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Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm
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Love, James H. (2010) Opportunism, hold-up and the (contractual) theory of the firm. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 166 (Number 3). pp. 479-501. doi:10.1628/093245610793102125 ISSN 0932-4569.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610793102125
Abstract
This paper considers the role of opportunism in three contractual theories of the firm: rent-seeking theory, property rights theory, and agency theory. In each case I examine whether it is possible to have a functioning contractual theory of the firm without recourse to opportunism. Without opportunism firms may still exist as a result of issues arising from (incomplete) contracting. Far from posing a problem for the theory of the firm, questioning the role of opportunism and the ubiquity of the hold-up problem helps us understand more about the purpose and functions of contracts which go beyond mere incentive alignment.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Strategy & International Business Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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Journal or Publication Title: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE | ||||
Publisher: | Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG | ||||
ISSN: | 0932-4569 | ||||
Official Date: | September 2010 | ||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 166 | ||||
Number: | Number 3 | ||||
Page Range: | pp. 479-501 | ||||
DOI: | 10.1628/093245610793102125 | ||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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