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EU Transport Infrastructure Policy, New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance: the cases of Vienna and London

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## Contents

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Chapter 1: Introduction p. 6

Chapter 2: Literature Review p. 25

Chapter 3: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance p. 50

Chapter 4: Trans-European Networks – Transport p. 81

Chapter 5: Case Study – Vienna p. 118

Chapter 6: Case Study – London p. 147

Chapter 7: Conclusion p. 188

Appendix 1: Vienna City Administration Survey p. 213

Appendix 2: Greater London Authority Survey p. 216

Bibliography p. 219
List of Tables

Table 3.1: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance p. 80
Box 4.1: Articles 74 and 75 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957) p. 85
Box 4.2: Title XII (Articles 129b-c) of the Treaty on European Union (1992) p. 100
Box 4.3: ‘Essen’ Priority Projects of the TENT programme p. 104
Box 4.4: Additional Priority Projects of the TENT programme agreed in April 2004 p. 108
Table 5.1: TENT Policy, New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance: the case of Vienna p. 146
Table 6.1: TENT Policy, New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance: the case of London p. 187
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Abstract

The European integration process has fundamentally changed the system of governing in Europe. No longer is European governance confined to the nation-state level, but rather involves a variety of supranational, national and sub-national actors. Nowhere has this shift been witnessed more than at the sub-national level. Sub-national authorities (SNAs) have come to play a significant role in the European Union (EU), actively engaging at various levels of the European policy-making process. Thus, any adequate understanding of European governance requires an examination of sub-national government. However, existing research fails to place SNAs at the focal point of its analysis, viewing SNAs as passive and/or reactive political actors. As a result a research space exists in which to ask the question of why and how SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making. This is undertaken via an analysis of the Vienna city administration and Greater London Authority in the highly under-researched trans-European networks – transport (TENT) policy area. In taking such an approach, this thesis develops a new institutional understanding of multi-level governance (MLG). It is argued that the strength of MLG lies in its ability to encapsulate the reconfiguration of policy-making space in the EU. The EU’s institutions are critical to this reordering of policy-making space in that they undertake the role of ‘honey pot sites’, attracting actors and facilitating the processes of interaction that so mark MLG. By applying the analytical tools of new institutionalism to MLG, this thesis proposes a framework for understanding MLG as existing in three distinct types, varying in accordance to its rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalist guises. The three institutional types of MLG are clearly identifiable in the experiences of Vienna and London, presenting different perspectives on the emergence or not of an MLG form of policy-making in Austria and the United Kingdom. As such, attention is drawn to the key role played by SNAs in the formation of polycentric forms of governance. In doing so, this thesis highlights the importance of a SNA having a European self-identity in order to facilitate the consistent and dynamic engagement with the EU level required in order to achieve policy influence.
Chapter 1: Introduction

Why sub-national authorities?

The European integration process has radically altered the system and nature of governing in Europe. Particularly since the ‘relaunch’ of the European project with the 1986 Single European Act, the governing structures of the European Union (EU) have been subject to fundamental change. Whilst state-centric analysis continues to make its voice heard, the EU has also been characterised in a variety of other ways, such as an emerging federal system, a multi-level system of governance and a postmodern international political form (Ruggie, 1998: 173). Nowhere has this change been witnessed more than at the sub-national level. The EU has experienced a new intensity in the work and role of sub-national authorities (SNAs). No longer are sub-national actors confined to operating within the framework of the nation-state, rather they actively engage in European policy-making via both intra-state and extra-state means. Regional and local authorities have come to play an important role in the governance structure of the EU, facilitating the debate concerning the potential for a future ‘Europe of the Regions’. Whilst this debate was at its most lively in the 1990s, its significance certainly persists today as SNAs continue to develop and adapt their EU engagement (Moore, 2008: 535).

The position of the ‘third’ tier of government within the EU has come to the fore as a result of the potential of SNAs to offer solutions to a variety of problems associated with the pattern of European integration. The centralisation of powers at the supranational level, the EU’s democratic deficit, the lack of transparency in policy-making and the sense of alienation that European citizens feel towards their governing structures have all been presented as problems which could be tackled through a strengthening of the sub-national level of government. Furthermore, a reinforced sub-national level has been proposed as a catalyst for regional economic growth whilst also acting as a means towards strengthening regional
identities and preserving the cultural diversity of Europe. In sum, SNAs are viewed as having the potential to contribute towards the management of the variety of issues that face the EU through bringing ‘Europe’ closer to its citizens and acting as a counterbalance to the concentration of power at the national and supranational levels.

Demands for the inclusion of SNAs in EU policy-making emanate from the recent changes at Europe’s sub-national level. Most member states of the EU have gone through a process of administrative and political reorganization during the last two to three decades (Bullmann, 2001: 5), simultaneously experiencing the rise of the meso government (Sharpe, 1993). From 1988 until the coming into effect of its new constitution in 1993 Belgium completed its process of transformation from being a Jacobin unitary state to become a fully-fledged federation, whilst several countries, such as Italy, France and Spain, either established or strengthened political regions; regional mobilisation has even occurred in highly centralised states such as the United Kingdom and Ireland (Loughlin, 2001: 149). However, sub-national institutional structures across the member states still differ markedly, ranging from the fully federal (Austria, Belgium, Germany) through regionalised (Italy, France, Spain) and decentralised (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands) forms to centralised unitary states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) which only allow for very weak sub-national entities (see Loughlin, 2000). Sub-national structures remain rooted within national traditions and reflect the particular histories and developmental paths of each state.

The general pattern towards decentralisation can be seen as a consequence of the challenges that European countries have had to face. Key amongst these has been the challenge posed by the forces of economic globalisation which, whilst ensuring capital mobility between states, also created and exacerbated patterns of inequality within them. This process has been amplified by the pattern of European integration, in particular the creation of the single market which exposed the regions and localities to increased
competition leading to the widening of spatial disparities. As traditional nation-state based modes of intervention proved insufficient in addressing these problems, central governments offloaded the burdens of social and economic change downwards to local authorities and/or regions (Bullmann, 2001: 9). The appeal of such policies lay in their ability to be presented as a non-zero-sum-game in which all could win; economically justified in terms of the need to tap under-utilised resources in peripheral and declining regions, whilst politically serving to enhance national solidarity and secure support from peripheral regions for the party in power (Keating, 1995: 2).

At the European level, the integration process has changed the nature of the political game in Europe, further increasing demands for regional and local authority influence. The move from territorial government to functional or sectoral forms of governance has created a new political order in which authority is scattered and sovereignty shared. This new political order has emphasised the sub-national arena as a sphere for dialogue, strengthening the participation and representation of SNAs in EU policy-making. The development of the EU’s regional (cohesion) policy in particular has opened up new avenues for the sub-national level to press its demands, helping to mobilise SNAs around programmes and spending projects.

Regional demands for greater autonomy have often reflected historical or cultural issues. Numerous member states, particularly Spain, France, Italy, Belgium and the UK, have nationalist or regionalist movements calling for more autonomy or secession from central state control. However, European integration has served to provide a new context for these older political demands. Regionalist movements have increasingly come to frame their demands in European terms. The existence of the EU provides a framework for autonomous existence, either as an independent nation-state or as an alternative frame of reference to the state.
Thus, the increased presence of the sub-national level of government in the EU can be seen as the result of both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ regionalism (Keating, 1995: 2). Transformation at the global and European level has encouraged central governments to place the burden of economic development at the regional level in order to tackle exacerbated spatial inequality. At the same time, the European integration process has created new opportunities for SNAs to voice their concerns and demand representation in the European policy-making process. These changes have been characterised in terms of a shift from hierarchical, territorial modes of government based on the dominant position of the nation-state to a more non-hierarchical, functionally based system of governance (Boschma and Schobben, 2000: 1). In these circumstances, any adequate understanding of European governance insists upon an examination of the role of the sub-national level of government.

Structure of thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine the role and engagement of SNAs in EU policy-making\(^2\). As such, the thesis is composed of several chapters. The remainder of this introduction continues to develop and explain the context for the thesis, looking at the theoretical framework, research focus, SNA case studies, policy sector case study and research methodology. Chapter 2 provides a review of the existing literature on the role of SNAs in the EU, emphasising the dominant themes and as a result the existence of research gaps which this thesis aims to fill. To a certain extent Chapter 3 continues and extends the literature review through its analysis of Multi-level Governance (MLG) through the conceptual lens of new institutionalism in order to establish the theoretical focus of this research. Chapter 4 looks at the Trans-European Networks-Transport (TENT) policy area, examining its particular developmental path and obstacles to progress. Chapters 5 and 6

\(^2\) The focus of the thesis actually concerns the policy-making process in the ‘first’ European Community pillar of the EU’s three pillar structure. However, in accordance with the literature, the thesis refers to the organisation as the EU.
comprise of the SNA case studies by applying the new institutionalist understanding of MLG to the engagement of the Vienna city administration and Greater London Authority within the TENT policy field. The thesis concludes with an analysis of outcomes in line with the established research focus and by positing a framework for future research.

*Theoretical Framework: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance*

This thesis utilises Multi-level Governance (MLG) as its theoretical focus, underpinning its conception of the EU. However, the thesis does not employ MLG as theory as such, but rather as its ‘dependent’ variable. The core emphasises of the thesis is of MLG as a phenomenon which requires further explanation and development, in this case via the application of the theoretical tools provided by new institutionalism.

MLG facilitates an analysis of the role of SNAs in the EU through its assertion that in a growing number of policy areas no one actor – supranational, national, sub-national – has complete policy competence. Rather, these actors participate in diverse networks incorporating the interaction of institutions at each level. Thus, political arenas are viewed as interconnected rather than nested with direct and indirect linkages existing between sub-national and supranational levels which are able to bypass the state. As Marks, Hooghe and Blank explain, within MLG the EU is characterised by

‘overlapping competencies among the multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across these levels. Member State executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity. States are not the exclusive link between domestic politics and intergovernmental bargaining in the EU. Instead of the two level game assumptions adopted by state-centrists, MLG theorists posit a set of
overarching, multi-level policy networks’ (Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996: 41).

The strength of MLG lies in it coming armed with the tools to investigate the various parts of the EU (Jordan, 2001: 196). It allows an escape from the previously dominant analysis of the European integration process in terms of the dichotomy between state or supranational control by approaching the EU as an existing political system whose constituent parts require examination (Hix, 1999). Thus, MLG enables an analysis of the venues in which actors interact in the day-to-day politics of the EU. Furthermore, MLG is of particular relevance in relation to the role of SNAs due to the sheer volume of different forms of local and regional administrations, and therefore vertical relationships, which exist within the EU. Such variety requires the nuanced approach offered by mid-range theories as opposed to the sweeping outlooks presented by the grand theories of European integration. As Bauer and Borzel argue,

‘the patterns of intergovernmental relations between the EU, the central state and the regions are far too diverse to be explained by the theories of European integration that have dominated the debate on a ‘Europe of the regions’. The concept of multi-level governance is better suited to accounting for the varieties of regional government found in the EU’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 254).

Whilst, as mentioned, the thesis does not utilise MLG as theory, a response to the controversy surrounding the applicability of MLG as a theory is required in order to assert its relevance to this thesis. The theoretical legitimacy of MLG is questioned by Jordan (Jordan, 2001: 201) on the basis that it provides a description, rather than a theory, of the EU. This criticism is founded on two propositions. Firstly, that MLG lacks a causal motor of integration; and secondly, that MLG lacks a testable set of hypotheses. However, as George
asserts in response, these criticisms are highly unfair (George, 2004: 113). In terms of lacking a causal motor of integration, MLG does not set out to provide an explanation of European integration. MLG is part of the ‘turn to governance’ within theorising about the EU. As noted above, MLG is very much in line with the Hixian approach which sets to one side the attempt to discover the dynamics of the process of integration and attempts to discover how the EU currently operates as a functioning political system. Regarding the claim that MLG lacks a testable set of hypotheses, the reverse is the case. At the centre of MLG is the hypothesis that the EU represents a system of multi-level governance rather than one dominated by national governments or supranational institutions (Ibid: 116). Thus, whilst recognising these criticisms, they do not impede the validity of MLG as the theoretical focus of this thesis. In fact, if anything, such criticisms call for greater research into MLG as a means of developing its theoretical resilience and applicability further.

This thesis (Chapter 3) argues that MLG highlights the reconfiguration of policy-making space within the EU, whereby a single policy-making arena is emerging in an increasing number of areas. This reshaping is underpinned by the institution-dependent nature of the MLG form of policy-making in the EU. It is institutions which provide a system for the continuous, non-hierarchical and interconnected relationships between levels of government which mark MLG to exist. By applying the three core variants of new institutionalism (rational choice, historical and sociological) to MLG, what arises is a conception of MLG as existing in different institutionalist types. The three conceptual lenses of new institutionalism offer differing accounts for the emergence and existence of MLG.

**Research Focus: Question and Hypothesis**

The focus of this research project is an examination of the reasons behind SNA activism in EU policy-making and the particular forms this engagement entails. In doing so,
this thesis aims to explore, challenge and rectify gaps in the existing research. Chapter 2 argues that two themes dominate the current literature on the role of SNAs in the EU. Firstly, the two fields of inquiry within EU studies in which sub-national actors have been scrutinised, Europeanisation and MLG, both fail to place SNAs at the heart of their analyses. ‘Top-down’ Europeanisation and MLG view SNAs as ‘receivers’ of policies, practices and processes emanating from the EU level. SNAs are conceived of as reactive political actors, only mobilising resources once the impact of higher level decision-making has filtered down (see John 1994; Jeffery, 2000). As a result, both frameworks fail to place sufficient emphasis on the reasons for why SNAs engage with and shape EU policies, processes and institutions from the ‘bottom-up’ through the deployment of their own political and economic resources. Such mobilisation is identifiable through SNAs instigating direct relationships with the EU institutions, opening Brussels offices and engaging in inter-regional networks. At the same time, ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation marginalises the policy- and polity-shaping role of SNAs by focusing its attention on member state central governments. The capacity to structure the policies and institutions of the EU is viewed as lying in the hands of national governments (see Borzel, 2002b; Ladrech, 2004).

Secondly, the existing research points to the material resources (widely defined) that SNAs possess as determining their ability to engage with the EU. It is argued that issues such as the level of a SNAs budget, personnel, administrative adaptation, coalition-building and relationship with its central government are positively correlated to its ability to engage with, shape and influence EU policy (see Jeffery, 2000; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye, 2002; Bauer and Studinger, 2011). Bauer and Borzel refer to these as political, institutional and socioeconomic resources (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 256). Such material resources are declared as the key variables underpinning a SNAs EU involvement. However, other, ‘non-material’, variables may be equally, if not more, significant in determining levels of SNA
engagement. Applying the tools of new institutionalism to MLG allows for an examination of the importance of non-material resources, such as previous policy decisions or self-identity, in shaping regional participation in EU politics.

The increase in SNA activism across a range of EU policy areas means that an analysis of the reasons motivating the mobilisation of SNAs in EU policy-making and the particular forms this takes is required now more than ever. The gaps in the existing literature create a space in which to pose the main research question of this thesis:

Why and how do sub-national authorities involve themselves in EU policy-making?

Accompanying this are two sub-questions which help to further advance understanding of the role of SNAs in the EU:

What impact do different rationales for SNA mobilisation have on their ability to influence EU policy-making?

What impact do different rationales for SNA mobilisation have on the emergence and existence of MLG?

Whilst recognising the difficulty of clearly delineating cause-effect relationships in social research as a result of the ‘too many variables, not enough cases’ problem (Burnham et. al., 2008: 83), through taking a new institutionalist approach towards MLG, this thesis hypothesises that the self-identity of a SNA acts as a principal factor defining its level of engagement with, and ability to shape, EU policy and hence the emergence and existence of a MLG form of policy-making. Thus, the greater the European identity of a SNA, the greater its engagement with, and influence on, the EU policy-making process and therefore the greater likelihood of the emergence of a multi-level form of governance. Effective SNA participation in EU politics is dependent upon constant and consistent engagement with supranational practices and actors. It is the self-perception of a SNA as being a ‘European
region’ and/or containing a sense of European identity within its administrative rationale that instigates a commitment to such a process through the mobilisation of regional resources from the bottom-up. This research approach structures the research methodology and content of the SNA case studies, the Vienna city administration and Greater London Authority.

**SNA Case Studies: Vienna and London**

In order to enable hypothesis testing, this research takes a comparative approach to the research question. Whilst the original research proposal involved a comparative examination of three SNA case studies differing in accordance to their domestic constitutional positions (federal, regionalised and centralised) in order to analyse as wide a variety of SNA types as possible, the practical constraints of a PhD, particularly time and finance, militated against such an approach at this stage. As a result, the land of Vienna and the Greater London Authority were chosen as the SNA case studies. Whilst in general Vienna and London exist as different constitutionally-endowed types of SNA, one being a federal land whilst the other being part of a centralised national framework, both SNAs experience a centralised relationship with their respective governments with respect to the policy sector under examination, i.e. policy competence for Trans-European Networks – Transport lies with the central government in both Austria and the United Kingdom. Therefore, such a case study selection allows for an analysis of a variety of independent variables that may influence the emergence and existence of MLG within a most similar research design. At the same time, examining Vienna contains the added contribution of analysing and expanding awareness of federal SNAs in the EU away from the German lander which tend to dominate as case studies in this field. As Tatar states, ‘in order to further conceptualise multi-level governance, it needs to be subject to a great deal more case-study
testing before it can be adopted as a general account of how the EU operates’ (Tatar, 2009: 2).

It is appreciated that focusing on two SNAs entails inherent risks concerning the general applicability of research conclusions, particularly the ability to apply the research results to different types of regional authorities. In this sense, cross-sectional and cross-time ‘travelling problems’ (Burnham et. al., 2008: 86) exist whereby conclusions may only be applicable to these particular SNAs at the particular time of research. Research into a range of different SNA forms and policy areas which exist across the EU would be required in order to undertake a more holistic enquiry. In this way, this thesis calls for further empirical research into the reasons behind SNA mobilisation in the EU in line with its established approach.

Policy Sector Case Study: Trans-European Networks – Transport

A further theme emanating from the review of the current literature (Chapter 2) is that existing research on the role of SNAs in the EU suffers from a disproportionate focus on one particular policy area, EU regional (cohesion) policy. Despite the growth in SNA activism across a range of policy areas, regional policy continues to dominate the focus of research on SNAs. Consequently, our current understanding of SNA participation in EU policy-making is inherently limited and potentially distorted as a result of largely being confined to a single policy framework. Other policy areas evidently require examination in order to create an analytical framework applicable across the range of policies that SNAs are involved in.

This is particularly the case as a result of a possible reduction in the importance of cohesion policy to SNAs in the EU in the coming years. Despite signs of a developing trend towards the decentralisation of cohesion policy implementation in most of the new member states (Marek and Baun, 2008: 254), a reduction in the structural fund resources available
relative to the actual problem of uneven regional development as a result of eastern enlargement, the concentration of structural funding on the new member states and the weak institutional form of subnational authorities in central and eastern Europe will likely lead to regional policy losing significance for the old member states, potentially resulting in disengagement and attempts at renationalisation, alongside centralisation in central and eastern Europe (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 256).

As a result, the policy sector focus of this thesis is EU transport infrastructure policy as represented through the trans-European networks - transport (TENT) policy area. Despite its political and economic importance to the process of European integration, TENT remains a highly under-researched policy area of the EU. TENT policy is clearly identifiable and Treaty endorsed, enjoying its own Title (Title XV, Articles 154-156 [ex Title XII, Articles 129b-d]) within the treaty establishing the EU which declares the TENT as a key element in the internal market and the economic and social cohesion of the EU. As a result of the link to regional economic development, there is a clear SNA interest in EU transport infrastructure policy leading to sub-national activism in the TENT policy sector.

However, the existing literature on the role of regions and localities within the TENT is based largely within the field of economic geography, principally focusing on the debate concerning the transport infrastructure/regional economic development debate (see Hart, 1993; Vickerman, 1994; Fayman & Metge, 1995; Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener, 1999; Peters, 2003) rather than the dynamics of TENT policy-making. The research that does exist on the development of TENT policy (see Johnson and Turner, 1997; Stevens, 2004; Stephenson, 2007) confines itself to the respective inputs of national and supranational actors, marginalising the role of SNAs.

Research Methodology
The project was based on a three-pronged research methodology: surveys, elite interviews and primary documentary analysis. Such a ‘triangulated’ methodology was chosen in order to guard against the over-reliance on one method which can distort research results (Bryman, 2001: 274) and in order to ensure the generation of a comprehensive quantity of research data and thus an in-depth understanding of the relevant ideas and actions within the case studies under investigation. In order to gain an initial overview of Vienna and London’s TENT policy objectives, lobbying strategies and achievements, involved departments within the city administrations were invited to complete an online survey which was designed primarily to highlight the administration’s key relationships within this process (see Appendix 1 and 2). Via online research, officials were targeted who worked on European transport affairs within the administrations and thus who would be able to, and more likely have an interest, in responding.

In terms of survey design, as it was being sent to policy officials, the survey’s necessarily technical language was not an issue of concern. A primarily ‘tick box’ style, closed question structure was devised, complemented by open-ended questions towards the end. Such a structure was chosen in order to ensure ease of answering, and therefore a high return rate, and in line with the survey’s purpose which was to gain a general overview of the case studies’ involvement in TENT policy. The survey results were to be used as a means of structuring the focus of the more in-depth interviews. Thus, a largely closed-question survey allowed for easy analysis, and permitted clear comparability between the cases (May, 1997: 95). However, on reflection the structure of the ‘tick box’ style questions leave themselves open to the charge of being seen as ‘loaded’. This is particularly an issue of importance for policy officials who, in their eagerness to cooperate due to a feeling that they have something to contribute, can allow themselves to agree to leading questions (Burnham et. al, 2008: 116). Questions such as ‘Did Vienna attempt to directly influence the Austrian Federal
Government’s TETN policy opinions?’ can be seen as encouraging a positive reply. An open-ended question asking which institutions the city administration attempted to influence would be a more neutral format. However, a largely open-ended survey may have discouraged completion amongst time-pressed officials.

What was equalling challenging was ensuring a good sequence of questions so as to prevent contamination. Contamination is seen to occur ‘when answers to earlier questions influence or even pre-empt the answers to later questions’ (Burnham et. al, 2008: 113). This was guarded against by placing general questions concerning the policy influencing strategies utilised by the city administrations first before more specific questions regarding views on successes and failures. The potentially sensitive nature of these final questions also led to them being put last in an attempt to develop the respondent’s prior interest and trust.

The self-administered survey was posted online to ensure ease of access. Whilst this raises the risk that the correct person is not completing the survey (Burnham et. al., 2008: 120), there was no sign in the responses that this was the case. Emails were sent to the targeted officials inviting them to complete the survey online and explaining the purpose of the survey and why they were chosen. Despite sending follow up hardcopies and emails emphasising the importance of their views in an attempt to encourage response, only one official from each case study responded. Whilst these two individuals happened to be the officers in charge of their respective city authorities’ EU transport policy engagement, and thus provided significant feedback, a larger response rate would have been welcome. On reflection, a more direct and proactive attitude may have increased the number of responses, such as telephone reminders to non-respondents.

The survey results were used as a means of targeting and structuring the elite interviews. Elite interviewing acted as the key research methodology in the collection of data for this thesis due to its effectiveness in obtaining information about decision-makers and
decision-making processes (Burnham et. al., 2008: 231). In essence, elite interviews permit a researcher to peer into the ‘black box’ in which the dynamics of policy-making occur. Whilst such a methodology can be accused of being ‘unrepresentative and atypical due to its findings potentially being impressionistic, piecemeal, and even idiosyncratic’ (Devine, 1995: 141), elite interviews facilitated an understanding of the particular ideas, strategies, relationships and power dynamics at play within the case studies’ engagement with TENT policy. As Burnham et. al. state, ‘if one is interested in actors’ perceptions of the world in which they live, the way in which they construct their world and the shared assumptions that shape it, there is much to be said for the model of the elite interview as an extended conversation’ (Burnham et. al., 2008: 246).

Thirteen interviews were undertaken with officials within the Vienna city administration and the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (Bundesministerium fur Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (BMVIT)). Within the Vienna city administration, interviews were held within the Chief Executive Offices (Executive Group for International Relations; European Integration Unit), MA18 Urban Development and Planning (Transport Planning Unit) and MA27 EU Strategy and Economic Development (Head of Department Unit; Unit for International Cooperation). Within BMVIT, interviews were undertaken within Section 1 Presidium and International Affairs (Unit for EU and International Affairs; Unit for EU/International Infrastructure Affairs) and Section 5 Infrastructure Planning and Financing (Unit for International Infrastructure Networks). Furthermore, interviews were held with consultants and project managers within the associated research institutes TINA Vienna and Europforum Wien.

Seventeen interviews were undertaken in relation to the London case study. Within the GLA, interviews were held within the External Relations and Economic and Business Policy sections, Transport for London, London’s Europe Office and the London Assembly.
Interviews were also held with officials working for the boroughs in London Councils and the London Councils European Service. Furthermore, interviews were held with officials within the Department for Transport (Europe, International and Better regulations Division), Local Government Association Brussels Office, retired members of the London Planning Advisory Committee, former officials within the Government Office for London and a leading academic on London politics.

The strategy utilised in order to gain access to officials involved in the policy communities was a non-random snowball sample method whereby initial contacts recommended people to be interviewed. In line with the research methods literature, this proved a valuable means of generating a sample of people which otherwise would have been difficult to access (Burnham et. al., 2008: 108). Being able to contact an official on the recommendation of a current or former colleague also helped facilitate contact in the sense that it made potential interviewees more willing to be interviewed due to an immediate expectation of trust (see McCarville, 2002). This was particularly useful in Vienna due to the time restrictions of the research visit which demanded efficient access to personnel.

However, the limitations inherent within snowball sampling is also recognised in that there is an inherent reliance on the recommendations of others. As a result, there exists the potential for the generated sample not to be representative of the group (Burnham et. al., 2008: 108). Purposeful means to overcome this were attempted by simultaneously searching for colleagues of recommended officials. However, invariably such interviewees were of limited use and often would point me back in the direction of more knowledgeable associates.

Gaining access to officials did not prove particularly problematic. Recommendations from colleagues usually ensured agreement. This was particularly the case in Vienna where being a researcher in a foreign country brought with it the advantage of knowledge of UK SNAs which Vienna officials were keen to discuss. Similarly, mentioning previously
undertaken research on the Vienna city administration when contacting London officials seemingly helped to gain access, at least to the extent that questions concerning the experience of Vienna were invariably brought up during interviews. However, the most effective means of arranging an interview did noticeably differ between the two case studies. Initial attempts to arrange interviews via email in Vienna proved highly frustrating due to slow (or no) responses. Switching to a method of ‘cold calling‘ (with the name of the colleague who recommended them at hand) proved a far more effective and efficient means of gaining access. In contrast, attempts at ‘cold calling‘ in London always failed. Invariably, the response from ‘gatekeepers‘ was to request the interview via email.

The interviews were based on a semi-structured format. This was to enable a balance to be struck between focusing on the key issues of interest whilst at the same time allowing for the interview to proceed down previously unforeseen, yet potentially valuable, paths. However, a danger with such an approach was that a number of interviews went off on irrelevant tangents at certain points. Whilst this can be seen as something to be encouraged as it provides ‘insight into what the interviewee sees as relevant and important‘ (Bryman, 201: 312), it also occupied valuable time in interviews of a set length. As such, a more structured interview format may have been required in order to maintain focus on the issue of enquiry. However, the danger with such an approach is that it potentially constrains the interviewee and therefore does not allow for the revealing of significant points raised in more informal dialogue.

The use of a tape recorder during the interviews was utilised as an aid to cope with the competing demands of recording notes and participating in the interview. Except for a few inhibiting effects, usually in the early stages of interview, the presence of a recorder did not seem to effect interviewees‘ responses in any noticeable way. This applied across both case
studies and so there was no sign of any culturally different perspectives on, and reactions to, the use of a tape recorder.

The issue of deciding when to stop conducting interviews was to a large extent taken out of my hands. The time pressures associated with undertaking PhD research determined the period in which interviews could be undertaken in order to leave sufficient time for writing up. However, other case study specific factors also weighed on this decision. In the case of Vienna, the time frame of the research visit governed the length of period in which interviews could be conducted, whilst in the London research the looming GLA elections of May 2012 ensured that interviews were completed in advance due to the difficulties of gaining access to key individuals during an election period.

The interviews helped draw attention, and ensure access, to key related documents, such as Transport Master Plans and Strategies, position papers, international activity reviews. Whilst proving valuable sources of information, particularly in regard to the policy positions of the authorities, being pointed towards documents by interviewees contains the clear danger of the consulted documents not being representative of all the relevant documents (Scott, 1990: 24). In this sense, there is a danger of being ‘captured’ by an interviewees biases or agenda. Such a danger was mitigated by trawling the ‘publications’ sections of the websites of the Vienna and London city administrations in order to obtain relevant documents. However, in the case of Vienna, this brought with it the additional problem of language. Not being fluent in German meant that, even with the help of internet-based translation tools, I was largely restricted to English language publications. Whilst public authorities in Austria are generally very good at having English language versions of key documents, particularly when related to EU activity, it did mean that certain documents were out of reach. As a result, attempts at overcoming such difficulties were made via asking document-related questions in the interviews.
Research Outcomes

In taking this approach, this thesis demonstrates that a new institutionalist understanding of MLG facilitates an appreciation of the key role played by SNAs in the emergence and existence of a MLG form of policy-making in the EU. The reasons for why and how SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making differs in accordance with the different institutional understandings of MLG, be it specialised local knowledge required by central government, an embedded informal political culture of cooperative intergovernmental relations or a self-perception as a distinct political actor. In particular, a sociological institutionalist approach to MLG emphasises SNAs as proactive political players, stressing their ability to actively involve themselves in the EU policy-making process via the mobilisation of their own political and economic resources. Thus, SNAs are presented as having the capacity to shape EU policy from the ‘bottom-up’ and so play an active part in the development of multi-level forms of governance. Such an outcome is seen to emerge as a result of a European self-identity built in to an administration, facilitating the consistent and dynamic engagement with the EU level required in order to achieve policy influence. In detailing such a framework, this thesis contributes towards the further development of the SNA and MLG research agendas.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

The role of sub-national authorities (SNAs) in EU policy-making has been analysed predominantly within two fields of study, Multi-level Governance (MLG) and Europeanisation. The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the existing literature on the role of SNAs in the EU and in doing so highlight the existence of key research gaps which the remainder of the thesis attempt to tackle. As the MLG literature is assessed in-depth in Chapter 3, section one analyses the perspective of SNAs within current Europeanisation research, both in its ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ forms. Section two examines the dominant themes emerging from the wider SNA literature, particularly the reliance on EU regional policy and the importance placed on domestic constitutional systems.

In doing so, this chapter argues that the existing research on the role of SNAs in the EU fails to place regional and/or local authorities at the heart of the analysis. ‘Top-down’ Europeanisation views SNAs as ‘receivers’ of policies, processes and practices emanating from the European level as opposed to being able to shape the EU from the ‘bottom-up’ through the mobilisation of their own political and economic resources. This ‘top-down’ approach to regional government is continued within the MLG literature. At the same time, the existing ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation literature rarely incorporates SNAs in to its research framework, preferring to concentrate on the role of central governments in institution-building and policy-making at the European level. In addition, current SNA research disproportionately relies on one particular EU policy area, regional policy, and is dominated by agreement on the significance of an SNA’s material resources as determining its ability to engage in EU policy-making. As a result, there exists a research space in which to place SNAs at the focal point of analysis in order to examine exactly how and why SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making from the bottom-up in other, non-regional policy sectors.
Europeanisation

Over the last fifteen years analysis of the impact of the EU on the domestic politics of the member states has increasingly grown into a significant research field within EU studies. Europeanisation has come to be viewed in terms of the effect of EU institutions, defined as a set of new practices, rules, resources and structures of meaning, on the institutions and policies of the member states (Borzel, 2002b: 15) and the resulting domestic structural changes (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001: 6). As Radaelli sums up,

‘Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies’ (Radaelli, 2004: 3).

As domestic change is seen as resulting from pressures emanating from above, at the European level, this approach has been termed ‘top-down' Europeanisation (see Knill and Lehmkuhl, 1999; Borzel and Risse, 2000; Kassim, 2005). Within this framework, domestic change is viewed as resulting from a ‘misfit’ (Borzel, 1999) or ‘mismatch’ (Heritier, Knill and Mingers, 1996) between European and domestic policies, processes and institutions. At the same time, the impact of EU-induced changes is seen as varying between member states in accordance with their particular sets of formal and informal institutions, actors, norm entrepreneurs and veto points (Borzel and Risse, 2000).

Whilst much of the theoretical and empirical Europeanisation research is centred on the impact of ‘Europe’ on the policies and institutions of the member state central governments (see Hine, 2001; Ioakimides, 2001; Ladrech, 2004), attention has also been paid to the restructuring of politics at the regional and local level of government. In his analysis of
the role of SNAs in accessing European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) resources during the 1989-'93 period, Conzelmann (1995) showed how the Commission used its influence to enhance the ‘partnership’ status of North West England’s Regional Association (NWRA) through actions such as officially recognising it as a negotiating partner on behalf of the region against the wishes of the central government. In doing so, the NWRA was able to gain a limited amount of policy space through its bilateral relations with the Commission, particularly as a result of the provision of intelligence on the regional economy and its performance which had previously acted as obstacles to the operation of the structural funds. This is compared to the cases of North-Rhine Westphalia and Nord Pas de Calais where the (more) regionalised domestic politico-institutional environments meant that the necessity for change amongst these two SNAs was less of a requirement.

In southern Europe, Magone (2001) argues that European regional policy was crucial to the democracy-building process in Portugal. Pressures emanating from the EU for increased efficiency in the absorption, implementation and monitoring of the structural funds led the government to decentralise authority away from the central state and reinforced the process of overcoming the legacy of authoritarian government. From a policy perspective, Brugue, Goma and Subirats (2001) show how the autonomous government of Catalonia (Generalitat) has had to adapt to increased ‘territorial complexity’ as neither the EU, Spanish state nor the Generalitat fully exercise political control over policy domains. Rather, what they find is different degrees of involvement across institutional levels with the Generalitat having to get used to a reduced presence in economic policy-making in the face of EU-state dominance whilst maintaining its predominant position within welfare state policy areas.

Brusis (2002) examines the pre-accession Europeanisation effects on regional administrative reform in central and eastern Europe. He argues that the Commission’s preference for democratically elected regional self-governments, the requirements of the
partnership principle in the management of structural funds and the associated need to establish identifiable NUTS-2 regions acted as a rationale for the re-creation (Czech Republic, Slovakia) or further institutionalisation (Hungary) of regional authorities. However, the particular trajectories taken and forms of regional administrative structures established vary greatly between states. Factors such as domestic institutional and cultural legacies, debates between centralist and localist policy approaches, and the existence of historical and ethnic regionalism determined the outcomes of regional level reforms.

John (2000) summed up the impact of Europeanisation on sub-national governance relatively early within this research field, showing how the creation of ‘a different basis for the exercise of political power and authority’ through the EU has had ‘profound implications for the sub-national politics’ of the member states (John, 2000: 878). SNAs have had to react to the different content and implementation issues which come with EU policies, necessitating the formation of channels of communication (and potential influence) with supranational institutions as well as other regions. Whilst SNAs have adjusted to EU-level pressures to varying degrees as ‘each country has its own particularity’ (Ibid: 884), general adaptational trends are discernible, such as organisational change through, for example, the establishment of specialist European units and European officers. What he found most striking about the differing responses amongst SNAs is that they did not fit the traditional north-south dichotomy as some southern SNAs, such as in France and Spain, do not follow a clientelistic model whilst significant variation exists in the north.

As can be seen, early work on the Europeanisation of SNAs highlighted how regions and localities reshaped their structures in order to adapt to developments at the higher, European level, such as structural fund policies. The incorporation of analysis on SNAs into the recent Europeanisation research agenda has also continued to take place within this ‘top-down’ framework. The research focus of such work asks similar questions, such as how the
EU has affected SNAs, whether the EU has contributed to changing centre-region relations in EU member states and whether the EU enhances and/or constrains SNAs.

Kettunen and Kungla (2005) examine the impact of Europeanisation on SNAs in unitary states, arguing that, whilst membership of the EU is affecting all SNAs, ‘it leaves the specific organizational solutions open and free for the member states to decide’ (Kettunen and Kungla, 2005: 373). In the case of Estonia, they observe very weak Europeanisation of sub-national structures as the central government has taken the principal role in coordinating and managing the regional funds. Tatar (2009) draws a similar conclusion in his analysis of the impact of EU regional policy on sub-national mobilisation in Estonia. Despite EU cohesion policy resulting in the increased recognition of SNAs by the central government, he finds a very weak Europeanisation effect on SNA empowerment. Estonian SNAs are constrained by their ‘path-dependent political norms and constitutional position (strong de jure autonomy but de facto restricted)’ as well as ‘the low capacity of Estonian local government level which is also the result of lacking leadership, coordination and diversity of values still existent in different Estonian counties and municipalities’ (Tatar, 2009: 21). Likewise, in Finland, Kettunen and Kungla show how the central government has maintained control over the implementation of regional policy. However, Finnish SNAs have seen some strengthening of their policy capacities as the regions have been provided with responsibility for running the structural fund programmes and selecting and monitoring the projects. As a result, they conclude that the impact of Europeanisation on SNAs varies according to factors such as ‘the existing regional policy legacies, the number of veto points in the domestic political system, and the concrete interest constellation at the national level’ (Kettunen and Kungla, 2005: 373).

In assessing how, and the extent to which, EU policy and legislation influences sub-national decision-making in the Netherlands, Fleurke and Willemse (2007) find that although
the EU influences SNAs to a fairly large extent, SNAs are both constrained and enhanced by such pressures. The type of impact differs according to the governance level that SNAs are situated at. As such, local municipalities find their role in governance to be enhanced through indirect (largely financial) EU influences whilst provinces are directly constrained by EU legislation which impacts on their formal policy competences.

Bache et al (2011) focus on the domestic impact of EU cohesion policy and pre-accession aid on four case study countries in south-east Europe: Greece, Slovenia, Croatia and the FYR Macedonia. They find that engagement with such policies have made these previously simple polities more compound, demonstrating features of MLG. In particular, they observe a process of ‘learning’ amongst SNAs as a result of engagement with EU policies. Whilst this is generally a strategic means of ensuring continued access to EU funds, ‘thicker’ varieties are visible, such as incorporating EU-standard approaches to integrated planning and project management and monitoring into domestic practices (Greece) and increased inter-SNA and cross-sectoral working (Croatia). However, in all cases the central state has adapted in order to maintain a central role in decision-making. Central governments resisted pressure to regionalise beyond what was necessary to comply with EU requirements (Greece) and the partnership principle has been implemented in its most limited sense (Greece and Slovenia) whilst, at the same time, SNAs lack the resources to meaningfully influence policy-making. As a result, ‘cohesion policy has led to more pluralistic processes, but without any significant redistribution of policy control (Bache et al, 2011: 136).

The importance of emphasising the differing transformations in local and regional government is highlighted by Goldsmith and Page’s (2010) wide-ranging edited volume on changing government relations in Europe, updated from their 1987 collection to include chapters on thirteen European states. Two trends over the previous twenty years are identified across the case studies. Firstly, regionalisation i.e. ‘a means of reshaping local
government where large numbers of small municipalities persist’ (Goldsmith and Page, 2010: 256) has been seen in countries such as Belgium, Italy, France and Spain through the establishment of regional governments and increased inter-municipal collaboration. Secondly, greater central government direction ‘in systems where large-scale local government has become established as a significant service deliverer’ (Loc. Cit.). This has particularly been witnessed in Scandinavia states, Hungary and most of the UK where ‘local government units have increasingly been treated as units or agents of the national state’ (Goldsmith and Page, 2010: 255). However, Goldsmith and Page minimise the importance of the EU in these changes, arguing that ‘Europe’s role must be seen as generally a minor one in this process of changing intergovernmental relations’ (Ibid: 258). Whilst recognising the part played by the EU in obliging member states to develop regional structures, encouraging subsidiarity and partnership, and motivating sub-national mobilisation at the supranational level, they see the relationship between national and regional/local authorities themselves as being the key dynamic influencing types of intergovernmental change. Unfortunately, the authors do not extrapolate on this point to any great extent and therefore do not examine the potential role of EU pressures on encouraging state and sub-national actors to adjust their relations.

Whilst differing in focus, what these more recent pieces have in common is that they all operate within a ‘top-down’ conception of Europeanisation in which policies and processes at the EU level are adjudged to have (or not) shaped developments amongst SNAs. As John states, Europeanisation, in regards to SNAs, ‘concerns itself with examining the impact of the EU on local government management and internal structures’ (John, 1994: 881 [italics added]). Thus, according to the ‘top-down’ Europeanisation approach, SNAs are very much construed as ‘receivers’ of policies, practices and processes emanating from the EU level. SNAs are viewed as inactive, or at best reactive, players within the EU game, only
coming to life once the impact of European institutions has filtered down to their political space. In this sense, SNAs are judged through a prism of being ‘policy-takers’. Such an analytical structure fails to entertain the possibility that SNAs themselves, from the ‘bottom-up’, are able to engage with and shape EU policies, processes and institutions through the mobilisation of their own political and economic resources. Such mobilisation can be witnessed through direct contact with the EU institutions, lobbying via representative offices in Brussels and engaging in transnational inter-regional associations (Hooghe, 1995; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Jeffery, 2001).

Although the MLG literature is analysed in-depth in Chapter 3, it is worth noting at this point that MLG similarly follows a ‘top-down’ approach towards its understanding of the role of SNAs in the EU. Whilst the existing MLG literature should be given credit for emphasising the structural change in the territorial politics of member states, it fails to conceive of SNAs as being able to instigate a process of shaping the EU. As Jeffery asserts in his critique of MLG,

‘SNAs are typically portrayed as essentially inconsequential and passive players until either an incidental by-product of central state-EU interplay provides an opportunity for mobilization, or a central government decision is taken which passes decision-making powers down to SNAs’ (Jeffery, 2000: 8).

However, examples of successful SNA mobilisation from the ‘bottom-up’ can be seen via the extensive European policy powers that German, Austrian and Belgium regional actors enjoy. These are rights won from below on the basis of existing constitutional powers, rather than a result of central state-EU interplays (Jeffery, 2001: 215). As a result, existing ‘top-down’ Europeanisation and MLG research both fail to place the role of SNAs within the EU at the
heart of their analyses and as such are unable to take account of the policy- and polity-
shaping role played by SNAs within the EU.

Conversely, a ‘bottom-up’ analysis is necessary now more than ever due to the
processes of decentralisation which have occurred across member states over the last 20-25
years combined with the accompanying growth of sub-national activism across a range of
policy areas, providing a stronger base for sub-national influence in EU policy-making
(Jeffery, 2000: 8). At the same time, recent developments at the EU level have restricted the
ability of SNAs to influence the EU policy-making process via intra-state means, further
necessitating the mobilisation of own-resources towards the supranational level. As Bauer
and Borzel explain,

‘The extension of qualified majority voting and the introduction of the
double majority in the Council, respectively, undermine the co-decision
powers of the regions in the formulation of national bargaining positions.
What essentially remain for regions that seek to extend or at least safeguard
their influence on EU policy-making are lobbying activities at the EU level,
particularly if they team up with other transnational actors, irrespective of
their legal status’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 259).

Within the Europeanisation research field, a ‘bottom-up’ approach is identifiable,
albeit to a lesser degree. ‘Bottom-up’ Europeanisation is defined as ‘the evolution of
European institutions as a set of new norms, rules and practices’ (Borzel, 2002a: 193); a
process ‘driven by the progressive transfer of competencies from the member states to the
European Union’ (Borzel, 2002b: 15). However, as is alluded to in Borzel’s definition,
member state central governments remain the focal point of analysis. Within the ‘bottom-up’
Europeanisation approach, the capacity to structure the institutions of the EU is viewed as
lying firmly within the hands of national governments (also see Ladrech, 2004).
More recent research on SNA mobilisation continues this trend. The core focus of much of the current literature is on undertaking case study examinations on the differing forms of SNA mobilisation as a means of deepening understanding of SNA activities in the EU sphere. In research on the pre-accession mobilisation of Polish regional authorities, Sapala (2003) shows how the regions were motivated by the prospect of receiving pre-accession funds and thus concentrated their activities in a strategic manner. As a result, the majority of regions had organised training and education for staff in European matters, instigated contacts with Commission officials (largely in DG Regio and DG Enlargement) and had or planned to open representative offices in Brussels. On the other hand, few regions participated in inter-regional associations at that stage, preferring to limit their international contacts to twinning and partnership agreements.

Similarly, Scherpereel’s (2007) later research on SNA mobilisation in post-accession ‘post-socialist’ states points to significant cross-national and intra-country variation in emerging patterns of mobilisation within a framework in which ‘central states continue to keep tight reins over most elements of European domestic policy’ (Scherpereel, 2007: 41). He finds SNAs engaging in four channels of representation in particular: active participation in the Committee of the Regions; engagement with both ‘top-down’ (e.g. INTERREG) and ‘bottom-up’ (e.g. the Assembly of European Regions and the Association of European Border Regions) transnational associations and networks; establishing representative offices in Brussels; and forming links with the European Commission. As such, we can witness a strengthening, deepening and widening of SNA mobilisation in new member states between the pre- and post-accession periods.

Tatham (2008) analyses the efficiency of the different opportunity structures available to regions to directly represent their interests in the EU. He finds that ‘configurations of actors and the wider environmental setting can alter the usefulness of each route’ (Tatham,
2008: 511). As such, the Committee of the Regions is only useful in circumstances in which the Commission is looking for a testing-board for policy development or seeking an ally. Stages of the policy cycle are also seen to be important as the effectiveness of regional Brussels offices and European associations is greatest in the early stages of the policy process, whilst mobilising MEPs is a more valuable means of altering existing Commission policy positions.

Moore (2008a) focuses on one of these opportunity structures by highlighting how regions are expanding their direct activism in Brussels by not only opening up more representative offices but also employing more staff and moving to more prestigious and visible locations. This has occurred to the extent that a regional presence in Brussels has become institutionalised as a core element of EU membership. Such activism is a response to a primary concern with the practical issues of engaging with EU policy-making as opposed to a concern for the abstract idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’. She argues that the focus of representative offices is strategically driven in accordance with the interests of the broad range of controlling stakeholders in the home region. As such, regional offices are expected to account to their stakeholders on an annual basis in order to ensure they are delivering value for money. Thus, diversity is a core feature of regional office priorities and operational strategies and is dependent upon the type of regional authority. Constitutionally strong regions are seen to have a clear political dimension to their work, carrying out policy work for ministers, defining policy programmes and arranging ministerial meetings with key decision-makers in the most authoritative EU institutions, such as the Commission, Council of Ministers and their own member states Permanent Representatives. The representations of administrative regions usually have a wider range of sponsoring stakeholders and therefore their work plan commonly covers the less ‘political’ side of EU work, such as exploring and
publicising funding opportunities and establishing regional partnerships rather than seeking to shape EU legislation.

On the other hand, Moore finds the representations of regions from new member states tend to be smaller than those of the original EU-15 and thus struggle to have an impact. The focus of these regions is clearly on economic development issues and so on establishing links with officials in the Commission and other regions in order to facilitate this objective. In related research, Moore (2008b) shows that SNAs from the Poland and the Czech Republic imported the practice of founding a Brussels office through a process of ‘lesson-drawing’ from the experiences of their counterparts in the EU-15. As such, the motivation for opening up these offices was a ‘bottom-up’ desire to copy the norm of a successful model already established rather than as a reaction to ‘top-down’ stimuli from the Commission or national governments. Drawing on the Scottish and Welsh cases, Moore also draws attention to the recent establishment of regional parliamentary representations in Brussels as an emerging dimension of regional representation at the supranational level.

Greenwood (2011) furthers our understanding of the varying roles, activities and effects of regional representative offices by asking the question, ‘which of the territorial Brussels offices are likely to act as wider agents of EU democratic legitimacy?’ Through use of a principal-agent analytical framework he proposes that the level of autonomy enjoyed by offices to develop activities is the critical explanatory factor in accounting for whether they are oriented towards either highly defined or broad work agendas. The Brussels offices of those regions with high degrees of devolved authority (for example, from Germany and Spain) are seen to have workloads targeted towards specific goals, such as formalised input into the EU policy-making process. As a result, the principals of such offices have developed mechanisms of control in order to ensure they remain focussed on their prescribed agendas, such as sending staff from the ‘home’ SNA to the Brussels office on limited period
secondments. On the other hand, offices belonging to regions with ‘medium’ degrees of
devolved authority (for example, from the UK and Nordic states) enjoy sufficient autonomy
and agenda space to self-generate a broad range of activities, including civil society-wide
activities which help to bring ‘Europe’ to the region. Thus, Greenwood concludes, ‘the
Brussels territorial offices from countries with medium devolved authority have the most
potential, among the entire population of offices, to help connect the EU with wider civil
society’ (Greenwood, 2011: 450).

In contrast to mainstream views, Knodt, Greenwood and Quittkat (2011) view a
convergence in the varieties of strategies of interest representation utilised by territorial
authorities and functional interest groups in their engagement with the EU. Territorial and
functional actors are seen to have learnt from each other to the extent that the vast majority
are now physically present in Brussels both/either individually and/or as part of wider
networks and they all gather, filtrate, generate and transmit information to decision-makers.
Quitkatt and Kotzian (2011) in particular point to the Commission’s consultation regime as
an arena in which both territorial and functional interests from all organisational levels
participate. Similarly, early on, regional and local authorities learnt from functional interest
groups the necessity to use complementary representation strategies at the same time at
different levels of the EU’s multi-level system as a means of attempting to exert influence in
a polity in which they have limited formal mechanisms of representation. Conversely, Knodt
(2011) points to how German functional actors have, since the mid-1990s, learnt from and
copied the German lander example of directly sending regional administrative staff to work
in the European Commission for a defined timespan. At the same time, clear differences
remain between and within the two actor groups on the basis of the remits assigned by the EU
institutions and those represented, the mode of policy involvement allowed for, and capacities
to act. Despite these differences, the authors point to the emergence of ‘a European model of
interest representation’ which spans the diverse number of territorial and functional representatives that exist within the EU.

However, regional mobilisation is not synonymous with regional influence. As Tatham states, ‘whilst the former is a necessary condition for the latter, it is by no means sufficient. If interest representation is not influential, then much regional activity at the European level can be considered as merely background ‘noise’” (Tatham, 2008: 494). By focusing on forms of SNA mobilisation, the literature largely continues to conceive SNAs as submissive actors, unable to successfully draw on their own resources in order to influence the shape of the EU.

Having said this, within the SNA literature, two frameworks are noticeable for their ability to encapsulate the ‘bottom-up’ EU-shaping dynamics of SNA mobilisation, John’s (1994) ‘ladder of Europeanisation’ and Goldsmith and Klausen’s (1997) classification of the nature of SNA involvement with the EU. According to John, the involvement of SNAs in EU affairs is a step-by-step process whereby SNAs gradually ascend a ladder in accordance with their engagement with EU polices and practices. Thus, the ladder moves from the bottom rung of ‘minimal involvement’ (compulsory activities such as responding to directives and regulations, managing EU information, communicating to the private sector and general public) through ‘financial orientation’ (maximising EU grants, facilitating economic regeneration) and ‘networking’ (linking with other SNAs, participating in EU networks and cooperating in joint projects) to being ‘fully Europeanised’ (advising and lobbying the EU, making the SNAs policies more ‘European’). Similarly, Goldsmith and Klausen classify SNAs in accordance to their EU engagement. The four categories are ‘counteractive’ (place little or no importance on EU matters), ‘passive’ (little or no commitment or involvement in EU matters), ‘reactive’ (aware of the need to orient themselves towards Europe; positive interest in the EU, but as followers more than leaders; joining EU networks, involvement in
joint initiatives, building up EU specialist staff) and ‘proactive’ (committed to the ideal of European integration; active in EU networks; dedicated EU specialist staff; representation office in Brussels).

As such, John’s ‘fully Europeanised’ rung of the ladder and Goldsmith and Klausen’s ‘proactive’ category are able to account for the ability of SNAs to influence, shape and structure EU institutions and policies from the ‘bottom-up’ through processes of lobbying and incorporating European ideas in to their own policies (‘thinking European’). What these frameworks call for is further empirical research in to precisely the reasons for why and how SNAs involve themselves in EU affairs to the extent they do or do not. Applying the new institutionalist understanding of MLG detailed in Chapter 3 to the selected case studies aims to account for these differences in the EU engagement of regional authorities.

**Dominant Themes**

*Regional Policy*

Despite the growth in sub-national activism across a variety of policy areas in the EU, existing research on SNAs, and MLG more widely, suffers from a disproportionate focus on one policy area, EU regional (cohesion) policy. Whilst some notable exceptions are beginning to emerge (see Perry and May, 2007; Toonen, 2008; Bauer and Studinger, 2011), EU regional policy is overwhelmingly utilised as the policy sector focus within the existing literature (see Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Hooghe, 1996; Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996; Bache, 1998; Bomberg and Peterson, 1998; Benz and Eberlein, 1999; Bache, 2008; Bauer and Borzel, 2010). Such a singular policy approach is rooted in the early MLG work, as a result of MLG growing out of research on the EU’s regional policy (see Marks, 1993; Hooghe, 1996; Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996), and has continued its particular pattern in
more recent research on the development of MLG in the new member states of central and eastern Europe.

As outlined above, in their analyses of EU cohesion policy in the new member states Kettunen and Kungla (2005), Scherpereel (2007), Tatar (2009) and Bache et al (2011) find few signs of an emerging MLG form of policy-making as central states have maintained their lead role in regional policy decision-making. This is a pattern repeated across the research. Horvath (2008) finds that EU cohesion policy initially spurred significant change in Hungary’s institutional and administrative system as new macro-regions and Regional Development Councils were established in order to implement the regional funds. However, this process slowed considerably after accession as the state reasserted its management control to the extent that cohesion policy has ‘failed to decentralize Hungary’s overly centralized institutional system’ (Horvath, 2008: 202).

In the Czech Republic, Marek and Baun (2008) argue that a major factor impeding the development of MLG has been the politicised nature of cohesion policy within the domestic sphere as disputes between the regions and central government over management of the structural funds and between the government and opposition parties over the efficient use of money have dogged the process. McMaster (2006) shows how such conditions have impacted upon the function and position of Czech Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) as they have suffered from a lack of resources and suitable projects emanating from government decisions which have ‘confused or stifled the position of RDAs’ (McMaster, 2006: 367). Such confusion has also been witnessed on behalf of the Commission as uneven support and a shift from the original idea that RDAs would play a key role in the delivery networks of the structural funds provided mixed messages.

Nakrosis (2008) argues that the use of a centralised system for implementing cohesion policy in Lithuania proved more successful in terms of efficient negotiations with the
Commission and absorption of funds than a decentralised system would have done. However, he points towards elements of regionalisation being introduced in the implementation of cohesion policy in the 2007-13 financing period. A notable counterexample is provided by Gorzelak and Kozak (2008) who show that regional authorities in Poland have gradually gained more influence over the implementation of EU cohesion policies throughout the post-accession period which has introduced elements of MLG.

The pitfall with such an approach is that general conclusions regarding sub-national activity within the EU have been constructed based predominantly on the experiences of this one policy area, resulting in a field of research which suffers from a ‘policy deficit’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 260).

This has resulted in a situation whereby our current understanding of the role of SNAs in the EU is limited and potentially distorted. As Greenwood states, ‘without a grounding in case studies, theoretical propositions which are based on no more than speculation, however exotic, run a greater risk of misleading’ (Greenwood, 1997: 4). As such, existing research fails to analyse the potentially different dynamics at play in other policy areas regarding SNA participation. This is particularly the case for those policy areas in which the primary motivation for SNA engagement may not involve obtaining EU funds, as is largely the case in regional policy. Other policy areas evidently require examination in order to create an analytical framework applicable across the range of policies that SNAs are involved in. Hence, in an attempt to examine the dynamics of SNA engagement in a wider range of policy fields, the policy focus of this thesis rests on the Trans-European Networks - Transport sector.

*Determinants of SNA Influence*
A core focus of much of the research on the EU engagement of SNAs has been on the factors which account for differences in regional involvement and influence in EU policy-making. For a significant amount of time following the emergence of this research agenda in the early 1990s a widespread consensus existed within the literature based on the assertion that the formal domestic constitutional structure that SNAs operate within was a principal determinant of their ability to involve themselves in EU policy-making (see Anderson, 1990; Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Bache, 1998; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye, 2002). It was declared that the greater the autonomy an SNA enjoyed within its domestic policy-making arena vis-à-vis central government, the greater its ability to engage with and shape EU policy. Thus, a SNA’s constitutionally-ascribed policy competences within the domestic sphere were asserted as the primary variable underpinning its EU involvement. This claim was reflected strongly both in the SNA regional policy literature and research undertaken on the Committee of the Regions.

In terms of EU regional policy, research showed that not all regions were equally equipped to take part in the European arena as their capacity to enjoy access to the European level rested on their place within their national political systems. Keating and Hooghe stated that ‘regional interests are drawn into the EU arena within a protected national niche’ and therefore ‘institutional responses differ from one member state to another’ (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 380). In general, most central governments attempted to maintain their ‘gatekeeper’ roles, with the level of success or failure being a result of the pre-existing domestic distribution of power. For instance, Pollack contrasted the experience of Greece, where the regions are directly dependent on the central government and therefore were unable to muster the capabilities and competencies required to actively participate in regional policy, with that of Germany, whose federal nature allowed powerful regional actors to deal directly with the Commission in the implementation of structural funds (Pollack, 1995: 377).
Similarly, Greenwood (2007) argued that the ‘differential degree of regional autonomy conditions the response of territorial interests to the European level’ (Greenwood, 2007: 160). In doing so, he compared the favourable experience of federal regions in Belgium and Austria in their engagement with the EU to their counterparts in centralised states where ‘the position of member states as the gatekeeper of structural fund applications and the disburser of funds enhances its control in centre-local relations’ (Loc. Cit.). As such, he showed how the reinvention of administrative regions in the Republic of Ireland was a form of superficial decentralisation in response to the requirements of EU structural funding. He concluded that, in reality, ‘the creation of these symbolic entities has been a device entirely at the convenience of central government’ and that ‘regions in the most centralized states where they exist, are little more than paper entities’ (Ibid: 160-61).

This assertion was continued in analysis of the introduction of the key partnership principle into EU regional policy which aimed to involve sub-national actors in the regional policy process; a development which Bache claims as arguably the most significant political development in regional policy after its creation (Bache, 1998: 141). However, use of the partnership principle in practice re-exposed the significance of internal divisions of power in member states. For example, the UK government actively sought to play a gatekeeper role over the political impact of the new arrangements, resulting in sub-national actors being mobilised but not necessarily empowered (Ibid: 103), whilst Belgian regions were at the other end of the spectrum, as they negotiated directly with the Commission over finalising the detailed map of eligible areas, the allocation of funds, and implementation and monitoring (Hooghe and Keating, 1994: 380). As a result, a polarised policy area emerged in which those regions within federal and decentralised member states benefited from greater inclusion in the policy-making process than their counterparts from centralised domestic political systems.
A similar trend has been identified in the working of the Committee of the Regions (CoR). The Committee’s existence has been plagued by internal differences resulting from the variety of domestic constitutional systems within member states. Of particular importance is the division between regional and local delegates. A foretaste of this was evident in 1992 when the larger European regions openly expressed their preference for an exclusion of local government on the European level (Van Der Knaap, 1994: 91). Whilst rejected on the grounds that many member states do not have representation between the national and local administrative levels, such divisions have proved significant in that they have given rise to differing priorities, resulting in a lack of consensus within the CoR.

Regions with extensive domestic policy competences have been seen to enjoy a greater capacity to influence the European policy process in their interest, whilst local authorities have continued to seek the protection of their central governments (Bullmann, 2001: 18). This difference of outlook has made it difficult for the CoR to reach a unified opinion on a number of occasions, and, where agreement is reached, the heterogeneity of interests often leads to inevitable lowest common denominator outcomes. Whilst there have been signs of increased CoR influence over those EU policies that contain a regional focus (Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011: 236), such divisions have only served to restrict the Committee’s potential within the EU (Christiansen and Linter, 2005). As Bauer and Borzel conclude,

‘It is clear now that the CoR has disappointed any hopes that it might become a third chamber in the EU representing subnational territorial interests. As a consultative body, it lacks real political authority. Moreover, its membership is too diverse to allow for the formulation of common positions’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 257).
However, in spite of the original dominance of this claim within the literature, it has become increasingly clear that SNAs’ domestic constitutional position is not the only variable in explaining different levels of engagement with the EU. As Jeffery shows, a constitutionally stronger SNA in one member state may involve themselves less in, and exert less influence on, EU policy-making than a constitutionally weaker SNA in another, for example, Castille-la-Mancha versus Birmingham City Council (Jeffery, 2000: 12-13). Thus, non-constitutional variables can be seen as modifying levels of SNA participation. Jeffery points to intergovernmental relations between SNAs and the central state (even though here he tends to fall back into the trap of focusing on formal constitutional structures as opposed to informal interactions), entrepreneurship (internal administrative adaptation, leadership and coalition-building [a position supported by Bomberg and Peterson (Bomberg and Peterson, 1998: 234)]) and the legitimacy of an SNA’s European policy mobilisation (social capital) as variables that impact upon the levels of influence exerted by SNAs (Jeffery, 2000: 14-18).

As a result, Jeffery puts forward an alternative framework in which to understand the role of SNAs in the EU, labelled European Domestic Policy (EDP). EDP is defined in the sense that,

‘European policy should no longer be seen as foreign policy in the traditional sense of international relations and international law. Rather, it had adopted a new character as the domestic policy of an emergent Euro-polity. They (SNAs) consequently claimed rights in shaping this European domestic policy as far as possible equivalent to those rights they possessed in traditional domestic policy’ (Jeffery, 2000: 9).

However, by claiming that the ability of SNAs to shape ‘European domestic policy’ is a reflection of the ‘rights they possessed in traditional domestic policy’, Jeffery returns to SNAs’ domestic frameworks as a determining variable of their ability to engage with, shape
and influence EU policy. His EDP framework assumes that the level of autonomy experienced by SNAs in the domestic realm is positively correlated to their engagement in the EU sphere. Thus, he continues along the well-trodden path of asserting the dominance of domestic factors.

Whilst much of the more recent research on the EU engagement of SNAs seems to have moved on from this debate, certain works have managed to widen the scope beyond formal domestic centre-region relations as important factors shaping SNA EU engagement.

In their analysis of the impact of EU regional policy on SNAs, Bauer and Borzel (2010) argue that the ‘empowering effect of EU structural policy is differential and largely depends on intrastate politics and existing national constellations’. In doing so, they move beyond a simple emphasis on domestic constitutional relationships to include a region’s ‘political, institutional and socioeconomic resources’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 256). At the same time, they stress that SNA influence varies according to the stage in the policy cycle and a region’s ‘capacities’ and ‘political and organizational capabilities’, particular their willingness and ability to invest organisational and political resources in undertaking lobbying activities at the EU level alongside other regional authorities (Ibid: 256-259).

In reviewing the sub-national mobilisation literature, Bauer and Studinger (2011) extrapolate on these ‘capacities’ and ‘capabilities’ by referring to SNA ‘resources in terms of manpower, finances and domestic institutional access’ as being significant factors in structuring EU engagement, stating that ‘the resource base appears to determine the intensity of subnational-supranational political exchange’ (Bauer and Studinger, 2011: 6). However, their research develops such assumptions further by distinguishing between the different types of exchange desired by top SNA officials. They show that subnational elites are more eager to enhance the institutional structures of sub-national-supranational interaction (‘polity nexus’) as opposed to cooperating with the EU in a broad range of policy areas (‘policy
nexus’). This distinction is explained by a self-awareness amongst SNAs of limits to their ability to exert policy influence beyond their core areas of interest (identified as research and technology, business development and structural policy, and environmental protection). In contrast, the institutional relationship is seen as a valuable tool for receiving information on EU legislation and, if required, attempting to prevent it.

Tatham (2010) meanwhile provides a mixed picture for he does not discount the importance of devolved policy competences on the decision of SNAs to bypass or cooperate with central governments in their EU-focused interest representation. He finds that constitutionally stronger SNAs ‘are in a better position to influence their central government and hence have less of an incentive to bypass it’ (Tatham, 2010: 83). However, at the same time, party politics is also seen to be a significant variable in a regional authority’s decision-making process. SNAs run by the main national opposition party bypass the central government more frequently and cooperate with the central government less frequently in their EU engagement than those which are not. Conversely, he finds that other potential intervening variables, such as the relative and absolute size of a SNA, the amount of financial resources it boasts and the length of its exposure to the integration process do not act as structuring forces.

Thus, the argument has certainly developed away from a focus on solely domestic policy competences and formal central government relations as determinants of SNA EU engagement and influence towards a wider focus on resources. However, in doing so, there remains an emphasis on the material/practical resources that SNAs enjoy, such as the size of authority and budget, level of staffing, administrative arrangements and ability to build coalitions. Little focus has been placed on the importance of non-material resources in impacting upon the EU involvement of SNAs.
The few studies that have broached this field have largely centred on the importance of human resources within the administrative structures of a regional authority. As mentioned above, Jeffery (2000) lists the level of entrepreneurship SNAs display in adapting to the EU as a variable likely to impact on the extent of their influence. Within the umbrella term of entrepreneurship, he points to three particularly significant facets. Firstly, the importance of internal administrative adaptation as a means of enhancing SNA capacity, expertise and policy resources. Secondly, leadership in the form of the personal authority, interests and commitment of those leading on EU policy in SNAs. Thirdly, strategies of coalition-building in order to generate additional policy resources.

Similarly, Sapala (2003) accounts for the different degrees of mobilisation of Polish regional authorities at the EU level in the pre-accession period by emphasising the varying presence of human capital in the SNA administration. The key variable is not seen to be the amount of financial assistance from the EU or the economic wealth of a region but rather the presence of officials ‘who are aware of the necessity to adjust the structures and ways of operating….to the new situation’ (Sapala, 2003: 9). As such, she places the determinants of success on factors such as the training and education of staff in EU affairs, subscription to specialist papers and the reorganisation of offices leading to the co-ordination of European activities. In taking this approach, she concludes that ‘European mobilisation depends on representatives of a region and their commitment to international relations and participation in European integration. The more the people are educated and conscious of possibilities to act the more active internationally is a region’ (Loc. Cit.).

As a result, there remains a research space in which to place SNAs at the focal point of analysis in order to examine whether non-material resources impact upon why (formal and informal institutional contexts) and how (mechanisms, processes, channels) SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making from the bottom-up and whether such non-material
resources affect the ability of SNAs to influence EU policy-making. As Bauer and Borzel assert,

‘The differential impact of European integration on the power of the regions poses some major challenges to students of multi-level governance. Little attempt has been made so far to systematically explain the different types of relationship that have emerged……[T]he regions not only require sufficient capabilities to mobilize, they must also have a sufficient self-interest in using them to gain access to the EU policy process. And when they do, different regions may choose different strategies according to the resources that they objectively have at their disposal or according to their political predilections and priorities’ (Bauer and Borzel, 2010: 253)

As such, they conclude that ‘theoretical explanations for the different patterns of multi-level governance in the EU are still lacking’ (Ibid: 260). By offering differing institutionalist accounts for the emergence and existence of the different types of MLG that exist across the EU, this thesis contributes towards an answer to Bauer and Borzel’s call.
Chapter 3: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance

The changing nature of governing in Europe has been accompanied by a paradigm shift in theorising within EU studies. Rather than theorising the EU as a process of integration, in the mid-1990s the EU came to be viewed as an existing political system in its own right requiring theoretical analysis as a functioning polity (Hix, 1994). Accompanying this ‘turn to governance’ were debates concerning the continuing capacity and effectiveness of the state in an era of globalisation, the impact of internal territorial decentralisation and administrative reform, and the overall nature of the political project pursued by the state (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 132). Out of these debates emerged Multi-level Governance (MLG) as an attempt to encapsulate the multi-actor and shared authority nature of contemporary governing.

The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine MLG as a framework through which to analyse the process of governing within the EU. The first section provides a detailed definition of MLG, emphasising its non-hierarchical, interconnected and multi-actor nature. Section two highlights the ability of MLG to encapsulate the reconfiguration of policy-making space as the key strength of MLG in its application to the EU. This chapter argues that MLG captures the institution-dependent nature of polycentric governing in the EU and as such is itself underpinned by an institutional focus. In developing this argument, section three of this chapter moves on to apply the analytical tools of new institutionalism to MLG. In doing so, MLG can be seen to exist in different types, the new institutionalisms highlighting differing interpretations for the emergence of multi-level forms of governance.

In taking this approach, the chapter attempts to take further steps in responding to the charge that MLG literature has paid insufficient attention to the role of institutions. Peters and Pierre argue that most interpretations of MLG provide a misleading image of governing in which institutions are largely irrelevant having been replaced by a focus on context,
processes and bargaining (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 75-76). Moreover, Checkel states that the little institutional analysis on offer is firmly based on rational choice grounds, that is, institutions as constraints (Checkel, 2001: 23). By taking a new institutionalist approach to MLG this chapter places institutions at the centre of analysing the process of the dispersal of authority. In doing so, the chapter presents three different interpretations for the emergence and existence of MLG in accordance with the rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism perspectives.

What is Multi-Level Governance?

MLG can be seen as a response to the state-centric, intergovernmentalist theory of the EU which dominated EU studies throughout the so-called ‘eurosclerosis’ period following the 1966 ‘Luxembourg Compromise’. MLG challenges the view of the state as being the singularly important and dominating actor within the EU policy-making process. Thus, to a large extent, MLG is essentially a challenge to an understanding of the changing nature and role of the state.

At the heart of the MLG framework is the claim that in an increasing number of policy areas no one actor has complete competence. Marks et. al. state that ‘the point of departure for the multi-level governance approach is the existence of overlapping competencies among multiple levels of government’ (Marks et al, 1998: 41). Decision-making competencies are therefore seen as being shared amongst a variety of actors located at different territorial levels rather than monopolised by national governments (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 3). Of all actors, and perhaps unsurprisingly, having emerged out of particular research on the EU’s Regional Policy, MLG places a special emphasis on the mobilisation of sub-national authorities (SNAs) and their increasing significance within the EU policy-
making process (see Marks, 1993; Hooghe, 1996). Furthermore, MLG emphasises the involvement of private actors as well as public authorities (often in public-private networks) within governance mechanisms. This is not to say that states are no longer authoritative actors, rather that states no longer monopolise the European policy process. As Marks et al. continue, ‘member state executives, while powerful, are only one set among a variety of actors in the European polity’ (Marks et al, 1998: 41).

Within this multi-actor framework, MLG rejects the notion that political arenas are nested. Even though ‘national arenas remain important arenas for the formation of national government preferences’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 4), SNAs are seen as being able to pursue their interests within the European and global sphere. Thus, the state is not viewed as the exclusive channel through which domestic political actors funnel their interests (Marks et al, 1998: 41). Rather, arenas are interconnected with direct and indirect networks existing between sub-national and supranational levels, bypassing the state. As such, MLG is non-hierarchical whereby the traditional hierarchical command and control role of the state has been relaxed. This has been accompanied by a shift in the nature of exchange away from instruction towards dialogue, negotiation and bargaining (Peter and Pierre, 2001: 133). Peters and Pierre view these transformations as being evidence of institutional mutual dependency (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 83) and a change in the zero-sum nature of intergovernmental relations (Peters and Pierre, 2001: 133). Rather than seeing one institution’s gain as another’s loss, MLG’s emphasis on shared, non-hierarchical competencies allows for recognition of the positive-sum, problem-solving capacity of contemporary governance.

The complexity that MLG attempts to depict (Rosamond, 2000: 111) has a concern for the mechanisms of process (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 84). In particular, MLG stresses the importance of analysing the ‘day-to-day’ political processes which occur in the ‘interstitial
cracks of the EU’, in Commission and Parliamentary committees, advisory groups, functional councils of Ministers and so on (Jordan, 2001: 200). In this way, MLG attempts to shift analytical focus away from the grand, history-making events that so preoccupy intergovernmentalist theory towards the sub-systemic level (Peterson, 1995: 69-93) of political activity. Simultaneously, uniformity as an overriding feature of governing is rejected in favour of an emphasis on the heterogeneity of actor involvement in line with the nature of the policy problem. Diversity in actor engagement ensures that ‘the structure of political control is variable, not constant, across policy areas’ (Marks et al, 1998: 41). The importance of different political actors varies in accordance with the features of the particular policy problem and the resources each actor possesses. Bache and Flinders view the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ political issues, political processes at the implementation and post-decisional stage, and unintended consequences arising from MLG as being of particular significance in determining the nature of institutional control (Bache and Flinders, 2004a: 199-200).

A significant update in the MLG literature which has created much excitement has been provided by Hooghe and Marks’ (2003; 2004; 2010) new typology of MLG. As a means of advancing an understanding of the different ways in which MLG forms exist, Hooghe and Marks have developed two categories of MLG: Type I and Type II. Type I MLG consists of general purpose jurisdictions, nonintersecting memberships, a limited number of levels of governance and a system-wide architecture. On the other hand, Type II MLG comprises task-specific jurisdictions, intersecting memberships, an unlimited number of levels of governance and a flexible design.

Whilst this typology is primarily predicated on different jurisdictional features, of particular interest in the frame of this thesis is the different logics for the existence of the two types of MLG that is inferred. Hooghe and Marks state that ‘Type I and Type II governance
are not merely different means to the same end. They embody contrasting conceptions of community’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 240). Type I jurisdictions are seen to be rooted in a sense of community identity, whilst Type II result from functional desires for collective decision-making. As such, there is a clear potential for an analytical overlap between a new institutionalist understanding of MLG and Hooghe and Marks types of MLG whereby rationalist, historical or sociological institutionalist processes may provide different logics for their existence (see conclusion to this chapter).

More recently, research on MLG has attempted to add analytical depth to an understanding of the EU as a polycentric form of governance and begun the process of broadening both the geographical and policy focus of MLG away from its traditional concentration on examining the policy-making dynamics of EU regional policy within the ‘Original 15’ member states. Piattoni (2010) provides a conceptual and historical analysis of MLG, showing that even though MLG questions the continued existence of the unitary, autonomous, sovereign state, it does so by demonstrating the continuing relevance of territorial jurisdictions, particularly SNAs, within contemporary rule (Piattoni, 2010: 17-31). In asserting the analytical relevance of MLG, she focuses on three developments as being at the core of the theory. Firstly, a questioning of the centre-periphery divide through the establishment and assertiveness of regions vis-à-vis the central state (Ibid: 32-50). According to this argument, it is not necessarily economic, social and administrative efficiency claims that leads to greater regional autonomy, but rather ‘the skilful manipulation of political opportunities’ (Ibid: 50) by regional political entrepreneurs. Secondly, disputing the domestic-international divide as ‘states find themselves trapped in a cobweb of mutual interdependencies that powerfully limit their capacity to act autonomously’ (Ibid: 51). The necessity for inter-state collaboration leads to the creation of international organisations which in turn mobilises SNAs and social groups as they attempt to influence this new
political space (Ibid: 63) Thirdly, overcoming the state-society divide to show how a blurring between the two spheres has increasingly transpired as societal groups have become progressively more able to express public interests, defined as ‘interests widely shared by the population but left unattended to by the (state’s) pursuit of the “general interest”’ (Ibid: 69) whilst, at the same time, state actors pursue their own sectoral interests. This has culminated in a situation whereby domestic and transnational civil society organisations (CSOs) intimately contribute towards EU policy-making and implementation and in which ‘neither state nor society can govern effectively in isolation from the other’ (Ibid: 69).

Piattoni takes a holistic approach towards MLG, viewing it as simultaneously being a theory of political mobilisation, policy-making and polity structuring and as such requiring theorisation in politics, policy and polity terms (Piattoni, 2010: 26). As such, she empirically tests MLG in line with three policy areas varyingly judged a priori on the basis of their plausibility as being instances of MLG; cohesion policy, environmental policy and higher education policy. She sees empirical evidence of MLG across all three policy areas albeit in varying degrees.

Cohesion policy is judged to confer to a MLG perspective in terms of witnessing intensified mobilisation of regions at the EU level, the increased presence of transregional civil society organisations and the policy empowerment of regions alongside examples of institutional empowerment, for example Italian regions (Ibid: 102-132). However, CSOs are seen to make a rather weak contribution to EU regional development policy as SNAs are viewed as being more genuine representatives of the public, as well as issues such as the lack of public interest in cohesion policy, competing developmental objectives between CSOs and the technical nature of cohesion issues (Ibid: 122-124).

On the other hand, Piattoni’s research shows the active mobilisation of CSOs in environmental policy implementation, monitoring and enforcement. In particular, the role of
transnational CSOs has come to the fore as a result of the inherently international nature of many environmental concerns and the added-value they provide to the Commission in ensuring the effectiveness of policy outcomes. SNAs also increased their involvement in EU environmental policy-making following publication of the Fifth Environmental Action Programme (1993-2000) which marked a shift to a ‘bottom-up’ approach to environmental policy (Ibid: 133-150). Such multi-level innovation and creativity in designing environmental policy solutions is viewed by Walti as providing superior environmental policy outcomes (Walti, 2010). Similarly, the increased autonomisation of higher education institutions, the creation of a European market for higher education and pressures for supranationalisation have led to the mobilisation of individual higher education providers, the Europe-wide transnational academic community and SNAs as a response to the transformed higher education space (Ibid: 151-173). In confirming the relevance of MLG, Piattoni puts forward a sophisticated version of the ‘Europe of the Regions’ thesis, defined as,

’a competitive process of mutual recognition by subnational authorities – whether administrative or legislative, provided they express real links with their corresponding societies – and of recognition by EU authorities (which) could lead to the legitimation of these tiers of government as fundamental interlocutors for any policy that crucially impinges on the Community’s territory’ (Ibid: 131).

Enderlein, Walti and Zurn’s edited ‘Handbook on Multi-level Governance’ (2010) continues the process of broadening the analytical, geographic and policy foci of MLG by examining the theory from domestic, EU, comparative regionalism and global governance perspectives. From a domestic standpoint, Swenden (2010) examines the role of second chambers in structuring subnational participation in national decision-making, showing how the capacity of such institutions to act as effective mediums for representing SNA interests in
federal states varies significantly between states and is dependent upon the composition and powers of the second chamber and the way in which their members relate to the overall party system. Moving to an EU perspective, Rittberger (2010) discusses whether MLG strengthens structures of intergovernmental coordination and privileges non-public bodies at the expense of parliamentary institutions. He argues that, despite European integration having a profound impact on the legislative activity, internal institutional structure and strategies of national parliaments, the power of parliaments in EU policy-making have actually increased as a result of the successful empowerment of the European Parliament and expansion of the role of national parliaments in the EU policy process.

Jeffery (2010) explores multi-level party competition through an analysis of non-statewide political parties in terms of their growth, electorate, role in the dynamics of regional politics and relationship with and impact on national elections and parties. In doing so, he calls for the ‘systematic de-nationalization of the approaches traditionally used in the study of elections and parties’ (Jeffery, 2010: 147) in order to deeper understand the move ‘beyond the nation-state’ for party politics in an increasing number of European countries. Hix (2010) continues a focus on political parties by looking at the relationship between parties and MLG in the EU. He finds that the EU’s system of MLG both shapes and is shaped by political parties, showing how national general elections remain the priority for parties whilst national party leaders have designed the EU system in such a way as to ensure that no EU-level elites independent of party control are likely to emerge.

Similarly, Hassel (2010) highlights the constitutive impact of forms of MLG on the organisational structures and influence of private interest groups acting at the subnational, national, EU and global levels. As such, the hierarchical, constitutionally-defined setting of Type 1 MLG is seen to attract highly institutionalised organised interest (such as associations and clubs), whereas the more flexible design of Type II jurisdictions means that private actors
tend to be less institutionalised and more fragmented (for example, temporary social movements and coalitions).

Meanwhile, Braun (2010) and Stein and Turkewitsch (2010) undertake country specific comparative examinations of MLG structures in Germany/Switzerland and Canada/USA respectively. Braun shows how MLG operates in very different ways in Germany and Switzerland due to German federalism being ‘based on a desire for a unitary development with a strong sense for equality among the various territorial units’ (Baun, 2010: 180) leading to the norm of policy settlements at the federal level on a formalised basis. On the other hand, MLG in Switzerland largely takes place on an informal and pragmatic level with a clear focus on the implementation of federal laws and regulations. Interestingly, either membership of, or very close links with, the EU have not been seen to alter the functioning of MLG in both cases. In asking the question of what insights an MLG perspective may bring to understanding intergovernmental relations within Canada and the USA, Stein and Turkewitsch point to MLG’s ability to highlight the ‘horizontal and vertical governmental and non-governmental policy-making structures operating at different levels and across different sectors’ (Stein and Turkewitsch, 2010: 196) as well as an increased focus on the role of local government and the role of private actors in, and increased transparency of, decision-making. At the same time, they point to the lack of a supranational governmental level (compared to the EU) for Canada and the USA as limiting the applicability of MLG to these cases.

Returning to an EU policy focus, Graser and Kuhnle (2010) draw a distinction within social policy between those fields of regulation in which ‘the EU can nowadays be viewed as the major driving force’ (such as work place safety, gender equality, anti-discrimination) (Graser and Kuhnle, 2010: 406) and those more traditional, financially dependent aspects where direct supranational involvement is minimal, relying on the soft policy tool of the
Open Method of Coordination. In the economic sphere, Enderlein (2010), starting from the viewpoint of economic policy-making as being ‘almost by definition an area of multi-level governance’ (Enderlein, 2010: 423), sees Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as a special case of multi-level economic policy-making. In doing so, he sees EMU as a form of Type II MLG, containing legal and economic integration in the field of monetary (but not fiscal) policy, low levels of political integration, and depending almost exclusively on output legitimacy. This is compared to nation-state based fiscal federalism, which Enderlein views as an example of ‘true’, Type I MLG due to its hierarchically structured and highly institutionalised context. Hallerberg (2010) however, in reviewing the literature on fiscal federalism at the regional level and its experiences in Latin America and Europe shows how the implications for the emergence/continuation of MLG arrangements in this area are largely negative due to the costs associated with not having an identifiable, central fiscal leviathan.

As a result of MLG’s Euro-centric inclusion of supranationalism as a core component of governance, the theory is not seen to ‘travel well’ in its application to other global regions (Sbragia, 2010: 276). However, despite this, attempts at applying MLG from comparative regionalism perspectives have been made. In his analysis of NAFTA, Clarkson argues that the forms of transnational governance that exist in North America cannot be seen as constituting MLG due to the economic and political asymmetry and lack of solidarity that exists between the three member states. Similarly, ASEAN is seen to have few MLG characteristics relying largely on intergovernmental cooperation and the ‘diffusion of norms and development of consensual understandings as means of fostering change and promoting integration’ (Schreurs, 2010: 319). On the other hand, Obydenkova (2010) discovers aspects of MLG in the workings of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Whilst she finds vertical (supranational) expressions of MLG to have been unsuccessful, horizontal (transnational involving subnational actors) forms of MLG have developed.
integration further as a result of the multitude of actors (private actors, small and middle business, transnational corporations) involved in CIS regionalism.

The global reach of MLG has also been extended further via its application to actors and processes involved in global governance. Kaul (2010) offers ‘lessons for MLG’ beyond the nation-state by analysing the changing role of the United Nations and more specifically the changing role of the state in post-Cold War international relations. He points to hesitance in international cooperation due to the uneven distribution of its costs and benefits and the varying role and impact of non-state actors in global governance as leading to situation whereby global MLG is ‘a process in flux’ (Kaul, 2001: 332). Slaughter and Hale (2010) look at what the study of transgovernmental networks can contribute to MLG. They point to the possibility of shared identities and values being formed through operating in a complex web of interaction, better understanding of how best to manage forms of MLG for maximum efficiency and impact, and insight into how influence and power operates in such governance environments as being particularly helpful. Beisheim, Campe and Schaferhoff (2010) view transnational public-private partnerships (PPP) as being prime examples of MLG due to their core role in the vertical and horizontal dispersal of authority away from central states. Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs and Kraft-Kasack (2010) see aspects of this process in the less obvious and highly politically sensitive field of policing in which the fight against transnational criminality is ‘increasingly marked by a dense web of multi-level structures, shaping, constraining and regulating state activity’ (Herschinger, Jachtenfuchs and Kraft-Kasack, 2010: 477). Meanwhile, Scholte (2010), looking from the perspective of the ‘governed’ rather that the ‘governors’, identifies how civil society itself has acquired a multi-level character and in doing so engages with and influences the formulation, implementation, enforcement and review of the rules of global governance.

Finally, Marks and Hooghe, ‘the king and queen of multi-level governance’
(Stephenson, 2013: 818), have continued their development of MLG by forming ‘a postfunctional theory of European integration’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Their starting point is the idea that, while ‘governance is a means to achieve collective benefits by co-ordinating human activity’, it is ‘also an expression of community’. Thus, as well as incorporating a functional rationale, MLG needs to recognise that ‘the functional need for human co-operation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community’ and that ‘the preference for self rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority’. As such, identity is as much a ‘causally powerful factor’ in the ‘articulation of authority across jurisdictions’ as the logics of efficiency and distribution (Ibid: 2).

In claiming the importance of identity, Hooghe and Marks assert that the experience of the past fifteen years of the EU has dismantled the previously dominant elite-centred view of a ‘permissive consensus’ which saw the public’s attitudes towards the EU as superficial, European integration as a low salience issue for the public, and the issues raised by integration as unrelated to basic political conflict. In contrast, they find a ‘constraining dissensus’ in which public opinion on European integration is ‘rather well structured, affects national voting and is connected to the basic dimensions that structure contestation in European societies’ (Ibid: 7). As a result, they argue that the EU is ‘a system of multi-level governance which is driven by identity politics’ as ‘community and self-governance, expressed in public opinion and mobilized by political parties, lie at the heart of jurisdictional design’ (Ibid: 23).

The widening and deepening of the MLG research agenda by the above authors has also been accompanied by attempts to take stock of MLG in its current state. Two publications in particular are worth mentioning. Kohler-Koch and Larat (2009) present the results of research undertaken as part of the CONNEX network and in doing so provide a comprehensive overview of the patterns and trends in governance research on the EU from a
country specific perspective. The volume examines the unique individual national ‘stories’ of research on EU governance, ranging from the dominant contributors (UK, Germany, Netherlands and Norway) through small states with a strong social science tradition (Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and the Scandinavian states) to those at the periphery of governance research (Southern, Central and Eastern Europe). Despite increasing interdisciplinarity and the internationalisation of academia, what emerges from this exercise is a picture of a political science dominated EU governance research discipline which follows “a pattern of self-centred and self-referring national focuses” in which “national agendas with their specific preoccupations and interests still matter” (Kohler-Koch and Larat, 2009: 181).

In addition, the development of MLG over the past twenty years is summed up by Stephenson (2013) who performs a succinct stock taking exercise of the origins, progress, existence and future of MLG. In doing so, he identifies five ‘uses’ and ten ‘focal points’ loosely sequenced in accordance with their emergence. They are ‘original uses’ (dispersal of legal authority; Europeanisation/regionalisation), ‘functional uses’ (policy/country analysis and implementation studies; problem-solving, co-ordination, learning), ‘combined uses’ (new modes of governance; new institutionalism, principal-agent theory), ‘normative uses’ (legitimacy, democracy, accountability; identity/community politics) and ‘comparative uses’ (global governance, international institutions; EU and regionalism). As can be seen thus far and as the remainder of this chapter makes clear, this thesis can in particular be seen as part of and contributing towards the development of the ‘functional’ and ‘combined’ uses of MLG research.

**Multi-Level Governance and the European Union**

MLG arrived as part of a ‘new wave’ of thinking about how to approach the study of the EU. Theories of governance attempted to replace the traditional ‘supranational versus
state’ debate concerning the European integration process with an approach which accepted the EU as an existing political system whose constituent parts required examination. As Jordan notes, ‘the new Europeanists….arrived armed with the tools to investigate the various parts rather than the whole of the EU’ (Jordan, 2001: 196). However, making a distinction between analysing the EU either as a process of integration or as a political system does not seem to be as clear-cut as suggested. Surely a reciprocal relationship exists between both forces. In order to fully understand the integration process, analysts must appreciate the variety of mechanisms and procedures at play in the policy-making process which itself guides, promotes and hinders the process of European integration. At the same time, the integration process creates the conditions within which policy-making structures are established and patterns of decision-making formed.

The strength of MLG lies in its ability to ‘widen the conceptual lens’ (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 38) within political science away from an approach based at either the domestic or international level towards one which is able to encapsulate the interaction and importance of all governmental levels within contemporary forms of governance. MLG is said to stimulate ‘a reappraisal of the traditional dichotomy between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ policy’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004c: 94). A ‘Euromestic’ framework allows for an appreciation of complex institutional interdependence within the EU, in which problem-solving at the EU level not only depends on domestically located actors for implementation but also significantly impacts upon relative institutional roles and capacities within the domestic sphere. Simultaneously, the EU policy process is itself influenced by the involvement of domestic actors and their interaction with supranational institutions.

As such, what springs from MLG is a concern for the reconfiguration of policy-making space. Rather than the traditional process of interests and preferences being agreed within nested political arenas and then uploaded to the immediately superior level, where the
process is repeated, MLG throws light on a single policy-making space in an increasing number of policy areas (see Scharpf, 1997) in which direct channels of communication and influence exist between all actors within a complex web of interaction. Thus, the assumed institutional trade-off within a ‘zero-sum’ political game is replaced by an emphasis on the necessity for shared capacities in order to ensure effective problem-solving. This is not to say that the state no longer attempts to continue its role as gatekeeper for domestic interests and has renounced taking advantage of its long held relative power position, rather that it does so in a radically transformed political environment in which it no longer has monopolistic control over the levers of power.

Within this rearranged policy-making space, MLG is particularly useful in incorporating the variety of political actors involved in the EU policy process within its theoretical framework. As opposed to the ‘two-level game’ scenario proposed by intergovernmentalism or the narrow focus on supranational institutions within neofunctionalism, and whilst research on MLG has been accused of focusing on sub-national authorities rather than other sub-national actors (Jordan, 2001: 201), MLG allows recognition of the significant role played by domestic and international interest groups, business associations, trade unions, social movements and sub-national authorities (SNAs) within the EU’s polycentric structure.

The increasingly important role played by regional government in EU decision-making is at the forefront of MLG’s articulation of European governance. Sub-national mobilisation via the establishment of regional offices, inter-regional associations, the Committee of the Regions and the use of Article 146 of the Treaty on European Union (allowing sub-national ministerial access to the Council of Ministers) have been exploited to ensure the interests of regional government are placed on the policy table. Consequently, SNAs have become engaged in policy networks acting alongside institutions at all levels
within the EU’s governance structure. The state has been forced to accept regional authorities as actors in their own right with specific policy interests and goals. To a large extent, this process has been encouraged by the supranational level as a result of the Commission’s need for specialist information from the regional level and the resultant resource-interdependence relationship that has come to be established between supranational and sub-national actors.

The key feature which underlines this reconfiguration of policy-making space is the institution-dependent nature of the MLG form of policy-making in the EU. Institutions are critical to MLG in that it is they who define and coordinate interaction between different levels of government (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 79). MLG does not simply concern the involvement of different levels of government in policy-making. It emphasises the continuous, non-hierarchical and interconnected relationships between these levels of government in the process of policy-making. It is only institutions that can provide a system for these relationships to exist (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 80). The institutions of the EU act as ‘honey pot sites’ around which the variety of interested actors cluster. In doing so, institutions provide an arena of interaction in which non-hierarchical and interconnected relationships can form. However, within this arena, the EU’s institutions do not simply act as neutral, mediating forces but as political players in their own right with their own interests and goals.

Within this framework of multi-actor interaction, institutions act as stabilising forces. Whilst the involvement of actors in the process of governing in the EU is not uniform, the EU remains a formal decision-making system in which there exists a legally enshrined institutional path through which policy-making progresses. Policy-making in the EU does not occur on an ad hoc basis but is constrained by the established institutional route. As such, institutions structure policy-making and provide stability in a complex political environment.
In essence, the institutions of the EU facilitate the development of informal inter-actor policy relationships which are the focus of MLG. The processes which so mark MLG occur within the fissures of formal institutions, with the nature of informal policy networks being determined by the access points offered by formal institutions (Pollack, 1996: 453). In this way, MLG can be seen as an attempt to manage the multitude of policy-making arrangements necessary to confront complex social, political and economic issues through the means of institutionalisation.

The outline provided above of institutions as being central to a MLG form of policy-making still leaves various questions to be answered, such as what precisely is meant by institutions and through what processes and mechanisms do institutions come to determine MLG. A response to these questions is guided by the literature on new institutionalism and it is to this that the chapter now turns in order to develop the idea of MLG as institution-dependent.

**New Institutionalism and Multi-level Governance**

New institutionalism approaches the study of politics from the view that “institutions matter” because they shape political strategies and exert an independent or intervening influence on political outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 7). Institutions are seen as the key variable in any analysis of policy-making in that they structure the input of social, economic and political forces and thus influence policy results (Bulmer, 1998: 369). Thus, new institutionalism focuses attention on the mediating role of the institutional context in which political processes occur (Hay, 2002: 11). In this sense, new institutionalism brings the ‘political’ character of politics back in to the frame as opposed to an analysis solely highlighting interaction amongst rational actors (Kerremans, 1996: 218).

The definition of what constitutes an institution goes beyond ‘hard’ formal
organisations to also include the broad range of informal rules and procedures that define interests and structure conduct (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 2). Hall and Taylor define institutions as being ‘the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy’, be it a ‘constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy [or] the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank-firm relations’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938).

From the outset an institution-focused approach can be seen as complementing MLG by presenting a scenario of restricted actor influence in policy-making. New institutionalism’s view of political actors as being constrained by the institutional framework within which they operate immediately correlates itself with an understanding of MLG as essentially a challenge to the notion of EU policy-making as being a process controlled by the member states⁴.

However, new institutionalism should not be seen as a coherent, unified theoretical perspective but rather as consisting of differing variants. Whilst agreeing that institutions are important, strands of new institutionalism contain diverse views over the processes and mechanisms through which institutions impact upon political outcomes. Peters (1999) identifies seven new institutionalisms⁵, whilst more recently Hay (2008) and Schmidt (2008) have separately outlined their versions of constructivist or discursive institutionalism. Whilst this thesis recognises the applicability of, and intellectual value in, utilising the wide variety of new institutionalisms that exist (particularly discursive institutionalism which has much to offer in explaining the emergence of MLG through use of particular discourse), for reasons of

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⁴ In particular, see Pierson (1996) which explicitly presents itself as a response to intergovernmentalist analysis of the EU.

⁵ Peters identifies these as normative institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, institutions of interest representation, and international institutionalism.
manageable research scope and in line with the classification offered by Hall and Taylor in their classic article (Hall and Taylor, 1996) and oft-repeated across the literature on ‘new theories’ of European integration/theories of EU governance (see Rosamond 2010; Bache, George and Bulmer, 2011), the three most commonly observed new institutionalisms are employed: rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The remainder of the chapter will analyse each variant of new institutionalism in turn, providing an overview of their main theoretical claims before applying them to MLG. In doing so, the three new institutionalisms offer different perspectives for the emergence and existence of MLG.

Rational Choice Institutionalism

Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) approaches the study of political outcomes with a certain set of assumptions concerning actor behaviour and preference formation. Actors are presumed to be endowed with a fixed and consistent set of preferences that are exogenous to the political system (March and Olsen, 1996: 250). In order to achieve these given preferences actors behave in an entirely instrumental and strategic manner (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 944-945). Thus, institutions are established (and survive) because they ensure the desired gains from cooperation that the rationally acting designers and participating actors value (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 945). Hence, RCI employs a functionalist logic to institutional choice in which institutional creation and design is a consequence of rationally anticipated effects (Pollack, 1996: 433).

Within the RCI framework the role of institutions is confined to structuring the strategic interactions amongst rational actors. According to RCI, institutions provide a strategic context in which political exchange takes place, influencing outcomes by limiting the range of policy choices available and reducing uncertainty in actor behaviour (Thelen and
Steinmo, 1992: 7; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 945). Thus, institutions are viewed as arenas in which self-interested actors are constrained and encouraged to embrace new approaches in order to realise their goals. As Checkel summarises, ‘in this thin conception, institutions are a structure that actors run into, go ‘ouch’ and then recalculate how, in the presence of the structure, to achieve their interests; they are an intervening variable’ (Checkel, 2001: 20).

At first glance, the RCI approach seems to be a natural bedfellow to an intergovernmental account of institutional creation within the EU. Intergovernmentalism views the creation of institutions in terms of the functional benefits they provide to member states in overcoming collective action problems. As Moravcsik states, ‘the unique institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to national governments only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over domestic affairs’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 507). Institutional creation is seen as an explicit and purposeful choice by rational, self-interest maximising actors.

However, this does not necessarily contradict MLG, for Marks also takes a member state actor-centred approach to the emergence of MLG in the EU (Marks, 2001: 20-38; Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 69-80). Hooghe and Marks accept the significant role of government leaders in national states in the emergence of MLG as they remain decisive actors in determining how authority is organised in Europe (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 77). In explaining the reasons for the development of MLG, Marks begins with the question of ‘why would those in positions of authority within nation states agree to shift decision-making from central institutions to sub-national or supranational institutions?’ (Marks, 2001: 23 [italics added]). Thus, there is an overlap between the two theoretical approaches in that they agree national governments are the initial driving force behind the establishment of new policy-making forms. At one point Marks explicitly states that his ‘point of departure here is to allow for the possibility that those in government actually wish to shift competencies away
from central states’ (Marks, 2001: 36, footnote 4).

At its core, liberal democracy is seen as containing a distinctive characteristic in that maintaining authoritative leadership does not necessarily demand the centralising of authority. Thus, political leaders may be willing to shift authority away from the central state in order to increase their bargaining leverage in international or domestic negotiations or to relieve themselves from the burden of responsibility for unpopular policy decisions (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 71-74). Therefore, viewing MLG through the ‘conceptual lens’ (Allison, 1971) of RCI brings to the fore a vision of polycentric governance emerging as a result of choices explicitly made by national political leaders.

An RCI account of MLG also necessitates a focus on the notion of MLG as being a functionally beneficial form of policy-making. Marks hypothesises that one circumstance in which competencies may be shifted by member states is that the reallocation of authority is viewed as having ‘politically salient pareto beneficial consequences’ such as ‘reduce[ing] transaction costs or increas[ing] the efficiency of policy provision’ (Marks, 2001: 28). Marks and Hooghe view MLG as a normatively superior system of policy-making to a state based approach in that it ‘is the optimal way of allocating competencies in response to the trade-off between the benefits of scale and the costs of heterogeneity’ (Marks and Hooghe, 2000: 796). Kohler-Koch, in her analysis of EU governance, sees some of these forces at work in the progressive uploading of policy areas to the Community. She asserts that,

‘This was not just because of the persuasive capacity of the Commission….or the pro-integration rulings of the European Court of Justice. Instead, it was the member states themselves that considered joint problem-solving to be more attractive than preserving their national autonomy. As a consequence, governments may accept a further transfer of authority to the Community to increase, at least indirectly, their problem-solving capacity. Shifting policy
problems from the national to the European agenda may as well have been motivated by avoiding public pressure or giving in to rent-seeking strategies of private actors’ (Kohler-Koch, 1996: 362-363).

Thus, MLG can be seen as emerging not only as a result of the explicit choices of national leaders but, further, as a result of rational choices which explicitly had the creation of a joint problem-solving form of policy-making in mind. According to a RCI interpretation, MLG can be seen as being purposely established by national political leaders in response to the need to incorporate supranational and sub-national actors in the process of effectively solving complex socio-economic issues.

Much of the early work in the RCI field concerned the impact of institutional procedures within the US Congress on ruling certain policy alternatives ‘in’ and others ‘out’. Congressional committees were seen as being able to influence policy outcomes via use of their agenda-setting power (Pollack, 1996: 430-431). This analysis is equally applicable to MLG’s conception of the EU as a result of its emphasis on the importance of supranational institutions, particularly the Commission. The Commission formally enjoys the right of initiative within EC ‘pillar 1’ legislation and therefore is in a position to set the Community agenda by deciding which issues make it on to the policy table. Beyond this, the Commission also enjoys substantial informal agenda-setting power through its ability to identify policy problems, sell policy proposals and broker compromises among the member states (Pollack, 1996: 449). In this way, the procedures of Community policy-making can be seen to provide the Commission with a ‘nondecision-making’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 634) influence, whereby it is able to utilise its privileged position in order to ensure consideration of only those issues which do not undermine its interests.

*Historical Institutionalism*
Historical institutionalism (HI) sets out from an approach which shares certain features of RCI. In general, both agree on the broad definition of formal and informal institutions as being of significance (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 28-29), whilst the RCI view of institutions as being arenas in which strategies are defined and interests pursued is also a key premise of HI (Ibid: 7). However, HI diverges significantly on the matter of preference formation. RCI views institutions as essentially modifying the strategies actors adopt to secure rationally pre-formed preferences. In this sense, preferences are seen as being exogenous to the political system. On the other hand, HI views preferences as being endogenous to the political system, formed through processes of interaction with other actors and the formal and informal institutions themselves.

‘By shaping not just actors’ strategies (as in rational choice), but their goals as well, and by mediating their relations of cooperation and conflict, institutions structure political situations and leave their own imprint on political outcomes’ (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9).

Thus, inherent within the HI account is a focus on the reciprocal relationship between the policy-making system and actor preferences in which the system affects the very preferences to which it also responds (Lindblom, 1968: 101).

HI also questions the RCI approach over its functional understanding of institutional creation for it is incapable of explaining the existence of inefficient institutions (Pollack, 1996: 434). What emerges from this critique is an emphasis on unintended consequences and path dependence as fundamental features of institutional analysis. HI sees a ‘thickening’ of institutions over time. For Pierson (1996: 129-136), institutions are originally established in line with the RCI conception; as a result of the presumed gains they will contribute to actors’ desired goal. However, gaps in agent control occur over time leading to unanticipated consequences as a result of short termism and the complexities of poorly understood social
processes. Thus, political outcomes are ‘path dependent’ whereby institutions take on a
dynamic of their own, constraining policy choices by locking in certain policy paths which do
not necessarily coincide with actors’ preferences. In this way, institutions can become
difficult to reform. Rather than shifting in accordance with changing preferences, institutions
are ‘sticky’, reflecting past choices as opposed to current social and economic conditions
(Pollack, 1996: 438). HI therefore problematises the controlling power of actors over
institutions and the very rationality of institutions assumed by RCI, preferring to emphasise
the independent nature that institutions adopt over time resulting from early institutional
choices.

The third dominant feature of HI concerns the role of power, particularly relative
power, both in terms of institutional creation and distribution. Whilst RCI can be criticised
for being seemingly ‘voluntarist’, ignoring relative power relations by painting a picture of
voluntary quasi-contractual agreement among equal actors (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 952), HI
not only views institutions as structuring power relations between actors but, more
importantly, distributing power unevenly between those actors. The institutional organisation
of policy-making is seen as providing certain actors disproportionate access to decision-
making, leading to the creation of winners and losers in policy outcomes (Ibid: 941).
According to Thelen and Steinmo, this mobilisation of bias is well-understood by political
actors which creates the accompanying necessity to analyse the role of relative power in
institutional creation (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 9-10). Powerful political actors seek to
take advantage of their relative position in the process of institutional design by structuring
such institutions in their interests. Consequently, an uneven distribution of power becomes
an integral part of the institutional process, favouring already powerful actors over others.

The application of a HI analytical framework to MLG paints a picture of the
emergence of MLG over time as a result of the EU’s structure, procedures and norms. Initial
member state choices concerning institutional design and policies lead to a dispersal of authority to supranational and sub-national arenas not initially envisaged. MLG emerges through a process of path dependency in which initial policy choices structure and restrict subsequent developments. Hooghe and Marks allude to the possibility of unintended consequences leading to the advent of MLG by stating, ‘multi-level governance, like state building, is largely a by-product. It is the outcome of political pressures that, in most cases, do not have multi-level governance as their objective’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001: 75). An example of such unintended political pressures facilitating the establishment of multi-level forms of governance is provided by autonomous supranational institution action.

Member states seem to be in a ‘catch 22’ situation when it comes to the creation of supranational agents. Principal-agent literature guides our understanding of this dilemma. In order to ensure the desired gains from cooperation are fulfilled, principals (such as the member states) create new institutions (such as the Commission) to carry out certain functions. However, the necessity for effective decision-making and enforcement requires the supranational agent to be endowed with sufficient resources and authority to undertake its tasks. Thus, the agent is provided with the ability to pursue its own preferences which may not coincide with those of the principals (Pierson, 1996: 132). As Moe argues, this is a well-observed process:

‘A new public agency is literally a new actor on the political scene. It has its own interests, which may diverge from those of its creators, and it typically has resources – expertise, delegated authority – to strike out on its own should the opportunity arise’ (Moe, 1990: 121).

Marks and Hooghe allude to this process of agent activism by asserting that one reason why MLG may arise is through government leaders unintentionally losing control of the activities of the supranational and sub-national organisations they have set up (Hooghe
and Marks, 2001: 75-77).

The Commission’s privileged position as a centre of information, its budgetary and intellectual resources and its formal agenda-setting power are of significance here as it is through these mechanisms that the Commission is able to pursue its interests. A similar process of agent activism can be identified in the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Through its legal rulings, particularly those which establish the principles of supremacy, direct effect and mutual recognition, the ECJ has laid the legal foundations for an integrated European economy and polity (Burley and Mattli, 1993: 42). The extent of judicial activism has been such that it leads Volcansek to label the ECJ ‘the principal motor for the integration of Europe’ (Volcansek, 1992: 109).

A second result of initial choices is the materialisation of unintended consequences which encourage the emergence of MLG. Pierson (1996: 135-139) emphasises the long-run, unanticipated implications of decisions that are taken by political leaders for short-term, usually electoral, gains. Moreover, he claims that even if policy-makers do focus on long-run effects, unanticipated consequences remain likely due to the complexities of social processes. This is particularly seen as the case in the EU due to the presence of high issue density, which in turn generates problems of overload and spillover.

Hooghe and Marks (2001: 77-78) see these unanticipated consequences in practice through the mobilisation of sub-national actors as a response to the uploading of policy competence from the national to the European level. As European integration has progressed, the supranational institutions have gained policy competence in an increasing number of fields of relevance to the interests and activities of SNAs, most obviously through the development of an EU regional policy. As a result, sub-national actors have been encouraged to shift their focus to the EU level in order to secure a voice in the new policy-making arena. This occurs through such developments as the establishment of sub-national
offices in Brussels, direct communication with the Commission, the creation of pan-EU transregional associations and campaigning for direct representation in the Council of Ministers. Thus, the decision to deepen integration may instigate a ‘domino effect’ of unforeseen activity as a result of the transformation of the political environment in which actors operate, culminating in the emergence of MLG.

Analysing MLG with the analytical tools of HI also sheds light on the difficulties of modifying the institutional procedures and forms that constitute MLG once in existence. The EU contains clear institutional barriers to reform. The requirement for unanimity or qualified majority voting in order to overturn previous decisions creates a system identified by Scharpf as a ‘joint-decision trap’ (see Scharpf, 1988) in which the obstacles to reform lead to the maintenance of the status quo. As a result, MLG, once established, becomes ‘locked-in’ as a feature of EU policy-making.

The constraints posed by institutional arrangements ‘from above’ are compounded by the sunk costs resulting from societal level adaptation to MLG. Pierson highlights a second account of ‘lock-in’,

‘When actors adapt to the new rules of the game by making extensive commitments based on the expectation that these rules will continue, previous decisions may lock in member states to policy options that they would not now choose to initiate. Put another way, social adaptation to EC institutions and policies drastically increases the cost of exit from existing arrangements for member states’ (Pierson, 1996: 144-145).

Thus, societal actors gain a vested interest in MLG and the costs associated with disrupting the situation act as a further barrier to change. Consequently, MLG becomes ‘sticky’, reflecting past choices as opposed to the current preferences of political leaders.

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6 Marks recognises institutional lock-in and sunk costs in his actor-centred approach as constraints on the ability of government leaders to reverse the dispersal of authority (Marks, 2001: 32-34).
Sociological Institutionalism

At the heart of sociological institutionalism (SI) is a concern for the socio-cultural structures in which action occurs. SI broadens the definition of institutions further than RCI and HI to include symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide meaning to action (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 947). By doing so, institutions are viewed as constituting actors and their interests in the sense that they provide actors with identities, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment and behavioural rules (March and Olsen, 1996: 249). Institutions are seen as constructing a reality in which choices are made. As Hall and Taylor state, ‘institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying what one can imagine oneself doing in a given context’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948). In this sense SI essentially questions the given rationality of the RCI approach, claiming that what actors view as rational action is itself constructed according to the socio-cultural context in which actors exist.

What follows from this perspective is an interpretation of organisational forms and practices as being culturally embedded, reflecting culturally specific practices rather than functional efficiency (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 946). Thus, institutional design and actor behaviour are said to follow a ‘logic of appropriateness’ whereby choices are made according to what is viewed as socially valuable or suitable rather than a rational ‘logic of consequence’ (March and Olsen, 1996: 252; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 949). This view of the formation of actor preferences builds on Lindblom’s earlier view of the malleability of political preferences whereby goals are moulded by participation in a policy-making process. Lindblom’s ‘disjointed incrementalism’ viewed involvement in a policy system as an educating force in which actors learn how to formulate policy positions, learn what policy
positions are feasible and learn how to tailor policy positions in order to increase their chances of success (Lindblom, 1968: 102).

The application of SI to MLG indicates a process in which participating in EU policy-making provides actors with conceptions of their own identities and of how to act. MLG can be seen to emerge as a result of actor behaviour that is ‘learnt’ from being identified as a particular actor in the EU. Bulmer is correct in asserting that the institutions of the EU are not value free, but contain embedded values and norms which impact on how their functions are operationalised (Bulmer, 1998: 368). However, it is the identification of an institution as being, for example, supranational (via the provision of particular competencies) that provides it with a certain ethos and behaviour. Thus, according to a SI understanding, the behaviour of the Commission and ECJ is influenced by their self-perceived roles as supranational institutions which encourages them to support further integration and an expansionary interpretation of the treaties (Bulmer, 1994: 363). This enthusiasm is viewed as coming precisely from a norm of integration which is embedded within the cultures of these institutions. It is plausible that a similar process relates to sub-national actors whereby their self-perception as distinct actors with their own interests encourages demands for greater devolution of policy competencies and involvement in EU decision-making. However, it should be stressed that supranational and sub-national authorities also enjoy constitutionally ascribed competencies and roles and thus it is conceivable that their behaviour can also be attributed to such logics.

Therefore, in a SI interpretation of MLG, actors can be seen to behave in a manner they perceive as being socially appropriate in accordance with their roles, leading to the dispersal of authority away from the central state. In this way, MLG does not only emerge, but also becomes self-reinforcing whereby actors learn to function according to the behavioural rules of MLG. If it is assumed that social learning is more likely where actors
meet repeatedly and there is a high density of interaction (Checkel, 2001: 26), MLG itself becomes embedded as a form of policy-making.

**Conclusion**

What materialises from the application of the analytical tools of new institutionalism to MLG is a conception of MLG emerging and existing in three different types. The three conceptual lenses of new institutionalism offering differing accounts of MLG resulting from differing institutional processes (see Table 3.1). Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) views MLG emerging as a result of the explicit choices of national political leaders as the shifting of authority ensures desired gains, such as the acquisition of bargaining advantages, the divesting of responsibility or as a means of ensuring effective problem-solving. Historical institutionalism (HI) sees MLG as resulting from a path dependent process of initial choices leading to autonomous supranational institution action and unanticipated consequences which disperses authority away from the central state. Subsequently, MLG becomes ‘locked-in’ due to the procedural difficulties in the EU of reforming past decisions and a process of societal adaptation. A sociological institutionalist (SI) approach emphasises MLG as a ‘learnt’ process whereby actors behave in accordance with their socially perceived roles. Following an examination of the TENT policy area in Chapter 4, such an institutionalist understanding of MLG will be applied to the two case studies in order analyse the different rationales and forms that SNA engagement with EU level politics entails.

Finally, as mentioned towards the beginning of this chapter, a NI MLG framework continues Hooghe and Marks’ ‘types of multi-level governance’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2003) perspective but in a different form. Rather than primarily distinguishing types of MLG on the basis of jurisdictional features, this chapter presents three types of MLG emerging from differing institutional means. However, to continue the earlier discussion concerning the
potential relationship between the two different conceptions of MLG, a certain association is identifiable. SI MLG’s emphasis on actor identity and conceptions of self for the emergence and existence of a polycentric form of governance may provide a particular logic for the presence of forms of Type I jurisdictions in which there is a high sense of community identity. Similarly, RCI MLG’s focus on explicit choices to ensure effective problem-solving provides a logic for the existence of Type II jurisdictions which are established in order to resolve particular policy problems. Whilst the two types of MLG established by Hooghe and Marks is not the focal point of the NI understanding of MLG developed here, such a relationship is worthy of further research in order to advance understanding of the differing forms of MLG that exist.

Table 3.1: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Institutionalism and Type of MLG</th>
<th>Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| rational choice institutionalism multi-level governance (RCI MLG)       | · member state actor centred approach to MLG  
· explicit choice of national political leaders to ensure desired gains: bargaining advantage, divesting responsibility, effective problem solving |
| historical institutionalism multi-level governance (HI MLG)             | · path dependency leads to MLG  
· autonomous institutional action  
· unintended consequences: SNA mobilisation  
· MLG ‘locked-in’: institutional barriers to reform, societal adaptation |
| sociological institutionalism multi-level governance (SI MLG)           | · MLG results from ‘learnt’ behaviour: acting in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’  
· supranational institutions: support further integration  
· SNAs: distinct identities and interests |
Chapter 4: Trans-European Networks - Transport

The development of a European transport infrastructure policy has been a long, tortuous journey. For decades beset by a reluctance on behalf of member states to establish a supranational policy competence in the politically sensitive field of transport infrastructure provision, the pressures emanating from the single market project finally culminated in the emergence of the EU’s trans-European networks - transport (TENT) policy area. However, the difficulties did not stop there. Problems in financing such a large construction programme have continued to blight the process and have delayed the realisation of a European transport infrastructure network.

The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the EU’s TENT policy. This is undertaken via an analysis of both the process through which the policy emerged and its more recent developments. The first section provides the wider European transport policy context in which the TENT emerged through an assessment of the Common Transport Policy. Section two looks at the evolution of TENT policy itself, examining the ‘story’ of its particular developmental path whilst section three moves on to analyse the obstacles, particularly financial, that have emerged as impediments to progress.

Development of Common Transport Policy

The EU’s attempt to develop a Common Transport Policy (CTP) can be defined as a road trip, complete with bottlenecks, missing links, roadblocks, collisions and eventually a clear way ahead. It has been marked by inertia, intransigence, divisions, frustration and relief. As such, two clear stages within this journey can be viewed. Firstly, from the 1957 signing of the Treaty of Rome through to 1982 in which EEC/EC attempts to initiate a CTP continuously floundered against entrenched member state differences concerning the role of transport policy within their respective socio-economic environments alongside the
requirement for unanimity in the Council of Transport Ministers. A period summed up by Lindberg and Scheingold writing at the time as ‘a story of inaction and failure’ (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 141). The second leg of the journey takes place from 1983 onwards in which progress towards a CTP finally begins to inch forward. This is a period marked by Parliamentary, judicial and Commission activism, ideological convergence between the member states towards a liberal perspective of transport policy and impetus provided by the single market project.

1957-1982: inaction and failure

Curiously, given the sclerotic pace of progress towards a CTP in the initial period, transport policy is firmly entrenched in the Treaty of Rome. In fact, as pointed out by Aspinwall, it was one of only two ‘constitutionalised’ policies (alongside agriculture) in the Treaty (Aspinwall, 1999: 120). Article 3e calls for ‘the adoption of a common policy in the sphere of transport’ as a key activity of the Community whilst Articles 74-84, though relatively brief, lay down the common transport objectives to be achieved. It is clear that transport was identified as a natural policy area for EEC level action due to its key importance in facilitating the Treaty’s short and long term aims. A CTP was viewed as being central to the establishment of an internal market incorporating the free movement of goods, services, people and capital and as such could not be ignored (degli Abbati, 1987:17). This begs the question, how can a policy area of such fundamental significance to the aims of the Community and which was obviously at the forefront of the minds of those negotiating the Treaty so spectacularly fail to deliver?

Signs of future trouble ahead were clearly visible in the Treaty of Rome negotiations themselves. During these negotiations a clear division emerged amongst the original six over perceptions of the role of transport in the economy. In one corner there was a liberal camp
led by the Netherlands which viewed transport as an independent sector of the economy subject to the normal rules of competition, whereas in the other corner there existed an interventionist camp led by the Federal Republic of Germany (and supported by France) which viewed transport policy as a means for achieving broader socio-economic goals and as such was legitimately subject to state intervention (degli Abbati, 1987: 32).

The differing historical developmental paths of national transport systems and the diverging ideological traditions attached to them were the dominant feature of framing the debate. In the liberal states, transport was viewed as a trunk service serving the requirements of industry whereas in the interventionist camp, transport systems were a tool used to tackle issues of cohesion, security, employment and public service (Aspinwall, 1999: 120) and for sustaining the symbols of national pride such as state-owned airlines and railways (Vassallo, 1998: 140).

Whilst road transport was an area of heated debate, such as over the preservation of road haulage for national companies (Aspinwall, 1999: 123), railways in particularly were the transport mode over which divisions were particularly stark. The railways played a central role in the larger states as a tool of general economic policy and, as they were controlled by the governments in all of the negotiating states except the Netherlands, were staunchly defended during the Treaty negotiations (degli Abbati, 1987: 31-33). The interventionist camp refused to entertain any package which circumscribed their highly valued mechanisms for intervention.

In addition to the dominant liberal/interventionist divide, other significant points of dispute concerned whether users should be free to choose their mode of transport, conditions required to make modes of transport comparable and the division of responsibilities between public authorities and private business (degli Abbati, 1987: 52). Thus, transport officials were faced with a situation of deadlock, unable to reconcile deep differences emanating from
the conflicting historical role assigned to their respective transport sectors, but at the same time fully aware of the fundamental importance of including an agreed CTP in the Treaty.

In order to overcome such deadlock, the Intergovernmental Conference negotiating the Treaty, wary of the risks of delay, took the transport negotiations out of the hands of the transport officials and settled on a short and hurriedly drafted transport title (Stevens, 2004: 39). This consisted of eleven brief and extremely vague articles outlining general principles, rules concerning non-discrimination, basic minimum content of the future CTP and the procedure through which the EEC institutions will establish such a policy. Article 75 contains the most important transport provisions in the Treaty (see Box 4.1) and clearly reveals an attempt to bypass the preceding deadlock by relying on the EEC institutions to compensate for the negotiators’ failure. This is most reflected in paragraph 1(c) of Article 75 which relies on the institutions adopting ‘any other appropriate provisions’ in order to establish a CTP. It is this feature which is of crucial importance in explaining the failure of the EEC/EC to establish a CTP in the first twenty-five years of its existence for it was precisely as a result of the inability of the Treaty negotiators to gain agreement on the details of the CTP that it was left to the institutional procedures to complete the task. In turn, the inability of the member states to overcome their fundamental differences on the role of transport policy within their economies in the Council of Ministers confined the CTP to a condition of stasis. As degli Abati, writing in the 1980s, notes,

> ‘it is now clear that only those Community policies which are specifically required by the Treaty establishing the EEC have in fact been implemented. Conversely, wherever the Treaty left it up to institutional procedures to find ways of defining and implementing policies, the progress made has almost always been minimal’ (degli Abbati, 1987: 32-33).
Thus, member state divisions continued to dominate transport discussions within the newly established EEC and were the overriding feature of, and reason for, the initial stage of inaction and failure. The Netherlands (and to a lesser extent Belgium and Luxembourg) continued to take a commercial view of transport, pushing for a CTP based on market-economic principles which they viewed as being in the best interests of customers and society (Molle, 2006, 221). On the other hand, Germany and France insisted on approaching the CTP negotiations from a public service perspective, viewing transport as an integral part

Box 4.1: Articles 74 and 75 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (1957)

Article 74
The objectives of this Treaty shall, in matters governed by this Title, be pursued by Member States within the framework of a common transport policy.

Article 75
1. For the purpose of implementing Article 74, and taking into account the distinctive features of transport, the Council shall, acting unanimously until the end of the second stage and by a qualified majority thereafter, lay down, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Assembly:
   (a) common rules applicable to international transport to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more Member States;
   (b) the conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate transport services within a Member State;
   (c) any other appropriate provisions.

2. The provisions referred to in (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall be laid down during the transitional period.

3. By way of derogation from the procedure provided for in paragraph 1, where the application of provisions concerning the principles of the regulatory system for transport would be liable to have a serious effect on the standard of living and on employment in certain areas and on the operation of transport facilities, they shall be laid down by the Council acting unanimously. In so doing, the Council shall take into account the need for adaptation to the economic development which will result from establishing the common market.
of their social structure, shaping the community’s social life (Molle, 2006: 221). This perspective was rooted in a domestic transport governance sub-system termed by Aspinwall as a ‘domestic security network’ (Aspinwall, 1999: 125). Such a sub-system has national security, cohesion and public service values at its core and is maintained by the close relations enjoyed between the state-owned carriers and the bureaucratic elites creating a fossilised national policy community resilient to change. Such an impasse was made no easier with the 1973 accession of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Ireland, all of whom had a liberal attitude to transport policy (degli Abbati, 1987: 19).

Prospects for the successful establishment of a CTP via the institutional procedures of the EEC were further impeded by the requirement for unanimity in the Council of Transport Ministers. As can be seen by paragraph 3 of Article 75 (see box 4.1), the Treaty of Rome details an important opt-out of the move to qualified majority voting in the Transport Council if a proposal is deemed to be ‘liable to have a serious effect on the standard of living and on employment in certain areas and on the operation of transport facilities’. In such circumstances, the Council would have to act unanimously. Such a vague basis for blocking a qualified majority vote was exploited by the member states in order to ensure their interests were not threatened, thus contributing towards the situation of stalemate. The fact that paragraph 3 was quickly accepted by all the delegations (having been proposed by Germany) reflects how keen the member states were from the very beginning to ensure that transport decisions remained the exclusive responsibility of governments acting unanimously (degli Abbati, 1987: 36). As Stevens states,

‘when the Treaty of Rome was being drafted, and for many years thereafter, there was a wide gulf between the views of leading politicians committed to European integration and the views of their less visionary colleagues responsible for transport policy’ (Stevens, 2004: 36).
This lethargic condition was further advanced by the ‘Luxembourg Compromise’ of 1966 which firmly embedded the principle of unanimity into the Council’s voting structure and hence the primacy of state interest in the EC, condemning any prospects for developing a CTP to failure.

This is not to say that attempts were not made to push the process forward. In 1961 the Commission proposed to the Council a ‘Memorandum on the General Lines of the Common Transport Policy’ as a first attempt to establish specific objectives and principles for the CTP, focusing on introducing greater competition in the Community’s transport markets (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 7). This was followed in 1962, at the Council’s request, by an ‘Action programme on a common transport policy’, setting out measures to be taken and a timetable for their adoption (degli Abbati, 1987: 57). On both proposals the Council was unable to reach a unanimous consensus. In addition, in its 1973 review of transport policy, the Commission attempted to kick-start the process by focusing on issue linkages, explicitly emphasising the importance of transport policy to other policy areas within the newly enlarged EC, such as regional, social, environmental and energy policies (Erdmenger, 1983: 15). However, once again, not for the first nor last time, the review fell at the hurdle placed in front of it in the shape of the Council.

Thus, for the first quarter century of the EEC/EC’s existence attempts to establish a CTP were defined by ‘output failure’ as a result of the processes associated with ‘forward linkages’ not being activated, such as functional spillover, side payments and actor socialisation (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 165-66). These processes fell victim to the inability of the member states to overcome the diverging traditions and philosophies with which they approached the question of transport, culminating in a period described by Erdmenger as ‘the saddest chapter in the history of European integration’ (Erdmenger, 1983: 89).
1983 onwards: follow the road ahead

1983 is a landmark year in the story of the development of the CTP as it marked the beginning of the process of surmounting the stalemate which had gripped transport policy for the preceding quarter century. Key in this process was the activism of the EC’s institutions as agents of change, particularly that of the European Parliament and Court of Justice.

In January 1983, the Parliament, having become tired of the inability of the Council to overcome its divisions, took the unprecedented step of taking the Council to the Court of Justice on the basis that it had infringed the Treaty of Rome by failing to establish a CTP. Despite only partially deciding in the Parliament’s favour, on the basis that the Council was in breach of its specific obligations under paragraphs 1 (a) and (b) of Article 75 (freedom to provide international transport services and conditions for non-resident carriers to operate transport services), the Court’s 1985 judgement had a significant political effect, creating an impetus for the creation of the CTP, including crucially within the Transport Council (Stevens, 2004: 55).

The groundbreaking 1985 judgement was the culmination of a series of judicial rulings concerning transport, marking the Court out as a driving force behind the development of the CTP. In 1971, in a case regarding the work of crews of vehicles engaged in international road transport, the Court shook the member states by ruling that the Commission had external policy competence wherever the Community had begun to establish a common policy and should therefore be responsible for negotiating agreements with external partners (Stevens, 2004: 50). Its 1986 Nouvelles Frontieres judgement, that the general provisions of the Treaty of Rome automatically applied to air transport despite this mode being specifically excluded from the CTP, built on a similar ruling concerning shipping in the French Seafarer case of 1974 (Aspinwall, 1999: 122). A second ruling in 1974 in the
Reyners v. Belgian State case also confirmed that the right to freedom of establishment under Article 52 of the Treaty directly applied in the member states, including in the field of transport (Stevens, 2004: 52). These rulings had significant consequences for European transport policy, helping to fuel momentum behind the idea that action on European transport policy was required in line with the liberal principles outlined in the Treaty.

The role of the Commission as an engine for the development of the CTP in this period cannot be ignored either. Commission activism has been a significant force in attempts to increase European policy competence in the transport field and hence in the shift to a ‘pre-governance’ sub-system in which the EU, despite not having clear jurisdiction, gathered participants in preparation for a move to a ‘supranational regulatory network’ (Aspinwall, 1999: 126-29). As Aspinwall describes, the Commission acted as an agent of change by focusing its attention on emphasising issue linkages (in much the same way as in the 1973 review detailed above). It stressed the ability of transport liberalisation to tackle negative externalities in associated policy areas, such as congestion, environment and safety, as well as linking the adoption of transport infrastructure projects with relieving unemployment. Such tasks were undertaken via research, highlighting best practice and seeking partnerships with industry and consumer groups in order to encourage change (Aspinwall, 1999: 129).

Given the inability of previous attempts to develop a CTP to pass the final hurdle presented by entrenched divisions within the Council of Ministers, the ideological shift towards consensus over a liberal perspective on the role of transport amongst the member states is probably the single most significant factor in understanding the reasons for progress in development of the CTP. By the 1980s, structural changes in the European economy had led to a greater emphasis on low transport costs as a result of the shift from the production of low-value bulk goods to an increasing amount of intermediary products and finished goods
being transported to dispersed locations (Molle, 2006: 227). These new methods of production and retailing combined with global competition, declining economic competitiveness, a focus on cost cutting, the desire to attract foreign direct investment and trade placed the political economy of transport firmly on the agenda of the member state governments (Aspinwall, 1999: 131). It was clear that separate national transport policies were hindering the ability of European industry to compete within the transformed global economy. Thus, in the 1980s an ideological convergence emerged between the member states on the need to take European level action to liberalise the transport market, paving the way for inertia within the Council of Ministers to be replaced by a new found dynamism.

The Commission was able to take advantage of this liberal consensus. Still scarred by its previous experiences, the Commission began with thoughts of working on an incremental basis, devising limited proposals in the fields of inland, air and sea transport in 1983, ‘84 and ‘85 respectively (Stevens, 2004: 57). However, this step-by-step approach was soon overtaken by publication in 1985 of its White Paper on Completing the Internal Market which contained several measures related to liberalising the transport sector as part of the process of completing the single market by 1992. The culmination of this process with the signing of the Single European Act in 1987 provided further thrust towards the development of the CTP, not only via the laying down of specific measures but also as a result of the crucial change to the voting rules within the Transport Council from unanimity to qualified majority. This has led Stevens to claim that ‘the foundations of a common transport policy were laid between 1985 and 1992 under the impetus of the single market programme’ (Stevens, 2004: 60).

Fast forward to the present day and we can see that, at least in the rules affecting market access and competition, a governance sub-system along the lines of Aspinwall’s ’supranational regulatory network’ exists in transport (Aspinwall, 1999: 127). Such a sub-system is run by the Commission (particularly DG Competition), economic actors
(consumers and producers) and national governments in accordance with the principles of competition and the private provision of transport services. As a result, the removal of national barriers impeding market access and EU-wide competition (i.e. negative integration) is the core focus of EU transport policy-making today.

**Development of Trans-European Transport Networks**

*Economic and political role of transport infrastructure*

The relationship between transport infrastructure, economic development and political integration is not unique to the EU. It stretches back to the mists of time and is clearly identifiable across the ages within a variety of different political communities. Johnson and Turner undertake a historical analysis of the use of infrastructure as an economic and unifying device, showing how the concept of infrastructure has continuously exercised a powerful influence over policy-makers, citing various examples ranging from the construction of Roman roads, the emergence of canal and rail networks in eighteenth century England, the nineteenth century expansion of railways in Germany, the use of railways as a means of exerting British control over India and the symbolic importance of the construction of the autobahns in Nazi Germany (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 1-6). Thus, the development of the EU’s TENT policy needs to be seen in this context. It is the continuation of a historical process of using transport infrastructure as a means for achieving wider political and economic goals.

The movement of the TENT policy area up the EC’s agenda in the later part of the 1980s was only new in the sense that it represented the EC discovering transport infrastructure as an instrument for realising integration. In this way, the development of TENT policy is very much part of the ‘power game’ within the EU. The fact that the EU is
now involved in transport infrastructure policy-making is highly symbolic as a representation of the distribution of power within contemporary Europe. As Piodi states,

‘Historically, the role of public works in the Member States has far exceeded their specific function….they also function as a symbol of the tangible reality of power, which is of crucial importance even in the modern age. The fact that responsibility for this sector has been conferred on the Union means that the prospects for the political legitimization of the Union have been enhanced’ (Piodi, 1997: 24).

In spite of its political significance, arguments in support of increasing the volume and quality of transport infrastructure are more often than not based on the ensuing economic benefits of such investment. This can be seen in both spatial and non-spatial contexts (Vickerman, 1994: 2-6). In non-spatial terms, infrastructure is viewed as a positive input within the production process. It enables the efficient transit of crucial inputs to the location of manufacture and delivery of finished goods to the point of sale. As such, the quality of infrastructure augments the rate of return of private investment. In spatial terms, infrastructure is seen as a defining element of regional production capacity and in turn as a determinant of regional economic development. As Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener claim,

‘In its simplest form it is implied that better infrastructure will lead to lower transport costs or to a wider range of choice and more competition. Improved access to input materials and to markets will cause firms in a region, ceteris paribus, to be more productive, more competitive and hence more successful than those in regions with inferior accessibility’ (Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener, 1999: 1).

It is this link to regional development, as well as its significance to macroeconomic
management, its wider social and strategic importance and its nature as a monopolistic, vertically integrated industry (McGowan, 1993: 180), which makes transport infrastructure an attractive area for intervention from the institutions of governance. In terms of this thesis, it is the spatial significance of transport infrastructure which provides sub-national authorities with a vested interest in its local construction and thus acts as a force encouraging the mobilisation of regional resources in this field.

It is interesting to note that an argument has been proposed claiming that the impact of transport infrastructure on regional development is being diminished (rather than extinguished). Fayman and Metge claim that this is a result of the combination of several trends: (i) an increased production of high-value goods for which quality of transport services takes precedence over transport cost; (ii) transport infrastructure improvements which reduce the variability of travel times, increase travel speeds and allow flexibility in scheduling are valued more highly in locational decisions than changes resulting only in cost reductions; (iii) telecommunications have reduced the need for some goods transports and person trips; (iv) the shift from heavy industry manufacturing to high-tech industries and services has led to quality of life, access to information and institutional and political environment factors partly displacing traditional cost location ones (Fayman and Metge, 1995: 335).

However, competing trends continue to increase demand for transport and thus improvements in transport infrastructure. These have demographic, political and technological roots. Demographic change, such as an ageing population, increased migration, the reduced size and increased number of households and shorter working hours have led to a higher rate of car ownership, increased mobility and greater demand for leisure (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 46). At the same time, increasing volumes of intra-European traffic and trade, particularly as a result of the single market project, the Schengen agreement and the development of high speed rail (Stevens, 2004: 173-75), necessitate subsequent
increases in the supply of transport infrastructure. Moreover, these trends emerged within the context of a reduction in transport infrastructure investment across the EU. Following the economic crisis of the early 1970s, cuts in capital spending in the member states led to a decline in the level of investment in infrastructure from 1.5 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to around 0.9 per cent in 1994 (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 148), with real infrastructure spending in 1990 languishing at mid-1970s levels (Ibid: 45). Thus, by the 1990s there existed a pressing need for investment in Europe’s transport infrastructure in order to keep pace with increasing levels of European demand and so as to maintain a competitive position within the rapidly transforming global economy.

Nevertheless, this still does not provide sufficient explanation for why a specifically EU policy competence for transport infrastructure emerged. Infrastructure investment could have proceeded on a purely member state basis with cross-border links managed cooperatively amongst the companies involved as had traditionally been the case (McGowan, 1993: 180), independent of the EU. In order to understand the reasons behind the advent of an EU level involvement in transport infrastructure, an analysis of the evolution of this policy area is required.

*The TENT ‘story’: ready - start the engine*

The European Commission’s 1961 ‘Memorandum on the General Lines of the Common Transport Policy’ represented the EC’s first foray into the field of transport infrastructure. The Memorandum identified three key objectives for the CTP: the removal of transport-inspired barriers impeding the development of the common market; the harmonisation of transport conditions so as to enable a free market in transport provision; and crucially the organisation of a transport system according to European rather than national requirements (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 7). This last objective was to be achieved initially
be harmonising national decisions on infrastructure investment leading to the general coordination of transport investment projects at Community level (degli Abbati, 1987: 134). In spite of the Council of Transport Ministers’ inability to reach agreement on the Memorandum, the proposal marked the beginning of the process of Commission activism in the transport infrastructure policy area.

A much greater breakthrough occurred in 1966 when the Council approved a Commission proposal to institute a consultation procedure on infrastructure projects of Community interest. This move was significant as it was the first step in the institutionalisation of a formal mechanism for Community action in transport infrastructure and remained the main instrument of EC infrastructure policy for many years thereafter (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 10). As such, the development of the consultation procedure can be seen as the initiation of Community involvement with transport infrastructure, a course of activity culminating with the establishment of the EU’s TENT policy. The momentum created by the consultation procedure continued through to the Commission’s review of transport policy following the 1973 enlargement. This widened the Commission’s focus within the development of the CTP from hitherto largely prioritising the creation of a common market in the transport sector to incorporating the creation of a cohesive European transport network so as to meet the requirements of the economic community (Erdmenger, 1983: 14). Thus, the 1973 review marked the point where the development of an integrated European transport network came to the forefront of the Commission’s transport policy activism.

Whilst attempts to push forward the EC’s transport infrastructure agenda largely failed for much of the 1970s in the face of Council obduracy, the Community’s role was boosted by the 1978 Council Decision to establish a Committee of Transport Infrastructure consisting of representatives of the member states under the Commission’s chairmanship.
The terms of reference for the Committee went beyond mere consultation to include a mandate to examine all matters pertinent to the development of the EC’s transport infrastructure (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 46). This was politically significant as it not only illustrated the Council’s commitment to infrastructure as an important part in the construction of the CTP (degli Abbati, 1987: 136), but also facilitated a more active role for the Commission and the Community in the development of infrastructure with a European dimension (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 11). For the very first time the Community was directly involved in the coordination of national transport infrastructure planning. An achievement the Commission wasted no time in utilising. Its 1979 ‘Memorandum on The Role of the Community in the Development of Transport Infrastructure’ promoted ideas about possible EC action in infrastructure development, such as moving towards short and long term objectives and the provision of funding at Community level (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 46-47).

The early years of the 1980s saw little evolution in policy terms. Commission proposals continued to be held hostage to the Council’s lethargy. However, 1982 did witness a landmark with the creation of a specific fund within the Community budget for the financing of transport infrastructure. A combination of the Commission and Parliament urged the Council to grant financial support of 10million ECU to three projects: a railway marshalling yard in northern Italy, a road in Greece and studies related to the Channel Tunnel (Erdmenger, 1983: 18). Nevertheless, it should be noted that this was not the first time that the Community budget had directly financed spending on transport infrastructure. Following its establishment in 1973, the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) had dedicated the majority of its available resources to infrastructure, totalling 80 per cent between 1975-88 (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 36). At the same time, from 1958-1982, 21 per cent of European Investment Bank financing operations had been directed towards the transport sector (degli

*The TENT 'story': set - buckle up*

Similar to the experience of the wider CTP field, the major impetus for progress towards an EC policy competence in the field of transport infrastructure, and specifically the TENT policy, came with the single market initiative of the mid-1980s. The Commission highlighted its argument that in order to fully realise the economic benefits of a single European economic space incorporating the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, an associated fully integrated European transport network would have to be developed. In this way, the Commission drew attention to the apparent rift within the Single European Act between theory and practice. As Johnson and Turner put it, ‘mobility in law is not the same as mobility in fact’ (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 22). A single market requires an underlying infrastructural network so as to facilitate its existence and the achievement of its aims.

The key factor in determining the rapid adoption of the TENT idea by the Commission, and the wider EC institutions, in this period is the successful lobbying role played by industrial groups, in particular the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT). The ERT’s 1984 report, ‘Missing Links’, acted as a call for action, claiming that the EC would not be able to fully realise the potential of the single market due to crucial cross-border gaps in, and the general pan-EC inadequacy of, Europe’s transport infrastructure. In doing so, the report proposed three major infrastructure projects: a Channel Link between England and France; a ‘Scanlink’ plan for road and rail connections in Scandinavia; and a trans-European network of high speed trains (ERT, 1984). The proposals quickly gained the support of senior Commission officials who claimed that the segmented nature of Europe’s transport infrastructure and the underdevelopment of trans-border links were due to planning...
competencies remaining with the member states, resulting in a focus solely on projects of national importance (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 170). The lobbying success of the ERT was a result of the privileged access that the group had to EC decision-makers and the fact that the TENs framework seemed to serve the Commission’s interests at that time, in terms of providing a relatively uncontroversial further field of cooperation at a time where it was too early to push common defence and foreign policy or monetary integration and justifying an increase in the Community budget (Peters, 2003: 329-30). The success of the ERT in influencing EC policy was such that Peters claims that,

‘it may be even more accurate to say that most official EU transport infrastructure investment proposals, and the priority TEN projects in particular, originated as industry lobby proposals that were only later transformed into EU policy’ (Ibid: 328).

Whilst the construction industry also called for such moves, via the International European Construction Federation, it is interesting to note that utility companies themselves were not at the forefront of the debate, reflecting their national basis and the low priority that such schemes took relative to domestic projects (McGowan, 1993: 183).

The TENT ‘story’: go - hold on tight

The culmination of such pressure emerged in 1990 with the Council of Ministers adopting an Action Programme on transport infrastructure (3359/90) which spelled out the principles underlying the TENT. This document marked the beginning of the modern TENs programme and in doing so identified TENT as a policy priority to be achieved via three actions: the identification of priority projects; the promotion of horizontal measures (feasibility studies, masterplans, interoperability standards); and financial measures to attract private capital (including proposals for Declarations of European Interest) (Johnson and
Turner, 1997: 12-13). In turn, the momentum built up by the Action Programme paved the way for the incorporation of a TENs title within the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU).

Title XII of the TEU refers exclusively to TENs policy (see Box 4.2\(^7\)) and is significant in that for the first time it provided a legal basis for EU action on infrastructure policy. The first thing that should be noted is that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 129b, the EU’s infrastructure policy is not solely focused on transport networks. Telecommunications and energy infrastructures are also viewed as priorities. However, having said this, the fact that transport consumes around three-quarters of the TENs budget (Ross, 1998: 186) shows that TENT is by far the dominant focus within the wider TENs framework.

An examination of Title XII uncovers the core themes provided as rationales for the TENT. Of particular concern are economic growth and cohesion. Article 129b proclaims an objective of TENs to be ‘to derive full benefit from the setting up of an area without internal frontiers’. As such, the TEU explicitly establishes the TENT as being a key policy mechanism for economic development resulting from the exploitation of the full potential of the single market. In turn, it was hoped increased growth would create further employment opportunities. In doing so, TENT was presented as having a Keynesian logic through the preservation and creation of jobs as a result of the projects’ construction and future operation (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 172)\(^8\) and thus can be seen as being tantamount to shifting the traditional public service role of infrastructure provision from the national to the EU level (Ross, 1998: 192).

In an attempt to counterbalance the potential for economic divergence within the Union resulting from the functioning of the single market, due concern is also given to the

\(^7\) Title XII of the TEU also includes Article 129d, stating the procedure for adopting the guidelines and other measures. However, Articles 129b-c are of most relevance to the ensuing analysis.

\(^8\) Although Sichelschmidt does warn that any project-induced employment could be offset by job reductions resulting from a negative impact on existing transport modes (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 178).
Box 4.2: Title XII (Articles 129b-c) of the Treaty on European Union (1992)

Article 129b

1. To help achieve the objectives referred to in Articles 7a and 130a and to enable citizens of the Union, economic operators and regional and local communities to derive full benefit from the setting up of an area without internal frontiers, the Community shall contribute to the establishment and development of trans-European networks in the areas of transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructures.

2. Within the framework of a system of open and competitive markets, action by the Community shall aim at promoting the interconnection and inter-operability of national networks as well as access to such networks. It shall take account in particular of the need to link island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the Community.

Article 129c

1. In order to achieve the objectives referred to in Article 129b, the Community:

   - shall establish a series of guidelines covering the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the sphere of trans-European networks; these guidelines shall identify projects of common interest;

   - shall implement any measures that may prove necessary to ensure the inter-operability of the networks, in particular in the field of technical standardization;

   - may support the financial efforts made by the Member States for projects of common interest financed by Member States, which are identified in the framework of the guidelines referred to in the first indent, particularly through feasibility studies, loan guarantees or interest rate subsidies; the Community may also contribute, through the Cohesion Fund to be set up no later than 31 December 1993 pursuant to Article 130d, to the financing of specific projects in Member States in the area of transport infrastructure.

   The Community's activities shall take into account the potential economic viability of the projects.

2. Member States shall, in liaison with the Commission, coordinate among themselves the policies pursued at national level which may have a significant impact on the achievement of the objectives referred to in Article 129b. The Commission may, in close cooperation with the Member States, take any useful initiative to promote such coordination.

3. The Community may decide to cooperate with third countries to promote projects of mutual interest and to ensure the inter-operability of networks.
theme of cohesion. Cohesion had moved up the EC’s agenda in the 1980s following the accession of the poorer Mediterranean states, in particular Spain which campaigned vigorously for greater EC attention to intra-Community disparities (Ross, 1998, 184), culminating with the introduction of cohesion as an EC goal in the SEA. Building on the relationship between levels of transport infrastructure provision and inter- and intra-state economic disparities (see Johnson and Turner, 1997: 29-35), and in an extension of Community involvement in the provision of infrastructure via the ERDF, the TEU makes a clear link between transport networks and cohesion. Again, this was the result of robust lobbying by Spain, this time accompanied by Greece, Portugal and Ireland, within the European Council (Stevens, 2004: 177). Article 129b states that a TEN goal is to take ‘account of the particular need to link island, landlocked and peripheral regions with the central regions of the Community’. Thus, TENT is formulated as a means of linking the peripheral regions of the Union to its economic core and therefore promoting a more evenly distributed pattern of development.

However, interestingly, Article 129b also states that action will only be taken ‘within the framework of a system of open and competitive markets’ whilst Article 129c states that ‘the Community's activities shall take into account the potential economic viability of the projects’, i.e. implying that infrastructure location and development will be dictated by the market. The full significance of this statement will be analysed later (see below) but it is worth noting that this is the first sign of future tensions within TENT policy between the requirement for private finance and its cohesion rationale.

Facilitating links with third countries, particularly the pre-accession states, can also be clearly viewed as a TENT goal. The TENs negotiations took place at the same time as an increased focus on progress towards the accession of the ex-communist states of central and eastern Europe, leading Article 129c to state that ‘the Community may decide to cooperate
with third countries to promote projects of mutual interest’. TENT was seen as underpinning enlargement preparations by aiding the necessary economic and political reforms in order to ensure the reciprocal benefits of accession to the new and existing member states (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 41). In addition, a variety of other policy objectives have become associated with the TENT, such as harmonising technical standards (interoperability) (Ross, 1994: 192), regenerating rail (Ross, 1994: 192), facilitating political integration (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 1), encouraging modal choice (Ross, 1998, 182), sustainable mobility (Vassallo, 1998: 136), reducing congestion (Vassallo, 1998, 136), improving safety (Ross, 1998: 182) and forging a common external commercial policy (Ross, 1998: 182). In this way, TENT is viewed as a ‘positive sum’ policy area, simultaneously serving the interests of public authorities (at the supranational, national and sub-national levels) and business, social and environmental groups. This ‘all things to all people’ value acted as a factor in the rapid adoption of TENT policy but, as we will see, also served to limit its policy impact (see below).

Alongside the policy objectives, the TEU stipulates a limited role for the EU in the development of the networks. TENT emerged within the context of the TEU’s emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and as such the member states were given primary responsibility for ensuring planning, financing and construction. Thus, the role of the EU is confined to acting as a catalyst and coordinator for the realisation of projects. As proscribed in Article 129c, this is achieved via the provision of financial aid for feasibility studies, loan guarantees and interest rate subsidies as well as direct infrastructure financing for projects in cohesion fund member states. In practice, the substantial difference between required and available

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9 The EU’s involvement in transport infrastructure improvement within the states of central and eastern Europe occurred within a series of Pan-European Transport Conferences during the 1990s which resulted in the emergence of ten Pan-European Corridors as the focus of development. The EU’s financial contribution to this programme came out of its PHARE budget, switching to its instrument for structural policies for pre-accession (ISPA) post-2000 (Stevens, 2004: 193).
funding has meant that much of the EU’s focus has veered towards establishing favourable conditions in order to attract the necessary private capital through acting as a forum for cooperation, coordinating operators and re-regulation (Johnson and Turner, 2007: 11).

However, in terms of specific policy actions, and mirroring the EEC’s initial message on the CTP within the Treaty of Rome, the EU’s commitment to TENs within the TEU is relatively vague, reflecting the enduring member state sensitivity behind supranational policy competence within the transport field. The action to be taken in order to achieve the objectives, as laid down in Article 129c, speaks of ‘establish a series of guidelines’, ‘identify projects of common interest’, ‘ensure the interoperability of the networks’ and ‘support the financial efforts made by the Member States’. The lack of concrete proposals within the Treaty itself represents a political necessity so as to gain member state approval of the TENs title. As McGowan states, ‘success may be due to its vagueness, most likely a deliberate decision: a more explicit commitment, with financial ramifications, would probably have been rejected’ (McGowan, 1993: 184).

In order to maintain the impetus provided by the TEU, in 1993 the European Council established a panel of national experts, chaired by the Commission Vice-President Christophersen, to identify potential individual TENT projects. Following discussions with the member states, the Christophersen Group presented eleven priority projects to the Corfu European Council meeting of June 1994, to which three more projects were added, with all fourteen priority projects approved at the Essen European Council of December 1994 (see Box 4.3) on the basis that they met the criteria for selection, in particular that plans were sufficiently developed to start the construction process before the end of 199610. To this priority list, another twenty-one projects of further importance were identified.

10 The selection criteria in full were: a common European interest; large size; economic viability and scope for private investment; contribution to EU objectives, particularly economic and social cohesion; respect for other EU policies, especially on the environment; and degree of maturity (Ross, 1998: 190).
The focus on the selection of those projects which were already in an advanced stage of development is criticised by Sichelschmidt on the basis that these projects would have
been realised anyway, with their incorporation into the TENT framework simply being an EU windfall profit (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 178). This line of criticism is supported by a closer inspection of the priority projects which unveils the inclusion of certain projects of dubious common European interest. Malpensa Airport (Milan) and the UK West Coast Main Line seem to be national projects dressed in European clothing. Scepticism is further reinforced by the fact that the fourteen priority projects involve the entire EU15, revealing member state influence in their selection (Stevens, 2004: 194) and serving as a mechanism adopted by the Christophersen Group in order to sell the package to the member states (Ross, 1998: 190).

An analysis of the Essen projects reveals the EU’s relative priorities regarding the different modes of transport. The list exposes an overriding focus on rail projects within TENT policy, reflecting the EU’s desire to encourage a transport modal shift away from an over reliance on road. The previous thirty years had witnessed the rise of road transport over rail. Between 1960-2000, the length of the rail network within the EU member states decreased by 13 per cent, the number of goods wagons fell by more then 60 per cent whilst the number of lorries increased fourfold (Molle, 2006: 225) with all of the associated environmental, health and safety implications. TENT is an attempt to reverse this process. Eight of the fourteen priority projects are purely rail focused whilst a further two (Oresund link and Nordic triangle) are combined road/rail networks. Despite rail accounting for only 6 per cent of passenger and 15 per cent of freight traffic (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 61), of the estimated 91 billion ECU total investment required, 80 per cent is absorbed by rail with a further 8 per cent by road/rail projects (Vassallo, 1998: 137).

The dominant role of rail within TENT was precipitated by advances in high-speed rail at state level, in particular France’s TGV, which attracted attention to high-speed rail as both a hi-tech prestige project and a significant component of transport infrastructure (Ross, 1994: 195). The renaissance of rail at the European level was in no small part the result of
Commission activism in this field during the later half of the 1980s, emanating from DG Transport, which drew attention to the state of crisis in rail whilst also emphasising the potential of a rejuvenated rail sector to serve the ECs future transport needs (Ibid: 194). The Commission itself drew heavily on the work and support of the Community of European Railways, the association for rail operators in the EC, who themselves had put together plans for a European rail network (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 55).

The other transport modes, whilst not ignored, are given much lesser prominence. Five of the priority projects are either solely or combined rail focused, absorbing about 20 per cent of the total investment. However, this is only true of the TENT budget line itself. As Peters points out, the vast majority of transport spending from the larger Cohesion and ERDF Funds went towards roads; from 1994-99, over 70 per cent of ERDF Objective 1 funding went to roads, whilst between 1993-99, 69 per cent of TENT-related priority investments in the four Cohesion Fund member states went to roads (Peters, 2003: 320). Airports account for only 5 per cent of the estimated expenditure on the fourteen priority projects and twenty-one projects of further importance with the EU’s role very much confined to generating partnerships (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 64). Four inland waterways projects were initially included in the projects of further importance list, accounting for 4 per cent of the estimated total expenditure with the main goals being removal of bottlenecks, elimination of missing links and agreeing on technical specifications (Ibid: 70).

Following the expiry of the Christophersen Group’s mandate, the Commission recognised the need for a TENT specific structure to continue the development of the policy area. Thus, a Working Group of Commissioners was established in 1995 in order to manage and coordinate TENT policy, identifying major obstacles and proposing solutions.

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11. There are three airport projects within the TENT programme: Milan-Malpensa Airport (priority project), Spata Airport and Berlin Airport (both projects of further importance).
12. Rhine-Rhone connection, Seine-Schelde connection, Oder-Havel connection and the Straubing-Vilshofen link of the River Danube. The review of TENT projects in 2004 led to the Seine-Scheldt connection and an expanded Rhine/Meuse-Main-Danube network being added to the priority projects list (see Box 4.4).
(Stephenson, 2007: 3). The same year saw the adoption of a Regulation on TENs funding whilst in 1996, and in accordance with Article 129c of the TEU, a Decision on Community guidelines for TENs was approved (1692/96/EC) outlining ‘the objectives, priorities and broad lines of measures envisaged in the area of the trans-European transport network’.

In the 2000s, the major legislative development has been the Decision (884/2004/EC) amending the 1996 Community guidelines which significantly led to an extension of the priority projects list through the addition of sixteen more networks, primarily taking into account the 2004 enlargement into central and eastern Europe (see Box 4.4).

*The TENT ‘story’: apply the brakes*

Progress towards completing the TENT projects has been much slower than originally forecast. This is due to a combination of a shortage in forthcoming private finance, the deficiencies built into TENT policy itself and the lack of consistency in decision-making. In funding terms, the substantial levels of investment required to construct the TENT networks superseded that available from public funds, requiring the incorporation of private finance to fill the funding void. This has not been forthcoming at the rate that was initially envisaged. By 1995, only three of the fourteen priority projects had full financing in place\(^{13,14}\) (Ross, 1998: 200) whilst by 2003, the financial gap for the priority projects totalled around €235 billion, resulting in the deadline for core sections of infrastructure to be in place by 2010 being missed, some by up to twenty years (Johnson and Turner, 2007: 13).

Stephenson, in his analysis of TENT policy progress, puts the blame for slow implementation firmly within the structures of TENT policy itself (Stephenson, 2007). He focuses on the limits of the TEN guidelines (no obligation on behalf of member states to carry out the projects and application of the principle of subsidiarity creating insufficient

\(^{13}\) One of which, the Oresund link, was to be wholly paid for through government guarantees.

\(^{14}\) See below for a fuller analysis of the financial obstacles to completing the TENT projects.
Box 4.4: Additional Priority Projects of the TENT programme agreed in April 2004 (Source: Decision No. 884/2004/EC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15) Galileo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16) Freight railway axis Sines-Madrid-Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17) Railway axis Paris-Strasbourg-Stuttgart-Wien-Bratislava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18) Rhine/Meuse-Main-Danube inland waterway axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19) High-speed rail interoperability on the Iberian peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20) Fehmarn Belt railway axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21) Motorways of the sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22) Railway axis Athina-Sofia-Budapest-Wien-Praha-Nürnberg/Dresden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23) Railway axis Gdansk-Warszawa-Brno/Bratislava-Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24) Railway axis Lyon/Genova-Basel-Duisburg-Rotterdam/Antwerpen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25) Motorway axis Gdansk-Brno/Bratislava-Wien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26) Railway/road axis Ireland/United Kingdom/continental Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27) &quot;Rail Baltica&quot; axis Warsaw-Kaunas-Riga-Tallinn-Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28) &quot;Eurocaprail&quot; on the Brussels-Luxembourg-Strasbourg railway axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29) Railway axis of the Ionian/Adriatic intermodal corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30) Inland waterway Seine-Scheldt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

powers for the Commission to impose deadlines or spending priorities), policy-making deficiencies (numerous involved agencies with unclear inter-agency relationships, poor consultation and blurred institutional boundaries) and a lack of information flow from the member states to the Commission (particularly amongst federal and decentralised states).
Stevens takes this line further by stating the lack of consistency in decision-making is a direct result of the narrative formulated in the initial construction of TENT policy (Stevens, 2003). As we have already seen, in order to sell the emerging TENT policy to as wide an audience as possible, a variety of partially complementary and partially competing rationales, or ‘storylines’, were provided to support its development, such as economic growth, cohesion, sustainable mobility, third country links etc; what Peters terms ‘conflicting-storylines’. It is exactly this lack of precise policy direction which has structured TENT policy and therefore resulted in inadequate policy progress.

The EU has reacted to this malaise by increasing the funding available for TENT projects from the Community budget (but still far short of what is required) and, more significantly, shifting its focus away from a grand TENT strategy towards an emphasis on tackling the specific barriers to implementation. This switch to a more pragmatic, incremental approach has led to a concentration on less ambitious aims on projects where the obstacles have been more administrative than financial, resulting in the prioritisation of areas such as the broad re-regulation of railways, Eurovignette (to allow proper charging of infrastructure), Galileo (to aid advanced navigation systems) and air traffic reform (to instigate the development of a single European sky) (Johnson and Turner, 2007: 12-13). Part of this more focused approach has been the appointment of project coordinators on the most challenging of priority projects and the creation of a specific TENT executive agency in 2007 to oversee the implementation process.

**Obstacles to achieving TENT Objectives**

The inability of public authorities to provide sufficient funding for the construction of the TENT network is a key obstacle to achieving the established TENT goals. The resulting requirement to attract private capital investment has had significant repercussions for the
‘cohesion’ rationale behind TENT policy.

**Finance**

The key obstacle to realising the completion of the TENT projects is the exorbitant cost of constructing the network and therefore the availability of funding. At the time of their initial identification, the Christophersen Group estimated the total cost of completing the combined thirty-five priority projects and projects of further importance to be around 143 billion ECU, whilst the Commission estimated 1000-1500 billion ECU was required to bring the EU’s entire transport infrastructure up to a desired level (Vickerman, 1995: 239). The EU’s own funding sources available are: structural funds (up to 75 per cent of a project’s cost); cohesion fund (up to 80-85 per cent); TENs budget (for financing feasibility studies, soft loans and loan guarantees); European Investment Bank (EIB) loans (up to 75 per cent); and European Investment Fund loan guarantees. By 1999, EIB loans accounted for the majority of the EU’s contribution, with the structural funds, cohesion fund and TENs budget combined making up a further one-third (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 175).

A significant contributory factor to the high cost of constructing the TENT network is the requirement to ensure technical interoperability between the different national rail systems. This is a problem rooted in the historical national focus of rail infrastructure development. Member state rail systems and networks are designed to serve national operations, resulting in different technical standards, such as track and loading gauges, power supplies, signalling systems and safety controls (Ross, 1994: 204). For example, the French TGV, German ICE and Italian ETR 500 are all designed to only serve their national networks and therefore require expensive modifications in order to be able to continue their journeys into neighbouring countries (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 57). This has clear cost implications for attempts to connect national rail networks in order to create a cross-border TENT system.
The technical alterations required to ensure that rail services are able to operate on different national networks are expensive. This can be seen by existing multi-system services, such as the Eurostar cross-Channel service which is 25 per cent more expensive per seat than the TGV and the Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam service which is 60 per cent more expensive so as to enable it to run on four different national systems (Mulley and Nelson, 1999: 101).

From the outset, it was clear that EU funding was severely limited and totally inadequate as a means of financing the network. Funding gaps were recognised at the beginning of the process as a major challenge to the TENT. The Commission’s highly optimistic initial funding forecasts for the ten most mature priority projects showed an almost 15 per cent shortfall, even after having included possible public and private sector contributions (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 168). In essence, the EU’s financial contribution is designed to act as a catalyst for the projects in order to attract much larger amounts from other sources. At the same time, member states have not provided sufficient resources either. To a certain extent this was due to constraints on public purses during the 1990s. However, a continuing reluctance on behalf of national governments to prioritise TENT projects over purely national infrastructure development is also to blame. This is partly the result of the problem inherent within cross-border networks that national governments are unwilling to invest in projects where the main beneficiaries are other states (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 82). The consequences have been delays in project development.

Thus, the inadequacy of public financial support and the ensuing necessity to acquire significant sums of private capital in order to fill the yawning funding gaps has led to the development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a central element in achieving the TENT network. This in itself has further contributed to delays in that it has resulted in the re-evaluation of projects in order to incorporate the commercial concerns of private investors.
The necessity for projects to balance commercial goals with the wider social and political objectives of public authorities has meant that projects have had to fulfil a broad array of somewhat competing criteria prior to the commencement of actual construction.

However, TENT projects have not been as successful in attracting private sector investment to the extent that was initially hoped for. Alongside factors such as the uncertainties of investing in new technologies (Ross, 1994: 201), an inadequate financial infrastructure being in place in some, particularly Mediterranean, member states and the simple lack of commercial viability of certain projects (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 151), the lack of forthcoming private capital has fundamentally hinged on the interrelated reasons of risk, lack of experience and inadequate rates of return. In terms of risk being a disincentive to private investment in TENT projects, Ross distinguishes between financial risk and public policy risk (Ross, 1998: 196-97). Financial risks result from the complicated nature of infrastructure which requires large scale investment based on long term planning, uncertain construction costs and unreliable traffic forecasts. In the case of TENT projects, the potential for financial risk is furthered by the fact that no single public entity acts as a guarantor for private capital investment. The reticence on behalf of private investors to involve themselves in such enterprises is exacerbated by the lack of private sector experience in financing such projects (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 80). Public policy risks stem from the perception of TENT projects as being inherently unstable due to their cross-border nature and the involvement of public authorities which brings with it inherent possibilities of planning disruptions resulting from government-mandated changes. The impact of political intrusion can be seen by the Athens-Spata Airport project where the private company Hochtief saw its terms of involvement unilaterally altered by a new government following a general election (Ross, 1998: 207).

The uncertainty and instability created by the existence of risk leads to private
investors requiring a high rate of return, often beyond that which is deliverable by transport projects. The private sector would expect a return of 20-30 per cent on such an investment; well above the 3-8 per cent return that many of the TENT projects are estimated to provide (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 154). Even if this rate of return is accepted, the length of time required to wait in order to experience such a yield on capital lent is often unsuitable for the private sector.

Therefore, the key role of the EU within the realisation of TENT policy objectives has become to reduce risk by offering support to the private sector in order to encourage the flow of private funds into the TENT projects. One way this has been undertaken is via the provision of coordination forums. The Commission has created specific forums in which public and private interested parties are able to discuss, network, exchange information and build trust. The aim of such forums is to provide highly visible political support for the TENT projects in an attempt to reassure private investors. The creation of European Economic Interest Groups (EEIGs) is an example of such a forum. EEIGs incorporated transport operators and private finance representatives in order to coordinate studies into the cross-border sections of TENT projects in the hope that, by involving private finance, they could facilitate the flow of private funds (Stephenson, 2007: 11). In addition, the role of the EIB has been advanced as a means of increasing private sector confidence in the TENT projects. The EIB’s support has been used as a mechanism to gain credibility for certain TENT projects, and therefore attract private finance, as a result of its well-respected reputation within financial circles, whilst its successful record in infrastructure development has helped as a way of surmounting private sector inexperience in this field (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 167).

Cohesion
As stated above, the positive spatial economic impact of transport infrastructure is often cited as a core argument in favour of construction, particularly within peripheral regions. Transport infrastructure is viewed as a means of linking economically disadvantaged regions directly to the prosperity of the core. The resulting improvements in accessibility allow the periphery to benefit from, and take advantage of, economic activity within core regions, thus facilitating a more even pattern of development. A concern for the potential concentration of the economic benefits of the single market project within the EU’s core, led to the TEU establishing economic and social cohesion as a key focus of Union activity. The crucial importance that the EU placed on transport infrastructure as a principal mechanism towards achieving cohesion was reflected in Cohesion Fund spending being limited to the fields of the environment and transport. However, it should be noted that transport infrastructure in itself does not lead to economic development. Improved infrastructure facilitates, rather than provides, economic growth and as such is seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in ensuring cohesion (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 32).

However, the nature of the projects leads to certain question marks over the ability of TENT policy to promote the economic and social cohesion of the Union. A large proportion of the projects exist within the EU’s core and are aimed at connecting the EU’s major urban centres of economic activity. This is particularly true of the original ‘Essen’ priority list, where the six projects which are exclusively located within the core\(^\text{15}\) are estimated to absorb nearly two-thirds of the investment (Sichelschmidt, 1999: 172). To a certain extent there is a clear economic rationale for concentrating new transport infrastructure within and between core regions because this is where transport demand is highest (Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener, 1999: 3) whilst the relatively low population densities within the periphery result in high construction costs and low returns (Johnson and Turner, 1997: 32). The lobbying efforts

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\(^\text{15}\) Project numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 10.
of industry to structure the TENT in this fashion are clearly visible on the ‘Essen’ list as most of the projects are long-standing pet industry projects that had been heavily promoted for some time (Peters, 2003: 334). However, this does mean that the TENT will likely benefit the core region of the EU to a greater extent and thus enhance the social and economic disparities between the core and periphery. A clear example of this is the impact of the Channel Tunnel where the greatest positive effects have been felt in the London-Brussels-Paris triangle (Fayman and Metge, 1995: 344). Furthermore, even where the networks extend into the periphery, their aim is to link the major cities of the peripheral regions to the EU’s core area and as such will increase disparities between the cities of the peripheral regions and their hinterlands (Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener, 1999: 2). Thus, the TENT projects result in not only reinforcing the existing inequality between the EU’s core and periphery, but also amplifying intra-periphery differences.

This problem is particularly exacerbated by the TENT’s focus on high-speed train (HST) projects. HST projects inherently contain a core-to-core nature. In order to be ‘high speed’, services are required to travel between major urban areas with very few stops in between. A large number of stops in peripheral areas decreases the overall transit time between the major cities and thus reduces the added value of such a service. As a result, HST projects largely pass through the rural periphery without providing access points to the network. In doing so, a ‘corridor effect’ (Vickerman, 1994: 17) is created in which the economic advantages of the new route are concentrated at the urban endpoints of the corridor with rural areas experiencing very few of the benefits, whilst at the same time having to bear the significant environmental costs of construction. Depending on the location of the network, this can have the effect of creating uneven economic development as much within the core as in the periphery. For example, the concentration of the economic benefits of the Channel Tunnel at its London-Paris-Brussels endpoints has led to the emergence of
Normandie as an ‘economic grey zone’ (Fayman and Metge, 1995: 345). Moreover, the diversion of traffic away from existing routes creates ‘shadow effects’ (Vickerman, 1994: 17) whereby a negative economic pressure is exerted away from the new transport corridor in those areas which see a fall in demand as a result of modal shift.

Despite Sichelschmidt’s claim that, as a result of the varying influences on its policy-making path, TENT policy has been overloaded with ‘primarily non-economic, especially distributional or environmental, goals’ (Sichelschmidt, 199: 180), the necessity to fill the funding gaps within the TENT projects has had fundamental implications for the status of the cohesion rationale within the policy area. The requirement to attract private investment has led to concerns for the commercial viability of projects increasingly coming to the fore at the expense of wider socio-economic interests, such as cohesion (Ross, 1998: 199). This reflects the different interpretations of transport infrastructure between public authorities and private financiers; the latter’s interest being firmly rooted in profit maximisation. As a result, a reliance on private sector involvement has led to the emergence of narrow economic considerations over those of cohesion.

The tension between the commercial and cohesion aspects of the TENT network is also reflected in intra-Commission power plays. According to Peters, the rise of a commercial focus is a reflection of the dominance of the business interests in DG TREN over the cohesion emphasis of DG Regio within TENT decision-making (Peters, 2003: 321). He goes on to claim that,

‘the ‘Missing Links’ storyline (of DG TREN) is the one that most honestly reveals the key rational behind EU transport infrastructure investments, namely to improve conditions for business and trade between the most powerful, most competitive urban agglomerations in Europe’ (Peters, 2003: 331).
This has resulted in a situation whereby the most financially viable TENT projects, largely within the core, receive the necessary funding for completion (Vickerman, Spiekerman and Wegener, 1999: 12) whereas those projects which have a greater claim on improving the cohesion of the EU are left behind. The outcome is a widening of the social and economic disparities within the Union.
Chapter 5: Case Study – Vienna

The transformative political events within Europe over the last two decades have revolutionised the geopolitical environment in which Vienna operates. The removal of the Iron Curtain, Austria’s accession to the EU and EU enlargement in to central and eastern Europe have culminated in Vienna finding itself at the heart of the ‘new Europe’. The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the EU TENT policy-making engagement of the Vienna city administration in line with the new institutionalist understanding of Multi-level Governance (MLG) framework established in chapter 3. The first section provides the national context in which the Vienna city administration exists through an assessment of Vienna’s role within Austria, particularly focusing on the dominant aspects of cooperative federalism and corporatism as well as the lander-federal and inter-lander policy coordination mechanisms in place. Section two looks at Vienna’s wider European objectives and activities whilst section three moves on to analyse the Vienna city administration’s specific TENT policy involvement through the conceptual lenses of rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism MLG.

Vienna’s role within Austria

As the capital city of Austria, containing 20.1% of the population (Statistik Austria, 2006 census), Vienna dominates the Austrian state both politically and economically. Whilst being the location of all the federal level offices of state, Vienna also accounts for 26.5 per cent of Austria’s GDP (Statistik Austria, 2008 figure), making it the engine room of Austria’s economy. The economic dominance of Vienna is firmly rooted in the historical development of central Europe. As industry was concentrated in the western part of the Habsburg Empire (today’s Austria and Czech Republic), the Viennese bourgeoisie was able to take advantage of the economic booms, in particular in the mechanical and electrical engineering sectors,
during the 19th century allowing it to flex its financial muscles across the entire kingdom (Becker and Novy, 1999: 129). As such, Vienna was the economic heart of the Empire.

Today, Vienna enjoys the status as the high technology business centre of Austria, with an accompanying reputation as a research and development (R&D) hub within Europe. Almost a thousand R&D units are located within the city, including nine universities (of which five specialise in applied sciences) teaching approximately 110,000 students, who account for 58 per cent of all the students in Austria (Kaufmann, 2007: 76-77). In 2006, Vienna’s research expenditure amounted to €2 billion, equal to about 43 per cent of overall Austrian research expenditure, which served to attract almost half of all the international corporations setting up operations in Austria (City of Vienna, 2006b: 34-35). As a result, Vienna experiences significant strengths in the fields of electronics, IT, biotech, engineering and cultural industries (OECD, 2003: 15).

The Austrian federal constitution establishes Austria as a federal state (Article 2 (1)) and asserts the right of the lander to legislate through the Diets (Article 95 (1)). Chapter IV (B) of the constitution also sets out the special administrative provisions for Vienna as both a city and a land. Article 108 states,

‘For the Federal capital, Vienna, in its capacity as a Land, the municipal council has additionally the function of the Diet, the city senate the function of the Land Government, the mayor the function of the Governor, the City administration the function of the Land Government Office, and the city administration’s chief executive the function of the Land administration’s chief executive’.

As such, the city-regional government of Vienna is able to exercise wide powers over a variety of policy areas within its land, including technological and economic development, social welfare, public health, spatial planning, regional transport, environment, housing,
cultural affairs and primary education, as well as enjoying financial autonomy in order to utilise its powers. Furthermore, Vienna enjoys legal protection against federal encroachment in its policy domain via constitutional provisions asserting that the federal government does not have a right of veto over lander legislation within its competences (Article 98 (2)) or a right to establish federal authorities for matters other than those prescribed to it in the constitution (Article 102 (4)).

However, it should be noted that the structure of governing in Austria is very much based on a system of cooperative federalism in which levels of government interact and are closely linked as opposed to a form of classical federalism in which levels of government carry out their responsibilities in relative isolation from each other. As a result of responsibility for policy legislation and implementation being spread across the layers of government within the Austrian state, the federal, regional and local tiers of government are closely linked. This is firmly alluded to in Chapter 1 of the federal constitution. Articles 11 (1) and 12 (1) of the constitution explicitly specify the array of policies in which competence is shared between the different levels of government, ranging from those policy areas in which legislation is the business of the federation and execution is that of the lander (such as social housing, highway police, sanitation and environmental impact assessments) to those fields in which lander legislation is expected to follow policy principles established by the federation (social welfare, hospitals and nursing homes, land reform and agricultural labour legislation). The multi-level nature of public policy-making in Austria facilitates an inherent need for cooperation, multilateral bargaining, harmonisation in public services and the taxation system and strong redistribution effects across the territorial units (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 250).

However, the cooperative nature of Austrian federalism is not solely predicated on the formal constitutional division of policy competences, but also on informal intergovernmental
agreements. These result from a cultural norm of cooperation embedded within Austrian federal-lander relations, culminating in the coordination of action as standard practice. As an official within the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (BMVIT)) stated,

‘you would not be advised to decide something without involving the land
concerned because, if you do, you will have all the problems you can
imagine.’

(Interview with BMVIT official)

Since 1974, Article 15a (1) of the amended constitution has stated that ‘the Federation and the Laender may conclude agreements among themselves about matters within their respective sphere of competence’. Multi-level agreements between the federation and the lander as a means of facilitating policy coordination have subsequently become a feature of governing in Austria. One such instrument is the Austrian Conference of Regional Planning (Österreichische Raumordnungskonferenz, OROK) which, in the absence of a federal policy competence for spatial planning, acts as a joint federal-lander organisation to coordinate spatial planning projects (OECD, 2003: 127).

Moreover, the consensual nature of Austrian politics is not confined to vertical intergovernmental relations, but also incorporates social partners within a wider policy community. Thus, alongside cooperative federalism, corporatism is a second dominant feature of Austrian policy-making, in which a few privileged social groups engage with the state in the policy-making process. Corporatism firmly took root within Austria in the immediate post-1945 period as a result of the attractiveness of social compromise following the divisive rule of the previous 25 years and the need to minimise internal disputes whilst Austria’s international status hung in the balance (Becker and Novy, 1999: 136). Today, these social partners are the Chamber of Business (Wirtschaftskammer Österreich), the
Chamber of Labour (Bundesarbeitskammer), the Conference of Presidents of the Chambers of Agriculture (PRAKO) and the Austrian Trade Union Confederation (OGB) (Falkner, 2000: 227). These ‘chamber status’ social partners have a legal right to be consulted on draft legislation concerning both domestic and EU affairs.

At the local level, urban governance in Vienna has traditionally been marked by the dominant role of the local state through the centralisation of decision-making within the city administration, active intervention in the economy and public service provision. Commencing with the communalisation of public transport and gas distribution at the turn of the twentieth century, the scope of the city administration was dramatically enhanced by the start of the continuing period of social democratic hegemony over the city’s governing structures post-1918\(^{16}\) as the city took over responsibility for delivering public services to the population during the inter-war ‘Red Vienna’ era, particularly via an ambitious housing programme. This process continued post-1945 with the local state viewing its main function to be the direct delivery of social services, such as housing, education and healthcare (Becker and Novy, 1999: 132-137).

However, economic and political restructuring since the 1980s has led to Vienna increasingly witnessing a dilution of its corporatist tradition as new types of actors have become prominent, such as real estate business, parts of the internationalised elite and international investors (Novy, Redak and Jager, 2001: 140). The leading role played by private investors in the decision-making processes of high profile projects such as Donau City and the new Central Station (Novy and Hammer, 2007: 213) reflect the reformed structure of local governance. The traditional social partners increasingly being viewed by the city administration as one set of actors amongst many.

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\(^{16}\) Excluding the fascist era from 1934-45.
Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995 caused grave concern amongst the lander regarding their specific policy competencies and their ability to influence higher levels of decision-making. This anxiety was predicated on the potential for a ‘double erosion effect’ whereby not only would lander competencies be uploaded to the European level, but moreover would be decided upon in a supranational sphere in which the lander would have no direct representation, relying instead on their interests being represented by federal agents. Thus, a shift of competencies would occur on the one hand from the national to the European level and on the other from regional to federal representatives (Falkner, 2000: 228). Exacerbating the problem from the lander perspective was the seeming norm of compromise within the EU Council of Ministers, meaning that domestically harmonised national positions often have to be abandoned in intergovernmental negotiations (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 256). In addition, further worries concerned lander access to the wide variety of relevant information required to keep abreast of policy developments at different stages of the EU policy-making process and the prospects for inter-lander/lander-federation policy coordination within the time constraints emanating from deadlines set at the European level (Falkner et al, 1999: 500-502). Therefore, the risk of disempowerment became the key fear for the lander in the run-up towards accession.

In an attempt to compensate for the potential centralisation of policy-making power, EU specific lander-federation coordination mechanisms have been established. In 1992, an agreement was reached between the federation and the lander regarding the rights of the lander to participate in EU matters, which was later incorporated, under Article 23d, into the 1994 amendment of the federal constitution. As a result, the lander enjoy a right to be informed of all EU-related projects which affect their policy competencies or could otherwise be of interest to them (Article 23d (1)), the right to bind the federal government by agreeing a common lander position on an area in which the lander have legislative powers (Article 23d
(2)) and the right of a lander official (in cooperation with a member of the federal government) to represent the Austrian state in the Council of Ministers where a proposal falls in the lander’s policy domain (Article 23d (3)). Whilst the entitlement to represent Austria in the Council of Ministers is rarely invoked, largely as a result of very few debates concerning fields in which the lander have exclusive responsibility, a more widely used mechanism is inclusion in Austrian delegations to Brussels when conducting consultations and negotiations, such as involvement in preparations for meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and in Council working groups (Ferrara, 2005: 102-103, 108).

At the national level, ensuring the voice of the lander is heard by the federal government relies upon involvement in the Council for EU Integration Policy (Rat fur Fragen der Europaischen Integrationspolitik), where four lander representatives sit alongside members of the federal government, parliament, municipalities and the social partners in order to discuss and coordinate EU-related decisions (Ferrara, 2005: 106). On a more ad hoc basis, lander representatives are also involved in inter-ministerial EU coordination meetings (Falkner et al, 1999: 501). However, the level of involvement in such meetings fluctuates according to the attitudes of the various federal ministries towards inviting lander representatives (Falkner, 2000: 236). In theory, the Bundesrat (second chamber of parliament), which consists of representatives from the lander parliaments and may give opinions on EU issues, could also be an avenue through which the views of the lander are conveyed. However, the political weakness of the Bundesrat within the architecture of the Austrian state ensures that it remains a marginalised institution (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 253).

At the same time, inter-lander mechanisms have been established in order to coordinate EU policies. The Integration Conference of the Lander (IKL), consisting of the governors and parliamentary presidents of each land, and supported by the Standing
Integration Committee of the Lander (Standiger Integrationsausschuss der Lander (SIL)), was set up as part of the 1992 agreement as the formal institution through which a common EU position could be formulated amongst the lander. However, in practice the previously existing, and non-institutionalised, Conference of Governors of the Lander (Landeshauptmannerkonferenz (LHK)), supported by the Conference of Directors-General of the Regional Administrations (Landesamtsdirektorenkonferenz), continues to play the dominant role in EU-related affairs (Ferrara, 2005: 105). Agreed lander opinions are conveyed to the federal government via the Liaison Office of the Lander (Verbindungsstelle der Bundeslander) which acts to ensure the constant flow of communication between the two levels of government.

Analysis of the policy impact of such inter-lander institutional arrangements is mixed. Diverging lander interests create a high barrier to achieving consensus and unanimity meaning that often joint positions cannot be reached at all, resulting in the inability to bind the federal government, or final statements referring to general objectives based on lowest common denominator outcomes (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 257). These diverging interests were highlighted by an official within the Vienna city administration’s Chief Executive Office when he stated that,

‘Vienna’s emphasis on services of general interest is not shared (by the other lander) because so many hospitals are in Vienna. Public services are probably not such an important issue for a city like Klagenfurt for instance.

Also, tourist issues are particularly important for Tyrol and Vienna.’

(Interview with Vienna city administration official)

In addition, EU-initiated deadlines provide a further, often insurmountable, obstacle as a result of the lack of time available to complete the bureaucratic process of drafting nine individual lander viewpoints and then negotiating a joint lander policy (Falkner, 2000: 236).
In spite of the difficulties in influencing the federal government’s EU position, certain characteristics of EU policy-making continue to ensure that attempting to shape a common national policy remains a worthwhile objective for the lander. Wolffhardt and Bartik claim this to be the result of the combination of several trends: (i) the cultural norm of consensual decision-making in the Council of Ministers; (ii) the ability of even small member states to tip the balance in favour of a particular block within the Council; (iii) a preserved requirement for unanimity in key policy areas; (iv) increasing use of the intergovernmental Open Method of Coordination as a form of new governance (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 266). Thus, the role of the Council of Ministers as a key decision-making body within the EU policy process and the continuing importance of individual governments within that body serves to confirm the federal government as a key focal point for lander lobbying strategies.

Furthermore, the federal government as the primary national institution target of the lander’s focus is enhanced by the lack of influence of the Austrian parliament over EU policy. The shift of regulative competencies to the EU level alongside the federal government’s privileged access to EU decision-making and its participation in package deals through its regular interaction with other governments in the Council of Ministers means that parliament, particularly the Nationalrat (first chamber), has lost political weight in the making of policies which affect the lander (Falkner, 2000: 225). The potential disempowerment of parliament resulting from Austria’s accession to the EU was foreseen and accordingly attempts to maintain the relative institutional balance of power were established in the 1994 amendment to the constitution, such as the right to be informed about, and vent an opinion on, all EU projects (Article 23e (1)) and the Nationalrat’s ability to bind the federal government’s voting position on EU projects which would require federal legislation17 (Article 23e (2)). However, in practice, the Nationalrat has given binding mandates in very

17. Deviation from the Nationalrat’s opinion is admissible for ‘imperative foreign and integrative policy reasons’ (Article 23e (2)).
Vienna’s European Objectives and Activities

Vienna’s overriding objective is to position itself as a leading light in the European, and wider international, competition among cities. As such, the city administration’s policy goals revolve round three core themes: the economy and education (Vienna as a centre for business and finance, tourism, science and research); infrastructure (Vienna as a central European transport hub); and culture and quality of life (Vienna as a city of culture, a safe and secure city, an environmental model) (City of Vienna, 2006a: 1-5).

As a result, attempting to influence the federal government’s policies is not the sole focus of the city administration’s attention. Rather factors such as the use of qualified majority voting in an increasing number of policy areas of relevance to the lander, the relatively powerless voting weight of the Austrian government within the Council of Ministers and the increasing role of the European Parliament via the extension of the co-decision procedure has led to a dual-track strategy through the simultaneous mobilisation of lobbying resources directly towards the EU institutions. The reasons behind this vary from attracting resources (structural funds), preventing threats to existing policy competencies (liberalisation of services of general interest) to engaging in debates concerning the future direction of the EU (strengthening social cohesion through expansion of the European social model) and is undertaken via participation in the Committee of the Regions, a representative offices in Brussels and membership of transnational regional authority lobbying networks.

The marginalised status of the Committee of the Regions within the institutional architecture of the EU is viewed by the city administration as limiting its value as an effective channel of influence. As an official within the Municipal Department for EU Strategy and
Economic Development (MA 27) stated, ‘we do not take it too seriously’ (interview with Vienna city administration official). However, Vienna’s representative office has proved a more useful body. Ever since its establishment in 1996, ‘Wien-Haus’ has acted as the key avenue through which Vienna’s interests have been represented in Brussels. Its tasks have focused on obtaining, filtering, interpreting and disseminating information (particularly in the areas of public procurement, deregulation of public services and urban policy), fostering contacts with and lobbying the EU institutions, building networks with other EU regions and showcasing Viennese culture (through a monthly cultural events series, such as the ‘Viennese Lectures’) (Pretscher, 2004: 41-42). ‘Wien-Haus’ also contains the Brussels office of the Vienna Business Agency (Wiener Wirtschaftsförderungsfonds [WWFF]) which works on behalf of Vienna’s business sector. As such, the office acts as a force to represent the combined weight of both the public and private sectors of Vienna with the aim of portraying a united front at the EU level.

At the same time, entering into alliances with other regions through networks is viewed as essential as a means of augmenting Vienna’s potential influence on the EU policy agenda. The regional organisations in which Vienna is most active are Eurocities (including its Mobility Forum in which TENT policies are discussed), Assembly of European Regions (AER), Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMRE), Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers (REGLEG) and Union of Capitals of the European Union (UCUE). As well as formal regional networks, Vienna also partakes in ad hoc regional interest coalitions as can be seen by it leading a group of 18 cities in signing a declaration supporting the European Parliament’s resolution in 2004 concerning the Commission’s Green Paper on services of general interest (Pospischill, 2004: 94). Furthermore, since the mid-1990s Vienna has acted as a mentor to the capital cities of EU candidate states, such as
Bratislava, Budapest, Sofia and more recently Zagreb and Ankara, sharing information, expertise and examples of best practice (Fischmann, 2004: 43).

In relation to regional networking, Vienna’s engagement in the Community Initiative INTERREG (cooperation among regions) programme has been particularly intense. The end of the Cold War and Austria’s accession to the EU transformed the geopolitical environment in which Vienna found itself. The existence of the INTERREG programme created financial incentives for inter-regional cooperation. Consequently, on EU accession in 1995 the city administration firmly committed itself to the INTERREG programme as a mechanism through which to construct a neighbourhood policy vis-à-vis bordering cities and regions in adjoining states as well as a means of profiling Vienna as an east-west gateway and as an internationally oriented city (Wolffhardt and Bartik, 2005: 282-283). Preparing for the opportunities and challenges resulting from the EU accession of neighbouring states in 2004 only served to deepen Vienna’s commitment to the programme during the 2000-2006 INTERREG III funding period.

As such, Vienna was heavily involved in all three INTERREG III schemes: INTERREG IIIA (cross-border cooperation with neighbouring regions in Slovakia, Hungary and the Czech Republic in fields such as economic cooperation, transport, labour market, education and environmental protection); INTERREG IIIB CADSES (transnational cooperation for regions within the ‘Central, Adriatic, Danubian and South-Eastern Europe Space’ [CADSES]); INTERREG IIIC East (cooperation amongst the regions of eastern Europe in order to improve regional and structural funds policies). Furthermore, the Vienna city administration acted as the transnational secretariat for the INTERREG IIIB CADSES and IIIC East schemes as well as the INTERACT programme (which aimed to support the 2004 accession states in the management of programmes and projects under the INTERREG initiative). As a result, the city administration’s Municipal Department for EU Strategy and
Economic Development (MA 27) has come to be viewed as a European competence centre within the INTERREG context.

One noteworthy development that has emerged as a result of Vienna’s deep involvement in the INTERREG IIIA programme is the beginning of a process of constructing a cross-border region at the heart of Europe entitled CENTROPE (Central European Region) encompassing the Austrian lander of Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland, the Bratislava and Trnava regions of western Slovakia, the Czech region of South Moravia and Gyor county in western Hungary. Driven forward by Vienna, and anchored on the Vienna-Bratislava axis, the CENTROPE project was officially launched in 2003 with the goal of taking advantage of the opportunities, and responding to the challenges, of the reestablishment of the historical social geography of central Europe post-2004 through the creation a functional region. As such, and whilst still in its early stages of development, CENTROPE aims to create a framework for the cooperation of public and private actors in the central European region. Thus far, cooperative activities have been particularly focused on the fields of education, science and research (CENTROPE as a ‘knowledge region’), labour market integration, spatial integration (specifically transport infrastructure) and culture and tourism.

**Vienna and TENT Policy**

The increased importance of EU level policy-making to a variety of policy areas of significance to regional authorities has led to the Vienna city administration expanding its European attention away from its traditional focus on EU regional policy. This shift in the importance of the EU to Vienna has been enhanced by the start of the process of diverting structural funds towards the new, ex-communist member states following the 2004 enlargement; a process which is expected to accelerate in future funding periods. As a result, policies which do not come under the competence of DG Regio have increasingly become the
focal point of Vienna’s European activities. Of particular importance has been the services of
general interest (SGI) proposal which planned to deregulate public services such as local
transport, water supply and waste management through the introduction of a mandatory
invitation to tender principle. This was viewed by the city administration as a direct threat to
the long-held norm of local state controlled delivery of public services, particularly public
transport. Such was the fear that compulsory tendering of services would be foisted upon the
city that a dedicated office was established within MA 27 in order to coordinate Viennese,
Austrian and EU-wide regional lobbying strategies against the SGI proposal. In addition,
action has been taken in the fields of environment, employment, social affairs as well as
TENT policy.

Vienna’s approach towards the TENT policy area was delineated in its 2003
Transport Master Plan, a document prepared under the responsibility of the Municipal
Department for Urban Development and Planning (MA 18) which outlines the framework of
Vienna’s transport concept for the following 20 years. The overriding principle underlying
the administration’s TENT interests is the competitiveness of Vienna as a business location.
The fall of the Iron Curtain, Austria’s accession to the EU and the 2004 EU enlargement
pushed Vienna from the periphery to the very centre of the ‘new Europe’. Consequently,
Vienna sees itself as being in a prime location in order to exploit the economic opportunities
resulting from its transformed geopolitical environment, in particular the expansion of the
single market. In turn, the administration views being a central transport node within the
TENT network as an essential prerequisite for the development of Vienna as an attractive
business location. The relatively small size of the domestic Austrian market can be
compensated for by effectively linking to surrounding high-level markets through being
positioned on both north-south and east-west European transport axes. As such, Vienna’s
key TENT interest is to be located on the network in such a way as to become a central transit
and transfer point for passenger travel and an inter-modal goods transport interchange. In essence, it is the perceived economic benefits resulting from enhanced accessibility that is the driving force behind Vienna’s deep engagement with TENT policy.

In line with such priorities, thus far Vienna is involved in five TENT priority projects, all of which were added to the priority projects list as part of the 2004 amendment to the Community guidelines in order to take account of EU enlargement. These projects are: railway axis Paris-Strasbourg-Stuttgart-Vienna-Bratislava (priority project 17); Rhine/Meuse-Main-Danube inland waterway axis (pp 18); railway axis Athens-Sofia-Budapest-Vienna-Prague-Nuremberg/Dresden (pp 22); railway axis Gdansk-Warsaw-Brno/Bratislava-Vienna (pp 23); motorway axis Gdansk-Brno/Bratislava-Vienna (pp 25). At the same time, the city administration has invested heavily in surrounding infrastructure at the Vienna point of the networks in order to ensure seamless travel and intermodal exchange, such as a new container terminal at the Freudenau Port of Vienna along the Danube (opened in 2008) and a new Vienna Central Railway Station currently under construction (due to open in 2015) which is part funded by TENT grants.

**Rational Choice Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (RCI MLG)**

An RCI account of MLG views a polycentric form of governance emerging as a result of rational choices made by national political leaders with the explicit purpose of establishing a joint problem-solving form of policy-making. From the outset it should be stressed that policy competence for the principal motorways and railways within Austria lies at the federal level. Financing key transport infrastructure projects is the responsibility of the federal government whilst their construction and maintenance is undertaken by state-owned agencies, Austrian Federal Railways (Osterreichische Bundesbahnen (OBB)) and its road equivalent ASFINAG (Autobahnen- und Schnellstraßen- Finanzierungs- Aktiengesellschaft).
Thus, formal competence for TENT policy within the Austrian state remains firmly in the hands of the federal government, as represented by the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (Bundesministerium fur Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie (BMVIT)). In the case of Vienna, this begs the question of the rationales behind the federal government’s eagerness to involve the Vienna city administration in the TENT policy-making process.

Analysing the emergence of MLG in the TENT policy area within Austria through the prism of RCI brings to the fore a process whereby the federal government explicitly elected to shift authority away from the central state in order to ensure desired gains, in particular effective policy outcomes. The fact that Vienna is involved in five out of the six TENT priority projects that affect Austria means that the specialised local knowledge and expertise of the Vienna city administration is required by the federal government as an integral part of the transport infrastructure planning process. As one official within BMVIT stated,

‘although formally the federal government is competent, the lander have a high influence. The government depends on the lander because it wants to succeed in the policy’.

(Interview with BMVIT official)

On one hand, this local knowledge is provided by the city administration itself in the form of MA 18 (Municipal Department for Urban Development and Planning) within which the transport portfolio is based and consequently contains local transport specialists. However, the transport planning unit of MA 18 is relatively small, simply containing eleven people, only one of whom is responsible for the issue of European transport policy.

As a result, much of the European-related transport infrastructure expertise is provided by the TINA Vienna institute. The TINA institute was established by the City of Vienna in 1997 and served as the mechanism through which the city administration’s
intensive engagement with TENT policy began in earnest. TINA’s initial function was to undertake the European Commission’s Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA) project which involved detailing the routes for the extension of the TENT network into central and eastern Europe in preparation for EU enlargement. The results of this project provided the basis for the expansion of the TENT network as part of the 2004 amendment to the Community Guidelines. The fact that the TINA project was being administered by the TINA institute, essentially an office of the Vienna city administration, provided the city with the direct means through which to ensure a pivotal location and role on the enlarged TENT network. The successful results of such a strategy can be seen by Vienna’s central position on five key east-west TENT priority projects.

Despite moving out of the direct control of the city administration and becoming a subsidiary of Wien Holding in 2003, the fact that Wien Holding is itself 100% owned by the City of Vienna has served to ensure that TINA Vienna continues to work on behalf of the administration, particularly MA 18, in a role approaching that of an internal transport consultant. TINA Vienna provides a variety of transport-related services for the city administration, ranging from research, technical information and analysis to project planning and management. Such links are further deepened by the existence of close personal connections between the two bodies, facilitated somewhat by the exchange of personnel. Furthermore, TINA Vienna’s previous and continuing work on behalf of the European Commission\(^\text{18}\) provides the city administration with direct channels of communication to key points of contact at the European level, particularly within DG Transport, through which it is able to get its interests heard. In addition, the city administration employs the services of external research institutes in order to provide expert advice and skills on European matters.

\(^{18}\) As well as the initial TINA project, TINA Vienna has also previously acted as the secretariat for Pan-European Transport Corridor IV (now TENT priority project 22), written implementation reports on the TENT Guidelines, conducted the ERAIL project and continues to be the secretariat for TENT priority project 18 (the Danube).
In particular, the think-tank Europaforum Wien has worked heavily alongside MA 18 and MA 27 (EU Strategy and Economic Development), both as a source of information and in its role managing the CENTROPE cross-border project on behalf of the constituent regions.

As a result, the Vienna city administration as a source of specialised knowledge, expertise and contacts is much sort after by the federal government in order to ensure success in the TENT policy field. This was particularly of use to the federal government not only in its initial strategy to convince the European Commission to include Austria’s submitted transport projects on the TENT network but also in its subsequent attempts to access EU funding for these expensive projects. As Austria is one of the richer member states, the Commission required further convincing of the requirement for an EU financial contribution. The information and arguments provided by the city administration played a significant role in achieving a successful financial outcome for the federal government. For example, the information collated and work already undertaken by the city administration on the CENTROPE project was explicitly, and successfully, used by the federal government as an argument in favour of gaining EU funding for the new Vienna Central Railway Station. The project has very much been defined in that cross-border context.

Moreover, ensuring a united Austrian position was viewed as being of crucial importance by the federal government in serving to reinforce the strength of its voice in its negotiations with the Commission, something seen as being of fundamental importance for a small member state. At least the reverse, a divided position, was seen as having the potential to scuttle the federal government’s TENT interests. A common domestic position was also viewed by the federal government as necessary in order to gain the support of neighbouring states for the TENT networks that Vienna was part of. Regional-federal consensus from the beginning of the process reduced the risk of future complications and delays emanating from domestic Austrian political fractures, making it easier to gain the agreement of other states.
and regions located along the network. In turn, such pan-European agreement encouraged the Commission to look favourably on calls to accept the network as a TENT priority project.

However, it is not only the benefits of an enhanced problem-solving capacity which the federal government sought from transferring authority away from the central state. There were also clear political benefits for the federal government. Obtaining the support of the EU for its transport infrastructure priorities helped to reinforce the government’s argument in favour of dedicating substantial resources towards their construction during domestic political discussions. Gaining the stamp of approval as being a ‘project of international interest’ provided ready-made protection for Austria’s TENT projects in the face of any domestic criticism. Similarly, there were also the potential electoral advantages for the federal government stemming from the efficient construction of politically popular transport networks. As an official within BMVIT stated, ‘the government also depends on the lander to get more votes at the next election, so it needs the lander from a political point of view’ (interview with BMVIT official).

Therefore, an RCI perspective of the emergence of a multi-level governance form of policy-making in the Austrian state within the TENT policy field throws light on the added-value to the federal government of involving the Vienna city administration in its TENT policy-making process. The Vienna city administration’s specialised transport knowledge, expertise and EU contacts helped to ensure effective policy outcomes in line with the federal governments transport infrastructure interests. In turn, this was viewed as having positive political and potentially electoral repercussions for the central government.

**Historical Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (HI MLG)**

An HI interpretation of MLG views an interconnected and multi-actor form of governance emerging as a result of a path dependent process whereby existing political
structures and initial choices ‘lock-in’ certain policy paths, leading to the dispersal of authority away from the central state. The significance of HI is clearly visible in the experience of Vienna as a result of the norms of the Austrian domestic political system.

Even though, as mentioned above, constitutional policy competence for TENT policy lies firmly in the hands of the federal government, a culture of cooperative federalism is securely ‘locked-in’ as a feature of Austrian politics in which levels of government closely interact. As a result, cooperative federalism represented a pre-existing pattern of inter-governmental relations within the Austrian state which was naturally applied to Vienna’s involvement in TENT policy-making. As an official from BMVIT confirmed,

‘there has to be some communication (between the federal government and the lander) because whenever the interests of the lander are affected there must be a consultation. Even any small project must be agreed with the corresponding land.’

(Interview with BMVIT official)

As such, the Vienna city administration was involved from the early policy formulation stages of the process, involving project identification and development. Moreover, Vienna’s participation in this process was not dependent upon pledges of future contributory funding to these projects. Instead, the process of jointly developing projects was at an advanced stage before co-financing negotiations began. Thus, it is not the formal rules of Austria’s constitutional division of policy competences that an HI account of MLG brings to the fore, but rather the historically embedded informal norms of cooperation in the nature of federal-lander relations within the Austrian state. According to an HI account, Vienna’s involvement in TENT policy innately took place within this pre-established framework.

This norm of cooperation was certainly reinforced by the federal government’s own belief in the importance of Vienna as a key node within the TENT network. The federal
government’s objectives and priorities were established in its 2002 Transport Master Plan which set out a long term programme for the strategic development of Austria’s transport infrastructure. The overriding aim of the federal government in developing Austria’s transport infrastructure is to establish Austria’s main cities as major economic centres in central Europe. Ensuring the main cities occupy prime locations on the TENT network is the core strand of this objective in order to ensure easy accessibility and efficient access to larger markets. Alongside a further goal of encouraging a greater use of environmentally friendly modes of transport, and as such the prioritisation of rail, this has led to the federal government particularly focusing its attention on Austria’s involvement in TENT priority projects 17 (railway axis Paris-Strasbourg-Stuttgart-Vienna-Bratislava) and 22 (railway axis Athens-Sofia-Budapest-Vienna-Prague-Nuremberg/Dresden).

As a result, a clear channel of involvement in TENT policy-making emerged for the Vienna city administration with respect to the projects that ran through the city. However, the means of communicating Vienna’s interests to the federal government were not via the formal federal-lander body established to coordinate EU-related policy, the Council for EU Integration Policy, or the inter-lander equivalents, the Integration Conference of the Lander (IKL) and the Conference of Governors of the Lander (LHK). In fact, these channels of communication were of limited use to the Vienna city administration due to the variety of different transport infrastructure concerns held by the various Austrian lander. For example, the Brenner section of TENT priority project 1 (railway axis Berlin-Palermo) in the western land of Tyrol is dominated by trans-Alpine crossing matters with little relevance to Vienna’s cross-border interests in the east. The resulting difficulties in coordinating positions and gaining consensus within these formal bodies, and in turn jointly influencing the federal government, led the Vienna city administration to utilise alternative mechanisms of consultation.
Direct contact with the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) was the preferred course of action for the city administration as the principal means of lobbying the federal government. In particular, Section 1 (International Affairs) of BMVIT and MA 18 of the Vienna city administration were the focal points of intergovernmental communication. In addition, at the same time as inter-departmental consultation was taking place, personal links between the federal government and the Vienna city administration further served to encourage direct channels of communication. High level interaction amongst political elites within the ‘political village’ of Vienna is commonplace and as such have been utilised by the city administration as a means of gaining access to the levers of power at the federal level.

This has particularly been of benefit more recently as previously local Viennese politicians have gained positions of authority within the federal government. From 2007-08 the Federal Minister for Transport, and since 2008 the Federal Chancellor, Werner Faymann, is a former Vienna city councillor. As an official within Vienna’s MA 18 put it, ‘we can remind him of those links’ (interview with Vienna city administration official). In the current Faymann government, the Transport Minister, Doris Bures, also has roots in local Viennese politics as a result of her background as a councillor for the Vienna-Liesing district. Political party links between the two governing bodies have also stimulated this process. Whilst the overall approach to transport infrastructure policy, as set out in the 2002 Austrian Transport Master Plan, did not change as a result of the shift away from an Austrian People’s Party (OVP) led federal government coalition, the Austrian Social Democratic Party’s (SPO) return to power in the 2007 federal elections facilitated greater support for Vienna’s TENT interests. For example, having the two levels of government ruled by the same party led to the Vienna city administration being able to convince the federal government to concentrate extra
resources on the Vienna-Bratislava cross-border section of TENT priority project 17 in order to accelerate construction.

**Sociological Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (SI MLG)**

SI’s understanding of MLG emerging as a result of a ‘learnt’ process whereby actors behave in accordance with their socially perceived roles accounts for the active mobilisation of the Vienna city administration’s political and economic resources within the EU policy sphere. The transformative political events in Europe post-1989 acted as the instigators for a process of self-reflection within the city administration. The fall of the Iron Curtain, Austria’s accession to the EU and EU enlargement in central and eastern Europe have led to a revolution in Vienna’s geopolitical environment. Rather than finding itself situated besides the ‘no-man’s land’ of Europe’s Cold War frontline, Vienna now identifies itself as a city at the heart of the ‘new Europe’. The city administration has been at the forefront of this process.

As early as 1992 the City Council, which simultaneously acts as the land Assembly (Landtag), appointed a Commission on Europe to examine the issues of relevance to Vienna resulting from Austria’s upcoming accession to the EU. The result of these consultations has been a series of ‘European Declarations’ by the Viennese Assembly stating its positions on issues viewed as being of importance to Vienna within the European integration process. The rapid expansion in European matters commented upon by the Assembly between the initial ‘European Declaration’ in 1994 and its 2003 counterpart is striking and in turn characterises the growth in Vienna’s self-identification as a core European actor. The 1994 Declaration concerned itself with the domestic repercussions for Vienna of EU accession, such as opportunities for accessing EU funds, economic development and the impact of community law on Viennese laws (Weninger, 2004: 34-35). However, by 2003 the Declaration acted as
a call to arms by the Assembly, expressing an expectation for Vienna to play an active role in shaping the EU and making an impressive list of demands on the European Convention charged with preparing the European Constitution, such as greater rights for the European Parliament (including electing the President of the European Commission), creation of a European social union and the introduction of elements of direct democracy at the EU level (referenda, petitions) (Pelinka, 2004: 17). The Mayor of Vienna, Michael Haupl, has even gone as far as to call for ‘the creation of a United States of Europe’, claiming that he is ‘wholeheartedly behind it’ (Haupl quoted in Pelinka, 2004: 22). The fact that these demands go far beyond the traditional policy competences of regional authorities represents the increased self-confidence of Vienna as an individual player within the European political game.

Vienna’s self-perception as a ‘Euro-player’ has become embedded within the culture of the city administration, which in turn directly stimulates its intense European engagement. On Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995, Mayor Haupl instigated a process of administrative reform in order to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the new geopolitical environment Vienna found itself in. Alongside attempts to create an efficient modern service enterprise in line with new public management philosophy, of deeper significance was a cultural shift towards an awareness of the importance of the EU to all aspects of the administration’s work. Under the slogan ‘Think Europe – Act Local – Develop Vienna’, the various municipal departments were encouraged to identify European activity in their policy fields, actively exploit opportunities and engage with European developments as a means of placing a norm of ‘thinking European’ at the heart of policy-making practices. As Mayor Haupl stated in reference to the 2005 Vienna Urban Development Plan,

‘(the Plan) requires one very important thing from the actors involved: that
they think and act in a European perspective. Vienna is sustained by its
internationality, its integrative role in this new Europe. This must be the basis of our daily work irrespective of whether in the area of politics, administration or business. This is the only way that the best intentions can be turned in to a desirable reality’ (City of Vienna, 2005: 8).

It was in this context that an Executive Group for International Relations within the Chief Executive Office and Vienna’s representative office in Brussels (‘Wien-Haus’) were established in order to coordinate and contribute towards Vienna’s ‘Euro-profiling’. According to the Chief Executive Director of the Vienna city administration at the time, the result of this process of reform has ‘permanently changed the self-image within the bureaucracy’ (Theimer, 2004: 6) leading to the emergence of a city administration definitively ‘linked-in’ to the European sphere with a strong self-perception as a European city authority.

The process of ‘thinking European’ found clear resonance in particular in the field of transport infrastructure policy. Following accession to the EU, Vienna quickly identified itself as being in a prime location to act as a ‘gateway to the east’ for western Europe and as a ‘transport bridge’ between east and west. As such, the city administration’s primary transport infrastructure interest became to position Vienna as the key central European node on the TENT network. This intention was made clear by the Vienna Assembly’s 1997 ‘European Declaration’ which stated that,

‘Vienna declares the development of a high-capacity inter-modal transport node (rail, water, air, road) to handle European, trans-national and regional freight and passenger traffic to be an urgent goal and will in future increasingly direct the focus of its transport policy toward it’ (Schwetz, 2004: 96).

This strategy is clearly reflected in the TENT related construction projects currently taking place within Vienna. The new railway station, which will act as the single departure/arrival
point for all TENT routes, is being marketed under the slogan ‘Vienna Central Station – Centre of Europe’ whilst the upgrading of the Freudenau Port is being undertaken with the objective of making it the main intermodal exchange point in central Europe.

At the same time, the Vienna city administration felt it had a legitimate right to actively involve itself in the TENT policy-making process taking place at the EU level as a result of its self-belief as a European political authority. In reference to the transport infrastructure field, an official within MA 18 asserted that,

‘we prefer our role as a land (rather than a city) because nobody would expect a city to discuss such questions. Everybody says that cities should only organise their public transport within the city.’

(Interview with Vienna city administration official)

Thus, there has been a clear attempt to identify itself as a European political entity beyond simply being a city and as a result to link Vienna to wider Europe. It has been this self-perception which has led the city administration to mobilise its economic and political resources to strive for its goals within TENT policy.

At the European level, this has been undertaken via direct contact with the EU institutions. The Commission’s TENT coordination and funding role have meant that it has been the focal point of lobbying efforts. Whilst the city administration is happy to concede the limited policy impact of its individual influence, communication with DG Transport has proved valuable in terms of early access to information, particularly concerning the Commission’s future strategies, which has allowed for effective planning.

Vienna’s representative office in Brussels, ‘Wien-Haus’, has been indispensible in this process. A Brussels office has facilitated the establishment and maintenance of personal contacts with the Commission which act as the key mediums through which access and communication take place. As an official within the Chief Executive Office claimed, ‘if it
was not for ‘Vienna House’ we could not get ourselves heard’ (interview with Vienna city administration official). ‘Wien-Haus’ also plays a significant role in information collection, analysis and dissemination so that the city administration is able to react to developments at the EU level.

On the other hand, the European Parliament’s limited involvement in the TENT policy field has led to little engagement with MEPs beyond keeping local representatives updated with the administration’s opinions. Similarly, the fact that the Committee of the Regions (CoR) only enjoys advisory power means that is not viewed as a significant avenue for influence. The CoR’s value to the city administration lies in it acting as a forum for networking, creating personal contacts and information exchange.

As part of the city’s ‘Euro-profiling’, and as a result of a belief in the strength of a collective voice, the city administration has invested heavily in involving itself in transnational regional networks as a means of influencing EU policy-making. Working via regional networks is seen as crucial as a means of adding weight to the opinions of regional authorities such as Vienna, whilst also acting as important settings for knowledge transfer. Eurocities, and in particular its mobility forum, has been a central focus of Vienna’s attention. Consisting of medium to large EU cities, and with regular communication with the Commission via its Brussels office, Eurocities is viewed by the Vienna city administration as an effective mechanism through which to influence EU transport policy. As a result, Vienna was at the forefront of establishing a working group on international accessibility within Eurocities so as to create a space in which specifically TENT issues could be discussed.

**Conclusion**

An analysis of the experience of Vienna in the TENT policy area through a new institutionalist understanding of MLG draws attention to the key role played by the city
administration in the development of a multi-level form of governance. The three institutional types of MLG are clearly identifiable and provide differing explanations for the active involvement of Vienna in this field (see Table 5.1). RCI MLG emphasises the explicit choice made by the federal government to incorporate Vienna into the TENT policy-making process in order to ensure effective policy outcomes and acquire political and electoral advantages by making use of the city administration’s specialised local knowledge and presenting a united Austrian position in international and domestic negotiations. On the other hand, HI MLG highlights the emergence of an MLG form of policy-making as resulting from the existence of an informal political culture of cooperative federalism being ‘locked-in’ as a feature of Austrian intergovernmental relations. Meanwhile, SI MLG stresses the mobilisation of Vienna’s resources from below resulting from the self-perception of the city administration as a distinct political actor with its own European interests. As a result, Vienna can be seen as a dynamic player in the EU game, fitting John’s (1994) classification as being ‘fully Europeanised’ and Goldsmith and Klausan’s (1997) ‘proactive’ category.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>New Institutionalism and Type of MLG</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Vienna and TENT Policy</th>
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| rational choice institutionalism multi-level governance (RCI MLG) | · member state actor centred approach to MLG  
· explicit choice of national political leaders to ensure desired gains: bargaining advantage, divesting responsibility, effective problem solving | · effective policy outcomes: specialised local knowledge and expertise (MA18, TINA Vienna)  
· united Austrian position in negotiations  
· political and electoral advantages |
| historical institutionalism multi-level governance (HI MLG) | · path dependency leads to MLG  
· autonomous institutional action  
· unintended consequences: SNA mobilisation  
· MLG ‘locked-in’: institutional barriers to reform, societal adaptation | · political culture of cooperative federalism ‘locked-in’  
· preference for direct communication with federal government  
· personal and party links |
| sociological institutionalism multi-level governance (SI MLG) | · MLG results from ‘learnt’ behaviour: acting in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’  
· supranational institutions: support further integration  
· SNAs: distinct identities and interests | · post-1989 transformation in Vienna’s geopolitical environment  
· self-perception as distinct political actor at centre of ‘new Europe’  
· administrative reform: ‘thinking European’  
· self-identity as east-west ‘transport bridge’  
· mobilisation of own resources |
Chapter 6: Case Study – London

The governance of London has passed through a series of tumultuous stages over the past thirty years which have served to shape the city’s political outlook. Abolition of the Greater London Council, the disappearance of London as a single political entity during the interregnum years and the re-establishment of a city-wide body through the creation of the Greater London Authority have had a profound impact on London’s domestic, European and international engagement. The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine London’s involvement in the EU’s TENT policy-making process in line with the new institutionalist framework of MLG established in chapter 3. Section one provides the national context in which the political region of London operates through an examination of the city’s role within the UK state, focusing on London’s dominant position within the domestic sphere and the unsettled ‘story’ of London’s governance. The second section looks at London’s wider European objectives and activities, whilst section three assesses London’s particular transport infrastructure focus before moving on to analyse London’s specific relationship to TENT policy through the conceptual lenses of rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism MLG.

London’s role within the United Kingdom

As the capital city of the United Kingdom, containing 8.1 million people, equating to just under 13% of the population (Office for National Statistics, 2011 census), London dominates the UK state. In political terms, London is the location of all the national government offices of state, whilst also being the centre of the UK’s economic activity. London’s GDP is valued at £160 billion per year (Glaister, 2006: 100), which equates to about 18 per cent of the UK’s total GDP (GLA, 2008: 13). As a result, London contributes
over £22 billion to the UK’s tax revenues each year (GLA, 2001a: 12), equal to a net contribution of between £9-15 billion per year (GLA, 2004: 12).

The dominant fields of economic production in London reflect the city’s shift away from its previous role as a large scale manufacturing centre. London has revolutionised its economic base as an estimated three-quarters of a million manufacturing jobs have been lost since 1945, nearly 400,000 of these since 1984 (GLA, 2008: 16). In 2006, 30 per cent of the UK’s financial services jobs were located in London along with 23 per cent of business services employment (GLA, 2008: 16). The creative sector is the second largest contributor to employment in London after finance, most notably in the fields of publishing, leisure software, broadcasting and advertising. This accounts for around 12 per cent of jobs in the city (GLA, 2008: 16), which equates to about 25 per cent of all creative sector jobs in the UK (GLA, 2008: 61).

London also acts as the centre of much of the country’s cultural activity, accounting for over 25 per cent of Britain’s total cultural sector employment, including 60 per cent of total jobs in the UK film industry (GLA, 2008: 61-62). London enjoys a disproportionately high share of UK employment in the fields of transport and communications, public administration, hotels and restaurants (GLA, 2008: 16). In total, London accounts for 15 per cent of total UK employment (GLA, 2008: 13). However, whilst acting as the powerhouse of the UK economy, London and the UK economies are closely integrated. Three quarters of London’s ‘exports’ are to other parts of the UK, whilst 70 per cent of London’s ‘imports’ are from the rest of the country (GLA, 2001b: 29).

At the same time, London is very much a leading international city, acting as a global hub for finance, tourism, creative industries and higher education. The 2012 Global Financial Centres Index ranks London as the world’s leading financial centre (Long Finance, 2012) whilst the European City Monitor 2010 ranked London as the best major European city for
business investment overall (Cushman & Wakefield, 2010). London records the highest number of tourist arrivals of any city in the world, with an estimated 26.6 million overnight visits being made to the city in 2006 (GLA, 2008: 63), of which around 15 million were international visitors (GLA, 2010: 67). London is one of the key global centres for creative industries, being for example the third largest film production centre in the world (GLA, 2008: 14) whilst also having the most overseas students of any city in the world, numbering 60,000 (GLA, 2008: 16).

As a result, British governments have tended to view London as, as former Secretary of State for the Environment John Gummer put it, ‘the UK’s number one asset’ (Gummer quoted in Newman and Thornley, 1997: 969). This is particularly the case for London’s financial centre, the City of London. The City contributes around £7 billion to the UK’s tax revenues per year (GLA, 2001: 12), leading then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to declare that ‘the City of London is a precious national asset’ and that ‘any government which fails to recognise this, fails to understand our national interest’ (Thatcher quoted in Michie and Williamson, 2004: 172).

The importance of London to successive national governments has been reflected in the increasing concentration of UK transport infrastructure projects in and around the city. As Hart (1993) shows, there was a clear shift in public transport investment post-1974 away from its use as a means of reducing the regional disparities suffered by problem industrial regions towards an emphasis on London and the South-East as governments became increasingly fixated with Britain’s international competitiveness. This was exacerbated by a reliance on the forces of the market and competition in order to determine transport infrastructure projects and an emphasis on incorporating private financing which further focused investment on high return projects based in London. This is evidenced by completion of the M25 around London, the M20 to Dover, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link,
London Underground extensions and, most recently, government commitment to fund Crossrail.

An attempt to counter-balance the overriding influence of London in Westminster and Whitehall by England’s provincial cities has been witnessed. A notable example has been through the formation of the Core Cities group in 1995 comprised of eight cities seeking to raise their profile amongst central government policy-makers. Whilst success has been achieved in terms of bringing their city-region agendas to the attention of central government, they have not managed to diminish the pre-eminence of London in the corridors of power (Morgan, 2007: 1244). As a leading London academic stated,

‘In some ways London is like a ‘dark star’. London is so big and powerful within the UK that it is very difficult for matter to avoid being drawn towards it. I think that politicians find it impossible to ignore and things like riots and terrorist attacks remind politicians of why they have to be careful of not getting London wrong politically. The stakes are high. The Mayor of London probably does have privileged influence on national government simply because of the economic importance of London but also the fact that London is inherently interesting to government members even if they are not London MPs. They cannot get it wrong because the downside consequences of policy failures in London are very visible.’

(Interview with London academic)

The governance of London has a chequered and uneven history, alternating between direct central government control, pan-London government, and back again, and then back once more. Whilst the idea of a single London government was introduced in the 1830s by the Royal Commission on Municipal Corporations (Barlow, 1991: 49), it was not until 1855

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that such a body came to fruition with the establishment of the Metropolitan Board of Works (1855-88). Subsequently, London County Council (1888-1965) provided London with its first directly elected council (Barlow, 1991: 62). This was accompanied by the creation of metropolitan boroughs as the primary form of London local authorities in 1899 as an attempt by central government to undermine the perceived radicalism of the LCC (Barlow, 1991: 63).

The Conservative national government’s desire for the party to gain control of London in reaction to increasing Labour dominance of the LCC (Barlow, 1991: 75-76) led to the establishment of the Royal Commission on Local Government in Greater London (otherwise known as the Herbert Commission) in 1957. This, in turn, led to the creation of the Greater London Council (1965-86) alongside thirty-three boroughs as the structural form of London urban governance. Within this system, the boroughs were formally the primary units of local government with responsibility for fields such as local streets, public libraries, and health and welfare services. The GLC had sole responsibility for fire protection, ambulance service, major highways and refuse disposal whilst policy competence for housing, sewerage and drainage were split between the two levels (Barlow, 1991: 80). The GLC’s powers were further extended in 1969 when it was given control of London Transport (Barlow, 1991: 90). A particularly unique structure was given to education, with the GLC provided with responsibility within the inner boroughs, via the Inner London Education Authority (ILEA), whilst in the rest of London the boroughs were the education authority. At the same time, public services such as police, water, electricity, gas and hospital services continued to be the responsibility of central government or ad hoc authorities (Barlow, 1991: 87).

An important feature of the GLC years was the principle that neither tier of London government was superior or subordinate to the other. Each was designed to operate in separate functional fields. As a London Council leader at that time said,
‘(GLC-borough) coordination did not really exist. London-wide issues were left to the GLC. They were separate spheres. We ran the building department so what would the GLC have to say about that? Why would they ever ring us up? They ran the tubes. Why would we ever ring them up because they ran that?’

(Interview with London Council leader)

However, this inevitably caused difficulties in areas in which shared policy competence was the norm in practice, such as transport (parking responsibilities), housing and planning (Barlow, 1991: 94; White, 2002: 387).

Following Labour’s GLC electoral victory in 1981, there was a perception within Conservative central government that City Hall under the leadership of Ken Livingstone represented ‘a grand ‘socialist plot’ to destroy London’ (Young and Garside, 1982: 325). Severe conflicts between the GLC and central government followed, particularly over issues such as subsidies to London Transport, programmes to generate employment, the funding of voluntary service groups, minority groups, cultural services and housing programmes, fashioning an environment in which abolition of the GLC became a genuine proposition (Barlow, 1991: 97).

A precursor to the GLC’s abolition occurred in 1984 when central government exercised its muscles by taking control of London Transport and replacing it with the London Regional Transport body under the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Transport. Complete abolition of the GLC occurred in 1986 under the argument of cost effectiveness and creating a new structure that would be closer to, and more understandable by, the people (Stewart, 2003: 182). The GLC’s abolition was very much a personal decision taken by Margaret Thatcher in the face of overwhelming opposition from the London public and even the Conservative Party leader in the GLC, Alan Greengross (White, 2002: 399).
On abolition of the GLC, its responsibilities were transferred to either the boroughs, central government or ad hoc organisations established to perform essential tasks that the GLC had executed but which government had no wish to undertake (White, 2002: 401). Such organisations comprised of joint boards representing all the boroughs (e.g. London Planning Advisory Committee, London Borough Grants Committee, London Waste Regulation Authority) and organisations appointed by central government (e.g. London Regional Passengers’ Committee, London Dockland Development Corporation, London Ambulance Service) (Newman and Thornley, 1997: 969-70).

The Secretary of State for the Environment took the role of Minister for London and chaired a Cabinet Sub-Committee for London (EDL(L)) established in 1992 to take a holistic view on London issues and ensure the coordination of government policy on London. Alongside the Minister for London, EDL(L) consisted of the Minister for Transport in London, the Minister without Portfolio, and Ministers from the Home Office, Treasury, Office of Public Service, Trade and Industry, Health, Education and Employment, Environment, National Heritage and Social Security (GOL, 1996: 129). A Government Office for London (GOL) was established in 1994, integrating the regional offices of the Departments of Trade and Industry, Transport, Employment and Environment. GOL represented an attempt by central government to enable Whitehall to function effectively as a strategic authority for the city (Rao, 2008: 47). As such, GOL was not a representative voice for London but rather a means of coordinating central government control of London. GOL was ‘government bodies speaking to government departments about what London wanted. Its task was not to speak up for London’ (interview with London Assembly official). As an interviewee within GOL said, ‘GOL is not involved in representing interests. Its focus is implementing programmes at the local level on behalf of government’ (interview with GOL official).
In the 1990s, business groups were established as a means of filling the representative void left by the abolition of London-wide government. As such, London First was formed in 1992 (and its London First Centre in 1994) in order to promote London as a world-class business city as well as the public-private London Pride Partnership (LPP), set up in 1994, to lobby for its prospectus on London’s future. In 1995, the LPP was invited to regular meetings with the twelve Ministers of the Cabinet Sub-Committee for London through the Joint London Advisory Panel forum in order to advise the Ministers on the strategic issues facing the city (Newman and Thornley, 1997: 988).

At the local level, the acrimony caused by the controversial abolition of the GLC initially led to the boroughs splitting to create two different representative groups, the Association of London Authorities (ALA, representing Labour boroughs) and the London Boroughs Association (LBA, representing Conservative and Liberal boroughs). The healing passage of time and realisation of the counter-productiveness resulting from this division led to the two groups merging in 1995 to create the Association of London Government (ALG, renamed London Councils in 2006).

In essence, the abolition of the GLC had led to a maze of boards, groups and committees creating a patchwork urban governance structure which proved almost impossible to coordinate. As White asserts, ‘this was the ungovernment of London, an incomprehensible, labyrinthine and costly jumble’ (White, 2002: 401). Significantly, it left London without a single voice representing its interests in a period of increasing international city competition.

By the mid-1990s the difficulties associated with the lack of London-wide government were increasingly visible and, as a result, the return of some form of city-wide administration was back on the policy table. The rationale for the reestablishment of a London authority was an amalgamation of a desire to provide firm and clearly identifiable representative leadership for London, to boost social and economic development, to address London’s particular
problems through the efficient delivery of public services, to combat popular political alienation and to redress London’s democratic deficit and right the perceived wrong of the GLC’s unceremonious abolition (Travers, 2004: 155-57; Sandford, 2005: 212; Morgan, 2007: 1240). This received the widespread support of the public and an array of London-based actors, ranging from the boroughs’ ALG, leading Conservatives, business, the voluntary and community sector, and the city’s daily newspaper (the Evening Standard) (White, 2002: 401). However, the newly-elected Labour central government of 1997, whilst committed to recreating a London-wide authority, as ‘the first bit of a plan for further devolution in England’ (interview with London Assembly official), was very firm in its determination not to restore a body similar to the GLC which could act as an independent centre of power, challenging and undermining central control. Thus, as a result of conscious design (Morgan, 2007: 1240), an extremely restricted Greater London Authority was established in 2000, enjoying limited powers and resources and having to share the governance of London with central government, the boroughs and the City of London. This raised questions concerning the government’s commitment to devolving power and accusations of New Labour as a ‘modern Janus’ (Morgan, 2007: 1238).

As such, the GLA Act 1999 constructed the GLA as a strategic body consisting of a core authority based around a directly elected executive Mayor, a twenty-five member Assembly with powers of scrutiny20 and four arms-length functional bodies21. The principle purposes of the Mayor are to promote economic development and wealth creation, promote social development and promote the improvement of the environment (GLA Act 1999 Section 30(2)). As a result, s/he has a duty to draw up statutory strategies concerning spatial

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20. The Assembly has the power to scrutinise the activities of the Mayor, the functional bodies and ‘any other matters which the Assembly considers to be of importance to Greater London’ (GLA Act 1999 Section 59(2)). However, it does not enjoy the power to enforce its decisions and requires a two-thirds majority in order to reject or amend the Mayor’s budget.

21. Transport for London (TfL), Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA), London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) and London Development Agency (LDA, abolished in March 2012).
development, transport, economic development, culture, biodiversity, air quality, waste, ambient noise and, since the GLA Act 2007, adult skills, health and housing. The functional bodies are responsible for service delivery within their particular policy fields but whose boards are appointed by the Mayor. They are in effect QUANGOS, reflecting the central government norm of working through agencies, a ‘model which was carried into the GLA. It was carrying through the new models of Whitehall into City Hall’ (interview with London academic).

The single largest contribution to the GLA’s income comes from central government via the General GLA Grant and GLA Transport Grant\(^\text{22}\) (GLA Act 1999 Sections 100 and 101). Other funding sources are provided for by a Council Tax precept issued by the GLA and income raised through charges for use of its services, for example public transport. Such ‘soft money’ sources allow the Mayor to undertake policy initiatives and innovation, such as the GLA’s register of same-sex partnerships, organising London promotion events and creating subsidised childcare places (Sandford, 2005: 220-22). As Sandford claims,

‘soft money functions as the public sector equivalent of venture capital, funding the ‘laboratory of democracy’: it allows the small-scale initial development of new public policies, new delivery mechanisms, or new networks, which may pay substantial political dividends in the future’ (Sandford, 2005: 224).

The thirty-two borough councils and the City of London are responsible for education services, social services, health services, local roads and lighting, and refuse collection (GLA Act 1999 Section 31(3); Travers, 2004: 178). As such, the boroughs remain powerful political players within London creating, what one leading London academic called, a ‘bottom-heavy two tier system’ in which,

\(^\text{22}\) This equates to 43\% of the GLA’s budget for 2012-13 (GLA, 2012: 4).
‘the boroughs are collectively much more powerful than the upper tier. Within any borough, the borough will affect life more than the Mayor. However, the Mayor is more powerful than any one borough. It is a kind of constitutional settlement which recognises the primacy of the relative local area but gives the Mayor enough power within his or her sphere to deliver large infrastructure, public order and planning services which are seen as being necessary at the city wide level.’

(Interview with London academic)

As a result, the structure of London government reflects the nature of the life of Londoners themselves. It is,

‘a legitimate expression of the political reality that people who live in London have two versions of themselves. They have the version of themselves at home at night which concerns streets, playgrounds, schools etc. and then there is the ‘I go to work’ version which wants railways, roads, police etc. The system of government sort of recognises that fact that we as citizens have different interests. We have big metropolitan interests which are railways, roads, fire fighters etc. and we have local interests, such as streets being clean and safe.’

(Interview with London academic)

In addition, central government retains responsibility for the National Health Service, further and higher education, social security, national rail, civil aviation, training, heritage, sport and the arts (Travers, 2004: 184; Travers, 2006: 12). Whilst establishment of the GLA has simplified the structure of London governance to a certain extent from the complex jumble of the interregnum, London remains a ‘rococo layering of government departments,
regional offices, appointed boards (and their London sub-divisions), city-wide elected
government, joint committees, the 32 boroughs and the City of London’ (Travers, 2004: 185).

As can be seen, central government involvement and interference in the governing
structures of London as a means of maintaining its authority is a theme running throughout
the city’s particular story. The 1880s marked the beginning of central government
engagement with London reforms (Barlow, 1991: 60) and has continued ever since, through
the creation of the metropolitan boroughs in 1899, the establishment of the GLC in 1965, the
abolition of that same body in 1986 to the reinstalment of a city-wide authority in 2000.

Today, the GLA’s powers are strictly limited by central government, both in terms of
policy competences and fiscal autonomy. The Authority’s policies must have regard to any
guidance, targets, objectives and performance indicators issued by national government (GLA
Act 1999 Section 30(8) and 41(9)), central government retains the right to alter the GLA’s
powers and curtail its expenditure by simple order (GLA Act 1999 Section 31 (7) and (8)),
and the Authority does not have the right to raise revenue via taxation beyond the small
Council Tax precept (GLA Act 1999 Section 34 (2)). As such, in purely constitutional terms,
the GLA is ‘a relatively powerless authority’ (Stewart, 2003: 188). In part, this is a result of
the resistance put up by Whitehall in the process of delimiting the GLA’s competences.
Unlike in the cases of Scottish and Welsh devolution in which,

‘the Scottish and Welsh Office civil servants just changed boss – they were
all sitting in Edinburgh and Cardiff anyway – it did not make any difference
to the civil service in London. The GLA was different because it required
central government to cede responsibility because it was responsible for
London’s transport, policing, elements of economic development etc. The
London reform began to reduce the power of Whitehall and therefore it was
much more difficult because Whitehall fought many of those changes in a
way that the Scottish and Welsh Offices did not. Although Whitehall ceded some power, and have ceded more power subsequently, in the end the GLA is still operating within the England local government system which is much more centralised than Scotland and Wales now are. This affects the GLA’s relationship with central government because it has to go to Whitehall for money for all major projects.’

(Interview with London academic)

As a result, the Authority’s ‘relationship with central government is the key public sector relationship for the GLA, even more than with the boroughs’ (interview with GLA official).

The newly-established Mayor’s defeat to central government in 2001 over his challenge to the public-private partnership structure of London Underground provided an early demonstration of the limits to the Authority’s power and the continuing role and weight of central government within the governance of the city.

London’s European Objectives and Activities

Whilst central government is the ‘key public sector relationship for the GLA’, the Authority also mobilises its resources at the EU level. The GLA’s engagement with EU affairs is very much driven by two rationales. Firstly, to facilitate access to EU funds. An official within the GLA’s External Relations department clearly stated,

‘The opportunity of raising money in Brussels….is what the main focus of the GLA is in Brussels at the moment. Interestingly, we always thought we were very different from all the other regions in Britain who for many years have been very open to the fact that the most attractive thing about Brussels is money. We have always been rather snooty and felt we were above that. We do not think we are above that any longer. Money is now seen as a
perfectly reasonable reason to be interested in Brussels. That is our immediate focus.’

(Interview with official in GLA’s External Relations department)

As such, the GLA is involved in bidding for, and responsible for managing, London’s EU Structural Funds programmes. For the 2007-13 funding period this amounts to over £1.1 billion, consisting of £840 million from the European Social Fund (ESF) and £330 million from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (www.london.gov.uk). These funds are administered by the GLA’s European Programmes Management Unit (EPMU).

The second force guiding the GLA’s EU interaction is defensive in nature and concerns preventing threats to GLA policy competences. Similarly to Vienna, the GLA under Ken Livingstone lobbied intensively against the Commission’s services of general interest (SGI) proposal, both independently and in coalition with other city-regions, due to its perceived threat to the GLA’s provision of public transport. According to a GLA official, ‘We regarded this as a potential disaster. Just at the point when the Mayor had the powers to bring all of London’s transport policies together, there was a threat to split it up’ (interview with official in London’s European Office). Under Boris Johnson, a particular focus of this type of EU activity has concerned mobilising the GLA’s resources against the potential EU-wide regulation of financial services which is perceived as a threat to London’s global competitiveness.

The GLA undertakes such tasks primarily via its representative office in Brussels, London House. Opened in 2001, London’s European Office leads the GLA’s European activities and acts as the principal avenue through which London represents itself at the European level. In particular, its tasks focus on monitoring EU policy in order to act as an early warning system for any legislation which may impinge the Mayor’s priorities and strategies. According to an official within London European Office, ‘the core work we do is
monitoring all the information that comes out of the EU which is quite a big task. We are sitting there monitoring the press releases that come out of the Commission and their daily announcements’ (interview with official in London’s European Office). Other tasks concentrate on facilitating relationships with EU officials, lobbying the Commission and European Parliament in the advent of any legislative risks and undertaking relations with other cities and regions (interview with official in London’s European Office).

Eurocities is the centre point of the GLA’s networking efforts, utilised as a means of amplifying London’s potential influence at the EU level. The GLA is also part of the European Covenant of Mayors, a network of cities committed to go beyond the EU objectives of 20% carbon reduction by 2020. In addition, the London Assembly has one representative on the Committee of the Regions. However, due to the Committee’s fringe status within the EU’s policy-making structure, ‘it is not a huge part of the job of that representative. It is not something that features significantly in the body politic of this administration’ (interview with London Assembly official).

London is also represented at the EU level through the boroughs’ engagement with EU affairs. This began in the late-1990s as a result of a growing awareness of the importance of the EU and its regional funds to the boroughs’ interests and activities (interview with London Planning Advisory Committee official). The London Councils European Service (LCES), delivered by the London boroughs’ economic development company, Greater London Enterprise, provides the boroughs with advice on working with EU institutions and procedures, policy information and intelligence, help in accessing EU funds, management of EU funding programmes and a lobbying service led by its Brussels Office (www.londoncouncils.glegroup.co.uk). LCES particularly focuses its activities on the fields of structural funds, competitiveness, employment and social affairs, environment, energy, transport, lifelong learning, culture and sport.
LCES participates in a number of Europe-wide local and regional authority networks as a means of influencing EU policy in the boroughs’ interests. In particular, LCES engages with Cities for Cohesion and Capital Cities in order to lobby for the interests of urban areas in EU regional policy, as well as ERLAI (European Regional and Local Authorities on Asylum and Immigration) and EPRO (Environment Platform of Regional Offices). Similarly, the boroughs make use of their membership of the principal national local authority network, the Local Government Association (LGA), and its EU lobbying activities. The LGA itself is an active member of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) network which it views as being ‘a good method to amplify our views’ and gain ‘greater legitimacy’ in the eyes of the EU institutions as well as sectoral specific networks, such as the transport focused POLIS and Transport and Environment (TNE), which prove useful for information exchange and best practice (interview with official in LGA’s Europe Office). Thus, whilst access to EU funds remains a key rationale behind the boroughs’ European engagement, influencing policy, sharing best practice and policy learning have developed as significant pull factors. As an official within London Councils stated,

‘If there is a good idea in Lille or Berlin, why not grab it. It is not really that much harder to grab a Berlin idea than a Birmingham one anymore so let’s get on with it.’

(Interview with London Councils official)

**London and TENT Policy**

During the interregnum years between 1986 and 2000, London’s poor transport infrastructure was consistently highlighted as the city’s key weakness in the increasing global competition for business investment. The Confederation of British Industry’s (CBI) 1989 report, ‘Transport in London: the Capital at Risk’, emphasised ‘the current deplorable state of
public and road transport in, through and around London’ and claimed that it was ‘imperative that a Transport Infrastructure is quickly developed to solve the current, intolerable congestion-induced inefficiencies’ in order for London to ‘maintain and enhance its role as a leading commercial and entrepreneurial centre’ (CBI, 1989: 7). This was soon followed by the London Planning Advisory Committee’s (LPAC) key call to arms report of 1991, ‘London: World City Moving into the 21st Century’ (LPAC, 1991), which cited transport alongside education and training as the principal flaws in London’s ‘enabling infrastructure’. The report’s survey of domestic and international businesses ranked London well behind its international competitor cities of New York, Tokyo, Paris, Frankfurt and Berlin in the fields of national and international transport links and intra-city mobility (LPAC, 1991: 165). Similarly, A London Business School (LBS) report on London’s financial services sector called on the government to play a major role in overcoming the city’s transport infrastructure failings (LBS, 1995), whilst the public-private London Pride Partnership (LPP) claimed greater investment in public transport provision as being necessary in order to ensure London’s position as a world city (LPP, 1995).

Calls to remedy the inadequate and creaking condition of London’s transport system were not new. During the GLC years, London Transport was responsible for chronic underinvestment and poor management, to the extent that its headquarters became known as ‘the most affluent luncheon club in London’ (White, 2002: 390). In 1982, the House of Commons Transport Committee asserted that the state of the city’s transport system was a ‘scandal of international and national significance’ (Pimlott and Rao, 2002: 103). However, the lack of a single London transport authority following the abolition of the GLC served to compound the situation, particularly in relation to the increasing European involvement in transport infrastructure affairs following the signing of the Single European Act. London had
no strategic transport and planning body to coordinate its role or represent its city-wide interests in the domestic and EU TENT negotiations.

The boroughs by their very nature took a local view on transport matters, showing little interest in region-wide perspectives. The boroughs’ parochialism extended to transport projects with a European dimension, such as the decision concerning the location of the initial Eurostar terminal at Waterloo. A then leading member of Lambeth Borough Council stated that,

‘the Eurostar Commission and the Waterloo terminal was a very local issue. I do not remember any pressure from outside the borough on my decision-making process. All the pressures were internal to Lambeth’

(Interview with former Lambeth Borough Council member)

Such insularity was intensified by the continuing political grievances and fallout amongst the boroughs over GLC abolition (Burnham, 2006: 256). As a leading LPAC member asserted, ‘there was certainly a lacuna because there was nobody pulling all of London’s concerns together over the whole piece’ (interview with LPAC member).

As a result, London’s involvement in the TENT programme was established, controlled and managed by central government’s Department for Transport (DfT), more specifically its European, International and Better Regulation Division (EIBRD). The DfT’s approach to the UK’s participation in TENT projects was, and remains, very much financially motivated, driven by the desire to gain access to EU funds. ‘The overarching policy interest for DfT is to get as much money as possible from Brussels. To get the best return for the UK taxpayer’ (interview with DfT official). Such a financial rationale is viewed as the rightful return of UK money. The same official continued, ‘the UK pays into the central pot and so it is only fair that we get something back. Any projects that are funded by the Commission is simply because the UK is putting in the money first’ (interview with DfT official). However,
the limited project financing available through the TENT funds has meant that the DfT has never viewed the UK’s involvement in TENT as a policy priority.

‘There has been a general line that the amount of money available is not as substantial as you could get through other ways. The reward is there but it is not as substantive. There are funding caps and with these caps are certain obligations and requirements which are a burden on a project manager. I would be misleading you if I said we are hugely important within DfT’s mind.’

(Interview with DfT EIBRD official)

Consequently, London has been involved in two TENT priority projects, both of which were part of the original ‘Essen’ priority projects list of 1994. These projects are high speed railway axis Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London (priority project 2), the UK section of which concerns the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, and the West Coast Main Line (priority project 14). More recently, Transport for London (TfL) has responded to particular European Commission consultations concerning the EU satellite navigation project, Galileo (priority project 15), due to its potential use in any future system of road pricing (interview with TfL official). However, the long-time frame involved in such a project means that communication remains at an early stage.

**Rational Choice Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (RCI MLG)**

The state-centred approach to the emergence of a MLG form of governance highlighted by RCI raises questions concerning the space created by central government for London’s political actors to play a role in the TENT policy area. As mentioned, policy competence for the principal motorways and railways within the UK lies at the national level. Central government holds ultimate responsibility for financing key transport infrastructure
projects whilst their maintenance is undertaken by state-owned agencies, Network Rail and the Highways Agency. During the period of the initial development of TENT policy, ownership of the railways lay with the nationalised British Rail (1947-94) before being passed on to the privatised Railtrack in 1994 and then back into state-control under Network Rail in 2002. Thus, formal competence for TENT policy within the UK state rests firmly in the hands of central government, as represented by the Department for Transport. In the case of London, this begs the question of whether central government incorporated a London representative voice(es) in the TENT decision-making system. If so, what was the rationale behind this decision? Did this entail a shift authority away from the central state?

At its most obvious, London was handicapped by the lack of existence of any city-wide government following the abolition of the GLC. Therefore, there was no single, elected representative voice expressing London’s interests during the crucial period in which the city’s involvement in TENT was decided. Decisions were very much taken by DfT on behalf of London. According to a DfT official, this was ‘the only way to ensure that we are all speaking with one voice’ (interview with DfT official). However, despite the centralised control of national government over this process, the role of LPAC during this period reflected an attempt of sorts to fill this representative void.

On the House of Lords’ insistence that ‘London needed to have a planning organisation of some sort…..in order to function as a whole’ (interview with LPAC member), LPAC was established as a new statutory joint board under the Local Government Act 1985 which abolished the GLC. The view of the Lords was that there needed to be a means of bringing the boroughs together to provide a strategic city-wide view of London planning issues, including those of transport. Thus, an RCI perspective of MLG brings to the fore a process whereby the central state explicitly elected to establish LPAC and incorporate it into its London planning policy-making process as the result of an acceptance of the requirement
for a city-wide representative voice in order to ensure effective policy outcomes for London. The risk of not doing so lay in the creation of a policy vacuum between the national agenda of central government and the hyper-local perspectives of the boroughs.

Consisting of a committee containing one member from each London borough and a small staff of twenty-one officers, LPAC was the only official London-wide body charged with planning issues. Its remit was threefold: to inform central government on issues of London strategic planning; to advise the boroughs on these matters; and to represent London in the wider south-east region’s planning body, SERPLAN (South-East Regional Planning Conference) (LPAC, 1991: xi). In reality, LPAC focused on the first of these duties (Rao, 2008: 46), acting as a voice for London in central government’s London planning process. In the transport field, despite only having a transport section consisting of three or four officers, a consultancy budget allowed them to draw on external expertise and thus amplify outputs, particularly through regular use of the consultancies MVA (for transport modelling) and Colin Buchanan & Partners (for transport policy) (interview with LPAC officer). As a result, despite being foisted on the government on the insistence of the second chamber and thus initially being faced by a hostile central government, LPAC incrementally gained the respect of the government on the basis of its technical expertise to the extent that government reached the stage of invariably, voluntarily referring large planning applications to LPAC for an informal view by default (interview with LPAC officer). This shift in relationship particularly came about as a result of John Gummer becoming Secretary of State for the Environment under John Major in 1993, replacing Nicholas Ridley who ‘did not want anything to do with pan-London representation’ (interview with LPAC officer). As an LPAC officer claimed about central government,
‘they had almost a ‘raj-rule’ approach to governing London. They were like big, white chief sahibs sitting in Riverwalk House telling us what to do. Slowly they started giving us independence.’

(Interview with LPAC officer)

However, LPAC’s role within the development of TENT policy was negligible beyond general statements regarding the importance of international transport links for London’s prosperity. LPAC was much more preoccupied with transport issues related to London’s intra-city mobility and lobbying for central government to establish an integrated transport strategy for the city rather than relying on the mechanisms of the market (interview with LPAC officer). One notable exception was one section of LPAC’s ‘London: World City’ report of 1991 which acted as a rallying call to central government to urgently focus on London’s declining global position in the face of increasing international competition. The report emphasised the importance of constructing the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) as being crucial for London to take full advantage of the opening of the Channel Tunnel. In doing so, LPAC framed the CTRL very much in terms of being part of the wider European rail transport network, thus encouraging national government to take a European perspective on its construction. The report asserted that,

‘London….has been excluded from the European network until recently by its geographical position. With the opening of the Channel Tunnel all this will change. The benefits of high speed rail travel for London will not be fully realised until the planned new link to London from the Channel Tunnel is operational, but of all the European cities London has the potential to gain the greatest benefit from the Tunnel because of the new dimension in travel which it affords and the opportunity of being integrated into the new European High Speed Rail Network’ (LPAC, 191: 138).
However, even LPAC’s European perspective on the CTRL dovetailed with its intra-London planning interests. Once again on the insistence of the House of Lords, British Rail was required to consult with LPAC on any decisions concerning the London section of the CTRL. This provided an opportunity for LPAC to successfully lobby for its idea that the CTRL should be utilised for the regeneration of east London via a station at Stratford (interview with LPAC officer).

In general though, the role and influence of LPAC on central government should not be overstated. LPAC’s influence was constrained by the need to attract cross-party support which limited its scope, particularly up until 1994 when the party composition of the boroughs was balanced, and by the ability of such a diverse range of boroughs, each with their own interests, to coordinate a city-wide perspective (Newman and Thornley, 1997: 970). As an LPAC member confirmed, ‘many of the borough representatives were only interested in local issues and did not see the importance of London-wide government’ (interview with LPAC member).

The establishment and role of LPAC cannot be seen as a shifting in authority away from the central state. National government remained firmly in control of the process of TENT decision-making. At best, LPAC played a second-order influencing role, providing local knowledge and expertise to central government and through this attempted to persuade the government to act on its recommendations, which predominantly concerned issues of intra-London mobility. LPAC did not operate outside the UK policy-making process. It did not instigate any independent London engagement with the European institutions and did not view this as part of its raison d’être. As an LPAC officer stated, ‘it was not in LPAC’s remit to do so’ (interview with LPAC officer), whilst another asserted that,

‘London was missing from European transport policy. Whilst other European cities saw it as a way of developing their transport policies in a
much more aggressive way that London ever did, we were pretty silent.

There was not that engagement from a coherent city-region point of view.

There was not a wider view of how London was presenting itself in this wider field.’

(Interview with LPAC officer)

To a certain extent, this was the result of a clash between LPAC’s and the EU’s differing perspectives and approaches towards the role of public authorities in transport policy. LPAC’s mission led it to think more in terms of intra-city, integrated transport strategies rather than the EU’s more overtly political objective of creating a genuinely European transport network via TENT policy.

‘One of the problems with EU transport policy is that it is about big projects rather than recognising that cities are the powerhouses of the European economy and you need to get an integrated transport policy for them. That does not seem to be the way that EU transport policy works. It is all about lines on maps. It is about trying to stitch Europe together. I do not think EU transport policy really recognises the role that cities play. It seems to be much more about transport policy as a means of stitching together the union.’

(Interview with LPAC officer)

The principle of central government establishing a London-wide political body in order to ensure effective problem solving in the capital continued through to the establishment of the GLA. This was particularly the case in the field of transport. Of all its policy competences, transport is the key function of the GLA. The Mayor enjoys extensive powers over London’s transport, being responsible for developing and implementing safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities and services to, from and within Greater London.
Pimlott and Rao, 2002: 111). TfL exists as an integrated transport authority and benefits from possessing the largest budget of the GLA’s functional bodies (Travers, 2006: 18). In addition, the boroughs’ local transport plans have to accord with the Mayor’s transport blueprint. As a result, the GLA enjoys a range of ‘executive powers’ in relation to transport (Sandford, 2005: 224) from which it is able to fashion a comprehensive, London-wide transport approach. As a reflection of the importance of transport within the GLA’s responsibilities, the Mayor has the right to chair TfL, an entitlement Ken Livingstone undertook in his time as Mayor, reflecting his overriding concern for his Transport Strategy (West et. al., 2002: 5). As he stated, ‘that’s the only area where I’ve got real power, in everything else it’s marginal’ (Livingstone quoted in West et. al., 2002: 10).

However, similarly to LPAC, the GLA’s transport focus has remained on internal issues of intra-city mobility rather than a more expansive interpretation of interests. This has been the result of both functional and electoral rationales. In functional terms, the successful running of the underground system is fundamental to any spatial and economic strategy for London (Mcneill, 2002: 76), whilst the electoral motivation reflects the political importance of transport within the minds of the London electorate. Opinion polls consistently show transport as the single biggest issue that the London public care about more than any other (Travers, 2004: 91). Consequently, London’s Mayors have concentrated on a limited number of relatively small-scale, electorally salient transport projects which generate electoral capital (Rydin et. al., 2002: 10), such as Ken Livingstone’s focus on implementing the congestion charging system and Boris Johnson’s emphasis on cycle schemes. Congestion charging also contained the added benefit of raising funds for the GLA’s limited budget independently of the central government grant (Burnham, 2006: 260). In essence, there is no clear electoral, functional or financial incentive for the GLA to engage with the EU on transport infrastructure affairs. The perspective of the GLA is that London’s involvement in the TENT
network was established prior to the GLA’s creation and there is no desire to re-open that discussion (interview with TfL official).

Therefore, an RCI MLG perspective on the form of TENT policy-making in the UK state throws light on a process of central government explicitly and purposely establishing pan-London political bodies in order to generate a city-wide representative voice and incorporate specialised local knowledge and expertise into its London focused planning and transport policy-making processes so as to ensure effective policy outcomes. However, such city-region mobilisation has been confined to a narrow transport focus based on a preoccupation for improving London’s intra-city mobility rather than EU-wide transport infrastructure affairs. In the case of LPAC, this flowed from its particular policy remit and a clash with the EU’s transport policy perspective. For the GLA, such parochialism has been encouraged by a perceived lack of electoral, functional or financial benefits to be gained from EU level transport infrastructure engagement.

**Historical Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (HI MLG)**

The application of a HI MLG framework to London’s (lack of) involvement in TENT policy-making highlights two key processes. Firstly, the centralised nature of EU-relevant policy-making within the UK state and secondly, the pre-established nature of transport thinking in London.

Ever since accession, central government has actively attempted to maintain its relative power position within the UK state in the field of EU policy-making, particular vis-à-vis the English regions. Central government departments have jealously defended their roles as guardians of the UK’s European interests and as the primary UK representatives in the EU policy-making process. As such, the space for independent regional influence in EU decision-making has been consciously restricted (see Bache, 1998; Bache 2008 for an analysis of
Britain’s involvement in EU regional policy. As Roberts, writing about the experience of UK SNA’s in their attempts to engage with EU developments in the early/mid-1990s period, concludes,

‘Whitehall and Westminster saw the regions largely in an imperialist light: a view which assumed that all power rightfully resided at the centre and that the requirements of the regional ‘colonies’ were subservient to the needs of the central unitary state. The dominance exerted by Whitehall over the regions of the UK, and especially those of England, reflected the relatively powerless state of localities and regions in a political desert created by excessive central control’ (Roberts, 1997: 255).

Thus, centralisation is firmly ‘locked-in’ as a feature of UK (particularly English) politics in which responsibility for EU policy rests firmly in the hands of central government. As a result, centralisation represented a pre-existing pattern of centre-region relations within the UK state which was naturally applied to London’s involvement in TENT policy-making. Such centralisation was exacerbated in the case of London during the key period of the establishment of TENT policy due to central government taking on direct responsibility for a variety of London functions, including transport, following the abolition of the GLC and increasing its institutional control of London in the early/mid-1990s through the creation of a Minister for London, the Cabinet Sub-Committee for London and GOL.

As mentioned above, policy competence for TENT was placed securely in the hands of central government’s DfT whose interests took precedence. As DfT warns those SNAs contemplating bidding for TENT project funding, ‘All proposed bids for support must be in line with UK policy’ (DfT, 2008: 3). During the interregnum, London’s representative bodies were excluded from partaking in TENT policy-making by the central state’s monopoly position. This is not to say that direct communication with central government departments
and agencies did not take place. For example, the London Pride Partnership and the Transport Working Group (TWG), under the chairmanship of the Minister for Transport in London, acted as a forums in which London’s representative bodies (such as LPAC, the Association of London Government, London First) were able to exchange information, ideas and attempt to influence central government and its agencies (British Rail, Highways Agency, London Transport). However, TENT was not part of the discussion. The focus of such exchange largely concerned issues of London’s intra-city public transport system.

Despite the creation of the GLA, the centralising tendencies of central government vis-à-vis EU policy remain and thus, so does the exclusion of London authorities from the TENT policy area. Central government has remained a significant player in the governance of London and continues to exercise political control of the city, particularly in the area of finance. The single largest contribution to the GLA’s budget comes from the central government grant, whilst almost half of TfL’s budget comes from national government (Burnham, 2006: 266). Overall, the GLA’s net spending is only around 10 per cent of total public sector expenditure (by Whitehall, the GLA, the boroughs and QUANGOS) in London (Travers, 2004: 184). As a result, the Mayor has had to dedicate a substantial amount of energy on negotiating with central government in order to fund new transport infrastructure, such as the Crossrail and Thameslink projects. In particular, the Mayor viewed the government’s 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review as ‘a crucial opportunity to secure the additional investment needed’ to deliver his transport vision for the capital (GLA, 2006: 4). National government’s institutional control of key aspects of transport in London has also remained intact. A range of centrally-controlled bodies and agencies continue to exercise power over various aspects of transport provision, such as Network Rail, the Highways Agency, the Civil Aviation Authority and British Transport Police. As Travers asserts,
'Whatever else it did, the creation of the Greater London Authority did not mark a serious reversal of the centralist tendencies in the British state, nor did it signify a major devolution of political and fiscal authority’ (Travers, 2004: 142).

Furthermore, despite some contact with DfT’s EIBRD on an ad hoc basis, the GLA has continued to face the challenge of gaining regular access to the closed world of Whitehall. Statements such as, ‘it is much easier to contact a Commission official and get someone than it is with the UK civil service departments’ (interview with TfL official) and ‘the culture of UK government and policy is not to give the documents to people’ (interview with official in London’s European Office) was a common theme expressed by GLA interviewees. On the other side of the fence, DfT officials expressed little interest in engaging with SNAs in order to encourage a partnership approach.

‘We only meet with them when there is a suitable project, something on the table to discuss. We do not meet on a regular basis just to talk about TENT.

It is only when they come to us asking to talk about certain works starting that we say yes or no.’

(Interview with DfT EIBRD official)

The DfT does run a European Rail Policy Forum to which it invites TfL alongside other SNAs and stakeholder groups. However, the Forum largely acts as a space for central government to provide an update on its own strategies and plans rather than an avenue for regional lobbying and influence over TENT (interview with TfL official). To a much greater extent, and as a result of centralised policy control over large-scale London transport projects, DfT engages in internal departmental communication concerning such schemes. DfT officials rely on regionally-located policy colleagues, project managers and its operative agencies
(Network Rail and the Highways Agency) to gain local knowledge and insights rather than London’s city-wide authority (interview with DfT official).

Interestingly, throughout this process, personal and party links between the London-wide authorities and central government have not served to increase London’s voice within central government to any great extent. During the interregnum, the borough joint bodies, such as LPAC, were ‘hung’ politically until 1994 when Labour gained control. It was then faced with a Conservative central government. As a result LPAC interviews were ‘not aware of party links being significant’ (interview with LPAC official).

Since the creation of the GLA, the office of Mayor has been occupied by two individuals who have had strained relations with the government of the day. Ken Livingstone’s decision to stand as an independent against the official Labour Party candidate meant that his relationship with the Labour government was tense during his first term. Despite being readmitted to the Labour Party,

‘he was never really comfortable with people like Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. I am sure that most people within the Labour Party probably saw Boris Johnson, even if they did not like the politics of the Conservative Party, as not much worse than Livingstone.’

(Interview with London academic)

Similarly, there are now stresses and strains between Boris Johnson and the Conservative-led national government over issues such as airport capacity in south-east England, GLA funding and an amnesty for illegal migrants. To a certain extent, relationships between the Mayor and central government are strained simply as a result of the different political imperatives, interests and practicalities that the two positions encompass. As a GLA official commented,

‘I think it (party links) make less of a difference than people think. On key issues you are either going to be in accord or you are going to be having
discussions with central government. In some ways you are working with
the grain of what the government is doing and in other ways you want them
to change their policy. In that sense, political colour does not really matter
that much.’

(Interview with GLA official).

The second feature which a HI MLG understanding of London’s involvement in
TENT highlights is how the particular transport focus of London bodies on the core issue of
intra-city mobility during the interregnum has been transferred to the GLA. This has ‘locked
in’ a preoccupation with internal London transport strategies, rather than an expansive
understanding of transport interests, such as TENT.

London’s overriding concern for intra-city mobility was established by LPAC through
its ‘London: World City’ report. Despite recognising the importance of national and
international transport links, LPAC used the report to call for greater focus to be placed on
transport infrastructure within the city. In judging where transport infrastructure investment
should be concentrated, the report stated, ‘It is better mobility within London to which we
attach most significance’ (LPAC, 1991: 197). This is on the basis of two reasons. Firstly,
airports and international rail terminals depend on efficient access to them from the within the
city and secondly, intra-city mobility maintains business and social life within the city space,
or to use the words of the report, ‘good intra-city mobility is the oil that prevents
agglomerations from grinding to a halt’ (Ibid: 197). LPAC also judged London to fair
particularly badly in its intra-city transport infrastructure when compared to its world city
competitors (Ibid: 203) and had a specific concern for the issue of traffic congestion in central
London (interview with LPAC official). As a result, intra-city mobility was made one of
LPAC’s headline priorities, with a significant amount of success via lobbying for public
investment in projects such as extensions to the Jubilee underground line and Dockland Light Railway, and the construction of the ‘Heathrow Express’ airport rail link.

On the creation of the GLA, LPAC staff were simply transferred to the new body to become part of the GLA bureaucracy, sitting within the Strategy Directorate. Thus, charged with developing the GLA’s strategies, LPAC officers took their pre-established ideas about where London authorities’ transport emphasis should lie and implanted them into the GLA’s transport focus. The impact of this process is clearly identifiable in the Mayor’s Transport Strategies, which continue the focus on improving intra-city mobility as the central means of maintaining London’s world city status. In Ken Livingstone’s 2001 Strategy, all ten ‘key transport system priorities’ related to intra-city mobility, with the single reference to international transport referring to ‘improving access to international transport facilities’ (GLA, 2001b: 97). The core focus of the Strategy is encompassed by the statement,

‘Quality of transport is regularly rated as one of the most significant factors business – particularly international firms – considers in choosing a location, and London must substantially improve its congested and unreliable transport system to stay competitive’ (Ibid: 29).

Such an approach was continued through to the document establishing the GLA’s long-term transport vision for London, ‘Transport 2025’, which confirmed the issue of improving London’s public transport system as the policy priority alongside reducing carbon dioxide emissions resulting from car use (GLA, 2006: 2).

Similarly, all but one of the six transport goals identified in Boris Johnson’s 2010 Transport Strategy exclusively concern internal London transport affairs (GLA, 2010: 32-33).

Such viewpoints were confirmed by GLA interviewees. For example, in reference to London’s involvement in the CTRL and West Coast Mainline TENT priority projects, a GLA official asserted,
'I am not sure either of those two things is crucial to London’s position in the world or competitiveness or development at the moment. They are not really on the agenda.'

(interview with official in London’s European Office)

Therefore, a HI MLG perspective on London’s role in UK TENT policy-making highlights a path dependent process whereby the centralised nature of state-region relations within the UK state was innately applied to the TENT field. As a result, involvement in the TENT policy-making process was restricted to central government. Policy space was not provided for London authorities to engage with the process. Such an approach was augmented by the establishment of a particular transport concern amongst London-wide authorities for the issue of intra-city mobility rather than international transport links during the interregnum. This narrow view of London’s transport interests was transferred to the GLA and thus became ‘locked in’ as the focal point of London’s transport strategy.

**Sociological Institutionalism Multi-Level Governance (SI MLG)**

SI MLG’s emphasis on the self-identity of political actors leading to the formation of a pattern of policy-making provides a third interpretation for the London region’s failure to engage with TENT policy. This is rooted in London’s self-perception as a particular type of world, rather than European, city, instigating a global outlook which largely bypasses involvement in EU public policy in all but a select few circumstances.

Unsurprisingly, London authorities’ focus on itself as a world city was instigated by LPAC’s seminal ‘London: World City’ report of 1991 which highlighted the action it thought was required for London to maintain such a global position in the face of increasing international city competition from the likes of New York, Tokyo Paris, Frankfurt and Berlin. LPAC defined a world city as,
a place in which international business can be conducted efficiently and operate as a nodal point for the co-ordination and control of global economic activity. In addition, the attractions of such cities must be world-class; they must offer desirable residential areas and diverse and cosmopolitan cultural activity which satisfy, not just the needs of residents or people from other parts of the country, but also those of the international community’ (LPAC, 1991: 7-8).

As such, a world city should facilitate wealth creation, the generation of jobs and income, a high quality of life and be ‘recognised at an international level as contributing to, and benefitting from, the development of the global community’ (Ibid: 9). In particular, the concept of competitiveness resulting from economic globalisation is at the heart of the world city thesis. Thornley defines the chain of reasoning as,

‘new economic forces are operating at a global level; these forces are inevitable; changes are taking place in the nature of cities; the cities are becoming more powerful vis-à-vis nation states; there is increasing competition between cities; planning must respond with a new approach that accommodates to globalisation and increased competition’ (Thornley, 1999: 2)

Accordingly, a focus on the location, activities and economic value of international business is a key feature of the world city notion.

LPAC’s study unleashed a wave of research into London’s international role and competitiveness as witnessed by the reports ‘Paris, London: a comparison of transport systems’ (LRC, 1992), ‘The Competitive Position of London’s Financial Services’ (LBS, 1995), ‘Four World Cities’ (Llewelyn-Davies et. al., 1996), ‘The Four World Studies Transport Study’ (LRC, 1998) and ‘The London Study’ (ALG, 1998). As a result, the idea of
‘London as a world city’ quickly gained traction within regional and national authorities and became central to London’s self-identity. This was particularly the case in the city’s perception of itself as a global centre for international business and finance, centred on the City of London.

Within the GLA, the narrative of London as a world city permeates the authority’s documents and is often utilised as a means of gaining support for GLA priorities amongst local and national actors (see for example GLA 2001b; 2008; 2010). The theme of London as a world city was a central part of Ken Livingstone’s personal discourse as Mayor to the extent that he blocked the publication of the GLA’s initial Spatial Development Strategy, written by the Strategy Directorate, in 2001 on the basis that it did not sufficiently promote London as a world city (West et al., 2002: 15). The ‘world city friendliness’ of GLA Strategy documents became the bar against which drafts were judged by the Mayor’s Office under Ken Livingstone (Ibid: 18). The dominance of the world city discourse within Livingstone’s mayoralty developed to the level where its excessive use became questioned by the Transport and Spatial Development Policy Committee which argued that, ‘overuse threatens to make the term meaningless, and that greater consideration should be given to the appropriateness of this choice of words on each occasion’ (Mcneill, 2002: 79).

As a result, the GLA tends to ‘think globally’. In his first State of London report, Ken Livingston asserted, ‘If London is to maintain and expand its prosperity in this new economy it must build globalisation into the very foundations of the city and our thinking (Travers, 2004: 152). Consequently, London views itself as very much competing on the international level. The Mayor’s Transport Strategy of 2001 demonstrates this clearly.

‘Rapidly increasing globalisation…..brings new challenges from other established world cities (New York, Paris and Tokyo) and also rising competitors like Berlin and Frankfurt. It is against these international
competitors, not Manchester or Birmingham, that London’s performance and attractiveness, including the efficiency of its transport system, will be measured’ (GLA, 2001b: 28).

Such a concern was repeated by a GLA interviewee who exclaimed,

‘Tata is not going to have its European headquarters in Birmingham or Manchester or Sheffield. If it is going to have a great big shiny office block with all its executives in Europe, it is going to be in London or Paris or Amsterdam or Frankfurt.’

(Interview with GLA official)

Thus, London’s self-perception as a world city actively encourages the GLA to look beyond the EU to wider international processes and thus does not foster an attitude of in-depth engagement with EU policy-making. As a GLA official commented,

‘We are a global city. If you think about the sort of people the Mayor talks to and meets, a large chunk of them are running global businesses. The air that we breathe is a global air. There is a European bit in that but that is not necessarily the most important bit. We are always aware of the links of London to other places around the world. Europe is one of those but it is certainly not the only one.’

(Interview with GLA official)

The lack of importance that the GLA places on participating in EU policy-making is reflected in the bureaucratic structure of the authority. Under Ken Livingstone, City Hall contained an international section but not a European one. London’s involvement in EU affairs was purely overseen by its Brussels office, away from the GLA’s centre of power in the Mayor’s Office. Restructuring undertaken by Boris Johnson has downgraded the GLA’s EU focused resources further. Having come to power pledging to remove London’s international offices in
Brussels, Beijing, Mumbai and Caracas (the so-called ‘Kenbassies’), Mayor Johnson eventually retained London’s European Office but reduced its staffing level and subsumed it within the wider External Relations department. This ‘reflected the support that Boris personally gives to the European project’ (interview with GLA External Relations official). These actions have also had the repercussion of reducing the GLA’s relationships with other SNAs, both bilaterally and as part of inter-regional networks, as witnessed by a decline in the GLA’s activities as part of the ‘M4’ (‘Mayor 4’) network, to the extent that the GLA no longer actively seeks best practice from other cities (interview with GLA External Relations official).

As a result, there is no widespread appreciation of the importance of EU policy-making to London’s interests across the GLA administration. As a London academic commented, ‘beyond the normal niceties of civic diplomacy, Europe does not feature very large on their horizon’ (interview with London academic). A common theme emerging from interviews with GLA European policy officers is the amount of time they have to dedicate to convincing colleagues of the importance of developments at the EU level.

‘It has been a real struggle to get politicians and other officers here to recognise that Brussels represented both threat and opportunities to us and if we do not engage we risk not taking advantage of the opportunities and miss the threats that it poses. One of the problems is that for the officers and politicians here, most of whom who have previously been mostly exclusively involved at a political level in central government, they understand lobbying in central government and they get that you can influence policy quite dramatically. Brussels of course is a very different

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23. London’s Caracas office was closed but the other three offices were preserved on the insistence of London business, or as a GLA official put it, ‘Boris was bushwhacked at a business breakfast lobbying meeting who said that we need these people over there promoting London’ (interview with GLA official).
thing. I do a lot more of that than strategies about how we can influence Brussels which is deeply frustrating’

(Interview with GLA External Relations official)

‘The trick is to make it relevant to colleagues in London who are very busy doing their UK things. Europe is seen as a bit of a distraction. You have to make them see what the threats and opportunities are. You can always see the direct relevance of things that come out of the UK Parliament. They are tangible. But if you have a directive on the internalisation of external costs then what does that mean? It is all very technical and complex. If you want to get their attention, you have to tell them why they should be interested.’

(Interview with TfL Europe official)

This serves to detract from the ability of European officers to plan and execute strategic engagement in the EU policy-making process in order to advance London’s interests. This culminates in a situation in which the GLA does not possess a cohesive European strategy in any sense. ‘It is about muddling through’ (interview with GLA External Relations official).

One member of the ‘GLA family’ that provides a notable exception to London’s lack of EU engagement is TfL. TfL contains an International and European Affairs Section which sits as part of a wider public affairs team within the Communications and Marketing Directorate. By working closely with the transport officer in London’s European Office, TfL enjoys direct contact with officials in the Commission’s DG Mobility and Transport (MOVE) and European Parliament’s Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN), building personal relations and initiating regular meetings on issues of interest (interview with TfL Europe official). TfL also participates in a wide-range of inter-regional networks in order to exchange information, share best practice, lobby the European institutions and obtain project funding, such as Eurocities, the International Association of Public Transport (UITP) and
POLIS. Interviewees across other parts of the GLA widely recognised TfL as standing out in its EU engagement. However, at the same time, the issues on which TfL mobilises at the European level largely involve matters of intra-city mobility and relatively local concern, such as solutions to urban transport problems and lobbying for the cross-border enforcement of traffic offences. Matters pertaining to European transport infrastructure do not form part of its rationale.

Overall, London authorities have only been seen to mobilise their resources at the EU level in any significant sense on an ad hoc basis and in fields relevant to the city’s world city status, such as the prospect of European level regulation of the financial sector. Even here, the GLA’s involvement is largely defensive in nature, being centred on preventing EU legislation from encroaching on the Mayor’s priorities, rather than proactive engagement. London’s participation in the TENT network has never been viewed as being crucial to the city’s self-identity as a world city and thus has not been deemed as being of sufficient significance as to demand policy attention.

**Conclusion**

Analysing London’s relationship to TENT policy through the three institutional types of MLG provides differing explanations for the lack of involvement of London in this field (see Table 6.1). RCI MLG highlights a process of central government purposely involving pan-London political bodies into its planning and transport policy-making processes in order to ensure effective policy outcomes via the incorporation of specialised local knowledge. However, the focus of such city-region mobilisation has been confined to domestic, intra-city transport concerns. This is the result of defined policy remits, clashes with the EU transport policy approach, and a perceived lack of electoral, functional or financial benefits to be gained from EU level transport infrastructure engagement. On the other hand, HI MLG
emphasises a path dependent process founded on the centralised nature of EU policy-making within the UK state and a ‘locked in’ means of intra-city transport thinking amongst London authorities. Meanwhile, SI MLG stresses the importance of London’s self-identity as a world city which actively encourages an international, rather than European, outlook and thus discourages the active and sustained mobilisation of resources at the EU level. As such, London can be classified in accordance with John’s (1994) ‘minimal involvement’ rung of the ladder (with some signs of ‘financial orientation’) and Goldsmith and Klausan’s (1997) ‘counteractive’/’passive’ categories. As a result, a MLG form of TENT policy-making cannot be identified as having developed. The central state has strictly maintained its gatekeeper role between sub-national and supranational authorities.
### Table 6.1: TENT Policy, New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance: the case of London

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New Institutionalism and Type of MLG</th>
<th>Features</th>
<th>London and TENT Policy</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| rational choice institutionalism multi-level governance (RCI MLG) | · member state actor centred approach to MLG  
· explicit choice of national political leaders to ensure desired gains: bargaining advantage, divesting responsibility, effective problem solving | · effective policy outcomes: specialised local knowledge and expertise (LPAC, GLA)  
· intra-city focus: policy remit, clash with EU approach, lack of functional/financial/electoral benefits |
| historical institutionalism multi-level governance (HI MLG) | · path dependency leads to MLG  
· autonomous institutional action  
· unintended consequences: SNA mobilisation  
· MLG ‘locked-in’: institutional barriers to reform, societal adaptation | · centralised nature of EU policy-making in UK state: DfT control  
· intra-city London transport thinking ‘locked in’: transferred from LPAC to GLA |
| sociological institutionalism multi-level governance (SI MLG) | · MLG results from ‘learnt’ behaviour: acting in accordance with the ‘logic of appropriateness’  
· supranational institutions: support further integration  
· SNAs: distinct identities and interests | · self-identity as a ‘world city’  
· ‘global thinking’ and international outlook  
· little appreciation of importance of EU in GLA bureaucracy |
Chapter 7: Conclusion

This thesis argued that an analysis of the role of SNAs in EU policy-making is central to an understanding of the particular form of governance in contemporary Europe. The sub-national level of government has witnessed an increase in prominence within the EU as a result of its potential to contribute towards resolving the difficulties associated with the European integration process. In particular, a strengthening of the third tier of government has been held up as a means of tackling the democratic deficit and the resulting sense of alienation that European citizens feel towards their governing institutions as well as acting as a catalyst for regional economic growth. Consequently, increased calls for the inclusion of SNAs in EU policy-making have emanated from both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ pressures.

From above, the recent process of territorial decentralisation experienced by many member states as a response to the forces of economic globalisation has stimulated the mobilisation of the sub-national level whilst, from below, the European integration process has initiated new opportunities for SNAs to express their interests and demand representation.

Methodological Reflection

The research methods employed for this project were a combination of surveys, semi-structured elite interviews and primary documentary analysis all of which presented various challenges and provided varying degrees of utility. As a result, some of the most valuable learning points obtained from undertaking such a project concerned the research methodology itself.

In terms of survey design, the approach taken to structuring the surveys was based on two underlying objectives. Firstly, encouraging a substantial response rate amongst time-pressed officials and secondly, allowing for ease of analysis. As a result, a largely ‘tick box’ style, closed question survey was devised. However, such a structure inherently loads the
survey questions in the direction of pre-existing knowledge. For example, by asking whether the GLA attempted to influence the TENT policy proposals/amendments/opinions of the Commission, European Parliament, Committee of the Regions, central government, Local Government Association etc, the survey is in danger of pointing the respondent towards thinking about these institutions and therefore closing off responses regarding other avenues and strategies used. Therefore, closed question surveys are not necessarily useful means of discovering new knowledge outside of the confines of what is presumed. Placing an open question towards the end of the survey asking if any other agencies/institutions were targeted as a means of solving this problem is insufficient as by this stage the impression has been given that the research is primarily interested in the relationships formed with the named institutions. Busy officials with other matters to attend to are not necessarily going to have the time to think and look beyond the institutions listed.

As such, there seems to be a tension between the underlying objectives structuring the approach taken towards survey design (identified above) and the primary rationale for utilising a survey i.e. to gain new knowledge. On one hand, a closed survey seems ideal for encouraging a response and allowing for ease of analysis, whilst on the other hand, it also serves to discourage responses which move beyond existing presumptions. The most obvious answer therefore to such a dilemma seems to be to use an open-ended survey. However, a similar tension exists in this case, simply in reverse. An open-ended survey encourages the respondent to think ‘outside the box’, but, simultaneously, the time required to do so and complete such a survey acts as a barrier to responding.

A mixture of both closed and open-ended questions would seem to be the safest means of overcoming these tensions. However, the sequencing of questions in mixed surveys usually relies on the closed questions being placed first, in order to gain the respondent’s interest, followed by the open-ended questions. As mentioned above, the danger with such
an approach is that the presumed parameters of the survey are established by the closed questions which in turn contaminate responses to the subsequent open-ended questions. The challenge posed by these tensions poses significant questions about the utility of surveys as a means of gaining information in these types of research projects. In small case study projects, time, human and financial resources may be better employed by focusing on other types of research methodologies such as interviews.

Despite the initial idea that a closed survey would elicit a significant response rate, this did not prove to be the case. In both case studies, emails inviting officials to complete the survey online and follow up hardcopies and emails were simply forwarded to the designated official leading on the city’s EU transport policy engagement. Whilst this has the potential to cause annoyance on behalf of the official as a result of their inbox becoming congested with numerous requests to complete the survey, of greater concern was that this situation resulted in the surveys only extracting the views of one individual from each case study. In the early stages of the research process, i.e. prior to face-to-face contact and personal relationships and trust being formed, this proved extremely difficult to overcome. As a result, the information gleaned from the surveys was not representative of the administrations as a whole. However, at the same time, the objective of the survey was to simply gain an initial overview of each city’s TENT policy objectives, influencing strategies and successes/failures as a means of structuring the elite interviews. As such, the responses of the lead official proved sufficient in order to do so. Therefore, on reflection, if surveys were to be used for a similar purpose in future research projects, it would be beneficial to target a fewer number of key officials rather than aim for responses across the administration, i.e. to focus on depth rather than width.

By contrast, the information obtained via the elite interviews proved far more substantial to the extent that this particular research method transpired to be the most useful
of methodologies. In essence, the elite interviews opened up the ‘black box’ in policymaking, enabling an understanding of the different ideas, approaches, influencing strategies and experiences of the case studies’ involvement in the policy area. As stated by much of the research methods literature (McCarville, 2002; Burnham et al., 2008), the non-random snowball method of gaining access to officials was extremely useful as a means of identifying interviewees. As mentioned in the introduction, interviewing colleagues of recommended officials in an attempt to generate a more representative sample of the group proved of little value in obtaining further information. Thus, the non-random snowball strategy became the core means of gaining access.

An issue which is not referred to in the existing literature, and of surprising importance, in gaining access to interviewees is the importance of appreciating the cultural norms that exist in different societies. In Vienna, ‘cold calling’ was welcomed as a means of requesting an interview and invariably proved effective, as opposed to email requests which often had slow responses. In contrast, ‘cold call’ requests for interview in London were always rejected as requests had to be put in writing. Such administrative cultures impact upon the techniques used to, and efficiency of, gaining access to interviewees and as such should be enquired about in advance of beginning the interview process.

A similar cultural dynamic relates to the scheduling of interviews. Returning to Vienna after the Christmas/New Year period to complete the interviews, I found it unexpectedly problematic to arrange interviews in January due to it being peak skiing season, in which many Austrians take time off work. This resulted in very few interviews being conducted throughout the month. Such surprises can have significant associated research and financial costs and researchers should be aware of these differences when planning research trips.

The semi-structured format of the interviews brought up some interesting dilemmas
concerning the interview structure. Burnham et. al. state that there are three core propositions that should be kept in mind when approaching semi-structured interviews. Firstly, ‘interviews will have a list of topics or questions they want to cover’. Secondly, ‘there is a need to prioritize the topics to be covered’. Thirdly, ‘the interview must not seek to impose too rigid a framework on the interview’ (Burnham et. al., 2008: 240-241). The experience of elite interviewing in this project highlights the difficulty of marrying all three propositions, in particular the friction between the first/second points on one hand and the third point on the other. Propositions one and two suggest a somewhat rigid structure to the interview, focusing on pre-established topics, whilst proposition three promotes a more relaxed approach in which the interviewee is encouraged to open up new topics.

In many of the interviews conducted, a lot of valuable information was gained when the interviewee went off-script into areas not directly relevant to answering the specific question asked. Such gems of information often related to tensions and power battles within the administration which the respondent was (wittingly or unwittingly) willing to share. Similarly, much of the reflective analysis on what the interviewee thought the city administration was doing right or wrong occurred during these periods. This is not to argue that an unstructured interview would be of more use, particularly in the later stages of a research project when the aim is focus on specific topics. However, having unstructured elements to the interview and therefore allowing the respondent to raise unexpected information is of great value. To a large extent, only by providing for flexibility within the interview can the respondent be encouraged to offer new and unforeseen material. As Burnham et. al. correctly conclude,

‘Within the interview, a delicate balance has to be maintained between, on the one hand, covering the ground the researcher thinks is important and, on the other hand, allowing the respondent to open up new areas without
going off on irrelevant tangents’ (Burnham et. al., 2008: 193).

Within such an approach, the use of a tape recorder is invaluable as a means of keeping an accurate record of what is being said. Taking notes at the same time as participating in the interview is extremely difficult and runs the risk of missing or inaccurately recording significant comments. Equally importantly, knowing the interview is being recorded frees up the interviewer to focus on the responses and probe further when necessary.

The final methodological issue to reflect upon is that of researching in a country, the language of which the researcher does not speak fluently. Whilst this issue did not impact on the interviews, as English is spoken widely amongst Austria’s political elite, particular those involved in EU affairs, it was of significance with respect to documentary analysis. Despite key documents having English language versions, certain sources were only available in German. This can be overcome with the use of internet-based translation tools, however using such tools can be time consuming, expensive and not always accurate. If considering undertaking research in a country whose language they are not fluent in, researchers should check that interviews and documents are accessible before starting on the project.

*Research Focus*

An analysis of the existing literature identified clear gaps in the current research on the role of SNAs within the EU. In particular, the existing frameworks within which the sub-national level has been examined fail to place SNAs at the heart of their analyses. Both ‘top-down’ Europeanisation and MLG view SNAs as reactive political actors, receiving policies and practices initiated at the EU level and thus failing to entertain the possibility of shaping EU policies from the ‘bottom-up’. Whilst ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation shifts its focal lens to examine the forces moulding EU policies and institutions from below, attention
is firmly confined to the role of member state central governments as influential actors. As a result, SNAs continue to be conceived of as largely marginalised players within the EU political game. Conversely, the increased SNA activism experienced by the EU demands that an analysis of SNAs as political actors in their own right is undertaken in order to fully understand the factors motivating the mobilisation of SNAs in EU policy-making.

In addition, in terms of the outcomes of SNA mobilisation, the common claim within the existing literature asserts that the material resources possessed by a SNA acts as a determinant of its ability to influence EU policy-making. Thus, factors such as size of budget, staffing levels and administrative adaptation are declared as primary variables underpinning the level of SNAs’ EU involvement. However, SNAs also contain non-material resources, such as perceptions of self-identity, which may also impact on their ability to influence. As a result, there exists a research space in which to pose the question of exactly how and why SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making and what impact these rationales have on influencing strategies and the emergence and existence of MLG. This research hypothesised that a European self-identity is a primary variable in instigating SNA EU engagement and influence and in the emergence of a polycentric form of governance. This research approach was undertaken via an examination of the EU policy engagement of the city-regions of Vienna and London in the EU’s trans-European networks - transport (TENT) policy area.

Case Study Comparative Analysis

An analysis of the experiences of Vienna and London in the TENT policy area emphasises the potential for a central role to be played by SNAs in the emergence of an MLG form of policy-making in Europe as well as the ability of the central state to maintain its gatekeeper role. In doing so, all three new institutional processes can be identified as playing
a part in the creation of MLG in the Austrian state and the maintenance of central state control in the UK. As such, and in terms of the research question, this research shows that the reasons for why, how and whether SNAs involve themselves in EU policy-making differ in accordance with the different institutional understandings of MLG.

Within the RCI MLG approach, Vienna can be seen as having been drawn in to the process of TENT policy-making as a result of a purposeful choice made by the federal government in order to acquire an enhanced problem solving capacity. The specialised local knowledge and expertise contained within the Vienna city administration was required by the federal government in order to ensure success in the TENT policy field. In addition, gaining the active support of the lander helped the federal government acquire greater authority in international and domestic negotiations and potentially electoral advantages stemming from the efficient construction of popular transport networks. However, London political authorities, whilst established by central government in order to provide a source of local knowledge and expertise, have very much confined themselves to operating within the domestic sphere. This has been the result of abiding by a given narrow policy remit and by a perceived lack of electoral, functional or financial benefits to be gained from EU level engagement.

An HI MLG approach highlights the emergence of an MLG form of policy-making as a result of an embedded political culture of cooperative federalism within the Austrian state. Despite formal policy competence for TENT policy-making lying at the federal level, an informal culture of cooperative federalism is ‘locked-in’ as a feature of Austrian intergovernmental relations, representing a pre-existing pattern of federal-lander relations which was naturally applied to Vienna’s involvement in TENT policy-making. As a result, Vienna engaged in intense direct communication with the federal government, particularly utilising the close personal and party links that existed between the two government levels.
At the same time, HI MLG points to the centralised nature of the UK state and a pre-established pattern of transport thinking amongst city-wide authorities as restricting London’s access to the EU policy process.

SI MLG brings to the fore an understanding of MLG emerging as a result from a shift in the self-identity of Vienna, leading to the city administration mobilising its resources at the EU level and the subsequent dispersal of authority away from the central state. Through a process of administrative reform, a norm of ‘thinking European’ has been placed at the heart of local policy-making practices, culminating in a practice of ‘Euro-profiling’ via an enthusiastic engagement with EU policies, such as regional policy and INTERREG, the opening of a representation office in Brussels, active membership of transnational regional networks and a leading role in the construction of the cross-border region CENTROPE. On the other hand, in the case of London, SI MLG highlights the city authorities’ self-perception as a world city which encourages an international, rather than European, outlook and thus has suppressed a process of participating in EU policy-making.

Despite the fact that all three new institutional processes can be identified within both cities experiences, more assertive conclusions can be drawn concerning the relative importance of the institutional dynamics in each case study. To a large extent, London can be seen as driven by a rational choice approach towards its engagement with the EU. Two underlying rationales clearly structure the GLA’s interaction with EU affairs. Firstly, the opportunity to acquire EU funds and secondly, defending against perceived threats to GLA policy competences and London’s (particularly economic) interests. The economic rationale is especially significant as it was recognition of the importance of the EU’s regional funds to London’s activities which instigated the boroughs’ engagement with the EU in the 1990s, prior to the establishment of the GLA. Such an emphasis has been very much maintained throughout the GLA years and serves as a central focus of activity today. Both of these
driving forces of EU engagement can be seen as reflecting the pre-formed rational choices of the GLA which in turn structures its approach towards the EU. The GLA views the EU as a political and economic threat as well as an economic opportunity and it is this strategic outlook which determines the GLA’s minimal involvement in EU policy-making.

In contrast, Vienna’s active mobilisation and engagement with EU affairs can be seen to be explained by sociological explanations. The transformation in Vienna’s geopolitical environment in the post-Cold War period has resulted in the city administration perceiving itself as a distinct political actor with its own interests at the centre of the ‘new Europe’. It is this change in the city administration’s self-identity as a European, rather than only Austrian, SNA which has served to stimulate Vienna’s in-depth, widespread and continual involvement in EU policy-making.

As such, a comparative analysis of the case studies highlights some similarities and differences within their experiences. At the general level, London’s ‘story’ demonstrates the importance of a city having a city-wide government to represent its interests in domestic and European political arenas. There exists a requirement to have a single representative voice in order to construct a coherent message that can be presented to other actors. London was clearly hampered during the interregnum years following the abolition of the GLC in that it was left without a single voice representing its interests in a period of increasing international city competition. Leaving representation to a complex mix of boroughs, boards and committees simply resulted in damaging political rivalries coming to the fore which ultimately served nobody’s interests. The establishment of the GLA has provided London once again with strategic direction and the ability to act as a coherent political actor.

However, the experience of London also demonstrates that whilst political coherence is a necessary prerequisite for acting effectively in the European sphere, it is far from sufficient as a means of understanding why SNAs mobilise. In this sense, one of the key
relevant issues which is highlighted by the study of Vienna is the importance of administrative leadership and entrepreneurship. Across the range of existing literature, such issues are little considered. As alluded to in the literature reviews of chapters 2 and 3, a few exceptions exist. Piattoni (2010: 50) points to ‘the skilful manipulation of political opportunities’ by regional political entrepreneurs as a mechanism through which regions gain greater autonomy from the central state. In more general terms, Bauer and Borzel (2010: 256-259) talk of a region’s influence in EU policy-making being affected by its ‘capacities’ and ‘political and organizational capabilities’. Similarly, Jeffery (2000) claims that entrepreneurship and leadership are likely to act as a variable determining the extent of SNA influence, whilst Sapala (2003) talks of ‘human capital’ and the presence of EU-focused officials within an administration as stimulating greater SNA mobilisation.

An analysis of Vienna’s experience very much reinforces the importance of administrative leadership and entrepreneurship as key factors in structuring the extent of EU engagement on behalf of SNAs and, in doing so, deepens our understanding of precisely how leaders can play a role in motivating the extensive mobilisation of SNA resources at the EU level. Having a Mayor committed to the European integration project and as a result implementing a process of administrative reform in order to instil a culture of ‘thinking European’ at the heart of the city administration undoubtedly facilitated Vienna’s successful involvement in the process of EU policy-making. In contrast, the lack of administrative adaptation to the EU within the GLA is best seen by the fact that, under Ken Livingstone, City Hall did not contain a European section at all as EU affairs were overseen away from the GLA’s centre of power in its Brussels office. Boris Johnson has further served to downgrade the GLA’s EU resources by reducing the Brussels office’s staffing levels and bringing it under the control of the External Relations department. Leadership within an administration is required in order to drive forward the necessary institutional structural and ideological
reforms required to adapt to the multi-level complexities of EU policy-making and commit the required resources to such EU-level engagement.

In the case of Vienna, the establishment of a representative office in Brussels emerged out of this adaptation process. However, interestingly, the importance of having a permanent representative base in Brussels is a common factor across both case studies. In both city administrations, a Brussels office has come to be seen as indispensable as a means of exerting interests. In particular, having staff permanently based in Brussels helps facilitate the establishment and maintenance of personal contacts with EU officials and ensures effective information collection, analysis and dissemination in order to be able to react to developments at the EU level efficiently. To a certain extent, there is a noticeable difference between the cities in the particular aspect of their Brussels office work that is prioritised. For Vienna, the office is viewed in positive terms, as a means of networking and as a base from which to launch its participation in EU affairs. In contrast, for London, the focal point of the office’s work is more defensive in nature. The core role of the office is to monitor EU policy in order to highlight any legislation which may impinge on the Mayor’s policy priorities. The importance that Boris Johnson attaches to this work can be seen by his decision to reverse his initial pledge to close London’s European Office.

A similar difference can be seen in relation to the issue of networking and coalition-building. Whilst the GLA is represented in inter-regional associations such as Eurocities and the European Covenant of Mayors, its involvement is largely minimal and it no longer actively seek best practice from other cities. On the other hand, Vienna views participation in transnational regional networks as crucial as a means of enhancing its influence within the EU. Working through regional networks is seen as a way of adding greater weight and legitimacy to its opinions in the eyes of the supranational institutions. As such, it actively involves itself in a variety of networks, including Eurocities, the Assembly of European
Regions, the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Powers and the Union of Capitals of the European Union to name just a few. Such involvement provided the city administration with spheres of policy expertise which were utilised in order to strengthen its EU engagement, to the extent of becoming a European competence centre within the INTERREG programme.

The issue of party politics also presents a mixed picture in the case studies. Whilst changes between centre-left and centre-right governments at the federal level have not changed the importance attached to Austria’s and Vienna’s involvement in TENT policy, the Vienna city administration certainly capitalised on its fellow Social Democratic Party (SPO) returning to power in the 2007 federal election. The personal and party links facilitated by having the two levels of government ruled by the same party provided Vienna with the opportunity to encourage the federal government to dedicate extra finances to the transport projects under construction within the city. Such links motivated Vienna to bypass the formal federal-lander and inter-lander coordination bodies, preferring to focus on the more fruitful mechanism of direct communication with the relevant federal government ministries.

In contrast, party colour has not had any significant impact on the GLA’s weight of voice within the UK central government. Despite having two Mayors whose time in office have overlapped with their fellow parties being in power at the national level, relations between the two levels of government have been marked by stresses and tensions as much as by accord. To a certain extent, this is a reflection of the centralised pattern of relations between central government and the (particularly English) regions within the UK state and the resulting conflictual nature of inter-governmental relations whereby suspicions and power interests endure. Thus, Tatham’s (2010) findings that party politics is a significant variable in a regional authority’s decision to either cooperate or bypass the central government is more complex than stated. Issues such as the political culture structuring inter-governmental
relations, whether policy interests concur or conflict and the state of personal relationships between leading members of the administrations also act as important forces.

**Empirical Reflection**

A comparative analysis of the case studies helps to provide a deeper insight into our understanding of why SNAs mobilise and the factors which determine the intensity of engagement and ability to exert influence at the European level. Certain key themes emerge which contribute towards providing a framework of understanding.

Firstly, leadership and entrepreneurship within an administration are core factors in motivating and structuring effective involvement in EU policy-making. This research serves to reinforce Sapala’s (2003) focus on ‘human capital’ and Jeffery’s (2000) hypothesis that entrepreneurship and leadership are likely to impact on the level of SNA influence. In doing so, it provides empirical evidence of the particular ways in which EU-focused leadership can be exercised through administrative structural and ideational reform so as to adapt to and take advantage of the opportunities provided by EU policies. Of key significance in this process is the nurturing of an administrative self-identity as a European political authority which in turn stimulates widespread and comprehensive engagement. The extensive involvement in EU affairs fuelled by the creation of a European identity questions Bauer and Studinger’s (2011) conclusion that SNAs limit their attempts to exert policy influence to their core areas of interest. The fact that Vienna made demands on the European Convention, called for greater rights for the European Parliament and the introduction of direct democracy at the EU level shows that SNAs do act beyond their primary policy remits if they view themselves as having a stake in the development of the EU. Of course, such demands can simply be treated as background noise by other actors i.e. instances of SNA mobilisation rather than influence. However, that such actions are undertaken demonstrates the expansive shift in mobilisation
that can occur as a result of a change in self-perception. Therefore, the importance of the non-material, human resources held by SNAs as core variables impacting upon the extent of influence they are able to exert is emphasised.

Whilst such a conclusion contributes to moving the SNA research agenda on from its early fixation with domestic constitutional frameworks as determinants of influence, this is not to say that constitutional positions are insignificant. Kettunen and Kungla’s (2005) and Tatar’s (2009) findings that SNA empowerment in EU regional policy is weak in unitary states as the central government maintains its grip on managing and coordinating the funds can be extended to other policy fields. In TENT policy, a similar dynamic exists in situations where a centralised national-regional relationship transpires. In such constitutional systems, the ‘gatekeeper’ role of the central state is maintained, restricting and discouraging independent access to the supranational institutions, leading to few signs of a MLG form of policy-making emerging. It seems as if a certain level of engagement is required prior to simple polities becoming more compound, as identified by Bache et. al. (2011) in their analysis of countries in south-east Europe. Conversely, cooperative federal systems provide opportunities for SNAs to engage with EU policies, even in circumstances where formal policy competence lies in the hands of the federal government.

Actively participating in regional networks can also be seen as a significant variable impacting upon the extent of influence exerted by SNAs in the EU. Bauer and Borzel’s (2010) assertion that SNA influence varies in accordance with their willingness and ability to undertake lobbying activities at the EU level alongside other regional authorities is very much reinforced by this research. On one hand, acting as part of a transnational coalition adds greater weight and legitimacy to a regional proposal which in turn makes it more likely to be adopted, or at least listened to, by other institutions. In particular, the Commission is seen to prefer proposals which can demonstrate the widespread support of democratic actors.
as doing so strengthens its hand in its relations with the European Parliament and member states. The prospect of having some voice in the system outweighs the requirement to compromise which inevitably accompanies partaking in a coalition of actors. Similarly, networking brings with it the benefits of sharing information, best practice and policy learning. In turn, this can lead to a SNA being identified as executing good practice and therefore called upon to share its expertise with other regions and the Commission. In essence, actively participating in networks legitimises SNAs as Euro-players and therefore provides channels through which influence can be exerted.

The fundamental importance of having a permanent representative office in Brussels is also highlighted as a determinant of influence. Moore’s (2008a) claim that a regional presence in Brussels has become institutionalised as a core element of EU membership is shown by the importance attached to maintaining a Brussels office in both case studies. As she asserts, it is the practical issues of engaging with EU policy-making that is of most concern for the work of the offices. This can be either offensive in nature, such as building personal relationships with EU officials, building policy expertise, networking and coalition-building as means of attempting to exert influence and/or of a more defensive type, involving policy monitoring in order to act as an early warning system of potential threats to policy competencies and interests.

What emerges from this analysis is the pattern that SNAs which are successful at exerting influence in EU policy-making use a dual-track strategy, utilising both intra-state and extra-state mechanisms. Effective SNA involvement relies on taking advantage of the multiple points of access that the EU’s multi-level system of governance provides. SNAs that follow Tatham’s (2010) claim that constitutionally stronger SNAs have less of an incentive to bypass their central government run the risk of underplaying their hand. Even with the consensual nature of decision-making in the Council of Ministers, relying on a
national government to fight for policy interests at the EU level is a highly risky strategy for SNAs to adopt. National governments have other priorities and regional interests to consider and can ultimately be outvoted in the Council. Whilst trying to frame domestic policy, successful SNAs also mobilise directly at the EU level via the activities of their permanent representatives in Brussels, policy monitoring, building relationships with EU officials, transnational coalition-building and acting through networks. Relations with central government are only one amongst a variety of channels that offer themselves to SNAs as means of exerting influence.

Clearly basing conclusions regarding SNA engagement with EU policy-making on the examination of one policy sector inherently brings with it the danger of mistakenly generalising results. However, as stated earlier, existing research on SNA involvement in the EU disproportionately focuses on regional policy, resulting in a limited and potentially distorted understanding of the role of SNAs across the variety of policy areas that SNAs are involved in. The value of researching TENT policy lies in shining the spotlight on the particular dynamics of SNA engagement in other, under-researched, policy sectors and in doing so creating an analytical framework that is applicable across the variety of policy areas that SNAs are involved in.

TENT policy has proved particularly useful in this respect, because certain different rationales act as the motivating forces encouraging SNA input in this field compared to regional policy. The mobilisation of SNA resources in EU regional policy is primarily the result of the desire to access funds for use on designated projects at the regional/local level. Whilst SNA interest in TENT policy results from the well-established relationship between transport infrastructure and regional economic development, it is not competition for EU funds per se that drives SNA interest. The level of EU funding available for TENT project construction costs is minimal and has proven woefully inadequate. The EU’s financial
contribution is designed to act as a catalyst in order to attract much larger amounts from other public and private sources. What motivates SNA engagement with this policy area is the issue of accessibility. Being located on a TENT route increases the competitiveness of a city as a business location by linking to surrounding high level markets which brings with it associated economic benefits. At the same time, gaining the EU’s support for a project as being of wider European interest helps provide protection against any domestic criticism.

Interestingly, despite these different dynamics existing, there is no noticeable difference in the strategies adopted by SNAs in how they approach TENT policy as opposed to regional policy. SNAs tend to rely on the structures and agencies that already exist to coordinate their EU interaction. As regional policy tends to be the initial sector in which SNAs involve themselves, often these pre-existing structures and ways of working were established in order to provide opportunities to access the regional policy arena. As such, a process of policy learning takes place whereby the experiences gained through mobilising within regional policy are transferred to engagement with other policy areas and similar ways of working and strategies of influencing adopted. As a result, an analysis of SNA involvement in TENT policy provides an interesting insight into how SNAs approach and structure their operation in the increasing number of policy sectors in which they engage.

**Theoretical Reflection: New Institutionalism and Types of Multi-Level Governance**

This thesis presented a new institutionalist understanding of MLG as the theoretical framework underlying its analysis. MLG fundamentally presents itself as a challenge to a state based understanding of policy-making in the EU. MLG captures the multi-located nature of contemporary governing in the EU and in doing so rejects the conception of conceiving governing processes as existing at either the domestic or international level, emphasising an overlapping, interconnected, non-hierarchical and multi-actor framework of
interdependence. As such, it is argued that the strength of MLG lies in its ability to encapsulate the reconfiguration of policy-making space away from interaction between nested political arenas towards a singular entity characterised by a complex web of interaction amongst the variety of actors involved in EU governance. Underpinning the reordering of policy-making space is the key role played by the EU’s institutions in the process of EU policy-making. Institutions are central to MLG in that they provide arenas in which interested actors gather, therefore facilitating the processes that so mark MLG.

In order to develop the idea of MLG being institution dependent, the thesis examined MLG using the analytical tools provided by the three core new institutionalisms (rational choice, historical and sociological). What materialises from this exercise is a conception of MLG as emerging and existing in different institutional types. The three conceptual lenses of new institutionalism offer differing accounts of MLG.

Rational choice institutionalism (RCI) paints a picture of MLG emerging as a result of the explicit choices of national political leaders as the shifting of authority ensures desired gains, be it the acquisition of bargaining advantages, the divesting of responsibility or as a means of ensuring effective problem-solving. On the other hand, historical institutionalism (HI) views MLG as resulting from a path dependent process of initial choices leading to autonomous supranational institution action and unanticipated consequences which disperses authority away from the central state. MLG then becomes ‘locked-in’ due to the procedural difficulties in the EU of reforming past decisions and a process of societal adaptation. A sociological institutionalist (SI) approach meanwhile emphasises MLG as a ‘learnt’ process whereby actors behave in accordance with their socially perceived roles.

Whilst this is a different conception of types of MLG than that developed by Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe and Marks, 2003; 2004; 2010), there is certainly a relationship between the two forms resting on the logics provided by sociological and rational choice
institutionalisms for type I and type II respectively which is worthy of further research.

Despite Hall and Taylor’s unwillingness to adjudicate between the relative importance of the three new institutionalisms (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 95), this thesis can offer a judgement on the analytical validity of each new institutionalism in accounting for the role of SNAs in the emergence and existence of MLG. Whilst RCI MLG and HI MLG can, under the right circumstances, account for the development of multi-level forms of governance, the processes that are brought to the fore in both frameworks point to a ‘top-down’ process in which SNAs are ‘receivers’ of MLG, invited to participate in the supranational policy environment by central government request or the particular form of cultural norms which govern their domestic political environment. Thus, it is SI MLG which places emphasises on the dynamics of SNA mobilisation from below.

In this way, RCI MLG maintains the ‘top-down’ approach to the role of SNAs in the EU that is prominent in this existing literature. RCI MLG continues to paint a picture of SNAs as ‘receivers’ of processes and practices emanating from above. Within this framework, SNAs are viewed as inactive players within the EU until a central government decision is taken which incorporates them in to the policy process. As such, RCI MLG perpetuates a conception of SNAs as reactive political actors, only mobilising their resources in response to requests from higher level bodies and thus operating in a sphere established and maintained by the central state. This raises questions concerning the ability of RCI to capture the essence of a multi-level form of governance. The ability of SNAs to play a part in the dispersal of authority away from the central state is constrained by central state control. National governments can be seen to maintain their gatekeeper roles, providing and blocking SNA access to the supranational level in accordance with their own interests.

Similarly, HI MLG can be also seen as containing a ‘top-down’ element. The ability of SNAs to participate in and influence EU policy-making is determined by the political
cultural norms of centre-region relations within the domestic sphere in which they exist. Such norms are created largely exogenously from the SNA itself, being determined by a wider set of processes, relationships and actors, of which a single SNA is but one player. Therefore, once again, HI MLG views SNAs as reactive actors whose EU engagement and influence is determined by norms out of its direct control. SNAs operate in a field passed down or across to them which structures their mobilisation at the EU level.

The key value in a sociological institutionalist understanding of MLG lies in it enabling a ‘bottom-up’ approach towards conceptualising the role of SNAs in EU policy-making and in the development of MLG. A SI MLG analytical framework facilitates an understanding of SNAs as ‘policy-makers’, rather than simply ‘policy-takers’. In this way, SI MLG rectifies the gap identified in the existing research approach towards examining the role of the sub-national level of government by placing SNAs at the focal point of analysis. Rather than viewing SNAs as ‘receivers’ of policies, practices and processes emanating from the EU level (‘top-down’ Europeanisation) or as passive political actors (traditional MLG), SI MLG emphasises the policy- and polity-shaping ability of SNAs from the ‘bottom-up’ through the mobilisation of their own resources. According to SI MLG, this results from the construction of a self-identity as a European SNA with distinct European interests. Similarly, as opposed to the state-centrism of ‘bottom-up’ Europeanisation, SI MLG allows for an appreciation of the capacity of SNAs to structure the institutions of the EU from below.

The importance of such a self-identity can be seen from the case study analyses undertaken. The self-perception of the Vienna city administration as a European SNA instigated a process of mobilising own-resources at the EU level facilitating an influencing role within the EU’s TENT policy-making process independent of the Austrian federal government. Such influence has not been dependent upon the partial and ad hoc mobilisation of Vienna’s resources but rather a firm commitment to being an actor in the European game.
As such, SNA influence at the EU level is seen to result from ensuring a constant and consistent presence in EU level affairs via activities such as developing personal relationships with officials in the EU institutions and other regional authorities, active involvement in inter-regional networks, sharing best practice as well as involving oneself in an array of non-strategic civic activities, such as holding Brussels-based cultural events and participating in exchange programmes. It is this continuous presence which legitimises a SNA as being a ‘Euro-actor’ and therefore ensures a voice in the policy-making process. In terms of John’s ‘ladder of Europeanisation’ and Goldsmith and Klausen’s categorisation, it is this European self-identity which underlines a SNA’s movement to being classified as ‘fully Europeanised’ and ‘proactive’.

However, whilst this thesis has been structured in a way to highlight the different types of MLG that emerge from differing institutional processes, questions also arise concerning the extent to which the various new institutionalisms are as dissimilar as first portrayed. Overlapping tendencies can be identified between the forms of new institutionalism as means of explaining the emergence and existence of MLG. In particular, this relates to the SI claim that MLG arises as a ‘learnt’ process. This leads to the question of through what processes does this ‘learning’ take place? SI MLG points to actors behaving in a manner they perceive as being socially appropriate in accordance with their roles as an explanatory factor. Thus, institutions such as the Commission and ECJ can be seen to act in a way that is influenced by their self-perceived roles as supranational institutions or SNAs can mobilise their resources as a result of their self-perception as distinct political actors.

However, the dynamics identified within the RCI MLG and HI MLG practices can also influence the ‘learning’ process. As well as acting according to an endogenous ‘logic of appropriateness’, actors also behave in a manner that is determined exogenously. For RCI, such external forces can be seen as constitutional/treaty prescribed policy competences and

209
mandates, whilst for HI they can be political cultures which ‘lock-in’ certain behavioural norms. As a result, the ‘learning’ process actors experience can be an expression of internal and external forces, both of which can lead to the emergence of multi-level forms of policy-making. This is particularly pertinent to the role of SNAs within the EU as the self-identity of regional authorities as Euro-players can be structured as much by comprehensive involvement in EU policy-making resulting from policy remits and domestic political cultures encouraging supranational engagement as by internal administrative reform processes.

Identifying the intersections between the new institutionalisms, and as a point in the direction of future research, also opens up a space for the incorporation of the newest new institutionalism, discursive institutionalism (DI), into this framework of analysis. Through introducing DI to the field, Schmidt highlights the important ‘role of ideas and discourse in politics’, defined in terms of ‘the interactive process of conveying ideas’, as a means of explaining institutional change (Schmidt, 2008: 303). Schmidt claims that DI differs from each of the three older new institutionalisms in significant ways (Ibid: 322). Firstly, institutions are ‘simultaneously structures and constructs internal to the agents themselves’ and therefore, as opposed to in HI, institutional change is dynamic. Similarly, norms are also seen as ‘dynamic constructs rather than static structures’, as in SI. Thirdly, interests, unlike in RCI, are perceived to be ‘neither objective….nor material’.

As a result, analysis of the discursive processes through which MLG emerges and exists can be undertaken. Schmidt points us to examining how structures, in this case patterns of policy-making, can be created and maintained through the ideational and discursive abilities of actors as being a fruitful filed of analysis. By looking at the SNA case studies, it can be hypothesised that the particular language and forms through which the Vienna city administration expressed itself to other political actors played a part in
encouraging the emergence of a MLG form of policy-making in Austria. Examples of such language can be seen through the use of terminology as ‘Vienna’s Foreign Policy’, ‘European Declarations’ and the labelling of the new rail hub as ‘Vienna Central Station – Centre of Europe’. All of these terms portray a city authority that is attempting to market itself as having EU concerns and therefore a legitimate voice in the wider European sphere.

In doing so, intersections can once again be identified, in this case between SI and DI. The discourse utilised by an actor can play a role in structuring perceptions about themselves. For example, in the research interviewees conducted in Vienna, interviewees invariably talked of the EU as ‘we’ and ‘us’, reflecting their self-identity as a European political authority that is part of the EU polity. In contrast, London interviewees referred to the EU as ‘Brussels’, ‘they’ and ‘them’, revealing a perception of the GLA as primarily a British political authority that is external to the workings of the EU. In both cases, discourse can be seen as reflecting and reinforcing the administrative self-identities and, in turn, acting to encourage or discourage the development of MLG governance systems. Whilst these are initial conclusions, they certainly call for further analysis into the role of DI processes in the emergence of MLG.

A Framework for Future Research

By taking a new institutionalist approach to MLG, this thesis provides an analytical framework to guide future research on the role of SNAs in the EU system of governance. Within this framework, the crucial role of institutions in structuring the emergence of MLG is placed at the fore of investigation. Such an approach facilitates an understanding of the differing rationales behind the dispersal of authority away from the central state in contemporary Europe. In doing so, this framework is able to place the sub-national level of government at the focal point of analysis and as a result highlight the significant role played
by SNAs within this process.

Whilst asserting its research conclusions, this thesis is also aware of the limitations inherent within its design. Key amongst these is the ability to generalise from its results. This issue pertains to the uniqueness of sub-national politics between the member states. SNAs are not standardised political actors across the EU but reflect the particular developmental paths of each state. As such, the thesis conclusions call for further empirical research into the reasons behind SNA mobilisation in the TENT policy field. Of particular value would be an analysis of different types of SNAs that exist within different formal and informal domestic political frameworks so that a wider comparative examination of the importance of institutional relationships and processes could take place.

In terms of the issue of self-identity, further research into the dynamics behind the development of such a self-perception amongst SNAs, its impact in relation to influence in EU policy-making and its role in constructing multi-level forms of governance across a variety of SNA types would help the development of this finding. In particular, research into the role of leadership within SNA administrations as means of establishing EU outlooks would be welcome. Questions such as what type(s) of leadership motivate such internal shifts and what are the driving forces behind the EU perspective of administrative leaders? Models provided by associated disciplines, such as business studies, may be fertile frameworks to employ.

Moreover, further research into the role of SNAs in other policy sectors is also required in order to analyse whether the impact of different policy dynamics alters the nature of SNA involvement. As Tatar states, MLG ‘needs to be subject to a great deal more case study testing before it can be adopted as a general account of how the EU operates’ (Tatar, 2009: 16). However, this thesis makes a theoretical, empirical and methodological contribution towards the continuation of such a research agenda.
Appendix 1: Vienna City Administration Survey

A) With which political bodies did Vienna work with in order to exert its influence on TETN policies, e.g. European Commission, European Parliament, Austrian Federal Government, Committee of the Regions etc?
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Bi) Did Vienna attempt to influence the European Commission’s TETN policy proposals?
   Yes ☐ No ☐

Bii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was Vienna in influencing the European Commission’s TETN policy proposals?
   1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Ci) Did Vienna attempt to influence the European Parliament’s TETN policy amendments?
   Yes ☐ No ☐

Cii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was Vienna in influencing the European Parliament’s TETN policy amendments?
   1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Di) Did Vienna attempt to influence the Committee of the Regions’ TETN policy opinions?
   Yes ☐ No ☐

Dii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was Vienna in influencing the Committee of the Regions’ TETN policy opinions?
   1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Ei) Did Vienna attempt to directly influence the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   Yes ☐ No ☐

Eii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was Vienna in directly influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)
Fi) Did Vienna attempt to use the Bundesrat as a means of influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Fii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Bundesrat in influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

1 ☐

2 ☐

3 ☐

4 ☐

5 ☐

(not at all successful)

(very successful)

Gi) Did Vienna attempt to use the Council for EU Integration Policy (Rat für Fragen der Europäischen Integrationspolitik) as a means of influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Gii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Council for EU Integration Policy in influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

1 ☐

2 ☐

3 ☐

4 ☐

5 ☐

(not at all successful)

(very successful)

Hi) Did Vienna attempt to use the Integration Conference (Integrationskonferenz) for the Lander (IKL) as a means of influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Hii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Integration Conference for the Lander in influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

1 ☐

2 ☐

3 ☐

4 ☐

5 ☐

(not at all successful)

(very successful)

Ii) Did Vienna attempt to use the Conference of Governors of the Lander/Conference of Directors-General of the Regional Administrations (Landeshauptmannerkonferenz/Landesamtsdirektorenkonferenz) as a means of influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

Yes ☐

No ☐

Iii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Conference of Governors of the Lander/Conference of Directors-General of the Regional Administrations in influencing the Austrian Federal Government’s TETN policy opinions?

1 ☐

2 ☐

3 ☐

4 ☐

5 ☐

(not at all successful)

(very successful)

Ji) With which other agencies/institutions did Vienna work with regarding TETN policies, e.g. transnational associations, rail industry, construction companies etc?

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Jii) In your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how significant were relations with these agencies/institutions in helping Vienna exert its influence on TETN policies?

1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4 □ 5 □

(not at all significant) (very significant)

K) What were Vienna’s primary goals/interests with regard to TETN policy overall?

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L) At which stage of the policy process did Vienna focus its attention on in order to achieve these goals/interests, e.g. policy formulation, implementation etc?

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M) In your opinion, towards which institution/agency/body did Vienna primarily direct its attention in order to influence TETN policies (and why)?

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N) In your opinion, what successes did Vienna have in influencing TETN policies? What were the reasons for these successes?

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O) In your opinion, in what areas did Vienna fail to realise its interests in TETN policies? What were the reasons for these failures?

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Appendix 2: Greater London Authority Survey

A) With which political bodies did the Greater London Authority (GLA) work with in order to exert its influence on TETN policies, e.g. European Commission, European Parliament, United Kingdom Government, Committee of the Regions etc?

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Bi) Did the GLA attempt to influence the European Commission’s TETN policy proposals?
Yes ☐ No ☐

Bii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was the GLA in influencing the European Commission’s TETN policy proposals?
1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
(not at all successful) (very successful)

Ci) Did the GLA attempt to influence the European Parliament’s TETN policy amendments?
Yes ☐ No ☐

Cii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was the GLA in influencing the European Parliament’s TETN policy amendments?
1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
(not at all successful) (very successful)

Di) Did the GLA attempt to influence the Committee of the Regions’ TETN policy opinions?
Yes ☐ No ☐

Dii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was the GLA in influencing the Committee of the Regions’ TETN policy opinions?
1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
(not at all successful) (very successful)

Ei) Did the GLA attempt to directly influence the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
Yes ☐ No ☐

Eii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was the GLA in directly influencing the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
1 ☐ 2 ☐ 3 ☐ 4 ☐ 5 ☐
(not at all successful) (very successful)
Fi) Did the GLA attempt to use the Local Government Association as a means of influencing the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   Yes ☐     No ☐

Fii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Local Government Association in influencing the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   1 ☐  2 ☐  3 ☐  4 ☐  5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Gi) Did the GLA attempt to use any other joint national-regional bodies as a means of influencing the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   Yes ☐     No ☐

Gii) If yes: which other joint national-regional bodies?

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Giii) In your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of these other joint national-regional bodies in influencing the United Kingdom Government’s TETN policy opinions?
   1 ☐  2 ☐  3 ☐  4 ☐  5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Hi) Did the GLA attempt to use the Local Government International Bureau as a means of influencing TETN policy?
   Yes ☐     No ☐

Hii) If yes: in your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how successful was use of the Local Government International Bureau in influencing TETN policy?
   1 ☐  2 ☐  3 ☐  4 ☐  5 ☐
   (not at all successful) (very successful)

Ii) With which other agencies/institutions did the GLA work with regarding TETN policies, e.g. interregional bodies, transnational associations, rail industry, construction companies etc?
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Iii) In your opinion, on a scale of 1 – 5, how significant were relations with these agencies/institutions in helping the GLA exert its influence on TETN policies?
   1 ☐  2 ☐  3 ☐  4 ☐  5 ☐
J) What were the GLA’s primary goals/interests with regard to TETN policy overall?
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K) At which stage of the policy process did the GLA focus its attention on in order to achieve these goals/interests, e.g. policy formulation, implementation etc?
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L) In your opinion, towards which institution/agency/body did the GLA primarily direct its attention in order to influence TETN policies (and why)?
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M) In your opinion, what successes did the GLA have in influencing TETN policies? What were the reasons for these successes?
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N) In your opinion, in what areas did the GLA fail to realise its interests in TETN policies? What were the reasons for these failures?
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