On ‘a continuum with expansion’:

UK-US intelligence relations &
wider reflections on international intelligence liaison

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and International Studies

University of Warwick,
School of Politics and International Studies

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Declaration

This thesis is all my own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university. Any errors or omissions naturally remain my responsibility.

Language Guide

The spelling used in this study is mainly ‘British-English’. However, ‘American-English’ spellings are used where they feature in quotations from the sources drawn upon and when the name is American. Dates are provided in standard UK format (day/month/year).
Interviews Note:
Non-attributable sources

While researching for this study, over 60 (elite) interviews [i] were conducted in the UK and US. In a variety of ways, at least a further 60 prominent people were consulted [c], and kindly provided helpful insights and guidance in varying forms. Several meetings and conferences were also attended across the UK, and in the US, Italy and Canada. Naturally, due to the sensitive nature of this subject, the majority of these interactions took place ‘off the record’ and/or under the Chatham House Rule. Therefore, names cannot be provided in this study in order to respect the continued protection of identities.¹ In this study, the label ‘non-attributable source’ is used in endnotes to identify contributions from these sources.
Abstract

On ‘a continuum with expansion’:
UK-US intelligence relations &
wider reflections on international intelligence liaison

Since 9/11, intelligence liaison has increased exponentially. Yet, both in international affairs and within the academic fields of international relations (IR) and intelligence studies, the phenomenon of intelligence liaison remains under-researched and under-theorised. Moreover, intelligence studies remain remarkably disconnected from IR. Accordingly, this study attempts to advance a timely understanding of both international intelligence liaison generally, and UK-US intelligence liaison specifically, in a contemporary context. Methodologically, this is accomplished through conducting a qualitative analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison focussed on two ‘critical’ and ‘intensive’ case studies. These represent the key issues over which the UK and US have liaised, namely counter-terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-/counter-proliferation.

In practical terms, the ‘rise’ of intelligence liaison can be substantially explained. However, the phenomenon itself can only be ‘theorised’ so far. Intelligence is, by its very nature, a fragmented subject. Accordingly, cascades of complexities increasingly enter, especially at the lower/micro levels of analysis - where the details and specifics concerning particular sources and operations matter further. Therefore, intelligence liaison effectively represents the concept of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ in action. This is both at and across all its different, yet closely interrelated, levels of analysis, and also when broken down into eight systemic variables or attributes. Notwithstanding this complexity, wider conclusions can be drawn, allowing this thesis to advance the proposition that we are now witnessing the globalisation of intelligence. Overall, this trend is facilitated through the developments occurring in a web of overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements, which collectively span the globe. Reflective of a continuously evolving attempt for ‘optimum outreach’, these intra-liaison developments include: firstly, the establishing of frameworks and defining of operational parameters for the intelligence liaison arrangements, and then their subsequent consolidation (or normalisation) and optimisation over time. These wider trends are simultaneously observable in the microcosm of UK-US intelligence liaison relations, which are also on ‘a continuum with expansion’ as the UK and US remain broadly exemplary ‘friends and allies’.
# Abbreviations

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<td>11 September 2001 – Terrorist attacks on the US</td>
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<td>ASIO</td>
<td>Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation</td>
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<td>ASIS</td>
<td>Australian Secret Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASAS</td>
<td>Australian Special Air Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>BND</td>
<td>Bundesnachrichtendienst (German Intelligence)</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘C’</td>
<td>Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and (high-yield) Explosive agents/weapons (WMD)</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>US Military Central Command, Tampa, Florida (US)</td>
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<td>CENTRIXS</td>
<td>Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (US)</td>
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<td>CESG</td>
<td>Communications-Electronics Security Group, part of GCHQ (UK)</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Counter-Intelligence</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (US)</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Coalition Information Sharing</td>
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<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>Communications security</td>
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<td>CSI</td>
<td>Container Security Initiative (US)</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism Center (US)</td>
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<td>DCI</td>
<td>Director of Central Intelligence (US)</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration (US)</td>
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<td>Defense HUMINT Management Office (US)</td>
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<td>G8</td>
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<td>Geospatial intelligence</td>
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<td>Global Information Grid program</td>
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<td>US Multinational Information Sharing</td>
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<td>Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SISMI</td>
<td>Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO13</td>
<td>Police Anti-Terrorism Branch (UK) – from October 2006, SO15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO15</td>
<td>Police Counter-Terrorism Command (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious Organised Crime Agency (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOIA</td>
<td>Security Of Information Agreement (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCI</td>
<td>Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform (see the qualifier regarding this term, below [3.1])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTIC</td>
<td>Terrorist Threat Integration Center (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKUSA</td>
<td>UKUSA arrangement/'Five-eyes' (UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WoT</td>
<td>‘War on Terror’ or ‘War on Terrorism’ or ‘Global War on Terror’ (GWoT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTC</td>
<td>World Trade Center</td>
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Preface

‘So What?’ The rationale for this study

‘The modern security environment (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cross-national drugs and crimes – all occurring during unprecedented globalization) has brought about calls for stronger intelligence activities while at the same time it has created concerns about the unintended consequences of intelligence activities.’

- Professor Stan A. Taylor, US intelligence scholar

[1.0]: Why intelligence matters today

Today, intelligence is especially key. This is together with its study to further enhance our understanding of the phenomenon. As former UK intelligence officer Michael Herman has observed: ‘The main change has been the dramatic increase in intelligence’s own importance after September 11, 2001.’ Intelligence is central to the doctrine of pre-emption, a trend now dominant in the security and foreign policies of several countries, most notably the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). Part of what Canadian intelligence has dubbed a ‘New Intelligence Order’, this trend has been ascendant especially since the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in the US and during the subsequent so-called ‘War on Terror’ / ‘Long War’. Intelligence often dominates the headlines in a context where ‘new’ terrorism and associated global security challenges, such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), sit at the top of national agendas.

In the early twenty-first century, there have also been several high-profile inquiries into intelligence ‘failure’. These publicly emphasise the central importance of intelligence, as well as the other activities of states’ secret services, to wider political processes. Arguably, intelligence has changed from being a supporting activity (delivering an intelligence-informing contribution) to being more of a centrally involved activity (performing an intelligence-leading role, encapsulated by the phrase ‘intelligence-led’). As a result, intelligence has moved increasingly out of the shadows and into the spotlight. Moreover, reflecting its enhanced status, today within the academe, intelligence is no longer so confined to being a niche area of study. Instead, it must be considered more widely and form a greater part of any consideration of mainstream government.
[2.0]: Why intelligence liaison (co-operation) matters

In the current context, the ‘hidden hand’ of intelligence liaison has emerged as the most significant dimension of intelligence. As an article in *Jane’s Intelligence Digest* noted: ‘Since the terrorist attacks of [9/11] made Al-Qaeda’s global reach evident, much attention has focused on improving intelligence sharing and law enforcement co-operation...’ These actions have primarily been effected to help contribute towards enhancing the responsive reach of intelligence and security agencies. Generally, the intention is for this to be implemented across all the areas where intelligence operates and in which it has an interest. Occurring in both the domains of domestic and international affairs, including within intelligence and security organisations themselves, the ‘reach-enhancement’ process manifests itself more specifically: (i) in terms of the scale and persistence of intelligence and security activities/investigations, simultaneously ushering in related questions of proportionality; and (ii) it is ideally implemented in a directly competitive, as well as ultimately ‘winning’, manner versus targets and vis-à-vis risks. This is an approach that is characteristic of trying to be ‘ahead of the curve’ of events and developments, rather than instead being ‘behind’ that dynamic.

Moreover, the importance of liaison can be readily highlighted. Contemporary intelligence and security practitioners frequently refer to liaison and its utility. In April 2008, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Robert S. Mueller, acknowledged that:

The essential components to confronting [terrorist] threats are intelligence and partnerships... Today, ... the vast majority of the FBI’s terrorism cases originate from information developed by our partners overseas — even those cases in which the suspected terrorists and the potential targets are all on American soil.

More widely, as was emphasised by the Office of the US Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) in 2007: ‘The IC [US intelligence community] cannot win against our adversaries on its own ... its necessary work with foreign intelligence and security services must proceed on a planned and prudent basis.’

Clearly that work had already been central. In 2005, in testimony to a closed US Congress committee session, the CIA deputy director of operations reportedly revealed that ‘virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- more than 3,000 in all -- was a result of foreign intelligence services’ work alongside the agency.’ In evidence for the UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s *Renditions* report of June 2007, Sir David
Pepper, the Director of the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), succinctly remarked: ‘When we talk about use of intelligence, that would include passing it to liaison services.’ As former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, Mark Lowenthal, has also observed: ‘When assessing different intelligence services, keep in mind that most have liaison relationships with other services, thus increasing their capabilities. The degree to which these relationships complement or overlap one another is important.’

The centrality of liaison to contemporary intelligence is thus firmly demonstrable. Indeed, networks – whether they are composed of intelligence officers and/or (their) agents – as well as the process of networking, have always been key to intelligence, as well as representing how intelligence is organised. Furthermore, liaison is what those networks do, including how they can pursue it. In the contemporary globalised era, and undoubtedly continuing into the future, these networks need to be better connected and exploited through their enhanced facilitation. This is both at the human and technical levels. As an integral part of these overall processes, the significance of liaison is simultaneously further elevated. Subject to some similar trends, a ‘softer’ form of liaison, featuring as outreach, has also flourished in parallel in the open source (OS) or overt intelligence realm.

Rarely probed in detail and frequently remaining highly secret, intelligence liaison has increased exponentially. This is albeit if unevenly at times. Traditional, bilateral international intelligence liaison has increased particularly rapidly. This has brought with it a diverse range of new and sometimes non-traditional partners, including Libya and Sri Lanka. As former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage observed:

Probably the most dramatic improvement in our intelligence collection and sharing has come in bilateral cooperation with other nations – those we considered friendly before 9/11, and some we considered less friendly. This is a marked change, and one that I believe results not just from collective revulsion at the nature of the attacks, but also the common recognition that such groups present a risk to any nation with an investment in the rule of law.

Interestingly, some greater multilateral intelligence liaison has also been witnessed. This has been seen within regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – representing the regionalisation of intelligence – as well as between them, allowing the discussion of the globalisation of intelligence. Multilateral intelligence liaison has also been increasing, but more incrementally. Furthermore, developments occurring at the
plurilateral level focussed on counter-terrorism, such as between the US and EU, and the US and ASEAN, can be cited. Frequently, the concept of ‘uneven and combined development’ is effectively reflected. Perhaps more remarkably, post-9/11 direct linkages between the local and international levels are coming to the fore. This simultaneously points towards identified phenomena such as ‘glocalisation’.

[2.1]: International intelligence liaison as increasingly an ‘end’:

Some recalibration has occurred. This has involved some increased ‘strategising’ of liaison. Whereas previously international intelligence liaison played more of a supporting role in overall intelligence activities (as a ‘means’ at the operational/tactical level), today it is evidently playing an ever-more central and directing role (as an ‘end’/‘solution’ at the strategy/policy level). For instance, liaison relationship considerations formed a concern for the UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) in its increased withdrawal from involvement in managing certain operations targeted against organised crime. As the Chief of SIS, Sir John Scarlett, remarked in testimony to the ISC in early 2007:

> We [SIS] have become deeply involved in the setting up and management of quite complex… operations. Now these have been established, there clearly is an argument for saying “well, the management and running of these is not something which naturally falls to SIS. It is certainly something which could in theory be done by SOCA [the Serious Organised Crime Agency].” At the same time, they are so important, they achieve such results, they have such a strategic impact, and therefore they have such a political profile that they are not just police operations. They have real political and strategic significance. For us to just pull out of them would risk … undermining the bilateral relationship quite seriously…

In an increasingly globalised context, intelligence is becoming a greater actor in its own right. Self-evidently, this enhances its importance. Thus it requires ever-greater macro- extending to micro-management. The ISC Annual Report 2006-2007 again emphasised the importance of liaison, particularly where it noted the direction of (still classified) expenditure flows:

> Much of the £*** additional funding allocated to SIS in the 2005 Pre-Budget Report was used to enhance front-line counter-terrorism operations overseas … and to develop the capacity of liaison services in priority countries. This work has continued through 2006/07 and has included projects in ***, ***, ***, ***, *** and *** with further capacity-building work planned in key areas of the *** region and the ***. The funding has also
enabled SIS to put more personnel on the ground in areas where British forces are operating.\textsuperscript{28}

Again, driving these developments is the security and intelligence need for enhanced reach. This is as well as there being a persisting legitimate need for new insights into traditionally more closed-off and sensitive realms.\textsuperscript{29} Not least, this includes intelligence reach into various communities, foreign countries’ domestic spheres, and indeed even into individuals’ own homes and lives. In an era of increasing globalisation (\textit{writ large}), these pressures occur to a considerably greater degree. This results from an erosion of traditional distinguishing categories (internal/external or domestic/foreign) and from increasingly porous conventional barriers, such as states’ borders.\textsuperscript{30}

[2.2]: Increasing international intelligence liaison:
Liaison is on an upward trajectory. Undeniably some rhetoric is present in public pronouncements and surrounding discourse concerning the increase in international intelligence liaison. However, operationally there genuinely is a substantial increase. For instance, in 2005 it was authoritatively reported in \textit{The Washington Post} that: ‘The CIA has established joint operation centers [Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs)] in more than two dozen countries where U.S. and foreign intelligence officers work side by side to track and capture suspected terrorists and to destroy or penetrate their networks...’\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, highlighting the increase in intelligence sharing, these CTICs reportedly include ‘secure communications gear, computers linked to the CIA’s central databases, and access to highly classified intercepts once shared only with the nation’s closest Western allies.’\textsuperscript{32}

The liaison has also become more regularised. This is with ‘daily decisions [being made] on when and how to apprehend suspects, whether to whisk them off to other countries for interrogation and detention, and how to disrupt al Qaeda’s logistical and financial support.’\textsuperscript{33} Other countries, such as Denmark, have similarly witnessed a growth in their international intelligence liaison relationships in recent years.\textsuperscript{34} In the covert intelligence realm, intelligence liaison is the central mechanism contributing to the increasing ‘regionalisation’ and eventual ‘globalisation’ of intelligence.\textsuperscript{35} Alongside the outreach developments occurring in parallel in the overt intelligence realm, these evolutionary processes are underway for a range of reasons. In summary, they reflect a growing recognition of essential collective and co-operative security means as an adaptive response to the notoriously difficult globalised security threats of the early twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{36} Moreover, they are emergent so that, in harmony with a doctrine of pre-emption, more comprehensive pictures of the challenges confronted can be constructed in a more timely manner.
Yet, despite these observed developments, considerable shortcomings remain in our understanding. Both in wider public international affairs and within the academic fields of inquiry of international relations and intelligence studies, the intelligence liaison phenomenon remains under-studied and under-theorised. Indeed, as Swedish intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell has argued: ‘...there is no generally established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework for the analysis of intelligence liaison.’

Efforts contributing towards the addressing of these observed paucities require their extension. Intelligence liaison needs to be both better and more widely understood. This is because intelligence liaison now concerns not just intelligence ‘specialists’, but all - including the wider public. With the increasing emphasis on infrastructure protection, individuals in private companies - such as airlines - can be consumers and indeed providers of intelligence. Today, the onus on intelligence generally, and on intelligence liaison specifically, has been significantly increased in an era of a doctrine of preventative pre-emption in states’ foreign and security policies. Furthermore, as Canadian intelligence scholar Professor Martin Rudner has remarked: ‘The imperative for intelligence co-operation can sometimes make strange international bedfellows, and can have profound implications for foreign policy, civil society and human rights.’

Arguably the acceleration of liaison is leading to an imbalance. Intelligence liaison is now being used more extensively across the globe, it is playing an ever-greater pivotal role in international relations as a whole, as well as featuring more centrally in states’ and the private sector’s foreign and security policies. Alongside, however, we have seen the emergence of a correspondingly large, and indeed continuing to burgeon, intelligence liaison accountability and oversight deficit. Prominent events in the early twenty-first century have served to further emphasise the need to better understand the phenomenon of intelligence liaison. Recent significant episodes closely involving intelligence have also underlined the need to communicate that understanding more widely in the mainstream of academic and public inquiry. Notably the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003), the 9/11 and WMD intelligence inquiries and surrounding controversies - ethical and otherwise - including concerning ‘torture’ allegations and CIA secret prisons and ‘extraordinary renditions’, have significant implications to impart. Intelligence liaison, whether it is conceptualised broadly (as in this study) or more narrowly, requires to be better understood beyond solely the niche field of intelligence studies. Moreover, it needs to find its place in the broader schema of international relations.
[3.0]: Where the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship features

Amid the developments charted above, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is of vital importance. As FBI director, Mueller has claimed:

... the partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom is among the strongest in the world. I am particularly grateful for the relationship between the FBI and our British counterparts. It remains a model of international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation.\(^\text{40}\)

Through: (i) the modus operandi of their close intelligence liaison relationship; (ii) the modus operandi of their international intelligence liaison relationships with other partners across the world; and (iii) including outreach activities in the overt intelligence realm via both these routes, the UK and US intelligence communities contribute towards the overall gradual greater globalisation of intelligence.\(^\text{41}\)

Sometimes this is done perhaps enthusiastically, at other times more reluctantly. Notably officials seek to accomplish this within UK-US terms or ‘rules of engagement’. These conditional movements help enable UK and US-led (and favourable) ‘best practices’ and frameworks to be established. Essential security and counter-intelligence considerations can then be better addressed with adherence to an increased commonality of standards. This provides a firm foundation for greater and deeper international intelligence liaison in the future, in an ‘end’/‘solution’ modus vivendi form.\(^\text{42}\)

[3.1]: Establishing frameworks and defining operational parameters:

Several developments are contributing to ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ processes. In summary, these include: (i) trends apparent in intelligence, law enforcement and security sector reform (SSR)\(^\text{43}\) - involving the provision of training and other assistance to foreign intelligence services by Western, and in particular by UK and US, intelligence services on key issues, such as on terrorism and WMD proliferation;\(^\text{44}\) (ii) the UK-US encouraging of greater accountability systems and legal frameworks - such as for former-Communist Eastern European countries’ intelligence services;\(^\text{45}\) as well as (iii) the encouraging of ‘good practice’ in intelligence communications/information security and ‘information assurance’ (COMSEC/INFOSEC) – such as at the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) level, and NATO members becoming NATO Security and Evaluation Agency (SECAN) compliant.\(^\text{46}\) These multiple and wide-ranging ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ processes (or at least their attempts) represent ‘part one’ contributing towards the increasing international interconnectedness and, with it, interdependence, of intelligence through
international intelligence liaison. These processes help to establish the intelligence liaison arrangement frameworks and to define their operational parameters. In a multiplier-effect manner, they create a growing patchwork of over-lapping facilitators. Simultaneously, occurring in parallel in the overt intelligence world, greater outreach efforts are discernable. Thereby they also contribute to the overall globalisation of intelligence trends. Essentially, as time progresses, these trends are in harmony with being on ‘a continuum with expansion’.

[4.0]: The globalisation of intelligence & its ‘location’

The globalisation of intelligence can be readily characterised. When the above trends are confined to solely geographic regional bases, the mere increasing regionalisation of intelligence is observed. When these trends extend beyond the confines of regional bases, and are more ‘out-of-area’, the increasing globalisation of intelligence is witnessed. To varying degrees, the regionalised intelligence arrangements contribute to the overall globalisation of intelligence. This is especially apparent when different regionalised and/or other forms of intelligence liaison arrangements overlap across the globe through commonly linked participants. An example is the UK - which is a party in European region and EU intelligence arrangements, NATO, as well as UKUSA, and which enjoys extensive bilateral arrangements with countries in Africa and Asia.

Furthermore, when exploring the globalisation of intelligence, the main focus is most appropriately placed on the key UKUSA countries. These include the ‘five-eyes’ of the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Particular concentration should be on the UK and US. As Professor Stan A. Taylor notes: ‘In the contemporary world, only the US, UK, and Russian services [(and possibly those of China)] can claim to have truly global intelligence coverage and activities.’

Significantly, the UKUSA countries are instrumental in leading the discernable regionalisation and globalisation of intelligence developments. This is the case both within and beyond the confines of the exclusive multilateral UKUSA arrangement, as well as through other regional groupings, such as the EU and NATO, and through close co-operation with other regional groups - for example, ASEAN. Valuable contributions from other Western countries, such as the Netherlands, France, Germany and Sweden (with the Swedish Ministry of Defence’s ‘Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information Sharing [M3IS]’) simultaneously figure. In short, the most effective international intelligence sharing takes place within trusted and exclusive bilateral and, more occasionally (though increasingly), multilateral intelligence liaison arrangements. To
date, within the covert realm of intelligence, the exclusive intelligence liaison arrangements therefore represent the sites where the greatest regionalisation extending to the overall globalisation of intelligence has occurred, and is continuing to develop.

[4.1]: The optimisation of intelligence liaison arrangements:
Further developments are apparent. Building on ‘part one’, the establishing of frameworks and the definition of operational parameters, ‘part two’ contributing towards the overall globalisation of intelligence can be facilitated. Part two consists of the optimisation of the intelligence liaison arrangements. This involves the greater ‘flattening’ of hierarchies. This occurs within the now ‘exclusive’ arrangements, following – albeit perhaps paradoxically - greater inclusion through exclusivity on the basis of the ‘best practices’. In turn, these best practices address the security and counter-intelligence concerns, by becoming increasingly consolidated or ‘normalised’ in operations. Necessarily, a degree of the compartmentalisation of intelligence for security purposes is continued. These are intended for maintaining a degree of counter-intelligence protection and associated intelligence control through regulation. Although, arguably this compartmentalisation of intelligence is less pressing than witnessed during the Cold War because the threat from high-grade hostile state-actor intelligence services is lower (though not completely removed). Instead, the compartments now tend towards being larger and broader in their scope.

Part two is gradually implemented over time. The central condition for intelligence liaison, trust, is incrementally built up through these ‘confidence-building’, then maintaining, stages. Once these relationships are being conducted and over time are subject to being increasingly ‘optimised’, intelligence can then be shared in a more regularised manner. This follows more of a routine ‘need to share/pool’ rationale, which is based more on institutionalised values. This is rather than sharing taking place so much on a more restrictive, particular episodic or investigation-confined ‘need to know’, or quid pro quo basis.

[4.2]: ‘Uneven and combined development’:
Different interpretations of the trends persist. How evenly the globalisation of intelligence extends enduringly remains more debatable. These factors vary extensively from specific case-to-case. The final evaluation depends on which international intelligence liaison relationship is under scrutiny, at which point in time and in which context. The current degree of globalisation of intelligence appears to be very haphazard. This is both in terms of the speed at which it is happening and how far it extends, and it certainly is not uniform. However, while
trends can be mixed, they are not ambiguous - especially in terms of arrangements widening. The ‘globalisation of intelligence’ trends appear to be taking place most markedly at the macro levels of relations, and within the overt intelligence realm. Today, the micro levels, and the covert intelligence realm, are also increasingly included as previous hierarchies involved are increasingly ‘flattened’.

The overall globalisation of intelligence is multi-causal. Significantly, the several pressing contemporary threats and issues being regularly confronted are asymmetric, global and transnational in their nature and scope. They are, therefore, increasingly difficult to target, requiring ever-more sophisticated responses. Many of the driving pressures come from below. This is both from the publics and operators who are directly and individually experiencing the driving factors on the ‘front-/fault-lines’.

Together with the development of responses generated from below, a whole range of top-down reactions are prompted. These feature in the form of national, through to regional, extending to global, responses spearheaded by states. This is particularly the case if an overall goal of ‘public safety’ is the main driver. Some of these top-down responses observed in the intelligence and security sector realm form the main focus of inquiry in this study. As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted in 2002: ‘In the era of globalization, isolation is not an option for the intelligence service of a democratic country, but rather a recipe for failure.’

Observations, such as this one, have not gone unnoticed. They have fed directly into activities witnessed in the intelligence, security and law enforcement sectors during the early twenty-first century.

[5.0]: The centrality of the United States

The US role is pivotal in the above processes. The US global hegemony in the realm of intelligence power is substantially maintained in this novel arrangement of increasingly globalised intelligence. This is accomplished by attempting to steer these processes through international intelligence liaison, extending to including participating in outreach efforts. As a result, what Michael Herman has perceptively termed ‘intelligence power’ is prevented from becoming completely devolved and freely pooled amongst other countries. The purpose is to ensure that as many of the positive attributes of intelligence protectionism as possible can be maintained in conjunction with the gradual introduction of the more positive attributes of increased intelligence co-operation. Simultaneously, these trends reveal that the US has developed enhanced dependence upon international intelligence liaison with intelligence partners spread widely across the globe. These include some new and
non-traditional ones, who are regarded as essential contributors to US and global security, particularly post-9/11. Again according to the findings of US journalist Dana Priest, ‘Today’s CIA is desperately seeking ways to join forces with other governments it once reproached or ignored to undo a common enemy.’ Naturally these changes, together with some added diversification to help maintain agility, have entailed some nuanced adjustments - some of which can be observed in this study. Not least, strengthened links to domestic security services, both at home and in countries abroad, are emergent.

Collectively, what transpires is complex. There is an interconnected overarching web consisting of a plethora of various intelligence liaison arrangements. These arrangements, extending to including other forms of outreach, provide a form of global intelligence coverage. This is especially true for the US, which remains more or less at the top, continuing to perform (with varying effect) its pivotal ‘hub’ role. A range of ad hoc and informal through to regularised, institutional, and formal agreements - including those associated with UKUSA – governs and/or establishes the overarching tone for these arrangements. Frequently, they substantially overlap in state capitals, forming hubs - notably in London and especially in Washington. They also seek fusion within national intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies, which are intended to act as nodes, both domestically and internationally. In the overt intelligence realm, transnational ‘knowledge network’ clusters - consisting of complex potent mixes of public and private, commercial and non-profit sector, academic, government and non-government organisation (NGO) stakeholders - then form around these points of contact, participating variously.

Through the close UK-US alliance, the UK is closely associated with all of these developments. Beneficially, it is also able to tap significantly into, as well as contribute towards, the US resource of global hegemony of intelligence power across all these strata. Over time, other close UK-US intelligence partners, notably Australia (due to its close involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq operations, similarly to the UK) and Canada (due to its involvement in Afghanistan and its shared ‘continental security’ with the US), can be observed as being increasingly included. Indeed, here, the globalisation of intelligence can be argued as being synonymous with the ‘Americanisation’/’Westernisation’ of intelligence. This is rather than it representing a ‘purer’ form of globalisation per se. Yet, just as ‘Americanisation’ and ‘Westernisation’ trends writ large variously feed into overall globalisation developments, in a similar manner so too do those in this more specific domain of activity.
[6.0]: *Anglo-Americana: UK-US intelligence liaison relations*

The UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is of further significance. It is the focus of this study as it is widely recognised as being one of the ‘best’ examples of an international intelligence liaison relationship. Alongside the nuclear relationship, it has supplied one of the key ‘pillars’ for the overall UK-US relationship and ‘special’ relations for over 60 years. While being conventionally regarded as *sui generis*, in fact this relationship can provide us with some considerable insights concerning the international intelligence liaison phenomenon, as is demonstrated in this study. Also the UK-US intelligence relationship is already, to date, the most ‘globalised’, ‘homogenised’ and ‘internationally standardised’ intelligence liaison relationship. This is in part determined by the terms of the patchwork of agreements that collectively compose (update and upgrade) the UKUSA Agreement and the numerous parallel agreements relating to human intelligence and defence intelligence dating from the same era. These facilitate the extent of international intelligence liaison that exists today, as well as demonstrating the potential optimum form of international intelligence liaison that can currently be achieved. This is at least in terms of function, if not also in terms of intelligence and security reach. By closely studying the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, several insights into the multiple attributes composing a leading international intelligence liaison relationship can be gained. This includes valuable insights into its operating dynamics and key drivers. As the UK ISC argued:

> Our intelligence-sharing relationships, particularly with the United States, are critical to providing the breadth and depth of intelligence coverage required to counter the threat to the UK posed by global terrorism. These relationships have saved lives and must continue.  

Indeed, the exceptionalism and ‘unique’ nature of this relationship can be instructive. Its exceptionalism can be seen as serving as an inspirational ‘model’ which others seek to emulate in the operation of their international intelligence liaison relationships. Although, of course, it is not a perfect relationship, with critics particularly emphasising some shortcomings. Some regard it as inappropriately ‘cosy’, particularly in an era of globalisation. Others regard it as locking the UK into an Atlanticist frame of reference at the expense of European opportunities. Simultaneously, while they are generally outweighed, the ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ elements of relations co-exist alongside the ‘good’ dimensions, effectively demonstrating the pluralistic qualities involved.
[7.0]: Presenting the key themes

Throughout this study, three themes are prominent:

(1) In an era of ‘globalisation writ large’, both UK-US intelligence liaison relations specifically, and the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison more generally, are evolving in harmony with the trend of being on ‘a continuum with expansion’. This is so that multi-dimensional intelligence and security reach across and into multiple domains of operation and human activity at home and abroad can be enhanced, as well as extended into ‘new’ areas - ideally in an appropriately proportional, yet succeeding, manner to that of the targeted threat. In the process, this opens up a whole range of intelligence and security ‘reach dynamics’ to being worthy of consideration. When comprehensively explored, collectively these provide a powerful explanatory prism through which intelligence and its related phenomena, such as intelligence liaison, can be understood;

(2) In the early twenty-first century, the UK and US continue to be broadly exemplary intelligence ‘friends and allies’. Essentially, they effectively navigate the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ in their own relations. Together they also continue to attempt to navigate those aspects - namely the fruits of the impact of ‘globalisation on intelligence’ - in the wider world beyond, thereby helping to contribute towards the observable general trends;

And (3), as a response to ‘globalisation writ large’ and the impact of ‘globalisation on intelligence’, the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ can be discerned. This is emergent through the mechanism of enhanced international intelligence liaison, together with being facilitated by the developments occurring within those arrangements - including concerning factors such as reach dynamics. These key closely inter-related themes will now be explored further as this study progresses.

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July 2008

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References:

1 The Chatham House Rule stipulates that the interviewer is ‘free to use information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the [interviewee], nor that of any other participant, may be revealed.’


4 ‘Pre-emption’ is defined in this study as applying a priori, rather than post facto, intelligence, law enforcement and security service crime defeating, disrupting and/or frustrating actions. For the intelligence and foreign policy nexus, see, for example, ‘Intelligence: a Special Case?’ in C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), pp.66-69.


6 See also D. Kahn, ‘The Rise of Intelligence’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006).


8 For a demonstration of this trend, see, for example as discussed in Chapter 3 the Literature Review [2.0], below.

9 ‘Intelligence liaison’ is also known as intelligence co-operation, intelligence sharing, and intelligence exchange. A fuller definition and explanation is given below in the Introduction (Chapter 1 [5.0]) of this study.

threats to both parties.’; see also ‘Value of Shared Intelligence’ under heading ‘The Nature of Intelligence Sharing’ in UK ISC, Renditions (June 2007), pp.11-13.


We are still building the foreign intelligence relationships to help us meet global security challenges. … Progress has been made. In fact, the IC partnered with the Department of Defense to provide Commonwealth partners access to information on a classified US system to improve our combined ability to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The ODNI also completed the first-ever inventory of all US intelligence liaison relationships, and is using the knowledge gained to maximize our reach and minimize the real and potential costs of working with foreign partners. Its Foreign Relations Coordination Council (which includes members from around the IC) will help in this task. Two issues are of particular concern: how to set policies to expand and govern sharing of information and secure network access with foreign partners, and how to find the resources and access to assess the strengths and weaknesses of current and potential partners.


15 ISC, Renditions, p.56.


18 For a greater discussion of ‘outreach’ and how it is seen to connect with intelligence liaison, and indeed intelligence more widely, see Chapter 1: Introduction [4.0], below.

19 See, for example, under sub-heading ‘Intelligence sharing’ in A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Cooperative intelligence’, Strategic Comments, 12, 4 (London: IISS, May 2006). So-called ‘non-traditional’ and/or ‘dangerous liaisons’ are not a new phenomenon, however. For an historical example of ‘strange bedfellows in the wartime world’, see, for example, ‘Memoranda for the President: OSS-NKVD Liaison’, Studies in Intelligence, 7, 3 (1963), from p.63. For an example of what other countries located outside of the West, involved in intelligence, security and law enforcement sector training, can

20 Former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in testimony before the US Senate Joint Intelligence Committee on intelligence sharing and 11 September 2001 attacks (19 September 2002) quoted in D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror’, *Orbis* (Summer, 2006), p.455; see also US Secretary of State, C. Powell, ‘Secretary Powell’s Roundtable with European Editors’, *FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents* (29 April 2004) - particularly where he argues:

> …I think increasingly, the civilized nations of the world are coming to the realization that [terrorism] is a problem for the whole world and the whole world has to respond. That's why there is an increasing success in pulling people together to exchange intelligence information, exchange law enforcement information, coordinate and cooperate more closely with respect to going after these terrorists and making the case to the world that this is something that must be fought by all of us together. [(Emphasis added)] So whatever initial gaps there may have been with the United States responding perhaps more forcefully than anyone else because of what happened to us on 9/11, I think the other nations of the world are now recognizing, hey, this is our problem too. Moscow has had terrorist incidents. Everybody at this table has experienced terrorism in one form or another…

See also J.S. Porth, ‘Like-Minded States Must Work Together To Thwart Terrorist Agenda’, *The Washington File/USINFO* (24 April 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror659.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also Sir David Omand - Coordinator of Security and Intelligence & Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office (2001-06); Permanent Secretary, Home Office (1998-2001); Director, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (1996-7); Policy Director, Ministry of Defence (1993-96) – particularly where he refers to the UK’s national counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST): ‘…We said that working together we will be able to reduce the risk from international terrorism so that people can go about their normal business freely and with confidence… “Working together”: no nation on its own can achieve security, not even the United States… we look both to reduce the threat and reduce society’s vulnerability to that threat…’ - quoted from Presenter: (Professor) Peter Hennessy, ‘Analysis: Secrets and Mysteries’, *BBC Radio 4 Current Affairs* (Broadcast date: 19/04/2007).

21 For the EU intelligence liaison dimension, see, for example, L. Lugna, ‘Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting’, *Baltic Security & Defence Review*, 8 (2006), pp.111-139; see also A. Svendsen, ‘On “a continuum with expansion”? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early 21st century: Counter-terrorism as the lead issue’, paper delivered at the UACES Student Forum Eighth Annual Conference, held at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK (April 2007). For the ASEAN dimension, see, for example, ‘ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism’, *ASEAN website* - via URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/14396.htm> (accessed: 06/01/2007) and J.T. Chow, ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11’, *Asian Survey*, 45, 2 (March/April 2005), pp.302-321. Meanwhile, for some of the contemporary limitations on multilateral defence co-operation, with some associated implications for intelligence/information
sharing arrangements, see, for example, E. Marat, ‘Fissures in the force - Multilateral co-operation can only go so far: Regional Eurasian organisations are increasing the scope and size of military exercises. However… internationally weak Central Asian partners and fraying members’ relations are likely to prevent the groups forming an Asian NATO’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 June 2007). For EU-ASEAN co-operation, see, for instance, ‘15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Joint Press Release, Jakarta’, ASEAN website (26 February 2005) - via URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/17279.htm> (accessed: 02/11/2006); see also ‘ASEAN Efforts to Counter Terrorism’ - particularly where it notes: ‘At the 9th ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bandar Seri Begawan on 30 July 2002, the ARF Statement on Measures Against Terrorist Financing was adopted. The ARF participating states and organization (the EU) agreed on concrete steps that included: freezing terrorist assets, implementation of international standards, cooperation on exchange of information and outreach, and technical assistance’ (emphasis added); ‘Southeast Asian countries focus on counter-terrorism’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (02 February 2007); J. Grevatt, ‘Southeast Asian states discuss defence collaboration’, Jane’s Defence Industry (01 March 2007); see also documents/links on the European Union website concerning ‘ASEAN, a key partner for Europe’ - via URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asean/intro/index.htm> (accessed: 02/11/2006). For NATO and external partner co-operation, see, for example, ‘Afghanistan and Pakistan launch intelligence-sharing centre’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (23 February 2007); related, ‘NATO Parliamentarians visit Pakistan’, NATO-PA Press Communiqué - NATO Integrated Data Service (20 March 2007); see also sources, such as A.T.H. Tan, ‘Singapore’s Cooperation with the Trilateral Security Dialogue Partners in the War Against Global Terrorism’, Defence Studies, 7, 2 (2007), from p.193; D. Mahadzir, ‘Malaysia and US host intelligence conference’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (26 September 2007).


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24 For a definition of ‘glocal/glocalization’, see A. Mooney and B. Evans (eds), *Globalization: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge/Key Guides, 2007), pp.117-8 – especially where it is defined as: ‘This term has a range of meanings, all of which revolve around the apparent paradox of the relation between global markets and processes, and local needs and nodes. As a contraction of “global” and “local”, the “glocal” refers to the increasing entanglement of these two spheres…’

25 See also ‘INTERNATIONAL: US-Arab intelligence co-operation’ - particularly where it argues: ‘Intelligence liaisons can become the primary channel of communications between two governments, a function that is supposedly reserved for embassies, ambassadors, and heads of state.’


27 See also Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, pp.248-269 - particularly where he notes: ‘The most significant intelligence reform since the creation of the CIA in 1947 came about in 2005 with the creation of a National Intelligence Director (NID) along with a large support office. The bulk of these institutional and/or procedural reforms are meant to increase intelligence coordination within each nation and greater intelligence cooperation between nations.’ (pp.263-4); for other related changes, see, for example, P. Wilson, ‘Preparing to Meet New Challenges’, chapter 9 in S. Tsang (ed.), *Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism* (London: Praeger Security International, 2007), pp.111-120.


29 See also M. Herman, ‘11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?’, *International Relations*, 16, 2 (2002); for a greater exploration of the ‘reach dynamics’ involved, see, *Chapter 1: Introduction [9.2]*, below.


31 Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight’.

32 ibid.

33 ibid.

34 See, for example, K. Tebbit, *Benchmarking of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction and Summary* (Copenhagen: April 2006), p.v, no.15; see also S. Fidler, ‘The human factor: “All is not well in clandestine intelligence collection”’ In the second instalment of a two-part series, Stephen Fidler discusses how the Iraq war has demonstrated the continued importance of MI6 to the CIA, despite the UK’s reliance on America’s investment in technology’, *The Financial Times* (07 July 2004) - ‘Since the end of the 1990s, [according to Dutch intelligence scholar Cees Wiebes], co-operation between the monitoring services of France, Germany and the Netherlands has grown and the countries exchange “Sigint” daily. Together with Denmark and Belgium, a “Group of Five” is slowly taking shape…’

35 For definitions of these terms in this study, see *Chapter 1: Introduction [7.0]*, below.

37 W. Agrell, ‘Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29, 4 (August 2006), p.635; for further details, see also the Literature Review, below (Chapter 3 [7.0]).

38 M. Rudner, ‘The globalisation of terrorism: Canada’s intelligence response to the post-September 11 threat environment’, Canadian Issues (September, 2002) – emphasis added; for the impact of intelligence activities on the foreign policy dimension, see, for instance, the ‘Comments and Suggestions on Draft ICS 77-2146/a’, pp.1-2 attached to H.H. Saunders, INR, US Department of State, ‘Subject: Comments on PRM-11 Task 2 Draft Paper’, Memorandum to: ••• (5 May 1977) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00095A000300020009-1 (2002/09/03) – particularly where it is noted:

P.4: Somewhere the paper should reflect the full sweep of the State Department’s interests as they affect, or are affected by, the DCI’s responsibilities [including foreign/international intelligence liaison]. The paragraph on the State Department… does not clearly and fully bring out the role of the Department and Ambassadors in dealing with the foreign affairs aspects of all intelligence programs and projects, including, for example: -- U.S. intelligence collection facilities in foreign countries *** -- Relations with foreign governments in SIGINT and other intelligence activities… The State Department is particularly conscious of the foreign policy costs of intelligence – e.g. the need to preserve installations abroad, the fall-out from disclosure, •••… [p.6]

P.83: A paragraph should be added to reflect the role of the State Department and the missions abroad in dealing with the foreign affairs aspects of liaison with foreign intelligence services. Proposed wording: “The role of the DCI is also affected by the interests of the Department of State and the Ambassadors in foreign intelligence liaison and exchange. Intelligence arrangements with foreign governments often have significant implications for foreign affairs, and these aspects need to be closely coordinated by the State Department in consultation with the Ambassadors concerned.”… The last sentence on the page obscures the point that there are some arrangements ••• in which NSA is the designated agent for the conduct of SIGINT liaison.

39 See also T. Shorrock, ‘The corporate takeover of U.S. intelligence: The U.S. government now outsources a vast portion of its spying operations to private firms -- with zero public accountability’, Salon.com (01 June 2007) - via URL:


40 Mueller, ‘From 9/11 to 7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges of Tomorrow’, p.7.

41 For some ‘top-down’ impetus, see also, for instance, US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, pp.12-13 – where it notes:

On December 16, 2005, in accordance with section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the President issued a Memorandum to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies prescribing the guidelines and requirements in support of the creation and implementation of the ISE [Information Sharing Environment]… Guideline Four: • the President recognized the imperative for the ISE to facilitate and support the appropriate exchange of terrorism information with our foreign partners and allies and, toward that end, directed the development of recommendations to achieve improved sharing in this area.

42 Sharing can also include intelligence access, for example in physical arrangements, such as in Sensitive Compartmentalised Information Facilities (SCIFs) or ‘skiffs’ – see, for example, A. Huslin, ‘If These Walls Could Talk…. SCIF Rooms Play It Safe With U.S. Secrets’, The Washington Post (28 May 2006).

43 N.B: [please see over page ]
The use of the phrase ‘intelligence and security sector reform (SSR)’ deployed in this study refers to (1) national interest-led/driven/related initiatives in this area - that is, those geared towards developing and building up countries’ intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, particularly concerning the key issue areas of counter-terrorism, organised crime, and counter-proliferation. This is rather than referring to (2) international development/aid-led/driven initiatives.

Concerning (2), this is the strand to which the phrase SSR is commonly linked in the literature on this subject, especially in the field of international development literature, and where initiatives are instead done more in the country-being-developed’s interest, such as the democratisation of police/military, rather than in the national interests of the countries doing the developing. (This is at least the case in relation to the UK’s international development/aid-led/driven initiatives, such as laid out in the UK’s International Development Act of 2002 - effective 17 June 2002, and replacing the Overseas Development and Cooperation Act of 1980). For details concerning this act, see <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/devact2002overview.asp>, accessed 15 March 2007.) However, because of globalisation in wider international affairs, at times convergence, and equally clashes, between these two different (officially at least purportedly disconnected) intelligence and security sector reform drivers, whether explicitly or not, naturally can occur.

intelligence and SSR-related initiatives, see, for example, ‘NATO adopts standards for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’, NATO Update (12 October 2005), via URL:
<http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2005/10-october/e1012b.htm> (accessed: 10/03/2007); ‘The Partnership for Peace’, NATO Topics (updated 08 March 2007), via URL:


47 See also, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21, 1 (March 2008), pp.129-144.


49 See, for example, ‘15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Joint Press Release, Jakarta’; see also documents/links on the European Union website concerning ‘ASEAN, a key partner for Europe’. In terms of ‘North-South’ relations, see, T. Barkawi, ‘FOCUS: Transnational Terrorism: Terrorism and North-South Relations’, RUSI Journal (February 2006), pp.54-58. In Iraq, for the role of ‘reconstruction teams’, see, for example, R. Perito, ‘Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, United States Institute of Peace (March 2008).

50 As they both constantly evolve, for a snapshot of the UK’s intelligence community as at 2002-03, see, for example, ‘United Kingdom (Britain)’ in R.D’A. Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook - 2003 Edition (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), pp.207-215; for a snapshot of the USA’s intelligence community at the same time, see ibid., pp.217-234.

51 For some background on Chinese intelligence, see Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.294-296; see also ‘China and Russia avoid intelligence co-operation’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (25 March 2008).
55 These ‘security reasons’ include trying to reduce the risk of sources and/or methods being compromised, as well as measures designed to encourage the maintenance of greater intelligence control, secrecy, and clandestine operability. All these are geared towards (at least potential) greater intelligence protectionism. However, for some of the problems being confronted in the US over the ‘secrecy-sharing dilemma’, see, for example, M.E. Bowman, ‘Dysfunctional Information Restrictions’, Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), pp.29-37.
56 See, for instance, Director General of MI5, Jonathan Evans quoted in “‘Thousands’ pose UK terror threat’, BBC News Online (05 November 2007) - especially where the report notes: ‘There had been “no decrease” in the number of Russian covert intelligence officers operating in the UK since the end of the Cold War, Mr Evans said in a speech in Manchester. “A number of countries continue to devote considerable time and energy trying to steal our sensitive technology on civilian and military projects, and trying to obtain political and economic intelligence at our expense.” It was “a matter of some disappointment”, he said, that this ongoing threat continued to take up significant amounts of equipment, money and staff.’
57 See also Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, p.101 - especially where he argues: ‘Trusting intelligence relationships cannot simply be switched on at will, but are established over long periods by officers who are knowledgeable about the political and cultural context in which they operate…’
58 In detail, the threats and issues include: ‘new’ terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons, illegal immigration and people trafficking, drugs (narcotics) and other organised crime, the demands of peacemaking/keeping (stabilisation) and other humanitarian operations - especially reconstruction - as well as addressing anti-globalisation movements. For further details on these, see, for example, F.B. Adamson, ‘Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security’, International Security, 31, 1 (Summer 2006), pp.165-199; T. Farrell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations’, chapter 15 in J. Baylis, et al. (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World (Oxford University Press, 2007 [2ed.]), pp.313-334.
60 ‘Liaison and Cooperation’ in Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), ‘Counter-Terrorism’, Backgrounder Series, 8 (August 2002), p.11.


63 Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight’.


65 See, for example, ‘A new security architecture’ in ‘Opaque Networks’, chapter 6 in Roberts, Blacked Out, p.139; see also the paragraph on Roberts’ book in Chapter 3 [4.0], the Literature Review, below.

66 For the importance of ‘nodes’ and the role they play in intelligence/information sharing, see, for instance, W.L. Perry and J. Moffat, Information Sharing Among Military Headquarters: The Effects on Decisionmaking (RAND, 2004), p.xv - particularly where they note: ‘Information sharing among nodes ideally tends to lower information entropy (and hence increase knowledge) partly because of the buildup of correlations among the critical information elements. That is, information can be gained about one critical information element (e.g., missile type) from another (e.g., missile speed)…’

67 See also sources, such as D. Stone, ‘Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks’, The Policy Studies Journal, 36, 1 (2008), pp.19-38.


69 ISC, Renditions, p.12.

70 For example, in a written response to author’s questions, Robert David Steele noted: ‘In my view, while there remains a “special relationship” that is incestuous, and like incest, produces deformed … results, it is high time the USA broke away from special relationships and focused instead on honest relationships with as many as possible…’ (emphasis added) - from an e-mail communication with Robert David Steele, CEO of OSS.Net, Inc. and the new non-profit Earth Intelligence Network, and a former US spy, conducted on Monday, 2 July 2007.

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Chapter 1
Introduction:
Unpacking intelligence liaison

‘Now some of this information came from liaison. And the history of our Service [the CIA], from its first feeble squirming in the arms of its old British aunt, has been dominated in many ways by liaison. Indeed, we have created whole national services, internal and external, from one end of the world to the other, trained them, vetted them, funded them, in order to be able to conduct liaison in their countries, and to get them to do work that we, though expending vast sums in training and subsidy of operations, thought we were too small or too poor to handle ourselves.’

- W.R. Johnson, US intelligence practitioner

[1.0]: Introduction

Liaison is central to intelligence. In seeking to evaluate ‘liaison’ it is most helpful to start by delineating some parameters for this study. This introductory chapter, therefore, begins with some definitions. Firstly, what is meant by ‘intelligence’ and ‘liaison’, and their fusion in the distinct phenomenon of ‘intelligence liaison’, is clarified. This chapter then continues by presenting some generalisations about intelligence liaison. Thereafter, the phenomenon is broken down into eight attributes or variables, followed by an explanation of how it works and its rationale. In the final portion of this chapter, some initial insights into UK-US intelligence relations, including why and how the UK and US co-operate, are tabled. The general proposition that runs throughout this study, that they are broadly exemplary intelligence ‘friends and allies’, emerges in the following pages.

[2.0]: A definition of ‘intelligence’ – ‘cloak, dagger… and skulduggery?’

What is precisely meant by the word ‘intelligence’ is still widely contested. This study focusses on the Anglo-Saxon (UK-US) understandings. However, even here differences are detectable. UK intelligence scholar Philip H.J. Davies argues that: ‘The difference between British and US concepts of intelligence is that the US approaches information as a specific component of intelligence, while Britain approaches intelligence as a specific type of information.’ Much energy has been spent on frequently defining ‘intelligence’. Ultimately, the final definition depends
on how far and in which direction the definition is taken. As CIA historian Michael Warner argues: ‘the term is defined anew by each author who addresses it, and these definitions rarely refer to one another or build off what has been written before.’

In 1987, UK intelligence academic Ken Robertson declared that: ‘A satisfactory definition of intelligence ought to make reference to the following: threats, states, secrecy, collection, analysis and purpose...’ It is also worth noting former UK intelligence officer Michael Herman’s comment that: ‘…“intelligence” in government usually has a more restricted meaning than just information and information services. It has particular associations with international relations, defence, national security and secrecy, and with specialised institutions labelled “intelligence”.’ Warner’s own definition of intelligence - ‘Intelligence is secret, state activity to understand or influence foreign entities’ - will be added, with slight modification, as it brings in more of the important ‘intelligence’ as a form of power dimension – since ‘knowledge is power’. Indeed, the interesting notion of intelligence as a form of power, akin to economic power, derives from the work of Michael Herman. Neither is intelligence solely concerned with secrets, with the ‘familiar secrets/mysteries dilemma’ often featuring.

Intelligence comes in a myriad of forms. These range from technical (TECHINT) - including signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications intelligence (COMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), namely the ‘scientific’ dimension of intelligence - via human intelligence (HUMINT), notably the ‘artistic’ dimension of intelligence, to open source intelligence (OSINT).

Intelligence is also conceptualised as a process. Commonly known as the ‘intelligence cycle’, this process in its narrowest and supposedly most perfect conception consists of the steps of ‘determining the information intelligence consumers require [tasking]; collecting the data needed to produce this intelligence [collection or harvesting]; and analysing the collected data [analysis or packaging] and disseminating the resulting intelligence [now in product form embodied in assessments/estimates] to consumers [dissemination, delivery, marketing or producing]. Added to this can be the step of ‘re-evaluation’, for example if new intelligence has since emerged during the process. Although in reality the intelligence cycle is often more complex, the concept still captures much of what intelligence professionals seek to achieve.

Intelligence product again takes many different forms. The ‘finished’ assessments/estimates, essentially arising out of the analysis ‘stage’ of the intelligence cycle, can range from being single-source to being all-source. They also sit on a spectrum of being tactical to strategic. Intelligence product in tactical form
is arguably ‘rawer’, and figures as the most actionable and operationally viable intelligence. Hence, it tends to be tightly controlled and is made available for dissemination on restricted bases. Strategic intelligence meanwhile consists of slightly more ‘sanitised’ product therefore it has some greater potential for wider dissemination. This is due to particular sensitive sources, methods and their provenance being less explicitly revealed in the information communicated, thus helping to contribute to the mitigation of counter-intelligence and other security concerns (see below).18

When produced, intelligence then has to be transferred. How intelligence is securely conveyed from A \(\rightarrow\) B, and is otherwise shared/accessed, draws us into the domain of Communications Security (COMSEC) or Information Security (INFOSEC). Common standards in this area are often the bedrock of formal liaison. Officially, according to the US Government, COMSEC consists of ‘measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and [to] ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications’, and includes the four categories of: (i) ‘cryptosecurity’ - resulting ‘from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use’; (ii) ’emission security’; (iii) ‘physical security’ – ‘The component of [COMSEC] that results from physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons’; and (iv) ‘transmission security’.19

Intelligence is also institutionalised. In institutional terms, intelligence services can be both ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ in their deployment, encompassing ‘covert action’. Arguably the ‘dagger’ wielded by the ‘hidden hand’, RAND analysts Hannah et al observe that: ‘while not an actual category of intelligence, covert action should also be considered as part of intelligence activities, as it is generally undertaken (in this context) for intelligence purposes (i.e. either driven by or attempting to generate intelligence).’20 Denial, disruption, deception, disinformation, misinformation and propaganda activities - more popularly known as ‘spin’ - can also be added.21 In parallel exists the ‘psychological dimension’ of intelligence, which includes information and psychological operations (PSYOPs), intended to win over ‘hearts and minds’.22

‘Covert action’ can be further explained. Drawing on the definition frequently cited: “‘Covert action” is defined by US law as activity meant “to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” Covert actions are thus distinct from clandestine missions: whereas the term “clandestine” refers to the secrecy of the operation itself, “covert” refers to the secrecy of its sponsor; the action itself may or may not be secret…23
Typically, the UK definition is more obscure. Over time it has moved ‘from “special operations” to “special political action” to “disruptive action”.’ Often ‘covert action’ is carried out in the form of paramilitary activities usually conducted by some type of ‘special’ military or civilian-quasi-military units. There are the US Army’s ‘Special [Operations] Forces’ (SOF) and the ‘CIA Paramilitary Operations’ and, in the UK case, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) - closely guided by intelligence from, and feeding back intelligence to, the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6). Frequently UK Special Forces teams consist of a mixture of personnel from different units, including participants from SIS and the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), depending on what expertise and skill-sets are required for the particular operation to be undertaken. Currently, ‘covert action’ is very much back in fashion. It is being employed in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, due to the current so-called ‘War on Terror’ / ‘Long War’. Some widely publicised ‘extraordinary renditions’ have involved CIA (paramilitary) Special Forces following up the leads fed from the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC).

A final category of intelligence is ‘counter-intelligence’ (CI). This is defined in short as: ‘intelligence activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion or terrorism.’ Or, in the rather grand UK definition, it is ‘the defence of the realm.’ Here, too, liaison can perform an important role. Since 1989, efforts to thwart economic espionage by states have figured strongly in this area.

Former US intelligence oversight practitioners, Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, provide a helpful summary of ‘intelligence’. This features in their book on Understanding the World of Intelligence, where ‘intelligence’ is characterised as: ‘certain kinds of information, activities, and organizations.’ Standing on the shoulders of Sherman Kent, the traditional US doyen of philosophising about intelligence, subsequently they elaborate upon their definition: ‘The word “intelligence” is used to refer to a certain kind of knowledge, to the activity of obtaining knowledge of this kind (and thwarting the similar activity of others), and to the organizations whose function is to obtain (or deny) it.’

Meanwhile, former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, Mark Lowenthal, has defined ‘intelligence’ as: ‘... the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out of operations as requested by lawful authorities.’
Accordingly, after this brief survey of ‘intelligence’, the definition that will be drawn upon in this study is:

the collection and processing (analysis) of information that is particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to international relations, defence and national (extending to global, via regional) security (threats). It is also usually secret (covert and/or clandestine), state activity conducted by specialised “intelligence” institutions to understand or influence entities.

Most comprehensively, ‘intelligence’ can be best summarised as being: (i) a process (‘… the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.’); (ii) a product (‘… the product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.’); as well as being (iii) institutionalised or an ‘organization’ (‘… the units that carry out its various functions.’).36

[3.0]: A definition of ‘liaison’

Definitions of ‘liaison’ are less contested. It is often characterised as a ‘relation, link’, stemming from the French language and the original ‘Latin ligationem … “a binding”…’37, and as an ‘illicit intimacy… (mil.) co-operation of forces.’38 ‘Liaison’ perhaps also implies an element of prohibited courtship, something a bit mysterious, maybe even risqué, a private link. Here, the full intimacies, indeed the fact of the connection itself and whom it may be with, is not intended to be revealed to a wider audience. In the military context, as agreed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) and NATO, ‘liaison’ is defined more precisely as: ‘That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.’39 Optimally shared perceptions in a ‘milder’ incarnation are acceptable. However, over-shared perceptions are not. This is especially the occasions when the sharing of perceptions extends too far, to what can be regarded as a ‘groupthink’ extent, simultaneously representing a form of overreach. Questions concerning sustainability are also ushered in. Elsewhere, ‘liaison’ has been denoted more officially in the CIA Insider’s Dictionary as:

(1) in governmental, military and intelligence usage, close and regular contact between counterpart units, organizations or agencies having complementary, supplementary or overlapping functions, responsibilities
and areas of interest, usually on a lateral level, with a view toward facilitating and enhancing communications, coordination and effective cooperation in pursuit of common or similar goals; (2) in the intelligence and security sectors, international intelligence liaison between the intelligence and security agencies of the two nations or between two component agencies of the same national intelligence community. N.B. Liaison, especially for the purpose of exchanging sensitive information, is ideally, but not exclusively, maintained through cross-assignment of liaison officers (LOs), q.v.  

While the LO role has been defined in the following terms: ‘in governmental, military and intelligence usage, an officer of one agency, organization or unit who is assigned to a counterpart entity for the purpose of serving as the focal point of contact.’ But, ‘liaison’ is not solely about communication. It also has other aspects, as noted in a US Army definition dating from 1951: ‘Foreign liaison – Provides the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representative on duty, visiting or training in the United States.’

Liaison has had some further analysis. The American intelligence scholar, H. Bradford Westerfield, provides a useful insight into ‘liaison’ in the intelligence context, by listing its functions. He describes ‘liaison’ as comprising ‘a wide range of forms and degrees of collaboration, across international boundary lines, between intelligence services governmental and/or nongovernmental. In the cross-national liaison, these services may share information and operations, provide support (training, advice, and supplies) and access to or for facilities, and participate in crypto-diplomacy – any of these functions.’

Officially, in the UK, ‘liaison’ is referred to as: ‘Foreign intelligence services with which SIS cooperates.’ In the Butler Report, ‘liaison’ is defined as: ‘the term used to indicate a collaborative relationship between the intelligence services of different countries, as in “liaison service” or “liaison source”.’ In the US, ‘foreign liaison’ has been defined by the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 as: ‘Efforts to work with foreign government intelligence services, including law enforcement agencies that gather or carry out intelligence-related activities. Examples of foreign liaison include sharing information, joint collection efforts, and the arrest of suspected terrorists by foreign governments using US-supplied information...’ And demonstrating its extent of use: ‘Every major US intelligence agency has some form of liaison relationship with foreign governments.’ The depth of liaison can vary, but it is often characterised by a formal agreement. In this respect, intelligence services often behave like mini-states, negotiating their own treaties and sending out their own ‘intelligence ambassadors’. Formal liaison is also the mode of
liaison that can be most effectively investigated. The manifestation of this type of liaison will next be examined.

[4.0]: The etymology & history of liaison in the intelligence context

The word ‘liaison’ entered the intelligence context via the military route. It came from French, the nineteenth century military and diplomatic language, entering similarly to the words bloc, attaché, démarche, chargé d’affaires, détente and so on. It is closely associated with the history and professionalisation of intelligence institutions, as well as with the job-function of military and defence attachés – where conducting liaison was, and remains, a central role.

Prominent intelligence texts, including those of Michael Herman, UK intelligence scholar Christopher Andrew and UK journalist/writer Michael Smith, are especially insightful here. They provide useful in-depth insights into the history of UK intelligence institutions, particularly the ‘professionalisation’ and ‘institutionalisation’ processes that occurred during the Victorian era and beyond. As Andrew notes: ‘the first hesitant steps towards the creation of a professional intelligence community were taken … by the Victorian War Office.’ The first intelligence agencies gradually emerged from the military and contained military personnel. For example, the first Chief (‘C’) of what was to become SIS (MI6) was a Naval Commander, Sir Mansfield Cumming, and the first head of what was to become MI5 (the British Security Service) was an Army officer, Major Vernon Kell. Naturally, they brought military terminology and practices with them, and ‘liaison’ was no exception.

In the intelligence context, liaison can be seen as a technical term and indeed as part of the specialist vernacular of alliances. It is a term associated with the continuing ‘professionalisation’ and ‘epistemologisation’ of the intelligence community throughout the twentieth century and to date. During these processes, intelligence evolves from its origins as an ‘amateur’ practice to a more distinct, respected, even legitimate, civilianised, business-like, institutionalised and official activity. Simultaneously, intelligence’s military and defence connections are highlighted, and, by association, so is the utility and value of intelligence.

The roots of liaison can be effectively traced. Early developments in the realm of liaison owed much to security intelligence co-operation against anti-colonial agitators and the revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century. However, in the twentieth century, defence and strategy have been the main drivers. Increasingly regularised liaison has come with the rapid growth and development of SIGINT. This trend is particularly notable from the First World War onwards, when ‘the
emergence of radio as a primary means of communication [together with an early lack of communications security (COMSEC)] ... resulted ... in the development of communication intelligence and security as we know them today.' During the 1940s, and particularly due to the emergency conditions engendered by the Second World War, SIGINT became increasingly ‘scientifically’ managed and ‘industrialised’ in scale and collection. Sharing and joint exploitation on an industrial scale became a military necessity. Through agreements, such as BRUSA (Britain-USA) of 1943, SIGINT became increasingly pooled and shared, especially between the UK, US and the other English-speaking countries. This type of arrangement was most immediately spurred on by the Allies’ now well-known successes at breaking the Axis enemy’s codes, ULTRA (Germany) and MAGIC (Japan).

Intelligence liaison officers (ILOs) soon emerged. This was notably from the early-1940s onwards, with the specific role of these exchangeable ‘authorised’ and ‘declared’ intelligence officers being related to the wartime agreements. Indeed, intelligence and liaison appeared to become substantially more formalised during this epoch. This came with the explicit development of the intelligence liaison officer (ILO) role. Traditionally, the roles of the ‘intelligence officer’ and of the ‘liaison officer’, at least in the UK military context, were conceptualised as being more distinct from one another. When ILOs started to be introduced, intelligence duties were more explicitly fused with liaison tasks. Usually one ILO from each service was posted abroad to close intelligence partner countries, essentially as intelligence attachés. Perhaps the most (in)famous British ILO was Kim Philby, posted to Washington in October 1949, and who was later exposed as one of the ‘Cambridge Five’. In postwar London, an official US liaison office was opened, continuing the ‘formalising’ and ‘regularising’ processes of SIGINT sharing. While between 1946-8 a range of agreements forming the UKUSA arrangement were negotiated and signed.

The intensified intelligence sharing process developed during wartime continued during the Cold War. This was further enhanced by the advent of nuclear weapons and the need for joint warning systems. It also rode on the back of the twentieth century’s accelerating communications, information (including the Internet) and technology (including computer) revolutions. Together with these developments is the intimately associated rise of the increasingly sophisticated COMSEC/INFOSEC dimension, also managed by the SIGINT agencies. For example, ‘information assurance’ (IA) is currently maintained by groups, such as the Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG), an ‘arm’ of the UK’s Government and Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). In the commercial world, alongside the above developments has been the flourishing of ‘private’ and ‘business intelligence’. As Canadian intelligence scholar Wesley Wark notes: ‘the
“open source” revolution has also led to a previously unthinkable privatisation of assessment, with a plethora of private sector companies offering expertise in global risk analysis... These developments also include ‘private intelligence’ burgeoning in other areas - for instance, including within companies with global interests, such as Wal-Mart. Interestingly, these risk analysis enterprises tend to form parallel transatlantic intelligence structures, often including former UK and US defence and intelligence practitioners. Going beyond more ‘formal’ liaison practices (even informal liaison), the open source revolution has also allowed the growth of ‘outreach’ between various different entities. Notably this has been most focussed on improving intelligence analysis. In the 1998 CIA Annual Report, the importance of outreach and what it could offer was recognised: ‘CIA increased outreach to identify and communicate on a regular basis with outside experts to fill information gaps and to challenge and test analysis.’ Later by 2007, the importance of outreach was again clearly stressed by General Hayden, the Director of the CIA:

As the DNI has made clear in his remarks today, we operate in an unstable and dangerous world where international terrorism, the rise of new powers, and the accelerating pace of economic and technological change are placing strains on the ability of states to govern and increasing the potential for strategic surprises... The complexity and interdependence of these issues demands nothing less than the very best analysis. To achieve this we are pursuing a number of initiatives to continue to enhance analytic tradecraft, strengthen strategic analysis, and expand our analytic outreach.

Although the emphasis of outreach is on (or for) improving analysis, naturally it also has implications for collection. Moreover, again according to the CIA: ‘The [US] National Intelligence Council (NIC) has made outreach a central tenet of its efforts to improve the quality of its product.’ Other sources can be exploited which can then be subsumed into the overall intelligence efforts. Interestingly, outreach also features more explicitly with regard to intelligence training programmes. The power of the concept of outreach stems from its capacity to be broadly defined (see below [5.0]). This allows for essential agility and flexibility, offering a wide range of adaptable tools and several modes that can be applied. Indeed, it allows for the ingestion and infusion of information, with the contextual details and specifics again determining the precise form it adopts and how far it extends.

During the twentieth century, the professionalisation-process of intelligence overall was further consolidated. The ‘liaison’ dimension, alongside the handling of intelligence in all its diverse forms, was closely associated with these developments.
(See Appendix 1, at the end of this study, for some of the declassified CIA archival documents, which demonstrate at the micro level the gradual ‘professionalisation’ process of liaison and its management over time, along with the ever-present bureaucratic factors involved in such processes.) There was the provision of specific educational and training programmes, and the introduction of legal frameworks within which intelligence agencies have to operate.\textsuperscript{71}

Legal frameworks have been especially important in Europe since the late 1980s. For the UK intelligence services, this includes having to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).\textsuperscript{72} Several ‘legitimisation’ processes were witnessed. These most obviously involved special Parliamentary legislation – notably the UK Security Service Act (1989), the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000).\textsuperscript{73} The latter has also incorporated sections of ECHR. This type of embodiment helps to contribute towards delineating legally acceptable parameters for intelligence operations. Namely these operational parameters affect the scale and scope of intelligence operations, how sources can be exploited, as well as help to define what intelligence opportunities can be seized. Naturally, implications flow from the presence of these types of legal operational parameters when conducting relations with foreign liaison intelligence partners. Most recently, these considerations have surfaced vividly \textit{vis-à-vis} the controversial issue of ‘extraordinary renditions’.\textsuperscript{74} At junctures, by adhering to these legal stipulations, liaison (at least in its formal incarnation) can be more challenging to conduct. At other times, the legal stipulations can be empowering. This is especially in terms of helping to contribute towards the UK not forfeiting the moral high ground in its intelligence operations, as well as helping to clarify for staff what is legally permissible (see below \textsuperscript{[10.0]}\textsuperscript{75}).

Another symptom of these legal developments has been the creation of legislative accountability mechanisms and an oversight body, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).\textsuperscript{76} Limited executive accountability of the UK intelligence services has always occurred at the ministerial (Secretary of State) level – for instance, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) comes under the Defence Secretary, the British Security Service (MI5) comes under the Home Secretary, while the SIS (MI6) and GCHQ both come under the Foreign Secretary. Judicial accountability has also emerged, although this has been eroded through the creation of a separate Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner - posts established by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) in 2000.\textsuperscript{77} Alongside this, there has been the introduction of ‘democratisation’ processes and greater ‘openness’. The increasing ‘openness’ has been most noticeable with the intelligence agencies being given a presence online, including SIS in October
2005. In 2002, the ISC declared: ‘Oversight of the intelligence and security Agencies is now regarded as an important part of democratic society and any future developments will be based on the foundations created by the ISC.’

[4.1]: Liaison and oversight – ‘In all cases that the Committee is aware of...’:

Intelligence liaison, however, remains ‘fenced-off’. It rests firmly in the centre of the closed ‘inner ring(s) of secrecy.’ In both the UK and the US, the greatest accountability and oversight of international intelligence liaison appears to occur internally. This is within the intelligence agencies themselves and/or touched upon during episodes, such as ad hoc and/or annual reviews conducted by their respective parent departments. An insight into some of the UK intelligence agencies’ internal UK-US intelligence liaison-associated review processes, or indeed equally an absence of these, was provided by the UK Government itself. Responding to the ISC’s report on rendition it stated that: ‘The Government accepts that, with hindsight, an emerging pattern of renditions during 2002 can be identified but notes that... at the time the Agencies’ priorities were correctly focused on disrupting attacks rather than scrutinising U.S. policy.’ Indeed, through the declassified CIA archival documents (such as those cited in Appendix 2, below), we can garner considerable insights into the types of reviews, reports and other management tools being employed to try and internally manage US foreign intelligence liaison relationships at the highest levels within the CIA.

Similar trends are apparent in the UK context. When undertaken, the evaluations of the liaison processes can be either ad hoc or ongoing. The nature of these evaluations is subject to change and re-tasking according to the prevailing shifting circumstances and priorities. Unsurprisingly, these are considerations that vary intimately from specific relationship to specific relationship. As Peter Wilson has argued: ‘Trusting intelligence relationships cannot simply be switched on at will, but are established over long periods by officers who are knowledgeable about the political and cultural context in which they operate...’ Meanwhile, the sensitive details of intelligence liaison (essentially) remain protected from the eyes of any ‘external’ body, including the ISC. Although by mid-2007 at least some changes were apparent. This development came with the ISC examining the issue of renditions. However, this seems more of a temporary anomaly, essentially following close on the already aired findings of journalists and non-governmental organisations. In his letter dated 28 June 2007, to the new UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the Chair of the ISC, the Hon. Paul Murphy MP, outlined the remit of the ISC’s report Renditions: ‘Our inquiry has considered whether the UK intelligence and security Agencies had any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations, and also the Agencies’ overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services.’
added). This neatly reflects the ‘rise’ of intelligence liaison and its increasing centrality in overall intelligence affairs, as well as in wider international affairs. However, eventually how routine and regularised - and indeed how wide and/or deep - this type of probe of intelligence liaison becomes remains to be seen.

As a standalone, the ISC Renditions report has shortfalls. In its assessment, it does not move much beyond already established facts. It asserts that the overarching US intelligence dimension is very important to the UK, and that difficulties are currently being encountered in this relationship, which the British have to work around. According to the ISC report, when giving evidence, ‘The Chief of SIS told the Committee of the immense value to the UK of his Service’s relationship with U.S. intelligence agencies.’ This was along with the revealing claim that: ‘The knowledge of the U.S. rendition programme, as it evolved over time, has altered the manner in which intelligence is shared with the U.S. …’ Sir John Scarlett continued: ‘So we find ourselves in a position where we share with *** key [counterterrorism] interests, objectives and many techniques, but where we have some different methods and a quite different legal framework, specifically but not only on the issue of rendition.’

Delving into some further detail, in the process highlighting some of the safeguard caveats involved, he noted: ‘... it does mean that we have for a long time been aware that sharing what I would call “actionable intelligence”, leading to a possible rendition, would require very careful internal consideration and Ministerial approval.’

In his evidence to the ISC, the Director of the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Sir David Pepper, went further. He remarked that ‘GCHQ had “never knowingly provided support to a U.S. rendition operation and we would not authorise the use of intelligence for that purpose... and we have never been asked to do so”.’ Distinct caps on the UK’s liaison with the US are suggested. Yet, how far these consistently extend in practice is perhaps more open to debate. This is not least when ‘informal’ interactions can also be involved.

Elsewhere, liaison, as an entity worthy of being subject to regular exploration through an accountability and oversight lens, appears to be more overlooked. This includes by the narrowly drawn remits of the RIPA Commissioners, which is the routine case perhaps unless particular circumstances arise whereby the Commissioners are specially and specifically tasked to probe liaison interactions. By being categorised in the Intelligence Services Act (1994) as ‘sensitive information’, that is essentially only releasable for scrutiny by the ISC on authorisation from the Secretary of State responsible, several important aspects of intelligence liaison relationships in fact remain deeply hidden. From the Act, it appears that the ISC is only just located on the inside fringe of the ‘ring of secrecy’ and, therefore, ‘to an extent has to believe what it is told.” Notably, the ISC Intelligence Oversight brochure
does not refer directly to the oversight of ‘liaison’. Naturally, the ISC’s overall effectiveness at overseeing and probing the deepest depths of intelligence liaison is called into question. Indeed, Glees et al note that: ‘...there are still four main no-go areas for the ISC: It has no right to receive information on intelligence sources and operational methods, intelligence operations or foreign liaisons...’ The so-called ‘third party rule’ governing intelligence liaison can also effectively prevent disclosure of the details of international intelligence liaison relationships to anyone investigating and/or researching them. This is whereby a second party without the permission of the first party cannot pass details of the liaison onto a third party.

The US intelligence oversight and accountability system also suffers from similar crippling curbs on its ability to police the depths of ‘foreign liaison relationships’. This is highlighted in the ‘Appendix’ of the US Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:

The DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] refused to allow the Joint Inquiry to have access to a series of reports that had been prepared within CTC [(CIA’s) Counter-Terrorism Center] regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA’s liaison relationships with a variety of foreign governments. This decision affected the Inquiry’s ability to determine the extent to which some foreign governments had or had not cooperated and shared information with the United States in countering Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida prior to September 11.

While such long-term restrictions may be reassuring to US intelligence liaison partners, the lack of oversight regarding liaison is worrying. This is particularly in the context of enhanced US (and other countries’) dependency on intelligence liaison in the post-9/11 security environment in international affairs.

Ultimately, a multi-dimensional intelligence liaison accountability and oversight deficit exists and persists. In the process, this raises a number of concerns. These include pertinent questions surrounding the extent of review to which these relationships are subjected. Questions are also asked regarding the types of international interactions open to other governance and/or management considerations, such as how could they potentially be better optimised into the future? There are few clear answers to these questions. Significantly, this is occurring in a context where the intelligence liaison accountability and oversight deficit can have important ramifications – for instance relating to the observance of major treaties on human rights. This has been starkly demonstrated regarding recent ‘torture’ allegations, CIA secret prisons and ‘extraordinary renditions’. It has also emerged in episodes associated with 9/11 and the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq.
intelligence controversies. Therefore, in both the UK and US, there is ample scope for enhanced intelligence liaison accountability and oversight. Arguably, this is simultaneously matched by the increased need for greater intelligence consultancy and strategy in, at least, the UK.

Similar questions persist surrounding the issue of ‘openness’. In the so-called ‘War on Terror’ context, government leaders asserted that a higher degree of accountability deficit would have to be accepted by the public. Soon after 9/11, US Vice-President Dick Cheney remarked that: ‘We’ll have to work the dark side, if you will. We’re gonna spend time in the shadows of the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion...’ At least some of the greater ‘openness’ that governments claimed in the 1990s would be curtailed. Unsurprisingly, given the various constraints upon the UK and US intelligence oversight committees, this accountability deficit would be most marked in relation to intelligence liaison, making it enduringly the ‘most secret’ dimension of intelligence. In the following sections, attempts are made to address that deficit, beginning in the conceptual domain with a definition of ‘intelligence liaison’.

[5.0]: Defining the ‘double-edged sword’ of intelligence liaison

‘By combining their intelligence efforts with those of their allies, nations are able to trim intelligence costs and compensate for gaps in their own surveillance; yet fear that the other service has been penetrated by a common foe, and an awareness that the ally (however close) is likely to have some divergent objectives, keep the romance at arm’s length. The proposition warrants a corollary: the greater the perceived common danger, the more likely an effective liaison.’

- L.K. Johnson, US intelligence scholar and former Church Committee staffer

The term ‘intelligence liaison’ is expansive. It can be seen as synonymous with, and is often used - for example in the media - interchangeably with the terms ‘intelligence co-operation’, ‘intelligence sharing’, ‘intelligence pooling’, ‘intelligence alliance’, ‘intelligence integration’ and ‘intelligence exchange’. As a useful starting point, the nature of intelligence liaison is intrinsically diverse and can be characterised as being: ‘simple and complex’, ‘symmetric and asymmetric’, ‘adversarial’, ‘bilateral or multilateral’.

In this study, ‘intelligence liaison’ is a direct composite of the words ‘intelligence’ + ‘liaison’ as defined above. It means communication, co-operation and linkage between a range of actors, usually at (but not limited to) the official intelligence agency level, on intelligence matters - essentially exchanging/sharing information, particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially
(and purposefully) relates to national security. It also includes usually secret (covert and/or clandestine), state activity conducted by specialised ‘intelligence’ institutions to understand or influence entities. The presence and preservation of secrecy surrounding the liaison, particularly of the details, is regarded as essential. This is particularly if there is an associated illicit or risqué element and an intimacy to it that needs to remain hidden away, even from internal authorities.

Arguably, intelligence liaison can be conceptualised as being a covert form of ‘outreach’. Interpreted as ‘soft liaison’ - and hence less encumbered with the necessary operating restrictions and constraints of ‘hard liaison’ - ‘outreach’ is defined as: ‘... reach further than ... the extent or length of reaching out... an organization’s involvement with the community.’\textsuperscript{104} Therefore, the phenomenon of liaison is subject to some of the traits associated with the phenomenon of outreach, such as overreach and under-reach. But arguably (at least in theory) by figuring in its harder form, the outreach behind the cloak of liaison can be more formal and tightly controlled. These qualifiers reflect the requirements stipulated by the ‘professionalisation’ of liaison processes articulated throughout this chapter. How effectively these requirements are implemented in reality across all levels of interaction remains debatable. For instance, as Robert David Steele has claimed critically: ‘Professionalism and “foreign liaison” constitute an inherent oxymoron.’\textsuperscript{105}

This is a tension not least apparent in a context where a plethora of informal arrangements exist in parallel - often outside/beyond the authorities that are technically supposed to ‘govern’ intelligence liaison relationships. Crucially, this allows for some more essential flexibility of operation.

Intelligence liaison has multiple characteristics. For instance, there can be a single link (‘simple’), a network or matrix of links (‘complex’). The links can be of a formal (regulated), informal, ad hoc, continuing or temporary, enduring or brittle, institutional and/or personal nature.\textsuperscript{106} The links can also be deeper, acquiring relationship attributes, extending to a ‘special’ relationship nature – depending on the extent of conditional factors, such as trust.\textsuperscript{107} The link(s) may also be regulated - that is, subject to some form of internal\textsuperscript{108} self-oversight or accountability mechanism.

Depending on the actors or parties involved, a broader definition can be tabled. On an expanding continuum, this includes liaison between law enforcement (police) forces, between embassies’ and armies’ legal/defence/military attachés, and can include cross-sector/level/organisation contacts.\textsuperscript{109} It can range from a shared and pooled database to people merely talking. Intelligence liaison can be extended into the domain of diplomacy, such as being a form of readily deniable ‘clandestine diplomacy’ or ‘crypto-diplomacy’ through using ‘back channels’.\textsuperscript{110} It can be regarded as a form of covert action,\textsuperscript{111} or, adopting a yet wider focus, it can even
include essentially any form of cross-boundary contact where intelligence is exchanged - for example also featuring in the important intelligence community (producer) and user (customer/consumer) relationship.\textsuperscript{112}

Liaison has much relevance in relation to all stages of the ‘intelligence cycle’. This includes the collection and processing (analysis) of material. However, intelligence liaison is simultaneously not neatly or easily categorisable in generic terms without a degree of distortion. For instance, as it takes place in multiple locations, it cannot be sited in a specific stage in the ‘intelligence cycle’.\textsuperscript{113} The range of subjects or issue-areas covered by the liaison, and the extent they are interacted over, can also vary. Here, intelligence liaison often works on a quid pro quo basis.\textsuperscript{114} Intelligence liaison can additionally operate at the national and international (bilateral through to pluri- and multilateral) levels.\textsuperscript{115} It can take place between both friends and allies and, perhaps more controversially, foes. As Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst notes, the ‘intelligence relationship with Syria [(see below)] is an example of “adversarial liaison”.’\textsuperscript{116} Intelligence liaison is a useful mechanism for keeping tabs on friends as well as foes - as the ‘friends’ may be simultaneously regarded as a competitor, for instance in the economic arena\textsuperscript{117} - granting an insight into their activities, their future intentions, whether they are adhering to treaty obligations and so forth. Here, the frequently quoted maxim of Lord Palmerston that essentially ‘nations do not have friends, only interests’, and the similar observation along the lines that: ‘There are no friendly intelligence services, only the intelligence services of friendly powers’, resonate. This is together with the debates surrounding these observations: ‘All true’ argued the Dutch intelligence scholar Cees Wiebes in an internet forum posting; ‘I do not believe this’, so claimed the then Director General of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, in her Dimbleby Lecture in 1994.\textsuperscript{118}

Intelligence liaison or its cessation, or the threat thereof, can be used as a ‘bargaining chip’. This is in order to help try and persuade a rethink or change of policy at the highest government level of a current, former or potential intelligence partner. For example, in May 2005, Syria announced that it was ending military and intelligence co-operation with the US to underline its objections to US policy.\textsuperscript{119} Other examples include the ‘withholding’ of some intelligence on Bosnia by the US over UK-US differences on the issue during the 1990s,\textsuperscript{120} as well as the (brief) official US withdrawal of the supply of US SIGINT to UKUSA partner New Zealand after differences over nuclear matters in 1985.\textsuperscript{121}

Intelligence liaison can raise some awkward ethical and moral questions. These require compromises on one or both sides in order to work most effectively.\textsuperscript{122} The British may reluctantly have to put aside human rights concerns regarding intelligence material liaised over that may have been obtained through the use of
unsavoury and controversial methods. Arguably, these dubious methods can extend to being counterproductive and unlawful, notably torture, and include ‘extraordinary renditions’ and unpleasant ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques, such as ‘waterboarding’.\textsuperscript{123} Regarding UK-US intelligence relations, in their \textit{Renditions} report the ISC wistfully noted: ‘What the U.S. rendition programme has shown is that these ethical dilemmas are not confined to countries with poor track records on human rights – the UK now has some ethical dilemmas with our closest ally.’\textsuperscript{124} The liaison may equally be with an unpalatable person or organisation, introducing the concept of so-called ‘dangerous liaisons’.\textsuperscript{125} Moreover, in order to liaise effectively, the intelligence officers involved have to be ‘declared’ or ‘authorised’. Thus they reveal their identity to another party, increasing the chances of being exposed as a spy or being otherwise compromised.\textsuperscript{126} Both cultural and structural obstacles can feature. As the ISC \textit{Renditions} report remarked:

\begin{quote}
Despite the value that intelligence sharing can bring, working with a foreign intelligence service is not always straightforward for the UK Agencies. Other countries have different legal systems and different standards of behaviour to the UK, and their intelligence and security services have varying levels of capability, capacity and professional standards. These factors must be taken into account when working with foreign liaison services.\textsuperscript{127}
\end{quote}

Realist perspectives tend to compare the intelligence liaison process with a professional business relationship. Here intelligence, as a commodity or product, is carefully negotiated and traded over.\textsuperscript{128} The control and ownership of the intelligence liaised over, and of the source originating that intelligence, can be contentious and complicated. This is to varying degrees, depending on a complex mixture of circumstances and the terms of the liaison ‘deal’ struck.\textsuperscript{129} Similarly to any business deal, the final agreement under some circumstances is occasionally evaded, with details being interpreted slightly differently by each party involved.\textsuperscript{130} Insights into some of the micro-intelligence management controls in UK-US intelligence liaison relations can be glimpsed in ISC reports: ‘The sharing of intelligence with foreign liaison services on suspected extremists is routine. There was nothing exceptional in the Security Service notifying the U.S. of the men’s arrest and setting out its assessment of them. \textit{The telegram was correctly covered by a caveat prohibiting the U.S. authorities from taking action on the basis of the information it contained}.’\textsuperscript{131} Ultimately, each of the interactions outlined above generates its own politics. These warrant further in-depth exploration, particularly at this current juncture when there is quantitatively more intelligence liaison underway.\textsuperscript{132}
[5.1]: Exploring the depths of intelligence liaison:
This study argues that intelligence liaison is a form of what can be termed ‘overt-covert action’. Or, to borrow Michael Herman’s phrase, actually used in relation to how diplomats view intelligence generally, it is ‘a slightly fenced-off mystery’. The iceberg analogy resonates. The aspects describable as ‘hidden dynamics’ are rarely revealed, or at least tend not to be probed until after a significant passage of time. Even then, accounts can be constrained, in part because of the methodological problems.

Intelligence liaison, therefore, continues to be an under-researched area. The writing on intelligence liaison in all mediums, from media articles to the academic and (former-) practitioner literature, can be described as diverse and mainly historically orientated. It offers an almost exclusive empirical evaluation of liaison, contributing towards an overall dearth of theory in this area of contemporary intelligence studies. As UK intelligence scholar Len Scott notes: ‘Clandestine diplomacy [an aspect of intelligence liaison] is a neglected area of enquiry…’ In the following pages, with particular focus on international (or foreign) intelligence liaison, this study aims to contribute towards addressing that shortcoming. As Scott concludes: ‘The problems of learning about covert action (and clandestine diplomacy [and, by implication, intelligence liaison]) will nevertheless persist, as the need to evaluate and judge them will undoubtedly grow.’ A useful place to begin is by attempting some generalisations, the focus of the next section.

[6.0]: Intelligence liaison generalisations

Generalising about intelligence liaison presents multiple challenges. Yet, despite confronting these generalisability issues, some attempts to this end are still worth trying. Several generalisations concerning intelligence liaison can readily be made. Intelligence liaison is important to various processes. Indeed, it is one of the most effective modus operandi in order to help successfully achieve desired ends in politics and international relations. For instance in the US military context, as the US Joint Chiefs of Staff noted while emphasising the utility of liaison: ‘Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.’ Intelligence liaison also featured prominently in General Michael Hayden’s US Congressional confirmation hearing for the post of the head of the CIA in May 2006. In the UK, a substantial amount of the Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary (Intelligence, Security and Resilience)’s, and the heads of the intelligence agencies’, time is expended on managing liaison. These relationships are all deemed to be extremely valuable. Intelligence liaison takes place in multiple locations. Indeed, even ‘everywhere’,
depending upon how far and broadly it is conceptualised. It offers decision-makers an extensive range of options of deployable types and forms and functions.\textsuperscript{144}

Intelligence liaison can be the ultimate enabler. Often it is cloaked in intense secrecy staying hidden in the background, away from scrutiny and accountability. This feature adds to its appeal as a tool, according it more flexibility and dynamism of operation. As John Bruce Lockhart, former deputy Chief of the UK SIS/MI6, declared: ‘The essential skill of a secret service is to get things done secretly and deniably.’\textsuperscript{145} Intelligence liaison can be one of the key means of acquiring and communicating knowledge, as well as conveying knowledge’s associated power. Intelligence liaison can also be a means for using that resulting ‘intelligence power’.\textsuperscript{146} Therefore, in the post-11 September 2001 (9/11) and increasingly globalised security environment, it is unsurprising that to a greater degree than previously, countries are increasingly reliant upon intelligence liaison.\textsuperscript{147}

Hegemony over intelligence is vital. For the US, the hegemony is essential for: (1) acquiring and maintaining primacy; (2) persuading other parties into a collective and co-operative orbit; and (3) helps to provide for leadership and effective global management in international affairs. It increases the potential for a ‘rapier’, rather than a ‘bludgeon’, to be applied,\textsuperscript{148} significantly assisting in the calculation regarding the potentially most advantageous deployment of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power.\textsuperscript{149} Currently, a global hegemony of intelligence power and resources is central to helping sustain the multi-challenged status quo of Pax Americana.

Despite the positive attributes of intelligence liaison, it involves potential pitfalls. This was shown by the recent intelligence controversies concerning the 9/11 attacks and supposed Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).\textsuperscript{150} Intelligence liaison can be a powerful tool, but it is only as effective as those who use it. Equally, the effects and outcomes of intelligence liaison can be complicated and ambiguous.\textsuperscript{151} This prompts the recommended essential qualification: ‘proceed with caution.’\textsuperscript{152} As US intelligence practitioner Warren Mulholland noted: ‘...on balance we benefit from liaison with other services, and that although we use great caution in what we teach and give to them, we must face the fact that even the simplest and most basic of clandestine techniques can be used against us just as readily as against a common adversary...’\textsuperscript{153}

Despite its importance, intelligence liaison should not induce over-dependence. For example, international intelligence liaison arguably works best when deployed in a complementary fashion, in a supporting role, alongside other unilateral intelligence efforts.\textsuperscript{154} Intelligence liaison also contributes towards the generation of shared perceptions. Ironically, if international intelligence liaison is too close, or if a particular intelligence liaison relationship becomes too much of an ‘end’
In itself, then intelligence ‘reach’ excesses and deficits become more pronounced. Episodes of ‘intelligence liaison blowback’, namely ‘groupthink’, can result, as well as at least contributing to other intelligence analysis-related ‘flaws’, such as ‘mirror-imaging’. In a ‘traditional liaison’ context, there can also be concerns about participants going too ‘native’, suggesting the issue of ‘split loyalties’. These issues can increase the likelihood of some form of ‘intelligence failure’ emerging. However, the absence of intelligence liaison, together with the lack of the communication of knowledge, resulting in ignorance, is worse. Not infrequently, risk management considerations emerge. This is typically where foreign services are given permission to carry out an operation on sovereign national territory.

Intelligence liaison involves risk, but its absence would involve greater risk.

[7.0]: Establishing the operational parameters

International intelligence liaison can be demanding. For it to function, at least an element of ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ needs to be present. Usually conceptualised as some form of agreement established between all parties involved in the liaison, this arrangement helps to foster a foundation level of trust. This is the essential enabling condition for substantial liaison to take place. Trust, too, allows the prospect of increased liaison and related phenomena, such as ‘jointery’, in the future. In the case of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, this process is formally achieved by agreements including those associated with the UKUSA arrangement. More widely, as Michael Herman stresses: ‘This importance of standards spreads well beyond the English-speaking communities and applies to intelligence’s internationalisation.’ While in the rapidly growing peacekeeping intelligence (PKI) context, PKI ‘…seeks to establish standards in open-source collection, analysis, security, and counter-intelligence and training, and produces unclassified intelligence useful to the public.’

In this study, the term ‘homogenisation’ means making ‘of the same kind… consisting of parts all of the same kind; uniform…’ or, at least, approaching that condition. The term ‘international standardisation’ has a similar meaning, although it is not quite the same as ‘homogenisation’. This is because at its most formal and in its most pure form, it can correspond to the work undertaken by the International Organization for Standardisation (ISO), with ‘the ISO’ of intelligence having already been suggested.

The term ‘globalisation’ enjoys several potential meanings when employed in relation to intelligence. Three particularly standout: (1) the ‘globalisation of intelligence’, (2) the impact of ‘globalisation on intelligence’, and (3) ‘globalisation
Developed in response to (2) and (3), the focus of this study, (1) the ‘globalisation of intelligence’, essentially refers to the greater interconnectedness and interdependence of intelligence and its institutions, as well as intelligence exchange occurring more widely and in greater depth. This includes intelligence sharing taking place beyond solely bilateral and regional bases, extending to occurring on a global basis, often with improbable partners. Greater connectivity between the various internal/domestic security agencies, which now enjoy liaison networks as comprehensive as their counterparts focussed on exploiting foreign intelligence, simultaneously figures. Elsewhere, ‘globalisation’ has been defined relevantly as: ‘A historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in the spatial scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents…’ and the ‘de-territorialization – or… the growth of supraterritorial relations between people.’ In the intelligence realm, overall the complex processes create a web of intelligence liaison arrangements that collectively provide a form of global intelligence coverage. These then work by overlapping in key metropolitan centres, and by being governed by a mosaic of agreements ranging in nature from formal to informal. To extend our understanding of intelligence liaison further, some disaggregation of the phenomenon is now valuable.

[8.0]: The components of intelligence liaison

Intelligence liaison can be readily disaggregated. The anatomy of intelligence liaison can be conceptualised as having eight closely interrelated, systemic attributes or variables. These are: (1) internal influences/factors; (2) rationale; (3) types and forms; (4) conditions and terms; (5) trends; (6) functions; (7) external influences/factors; and (8) effects and outcomes. More fundamentally, these eight attributes or variables provide useful criteria that can be employed for benchmarking in this study. These are used to accept and/or reject at least aspects of the other bodies of theory consulted. This is in order to try and better explain the phenomenon of intelligence liaison (see below [9.1]).

[8.1]: Unpacking the eight attributes of intelligence liaison:

The internal influences/factors are extensive. Primarily, they include the specific countries or actors/agents involved in the intelligence liaison. This is along with all the associated factors they bring, for example: (i) the nature and culture of the intelligence communities and agencies involved; (ii) their modi operandi and their intended ends; (iii) the people involved – their personalities, their interpretations, philosophies, ideologies, and roles (including as liaison officers and defence/military
attachés) – as well as (iv) organisational, managerial, structural, and bureaucratic factors – such as inertia and ‘red-tape’. As an example of organisational factors having an impact with regard to intelligence liaison, overlapping lines of command can be unhelpful. This generates tensions as people can clash, making ‘proper liaison impossible’, as seen at times in Bletchley Park during the Second World War.¹⁷⁷ For the purposes of this study, the UK and US are the main focus as the key actors. Here, the ‘agency-structure’ debate in international relations (IR) theory arguably has its most relevance in relation to intelligence liaison.¹⁷⁸

The rationale behind intelligence liaison usually operates at several levels. These range from the generic to particular participant specific. For example, intelligence liaison figures as the mechanism (in both a ‘means’ form and ‘end’ or ‘solution’ form) for responding to the current global security concerns; being the mechanism for fulfilling and managing coerced, mutual or similar aims and interests; being the supplement to intelligence collection or analysis weaknesses or limitations, filling knowledge gaps; being a mechanism for widening access; and being a mechanism for implementing the functions and for achieving means and desired ends - perhaps on a financially cheaper basis than if it had to be done alone. Throughout, the driving desire for enhanced intelligence and security outreach is central. This in turn contributes towards trying to attain greater optimised balances both in terms of overarching intelligence and security (general) reach and (more specific) outreach. This is notably in a directly ‘winning’, and ideally proportionate, manner against threats in the form of targets and risks.

The types and forms of intelligence liaison are again numerous. They can be broken down into: (1) domestic – intelligence liaison between (i) the intelligence agencies within one country’s intelligence community - essentially more intelligence liaison between these leads to greater integration within the intelligence community or the nationalisation of intelligence;¹⁷⁹ and (ii) between intelligence agencies and users, for example, politicians and businesses – and (2) international. International intelligence liaison can be further divided into (i) bilateral - two parties involved; (ii) trilateral - three parties involved; (iii) multilateral – when four or more parties are involved; and (iv) plurilateral – which can be bilateral to multilateral, but between different forms of parties, such as the European Union (EU) and US. As well as being a form of integration and interdependence, facilitating collective and common security, intelligence liaison also involves a business-like relationship. Intelligence liaison can be selective or a partnership. It can espouse other characteristics as outlined throughout this chapter – often determined by the conditions and terms.

The conditions and terms determine when intelligence liaison takes place. This is done through establishing the frameworks for the arrangements and defining
the operating parameters for the intelligence liaison. They are set up when the *rationale* for the intelligence liaison is present. The central condition forming the basis for intelligence liaison is ‘trust’. As seen earlier, trust is established when an agreement, which is acceptable to all the parties involved, has been adopted, thus allowing for confidence building over time. This contract establishes the standards, rules and guidelines for the process and/or for the use of the product of intelligence liaison. In the case of substantial liaison, the agreement is usually formal and written (see *types and forms*). In the case of this study, the UKUSA agreements and other memoranda of understanding (MoU) can be cited. The contract is arrived at through the processes of bargaining and negotiation. The contract determines and regulates the *functions* of the intelligence liaison, their nature, and establishes the various *quid pro quos*, as well as forms the framework for the homogenisation and (international) standardisation processes. Meanwhile, in the defence realm, as Alasdair Roberts notes, the ‘conditions that govern the handling of shared information are laid out in bilateral Security Of Information Agreements, or SOIAs... The practice of negotiating SOIAs was formalized in the United States in 1971 by National Security Decision Memorandum 119, which prohibits the sharing of military information with a foreign government that has not signed a legally binding SOI agreement.’ Additionally, alongside these formal/regulated arrangements, governed by rules, can also co-exist more informal arrangements. This includes those more loosely governed by guidelines, which can potentially allow some greater room for careful individual interpretation depending upon factors such as precise circumstances.

The *trends* range from revealing and understanding the history of intelligence liaison through to thinking about possible future directions and scenarios. They include lessons learnt from a range of sources. They also allow for conceptualisation, hypothesis formulation and the posing of questions, such as: ‘is the British Empire/Commonwealth intelligence system witnessed in the past a useful model for effective globalised and multilateral intelligence liaison in the future?’

The *functions* detail some of the operating dynamics of intelligence liaison. *Functions* include: influence or control of overall policy; the sharing of information, operations and facilities; support through training, advice and supplies; clandestine or crypto-diplomacy; evading national and/or international restrictions; and monitoring. Including the controversial ‘friends spying on friends’ dimension, monitoring: (i) ensures that neither side has broken any agreements - for instance, through foreign intelligence partners conducting black/unilateral (especially active) intelligence operations *sans* permission on the host country’s territory, and thus
making them *persona non grata*\textsuperscript{188} - (ii) offers reassurance against penetration,\textsuperscript{189} (iii) grants insights into future intentions of ‘allies’ and ‘foes’; and (iv) allows for the managing of an internal oversight, self-policing, self-regulation and accountability system – that is, using intelligence liaison to oversee other areas of the intelligence liaison, for instance.

The *external influences/factors* contribute towards establishing the operating context for the intelligence liaison. This includes anything ‘external’ to the intelligence liaison, and includes other relationships, such as the overall political, economic, and defence relationships. In this study, the focus is on the Anglo-American relationship, therefore the overall UK-US alliance, and its associated dynamics, figures centrally. *External influences/factors* also include: circumstances, the wider international affairs context and its impacts - such as currently globalisation, the so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’, and previously the Cold War; ‘domestic’ politics and their influence on the intelligence agencies/communities conducting the liaison; foreign policy influences, for example the UK trying to play its Atlantic ‘bridging’ role and treading a fine balance between maintaining closeness to both Europe and the US; the media, domestic and international public opinion, and any form of *external*\textsuperscript{190} oversight, regulation and accountability system of intelligence generally; as well as relationships with other countries and, closely related to this, other countries’ influence(s).

What results from the intelligence liaison is identifiable as the *effects and outcomes* of the intelligence liaison. In analyses of the observed and recorded *effects and outcomes* of intelligence liaison, a form of risk assessment is undertaken. The *effects and outcomes* can also have an impact on the other attributes/variables - for example, if an outcome affects the linked *external influences/factors* or the *internal influences/factors* in any manner.\textsuperscript{191}

Normally, the influence of each of the eight attributes/variables on one another is seen as being essentially about the same. A particular attribute/variable, or part of an attribute/variable, only gains ‘special’ or more influence or is particularly expressed on the overall intelligence liaison ‘system’ or *modus vivendi* at a particular time and/or in particular circumstances. The issue of ethics can enter the equation at several points by being attached to several different parts of the different attributes/variables, such as relating to the *modi operandi* deployed during the intelligence liaison.\textsuperscript{192}

\[\text{[For further explanation, and for how all the eight attributes/variables interact, see figure 1 below]}\textsuperscript{193}\]
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 1: Introduction

[Figure 1]: An international intelligence liaison relationship in operation in theory, contributing towards the ‘globalisation’ of intelligence.
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 1: Introduction

[9.0]: Analytical frameworks for explaining intelligence liaison

‘This topic is a very interesting one. While it can be demonstrated that “Intelligence Liaison” is imperative, it can be shown equally well that it is [no] substitute for other, more traditional defensive and offensive source programs and operations.’

- Rocco Rosano, commentator on US intelligence

An analysis of intelligence liaison can be extended further. Intelligence liaison in all its myriad of forms reflects the chaotic ‘real’ and ‘constructed’ worlds in which we live. It also effectively represents concepts such as ‘complex interdependence’. Furthermore, its spread can in part be explained by the influence of a pragmatic ‘problem-solving’ and ‘risk management’ mentality. As the UK Government’s response to the ISC’s Renditions report highlighted: ‘...the [UK intelligence] Agencies have adapted their procedures to work round problems and maintain the exchange of intelligence that is so critical to UK security.’ However, the presence of these factors alone does not offer the fullest explanation for why and how intelligence liaison occurs, as is demonstrated below.

[9.1]: Intelligence liaison and theory, and why it needs its own theory:
Theory can have some utility in explaining intelligence liaison. Several different bodies of pre-existing theories appear to contain significant analytical potential for explaining intelligence co-operation. Mainstream theories of alliance and balance of power, of bureaucratic politics and securitisation, together with theories concerning business, risk and negotiation – even cybernetics - can all be drawn upon in relation to the phenomenon of intelligence liaison.

However, what is also clear is that individually each of these theories is inadequate. While aspects may fit, alone these theories fail to capture precisely enough the full complexities observed within and surrounding the intelligence liaison phenomenon. This is particularly evident when it is broken down into its different systemic attributes or variables (see above [8.0]), and when it is analysed at and across all its different identified levels of analysis (see Chapter 2 [4.1]). Therefore, to start explaining the phenomenon of intelligence liaison more comprehensively with these other theories, they need to be employed in a condition of ‘complex co-existence plurality’.

We can then try to go beyond this characterisation. Once the parameters and limitations of these other bodies of theory have been ascertained, we can attempt to refine our understanding of the intelligence liaison phenomenon yet further. The way is now paved for some more detailed attempts at more directly theorising the phenomenon of intelligence liaison itself.
‘Reach dynamics’: An ‘intelligence paradigm’ that also explains liaison?

When explaining intelligence liaison, ‘reach dynamics’ also have relevance. Due to perceived threats and risks, enhanced intelligence and security reach is frequently demanded as a solution. Indeed, arguably the craft of ‘doing’ intelligence as a whole can be best explained by a generic theory of optimised reach. The power of this theory reveals itself in several respects. Not least, by thinking of intelligence in terms of its functional reach - and by association ‘reach dynamics’, namely concerning reach factors and calculations - all the stymying definitional problems and disagreements associated with trying to precisely define ‘intelligence’ can be escaped. Thinking of intelligence in terms of reach and its dynamics also allows the provision of a domain where intelligence and related concepts, such as surveillance, can closely and appropriately connect. Furthermore, when conceptualised in terms of reach, the overall ‘holy grail’ goal of intelligence - or the ‘intelligence paradigm’ - emerges as being one of trying to acquire optimum reach. This is frequently characterised (albeit perhaps misguidedly) as attaining ‘the truth’ - something that can ideally then be ‘spoken unto power.’

However, some limits are distinct. Due to the nature of the world, at most realistically only an optimised reach balance in the overall condition of ‘intelligence and security reach’ can hope to be attained. This condition arises as ‘reach requirements’ constantly fluctuate over time, and particularly markedly in extreme times of war, for instance. Although, the quest for trying to attain the loftier (ideal) goal of optimum reach should be the case both for the driving and steering of the intelligence collection and analysis processes: It should figure as the central ‘holy grail’ to be kept constant by intelligence and security services over time in all of their interactions. This is so that ultimately in practice they can most expeditiously facilitate the best fulfilment of their core requirements. Indeed, the continuous quest for optimum reach should feature largely in all intelligence activities, as well as across and within all the domains in which those activities occur (physical and/or virtual). This is whenever and wherever intelligence is operating. Not least, this is crucial with regard to sensitive surrounding issues, such as civil liberties and human rights. This is in order to help towards the retention of the moral high ground, whose sacrifice is inimical to any wider and longer-term enduring intelligence and policy efforts; and especially to their operation, as well as to any opportunity generation and exploitation.

Striving for optimum reach has added merit. This core driving rationale of intelligence increases leverage and negotiation possibilities across many domains of activity. When on outreach bases, this is not least with regard to relations and interactions with intelligence ‘friends and allies’, and with other countries that
require consulting for assistance purposes – such as either for the outflow or inflow of information, expertise or training. Moreover, as an article published in Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst commented: ‘[a]lthough intelligence links are often conducted independently of broader foreign relations, they cannot ignore the realities of state interests.’ Such an overarching rationale again helps to explain the duality of the co-operative (‘altruistic’) and competitive (‘egotistic’) dimensions found within intelligence - and more specifically in intelligence liaison interactions - as well as those associated with the (albeit haphazard) ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ trends.

At least in theory, the ‘optimised reach’ balance contributes to intelligence ‘success’. Meanwhile reach flaws emerge to the fore, for example, through the neglect and/or the bypassing of the goal of an optimum reach balance (albeit unconsciously). This is notable in ‘cherry-picking’ situations, for instance. The ‘reach flaws’ in turn contribute to intelligence ‘failure’ - either in particular domains, at specific levels of analysis, or even overall and more systemically. The most prominently recognised failure includes the concept of ‘strategic surprise’ - for instance, due to under-reach in an intelligence collection area. Discernable within intelligence failure are two notable reach flaws: (1) Too much reach, namely overreach, reflective of reach excess(es); and (2) Too little reach, namely under-reach, representative of reach deficit(s). Both intelligence and security reach excesses and deficits demonstrably feature centrally in intelligence analysis and assessment shortcomings – mirror-imaging and groupthink - as well as figuring in collection limitations – blind spots, a form of under-reach – and in data/information-overload situations - for example, resulting in what can be termed ‘blanch spots’/‘white-outs’, a form of overreach. Phenomena, such as intelligence and security overstretch, can also be directly mapped vis-à-vis the reach flaws, and thus can be seen to be closely associated.

An important question now comes to the fore: how can we best benchmark the intelligence and security ‘reach’ condition, or determine whether the reach is excessive and/or deficient? The most compelling answer is that there are no rigid or generic criteria that can be universally applied. Therefore, measuring intelligence and security ‘reach’ and agreeing on its extent (width and depth), can remain ambiguous and hotly contested. This simultaneously resonates with the ambiguities that can be empirically discerned within intelligence liaison interactions.

In short, the criteria for measuring the intelligence and security reach that should be most appropriately applied vary on a case-by-case basis. These are determined according to the particular entity being evaluated and its operating parameters. Again, the importance of details and specifics is highlighted. This is together with the requirement that these need to be effectively represented or
reflected in some form - such as caveats or footnotes - in the final/overall products (that is, assessments or estimates) that are synthesised. If these details and specifics are lost, evaluations unravel; if they are subsumed or buried, they cease to inform. Presenting a portfolio that demonstrates the fullest range of the mix of insights - for instance through using a greater ‘scenarios methodology’ - can capture the ambiguity involved in the overall case. This is in order to have a greater opportunity to inform. Arguably a form of under-reach figures, if the ambiguity is persistently too deep and/or is too wide. In summary, there is not enough (nor compelling enough) data to sufficiently underpin the triumvirate of a ‘final’ judgement, overall consensus, and the decision-cut-off and/or tipping point – especially that sited at the policy level.

Thinking in terms of ‘reach’ and its dynamics in the intelligence and security context can be instructive. Some diversification into its descendent phenomena of ‘inner-reach’ and ‘outreach’ is allowed. Again these closely concern both the collection and analysis domains of intelligence. These can be evaluated as follows: (1) ‘inner-reach’ - that is, ‘know thy self’, which is internal – for example, figuring in the intelligence world as any form of internal intelligence management, including concerning how data/information-overload issues are handled within intelligence and security organisations, while (2) ‘outreach’ denotes ‘know others – thy friends, allies, opponents, enemies’. In contrast, outreach is concerned with the external – for example, figuring in the intelligence world as intelligence liaison (at least in the covert/clandestine intelligence world), and as outreach (in the overt/open source [OS] intelligence world). A form of outreach is also involved in any ‘external’ intelligence management, such as in human-to-human interactions. Significantly, both reach ‘excesses’ and ‘deficits’ (as outlined above) feature in ‘inner-reach’ as well as ‘outreach’.

Simultaneously, employing an ‘optimised reach theory lens’ overall helps to resolve ‘puzzles’ that can be empirically observed concerning the intelligence world. For instance, it helps to answer the question of why frequently in the wake of an ‘intelligence failure’ instead of cutbacks more resources are devoted to the intelligence and security sector. This is in order to better address the perceived reach mis-configurations/mis-calibrations present at various levels and junctures, in turn frequently ascertained by some form of inquiry/review. Furthermore, this adjustment is done to attempt to strike a better balance in terms of the discernable intelligence and security reach ‘deficits’ and ‘excesses’ - for instance, including those evident in intelligence and security investigations/activities and where they extend in terms of their width, depth and direction. The intelligence budget cuts of the early 1990s can also be explained in such ‘reach-scale’ terms. This is not least as they came
in the wake of an ‘intelligence success’, namely claimed ‘victory’ in and the end of the Cold War.\textsuperscript{212} Human-to-human spy interactions and their dynamics can also be viewed through the prism of the intelligence and security reach theory lens.

Some conclusions readily emerge. Working on the premises discussed above, the drivers behind international/foreign intelligence liaison can, therefore, be explained comprehensively by a descendent or related theory of \textit{optimised outreach}. More arguably, in the contemporary early 21\textsuperscript{st} century context, that optimised outreach features as occurring on an \textit{exponential} basis. Especially in the post-9/11 security environment, enhanced intelligence and security outreach is similarly demanded. This is in order to try and strike a better-optimised balance in terms of the overall (and general) intelligence and security reach present across and into the multiple domains of operation and human activity. Particularly prior to 9/11, some of these domains were hitherto deemed more sensitive and ‘closed off’. Hence, they were treated more carefully with a greater ‘hands-off’ approach. No longer is this type of approach so acceptable in an era of (at least perceived) heightened risks and threats, where preventative pre-emption is the dominant mode.

The trends outlined here can simultaneously trigger concerns. For instance, in a disproportionate manner, the intelligence and security reach - extending to outreach - could extend too far. In the process, this exacerbates all the associated risks of such a scenario. Some of these have already been discussed in this chapter.\textsuperscript{213} Furthermore, methodologically, while the extent of its \textit{predictive utility} might be contested, the resulting ‘theory’ that can be constructed surrounding intelligence and security reach - and by association through the phenomenon of related outreach, intelligence liaison - can still be valuably instructive. This is albeit the presence of some informing hindsight being required in some form or other, such as in the form of adopting and adapting insights from ‘lessons learnt from history’.\textsuperscript{214} In this study, the theory development process samples from a range of what can be termed most fittingly as ‘empirical and interpretive extrapolations’. This allows both the scientific and artistic capture of intelligence-related phenomena – in the process appropriately reflecting the nature of intelligence itself, as well as helping to dilute any overly-positivist rendering. During the course of this study, the range of hypotheses raised in this section will be subjected to empirical testing through the material presented in the case studies in \textit{Chapter 5}. Due to its nature, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship emerges as a useful example of where to begin locating the types of trends and dynamics that this study seeks to explore.
[10.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison – exemplary ‘Friends & Allies’?

‘Whilst the fact that the UK has a general intelligence relationship with the US is in the public domain, the detailed nature of that relationship, particularly in relation to sources of intelligence, is classified and cannot be openly disclosed. To do so, would jeopardise that relationship and could lead to those sources being denied to the UK…’

- UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence

The focus of this study is on UK-US intelligence liaison for several reasons. By closely examining this bilateral international intelligence liaison relationship, important insights can be obtained. These extend into the multiple attributes composing an apparently leading - even ‘model’ - international intelligence liaison relationship and its operating dynamics, including what drivers are involved. Whether the exact configuration at the relationship’s core is thought to be wrong, particularly in an era of globalisation; whether the relationship is deemed to be so ‘special’ and/or ‘unique’ that it cannot be replicated elsewhere (that is, it is sui generis); or whether these lines of argument are agreed with or not - for all its positive and negative traits, the UK-US intelligence relationship is certainly worthy of exploration. Broadly, they are exemplary ‘friends and allies’, and this can be instructive for the purposes of further generalisation.

While there are naturally some sceptics in the UK and US and elsewhere, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is generally (and indeed conventionally) recognised as being on the whole very close and enduring. The sharing of UK-US knowledge being hailed, as has been highlighted in Professor Harold Shukman’s volume, as the ‘jewel in the crown of British intelligence.’ Ultimately, in various ways it is (and continues to be) worth the effort and investment for both sides and their own self and mutual interests. Alongside the nuclear dimension, the intelligence pillar is often credited with making the overall UK-US relationship ‘special’.

The centrality of the intelligence dimension in UK-US relations is frequently officially acknowledged. As Canadian intelligence scholar Professor Martin Rudner argues: ‘To some, [the UKUSA] hub-and-spokes pattern of liaison relationships exemplified the configuration of capability in the UKUSA alliance, with Britain and the United States comprising core contributors, despite an unequal availability of resources, and the other partners who served more like auxiliaries at the periphery of global SIGINT operations.’ Therefore, despite some asymmetry, the UK-US intelligence relationship is arguably one of the ‘best’ examples of an effective international intelligence liaison relationship. At least to some, it faithfully...
represents the optimum that can currently be achieved in contemporary international affairs – in function, if not also in reach.\textsuperscript{221}

However, the UK-US intelligence liaison is not boundless. In common with all other international intelligence liaison relationships, it too is subject to caveats and limitations. These set the operational parameters, and at least at junctures also the safeguards, for the liaison (conditions and terms). Indeed, these types of safeguards and their nature within the domain of liaison were again pertinently revealed in the ISC Renditions report: ‘... These safeguards take the form of conditions which restrict the use that a liaison partner may make of UK intelligence. We have been told that such conditions are understood by intelligence and security services globally, as they all use similar conditions to ensure that one agency does not endanger another agency’s sources through their incautious use of intelligence … failure to [observe these conditions] would mean that they might not be trusted to receive intelligence in the future.’\textsuperscript{222}

Some further insights into the safeguards were provided as the report continued: ‘Since 2004, SIS and the Security Service have revised their guidance to staff on the use of these safeguards to ensure that no mistreatment to individuals arises from the sharing of intelligence, and joint guidance [entitled Guidance on dealing with liaison services: Agency policy on liaison with overseas security and intelligence services in relation to detainees who may be subject to mistreatment], approved by Ministers, was issued to all SIS and Security Service staff in 2006…’ Furthermore, demonstrating a need to meet role and case-specific requirements, ‘There is separate guidance for staff involved in questioning detainees in the custody of foreign liaison services…’\textsuperscript{223} \textit{Vis-à-vis} liaison, ‘At the outset the guidance makes it clear that, whilst it is necessary for the UK Agencies to work with foreign liaison services to counter terrorism, the UK Agencies will not condone the use of torture or mistreatment.’ To work around such parameters, the report continued: ‘When a risk of mistreatment is foreseen, then caveats and assurances are used to minimise the risks... [If] there is still considered to be a risk of mistreatment, senior managerial or Ministerial approval is required.’\textsuperscript{224}

Other qualities of UK-US intelligence relations emerge. Due to the already advanced processes of ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ in this relationship (when compared \textit{vis-à-vis} other existing international intelligence liaison arrangements), the traditional dividing and compartmentalising national intelligence lines can be seen as increasingly blurred. A greater degree of ‘exclusivity’ has been introduced over time. Essentially, alongside the bilateral relationship, these changes and their stipulations are enshrined in the multilateral UKUSA Agreements and the other subsequent aggregated memoranda of understanding (MoU) that establish the
contemporary UKUSA framework, and which help to define its current operating parameters. Therefore, in an arguably ‘post-modern’ ‘dissolving’ of traditional national intelligence community identities and boundaries, the UK-US intelligence community goes substantially down the road towards an increasingly fused entity. It can be characterised as being exceptional, ‘networked’, as well as at least quasi-epistemic in nature (internal influences and factors).

Further exchanges take place. There is also the identifiable, at times considerable, borrowing of each other’s institutional/intelligence community ‘intellectual and practical capital’. Practices, techniques, structures, ideas of bureaucratic organisation, and lessons learnt from their own, and equally one another’s, experience over time (trends), can all be included. Indeed, it has even been claimed that the CIA is ‘not the brainchild of a lone bureaucratic gunslinger [William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan] but the off-spring of an Anglo-American liaison.’ Although, the extent of UK influence here is perhaps overstated. Others claim that when times are good, relations are like those of older (UK) and younger (US) sibling relations; while, when not so good, the relations are more akin to relations between cousins. In November 1944, in a memorandum to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, William Donovan scotched other prevailing rumours regarding the relationship between British intelligence and the OSS:

Your correspondent suggests that OSS has been penetrated by the English Intelligence Service. If by penetration is meant that we have worked closely together with that Service in the spirit of cooperation that you have urged upon us, then the statement is true; but if more than that is meant, the statement is not true and on the contrary we have greatly profited by our working with the British and at the same time we have maintained the integrity of our organization. In point of fact you would be interested to know that both our Allies and our enemies know less about our inner workings than we do about theirs.

Relinquishing the relationship is not an option. It is an intelligence liaison that (perhaps especially) the British are keen not to give up - either for quantitative (the volume of intelligence exchanged) and/or qualitative reasons. This is while it is simultaneously an intelligence liaison relationship that does somewhat complicate, arguably even often to the point of thwarting: (i) the UK’s Atlantic-‘bridging’ ability; (ii) the European aspects of British foreign policy; and (iii) further closer European intelligence, security and defence integration. Some Americans, in particular – at least at the operational level - believe that the ‘Europe question’ will come to more of a head for the UK in the not-too-distant future, thus forcing some tough choices to be
made by the UK. Others, however – at least at the policy level - dismiss this type of ‘choice’ as a ‘false choice’ and see it as potentially damaging to all parties.

The asymmetric UK-US intelligence liaison crucially nets several benefits for the UK. It allows the middle-power-sized UK much-appreciated and privileged access to the US hegemony over Pax Americana-sustaining intelligence power. It also facilitates substantial access to the vast intelligence resources of the US, most notably in the domains of SIGINT and IMINT. Consequently, the UK is able to continue its post-Empire role in international affairs, essentially allowing it to continue to wield some significant power and for it to exert some influence by ‘punching above its weight’. As Whitehall official Sir Burke Trend noted: ‘After the Second World War, it became apparent that we should henceforth have to make our way in the world by influence rather than by power and that political intelligence would henceforth be at least as important as military intelligence, if not more so.

From the US perspective, continuing to be closely tied to the ‘junior’ partner of the UK on intelligence matters also still has its merits. By contrast to the UK, for the US this is particularly the case for qualitative reasons more than for quantitative reasons. Most importantly, the US values a partner that has an analytical world-view. No other western ally offers this quality, as they tend to be more regionally focussed. Alongside, there are numerous operational considerations. These include access to particular language skills, which are especially essential in the domains of HUMINT and SIGINT. At least in some areas, the UK and US are one another’s most important international intelligence stakeholder. This undoubtedly helps to concentrate minds in both London and Washington, and naturally those areas will be subject to some ebbs and flows in their importance as time progresses. UK assets to the US can be summarised as follows:

**Firstly**, the ties provide the US hegemony of intelligence power much needed access to the UK’s own intelligence power. This is so that the US can continue to sustain its approach to the ideal of having a more consolidated hegemony of intelligence power, which is global in scope. This emerges as essential for underpinning the desired preventative and pre-emptive foreign and security policies, as well as helping to potentially best maintain primacy in international affairs.

**Secondly**, on the HUMINT front, UK HUMINT complements US HUMINT collection efforts.

**Thirdly**, on the SIGINT front, there is an element of UK-US dependency, and the UK is especially helpful to the US as a ‘back-up’ in times of ‘crisis’.
This was particularly witnessed in January 2000, when the UK GCHQ stepped in to assist the US National Security Agency (NSA) during a period of computer ‘outage’.  

**Fourthly**, the UK helps provide US intelligence with a useful OSINT service through the close partnership between the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) part-funded BBC Monitoring and the US (CIA’s) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) – re-named and re-packaged as the (ODNI’s) Open Source Center (OSC) in November 2005.

**Fifthly**, the UK remains consistently and enduringly interested in Weltpolitik. Mindful of its Commonwealth and other obligations to ‘friends and allies’, the UK intelligence and foreign policy perspectives and observations continue to operate on a global scale, rather than on a narrower merely regional basis. This allows for the frank UK-US exchange and analysis of global views, and, for better or worse, the generation of at least some shared UK-US perceptions.

For both the US and the UK, economic considerations simultaneously figure. Taking the above factors into consideration, the UK-US intelligence relationship and what drives it appears to be easily reduced to the ‘economic reductionist’ position. However, while perhaps a useful starting point, when striving for a fuller understanding of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, this position is an unhelpful over-simplification. It ultimately fails to capture the full complexities and dynamics inherent in the UK-US intelligence relationship. The UK-US intelligence relationship consists of more substance than merely ‘balance sheet’ considerations and the narrow *quid pro quo* basis.

All, however, is not easily won. Despite all the ties and conduits for UK-US intelligence liaison, the relationship does not always flow smoothly. On occasions, it can be subject to some tidal ebbing. While there exist broadly agreed UK-US ‘ends’, at times different ‘styles’ and ‘methods’ of reaching those ends can generate some tensions of differing degrees of intensity over time. This has been underlined by recent controversies over counter-terrorism and ‘extraordinary renditions’. Yet, these tensions are arguably kept ‘contained’ through their management. For example, this was seen during the Katharine Gun GCHQ-‘whistleblower’ affair in 2003-4. As former CIA operative Fred Hitz has noted: ‘Aren’t the CIA’s supposed relations with liaison services like… the British more important than one spy?’ Hitz continues by concluding about intelligence liaison relationships generally that: ‘Relations between “friendly” intelligence services will blow hot and cold,
depending on the times and the issues in play.’

Evaluating the nature of UK-US intelligence relations are never entirely divorced from how the broader UK-US relationship can be assessed. Drawing on the different ‘schools’ of interpretation present in the literature concerning the nature of generic UK-US relations, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship similarly represents a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of the different positions. UK-US intelligence liaison reflects elements of the dominant modes of ‘evangelicalism’ and ‘functionalism’, and more of a limited, particular episode-linked, minor mode of ‘terminalism’. Frequently this ‘terminalism’ is most starkly seen when co-operation over a specific operation ends, such as over a weapons-system programme, because it is discontinued or it has been redirected.

Ultimately, however, similarly to that of other ‘core’ areas – such as over nuclear weapons - the balance between the different positions struck in the UK-US intelligence relationship is of greater importance. Hence they are more carefully protected and managed. This in turn accords the intelligence dimension more ‘specialness’. This ultimately stems from there being something specific of greater qualitative and quantitative value at stake for both parties involved, namely intelligence itself.

[11.0]: The design of this study

In this study, international intelligence liaison will be explored further. This will be achieved through attempting a qualitative analysis of UK and US intelligence liaison focussed on a number of key issue areas. Particularly drawing on examples from the years 2000 to the end of 2005, respectively these issues are counter-terrorism and WMD counter-/non-proliferation. They have been selected because they represent the domains where, both qualitatively and quantitatively, UK and US intelligence has been most concentrated during the years under examination in this study. Furthermore, as the IISS Strategic Survey 2007 noted: ‘In 2008, managing nuclear proliferation and terrorism will remain the priorities.’ This study also attempts to shed some light on the ideological and theoretical, strategy and policy, operational and tactical, as well as the individual (as professional) and personal implications of international intelligence liaison. These constitute the different levels of analysis employed. How this is done methodologically forms the subject of the next chapter.

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References


2 See, for example, G.F. Treverton *et al.*, *Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report* (RAND, 2006); see also M.S. Goodman, ‘Intelligence Education: Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom’, *Studies in Intelligence*, 50, 2 (2006), particularly where he notes: ‘Producing an exact definition of intelligence is a much-debated topic. Put simply, however, intelligence is many things – it is the agencies themselves, the business they conduct, and the information they seek – thus, intelligence refers both to a process and a product…’; see also for a clear and interesting overall background introduction to ‘intelligence’, S.A. Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, chapter 14 in A. Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.248-269; for more of an ‘operational guide’ and definitions of ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ used in the UK law enforcement context, see, for example, ‘Using Intelligence and Information: Intelligence & Information models: Introduction’, *Crime Reduction Toolkits* - via URL: <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/ui0201.htm> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also ‘Using Intelligence and Information: Definitions’, *Crime Reduction Toolkits* - via URL: <http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/ui0202.htm> (accessed: 09/04/2007) - particularly where it is noted: ‘Definitions: Some confusion exists surrounding definitions of the terms “information” and “intelligence”: information is essentially the passing of knowledge from whatever source to another. Intelligence is the end product of a process by which that information is checked and compared with other information and is then used to inform decision-making.’; for an earlier definition of ‘intelligence’ from when it started to be written about publicly as a legitimate subject of inquiry, see, for example, D. McLachlan, ‘Preface’ in his *Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action 1939-45* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), p.xiii.


7 Warner, ‘Wanted: A definition of “intelligence”’.


10 See, for example, Michael Herman’s book, *Intelligence Power in Peace and War*. 

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13 ‘Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) supports joint forces in their ability to rapidly respond to threats around the world by providing geo-referenced visual and data products that serve as a foundation and common frame of reference for any joint operation. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and geospatial information.’ – quoted from ‘Executive Summary’ in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations’, *Joint Publication 2-03* (22 March 2007), p.vii - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-03.pdf> (accessed: 29/03/2007).


17 See also ‘What does it all mean? Intelligence analysis and production’, chapter 3 in *ibid.*, pp.41-73.


19 Quoted from and for more information regarding these COMSEC categories, see The Institute for Telecommunication Services (ITS): ‘ITS is the research and engineering branch of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)’ (http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/) - ‘Communications Security (COMSEC)’ (23 August 1996) – via URL: <http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-008/_1132.htm> (accessed: 20/01/2006).

20 Hannah, O’Brien and Rathmell, *Intelligence and Security Legislation*, p.2; see also L. Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 2 (Summer, 2004), p.323 – ‘For many writers, for example, on British intelligence, special operations are integral to the study of the subject. But for others they are not…’

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‘Denial and Deception’, chapter 8 in Sims and Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, pp.134-146.

22 For further information on PSYOPs, see the case studies in Chapter 5, below. For more on the ‘psychological dimension’ of intelligence, see, for example, I.J. Deary, Intelligence: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001); see also A.C. Grayling, The Heart of Things: Applying Philosophy to the 21st Century (London: Phoenix, 2006).


24 ibid., see also p.325 - where Scott states: ‘Lack of clarity about the term disruptive action reflects the determination of the British government to avoid disclosure of the activities involved.’


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32 See, for example, as discussed in the literature, below, in Chapter 3 [4.0].

33 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, p.1.

34 ibid., p.169.

35 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.9.

36 ibid.


41 ibid.


43 H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, Intelligence and National Security, 11, 3 (July 1996), p.523; see also the further insights into ‘liaison’ he provides in his (ed.), Inside CIA’s Private World (Yale University Press, 1995) – particularly the chapter on ‘Clandestinity’: ‘The Sun never sets on liaison’. (Some other fleeting references to liaison are scattered throughout this book).


45 From the Butler Committee, Report, p.xi.

46 [US] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (PSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (December 2002), p.428.

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Since the Second World War, military/defence attachés have been added to, with today other specialist attachés conducting forms of international intelligence and/or law enforcement liaison, such as ‘Legal Attachés’ – or ‘legats’ – US FBI agents based abroad in US embassies to ‘liaise with foreign law enforcement agencies’ and to assist with criminal investigations concerning the US in the host country – see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Legal Attaché Program (March 2004) - via URL: <http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0418/index.htm> (accessed: 19/01/2006). For contemporary FBI worries about military attachés over-stepping their ‘legitimate’ remit, see ‘Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director FBI, before the [US] Senate Committee of Intelligence’ (16 February 2005) - via URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm> (accessed: 23/01/2006); see also P. Williams, ‘The Changing Face of Military Liaison’, Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) (2007) [originally published in the British Army Review, Autumn 2003.] - via URL: <http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_brixmis/military_liaison.cfm?navinfo=27752> (accessed: 10/04/2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘It can be seen … that ‘military liaison’ has undergone some remarkable changes during the last one hundred years or so. In addition to continuing to be a tactical level activity, it has been adopted by and adapted to the requirements of the politico-military level. At what was perhaps its nadir, military liaison served during the Cold War as a ‘fig leaf’ for some very non-traditional liaison activities. It then evolved in the 1990s to meet the varying demands within the operational theatres in the Western Balkans. No doubt, similar challenges are also now being faced in Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres where crisis response operations are being conducted. Finally, as the new century began military liaison underwent its latest metamorphosis…’ For management controls and instructions issued for the attention of an official of the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Foreign Liaison Section before a meeting with a foreign attaché, see US DIA, ‘Instructions for DIA Meeting with Soviet Attaché’ (Undated/c.1977-78) - accessed on 13/06/2007 via US Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS) via Georgetown University Library.

Andrew, Secret Service, p.7.

See, for example, R.J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-24 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.5 – especially where he notes: ‘…the British were able to defeat the Indian revolutionaries only by developing a complex intelligence network on a global scale…’


Andrew, Secret Service, p.7.


See, for example, G.A. Wade, *Liaison and Intelligence* (Aldershot, UK: Gale & Polden Limited, ?1942) - part of the ‘Gale & Polden training series’, located in the special Bowen collection held at Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the Director-General of the UK Security Service (MI5) from 2002 to 2007, in one of her previous jobs was a ‘senior [intelligence] liaison officer’ in Washington during the early-1990s. Meanwhile, Barbara McNamara, formerly the Deputy-Director of the US NSA, was ‘Senior United States [intelligence] Liaison Officer’ in London from 2000 until her retirement in 2003; see also P. Heap, ‘Comment: The truth behind the MI6 façade’, *The Guardian* (20 October 2003), where he states: ‘The role of MI6 officers was to develop contacts…’, highlighting the centrality of liaison to their job function.


For this period, see R.J. Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, *Review of International Studies*, 24 (1998); see also Hennessy, *The Secret State*.


65 Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [i-22]; see also where Dr. Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), has noted: ‘We have in final stages a draft Intelligence Community directive, the rules we live by, that mandates that agencies enable analysts to reach out beyond, to simplify the procedures for doing this, reward people who do it. It ought to be a normal part of what we do...’ - quoted in ‘5. TRANSCRIPT: Speech by Dr. Thomas Fingar at the Council on Foreign Relations’, Media Highlights (Wednesday, 19 March 2008 [UNCLASSIFIED]), p.21.


W.R. Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, *Studies in Intelligence*, 17, 2 (Summer 1973), p.24 – especially where he notes: ‘Training by itself will not necessarily make a better service… The Agent and Liaison Training Branch (ALT) of the Office of Training should participate in such planning, although of course the decision whether to train is one which is the responsibility of the operating division. One of the first questions that arises after this decision has been made is, where should the training take place. Instructors from ALT, most of them operations officers on rotation, have some strong opinions here… Weighing the pros and cons usually leads to the decision to train abroad. More than two-thirds of all liaison training programs are done in the country of origin…’; for an earlier insight into how the UK used to be regarding the researching of intelligence and its institutions, see, for example, C. Andrew, ‘Whitehall, Washington and the Intelligence Services’, *International Affairs*, 53, 3 (July 1977), pp.390-404.


See below [4.1], for example; see also the implications flowing from the findings of reports, such as the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners*, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66th Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006) – as discussed in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii], below; for an evaluation of law impacting on military operations, in this instance, see, for example, C.P.M. Waters, ‘Is the Military Legally Encircled?’, *Defence Studies*, 8, 1 (2008), pp.26-48.

For an example of this type of guidance in such operations, see, for example, OSCE, *Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual* (Warsaw: Organization for Security Cooperation Europe [OSCE]/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR], 2007).

For more background on the ISC, see, for example, A. Glees, P.H.J. Davies and J.N.L. Morrison, *The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee* (London: Social Affairs Unit,


80 M. Hollingsworth and N. Fielding, *Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 and the War on Terrorism* (London: André Deutsch, 1999), p.305. Incidentally, the edition of this book cited mistakenly displays Vauxhall Cross, the MI6 headquarters, on its front cover instead of the MI5 headquarters in Thames House; see also ‘The “Ring of Secrecy” and the concept of “oversight”’ in Glee, *et al.*, *The Open Side of Secrecy*, pp.128-130; for the US, see ‘Oversight and accountability’, chapter 10 in Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, pp.191-219; see also *ibid.*, pp.292-3 – especially where he notes: ‘The [UK Intelligence and Security Committee] considers the budget, administration, and policy of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, but its oversight function is not as powerful as that exercised by U.S. congressional committees.’


82 For details, see *Appendix 2*, below (at the end of this study).

83 This passage is also based in part on information from a non-attributable source [i-4].


85 For some of the findings by journalists and NGOs, see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii], below.


87 ISC, *Renditions*, p.52.

88 Sir John Scarlett, Chief of SIS (MI6), quoted in *ibid.*, p.52.


90 See, for instance, the episode involving Katharine Gun, as covered in Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], below.
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93 Glees, et al., The Open Side of Secrecy, p.179 (emphasis added) – they continue: ‘… Note that ISA [Intelligence Services Act] 1994 does not say that the Committee may not have access to such information, only that the agency heads may refuse to grant it. By contrast, some other countries’ oversight bodies have a statutory right to complete access. The agency heads appear to have clung grimly to their prerogative of silence about these core subjects, and there is no evidence from its reports that the ISC has pressed the issue by appealing to the relevant secretary of state (who could override an agency head if he or she so wished).’
94 From a non-attributable source [c-2]; see also J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals and Details’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19, 2 (Summer, 2006), p.205 – where she notes that: ‘The best that most services can arrange in a formal liaison arrangement is agreement on instituting the “third-party rule,” which requires each party to check with the originator of data before passing intelligence to a third party...’
95 For background on the US oversight of intelligence, see F.M. Kaiser, ‘Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives’, CRS Report for Congress (updated 15 February 2007). Interestingly, in this document the term ‘liaison’ does not feature at all. See also ‘Intelligence oversight in the new US Congress’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (19 January 2007); see also the sources from the CIA archive presented in Appendix 3, below (at the end of this study).
96 Appendix: Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry’, p.2 of appendix to the PSCI and the SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry. For the lack of ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ accountability/oversight of intelligence liaison, see also Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.207 – where she notes: ‘At present, few oversight mechanisms exist in the U.S. government to relieve the CIA of the burden of self-monitoring its liaison relationships...’; see also the sources from the CIA archive presented in Appendix 4, below (at the end of this study).
97 See, for instance, J.S. Warner, ‘The Watchdog Committee Question’, Studies in Intelligence, 10, 3 (Summer 1966), p.38 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000200040001-9 (2005/02/10) – particularly where he notes: ‘It has been mentioned that the creation of a new joint committee might have adverse effects on liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services. Some liaison services have exhibited apprehension about our relationships with the Congress under the present system, but when the situation has been explained to them their fears appear to be allayed. No doubt the same thing could be done if a new joint committee were established...’
98 See also, for example, Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.211 – where she argues that: ‘…the U.S. government oversight of complex intelligence liaison needs to be improved.’


much transparency are still a rather hypothetical problem, since national and international efforts to control disclosure of information persist and in some cases are growing… In another recent book, author Alasdair Roberts identifies several factors that are inhibiting transparency, including… the growing international collaboration of security agencies.’; see A.S. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also on this issue, A-M. Slaughter, ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks’, Government and Opposition, 39, 2 (Spring 2004), pp.159-190. In some other areas, however, the interaction between the intelligence services and the public on the issue of terrorism has been extending over time, see, for instance, ‘MI5 to send e-mail terror alerts: A system sending e-mail terror alerts to the public is being launched by security chiefs at MI5’, BBC News Online (09 January 2007); for a document contributing towards the debate on ‘openness’ and the controlling of its extent, see, for instance, G.J. Knezo, “Sensitive But Unclassified” Information and Other Controls: Policy and Options for Scientific and Technical Information’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 29 December 2006); see also M. Welch, ‘Sovereign impunity in America’s war on terror: examining reconfigured power and the absence of accountability’, Crime Law and Social Change, 47, 3 (2007), pp.135-150. For more detail on this issue, see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.i], below.

101 For other oversight criticisms, see, for example, J. Solomon, ‘In Intelligence World, A Mute Watchdog: Panel Reported No Violations for Five Years’, The Washington Post (15 July 2007).


104 Definition via askOxford.com (the Oxford English Dictionary online edition). This conceptualisation of intelligence liaison as a covert form of outreach is also present in at least one national intelligence community – from a non-attributable source [i-22].

105 Quoted from the response to the author’s question – ‘Do you think that it is reasonable to claim that there has been a professionalisation of liaison during the 20th Century, and that it is continuing today?’; see also ibid., where Robert David Steele argued: ‘Absolutely not. An Australian journalist said it better: “giving more money to spies is like pouring gasoline on a fire.” Bilateral secret liaison is history. The future lies with multinational, multiagency, multidisciplinary, multidomain information sharing (M4IS), a Swedish concept I have adopted…’ - from an e-mail communication with Robert David Steele, CEO of OSS.Net, Inc. and the new non-profit Earth Intelligence Network, and a former US spy, conducted on Monday, 2 July 2007; see also the discussion of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war in Chapter 5: Case Study 2, below.

106 For more on the ad hoc nature of the so-called ‘War on Terror’, see, for example, ‘Friends like these’, Jane’s Foreign Report (21 August 2003).

107 For more on ‘trust’, see, for example, under the subheading ‘Trust’ in J.O. Zinn and P. Taylor-Gooby, ‘The Challenge of (Managing) New Risks’, chapter 3 in their (eds), Risk in Social Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.61-63; see also the references to trust presented throughout this chapter.
That is, within and by the participating intelligence agencies, both jointly and individually nationally.


See Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, pp.523-60; for more on the ‘clandestine diplomacy’ aspect, see Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.330 – especially where he states: ‘Conceptually, there may be an overlap between diplomacy and liaison where relations between the actors are in part antagonistic… There may also be overlap between conducting clandestine diplomacy and gathering intelligence.’; see also H.H. Saunders, INR, US Department of State, ‘Subject: Comments on PRM-11 Task 2 Draft Paper’, Memorandum to: ••• (5 May 1977) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00095A000300020009-1 (2002/09/03) – particularly where he notes: ‘We have two other general comments on the draft… -- Somewhere the paper should point out that much of the information the intelligence community needs is readily available on the public record, and that telegrams between the Department and posts abroad provide a wealth of extremely useful information on the interests of policymakers and on matters under discussion or negotiation with other governments. – In several places the paper gives the impression that intelligence is an end in itself. Thus, that the need for intelligence is limitless is stated axiomatically on pages 10 and 33, with reference both to range of subjects and quality of analysis, and on page 92, in terms of “sufficiency” as an aspect of the policymaker’s dilemma in dealing with an uncertain world. The tendency to regard the need for intelligence as having no theoretical limits must be resisted. The policymakers and the intelligence community should not be exempted from the need to sort out their problems at least according to a rough standard of useful applicability of intelligence information. Top policymakers must recognize that there [are] uncertainties unsusceptible to any feasible intelligence source or method, and the intelligence community must acknowledge that some things are beyond its capabilities. A disturbing aspect of this problem results from the thirst of analysts for ever more input of information and analytical comment. The intelligence community must realize that it cannot have a blank check, that its consumers can use only a finite amount of information, that there are foreign policy as well as monetary costs to intelligence gathering, an that its demands for data are properly subject to an internal
standard of reasonableness.’ For the importance of ‘back channel’ diplomacy and these types of
interactions, see Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, p.93.
112 ‘Users’ are also frequently referred to as ‘consumers’, ‘customers’ and/or ‘clients’ - see Herman,
 Intelligence Power, p.44; H. Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the Twenty-
the intelligence-policymaker relationship and politicisation within it, see P. Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy,
and the War in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 85, 2 (March/April 2006); see also the issues pertinently raised
for consideration in ‘Guarding the Guardians: The Management of Intelligence’, chapter 6 in Shulsky
and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.129-158; see also ‘The intelligence process – A macro look: Who does
what for whom?’, chapter 4 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.54-67 and ‘The role of the policy maker’,
chapter 9 in ibid., pp.174-190.
113 For other reservations and flaws with the ‘intelligence cycle’ model, see A.S. Hulnick, ‘What’s
Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle’, Intelligence and National Security, 21, 6 (December 2006), p.959
- particularly where it is noted in the ‘abstract’ that: ‘… the cyclical pattern does not describe what
really happens… The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert
action. [Liaison can also be added here to this list.] Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed
model…’
114 For more on the quid pro quo aspect, see C. Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of
International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 17, 4 (2004); see also F.P. Hitz, The Great Game: The Myths and Reality of
Espionage (New York: Knopf, 2005), p.157 – ‘Except between the oldest and most interdependent
allies, the working principle will most often boil down to a quid pro quo exchange in the context of
“what have you done for me lately?”’; see also D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-
Sharing in the War on Terror’, Orbis (Summer, 2006), p.467 – where he argues: ‘Intelligence-sharing
is asymmetrical, not necessarily a quid pro quo, equal exchange.’ However, does a quid pro quo
always have to be ‘equal’?
115 See M. Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism’, The
2007).
117 For ‘friends spying on friends’, see P. Schweizer, Friendly Spies (New York: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 1993); M.S. Alexander, ‘Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies –
perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998);
see also references to this issue in the Literature Review (Chapter 3 [4.0]) below; see Shukman (ed.),
Agents for Change, p.xviii – where he states ‘… new intelligence services have been created by most
of the former Soviet republics, and Western agencies believe they require some monitoring.’; see also
D. Campbell and P. Lashmar, ‘US Spy Agencies Now Probing British & Euro Industry: Documents
shed light on US policy of covert surveillance of British and European industry’, The Independent (07
March 2000); G. Miller, ‘U.S. spies on Iraqi army, sources say: Satellites are allegedly being used to
track the American-backed force after breakdowns in trust and coordination’, Los Angeles Times (02 July 2008).


119 R. Watson, ‘Syria ends co-operation with US’, BBC News Online (24 May 2005). Arguably, this change in the state of intelligence relations with Syria has been counterproductive for the US – see, for example, Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.466 – especially where he argues (as during 2003/04): ‘…Syria has become one of the CIA’s most effective and prolific sources of intelligence on Al Qaeda and has provided hundreds of files on its cells throughout the Middle East and in Muslim communities in Europe…’

120 Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, pp.59-60. Simultaneously, in such circumstances, ‘…[w]ith new allies in mission-specific roles, the United States found it necessary to shift from producing classified information at the NOFORN [no foreigner or US eyes only] level to UN-releasable.’ – see Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.465.

121 S. Fidler and M. Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? The UK and US spying alliance is put under the spotlight’, The Financial Times (06 July 2004).


123 ‘MI5’s “torture” evidence revealed’, BBC News Online (21 October 2005); for an argument that torture is a form of verification of information, see J. Walker, with F. de Vivo and J. Shaw, ‘A Dialogue on Spying in 17th-Century Venice’, Rethinking History, 10, 3 (September 2006), p.333 - particularly the references to (Cohen, 1998); see also D. Riechmann, ‘Bush to Veto Bill Banning Waterboarding’, The Huffington Post (08 March 2008).

124 ISC, Renditions, p.13, para.34.

125 See, for example, G.F. Treverton, The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence (RAND, 2005), p.25; R.J. Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances’, Harvard International Review, 24, 3 (Fall, 2002).

Jamal Ware, spokesman for House Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., said leaks are “one of the greatest threats” to intelligence cooperation with countries that do not want to be public about the cooperation. [However, despite these risks,] Hoekstra “firmly believes that we should work to expand intelligence sharing cooperation with other foreign governments as appropriate and necessary” and that’s something the United States is “continually working on.”…

ISC, *Renditions*, p.12, para.29.

Herman, *Intelligence Power*, p.217-8; Intelligence is also marketed, bartered and bargained over. In such circumstances, the vernacular and practices of the world of business are employed. See also Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.196 – where she states: ‘Although sometimes equated with intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted intelligence collection based on barter.’

See, for example, the Butler Committee, *Report*, p.101 - where it is stated that: ‘In oral evidence to our Review in May [2004], the Chief of SIS said that this source’s reports had been received through a liaison service and that he had not therefore been under the control of SIS. SIS had been able to verify that he had worked in an area which would have meant that he would have had access to the sort of information he claimed to have. But they had not been able to question him directly until after the war.’


See, for example, Hitz, *The Great Game*, p.156; see also K. Tebbit, *Benchmarking of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction and Summary* (Copenhagen, April 2006), p.v, no.15 - especially where he notes: ‘I also comment, in Chapter 4, on the high quality of the DDIS’s [Danish Defence Intelligence Service] liaison office and the way it manages relations with foreign intelligence partners. These have grown in number in recent years – a mark of DDIS’s standing – and are important, both in terms of the need for closer international cooperation and information exchange for collective safety and to fill in gaps in national intelligence collection. The DDIS manages partner relationships in a way which is a source of strength for Danish intelligence rather than a dependency. I have recommended some strengthening of this role, possibly to cover PET’s [Danish police intelligence service] interests abroad as well.’


For more detail on these ‘methodological problems’, see Chapter 2 [2.0/3.0], below.

Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.330; see also Chapter 3, below.


Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.338.

See, for example, the reasons outlined in the *Preface* to this study, above.
In its fullest form, intelligence liaison can be extended to include information sharing, information exchange, information access, and so forth.

US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Operation Planning’, Joint Publication 5-0 (26 December 2006), p.II-7; see also ibid., p.II-8 - where it notes: ‘Continual liaison and sharing of information… will be instrumental in accomplishing US national objectives.’ The Japanese have also recognised the significance of international intelligence liaison – see, for example, R. Karniol, ‘Japan to set up liaison office in Washington’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (04 October 2006): ‘This will mark Tokyo’s first overseas intelligence presence in the modern era…’; see also ‘Japan launches new spy satellite: Japan has launched a rocket carrying its third spy satellite, increasing its ability to monitor North Korea’, BBC News Online (11 September 2006).

See, for example, ‘Transcript: CNN LIVE EVENT/SPECIAL: Hayden Hearing’, CNN.com (18 May 2006) - via URL: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/18/se.01.html> (accessed: 28/05/2007) - particularly where General M. Hayden remarked: ‘To begin, I’d focus significant attention, under the direction of Ambassador Negroponte, the DNI, on the handling of intelligence relationships with foreign partners. As this committee well knows, these relationships are of the utmost importance for our security, especially in the context of the fight against those terrorists who seek to do us harm. These sensitive relationships have to be handled with great care and attention, and I would, if confirmed, regard this responsibility as a top priority. International terrorism cannot be defeated without international cooperation. … For the same reason I’d push for greater information sharing within the United States, among the intelligence community and with other federal, state, local and tribal entities. There are a lot of players out there on this one: the DNI, the program manager for the information sharing environment, the intel community's chief information officer, other agencies like FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. The CIA has an important role to play in ensuring that intelligence information is shared with those who need it. When I was at NSA, I focused my efforts to make sure that all of our customers had the information they needed to make good decisions. In fact, my mantra when I was at Fort Meade was that users should have access to information at the earliest possible moment and in the rawest possible form where value from its sharing could actually be obtained. That's exactly the approach I would use if confirmed at CIA. In my view, both of these initiatives, working with foreign partners and information sharing within the U.S., require that we change our paradigm from one that operates on what I've called a transactional basis of exchange -- they ask; we provide -- in favor of a premise of common knowledge commonly shared, or information access. That would entail opening up more data and more databases to other intel community agencies as well as trusted foreign partners, restricting the use of what I think is an overused originator-controlled caveat, and fundamentally embracing more of a risk management approach to the sharing of information…’; see also A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Cooperative intelligence’, IISS Strategic Comments, 12, 4 (May 2006); C. Jones, ‘Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 3 (June 2007), pp.384-401.

The post that replaced the ‘Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator’ role in the Cabinet Office, in the wake of the recommendations made by the 2004 Butler Review. The Permanent Secretary (Intelligence, Security and Resilience) also now chairs the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and is in
charge of the UK’s Central Intelligence Machinery. Although, by the end of 2007, with the retirement of Sir Richard Mottram from that post, the separation of these two roles has again been undertaken - for further background on these changes, see ‘Security Structures in the Cabinet Office’, CAB/067-07 (25 July 2007) - via URL: <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2007/070725_security.aspx> (accessed: 05/11/2007); for more on the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience role, see, for example, ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.22.

143 Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [c-8]; see also D.I. McKeeney, ‘International Intelligence Exchange Top Priority, Says Hayden’, The Washington File/USINFO (18 May 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror668.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also G. Tenet (with B. Harlow), At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p.34 – particularly where he noted: ‘Another big part of the DCI’s [Director of Central Intelligence] role was to maintain contact with the heads of foreign intelligence services. I met with visiting senior security officials from just about every country imaginable. Most countries had multiple intelligence services, and so I would need to be in touch with various sets of people from the same country… [including] the British MI-5 and MI-6…’

144 See below [8.0] for a breakdown of the intelligence liaison phenomenon into its eight components, of which types and forms, and functions are two.

145 Quoted in Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.322; see also Sir David Omand: ‘…there is no way that you can have effective secret agencies if you allow their sources and methods to become publicly known…’, quoted from Presenter: (Professor) Peter Hennessy, ‘Analysis: Secrets and Mysteries’, BBC Radio 4 Current Affairs (Broadcast date: 19/04/2007); see also the essays in P. Hennessy (ed.), The New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism (London: Continuum, 2007); for an example of similar political equality and accountability conundrums faced in other areas of politics, see H. Agné, ‘A Dogma of Democratic Theory and Globalization: Why Politics Need not Include Everyone it Affects’, European Journal of International Relations, 12, 3 (2006), pp.433-458.

146 For ‘intelligence power’, see former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman’s book Intelligence Power in Peace and War.

147 For increased US dependence on intelligence liaison, see, for instance, ‘Secretary Rice Interview with James Rosen of Fox News Channel’, States News Service [information released by the US Department of State] (10 July 2005) - particularly where it is noted: ‘QUESTION: How extensive has North Korea's provision of nuclear technology to Iran been? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can’t really answer that with any precision. I think it’s well known that we have concerns about North Korea’s provision of certainly missile technology broadly across the world, and worries about what else may be transferred. But this is the reason that we need to enhance our intelligence cooperation with others, that we do need to rely on the Proliferation Security Initiative, and that it has been useful to have the A.Q. Khan network wrapped up…’ (Emphasis added).

148 See, for example, D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript (20 October 2005).

For further detail, see the case studies in Chapter 5 below.

See Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17; see also Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’.

See also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.468 – especially where he notes: ‘Nowhere is “trust, but verify” as important as in intelligence-sharing relationships.’


‘Blowback’ can be readily defined:

The word ‘blowback’ originally stems from poison gas warfare, covering the times when, for example, there was a sudden unforeseen change in the uncontrollable wind direction that would blow back the poison gas onto the side that had deployed the gas in the first place. Had the decision-makers foreseen the fuller scope, extent and (at least in some cases) enduring nature of the negative consequences, and had a better understanding of, or had taken into account more fully, the action’s highly complex operating context and its controllable and uncontrollable parameters, all these factors might have helped change their mind as to whether or not to pursue or continue pursuing the action.

‘Blowback’ includes the unforeseen, certainly unintended, even opposite to what was intended, negative consequences – at times stemming from earlier actions carried out in a context where detrimentally the operational parameters were little understood or acknowledged - and their return and ‘dividend’, and the negative repercussions and fallout from all these shortcomings and ‘mistakes’, that can now be seen to be being revisited upon those who initiated the action in the first place.

‘Blowback’ is additionally seen as cumulative over time, and in the intelligence liaison context can include episodes of ‘group-think’, when it can be argued that sharing is sometimes detrimentally too complete and unquestioning goes too far. ‘Blowback’ also includes episodes when intelligence from ‘A’ saying ‘x’ is shared with ‘B’, who then shares it with ‘C’, who then in turn shares it back with ‘A’. If ‘A’ is not fully aware of the origin and path of the intelligence saying ‘x’ obtained from ‘C’, ‘A’ might mistakenly think that it
has another collaborating source confirming ‘x’. ‘Blowback’ is most closely associated with
the ‘covert action’ element of intelligence generally and the ‘covert action’ characteristic of
intelligence liaison.

For more on ‘blowback’ (especially in a foreign policy context), see C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs
and Consequences of American Empire (London: Time Warner Paperback, 2002); also for the
‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see Wark,
‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; for more on the importance of knowing history in
the intelligence context, see C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking
forward’, History & Policy (June 2004); R. Popplewell, “Lacking Intelligence”: Some Reflections on
Recent Approaches to British Counter-Insurgency, 1900-1960, Intelligence and National Security, 10,

156 The term ‘groupthink’ dates from 1972 and is attributed to the psychologist Irving Janis. ‘The
“group think” theory of error defines a form of decision making characterised by uncritical acceptance
of a prevailing point of view. Contradictory evidence is often discarded and the group’s policies are
rationalised collectively…’ – see I. Davis and A. Persbo, ‘After the Butler Report: Time to take on the
(accessed: 07/04/2006); see also C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke:

157 For more on ‘mirror-imaging’, see, for instance, under sub-heading ‘Averting Strategic Surprise
through Alternative Analysis’ in J. Davis, Sherman Kent Center, ‘Improving CIA Analytic
Performance: Strategic Warning’, Occasional Papers, 1, 1 (The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence
Analysis, September 2002), particularly where the article notes: ‘One of the main cognitive traps
analysts must overcome is mirror-imaging—estimating the risk-benefit calculations of a foreign
government or non-state group based on what would make sense in a US or Western Europe context…’
02/03/2007); see also as characterised by former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for
Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal in his Intelligence, p.8.

158 See, for example, the concerns raised in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Electronic Warfare’, Joint

159 On ‘intelligence failure’, see, for example, ‘Think Point 14.1: Intelligence failure or policy failure?’
phrase “intelligence failure” is widely used but minimally understood. One of the frustrating facts of
life faced by intelligence agencies in any country is that they are, in one sense, always in a “lose-lose”
situation. The phrase “policy failure” is seldom heard, while the phrase “intelligence failure” is heard
with increasing frequency…’; see also ‘What does it all mean? Intelligence analysis and production’,
chapter 3 in Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.41-73; see also ‘Analysis’, chapter 6 in
Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.109-144.

See, for example, Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’ – where she stated that: ‘We developed links with a number of countries in the former Warsaw Pact – once we were satisfied that democracy had taken hold and espionage against us had ceased. Together with our sister service SIS, we provided advice and support for the reorganised and reoriented security services, particularly to help them establish a democratic framework for their work. We also began to exchange information on areas where there were shared concerns – crucially in countering terrorism…’

‘Trust’ has an expansive definition, being deployable as a noun or a verb, engendering a broad meaning – see, for example, R. Allen (ed.), *The Penguin English Dictionary* (London: Penguin, 2002), p.960. ‘Trust’ is also highly ‘subjective’, relying heavily on the interpretation of those parties involved in the relationship. ‘Trust’ is in turn generated by the presence of the existence of specific ‘objective’ criteria or ‘conditions’ essentially addressing security and counter-intelligence anxieties – for example, as laid out in a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) and/or a logically named ‘security agreement’ - and their agreed observation by all parties involved during a particular set of circumstances or activities – such as intelligence sharing. ‘Trust’ can instantly be broken, while it takes a longer time period to become gradually established, as the assessment of the degree of ‘risk’ involved through interactions with the other party or parties has to be more clearly tested and ascertained over time. Meanwhile, in the world of business, that also has relevance to the intelligence world: ‘Trust has been defined as the willingness to become vulnerable to the actions of another party... In general, when individuals and organizations have trust in their partners, they become willing to engage in collaborative action with them despite the presence of risk that is contingent on the other party’s less than fully controllable behaviour. The need for risk-taking and trust are central to all business activities.’ – A.K. Gupta and M. Becerra, ‘Impact of Strategic Context and Inter-Unit Trust on Knowledge Flows within the Multinational Corporation’ chapter 2 in B. McKern (ed.), *Managing the Global Network Corporation* (London: Routledge, 2003), p.25; see also M. Lubell, ‘Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain’, *The Journal of Politics*, 69, 1 (February 2007), pp.237–250; see also see also C. Black, ‘The importance of independence: Trust is crucial in intelligence work - and trust is what the intelligence services have forfeited as a result of the Iraq fiasco’, *commentisfree, The Guardian* (16 November 2006) - via URL: <http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/crispin_black/2006/11/post_642.html> (accessed: 06/02/2007); see also ‘Conceptualising Trust’ in I. Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?’, *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 17, 4 (December 2006), p.424; for more on the issue of trust, see also, for example, A. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton University Press, 2005); see also US Government, *National Strategy for Information Sharing* (October 2007), p.10 - where it refers to the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Among other things, the law called for the creation of the ISE [Information Sharing Environment] to enable trusted partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in
order to more effectively detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of the United States.’

163 The term ‘jointery’ is used to describe the joining up of the three UK military services – the army, air force, and navy – in response to the trend that ‘military power has been increasingly recognised as a unity…’ - see M. Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.51.

164 See, for example, Sqn Ldr S. Gardner, ‘Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Coalition Operations’, Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 36 (2006), p.30 – particularly where she notes: ‘… the sharing of information is at the centre of the relationship of trust that is needed in a coalition…’

165 M. Herman, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in L. Scott and P.D. Jackson (eds), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows (London: Routledge, 2004), p.187; see also, for example, under heading ‘Sharing Information with Foreign Partners’ in US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, pp.25-26 - where it states:

‘The strategic objectives for sharing information with foreign partners can be broadly summarized as follows:

• Expanding and facilitating the appropriate and timely sharing of terrorism-related information between the United States and our foreign partners;

• Ensuring that exchanges of information between the United States and foreign governments are accompanied by proper and carefully calibrated security requirements;

• Ensuring that information received by Federal agencies from a foreign government under a sharing arrangement: (1) is provided to appropriate subject matter experts for interpretation, evaluation, and analysis; and (2) can be disseminated and used to advance our Nation’s counterterrorism objectives;

• Refining and drawing upon sets of best practices and common standards in negotiating sharing arrangements with foreign governments; and

• Developing standards and practices to verify that sharing arrangements with foreign governments appropriately consider and protect the information privacy and other legal rights of Americans.’ (p.26).

166 Quoted from opening paragraphs of D. Carment and M. Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2006); see also ibid., p.1 - where they state:

‘PKI is fundamental because, for the past five decades, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations have represented the predominant international deployment of most armed forces.’; see also the Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, ‘Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI)’ website via URL: <http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/> (accessed: 05/01/2007); see also A.M. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Linkages between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Intelligence’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 1, 1 (March 2003); see also R.D. Steele, ‘Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still in Denial’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 20, 1 (2007), p.167 – where he states: ‘Bottom-up collective public intelligence is here to stay, and the new standard, defined by the Swedish Ministry of Defence, is Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information Sharing (M4IS). As I note in on the inside flap of my latest book, “Sharing, not secrecy, is the operative principle.”…’; for another argument concerning the importance of standards, and their maintenance generally in the intelligence and security domain, see the evidence to the ISC from the former DG of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, especially where she noted: ‘[Maintaining standards] is incredibly important because people get access to secrets and responsibility and the capacity to make a


168 For more information, see the ISO website at URL: <http://www.iso.org>.


170 For further detail on each of these, see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National Security (forthcoming, 2009).


175 Naturally, these ‘benchmarks’ are not too dissimilar to those found in mainstream foreign policy analysis studies, see, for example, how Hill has structured his The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.

176 For more on ‘intelligence culture’ see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004); see also ‘C. People and Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO Advanced Research Workshop – Report’, The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence, St Antony’s College, Oxford (09-10 December 2005), p.3.


See, for example, the sentiments articulated in ODNI, ‘Transformation through Integration and Innovation’, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America* (October, 2005) - via URL: <http://www.odni.gov>.


‘(7) Information and Intelligence Sharing. The success of a multinational operation hinges upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. As DOD [US Department of Defense] moves toward a net-centric environment, it faces new challenges validating intelligence information and information sources, as well as sharing of information required to integrate participating multinational partners. This information sharing can only occur within a culture of trust, based upon an effective information-sharing environment, that uses the lowest classification level possible, must support multilateral or bilateral information exchanges between the multinational staff and forces, as well as the military staffs and governments for each participating nation. Actions to improve the ability to share information such as establishing metadata or tagging standards, agreeing to information exchange standards, and using unclassified information (e.g., commercial imagery) need to be addressed early (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). SecDef [Secretary of Defense], the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CCDRs [combatant commander] play an important role determining and providing disclosure criteria guidance early in the planning process for a multinational operation. JFCs [Joint Force Commanders], in accordance with national directives, need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. To the degree that security permits, the limits of intelligence sharing and applicable procedures should be included in disclosure agreements with multinational partners. These agreements should incorporate limitations imposed by US law and/or the US National Disclosure Policy; which promulgates specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, facilitates CID [combat identification], and is perishable.’

Roberts, *Blacked Out*, p.132; see also *ibid.*, particularly where he notes: ‘Tracking the number of SOIAs that have been negotiated by the [US] Department of Defense is difficult, because the very existence of the agreements themselves may not be acknowledged… For forty years, the British and American governments refused to divulge the content of the bilateral SOIA signed in 1961. This agreement was finally declassified in 2001…’ Other formal arrangements involved include the US National Disclosure Policy (NDP), such as *NDP-1 National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure*

For a discussion of the presence of ‘rules’ and ‘guidelines’ governing intelligence liaison in the intelligence world, see Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’; see also Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/10.

See also, for example, for the importance of heeding some of the lessons from history in particular: Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking forward’; and Popplewell, ‘Lacking Intelligence’.

See, for example, Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence.

Several of these ‘functions’ are based on those identified in Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, from p.523.


For a recent example of ‘friends spying on friends’, namely Israel allegedly ‘spying’ on the US, see, for example, ‘Allies and espionage’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 March 2002); see also ‘British M.P.’s Link 10 Attaches to C.I.A.’, The New York Times (20 March 1975) and UPI, ‘There Are No Friends In World of Spying’, Baltimore News American (16 March 1975) – particularly where it notes: ‘Do our friendly allies spy on Americans in the United States? They often do. And we spy on them in their home countries. Intelligence gathering knows neither friend nor foe. In many intelligence areas, allies cooperate and exchange information. But on some delicate subjects, particularly advance information on dramatic policy or strategic changes affecting another country and in technology and weapons, it’s every spy for himself…’ – both articles reproduced in CIA, News, Views and Issues (c. April/May 1975) – via CREST – CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 (2001/08/08).

See N. Paton Walsh et al., ‘The Cold War is over, but rock in a park suggests the spying game still thrives’, The Guardian (24 January 2006); see also former CIA operative, Bob Baer’s account of a walk he took around London in his See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Wars (New York: Crown, 2002), pp.xv-xvi - especially where he notes: ‘… the CIA was prohibited by British authorities from recruiting sources, even Islamic fundamentalists, in [Britain]…’; for a discussion of this theme see also Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.5.

In fact, the fear of ‘penetration’ of a liaison service by an enemy is today arguably a lesser intelligence liaison-obstructing factor (risk) in the current so-called ‘War on Terror’ context than during earlier periods in history. This is due to the nature of the primary threat that is being faced being ‘terrorists’ rather than a particular hostile intelligence agency, such as the KGB during the Cold War. From a well-placed non-attributable source [c-2]. During the Cold War there was additionally Western intelligence agency liaison, involving regular meetings, on the issue of intelligence agency ‘penetration’ and other counter-espionage issues. Notably, this was between Britain, America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the CAZAB link. For more information, see, for example, S. Rimington,
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Open Secret: The Autobiography of the former Director General of MI5 (London: Hutchinson, 2001), pp.206-8. However, ‘penetration’ remains a significant enough risk that still needs to be considered – see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.iii], below, for more details; see also ‘US security clearance reform worries: Securing appropriate security clearances has been a long-standing problem within the US intelligence community, however the post-11 September 2001 increase in the volume of sensitive information has required a corresponding increase in the number of cleared people. For example, heightened worries about the vulnerability of the US homeland to terrorism and the creation of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has necessitated governors, mayors and other local officials gaining access to sensitive information useful for protecting local critical infrastructure and populations’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (11 March 2008).

That is, operating outside of the intelligence agencies/communities participating in the intelligence liaison.

For a fuller explanation, see Chapter 6 [6.1] below.

Including the use of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and torture evidence.


Keohane and Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’.

On ‘problem-solving’, see, for example, C.E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”’, Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring, 1959), pp.79-88; see also C.E. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, Not Yet Through’, Public Administration Review, 39 (1979), pp.517-26. On the ‘risk management’ dimension see, for instance, S.D. Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’, Risk Management: An International Journal, 7, 4 (2005), pp.23-41; see also S. Bell, ‘The UK’s Risk Management Approach to National Security’, RUSI Journal, 152, 3 (June 2007), pp.18-22; see also M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also the other references to ‘risk management’ in this study, below. However, it is worth noting that these methodologies again have their limitations in entirely explaining the intelligence liaison phenomenon at its fullest. For further elaboration on this, see below.

HMG, Government Response to … Rendition, p.6.


199 For a greater development of this section, see Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and theory’.

200 See also, for example, G. Corera, ‘MI5 expanding outside London’, *BBC News Online* (11 December 2007); G. Corera, ‘Real spooks with new role after 9/11’, *BBC News Online* (04 December 2007).

201 See also, for example, J. Sims, ‘Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American Intelligence Reform’, chapter 2 in her and B. Gerber (eds), *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p.17 - especially where she notes: ‘Protecting the intelligence infrastructure for tomorrow’s decision makers also means, however, that intelligence professionals must try to prevent the kind of blowback that occurs when the intelligence business goes awry – as a result of either substandard performance [e.g. in the form of under-reach] or overreach.'
This point is particularly important for democracies such as the United States during periods of high threat and aggressive intelligence reform.’ – emphasis added.

202 For further background information on the ‘surveillance dimension’ see, for example, D. Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); for some more ‘surveillance’ literature, see, for example, K. Ball and F. Webster (eds), The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

203 See, for example, Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.7 – particularly where he notes: ‘Upon entering the old entrance of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, one will find the following inscription on the left-hand marble wall: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” – John VIII-XXXII. It is a nice sentiment, but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or any other intelligence agency.’

204 See, for instance, the comments of Sir Richard Dearlove, the former ‘Chief’ (‘C’) of the UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), reproduced below in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.0].


207 See, for example, as illustrated in Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.7], below.


209 See, for instance, Chapter 6: Conclusion [2.4], below.

210 See, for example, J. Sims, ‘Understanding Ourselves’, chapter 3 in her and Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, from p.32; see also P. Gill, “‘Knowing the self, knowing the other’: the comparative analysis of security intelligence’, chapter 6 in Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies, from p.82.

211 Sims, ‘Understanding Friends and Enemies…’, chapter 2 in ibid., from p.14; see also B. Hoffman, ‘We Can't Win If We Don't Know the Enemy’, The Washington Post (25 March 2007).

212 For more on this issue, see Chapter 3: Literature Review [4.0], below; see also Chapter 6 [1.0], below.

213 See also news reports, such as ‘Councils warned over spying laws: Councils in England have been urged to review the way they use surveillance powers to investigate suspected crime’, BBC News Online (23 June 2008).

214 For the importance of knowing history in the intelligence context, see Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking forward’; see also, for example, for the ‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; Popplewell, “‘Lacking Intelligence’”, pp.336-52.

See, for example, ‘In many respects, UK and US [intelligence] co-operation represents the most significant aspect of the so-called special relationship’ in Fidler and Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? The UK and US spying alliance’; K.A. O’Brien, ‘Europe weighs up intelligence options’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 March 2001) and A. Whittam Smith, ‘It’s France that has a special relationship with America’, The Independent (21 February 2005); see also content in Chapter 3: Literature Review [4.0], below. For the long-term nature of the UK-US intelligence relationship, see also, for example, J. Beach, ‘Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917-18’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 2 (April 2007), pp.229-249.

See Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii; see also R. Niblett, Director Chatham House, ‘What Bush might make of Brown’, The Financial Times (07 February 2007) - via URL: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/ArticleFT070207.doc> (accessed: 07/04/2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘[UK-US] Bilateral intelligence co-operation on counter-terrorism, for example, is more important than ever, as Mr Brown has noted in recent speeches…’


Rudner, ‘Britain Betwixt and Between’, p.575.

See, for example, some of the criticisms of the close UK-US intelligence sharing tabled below.

ibid.

ibid.

To date, these documents remain classified.


That is, arguably very marginally moving away from being so firmly tied to ‘the state’ – see R.J. Deibert, ‘Deep Probe: The evolution of network intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003); see also J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and see ‘Opaque Networks’, chapter 6 in Roberts, Blacked Out, pp.127-149; see also Clutterbuck, ‘Network forms of Organisation in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism’ in his ‘Developing A Counter Terrorism Network’. Warfare is also moving more towards network centric operations, see, for example, C. Wilson, ‘Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 15 March 2007); L. Freedman, ‘The Transformation of Strategic Affairs’, IISS Adelphi Paper, 379 (2006).


229 See also P. Knightley, *The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist, and Whore* (London: Deutsch, 1986), p.5 – where he argues: ‘… one of the curious features of intelligence agencies is that they gradually grow to resemble one another…’ (emphasis added), not least when carrying out matching functions. See also Smith, *The Spying Game*, p.25 – where he argues: ‘The relationship between the various American spy organisations has been so bad at times during the past 50 years that they have had far better relations with their British counterparts than they have enjoyed with each other.’


231 Critic identified only as ‘Morley’ quoted at URL: <http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/T_folder/troy.html> (accessed: 20/01/2006).

232 Based on information from various non-attributable sources [e.g. i-37 + i-30]; see also texts, such as N. West, *The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).

233 William J. Donovan, Director, *Memorandum for the President 2/8/52-ABD* (07 November 1944) – via CREST – CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090008-3 (2006/02/07); see also *Interpretive Notes of Memorandum for the President* (18 November 1944) – via *ibid.* – especially where it notes (p.8): ‘The British Government is not to be condemned when high American commanders in Europe lean heavily upon British strategic and policy intelligence. There exists no American agency wholly competent to prepare or responsible for furnishing intelligence of American origin. Intelligence staffs in the various military commands may satisfy combat demands, but policy intelligence from American sources is inferior. Hence it is supplied largely by the better developed British system.’; see also T.F. Troy, *Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981) – via CREST – CIA-RDP90-00708R000600120001-0 (2000/04/18).

the Committee that the UK/US collaboration is highly valuable and remarked that it “is obviously a very important factor in relation to our thinking”…; see also Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii – where he states: ‘The UK-US nexus is viewed by the UK as a precious asset…’; see Fidler and Huband, ‘A special relationship? The US and UK spying alliance’; for importance of UK-US intelligence liaison to Britain see also J. Freedland, ‘Comment & Analysis: Time for Tough Love: Gleneagles gives Tony Blair a chance to demand from Bush a relationship that’s a bit more special for Britain’, The Guardian (06 July 2005).

235 For example, see M. Dejevsky, ‘Comment: Now is the time to push for a European Army’, The Independent (22 October 2003).

236 Based on information from non-attributable sources [e.g. i-30]; see also, for example, R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Intelligence test: After the rapid reaction force, the logical step is an EU intelligence policy – and that would be the ultimate test of mutual trust between allies’, The Guardian (20 December 2000); see also the sentiments expressed in G. Poteat and W. Anderson, ‘A Declaration of Interdependence: A second letter from America to our British friends’, The Daily Standard (03 May 2007) - via URL: <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/562ahjrw.asp?pg=1> (accessed: 06/11/2007); see also J. Bolton, ‘Britain cannot have two best friends’, The Financial Times (01 August 2007); see also ‘New EU treaty worries US intel services’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 January 2008) - particularly where it notes: ‘As EU governments focus on securing ratification of the proposed Lisbon Reform Treaty in 2008, United States policymakers are concerned its provisions could present serious challenges to transatlantic intelligence and homeland security co-operation. The main US reservation is that by transferring additional law and justice functions from the individual EU member states to EU institutions, the treaty could disrupt existing bilateral relations between US and EU governments without establishing anything better…’

237 See, for example, Secretary James Baker, III talk at Chatham House on Monday 29 October 2007, especially where he noted: ‘Some have advocated the idea that the United Kingdom must somehow choose between the United States and the European Union. That is both misleading and dangerous. It is misleading because it fails to recognize the unique and productive role that London can play in both Washington and Brussels. And it is dangerous because it could lead to international divisions injurious to the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Let me be blunt. The conduct of foreign policy is hard enough without creating false choices.’ - Secretary James Baker III, ‘The Whitehead Lecture – The West and the World: A Question of Confidence’, Chatham House meeting transcript (29 October 2007), p.5.

238 See, for example, ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14 – ‘The quality of intelligence gathered clearly reflects the value of the close co-operation under the UKUSA agreement…’


240 See, for instance, Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With U.S.’: ‘…Increased intelligence-sharing and cooperation with foreign countries, especially Britain, has been “one of our biggest accomplishments since 9/11,” [House Homeland Security Chairman Peter T. King, R-N.Y.] said. Not only do the British coordinate well with Americans on intelligence, they might be better at some aspects of it. William Rosenau of the Rand Corporation said the British are better at
human-source intelligence and “they’ve been willing to make investments in language skills that we haven’t been willing to make. … The British trump us in their use of police in counterterrorism,” while in the U.S., police are viewed largely as first-responders… The police are integrated into the intelligence community in Britain in ways they aren’t in the U.S., except perhaps in New York, L.A., and Chicago, Rosenau said…’

241 On 11 September 2001, the US arguably did not have hegemony of intelligence power. This was for a variety of reasons, such as ‘information overload’ – see, for example, the 9/11 Commission Report, pp.275-6 and references to the information ‘logjam’; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.i], below.


243 Smith, The Spying Game, p.432.

244 See, for example, ‘UK spied for US as computer bug hit’, The Times (26 April 2000); Keefe, Chatter, p.109; ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14.

245 See, for example, ISC Annual Report, 2003-04 (June 2004), p.45, paragraph ‘J’.

246 This is reflected by American intelligence officials being allowed to attend some of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment meetings; see also S. Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An Inside Perspective’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004); see also Chapter 4 [7.0], below.

247 See, for example, the earlier references to the reduction of financial costs to all parties through having intelligence liaison [8.1].

248 For further details, see, for example, the ISC, Renditions report; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii] of this study, below; see also A. Svendsen, “‘Friends and Allies’ like these: UK-US intelligence relations in the early 21st Century’, paper presented at the annual British International Studies Association (BISA) conference, University of Cambridge, UK (December 2007).

249 For more background detail on the ‘Katharine Gun affair’ see Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], below; see also Keefe, Chatter, p.29.

250 Hitz, The Great Game, p.152.

251 ibid., p.157.

252 For more on the schools of interpretation in Anglo-American relations, see A. Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’, chapter 1 in his On Specialness (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), from p.1; see also the ‘Introduction’ in J. Baylis (ed.), Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester University Press, 1997); for an expansion on the discussion here, see Chapter 2 [4.1] below. For an example of (at least perceived) ‘terminalism’ in an area of UK-US relations – which may threaten more of the whole of the relationship - see, for example, P. Chao and R.
Niblett, ‘Trusted Partners: Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship’, *CSIS Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, A Working Paper* (26 May 2006). Reference can also be made to tensions within the ‘Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme’ – see, for example, D. Mulholland, ‘Bush second term strains defence co-operation’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (26 November 2004). However, there appears to be high-level political support for the UK in the US, see, for example, J. Murphy, ‘Bush supports UK role in JSF programme’, *Jane’s Defence Industry* (01 July 2006), suggesting that the difficulties encountered may be featuring more at the lower operational levels of UK-US JSF co-operation. See also ‘Future fighter takes to the skies’, *BBC News Online* (15 December 2006); see also R.D. Sugar, ‘Trends and Opportunities: US/UK Defence Co-operation’, *RUSI Defence Systems*, 9, 1 (Summer 2006), pp.24-27.


Chapter 2
Study Design:
Research practice, methodology & orientation

‘Anyone who sets out to write seriously about Intelligence has to accept in advance certain limitations. Because it has been surrounded with secrecy, which has generated myth, the subject is ill defined. The very word provokes in different people completely different expectations. Because it has to do with methods and tricks which may be needed again, some think it wise to remind enemies as little as possible of past triumphs and failures. Because so much of the work goes unrecorded on paper, lost forever in scrambled talk and burnt teleprinter flimsies, any account must be incomplete. One runs, therefore, the risk of arousing the historian’s interest without fully satisfying his curiosity. I accept that shortcoming because the British… are good at Intelligence and the advantage that this gives them in a world of hostile nation-states should not be discarded. It is one of the qualities which makes us “alliance-worthy”.’

- Donald McLachlan, UK journalist and former intelligence officer

[1.0]: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive insight into how this study has been constructed. This chapter consists of three main sections: Firstly, the research practice and approach adopted are evaluated; followed, secondly, by an analysis of the methodology utilised; and then, finally, there is an assessment of the macro-orientation of this study, including which school of Anglo-American relations literature the study fits most appropriately.

[2.0]: Research practice & approach

[2.1]: Limitations when researching ‘intelligence’:
Several challenging limitations confront any scholar researching ‘intelligence’. Starting with (i) the problems encountered when researching intelligence generally, this section will then go on to examine (ii) the specific problems encountered when researching intelligence liaison, and (iii) the problems associated with researching intelligence liaison in a contemporary historical context.
[2.1.i]: Problems encountered when researching ‘intelligence’ generally:
The problems encountered when researching intelligence generally are mainly due to its highly secretive nature. As will be seen in Chapter 3, these have arguably contributed towards deterring researchers. This in turn has partly helped contribute towards ‘intelligence studies’ being less ‘mainstream’ and more of a ‘niche’ subject. Simultaneously, it is a ‘spin-off’ from fields such as international history to strategic and security studies. This explains why intelligence studies is attractive to academics and to (usually former) practitioners alike, who are keen to adopt an interdisciplinary approach; and who are not simply confinable to the traditional or conventional categories of scholarship – that is, being solely a historian or a political scientist/theorist, or coming from one particular fixed theoretical position. Because of the nature of intelligence studies, several areas, such as the focus of interest in this study - intelligence liaison – are, at the least, under-researched and under-theorised, or, at most, they are haphazardly so. Increasingly, today, this condition is now at least beginning to be seriously addressed - although there is much scholarship still to be undertaken. The problems encountered, however, should not be discouraging to researchers. Researching intelligence is indeed a difficult and challenging task, but it is by no means impossible - as this study helps to demonstrate.

Intelligence is not impossible to research for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a plethora of open sources, which can be utilised by the intelligence scholar similarly to how open source intelligence (OSINT) is drawn upon by the intelligence practitioner. Often the same (or at least similar) sources are drawn upon – such as drawing on media reporting and commentary, or on BBC Monitoring output. Moreover, the number of open sources available for exploitation is proliferating exponentially as time progresses.

Secondly, potential sources have become more accessible, and increasingly instantly. In recent years there has been the continuing trend towards greater ‘openness’ and ‘transparency’ in government affairs and elsewhere. The intelligence agencies themselves have not been immune – even partaking in so-called ‘PR’ (public relations) activities themselves to communicate their message in the public domain. These trends have been aided by the rapid technological developments of recent years, such as the Internet revolution. Today, anyone can be an online publisher and communicate their ‘Googleable’ message, such as through a ‘blog’. This vexes governments, who are increasingly anxious about the ability of their personnel to undertake these activities.

Intelligence is still challenging to research because the ‘openness’ remains governed by differing rules and guidelines. These are always subject to one of the greatest of all fallibilities, human interpretation. The rules and guidelines stipulate
when archives are released, ‘weeded’, or whether they are destroyed. An episode in 2000, involving The Guardian newspaper’s security and intelligence affairs journalist Richard Norton-Taylor, effectively illustrates the impact of differing states’ ‘openness’ rules and guidelines. This episode also provided some interesting insights into the interpretation, as well as the determination, of what is made available. Norton-Taylor revealed that:

[The Guardian] asked the [UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)] if it would release at least some of the information it insisted must remain officially secret (including information since released by Washington and Nato about the number of tanks it did, or did not, destroy in Kosovo). In an episode which would have delighted Kafka, MoD officials decided to claim they could not release the information since the [Commons defence committee] had agreed to suppress it. Once evidence is provided to a Commons committee it becomes subject to “parliamentary privilege”, we were told. It was therefore up to the committee and not the MoD to decide whether and how it was published. … The committee eventually recorded (dryly): “After a somewhat drawn-out exchange of correspondence between this committee, the MoD and Mr Norton-Taylor, the MoD did review its classification and derestricted some further information.”

Significantly, this episode involved the UK-US intelligence relationship, hence the appropriateness to cite it here. Norton-Taylor continued, by noting that more recently:

The MoD has agreed to disclose part of an answer given by Group Captain Stephen Lloyd, who was asked how dependent the ministry was on military intelligence provided by the US. We are now allowed to know that Lloyd told the committee that Britain's military intelligence relationship with the US “dates back to the period of 1943. So it is a very strong and very long relationship.” He adds: “***.” We are still not allowed to know officially what kind of intelligence we provide to the US. A question to Lloyd about that remains ***. Yet it is widely known that we give the US a broad range of intelligence, not least through the electronic eavesdropping agency GCHQ, and US intelligence bases in Britain…

This episode also neatly ties in with the general observation that the US is more ‘open’, if not transparent, than the UK. See the case studies presented below in Chapter 5, for differing UK and US publicising activities and (albeit arguably slightly more converging over time) philosophies concerning the issue.
Further problems encountered when researching ‘intelligence liaison’:
Intelligence liaison is the ‘most secret’ area of intelligence and is conducted in an ‘invisible world’.12 These observations form the bedrock of the closely interrelated further problems encountered when researching intelligence liaison. There are at least five problems that feature prominently:

Firstly, there is the active official discouragement of the investigation of intelligence liaison. For instance, the entry for ‘liaison’ on the ‘glossary’ page of the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) website reveals this official discouragement where it states: ‘It is SIS policy not to comment on its relationships with liaison services.’13 While in the US, according to Steven Aftergood, the author of the Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Secrecy News, ‘Liaison relationships between US intelligence agencies and their counterparts in other countries are typically among the most important and the most secretive of intelligence activities. Questioned about them in public, the CIA can hardly be bothered to respond even with a “no comment”.’14 Therefore, an unsanctioned independent analysis, such as this study, might not be entirely welcomed. There are dilemmas, including those of an ethical nature.15 For instance, this study may in itself contribute towards revealing something that complicates the liaison relationship. Whenever complex and intricate trade-offs are involved, such as when conducting intelligence liaison relations, ideally further impediments to the smooth management of the liaison relationship want to be contained, rather than highlighted.

Secondly, when actually undertaking the task of analysing intelligence liaison, the analyst is confronted by a ‘practical’ research problem that needs mitigation. Frequently there is a lack of sources showing intelligence liaison underway in its fastest ‘real-time’ action form. Informal ‘cocktail party’, ‘café’ or ‘sofa’ interactions (such as in the form of fleeting conversations) go unrecorded.16 Occasionally, a publicly available recorded glimpse of intelligence liaison in action - but in more of a ‘slow-motion’ form (such as preserved in the form of a document or e-mail communication) - can be captured. These, however, are usually only ‘released’ into the public domain through the outlet of the media, and due to ‘leaking’ and/or ‘whistleblower’ activities. Therefore, they are a rarity.17

Thirdly, there is obfuscation during the intelligence process. This includes the intentional manipulating or unintentional (accidental) obscuring of the background history and origin of the intelligence liaised over. These processes or procedures (including misinformation and/or disinformation activities18) can significantly complicate the process of source verification - both for intelligence ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. This is especially apparent when the source is ‘incomplete, both shorn of time or place or origin…’.19 Any research leads can be muddied. There is also the
abdication of individual responsibility and accountability, as old boundaries are blurred and new ones are constructed.

Fourthly, information management issues exist. There is the determination and selection carried out by the intelligence service participants themselves - or by those closely guided by them - of what content is released and disseminated in the final resulting intelligence product outputted to ‘users’ and/or to the public and archives.\(^2^0\) This forms part of the management of ‘openness’, as already briefly discussed above in relation to the episode experienced by Norton-Taylor.

Fifthly, again closely related to the management of ‘openness’, there is a persisting lack of declassification of official documents in and/or related to intelligence liaison.\(^2^1\) This is especially acutely the case if the specific liaison under-scrutiny is still ongoing, and long-term, enduring, conditional promises have been made to the actor (or any related parties) being liaised with that either the very fact of the liaison and/or any of its details would not be revealed.\(^2^2\) This situation often continues long after the conclusion of the liaison, in case any ‘spin-offs’ or ‘descendants’ from that liaison also may potentially become compromised by disclosure.\(^2^3\)

[2.1.iii]: Researching ‘intelligence liaison’ in a contemporary historical context:

The contemporary context makes several of the above restrictions even more acute. In a contemporary historical context, scholars do not have access even to a few selectively declassified primary source ‘official’ documents and papers available in the UK and US National Archives.\(^2^4\) This helps to explain why most literature on the intelligence liaison subject is longer-term historically-orientated (see Chapter 3). The contemporary historian becomes increasingly dependent upon sources such as official strategy documents released for public consumption, the media output and their own semi-structured (elite) interviews they have conducted. A quick foray into the endnotes in the case studies of this study (Chapter 5) reflects those trends. Interestingly, but unsurprisingly given the reconstructions attempted here, the challenges experienced by the contemporary historical researcher closely reflect those encountered on a daily basis by intelligence officers in the real intelligence world. This is along with undertaking the functions of source assessment/analysis and protection, as well as carrying out some of the more mundane tasks, such as data processing vast quantities of material.\(^2^5\)

Additionally, compared to other fields of study, the veracity gap encountered is arguably somewhat wider. When studying intelligence, epistemological problems are enhanced and tend to be more persistent. Therefore, naturally some of the conclusions drawn have to be tentative. This is understandable, particularly when trying to study a subject where several of the key documents have not yet been
released - such as those composing the UKUSA agreements. In such circumstances, informed insights are somewhat emasculated. While the conclusions might be arguably less definitive in ‘ground-breaking’ terms, they can certainly compensate by being explorative and more discussion or debate provoking. Thus, useful ‘springboards’ for further research are provided. Arguably more contemporary historical studies are less rigidly tied to specific sources. This allows them to be more flexible and for the thinking within them to be ‘softer’ and ‘broader’ in terms of the nature of interpretation. Being less firmly rooted in particular sources may have an added benefit. It may prevent a particular interpretive slant or framing from having an overwhelming effect on the study. For instance, one that is trying to be officially disseminated through what is (eventually) released. As there is less to already conform to, perhaps this situation allows a greater scope for independent originality by the analyst.

[2.2]: Approaches this study adopts:
This study adopts a conventional interdisciplinary hybrid approach. The approaches of a modern to contemporary international historian and an international relations-orientated political scientist/theorist are combined. As Mark Trachtenberg argues: ‘...the key thing is to do the sort of work that can draw theory and history together.’ All four approaches towards the study of intelligence, as identified by Stafford Thomas, are employed throughout: ‘(1) historical/biographical; (2) functional; (3) structural; and (4) political.’ A relatively ‘broad’ approach has also been adopted. This is justifiable and defensible for several reasons:

Firstly, a major objective of this study is to bridge and ‘join-up’ in an ambitious manner several issues and concepts. The main intention is to attempt to connect intelligence studies with international relations (IR) theory. Along with intelligence studies as a whole, intelligence liaison is remarkably disconnected from IR theory. This appears most puzzling - not least because of the presence of international intelligence liaison relationships in international affairs. Moreover, palpable is the fact that they perform an important, indeed essential, role in that context, within international relationships, as well as in relation to states’ wider foreign and security policies. Intelligence liaison relationships constitute the international relationships of national intelligence agencies. The subject of international intelligence liaison is therefore the best domain in which to connect IR theory with the wider discipline of intelligence studies. Furthermore, international intelligence liaison involves and includes intelligence alliances, clandestine diplomacy, transnational relationships, and other characteristics, which fit (to varying degrees) into the domain of international relations. This study also seeks to:

(i) connect IR theory with contemporary international history; (ii) connect an
analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison with the wider, well-established literature on generic Anglo-American relations – for example that ‘schoolified’ by Alex Danchev and used by John Baylis (see below [4.1]); and (iii) connect (at a minimum as beginning efforts) theories of alliance, bureaucracy and ‘securitisation’ with international intelligence liaison, showing where they fit into the intelligence liaison ‘system’; and (iv) equally demonstrating, more significantly, why individually they are inadequate to explain the amalgamated intelligence liaison concept. This necessitates attempts at the theorisation of intelligence liaison itself. Adopting an arguably ‘broad’ approach helps attain this overall objective.

Secondly, another key ‘added value’ purpose of this study is to serve as a useful, long-term enduring and connective reference text, accessible to as wide a readership as possible. It aims to provide an in-depth and a sustained scholarly analysis of UK intelligence in the contemporary context in the form of a full and well-researched academic study. It also intends to demonstrate that this approach is a feasible one to adopt. Such attempts to evaluate UK intelligence in the contemporary context have barely been attempted before, and then frequently do not go substantially beyond figuring in the form of shorter journal or newspaper articles. These only offer occasional and more fragmented insights into contemporary UK intelligence. Wherever possible, well-stocked endnotes have been provided throughout this study to further support its aim of being a work with reference utility. Again, the adoption of a relatively broad approach allows the effective conveying of some general observations and lessons. How this study constructs these will now be explored.

[3.0]: Methodology

[3.1]: Methodology deployed:

This study attempts to advance an understanding of (international) intelligence liaison generally and UK-US intelligence liaison specifically in a contemporary context. This is accomplished through attempting a qualitative analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison focussed on a number of key issue-areas from 2000 to the end of 2005. The issue-areas are represented in the study as two case studies, focussing on UK-US intelligence liaison concerning: (i) counter-terrorism and (ii) WMD non- and counter-proliferation efforts. Drawing on the results of the full panoply of methodologies employed throughout, this study also advances some empirically underpinned theoretical observations. These are both deductive and inductive in nature. They also concern the possible theorisation of intelligence liaison, as well as how this might be connected to the more developed literature on the nature of UK-US relations.
Canadian intelligence scholar Wesley Wark has identified eight methodologies, which are deployed throughout intelligence studies. This study also uses some of those methodologies, notably adopting: ‘(1) the research project – utilizing primary source archival evidence; (2)… the historical project – essentially the production of case-study based accounts; (3) the definitional project… concerned with the foundation of intelligence studies… it attempts to define the subject [in the case of this study, unpacking the phenomenon of intelligence liaison]; (4)… building on [(3)] … the fourth perspective – that is using the case studies to test the theoretical deliberations… [extending to using the methods of] (7) investigative journalism – typically these are on topics for which there are no historical archives available [for example, due to research being undertaken on and in the contemporary context]; … [and] (8) [the] popular culture project… [which] considers … topics such as the politics of James Bond [and the insights the wider spy fiction genre can offer].’

[3.2]: Methodological components:
The methodological components of this study can be summarised as follows: A qualitative analysis based on case studies, with some small-N (small sample) comparison elements figuring. The case studies are intensive and critical, and are composed of the results from semi-structured (elite) interviews and the outcome from text/documentary analysis. The semi-structured interviews are particularly useful for accessing the micro/lower levels of intelligence liaison, notably the operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels. Furthermore, the interviews can have some added importance. They bring some heuristic value by helping to fill in ‘gaps’ or ‘missing dimensions’ present in the files or documentary record alone. Meanwhile, the text/documentary analysis is particularly useful for introspection into the macro/higher levels, such as the ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels. Combining both of these methodologies therefore allows the capture of insights into all the levels of intelligence liaison. This in turn also may have at least some relevant strategy and policy implications.

[3.3]: Awareness of drawbacks:
The qualitative analysis, small-N comparison approach to research is not universally popular. This methodology has some ‘generalisability limits’. Sometimes analysts argue that conclusions that are too ‘big’ are reached from too small a sample. This shortcoming is accepted, but arguably it is offset by the possibility to encompass many variables. Nevertheless, the inferences drawn, no matter how potentially valid they may actually be, must not become unhinged from their supporting evidence and thereby compromised. As Todd Landman argues, ‘the substantive conclusions and inferential aspirations of a particular comparative study should not go too far
beyond the scope of its sample... comparative scholars must recognise the limits of their own enterprise in making generalizations about the political world they observe.36 Ideally, ‘grand’ and widely acceptable theories require a sizeable to large reservoir of both qualitative and quantitative data on which to be well built.37

In addition, frequently the small-N methodology is juxtaposed against large-N (large sample) research. But rather than being opposed, these different methodologies should complement - just as quantitative and qualitative methodologies should complement. As US political scientist Michael Coppedge has argued: ‘No camp needs to demean the work of the others; all make useful contributions to the big picture. Those who specialize in small-N studies should not take offense at a division of labor that assigns them to the outliers. This is in part because the outliers are the most interesting and challenging pieces, the ones with the greatest potential to innovate and challenge old ways of thinking.’38 Being thought provoking is also one of the purposes of this study.

Another concern is that adopting a comparative analysis methodology means that a researcher’s mind is ‘closed-off’ too early in the research process. For example, ‘the need to forge comparisons tends to mean that the researcher needs to develop an explicit focus at the outset, whereas it may be advantageous to adopt a more open-ended approach in many instances.’39 In the development of the study, this problem has been mitigated somewhat by (i) not overly relying solely on, as well as (ii) leaving until later, the process of enacting the comparative analysis. This is accomplished through it featuring as an integral part of the case studies presented in Chapter 5. A broad approach has also been adopted to preserve both ‘open-mindedness’ and essential contextualisation of UK-US intelligence liaison (see above [2.2]).

There is a further problem with the comparative analysis methodology. Again, Landman draws attention to the observation that those ‘studies that compare few countries are not able to draw strong inferences owing to problems of selection bias both in terms of the choice of countries and the choice of the historical accounts used for evidence.’40 Therefore, this study, perhaps rather than seeking to be definitive per se, is more a contribution intended to provoke discussion and debate. This study’s ‘added value’ is that by building on a wide range of substantial and more specific studies dispersed in a fragmented manner, it synthesises an in-depth, yet generally educative, connected evaluation of intelligence liaison - a phenomenon that is frequently fleetingly referred to, but rarely probed in further detail. One of the outcomes of this study should be to encourage greater in-depth research into intelligence liaison – of both a qualitative and quantitative nature, empirical and theoretical - to enhance our understanding further.
Using the case study method, too, is not without its drawbacks. Firstly, as Alan Bryman notes, ‘…not all writers are convinced about the merits of multiple-case study research. Dyer and Wilkins (1991), for example, argue that a multiple case study approach tends to mean that the researcher pays less attention to the specific context and more to the ways in which the cases can be contrasted.’ This can occur if a particularly ‘narrow’ approach is adopted, where the more peripherally located, yet meaningful, factors in accounts are overly neglected.

Secondly, as Landman highlights, ‘case selection significantly affects the answers that are obtained to the research questions that are posed… In order to make stronger inferences, the rule of thumb for political science method is to raise the number of observations… which for comparative politics means either a larger sample of countries or [pertinent and followed in the case of this study] more observations within a smaller sample of countries.’ The above limitations will now be comprehensively addressed.

[3.4]: Why this methodology has been adopted - Positive reasons for selection:
The methodology adopted in this study has been selected for several positive and pragmatic reasons:

On a pragmatic basis, this study has to be realistically researchable or ‘doable’ within the scope of its available resources. Important issues ascribable to ‘constrained choice’ feature prominently in the selection of the methodology and approach. For example, choice is constrained by, firstly, intelligence liaison being the ‘most secret’ dimension of intelligence, and secondly, due to the ‘language factor’, the researcher being limited to just the English language. Fortunately, however, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is one of the most discussed, already well-researched and well-known intelligence liaison relationships in the public domain. Thus it constitutes the ‘best’ to research, as there are enough sufficiently accessible sources to draw upon. This helps to address some of the methodological problems faced when researching in this ‘most secret’ and challenging area of intelligence studies. Also researching in the subject area of UK-US relations offers the ability to draw upon a sizeable and well-established wealth of general UK-US relationship literature, as well as theories concerning the nature of generic UK-US relations (see below [4.1]).

The ‘exceptional’ nature of the UK-US intelligence relationship might be invoked negatively. For example, the exceptional qualities may be summoned as a reason to dismiss looking at the relationship for ‘generalisability’ purposes, for informing readers about intelligence liaison relationships generally. However, often, as is the case with drawing upon this example of an international intelligence liaison relationship, the ‘exception’ can ‘prove the rule’. At the least, it provides some
enlightening insights and suggestions that can be ‘scaled-up’, and which resonate more broadly in relation to other intelligence liaison relationships. Furthermore, focussing on the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship and adopting the particular cases selected allows the ability to concentrate upon so-called ‘knowable episodes’. This is essential when, on subjects such as intelligence liaison, the nature of the overall evidence is patchy and tends to coalesce around particular episodes. Here, adopting the qualitative analysis approach can be most valuable. Such an approach allows for the concentrated focussing on the stronger areas contributing towards more robust analysis throughout. This is rather than attempting to cover ‘everything’ in an over-ambitious, and ultimately ‘undoable’ manner.

With further reference to the qualitative comparative analysis methodology, one of its strengths is that: ‘Comparative design... entails the study using more or less identical methods of two contrasting cases. It embodies the logic of comparison in that it implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations.’ By comparing the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, what drives one of the leading intelligence liaison relationships, and one that is most accessible to research, can be ascertained.

Additionally, as Landman highlights, ‘there have been a number of developments in the world... that are particularly suited to systemic comparative analysis... these issues include transnational political influences, the diffusion of political ideas and political culture... and the broad category of globalisation.’ The phenomenon of international intelligence liaison is not isolated from these factors, and indeed is very much an integral part of them, as can be seen throughout this study.

More broadly, ‘this style of political science concentrates on observable political behaviour and events at the individual, group, or national level, and assumes that explanations of that behaviour are “susceptible to empirical testing”.’ Moreover, by pursuing the qualitative analysis methodology, this study, similarly to that of Landman’s intention with his own study, attempts to make ‘statements about politics based on the best empirical evidence available... [it also] accepts that these statements are imperfect and uncertain, but by advocating systematic and well-grounded “procedures of inquiry”... it aims to help... make such statements the best they can be.’ This study attempts to set a high standard in order to lend its observations greater credibility, as well as to make a valuable contribution to the field.

In addition, this methodology has been chosen because, as Bryman notes, comparative design ‘is something of a hybrid... in qualitative research it is
frequently an extension of a case study design. It even exhibits certain features that are similar to experiments and quasi-experiments, which also rely on the capacity to forge a comparison. This allows, in an interdisciplinary manner, the introduction of the key components of a ‘political science’ dimension to complement and further enhance the contemporary international historical narrative that has been sculpted.

Moreover, comparative analyses of various aspects of UK and US intelligence have been attempted before. Therefore in this field of study, this methodology has already been tried, tested and found to be viable and upheld as an appropriate methodology to pursue. Five examples, which can be readily cited, include two articles by Philip H.J. Davies, a conference paper and a book chapter by Michael Herman, as well as a book chapter by John Ranelagh. Adopting the comparative analysis methodology in this study thus follows the precedent of these earlier studies and can also try to successfully build upon them. Finally, as UK intelligence scholar Davies argues: ‘The comparative study of British and American intelligence not only provides a clear illustration of national intelligence cultures [and intelligence liaison] at work, but also provides insight into how intelligence [and intelligence liaison] operates in general…’

The case studies meanwhile provide the material that supplies the foundations upon which this study is constructed. Using case studies, aside from them performing an important supporting role, can also help the study provide much more ‘added value’. As Bryman states, the ‘main argument in favour of the multiple-case study [using more than one case study] is that it improves theory building. By comparing two or more cases, the researcher is in a better position to establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold… the comparison may itself suggest concepts that are relevant to an emerging theory.’ This study, by using just two case studies, effectively avoids the problems associated with having a multiplicity of cases. This study can therefore at least attempt to pay sufficient attention to the specific context as well as to the points of comparison.

Attempts at theory building are another important objective of this study. Bringing in ‘theory’ can be controversial. As Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan argue: ‘The word “theory” is used in a bewildering variety of ways in the study of international relations. It is applied to propositions and arguments at varying levels of abstraction, and debates over its most appropriate meaning have proceeded apace with little consensus achieved.’ In form, it can figure on a spectrum ranging from ‘hard’ theory (more characteristic of that found in the ‘physical sciences’ disciplines) through to ‘soft’ theory (more characteristic of that sited in the ‘social sciences’). Davies meanwhile argues that the utility of ‘theory’ in this last domain of inquiry is limited: ‘…indeed, theory should be avoided wherever possible in the social sciences.'
Rather, empirical research is essential, but empirical trends and patterns are not theories.\(^{53}\)

However, some theorisation is deployed. This is albeit it perhaps featuring in more of a ‘softer’ form as (or more akin to) ‘empirical and interpretive extrapolations’. These are intended to respectively capture the ‘scientific’ and ‘artistic’ dimensions of intelligence as successfully as possible. At a minimum, it is from this mode of ‘theory’ that practical ideas for driving intelligence liaison, and the directions in which to steer it, stem. Theory generally, and theory concerning intelligence liaison specifically in the case of this study, therefore has an important value. Thus, it is worth the expending of energy on them, not least in terms of their exploration and development. Theory also helps us to be more creative with ideas and access realms which solely an empirical approach alone cannot throw into relief. By theorising, rather than solely merely observing, some greater scope for attempts at generalisation concerning phenomena, such as intelligence liaison, can be engendered. What is actually needed – and is attempted by the efforts undertaken in this study - are empirical theories that are solidly rooted in and underpinned by the empirical research so that the ‘best’ aspects of each of these different approaches (theoretical and empirical) can be drawn upon in a synergistic and complementary manner. By adopting such an approach, the real ‘added value’ of intelligence studies, and studying phenomena such as intelligence liaison, can be presented and communicated.

The case studies are central. They are used to help empirically underpin the theorisation efforts. The ‘critical case’ or ‘instrumental case’ methodology selected for use in this study allows ‘the researcher’ to have ‘a clearly specified hypothesis, and a case is chosen on the grounds that it will allow a better understanding of the circumstances in which the hypothesis will and will not hold.’\(^{54}\) Moreover, as Bryman continues: ‘Case study researchers tend to argue that they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which they then engage in a theoretical analysis.’\(^{55}\) That is another intention of this study by pursuing the case study methodology. Furthermore, ‘a case study design is not necessarily associated with an inductive approach… Thus, case studies can be associated with both theory generation and theory testing.’\(^{56}\) Not only does the theory become built through using the case studies, but also its veracity is simultaneously probed in detail.

Using the case studies, also allows for in depth ‘contextual [or thick] description’.\(^{57}\) In the realm of intelligence, the provision of detailed and substantial evidence, where possible, is especially desirable. Therefore, as Landman observes, ‘comparing few countries can lead to inferences that are better informed by the
contextual specificities of the countries under scrutiny." Also, as Landman continues, ‘Comparing few countries achieves control through the careful selection of countries that fit within either the most similar systems design (MSSD) or the most different systems design (MDSD). These types of studies are intensive and are good for theory generation." This study follows that advice, partly in order to keep the scope of the project within conventionally respected as well as realistic and manageable boundaries.

[4.0]: The orientation of this study

[4.1]: ‘Schools’ and ‘levels’ in UK-US intelligence liaison relations:
There are at least three significant schools of thought to which the nature of general UK-US relations can essentially be allocated. Developed by Alex Danchev, and also used by John Baylis, these schools are termed ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’. The role of emotional, personal ties and sentiment are especially emphasised in the ‘evangelical’ school. Meanwhile, in the ‘functional’ school, the role of sentiment is less emphasised and there are specific functional purposes behind UK-US relations - such as witnessed during the Second World War and again today in the contemporary so-called ‘War on Terror’ and ‘Long War’ context. In contrast, in the ‘terminal’ school, ‘endism’ to the ‘specialness’ of UK-US relations is posited. The more specific UK-US intelligence liaison relationship arguably reflects elements of all the three schools.

In the world of intelligence, ‘specifics’ and ‘low politics’ take on greater significance. The details and their connection can determine whether there is intelligence ‘success’ or intelligence ‘failure’. Because of this, as well as the presence of so-called ‘intangibles’ or ‘personal factors’ - such as concerning the central issues of ‘trust’ and ‘betrayal’ - the presence of different ‘levels’ within UK-US intelligence liaison relations are suggested. Identifying, codifying and then employing these ‘levels’ for analytical purposes can facilitate a more sophisticated understanding of the nature of UK-US intelligence liaison relations.

In his discussion of espionage literature, Thomas J. Price usefully identifies four ‘levels’ of relations. However, most helpfully, these can be extended further into eight distinct, but closely inter-related, ‘levels’ of relations for analysis purposes. These descend from ‘macro/broad’ and ‘high politics’ (the first ‘quartet’ of levels, i-iv) to ‘micro/narrow’ and ‘low politics’ (the second ‘quartet’ of levels, v-viii). They can be summarised succinctly as:
(i) the ideological level;
(ii) the theoretical level;
(iii) the strategy level;
(iv) the policy level;
(v) the operational level;
(vi) the tactical level;
(vii) the individual (as ‘professional’) level; and
(viii) the personal level.

The boundaries between these different levels are considerably blurred. Within each of these levels, as well as across them, is a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of instances and episodes that can be evaluated as being overall representative of: (1) ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’; and reflective of: (2) optimised, non-optimised, or under-optimised ‘reach’ balances. Naturally, the condition that emerges as being proportionally the most predominant in the overall mix present at that level then emerges as the condition most expressed at that level.

Much flows from this model. When conceptualised in terms of separate, yet closely interrelated, levels, arguably a more powerful explanation of the dynamics of intelligence co-operation emerges. This type of explanation helps explain why the close UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is often regarded as the most ‘special’ and ‘important’ dimension and helps to sustain, wider and overall UK-US relations.63 Also it accounts for why the low politics of UK-US intelligence relations (representative of the lower ‘quartet’ of levels) have endured so well over some 60 years, despite co-existing times of considerable tension over higher and broader policy (representative of the higher ‘quartet’ of levels) - for example, as seen during the Suez Crisis in 1956.64 As former Royal Artillery officer, Ronald Lewin has noted: ‘It is interesting to observe how McLachlan [in his Room 39 (1968)] and Sir Kenneth [Strong in his Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (London: Cassell, 1968)] … [b]oth quite firmly place the “agent” or “spy”, the denizens of the world of John le Carré, at a very low level in the Intelligence pyramid.’65 Indeed, in the world of intelligence, the lower/micro-operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels frequently emerge as the most important. Often they constitute the key levels over the other considerations and levels in the intelligence liaison relationship. Here, the ‘specifics’, including involving personal reverberating issues of ‘trust’ and ‘betrayal’, do matter over ‘broader’ considerations. This situation arises not least because a valuable ‘commodity’ for all parties, intelligence itself - together with particular sources and operations, as well as the interactions being conducted over them - are all at stake in dynamic contexts.

Ultimately, generally the ideal ‘condition’, ‘status’, ‘balance’ or ‘trade-off’66
sought across all these levels of analysis is one of ‘operational policy’ – namely policies that function as intended. This figures in the form of a *modus vivendi*, which effectively fuses (or most harmoniously connects) together the identified high and low quartets of levels and each of their respective inputs. Indeed, as its name of ‘operational policy’ suggests, this is also an overall condition that effectively demonstrates the primacy and importance of the lower/micro levels, as well as their contribution, to that overarching arrangement. For intelligence, the ideal condition of ‘operational policy’ striven for is that of ‘optimised reach’, encompassing both the phenomena of ‘inner-reach’ (internal) and ‘outreach’ (external). For intelligence liaison, this ideal condition or *modus vivendi* figures as that of ‘optimised outreach’.

[See figure 2, below, for further explanation]
[Figure 2]: Levels of analysis and framework for evaluating relations and analysing key trends.
[4.2]: Which Anglo-American relations ‘school’ and why?
Overall, this study is representative of being ‘functionalism’-dominated. ‘Evangelicalism’ is also present, but, on the whole, it is subordinate. ‘Terminalism’ is further subordinate, and only occasionally and fleetingly emerges in more of an ‘isolated’ form, before being quickly ‘contained’. This appears to be the most appropriate general position to adopt, given the ‘functional’-nature of issues explored in the case studies – for example, counter-terrorism and WMD non-/counter-proliferation. In addition, this position directly mirrors/correlates with the nature of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship itself. This study, too, reflects a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of the ‘evangelical’, ‘functional’, and ‘terminal’. The overall balance between these varies depending on which particular ‘aspect’ of the relationship is being scrutinised and at which moment in time.

[4.3]: Which body of theory is most appropriate to draw upon and why?
As already demonstrated in Chapter 1 [9.1], international intelligence liaison is a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of aspects of several different theories. To aid understanding, we have to deploy a complicated combination of these aspects both at and across all the identified levels of analysis to explain the different dimensions of intelligence liaison. This reflects its amalgamated quality. The limits of these bodies of theory in relation to intelligence liaison have also been demonstrated. Where each of the various theories fit into the eight attributes or variables of intelligence liaison has been suggested. To further explain intelligence liaison comprehensively, attempts towards directly developing an original tailor-made theory of its own are useful. In the chapters that unfold later in this study, these attempts are presented. First, however, a review of the background literature on intelligence liaison generally, and on UK-US intelligence liaison relations more specifically, is helpful. This forms the subject of the next chapter.
References


3 See also Y. Boyer, ‘Intelligence Cooperation and Homeland Security’, chapter 9 in E. Brimmer (ed.), Transforming Homeland Security: U.S. and European Approaches (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, John Hopkins University, 2006), p.155 – particularly where he notes: ‘Intelligence cooperation and homeland security issues are tricky matters and remain largely marked by secrecy making analysis an almost impossible task with which to grapple. Intelligence cooperation is indeed a matter of high confidentiality in a scene where shadows matter as much as light. People involved in that business will certainly not expose the nature, the purpose, the scope, the channels and the depth of their cooperation. To such opacity, one has to add the very nature of what is at stake. It is about using the means offered by international cooperation for exchanging very sensitive information in order to identify, deter, prevent and act against terrorism. In that sense international intelligence cooperation for protecting the nation, the homeland, is about linking the local [‘The local is at the same time the precise location where the attack occurred and the level where citizens are expected to find help and protection, i.e. the national level.’] to the global.’


7 These trends include, for example, the UK’s Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government from the early 1990s; see also for its impact, R.J. Aldrich, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government Upon British History’, *Twentieth Century British History*, 9, 1 (1998), pp.111-26.

8 See, for example, ‘Blogging ban for the armed forces’, *BBC News Online* (10 August 2007).

9 See, for instance, the CIA’s job description for ‘Intelligence Officer, Classification Review’ (c.1970s), particularly where the document notes, under the heading ‘4. Complexity’: ‘… Incumbent must be keenly aware of the need to protect intelligence sources and methods as well as CIA organizational data, scientific and technical collection programs, foreign intelligence liaison relationships, and U.S. foreign relations. He must be able to use his knowledge of these subjects in the classification review process.’ – via CREST – CIA-RDP93B01100010003-6 (2002/05/07). More speculatively, for a possible example of ‘weeding’ encountered by the author of this study: in the summer of 2007, a search was undertaken of the ‘CIA Ground Photo Database’ in the US National Archives II’s ‘Still Photographs’ room, at College Park, University of Maryland. Once the computer running the system had been made to work(!), four photographs were listed as being of the ‘United Kingdom’, dating from 1977-8, and as part of the collection declassified in 2000. When the boxes containing the photographs were requested, a search of the boxes revealed that all those four photographs were no longer part of the collection, and distinct gaps in the ‘Photo #’ remained where they should have been located. Naturally, there is no way to verify whether those photographs of the UK were merely ‘misplaced’, rather than being ‘weeded’ for instance, but it remains of interest that all four were absent from a range of different boxes.


11 *ibid.*


13 See, for example, via URL: <http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/Page59.html#L> (accessed: 25/06/2008); see also the Literature Review (Chapter 3 [3.0]), below, for further comment on the methodological challenges confronted when researching intelligence liaison.


On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 2: Study Design

16 Sometimes, however, the ‘product’ and ‘outcome’ from this ‘type’ of liaison is recorded and does appear to surface, see, for example, B. Whitaker, ‘Conjecture over Bin Laden death’, The Guardian (25 September 2006).

17 See, for example, the Koza communication that features as part of the ‘Katharine Gun affair’ as discussed in Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], below.

18 See also Thomas, ‘Assessing Current Intelligence Studies’, p.219 – particularly where he argues: ‘Some aspects of intelligence may even occasionally reflect deliberate obfuscation or possibly even “disinformation.”’


21 See, for example, the ‘Disposition Instructions’ outlined in Office of Basic and Geographic Intelligence, Office of the Director [of Central Intelligence], Records Control Schedule (09 November 1971) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-07317A000100140001-8 (2001/07/12) – especially where it notes (p.1): ‘Permanent – Hold indefinitely in office of record on a current basis. When no longer needed for reference, research, or operational purposes, screen and retire to the Archives and Records Center.’; see also Admiral Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Address to Amherst, Smith, Vassar and Williams, Washington, D.C., Alumni Clubs (19 March 1980)’, Original Transcript (20 March 1980), p.13 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80B01554R00031000700001-4 (2005/11/23) – particularly where he noted: ‘We are also asking for partial relief from an act called the Freedom of Information Act, in which you or the Russian Embassy or anybody could write to us and ask for information out of our files and we must respond within ten days. It is a very onerous problem for us, but particularly back to the previous reference of perceptions of foreign liaison services and foreign agents. It is difficult to persuade someone to risk his life for you if he has heard there is an act, a law in this country that may
require me to adduce his name in public. We want enough relief for us to look that individual in the eye and say, it will not happen…’

22 For evidence of some of these methodological restraints, see Appendix 5, presented at the end of this study, below.


25 An example of source protection used in this study can be seen vis-à-vis the handling of interviewees and others consulted during the research process – see, for example, the ‘Interviews Note’ presented at the beginning of this study.

26 M. Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method (Princeton University Press, 2006), p.44; for more on some of the issues raised by this approach, see, for example, the discussion in I. Hall, ‘Review article: World government and empire: the international historian as theorist’, International Affairs, 82, 6 (2006), pp.1155-1165 – where he argues that ‘in methodological terms at least, history and theory are not the distinct enterprises they are commonly taken to be.’


28 See also W. Agrell, ‘Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29, 4 (August 2006), p.635 – where he argues: ‘Diplomacy, as we know, can be studied and understood in several ways, as an exponent of national interests and strategies, as a collective system or “regime”, or as a culture in itself. A similar set of perspectives can be applied on intelligence liaison.’

29 See, for example, Chapter 3, the Literature Review [6.0], below.

theory seeks to establish causal relationships between two or more concepts in an effort to explain the occurrence of observed political phenomena.’


32 Semi-structured interview: This is a term that covers a wide range of instances. It typically refers to a context in which the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview schedule but is able to vary the sequence of questions. The questions are frequently somewhat more general in their frame of reference from that typically found in a structured interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions in response to what are seen as significant replies.’ – quoted from ‘Box 5.3: Major types of interview’ in A. Bryman, Social Research Methods (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.110; for more on interviews, see ‘Structured interviewing’ chapter 5 in ibid., pp.105-125; see also ‘Elite Interviewing’, chapter 9 in Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.205-220; for details on text/documentary analysis, see ‘Documents as sources of data’ chapter 18 in Bryman, Social Research Methods, pp.368-384; see also ‘Documentary and Archival Analysis’, chapter 7 in Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.165-188. The text/documentary analysis also involves media analysis, which in turn also touches upon the discourse analysis methodology – for more on the discourse analysis methodology, see, for example, ibid., p.536, col. 2 for references; see also on discourse analysis, N. Gilbert (ed.), Researching Social Life (London: Sage, 2001 [2ed.]), p.399 for references. For an example of the discourse analysis methodology in action, see ‘The end of the story?’ chapter 10 in A. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.231-8. For some media analysis in this study, see Chapter 3 the Literature Review [6.0], below; for general background on ‘Comparative Methodology’ see also chapter 3 in Burnham et al., Research Methods in Politics, pp.58-79.

33 See, for example, the arguments of Ronald Lewin in his book Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story (London: Hutchinson, 1978), pp.19-20 especially where he notes: ‘In the British, American and German archives much that is relevant to Ultra’s story can be discovered by the informed student, though far too many documents are still classified and reserved. Nevertheless, Goethe’s remark is true of military history: “The most important things are not always to be found in the files”. This is specially so where intelligence is concerned. The over-riding need for secrecy, never more rigorously applied than in the case of Ultra, creates exceptional conditions for the historian. I saw that I could not get close to the reality unless I could seek out and interrogate those who, as producers or users of Ultra, knew the important things that never get into the files… In all [my] areas of inquiry the key figures shared with me their recollections - and much of what I heard is certainly missing from the files!’


35 See also S. Lieberson, ‘Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An examination of the reasoning in comparative studies based on a small number of cases’, Social Forces, 70, 2 (December 1991), pp.307-320.

For an example of a supportive study employing a quantitative methodology concerning the phenomenon of liaison generally, which complements the qualitative methodology pursued in this study that is specifically focussed on intelligence liaison, see D.F. Schwartz and E. Jacobson, ‘Organizational Communication Network Analysis: The Liaison Communication Role’, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 18 (1977), pp.158-174.


Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.53.


For more detail see Chapter 3 - the Literature Review [3.0], below.


Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure’, p.518.

Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.53.


Bryman, Social Research Methods, p.50.

ibid., p.51.

ibid.

For more see Landman, Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, pp.4-5.

See, for example, M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.218.


See, for example, ‘In many respects, US and UK co-operation represents the most significant aspect of the so-called special relationship…’ in S. Fidler and M. Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? The US and UK spying alliance is put under the spotlight’, The Financial Times (06 July 2004).

See W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995).


All these terms are used essentially interchangeably in the literature.


For further information on each of these theories, see the texts cited in Chapter 1 [9.1]; see also Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and theory’.
Chapter 3

Literature Review

Intelligence liaison - an under-researched subject suffering from a dearth of theory?

The literature on foreign intelligence liaison – one of the most tightly kept secrets in this invisible world – uniformly indicates that intelligence sharing does occur, but within strict confines and always laced with ambivalence and caution.

- L.K. Johnson, US intelligence scholar

[1.0]: Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the diverse literature on intelligence liaison. Specific focus is on the writing on one of the better (if not best) known intelligence liaison relationships, the Anglo-American (UK-US). This approach with a focus on the bilateral level has been adopted, as currently the most effective intelligence liaison evidently takes place here. Meanwhile, intelligence liaison is developing more slowly and extends less far at the multilateral level – for example, as witnessed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

This chapter begins by surveying how UK-US intelligence liaison is conceptualised in some of the significant bodies of relevant literature. Firstly, the general literature on Anglo-American relations is examined. Secondly, the more specialist general literature on intelligence liaison - particularly that which draws (to varying extents) on examples and episodes of UK-US intelligence liaison, along with more specific research monographs and case study texts, as well as the non-fiction literature focussing more on UK-US intelligence liaison, will be scrutinised; thirdly, this chapter will focus on how UK-US intelligence liaison is portrayed in fiction and popular culture, followed, fourthly, by a brief survey of mainly the UK media (and less specialist) literature on UK-US intelligence liaison, which reaches a wider public audience. Finally, some concluding observations are presented. An analysis of this work also allows us to begin to identify several different ‘schools’, within which to start ‘codifying’ some of the different work drawn upon throughout this study. Indeed, those schools are used in part to help inform the structuring of this chapter. However, before surveying the literature, some contextualisation is helpful.
Investigating intelligence liaison requires more research effort. Often and persistently the most secret area of intelligence, it needs to be probed in depth. This is particularly the case as currently intelligence liaison is being used more extensively than previously, and as in parallel this trend is generating a substantial accountability deficit. As US intelligence scholar Bradford Westerfield argued in 1995: ‘Liaison stands out as having been one of the least sufficiently studied aspects of the entire [intelligence] field.’ Today in 2008, while that paucity of scholarship has been better addressed, there is still plenty of scope for research to be undertaken concerning the phenomenon of intelligence liaison. Partly as a consequence of intelligence liaison on the whole suffering from a lack of sustained study, currently it also remains under-theorised in the field of intelligence studies. Moreover, it continues to be remarkably disconnected from international relations (IR) theory. This is perhaps most mystifying when the ubiquitous presence, and indeed importance, of international intelligence liaison relationships in international affairs is considered. The domain of international intelligence liaison therefore emerges as the best in which to connect IR theory with the wider discipline of intelligence studies. This is not least because, both in theory and practice, international intelligence liaison involves a plethora of characteristics that are all closely associated with international relations. Significantly, these include intelligence alliances, clandestine diplomacy and transnational relationships.

Around 2003, UK intelligence historian Christopher Andrew judged intelligence studies as a whole to be ‘under-theorised’. This echoed former US intelligence oversight practitioners, Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, who observed in 2002, that: ‘If intelligence is becoming a recognized field of academic study, especially in the English-speaking world, its theoretical treatment remains undeveloped.’ Andrew continued: ‘But though intelligence theory is thin on the ground, the work of at least a handful of scholars, notably in Britain that of Michael Herman, gives grounds for guarded optimism…’ Added to Herman’s efforts, as well as those of US intelligence scholars Michael Handel and Richard K. Betts, are also the recent attempts at addressing the thinness of theory in intelligence studies by Loch K. Johnson and several others. Such efforts have prompted another UK intelligence scholar, Philip Davies, to argue more recently that: ‘Intelligence studies are not “under-theorized”…’

Indeed, what we see here is unevenness in the theoretical realm. Therefore, it is arguably most appropriate to judge the overall field of intelligence studies as being essentially ‘haphazardly-researched’, and thus, by logical extension, ‘haphazardly-theorised’. This condition partly stems from intelligence studies being a specialist
niche field of study that has emerged out of a wide range of fields of study. These include (at a minimum) the fields of strategic studies, international history, law and sociology.\textsuperscript{11} Some dimensions, such as intelligence liaison, are under-theorised. Meanwhile, other dimensions of intelligence and closely associated phenomena/entities - such as surveillance and the tactics of surprise and deception - over time have enjoyed considerably more efforts expended on their study and theorising.\textsuperscript{12} Comparatively, the academic study of intelligence is a new phenomenon,\textsuperscript{13} while comprehensive chapters focussing solely on intelligence are still in the early stages of breaking through into more mainstream textbooks.\textsuperscript{14} As Canadian intelligence scholar, Wesley Wark, has helpfully observed about the evolution of the literature on intelligence generally:

A substantial literature on intelligence did not begin to emerge until the last quarter of the twentieth century. Writing on intelligence began from a relatively narrow base. It was sparked in the beginning by a historical fascination with newly released documentation on the impact of signals intelligence during World War II, the famous story of Ultra, and contemporary concerns about intelligence abuses, particularly in the conduct of covert operations. Since the mid-1970s, the literature on intelligence has grown exponentially and moved well beyond its original interests. Intelligence now has at least the outlines of a usable past, with a library of case studies, national histories, and synoptic studies waiting the reader.\textsuperscript{15}

Intelligence liaison is a further specialist niche sub-field of intelligence studies. Therefore, in its current under-studied (albeit beginning to be better addressed) and under-theorised condition, it is even less systematically and even further haphazardly studied than intelligence as a whole.\textsuperscript{16} This is also the case when it is compared with at least some other specific or associated dimensions of intelligence. While frequently referred to in passing, such as in the media, intelligence liaison is then rarely probed in further depth. Sensational news stories of success, scandal or failure provide the most frequent openings for these generally cursory and fragmented empirical references to liaison.\textsuperscript{17} Moreover, while much individual research into the various specific components composing the different dimensions of intelligence liaison may have been completed (see below [4.0]), fewer efforts at the comprehensive fusion of these under the scope of the intelligence liaison phenomenon have subsequently been undertaken. Furthermore, in chapters focussing on intelligence, the phenomenon of intelligence liaison is not evaluated.
separately or highlighted as an entity in its own right. This emphasises its greater supporting role, its behind-the-scenes operation, and assumed characteristics.18

Generally, even intelligence studies texts themselves do not assist in addressing the dearth of a systematic focus on liaison. For instance, this is evident in volumes such as those edited by US intelligence scholar Roy Godson. These essentially emphasise using the intelligence cycle model as the basis for a functional approach to the study of intelligence. However, by adopting this approach, they tend towards overlooking intelligence liaison as an individual dimension of intelligence worthy of having its own chapter. This is because, as already seen in Chapter 1 [5.0] of this study, liaison does not neatly fit into a specific category of the intelligence cycle. Instead, it is more subsumed throughout. Perhaps unconsciously, through their earlier fragmenting and dispersal of the various components of liaison through using the framing approach of the intelligence cycle model lens, pioneering works in intelligence studies have helped contribute towards shaping a form of orthodoxy in the way that intelligence is studied and presented in its literature. More recently, the *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*, edited by US intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson and published in 2007, similarly adopts this approach with an emphasis on the intelligence cycle as a way of setting the study’s parameters and priorities. Therefore, Johnson’s volume also continues to propagate the observed omission concerning liaison in the general intelligence literature. This is perhaps all the more remarkable, firstly, given the book’s general strong emphasis on accountability and oversight concerns in the world of intelligence; and, secondly, when confronted by the fact that in recent years (as is explored by this literature review), a sizeable body of literature solely devoted to intelligence liaison as a distinct, and indeed significant, phenomenon and dimension of intelligence is now beginning to become increasingly emergent.19

Theories of intelligence liaison are lacking for several reasons. Firstly, this is due to intelligence liaison being the most secret area of intelligence conducted in an ‘invisible world.’20 Rigorous investigation of intelligence liaison is also officially discouraged, as is readily apparent from the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) website (see Chapter 2 [2.1.ii], above).21 Moreover, as UK intelligence scholars Len Scott and Peter Jackson note, ‘… despite the valuable start made by pioneers, this is a field that has not received systematic study by either political scientists or historians.’22 The intense secrecy surrounding intelligence liaison arguably contributes towards discouraging scholars from investigating and engaging with the often off-putting methodological restrictions associated with researching such a phenomenon. Intelligence liaison is also an under-studied sub-field further complicated by the fact that on the whole the literature has developed in a
haphazard rather than linear fashion. There is an array of different perspectives and approaches deployed, ranging from short- to long-term historical to contemporary, and insider to outsider. There is additionally little room for consensus as is demonstrated by the observation by one of its foremost commentators that ‘perspectives on the inner workings of intelligence alliances [being only one aspect] differ sharply.’ The research undertaken for this study supports that conclusion. Where intelligence liaison figures in the general Anglo-American relations literature will now be considered.

[3.0]: Intelligence liaison in general Anglo-American relations literature

In the general literature on Anglo-American relations, the writing on the intelligence dimension is thin. More specifically, the writing detailing UK-US intelligence liaison is much thinner still. This is surprising given the widespread acknowledged importance of intelligence to the overall Anglo-American relationship. A comparison with the space and depth allocated to other equally specialist issues, such as nuclear weapons and relations throws this observation into sharp relief. When the wider intelligence dimension does appear, it is usually only covered in a cursory manner, and then often subsumed within general discussions of defence relations. In other areas it rarely gets featured. The thin coverage of intelligence is partly down to confronting the well-documented methodological challenges (as discussed in Chapter 2 [2.0], above). However, these methodological concerns alone do not sufficiently explain the dearth. This is especially the case more recently when generalists themselves can draw upon an increasingly substantial body of specific and specialist literature by intelligence experts discussing the Anglo-American intelligence dimension. Therefore, the neglect and under-emphasis of the intelligence dimension in the general studies is likely to be explained, at least in part, by what Christopher Andrew terms ‘cognitive dissonance – the difficulty of adapting traditional notions of international relations and political history to take account of the information now available about the role of intelligence agencies.’ He continues: ‘One striking example of this conceptual failure concerns SIGINT, a word still curiously absent from the great majority of histories of international relations… few [historians] stop to consider the influence of SIGINT on the rest of the twentieth century.’

In Anglo-American relations studies, the importance of the wider intelligence dimension is recognised. Still, most references to it remain brief. This trend, to varying degrees, is particularly noticeable in the significant works on Anglo-
All these works, however, say very little about UK-US intelligence liaison *per se* and fail to unravel it in substantial depth. The subordination of intelligence as a whole in analyses of Anglo-American relations may also stem from the observation that intelligence co-operation was nevertheless *subordinate* to themes such as atomic cooperation. It may also reflect the fact that intelligence is a *‘specialité’*, with intelligence liaison being a *‘specialité of a specialité’*. Simultaneously, intelligence studies is located more marginally on the periphery of the mainstream fields of international relations and international history, and thus is not so fully integrated with them. This is despite having once partly emerged from them, while being fused in an interdisciplinary manner with other associated fields of inquiry.

Furthermore, intelligence as a whole can remain a completely ‘missing dimension’ in some works. Of course there are exceptions to this overall trend of intelligence dimension under-emphasis or absence. The works with greater emphasis on the intelligence dimension help contribute towards counterbalancing and beginning to reverse the general observed scenario as the 1990s progressed. Albeit unevenly, the underemphasised intelligence dimension gradually does feature more substantially. It gets some more commensurate space allocated in the Anglo-American relations literature. This trend can be seen as following closely behind the trend of intelligence studies as a whole beginning to flourish more during the 1990s and into the new millennium. Thus ‘generalists’ can now draw upon an increasing wealth of gradually joining-up and connective specialist intelligence literature, which offers more substantive insights and sustained analyses. This also aids the beginning of the formulation of generalisations and the recognition of trends relating to the intelligence dimension. Although here it can also be argued that the sections devoted solely to intelligence in the general Anglo-American relations literature continue to remain relatively brief and fragmentary. They could be extended further, exploring the themes in greater depth. Consequently, UK-US intelligence liaison in all its complexity continues to be under-studied.

After 9/11 and the subsequent greater prominence of intelligence issues, the intelligence dimension could no longer be overlooked in general studies. The specialist area of intelligence moved into the mainstream. In John Dumbrell’s article, ‘The US-UK “Special Relationship” in a World Twice Transformed’, the intelligence dimension undeniably gets a higher profile in his analysis. It moves out from more special, self-contained sections into featuring regularly and interspersed throughout the main body. This change is hardly surprising. The article addresses the recent inescapable experience of the contemporary early twenty-first century period. Here, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and during subsequent events in
the so-called ‘War on Terror’, key intelligence issue areas - such as terrorism and WMD proliferation concerns - have featured largely. Empirically, prominent intelligence issues have been unable to be missed and hence unable to be ignored. In this context, intelligence has moved out from the secret hidden periphery and more to the centre. It has undeniably been placed under a greater spotlight. Furthermore, as the official historian of the JIC Michael Goodman notes, these events ‘have ensured that intelligence is now taken as part and parcel of government.’

Yet, again UK-US intelligence liaison more specifically remains essentially unexplored in any greater depth. Interestingly, even in the second edition of Dumbrell’s book, *A Special Relationship*, published in 2006, the section focussing specifically on ‘intelligence cooperation’ still remains in a comparatively minor key. It figures merely as a small subsection in chapter 7, presented in compound with ‘Nuclear Defence’. Works that adopt this approach can be appropriately categorised as being located within a ‘superficial’ sub-school of the ‘characterisation’ school of literature (summarised as ‘superficial-characterisation’) covering the theme of UK-US intelligence liaison.

The particular school of thought relating to the status and ‘specialness’ of Anglo-American relations also has relevance here. The schools of ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’, as identified by Alex Danchev in his *On Specialness*, and to which writing in this field can be assigned (see Chapter 2 [4.0]), are useful indicators of the importance and space allocated to the intelligence dimension in the general studies. The intelligence dimension is often perceived as being the most ‘special’ aspect of the overarching UK-US alliance, contributing to the importance accorded to it throughout the literature, whatever the medium. In the ‘terminal’ school, where ‘endism’ to ‘specialness’ is argued, it is observed that the role of intelligence is underplayed or absent. Here, Coker’s 1992 article would fit. By contrast, in the writing assignable to the other schools, the wider intelligence dimension enjoys increasing emphasis and a higher profile. This is discernable in namely the ‘evangelical’ school - where the role of emotional, personal ties and sentiment are especially emphasised - and the ‘functional’ school – where there were specific functional purposes behind Anglo-American relations (such as during the Second World War when staving-off the Axis Powers and during the Cold War, when confronting the Soviet/Communist threat), and where the role of sentiment is less emphasised. This trend is also seen in ‘functional’ works such as those by John Dumbrell and David Reynolds. Yet, despite acknowledging the undeniable importance of the UK-US intelligence links, their treatment of that dimension continues to remain largely fragmentary and terse at best. Frequently, it, too, soon merges with, and becomes overtaken by, their exploration of the nuclear dimension of UK-US relations. Again, these works can be seen as effectively reflecting the
'superficial-characterisation' school of the literature on UK-US intelligence liaison. Overall, for a more in-depth and 'joined-up' analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison, the specialist literature on intelligence liaison relationships has to be consulted.

[4.0]: General intelligence liaison literature & its portrayals of UK-US interactions

There is a small body of specialist literature that explores intelligence liaison generally. This body of literature is gradually growing and to varying degrees it draws upon examples and episodes of UK-US intelligence liaison. It is this literature that starts to provide a fuller and more substantial discussion of UK-US intelligence liaison in all of its differing guises. Also through the literature examined here, the full range of different perspectives and approaches begin to emerge.

In the early 1990s, the study and understanding of the sub-field of intelligence liaison as a whole was still in the early stages of development. This was especially so when compared to the studies of particular intelligence communities themselves that had been published. Therefore, the sub-field’s ability to impart substantial ‘knowledge’ and even suggest policy-orientated solutions was arguably distinctly minimal. In the autumn of 1990, US national security scholar Jeffrey T. Richelson helped to address the dearth of understanding. He accomplished this by examining when intelligence liaison takes place. A more ‘substantive’ sub-school was emerging in the ‘characterisation’ school of literature. In his article, Richelson takes a general approach to examining intelligence liaison, by drawing upon several different intelligence liaison relationships. This article serves as a useful introduction into the major themes relating to intelligence liaison, through particularly introducing ‘types’, as well as potential ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’.

Shortly afterwards, articles by US authors Arthur Hulnick and James Wirtz were also published. They, too, added valuably to the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school. All these early-Post-Cold War works can be seen as relatively pioneering, as they focussed more specifically and systematically on intelligence liaison as a sub-field of intelligence studies. They also provided more of a contemporary perspective and some future insights, albeit dominated by the US angle. This stands in contrast to being overwhelmingly historical in their focus, or else involving mere fleeting references to intelligence liaison – those that are scattered more widely and buried in general intelligence studies texts or various memoirs, such as in Joseph Burkholder Smith’s Portrait of a Cold Warrior and Ray S. Cline’s Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA. We might add that especially others ‘in-the-know’ do not always universally welcome these exposés.
Hulnick’s article is a useful contribution to the literature. It brings to the fore the importance of intelligence liaison and asks the question of ‘what next for intelligence liaison?’ in the wake of the Cold War. It can also be identified as an early contribution from a US intelligence practitioner, providing an analysis from an ‘insider’ perspective. Moreover, it arguably provides some authoritative testimony in the general spirit of the ‘greater openness of US society with regard to intelligence matters.’ As a result of his position as an intelligence officer, Hulnick is naturally unable to confirm or deny or reveal inner, classified and detailed specifics. Instead he only reveals essentially generic insights into intelligence liaison and its associated concerns. In the article, Hulnick articulates the wider and very public prevailing concerns of the time, those of the early-Post-Cold War era and their arguably disproportionate fascination with matters of ‘economic espionage’. He begins to address the controversial issue of ‘friends spying on friends’. Once the Soviet/Communist threat of the Cold War era had eroded and before the plethora of more pressing amorphous Post-Cold War era security concerns had filled up agendas by the mid-1990s onwards, Peter Schweizer noted that economics had become the new focus of concern: ‘Economic strength is increasingly seen by US officials as a critical measure of national power and an important determinant of national security…’ and, raising the theme of ‘friends spying on friends’, he argued that: ‘Espionage between friends is likely to continue to grow as long as economics is seen as an aspect of national security because technology is becoming the new determinant of national power.’

Wirtz’s article is similarly a helpful contribution to this new wave of literature. It partly addresses how the intelligence community will adjust to the new context of the Post-Cold War era. This was then an issue of much concern, especially within intelligence communities, as Cold War budgets and staffing levels were being heavily cut. He also provides some further insights into the complexities of intelligence liaison and into a few of the controversies it can engender, especially at the domestic level. The constraints these can impose upon the modus operandi of intelligence agencies in the future are simultaneously presented. These issues are still very relevant and resonate today. This is amid the concerns surrounding the use of intelligence material obtained by ‘intensive/enhanced interrogation’ techniques, alleged to be ‘torture’, and through the use of ‘extraordinary rendition’ tactics. By focussing more closely on the domestic constraints on intelligence collaboration, he can explore this dimension of intelligence liaison in some greater depth than the previous authors, who adopted more of a general approach. In the process, the related question of how far such modus operandi can be opportunistically exploited is also valuably suggested. He concludes that: ‘intelligence collaboration is no
...[particularly guarding] against the domestic political backlash that cooperative arrangements can generate... if uncovered. Again, another insight is offered into why this area of intelligence continues to be shrouded in intense secrecy, as well as why the maintenance of caution is essential, especially when dealing with ‘unsavoury’ intelligence partners. Later, in 2002, UK scholar Richard Aldrich raised this last theme vividly in an article on ‘dangerous liaisons’ during the ‘War on Terror’ (see below).

During 1996, the subfield of intelligence liaison was more fully established. In that year, there were two significant publications: (i) H. Bradford Westerfield’s article ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’ and (ii) a chapter examining ‘intelligence cooperation’ in a book by retired UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman. Both these works can be seen as adopting ‘functional’ approaches, and emphasise that intelligence liaison is more akin to a business relationship, where the role of sentiment is less stressed. They can also be seen as early, although limited, attempts to theorise intelligence liaison. These texts similarly extended the quality of texts that can be seen as appropriately belonging to the ‘substantive’ vein of the ‘characterisation’ school. In this manner, together with their sustained analysis of liaison, they contributed significantly to the further enhancement of the overall body of literature examining intelligence liaison.

From the outset, Westerfield makes more of a concentrated attempt than the previous authors to define ‘liaison’ clearly and precisely. This aids subsequent analysis efforts, as well as our understanding of intelligence liaison as more of a distinct phenomenon. He also notes the under-studied status of liaison, and emphasises its importance. Significantly, he identifies and lists eight ‘forms and risks of liaison collaboration’, which, though by no means exclusive, helps the process of starting to ‘codify’ and categorise the different characteristics of liaison more precisely than earlier works. Westerfield also briefly touches upon the contemporary concern of ‘liaison and “spying on friends”’, playing down the role of sentiment in his analysis. In his conclusion, Westerfield notes that international intelligence liaison is essentially a form of ‘secret international relations’ and captures a significant, yet at times overlooked, feature of intelligence liaison, namely that it: ‘...deserves attention as an important component of all parts of a broad spectrum of policy instruments, except open diplomacy.’ However, Westerfield’s article is constrained by the process of merely listing the ‘functions’ of liaison. These are only partially helpful when trying to explain comprehensively the fuller question of why intelligence liaison occurs. The what and how dimensions are effectively explained in some detail, but in this article, Westerfield goes no further than supplying a superficial insight into the underlying and deeper rationale for American
intelligence liaison. This article provides the closest we have to a ‘definition’ of liaison, although it is more akin to a functional typology. Therefore, while a good starting point, further efforts are required to expand upon his findings.  

Similarly to Westerfield, Herman’s analysis of intelligence liaison has some discernable shortcomings. While undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the literature, it does lack some dimensions of intelligence liaison. These deserve to be explored. Other than reference to ‘intangibles’, most notably absent appears to be an explicit exploration of the dimension of sentiment, personal relations and bonhomie. Undeniably, these do have a role to play in intelligence liaison, particularly when it is considered in its most ‘informal’ incarnation. Although, to what extent does vary according to circumstances, and - similarly to when analysing the impact of cultural factors - is difficult to evaluate precisely, and so remains extensively debated.

Instead, Herman highlights the easier to capture and more ‘formal’ business relationship characteristic, even deploying the vernacular of business. He comes to a conclusion that: ‘For most powers – including even the US superpower – part of the national intelligence effort is the *quid pro quo* for what is received from partners and clients.’ Aspects of this conclusion would later be echoed and explored partially further by the more recent work of Lefebvre and Clough in 2003 and 2004 (see below).

Herman continues his evaluation of intelligence liaison with the assertion that: ‘Cooperation with foreign agencies is often rooted in historical links [as explored by the historical bodies of work on intelligence liaison] and other intangibles, but there is usually a bottom line of national professional-technical self-interest. Overseas liaisons are ultimately sets of professional bargains…’

This observation also suggests that intelligence is a product or commodity which can be traded through the carefully negotiated business-like intelligence liaison. Also, unlike Westerfield, according to UK scholar Martin S. Alexander, the theme of ‘economic and industrial intelligence and spying upon friends… is fascinatingly and strikingly absent…’ However, it can equally be argued that Herman and his contribution were unusually ‘ahead of the curve’ of the rest of the existing literature. His contribution appears to be more focussed on the plethora of ‘higher’ Post-Cold War security concerns that were beginning to bite by the mid-1990s. This included the very real prospect of WMD terrorism, vividly witnessed with the Tokyo underground Sarin attack in 1995.

By 1998, more of a descendant ‘critical’ school was beginning to emerge from the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school of literature. Martin S. Alexander *et al.*, focussed more specifically and systematically on the ‘friends spying on friends’ dimension of intelligence liaison. This was a theme more briefly dealt with in some
of the earlier work.\textsuperscript{69} Alongside his own useful survey of the literature in this subfield, Alexander declares that: ‘a major objective of the present collection is to promote the examination and understanding of what may still reasonably be termed the “missing dimension to the missing dimension”’.\textsuperscript{70} Here, a ‘French school’, namely an additional and ‘French perspective’ on liaison, consisting of Le Goyet, is identified.\textsuperscript{71} This helps to bring into the discussion on intelligence liaison more under-considered ideas. The perhaps often overlooked role of military/defence attachés is brought in by the ‘French perspective’, reminding us that intelligence liaison is multifaceted and considerably more than the commonly assumed links solely at the intelligence agencies’ level.\textsuperscript{72} Another interesting insight is provided into the plethora of conceptual problems - ‘…is intelligence collection and assessment against one’s friends and allies mostly subsumed in activities that would not be immediately considered intelligence as such?’\textsuperscript{73}, and thus lower on intelligence agency agendas? There is also substantial consideration of several methodological problems that challenge researchers studying in this sub-field of intelligence studies - notably concerning a lack of sources to trace, and the consideration that those that do exist are less likely to be declassified.\textsuperscript{74}

The early years of the twenty-first century have seen the proliferation of literature on intelligence liaison. This mirrors the exponential growth in intelligence liaison witnessed after the 9/11 attacks and during the ‘War on Terror’. Significantly, the authors of the more recent articles agree that intelligence liaison is important, echoing the earlier authors’ assertions. There is also a consensus that further intelligence liaison is needed to help tackle the global security challenges. They also add that there already is, and that there is likely going to be into the future, quantitatively more intelligence liaison taking place. However, they add that vigilance simultaneously needs to be maintained.\textsuperscript{75} In terms of schools of literature focussed on UK-US intelligence interactions, within the ‘critical’ school, a sub-school that can be readily described as being ‘advocate/optimistic’ in its reflective nature was now beginning to flourish.

Towards the end of 2002, a substantial addition to this latter dimension of the literature emerged. There was the publication of a short but wide-ranging article on intelligence liaison by Richard J. Aldrich in the \textit{Harvard International Review}.\textsuperscript{76} He begins by highlighting that: ‘intelligence alliances are often highly secretive and consequently poorly understood…’, and, through adopting a critical approach, he cautions that some of the post-9/11 intelligence alliances during the ‘War on Terror’ could be considered ‘dangerous liaisons’.\textsuperscript{77} This arose as ‘September 11 blurred the boundaries between friends and enemies even more, as Western agencies have now teamed up with unlikely partners…’ Aldrich conveys a substantial contemporary
perspective on and evaluation of post-9/11 intelligence alliances, as well as attempting to look beyond the intense secrecy surrounding them. He concludes with: ‘Perhaps the world of intelligence alliances constitutes a place where ideas and knowledge have real power and where cooperative exchange has always been viewed as a public good.’ In the process, the potential value of greater intelligence liaison is emphasised, while simultaneously reminding us of the potential pitfalls. This article is a further significant development in the literature as it offers the first attempt to connect intelligence liaison with international relations (IR) theory. Intelligence liaison as consisting of a ‘duality’ of ‘realism’ and ‘liberal institutionalism’ is posited.

Alongside, former Canadian defence analyst Stéphane Lefebvre’s article published in 2003 further adds to expanding the ‘critical’ yet ‘advocate/optimistic’ dimensions of the literature. Similarly to the former Director General of the British Security Service (MI5), Sir Stephen Lander, and other authors writing on contemporary issues in the intelligence liaison sub-field, he stresses that the nature of al-Qaeda and the related global security threats ‘implies that their detection, disruption, and elimination can succeed fully if done globally.’ He, too, emphasises that ‘although intelligence liaison activities are rarely discussed, their importance needs to be recognised.’ Overall, Lefebvre provides another detailed contemporary insight into intelligence liaison. He demonstrates that writing on this topic has now matured sufficiently to start allowing the tabling of viable policy-orientated solutions. His article concludes by highlighting that international intelligence liaison - in both bilateral and multilateral forms - will be deployed widely during the ‘War on Terror’, while: ‘the key for US intelligence agencies, as well as for other agencies involved in the worldwide fight against terrorism, will be to find the right quid pro quo…’

In 2004, the ‘advocate/optimistic’ vein of the ‘critical’ school was enhanced further. Building on Lefebvre’s contribution, Canadian intelligence scholar Martin Rudner’s article took this approach further. He enhances the literature by raising the little considered ‘question of probity’, hinting at the often absent theme of intelligence liaison oversight and accountability. He additionally emphasises a core paradox that continually vexes intelligence liaison, namely that ‘the secrecy that cloaks intelligence cooperation can also pose dilemmas for national sovereignty and cooperative security’. This manifests itself particularly during the critical times when transparency is needed, not least to facilitate the successful sharing and exchange of information and intelligence. Throughout the article, in great depth, Rudner focusses specifically on one of the key contemporary rationales for intelligence liaison: namely the hunt for al-Qaeda and related jihadist terrorist
groups. He concludes by tabling the ‘Asymmetric Warfare Risk Paradigm... [which is seen as] especially conducive to international cooperation...’ In the process, he presents an effective tool for helping conceptualise the ways intelligence liaison can address the security problems currently faced. Rudner also exposes other forms of international intelligence liaison arrangements. The multilateral level is disaggregated, distinguishing between those and other more ‘plurilateral’ arrangements. This serves to highlight further the levels of complexity of the several overlapping and intricately intertwined international intelligence liaison arrangements that currently exist.

The ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school in the literature meanwhile received a further contribution. In an article in the July 2004 issue of *International Affairs*, Aldrich presented another argument worthy of consideration. He argued that despite the acute importance of intelligence liaison, ‘transatlantic intelligence cooperation continues to present awkward challenges... because there is a fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world ... and highly compartmentalised national intelligence-gathering...’, which ultimately slows down the process of greater intelligence liaison. In his conclusion, Aldrich also underlines the acute significance and relevance of intelligence liaison today. He highlights why it needs to be better understood, and why it deserves further attention from scholars adopting a contemporary approach, including those who are more willing to battle the methodological challenges. Simultaneously, he questions whether greater sharing of intelligence between states generates convergent policy. This effect is often assumed by politicians, but does not appear to be born out in practice.

The impact of the European dimension on UK-US intelligence liaison is noteworthy. Contemporaneously with and partly due to the European Parliamentary inquiry into ‘ECHELON’, there were some UK-US-Europe tensions concerning UK-US intelligence liaison. These were exposed most starkly around 1999-2001. Some of these tensions were captured in the literature in UK researcher Charles Grant’s *Intimate Relations*. Grant highlighted a key dilemma: the UK’s European or US dimension thwarting the other, in an ‘either/or’ manner. Furthermore, Grant argued that officials essentially perceived that there was not a Europe or US ‘choice’ to be made by the UK: ‘But some continental officials are convinced that if Europe becomes a significant player in foreign and defence policy, Britain will eventually have to confront a painful strategic dilemma...’ He added woefully: ‘But, the British are too insouciant...’ Through such contributions, a ‘sceptical/pessimistic’ sub-school was beginning to be added to the increasingly emergent ‘critical’ school of literature drawing on the subject of UK-US intelligence liaison.
These important contributions to the literature on intelligence liaison are not alone. Complementing the various ‘outsider’ and ‘external’ contemporary perspectives are two further key articles. These emerged during the early years of the twenty-first century, and instead provided significant ‘insider’ contemporary perspectives. Again, both contributed to the contemporaneous general trend in the literature - that of further expanding the ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school.

Royal Navy Officer, Chris Clough’s central argument hangs on the phrase quid pro quo. This ‘...is often used within intelligence agencies to describe the exchange of information or analysis, implying perhaps that such exchanges are rarely even or equitable, but that mutual benefit will be gained over the length of a liaison.’ He also underscores the importance of intelligence liaison today, arguing that ‘international cooperation demonstrably plays an essential role in the targeting and analysis of common, multinational threats.’ Clough sees intelligence liaison as increasing in the future, but cautions that it is a double-edged sword. When compared to the work of the other contemporary authors explored, he appears to be somewhat more sceptical of both bilateral and multilateral intelligence arrangements, arguing that ‘the business of strategic intelligence will remain firmly wedded to national decision-making and military planning and operations.’

Clough’s article again refers to the familiar secrecy and methodological challenges of researching in the intelligence liaison sub-field. He then sets out to analyse strategic intelligence co-operation ‘from several perspectives.’ Overall in the article, however, the multiple beneficial ‘rationales’ for intelligence liaison particularly come through, notably when dealing with the ‘multinational threats’ of ‘global terrorism’ and ‘WMD’, as well as economic factors such as ‘the cost of modern technology’. Some of the costs of collaboration are additionally highlighted with ‘a few negatives’, while more co-operation is expected. This builds on his observation that ‘intelligence cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War and is likely to become more significant.’ When concluding he argues that ‘Intelligence relationships will continue to proliferate, in both depth and breadth, adding to the many potential benefits of liaison, but also increasing the possibility of compromise.’

Sir Stephen Lander, the non-executive chair of the UK Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the former DG of MI5 (1996-2002), similarly contributes a useful contemporary ‘insider’ perspective in his article. This contribution helps to reduce the imbalance of analyses being entirely dominated by an ‘external’ perspective and from being excessively academic. In his article, Lander stresses that ‘there is a poverty of accurate public comment about intelligence sharing (or the alleged lack of it)...’ He analyses international intelligence liaison from the ‘UK security professional’ perspective. To conclude, he makes a call for more and better
Western multilateral intelligence liaison arrangements, building on bilateral intelligence liaison arrangements: ‘I believe that the threats faced by the West are such that a step change in multilateral cooperation is necessary, at least on those issues of collective security where all are affected by the same threats.’ He also tables an interesting policy-orientated solution for enacting his call, a ‘new treaty for a new century’. Essentially, he proposes extending the UKUSA agreements to include other countries, notably those in Europe. The tone he adopts suggests one of ‘quiet optimism’ concerning future intelligence liaison developments.

Within the overall body of literature focussing on intelligence liaison generally, the ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school can be seen as being well on the ascendancy. Two further notable articles were published in the summer of 2006. Both focussed specifically on intelligence liaison. Again providing a strong US perspective, these articles were by US intelligence experts, Jennifer E. Sims and Derek S. Reveron. The first article, by Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, focusses specifically on international intelligence liaison, both the bilateral and multilateral varieties. With reference to the recent intelligence controversies surrounding 9/11 and supposed Iraqi WMD, and the associated problems and drawbacks observed with regard to intelligence liaison, she poses the question: ‘Is there reason for alarm, then, that experts continue to suggest that the principal means for augmenting U.S. intelligence collection on al-Qaeda should be enhanced reliance on liaison with foreign intelligence services?’ Her article sets out to explore that question. While building on the already existing literature on intelligence liaison, Sims attempts to go beyond it by offering a ‘framework… [to] help governments manage the costs, risks and gains of intelligence operations among states.’ She begins by providing a useful breakdown of the nature of the phenomenon. Again demonstrating how rapidly the literature on intelligence liaison has developed in recent years, especially in terms of being able to offer viable policy suggestions, Sims presents a section towards the end of her article offering ‘Recommendations for U.S. conduct of the War on Terror’. Similarly to other authors, she concludes by signalling a warning concerning the ‘disadvantages of sharing’. She also notes that: ‘… the US government needs to balance its dependency with a renewed commitment to collection assets in which it has a comparative advantage, such as space-based platforms, and new initiatives to develop unilateral human sources as well.’ Sims finishes by asserting the trend towards the greater, but not unbounded, sharing of intelligence.

Equally informative and educative is Reveron’s article. This also examines intelligence liaison in the ‘War on Terror’ context. His article and its contribution to
the literature, however, is much more focussed on practically assessing ‘the state of bilateral intelligence-sharing relationships and the challenges that need to be overcome.’ Together with his generic observations concerning intelligence liaison, throughout his article, he, too, asserts the importance of intelligence in efforts against terrorism, and scrutinises the central issue of ‘Relationship management’. In his analysis he provides insights into ‘technical details’, the physical mechanisms facilitating how the observed liaison takes place - such as the presence of the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) - as well as presenting the familiar overarching considerations. In his conclusion, Reveron rightly stresses the importance of ‘trust, but verify’ in intelligence liaison relationships. The powerful potential of well-adjusted intelligence liaison is additionally presented in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ context, where he notes: ‘…there will always remain “unknown unknowns,” but intelligence cooperation should be able to expose some of the unknowns.’ The idea of liaison as a constantly evolving work-in-progress in relation to its understanding and its use, as well as striking ‘right’ (optimised) balances in the highly intricate and complex trade-offs involved, is again suggested.

The upward trajectory of the ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school was not completely hegemonic, however. The work of Alasdair Roberts constituted a significant and distinctive contribution to the liaison literature in 2006. More specifically, it enhanced the range of texts figuring in the more ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school. In Roberts’ book, Blacked Out, chapter 6 on ‘Opaque Networks’ is especially useful to further understand international intelligence liaison, aspects of UK-US intelligence liaison, and the different types of networks that exist, such as defence networks. There is also a short subsection focussing on ‘International intelligence networks’. Although this subsection is less helpful for insights into the specific UK-US intelligence liaison relationship - as the focus is on Canada and the Arar case as an illustrative example of an international intelligence network in operation - it still helps to communicate the views and the interactions of a key UKUSA ally regarding the topic of intelligence sharing. Perceptively, he highlights the presence of ‘A new security architecture’ where: ‘...there undoubtedly is a new global architecture – a new set of networks among national security and intelligence agencies – and this architecture includes a set of rules on the exchange of information that is intended to ensure that work within the networks cannot be easily observed by people or organizations outside the networks.’ This observation helps to feed into the arguments that the overall greater globalisation of intelligence in the twenty-first century is tangible. Simultaneously, the presence of the ‘accountability deficit’ as a burgeoning and negative parallel is re-emphasised.
These were among some of the themes that were raised slightly earlier in 2003 by Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, in their insightful book *Global Intelligence*. Herein the ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school of literature had received another valuable contribution. Although now seeming a little dated in places, overall this is an interesting concise background text. Within its pages, some time-honoured trends that are now expanding can be readily discerned. These include training activities and the growth of the private sector in intelligence and security related activities. Some of their conclusions, particularly ‘intelligence and accountability – bucking the trend?’ continue to resonate. These remain themes of enduring interest and relevance as the trade-offs charted continue to be acutely experienced and encountered. Indeed, due to its comprehensive scope, their book forms a useful introduction to the subject of the globalisation of intelligence, as well as elucidating some of the complex connections that exist. Accordingly, their text provides a valuable starting basis from which to develop some aspects of this study. The globalisation-related findings of this study can elaborate upon Todd and Bloch’s recent historical findings, drawing out some of the familiar and shared themes. Moreover, this allows for the facilitation of a greater in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison and its lower levels, including the impact of globalisation on intelligence.

Research monographs or specific case study texts also come to the fore. They, too, can contribute significantly to the literature on UK-US intelligence liaison. These possess a narrower focus than the wider general studies, thus allowing the more comprehensive covering of specialist areas, such as intelligence. When these studies examine intelligence, normally the less emphasised aspects tend, and have the greater potential, to emerge in the overall analysis. Two recent studies on ‘peacekeeping intelligence’ can also be included in this category. Effective multinational intelligence liaison is essential in the peacekeeping context, and many practical lessons can be learnt from several episodes in the 1990s, such as Bosnia and Rwanda. Indeed, the globalised intelligence liaison required to tackle the global security concerns faces exactly the same challenges that peacekeeping intelligence has to confront. Therefore, much can be learnt from this area. Again contributing towards the ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school, in Dutch scholar Cees Wiebes’ study, a section of particular interest is focussed on ‘the problems surrounding intelligence liaison in Western intelligence services’. This catalogues some of the tensions involved in intelligence liaison relationships. A useful, concise mini-discussion of and introduction to UK-US intelligence liaison, such as where and how it takes place is included, together with identifying the key trends that are observed in the relationship, as well as drawing on some recent commentary and valuable confidential interviews he has conducted. Some of the disadvantages and limits of
intelligence liaison are highlighted: notably, the ‘reliability of the information from
the partner…’ and that ‘even within certain long standing intelligence alliances, such
as... UKUSA... not all intelligence is automatically shared.’ The issue of how
dependent the UK is on the US is also addressed, with the varying claims on this
debated issue being presented.

[4.1]: Turning the spotlight onto UK-US intelligence liaison:
The literature that focusses more specifically and in greater depth on UK-US
intelligence liaison will now be briefly discussed. Here the literature is sparser.
Significantly, many of the detailed, scholarly studies are mainly historical in nature.
In 1990, contributing to the then burgeoning ‘substantive-characterisation’ school of
literature, the few key texts that had pioneered the more specific addressing of the
UK-US intelligence liaison relationship could be counted on one hand. These
essentially included: US journalist James Bamford’s The Puzzle Palace, published in
1982; a working paper by Professor Andrew from 1987; and US national security
scholar Jeffrey T. Richelson and Australian national security scholar Desmond Ball’s
The Ties that Bind, which was just running to a second edition. It is worth noting
that by 1998 Aldrich could still claim without exaggeration - even despite the work
of these ‘usual suspects’ in any bibliography focussing on UK-US intelligence
liaison - that: ‘... our present understanding of ... [British] intelligence “liaison”
with the United States in the postwar period leaves much to be desired.’ Since
then, this particular ‘gap’ has been addressed. This has been accomplished directly
with historical work allowing greater and more holistic insights into UK-US
intelligence liaison in the past. In part, the Post-Cold War opening of archives in
London, Washington and Moscow has facilitated this development.

Other texts have some more distinct limitations. This consideration concerns
those that focus more specifically and in greater depth on UK-US intelligence liaison,
and which can be well sited within the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school.
Arguably they have become somewhat outdated by rapid developments during the
Post-Cold War era, or are texts whose ‘accuracy’ has been challenged. For example,
Hulnick in footnote ‘9’ of his article questions Ball and Richelson’s detailed book on
UK-US intelligence liaison, The Ties That Bind: ‘Readers should note that ... citations
are drawn from such spurious sources as the Covert Action Information Bulletin, a
vehicle for disinformation about US intelligence, as well as from other authors whose
anti-CIA biases are well known.’ UK Eyes Alpha by the BBC journalist Mark
Urban - which also draws heavily on the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship
for examples – has also been subject to some scepticism from intelligence
professionals concerning some of the conclusions drawn. How much faith, then, should be put into some of the more dramatic arguments made in the book, including: ‘More than anything else, British intelligence is a system for repackaging information gathered by the USA...’? For GCHQ this might be true, but further supporting evidence for such claims thus has to be garnered from elsewhere.

More recent additions to the literature in this area include US scholar Patrick Radden Keefe’s book, *Chatter*, which focusses on the UKUSA SIGINT (signals intelligence) dimension of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, and UK journalist Michael Smith’s books *The Spying Game* and *Killer Elite.* The ‘added value’ of both Keefe’s book and those of Smith is that these works make an effort to bring more up-to-date, in an in-depth form, the reader’s understanding of the contemporary UK, US and UKUSA intelligence worlds, as well as charting their historical origins.

The limitations with all these works can be readily illustrated, however. For example, when reading about the SIGINT relationship, a key question always presents itself regarding how up-to-date, accurate and insightful is the material divulged? Being aware of the plethora of exceedingly rapid developments in the computer, information technology (IT) and communications (ICT) sectors over the last few decades does nothing to assuage the doubts. Yet, at least arguably an element of credibility is present in these works. Current ICT systems and architectures tend to be derived from earlier incarnations, and adhere to the same or similar underlying thinking, in turn often shared by at least some segments of wider and open society as a whole. Perhaps more of a moot point is to what extent is what we know about SIGINT what we have been fed by the SIGINT intelligence agencies themselves, in order to preserve at least an aura of secrecy? While the exact accuracy of these contributions to the literature is thus questionable, on balance they can still be seen as having some use and value. They do offer some reflection of various framings of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. The wealth of diverse sources consulted by these studies, the range of interviews conducted, the interview content provided, and the insights offered into the many methodological problems encountered when undertaking these types of studies, have their utility. They also boast sufficiently harmonisable narratives and readings of history, as well as clarifying to the reader the limiting parameters with which these often self-aware studies have to contend. In short, these texts provide the researcher with useful ‘leads’, which can then be followed up in their own study.

On the whole, however, for a more contemporary insight into UK-US intelligence liaison during the late-1990s to date, that void is still waiting to be filled, with much that needs to be critically examined. For this more contemporaneous
period, we are currently pretty much limited to relying on the snippets and references that refer to UK-US intelligence liaison. These appear scattered in the more general works on intelligence liaison, such as those discussed above, or are those surfacing in the articles and revelations that feature in the media and recent retirees’ memoirs.  

When surveying the specialist literature on intelligence liaison relationships, historical writing dominates over contemporary writing. Albeit being assuaged, this trend of historical-study supremacy was also highlighted in Hulnick’s article (examined above in [4.0]). This parallels the methodological restrictions challenging more contemporary analyses. As he observed: ‘…detailing more than the historical record is difficult indeed… the [more contemporary] literature becomes somewhat less authoritative…’ Hulnick also noted that: ‘In the literature on intelligence, the material concerning relations between services in the West has almost always come from outside observers rather than from professionals.’

Today, there is at least a partial addressing of these concerns. We do have more of a discernable, and increasing, insider view, recently and gradually coming through in the literature. This is thanks to the valuable contributions from former and serving professionals and practitioners - such as those above from Sir Stephen Lander, the former DG of MI5, Commander Chris Clough of the Royal Navy - and especially from the books and articles by Michael Herman, formerly of GCHQ and a former Secretary to the JIC. Further ‘insider views’ regarding UK-US intelligence liaison, helping to remedy the overall balance, can be gleaned directly from ‘primary’ source material. This includes from the UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s (ISC) reports, available via the Cabinet Office website. Significantly, these allow the reader an insight into the more rarely seen valuable views and attitudes of intelligence ‘consumers’ and ‘customers’.

Also, today, an authoritative, contemporary perspective and approach can be seen as considerably more viable. Recent events in international affairs and factors related to the rapid increasing of globalisation and technological developments (writ large) have helped. These include: the Internet, a greater role for OSINT (open source intelligence), and a hand-in-glove trend towards increasing openness in all areas of government and society as a whole - including, for example, the UK’s Waldegrave Initiative on Open Government from the early 1990s - which have all contributed towards eroding some of the methodological restrictions.

An array of further observations can be tabled. The perspectives and approaches on intelligence liaison in the major literature, drawing on the work above, are undoubtedly Western dominated. Additionally, within the ‘Western’ category, these are UK-US/‘Anglo-Saxon’ dominated and orientated, and within that
nexus the US perspective predominates. An exception to this trend, a ‘French perspective’, does come through during the examination of the issue of ‘friends spying on friends’. This suggests that a wealth of other countries’ perspectives, thinking, conceptualisation and knowledge of intelligence liaison – not least those from other European countries and the rest of the world, such as South East Asia – is yet to be tapped and to make it into the mainstream English-language literature on intelligence liaison. For example, what do the world’s most populous countries of China or India think and suggest? As the globalisation of intelligence emerges as a response to the current global security concerns, considerably more ‘globalisation’ of the literature on intelligence liaison needs to take place in parallel.

[5.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison as portrayed in fiction and popular culture

From the fiction and ‘popular culture’ medium, much can be garnered. Some former ‘official’ and ‘insider’ viewpoints (or at least their derivatives) can be discovered, offering useful insights into the murky world of intelligence liaison. A wider public audience than the specialist non-fiction literature on this topic reaches can then access those insights. Notably, much of this work has an informed basis in reality. This is particularly valuable vis-à-vis the intelligence world where reality and facts, fantasy and fiction all become inextricably intertwined, further emphasising the utility of this genre. This scenario is especially apparent if the work by the prominent spy-writers - John le Carré, Graham Greene and Ian Fleming – is examined.

Some substantive insights can be attained through analysing the ‘serious’ spy fiction of John le Carré, Graham Greene and, to a lesser extent, Ian Fleming. This is particularly the case concerning the subject of UK-US intelligence liaison, where source material can be difficult to access due to the presence of the many methodological challenges. The ‘serious’ spy fiction and popular culture genre shares several key themes that are found within the non-fiction literature on intelligence liaison. The themes can also be seen as being highlighted at least as effectively in spy fiction. The key themes tabled and examined by le Carré, Greene, and (at least at times, differently) by Fleming, include: the issues of duplicity between allies and ‘friends spying on friends’, the central importance of trust in the UK-US relationship, and the decline of the UK’s postwar world position in the ‘End of Empire’ context.

Significantly, these three authors had direct insider experience of the British intelligence world, and by association intelligence liaison, which they could draw upon. Both le Carré and Greene spent some time in MI6, and Fleming was in Naval Intelligence at Bletchley Park during the Second World War. Fleming arguably had the most extensive experience vis-à-vis UK-US intelligence liaison, as he, so notes
Thomas Price, ‘had a role in the creation of the American OSS [Office of Strategic Services, a precursor to the CIA during the Second World War].’ Often their insights are well-informed, with quite substantial roots in and reflections of ‘actual-reality’. The insights frequently range from referring to or echoing familiar episodes in actual history, to drawing upon the author’s own personal experiences of the British intelligence world. They also draw upon the past and contemporary wider socio-political and international affairs contexts surrounding them for plot inspiration.

Le Carré effectively draws the reader’s attention to the centrality of so-called ‘intangibles’ or ‘personal factors’. These exist at the lower/micro ‘operational/tactical’ and ‘individual (as professional)/personal’ levels of analysis and relations. Notably, the ‘intangibles’ or individually experienced ‘personal factors’ are often overlooked and are difficult to encompass in the non-fiction literature on this topic. Le Carré, too, captures the central importance of the key themes that constantly or repeatedly feature prominently in UK-US intelligence relations. He effectively portrays the decline of the UK’s world position and power during the post-Second World War ‘End of Empire’ context. He rolls out from a range of perspectives, and through different attitudes, how the UK deals with this shift vis-à-vis the Americans, and equally vice versa. Throughout, le Carré’s portrayals of UK-US relations are assignable to the positions of ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’.

Similarly to le Carré, Graham Greene taps into such key themes. However, the contrasts between the UK and US are particularly articulated. In The Quiet American, the ‘realists’ are juxtaposed opposite the ‘idealists’. There is the interplay between the practice-experienced, ‘old’, colonial and ebbing powers versus the naïve, book-inspired, inexperienced, rising ‘new’ power. Greene, too, exposes some of the operational parameters and limits of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. This is notably in Our Man in Havana. The positions of ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’ are especially laid bare in Greene’s exploration of UK-US intelligence liaison relations.

Meanwhile, Ian Fleming in the James Bond novels tends to be more celebratory of UK-US intelligence relations (than both le Carré and Greene). The importance of the presence of close friendship within the UK-US partnership with the oft teaming up of Bond and his CIA counterpart Felix Leiter is highlighted. The positions of ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ in UK-US intelligence relations are particularly pronounced in Fleming’s novels.

There is some mileage in the famous cliché ‘art imitating reality and reality imitating art’. As illustrated here, this is especially apparent when looking at Anglo-American intelligence liaison relations and its portrayal in the knowledgeable fiction.
and ‘popular culture’ medium. As Christopher Hitchens states: ‘it is difficult to think of any more harmonious a collusion between unequals, or any more friendly rivalry, than that existing between the American and British “cousins” [during the Second World War]… It is the foundation of James Bond’s husky comradeship with Felix Leiter, and of numerous if slightly more awkward episodes in the works of John le Carré.’

How much mileage, and diversions there are along the route, is, of course, more of a moot point. William Hood highlights the complicating query ‘how [could] an outsider … possibly distinguish the realistic and informed espionage novels from the hundreds of adventure stories tarted up as spy books[?]’ In addressing this query, the respondent declares that ‘“Casual readers … and others seeking plausible espionage fiction will find that an occasional whiff of drudgery and a touch of humour are the most reliable bench marks of realism…”’ – two features particularly detectable in the works of both John le Carré and Graham Greene.

Collectively, the fiction and ‘popular culture’ medium reminds us of the often close and difficult to unpack blending of fact, fiction and fantasy in the ‘real’ world of intelligence. From examining their fiction, the created versions of ‘actual-reality’ that are portrayed as ‘virtual-reality’ or ‘alternative-reality’ emerge. The continuation of a close relationship to at least some elements of readily recognisable ‘actual-reality’ is essential to maintain at least a hint of plausibility. This technique helps to continue to engage rather than alienate the reader. Gravitas and authority is lent to the writing. Alongside some escapism, readers are given more of an intellectual challenge, while the ‘serious’ spy fiction also allows for a more refined ‘suspension of disbelief’. Ample opportunities for encouraging (even provoking) in-depth reflection on intense philosophical, moral and ethical questions - such as regarding trust and betrayal - are simultaneously provided.

Ultimately, however, considerable heuristic value is provided by the novels and by their associated observations. Through the novels, the alert researcher and reader are assisted to access domains where documents in archives tend not to be so effective. This is especially the case in relation to the ‘intangibles’. Examining the genre of ‘serious’ spy fiction significantly complements the adoption of an archival approach, and a more sophisticated and holistic understanding of the intelligence world and the nature of intelligence liaison can be attained.

[6.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison in the media

Analysis of media material can be similarly useful. Not least, it reaches a wider audience than the other mediums of literature hitherto explored. Here, there appear
to be two main types of writing on, or coverage of, intelligence liaison. Firstly, there are fleeting references in general articles by ‘generalist’ journalists, whose reports and commentary tend to be press release or newswire led and dominated, and which, in their managed condition, rarely reveal anything substantial (reflective of the ‘superficial-characterisation’ school present in the literature); and secondly, more in-depth and reflective reports by ‘specialist’ journalists (which are more akin to belonging to the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school). In both quantitative and qualitative terms, this last group provide more useful information, offering some distinct added value. Thus they provide the public with greater insights into intelligence liaison, and into all its complexities, as well as the controversies it can engender. Notably the majority of these specialist articles focus on the SIGINT dimension of intelligence liaison. This is where the largest exchange of intelligence, in the form of vast quantities of data, takes place. The other dimensions of intelligence liaison, such as concerning the especially highly sensitive and closely guarded HUMINT dimension, are covered even more rarely.

Six key journalists specialising in security, intelligence and defence issues appear to stand out in the UK media. They are: Michael Smith, Richard Norton-Taylor at The Guardian, Mark Huband at The Financial Times, and Mark Urban, Frank Gardner and Gordon Corera at the BBC. Also, both Smith and Corera’s writing relating to intelligence liaison has recently featured in more specialist publications, such as Jane’s Intelligence Review. Meanwhile, in the US media, journalists who focus on security, intelligence and defence issues and who particularly standout include, Dana Priest and Walter Pincus of The Washington Post, Douglas Jehl of The New York Times, and Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff and Michael Hirst of Newsweek. All of these journalists have good access to sources from the various intelligence communities they examine, helping to convey some more contemporary insider insights. To what extent media outlets determine the journalists’ outlook on the topic of intelligence liaison appears to be more of a debatable issue and, again like the influence of cultural factors, difficult to measure, at least within the confines of this study.

In the general media coverage the writing on UK-US intelligence liaison again tends to be very thin and superficial. This is often the case in an era of a rapid turnover of 24/7 news, which is fleetingly very much ‘in the moment’, rather than tending to be more reflective. Writing of this type can also be subject to propaganda, mis-/disinformation, psychological/information (management) operations pressures, more commonly known as ‘spin’. Similarly to the general studies of Anglo-American relations, the general media coverage mainly imparts - to varying degrees of quality and hence accuracy - the ‘standard’ generic information that: (1)
UK-US intelligence liaison exists; (2) it is vitally important; and (3) it is very close; and (4) that it does not always go smoothly; and (5) that it can have some drawbacks, thus triggering some ambiguity and vigilance. The general media coverage strengths can be recognised where revelations surface and there is an attention grabbing ‘news flash’ or ‘heads-up’ relating to a particular intelligence liaison development. This then allows the ‘specialists’ to later explore that ‘lead’ further in their own more investigative research.

Ultimately, for a deeper analysis and more of a valuable and ‘faithful’ insight into intelligence liaison from the media, it is necessary to refer to the more specialist articles. These are often by the ‘specialist’ journalists identified above. It is also worth consulting the material that features in the more specialist publications, such as in Jane’s Intelligence Review.

[7.0]: Concluding observations

To conclude, generalisations regarding the literature on intelligence liaison are difficult to make. This is due to the haphazard development of and the fragmented nature of writing on this subject. This in turn reflects the multifaceted and highly complex intelligence liaison phenomenon. However, some observations can be confidently presented.

It is quickly apparent that rather than being undertaken more by ‘generalists’, the most revealing literature on intelligence liaison is by ‘specialists’, ‘experts’ and intelligence liaison ‘connoisseurs’. These include the academics and journalists specialising in the intelligence studies field, as well as the former and serving intelligence practitioners and professionals who have experience of the phenomenon. As a consequence, this area is still mostly confined to a specialist niche position and is still in what can be regarded as the early stages of: (i) breaking through into the mainstream of intelligence studies; (ii) being connected to international relations; and also, in the specific case of UK-US intelligence liaison, (iii) breaking through into the field of general Anglo-American relations studies.

In addition, the material examined can be characterised as being diverse. It is on a spectrum that ranges from the general, at times imparting only superficial insights, to the opposite extreme – namely having more constrained parameters and dealing with only certain aspects of intelligence liaison. This extensive range of output results in a plethora of interpretations from many differing perspectives – a trend reinforced by the literature being difficult to ‘schoolify’ neatly. In short, the intelligence liaison literature can be best evaluated similarly to how the complex globalisation debates are codified. This is utilising a combination of horizontal and
vertical axes so that there is scope to capture the ‘complex co-existence plurality’, that is reflected across the literature when taken collectively. (See as illustrated in figure 3, below.) The vertical axis scale portrays the range from ‘hyper-globalists’ (or ‘advocates’) through to ‘hypo-globalists’ (or ‘sceptics’), while the horizontal axis scale represents the spectrum of ‘secret statecraft’ (or national self-interest) to ‘clandestine kinship’ (or collective interest) drivers. Corresponding schools of generic Anglo-American relations, and indeed even different international relations theories, can then be mapped over these.

Figure 3: Schools of International Intelligence Liaison Literature.

The ‘schoolification’ can be extended further. This can be accomplished by, firstly, disaggregating the diverse intelligence liaison literature into various groups. These are essentially determined according to what makes that text distinct, namely in the form of its overarching theme, main focus or approach - such as representing a ‘French perspective’, a ‘British perspective’, an ‘American perspective’, a ‘European perspective’, concentrating on the European dimension (a ‘European focus’), and highlighting UK-US interactions (a ‘UK-US focus’). Although probably not exclusive, these are the groups that appear to particularly stand out when the literature is taken as a whole. Indeed, the last group forms the focus of this literature review, and hence supplies the selection criteria for choosing which texts are examined in this chapter.
The groups can be further analysed. Within each of these respective groups, the ‘schools’ that can be most readily distinguished in their nature range from: (i) a school which has the prominent aim of ‘characterisation’ – this is where analyses in their impart tend towards being more ‘neutral’ and uncritically accepting of, or (if pioneering works) establish, various ‘orthodoxies’; to (ii) the ‘critical’ school. The ‘characterisation’ school can be further divided into the sub-schools of (i) ‘superficial’ and (ii) ‘substantive’. These are determined according to the depth and extent of insights provided to the reader. The texts within the ‘characterisation’ school tend to sit on, or at least in close proximity to, where the horizontal and vertical axes (as described above) cross one another.

The ‘critical’ school is where quantitatively the majority of the literature is sited. Again with reference to the above axes, the literature in this school is located in more polarised positions, demonstrating the distinct presence of particular interpretive slants. Qualitatively, the literature herein also has more of an ‘agenda’ to push, enabling the school to be further disaggregated into the sub-schools of ‘sceptics/pessimists’ and - albeit with a persistently strong cautious vein – ‘advocates/optimists’. Texts located within this last category lean towards being the more constructive of the two sub-schools in terms of their output. Reflecting the diversity and dynamism of the literature on intelligence liaison, some of the texts - such as Charles Grant’s Intimate Relations (see above [4.0]) - can be seen as suggesting at least a duality in terms of these various ‘schools’ and their sub-variants. Thus, frequently these texts are not confined to being placed in merely one group of intelligence liaison literature. For instance, this can be especially seen where Grant inclines to being ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ towards the UK-US intelligence link, while simultaneously leaning more towards being ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ vis-à-vis the European dimension.

Examining intelligence liaison more comprehensively and systematically, allowing for greater attempts at theorisation, would help advance rather more substantially and qualitatively our understanding. These processes would allow us to better understand intelligence liaison in all of its (dis)guises, as well as help us to comprehend the nature, full depth and breadth of the dynamics and politics behind the phenomenon. This would be particularly useful at this time when there is quantitatively more intelligence liaison taking place, and when more of this important phenomenon is needed in order to respond effectively to globalised security challenges. Indeed, this last significant point can be seen as one recognised and agreed upon by the authors of the more recent works in the field. This is regardless of their perspective and approach.
Arguably, the historical works on intelligence liaison still tend to dominate the field. However, more recently, further contemporary contributions can be seen to be gradually coming through and making more of an impact. The historical works tend to be better at conveying more of a holistic reflective perspective. Simultaneously, a more in-depth and inclusive picture of intelligence liaison and its closely interrelated, systemic attributes can be aided by the passage of time. This helps to erode some of the methodological constraints when researching in this area. The often highlighted methodological restrictions, together with some reluctance on the part of many scholars to confront those challenges, partly contributes towards the under-studied condition of the intelligence liaison sub-field. In addition, apart from rare in-depth scholarly books, such as Aldrich’s *The Hidden Hand*, the majority of recent analyses remain curtailed and short in nature, only appearing in article form, and then often hidden away in specialist intelligence journals, or featuring as a brief chapter buried in a book focussing on intelligence as a whole. Thus intelligence liaison and its coverage in greater depth persistently have a quantitatively low-volume and qualitatively low profile stature. This is also the case at times with some of the components/phenomena that collectively compose the intelligence liaison phenomenon. For instance, intelligence liaison is also a form of ‘covert action’. Scott and Jackson note: ‘Scholars have frequently ignored covert action in their analyses of intelligence. As Elizabeth Anderson has argued: “the specific subject of covert action as an element of intelligence has suffered a deficiency of serious study.”’

Another observation is that other previously witnessed trends are gradually eroding. Mainly since around the mid-1990s to date, the ‘one-sidedness’ of the field, previously dominated by external and academic writers, is breaking down. More internal, intelligence practitioner and professional writers have contributed to the overall body of work. In the process, the increasing of the insider perspective has had a beneficial effect of helping to correct the imbalances of the past. More recently from an official angle, albeit in a constrained manner, the UK ISC *Renditions* report of June 2007 discussed the UK’s international intelligence liaison relationships for the first time.

Drawing on the fiction literature and the portrayals of UK-US intelligence liaison in the popular culture medium is additionally helpful to further understanding. This genre provides us with some useful insights and perspectives - at times well-informed and with quite substantial roots in and reflections of ‘actual-reality’ - as well as reminding us of the often close and difficult to unpack blending of fact, fiction and fantasy in the world of intelligence. The fiction and popular culture medium also reaches a much wider audience than the specialist non-fiction literature, with the media in turn reaching an even more extensive and less specialist...
public readership. This helps to enhance its reach and - more debated - influence upon popular conceptions of intelligence liaison.

Concerning the closely associated phenomenon of ‘outreach’, again the literature appears to be very diffuse. Indeed, any fusion between intelligence and outreach currently appears to surface in official government produced information, those sources variously associated with government, and in the media, as a response to government-linked events. The fusion of intelligence and outreach appears to be more overlooked in the academic literature. Certainly this is an area rich for further exploration. At this juncture, perhaps the literature concerning outreach and intelligence is also less conscious of the full extent of the ramifications involved with such a fusion. Hence currently it barely goes beyond more surface observational analyses of the fact that outreach does occur in, and vis-à-vis, the realm of intelligence.¹⁶⁶

One symptom of the rise of international intelligence liaison has been a tangible accompanying expansion of the academic literature on this subject.¹⁶⁷ However, this recent wave of scholarship offers an almost exclusively empirical analysis of the exponential growth of intelligence liaison.¹⁶⁸ Therefore, our understanding of international intelligence liaison as a general phenomenon remains somewhat sparse, with deficiencies apparent in the realm of theory development.¹⁶⁹ This is puzzling when we consider that most other aspects of international co-operation have attracted considerable theoretical analysis. At least in a preliminary manner, this study seeks to address that imbalance. Moreover, this further work on international intelligence liaison needs to be given a higher and wider profile.

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2 See, for example, J. Kriendler, NATO Intelligence and Early Warning (Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre [CSRC], March 2006); ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO Advanced Research Workshop’, Report, The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence, St Antony’s College, Oxford (09-10 December 2005); see also ‘Intelligence and International Agencies’, chapter 5 in H. Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the Twenty-First Century (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000), pp.173-201.

3 See R.J. Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances’, Harvard International Review, 24, 3 (Fall, 2002); see also Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17.

4 H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, Intelligence and National Security, 11, 3 (July 1996), p.523; see also his earlier (ed.), Inside CIA’s Private World (Yale University Press, 1995) – particularly ‘The Sun never sets on liaison’, in the chapter on ‘Clandestinity’. (Some other references to ‘liaison’ can be found in the index of this book); see also the original text of ‘The Sun never sets on liaison’ in W.R. Johnson, ‘Clandestinity and Current Intelligence’, Studies in Intelligence, 20, 3 (Fall 1976), pp.56-59 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010019-1 (2005/01/26).


7 See Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-theorisation”’, p.34.


10 Quoted in Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence, p.27.


14 For an example of a comprehensive chapter on intelligence featuring in a mainstream security studies textbook, see Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, from p.248.


16 For a greater discussion of some of these issues, see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National Security (forthcoming, 2009).

17 See, for example, N. Paton Walsh, ‘Ambassador defends diplomat in spying row; British envoy hits back over Moscow transmitter; Putin to raise Russian allegations with Blair’, The Guardian (01 February 2006); see also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Police raid Riviera home of former MI6 officer’, The Guardian (29 June 2006), for a fleeting insight into SIS (MI6) training, including ‘“…courses for liaison officers from other friendly intelligence services.”’

18 See, for example, Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’.
19 See, for example, R. Godson (ed.), *Intelligence requirements for the 1990s: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); see also L.K. Johnson (ed.), *Handbook of Intelligence Studies* (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.v-vii; see also S.A. Taylor, ‘Counter intelligence failures in the USA’, chapter 18 in *ibid.*, pp.248-250 – for an example of the level where coverage of dimensions such as ‘co-operation’ figures in the Johnson volume – that is, more subsumed as a subsection in a chapter devoted to another leading intelligence theme.


21 See also URL: <http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/Page59.html#L> (accessed: 25/06/2008).

22 Scott and Jackson, ‘Chapter 1 – Journeys in Shadows’ in their (eds), *Understanding Intelligence*, p.20.

23 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.


27 See Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-theorisation”, pp.32-3; see also E.R. May’s comment made in 1993 that: ‘The revolution in intelligence scholarship, however, has been largely self-contained. It has not so far had much effect outside its own inner circle. Writing on intelligence rarely appears in other learned journals – even *Diplomatic History* and *World Politics*… There is clear need to make research on intelligence better known and better understood outside the company of intelligence specialists…’ – from E.R. May, ‘The importance of interchange: Studying and teaching intelligence’, *Studies in Intelligence* (c. 01-02 October 1993) – via URL: <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/May.html> (accessed: 02/01/2006). Although today (in 2008) such considerations are undoubtedly more effectively and systematically addressed, they still resonate to varying degrees, reflecting effectively the essentially haphazard nature of the overall addressing that has been observed above.


29 See, for example, Hollowell (ed.), *Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations*, p.192.


Goodman, ‘Intelligence Education: Studying and Teaching About Intelligence’.


For further explanation of these ‘schools’ see the ‘Conclusions’ section [7.0] of this chapter, below.

See, for example, as demonstrated in the *Preface [6.0]* and *Chapter 1: Introduction [10.0]* of this study, above.


See, for example, as discussed vis-à-vis Dumbrell above. For David Reynolds’ treatment of intelligence, see, for instance, Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”?’ , pp.4-5, p.9, pp.10-11, p.16 and p.18.


J. Burkholder Smith, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior* (New York: Putnam’s, 1976); R.S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976) – offers an account of early post-war (1950s) UK-US intelligence liaison by a US intelligence officer. Scattered references to (foreign) liaison can also be found throughout the formerly classified literature – see, for example, J.P. Dimmer, Jr (aka. F.M. Begoum), ‘Observations on the double agent’, *Studies in Intelligence*, 6 (Winter 1962) and his ‘You And Your Walk-In’, *Studies in Intelligence*, 6 (Spring 1962), particularly where he emphasised: ‘Know the liaison equities. Know the do’s and don’t’s with respect to the local foreign [liaison] service. How far can you go unilaterally, considering the liaison relationship? In what instances do we feel that we must tell them, and when would holding out fall within acceptable risk? This applies particularly in our larger stations that tend to be sectionalized: they may have an external liaison unit that deals with the local services and an internal unit working on other activities. The walk-in may come to this latter, not the one dealing with liaison. Does it know what the real equities are? Its initial handling may prejudice the liaison relationship and may hamper efficient subsequent handling of the walk-in.’ (pp.54-55) - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007).

See, for instance, the criticism of J. Burkholder Smith’s book, *Portrait of a Cold Warrior*, in a book review by D.S. Blaufarb, under heading ‘Intelligence Bookshelf… Current books of interest to intelligence buffs’ in *Periscope: Official Organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers*, 3, 2 (Summer 1977), p.4 – via CREST – CIA-RDP88-01315R000100480001-4 (2005/12/14) – particularly where he notes: ‘… The liaison services whose officers it identifies and whose operational activity it describes are also undoubtedly smarting. All of this can only harm the goal of an improved and tightened American intelligence service which the author claims to support…’


See, for example, footnote ‘10’ in Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, p.464 – where he states: ‘I must advise readers that the citations given relating to inter-service cooperation in no way suggest that I am confirming or denying any of the material contained therein.’

See Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’; see also, for an example of focus on economic espionage at this time, P. Schweizer, *Friendly Spies: How America's Allies are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our


52 Schweizer, Friendly Spies, p.30.

53 For more on these Post-Cold War cuts and their unhelpful impact on intelligence see, for example, G. Corera, Shopping for bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), pp.130-1.


55 ibid., p.95.

56 Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, pp.523-60.


58 See the definitions of liaison and intelligence liaison in the Introduction (Chapter 1 [3.0/5.0]) of this study, above.

59 Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, p.523.

60 ibid., p.524.

61 ibid., p.552.

62 See also J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19 (Summer, 2006), p.214, reference 8 – where she argues: ‘Westerfield’s definition is… unsatisfying, as it mixes motives and obscures the measures of value that must accompany any long-standing liaison relationship…’

63 For the difficulties of measuring the ‘cultural’ dimension, see, for example, S. Murden, ‘Introduction: culture in human affairs’ in his ‘Culture in world affairs’, chapter 24 in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2005 [3ed.]), p.540 – particularly where he notes: ‘Culture is … important to human beings… but using it as an analytical tool can be problematic. Culture is such a multifaceted concept that it may only be possible to apply it in rather vague and intuitive ways.’; see also A.I. Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19, 4 (Spring 1995), p.52 – where he argues: ‘One of the problems that has plagued cultural analysis, however, has been precisely the difficulty in determining the relationship of attitude to behavior.’; for more on ‘intelligence culture’ see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004), p.496 - ‘Theories of culture are… difficult to operationalise and test with any real degree of rigour.’; see also ‘C. People and Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence’, p.3.

65 Herman, ‘Intelligence cooperation’, chapter 12 in his *Intelligence Power*, p.218.
66 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.7. However, Herman does later draw on this theme in his section ‘Spying on friends?’ in his work, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in Scott and Jackson (eds), *Understanding Intelligence*, p.188.
68 See the journal *Intelligence and National Security*, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998), from p.1.
69 See Hulnick and Westerfield’s contributions discussed earlier.
70 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.2.
72 See also A. Vagts, *The Military Attaché* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). Later texts, such as M. Deflem, *Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation* (Oxford University Press, 2002), can also be cited here. These texts grant an insight into other ‘types’ of liaison, for example liaison between police forces.
73 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.8.
74 *ibid.*, p.5, p.7 and p.9.
75 See also, for example, ‘Intelligence Sharing: Prospective Risks, Potential Rewards’, chapter 5 in J.D. Ellis and G.D. Kiefer, *Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy* (John Hopkin’s University Press, 2004), pp.109-144.
76 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.
77 For an earlier treatment of this theme in the literature see the analysis of the article by J.J. Wirtz (Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’), above.
78 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.
79 Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’, p.527.
80 *ibid.*, p.528.
81 *ibid.*, p.537.
84 *ibid.*, p.223.
85 *ibid.*, p.195.
87 *ibid.*, p.752.
88 *ibid.*, pp.731-53.
C. Grant, ‘Intimate relations: Can Britain play a leading role in European defence - and keep its special links to US intelligence?’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper (April 2000).


See, for example, as cited in Chapter 1 of this study.

Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, pp.195-217.

ibid., p.195.

ibid., p.196.

See, for example, as cited in Chapter 1 of this study.

Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, p.208.

ibid., p.212.

ibid.

ibid., p.493; see also Aid, ‘All Glory is Fleeting’, pp.109-111.

Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, pp.195-217.

ibid., p.195.

ibid., p.453.

ibid., p.460.

ibid., p.468.

ibid., pp.127-149.

ibid., pp.135-8.

ibid., p.139; see also ibid., where he notes: ‘Amitai Etzioni has argued that patterns of cooperation among security and intelligence agencies born out of the “global war on terrorism” are now so routine and institutionalized that they can be described as “a new global architecture,… a de facto Global Antiterrorism Authority, formed, led, managed and largely financed by the superpower.” Etzioni is probably mistaken to put so much emphasis on the influence of the “war on terror”; there is good evidence that the movement toward this new “Authority” began soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union… There is also an aspect to this emerging “security architecture” that is overlooked by Etzioni. This architecture does not consist only of a thickening web of relationships between the security and
intelligence agencies of different countries. There is a domestic component as well.’; A. Etzioni, *From Empire to Community* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.103-9.


117 For example, the book was published before many of the various significant inquiries into 9/11 and supposed Iraqi WMD intelligence had reported.


119 *ibid.*, p.209.


123 Wiebes, *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia*, p.57.


125 *ibid.*, p.60.


129 Examples here include: R.J. Aldrich, *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (London: John Murray, 2001); sections on UKUSA and the UK in J. Richelson,


133 From private, non-attributable sources [e.g. u-26].

134 Urban, *UK Eyes Alpha*, p.286.


137 See, for example, the revelations contained within J. Gerstein, ‘Spies Prep Reporters on Protecting Secrets’, *The New York Sun* (27 September 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘Frustrated by press leaks about its most sensitive electronic surveillance work, the secretive National Security Agency convened an unprecedented series of off-the-record “seminars” in recent years to teach reporters about the damage caused by such leaks and to discourage reporting that could interfere with the agency’s mission to spy on America's enemies… Dubbed “SIGINT 101,” … the seminar was presented “a handful of times” between approximately 2002 and 2004…’

138 See Chapter 2 [2.1.iii] of this study for more details on sources.


140 See *ibid.*, pp.455-56.

141 See for example, UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), *Annual Report 1999-2000* (2000) - via URL: <http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm48/4897/4897-02.htm> (accessed: 10/2005). The insights provided by the ISC reports are, however, arguably limited and can be regarded as somewhat sanitised so that the report can be released into the public domain.


143 Indeed, as a beginning, some insights into what one Indian commentator on intelligence and intelligence liaison thinks can be garnered from sources, such as: B. Raman, former additional secretary in the Cabinet secretariat, Government of India, ‘The dangers of intelligence cooperation’, *rediff.com* (18 July 2002) and B. Raman, ‘When Spooks of the World Unite’, *rediff.com* (21 February 2003). For bodies of literature examining dimensions of European intelligence co-operation (and associated issues) – again not explored in this literature review in depth due to their main focus not being more directly orientated towards UK-US intelligence interactions – see, for example, some of the sources presented in the footnotes of A.D.M. Svendsen, ““On a continuum with expansion””

144 For further exploration of this issue in greater depth, including examples (not reproduced here) from the various spy fiction texts consulted, see A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Painting rather than photographing: Exploring the genre of spy fiction as a legitimate source concerning UK-US intelligence co-operation’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies (forthcoming: 2009). Some of the observations featuring in this section were also presented in a paper given by the author at the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA) Conference at the University of Dundee, Scotland, UK, in June 2006.

145 See the praise for John le Carré’s The Honourable Schoolboy, in a book review by D.S. Blaufarb, under heading ‘Intelligence Bookshelf… Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of the world scene. All reviews are by AFIO members’ in Periscope: Official Organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 3, 4 (Winter 1977), p.6 – via CREST – CIA-RDP88-01315R000100480001-4 (2005/12/14) – particularly where he notes: ‘Granted his sophistication and understanding of the mechanics of clandestine operations, his mastery of pace and setting, therein is the real secret of Le Carré’s superiority. A pity he choses [sic.] to depict the American “cousins” of SIS (i.e., CIA) with a lack of the precise kind of sympathy which makes much of his work memorable. Ah, well, you can’t have everything. Read it anyway. You will enjoy it.’


148 See, for example, in Herman, Intelligence Power.

149 Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia, pp.332-3.

150 W. Hood, ‘… or tarted up spy books?’ in Peake and Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence, p.293.

151 ibid., p.295.

See also, for example for a general critique of the media, insights provided in N. Davies, *Flat Earth News* (London: Chatto & Windus, 2008); for a detailed review of *Flat Earth News*, see, for example, J. Lanchester, ‘Riots, Terrorism etc’, *London Review of Books*, 30, 5 (06 March 2008) - via URL: <http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n05/print/lanc01_.html> (accessed: 28/02/2008).

See also, for example, the various articles in ‘21st Century Muckrakers’, *Nieman Reports*, 62, 1 (Spring 2008) - via URL: <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/08-1NRspring/index.html> (accessed: 17/04/2008).

See also Gerstein, ‘Spies Prep Reporters on Protecting Secrets’.


Also author of *The Spying Game* and *Killer Elite*. See comments above [4.1].

Also author of *UK Eyes Alpha*. See comments above [4.1].

Gordon Corera is also author of *Shopping for bombs*.

See, for example, M. Smith, ‘Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (01 July 2005) and G. Corera, ‘UK makes changes to Secret Intelligence Service’, *Jane's Intelligence Review* (01 February 2005).


See Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’.

Scott and Jackson (eds), *Understanding Intelligence*, p.3.

See, for instance, (UK) Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), *Renditions* (June 2007); see also Chapter 1 [4.1] of this study.


Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’ is somewhat of an exception from the other studies cited in the endnote above. This is because alongside his empirical analysis he introduces some International Relations (IR) Theory (see comments above).

See, for example, W. Agrell, ‘Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29, 4 (August 2006), p.635 – where he notes: ‘However, there is no generally established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework for the analysis of intelligence liaison.’
Chapter 4
Enhancing Interoperability:
Structural UK-US intelligence liaison
in the early 21st Century

“We are now in the midst of a… revolution [in information technology and connectivity] in military communications. Proprietary solutions, where each nation develops its own radios and waveforms at the cost of wider interoperability, are becoming a thing of the past. Instead we are seeing international standardisation… and interoperability emerge as the watchwords.’

- Bruno Rambaud, Senior Vice-President and Managing Director of Thales.

[1.0]: Introduction

‘American help is vital,’ The Economist succinctly noted in an article on UK intelligence during March 2005. This chapter expands on the introductory passage provided in Chapter 1 [10.0] by further exploring UK-US intelligence liaison in the early twenty-first century. Notably this chapter examines the extent to which interoperability is enhanced and underpinned by structural factors. Accordingly, we need to analyse: (i) who is involved in UK-US intelligence liaison – for example, which agencies and which roles; (ii) what type of liaison takes place; (iii) when does it take place; (iv) where that liaison is ‘located’; as well as (v) how it is conducted. This chapter, together with this study as a whole, also seeks to contribute towards comprehensively addressing the observation of Dan Plesch that ‘despite efforts the [UK-US intelligence] relationship has not yet received the attention it deserves in Britain.’ Whether the nature of UK-US intelligence liaison is structurally ‘ever closer’ in the early twenty-first century is then evaluated towards the end of this chapter.

A plethora of conduits exist. When disaggregated, structurally UK-US intelligence liaison consists of a matrix or a series of different simple to complex linkages. These are found in each of the specific areas liaised over - such as HUMINT, SIGINT, and so forth. These are relatively self-contained channels, although they are interrelated and naturally there is sometimes overlap. In terms of UK-US relations, over time each of these links, together with their multiple ties within them, varies to different degrees of ‘specialness’.
Distinct trends emerge. The greatest UK-US intelligence interactions (in terms of their freedom and extent) occur in the overt intelligence realm, through outreach activities. While, in the covert intelligence realm - roughly descending from the broadest (‘need to share/pool’) to narrowest (‘need to know’) domains of exchange/sharing/access - the interactions concern: open source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), military intelligence (MILINT or MI) - including measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT), etc. - and finally human intelligence (HUMINT). Extending beyond merely these expanding, and often increasingly technically automated, channels, are more collaborative interactions. These are structurally orientated around exponentially proliferating specific tasks/cases that have an increasingly central intelligence component, such as in the domains of law enforcement and military operations. Moreover, in parallel there exist interactions involving all-source and intelligence assessment/analysis material, which includes a degree of input from all the above ‘INTs’.

Variously over time, each of these links and their associated ties also contribute towards collectively helping to sustain the overall UK-US intelligence relationship. For example, from the UK side, this is mainly on qualitative (quality of intelligence exchanged), rather than so much on quantitative (volume of intelligence exchanged), bases. Again, for the UK at least, maintaining a close UK-US intelligence relationship has moved beyond being merely a central component of overall UK foreign policy towards being more of a condition of ‘an ingrained habit.’ Providing some insights into international intelligence liaison generally, and more specifically UK-US intelligence interactions focussed on counter-terrorism, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) Renditions report clearly highlighted how necessary the US help was to the UK:

We have been told by all three Agency Heads that their intelligence-sharing relationships with foreign liaison services are vital to counter the threat from international terrorism. The U.S. link is the most important, not least because of the resources the U.S. agencies command. The Chief of SIS [Sir John Scarlett] told the Committee:

\[\text{The global resources of CIA, FBI and NSA [National Security Agency] are vast... The UK Agencies' long-developed relationships with U.S. intelligence agencies give them vital access to U.S. intelligence and resources. It is neither practical, desirable, nor is it in the national interest, for UK Agencies to carry out [counter-terrorism] work independently of the U.S. effort.}\]
The Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) [Sir David Pepper] reiterated the value of the relationship to the UK, saying “Overall the benefit to the UK from this arrangement is enormous”, and the Director General of the Security Service [Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller (in post until her retirement in April 2007)] said “It is unimaginable that we could [cease sharing intelligence with the U.S.] because of the degree of importance of SIGINT and HUMINT and the intelligence they give us”.

The Director General of the Security Service made a further important point about the UK/U.S. relationship – that the two countries are inextricably linked: “As [the summer 2006 UK/U.S. airliner plot] showed, their security is absolutely bound up with ours.”

Similarities emerge as important facilitators. As former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman notes, the most ‘effective contact is specialist-to-specialist; like talks with like.’ However, this is more easily stated than mapped. To provide at least an initial insight, each of these expanding clusters of specialist/expert intelligence ties will now be briefly explored in succession. Starting with SIGINT liaison, this chapter will then go on to examine: HUMINT liaison, MILINT or MI, MASINT and IMINT liaison, OSINT liaison, UK-US law enforcement intelligence liaison, and UK-US intelligence assessment/analysis and ‘shared/common perceptions’ liaison. Some further insights into how UK-US and international (or foreign) intelligence liaison is managed and co-ordinated are also presented.

[2.0]: UK-US signals intelligence (SIGINT) liaison

Some of the closest ties are over SIGINT. In the realm of covert intelligence, this forms the ‘core’ of the UK-US intelligence relationship – or, at the least, in the contemporary era of exponentially burgeoning OSINT (see below [5.0]), SIGINT liaison continues to form one of the relationship’s major supporting pillars. It is because of the nature of this dimension that BBC journalist Mark Urban somewhat controversially claims that: ‘More than anything else, British intelligence is a system for repackaging information gathered by the USA.’ There is the constant exchange of vast quantities of data between the substantially integrated UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and its US counterpart, the National Security Agency (NSA). According to The Guardian newspaper’s security affairs correspondent, Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘GCHQ... has a symbiotic relationship with its American big brother...’ He continued, while quantitatively at least ‘the
Americans give more than Britain gives in return... an internal GCHQ staff manual [dated 1994] notes that the [UK] agency’s contribution to the relationship must be “of sufficient scale and of the right kind to make a continuation of the Sigint... alliance worthwhile to our partners.”

Elaborating further, the GCHQ staff manual noted that: ‘This may entail on occasion the applying of UK resources to the meeting of US requirements.’

Intricately networked computer set-ups facilitate the UK-US intelligence interactions in the SIGINT domain. These include the UKUSA ECHELON system, described by one of its foremost analysts, US national security scholar Jeffrey Richelson, as: ‘a computer-based tasking and exchange system... that allows the various [UKUSA] parties to request, via keywords, data collected by the other’s collection assets and to have it transmitted to the requesting party.’ Around 2000, during the debates surrounding the prominent European Parliamentary inquiry into ECHELON, several claims regarding the capabilities of the system were arguably exaggerated. The intelligence ‘failures’ surrounding 9/11 demonstrated vividly that the system was not as ‘all-powerful’ as some had claimed. Constant rapid technological developments writ large have also served to keep the UK and US intelligence agencies smartly on their toes in this domain of operation. This is so that they do not fall behind the curve of general trends.

Undoubtedly, a high volume of data is gathered and processed in the SIGINT domain. Much of this is undertaken as part of the bilateral UK-US sharing arrangements, also involving the ‘exclusive’ multilateral UKUSA arrangement. Tasks include monitoring e-mails, faxes, mobile (cell) and fixed-line telephone calls and electronic (and financial/bank) transactions. Moreover, the volume of data processed, with arguably some greater finite targeting over time, has increased exponentially in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ context. Indeed, the volume of data processed in the UK-US intelligence relationship is so vast, that there is considerable engagement with the real issue of ‘information overload’. This requires the application of ever-more sophisticated data filtering software, which is generally orientated around the flagging up of particular targeted keywords of interest. In 2000, Professor Harold Shukman posed an ongoing concern vis-à-vis this domain of operation. This took the form of the reasonable question: ‘Are the intelligence services faced by the paradox that too much data can mean too little understanding?’ Inevitably, various time lags are involved due to the processing (including translation) of the vast quantities of data gathered.

A significant amount of UK-US liaison is witnessed in this domain. Due to the substantial integration of NSA and GCHQ, there is routine ‘physical’ liaison to varying degrees on more of a regularised everyday basis. This is facilitated through a
sizeable exchange of staff both at headquarters level (Fort Meade and Cheltenham), and with the running of joint UK and US staffed monitoring sites located in different parts of the world. The liaison simultaneously occurs ‘virtually’ through the constantly networked and highly integrated computer systems and platforms, allowing access to the (substantially) pooled SIGINT.

Close liaison between GCHQ and the US National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is also apparent. This involves interactions over US ‘spy’ satellite output, where intelligence ‘product’ comes from an elaborately networked satellite system offering global coverage. It is a set-up in which the UK is a part investor. Rather than (explicitly) developing the UK’s own expensive series of satellites for espionage, surveillance and monitoring purposes - and after the UK’s own short-lived pursuit of the ‘ZIRCON’ satellite project in the 1980s - today the UK contributes a sizeable sum of money towards the US ‘spy’ satellite system. This is in order to acquire (at least a degree of) privileged access to the valuable data produced.

By 2006, further technological advances in the satellite sector had emerged. Some ramifications of these developments for the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship could be readily anticipated. Reportedly in 2006, according to defence analyst Bruce Sweetman, again ‘[t]he idea of a UK-operated space constellation is being taken seriously within the UK MoD…’ He continued, ‘Strategically, one goal of a UK space programme would be to give the MoD and intelligence community more to offer its US allies, in exchange for continued or improved access to US satellite data.’ Furthermore, the Eros satellites ‘contain no critical US technology [(such as the US DoD-developed global positioning system [GPS])]… [meaning] that the US government exercises no “shutter control” over the system.’ Wing Commander Mark Presley, the director of space strategy at the UK’s air staff, remarked: ‘The UK is a leader in small space technology, and that provides an opportunity for indigenous capability and influence with our allies.’ In short, through pursuit of such a strategy, greater bargaining and leverage potential in this area of UK-US relations could be better facilitated.

Added to these developments, March 2007 saw the launch of the upgraded UK ‘Skynet’ 5A satellite. Reportedly, its tasks include delivering ‘secure, high-bandwidth communications for UK and allied forces.’ As Sweetman noted:

The practice is to offload mundane [data] traffic on to commercial satellites and then to use a complementary, secure proprietary system for the traffic that has to be protected… Take for example the capability of unmanned air vehicles [UAVs]. These generate a lot of imagery and that has to be passed over a secure communications link. Modern warfare involves passing
around a lot of data [including processes such as transferring SIGINT], and that puts a premium on satellite capacity.\(^{26}\)

Once gathered and processed, dissemination of SIGINT ‘product’ is undertaken. The SIGINT ‘take’ tends to be more pooled between the UK and US. Also it tends to be widely shared with varying degrees of ‘exclusive’ multilateral distribution, on a ‘need-to-share/pool’ basis, for example with the other UKUSA partners. The ‘need-to-share/pool’ mentality is codified and sanctioned by exclusive agreements, such as those composing the overall UKUSA agreements and their associated ‘memoranda of understanding’ (MoU), between the parties involved.\(^{27}\)

\[3.0\]: UK-\textit{US human intelligence (HUMINT) liaison}

Exchange in the domain of HUMINT is different. In contrast to SIGINT, HUMINT tends to be shared on much more of a strict ‘need-to-know’ basis. This type of sharing is more narrow and direct. It is usually confined to being bilateral and to just involving a carefully managed limited range of particular individuals within the partaking intelligence services. Reflecting this trend, in the UK-US intelligence relationship, the ties on the HUMINT front are mainly between the UK Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Although, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and its Defense HUMINT Service (DHS)/Defense HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) - created in 2005 - is also sometimes involved.\(^{28}\) Showing the value of the UK to the US in the realm of HUMINT, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal, has noted that: ‘British HUMINT does not completely overlap that of the United States, with Britain having some advantages in Commonwealth countries.’\(^{29}\)

Demonstrably, the HUMINT ties tend to operate restrictedly. This is in terms of the volume and what precise intelligence is exchanged, as well as these interactions operating on more of a selective case-by-case basis than the SIGINT ties. Done for the ubiquitous so-called ‘security reasons’, these controls are intended for addressing counter-intelligence anxieties and maintaining at least a form of intelligence control and protectionism.\(^{30}\) Indeed, these forms of control, and the associated ‘sanitisation’ of intelligence, are at their most apparent during two occasions: (i) declassification; and (ii) when in operation \textit{vis-à-vis} the interactions within forums where the broader forms of intelligence liaison is undertaken. Notably, this is vividly seen in the ‘less-exclusive’ multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements (for instance, when compared with the UKUSA arrangement), such as at the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation (NATO), especially as expansion is undergone. As US defence expert Derek S. Reveron has observed:

Multilateral relationships through organizations like NATO provide a greater audience for intelligence, but may create counterintelligence concerns greater than the value of the intelligence they produce ... when expanding beyond traditional allies, a variety of practical and counterintelligence concerns arise.

HUMINT sources and their provenance are especially sensitive. They thus continue to be closely (and at times jealously) guarded by national intelligence agencies. As UK journalist Stephen Fidler has observed, ‘The sharing of humint between the US and UK is more selective than the sharing of sigint...’, and demonstrating the importance and high sensitivity accorded to HUMINT intensive operations, ‘Whitehall officials say that intelligence gathered by MI6, obtained they say at great risk to those involved, was critical in bringing an end to Libya’s non-conventional weapons programmes.’ This practice of closely guarding HUMINT is even largely maintained in an era of increasingly ‘globalised’ intelligence. It simultaneously demonstrates that observed phenomena, such as the ‘globalisation of intelligence’, are not entirely unfettered processes in all domains of intelligence activity. Again, their overall haphazard nature is emphasised.

[4.0]: UK-US military intelligence liaison (including MASINT & IMINT)

MILINT/MI offers another extensive mode of liaison. This is not least as military doctrinal concepts, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, [Target Acquisition] and Reconnaissance (ISTAR/ISR), together with their facilitators, perform an increasingly central role in real-time on the battlefield (or in the ‘battle-space’). However, in this domain, interoperability obstacles can emerge more starkly, and can have more of an impact. This is due to the nature of the tools closely involved, and the (often high) tempo at which operations in this domain are conducted. The UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) liaise mainly over military intelligence (MILINT or MI), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), as well as imagery intelligence (IMINT). The UK DIS also liaises with other US intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, over geographic and thematic/functional issues, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and proliferation. The UK Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), also known as the National Imagery Exploitation Centre, handles UK IMINT, GEOINT and MASINT. Their main point of interface is the US National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), which manages US IMINT/GEOINT (including high-resolution radar-imagery), acquired from sources such as its satellites. Some US IMINT is also acquired out-in-the-field. This is obtained by the UK from the US, reportedly due to ‘an agreement with the US Air Force (USAF) to gain access to imagery from the service’s RQ/MQ-1 Predators in Iraq and Afghanistan.’ Some valuable SIGINT, particularly of the ‘short-range’ variety (see below), is simultaneously obtained through the use of these platforms and their ability to fly over battle spaces. However, this operational sharing is not always smooth, with it being reported in 2006 that ‘British Army officers in Afghanistan are ... frustrated that they are not getting the level of support required to cope with the current upsurge of Taliban activity and have asked for dedicated UK UAV [(unmanned aerial vehicle)] support.’ These concerns were particularly troubling for the UK military before the delivery of the UK’s own new UAV models (Watch-Keeper 450 and Reaper [a Predator B purchased from the US] with a strike-capable platform) later in 2007. These new arrivals could now - at long last by October 2007 - operate in terrain as diverse as Afghanistan, as well as bring with them the added value of being able to function independently without the UK having to (overly) rely upon the capabilities of the US. Summarising the other element of persisting UK dependency on the US in the IMINT domain, Lowenthal observed in 2006 that: ‘Britain’s independent imagery intelligence (IMINT) capability is restricted to airborne platforms, but it receives satellite imagery from the United States.’

Sharing over MASINT is similarly witnessed. MASINT is particularly key in assisting UK-US intelligence WMD and non-proliferation detection and verification enterprises. MASINT provides essential data on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and (high-yield) explosive (CBRNE) components and their associated programmes. Gathered via a range of sensors located across the world, including seismometers, the MASINT is exchanged between the UK and US’s WMD specialists to aid their individual and joint analysis and assessment efforts. Other selected partners beyond, such as other UKUSA members - notably Canada and Australia - are also frequently included within this sharing.

Further liaison takes place in the military context. In the armed services (army, air force and navy), UK-US intelligence liaison takes place primarily within G2 and J2 departments at headquarters. Activities include joint military planning and operations - involving operations intelligence (OPINT) and, in its handling, operations security (OPSEC) - and occur between ‘conventional’ forces as well as the Special Operations Forces (SOF). Indeed, the close contact maintained between the UK and US Special Forces (SF) dates from their joint operations undertaken during the Second World War. For instance, alongside joint SF training activities and
operations, over time the UK SAS has retained at least two operators who liaise with US Delta Force at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.46

The UK-US military intelligence liaison is witnessed both at joint respective home-based headquarters and within their commands out in-the-field/on-the-ground. This includes within Joint Task Forces (JTF) and Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) - for example, as witnessed during the 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq wars. During OPERATION ‘ENDURING FREEDOM’ in Afghanistan, UK and US military chiefs and planners worked together at US Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Meanwhile, at the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood, UK staff worked with their US counterparts.47

The US Military European Command (EUCOM) Joint Analysis Center (JAC) based at RAF Molesworth, the US Visiting Forces base in Cambridgeshire, UK, also features as a location where UK-US military intelligence liaison takes place.48 Generally, a sizeable number of UK and US military personnel are routinely exchanged between the two countries and their respective armed forces at all levels.49 Indeed, as a UK Defence White Paper in 2003 noted:

Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will wish to be able to influence political and military decision-making throughout the crisis, including during the post-conflict period. The significant military contribution the UK is able to make to such operations means that we secure an effective place in the political and military decision-making processes. To exploit this effectively, our Armed Forces will need to be interoperable with U.S. command and control structures, match the U.S. operational tempo and provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating alongside the U.S.50

Military and defence attachés simultaneously figure.51 These personnel, based in the UK embassy in Washington and the US embassy in London, both conduct liaison on military and defence matters. Their role includes handling military/operations-relevant ELINT/SIGINT, such as the ‘short-range’ varieties (from military-tactical communications, including radios) found in battle spaces.52 Moreover, again highlighting the importance of the defence attaché’s intelligence role, in the US, responsibility for managing that post is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).53
UK-US OSINT liaison similarly performs a vital role. Indeed, this is one that is growing exponentially. The vast majority of UK-US intelligence information comes from open source intelligence (OSINT). In the realm of UK-US OSINT handling, historically there is a long-term and close partnership between the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring and the US (CIA) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) – the latter replaced by the DNI Open Source Center (OSC) in November 2005.\(^\text{54}\) Recognising this relationship’s importance, not least to sustaining the overall UK-US partnership, BBC Monitoring, an arm of the BBC World Service, is also partly funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).\(^\text{55}\) Today, operating alongside private sector media output monitoring companies, 24-hours-a-day and 7-days-a-week, together these services monitor and translate a high volume of foreign media and newswire/news agency output. The resulting product is arranged ‘geographically’ and ‘thematically’, and is produced for a large range of both public and private sector clients, from intelligence agencies to think-tanks.\(^\text{56}\) The UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) officially judge the exchange of OSINT between the UK and the US via these services as valuable.\(^\text{57}\)

Indeed, the overall OSINT collaboration extends further. In terms of OSINT international partnerships, core international partnerships include between the Open Source Branch (OSB) of the Office of National Assessments in Australia, the UK’s BBC Monitoring (including input from the UK Intelligence Community Open Source Joint Working Group), and the US Open Source Center (OSC). More widely, there are OSINT international partnerships within the framework of the ‘International Open Source Working Group’ (IOSWG), which consists of the USA, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Austria, Sweden, Israel, Australia, Norway, France and Belgium. All share OSINT via the Internet portal of ‘opensource.gov’, managed by the US intelligence community.\(^\text{58}\) Again, within this domain of collaboration, ‘best practices’ and ‘standards’ are shared across the globe amongst these partners.\(^\text{59}\) The domain of OSINT is where the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ extends to its furthest in the world of covert intelligence.

In parallel in the overt intelligence realm is some considerable outreach. This occurs between various configurations of UK and US groups. Reflecting the presence of entities such as transnational knowledge and policy networks, it takes place around tables in the UK, US and abroad in other countries, involving varying key societal stakeholders (including practitioners, former-practitioners, academics, private sector, non-profit sector operators and other non-governmental groups).\(^\text{60}\) The outreach mainly involves interactions over information. For instance, concerning open source (OS) material and research-originating material, or ‘RESINT’, which in
turn essentially consists of connected OS material, offering effective contextualisation potential. If properly and fully utilised through effective exploitation, the product gathered in this domain of activity can offer both high volume and high impact assistance to overall intelligence efforts. Here, anyone is included who can potentially contribute usefully to overall intelligence efforts in some manner.₆¹

[6.0]: UK-US law enforcement intelligence liaison

UK-US intelligence liaison extends beyond merely the conduits already examined. A more recent addition in terms of participating agencies is the UK’s Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).₆² SOCA was formally launched in April 2006, after shadow operating during 2005, and has been dubbed by the media as the ‘British FBI’. Typically, this comparison is not entirely accurate.₆³ Although, both the FBI and US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can be seen as models for SOCA, and certain areas of responsibility do overlap, providing useful points of contact for liaison purposes. An amalgamation of the UK National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and Customs and Home Office Immigration Service investigators, the intention is for SOCA to facilitate information sharing on organised crime and related issues, as well as to allow for the more effective targeting of resources to those ends.₆⁴ SOCA also now conveniently provides one UK agency with which various US agencies can liaise. Bureaux under the control of the US Department of Justice (DoJ), including the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) - liaise with SOCA on drug (narcotics) investigations - while the FBI liaises on issues such as money laundering and other financial crime related matters. Bureaux under the US DHS liaise with SOCA on immigration and customs issues.₆⁵ Joint UK-US conferences are held,₆₆ while liaison also takes place with and via SOCA’s ‘large network of overseas officers.’ Again for ‘security reasons’, more details concerning SOCA officers’ exact postings are not provided.₆₇

More focussed law enforcement intelligence liaison also exists. For example, this concerns particular ‘functional’ issues such as specific legal cases and investigations. This occurs between the FBI - usually conducted by its overseas-based US embassies’ legal attachés (‘legats’) - the US State Department’s ‘regional security officers’,₆₈ and SOCA, the UK Police ‘Special Branch’ (SO12) and the Anti-Terrorism branch (SO13) – in 2006 both amalgamated into Counter-Terrorism Command (SO15)₆⁹ - and between conventional UK and US Police forces.₇₀

Similarly, UK and US Customs closely co-operate. In December 2002, the UK joined the US Container Security Initiative (CSI), by signing a ‘Declaration of Principles’.₇¹ This co-operation was later further enhanced by US Customs personnel
coming to work at major container ports in the UK alongside their UK counterparts in a specific intelligence-sharing role.\textsuperscript{72}

Moreover, a form of UK-US liaison occurs concerning the issue of accountability. For instance, there is some evidence of communication, including bilateral visits overseas and multilateral conferences, between the UK and US (and other countries') intelligence oversight committees.\textsuperscript{73} This type of liaison, albeit taking place more regularly, is similar to the liaison witnessed between the UK Butler Committee conducting the \textit{Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction} and the US Robb-Silberman Commission on the \textit{Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction}.\textsuperscript{74} While not strictly ‘pure’ UK-US intelligence liaison \textit{per se}, this mode of liaison does, however, sit on the fringes of, and involves, both the UK and US intelligence communities - albeit if perhaps more indirectly and peripherally. Thus it demonstrably has some relevance to be at least referenced.

Together with these more direct UK-US ties, other transatlantic and plurilateral (European/EU/Council of Europe-US) interactions occur. These take place in parallel in the domain of intelligence and security co-operation, and concern issues such as the exchange of airline passenger data.\textsuperscript{75}

\textbf{[7.0]: UK-US intelligence assessment/analysis and all-source liaison}

‘Pure’ UK-US intelligence liaison has other dimensions. As well as ‘raw’ intelligence product liaison over each of the ‘INTs’, there is UK-US liaison over ‘finished’ or ‘processed’ intelligence - namely analysis output in the form of assessments/estimates. This occurs not only between experts and specialists at regular cross-national and cross-agency meetings, but also between ‘higher-ranking’ intelligence assessment ‘committees’, and within terrorist threat assessment/analysis centres, such as the UK Joint Terrorism Assessment/Analysis Centre (JTAC).\textsuperscript{76} Significantly, in the UK, the US is sometimes involved in the drafting of the final analyses produced.\textsuperscript{77} The exchange of this type of ‘finished’ intelligence reports, judgements, and frequently ‘all-source’ material, helps to facilitate the development of shared UK-US perceptions on intelligence issues. In the UK Cabinet Office, there is a UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland Security, established in 2003 and originally (before the role underwent all of its subsequent changes\textsuperscript{78}) chaired by the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator.\textsuperscript{79} Meanwhile, in the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), liaison officers from the UKUSA partner countries (including CIA personnel) sometimes attend meetings.\textsuperscript{80} The JIC also has an ‘assessment staff’, which, according to the UK Government’s \textit{National Intelligence Machinery} brochure,
like the three agencies and the DIS... maintains its own contacts with analogous overseas intelligence organisations. Such liaison arrangements allow access to information and analysis, which might otherwise not be available. In the case of countries with which the UK has military alliances or faces a common threat, information is shared so that decisions can be taken on the basis of a common perception... 

This example additionally serves to highlight a case of where having an alliance facilitates the sharing of intelligence. Although, of course if the shared/common perceptions are taken too far, as cautioned throughout this study, detrimental episodes of intelligence liaison ‘blowback’, for example in the form of ‘groupthink’, can occur. This is particularly the case when intelligence liaison ironically overextends. In such circumstances, liaison undermines its positive attributes.

[8.0]: Mapping further UK-US intelligence flows and challenges

Transatlantically, liaison is rarely conducted with solely one agency. Alongside the SIS, the UK domestic Security Service (MI5) also liaises with the CIA, as well as with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Indeed, especially post-9/11, this is one of the areas where the greatest increase in intelligence/information sharing has occurred: namely concerning the exchange of domestic-focussed intelligence and information, rather than merely just foreign/international-focussed intelligence and information.

Some CIA liaison activities can be readily mapped. CIA staff on-the-ground or out in-the-field abroad are usually based in the US embassies’ CIA ‘Stations’ belonging to the ‘Directorate of Operations’ (DO) (called the ‘National Clandestine Service’ [NCS] since October 2005). Alongside specific US intelligence liaison officers (ILOs) posted in that host country, other CIA staff conduct liaison with parties in the host country. Together with this liaison is that conducted between specialist ‘liaison officers’ from the service being liaised with (‘liaison service’) who are usually posted in their own intelligence services’ ‘station’ (or equivalent) in their country’s Washington embassy. Less frequently, ‘summit liaison’ is undertaken. This occurs with CIA staff, sometimes including senior personnel, at specific conferences and meetings with their counterparts in the liaison service at various locations, such as abroad or at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. In the case of the UK, such a meeting is usually held annually.

Some SIS liaison interactions can similarly be mapped. In SIS, liaison again takes place between UK intelligence liaison officers (ILOs) based in the host country...
and various relevant parties in the host country. It also occurs between members of
UK intelligence staff, including those at the most senior levels, at summits and
meetings. A well-known example is catalogued in the ISC Annual Report 2001-02
when ‘the day after the attacks [of 11 September 2001] the Director of GCHQ, Chief
of the SIS and the Deputy Director General of the Security Service were in the USA,
to co-ordinate the intelligence picture with their US counterparts.’

Further UK-US intelligence and law enforcement liaison takes place less
directly, such as at The Hague, between EUROPOL (the European police service) and
the US Secret Service. This type of liaison was facilitated, for instance, with the
‘formal creation of a Secret Service liaison position at EUROPOL’ in 2005.

Moving more into operational UK-US and multilateral international
intelligence liaison territory, other liaison ‘locations’ or nexus
es come to the fore. Most notably, the top-secret centre in Paris, codenamed ‘Alliance Base’, can be
highlighted. After 9/11, some of the counter-terrorism efforts directed
to internationally involved input from the interactions undertaken in this significant
venue. Reportedly,

Funded largely by the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Alliance Base
analyzes the transnational movement of terrorist suspects and develops
operations to catch or spy on them… The base is unique in the world
because it is multinational and actually plans operations instead of sharing
information among countries… It has case officers from Britain, France,
Germany, Canada, Australia and the United States.

The importance of the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) venue (see above [4.0]) can
simultaneously be further highlighted. Since from around 2006, it can be formally
connected to contributing towards helping bolster NATO intelligence
arrangements.

Yet, despite the presence of the extensive range of various structural
 facilitators, the liaison undertaken within them is not always entirely
straightforward. At least on formal bases, many liaison challenges continue to be
confronted. Most obviously, structural obstacles to liaison are encountered, and more
or less persist. As US defence expert Reveron notes, ‘…the sheer number of
organizations in the U.S. intelligence community [17 agencies including the Office of
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)] presents a major
challenge for internationalizing the community…’

Alongside, are worries about
‘technology gaps’ between international partners impacting operationally (see below
[10.0]), as well as concerns about UK (and European) and US practice and legal
differences influencing operations and the directions and extents to which they can be pursued.\textsuperscript{93} In their \textit{Renditions} report, the ISC observed:

The UK/U.S. relationship has a long history based upon shared goals, common values and complementary intelligence capabilities. This is not to say that the UK and U.S. Governments necessarily see eye to eye on all subjects – there are certain areas of foreign policy and strategy where the two countries have quite different approaches. There are also certain aspects that complicate the relationship between the respective intelligence and security agencies – for example, the possibility that UK assistance to a U.S. operation might result in a trial leading to capital punishment.

Demonstrating some of the UK-US operational constraints, the report later continued, ‘Where credible assurances cannot be obtained, the Chief of SIS [Sir John Scarlett] explained “… then we cannot provide the information. Therefore you have the dilemma [of perhaps not being able to prevent attacks] that flows from that.”\textsuperscript{94}

However, here, arguably the more culturally imbued dimensions of liaison can offer (at least some) assistance. Informal liaison also occurs. Beside the more ‘formal’ conferences and official venue interactions, some more personal/friendship-aided UK-US intelligence liaison takes place in more informal settings. This includes face-to-face contact through social-linked ‘café’, ‘sofa’ and ‘cocktail party’ interactions - for example, at diplomatic functions and parties, in hotel lobbies, and so forth. Again, this mode of liaison is hard to quantify (indeed, it is the most challenging to quantify), including in terms of its qualitative range and scope – namely what it can achieve. For instance, it is persistently unclear to what extent informal liaison operates outside of, and beyond, the more formal liaison constraints and considerations. Hence, it remains subject to being highly open to differing interpretations. Going unrecorded, and taking place in real-time, not (always) unintentionally, these interactions are the most difficult to capture and preserve. This is as well as them being challenging to portray faithfully and to analyse and assess in sufficient detail in contemporary and historical accounts, such as this study.\textsuperscript{95} However, the US phrase ‘friends and allies’ appropriately resonates here, to a degree encapsulating these different dimensions in broad terms.\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{[9.0]: Management of UK-US and international intelligence liaison}

Managing liaison is useful. Indeed, today, at all levels of interaction, further efforts need to continue to be devoted towards implementing this task. Inside the CIA - traditionally at least - the ‘Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis (CSAA)',

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under the ‘Directorate of Intelligence’ (DI), manages international intelligence liaison while ‘…develop[ing] policies on foreign intelligence-sharing activities.’

In SIS, the responsibility for liaison ultimately rests with ‘the Chief’ (‘C’). The UK JIC, for example when ‘tasking’ SIS, supplies additional guidance. Intelligence liaison takes place in multiple locations throughout the whole organisation of SIS. It concerns both ‘geographical’ (‘regional’) and ‘functional’ (‘thematic’) desks, and it is associated with both the ‘Requirements Department’ and the ‘Operations Department’. More recently, ‘the most significant reform [of SIS since the Butler Inquiry Report into WMD intelligence in July 2004] is the creation of a head of requirements post… [‘a senior “quality control officer”… who will be known as “R”… for reporting officer… responsible for reviewing secret information…”] The new interface function will include liaison relationships with foreign services and other exchange partners…’

The greater and pressing micro-management of these intelligence liaison relationships can also be anticipated. This is alongside a greater challenging of the intelligence received - adopting ‘A + B Team’ and ‘Red Teaming’ tactics – as part of the enhanced ‘professionalisation’ of intelligence, particularly in the wake of the high profile UK and US intelligence inquiries.

Some broader co-ordination of international intelligence liaison would be helpful. Concerning the management of the intelligence liaison relationships, as US intelligence scholar Jennifer Sims has emphasised, ‘policy oversight of liaison has, until 2005, largely been the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).’ She continued, raising some contemporary concerns: ‘In the transition to the new structure, in which a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) now heads the Intelligence Community, responsibility for oversight of liaison requires urgent clarification.’

In 2004, in theory at least, attempts in the US at asserting some greater clarity concerning the management of liaison were tried. This came as responsibility for overseeing foreign liaison was added to the long-list remit of the newly created post of DNI. However, Sims is right to be concerned. These qualitative movements emerged just as liaison is quantitatively increasing exponentially in the early twenty-first century. Worryingly, when compared with previous configurations, today there is arguably the overall effect of the greater ‘dilution’ of liaison’s ‘management’ (control and oversight) in the US. This paucity extends further than witnessed before; when those responsibilities were instead included as part of the DCI’s less wide-ranging remit. US intelligence scholar Stan Taylor flags up some further concerns, particularly where he notes:
The DNI was supposed to be given the necessary personnel and budget authority to enforce greater cooperation. While cooperation is greater in some areas of the IC than it was earlier, the failure to include many of the Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence operations under the authority of the new DNI is widely seen as a weakness of the 2004 reorganization. … The intelligence activities of the DoD have grown dramatically since 2001, most recently by its placement of Military Liaison Elements (a euphemism for military special forces teams) in more than a dozen embassies around the world.104

Interestingly, by 2007, such concerns were being officially rebuffed. The claim surfaced from the ODNI that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 … did more than create the Office of the Director of National Intelligence - it charged the Office with significantly reforming and strengthening America’s Intelligence Community. Under the leadership of Director John D. Negroponte, the ODNI has revitalized, reformed, and led the Community to better protect our nation … [including the creation of] the Foreign Relations Coordinating Committee to synchronize Intelligence Community foreign outreach efforts and maximize opportunities for the U.S. to achieve intelligence goals and national policy objectives. For example, a new intelligence relationship was expeditiously established with a country and an existing relationship with another country is being enhanced as a Community effort instead of the traditional “stove-piped” approach to partner relationships…105

Were foreign liaison relationships now becoming less compartmentalised, at least within the US intelligence community? It appears so, at least on paper and in some areas. But, typically this was only to a degree. Yet, again demonstrating that in the US the management of foreign liaison relationships is not solely confined to the DNI level or to happening just within the CIA, or even solely within the other civilian US intelligence agencies, the US defence intelligence agencies also have ‘foreign disclosure offices’ to help manage their foreign intelligence liaison relationships.106

While challenging to quantify precisely, a degree of poorly centralised and inadequately comprehensive co-ordination of international intelligence liaison therefore continues in the large US intelligence community. Here, somewhat of a conundrum emerges: to what extent should international intelligence liaison relationships be subject to centralised high/macro level co-ordination, control and
management? Indeed, evident in both the US, and arguably to a slightly lesser degree, the UK - due to the element of enhanced input coming from the JIC (see above) - the co-ordination of international intelligence liaison relations instead essentially exists in a more devolved manner. Responsibility for the management of those relationships remains largely within the major channels outlined throughout this chapter. The important role technology collectively plays in these will now be explored.

[10.0]: Structural UK-US intelligence liaison and technology

Generally in the intelligence world, great emphasis is put on technology. Rightly technology is accorded an important status. This is not least as it underpins activities in a multiple number of ways on a daily basis, as well as delivering the bulk of intelligence gathered. However, again like any tool, technology alone is not infallible nor enough. At times, in some circumstances, the emphasis on technology and what it can deliver can be exaggerated and too glossy. Also there exist several concerns that (at least sometimes) this scenario, and techniques – such as data mining and terrorist profiling - can be at the expense of other dimensions, such as HUMINT efforts. Simultaneously, there is anxiety that these ‘tools’ can transgress on other important considerations, notably civil liberties and privacy. Worries also prevail about ‘technology-gaps’ between partners hampering co-operation and interoperability - for example, in coalition and alliance contexts. This includes core allies, such as the UK and US – although considerable lengths are gone to in order to try and effectively address these types of concerns (of which the US is acutely aware), for instance through trying to encourage arrangements such as ‘backwards interoperability’ (whereby old and new systems can still work together). Constant modernisation programmes vis-à-vis SIGINT are similarly witnessed.

There are a plethora of ‘systems’ and ‘architectures’ involved. These structurally help to facilitate internal (both in the UK and the US) and external UK-US intelligence liaison. These vary in terms of their overall effectiveness, at times also being plagued with expensive development problems. Alongside varyingly shared hardware (computer platforms), there is varyingly shared software (databases and other programmes). Sometimes, the development of hardware and software is done ‘in-house’ (privately) by specially recruited specialist programmers; at other times, it is obtainable from commercial sources - such as Microsoft - in either an exclusively developed or in a more publicly available (off-the-shelf) form. At the various different points of contact, there are many databases, so-called ‘watch lists’ – itemising ‘persons of concern/interest’ – and computer programmes...
involved, enabling instantaneous cross-linking and referencing. They can also be web-based, harnessing the power of the Internet. Collectively and individually, these are intimate components to operational C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence/Information) concerns. The tasks the technology focusses on include the sharing of intelligence, forensics, protection of borders, surveillance operations, processing biometrics and identification (DNA, fingerprints, etc.), processing visa and passport controls, the pooling of research and training, preventing and countering cyber and electronic attack. Carefully selected product for dissemination across the Atlantic from each party’s own exclusive databases, such as the UK’s SCOPE (currently under continued development), can also be shared/made available for access.

As witnessed in relation to other ‘facilitators’ in intelligence liaison interactions, familiar trends emerge. The structural information computer/communications technology (ICT)/COMSEC components, systems and architectures are shared to varying degrees, ranging from bilateral to exclusive multilateral. One of the most notable ‘systems’ is the UKUSA ECHELON system (discussed above [2.0]). The UK and Australia were also eventually allowed at least some ‘special’ access to the US Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) - viewed as the foremost computer network for accessing and communicating US classified/secret material. This came once the intelligence-sharing hampering ‘NOFORN’ (No foreigner/US eyes only) restriction was removed exclusively for the UK and Australia after US President Bush signed a directive in July 2004, following pleas from UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This access appears to have been authorised due to pressing operational demands, and the need to conduct more closely co-ordinated and well-informed joint operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Granting of this access to SIPRNet again demonstrated the UK and Australian privileged intelligence status with the US. But, obtaining these ‘permissions’ was by no means an all-smooth or easy process at the lower daily work levels of activity - even once the US Presidential directive had been signed at the high level. Some scepticism also remains concerning the exact nature of the access in terms of its extent and scope. Operationally, some of these frustrations persist, albeit in slightly recalibrated forms. For instance, most troublingly, UK-originating content put onto the US SIPRNet platform cannot be shared back to the UK unless it has been explicitly sanitised/cleared for release to the UK. However, in general terms, overall this development (access to SIPRNet content) can be seen as more positive than negative - as reflecting ‘work-in-progress’ evolution - with there undoubtedly being sufficient scope for it to be extended further into the future through some re-adjustment.
Other information/intelligence sharing and exchange set-ups are being developed in parallel. These become of increasing importance as various multilateral coalitions are formed to deal with the globalised security problems of the early twenty-first century. A more widely available system for assisting information/intelligence exchange between countries is the US Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). Reveron notes that: ‘The system not only enables the United States to collaborate with its partners, but also allows the partners to collaborate with one another.’ Again, this system and similar, associated spin-offs are very much works-in-progress, being constantly updated and upgraded, evolving over time in a manner reactive to requirements.

Recent multi-national military operations, such as ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’ in Iraq and ‘ENDURING FREEDOM’ in Afghanistan, have provided several lessons, while highlighting the flaws that need to be addressed in the various systems. In her assessment, a Royal Air Force Squadron Leader highlighted some of the information-sharing flaws and frustrations experienced during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. She also demonstrated how operationally these sorts of obstacles were largely mitigated:

... CIS [Coalition Information Sharing] systems were also a problem, with the US operating on their infinitely superior SIPRNET system, which was not releasable to UK eyes without US supervision, while the UK operated its myriad CIS systems, and had access to CENTRIX; a US CIS system, with AUS/UK access, onto which AUS/UK releasable SIPRNET information could be transferred. However, the process was “mandraulic” rather than automatic, requiring our US counterparts to find the time (in a high tempo operational environment) to decide on and implement the transfer of information. Again, [emphasising the importance of the presence of a more personal/friendship-aided and direct variant of liaison] these challenges tended to be overcome through face-to-face dialogue and the development of good working relationships, although not without costs to efficiency.

Some lessons were learnt. By mid-2006, reportedly Coalition Information Sharing (CIS) ‘architecture’ was being assessed by US Central Command (CENTCOM) as a possible, and arguably more simplified and streamlined, ‘alternative’ to CENTRIXS. According to CENTCOM’s Chief for Data Systems, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Claypool, the CIS architecture ‘could also provide technologies for migration to the US Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) and Global Information Grid (GIG) programmes...’ Such developments suggest that some further advances in attempting to facilitate bilateral to multilateral international intelligence liaison through technological means are currently underway. These developments are also
likely to continue on similar trajectories into the foreseeable future. Yet, despite these observed developments, questions still linger surrounding exactly how far the interoperability qualitatively and quantitatively extends. Notably, to what extents will the US’ allies genuinely be able to keep up with future developments, particularly when those developments are present in their most formal and indirect variants? It can also be anticipated that some ‘technology gaps’ will remain in this domain, albeit if in slightly reconfigured varying forms.

[11.0]: **Conclusions: Structurally ‘ever closer’?**

Significant changes have emerged. As the former Director General of MI5 (1992-96), Dame Stella Rimington, observed in 2001: ‘Secret services are not usually associated with cooperation and sharing. It sounds like a contradiction. But in a world where the threats get more sophisticated and more global, the intelligence task gets more difficult, and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital and grows ever closer.’

On balance, UK-US interoperability has been enhanced. In the early twenty-first century, at least broadly, UK-US intelligence liaison appears to be structurally ‘ever closer’. This is at least largely physically, if not so much spiritually/culturally. While many of the ties and infrastructures in the various domains of intelligence liaison – notably SIGINT, HUMINT, and so forth – already existed prior to the 9/11 attacks, many of these were considerably reinforced, consolidated and expanded (recalibrated) in the wake of the attacks. The extent of the effectiveness of these structures to facilitate UK-US intelligence liaison was also considerably tested over time on intensive and high-tempo joint UK-US conventional military and Special Operations Forces’ tasks and operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. Several lessons have been propagated.

Developments can be readily charted. The trend towards increasing structural expansion was in line with the gradual continuing expansion and evolution towards greater transatlantic co-operation witnessed in the UK-US intelligence, law enforcement and military sectors over time. These developments occurred particularly markedly during the post-Cold War years. This was as globalisation (writ large) generally gathered pace, and as previous intelligence liaison hampering Cold War considerations – such as the high risk of penetration by a high-grade intelligence agency belonging to the main threat faced – ebbed somewhat, due to sub- and non-state actors instead increasingly taking centre stage. The quantity of intelligence exchanged across the Atlantic, already on an increasing trajectory, simultaneously grew more significantly as post-9/11 and subsequent joint UK-US intelligence investigations and operations rapidly proliferated. This trend in
turn correlated with an expansion in the range of ‘functional’ security, law enforcement and intelligence issues liaised over by the UK and the US; together with those issues uncomfortably acquiring a higher public profile, as well as assuming greater mainstream political importance, in both Washington and London. This was not least through the application of a ‘new prism’ through which international security affairs were viewed (see Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.6], below).136

Agency reorganisations in both the UK and US contributed. The creation of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from 2002 and the UK SOCA from 2004 officially helped to provide several further UK and US security and law enforcement conglomerates. These both consisted of amalgamations of previously more scattered agencies. Arguably, they then helped facilitate the development of clearer UK-US liaison ‘connection points’ concerning particular intelligence and law enforcement issues. Thus they contributed towards paving the way for helping enable further consolidated UK and US intelligence and information sharing activities.

Nevertheless, such moves are not entirely beneficial. One of the claimed significant downsides is that as the UK-US intelligence services have increasingly moved ‘ever closer’ to one another over time, the ability in either the UK or the US to call their activities effectively, democratically and publicly to account, has commensurately haemorrhaged.137 At least for ‘outsiders’, it is increasingly difficult to unpack ‘individual’ UK and US intelligence agency activities from those jointly taken in concert with their major and primary partner.138 This disaggregation is especially hard to ascertain once intelligence product has been subject to ‘sanitisation’ processes purposely intended to protect sources and methods. As the former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook noted in his testimony to the UK Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) in June 2003: ‘…it is often difficult when you look at intelligence assessments to spot which raw data was originally gathered by the United Kingdom and which was originally gathered by the United States.’139

However, all has not become entirely ‘homogenised’. Together with the trends representative of convergence, some broader UK and US intelligence community differences persist. Most obviously, the scale/size factor can be highlighted. The US intelligence community is considerably larger than the UK intelligence community. For instance, the US intelligence community consists of 17 agencies (and of approximately 100,000 employees140) to the UK intelligence community’s three agencies and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) (collectively some 13,400 employees141). The US intelligence community also enjoys access to significantly more resources. For example, while in the UK, according to the IISS: ‘the annual
allocation rose from £1.31bn [$2.57bn] in 2004 to £1.48bn [$2.90bn] in 2006’,\(^\text{142}\) in the US – although the precise total figure was at least supposed to remain classified – it ‘slipped out’ that the annual US intelligence budget (around the end of 2005) was $44bn (£22.45bn).\(^\text{143}\) Given the dynamic nature of the contemporary threats confronted, both of these budgets will have risen further since those dates. Indeed, somewhat to the chagrin of the ODNI, the official US intelligence budget was declassified in October 2007. According to Walter Pincus of The Washington Post, it was now said to stand at:

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\text{\$43.5 billion budget total for national intelligence programs... When the cost of intelligence by the military services is added, aggregate U.S. intelligence spending for fiscal 2007 exceeded $50 billion, according to administration and congressional sources, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the total remains classified.}^{144}
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Even with ‘like talking to like’, connecting on such bases is increasingly challenging for the UK to effect when there are a multitude of differing, yet relevant, US intelligence players to consider. Structural changes, on either side, similarly contribute to the challenges encountered, and which have to be navigated, by intelligence practitioners. More significantly, added to this, during the early years of the twenty-first century, the intelligence ‘centre of gravity’ in the US has undergone a shift. It has moved more to the Pentagon and the other military agencies, away from the CIA and the other civilian intelligence agencies.\(^\text{145}\) Such internal US adjustments have reverberations affecting the UK’s own intelligence community – not least how it interacts with its US counterpart, both transatlantically and elsewhere across the world.\(^\text{146}\) Here, further UK-US differences, including over adhering to different laws and practices - such as rendition and ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques - similarly figure.

Ultimately, the structural framework constructed for facilitating UK-US intelligence liaison, both formal and informal, emerges as being key. As is revealed in the two case studies contained in the next chapter, Chapter 5, once the various structures were in place to facilitate close UK-US intelligence liaison, over time these formed the main ‘channels’ along which increasing volumes of UK-US intelligence could flow. Continuing into the future, these formed the conduits through which the assets of UK and US intelligence co-operation could be communicated. As already seen, they also formed the structures through which tensions that simultaneously arose could be contained and mitigated.


References


4 For further useful background on each of these different ‘INTs’, see also M.M. Lowenthal, ‘Collection and the Collection Disciplines’, chapter 5 in his Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006 [3ed.]), pp.68-108.


7 Herman, ‘Intelligence in the Anglo-American Relationship’, p.6; see also M. Herman, ‘British and American Systems: A Study in Contrasts?’, chapter 6 in his Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001), from p.130.

8 See, for example, Herman, ‘Intelligence in the Anglo-American Relationship’, p.8. Again demonstrating the extent of close UK-US relations in this domain of intelligence activity, see also ‘UK considers leasing Rivet Joint: Proposals to lease US Air Force (USAF) Boeing RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT)-gathering aircraft or operate them as part of a “joint pool” are being considered by UK procurement planners. As Jane’s reported in January, the UK’s current Royal Air Force (RAF) Hawker Siddeley Nimrod R.1 ELINT/SIGINT platforms will now be withdrawn early next decade and activity to migrate the capability to another platform has accelerated’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (07 February 2008); see also Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.293.


11 Quoted in Norton-Taylor, ‘A test between nations’.


13 See, for example, Richelson, ‘Desperately seeking signals’.

14 See also, for instance, P. Warren, ‘Lifting the veil on internet voices: Police and intelligence agencies are lobbying hard for means of snooping on internet-based telephony….’, *The Guardian* (27 July 2006).


20 For more background on ‘ZIRCON’, see for example, Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p.290, and chapter 5 ‘1986/7 ZIRCON’ - also available online via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/alpha/zircon.htm> (accessed: 21/06/2006); see also Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (1999 [4ed.]), p.295.


22 B. Sweetman, ‘Satellite micro-revolution offers the potential for broader vision’, Jane’s International Defence Review (01 September 2006); see also J. Amos, ‘UK military awaits Skynet launch: The British military is set to take one of its most significant steps into the digital age with the launch of the first Skynet 5 satellite’, BBC News Online (09 March 2007), particularly where the article notes: ‘The spacecraft will deliver secure, high-bandwidth communications for UK and “friendly” forces across the globe…’; see also T. Ripley, ‘UK plans opening of Space Operations Co-ordination Centre’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (31 March 2008); J. Amos, ‘Skynet military launch postponed’, BBC News Online (30 May 2008).

23 Sweetman, ‘Satellite micro-revolution offers the potential for broader vision’.

24 Quoted in ibid.


26 Quoted in ibid.


29 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.293.

30 These ‘security reasons’ include trying to reduce the risk of sources and/or methods being compromised, as well as measures designed to encourage the maintenance of greater intelligence control, secrecy, and clandestine operability. All these are geared towards (at least potential) greater intelligence protectionism. See also F.P. Hitz, ‘Human source intelligence’, chapter 9 in Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies, from p.118.

31 See, for example, ‘NATO’s intelligence concerns’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (05 September 2003). Reflecting the later unevenness, see, for instance, R. Pengelley, ‘NATO TRANSFORMATION – Forcing agent: ACT shows NATO members way to transformation’, Jane’s International Defence Review (07 November 2006) – especially where he notes: ‘With regard to transatlantic technology transfer and information sharing, two of the pacing facts on transformation, Adm [Admiral] Stanhope affirms: “We have been working this hugely at the policy level. Technology transfer [or lack of it] is certainly a constraint on the way we do business. This organisation has been presenting and exposing these constraints, and there have been some wins.” He also cites the [Allied Command Transformation]
ACT-developed ITAN (Intelligence Transformation Advice for NATO) intelligence sharing and processing methodology, which has included a complete about-turn in the US approach. In principle all information is now to be disclosed rather than withheld, unless otherwise specified.; see also C. Hodes, ‘Identity crisis – Split looms over NATO’s Afghan operations’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (10 March 2008) – particularly where he notes: ‘Moreover, the [NATO] mission [in Afghanistan] is lacking a joint C4ISR structure and approach, as a result of caveats initiated on policies on intelligence. A US intelligence officer returning from Afghanistan tells Jane’s the non-sharing of sources between NATO/EU countries was qualified as a “real operational failure”. Adding to the policy layers of the intrinsic resistance against sharing in intelligence, there is still a daunting technical problem as far as interoperability of equipment and databases are concerned. A senior US Department of Defense official tells Jane’s the lack of investment within NATO countries also hampered good interoperability…’; see also CIA, ‘Guidelines for identifying and handling CIA information during declassification’, Review of records from the period 1946-1954, 6 (undated) - accessed via CIA Records Search Tool (CREST), US National Archives II, College Park, University of Maryland: CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060003-9 (2005/08/16).


33 See also for strict HUMINT restrictions present in the US intelligence community, ‘Full text: Conclusions of Senate’s Iraq report: Report on the prewar intelligence assessments’, MSNBC (09 July 2004) - via URL: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5403731/> (accessed: 20/02/2008) - particularly where it notes: ‘Another significant problem found by the Committee is the fact that the CIA continues to excessively compartment sensitive HUMINT reporting and fails to share important information about HUMINT reporting and sources with Intelligence Community analysts who have a need to know. In the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the CIA protected its Iraq weapons of mass destruction sources so well that some of the information they provided was kept from the majority of analysts with a legitimate need to know…’

34 S. Fidler, ‘The human factor: “All is not well in clandestine intelligence collection” In the second instalment of a two-part series, Stephen Fidler discusses how the Iraq war has demonstrated the continued importance of Mi6 to the CIA, despite the UK’s reliance on America’s investment in technology’, Financial Times (07 July 2004).

35 See Dupont, ‘Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century’, p.21 – where he states: ‘HUMINT has traditionally been considered a potentially high-value but low-volume contribution to the overall product of Western intelligence communities…’

36 On joint/coalition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts, see, for example, S.R. Gourley, ‘Imagery Intelligence – Allies simulate ISR data-sharing’, Jane’s International Defence Review (01 December 2006).

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39 For more information about the NGA, see its official website at URL: <http://www.nga.mil/> (accessed: 09/06/2006).

40 T. Ripley, ‘UK eyes Predator for Afghanistan operations’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (09 August 2006) - according to this article: ‘The British Army’s BAE Systems Phoenix UAV cannot operate in Afghanistan’s hot and high conditions…’ For the importance of UAVs to operations, see, for example, B. Sweetman, ‘In the tracks of the Predator: combat UAV programs are gathering speed’, Jane’s International Defence Review (01 August 2004); see also C. Duhigg, ‘The Pilotless Plane That Only Looks Like Child’s Play’, The New York Times (15 April 2007); see also ‘Defence priorities in the anti-terrorism campaign: Technology and procurement’, IISS Strategic Comments, 8, 2 (March 2002); see also Gourley, ‘Imagery Intelligence – Allies simulate ISR data-sharing’.

41 See also C. Wyatt, ‘Military’s crucial “eye in the sky”’, BBC News Online (29 May 2008).

42 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.293.

43 See, for instance, ‘North Korea claims nuclear test: North Korea says it has carried out its first test of a nuclear weapon’, BBC News Online (09 October 2006) - particularly where it is noted: ‘The US said intelligence had detected a seismic event at a suspected test site…’

44 See, for example, as frequently demonstrated throughout Chapter 5: Case Study 2, below; see also, for example, A. Wilkie, Axis of Deceit (Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2004), pp.91-3.


48 For details on JAC, see, for example, via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/eucom/jac/> (accessed: 20/02/2008).

49 These observations are based on information from non-attributable sources [e.g. i-3, i-4, i-7, i-8, i-12 + i-53].


See, for example, M.M. Aid and C. Wiebes (eds), Secrets of Signals Intelligence During the Cold War and Beyond (London: Routledge, 2001), p.317.

See, for example, paragraphs (a) and (4) under sub-heading ‘1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense,’ Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (04 June 2006) - via URL: <http://www.apfn.net/Messageboard/06-05-06/discussion.cgi.32.html> (accessed: 18/02/2008); see also ODNI, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY (2007), p.8 - via URL:<http://www.dni.gov/who_what/061222_DNIHandbook_Final.pdf> (accessed: 18/02/2008) - especially where it notes: ‘DIA’s Directorate for Human Intelligence (DH) … manages the Defense Attaché System, which has military attachés assigned to more than 135 U.S. embassies. These attachés are an integral part of the U.S. diplomatic presence abroad and help develop working relationships with foreign military forces. They represent the Secretary of Defense and other senior DoD officials to their overseas military counterparts.’; see also A. Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967).


For more information on this relationship, see, for example, Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (1999 [4ed.]), pp.307-8; see also ‘BBC Privilege at US Intelligence Web Site’ - via URL: <http://cryptome.org/bbc-osc.htm> (accessed: 18/09/2006). This webpage also shows an interesting screen-shot of the US OSC ‘registration affiliation’ page, which displays the option ‘BBC Monitoring employee’. Again, another insight is granted into UK-US shared computer ‘platforms’; see also the registration web page of the Opensource.gov website, and the sign up options available - via URL: <https://www.opensource.gov/login/RegistrationAffiliation.jsp> (accessed: 29/06/2007).

For more information on this topic, see, for example, ISC, Annual Report 2003-04 (June 2004), p.45, paragraph ‘J’; see also ISC, Annual Report 2005-06, pp.26-7, paragraphs 90-6; see also C. Pallaris, ‘Open Source Intelligence: A Strategic Enabler of National Security: The importance of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has grown in recent years. for the traditional intelligence community, OSINT is likely to remain one
component of an all-source intelligence capacity that includes classified sources. For most government agencies, however, OSINT is the only intelligence they have access to, which renders it a strategic enabler of decision- and policy-making. Governments should consider formulating a national OSINT strategy and establishing an OSINT center to allow for the effective exploitation of open source information’, CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 3, 32 (April 2008), pp.1-3 - via URL: <http://sei.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=B5D36B62-0E20-BC0B-DD2E-C12E73D54892&lng=en> (accessed: 20/04/2008).

58 For these further OSINT UK-US (and beyond) sharing arrangements, see, for example, the ‘International Partnerships’ panel information, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Open Source Conference, held at Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, DC (16-17 July 2007) - via URL: <https://www.dniopensource2007.com/sessions.cfm#GLOBAL%20INPUT7> (accessed: 22/11/2007).


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61 Based on information from a non-attributable source [i-22].

62 New “FBI-style” agency launched’, BBC News Online (01 April 2006); ‘Agency “to target brutal crime”’, BBC News Online (03 April 2006); see also ‘“British FBI” in huge staff hunt’, BBC News Online (10 June 2005); ‘“British FBI” to have new powers’, BBC News Online (11 January 2005); ‘Blunkett unveils FBI-style police’, BBC News Online (29 March 2004). For more background on SOCA refer to its official website at URL: <http://www.soca.gov.uk/> (accessed: 09/06/2006). For further background on SOCA and how it works with the other UK intelligence agencies, see also the ISC, ‘Serious Organised Crime’, Annual Report 2005-2006, pp.29-31, paragraphs 105-112.


64 See, for example, the US State Department’s evaluation of SOCA in ‘United Kingdom’ in ‘Money laundering and financial crimes’, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2006, Volume II (March 2006), p.393 – via URL: <http://www.state.gov/> (accessed: 09/06/2006); see also for the ISC’s assessment of SOCA: ‘S. The Serious Organised Crime Agency is a large organisation formed relatively quickly from four separate bodies. It will take some time, in the Committee’s view, before its performance can be readily assessed against its strategic aims.’ - ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.27.

65 See also R.A. Best, Jr., ‘Intelligence Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated: 16 May 2007) - particularly where it is noted: ‘… Legislation was also enacted to create a Department of Homeland Security that would contain an analytical office responsible for integrating information from foreign intelligence and law enforcement sources.’ (p.CRS-14).

This document also serves as useful further evidence supportive of the argument of the US-led ‘top-down’ ‘international standardisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ of intelligence and law enforcement/security initiatives.

67 See, ‘FAQs’, question: ‘What will SOCA do overseas?’ - via URL: <http://www.soca.gov.uk/faqs/index.html> (accessed: 09/06/2006). The US, however, is an obvious country of posting for SOCA personnel; see also ‘Recruitment: Intelligence: Knowledge Management Departments’ and the subsection titled: ‘Relationships – responsible for managing SOCA’s relationships with key stakeholders, including day to day relationships with the Police Service and HMRC [Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs]; ensuring the benefits of collaborative working are fully understood, producing and maintaining formal Partnership Agreements; providing a single point of contact for each partner agency and embedding staff within those agencies as appropriate.’ Intelligence liaison additionally takes place in the other ‘Knowledge Management Departments’ – ‘Records’, ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Tasking and Co-ordination’. Again this points to the multi-location operation of intelligence liaison. For more information, see URL: <http://www.soca.gov.uk/recruitment/intelligence.html> (accessed: 16/07/2006).


69 N.B. On 2 October 2006, SO12 and SO13 were ‘restructured’ to form SO15 ‘Counter-terrorism command’ – via URL: <http://www.met.police.uk/terrorism/> (accessed: 04/10/2006); see also S. O’Neill, ‘Special Branch absorbed into counter-terror unit: Our correspondent reports on a new force created by Scotland Yard in response to the vastly altered worldwide threat since 9/11’, The Times (03 October 2006).

70 For the value to the US of the ‘legat’ and the intelligence liaison conducted by them, as well as further evidence of UK and US Police liaison, see, for example, Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.ii], below; see also as detailed in R.S. Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘From 9/11 to 7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges of Tomorrow’, Chatham House Transcript (07 April 2008) - via URL: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/11301_070408mueller.pdf> (accessed: 07/04/2008). For more background on Police liaison, see for example M. Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); for some examples of Police liaison, see I. Cobain, ‘Police call in foreign terror experts’, The Guardian (12 July 2005); J. Burns and J. Murray Brown, ‘Police in bank and charities probe’, The Financial Times (17 September 2001); ‘LA police ponder London link-up: Los Angeles police officers could be seconded to Scotland Yard to liaise on counter-terrorism operations’, BBC News Online (11 January 2006); for New York Police Department (NYPD) and UK Police links, see, for instance, as detailed in D. Linzer, ‘In New York, a Turf War in the Battle Against Terrorism’, The Washington Post (22 March 2008).


See, for example, A. Glees, P.H.J. Davies and J.N.L. Morrison, *The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee* (London: Social Affairs Unit, 2006), pp.43-44 – particularly where they note: ‘From its inception, the [UK Intelligence and Security] Committee has travelled widely, typically visiting two or three overseas countries a year and making several domestic visits to agency headquarters and other intelligence-related establishments. Committee members have also participated in the biennial international conference of oversight bodies, while the ISC has hosted a stream of visitors from foreign oversight organizations.’ Some more details about one of the ISC’s trips to the US can be obtained from ‘Appendix 3: Those met during the Committee’s visit to the USA, 8-12 May 2000’, in ISC, *Annual Report 1999-2000* (2000).

See also ‘Proposed reform of the Intelligence and Security Committee’ in ISC, *Annual Report 2006-2007* (January 2008), p.5; and *ibid.*, pp.4-5 – particularly where the report notes: ‘6. As part of the Committee’s programme of reviewing different oversight systems, we attended:

- the International Intelligence Review Agencies Conference held in South Africa;
- the Conference of the Parliamentary Committees for the oversight of intelligence and security services within the European Union held in Romania; and
- the International Symposium on intelligence oversight hosted by the Netherlands.

In terms of bilateral discussions, we visited the United States and hosted visitors from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Slovenia and Switzerland.’


For official background information on the UK JTAC, see URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/agencies/jtac.asp> (accessed: 14/08/2006); see also, for example, M. Huband, ‘US, Britain and Australia to build global intelligence operation to counter al-Qaeda’, *The Financial Times* (30 June 2004).

Herman, ‘Intelligence in the Anglo-American Relationship’, p.8.

See, for example, the details as cited in *Chapter 1: Introduction [6.0]*, above.

See, for example, M. Smith, *The Spying Game* (London: Politico’s, 2004), p.32. For the official background on the UK JIC, see URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/machinery/jic.asp> (accessed: 14/08/2006); see also P. Hennessy, *The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War* (London: Penguin, 2003 [Revised and updated edition]), pp.3-4; see also *The Typical CIA Political Analyst and What He Does* (June 1977) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R001900200017-2 (2004/07/08) – particularly where it notes: ‘Within the past year, our analyst will have briefed or debriefed the US ambassador to his country or countries of responsibility and several members of the country team, including the Department of Defense attaché. He will have briefed the foreign intelligence liaison representatives and commented on the product of the Joint Intelligence Committees of the UK, Canada, and Australia, in some cases causing them to change their analysis. He will also have briefed one or more members of Congress, a journalist or two, and officials of friendly foreign governments and intelligence services.’ (emphasis added).

81 UK National Intelligence Machinery (March 2005), p.22.
82 For a fuller discussion and definition of ‘groupthink’ in this study, see Chapter 1 [6.0], below.
83 For further background on the British security and intelligence agencies and the counter-terrorism issue, see, for instance, ‘Security Intelligence in the United Kingdom’, chapter 2 in P. Chalk and W. Rosenau, *Confronting the “Enemy Within”*: Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (RAND, 2004), from p.7.
84 See, for instance, ‘Liaison and the “Long War”, in Rosenau, ‘Liaisons Dangereuses?’, p.35; see also Chapter 5 [4.1.iii] of this study below.
86 For an example of these types of meetings and conferences between the UK and US, see Risen, *State of War*, p.113 – particularly where he states that: ‘The American and British intelligence services are so close that under normal circumstances, they hold an annual summit to discuss a wide range of issues in a relaxed setting...’
90 See, for example, the references to ‘New NATO intelligence centre opens in Britain’, *UK Ministry of Defence Press Release* (16 October 2006) – via URL:

91 The 17 US intelligence agencies are:
1. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE;
2. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
3. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
4. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE;
5. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS;
6. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH;
7. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY: OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS;
8. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION: OFFICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE;
9. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION: NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH;
10. NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;
11. NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE;
12. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY;
13. UNITED STATES AIR FORCE;
14. UNITED STATES ARMY;
15. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD;
16. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS; and
17. UNITED STATES NAVY.
- Source: ‘Contents’ in ODNI, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY; see also ‘The U.S. Intelligence Community’, chapter 3 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.30-53 – especially, the section entitled ‘The Many Different Intelligence Communities’ (p.34.).

92 Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.459; see also ‘5. TRANSCRIPT: Speech by Dr. Thomas Fingar [Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the US National Intelligence Council (NIC)] at the Council on Foreign Relations’, Media Highlights (Wednesday, 19 March 2008 [UNCLASSIFIED]), p.20 – especially where he notes: ‘…the scale of our community is intimidating to some. So we get the “We want to be able to have access and take advantage of what you’re doing, but we’re kind of nervous about our stuff being in it.” I have kind of a flip answer, which is simple. If you don’t trust my analysts to use your material, you shouldn’t expect them to be providing any analytic judgment to share with you… it resonates.’

93 For more on the legal/practice differences, see, for instance, as particularly discussed above in Chapter 1: Introduction [4.0] to this study and below in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.iv].

95 For more on this and related methodological issues, see Chapter 2 [2.1.ii] of this study, above.

96 See particularly, for example, where US President G.W. Bush noted in a speech to the National Defense University, Washington, DC, on ‘Missile Defence’, White House Transcript (1 May 2001): ‘…I’ve made it clear from the very beginning that I would consult closely on the important subject with our friends and allies who are also threatened by missiles and weapons of mass destruction…’ (emphasis added) - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/010501bush.html> (accessed: 08/03/2008).


98 For the responsibility placed upon ‘C’, see Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Annex F – What happened in the SIS’, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report (June 2000) - via URL: <http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4764/4764-axf.htm> (accessed: 25/10/2005) - particularly where it states: ‘(v) … SIS’s authority in passing information to its liaison partners derives from Section 2(1) of the ISA [Intelligence Services Act (1994)] which gives the Chief of SIS the control of the Service’s operations. Section 2(2)(a) obliges the Chief of SIS to ensure that no SIS information is disclosed except so far as necessary for various listed purposes. These include disclosure in the interests of national security. These interests are served by reciprocal exchanges of intelligence between liaison partners…’ Although, the remit of the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) also includes the responsibility ‘to maintain and supervise liaison with Commonwealth and foreign intelligence organisations as appropriate, and to consider the extent to which its product can be made available to them…’ - source: The [UK] National Intelligence Machinery (September 2001 [2ed.]), p.19 - PDF via URL: <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/> (accessed: 11/2005).


101 See also P.H.J. Davies, ‘Collection and Analysis on Iraq: A Critical Look at Britain’s Spy Machinery’, Studies in Intelligence, 49, 4 (2005) – particularly where he notes that ‘Butler identified a structural weakness in SIS’s quality control system embodied in its Requirements machinery.’


108 See also ‘Special Report: Technology and Terrorism: Terror What’s Next? Five years after 9/11, technology’s role against terrorism is still murky’, *IEEE Spectrum*, 43, 9 (New York: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, September 2006 [international edition]), pp.16-17; H. Goldstein, ‘Modeling Terrorists: New simulators could help intelligence analysts think like the enemy’, in *ibid.*, pp.18-26; J. Kumagai (ed.), ‘Nine cautionary tales: If terrorists decide to strike again, are we prepared? Not really, as these scenarios of extremism make clear’, *ibid.*, pp.28-37; C. Perrow, ‘Shrink the targets: We can’t defend everything. So we should take steps that protect against both terrorism and natural disasters’, *ibid.*, pp.38-41; see also K. Smith, ‘Success in future wars “depends on the human aspect”’,
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 4: Enhancing Interoperability


See also Dorman, Transforming to Effects-Based Operations, p.21 - especially where he notes: ‘For the UK, forming a coalition with the world’s only superpower is an increasing technological challenge.’
See, for example, P.T. Mitchell, ‘International Anarchy and Coalition Interoperability in High-Tech Environments’, chapter 7 in D. Carment and M. Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2006), pp.87-104; see also references to the ‘Technical Co-operation Programme (TTCP)’, where scientists and engineers from the UKUSA partner countries collaborate – in ‘Globalising homeland security’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (06 October 2006). Also based in part on information from a non-attributable source [i-3]; see also ‘5.

TRANSCRIPT: Speech by Dr. Thomas Fingar at the Council on Foreign Relations’, p.20 – particularly where he notes: ‘Many [foreign intelligence services] realize that they are not well structured for the contemporary world and the world to come; that they have to make changes. And they’re very interested in sort of what we’re doing, why we’re doing it, is it scalable from us to them and the like… some of the close partners want to make sure that as we do this [the US Intelligence Community become more integrated digitally] we don’t do it in ways that will prevent them from engaging with us. Let’s keep the door open for this…’

See, for example, ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007, pp.39-40 - especially where it notes: ‘J. The Committee is satisfied that, despite the substantial costs involved, the current SIGINT Modernisation [SIGMOD] programme represents an essential investment in maintaining GCHQ’s technological capabilities. Given the unremitting progress of technology – particularly internet-based communications – we believe it is vital that plans and budgets are established early to ensure that GCHQ is able to continue vital modernisation work. The Committee will continue to monitor the existing programme and intends to study these future plans carefully.’; see also ‘Technological change’ in ibid., pp.16-17.

For more background on the UK ‘internal’ (and to some extent overseas to selected allies) intelligence sharing technological facilitators see, for example, the section on ‘SCOPE’ in the ISC, Annual Report 2004-2005 (April 2005), p.27, para.70 onwards; for more on SCOPE, see also ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007, pp.25-26. See on ‘IMPACT’, an ICT system for sharing intelligence between UK Police forces and reportedly to eventually replace the Police National Computer (PNC), A. McCue, ‘Police go ahead with £367m national intelligence system: Forces will be able to share vital information by 2010…’, Silicon.com (20 April 2006) – via URL: <http://www.silicon.com/publicsector/0,3800010403,39158222,00.htm> (accessed: 05/08/2006); see also the official information on IMPACT at URL: <http://police.homeoffice.gov.uk/operational-policing/impact/> (accessed: 03/10/2006). For the US see, for example, A. Broache, ‘US push for more internal anti-terror data sharing: The devil is in the detail…’, Silicon.com (18 January 2006) – via URL: <http://management.silicon.com/government/0,39024677,39155702,00.htm> (accessed: 05/08/2006).

There is also scope for at least aspects of these ‘internal’ intelligence systems to be shared with close intelligence partners, through granting limited access to certain areas, for instance. For systems facilitating joint UK-US exchange of data, see, for example, T. Ripley, ‘ASTOR tests will prove data sharing with legacy systems’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (27 September 2006).

See by way of illustration, D. Eggen and G. Witte, ‘The FBI’s Upgrade That Wasn’t: $170 Million Bought an Unusable Computer System’, The Washington Post (18 August 2006). For further background on some of the information sharing and technology problems confronted by the US
intelligence community, see, for example, C. Thompson, ‘Open-Source Spying’, *The New York Times Magazine* (03 December 2006).

115 US intelligence also look set to share one of their recent intelligence databases, the so-called ‘Intellipedia’, modelled on the popular internet encyclopaedia, ‘Wikipedia’, with their other UKUSA allies: UK, Australia and Canada – see, for example, F. Ahrens, ‘A Wikipedia Of Secrets’, *The Washington Post* (05 November 2006); see also R.J. Smith, ‘Report Details Missteps in Data Collection: Over a three-year period ending in 2005, the FBI collected intimate information about the lives of a population roughly the size of Bethesda's -- 52,000 -- and stored it in an intelligence database accessible to about 12,000 federal, state and local law enforcement authorities and to certain foreign governments [including the UK?]’, *The Washington Post* (10 March 2007); for a letter to Mr. E.P. Black, Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee, Office of the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, regarding the establishment of the US intelligence community APEX system and its possible shared use with Canada, dated 29 July 1980, see via CREST – CIA-RDP85T00788R0000100110017-4 (2004/05/12).

116 See, for example, ‘ISYS finds new popularity as counter-terrorism tool’, *PR Newswire Europe* (09 June 2003).

117 These so-called ‘watch lists’ can be highly controversial, particularly if the names flagged up result in ensnaring the wrong people with the same name, for instance, at airports – see S. Kroft, ‘Unlikely Terrorists On No Fly List’, *60 Minutes - CBS News* (08 October 2006) - via URL: <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/05/60minutes/printable2066624.shtml> (accessed: 20/10/2006); see also for the US terror watchlist trying to meet the ‘catch-all/most’ objective, K. DeYoung, ‘Terror Database Has Quadrupled In Four Years: U.S. Watch Lists Are Drawn From Massive Clearinghouse’, *The Washington Post* (25 March 2007).

118 See, for example, O. Bowcott, ‘Biometrics – great hope for world security or triumph for Big Brother? British police ready to link up to databases of US intelligence’, *The Guardian* (18 June 2004).

119 See, for example, B. Starr, ‘CIA looks to web to solve data overload’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (01 August 1997).


121 See the references to SCOPE cited above; see also M. Ballard, ‘UK and US plan realtime police database links: Dry run on immigration databases’, *The Register* (03 October 2006) - via URL: <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/10/03/us_uk_dbsharing/> (accessed: 08/04/2007) - particularly where it is noted that: ‘UK and US immigration databases have been linked in an intelligence sharing experiment that could lead to permanent trans-Atlantic data stores of wanted and suspected people. Data is already shared in an ad-hoc fashion between London's Metropolitan Police and the US Federal Bureau of Investigations, but direct links between databases have not been possible because different forces use different standards to store and process data… Robert Mocny [sic.], acting director of the
US-VISIT programme at the Department of Homeland Security, called for more information to be shared globally between government agencies.’; see also D.I. McKeel, ‘U.S. Law Enforcement Promoting Data Exchange on Terrorism’, The Washington File/USINFO (25 April 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror660.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007): ‘Within hours of the July 2005 bombing of a London commuter train, Scotland Yard was able call upon law enforcement expertise worldwide, thanks to DFuze, a database developed by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). “DFuze allows our foreign partners to seamlessly transfer knowledge as a case unfolds,” making the database a useful tool in the global war on terrorism, said Jim McDermond, ATF assistant director of strategic intelligence … Launched in 2004, DFuze is an encrypted database available to participating law enforcement and allied government organizations to help collect, analyze and exchange information related to incidents involving explosives or arson, technical information about recovered devices, perpetrators and methods of bomb delivery, as well as response data concerning chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear devices. DFuze provides investigators and analysts with built-in tools for imaging, secure record transmissions, high-speed data searches, multimedia intelligence management and the ability to print hard copy reports. In addition, DFuze offers a multilingual user interface with the ability to translate its data fields into Arabic, English, French, Portuguese or Spanish, allowing users to exchange information without losing it in translation. …’

122 B. Woodward, State of Denial: Bush At War, Part III (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), pp.318-9; for more concerns about the ‘NOFORN’ hampering international intelligence sharing, see D.J. Murphy, The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Policy Review Office, ‘Subject: Revision of DCID 1/7, “Control of Dissemination of Intelligence Information”, Memorandum for Executive Secretary, National Foreign Intelligence Board (11 January 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP82M00591R000200120014-3 (2004/11/03) – where it notes: ‘While the NOFORN marking may serve a useful security function in readily identifying intelligence which should not be released to foreign governments, it often poses problems for those charged with responsibility for foreign disclosure and liaison with foreign governments… To be sure, the foreign disclosure/foreign liaison officer who wishes to release the information in question can obtain the permission of the originator, but it is the rare case where an overseas liaison officer takes the trouble to return for the originator’s approval – indeed, the identity of the “originator” is often not readily apparent. Thus the foreign liaison officer… is confronted with a time-consuming and an often uncertain task if he wishes to pursue release of the document in question. He is further confounded by the haphazard use of the marking… Ideally, its use ought to be limited to intelligence which is not, by specific criteria, releasable to any foreign government. It ought not to be left to the judgment of an individual.’ (Emphasis in original).

123 See, for example, Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’ and sources listed in his ‘footnote 19’, p.460; for the general importance of IP (Internet Protocol) network systems creating new partnerships, see, for example, A. Plewes, ‘IP equals new alliances – get used to it’, Silicon.com (20 August 2003) – via URL: <http://comment.silicon.com/0.39024711.10005663.00.htm> (accessed: 05/08/2006). N.B. Although this article focusses on the commercial sector/world of business, arguably the same concepts discussed are applicable to the intelligence world as well.
See, for example, ‘General warns over digitalization split’, *Jane’s International Defence Review* (01 January 2001), where the article notes: ‘Full interoperability between forces would depend upon integrated collaborative planning, based on the maintenance of a common operating picture and common intelligence inputs. Without appropriate digital communications this would not be practical, and made all the more unlikely because the US secure wideband network (SIPRNET) is NOFORN (US eyes only).’ For another example of exclusivity in UK-US intelligence liaison see, for example, R. Pengelley, ‘UK offered access to US “black” radio for FIST’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (19 October 2005); see also R. Pengelley, ‘UK rethinks joint effects computing plan’, *Jane’s International Defence Review* (01 October 2006); R. Pengelley, ‘UK and US seek to breach communications impasse’, *Jane’s International Defence Review* (01 September 2007); for further background on the SIPRNet and NIPRNet (non-/Unclassified but sensitive internet protocol router network), see US Department of Defense, ‘DISN Data Services’, *Defense Information Systems Agency* - via URL: <http://www.disa.mil/main/prodsol/data.html> (accessed: 15/06/2007).

See, for example, the detailed account given in Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp.380-1. Again, some of the obstacles present at the lower levels of relations, such as at the operational level, are demonstrated.

Based on information from a non-attributable source [c-38].

Based on information from a non-attributable source [u-35].


See also T. Skinner, ‘UK communications systems reach milestone stages’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (06 July 2005); ‘US and Europe believe in MAJIC’, *Jane’s International Defence Review* (01 January 2004); for an insight into other general and related developments in this area, see, for instance, ‘Special Feature [giving a snapshot of the services the Defence Fixed Telecommunications Service (DFTS) can offer]: Assured information anytime, anywhere: Social change and recent legislation is altering the expectations of employees [including those in the intelligence, defence and security sectors]. The development of assured, flexible communications means that organisations should embrace the opportunities this affords rather than feel they are losing control.’, *RUSI Defence Systems*, 9, 1 (Summer 2006), pp.102-3.

See, for example, G. Ebbutt, ‘Flaws in the system: modern operations test the theory of network centricity’, *International Defence Review* (01 July 2006); see also J. Kucera, “‘Iraqi Freedom” report shows up shortcomings’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (07 April 2004).


See also N. Hodge, ‘Networking system aids “Flintlock”’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (19 September 2007).


See also, for example, US Secretary of Defense, D. Rumsfeld’s testimony to the US Senate Armed Service Committee, quoted in S. Schifferes, ‘Rumsfeld brushes aside WMD fears’, *BBC News Online* (09 July 2003).

See, for example, A. Sampson, ‘Secret Services: Security v. Accountability’, chapter 11 in his *Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of Britain in the Twenty-First Century* (London: John Murray, 2004 [Updated Edition]), from p.148; see also the Introduction (Chapter 1 [4.1]) of this study.

See also *Introduction, Chapter 1 [10.0]*, of this study.


See, for example, as reported in S. Aftergood, ‘Deliberating the Intelligence Budget in France’, *FAS Secrecy News*, 2007, 123 (14 December 2007).


W. Pincus, ‘Intelligence Budget Disclosure Is Hailed’, *The Washington Post* (31 October 2007); see also S. Aftergood, ‘DoD Regulation on Formulating the Intelligence Budget’, *FAS Secrecy News*, 2007, 111 (07 November 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘The U.S. intelligence budget is comprised of two spending “aggregations”: the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence Program (MIP) … The NIP budget, which totaled $43.5 billion in 2007 according to last
week’s official disclosure, funds intelligence to support national policy makers. The MIP budget, which probably amounts to at least another $10 billion, supports the Secretary of Defense, the military services, and military commanders in the field. In practice, the distinction between the NIP and the MIP is not crystal clear, and several large “national” intelligence agencies -- including NSA, DIA, NGA, NRO -- also receive funding through the MIP.


The recent growth of UK military intelligence can be cited – from a non-attributable source [c-38].
Chapter 5: The Case Studies
Evaluating UK-US intelligence liaison in the early 21st Century:
The ‘operationalisation’ of understandings

Introduction:
Strategic & operational dissonances & harmonies

This chapter presents the two case studies. These contextualise and evaluate episodes of UK-US intelligence liaison: firstly, against terrorism; and secondly, against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. These case studies also empirically underpin the efforts at theorising intelligence liaison undertaken throughout this study. The case studies have been adopted for pragmatic reasons. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, they represent the key issue areas that the UK and US intelligence communities have constantly liaised over from 2000 to 2005, and beyond. These issues have been liaised over particularly intensively since after the 9/11 attacks on the US and during the so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’. The two case studies are closely interrelated, for instance where terrorism and WMD concerns overlap, as well as being intensive and critical in their scope.

Especially since 9/11, the quest for enhanced security has been dominant. This has been sought by both the UK - and particularly markedly – the US in their foreign policies. A discernable shift has resulted. Rather than as previously that quest trying to be realised merely on defensive grounds, it has tried to be realised more instantaneously on offensive-defensive grounds. The military has simultaneously become the primary agency in contemporary international affairs in order to deliver that enhanced security.

The examples selected for examination in Case Study 1 appropriately catalogue the central trend of the shift against terrorism. In summary, this can be characterised as moving from being: (i) more of a ‘containment’ approach – that is: reactive, overall broader and ‘softer’, promoting an ‘anti-terrorism paradigm’; to being (ii) more of a ‘rollback’ approach – that places more of an emphasis on overarching ‘harder’, proactive, preventative and pre-emptive qualities, propagating a ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’. Rather than counter-terrorism tactics forming merely
one part (tool or pillar) of the overall anti-terrorism approach, this dimension is instead enhanced. Meanwhile, the other anti-terrorism strategy tactics have simultaneously become more subsumed or overlooked during the strategising of counter-terrorism.

Similar trends can be readily discerned in the proliferation domain. The example of supposed Iraqi WMD, selected for exploration in Case Study 2, effectively illustrates the shift from: (i) more of a ‘containment’ stance – promoting a wider overall ‘softer’ ‘non-proliferation paradigm’; to (ii) more of a ‘rollback’ stance – propagating an overall narrower and ‘harder’ preventative and pre-emptive ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’. Again, in the broader non-proliferation approach, counter-proliferation tactics only form one aspect or pillar in its toolset. However, during the years 2000-05, and especially post-9/11, the implementation of this last pillar has been particularly enhanced. Alongside the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’, a ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ has therefore been increasingly implemented by the US, and, by close association, the UK. This shift can also be characterised as the strategising of counter-proliferation, rather than it remaining as merely a tactic. Also this shift effectively represents the tipping point between mainly applying the ‘intelligence methodology’ or the ‘security/law enforcement methodology’ during the pursuit of operations. Again, in this shift, the UK has not gone quite as far or as fast as the US. Naturally, some UK and US strategic and operational dissonances, and equally harmonies, flow from these sorts of considerations. These shall now be explored in greater depth within the following case studies.

\[\ldots\]

\textit{(Over the page – [Plates 1-8]: Presented below are 16 photographs of key participants in UK-US relations, many of whom feature in the following case studies.)}
Chapter 5: Case Study 1

Enhancing efforts against terrorism:
Implementing the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’

‘I cannot remember any incident in my work where we were hesitant to share anything… It’s a bit of a special case with the Brits.’

- Admiral James M. Loy, Deputy Secretary of the US DHS (2003-05).1

[1.0]: Prologue

The years 2000 to the end of 2005 were punctuated by a series of major jihadist-inspired terrorist attacks that signalled further developments in the continuing rapid evolution of terrorism.2 On 11 September 2001, international terrorism vividly struck the American homeland. The attacks were ‘spectaculars’ and seized the attention of the world, galvanising the international engagement and the Bush administration’s fight against terrorism.3 Virtually simultaneously, four US domestic flights were hijacked. Two aeroplanes crashed into the two World Trade Center towers, which both shortly later collapsed, killing c.2,500 people. The third aeroplane crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth aeroplane, said to be en route to the White House or Camp David, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.4 266 crew and passengers were killed on the planes.5 The following year, on 12 October 2002, two bomb explosions tore through busy nightclubs in the Kuta district of Bali. According to the final death toll, 202 people died as a result of the attacks, including 26 Britons.6 The following month, on 28 November 2002, in Kenya, two missiles were fired at a civilian Israeli aeroplane just after take-off from Mombasa airport, but missed. Minutes afterwards, there was a suicide bomb attack on the Israeli-owned ‘Paradise Hotel’, at least 11 people were killed.7 The year 2003 saw attacks in Saudi Arabia, Casablanca (44 killed) and on UK interests in Istanbul (killing more than 30 people, including the UK Consul-General).8 On 11 March 2004, 10 bombs exploded on four packed Madrid commuter trains in three stations during the morning ‘rush-hour’. 191 people were killed in the attacks.9 In 2005, on the morning of 7 July, almost simultaneously, three bombs exploded on the London Underground (the ‘Tube’). A fourth bomb exploded almost an hour later on a bus. Four suicide bombers carried out the bombings; 52 other people died with over 700 injured.10 Significantly, these attacks represented the first time suicide attacks had been carried out in Europe. On 21 July, four more bombings were attempted on three London Underground trains and a bus. The devices failed to detonate.11
These episodes catalogue but a few of the terrorist attacks that took place. The attacks also formed the most pressing issues that governments and their publics alike were trying to comprehend, and then address, in the nascent twenty-first century. Indeed, the ‘new’ terrorism - hailed at least in conceptual terms throughout the 1990s - now appeared to be beginning to be directly experienced. ‘Where and what next?’ were questions that figured prominently. ‘Fire-fighting’ and other emergency first-response activities (more akin to crisis management, rather than mere risk management) were fast becoming the dominant mode of operating, with the desire for effective preventative pre-emption in the name of ‘public safety’ firmly on the ascendancy in Washington and London. Time for reflection by intelligence and security services was increasingly eclipsed. This was apparent as their predominant task became one of successfully getting ‘ahead of’, rather than remaining ‘behind’, the prevailing ‘curve’ of events.

[2.0]: Introduction

This case study evaluates UK-US intelligence liaison focussed on the key issue area of counter-terrorism (CT) from 2000 to 2005. A high volume of intelligence on CT issues is shared between the UK and US. Despite having slightly differing strategic cultures and CT approaches and emphases, there is sufficient common ground for considerable UK-US agreement on CT. The UK and US, therefore, co-operate closely on the issue of CT. This is perhaps in part epitomised by the existence of the ‘UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland Security’, established in June 2003 by an agreement between the then UK Home Secretary David Blunkett and the then US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge. Furthermore, both the UK and the US political and intelligence communities are agreed on the essential need for effective, but not unbounded, international co-operation to help deal with the threat. This is an agreement that helps to pave the way for particularly close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison.

In their detail, the different UK-US CT styles can at times diverge. This can engender some tensions of fluctuating degrees of intensity over time during UK-US intelligence liaison. However, these tensions ultimately appear not to thwart overall joint UK-US CT efforts, and in broad terms there is substantial overlap in the UK and US approaches on which common, though not always smooth, movements focussed on CT can be made. The greatest UK-US CT collaboration is witnessed when catalysed by specific terrorist attacks, such as 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the US and 7 July 2005 (7/7) in the UK.
Bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is generally healthy. In terms of the schools relating to the nature of overall Anglo-American relations, from 2000 into 2006 ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ were the dominant drivers. Any hints of ‘terminalism’ were considerably less, being tied to particular episodes of specific disconnect, and were subject to being swiftly suppressed through their ready navigation. Overall, on pragmatic, functional bases, ultimately too much was at stake for both the UK and US to let those ‘narrower’ considerations counter-productively obstruct in wider terms.

Multilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue of CT is no less important. Indeed, here, CT is the lead issue in these types of interactions. While ‘less-exclusive’ than the multilateral liaison that takes place within the UKUSA SIGINT arrangement, this works on the basis of international intelligence liaison with other countries, as well as within international organisations and arrangements, including the United Nations (UN),\(^\text{17}\) the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),\(^\text{18}\) the G8,\(^\text{19}\) and with the European Union (EU).\(^\text{20}\) As the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) remarked in their *Renditions* report:

> The importance of international cooperation between intelligence and security services was emphasised after 9/11 by UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which called on all States to work ever closer in the fight to combat terrorism. In particular, it called for States to “find ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or networks” and to cooperate more generally to “prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts”.\(^\text{21}\)

Indeed, the UK and the US were key driving partners behind getting UNSCR 1373, as well as its substance, quickly onto the table and unanimously adopted on 28 September 2001.\(^\text{22}\) As part of the measures introduced, the Counter-Terrorism Committee was established at the UN to effectively oversee the subsequent implementation of the requirements as stipulated by UNSCR 1373, including the enhanced internationalisation of intelligence co-operation.\(^\text{23}\) Other interesting movements were also lent some further impetus by the adoption of UNSCR 1373. These involved assisting developing countries in building up their counter-terrorism capabilities.\(^\text{24}\)

However, despite these more multilateral movements, some familiar parameters remain distinct. Accordingly, to maintain at least some intelligence protectionism, and to best prevent intelligence compromise in the face of security
and counter-intelligence anxieties, the multilateral intelligence liaison necessarily continues to work on more of a restricted ‘need to know’ basis. This is rather than on the greater ‘need to share/pool’ basis of more exclusive bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison. Smaller quantities of increasingly ‘diluted’ or ‘sanitised’ intelligence are exchanged, with interactions featuring more in the form of information sharing.

Some analytical distinctions are helpful. This is especially when evaluating multilateral intelligence liaison in these ‘less-exclusive’ forums, and indeed when evaluating intelligence liaison generally. These distinctions include: (i) differences between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’; (ii) the type(s) of intelligence involved – SIGINT, MASINT, OSINT, etc.; (iii) the different forms intelligence can take – is it ‘raw’ or ‘finished/processed’ intelligence, ‘single-source’ or ‘all-source’, analysis (what is it?) or assessment (UK)/estimate (US) (what does it mean?) product?; (iv) purpose: what is it needed for - ‘strategy/policy’ and/or ‘tactical/operational’ purposes, thereby is it operationally-viable/processable/serious intelligence, or is it more ‘sanitised’ intelligence, in order to better protect sources and methods, for strategic/decision-making purposes?; (v) how is the intelligence access/sharing/exchange occurring – is it ad hoc (conducted on a ‘need to know’ basis) or more regularised and/or institutionalised (conducted on a ‘need to share/pool’ basis), formal or informal?; and (vi) when is the intelligence access/sharing/exchange taking place – for instance, is it a priori (before events, in an attempt to pre-empt/prevent them) or post facto (in the context of post-event investigations); and (vii) where is the intelligence access/sharing/exchange taking place – for example, is it in an organisation at headquarters level, more out-in-the-field in ‘operational commands’ or in ‘Sensitive Compartmentalised Information Facilities’ (SCIFs), if such distinctions exist (for example, in the NATO context)?

Specific details concerning the particular intelligence liaison under-scrutiny acquire enhanced importance.

The general impetus for international co-operation on CT is high. It also continues to grow. Not least, international co-operation is a useful means of intelligence gathering. Throughout the 1990s, the jihadist-inspired terrorist threat to the US and to the ‘international community’ as a whole had been becoming increasingly apparent, lethal and with more of a global reach as time progressed. This was seen notably, for example, in 1993 with the World Trade Center (WTC) underground car park bombing in New York and the shooting of two CIA employees outside CIA headquarters in Langley, and later in 1998 with the almost simultaneous US embassy bombings in Kenya, where 224 people were killed. Subsequently, there were substantial and increasing calls for greater international co-operation on terrorism as the new millennium approached. Cosmetically at least, this was seen on 18 October
1999 when UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1269 was passed: ‘unequivocally condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and calling on states to strengthen international cooperation in fighting terrorism and bringing terrorists to justice.’ Overall, later reflecting back, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the Director General of MI5 (2002-07), in the words of the ISC, ‘described the UK’s work on [international co-operation on terrorism] in the post-11 September environment as a continuum with expansion, rather than a kick-start…’ The findings of this case study support that observation. The terrorist attacks meanwhile served as catalysts on the expansion or at least drove forward its underlying impetus.

Throughout, this case study draws on a number of prominent themes. Adopting a largely thematic-chronological hybrid approach, this case study evaluates in depth UK-US intelligence liaison on CT from 2000 to the end of 2005. With main focus on the domain where the most interactions take place, the key theme explored is bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison. This is evaluated, first, more generally, and then focussed on a series of more specific issues. References out to multilateral intelligence liaison arrangements, with which the UK and US are closely associated, simultaneously figure. A useful place to begin, however, is with some of the differences concerning how the UK and US approach the tackling of terrorism.

[3.0]: Differentiated UK and US approaches to countering terrorism

‘Frustrating terrorism’ both vis-à-vis and versus ‘defeating terrorism’ captures the core differences present in the respective UK and US approaches to addressing terrorism. This is together with characterising the sources of their synergies and tensions. The overall CT approaches of both the UK and the US consist of two key pillars. These are conceptualised here as: (i) ‘law enforcement’, where broader anti-terrorism tactics are reflected in the overall strategy adopted (reflective of the ‘anti-terrorism paradigm’); and (ii) ‘militarised’, where narrower counter-terrorism tactics predominate in the overarching strategy pursued (reflective of the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’). Within each of the UK and US approaches, elements of both the intelligence (‘wait and watch’) and military (‘see and strike’) methodologies are reflected. A complex co-existence duality is present at their core. For instance, the investigation element reflects the intelligence-style of using surveillance tactics, while the actual act of the application of the law (enforcing/implementing the law) reflects more a military-style of tactics, which involves the breaking up and disrupting of criminal activities. Here, the tensions between ‘pure’ intelligence and security activities (and equally their differences) similarly become distinct.
There are fundamental tensions between the two pillars. These tensions not least involve timescales. This is especially apparent at the ‘operational’ level, concerning at what point in time should intelligence operations be stopped and the law enforced - typically through the interdicting of suspects? Naturally, on which pillar the most emphasis is put determines the core balance and overarching nature of the CT approach and strategy implemented. Overall, UK and US security strategies have slightly different configurations. In its law enforcement dominated (and more subset militarised) approach to CT, the UK appears to put greater emphasis on the intelligence methodology. Instead, the US, in its militarised dominated (and more subset law enforcement) approach to CT, appears to put greater emphasis on the military methodology. This contributes to a differing balance to varying degrees in the nature of their respective overall CT approaches. In part, due to their respective experiences, the UK views terrorism more as a tactic and the US views terrorism more as a strategy.

In summary, as Lutz and Lutz note when drawing distinctions: ‘Terrorism can be viewed as a problem to be resolved by military means (war on terrorism) [more the US approach], by normal police techniques (terrorism as crime), or as a medical problem with underlying causes and symptoms (terrorism as disease)...’ the last two of which are more characteristic of the UK approach. At times these differentiated CT approaches can converge and complement in a synergistic manner (by figuring in their vis-à-vis mode).

However, at other junctures, they can diverge and clash, even compete (by instead featuring in their versus mode). This generates tensions of varying degrees of intensity in relations. Again, while overall the UK has tended to stress the frustrating of terrorism, the US has tended to instead emphasise the defeating of terrorism. For many in Europe, over time the phrase ‘War on Terror’ has considerably rankled. Both domestically and internationally, the UK traditionally responds to terrorism and insurgencies as an ‘emergency’, rather than a ‘war’. These considerations, involving more than mere semantics, naturally have some implications for how UK and US intelligence and security confront the issue of terrorism. Again, a range of strategic and operational dissonances and, equally, harmonies between the UK and US can flow from such distinctions.

[4.0]: Bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on counter-terrorism

In 2000, close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue of CT was not new. As the so-called ‘new’ terrorism developed, the intelligence co-operation on CT had evolved in-step. Terrorism ‘is a common problem so intelligence is shared...’,
candidly remarked a Whitehall official in November 2002. The UK Government echoed this sentiment in its response to the 2007 ISC Renditions report: ‘... Many of the terrorist threats to the UK have international connections which can only be dealt with effectively in cooperation with the intelligence and security agencies of other States.’ As the US Joint Inquiry examining the attacks of 9/11 observed in December 2002, prior to the attacks: ‘The [US] intelligence community depended heavily on foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism activities.’ This was especially due to the persisting perennial weaknesses of US intelligence concerning HUMINT (see below [4.1.i]).

Indeed, terrorism has been a long-term driver for spurring close intelligence liaison. For this reason, close US intelligence liaison with countries such as the UK was necessary. Although, overall, the Joint Inquiry went on to judge that: ‘The results were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflecting vast differences in the ability and willingness of the various foreign services to target the Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida network...’ The UK, however, was a leading partner with the US on CT. In 2006, the ISC noted that: ‘intelligence on Islamic terrorist networks... has been a JIC Priority Band 1 [high priority] requirement for many years, well before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001.’ Over time, overseas liaison continued to be of importance to the UK. Yet, in 2000, the volume of intelligence exchanged was quantitatively less than would be seen later. This was due to the then prevailing circumstances.

Before the 9/11 attacks, different main UK and US CT priorities were evident. This trend of each being mainly preoccupied with their own, at times disparate, highest priority terrorist targets naturally resulted in there being less CT intelligence collaboration. Greater CT collaboration and harmonisation of approaches were seen once the UK and US highest priority CT targets had significantly converged after the 9/11 attacks on the US. This trend was cemented after several new joint investigations had been launched. Subsequent attacks, such as the 7/7 London bombings, had a similar ‘multiplier effect’ on UK-US CT interactions, assisting in their focussing.

The structures to facilitate UK-US intelligence liaison already existed prior to 9/11. The framework and channels facilitating the exchange of information, and close UK-US intelligence liaison, were already functioning. The UK-US interactions were taking place along the lines as outlined in Chapter 4, above. After the 9/11 attacks, the volume and frequency of intelligence flow through these began to increase substantially. Further channels were also opened up to cope with the enhanced supply and demand. This happened especially as CT targets converged
and as the numbers of specific cases opened for joint investigation proliferated exponentially.\textsuperscript{47}

There was increased UK-US convergence at all levels. On 9/11, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair unhesitatingly declared the UK’s solidarity with the US: ‘We ... in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.’\textsuperscript{48} Some of the ‘evangelicalism’ present in UK-US relations was revealed. Between the UK and US intelligence agencies, George Tenet, head of the CIA, called Sir Richard Dearlove, Chief of SIS (MI6), ‘to tell him what we were hearing and what we knew’. Especially as events were rapidly unfolding in real-time on 9/11, there were concerns regarding what Tenet later described as ‘a commercial passenger jet on its way to Great Britain [which] was emitting all kinds of squawks, with its transponder going off and on...’\textsuperscript{49} On 12 September, as a physical realisation of the UK and US intelligence services standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’, the Director of GCHQ (Sir Francis Richards), the Chief of SIS (Dearlove) and the Deputy Director-General of the Security Service (MI5) (then Manningham-Buller) flew to the US for urgent discussions with their US counterparts.\textsuperscript{50} As Tenet later recalled: ‘I still don’t know how they got flight clearance into the country, but they came on a private plane, just for the night, to express their condolences and to be with us. We had dinner that night at Langley, an affirmation of the special relationship between our two nations and as touching an event as I experienced during my seven years as [US Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)].’\textsuperscript{51}

Later, the contemporary centrality of liaison was further demonstrated. Indeed, in relation to international intelligence liaison generally, in the \textit{Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual Report 2001–2002}, the UK Government noted that:

\begin{quote}
The ISC supports the collaborative work of the Agencies with their partners abroad, and wants to see this vigorously pursued in the future. Even before 9/11, there were well-established and effective links, both bilateral and multilateral, between the Agencies and a wide range of international partners, on counter-terrorist and other investigations and operations. The Government shares the ISC objective of making such liaison relationships even more close and effective.\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

UK and US CT targets increasingly converged. Previously already at the top of the agendas of GCHQ and MI6, and gradually making its way up the other UK intelligence agendas, international, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and \textit{jihadist}-related terrorism now forcefully dominated all of the UK and US intelligence agencies’
increasingly harmonised agendas. As the leading priority, this variety of terrorism was going to get sustained attention, as well as the allocation of substantial intelligence and security community resources directed towards its tackling. As one analyst commented, noting the UK’s value as an educative CT intelligence partner to the US, the UK is ‘America’s premier ally, and the potential number two target for Al-Qaeda... But with more than 30 years’ experience of dealing with IRA activity, the UK is ahead of the US in many areas, including intelligence...’ Although, while there was British willingness to impart this experience and the lessons learnt to their US counterparts, these lessons were not always universally welcomed.

CT investigations were rejuvenated. After the 9/11 attacks, the US and UK intelligence agencies in their investigations now could cast at a minimum a slightly better targeted - yet in practice still wide - net for leads. Enhanced international intelligence liaison on CT efforts was of central importance. Response to this impetus was soon forthcoming, albeit more gradually over time on the multilateral bases. The departing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton unambiguously declared: ‘Intelligence will be key. There is no question about it.’

Joint UK-US interests were also more pronounced. The importance of maintaining close UK-US intelligence relations on CT issues, and UK-US relations more widely, was stressed pragmatically in 2005 by Ed Owen, a former special adviser to the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: ‘The bottom line... is that “the US has the diplomatic and military strength to make things happen. They are the dominant power and in so many areas there’s nothing that can be done without their support... What’s the alternative?”’ The belief that UK and US interests are close was frequently stated. In November 2002, during the NATO Prague Summit, UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon emphasised the extent to which the UK and US came together on issues such as CT: ‘I do not see a divergence between the basis of UK and US security interests... Our security interests coincide or are very similar, whether as part of our close bilateral relationship or within wider defence alliances such as Nato.’ This suggested some continuing UK-US convergence particularly detectable at the macro ideological/theoretical level of relations.

By the end of 2005, the scope of UK CT investigations was continuing to expand. The investigations were edging slightly closer towards the large-scale nature of US CT efforts. This was during attempts by UK intelligence to strike better intelligence and security reach balances within its own terror enquiries, as well as to become more effectively ‘catch-all/most’ in a broadening of its risk management approach. In the UK, the devotion of further resources was later seen as being helpful in addressing any perceived intelligence and surveillance under-reach.
The bilateral intelligence liaison between the UK and US on CT from 2000 to the end of 2005 took two major closely related forms. Firstly, there was general intelligence liaison; secondly, there was more focussed intelligence liaison concerning specific issues, such as on: (i) whether to publicise intelligence or not, (ii) ‘persons of interest’, (iii) counter-cyber-terrorism, and (iv) ‘asset freezing’ and financial CT efforts. Each of these will now be explored in turn.

[4.1]: General intelligence liaison:
General intelligence liaison formed the bulk of UK-US interactions on CT. This tended to be less specifically focussed, and was more concerned with broader issues figuring at the macro/higher ‘ideological/theoretical’ and ‘strategy/policy’ levels. More peripheral concerns and topics for UK-US intelligence liaison were also covered here. Several generic issues emerged over time during the bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on CT from 2000 to the end of 2005. Those that appear to particularly standout in the historical record will now be explored. This is together with efforts towards their appropriate contextualisation.

[4.1.i]: Before 9/11 – Different highest priority targets:
At the beginning of 2000, international and jihadist al-Qaeda-related terrorism was the main CT focus of the US.\(^63\) This was due to the increasing series of attacks against US interests from this source throughout the 1990s. From 1998 and after the US embassy bombings in Africa, the US intelligence and law enforcement agencies had already declared ‘war’ on the jihadist-inspired al-Qaeda terrorism,\(^64\) although, the ‘war’ was not as all encompassing and overt, as that which would be seen after the 9/11 attacks. Moreover, at this juncture, the main US emphasis was still focussed on anti-terrorism, before a fuller implementation of what can be termed the wider and deeper reaching ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’.

The spectre of terrorism overshadowed the new millennium celebrations. On the US CT front, during December 1999 there was the arrest in the US of Ahmed Ressam along with the recovery of explosives.\(^65\) There was also the pressing need to disrupt the associated so-called ‘Millennium Threat’ in the US and Jordan. US CT efforts included thwarting the plot to bomb Los Angeles Airport (LAX) on New Year’s Eve 1999, alongside responding to intelligence warnings of possible terrorist attacks during the Seattle, Washington and New York celebrations.\(^66\)

By contrast, the main UK CT focus in 2000 was instead fixed elsewhere. In its anti-terrorism approach, the UK was more focussed on domestic terrorism, and the more immediate UK national security threat posed by the dissident ‘Real IRA’.\(^67\) The Real IRA was refusing to participate in the 1998 Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement peace process. It launched a bombing campaign involving carrying out a
series of attacks, such as the 1998 Omagh bombing, and several bombings around London, including mortars being fired onto the SIS (MI6) Vauxhall Cross headquarters on 20 September 2000, and the explosion of a car bomb outside the BBC Television Centre on 5 March 2001.\(^6\)

However, UK-US CT interests were increasingly converging. Gradually each of the other’s main CT targets made it higher up their own respective agendas. This trend occurred as the range and extent of terrorist attacks against both individual and shared UK and US interests continued to mount. The attacks were now well-surpassing the ‘inconvenience’ of other terrorist attacks in the past. This was by being more frequent, as well as more absorbing of attention and resources. Simultaneously, the international co-operation heralded earlier still was seen as being a helpful solution. Moreover, over time it was continuously developing and evolving. For example, the UK was aided by the US no longer being so ambivalent towards the activities of the IRA,\(^69\) with Washington placing the Real IRA on its terrorist organisations list.\(^70\) This was a decision reportedly based on the sharing of a sizeable dossier including UK and Irish intelligence. The FBI was also tasked with the monitoring of Irish-Americans allegedly continuing to help fund the Real IRA.\(^71\)

In return, the UK was willing to pass on some of the CT lessons it had learnt during its dealings with the IRA and Northern Ireland, while al-Qaeda and the jihadist terrorism was placed at the top of the agendas of both MI6 and GCHQ.\(^72\) This contrasted somewhat with the other European countries (except perhaps more indirectly France, and its focus on Algerian-associated terrorism). In his evidence, former US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger later ‘told the Joint Inquiry that European governments (except Britain) did not share the US assessment of the al-Qa’ida threat…’\(^73\) As Tyler Drumheller, division chief for the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO) in Europe until he retired in 2005, later reflected:

> My part … was to try and go to our European allies. One of Tenet’s real goals was to break down the barriers between the services, because you have very long-standing rules of engagement between foreign intelligence services. You work together, but you don’t really trust each other. It’s an interesting sort of dance in that every service wants to protect its sources, obviously, and information. We had been looking for ways to engage on this [the terrorist threat]; they, [the] Europeans, were looking for ways to engage on it. But even among themselves, they had a hard time doing that. Then after 9/11, there was increased interest in it obviously, and I think we actually had some success…”\(^74\)
Over time, the main US CT focus continued to remain on international terrorist attacks. These were occurring on US interests largely in the Middle East and those geographically away from the West.\textsuperscript{75} The major international terrorist attack on US interests of 2000 came on 12 October when a small boat was brought alongside the US Navy’s destroyer the USS Cole, docked in the port of Aden. A bomb was detonated blowing a hole in the hull of the USS Cole, killing 17 US sailors and injuring 39.\textsuperscript{76} During the 1990s and beyond, as a whole CT had been gradually steadily increasing its way up the US intelligence agencies’ agendas, becoming focussed more specifically on bin Laden and al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{77} However, it took the deeply shocking terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the US homeland to push CT efforts to the absolute top of the Bush administration’s political agenda, and for more of a national US CT strategy to be better developed. CT would now get the necessary and sustained highest-level attention that some well-placed US CT experts, such as Richard A. Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism adviser on the US National Security Council (NSC), believed (and had argued) it deserved and should have received prior to the 9/11 attacks.\textsuperscript{78}

Liaison generally flourished after the Cold War. In the wake of post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ cuts, part of the CIA’s strategy had been to place ‘great emphasis on close relations with foreign liaison services, whose help was needed to gain information that the United States itself did not have the capacity to collect.’\textsuperscript{79} The close intelligence liaison relationship with the UK fitted neatly into that strategy of drawing heavily on liaison partners. The US Joint Inquiry noted:

> The [US] Intelligence Community recognized early on that an effective US response to al-Qa’ida must be global and that foreign intelligence and security services (“liaison services”) would be important allies in fighting terrorism. Improving ties to liaison services became increasingly important for the CIA, FBI, NSA, and other agencies, and their efforts helped make foreign countries more effective partners and more willing to assist US counterterrorism efforts…\textsuperscript{80}

However, overall this strategy was judged later to have been too limited. Some US weaknesses on CT matters were highlighted with acknowledgement by the 9/11 Commission Report that: ‘Serving officers… were suited for traditional agent recruitment or for exploiting liaison relationships with foreign services but were not equipped to seek or use assets inside the terrorist network.’\textsuperscript{81} Accordingly, the US had crucially needed some more unilateral intelligence gathering to complement the liaison input. Essentially US infiltration of terrorist cells had apparently been forfeited at the expense of over-reliance on foreign liaison services.\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, at this
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time, arguably under-reach and non-/under-optimised outreach balances were also present within these sorts of interactions across the US intelligence community. This was not least in a context where there was the beginning of a transition from predominantly international competition - including the enduring residues of its legacy during that transitional period – to principally international co-operation in transformed intelligence activities during the 1990s. Reportedly, before the 9/11 attacks at least 19 ‘explicit warnings’ had been received by US intelligence from various foreign sources, including the UK on at least a couple of occasions.

US intelligence was otherwise emasculated. More generally prior to 9/11, the quantity of CT intelligence – for instance, too much SIGINT and lesser HUMINT - had on the whole usurped the quality of intelligence available and analysed. There had been both systemic and systematic breakdown involving all levels of the intelligence cycle. Compounding issues were notably: (i) the type and quality of intelligence available; (ii) the technological obstacles (such as information overload and targeting issues); and (iii) management factors, in both the intelligence world and at the macro/higher political/national security leadership levels. Collectively, these had contributed towards not helping intelligence analysis, information sharing, and warning efforts before 9/11. As former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal, has observed about intelligence: ‘[It] … serves and is subservient to policy and ... it works best – analytically and operationally – when tied to clearly understood policy goals.’

Within US intelligence, overall an unhealthy outreach balance had been present. Including within the ‘producer-consumer’ relationship, under-optimised and non-optimised conditions were reflected. Counter-productively, reach deficits and excesses had tended to dominate. Ultimately, too much overreach and under-reach had featured too widely.

[4.1.ii]: After 9/11 - a ‘wake-up call’? Implementing the counter-terrorism paradigm:

In the wake of 9/11, the UK also came more under the spotlight. In the plethora of widely cast investigations that were quickly launched, some ‘terrorist’ connections to the UK were beginning to emerge. To some critics, the UK first had to ‘get its own house in order’. Throughout the 1990s and into the early years of the new millennium, both foreign (such as French) and the UK law enforcement, intelligence and security authorities were increasingly aware of the presence in the UK of some Islamic ‘extremists’ harbouring anti-US sentiments and with (at least alleged) links to international terrorism. Former CIA operative Bob Baer’s account is especially vivid: ‘It didn’t take a sophisticated intelligence organization to figure out that Europe, our traditional ally in the war against the bad guys, had become a hot-house of Islamic fundamentalism… [and, exposing the formal limits and conditions of UK-US
intelligence liaison as explicitly specified by treaty, as well as an area of real persona non grata transgression, the CIA was prohibited by British authorities from recruiting sources, even Islamic fundamentalists, in their country... But how exactly and to what extent intelligence services should react to the presence of such individuals and groups was a different matter than simply detecting their presence. Moreover, in what circumstances should pro-active preventative and pre-emptive actions be taken against them? Recognising that they had to tread carefully with the finite resources at their disposal, the British were especially keen that any perceived ‘disproportionality’ did not emerge in a potentially provocative and then counter-productive manner.

These were the types of considerations that generated much intra-liaison debate. Indeed in the UK, these extremists and controversial groups – such as ‘the Islamic Jihad’, ‘Gamaa Islamiyya’ (the ‘Islamic Group’), the ‘Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé [GIA])’, and ‘Al-Muhajiroun’ – had already been significant contributory factors towards the introduction and passing of the UK Terrorism Act of 2000. However, on the whole, the extremists - in a considerable minority in relation to the wider moderate Muslim population in the UK - were essentially treated pragmatically. The UK intelligence and security authorities continued to adopt a ‘watchful tolerance’ or ‘hands-off’ approach, as was especially witnessed (and had seemed proven to be a satisfactorily viable approach forward to adopt) throughout the 1990s. This approach dovetailed into the general UK CT containment and ‘wait and watch’-dominated strategy.

A small proportion of key priority individuals were kept under some surveillance. This approach was due to the UK authorities only having limited resources and staff to hand. Additionally, it could be argued that at the time the extremists appeared to be more incoherently noisy than spreading cohesive, potentially effective and popular, national - extending to global - security undermining jihadist messages and ideologies. Therefore, compounded with the absence of an attack from this source on UK soil and against UK interests, they could be evaluated at this time as not posing the most pressing threat to the UK’s own national security - unlike the then more immediate UK CT priority, the Real IRA, who at the time were actually conducting an active bombing campaign. As a logical extension of this evaluation, neither were the extremists in the UK deemed a sufficient national security threat to close UK allies, such as the US. This was especially before the full nature of the terrorist threat had been increasingly clarified.

After the attacks of 9/11, broadly this softer type of approach was still felt to be defensible. Appropriate proportionality was still trying to be maintained in CT activities by the UK authorities. In the UK context, a sufficiently provocative ‘tipping
point’ with the jihadist vein of terrorist had still not yet been reached. Although, arguably time was quickly running out for the authorities as some post-9/11 changes were increasingly ushered in, such as the issue of extremists operating in the UK beginning to be more significantly addressed. This was alongside the rapid increasing of UK police and intelligence CT resources and staffs. An interviewee identified only as a ‘Whitehall official’ was keen to stress early on during the post-9/11 investigations that: ‘Both the FBI and British security officials do not at this stage believe the UK end of the investigation is too significant.’ However, this did not prevent tensions from surfacing. The UK came under some public US criticism for essentially being too lax towards the extremists prior to 9/11. The UK Cabinet Office Intelligence and Security Coordinator, Sir David Omand, also later admitted in 2004 that: ‘…my own hunch is that round about 1999-2000 we probably underestimated the extent to which there were radicalised individuals here in the UK.’

To what extent hindsight was aiding this reflecting back is more debatable. Nevertheless, the 9/11 attacks provided a newfound lens and some greater focus. At least for a time, this helped to ‘clarify’ the scale and source of the ‘new’ highest priority terrorist threat. The ISC concluded later in its Annual Report 2001-2002, that: ‘… with hindsight… the scale of the threat and vulnerability of Western states to terrorists with this degree of sophistication and a total disregard for their own lives [such as using suicide bombing tactics] was not understood.’

UK-US intelligence liaison was further galvanised after the attacks. Rather than being solely mainly reactive after an event, pro-activity increased. This shifted to varying degrees the balance found in the CT stance of all parties. Psychologically, the attacks of 9/11 on the US homeland, relayed essentially live and repetitively by the global mass media, had been so spectacularly shocking and on such a virtually simultaneous grand scale that they well-surpassed the earlier arguably more ‘nuisance’ level of previous terrorist atrocities. Furthermore, in the words of some US commentators, the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland represented ‘a quantum leap in the deadliness and audacity of terror… [revealing] a vulnerability that many in the United States had never before appreciated.’

The new investigative lens helped. There was now a prism provided through which to jointly view and evaluate security issues. Post-9/11, information passed from the FBI was quickly followed up by UK authorities. These moves were also pursuant with already existing UK-US agreements, for example the UK-US Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) of 1994 – essentially a ‘mutual assistance agreement on criminal and counter-terrorism with UK law enforcement and intelligence organisations.’ Several raids and arrests in London and elsewhere in the UK, such as the detention of one man in Birmingham, resulted. At times perhaps these leads
were too swiftly and keenly followed up given the number of those arrested later being released without charge. Moreover, as a US Congressional Research Service Report observed: ‘As of January 2004... only six of the 544 people arrested under UK anti-terrorist legislation since September 11 [2001] had been convicted...’

But, as the UK Government defensively noted vis-à-vis the US renditions policy and UK-US intelligence interactions: ‘It is important to remember the context... events were moving quickly, the settled direction of the U.S. Government’s response to the 9/11 attacks was not clear, and the priority for the UK and U.S. intelligence agencies was to identify and seek to prevent further attacks.’

Arguably, the full implications of the legislation introduced earlier in 1989, 1994 and 2001, to which the intelligence agencies legally had to adhere in the UK (see Chapter 1 [4.0], above), had not yet been appreciated (see also below [4.1.iv/4.2.ii]). This was together with there being operational difficulties in reconciling the stipulations of the various pieces of legislation with the episodes being actually experienced, as well as there being further complications posed by considerations such as how those episodes should be best handled subsequently.

In the joint UK-US CT efforts, the continuing importance of FBI legal attachés was repeatedly emphasised. Foreign intelligence liaison underway in the law enforcement sector was seen as central. Alongside the presence of liaison between UK authorities and the FBI legal attachés in London, there was evidence of liaison between UK counterparts and FBI agents on the issue of CT at FBI Headquarters in Washington.

Some changes were becoming increasingly apparent, however. In September 2002, the US explicitly outlined its national strategy. With pre-emptive action an important cornerstone of the document, it carefully stressed inclusiveness with ‘this path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.’ The security issue of WMD featured heavily alongside terrorism. This was because the two issues were substantially integrated, instead of being more disaggregated. London also followed this route. On 24 September 2002, the UK Government released a dossier titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government. On 7 October, US President Bush gave a televised address outlining the case against Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s (supposed) WMD. In the risk management argument being promoted politically, possibilities were being articulated over probabilities. Already, at this early stage in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war, pursuit of this line of activity was being criticised by some members of the US intelligence community. Concern was continuing to mount that the political momentum snowballing on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD was counter-productively sidetracking the UK-US intelligence focus. The worry was that the intelligence tasking had undergone a shift, together with
resources and staff allocations. Instead, now they would be focussed more on the alleged threat posed by supposed Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein himself, as well as his fancied links with al-Qaeda (see Case Study 2, below). Another major international terrorist attack was to bring exactly these concerns firmly to the forefront of peoples’ minds.

On 12 October 2002, Bali was attacked. The Bali attacks did nothing to assuage the prevailing worries. Indeed, some critics felt that, distracted by focussing on supposed Iraqi WMD, the UK-US intelligence agencies and governments had misguidedly failed to remain sufficiently focussed on terrorism. This shortcoming was believed to extend further, with the UK remaining insufficiently focussed on other potentially problematic parts of the world beyond merely Iraq. Later in December 2002, the special ISC report examining the intelligence circumstances surrounding the Bali attacks concluded significantly that given the prevailing circumstances ‘...the threat assessments to general British interests [in Indonesia] ought to have been raised to HIGH...’ The report continued: ‘However... on the available intelligence... we do not believe that the attack could have been prevented.’ At the time of the Bali attacks, the context again had failed to be appreciated to its fullest extent. This was a factor that some informing hindsight could illuminate, suggesting that some greater foresight, as well as there being enhanced efforts towards its engendering and subsequent development, could be of real added value to the intelligence efforts of the UK. Bali clearly did not represent an intelligence failure. However, it did represent more of a knowledge failure, where inadequate and insufficient contextualisation had prevailed, once again to all too unfortunate extents.

In the meantime, the general wider political concerns were firmly dismissed by No. 10 Downing Street: ‘What Bali shows is that if you don’t deal with problems, they will come back and hit you. The same applies to Iraq. It’s not either or, it’s both.’ Later in March 2004, continuing to highlight the UK’s enhanced – yet still developing – approach to the perceived risks, the Cabinet Office Security and Intelligence coordinator, Sir David Omand, publicly warned of the connection between terrorists and WMD. The 9/11 attacks with terrorists creatively using conventional aircraft as weapons had caused terrible enough atrocities, ran the argument, what if WMD had been used as well or instead? The possibility of such a scenario could easily be contemplated, even if the probability of such an eventuality was considerably harder to quantify. As risk analyst Jens O. Zinn has observed:

Risk perception research shows that the perceived seriousness of risks (expected number of fatalities) and the catastrophic potential influence the acceptance of a risk even when its probability of occurrence is very low.
Risks with a low probability but high consequences are perceived as more threatening than more probable risks with low or medium consequences. Additionally, having personal control over a risk or familiarity with a risk decreases the perceived risk...

Evidence gathered by Special Forces ‘in-the-field’ in Afghanistan in November 2001 - along with memories of the 1995 Sarin nerve agent attacks in Japan - had certainly not helped to alleviate the very real fears of terrorists potentially using WMD or a ‘dirty bomb’. The considerable extent of UK-US convergence at the high levels was again suggested.

Operationally, the Bali bombings prompted further UK-US liaison. Another major international terrorist attack had taken place involving both British and US citizens, over which the UK and US intelligence agencies would liaise. A team of UK SO13 (Police anti-terrorism Special Branch) officers was sent to Bali to assist in the post-attacks investigation alongside their US and Australian counterparts. At the political leader level, UK PM Blair had discussions with US President George W. Bush and the Australian PM John Howard – the leaders of some of the other UKUSA intelligence community countries. In his subsequent statement to the House of Commons, Blair noted that: ‘We had no specific intelligence relating to the attack in Bali…’ Had the political considerations concerning Iraq trumped other security interests? Blair finished his statement by continuing to scotch claims of political distraction. He declared: ‘Some say that we should fight terrorism alone; and that issues to do with WMD are a distraction. I reject that entirely. Both, though different in means, are the same in nature…’ Whatever is accepted, undeniably by October 2002 the highest priority tasks allocated to the UK-US intelligence agencies were increasing exponentially, as was the tempo at which these issues needed processing. With the significantly increased UK-US intelligence efforts focussed on supposed Iraqi WMD (see Case Study 2), as well as having to remain focussed on CT, UK-US intelligence resources and staffs were being increasingly stretched.

There were plenty of topics for consideration. In early November 2002, another series of high-level meetings were held in London between US and UK intelligence counterparts. The Director of US Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, met with both the Director-General of the British Security Service (MI5) and the Chief of SIS. A wide range of issues was discussed during the talks, demonstrating the multiplicity of tasks with which they jointly had to grapple. These issues notably included the UK’s extensive long-term counter-terrorism experience with the IRA, with the articulation of intelligence lessons learnt, and – perhaps more significantly, given the extent to which this issue was to absorb high-level US attention in Washington during the years 2002 to 2004 – there was the consideration of whether
MI5 would be a good model for the US to draw upon for reforms to the FBI.\textsuperscript{117} Reportedly, ‘...behind the scenes there has been growing intelligence co-operation and a recognition within Washington that Britain and Israel are world leaders in this field.’\textsuperscript{118} Eventually, however, the US decided not use the MI5 model for reforms to the FBI – in part demonstrating the continued US discomfort with, and lack of consensus regarding, the issue of domestic intelligence and its management.\textsuperscript{119} The sentiments of those opposed to such a move were clearly apparent. These were evident in testimony given to Congress in 2003 by former US Attorney General (1991-1993) William P. Barr, where he argued:

I would like to focus my remarks on the idea advanced in some quarters of severing “domestic intelligence” from the FBI and creating a new domestic spy agency akin to Britain’s MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counter-terrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this area.\textsuperscript{120}

UK-US intelligence liaison also had other business. Reflecting its multi-levelled character, the liaison was not confined to just taking place at the highest echelons in Washington and London. There was simultaneously close UK-US intelligence liaison discernable ‘on-the-ground’ and ‘out-in-the-field’ in numerous other countries scattered across the world. A few days after the November 2002 Kenya attacks, following receipt of a ‘specific threat’, the UK closed its High Commission in Kenya. The US also closed its diplomatic offices in Nairobi, with an American diplomat acknowledging that: ‘The British have shared intelligence with us which we consider extremely disturbing.’\textsuperscript{121} Memories of the US embassy bombings in Kenya, just four years earlier in 1998, still resonated strongly. Similar UK and US embassy closures were again undertaken in Kenya following a subsequent ‘security scare’ around May/June 2003.\textsuperscript{122} In harmony with UNSCR 1373, there was also evidence of joint UK-US counter-terrorism capability and capacity building assistance to Kenya.\textsuperscript{123} Later, in the Middle East, the UK and US embassies in Yemen exchanged intelligence concerning threats to Western interests.\textsuperscript{124} The overall picture, however, appeared to be becoming increasingly complicated.
[4.1.iii]: The terrorist threat morphs as ideas increasingly take centre stage:
By early 2003, the changing nature of the terrorist threat was evident. Structural changes had been wrought. The individual (as professional)/personal and operational/tactical levels of the terrorists were being increasingly disrupted. This was mainly thanks to actions such as the destruction of al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the systematic ‘dismantling’ of extremist networks in Europe. Notably, as the physical terrorist infrastructures were on the whole successfully broken up by the CT efforts, the macro/higher levels were instead gaining in significance. This included what was occurring at the ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels. The ideas war or engagement was becoming increasingly important (and has continued to do so to date) as the other lower/micro levels of operation were stripped away, and as al-Qaeda as an ‘organisation’ was successfully being increasingly fractured through its disruption. As The Observer journalist Jason Burke reported: ‘What [now] worries intelligence chiefs is that bin Laden’s close associates, with their experience, [and ideologies] will link up homegrown groups comprising individuals with no known links to terrorism and thus unknown to police. “That’s the nightmare scenario,” said one senior police source.’ Unfortunately, that ‘nightmare’ was soon to emerge.

Al-Qaeda had changed. The al-Qaeda entity of 2003 appeared no longer to be the al-Qaeda entity of 2001. Rather than being so much (i) a hierarchical organisation per se, with a discernable ‘command and control’ set-up headed by bin Laden himself, and (ii) possessing detectable individuals and cells with discernable and breakable connections, such as being ‘foreign fighters’ and possessing shared Afghanistan training camp histories/experiences, al-Qaeda now appeared to be different. Instead, it seemed to be more of a virtual entity that was providing international ideological inspiration. Worse, those it was providing ideological inspiration to appeared to be more dispersed and consist of more devolved - and consequently harder to detect - groups and individuals scattered in several countries across the world. They were also increasingly members of ‘home’ (domestic) populations, on the whole possessing local rather than remote (or foreign) nationality status. The task at hand now for intelligence and security services was increasingly more akin to searching for ‘a needle in a haystack’.

The fact that this scenario had now emerged needed to be quickly recognised. Effective re-tooling was involved in response. This figured in the form of intelligence and security agencies themselves quickly evolving in order to most successfully deal with this even ‘newer’ terrorist threat which continued to rapidly morph in real-time. The important development of national threat assessment/analysis centres, such as the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in the UK, can be cited here as part of this
general trend.\textsuperscript{129} Spearheaded by the UK and US, these centres were established from early 2003 firstly in the UKUSA countries (see below [4.2.i]), with similar concepts also later being adopted by other countries beyond, such as Denmark and Germany.\textsuperscript{130} The centres then became increasingly interconnected internationally, extending their activities beyond merely their domestic spheres. Moreover, significantly in terms of its form, the intelligence product shared within and between these centres represents more of a mid-way fusion between actionable operational/tactical intelligence, as well as more strategic-leaning intelligence (as characterised above [2.0]), extending its utility to the various partners. Also at this time, the learning curves encountered by the intelligence and security services were clearly continuing to be increasingly steep, as well as needing to be swiftly refined while on the move in the high-tempo operating environments. This was so that the authorities could try to keep at least one step ahead of their adversaries.

In these murkier circumstances, the popularity of intelligence liaison was further enhanced. Unlike during the Cold War, the issue of penetration of a liaison partner’s intelligence and security service by the primary enemy (namely in the form of a high-grade intelligence service of a rival state) was felt to be no longer quite so acute.\textsuperscript{131} This was due to the different nature and source of the primary post-Cold War threat (now coming from non- and/or sub-state actors). Some of the inherent risks of intelligence liaison appeared to be more neutralised, making liaison more of an attractive option to pursue further.\textsuperscript{132} 9/11, together with trends linked to globalisation \textit{writ large}, further spurred on this thinking, with reports noting: ‘The ease with which people can now move across borders has involved a radical rethinking in intelligence sharing.’\textsuperscript{133}

In early 2003, bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison was extended. UK-US intelligence liaison developments appeared to be re-energised. On 1 April, it was announced that a UK-US agreement concerning intelligence liaison had been made in Washington between the US Director of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, and UK Home Secretary David Blunkett. The agreement was described as being focussed ‘on unprecedented co-operation and sharing of intelligence between the two countries.’ As part of the agreement, it would be subject to ‘internal’ monitoring processes - also through the mechanism of intelligence liaison – whereby: ‘A new group of senior officials will meet regularly to make sure their joint programme is on track.’ The agreement reportedly involved ‘closer working’ on a large range of issues, including biometrics and the development of scenarios.\textsuperscript{134} As Blunkett revealed, the concept of ‘best practice’ was central:

We are announcing today that we will establish a joint working group, a contact group, [the UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland
Blunkett later argued: ‘If we accept that we are now interrelated with one another, whether we like it or not, we will understand why the UK and the US stand shoulder to shoulder.’

It was not all unsupported rhetoric. As a way of translating the words of the UK-US agreement of April 2003 into practical action, it was later reported that a joint UK-US CT exercise would be launched. Ongoing ‘unpublicised “table-top” planning exercises to test national resilience against terrorist attack’ were taking place in both the UK and US. Meanwhile, continuing explorations to improve UK-US intelligence sharing were underway as part of discussions between Omand, other UK officials and the US officials based in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

This was not the only enhanced UK-US liaison. Evidence simultaneously abounded of some newer and expanded UK-US intelligence liaison at other levels of authority. Notably there were joint UK-US Customs and Excise operations shortly after the UK had joined the US Container Security Initiative (CSI). These included forward US border controls in the UK, so ‘Fortress America’ would not become penetrated. US and UK Customs counterparts worked alongside one another in the UK’s large container ports in order to stop anything terrorist-related, such as a ‘dirty bomb’, from being sent across the Atlantic into the US.

The international terrorist threat continued to provide impetus. During May 2003, intelligence warnings and actual terrorist bombings persisted. There were attacks in the Saudi Arabian capital, Riyadh, and the Casablanca attacks on 17 May 2003 (44 killed). A plethora of deteriorating security situations, demonstrated that internationally there were still plenty of counter-terrorism issues with which the UK and US intelligence services could jointly grapple. There were the Istanbul attacks on 20 November 2003 on UK interests - HSBC bank offices and the UK consulate - alongside the continuing deteriorating security situation in Iraq. More ominously, the increasing involvement of foreign fighters and foreign sponsorship was apparent in Iraq.

National publics were increasingly dismayed with developments. The UK, in particular, was experiencing difficulties on the domestic ideological front. Public concerns about being over-spied upon emerged prominently. Some of the fears of intelligence and security overreach were not helped by the burgeoning climate of
mistrust in politicians and their - seemingly colluding - intelligence services. UK and US intelligence was looking - and indeed arguably was even made to look - particularly discredited after the headline-dominating failure in the wake of the 2003 Iraq war to locate supposed Iraqi WMD, the claimed *casus belli*.

As 2004 progressed, widely held discussions also turned to whether proportionality had been lost.

Concerns were also present regarding whether the terror ‘myth’ had been overly exaggerated and misevaluated by governments, particularly the US and UK.

Ideas were now undeniably performing a more central and coherent role. Gradually, the ideological dimension was increasingly recognised as being of growing importance internationally, as well as domestically. The issue of ‘radicalisation’ was beginning to figure more prominently. Several experts believed that ideas should receive considerably more attention and be systematically addressed in both the individual and joint UK-US counter-terrorism efforts. The former Chair of the UK JIC, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, succinctly captured the contemporary lack of clarity concerning the US-led so-called ‘War on Terror’ by noting: ‘Uncertain objectives are hampering success on the propaganda front…’

Other authors with ‘insider’ and intelligence expertise, such as Mike Scheuer, the former head of the CIA’s bin Laden Unit, further criticised the general direction of the so-called ‘War on Terror’.

By mid-2004, the terrorist threat confronted on 9/11 had changed. Governments now felt that they were less ‘behind the curve’ and instead were more ahead of terrorist events and developments. Reports observed that: ‘The better preparedness of businesses, improved protection for national infrastructure and the success in preventing attacks … have combined to create an increased sense of confidence that counter-terrorism is no longer trying to catch up…’

For the US, continuing to maintain its forward borders and ‘Fortress America’ approach, the highest priority CT problem remained essentially international terrorism. Or, at the least, the terrorist threat was originating and operating elsewhere - most notably amongst the burgeoning insurgency in Iraq.

While by contrast for European countries - such as witnessed with the Madrid (11 March 2004) and the later London bombings (7 July 2005) - technically domestic terrorism, ‘homeland’ originating, stemming from radicalised ‘indigenous Muslim communities’, was being increasingly confronted. It was ‘homegrown’ in nature, but internationally inspired.

More worrying, for some US intelligence and security experts, as well as their partners beyond, was the extent to which the *jihadist* terrorism threat was now increasingly (and more clearly) being confronted both from and within Europe (see below [4.1.iv]).
These trends helped to continue to complicate joint CT efforts. Indeed, one of the traditional categorising (and hence management) distinctions of terrorism was further eroding. On one hand due to its domestic origin, states wanted to deal with the terrorism in their own way as domestic terrorism, without ‘interference’ from an external state, such as the US, ‘transgressing’ their sovereignty. However, this results in a tension with the fact that the terrorism is internationally inspired and so fits into the wider US-led global CT efforts and its so-called ‘War on Terror’. In these circumstances, international intelligence liaison being conducted by domestic-focused security and intelligence services, such as MI5, was on an upward trajectory.

Conceptually, analysts tried to capture the terrorist inspiration. Observer journalist Jason Burke characterised it as ‘al-Qaeda-ism’. ‘Al-Qaeda-ism’ and international jihadism as ideologies and ideological inspiration made the CT efforts more challenging. Targeting concerns again took centre stage. It was harder for intelligence and security agencies to deal with the threat through their traditional toolset of targeting methods, as well as their traditional division of responsibility and labour. Ideas can readily be concealed inside individuals’ heads, without presenting external and visual signs that can easily and ‘objectively’ be detected, and then agreed upon, by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The threat is more elusive, and it is difficult to try and pin down ‘gaseous’ ideas and the radicals/extremists who expound them. Confronted with these types of challenges, conventionally relied upon tools, such as terrorist profiling, struggle to function as they are originally intended, and their meaning is increasingly questioned. In these circumstances, agreement between intelligence partners is naturally harder to reach. More room is provided for interpretations to differ on increasingly ‘subjective’ and slippery concepts. The US CT intelligence expert, Paul R. Pillar, cautioned that: ‘Foreign cooperation will become more problematic as the issue moves beyond Al Qaeda.’ Methods borrowed from military-associated ‘war-gaming’ - such as the use of joint ‘table-top’ and ‘Red Teaming’ exercises, as well as enacting actual physical training scenarios - were of increasing value in terms of their instructiveness. This was apparent through their enhanced adoption by the UK and US intelligence and security communities during 2003.

Would shared UK-US perceptions on CT now increasingly breakdown? On the approach to the first anniversary of 9/11 in September 2002, reportedly ‘both the US and UK security establishments [had taken] seriously broad warnings of attack...’ on the basis of shared perceptions. By logical extension, as the terrorist threat gets less clear, the loosening and unravelling of tight co-operation is suggested, raising questions, such as: will some increased divergence in CT priorities be witnessed

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again? And: has the CT strategy of breaking-up terrorist cells, rather than watching them, been counter-productive over a longer-term time span? At least partially, the threat had become more devolved and dissipated. As the US Acting Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Joe Morton, acknowledged in a speech which summarised counter-terrorism ‘successes’, by 2005 there was still much to be accomplished: ‘…even as we have achieved such tremendous success in breaking up al-Qaida as a centralized organization, the threat of international terrorism continues… al-Qaida has energized a movement greater than itself…’

Anxieties continued to persist. In early 2005 and within its own CT strategy (‘CONTEST’) document, the UK Government summed up the current broad situation in a similar manner to the US. At the macro level, broad agreement could be sufficiently maintained between the partners. Persisting common UK-US CT evaluations and shared perceptions again were illustrated: ‘Although Al Qaeda has been damaged as an organisation since 9/11 – losing key leaders, its base in Afghanistan and, with it, its infrastructure of training camps and laboratories – its ideology has inspired other networks of terrorists across the world, some exploiting local grievances.’ Accordingly, the current terrorist threat was far from ‘defeated’. Its ‘frustration’ was also continuing to be broadly elusive. Indeed, it was becoming increasingly complex. Moreover, keeping ‘ahead of the curve’ was not being accomplished as far, or as steadily, as was desirable. Prior to the Pakistan connections acquiring some clarified potency later in 2005, enhanced uncertainties had returned by 2004, and continued into mid-2005. Their nature was similar to those that had existed pre-9/11, before a lens was provided by the attacks.

Partly in response to this burgeoning complexity, yet further intelligence liaison was fuelled. As CT investigations became increasingly fragmented, the pieces of the proverbial ‘jigsaw puzzle’ were becoming smaller and thus harder to gather and fit together. Arguably this necessitated even further enhanced communication between intelligence liaison partners. Some increased differences could also be perceived as being not entirely negative. Indeed, frequently those differences arguably acted as a valuable asset. They helped contribute towards preventing overreach in interactions and hence intelligence liaison ‘blowback’, notably in the form of ‘groupthink’.

[4.1.iv]: Tense moments and intense UK-US counter-terrorism debates:
Continuing to maintain heightened vigilance was advisable. On 7 July 2005, London itself experienced a jihadist-inspired terrorist attack. Close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison again demonstrated its fullest value in the post-attack investigations. As Manningham-Buller acknowledged, the London attacks when they came ‘were a shock’, but not altogether a ‘surprise’ to the UK intelligence
Some form of attack had been anticipated at some point. Accordingly, there had been some preparation in the form of training during a joint UK-US (and Canadian) anti-terror drill - ‘Exercise Atlantic Blue’ - carried out shortly before in April 2005. The questions remained when and how the actual attacks would occur, rather than if.166

Links to the perpetrators were immediately sought. As the investigations into the bombings got underway, claims of responsibility were posted on supposedly al-Qaeda-related websites citing the UK’s involvement in the US-led 2003 War in Iraq as a cause.167 On the BBC Newsnight television programme, an ‘Islamic extremist’, Abu Uzair, claimed that British ‘Muslims had previously accepted a “covenant of security” which meant they should not resort to violence in the UK because they were not under threat there. “We don’t live in peace with you any more, which means the covenant of security no longer exists”.168 The so-called ‘covenant of security’ - whether a construct in reality, or else merely more an unofficial truce in the form of an unspoken threshold never really explicitly agreed - had been considerably undermined by the high-profile UK participation in the US-led war in Iraq in March 2003. This participation, and the ‘unquestioning’ manner in which it had been presented publicly, had unfortunately propelled the UK to the forefront of jihadist ire that had previously been more concentrated solely on the US. Other European countries that had explicitly participated in the Iraq invasion, such as Denmark and Spain, were not spared similar vitriol. Worse, the extent of the vulnerability of the UK was starkly exposed to enemies and allies alike. This vulnerability, together with the extent of UK ‘permissiveness’ – in order to try and maintain at least an element of adequate proportionality in its overall CT activities - sought to be effectively exploited by adversaries into the future.

During the investigations, tension-generating differences in UK and US CT methods were exposed.169 MI5’s general tactics of keeping people under surveillance (‘wait and watch’), rather than adopting more of the US style of taking earlier disruptive action (‘see and strike’) were reiterated. According to a US diplomat with CT experience, ‘Britain’s small size and island geography make it easier for the security services to track and gather intelligence on local extremists, a luxury he contends that the US does not have. “You can get lost in the US a lot easier... Letting people wander around and watching them presents more of a dilemma.”’170 The multi-layered nature of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship was again highlighted. One official reportedly rated the broad UK-US intelligence liaison relationship as ‘excellent’. Meanwhile, the more specific UK-US intelligence relationship focussed on CT was judged to be ‘more fraught’.171 Different UK-US human rights concerns and justice system requirements were repeatedly stressed -
for example, UK intelligence legally having to adhere to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in its operations (see below [4.2.ii]). UK law enforcement officials also noted that an ‘offence of acts preparatory to terrorism’ was required to address what their US counterparts saw as ‘loopholes’ in the UK legal system, which would then allow for more terrorism-related prosecutions. One unnamed former senior US intelligence official claimed: ‘(The problem) we have had with the British is the failure to see that the existing laws and protections, privacy etc, aren’t getting the job done in terms of protecting their own society… The place was being used as a recruitment centre and also a place from which people were being dispatched out for training to other places.’

Indeed, UK-US legal tensions and differences cut across all levels of activity. At the operational level, these formed some further obstacles that had to be successfully navigated in UK-US intelligence relations. This was especially so that UK intelligence officers, in particular, would not become incriminated, which presented them with several dilemmas when interacting closely with their US counterparts. Unlike their US counterparts - who were more protected by their methods being underwritten (albeit arguably somewhat dubiously) by the Bush administration’s series of controversial Department of Justice (DoJ) legal memos - as already seen, UK intelligence officers were instead considerably more vulnerable to being prosecuted for breaching the ECHR, and other related human rights covenants, during the conduct of their joint operations. It is quite remarkable that we have not seen, either in the UK or in the US, considerably more legal action being taken against individual intelligence officers and agencies (or their contractors) for some of the actions they have (allegedly) undertaken. This is especially as liberal democracies, most notably and disappointingly the US, to varying degrees have increasingly adopted some of the distinctly unseemly methods of the very adversaries they are trying to confront, in order to successfully combat them.

Nevertheless, significantly, intelligence in the US has not been completely immune to some legal probes. These have been conducted along similar lines to those in the UK (see below [4.2.ii]), and have similarly concerned the conduct of intelligence vis-à-vis issues such as the treatment of detainees and intensive interrogation techniques. In February 2005, according to reports based on information from US intelligence officials, the CIA’s own Inspector General, John L. Helgerson, was ‘conducting several reviews of the agency’s detention and interrogation practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, including several episodes in which prisoners have been injured or killed in C.I.A. custody…’, and reportedly there was already ‘one C.I.A. contract employee, David Passaro, [who had] been charged with a crime in connection with allegations of abuse of Al Qaeda prisoners.’ These CIA
Inspector General probes, including into the wiping of CIA detainee interrogation videotapes, themselves were later subject to review, as they were deemed by some officials to be overly rigorous.\textsuperscript{178} By February 2008, the CIA Inspector General was said to have ‘agreed to tighter controls over [his] investigative procedures… in what appeared to be an attempt to soften resentments among agency officials over the watchdog’s aggressive probes into the legality and effectiveness of the CIA’s counterterrorism efforts and detention programs.’\textsuperscript{179}

Tension-generating differences emerged. The presence of transatlantic and epistemic legal communities pitted against similarly clustered transatlantic intelligence, law enforcement, and political communities, became apparent. Better interdisciplinary working agreements had to be sought. For instance, this was most evident during the occasions that significantly involved the presence of the overriding goal of public safety in governing calculations.\textsuperscript{180}

Post-9/11, the goal of public safety had continued firmly on its ascendancy. This was as a strong political impetus and intelligence and security operational driver in both the UK and US. Indeed, its general pursuit was especially energised after the 9/11 attacks, together with enhanced attempts towards its better realisation and maintenance into the future. This resulted in it being sought more widely, and its implementation being attempted in more of a timely manner on improved \textit{a priori} bases.\textsuperscript{181} Sometimes, this enactment could even be \textit{versus} the law. These were actions deemed essentially legitimised (at least to some participants and observers) according to the (believed exonerating) ‘crisis’ circumstances in which the overarching goal of public safety was trying to be successfully fulfilled. Particularly as witnessed in and by the UK, largely proportionality considerations were simultaneously attempting to be appropriately maintained in the situations judged to be requiring a \textit{crisis management} approach.\textsuperscript{182} These were the situations believed to necessitate approaches beyond merely \textit{risk management} - for instance, in the UK requiring the ‘activation’ of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) mechanism with its various Bronze, Silver and/or Gold Commands, such as used on 7/7, and in the US, the use of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).\textsuperscript{183} But, difficult trade-offs were involved on individual bases, especially in terms of individual human rights \textit{versus} the wider goal of public safety.\textsuperscript{184} This was apparent when the more collective leaning utilitarianism-influenced ‘greatest good/happiness for the greatest number’ in the domain of human security, was one of the prominent prevailing underlying philosophies emergent in the overall mix of expressed governing ideas (see below).

Legal tensions encountered both \textit{between} and \textit{within} the UK and US continued to increase over the years from 2002, becoming increasingly paramount. By 2004, and
indeed continuing to date, the law itself was now having to considerably, and rapidly, catch-up. This was most pressing with regard to the enhanced public safety-led political and operational requirements that had been adopted strongly on either side of the Atlantic, as well as more broadly globally when intelligence and security (including military) operations were conducted abroad. For the law, this involved some of its own essential adjustments, again undertaken in both the UK and US, in order to try and better accommodate, as well as appropriately control, the latest developments which were rapidly unfolding in their multitude in high-tempo real-time environments.\textsuperscript{185}

Meanwhile, some of the UK-US differences extended further. US frustration was voiced, particularly highlighting UK-US differences over terrorism. The UK often drew on their lessons learnt in Northern Ireland and from their experience with dealing with the IRA. The UK also tried to pass on this knowledge and expertise to their US partners. However, there were views that the jihadist terrorism being faced was different, conceptualised as so-called ‘new’ terrorism. This therefore called into question the exact value of the UK’s Northern Ireland experience and lessons. Reportedly, UK officials were ‘… said to be frustrated at US reluctance to learn from Britain’s experience in fighting terrorism in Northern Ireland…’\textsuperscript{186} Meanwhile, a US official lamented: ‘‘[The British] have a really hard time understanding that people like Masri\textsuperscript{187} and Abu Qatada\textsuperscript{188} are real goddamn problems. It took a long, long time before they began taking those threats seriously…’’\textsuperscript{189} Indeed, some prominent security commentators in the US and beyond were sharply critical of the British approach. These were sentiments that other commentators quickly picked up on in their own opining, such as Daniel Pipes:

Thanks to the war in Iraq, much of the world sees the British government as resolute and tough and the French one as appeasing and weak. But in another war, the one against terrorism and radical Islam, the reverse is true: France is the most stalwart nation in the West, even more so than America, while Britain is the most hapless… In frustration, Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, publicly denounced Britain for “protecting killers.” One American security group has called for Britain to be listed as a terrorism-sponsoring state. Counterterrorism specialists disdain the British. Roger Cressey calls London “easily the most important jihadist hub in Western Europe.” Steven Simon dismisses the British capital as “the Star Wars bar scene” of Islamic radicals.\textsuperscript{190}
Such evaluations did not stop there, however. Continuing to illustrate the depth of some frank US concerns that the UK’s CT approach was not being sufficiently ruthless: ‘More brutally, [a US] intelligence official said of last week’s [7/7 London] attacks: “The terrorists have come home. It is payback time for … an irresponsible policy.”’ The criticism was sustained. The contention that the French were ‘better’ than the British at countering terrorism (at least the jihadist variant), and were more skilled with dealing with the associated issue of radicalisation, was then pursued further, as Pipes continued:

While London hosts terrorists, Paris hosts a top-secret counterterrorism center, code-named Alliance Base… As the British ban fox hunting, the French ban hijabs. The former embrace multiculturalism, the latter retain a pride in their historic culture. This contrast in matters of identity makes Britain the Western country most vulnerable to the ravages of radical Islam whereas France, for all its political failings, has held onto a sense of self that may yet see it through.191

Simultaneously, some of the more critically inclined US intelligence experts speculated that their ‘Fortress America’ would be penetrated via the UK. They were reportedly concerned that the ‘Visa Waiver Program could allow British terrorists to enter the US with insufficient security screening…’192 Albeit frequently somewhat exaggerated, and figuring as ‘worse-case scenarios’, these US arguments had some resonances in the UK.193

The UK did undergo a shift. Over time, the UK moved somewhat closer to the US position.194 This was perceptible especially after the 7/7 London bombings, with the UK Government adopting a harder line towards extremists and radicals, and threatening to deport allegedly jihad-encouraging so-called ‘preachers of hate’.195 Additionally in the DG of MI5’s speech of 1 September 2005, the UK Government’s post-7/7 toughening stance was articulated. Manningham-Buller warned:

We also value civil liberties and wish to do nothing to damage these hard fought rights. But the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on whether some erosion of what we all value may be necessary to improve the chances of our citizens not being blown apart as they go about their daily lives.196

However, the UK shift was only partial. An intensification of effort, along broadly similar lines as witnessed earlier, emerged as the dominant theme. Typically, rather than more dramatic reform, some incremental intelligence change was introduced. At all costs, in a well-balanced manner, a form of appropriate proportionality strived
be maintained by the UK, while simultaneously still successfully pursuing the overarching honourable goal of ‘public safety’. A slight re-framing of the nature of the problem confronted was enacted. This was not least with the greater focus on ‘radicalisation’, in intelligence and security efforts to try and improve their targeting.

By the end of 2005, UK CT efforts had increased even further than witnessed previously. The boundaries of investigations appeared to have been pushed to greater extents. The UK continued to try to better address its overall balance in terms of intelligence and law enforcement reach. This was attempted by trying to move away from marginal under-reach to more of an ideal optimised reach balance, with the investigations edging slightly closer towards the larger-scale and enhanced risk averse nature of US CT efforts. Yet, reflective of only the marginal shift, the ‘wait and watch’ approach of the UK was the dimension that was most expanded. Shortly after the 7/7 London bombings, media reports flagged up that while

... co-operation between US and UK intelligence officials over the London bombings had been “superb”... the UK had a different view of the war on terrorism than the US. “One of the distinguishing characteristics of (the US) is that they think they are at war, and we don’t. It is very difficult to persuade people in London, even after the bombings that there’s a war on. This is a big psychological difference.”

Ultimately, however, these wider differences were not allowed to obstruct the more narrowly focussed CT interactions. The UK-US CT divergences were broadly contained. Functional and regular ‘business as usual’ activities continued, particularly at the daily operational/tactical level of relations. On 20 July, a series of high-level UK-US government and intelligence service meetings (arranged before the bombings) were held in London. Senior attendees included the new US Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, with the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, the new Chief of SIS (MI6), Sir John Scarlett, and the DG of MI5, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller. Officials felt that the London attacks had given the meeting greater focus. A terrorist strike had again provided something specifically tangible to lend further impetus to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. This was despite some prevailing differences.

[4.2]: Specific intelligence liaison:
Specific issues similarly underpinned close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison. Together with the general bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison and the generic UK-US CT concerns and differences, there was some more focussed UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. This especially dealt with ‘specifics’, often linked to particular
investigations. Here, more of the core fundamental issues were addressed. Also here the micro/lower operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels gained greater significance. The first of these more specific issues concerned the publicising of intelligence.

**[4.2.i]: Publicise intelligence or not?**
The publicising of intelligence product frequently causes quandaries. Most obviously, ‘sensitive’ sources and methods could be exposed and compromised. The extent to which intelligence should be shared is a topic of considerable debate. This concerns whether it is between intelligence agency departments internally, with other government agencies, with another liaison service, more widely with the public, or multilaterally rather than just bilaterally. The matter under consideration often results in a series of finely balanced trade-offs. Ideally this is so that the excesses and deficits of outreach, respectively overreach and under-reach, can be managed as far as possible.

After the Bali attacks in 2002, some shortcomings in the handling of CT intelligence were exposed. The UK CT threat assessment system was judged to be flawed following an inquiry by the ISC (see above [4.1.ii]). To improve both the national and international co-ordination of CT intelligence, a Joint Terrorism Analysis (or Assessment) Centre (JTAC) was established in Thames House (MI5 headquarters) in June 2003. The intention was essentially to facilitate the communication of CT intelligence cross-agency, as well as the better integration of government agencies specifically focussed on the CT task. To achieve this, JTAC included members from UK intelligence agencies, such as MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, as well as drawing members from the other UK Government departments, such as Transport (TRANSEC). By 2004, it was noted by the ISC that: ‘...because [JTAC] allows all counter-terrorism intelligence to be processed centrally, [it] has significantly improved the UK intelligence community’s ability to warn of terrorist attacks, and this concept is now being copied by several countries...’ The US had invested in a similar model with the setting up of its multi-agency Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in May 2003. Later, by December 2004, this became re-branded the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The US had been studying and had learnt some useful lessons from the then proposed UK JTAC model when thinking about setting up its own TTIC. Moreover, from the end of 2005, greater ‘integration’ and ‘standardisation’ on the domestic front for the US intelligence community was the strategy being generally promoted.

Prior to JTAC being in operation, the UK’s threat assessment process remained firmly under the spotlight in 2002. This was as further terrorist attacks were emerging. In the wake of the Kenya attacks of 28 November 2002, an increasing
political dispute arose in the UK surrounding the type of warning issued to UK
nationals abroad concerning Mombasa and terrorism. The UK Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw was prompted to declare that ‘no information was available to the UK, US or
Australia which could have prevented the attacks which took place…’ This was a
cast of countries that again hinted at the important role played by the UKUSA
SIGINT arrangement in CT intelligence gathering and pooling. Moreover, the
security/sharing dilemma was continuing to be intensively debated, together with
how best to achieve an optimum balance.

UK intelligence remained reluctant about releasing intelligence. Overall, MI5
and MI6 continued their traditional wariness about frequently issuing generic
intelligence warnings in the public realm. These were felt to be too vague and
general to be of much tangible utility. The UK CT strategy (‘CONTEST’) document of
2005 carefully spelt out the UK’s position on the publicising of intelligence: ‘Our
citizens can be confident that we shall warn if a specific threat emerges … But we do
not intend to provide a running commentary on our assessment of the threat. That
would help terrorists without helping the public…’ In the absence of specific
intelligence, the UK intelligence community was determined not to acquire a
counterproductive ‘crying wolf’ reputation amongst the public. This also offers an
explanation for why more tangible information, such as the approximate
numbers of suspects being kept under surveillance – in the UK, about 2,000 as at mid-
2007 – has been released over time by MI5; a move in order to effectively demonstrate that the
UK Government is not exaggerating the terrorist threat, and that the threat is
genuinely substantial, rather than the Government conspiratorially engaging in more
sinister public scaremongering activities for the purposes of greater draconian
political and population control.

Especially prevalent during the years 2002 to 2004, some sharp differences
emerged between the UK and US on the issue of threat warnings. Alluding to the at
times tension-generating modus operandi differences in the UK-US intelligence
relationship, it was observed that Whitehall had at times criticised their US
counterparts for issuing warnings too frequently. Echoing these earlier debates and
differences, the threats concerning British Airways (BA) flight 223 (London to
Washington route) around December 2003, together with the UK and US responses,
continued to generate some debate. This was apparent between UK and US
intelligence officials when they were deciding on how best to handle their joint
warnings and the issues. Apparently, amongst UK officials concerns existed that:
‘‘There is a feeling that the intelligence which is being put out has not been through
all the filters it should go through’’ This contributed towards the alleged ‘‘frank
exchanges of views’’ between London and Washington…
Over time, such differences re-emerged. Despite general instances of increasingly close UK-US co-operation, some publicly aired UK-US tensions within the intelligence liaison relationship were evident in parallel during the summer of 2004. During September 2004, as Sir David Omand attended meetings in Washington, it was noted that UK officials were critical of the US (and Pakistan) for revealing to the global media sensitive details closely relating to one of their ongoing investigations. This concerned material found on a detainee’s computer that had been seized following a recent raid in Gujarat by Pakistani authorities in July 2004.215 A UK official stated: ‘I think the consternation expressed by some British officials was warranted... When information is divulged, it does complicate your law enforcement.’216

Subsequently, the media picked up some of the details. This episode also threw into sharp relief in the public domain the differences between the UK’s greater ‘wait and watch’-dominated CT strategy vis-à-vis the US’ greater ‘see and strike’-dominated CT strategy. The US dimension of this terrorist plot initially dated from 2000 - before being resurrected again after the 9/11 attacks, and being planned as recently as up to February 2004 - and again the connection between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was highlighted. Significantly, this plot involved a British-born Muslim convert, together with the assistance of two other Britons, targeting - reportedly including with a WMD (in the form of a ‘dirty bomb’) - prominent global financial institutions in the US. For example, among those listed was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) headquarters in Washington, DC and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Causing consternation, according to the interrogations of a key al-Qaeda figure held by the US, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the plotters were operating on behalf of al-Qaeda, tasked by bin Laden himself. A plot in the UK was also being planned. Various targets around London, particularly major railway stations, such as Paddington, Waterloo and King’s Cross, were suggested. Most developed was the idea to blow up three limousines loaded with explosives and gas cylinders next to prominent UK buildings.217

US authorities quickly went public with the plot in July 2004. Potential target institutions, in the buildings focussed on, were also briefed on the threat. This tactic and the use of sensitive intelligence in the public realm, arguably even as a form of a political public relations (PR) exercise in the run-up to the US Presidential Election of 2004, was very much to the dismay of the UK authorities. They, in the form of MI5, were meanwhile using surveillance to monitor the British national, Abu Musa al-Hindi (one of the many aliases for ‘Dhiren Barot’), who the US officials requested be arrested. The UK acquiesced. Al-Hindi/Barot’s subsequent detention and that of around 13 others in August 2004 curtailed the UK intelligence gathering activities.
The UK authorities were thus prevented from determining whether any others were potentially involved, and from acquiring further investigative leads. Using the media to express thinly veiled irritation with the tactics adopted by the US in this case, the Home Secretary David Blunkett commented soon after Ridge’s announcement: ‘There are very good reasons why we shouldn’t reveal certain information to the public... We do not want to undermine in any way our sources of information, or share information which could place investigations in jeopardy.’

Later in March 2008, after some successful prosecutions had eventually been accomplished during November 2006, US Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey offered the following appraisal of the case:

In counter-terrorism, one important case run jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom was known by the codename Operation Rhyme. In that case, Dhiren Barot, a British national with links to Al Qaeda, and seven co-conspirators were convicted of plotting: to detonate car bombs and a dirty bomb; engage in other attacks on civilians in the United Kingdom; and detonate bombs at financial centers in the United States, including the New York Stock Exchange and the World Bank.

He continued, highlighting a source where US visa concerns (see above [4.1.iv]) once more originated vis-à-vis a UK citizen:

Barot traveled freely between our two countries [the UK and US] and enrolled in a university in the United States under a student visa. He exploited the convenience of our open borders and our friendly relations in order to try to kill American and British civilians alike. We were able to thwart his plans only through the close cooperation of our law enforcement agencies.

Ultimately, the ‘knocks’ to UK-US intelligence and law enforcement relations stemming from the public revelations had been kept in perspective and were contained. Overall, the tensions were not so severe as to frustrate overarching ‘functional’ and ‘evangelical’ relations. Too much was at stake for the disputes to have an interrupting effect on the whole of UK-US intelligence liaison on CT.

However, similar further disagreements soon emerged. These came in the wake of the 7/7 London bombings as the investigations progressed during July 2005. On this occasion, they were over the handling of bomb scene evidence in the UK-US police and law enforcement sector. Sir Ian Blair, the London Metropolitan Police Commissioner, publicly expressed his ‘concern’ at the US television broadcast of sensitive crime-scene photographs, which had been ‘supplied in confidence to some
of our colleague agencies.’ Later, further UK-US differences concerning intelligence liaison at the UK-US police and law enforcement level surfaced. This was after the New York Police Department apologised to London as confidential details concerning the 7/7 bombers again emerged in the US media. However, the fact of both the UK and US sharing the sensitive investigation-related material once more highlighted the extent to which the UK and US worked closely at this operational level. Relations were not overly interrupted by these episodes. From the frank expression of UK dismay at the above revelations, some useful lessons were propagated. These could be applied in the management of UK-US relations into the future.

Keeping intelligence operations secret was not always intended. Intelligence agencies also at times felt obligated to participate in overt politics and in their own PR (public relations) activities. In a manner non-compromising to intelligence gathering efforts once the joint investigations had ended, sometimes the authorities welcomed the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and sanctioned the release of further details concerning a case. This was done for several reasons. For instance, in order to help try and make or bolster a particular case, and to try to prove to public opinion that the terrorist threats were not being exaggerated. These officially controlled/determined exposés revealed some cases where international intelligence co-operation had been regarded as ‘successful’.

More remarkably, sanitised UK JIC intelligence assessments were released. Setting another precedent after 9/11, some of the intelligence collected and evaluated was shared widely with the public during the autumn of 2001. This was done to help foster UK domestic and international public opinion in the burgeoning so-called ‘War on Terror’. The UK Government released a dossier drawing on sanitised intelligence. It aimed to prove bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s culpability for the 9/11 attacks. It bluntly stated: ‘Although US targets are al-Qaeda’s priority, it also explicitly threatens the United States’ allies, which unquestionably include the United Kingdom.’ That threat also came from certain individuals.

[4.2.ii]: ‘Persons of interest’:
Particular individuals formed another specific issue of liaison interest. Again frequently during these interactions, the importance of the micro individual (as professional)/personal level in intelligence liaison was suggested. On this issue, the UK and US could be useful to one another. The extent of US dependence on and the enduring importance to the US of the UK intelligence liaison relationship on a CT task was outlined in depth in the 9/11 Commission Report. The value of FBI legal attachés for conducting such liaison on criminal matters was again highlighted.
Shortly before 9/11, the FBI launched an investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested on 16 August 2001 and was supposed to have been the twentieth hijacker on 9/11. During the course of this investigation, the FBI became aware that Moussaoui had lived in London. Through their legal attaché based in London, the FBI liaised with their ‘counterparts in the British government, hand-delivering the request [for assistance regarding information about Moussaoui] on August 21.

On August 24, the CIA also sent a cable to London and Paris regarding “subjects involved in suspicious 747 flight training” that described Moussaoui as a possible “suicide hijacker.” On August 28, the CIA sent a request for information to a different service of the British government [given the content of the communication, presumably the Security Service (MI5)]; this communication warned that Moussaoui might be expelled to Britain by the end of August. The FBI office in London raised the matter with British officials as an aside, after a meeting about a more urgent matter on September 3, and sent the British service a written update on September 5. The case was not handled by the British as a priority amid a large number of other terrorist-related inquiries...

On September 11, after the attacks, the FBI office in London renewed their appeal for information about Moussaoui. In response to the US requests, the British government supplied some basic biographical information about Moussaoui. The British government informed us that it also immediately tasked intelligence collection facilities for information about Moussaoui. On September 13, the British government received new, sensitive intelligence that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. It passed this intelligence to the United States on the same day. Had this information been available in late August 2001, the Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level attention… Either the British information or the Ressam identification would have broken the logjam.227

Other ‘persons of interest’ were soon flagged by intelligence and security services during the continued further development of potential investigative leads. After the 9/11 attacks, in the UK intelligence agencies, outstanding US requests, such as that concerning Moussaoui (above), were urgently re-prioritised, tasked and followed up. UK-US liaison continued concerning specific people, such as the London-based Saudi ‘dissident’ Khalid al-Fawwaz, who were alleged to have links to terrorism. Over time, ‘individuals of concern’, such as Moussaoui and UK citizen Richard Reid - the failed ‘shoe bomber’ of December 2001 - remained the subject of specific UK-US
intelligence and law enforcement liaison as their cases continued.\textsuperscript{228} In the wake of the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 and during their subsequent investigations, UK authorities probed the UK connections to the bombings. A connection was reportedly made between the terrorists who perpetrated the Madrid attacks and the already detained terror suspect, Moussaoui.\textsuperscript{229} Shortly before the November 2004 US Presidential election, UK-US intelligence liaison at the operational/tactical level was continuing unabated. This was apparent with UK and US law enforcement and intelligence personnel jointly analysing the latest videotape supposedly from bin Laden.\textsuperscript{230}

Particular individuals continued to provoke concern. By the spring of 2005, the FBI and UK anti-terrorism Special Branch (SO13) were liaising closely over another specific ‘person of interest’. US authorities’ suspicions were raised by Zayead Christopher Hajaig, a British citizen, who had escaped back to the UK after taking flying lessons at the same flight school where two 9/11 hijackers had trained.\textsuperscript{231} After the 7/7 London attacks, close UK-US intelligence liaison was again undertaken specifically concerning the suicide bombers who had perpetrated the attacks. These interactions took place against the backdrop of the ongoing wider post-attack investigations.\textsuperscript{232}

Allegedly, this type of UK-US intelligence liaison was not always effective. According to disclosures made in 2006 in The One Percent Doctrine, by US journalist and author Ron Suskind, the believed ‘leader’ of the 7/7 London suicide bombings, Mohammed Sidique Khan, had previously been flagged up in 2003. Contradicting evidence given by MI5 to the ISC and based on what ‘a senior British security source’ dismissed as ““untrue and one of the myths that have grown up around Khan””, Suskind claimed:

\begin{quote}
British intelligence was certainly told about Khan [by the US] in March and April 2003. This was a significant set of contacts that Khan had, and ones of much less importance were exchanged on a daily basis between the CIA and MI5. British authorities were sent a very detailed file. This demonstrates a catastrophic breakdown in communication across the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{233}
\end{quote}

However, from the debates surrounding the UK and US official rebuttals made directly in relation to Suskind’s claims regarding Khan, it appears most likely that the ‘wrong’ Khan may have been flagged-up (at least on occasions) in his claims. This was attributed to there being ‘confusion’ on the behalf of Suskind’s original source.\textsuperscript{234} From other well-placed sources, it does appear most likely that there was a mix-up regarding the particular Khan identified in the claims.\textsuperscript{235}
different individuals with the same name is a challenging issue encountered on a
day-to-day basis for intelligence officers. This is aside from also being similarly
challenging for those journalists and researchers following intelligence activities. The
name ‘Khan’ surfaces many times in relation to several different individuals, as seen
throughout this study, for instance. Although, it is worth highlighting that several
unanswered questions still surround precisely how much MI5 exactly knew about
the perpetrators of the 7/7 London bombings, including Mohammed Sidique Khan.
Reportedly, some of the information is legally blocked from being disseminated to
the public by the media, arguably possibly to avoid prejudicing a trial that was later
being held in April 2008, and also suggesting perhaps a ‘[Defence Advisory] DA-
Notice’ being in force.\textsuperscript{236}

Whatever can be agreed concerning this particularly controversial case, due to
limited resources at their disposal, intelligence agencies continued to maintain
specific targeting on their perceived highest priorities. Those who were not included
on those lists were essentially allotted a lower priority status and hence appeared to
more slip under the radar.\textsuperscript{237} After the 7/7 London bombings, there was the
allocation of further resources, especially for surveillance purposes.\textsuperscript{238} This emerged
as a useful way of helping to contribute towards further mitigating the shortfalls and
related shortcomings, as well as better addressing the associated (and unavoidable)
risks, of the approach that had been adopted by the UK authorities. As BBC security
correspondent Gordon Corera has highlighted: ‘Since January of 2006, [MI5’s]
casework on counter-terrorism has increased by 80%.’\textsuperscript{239} Simultaneously
demonstrating the extent of MI5’s contemporary overstretch, as Corera has argued,
to a degree these types of pressing management considerations persist:

\begin{quote}
The scale of activity leads to hard choices. Every week, in co-ordination
with the police, MI5 has to decide which of its many investigations it will
prioritise and, every day, it has to make further decisions on how to apply
its resources - whose phones to tap, who to follow. It takes many officers to
conduct 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week surveillance so putting
resources in one area involves diverting them from other investigations.\textsuperscript{240}
\end{quote}

Dealing with ‘persons of interest’ abroad was another task involving liaison.
Over time, the joint UK-US interrogation of about nine UK prisoners (at least by the
years 2003 to 2004)\textsuperscript{241} continued at the US Guantánamo Bay prison (‘Camp X-Ray’) in
Cuba.\textsuperscript{242} Indeed, US ‘War on Terror’ detainees and the issue of associated abuse
figured prominently.\textsuperscript{243} As 2003 progressed, UK-US intelligence relations persisted
amid the public controversy.\textsuperscript{244} Domestically in the UK, there were concerns about
the general treatment of detainees and, more specifically, the detention of UK
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citizens at that location, including the recently developed ‘Camp Delta’. At least early on, in July 2003, Downing Street readily justified the risks of the UK’s association, claiming that there was some intelligence value to be reaped: ‘...the information flowing from those at Guantanamo Bay is important in terms of the war against terrorism and we can’t overlook that.’

However, as time progressed, this issue itself could not be ignored. Not least, some domestic and international legal obligations made increasing inroads. The generally prevailing concerns surrounding the treatment of detainees eventually made it into the ISC ‘accountability’ system. On 9 March 2004, showing the high degree of trust established with the UK through agreements on sensitive intelligence and security matters, the US announced that it was transferring five British Guantanamo detainees to the UK. Granting another insight into interactions at the operational/tactical level, the criteria for permitting this move were declared to be as follows:

The decision to transfer or release a detainee is based on many factors, including whether the detainee is of further intelligence value to the United States or its allies. The decision to transfer these detainees was made after extensive discussions between our two governments. The British government has agreed to accept the transfer of these detainees and to take responsibility to ensure that the detainees do not pose a security threat to the United States or our allies.

Although, again showing that these sorts of interactions are not unconstrained, the remaining detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had to wait until sufficient UK security measures were in place. This was to be to the mutual satisfaction of both the UK and US authorities, before the detainees could be handed over safely. Moving forward on this issue dragged. As Blair remarked in his testimony to the UK House of Commons Parliamentary Liaison Committee in July 2004:

[H]e hoped the issue would be resolved “reasonably soon... I do not think the US is being unreasonable in saying we need to make sure there is security in place for these people... There is an issue about these particular people in respect of the United States that is not just about their status as detainees and we need to be very clear ... that we are not putting anyone at risk... I am not yet satisfied that we have the necessary [security] machinery in place but we are working on that... We all know that we are faced with a significant terrorism threat. These people were picked up in circumstances where we believe at the very least there are issues that need
to be resolved ... in respect of those individuals... Certainly from what I have seen about those individual cases I would need to be very, very clear that there was in place in this country a sufficient infrastructure and machinery to be able to protect our own security."

Some of the acute moral/ethical dilemmas that UK and US intelligence were confronting were highlighted. UK and US intelligence were striking some increasingly complex balances in their international intelligence liaison. These difficult and morally-explosive trade-offs were exposed particularly starkly during the controversy in May 2005 over the use of Uzbekistani intelligence. The former UK ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, revealed that Uzbekistani intelligence (allegedly) obtained through dubious methods, such as torture, was then being intimately shared between the UK and US as part of the close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison arrangements. Together with some civil liberties, some human rights principles would have to be set aside. This was as part of the controversial trade-off when dealing with unsavoury intelligence partners with distinctly doubtful human rights records. These ‘dangerous liaisons’ were courted when the UK and US intelligence agencies also wanted access to the potentially valuable intelligence product that could be supplied. Indeed, on occasions in the past, interrogation under duress reportedly had yielded some useful intelligence and investigative leads. This was highlighted especially where Alasdair Palmer noted in December 2002:

Most of us are so appalled by the whole idea of torture that we are inclined to claim that it does not work. Unfortunately it does - at least sometimes. In 1995 al-Qaeda planned to hijack 11 airliners flying out of the Philippines, with a total of 4,000 people aboard, and to crash them into the Pacific. The Philippine intelligence agencies, suspecting a plot, arrested and tortured a man they thought was one of the terrorists. They broke most of his ribs, burned his genitals with cigarettes and poured water into his mouth until he couldn’t breathe. After 67 days, he came up with the information which enabled the Filipinos, together with the Americans - who were provided with the fruits of the interrogation - to frustrate the plot.

Risk management considerations while conducting liaison in such contexts, and when involving torture-originating intelligence product, again figured prominently in this domain of activity. This was not least as other potentially extreme and politically-acute situations had to be carefully navigated in parallel by intelligence and security personnel in their day-to-day work. These considerations were captured by a referential eye to the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, together with the presence of a
vigorouss ‘not on our watch’ mentality, as the overarching goal of public safety continued to predominate. By November 2005, UK-US intelligence relations were evidently taking place amid the public controversy regarding the US’s own CIA ‘extraordinary renditions’ and associated use of ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques, such as ‘waterboarding’. Many people both inside and outside of the intelligence world found these methods exceedingly repugnant morally. Inevitably, even in private, UK-US intelligence liaison relations were not isolated from stressful knock-on ramifications and implications concerning the widespread US use of these controversial methods, as explicitly endorsed by the Bush administration. As the UK ISC later observed solemnly in June 2007, when it reported on the renditions issue:

The rendition programme has revealed aspects of the usually close UK/U.S. relationship that are surprising and concerning. It has highlighted that the UK and U.S. work under very different legal guidelines and ethical approaches. The Director General of the Security Service said that the Americans are aware of the concerns of the UK Agencies in relation to rendition and detainee treatment…

Indeed, as the ISC soberly continued:

The U.S. rendition programme has required that the Security Service and SIS modify their relationship with their American counterparts to ensure that, in sharing intelligence, the differing legal frameworks of both countries are honoured. … Although the U.S. may take note of UK protests and concerns, this does not appear materially to affect its strategy on rendition.

Some of the reconfigurations that had to be undertaken within UK-US intelligence liaison relations were emphasised. These were principally implemented as a consequence of the presence - and indeed enhanced use (or ‘normalisation’) in the ‘War on Terror’ context - of the US ‘extraordinary renditions’ programme and use of ‘intensive interrogation’ methods. Distinct defining operational parameters for UK-US intelligence liaison relations were again clearly demonstrated. From an international intelligence liaison risk management perspective, the UK-US intelligence liaison was disappointingly becoming somewhat increasingly dangerous. With the enhanced attention focussed on legal liabilities, as well as their associated greater enforcement through being better adhered to in operations, in some circumstances, actionable operational/tactical intelligence (as defined above [2.0]) now could not be so directly or explicitly, or indeed legally permissibly, shared
by the UK (or other European countries) with the US. Intelligence interactions involving intensive interrogation techniques and renditions, quickly acquired similar ‘blocks’ on the scope of their operation as those interactions involved in investigations that might ultimately lead to the US legal sentence of capital punishment being enacted (see below).

Significantly, this political controversy was not confined to impacting solely on direct UK-US intelligence liaison relations. By late 2005 and into early 2006, it also figured at the plurilateral level between the US and the EU, with the European Parliament inquiry, and the Council of Europe (CoE) inquiry. CoE Secretary General Terry Davis, who presented the Council’s report, importantly claimed ‘safeguards were needed to stop abuse… a number of countries had systems for overseeing their own national security services - such as the UK. But “hardly any country in Europe has any legal provisions to ensure an effective oversight over the activities of foreign agencies on their territory.”’

The CoE’s advisory body on constitutional affairs, the ‘Venice Commission’ (The European Commission for Democracy through Law) also probed the issue. Notably, in March 2006, the Venice Commission report quickly unveiled the further obstacles and operational parameters that would need to be navigated in UK-US intelligence interactions. Together with making many valid points, the most awkward implications for UK-US intelligence liaison relations flowed from the Venice Commission observing within its conclusions that:

Council of Europe member States are under an international legal obligation to secure that everyone within their jurisdiction ... enjoy internationally agreed fundamental rights, including and notably that they are not unlawfully deprived of their personal freedom and are not subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, including in breach of the prohibition to extradite or deport where there exists a risk of torture or ill-treatment. This obligation may also be violated by acquiescence or connivance in the conduct of foreign agents. There exists in particular a positive duty to investigate into substantiated claims of breaches of fundamental rights by foreign agents, particularly in case of allegations of torture or unacknowledged detention.

In the overall mix of controversy - which persisted into 2008 with revelations of detainees allegedly being held on some 17 US ‘prison ships’ - parliamentary inquiries in other European countries, such as Germany and Italy, were also closely involved. In the throes of the wake of the Arar case and its subsequent commission, Canada, too, was not exempt from these types of probes. The disputes
concerned particularly those renditions to countries where interrogation (allegedly) takes place with torture. Together with the UK, the other European countries and their interactions with the US on this issue were subject to close scrutiny. This was not least due to several prevailing concerns surrounding the violating of their domestic and international legal obligations. As already witnessed, these requirements were largely incurred as a consequence of being signatories to the ECHR, as well as due to the presence of other prevailing human rights legislation, such as for the UK, its Human Rights Act of 1998, as well as having to adhere to the obligations as laid down by the various UN agreements on human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

With these in mind, from September 2005, the media probed the UK’s alleged involvement in the US process. Although later in December 2005, this was officially rebutted by the UK Government with explicit assurances claiming ‘no record’ of any involvement. However, some MPs were not convinced by those assurances, and still wanted to question UK intelligence and security service officers concerning the renditions. In these circumstances, the ISC decided to investigate the process. Later, in early 2008, an examination of US records demonstrated that two CIA renditions flights had in fact landed on British territory in 2002. This was at the base on Diego Garcia. Chastened, the UK Government apologised. More characteristically, an official UK Government response to the (alleged) role performed by UK Special Forces in the US-led renditions process has remained conspicuously absent. This was not least concerning the claims of Ben Griffin, reportedly ‘a former SAS soldier who quit the Army in protest at the “illegal” tactics and policies of coalition forces, [who] said the [UK] Government knew what was happening… [He] said the SAS was part of a joint US/UK unit which captured suspected terrorist[s] who were then spirited away for interrogation.’

The fallout spread further. By October 2005, worries were already prevalent that wider ‘counterterrorism co-operation is endangered by US renditions.’ Simultaneously, in December 2005, the UK Law Lords raised the ‘burden of proof’ required for terrorism cases. They declared that evidence against terror suspects obtained by torture was inadmissible in the UK courts. Again, the high legal threshold set by UK courts, and which had caused some earlier US chagrin (see above [4.1.iv]), was demonstrated. The controversy also had some impact politically on the US, with a ‘torture ban law’ being introduced. But in the US this quickly became overshadowed later in December 2005, by the US ‘spying on its own citizens’ domestic controversy. The persistently disliked whiff of Americans spying on Americans lingered, extending into 2006. Behind-the-scenes, away from public scrutiny, UK-US intelligence liaison on CT continued. However, as a consequence of
the impact of the above controversial methods and practices pursued by the US, it was plainly subject to some recalibration.\textsuperscript{277}

\textbf{[4.2.iii]: Counter-cyber-terrorism:}  
The Internet similarly figured in specific bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison.\textsuperscript{278} At the dawn of the new millennium, cyber-terrorism concerns were prevalent. ‘Info-war’ was emerging as a new paradigm.\textsuperscript{279} In both the US and UK there were worries that ‘cyber-terrorists’ would exploit any ‘millennium bug’ or ‘Year 2000’ (Y2K) issues and launch attacks on major computer systems.\textsuperscript{280} This was something that the intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic were keen to watch and prevent. The Chairman of the US National Commission on Terrorism, Paul Bremer, later in June 2000 revealed the importance of intelligence liaison, remarking that: ‘It turned out that there really were plans for some major attacks during the Millennium, and thanks to some excellent liaison work... we were able to avoid them.’\textsuperscript{281}

Persisting joint UK-US concerns maintained the momentum. These surrounded wider ‘cyber-crime’, and at times again especially focussed on specific cases and individuals, ensuring that over time there was continuing close UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue.\textsuperscript{282} Additionally, suggesting close ties with the wider exclusive multilateral UKUSA SIGINT arrangement, it was revealed that:

\begin{quote}
Within [the US National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), FBI], the NIPC has full-time representatives... [including those] from three foreign partners: the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The NIPC has established information sharing connectivity with a number of foreign cyber watch centers, including in the UK...
\end{quote}

The continued important role of FBI legal attachés on this issue was asserted with: ‘And, we continue to take advantage of the FBI’s global presence through its Legal Attaché offices in 44 nations...’\textsuperscript{283} The ‘legats’ were also useful for aiding with UK-US intelligence liaison on the financial front of counter-terrorism efforts.\textsuperscript{284}

\textbf{[4.2.iv]: ‘Asset freezing’ and financial counter-terrorism:}  
Following money trails emerged significantly. After the 9/11 attacks, bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison concerning financial counter-terrorism efforts was enhanced. Involving financial ‘asset freezing’, these formed the first strikes the UK-US intelligence services could jointly take the lead in mobilising, in the ensuing so-called ‘War on Terror’. These began with the bank details of suspect ‘charities’ beginning to be probed.\textsuperscript{285} As more multilateral moves slowly began to burgeon, the UK-US-led freezing of ‘terrorist’ assets continued over time with the circulation of lists drawn up as ‘a result of intelligence sharing and co-ordination between the UK and US. We
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will continue to work with our allies, and take a leading role internationally to cut off the ready supply of finance which is the lifeblood of modern terrorism…’, declared UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.286 He later offered the US Treasury Secretary, Paul O’Neill, the services of the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) as a ‘force multiplier’287, in order to ‘co-ordinate intelligence’ relating to terrorist finances.288

How successful these ‘asset freezing’ efforts were remains questionable. At least in the short-term, it appears that they were not outstanding, having only a limited impact. For example, ‘conventional’ Western banking tools and controls were variously undermined by the presence of popular alternative, more ‘informal’, banking methods/systems - especially used in the Middle East - known as hawala.289 By April 2002, according to The Financial Times, the UK and US ‘admitted they had tracked down only a fraction of funds used to finance alleged terrorists.’290 Later, by 2004, a British Bankers’ Association conference was reportedly informed that although ‘the number of terrorist-related suspicious bank transaction reports in the UK has fallen since 2001 … the overall number of suspicious reports is rising…’291

Some diversification in the methods of terrorist financing was suggested. This was along with a greater appreciation that vast sums of money were not necessarily essential when executing jihadist terrorist attacks - as the 7/7 London bombings had demonstrated.292

Yet, overall, the tool of financial ‘asset freezing’ was still useful. As part of the UK counter-terrorism response to the Bali bombings, and in the wake of similar US moves, the Chancellor ordered the freezing of assets associated with Jemaah Islamiyah, the radical Islamic group believed to be responsible for the bombings.293 As the group’s al-Qaeda connections tried to be ascertained, the announcement came that more terrorist groups were being banned under the UK Terrorism Act of 2000.294

Finance intelligence underwent substantial evolution between 2003 and 2005. Given the multiple difficulties encountered, intelligence and security authorities gradually adopted some more sophisticated strategies and tactics. Watching rather than snatching tactics again took the lead. Instead of instantly freezing the assets, it was reported that,

Special Branch, regional police forces and the intelligence agencies have learnt over the past 16 months that terrorist money, once identified, is often better put under surveillance than seized. “Watching those funds come and go has been a revelation and far more useful in developing new leads than just steaming in with confiscations and arrests”, [said] a Home Office source … “Better for us to know what terrorists are doing than vice versa…”
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The ‘asset freezing’ tactics adopted after 9/11 were recognised to be somewhat ineffective. The Home Office source continued: ‘I think everyone now concedes that was a bit of a knee-jerk reaction… We were all flailing about to reassure the public that we were on top of things, but freezing money didn’t always get us very far.’

Steep learning curves for the authorities again had to be mastered.

By mid-2005, the US officially evaluated that there had been some partial success: ‘The US government has made significant progress in bolstering the political will and ability of governments in the Middle East and South Asia to combat terrorism and the financing of terrorists, but more needs to be done…’ Although, ‘…burden sharing with our key coalition partners is an emerging success story.’

Further actions against terrorist financing were demanded after the July London bombings. These movements would build on the secret programmes that had already been underway for some time since the 9/11 attacks, including the monitoring of international bank and money transactions. By early 2006, these efforts, including those against hawala, were judged to be ‘very successful’. However, into 2007, some associated shortcomings remained. Overall, results continued to be mixed in terms of their effectiveness.

Over time, some broader UK and US attempts to tackle terrorist funds were witnessed. These concerned wider multilateral efforts, including the setting up of a G7 anti-money laundering task force in October-November 2001. This specific multilateral effort co-existed as part of several other general multilateral CT initiatives. Similarly to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT elsewhere, trends here were also on a ‘continuum with expansion’.

[5.0]: Overall conclusions - Evaluating UK-US intelligence liaison on CT

Terrorism featured prominently in the early years of the twenty-first century. At the end of 2005, the results of the US-led so-called ‘War on Terror’ were mixed. As it morphed into the ‘Long War’ during early 2006, at best there could be deduced some partial counter-terrorism (CT) success. Arguably this success was particularly seen in the disruption wrought at the lower and narrower operational/tactical and individual/personal levels of terrorism. Terrorist ‘al-Qaeda’ bases in Afghanistan had been destroyed and numerous ‘persons of interest’ had either been killed or detained across the world. Yet, by 2007, and continuing into 2008, how long-lasting, and indeed sustained, this ‘success’ would be, appeared to be considerably more debatable.

At worst, the counter-terrorism strategies were not being sufficiently effective. Their long-term sustainability, both in terms of their modi operandi
deployed and the resulting *modus vivendi*, was at best questionable. This was because, in implementing the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’, narrower *counter-terrorism* activities, rather than wider *anti-terrorism* efforts, were being promoted. The considerations concerning *how*, rather than *why*, there was terrorism were being better addressed. According to the annual US State Department *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report, an increase in terrorism was recorded during 2005. Al-Qaeda as a command-and-control organisation had received a battering, but not a killer blow.

By 2006, the security situation in Afghanistan was still volatile. There were continued Taliban uprisings and there was the further expanded presence of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Moreover, *vis-à-vis* the macro/higher, broader ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels – arguably increasingly the most important levels in the *jihadist* terrorism being faced by the end of 2005 - success was lacking. Indeed, at this juncture a convincing case could be made that on the ‘ideas front’ aspects of the counter-terrorism strategies – that is, crudely the winning of ‘hearts and minds’ – the approaches currently being adopted were even being counter-productive.

Essentially, not enough ‘counter-jihadism’ was taking place. The associated circumventing of international law, and the undermining of the moral high ground with highly visible so-called ‘War on Terror’ symbols, notably Guantánamo Bay, highlighted the full shortcomings. These could be, and were, effectively exploited by opponents, further fuelling widespread vitriol against the West and its allies. Equally, UK and US intelligence and security operations at home and abroad were hampered by such moves. In 2003, the US *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* had declared: ‘We will win the war of ideas.’ However, by 2006 this was not being achieved as effectively as it potentially could be. ‘Soft’ power was still not being sufficiently projected. Indeed, through being overly ‘kinetic’ in its efforts, the US was even being counter-productive. Strains were also caused with close allies on this plane of activity:

As Sir Richard Dearlove [former ‘Chief’ of the UK SIS/MI6]… put it, by the end of the Cold War there was no doubt about which side stood on the moral high ground. “Potential recruits would come to us because they believed in the cause,” he said. “This made our work much easier.” Dearlove and countless others argued that the United States had gravely weakened its position by seeming to ignore its long-standing constitutional principles, in internal checks-and-balances and in its practices around the world. “America’s cause is doomed unless it regains the moral high ground,” Dearlove said.
Therefore, implementing the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’ has had chequered results. This raises some interesting conclusions. Especially for the US, rather than counter-terrorism (‘rollback’) featuring as a strategy, this dimension should be somewhat more scaled back and feature more as tactics. In turn, this dimension should then be subsumed within, and as part of, a broader anti-terrorism strategy, which involves more ‘containment’. Within its overall anti-terrorism strategy, the UK, meanwhile, arguably needs to marginally extend its counter-terrorism dimension.\(^{321}\)

Prioritisation problems can be highlighted. While funding and resources for intelligence, law enforcement and security services in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ context undoubtedly have substantially increased, as US intelligence scholar Stan Taylor has observed, ‘an increasing percentage of intelligence spending is being targeted against terrorism.’ This is fuelling concern that ‘it is leaving other traditional intelligence targets (non-proliferation, transnational drugs and crime, and even WMD, for example [including counter-intelligence (CI) efforts]) under-funded and ripe for surprise.’\(^{322}\) Open sources (in the form of OSINT) needed to be further exploited, including through the greater ‘globalisation of intelligence’. This is alongside realising the fuller potential of an all-source intelligence approach.\(^{323}\) A case for a coherent and comprehensive UK national security strategy was also beginning to be put forward.\(^{324}\) Critically, these types of efforts continue to need to be extended further.

By 2006, there was still much to do.\(^{325}\) In January 2006, Henry A. Crumpton, US Coordinator for Counterterrorism, summarised the currently perceived situation in the following way:

> Non-state actors like Al Qaeda have ... developed asymmetric approaches that allow them to side-step conventional military power. They embrace terror as a tactic, but on such a level as to provide them strategic impact. Toward that end, they seek to acquire capabilities that can pose catastrophic threats, such as WMD, disruptive technologies, or a combination of these measures... we will increasingly face enemy forces in small teams or even individuals ... these are “micro-targets with macro-impact” operating in the global exchange of people, data, and ideas ... all evolve at the pace of globalization itself. We are facing the future of war today. The ongoing debate, sometimes disagreement, among allies reflects this new reality...\(^{326}\)

Offering some further detail of the US perspective, he continued:
We see the enemy as a “threat complex” comprising three elements: leaders, safe havens and underlying conditions… We seek to act globally, over an extended time-frame, to isolate the threat, defeat the isolated threat, and prevent its re-emergence… The first implication [for the future] is the need for us to build trusted networks of allies and partners - state, non-state, and multilateral - who support the rule of law and oppose the use of terrorism to resolve grievances.327

To progress the ‘Long War’ counter-terrorism efforts further and to realise greater success in the future, the psychological, ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels, on many different planes of activity, needed to be more comprehensively and carefully addressed.328 This also needed to be done in a sustained – and, into the future, sustainable – manner, fully sensitive to and more closely connected to all the highly complex details encountered. Such an approach particularly includes better observing those aspects experienced and encountered at the micro/lower operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels, again in many different domains of activity. Enhanced contextualisation efforts, both in terms of their comprehensiveness and coherence, are increasingly required. This is together with the increased uptake of their results, especially by policy/decision-makers, politicians and their publics alike, in an educative manner that ideally produces ‘intelligent customers’. Also emphasising the importance of the contextualisation task, Crumpton maintained:

...operations ... need to be partner-led wherever possible - initiatives need to be developed in close conjunction with local partners, to meet their needs and address the real conditions on the ground, rather than address conditions only as they are perceived to be in Washington, London, or Paris... A final implication is the need for inter-agency operations... [which] goes way beyond mere coordination or cooperation. It demands that we plan, conduct and structure operations - from the very outset - as part of an intimately connected whole-of-government approach.329

In terms of intelligence and security outreach, some under-reach was evident. The beginnings of some more effective official recognition of this need to step-up and engage more productively in the so-called ‘ideas war’, as part of the wider CT efforts, were being witnessed. For example, at least in the military realm, the US Pentagon doctrine document, ‘Information Operations,’ Joint Publication 3-13 of 13 February 2006 examined the issue.330 Meanwhile, in the UK, slightly later in March 2007, the establishment of the so-called ‘Research, Information and Communications Unit’
(RICU), was announced, as part of wider Home Office changes to attempt to deal better with the tackling of terrorism.\textsuperscript{331} RICU is supposedly intended to handle the tasks required in the realm of ideas.\textsuperscript{332} As Home Secretary Jacqui Smith revealed in a House of Commons debate in early July 2007, outlining RICU’s purpose: ‘We will push forward on the need to counter the destructive ideology...’\textsuperscript{333} However, how largely it figures as part of the UK’s overall strategy is rather more of a moot point. Not least, these concerns emerge when we are aware of the reportedly small size of the unit, consisting of around just 30 people.\textsuperscript{334} A comprehensive humanistic Western values system, based on liberal-democratic values, now required promoting. This was as well as consistent adherence to those values by the UK, the US, and their other allies, in a non-hypocritical manner. This would be in order to potentially counter the \textit{jihadist} values more effectively, and intended to fill any ideological vacuums before these became further hijacked by the alternative \textit{jihadist} values.

\textbf{[5.1]: Delivering tangible results through UK-US intelligence collaboration?}
Frequently with the highly secret intelligence liaison phenomenon, ‘... we cannot know what invisible successes have been achieved...’\textsuperscript{335} Equally, we cannot discern what shortcomings have emerged.\textsuperscript{336} However, as is demonstrated throughout this case study, a few specific publicised episodes can be confidently explored and evaluated, yielding some interesting conclusions.

\textbf{[5.1.i]: The dynamics of UK-US counter-terrorism relationships:}
The UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is dynamic. It is multilayered and multifaceted, consisting not of one relationship, but many overlapping ones. As frequently witnessed over time in UK-US relations generally, the ends are broadly agreed upon; although the means and respective UK-US approaches or styles of reaching those ends can diverge, at times considerably, generating some tensions. These tensions, however, even when intense, tend to be kept contained in perspective and to be localised to their sector/level. Thus they do not disrupt more widely.\textsuperscript{337} As Stevenson argues: ‘Transatlantic strategic policy differences and a few episodes of counter-terrorism dyspepsia belie overall day-to-day operational harmony, for which there are strong incentives...’\textsuperscript{338} The importance of the micro/low levels in the intelligence world is suggested, where personal relationships, routine (including daily work patterns and practices) and specifics feature significantly.

Further trends are apparent. The UK-US divergences that do emerge over time repeatedly appear to tend to revolve around the same or similar contentious issues. These are often also dealt with, including being minimised, in a corresponding manner to the previous episodes. Frequently this is done on the basis
of lessons learnt from that previous experience. Here, having a long-term history of operating together can have particular ‘added value’. At other times, the different UK-US approaches to CT can equally complement (in their vis-à-vis mode) alongside those that compete or clash (in their versus mode).

Overall, ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ are predominant. They appear to trump ‘terminalism’ in each of the eight levels of UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. The detectable fleeting instances of ‘terminalism’ were confined to particular episodes or issue areas - such as the UK sentiments concerning the counter-productive ceding of the moral high ground by the US, and the US worries that the UK was failing to clamp down adequately on their domestic terrorists. Again, these issues have tended to be focussed on specifics, allowing at least some scope for them to be negotiated in a problem-solving manner. They do not appear to have persisted long enough, and/or to sufficiently deep or wide extents, across enough of the levels, without some form of recalibration being effected.

‘Functionalism’ appears to be the dominant position. This perhaps comes as an unsurprising conclusion, as UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is focussed precisely on the ‘functional’ CT issue. Ultimately, the end stakes for both parties are too high to be forfeited to any detrimentally counter-productive instances of overall ‘terminalism’ linked to particular events or episodes. Furthermore, any ‘evangelicalism’ articulated arguably tends to become somewhat more muted at the juncture of production. This is when agreements actually have to be put into practice, and promises have to be delivered. Issues concerning practicalities, such as the control of intelligence, then have a greater impact.

Together, these observed trends help to account for why UK-US intelligence relations have endured as effectively as they have done for over 60 years. Overall, the ‘functional issues’ have essentially provided something tangible around which the UK and US can collectively orbit.

[5.1.ii]: Presenting a generic overview:
Some general trends can be depicted. Usually, the greatest and most easily negotiated CT agreement between the UK and the US is at the broadest and highest/macro level. This concerns the ends - for example, terrorism and political violence being unacceptable actions requiring pre-emption and prevention, in order to best fulfil the goal of ‘public safety’. Greater UK-US counter-terrorism differences tend to emerge at the increasingly micro/narrower, yet closely interlinked, levels of analysis. Cascades of complexities increasingly enter as these depths are reached. Again, it is here that the specifics and intangibles matter more in the UK-US interactions, particularly when concerning the means and styles of achieving the
desired ends. The endurance of continuing routine interactions also should not be undervalued or overlooked. Neither should the possibility for more informal and individual processes - such as (albeit frequently unrecorded) face-to-face interactions – namely those beyond and outside of mere formal constraints, be discounted. Here, the cultural dimension of relations can perform an important role.

[5.1.iii]: Developments before and after 9/11:
Some themes have endured. Developments before and after 9/11 do appear to have been on a ‘continuum with expansion’, also including ‘muddling through’ characteristics.339 Before 9/11, some initiatives were evidently already in place and evolving, such as the UK-US MLAT of 1994.340 These developments were extended and given greater impetus by the 9/11 attacks, the 7/7 bombings and other subsequent attacks. Collectively, the attacks acted as catalysts, generating some overall exponential growth in international intelligence liaison. The growth was most remarkable at the bilateral level, with some increases also taking place at the multilateral level - albeit more tentatively and gradually. This was noticeable with some intelligence sharing and co-operation limitations/obstacles remaining in place, as was particularly evident during the most sensitive investigations - for example, involving HUMINT - and especially acutely so concerning the interactions at the less-exclusive multilateral level.

SIGINT liaison also featured centrally. During the whole period 2000 to the end of 2005, the UKUSA SIGINT arrangement evidently continued to remain important to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT and law enforcement issues.341 However, it was most effective when not too widely targeted in an unfocussed manner. This better enabled the more proportionate applying of the ‘rapier’ rather than the ‘bludgeon’.342

[5.1.iv]: Are moves being made towards the greater ‘globalisation’ of intelligence?
Yes. Despite the presence of some rhetoric concerning the greater international sharing of CT intelligence in international affairs post-9/11, it is not all over-hyped. Some actual and greater ‘globalisation’ of CT intelligence is perceptible. Notably this is most acutely seen through developments including the increasingly integrated, both nationally and internationally, terrorism threat assessment/analysis centres.343 Also, there is considerable evidence of Western, UK-US-led, top-down, and long-term ‘international standardisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ moves being undertaken, particularly focussed on the issue of CT. This seems to be being done through the mechanism of the close UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, as well as through international intelligence liaison with other countries - for example,
Indonesia - in both the law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ sectors, through the processes of intelligence and security sector reform (SSR). In these newer, overlapping and more ‘globalised’ intelligence arrangements, episodes of counter-productive ‘groupthink’, and other intelligence reach excesses and deficits, will have to be carefully avoided. Some ‘shared perceptions’ are healthy and acceptable; over-shared, unchallenged perceptions, forfeiting considerably divergent micro/lower level differences, are not. This is another fine balance, especially in terms of outreach, which has to be struck. Moreover, all the different trade-offs involved need to be carefully and judiciously weighed.

[5.1.v]: The results are fluid:
Some uncertainties remain. The overall outcomes and effects of UK-US intelligence liaison on CT can be regarded as having a complex and mixed record. The wider ambiguous characteristic of international intelligence liaison is discernable. In part, the UK-US intelligence liaison is delivering tangible results (effects and outcomes) through successful collaboration. By the end of 2005, it appears that there were some successes and some shortcomings. Where to place the weight of the overall balance is more of a moot point. It will continue to be considerably debated. This is not least because of the presence of the intangibles, and due to the fact that the multiple CT efforts are constantly ongoing in a dynamic manner.

Some progress has been made. As a result of joint UK-US CT efforts, together with those of other countries, the formal and physical terrorist infrastructures have been substantially shattered. Although to what extent they remain intact in more of a devolved and dispersed form, or only fractured in the short - rather than long and enduring – term, is more questionable. This is especially as by 2007-08 they appeared to be re-emerging, such as being located near the Afghan border in Pakistan. However, the nature of the terrorist threat as it was confronted during September 2001 has indeed changed. This is in part thanks to those earlier CT efforts – as appears to be particularly the case in relation to the micro/low levels of the jihadist terrorism confronted.

Yet, several persisting intangibles and shortcomings do standout. It is arguably at the macro/higher levels of ‘al-Qaeda-ism’ and global jihadism that the counter-terrorism results are less tangible; and, so far, there seems to have been considerably less success. The increasingly amorphous, extremist/radical promulgated and propagated, jihadist terrorism-inspiring ideologies (‘al-Qaeda-ism’) and other informal aspects - for example, as effectively delivered socially over the Internet - still remain to be adequately addressed in a defusing and non-counterproductive manner. This is despite more recent governmental initiatives such as RICU. As Rumsfeld himself remarked on 27 March 2006:
If I were rating, I would say we probably deserve a D or a D+ as a country as how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place… I’m not going to suggest that it’s easy, but we have not found the formula as a country.\textsuperscript{346}

It is challenging to determine whether the re-branding of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ as laid out in the February 2006 US \textit{Quadrennial Review} strategy – now termed the ‘Long War’ - and the more recent \textit{National Strategy of the United States} (of March 2006) - reaffirming pre-emptive action advocated in the earlier 2002 US \textit{National Strategy} document and applied in relation to Iraq in 2003 - will be effective in this area.\textsuperscript{347} Early impressions into 2008 are perhaps not the most inspiring. This is as the UK and US in particular remain engaged by various intractable insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.

\textbf{[5.1.vi]: The CT future is uncertain, but \textit{bleak if adjustments are not implemented}:}
Into the future, considerably more positive moves can be implemented. Deducible is that co-operation on CT intelligence is likely to be at least as equally dynamic as already observed. This is the case as complications proliferate exponentially - for example, with ‘subjective’ interpretations rather than more ‘objective’ determinants increasingly featuring; and as the arguably ‘post-modern’\textsuperscript{348} breaking-down of traditional categories used to distinguish and evaluate types of terrorism – for example, ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ - continue apace in the era of globalisation \textit{writ large} being experienced in international affairs.\textsuperscript{349}

Undoubtedly, the moral high ground needs to be better upheld. Whatever results over the long term, continuing poor adherence to human rights and civil liberties, disregard for international laws and the Geneva Conventions, sidelining international institutions (such as the UN and NATO), the use of the CIA secret prisons and the ‘extraordinary renditions’ process outside of international law,\textsuperscript{350} and related movements, and what have become essentially so-called ‘War on Terror’ ‘symbols’ - such as the phrase ‘War on Terror’ itself and the existence of Guantánamo Bay - as seen especially in the US counter-terrorism approach, are far from helpful.\textsuperscript{351} The ‘fallout’ from the Iraq war has also undeniably contributed to complicating the issue of global CT efforts.\textsuperscript{352} As some more cracks are appearing in the international consensus in early 2008, Afghanistan itself, too, continues to be far from being beneficially ‘solved’ in any sustainable security manner.\textsuperscript{353}

Ultimately, ‘finding and killing’ terrorists was not enough.\textsuperscript{354} To use an analogy, just amputating was not curing or preventing the disease. Taken together, the observed shortcomings in UK and US CT efforts serve only to alienate people
further. This includes estranging those critically needed supporters out in communities, located both at home and more widely within other countries’ populations across the world. As the UK Government itself has noted: ‘The Government’s strategy for countering terrorism depends upon everyone making a contribution to its success.’\[^{355}\] ‘Hearts and minds’ are not being sufficiently engaged. Crucially, these very people need to be better engaged in order to assist the law enforcement and intelligence and security agencies’ local, extending through to global, CT operations.\[^{356}\] Greater (wider and deeper) stakeholder ‘ownership’ needs to be engendered.

Forfeiting of the ‘moral high ground’ is counter-productive. The achieving of the longer-term ‘end’ objectives is detrimentally undermined. This is both in terms of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power and security, and whether those end objectives are deemed ‘realistic’ or ‘idealistic’. In the shorter-term, operations are simultaneously not helped by such actions, not least where wider engagement is critically needed by, and indeed even beyond, intelligence and security agencies. Much required tolerance is also stifled. By mid-2006, the US appeared to be officially at least beginning to recognise some of these shortcomings.\[^{357}\] The passage of further time is now required to see whether new measures subsequently introduced will be effective overall. That time is also needed to discover whether they will actually contribute in a productive manner towards wider CT, and related counter-insurgency (COIN), efforts into the future.

Finally, as the new Director of Chatham House observed in early 2007: ‘Cooperation between our intelligence services and our surveillance agencies is as valuable as ever today, at a time when international terrorists are targeting both UK and US citizens on a persistent basis.’\[^{358}\] But, as Charles Secrett, Director of Friends of the Earth, has rightly stressed, that vital co-operation should not be in isolation. Nor should it be confined to solely the intelligence and security sector, again without some wider public (or stakeholder) engagement. As Secrett astutely observed in a UK Cabinet Office briefing in late 2001:

... engagement in Anglo-Saxon culture (political and social) like Britain’s is too often of the oppositional kind ... and ... eventually synthesis emerges. We rely a great deal on the analysis of experts, and a top-down approach to make up our public minds: it is much more a command-and-control political model than in other cultures. It is very different, for example, from a Scandic or Dutch approach, where parties from government, the private sector and societal groups engage around full discussions and consideration of alternatives in the round, and almost as equals in terms of input.\[^{359}\]
Where does this leave us? In an era where much of the desired command-and-control appears to be lacking, greater engagement on these latter more consensual bases now needs to be better facilitated. This is in both individual and joint UK and US intelligence and security counter-terrorism enterprises. In a transformative manner, this is in order to realise longer-term enduring intelligence and security sustainability, through some better burden sharing, emancipation, and to best maximise these types of arrangements’ potential for success into the future. Simultaneously, in CT risk management efforts, by adopting such an approach, the UK and US can move more away from their current condition of deploying costly ‘fire-fighting’ tactics, to increasingly one of effective ‘risk pre-emption’. Informative lessons stemming from the experiences of other close CT partners, such as Canada, should also be carefully heeded. Otherwise, the commonly shared wider driving goal of ‘public safety’ will remain increasingly elusive for us all.
References

1 Quoted in R. Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing: Americans and British encounter tensions over terrorism: After the London Bombs: Differing approaches to surveillance and pursuit of radical Islamist groups are showing signs of convergence as transatlantic co-operation is stepped up’, The Financial Times (17 August 2005).


4 This fourth aeroplane (United Airlines flight 93) became the subject of UK film director Paul Greengrass’ highly acclaimed docu-drama United 93 (Universal Studios, 2006).


For more information on ‘crisis management’, see, for example, D. Smith and D. Elliot (eds), *Key Readings in Crisis Management: Systems and Structures for Prevention and Recovery* (London: Routledge, 2006).


See, for example: ‘The basis for the different national approaches to domestic terrorism, experts and officials agree, goes back generations… One American diplomat who has worked closely with the UK on counter-terrorism issues also notes that Britain’s small size and island geography make it easier for the security services to track and gather intelligence on local extremists, a luxury he contends that the US does not have…’ - Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’.

See, for example, S. Chesterman, ‘Does the UN have intelligence?’, *Survival*, 48, 3 (Autumn 2006), pp.149-164; ; see also the references to peacekeeping intelligence (PKI) throughout this study.

See, for example, J. Kriendler, *NATO Intelligence and Early Warning* (Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre [CSRC], March 2006); see also ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO Advanced Research Workshop’, *Report* (St Antony’s College, Oxford: The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and Intelligence, 09-10 December 2005).


ISC, Renditions (June 2007), p.12, para.24.

See, for example, ‘US presses UN over terrorism’, BBC News Online (27 September 2001).

For further background, see, for instance, via URL: <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/> (accessed: 01/05/2008).

See, for example, as outlined at ‘Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Assistance’, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada website (04 July 2007) - via URL: <http://www.dfait-maceci.gc.ca/internationalcrime/CTCB-en.asp> (accessed: 01/05/2008).

At least potential greater intelligence protectionism is intended to be maintained by the presence of so-called ‘security reasons’. These include trying to reduce the risk of sources and/or methods being compromised, as well as measures designed to encourage the maintenance of greater intelligence control, secrecy, and clandestine operability.

For evidence of such sanitisation practices in action, see, for instance, ‘Subject: Counterintelligence Note: ***’, CIA Memorandum CI 873/76 (26 November 1976) – via CREST – CIA-
particular where it notes: ‘… and sterile copies will be available for release to foreign liaison services.’; see also the ‘Security Precautions’ at the front of copies of Studies in Intelligence, where they note: ‘Permission to make use of individual articles for liaison purposes with foreign nationals must in all cases be formally requested from the Chairman of the Editorial Board. In all cases, articles released by the Chairman for liaison purposes will be altered from the Studies format before being passed to foreign nationals or foreign liaison.’ – see, for example, ‘Security Precautions’ at the front of Studies in Intelligence, 23, 4 (Winter 1979) – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00630A000100090001-0 (2007/01/18).


29 For example, beyond its ‘traditional’ and ‘usual’ Middle Eastern domain. Demonstrating that jihad was not a new phenomenon in 1989, see, for example, CIA, Terrorism Review for 19 October 1989 (19 October 1989), p.5 - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of Information Act (FoIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007). For a later assessment of the jihadis threat, see, for example, A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘The jihad: Change and continuation’, IISS Strategic Comments, 11, 7 (September 2005).


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A further example of the ‘militarised’ US counter-terrorism strategy can be obtained from

For further background, see the ‘US counter-terrorism strategy’ subheading in ‘Strategic Policy Issues: The Campaign against Terrorism: Five Years after 11 September’, chapter 2 in IISS Strategic Survey 2006, pp.29-31; see also under the subheading ‘Counter-arguments’ in ibid., pp.31-4, particularly where it is noted that: ‘And although Americans and others tend to view counter-terrorism as an endeavour closely akin to a war, Europeans and others still are inclined to see it as a law-enforcement and public-policy challenge.’ (p.33).


An historical example of the British ‘emergency’ counter-terrorism/counter-insurgency approach was witnessed during the ‘Malayan Emergency’ in the 1950s – see R.J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001), pp.494-518; see also Major General J. Thompson (ed.), The Imperial War Museum Book of Modern Warfare: British and Commonwealth Forces at War 1945-2000 (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004); the difference between the use of the word ‘war’ and ‘emergency’ to describe US and UK approaches to counter-terrorism is more than mere semantics, see M. Howard, ‘What’s in a Name?’, Foreign Affairs (January/February 2002); see also G. Andréani, ‘The “War on Terror”: Good Cause, Wrong Concept’, Survival, 46, 4 (December 2004), pp.31-50; for transatlantic differences, see W. Rees and R.J. Aldrich, ‘Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?’, International Affairs, 81, 5 (2005) and J. Stevenson, ‘How Europe and America Defend Themselves’, Foreign Affairs, 82, 2 (March/April 2003).

See, for example, W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (London: Phoenix Press, 1999). By 2007, interestingly so-called ‘retro-terrorism’ - for example, that used by groups such as ETA, et al. - was being discussed – see ‘New wave of retro-terrorism’, Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor (14 March 2007). For how the terrorist threat was perceived and


41 See, for example, M. Copeland, ‘The CIA debate: What are 10,000 names to an organization that “spies” on millions?’, The Times (11 January 1975) – particularly where he noted: ‘… the liaison continues, for one reason: the increasing internationalization of terrorism… Purely defensive measures will not deter “the new terrorism”, as security experts are beginning to call the wave they foresee for 1975.’

42 PSCI/SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry, p.109; see also B. Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Wars (New York: Crown, 2002), p.xvii – ‘… As for Islamic fundamentalists in particular, the official view had become that our allies in Europe and the Middle East could fill in the missing pieces…’


44 See, for example, ibid., p.35, para. 125; see also ibid., p.44, para. ‘S’ – ‘Inter-Agency collaboration and co-operation with others, including the police and intelligence services abroad, have developed well as a result of the universal appreciation that terrorism is a common threat, but continuing this improvement must be at the heart of future efforts. It is recognised that this is not just a domestic threat but part of international terrorism and in the longer term it is clear that the answer lies not just with the Agencies but in successfully countering the spread of the terrorist message in the UK and overseas.’


47 See also PSCI and SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry, p.278 – where it discusses ‘[Foreign intelligence liaison] progress after September 11: The Joint Inquiry did not delve deeply into how liaison relationships changed after the September 11 attacks. However, almost all interviews and testimony that dealt with this subject indicated that cooperation had improved dramatically, particularly
in regard to al-Qa’ida. The immediacy and magnitude of the threat impressed governments worldwide. In addition, increased US attention to terrorism increased pressure on other governments to cooperate, and the amount of shared intelligence reporting has greatly increased, as have other types of cooperation, even with some previously recalcitrant or hostile countries [---]…; for an example of investigations proliferating exponentially, see: ‘During the period 2003-05 there was a substantial increase (over 300%) in the number of the Security Services’ investigative targets…’ in HM Government, Government Response to the ISC Report into the London bombings of 7 July 2005 (May 2006), p.2.


49 G. Tenet (with B. Harlow), At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p.166.


51 Tenet (with Harlow), At the Center of the Storm, p.174.


55 See, for instance, as noted below (in section [4.1.iv]).

56 As an example of the scale of potential ‘leads’, see ‘footnote 7’ - ‘JTAC [the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre] receives around 1,000 pieces of intelligence per week’ in the ISC, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 (May 2006), p.7.

57 See, for example, S. Fidler, et al., ‘Pakistan in last bid to win handover of bin Laden’, The Financial Times (28 September 2001) – particularly where he notes: ‘People close to UK defence officials said Britain had begun from a “low base” on intelligence and it was necessary to obtain other countries’ help in gathering information about the hideouts of Mr bin Laden and his associates…’

58 Quoted in ibid.

59 J. Freedland, ‘Comment & Analysis: Time for tough love: Gleneagles gives Tony Blair a chance to demand from Bush a relationship that’s a bit more special for Britain’, The Guardian (07 July 2005).


ISC, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks (May 2006), pp.39, para.143; see also M. Hosenball, ‘The U.K. Threat: British authorities say they’ve disrupted at least three terror attacks in the last year. Could some of these suspects have easily entered the United States?’, Newsweek (05 July 2006); see also HM Government, Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual
Report 2005–2006 (July 2006), p.5, para.G. – particularly where it states: ‘Existing Security Service [MI5] projects were accelerated following the July [2005] bombings but, as the [Intelligence and Security] Committee reflected in its Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, there is a need to balance the need for expansion with the need to absorb and train people effectively.’; see also, for example, G. Corera, ‘MI5 expanding outside London’, BBC News Online (11 December 2007); G. Corera, ‘Real spooks with new role after 9/11’, BBC News Online (04 December 2007).

63 See, for example, P.R. Pillar, Terrorism and US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p.56 - especially where he states: ‘To a large degree bin Ladin became such a preoccupation for the US following the East African bombings. Capturing him has been a grail whose pursuit has overshadowed other counterterrorist efforts and accomplishments...’


66 J. Hopper and N. Hopkins, ‘Al-Qaida cell in UK “planned attack”’, The Guardian (26 October 2001); see also: J. Eaglesham, ‘Seattle scraps millennium celebration on terrorist fears: Companies block e-mail over New Year to thwart threatened computer viruses’, The Financial Times (29 December 1999).

67 Smith, The Spying Game, p.443; see also, for example, R. Gunaratna, ‘Terrorist trends suggest shift of focus to national activities’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 June 2001).

69 See, for example, D. Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.244-54.

70 Burns and Murray Brown, ‘US set to brand Real IRA as terrorist organisation’.


74 Interview: Tyler Drumheller’, *PBS Frontline edited transcript* (15 February 2006).


77 See, for instance, ‘Defending the homeland becomes a priority for Bush’, *Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor* (01 August 2001); see also R.A. Best Jr., ‘Intelligence Issues for Congress’, *CRS Report for Congress* (16 August 2001); R.A. Best Jr., ‘Intelligence and law enforcement: Countering Transnational Threats to the US’, *CRS Report for Congress* (16 January 2001); A. Khan, ‘FBI goes global: Crime-fighters have had to spread their net in the war against international terrorism’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (12 April 2000).


80 PSCI and SSCI, *Report of the Joint Inquiry*, p.271


82 See, for example, G. Corera, ‘Report points to weaknesses in US intelligence machinery’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (20 August 2003).

See, for instance, as itemised from various sources on ‘Can You Connect The Dots?’, *Crooks, Liars And Thieves* web blog (16 February 2008) - via URL: <http://crooksliarssanndthieves.blogspot.com/2008/02/can-you-connect-dots.html> (accessed: 17/02/2008) – see particularly where UK input is noted: ‘(1) 1999. The U.S. was warned by British intelligence two years prior to “911” that terrorists were planning to use airplanes in unconventional ways, perhaps as bombs… (4) July 16, 2001. British intelligence sent a report to Tony Blair warning of imminent attacks. The report was also sent to Washington…’

See, for example, Leader, ‘Reforming the intelligence services: The spy game’, *The Economist* (19 March 2005), p.12 – ‘Meanwhile, the comforting idea that technology would make spying more of a high-tech science was blown apart by September 11th and the Iraq fiasco; it is now a more risky, more human affair where real eyes and ears matter.’; see also D. MacEachin, ‘Analysis and Estimates: Professional Practices in Intelligence Production’, chapter 7 in J. Sims and B. Gerber (eds), *Transforming U.S. Intelligence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), pp.115-133.


... Post 9/11 environment lowered the Intelligence Community’s reporting threshold…’ – US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Report on the US Intelligence Community’s Pre-War Intelligence Assessments on Iraq* (7 July 2004), p.34.

See Bob Baer’s account of a walk he took around London in his *See No Evil*, pp.xv-xvi.


See, for example: ‘Straw defends new terrorism powers’, *BBC News Online* (19 February 2001); ‘Britain’s “safe haven” past’, *BBC News Online* (19 February 2001); see also ‘Annex A: The Evolution of the Modern International Terrorist Threat’ in *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* (May 2006), p.29, para.9 – ‘As Al Qaida developed in the 1990s, a number of extremists in the UK, both British and foreign nationals – many of the latter having fled from conflict elsewhere or repressive regimes – began to work in support of its agenda, in particular, radicalising and encouraging young men to support jihad overseas. These included Abu Hamza and Abdallah al Faisal (both now serving prison sentences), Abu Qatada (currently detained pending possible deportation) and Omar Bakri Mohammed (now outside the UK and excluded from returning here). During the 1990s, it is now known that there was a flow of young Muslims, from the UK and elsewhere, travelling to Pakistan and Afghanistan for indoctrination or jihad.’; ‘UK fears “Pakistan terror link”: Britain's top envoy to Pakistan has expressed concern that extremists in the UK are receiving guidance from al Qaeda leaders hiding in Pakistan’, *BBC News Online* (11 May 2007); see also J. Horgan, ‘Disengaging
from terrorism: People who leave terrorist groups or move away from violent roles do so for a multitude of reasons. Dr John Horgan explains why greater understanding of the motivations behind this so-called “disengagement” will help in developing successful anti-terrorism initiatives’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 December 2006); for more on ‘motivations’, see, for instance, M. Ruthven, ‘The Rise of the Muslim Terrorists’, The New York Review of Books, 55, 9 (29 May 2008).

92 See, for example, Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’.

93 See, for example, the background given in Gregory and Wilkinson, ‘Riding Pillion for Tackling Terrorism is a High-risk Policy’, p.2.

94 Quoted in J. Burns and V. Mallet, ‘France and UK arrest 11 over terrorist links’, The Financial Times (22 September 2001); for more reported, but disputed by ‘British Security sources’, British connections, see A. Gillan et al, ‘Allies point the finger at Britain as al-Qaida’s “revolving door”: The British connection’, The Guardian (14 February 2002) – includes a section titled: ‘Blame game or list of shame?’

95 A. Oppenheimer, ‘Europe – Security one year on’, Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor (13 September 2002); see also PSCI and SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry (December 2002), p.274 – where it notes: ‘Governments can also be highly sensitive about information that embarrasses them or implicates their citizens in terrorism…’; France, the European state most experienced with dealing with Islamic-extremist-imbued terrorism, too had ‘long chided the UK… for electing to watch rather than snatch.’ – see Stevenson, ‘Chapter 2: Law Enforcement and Intelligence Capabilities’, p.54.


99 Cole and Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, p.ix.


101 See Burns and Mallet, ‘France and UK arrest 11 over terrorist links’.


103 HMG, Government Response to ... Rendition, p.2.

104 This has been recognised, for example, with the US-originating FLOAT programme. For reference to the Foreign Liaison Officers Against Terrorism (FLOAT) programme, see House Committee on

Counterterrorism initiatives: Mr. Chairman, the following are just a few of the unclassified examples of successes in the war against terrorism that would not have been possible without extensive cooperation and coordination with our partners. · Operation Crevice was a joint US, UK, Pakistani, and Canadian investigation of a group of individuals targeting unidentified Western targets. Through joint investigation by intelligence and law enforcement agencies in these countries, components for explosive devices were recovered and numerous individuals overseas were arrested. An investigation conducted by the FBI led to the arrest of an individual in the US who was charged with terrorism offenses. · Operation Rhyme was a joint US-UK investigation into a UK-based terrorism subject and his associates. Investigation by the FBI and our British counterparts led to the identification of several individuals in the US who maintained contact with the main subjects of the investigation. The main subject and two of his associates have been indicted in the US for terrorism-related offenses... Cooperation has improved globally as well. FBI Agents are working with our law enforcement partners from Rome to Romania. We are gathering intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan. These international partnerships are critical if we hope to be successful in the future... In this era of globalization, working side-by-side is not just the best option, it is the only option...

For an earlier insight into the foreign liaison activities conducted by the FBI, see the ‘Foreign Liaison Program’ chapter in FBI, *FBI Liaison Activities* (26 January 1953), pp.3-5a - accessed on 13/06/2007 via the US Declassified Documents Reference System (DDRS); for a later background insight into FBI foreign liaison activities, see also ‘The Legat Program and Interpol’ in A.G. Theocharis, ‘FBI Oversight and Liaison Relationships’, chapter 4 in his *et al.* (eds), *The FBI: A Comprehensive Reference Guide* (Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press, 1999), p.165; see also ‘Legal Attachés (Legats)’ in the chapter titled ‘Organization and Day-to-Day Activities’ in *ibid.*, pp.218-219; for some further insights into the FBI’s enhanced foreign intelligence and international role, as well as those requests being in harmony with being on ‘a continuum with expansion’, see, for instance, FBI, *Budget Document* (2008), pp.6-123-6-131 - where references are made to issues such as: ‘Expansion of CT Presence Overseas’, ‘Legal Attaché Expansion’ and (on the domestic intelligence front) ‘Fusion Centers’ - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doi/fbi/2009just.pdf> (accessed: 11/03/2008); see also R.S.

See, for example: ‘Remarks prepared for delivery by John E. Lewis Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, Fourth Annual Conference on Public Safety, Technology and Counterterrorism: Counterterrorism initiatives and partnerships, San Francisco, California’ (14 March 2005) – via URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/lewis031405.htm> (accessed: 23/01/2006) – particularly: ‘… In the months before that, we hosted similar meetings with our UK counterparts at FBI Headquarters’.

106 The National Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), p.1; for media coverage, see, for example: J. Blitz, et al., ‘Bush unveils first-strike US security strategy: White House willing to use pre-emptive force…’, The Financial Times (21 September 2002); see also: R.H. Schultz and A. Vogt, ‘It’s War! Fighting Post-11 September Global Terrorism through a Doctrine of Preemption’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 1 (Spring 2003), pp.1-30; see also then Home Secretary David Blunkett quoted in ‘White House Briefing: Topic: The U.S.-British Homeland Security Partnership to combat terrorism’, Federal News Service (01 April 2003): ‘… We need to ensure that … we are literally on the ball, that we are ahead of [adversaries] rather than waiting for something to happen and then chasing that eventuality once it’s occurred.’

107 The National Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), p.13; for more on WMD terrorism see, for example, A. Wilkie, Axis of Deceit (Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 2004), pp.85-90 – particularly where he argues: ‘Bush, Blair and Howard also chose to use the truth selectively, for example by regularly playing up the risk of WMD terrorism but neglecting to point out that the likelihood of such an attack is low.’ See also J. Parachini, ‘Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective’, The Washington Quarterly, 26, 4 (Autumn 2003), pp.37–50. For more on this theme of terrorism and WMD, see also the volume: I. Bellany (ed.), Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Responding to the Challenge (London: Routledge, 2007).


109 See, for example, P. Wintour, ‘Bali bombing: Blair denies that Iraq focus is misguided: Britain No 10 says no contradiction between combating Saddam and al-Qaida’, The Guardian (15 October 2002).

110 ISC, Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002 (December 2002), p.13, para.43-44.

111 No. 10 Downing Street spokesperson quoted in Wintour, ‘Bali bombing: Blair denies that Iraq focus is misguided’; for later continuing criticisms, see P. Wintour and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Straw admits MI5’s Bali blunder: Minister agrees with MPs that terror threat was misjudged’, The Guardian (12 December 2002).


For a further in depth discussion of the close linkage between terrorism and terrorists’ potential use of WMD, see, for example, J. Eldridge, ‘Terrorist WMD: Threats and responses’, Jane’s International Defence Review (01 September 2005) - particularly where he notes: ‘Intelligence services and defence planners have long predicted a terrorist attack using toxic weapons [WMD]. After the fall of Kabul (Afghanistan) to Western coalition forces in November 2001, a substantial amount of evidence was found that Islamic militants had seized the potential offered by toxic compounds in raising the death toll per event against unprotected people…’; see also M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.379; for some first-hand accounts of the 1995 Sarin attack, see H. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche (London: Vintage, 2002); P. Zimmerman and J. Acton, ‘Radiological lessons - Radiation weapons beyond “dirty bombs”: The polonium poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko has highlighted the threat from radiological attacks in which the victims ingest or inhale radioactive materials’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 June 2007); P.D. Zimmerman, J.M. Acton and M.B. Rogers, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS: Seize the Cesium’, The New York Times (01 August 2007); J.M. Acton, M.B. Rogers and P.D. Zimmerman, ‘Beyond the Dirty Bomb: Re-thinking Radiological Terror’, Survival, 49, 3 (Autumn 2007), pp.151–168; see also Case Study 2, below.

See also A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘US domestic intelligence initiatives: Information access and bureaucratic efficiency’, IISS Strategic Comments, 9, 1 (January 2003); see also W.E. Odom, ‘Testimony Before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’ (04 August 2004), p.8; see also the several sources cited in the next endnote below.


119 ‘Bush sets up domestic spy service’, BBC News Online (30 June 2005); see also Masse, ‘Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom’. For continuing post-9/11 FBI struggles, see, for example, S. Horwitz, ‘Old-School Academy in Post-9/11 World: New Focus Is on Terrorism, but Training Is Struggling to Keep Up’, The Washington Post (17 August 2006); see also on this theme Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.1 – especially where he notes: ‘…this same secrecy can be a source of consternation, especially in a democratic country such as the United States… Some Americans are uncomfortable with the concept that intelligence is a secret entity within an ostensibly open government based on checks and balances. Moreover, the intelligence community engages in activities – spying, eavesdropping, covert action – that some people regard as antithetical to what they believe the United States should be as a nation… Some citizens have difficulty reconciling American ideals and goals with the realities of intelligence.’

120 ‘Statement of William P. Barr to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States’, Sixth public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (08 December 2003).


J. Burke, ‘Iraq crisis: Terror Crackdown: Shots in the dark against an unknown enemy – The nervous battle against an unknown threat: British security services are frantically trying to piece together a jigsaw of information about the danger within – but gaps remain’, The Observer (16 February 2003); see also for similar targeting challenges being confronted by the US, B. Hoffman, ‘We Can't Win If We Don't Know the Enemy’, The Washington Post (25 March 2007).

For a continuation of this line of argument into 2008, see, for instance, M. Sageman, ‘The Next Generation of Terror’, Foreign Policy (March/April 2008) - particularly where in the abstract he notes: ‘The world’s most dangerous jihadists no longer answer to al Qaeda. The terrorists we should fear most are self-recruited wannabes who find purpose in terror and comrades on the Web. This new generation is even more frightening and unpredictable than its predecessors, but its evolution just may reveal the key to its demise.’; see also A.J. Echevarria II, Wars of Ideas and The War of Ideas (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008) - via URL: <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB866.pdf> (accessed: 09/07/2008).

Burke, ‘Iraq crisis: Terror Crackdown: Shots in the dark against an unknown enemy’.

For this similar line of thinking by 2006 see, for example, F. Gardner, ‘One year on: Is the UK any safer?’, BBC News Online (03 July 2006); see also ‘UK “number one al-Qaeda target”’, BBC News Online (19 October 2006).

See, for instance, ‘International cooperation’ in ‘ITAC: The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre’, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) publication (July 2006), p.3 - particularly where it notes: ‘Canadian security will increasingly depend on the country’s ability to contribute to international security. Accordingly, the Government of Canada, through ITAC [Integrated Threat Assessment Centre], is promoting a more integrated international intelligence community by developing liaison arrangements with foreign intelligence organizations, including the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre [JTAC], in Britain; the National Counterterrorism Center [NCTC], in the United States; the National Threat Assessment Centre [NTAC], in Australia; and the Combined Threat Assessment Group [CTAG], in New Zealand.’; CSIS, ‘Liaison and Cooperation’ in ‘Counter-Terrorism’, Backgrounder Series, 8, 11 (August 2002), pp.10-11.

See, for example, the references to Denmark’s ‘Centre for Terrorism Analysis’ in K. Tebbit, Benchmarking of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction and Summary (Copenhagen, April 2006), pp.iii-iv, paras 11-12; for references to the German ‘Coordination Center’, see, for instance, F.T. Miko and C. Froehlich, ‘Germany’s Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for U.S. Policy’, CRS Report for Congress (27 December 2004), pp.7-9.

Possible ‘penetration’ and ‘infiltration’ are, however, still factors which need to be considered, for example during intelligence service recruitment campaigns – see ‘Al-Qaeda “bid to infiltrate MI5”’, BBC News Online (03 July 2006); see also Hosenball, ‘The U.K. Threat’; for elsewhere, see, for example, E. Blanche, ‘Islamist groups target Arab security services’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 June 2004).

Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [c-2].

See, for example, ‘UK and US set out anti-terror plans’, No. 10 Downing Street Press Release (02 April 2003) – via URL: <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page3399.asp> (accessed: 24/10/2005) – especially where it notes: ‘… the development of biometric technology, such as iris and facial recognition; pooling of knowledge and resources, such as vaccines, to counter chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats; strategies to prevent and deal with cyber/electronic attacks; joint forward planning and exercise programmes to test out different scenarios; greater protection for borders through visa and passenger intelligence sharing; continued prior warning of changes in alert states.’; see also A. Travis, ‘War in the Gulf: Britain and US to join forces in fight against terrorist threat’, The Guardian (02 April 2003).


Quoted in J. Eaglesham, ‘Comment and Analysis: Guantánamo justice: as two British terror suspects face a US military trial, the special relationship takes the strain: Growing disquiet about the treatment of detainees in Cuba is fuelling criticism of Tony Blair’s unwavering support for Washington’s security policies’, The Financial Times (12 July 2003); see also: Leader, ‘A matter of trust: Military tribunals are not the answer for Guantánamo Bay’, The Financial Times (14 July 2003); see also ‘UK’s “concerns” over 9/11 trials, Foreign Secretary David Miliband has said he has “some concerns” over US military tribunals for six men charged with involvement in the 9/11 attacks’, BBC News Online (12 February 2008).


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143 This was not new and had been around for sometime - see, for example, J. Pilger, ‘Lies, Damned Lies and Government Terror Warnings: John Pilger on the evil art of Black Propaganda’, *The Mirror* (03 December 2002).

144 P. Preston, ‘Comment: Protect us from the protectors: For intelligence chiefs, the war on terror has become good business’, *The Guardian* (05 January 2004); see also: P. Stephens, ‘The distorted view through the intelligence spyglass’, *The Financial Times* (09 January 2004); see also G. Hinsliff and M. Bright, ‘MI5 chief leaves shadows to restore faith in intelligence services’, *The Observer* (18 July 2004).


147 P. Neville-Jones, ‘The confusion that is holding us back in the War on Terror’, *The Times* (23 June 2004).

148 See, for example, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit, Mike Scheuer’s (aka. Anonymous) *Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror* (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004).


150 M. Huband, ‘Debate gets down to the fundamentals: The “global war on terror” has moved from grand themes to the nitty gritty of everyday safety considerations’, *The Financial Times* (09 May 2005); see also: ‘Is Al Qaeda still an organisation?’ in P. Wilkinson, ‘Memorandum on International Terrorism and the International Response’, *House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Memoranda* (c.October 2005).

151 See also *IISST Strategic Survey 2006*, p.40 – where it states: ‘US counter-terrorism strategy continues to pivot on the application of military force to engage terrorists outside US borders and thereby deny them access to US territory.’

152 Huband, ‘Debate gets down to the fundamentals’; see also ‘Is Al Qaeda still an organisation?’ in Wilkinson, ‘Memorandum on International Terrorism’; ‘Rage and Britain’s young Muslims’, *Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst* (01 September 2006); see also A. Nicoll and J. Delaney (eds), ‘Spain’s complex terrorist threats’, *IISST Strategic Comments*, 14, 2 (March 2008), pp.1-2. By mid-2006, however, the US also had found a ‘homegrown’ group with characteristics similar to those found in the UK – see, for
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example, J. Coomarasamy, ‘Home front fears in war on terror’, BBC News Online (24 June 2006). For the arguably generally different nature of the US ‘homegrown’ terrorism, for example more similar to that posed by individuals - such as Timothy McVeigh (the 1996 Oklahoma Bombings) and the ‘Unibomber’ - see M. Reynolds, ‘Homegrown terror: A bomb is a bomb. A chemical weapon is a chemical weapon. It won't matter to the victims whether their attacker's name is Ahmed or Bill’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 60, 6 (November/December 2004), pp.48-57; see also for a ‘controversial’ article presenting the argument that ‘…there are no terrorists within the United States, and few have the means or the inclination to strike from abroad…’, see J. Mueller, ‘Is there still a terrorist threat?’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006) – via URL: <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/> (accessed: 22/08/2006); J. Mueller, ‘Simplicity and Spook: Terrorism and the Dynamics of Threat Exaggeration’, International Studies Perspectives, 6, 2 (May 2005), pp.208–234; see also L. Wiley, Jr., ‘The Enemy Within - Tuesday, Oct. 10 at 9pm on PBS’, PBS FRONTLINE (08 October 2006) - via e-mail – particularly where it notes: ‘Since 9/11, authorities say they have made more than 400 terrorism-related arrests inside the U.S. The news headlines from Atlanta, Miami, New York and other cities play to the sense of fear that the country may be subjected to another terrorist attack... Veteran correspondent Lowell Bergman and producer Oriana Zill de Granados report on a new FBI approach towards domestic terrorism that emphasizes “disruption” rather than building legal cases. The Bureau is trying to transform itself into a domestic intelligence agency like Britain’s MI-5. The FBI claims to have disrupted plots all around the country, but critics argue many of the headline cases are overblown...’; J. Fisher-Thompson, ‘Intelligence Chief Nominee Warns of Internal Terrorist Threat’, The Washington File/USINFO (06 February 2007) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror722.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also D. Kocieniewski, ‘6 Men Arrested in a Terror Plot Against Fort Dix’, The New York Times (09 May 2007); D. Russakoff and D. Eggen, ‘Six Charged in Plot To Attack Fort Dix: “Jihadists” Said to Have No Ties to Al-Qaeda’, The Washington Post (09 May 2007); A. Faiola and D. Russakoff, ‘The Terrorists Next Door?: Plot Suspects Lived Quietly in Suburb’, The Washington Post (10 May 2007); A. Faiola and S. Mufson, ‘N.Y. Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say: 3 Held in Alleged Plan to Bomb JFK’, The Washington Post (02 June 2007); C. Buckley and W.K. Rashbaum, ‘4 Men Accused of Plot To Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines’, The New York Times (03 June 2007); A. Faiola and R. Shulmansee, ‘In “Little Guyana,” Disbelief Over Terrorism Arrests: "We're Kind of a Peaceful People"’, The Washington Post (04 June 2007); see also AP, ‘Terror Suspect Surrenders in Trinidad’, The New York Times (05 June 2007) - international law enforcement co-operation again played a key role: ‘… Nur’s surrender won Trinidad praise from the FBI. "I am confident that the pressure brought to bear by the Trinidadian police authorities contributed to his surrender," said Mark Mershon, the head of the FBI in New York. "We are very grateful for their tremendous cooperation in this investigation."…’; ‘Four indicted for JFK 'bomb plot': Four men have been charged with trying to blow up fuel tanks and pipelines at John F Kennedy airport’, BBC News Online (30 June 2007).

See also Sir David Omand: ‘...[Y]ou're right ... to highlight things that are different [during the current so-called ‘War on Terror’ compared to during the Cold War]. We face suicide bombers; we see a blurring of the distinction between domestic security and overseas national security...’, quoted from Presenter: (Professor) Peter Hennessy, ‘Analysis: Secrets and Mysteries’, BBC Radio 4 Current Affairs (Broadcast date: 19/04/2007).

See J. Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p.240; see also C.M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’, *CRS Report for Congress* (16 November 2004); C.M. Blanchard, ‘Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology’, *CRS Report for Congress* (Updated: 24 January 2007); see also J. Gray, *Al Qaeda and what it means to be modern* (London: Faber & Faber, 2003). For more recent concerns about addressing this ideological dimension (although some see it as more of an identity issue), see, for example, D. Casciani, ‘Can radicalism be tackled?’, *BBC News Online* (10 November 2006) - particularly where he notes: ‘And so while MI5, the police and others press ahead with counter-terrorism work, the real battle is how to undermine the ideology used by extremists to tempt youngsters to their cause...’; see also ‘Rage and Britain’s young Muslims’. Meanwhile, for a different picture in the US, see, for example, A. Cooperman, ‘Survey: U.S. Muslims Assimilated, Opposed to Extremism’, *The Washington Post* (23 May 2007).

For some of the difficulties databases confront, see, for example, S. Atran and M. Sageman, ‘Connecting the dots’, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 62, 4 (July/August 2006), p.68; see also B. Schneier, ‘Why Data Mining Won't Stop Terror’, *Wired.com* (09 March 2006) - via URL: <http://www.wired.com/news/columns/1,70357-0.html> (accessed: 14/08/2006). See also Chapter 4 above for more on the types of tools available.

For a detailed assessment of this dilemma for intelligence, see: P.R. Pillar, ‘Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda’, *The Washington Quarterly*, 27, 3 (Summer 2004), pp.101-13; By extension, the utility of intelligence and the allocation of extra resources is evaluated, see for example: S.A. Taylor and D. Goldman, ‘Intelligence Reform: Will more agencies, money, and personnel help?’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 19, 3 (Autumn 2004), pp.416-35; see also: D. Aaron (ed.), *Three Years After: Next Steps in the War on Terror* (RAND Corporation, 2005).

See, for instance, as used around 2003 at the time of forging closer UK-US ties spearheaded by the agreement between UK Home Secretary David Blunkett and US Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, and in 2005 with ‘Exercise Atlantic Blue’, discussed below (in section [4.1.iv]).

J. Burns, ‘Al-Qaeda planning attacks on US interests’, *The Financial Times* (05 September 2002); see also ‘Al-Qaeda: One year on: Down, but far from out’, *IISS Strategic Comments*, 8, 7 (September 2002).


See, for example, J. Corbin, ‘The age of terror: With the destruction of its base in Afghanistan in 2002, al-Qaida looked weakened and on the run. So how has it now been able to evade the west’s


168 ‘Terror treason charge considered’, *BBC News Online* (08 August 2005); see also M. Kearney in BBC subscribers’ *Newsnight* e-mail (01 August 2005) - ‘… two Islamic extremists… tell us that the so-called “covenant of security” which instructed *jihadists* not to attack the UK because of the shelter it offered dissidents, was abandoned as a result of Britain’s involvement in the Iraq War and the re-election of Tony Blair [in the May 2005 UK General Election].’; see also on the issue of radicalisation, ‘Woman in UK “groomed” as bomber: The former wife of a British Islamist extremist has said her husband suggested she carry out a suicide bombing against the UK’, *BBC News Online* (11 June 2007).


Burns et al., ‘Intelligence agencies’ different approach to tackling terrorism exposed’.

ibid.; see also R. Cox, ‘Law and terrorism: US and British responses compared’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 October 2005). By 2006, several legal problems were still confronted – see, for example, ‘Judge critical of MI5 testimony: A judge in a secret hearing has criticised the Home Office over contradictory MI5 intelligence in the trial of two terrorism suspects…’, BBC News Online (12 October 2006). Meanwhile, a case that appeared to be more successful can also be cited – see, for example, R. Cowan, ‘Plot to hit UK with dirty bomb and exploding limos: Man admits plan to cause “injury, terror and chaos” with synchronised strikes’, The Guardian (13 October 2006); R. Cowan, ‘Most senior al-Qaeda terrorist yet captured in Britain gets 40 years for plotting carnage: Detailed plans to kill thousands in US and UK; Aim was to strike at heart of democracy, says judge’, The Guardian (08 November 2006).


See, for example, C. Gearty, ‘Cry freedom: Anti-terrorist legislation threatens our civil liberties, warns Conor Gearty. And it’s no use expecting the courts to protect us’, The Guardian (03 December 2002); A. Palmer, ‘The US may use torture against terrorism’, The Daily Telegraph (15 December 2002).


See, for instance, several of the episodes discussed throughout this case study, as well as those presented in Case Study 2, below.

For further nexuses, see also the references to ‘pre-emption’ cited throughout this study.
For more on the issue of proportionality in these (and related) circumstances, see, for instance, Svendsen, ‘Strategy and disproportionality in contemporary conflict’.

For background on ‘COBRA’, see, for instance, ‘Cobra: The UK’s emergencies team: Cobra is the dramatic name for the civil contingencies committee which leads responses to national crises’, BBC News Online (06 April 2006); on ‘FEMA’, see, for example, its official US Government website - via URL: <http://www.fema.gov/> (accessed: 04/06/2008).

See also, for example, the arguments in C. Gearty, ‘11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act’, Journal of Law and Society, 32, 1 (March 2005), pp. 18-33.


Abu Hamza al-Masri: ‘…an Egyptian who took UK citizenship and came to London in the 1970s…’ – as described in Burns et al, ‘Intelligence agencies’ different approach’.

Abu Qatada: ‘[A] radical Palestinian preacher wanted on terror charges in Jordan…’ – as referred to in ibid.

ibid.


ibid. For more sources on France and CT, see, for example, Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’; see also Stevenson, ‘Chapter 2: Law Enforcement and Intelligence Capabilities’; S. Gregory, ‘France and the War on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 15, 1 (Spring 2003), pp.124-147; for the importance of France in US and international counter-terrorism efforts and the multilateral top secret centre in Paris, codenamed ‘Alliance Base’ - also including UK intelligence involvement – see, for example, D, Priest, ‘Help from France key in covert operations’, The Washington Post (03 July 2005); D. Priest, ‘Secret Anti-Terrorism Unit Pairs CIA, Europeans’, The Washington Post (07 April 2005); D. Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account for Bulk of Agency’s Post-9/11 Successes’, The Washington Post (18 November 2005).


See also sources, such as Phillips, Londonistan.

See also M. Benjamin, ‘Is the U.K. better than the U.S. at stopping terror?: Americans bust the hapless Seas of David gang. The British round up real terrorist rings. But experts say the U.K. arrests more extremists because more of them live on British soil’, Salon.com (11 August 2006).
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196 Press Association, ‘MI5 chief warns on civil liberties’, The Guardian (10 September 2005); see also the original speech: Manningham-Buller, ‘The International Terrorist Threat and the Dilemmas in Countering It’.

197 For instance, the unfortunate shooting of the Brazilian national at the end of July 2005 by London Metropolitan Police, arguably acting in a risk averse manner, to some extent demonstrated this type of overall shift – see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism’ (article in peer-review).


199 Burns and Sevastopulo, ‘British and US intelligence chiefs meet’; see also Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’.

200 See, for example, J.D. Ellis and G.D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy (John Hopkin’s University Press, 2004), p.109. This is also a concern in the law enforcement domain, for similar sentiments concerning a ‘leak’ episode, see also I. Cobain, V. Dodd and W. Woodward, ‘Terror leaks: both Home Office and police implicated: Guardian told that Reid aide and senior officer involved’, The Guardian (26 April 2007).

201 See, for example, ISC, Inquiry into Intelligence, Assessments and Advice prior to the Terrorist Bombings on Bali 12 October 2002 (December 2002); see also Burns and Huband, ‘US considers security reforms along UK lines’.

202 For more information on JTAC, see URL: <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page421.html> (accessed: 02/04/2006); see also for more background on JTAC, UK ‘Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre’ in ISC, Annual Report 2003-2004 (June 2004), p.27, para. 92 onwards.

203 UK ‘Policy: International Co-operation on Terrorism’ in ibid., p.22, para. 76.


(Institute for Defense Analyses [IDA], June 2005); see also D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends:
Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror’, Orbis (Summer, 2006), p.456 – particularly where he notes
that: ‘The United States has pledged to bolster the counterterrorism efforts of those lesser developed
allies, by providing aid, assistance, technology, and training. The National Intelligence Strategy
establishes three core objectives for developing these intelligence relationships…’ These are then
summarised by Reveron as: (i) ‘…engaging friendly foreign intelligence services…’; (ii)
‘…coordinating with foreign intelligence services to assess threats and consider responses…’; and (iii)
‘… the [US] intelligence community is to ensure that insights gained from foreign intelligence
relationships… inform intelligence judgments.’; see also F. Harrison, ‘Sharing Information is not
Enough’, Defense Intelligence Journal, 15, 1 (2006), pp.25-29; for related and surrounding issues, see,
for example, Sheridan and Hsu, ‘Localities Operate Intelligence Centers To Pool Terror Data’; see also
Elsewhere, the crux of the problem is explored – see, for example, Colonel D. Putbrese, U.S. Air
Force, Atlantic Council Senior Fellow, ‘Intelligence Sharing: Getting the National Counterterrorism
Analysts on the Same Data Sheet’, Occasional Paper (US: The Atlantic Council of the United States,
October 2006) - particularly where it is noted: ‘…There is broad agreement that intelligence sharing
needs to be improved, but there is very little agreement on exactly what information should be shared,
who it should be shared with, and how exactly the sharing should be accomplished.’ (p.1); for further
US intelligence standardisation moves in the analysis domain, see DNI, ‘Analytic Standards’,
Intelligence Community Directive Number 203 (effective: 21 June 2007).

207 Quoted in R. Beeston and M. Evans, ‘Straw is asked why no warning was given on Kenya’, The
Times (30 November 2002); see also: R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Kenya terror attack: Britain had warning of
possible attack in Kenya’, The Guardian (30 November 2002); P. Conradi and E. Leahy, ‘Britain “fails
public” on issuing attack warnings’, The Sunday Times (01 December 2002).

208 See on the Australian dimension, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since
9/11: The optimization of intelligence liaison arrangements’, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence (forthcoming, 2009); see also G. Sheridan, ‘Bound by intelligence’, The
Australian (03 September 2005); see also B. Vaughn, ‘Australia: Background and U.S. Relations’, CRS
Report for Congress (20 April 2006), p.6; see also J. Elsegood, ‘Analysis: Australia stands with the
calm’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (10 March 2005); P. Baker, ‘Bush reinforces friendship with
Australia: Pomp surrounds visit by Prime Minister, who has backed White House in Iraq’, The
Washington Post (17 May 2006); N. Hordern, I. Bostock and P. Chalk, ‘Australia’s reaction to Bali’,
Jane’s Intelligence Review (15 November 2002); see also N. Hordern, ‘JI suicide bombing targets
Australian embassy’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (21 September 2004); P. Chalk, ‘Australia’s mass
transport network remains vulnerable’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (18 May 2006); G. Sheridan, ‘New
ranking lets us share in US secrets’, The Australian (01 September 2005); see also ‘Australia – United
States Ministerial Consultations 2004 Joint Communiqué’, DOD News Release, Office of Assistant
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See also Beeston and Evans, ‘Straw is asked why no warning was given on Kenya’ – particularly where they note: ‘At the heart of the dispute is the difficulty that governments have in balancing their concerns for the safety of their citizens with protecting sensitive intelligence sources and avoiding causing unnecessary panic.’; see also ‘UK stance over Manila threat questioned’, BBC News Online (29 November 2002).


For a greater in depth discussion on this topic and from a psychology perspective, see Persaud, ‘Confronting the Terrorist mind’ – particularly where he discusses the ‘Paul Revere paradigm for successful dissemination of public alarms…’, as well as ‘After seven no consequence alarms, many Americans became desensitised to the need to be on high alert.’; Discussions concerning threat levels, warnings and their assessment also continued after the London bombings of 7 July 2005 - see, for example, HM Government, Government Response to the ISC Report on the London Bombings of 7 July 2005 (May 2006), pp.2-5; ISC, Report on the London Bombings of 7 July 2005 (May 2006), pp.17-32; see also L. Freedman, ‘The Politics of Warning: Terrorism and Risk Communication’, Intelligence and...
National Security, 20, 3 (September 2005), pp.379-418. However, by mid-2006, it appears that London has decided (at least partially) to go down the Washington route on the issue of terrorism threat warnings – see, for example, ‘Terror warnings to be made public’, BBC News Online (10 July 2006). See also for the UK official threat levels warnings information URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/threat_levels/index.asp> (accessed: 14/08/2006); see also ‘MI5 to send e-mail terror alerts: A system sending e-mail terror alerts to the public is being launched by security chiefs at MI5’, BBC News Online (09 January 2007).

212 See, for instance, as reported in F. Gardner, ‘MI5 watch 2,000 terror suspects’, BBC News Online (02 May 2007).

213 P. Wintour and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Straw admits MI5’s Bali blunder: Minister agrees with MPs that terror threat was misjudged’, The Guardian (12 December 2002).


In 2006, flights between the UK and US continued to be targets of interest for terrorists - see, for example, ‘“Airlines terror plot” disrupted’, BBC News Online (10 August 2006) – contributing to close UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue; see also D. Eggen, ‘Air Plot Said to Target Cities’, The Washington Post (02 November 2006); E. Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With U.S.’, Congressional Quarterly - CQ.com (10 August 2006) - via URL: <http://public.cq.com/public/20060810_homeland_stables.html> (accessed: 07/04/2006) - see particularly where the article notes: “British-American intelligence sharing is “as good as it gets in terms of two western democracies,” [William Rosenau of the Rand Corporation who served as senior policy adviser in the State Department’s counter-terrorism office] added… Disagreements with various European countries over the war in Iraq hasn’t decreased intelligence sharing with those countries because “all of these countries recognize the value of cooperation,” he said. … With the British and Americans, similar laws and culture, as well as a shared language help intelligence coordination, said Lewis, a former diplomat who worked on intelligence at the State Department… Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff called the British government “terrific, in terms of close information sharing and close coordination, recognizing that both countries, which are bound together with great common feelings of culture, are also, unfortunately, bound together by being targeted through terror.”…”; see also D. McKeey, ‘U.S. Security Tightened in Wake of U.K. Exposure of Terror Plot’, The Washington File/USINFO (10 August 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror685.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); the airline plot was known as ‘Operation OVERT’ by British intelligence – see, for example, ISC, Annual Report 2006-07 (January 2008), p.11, para.32; for an insight into the types of law enforcement investigations and associated considerations involved in such cases, see also Chief Constable K. Jones, President, Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘Letters: Police, politics and public safety’, The Guardian (19 August 2006).

215 See, for example, Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’.

See also, for instance, ‘Prosecution case against al-Qaeda Briton: Dhiren Barot has been sentenced to life in jail after pleading guilty to conspiracy to murder people through a series of bombings on British and US targets. Here is a summary of the prosecution case outlined at Woolwich Crown Court’, BBC News Online (06 November 2006).

Quoted in Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’; For details of the case over which there were Anglo-American tensions following the release of information into the public domain by US authorities, see D. Priest and G. Frankel, ‘Terrorism suspect had US ship data; British subject accused of trying to aid Taliban’, The Washington Post (07 August 2004); Burns et al, ‘Intelligence agencies’ different approach’.


ibid.; see also ‘Prosecution case against al-Qaeda Briton’.


Blitz et al, ‘The politics of policing’. A year later, however, similar concerns were still evident in UK-US relations - see also J. Doward and M. Townsend, ‘[UK] Police hit out at FBI over leaks’, The Observer (20 August 2006).

Historically, intelligence has long been intimately associated with public relations - see, for example, J. L’Etang, ‘State Propaganda and Bureaucratic Intelligence: The Creation of Public Relations in 20th Century Britain’, Public Relations Review, 24, 4 (Winter 1998), p.426 - particularly where it is noted: ‘…Another man credited by some as being Britain's first fully fledged public relations consultant was Basil Clarke, whose background included journalism, intelligence work in the First World War and the civil service…’ and where it is observed that during the Second World War ‘…Two organizations were established to conduct subversive activities including black propaganda against the enemy: Section D which ultimately became Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) to focus on psychological warfare. Under PWE was SOE1, headed by Sefton Delmer, responsible for black propaganda. SOE1’s extensive black propaganda leaflets were printed by a certain Ellic Howe (who joined the Institute of Public Relations as a full member in 1955) who was then operating under the pseudonym of Armin Hull…’ (p.431). Furthermore, the argument that ‘The wartime experience sensitized civilian and military populations to issues of propaganda, information, and intelligence…’ (p.433) still resonates strongly today in relation to the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) – see below in Case Study 2; see also J.J. Wirtz, ‘Hiding in Plain Sight: Denial, Deception, and the Non-State Actor’, SAIS Review, XXVIII, 1 (Winter–Spring 2008), pp.55-63; see also E.P. Allen, ‘Of Note: To Deny and Deceive: The Limits of Counterdeception—an Addendum’, ibid., pp.91-92; for some critical commentary regarding the case of supposed Iraq WMD, see, for example, some of the criticism levied in N. West, ‘Cover Story: How Labour has subverted British Intelligence’, The Spectator (16 August 2003); see also for more background insights into PR activities and their impact, see, for example, W.T. Coombs and S.J. Holladay, It's Not Just PR: Public Relations in Society (London: Blackwell, 2006); see also for recent developments in the PR world, K.
Allen, ‘Analysis: Boom time for PR: The public relations industry is experiencing soaring demand as companies wake up to the importance of “reputation management”’, The Guardian (14 September 2006). This last observation can be equally extended to the domains of the UK and US intelligence communities.

224 See, for example, A. Russell, ‘Phone call helped to smash al-Qa’eda web’, The Daily Telegraph (05 March 2004).


226 For more on Moussaoui, see ‘3. The Twentieth Man’ in S.M. Hersh, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib (London: Penguin, 2004), p.103; see also Shapiro and Suzan, ‘The French Experience of Counter-Terrorism’, p.87.


See, for example, throughout this case study.


See, for instance, follow-up reports, for example, M. Hosenball, ‘Which Khan? U.S. and U.K. officials dispute a claim in a new book that the Americans had warned the British about a London subway bomber before the July 2005 attacks’, *Newsweek* (21 June 2006); see also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘An intelligence failure. An explosive exclusive. But was it the wrong Khan?: Claims on bomber may be case of mistaken identity; FBI source could have confused two suspects’, *The Guardian* (20 June 2006).

Based on information from various non-attributable sources - e.g. [c-1].

For more on Defence Advisory Notices - formerly D-Notices – see URL: <http://www.dnotice.org.uk/> (accessed: 05/01/2007); see also, for example, D. Leppard, ‘New MI5 boss is top expert on Al-Qaeda’, *The Sunday Times* (17 December 2006) - particularly where he notes that: ‘The sources said that the agency [MI5] was bracing itself for detailed disclosures about its intelligence on Mohammad Sidique Khan and Shezhad Tanweer, the two leading bombers who killed 52 people [during the 7 July 2005 London bomb attacks]. *The Sunday Times* and other media are prevented by court orders from making this evidence public.’; for reference to a possibly applicable trial where such legal considerations as non-prejudicing the case would have figured, see the next endnote below.

See, for instance, ‘Court sees footage of 7/7 bombers: A jury has seen previously unreleased surveillance footage of the 7 July suicide bomber Mohammed Siddique Khan’, *BBC News Online* (23 April 2008).

See, for example, ISC, *Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* (May 2006), p.8, para. 24, where it states the rationale for the allocation of resources: ‘… In making investigative decisions the Security Service recognises, partly because of the resources available, that it has to be selective and that it has to bear risks. Proportionality is also taken into account in the decision-making process: consideration is given to what degree of intrusion is proportionate on the basis of the available intelligence. Targets move between investigative tiers as new information of activities and intentions is received, and cases and priorities are regularly reviewed to ensure that resources are appropriately allocated.’; see also *ibid.*, p.39, para. 143, where it is noted that: ‘… The story of what was known about the 7 July group prior to July indicates that if more resources had been in place sooner the chances of preventing the July attacks could have increased. Greater coverage in Pakistan, or more


240 ibid.

241 See, for instance, ‘Foreign Secretary Statement on Return of British Detainees’, *No. 10 Downing Street Website* (19 February 2004).


244 For the treatment in the literature of these sorts of issues, and how they can impact on intelligence liaison, see, for example, J.J. Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, *The Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 6, 1 (1993).

245 Quoted in J. Eaglesham, ‘Comment and Analysis: Guantánamo justice: as two British terror suspects face a US military trial, the special relationship takes the strain: Growing disquiet about the treatment of detainees in Cuba is fuelling criticism of Tony Blair’s unwavering support for Washington’s security policies’, *The Financial Times* (12 July 2003); see also: Leader, ‘A matter of trust: Military tribunals are not the answer for Guantánamo Bay’, *The Financial Times* (14 July 2003); see also D. Rose, ‘Beatings, sex abuse and torture: how MI5 left me to rot in US jail: In the first eyewitness account to come out of the infamous Bagram prison, Londoner Richard Belmar takes exclusively to David Rose’, *The Guardian* (27 February 2005). See also G. Corera, ‘What the Guantánamo captives know’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (01 July 2002); see also V. Dodd, ‘Four years in Guantánamo - the man who said no to MI5’, *The Guardian* (04 April 2007) - particularly where it is reported that: ‘…In 2002 Mr Banna, a father of five from London, was seized by the CIA and secretly flown to Guantánamo Bay, after MI5 wrongly told the Americans that his travelling companion was carrying bomb parts on a business trip to Gambia. … the Liberal Democrat [MP] Sarah Teather… said… “These cases reflect very badly on the British government who have used these men and their families as expendable pawns.”…’

246 See, for example: ‘The Prime Minister informed us that, with one exception, all interviews conducted or observed by UK intelligence personnel have been conducted in a manner consistent with the principles laid down in the Geneva Convention, but that some detainees questioned by them have complained about their treatment while in detention. Whilst the UK personnel never witnessed any

247 ‘US transfers five British Guantánamo Detainees to UK’, USINFO (09 March 2004); M. Huband, ‘UK prisoners to be moved from Guantánamo’, The Financial Times (10 January 2005); see also: C. Adams, ‘Guantánamo detainees expected to be held on return’, The Financial Times (25 January 2005); see also: Rose, ‘Beatings, sex abuse and torture’; for later developments (and some UK-US differences) on this issue, see also, for example, I. Cobain and V. Dodd, ‘Britain to US: we don't want Guantánamo nine back: Documents reveal secret talks in Washington; British residents have no right to return say officials’, The Guardian (03 October 2006).

248 ‘Terror concern over UK detainees Guantanamo Bay: The US was not being “unreasonable” in refusing to release the last Britons at Guantanamo Bay, Tony Blair said’, BBC News Online (06 July 2004).

249 For further discussion of this issue see, for example, M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh University Press, 2004).


Palmer, ‘The US may use torture against terrorism’; see also for an argument that torture is a form of verification of information, Walker, *et al.*, ‘A Dialogue on Spying in 17th-Century Venice’, p.333 - particularly the references to (Cohen, 1998).

On the 'ticking bomb' scenario, see, for example, A. Dershowitz, ‘Tortured Reasoning’, *PBS.org* (2005), p.3 - PDF via URL: <http://www-TC.pbs.org/inthebalance/pdf/dershownitz-tortured-reasoning.pdf> (accessed: 29/05/2008) - especially where he notes: ‘The ticking bomb case refers to variations on a scenario that has been discussed by many philosophers, including Michael Walzer, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jeremy Bentham. The current variation on the classic “ticking bomb case”
involves a captured terrorist who refuses to divulge information about the imminent use of weapons of mass destruction, such as a nuclear, chemical or biological device, that are capable of killing and injuring thousands of civilians.’


255 See, for instance, L.J. Jordan and P. Hess, ‘Cheney, Others OK’d Harsh Interrogations’, The Huffington Post (10 April 2008); R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Exclusive: Top Bush aides pushed for Guantánamo torture: Senior officials bypassed army chief to introduce interrogation methods’, The Guardian (19 April 2008); P. Sands, ‘Stress hooding noise nudity dogs: It was the young officials at Guantánamo who dreamed up a list of new aggressive interrogation techniques, inspired by Jack Bauer from the TV series, 24. But it was the politicians and lawyers in Washington who set the ball rolling. Philippe Sands follows the torture trail right to the top’, The Guardian (19 April 2008); M. Tran, ‘Q&A: Torture and “enhanced interrogation”: The US uses pain and force against terror prisoners, and argues it is all perfectly legal. Mark Tran explains’, The Guardian (18 April 2008); see also P. Sands, Torture Team: Deception, Cruelty And The Compromise Of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

256 (UK) ISC, Renditions (June 2007), p.48, para.156.


258 See, for instance, as outlined in SIS testimony to the UK ISC inquiry on renditions, as directly quoted above in Chapter 1: Introduction of this study.

259 See also for more on this issue of UK-US legal co-operation and differences, for example, ‘Remarks prepared for delivery by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey at the London School of Economics’; see also media reports, such as M. Bright, K. Ahmed and P. Beaumont, ‘Confess or die, US tells jailed Britons: Outrage over plight of Guantanamo detainees’, The Observer (06 July 2003).
‘Spies “not monitored” in Europe: Europe has become a “happy hunting ground” for foreign intelligence agencies, according to the human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe’, *BBC News Online* (01 March 2006).

For further general information on ‘The Venice Commission’, see, for example via URL: <http://www.venice.coe.int/site/main/presentation_E.asp?MenuL=E> (accessed: 12/05/2008).

See, for instance, European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), *Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66th Plenary Session* (Venice, 17-18 March 2006), para.155. (Emphasis added); see also under subheading ‘Scope of the duty of Council of Europe member States to secure human rights’ in *ibid.*, especially paragraphs 64-66.

See, for example, A. Kroeger, ‘EU to vote on CIA flights report’, *BBC News Online* (14 February 2007); see also, for later revelations in 2008, D. Campbell and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘US accused of holding terror suspects on prison ships: Report says 17 boats used; MPs seek details of UK role; Europe attacks 42-day plan’, *The Guardian* (02 June 2008).

For a recent discussion of the Arar case involving Canada, see, for example, Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk’.

See, for example, ‘EU warned on “secret CIA jails”’, *BBC News Online* (28 November 2005); ‘Straw quizzes US on “CIA flights”’, *BBC News Online* (30 November 2005); ‘US civil rights group to sue CIA’, *BBC News Online* (03 December 2005); ‘CIA flights “landed in Germany”’, *BBC News Online* (03 December 2005); D. Priest, ‘Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake – German citizen released after months in “rendition”’, *The Washington Post* (04 December 2005); ‘Rice “to talk tough on CIA claim”’, *BBC News Online* (05 December 2005); S. Goldenburg and L. Harding, ‘Detainee flights have saved European lives, says Rice’, *The Guardian* (06 December 2005); G. Kessler, ‘Rice defends tactics used against suspects: Europe aware of operations, she implies’, *The Washington Post* (06 December 2005); Leader, ‘Terrorism and torture: Extraordinary and unacceptable’, *The Guardian* (06 December 2005); ‘US “shifts” position on torture’, *BBC News Online* (07 December 2005); ‘Rice allays CIA prison row fears’, *BBC News Online* (08 December 2005); ‘CIA abduction claims “credible”’, *BBC News Online* (13 December 2005); ‘Powell raps Europe on CIA flights’, *BBC News Online* (17 December 2005); for more on renditions, see, for example, Stephen Grey, ‘The corrosion of secrecy – the CIA’s policy of covert renditions’, transcript of talk delivered at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London (26 October 2006) - via URL: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/> (accessed: 03/11/2006); C.D. Leonnig and E. Rich, ‘U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons: Court Is Asked to Bar Detainees From Talking About Interrogations’, *The Washington Post* (04 November 2006); ‘CIA jails in Europe “confirmed”: A Council of Europe investigator says he has evidence to prove the CIA ran secret jails in Poland and Romania to interrogate “war on terror” suspects’, *BBC News Online* (08 June 2007); see also ‘CIA rejects secret jails report: The CIA has dismissed a Council of Europe report alleging that it ran secret jails for terror suspects in Europe after the 11 September attacks’, *BBC News Online* (08 June 2007); for the CoE report, see D. Marty, ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe

See also the further references to this issue provided throughout this study; for a summary of the various UN human rights agreements, see via URL: <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/undocs.html> (accessed: 02/05/2008).

See, for example, I. Cobain et al, ‘Britain’s role in war on terror revealed: 200 ghost flights logged across nearly 20 airfields; MPs urge government to state level of cooperation’, The Guardian (06 December 2005); see also I. Cobain and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘UK link to terror snatches’, The Guardian (12 September 2005); I. Cobain, S. Grey and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MPs from all parties prepare campaign to halt CIA terror flights from Britain’, The Guardian (13 September 2005); see also ‘Probe rejects UK rendition claims: A police inquiry says it has found no evidence UK airports have been used to move CIA detainees who faced torture’, BBC News Online (09 June 2007) – particularly where the report notes: ‘The Association of Chief Police Officers dismissed claims by campaign group Liberty that "extraordinary rendition" flights landed in Britain. Liberty’s Shami Chakrabarti accused Acpo of spin, saying the claims were based on “credible investigations”. Reports had suggested that CIA flights carrying prisoners had entered Britain 210 times since 2001…’

See, for example, ‘Straw: No record of CIA transfers’, BBC News Online (12 December 2005).

See, for example, J. Burns, ‘MPs to question British security officials’, The Financial Times (16 December 2005); on the ISC dimension, see, for example, the ISC, Annual Report 2005-2006 (June

271 See, for instance, P. Johnston, ‘SAS “held suspects for extraordinary rendition”’, The Daily Telegraph (26 February 2008) - particularly where it is reported that: ‘British special forces have been used to detain terrorist suspects for extraordinary rendition by the Americans, it has been claimed…’

272 ibid.

273 See, for example, A. Koch, ‘Counterterrorism co-operation is endangered by US renditions’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (October 2005), pp.20-3.

274 ‘Lords reject torture evidence use’, BBC News Online (08 December 2005); see also P. Reynolds, ‘Defining torture in a new world war’, BBC News Online (08 December 2005); see also, for instance, Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With U.S.’: ‘…Steven Clemons of the New America Foundation says there is great “frustration” among British law enforcement officials because that country’s laws prevent use in court of human intelligence gathered by American authorities from detainees at Guantanamo Bay. …’


277 See, for instance, as already detailed in Chapter 1 of this study.

278 See, for example, A. Barnett, et al., “7/7 ringleader “had direct link with terror cell””, The Observer (07 May 2006); see also K. Anderson, ‘Militants weave web of terror’, BBC News Online (14 July 2004).


280 J. Eaglesham, ‘Big groups act on e-mail threat’, The Financial Times (29 December 1999); L. James and J. Cooper, ‘Organised exploitation of the information super-highway’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 July 2000); see also E.F. Kohlmann, ‘The Real Online Terrorist Threat’, Foreign Affairs
Summary: Fears of a “digital Pearl Harbor” -- a cyberattack against critical infrastructure -- have so preoccupied Western governments that they have neglected to recognize that terrorists actually use the Internet as a tool for organizing, recruiting, and fundraising. Their online activities offer a window onto their methods, ideas, and plans.”; S. Drennan and A. Black, ‘Jihad online - The changing role of the internet’, Jane's Intelligence Review (01 August 2007).


For more on ‘legats’, see also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, pp.459-60; see also A. Khan, ‘FBI goes global: Crime-fighters have had to spread their net in the war against international terrorism’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (12 April 2000).

See J. Burns and J. Murray Brown, ‘Assault on America: Police in bank and charities probe’, The Financial Times (17 September 2001); see also Burns and Mallet, ‘France and UK arrest 11 over terrorist links’; for the potential significance of tracking terrorist funds, see PSCI and SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry (December 2002), p.113 – particularly where it states: ‘Tracking terrorist funds can be an especially effective means of identifying terrorists and terrorist organizations, unravelling and disrupting terrorist plots, and targeting terrorist financial assets for sanctions, seizures, and account closures. As with organized criminal activity, financial support is critically important to terrorist networks like al-Qa’ida…’; For earlier efforts and thinking on this ‘financial’ front see, for example, R.


290 J. Burns, ‘Disunity hampers terror fund tracking: US-led crackdown impeded by non-co-operation in international community’, The Financial Times (10 June 2002); E. Alden, ‘The money trail: how a crackdown on suspect charities is failing to stem the flow of funds to al-Qaeda: Terror Finance: US-led efforts to shut down organisations that channel money to terrorists are frustratingly incomplete. But poor international co-operation is only partly to blame’, The Financial Times (18 October 2002); for a more in depth coverage of this dimension see also L. Napoleon, Terror Inc.: Tracing the money behind global terrorism (London: Penguin, 2004), from p.273; T.J. Biersteker, ‘Targeting Terrorist Finances: The New Challenges of Financial Market Globalization’, chapter 6 in K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds), Worlds In Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p.74; Matters on this issue had not improved much a few years later: ‘… attempts to address the problem of terrorist financing have been inadequate. While in the three months after 11 September 2001 $112 million in alleged terrorist funds were frozen, only $24 million were frozen in the two years that followed. Seized funds represent only a small fraction of total funds available to terrorist organizations…’, paragraph 149, p.37 from FCO, UK Government paper on “A More Secure World: Our shared responsibility – Report of the UN Secretary General High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. (February 2005) – PDF via URL: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/> (accessed: October 2005); see also Stevenson, ‘Chapter 2: Law Enforcement and Intelligence Capabilities’, pp.61-71; A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Financing Islamist terrorism: Closing the net’, IISS Strategic
Comments, 9, 10 (December 2003); M. Rudner, ‘Using Financial Intelligence Against the Funding of Terrorism’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19, 1 (Spring, 2006), pp.32-58.


294 ‘Blunkett bans more terror groups’, The Guardian (28 October 2002).


299 See ‘Curbing Terrorist use of hawala’ - particularly: ‘… hawala brokers now turn away suspected terrorists…’; for later developments in this area during 2006, see L. Elliott, ‘Brown to use classified intelligence in fight to cut terrorist funding: Chancellor revives spirit of wartime code breakers; New
powers to freeze cash “will leave no hiding place”, *The Guardian*, (11 October 2006) - particularly where the report notes that: ‘Intelligence from secret sources is to be used for the first time in freezing financial assets as part of a crackdown on terrorist financing designed to prevent a repetition of the 7/7 attacks, Gordon Brown announced yesterday… Until now, the UK authorities have had to wait for suspects to be put on a UN list or for them to be arrested before freezing assets.’; see also G. Brown, ‘Full text of Gordon Brown's speech on terrorism: “Meeting the terrorist challenge”’, *The Guardian* (10 October 2006); T. Wittig, ‘Not so legal tender – What next for the financial war on terrorism?’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (02 February 2007).


301 See also on this subject, T.J. Biersteker and S.E. Eckert (eds), *Countering the Financing of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2007); see also H. Trinkunas and J. Giraldo (eds), *Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective* (Stanford University Press, 2007).


3, (June 2007), pp.391-420; see also ‘US AFRICOM’s intelligence plans’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 February 2008).


306 See, for example, A. Levy and C. Scott-Clark, ‘‘One huge US jail’’: Afghanistan is the hub of a global network of detention centres, the frontline in America’s ‘war on terror’, where arrest can be random and allegations of torture commonplace’, The Guardian (19 March 2005).

See, for example, ‘US shifts strategy in new effort to counter terrorism: The Bush administration is conceiving a new strategy to counter terrorism. The strategy places a greater emphasis on countering extremist ideology and disrupting terrorist activities abroad. For the first time measures will be developed to assess the progress of the “war on terrorism”’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (05 August 2005).


See, for example, K. DeYoung, ‘Terrorist attacks rose sharply in 2005, State Dept. says’, The Washington Post (29 April 2006). Later still, during November 2006, UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett claimed that the international terrorism threat was continuing to increase – see, for example, ‘Terror threat growing – Beckett’, BBC News Online (09 November 2006); for the speech itself, and for an update on how the UK Government and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) currently perceives and is officially tackling terrorism, see M. Beckett, ‘Trans-national Terrorism: Defeating the Threat’, speech delivered at seminar: Trans-national Terrorism: defeating the threat, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), London (09 November 2006) - via URL: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/>(accessed: 09/11/2006). Meanwhile, on the same day in London, ‘Dame Eliza gives terror warning: Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller has given a stark warning that the police and intelligence services are tracking some 200 groupings or networks, totalling over 1,600 identified individuals. These are “actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas”, she said’, BBC News Online (10 November 2006); see also ‘MI5 tracking “30 UK terror plots”: MI5 knows of 30 terror plots threatening the UK and is keeping 1,600 individuals under surveillance, the security service’s head has said’, BBC News Online (10 November 2006); ‘Security Director General Warns of Terrorist Threat (10.11.06)’, MI5 website (10 November 2006) - via URL: <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page567.html>(accessed: 10/11/2006); for the full text of the speech, see: Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, “‘The International Terrorist Threat to the UK”’, speech by the Director General of the Security Service, at Queen Mary's College, London, MI5 website (09 November 2006) - via URL: <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page568.html>(accessed: 10/11/2006).


For the suggestion that al-Qaeda with global command and control organisation characteristics has not been entirely wrapped up by 2007, see C. Whitlock, ‘In Morocco’s “Chemist,” A Glimpse of Al-Qaeda: Bombmaker Typified Resilient Network’, The Washington Post (07 July 2007).

See, for example, ‘Afghanistan sees violence upsurge’, BBC News Online (18 May 2006); see also ‘Statement by the Secretary General on expansion of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan’, NATO Integrated Data Service (05 October 2006) - via e-mail. The NATO operation still remained short on

This was particularly the case out on the battlefields in Iraq and Afghanistan stemming from particular episodes - see, for instance, the US military in Iraq, J. White, ‘Death in Haditha: Accounts in Report Indicate Marines Gunned Down Unarmed Iraqis in the Aftermath of a Roadside Bombing in 2005’, *The Washington Post* (06 January 2007); ‘US troops on Iraq murder charges: The US military in Iraq has charged two of its soldiers with the murder of three Iraqis between April and June in the Iskandariya area, south of Baghdad’, *BBC News Online* (30 June 2007); and in relation to NATO
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314 Later, by December 2006, in the UK and its foreign policy at least, greater attention appeared to be turned to tackling this dimension – see, for example, UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett, ‘Transnational Terrorism: Defeating the Threat’, RUSI Journal (December 2006), pp.10-14 - particularly where she notes: ‘In fact, this warped vision needs to be addressed head-on…’ (p.11).


316 See, for example, ‘UK calls for Guantanamo closure’, BBC News Online (10 May 2006) - where UK Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith, states: “… It is time, in my view, that [Guantanamo Bay prison] should close. Not only would it, in my personal opinion, be right to close Guantánamo as a matter of principle, I believe it would also help to remove what has become a symbol to many – right or wrong – of injustice. The historic tradition of the United States as a beacon of freedom, liberty and of justice deserves the removal of this symbol.”; see also the follow-up reports, for example: ‘UK told US won’t shut Guantánamo’, BBC News Online (11 May 2006). Shortly later, by mid-2006, the US appears to be heeding the calls of allies, such as the UK, as now the US also wants to close Guantánamo Bay – see, for example, ‘The US “wants to end Guantánamo”’, BBC News Online (21


318 For more on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, and the importance of ‘soft’ power, see R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 5 (September/October 1998); J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science Quarterly, 119, 2 (2004); and J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, 83, 3 (May 2004); see also A. Saikal, ‘Afghanistan, Iraq and the “war” on terror: Struggle for the Global Soul: Afghanistan, Iraq and the US-led “war” on international terrorism are at different critical phases, but the fates of all three are now interlocked. The outcome in one is capable of seriously affecting the fortunes of the others… the war on terror has lost its initial focus’, The World Today (August/September 2004), pp.7-10; see also M.R. Gordon, ‘Military Hones a New Strategy on Insurgency’, The New York Times (05 October 2006).

319 The term ‘kinetic’ in this study is defined as involving a spectrum of associated activities, ranging from moving quickly and firmly against targets/suspects, not least during their disruption and interdiction, to including, but not exclusively meaning, ‘killing’. Proportionality and breadth/extent of response questions also figure in the overall equation.


321 See, for example, as qualified above in the overall ‘introduction’ to the case studies.

For the importance of an all-source approach, particularly in counter-terrorism efforts, see J. Sims, ‘Intelligence to Counter Terror: The Importance of All-Source Fusion’, *Intelligence and National Security*, 22, 1 (February 2007), pp.38-56.


For another analysis, see also P. Rogers, ‘The war on terror: past, present, future’, *openDemocracy.net* (24 August 2006); see also E. Thomas, ‘Five Years After 9/11, Are We Any Safer?: Soldiers in the war on terror have learned much since 9/11. So, too, has the enemy. How the London plot was foiled — and where we are in the five-year struggle’, *Newsweek* (21-28 August 2006); for official US evaluations, see, for example, J.D. Negroponte, ‘Yes, We Are Better Prepared’, *The Washington Post* (10 September 2006) - reproduced in ‘U.S Intelligence Chief Outlines Improvements Since 9/11 Attacks’, *The Washington File/USINFO* (14 September 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror706.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also D. McKeeby, ‘Counterterrorism Strategies Adapting to Ever-Changing Threats’, *The Washington File/USINFO* (13 June 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror674.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also ‘UK “must face security challenge”: The UK is currently unable to meet the challenges posed by the various threats it is facing, a new commission for security in Britain has warned...’*, *BBC News Online* (23 May 2007).


For further information on the ‘psychology dimension’, see for example, R. Persaud, ‘Confronting the Terrorist Mind: Explaining the Repeated Failure of Intelligence’, *Gresham College Transcript* (29 September 2004); see also for some of the wider and psychological repercussions of the Iraq war on participants, see, for example, D. Priest and A. Hull, ‘The War Inside: Troops Are Returning From the Battlefield With Psychological Wounds, But the Mental-Health System That Serves Them Makes Healing Difficult’, *The Washington Post* (17 June 2007).


334 See, for instance, as outlined in Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk’.


336 Here, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s (in)famous phrase resonates: ‘There are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don’t know we don’t know…’ as quoted in J. Ezard, ‘Rumsfeld’s unknown unknowns take prize’, *The Guardian* (02 December 2003). As an example of ‘known unknowns’ in the world of intelligence, see, for example, B. Sweetman, ‘US Black Programmes: Funding the Void: Classified projects form a large and increasing proportion of the US defence budget’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (12 April 2006).

337 For example, the differences are frequently contained within just the law enforcement or intelligence sectors, within their specific relationship, or are contained at their particular level (for example, ‘policy/strategy’ or ‘operational/tactical’), rather than also affecting the other levels.


340 MLATs also refer to Multilateral Legal Assistance Treaties, see ‘Law enforcement’ in Roberts, Blacked Out, pp.138-9.

341 See also M.M. Aid, ‘All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against International Terrorism’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (2003), pp.72-120.

342 See, for example, D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript (20 October 2005).

343 For more on developments in this domain, see, for example, Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: The optimization of intelligence liaison arrangements’.

344 For some further detail on these developments, see, for instance, Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters’, pp.129-144. These trends are also occurring within other international security relationships on other issue areas, such as in the domain of security sector reform (SSR) - see, for example, A. Webb-Vidal, ‘Colombian police to train Afghans in counter-narcotics’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 October 2006); ‘Kurdish soldiers trained by Israelis’, BBC Newsnight Online (20 September 2006); see also HM Government, Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (July 2006), p.22 - especially where it notes:

Both intelligence gathering and action to disrupt and apprehend terrorists are often carried out in co-operation with our international partners. To facilitate this, the UK provides training and other assistance to certain foreign governments, in order to help them build up their ability to counter terrorism.

**Assisting other countries:**

- In FY05/06, the UK spent over £7.3M helping other nations to build their counter-terrorist capabilities.
- Over the past year the Ministry of Defence has assisted with counter-terrorist training in more than a dozen countries.
- Other agencies, such as the Police, have provided counter-terrorism training assistance to officials from other nations, both in the UK and by deploying trainers overseas.
- The police Counter-Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officer (CTELO) Scheme has also been expanded. In addition to close co-operation with our partners in the European Union, CTELOs are now being posted to Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa.

**Working with and through international institutions:**

- A new EU Counter-terrorism Strategy was endorsed by the European Council in December 2005 during the UK’s Presidency.
- The swift extradition from Italy to the United Kingdom of a suspect in the attempted bombings on 21 July demonstrated the effectiveness of the new European Arrest Warrant.
- In the United Nations we are working to ensure the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 which creates legal obligations on all states to crack down on terrorists, their supporters and their sources of finance, as part of an effective UN global counter-terrorism strategy.
See, for example, the definition of ‘liaison’ cited in Chapter 1 of this study and as agreed by the US Department of Defense and NATO: ‘That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.’ - Quoted in NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (AAP-6[2006]), p.2-L-3. (Emphasis added); also cited in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, Joint Publication 1-02 ([12 April 2001] updated 17 September 2006), p.312.

US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Aftergood, ‘DoD issues new doctrine on information operations’.


That is: the shipping of suspects to countries where they will be interrogated under the duress of torture, rather than being taken into custody and being put on trial in the US or UK, for instance.

There is arguably at least some official US recognition of this counter-productivity, for example, the closing of Abu Ghraib and the re-branding of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ to the ‘Long War’. More complete recognition would come with the US dropping of the term ‘war’ altogether. A phrase such as the ‘Long Engagement’ would arguably be more appropriate, particularly in the domain of ideas. Such a phrase also suggests greater inclusiveness, rather than setting up dangerous ‘us and them’ juxtapositions. For some of these concerns, see, for example, P. Sands, Lawless World: The whistle-blowing account of how Bush and Blair are taking the law into their own hands (London: Penguin, 2006 [Updated ed.]); H. Kennedy, Just Law: The Changing Face of Justice – and Why It Matters to Us All - Equality, Fairness, Respect, Dignity, Civil Liberties (London: Vintage, 2004); S.V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); for background on law and international relations, see J. Morris, ‘Law, Politics, and the Use of Force’, chapter 5 in Baylis, et al (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World, pp.101-121; A. Roberts, ‘Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War’, Survival, 44, 1 (Spring 2002), pp.7-32; see also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.462 – where he notes that: ‘The ongoing investigation of
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353 See, for instance, ‘UK-US call for Afghan war support’, BBC News Online (06 February 2008); see also C. Wyatt and R. Watson, ‘Nato at pains to dismiss Afghan tensions’, BBC News Online (07 February 2008).


355 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism, p.33.

356 See, for example, A. Rathmell, ‘Building Counterterrorism Strategies and Institutions: The Iraqi Experience’, chapter 9 in D. Aaron (ed.), Three Years After: Next Steps in the War on Terror (RAND, 2005), p.47; see also, “‘Help Muslims report terror” call: A top Muslim police officer has urged forces to use “third-party reporting” to get terror information from Muslims’, BBC News Online (28 January 2007); see also N. Suleman, ‘Police chief calls on communities: The police are considering proposals
to share intelligence and information with Muslims before launching anti-terror operations. The plans, announced by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, are part of a wider vision to engage more with British Muslims whose support police need in fighting terrorism’, BBC News Online (24 January 2007); ‘Police rethink on stop and search: Police are reviewing stop and search policies amid fears they are damaging community relations, a senior officer has confirmed’, BBC News Online (24 January 2007); see also I. Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against Terrorism?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, 4 (December 2006), pp.421-436. By way of an example of this type of engagement beneficially in action: in early June 2006, Canada’s domestic CT approach was demonstrably sufficiently well-tuned, allowing for the successful thwarting of the Toronto Cell. This was achieved through the use of an informant, a Muslim Canadian citizen willing to engage, reportedly voluntarily, with the Canadian authorities - see J. Bennion, ‘The Radical Informant’, PBS Frontline/World website (30 January 2007), via URL: <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/shaikh.html> (accessed: 22/02/2007).

By mid-2006, the US, at least minimally, appears to be beginning to address the counterproductive wider counter-terrorism shortcomings. For example, the US also wants to close Guantánamo Bay – see, for example, ‘The US “wants to end Guantánamo”’, BBC News Online (21 June 2006); see also ‘Editorial: Closing Guantánamo: It’s inevitable; better that Mr. Bush do it, while fixing the flawed legal system behind it’, The Washington Post (27 June 2007). In addition, on 29 June 2006, the US Supreme Court ruled that the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply to US detainees – see C. Lane, ‘High Court rejects detainee tribunals: 5 to 3 ruling curbs President’s claim of wartime power’, The Washington Post (30 June 2006). Following the ruling, the White House shifted its policy and announced that ‘All US military detainees, including those at Guantánamo Bay, are to be treated in line with the minimum standards of the Geneva Conventions’ – see, for example, ‘US detainees to get Geneva rights’, BBC News Online (11 July 2006); see also M.D. Davis, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR: The Guantánamo I Know’, The New York Times (26 June 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘LINDSEY GRAHAM, a Republican senator from South Carolina, is right: “The image of Guantánamo Bay and the reality of Guantánamo Bay are completely different.” It is disappointing that so many embrace a contrived image…”’ On the ‘image’ issue, see, for example, K. DeYoung, ‘The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From Madison Avenue: U.S. Needs to Devise a Different “Brand” to Win Over the Iraqi People, Study Advises’, The Washington Post (21 July 2007). The Pentagon then issued instructions to its personnel – see US Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, ‘Application of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense’, Office of the Secretary of Defense Memorandum (07 July 2006) – via URL: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/geneva070606.pdf> (accessed: 11/07/2006); T.E. Ricks, ‘U.S. troops will benefit from clarity, experts say’, The Washington Post (12 July 2006); see also Roberts, ‘Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the “War on Terror”’, pp.199-212 – especially where he notes: ‘The US change of policy following this decision in 2006 is significant but still incomplete.’ (p.199). Other shortcomings also appear to be beginning to be addressed - see, for example, G. Witte, ‘Army to end expansive, exclusive Halliburton deal: Logistics contract to be open for bidding’, The Washington Post (12 July 2006); see also J. Glanz, ‘U.S. Agency Finds New Waste and Fraud in Iraqi
‘Rumsfeld Memo on Iraq Proposed “Major” Change: Two days before he resigned as defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld submitted a classified memo to the White House that acknowledged that the Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq was not working and called for a major course correction...’, *The New York Times* (03 December 2006); P. Harris, ‘Rumsfeld: US failing in Iraq: A leaked memo shows that the former Defence Secretary thinks a major change in strategy is needed, focusing on a staged pull-out of troops’, *The Observer* (03 December 2006). However, changes in US domestic politics in early November 2006, whereby the Democrats seized a majority and control of Congress from the Republicans in the US mid-term elections, and with the subsequent resignation of Donald Rumsfeld as US Defense Secretary, suggested that some further changes will be afoot in the future, including in relation to Iraq - see, for example, T.E. Ricks and M. Abramowitz, ‘A Meek Departure From the War Cabinet: Rumsfeld Ends His Stormy Tenure at Defense Dept.’, *The Washington Post* (09 November 2006); D. Balz, ‘For Bush’s New Direction, Cooperation Is The Challenge’, *The Washington Post* (09 November 2006); S.G. Stolberg and J. Rutenberg, ‘Rumsfeld Resigns; Bush Vows to “Find Common Ground”; Focus Is on Virginia’, *The New York Times* (09 November 2006); J. Alic, ‘“Stuff happens,” Mr Rumsfeld’, *ISN Security Watch* (09 November 2006); see also ‘Top of the Agenda: Rumsfeld Out; Gates In’, *Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Daily Brief* (09 November 2006) – via URL: <http://www.cfr.org/about/what_we_do/editorial_detail.html?id=246> (accessed: 09/11/2006); D.E. Sanger, ‘After Rumsfeld: Bid to Reshape the Brain Trust’, *The New York Times* (10 November 2006). The ushering in of a more consensual, intelligence-led, rather than military-led, era in US foreign, defence and security policies, as well as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies, may be heralded with former CIA Director Robert Gates (1991-92) being nominated as the new US Defense Secretary – see, for example, ‘Rumsfeld replaced after poll loss’, *BBC News Online* (08 November 2006). There also appears to be the beginning of more policy/strategy level engagement and re-connection with the lower operational/tactical level - see, for example, ‘US army “to suggest Iraq changes”: US military leaders are preparing to recommend changes in strategy on Iraq, America's top military officer says’, *BBC News Online* (11 November 2006); E.A. Cohen, ‘Plan B’, *The Wall Street Journal* (20 October 2006); D.E. Sanger, *et al*, ‘Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says’, *The New York Times* (02 January 2007). The passage of more time now is required to see how future developments evolve. What is clearer, however, is the increasing domestic US frustration with the Bush administration’s approach to Iraq, as articulated in the US media – see, for instance, ‘EDITORIAL: Past Time to Get Real on Iraq’, *The New York Times* (09 January 2007). However, the back-to-front US strategy in Iraq appears likely to continue, as again there is reportedly some political and military disconnect present – see, for example, M. Abramowitz, R. Wright and T.E. Ricks, ‘With Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His Generals’, *The Washington Post* (10 January 2007), particularly where they note: ‘When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against...’ Related to this overall issue of disconnect between ‘idealism’ and ‘reality’ in relation to Iraq, see also M. Danner, ‘Iraq: The War of the Imagination’, *The New York Review of Books*, 53, 20 (21 December
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359 C. Secrett, ‘What Steps should Governments be taking in Communicating with and Engaging the Public More Effectively on the range of Complex Risks that we all face?’, PIU Presentation (14 December 2001) - via URL:

360 For more on ‘emancipation’, see, for instance, K. Booth, ‘Emancipation and ideals’ in his Theory of World Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp.110-116; see also initiatives, such as D. Casciani, ‘Think tank to counter extremism: Former radical Islamists are launching a think tank [The Quilliam Foundation] to counter the ideology they blame for violent extremism’, BBC News Online (21 April 2008); D. Casciani, ‘Ex-extremists call for “Western Islam”’, BBC News Online (22 April 2008). However, see also ‘Welcome to Quilliam Foundation Exposed!’, weblog - via URL: <http://www.quilliamexposed.blogspot.com/> (accessed: 27/05/2008).

361 See, for example, Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk’; see also, for ‘lessons learnt’ in Canada before the Arar Commission recommendations were introduced during 2006, W. Wark, ‘Learning lessons (and how) in the War on Terror: The Canadian Experience’, International Journal, 60, 1 (Winter 2004-2005).
Chapter 5: Case Study 2

Enhancing efforts against proliferation:
Implementing the ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’

‘Good intelligence and the rough-and-tumble of the open political process do not always mix… To be agile and well-informed, policy needs disinterested intelligence. To be relevant, intelligence efforts must address policy concerns.’


[1.0]: Introduction

This case study evaluates UK-US intelligence liaison on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non- and counter-proliferation (N/CP) efforts. It also seeks to assess whether together UK and US intelligence have delivered effective results. WMD and their N/CP efforts have had prominent coverage in recent years. This key issue area also features largely in UK-US intelligence liaison, alongside and especially after 9/11 - intimately tied to counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. However, rarely probed are questions concerning: how effective is the UK-US intelligence liaison concerning WMD N/CP; and how effectively is that liaison contributing towards the tackling of the proliferation challenges currently being confronted?

From 2000 to the end of 2005, several UK and US WMD N/CP efforts can be highlighted. Indeed, these types of interactions are routine, frequently occurring on a daily basis. The most high profile example on which there has been considerable UK-US intelligence liaison, and which especially stands out in the early twenty-first century, is the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes. Adopting a broadly chronological-thematic hybrid approach, this example is now evaluated.

This episode has been selected for examination for several reasons. It was explored by the official WMD inquiries in both the UK and US, held in the wake of the 2003 war in Iraq. In the UK, the Butler Committee Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘Butler Report’) was published on 14 July 2004; while in the US, the Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was published on 31 March 2005. Both of these reports, therefore, offer some valuable official UK and US insights. As well as
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figuring prominently in public, this example also effectively demonstrates the implementation of the ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ in action.

Significantly, the Butler Report carefully avoided probing in depth the specific issue of UK-US intelligence liaison. The authors remarked that:

[w]e have focused on the intelligence available to the British Government and the use made of it by our Government. Although that inevitably has led us to areas of UK/US co-operation, we have deliberately not commented in this Report on the actions of the US intelligence agencies, ground that is being covered by the Presidential Commission.³

Detailing intelligence co-operation with allies was essentially outside of the UK Committee’s remit. It was intended to look solely at the UK use of the intelligence. Acting like exemplary professional allies at the inquiry level, as well as elsewhere, the UK inquiry did not want to publicly probe, pre-empt or discuss critically any US findings on US intelligence on WMD. Otherwise, they could have potentially jeopardised generic UK-US relations and, more specifically, the UK-US intelligence relationship. Notably, for similar reasons, in the final US Robb-Silberman Commission Report, their references to British Intelligence did not go beyond the findings of those already presented in the Butler Report.

Some commentators saw this omission as the crucial ‘missing link’. Dan Plesch argued that: ‘The missing third dimension concerns the relationship of the British with their American counterparts... In general terms, the government is proud of the special intelligence relationship, and we are told that British ministers spoke to their American counterparts almost daily during the run-up to [the 2003 Iraq] war. But Butler and his colleagues produced a report with just eight references to the United States, and several of these are to US publications...’⁴ US intelligence historian, Thomas Powers, argued that: ‘...the close cooperation between American and British intelligence services... helped President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair make their case for war while protecting them from awkward questions...’⁵ Publicly available evaluations of UK-US intelligence liaison by each inquiry are significantly absent, leaving a gap in the contemporary historical record. This case study aims to address that gap.

UK-US intelligence liaison on the N/CP of WMD is widespread. Importantly, UK-US intelligence liaison on this issue involves the participation of multiple intelligence agencies. This is apparent on both sides, as well as beyond when involving more multilateral input than solely bilateral intelligence liaison interactions. Multiple agency participation is especially evident with regard to the vaster, and more
competitive than co-operative, US intelligence community. As is revealed throughout this case study, at times, this factor can contribute to some significant disconnects and mis-flows of information. This is particularly the scenario that appears either in the absence of effective overall intelligence co-ordination and associated orchestrations (for instance, as was witnessed in the US [2.6/2.7]); or during its co-option for contributing towards the building of specific political cases, which can then be easily marketed and sold to the public (for example, as observed in the UK - see below [2.3/2.7]).

Indeed, examples of these types of disconnect, as well as their associated mis-flows of information, were witnessed frequently during the run up to the Iraq war. This was particularly concerning the source appropriately codenamed ‘CURVEBALL’, and the handling (or rather mis-management) of his product. Forthcoming from German Intelligence, the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst), his product - rather than the actual source himself in person (for standard, perhaps in this case overly rigorous, HUMINT source ‘protection’ purposes by the BND) - was handled/accessed by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); while simultaneously the CIA was kept more out of the loop – even ignored/bypassed (see below [2.4]) - concerning this source. This was not least after CURVEBALL had been dismissed as a ‘fabricator’ by the CIA, as well as by their direct counterparts in British Intelligence (SIS/MI6). For instance, as reported in Der Speigel:

... The [German] secret service [the BND] now points to a Washington meeting in the autumn of 2002 ... whereby the then-BND agent in Washington met with Tyler Drumheller, CIA operations leader for Europe, for a lunch meeting ... Drumheller recalls that the BND agent warned that “Curveball” was psychologically unstable and likely a fraud. ... The British secret service had expressed its doubts openly as early as 2001, after an expert from MI6 used a pretext to arrange a meeting with “Curveball.” He came to the conclusion that elements of “Curveball’s” behavior “strike us as typical of fabricators.”...

The interactions concerning CURVEBALL also nicely expose some of the dynamics that can be encountered when engaging in wider international intelligence liaison exchanges. This is together with revealing episodes when different international intelligence liaison arrangements significantly overlap, both jointly and individually, in London and/or Washington. To this end, the episodes concerning CURVEBALL are referred to throughout this case study for its illustrative value. These interactions (as well as those closely associated) can then go in either a positive or negative direction depending on the other surrounding circumstances involved. This includes
the political climate and its forcefulness, in terms of influence, within which these interactions are being played out. Evidently, in such contexts, higher-level intelligence management and co-ordination considerations also have an important role to perform. This is especially in helping to shape the final effects and outcomes that eventually emerge from the liaison interactions undertaken.

Generally, UK and US strategies regarding N/CP efforts are manifold and complex. A significant part of the UK and US N/CP strategies involve signing up to several, sometimes overlapping, multilateral arrangements and non-proliferation ‘regimes’. A complex series of intelligence liaison arrangements then take place in the background behind them. Amongst many tasks, these activities help to verify that the agreements are being upheld. Due to all the risks inherent in intelligence liaison, unsurprisingly the intelligence liaison and associated interactions on proliferation issues often operate in a similar manner as witnessed over other issues, such as counter-terrorism (CT) intelligence sharing. As Ellis and Kiefer observe:

... intelligence sharing is a potentially risky, if sometimes necessary, enterprise. When undertaken, intelligence-sharing or data exchanges must be conducted with a full appreciation of the potential risks involved. Yet despite the obvious downside potential, intelligence sharing need not be dismissed as a pointless exercise or one that is so fraught with danger that it should never be attempted. As in other policy areas, decisionmakers will be required to prioritize objectives and resources, making difficult trade-offs when necessary.

Again, on this issue, the closest and highest volume of intelligence liaison is witnessed bilaterally between the UK and the US, with the exclusive multilateral UKUSA SIGINT arrangement performing a demonstrably important role. There is also some intelligence liaison, frequently involving more information sharing, bilaterally and multilaterally, with other countries and international organisations - such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NATO.

[2.0]: The issue of supposed Iraqi WMD & related programmes

UK-US intelligence liaison was generally close on this issue. Moreover, it formed the core intelligence liaison relationship around which other international intelligence liaison relationships with other countries - such as Germany (as already seen), France, Israel, and Italy (see below [2.6/2.8]) - bilaterally and multilaterally clustered in their both joint and individual overlap with the UK and/or US. As CIA Director George Tenet demanded: ‘How come all the good reporting I get is from SIS?’ In
fact, UK-US liaison was judged to be so close that sometimes it was perhaps ironically too ‘successful’. *Vis-à-vis* intelligence liaison generally, as the Robb-Silberman Commission later warned in 2005:

A cautionary note: the increased sharing of intelligence reporting among liaison services — without sharing the sourcing details or identity of the source — may lead to unwitting circular reporting. When several services unknowingly rely on the same sources and then share the intelligence production from those sources, the result can be false corroboration of the reporting. In fact, one reason for the apparent unanimity among Western intelligence services that Iraq posed a more serious WMD threat than proved to be the case was the extensive sharing of intelligence information, and even analysis, among liaison services. Such sharing of information, without sharing of source information, can result in “groupthink” on an international scale.13

The perceived ‘groupthink’ or ‘a bureaucratic consensus’14 appears to have been most acute in the critical domain of the ‘producer-consumer/customer’ relationship. This was between senior intelligence staff and the politicians in both the UK and US. The alleged global/international ‘groupthink’ also has been attributed to what one commentator has characterised critically as ‘…an ingrained “inferiority complex” with regard to the capabilities of American intelligence…’ amongst the major intelligence agencies around the world that liaise with the US. This was attributed to being due to them ‘lack[ing] the capability to collect the information on which to base independent judgments.’ Furthermore, he asserted that these intelligence agencies’ leaders generally fear to take positions at variance with American intelligence conclusions because the political leaders of their countries tend to judge their performance by the criterion of their agreement with American Intelligence.’ Significantly, the British were judged as being ‘no exception to this rule…’15 Although, as is demonstrated throughout this case study, that judgement arguably extended too far.

A degree of ‘overreach’ did figure in the overall mix. More detrimentally, here, and certainly amid the highest intelligence and political echelons between, as well as within, the UK and US, an optimised intelligence outreach balance was absent.

**[2.1]: Twentieth Century Prelude:**

Iraq and its supposed WMD had plagued UK and US intelligence for sometime. During the 1990s, Iraq, together with its disarmament verification process, evidently
absorbed substantial UK-US intelligence resources. For instance, inside the UK intelligence community, a special Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) led group (cell) focussed on Iraq - part of ‘Operation Rockingham’ - had existed from 1991. Its role over time was to provide intelligence support, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapon expertise, to both the UN weapons inspectors and to a range of UK customers.\(^{16}\)

In 1991, after the ‘Gulf War’ (1990-91) following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 was passed. This established the United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM). UNSCOM was intended to verify the Iraqi disarmament of WMD. However, as the 1990s progressed, the eventual findings of UNSCOM were essentially dismissed by the UK and the US. This was not least with the findings coming soon after the disquieting revelations regarding the exposure of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme in the wake of the Gulf War. Increasing speculation about what else was being missed by the UNSCOM and the IAEA now had to be surmounted (see below).

Although UNSCOM had destroyed several Iraqi WMD, the Iraqis had also ensured that the besieged UN weapons inspectors had been effectively excluded from inspecting so-called ‘presidential sites’. This suggested that the UNSCOM findings of 1997, that Iraqi WMD had essentially been destroyed, were not absolute enough. Indeed, they were incomplete in the eyes of the US and UK, to the extent of being substantially discredited.\(^{17}\) This was despite other countries, such as Russia and France, being more accepting of those findings. UK-US trust in the UNSCOM verification regime was lacking, and over time continued to haemorrhage.\(^{18}\) Plagued with such problems on all sides, and having also been accused of being a thinly veiled Israeli spying mechanism by the hostile Iraqis - who continued to obstruct the inspectors, thus over time preventing the inspectors from working as freely as they would have desired - UNSCOM eventually withdrew from Iraq in early December 1998.

A few days afterwards, on 16 December 1998, the controversial US-UK OPERATION ‘DEsert Fox’ was launched. A more proactive ‘containment’ approach through the bombing of suspected Iraqi WMD sites was attempted. However, the operation was ultimately judged to be ‘highly ineffective’.\(^{19}\) Drift on the issue then ensued as other pressing political considerations, such as Kosovo, increasingly took centre stage. Uncertainty regarding the exact status of Iraqi WMD continued over into the new millennium. By 2000, UN-sponsored weapons inspectors carrying out even disputed verification activities were also now currently lacking. This contributed further towards the general prevailing uncertainty concerning the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD. Moreover, according to the
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BBC, in January 2000, ‘Iraq ... said that it has already destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction and it will not accept a new arms control body.’\(^{20}\) Stalemate had been reached.

By 2002, the potential strengths UK-US intelligence liaison could bring on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD appear to have been even further reduced. Indeed, they were shown to be considerably undermined in the process of having (and following) a set political agenda. Thereby the crucially required flexibility and open-mindedness needed in approach when dealing with the generally non-static WMD N/CP issue, was absent.\(^{21}\) Rather than a greyer response regarding the supposed Iraqi WMD, political masters in the UK and US sought to extract a ‘black-or-white’ answer from their intelligence agencies.\(^{22}\) In the absence of that type of artificial answer being provided, due to the nature of the problem being probed (that amply reflected the qualities of dynamism, ambiguity and high complexity), the decision-makers instead sought to create it through a policy of ‘regime change’ in Iraq. A stronger counter-proliferation paradigm was advocated. This chosen course of action was virtually regardless of the on-the-ground considerations. A dangerous path was being forged into the future. This came as the importance of contextualisation, as well as allowing intelligence to fulfil its proper and most useful informing role, became increasingly overlooked and dismissed politically.\(^{23}\)

[2.2]: The road to war in Iraq: much ado about nothing?

In 2000, US and UK interest in Iraq and its supposed WMD clearly was not new.\(^{24}\) However, it was not until the Bush administration took office in January 2001 that the political ‘obsession’ with Iraq was clearly apparent.\(^{25}\) This political ‘obsession’ also fitted with the widespread prevailing, and increasing, beliefs that the Iraq ‘containment policy’ of the previous Clinton administrations during the 1990s had not worked.\(^{26}\) This was albeit that – arguably - there were not any sufficiently compelling ways, or mechanisms in place, for telling convincingly whether containment had, or equally had not, adequately worked.\(^{27}\) The re-invigorated political focus on Iraq of early 2001 also fitted in sufficiently with similarly long standing US, UK, and indeed other countries’, desires to see Saddam Hussein at least disarmed of WMD, if not removed from power altogether. Again, these sentiments dated most strongly from the end of the ‘Gulf War’ in 1991.\(^{28}\)

From February 2001, the new Bush administration, with the UK, increased the pressure on Iraq through further bombing raids.\(^{29}\) UK Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged to use ‘whatever means are necessary’\(^{30}\) to contain Saddam Hussein, and to stop the supposed Iraqi WMD development. As veteran Washington Post journalist, Bob Woodward observed during a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) interview in September 2004: ‘...on Aug. 1, [2001], after a series of meetings among the National
Security Council [NSC] principals, they presented a document ... called “A Liberation Strategy” for Iraq, attempting to ratchet up the pressure in terms of covert action, economic sanctions -- not a military invasion, however. It was only after 9/11 that the president took [US Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld aside and said, “Let’s start looking at Iraq seriously.”31 Indeed, after the 9/11 attacks, there is considerable evidence that several ‘hawkish’, ‘neo-conservative’, members of the Bush administration believed that there should now be the long hankered after action against Iraq.32 Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, thought that 9/11 provided the opportunity.

However, others in the Bush administration were opposed. This was at least at this early stage in the burgeoning so-called ‘War on Terror’. Notably Vice-President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and ultimately President Bush himself, decided to focus first on al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and international terrorism, and deal most immediately with Afghanistan. They would then return to the issue of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and his alleged terrorism links and supposed WMD later. As Woodward again observed: ‘All of the discussion of Iraq, it’s there, it’s serious, but the president and Cheney reject it and adopt very clearly an “Afghanistan first” policy. But it’s background music.’33 After, at least initial, ‘success’ in the operations undertaken in Afghanistan, and in the wake of the toppling of the Taliban regime, by around the end of November to early December 2001, Bush et al were again much more attentive to the issues of WMD and Iraq. The issue began to feature more prominently.34

This prioritisation was especially highlighted by the US ‘State of the Union’ address of January 2002. The ‘axis of evil’, including Iraq, figured significantly. Indeed, US President Bush declared: ‘Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens... This is a regime that agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilised world.’ He continued: ‘States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.’35 The Bush administration’s line of argument and course of action was becoming established publicly.

Iraq was now again firmly at the top of the agendas of the UK and US
intelligence agencies. It also featured more in the media. Washington and London started to channel more energy and intelligence staff and resources into continuing to build their case against Saddam Hussein. Moreover, reportedly according to the BBC, ‘The day after the [‘axis of evil’] State of the Union message, members of the leading Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress [(INC)], suddenly found doors were opening for them in Washington. Frozen funding was resumed.’

The essential prevailing political reasoning was one of inevitability. It was argued that Iraq and the decisive tackling of its supposed WMD issue, more or less whatever the intelligence picture of the precise nature of the threat confronted, would have to be undertaken sooner or later. What would need to be done in the future might as well be done now ran the prevailing reasoning. Constellations of location, space and time considerations emerged. Executing the desired policy against Iraq, not least following soon in the wake of the recent ‘defeat’ of the Taliban in nearby Afghanistan, and while substantial US military forces and matériel were already deployed geographically close to Iraq in the South Asia/Middle East Gulf region, resonated. This was not least in pragmatic managerial and organisational terms.

However, the UK case for tackling Iraq was presently undeveloped. It was not ready at this early stage in the run-up to war. Nor was it yet sufficiently ready for a future risk to be conflated with a threat that was supposed to present an immediate danger/crisis, in terms of the underlying conceptualisation driving the ‘responsive’ pre-emptive policy trying to be pushed politically. In April 2002, a UK Government decision to publish evidence against Iraq was delayed. This was due to the body of evidence, based on sanitised intelligence sources and UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) intelligence assessments, arguably not yet being compelling enough, either quantitatively and/or qualitatively. Already existing intelligence, available from older and better-developed/vetted sources, appears not to have provided the case wanting to be established with enough political weight and urgency (see below [2.6]). Further tasking got underway as more, new, and indeed hopefully publicly persuasive, intelligence had to be gathered. This extended to it even having to be more actively hunted by UK intelligence agencies. Significantly, some of the intelligence secrecy and control restrictions were commensurably eroded. Instructively, in its report of September 2003, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) later claimed the reason for not publishing a dossier in March 2002 was ‘because the time was not right to produce either a document on the WMD capabilities of four countries including Iraq or on the Iraqi capability alone. The 24 September [2002] dossier was a new piece of work, produced by the JIC Chairman, based on earlier material and new intelligence.’ This observation simultaneously
provides an interesting insight into the JIC ‘process’ at the time. As a former Secretary to the JIC, Michael Herman, had catalogued in 2001 concerning how the JIC operated:

It is misleading to see JIC assessment as just the work of a committee, or a principal committee sitting over its subsidiary London committees, the Current Intelligence Groups (CIG). It has always been serviced by a central staff who do the important drafting and effectively lead the system, sometimes short-circuiting committee procedures and producing items direct for senior readers.41

Prolonging the electronics metaphor, did any ‘short-circuiting’ during the run-up to the war in Iraq cause the ‘fuses’ in the JIC system to become essentially blown – namely in the form of people (agents) bypassing formal mechanisms and machinery (structures) in high tempo and condensed space operating environments? The methods employed by some of the people acting within and in close proximity to the JIC could point to at least some of the less desirable outcomes observed later in terms of the handling and presentation of intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD at the important producer-consumer nexus. This also concerned the handling of the badly laundered information that was eventually disseminated to the public through the notorious British dossiers. Intelligence sanitisation processes, together with validation processes, were badly skewed. In one instance of direct producer-customer interaction, for example, the Butler Report provided some enlightening insights:

… As it happened, the Chief of SIS had a meeting with the Prime Minister on 12 September [2002] to brief him on SIS operations in respect of Iraq. At this meeting, he briefed the Prime Minister on each of SIS’s main sources including the new source on trial. He told us that he had underlined to the Prime Minister the potential importance of the new source and what SIS understood his access to be; but also said that the case was developmental and that the source remained unproven. Nevertheless, it may be that, in the context of the intense interest at that moment in the status of Iraq’s prohibited weapons programmes, and in particular continuing work on the dossier, this concurrence of events caused more weight to be given to this unvalidated new source than would normally have been the case.42

Arguably, the JIC itself was by now increasingly reflecting an antiquated structure akin to a relic dating from a different era, the Cold War. Worse, in the contemporary increasingly globalised early 21st century circumstances in which it was now being
forced to operate, it was being substantially stretched. While it had to consider a wider range and volume of sharply contrasting intelligence material of varying quality, which also had to meet political – rather than deliberative - requirements, its processes simultaneously had to be accelerated.

Eventually, the JIC essentially became overextended. It was operating well beyond its conventional capabilities and its proper, as well as traditionally intended, functioning. There were also some prevailing worries about the extent of foreign liaison partner participation in the JIC (see Chapter 4 [7.0], above). These concerns were raised in 2005 by the commentator Dan Plesch, who claimed that: ‘Some former JIC staff and chairs have told me that they consider that it has become more and more difficult for the UK to think independently and to reject United States-sourced intelligence for fear of offending the Americans…’ However, he continued: ‘Others … say that since JIC meetings have two parts – one open to foreigners and another … closed, there is no cause for concern.’ Although, the precise role of the JIC, in the overall decision- and policy-making processes in the UK during the run up to the war in Iraq, continued to be a focus of interest (see below [2.3]).

[2.3]: They who seek… find?

Overall, it was readily apparent that some UK-US agreement did exist regarding the intelligence assessments on Iraq. For instance, as the later Robb-Silberman Commission report remarked: ‘For its part, the British Joint Intelligence Committee assessed, as did the [US National Intelligence Estimates] NIE, that the aluminum tubes, with some modifications, would be suitable for use in a centrifuge, but noted that there was no definitive intelligence that the tubes were destined for the nuclear program.’ However, the UK-US agreement was not complete. Differences were most sharply delineated when it came to the specifics encountered at (and within) the micro/narrower levels of analysis into which intelligence liaison relations can be disaggregated. Moreover, differences became more apparent when intelligence was analysed (i) beyond the competencies (especially technical) and (ii) beyond the primary business (or ‘INT’) focus of the intelligence agency involved in conducting the analysis. As former Australian intelligence officer Andrew Wilkie noted: ‘Even in Australia the trust usually placed in the CIA was abandoned when it came to the aluminum tubes story.’

UK-US intelligence differences emerged early on. Some of these persisted over time, although they were increasingly subject to being ‘tidied’ into the background at the macro/higher levels. Convergence was the dominant theme. This was intended to help reach more UK-US agreement at the ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels. Indeed, at these latter levels, both within each of the UK and US, as well as between them, intelligence and security reach excesses and deficits
increasingly featured in the overall reach balances being struck. In March 2002, CIA Director George Tenet reportedly claimed US intelligence had detected ‘contacts and linkages’ between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. This was something US politicians, such as US Vice-President Dick Cheney, seized upon. According to Woodward, ‘Former [US] president Gerald R. Ford said in an embargoed interview in July 2004 that… he agreed with former secretary of state Colin L. Powell’s assertion that Cheney developed a “fever” about the threat of terrorism and Iraq. “I think that’s probably true.”’ As Paul Pillar, the former US National Intelligence Council (NIC) official responsible for the Middle East region, later observed:

The issue of possible ties between Saddam and al Qaeda was especially prone to the selective use of raw intelligence to make a public case for war. In the shadowy world of international terrorism, almost anyone can be “linked” to almost anyone else if enough effort is made to find evidence of casual contacts, the mentioning of names in the same breath, or indications of common travels or experiences. Even the most minimal and circumstantial data can be adduced as evidence of a “relationship”, ignoring the important question of whether a given regime actually supports a given terrorist group and the fact that relationships can be competitive or distrustful rather than cooperative.

On both sides of the Atlantic, much scepticism remained concerning these claims in the intelligence communities. According to a US official in early February 2003, ‘…drawing such a conclusion [official Iraq-al-Qaeda links] from Mr al-Zarkawi’s presence in Baghdad was “an inferential leap”.’ UK intelligence as a whole was especially critical of such links, and instead decided to focus their efforts on Iraqi WMD. Early on, at least, it appeared that a far more compelling case - in the style of a lawyer seeking argument/case-shoring evidence, rather than an intelligence officer searching for any further potential investigative leads - could be made on the issue.

Over time, UK intelligence continued to remain sceptical of the weak alleged links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. As the Butler Report later observed: ‘LINKS BETWEEN AL QAIDA AND THE IRAQI REGIME: 42. The JIC made it clear that the Al Qaida-linked facilities in the Kurdish Ansar al Islam area [of northern Iraq] were involved in the production of chemical and biological agents, but that they were beyond the control of the Iraqi regime. (Paragraph 479); 43. The JIC made clear that, although there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaida, there was no evidence of co-operation. (Paragraph 484).’ The WMD disarmament argument appeared to have more mileage. Unfortunately, the Iraq-WMD-linked route was
subsequently proved to be just as bankrupt as the Iraq and al-Qaeda/terrorism-linked route.\textsuperscript{54}

By early 2002, the UK was keen to know more. Current high-level US thinking on Iraq was sought. In these early stages of the eventual run-up to war, UK and US political and intelligence co-ordination and liaison on the issue of Iraq was arguably lacking. Prior to 9/11, SIS and CIA annually held a summit meeting at various locations. In early 2001, it was held in Bermuda. After 9/11 and during early 2002, however, Tenet was reportedly ‘too busy’ to have another such conference with UK intelligence. Tenet’s reluctance was suggestive that liaison with UK intelligence at this time was arguably not the priority, or indeed so important, or useful, in terms of the sources and other intelligence which could be exchanged. The UK-US intelligence interactions could be left to those that were routine at the more regularised, micro/lower levels of operation. By early July 2002, the UK reportedly urgently requested a meeting with the CIA. This suggested UK hunger for more intelligence input on a range of issues, including US intentions and the latest intelligence the US had on Iraq. After the apparent ‘insistence’ of SIS, eventually a summit meeting was held with the CIA at their headquarters in Langley. Blair appears to have tasked Sir Richard Dearlove (‘C’), the Chief of SIS, with finding out the Bush administration’s current position on the issue of Iraq.\textsuperscript{55}

Intelligence from that SIS-CIA meeting was soon forthcoming. On 23 July 2002, Downing Street foreign policy aide, Matthew Rycroft, sent to David Manning, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser - and to other select UK officials on a restricted list - the so-called ‘secret Downing Street memo’. On intelligence it stated that:

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC [US National Security Council] had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record…\textsuperscript{56}

The future did not augur well. By late 2002, it was clear that intelligence was increasingly irrelevant. Such a scenario was also suggestive of the legitimate basis for conducting intelligence activities becoming increasingly perverted, and intelligence was instead emerging as an entity that could be ‘picked and mixed’ to fit the prevailing political desires. This was apparent after reportedly ‘the CIA … made a major intelligence breakthrough on Iraq’s nuclear program [when] Naji Sabri, Iraq’s
foreign minister... made a deal to reveal Iraq’s military secrets to the CIA.’ Tyler Drumheller, Europe division chief for the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO), until his retirement in 2005, headed up the operation: ‘“This was a very high inner circle of Saddam Hussein. Someone who would know what he was talking about ... He told us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction program...”’ Drumheller continued: ‘“The policy was set... The war in Iraq was coming. And they [the policymakers] were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the policy.” ... Once they learned what it was the source had to say — that Saddam Hussein did not have the capability to wage nuclear war or have an active WMD program, Drumheller says, “They stopped being interested in the intelligence.”’

Later, he remarked: ‘Eventually I had to accept that nothing we said or did was going to change the administration’s collective mind.’

A worrying paradox was emerging. Indeed, this scenario also made it all the more ironic that the case for war would try to be built on intelligence ‘evidence’. At least intelligence would give the war a veneer of respectability and seeming legitimacy publicly – or so it was hoped. Publics, through the conduit of the generally passive and uninformed mainstream media, are arguably somewhat readily seduced by the presentation of ‘secret’ intelligence, which can only be taken at face-value. Its full veracity can rarely be challenged by those ‘not in the know’ and excluded from the ‘inner ring(s) of secrecy’. Strategic differences were also a factor. The Downing Street memo clearly expressed London’s concern that ‘... on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences...’. Another marketing strategy, or at least some capitulation, would have to be devised to prevent this state of affairs from occurring.

WMD featured prominently in the US National Strategy of September 2002. Globalised security issues were becoming increasingly integrated (or conflated). The early uncertainty surrounding the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD was not missed, however, with reporters noting in September 2002 that: ‘Tony Blair... has until now insisted that the UK and US do not know the state of Iraq’s weapons capability because United Nations inspectors have not been allowed into the country for the past four years...’ Moreover, towards the end of December 2002, there were still some concerns emanating from the UK intelligence community that the US intelligence community was perhaps not sharing to the fullest extent. According to an unnamed senior British official: ‘We know [of] material which is unaccounted for... But we have not got a definite site, a grid reference, where we can say Saddam is hiding it...’ Reflecting some of the continuing wider uncertainties, as well as some of the ambiguity discernable within UK-US intelligence liaison relations as they were being conducted in real-time situations, the official maintained: ‘If the US
administration does indeed have that kind of specifics, it has not been passed on to us. The main problem is known to us all. After all, it was Paul Wolfowitz ... who said, “Iraq isn’t a country where we’ve had human intelligence for years”.

The UK and US intelligence agencies now, at least in theory, had to establish more clearly the status of supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes. This had to be accomplished without (at this stage) what is believed to have been essentially one of their previously most useful and reliable sources of information (despite the earlier political dismissals), namely the UN weapons inspectors. When UN weapons inspectors were later re-introduced into Iraq in November 2002, under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, arguably they were then essentially not helped by the US and the UK, frustrating them from performing to their fullest potential (see below [2.4/2.6]).

In political terms, the selection of Dr Hans Blix to head up the renewed weapons inspections was particularly unfortunate. In the eyes of some critical decision-makers, especially in the US, Blix had already failed to impress vis-à-vis the issue of Iraq and its arms inspections. This had occurred when he had previously held the post of head of the IAEA from 1981-1997, during the period when Iraq’s clandestine extended nuclear programme had subsequently been exposed after the first Gulf War in 1991. As Drumheller noted: ‘This general view developed that the inspectors were a bunch of clowns, which wasn’t true. The inspectors are very serious guys, and they actually did an effective job -- not perfect, but they were pretty effective. But the intelligence that was coming in was saying that there aren’t any weapons, the actual hard intelligence.’ Politically, however, these findings were discounted.

Ultimately, UK and US intelligence were under pressure. They felt somewhat obligated to provide (or in ‘Whitehall/mandarin-speak’, deliver) evidence to meet, and indeed surpass, the ‘burden of proof’ for justifying the war. This was done in order to help bolster the grand aims of the hard ‘shock and awe rollback’ political regime change case (pervaded by a counter-proliferation paradigm), originating in particularly strong terms from Washington. This was rather than focussing to a greater extent on a softer ‘containment and then gradual rollback’ disarmament case (influenced by a greater and wider encompassing non-proliferation paradigm), which was more favoured in other countries’ capitals. The counter-proliferation paradigm was in the ascendency.

In fact, perhaps more debatable is whether a ‘burden of proof’ really was actually needed. This was given that military action was essentially looking, and arguably was becoming, increasingly ‘inevitable’ as time leading up to the launch of the war (in the narrow window available) rapidly progressed. Indeed, on a perceived
stagnant issue, where stalemate had prevailed for some time, any form of kinetic was demanded. This course of action was essentially followed whatever the precise circumstances. Intelligence resources in both the UK and US were becoming too overburdened in an unhelpful and overly narrow direction.

In the end, adopting this approach, and trying to fulfil all these requirements at once, proved to be far too ambitious. Disconnects in several areas in both the UK and US, as well as between them, emerged compellingly. The burden of responsibility being placed upon individual UK and US intelligence, as well as on more joint UK-US shared intelligence, was too great. Later, in January 2004 in a spirited defence of UK intelligence, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and foreign policy adviser to UK PM John Major, tried to contextualise the dilemmas UK intelligence had encountered. He rallied against ‘unreasonable expectations’, declaring that ‘Intelligence agencies are no more immune to error than other human organisations.’ Drawing a valid contrast between the UK and US, he continued by noting that: ‘The Americans believe that truth emerges from a dialectical clash of opinions... The British, on the other hand, try to reach a consensus among interested parties. Their instrument is the Joint Intelligence Committee [JIC]...’ Indeed, as Braithwaite also remarked, providing some further insights into the JIC process and how it operates: ‘The result is often a bland lowest common denominator, which does not make exciting reading. One minister remarked that he found JIC assessments “very boring”. And a colleague said they were “very unhelpful” on the subject. I took it all as a compliment. The alternative is worse: the risk identified by [former Chairman of JIC, Sir Percy] Cradock [is] that “the analysts become courtiers, whereas their proper function is to report their findings, almost always unpalatable, without fear or favour.”’ In Braithwaite’s view, and equally supported by the findings of this case study,

…the JIC’s real failure seems to have been that it fell straight into Cradock’s trap. It stepped outside its traditional role. It entered the prime minister’s magic circle. It was engulfed in the atmosphere of excitement which surrounds all decision-making in a crisis. It went beyond assessment to become part of the process of making, advocating and implementing policy. That was bound to undermine the objectivity which is the main justification for its existence.

Both UK and US intelligence capabilities and capacities, together with the sources they were each variously and overly relying upon, were being stretched too far.

In private, this intelligence overstretch was something that was dawning on US
Secretary of State Colin Powell. This was especially as he later tried to put together his 5 February 2003 presentation for the UN Security Council (see below [2.4]). In the days before that presentation, rather than the verification of the intelligence being the dominant mode, rejection was instead. As he and his secret review team checked and decided which supporting intelligence to include and remove from the draft presentation to the UNSC, Powell at one stage reportedly got so exasperated that he declared: ‘I’m not reading this. This is bullshit.’ His case appeared to be (and was) being built on increasingly shaky ground.

Worse was to come. At the launch of the UK dossier of 24 September 2002, critically Blair did not articulate any ambiguity in the case. As former Australian intelligence analyst Wilkie argued, again demonstrating the extent of allied Western intelligence convergence, as well as the commensurate haemorrhaging of adequate intelligence tradecraft and management techniques: ‘Most often the deceit lay in the way Washington, London and Canberra deliberately skewed the truth by taking the ambiguity out of the issue... On balance the strong, unambiguous language contained in the case for war seemed more the work of salespeople than professional intelligence officers.’ In *Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government*, essential caveats appeared to be suppressed. Indeed, as part of the UK’s striving to make a compelling, not only a convincing, disarmament case, Blair announced that Saddam Hussein’s ‘WMD program is active, detailed and growing. The policy of containment is not working...’ However, it was Blair’s forceful ‘Foreword’ to the dossier – including passages such as: ‘...Saddam Hussein is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon the region, and the stability of the world...’ - which was particularly problematic for the case Blair *et al* were trying to make.

The dossier featured centrally. Notably, it was judged by Wilkie as a ‘key building block for the case, not least because of its timing and scope.’ This was unfortunate, and would continue to bedevil Blair *et al* into the future. Not least, this came as making a credible disarmament case continued to collapse under the weight of (or in danger of being hoist by) its own petard-like claims. As the *Butler Report* later revealed, there was evidence of UK-US liaison as the dossier was compiled: ‘In preparing the dossier, the UK consulted the US.’ To help their premier ally, based on sanitised information acquired during a unilateral ‘fact-finding’ mission they had recently undertaken (see below [2.6]): ‘The CIA advised caution about any suggestion that Iraq had succeeded in acquiring uranium from Africa, but agreed that there was evidence that it had been sought.’

Senior Iraqi officials publicly dismissed the September dossier. Blair’s launch announcement was also termed by Lt. Gen. Amir Sadi, an adviser to Saddam
Hussein, as ‘a hodgepodge of half-truths, lies and naïve allegations.’ But was this Iraqi rejection a ‘double-cross’? During October 2002, the CIA released a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) document, also including references to Iraq and uranium from Niger. However, some persisting CIA uncertainty was suggested with the qualification in the NIE that the CIA ‘cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.’ The shadows of something rather more sinister within international intelligence liaison relationships, as well as the extent and consequences of their important overlap, was suggested. This was together with the (rarely flawless) collaborative impact these activities can stimulate. Overall, the Australian WMD inquiry later was critical of the UK and US dossiers, noting that:

Both the US and UK documents, as published in September/October 2002, presented an unequivocal and uncontested view of Iraq’s possession of WMD and its willingness to use them. This view did not recognise the gaps in the intelligence, the problematic nature of much of the new intelligence or the uncertainties and disputes within the agencies about what the intelligence meant. Taken together, the omissions and changes constituted an exaggeration of the available intelligence, since established as an exaggeration of the facts.

Again, the ‘irrelevance’ of intelligence was highlighted. This was most apparent when that intelligence was trying to be evaluated in the face of a ‘fixed’ policy. Intelligence that did not shore up the argument being advanced by the Bush administration, such as those sources that claimed there were not any Iraqi WMD, was discarded. Or perhaps, alternatively - or even in addition - the latter type of intelligence was in fact very relevant. Was it seized upon to fulfil the ‘private’ judgement by Dick Cheney, for example, that Iraq was ‘doable’? As Drumheller later observed, ‘[the] idea that we could overwhelm [the Iraqis and Iraq] with our technology really caught on.’ Unfortunately, matériel - such as satellites, ‘smart bombs’, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - can only go so far before their discernable limits are reached. Arguably the ‘human dimension’ was overly discounted, together with other cultural factors. Acontextualisation and streaks of arrogance also prevailed. Both of the above scenarios resonate, however, offering an effective reflection of the reality.

Considerable uncertainty remained. Looking increasingly prescient from the later vantage point of 2008, towards the end of February 2003 a news report claimed that: ‘…Experts can spin out countless … scary scenarios [concerning Iraq]. Kurdish parties could be tempted to push for independence. The country could split between
Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Or neighbor Iran could meddle. “On some days, I get up thinking this will be relatively quick and we will be left with a pretty good situation afterwards,” says one U.S. official involved in the planning. “On other days, I wake up and think, ‘Holy sh - -.’” 85 Several analysts and experts in the UK and US intelligence communities could not agree amongst themselves, especially when delving more widely and deeply. This was of little value to the politicians on either side of the Atlantic, especially regarding the case they were trying to build and present to the public. Indeed, it was unhelpful and frustrating. 86 Discernibly, a sizeable quantity of scepticism, ambiguity and a lack of clarity persisted amongst serving and former intelligence officials and more technically inclined WMD experts. This was particularly evident when President Bush’s televised address to the US nation on 7 October 2002 was criticised. Meanwhile, it appeared according to reports, and supported by the findings of the later Australian Parliamentary inquiry concerning supposed Iraqi WMD, that ‘officials in the CIA, FBI and energy department are being put under intense pressure to produce reports which back the administration’s line…” 87 However, the persisting US and UK intelligence differences over the Iraq and uranium claim during 2002 and later beyond (see below [2.6]) contributed towards, at least on this earlier occasion, the CIA successfully requesting that such references were removed from Bush’s address before it was delivered. 88 However, the luxury of time for observing such nuanced intelligence considerations was not to last for long.

[2.4]: Trying the United Nations route:
On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed UNSCR 1441. 89 The extent of sufficiently existing international consensus amongst the members in the UNSC on the issue of ‘containing’ and disarming Iraq of WMD was demonstrated. Later, however, both the UK and US failed to capitalise upon this earlier ‘success’ at the UN in order to secure a second unifying UNSCR. A second ‘insurance policy’ UNSCR could have more explicitly sanctioned WMD disarmament and more firmly legitimised military intervention in Iraq, rather than more controversially relying just on UNSCR 1441. In its text, UNSCR 1441 recalled ‘repeated warning of “Serious Consequences” for continued violations... Holding Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, the Security Council … decided to afford it a “final opportunity to comply” with its disarmament obligations [within 45 days], while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full and verified completion of the disarmament process established by [UNSC] resolution 687 (1991)…” 90 Blix, as chief UN weapons inspector, took charge of the new round of UN investigations (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission - UNMOVIC). 91 UK and US intelligence supplied some information to
‘assist’ with the UN inspections. This was forthcoming as the inspectors returned to Iraq as stipulated by UNSCR 1441.92

Enhanced information gathering was wanted. Perhaps showing US intelligence ‘desperation’ at this time for further intelligence, it was observed that: ‘The United States has signalled that it will reward any Iraqi scientists coming forward with information about Saddam Hussein’s clandestine weapons programmes with sanctuary... “The key to the next few months is getting a couple of good defectors,” [noted] one [US] official.93 These reports also suggested the arguably potentially ‘dangerous’ lengths, extending to overreach, intelligence would need to go to in order to successfully deliver to its tasked requirements. For example, hinted was the extent of arguably relying too heavily on potentially untrustworthy defector and dissident sources, such as was eventually witnessed most notably with regard to ‘CURVEBALL’.94 However, such a situation was eventually discounted by the Butler Report, at least with regard to the performance of UK intelligence: ‘We do not believe that over-reliance on dissident and émigré sources was a major cause of subsequent weaknesses in the human intelligence relied on by the UK.’95 Ultimately, did the presence of potentially untrustworthy sources in this context of an agenda set on regime change really matter? As already witnessed (see above [2.3]), not really.

More concerning for intelligence agencies, however, was the enhanced plausibility of the argument that they were increasingly losing control of their product. This included its associated handling, both vis-à-vis and by their customers. These concerns emerged especially as the product was being inputted on industrial scales into vast intelligence databases, such as the US Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (see Chapter 4 [10.0]), to which policy/decision-makers had their own secure access. This type of facilitator, enabling intelligence pooling, allowed consumers to conduct their own analysis and synthesise their own assessments. These activities extended beyond those conducted merely by the agencies and their traditionally skilled analysts, who, by contrast, were more inclined to exhibit tradecraft standards and qualities, as well as recognise their significance.96

In December 2002, UK and US intelligence came under some early criticism. While still facing some Iraqi intransigence, simultaneously the UK-US intelligence sharing with Blix was not as extensive as he would have liked. Further tensions were generated. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) also later found that ‘The rationale used by the Central Intelligence Agency for deciding what information to share with the United Nations was inherently subjective, inconsistently applied, and not well-documented...’97 The UK offered to give UN weapons inspectors Iraqi telephone conversations that had been intercepted at GCHQ, and hinted that the quantity of intelligence shared would increase. Arguably,
in harmony with their tasked agenda, this supply of information was provided in order to help bolster the overarching case-building attempts. However, doubts still remained concerning the supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes ‘evidence’. Those doubts also persisted, not least amongst the weapons inspectors themselves, concerning the quantity and quality of the intelligence held by both the UK and the US. 98 Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw pointed to the UK essentially embracing ‘America’s “axis of evil” philosophy’. This development came when the UK appeared to move closer - at least politically - towards the US position on the issue of WMD at the macro/broad levels of their interactions. 99 The counter-proliferation paradigm continued to burgeon.

The descent towards war was gaining momentum. Early in January 2003, ahead of his final deadline of 27 January, Blix gave an interim status report to the UNSC. He observed that no Iraqi WMD or ‘smoking guns’ had been found. Remarkably (or perhaps not given the eventual outcome), this was despite all of the UK and US intelligence efforts to try and provide those ‘smoking guns’ - conducted by variously assisting Blix through providing, if not UK-US intelligence in its purist and most actionable form, at least information, regarding sites where those weapons should be discovered. Nevertheless, several questions remained unanswered and it was felt that the Iraqis needed to be more co-operative. 100 The UN weapons inspectors’ ambiguity concerning Iraqi WMD persisted over time. The US was not convinced by the UN/IAEA weapons inspections results. 101 However, in the intelligence world, as former US intelligence officer Frederick Harrison, writing later in the Defense Intelligence Journal, has observed: ‘Sometimes, truth is discovered not by connecting dots, but by determining that there are none.’ 102 Rightly, the UN weapons inspectors were trying to be more discursive on the issue. They were acting more as a source of information and were trying to just present the facts so the facts could ‘speak for themselves’. This was rather than the weapons inspectors intending to make or support a specific case one way or the other regarding the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD. Ambiguity overall persisted.

UK and US intelligence efforts continued in the background. Both jointly and individually, the UK and US case building occurred in parallel to the UN weapons inspectors’ efforts. On 14 January 2003, the UK Government released another (the second) dossier. Blair again unambiguously claimed Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme was ‘active, detailed and growing…’ The conclusions of uncertainty so far reached by Blix et al, who were actually on the ground in Iraq - including visiting the suspected sites that were pointed to by the UK and US through the data they supplied (see above) - were thus contradicted. Blair meanwhile reiterated, with doubts suppressed: ‘The policy of containment is not working. The WMD
programme is not shut down. It is up and running.’ The available intelligence appeared to be (and was) being stretched. Similarly to the first dossier, the new dossier again sensational claimed that Iraq could deploy WMD in 45-minutes, Iraq had sought uranium from Africa, and that mobile biological weapon laboratories had been developed. Much to the CIA’s regret, and despite their prevailing doubts and best (albeit typically haphazard) efforts, the extent of inadequately controlled UK-US intelligence pooling on this issue was soon apparent. This was with the reference to the Niger yellowcake, and the British links to the claim, figuring in Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address (see below [2.6]).

Washington was similarly sceptical concerning the UN inspections. Reportedly, by 31 January, behind-the-scenes Bush saw war as ‘inevitable’. This was according to a ‘confidential memo’ by David Manning, Blair’s head foreign policy adviser, recording a Blair-Bush Oval Office meeting. Blair said he would ‘solidly’ back the US, while the second UN resolution would serve as an ‘insurance policy’. Back in the public domain, in a push for that second UNSC resolution, on 5 February 2003 US Secretary of State Colin Powell made his presentation to the UNSC. The presentation pulled together the mélange of UK and US ‘intelligence’ and ‘evidence’. This was intended to try and convince the UNSC members and international public opinion that the Iraqis were still not complying with UNSCR 1441. According to the case made, the Iraq WMD still existed along with related programmes. The source ‘CURVEBALL’ was again pivotal. This was particularly where Powell declared: ‘...One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents... The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one of these facilities... This defector is currently hiding in another country [Germany] with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will kill him if he finds him...’ As Drumheller later revealed in an interview with Der Speigel in early January 2007, CURVEBALL’s central role was particularly unfortunate for - at the least - German-US intelligence liaison relations. It is not too much of a stretch to observe that some British Intelligence operatives, given their professional views concerning CURVEBALL that have already been expressed, similarly would not have been impressed by this turn of events:

Drumheller: I had assured my German friends that [CURVEBALL] wouldn’t be in the speech. I really thought that I had put it to bed. I had warned the CIA deputy John McLaughlin that this case could be fabricated. The night before the speech, then CIA director George Tenet called me at home. I said: “Hey Boss, be careful with that German report. It’s supposed to be taken out. There are a lot of problems with that.” He said: “Yeah,
yeah. Right. Don’t worry about that.”

SPIEGEL: But it turned out to be the centerpiece in Powell’s presentation -- and nobody had told him about the doubts.

Drumheller: I turned on the TV in my office, and there it was. So the first thing I thought, having worked in the government all my life, was that we probably gave Powell the wrong speech. We checked our files and found out that they had just ignored it.

SPIEGEL: So the White House just ignored the fact that the whole story might have been untrue?

Drumheller: The policy was set…

At the UN, the US, and closely in train, the UK, tried to push their case for preemptive action against Iraq on the basis of the ‘evidence’ presented. Although many key UNSC members, such as France (headed by the former French-Algerian war veteran President Chirac), remained firmly unpersuaded. Significantly, this was despite having access to most of the same or similar intelligence, as well as to the sources shared in Powell’s recent presentation. Germany (at least publicly, and beyond the more cloistered intelligence world) and Russia (headed by the former KGB intelligence officer, President Putin) were also opposed, wanting more time for, and as repeatedly requested by, the UN weapons inspectors. High-level political relations with the US in particular, and by close association, with the UK, cooled considerably.

In February 2003, Katharine Gun, a translator working at GCHQ, leaked a memo. Detailed insights into UK and US intelligence interactions were soon forthcoming. By 2 March, the memo appeared in The Observer newspaper. As a consequence of the leaking activity, an insight was granted into the extent and nature of UK-US intelligence liaison then taking place in the SIGINT UKUSA arrangement. The leak again demonstrated the lengths – extending to the allegedly illegal, at least in terms of international law - that both the UK and US intelligence communities were going to in order to deliver their tasked outcomes. Collective UK-US intelligence ‘desperation’ for any leads and useful intelligence was again suggested. The document leaked appears to have been an ‘informal’ approach, in the form of an e-mail/memo from Frank Koza, Defense Chief of Staff (Regional Targets) at the US NSA. (The judgement that this was an ‘informal’ communication stems from the passage in the text, ‘… I suspect that you’ll be hearing more along these lines in formal channels…’) Dated 31 January 2003, the communication was forwarded
around GCHQ essentially requesting UK assistance in monitoring six members of the UN Security Council. These parties’ votes would be crucial in order to support the second resolution sanctioning military intervention in Iraq. The telephones of officials from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria, Guinea and Pakistan were monitored in an intelligence ‘surge’ seemingly violating diplomatic protocols, such as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This enabled the UK and US to determine those countries’ voting intentions and positions, thus aiding the UK and US in advance of subsequent UNSC resolution negotiations.115 The Iraq war ‘insurance policy’ was proving increasingly elusive.

Revelations continued. During February 2004, the UK Government decided not to prosecute Gun under the Official Secrets Act. Officials decided to let the issue quietly fade away into the background, especially as the precise ‘legality’ of the Iraq War would be increasingly (and uncomfortably) opened up for examination in court. The former Cabinet minister and International Development Secretary Clare Short somewhat, albeit temporarily, thwarted that strategy. She also made some further (but vaguer) allegations concerning the alleged UK and, at least by implication, US bugging of the office of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York. She claimed to have read transcripts of his telephone conversations.116 The origins and methods of intelligence and intelligence-gathering were once again exposed publicly in a manner that both the UK and US Governments were keen to quickly tidy away. The UK Government was determined not to allow the revelations of one intelligence employee and her conscience, and one former Cabinet minister - whom Blair denounced as ‘deeply irresponsible’117 - jeopardise overall UK-US intelligence liaison relations.

The US and GCHQ were concerned by the Gun leak. However, the subsequent investigation and the speed at which the source of the leak was located and dealt with was helpful vis-à-vis the management of relations.118 The overall damage to UK-US intelligence relations from these episodes was not severe, and they did not impact overwhelmingly on the outcomes and effects of the liaison. Episodes, such as these, of occasional compromise on each side, are anticipated as part of the trade-offs of such a close intelligence relationship. GCHQ in turn, for example, is reportedly concerned about the rapid turnover of NSA staff.119 As a result, there is the contingency of effective mechanisms in place to assist with a quick and thorough post-‘incident’ investigation existing on both sides.120 Additionally in the Gun case, the ‘leak’ investigation was considerably aided by the integrity of the ‘source’ quickly identifying herself to the relevant authorities, and by the fact that her actions were ascribable to those of genuine conscience rather than political maliciousness. Significantly, the ‘leak’ ultimately did not detrimentally affect UK or US national
Chiming with the findings of the subsequent inquiries, revelations about the intelligence agencies were politically helpful to government. By letting the public and media dwell over time more on issues pertaining to (at least alleged) ‘intelligence failure’, was arguably preferred. This was determined by the tightly drawn remits for the inquiries, such as that conducted specifically into the death of Dr David Kelly (see below [2.6]). Moreover, this approach was adopted because encouraging concentration on alleged ‘intelligence failure’ was an effective way of diverting (through distraction tactics) unwanted attention away from the politicians/policy-makers and their conduct. This was as well as diverting ‘heat’ away from other politically-charged issues, such as the ‘legality’ of the war. As Wilkie cogently argued, challenging the hegemony of ‘intelligence failure’ claims: ‘I emphasise that the [intelligence] agencies were producing measured assessments and that all it took to distort their work decisively was for politicians and their advisers to omit a few words like “uncorroborated evidence suggests” and insert a word or two like “massive”… In essence, the politicians turned uncertainty into certainty. Bush, Blair and [Australian Prime Minister John] Howard also chose to use the truth selectively, for example by regularly playing up the risk of WMD terrorism but neglecting to point out that the likelihood of such an attack is low.’

US non-proliferation expert, Joseph Cirincione, was similarly critical of the inquiries and their findings: ‘First, by limiting the scope of their investigations to the narrow issues of intelligence policy and procedures, the commission and the committee fail to examine the larger policy failure. It was failure at the strategic level, not the operational or tactical, that caused US officials to underestimate the terrorist threat in the first instance, and then target the wrong country for attack in the second instance.’ He continued: ‘Second, in the name of political unity, they both stop short of the logical completion of their investigations: they pull their punches, and find no one is to blame. Or rather, they blame everyone, and thus no one… The result is … long on organisational diagrams and short on accountability.’

US political scientist, Ian Shapiro meanwhile observed that: ‘The intelligence “failure” over WMD masked larger institutional and political failures on Capitol Hill. In view of what we have since learned of dissenting views within the intelligence community, and field reports that were at variance with the administration’s public claims about the threat Iraq actually posed, the questions have to be put: Where were the checks and balances? Where was the loyal opposition? In the absence of a vigorous opposition it
is easy for governments to get people to support war...' In his assessment, former US intelligence practitioner Drumheller pithily observed, ‘... the White House deliberately tried to draw a cloak over its own misjudgments by shining a light on ours.’

The spotlight was additionally diverted from scrutinizing the vitally important producer-consumer relationship. More muted departures in protest due to the dubious legality of the war, notably that of Elizabeth Wilmshurst from her post as Deputy Legal Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in March 2003, were arguably potentially more damaging to the UK Government. This increased the pressure exerted on the politicians and focussed the spotlight in a more concentrated manner on their flimsy disarmament case for war, which was more rooted in perceived Iraqi intent in the long-term rather than its actual immediate capabilities. Still enduring into 2007, palpable dissatisfaction concerning these issues remained apparent in the UK.

The Iraq-terrorism link continued to be probed in the immediate pre-war phase. In February 2003, the UK and US intelligence agencies were still struggling to establish links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While it was an integral part of their multiple-branched investigations, UK and US intelligence ‘closure’ on this issue remained elusive. Reportedly, they remained ‘unconvinced by the allegations made by senior US politicians’, such as Cheney. Reports that Jordanian Abu Musaab al-Zarkawi ‘known to have worked on al-Qaeda’s [WMD] programme in Afghanistan’ had visited Baghdad for ‘medical treatment’ around May 2002, were arguably too circumstantial and lacking in substance to draw direct links to Saddam Hussein. This was at least the case for (the majority of) intelligence practitioners. US politicians, however, were seemingly more convinced by such links. Crucially, more short-term revelations (or intelligence ‘blips’), needed to be put into better overall and longer-term perspective - especially given that Iraq had been a long-term target of UK-US intelligence interest. It, therefore, hardly formed a ‘new’ issue; nor was it a subject void of plenty of essential contextualisation opportunities. However, none of these were properly or meaningfully seized. Events then rapidly overtook the UK and US intelligence agencies and diplomats. After the persisting failure to secure a second UNSC resolution, by 20 March 2003 the overt dimension of the US-UK-led war on Iraq – OPERATION ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’ - was underway.

[2.5]: It’s war!

In the wake of Rumsfeld’s kinetic ‘shock and awe’, the invasion of Iraq progressed quickly. But where were the Iraqi WMD? Despite some Iraqi surrenders, by 17 April 2003, it was observed that ‘no firm evidence of weapons production has emerged… “Our experience to date is that the [Iraqi] people we have... are sticking
to the party line, that there have been no [WMD] programmes since 1991”, remarked an unspecified official.\(^{134}\) The 1990s Iraq ‘containment policy’, on the whole, had appeared to work after all. Towards the end of May 2003, one of the leading proponents for war, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, conceded that Iraqi WMD might have already been destroyed prior to the war.\(^{135}\) This was a line of argument that former chief UN weapons inspector and US Marine Scott Ritter had been trying to put across forcefully prior to the war:\(^{136}\) ‘President Bush is force-feeding Americans “a whole bunch of oversimplified horse manure,” [Scott Ritter] told them boldly. “None of what you are being told remotely resembles the truth. Facts do matter, and it is time that you, the American people, start demanding the facts.”…’\(^{137}\) Postwar he could feel somewhat vindicated. Indeed, he later even dubbed this episode as ‘an intelligence success and [a] policy failure’. He explained his premise: ‘The job given to the CIA, and the job assumed by MI6, was that of regime change. In April 2003 they succeeded. The regime of Saddam Hussein was eliminated…’\(^{138}\)

Drumheller also challenged the intelligence ‘failure’ allegations. He later observed that: “It just sticks in my craw every time I hear them say it’s an intelligence failure. … This was a policy failure”…’ Overall, as already argued, it was partially an intelligence failure - spearheaded by the US and in close train the UK, both jointly and individually. However, clearly the presence of the policy failure dimension undoubtedly helped to have knock-on ramifications onto the intelligence world and the nature of its interactions. Thereby, the policy failure also contributed substantially to the subsequent intelligence failure encountered, and therefore could quite legitimately take the lead in being the most flawed dimension.\(^{139}\) Continuing, Drumheller reportedly said that he did not ‘think it mattered very much to the administration what the intelligence community had to say. “I think it mattered it if verified. This basic belief that had taken hold in the U.S. government that now is the time, we had the means, all we needed was the will”…’\(^{140}\)

UK and US intelligence held their breath. Over time, the UK and US Governments faced growing disquiet over the rationale for the Iraq war. This was especially marked in light of the supposed Iraqi WMD not having been located.\(^{141}\) By 17 April 2003, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, a US military spokesman, tried to contextualise: ‘…the hunt for evidence of WMD is “very much putting together pieces of a puzzle, one piece at a time, and when you see the shape of the one piece, you see how it may relate to the other pieces that are out there.”’\(^{142}\) Adopting this contextualisation approach was now – finally - deemed to be of value, as it suitably met the political requirements. However, such arguments did not convince.

Blame games started.\(^{143}\) Within the US intelligence community, the
CIA/Pentagon intelligence rivalries were emphasised, with each accusing the other of intelligence shortcomings and inaccuracies. The complicated and hostile politics amongst US intelligence bodies, including intense competition or ‘turf battles’ between the so-called ‘Cabal’ group of advisers and analysts based in the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans (OSP) - headed by Doug Feith - the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CIA, continued unabated in the context of Iraqi WMD intelligence fallout.

Indeed, there are several examples of ‘turf battles’ that have erupted over time within the US intelligence community. These also tie-in closely with the long-term enduring CIA/Pentagon intelligence ‘rivalries’, and each trying to attain some sort of intelligence ascendancy over one another - in, for instance, the specific area of HUMINT collection and processing. By 2006, the Pentagon did seem to have triumphed over a weakened CIA, damaged in the wake of the Iraq war intelligence ‘fallout’. The US intelligence ‘centre of gravity’ has therefore shifted away from the civilian intelligence agencies more to the military intelligence agencies. As US intelligence insider Mark Lowenthal has observed, highlighting how the US intelligence community operates: ‘The secretary of defense continues to control much more of the intelligence community on a day-by-day basis than does DNI [Director of National Intelligence]... At the same time, the secretary of defense is unlikely to have the same level of interest in intelligence as the DNI does. In fact, much of the responsibility for intelligence within DOD is delegated to the under-secretary of defense for intelligence (USDI), a relatively new office that was created in 2002.’

By February 2007, following the published findings of a Pentagon Inspector General investigation, reportedly ‘Senate Democrats and Republicans disagreed … over the meaning and importance of … [the] conclusion that a Pentagon policy office produced and gave senior policymakers “alternative intelligence assessments on Iraq and Al Qaida relations” that were “inconsistent” with the intelligence community’s consensus view in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq…’

Amid the fallout, UK-US strains were similarly apparent. In terms of UK-US relations and their interactions over Iraq, together with the Blair-claimed equal partnership, according to Jonathan Steele, The Guardian newspaper’s roving foreign affairs correspondent and columnist:

British officials were under no such illusions. “We weren’t plugged into the state department’s detailed planning exercise. We tried but couldn’t get into it. It was the first warning sign that we weren’t part of it,” one senior diplomat told me. In the words of another: “The UK supplied 10% of the invasion force. We provided 10% of the staff of the Coalition Provisional Authority. We had 10% of input into policy.” In the final weeks before the
invasion, the Pentagon wrested control of postwar planning away from the state department, leaving British ministers even more in the dark…\textsuperscript{150}

As Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London, Sir Lawrence Freedman had presciently observed in 1998, with an eye on Britain and revolution in military affairs (RMA) developments: ‘We can assume that [in the future] British foreign policy will still be tied to the United States and, like the Americans, will follow a line of limited liability but without lapsing into isolationism.’\textsuperscript{151} He continued: ‘If the Americans intervene in a particular conflict, it will be difficult for Britain to remain a spectator (although it may still opt for minimal participation)… As in the past, Britain’s force structure will be designed to find the minimum level sufficient to ensure access to high-level American decisionmaking…’\textsuperscript{152} Highlighting the most plausible form that the UK contribution/participation would take, which was exactly witnessed in relation to Iraq five years later in 2003, he maintained: ‘Immediate operational requirements will keep [Britain] focused on the infantry and Special Forces as well as seeing through established [defence and military] programs…’\textsuperscript{153}

As vocal criticism concerning Iraq gathered momentum, UK-US intelligence interactions were increasingly brought into focus. More worryingly for UK-US intelligence relations, as the UK liaised with varying effect with all of the different sparring US intelligence agencies, were the claims presented in media reports that ‘unreliable information had been passed to London as part of intelligence-sharing by American officials who had interviewed a defector recruited by the INC.’ However, some UK intelligence officers forcefully dismissed this claim considering it ‘to be unreliable and uncorroborated.’\textsuperscript{154} Another ‘season of inquiries’, similar to that witnessed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, was soon to be in the offing in both the UK and the US.

[2.6]: The aftermath - inquiries begin into what went wrong:
In June 2003, the US Congress decided to open an inquiry. The intelligence concerning supposed Iraqi WMD would be probed.\textsuperscript{155} Holes in the UK-US case for war continued to be exposed – not least the extent of alleged exaggeration by politicians. The embarrassing UK January 2003 ‘dodgy’ dossier, exposed as hastily and poorly compiled, was particularly criticised for using plagiarised content reportedly from a 12 year old PhD thesis,\textsuperscript{156} authored by an unaccredited ‘US-based expert on the Iraqi security services… and [it] contained elementary cut-and-paste errors.’\textsuperscript{157} Moreover, as University of Cambridge academic Glen Rangwala had quickly discovered soon after the dossier’s original publication, out of a total of 19 pages, pages 6 to 16 were ‘directly copied’, inclusive of the original grammatical errors.\textsuperscript{158} As evidence of supposed Iraqi WMD continued to elude discovery,
intelligence officers and agencies on both sides of the Atlantic went on the defensive. Damage limitation exercises were attempted.\textsuperscript{159} Intelligence had counter-productively been laundered in the public domain without necessary qualifiers and caveats included, and without the fuller complexities being sufficiently revealed or acknowledged. UK and US intelligence were dismayed.

The security situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. During June 2003, UN inspectors examined the looting of sensitive facilities, such as laboratories, in Iraq.\textsuperscript{160} A leaked Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, dating from September 2002, reportedly noted that there was ‘no absolute proof that Iraq had WMD’, adding fuel to the speculation and controversy over supposed Iraqi WMD.\textsuperscript{161} The so-called ‘45-minute claim’ was also increasingly discredited. The claim about Iraqi WMD being able to be deployed in 45 minutes was shown to be detrimentally over-simplified. The UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) decided to launch an inquiry into especially that claim.\textsuperscript{162} In July 2003, Blix also raised concerns about the ‘45-minute claim’.\textsuperscript{163} By July 2004, the Butler Report soberly concluded that: ‘The JIC should not have included the “45 minute” report in its assessment and in the Government’s [September 2002] dossier without stating what it was believed to refer to [that is, short-distance, battlefield weapons, rather than long range missiles]. The fact that the reference in the classified assessment was repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions that it had been included because of its eye-catching character.’\textsuperscript{164} Again, alluded to were the ‘mystique’ qualities attributed to intelligence, which could be conveniently relied upon for political purposes in tricky and complicated circumstances.

The FAC final report was more muted from an intelligence perspective. Concerning UK-US intelligence, the FAC report provided little enlightenment. The findings of the report suffered from the FAC not having access to classified intelligence material, and from the FAC lacking the ability to draw on and question senior UK intelligence personnel. The ISC did have that ability, but in its later investigation into intelligence concerning Iraq’s WMD, the issue of UK-US intelligence and their liaison barely featured.\textsuperscript{165} As foreign agents, US intelligence personnel were of course well beyond the scope of both these inquiries’ jurisdiction, and hence could not be summoned to contribute their potentially enlightening insights.

UN weapon inspector findings were similarly critical. In Blix’s final report presented to the UNSC he declared an ‘open verdict’ on supposed Iraqi WMD.\textsuperscript{166} This was another disarmament/non-proliferation case where ambiguity had trumped certainty. The quality of intelligence supplied by the US and UK to Blix was also criticised by him, noting that on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD there
remained ‘many unanswered questions’. Later Blix argued that he had encountered some unhelpful opposition from the Pentagon in Washington.

The UK political controversy concerning alleged political ‘editing’ or ‘sexing up’ of intelligence then broke into public view. No. 10 Downing Street denied pressure had been exerted on intelligence. Although they admitted that certain revisions had been needed in the drafting process of the September 2002 dossier. UK Minister of Defence Geoff Hoon later remarked to the UK ISC that at the time, after seeing a draft of the dossier, he felt that ‘his “reaction in a political sense was that I was concerned that this was insufficiently dramatic to make our case as strongly as I would have liked it to be made.”’ The role of the UK PM’s press chief, Alistair Campbell, in that process continued to be probed. Allegations made in a BBC report by BBC Defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan on the Today Radio 4 programme, about which the BBC refused to apologise to the UK Government, as well as (perhaps more provocatively) an article written by Gilligan that was published shortly afterwards in the Mail On Sunday newspaper, did not help. These allegations concerned the UK September 2002 dossier essentially being ‘sexed up’ by Campbell in particular, which brought the BBC into conflict with the UK Government. In his approximate allegations, Gilligan got close to the roots of what had gone ‘wrong’, and where, in the overall government machinery. However, his chosen focus and approach of more singling out and emphasising Campbell’s role was less beneficial - not least in his accusations being too over-simplified. This was especially apparent with critical dimensions such as the JIC’s role in the overall dossier drafting process, under the chairmanship of Sir John Scarlett, being more overlooked.

During early July 2003 the dispute escalated. Eventually the scientist Dr David Kelly - a former UN weapons inspector and important UK/global WMD expert – was identified as the BBC’s source, and not just confined to being solely the journalist Gilligan’s source. This sequence of events contributed to Kelly’s subsequent suicide on 18 July. His suicide compelled the UK Government to establish the Hutton Inquiry to investigate his death. Indeed, together with the FAC’s inquiry and the later ISC inquiry in September 2003, this inquiry was to form the second of four high profile official inquiries in the UK and US being conducted during 2003, probing the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD and associated matters.

Over the next series of weeks, several government ministers, civil servants and, perhaps more remarkably, intelligence officials, were called to give evidence at the Hutton Inquiry. Meanwhile, at least confined solely to the intelligence world at this early stage, there was already the postwar ‘withdrawal’ of some of the prewar intelligence by SIS due to its unreliability. However, Dearlove (‘C’) or Scarlett
(Chairman of the JIC) did not mention this development in their evidence to the Hutton Inquiry. Also suggesting the intelligence services’ withholding of some information from the intelligence producer-consumer/user relationship at this time - perhaps demonstrating somewhat of a breakdown of trust within the producer-consumer relationship in the UK - Blair also appeared to be unaware of such intelligence developments by not having been briefed by C on the issue. Instead Blair apparently – and arguably politically conveniently, some might claim - found out later in 2004 from the Butler Report that the intelligence had been withdrawn. According to a later anodyne comment by Blair’s official spokesman, the ‘security services … felt that this development was “too sensitive” to be made public.’  

Despite the release of several government documents and e-mails during the course of the Hutton inquiry, the final Hutton report, however, was widely perceived as a ‘white-wash.’ To much disappointment, it was felt that Hutton had perhaps been too harsh on the BBC, while keeping too narrowly to his remit (solely investigating the death of Dr Kelly). This was rather than roaming wider and including investigating the intelligence and political compiling of the case for war in the run-up to the Iraq invasion, and thus castigating the politicians further. Campbell also was exonerated of Gilligan’s earlier ‘sexing up’ allegations. Indeed, according to Campbell’s own diary entry of 7 July 2003 (released by Lord Hutton during the course of his inquiry), Campbell observed from a conversation that he had just held with the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) of the MoD, Sir Kevin Tebbit, that: ‘Kevin said the guy [Dr David Kelly] claimed he never mentioned me… Felt that maybe Gilligan just lied about the stuff about me … Again we should be saying the source was misrepresented by [Gilligan]…’ Although formally exonerated, Campbell’s role as ‘communicator-in-chief’ in charge of ‘presentation’ in the dossier process nevertheless still continued to provoke several unanswered questions. Unsurprisingly, the US intelligence dimension also was absent.

Storm clouds continued to gather. Throughout the summer of 2003, several questions remained concerning the supposed Iraqi WMD. The integrity of UK and US intelligence agencies, their analysis and assessment systems and the quality of their product, as well as (perhaps more concerningly) their respective relationships with foreign liaison services and the politicians (their customers/users), were all widely called into question. Together with the uncomfortable highlighting of these shortcomings publicly, many other questions, concerning the case for the war, were left completely unanswered or at most unsatisfactorily answered. Again the extent of uncertainty in UK and US intelligence circles concerning Iraqi WMD, and whether they would be deployed against coalition troops when attacking Iraq, was reportedly suggested in a UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) report entitled: Operations in Iraq 2003:
First Reflections.181 For battlespace ‘health and safety’ considerations, troops were issued with gas masks during the invasion of Iraq. On one plane of analysis, therefore, an argument could be made that, in the context of this perceived uncertainty, the invasion of Iraq was actually instead a potentially high-risk UK-US gamble. Although, the ambiguity - resulting from the absence of firmer evidence of actual Iraqi WMD, and indeed added to the reporting (both from intelligence and media sources) stating otherwise, and arguably more reliably countering the prevailing general flow of UK-US claims - could suggest that in the event the risks from supposed Iraqi WMD would actually be much lower. This last point accounts, at least in part, for the different Canadian response to the issue – notably its subsequent absence from the US ‘coalition of the willing’ that invaded Iraq in March 2003.182

The politicians’ credibility was similarly under challenge. Blair went on the defensive. As the UK Parliament Commons Liaison Committee questioned him on the issue in July 2003, he dismissed doubts concerning supposed Iraqi WMD claiming: ‘For me, the jury is not out at all.’183 Across the Atlantic, in his justification, Rumsfeld, in front of the US Senate Armed Service Committee, claimed: ‘The coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence in a dramatic new light – through the prism of our experience on 9/11.’184 It was time to wake-up and pursue the perceived real and projected US national security threats more vigorously, including through the application of a forward strategy of pre-emption.185 The counter-proliferation paradigm would now get fuller expression.

UK-US intelligence divergences again featured. This was with the UK-US differences over intelligence concerning African uranium or Niger ‘yellowcake’ surfacing publicly to a fuller extent. By now, it was evident that the CIA had essentially disavowed the intelligence on the issue in 2002-03, after the CIA’s fact-finding mission by former US Ambassador Joseph Wilson during early 2002. In a memo to the National Security Council (NSC), showing the lack of co-ordination of information flows in the US, a senior CIA official remarked: ‘We told Congress that the Brits have exaggerated this issue...’186 The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry also drew attention to an episode during September 2002 where a CIA analyst in conversation with a NSC staff member apparently ‘suggested that the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa be removed. The CIA analyst said the NSC staff member said that would leave the British “flapping in the wind.”...’ The NSC staff member, in a later communication with the inquiry,

said he had no recollection of telling a CIA analyst that the replacing the uranium reference would leave the British “flapping in the wind” and said
such a statement would have been illogical since the President never presented in any one speech every detail of intelligence gathered on Iraq either by the U.S. or the U.K.\textsuperscript{187}

With hindsight, the CIA had other regrets. It bemoaned the fact that the 16 word sentence, ‘The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa…,’ had featured in Bush’s 28 January 2003 State of the Union address. An apologetic statement was issued.\textsuperscript{188} As US investigative journalist Ron Suskind noted, and as seen earlier: ‘On that last score, CIA had … alerted the British – in mid-September [2002] – that MI6’s similar claims about the yellowcake had been investigated by U.S. intelligence and shown to be suspect.’\textsuperscript{189} The UK Government, however, continued to defend the African uranium intelligence. It claimed that not all the intelligence on the issue was shared with the US. Reportedly, that ‘UK-EYES ONLY’ intelligence ‘had come from a foreign [liaison] service [(believed to be the French\textsuperscript{190})] and [therefore] could not be disclosed.’\textsuperscript{191}

Despite their perceived cliquleness, UK and US intelligence were clearly not interacting alone. Several other states’ intelligence agencies were intimately involved in the thirsty UK and US intelligence-gathering processes in the run-up to war in Iraq. Much international intelligence liaison with both the UK and the US, jointly and individually, over the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD was going on behind the scenes. While inevitably many of the originating points of the intelligence involved are difficult to trace and unpack, it appears that the international intelligence liaison included (at the least) the Italian, French and German intelligence agencies. This was even though at the macro/higher political levels, France and Germany did not support the ‘means’ - notably the latest US-proposed course of action, war in Iraq (see above [2.4]). They had, however, remained consistently supportive of the ‘ends’, namely the disarmament of Iraqi WMD.\textsuperscript{192}

The existence of this extensive international intelligence liaison, with all of its ‘double-edged sword’ characteristics, was most starkly witnessed during disputes over sources. This included over such dubious sources as ‘CURVEBALL’, and during the fallout surrounding the Niger uranium ‘yellowcake’ controversy. This last issue was one over which there was distinctly some significant Italian Intelligence (Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service, Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare – SISMI) participation.\textsuperscript{193}

The SISMI involvement was very interesting. However, former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) defense intelligence officer for the Middle East, South Asia and terrorism, Colonel W. Patrick Lang, was under no illusions why SISMI might be interested in contributing to overall efforts: ‘… SISMI would also have wanted to
ingratiate itself with the incoming administration. “These foreign intelligence agencies are so dependent on us [the US] that the urge to acquire I.O.U.’s is a powerful incentive by itself…”¹⁹⁴ As reported in 2005 by Laura Rozen, a Prospect senior correspondent and a national security correspondent for The Washington Monthly:

... Nicolo Pollari, chief of ... Sismi, brought the Niger yellowcake story directly to the White House [reportedly via a secret meeting held with Deputy National Security Adviser (NSA) Stephen Hadley on 9 September 2002] after [Pollari’s] insistent overtures had been rejected by the Central Intelligence Agency in 2001 and 2002... the Italians sent the bogus intelligence about Niger and Iraq not only through traditional allied channels such as the CIA [and including copies sent to British and French Intelligence], but seemingly directly into the White House... [a] channel [that] amplifies questions about a now-infamous 16-word reference to the Niger uranium in President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address -- which remained in the speech despite warnings from the CIA and the State Department that the allegation was not substantiated.¹⁹⁵

For the sake of continuing and maintaining their overarching valuable intelligence liaison relationships with UK and US intelligence, intelligence co-operation was forthcoming from these quarters at the routine micro/lower levels. Maintaining close interactions with UK and US intelligence at these levels ultimately were overall more valuable than particular differences at the macro/higher levels could, and indeed perhaps more arguably should, be allowed to interrupt. Allegedly, for its different overarching stance concerning Iraq, Canada had arguably experienced a degree of intelligence ‘punishment’ at the hands of the US: ‘Aspects of the intelligence pipeline, which we’ve taken for granted, are shutting down. We’ve been told essentially by Pentagon officials that some of our senior officials need not call because they’re not going to get calls returned,’ claimed chair of the Canadian Parliamentary Defence Committee, David Pratt. However, Canadian Solicitor General Wayne Easter directly contradicted this claim (probably with more of a referential eye focussed on the CIA-Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS] ties than the defence/military intelligence links): ‘Our Canadian security intelligence agency is certainly working very closely with the Americans and with others around the world, as well…’¹⁹⁶

Through this enhanced international intelligence liaison, potentially useful sources could be passed on. Unfortunately, equally, as already seen, so could tainted sources, as well as incompletely/inadequately referenced ones, which – even worse – are then more easily susceptible to becoming artificially corroborated through other
liaison channels. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry later concluded that:

Because the United States lacked an official presence inside Iraq [for instance, due to not having human agents recruited within Saddam Hussein’s inner-circle\(^{197}\)], the Intelligence Community depended too heavily on defectors [a reference to sources, such as ‘CURVEBALL’] and foreign government services [for example, Germany, Italy, and the UK’s (SIS/MI6’s) own increasingly discredited and subsequently withdrawn sources (see above)] to obtain HUMINT information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activities. [Again, the familiar perennial US intelligence HUMINT weaknesses were clearly highlighted.] While these sources had the potential to provide some valuable information, they had a limited ability to provide the kind of detailed intelligence about current Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts sought by U.S. policymakers. Moreover, because the Intelligence Community did not have direct access to many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to assess and was often left to the foreign government services to judge [such as again as witnessed in relation to ‘CURVEBALL’ tightly-controlled by the German BND]…\(^{198}\)

Indeed, regarding this last issue, Dr David Kay, the former head of the Iraq Survey Group (see below [2.7]), was sharply critical. This international intelligence liaison had not been as successful as might have been hoped from the outset. Nor were intelligence liaison dividends reaped. More condemningly, albeit in an educative manner, it had exposed real weaknesses in tradecraft on all sides to each of the participants involved in the interactions, as well as – perhaps even more worryingly - to their other foreign liaison partners beyond. In a 2008 interview with Der Spiegel newspaper, Kay remarked:

I stand by my criticism of the BND to this day: To not have checked up on the exile Iraqis in Germany who knew [‘CURVEBALL’], not to have made all the appropriate efforts to validate the source, is a level of irresponsibility that is awfully hard to imagine in a service like the BND. And then, the fact that they failed to provide direct access to him remains one of the most striking things. It was a blockade that made it impossible for any other service to validate his information. The German service did not live up to their responsibilities or to the level of integrity you would expect from such a service… I feel disillusioned. I think that ‘Curveball’ was the biggest and most consequential intelligence fiasco of my lifetime. It shows how
important effective civilian control of the intelligence services is, because
non-transparency is extraordinarily dangerous for democracy.\textsuperscript{199}

Even between the UK and US, intimate intelligence sharing was not always
forthcoming. Again concerning the Niger ‘yellowcake’ intelligence issue, similarly to
the UK, the US also did not share all of its intelligence with its closest intelligence
partners. It appears that the US did not share with the UK or Australia all of its
information concerning the circumstances and results of Wilson’s fact-finding
mission.\textsuperscript{200} The plot of the UK-US intelligence controversy over the Niger
‘yellowcake’ issue then thickened somewhat. This was as reports noted that National
Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice defended the claim – perhaps with
reference back to the secret September 2002 SISMI-Hadley meeting (see above) -
while still admitting it should not have featured in the January 2003 State of the
Union address.\textsuperscript{201} The Niger uranium intelligence UK-US differences continued with
the CIA arguing that the claim was based on faked documents. The IAEA also had
dismissed those documents as forgeries on 7 March 2003, shortly before the launch of
the war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{202}

However, the UK maintained that it had a separate, unshared independent
source the CIA did not.\textsuperscript{203} This source was believed to be acquired from GCHQ
intercepts.\textsuperscript{204} Although, this claim has not gone unchallenged by those in the US:
‘Drumheller, who oversaw intelligence operations for the CIA in Europe doubts
the British had something the U.S. didn’t. “No. I don’t think they did”…’\textsuperscript{205} The Butler
Report noted that the UK and US intelligence services did not both rely on all of the
same sources: ‘…It subsequently emerged that the intelligence from one of the US
sources, a defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress, had already been
retracted by the time the [US] National Intelligence Estimate [(NIE)] was issued. This
source was not, however, relied on by the UK.’\textsuperscript{206} Neither did the Report judge the
forgeries to have been an issue for UK intelligence as: ‘The forged documents were
not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so
the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.’\textsuperscript{207} In his now famous July 2003 New
York Times article (due to the subsequently triggered ‘Plamegate’ affair\textsuperscript{208}), former US
diplomat Wilson argued adamantly that: ‘It was highly doubtful that any such
(Niger-Iraq) transaction had ever taken place.’\textsuperscript{209} Whether ‘true’ or not, SIS preferred
to let this controversy fade away once it had run its course.

Many questions concerning intelligence still remained unanswered.\textsuperscript{210} Indeed, did
the politicians instead over-rely on intelligence for their Iraq war case? Other UK and
US intelligence differences were highlighted. As Mark Huband, security
respondent for the Financial Times, argued: ‘…information accepted by the CIA
was often rejected by MI6, and vice versa.’ There were the UK-US differences over Iraq, Niger and uranium, meanwhile, reportedly ‘other significant differences existed...’ These included regarding the alleged Saddam-al-Qaeda links, and the CIA believing Iraq could build a nuclear weapon in a year if there was no intervention, while UK intelligence instead believed that it would take at least twice that time. Once the war itself was underway, there were considerably differing UK-US views of Iraqi military capability and strategy. Those were not the only problematic concerns. Huband continued:

Herein lies the difficulty for the US and UK governments... [To ‘win’ their ‘case’ they] had at all costs to highlight the common ground and breadth of agreement that existed between them. But to achieve this they used material from intelligence agencies whose positions differed on crucial issues and whose often opposing views are a normal state for the intelligence community. It is these opposing positions that enrich the US-UK intelligence-sharing process – but which have become the Achilles’ heel of the two countries’ political alliance... leaving their political masters to utter only partial facts while arguing that the full story cannot be told because it is a secret.

Under the heat of such a scenario, trust rapidly evaporates between the ruler and the ruled.

During the rapid run-up to war in 2002-03, UK and US intelligence were in a quandary. The fundamental intelligence differences were a dilemma for the UK and US politicians. How could the dilemma identified be resolved? The opposing UK-US intelligence and individual UK and US intelligence positions had to be considerably tidied and brought to a consensus. As Wilkie claimed: ‘Wolfowitz at one point explained the US government’s approach to Iraq as the product of a bureaucratic consensus among the relevant US bodies. On reflection this is only one-third of the whole story, because the official British and Australian cases for war were themselves the product of a consensus with the US, in which the US set the terms.’

In the final effect and outcome of the UK-US intelligence liaison, differences had to be pushed into the background. The full context had to be omitted to help smooth out obstacles to agreement. During the building of a supportive case, a counter-productive process of acontextualisation was undertaken, albeit perhaps not always consciously. However, of course reality is never so sterile. The differences, doubts and caveats existing at the important and micro/narrow quartet of levels of relations (operational/tactical and individual [as professional]/personal levels) in both the UK and US were substantially reduced and/or papered over through their
containment. As already demonstrated, these micro/low levels are even more acutely important in the world of intelligence, where specifics and details matter substantially. By contrast in wider, generic political UK-US relations, macro/broader considerations thrive, and they can be (politically) manipulated with less damaging consequences. Arguably, ‘fudging’, agreeing to disagree on particular points (especially those where convergence was unforthcoming) was another available option. This ‘tidying’ was done in order for greater UK-US agreement at the macro/higher, more ‘idealistic’, and broader levels (ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels). However, all these different levels are intricately and closely inter-related. They, therefore, cannot be isolated from one another. Otherwise, if the macro/high and micro/low levels are (or, equally, become) disconnected, cases unravel.

Artificially over-isolating the different levels unhelpfully contributes to the making of an insecure case. A flawed policy is the final outcome. In the hierarchy of levels (as illustrated in Chapter 2 [4.1]), instead of necessarily being more ‘flattened’ – resulting in greater equalization between all the different levels and their input - the macro/higher levels dominated. This was over and above, and at the expense of, the micro/lower, ‘foundation’ or more ‘realistic’ levels – especially when and where intelligence customer/consumer own analysis and assessment activities flourished (see above [2.4]), and their outcome was then used as a tool for political engineering purposes. Furthermore, the macro/higher quartet of levels became increasingly and detrimentally disconnected and removed from their empirical bases at the micro/lower quartet of levels.

In the run up to the war in Iraq, the resulting top-heavy case that was produced, in all of its disconnected artificiality, toppled over. This serves as a stark warning that should be widely heeded in the future. In ambiguous circumstances, through a process of enhanced contextualisation, more ‘flattened’ hierarchies and closer connections between all the different levels are required in the decision-making processes, together with more optimised intelligence and security reach balances. This allows for the inclusion of more complexity, which is more akin, and hence more adaptable, to the chaos of ‘reality’.

[2.7]: Weapons of Mass Distraction?
The search for Iraqi WMD led by UK and US intelligence was prolonged. By June 2003, the hunt for Iraq’s supposed WMD was taken over by the US-dominated Iraq Survey Group (ISG), headed by Dr David Kay. In the ISG, consisting of over a thousand-strong, some UK and Australian members assisted, again demonstrating their close interactions. Shortly afterwards during a visit to Washington, Blair and Bush jointly defended the Iraq war amid the current controversy. In a well-
received speech to the US Congress Blair claimed that history would prove that the Iraq war was justified, whether supposed Iraqi WMD were found or not. His understanding of history was clearly on an equal par with his understanding of intelligence.

By September 2003, the ISG was still drawing a blank.216 Blix was critical of UK-US ‘spin and hype’ after Bush admitted that while, ‘There’s no question that Saddam Hussein had al Qaeda ties… We have no evidence that [he] was involved with … September 11.’217 Later, however, in September 2006, the Saddam Hussein-al-Qa’eda links were also shown to be unreliable by a Congressional inquiry.218 In its conclusions, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry report observed that:

Postwar findings indicate that the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) assessment that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida resembled “two independent actors trying to exploit each other,” accurately characterized bin Ladin’s actions, but not those of Saddam Hussein. Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa’ida and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all requests from al-Qa’ida to provide material or operational support…219

After his capture in December 2003, Saddam Hussein had made clear his distrust of ‘fanatics’. According to Saddam’s interrogator, FBI Field Agent George Piro, Saddam ‘considered [Osama Bin Laden] to be a fanatic. And as such was very wary of him. He told me, “You can’t really trust fanatics” … He didn’t wanna be seen with Bin Laden. And didn’t want to associate with Bin Laden…’220 CBS 60 Minutes correspondent Scott Pelley continued, ‘Piro says Saddam thought that Bin Laden was a threat to him and his regime.’221 Indeed, even if the evidence available prewar could (generously) be argued to be more of an ambiguous nature - and hence somewhat more susceptible to becoming scaled-up and exaggerated - according to the evidence available postwar, a more compelling case could be made firmly in the contrary direction. This was a considerable counter to the claims coming strongly from Bush et al concerning the alleged Saddam Hussein-al-Qa’eda links.

Undoubtedly, this was not entirely a narrative of intelligence shortcomings. UK intelligence and several people in US intelligence circles were right to have remained sceptical of such links prewar and beyond. Meanwhile some further ‘cherry-picking’ or ‘scaling-up’ of ‘intelligence’ and of alleged claims was again suggested – especially in a year when the crop of sources was, and had been consecutively for a number of years, poor overall, due to intelligence under-reach.222 Moreover, again highlighting the deficient intelligence co-ordination, at least in the
US, as Drumheller later observed: ‘...There was no one voice in coming out of the intelligence community and that allowed those people to pick and choose those bits of information that fit what they wanted to know...’

Meanwhile, in the better co-ordinated UK intelligence community (albeit in a somewhat distorted manner thanks to the better political co-option and collusion that was undertaken), so that overall ‘one voice’ could successfully be spoken with, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) was evidently more sidelined (see below [2.8] and Chapter 6 [1.1]).

Further linkages between UK and US intelligence were flagged. The UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) reported in September 2003 on the intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD. Two brief insights were granted into the UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue. It appears that the CIA had some input into at least the WMD section of the September 2002 UK dossier, as they were invited to make some comments. However, in ‘Annex B’ the ISC rejected part of a conclusion that had featured in the earlier July 2003 FAC Report: ‘The UK certainly used US intelligence, but we do not support the statement that the UK was “heavily reliant” on the US, defectors or exiles.’ The ISC report continued by claiming: ‘The UK intelligence community had a number of their own reliable sources [such as claimed by UK intelligence on the Iraq and uranium issue], including sources in Iraq.’

In July 2004, the findings in the Butler Report later fleshed out this ISC finding, exposing some further flaws with the sources.

By early October 2003, the interim report of ISG was produced. The report was released amid the continuing political controversy over no Iraqi WMD having been found, and the ongoing deteriorating security situation in Iraq postwar. Still no Iraqi WMD had been located by the official US-led investigation, although there was some evidence of arguably related facilities. However, prominent anti-war opposition was not quelled. The former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who had resigned from the Cabinet as Leader of the House of Commons on 17 March 2003 in protest against the imminent war in Iraq, continued to demand an inquiry into the decision for war. US opposition, in the form of General Wesley Clark, a former NATO commander in Europe, also continued to voice his disquiet.

Former chief UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, again contributed criticism. He simultaneously highlighted what was reportedly a SIS ‘disinformation drive [against Iraq] in the late 1990s... designed to shift public opinion.’ Something SIS claimed was ‘unfounded’.

Media speculation concerning the pending outcome of the Senate Intelligence Committee inquiry thought it would criticise the CIA and Tenet. Demonstrating the extent of experimenting with Iraq, Blair on a visit to UK troops in Iraq claimed that he saw Iraq as ‘test case’ for dealing with countries with WMD. Lessons were being learnt, but pursuing a policy of pre-emption had been shown to be as highly
problematic as critics had cautioned prewar. By the end of January 2004, the by now disillusioned head of the ISG, Dr David Kay, had resigned. The leadership of the ISG was then taken over by a former UN weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, as the quest to find Iraq’s WMD continued.\textsuperscript{232}

UK and US intelligence were keen to attempt a ‘salvage’ job. Further damage limitation amid all the messy postwar intelligence fallout was the intent. The results of ISG reports looked suitable places on which to operate. According to Australian Dr Rod Barton, the special adviser to the ISG, ‘senior figures in British intelligence tried to stop the ISG publishing its [next] … report when they realised what it would say…’\textsuperscript{233} Showing UK intelligence interest in the ISG findings that would be presented, on 19 January 2004, Martin Howard, the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence at the UK MoD, had even visited Barton in Baghdad. As Barton observed from that meeting, Howard ‘was not very keen on having this report’ or at least not yet, that is, not until something ‘substantive’ had been located.\textsuperscript{234} Barton’s account continued, ‘when this [the blocking of the ISG report] failed, [by circa 8 March 2004 in an e-mail to Duelfer,] John Scarlett [then still Chairman of the UK JIC]… tried to strengthen the ISG report by [suggesting the] inserting [of] nine “nuggets” of information to imply Saddam’s WMD programmes were active, despite evidence to the contrary.’\textsuperscript{235} Apparently, the UK intelligence attempts were not alone. The CIA also tried to have an input into what content was included in the ISG report - not wanting anything in there which might embarrassingly contradict the supposed Iraqi WMD claims made in earlier statements by Tenet.\textsuperscript{236} By 22 March the ‘truncated and pointless 20-page’ report was finished.\textsuperscript{237} Barton resigned in protest shortly afterwards. Kay later judged it as, ‘a misleading and anodyne document.’\textsuperscript{238}

These UK and US intelligence activities were not alone. Less than a year after his presentation to UNSC, US Secretary of State Powell was now beginning to publicly express some of the doubts he held. Concerning Iraq’s supposed WMD: ‘…the answer to that question is, we don’t know yet…’\textsuperscript{239} The CIA’s intelligence was criticised by Dr Kay, the recent former head of ISG.\textsuperscript{240} During a private lunch with Bush and other White House staff, Kay was also somewhat critical of UK intelligence. As veteran Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward recounted:

Card asked, “You told us about the U.S. intelligence service. Who do you think runs a really good intelligence service?”

“In my experience, it was not the British or the Israelis, despite their reputation,” Kay said. MI6 and the Mossad were legends in the intelligence world, but Kay said he was not always impressed with the usefulness of their product. “In my judgment, the best one is the Chinese.”\textsuperscript{241}
The absence of WMD continued to be puzzled over in London and Washington. In February 2004, there was further criticism from the UK FAC, reminding about other pressing security issues, such as counter-terrorism efforts, and alleging ‘blowback’: ‘The continued failure of the coalition to find WMD in Iraq has damaged the credibility of the US and UK in their conduct of the war against terrorism.’ Within days of each other, both the US Government and, following the US lead, the UK Government, decided to launch in-depth inquiries into their respective, but not joint, intelligence concerning Iraq’s supposed WMD. In light of Kay’s admission in front of the US Senate Armed Services Committee: ‘It turns out we were all wrong, probably, in my judgement, and that is most disturbing…’, the alleged shortcomings of intelligence continued to be probed. Powell again expressed that he was increasingly uncomfortable about the case for war in this postwar phase, adding to his prewar disquiet: ‘It was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world… [The] absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the answer you get.'

Into 2004, the so-called ‘45-minute claim’ continued to be contentious. It emerged that a former intelligence official thought that the information might have been ‘misinterpreted’. In February 2004, Blair also revealed to the House of Commons that he was not aware which weapons the ‘45-minute claim’ applied to when the Commons voted on the war on 18 March 2003. Meanwhile, in Washington, Rumsfeld denied hearing the ‘45-minute claim’. Straw also, at least at first, was vague about the term. In the dash to disarm Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein, it appears that the politicians had missed or glossed over at least some of the details of the case that they themselves were keen to make. The key question, whether intelligence actually mattered, was again emphasised. What other ‘intelligence’ details were missed or forgotten, and would those details have mattered in altering the course of events by affecting the tipping-point or ‘decision shut-off point’ in any manner? Again, the (virtual) ‘irrelevance’ of intelligence to the politicians and their decisions taken (at least on occasions) was suggested. As US intelligence expert Paul Pillar has observed: ‘What is most remarkable about prewar U.S. intelligence on Iraq is not that it got things wrong and thereby misled policymakers; it is that it played so small a role in one of the most important U.S. policy decisions in recent decades.’

There were simultaneously some whiffs of ‘conspiracy’. The case built on contentious intelligence arguably helped to serve as a convenient and distracting fig-leaf for the ‘real’ intentions of UK and US politicians. This was at least until the post-invasion intelligence ‘fallout’. By turning the general focus onto the alleged...
intelligence ‘failures’ and their subsequent inquiries, these would then serve as a convenient distraction post facto and post bellum. These moves would help to take the focus off the politicians and their decisions pertaining to war in both the UK and US. Instead, that attention would be re-focussed more fully on the ‘flaws’ of the UK-US intelligence world. This focus aided the emergence of suggestions that perhaps some further modernisation of UK intelligence structures, processes and procedures was necessary in the early 21st century - manifesting its change and reforms under the guise of ‘professionalisation’. The actual UK Government response to the Butler Report, notably involved the creation of the post of Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis (PHIA), with a support team in the Cabinet Office. The murky depths of multilateral international intelligence liaison interactions, including some of their dynamics (positive and negative), were also highlighted.

[2.8]: Intelligence ‘fallout’ – ‘fall-guys’, ‘scapegoats’, and a convenient ‘mask’?

UK and US intelligence braced itself for the onslaught. A year after the presentation to the UNSC, CIA director Tenet defended the increasingly besieged CIA in a speech at Georgetown University. Blix continued to criticise the intelligence the US and UK had on Iraq. Israeli intelligence also were criticised by their Knesset oversight subcommittee investigation for poor intelligence assessments concerning both Iraq and Libya (exposed in the light of the tackling of the A.Q. Khan ‘nuclear network’ in 2003-04). Powell meanwhile continued to distance himself further from the arguments that he had made to the UNSC in early February 2003. Doubts also emerged regarding the existence of the earlier claimed mobile biological weapons laboratories or trailers (see above [2.4]). These were the sensational claims based on the ‘intelligence’ passed from the increasingly discredited Iraqi defector source codenamed ‘CURVEBALL’. Much ‘stove-piping’, caveat jettisoning, and bypassing, was in effect in relation to CURVEBALL within the US intelligence community. As the SSCI found:

The Committee noted that concerns about the liaison source CURVE BALL had been raised in CIA operations cables, but were not disseminated to analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part because of their limited dissemination, the Intelligence Community judged CURVE BALL to be “credible” or “very credible”. Uncertainties about his reliability should have been taken into account by the operations officers who provided the judgment of his credibility, should have made the analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE
BALL’s information publicly... Europe Division officials had relayed concerns about the public use of CURVE BALL’s information.²⁵⁶

UK officials later discovered that, rather than having a more sinister germ warfare role, the mobile facilities were actually for producing hydrogen for filling weather and artillery balloons, as Iraqi officials had themselves earlier repeatedly claimed.²⁵⁷

More embarrassingly for UK intelligence in particular, it was reported 'likely that the units were ... part of a system originally sold to Saddam by Britain in 1987.'²⁵⁸ Indeed, US intelligence officials apparently knew that the mobile laboratories or trailers, by at least 27 May 2003, had ‘nothing to do with biological weapons’.²⁵⁹ As Drumheller later cogently argued regarding CURVEBALL’s input:

I think a lot of the preconceptions about the weapons of mass destruction and all that were driven by the Iraqi émigré reporting, whether it was from the Iraqi National Congress [INC] or others. ... Émigré reporting is notoriously unreliable ... because they always have an agenda... I think that [émigré reporting] drove a lot of it.²⁶⁰

Reaching some more into the intricate depths of intelligence specifics and details, he continued:

There’s some complications in the Curveball case. [That] is a good example of how, had that been an agency [CIA] case handled by us, we would have vetted it much, much more before the reporting was put out and given the credence that [it] was given. [CURVEBALL] came out as a defector, was handled by Defense Intelligence [Agency (DIA)] officers. But that’s nothing against Defense Intelligence officers; [there are] great Defense Intelligence officers. But we [CIA] have a certain way of doing things that’s built up over 50 years. Some people look at that as being cautious. In fact, it’s a professional standard that you really have to have.²⁶¹

The SSCI inquiry again found that, at least at times however, reservations concerning sources were passed on through intelligence liaison relationships, for instance, with warnings attached to the product: ‘Concerns existed within the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) Directorate of Operations (DO) prior to the war about the credibility of the mobile biological weapons program source code-named CURVE BALL. The concerns were based, in part, on doubts raised by the foreign [German] intelligence service that handled CURVE BALL and a third service [probably SIS/MI6 (see above [1.0])]...’²⁶²
Top UK and US intelligence agency personnel began to depart. By early June 2004, Tenet had announced his resignation as head of the CIA. The CIA Director of Operations James Pavitt announced he was retiring. Later, in the summer of 2004, the Chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, also retired to become Master of Pembroke College, Cambridge. By 6 July 2004, to the Commons Liaison Committee, Blair finally admitted that WMD might not be found in Iraq: ‘What I have got to accept is that I was very, very confident we would find the weapons. I have to accept that we have not found them - that we may not find them.’

The CIA and its intelligence did not escape some heavy criticism. This came from the report produced by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) on 7 July 2004. The report identified ‘collective group think’. In light of this alleged intelligence ‘failure’, President Bush promised reform of US intelligence and remarked: ‘We haven’t found the stockpiles, but we knew he could make them.’ UK intelligence also did not escape judgement. The US SSCI Chairman Senator Pat Roberts commented that: ‘It is clear that this group-think also extended to our allies, and to the United Nations, and several nations as well, all of whom did believe that Saddam Hussein had active WMD programmes. This was a global intelligence failure.’ One commentator, veteran British journalist Tom Mangold, argued: ‘Never before has the Siamese twin relationship between the CIA and MI6 been so roundly condemned. It is unprecedented for Washington to criticise London or vice versa…’ Although Drumheller later qualified this inquiry’s finding somewhat more effectively by remarking:

They always say, “Well, all these other European services and all these other countries around the world felt the same way.” Well, no, it wasn’t exactly the same way. They were all concerned; there was a general fear that Saddam was building [weapons] because Saddam was Saddam. … It’s the way he kept his enemies inside and outside the country off balance.

Significantly, the SSCI Report’s evaluation of the ‘British White Paper’ - the first UK dossier of 24 September 2002 - remains classified. It continues to be blacked-out/redacted, at least from public eyes. This raises the reasonable question: would further discomfort to and within UK-US intelligence relations be caused by the public dissemination of that evaluation?

The general nature of non-proliferation enterprises continued to cast a characteristic shadow. At the end of 2001, the global intelligence ambiguity and uncertainty concerning the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD stockpiles and associated programmes was apparent. This scenario was coupled with the lack of sources in Iraq – especially those that were well-placed and had little to gain from
regime change actions, such as UN weapon inspectors\textsuperscript{274}. In such murky circumstances, various intelligence sources were communicated amongst one another and were picked by their users/customers. In turn, a paucity of ‘intelligent customers’ was evident. Those customers themselves were clearly naïve and inexperienced regarding intelligence, exhibiting a demonstrably poor understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses/limitations of intelligence, and all it could hope to offer. This was as well as them clearly lacking an awareness that was cognisant of - and/or, even more damningly, outright dismissing - the surrounding complexities and associated dynamics of intelligence, intimately informed by carefully heeding contextualisation efforts. Worse still, relying on their strongly held assumptions and beliefs, they were largely doing their own analysis and assessment. This was in paradoxical contexts where even former White House press secretary Scott McClellan could claim, in May 2008, that Bush demonstrated a ‘lack of inquisitiveness’\textsuperscript{275}.

A while later, on 5 June 2008, the US Senate Intelligence Committee released its Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence. Marking their last official oversight findings on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD, significantly these two reports addressed the themes of ‘Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence’ and ‘Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by the Pentagon Policy Office’. At their unveiling, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV remarked: ‘Before taking the country to war, this Administration owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the intelligence…’ He continued: ‘In making the case for war, the Administration repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.’\textsuperscript{276} Meanwhile, the report on the Pentagon’s activities most significantly found that: ‘Potentially important information collected during the meetings [held clandestinely between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris] was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials…’, and that ‘…senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.’\textsuperscript{277} Against this backdrop, many rotten interactions concerning intelligence were being undertaken both inside and beyond the Pentagon during the run up to the war in Iraq.

The intelligence gathering net was also cast more widely. When the particular case and line of action the US wanted to pursue in Iraq was launched intensively from the
end of 2001/beginning of 2002, this tasked not only the US intelligence agencies, but also their liaison partner intelligence services across the globe, as US intelligence reached out to them. Reporting was then mustered from the few sources each of the various national intelligence agencies could scrape together. They produced, delivered and communicated anything that was, or was perceived to be, at least potentially useful for the US, essentially tailored to the requests. Arguably, the ‘allied intelligence’ conferences on WMD held regularly (annually) over time also had not helped towards contributing to thwart the collective internationally held suspicions from arising concerning the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD. Working alongside one another in real-time on in-progress analysis was increasingly discredited as shared perceptions became overdone. Beyond the confines of these narrower interactions, these activities contributed towards stunting essential factors, such as diversity, as well as reducing the positions from which intelligence officers could reach out.

Regarding the so-called ‘global intelligence failure’, this evaluation only resonates in part. It is apparent from all the various inquiries that intelligence agencies in at least the US, the UK, Germany, Australia, Italy, Israel and Denmark had some essentially shared perceptions on and suspicions concerning supposed Iraqi WMD. Did intelligence alliance politics fail? Not entirely. While reach deficits and excesses appear to have been more pronounced across the board concerning this specific example, it appears that intelligence alliance politics did not fail completely. Instead, like the military coalition that eventually went into Iraq, the basis was more a ‘coalition of the willing’. Subsequently, for better and worse, intelligence liaison interactions similarly followed that direction.

Indeed, in some ways, this example was arguably a ‘success’ for international intelligence liaison. This is in that on the whole information was closely shared and that intelligence relationships were maintained between countries even when there were higher political differences concerning the path, scope and timing of the action that was eventually adopted. In some cases, the international intelligence liaison was so widespread that it was perhaps too successful, even to an ironic extent, in the process partially becoming a ‘victim of its own success’. However, what can be more agreed, is that this example of supposed Iraqi WMD nicely exposes the discernable operational parameters, limits and dynamics (both positive and negative) of international intelligence alliance politics.

More importantly, amid all the associated fallout, the desirability of continuing to have these intelligence interactions was sustained. According to The Washington Post, in the summer of 2008, the CIA was having ‘success’ in ‘mending [its] fences’ with some of the foreign intelligence liaison partners who had ‘distanced themselves’ from the US over the Iraq war. As DCI Hayden significantly remarked
in July 2008, again effectively illustrating the degree of internationally connected intelligence: ‘[We] seek out their ideas, undertake common efforts... We’ve given many of them secure phones so they can call me directly.’

Personal links would also continue to perform a demonstrably prominent function.

Crucially, however, the role of international intelligence liaison and intelligence alliances is only to perform part of the intelligence process. Moreover, arguably it is only an auxiliary role at that, such as assisting in the gathering of intelligence and contributing final analysis input into final intelligence assessments/estimates. As the supposed Iraqi WMD example also demonstrates, the contribution of such arrangements should not be overextended. Nor should they be uncritically assimilated into overall processes. This is, for instance, by jettisoning differences and/or weakening or abandoning source verification regimes. Indeed, in terms of intelligence outreach, the most optimised and better outreach balances were struck at the micro/low levels of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. Simultaneously, the worst outreach balances, resulting in more pronounced counter-productive outreach deficits and excesses, occurred at the macro/higher levels, especially in the producer-consumer relationships.

The intelligence ‘fallout’ continued unabated. By mid-July 2004, there was (finally) the public ‘rare’ retraction of pre-war intelligence by SIS. The intelligence informing the assessment that Saddam Hussein had still been developing WMD was withdrawn, suggesting its unreliability.

Also recently retired senior UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) official, Dr Brian Jones could not reconcile the quantity of intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD he saw, with the quantity that Blair had claimed in evidence given to the Hutton Inquiry crossed his own desk. Had the intelligence WMD experts effectively been sidelined? On occasions, at least, it appears that essentially they were. This was if only by a form of process short-circuiting - for example, due to the speed at which machinations were taking place in the high tempo lead up to the Iraq war. Intelligence Middle East experts, at least occasionally, were similarly out of the loop. As Paul Pillar later observed: ‘As the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of the [US] intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until a year into the war [c.2004].’

Critical contextualisation paucities quickly emerged. This was due to the bypassing of the ‘functional/thematic’ and ‘regional/geographical’ experts and advisers in both the UK/US intelligence and diplomatic communities - for example, located in the US State Department and in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) - during the run-up to the Iraq war, and then again on occasions during
its progression. The history of the Middle East region evidently appeared to be poorly understood, even ignored and/or discounted by the decision/policy-makers. This was along with any knowledge of Middle Eastern culture and their long-standing sectarian rivalries. The realisation of these issues as being important factors then dawned far too late, as the security situation in Iraq continued to rapidly deteriorate during 2003 and beyond. This was especially marked amongst those occupying the highest political echelons, amid the leaders cloistered in their remote home capitals of London and Washington. Other observers, however - particularly those participants out-in-the-field in Iraq and based on-the-ground in Baghdad and Basra - were naturally much quicker at grasping the significance of these issues as they more directly experienced them.

At least some of the actual intelligence details were demonstrably afforded lesser significance than perhaps they should have otherwise received. Indeed, a convincing argument could even be made that ‘specialist’ intelligence experts and analysts, arguably ‘obsessed’ by specifics and details, were being more sidelined in favour of more ‘generalist’ officers performing liaison. In turn, those jobholders were arguably less likely to quibble over details, as it was their job to get together, pass on information and essentially agree by brokering deals orientated around points of convergence. Retired US military Colonel Patrick Lang remarked: ‘They [policymakers] wanted only liaison officers... not a senior intelligence person who argued with them.’ Meanwhile, the lack of certainty surrounding Iraq’s WMD was again cited. In the run-up to the November 2004 US Presidential elections, Bush went on the defensive arguing that it was still ‘right’ to go to war in Iraq despite the persisting absence of WMD.

Defenders of intelligence emerged from the shadows. On the day that the UK Butler Report was published (14 July 2004), another former UK Foreign Secretary (1989-1995), Lord Douglas Hurd, stepped out from the relative obscurity of retirement. He publicly defended the intelligence services. He claimed: ‘Intelligence services across the western world are looking for help... Into [their post-9/11 CT] effort their political masters threw the spanner of Iraq.’ In this case, ‘offensive’ as well as ‘defensive’ intelligence had to be provided. He particularly highlighted their ‘unenviable’ position: ‘There is always a temptation for politicians to exaggerate the importance of intelligence reports because of the glamorous badge of secrecy … The intelligence services do not normally take the front of the stage...’ The differences between the UK and US positions were additionally emphasised, where he noted that: ‘This problem was more acute in Britain than in the US…’ as Blair had a tougher political case for war in Iraq to produce, and a more substantial political opposition to overcome. In trying to acquit their tasks adequately on the political front and in
the glare of the public domain, similarly to their US counterparts, the UK intelligence agencies had, in part at least, shown themselves to be suffering from some shortcomings. They, too, were deemed to be in need of some reform.\(^{291}\)

The \textit{Butler Report} was critical of UK intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD.\(^{292}\) The way it was used by the UK Government also came under fire. Intelligence was stretched to breaking point. Its limitations were not made clear and caveats had been removed, for example in the September 2002 UK Government dossier. Essentially, the ill-documented and informal sofa-characterised decision-making process in No. 10 Downing Street was criticised as being unhelpful. It had hints of being more ‘presidential’ in nature, with implications for the UK Cabinet-style of doing government. Moreover, Lord Butler described the ‘45-minute claim’ as an ‘uncharacteristically poor piece of assessment.’\(^{293}\)

Later, in a \textit{Spectator} magazine interview in December 2004, Lord Butler remarked rather more strongly: ‘I would be critical of the present government in that there is too much emphasis on selling, there is too much central control and there is too little of what I would describe as reasoned deliberation which brings in all the arguments.’\(^{294}\) He also argued: ‘Good government, in my view, means bringing to bear all the knowledge and all the arguments you can from inside and outside, debating and arguing them as frankly as you can, and to try to reach a conclusion. It is clear that politically appointed people carry great weight in the government and there is nothing necessarily wrong with that, but if it’s done to the exclusion of advice from civil servants, you tend to get into error, you make mistakes.’\(^{295}\) Concerning the handling of intelligence on Iraqi WMD, Butler noted: ‘The purpose of the dossier was to persuade the British people why the government thought Iraq was a very serious threat ... Would it [adding a warning about the limitations of the evidence] have undermined it? I think it would have; I think it would have weakened it.’\(^{296}\)

In the wake of the Report, commentators argued that the recent inquiries in both the UK and US were incomplete. This was because of their focus on the intelligence agencies and the intelligence itself, rather than also including evaluating the activities of the politicians and probing their decision to go to war.\(^{297}\) In front of the House of Commons Public Administration Committee later in October 2004, Lord Butler denied that the terms of reference of his inquiry had prevented a thorough investigation, essentially observing that ‘policy decisions were a matter for politicians, not inquiries.’\(^{298}\) Indeed Butler declared: ‘On the political issues, we wanted to give people the information but we felt that really the proper place where governments should survive or fall is with parliament and the electorate.’\(^{299}\) Sir Lawrence Freedman cautioned: ‘This saga warns of how intelligence, when used to
serve a wider political purpose, can be corrupted.' The case for war had been made more on theoretical than on firmer empirical bases. The ‘legality’ of the Iraq war, in the absence of a second legitimising UNSC resolution, also continued to rankle and be much debated.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, commentators on intelligence in the US were rather more dismissive of the Butler inquiry findings. Former CIA operative Bob Baer believed that ‘They [the UK and US ‘establishments’] just wanted it all to go away.’ While one veteran US intelligence officer, Ray McGovern, declared ‘It’s just old boys. You’ve had Lord Hutton, Lord Butler. It’s so clubbish.’ Drawing a comparison between the recently published US Congressional inquiries and the Butler Report, Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA chief of operations for counter-terrorism, argued: ‘I can tell you there’s rampant jealously in the CIA, where they wish they could have had a report more like Butler’s. It was much more nuanced, much more fair.’

A ‘Leader’ article published in The Observer newspaper on 18 July 2004 rightly highlighted that the Butler Report findings would have to be carefully read and digested: ‘On first reading, the report from Lord Butler’s enquiry seemed another Establishment closing of ranks. By today it is becoming clear that it is a more subtle indictment of the processes of British government, the ramifications of which will become clearer in the weeks ahead…’ The Leader continued: ‘Butler’s report raises for some the question of whether, with proper process and properly caveated intelligence, the government would have been able to muster a majority in the House of Commons to support the war and of whether government law officers could have judged it legal. Without those two pillars, it is argued, we could not have gone to war…’

In the wake of the UK Butler Report, reform was also prescribed for UK intelligence. By 21 July 2004, SIS was conducting an ‘unprecedented inquiry’ into its (by now) discredited sources. Showing dismay with its customers, it also sought to establish, with providing safeguards, ‘greater control over Downing Street’s use of its secret intelligence in future…’, as well as changing some of its practices, including agreeing ‘to share information provided by its agents with members of the Defence Intelligence Staff.’ Summarising the problems encountered, the BBC’s security correspondent, Gordon Corera noted:

Two central problems areas can be identified… The first was in the collection of intelligence… Essentially, the quality control broke down… [and] the sources were not properly validated. The checking of their reliability seems to have become subjected to the need to produce results… The scarcity of sources and the urgent requirement for intelligence also meant more credence.
was given to untried sources than would normally be the case... The second
major problem came in the transition from internal [Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC)] assessments to a public dossier. Along the way, the caveats
and qualifiers got lost... and the warnings that the intelligence... was thin
never made it... public.305

Despite the revelations about pre-war intelligence, Blair continued to defend the
war.306 He maintained that the ends would vindicate and still justify the
methodology deployed. Unsurprisingly, the ‘reality’ to date has been much less clear
cut than that, suggesting undesirable ends – for example, the dire security situation
in Iraq with elusive peace and rampant insurgency – co-existing in a more pluralistic
condition of ‘complex interdependence’ with the intended outcomes, such as the
removal of Saddam Hussein from power.

The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) finally reported in October 2004. The ISG
‘concluded it was unlikely that Saddam Hussein had [WMD]. It also concluded that
he probably meant to make chemical weapons again one day, if sanctions had been
lifted. “The emphasis is on capability and intention not on immediate threat,” said
one British official...307 This was echoed in the findings of the interrogators of
Saddam Hussein. As FBI Field Agent Piro observed:

[Saddam] told me that most of the WMD had been destroyed by the U.N.
inspectors in the ‘90s. And those that hadn’t been destroyed by the
inspectors were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq ... It was very important for
him to project that [he still had WMD] because that was what kept him, in
his mind, in power. That capability kept the Iranians away. It kept them
from reinvading Iraq...308

Piro also reportedly found that the impetus to develop WMD still prevailed:
‘Saddam intended to produce weapons of mass destruction again, some day. ... “He
wanted to pursue all of WMD. So he wanted to reconstitute his entire WMD
program”...309 The ISG report essentially suggested that the ‘containment’ of Iraq
had worked, although it was not ‘rollback’ which could only be achieved by regime
change. Everyone could feel somewhat vindicated by the report. Although, Blair and
Bush again felt compelled to defend the war.310

Shortly after the ISG had reported, more UK intelligence was officially
retracted. In the House of Commons, the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw formally,
and finally, withdrew the controversial ‘45-minutes claim’.311 According to
Woodward in Plan of Attack, ‘Tenet and the CIA had warned the British not to make
that allegation, which was based on a questionable source, and almost certainly
referred to battlefield weapons – not ones that Iraq could launch at neighboring countries, let alone American cities. Tenet referred privately to this as the “they-can-attack-in-45-minutes shit.” Later referring to this passage, the Butler Report noted: ‘We asked the Chief of SIS [Sir Richard Dearlove], if Mr Tenet had ever mentioned his scepticism to him. He said: “There’s no record of them having commented negatively on the report and nor does the desk officer at the time recall any comeback from the CIA.” We asked Mr Tenet directly for a comment but no reply had been received by the time that he resigned from office.’

Allegations of intelligence abuse were sustained. In October 2004, the former Deputy Chief of the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) (1995-99), John Morrison, voiced his concern about the use of intelligence. His concerns echoed those earlier articulated by Hurd. He argued that at the time of the 1998-9 Kosovo campaign, and at least by implication again during the Iraq campaign: ‘I had the feeling... that intelligence was being seen as a PR tool and intelligence should really work in the shadows, not in the limelight.’

Indeed, as had recently been seen deployed vis-à-vis the counter-terrorism domain (see Case Study 1 [4.2.i], above), intelligence had significant PR and marketable value with the public (or so it was believed). This was a role for intelligence that extended considerably beyond being used merely (and most legitimately) to inform policy and decision-making. As Pillar later remarked with regard to US intelligence: ‘Another problem is that on Iraq, the intelligence community was pulled over the line into policy advocacy – not so much by what it said as by its conspicuous role in the administration’s public case for war...’ Discomfort within and surrounding the UK and US intelligence communities, regarding this degree of political collusion, was palpable. Strains were widely evident. For Morrison, his personal observation on a BBC Panorama documentary programme broadcast in July 2004 that: ‘When I heard... [Blair’s claim that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq posed a “serious and current threat” to Britain], I could almost hear the collective raspberry going up around Whitehall...’ subsequently resulted in his dismissal as the UK ISC’s investigator.

By January 2005, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was re-tasked. The search for supposed Iraqi WMD was quietly ended and instead the ISG focussed on helping to combat the postwar insurgency in Iraq – by now undoubtedly the dominant task. However, some significant problems involving the intelligence world persisted. According to a former US defense intelligence analyst, who served in both Iraq and the Pentagon, A.J. Rossmiller, other ‘disconnects’ were readily apparent. He claimed:
‘Indiscriminate detention policies cripple strategic efforts in Iraq...’, and, emphasising a specific example, he argued: ‘The action units place the responsibility on the intel crew to sort out the guys they grab, and intel guys figure that the action units bring in only legitimate targets. In that space an innocent individual becomes a prisoner...’ \(^{318}\) Rossmillier argued compellingly that fixes to intelligence being implemented in the wake of the run-up to the Iraq war had to extend further.

By March 2005, the UK Government released its account of the implementation of the Butler Report’s conclusions. \(^{319}\) Intelligence would no longer be used so unthinkingly. \(^{320}\) While unsurprisingly in the report the US was not mentioned explicitly, a characteristically anodyne insight was granted into ‘international co-operation’ generally. The report dryly conveyed the conventional driving wisdom behind international intelligence liaison that:

> International co-operation is essential to countering current terrorist threats. UK agencies have built on existing bilateral relationships and developed others to ensure that there is extensive international co-operation. Since 9/11, co-operation, information exchange and personal contacts have significantly increased. However, there remain complexities and difficulties in these international relationships. The Agencies and policy departments are continuing to work to overcome these constraints both bilaterally and multilaterally. \(^{321}\)

On 31 March 2005, the US Robb-Silberman Commission reported in Washington. US intelligence received another critical treatment. As Corera observed: ‘Crucially, the absence of new evidence was coupled with a failure to challenge existing assumptions... The commission found that dissenting views – of which there were some, notably at the State Department – were not given sufficient weight in the face of... general consensus.’ More reform of US intelligence was demanded. \(^{322}\) The attitude towards sharing within the US intelligence community’s culture was also criticised. \(^{323}\)

The continuing poor security situation in Iraq postwar still rankled. Reconstruction was obstructed. \(^{324}\) Unusually, some senior UK civil servants continued to publicly voice their opposition about how the UK was taken to war. The political controversy rumbled on as it gently ebbed away slightly more into the background, albeit leaving behind highly visible stains on the reputations of UK and US politicians and intelligence services. \(^{325}\) In a leader, *The Economist* noted: ‘America’s and Britain’s spying operations both stand cursed at the moment.’ \(^{326}\) As the security situation in Iraq continues to be bleak - increasingly akin to civil war, rife with Shia and Sunni Muslim sectarian violence, \(^{327}\) and as the much-disputed Iraqi
violent-death toll continues to rise\textsuperscript{328} - several questions remain unanswered, or unsatisfactorily and incompletely answered. The passage of more time will have to take place before history can deliver some fuller answers to those questions.\textsuperscript{329}

\textbf{[2.9]: Conclusions: evaluating UK-US intelligence liaison on supposed Iraqi WMD}

In 2004, shortly before the \textit{Butler Report} was released, it was noted in an authoritative article featuring in the \textit{Financial Times} that:

As [UK and US] records are examined, the fortunes of the intelligence agencies of the two countries will to some extent rise and fall together. While their assessments of the threat posed by Iraq in 2002 did not agree on everything, they shared an enormous amount of raw information and co-operated closely on the analysis. Inevitably, intelligence co-operation across the Atlantic will come under intense review.\textsuperscript{330}

However, any internal reviews conducted individually and jointly by UK and US intelligence agencies, and politicians themselves, will be heavily classified. This is especially the case regarding any observations concerning the liaison dimension, if it is even explicitly examined. They are unlikely to be made available to the UK and US publics, nor, if unilateral, indeed perhaps to each other. This is despite the importance of the issue and several questions remaining unanswered. An oversight and accountability gap persists – again, especially concerning liaison questions.

Intelligence is well known to often be an imperfect ‘science’ and ‘art’. In its encompassment, intelligence results in several differences of interpretation.\textsuperscript{331} The doubts and the caveats were there.\textsuperscript{332} They were especially present and enduring amongst the wider and experienced cohorts of the UK and US intelligence communities at the lower/micro operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels. For example, this is evident with the concerns particularly expressed by former senior UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) official, Dr Brian Jones, and those of the late WMD expert Dr David Kelly, \textit{et al}:

\‘Jones … told the \textit{Independent} newspaper the DIS’ “unified view” was for there to be careful caveats about assessments of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons. But they had been overruled by the heads of the intelligence agencies. Mr Blair said Dr Jones’ concerns had been considered by the head of defence intelligence, who decided the dossier’s wording was correct…’\textsuperscript{333} Inevitably some differences between the UK and US intelligence assessments were apparent. But, it appears that - along with the other original caveats and doubts - several of these divergences were suppressed and removed at more ‘senior’, macro/higher-level meetings. For example, as the BBC reported: ‘Mr Blair said the disputed claim over Iraqi weapons strikes within 45
minutes was entirely the work of the JIC... Arguably this was done so that the intelligence services could fulfill their obligations to their users and customers in both Washington and London. In Whitehall ‘mandarin’-speak, they were tasked to ‘produce’ or ‘deliver’ in harmony with their users’ political agenda. Interestingly, again according to the BBC, ‘Analysts in the [DIS] in the Ministry of Defence did question the 45-minute claim because of the vagueness... They also raised concerns about claims about Iraqi production of chemical agents. But their bosses, who sat on the [JIC] but were not intelligence specialists, agreed the DIS experts should not see intelligence which came in during the latter stages of the dossier’s drafting and which MI6 said overrode their concerns. The late intelligence is now thought to have been unreliable...

Overt ‘pressure’ exerted by the politicians in both the UK and US was perhaps not necessary per se. The intelligence machines in both the UK and US generally worked as they were intended. Arguably sufficient conforming ‘pressure’ could come from, at least ‘politically-aware’ or ‘politically-sensitive’, senior intelligence managers, in order to fulfil successfully the role that was expected of them by their political masters. This is always helpful, especially when there is still a career to be remembered and made. As the Butler Report recommended: ‘We see a strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post. In August 2004, Sir John Scarlett, Chairman of the JIC during the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq and during its immediate aftermath, was ‘promoted’ to ‘C’ of SIS/MI6. Actual ‘pressure’ was essentially not so needed when perceptions of political/policy and ideological desires, and when expectations in the form of the requirements that were provided, were enough. As the BBC’s Corera noted: ‘The process was... subjected to the “operational imperative to produce results”. In the case of Iraq, Sir Richard Dearlove, the chief [‘C’] of SIS until ... summer [2004], also made clear there was a “pressure on the [Secret Intelligence] Service [(MI6)] to produce” as it tried to ramp up its coverage of Iraq from mid-2002.

In this broken context, resplendent with forced disconnects, intelligence liaison could not function properly. Consequently, it failed to act as an adequate force multiplier. Its power became diverted, together with all the enforced distortions. Instead, in these circumstances, it acted more as a false verifier, and in its collusion, provided a veritable smörgåsbord of any range of sources, which could then be more easily selected in order to conveniently produce the adequate support – at least seemingly – for the desired case attempting to be fashioned. This scenario also made it easier to bury non-supporting sources, as well as to better obscure the
counter-arguments and contradicting facts presented in their reporting. Due to poor and/or distorted intelligence management and co-ordination - stemming from trying to help advance the proscribed political case, as delineated from up high, without too many obstacles posed by properly verified details - governments were able to effectively double-cross themselves with their own intelligence. Worse, they were able to be effectively double-crossed by inadequately vetted external sources (‘CURVEBALL’), perhaps even triple-crossed (Iraq-Niger claims), through variously overlapping and fused international intelligence liaison channels in London and Washington. The intelligence management process clearly needs to remain neutral, de-politicised, and objective, as far as is humanly possible.

Other areas under stress can be highlighted. The micro/narrow individual (as professional)/personal and operational/tactical levels, the most important levels in the world of intelligence generally, and indeed more specifically (international) intelligence liaison, were essentially bypassed. Or else, they were ‘cherry-picked’ if unquestioningly favourable. Albeit in different configurations, this happened in both the UK and US - implemented in order to help reach agreement at the macro/broader, higher policy/strategy and ideological/theoretical levels. The enhanced internationalisation of the intelligence liaison helped – seemingly lending the case greater credibility, as more foreign liaison partners were able to sign on to the overall case being made. This was undertaken in order to try and capitalise upon the general flow of intelligence, potentially for gains for themselves. As Ritter observed, what the UK and US intelligence did effectively deliver together was more of a kinetic ‘shock and awe rollback’ disarmament case, in the form of regime change, essentially as they were tasked. This was enacted and Saddam Hussein (the target who threatened to provide an ongoing proliferation problem well into the future) was successfully removed. The ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ was translated into action. The problem was, however, that its activation was distinctly dubious in terms of garnering sustainable and widespread support into the future.

Specifically on Iraqi WMD, as Blix himself recorded, there is an ‘open verdict’. Additionally, on the wider global non-proliferation front, the US-led invasion of Iraq, with all the associated whiff of international illegality, without at least a second clearly legitimising UNSC resolution, has essentially presented an unhelpful ‘message’. We are now in a newer proliferation era, where (as seen especially with the A.Q. Khan nuclear network) ‘entrepreneurialism’ is the dominant driver. This is together with a commensurate overlooking, even dismissal, of moral/ethical dimensions, aspects that should ideally act as a check on proliferation activities. Strategically, this requires a recalibrated, but not entirely reformed, response (see below [3.0]). Intelligence, through efforts towards its greater
‘professionalisation’, including vis-à-vis intelligence liaison relationships domestically and internationally, similarly clearly needs to be better harnessed, as well as be better deployed, to more effectively realise that response in a sufficiently adequate manner.

As in the overarching realm of CT, the highly crucial so-called ‘ideas war’ has again been more lost than won (if those terms are sufficiently applicable). This rather dubious state of affairs was accomplished through implementing a policy that had inadequate sensitivity to the details and subtle nuances of the actual chaos of ‘reality’. Reversing this troubling trend now needs to be more comprehensively implemented - for instance, through greater contextualisation efforts. What happened with Iraq arguably serves to suggest to regimes that they should actually speed-up WMD programmes, and should increase stockpiles of lethal weapons, including conventional ones. Actual, unambiguously known possession of WMD brings with it the greater national and international security threat of more effective retaliation in the form of approaching mutually assured destruction (MAD), as witnessed during the Cold War. As seen in the past, it is highly likely that MAD will help contribute towards, at least potentially, deterring the US (and the UK) from adopting and adapting actions that were taken vis-à-vis Iraq (invasion and regime change), and from applying the same actions towards other ‘rogue’ states, such as notably Iran and North Korea. The passage of more time will have to take place to ascertain whether, despite appearances, the invasion of Iraq can even begin to be evaluated as having been more of a success in the long-term concerning the issue of WMD, and indeed additionally of conventional weapon, N/CP.

The Iraq war example nicely exposes numerous limits of intelligence. Regarding technical intelligence, consisting of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT), it could only be used so far. The crucial centrality of intelligence liaison and human intelligence (HUMINT), in helping to fill in the remaining blanks of the WMD puzzles, was highlighted. This was together with exposing all of the associated limitations of liaison, when intelligence sources were trying to be stretched and re-configured to fit most desirable frames. With such high stakes in play, the onus upon all involved is heightened, and patience and acute sensitivity to detail are crucial. The more micro operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels are essential. The reliability of the HUMINT reporting in such circumstances has to be even more robust and subjected to tougher validation criteria and processes, and cannot be rushed or moulded with caveats jettisoned. This is not least the case when a policy of pre-emption is being pursued. Otherwise, as seen in the Iraq war example, the ‘case’ made on the basis of available intelligence ‘evidence’ can rapidly disintegrate and collapse in the wider
acontextualised operating environment.\textsuperscript{344} In the process, even the best meant intentions can be destroyed, no matter how passionately - and indeed messianically - they are believed and pursued.

\textbf{[3.0]: Overall Conclusions – together delivering effective results?}

‘The WMD proliferation landscape is dynamic; our responses must similarly evolve…’, so remarked the US State Department in 2005.\textsuperscript{345} While undoubtedly there were episodes of close sharing of WMD intelligence between the UK and US, there were also some occasions where each party withheld intelligence from the other, or did not share it to its fullest extent. Frequently, here, the ‘third party rule’ was invoked. This appears to have been most significantly witnessed concerning the Iraq and Niger uranium issue. UK-US intelligence liaison is frequently replete with differences of varying degrees of intensity. However, when not over-exerted to the point of thwarting joint movements, and when finely balanced with points of agreement, these differences can often have a beneficial effect. These can contribute towards preventing unhelpful instances of intelligence and security reach excesses and deficits within relations.

With reference to the schools of UK-US relations, similar patterns emerge as concerning the UK-US intelligence relations on other ‘functional’ issues, such as CT. ‘Functionalism’, as the dominant theme, and ‘evangelicalism’, as marginally subordinate, both dominate over ‘terminalism’ in the overall ‘complex co-existence plurality’. Any instances of ‘terminalism’ appear to be more confined in nature and are appropriately evaluated as ‘knocks’. There is a short, sharp impact on relations, which may intensely ‘hurt’ in the short-term, but then the pain soon dulls and some form of recovery soon sets in. Similarly to actual flesh knocks, bruises can remain. However, these tend to help educate both parties on the parameters of the relationship. This is rather than instead those knocks being present as long-term systemic-affecting, gangrenous wounds. Such a scenario also helps to account for why UK-US intelligence relations have endured as effectively as they have done for over 60 years at all the different levels. This includes during episodes of generic Anglo-American dyspepsia, especially at the macro/higher ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels, such as over Suez in 1956.

Indeed, rather like the Suez crisis, Iraq represents more of an unfortunate and undesirable ‘blip’ for UK-US intelligence liaison relations. Although admittedly figuring as a sizeable blip, this outcome is rather than the Iraq episode representing something considerably more fundamental in strategic terms, such as a longer-term overawing of relations infused with ‘terminalism’ sentiments.\textsuperscript{346} Specifically within
the domain of UK-US intelligence relations, during this episode, the greatest disconnects and areas of stress (shared by both the UK and US intelligence communities) were, on the whole, ‘vertical’ in their nature - for example, being between intelligence producers and their consumers. This in fact brought the UK and US intelligence communities closer to one another, perhaps, as witnessed at times, ironically too close. Again, this was rather than the observable disconnects and areas of stress being so much more definable in ‘horizontal’ terms transatlantically.

Complexities must not be allowed to overwhelm the whole system. Similarly as to how the effects and outcomes of UK-US intelligence liaison on other functional issue-areas can be captured, the effects and outcomes of UK-US intelligence liaison on WMD and N/CP efforts are highly complex. They are difficult to unpack, are mixed, and frequently remain murky. Are the UK and US together delivering effective results? Sometimes and partly – although it is worth remembering that there is never complete closure, with N/CP efforts constantly ongoing in multiple directions. These efforts continue on several different fronts, including centrally with the ideas and messages being propagated.

Sharing the characteristics of general non-proliferation efforts, the results are not static and are ambiguous. Moreover, they remain so. Accordingly, any ambiguity detected cannot and should not be automatically labelled ‘failure’. Indeed, that condition should not even be evaluated in those terms of ‘success’ and/or ‘failure’. This is detrimentally reductionist. At times it appears what can be regarded as ‘effective results’ - at least in part - are delivered. Although how long-term enduring the result from this example will be, and whether it ultimately will ‘successfully’ deter and prevent other similar proliferation activities from emerging and developing into the future remains to be seen.

However, at other times, the WMD N/CP efforts can get lost. For example, this is largely witnessed over the example of supposed Iraqi WMD and the resulting Iraq war and its fallout. This extends to including the continuing dire security situation in Iraq and the subsequent failure to secure the peace. Together with other essential security strategies - such as CT, counter-insurgency (COIN), and postwar reconstruction considerations – WMD non-proliferation strategies appear to have become counter-productively dissipated. This occurs amongst the overwhelming noise of other more pressing and grander political considerations. In the case of Iraq, this was notably apparent, for example, with the over-zealous implementation of the counter-proliferation paradigm with a push for kinetic ‘shock and awe’ rollback ‘disarmament’ through regime change and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. This was rather than emphasising a more achievable and sustainable gradual rollback disarmament strategy. Counter-productively, too much kinetic was apparent vis-à-
vis a stagnant (stalled and stalemate) issue. Instead, it required a ‘soft-slow’ rather than a ‘hard-fast’ approach at its attempted mitigation. Indeed, implementing an approach more informed by a non-proliferation paradigm would have been more useful. This was especially the case in the absence of an immediate genuine threat.

A convincing argument can be made concerning the ‘irrelevance’ of intelligence. This figured at least on occasions, and particularly in the face of a fixed policy. Intelligence is essential in the decision-making and decision-implementing processes, and can and should have its greatest value then. However, once a particular decision has been made - after the tipping-point or ‘decision shut-off point’ - it is much more of a challenge for intelligence to continue to perform its informing role. It is increasingly difficult to continue to alter the decision that has been taken. This was witnessed most starkly in relation to the run-up to war in Iraq. A flattened hierarchy, more effectively sampling and attaining input from all the different levels closely involved, is essential.

Enhanced evaluation of these trends is useful. All the levels are closely inter-related, constantly interacting and negotiating through the means of a ‘feedback loop’. Here, again, in terms of information flows, the cybernetics dynamics charted in domains such as systems theory can be instructive. No level can be ignored, or over-detrimentally reduced or suppressed. This is not without great expense to the whole, albeit a system, overall framework or structure, decision, or case trying to be made. If the higher levels are exerted too much over the lower, foundation levels, there is an increased risk of top-heaviness as a consequence. The structure or case becomes increasingly groundless, increasing the risk of collapse, and hence failure. Phenomena, such as ‘groupthink’, which are inconsiderately exclusive, increasingly emerge. Counterproductive traits (extreme conditions) of intelligence and security outreach, notably overreach (in terms of the macro/high-levels) and under-reach (in terms of the micro/low-levels) - namely reach excesses and deficits – similarly figure. By allowing these last dimensions to flourish to a counter-productive extent, naturally too much liaison can then compound problems.

Interestingly, any ‘groupthink’ that appears to have thrived seems to have originated considerably more from the top-down, rather than coming from the bottom-up. This was especially apparent among the producers and consumers who were acting ‘unintelligently’. Consequently, this scenario appears to have been most prevalent at the broader and macro/higher ‘quartet’ of levels of relations. After 9/11, and after the success of the initial battle plan [used in
Afghanistan] ... because of that, Tenet was right at the heart of the matter. He was in every meeting, and they [the policy/decision-makers] depended on him because he could speak. He is articulate, and he doesn’t equivocate a lot. I think the president liked that. He was able to say, “Yes, we can do this; yes, we can do this; we can do that.” It got to the point, actually, that that became a problem, because it started to stretch us really, really thin. The Directorate of Operations, they always said, “Well, we never say no to someone.” It did start to fray some of the fabric...

Indeed, illustrating the degree of disconnect involved, at the micro/lower levels many divergent views existed. Evidently ‘groupthink’, extending to overreach, was not prevalent here. At these levels, arguably some more effectively optimised outreach balances were being struck. This was where simultaneously (at least some) traditional and more professional tradecraft prevailed. According to US intelligence scholar Stan Taylor, these findings have even led to some ‘senior analysts in both Britain and America [to ridicule the ‘groupthink’] interpretation...’ Meanwhile, so-called ‘Bureaucratic Pressure Theory’, characterised as “‘cooking the intelligence to fit the decision maker’s recipe’” is believed to have much more traction in this case.

Despite these nuances, all these issues have at least some relevance in the wider intelligence world in relation to the process of intelligence analysis. Thus, they are still worthy of being explored in this case study, however they are precisely conceptualised.

At a minimum in theory, and very often in practice itself, the lower/micro levels are the ones that matter the most in the world of intelligence. Indeed, they should do. At the very least, they should be sufficiently sampled, as well as in a way that is able to inform in an ongoing manner. This is because those levels concern specifics - such as particular items of ‘intelligence’, sources and operations - and routine daily interactions. Moreover, they provide the essential building blocks for best facilitating adequate contextualisation – a critical requirement that should not be neglected; otherwise there is the increasing risk that dire consequences will ensue amid the ‘knowledge failure’. In terms of inclusiveness of the fuller complexities (ambiguities and nuances) that exist and are encountered at these micro/lower levels or low politics, in the case of Iraq, detrimentally these were more forfeited in the pursuit of an over-rigid and set agenda at the macro/higher levels. Although simultaneously evident in the overall mix, there was some sufficiently assisting complicity coming from the micro/lower levels. This was particularly so from perhaps less experienced (extending to even incompetent) operators, with less refined (or even abandoned) tradecraft skills, and keen careerists.

Ultimately, a distinct decision ‘cut-off’ result was established for never static
WMD N/CP efforts that have no one specific end result \textit{per se}. This is frequently due to them being subject to many years of follow-up verification activities. In turn, these verification activities also need to (indeed, \textit{must}) maintain their credibility for enduring trust. Critically, as observed, this scenario was not maintained \textit{vis-à-vis} the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD. The verification (or perhaps not) of Iraqi WMD disarmament throughout the 1990s, as well as all the associated dances performed by all sides involved concerning this issue, can be cited as an example.

Finally, as the \textit{Butler Report} remarked: ‘A number of common threads have become clear from our examination of each case… [including] the powerful multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) collaboration…’\textsuperscript{353} Long may it last in a manner complementing unilateral intelligence efforts. However, intelligence liaison can be a ‘double-edged sword’ that cuts both ways. All the risks and downsides, for instance in the form of reach deficits and excesses, also need to be more fully appreciated and accounted for by all parties involved. This is especially when navigating intelligence investigations on highly complex issues such as WMD N/CP in a dynamic domain where the stakes now and for the future are so high, not least while operating in a high-tempo environment where operating space is simultaneously condensed. For policy-makers and intelligence operators alike, a greater – and more coherent/co-ordinated and indeed strategic - emphasis on mainstream economic market mechanisms will help to build a more enduring non-proliferation regime.\textsuperscript{354} Intelligence, when sensibly and legitimately used to \textit{inform} policy- and decision-making, can considerably aid in these efforts. This is not least as ‘entrepreneurialism’, with the simultaneous overlooking/dismissal of the moral and ethical dimension, has emerged as the dominant driver in contemporary WMD proliferation activities.
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228 ‘Cook war claims prompt inquiry call’, *BBC News Online* (06 October 2003); for more detail on Robin Cook’s opposition to the war, see his *The Point of Departure* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003); see also Robin Cook’s ‘Oral evidence taken before the [UK Parliament’s] Foreign Affairs Committee’ (Tuesday, 17 June 2003) – via URL: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/> (accessed: 03/2006); see also General Wesley Clark (former NATO commander in Europe), ‘Iraq: Why it was the wrong war on the wrong enemy for the wrong reasons’, *The Times* (23 October 2003); ‘Powell confident of WMD claims’, *BBC News Online* (09 January 2004).
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231 ‘Blair: Iraq war was test case’, *BBC News Online* (05 January 2004).
233 A. Barnett, ‘Arms and Iraq: Secret emails, missing weapons: In an exclusive interview, a former arms inspector tell Antony Barnett that, a year after the Kelly affair, a spy chief tried to “sex up” his Iraq report’, *The Observer* (15 May 2005).
234 See *ibid.*; see also T. Mangold, ‘Tomorrow John Scarlett starts his job as boss of MI6, reward for sexing up the dodgy dossier on Iraq’s weapons. Now damning new evidence emerges on just how far
he was prepared to go to protect Blair… by trying to distort a report that finally told the truth about Saddam’s WMDs’, *The Mail on Sunday* (01 August 2004).


236 See, for example, R. McGuirk, ‘Australian scientist says report on search for Iraqi weapons was censored’, *Associated Press Worldstream* (14 February 2005); see also Mangold, ‘Tomorrow John Scarlett starts his job’.

237 *Ibid*.

238 Quoted in *Ibid*.; see also the ‘Acknowledgments’ in Duelfer’s later *Comprehensive Report*, pp.1-2, for an insight into the teamwork and intelligence liaison efforts which contributed towards the work of the ISG, especially where Duelfer notes:

‘The intelligence services of three nations supported ISG, a long and demanding task. In the United Kingdom, mention must be made of SIS and the Defense [sic.] Intelligence Service (especially the Rockingham group) for their long support. In the United States, both the Defense Intelligence Agency and Central Intelligence Agency sustained the process at substantial cost. Australia provided some of the best intelligence analysts anywhere. While these institutions expressed interest in the finding and certainly were curious where their pre-war assessments went wrong, they did not try to steer in any way the judgments included here.’ (Emphasis added).


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243 Quoted in ‘Iraq war “increased terror threat”’, *BBC News Online* (02 February 2004).

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250 Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq’; see also “‘Lack of thought” into Iraq war: The [UK] government did not fully consider the implications of the Iraq invasion, a former senior aide to Tony Blair [Ex-Downing Street chief of staff Jonathan Powell] has admitted’, *BBC News Online* (16 March 2008).
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260 ‘Interview: Tyler Drumheller’.

261 ibid.

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264 A. Brookes, ‘Where now for the CIA?’, BBC News Online (05 June 2004).
265 See, for example, M. White and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MI6 chief’s plan to quit not linked to Iraq, insists No 10’, The Guardian (04 August 2003).
266 Quoted in ‘Blair grilled: Main points’, BBC News Online (06 July 2004).
267 See, for example, ‘Conclusion 7’ in SSCI, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq.
268 See, for example, ‘Conclusion 3’ in ibid.
270 Quoted in ‘CIA slated over Iraq intelligence’.
272 ‘Interview: Tyler Drumheller’. This scenario again became clearly apparent during the postwar interrogation of Saddam Hussein (see below).
273 SSCI, U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq, pp.49-51.
274 See also B. Keller, ‘What to Expect When You’re Inspecting’, The New York Times (16 November 2002) - particularly where he notes: ‘…inspections are a valuable source of collateral intelligence. Mr. Blix is understandably anxious about his agency’s being seen as an arm of the C.I.A. The earlier Unscom inspection operation probably overstepped a line by helping the Americans eavesdrop, thus lending some credence to Saddam's anti-American rants. But there is ample room for legitimate cooperation between the inspectors and national intelligence agencies… Intelligence-sharing is another place Mr. Bush can help. Both sides will be wary of cooperating -- the U.S. to protect sources, the U.N. team to protect against accusations of being a C.I.A. tool. America should insist on a close collaboration, both ways.’
276 Quoted in ‘Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence: Two Bipartisan Reports Detail Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence, and Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by Pentagon Policy Office’, Press Release of Intelligence Committee (05 June 2008).
For more background on these ‘allied intelligence’ conferences on WMD see, for example, Wilkie, \textit{Axis of Deceit}, pp.91-3.

See, for example, J. Warrick, ‘Secretive Agency Under the Spotlight: Chief Tries to Repair CIA as Scrutiny Grows’, \textit{The Washington Post} (05 July 2008) - especially where he reports: ‘[Director of Central Intelligence Michael] Hayden has had greater success in mending fences with foreign intelligence services, some of which had distanced themselves from the Bush administration since the start of the Iraq war. By late August, Hayden and his chief clandestine officer, Stephen R. Kappes, will have made visits to 50 foreign countries to cement relations with their intelligence counterparts. Other foreign intelligence heads have been hosted by Hayden at his private residence on the grounds of Bolling Air Force Base in Southwest Washington’.

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See, for example, G. Hinsliff and A. Barnett, ‘Spy chiefs “withdrew” Saddam arms claim’, \textit{The Observer} (11 July 2004).

‘Blair accused over WMD evidence’, \textit{BBC News Online} (11 July 2004); see also ‘MI6 “retracted” Iraq intelligence’, \textit{BBC News Online} (11 July 2004).

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Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq’.


287 Quoted in S. Blumenthal, ‘Comment: There was no failure of intelligence: US spies were ignored, or worse, if they failed to make the case for war’, The Guardian (05 February 2004).

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296 ibid.

297 ‘Comment & Analysis: Blame the leaders, not the spies’, The Financial Times (15 July 2004).


299 Quoted in M. White, “‘No one to blame” for flaws in Iraq dossier, Butler tells MPs’, The Guardian (22 October 2004).

300 L. Freedman, ‘We must guard intelligence from corruption’, The Financial Times (15 July 2004); see also L. Freedman, ‘War in Iraq: Selling the Threat’, Survival, 46, 2 (June 2004), pp.7-49.


303 Leader, ‘Why Butler is a warning shot: Errors of judgment in the lead-up to war were the responsibility of many’, The Observer (18 July 2004).


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307 P. Reynolds, ‘A huge failure of intelligence’, BBC News Online (06 October 2004); see also A. Brookes, ‘Mixed messages from WMD report’, BBC News Online (07 October 2004); for an evaluation at this time see, for example, D.M. Gormley, ‘The Limits of Intelligence: Iraq’s Lessons’, Survival, 46, 3 (September 2004), pp.7-28.

308 Quoted in Pelley, ‘Interrogator Shares Saddam’s Confessions’.

309 Pelley, ‘Interrogator Shares Saddam’s Confessions’.

310 ‘Bush defends action against Iraq’, BBC News Online (07 October 2004); see also ‘Blair under fire over Iraq report’, BBC News Online (07 October 2004).


313 The Butler Committee, Report, p.126.

314 Quoted in G. Corera, ‘Was intelligence used as “a PR tool”?’ , BBC News Online (28 October 2004); see also: ‘No regrets for sacked spy expert’, BBC News Online (29 October 2004).

315 Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq’.

316 Quoted from R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Official sacked over TV remarks on Iraq’, The Guardian (26 July 2004). After ‘speaking out’ on the BBC Panorama programme in July 2004, John Morrison then subsequently lost his job as the UK ISC investigator. This role has not been filled again since. For details on the BBC Panorama programme, see ‘A failure of intelligence’, BBC Panorama Online (09 July 2004) - via URL: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/3850979.stm> (accessed: 05/01/2007). [A full transcript of the programme broadcast can also be downloaded via this link.]


See *Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implementation of its Conclusions*, p.3.


Some of the reconstruction that was able to be undertaken, was also found to be flawed – see, for example, J. Glanz, ‘Inspectors Find Rebuilt Projects Crumbling in Iraq’, *The New York Times* (29 April 2007); D. Hedgpeth, ‘U.S. Rebuilding in Iraq Is Missing Key Goals, Report Finds: Production of Oil, Electricity Falls Short’, *The Washington Post* (30 April 2007); J. Glanz, ‘Inspector of Projects in Iraq Under Investigation’, *The New York Times* (04 May 2007); for other obstacles, see J. Glanz, ‘As U.S. Rebuilds, Iraq Won’t Act on Finished Work’, *The New York Times* (28 July 2007); see also J. Corbin, ‘BBC uncovers lost Iraq billions: A BBC investigation estimates that around $23bn (£11.75bn) may have been lost, stolen or just not properly accounted for in Iraq’, *BBC News Online* (10 June 2008).


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331 See, for example, M. Huband, ‘MI6 and CIA seek to draw a line under very bad year’, The Financial Times (23 December 2004); see also P. Heap, ‘Comment: The truth behind the MI6 façade’, The Guardian (02 October 2003).

332 See, for example, Wilkie, ‘The Big Lie’ in his Axis of Deceit, pp.75-102; see also ‘The big lie’, The Sydney Morning Herald (19 June 2004) for an edited extract from Axis of Deceit.

333 ‘Blair “unaware” of WMD threat’; see also ‘Blair accused over WMD evidence’; see also the Butler Committee, Report, pp.137-8.

334 ‘Weapons dossier “sent back six times”’.

335 ‘Q&A: The weapons evidence’, BBC News Online (20 July 2004).

336 The Butler Committee, Report, p.144.

337 ‘No 10 defends spy chief Scarlett’, BBC News Online (02 August 2004).

338 Corera, ‘Analysis: Death of the 45-minute claim’.

339 See also Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq’.

340 See also The Financial Times security correspondent, Stephen Fidler’s analysis of US Professor Philip Bobbitt’s new book Terror and Consent (London: Allen Lane, 2008), in S. Fidler, ‘The way we war’, The Financial Times (07 June 2008) - especially where he notes: ‘Bobbitt argues that as the nature of states has changed over history so has the form of terrorism that has challenged them. The terrorism with which we were most familiar during the 20th century was associated with the nation state, national in focus and with a national agenda. Now, he argues nation states are morphing into “market states”, dependent on global international markets, decentralised, devolved and deriving their legitimacy from maximising individual opportunity. Out of this has emerged a new style of terrorism that “will be just as global, networked, decentralised and devolved and rely just as much on outsourcing and incentivizing as the market state”. Such terrorism does not rely on the support of states and is not constrained by the limits on violence that used to be imposed by state sponsors or by the
requirement to maintain popular support. Moreover, these new terror groups have the potential to cause mass casualties because they have access through new technological developments and clandestine markets to biological or nuclear weapons…”


342 See also S.P. Rosen, ‘After Proliferation: What to do if more states go nuclear’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006).


344 See also, for instance, B. Berkowitz, ‘Commentary: The Big Difference Between Intelligence and Evidence’, The Washington Post (02 February 2003).

345 ‘Transforming our counterproliferation efforts in Asia region’, States News Service (15 August 2005).

346 See also, for example, Warrick, ‘Secretive Agency Under the Spotlight’.


349 For a description of the ‘levels of relations’ involved, see, for instance, as outlined in Chapter 2 of this study, above.

350 ‘Interview: Tyler Drumheller’.


352 See, for example, ‘UK Iraq policy a “rank disaster”’.


Chapter 6
Conclusion

‘This is a brave new world for Western intelligence agencies. It will demand in most instances close cooperation with the host spy service where the incident occurred or the perpetrator can be found. Liaison relationships thus become crucial, doubtless sometimes leading to overinvolvement with local brigands like Manuel Noriega in Panama and, reportedly, Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru. Nonetheless, there is a long history of Western law enforcement dealing successfully with the criminal challenges of mob violence, terrorism, and drug trafficking domestically, so there is ample room for collaboration and a sharing of spy expertise with the gumshoes. It will just be a different world.’

- F.P. Hitz, former CIA Inspector General

[1.0]: The intelligence world and the wider globalised context

The Cold War era was arguably the zenith of ‘realism’. This was the case both in international affairs and, more specifically, in the intelligence world. The new post-Cold War era ushered in a time of much soul-searching for intelligence. With the demise of the ‘Soviet Issue’, there was increased uncertainty about what the future might hold. This was especially apparent in the context of the post-Cold War ‘peace dividend’ intelligence budget cuts witnessed in the early 1990s.

As the post-Cold War era progressed, the trend of greater international co-operation emerged. Both generally, as well as more specifically within the field of intelligence, this trend became manifest as a response to the continuing general rapid globalisation, and to the exponentially increasing ‘complex interdependence’ trends proliferating in international affairs. Moreover, this trend has been increasing particularly rapidly after the events of 9/11 and in the wake of the other terrorist attacks, including during the ‘emergency’ and/or ‘war’ conditions fostered by the so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’. As US intelligence consultant Larry L. Watts observed:

The 9/11 attacks accelerated [some already existing post-Cold War] efforts to transform the orientation of intelligence services from rivalry, both domestic and international, to cooperating against the new threats. This was an unprecedented situation for intelligence services where considerations of secrecy, trust, and national security made them the
strongest bastion of the nation-state and its sovereignty against all other states and their institutions.\textsuperscript{6}

In this context, complex trade-offs are increasingly prevalent. This includes the claim made by Jusuf Wanandi that: ‘We are locked in a struggle for ideas and beliefs…’\textsuperscript{7} Neither can the trade-offs be so easily avoided or postponed. As the UK commentator Will Hutton has astutely observed: ‘The lesson for the twenty-first century is that the fight for security, prosperity and justice can no longer be won on any one nation’s ground. It is international…’ Importantly, he continued: ‘It requires a political narrative. It requires courage and leadership…’\textsuperscript{8} Sustainable enterprises for viably tackling the contemporary global security issues continue to need to be found. Moreover, they require further development.\textsuperscript{9} They also need to better build upon and adapt earlier ‘older’ lessons, not least those from history, which still have at least some relevance.\textsuperscript{10} In summary, the importance of strategy has been enhanced. Indeed, as the Danish political scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen has remarked: ‘We have stopped believing in lasting peace, what is left is only strategy – we had better be good at it.’\textsuperscript{11}

[1.1]: Complex co-existence plurality:

Overall, adopting the concept of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ helps to explain current developments.\textsuperscript{12} This is particularly apt when utilising the tool of international relations (IR) theory to aid our general understanding, and in order to further explain the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison. The ‘complex co-existence plurality’ that emerges from empirical research can be readily characterised. It appears to consist of the previous Cold War ‘norm(s)’ becoming increasingly (but not entirely) outmoded. In its newer definition, the overall realist-dominated and the more subordinated collective/co-operative/human security-sympathetic theories’ hierarchy now instead becomes more flattened, and thereby somewhat more equalised.\textsuperscript{13} As Oxford Professor Sir Adam Roberts has argued: ‘If there is a single theme that unites what follows, it is recognition, even celebration, of a pluralist approach both to the actual conduct of international relations and to the academic subject.’\textsuperscript{14}

The ‘complex co-existence plurality’ also resonates with the ‘hybridisation’ aspect of globalisation.\textsuperscript{15} Together with the exponential breaking-down of other traditional boundaries (physical, virtual, analytical and managerial), the different IR theory positions simultaneously appear harder to disaggregate than previously. This is particularly the case as there is variation in all the different IR theory positions discernable at all the different (horizontal) levels of analysis of intelligence liaison at the same (vertical) point in time of evaluation (see figure 2, Chapter 2 [4.1]). For
instance, in one characterisation, at the high/macro quartet of levels, liberal internationalism could be the dominant mode; while concurrently at the lower/micro quartet of levels, realism instead dominates.

Which position ultimately triumphs over the whole particular intelligence liaison relationship or ‘system’ therefore continues to remain highly contestable. This is especially the case if those analysts from what can be regarded a realist position, and equally if those from a liberal internationalist/institutionalist position, both pragmatically adopt similar means (modi operandi) to explain practically the same challenges and to reach similar end solutions (modus vivendi). Furthermore, this will continue to be debatable well into the foreseeable future. This is because in such dynamic domains, any ability to determine with greater clarity in a consensual manner where one theory begins and another ends is unlikely to be forthcoming. Hence, at a minimum, a duality exists across all the levels, extending more plausibly to a plurality.

Evidently each IR theory position individually is not adequate enough. It does not provide a sufficiently powerful explanation for what can be observed over time at all the different levels of intelligence liaison. An overabundance of realism in the increasingly globalised post-Cold War world and within the overarching ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance - including resistance to the greater sharing of intelligence, and the related consequent over-compartmentalising of intelligence in mutually exclusive silos - has repeatedly been found wanting. Moreover, it is increasingly unsustainable. As the Butler Report remarked:

We have … seen evidence of difficulties that arose from the unduly strict “compartmentalisation” of intelligence. It was wrong that a report which was of significance in the drafting of a document of the importance of the dossier was not shown to key experts in the DIS [Defence Intelligence Staff] who could have commented on the validity and credibility of the report. We conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports on technical matters to the most expert available analysis.

The ‘blocks’, in the form of some resistance, still remain the case. This is even despite the realist paradigm morphing into neo-realism, where perhaps there is some more room for accommodation and compromise. As Australian IR theorist Scott Burchill has noted: ‘The strength of the realist tradition… [stems from] its capacity to argue from necessity.’ Perhaps this is most apparent vis-à-vis ‘the State’.
[1.2]: Under siege, encouraging change, but not overwhelmed:
While still resilient, ‘the State’ - as the primary actor in international affairs (a central pillar of the realist view) - is considerably besieged. This is on all sides, by the globalisation-associated breaking down of traditional barriers, and their related categories of analysis and management allocation. Despite the presence of some privatisation trends, intelligence still continues to be substantially linked to the State. Intelligence, therefore, is also not disconnected from these wider developments or unaffected by them. Neither can intelligence overlook them. Indeed, the general flow of the overarching globalisation trends even further enhances the importance of intelligence, including in a capacity and capability-extending manner. This is equally the case whether those trends are deemed positive and/or negative in their nature. Aware of the increased centrality of its role, in 2007, the CIA evaluated the ‘Strategic Environment’ in the following bleak terms:

We operate in an unstable and dangerous world where international terrorism, the rise of new powers, and the accelerating pace of economic and technological change will place enormous strains on the ability of states to govern and will sharply increase the potential for strategic surprises.

Undeniably, in an operating context where threats and issues - and with them interests - go from national to regional then global, with there also often being a feedback loop to the individual (local), some sort of response is needed.

Some responses have been witnessed. Frequently, ‘the State’ tries to maintain its primacy against the global concerns. These have attempted to be intelligence-led. Arguably, these responses also include launching the ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’, a move in order to tackle the so-called ‘new’ global terrorism, as well as deal with ‘rogue’ regimes - such as Taliban-dominated Afghanistan (from 2001) and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (from 2003) - and other ‘states of concern’, notably Iran and North Korea. Neither can Pakistan be overlooked in Western-led counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts. This is particularly because – in all of its globalisation-empowered ‘entrepreneurialism’ - several contemporary intelligence and security investigative roads lead in its direction.

Equally, the global concerns require ‘global solutions’. As UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett declared in a speech in July 2006: ‘...the globalisation of economies and the globalisation of threats requires a globalised response – in other words multilateralism.’ If only by its close association with the State, intelligence also has quickly recognised, and then increasingly adopted, this last quality (see below [2.2]). During the multinational operations especially in Iraq and Afghanistan,
in the domain of intelligence we have also witnessed, as US defence analyst Derek Reveron has remarked, that ‘widely disseminated U.S. intelligence has become institutionalized… [including] a variety of new partners.’

However, sometimes, the State’s reassertion is not always so well judged. At times, its responses can be ascertained as being ‘disproportionate’. Disappointingly, this is often at the expense of human and constitutional rights, privacy and civil liberties, both at home and abroad. Worse, similarly located publics become commensurably disillusioned. This includes their worries about intelligence imbalances becoming prevalent, such as being ‘over-spied’ on, as well as their concerns that State responses are overly militarised, including the use of rendition and intensive interrogation techniques (see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.ii-4.1.iii]).

[1.3]: Evolving ‘norms’:
The changes to previously existing ‘norms’ are readily perceptible. Clearly, intelligence also has not been immune from these general trends. On some occasions, perhaps it has even led the way. Former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman is not entirely wide of the mark when claiming:

From [the globalisation-associated developments outlined above] comes the possibility of a new paradigm for intelligence. In the international system of (normal) states, it is moving to becoming not a zero-sum contest, but a cooperative activity between them, directed against common threats and common concerns. Even major policy disagreements ... are based on shared (or partially shared) evidence; Intelligence has become the material of world wide inter-governmental and public discourse. The paradigm of cooperative intelligence activity and interpretation was implicit in the developments of the 1990s, but with 9/11 and subsequent events it can now be articulated.

However, what exists appears to be more complex. Rather than being so completely transformed (in a ‘flattened’ manner), some previous continuity with ‘older’/traditional and more familiar trends (‘spikiness’) persists in parallel in the intelligence world. The prevailing picture is believed to be better conceptualised as being essentially the more (but not entirely) flattened and equalised ‘complex co-existence plurality’, as detailed above (see [1.1]).

The nature of the overall ‘normal’ ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance depends on circumstances. Moreover, demonstrating its context specificity, its calibration varies from intelligence liaison relationship to intelligence liaison relationship. For example, the balance struck in the UK-US intelligence liaison
relationship is different from that struck in the US-Pakistan intelligence liaison relationship. In short, the overall ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance depends on: (i) the nature and details of the eight attributes or variables of intelligence liaison (as defined in Chapter 1 [8.0]); as well as (ii) being according to the different ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balances that emerge at all the different levels of intelligence liaison, (a) at different points in time, (b) in different contexts, and (c) at the different points of evaluation.

The prevailing intelligence paradigm is, therefore, still the functional one of optimised reach. More specifically, the intelligence liaison paradigm remains the descendant one of optimised outreach - as arguably since time immemorial. Although, today, due to observed phenomena - such as both globalisation and glocalisation trends - the intelligence and security reach extends further (wider and deeper), and on greater and continuing exponential bases. Here is where change is most evident.

[2.0]: Placing UK-US intelligence liaison in the wider context

UK-US intelligence liaison inevitably does not occur in a contextual vacuum isolated from the general trends. It, too, buys into the exponential outreach in harmony with being on ‘a continuum with expansion’ (see below [3.0]). Today, we are also operating in a context where, according to one analyst, former CIA operative Charles Cogan, intelligence services post-9/11 have become more ‘hunters not gatherers’ (external influences and factors). This has especially been seen when implementing the counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation paradigms.

However, some overarching intelligence imbalances are again readily evident within this more specific domain of intelligence activity. The novelist John le Carré brilliantly summarised the four key ‘pillars’ of the intelligence world in the title of his book: Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy. Today, the optimisation (including ‘professionalisation’) efforts of intelligence continue apace in both the UK and US (see Chapter 1 [4.0-5.0]). Moreover, the UK and US (together with other partners) are certainly doing the ‘soldiering’, with the deployment of Special Forces (and conventional troops) in theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and by conducting covert operations across the globe; the UK and US are certainly doing the ‘spying’, with the presence of extended surveillance activities. But, are the UK and US doing enough ‘tinkering’ (short-term/tactical fixes/engineering activities); and – especially – ‘tailoring’ (long-term/strategic fixes/engineering activities)?

Concerning these last two ‘pillars’, arguably they are not. Moreover, some of those efforts that are present, such as most contemporaneously witnessed vis-à-vis
Iran, even head unhelpfully in the wrong directions.\textsuperscript{38} Especially amid the higher/macro intelligence functions, opportunities and possibilities can be seized more substantially and creatively. Here, more concerted efforts need to be made in order to have an appropriately transformative impact on intelligence and the world beyond. It is, therefore, particularly these last two pillars, and what they can collectively yield, that need to be further exploited into the future by the UK and US as the 21st century progresses.

Greater leadership and vision is also essential in those efforts. This is especially necessary as, unfortunately, so far the overarching attempts witnessed in the domains of counter-terrorism (Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.0]) and WMD non-/counter-proliferation (Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [3.0]) have generally had mixed results. Moreover, distinct shortcomings are apparent. This is not least as the \textit{spying} and \textit{soldiering} activities have predominated over the \textit{tinkering} and \textit{tailoring} activities. All these diverse areas now need to be more intelligently refined, as well as to be better connected - especially so the \textit{intelligence methodology} can be better appreciated, resourced, and then used, into the future by both the UK and US.

In this context, together with its prevailing use, intelligence has been (and still is) compelled to reform. Or, at least, further change is required. Moreover, rather than being resistant, intelligence needs to keep vigilant and evolve at a quicker pace than experienced previously.\textsuperscript{39} This is reflected in the traditional outreach, underpinning and sustaining intelligence activities over time, now becoming conducted at a higher tempo along the lines of an exponential mode (see, for instance, as discussed in Chapter 1 [9.2]). Intelligence also has to become more globalised (less nationally compartmentalised) in order to effectively deal with all the frequently competing pushes and pulls exerted on it.\textsuperscript{40} This includes better and earlier engagement with the global challenges, not least in the contemporary higher-tempo and condensed-space operating environments.\textsuperscript{41}

Having greater international intelligence liaison is central to that process. This includes extending to having more outreach in the overt intelligence domain. The increased intelligence liaison simultaneously reflects the elements of some enduring realist influence. In many cases, this is through developments being protected by US (and UK) led agreements embodying the desired outcomes of the processes of greater ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ (or at least the attempts towards those ends\textsuperscript{42}); as well as, similarly to as witnessed during the Cold War era, helping to create proxies attuned to their interests, promoted through mechanisms such as national interest-complementing intelligence and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives.\textsuperscript{43}
[2.1]: Identifying and exploring roots, killing weeds:
The more combined global interests have emerged for several reasons. Suitably reflecting the overall plurality involved, this is either: (i) because US national security interests, and those of other countries, have converged; or (ii) they are sufficiently harmonisable. This is thanks to the same/similar threats being jointly and directly experienced by many states across the world - for example, in the form of the series of jihadist-related terrorist attacks witnessed during 2000-05 and beyond. Or else, (iii) it is out of convenience - for instance, for countries’ own domestic purposes. Or (iv) it is because interests have been compelled to become harmonised and converge by top-down coercion from the besieged hegemonic US ‘hyperpower’ - as enunciated by the 2001 ‘Bush Doctrine’: ‘either you are with us or against us.’ 44 The presence of coercion also helps to account for the increase in international intelligence liaison on counter-terrorism with non-traditional intelligence liaison and/or less-friendly partners, such as (at least publicly for a time for the US) Syria. 45 Again, there are many ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’ that need to be factored in during adequate contextualisation. Moreover, it is detrimentally reductionist to select just one for emphasis during analysis.

Indeed, the presence of the global interests opens up the possibility and increases the necessity for greater intelligence liaison on deeper and wider bases. As terrorists, traffickers, proliferators and other (organised) criminals have extended the reach of their influence, so have security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This route has been followed in order to (at the least) compensate. 46 Today, arguably, that intelligence and security reach tries to be extended yet further - to stay ahead, and thus better pre-empt, these globalisation-empowered adversaries.

A more globalised intelligence capability is simultaneously needed. Such considerations include one that is able to comprehensively provide a more holistic and timely picture of the threats and challenges faced now and into the future. This is particularly the case today with many states – notably the US, UK and Australia - opting to pursue potentially risky proactive and pre-emptive preventative security and foreign policies, which can be further provocative. As Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz has observed, pre-emption is a ‘knife that cuts both ways.’ 47 Therefore, by applying a greater intelligence methodology, the scenario that eventually emerges can be increasingly engineered. Indeed, by doing the enhanced engineering, better calibration efforts can be realised, helping to ensure that the emergent scenario ‘cuts’ (works) more the way desired in its effects and outcomes. Namely, this is more effectively facilitating the condition of ‘operational policy’ so it can have the best opportunity to succeed. 48
[2.2]: Intelligence and globalisation:
The intelligence world is not isolated from other general trends. Closely associated are those observable as burgeoning in the business world. As Brian McKern has argued: ‘Managers are much more concerned today with communications laterally, across functions and across national boundaries, than with the vertical flows associated with the traditional hierarchy...’ Continuing, he remarked: ‘Managers have to deal with far greater complexity in the management of business than in the past, arising from the more rapid pace of change, the density of communication linkages and greater diversity in business lines, geography, personnel, and business partners.’ Meanwhile, on an organisational plane of analysis, as UK intelligence scholar Philip Davies notes: ‘The presence of collegial and organic structures in a secret service is, in many respects, a counter-intuitive phenomenon... [especially] in a field of activity where security and “compartmentalization”... must be paramount...’ Significantly, neither has the intelligence world been divorced from further relevant developments, including the general ‘boom’ in the PR (public relations) industry.

Both UK and US intelligence have also been participating more in their own so-called ‘PR’ activities. Again, these can be closely associated with the outreach activities.

So, are we witnessing the ‘globalisation of intelligence’? Yes. As the US intelligence scholar Loch Johnson has observed:

Indeed as globalization (interdependence) seems to bring in its wake a greater incidence of worldwide terrorist, drug, and criminal activity, victimized nations have proven more willing to provide some of their intelligence findings to one another and – a dramatic change in norms – to international organizations, in what Herman refers to as the “globalization of intelligence”...

Even if we adopt a cautious stance, distinct trends emerge. Gradually and unevenly, phenomena that can be characterised as being moves that overall add up to being the globalisation of intelligence can be seen to be underway. These uneven and combined developments are frequently led and determined by the US, and the UK - through the prevailing hegemony of the close UK-US (extending to UKUSA) intelligence liaison relationship. Or, if adopting more of a sceptic’s stance and ‘globalisation’ is defined narrowly, at the very least, the globalisation of intelligence movements can be seen to be starting to be made. This is notably in the direction of greater intelligence sharing and increased co-operation with other countries.

How calculated or consolidated these ‘globalisation of intelligence’ moves are is more of a moot point. This is particularly in terms of what can be conceptualised as
an overall coherent and co-ordinated international intelligence liaison strategy. There are some pointers that arguably such an approach to an extent has been adopted.\(^53\) Although, several key questions concerning this issue remain unanswered. For example: (i) how connected these moves are; (ii) how far they extend; and (iii) how far they are being implemented beyond being there perhaps more in rhetorical and theoretical terms; as well as (iv) whether they are being implemented in more fragmented ways (in disjointed short-term tactical rather than connected longer-term strategic manners), is perhaps more debatable.

Furthermore, other uncertainties persist concerning these ‘globalisation of intelligence’ movements. For instance: (i) whether and to what extent such an approach is entirely by design; or (ii) has come about more naturally (organically); or (iii) essentially by ‘accident’, driven by circumstances - rather than explicitly consciously – is considerably harder to unpack. Most likely, reflecting the complexities involved, over time the current scenario appears to have arisen through a complex pluralistic mixture of all these varying drivers and methodologies/approaches, including their different balances. Unevenness is therefore again effectively reflected.\(^54\)

While mixed, the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ movements (together with those of their facilitator, intelligence liaison) are not ambiguous. Admittedly in the covert intelligence realm, they tend to extend less widely and deeply. This is particularly the times when there is enduring reluctance to surrender the perceived sovereignty of ‘intelligence property rights’. These are developments that are especially evident mainly at the plurilateral and multilateral levels, and especially to those actors deemed not so trustworthy. Elements of intelligence protectionism continue, with a careful eye to counter-intelligence trends and security anxieties. This is in order to maintain some control and to protect sources, as is particularly apparent in the domain of HUMINT.\(^55\)

In short, gradually the best aspects of intelligence co-operation attempt to be traded-off effectively and carefully with the best aspects of intelligence protectionism.\(^56\) Unsurprisingly in the more overt intelligence realm, the globalisation trends have tended to flourish considerably more freely. However, in order to have proper utility, these efforts should not be structure-less or be entirely uncontrolled.

Significantly, many of the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ moves appear to be being made on rigorous UK-US terms and conditions. This is most perceptible in the domain of counter-terrorism, and vis-à-vis intelligence and security sector reform (SSR) initiatives (see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.1.iv], above). These contribute towards helping to define the operational parameters and towards establishing the
intelligence liaison arrangement frameworks. Moreover, these developments are shaped, at least in part, by the technological and information-originating factors involved. Operating under such constraints again helps to explain these developments’ overall uneven advance. This is so that degrees of substantial US – and, by close association, UK - control and hegemony over intelligence power can be sustained into the increasingly globalised intelligence future. At least on occasions, moments of unipolarity also wish to be preserved.

Some control, however, has been carefully traded-off. This is evident within countries’ internationally connected terrorist threat integration/analysis centres, such as JTAC in the UK, as well as within arrangements such as the CIA’s ‘Alliance Base’ in Paris and Counterterrorism Intelligence Centers (CTICs). Moreover, this intelligence control trade-off has been done in order to try and meet the more pressing higher political requirements of tackling the global threats in potentially the most successful manner possible. As Watts has observed: ‘After the Cold War, especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil, a new wave of reform focused more on effectiveness and functional coordination than on control per se...’ Simultaneously, as McKern has noted vis-à-vis the business world, which also resonates considerably in the intelligence world: ‘For most industries and for most firms, it is no longer possible to depend on a competitive position arising from monopoly, location, protection or privileged access to resources or markets...’

Again, how far this control has been relinquished to those ends remains debatable. Some protectionism in the security sector is simultaneously witnessed as at least trying to be maintained. This is as other alternative, and frequently traditional, barriers (virtual – ICT firewalls - and physical – border walls, such as Israel’s security wall and the US-Mexican border fence) are constructed - in order to try and reassert some greater state-centric, and more individualistic, security control amid the general erosions.

[2.3]: Persisting US intelligence hegemony:
The greater international intelligence liaison (extending to including outreach) allows much. Most significantly, it enables the US global hegemony of intelligence power and intelligence omniscience to be increasingly realised and maintained. Yet, all is not as rosy as this scenario might depict. This is because in parallel the US hegemony of intelligence power is being increasingly challenged. As US Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Henry A. Crumpton observed in January 2006:

Globalization and the related spread of free market economies, liberal values and institutions, and a developing global cultural network has provided unprecedented advancements in so many areas. This global
interdependence, in the long run, will make us all more secure. ... Yet, this growing interdependence, inexorably linked to technology, poses risks because our infrastructure is increasingly more fragile. Our global interdependence makes us stronger, but also in some aspects, more vulnerable.\(^{65}\)

To a greater extent than previously, the US is dependent upon its international intelligence liaison relationships, including outreach, for what Rumsfeld called the ‘scraps of information that people from all across the globe [can provide].’\(^{66}\) This is even in order to best sustain America’s traditional general insularity and ‘isolationism’ qualities. However, essentially the US can substantially continue its role of being the hub at the centre and at the top of the collective web of the plethora of variously overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Together, these provide global coverage/reach and reflect the outcome of the increasing globalisation of intelligence. The intelligence power in turn is additionally essential for at least attempting to successfully pursue the desired pre-emptive security and foreign policies in a suitably timely manner. Moreover, through the diversification of intelligence liaison risks, at least some enhanced resilience is provided. This is albeit while simultaneously making oversight and accountability activities increasingly challenging. More complex trade-offs are encountered.

[2.4]: USA not alone:
While the US essentially persists as the overall hegemon in the realm of intelligence, its ‘friends and allies’ can also gain. In return for greater intelligence power-sustaining liaison with the US, ‘special’ partners - such as the UK and, to further extents than previously, Australia and Canada - can increasingly tap into some of the US global hegemony of intelligence power and intelligence resources. This is facilitated through their close friendship and alliance with the US. Simultaneously, therefore, the collective/co-operative/human security dividends of the US intelligence power can then be deployed more widely top-down and paternalistically for their benefit.\(^{67}\) In these circumstances, the US can act as a benevolent hegemon. Ultimately and primarily, however, that power can be deployed for the US itself. This takes place in a context that involves a convenient so-called ‘coincidence of interests’. At a minimum, a duality consisting of ‘altruism’ and ‘egoism’, continues firmly in place - extending to a plurality when involving their derivatives.\(^{68}\)

Once intelligence is increasingly globalised according to this model, a system that operates on more of a globally omniscient basis emerges. Of course it is not perfect, and neither should we ever expect it to be. However, this all-/most-seeing (or reaching) intelligence arrangement arguably helps to better deliver the ideal type
of a more holistic and all-/most-knowing (or optimised reach) improved intelligence capability. Again, this is required for pursuing the pre-emptive preventative security and foreign policies.

States and their governments can then focus on pragmatically trying to successfully tackle the early-twenty-first century global challenges into the future.\(^{69}\) This includes in a more \textit{a priori} and intelligence-informed \textit{risk management} manner, capitalising upon enhanced \textit{foresight} activities (including scenarios), ‘ahead of the curve’ of events to a greater extent, and more firmly doing \textit{opportunity management}, including seizing the \textit{architectural} and \textit{engineering} possibilities. These are moves that should figure prominently and be on the ascendency, rather than intelligence and security services instead having to merely act increasingly akin to emergency first-responders, more ‘behind the curve’ of events, and, as a consequence, having to adopt more extreme (and hence potentially more contestable) \textit{crisis management} approaches \textit{post facto}.\(^{70}\) Unfortunately, particularly during the episodes where controversial ‘disproportionality’ is observed, the attempted policy efforts can flounder.\(^{71}\)

Indeed, these episodes of ‘failure’ can also be measured in terms of the (mis-)configurations or (mis-)calibrations of intelligence and/or security \textit{reach} involved. Factors, such as the ‘speed’ of those (and closely related) dynamics’ implementation, can be similarly included.\(^{72}\) Richard Popplewell has even appropriately characterised these types of episodes as ‘lacking intelligence’, or certainly they lack its informing qualities to an adequate enough extent.\(^{73}\)

A model featuring a considerably enhanced intelligence methodology instead needs to prevail. As Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War at the University of Oxford, reminds us: ‘…security is relative, not absolute.’\(^{74}\) The proposed model can be along the lines of a consecutively (or linearly) implemented 3-step opportunity-generating risk management programme, involving appropriately inter-linked (i) problem analysis, (ii) containment, and then (iii) rollback (summarised as P-C-R). While prevailing in the domain of counter-proliferation, for instance, this model can then also be viably used in a range of other circumstances - including with regard to counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT) enterprises.\(^{75}\) Unless (and/or until) the ‘problem analysis’ dimension is considerably enhanced, through better and suitably informing contextualisation efforts, the problem solving cannot be commensurably improved. Simultaneously, potential ‘solutions’ - for instance, in the form of well-considered strategies - remain increasingly elusive.
Focussing on UK-US intelligence liaison relations is instructive. These interactions can communicate several significant details. A useful place to begin is with a comparison. Is this a study of contrasts? Partly, but that term is perhaps not the most appropriate to use. Neither does it appear to offer the only or indeed the deepest analysis that can be rendered. The term ‘contrast’ does not sufficiently capture the full complexities and dynamics evidently inherent within contemporary UK-US intelligence liaison interactions. Significantly, more contrasts appear to emerge as we delve deeper, and examine the micro/lower and narrower quartet of levels belonging to the range of intelligence liaison relationships underway between the UK and US. This is where affairs especially concern details and specifics - as often seen, an important domain in the intelligence world (see Chapter 2 [4.1]).

Across all levels of analysis in UK-US intelligence liaison relations, values appear to have great significance. Here, there appear to be lesser immediate and pressing ‘balance sheet’ considerations in terms of the weighing up of the costs and benefits of the relations. Moreover, some of the quid pro quo bargains that do feature are sculpted at the macro/higher levels, in the form of ‘areas of responsibility’, such as in the domains of each country’s respective key expertise - for example, for the UK, mainly in the realm of HUMINT, and for the US, mainly in the domain of TECHINT. This is so that these sorts of interactions do not have to be so worked out (other than their implementation) at the micro/lower levels of interoperability and interaction on a day-to-day basis; because these ‘deals’ have already been adequately determined elsewhere.

Overall, the dominance of similarities in UK-US intelligence liaison relations appears to be apparent. Differences also figure centrally. However, repeatedly, a discernable pattern emerges with regard to the differences. In each of the functional issues areas liaised over by the UK and US - whether it is on counter-terrorism, WMD non-/counter-proliferation, or joint Special Forces operations – similar differences are apparent. These can also be mitigated deploying similar strategies across the different issue areas. This is suggestive of how negatively leaning differences can be smartly dealt with when they emerge. It also provides a roadmap for later management techniques of these and associated contested issues as they arise in UK-US intelligence liaison relations in the future.

UK-US intelligence liaison is again better conceptualised as consisting of a ‘complex co-existence plurality’. Notably, this is one that intimately involves other considerations and conditions than merely similarities and differences. For instance, UK-US intelligence liaison interactions also include multiple bargains or ‘fudges’. These ‘fudges’ consist of situations where agreement is struck to essentially ‘agree to
disagree’. In the process, detailed differences held by each party can be mutually glossed over or traded-off, resulting in some greater neutralisation. Furthermore, these ‘fudge’ scenarios concern episodes where several differences over specifics within the liaison, particularly present at micro/lower levels, are considerably suppressed or navigated. Or else, they are substantially tidied in order to reach better agreement at the macro/higher levels, such as at the strategy/policy level. Frequently these compromises are implemented by the UK so that at least some degree of ‘access’ (or ‘buy-in’) into the high-level military and/or political US decision-making processes can be sufficiently maintained.99

In the meantime, the operators working at the micro/lower levels would then have to engage and produce/deliver essentially whatever the prevailing circumstances. With adequate contextualisation more passed over by policy/decision-makers, the operators would have to creatively devise ways of solving the problems and challenges subsequently experienced ‘on-the-ground’ and ‘out-in-the-field’.80 Arguably, several of these episodes of ‘fudging’, together with their associated negative fallout, were most starkly evident in the run-up to the war in Iraq in 2002-2003, with much controversy and rancour simultaneously sticking on both sides of the Atlantic. This was alongside the (out)reach deficits and excesses in UK-US intelligence liaison relations being most emphasised (see Chapter 5: Case Study 2, above). Into the future, Iran may form the next test case for the UK and US.81

Indeed, the labels the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’, emerge as the most appropriate to be adopted for analytical purposes. This is not least to better capture the plurality of interactions involved in UK-US intelligence liaison relations. In the relations, all of these ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ dimensions feature in parallel. They co-exist in complex ways. This perhaps allows us to go beyond just observing the mere similarities and differences in our evaluations of UK-US intelligence liaison relations in the early 21st century.82 By using the ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ ‘lens’ approach, deeper analyses can be better attained. This is not least as differences, in all of their dynamism, can be both: (i) positive, offering synergistic and complementing qualities (‘good, but different’, in overall judgements of their effects and outcomes); as well as judged as being (ii) more negative and counter-productively ‘ugly’; and (iii) ‘bad’, in their overarching nature, which causes stress.

‘Continuities’ can also be legitimately raised. They deserve equal consideration alongside the ‘contrasts’. Both structurally and culturally, the UK and US are still essentially characterisable as being ‘Greeks and Romans’ (see, for example, Chapter 4, above). Yet, in conjunction with frequently trying to variously address these structural and cultural differences, as observed previously, together the UK and US continue to navigate the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ more or less
effectively in their relations. This is as well as similarly negotiating those characteristics in global politics beyond, in other countries across the world. Overall, in the contemporary era of globalisation, their interactions continue on the trajectory that can be appropriately characterised as being on ‘a continuum with expansion’, including across each of the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ dimensions.

Again drawing upon the schools of generic Anglo-American relations (see Chapter 2 [4.1], above), overall ‘functionalism’ repeatedly appears to succeed the most in UK-US intelligence liaison relations. This continues to be the case, apart from when there are occasionally some more specific operational restrictions that make fleeting inroads. Indeed, this overall predominance of ‘functionalism’ perhaps comes as an unsurprising conclusion given the centrality of the functional issues driving the rationale for relations. At least some ‘evangelicalism’ appears to be another dominant mode, performing at least a supporting role to the ‘functionalism’ in relations. Sometimes it is even an essential component. This is not least when UK and US operators are working literally side-by-side in high tempo/condensed battle spaces. As RAF Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner also earlier stressed in the context of OPERATION ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’, routine face-to-face interactions - together with other tangible, extending to intangible, aspects - clearly matter in UK-US intelligence liaison relations (see Chapter 4 [10.0]). Loss of ‘functionalism’ would clearly spell serious problems.

‘Terminalism’ is instead much less prevalent. Any ‘terminalism’, when it approaches the surface in UK-US intelligence liaison relations, on the whole is sporadic. It remains confined to particular episodes of disconnect and restricted to specific sectors. Moreover, largely, it is immediately consigned to the background. This is where defusing and mitigating efforts are then quickly undertaken. In summary, any shortcomings and shortfalls experienced in UK-US intelligence liaison relations figure embedded in circumstances where the tackling of the globalised security challenges in high-tempo/condensed space environments occupies a higher priority position on the considerably homogenised UK and US intelligence, security and foreign policy agendas. At least usually, these agenda items hence generally override UK and US disconnects in terms of their importance.

However, observing this last consideration should not prevent the UK from taking more of an independent line or stance vis-à-vis the US. In international relations, vis-à-vis is not the same as versus. Neither should these two operators be conflated. On the whole, the UK and US are broadly exemplary ‘friends and allies’. More or less successfully, they will ‘press on’ in this manner into the future. Although there have arguably been some lapses on occasions, these have essentially been quickly addressed. Their long (and shared) history of co-operating together also
readily demonstrates that times of wider and deeper differences/difficulties can be overcome. Again, the ‘blip’ in relations surrounding the ‘Suez Crisis’ of 1956 can be highlighted as a well-known example, from which recovery was successfully accomplished.\textsuperscript{83} The UK and US will therefore continue to be broadly exemplary ‘friends and allies’ for the foreseeable future. This is albeit at times in slightly reconfigured and recalibrated manners, ideally determined appropriately according to the prevailing contexts.

To enhance UK and US intelligence capabilities, as well as to help prevent disconnects from receiving further oxygen, other movements can be readily made. As both Sir Stephen Lander and SIGINT scholar Matthew Aid have valuably suggested (see Chapter 3 \[4.0\]), perhaps more energy should be invested in the multilateral UKUSA arrangement? This is to better mitigate some of the witnessed pressures and difficulties on the more direct bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison relationship. The ‘shortcomings’ of UK-US intelligence relations highlighted earlier by critics (see, for instance, those outlined in Chapter 1 \[10.0\]), would simultaneously be better addressed by pursuing this more inclusive approach. Through UKUSA’s careful widening and deepening over time, a greater number of partners, including those in Europe, could be engaged in more of a ‘burden-sharing’ manner on the contemporary globalised and transnational threats, that currently and mutually confront us all. Indeed, this type of change could even have a transformative effect on intelligence. This is because the greater maximisation and exploitation of international intelligence resources, along further enhanced ‘need to share/pool’ lines, would be better facilitated. Whatever is evaluated and agreed, both within the bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison relationship and beyond in the more multilateral UKUSA arrangement, there is plenty of scope for future growth.

The future could be bleaker, however. This is apparent if the trajectory is carried on where there appears to be (at least at times) the increasing disconnect between the macro/high and micro/low levels of analysis and experience. Detrimentally, in such circumstances, the goal of ‘operational policy’ is increasingly forfeit (see figure 2, Chapter 2 \[4.1\]). Instead of being more like coerced firefighters and emergency first-responders, intelligence, security and law enforcement services in both the UK and US need to return to being more akin to architects and engineers. Consequently, a re-think and re-adjustment of policy and strategy is urgently required - together with their enhanced generation, for providing some better leadership and guidance.\textsuperscript{84} This is particularly by the US, and, by its close association, the UK. Increasingly bankrupt is thinking akin to that reflected in Robert McNamara’s claim (from soon after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis) that, ‘Today, there is no longer such a thing as strategy, there is only crisis management.’\textsuperscript{85}
A mode of strategy/policy is needed that is considerably more intimately tied to the considerations as both directly and indirectly encountered and experienced at the micro/lower levels, such as at the operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels. An enhanced intelligence methodology is also therefore required. This is together with a greater listening to the results it can yield, as well as a wider understanding of what intelligence can appreciably offer. Notably, this is allowing it to perform an improved informing, rather than so much a leading, role. By mid-2007, a degree of re-connecting adjustment appeared to be at least beginning to emerge somewhat more effectively, including the UK vis-à-vis the US.\footnote{However, doubtlessly such efforts can be extended further. Indeed, they need to be – both structurally and culturally.\footnote{This is highly evident in 2008, even with the recent launch of the UK’s first attempt at producing a \textit{National Security Strategy}.\footnote{Failure to address this observed fundamental imbalance will only result in increased episodes of policy failure and strategy paralysis in both the UK and US, as well as - more worryingly - between them. Again, the overriding end goal of ‘operational policy’ will be missed. This in turn will then have increasingly unavoidable and damaging consequences with implications for the whole of global civil society, both at home and abroad. Significantly, this will feature - and indeed unfortunately already has (at least in part on occasions) - in the form of ‘blowback’, that detrimentally undermines all of our public safety and security.\footnote{The implications of some Bush administration-championed action against Iran are now awaited with interest.}}}}\footnote{The impli- cations of some Bush administration-championed action against Iran are now awaited with interest.}}\footnote{Ultimately, we would do well not to become complacent. As uncertainties proliferate in the wider world, so too do some of those present in UK-US intelligence liaison relations. Equally, some other boundaries between the UK and US in the realm of intelligence simultaneously become more clearly delineated - for instance, with each following some differing laws and ethics in their respective policies and practices (see, for example concerning the issue of renditions, as especially discussed in \textit{Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii]}, above). Will this last dimension frustrate overall UK-US intelligence liaison relations? Unlikely. However, some greater wariness is injected, and again these developments will necessitate the greater and more refined management of UK-US intelligence liaison relations into the future. Heightened vigilance continues to be key. Broader conclusions concerning the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison more generally will now be considered.}}\footnote{[4.0]: \textit{Facilitator dynamics: Sketching international intelligence liaison}}\footnote{A two-dimensional diagram suggestive of \textit{how} the multidimensional international intelligence liaison phenomenon works is portrayed in \textit{figure 1} in \textit{Chapter 1 [8.1]}. In
the diagram, an international intelligence liaison relationship in operation in theory is displayed. From that diagram, the key framework contributing towards the regionalisation extending to the overall globalisation of intelligence through the mechanism of international intelligence liaison is represented graphically. Albeit in all of its representative simplicity, this model also offers an explanation for how the phenomenon of intelligence liaison contributes to the overarching trends. The theory articulated here unashamedly paints intelligence liaison, and its contribution towards the globalisation of intelligence, in their most ideal form and operation. For example, this is logically as they look (and arguably how they should look) in the calculations at the highest and macro quartet of levels of intelligence liaison.

However, distinct limitations remain. In terms of theorising intelligence liaison, the analyst cannot get much beyond a general (functional) theory of how intelligence liaison operates to attain one that more fully satisfactorily answers the core question of why intelligence liaison occurs. This is because too many specifics and general considerations feature at all the different levels of intelligence liaison, and intimately vary from case to case (see below [4.1]). International intelligence liaison is therefore on the whole essentially beyond general theorisation on that plane of analysis. Other than to argue that international intelligence liaison occurs and is evolving because it is increasingly needed by policy/decision-makers in the rapidly globalising context in international affairs, a general theory of international intelligence liaison then starts to unravel. This happens as its depths start to be explored further, and therefore such theorisation is too vague to be of much greater utility than providing an arguably obvious starting premise for understanding the phenomenon more comprehensively in generic terms.

Unsurprisingly, when figuring in reality, intelligence liaison in all its dimensions is considerably more complex and messier. Also in reality, it is significantly harder extending to (virtually) impossible to capture and unpack neatly in overarching terms as the analyst of the phenomenon delves ever deeper. This is once particular contexts, and thereby increasing quantities of raw details and specifics, get added in during the actual practice of intelligence liaison. And this trend is particularly acutely the case at the lower/micro levels. This includes where the details and specifics also appear to be more important, perhaps even gaining more of a momentum of their own – for example, as was demonstrated during the ‘CURVEBALL affair’. Small wonder then that it is at these lower/micro levels that there appears to be greater potential for intelligence liaison to unravel, and for reach deficits and excesses, such as under-reach and overreach, to emerge. These are developments that manifest themselves further away from even the most alert eyes
(and/or grasp) of macro- and even micro-managers. This occurs at essentially less monitorable and harder to control depths.

[4.1]: Intelligence liaison theory limits:
The intelligence liaison phenomenon can only be theorised so far. An overarching theory of intelligence liaison resonates most comprehensively at the higher ideological and theoretical levels of analysis and activity. Beyond these high levels of analysis and degrees of abstraction, due to the highly complex nature of the intelligence liaison phenomenon, greater cascades of complexities enter the equation at the lower (more micro) levels of analysis and activity. These become increasingly apparent when descending from the strategy and policy through to the operational and tactical and to the individual (as professional) and personal levels. The fuller complexities also emerge particularly clearly when examples of the intelligence liaison phenomenon are meticulously probed empirically in case studies. Furthermore, at these lower levels, specifics and details - in the form of particular sources and concerning certain operations - increasingly matter. This is acutely so in the precise casework and operations-dominated world of intelligence. Here we are perhaps more in search of theories about individuals rather than institutions or states.

Indeed, given all the complexities that can be observed, arguably the domain of ‘complexity theory’ offers us an attractive explanatory tool. This is especially where ‘agent-based models of competition and collaboration’ can be appropriately applied in testing when trying to best understand and explain intelligence liaison. Moreover, reference can be made to Robert Axelrod’s findings - which can be summarised as ranging across: ‘Evolving new strategies’; ‘coping with noise’; ‘promoting norms’; ‘choosing sides’; ‘setting standards’; ‘building new political actors’; and ‘disseminating culture’. As explored in this study, all these elements evidently resonate with regard to intelligence liaison and the developments occurring within its realm. They also allow sufficient scope for taking into account the observed complexities at and across the levels of analysis. Therefore, future work concerning analysing the intelligence liaison phenomenon could do well by building on these conclusions in a systematic manner. However, even here with this powerful explanatory theory present, distinct limits remain palpable. Ultimately, as Stafford Thomas cautioned in his discussion of intelligence studies: ‘A complete description of a phenomenon is never truly possible for the “reality” can never be actually duplicated.’ Yet, despite all these imperfections persisting, at a minimum the key framework and the overall guiding principles for the phenomenon can be articulated. Finally what can be offered, therefore, is a comprehensive range of empirical and interpretive extrapolations concerning the phenomenon of international
intelligence liaison. This is along with the key driving considerations. Indeed, these findings are appropriately reflective of what international relations (IR) ‘theories’ as a whole can generally hope to offer analysts.95

[5.0]: How the ‘theory of optimised outreach’ explains intelligence liaison trends

Employing a slightly softer theory ‘lens’ can be most instructive. Set at a broader focus, this can be done in the form of employing a slightly more abstract theory of optimised outreach. Indeed, deployment of this lens can be powerful, in order to more satisfactorily explain the intelligence liaison phenomenon and some of its observed dynamics. Its power stems from the premise that a ‘theory of optimised outreach’ is not only valuable for explaining the intelligence liaison phenomenon developments, but also - through its ‘parent’ of reach - those observed more widely in the world of intelligence as a whole.96 Using the ‘theory of optimised outreach’ lens simultaneously allows a necessary escape from being overly constrained by all the definitional problems and disagreements associated with trying to precisely define the term ‘intelligence’, and by association, ‘intelligence liaison’.97 Furthermore, adopting this lens allows for a more holistic understanding of the intelligence liaison phenomenon. Simultaneously, it informs us about other intelligence interactions, and, perhaps more significantly, offers an explanation for how intelligence liaison connects with the other interactions observed in the intelligence world. This is rather than increasingly isolating it and its dynamics artificially from the wider machinations. For instance, the central role international intelligence liaison performed as part of the wider run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq can be readily observed.98

Thinking in terms of reach (and that of optimised outreach more specifically with regard to intelligence liaison) allows the introduction of its associated phenomena or various conditions. These include: overreach, when there is too much present;99 and under-reach, when there is too little.100 A viable conceptual framework is now tabled for explaining why several developments occur. This framework also explains why several developments have occurred, and perhaps even offers tools - in the form of suggestions regarding what to look out for or to be sensitive towards - for how (out)reach imbalances could try to be better pre-empted, and hence avoided, into the future.

Highlighting this last qualifier, this framework also, therefore, has some predictive utility. This is albeit if the presence of some informing hindsight is helpful - such as in the form of adopting and adapting insights remembered from ‘lessons learnt from history’.101 The setting of requirements can be aided most expeditiously by providing a lens through which the challenges and the responses to them can be examined; and whereby problematic areas or vulnerabilities can be identified, and
then potentially addressed. It is a risk management strategy intended to maximise risk resilience and to advance the enhanced minimisation of vulnerabilities. In intelligence liaison relationships, if there is too much or too little outreach, some form of ‘blowback’ is likely to occur. The risk(s) adopted in those domains are thus higher. Here, the risk management concerns connect closely with the outreach considerations. ¹⁰²

Further explanation can be offered. If there is overreach, the outreach needs to be carefully rolled back. This needs to be done appropriately tuned to the specific operational circumstances. For example, this can be accomplished by undertaking ‘stepping-back’ actions, and by having mechanisms in place so that the stepping-back can have a meaningful impact (or at least a viable opportunity to inform). This can be done with introducing ‘Red-’ or ‘A+B-Teaming’ activities – for instance, a useful way to contribute towards addressing intelligence analysis/assessment flaws.¹⁰³

Other scenarios exist. Alternatively, if there is under-reach, the outreach needs to carefully be rolled forward. In the domain of staff/personnel management, such a mechanism - for example, the appointment of counsellors by intelligence agencies - can be cited, so (at least in theory) employees feel less compelled to vent their frustrations more publicly through ‘whistle-blowing’ activities in the media, for instance.¹⁰⁴ Again, whichever approach is adopted here, it should be appropriately tuned to being directly in harmony with the specific operating context. In summary, all of these machinations represent the quest for attempting to reach the ‘holy grail’ of intelligence liaison: optimum outreach. This will now be explored further.

[6.0]: The quest for the ‘holy grail’ of intelligence liaison – optimum outreach

Targets figure prominently in the intelligence world. The overall goal for intelligence liaison should be the constant attempt to attain a condition of optimum outreach. Today, in the context of globalisation, that outreach features most appropriately in an exponentially expanding mode. This is effectively illustrated by the witnessed increase in contemporary international intelligence liaison, especially after 9/11.¹⁰⁵ Although, actually attaining an overarching optimum outreach balance will essentially remain elusive – even to a frustrating degree. This is as over time reach requirements constantly fluctuate, and particularly markedly so at times of ‘crisis’ - for example, during the ‘emergency’ times of ‘war’. However, the continuous quest for the ‘holy grail’ of optimum outreach, and thus the striking of the best outreach balance that can be attained, should not be elusive. This is namely striving for optimised outreach. Otherwise, counter-productive traits ensue, such as complacency.
Worse can emerge. Poor intelligence liaison tradecraft increasingly becomes the dominant theme when the goal of optimum outreach is forfeited, albeit perhaps more unconsciously. Business then starts to go increasingly awry in the intelligence liaison world, ultimately contributing towards so-called intelligence liaison ‘failure(s)’. Again, this was effectively demonstrated during the period leading up to the launch of the 2003 war in Iraq.\textsuperscript{106} By pursuing the correctional/adjustment activities fastidiously across all the levels involved, better (increasingly optimised) outreach balances can be struck overall. This also includes with regard to closely connected areas such as privacy, human, civil and constitutional rights and liberties considerations. To achieve this optimisation of outreach, as well as ensuring its continuity, some form of improved oversight is essential. In the process, problems can then be better mitigated in all intelligence-associated interactions where outreach features in some form - that is, everywhere. This includes in human-to-human spy interactions in the HUMINT domain.\textsuperscript{107} Analysis and assessment shortfalls, such as ‘group-think’ and ‘mirror-imaging’ - including ‘blind-spots’ and ‘blanch-spots’/‘white-outs’ – can be similarly addressed. Moreover, through carefully striking and effectively upholding such optimised outreach balances, intelligence liaison can be at its most empowering.

[7.0]: \textit{Final observations}

As Swedish intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell argues instructively in his analysis about intelligence liaison:

\begin{quote}
... in theory intelligence liaison should be guided by reason, logic and trade-offs. The actual conduct of intelligence liaison might be something quite different. The pattern of liaison and the political setting of the intelligence relations are at best complicated and full of contradictions, at worst irrational, obscure and impossible to comprehend in terms of a coherent security strategy.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

As this study has demonstrated, much can be observed, connected and, beyond that, at least some of it can be theorised. Also appearing discernable from the findings of this study is the proposition that (at least in the covert intelligence realm) international intelligence liaison is the mechanism central to the increasing ‘homogenisation’, ‘international standardisation’ and eventual globalisation of intelligence. This is because there are at least attempts towards realising the essential collective/co-operative security means of responding to the notoriously difficult globalised, and hence globally-shared, security threats of the early twenty-first century. Intelligence liaison (extending to outreach) is additionally the mechanism -
in its ‘means’ form - for enabling further and deeper intelligence liaison on these concerns into the future - in its ‘ends’ or ‘solution’ form. International intelligence liaison, together with international outreach activities in the overt intelligence realm, therefore offers an incredibly powerful and wide-encompassing tool for conducting and managing international relationships. This is as well as the product of those interactions. Without it, undoubtedly the foreign policies of states would flounder, and interests - whether they are of a national, regional or even global nature - would be left unfulfilled. In short, as a tool it offers much.

By recognising the value of theory (see Chapter 2 [3.4]), this study attempts to address the under-theorised condition of the intelligence liaison phenomenon. This study presents a theory of international intelligence liaison that is as comprehensive as is believed to be possibly attainable concerning the phenomenon. The theorisation attempts can only extend so far. The limitations can be highlighted. If the theory of intelligence liaison is extended further, then it appears to become over-stretched to breaking point. In such circumstances, the theory becomes increasingly top-heavy and detrimentally disconnected from being adequately grounded in its (lower) empirical bases. This increases the likelihood of it becoming over-exerted, and it essentially ‘falling over’ and ‘failing’.

The generalisability of the theory similarly drops. This happens because when intelligence liaison is applied in the cold light of ‘reality’, specific details and contexts become increasingly important. These factors can then even run counter to the general macro higher-level principles. They are also most detectable at the micro/lower levels, as the analyst delves into the deeper depths of the particular intelligence liaison relationship being scrutinised. The phenomenon of intelligence liaison when it is probed in-depth is never as straightforward, or as obvious, as it may look superficially or at first. It is here that trying to articulate the dynamics of the intelligence liaison phenomenon can be most satisfactorily accomplished through the lens of a ‘theory of optimised outreach’. More arguably in contemporary circumstances, that outreach can be most appropriately characterised as occurring on exponential bases.

[7.1]: The power of international intelligence liaison:
International intelligence liaison is powerful. Potentially at least, it provides both the means and ends for successfully acquiring whatever wants to be achieved or attained in politics and international relations. In theory at least, international intelligence liaison (extending to outreach) offers policy- and decision-makers a wide-range of options in the form of several toolsets and resources. In reality, inevitably specific circumstances contribute towards dictating which choices can be made. The selection process of the different components of intelligence liaison and how they are used
then contributes towards determining what is discernable in the evaluation of the effects and outcomes of the intelligence liaison. Intelligence liaison is not entirely rigid and inflexible. Nor is it overly centralised without the ability to be informed by factors more locally. The finer tuning of the international intelligence liaison relationship, and the outreach balances struck therein and indeed beyond, can be undertaken. Some essential scope is therefore available for potential adjustments.

International intelligence liaison (extending to outreach) offers a reservoir of possibilities. The ways in which that reservoir is harnessed is key to successfully fulfilling requirements and wider goals as fully as possible. At a time when the stakes involved in global affairs appear to be ever higher - and the general tempo at which they are being played out is ever quicker in increasingly condensed spaces - international intelligence liaison (at least potentially) provides one of the most viable and far-reaching means, and indeed solutions, for tackling the complex and nuanced challenges being confronted. This helps to account for its popularity.

In short, at least in its most broad overarching form, intelligence liaison is worth all the risks that its ‘double-edged sword’-characteristic brings into the overall equation of wider intelligence efforts. Furthermore, future intelligence liaison movements can be realised on an increasingly global scale. This is most explicitly seen with outreach occurring in the parallel overt intelligence realm. Indeed, in some areas, that outreach might even feature as some form of intelligence liaison trailblazer. This potentially allows for the more formalising of those relations later, including their widening and deepening.

As a ‘code’, intelligence liaison in all of its (dis)guises will never always be fully ‘cracked’. Too many unknowns and intangibles are encountered and endure. This is especially at the lowest/micro levels of intelligence liaison. Great peril ensues in the realms of intelligence and beyond should the considerations at these important micro levels be ignored, neglected and bypassed - even ‘cherry-picked’. This was starkly seen in the case of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war and in its subsequent fallout, which continues to be experienced in 2008.\(^{110}\)

Finally, the historically enduring phenomenon of intelligence liaison will survive. Reflecting trends apparent in the microcosm of UK-US intelligence relations, for the foreseeable future, intelligence liaison is most likely to remain essentially on a trajectory that can be generally characterised as being on ‘a continuum with expansion’. What is more apparent is that intelligence liaison - together with its associates, extending to outreach - is so dynamic that it will continue to fascinate. This is together with considerably challenging its practitioners and analysts alike well into the future.

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References


4. This trend was recognised early on in the transition from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War era - see, for example, ‘The CIA’s World-View’, *Jane’s Foreign Report* (16 February 1989), particularly where it states: ‘Instead of regional issues, world leaders will be talking to each other about global ones, such as the environment, drug-trafficking, terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles…’ The focus of the CIA was also later further sharpened – see, for example, B. Starr, ‘CIA to refocus as new top team is announced’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly* (01 August 1997); see also ‘The new intelligence agenda’, chapter 12 in Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, pp.232-54.


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9 See, for instance, J. Moran and M. Phythian, ‘Introduction: In the shadow of 9/11’, *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 44 (2005), p.327 – particularly where they note that: ‘As a result of the War on Terror individual states have witnessed significant changes in security and intelligence polices, criminal law, the operations of security and police agencies (including the development of extended surveillance architectures), and immigration law…’ and where they continue: ‘Indeed, domestic and international security have come to represent different dimensions of the same core issues, and have generated controversy at both domestic and international level over the appropriate balance between liberty and security in a post-9/11 liberal-democratic context.’; see also A. Rogers, ‘Conference Report: Security threats are “global”’, *Jane’s Intelligence Review* (01 November 2004) - where she noted: ‘The acute need for collective international action to counter increasingly “global” security threats was evident at the 6th International Security Forum in Montreux in October…’


12 See also, for example, ‘Conclusion’, chapter 5 in R.D. Crelinsten, *Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World* (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2006), p.103 – particularly where he notes: ‘A complete model of counter-terrorism in a multi-centric world would incorporate [several figures presented in his book] … in some kind of three- or four-dimensional model that depicts simultaneously all the communication channels that connect all the different state and non-state actors in the international system across space (3D) and over time (4D).’

13 How far the flattening extends is more debatable – see, for instance, for more of a contrary argument, P. Ghemawat, ‘Why the World Isn’t Flat’, *Foreign Policy* (March/April 2007), pp.54-60; see also


15 For more background on this aspect of globalisation, see, for example, Scholte, Globalization, pp.252-254; see also the definition provided in A. Mooney and B. Evans (eds), Globalization: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge/Key Guides, 2007), pp.127-8.

16 See, for instance, an episode recounted in B. Woodward, State of Denial: Bush At War, Part III (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006), p.387 – especially where he catalogued: ‘… Once [the Americans] arrived in Pakistan, they started an evaluation of the walk-in. Ah, Jesus, the CIA men soon realized. The walk-in was a known commodity to both the CIA and the British MI6 service. He had tried the scam before. Why hadn’t the Saudis and the CIA been able to figure that out before going to the president [Bush] and sending a mission to Pakistan? “Because nobody ever shares sources with anybody,” said one of the people involved. “That is standard modus operandi.…”

17 See, for example, M. Smith, ‘Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 July 2005).


19 S. Burchill, ‘Realism and Neo-Realism, chapter 3 in his et al., Theories of International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001 [2ed.]), p.98.

20 See, for example, B. Kendall, ‘Does “the West” still exist?: With the Cold War no longer defining East and West, a US conference invited delegates from both sides of the Atlantic to try to define the shape of the new world order’, BBC News Online (17 March 2007).

21 For privatisation of intelligence developments, see, Chapter 1: Introduction [4.0]; see also, for example, J.R. Bennett, ‘Private intel, the new gold rush’, ISN Security Watch (01 July 2008).

22 The CIA document continued:

- Our adversaries in the long war on terrorism are dispersed across the globe; they are resilient, ruthless, patient and committed to the mass murder of our citizens.
- The possession and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threatens international stability and safety of our homeland.
- The rise of China and India and the emergence of new economic “centers” will transform the geopolitical and economic landscape.
- Weak governments, lagging economies, competition for resources, and youth bulges will create crises in many regions.


23 See also M. van Creveld, ‘The Fate of the State Revisited’, Global Crime, 7, 3-4 (August-November 2006), pp.329-350; P. Williams, From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of The State and U.S. Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008) -


See, for example, *Chapter 5: Case Studies 1 [4.1.iii] & 2 [2.8]*, above; see also, for instance concerning Pakistan’s contemporary involvement in the cyber-security domain, ‘YouTube outage blamed on Pakistan’, *BBC News Online* (25 February 2008); see also ‘Prioritizing Policy Toward Pakistan’, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 30, 2 (2008), pp.119-121; see also ‘Britain doubles aid to Pakistan’, *BBC News Online* (03 July 2008).

See, for instance, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 1999 speech to the Economic Club of Chicago – ‘Prime Minister’s speech: Doctrine of the International community at the Economic Club, Chicago’, *No.10 Downing Street website* (24 April 1999) - via URL: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp> (accessed: 10/01/2007); see also R.J. Aldrich, ‘Comment: The New Terrorism: The problem is balancing security, freedom and the globalising quest for luxury’, *The Independent* (10 July 2005); see also, for a more recent example, K. Ghattas, ‘Brown’s speech looks beyond Bush’, *BBC News Online* (19 April 2008) - particularly where he notes: ‘In a broad and almost idealistic speech, [UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown] emphasised the need for global solutions to global problems and said international institutions, set up after World War II, needed to be overhauled to deal with the challenges of the 21st Century…


D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror’, *Orbis* (Summer, 2006), p.465; see also ‘Information superiority key to success of operations: A high-level conference called for continued national and NATO investment in information and intelligence-sharing, noting that this had a direct impact on the Alliance’s ability to succeed in Afghanistan…’, *NATO Update* (06 May 2008).
30 Defined in ‘just-war’ terms of both *jus ad bellum* (‘just recourse to war’), where proportionality concerns ‘more good than evil results’, and *jus in bello* (‘just conduct in war’), where proportionality concerns the ‘amount and type of force used’ – see M. Griffiths and T. O’Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp.172-6.

31 For example, seen with the introduction of tougher ‘anti-terror’ laws in states, such as in the UK and with the US PATRIOT Act, and the use of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and the (alleged) use of ‘torture’ during interrogations, alongside the growth of spying-on-own-citizens ‘scandals’; see also H. Young, ‘Once lost, these freedoms will be impossible to restore: The terror threat is being used to attack civil rights here [the UK] and in the US’, *The Guardian* (11 December 2001); see also the reference to ‘accountability deficit’, above in Chapter 1 [4.1], and the concluding observations to Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.0], above; see also Wanandi, ‘A Global Coalition against International Terrorism’, p.187 – ‘The danger is that as the role of the state increases, adherence to the rule of law, respect for civil liberties, and support for human rights may weaken. It could even delegitimise the fight against terrorism itself.’; see also Moran and Phythian, ‘Introduction: In the shadow of 9/11’, p.328; J. Moran, ‘State power in the war on terror: A comparative analysis of the UK and USA’, *Crime, Law & Social Change*, 44 (2005), pp.335-359; see also ‘Concluding Perspectives: Knowledge, Power and Accountability’, chapter 8 in P. Todd and J. Bloch, *Global Intelligence: The World’s Secret Services Today* (London: Zed Books/Global Issues series, 2003), pp.207-215; see also texts such as D. Cole and J.X. Dempsey, *Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security* (NY: The New Press, 2006 [3ed. – fully revised and updated]); G. Peirce, ‘Was it like this for the Irish?’, *London Review of Books* (10 April 2008).


34 See the discussion under the heading ‘[9.2]: “Reach dynamics”: An “intelligence paradigm” that also explains liaison?’ in Chapter 1: Introduction [9.2] of this study, above.


36 See, for instance, as outlined in the case studies presented in Chapter 5, above.


38 See, for example, S.M. Hersh, ‘ANNALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: PREPARING THE BATTLEFIELD: The Bush Administration steps up its secret moves against Iran’, *The New Yorker* (07 July 2008); for another critic of US national security policies, see also, for example, R.A. Clarke, *Your

40 See, for example, where the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) noted in 2002: ‘In the era of globalization, isolation is not an option for the intelligence service of a democratic country, but rather a recipe for failure.’ – quoted from ‘Liaison and Cooperation’ in Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), ‘Counter-Terrorism’, Backgrounder Series, 8 (August 2002), p.11.


42 See also, for example, for attempts at international standardisation in the domain of counter-terrorism operations and human rights, OSCE, Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual (Warsaw: Organization for Security Cooperation Europe [OSCE]/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR], 2007).


45 On the issue of coercion, see also ‘Mutual Coercion Mutually Agreed Upon’ sub-heading in G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’, Science (13 December 1968); see also ‘Bush defends Syria reactor claim: President George W Bush has defended the recent disclosure of intelligence by the US on suspected nuclear links between North Korea and Syria’, BBC News Online (29 April 2008) -
particularly where it is reported that: ‘The move was meant as a “message” to the two states [North Korea and Syria] and also Iran, he [Bush] said.’

46 See also, for example, Dame E. Manningham-Buller, ‘Opinion: Partnership and Continuous Improvement in Countering Twenty-First Century Terrorism’, Policing, 1, 1 (2007), pp.43–45.


48 For more on the condition of ‘operational policy’, see Chapter 2 [4.1].


50 P.H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p.8; see also where he notes: ‘… Burns and Stalker are firm that both organic [or collegial] and mechanistic [or bureaucratic] management structures are equally viable alternative modes of rationalization, the former suited best to complex and highly variable environments, the latter to simpler and less radically changeable settings and industries… Researchers concluded… that what was required were systems that hybridized bureaucratic and organic/collegial forms, employing a hierarchical and specialized bureaucracy for day-to-day administration but also operating (often ad hoc) organic project teams assembled [for example, according to skill-set] across bureaucratic demarcation lines. These systems were termed matrix organisations.’ (ibid., p.326 - emphasis in original). Furthermore: ‘It has been the need [at the national level] for interdepartmental [extending to international] consultation and coordination over both policy and specific operations that has driven the need for institutional arrangements based on horizontal lines of communication and more or less consensual decision-making processes. This has led in turn to collegial and organic modes of organization.’ (ibid., p.328.).

51 For recent developments in the PR world, see, for example, K. Allen, ‘Analysis: Boom time for PR: The public relations industry is experiencing soaring demand as companies wake up to the importance of “reputation management”’, The Guardian (14 September 2006); see also the references cited in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.i] above.


53 See, for instance, the references to what are termed in this study as ‘international standardisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ moves, as detailed above in the Preface [3.1] and defined in Chapter 1 [7.0].

54 See, for instance, where a non-attributable source [c-9] argues: ‘The UK Government relies on the law-enforcement and security capabilities of a range of partner countries in countering terrorism. Effective and fair policing at the community level in partner countries can inhibit the emergence of terrorist and insurgency groups [See for example, D. Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies (Washington, DC: RAND, 2007)]. Conversely, heavy-handed security action and abuse by partner countries in the name of counter-terrorism strengthens the single narrative and contributes to radicalisation [See for example, M. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp.155-156]. Under UK and EU Human Rights Legislation [such as ECHR], actual or suspected human rights abuses in those countries inhibit the ability of UK agencies to pass operational leads. The UK therefore has a strong strategic and operational interest in the standards of security policy-making, policing and rule of law in CT partner countries. But there is little coherent work to cooperate on
raising these standards… The security and intelligence agencies work to raise the operational standards of their direct counterparts, but rarely work on wider security policy, policing or rule of law questions. The Conflict Prevention Pools work on security sector reform in developing countries, but the majority of this activity is subject to Overseas Development Assistance criteria so is focused in developing countries and not in the middle or high-income countries which form the majority of CT partners. The Global Opportunities Fund has sponsored some human rights training for security forces but has not worked on more comprehensive assessments of security policy-making and delivery.’; see also sources, such as H.J. Cohen, ‘In Sub-Saharan Africa, Security Is Overtaking Development as Washington’s Top Policy Priority’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 30, 2 (2008), pp.88-95.

55 See, for instance, as outlined above in Chapter 4 [3.0].


59 See, for instance, as referred to in the Preface [2.2], as well as in Chapter 4 [7.0-8.0] and Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.iii/4.2.i], above.

60 See, for example, Watts, ‘Conflicting Paradigms, Dissimilar Contexts’; see also ‘Intelligence reform’, chapter 14 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.274-88.

61 McKern, ‘Organizational Innovation in Multinational Corporations’, p.3.

62 As a general example of this, see ‘Barriers to conflict: a concrete solution to shifting concerns?’ Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 July 2006); see also ‘Plans for tougher [UK] border controls’, BBC News Online (26 January 2007); J. Weisman, ‘With Senate Vote, Congress Passes [US-Mexico] Border Fence Bill: Barrier Trumps Immigration Overhaul’, The Washington Post (30 September 2006). These trends can also represent a counter to, or at least a brake on, the flattening of hierarchy trends observed.

63 See G.F. Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (RAND, 2006), p.32 – ‘The campaign against terrorism is inherently multi-lateral; no one state can protect itself on its own. And as nations build coalitions, one of the critical things they can offer would-be partners is information – or intelligence…’


See also S. Biddle, ‘Speed kills? Reassessing the role of speed, precision, and situation awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 30, 1 (February 2007), pp.3-46. Wider trends, such as the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA), can also be cited here.

See Popplewell, “Lacking Intelligence”.


See, for instance, the model as outlined in detail in Svendsen, ‘Strategy and disproportionality in contemporary conflict’.

See Chapter 4 [3.0/10.0] for more information.

Information based on a non-attributable source [i-37].

For example, this is noticeable with the handling of episodes of ‘leaks’ – see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.i] and Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4].

See, for instance, as discussed above in Chapter 4 [4.0] and Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.5].

See also, for example, S. Milne, ‘We need to listen to the man from special branch: In this climate of anti-Muslim rage, counter-terrorist police are talking more sense than the government or media’, The Guardian (14 February 2008); on the issue of Iran, see also, for example, ‘US admiral urges caution on Iran: America’s top military officer has said opening up a new front in the Middle East through a strike on Iran would be “extremely stressful” for US forces’, BBC News Online (02 July 2008).


See, for example, the analysis in A.D.M. Svendsen, “‘Friends and Allies” like these? UK-US intelligence liaison relations in the early 21st Century’, paper presented at the British International Studies Association (BISA) conference 2007, held at the University of Cambridge (December 2007).

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95 See, for instance, the references to ‘theory’ in *Chapter 2 [3.4]* of this study, above.

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101 See also the earlier references for the importance of ‘lessons from history’ in the intelligence context.


103 See also the reference to these types of activities as discussed in *Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.iii]*.


105 See, for example, as discussed in the *Preface [2.0]*, above.

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Research contained in texts, such as A.S. Zuckerman (ed.), *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2005), may also help to inform in this area of inquiry.

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Appendix 1

Introduction

The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), demonstrate the gradual ‘professionalisation’ process of liaison and its management. This includes those developments discernable over time at the micro level, together with the ever-present bureaucratic factors involved in such processes. The information provided at the end of this appendix (Appendix 1, p.A:vii) gives an insight into what a brief search of the UK National Archives at Kew, London, can yield from the historical record on the subject of inquiry pursued by this study.

‘U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad’, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (effective 21 April 1953);

US Army management of its foreign relations, see, for example, Department of the Army, US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, ‘Army Programs: Utilization of the United Kingdom Integrated Officer’, FSTC Circular, Number 11-1 (25 May 1982, expires 1 June 1983) - particularly where it notes (p.1): ‘It is the responsibility of all persons subject to this Circular to treat the UKIO as a FULLY integrated member of FSTC, serving in a position normally filled by a US military officer. … Disclosure of classified military information (CMI) to the UKIO is limited to information releasable to the UK UP AR 380-10. In the case of the UK, this regulation prohibits disclosure of CMI marked NOFORN and information obtained from another government for which dissemination to the UKIO would violate the third party rule. …’;

For US internal intelligence community management of foreign liaison, see also ‘Subject: Coordination and Reporting of Foreign Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Contacts and Arrangements’, US Department of Defense Instruction (23 March 1984). In order ‘to provide policy and procedural guidance to implement DIAR 60-28 for coordinating and reporting contacts, liaison, and intelligence exchanges by USEUCOM elements with elements of foreign governments and international organizations’, see HQ United States European Command, ‘Policy: International Intelligence Contacts and Arrangements’, Directive Number 40-5 (25 April 1986). In order ‘to prescribe procedures applicable to the Naval Intelligence Command Headquarters and its subordinate commands regarding foreign naval intelligence cooperation’, see Commander, US Naval Intelligence Command, Department of the Navy, ‘Subj: Foreign Naval Intelligence Cooperation’, NAVINTCOM Instruction 3810.1C (04 January 1982). All of these documents can be located via the Digital National Security Archive - via URL: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> (accessed: 13/06/2007);

See also under the headings ‘Deputy Director for Management Science’ and ‘Intelligence School’, on page 17 of an untitled and undated archival document, where it is noted that the intelligence school is: ‘Responsible for orientation and general course for new, middle and senior level employees; for specialized training in preparation for overseas assignment… and gives ad hoc foreign liaison tutorials.’ – via CREST – CIA-RDP83T00573R000200230001-7 (2002/11/07);

See also M. Baird, Director of Training, ‘Subject: Summer Area Programs’, [Security Information] Memorandum to: Training Liaison Officers (17 December 1951) – via CREST – CIA-RDP54-00216A00010030003-3 (2006/12/04);

L.K. Truscott, Jr., ‘Subject: Proposed Revision of NSCID 5 and Counter Intelligence Policy’, Memorandum for the Director (27 June 1957) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170003-4 (2006/07/27) – particularly where he noted: ‘Specifically with regard to counter intelligence, the revision… e. Indicates how liaison on counter intelligence
will be carried on with foreign clandestine services and overt government agencies dealing in policy matters...;’

See also the attachment to ibid., ‘Espionage and Counterintelligence’, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (Draft, 27 June 1957), pp.3-4, para.10: ‘The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for the establishment, conduct, and development of liaison concerning clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security services. Other Departments and Agencies may conduct liaison on non-clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security services as required for the proper execution of their missions. However, all liaison which concerns or affects clandestine matters shall be coordinated in advance and on a continuing basis with the Central Intelligence Agency in order to insure that such relationships are beneficial to the over-all clandestine interests of the U.S.’ In another draft dated (27 June 1957), in ibid., it is noted on p.4 in (revised) para.11.c. that: ‘The Director of Central Intelligence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison between U.S. military commanders and foreign services concerning clandestine matters.’;


‘Subject: Office of Security Statistical Report for FEBRUARY 1964’, Memorandum for Director of Security (23 March 1964), p.3, para.5.j-k – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-04004R000200280001-5 (2003/04/17) – where it notes: ‘j. A register of foreign liaison contacts in the United States has been established in the Office of Security. Procedures for the maintenance of this register and the reporting responsibilities have been developed and established. A proposed Headquarters Regulation implementing this program has been submitted. k. A report was prepared for the Executive Director-Comptroller on the security aspects of foreign intelligence liaison contacts in the U.S. and forwarded to the Deputy Director for Support for signature.’

As an example of reporting requirements (albeit in rather perfunctory form), see, for instance, Foreign Liaison Control Officer, Scientific Intelligence, ‘Subject: Foreign Liaison’, Memorandum for the Record (18 November 1965) – via CREST – CIA-RDP71R00140A000100010038-4 (2000/05/05) – where it remarks: ‘During a conversation last evening at the home of *** requested briefings on the ABM problem and on cybernetics. There was no discussion about dates or times.’;


See also ‘Clandestine Service Support Officers’ Meeting; DDS Conference Room’, Minutes (12 August 1970) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-04722A00020010055-5 (2002/09/03) – particularly where it notes: ‘2. Items of interest at the DDP Staff Meeting: a. Liaison Visits to Washington: DDP requested that field proposals for foreign liaison visits to Washington be reviewed very carefully to make sure that they are space-out properly and don’t create too much of a load on senior agency officials. Chief, FI is the CS coordinator for this purpose.’;


An ‘individual presentation’ lecture entitled ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison in the DDI’ featured as a ‘CIA Senior Seminar’, under ‘Block IV: CIA’s Official Relationships’ on Wednesday 19 April 1972 – document via CREST – CIA-RDP84-00780R005000020027-8 (2003/05/27);


‘Minutes: One Hundred Sixty-Fourth Meeting, Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters, Tuesday, 22 October 1974, 1000 to 1200 Hours’, United States Intelligence Board Security Committee: SECOM-M-164 (30 October 1974), p.7 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80M10182A000100290002-2 (2004/03/31) – especially where it notes: ‘(e) *** CIA, requested the guidance of the members as to their perceived needs in the report of foreign, integrated and liaison officers. It was decided that an initial report would be desired by all members. This report would list all foreign
integrated officers and the agency to which they are assigned. The report would list all foreign liaison officers in the Washington area and reflect to which departments and agencies they are accredited. Quarterly changes should be in the form of a list of additions or deletions from the initial list. If it is determined later that less frequent update reports are needed, then the schedule could be adjusted. The CIA member proposed that CIA prepare an initial submission for review of the members. The Chairman and members accepted this proposal. To ensure an accurate listing, *** requested members to submit identification of current foreign liaison and integrated officers and to submit any changes prior to issuance of the first quarterly report.

‘Subject: Navy Proposed Security Policy Statement on Foreign Intelligence Liaison Relationships’, United States Intelligence Board Security Committee / Memorandum for: Acting Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community SECOM-D-76 (19 June 1975), pp.1-2 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80M01133A000600090006-8 (2004/06/14) – especially where it notes: ’1. Action Requested: … that you sign the attached memorandum to the DCI recommending USIB concurrence and DCI approval of Navy’s proposal for promulgation of a USIB security policy statement on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. 2. Background: a. On 12 May 1975 Admiral Inman wrote to the DCI with a proposal that USIB review and DCI promulgate security policy on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. This proposal was stimulated by concern generated in some foreign intelligence services about our ability to safeguard knowledge of their relationships and material they may provide us. While existing policy is generally adequate to protect sensitive sources, the Community does not appear to have any established policy on protecting the facts about liaison relationships… c. The Security Committee has completed its review. It agrees that such a policy statement would be beneficial and accepts the Navy version with but slight changes…’;

‘Subject: Gifts from Foreign Governments’, Memorandum for: Director of Personnel (8 June 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010009-6 (2001/04/05) – especially where it notes: ‘In compliance with Headquarters Regulation *** and PL 89-673, 80 Stat. 952, of October 15, 1966 (Foreign Gifts & Decorations Act), the following described gifts, valued at less than $50.00 each, were received by me from foreign intelligence liaison contacts in the course of my official duties…’;

See also the reply to ibid., (21 June 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010008-7 (2001/04/05); ‘Fact sheet on possible amendment to the “Foreign Relations Authorization Act, for Fiscal Year 1977” restricting foreign gifts’, Attachment to Memorandum: Subject: Agency Policy on Gifts and the Proxmire Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1977 (16 June 1976), p.1 – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010006-9 (2001/08/27) – particularly where it notes: ‘The practice of “gift-giving” to establish relationships of trust in foreign intelligence liaison activities could also be affected adversely by this provision. If U.S. employees are effectively prohibited from giving or receiving such gifts – which generally are personal, ceremonial items – these liaison activities will only be made more difficult… The problem with the provision is that employees could not accept the gifts even for ultimate turnover to the U.S. Government. To prohibit acceptance of ceremonial and other gifts would be a slap in the face to foreign persons and would work against the need to establish relations of trust and equality that are necessary to develop productive interchanges. Moreover, the requirement that the circumstances surrounding gifts to foreign persons be detailed in an annual presidential report to Congress could conflict with the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods…’;

‘Subject: Understanding the Agency’, Memorandum for: Assistant to the Director – Review Staff (9 September 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00467A000030060005-8 (2005/06/01), pp.3-4 – particularly where it notes: ‘d. One recommendation, as an example, requires that CIA stop giving “support” to foreign liaison services guilty of “systemic violation of human rights.” As stated, the recommendation applies only to CIA, although both AID and the U.S. military services have relations with many of these foreign instrumentalities as well. And in any event, the relationships with these foreign organizations is only one part of a larger U.S. relationship, in which the Department of State deals in diplomatic niceties with repressive governments. It is also noted that CIA has a traditional policy that there should be “net advantage” in its liaison relationships, which complicates interpretation of the word “support” in the SSC [Senate Select Committee] recommendation…’;

Foreign Liaison Relationships, the Agency should: a. explicitly develop for use with the critics the best possible case for maintenance of responsible liaison. b. explicitly request interested Agency officers to come forward with ideas for new collection techniques to compensate for any future losses in liaison information. c. encourage initiatives designed to modify objectionable behavior of liaison services.

Report of the Second Seminar on Creativity and Ethics in CIA (c.1977), pp.8-10 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00473A000700100007-1 (2002/05/20) – especially: ‘Foreign Liaison: The group was appalled by the possibility that outside elements – the public, the media, or Congress – could eventually force the abandonment of foreign liaison programs, especially if this were to be done in a manner dictating which foreign *** [entire p.9 redacted] – After such a review – aspects of which may already be under way – a firm defense should be made wherever the Agency is challenged by external elements to alter its liaison relationships, especially to Congress and the National Security Council. – More can and should be done in fostering creative approaches to alternatives to liaison relationships. We should look now at what we would lose in a termination or severe curbing of a liaison relationship and adjust operating directives, planning, and activities accordingly to cover that contingency. Our recruiting patterns should be targeted with possible liaison loss in mind.’;

Chief, ***, ‘Subject: *** Human Rights Factor in Foreign Liaison Relationships’, Dispatch (31 January 1977), pp.1-3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00473A000800060005-7 (2002/01/08) – especially: ‘…Over the years, stations and individual case officers have exerted a measure of restraint upon military and security services with which liaison has been maintained and upon individuals who have security responsibilities. In that vein, the *** described below reflect a continuing process of which reference is a part, and provide specific guidelines for Headquarters’ reporting and for actions to be taken by *** personnel in the defense of human rights… It is important for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy that the [human rights] record [reported by the State Department to Congress] be as full and accurate as possible since conclusions drawn on the data available may well affect intergovernmental and liaison relationships… As noted in *** quoted below, as human rights implications on liaison relationships become evident, “In each case the record of violations will be weighed against imperatives of national interest.” The Department of State shares this pragmatic outlook… The Human Rights Factor in Foreign Liaison Relationships [dated 11 November 1976]: 1. *** requires that the approval of Deputy Director of *** be given for the exploration, development, or establishment of any *** liaison and intelligence exchange relationship abroad or *** or for a major change in a relationship. A consideration in any liaison relationship is the Deputy Director’s determination that it contributes to or supports the objectives of ***. … The purpose of this notice is to alert component chiefs that *** policy is to consider the record with respect to human rights when a determination regarding the nature and extent of each liaison is made at Headquarters. In those instances where there is clear evidence of gross violation of basic human rights on the part of intelligence or security services, a review will be made to determine if the scope and nature of our relationship with those services should be modified. In each case the record of violations will be weighed against imperatives of national interest. Efforts by personnel in direct contact with foreign intelligence and security services to convey, appropriately, this policy of *** may have a salutary effect in improving respect for human rights in countries where the liaison with *** is important to the host country. Additionally, personnel of *** will not participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights. 3.*** will assist the Deputy Director of *** in making periodic reviews of liaison relationships, taking into account all factors that have a bearing on Organizational interests. This will be done in coordination with all Directorates as applicable. To comply with this responsibility, *** will collect information pertinent to liaison relationships, corresponding through area components with field stations and bases as necessary.’;

CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, ‘Two Seminars on Creativity and Ethics in the CIA’, Seminar Report TR/SR 77-02 (15 February 1977), pp.9-11 – via CREST – CIA-RDP82-00357R000500110004-5 (2006/11/01) – particularly where it notes: ‘The Foreign Liaison Relationship: In response to Mr. Knoche’s expressed concern that the Agency may come under pressure to drop or alter its foreign liaison arrangements with certain “repressive” governments *** and his question as to whether we should creatively attempt now to develop alternative collection sources, the group arrived at a dual consensus. One consensus was that the Agency needs to muster in the most effective fashion it can the many good points to be made in favor of our liaison relations. In brief, these include: -- the fact that our entire clandestine operations in a given country often depend on the nature of the liaison relationship. – the fact that we do often

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gain useful leverage on a country through the liaison relationship, leverage that is in our national interest. – the fact that such relationships do not need to be viewed simply in terms of maintaining or not maintaining them. There is room in each for limitations and alterations tailored to fit the specific situation. – the fact that such relationships can and should be used for good example purposes by showing that our service does not engage in repressive practices. – the fact that, contrary to many outside critics, our liaison relationships have not been the seedbed for questionable covert action operations. ••• In terms of alternatives for liaison arrangements, the consensus of the group was that we can assess rather well at this time what we would lose by terminating them, but that the possible substitutes are not very susceptible to analysis at this point. It was deemed worthwhile, however, that the appropriate Agency management specifically request ideas on substitute collection means from the concerned units as well as more broadly in the DO, hoping to garner ideas from officers with varied perspectives. … Additional points made on the liaison question included the view by several DO officers present that guidelines on these aspects of liaison relationships are insufficient and thus have not been disseminated effectively in the ranks, leaving many officers in the dark. The need was also suggested for support of those chiefs of station who believe •••.

**Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, ‘Subject: Issues and Related Material for PRM-11 Task 3 Drafting Group’, Memorandum for: ••• (18 April 1979), see especially III. H. Coordinator of Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services’ in the attached draft titled The Roles of the DCI and US Intelligence: An Organizational Analysis, pp.83–87 – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010006-4 (2005/04/22) – where it notes: ‘No comprehensive national policy has been issued to govern the conduct of US official relationships with foreign intelligence and security services. Several aspects of foreign liaison are, however, addressed in NSCIDs [National Security Council Intelligence Directive] 2, 5 and 6 and related DCI Directives. Some ambiguity results from this piecemeal approach, especially as pertains to the respective responsibilities of the DCI, the DIRNSA, and Chiefs of US Missions abroad. Relationships with foreign intelligence and security organizations are maintained by several departments and agencies within, and outside of, the Intelligence Community to exchange intelligence, counterintelligence and related information for mutual benefit. The totality of US–foreign liaison relationships and information exchanges (intelligence or otherwise) is not now under the cognizance, control or management of any single individual or organization in the government. A national policy issuance which assigned specific responsibilities and oversight for foreign liaison supportive of national intelligence needs would be both desirable and timely. The responsibilities of the DCI for coordination of US foreign intelligence activities as described in NSCIDs 1 and 2 need to be more clearly defined in relation to State and Defense responsibilities set out in NSCID 2. [Details follow, including the following excerpts: … The DCI exercises a predominant foreign liaison coordinating role in clandestine intelligence and CI matters… Since NSCID 5 is limited to clandestine matters, it does not address the DCI’s role per NSCIDs 1 and 2 in the extensive non-clandestine foreign liaison intelligence exchange activities carried out by Defense Department elements and other federal agencies under various intelligence and security-related programs. In addition, to clandestine charters, many foreign intelligence services have criminal investigation, overt collection, analysis and production responsibilities in the context of which US Government intelligence elements need to conduct liaison. These factors have caused occasional coordination problems at the field level, primarily in areas where major US military commands are located, ••• military intelligence representatives have disagreed on the extent of ••• control over information exchanges between the US military and host country intelligence components. Such conflicts appear to stem from an inadequate understanding of the DCI’s authority and responsibilities on such matters rather than from a need for new policies or directives. We would expect such problems to largely disappear in the event of more centralized management and oversight of US–foreign intelligence liaison relationships and information exchanges.

Intelligence exchanges and activities with foreign intelligence services in sensitive compartmented activities, such as SIGINT and imagery, have required special arrangements… normally [involving]… the protection and control of the product of sensitive technical operations… In the case of imagery, the DCI’s authorities are specifically set out in special Presidential memoranda. These memoranda provide for DCI control over policy and procedures for exchange of imagery products with certain ••• zations. Most of this product is military-related and complex agreements have been worked out with the foreign countries concerned, governing the use of this special product… Because of the sometimes confusing lines of authority inherent in NSCID’s 5 and 6 with respect to SIGINT activities, problems occasionally
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arise in interpreting what respective roles should be played in the SIGINT field by the DCI and the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA). ••• No solution to this problem suggests itself at this time but it is one that should be addressed when the NSCIDs are revised and updated.’

‘Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations’, DDS&T Creativity and Ethics Seminar (26 April 1977), p.3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00473A000800010015-1 (2001/11/20) – particularly where it notes: ‘On foreign liaison, the group concluded that we generally are merely following existing, and usually publicly acknowledged, official U.S., relations policy. We did recognize, however, that there are situations where the U.S. does not acknowledge official relationships with a foreign power yet we, the Agency, are expected to maintain liaison associations. Here, we felt, another potential ethical problem could exist.’

R.W. Gambino, Chairman, Security Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Subject: Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign ••• Liaison Personnel in the US •••’, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence SECOM-D-680 (12 October 1979) – via CREST – CIA-RDP82M00591R0000200150024-9 (2005/03/24) – especially where it notes: Action Requested: Your approval to circulate for National Foreign Intelligence Board concurrence a proposed policy on the subject above. ••• Background: In 1966, the then USIB [US Intelligence Board] approved a Security Committee proposal … tasking Community agencies to provide CIA, for central indexing as a service of common concern, the names of all foreign representatives in the U.S. accredited for liaison ••• and who had access to U.S. intelligence. Over the years the quality of Community inputs declined markedly, and CIA assessments raised questions about the value of a central index. The Security Committee reminded Community agencies of the reporting requirements and asked them to be more diligent in response in the interests of testing the value of the policy. The level of response suggested that the perceived value was low… The Security Committee has agreed on a proposed new Community policy which would:

a. Eliminate tasking on CIA to maintain a central index of names, and the requirement for Community agencies to do national agency checks on foreign liaison personnel and certify the results thereof.

b. Require Community agencies to list with CIA’s Compartmented Information Branch all compartmented accesses they grant or sponsor for foreign liaison personnel; to maintain indexes ••• and to provide both CIA and FBI any adverse security data coming to their attention on such foreign personnel…’

See also Special Assistant to the DDCI, ‘Subject: Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 2 April 1980’, Memorandum for: Executive Committee Members EXCOM 9046-80 (15 April 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00988R00050050031-9 (2003/06/26) – particularly where it notes: ‘The Executive Committee met on 2 April 1980 to hear reports and consider the recommendations of two Committee-sponsored task forces, one on Release of Information to the Department of State and one on Release of Information to Foreign Liaison… ••• Chairman of the Foreign Liaison Task Force, reviewed the terms of reference and methodology of his group’s study. He confirmed that foreign liaison information exchange was meeting Agency goals, but that practices and procedures needed some tightening. Before turning to the task force’s specific recommendations, the Committee members commended the group for its excellent report. Mr. Carlucci acknowledged that the need for tightening up practices and procedures relating to foreign liaison extended beyond the Agency, but Agency procedures needed to be addressed first before moving into the Community. Messrs. McMahon and ••• discussed the best way to approach the problem in the Community and agreed that a draft DCID [Director of Central Intelligence Directive] should be proposed. Some work is underway in this area, and Messrs. Carlucci, ••• and McMahon agreed to meet on this topic separately. ••• … Recommendation 7 was disapproved with the understanding that DDA [Deputy Director for Administration], DDO [Deputy Director for Operations] and NFAC [National Foreign Assessment Center] would examine the need for training employees returning from overseas assignments on policy and procedural changes, particularly in responsibilities for foreign liaison control and clearance procedures… Regarding recommendation 10, Mr. Wortman noted suitable space for secure foreign liaison conference rooms adjacent to secondary entrances had already been identified. Mr. Kerr reflected NFAC’s view that requiring escorts for all foreign visitors as stated in Recommendation 13 would be seen as a slight by some foreign liaison representatives. After a brief discussion the Committee approved the recommendation. Recalling earlier comments regarding ground work begun on tackling the release of information to foreign liaison
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on a Community basis, the Committee noted that Recommendation 14 had been overtaken by events...);

*** CSG, ‘To *** PPG/OS’, Transmittal Slip (16 April 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP87B01034R000500090015-6 (2005/08/02) – particularly where it notes: ‘Remarks: Here’s a copy of the revision of DCID 1/10 with memo to DCI showing approval to circulate to NFIB – For Registry DCID 1/10 folder when it is returned.’

See also the references to the various DCID 1/10 drafts throughout Chapter 1: Introduction [e.g. 8.1];

‘Subject: Policy on Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign Integrated and Liaison Personnel in the United States (This supersedes policy set forth in USIB-D-9.1/11 dated 20 September 1966)’, Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board NFIB-9.1/40 (28 May 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP83M00171R002100210005-7 (2001/11/08) – where it notes: ‘In order to enhance the security of intelligence information, the following uniform procedures are established for use within the Intelligence Community in relationships with representatives of foreign governments. These procedures apply to all accredited foreign representatives, both military and civilian, in the United States who are integrated within or serve in a liaison capacity with a member of the Intelligence Community and who have access to US intelligence information.

2. For purposes of this Policy Statement, a foreign integrated officer is one who occupies a billet or slot requiring access to US intelligence information in a host US agency and who functions essentially as do US personnel of the host agency. A foreign liaison officer is one who is accredited by his government to one or more US departments or agencies, and whose duties include representing his own government in the exchange and/or discussion of intelligence. The provisions of this statement other than paragraph 3 ... need not apply to foreign government representatives, civilian or military, who are in the US exclusively for training purposes or to foreign representatives in the US who have other than a normal liaison or integrated relationship... Security Assurances: ... In every instance, there shall be required a written assurance from the foreign government stating that its representative, as defined •••...’;

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Subject: Implementation of Decisions Concerning Foreign Liaison’, Memorandum for: Executive Committee Members (8 September 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00988R000500019-3 (2003/06/26) – where it notes: ‘Substantial progress has been made toward need correction of some basic problem areas in the Agency’s conduct of foreign liaison. However, progress has been slowed in implementation of some accomplishable actions, and we appear to be marking time on others. I urge you to expediate completion of these actions. Where this is not possible, perhaps effective alternative can be proposed... Because the nature of most of the pending actions allows for fairly short-term accomplishment, please provide me your third progress reports by 1 October...’;

Security Officer, ODP, ‘Visit of Foreign Nationals to CIA Building’, Memorandum for: Chief, Industrial Certification Branch, Office of Security ODP-0-1353 (10 October 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP83T00573R000300130007-1 (2001/07/12) – particularly where it notes: ‘The SAFE program people have been advised that visits of Foreign Visitors must be approved by the Office of Security and the Foreign Liaison Office and in the future appropriate plans be made and sufficient time be afforded for all approvals.’

From the UK National Archives at Kew, London:

‘UK / US intelligence liaison: proposal to regulate future visits by officials to Washington’ (09 February 1973 - 20 June 1973), UK National Archives (formerly known as the Public Records Office - PRO), Kew, class: CAB 163/195. Availability: ‘Closed Or Retained Document, Open Description, Retained by Department under Section 3.4 [for more on Section 3.4, see the discussion concerning the declassification of records concerning intelligence liaison, below]’ - via UK National Archives online catalogue via URL: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATID=8335325&j=1> (accessed: 15/06/2007);

See also ‘UK / US intelligence liaison: visits to USA of JIC staff to meet their counterparts in the CIA; administrative arrangements and programme for Prime Minister Heath's visit to Washington in 1970’ (04 November 1970 - 30 April 1971), UK National Archives, Kew, class: CAB 163/167. Availability: ‘Closed Or Retained Document, Open Description, Retained by Department under Section 3.4’ - via UK National Archives online catalogue via URL:
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Appendix 2

Introduction
The declassified CIA documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), present us with considerable insights into the types of reviews, reports and other management tools being employed to try and internally manage US foreign intelligence liaison relationships at the highest levels within the CIA.

Letter from Major General D.O. Graham to Rear Admiral E.F. Rectanus on 7 December 1973 – via CREST – CIA-RDP82M00531R000400020009-4 (2005/06/09) – particularly where he notes: ‘As you may be aware, Mr. Colby at the 20 November USIB meeting initiated a discussion of foreign intelligence liaison relations, indicated that he intended to submit a report to NSCIC on the subject, and assigned the action on this to me. For this purpose, I am obtaining background material from appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community and would appreciate additional material from you on the US Navy’s intelligence liaison relationships, ...’;

See also ‘ICS Activities Report No. 1’, DCI/IC 74-0952 (15 February 1974), p.3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-05343A000200070015-3 (2002/05/08) – particularly where it notes: ‘6. Foreign Intelligence Liaison Study: An examination of foreign intelligence liaison relationships is being made leading to a report which the DCI plans to send to the NSCIC [National Security Council Intelligence Committee] on how current arrangements contribute to US policy and intelligence objectives and whether and how they could be improved. The DCI indicated his desire for such a report at a USIB [United States Intelligence Board] meeting in late 1973 and asked the D/DCI/IC to undertake the study with the assistance of appropriate community elements. Contributions are being received and drafting of the report has been started.’;


W.R. Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, Studies in Intelligence, 17, 2 (Summer 1973) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010006-5 (2004/12/16) – particularly where he notes (p.23): ‘One of the area divisions of the Clandestine Service recently made a detailed survey of its liaison operations, and it is somewhat surprising to find that the survey was not very helpful in answering some of the more traditional and tiresome questions which bother us all. It did reveal some interesting facts about training, however.’;

See also J.H. Waller, Inspector General, ‘Subject: Terrorist and Counter-Terrorist Activities’, Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (13 August 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090028-6 (2002/09/04) – especially where it notes: ‘Inspector ... has been designated by me as terrorist referent for the Inspection Staff. A lawyer by training and a long-time DDO officer with much experience in liaisons as well as foreign operations, Mr. ... is well qualified in this field. 2. This assignment fits into and complements his now-ongoing inspection project which concerns overseas liaisons with emphasis on the following possible problem areas: -- Liaison relationships with intelligence/security services which are repressive, abuse civil liberties or offend U.S. moral standards. – CI, counter-terrorist and anti-drug collaboration with foreign liaison services. – Liaison agreements which could be construed as requiring examination in connection with the Case Act [’Reporting International Agreements to Congress under Case Act’ - see URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/> (accessed: 13/07/2007.)] – Liaison operations which could be construed as being carried out in [sic.] behalf of CIA and are illegal by U.S. law, contrary to Executive Orders or in violation of CIA regulations.);

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(2001/08/09) – particularly where it notes: ‘The Staff for International Activities/… is compiling a record of training programs provided to foreign intelligence and security services during calendar years 1975 and 1976. For this purpose, please provide a listing of the training programs provided by your element, indicating for each: number of program participants and nationality, subject of the training, working days, numbers of trainers involved, and the area in which the training was given…’;

Chief, Staff for International Activities, ‘Subject: Activities of Foreign Liaison Services in the U.S.,’ Memorandum for: Foreign Liaison Officer, DDA (c. January 1977) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00966R000100130001-1 (2001/08/09) – where it notes: ‘1. The Directorate of Operations is tasked with the preparation of a briefing paper on the activities of foreign intelligence and security services in the United States. We have asked our Staffs and Divisions to provide certain information on each foreign liaison representative with whom we are in contact in Washington, as follows: a. What are you discussing with each representative? b. How often are meetings held with each representative? c. With whom does each representative meet in the Agency, that is, DDO, DDI or DDS&T? d. What intelligence is exchanged with each individual? e. What operational discussions take place? f. What is exchanged in the security or CI field? g. What training is given any of these representatives? [sic.] 2. Contributions from the other Directorates on items a, b, c, and d on liaison representatives with whom they are in contact would make possible a complete study on the nature and scope of foreign liaison in Washington…’;

Chief, Policy and Plans Group, Office of Security, ‘Subject: Activities of Liaison Services in the U.S.,’ Memorandum for: Executive Officer/DDA (3 February 1977) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00966R000100130001-1 (2001/08/09) – where it notes: ‘1. … please be advised that the Special Security Center of the Office of Security meets with foreign liaison officers and security officials concerning security policies and procedures related to the handling and utilization of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and/or technical collection sites or operations abroad. These contacts are generally confined to ••• representations. During the past nine months there have been two meetings, ••• Generally, their contacts are with liaison officers who have relationships with the DDI and/or the DDS&T, as well. There is no exchange of intelligence or operational discussion. The contacts deal strictly with security policies and procedures which may include some discussion of unauthorized disclosures of SCI material in the press. There is no formal training involved, but information and advice in compartmented security is provided as required. During the two meetings mentioned, ••• representative were permanently assigned to Washington. Both were accompanied by individuals visiting this area on a TDY [temporary duty] basis… 3. It should also be mentioned that the Director of Security in coordination with the Directorate of Operations has had liaison contact with ••• on matters of mutual interest in the counter-terrorism field…’;

Director, Intelligence Community Staff, ‘Subject: Report of Intelligence Community Views on Needed Revisions to Executive Order 12036′, Memorandum for: National Foreign Intelligence Council (23 April 1981), pp.8-9 – via CREST – CIA-RDP84B00890R000300050004-8 (2004/06/29) – particularly where it notes: ‘Issue 6: Should the DCI’s authority to coordinate U.S. intelligence relationships with intelligence services of foreign governments be limited such that the DCI may only coordinate U.S. liaison with foreign clandestine services? Discussion: DoD has proposed certain amendments to the Order which would appear to significantly affect the DCI’s foreign liaison coordination authority. The DCI’s authority in this area is delineated in section 1-601(g) of the Order, which provides, inter alia, that the DCI shall coordinate U.S. intelligence relationships with intelligence services of foreign governments. DoD has proposed amending this section to limit the DCI’s coordinative role to that of coordinating U.S. liaison with foreign clandestine services. Under the DoD formulation, presumably any “intelligence relationship” which is not cast as “U.S. liaison” would not be subject to the DCI’s coordination. Moreover, any liaison with foreign intelligence services other than “foreign clandestine services” would not be within the purview of DCI coordination authority. These presumptions are supported, in part, by a new section 1-1113 of the Order which DoD has proposed. That new section would provide that the Secretary of Defense shall: “Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international organizations.” This provision would enable the Secretary of Defense to conduct “military intelligence relationships” with “foreign defense establishments and international organizations” without any DCI coordination. DoD believes that it is necessary to have service-to-service
intelligence relationships with foreign governments unencumbered by any coordination external to DoD.

The purpose of centrally coordinating foreign liaison relationships is to ensure that U.S. intelligence agencies are not played off against one another by opportunist foreign governments seeking to gain advantage over the U.S. and to prevent U.S. intelligence agencies, in the conduct of their liaison arrangements and activities, from unwittingly interfering with, or undercutting, one another. Dilution of the DCI’s role would undermine such coordination. It should be noted that DoD has also proposed a new section 1-1202(j), which authorizes NSA to conduct cryptologic liaison relationships. However, NSA cryptologic liaison conducted under this section is required to be consistent with the policies and procedures of the DCI.

Community Positions: DoD supports amendments to the Order which would limit the DCI’s foreign liaison coordination authority and expand the authority of the Secretary of Defense in this area. The CIA opposes the amendments.’

See also some of the other sources cited throughout this study.
Appendix 3

Introduction

The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), provide some insights into accountability/oversight issues – as discussed in Chapter 1: Introduction [4.1].

D.P. Gregg, ‘Subject: Meeting with William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’, Memorandum for the Record (16 February 1978), pp.1-4 – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R002100010051-2 (2006/08/18) – particularly where he notes: ‘On 15 February 1978, in a 90-minute luncheon, a useful exchange was held on the overall subject of SSCI’s attitudes towards CIA. … Miller’s central theme… was that although relations between the SSCI and CIA are vastly improved over what they were two years ago, there are still areas of great concern. He said that the SSCI is not satisfied with the degree of information and insight which it now has into our sensitive collection operations or our foreign liaison relationships. I remarked that I had been told that the DCI’s April meeting on sensitive sources had been highly successful and that he had felt the Committee was satisfied on this score. Miller strongly demurred, saying that the Committee believed that the DCI was very new in his job and needed more time to get into what is admittedly a difficult oversight issue, i.e. how to increase the SSCI’s sense of confidence in our internal review procedures on sensitive collection operations. Various ways of approaching this problem were discussed. Miller reacted positively to the suggestion that three or four specific sensitive operations could be discussed before the Committee (without naming specific sources), outlining for them the review process which had been used to judge whether the risks of the operation justified the possible gains. He stressed that the SSCI would want to know the degree to which the Department of State and/or Ambassador concerned had been brought into the review process… 3. Turning to the subject of liaison relationships Miller said there was “deep cynicism” among the Committee about our liaison relationships. He said that many members are convinced that CIA uses foreign liaison services to do those things which CIA is prohibited from doing by charter or Executive Order. He cited the ••• as two examples of this. I said that I would be delighted to go down and talk to the staff members on the subject of liaison in order to gain a clearer grasp of what their concerns are and how we can alleviate them. Miller said this would be helpful and that he would be in touch with me about setting up an appointment… 6. I responded to Miller by saying that I was both surprised and disappointed to learn that the SSCI’s attitudes toward the Directorate were still as riddled with negative feelings as he indicated. Miller said things were on the upswing but that the members had not yet been told enough about our internal review processes or the nature of our relations with liaison services to have any sense that the Agency was conducting a broad and objective review of the costs and risks of our more sensitive operations. He said “we feel it is wrong for threat assessments to be made only by those directly involved.” 7. I suggested that what might be helpful was a more informal exchange process with the Committee. I asked if the Committee felt that it only wished to be briefed by Deputy Directors or the Director himself. Miller replied that the committee would be delighted to be briefed by anyone, particularly those directly concerned with operations under review. (It was in this vein that I suggested my willingness to brief the staff on the subject of liaison relationships.)… My recent experience with an equally sceptical group ••• (FSI [Foreign Service Institute – ‘the Federal Government’s primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community’ - see URL: <http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/> (accessed: 14/07/2007).] and INR [US Department of State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research - see URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_state.shtml> (accessed: 14/07/07).] group) leads me to feel that a more forthcoming posture with the SSCI might gain us more in the long run…’; For follow-up on this issue, see, for instance, Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: 11 April 1978 Meeting of NFIB [National Foreign Intelligence Board] Representatives to Discuss Procedures for Handling Congressional Inquiries About Foreign Liaison Relationships’, Memorandum for the Record (11 April 1978) – via CREST – CIA-
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RDP81M00980R000200030042-1 (2006/08/09) – where it notes: ‘The paper that was produced as a result of the 5 April session was reviewed and modified fairly significantly. Essentially, the paper limits the authority of program managers to pass only the following information on foreign liaison relationships: (1) the identity of the country; (2) U.S. funds, resources and manpower devoted to the relationships; and (3) summaries of the product of the relationship. Any additional provision of information would be coordinated with the DCI. 2. All parties recognized that this apparent hard line will not be very palatable to congressional oversight committees and that there will be a steady stream of exceptions. The major objective is to attempt to preclude ever providing compendium reports to Congress on any agency’s foreign liaison relationships. In the event that there are needs to know more, obviously it will be forthcoming… Once the paper is agreed upon by one and all, we will then have the job of negotiating it with Congress. Inasmuch as the paper is fairly close to the previous Senate Select Committee on Intelligence informal agreement with Hank Knoche, former DDCl, I am hopeful that we will be able to get them to chop off first; then, with the [SSCI] concurrence in hand, it may be easier to convince the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of its validity.’;

See also: F.P. Hitz, Legislative Counsel (CIA), ‘Subject: Reporting on CIA Liaison Relationships to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’, Memorandum for: [various] (17 July 1978), p.1-3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R002300050022-8 (2006/11/22) and CIA-RDP81M00980R0021000400032-0 (2006/12/12) – where they note: ‘As addressees may recall, in November 1977 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) requested that CIA provide a briefing on its foreign intelligence liaison relationships… On 6 July 1978 Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director, [HPSCI], asked that the Committee be briefed on “written agreements that are essentially government to government agreements which have not been reported to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act.” Mr. Latimer indicated that he and the Committee understand that the Agency regards these relationships as both sources and methods of intelligence acquisition, but said that the Committee has a responsibility to be apprised of formal relationships which carry with them substantive commitments on the part of the U.S. Government. He also stated that he was not interested in oral and essentially informal arrangements carved out by present or former Chiefs of Stations with chiefs of foreign intelligence services… Reporting to HPSCI on written agreements which are essentially government to government in nature is probably the absolute minimum to which we will be able to limit a briefing on Agency relationships with liaisons. There follows a proposed outline for addressees’ consideration in attempting to meet the needs of the Committee while maintaining the sense of confidentiality implicit in our relationships with the various foreign liaison services.

4. I believe the briefing should be oral and off-the-record (i.e., that no transcript be taken) and that it should be stressed throughout the briefing that these arrangements constitute some of our most sensitive activities. In addition, it should be pointed out that our reluctance to brief on such matters stems from the fact that we could very possibly lose the cooperation of foreign intelligence services if they found out that we were briefing Congress on those relationships, given the recent Congressional leak record. I propose the following structure for the briefing:

a. Types of relationships:

SIGINT – Limit geographical descriptions to general areas, i.e. ***. Tell the Committee what the nature of these relationships are and how we carry them out. The Committee should be briefed in terms of funds expended, passed, material provided, information passed as well as the benefits to the USG from these relationships.

OPERATIONAL – Again, limit geographical descriptions to general areas and provide the Committee with descriptions of the kinds of relationships encompassed, such as Exchange of Information (what kinds), Ground Rules (such as), Operations (what kinds and with what objectives), as well as the overall benefits to the United States Government.

b. This might also be an opportune moment to discuss with the Committee the overall benefits of liaison relationships; viz., the value of those relationships to the U.S. intelligence effort, the basic philosophical position that there must be net advantage to the USG in order to justify the relationship, the kinds of product that emanate from these relationships and concluding with some kind of estimate on the number of man-years that these relationships save the USG.

c. Once having concluded the opening remarks and briefing, the Committee will most probably ask some specific questions which the briefers will have to respond to in as general terms as the situation permits… it is worth remembering that the more financially significant of these intelligence agreements have already been exposed to the [HPSCI] in the course of budget mark-up.
5. Once a briefing package has been worked out, it will have to be coordinated in scope with DOD and NSA, both of whom are being tasked with similar requirements. Attached are proposed guidelines for NFIB agency responses to Congressional inquiries regarding liaison relationships. The proposed briefing is in general consonance with the guidelines…'

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management, ‘Subject: Reporting to the Congress on Foreign Intelligence Liaison Relationships’, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence DCI/IC 78-0620 (undated, c.June-July 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R003100020030-3 (2004/05/21) – especially where it notes: ‘Action Requested: That you provide verbal guidance to the NFIB on the above subject… Background: As you may recall, the Agency reached an understanding with Bill Miller and Senator Inouye in the fall of 1976 on reporting intelligence arrangements to the SSCI (see copy of guidelines at Tab A). No similar understanding has yet been reach with the HPSCI although, as ••• recently phrased it, “…we are nudging our way toward it in the House.”… In March OLC [Office of Legislative Counsel] learned that DIA was about to send to the HPSCI (at its insistence) a list of all DoD bilateral intelligence agreements. This action could have created an awkward precedent in view of the fact that the HPSCI request to you of last November for “detailed summaries of all intelligence agreements… reached with other nations…” has never been answered. You were prepared to brief the Committee in December but the subject did not come up. More recently Mike O’Neil, chief counsel for the HPSCI, has expressed renewed interest in this outstanding request… The DIA response was eventually modified to take care of most of the CIA and NSA concerns. Nonetheless, some Community action seemed called for in anticipation of similar requests in the future. … In April a group, representing those NFIB agencies with foreign intelligence liaison responsibilities, met to discuss the need for uniform guidelines for handling Congressional inquiries regarding such relationships. The group proposed, and their NFIB principals agreed, that the Community as a whole should be guided by the following principles:

(1) Wherever possible, information about intelligence relationships should be provided only in response to requests from committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities.

(2) Whenever possible, responses should be to specific queries regarding specific countries or services. Information should be limited to the identity of the country and the service, the agency working with that service, the general purpose of the relationship and, when necessary for oversight purposes, the resources and manpower involved.

(3) In the event of allegations of improper activities on the part of the foreign intelligence or security service, every effort should be made to provide information bearing on the allegation. Where this would depart from (1) and (2) above, the matter should be referred to the DCI who will attempt to resolve the matter with the requesting committee or, if no resolution is possible, consult with the President.

(4) Whenever possible, responses to inquiries concerning liaison relationships (except those reported under the Case-Zablocki Act) should be answered orally and off the record…

Recommendations: It is recommended that … You express your concern for the handling of all Congressional inquiries regarding intelligence liaison activities in a secure, uniform and coordinated manner, and designate your Legislative Counsel as contact point to be kept informed regarding such inquiries on your behalf, especially now while negotiations are under way with the committees.’

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Appendix 4

Introduction

The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), provide some further insights into accountability/oversight issues – as discussed in Chapter 1: Introduction [4.1].

Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management, ‘Subject: Reporting to the Congress on Foreign Intelligence Liaison Relationships’, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence (21 August 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R001900030005-4 (2006/10/31), CIA-RDP81M00980R002300050020-0 (2006/07/27) and CIA-RDP80M00772A0004000100026-8 (2004/09/03);

Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: A/DDO Meeting with Mike Glennon [Senate Foreign Relations Legal Counsel] on 4 October 1978’, Memorandum for: Legislative Counsel (29 September 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R001800060031-3 (2006/11/20) – especially where it notes: ‘Two papers are in preparation. The first, to be read by ••• will be based on the subject of foreign liaison relationships generally. It will be based on the attached paper done for Senator Inouye in January 1977, with the addition of material on: why liaison is such a sensitive source and method; the kinds of training that may be provided to a liaison service; and the question of CIA support in the area of funding. … In addition, •••, will be preparing material on our justification for declining to answer the McGovern Subcommittee staff’s specific questions on our liaison relations with particular foreign intelligence services. This explanation… will also make reference to Senator McGovern’s promises to the President and DCI … regarding the circumspection with which the Subcommittee’s investigation would be conducted, and it will draw upon the rationale to be provided by DDO regarding the sensitivity of liaison relationships and the potential for damage, should it become known that the Agency was providing specific information on individual relationships to the Congress.’;

Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: Draft Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Legal Counsel Michael Glennon [Senate Foreign Relations Legal Counsel] on 4 October 1978’, Memorandum for: ••• OLC: 78-647/18 (26 October 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R003400070021-5 (2004/03/26) – especially where it notes: ‘Please give this draft your close scrutiny. It is essential that the information we are providing be as complete and accurate as possible within the bounds of sources and methods protection, and that our answers do not in any way mislead the International Operations Subcommittee in its investigation of foreign intelligence activities in the U.S… Request: Provide a memorandum discussing guidelines governing CIA dissemination of information concerning residents of the United States to foreign governments. Include an analysis of how these guidelines have changed since 1 January 1970. Response: … With respect to dissemination of information, Executive Order 12036 essentially carries forward the regulatory scheme of its predecessor… In addition to the Executive Order, Attorney General-approved procedures, and an internal implementing regulation, CIA has been constrained in what it may provide foreign liaison services, including information regarding residents of the United States, by an internal regulation in effect, with modifications, since at least 1 January 1970. This regulation provides that information, insofar as it may be classified, may not be provided to a foreign government unless a determination has been made that to do so would be to the net advantage to the United States “giving consideration to such matters as mutual interest, need-to-know, security aspects and the wisdom of the proposed release.” The regulation also provides that classified information originating in agencies other than CIA will not be released without the consent of the originator.

Moreover, Directorate of Operations policy in effect since September 1976 imposes strict guidelines on the dissemination of “derogatory information” on United States persons to foreign governments even if such dissemination is otherwise permissible under Executive Order. Even where information on a non-United States person is considered to be nonderogatory, officials authorized to release information to foreign governments are obligated to consider whether the release may result in a foreign government’s taking action which could result in social, political or economic discrimination against the person.’
Appendix 5

Introduction

The various sources, listed below, provide some further insights into disclosure issues and methodological restraints encountered when dealing with and/or researching intelligence liaison relationships – as discussed above in Chapter 2 [2.1.ii].

‘Minutes – Open Session, June 23’, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (23-24 June 1997) - via URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/adcom/mtgnts/11705.htm> (accessed: 26/10/2005) - particularly where it states: ‘Slany noted that a decision for disclosure might affect intelligence liaison between two or more parties…’;


In the archives, see, for instance, right hand column heading ‘Justification for Extension Beyond Six Years’, in Directorate of Administration Classification Guide (?c.1970s) – via CREST – CIA-RDP87B01034R000200070055-7 (2005/08/15) - especially where it notes: ‘To protect sensitive clandestine sources and methods of collecting intelligence which are expected to remain sensitive by virtue of loss of informational advantage to the United States over the full stated period of classification. The foreign government(s) or international organization(s) concerned require that the fact of their cooperation with the United States in making information available be kept in confidence. E.O. [Executive Order] 12065, sections 6-103 and 1-303 define Foreign Government Information and specify that its unauthorized disclosure is presumed to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security. Section 1-402 of E.O. 12065 specifies that such information may be classified for up to 30 years; Section 3-404 exempts such information from automatic declassification and 20-year systematic review. This justification applies for all foreign government information categorized under Section 9b.’;

Special Assistant for Information Control, ‘Subject: Guidelines Evolved in Classification/Declassification Process’, Memorandum for Executive Director Comptroller (18 December 1972) – via CREST – CIA-RDP80B01495R000200110025-4 (2006/09/18) – especially where it notes: ‘2. Taking [Executive Order 11652] exemptions in the order in which they are presented, we have dealt with them as follows: a. Material derived from foreign liaison. We have refused declassification on material derived from foreign liaison unless the government concerned has acquiesced in the release. We have viewed this concept as including materials exchanged between allies in time of war, covering even tactical intelligence. Perhaps we have been a little too broad in this last interpretation… We have further protected the names of intelligence officers from other services, including foreign… It is apparent that tedious, word-by-word review of documents is an expensive and time-consuming process. Where we have identified document sets which we intend to proscribe from declassification, we can use an initial determination of continued classification as the basis for eliminating the word-by-word review…’;


See also “A different set of questions from [Carter’s running mate, Senator Walter “Fritz”] Mondale caused the CIA Director some concern because they raised sensitive policy issues. In some cases his queries related to ongoing CIA relationships with foreign liaison services or the Agency's operations…” [Emphasis added] - from Central Intelligence Agency, ‘In-Depth Discussions With Carter’, chapter 5 in CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates (22 May 1996) - via the National Security Archive, based at The George Washington University (GWU), Washington, DC, via URL <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/cia/Chapter%205%20--%20In-Depth%20Discussions%20With%20Carter.htm> (accessed: 08/06/2007);

See also references to ‘liaison’ in N.R. Kinsman, ‘Protecting CIA’s Interests: Openness and the Future of the Clandestine Service’, Studies in Intelligence (Fall/Winter 2001) - via URL: <https://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v44i5a07p.htm> (accessed: 04/09/2006);

See also the reference to the third party rule above in Chapter 1: Introduction [4.1] of this study.

For which documents have been released concerning foreign liaison (and associated subjects) by the CIA, and its declassification policy concerning this area of inquiry, see also the column titled ‘Supplementary information’ in ‘Notices’, Federal Register, 69, 244 (Tuesday, 21 December 2004), pp.76449-76450 - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007);

See also ‘Presidential Documents’, Federal Register, 60, 76 (Thursday, 20 April 1995) - especially where this document notes: ‘Section 1.1. Definitions. … (d) “Foreign Government Information” means: (1) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, with the expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence; (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence; or (3) information received and treated as “Foreign Government Information” under the terms of a predecessor order…” (p.19825) and ‘Sec. 4.2. General Restrictions on Access. … (g) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order, an agency shall safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization of governments that furnished the information…” (p.19837).

In the UK case, retained documents are covered by ‘Section 3.4’ (see Appendix 1, above, that refers to documents in the UK National Archives). ‘Section 3.4’ refers to Section 3 (4) of the UK Public Records Act (1958). This states: ‘Public records selected for permanent preservation under this section shall be transferred not later than thirty years after their creation either to the Public Record Office or to such other place of deposit appointed by the Lord Chancellor under this Act as the Lord Chancellor may direct: Provided that any records may be retained after the said period if, in the opinion of the person who is responsible for them, they are required for administrative purposes or ought to be retained for any other special reason and, where that person is not the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chancellor has been informed of the facts and given his approval.’ (p.3 - emphasis added) - via URL: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/public-records-act1958.rtf> (accessed: 16/06/2007);

See also Intelligence Records in The [UK] National Archives (London: 17 August 2005) - via URL: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/Leaflets/ri2026.htm> (accessed: 16/06/2007);

See also C. O’Reilly, ‘SOCA, so good?: Carina O’Reilly speaks to Bill Hughes, the director-general of SOCA, on the agency’s achievements in tackling organised crime during its first year of operation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 August 2007) - particularly where ‘Hughes says that it is [the] desire for partnership that has led [SOCA] to avoid publicity: “[SOCA] has a low media profile on the basis that while you are singing your praises, you are switching off a lot of your partners…”’