues that with at least some social norms we can find two kinds of psychological ‘systems’ in play: on the one hand, a ‘normative system’ that identifies and categorises norms; on the other, an ‘affective system’ (or perhaps a number of affective systems) that further
motivates norm-following. Nichols looks at two kinds of affect-backed norms: norms against harm to others, which are backed by what we might think of as empathic emotions; and norms involving disgust. His experimental findings show that where norms are linked to either of these affects they tend to be felt to be more serious, and to bind in a wider range of contexts. Perhaps we could also see other affective-normative connections in a similar way, including those that involve fear.

As Nichols puts it, ‘there is an important sense in which [in his theory] norms are only contingently connected to the emotions’ (2004:139). But these contingent connections can be powerful. One factor that Nichols cites in explaining the power of emotions to fortify norms, and which raises particularly Nietzschean resonances, involves ‘the impressive experimental tradition tracking the effects of affect on memory’ (ibid:125). In short, strongly emotive events (and words, objects, etc.) are more likely to be fixed in memory, retained and repeated. We might see this as a generalisation of Nietzsche's claim (GM2.3) that what best digs social norms into memory is pain.

40 Nichols uses the term ‘normative theory’ more frequently than ‘normative system’; but given my stress on the pre-theoretical nature of basic normativity I am avoiding this usage.
41 Philosophers have not often paid much attention to emotions of disgust in relation to normativity or morality: ‘sentimentalist’ accounts of morals usually focus on empathy (e.g., Hume); or on ‘reactive emotions’ such as guilt, shame, etc. (e.g., for a recent such theory, Gibbard (1999)). The psychologist Paul Rozin (1999) investigates the role of disgust in forms of morality, and in the ‘moralisation’ of practices.
42 More precisely, Nichols is interested in how normative force compares across certain key characteristics: how seriously infringement is viewed; whether norms are contingent on being commanded or endorsed by authority figures; and whether they are felt to bind only in particular social contexts, or in all kinds of interactions. These are the key features associated with moral as opposed to ‘conventional’ norms in the moral psychology research programme initiated by Elliott Turiel (e.g., Turiel, Killen and Helwig 1987). Whether these characteristics in fact say something about the nature of ‘morality’ – or what distinguishes moral from other norms – is however very debatable.
43 As Nichols puts it: ‘increased emotion at encoding facilitates retention’ (125). He cites the literature reviews by Heuer and Reisberg (1992) and Revelle and Loftus (1992).
4.3. Making subjects

In the last section I drew on Nietzsche's account of morality of custom to help build a more general picture of social norms. Now I want to make a parallel move and draw on his discussion of the sovereign individual to think about the nature of subjectivity. Nietzsche does not speak well of the ‘subject’. His main use of this classic philosophical term is in exposing as fictions ideas of ‘transcendental’ subjectivity associated with the tradition of Descartes and Kant, but also connected to deep structures of our everyday language and folk psychology (D116, GM1:13, TI The Four Great Errors). However, I think that we can usefully reclaim this term within a Nietzschean framework. My main interest in doing so is to understand the self-cultivation of subjects within the framework of drive psycho-physiology. This approach also follows in the footsteps of Michel Foucault, who in many respects can be seen as developing a Nietzschean picture of subjectivity.

In GM1:13 Nietzsche attacks the ‘subject’ understood as a neutral ‘substratum’ of uncaused free will behind or within the individual body:

as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum: there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming: “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything.

But note that here Nietzsche does not reject the very identification of an individual body (‘the strong man’) that acts.\textsuperscript{44} In one sense, at least, Nietzsche does identify a

\textsuperscript{44} As I discussed in Chapter 2, we can read other passages as viewing even the very identification
‘doer’ or actor: this body, this person who acts, who expresses her strength. The problem is not identifying an acting body, but looking for something else, a special kind of subject of free will, ‘behind’ it. This opens a possibility: we can think of a Nietzschean subject, so long as this subject is not something behind or within the body, but is identified with the body itself. To paraphrase Zarathustra, a Nietzschean subject has to be ‘body … through and through, and nothing besides’ (Z. ‘On the Despisers of the Body’). From this starting point, here are some suggestions for a Nietzschean subject:

(i) A subject is not something distinct from the body, but is a certain kind or form of body: namely, a body that is ordered, composed, structured in a particular way.\(^{45}\) I will call this ordering a ‘subjectivity’. Using the term subject in this way parallels Nietzsche's suggested resignifications or ‘new versions’ of the term soul in BGE12: ‘soul as subjective multiplicity’ and ‘soul as social structure of the drives and affects’.

(ii) The actions of subjects, like the actions of all bodies, remain outcomes of drive processes working through a largely unknown ‘clash of motives’.

(iii) Bodies of drives are not automatically or necessarily subjects: subjectivities are formed through contingent developmental processes. Again, we can make a parallel with BGE12 where Nietzsche advocates a ‘mortal soul’ that is not ‘indestructible, eternal, indivisible’. Also, bodies may have multiple of individual bodies as erroneously dismembering the flux of experience. Basic ‘atomisation’ is a ‘necessary’ error; an abstraction we cannot avoid as human perceivers, let alone as speakers, readers and writers. Identifying an individuated body with a subject of free will is a further, more compounded, and more avoidable, level of error.

\(^{45}\) To provide a contrast: Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘Body without Organs’ (BwO) is one kind of body that is not ordered as a subject: ‘it is non-stratified, unformed, intense matter’ (1980:176). Or, at least, whose ordering is substantially reduced: ‘You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn; and you have to keep small supplies of significance and subjectification, if only to turn them against their own systems when the circumstances demand it, when things, persons, even situations, force you to; and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality.’ (ibid:178).
subjectivities: they may have distinct orderings at different times, in different situations, and these may change over time. It may also be possible for bodies to ‘de-subjectify’, lose subjective ordering altogether, at least temporarily.

So, just what kind of ordering is a subjectivity? My thought is that the ‘sovereign individual’ is the ideal type of a Nietzschean subject, and so I draw directly on the account in section 1. To sum up from there: a subject is a regular body, with a conscious self-identity, that has capacities to intervene in its own composition of drives. In slightly more detail:

(i) Regularity. A subject has a more or less stable, ‘calculable’ structure of ruling drives that creates motivational consistency over time.

(ii) Self-identity. A subject has some conscious awareness of this motivational consistency, which it understands as a persisting identity. As Foucault writes, a subject is ‘tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (EW3:331). This feature of subjectivity involves a number of developmentally ‘higher’ pre-requisites including: linguistically shaped reflexive consciousness; a ‘memory of the will’; and use of ‘theory of mind’.

(iii) Self-ordering. A subject can learn and apply techniques which employ self-consciousness in order to intervene in its own drive processes, and so re-shape its drives. Foucault puts it: ‘the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self’ (EW1:291). Following Foucault, I will also use the

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46 Foucault makes this point in a passage where he presents subjectivity as a relationship to oneself: ‘you do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speak at a meeting as when you are fulfilling your desires in a sexual relationship’ (EW1:290). These different self-understandings or self-orderings are ‘different types of subject’ (ibid) that may be realised within the same body in different contexts. Also see his last interview where he defines subjectivation as ‘the process by which one obtains the constitution of a subject, or more exactly, of a subjectivity, which is obviously only one of the given possibilities for organising self-consciousness’ (FL:472).

47 This does not mean, of course, that subjectivation goes on independently of social power relations: the self-shaping subject works with materials and within limitations shaped by her own history and by the social and material environments she inhabits. I return to these points in
term subjectivation for these processes of self-constitution. The subject may draw on and be guided by its current self-identity in framing projects of self-cultivation: as Nietzsche puts it, ‘our opinion of ourself, [...] the so-called ego, is thenceforth a fellow worker in the construction of our character and our destiny’ (D115).

Normalisation and subjectivity

One is not born a subject, but must be contingently constituted as such. Nor is a subject something that is formed once and for all: subjectivities are continually developing and transforming. We can think of various kinds of drive processes that may be involved in ordering bodies of drives into subjectivities. Here I will focus on just one main aspect: on how social norms are involved in making bodies into subjects. I will use another term from Foucault, normalisation, to talk about processes through which bodies of drives become regulated by social norms. We

Chapter 8.

48 Subjectivation is a neologism coined by Foucault, spelt the same in English and French. Foucault also uses the terms subjection or asujetissement, both of which can be found translated as ‘subjection’ or ‘subjectification’. Subjection has the double meaning, famously punned upon by Althusser (1970) as well as by Foucault himself and more recently by Judith Butler (1994), of both a process of domination and a process of subject-formation. As Foucault writes, a subject is an individual who is ‘subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge’ (EW3:331). Mark Kelly (2009) argues, I think quite convincingly, that Foucault introduces his new term in order to highlight processes that are self-directed: whereas subjection may be something that happens to me at the hands of others, subjectivation is something I must actively take part in myself.

49 However, my use of ‘normalisation’ is in at least one important respect quite different from Foucault’s. Foucault turns to the study of normalisation processes in his works of the 1970, notably in Discipline and Punish (DP) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (HS1). Here he largely associates norms and normalisation with the modern development of governmental systems of ‘control’: ‘new methods of power whose operation is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go beyond the state and its apparatus.’ (HS1:87). We have now entered ‘the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the ‘social-worker’-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based’ (DP:304). My use of ‘normalisation’ refers more generally to psychophysiological processes found not only in modern life but even in Nietzsche’s prehistoric
are now in a position to outline some ways in which normalisation underpins subjectivation.

(i) *Scripting regularisation*. Even before norms, we can see the early incorporation of scripts as involving a kind of social ordering of drives. Individuals learn, rehearse, and incorporate script patterns that they are repeatedly exposed to in their social environments: they build up individual repertoires of scripts by drawing from, and varying, social repertoires. This basic phenomenon is tied to the deep features of human memory discussed in Chapter 3: human infants (implicitly) remember and so adopt repeated patterns, and develop a limited array of categorisations and scripts. This implies a first layer of regularisation of bodies: young children already come to ‘dismember’ the world by categorising situations with a limited set of categories, which call for a limited range of scripted responses.

(ii) *Normative regularisation*. Normalisation adds a further layer of ordering, on top of basic scripting, by reinforcing certain script patterns. It marks some scripts as normal and correct within a group’s forms of life, and other scripts as abnormal and wrong. The force of basic normativity is further strengthened through affective backing and by sanctioning practices. Normalisation further narrows the diversity of patterns of valuing, desiring and acting present in both social environments and individual bodies. This point generalises Nietzsche’s account of how customs makes human beings ‘calculable’, and so prepares them to become subjects.

(iii) *Normalisation and the formation of consciousness*. Other pre-

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*‘morality of custom’. I am not going to look in this thesis at Foucault’s historical account of the shift from law to norm, or at what he thinks is specific to the normalisation processes of recent and contemporary societies of control.*
requisites of subjectivity include the internalisation of linguistic consciousness, and the development of ‘theory of mind’ – perhaps amongst other folk psychological practices. Both of these involve normative social scripts: our social groups have norms of language, and norms relating to how we explain and predict the behaviour of others and ourselves. So consciousness and self-reflective practices are shaped by norms from the outset.

(iv) **Normative identities.** Subjects understand themselves as having persisting self-identities. We can learn about our identities by reflecting on our own motivations and actions (using normatively shaped folk psychology). But in doing so we are also guided by normative ideals of what our identities should be. Subjects may claim or aspire to identities that are valued roles within the forms of life of their social groups, and come to interpret their own values, desires and actions in light of these roles.

(v) **Normative practices of the self.** Normative identities may then guide self-ordering: for example, subjects may work on themselves in order to make their values, desires and actions more in line with socially valued roles. But, furthermore, the techniques they use to cultivate their bodies are also learned social scripts, which may themselves have normative force. As Foucault writes: practices of the self ‘are not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society and his social group’ (EW1:291).[^50]

Note that some of these processes develop before, and are prerequisites for, subjectivities; but some require and work together with existing subjectivities.

[^50]: Foucault’s detailed examples run from Greek practices of mentored ‘care of the self’, through the Christian ‘pastoral power’ that he identifies as the direct ancestor of contemporary forms of subjection (EW3:332).
Scripting, normalisation, and subjectivation are not successive stages of the ordering of bodies, but continue to interact throughout life.

Throughout this chapter I have touched on some deep ambivalences in Nietzsche's thinking about norms and subjects. Morality of custom is idiocy and cruelty, and it is what forms our possibilities for self-shaping, and so for overcoming the power of customs and norms. Linguistically shaped reflective consciousness is the weakest and basest part of our psyche, and it is a crucial tool for self-transformation. The sovereign individual is the ultimate product of the herd, and also the only way out of the herd. Once again, we're back with the key genealogical message of GM2:12 that ‘the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual purpose lie worlds apart’, as any project of self-transformation involves taking over, transforming, and reinterpreting to new ends the very processes and assemblages that creates us as normalised subjects. In this context we indeed have to use the master's tools to dismantle the master's house: there are no other tools around.\footnote{To completely reverse Audrey Lorde's (1984) phrase, which has itself been so often ‘taken over, transformed … re-interpreted to new ends’ (GM2:12).} I will come back to projects of self-transformation in Chapter 8.
Chapter 5. Evolution I: Nietzsche and Darwinism

In the last three chapters I have looked at the psycho-physiological underpinnings of Nietzsche's view of social change. Now I want to turn to another important shaping force of Nietzsche's approach: his relationship with Darwinian evolutionary thought. In the next two chapters I develop the idea that the processes through which drives are transmitted and transformed in social worlds are evolutionary processes.

I will argue in this chapter that we can see this evolution in Darwinian terms: Nietzschean genealogy and psycho-physiology fit with ‘generalised Darwinism’. But, on the other hand, Nietzsche's views challenge certain dominant positions within recent evolutionary theory: to put it pithily, Nietzschean thinking is Darwinian, but not neo-Darwinian. Why does this matter? Because, on the one hand, linking the Nietzschean approach of this thesis to Darwinism can open up valuable connections with a wealth of ideas and research programmes shaped by evolutionary thinking, across disciplines from biology to anthropology to cognitive science to feminist theory. At the same time, many of Nietzsche's criticisms of the Darwinism of his day – of the social Darwinists and ‘English genealogists’ he turns on in the Genealogy – anticipate current live debates. I will argue that Nietzsche's approach resonates with contemporary moves against organism/environment and nature/culture dichotomies and, in particular, works against narrow views of ‘cultural evolution’.

Section 1 of this chapter looks extremely briefly at Nietzsche's historical
relationship with Darwin and early Darwinism, before re-presenting drive processes in Darwinian terms. Section 2 addresses the question of Nietzsche's 'Lamarckism', and confirms that Nietzsche was no neo-Darwinist. I suggest in Section 3 that we should embrace this as a good thing. Here I draw on recent challenges to neo-Darwinism including Jablonka and Lamb's (2005) multidimensional account of transmission processes, and the Developmental Systems Theories (DST) of biologists such as Susan Oyama (2001). Section 4 then looks at a particular implication of moving away from the nature/culture dichotomy: when thinking about how our values, practices and norms evolve, we cannot read from ‘nature’ a fixed and universal source of selection criteria that shape cultural ‘success’. This point is as important today as it was in Nietzsche's polemics against the ‘English genealogists’ of his time.

5.1. Nietzsche's Darwinism

I am going to say very little about the historical relationship between Darwin and Nietzsche's own texts. As Gregory Moore (2002) points out, readers of Nietzsche have been interested in the Darwin connection since the publication of *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1872, and recent scholarship has examined the matter in depth.¹ I just need to make two points. First, Darwin was clearly a powerful influence on many aspects of Nietzsche's thought, beginning with *Human, All Too Human* where Nietzsche frequently invokes natural selection. Daniel Dennett (1995)

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observes that ‘Nietzsche probably never read Darwin’, but only second hand interpretations; and Dirk Johnson (2010) spots that the name Darwin only gets 21 hits in a database search of Nietzsche's texts as opposed to Schopenhauer's 415 (2010:3). Yet Johnson (and others) make a strong case that ‘Nietzsche's theory always gravitated within a Darwinian orbit’ (ibid) from the middle period on: Darwin's radical naturalism and his turn to genealogy represent an ‘absolute starting point and unspoken framework’ (ibid) for Nietzsche's work after his break from Wagnerian romanticism. The one caveat here being that, as Moore argues, we should remember that Darwin was far from the unique source of the 19th century naturalist and evolutionary ideas Nietzsche imbibed from German as well as English sources.

The second point is that in his later works, and most systematically in the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche turns avowedly against Darwin. Following Dennett, John Richardson in his *Nietzsche's New Darwinism* (2004) argues that Nietzsche's statements ‘contra Darwin’ are not so much disagreements with Darwin himself as with the narrower (mis-)interpretations of his Social Darwinist followers. Johnson, in his *Nietzsche's Anti-Darwinism*, undermines this picture by reminding us that Darwin himself was not always free of views that good contemporary Darwinians soundly reject. Nietzsche attacks Darwin on a number of counts, and some of these do bite Darwin as well as other Darwinists. Nietzsche opposes Darwin's progressivism, and Darwin does indeed talk of evolution as a ‘progress towards perfection’ (1859:489). Nietzsche opposes Darwin's 'Spinozist' claims about self-preservation (GS349), and Darwin does identify an ‘instinct … of self-preservation’ (1871:87) – although this is hardly central to his theory. A more
central issue, which I will discuss in the last section, is that in *The Descent of Man* Darwin sketches a theory of the evolution of human morality that clearly fits Nietzsche's critique of the ‘English’ approach to genealogy. Nietzsche also attacks Darwin's exclusive focus on selection, which he sees as denying ‘spontaneous’ or ‘active’ (to use the term Deleuze (1962) picks up) sources of variation: I will look at this point in the next chapter.

But what Nietzsche does *not* do is strike at the heart of Darwinism, the very idea of evolution by natural selection. Here Dennett and Richardson are fundamentally right: Nietzsche continues to work within a genealogical framework that fits with Darwinian natural selection, and in this sense remains Darwinian until the end. As Richardson puts it, Nietzsche has ‘thoroughly … absorbed this Darwinian way of explaining things: he uses its logic, without thinking of himself as explaining “by Darwinian selection”’ (2004:21). We might even say: Nietzsche is Darwinian in much the same sense that contemporary evolutionary theorists are Darwinian, working within the broad tracks of Darwin's approach even as they reject many of his particular views on the workings of evolutionary processes. In the rest of this section I will make this point in the following more precise terms: Nietzschean drive processes follow the basic Darwinian principles of *heredity, variation, and differential reproduction*.

**Darwinian principles**

The term ‘generalised Darwinism’ (or ‘universal Darwinism’) signals an approach
that sees evolutionary processes such as those studied by Darwin at work beyond the traditional confines of biology. Darwin himself took this view, suggesting that we might understand the development of languages, amongst other social phenomena, to involve natural selection. In whatever domain, Darwinian processes share a number of key features: wherever these hold, evolution by natural selection will occur. Here is a version of these principles adapted from the classic formulation of Richard Lewontin (1970):

1. **Variation**: a population is made up of entities with different characteristics.

2. **Inheritance (or Transmission)**: entities multiply or reproduce, and pass on at least some of their characteristics to descendents.

3. **Differential reproduction**: some of the different characteristics of entities influence the likelihood that they will survive and reproduce.

Many writers, including (on most interpretations) Darwin himself, also add one more feature:

4. **Competition**: there is a biting limit on the multiplication of the population as a whole, so that if some entities reproduce rapidly there is less opportunity for others to do so.

This last point is what Darwin, strongly influenced by Malthus, called the ‘struggle for life’. Although we can also find it in Nietzsche, and perhaps in a particularly strong version, I am not going to give it attention in this chapter.

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3 E.g. this famous passage: ‘A struggle for life is constantly going on amongst the words and grammatical forms in each language. The better, the shorter, the easier forms are constantly gaining the upper hand, and they owe their success to their own inherent virtue’ (1871:60).

4 Lewontin’s own formulation specifies that the characteristics in question are ‘phenotypic’. However, as we will see in a moment, the genotype/phenotype distinction is not essential to Darwinian evolution, and may not apply to all evolutionary processes. Darwin himself, of course, wrote before this distinction had been introduced.
Unlike the other three principles, this one is optional rather than basic: we can think of evolutionary systems without such competition. For example, we can think of a world where all characteristics are increasingly present in absolute terms in a growing population, and differential reproduction only effects their relative frequencies.\(^5\)

It is important to emphasise that the basic principles can be instantiated by many different processes. Lewontin notes: ‘no particular mechanism of inheritance is specified, but only a correlation in fitness between parent and offspring. The population would evolve whether the correlation between parent and offspring arose from Mendelian, cytoplasmic, or cultural inheritance’ (1970:2). We can say the same for the other principles: a range of processes may create variation in populations, and influence the likelihood of reproduction of traits. Multiple processes may work together more or less interdependently to shape evolutionary outcomes.

**Genealogy and evolution**

In Chapter 1 I outlined the general structure of Nietzsche's genealogical approach. To recap: a genealogy is a particular kind of historical account of an entity. Its objective is to show how something has become what it is, and its method is to

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\(^5\) In Darwin's (1859:489-90) own words, there is ‘a Ratio of increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms.’ Lewontin (1970:2) defends his more general formulation with a different reading of the term “struggle for life”. He writes: ‘It is not necessary, for example, that resources be in short supply for organisms to struggle for existence. Darwin himself pointed out that “a plant at the edge of a desert is said to struggle for life against the drought.” Thus, although Darwin came to the idea of natural selection from consideration of Malthus’ essay on overpopulation, the element of competition between organisms for a resource in short supply is not integral to the argument. Natural selection occurs even when two bacterial strains are growing logarithmically in an excess of nutrient broth if they have different division times.’
study a thing's lineages, its lines of descent (*Herkunft*) from other entities. In doing so, it identifies processes of formation: causal processes through which earlier entities contribute to the present nature and activity of the thing we are studying, and also to its possibilities for future development. An entity has multiple lineages: it is shaped by the conjunction of numerous ancestors, of which we can identify and study just a few. These ancestors were themselves formed by multiple previous conjoining lineages. Thus, as Foucault stresses, a genealogical investigation finds no one point of ‘origin’ (*Ursprung*), but has to pick arbitrary starting points. Furthermore, in Nietzsche's view of history, the particular conjunctions of lineages that shape entities are highly contingent, and largely unpredictable: as Foucault puts it, genealogy looks at ‘details and accidents’ (*NGH* 344).

To connect Nietzschean genealogy to Darwinian theory it will help if we can simplify the explanatory universe somewhat and work with one basic ‘scale’ of evolving assemblage. I use the psycho-physiology of drives to do this. In this move I follow John Richardson (2004:44), who suggests that we can see drives as the basic ‘units’ on which evolutionary processes operate.\(^6\) If this is right, then we can build up from an account of drive evolution to look at the development of larger scale assemblages as well. Here I will just outline the skeleton of that idea. In Chapter 2 I presented a drive as a characteristic pattern of valuing, desiring, and

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\(^6\) In fact Richardson sees drives as units of selection for what he calls Nietzsche's biology; and distinguishes practices as separate ‘social selection’ units. I will not follow this distinction here: on my account ‘practices’ are also drive patterns; and, as I will discuss below, I want to de-emphasise the separation of biological and cultural/social evolution. To be clear, I do not claim that all genealogy needs to be approached on the scale of drives – or that they are the only possible evolutionary units. There may perhaps be historical processes that are better understood in other ways. However, I am not setting out to give an account of all Nietzschean processes here. Working on drive processes will provide important insights for understanding Nietzsche and for answering my own questions about social change in this thesis, and that is enough for my purposes.
acting. Large scale systems and institutions, such as ‘Christian morality’ or ‘the state’, are complex assemblages that can ultimately be decomposed into myriad patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting shared (and contested) by many individual bodies. In between the psycho-physiology of drives and macro-institutions there are intermediate layers of social scripts, norms, and shared forms of life. I looked at some of these features in the last chapter. Individuals incorporate values, desires and practices that are embedded in shared social scripts. Some of these scripts are reinforced by the weight of normativity, and some may be affirmed by individuals as subjective self-identities. Groups of individuals may share clusters of scripts that we can think of as shared ‘forms of life’.

To move to the language of evolutionary biology, I think of a drive as an important kind of *trait*. Traits are characteristics – of physiology, morphology, or behaviour – that may be more or less prevalent in individual bodies, can be found in different individual bodies, and can be passed on across bodies.\(^7\) Drives can be idiosyncratic to particular individuals, but many are spread across social groups. Perhaps some are found in various forms in almost all humans. Although I won't explore this point in detail, we might also want to think of drives as traits that are transmitted within as well as between bodies: drives may be more or less recurrent patterns in an individual, and it might sometimes make sense to see their recurrences as instances of ‘internal’ heredity or self-transmission.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Jablonka and Lamb – of whom more in section 3 – argue for traits as ‘evolutionary units’ against Dawkins’ ‘replicators’. ‘Alternative traits can be traced from one generation to the next and their frequency may change. They have sufficient permanence through time to be units of evolution, even though many genes concurrently affect them and these genes are reshuffled in every generation through sex’ (Jablonka and Lamb 2005:41; also see (ibid:376)).

\(^8\) Gabriel Tarde developed such a view in his *Social Laws* (1899), where he sees ‘internal’ and ‘external’ ‘heredity’ as two forms of a fully general principle of repetition: ‘habit is merely a sort of internal heredity, just as heredity is only externalised habit. Heredity […] is the form of
It may not always be easy (or necessary) to identify an instance of valuing/desiring/acting as belonging to a particular drive. And, as discussed in Chapter 2, drives can be more or less flexible or ‘plastic’: many may be best thought of as meta-patterns, or families of attitudes and activities. But I assume that we are commonly able to group instances together and recognise them as tokens of the same drive patterns. To say that instances are tokens of the same drive means that (a) they resemble each other, and (b) they share lineages – that is, they are causally connected by processes of transmission and transformation.

So here are the Darwinian principles applied to drives – I will develop all of these points in more detail as we go on:

(1) Inheritance or Transmission. Drives are reproduced within the same individual bodies: that is, individuals repeatedly follow the same patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting over spans of time. And drives spread between bodies: patterns of valuing, desiring and acting are ‘adopted’ (D104) by others. We can think of these phenomena in terms of processes whereby ‘ancestor’ drives transmit their patterns, or at least elements of them, to future ‘descendent’ drives.

(2) Variation. There are multiple, various, drives. Any individual body is already a diverse population of drives. There is still more variation in social environments made up of numerous individuals. In the next chapter I will ask about how these variations arise in the first place.

(3) Differential Reproduction. Some ancestor drive patterns are more prolific than others, transmitting to numerous descendents. As in genetic and other

repetition appropriate to life, just as undulation, or periodic movement, is its physical, and imitation (we shall say) its social form.’ (1899:22). ‘Imitation between man and man, as I understand it, is the consequence of imitation between one state and another in the same man’ (ibid:40).
forms of evolution, there is no one cause of this ‘success’: it is the outcome of many contingent interactions within the ecologies that drives inhabit.

5.2. Nietzsche contra Neo-Darwinism

Daniel Dennett (1995) reads Nietzsche as an anticipator of recent ‘cultural evolution’ theories, and particularly of Richard Dawkins’ (1977, 1982) ‘memetics’, in which cultural ‘replicators’ spread through human minds in ways analogous to orthodox models of genetic reproduction. John Richardson's (2004) detailed evolutionary reading of Nietzsche, as he writes, ‘develops and modifies’ this Dawkins-Dennett approach (2004:82 fn. 31). For Richardson, Nietzsche's step forward is to distinguish a separate domain of cultural evolutionary processes – ‘social selection’ – from natural selection. Richardson writes: ‘By this superimposition of social on natural selection, a new set of behavioural dispositions arises and evolves, a web of practices that is both a rewriting and an overwriting of the dispositions shaped by natural selection’ (ibid:83). These two realms, according to Richardson, involve two distinct ‘replicative mechanisms’ (ibid:82) with distinct evolutionary units: natural selection processes work on drives (Triebe) or instincts (Instinkte); social selection on practices (Bräuche) or habits (Gewohnheiten). I am going to dispute this reading. I don't think that Nietzsche sees ‘culture’ and ‘biology’ as two separate evolutionary spheres, each with distinct units and processes of inheritance; and I don't think that contemporary Nietzscheans need to impose such a distinction either. But first I want to look at the view of Darwinism that Richardson's reading draws on, for
which we need to make a very quick excursus into the history of evolutionary biology.\footnote{My account here draws on Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb's (2005: Chapter 1) critical survey of the history of the ‘transformations of Darwinism’.}

**Neo-Darwinism**

Darwin himself knew very little about how biological inheritance works. Like other biologists of his time, he accepted the idea, commonly associated with the early nineteenth century evolutionist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, of ‘inheritance of acquired characters’: i.e., that new features developed by an organism as a result of environmental interactions during its lifetime (for example, the blacksmith's brawny arms) could be passed on to biological offspring. In the first half of the 20th century Darwinian theory was put on a sounder footing by new discoveries in cell biology and genetics, resulting in what has become known as the ‘modern synthesis’, or ‘Neo-Darwinism’.

August Weismann's key distinction between ‘germ line’ and ‘somatic’ characteristics was the first step along this road. Germ line features of organisms are those that are transmitted to offspring through reproduction; somatic features may develop over an individual organism's lifetime, but are not passed on. The genetic theory initiated by Gregor Mendel entrenched this principle by identifying the germ line with *genes*; and in the second half of the 20th century genes became identified with sequences of chromosomal DNA. To summarise some of the very basics: sequences of DNA molecules ‘code for’ or cause the production of strands of messenger RNA (another nucleic acid), which in turn code for particular cell
proteins, which make up the structures of cells, which join together to form multicellular organisms like us. Crick's ‘central dogma’ of molecular biology says that this ‘coding’ process works in one direction only: changes in proteins cannot be ‘reverse translated’ back into changes in DNA.

The modern neo-Darwinian approach can be summarised using the key distinction between genotype and phenotype. The genotype is the inherited potential of what an organism can become, transmitted very largely intact across generations through DNA reproduction. DNA reproduction is a highly precise process, admitting only a small degree of gradual change through ‘copying errors’ and other rare mutations. And crucially, these mutations are viewed as random: for example, the presence of harmful mutagens can increase the rate of mutation, but not ‘direct’ it. The phenotype is the form an organism actually takes – its morphology, physiology, and behaviour – as the genotype is ‘expressed’ through environmentally contingent development. In this picture there is no room for Lamarckism: no amount of blacksmithing or giraffe neck-stretching will effect DNA. There are only two sources of genetic variation: (a) rare random mutation; and (b) the combinatory shuffling of parents' DNA in sexual reproduction. To simplify somewhat: we have a clear separation between evolutionary processes, which work exclusively on the genotype; and developmental processes, through which the phenotype is then constructed as the product of the interaction of the organism's genotype and its environment.

Richard Dawkins' particular take on neo-Darwinism has had a wide influence in biology and beyond. Dawkins' first key contribution is to argue strongly for the ‘gene's eye view’ in biological evolution, in which genes
themselves, rather than individual organisms or groups (e.g. species), are the
exclusive focus of selection. But Dawkins also holds that human social evolution
has substantially broken free of genetic determination. We can describe Dawkins'
approach to non-genetic cultural evolution as a case of generalised neo-
Darwinism. The key conceptual move here is the theory of the replicator, which
generalises the properties of the neo-Darwinian gene. Replicators are transmitted
intact between their ‘vehicles’ save for transformations that result from random
mutations; evolving replicators then interact with environmental features to
develop phenotypic traits. The cultural variant of the replicator is called the meme
– which Dawkins sees as a feature of brain neurology that is phenotypically
expressed as an idea, belief, desire, symbol, etc.

If we apply this approach to the evolution of values, desires, and practices,
we have a picture something like the following. A drive pattern is a phenotypic
trait that is produced by the interaction of three distinct factors: (i) genetic
inheritance (or replication of genes); (ii) cultural (memetic) inheritance, (or

10 Dawkins and other gene-focused theorists accept the picture of generalised Darwinism I
outlined in Section 1. In principle, this picture allows for a multiplicity of evolutionary
processes working on many different levels. The units of selection debate is then, at least in
principle, an empirical debate about what kinds of selection processes are actually important in
life. Where genetic reductionists argue that gene-level mechanisms predominate, pluralists like
Lewontin identify a diversity of actual processes at work on different selection levels – from
sub-individual entities including DNA to individual organisms, to super-individual groupings
(e.g., species, populations, sexes, communities).

11 While Dawkins’ ‘meme’ has given a name to a whole internet culture, memetics has not caught
on in academic research on cultural evolution. However, core aspects of his approach – the
generalised neo-Darwinian replicator model, and the biology/culture divide in examining
transmission processes – are widespread. We can see them not only in Richardson's reading of
Nietzsche but, for example, in the work of ‘co-evolutionist’ theorists such as Boyd and
Richerson (2005), who focus on the interdependence of biological and cultural processes: the
two domains co-evolve, but maintain their separation. This is clear in the use of techniques and
models for investigating their interrelation: genetic processes are responsible for forming
cognitive modules that are the subject of evolutionary psychology; these modular dispositions
then act as constraints on separate cultural processes. Dan Sperber (1996), although rejecting
neo-Darwinian evolutionary modelling and language, also maintains a similar divide between
biological and cultural processes. A good general, but definitely sympathetic, introduction to
late 20th century evolutionary approaches to culture from sociobiology to gene/culture
coevolution theory is Laland and Brown (2002).
replication of memes); and (iii) environmentally contingent development. One common way of thinking about how these processes combine is captured in theories of ‘gene/culture co-evolution’, developed by writers such as Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson (2005). On this view, to simplify, genetic evolution takes place over very long stretches of time, as selection works on variations (mutations and sexual recombinations) over generations. These genetic dispositions are ‘expressed’ as basic psychological dispositions – perhaps ‘instincts’, or the ‘modules’ of evolutionary psychology – in the development of each individual organism. Of course, because individuals develop in varying environments, phenotypic expressions of genes will also vary to some degree. Cultural evolution, which can work over much shorter timeframes within individual lifetimes, then gets to work within the limits of genetically ‘hardwired’ structure, again in interaction with the environment in which an individual further develops throughout her life. I will look more at these kinds of models in the last section.

_Nietzsche’s Lamarckism_

So how does Nietzsche fit with this picture? Although Nietzsche does not systematically discuss the ways in which drives are adopted, I think we can identify three main kinds of transmission processes in his texts. First, he thinks that some patterns are carried ‘in the blood’, through biological inheritance between parents and offspring. Secondly, many drive patterns are transmitted through unconscious imitative or ‘mimetic’ processes such as those I looked at in Chapter 3. Thirdly, some drive patterns can be acquired through more conscious
forms of linguistic communication, learning or ‘education’.

There is a hierarchy of strength of these three kinds of processes. Conscious educative processes are the weakest: drives acquired in this way are less stable and fixed than those incorporated through unconscious mimesis (see Chapter 3). However, and with particular insistence in *Beyond Good and Evil*, Nietzsche also believes that some drive patterns are rooted even deeper, and more strongly, in the ‘blood’: for example, in BGE213 and BGE264 Nietzsche insists that some forms of ‘noble’ behaviour cannot be learnt through education or imitation, but must be ‘bred’ into new generations.\textsuperscript{12} Nietzsche says little about how such ‘breeding’ processes work. Mimetic ‘adoption’ is the one inheritance process that he discusses in detail, above all in his middle period works. On that count, Dennett and Richardson are right to present Nietzsche as a pioneer in the study of non-genetic evolutionary processes involving communication, imitation, and the power of custom. His ‘mimetic’ observations anticipate not only Dawkins' ‘memetics’ and other recent versions of ‘cultural evolution’, but also other more distant cousins such as Gabriel Tarde's (1903) ‘laws of imitation’, or Dan Sperber's (1996) ‘epidemiology of representations’.

My problem is with Richardson's further claim that Nietzsche identifies two distinct evolutionary domains of ‘natural’ and ‘social’ selection, working on distinct units called ‘drives’ and ‘practices’. Nietzsche of course does not use such explicitly Darwinian language, but Richardson identifies these distinct processes in Nietzsche's contrast between humans' ‘animal nature’ on the one hand, and on

\textsuperscript{12} ‘Breeding’ (Züchtung) does not necessarily always mean genetic or biological artificial selection for Nietzsche, although this is certainly one strand in his thinking – prominent in passages such as BGE213 and BGE264 where breeding is clearly connected to inheritance in ‘the blood’. See Richardson (2004:190-200) for a detailed discussion of Nietzsche on breeding and eugenics.
the other our taming (Zähmung) and domestication (Domestikation) through the morality of custom (2004:84). While Nietzsche does make such contrasts between ‘animal nature’ and human socialisation, I don't think that these play the central role Richardson claims of identifying a distinct new form of evolutionary selection. Richardson himself acknowledges that Nietzsche does not ‘consistently observe [the] distinction, often calling learned tendencies “drives” as well’ (ibid). This is because ‘The boundary is a permeable one for him, because he accepts a Lamarckian “inheritance of acquired traits”’ (ibid:84). In short: ‘Nietzsche tends to blur or ignore the difference between genetic and cultural inheritance’ (ibid:18).

Richardson’s approach is to clean up the blurry bits in Nietzsche’s account: if we can see his Lamarckian remarks as lapses or exceptions, then excising them will leave untouched a core evolutionary stance that observes the Dawkinsian separation of biological and cultural transmission. I question this move on two points. First, I think that Nietzsche's nature/culture transgressions are more than peripheral to his evolutionary approach. Further, I question whether we actually want to embrace the neo-Darwinian dichotomy after all.

But first: just what is meant by Lamarckism?\(^\text{13}\) Roughly put, Lamarckism involves organisms inheriting characteristics acquired by their biological parents. But we can read this in various ways. On a very broad reading (Lamarckism 1), Lamarckism would involve offspring inheriting acquired characteristics through any evolutionary process. But this would make some cases of ‘Lamarckism’ uncontentroversial for contemporary neo-Darwinians like Dawkins who embrace

\(^{\text{13}}\) As Jablonka and Lamb (2005:360) aptly point out, ‘just as no one today believes in Darwin's Darwinism, so no one today believes in Lamarck's Lamarckism’. Lamarckism nowadays is used in a wider, usually pejorative, sense which is not always clearly defined. See also Jablonka and Lamb's discussion of the meaning of Lamarckism (ibid:360-2) which differs somewhat from mine.
cultural evolution: children clearly can, on that account, inherit characteristics acquired by their parents through *cultural* inheritance processes. If Lamarckism is to remain heretical, we need a narrower reading, perhaps this (Lamarckism 2): offspring inherit acquired characteristics through ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ transmission processes, as opposed to ‘cultural’ transmission. In short, one way to identify Lamarckism from orthodoxy is to clearly distinguish ‘cultural’ from ‘natural’ inheritance – precisely the move that Richardson wants to find in Nietzsche. But how to define and distinguish ‘nature’ and ‘culture’? 20th century neo-Darwinism seems to provide a ready answer: in the context of evolutionary processes, ‘nature’ refers to genetics. So we can get a still narrower, and more precise, definition of the target (Lamarckism 3): offspring inherit acquired characteristics through genetic heredity.

Nietzsche is clearly Lamarckian in the broadest of these senses (Lamarckism 1). Take, for example, this passage from GS110:

> Over immense periods of time the intellect produced nothing but errors. A few of these proved to be useful and helped to preserve the species: those who hit upon or inherited these had better luck in their struggle for themselves and their progeny. Such erroneous articles of faith, which were continually inherited, until they became almost part of the basic endowment of the species.

Here we see traits that are originally ‘acquired’ by the intellectual production of individuals and social groups, and then become inherited and selected across generations. In this passage, and many others, Nietzsche says little or nothing about the details of the inheritance processes involved, and so leaves it open to us to read him in terms of purely ‘cultural’ selection. There are, however, a smaller
number of passages where Nietzsche also appears to be Lamarckian in a narrower sense (Lamarckism 2). These include those where he refers to inheritance by *blood*, such as GS143, where he suggests that species have ‘translated the morality of custom definitively into their own flesh and blood’. Or BGE213, where he claims that ‘many generations must have laboured to prepare the origin of the philosopher; every one of his virtues must have been acquired, nurtured, inherited, and digested singly’ until eventually some have a ‘right to philosophy’ by virtue of ‘one’s ancestors, one’s blood’. Or one of Nietzsche’s most unpleasant racist and classist passages, BGE264, which begins with the idea that ‘one cannot erase from the soul of a human being what his ancestors liked most to do and did most constantly’ – ‘plebeian’ characteristics are ‘transferred to the child as corrupted blood’.

I want to relate Nietzsche’s Lamarckism to a more general feature of his evolutionary approach: he does not (in general) distinguish heredity processes in terms of *what* things they transmit. He does not think in terms of different types of ‘replicators’, or distinguish (as in Richardson’s reading) cultural and natural ‘units’. The same drive pattern may be transmitted by one or more of the routes mentioned above: education, mimesis, or ‘blood’. Take, for instance, a normative evaluation of a practice as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. As I discussed in Chapter 4, such a valuing may be a conscious thought that can be communicated with language, or an embodied feeling, or perhaps an instinct that is entirely unconscious. In these

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14 For a more detailed discussion of Nietzsche’s Lamarckism, based on BGE and also other passages including GS99 and TI ‘Improvers’ 2-5, see Richard Schacht (2013). For a counter-argument see Maudemarie Clark (2013). Clark rightly notes that ‘Nowhere in these passages does Nietzsche actually say, that is, make explicit, that acquired characteristics are transmitted biologically. ‘ (ibid:284), and goes on to argue that all Nietzsche’s apparently Lamarckian passages can be interpreted as referring to cultural inheritance, I think this last point stretches interpretation somewhat in the case of the passages that explicitly mention ‘blood’ inheritance.
various forms, it may be spread symbolically and linguistically (e.g., through ‘education’), or be transmitted mimetically (as the ‘moral feelings’ of D34, or perhaps be inherited in ‘the blood’ – or perhaps all of these at once.

This general feature is not Lamarckian in itself. Lamarckism (type 2) enters with Nietzsche’s idea that drives can switch or ‘translate’ across transmission processes. Moral customs, or the first ‘acquired’ forms of philosophers’ ‘virtues’, or plebeian work habits (blacksmithing, for example), are initially developed as cultural artefacts, and first of all spread through education or mimesis. But over time, with the repetition of constant practice, they turn into deep instincts that are inherited by ‘blood’.

This idea is clearly connected to Nietzsche’s important concept of incorporation, which I discussed in Chapter 3. A value, desire, or practice that starts out on a more ‘superficial’, conscious level as a ‘thought’ can, given time and repetition, become dug or burnt into the body. More deeply incorporated drives, drives that have become ‘instincts’, tend to be stronger in a number of senses: in their power to move the body to act; in their recurrence within an individual body; and in terms of their power to spread across bodies. In Chapter 3 I focused on processes of incorporation working within individual bodies and lifespans. But Nietzsche thinks that incorporation also has a further dimension: not only do drives take on deeper, stronger, forms within individual bodies, they also become subject to further, stronger, inheritance processes. We can thus see them moving along a second spectrum line from education to mimesis to blood inheritance. In short: translation into ‘blood’ inheritance is an outcome of particularly deep incorporation.
I see Nietzsche's Lamarckism, then, not as a peripheral anomaly, but as closely tied to his core idea of incorporation. As Walter Kaufmann puts it: ‘Lamarckism is not just an odd fact about Nietzsche but systematic of his conception of body and spirit’ (2000:404 fn.). Of course, this does not make it right. If Nietzsche were writing a century later, in the late 20th century, he could have incorporated the intellectual productions of 20th century genetics into his view of body and spirit. He would, we can imagine, no longer talk about inheritance by ‘blood’, and he would reject Type 3 Lamarckism. This would not entail rejecting the idea of incorporation altogether, but placing a specific Weismannian limit on it: acquired drives can be dug down deep into the body (soma), just not into the genome (germ line). He could still think that drives can become embodied through processes working within an individual's lifetime (particularly in early childhood), and may be transmitted across generations through cultural – including unconscious mimetic and performative – processes.

However, if we fast forward a few more years to the present, the picture becomes more complicated. New research in genetics, epigenetics, behavioural evolution, and other fields starts to question the neo-Darwinian picture. A first major problem is that, as Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb write, it ‘simply is not true’ that ‘the gene is the only biological (noncultural) hereditary unit’ (2005:42). So rejecting genetic inheritance of acquired characteristics (Lamarckism 3), does not immediately imply rejecting all forms of ‘biological’ inheritance of acquired characteristics (Lamarckism 2). Secondly, as we will see, recent work on processes such as the ‘Baldwin effect’ or ‘gene assimilation’ do open possibilities

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15 If we take the term literally, the idea of inheritance by ‘blood’ had already been strongly criticised by Francis Galton's early experiments with blood transfusions in 1869-71. See Bulmer (2003:104-7).
for some form of Lamarckian-Nietzschean ‘translations’ between cultural and noncultural heredity. And there is also a third, perhaps deeper, issue: if we can no longer simply identify the biological or natural with the genetic, how do we draw the (type 2) anti-Lamarckian line? In fact, does it still make sense to think of evolutionary processes as strictly divided between nature and culture?

5.3. Nietzsche and the new biology

The Dawkinsian position is increasingly challenged within evolutionary biology. I will very briefly outline two alternative views. First I look at Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb’s (2005) multi-dimensional view of heredity processes, which challenges the two-dimensional picture of genetic vs. cultural replication. Then I look at some thoughts from Developmental Systems Theory (DST), which challenges (amongst other things) the dichotomy between heredity and development. We thus have a two pronged attack on the Dawkinsian view that traits (drives) are phenotypic ‘expressions’ of two separate replicators in an external environment.

**Multi-dimensional transmission**

Jablonka and Lamb identify four main ‘dimensions’ of transmission processes: genetic, epigenetic, behavioural, and symbolic. In the genetic dimension, recent research stretches neo-Darwinian orthodoxy in a number of ways. Jablonka and Lamb do not challenge the central dogma of molecular biology, but argue that
‘Lamarckian’ effects can happen even so.\footnote{More exactly, they do not challenge the ‘critical part’ of the central dogma, no reverse translation between proteins and nucleic acids (RNA and DNA). See Jablonka and Lamb (2000:152-3) for more detail.}

One way this can happen is if germ line DNA mutations are not fully random, but can be prompted by environmental changes. There is increasing evidence of various forms of ‘induced’ mutations: for example, of bacteria and viruses, and also of some genes in some plants and animals, whose rates of mutation dramatically change under certain conditions. Usually, these are conditions of stress. There is a quite simple functional rationale: in regular or stable conditions, and if organisms are adapted to their environments, mutations are likely to be detrimental; but in times of stress or famine, new mutations may turn out to be adaptive ‘innovations’. Organisms facing particularly hostile and variable environments – for example, viruses engaged in a constant ‘arms race’ with immune systems – will have a reproductive advantage if they evolve mechanisms to vary their own variability. Note that induced variations are still random in the most basic sense: transformations of the nucleotide ‘code’ are not controlled, there is no guarantee that the mutation will be beneficial to survival and reproduction; what is induced is the timing, and in some cases the areas of the genome that are transformed.

The second dimension is the epigenetic. DNA cellular ‘transcription’ processes are complex, involving an array of intermediary stages and entities. Extremely roughly, we can think of many of these processes in terms of genes (segments of the DNA strands) being switched on or off. Only a small part of the genome is active in any cell: many genes are, for example, ‘marked’ out through an array of interacting cellular processes. These are the various epigenetic
systems. Amongst other things, they cause the cells of human bodies to become kidney cells, skin cells, or the ‘germ line’ cells of sperm and eggs, etc., and to reproduce more cells of the same kind by mitosis throughout lifetimes, even though all share the same nuclear DNA code. Epigenetic processes also repair DNA and ‘proofread’ its transcription, which also means that they are largely responsible for the stability or mutability of the genome; inducing DNA mutations can involve switching off or blocking these epigenetic caretaker systems.17

Epigenetics is a rapidly developing area in biology, with much to discover. As for what it means for evolution, there are two key points. First, there is increasing evidence of epigenetic marking being passed on in germ line cells: it is not just DNA that is transmitted in biological reproduction. This is what leads Jablonka and Lamb to identify epigenetics as an independent dimension of heredity. Second, epigenetic systems are much more responsive to environmental change than DNA. If induced mutations in DNA introduce a dose of Lamarckism to cellular inheritance, epigenetic inheritance takes this to another level.

In their behavioural and symbolic dimensions Jablonka and Lamb discuss a diversity of further transmission processes involving the interactions of social animals. Symbolic processes involve communication through language or other symbolic systems. Jablonka and Lamb's behavioural category is very broad. They include mimesis, but also other forms of non-imitative social learning, early imprinting in birds, and processes involving physiological exchanges: for example, transmission of hormones and food traces in the egg, or in amniotic fluid, mother's milk, and faeces (in coprophagic animals) which shape infants’

17 As Jablonka and Lamb put it, DNA is ‘not an intrinsically stable molecule’. The mutation rate in human DNA is around 1 in 10 thousand million; it would be around 1 in 100 without these cellular support systems.
behavioural traits such as food preferences.

Jablonka and Lamb's approach doesn't just double the number of heredity systems or 'replicator' units. Dimensions are loose categories that can involve multiple processes, systems, units, patterns, entities. Furthermore, Jablonka and Lamb argue that Dawkins' replicator model does little justice to heredity systems. Even in the genetic dimension, and still more so in the others, transmission does not simply mean copying of identical units with occasional blind errors. All processes are to some degree responsive to environmental feedback – or, we might say, to 'acquiring' new variations which they can then transmit. Thus Jablonka and Lamb's self-affirmation as Lamarckians – as well as Darwinians. As they put it: ‘the majority of processes in the real world … are to varying degrees both instructive and selective’ (2005:102), where ‘instruction’ means that ‘what happens in cells or organisms is controlled by internal or external regulatory signals’ (ibid). And so ‘Darwinian evolution can include Lamarckian processes, because the heritable variation on which selection acts is not entirely blind to function; some of it is induced or “acquired” in response to the conditions of life’ (ibid).

Nietzsche and Baldwin

What about Nietzsche's more specific Lamarckian view, which I understood above to involve the idea that incorporation may involve ‘translation’ of traits across inheritance processes? In fact there is support for phenomena of this kind in recent evolutionary theory. Much of the relevant discussion involves what the
American psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1896) called ‘social heredity’, and contemporary evolutionists often name the ‘Baldwin effect’. This involves a trait that is initially transmitted by social learning (imitative or otherwise) becoming transmitted through biological reproduction (e.g., genetically, or epigenetically). The basic idea is this: e.g., an animal discovers how to use a new tool to find food – say, Galapagos woodpecker finches using twigs to dig out insects. At first the new practice spreads through social learning. But some animals are genetically disposed to learn and perform the new practice better than others. These animals may then have a reproductive advantage and so, if the practice continues to be spread and used for long enough, natural selection can work on genetic variations that favour the practice. Eventually, later generations may pick it up with only a very brief exposure to social models, or perhaps just brief individual trial and error encounters. The practice has thus been (largely) ‘translated’, as Nietzsche might put it, from behavioural to genetic transmission.

The Baldwin effect can be related to another phenomenon, C.H. Waddington's ‘genetic assimilation’. In his most famous experiment, Waddington applied heat shocks to fruit fly larvae, and then bred the fruit flies that hatched with a particular unusual trait – veinless wings. After 12 generations, fruit flies were hatching with veinless wings even without the high temperature exposure. That is: a trait that had been initially environmentally induced, or ‘acquired’, becomes genetically established in the population by selection (here, artificial selection).

18 Here I draw on David Papineau's (2005) philosophical account of Baldwin effects involving social learning, as well as Jablonka and Lamb's discussion. See also Weber, Bruce and David Depew (eds.) (2003) for further discussion on the Baldwin effect.

19 These disposing genes, of course, arose through quite different processes in the past – they are now ‘exapted’.
Waddington thought of this process in terms of a shift in the ‘canalisation’ of traits. Canalisation means that organisms are disposed to develop a trait despite variations in either their genomes or in environmental conditions. Evolutionary ‘canals’ can then act as a kind of break on evolutionary change, by effectively making some genetic variations invisible to natural selection. Some writers refer in this context to ‘evolutionary capacitance’: variations are stored up unused, as it were, like electrical charge in a capacitor. Genetic assimilation occurs when environmental changes, particularly conditions of stress, break down existing canalisations and so expose (“discharge”) hidden genetic variation to selection. The eventual result may be the development of a new canalisation favouring a different trait.

Waddington himself said little about how canalisation and assimilation can occur. As Jablonka and Lamb discuss (Chapter 7), one type of mechanism involves epigenetic systems marking out genetic variations that could perturb the canalised trait. Environmental shocks can remove this epigenetic marking in some organisms, so causing sudden increases in genetically induced phenotypic variation of the population. But we can also think of other kinds of assimilations and shifts in canalisations: for example, the appearance and spread of a new social practice (such as the use of sticks to dig grubs) may also shift the selective environment in ways that ‘expose’ variations to selection. As Jablonka and Lamb put it, previously ‘there was no advantage to being a fast or slow learner, because no such learning was necessary’ (2005:290), but now ‘the previously hidden

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20 Waddington himself thought of canalisation in terms of combinations of genes that reinforce phenotypes: for example, if one gene is ‘knocked out’ by a mutation, others will still work to shape the phenotype. But we might also think of canalisation in terms of behavioural and symbolic inheritance systems: for example, social norms can act as canalisation mechanisms by suppressing behavioural variations.
differences between individuals are exposed’ (ibid).

There is much more to say about these ideas than I can possibly cover here. I should note that there is plenty of debate in evolutionary biology over how to understand these processes – and certainly not all writers share Jablonka and Lamb's unabashed proclamation of them as revived ‘Lamarckism’. There is also no consensus over how widespread they actually are in natural selection. But they at least open possibilities for Nietzschean ‘translations’. One further point I want to make, very much drawing on Jablonka and Lamb's approach, is the important role that multi-dimensional interactions can play here, particularly involving epigenetic systems. In general, at least for humans and some related species, behavioural inheritance systems can respond much faster to environmental shifts than genetic selection, with epigenetic changes somewhere in between. It may be that a common pattern involves translation or assimilation first from behavioural to epigenetic systems, and later to genes. And a final note: we should be clear that social learning of a new practice, for example, cannot directly change the genome by inducing new variations. What it does is shift the environment in which traits are selected. That is, these processes involve not only interactions between different inheritance system, but also interactions between these systems and the ecologies in which bodies develop and evolve.

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21 Another related process is the ‘genetic accommodation’ discussed by West-Eberhard (2003), Jablonka and Lamb (2005: 247-250) do also argue that there are epigenetic processes which can directly stimulate genetic mutations – or, more precisely, increased rates of mutation. So there can also be some forms of direct (not environmentally mediated) ‘translation’ from epigenetic to genetic inheritance.
That last point raises another deep issue. In Section 2 I framed the Dawkinsian view as involving three kinds of causes that interact to produce phenotypes: (i) genetic replication; (ii) cultural replication; and (iii) environmentally contingent development. Jablonka and Lamb’s approach gives us a complex array of heredity processes in place of the two discrete replication systems. They also introduce a more nuanced view of the interaction between heredity and development in which ‘conditions of life’ not only select but also instruct heritable variations. A number of contemporary evolutionary thinkers go still further in questioning any dichotomy between heredity and development. Some of these writers identify themselves as proponents of the ‘Developmental Systems Theory’ (DST) approach.  

While I cannot give a full picture of DST thinking here, one way into the core issues involves the role of *niche construction*: that is, how organisms themselves shape the environments in which they develop and evolve. Organisms alter their ‘conditions of life’ in numerous ways: for example, they build nests or dams or cities, pass on songs (e.g., in birds), demonstrate food gathering techniques, pass on food preferences through amniotic fluid or coprophagy or TV shows, pass on bacteria that may be essential to digestive and other physiological systems, excrete pheromones that direct infants’ sexual

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23 For an outline of DST see the introduction and essays in Oyama, Griffiths, and Gray (eds.) (2001). John Protevi (2009a: Chapter 1) also gives a helpful presentation connecting DST to Deleuzian thought.

24 The key figure in developing the theory of niche construction, and a major influence on contemporary DST, is again Richard Lewontin. A Marxist, he has sometimes described his approach as ‘dialectical biology’ (Levins and Lewontin 1985).
development (e.g., in ants), etc. In doing so they shape (a) their own conditions of ontogenetic development, but also (b) both the ontogeny and the phylogeny of future generations as they ‘bequeath a legacy of modified natural selection pressures, as an ecological inheritance’ (Laland, Odling-Smee and Feldman 2001:125).

So exactly which of these phenomena should be counted as transmission processes? Orthodox neo-Darwinians tend to downplay the role of niche construction, endeavouring to maintain a strict separation from true inheritance. On the broadest view, DST theorists such as Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray see inheritance as involving ‘any resource that is reliably present in successive generations, and is part of the explanation of why each generation resembles the last’ (Griffiths and Gray 2001:196). DNA and heritable epigenetics of germ line cells transmitted through sexual or asexual reproduction are just some of these resources. Others are imitable sounds and movements, or stories told around campfires or written in books. But there are also many more features of environments that have this dual relationship of both shaping and being shaped by organisms across generations. The main focus of debate is the extent to which such processes can act as targets for ongoing selection.

To sum up: multiple processes and entities interact to simultaneously ‘construct’ both organisms and their ecosystems; once we move away from the replicator model, the boundaries between ‘transmission’ and development become more fluid. This does not mean that we cannot pragmatically identify and study

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25 As Paul Griffiths and Russell Gray (2001:196) point out, such environmental shaping is hardly the sole province of animals. Here is one example they give: ‘Many eucalypt species have seeds that cannot germinate until they have been scorched by a bushfire. To increase the frequency of bushfires to the point where this system works reliably, local populations of eucalyptus trees must create forests scattered with resinous litter and hung with bark ribbons. These are carried aloft by the updraft as blazing torches and spread the fire to new areas.’
particular processes, but it seriously questions blanket categorisations.

*Nietzsche*cultures*

I now want to bring these strands back together to sketch a contemporary Nietzschean picture of drive transmission. I take from Jablonka and Lamb the idea that we can focus on *heritable traits* as evolutionary units. A drive pattern is not a replicator, but a trait that is constructed and reconstructed in the same and different bodies through complex interactions of causal processes. We can think of and identify at least some of these as transmission processes, and we can categorise them using Jablonka and Lamb's dimensions.

Nietzsche has most to say about mimetic and performative processes, as discussed in Chapter 3, but these are certainly not the only forces involved in forming drives. Just to highlight a few more, mimesis is underpinned by deep physiological mechanisms including, amongst others, a disposition to automatic imitation apparent in newborn babies, and structures of early infant memory that lead repeated event patterns to be fixed in memory. We may suppose that the formation of these mechanisms involves genetic and/or epigenetic transmission processes. On the other hand, as children develop, mimetic incorporation interacts with ‘higher order’ symbolic processes involving language and consciousness, and including the self-shaping of conscious subjects. And mimetic absorption is also shaped by ‘environmental’ features – e.g., artefacts such as books or computer

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26 For example, in Chapter 3 I looked at one way in which conscious instrumental learning and mimesis interact in the phenomenon of *performative incorporation*. First I deliberately set out to perform a particular scripted drive pattern; then through repeated performance I come to mimetically incorporate its values and desires.
screens spread mimetic inputs; as memories and repetitions are stimulated by many sensory ‘triggers’; while many of these environmental features are unconsciously or consciously shaped by interventions of one’s own, and other, bodies of drives. Thus the patterns of valuing, desiring, and acting in an individual, and that spread to others, are products of multiple interacting processes in multiple ‘dimensions’. It may not be possible to quantify the roles of particular transmission processes. In particular, as the DST theorists emphasise, we should beware of gross abstractions such as ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’.\textsuperscript{27}

This brings me back to the issue of the nature/culture distinction in evolutionary selection. Jablonka and Lamb do use this language. They define culture as ‘a system of socially transmitted patterns of behaviour, preferences and products of animal activities that characterise a group of social animals. The transmitted behaviours can be skills, practices, habits, beliefs and more.’ (2005:160). Cultural evolution is then ‘the change, through time, in the nature and frequency of socially transmitted preferences, patterns or products of behaviour in a population’ (ibid).

I raise two issues here. First, these definitions are then based on an underlying idea of ‘social transmission’, which Jablonka and Lamb do not spell out. The obvious inference is that social transmission involves behavioural and symbolic processes, as opposed to genetic and epigenetic processes. But why draw the line just there? Remember that the epigenetic dimension is not one discrete system, but a looser category of multiple cellular processes. Perhaps we could just agree on a fiat categorisation of ‘social transmission’ as involving any process except those that take place within germ cells passed on through sexual or

\textsuperscript{27} See Oyama et al. 2001.
asexual reproduction. However, Jablonka and Lamb themselves see ambiguity when it comes to physiological processes such as the transmission of hormonal substances in utero that then effect developing embryos. Is it obvious that we should label non-cellular embryonic processes ‘cultural’ – particularly if the contrast category is ‘biological’?

Secondly, and perhaps more substantially, Jablonka and Lamb define culture as a ‘system of socially transmitted patterns …’ But, as their own account helps us to understand, the ‘cultural’ patterns in question – skills, practices, habits, beliefs … and Nietzschean drives – are traits formed by the interaction of an array of transmission processes, including ‘biological’ (genetic and epigenetic) systems as well as ‘social’ (symbolic and behavioural) processes. It is then not possible to make this clear identification of ‘socially transmitted’ traits.

Why does this matter? If we can, pragmatically, focus on particular transmission processes, and categorise some as genetic, epigenetic, behavioural and symbolic, then why not also work with still broader groupings of natural/biological/noncultural vs. cultural/social? I give three reasons for my reluctance. First, these particular categorisations come with a deep history of political loading that I think needs to be challenged. Second, there are particular reasons to question them within a Nietzschean framework, some of which I discussed above. Third, I want to highlight some specific problems about the way this distinction has structured thinking in recent – and not so recent – approaches to ‘cultural evolution’. I will turn to this last point in the final section.

To be clear, I am not claiming that we need to abandon all ideas of ‘nature’ or ‘culture’: I am saying that we don't need to set them up as a dualism of opposed

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or discrete ‘domains’. For example, this is the approach emphasised by Donna Haraway (2003) in coining the term ‘naturecultures’. Or we can read it in Elizabeth Grosz’s reading of Darwinism, which advocates understanding the relations between nature and culture as a relation of ramification and elaboration, or in the language of science, as a form of emergence and complexity, rather than one of opposition, the one, nature, providing both the means and the material for the other’s elaboration, and the other, culture, providing the latest torsions, vectors, and forces in the operations of an ever-changing, temporally sensitive nature (Grosz 2005: 47)

We can see Nietzsche as a forerunner of these approaches. Nietzsche himself uses ‘culture’ [Kultur or Cultur, and sometimes Bildung] in a narrow and elitist sense, to refer to the ‘highest’ or most ‘advanced’ aspects of life: culture is ‘above all, unity of artistic style in all the expressions of a people’ (DS:3); its goal is the ‘procreation of genius’ (SE:3 p142), the production of the ‘individual higher exemplar’ (SE:6 p161); it is the ‘evolution of the spirit feared by the state’ (HH474). In one of his most extended treatments of ‘culture’, the 1874 ‘untimely meditation’ on ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Nietzsche’s contrasts culture with ‘lower’ areas of human life including politics, militarism, ‘money-making’, and academia. He does not contrast it with nature. On the contrary, culture is ‘transfigured physis’ (SE:3 p145), the advancement and ‘perfecting’ of

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28 Tracing the etymology and genealogy of ‘culture’, Raymond Williams (1976) identifies three main strands: (i) first, the cultivation (Latin colere) of ‘crops and plants’; (ii) then extending to the cultivation of humans, emphasising their differences, so that a culture is ‘a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity’ (ibid:90), a move that Williams identifies with Romanticism and Herder in particular; (iii) then a narrower 19th century association of culture with ‘the arts’ and with, as Matthew Arnold writes in Culture and Anarchy, ‘the best which has been thought and said in the world’. Notwithstanding the differences in their evaluative perspectives on ‘the best’, Nietzsche’s use of ‘culture’ is here close to Arnold’s.
nature working through humanity. At this point Nietzsche presents nature as purposive agent of evolution: nature is an ‘artist’ (SE3:162); culture is nature’s ‘goal’ (SE:3 p164); human beings are the most advanced of nature's tools. It is nature who ‘propels the philosopher into mankind like an arrow’ (SE:7 p177), as part of creating cultivated humans who can ‘render it a little assistance’ (ibid) through using their capacity for reflective consciousness to devise and carry out educational and self-transformative projects.

With a turn to science in his middle period texts Nietzsche moves decidedly away both from the personification of nature and from this form of humanism. By *The Gay Science*, he is calling for both the ‘de-deification of nature’, and with it the ‘naturalisation’ of humanity ‘in terms of a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature’ (GS109). Both nature and humanity lose their privileged status: nature doesn’t set goals; and humans are not its instruments of perfection.29 In other respects, however, Nietzsche follows the same guiding themes throughout his work. Culture indicates the domain of the ‘high’, the ‘advanced’; and every ‘enhancement of the type “man”’ (BGE257) still involves the cultivation of a few ‘higher’ individuals on the backs of the masses.30 I am not going to discuss those Nietzschean claims any further here. The point I want to make is that the evolution of ‘culture’, for Nietzsche, always involves the interaction of many processes of biology, physiology and psycho-physiology, ‘blood’, climate, nutrition and digestion, imitation and education, and including the reflective interventions of ‘philosophers’ and other educators and self-

29 GS115 describes two of the ‘four great errors’ as: ‘[man] endowed himself with fictitious attributes’ and ‘he placed himself in a false order of rank in relation to animals and nature’. Similarly D31 discusses the ‘pride of mankind which … establishes the great gulf between man and nature’ and which is based on a ‘prejudice as to what spirit is’.
30 An important question, but not one I will try to answer, is what now provides Nietzsche with a standard of ‘height’ once nature is de-deified and de-teleologised.
cultivators. Culture continues to be ‘transfigured physis’, not non-natural but part of evolving nature.

5.4. English genealogy part 2: fixing values

In Chapter 1 I looked at Nietzsche's critique of the ‘English genealogists’, and at Hume as a grandfather of that lineage. I contrasted Nietzsche's picture of conflictual plurality with Hume's fundamentally universalist view of history. The evolutionary outcomes of Hume's story – the ‘artificial virtues’ of justice and allegiance, etc. – are universal; all human societies are bound to develop or ‘invent’ them, and so converge on a common understanding of the ‘good’. This shared “cultural” endpoint of Hume's genealogy arises from a shared “natural” start point: a universal human nature that features two particularly strong psychological structures, the passion of ‘avidity’ or ‘self-interest’, and the basic instinct of sympathy.

Darwin's genealogy of morals in The Descent of Man takes up many features of Hume's story including the starring role of the ‘all important emotion of sympathy’, or more generally what he calls the ‘social instincts’, bolstered by other Humean features including ‘selfishness’, ‘experience’, and ‘habit’ (1871:81). Darwin's main contribution is to go a further step back and explain the evolutionary development of sympathy through natural selection operating on social groups: it is ‘of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend each other’ and ‘will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic
members, would flourish best and rear the greatest number of off-spring’ (ibid). As with Hume, contemporary moral values are naturalised through a genealogy that traces them back to universal features of human nature. Although Darwin’s evolutionary theory adds a new grounding of these claims about human nature, and roots them in a heritage shared by all social animals, the core ‘English’ structure is the same.

With Hume and Darwin as exemplars, I take these to be at least some core features of ‘English genealogy’: (i) affirming contemporary value systems that are taken to be universal; (ii) using genealogy to naturalise these values – that is, to explain their origin and development in terms of natural features; and where, specifically (iii) these are features of a universal human nature. In the late 19th century Darwinism provided English genealogy with a new arsenal, more powerful ways of understanding developmental processes and the ‘natural’. Neo-Darwinian theory in the 20th century has similarly reshaped new English genealogies.

**Fixed success in cultural evolution**

The lineage of ‘English’ genealogy continues to flourish in contemporary moral and political thought. We can see crude versions of this pattern in some of the “just so stories” of human sociobiology, and also in some more recent work in evolutionary psychology, which give gene-level evolutionary naturalisations of dominant values. But there are also more sophisticated versions. In particular, I

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31 The ‘Evolutionary Psychology’ approach has largely succeeded the ‘Human Sociobiology’ most famously associated with Edward O. Wilson (1975) as a research project focusing on genetic explanation of human cultural and psychological life. Its best known figures include
think of the contemporary application of *cultural evolution* models in liberal moral and political philosophy, as in the work of writers like Robert Axelrod (1984), Ken Binmore (1994, 1998), Brian Skyrms (1996, 2004), Christina Bicchieri (2006), Gerald Gaus (2011), and others who are close to or draw on their approaches. Here I will focus on just one particularly influential text, Skyrms' *Evolution of the Social Contract*.

Skyrms explicitly links his approach both to Darwinism and to ‘the tradition of Hume’ (1996: xi), which he identifies in terms of the central questions: ‘How can the existing implicit social contract have evolved? How may it continue to evolve?’ (ibid: ix). Contemporary Humean naturalism uses Darwin’s understanding of ‘the natural dynamics of evolution’ (ibid). In particular, Skyrms’ approach both to Darwinism and to ‘the tradition of Hume’ (1996: xi), which he identifies in terms of the central questions: ‘How can the existing implicit social contract have evolved? How may it continue to evolve?’ (ibid: ix). Contemporary Humean naturalism uses Darwin's understanding of ‘the natural dynamics of evolution’ (ibid). In particular, Skyrms’

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Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (1992), and Steven Pinker (1997). A distinguishing feature of Evolutionary Psychology, reflecting its closeness to the wider ‘cognitive turn’ in psychology, is a focus on basic ‘modular’ cognitive mechanisms believed to underlie behaviour patterns. A second is the idea of an ‘adaptive lag’. That is: human activity is shaped by psychological mechanisms that were once genetically adaptive (i.e., advanced the reproductive fitness of genes), but may be so no longer. This idea is often connected to the concept of the ‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness’ (EEA). Psychological mechanisms are supposed to have evolved during a past era of relative stability in physical and social environments – on most accounts, the pre-agricultural Pleistocene era (1.7 million to around 10,000 years ago). The core structure of the human psyche evolved genetically, over a timescale amenable to genetic evolution, in response to stone age conditions. Some of this structuring may then be ‘maladaptive’ for our very different modern world, as genetic evolution works too slowly to keep up with technological and social change. See Laland and Brown (2002) for a useful, but certainly sympathetic, philosophical introduction. Critiques include Richardson (2007), Rose and Rose (2012).

I should note here that in his middle period Nietzsche himself presents something like an ‘adaptive lag’ thesis. HH2 can be read in this way: ‘Now, everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times, long before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind may well not have altered very much.’ Similarly in *Dawn* Nietzsche writes of ‘those tremendous eras of “morality of custom” which precede “world history” as the actual and decisive eras of history which determined the character of mankind’ (D18). At this point in his thinking, then, Nietzsche at least sometimes (not all passages support this view) sees the ‘character’ of at least the mass of humans as stuck in a shape given it by ‘primitive’ morality of custom. However, (1) he seems to turn decisively away from this idea by GM, now arguing that human drives have been dramatically transformed by the great ruptures of state civilisation and the slave revolt. And (2) the main point of HH2 is to criticise the ‘philosopher’ who ‘sees “instincts” in man as he now is and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind’ (ibid), whereas in fact ‘everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths’ (ibid). So Nietzsche’s emphasis right through HH to GM emphasises the *mutability* of human ‘instincts’, although his views on the historical timescales involved appear to shift.
Darwinism is Dawkinsian: ‘In the apt language of Richard Dawkins, we may say that both cultural and biological evolution are processes driven by differential replication’ (ibid). Unlike the gene-focused sociobiologists, Skyrms works almost exclusively on cultural replication processes, which he studies using evolutionary game theory, and in particular the replicator dynamics model. The book's five chapters use this model to offer evolutionary explanations of moral and political institutions that Skyrms takes to be part of an ‘implicit social contract’ which he takes to be common across human societies, including principles of distributive justice – ‘the rule or habit of just division’ (ibid:11), altruism and mutual aid (Chapter 3), and ‘the origin of property’ (ibid:79).

Evolutionary game theory, and replicator dynamics in particular, was originally developed by John Maynard Smith and George Price (1973) to model genetic transmission of animal behaviours. Robert Axelrod's (1984) *The Evolution of Cooperation* was the first major, and highly influential, study applying the approach to human cultural evolution. The original idea is that animals in a population interact with each other in foraging, mating and other ‘games’, following genetically programmed ‘strategies’. Some strategies are more successful than others – i.e., organisms following them have more offspring. Success is locally contextual, contingent on the other strategies the organism

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32 Skyrms writes: ‘Although this dynamics is surely oversimplified from biological and cultural perspectives, it provides a tractable model that captures the main qualitative features of differential replication’ (ix-x).

33 Throughout the book Skyrms uses these singular terms: the social contract, the rule of just division, the conception of property. There are other writers in this tradition who are more cautiously pluralist: for example, the notable research project by Henrich et al. (2004) that involved game theoretic experiments (playing bargaining and other games) to investigate ‘fairness norms’ in 15 ‘small scale societies’. This project does acknowledge a diversity of normative patterns emerging in different cultures; although I would argue that it is still limited by many of the same assumptions as Skyrms and others, some of which are built in to the idea that we can grasp generic normative principles of ‘justice’ by playing money-based games in decontextualised and unfamiliar experimental set-ups.
encounters: e.g., using a cooperative hunting strategy can bring rich nutritional rewards, and so help survival and chances of reproduction, but only if there are other cooperative animals nearby to work with. Offspring are programmed with the same strategies as their parents (for simplicity's sake, reproduction is modelled as asexual) and so, as the game is repeated over multiple generations, the frequencies of different strategies change following their differential success. Eventually the population may settle on an equilibrium distribution of strategies – but mutations or ‘invasions’ of new strategies can perturb equilibria and lead down new paths.\textsuperscript{34}

The point I want to draw out concerns the meaning of evolutionary \textit{success}. In the original genetic model, the root idea is that certain behaviour patterns help individual organisms reproduce more, and so are spread by differential genetic reproduction. But cultural evolution, as understood by Dawkins or Skyrms, does not involve strategies genetically programmed in to individuals over their lifetimes. Rather, the idea is that ‘successful strategies are communicated and imitated more often than unsuccessful ones’ (Skyrms 1996: 9). We should not then think of game rounds as biological generations, but as repeated social interactions in the course of which individuals can learn and change their behaviour.

But now we have a new question: why do individuals adopt some strategies and not others?\textsuperscript{35} It is notable that Skyrms says almost nothing about

\textsuperscript{34} For example, in basic replicator dynamics individuals randomly encounter any other member of the population; more recent ‘social network’ models consider population size and the ‘geographical’ distribution of actors. James Alexander's (2007) \textit{The Structural Evolution of Morality} follows in Skyrms' footsteps whilst using an array of such models.

\textsuperscript{35} We should perhaps take some care here with how we use the term ‘success’. Skyrms' sentence above could actually be read in two ways: (a) some strategies are successful in that they are communicated and imitated more – i.e., success is just a term for widespread transmission; or (b) some strategies are communicated and imitated more because they are successful – i.e.,
this central point. Axelrod and some other cultural evolution theorists say just a bit
more. Axelrod's key principle is that: ‘what works well for a player is more likely
to be used again while what turns out poorly is more likely to be discarded …
effective strategies are more likely to be retained than ineffective strategies’
(1986:1097). More specifically, the most ‘congenial’ interpretation of this
principle for studying the evolution of cultural norms is ‘that the players observe
each other, and those with poor performance tend to imitate the strategies of those
they see doing better’ (ibid).36

To put it another way: individuals compare and evaluate their own and
others’ behaviour patterns, and their outcomes, and adjust their future activity in
line. There are many things to be said, from a Nietzschean standpoint, about the
evaluative processes at work here, but I will concentrate on just one particular
aspect of the theory. This is: (a) individuals' evaluative standards (the game theory
payoff matrix, in the model) are fixed over the repeated rounds of the game; and
(b) all individuals have the same evaluative standards (the same payoff matrix).
Individuals are diverse in so far as they play different strategies. But there is one
fixed, and common, standard of ‘success’ for all players of the game. This is a
very big, and not immediately obvious, claim. Why should all players have the
same judgements of who ‘does better’? And why should their evaluative stances
be fixed for long stretches of time?

Skyrms does not give an explicit argument, but various comments in the

36 success denotes an independent feature that can be used to explain transmission. In either case,
though, the same question stands, we need to explain what underlies success: (a) why do
dividuals imitate some strategies, so making them successful; or (b) what do individuals
identify as success in strategies, so leading them to imitate them.

36 We might call this the ‘imitate the successful’ principle. It is also fundamental in the work of
Boyd and Richerson (2005) and other cultural evolution theorists. Alexander (2007: Chapter 1)
gives a detailed and more formal treatment of imitation-based replicator dynamics drawing on
the work of Weibull (1995) and Björnerstedt and Weibull (1999).
book suggest a position. He indicates that we should see game payoffs as representing ‘real goods’, where ‘an increase in income of real goods usually translates into an increase in evolutionary fitness’ (1996:28). And he adds in a footnote that ‘through most of evolutionary time, payoff in real goods means the difference between nutrition and starvation, and it correlates very well with Darwinian fitness’ (ibid:115). So, if I understand right, ‘evolutionary’ or ‘Darwinian’ ‘fitness’ here implies biological or genetic reproduction rather than cultural transmission, and we should think of ‘real goods’ at least largely in terms of food, shelter, tools, and other basic requirements for human survival. Skyrms’ games, then, are set in a world in which individuals start out by valuing only (or very largely) the acquisition of the largest possible quantities of ‘real goods’, and this evaluative stance is tied closely to the necessities of biological reproduction.

There are perhaps two ways to take this position. On the one hand, it could be that the interactions being modelled are meant to be taking place in prehistoric subsistence conditions back ‘on the savannah’ (ibid:115). The game players value only ‘real goods’ because their evaluative stance is immediately constrained by ‘biological’ selection: anyone who starts valuing more ephemeral goods is likely to starve. Alternatively, we might think that this evaluative stance is a basic acquisitive instinct that has been shaped by past selection in subsistence conditions, but continues to determine human valuing even in a gentler world. On either reading, the basic features of ‘English genealogy’ are clear. The cultural evolution of contemporary humans’ shared moral and political values and institutions has been shaped by a fixed and common evaluative stance which is a product of humans’ shared biological evolutionary history – that is, of a universal
human nature.

I think that Skyrms is certainly right in identifying this version of cultural evolution theory with the ‘tradition of Hume’. We are again working with a view of history in which conventions and ‘artificial virtues’ evolve against a fixed bedrock of human nature dominated by the avid passion of ‘interest’ – i.e., the desire to accumulate material goods. In so far as Skyrms argues for this view, rather than simply assuming it, he turns to the basic naturalisation model of evolutionary psychology: human cultural evolution works within a framework of genetically fixed instincts (or ‘modules’) that evolved under subsistence conditions in a distant state of nature.\textsuperscript{37}

\textit{Beyond Englishness}

Nietzsche's critique of English genealogy remains relevant today because English genealogy is alive and well. Remember that what we are talking about here are genealogies of powerful moral and political value systems, norms of justice or obedience, property systems, etc. These values and practices, we might think, have evolved over millennia, through wars, famines, migrations, revolutions, and through days and years and generations of everyday life and everyday struggle. They have evolved along many different paths, which sometimes meet in clashes or combinations. And they continue to evolve today. Is it realistic to think that evaluative criteria that guide their evolution have remained fixed over this history?

\textsuperscript{37} See footnote 31 above on the concept of the ‘environment of evolutionary adaptedness’ (EEA) in evolutionary psychology.
On a Nietzschean picture, we can see these values and institutions as developing along evolutionary paths shaped by evaluative stances, and we can understand the evolutionary processes involved in Darwinian terms. But these evaluative stances are not, in general, either fixed or common. They are themselves produced by divergent and cumulative evolutionary development. If there are pockets of stability in particular places and times, these need to be explained not assumed.

If there is a value in the kind of game theory models used by Skyrms and others, it is that they bring out strategic structures of particular forms of interactions, so long as guiding values can be held fixed. This fixing may make sense as an abstraction in limited, local, contexts. It breaks down once the guiding values are themselves cumulatively evolving over chains of interactions: that is, once we see them as part of history. Ahistorical models may be useful as specialist tools within a genealogist's toolbox, but they can't tell us everything we need to know about how cultures evolve. In the next chapter I want to move towards developing a broader Nietzschean framework for thinking about the evolution of values, in which no valuing is fixed.
Chapter 6. Evolution II: Transforming Values

It is almost time now to start pulling together ideas about psycho-physiology and evolution from the last four chapters, and so outline a Nietzschean framework for studying social change. First, though, there is one more question I need to look at. We have seen quite a few ideas about how values and other drive elements are adopted or inherited in social worlds, how they spread across bodies, and how these transmission processes are ‘ordered’. But what does Nietzsche have to say about how “new” or transformed values, desires and practices arise? This is the subject of Section 1.

Section 2 then brings transmission and transformation together to sketch a general picture of how drives evolve as they are assembled and re-assembled within and across bodies. These processes are shaped by encounters between drives, bodies, and other forces. Pilfering from Felix Guattari (1989), I will think of these encounters as taking place within three ecologies – psychic, social, and material. The main focus of this section is on a key dynamic that is central to Nietzsche's accounts of social change in the *Genealogy* and elsewhere, a pattern of blocking and redirection. But I also make some suggestions for how this ecological-evolutionary approach can help us think about other kinds of patterns.

Finally, in Section 3 I turn one last time to the critique of ‘English *Genealogy*. We can see from Hume to today’s cultural evolution models a very different dynamic involving the progressive spread of welfare-improving innovations. We can reframe this pattern within a Nietzschean approach, but as a
limited special case – and one that historically has often been engineered, by force if necessary, rather than discovered in “nature”.

6.1. Two Nietzschean ideas about value creation

Strong creativity: spontaneous self-affirmation

There are at least two main themes in Nietzsche concerning the emergence of new values. The first involves a ‘spontaneous’, ‘active’, affirmative creation of values, which Nietzsche associates with strong bodies: the noble ‘conceives the basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously out of himself’ (GM1:11). The second involves the transformation of values by weak drives and bodies in response to blockage and adversity. Nietzsche connects both, in different ways, to his criticisms of Darwinism. The second idea is going to play a bigger role in this chapter and the rest of this thesis, but I will start by looking briefly at the first, perhaps better known, theme. This appears most clearly in the Genealogy, where Nietzsche objects to a conception of evolution as a mechanistic process where change stems only from random variation operated on by selection: ‘a blind and chance mechanistic hooking-together of ideas, […] something purely passive, automatic, reflexive, molecular and thoroughly stupid’ (GM1:1). In GM2:12, he blames democratic ‘misarchism’ for robbing the ‘theory of life’ of ‘a fundamental component, that of activity’:

one places instead “adaptation” in the foreground; that is to say, an activity of
the second rank, a mere reactivity; indeed, life itself has been defined as a more
and more efficient inner adaptation to external conditions (Herbert Spencer).
Thus the essence of life, its will to power is ignored; one overlooks the essential
priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give
new interpretations and directions, although “adaptation” follows only after this

This strand of Nietzsche's response to Darwinism comes to the fore in Deleuze's
reading, which centralises the activity vs. reactivity distinction. Deleuze writes:

Nietzsche criticises Darwin for interpreting evolution and chance within
evolution in an entirely reactive way. He admires Lamarck because Lamarck
foretold the existence of a truly active plastic force, primarily in relation to
adaptations: a force of metamorphosis. For Nietzsche, as for energetics, energy
which is capable of transforming itself is called “noble”. The power of
transformation, the Dionysian power, is the primary definition of activity.
(1962:39)

As in the last chapter, I am not going to look in any detail at the historical sources
and context of Nietzsche's anti-Darwin position, which have been well discussed.
In particular, Keith Ansell-Pearson (1997: Chapter 4) shows how Nietzsche
develops his ideas of an inner ‘form-shaping’ force, identified with ‘will to
power’, from his reading of Wilhelm Roux and Carl Von Nägeli. We can see the
core structure of Nietzsche's point in terms of two stages of evolutionary process:
first, non-random formative processes ‘within’ the organism create new
variations; only afterwards, secondary processes select amongst these variations.

Deleuze continues: ‘He admires Lamarck because Lamarck foretold the existence of a truly
active plastic force, primarily in relation to adaptations: a force of metamorphosis.’ (ibid).
Deleuze also goes on to relate this point to Nietzsche's critique of science: ‘science, by
inclination, understands phenomena in terms of reactive forces and interprets them from this
standpoint. Physics is reactive in the same way as biology; things are always seen from the
petty side, from the side of reactions’ (ibid:42).
Nietzsche accuses Darwinism of ignoring the first stage. This point descends from Von Nägeli who, to quote Ansell-Pearson:

construes evolution taking place in terms of the primacy of internal forces that result in increasing complexity (ever more elaborate “configurations” of forces) corresponding to external conditions. Natural selection prunes the phylogenetic tree but does not cause new branches to grow (1997:93).

The idea of ‘form-giving forces’ comes from Roux’s embryology of the formation of ‘organs’, but is dramatically extended by Nietzsche to ‘play a fundamental role in his positing of the will-to-power as a principle of “historical” method that is applicable to variegated forms of evolution, whether they occur in biological, physiological, cultural or technological domains’ (ibid:98).

Is Nietzsche able to give a substantive account of what this ‘active’ process amounts across all of these domains – or even just with respect to moral values? Nietzsche does not appear to have worked out a general theory of active evolutionary force, only leaving us rather cryptic unpublished notes. However, we can see at least some main features in his remarks in the Genealogy on the ‘noble mode of valuation’ (GM1:10). As Deleuze signals, Nietzsche sees the hidden first stage of spontaneous, active ‘form-shaping’ as the work of ‘noble’, strong bodies. This is why Nietzsche sees Darwinism’s overlooking of ‘activity’ as a symptom of a democratic ‘misarchism’.

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2 See Ansell-Pearson (1997:105-107) for a detailed discussion that concludes that he cannot: ‘Nietzsche’s outline of a theory of will-to-power as a rival to Darwinian mechanism looks decidedly awkward and hugely problematic’ (ibid. 105-6).

3 As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 5, the failure of the English Genealogists involves the denial of differences, of how values are shaped by encounters of bodies with very different evaluative perspectives. In particular, in relation to the evolution of contemporary morals as Nietzsche traces it in GM, they deny or simply fail to notice the ‘noble mode of valuation’, the perspective of the ‘masters’.
In fact both weak and strong bodies, slaves and masters, create or transform values in the *Genealogy*, only they do so in quite different ways. Slaves create new values by de-forming existing values in ‘an inversion of the value-positing eye’ (GM1:10), negating values and practices that they first encounter in the outside world, in the persons and acts of their enemies and rulers. By contrast, noble or active valuation is a ‘triumphant affirmation of itself’, that ‘acts and grows spontaneously’ (ibid). The ‘noble man … conceives the basic concept “good” in advance and spontaneously out of himself and only then creates an idea of “bad”’ (ibid). And, in a perhaps surprising use of the first person plural, Nietzsche also presents the noble mode of valuation as a collective self-affirmation of the ruling caste: ‘its positive basic concept – filled with life and passion through and through – “we noble ones, we good, beautiful, happy ones!”’ (ibid)

Here are at least three clear characteristics of the noble or active form of value-creation. First, it is affirmative: the noble valuer starts by identifying something as positive, good. Second, it is self-affirmative: the noble valuer identifies a feature of her own body or practice, or perhaps the bodies or practices of those of her own kind (“we noble ones”), and calls it good. Third, it is spontaneous. The first two points seem straightforward enough, but just what does spontaneity involve here? It is perhaps clearer what it is not: the noble valuation is not a response or reaction, not caused at all by an outside force, body or encounter; and so not part of any mechanistic chain (GM1:1; see also Deleuze 1962:40-3). Instead, it is ‘expansive’ (GM2:12), it involves a movement that begins and develops within the body, then expresses itself outwardly in the world.
But does this mean that noble value creation is altogether uncaused, or just that the drive processes involved are internal and unknown, perhaps because they are deeply incorporated and unconscious?

In GM2:17 Nietzsche describes the masters who create the state as artists – ‘the most involuntary, unconscious artists that have ever lived’. It is hard to read this without thinking of the development of Nietzsche’s thinking of artistic creation through his early and middle works, including his exposure of the Wagnerian ‘cult of genius’ in Human, All Too Human. There Nietzsche devotes a sequence of sections, HH162-164, to unpicking the idea that artistic works somehow appear ex nihilo as ‘miracles’ (HH162). Nietzsche maintains that all human creations are in principle ‘explicable’ (ibid), and in particular traces a genealogy of artistic creativity which involves the absorption and combination of multiple influences (ibid), together with the ‘seriousness of the efficient workman’ (HH163). A work of ‘genius’, though it may appear unexpected, unpredictable, uncaused, is really the product of many unseen processes, repetitions, accidents, encounters, influences, etc. We fall into a ‘childish’ and quasi-religious attitude to creativity because we are unable to ‘see in the work of the artist how it has become’ (HH162): we are unable to keep track of the multiplicity and complexity of all these lineages – just as we are unable ever to fully understand the activity of our drives (D119). ‘Every activity of man is amazingly complicated, not only that of the genius: but none is a “miracle”’ (HH162).

Maybe this suggests a somewhat more modest way to read the nobles’ spontaneous creativity. The so-called ‘genius’ is a complex varied body in which many lineages meet in transformative encounters.\(^4\) Our grasp of the lineages and

\(^4\) However, as Nietzsche discusses in HH230, the ‘genius’ must also somehow (it is unclear just
processes at play will very often be too weak for us to anticipate the form such changes will take: to paraphrase Deleuze (1962:36), we do not know what an encounter of the drives that make up a body can do. But that does not mean that the processes at work in these encounters are not in principle explicable. My own view is that Nietzsche's best thoughts on how we might start to explain them do not come from his biologically-influenced attempts to work out a picture of ‘form-giving forces’, but rather from his earlier explorations of creativity in the ‘free spirit trilogy’ based on psychological close observation. This is where I want to turn now.

**Weak creativity: encounters and redirections**

Nietzsche's idea of spontaneous ‘form-giving’ value creation never entirely replaces an earlier theme that he developed in *Human, All Too Human*. There, new values are not spontaneous creations of the strong but, on the contrary, responses of weak bodies and drives to hostile encounters and shifting environments. In *HH224* Nietzsche also relates this idea to a critical reading of Darwinism. Here the point is that the ‘celebrated struggle for existence’ in which the fittest prevail is not sufficient to explain the development of human cultures. We need to separate two different kinds of contributions to any successful ‘nation’ or species: rigid, conservative forces ensure that values are maintained and transmitted; but other transformative elements create new variations, so allowing the society to adapt. Stern custom-ordering makes for strong but ‘stupid’ bodies. Creative or

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...how) acquire the ‘strong spirit’ required to ‘at least make his way and not effectively perish’ despite the weakening of the body that this variety and complexity implies.
transformative bodies are those that escape rigid morality of custom, but at the price of weakness. A successful ‘nation’ may then be a social assemblage involving bodies of both kinds: ‘The strongest natures preserve the type, the weaker help it to evolve’. The weak but creative types are what Nietzsche, at least at this point, understands by ‘free spirits’. So, just as in the later critique in the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche here accuses Darwinism of ignoring differences in valuing bodies and perspectives, and so of missing sources of “variation”. Only this time it is the weak, not the strong, who are being ignored.

Why this association of creativity and weakness? We can perhaps separate out two thoughts. The first is to do with the internal composition of a ‘free spirited’ body of drives. As discussed in Chapter 4, Nietzsche tends to think of the strength of a body as an outcome of an ordered, or otherwise coherent or harmonious, composition of drives. Conversely, disorder or disharmony in a body will lead to weakness: it has too many drives pulling it in different directions, too many ‘possibilities to choose from’ (HH228), ‘too many motives and points of view’ (HH230), too many competing forces in the internal ‘clash of motives’ (D129). However, this internal division can also have a second more positive consequence: free spirits are ‘degenerate’ bodies who ‘attempt new things, and in general, many things’ (HH224); they usually fail – ‘countless numbers of this kind perish on account of their weakness without producing any very visible effect’ (ibid); but a few lucky hits create ‘progress’ (ibid).

The second thought relates to what the weakness of a free spirit means for its external relations with other bodies. If an insufficiently powerful drive or body confronts an opposing force or adverse environment, these blocks and limits may
act as spurs to its creativity. In *Human, All Too Human* this comes across most clearly in a further run of images reflecting on creative ‘genius’. A prisoner locked in a cell ‘uses his wits in the search of a means of escape’ (HH231); ‘someone lost in a forest … sometimes discovers a path which no one knows’ (ibid); ‘a mutilation, crippling, a serious deficiency in an organ offers the occasion for an uncommonly successful development of another organ’ (ibid). In general, genius seems to be a response to ‘mistreat[ment] and torment’:

> a spark as it were thrown off by the fearful energy thus ignited, the light of genius will suddenly flare up; the will, made wild like a horse under the rider's spur, will then break out and leap over into another domain (HH233)

These ideas remain very much alive in the *Genealogy*. The discussion of internalisation, which I looked at in Chapter 2, is a classic case. Because of weakness in the face of state society, the enslaved body is unable to directly requite an attack with a physical response, and its aggressive drives are redirected into an ‘inner world’ of fantasy, bad conscience and *ressentiment*. Such redirection is a crucial source of transformation. Whilst denigrating the values of the slave revolt, Nietzsche is clear about their transformational impact: *ressentiment* is what makes the human an ‘interesting animal’ (GM1:6). Just as bad conscience is ‘an illness just as pregnancy is an illness’ (GM2:19) and will turn ‘active’ to become ‘the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena’ (GM2:18).

To summarise, in the *Genealogy* Nietzsche introduces a new conception of noble or strong creativity, yet the older idea of the value-creation of the weak also continues to play an important role. What happens, however, is that Nietzsche now comes to give weakness a much clearer negative association by contrast with
‘noble’ value-creation. Whilst Nietzsche acknowledges that the slave revolt ‘gives birth to new values’, the creativity of resistance is of a distinct, derivative, kind: in contrast to the ‘spontaneous’ value-creation of the strong, the weak merely distort – specifically, ‘invert’ – existing dominant values.

Here I want to make a point about the notion of ‘reactivity’. In fact Nietzsche does not always see ‘reaction’ (Reaktion) as inherently negative. It can simply mean the response of one body or will to another it encounters: as in GM1:10, where the nobles react to a hostile encounter with ‘the true [eigentliche] reaction, that of deeds’. ‘Reactivity’ first appears in a specifically negative guise in Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt in morality: that is, of the ‘inversion’ of values by the subordinated. We can also, perhaps, identify two senses of reactivity with respect to transformations of drives. In a broad sense, a transformation is reactive wherever it occurs in response to an external force, is prompted by an encounter. In a narrow sense, it responds in a particular way: an inversion or negation. In the Genealogy Nietzsche focuses on reactive transformations of this second narrower kind. But in HH his scope was wider, and he entertained the possibility of other kinds of reactions: the clashes and blockages met by the frustrated ‘genius’ can provoke conjunctions and mutations that transform values in all kinds of unpredictable directions, not only negations or inversions. I will try to develop this broader sense of reactive creativity of the ‘weak’ in the rest of this chapter.
To conclude this section, I want to tie this discussion back to the last chapter and note some further parallels with recent evolutionary thought. Above I cited Deleuze connecting Nietzsche’s ‘noble mode of evaluation’ with his Lamarckism, and this is apt. In orthodox neo-Darwinism, there are two main sources of new variations upon which selection can get to work: random mutations of the genome, for example through DNA “copying errors”; and combinatory ‘shuffling’ through sexual reproduction. One of the key ideas I looked at from Jablonka and Lamb was the possibility of induced or instructive mutations, in which mutation rates can dramatically change either across or in regions of the genome, in response to environmental changes, usually conditions of stress. Jablonka and Lamb themselves see this as a Lamarckian point: organisms respond, genetically and/or epigenetically, to the world in targeted ways, creating new traits that are heritable.

There are particularly interesting parallels between such induced mutations and the ‘weak’ form of Nietzschean value creation. Both are reactions to external stimuli, and in particular to blockages and stresses – e.g., to quote Jablonka and Lamb, ‘highly mutable genes, with DNA sequences that seem to have been selected for mutability, have been found in other pathogens that are constantly at war with their host's immune system’ (2005:96). And, in both cases, stress provokes mutations or shufflings that are random: they may be ‘lucky hits’, but also ‘countless numbers of this kind perish on account of their weakness without producing any very visible effect’ (HH224).
Another interesting point that Jablonka and Lamb make is that sexual reproduction may also often play a similar role in some lineages of plants and animals. The question of the evolutionary development and significance of sexual reproduction is fascinating and hotly debated. In what circumstances is it ‘adaptive’ for organisms to radically shuffle their genes in this way? If organisms are well adapted to stable environments then new variations, whether through mutation or sexual shuffling, may be more likely to hinder than improve their reproductive success. Reproductive processes that involve greater degrees of transformation are then more likely to evolve, it is argued, where environments are also transforming apace.  

Can we also find parallels in contemporary biology for Nietzsche's active or ‘noble’ processes? Perhaps one interesting idea here is that of ‘evolutionary capacitance’, which I discussed in the last chapter in relation to genetic assimilation and canalisation. The basic idea is that variations can be stored, as it were, within the genetic and epigenetic structuring of organisms without influencing the phenotype. Environmental changes can then release this ‘charge’ of variation, causing substantial and surprising changes. If an active ‘spontaneous’ process cannot involve response or reaction to outside events in any way, then evolutionary capacitance does not fit the bill – and probably no processes studied by contemporary biologists will. But evolutionary capacitance does recall Nietzsche's idea of an ‘expansive, form-giving’ process that in some senses begins ‘within’ the body. It could perhaps be related to Nietzsche's earlier view of genius.

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5 Cases of organisms that have both sexual and asexual reproduction give some suggestive support for this idea: for example, aphids who ‘commonly reproduce asexually through the summer, but before they overwinter, they have a sexual generation. Similarly, Daphnia, the water flea, reproduces asexually when environmental conditions are good, but when life gets tough it switches to sexual reproduction and produces resistant eggs that can survive poor conditions.’ (Jablonka and Lamb 83).
in HH: variations and combinations are ‘stored’ within a creative body, interacting in complex and usually unseen ways, before bursting out to reshape the world in unexpected ways.

Finally, forms of Nietzsche’s critique of Darwinian ‘reactivity’ reverberate through evolutionary thought today. An important reference point is Lewontin’s classic paper ‘Gene, Organism and Environment’, the themes of which have been taken up and further developed in recent Developmental Systems Theory (DST). Lewontin describes how Darwin and Mendel ‘brought biology at last into conformity with the epistemological meta-structure that already characterised physics since Newton and chemistry since Lavoisier’, allowing it to become ‘quantitative and predictive’ (1982:60). The way it did this was to make ‘organisms the objects of forces whose subjects were the internal heritable factors and the external environment’ (ibid:59). In essence, the idea is that an organism is shaped to ‘fit’ its environment, as a key fits a lock (ibid:63). Lewontin even follows Nietzsche in critiquing the very idea of ‘adaptation’: ‘so long as we persist in thinking of evolution in terms of adaptation, we are trapped into an insistence on the autonomous existence of environments independent of living creatures’ (ibid). For Lewontin, an environment is something that organisms themselves ‘construct … out of the bits and pieces of the external world’ (ibid:64).

Nietzsche largely reverses Darwin’s emphasis on adaptation, instead prioritising ‘active’ processes working in the other direction: the environment becomes the ‘object’, the living organism the ‘subject’. An alternative approach, which is at the heart of recent Developmental Systems Theory, is to more thoroughly question the organism/environment dichotomy, and reject any idea that
either comes ‘first’. Lewontin critiques ‘the alienation of internal and external causes from each other’, and insists that ‘organisms … both make and are made by their environment in the course of phylogenetic change, just as organisms are both the causes and consequences of their own ontogenetic development’ (ibid:66). For Paul E. Griffiths and Russell D. Gray, ‘Fundamentally the unit of both development and evolution is the developmental system, the entire matrix of interactants involved in a life cycle’ (2001:206). We can also look at the ideas of induced mutation and evolutionary capacitance in this light. In both cases, there are complex interactions between processes ‘internal’ to an organism, and ‘external’ processes involving the organism and other bodies and forces in the world around it. Neither case is only ‘active’ or only ‘reactive’.

6.2. An ecological view of drive evolution

I now want to bring various strands together and present a more general Nietzschean framework for thinking about how values, desires and practices – that is, drives and their elements – evolve. Drives encounter each other both within and through bodies of drives. I will largely think of these encounters in terms of two kinds of negative and positive relations, relations of opposition or agreement: on the one hand, drives and bodies can block each other, closing down each other's activity paths; on the other, they can support each other by opening up new possibilities for action. Some encounters involve transmission: as for example, where elements are passed mimetically between bodies. Some encounters involve transformations: e.g., combinations or mutations. Some encounters involve both.
We can think of encounters as taking place within environments made up of many drives, bodies, and also other kinds of entities and forces. These environments are also constantly evolving as the drives and bodies that compose them evolve.

**Three ecologies**

To start off, I want to characterise more clearly the kinds of environments and relations we need to study. To help with this I will adopt and transform Felix Guattari's (1989) idea of three interlocking ecologies: mental, social, and material (or, as he has it, ‘environmental’). Guattari, following Gregory Bateson (1972), develops this vocabulary to emphasise that ‘it is quite simply wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius, and the environment as separate’ (1989:134). The three ecologies are not independent domains but ‘three visions or lenses’ (ibid:140) through which we can view actions and their effects without losing sight of their deep interactivity. Each of these perspectives is ecological (or, as Guattari puts it, ‘eco-logical’) in that it emphasises (a) the complex interconnectedness and (b) the continual evolution of the entities and relations it looks at, and so (c) the ‘precarious, finite, finitized’ (ibid) nature of any states or conditions that obtain at any moment.

The three lenses are distinct in so far as they identify different kinds of entities embroiled in different kinds of relations and processes. The mental ecology is made up of ideas, desires, etc., and their assemblages, which interact following a ‘pre-objectal and pre-personal logic’ (ibid:140). The social ecology is made up of human individuals and groups which interact following the ‘principle
of [...] affective and pragmatic cathexis’ (ibid:144). The environmental ecology involves the interactions of humans (and other animals) with the natural or material world. I am not going to follow all the details of Guattari’s discussion here, but instead re-assemble it to fit the psycho-physiology of drives. Mental ecology, for my purposes, is where drive patterns directly interact with other drives with which they share bodies. This gives us a new way of conceptualising Nietzsche’s picture of the human (in)dividual: a body is precisely an evolving psycho-physiological ecosystem composed of many interacting drives. Social ecology, for my purposes, is made up of interacting bodies of drives. Note that these bodies need not necessarily be human: other animals also have social worlds of their own, and some share (most often under domination) social ecologies with humans; and we might also look at artificial intelligences, or some machinic or cyborg bodies as bodies of drives. What matters, for my purposes, is just that we can conceptualise the bodies in question as composed of drive patterns, and understand their interactions in these terms. Contrarily, I will think of material ecology as the site where drives and bodies of drives interact with all other forces and beings that we can’t understand as composed of drives.

I add in two further points from recent philosophy of biology. The first is Robert Brandon’s (1990) distinction between three senses of ‘environment’. An external environment is a particular region of time and space that organisms (or drives) inhabit. An ecology, or ecological environment, sees the world through a

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6 Guattari, following Bateson – and anticipating contemporary theories of ‘extended mind’ – also considers mental ecologies that ‘cannot be circumscribed within the field of individual psychology’ – the ecology of mind ‘is organised in systems or “minds”, the boundaries of which transcend the boundaries of the individual’ (1989:141). Although I am not pursuing this idea here, this does not mean that I am ruling it out. I find it useful for my project to look at individual human bodies as mental ecologies; in other settings it may make sense to look at more extended mental ecologies.
narrower lens, focusing on just those features of the external environment that shape the development and reproduction of the entities in focus. Thirdly, the selective environment takes a still narrower view, referring just to those features that shape differential reproductive success. Here I will suppose that selective and ecological environments coincide, and I use ‘ecology’ as shorthand for both. An important point arising is that an ecology must be identified relative to particular entities, and so we can talk in the plural of different ecologies, which may overlap to a varying extent, relative to different beings that share the same physical space.

Secondly, it is worth stressing again that the relationship between evolving entities (organisms or drives) and ecologies works both ways. I discussed this point above with reference to Lewontin's rejection of the the classic ‘metaphor of adaptation’ (1982:63). Rather than thinking of organisms (or other evolving entities) adapting to ‘fit’ environments, we need to look at how lineages and ecologies co-construct each other, and so co-evolve.

**Drive ecologies: blocks and supports**

I will quickly recap a few key points of drive psycho-physiology from Chapter 2. It can help – as a simplifying abstraction – to think of an individual body as composed of a repertoire of drives, as it were, ‘stored’ in memory, that it has incorporated over its history. At any moment, only some of these drives are active while others are latent. Those drives that are active within a body shape its movement, interacting through the largely unknown processes that Nietzsche discusses as a ‘clash of motives’ (D129).
I will focus on three kinds of processes involving the interaction of drives in the three ecologies. First, there are formative processes that shape the body's “repertoire” of drives: for example the processes of incorporation I looked at in Chapter 3, and more broadly the multi-dimensional transmission processes of the last chapter. Second, there are processes of activation, involving both sensory stimuli and internal processes within the body of drives. Third, there are processes of motivation through which the active drives move the body – whether to ‘external’ activity that directly impacts on other bodies, or ‘internal’ activity in an ‘inner world’.

In general, I will suppose that drives are more or less flexible or plastic: that is, they have a number of potential activity paths. Some of these activity paths are (more) primary: that is, these are the activities that the drive will pursue if it is not blocked by other drives or forces. But a drive may also have secondary activity paths that will be followed if primary paths are blocked. For example, I hear the laughter in the marketplace (D119), and my first ‘instinct’ may be to clench my fists and look to requite the slight with a ‘true reaction’ ‘in deed’; but then, noticing the nearby policemen, I switch to a secondary more ‘internal’ action path, and mutter a curse under my breath.

Just for a moment, I am going to hold formative processes fixed, in order to look at the various ways in which encounters in the three ecologies can shape activation and motivation processes. Then in the next sub-section I will look at the consequences for the formation and trans-formation of drives.

I will start with material ecologies. First, material interactions shape the

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Note again that, as discussed in Chapter 2, I mean action in a very general sense that does not imply intentionality: e.g., a ‘low level’ instinctual or habitual drive pattern would also move a body to act in this sense.
activation of drives through sensory stimulation. I am not going to look in detail at how this happens, but here is a very rough idea: a body's material environment, by providing certain stimuli to perceptual systems (Nietzsche's ‘nerve impulses’ in D119), supports the activation of some drives ‘stored’ in the body's memory; at the same time, it makes the activation of others less likely. However, I don't want to think of bodies of drives as entirely passive in these processes. In Nietzsche's account in D119, activation involves a two-way interaction between drives and environments: on the one hand, drives respond to stimuli and only certain situations offer opportunities to particular drives; but on the other, drives are actively ‘lying in wait’ to ‘seize’ their opportunities.

Second, material interactions block or support the motive power of drives by shaping their possibilities for external action. One obvious way that a drive can be blocked is that it may be physically impossible for its body to follow certain activity paths. For example, imagine that someone, perhaps a child who loves watching birds, has developed a strong desire to ‘blissful as an eagle … soar up and away to the distant mountain tops’ (D119). But this drive is physically blocked by forces including the earth's gravitational pull. We can certainly think of shifts in the material ecology that could change the activity paths open to this drive: for example, access to artifices such as a hang glider. Some forces and entities (e.g., gravity) in the material ecology may block a drive, restricting its field of possible activities, while others (e.g., hang gliders) may support it, increasing its possibilities. Overall, the action paths open to a drive are shaped by (amongst other things) the interaction of all the blocking and supporting forces in its material environment.
Now to ecology of mind. The first point here, with respect to activation, is that drives may be stimulated not only by external sensory encounters, but also by the ‘internal’ activity of other drives within their bodies. We see this happening, for example, in a chain of thoughts or feelings, where ideas, memories, etc., prompt or arouse new valuings and desirings. I looked briefly at this idea in Chapter 4, discussing the possibilities for subjects to make conscious interventions and commitments.

In terms of motivational processes, my starting point is Nietzsche's emphasis on the often turbulent diversity of the numerous drives within a body. Nietzsche tends to view this interplay in terms of strife: ‘rival’ drives compete or struggle to become ‘tyrants’ and direct the body. Here is one possible reason for this view. A body’s possibilities for action are, on the one hand, dependent on its physical conditions: we might say that a body's materiality, always contextualised to a particular physical environment, gives it a restricted set of possible action paths. Which of these activities it then pursues is an outcome of the interplay of the diverse drives within the body through the ‘clash of motives’. At least in certain circumstances, Nietzsche's antagonistic image of drives competing over a scarce resource makes sense: there may be multiple drives active at the same time, but their activity paths are incompatible – i.e., the body cannot physically pursue all of them. For example, standing at the edge of a cliff with my hang glider might stimulate a new drive involving sheer panic. This drive's primary activity path – to run away from the edge to safety – clashes with my longing to fly. One of these drives will be blocked.

But not all drive interactions are so antagonistic: drives may also be
supported by other drives in their psychic ecology. Even if there are more drives than activity paths, multiple drives can converge on the same activity path. For example, the flying drive may overcome the panic drive because it is reinforced by a drive involving a personal sense of honour or self-respect in the face of fear, a drive not to look stupid, a daredevil drive, etc. The ‘clash of motives’ is not necessarily a war of all against all; it can also be a combat involving coalitions and alliances.

An important aside: this last point implies a way beyond Nietzsche's common identification of ‘strength’ of bodies with the rigidity or narrowness of their internal composition (see Section 1 above). Having only a few desires or ‘options’ is not the only way for a body to be coherent; more complex bodies featuring many drives can also achieve relative ‘harmony’ if these drives enjoy relations of agreement rather than of opposition. Nietzsche at least sometimes recognises the importance of supportive relations in composing individual and social bodies – as for example, in the note that I quoted in Chapter 2: ‘The most general picture of our being is an association of drives, with ongoing alliances and rivalries with one another.’ (KSA 10.7[94] [1883]). However, the focus of his work is very largely on antagonistic encounters, whether between drives, bodies, or groups, and this emphasis perhaps blocks him from exploring alliances and their possibilities in due depth. This issue will become important in the next two chapters looking at relations in social ecologies; but it is also very relevant to psychic ecologies.

Finally, to interactions in social ecologies. A social ecology is made up of multiple interacting bodies; each of these bodies is itself a psychic ecology made
up of multiple interacting drives; and all of these bodies exist in material ecologies that shape the activity paths of their drives. Recalling Brandon's distinction, different bodies that share the same ‘external environment’ may inhabit distinct (social and material) ecologies; but these may overlap to a greater or lesser extent – they may be shared.

In order for a drive in your body to block or support a drive in my body, there must be an interaction of our bodies in shared social and material ecologies. We can outline the following steps: (1) the drive moves your body in an ‘external activity’ (so, it must not be blocked by other drives in your psychic ecology); (2) your activity reshapes a shared material ecology in some way (though this might mean as little as making a sound or a gesture); and then (3) this reshaping of the material ecology may block or support my drives. This last step takes place through the same material processes just discussed: i.e., by (a) stimulating the activation of my drives or (b) affecting their possibilities for action.

One way you can block or support a drive in my body is at the motive level, by affecting its material possibilities for action. For example, you can shape the available activity paths of my drive to fly by destroying or building a hang glider. But you can also block or support my drives, and so also influence my actions, by another route: by stimulating their activation. These two routes may be more or less distinct: e.g., you can sabotage my hang glider unseen, changing my possibilities of action without my becoming aware of it; or you might arouse my drives with just a word or a glance, and perhaps without shifting in any significant way my body's material possibilities. In the first route, your action is effective because it causes a shift in a material ecology; in the second, because it alters the
current composition of drives in a psychic ecology. Broadly speaking, to introduce ideas I will discuss in much more depth in the next chapter, we can relate the first route to the use of force, and the second to the exercise of forms of (social) power.

In many cases, of course, the two routes can work together. Here I will just give a fairly crude example. Suppose that you (credibly) threaten me with violence if I use the hang glider. If I disobey the threat, and you or your agents follow it through, your action may reshape my physical possibilities in the future. Just right now, though, it does not physically block my flying drive. If the threat does lead to my drive being blocked, it is because it effectively intervenes in my own psychic ecology by reshaping the composition of drives of my body. For example, your threat may arouse rather “rational” drives for safety and self-preservation: I value my freedom or bodily integrity, I desire to avoid attack or imprisonment. But also, like standing at the cliff edge, the threat might stimulate more gut-level fearful drives that shake and immobilise my body. These drives, singly or in coalition, may overcome my desire to fly.

As this case brings out, the three ecologies are not independent sites but closely interacting. Grounding this is a basic point about drive psycho-physiology: the activation of a drive always means a two-way interaction with the world outside the individual's own body. An individual does not have one unique (consistent or otherwise) fixed set of values, desires, beliefs, preferences etc.; her patterns of interpreting, valuing and feeling the world, and so acting in it, are multiple and changing, and these shifts are embedded in interactions with social and physical worlds. This is the case even if we hold fixed the formation of the ‘repertoire’ of latent and active drives that compose her body; and even more so
where we think of drives as evolving.

**A dynamic of blocking and redirection**

Now I turn to the formation processes of drives. I will start by looking once more at the key dynamic of blocking and redirecting, introduced in Chapter 2 in the context of Nietzsche's discussion of ‘internalisation’ in the *Genealogy*. We can break the pattern down into these steps: (a) a drive's primary activity path is blocked by another drive or force; (b) this blocking redirects it onto a secondary activity path; (c) if the blocking and redirection continues, the secondary path is strengthened (‘nourished’) and the primary path weakened, until eventually the drive pattern shifts and the former secondary path becomes primary.

The question I want to look at now is: where do these ‘secondary’ activity paths come from? Here are three suggestions. First, they may be latent sub-patterns: like primary patterns, and other drive components, they have been transmitted through the same mimetic and other processes we have looked at in earlier chapters, and “stored” in memory. For example, it may be that a drive's primary patterns are those that its body has been most strongly exposed to in its social environment, and most strongly incorporated through mimetic and other processes. But the body has also been exposed to other possible variations of the drive pattern, and incorporated these to a lesser degree. If primary drive patterns are blocked the drive may now switch to these latent variations.

Second, they may be new adoptions from other bodies (or perhaps from other drives within the same body). If a drive is blocked, I may adopt alternative
activity paths from others around me – I don't have to invent solutions myself, but can learn or borrow them. For example, we might see something like this at work in Nietzsche's slave revolt story: when slaves are blocked from the directly expressing their aggressive drives, they adopt new activity paths from each other. The ‘dark workshop’ described in GM1:14 is a space where slaves come together and collectively develop responses to their oppression. The aggressive drives in question could be redirected in a range of ways, but some particular paths spread amongst the slaves by imitation and communicative learning.

Third, blocking might also lead to a more radical kind of transformation involving the creation of entirely original patterns – the discovery of ‘a path which no one knows’ (HH228). That is, a blocked drive may sometimes develop a new variant pattern that is not simply a copy or combination of models. In the account of internalisation in GM2:17, aggressive ‘instincts of freedom’ are not just redirected onto existing internal paths, but have to dramatically expand the ‘inner world’. Nietzsche does not tell us just how this creative ‘spark’, or ‘hollowing out’ of the psyche happens, and I don't have any clear answers to offer either. My tentative suggestion, drawing on the discussion in Section 1, is that we might think of such radical transformations as involving induced mutations. We can say something about when and where such mutations are likely to occur: here, they are responses to blockages. But we cannot explain or predict the direction they take: the particular variant pattern that develops is a random ‘leap’.

In the case of internalisation, the redirection is prompted or induced by a dramatic shift in the social ecology: the conquest by the tribe of ‘masters’ who set up the first state society. This is a traumatic, violent event that severely blocks the
slaves’ ‘instinct for freedom’ (GM2.17). And this traumatic blockage is not a one-off event, but sustained and continuing: ‘the oldest “state” thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine, and went on working until this raw material of people and semi-animals was at last not only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed’ (ibid). In this passage Nietzsche once again highlights the creative, ‘form-shaping’ work of the masters who have actively restructured human drives through their work of ‘an instinctive creation and imposition of forms’ (ibid). And yet, it is questionable how much the masters are really in control of this form-changing process. Certainly their actions lead to dramatic redirection and transformation of the slaves' drives. But the noble powers never predicted or desired the particular directions these transformations would take into bad conscience, and eventually ressentiment and the ascetic ideal. These are unexpected, unexpectable, mutative transformations.

Dynamics of reassembly

I have been exploring the blocking and redirection dynamic for two main reasons: because I see it as key to understanding Nietzsche’s thinking in the Genealogy; and because I think it can help us think about social change in our world. It is for this second reason that this dynamic will be at the heart of my analysis in the next two chapters. But now I want to look, if only quite summarily, at how we might move beyond this dynamic to a more general picture of drive evolution.

In the above case of redirection, a drive is blocked and then radically transforms. At the other extreme, there are cases where a drive is activated but not
blocked, and continues in its present form. More generally, we can see these as two instances of a wider phenomenon: we can think that every time a drive is activated, it is re-assembled as an instance or token of the same family or lineage, one that may be more or less similar to previous instances. We can then ask the very general question: what influences whether a drive will be assembled in more or less the same way, or in a new way?\(^8\)

At this level of generality, I will say that a drive is re-assembled by combining elements that go to make-up its overall pattern, and I will think of these elements as *inputs* to its re-production. These ‘inputs’ can have various sources, including: (a) repetitions from previous instances of the drive in which it followed its currently primary patterns; (b) repetitions from other (less frequent) instances of the drive following secondary patterns; (c) inputs transmitted from other drives of the same body; (d) inputs transmitted from drives of other bodies – by mimesis, ‘education’, or other processes; (e) wholly new variations, such as random or induced mutations.

If a drive instance is assembled only from inputs of the first kind, then we have the special case of ‘pure’ transmission without transformation. The more that

\(^8\) Here my account bears some similarities with Dan Sperber’s (1996) theory of the ‘epidemiology of representations’. He writes: ‘Standard epidemiological models picture the transmission of stable diseases or of diseases with limited and foreseeable variations. Cultural representations, on the other hand, tend to be transformed each time they are transmitted. […] an epidemiology of cultural representations is first and foremost a study of their transformations; it considers the reproduction of cultural representations as a limiting case of transformations.’ I am not sure that we need to see either transformation or transmission as foremost. I prefer to say that we may find both transformation and transmission at work in the formation or assembly, and re-assembly, of any drive. Reproduction does happen: there are times where we can say that the same drives are repeated, within and across different bodies, perhaps even over great distances and long stretches of multi-generational history. But there are other cases involving rapid shift. We need to look at the circumstances that make for more stable or variable drive lineages. For example, ordering structures such as scripting, norms, and subjectivation, discussed in Chapter 4, tend to stabilise drives, slowing transformation. On the other hand, for example, increasing the diversity of models and potential inputs in environments may tend to increase change in drives.
inputs of the other kinds go into its re-assembly, the more it is transformed from previous instances. The general question can then be rephrased: under what conditions will a drive pattern pick up new inputs?

The dynamic of blocking and redirection gives one partial answer: here a drive pattern picks up new inputs when its previous primary (activity path) inputs are blocked. Note here how ecological encounters play two major roles. First, ecological relations of blocking (or support) prompt or ‘induce’ transformation: e.g., the more a drive is blocked by encounters in its three ecologies, the more it is pressured to change, made open to new inputs, or induced to mutate. Secondly, the other drives that populate its ecologies, including social ecologies, can then help shape the drive's reassembly by transmitting or supplying new inputs. In the story of conquest in the Genealogy, the masters' intervention clearly plays the first role, but has less to do with the second.

But is blocking the only condition that opens drives to new inputs? For example, in Chapter 3 we looked at the idea, shared by Nietzsche and contemporary developmental psychologists, that young children are particularly open to absorbing new mimetic inputs that reshape their drives, or perhaps develop entirely new drives. As children grow up their drive patterns appear to become more fixed, less open to transformation: that is, they are more likely to be repeatedly re-assembled in the same ways. But adult bodies are not entirely closed to mimesis: the research on ‘chameleon effects’ and ‘priming’ I discussed in Chapter 3 recalls Nietzsche's remarks on the ‘contagious’ nature of the inclinations and aversions of others (HH371).

Here is just one very broad suggestion: in general, drives may be more
open to transformation the more the ecologies they inhabit – material, psychic, and social – are transforming. Shifting ecologies are likely to provoke drive shifts in a number of ways, for example: drives simply encounter more possible influences and variations; they may encounter new or unfamiliar situations in which existing patterns effectively become blocked; but also, they may have new positive encounters that open new paths, new ways for drives to enact their valuing dispositions. As they develop, children are exposed to constantly changing and unfamiliar environments, including new social situations, and respond both by absorbing patterns from others and by transforming and inventing new variations of their own. Adults may become largely sheltered from further development if their worlds become fixed and regularised, and do not expose them to new challenges and possibilities.

I will end this section with two last points, both of which are really just suggestions for further exploration. The first exploration would remain very much in sight of Nietzsche's thinking, whereas the second would mean embarking beyond. First, we need to remember here that the ‘ecologies’ within which drives evolve are not only external material and social worlds, but also the psychic ecologies of a human being's own body. Ecological ordering to restrict transformation can occur at all three levels: material landscapes are tamed, depopulated and regularised; social worlds are regulated with laws, norms, and conventions; and individual psychic worlds are stabilised with norms and self-identities. But disruptions and disorderings, which may provoke and feed transformations of drives, can also occur in all three ecologies. Here is another important Nietzschean evolutionary dynamic, which has a strong beginning in
human all too human but continues to be developed through his work: the free spirit is an individual body, a more or less isolated psychic micro-ecology that is replete with diversity, ‘internal’ variation and so transformation, in spite of and against the regularising forces of conformist social ecologies that surround it. The free spirit, if it manages to survive (perhaps by becoming the ‘esprit fort’ of HH230), is a site of the creation of new values and drive patterns. The question is how and when these ‘inventions’ can also spread into wider social ecologies.

The second thought is that while Nietzsche explores the transformative power of blocks, limitations, antagonisms and other negative encounters, he thinks much less about the creativity of positive encounters: alliances, affinities, collaborations, etc. This may be an aspect of his recurrently antagonistic (or at least agonistic) view of the world as will to power, and where will to power is largely understood as a will to domination – a view that he states with increasing militancy in his later writing: for example ‘life operates essentially, that is in its basic functions, through injury, assault, exploitation, destruction, and simply cannot be thought of at all without this character’ (GM2:11). Here I will do no more than raise a question: can we develop the tools of Nietzsche's psychophysiology and genealogy whilst moving away from this focus on domination and exploitation, and so open up ways of seeing other forms of “positive” transformation?

To investigate this question properly would require a study of Nietzsche's theory of will to power and its relation to the psycho-physiological and genealogical ideas I have explored in the last 5 chapters. I have no space to do this here. John Richardson (1996) explores will to power in detail, in relation to a view of drives that is in many respects similar to mine. My own ideas on this point are also not far from those of Mark Warren (1988), who argues (his Chapter 7) that Nietzsche, particularly but not only when he turns to explicitly ‘political’ topics, introduces a number of ‘uncritical assumptions’ relating to hierarchy and domination that are not supported by the main substance of his thinking of will to power.
6.3. English genealogy part 3: spreading innovations

To help make the ideas of this chapter a bit more concrete, I will turn one last time to the critique of English genealogy. At the end of the last chapter I examined the idea, running from Hume through Darwin to contemporary forms of evolutionary liberalism, that fixed values of “human nature” guide the evolution of norms and institutions of private property and the state. Now I want to examine another related idea: that the evolution of these norms and institutions means the adoption of innovations.

In Hume’s story the property convention is a human invention, but one that is so ‘simple and obvious …’ (T493) that all social groups will invariably hit on it. Contemporary cultural evolution theories are less sanguine on this point: first some individual or group needs to come up with an innovation; then it needs to be spread through contingent interactions, typically involving imitation. Still, in the evolutionary game theory models of writers like Axelrod and Skyrms, welfare-improving innovations will tend to spread so long as these encounters take place under the right conditions.\textsuperscript{10} This idea is embedded in the ‘imitate the successful’ principle I discussed in the last chapter.

Think of an encounter like this: an individual observes other members of a social group following a new practice, e.g., a new property convention; she evaluates this new practice as beneficial; and so she starts to follow it herself. There are a number of requirements for this story to work, including: (a) the

\textsuperscript{10} There are still barriers to transmission of innovations that include: (a) barriers to encounters due to the physical or social-network geography; and (b) strategic barriers – e.g., a cooperative strategy may not in improve welfare unless or until enough actors adopt it.

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adopter needs to observe the practice – that is, a physical encounter of the right kind must take place; (b) and also, particularly if we think of complex linguistic or symbolic practices, she needs to recognise, understand, interpret what is going on; (c) she needs to positively value it, from the perspective of an evaluative stance active in her body of drives; (d) in particular, if the new practice ‘clashes’ with an existing activity path, then she must value it over this alternative; and (e) she must be able to follow it, i.e., it is not blocked by other drives or forces in her ecologies.

Many of these requirements become unproblematic if we assume that human individuals are all alike. If the inventor of the practice recognises its meaning, then so will later adopters – assuming all share the same cognitive and interpretive faculties. If one group member values it more than a previous practice, then so will the others – assuming all share the same mode of valuation. If some group members are able to follow the practice, then the others will be too – assuming all share the same basic capacities for action.

It is these ‘democratic’ assumptions of human likeness that Nietzsche fundamentally rejects. We can see situations in Nietzsche's genealogies where they hold – but locally, not generally. An important example, I think, is the ‘dark workshop’ of the slave revolt in GM1:14. This is where ‘ideals are made on earth’: a new set of values is created and spread. The slaves adopt the new values en masse because they do indeed act as effective innovations to improve their common well-being – or, at least, they help them believe and feel that they are ‘better off’. The slaves face the same common problem: the conquest and imposition of state society which has destroyed their freedom, blocked their
opportunities to express their ‘aggressive instincts’. It is because of this shared historical trauma that they are all consumed by the same powerful drive – not economic avidity, but ressentiment. It is because of this shared evaluative stance that they embrace the same “innovation” – the beginnings of the new Christian moral conception. This particular innovation spreads as it does in a dense and closed social ecology in which ‘all these mutterers and counterfeiters … crouch warmly together’ (ibid). So, contingent historical events, summed up in the image of the conquest, have created a specific context in which an innovation can spread effectively amongst ‘equals’.

But the innovation does not – at least, not yet – spread to the other social group in Nietzsche’s story, the minority of ‘masters’. The encounters or channels for transmission simply do not exist: the slave workshop is a segregated, closed social ecology that masters at most ‘eavesdrop on’, but do not participate in. And even where they do come into contact with slave values, the masters, with their very different mode of valuation, find nothing to attract them, and are instead uncomprehending or disgusted. As Nietzsche writes in the concluding note at the end of Essay 1, ‘the well-being of the majority and the well-being of the few are opposite viewpoints of value’.

Some general thoughts on spreading values

The point is that the “spreading innovations” model of cultural evolution has a more limited range of application than ‘English genealogists’ assume. Just how limited, or how widespread, is not a question for armchair philosophising. As well
as this model, we can also think about a more general idea that may apply more widely. That is: drive elements (e.g., practices, but also values, desires, etc.) are more likely to be transmitted the more they are positively valued, from the evaluative stances of drives active in the bodies of potential adopters, even if these evaluative stances are not universal or fixed. Yet this is still not the whole story: there are many other factors effecting transmission through bodies and ecologies. I don't claim to offer any general theory of drive evolution in this thesis. Here I will just highlight a few points, some of which will prove important in the next two chapters:

(i) Being positively valued by active drives is only one factor that may increase ‘openness’ to an input. For example, to think again of childhood mimesis, as suggested in Chapter 3, small children do not copy and incorporate patterns because they judge them to be successful – copying and incorporating is just what small children do. It is also still what adults often do unconsciously in, e.g., ‘priming’ phenomena. Conscious or unconscious ‘inclinations and aversions’ to inputs may play a role in blocking or encouraging mimetic and other transmission routes, alongside other kinds of filters (for example, ‘herd instinct’ evaluations of others’ ‘status’ as models). But these are only some of the factors involved. We should not assume that (adult) human bodies will adopt new inputs just because these further what we (or they) consider their ‘well-being’.

(ii) If an input is positively evaluated by different bodies, this does not necessarily mean that they share a common evaluative stance: the element may be valued or disvalued in different ways, by different drives in different bodies. E.g., you might adopt a new property convention because it furthers your avidity,
whereas I use it to further my drive to refined cruelty against the property-less. And of course, as Nietzsche tells us (GM2:12), common valuations and ‘meanings’ of a practice may be continually transformed and re-interpreted over its history.

(iii) Transmission can only occur if social and material ecologies afford the necessary encounters between bodies. For example, I cannot mimetically transmit a gesture to you unless you can see me (maybe via a webcam), touch me, etc. I can't transmit the meaning or beauty of a poem to you unless we share a language and more. I can't transmit a new property rule unless we share some underlying normative form of life to start with. Here again we need to recall that an ecology is not just a shared ‘external environment’. For example, slaves and masters, or ‘free spirits’ and members of the herd, may share the same physical space, and perhaps even speak the same language, yet inhabit quite different ecologies.

(iv) Processes and technologies for ordering bodies of drives, such as the norms and subjectivities looked at in Chapter 4, can be important in opening and closing bodies. In *Dawn* Nietzsche claims that, in the past, innovations faced strong barriers because of the normative power of traditional morality of custom (D14). Perhaps in a less ‘moral’ age (D9) we have become more ‘accustomed’ to novelties – of certain kinds, at least. Also, the basic processes that drive transmission and transformation – for example, mimesis and ‘herd instinct’ – are themselves evolutionary productions, and transforming.

(v) Finally, all of the above factors provide openings for *interventions*, however deliberate or unintended. There are ways to influence the openness of one's own or other bodies. There are ways to reshape the ecologies our bodies
inhabit. There are ways to shore up or shift norms and subjectivities. As in Lewontin's discussion of *niche construction* in biology, the conditions of transmission of values, desires, practices are not just given to but also made by bodies.

**Manufacturing success**

Following up that last point, I want to conclude with this observation: it is possible to construct niches in which ‘imitate the successful’ models apply. In fact, I think this is an important theme in the history of capitalism. ‘English genealogists’ retroject ideas about common human values into a conception of human nature. But others have worked to actively manufacture just such a nature. Here I will just note a couple of examples from the recent history of the United States.

In Hume's story, as discussed in Chapter 1, private property improves the well-being of all because it solves a problem of social order caused by the undirected passion of avidity. But if we look at the history of colonisation and capitalism in the modern era, we see that the ‘social problem’ has often been quite the opposite: not too much avidity, but too little. One example is the story of the doomed reformer Nathan Meeker, Indian agent to the southern Ute tribe, who set out to introduce his subjects to welfare-improving innovations such as intensive agriculture. The Utes did not share Meeker's mode of valuation. The agent wrote to his superiors in the US government in 1879: ‘Their needs are so few that they do not wish to adopt civilised habits. What we call conveniences and comforts are
not sufficiently valued by them to cause them to undertake to obtain them by their own efforts […] the great majority look upon the white man's ways with indifference and contempt.’ (Quoted in Brown 1970:298-9). Meeker saw that the solution was to block the Utes' previous form of life – indeed, as in Nietzsche's story of conquest, to utterly and traumatically destroy their existing material and social ecologies. He proposed to begin by shooting the tribes' ponies, so reducing them to a subsistence level from which they would appreciate the welfare benefits of agriculture. Meeker himself was shot in the process, leaving his successors to carry on the job.12

Similar refrains appear, with less immediate brutality, in the development of the US advertising industry in the twentieth century. Stuart Ewen (1976) documents in detail the development of a new industry and new techniques aimed at creating ‘real or fancied need’ for the goods rolling off the production lines pioneered by Henry Ford. Stimulating the desire for consumer goods was seen by many politicians as well as businessmen not just as profitable but as essential to maintaining social order by keeping workers busy, integrating immigrant communities into the ‘American lifestyle’, involving women in new consumer markets, and undermining seditious anti-capitalist movements. Again: where sufficient avidity for ‘real goods’ did not exist already, it could be created, which meant intervening to transform the ecologies in which individuals value, desire

11 As Dee Brown puts it: ‘In his humourless and overbearing way, Meeker set out systematically to destroy everything the Utes cherished, to make them over into his own image, as he believed he had been made in God's image’. (1970:297).
12 To tie Meeker's view to the mainstream of philosophical thought, compare his comments on the Utes' form of life to those of one of the founding fathers of ‘English Genealogy’, John Locke on the ‘needy and wretched’ Indians in the Second Treatise on Government (Chapter 5) some two centuries earlier. On the historical relationship of liberal political philosophy to colonialism, slavery, and other oppressions, from Locke to the 20th century, see Losurdo (2011).
and act. By contagion or by force, as necessary.

In Chapter 1 of this thesis I began by identifying two views of history and social change, which I associated with the names Nietzsche and Hume. Put very crudely, Nietzsche sees history as made up of contingent transformative encounters which are very largely relations of conflict and domination. Hume views the history of social institutions largely in terms of consensus and improvement, in which humans adopt welfare-improving innovations. But in practice these dynamics are not so easily separated. Clashes may require alliances and agreements, perhaps shared warlike forms of life. Consensus may be induced, shaped and conditioned by domination.
Chapter 7. Power I: Domination

In the next two chapters I will apply the Nietzschean ideas developed so far in this thesis to look at how individuals and groups shape and are shaped by their worlds as they interact in relations of domination and resistance. In this chapter I focus on moves and technologies of domination; in the next I turn to projects of resistance. I continue to look at key patterns from Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals*, using these as philosophical tools to help think about today's struggles.

First of all, in Section 1, I reframe the last chapter's account of drive evolution in terms of the *power* of bodies to intervene and (re-)shape their worlds, using ideas from Michel Foucault. Section 2 looks at practices or technologies of domination in Nietzsche's *Genealogy*. These include not only the violent *conquest* of the masters, but also the perhaps more subtle technologies of *control* and *contagion* to be found in the tactics of the slave revolt and of the priests. In the last part of this section I also draw on feminist psychiatrist Judith Herman's research on psychological trauma to deepen a Nietzschean understanding of the psycho-politics of domination. Section 3 looks at practices of identification through which dominant and resisting groups define themselves and others. Section 4 then sees contemporary capitalism as an invasive cultural assemblage that brings together masterly, priestly, and slavish forms of domination.
7.1. Power as shifting the world

Thinking about social change in terms of psycho-physiology and evolution does not stop us from thinking about agency: about how we can imagine, transform, destroy or create values, institutions, forms of life. In Chapter 4 I looked at self-ordering and self-transformation: bodies of drives can become subjects, who can consciously act to re-shape the make-up of their own drives. At the end of the last chapter, I started to look at the dynamic effects on people's values and desires of the political actions of the powerful, from violent invasions to contagious advertising. From one perspective, we can think of both individual “therapy” or “care of the self” on the one hand, and macro-political projects on the other, in the same terms: both involve interventions in the ecologies – psychic, material, and/or social – in which drive patterns develop. They shift our values, desires and practices by shifting the worlds in which they evolve. We can then ask: what powers do particular individuals, groups, or other assemblages or forces have to intervene and shape futures?

I will define power, in the most general sense, as the ability of any assemblage, force or entity to cause – or, conversely, to resist or block – changes in the world.¹ Borrowing from Spinoza, I will call this general kind of power by the Latin name potentia.² I will talk about an exercise of power (potentia) as an

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¹ It is certainly not only human or other bodies of drives that can be powerful. For example, we can talk about the power of waves or tornadoes, of weapons or tools or remedies, dreams or ideas or emotions, values or desires or practices – or of drive patterns, institutions or groups, cultures, forms of life, etc.

² In this use of Spinoza's terminology I follow Steven Lukes (2005:73-4). Lukes also makes use of Spinoza's term potestas, which he reads as 'power over'. Neither of the two other power terms I define below correspond exactly to potestas as I understand it: 'social power' is rather broader, and 'domination' rather narrower.
event where *potentia* is actualised, i.e., an entity moves or acts in a way that produces or impedes changes. Although I will generally write power or *potentia* in the singular, more generally entities may be powerful in many different ways, able to effect many different kinds of changes: that is, in talking about the “power” of an assemblage we abstract from its many “powers” (*potentiae*).³

My main focus is more narrowly on a particular kind of *potentia*, which I will call *social power* – or just “power”, for short. This is the power to intervene in social ecologies, and to understand it I turn to Foucault. In his essay ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault defines an ‘exercise of power’ – in my terms, of social power – as ‘a way of acting upon one or more acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions’ (EW3:341).⁴ He also writes: ‘a way in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions’ (ibid:343).⁵ The first of these definitions is a bit too

³ For example, a chainsaw is a powerful tool for cutting down trees, but not for hammering nails. When does it make sense to ask: which is the more powerful tool, a chainsaw or a hammer? We can only meaningfully talk about power *tout court* if we can assume a context in which we are interested in particular kinds of changes and relationships.

⁴ This 1984 essay is one of two key texts in which Foucault sets out his thinking on power at different points in its development, the other being the list of propositions on power in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality*, published in 1976 – anticipated and with some further interesting formulations in the 1975-6 lecture course *Society Must Be Defended*. Very roughly, in the earlier work Foucault presents a picture of the formation of macro-level structures of power and domination, arguing that we have to see ‘major dominations’ such as class or gender as emerging from particular and contingent local interactions. It is an account, we might say, of the dynamics of ‘Power’ with a capital P, but says less about just what power relations (small p) involve at the micro-level of interactions between (and within) individuals. This is the question on which Foucault refocuses in the late essay, and also in a number of interviews of the 1980s. In this reading of Foucault I agree with Mark Kelly (2009), who argues – against some other commentators – that we should see these two moments in Foucault's thinking as complimentary not contradictory.

⁵ I am not going to investigate here whether Foucault provides a precise or comprehensive definition of social power. For an alternative, compare Weber’s classic formulation: ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance.’ (1978:53). This definition adds a number of elements. On a Weberian view, an exercise of power doesn’t just effect the other’s ‘possibilities for action’, it (at least probabilistically) effects their action itself. And, still more precisely, it does so in a way that furthers the ‘will’ of the powerful; and despite their ‘resistance’ – against their own ‘will’. All of these elements bring up further questions, the subject of lengthy debates in the literature on power. See Lukes (2005:76) for a discussion of these points.
narrow for my purposes, because it focuses on relations between subjects. My suggestion, rather, is that we think of social power primarily in terms of relations between bodies of drives. Some of these bodies may be ordered as subjects, but all the main points could also apply to interactions of bodies that are not.

To be more precise, if a bit unwieldy: an exercise of (social) power is an action in which bodies (of drives) shape the possibilities of action of other bodies, or of themselves. And, to be clear, although I will be focusing on interactions between human bodies, the bodies in question do not necessarily have to be human or individual: e.g., they might be non-human (e.g., other animals, artificial intelligences, etc.), or sub-individual assemblages of drives, etc.\(^6\)

To see what is specific to social power, we can contrast it to another form of power that impacts on social ecologies, which Foucault sometimes calls force.\(^7\)

For example, imagine that someone imprisons or injures you. We can see this action in terms of three kinds of power. First, most generally, it is an exercise of potentia: the world has changed. Secondly, it is an application of force: that is, the action makes a direct, noticeable physical change in your body, or in the immediate material environment of your body. Thirdly, in doing so, the action

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\(^6\) One of Foucault’s clearest statement of a Nietzschean view in which power relations may involve sub-individual entities comes in a discussion translated as ‘The Confession of the Flesh’. ‘FOUCAULT: ‘This is just a hypothesis, but I would say it’s all against all. There aren’t immediately given subjects of the struggle, one the proletariat, the other the bourgeoisie. Who fights against whom? We all fight each other. And there is always within each of us something that fights something else. J-A MILLER: Which would mean that there are only ever transitory coalitions, some of which immediately break up, but others of which persist, but that strictly speaking individuals would be the first and last components. FOUCAULT: Yes, individuals, or even sub-individuals. J-A MILLER: Sub-individuals? FOUCAULT: Why not?’ (PK:208).

\(^7\) In ‘The Subject and Power’ Foucault uses the term ‘violence’ for what I am here calling force. It is also worth quoting the following from a 1980 interview (PMV): ‘What does it mean to exercise power? It does not mean picking up this tape recorder and throwing it on the ground. I have the capacity to do so—materially, physically, sportively. But I would not be exercising power if I did that. However, if I take this tape recorder and throw it on the ground in order to make you mad, or so that you can’t repeat what I’ve said, or to put pressure on you so that you’ll behave in such and such a way, or to intimidate you—well, what I’ve done, by shaping your behaviour through certain means, that is power.’
changes your possibilities for action: now that you are locked up, or no longer have the use of your legs, you can no longer act in the same ways. It is in this last sense that the action is an exercise of social power.

So, an exercise of force changes a material ecology. An exercise of social power changes a social ecology, that is, in a world made up of bodies of drives that value, desire, and act. Of course, the same action may do both. As I discussed in the last chapter, an encounter of bodies of drives in a social ecology also (a) always involves an encounter in material ecologies, and (b) sometimes involves noticeable changes in psychic ecologies too. Although social encounters necessarily have a material dimension, it will often make sense to think of their power more in terms of how they change psychic ecologies. For example, if I whisper a powerful secret in your ear, this involves a physical interaction of vocal chords, sound waves and ear drums, etc. – but these direct physical effects of the whisper are unlikely to be our focus. Revealing the secret barely alters the physical make-up of your world, but may substantially affect your values, desires, beliefs, interpretations, etc. And so social power can involve not only acts of force but, e.g., making threats or offers, making available or concealing information, or inciting or inducing or seducing (paraphrasing Foucault (ibid:341)) the activation of your desires in various ways.

Foucault draws out one key element in the distinction between force and (social) power, perhaps somewhat extravagantly, by saying that power always ‘includes an important element: freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are “free”’ (ibid:342). If you are strong enough, you can use force to move or break my body, and there is nothing I can do to stop
this. But force alone cannot determine my action: even in the most extreme cases of injury or imprisonment, I am left with at least some limited range of alternatives, however desperate. The sense of ‘freedom’ invoked here may often be rather weak: although you cannot fully determine my action, restrict it to just one possible path, you can severely restrict my possibilities, leaving me only an ‘extremely limited margin of freedom’ (EW1:292). But it highlights an important point: even the strongest bodies are not able to fully control the consequences of their actions upon others, as there are always options open to weak bodies. Furthermore, at least very often, some of these options may lead to outcomes that are unexpected, and/or that in same way undermine the power of the powerful. We can tie this point to Foucault’s famous claim that ‘where there is power there is resistance’ (HS1:96).

Why or how does a body have the powers and abilities it has? One possible way to look at power relations is in terms of the control of resources. For example, I need certain resources – bodily strength, or weapons, or alliances with others – in order to use force, and so to make credible threats. Or I might use resources such as money, gifts, favours, influence, to make offers and persuade. We can think of knowledge and know-how as resources – skills, techniques, technologies, including ‘governmental’ arts and technologies of how to exercise and develop power. We could also look at social properties such as attributions of rights and privileges, or of status, attractiveness, respect, etc. where these may involve others’ views of me and my roles in social scripts.

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8 Foucault’s example is: ‘the other still has the option of killing himself, of leaping out of the window or of killing the other person’ (EW1:292).
9 Keith Dowding’s (1996) rational choice account of power notably develops this approach.
10 See, e.g., Peggy McIntosh’s (1988) discussion of ‘white skin privilege’ as ‘like an invisible knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear and blank checks’. And also McIntosh’s problematisation in this
kinds of approaches developed in economists' and sociologists' theories of human, social, or cultural capital.¹¹ Note that many power resources involve reinforcing and cumulative structures: e.g., occupying a social status position gives me power to threaten, offer, persuade, or simply be accorded certain forms of treatment as an unquestioned ‘right’, etc.; I can use these powers to maintain, and perhaps further develop, my status – thus indeed deploying my ‘capital’ to accumulate further power.

While it may in many contexts be handy to think of power in this way, Foucault insistently reminds us of its limitations. Foucault’s first thesis on power in The History of Sexuality is that ‘power is not something that is acquired, seized or shared, something that one holds onto or allows to slip away’ (HS1:94). Against this he emphasises the ‘strictly relational character of power relationships’ (ibid:95). For example, money only gives me power within a complex context involving property norms, a functioning money system, and people who desire or need to trade for goods, etc. We can lose sight of this if we see power itself, or resources that “bring” power, as stable possessions that actors enjoy across various relations. In fact, it may be well to note that the relationality of power extends not us to social power but to potentiæ of all kinds.¹² To talk about power is to talk, from a particular perspective, about the relationships that a body or other assemblage enjoys, about how it is blocked or supported in different ways.

¹¹ ‘Human Capital’ theory was pioneered by the Chicago School economists Gary S. Becker (1964) and Theodore Schultz (1971): very roughly, the basic idea is that education is investment in one’s future earning power. See Foucault’s (BP) for an important discussion of human capital theory and its role in developing a new stage of the conception of humans as ‘subjects of interest’, in which now the pursuit of ‘interest’ is understood specifically on the model of rational investment in future (self-)production. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu was largely responsible for introducing ideas of social, cultural and symbolic capital, as summarised in his (1986).

¹² For example, a sledgehammer is a powerful tool only when assembled with a body that can wield it, and with a house to be demolished, etc.
by other entities and forces, about its positioning in its ecologies.

**Domination**

Another key Foucauldian point is that *all* social relations are, seen from one perspective, power relations. Wherever two bodies interact, their actions have effects, however great or small, on each other's possibilities for action, and so 'in human relations whether they involve verbal communications …, or amorous, or institutional, or economic relations, power is always present' (EW1:290-1).

Unless we withdraw from social life altogether, there is then no ‘escape’ from (social) power: ‘power is co-extensive with the social body’ (PK:142). One immediate practical corollary is that it would be pointless (for anyone except a hermit) to ethically or politically oppose themselves to power *per se*: thus Foucault's declaration, *contra* Sartre, that ‘power is not evil’ (EW1:298).

However, we can distinguish different kinds of power relations. One important kind involves what Foucault calls ‘situations or states of domination’ (EW1:283). These are relationships that are ‘fixed in such a way that they are perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom’ (EW1:292). In fact, Foucault maintains, all power relations contain asymmetries. For example, in close relationships between lovers, friends and comrades we have great power to shape each other's possibilities, and this power is unlikely to be entirely balanced at any moment: at any moment, for example, some partners may

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13 The citation continues: ‘I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try and dissolve them in the utopia of completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management techniques, and also the morality, the *ethos*, the practice of the self, that will allow us to play these games of power with as little domination as possible.’ (EW1:298)
need or desire others more. But relations may be balanced over time if asymmetries are ‘mobile, reversible, and unstable’ (EW1:292). Foucault writes: ‘to wield power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be reversed is not evil; it’s a part of love, passion, and sexual pleasure’ (EW1:298). It is this mobility and reversibility that is lacking in relations of domination. Here:

power relations, instead of being mobile, allowing the various participants to adopt strategies modifying them, remain blocked, frozen. When an individual or social group succeeds in blocking a field of power relations, immobilizing them and preventing any reversibility of movement by economic, political or military means, one is faced with what may be called a state of domination (EW1:283)

To sum up, then, a relation (or state) of domination is a (relatively) fixed asymmetrical power relationship. We might also say, a hierarchy, which I will understand as a social script (see Chapter 3) with distinct roles that are: (a) relatively fixed – individuals are repeatedly assigned to the same roles; and (b) where these roles imply asymmetric social power. In the passage quoted above, we see Foucault's interest in how power relations become states of domination. I will use the term technologies of domination to refer to practices, techniques, moves, strategies and tactics, etc., of powerful bodies that work to turn mobile power relations into states of domination.¹⁴

¹⁴ I am leaving aside here a further dimension of Foucault's philosophy of power, his conception of ‘government’ or ‘governmentality’. In the same interview Foucault says: ‘There are three levels to my analysis of power; strategic relations, techniques of government, and states of domination’ (EW1:299). Some commentators, including Mark Kelly, trace Foucault ‘mov[ing] from a model of domination to one of government’ (Kelly 2009:77) at the end of the 1970s. Roughly, Foucault develops the idea of domination in HS1 and SD, at which point he theorises power in terms of war and relations of conflict; then in the lecture courses STP (1977-8) and BP (1978-9) he shifts to accounts of governmentality and biopower, in which power relations are seen in terms of ‘pastoral’ management rather than of conflict (On Foucault's move away from the image of ‘war’ see also John Protevi (2009b)); and finally, in his late interviews,
Dominating practices can take many forms. They may be ‘economic, political or military’ but also micro-political, domestic, inter-personal – or indeed intra-personal. They may be deliberate strategies that powerful individuals and elite groups study and consciously apply, but they can also be habitual and unconscious practices. They may be employed by very different individuals and groups in different contexts: by military commanders, bosses, parents, members of racial elites, men, siblings, prison guards, manipulative friends, teachers, revolutionaries, etc. Some dominating techniques may apply to quite specific domains – e.g., military tactics, lessons for princes or politicians, practices of animal husbandry; others may be spread and adapted across wide ranges of social life.

I will just flag up a couple of more critical points about Foucault's idea of domination. First, Foucault typically ties together hierarchy and immobility. But, as we will see in the next section, some key weapons of domination are precisely moves of destabilisation, for example tactics to divide, terrorise and traumatise. Conversely, not all stabilising practices work in the interest of hierarchies: for example, anthropologists since Pierre Clastres (1990) have noted the prevalence of egalitarian, anti-hierarchical, norms of redistribution found in many non-state societies, and have argued that these traditional practices work precisely to

15 Nietzsche clearly thinks of relations of domination at work within individual bodies, e.g., in his discussions of how drives ‘tyrannise’ each other, or of how we can learn to ‘master’ and reshape our drives.
undermine or ward off states of domination.

Second, the Foucauldian conception of domination – which I follow – is at odds with other, perhaps more mainstream, understandings. I am not going to mount a full defence of Foucault’s position here, but just note the main outlines with respect to one of Foucault’s most cogent opponents on this point, Steven Lukes (2005). Very summarily, Lukes sees himself as upholding a ‘radical view’ of power and domination, connected to a Marxist humanism, against both a ‘liberal view’ on the one hand, and Foucault’s ‘ultra-radical’ view on the other. We can characterise these positions in terms of competing definitions of domination:16

(Liberal) domination: A exercises power over B in a way that conflicts with B’s ‘subjective interests’.

(Radical) domination: A exercises power over B in a way that conflicts with B’s ‘real interests’.

(Foucauldian) domination: A exercises power over B in a way that establishes or reproduces a stable hierarchical relationship between them.

It should be clear from this that the liberal and radical definitions share a common form: both effectively understand domination in terms of *coercion*. That is, dominating acts are power exercises that go against individuals’ desires, interests, volitions, or values, however conceived. Where the liberal and radical views disagree is on the nature of the valuings that count. On the liberal view, the relevant evaluations are preferences expressed or affirmed, in some way, by a

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16 Lukes himself does not frame the issues in this way as he does not seem to notice, or find relevant, Foucault’s own definition of *domination* (as opposed to power). This, I think, is a source of confusion in his own reading of Foucault. In fact Lukes’ explicit discussion of Foucault in Chapter 2 of the expanded edition of *Power: A Radical View* (2005) does not identify the substantive differences between his position and Foucault’s, and I will not look at that part of Lukes’ work here. The issues become much clearer once we contrast Lukes’ discussion of domination and Foucault’s own thoughts on this subject.
subject; on Lukes’ radical view, they are values associated with some objective
criterion. As Lukes writes, the liberal definition is associated with the
‘Benthamite view that everyone is the best judge of his or her own interests’
(2005:81). Lukes rejects this view in order to account for how subjective
preferences can themselves be shaped by interventions of the powerful, so that the
dominated can come to voluntarily affirm their own subordination. Domination
cannot then be identified as an infringement of subjective valuing; instead, we
need to see it as an infringement of ‘real interests’ that the dominated may or may
not be aware of.

For this definition to be workable, there must be such things as ‘real
interests’ – or as Lukes also puts it, borrowing a phrase from Spinoza, as an
individual's ‘own nature or judgement’ (ibid:73) – that are (a) not themselves
shaped by domination and (b) can in principle be identified by somebody, if only a
third party. This idea is highly problematic from the Nietzschean perspective of
this thesis, in which in so far as any being has a ‘nature’ this is (a) a moving
assemblage shaped by power relations and (b) will be differently identified from
different perspectives both within and without the body.

But the main point I want to note is that the Foucauldian sense of
domination takes a quite different form from both ‘liberal’ and ‘radical’
definitions, and is conceptually distinct from coercion. There may be entirely non-
coercive dominating practices – e.g., slaves may indeed desire and value their own

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17 It is also notable here that Lukes defines both positions in terms of ‘interests’. Interests, even
subjective ones, are values and desires of a subject that are particularly stable, long standing,
and ordered or consistent in some sense; as Lukes puts it, subjective interests qua preferences
are ‘structured, standing, rankable dispositions’ (2005:157). It could be argued that defining
domination in terms of interests already introduces norms of rationality, or at least some
criteria (in terms of ordering, consistency) that are open to external or objective assessment.
See also the discussion of Hume and Hirschman on interest in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
18 I will return to issues of ‘voluntary servitude’ in the next chapter.
submission. And there may be non-dominating acts of coercion – e.g., violent revolts. The question of domination is not, on this view, about the coerciveness of individual actions, but about how these actions contribute to shaping ongoing relations between rulers and ruled. This doesn't rule out also looking at whether actions are coercive, infringe values and desires of various kinds; but this is separate from the question of domination.

Finally, it needs to be recognised that discussions about power, coercion and domination are tied tight to evaluative – political and ethical – stances. And yet none of the three definitions of domination above necessarily imply any evaluative stance. Nietzsche is a clear example of a philosopher who affirms domination, perhaps under all three of the above definitions. He is far from alone: most political thinkers, whether or not they use these terms, have judged various forms of domination (and coercion) to be legitimate. Lukes sets himself against domination under his definition; Foucault does the same with respect to domination in his sense. But these commitments do not immediately follow from upholding any of the definitions.

The productivity of power

Another of Foucault's often quoted, and often misunderstood, theses is that power is productive. In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault writes that power relations do not have ‘merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly

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19 This view can claim some etymological grounding: in its Roman roots, *dominus* was originally the title of a master of slaves, later taken up as an imperial title and formalised under the *dominate* of Diocletian, and domination thus suggests an established, continuing – and potentially contested – relationship of mastery or sovereignty. Dominating actions are then, I suggest, actions that create and reproduce such relationships between rulers and ruled.
productive role, wherever they come into play’ (HS1:94). In an interview a year later he adds: ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production’ (PK:194). In the earlier *Discipline and Punishment*, Foucault writes that power relations have not only ‘repressive effects’ but also ‘positive effects’ (DP:23). In ‘The Subject and Power’, Foucault relates this point to his new focus on subjectivity: power is productive in that it constitutes subjectivities. More generally, I want to think here of two main ways in which exercises of power are productive: first, they form and transform individual bodies of drives – including ordering them as subjects; second, they form and transform social assemblages.

In the terms I have developed in this thesis, bodies of drives are formed and transformed by encounters in the three ecologies. This includes, then, encounters in the social ecology, which are always relations of social power. Social encounters reshape the possibilities of action of the bodies involved. In doing so, they also have dynamic effects on the evolution of the drives that compose those bodies. In the last chapter I noted two ways in which this happens. First, an encounter between bodies in the social ecology can prompt or induce transformations: for example, by blocking their action paths (‘possibilities for action’), or by opening new paths. There certainly are such things as repressive exercises of power – imprisoning someone, injuring them, terrifying them, threatening them, etc. The point here is that repressive actions are also productive: for example, imprisonment, injury, and other traumas substantially reshape bodies’ drive patterns, even long after the immediate violence and blocking are gone.
Clearly, ‘productivity’ in this sense is not necessarily valued and desired by everyone involved.

Second, social encounters may also shape the re-assembly of drives and bodies by providing “inputs” to their future forms. This point highlights a somewhat different aspect of social power. We might take, for example, Nietzsche's account in *Dawn* of the mimetic ‘adoption’ of values by children (see Chapter 3). Here parents and other respected models – or, e.g., those who influence school curricula or newspapers or advertising – have an important form of social power by providing inputs to the transforming drive patterns of mimetically open minds. This kind of power may not have such sudden impacts, it may not immediately block or open others' possibilities for action; but in the long run it may have just as dramatic effects on others' psychic ecologies, and so on their possibilities for action.

Furthermore, at the same time as forming individual bodies, power relations also form social assemblages. These may be relatively transient encounters, or more stable formations – e.g., long-lasting institutions, fixed identities of race, class, gender, etc. I will come back to this point in Section 3.

### 7.2. Technologies of domination in the *Genealogy*

Now armed with these Foucauldian ideas about power and domination, I turn once more to Nietzsche's *Genealogy*. What I want to focus on now is how the bodies in Nietzsche's story of the state and the slave revolt develop and make use of different kinds of technologies of domination.
**Noble conquest**

The most obvious domination in the *Genealogy* is that practised by masters over their slaves. As I suggested in Chapter 1, to follow the psycho-politics of Nietzsche's *Genealogy* we can start by imagining a limit case of ‘total domination’ in which the state is a social organism characterised by strict hierarchical ‘rank ordering’ (*Rangordnung*). The conquering ‘pack of blond beasts of prey’ (GM2:16) becomes a ruling caste; the vanquished a caste of slaves who are fully *instrumentalised*, mere ‘organs’ with no values or desires other than those received as commands from the masters. However, this ideal state is never achieved; the slaves’ ‘instincts of freedom’ do not disappear, but are redirected inwards to create new valuing stances associated with bad conscience and *ressentiment*. Even when the aristocratic state is at its strongest, slave valuing is only forced underground into ‘inner worlds’ of fantasy (GM2:16), or hidden social spaces such as the ‘dark workshop’ of GM1:14. When the masters' grip weakens these ‘subterranean’ (GM1:8, GM3:14) valuings emerge again into external activity – the ‘slave revolt in morality’. In short, domination is always accompanied by a continuing resistance.

We can understand this point in terms of the dynamic of blockage and redirection analysed in the last chapter. The masters' conquest does not simply eradicate or overwrite the values of subordinates.\(^2^0\) What it does is to (a) substantially block the activity paths of slaves' existing drives; so (b) immediately,

\(^{20}\) *Contra* Hobbes, for whom ‘The common-people's minds … are like clean paper, fit to receive whatsoever by Publique Authority shall be imprinted in them’ (1982:176).
redirect them onto new (internalised) activity paths; and (c) in the longer term, if the blockage is maintained, induce substantial transformations in their overall valuing stances. The masters’ technology of conquest is, in its direct application, entirely negative or repressive.21 That is, the only role of the masters is to block particular activity paths, the slaves' customary practices (such as physical requital), and so “induce” the transformation of their values. But these ‘bulwarks’ created by the state only define certain hard limits, within which the slaves are then left alone to create the actual paths that their transforming drive patterns take. Crucial to this is a point that I will develop in the next chapter: the subordinated are able to hold what we can call free spaces – ‘inner world[s]’ in their psychic ecologies, and hidden and separate ‘dark workshop[s]’ in their social ecologies. The masters are unable, or do not attempt, to infiltrate or influence these spaces and the processes of transformation that play out within them.

This is not accidental. Nietzschean nobles maintain their domination through a ‘constant exercise of obedience and command’ (BGE257) enforced with repressive violence. But they wield mastery only from a distance: ‘looking out and looking down’, ‘holding down and holding at a distance’ (BGE257). The noble ‘separates himself’ from and ‘despises’ lesser natures (BGE260). Nobles disdain to approach the spaces of the slaves, which ‘stink’ (GM1:14). With the ‘innocent conscience of the beast of prey’ (GM1:11) they can attack and punish freely and without remorse; but they have no understanding of or interest in the developing ‘inner worlds’ of their subjects. Nobles and slaves live in largely segregated social ecologies, partitioned off from each other, with only narrow and

21 This does not mean, however, that is not also ‘productive’ in the Foucauldian sense discussed above: i.e., “inducing” transformation,
selective communication routes between their separate zones: masters need just
enough contact with subordinates to transmit orders, inflict punishments, and
receive tributes or taxes. These channels of contact do not allow the transmission
of values (e.g., by mimesis) – in particular, not from below. This aristocratic
‘pathos of distance’ is celebrated by Nietzsche, who sees it as the source of every
‘elevation of the type man’ (BGE257). But it plays a highly ambivalent role when
it comes to maintaining domination.

**Slavish contagion**

Nietzsche asks how it has come about that aristocratic society, and with it the
‘noble’ mode of evaluation, has been largely defeated and given way to a
‘democratic’ age. Nietzsche sees contemporary society as a world turned upside
down in which the majority have not just successfully revolted against the strong
but largely achieved their own new form of ‘tyranny’ (GM3:14), after a ‘fearful
struggle on earth for thousands of years’ (GM1:16). That is, Nietzsche
understands 19th century ‘democratic’ society, as much as ancient slave society, in
terms of a relation of domination: only now, it is an inverted hierarchy in which
the ‘slaves’ dominate the ‘nobles’. The strategies and tactics through which the
former slaves have achieved and maintained this new *status quo* are then also
technologies of domination; however, they are markedly different from the classic
noble technologies. The victory of the slave revolt is achieved not by open
*conquest* but through *contagion*, as the slaves manage to transmit their debilitating
values to the masters and so debase their form of life. The weak have ‘poisoned
the consciences of the fortunate with their own misery, with all misery, so that one
day the fortunate begin to be ashamed of their good fortune’ (GM3:14).²²

Infection is made possible by the breakdown of the ‘pathos of distance’. Although the partition of social ecologies of masters and slaves limits the masters' power over the inner worlds of the slaves, it provides a very important defence against values spreading from below. While there are passages such as BGE261 where Nietzsche frets about inter-caste miscegenation – ‘the mixing of the blood of masters and slaves’ is the cause of the ‘slow rise of the democratic order of things’ – the main danger, as I read the Genealogy, is mimetic transmission. Thus Nietzsche continues to recommend segregation from the ‘madhouses and hospitals of culture’ for his readers:

And therefore let us have good company, our company! Or solitude, if it must be! [...] So that we may, at least for a while yet, guard against the two worst contagions that may be reserved just for us – Against the great nausea at man! Against great pity for man! (GM3:14).²³

It is not entirely clear in the Genealogy just what causes caste segregation to break down. We can perhaps find the explanation in related passages of Beyond Good ²² As so often with Nietzsche’s, however, we can find multiple lines of thought. Here are some further explanations that Nietzsche considers in later unpublished notes: ‘The values of the weak prevail because the strong have taken them over as devices of leadership’ (WP863 [1888]); ‘the sick and weak have more spirit, are more changeable, various, entertaining – more malicious’ (WP864 [1888]) – this point recalling the ‘creativity’ of the weak I discussed in Chapter 6; meanwhile ‘the strong races decimate one another’ (ibid), so leading to a cycle of periods of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ ‘races’. None of these ideas are incompatible with the main point I am pursuing.

²³ See also BGE284: ‘solitude is with us a virtue … it is a sublime urge and inclination for cleanliness which divines that all contact between men and men – “in society” – must inevitably be unclean. All community makes somehow, somewhere, sometime – common.’ In these passages Nietzsche intimately links the caste segregation of nobles with the individual self-segregation of contemporary (aspirant) ‘free spirits’. I will discuss Nietzschean solitude further in Section 3 of the next chapter. Recall also here the idea of mimetic contagion in HH371, which I discussed in Chapter 3: ‘Why are inclination and aversion so contagious, that one can scarcely live in the proximity of a person of strong feelings, without being filled like a barrel with his For and Against’.
and Evil, where Nietzsche develops a theme of the cyclical rise and fall of ‘species’ or ‘types’. In the first stage of this pattern, a noble type is made ‘fixed and hard’ by ‘continual struggle against ever-constant unfavourable conditions’.

But:

In the end, however, there arises one day an easier state of affairs and the tremendous tension relaxes; perhaps there are no longer any enemies among their neighbours, and the means of life, even the enjoyment of life, are there in plenty. With one stroke the bond and constraint of the ancient discipline is broken: it is no longer felt to be a necessity, a condition of existence [...]

(BGE262)

In this picture, decadence is the eventual price of the masters' success, of the abundance supplied by conquest. The ‘ancient discipline’ includes the pathos of distance that had maintained separation from the common herd. The result of relaxation is the sudden explosion of ‘variation, whether as deviation (into the higher, rarer, more refined) or as degeneration or monstrosity’ (ibid) – including, I take it, the absorption of infectious slave values.

The basic psycho-physiological point here is that human bodies of drives are, in general, mimetically (or otherwise) highly open to the transmission of values – unless they have defences in place to resist this openness. Nietzsche writes in BGE268: ‘Tremendous counter-forces have to be called upon to cross this natural, all too natural progressus in simile, the continuing development of mankind into the similar, ordinary, average, herdlike – into the common!’ The key defences involve partitioning social ecologies by creating distances and barriers. These barriers may be geographic or temporal: the less individuals or groups are
physically exposed to each other, the less opportunity for contagion. But they may also be cultural or psychic: it is above all the ‘discipline’ and disdain of the masters, their pathos of distance, that closes their psychic ecologies to slavish inputs.

**Priestly control**

To follow Nietzsche's ‘fearful struggle’ to the end we now need to introduce a third character, the priest, who plays a complex and ambivalent role. On the one hand, priests are nobles, forming an ecclesiastical as opposed to knightly ruling caste (GM1:6); on the other, they ally with the slaves. Their ‘priestly mode of valuation’ is both self-affirmative, and sickly vengeful (GM1:7). Without trying to disentangle all these threads, I will highlight the priest's central role in the third essay of the *Genealogy*. Here we see the priests playing off both sides as they further their own project of domination. Their basic strategy or ‘art’ is distinct from both conquest and contagion, and involves exploiting the weakness of damaged and disordered bodies to acquire ‘dominion over the suffering’ (GM3:15), the ‘concentration and organisation of the sick’ (GM3:16). To do this priests present themselves as ‘physicians’ who offer ‘remedies’ for the suffering of the weak. Priestly domination is consensual: the weak come to them not under coercion but because of the relief they offer from pain that has already been inflicted by the warrior-masters, and spread by slavish contamination. However these remedies, rather than curing or strengthening, are temporary palliatives that only make their patients weaker and more dependent (GM3:17); ‘when he then
stills the pain of the wound, he at the same time infects the wound’ (GM3:15).

At least initially, the priest's function as quack-doctor serves the noble project of maintaining an instrumentalised social organism. Owing to their segregation, the masters are unable to influence the direction of the transformations they induce in the psychic ecologies of the subordinated. The priests, on the other hand, are in direct and continuing contact with the slaves – they are not simply predators, but also ‘shepherds’ of the herd (GM3:15). They can thus do the dirty work of managing the psychic consequences of conquest: in particular, they fight ‘with cunning and severity and in secret against anarchy and ever-threatening disintegration within the herd, in which the most dangerous of explosives, ressentiment, is constantly accumulating’ (ibid). Priestly pseudo-therapy delays the danger of the slave revolt by providing ‘harmless’ activity paths that function

\[ \text{to render the sick to a certain degree harmless, to work the self-destruction of the incurable, to redirect the ressentiment of the less severely afflicted sternly back upon themselves [...] and in this way to exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-surveillance and self-overcoming} \]

(GM3:16)

But as soon as they get the chance the priests will also turn their art against the masters. As their techniques work by exploiting weakness, they have little opportunity so long as the ruling caste remains strong and joyful. But if, as I suggested above, the masters begin to degenerate as they lose their ‘discipline’, and so become exposed to contagion from the herd, then points of weakness appear which the priests can target and deepen. Nietzsche writes that the priest
‘walks among the other beasts of prey […] determined to sow this soil with misery, discord, and self-contradiction where he can’ (ibid); in his presence ‘everything healthy necessarily grows sick’ (ibid). In particular, the priests sink their teeth into the nobles once these have become infected by altruistic valuing, so begun to ‘be ashamed of their good fortune’, to ‘doubt their right to happiness’ (GM3:14), and started to feel the need of a meaning for their existence.

To be more precise, the priests’ ‘remedies’ consist in a number of pseudo-therapeutic techniques. The first is a kind of ‘hibernation’, (GM3:17) ‘the hypnotic muting of all sensitivity’ (GM3:18) which works to ‘reduce the feeling of life in general to its lowest point’ (GM3:17) by avoiding and reducing all psycho-physiological stimuli. The second, particularly apt for the ‘lower classes’, is repetitive ‘mechanical activity’ – also known as work (GM3:18). The third involves ‘petty pleasures’, of which Nietzsche’s main example is the pleasure of sociability or ‘mutual helpfulness’ in forming herd associations (ibid). Number four involves temporary cathartic release through ‘orgies of feeling’. All ‘great affects’ can be used in this way, unleashing the ‘whole pack of savage hounds’ of the more passionate drives (GM3:20); but the favourite orgiastic affect, and the one with the most destructive effects, is guilt (GM3:20-22).

There are strong similarities between the priests’ remedies and the techniques of drive therapy that Nietzsche listed in D109 as ‘methods of combating the intensity of a drive’ (see Chapter 2). Most clearly, ‘hibernation’ reprises the sixth method of D109, ‘general debilitation and exhaustion’, which Nietzsche already associated with asceticism.24 Like work, the second method of

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24 This recalls the sixth method of D109: ‘anyone who finds it reasonable and can stand to debilitate and oppress one’s entire physical and spiritual constitution naturally achieves the goal of debilitating a particularly vehement drive as well; as does, for example, the person who, just
D109 involves imposing periodisation or routine on drives. The third method of D109 involves orgiastic ‘wild, uncontrolled gratification of a drive’ – although in this case only ‘in order to become disgusted with it’. Just like the techniques of D109, the priestly methods fundamentally involve developing control over drive patterns by nourishing, starving, or re-directing. But, of course, there are also crucial differences. Priestly therapy is not conducted autonomously, but under watchful guidance. And whereas the aim of Dawn’s techniques is to bring empowering order to the individual body, all the priestly techniques do is temporarily suppress painful affects, and in the long run weaken the body. In sum, the techniques work with the same underlying psycho-physiological drive principles, but have very different outcomes: on the one hand, individual self-mastery; on the other, domination by the pseudo-therapist.

The psycho-physiology of trauma and captivity

I want to conclude this section by connecting the Genealogy with a more recent investigation into the psycho-physiology of domination. In particular, I think that the concept of psychological trauma, and its development in contemporary trauma studies, can enrich Nietzsche's analysis. Here I will focus on the work of feminist psychiatrist Judith Herman (1997). Herman writes:

Trauma is an affliction of the powerless. At the moment of trauma, the victim is rendered helpless by overwhelming forces. When the force is that of nature, we speak of disasters. When the force is that of other human beings, we speak of

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*like the ascetic, starves his sensuality and, in the process, starves and spoils certainly his vigor also and not infrequently his understanding*. 

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Traumatic events are extraordinary, not because they occur rarely, but rather because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life. (1997:33)

The Nietzschean conquest is a traumatic event that is both acute and chronic. As Nietzsche puts it: ‘the change […] was not a gradual or voluntary one and did not represent an organic adaptation to new conditions but a break, a leap, a compulsion, an ineluctable disaster which precluded all struggle’ (GM2:17). The initial moment of conquest then leads to a continuing traumatic captivity in which the human becomes ‘an animal that rubbed itself raw against the bars of its cage’ (GM2:16). This point is important because, as Herman and other contemporary psychologists understand, such extreme assaults on psychic ecologies have particular, significant and lasting psycho-physiological effects. While a body of drives may be able to ‘cope’ with a succession of gradual blockages and transformations, traumatic situations create major and lasting disorder. And the most extreme effects result from prolonged traumatisation, such as states of captivity or enslavement where bodies are held imprisoned and continually threatened with overwhelming violence.

Very summarily, the basic phenomena of psychological trauma occur when bodies are exposed to threats that excite danger responses – arousal of the sympathetic nervous system, creating an adrenalin-fuelled state of alert – which then cannot be ‘discharged’ (as Nietzsche would put it) in action. Herman writes:

Traumatic reactions occur when action is of no avail. When neither resistance nor escape is possible, the human system of self-defence becomes overwhelmed and disorganised. Each component of the ordinary response to danger, having
lost its utility, tends to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long after the
actual danger is over (ibid:34)

Herman identifies three basic kinds of post-traumatic symptoms. In
‘hyperarousal’, alert states are, as it were, left switched on in a ‘chronic arousal of
the automatic nervous system’ (ibid:36). In ‘intrusion’, ‘the traumatic moment
becomes encoded in an abnormal form of memory, which breaks spontaneously
into consciousness’ (ibid:37). As Nietzsche suggests in his remarks on the
‘mnemotechnics’ of ‘blood, torture and sacrifices’ (GM2:3), traumatic events can
create deeply imprinted memories (Herman 1997:39), and memories that
powerfully alter and fix behaviour – including through unwanted ‘compulsive
repetitions’ (ibid:41). The third main symptom complex, ‘constriction’, involves
states of dissociation where traumatised psyches ‘shut down’ or disconnect from
experience and memory (ibid:42-45). Here Herman discusses the numb and
trance-like states often experienced by the traumatised, as well as the blocking or
‘burial’ of memories – and, in extreme chronic cases such as those of survivors of
prolonged child abuse, the development of partitioned multiple personalities.

Much like Nietzsche’s priestly technique of ‘hibernation’, we can think of
traumatic constriction as a therapeutic response to extreme suffering. It may
provide much needed short-term relief, indeed survival, but can have debilitating
long term effects.

Trauma studies has important implications for how we think about forceful
exercises of power. Political theorists at least since Hobbes have often looked at
how acts and threats of force shape the motivations of rational actors. For
example, if someone seriously threatens to kill or harm you unless you comply
with an order, this can shape your possibilities for action by changing the potential costs and benefits of your actions. But an attack or a threat often has other important effects besides this. It can stimulate states of alert, fear, rage, etc., activating new drive patterns altogether, with their own (perhaps ‘irrational’) valuations and motivations. And, in the wrong conditions, these alert states can become traumatic, disrupting bodies in significant and enduring ways.

Furthermore, the traumatic impact of exercises of power is not a mere ‘side-effect’. The induction and manipulation of trauma is itself a widespread technology of domination. Prison guards, torturers, domestic abusers – and many parents, educators, bosses, and others in positions of power – systematically create and use trauma as a technology of domination. Herman writes:

>The methods that enable one human being to enslave another are remarkably consistent. [...] [they] are based upon the systematic, repetitive infliction of psychological trauma. They are the organised techniques of disempowerment and disconnection. (ibid:77)

As a weapon of domination, the main function of trauma is to break or dis-order bodies of drives. In particular, using the terms of Chapter 4, trauma can be used to attack and undo the ordering systems of normativities and subjectivities. This comes across clearly in many of the studies and survivor accounts of captives discussed by Herman. For example, former gulag prisoner Irina Ratushinskaya recalls how: ‘All those norms of human behaviour which are inculcated in one from the cradle are subjected to deliberate and systematic destruction’ (ibid:77). Herman sums up:

>All the psychological structures of the self – the image of the body, the
internalised images of others, and the values and ideals that lend a person a sense of coherence and purpose – have been invaded and systematically broken down (ibid:93)

The traumatised body is then a dis-ordered, fragmented, often in many ways incoherent subject, plagued by invasive memories, night terrors, psychosomatic suffering of all kinds. A first and most obvious way that trauma can serve domination is by weakening bodies, and so their possibilities for resistance. If trauma robs individuals of all will to resist, states of domination may approximate the total instrumentalisation Nietzsche envisaged as the nobles' ideal. In real life, these conditions have been best achieved in total control environments such as gulags, concentration camps, or the industrial work-prisons of the US and other states, and in the close confinement of family homes.  

As for the psychic effects on the subordinated, to quote the Argentinian prisoner Jacobo Timerman on his experience of repeated torture:

I realised that, instinctively, I'd developed an attitude of absolute passivity [...] I felt I was becoming a vegetable, casting aside all logical emotions – fear, hatred, vengeance – for any emotion or sensation meant wasting useless energy

(ibid:85)

Secondly, trauma may also be used to prepare the way for more actively re-ordering subjects. In the terms of the last chapter, the key point is that traumatised bodies can, at least in some conditions, become radically open to new inputs.

Herman notes the prevalence of ‘Stockholm syndrome’ effects amongst hostages

25 See here Hannah Arendt's discussion of ‘total domination’ and concentration camps that ‘serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating ... spontaneity itself as an expression of human behaviour and of transforming the human personality into a mere thing’ (2004:65). Howard Caygill (2013:152-8) critically discusses Arendt's idea of ‘total domination’ in relation to the capacity to resist.
Attachment between hostage and captor is the rule rather than the exception. … Under duress, the hostage gradually loses her previous belief system; she eventually comes to empathise with the captor and to see the world from the captor’s point of view (ibid:82).

In many hostage-taking and domestic situations, as opposed to typical prison or concentration camp conditions, prisoners are both (a) isolated from other companions and at the same time (b) in sustained and often intense contact with captors. Traumatised and isolated bodies hunger for solidarity, contact and support from others. They form bonds of attachment which may make them mimetically wide open. The same process can both cement powerful affinities between comrades, and create dangerous vulnerabilities for isolated prisoners. For this reason many political prisoners describe how they have to fight to defend their emotional segregation from captors. As Herman quotes the gulag prisoner Natan Sharansky: ‘the growing sense of our common humanity could easily become the first step in my surrender’ (ibid:82).

As in Nietzsche’s story of the priests, more ‘cunning’ captors not only induce trauma but also exploit the vulnerabilities it creates. Nietzsche’s priests do this by offering ‘remedies’ that assuage the suffering of trauma, but in doing so weaken and create further dependence. Similar ‘pastoral’ techniques make up the folk wisdom of authoritarian parents, and the science of the penologists who devise earned privilege schemes, control units, close supervision centres, supermax facilities and other disciplinary regimes.
Now I want to return to the point I left hanging at the end of Section 1: how power relations produce not just individual bodies of drives, but social groupings. In looking at technologies of domination in the *Genealogy*, we have seen particular practices associated with particular characters or types: ‘masters’, ‘priests’ and ‘slaves’. We might define each of these types in at least two ways: on the one hand, each refers to a distinct ‘mode of valuation’ and set of characteristic practices. At the same time, Nietzsche identifies them with more or less stable groups, ‘tribes’ or ‘castes’; and indeed, throughout the *Genealogy*, often with racial categories, historic or contemporary ‘peoples’ and ‘races’.

However, the picture becomes more complex as the story proceeds. By the nineteenth century, Nietzsche thinks, genealogies are so intermingled that a modern European individual may be a ‘genuine battleground of opposing values’ (GM1:16) in which ‘noble’, ‘priestly’ and ‘slavish’ modes uneasily co-exist. Here Nietzsche moves towards the approach that Foucault will take in his genealogies. Foucault argues that ‘there exists a relative, nonabsolute autonomy of the techniques of power’ (EW3:293) in which, for example, techniques employed in Latin American slave colonies ‘turn up again in nineteenth century France or England’ (ibid), or the British invention of concentration camps becomes ‘one of the chief instruments of totalitarian regimes’ (ibid). Just like other activities of drives, practices of domination spread across bodies, groups, and contexts, are

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26 More precisely, Nietzsche applies this description to those of a ‘higher nature’, the implication being that the majority of ‘lower’ beings are fully enmeshed in slavish values.

27 And here Foucault claims that ‘if there is one country that was not totalitarian in the history of Europe, it is undoubtedly Britain’ (EW3:293). At least, the British state would arguably have been unlikely to set up concentration camps on home turf.
transformed as they are transmitted, and in the process transform the bodies they compose. For Foucault, practices come conceptually before groups, because groups and their identities are made by actions. So we need to start by focusing on and tracing practices and techniques, rather than on the individual or group ‘actors’ who apply them; we can then see how individuals and groups are largely formed by these practices.28

This is not to say that there are not more or less stable groupings and identities of dominators and dominated – hierarchies of species, gender, race, class, and more. The point is that these formations are themselves contingently shaped by practices of domination and resistance. For example, Nietzschean priests appear, and achieve dominion as a ruling caste, only as they develop ‘remedies’ to exploit the damage done by the historical event of conquest. Foucauldian psychiatrists and prison managers emerge as new professional competences develop alongside prison systems and other disciplinary institutions. Or the bourgeoisie ‘makes itself’ as a class (to paraphrase E.P. Thompson (1968)) only as values and norms with respect to property transform, markets grow and become less constrained, and in this context individuals and groups actively develop, learn, share, and to some degree coordinate, new techniques of market-based power. Furthermore, and centrally, none of these groups can be recognised or defined without what we can think of as practices of identification, or particular ways of identifying, categorising, and assigning bodies, which themselves very often act as techniques of domination – or of resistance. I will now try to elaborate

28 I think this is what Foucault means when he says that individuals are ‘relays’ of power: ‘to the extent that he is a power-effect, the individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it has constituted.’ (SD:30)
on this last point.⁵⁹

**Practices of identification**

What does membership of a social group consist in? There are innumerable ways to define or identify kinds of things, or of people. We can think of the group of all citrus fruits, the group of all houses painted orange, the group of all red-headed men, the group of all families with red headed members, etc. In all these cases defining a group involves identifying, actually or potentially, a number of members who share characteristics or points of resemblance. There may be one defining characteristic, or a number – or indeed, as Wittgenstein (1958:s.67) pointed out, only a ‘family’ of overlapping resemblances that may not all be shared by any one member. I will call a social group a group whose members are

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⁵⁹ See here Foucault's second proposition on power in *The History of Sexuality*: ‘Relations of power are not in a position of exteriority with respect to other types of relations (economic processes, knowledge relations, sexual relations); they are the immediate effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibria which occur in the latter, and conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are not in a superstructural position, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play.’ (HS1:94).

Here Foucault is distinguishing his position from what he takes to be a Marxist view in which first (a) social formations are formed by economic ‘material conditions’ and then (b) these social groupings develop varying ‘superstructural’ techniques of domination and resistance in pursuit of their interests. To sum up: group identities come before power relations, they are fixed by an already existing basic domain, here identified with relations of economic production. (Note how economic production here plays something like the role assigned to ‘nature’ in the English Genealogies I looked at in Chapter 5.) In the Foucauldian view, by contrast, groupings are emergent from all of their encounters on many levels between bodies in social ecology, and all of these encounters are power relations.

To what extent such a ‘Marxist’ view of class and ‘superstructure’ is representative of Marx or later Marxist positions is not a point I can hope to resolve in this thesis. One rather more nuanced Marxist account, for example, is that of E.P. Thompson (1968). Although Thompson does prioritise the historical role of ‘productive relations’ (1968:10), in other respects his views on how classes are actively ‘made’ by their members are not far from Foucault’s. Thompson argues that class is a ‘relationship, and not a thing’ (ibid:11); and it is a relationship that above all needs to be understood historically – or genealogically. ‘If we stop history at a given point, there are no classes but simply a multitude of individuals with a multitude of experiences. But if we watch these men over an adequate period of social change, we observe patterns in their relationships, their ideas and their institutions.’ (ibid:11).
bodies of drives.

I apply Nietzschean perspectivalism not only to valuing but also to categorising or identifying groups. Both valuing and identifying can be seen, more broadly, as aspects of what in Chapter 2 I called the ‘meaning giving’ in which drives evaluatively interpret the world. So just as a value come not ‘in itself, from nature’ but ‘as a gift’ from valuers (GS301), so group identities are ‘gifted’, bestowed or productively defined, by bodies of drives. That is, there are no ‘natural kinds’, or only if we can interpret these ‘conventionally’ within perspectival schemes. And, just as values are ‘values for’ particular valuing stances of drives, so identities are ‘identities for’ particular identifying stances. To be precise, we can think of identities as established at a particular moment, by a particular identifying body, from a particular identifying stance, and in a particular act of identification.

By practices of identification I mean recurring ways in which individuals identify each other through various actions, for example by looking for particular characteristics, using particular tests and questions, etc. Like other practices, these are not exclusively tied to particular contexts and identifying stances, but are contingently shaped as they are transmitted and transformed. We learn and teach ways of identifying others – and indeed, of identifying ourselves – as members of a myriad of different kinds of groups.

I suggested in Section 1 that we can think of a state of domination as a stably asymmetric social script. For example, to grossly oversimplify, we might think of an ongoing relationship of domestic domination, such as those discussed by Herman, as following a recurring scripted pattern in which one individual
repeatedly plays the role of ‘abuser’, the other that of ‘victim’. The abuser uses various techniques of domination to create this script and keep it fixed, including violent and traumatising techniques of ‘conquest’, but also practices of contagion and pseudo-therapy. And as the script is repeated, its values, desires and practices may become more strongly naturalised, incorporated into both bodies (as discussed in Chapter 3), so that the ‘victim’ herself continues to actively participate in and reproduce the relation. But, as unique as this relationship between two individuals may be, it is also situated within a wider social ecology characterised by larger scale ‘lines of force’ (Foucault HS1:94), including ‘major dominations’ (ibid), such as those of gender. Using the script framework, we can think of major dominations as involving relatively stable social scripts that proliferate and are shared across many bodies. For example, millions of children grow up learning common practices of identification for categorising individuals by species, class, race, gender, etc. These identifying practices identify individuals as members of widely recognised social groups. As bodies are categorised in this way, they are simultaneously assigned to roles within a range of common scripts, including hierarchical scripts.

It should be clear, then, that practices of identification are central to relations of domination. To establish and maintain asymmetric scripts involves establishing and maintaining identities linked to rank-ordered roles; whilst creating or extending states of domination can involve creating new identifications – as, for example, identifying races or other inferior or pariah groups. So, for example, a master may need to identify and categorise bodies that are slaves, or that are slaves of various kinds – e.g., her own slaves, house or field
slaves, slaves of friendly or rival masters, runaway slaves, submissive slaves, potentially rebellious slaves, slaves good for different kinds of work, etc. Or, for example, Foucault in his studies of biopolitical technologies, and recently James C. Scott in his *Seeing Like A State* (1998), have followed the development of identification practices of modern government including statistics, censuses, standardised forms of measurement. Although at the same time, as I will discuss in the next chapter, identifying practices are also central to many projects of resistance.

**Groups, forms of life, and cultures**

It may often be the case, although not always, that bodies which are stably grouped together share a broad assemblage of values, desires, practices and social scripts enacted over a range of contexts. That is, to use the Wittgensteinian term I introduced in Chapter 4, they share a *form of life*. For example, Nietzsche's story of conquest begins with two tribes, with distinct stable identities and forms of life. The stability and coherence of these two groups, identities and forms of life is a product of contingent historical processes including the binding force of herd instinct and morality of custom. The conquest transforms these two groups into interdependent castes, and in the process their forms of life are dramatically transformed, even as they remain distinct. Again, specific practices, such as the nobles' pathos of distance, work to maintain coherence and also separation.

At the same time, however, the two groups are also bound together in a relationship in which they regularly interact with each other in patterned ways. To
make this point clearer, I want to think in general about four different kinds of scripted interactions within a social ecology shared by distinct groups:

(i) *Shared asymmetric scripts.* Members of different groups interact together, taking on hierarchical roles that are tied to their group identities. In Nietzsche's master/slave society, all interactions between the two groups are of this kind.

(ii) *Shared symmetric scripts.* Members of different groups interact, but without taking hierarchical roles defined by their group identities. For example, in gendered human societies, there are usually some contexts in which gender, if never entirely absent, becomes less central in determining power roles. It is a notable feature of Nietzsche's story that there are no such interactions between masters and slaves: this may help to maintain an effective ‘pathos of distance’.

(iii) *Separate scripts.* Members interact only with others in their groups. Although even in these settings group identities and relationships may still be very much at stake: e.g., in Nietzsche's ‘dark workshop’ the slaves on their own are busily fantasising about revenge on the masters.

(iv) *Conflict situations.* There may also be situations in which members of different groups are not settled on a shared script, but contest the form the interaction will take. As Erving Goffman (1959) might put it, there is no agreed ‘definition of the situation’. This could mean some form of mutual incomprehension, tense stand-off, or open struggle.

Although masters and slaves have quite distinct forms of life, these forms of life are very largely interdependent. For example, the masters cannot express their ‘artistry’ as state-founders and rulers without a slave caste to dominate, while
the slaves' mode of valuation is an inversion of noble valuing. The masters fail to fully instrumentalise the slaves, but nevertheless the two castes are tied together not so much as one organism but rather in a symbiotic – or parasitic – assemblage.

In the discussion that follows I will use the term ‘culture’ in two ways, to refer to both (a) a particular form of life shared by a group, and (b) an assemblage of shared forms of life of closely interdependent groups, even where this social assemblage is riven with inequalities and antagonisms. In this latter sense we can think of ‘aristocratic’ caste societies or ‘capitalist’ social assemblages as having cultures. I should make clear that my use of ‘culture’ here is quite different from Nietzsche's. For Nietzsche, ‘culture’ is always a ‘higher’ or ‘advanced’ domain of life distinguished from ‘base’ activities such as politics or commerce (see Chapter 5). The sense of culture I am employing is much closer to the sense developed by Raymond Williams and other ‘British cultural theorists’ (not to be confused with English genealogists), in their move away from 19th century elitist ideas of culture to a more general conception of culture as ‘a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity’ (1976:90).

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30 See footnote 28 in Chapter 5 above on Williams' genealogy of ideas of 'culture'. Another well known definition of culture from 'British' cultural studies, which develops Williams' approach, is this: ‘The ‘culture’ of a group or class, is the peculiar and distinctive ‘way of life’ of the group or class, the meanings, values and ideas embodied in institutions, in social relations, in systems of beliefs, in mores and customs, in the uses of objects and material life. Culture is the distinctive shapes in which this material and social organisation of life expresses itself.’ (Clarke, Hall, Jefferson and Roberts 1976:10). This also fits well with my approach, save for one quibble: the separation between ‘material life’ and its cultural ‘expression’. This distinction is added by Clarke et al. to incorporate the central point of E.P. Thompson's (1960) critique of Williams' definition of culture, that ‘Any theory of culture must include the concept of the dialectical interaction between culture and something that is not culture’ (1960:33). It would be interesting to develop a Nietzschean (genealogical) response to Thompson's Marxist (dialectical) claim here, but that is well beyond the scope of this thesis.
7.4. Capitalism as a culture of domination

I now want to try and apply the ideas I have been developing above to real life today. I want to look at contemporary capitalism as a culture. That is, it as an assemblage of multiple forms of life, themselves containing multiple scripts and drive patterns. However, from this multiplicity we can identify some important recurring patterns. In particular, I want to explore how capitalist culture is (a) dominating, i.e., it has core values and practices that work to establish and maintain states of domination; and (b) invasive, i.e., it has core values and practices that work to disrupt and invasively transform other forms of life it encounters. One note: while I sometimes write ‘capitalism’ in the singular, by this I mean a family of culture-assemblages that vary and evolve across space and time: from 16th century Amsterdam to 21st Century Mumbai or Mombasa, there have been and are many capitalisms.

Capitalism is more usually thought of as an economic system. I use the term ‘culture’ to help emphasise that capitalist economic practices are embedded – to use and extend Karl Polanyi’s (2001) term – within a broader complex of values, desires and practices. Still, it is the case that ‘the economy’ is right at the heart of capitalist culture, and is the obvious place to start in exploring its forms of

31 Karl Polanyi (2001) developed the idea of the ‘market economy’ as ‘embedded’ within broader political and social contexts. See also the papers collected in (Hann and Hart 2009) for discussion of Polanyi’s ‘embeddedness’ and its mobilisation in recent social thought. My Nietzschean approach takes this idea further than Polanyi in emphasising that economic systems are dependent not only on other practices and institutions, such as those of government, but on diverse and changing modes of valuation. Without agreeing with all of his conclusions, I think that Polanyi makes a key contribution to the theory of capitalism by introducing ideas emerging from the empirical and comparative ethnographic study of the economic life of different cultures. A leading exponent of this approach today, whose work I also draw on in this section, is Keith Hart, who calls for an ‘anthropology of globalisation’ that brings together ethnography and world history (Hart and Ortiz 2014).
life. Some typical core features of capitalist economic systems include: (i) market economy – markets take a central role as institutions for organising production and distribution; (ii) commodification – a wide range of entities and relations, including human time and effort ('labour') as well as much of the non-human world, are identified as ownable and tradeable objects; (iii) private property – a system of laws and norms assigning strong rights to individuals (and corporate 'persons') to possess, trade and otherwise dispose of ('alienate') commodities; (iv) concentratons of capital – the accumulation of capital ('wealth used to make more wealth' (Hart 2000:82)), and so market power, in the hands of elites; (v) centralised states – which enforce, stabilise, and are instrumental in expanding property systems and markets.32

Using the framework developed in earlier chapters, we can think of capitalist economic institutions and practices in terms of social scripts. For example, markets of different kinds, from the local shop to the jobcentre to the virtual trading floors of global financial markets, are all sites of interactions that follow familiar sequences, and in which actors take on distinct roles as buyers, sellers, traders, regulators, etc., of various kinds.

Here are a few reasons why we need to look more broadly at capitalism as a culture. First, the roles and actions of market and other capitalist scripts make sense only within a complex framework of conventions and beliefs, norms and

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32 This list is not meant to be definitive, and certainly leaves out many other prominent features of historical capitalist economic systems. Just to give two examples, Marx (1867) and later Marxists centralise the role of wage labour, but here I lean towards Weber and Polanyi in seeing 'industrial capitalism' based on the exploitation of wage labour as only one possible (if historically crucial) form; on the other hand, I leave out Polanyi's emphasis on mechanisation. Others would argue that I include too much: there are so-called 'anarcho-capitalists' who believe in the possibility of capitalism without state authority; just as there are those who believe that there can be market economies without capital concentration (see e.g. Carson 2007 for a 'free market socialist' position); but I don't believe there are any historical examples of either.
laws, and modes of valuation. Despite the claims of economists since Adam
Smith, none of these are ‘natural’ to human beings. For most of human history
markets, wage labour and alienable individual property played only marginal roles
in organising social life.\textsuperscript{33} Capitalist economic scripts have been assembled over
hundreds of years of cumulative evolution, dramatically transforming earlier
forms of trading and other interactions. Second, the very idea of the ‘economy’, as
a particular domain of human activity, is itself a product of modes of valuation
developing with capitalist culture.\textsuperscript{34} For example, the development of norms about
just what kinds of things can be treated as economic goods is central to the
development of markets and capitalist culture as a whole. Third, although
economy is at the heart of capitalist culture, capitalism has driven much more
extensive social changes in every aspect of life from love to war.

Fourth, and this is the main point I will focus on, in order to see how
capitalist economic practices transform and spread, we need to look at the values
and desires that support them. For example, norms and laws that assign strong
alienable property rights are not possible unless and until human beings come to
view the world as made up of things that can be possessed and traded by
individuals. An economy based on wage labour is not possible until people
become disciplined to work regular long hours for pay. Concentration of capital in

\textsuperscript{33} As Polanyi summarises: ‘Though the institution of the market was fairly common since the
later Stone Ag, its role was [until ‘our own’ time] no more than incidental to economic life.’
(2001:45). He goes on to describe Smith’s theory of the natural propensity of humans to ‘truck
and barter’ by saying: ‘In retrospect it can be said that no misreading of the past ever proved so
prophetic of the future’ (ibid). This point has been tirelessly repeated by many economic
anthropologists since, and just as tirelessly ignored by neo-classical economists. See Marshall
Sahlins (2013) for a recent anthropological critique of economic theory’s ‘naturalisation’ of
\textit{homo economicus} – or, as he puts it, of ‘zombie economic ideas that refuse to die’; and David
Graeber (2011) for a detailed treatment drawing on historical and anthropological research.

\textsuperscript{34} On the development of ideas of the ‘economy’ in the modern era, and the economising of
politics, see Foucault (BP), Hirschman (1977), and also Douglas Dowd’s (2000) detailed
historical study of the co-development of capitalism and capitalist economic theory from 1750
to the present.
the hands of elites requires the acceptance of gross social inequalities. Centralised authorities to enforce property and market rules requires an acceptance of state legitimacy. Market interactions cannot become central to human life until people come to routinely value things as commodities to be accumulated and profited from. And in ‘developed’ forms of capitalism from the 20th century on, the further proliferation of markets requires spreading rampant ‘consumption’ to whole new swathes of the world's population. All of these phenomena involve shifts in people's values and desires that cannot be explained by relations within economic systems.

In what ways is capitalism a culture of domination? One particularly characteristic form of domination within capitalism is based on the unequal ownership of property. Market interactions are power relations in which power lies with the wealthy, those who have commodities to trade. These interactions create stably asymmetric states of domination, as some individuals systematically have greater control of wealth than others. But market and property relations also help other forms of dominations to thrive. The distancing and alienating effects of market interactions serve to mask other relations of coercion and domination. Commodification of human and non-human life transforms our relations with each other and with the natural world. Core capitalist evaluative stances that affirm accumulation, profit, growth above all else allow inequalities to appear as natural or inevitable, or not to appear at all.

It is important to keep in mind that capitalism as a culture-assemblage is not monolithic. First, because it can assemble multiple forms of life and modes of valuation. This point can be occluded by major theories of capitalism such as
those of Marx and Weber, for all their important contributions. For Weber, capitalism is above all the story of one basic type – the bourgeois ‘capitalistic entrepreneur’ (1990:33), who embodies the ‘ethos’ or ‘spirit of capitalism’ (ibid:xxxix), profit-driven ‘rational enterprise’ (ibid:xxxiv). For Marx, there are two key actors: profit-pursuing capitalists who own the means of production; and workers who ‘have nothing to sell but their labour-power’ (1867: Volume 1 Chapter 28). I would argue that both these views are too narrow, and particularly when looking at the complex globalised capitalism of the 21st century. There is no one capitalist ‘ethos’, nor two key classes, but diverse forms of life assembled in multiple relations of partial agreement or antagonism, collusion or conflict.

Capitalism has been shaped by the interactions and struggles of middle class entrepreneurs and industrial proletarians, but also colonial adventurers, robber barons and investment bankers and pension fund managers, PR gurus, politicians, trade union bosses, career bureaucrats and soldiers, idle super-rich, cops, students, housewives, peasants, consumers, vagabonds and slum-dwellers and the unemployed, slaves and indentured labourers, etc. These and many more groupings and roles interact in multiple capitalist economic and extra-economic scripts. They may share forms of life that are more or less distinct or overlapping, stable or fluctuating, partial or life-defining.

Furthermore, capitalism even now co-exists, combines and clashes with other culture-assemblages and forms of life. This is most obvious on the borders where capitalism still meets non-capitalist cultures. But even in the heart of ‘advanced’ capitalist societies, many other lineages remain alive. For example, to draw on a favourite theme of Kropotkin (1908), capitalist firms and corporations
themselves do not typically use market structures for internal organisation and
decision-making, but draw on neo-feudal organisational forms or even use
practices of mutual aid and solidarity. And capitalist institutions live and work
alongside much older military, governmental, religious, patriarchal, etc., forms of
life. Capitalist entities are also adept at forming symbioses (or parasitisms) even
with previously or ostensibly antagonistic forms of life: for example, think of the
role played by labour movements in disciplining work forces.

**Capitalism as an invasive culture**

However, although capitalism can and does co-exist with other forms of life, it is
an invasive culture that radically transforms the social ecologies it encounters. It is
this point that I want to focus on now. To understand how capitalism spreads and
grows, and how it can be resisted, we can look at how its practitioners use
techniques of domination to (a) disorder rival forms of life, (b) spread capitalist
forms of life through social ecologies, and (c) normalise and naturalise these
values and practices. To give this discussion more focus, I will concentrate on the
central capitalist transformation that we can call commodification, or the
‘opening’ of new markets. That is: features of the world, entities or relations,
become identified and valued in a new way, as items of owned and tradeable
private property.

For example, to follow in Marx's footsteps, we can start with the

35 Marshall Sahlins (2013) makes the same point with a different reference: ‘I admit that during
the McCarthy era in America I used to épater the bourgeois students by rehearsing L. H.
Morgan’s dictum that the family economy was “communism in living,” running on the
principle of from each according to his or her ability, to each according to his or her need. If
you were afraid of communism, I warned, you shouldn’t go home.’ Although, of course, there
are many different economic regimes within families too.
enclosures that characterised the early history of capitalism in Western Europe.\footnote{Marx discusses the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital and the English enclosures in (1867: Volume 1Part 8). Since Marx there have been numerous studies of these events, some notable ones including: R.H. Tawney (1926), E.P. Thompson (1968), Christopher Hill (1972), and Jeanette M. Neelson (1993). A strong influence on my discussion in this section is the work of Silvia Federici (2004), who brings together Marxist, feminist and Foucauldian perspectives in a study of early capitalist primitive accumulation in Europe and the colonies that also emphasises the role of pre- and anti-capitalist resistance movements.}

In England from the 15th through to the early 19th century enclosure meant fencing or hedging areas of land that then became legally deeded private property. Previously, most land had either been worked by families under ‘open field’ or strip farming systems or had been ‘commons’ such as forest, pasture, ponds and rivers, etc., which were collective resources of villages. Although villagers were subject to demands for rent, labour obligations, tithes and other services from feudal landlords, these relations of domination still allowed a considerable scope for autonomous organisation, governed by custom and collective forms of decision-making more than by property relations between individuals. In much the same period, in the colonies of the ‘New World’, land and other ‘natural resources’ were similarly (only still more brutally) claimed for private ownership.

More figuratively, we can also think of a further kind of enclosure as property relations and markets also came to play much greater roles in governing human bodies, time and energy: markets both for enslaved and for waged labour massively expanded in this period. Furthermore, as feminist writers including Silvia Federici (2004) have studied, the enclosure of slaves’ and wage-workers’ bodies and time was accompanied by moves towards the ‘biopolitical’ control of women’s bodies as means of the reproduction of labour. All of these cases, as also more modern examples such as the ‘enclosure’ of new forms of intellectual property, involve transforming the practices and scripts that groups use to manage
their relations with respect to a resource. To break this transformation down ratheroughly: (a) the resource needs to be defined and identified as a discrete and
quantifiable substance, and ‘parcelled’ into units (commodification); (b) these
units can then be claimed as property by particular individuals or groups (private
property) – which then allows the build up of concentrations of wealth that can be
effectively used as capital (concentrations of capital); (c) at the same time,
markets are established in which these units can be traded (market economy).

Throughout the history of capitalism, the ‘opening’ of new markets has
met resistance. For example, rural populations in 16th century England, and
indigenous cultures in the ‘New World’, had ideas of their own about how the
land they inhabited and their own bodies should be treated. To simplify, I will
think about these conflicts in terms of clashes between forms of life: on the one
hand, a capitalist form of life that sets out to create new markets and commodities;
on the other, a non-capitalist form of life that has quite different values, desires,
practices, and institutions in relation to the targeted resource. Where such a form
of life resists capitalist expansion, this expansion must take the form of an
invasion: to be successful, it must overcome and transform the existing form of
life of the resisting bodies.

One cautionary note here: again, I don't want to think of either capitalism,
or on the other hand of non-capitalist cultures as monolithic. For example, it may
be that the forms of life that actively move to open a market are only relatively
small formations within a wider capitalist culture: through the history of
capitalism there have been “adventurers”, “modernisers”, “pioneers”, etc., but also
“bureaucrats”, “reformers”, “moderates”, “conservatives”, etc.. Similarly within
resistant cultures there are more militant and more accommodating groupings and
tendencies, and often internal debates and struggles amongst these. So the idea of
appropriation as a confrontation between two opposed forms of life is always, to a
greater or lesser degree, a simplification.

Tactics of appropriation

A quick glance at the history of capitalist development suggests that the oldest and
most common technology of domination used by expanding capitalist forms of
life is that of forceful and traumatic conquest. Or, as Gerrard Winstanley and the
Diggers wrote in 1649: ‘The power of enclosing land and owning property was
brought into the creation [...] by the sword’. This is most obvious in the colonised
world, particularly Africa, where millions were enslaved, and the Americas, where
in places the vast majority of the population was wiped out.\footnote{The commonplace association of capitalism with waged labour can obscure the fact that the rise and spread of capitalism also coincides with a rise in enslaved and indentured forms of labour. See on this point Losurdo (2011).} In 16th and 17th
century England, and across Europe, enclosure was brutally enforced with
clearances and dispossessions. Enclosures were vigorously resisted, from local
acts of sabotage and disobedience through to major uprisings.\footnote{The largest anti-enclosure uprising in England was ‘Kett’s Rebellion’ in Norfolk in 1549, which began by uprooting hedges across the county and progressed to seizing the city of Norwich with a force of 16,000. The rebels had 29 demands, the first one reading ‘from henceforth no man shall enclose any more’. State forces eventually defeated the insurrection and massacred several thousand prisoners. Smaller local riots and uprisings, always involving digging up the hedges, took place throughout the period across England. Federici (2004: Chapter 2) is particularly insightful on early resistance to enclosures.}

The use of overwhelming force to create and maintain markets is by no
means just history. At the most ‘macro’ scale, we can see this clearly in the
continuing history of interventions in the service of property by both state and
mercenary armed forces. Just to take the most obvious example, since the end of the second world war US government agencies and sub-contractors have carried out a constant stream of overt and covert armed interventions at home and abroad, justified in the name of anti-communism or, more recently, of the ‘War on Terror’. In reality, US foreign policy serves to support US business by removing or terrorising governments and populations that threaten existing markets, or resist the development of new ones.

In line with my analysis in this chapter, Naomi Klein's (2007) study of ‘shock treatment’ in the recent ‘neoliberal’ phase of capitalist expansion is particularly relevant. Intellectual leaders such as Milton Friedman and political leaders from Pinochet to Thatcher often presented their project as one returning to market control (privatising) areas of economic life that had become organised by state structures in the post-war interregnum of Keynesian ‘social liberalism’. But more broadly, state assets provided one frontier of opportunity for a new wave of marketisation. Other important sources in recent decades have been the opening of ‘emerging markets’ in the ‘developing world’ and former Soviet bloc; and the rapid growth of financial markets built on consumer credit bubbles and the ‘innovation’ of new financial instruments involving securitisation and derivatives.

Klein argues that this period of market expansion has been characterised


40 I have nothing like the space needed to give an adequate account of either the practices or ideological self-presentations of actors and assemblages that might be called ‘neoliberal’. I think Klein's (2007) book is one of the best starting points for a historical overview; another is Harvey (2005). Foucault's discussion of 'American Neo-liberalism' in (BP) offers interesting insights on aspects of early Chicago School economic thought, in relation to the ongoing history of the 'Homo Economicus' ideal; but (he was writing in 1978) these do not tell us much about how the Chicago project for a 'liberal utopia' (BP:219) would play out in practice.

41 I develop these points in this paragraph in much more detail, in relation to the background to the 2008 crisis, in Sokolov (2012).
by the systematic use of ‘fear and disorder’ (2007:9), of ‘moments of collective trauma’ (ibid:8), as ‘catalysts for each new leap forward’ (ibid:9). She traces this pattern from the experiment of the 1973 Chilean coup, in which Pinochet's US-backed forces imposed a state of terror that was immediately followed by the economic ‘second shock’ of a raft of simultaneous privatisation and price liberalisation measures, to Iraq's case of ‘shock and awe’ assault followed by an (attempted) corporate takeover. However, military terror is only one way to create an exploitable collective trauma: for example, a natural disaster will also serve, as seen in the way that Hurricane Katrina was immediately seized on as an opportunity for radical reform of local housing, education and other government services. To summarise:

This is how the shock doctrine works: the original disaster – the coup, the terrorist attack, the market meltdown, the war, the tsunami, the hurricane – puts the entire population into a state of collective shock. … Like the terrorized prisoner who gives up the names of his comrades and renounces his faith, shocked societies often give up things they would otherwise fiercely protect. (ibid:17).

A still more current example is the effective exploitation of the 2008 credit crisis by the very neoliberal formations responsible for precipitating the collapse. The immediate aftermath of the credit crunch saw a backlash against deregulated finance, with talk of a ‘return to Keynes’, or even a ‘return to Marx’. But this proved very short-lived: in fact the outcome was a political movement towards austerity in Europe and other rich regions, not a retreat but an escalation of privatisation and marketisation. The point here is that, to go back to my
Nietzschean analysis, while a crisis or trauma can induce a transformation in values, desires and practices, the shape of change is largely open. In Nietzsche's story of conquest, the masters failed to direct the effects of the trauma they had induced; in this respect today's leading neoliberal actors are much more practised. The 2008 crisis created an opening for a range of possible transformations of current economic norms and practices; but it was the neoliberals themselves, not Keynesian reformers (let alone any anti-capitalist forces), who had the position and strength to give a meaning to the crisis and offer 'solutions'.

This last point moves us from technologies of conquest to 'priestly' practices of control. In Nietzsche's story, after the masters inflict the original trauma, the priests appear with pseudo-therapeutic 'remedies' to assuage the suffering, but which in fact create further weakness and dependency. This is exactly the pattern we find in Klein's account of the 'shock doctrine'. As I discussed above, the identity of 'masters' and 'priests' – that is, those who apply 'noble' and 'priestly' tactics, whether they are the same or distinct actors, is only a secondary question. In some cases, inflicting trauma and and offering remedies may be separate roles, perhaps played by individuals and groups with quite distinct forms of life who may even see themselves as antagonists – e.g., military units and aid agencies. Or, just as in Judith Herman's discussions of domestic captivity, the abuser may also be the loving partner. In austerity politics, the same politicians who helped crash the system are back to inflict austerity. In contemporary crisis capitalism the same outsourcing corporations can often provide the full range of services from disaster to relief.\footnote{Take the example of G4S, which is (a) active in the occupation of the Palestinian territories, providing security and prison services to the Israeli state; (b) imprisons Palestinian and other refugees arriving in the UK and other 'safe' countries, where it contracts to run immigration...}
The third type of Nietzschean technology I identified was *contagion*. I want to mention two forms of value contagion in capitalist history. But first I want to pick up one more time a key point from above: a stable or expanding capitalist culture does not require that all groups share the same ‘spirit of capitalism’, only that their different values do not lead to antagonisms that break the system. For example, in the early history of capitalism it certainly helped market expansion for *certain groups* to develop modes of valuation based around the accumulation of property – Hume’s ‘passion of avidity’, or Weber’s more refined rational pursuit of profit. But so long as most humans within early capitalist cultures were either enslaved or on subsistence wages, the ‘men of property’ remained a narrow caste, physically and culturally segregated from the majority.

The ‘democratisation’ of aspects of capitalist valuing, to create what we now know as a consumer culture, is a recent phenomenon. If we want to identify a transition point, the obvious shift comes with development of mass production, initially in the US. Henry Ford and other industrialists, and political allies, were quite conscious of the need to boost consumption demand in order to keep up with expanding production. This was only possible by ‘liberating’ the industrial working class from subsistence wages into the modern paradise of high wages and leisure time.\(^{43}\) It then becomes crucial to spread, largely by mimetic contagion, aspiration, social status anxiety, desire for the new products. The primary channels for doing this, as traced most ably by Stuart Ewen (1976), were mass media and the advertising industry. The creation of a consumer form of life in which much

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\(^{43}\) The most comprehensive historical study of the birth of consumerism in the US in the period 1890-1930 is William Leach (1997).
larger sections of populations come to feel ‘included’ in the system, to share core values tied to market practices, and feel themselves threatened by any disruption of the status quo, has brought a powerful new stabilising and expansive force to capitalism. It transforms capitalist culture from an unsteady assemblage characterised by open parasitism and class antagonism, to a much denser and stronger symbiosis.

There is also another key capitalist contagion technology to note, older but still very much in use. This works by spreading not unity but division, to fracture forms of life that threaten domination. Here I turn to Silvia Federici's (2004) account of early capitalist primitive accumulation, and specifically to how it played out in gender and race relations. Federici argues that the destruction of community ‘subsistence economies’ in Europe went together with ‘years of propaganda and terror [that] sowed among men and women the seeds of a deep psychological alienation from women, that broke class solidarity and undermined their own collective power’ (2004:189). The tactics used to create racial divisions between European and colonial bodies ran very much in parallel: for example, many of the same weapons of rape, torture, and legal abjection, and the same accusations of bestiality, idiocy, and infanticide were turned against working class women, African slaves and American indigenous.

With respect to gender, the terror was most brutally manifested in the witch hunts that exterminated hundreds of thousands of women, attacking especially the poor, the old, and all those seen as a threat to new norms of production and reproduction. For example, midwives were particular targets as they were involved in women's control over reproduction; old women were ‘the
ones who embodied the community's knowledge and memory … traditionally considered a wise woman, she became a symbol of sterility and hostility to life’ (ibid:193). With respect to propaganda, Federici connects the witch-hunt to ‘the first persecution in Europe that made use of a multi-media propaganda to generate a mass psychosis among the population’ (ibid:168). The first printing presses were publishing misogynist tracts, witch scare pamphlets, and pornographic scenes of American cannibal orgies.

**Domination and resistance**

This section only gives the briefest of sketches of certain recurring technologies of invasion and domination found in the history of capitalism. And there is something very important missing: here I have looked at capitalist domination effectively as a one-way interaction in which strong forms of life act on other weaker formations. Left at that, the picture is very misleading. For example, to note another crucial point highlighted by Federici (ibid:Chapter 1), many of the first moves of capitalist accumulation in fact need to be understood as reactions to the ‘anti-feudal struggle’ of peasants’ and workers’ movements that tore across Europe from the late 14th century. It is very far from true that enclosures and appropriations were imposed by dynamic ‘modernisers’ on a static peasantry: the lower orders had their own radical ideas about how to change the world. From then on, we can only start to understand the development of capitalism if we also look at the role played as protagonists – antagonists, but also collaborators – by the oppressed and dispossessed. To do this we now need to switch perspective and
go over to the resistance.
Chapter 8. Power II: Resistance

Nietzsche offers us a number of important conceptual tools for thinking about resistance to domination. I want to end this thesis by introducing some of these, and at the same time facing up to some limits of Nietzsche's thinking. In the first section I briefly trace some of the main lines of a Nietzschean psycho-politics of resistance. Then I zoom in on three particular issues in more detail. Section 2 looks at what I call base resistance, moves through which weak bodies keep alive rebel forms of life and avoid ‘voluntary servitude’, or the incorporation of submissive values. Here I bring Nietzsche together with the work of James C. Scott. Section 3 looks at what I call self-transformative resistance projects, in which individuals and groups, at the same time as confronting states of domination imposed on them by others, work on remaking themselves.

Nietzsche's understanding of self-constitution can be invaluable here; but we also need to go beyond his individualist focus and look at the power of collective alliances. Finally, in Section 4 I turn to the question of Nietzsche's often bitter attacks on resistance movements, focusing particularly on his rants against anarchism. I conclude that resistance involves ‘reaction’, in a broad sense, but that does not mean it has to be resentful.

8.1 Patterns of resistance

I will start with just a little historical and philosophical background. Why think
about political struggle and change in terms of resistance? And why with Nietzsche? To take the second question first, although Nietzsche himself largely sided with the ‘strong’, resistance is crucial to his thinking of power and domination. In the *Genealogy* he writes that to understand ‘the “evolution” of a thing, a custom, an organ’ we have to study not only the processes of ‘subduing’ that shape its history, but at the same time ‘the resistances they encounter’ (GM2:12). Resistance is ubiquitous, even where on the surface all seems tranquil: ‘resistance is present even in obedience: individual power is by no means surrendered [...] “Obedience” and “commanding” are forms of struggle’ (WP642 (1885)). And, as we saw in looking at the story of the slave revolt, ultimately it is resistance that makes humans ‘interesting’.

We can distinguish broader and narrower concepts of resistance. In a very general sense, resistance is present wherever the activity of one body or force is blocked or limited in some way by another. A tree offers resistance to an axe, friends may resist each other’s suggestions, a master resists a slave’s moves to liberate herself. Or drive patterns and processes within a body may resist each other – an idea I made use of at the end of Chapter 3. In this chapter, however, I will focus more narrowly on the resistance of weak bodies to the domination of the strong. This is the form of resistance, of slaves against masters, that plays a central role in Nietzsche’s genealogies – and that I feel it is urgent to think about in the present.

The power of Nietzschean thinking about resistance is further brought out

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1 In *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche adds that we need to study resistance in order to think about freedom: ‘How is freedom to be measured in individuals and psyches? According to the resistance which must be overcome, according to the exertion required, to remain on top.’ (TI 38 ‘My Conception of Freedom’).
by his French readers of the ‘poststructuralist’ generation, including Deleuze and Foucault. Loosely following the genealogy traced by David Couzens Hoy (2004), 1960s France is where Nietzsche forms an assemblage with the powerful and contested legacy of wartime resistance to fascism; with the needs of French philosophy to challenge the limits of its tradition – first Hegel and Heidegger, later Freud and Marx; and with the politics of ‘68, which exposed the living corpse of the established Left. For Hoy, if any one text could be highlighted as the ‘beginning’ of poststructuralist ‘critical resistance’, it is Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962). For my purposes, the vital role of this text is that it pulls out the dynamic of Nietzschean psycho-politics with the image of an antagonistic encounter of forces: ‘Every force is related to others and it either obeys or commands. What defines a body is this relation between dominant and dominated forces.’ (Deleuze 1962:37).

My other French reference point is Foucault's work on power in the 1970s. Foucault develops Nietzsche's understanding of the ubiquity of resistance, claiming that ‘where there is power there is resistance’ (HS1:96). Beyond my account in the last chapter, particularly interesting for resistance is one of Foucault's first statements of his approach to power, in the 1975-6 lecture course *Society Must Be Defended*. Here he identifies a number of different ways of thinking about power, including the ‘economistic’ approach of (forms of) Marxism, a ‘repressive hypothesis’ which he associates with Wilhelm Reich, and an alternative approach in which ‘the basis of the power-relationship lies in a warlike clash of forces’ (SD:16). He calls this approach ‘Nietzsche's hypothesis’.

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2 Others that I am not discussing include Derrida's texts on resistance, which are discussed by Hoy (2004) and by Caygill (2013).
and also associates it with the ‘inversion of Clausewitz’ aphorism – politics is the continuation of war by other means’ (ibid).

Why look at philosophy of resistance now? I do not claim that thinking about resistance opens into a comprehensive view of political philosophy, or that it is the only way to think about political action today. Thinking about politics in terms of resistance means taking a specific and local perspective. For me, a perspective of resistance means two things. First, it is a perspective of social war: it ascribes to ‘Nietzsche’s hypothesis’, seeing social ecologies in terms of conflictual encounters of forces. Second, it is a perspective of weakness, of social war seen from below: it sees itself in dark times, confronting an overpowering enemy, having to wage asymmetric warfare. On the first count a perspective of resistance is in contrast to economic or juridical views of politics, or to views of politics as consensus. On the second count it is in contrast, for example, to views of politics as the inevitable unfolding of revolution, or ideas that there is no need to think about positions of strength and weakness or about the strategic impact of our actions. I take the perspective of resistance because I think that to live well I need to fight against capitalism, and I think that to fight well I need to think strategically.

**Resistance with fixed identities**

In his recent book on the philosophy of resistance, Howard Caygill (2013) makes a strong argument for reading Clausewitz’ strategic classic ‘On War’ as a treatise ‘On Resistance’. Clausewitz’ concern is to analyse possibilities of opposing
Napoleonic imperial warfare, his reference points are the guerrilla campaigns in Spain and Russia, and he becomes the first major theorist of the ‘People's War’ in which conflict becomes intensified and extended beyond the army to involve a whole ‘people in arms’. Clausewitz’ starting point is the image of two identifiable combatants in a ‘duel on a larger scale’ each aiming to render the other ‘incapable of further resistance’ (Clausewitz 1989:75).\(^3\) We might think of this aim as being achieved in a number of ways: perhaps the enemy is destroyed altogether; or one force achieves ‘total domination’, fully enslaving and instrumentalising the other; or the enemy withdraws from the field, e.g., an invader gives up its occupation. In all of these cases, war ends when one side loses what Caygill summarises as ‘the capacity to resist’ (Caygill 2013:16), understood by Clausewitz to be made up of ‘two factors that cannot be separated, namely the sum of available means and the strength of the will’ (quoted in Caygill 2013:60).

Resistance may certainly be carried out unwittingly and sporadically, but I want to focus on more concerted attempts, on what I will call projects of resistance. In the most general terms, I think of a project as involving (a) a desire active in a body in the present that (b) moves the body to an extended course of action reaching into the future.\(^4\) Projects may be projects of individual bodies of

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3. In Clausewitz’ analysis the combatants are nations states, which are complex bodies comprising: rulers or politicians; their armies; and ‘peoples’ who can also become armed in defensive warfare. Following the Napoleonic pattern, one body is the invader or attacker, extending itself into conquered territory. The defender may be the weaker force, but has the advantage of knowledge of the terrain, of not having extended supply lines, and of being able to grow its force by mobilising ‘the people in arms’ for a guerrilla campaign. It is for these reasons that Clausewitz argues that defence is ‘stronger’ than attack. It is important to note here Clausewitz’ distinction between attack and defence as strategic and tactical modes; e.g., a defensive strategy of retreating and avoiding open confrontation, so over-extending and weakening the invading body, can certainly incorporate offensive tactics such as frequent raids and sorties. Resistance, then, certainly does not mean refraining from actions of attack.

4. In addition, I will talk about these desires in terms of aims or goals, although I am not committed to projects always having a telic structure, nor to the desires and actions in question always being (self-)conscious or deliberative.
drives, or they may be collective projects shared by a number of bodies, in which individuals may play varying roles, and which may or may not be coordinated at different stages using various forms of communication and collective decision-making. By a resistance project I mean a project that works to break, remove, evade or otherwise overcome a state of domination. A resistance project thus has a negative aim, though it may well be subsidiary to another positive goal.\textsuperscript{5}

Resistance projects can take many forms. To note a few basic patterns, I will draw on the outline I gave in the last chapter of some types of scripted interaction between dominant and subjugated groups: (i) asymmetric interactions between members of dominant and dominated groups; (ii) symmetric interactions involving different groups; (iii) segregated interactions within groups; and (iv) encounters of open conflict. Resistance to domination aims to break asymmetric or hierarchical scripts, to end interactions of the first kind. We might then think of resistance projects in terms of transforming hierarchical interactions into one of the other patterns. For example, the project might aim to move to a more equal symmetric interaction (type ii). Or it might desire a separation, escape, decolonisation, partition, etc., in which the groups no longer interact (type iii). Or, if only as a provisional move, it aims to move to a situation (type iv) of open conflict, in which we refuse to play the subordinate role in the script. Finally, another possible aim is to destroy the enemy outright. Destruction here need not necessarily mean death or material destruction, but also radically destabilising the identity and form of life of a body or group.\textsuperscript{6}

\textsuperscript{5} For example, it may well be that the positive goal behind many resistance projects is in fact to achieve an inverted state of domination over the enemy. This is the model that Nietzsche works with, for example in his account of the slave revolt. Personally, I desire to pursue resistance projects that lead not to new dominations but to non-dominating forms of life; but I am not going to develop this point here.

\textsuperscript{6} None of these possibilities needs to be thought of in absolute terms: it may be that resistance
Still following Clausewitz’ model, I will assume that the enemy acts to maintain its state of domination so long as (a) it continues to exist and (b) it still values and desires the continuation of its state of domination (Clausewitz’ ‘will’) and (c) it still has the resources it needs to act to maintain this state (Clausewitz’ ‘means’). The idea of resources for action here is very broad (and limited, as I discussed in the last chapter), and might include, e.g., weapons and other provisions, sources of information, communication channels, alliances and networks of support involving other groups, etc.

Resistance projects might target any of these elements, using diverse strategies and tactics. For example, some projects may attempt to change the values and desires of dominating groups, whether through dialogue, or through spreading new values contagiously (as in Nietzsche’s slave revolt), or perhaps by terror (as in the ‘shock tactics’ more commonly used by dominant groups against the weak), etc. Other practices target the resources that dominant groups need to support their domination, for example by sabotage, or by resisting appropriation through labour strikes or rent strikes, or by hiding crops, refusing to pay debts or taxes, or with acts of expropriation, etc. And resistance projects may also target what we could think of as the moral or cultural resources of rulers, perhaps by working to undermine the alliances and complicities that hold dominating coalitions together and maintain consent for their rule. Finally, I also want to note forms of resistance that involve escape or evasion: for example, in recent work James C. Scott (2009) (of whom more in the next section) studies the long history of communities fleeing the governance of states to the highlands of South East

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reduces the asymmetry of a state of domination, or lessens the extent or consequences of the dominating interaction, etc., without fully breaking it.

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Asia – just as nomads, early cossacks, maroons, itinerants and vagabonds have done in different contexts the world over.

A very important point to note here, also brought out by Scott (1990), is that effective resistance often makes no appearance in the ‘public transcript’ of official history. There are resistance moves that rely on publicity: e.g., demonstrations and other symbolic shows of strength and feeling, or proclamations and other published statements, whether intended to persuade or threaten (or both). There are moves such as strikes or insurgencies that, aside from any symbolic or communicative roles, cannot help but be noticed. But we can also think about two kinds of hidden moves. First, actions that are noticed by the powerful but are carried out anonymously: e.g., unattributed attacks and propaganda. Secondly, acts of resistance that go at least partly unnoticed. For example, as Scott discusses, peasant communities and others evade taxes in money and kind, and defy enclosures by, e.g., poaching animals and fuel from the forest, just as workers shirk, pilfer, etc. Even if elites suspect what goes on they are unable to identify, quantify, attribute blame. These acts may by themselves significantly reduce the scale or strength of states of domination; in the most successful cases, official rules and institutions become empty formalities accorded only token deference.

In such cases, as in cases of escape, subordinate groups may manage to effectively break from asymmetric scripts without having to face an open confrontation. However, in many states of domination, ruling elites do not let things go so easily: fugitives are pursued, free territories are laid waste or colonised, wherever rulers have the strength to do so. Resisting groups must then
prepare to defend any gains they have made. As I have defined it, resistance is the movement of a weaker body. Ultimately, if the resisting body is to have a chance of success in a direct confrontation, it then needs to shift this balance of forces by growing stronger itself, and/or by weakening the dominant body. That is to say: at least in many circumstances, a successful project of resistance, one that can effectively act to overcome domination, must also overcome itself by transforming the nature of its own body and/or that of the enemy. It may then move beyond resistance towards a different kind of conflict.

**Who resists?**

In the last chapter I developed the idea that any group is defined from a particular identifying perspective, in a particular context, and through particular practices of identification. While certain practices of identification develop as technologies of domination, other – or sometimes, the same – identifying perspectives and practices can be part of resistance projects. Here I want to look at a particular identifying perspective that is strongly associated with resistance thinking, although it can certainly also be used by other projects that take a perspective of social war. This is the perspective in which we see the social ecology as made up of allies and enemies.

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7 Foucault's genealogy of the ‘Nietzschean hypothesis’ in *Society Must Be Defended* is very interesting on this point. He argues, against a common reading of Hobbes, that the view of politics as war emerges in 17th century England as a resistance perspective – associated, for example, with the ‘Norman Yoke’ mythos reappropriated by the Diggers and Levellers. Hobbes' theory of war of all against all, on Foucault's reading, then works to defuse or ‘eliminate’ this radical antagonistic view of politics: the important point is that the state brings war to an end. However, Foucault then traces precisely how the war perspective is also taken up and resignified by projects of domination such as state discourses of racism. To give a contemporary example, while liberal theory mostly emphasises a view of politics as consent, and prefers juridical or organismic views of the socius, still the card of ‘war on terror’ is always there to be played.
I understand alliance and enmity as particular forms of the more general idea of relations of agreement or opposition, which I discussed in Chapter 6. There I looked at the three ecologies as composed of forces, drives, bodies encountering each other in ways that either block or support each other's activity paths, shutting down or opening possibilities for action. Now I will define a relation of enmity as a relation of opposition in which one body blocks another's possibilities to follow its projects of domination or resistance. A relation of alliance, conversely, is a relation of agreement in which one body acts to support another's projects of domination or resistance.  

Alliances and enmities are thus defined with respect to particular projects. They may only last for specific one-off encounters, and it may well be that bodies are allies in some situations but enemies in others. But in many other cases alliances and enmities extend and persist across a range of recurring situations. Also, we can think of alliance and enmity as weaker or stronger, more or less blocking or supportive, in any context. Bringing these dimensions together, we can see the social ecology as structured by relations of alliance and enmity along a continuum from close comradeships, through more partial and strategic alliances and forms of neutrality, to heated antagonisms.

Taking this perspective, we can think of the combatants in struggles of domination and resistance as coalitions of allies. The Clausewitzian image of two combatants with fixed identities is an abstraction from this more general approach. We can use it effectively so long as, in the particular context of struggle we are interested in, there are opposing coalitions whose identities and

8 Note that on this definition alliances and enmities need not be mutual or two-way. Indeed, we might see some at least some relations of domination, from the perspective of the master, as alliances.
compositions are relatively stable. However, many projects of resistance are all about transforming the compositions of coalitions. For example, one classic resistance strategy involves growing a resistance coalition by recruiting new members or cells, or spreading its values, desires and practices of resistance to new adherents. Though this is certainly not the only model: other strategies may work, conversely, to restrict numbers, concentrate force, build up and reinforce barriers between resisting bodies and wider social ecologies – e.g., to defend against infiltration or ‘contagion’. Or other strategies may involve decentralising and loosening coalitions, so reducing tensions amongst allies and allowing greater autonomy, mobility and invisibility. Powerful resistance strategies may combine elements of these various approaches and more.

I want to end this section with just a few further notes on resistance alliances, some of which I will develop further in the rest of the chapter. One important point concerns the relation between two different kinds of groupings, identified from two distinct perspectives: on the one hand, a dominated group, a grouping of those who are subject to a state of domination; on the other, a resisting group, a coalition of allies who share a project of resisting this state of domination. This is the kind of distinction that we see, for example, in the division made by some Marxists (if, arguably, not by Marx himself) between a ‘class in itself’ and a ‘class for itself’, where the former is a group defined by its members’ positioning in relations of economic production, and the latter involves sharing a revolutionary consciousness. However, this kind of distinction goes well beyond Marxist theory.

Edward Andrew (1983) gives a very helpful survey of this topic, looking both at Marx’s own writing and that of 20th century Marxists. See also footnote 28 in Chapter 7 above.
For example, to pick up Howard Caygill's discussion (2013:146-152), we can see it framing issues about the nature of the French Resistance. General de Gaulle addresses a dominated group that he identifies as the ‘French People’. And, as Caygill discusses, he calls on the ‘French People’ to unite and form one, singular, centrally directed ‘French Resistance’. These two identities, the French nation and their unified Resistance, notably contrast with the reality of anti-fascist resistance in France at the time of de Gaulle's early ‘appels’: it was a resistance carried out less by French patriots than by radical immigrants, Jewish and East European communists and Spanish anarchists, organised in multiple decentralised groups and networks. But of course these two identities and their relationship are central to De Gaulle's political project, which is a project both of present resistance and of future domination:

Without the CNR [Conseil Nationale de la Résistance], there would not have been a resistance, there would have been resistances. At the liberation there would not have been a people in assembly but a divided country. It would not have been possible to prevent the communists from holding parts of the territory. (De Gaulle, cited in (Caygill 2013:151)).

There are commonalities between De Gaulle's nationalist project and that of some Marxist projects of class struggle. The aim is to develop an effective resistance movement that also has the potential to play another role once resistance is successful. The project addresses a dominated group that it takes to have, or represents as having, a given stable identity – e.g., an economic class, or a nation. This common identity underpins a common motivational basis, e.g., a shared ‘interest’, or patriotic duty, etc., that is appealed to in calls to resistance. The
project aims to create and organise its resistance group as one unified formation. This could involve the participation of the class or nation as a whole, or of just some representative sections – e.g., the young men of the nation, or a militant vanguard; but in either case there is a one-to-one mapping between one dominated group and one resistance group that fights for it.

Here I just want to point out that this is only one template for resistance. There are resistance projects that identify dominated groups and resistance groups in quite different ways, and think quite differently about the relations between them. More generally, identifying a group subject to a state of domination works, at least in some resistance projects, as a practice of (a) identifying potential allies and (b) of approaching and calling out to potential allies. Those who experience the same or similar states of domination as I do may, other things equal, be more likely to have values, desires, and forms of life that will lead them to join me as allies. Although Nietzschean thinking, which emphasises the contingency and diversity of the multiple values, desires and practices that compose bodies and move them to act, warns us not to jump to easy conclusions on this score.

8.2 Against voluntary servitude

According to Clausewitz, the two elements of a body's ‘capacity to resist’ are its ‘means’ and its ‘will’. I am going to focus on the second element. An important question for many resisting bodies is this: how to maintain the values and desires that motivate struggle, even when the odds can seem overpowering? I will connect this question to the problem highlighted in Etienne de La Boétie's (2008)
classic study of ‘voluntary servitude’. La Boétie writes:

I should like merely to understand how it happens that so many men, so many
villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single tyrant
who has no other power than the power they give him; who is able to harm them
only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear with him; who
could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with him
rather than contradict him. (2008:40)

Although La Boétie frames the question in terms of exceptional states of
‘tyranny’, the basic issue is much more general. Hume makes a point of stating
that the same ‘maxim’ is true of both ‘the most despotic and most military
governments’ and of ‘the most free and most popular’. In all cases:

NOTHING appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a
philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the
few; and the implicit submission, with which men resign their own sentiments
and passions to those of their rulers. When we enquire by what means this
wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as FORCE is always on the side of the
governed, the governors have nothing to support them but opinion. (E: On the
First Principles of Government, para.1).

To generalise still further, people come to submit not only to states, but in all
kinds of relations of domination, micro- as well as macro-political. A notable
aspect of the accounts of both La Boetie and Hume is how they approach this
question dynamically. Both think of submission as something that develops over

10 The micro-politics of voluntary servitude is developed in 20th century approaches including
that of Wilhelm Reich: ‘What has to be explained is not the fact that the man who is hungry
steals or the fact that the man who is exploited strikes, but why the majority of those who are
hungry don’t steal and why the majority of those who are exploited don’t strike.’ (1975:53) And
Deleuze and Guattari, who ask in *Anti-Oedipus* about how it can be that ‘desire can be made to
desire its own repression’ (1972:98).
time, involving a shift in desiring (‘sentiments and passions’) as well as in practice. La Boetie thinks that ‘custom becomes the first reason for voluntary servitude’. The human under tyranny is like a horse who becomes broken to the rider; like Mithridates who trained himself to drink poison, ‘we learn to swallow, and not to find bitter, the taste of servitude’. For Hume, ‘when a new government is established, by whatever means, the people are commonly dissatisfied with it, and pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation’ (E: Of the Original Contract, para.22) – but then ‘[t]ime, by degrees, removes all these difficulties, and accustoms the nation to regard, as their lawful or native princes, that family which at first they considered as usurpers or foreign conquerors’ (ibid.)

There is a major difference, though, between these two writers' approaches. To simplify somewhat, La Boetie thinks that ‘it is truly human nature to be free’, and that submission to tyranny is an unnatural condition that makes us ‘suffer’. Hume, by contrast, believes that submission to almost any government, by securing property-based ‘justice’, serves universal human self-interest (i.e., the passion of economic avidity). In the one case, habituation works against natural human valuing, in the other it assists it. A Nietzschean perspective, which recognises the diversity of valuing stances, stands apart from both these positions: humans, as a whole, are neither naturally desirous of freedom from domination nor naturally subordinate. Some (‘slavish’) human bodies indeed desire their own submission, and in such a way that (in the sense I looked in Chapter 3) these

11 This is a very cursory summary. I discussed Hume's view on interest and human nature in Chapter 1. With respect to La Boetie, a full treatment would also need to take account of some more complex statements of his position on human nature, as where he writes that ‘It is truly human nature to be free, but also our nature is such that it naturally takes the shape [literally, ‘fold’] given by its nourishment’ (‘La nature de l’homme est bien d’être franc et de le vouloir être, mais aussi sa nature est telle que naturellement il tient le pli que la nourriture lui donne.’)
desires have become their ‘nature’. But others have deeply incorporated values that fight against particular forms, or perhaps all forms, of domination. Here, what I want to pursue is how it happens that a body *becomes* submissive, at least in a particular context; or, conversely, overcomes tendencies to submission, and begins instead to act for freedom.

**Deep domination and incorporation**

I will start by making a distinction between deep(er) and shallow(er) states of domination. I will say that domination is deep to the extent that the dominated body affirms – that is, positively values and desires – its subordinate role. We need to remember here the core Nietzschean point that bodies are moved by multiple and often conflicting values and desires engaged in a ‘clash of motives’. For example, a captive body may have many active desirings, some involving rationally calculating benefits and risks of compliance or rebellion, but others deeply affective movements of rage and longing, or of paralysing fear, and others more or less entirely unconscious habits of resistance or submission, more patterns of nerve and muscle than thoughts or feelings.

Still, abstracting from this complexity, I will suppose that we can loosely think about a continuum with two extreme cases. In a situation of deep domination the individual’s valuing stances overwhelmingly support the subordinate practice, without any significant internal “dissent”. In shallow domination, on the other hand, strongly incorporated drive patterns within the individual’s body oppose the practice. The body still outwardly follows the
imposed script, but only against these strong values and desires – e.g., as Hume puts it, ‘from fear or necessity’. So a situation of shallow domination implies a division within a body’s psychic ecology: on the one side, submissive (e.g., fearful or pragmatic) values and desires that move the body to outward compliance; on the other, rebel values and desires that are blocked from (external) action.

Becoming submissive, then, can involve a movement from shallow to deep domination, a voluntarisation of servitude. And we can think of such transitions in terms of incorporation, as discussed in Chapter 3. In particular, the pattern of performative incorporation I looked at there may be in play. To recap, in *Dawn* Nietzsche studies a situation where we begin by ‘dissimulating’ a role, perhaps initially ‘out of fear’ (D104); but then over time ‘we grow so accustomed to this pretence that it ends up being our nature’ (ibid.) I analysed this incorporative process in terms of a clash between drive patterns: on the one hand, a ‘public’ valuing stance that openly, performatively, affirms the dissimulatory (subordinate) practice; on the other, a ‘hidden’ valuing that cannot be openly enacted. The public valuing strengthens the more it is repeatedly enacted, while the hidden valuing fades – the fate of a Nietzschean drive that receives no ‘nourishment’. So, publicly enacted subordinate values and desires will become more deeply incorporated, while resisting values that clash with subordinate practices will weaken.

In general, tendencies towards incorporation are present wherever bodies are repeatedly exposed to, and especially where they themselves repeat, values, desires and practices in their social ecologies. These tendencies may be strongest in childhood, but continue to act in us throughout life. The technologies of
domination I looked at in the last chapter are moves with which dominating bodies can further encourage and reinforce incorporative tendencies. In addition, the processes of normalisation and subjectivation discussed in Chapter 4 can make the pressure even stronger. And yet, these are tendencies not certainties: they can be resisted.

I use the term base resistance to mean moves that act against the deepening of domination. Base resistance is what keeps a rebel form of life alive, nurtures values and desires that oppose a state of domination, perhaps even if we are forced to dissimulate or perform acts of obedience. We might distinguish base resistance from practical resistance, by which I mean projects in which weaker bodies act externally to escape or destroy states of domination. However, base resistance and practical resistance are neither opposites nor sequential stages: they are intertwined, mutually supporting throughout. Practical resistance is impossible without base resistance, because a body only moves to oppose domination if it nurtures rebel values and desires. And base resistance is unsustainable without practical resistance, because values and desires can only be kept alive if they are enacted.

_In the dark workshop_

In Nietzsche's _Genealogy_, we see slaves practising a form of base resistance in the ‘dark workshop’ of the slave revolt. Although the slaves are too weak to openly challenge the masters, they retain ‘inner worlds’ and segregated ‘underground’ spaces in which antagonistic values and desires are nurtured. The political theorist
and anthropologist James C. Scott offers some important tools to explore these themes further. In his *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, which builds on earlier research on everyday class struggle in a Malaysian village, Scott looks at possibilities of resistance under conditions of ‘slavery, serfdom, caste domination, and … peasant-landlord relations in which appropriation and status degradation are joined’ (1990:193). But the concepts he develops can also, with some care, be applied more widely.

One of Scott's main contributions is to draw out the crucial distinction between ‘public’ and ‘hidden’ ‘transcripts’ in studying living relations of domination and resistance. Very summarily, public transcripts are records of acts and discourse in which elite and subordinate groups openly and directly encounter each other; whereas in hidden transcripts they talk and act out of sight of each other. In the public sphere masters typically act out displays of strength, wisdom, pomp and circumstance, while subordinates perform deference and a willing acceptance of dominant values. Reading only the public transcript gives a partial and distorted view of power relations, as resistance mainly develops underground: if and when struggle ‘erupts’ into open rebellion, and so enters the public transcript, it very often takes elite observers by surprise.\(^\text{12}\) Ignorance of hidden transcripts thus leads to big gaps and misunderstandings in mainstream history and theory: ‘much of the active political life of subordinate groups has been ignored’ (ibid:198).\(^\text{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) There are many interesting parallels between Scott's work and Nietzsche, some of which I discuss in this chapter. One other less obvious parallel, which works at the level of the psychophysiology of the individual body, is between hidden/public transcripts and Nietzsche's discussion of the 'surface' of conscious awareness of drives vs. their hidden unconscious activity, as discussed in Chapter 2.

\(^{13}\) To take an immediate example, it would be interesting to investigate the role of the mass media within Scott's framework, this time looking at the public and hidden transcripts of contemporary capitalist societies. Major media very often present themselves as either
As Scott himself is clear, it is a big simplification to think of ‘a society’ divided into two groups with one ‘public transcript’ and two ‘hidden transcripts’. We need to root any such analysis in a broader conception of social ecologies as made up of multiple sites of interaction involving multiple groupings and forms of life. Here I will just note how Scott's approach can be connected to the schema of interaction types I noted in the last section. All four kinds of situations – symmetric and asymmetric scripts, independent scripts, and clashes – may appear in various hidden and public transcripts. It is the third kind of segregated intra-group interaction, if it can be concealed from outsiders, that provides ‘free spaces’ for hidden transcripts.

Scott (ibid:Chapter 4) also mounts a critique against theories of ‘false consciousness’, or ‘hegemonic ideology’. The idea of false consciousness, as speaking for ‘the public’ or, slightly more modestly, as important voices or representative positions within ‘the public debate’. In either case, we can typically find in media discourse the reproduction of, firstly, the claim that this public sphere stands for human politics and social life as a whole – or at least, for those human voices that we need to listen to. This is the point that Scott's theory critically addresses. But also, we can find the conception that this ‘public sphere’ is singular – although there are disagreements about how coherent or multivocal, monocultural or multicultural, the public is or should be. This claim also needs examining. For example, the voices, coverage, angles, commentary, etc., of a right wing newspaper (e.g., The Daily Mail) largely but not entirely overlap with those of a mainstream liberal newspaper (e.g., The Guardian), and somewhat less with a black community newspaper or a rebellious internet news source. Should we see these media as participants within one public transcript, or as separate public transcripts that intersect and cohere to varying extents – but may also be, on other issues and at other times, mutually incomprehensible? In thinking about this question we also need to consider how different public transcripts connect to different hidden transcripts: for example, how Daily Mail editorials implicitly refer to what can only be said privately about immigration and race.

One very interesting look at similar issues, which anticipates some of Scott's key points, is E.P. Thompson's (1960) discussion of the ‘reading public’ and ‘the tradition’ (of high culture) in his in-depth review of Raymond Williams' The Long Revolution. For an introduction to some of the main lines of debates on the idea of the public within recent liberal political thought see Gripsrud et al. (2010). I find still more illuminating Stuart Ewen's (1996) history of the development of ideas of the public in relation to the history of the mass media and of ‘public relations’. An important point Ewen brings out concerns how ‘the public’, as a site of reason – and management, is distinguished from ‘the crowd’, a site of dangerous, and uncontrollable, passions; a theme he traces back to late 19th century psycho-sociologists including Tarde and Le Bon. Ewen (1996:73) quotes the American sociologist Edward A. Ross: ‘The crowd may be stampeded into folly or crime by accidental leaders … the public can receive suggestions only through the columns of its journal, the editor of which is like the chairman of a mass-meeting, for no one can be heard without his recognition’.
Scott reads it, comes in two forms, ‘thick’ and ‘thin’. The thick version holds that domination leads ‘subordinate groups to believe actively in the values that explain and justify their own subordination’; the thin version holds that subordinate groups become convinced ‘that the social order in which they live is natural and inevitable’ (ibid:72). Scott argues that theorists diagnose ideological incorporation largely because they take public performances of submission at face value. He maintains that absence of open confrontation can usually be explained by lack of ‘means’ rather than lack of ‘will’: it is not that slaves and peasants don't want to turn the world upside down, but they are ‘divided by geographical and cultural background’ (ibid), and well aware of their military weakness. Indeed, the history of peasant and slave rebellions, in Scott's view, shows not so much resignation as recurring courageous optimism about the hopes of insurrection against well-armed forces of professional killers.

Aside from the issue of the falsity of false consciousness (see Appendix), Scott's critique also challenges my Nietzschean view of incorporation and deep domination. I have indeed been arguing that incorporation processes can shape our values in ways that sustain subordinate positions. While Scott makes very important points, I think that he overstates his claim – and particularly when he generalises it beyond slave and peasant struggles.14

Our values, desires and practices are significantly shaped by the social ecologies we inhabit, by the values, desires and practices of other bodies. Incorporation processes may be particularly strong in childhood, but our values do

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14 For example, he argues that according to both ‘social psychology’ and ‘the historical evidence’ ‘little or no basis exists for crediting either a fat theory or a thin theory of hegemony’ (1990:81), and the domain he discusses here goes beyond slave and peasant societies to also take in contemporary capitalism.
not cease to develop and transform with the world around us. And our social
ecologies, throughout our lives, are sites of power relations – and, in the world we
live in that means, to a very large degree, relations of domination. So, to be
succinct: domination shapes our world, and the world shapes our values, and our
values shape our acts of resistance or submission. Given this, it makes little sense
to deny the very possibility of voluntary servitude. And so, for example, I inhabit
a social ecology in which those with bodies marked as female are educated from
birth into practices of subordination and deference, and to accept as normal and
natural acts of harassment, violence and discrimination and relations of
dominance. I live in a social ecology in which most people around me accept as
natural, normal, inevitable (“there is no alternative”), or just do not ask questions
about, a brutal and alienating economic system that is destroying life on this
planet. This is not a timeless fact of human nature: capitalist economic relations
would have seemed bizarre and unnatural to most human beings through history.
Nor is it an accident: these attitudes and assumptions are actively, both
deliberately and non-deliberately, shaped by practices of domination. The point is
not that these attitudes and assumptions are false, but that they threaten me and
everyone and everything I love.

What I think Scott’s analysis shows is not that deep domination never
happens, but that it happens to greater or lesser extents in different circumstances,
and that we can identify some of the factors that count. Scott himself allows that a
‘paper thin’ form of ideological incorporation may work in extreme conditions,
such as the states of highly intrusive captivity discussed by Judith Herman. The
key point about such conditions, according to Scott, is that:
subordinates are more or less completely atomised and kept under close
observation. What is involved is the total abolition of any social realm of
relative discursive freedom. In other words, the social conditions under which a
hidden transcript might be generated are eliminated. (ibid:83)

By contrast, a key feature about the conditions experienced by ‘slaves, serfs,
peasants and untouchables’ is that ‘they have always had something of a life apart
in the slave quarters, the village, the household and in religious and ritual life’
(ibid:85). Dominant castes in these societies are ‘unable to prevent the creation of
an independent social space in which subordinates can talk in comparative safety’
(ibid) – and not just talk, but also prepare actions, share skills, hide resources
(weapons, expropriated goods, fugitives, …), and more. To summarise Scott's
analysis, before I look further at the details: (i) what defends against deep
domination is the continuing existence of an ‘autonomous life’ or ‘counter-culture’
(ibid:132) – or what I will call a rebel form of life. (ii) We can keep alive a rebel
form of life if we can enact its values, desires and practices in a network of ‘free
spaces’, social sites of action and discourse that are ‘insulated from control and
surveillance from above’ (ibid:118). (iii) Maintaining these free spaces often
(though not always) involves secrecy, guarding a hidden transcript that is ‘opaque
to the elite’ (ibid:132). (iv) But these free spaces, and their invisibility, cannot be
taken as given – they are sites of struggle that must be ‘carved out’ (ibid:118) and
continually defended. This last point bears emphasis: ‘whether these possibilities
[of resistance] are realised or not, and how they find expression, depends on the
constant agency of subordinates in seizing, defending and enlarging a normative
power field’ (ibid:132).
Bases of resistance

There are strong parallels between Scott's account of the base resistance of groups and Judith Herman's reflections on how individuals can survive the chronic trauma of captivity (see last chapter). Herman discusses what can make bodies ‘resilient’ to chronic traumatisation, and what can aid their recovery. There are three basic ideas to bring out here. First, as trauma fundamentally involves disempowerment or the loss of control, the massive blocking of paths for action, a first defence can be to find ways to maintain independent capacities to act – as Herman writes, to ‘preserve … active coping strategies’ (Herman 1997:58). Where the scope for action is severely limited, small practices of resistance and survival can still help play this role. Herman also notes as an example the significance of the hunger strike for many prisoners, which can offer a last means of re-taking control over your own life, your own body, in the face of extreme domination that deprives you of all other resources.

Second, trauma very typically involves disconnection – separation, isolation, atomisation – from the world beyond the individual body. The traumatised individual becomes cut off from supporting relationships in her material and, particularly, social ecologies. This disconnection also has the danger of opening the body to desperate attachments to captors. A key defence, then, is to maintain (social) connections – even if, in the most extreme cases of isolation, in memory and imagination. Military psychiatrists realised that ‘the strongest protection against psychological breakdown [in soldiers] was the morale and
leadership of the small fighting unit’ (ibid:25). Concentration camp survivors identify the pair as the ‘unit of survival’ (ibid:92). And just as captors know the power of isolation, prisoners and comrades on the outside know how important it is to maintain solidarity.

Thirdly, trauma typically involves a *breakdown of meaning*, the loss of a sense of coherence, purpose or value in the world, and in one's identity and form of life. One way to defend against this is to develop or hold onto goals, hopes, beliefs, communities (real or imaginary) and other structures that extend horizons to a future beyond the hostile present. Religion, with its inbuilt immune defences against reality, comes to play this role for many desperate people: the classic opening for Nietzsche's priests peddling remedial meanings. But so can projects of resistance.

As the ‘systematic repetitive infliction of trauma’ is a classic practice of domination, and as many of its characteristic patterns can also be found in less extreme dominating encounters – which also involve blocking of possibilities for action but in less totalising forms – it is not surprising that collective practices of base resistance are closely connected to defences against individual psychological trauma. In Scott's theory, the crucial element is the ability of subordinate groups to create or maintain an ‘autonomous life’. Again, we can understand this necessity in terms of the Nietzschean account of incorporation. A body will incorporate the values and desires of the scripts it outwardly performs *unless* it can at the same time successfully maintain and nourish another independent form of life. And ‘nourishing’ this resisting form of life requires enacting its values and desires in some way (the ‘nutrition principle’ of Chapter 2). The opaqueness of the hidden
transcript is not then the end in itself, but a strategic measure: it is almost always necessary for subordinate groups to hide many of their spaces and activities. Where rebel values and desires cannot be enacted openly, they must be enacted unobserved.

Scott notes, referring to the famous account of W.E.B. Du Bois (1969), that to lead an autonomous life alongside a ‘dissimulatory’ life of subservience means keeping up a *double life*.

An ‘inner world’ must be carved out that is distinct from the ‘mask’ of outward activity. At the level of the individual we can think of this in terms of a division of a body of drives – or, to put it another way, a partition of a psychic ecology. Similarly, at a collective level, base resistance involves partitioning social ecologies to create micro-ecologies that elites cannot enter, block, or control. Paralleling Herman's account of resilience to trauma, the underground life of free spaces plays three crucial roles in base resistance. First, the hidden transcript holds a number of activity paths for subordinates to enact their rebel values and desires. One important path, as discussed by Scott, is verbal or discursive: subordinates can ‘vent’ their rage with curses, gossip, myths, stories, conspiracies and revenge fantasies. But also, as Scott is clear to point out, the hidden transcript is not all talk. Not all revenge fantasies stay fantasies. The underground is also where covert forms of active resistance are organised and carried out.

Secondly, these are shared spaces where communities are created. As

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15 W.E.B. DuBois writes in ‘Souls of Black Folk’ (1969:221-2): ‘Such a double life with double thoughts, double duties and double social classes must give rise to double words and double ideals, and tempt the mind to pretense or revolt, to hypocrisy or radicalism’. Quoted in Scott (1990:41).

16 Max Scheler, as quoted by Scott (1990:37), makes the basic point in reference to Nietzschean resentment: where an ‘ill-treated servant can vent his spleen in the anti-chamber, he will remain free from the inner venom of resentment.’
groups come together to organise and act, they also share and develop values and desires. The discourse of the hidden transcript is much more than just a way of ‘venting’ blocked aggression: as Nietzsche understands, the hidden workshop is where values are produced and transmitted through collective processes of transmission and transformative re-assembly. While subordinates may close themselves, mimetically and otherwise, to masters and other outsiders, the hidden transcript can be a hothouse for value creation. Intra-group mimesis can help both to reinforce rebel drives, and to shape their evolution in response to new attacks.

Thirdly, action and collectivity keep alive not just an isolated set of values and practices, but as Scott puts it, ‘a counter-ideology […] that will effectively provide a general normative form to the host of resistant practices invented in self-defence by any subordinate groups’ (1990:112). In my terms, a rebel form of life, perhaps an independent culture, with its own language, myths, projects, history, and dreams. A key aspect of this, which I want to develop further in the next section, is that this rebel form of life can help connect individuals not only to across social space to community, but through time to a past – e.g., a lineage or tradition, and to a future – e.g., to unfolding projects for overcoming domination.

Here I want to stress one more time the interaction between practical and base resistance. Action keeps an independent form of life living, which can sustain further action. One last point from Scott: in one common dynamic of resistance, at least in peasant and slave societies, the hidden transcript is where subordinates constantly probe the limits of the enemy's power, and can experiment with new tactics. ‘[T]he actual balance of forces is never precisely known, and estimates about what it might be are largely inferred from the outcomes of previous probes
and encounters’ (ibid:192). If there is an effective underground network, then word about weaknesses and openings can spread fast: ‘any weakness of surveillance is likely to be quickly exploited; any ground left undefeated is likely to be ground lost’ (ibid:195). This is when hidden resistance can suddenly ‘erupt’ into the open.

**Base resistance in contemporary capitalism**

Different social ecologies contain different possibilities for nurturing rebel forms of life. In historical slave and peasant societies, as Scott puts it, ‘the development of a thick and resilient hidden transcript is favoured by the existence of social and cultural barriers between elites and subordinates’ (ibid:132). To put the point very roughly, such states of domination are relatively shallow relations of involuntary servitude, in which brutal force and terror (technologies of conquest) typically play larger roles than technologies of contagion and incorporation.

On the other hand, we can expect deep forms of domination to be more prevalent in social ecologies that are less amenable to partitions (one-way or two-way) between groups. Scott thinks of extreme cases of captivity perpetrated by states. But I would argue that the classic site of deep domination, in many cultures, is the family. First of all, various forms of family are common sites of micropolitical relations of deep domination between individuals – as in Herman’s studies of domestic abuse. Secondly, they are where as children we incorporate values, desires and practices that incorporate some of the oldest and most powerful major lines of domination, including those of gender. Thirdly, the power
of the family as a mimetic micro-ecology can also be harnessed by states and other elite groups (though also by ‘counter-ideologies’) to embed further forms of domination: for example, to educate children as participants in nations and markets.

To conclude this section, I want to flag up the question: what kind of terrain of deep domination and base resistance do we see in contemporary capitalism? Capitalism isn’t a monolithic world empire, and very different conditions obtain in different places and contexts. But there are some basic tendencies, with increasingly global reach, that significantly affect the issues I am discussing. I will just very briefly note three points.

The first is that contemporary capitalist states have, and are further developing, unprecedented powers of surveillance and control of territory. There are no uncharted wildernesses or pirate islands left. There are no spaces that cannot be immediately viewed by satellite or attacked with remote-controlled drone strikes. The military and technological advantage of states and corporates combatants is perhaps greater than ever. CCTV, mobile phones and internet surveillance are creating a world-scale panopticon. But technologies of surveillance and force by themselves do not close down free space. For one thing, invisibility is only one strategy against control: knowing does not yet mean acting. For another, no technologies of surveillance (so far invented) are total: the arms race of asymmetric resistance continues as it always has done. For these reasons, surveillance can be over-stated as a threat to resistance; indeed, as has often been the case, the bigger danger may come from the paralysing effect of the spreading fear of surveillance and repression.
New forms of surveillance are an escalation of ancient technologies of conquest and control. I think the more radical and challenging features of contemporary capitalist technologies of domination work on other levels. As discussed in the last chapter, the major shift of 20th century capitalism was the democratisation of consumption. Consumer cultures developed first in the richest parts of the world, but have mutated and spread globally in various forms. In the ‘developing world’, they co-exist with more obviously repressive technologies. At the same time, consumer cultures have proved extremely successful at ‘recuperating’ counter-cultures and resistance practices. I would argue that it is the contagious power of consumer values and desires that has been most successful in destroying autonomous forms of life. So the problem is less about flows (of information) out of hidden transcripts than flows in. At the same time, consumerism also succeeds in isolating, atomising, disconnecting individuals from communities and traditions, at breaking up social micro-ecologies that can support resistance cultures.

Yet consumer forms of life are not universally successful in spreading through social ecologies; other cultures, for example those based around patriarchal religions, have proved resilient and resurgent in recent decades. These ancient lineages and projects, on the wane for generations, have returned with a vengeance. In many contexts they have been able to fill gaps left by the death of Marxist authoritarian socialist forms of life and take their place in linking up anti-capitalist struggles of individuals and communities. In doing so they have often been promoted by capitalist state formations, as they may ward off greater threats.

Though there is so much to say here, I just want to note one point from the
heart of a genealogical approach: rebel forms of life do not appear, as if from nowhere, wherever there is domination. The possibilities for resistance in any local ecology, and the forms it may take, are shaped not just by its conditions of domination but by what alternative lineages remain alive and able to grow. Where consumer values have not been able to penetrate ecologies, or have been repelled, it is because they have faced resistance from surviving alternative forms of life – which may not themselves be any less authoritarian or hierarchical.

8.3. Self-transforming resistance projects

A resistance project is a project against a state of domination. A project of self-transformation is a project in which a body acts to transform its own composition and/or form of life. These two kinds of projects can go together. For example, in order to increase our will and means to resist, we may need not just to challenge ongoing deep domination, but also undo its historical work, including overcoming patterns of passivity that have been deeply incorporated in us from childhood. These are the kinds of projects that I want to focus on in this section, and looking at them will also bring together many of the strands of this thesis. Nietzsche's discussions of self-cultivation can help us think about these projects; and yet Nietzsche is disdainful of what I will call self-transformative resistance projects. And so working with Nietzsche on this topic both helps us see the practical reach of his approach, and also brings us up against its limits.
Nietzsche on self-shaping

Book Four of *The Gay Science* contains some of the most joyful and ‘yes-saying’ of all Nietzsche's writing. It draws on and takes in new directions the account of drive therapy developed in *Dawn*. The longest section of the book, and at its heart, is GS335, which I looked at in earlier chapters with relation to its dissection of ‘conscience’ and of common sense ideas of action. The section ends with a call to action. As moral values and the voice of conscience are just deeply incorporated inherited evaluations, the moral ‘great majority’ are those who ‘have nothing else to do but to drag the past a few steps further through time and who never live in the present’. Nietzsche continues:

We, however, *want to become those we are* – human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create themselves. To that end we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world: we must become physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense [...] 

This statement sums up much of Nietzsche's work over the free spirit period. It is possible to transform ourselves into new compositions. But to do so we first need to really study what we are, and so the principles and possibilities of how we can transform. I take ‘physics’ here to refer us both to *psycho-physiology*, the study of the (largely unseen) workings of our drives, and to *genealogy*, the study of the relations and encounters that shape our bodies through time. The section ends with Nietzsche's invocation of the ‘honesty’ or ‘integrity’ (*Redlichkeit*) that we need if we are going to pay proper attention to these processes. Another key passage here
is GS290, in which Nietzsche presents projects of transformation as a ‘great and rare art’ of ‘giv[ing] style to one’s character’. This art:

is practised by those who survey all the strengths and weaknesses of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until every one of them appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye. Here a large mass of second nature has been added; there a piece of original nature has been removed – both times through long practice and daily work at it.

Reading these two passages together, physics is precisely the ‘surveying’ of one’s nature (physis). The subsequent ‘artistic’ work of self-creating, to return to the imagery of Dawn, involves the nurturing (D109, D119), pruning and ‘gardening’ (D560) of the drives. Particularly noticeable in GS290 is how Nietzsche frames transformation in terms of alteration of the nature of a body, highlighting the idea of nature as mutable (as I discussed in Chapters 1 and 3). The current composition of my body, its current nature, has been produced by past psycho-physiological processes; present and future psycho-physiological processes will continue to reshape that nature; if I know how these processes work, I can intervene and (at least partly) direct them. We can think of a project of self-transformation as involving a series of interventions in the psychic ecology, carried out to an ‘artistic plan’. Nietzsche goes on in GS290 to say that the plan is governed by a ‘single taste’, a point that recalls the account of self-ordering guided by a ruling drive in D109.

But how well can these ideas apply to those whose transformative projects are connected to resistance against social relations of domination? Nietzsche primarily addresses those who, like him, are in privileged positions in social
hierarchies, with considerable social and material freedom. He almost never considers how projects of self-transformation can be carried out by the ‘great majority’ experiencing states of domination, by those who have to contend with slavery, oppression, exploitation, material hardship, discrimination, and also their psychic consequences.

One of the themes I have tried to develop in this thesis is that of the interplay of psychic, social and material ecologies: interventions in psychic ecologies also inescapably impact on social and material worlds, and vice versa. This is a theme that runs through Nietzsche's discussions of self-work. For example, his awareness of how material ecologies shape the psyche can be seen in his insistence on the vital importance of ‘nutrition, place, climate, recreation’ (EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 10). Having the right social environment is also essential for drive therapy. Although bodies differ in their needs, Nietzsche's ideal conditions for self-work involve solitude, a simple diet, mountain air, and plenty of time for walking and thinking. Perhaps the most basic and general requirement is the space and time to work on oneself as an individual project.17

One of the rare passages where Nietzsche seriously considers the conditions of life of the dominated is D206, directed to workers subject to ‘today's factory servitude’. I think this passage shows both the depths and the shallows of Nietzsche's psycho-political insight. He starts by presenting the problem of factory workers as precisely a problem of the self: what is at stake is not just an economic condition but whether you can hold onto your ‘inner value’, your nature

17 Nietzsche discusses his dietary and other routines, and their significance for his philosophy, in detail in (EH ‘Why I am so wise’). In Foucault's study of ‘care of the self’ in Hellenistic and Roman practices (HS3, also see EW1:281-301), projects of self-transformation more obviously involve therapeutic relationships involving a teacher and a student. Ure (2008) examines Nietzsche's relationship with Hellenistic therapeia, his conception of friendship in this context, and also discusses Foucault's approach.
as a ‘person’, or whether you become fully instrumentalised, ‘merely a cog’.

Capitalism wants ‘to produce as much as possible and be as rich as possible’, but ‘what vast sums of genuine inner value are being squandered on such a superficial external goal! Where is your inner value, however, when you no longer know what it means to breathe freely?’

Nietzsche then mentions three paths for workers, two of which are traps or dead ends. The first dead end is the reformist struggle for higher wages: ‘To believe that higher payment could lift them from the essence of their misery, by which I mean their impersonal enslavement!’ Workers fighting for wages become just ‘co-conspirators’ in the capitalist ‘folly’. They have no project of their own, but have incorporated the values of the factory system.

The second dead end is revolutionary socialism, which Nietzsche reads as a rebirth of millenarian Christianity. The ‘socialist pied pipers who want to inflame you with mad hopes’ are a 19th century version of the *Genealogy*'s priests, similarly offering false remedies, palliatives which only weaken further.

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18 In later writings and unpublished notes Nietzsche continues to analyse capitalism as a depersonalising machine. However his later notes are usually pro-capitalist, heralding the ‘mechanisation’ of humanity as a potential precursor condition for the overman. One note (WP866) outlines a science fiction plot reminiscent of HG Wells’ *The Time Machine*. The ‘consumption of man and mankind becomes more and more economical and the “machinery” of interests and services is integrated ever more intricately’. Not only will future capitalism create a greater than ever ‘luxury surplus’, but also an ever more levelled, ‘dwarfish’ (WP890) herd class, and so a greater than ever creative pathos of distance. Nietzsche’s futurology is not dialectical but contingent, and he offers at least two possible scenarios: either an ‘overall diminution’ spelling disaster for European culture as a whole; or the appearance of a new ‘higher form of aristocracy’ to justify the 20th century. The question is: how can such a ‘stronger species’ ‘raise itself’ out of the degenerated form of the 19th century European intellectual? ‘A dominating race can grow up only out of terrible and violent beginnings. Problem: where are the barbarians of the twentieth century? Obviously, they will come into view and consolidate themselves only after tremendous socialist crises ...’ (WP868). This is the only way in which anarchist and socialist movements are ever positively valued by Nietzsche: new masters will emerge through the test of overcoming these resistances. In one other note from the same period: ‘The revolution made Napoleon possible: that is its justification. For the sake of a similar prize one would have to desire the anarchical collapse of our entire civilisation.’ (WP877). BGE262 gives probably his clearest published exposition of the idea of a cyclical history in which strong master classes can emerge in response to revolts from below.
Like preachers of the afterlife, they ‘enjoin you to be prepared and nothing more, prepared at any moment such that you are waiting and waiting for something external, but otherwise you continue to live in every way the same way as you had otherwise lived before [...]’ In this case workers have a project, but one that is fixated on the future, always deferring action until the never-approaching right moment is determined by the leaders, and so one that effectively removes their own power to act. Ultimately, then, the only choice this path offers is that between two masters, of ‘being a slave of the state or the slave of the party of insurrection’.

The third path, Nietzsche's own proposal, is:

- to emigrate, to seek in wild and fresh parts of the world to become master, and above all master of myself: to keep moving from place to place as long as any sign of slavery whatsoever still beckons to me; not to avoid adventure and war and, if the worst should come of it, to be ready for death: only no more of this indecent servitude, only no more of this growing sour and venomous and conspiratorial!

Nietzsche's call to the European workers of the nineteenth century pays no heed to what emigration and colonisation meant for the colonised, for the role emigration played in pushing back every last frontier for capitalist expansion, or for the last ‘wild and fresh’ parts of the world to be despoiled. Geopolitically it is completely naïve; psycho-politically it continues the same guiding thought that self work requires individual withdrawal from the social prison. In the 21st century, Nietzsche's suggestion is hardly feasible even for individuals. There are vanishingly few escape routes left. If any chance remains to ‘take on a wild, beautiful naturalness’, we have to do it by transforming the social and material

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ecologies we are confined in here and now.

Why does Nietzsche ignore or dismiss the idea that workers, or other dominated groups, can stand and fight? As the quote above shows, he is certainly not against war as such. Yet he never has anything but scorn and loathing for the idea of slaves taking direct action.¹⁹ This is where I think we come right up against the limits in Nietzsche's political thought. But first, before tracing these limits, I want to leave Nietzsche for a moment and look at a quite different line of thinking about projects of self-transformation.

**Feminist projects of identity**

Feminism, perhaps more than any other movement against domination, has thought hard about how projects of personal change can and must interact with social struggles. Here I will just look briefly at one major issue faced by feminists, the question of the identity of ‘woman’. In some early forms, feminism was typically conceived of as the struggle of women to transform their relationship with men. A simple reading, along the lines of the Clausewitzian image of the duel, would see this as a project in which one social body (women) confronts another (men) and seeks to reconfigure the power relation between these two groupings. However, it has become apparent to more recent feminists that any such project is also a project of self-transformation, in which the identity of ‘woman’ is itself put into question. Feminists have approached this question in

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¹⁹ As an example, consider his verdict on the French Revolution in D534: ‘nothing more than a pathetic and bloody quackery, which understood how, through sudden crises, to supply a trusting Europe with the hope of a sudden recovery – and in so doing has rendered, right up to the present moment, all the politically sick impatient and dangerous’.
very different ways. I will look very briefly at just two quite different approaches
taken by Monique Wittig (1981) and Rosi Braidotti (2011), and my aim is not to
pronounce upon their arguments but to draw out some general points about the
dynamics of transformative projects.

Wittig's speech ‘One is not Born a Woman’ opens with the statement that
‘A materialist feminist approach to women’s oppression destroys the idea that
women are a “natural group”’. The identity of ‘woman’, understood as a fixed
natural kind, is a ‘myth’, an ‘imaginary formation’. At the same time, it is
certainly the case that in our current world some people are identified – or
marked, as Wittig puts it, citing Colette Guillamin – as women. They are
identified in this way not only by (those marked as) men, but also by others
marked as women and, in many cases, by themselves. And this marking is not
merely a superficial naming but:

ideology goes far since our bodies as well as our minds are the product of this
manipulation. We have been compelled in our bodies and in our minds to
 correspond, feature by feature, with the idea of nature that has been established
for us.

There is, therefore, a group or category of women defined by perspectives and
practices of identification which are deeply incorporated in women themselves.
Wittig's materialist feminism aims to destroy this group identity altogether: the
future target of the project is a world in which there will be no more women and
no more men. The immediate task, a key step in that direction, is to destroy the
‘myth of woman’. This, in Wittig's formulation, means ‘making it evident’ that the
group of women (and the group of men) are not natural kinds but classes: i.e.,
‘political and economic categories not eternal ones’, products of ‘social relationship[s]’, and so can be overcome by activity in social ecologies.

The project thus involves a movement between two different schemes of identity, two ways of grouping a social ecology. Now, in the present, and formed historically by past relations of domination (and so also by past resistance), there is an identity scheme in which human beings are classed as men and women. The future goal of the project is a quite different identity scheme. Wittig doesn’t, and doesn’t need to, lay out exactly what this projected future scheme will look like. It is enough for now to define it negatively: ‘At this point, let us say that a new personal and subjective definition for all humankind can only be found beyond the categories of sex’.

But there is also a third set of identities we need to look at. Who are those who do the work of overcoming, in theory and in practice, the categories of sex? For Wittig, this is necessarily the task of those who are themselves marked as women. But not all women have taken on this task, and there are narrower alliances of women that Wittig specifically identifies with and addresses – ‘feminist and lesbian movements’. While ‘woman’ is an identity scheme from the past, feminism and lesbianism are identities of immediate concern for the present of the struggle. Although, at the same time, they make important temporal connections: Wittig affirms feminism, despite the ambivalence of its connection to the name of woman, not ‘[...] to identify ourselves with the oppressor’s definition of us, but rather to affirm that our movement had a history and to emphasize the political link with the old feminist movement.’ Whereas lesbianism is not just a present necessity but prefigures relationships of the future: ‘Lesbianism provides
for the moment the only social form in which we can live freely. Lesbian is the
only concept I know of which is beyond the categories of sex (woman and man)
[...]’

In *Nomadic Subjects*, Braidotti's feminist project embarks from the point
that ‘there can be no subjectivity outside sexuation, or language; the subject is
always gendered: it is a “she-I” or a “he-I”’ (2011:128). The tense of this ‘always’
is not entirely clear: if it means that we can't imagine any potential future form of
language and sexuality without binary gender, this opposes Wittig's project from
the start. On the other hand, we might read it to say that people living now have
(with few exceptions) grown up gendered as male or female. Braidotti's account
of sexual difference then deepens the conception of how humans are ‘marked’ by
gender from birth through infancy and as we learn to move, to speak, to value and
interpret the world, to experience and shape our bodies, to identify others and
ourselves as subjects and as objects and as members of groups, and to practice
domination and resistance.

Braidotti, unlike Wittig, holds that the historical identity of woman can be
re-deployed within a project of resistance. Her argument draws on the idea that
practices of gender identification have produced, or allowed the production of, a
collectivity or ‘community of women’. Although this collective identity is
‘enforced’ by practices of domination, this doesn't prevent it from being – to bring
in Nietzsche – ‘reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed’ (GM2:12). The
importance of ‘the signifier “woman”’ is that it is ‘the concept around which
feminists have gathered’ even if it is also ‘the very concept that needs to be
analysed critically’ (2011:130). By using the name of woman, feminists can gather
together women in order to work collectively against gender domination, which
includes ‘the project of redefining female subjectivity’ (ibid). Referring to Spivak
and to Irigaray’s strategy of ‘mimesis’, Braidotti suggests that women need to
gather together in order to ‘work through’ and so overcome the existing
‘dichotomous logic in which Western culture has captured sexed identities’ (ibid).
This collective process:

allows for the constitution and the legitimation of a gendered female feminist
community. In other words, the ‘she-self’ fastens upon the presence of the
female embodied self, the woman, but it does so only as long as other women
sustain, hic et nunc, the project of redefining female subjectivity. It is a sort of
ontological leap forward by which a politically enforced collective subject, the
‘we women’ of the women’s movement, can empower the subjective becoming
of each one of us ‘I, woman.’ (ibid).

Braidotti’s approach here follows the classic resistance theme of ‘self-
emancipation’ – to draw on the slogan of the First International that ‘the
emancipation of the workers must be the task of the workers themselves’. Or, to
take a more micropolitical example, we can recall Herman’s discussion of the role
played by the comradeship of combat units, and of the ‘rap groups’ of war
veterans and survivors of abuse, in working through trauma. In many different
contexts, it is those who share common experience of a form of domination who
are best able to combat it in a project of collective action. Thus Braidotti’s project
sees women’s ‘common ground of experience’ (ibid:135) as underlying the
collective feminist project of those who are ‘mutually engaged in a political task
of resistance to “Woman” – the dominant view of female subjectivity’ (ibid).
Despite their clear differences, I want to bring out a shared dynamic structure in the projects of Wittig and Braidotti. Both projects develop around three distinct perspectives, or moments, of identity. For both, the starting point is a past and present definition of ‘woman’: an identity that is shaped by a history of domination and struggle, but that lives very much in the present as it is deeply incorporated into bodies and relationships here and now. Second, both projects move towards a future in which gendered identities will be transformed: whether, for Wittig, destroyed outright; or, for Braidotti, remade. Thirdly, to reach this future involves the formation of more specific alliances, communities and forms of life, that are actively engaged in resistance here and now: ‘feminists’, ‘lesbians’, ‘feminist women’.

How, within the projects, do these three identity schemes connect to each other? For Wittig, the projected relationship between past and future female groupings is straightforward: the aim is that the class of women will cease to exist. For Braidotti, there also appears to be a straightforward relationship, but this time one of continuity: female subjectivity is being redefined, but apparently in the same way for all, so that those who are women now will also be women in the future – or at least, this is what is suggested by Braidotti’s framing of the project in the singular ‘a redefinition of the female subject’ (ibid:131). More complex, in both cases, is the relation between the ‘class’ or category of women as a whole and the resistance groups that form within it. Is there only one ‘feminist movement’, or one ‘lesbian society’, that needs to come together around one project whether of rejecting or redefining? Or is there scope for multiple feminist projects advanced by multiple feminist communities and alliances?20 To recall the

20 Neither writer explicitly address this question. The language they use to frame their projects
discussion of de Gaulle in Section 1: must there be one Resistance, or can there be many resistances?

Now to bring in Nietzsche's thinking of self-transformation, I want to generalise this schema of three moments of identity, and think about three key moments for a self-transformative project. I will think of these as states of composition of a psychic ecology – although we might also think in a similar way about projects directed at social or material changes.

The first state is the current composition of a body of drives, its ‘nature’ – that is, the make-up of all its values, desires and practices, as they has been formed by historical processes of transmission, transformation, incorporation, and by normalisation, subjectivation and other ordering processes. This is the ‘status quo’, the material that any project of transformation must begin with. It makes up at least an important part of what Nietzsche refers to as our ‘fate’ (GS276). In feminist projects of identity, this fate includes the identity of ‘Woman’ as it has been shaped and enforced by past and present relations of domination. For Nietzsche, the starting point for any project of transformation is the study of the ‘physics’ of bodies as they have been and are composed. For feminist and other resistance projects, it is particularly important to note how current compositions tends to the singular. Drawing on Adrienne Rich's politics of location, Braidotti recognises a ‘continuum’ of women's experience, made up of ‘multiple, complex, and potentially contradictory sets of experience’ (2011:128). However, this continuum ‘draws the boundaries’ within which can emerge ‘a redefinition of the female subject’, (ibid:131), this being the project of ‘the community of women’ (ibid) coming together in ‘an alliance or social pact’ (ibid:133) to make up ‘the common corpus of female subjects who posit themselves theoretically and politically as a collective subject’ (ibid:134). Whereas experiences are multiple, the project and its community is singular. More generally, could Braidotti's strategy of redefinition not be one possible feminist project amongst many, with different affinities and communities forming around different projects? Certainly in her discussion of subjectivity throughout Nomadic Subjects she emphasises multiplicity and diversity, the difference amongst and within each woman. Wittig also often writes about ‘the feminist movement’, etc., and addresses her text to a 'we' whose identity is not always clear. Yet she certainly acknowledges through her text multiple strands and tendencies within feminist and lesbian movements, many of which strongly disagree with her approach.
have been, and continue to be, shaped by relations of domination. Although it may also help us to remember that even in the bleakest circumstances a body's history is never only a history of domination, but also a history of past and ongoing movements of resistance.

The second reference is a projection, an aspirational vision of the future. This is Nietzsche's 'artistic plan' (GS290) that guides the self-creator. In feminist projects such as those of Wittig and Braidotti, this vision involves new forms of identity for those currently marked as women – whether these involve redefining or rejecting gender altogether. This vision does not have to give a detailed blueprint: for example, in both Wittig's and Braidotti's projects it is defined mainly in the negative. In Nietzschean terms, this vision is a projection guided by a particular ‘taste’ or ‘style’ – that is, by a value or desire, or complex of values and desires, that has managed to achieve a position of ‘rule’ within a body composed as a subject.

The third reference is an assemblage of values, desires and practices that are actively involved in the ongoing work of the project. I will call this the project form of life. It includes, amongst other things, the values and desires that guide the work of self-transformation in its everyday activity, and all the particular practices of study, therapy, intervention, defence, attack, etc., that are employed. This is where we have a major cleavage between Nietzsche's project and the feminist projects of Wittig and Braidotti. Nietzsche has a particular individualist view of what the form of life of a self-transforming project must involve. The feminist projects, on the other hand, are collective projects: rather than isolating herself, the self-transforming subject finds or creates an alliance, a community of subjects.
who work together on their overlapping projects. Here the project form of life is a collective form of life – perhaps indeed, a *culture* – that takes shape through the interactions of a group of allied bodies.

*Nietzsche's solitude*

Why does Nietzsche present self-transformation as fundamentally an individual project? Solitude is an important theme for Nietzsche in *Dawn*, where it develops alongside the idea of the ‘herd’, of the mass of people bound together by imitative herd instinct, ‘morality of custom’, and also the powerful instinct of compassion or pity (*Mitleid*, literally ‘suffering-with’). The need for solitude is the need to remove oneself from the herd, from conventional opinion, from the mimetic contagion of mainstream values. To focus on developing my own project I have to get away from the ‘noise and dust’ (D177) of society. So Nietzsche writes in D491:

> For this reason I enter into solitude – so as not to drink out of everyone's cisterns. Amid the many I live like the many and don't think as I; after some time I always feel then as if they wanted to ban me from myself and rob my soul – and I turn angry toward everyone and fear everyone. Then I need the desert to

21 For a different view see Ure (2008: Chapter 7). Ure argues that ‘For Nietzsche solitude is not a contraction of oneself from others or a means of blocking one's receptivity to the other. It is a way of processing the fear and anger generated by the unyielding communal demand that one yield one's individuality to the tyranny of the collective conscience” (ibid:214). I think Ure is right to point out this “processing” or “self-digestion” (ibid:215; see also D18) role of solitude for Nietzschean therapy; but wrong to reject the many other passages, some of which I cite in this section, where Nietzsche clearly does think of solitude in terms of ‘blocking one's receptivity to the other’. Indeed the two points are connected: solitude gives us the possibility for self-cultivation *in part* because it makes a space away from social “receptivity”. Parkes (1994:285-9) also brings out some further important points about the role of solitude in Nietzsche's development of drive psychology and drive therapy: very summarily, solitude helps Nietzsche to listen to and converse with his multiple drives as 'other persons in our conversations with ourselves’ (D569).
We also see a more specific theme appearing in D323. The common values and desires that I am exposed to in society are particularly sick and harmful values, values of what Nietzsche will later call *ressentiment*. Those I encounter in society are ‘revenge addicts’, ‘invalids of all stripes, the sickly and oppressed’, and ‘the whole air is constantly buzzing from the arrows and darts launched by their malice so that the sun and sky of life are darkened by it – not just for them but even more so for us, the remaining ones’. ‘Therefore solitude’ because otherwise ‘don’t we end up denying from time to time sun and sky simply because we haven’t seen them for so long?’

These ideas continue to develop in later texts where Nietzsche links solitude, cleanliness, and the noble ‘pathos of distance’. Through *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche explores Zarathustra's movements of retreat – going out to the desert, or ‘going up’ to the mountains – to work on himself in solitude, as well as his attempts to ‘descend’ again to society. Zarathustra also describes his ascent as ‘draw[ing] circles around me and sacred boundaries’ (*Z* ‘On Old and New Tablets’ 19). In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche will call *Zarathustra* ‘a dithyramb on solitude or, if I have been understood, on cleanliness [...]’ (*EH* ‘Why I am so wise’ 8). In *Beyond Good and Evil* he connects solitude to the noble ‘pathos of distance’:

> solitude is with us a virtue: it is a sublime urge and inclination for cleanliness which divines that all contact between man and man – “in society” – must

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22 See also D485: ‘But why this solitude?’ ‘I'm not angry with anyone. But on my own I seem to see my friends more clearly and more appealingly than when together with them [...] It seems I need distant perspectives to think well of things.’
inevitably be unclean. All community makes somehow, somewhere, sometime – “common” (BGE284).23

And yet Nietzsche does also have some positive images of alliances. One of these is the community of nobles in the *Genealogy*. The masters form a community of equals who come together ‘with the aim of aggressive collective action’ (GM3:18), ‘organised for war and with the ability to organise’ (GM1:17). It is this collective structuring that gives them the terrible strength they turn on their enemies, even as ‘in their relations with one another [they] show themselves so resourceful in consideration, self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship’ (GM1:11). Furthermore, the noble tribe shares not just practices (of war) but a form of life, a shared ‘mode of valuation’ and a shared identity expressed in the first person plural affirmation that grounds their valuing – ‘we noble ones, we good, beautiful happy ones!’ (GM1:10); although Nietzsche also insists that this collective is only maintained ‘with much resistance from the individual conscience’ of these members of the ‘solitary, beast-of-prey species of man’ (GM3:18).

We can catch sight of another kind of positive alliance in Nietzsche’s discussions of friendship. Zarathustra ‘teache[s] … the friend’ as a ‘festival of the earth and an anticipation of the overman’ (Z ‘On Love of the Neighbour’ 4). In *The Gay Science* Nietzsche contrasts the dependency and possessiveness of sexual love, as he understands it, with another kind of love called friendship, which is a

23 See also BGE271: the instinct for cleanliness ‘is distinguishing – it is a noble inclination – but it also separates’. And especially GM3:18: ‘the strong are as naturally inclined to separate as the weak are to congregate; if the former unite together, it is only with the aim of aggressive collective action and collective satisfaction of their will to power, and with much resistance from the individual conscience; the latter, on the contrary, enjoy precisely this coming together – their instinct is just as much satisfied by this as the instinct of the born ‘masters’ (that is, the solitary, beast-of-prey species of man) is fundamentally disquieted by organisation.’
‘shared higher thirst for an ideal’ (GS14). Amongst the many more complex notes in Nietzsche's references to friendship, I want to highlight a few themes. One is that friendship means ‘Mitfreude’, or ‘joying-with’, as opposed to ‘Mitleid’ or ‘suffering-with’ (HH499, AOM62, GS338).24 Another is that a friend is an antagonist – even, ‘the best enemy’ (Z ‘On the Friend’ 4) – who, far from showing pity, helps by challenging and spurring on the other.25 Furthermore, Benedetta Zavatta (2008), in an essay discussing Nietzsche's thoughts on friendship together with his reading of Emerson, notes also a particularly ‘therapeutic’ role that the friend can play.26 Although Nietzsche urges solitude, she concludes:

solitude also houses dangers, including that of not being able to see oneself objectively and that of ‘resting’ one's convictions. Therefore, for self-perfectionism it is necessary, according to Nietzsche, both to move away from the masses and to seek relationships with one's equals. Friendship is the ideal condition for attaining this objective, since it represents an alternative both to solitude and to life in society (2008:525)

In 1876 Nietzsche attempted to put this approach into practice by establishing what he called a ‘cloister for freer spirits’ (Kloster für freiere Geister), or “school of educators” (who educate themselves’), which Zavatta describes as ‘a micro-community of friends’ living and studying together.27 Nietzsche writes in a letter to one prospective member: ‘If you knew what this meant to me! In fact, I am always hunting for men like any pirate, but not to sell them as slaves, rather to

24 For a more detailed discussion of Mitfreude and friendship see Ure (2008: Chapter 7).
25 E.g., (Z ‘On the Friend’ 4): ‘In one's friend one should have one's best enemy’. See also GS338, the beautiful ‘star friendship’ of GS279, and GS283 where Nietzsche advises ‘seekers of knowledge’ to ‘Live at war with yourselves and your peers!’ Also GM1:10 on the noble’s ‘reverence’ for enemies. For further perspectives on Nietzsche and the relation between friendship and enmity see Richardson 1995 185-191); van Tongeren (2008).
26 On this point see also the final chapter of Ure (2008).
ransom myself with them in liberty!’

Keith Ansell-Pearson (forthcoming) writes that Nietzsche nurtured through the ‘free spirit’ period the idea of founding ‘a philosophical school modelled on Epicurus's garden’, writing about this project to his friend Peter Gast as late as 1883. In following this model, Nietzsche both envisages a community that can work together on projects of self-transformation, and at the same time takes up the Epicurean injunctions ‘live unnoticed’ and ‘do not get involved in politics’. In short, the Epicurean garden is a shared seclusion. The retreating individual draws, like Zarathustra, ‘circles’ and ‘boundaries’ around herself, partitioning the social ecology in order to segregate and work on the psychic ecology. The retreating community does the same; but the partition is drawn around a group rather than an individual.

**Rebel packs**

The pack of nobles is an alliance of equals that shares a political project of domination, of conquest and state-formation. The Epicurean community of friends is a coalition of equals that shares an ‘anti-political’ project of self-transformation, removing itself from struggles of domination and resistance in the wider social ecology. Neither of these groups is involved in what I am calling a self-

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29 The image of the garden runs through Dawn – therapy is viewed as the gardening of the drives; and the aim is *fashioning* out of oneself something the other will behold with pleasure, a lovely, peaceful, self-enclosed garden, for instance, with high walls to protect against the dangers and dust of the roadway, but with a hospitable gate as well* (D 174).
30 As Marina Cominos (2008) discusses, Nietzsche uses the term ‘anti-political’ twice. He calls himself ‘the last anti-political German’ in the first version of *Ecce Homo* (EH ‘Why I am so wise’ 3) – although he removed this line from a revised edition; and in (TI ‘Germans’ 4) he writes that ‘what is great culturally has always been unpolitical, even anti-political’. 
transforming resistance project and, as far as I am aware, Nietzsche nowhere considers the possibility of coalitions of this kind. Very summarily, I think we can connect this gap to two important limits in Nietzsche's thinking. The first limit relates to his general philosophical approach to social relations. That is, whereas Nietzsche explores in great depth relations of domination and resistance, he does not develop to anything like the same degree a philosophy of non-hierarchical alliances. He very frequently thinks that 'all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming master’ (GM2:12). It is perhaps because of this view that Nietzsche does not come to think more generally about the possibilities for communities of equals.\footnote{As I discussed in Chapter 6, in fact this limit applies not only to social relations but also to his thinking of internal relations between drives within a body.}

The second limit relates to Nietzsche's social perspective, a narrow and prejudiced view of the social ecologies of nineteenth century Europe. Nietzsche denies, or perhaps simply doesn't see, possibilities for oppressed bodies of workers, women, or other slaves to form empowering communities of friends. In the \textit{Genealogy}, Nietzsche eavesdrops on a part of the hidden transcript of the dispossessed and overhears ressentiment, millenarian plotting, and revenge fantasies. It is certainly the case that anarchists, feminists, anti-imperialists, socialists and others of his time (as in other times) had their share of these sicknesses. But this is only a part of the hidden transcript of rebel movements. What Nietzsche never hears in the ‘frantic baying [...] of the anarchist dogs’ (BGE202) that so terrifies him is the calls of comradeship and solidarity, the self-transformative experiments with new lives and new cultures, the activity, bravery and embrace of fate.
I will return to this second limit in the final section. Here I will just make a very brief suggestion as to how a Nietzschean thinking of self-transforming resistance projects might be extended by developing a broader view of alliances. My suggestion is not an original one: following Deleuze, one way forward is to read Nietzsche together with Spinoza. In his reading of Spinoza, Deleuze distinguishes two sorts of encounters between bodies, which can be characterised by the affects they produce in us: ‘joyful’, or ‘sad’ (1968:239). In a joyful encounter, I meet another body which ‘agrees with my nature’ and ‘increases my power of acting’ (ibid). A sad or ‘evil’ meeting is one that weakens my body, acting on it, as Spinoza explains in his correspondence with Blyenburgh, like a decomposing poison (ibid:248). We can see this theme underlying the politics Spinoza that works out in the *Tractatus Politicus*: ‘If two men unite and join forces, then together they have more power, and consequently more right against other things in nature, than either alone ...’ (1955:2.13).

We can use this Spinozist viewpoint to frame the characteristics of a ‘pack’ or ‘band’ of friends and comrades, as opposed to a herd. The key point is that although a herd may gather strength in numbers by massing bodies together, each member is in the process weakened with respect to her possibilities for individual action and self-transformation. Being in a herd makes you dependent, weak, sick, and vulnerable to old or new forms of slavery. In contrast, the pack is a coalition

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32 Michael Hardt (1993), following Deleuze’s movement through Nietzsche to Spinoza, places emphasis on this form of political encounter in which two bodies ‘are compatible and together compose a new relationship, a new body’. To fully understand this compatibility in Spinoza’s terms would involve looking at his conceptions of adequacy and the common notion (see Deleuze (1968: chapter 16), Hardt (1993: chapter 3.8)). I find Hardt’s treatment of Deleuze’s relationship with Nietzsche and Spinoza useful, but I do not agree with his specific (post-)Marxist valuation of the type of encounter that he calls ‘organisation’, which seems to limit possibilities for joyful rebellious alliances to coming together in one big mass or multitude. This rather smacks of Nietzsche’s ‘autonomous herd’ (BGE202).
that empowers its members in pursuing their own individual projects and forms of
life, in so far as these coincide. The pack does not stop you from following ‘your
own way’ (to paraphrase GS338), but strengthens you to act both collectively and
as an individual. So: under what conditions can we form packs? Specifically, can
dominated bodies only form packs if they can first escape (‘emigrate’) and
seclude themselves from hierarchical social ecologies, or is it possible to form a
pack whilst at the same time fighting where we are?33

Nietzsche's main ‘reason for solitude’ is to partition the social ecology in
such a way that an individual or pack has a free space for self-transformative work
– free, that is, from mimetic assimilation of the values of the herd, including pity
and ressentiment. However, this partitioning does not necessarily have to involve
a physical exile or removal. The same role is played by the pathos of distance of
the nobles; but also, as I suggested above in discussing base resistance, by the
various strategies of subordinates for maintaining hidden transcripts and other
resisting free spaces. That is: social ecologies can also be partitioned through
cultural means, and technologies for doing this are also available to – indeed, they
are typically very much part of the life of – resisting groups. A broader study of
the possibilities of packs would thus involve a broader study of practices of
separation and differentiation – alongside practices of openness and unification –
within struggles against domination.

33 The image of the pack in opposition to the herd – or ‘mass’ – is developed by Deleuze and
Guattari (1980:1st Plateau), drawing on Elias Canetti (1978). ‘The pack, even on its own turf,
is constituted by a line of flight or of deterritorialization that is a component part of it, and to
which it accredits a high positive value, whereas masses only integrate these lines in order to
segment them, obstruct them, ascribe them a negative sign. Canetti notes that in a pack each
member is alone even in the company of others (for example, wolves on the hunt); each takes
care of himself at the same time as participating in the band.’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1980:33).
As Deleuze and Guattari also point out: ‘Doubtless, there is no more equality or any less
hierarchy in packs than in masses’ (ibid) – although they argue that pack hierarchy is ‘of a
different kind’ (ibid). The strong hierarchy of packs of wolves and other beasts of prey does
rather weaken the metaphor for my purposes.
8.4 Affirmative resistance

Throughout his writing Nietzsche sneers at those who resist domination. Most notably, he associates anarchism, socialism and other modern slave revolts with Christian morality and the sickness of *ressentiment*. In one of his most explicit published passages, BGE202, he argues that ‘the democratic movement inherits the Christian’, the herd morality of ‘praising and blaming’. His greatest scorn is reserved for anarchists who, despite their apparent distance from ‘the placidly industrious democrats and revolutionary ideologues’ are ‘in fact one with them all’ in their ‘religion of pity’. The ‘plant’ of *ressentiment* ‘blooms best’ amongst anarchists (and anti-semites) (GM 2:11), and insurrection is no more than ‘the explosion of a stored-up antipathy against the “masters”’ (WP209). In short, the key note of Nietzsche's anti-anarchist rants is that resistance is motivated by vengeance. Those who resist do so not to affirm our ‘own’ values and forms of life, but out of hatred of the other: And *ressentiment* is a sickness – in acting vengefully, we not only harm the enemy, but weaken our own bodies and groups, and so continue to make ourselves vulnerable to new forms of slavery.

I don't believe that resistance to domination has to fall into *ressentiment*. It is possible to fight against an oppressor whilst also fighting for one's own projects. Nietzsche's particular bile against anarchism and other resistance movements, I think, is largely a result of his own prejudice, ignorance, and fear. However, we can valuably listen to his thoughts on resistance and *ressentiment* if we treat them not as diagnoses but as warnings: it is not the case that all rebellion weakens itself; but there are dangers, pitfalls, that rebels do well to look out for.
I start again with Deleuze's highlighting of the concepts of active and reactive: ‘superior or dominant forces are known as *active* and the inferior or dominated forces as *reactive*’ (1962:37). On that definition, projects of resistance, being projects of the dominated, are reactive. Still more generally, as I argued in Chapter 6, we can say that a move or project is reactive insofar as it is prompted by an encounter with an outside body. These two definitions are connected: the weaker a body is relative to other bodies in a social ecology, the more it is susceptible to encounters that prompt it to act in new ways, that block or otherwise redirect its primary patterns of activity. But the crucial point is whether an action or reaction is *harmful* to the body: that is, whether it weakens the body, diminishing its possibilities of action. Not all reactions are harmful. For example, in the noble’s ‘true reaction, that of deed’, the strong body responds to an insult or incursion with a physical act of ‘requital’ (GM1:10), and does no harm to itself by immediately ‘discharging’ its aggression. Or, for example, Nietzsche is clear that critical negation is often a healthy response:

> When we criticise something, this is [...] at least very often, evidence of vital energies in us that are growing and shedding a skin. We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm – something that we perhaps do not know or see as yet. (GS307)

So, Nietzsche does not give a blanket condemnation of all reactions or all negations. Rather, in the *Genealogy* he analyses some particular ‘sickly’ responses to domination. Specifically, the focus in Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt in GM1:10 is on the compensatory reaction in which ‘ressentiment’ itself becomes creative and gives birth to values’. This imaginary revenge involves creating a
new pattern of valuing by ‘inverting’ the values of the masters and blaming them as ‘evil’. I argued in Chapter 6 that this value inversion is only one particular form of reactive value creation. There are also other ways that bodies can respond to being blocked by outside forces, and which involve creating new values. For example, these include the mutations and creative leaps that Nietzsche discusses in *Human, All Too Human*. In short, resentful valuing is one possible path that a slave revolt in values can take, but not the only one.

Here we can recap some of the basic points about Nietzschean genealogy discussed in Chapter 1. Genealogy identifies transformations that result from encounters and combinations of lineages. And these combinations are contingent and often unpredictable – as Foucault puts it, the genealogist needs to trace ‘the details and accidents that accompany every beginning’ (NGH:344). So, whether a resisting body responds to domination by creating resentful values, or by following some other quite different path, is a contingent outcome shaped by the particular combinations that have occurred in its history. On this basis, when Nietzsche claims that 19th century anarchism follows the same resentful valuing patterns as Christianity, this is not a claim about a timelessly necessary pattern of all resistance to domination, it is a contingent local historical claim about European moral lineages. It is on this basis, the basis of genealogy, that we should consider Nietzsche's thoughts about resistance movements.

It could be a rewarding project to investigate actual genealogies of anarchism and other resistance traditions in Nietzschean terms in order to trace, amongst other things, their relationships with Christian and other moral orthodoxies and heresies. Nietzsche certainly didn't carry out any kind of ‘grey’
and detailed genealogical investigation of anarchism, and I don't know that anyone else has since. I will just make two notes. First, anyone embarking on such a project needs to pay close attention to Scott's crucial methodological observations about the multiple public and hidden transcripts of resistance and the strategic and performative roles they play. Second, any genealogy of anarchism beyond about 1890 has to consider Nietzsche's own very important influence.

To the extent that Nietzsche knew anything at all of anarchism, it was almost certainly through ‘public transcripts’ filtered by the perspectives of his peers as well as his own class prejudice. But Nietzsche was a remorselessly honest student of his own psycho-physiology, including its Christian heritage. Insofar as 19th century anarchists shared patterns of nature and culture with Nietzsche, insofar as we still share much of the same heritage today, and insofar as we embark on projects of self-transformation, we can find many important lessons in his thought. These lessons include important warnings about the dangers of ressentiment for rebels. I want to highlight some of these warnings in the context of thinking about how we orient resistance projects to the past, present and future.

First, Nietzsche warns us about the danger of resenting our ‘fate’. If we want to create projects of resistance that increase our power rather than weaken us further, we need to become honest students of the current nature of our bodies and

34 E.g., many of the most important transcripts of rebel movements through history are court documents and trial statements, which are documents of confrontations in a remorselessly ‘public’ space. In fact the centrality of trial statements is still true of 19th century and indeed contemporary anarchism even though, unlike earlier movements, we also have an abundance of journals, memoirs, and friendly and hostile propaganda to look at.

35 As far as I am aware, there has been no study of Nietzsche's knowledge of anarchism. A search of his Nachlass and letters does not offer many clues, with only one cursory reference to each of two named anarchist writers, Proudhon and Bakunin. My guess is that, as is largely the case with his knowledge of Marx and Marxism (on which see Brobjer 2002), Nietzsche’s impressions of anarchism came mainly from newspaper coverage and hostile secondary references.
our ecologies. Such integrity (*Redlichkeit*) is difficult, rare and often painful.\(^{36}\)

Nietzsche challenges us to maintain an honest gaze at what we are, how we have been formed, and at our possibilities for action and transformation, without flinching or retreating into bitterness, despair, moralisation or idealisation. Those who have lived through traumatic histories of domination may face this challenge in particularly acute forms. In GS337 Nietzsche asks whether anyone could possibly endure the experience of ‘the history of humanity as a whole as his own history’, with its ‘immense sum of grief of all kinds’. He invokes the image of a ‘hero on the evening after a battle that has decided nothing but brought him wounds and the loss of his friend’, but who then ‘as the second day of battle breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune’. It is this sentiment of honest affirmation that he calls ‘*amor fati*’, love of fate.\(^{37}\)

\(^{36}\) Nietzsche frequently sees his psychological investigations as digging up ugly or shameful truths – the ‘*pudenda origo*’ of D102. In this, as Robert Pippin brings out, Nietzsche situates himself in the lineage of the sceptical French moralistes, with a particular fascination for Montaigne’s ability ‘to exhibit such a thorough-going skepticism and clarity about human frailty and failings (the virtue of *Redlichkeit* so often praised by Nietzsche) without Pascal’s despair and eventual surrender, or La Rochefoucauld’s icy contempt for the “human all too human”.’ (Pippin 2009:74).

\(^{37}\) This idea is introduced in GS276, the opening section of Book 4 of the Gay Science: ‘I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation. And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer.’ A difficulty with my interpretation, which reads *amor fati* together with *Redlichkeit*, is that here Nietzsche advocates ‘looking away’ rather than looking honestly at what is ugly. But it may be some things are just too ugly or dangerous to scrutinise – as, e.g., in the dark workshop of GM, where the investigator can only bear a brief exposure to the processes of *ressentiment* creating values. Looking away may then be a necessity; the real problem would be not just looking away from things but also denying their existence. This comes across more clearly in Nietzsche’s later formulation: ‘*amor fati*: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, *still less conceal it* […] but love it.’ (EH ‘Why Am I so Clever’ 10).

*Amor fati* is a particularly stringent challenge, and despite Nietzsche’s desire to become a ‘yes-sayer’, his works after GS are increasingly critical and negative, following closer to the model of GS307: ‘We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm’. There are also places, I think, where Nietzsche accepts a less than loving attitude towards fate; for example, in his valorisation of ‘contempt’ in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: ‘the time approaches where humans no longer launch the arrow of their longing beyond the human […] the time of the most contemptible human is coming, the one who can no longer have contempt for himself!’ (Z Prologue 5). At least the ‘noble’ attitude of contempt can still share the honesty of *amor fati* – unlike slavish attitudes of resentment, reification, idealisation, etc., that conceal and
Secondly, Nietzsche warns us against retreating into an ‘after-world’ or ever-deferred future. This does not mean rejecting altogether goals, visions, and strategies – that would itself be another kind of retreat, into an entirely reactive living without horizon. Rather, Nietzsche talks about living with ‘longing’ for new becomings: the struggles of our past and present create a ‘magnificent tension of the spirit’, and ‘with such a tension in our bow we can shoot at the furthest goal’ (BGE preface). What is important is that future goals and present practices are tied together in an evolving immanent dynamic. The dangers that Nietzsche diagnoses in socialist movements involve alienating one’s power to act: delegating responsibility to others; or deferring life to the future so that ‘you are waiting and waiting for something external, but otherwise you continue to live in every way the same way as you had otherwise lived before [...]’ (D208). Whereas to nurture resistance we need, in a phrase from contemporary anarchism, to act for freedom now.

Third, Nietzsche warns against poisoning the forms of life we live now with ressentiment. This does not mean never negating or requiting, but there is a real danger that resisting forms of life can become dominated by responding to the values and attacks of others. A form of life without confrontation and struggle will make you weak and sick, but so will a form of life without joy, affirmation, and deny what is.

38 The Argentinian anarchist America Scarfó (1928), in a letter written when she was 16 years old, expresses very beautifully an anarchist attitude towards the connection between future and present practice, and social and individual struggles: ‘I desire for all just what I desire for myself: the freedom to act, to love, to think. That is, I desire anarchy for all humanity. I believe that in order to achieve this we should make a social revolution. But I am also of the opinion that in order to arrive at this revolution it is necessary to free ourselves from all kinds of prejudices, conventionalisms, false moralities and absurd codes. And, while we wait for this great revolution to break out, we have to carry out this work in all the actions of our existence. And indeed in order to make this revolution come about, we can’t just content ourselves with waiting but need to take action in our daily lives.’
Nietzsche writes that he wants to make his friends ‘bolder, more persevering, simpler, gayer’ (GS338). And rebels are perhaps especially in need of learning ‘what is understood by so few today, least of all by these preachers of pity: to share not suffering but joy’ (ibid).

39 Here is just one anarchist statement of this Nietzschean point, from Kropotkin (1897):
‘Struggle! To struggle is to live, and the fiercer the struggle the more intense the life. Then you will have lived, and a few hours of such life are worth years spent vegetating. Struggle so that all may live this rich, overflowing life. And be sure that in this struggle you will find a joy greater than anything else can give!’ This connection of struggle and joy is a very common theme in anarchist writing. Nietzsche’s influence has undoubtedly played a part in that: e.g., some of the best known statements of this theme are from Emma Goldman, or from the letters of Sacco and Vanzetti, all great readers of Nietzsche. This is unlikely to apply to Kropotkin, however, who was no fan. What they did share was a common influence in the life-affirming ethics of Jean-Marie Guyau (1885). Kropotkin discusses Guyau in his unfinished treatise on ethics (1924); for Guyau’s influence on Nietzsche see Brobjer (2008:172n).
Appendix to Chapter 2: Do drives have goals?

My interpretation of drives in Chapter 2 is, in a number of respects, influenced by John Richardson's (1996; 2005) view of Nietzsche's rives as characteristic ‘activity patterns’ (1996:21-28). However, there is also a clear divergence. According to Richardson, we need to think of Nietzschean drives in terms of ends or goals. He writes:

I take it that Nietzsche, despite his repeated attacks on (what he calls) “teleology”, really has such a theory himself: the beings or units in his world [i.e., drives] are crucially end-directed, and to understand them properly is to grasp how they’re directed or aimed. (1996:21)

Richardson identifies a double telic structure. Firstly, each particular drive has its distinct ‘internal end’, or ‘internal network of ends’ which identifies and characterises it. ‘The sex drive, for example, is one pattern of activity aiming at its own network of ends – perhaps these are centred on seduction or coupling or orgasm – whereas the drive to eat aims at a very different network’ (ibid:21).

Secondly, all drives also share a further ‘second order’ end of ‘power’ – which is not really a distinct goal but rather the ‘enhancement’ and ‘extension’ of their activity in pursuit of their internal ends. I won't look at this second ‘will to power’ aspect here but will focus on the question of whether we to ‘understand them properly’ we indeed need to characterise them in terms of ‘internal’ ends.¹

¹ I thus leave open a second question of whether Richardson is right that we need to view drives telically in order to understand Nietzsche's thinking of will to power. I think that we don't need teleology here either, but I don't have space to make the argument here.
Nietzsche's anti-teleology

First, though, what about Nietzsche's 'repeated attacks' on teleology? Richardson argues that Nietzsche's main problem is only with 'intentionalist' explanation of human behaviour as purposive, rather than with teleology per se. I take Nietzsche's attacks more literally, and read him as thoroughly problematising all teleological thinking. I think that Nietzsche has a number of problems with purposes. Some may only, or mainly, apply to attributing purposes to human agents. For example, it might be argued that such purposive explanation is based on a paradigm of introspective access to one's own motives, challenged by Nietzsche's views on the limits and distortions of conscious introspection (See Chapter 4 on this). However, I think that Nietzsche also has a deeper concern about all forms of telic ascriptions, including the form that Richardson develops in his later book (2004), the attribution of function-like goals to drives.

This concern emerges in the genealogies of causation and willing that Nietzsche develops from Human, All Too Human and into his later works. In Section 2.1 I briefly mentioned Nietzsche's discussion of how humans erroneously learn to dismember the world into atomic entities and events. Nietzsche adds that, in a late stage of our error-making, we then 'mythologically' (BGE21) connect entities back together by imputing causal and other relations. Ideas of scientific or 'mechanistic' causation are the newest blossoming of this tendency, whose earliest form involves the superstitious ascription of purposive wills to all beings. More sophisticated forms of teleological explanation appear somewhere in between, offshoots of will- ascription that have not yet been fully reified and mechanised. In

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See, e.g., HH18, GS111, GS112, GS127, BGE21, BGE32, TI 'The four great errors' 3).
short: purposes are myths. Or, to use the softer language that Nietzsche applies to drives in D119, they are ‘images and fantasies’. Being myths that are deeply incorporated into human experiencing (See Chapter 3 on incorporation), we cannot simply throw them away, but we ought to employ them warily as ‘conventional fictions for the purpose of designation, mutual understanding, not explanation’ (BGE21).

Nietzsche makes clear that this critique applies more widely than just to conscious human intentions. For example, Richardson (2004: Chapter 1) argues that the etiological analysis of function developed by some philosophers of biology can ground an acceptable form of teleology. However, Nietzsche explicitly analyses biological function as subject to his critique. In D122 he argues that ‘sight was not the intention behind the origin of the eye; on the contrary, it turned up once chance had brought the apparatus together’. His conclusion from this is not just to distinguish some sense of function from intention, but to make a general rejection of evolutionary teleology: ‘One single such example: and “purposes” fall away like scales from our eyes!’

Here I read Nietzsche as in line not with the ‘neo-teleological’ view of philosophers of biology such as Wright (1973) and Ruth Millikan (1989) whom Richardson draws on, but rather with the critique raised to these approaches by Robert Cummins (2002). For Cummins, also, the prevalence of such ‘exaptations’ in evolutionary trajectories tells against evolutionary functionalism. Cummins argues instead that a coherent biological notion of function needs to be based in the pragmatic requirements of what he calls ‘functional analysis’. It can help us to ascribe function to, e.g., an organ or trait, in order to understand the role it plays in
a system that we disassemble pragmatically – for example, because we want to think about how such a part could be replaced or substituted. Here function is not ‘out there’ as a product of natural selection, but is a construction of human models, which serve particular human projects. That is, as Nietzsche would say, it is a ‘conventional fiction’.

To be clear, none of the above argues that we should never talk about ‘purposes’ or ‘causes’; and indeed, as discussed in Section 2.1 it all applies as well to ‘drives’ themselves, which are themselves only ‘fantasies and images’. Nietzsche certainly does use both telic and mechanistic imagery and language throughout his work. The point I want to draw out here is that it is by no means only ‘intentionalist’ teleology that Nietzsche criticises; it is not that there is a “good” form of non-intentionalist teleology that escapes his concerns. All purposes are flawed images, to be used with caution.

**Must we think of drives telically?**

My question now is: do we always need to deploy telic imagery to understand drives? In some cases, it certainly seems helpful or obvious to talk about a drive ‘to’ or ‘for’ a goal. But Richardson's stronger claims, which I am disputing, is that all drives should be characterised in terms of ‘networks of ends’.

This is not immediately apparent. First, turning once again to the marketplace story (D119): when you hear someone laughing and take it ‘like a drop of rain’, or ‘shake it off like an insect’, is there a need to think that any goals are being formulated or pursued? In these cases, drives appear primarily as
interpretive and evaluative stances, which imply no goal-directed activity. Of course, I argued above for a ‘unity principle’ in which the evaluating activity of drives is always related to action: a drive's interpretation of a situation already begins a movement towards bodily action. But that doesn't mean that this action is goal-directed. There are many forms of activity that do not immediately appear to be goal-directed. For example: the ‘almost automatic’ (D34) drive to involuntary imitation, which I think is one of the most central drives discussed in Dawn (see Chapter 3); or the ‘herd instinct’ to identify and identify with members of one's social group (see Chapter 4); or other ‘automatic’ responses like the trained reactions of athletes, fighters, dancers; or many everyday ‘habitual’ and unreflective activities. Or then there are desires that we may well be strongly aware of, and which indeed cause pause for reflection, but that impel us towards definite immediate actions rather than towards goals. For example, it sometimes happens that I just feel, and perhaps act on, a desire to hit a laughing man (or to kiss someone, or to speak my mind, or to jump in the ocean, …), without any concern at all for where my action will lead. A lot of human activity, I think, is of these kinds. And a psycho-physiology of drives should account for reflexes, impulsions, urges, and other non-telic activity patterns as much as for apparently purposive action.

A counter-argument might begin: even though an activity doesn't immediately appear to us (phenomenologically, or otherwise) as goal-directed, this doesn't mean that we can't give it a teleological explanation. But, on the other

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3 It might be said that here simply performing the action is itself the goal. But this is not very helpful if the reason for citing a goal is to explain the action (in Donald Davidson's (1963) terms, to ‘rationalise’ it); or in any other sense to understand the action by fitting it into a pattern.
hand, just because we can characterise and action teleologically, that doesn't mean that we must or should do so. If, as I argued above, telic terms are at least as much ‘images and fantasies’ as any others, then there seems no obvious reason why we should always work with purposes. Nietzsche himself uses a wide range of motivational language, just as often talking about ‘impulsion’ as goal-directed ‘attraction’: see, for example, GS305 where ‘natural stirrings and inclinations’ may ‘push, pull, attract, or impel … from inside or outside’. Why seek to reduce this plurality of imagery to one format?

For example: you are walking through the marketplace and hear someone laughing at you, and your hands clench into a fist. Now, you might perhaps explain or describe this activity purposively: your hands clench in preparation for pursuing a possible end, fighting with the laughing man. Or non-telically: e.g., your hands clenched in a learnt and engrained response. Here we have just two of perhaps many possible characterisations of the same activity. Both are common, indeed ‘common sense’, ways of thinking about human activity. Sometimes the first kind of characterisation seems to provide the most helpful ‘image’ for understanding the psycho-physiological pattern we are interested in, sometimes the second, and sometimes either (or neither) might be what we need to ‘understand’ the drive pattern in question.

Can we say more about when a goal-directed account of activity seems particularly apt? First, the paradigm case of goal-directed activity involves conscious deliberation: the formation of goals takes place, at least to some degree, in consciousness. I have discussed already Nietzsche's scepticism about such conscious goal attributions (and will say some more about it in Chapter 4). But,
secondly, there is another case that is not related to introspection. As Richardson notes, goal attribution can be a tool for characterising ‘plastic’ activity patterns. On these lines, we can break down a simple automatic activity pattern as follows: (1) you perceive a stimulus, laughter; (2) you respond in a definite way – you clench your fists, start to pick a fight. A ‘plastic’ goal-directed pattern is more complex: (1) you hear the laughter; (2) you form a goal, e.g., getting revenge on the laugher; (3) you act in pursuit of this goal in a way that adapts, ‘plastically’, to other features of the environment. E.g., noticing that you don't have much hope of taking on the laughing person in a fist fight, you look for a weapon, or concoct a more subtle plan. Goals add little or nothing to understanding non-plastic activity patterns, but can be handy for characterising plastic ones. Clenching your fists, looking for a weapon, or concocting a revenge plan, are three distinct actions; by introducing the idea of a goal we can bring them together as variations of one vengeful activity pattern.

There is much more to say on this, but I will end with one quick observation: even for a plastic drive, there may be other methods than attributing goals to characterise or ‘understand’ a drive. For example, what we might call a *genealogical* account of a drive would identify and understand that drive in terms of its developmental history: saying how it has become what it is through the transmission and transformation of elements of previous drive patterns, along its multiple lineages and paths of encounter, through various processes such as education, mimesis, and more. A genealogical description could characterise a plastic drive by identifying the historical formation of its various activity paths: how, when, in what contexts these have emerged.
I raise this possibility because it brings up a relevant parallel for Richardson's neo-teleological view of evolution. In evolutionary theory, identifying ‘functions’ may play a useful role in framing some evolutionary enquiries. But it can never substitute for a historical investigation of the contingent events and encounters through which an entity or lineage has evolved. Similarly, in Nietzsche's investigations of drives, a purposive characterisation even of the most plastic drive is not a substitute for what Nietzsche is most interested in, genealogical accounts of how drives have become what they are.
Appendix to Chapter 8: A very short note on false consciousness

In the 20th century Marxist thinkers such as György Lukács, Antonio Gramsci, and Louis Althusser addressed a form of the problem of voluntary servitude as they sought to understand the failure of their hopes for proletarian revolution in the ‘first world’. I am not going to look in any detail at these Marxist approaches, only to highlight two basic points of difference from my Nietzschean approach. First, Marxist discussions have focussed on the domination of economic classes, with the state and cultural apparatuses as means of class power, whereas this Nietzschean approach works with a more general framework in which power relations are not necessarily tied to ‘relations of production’. Second, Marxist discussions have typically seen ideological domination as leading the dominated to act against their ‘real interests’ (to use Steven Lukes’ term): thus, in the phrase Lukacs takes from Engels, as a form of ‘false consciousness’. This second point may also hold more generally for some other ‘humanist’ approaches to ideology: by which I mean views in which dominating ideology is seen to lead people to develop desires that go against core valuing stances of ‘human nature’.  

1 In Chapter 1 I noted Hume’s use of the idea of interest, and the historical investigations of the concept by Albert Hirschman and Foucault. I think it would be illuminating to continue that historical project looking at how liberal ideas of interest such as those of Hume and Adam Smith were developed within Marxism. For example, in Lukacs’ definition of class consciousness as ‘the appropriate and rational reactions imputed [zugerechnet] to a particular typical position in the process of production’ (1971:229) we read an idea of interest that descends from, and remains very close to, Hume’s conception of the ‘cold passion’ of avidity (the pursuit of material goods). In both cases, following one’s interests means adopting an evaluative stance that is (a) rational, calculating, objective – and so contrasted with fleeting, illusory, or misled forms of desiring and (b) tied to the economy. The obvious difference is that where Hume sees all humans as sharing a ‘like interest’ in the status quo, in Marxist theory humans occupy distinct asymmetric positions in an economic system that sets their interests at
Perhaps the clearest way to think about an idea of real interests is counterfactually: they are the valuing stances that people would follow if free from deep domination. So Lukacs defines class consciousness as ‘the appropriate and rational reactions imputed [zugerechnet] to a particular typical position in the process of production’ (1971:229), and which individuals would in fact experience ‘if they were able to assess [the situation] and the interests arising from it in their impact on immediate action and on the whole structure of society’ (ibid). Or, in the recent theory of Steven Lukes, real interests are those that people would follow or express if they could ‘exercis[e] choice under conditions of relative autonomy’ (2005:146).

Real interest theories can play both empirical and evaluative roles. Lukacs claims that 'the historically significant actions of the class as a whole' (1971:229) are guided by class consciousness: so we need to identify the real interests of classes if we are to understand history. For Lukes, the call to truth is ethical and political: we need to understand domination ‘as an imposition or constraint upon the dictates of one's nature’ (2005:117) in order to establish a politics of resistance grounded in an ethics of freedom. Or as Charles Taylor (1984) puts it in his critique of Foucault, to fight domination we need to raise the ‘banner of truth’.

I would suggest that a Nietzschean approach critiques both empirical and evaluative groundings of real interest. ‘Historically significant actions’ of workers and others are motivated by the contingently incorporated values and desires of people's bodies, whether or not these values and desires are formed by deep domination. Nietzsche, and Foucault following him, make important points about
the ethics and politics of claims to truth.² Perhaps the key Nietzschean observation is that claims to identify real interests and false consciousness can and do play important tactical roles as moves in power struggles. For Lukes and Taylor, they are weapons against domination. On the other hand, large parts of Foucault's work shows how ‘the power of truth’ (EW3:133) is mobilised by states, experts, judicial systems and dominating elites of all kinds.

Finally, if truth claims can be moves for both sides, they are not necessary moves for either. We can and do fight domination under other banners. Personally, I act against domination in my own life in order to follow the values, desires and practices that are of vital importance to me. I rarely pose the question of whether my values are true: the Nietzschean question of how they help me and those I love flourish – whether they are ‘life-promoting’ (BGE4) – seems much more relevant. And I don't think that values are, in many cases, most effectively defended or propagated by arguing for their truth. This is particularly the case for rebel values, where forums of debate are governed by the powerful. Slave revolts tend to spread not by persuasion but by contagion.

² Some of Foucault's clearest statements on discourses of ideology and the ‘power of truth’ are in the interview ‘Truth and Power’ (collected in EW3). The interview ends: ‘The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated consciousness, or ideology: it is truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche.’ (EW3;133).
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