‘Thinking Soldiers’: the Construction of Subjectivity in the Era of the Korean War

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DECLARATION

This thesis is the author’s own work and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ABCA – Army Bureau of Current Affairs
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BKVA – British Korean Veterans Association
BWP – British Way and Purpose
CDC – Civil Defence Corps
CPV – Chinese People’s Volunteers
‘Coy’ – Company
‘Div.’ – Division
DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EUSAK – Eighth United States Army Korea
IWM – Imperial War Museum
IRD – Information Research Department
NAM – National Army Museum
NKPA – North Korean People’s Army
PRC – People’s Republic of China
ROK – Republic of Korea (South Korea)
WVS – Women’s Voluntary Service
UN – United Nations
US – United States
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Soviet Union

Regimental and Corps Abbreviations c. 1950

AGC – Adjutant General’s Corps
A&SH – Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
KOSB – King’s Own Scottish Borderers
KOYLI – King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry
KRH - King’s Royal Hussars
RA – Royal Regiment of Artillery
RAEC – Royal Army Education Corps
RAMC – Royal Army Medical Corps
RAPC – Royal Army Pay Corps
RASC – Royal Army Service Corps
RE – Corps of Royal Engineers
RF – Royal Fusiliers
RUR – Royal Ulster Regiment

Unless otherwise stated, Korean place names are quoted verbatim and in accordance with contemporary British spelling.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the significance of the Korean War (1950–1953) to British social history. In particular, it examines the subjectivity of individuals who served in the British military during this ‘forgotten war’. It uses the conflict as a case study through which to understand the influence of the state in shaping individuals in the Cold War period. This thesis suggests that the construction, control and efficiency of human subjects – and of the soldier in particular – were key concerns for all combatant nations involved in the Cold War.

In their recent studies of life-writing Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck argue that state mechanisms were paramount in moulding subjectivity in Soviet Russia, but this thesis argues (also using life-writing as the principal source) that such historical discussion should be extended to other contexts. From the psychological assessment of new recruits to the interrogation of returned prisoners of war, British authorities in the mid-twentieth century repeatedly projected their ideal models of ‘thinking’ military subjects. In making such an argument, this thesis references a particularly influential body of work on the construction of subjectivity which began in the late 1980s, including work by Nikolas Rose, Anthony Giddens and Mike Savage. Yet the following chapters also suggest that there are limits to these interpretations. Using the under-researched and under-theorised letters, diaries, poetry and memoirs of British servicemen (from a range of social and military backgrounds) this thesis argues that soldiers frequently deviated from the models that were presented to them or were ambivalent towards to the structures that sought to shape them into uniform, and uniformed, subjects. In different contexts and over time, this thesis shows how the meaning of being a ‘thinking soldier’ of the Korean War changed profoundly, with ramifications for society more broadly.
INTRODUCTION | THINKING SOLDIERS

The discipline of the army gives birth to all discipline.

— Max Weber, ‘Legitimacy, Politics and the State’.¹

The soldier today can no longer be viewed as a robot[.] ... That is why all those who consider the soldier merely as a thing to be used, like the rifle he carries or the pack he wears, are bound to come out very badly in their calculations.

— Andrew Condron, Thinking Soldiers.²

In June 1950 the British government sent its thinking soldiers to war. British involvement in the Korean War (1950–1953), seldom remembered by either historians or popular culture, exemplified the British commitment to fight the spread of international Communism, but also the domestic and international importance of the figure of the ‘soldier-citizen’. In 1948, Field Marshall Lord Wavell stated that ‘the soldier is also a citizen and must be encouraged to take an intelligent interest in the problems of the day. Our type of democracy can only survive if freedom of opinion amongst free men is maintained’.³ Soldier and citizen were cast as compatible, indeed mutually reinforcing, roles in the Korean War. In the early Cold War period the military reconceived the soldier not simply as a global policeman, but as a combatant against Communist enemies. The soldier was simultaneously cast as typically British and as a transnational defender of democracy. The revised National Service Act of 1948 established peacetime conscription for the first time and military training was framed against the threat of Communist aggression.⁴ Furthermore, the ‘soldier-citizen’, who knew (in theory) both his role in the military and the reasons behind the tasks he was asked to

³ Archibald Wavell, ‘Minerva’s Owl, or Education in the Army’, Army Education. The Journal of the Army Educational Corps, 22, 1 (1948), p. 11.
fulfil, was a central figure in British society in the 1940s and 1950s. This model of soldiering, with its origins in the Second World War, cast ‘Tommy Atkins’ as thoughtful, critically engaged with his domestic and international role, and aware of his own ‘self’. How the British soldier was perceived is thus a crucial component in understanding the histories of British society and selfhood.

But how did the soldier at the centre of this new typology see himself? Was he the archetypal adventurer of Western imagination, the defender of democracy, the embodiment of the nation, or simply a man compelled by financial circumstance, conscription and curiosity to voyage to the other side of the world to a relatively unknown country? Furthermore, how did he formulate a view of himself over time, when he was no longer a serving soldier but a relic of the ‘forgotten war’ of the twentieth century? This thesis explores how the British serviceman interacted with the ideals to which he was meant to aspire during and after the Korean War.

In doing so this thesis asks a broader question: how far was individual subjectivity, the sense that people had of themselves, influenced by state projects during the second half of the twentieth century? In addressing such a question, this research follows a long line of historians and sociologists who have attempted to gauge the relationship between the individual and the state (loosely defined in the relevant historiography as a set of centrally-orchestrated regulatory and organisational mechanisms), from the pre-modern world to the twenty-first century. Nikolas Rose, Peter Miller and Mike Savage all argue that in the post-1945 period the state shaped the formation of the modern ‘self’ through mechanisms of

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5 ‘Soldier-citizen’ in this case refers to the soldier who should understand his social context and motivation, a common idea in the 1940s, see first sequence ‘Soldier-Citizen’ (Booklets 1-5) in Directorate of Army Education (ed.), The British Way and Purpose. Consolidated Version (London, 1944), pp. 13–44. The connected idea of a ‘citizen-soldier’ was used in the nineteenth century to describe civilians taking up arms in a time of crisis, embodying the ‘military service and civic participation’, see R. Claire Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers and Manly Warriors. Military Service and Gender in the Civic Republican Tradition (Maryland and Oxford, 1999), p. 1. This discourse continued into twentieth-century wars too; see Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers. The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge, 2005). However, the introduction of conscription in Britain in 1916 and the later introduction of even peacetime conscription of National Servicemen in 1948 arguably undermined the liberal ideas of individual volition of the citizen in deciding to participate in war.

centralised observation, quantification and surveillance. In their arguments, the state is subsumed into the wider, power-infused framework of ‘governamentality’ or ‘the conduct of conduct’ as Rose puts it. Intelligence historian Richard Aldrich argues that in the early years of the Cold War ‘operations to influence the world by unseen methods – the hidden hand – became ubiquitous and seemed to transform even everyday aspects of society into an extension of this battleground.’ The sociologist Anthony Giddens even claims that subjectivity and autobiography – or one’s ‘interpretative self-history’ – became the core of modern life in this period. Subjectivity, and the state’s influence over it, mattered in the era of the Korean War. The processes of subject-formation, and the individual responses to them, are an integral part of the history of post-1945 Britain. Yet there are other global comparisons upon which we might draw and which potentially nuance such state-centric interpretations. In their recent studies of ‘Soviet subjectivity’, Jochen Hellbeck and Igal Halfin innovatively describe the complex blurring of state and self, of ‘public’ and ‘private’, in the life-writing of men and women in 1930s Soviet Russia. In the following chapters this thesis extends Hellbeck and Halfin’s approach by studying the life-writing of servicemen from Britain, balancing the influence of the state with the human capacity for subversion and resistance and even misunderstanding and apathy. In doing so this thesis conveys the importance, but also the complexity, of subjectivity in the post-1945 world.

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8 Rose, *Governing the Soul*, p. xxi. This thesis uses the more specific term ‘state’ rather than ‘governamentality’ (a concept originally expounded by Michel Foucault) as its analysis concentrates on the reactions of individuals to particular measures used by the British military and War Office.
The Korean War is a fitting case study for an analysis of subjectivity. Mike Savage and Tony Judt argue that the post-1945 period was one of perceived crisis and insecurity.\textsuperscript{12} The Korean War was indeed testing in many ways: it tested Britain’s post-war economy; it challenged the welfare agenda of the post-war Labour government, threatening party unity; it exhibited the weaknesses of Britain’s international position in the early Cold War and the difficulties in its relationships with the United States (US), the Commonwealth and the dwindling British Empire; and it led to the deployment of 100,000 British and Commonwealth servicemen over three years of war. Of these servicemen 1,078 died, many of them young National Service conscripts.\textsuperscript{13}

Less visibly, the Korean War was also one of the first and hardest tests of the typologies and models of subjectivity which the British military had sought to develop in its modern ‘soldier-citizens’. The soldier, given his status as an ‘agent’ of one of the branches of the state, is sometimes assumed to have an unproblematic relationship with central authorities. His sense of self is contingent on his one, uncomplicated task: to do as he is told. But soldierly subjectivity is far more complex. As Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper note in \textit{Men after War} (2013) ‘[t]he soldier is a national avatar, a foundational figure and is evocative of the history, self-image and identity of the nation’.\textsuperscript{14} The political geographer Rachel Woodward goes further by arguing that the soldier’s narrative can provide an insight into how individuals develop both a sense of themselves and the state. She notes that ‘[r]eading these narratives for what they say about military participation and citizenship means moving beyond the conceptualization of the soldier as the passive recipient of rights and the bearer of obligations’ and leads us instead ‘toward an understanding of the soldier as an active participant and protagonist in uneasy arguments about where, exactly, the


contemporary British soldier sits in relation to wider civilian society'. Soldier narratives are vital in deciphering the complex, contradictory and ‘uneasy’ formation of subjectivity and in showing how subjectivity can be cemented or destabilized by the demands and actions of the state.

In order to analyse the complex and broad topic of subjectivity, this thesis is divided into two parts, although there are clear overlaps between all chapters. The first chapter asks why the state was interested in the individual and why subjectivity mattered to state authorities in this era. This chapter also explores several mechanisms through which the state sought to shape its ‘soldier-citizens’, including recruitment and citizenship education. As political theorist Colin Flint notes, ‘the Cold War required a construction of society, a form of social life equipped to fight the wars of hegemony.’ The soldier was integral to this ‘construction’. The first chapter explores the extent to which various processes sought to mould the subjectivity of military men. The broad term ‘state-directed subjectivity’ is used to describe the attention paid to the self-perception of individual servicemen and citizens by the state. As an Army Education Report from 1948 noted, 'you cannot educate a man to think for himself without causing him to pass through the stage of thinking of himself.' The post-1945 soldier was encouraged to think of himself as both a guardian of order and as a potential warrior against the growing Communist threat.

The remaining chapters of this thesis question the extent to which servicemen internalised these views. It examines the often complex repercussions of ‘subjectivising techniques’ by studying a range of life-writing produced by British servicemen during and

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18 Wavell, ‘Minerva’s Owl’, p. 5.
19 As seen in the 1950 War Office film *Men of the World*, see *Men of the World* (dir. Ronald Clark; Crown Film Unit, 1950) This film is explored in Chapter One in greater detail.
after the Korean War. The second chapter argues that, although the model of Cold War ‘soldier-citizens’ was partially adopted by servicemen, there was a degree of confusion in practice. As Sonya O. Rose notes, citizenship is a discursive and multidimensional framework which ‘provides the basis upon which people can make claims on the political community’ and therefore prompts a variety of responses. Servicemen were unclear about their purpose in Korea and frequently felt overshadowed by the Second World War generation, as seen in their letters, diaries and in the seldom-studied ‘battle experience’ forms which were filled out by all British officers upon their return from Korea.

The third chapter problematizes the concept of the ‘soldier-citizen’ still further by examining the writings of British prisoners of war. Removed from the frontline and military hierarchy, the prisoner of war sometimes struggled to identify himself as a soldier and defender of democracy. This chapter examines a range of sources and practices (including letters and the long-standing Chinese practice of enforced diary-writing) to understand the experiences of the 1,076 British servicemen taken prisoner by the Chinese. Meanwhile, British authorities were concerned about whether prisoners had been ‘brainwashed’ (a term that originated in the Korean War) and whether individuals had been ‘turned’ against the democratic system they had been sent to defend. Once again, the self and subjectivity clearly mattered to the British state in the early Cold War period.

This thesis also suggests how soldierly subjectivity changed over time. The fourth chapter explores how Korean War veterans have written, published and spoken about their ‘experiences’ of a conflict that has been largely overlooked by the British public. It highlights the bitterness felt towards the ‘learned discourse of … [the] war historian’ by British Korean War veterans and how these former servicemen used their own history-writing to understand their changed relationship with the state. Overall this thesis uses British servicemen’s experiences in the Korean War to question the notion that soldiers are

22 National Archives, War Office (DTI), Korea, Battle Experience Questionnaires, WO 308.89–90.
simply ‘palimpsests’ of modern governmentality. The focus on the era of the Korean War, rather than the Cold War as a whole, is intended to highlight both this important moment in the development of the mid twentieth-century British state and to show servicemen’s apparent ambivalence to the course of the Cold War after 1953. The original contributions of this thesis are therefore to analyse the social significance of the Korean War in British history and to use the experiences of servicemen as a case study through which to investigate the construction of subjectivity in modern Britain. This study will not confine itself to a state-focused study of central mechanisms of observation and surveillance. Rather, it will be grounded in historical research of the intricate, ongoing and untidy processes of self-formation. Cumulatively, it offers a reappraisal of how far a system of categorisation was imposed and how far it was internalised by historical actors themselves.

Before setting out the unique research findings of this thesis, it is vital to position this study within existing scholarship and to provide an account of the Korean War itself. The purpose of this introduction is therefore to examine the historical literature exploring the impact of the Korean War in Britain and then to consider in more depth the merits, limitations and methods of studying subjectivity. This introduction then justifies the use of life-writing and concludes by considering the wider utility of war to social history and by summarising the selection parameters and methodology of the wider thesis.

The Korean War in British Social History

The Korean War certainly merits inclusion in the social history of Britain and in the study of modern subjectivity. Korea was occupied by the Japanese from 1911 to 1945 and, following the Second World War, two politically divergent regimes developed on either side of the 38 Parallel. Communist North Korea, known as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was supported by the Soviet Union. South Korea, the Republic of Korea (ROK), was backed by the US. On 25 June 1950 North Korea invaded South Korea and twenty-four nations offered armed or humanitarian support to South Korea and to a US-led United
Nations (UN) force. By the end of 1950, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had entered the war to support North Korea and had pushed back the initial UN advance. The first year of the conflict was marked by the rapid movement of troops up and down the peninsula, with the city of Seoul changing hands frequently. In July 1950 the Labour government (led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee) decided to commit British troops in defence of South Korea. As many as 50 per cent of the British troops deployed were National Servicemen, men aged between eighteen and twenty-one and conscripted for eighteen months (extended to two years in October 1950). They were dubbed by some MPs as ‘citizens in uniform’, but deemed ‘costly and inefficient’ by others. The National Servicemen were joined by recalled reservists from the Second World War and a small number of ‘K-Force’ volunteers from across the Commonwealth.

Korea, however, rarely features in domestic assessments of the period: the categories of Cold War and post-war are seldom used side-by-side in one study. David Kynaston only focuses on the economic consequences of the Korean War in his study of the post-war Labour government (1945–51) and David Edgerton, whose book Warfare State (2006) puts forward the argument that Britain’s economy was still geared up for war – not welfare – after 1945, makes little mention of Korea. There are a number of factors behind the exclusion of the conflict from post-war British history. US historian Charles Young argues that the ambiguous war aims of the Korean War and the uneasy truce marking its end in 1953 meant that it was not celebrated by either central government or historians. Additionally, as both James Hinton and Michael Paris have noted, the legacy of the Second World War in Britain became so important to the national narrative that it eclipsed subsequent conflicts in popular culture and historical writing.

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24 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 512 cols 844–910; Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. 472, cols 1559–622. These figures were greatly debated at the time. Overall, between the end of the Second World War and the demobilisation of the last National Servicemen in May 1963, over two million men were conscripted into the British military.
argument by showing how British servicemen in Korea also felt the shadow of the Second World War, both during and after Korea. Historians too have been unable to fit the Korean War into their narratives. David French argues that the British Army’s view of itself from 1945 as just a counter-insurgency and humanitarian force did not fit the realities of the post-war world, as the British Army was actually deployed on more occasions than the armies of either the Soviet Union or US in the early years of the Cold War.28

Despite the absence of the Korean War in British culture and history-writing, this thesis suggests it is an important case through which to understand modern subjectivity. Yet before exploring the concept of subjectivity in detail, it is necessary to highlight several other reasons why the war was important in post-1945 Britain. The year 1950 was a critical moment in defining Britain’s relationship with the US in the so-called ‘First Cold War’ period.29 Historians have interpreted the decision of the Labour Cabinet to go to war in Korea in June 1950 in a number of ways. Some historians argue that Attlee and his cabinet were driven by diplomatic pressure from the US (and the aid they gave to post-war Europe), others argue they were committed to enforce international law through the UN or that they simply wished to safeguard British interests and ‘Commonwealth harmony’.30 Winston Churchill’s Conservative government, which came to power in October 1951, also supported the war and wished to maintain the ‘special relationship’ that Churchill himself had engineered. Although cautious over rearmament expenditure, the Conservatives had fewer internal debates than Labour over the US diplomatic approach toward China.31

US policy in the Far East did, however, make consecutive British governments uneasy. Sean Greenwood and Callum Macdonald argue that both Labour and Conservative

28 French, Army, Empire and Cold War, pp. 1–2. David French states that between 1945 and 1968, the British not only deployed their forces more than the USSR and US, but also mounted thirty-six overseas military operations.
29 The term ‘first Cold War’ is typically used to indicate the initial period of international rivalry from 1945 to the mid to late 1950s, see Ann Deighton, ‘Introduction’, in Ann Deighton (ed.), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke, 1990), p. 2.
governments were keen, from long before the North Korean invasion of 1950, to mediate the US policy towards China. Policymakers in Britain had largely accepted that mainland China was now a Communist state and that the Chinese nationalists on the island of Formosa (modern-day Taiwan) had no great political sway: in 1950 US Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893–1971) had yet to be convinced that this was the case.  

British and American historians have also cast more direct aspersions on the US policy of ‘containment’ in Asia. Using a selection of US documents on Korea, Rosemary Foot disputes the widespread theory that Korea was intended to be a ‘limited war’ aimed at forestalling Soviet aggression elsewhere and argues that there was support from within the US for an expanded conflict against Communism, not least by Supreme Commander for Allied Powers General Douglas Macarthur (1880–1964). Foot’s criticism of US foreign policy follows a well-trodden path amongst American and British historians. I.F. Stone’s *The Hidden History of the Korean War* (1952) was the first significant critique of Truman and the US, written during the war itself, and further critique was perhaps generated by the protracted conflict in Vietnam between 1959 and 1975. Soviet historians, writing after the fall of Communism in Russia, have also attempted to reappraise the Korean War in the wake of the release of historical documents in the mid-1990s. Joseph Stalin’s direct involvement in the North Korean invasion of 1950 became apparent from new documentary evidence and showed his attempts both to safeguard Soviet interests in South Asia and to check the power of the fledgling Chinese Communist state. Accusations of US ‘paranoia’ and overt intervention in the area have therefore been better contextualised in recent years.


Whilst many of these histories are undoubtedly overtly critical of US foreign policy, evidence suggests that, in Britain at least, political and public opinion was indeed very suspicious of Macarthur’s motives and methods. In April 1951, the new Labour Foreign Secretary Herbert Morrison (1888–1965) was concerned that Macarthur’s naval exercises off the coast of China and talk of atomic weaponry would provoke the Chinese and would reduce the likelihood of peace talks.36

Illustration 1: David Low, ‘Misguided Missile’, Daily Herald, 10 April 1951.

Popular opinion was similarly critical of the regime of South Korea’s leader, President Syngman Rhee. The vehemence of anti-Rhee sentiment in Britain in 1950 is often forgotten by some popular historians of the Korean War, who dismiss this widespread disapproval as merely a product of the ‘left-leaning’ historiography of the Korean War.37 Yet from late 1950 political and popular opinion was wary of expanding the war any further and unpredictable, bellicose characters who could spark a wider war (like Macarthur and Rhee)

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36 Macdonald, Britain and the Korean War, pp. 48–50.
37 Macdonald, Korea, p. 84; Allan R. Millett, ‘The Korean War. A 50-Year Critical Historiography’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 24, 1 (2001), pp. 190–91; Max Hastings notes in his Sunday Times review of The Coldest Winter by David Halberstam that ‘[f]or years, western left-wing mythology held that the south was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1950’, see Max Hastings, ‘The Coldest Winter’, Sunday Times, 10 August 2008. Whether or not this was the case, there is little denying contemporary animosity towards Rhee’s government and the ROK forces, see Anonymous, ‘N.U.R. rebuke for Syngman Rhee’, Dundee Courier, 10 July 1953; David Low, ‘Prisoners in Korea’, Manchester Guardian, 23 June 1953.
were criticised. The Korean War was therefore an important moment in the burgeoning ‘special relationship’ between the US and Britain and in defining Britain’s early position in the Cold War.

The Korean War also highlights Britain’s relationship with international organisations, such as the UN and the Commonwealth, and its international reputation amid growing decolonisation in the 1950s. Greenwood argues that the ‘UN flag ... hid the reality of American power’ and, without the Soviet Union, ‘the United States was able to employ the Security Council as an instrument in the Cold War’. The Eighth Army United States Korea (EUSAK) certainly contributed the largest number of troops in support of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army in June 1950. Fourteen nations had troops on the ground at the height of the war: as well as Commonwealth countries, ground forces came from the Netherlands, Turkey, Ethiopia, France, Colombia, Belgium and Thailand. However, William Stueck argues that whilst the US mostly ‘had much of its way in the United Nations’, other member nations were worried about the conflict escalating and this reticence slowed down the UN’s decision-making process. More recent historical work has shown how Britain, as a member of the Commonwealth and the UN, had direct political influence on the course of the Korean War. British representatives at the UN even succeeded in diluting some US draft resolutions. India, independent from Britain since 1947, also played a crucial political role at the UN, leading some negotiations over prisoner of war exchange

38 Macdonald, Britain and the Korean War, p. 19. The Soviet Union were boycotting the UN Security Council due to UN’s refusal to include Communist China, although the Soviet Union returned in August 1950 and presented a counter-resolution to America’s plans (supported reluctantly by Britain) to unify the peninsula, see William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War. A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton and Oxford, 2002), pp. 63 and 99–100.


40 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p. 129. Stueck argues this delay actually allowed time for situations to stabilise, like in April 1951 when General MacArthur was dismissed.


42 Bodleian Special Collections, Clement Attlee Papers, Instructions to UK Representative at the United Nations’, June 1950, MS Attlee 102.227; Clement Attlee papers, Statement by the Prime Minister, 1 February 1951, MS Attlee 118.2–7. In particular, British diplomats were able to dilute the strong wording used by the US about China’s apparent non-cooperation in peace negotiations and to stop allegations of ‘Communist imperialism’. 12
in the latter half of the conflict. Member nations therefore retained some political influence at the organisation throughout the Korean War. Britain’s international position was further complicated by lingering imperial commitments and conflict. The British Army was fighting in Malaya, Kenya (where the Mau Mau Rebellion was suppressed in 1952), Singapore and increasingly around the Suez Canal region.\textsuperscript{43} The British role in Korea was therefore highly complex, problematised further by Britain’s own struggles in the context of decolonisation. This analysis of British servicemen in the Korean War thus purposefully looks beyond the outmoded, bifurcated model of the Cold War as simply rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union.

The economic burden of the Korean War also had important consequences, not least in dividing Attlee’s Cabinet over the long-standing ‘guns vs. butter’ debate. Britain’s economic position could have been an impediment to military involvement, as the country was weakened economically following the Second World War.\textsuperscript{44} British reluctance was later described by General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, the former Adjutant (Captain) of the Gloucestershire Regiment in Korea and author of the official history of the British in the Korean War. In his opening chapter Farrar-Hockley depicts a Cabinet weary of war and aware of the economic burden that involvement in Korea would entail, but which realised its ‘duty’ to protect the world from tyranny. This description of ‘duty’ and perseverance perhaps emanates from Farrar-Hockley’s own experience as a prisoner of war in the conflict and his subsequent career as a high-ranking British Army officer.\textsuperscript{45} Attlee’s government nevertheless embarked upon a huge rearmament programme: the defence expenditure ‘ceiling’ was initially set at £2,340 million in 1949 for the period 1951–1953, but was revised in August 1950 to £3,400 million and again to £4,655 million by September 1951. By 1952–1953 defence expenditure represented 11.3 per cent of Britain’s Gross National Product (GNP). David Edgerton’s argument that Britain was still a ‘warfare state’ in the

\textsuperscript{43} National Army Museum, \textit{Project Korea}, p. 8.
1950s is supported by David Kynaston who notes that one 1950 Gallup poll saw 78 per cent of people supporting this increased defence expenditure.\textsuperscript{46} Using the case study of Leyland Motors, Peter Burnham suggests that such support for military spending might have impeded British industrial development in the immediate post-war years, potentially contributing to an industrial slump in 1952.\textsuperscript{47} The Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan’s high-profile resignation in April 1951 over the introduction of health service charges (‘the abolition of free spectacles and false teeth’) to fund continuing rearmament demonstrates that if Britain remained a ‘warfare’ state, as Edgerton asserts, its spending was not unchallenged by politicians.\textsuperscript{48} Bevan himself blamed this spending on the privileged position of Western militaries: ‘The military advisers demanded, and, the Governments of the West conceded[,] ... No one is less fitted than a military expert to weigh the economic consequences of his inordinate demands.’\textsuperscript{49} Korea was an important chapter in ongoing debates about the nature of the post-war economy.

Yet despite the clear political and economic significance of the war, on the surface it seems hard to argue that it was socially significant. Historian Tony Shaw notes that the British Foreign Office faced a difficult task in explaining involvement to the wider public, as most people felt that ‘Britain had no economic or strategic interest in Korea’.\textsuperscript{50} A Foreign Office document, sent to Clement Attlee in 1950, noted that ‘Korea is remote and the threat to our own interests presented by the extinction of democracy in Korea would ... [be] indirect and not immediate.’\textsuperscript{51} Few people could even find it on a map, a fact corroborated by hastily-made BBC programmes in the summer of 1950. In a programme entitled ‘Korean News Flash’ aired on 26 June 1950 the presenter stated that:

\textsuperscript{46} Edgerton, \textit{Warfare State}, p. 5; Kynaston, \textit{Austerity Britain}, p. 548.
\textsuperscript{50} Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and the Korean War’, p. 265.
\textsuperscript{51} Clement Attlee Papers, Foreign Office memorandum ‘Korea – Implications of the Situation and the Principles on Which His Majesty’s Government Propose to Act’, c. July 1950, MS Attlee 103.7. This rather telling line was in fact crossed out by Attlee or one of his advisors.
The outbreak of fighting in Korea has come as a very unpleasant suprise [sic] to the British and United States Governments. It is true that people had been expecting for some time that events in Korea would take a serious turn – since Korea is one of the few places in the world – Germany is another – where Soviet power and United States power stand face to face, separate[d] only by a thin line drawn on the map[.]

... If Soviet power were to control the whole of Korea it would turn the Yellow Sea into a Soviet Lake.52

This scene was coupled with a world map indicating the Korean peninsula. Another programme noted that ‘[v]ery few people on that Sunday morning were quite sure exactly where Korea was’.53 It was stated that the war had not been planned, but that it was necessary for the protection of democracy. However, in yet another programme (aired in September 1950) presenter Allan Bullock explained the principle of Communist interference in the Korean conflict: ‘[At the] back of all this lies the clash between the intolerant and uncompromising ideology of the Communists, eager to expand their influence, and the very different views of the Western nations, anxious to preserve the freedom to live their lives and organise their societies in a variety of ways.’54 In March 1953 the Labour MP for Birmingham West and First World War veteran Charles Simmons (1893–1975) told Parliament that: ‘We shall not win the war of ideals by hauling down our “brave tattered banners” and emulating the action of our totalitarian opponents; we shall win it by proving by actions that our way of life is the better way of life.’55 The war’s legitimacy was framed in terms of defeating a wider Communist threat to state and society: as the journalist Toby Manning notes in his study of John Le Carré’s spy fiction, the Soviets had an ‘ideology’; the

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British had a ‘way of life’. As such, not only was this ‘ideology’ repugnant to the values of British society (often based, as they were in the case of spy fiction, on a rather circumscribed set of elite, male-orientated ideals), but the British were perfectly placed among the post-war nations to identify the creation of Soviet satellite states. The BBC documentary of September 1950 asserted:

There are legitimate grounds for doubting just how far the people of any of the satellite states are genuinely anxious to try the experiment of Communism and how far they are being dragooned by a ruthless minority, who’ve seized power over their heads[.]... The British can claim some credit for being the first to see the magnitude of the problem and the only possible solution to it – the grant of immediate independence to India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma in the hope of sufficiently overcoming the legacy of the past to make co-operation with these new nations possible in the future.

This sense of diplomatic and moral ascendancy, arguably originating in the legacy of an imperial sense of ‘benevolence’ and self-professed knowledge of protean nationalisms, coloured British involvement in Korea. Whilst revealing the widespread lack of knowledge about Korea, these news reports provide insight into how the early Cold War was presented to the British viewing public by means of a contrast between Communist ‘ideology’ and a British ‘way of life’.

These media representations did not convince everybody. The war prompted extensive opposition from British Communist organisations, trade unions and leading left-wing academics. In a grotesque re-imagining of American foreign policy, E.P. Thompson wrote of the capture of Seoul in 1950 by EUSAK that ‘[s]o many souls were liberated on

57 S Series, ‘Korea in World Politics’, 8 September 1950, S22/85/1.
that day/ Out of their cage of skin and freed into the airs./ It is curious that a buzzard ate the speeches/ And odd that flies should have blown on the prayers."^{58} Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the public, political and intellectual opposition to the war (explored briefly in Chapter One) is a significant moment in the history of the British Left (before the mass exodus of intellectuals from the Communist Party of Great Britain following the suppression of Hungarian Rising in 1956) and merits further academic attention.\footnote{59}

Taken together, these strands demonstrate the broader social significance of the Korean War. All of them, however, are a degree removed from the war itself. As Thomas Welskopp argues, social history should begin with ‘the premise that agents interpret their environment in the process of making “experiences” ... [and] combine ... the analysis of economic, social, cultural and political institutions from the perspective of the social subjects meaningfully interacting with one another.'\footnote{60} In other words, the ‘agents’ at the core of historical events should form an important part of historical analysis. This idea is particularly fitting when studying the Korean War. In the 1950s, the soldier on the ground was still regarded as one of the most important components in warfare.\footnote{61} The British serviceman played an important part in the strategic thinking of military leaders.\footnote{62} British land forces were mobilised from across the Empire from July 1950: 27 Brigade, stationed in Hong Kong, was hurriedly sent to Korea in the summer of 1950. The British were heavily involved in the rapid advances and withdrawals which characterised the first year of conflict on the peninsula. 27 Brigade arrived in Pusan (in the south-east corner of the peninsula) on 28 August 1950 and was almost immediately involved in repelling an offensive of the North

\footnote{59} As the focus of this thesis is primarily on the response to subject-formation mechanisms, rather than party politics, it does not fully investigate the parallel debate over whether a new political ‘consensus’ emerged after 1945, although it is important to understanding the wider political climate in which opposition to the Korean War took place. See Paul Addison, \textit{The Road to 1945. British Politics and the Second World War} (rev. edn, London, 1994); Jose Harris, ‘Political Values and the Debate on State Welfare’, in Harold L. Smith (ed.), \textit{War and Social Change} (Manchester, 1986), pp. 233–63.
\footnote{61} Bishopsgate Institute Library, Andrew Roth Papers, ‘Persia Turns the Military Scales’ (article manuscript), 15 September 1950, ROTH/3/20.
\footnote{62} Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM), General Sir Michael West Papers, \textit{Press Conference Transcript}, 1 January 1954, Docs 11300.
Korean People’s Army (NKPA). Between September and November 1950, the UN forces pushed back the initial North Korean advance still further (precipitated by the famous Inchon landings in mid-September), crossing the 38 Parallel on the order of General Macarthur.


Some commentators used the hackneyed phrase that the war would be ‘over by Christmas’ and even doubted whether the preparation underway of more brigades (the British 29
Brigade, Canadian 25 Brigade or New Zealand 16 Field Regiment) was necessary. Yet the standard historical interpretation is that Macarthur’s rapid advance up the peninsula toward the Chinese border was seen as an act of aggression by Communist China, which responded by sending 120,000 troops to support the North Koreans in October 1950. In November/December, as the UN forces were withdrawing rapidly down the peninsula to the area around Pusan, 29 Brigade arrived in South Korea. Describing the retreat down the peninsula, Jeffrey Grey says that 27 and 29 Brigades were used as ‘rear-guards for retreating American divisions’, a claim that is supported by narrative accounts from the conflict.

After lengthy discussions amongst Commonwealth governments the 1st Commonwealth Division was formed on 28 July 1951, incorporating the British and Commonwealth units under one command structure. These included the following contributions: UK (58 per cent), Canada (22 per cent), Australia (14 per cent), New Zealand (5 per cent) and India (1 per cent). By this stage, the former commander of EUSAK, General Matthew B. Ridgway (1895–1993), had replaced General Macarthur as commander of all allied forces following the latter’s ‘political insubordination’ in April 1951. Macarthur, seemingly ignoring President Harry Truman’s wishes, had continued in his quest to push beyond the 38 Parallel, ruining the fledging peace negotiations taking place at the time.
The Times heralded Truman’s action as courageous and Macarthur’s removal was popular in Western Europe as it lessened the chances of conflict in China.71

These unit formations did not simply provide an arbitrary context surrounding soldiers’ experiences: regimental commitment was deeply felt by many individuals. In a radio programme entitled ‘Korean Campaign: As the Soldier Sees it’, Lieutenant Colonel Digby Grist noted that 29 Brigade was ‘one of those big things in our lives’, a sentiment which this thesis shows was widely-felt.72 During the war, sixteen British infantry battalions and four armoured regiments served on the peninsula, alongside supporting units such as engineers.73 Whilst the British Army formed the bulk of Britain’s military contingent in Korea, the Royal Air Force (RAF) and Royal Navy (RN) played important supporting roles. The RAF provided reinforcement to the often unpopular US-led air support: Grey notes that in the first year of the conflict, USAF’s air-ground coordination was found ‘wanting’.74 British soldiers on the ground were less forgiving in their criticism, particularly those taken prisoner by the North Koreans and whose march northwards to camps along the Yalu River was made more arduous by the possibility of American air attack.75 The likelihood of these accidental attacks diminished when fighting became more static from mid-1951.

Amid these developments, there was a fear amongst senior officers that servicemen were far too uncertain over the reasons for their involvement. In response, General Ridgway asked for a memorandum to be read to all allied servicemen in January 1951, entitled ‘Why We Are Here’, which reiterated that servicemen were fighting for societal, political and even religious values which underpinned collective Western society.76 Korea was not justified in operational terms, in ‘towns’ or ‘villages’, but in ideological terms. Chief of the Imperial

71 Anonymous, ‘General MacArthur Relieved of All Commands’, The Times, 12 April 1951; Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, p. 225. This anxiety was also fuelled by US plans to rearm West Germany in the face of the Soviet threat, which worried many European governments, as the memory of Nazi power had not yet receded.
73 National Army Museum, Project Korea, p. 9.
75 IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Beckerley, 8 November 1987, 10982; IWM, Papers of RW Maguire, Unpublished Memoir, Docs 12388, p. 5.
76 IWM, Papers of Lieutenant R.S. Gill, Memorandum by HQ Eighth Army United States Army Korea (EUSA), ‘Why We Are Here’, 21 January 1951, Docs 13204.
General Staff William Slim (1891–1970) reiterated this message to returning soldiers from Korea:

[Y]ou earned the admiration, not only of your own country and of all Nations fighting in Korea, but the hearty respect of the enemy[.]. Most important of all you have helped to strike a blow in the defence of the free world which has, I think, done much to lessen the likelihood of further wars. You’ve done something to be proud of; be proud of it.\(^77\)

Yet did such high ideals necessarily help frame the Korean War for those involved or influence how they thought about themselves as servicemen and democratic citizens? When Benjamin Welles of the New York Times was asked on the BBC radio programme London Forum what the aims of the Korean conflict were he commented: ‘I think the average G.I. has no objective in mind[,] ... I think that the senior officers and the political leaders of the United States have one stated objective, and that is to repel the aggression of North Korea at least as far as the 38 Parallel.’\(^78\) This sentiment was supported by some British troops too: in a letter to his girlfriend, Valerie Wassell, National Serviceman Keith Taylor wrote: ‘[The] trouble with this war, Val, is this. There’s no object. Everything anyone does is normally done for a reason. In the last war it was “Berlin or bust”. Out here what is it? To capture Pyongyang, the capital? ... What? No one knows, except something called vaguely the peace of the world and what does that mean to the average soldier? Nothing at all.’\(^79\) This was a bold claim and potentially unsettled the servicemen’s view of himself. Did, as Taylor writes, the war mean ‘nothing at all’ to the average soldier and did this even matter? This thesis aims to answers these questions and in doing so address in greater detail the wider issue of

\(^77\) IWM, Papers of Lieutenant R.S. Gill, Personal Message from Field Marshall Sir William Slim, CIGS, to Officers and Other Ranks of the Army Reserves who are returning to Civil Life after serving in Korea, November 1951, Docs 13204.


subjectivity in mid-twentieth century Britain. Yet first of all, we must first ask why and how to analyse this complex term.

**Analysing Subjectivity**

The term ‘subjectivity’ is a useful way to analyse the relationship between individual and state in the post-war period. Subjectivity is often treated as a synonym for ‘identity’, a wholly inaccurate conflation although the two are closely connected. Rose argues that ‘practices of subjectification’ are ‘attached’ to identity projects or lifestyles, ‘our little machines of living’. In this conceptualisation, identity represents one’s overall self-perception, and ‘subjectification’ stands for the *practices* facilitating such schema of existence. However, Rose’s conceptualisation of identity and subjectivity does not allow for change over time. By contrast, in her Lacanian assessment of modern identity politics, Chris Weedon notes that ‘identity is perhaps best understood as a limited and temporary fixing for the individual of a particular mode of subjectivity as apparently what one is.’ According to this formulation, subjectivity is the sense an individual has of him or herself within a broader systemic framework, inside which time-specific ‘identities’ are mobilised, utilised and discarded. For example, the ever-contentious concept of ‘national identity’ has had very different meanings across time and space, built on specific notions of alterity and group cohesion that are highly context-specific. The ability to be ‘identified’ by certain parameters, what Louis Althusser termed the capability of the ‘hailed individual’ to

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80 For the ease of the reader, quotation marks are used sparingly around this term through the remainder of the thesis.
recognise or rail against the labels which people assign to him/her at a given moment, is thus at the core of identity. By contrast, subjectivity describes the more long-term development of a ‘subject’ in system or time period, hence its suitability for a context such as the Cold War. Subjectivity is therefore a far more dynamic term to use when assessing the interaction between state, individual and selfhood over time, and is used throughout this thesis.

Several theoretical assumptions necessarily infuse the study of subjectivity. The main assumption that underpins this thesis is by now quite familiar to historians: the idea that the self, far from a trans-historical certainty, is ‘constructed’ within particular parameters, changing according to context. In a break from Western Enlightenment individualism, post-structuralist theorists have argued that the self is not a universal, unchanging core of a human being, but instead a dynamic and constructed entity. Feminist scholarship has further contextualised the construction of selfhood, particularly in highlighting that the self, like gender, is created in relation to others. Juliet Mitchell argues that the story of the self is always told to another and does not exist independently of that encounter. Gender itself is an important component in the analysis of subjectivity. This thesis uses the case study of the Korean War to understand subjectivity in the 1950s and by examining the life-writing of British servicemen (and the women with whom they interact) it focuses on the construction of male subjectivity. However, this does not mean that female subjectivity does not feature in the subsequent chapters. Whilst the first chapter of this thesis shows that centralised models of subjectivity frequently conceptualised the citizen, the worker and the soldier as masculine, the remaining chapters demonstrate that the response to such models was far more complex. For instance, British servicemen in Korea developed a sense of themselves in relation to other men – to men in different units from themselves, to

American men, to their fathers who fought in the Second World War. Masculinity and subjectivity are not solid entities but are cross-sectioned by age, experience and nationality. Particular definitions of masculinity are ‘hegemonic’ at specific moments of time and in specific contexts. British servicemen in Korea also formulated their sense of self in relation to their loved ones (both men and women), to generations that had gone before and to the Korean population they encountered – in fact, to a vast range of subjective outlooks different to their own. Although this thesis is largely an investigation of British male subjectivity, it necessarily addresses other subjective positions and argues that subjectivity is framed by class, gender, age, race, nationality and individual encounters.

Yet despite the near consensus that selfhood is constructed in particular contexts, important questions still remain – notably that of agency. Do some of the most widely-referenced models of centrally-imposed selfhood (such as those given by Rose and Savage) allow for negotiation, irrationality or the possibility of independent thought? As this thesis suggests, a major part of the history of subjectivity is identifying instances of subversion, apathy or syncretisation of subjective models and structures. In people’s overt or understated resistance to ideas of what they should be, the historian can truly understand the extent and nature of subjectivity in a particular historical period. More broadly, contextualising selfhood highlights agency rather than reduces it, as assuming human behaviour and thought have remained unchanged can impose a value-system on the past that is not its own. Life-writing can help the historian study agency. As Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer Pierce and Barbara Lasslett note ‘personal narrative analyses not only reveal the dynamics of agency in practice, but also can document its construction through culturally embedded narrative forms that, over an individual’s life, impose their own logics and thus also shape both life stories and lives.’

In historicizing subjectivity, we perhaps risk losing our historical ‘empathy’. Barbara Taylor has noted that subjectivity has been ‘over-historicised’ and that the study of subjectivity precludes an empathetic connection with the people that a historian studies. She notes that ‘the cultural anchoring of subjectivity precludes any easy “meeting of minds” across time’, although she does warn against ‘a false sense of contemporaneousness’.91 According to this view, analysing subjectivity and identifying its key components across time reduces the agency of both historical subject and historian. There can be no room for a “meeting of minds” when those minds are filed under particular historical epochs. However, whilst the empathy Taylor describes is undoubtedly invaluable in historical research, selecting which characteristics are symptomatic of ‘species similarity between individual subjectivities across place and time’ and which ones are ‘contemporaneous’ is a difficult task. As Joan Scott notes, selection parameters in historical research are always highly ‘political’ and identifying timeless features of human behaviour is similarly dependent on the historian’s choice.92 The historian cannot identify with certainty those aspects of subjectivity which are supposedly trans-historical, even when analysing sources – such as life-writing – which might shed light on what people thought and felt in the past. The study of subjectivity does not seek to devalue human emotion at its core. Quite to the contrary, it aims to highlight how individuals’ self-perception contributed to or countered broader attempts to inculcate a specific sense of self. As Stephen Greenblatt writes, scholars wish to speak with the dead, but frequently end up speaking for them.93 Historicising subjectivity goes some of the way towards allowing historical actors to speak on their own terms, however different they might be from our own.

Historians and Life-Writing

The decision to use life-writing to study subjectivity is deliberate, although not without its challenges. There are several potential problems in using life-writing – particularly that of servicemen – as a source-base through which to analyse subjectivity in mid-twentieth-century Britain. Through writing about their life (and through centralised archives preserving that material), the writer is already unusual and apparently ‘non-representative’. Surely the historian, who analyses change over time, must tell a wider story than simply that of the individual writer? Perhaps even more profound is the claim by literary theorist Walter Ong that writing itself is also an ‘artificial’ technique which divides past and present; lived experience from the words on the page.94 The written word can never fully articulate the subjectivity of an individual, only ever represent it.

Given these challenges, how can the historian use life-writing to analyse subjectivity? However imperfect it is as a gauge of sense of self, life-writing remains one of the most important bodies of source material in analysing subjectivity. First, the issue of the ‘representativeness’ of life-writing need not dominate historical analysis. Historians have used case studies to demonstrate wider historical trends yet, as Lauren Berlant notes, the border between exemplarity and singularity is a fine one.95 In his recent study of Nine Wartime Lives, James Hinton shows how difficult it is to acknowledge individuality and historical utility at the same time. He acknowledges that his small sample of wartime diaries from the Mass Observation archive could never be ‘representative’, but neither would a larger sample: ‘No one is typical ... and the more one knows about any particular individual, the less they can be used to illustrate some more general experience or theme.’96 Nevertheless, Hinton goes on to note that while we should not generalise from these diaries, they can, at the very least, contribute to our understanding of war and democratization in

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twentieth-century Britain and, indeed, make us realise that it is through the individual choices made by people that we understand the process of historical change.\(^97\) We must therefore strike a balance between accepting the uniqueness of any source and acknowledging its part, however small, in broader collective action.

In the quest to be ‘representative’ many historians have in turn applied the equally unsatisfactory term ‘ordinary’ to the historical actors they study.\(^98\) In his book *Uncommon People*, the late Eric Hobsbawm noted that ‘ordinary people’ are capable of initiating great social change when working ‘collectively’, thereby transcending the category of being ‘common’ to being extraordinary.\(^99\) Despite this bold claim, Nick Thomas argues that Hobsbawm’s tendency to offer broad geographical and temporal surveys rendered these ‘ordinary people’ largely ‘nameless and faceless’.\(^100\) The category of ordinary (if imposed by the historian) potentially aggregates, even denigrates, the experiences of historical actors into one formless mass.\(^101\) As the literary scholar Hope Wolf has noted, the term ordinary is also a ‘frustratingly vague term, with resonances of the “non-professional writer” and of “limited education”’.\(^102\) This is not to argue that the historian cannot identify trends or common processes in life-writing which might contribute to understanding how and why individuals thought of themselves in a particular way. Nevertheless, the historian should not de-individualise their subjects in an attempt to make their sample seem more representative or to make wider historical assertions than their evidence allows. As a result, whilst this thesis uses life-writing of men from a range of social and geographical backgrounds, none of their contributions are considered ‘ordinary’, even if they reflect the day-to-day actions of

\(^97\) Ibid., p. 18.
\(^101\) This is not to argue that the category ‘ordinary’ has not been used by historical actors themselves for various ends. For instance, Mike Savage argues how workers in the influential sociological survey, the Affluent Worker Study (conducted by John Golthorpe and other eminent sociologists in the 1960s) used the label of ordinariness to position themselves within the British class system. See Mike Savage, ‘Working-Class Identities in the 1960s. Revisiting the Affluent Worker Study’, *Sociology*, 39, 5 (2005), pp. 938–39.
many servicemen. The term ‘everyday’ is a potentially preferable alternative here, as it allows historians to express the quotidian, familiar actions and attitudes of individuals without imposing a normative retrospective judgement on them.103

However, despite these difficulties, life-writing itself is undoubtedly helpful in analysing subjectivity. Oral historian Alessandro Portelli reminds us that to understand human action the ‘historian must work on both the factual and the narrative planes, the referent and the signifier, the past and the present, and, most of all, on the space between all of them.’104 Life-writing occupies such a space. Maynes, Pierce and Lasslett agree, noting that personal narratives tell us about the ‘subjective dimensions of social action’ more than other types of writing and prompt the researcher to think beyond the rigid distinction of social and individual levels of experience. All life-writing contains ‘notions of temporal causality that link an individual life with stories about collective destiny’, although the form it can take varies tremendously.105 In linking the individual and the collective, life-writing demonstrates how writers contextualise themselves in broader society. Aaron William Moore notes in his study of Japanese servicemen’s diaries that examining life-writing is thus ‘an investigation into the phenomenon of self-discipline – that is, how individuals participate in the act of defining (subjectifying) themselves and the world around them.’106

In other words, we might interpret life-writing as subjectivity in action, the process through which individuals reflect upon their experiences within broader narratives of time. The very process of life-writing requires an act of self-construction and self-description. Furthermore, that act of self-description is often culturally recognisable and accessible to readers – whether that reader is another individual or oneself. As Maynes, Pierce and Laslett summarise, personal narratives ‘are individual creations but are never simply individual

105 Maynes, Pierce and Laslett, Telling Stories, p. 3.
creations; they are told in historically specific times and places and draw on the rules and models and other narratives in circulation that govern how story elements link together in a temporal logic." In short, life-writing shows how people communicated ideas about themselves to one another. Moreover, analyses of life-writing address the method and context behind self-representation, not simply its content: no other body of source-material displays subjectivity in action to such an extent.

There is also a more personal dimension to this representation of the self. The concept of ‘composure’, first defined by historians Graham Dawson, Penny Summerfield and Alistair Thomson, has been widely utilised to understand the process of creating a personal narrative and is used throughout this thesis. Dawson explains that:

In composing a story of the day’s events ... a complex process of selection, ordering and highlighting gives prominence to some events over others and interprets their significance, thereby making sense of an objective world. At the same time, telling also creates a perspective for the self within which it endeavours to make sense of the day, so that its troubling, disturbing aspects may be ‘managed’, worked through, contained, repressed.

This concept of composure is highly useful in analysing how veterans in particular construct their subjectivity. Dawson argues that composure is a ‘cultural practice, deeply embedded in everyday life, a creative activity in which everyone engages.’ But how does an individual compose a story about an event which is not given any prominence in collective memory?

Chapter Four of this thesis suggests that when veterans feel that they are ‘forgotten’, they

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110 Ibid.
produce a distinct type of life-writing, reflecting an uneasy relationship with the state and remembrance practices. This shared sense of disappointment and displacement is the main reason why the term ‘generation’ is used throughout the thesis. As autobiographical theorists Jeremy Popkin and Paul Ricoeur argue, generational time can also mediate between calendar (public) time and individual experience, thus providing another level of interaction between individual and the systemic frameworks in which they find themselves.\footnote{Jeremy D. Popkin, *History, Historians and Autobiography* (Chicago and London, 2008), pp. 39–40; Paul Ricoeur (trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer), *Time and Narrative, vol. III* (Chicago and London, 1998), pp. 109–12.}

How do we differentiate between different types of life-writing? Alex Vernon argues that historians must remain open to the fact that servicemen come with their own preconceptions about the form of life-writing which they are producing.\footnote{Alex Vernon, *Arms and the Self: War, the Military and Autobiographical Writing* (Kent, Ohio and London, 2005), p. 12.} Life-writing is defined in its broadest sense in this thesis: whilst the majority of sources used are written or transcribed, the life-narrative is not restricted to the written word. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson make the helpful distinction between written and non-written autobiographical acts, using the term life-writing to describe written forms of self-referential reflection and life/self-narrative to describe ‘autobiographical acts of any sort’.\footnote{Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, *Reading Autobiography. A Guide for Interpreting Life Narratives* (Minneapolis, 2010), p. 4.} Following Smith and Watson’s lead, this thesis only uses the term ‘autobiography’ to refer the ‘traditional Western mode of the retrospective life narrative’, preferring the more catholic term life-narrative, which refers to any form ‘that takes a life, one’s own or another, as its subject.’\footnote{Ibid.}

Given the potential significance of different forms of life-narrative to the thesis, Chapters Two to Four each focus on particular types of life-narrative. Chapter Two concerns the use of letters, diaries, creative outputs (including responses to reading material) and ‘battle experience’ forms filled out by British Army officers on their return home. The state undoubtedly influenced the production of life-writing (and even demanded it, in the case of letter-writing), but servicemen used these types of writing to express their dissatisfaction or apathy towards their role in Korea and the type of ‘soldier-citizen’ they were being asked to
be. Experience, not citizenship, was the ever-present theme in their writing: the shadow of the Second World War consistently influenced how servicemen saw themselves in Korea.

Chapter Three explores a more specific type of military writing: that of the prisoner of war. Studying life-writing in the twentieth-century Japanese military, Moore suggests that ‘individuals use public discourse, such as war reports and patriotic literature, to narrate their experiences; this effectively invited the state, military and mass media to define who they are.’ Yet, as in the Korean War, ‘diarists also wilfully subverted or simply misinterpreted such discourse, particularly when extreme experiences, like combat, put pressure on them to find new ways to write about their lives.’ Chapter Three explores this interaction between individual and central authorities through a study of enforced writing, looking for instance at the diaries distributed to prisoners to record their political education and the public self-criticisms they were forced to make by their Chinese guards, the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) in camps along the Yalu River. Chapter Three uses the work of scholars of ‘Soviet subjectivity’ to question the assumption that life-writing is profoundly private. British servicemen were interrogated by military authorities on their return home when a life story was extracted from them. As Carolyn Steedman argues, personal narratives were frequently enforced in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through bastardy examinations, court appearances or the forced testimonies of ‘subaltern’ subjects, even from the illiterate. The self was ‘a thing that could be fashioned according to requirement, told and sold, alienated and expropriated.’ One of the original contributions of this thesis is to apply this argument to other contexts. In addition to prisoner of war interrogations, British servicemen in the Korean War were frequently called upon to give an account of their lives, from the recruitment interviews to ‘battle experience questionnaires’ when they returned to Britain. This thesis therefore seeks to highlight the involuntary nature of many life-narratives.

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116 Ibid.
117 The sensitive nature of this material is clear because the resultant transcripts remain closed today, even following Freedom of Information Requests.
produced by British servicemen, which has potential ramifications for the study of life-narratives and subjectivity more broadly.

Chapter Four, analysing veteran subjectivity, uses two highly debated types of life-narrative to explore veteran subjectivity: military ‘memoirs’ and recorded oral histories. Smith and Watson argue that in the nineteenth century memoir ‘was understood as mémoire[,]... recollections by the publicly prominent who chronicled their social accomplishments.’ Previously, as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the plural term ‘memoirs’ was also used to describe formal documents or minutes (also described as memoranda). Jeremy Popkin notes that some historians class ‘memoirs’ as commentary on larger ‘external’ (i.e. ‘public’) events in which the individual took part, whereas ‘autobiography’ is typically categorised as more personal thoughts (i.e. ‘private’) on these events. Some theorists also argue that there are more subtle divisions between ‘memoir’ and ‘memoirs’. In Writing the Memoir (2001), an example of the numerous practical guides on how to write life stories produced since the 1990s, Judith Barington describes memoirs as akin to autobiography and typically featuring the lives of great men and women. The (singular) memoir, in contrast to its rather august counterpart, must include ‘retrospection’, contextualisation and entertainment, and must not ‘shut the world out too completely’. John Newsinger further notes the military memoir is a highly specific form of memoir which, from its publishing apogee in the nineteenth century, has encapsulated important information about British popular culture and national identity. In her study of memoirs of British servicemen from the Falklands War, Lucy Robinson argues

119 Oral histories interviews transcribed by author.
120 Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, p. 3.
124 Barrington, Writing the Memoir, pp. 21 and 141. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson argue that many publishers are now returning to the older label of memoir to describe the outpouring of autobiographies in recent years, see Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, pp. 2–3.
that although the memoirs share the common process of making sense of a given situation (or ‘composing’ as Graham Dawson and Penny Summerfield argue), they also contain a large amount of ‘justification’ as authors try to grapple with how events ‘actually unfolded’ – with history. Chapter Four examines texts in which the Korean War is the central (and often the only) event which is described in detail, but also those where it forms part of a wider narrative of military, or indeed non-military, life. In particular, Chapter Four explores the meaning of ‘history’ to veteran subjectivity.

Memory is an important concept in Chapter Four, even if it is not the main focus of analysis. Smith and Watson argue that the memoir-writer ‘depends on access to memory to narrate the past in such a way as to situate that experiential history within the present.’ Sociologists Jenny Hockey and Allison James argue that the fragmentary nature of memory (‘the scanty evidence of a life’) necessitates that the writer construct a narrative in order to seem coherent and authentic. Memory serves to make the amorphous, vast notion of ‘the past’ intelligible and in doing so creates an ‘experiential history’. As Chapter Four shows, when veterans eschew the academic discipline of ‘History’, they do so in favour of this ‘experiential history’. The chapter returns to a recurring question of this thesis: is it right to assume that the individuals involved echo the wider sentiments or constructions around them? Lucy Robinson argues that many memoirs disprove Graham Dawson’s idea of the ‘soldier hero’, as not all interviews or documents reflect the dominant ‘discursive moments’ of the ‘cultural circuit’. As this thesis suggests, soldiers and veterans do not necessarily take on the models which are provided for them or, at least, not fully. Yet it argues that stories are always told to an audience, actual or imagined, from which different kinds of response and recognition are elicited: as Dawson notes, ‘subjective composure

127 As with all the chapters and for the sake of analytical clarity, subjectivity is the principal issue under discussion, although many theorists of national and autobiographical memory consider or make reference to the issue of subjectivity, including: Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge, 2003); Harold Rosen, Speaking from Memory, The Study of Autobiographical Discourse (Stoke-on-Trent, 1998); Nigel C. Hunt, Memory, War and Trauma (Cambridge and New York, 2010).
128 Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, p. 22.
130 Robinson, ‘Soldiers’ Stories of the Falklands War’, p. 578.
fundamentally depends on social recognition’. All life-writing thus negotiates between the individual and the collective.

As Portelli points out, oral histories too are ‘always the result of a relationship, a common project in which both the informant and the researcher are involved, together.’ This relationship is particularly evident in the ‘re-analysis’ of oral history interviews in this thesis. Historian April Gallwey recently defended her use of pre-recorded interviews from the Millennium Memory Bank to explore single motherhood in post-1945 England. Although ‘re-analysing’ data clearly curtails the researcher’s power to question interviewees directly and can prompt debate over consent and a lack of contextual awareness, the ‘secondary’ study of recorded interviews by someone other than the interviewer can also be immensely useful. Gallwey and gerontologist/oral historian Joanna Bornat both assert that we can ask ‘new questions’ from existing data and reveal hitherto unacknowledged tensions in an interview. Gallwey’s study is also an important example of how the social historian can contextualise collections, interviewees and interviewers through detailed research of material about oral history project construction, much of which is not available at the time of interview. Furthermore, whilst the secondary researcher was not present at the interview itself, they do have access to the recording and the transcript (or they may produce their own, as in Chapter Four). Oral history can be accessible therefore to the secondary researcher. The archived interview can perhaps also mediate some of the practical impediments in using oral history, especially for research into periods beyond living memory. A far-reaching oral history project of the Korean War is perhaps prohibited by the age, health and dwindling numbers of veterans and the ever-decreasing administrative power and significance of veteran organisations. The in-depth interviews used here from the

131 Dawson, Soldier Heroes, p. 23.
National Army Museum and Imperial War Museum, recorded between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, also merit further analysis. Joanna Bornat and Gail Wilson have noted that ‘secondary analysis’ might prove helpful in examining ‘silences’ in oral history (a concept powerfully set out by Luisa Passerini), through studying both the answers given by the interviewee and the questions asked by the interviewer. Silences (both in speech and in the content of answers) are important in understanding veteran subjectivity. For instance, a veteran interviewee might exclude autobiographical details in favour of discussing his regiment or unit’s history. The individual is silent about his own exploits and speaks only in general terms about collective action. Chapter Four of this thesis thus uses recorded oral histories, together with memoirs, to assess how veteran memoirs change over time and how their relationship with the state changes. The ability of individuals to rally against the subjective models expected of them is apparent once more in these life-narratives.

The Social History of War

In studying subjectivity in the era of the Korean War, one of the main aims of this thesis is to reconcile the study of the military with the wider historical assessments of British society. ‘Military history’, in its most traditional sense, has often seemed at odds with social history and is typically associated (particularly by academic historians) with empirical accounts of armies at an operational or strategic level. From the 1970s, however, a school of ‘new military history’ emerged which aimed to place human experience at the centre of historical analysis. Historians utilised literary criticism, psychology and autobiographical theory to provide a more nuanced account of military experience. John Keegan’s The Face of Battle (1976) is often acknowledged as one of the first works of new military history and remains a

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137 Silence has also been explored extensively by scholars studying First World War, see Adrian Gregory, The Silence of Memory, Armistice Day 1919–1946 (Oxford, 1994).
comprehensive yet moving examination of soldierly experience. Keegan describes his dissatisfaction with the study of weaponry, economics and generals ‘which, by its choice of focus, automatically distorts perspective and too often dissolves into sycophancy or hero-worship’. Richard Holmes also took this stance, noting that military history reduces ‘one of the most passionate of dramas ... to a knockabout affair dripping with clichés ... [or] to a desensitised operational narrative in which the individual is lost in a welter of arrows on a map.’ Keegan and Holmes radically altered historians’ approach to war and laid the foundations for the inclusion of the military into wider social history. Although traditional military history largely still remains something of an academic pariah, the history of the military has, since the 1980s, been included in historical analyses of social progress, education, gender, medicine and language, to name but a few topics.

Nonetheless, the transition from traditional to new military history has not been seamless. Joanna Bourke notes that the new military historians (who hail from a variety of disciplinary backgrounds) have adopted this ‘convenient soubriquet’ primarily to vent their frustration at the prevailing military historiography and its hegemony over the history of warfare, and that they form quite a disparate body of scholars. More traditional military historians have also argued that the new historians are woefully ignorant about the details of wars, preferring to focus on the representation of those wars: as Bourke concedes, war cannot simply be a collection of ‘tropes’. The challenge Bourke poses to new military historians is to scrutinise human experience whilst still rigorously analysing their sources and their context. It is a difficult task. Although quoting E.P. Thompson’s famous call to rescue historical subjects ‘from the condescension of posterity’, David French’s recent

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142 Bourke, ‘New Military History’, p. 258.
143 Ibid., p. 274.
authoritative history of the Cold War British Army still largely focuses on elite-level military decision-making, rather than using any personal accounts. At the other end of this spectrum, cultural historian Yuval Harari avoids the question by stating that he is not aiming to recover the actuality of experience, only the way it has been represented, thereby avoiding claims of inaccuracy.

Even so, new military history presents researchers with the opportunity to incorporate the history of the military into other historical areas. Global historians, for instance, have recently emphasised the importance of the military as a vector of global change. For example, this thesis brings some of the advances of the emerging interdisciplinary field of ‘prisoner of war studies’ to the study of subjectivity. Much of the research carried out in this relatively new sub-discipline, which developed out of new military history in the last twenty years, situates the prisoner of war in a global context. By doing so, this research argues that the displaced person can act as a vehicle in the exchange of ideas, technical expertise and language. As Chapter Three of this thesis shows, servicemen were not under the orders or military hierarchy of their own armies when in Chinese-run prisoner of war camps. This chapter suggests that military experience is cross-sectioned by a range of variables which mean that the story of white Western man (or the story told by him) is not universally applicable. As historian Jeremy Black has written, we should also ‘be wary of the concept of a single Western way of war’. This awareness is needed particularly when considering prisoners of war.

One of the main stumbling blocks to the effective inclusion of the military in wider historical analyses, however, is the continued tendency to divide military and civilian ‘spheres’. Military and social historians alike have deepened the conceptual gulf between the two. Samuel Hynes’ underlying assumption in The Soldier’s Tale (1998) is that war

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144 French, Army, Empire and Cold War, p. 11.
profoundly changes a man: he travels from innocence to experience, from naivety to knowledge through his immersion in war. In her recent study of American servicemen’s letters and diaries from modern wars, Diana Gill uses this paradigm too. Gill presumes that the individual changed by war somehow represents a descent, a perversion, of the normal self or at least a tale of growing disenchantment (in contrast to the ‘euphoric transparency’ of the soldier’s first stage in the military).

Although the distinction between soldier and civilian is helpful on a basic level in analysing employment, legislation, welfare or pay, it is not necessarily applicable to the study of subjectivity. A central argument of this thesis is that the two ‘spheres’ are different but also intimately connected through a cross-pollination or merging of practices and attitudes. It is misleading to depict the civilian and the soldier as worlds apart during the 1950s, due to peacetime conscription and the recent memory of the Second World War. As the Labour MP James Harrison noted in March 1953 ‘every family has [had] someone in the Army now, so that it has become part and parcel of our daily lives’.

It is inaccurate (if not anachronistic) to portray the two as separate ‘spheres’ in the 1950s. This is not to belittle the Korean War serviceman’s sense of separation. As Chapters Two and Four suggest, the tendency to separate the military and the civilian, on the grounds that military ‘experience’ is unattainable and impossible to describe, had a profound impact on how servicemen in Korea wrote about their lives. Servicemen understandably felt isolated at times. Nevertheless, by looking at subjectivity in detail, this thesis suggests that it is productive to consider the connections and crossovers which characterise both the military and broader society at this time. Accordingly, Appendix A contextualises the main events in the Korean War alongside other events mentioned in this thesis which were of significance to British servicemen, from sporting victories to the end of rationing.

149 Diana C. Gill, How We Are Changed by War. A Study of Letters and Diaries from Colonial Conflicts to Operation Iraqi Freedom (New York, Abingdon, 2010), p. 136; Samuel Hynes, The Soldier’s Tale. Bearing Witness to Modern War (London, 1988), pp. 16–17; Hynes does not include Korea in his analysis of soldierly writing, noting that ‘I have nothing to say, for example, about the war in Korea, a war that came and went without glory’, see p. xiii.

150 Gill, How We Are Changed by War, p. 87.

The theoretical separation of the civilian and military worlds has also had an undeniable impact on history-writing. As Chapter Four of this thesis suggests, military history, perhaps more so than any other sub-discipline of history, prizes lived experience in its chroniclers. From Shakespeare’s *Henry V* to Samuel Johnson, men who have not been soldiers ‘hold their manhoods cheap’ or think ‘meanly of ... [themselves] for not having been a soldier.’ John Keegan, Richard Holmes and Jay Winter all describe similar feelings when writing their books or interacting with veterans, but conclude that lack of lived experience should not inhibit historical study. However, both Holmes’ gendered statement that ‘he [the military historian] will have to contend with those who argue that lack of personal experience is a disqualification’ and Keegan’s call to socialise with male veterans are complicated when the historian of the military is female. In her poem ‘The Loneliness of the Military Historian’ (1995), the poet and novelist Margaret Atwood describes the repugnance with which an imaginary dinner guest might treat a female military historian: ‘In general I might agree with you: / women should not contemplate war/... Women should march for peace, / or hand out white feathers to arouse bravery, / or spit themselves on bayonets / to protect their babies / ...These are the functions that inspire general comfort. / That, and the knitting of socks for the troops’. Many female historians of war are familiar with the surprise with which family, friends, members of the public and even fellow researchers react to their thesis or book topic, even if they are studying a fairly well-known conflict. When that military topic is in itself obscure, the general response is even more puzzled. Julia Lovell, recently reflecting on her own research into the Opium Wars in nineteenth-century China, similarly refers to the incredulity with which people (including famous television historians) have treated her as a woman researching the history of

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154 Holmes, Firing Line, pp. 8–9; Keegan, *The Face of Battle*, p. 34.

warfare.\textsuperscript{156} Yet Lovell argues that wars are ‘full of opportunism, errors, lies and collaboration. You don’t need to possess a Y chromosome to find it compelling; you need only to be human.’\textsuperscript{157} Recent research into the social history of war, which incorporates a host of gendered positions, such as ‘military femininity’, female defence or the complex bonds of homosociability, supports Lovell’s statement.\textsuperscript{158} There remains a need for diversification in a discipline that is still characterised as ‘for the boys’. In addition to addressing the common problem of accessing experience (which social historians frequently confront), this thesis also asks why military history in particular stresses the value of experience, and the consequences of such a hierarchy in the subjectivity of servicemen, veterans and the historian.

\textbf{Methodology and Source Material}

The material used in this thesis comes from a variety of state-generated documents and material written by servicemen themselves. In using state documents, Aldrich has noted that ‘nowhere else is the researcher confronted with evidence precisely managed by their subject[.] ... Historians are what they eat and the convenient but unwholesome diet of processed food on offer in national archives has resulted in a flabby historical posture.’\textsuperscript{159} In an attempt to remain in historical shape, this thesis focuses primarily on the response of servicemen to the directives of the state. As seen above from debates over the representativeness of material, ‘sample size’ is a frequent area of dispute. A project concerning \textit{Nine Wartime Lives} clearly has a different range of analysis from a project studying four hundred (such as Paul Thompson’s famous oral history of the Edwardian


\textsuperscript{157} Lovell, ‘Military History’.


\textsuperscript{159} Aldrich, \textit{The Hidden Hand}, p. 6.
period), but neither are, nor ever could be, ‘complete’ studies of a given generation. Oral historians have dealt with allegations of ‘non-representativeness’ by either including a very large ‘representative’ sample or, in the wake of Passerini’s path-breaking essay, ‘Work, Ideology and Consensus under Fascism’ (1979), by embracing the variation of expression, subjectivity and production methods at the core of oral history. This thesis openly takes the second approach in analysing the construction of subjectivity in the era of the Korean War but, heeding Joanna Bourke’s call, has also endeavoured not to sacrifice the detail and breadth of source material. Each section will first position salient issues within the relevant historiography, before examining sources and original findings in detail. Using archives from national and regimental museums from across the UK, this thesis explores life-writing from a range of geographical locations and social backgrounds, using rank as an imperfect yet workable indicator in the latter case. It also uses material produced by both National Servicemen and by regulars in the British Army and covers a broad temporal range in order to address the changing nature of subjectivity.

Owing to the oversight of the Korean War in British social history, there are inevitably areas which this thesis cannot pursue by itself. There remains a need for a comprehensive analysis of both the Korean War within the history of the British Left and of the wider social significance of the National Service. Furthermore, owing to the largely land-based campaign in Korea, this thesis focuses principally (although not entirely) on the experiences of the British Army in Korea, rather than on the RAF or RN. Nevertheless, many of the directives detailed in the following chapter applied to all branches of the Armed Forces in the early Cold War period. On the outbreak of war in 1950, the subjectivity of soldiers, sailors and airmen was a pressing concern for the British military and the state adopted various ‘subjectivising techniques’ to produce the ideal serviceman in these ‘threatening years’.

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162 Historian Richard Vinen’s recent study is one of the first academic attempts to analyse the social impact of National Service, see Richard Vinen, National Service. Conscription in Britain 1945–1963 (London, 2014).
In 1950, shortly after Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s commitment of British forces to the UN mission in Korea, the War Office sponsored the production of a Crown Film Unit film entitled *Men of the World* (1950).\(^1\) Amid aerial shots of ‘exotic’ locations including Libya, Singapore and Malta, the film’s primary focus was the character of the British soldier and his suitability to act as a policeman in the post-war world, from the markets of Libya to the jungles of Malaya:

[Narrator:] The British soldier. All around the globe you’ll find him. From Gibraltar to Hong Kong. Everywhere he stands against the threatening years, staunch symbol of our common will to order[.] … Citizen in his sense of the responsibilities of freedom. Soldier in his acceptance of the disciplines of duty. Truly a man of the world.\(^2\)

The military’s position as a vanguard ‘against the threatening years’ meant that the soldier was still regarded as a frontline defender, even with the indistinct battle lines of the Cold War.\(^3\) The soldier remained the archetypal adventurer and symbol of martial masculinity.\(^4\) Against this new international political background, *Men of the World* nevertheless echoed tropes from an imagined (and idealised) imperial past: amid the complex process of ‘seeking

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\(^1\) In 1940, the Crown Film Unit succeeded the Empire Marketing Board Film Unit (1930–33) and General Post Office Film Unit (1933–40) in making centrally-funded documentary films. The CFU was discontinued in 1952 due to criticism over its costs. Central government films were increasingly made by private firms such as the Shell Film Unit from the mid-1940s. See IWM, ‘Personnel Selection in the British Army’, (prod. Shell Film Unit), 1944, UKY 591; Jack C. El lis and Betsy A. McLane, *A New History of Documentary Film* (New York and London, 2005), p. 154; Paul Swann, *The British Documentary Film Movement, 1926–1946* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 164.


\(^3\) Journalist Andrew Roth argued that the ‘armed ground soldier is still in the decisive force in modern warfare’; see Bishopsgate Institute Library, Andrew Roth Papers, Andrew Roth, ‘Persia Turns the Military Scales’, (article manuscript), 15 September 1950, ROTH/3/20.

a role’ in the post-war period, the ‘ubiquitous British soldier’ still policed local bazaars and British Army officers still formed exclusive polo clubs across the world. The unchanging characteristics of the British serviceman were depicted as emblematic of British character more generally, such as his readiness to speak to ordinary people in different locales, his commitment to defend freedom and even his fondness for a nice cup of tea at the NAAFI.

Yet emergent domestic and international concerns precipitated the redefinition of an active (frequently male) citizenship, which meant that the serviceman had a special pertinence to the post-war state. The British government and military authorities focused on the capabilities and characteristics of ‘cold war frontiersmen’, as protection against the perils of the ‘threatening years’. The serviceman represented the maintenance of international law and the British ‘common will to order’. This chapter argues that authorities were keen to instil a particular kind of subjectivity in the soldier himself: indeed, this thesis forms a case study of how states seek to shape subjectivity and how individuals respond to it. At the same time military life was also used as a catalyst in shaping the self-perception of the post-war civilian too, particularly for the young growing up amid the currents of decolonisation. Male adventure stories from the Second World War featured in the school curriculum in Britain and Commonwealth countries, the virtues of the conservative ‘wartime hero’ extolled to school children. We are reminded therefore that soldierly subjectivity had consequences beyond the barracks.

The soldier was theoretically self-aware of his role as a ‘man of the world’ and defender of democracy and order. To some extent, this mirrors Anthony Giddens’ argument

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6 NAAFI stood for Navy, Army and Air Forces Institutes and most commonly referred to military canteens, bars and small supplies outlets (as well as welfare facilities); *Men of the World* (dir. Ronald Clark, Crown Film Unit, 1950).
8 The value of ‘order’, both legal and social, has been questioned by historiography from the 1970s on social dislocation in Britain during the Second World War. See Angus Calder, *The People’s War, Britain 1939–1945* (London, 1969), p. 17.
9 Lynne Segal, *Slow Motion. Changing Masculinities, Changing Men* (London, 1990), p. 20. In her study of masculinity in the 1950s, Lynne Segal argues that the young National Service conscripts of the 1950s were the first generation to reach adulthood in a ‘post-Imperial Britain’, where the vacuum of imperial ‘sexualised fantasies of military glory’ were filled by stories of past adventure and once again by tales of British espionage.
that ‘the reflexive project of the self’ underpinned modern subjectivity.\(^{11}\) This chapter demonstrates how such subjectivity was a central concern to the state and one of its foremost branches – the military. It closes with an analysis of the range of assessments used to test potential military candidates and argues that British authorities repeatedly ‘projected’ their ideal models of the military (and masculine) subject and his role in a global conflict.

As referred to in the introduction, the Korean War provides a good prism through which to view this state attention: not only does it mark the first instance of active conflict by these ‘men of the world’ against a Communist foe, but the war coincided with broader shifts in the conception of the individual in British society as a whole. A heightened emphasis on individual volition within Western democracy ran parallel to (or as Mike Savage argues intermingled with) new systems of testing, categorising and quantifying individuals.\(^{12}\) Colin Flint has also used the Korean War to examine concepts of citizenship and military participation in a geopolitical context: he argues that in the USA the discrete concepts of ‘citizen’ and ‘soldier’ collapsed into one another during Korea, as US authorities were forced to redefine both the aims and the agents of conflict in this first wholly extra-territorial conflict in the name of ‘homeland defense [sic]’. As Flint notes: ‘Violence, in the form of fighting wars and preparing for them, is used to create particular forms of the democratic subject, and hence the sovereign power.’\(^{13}\) This chapter examines the individual in greater detail and highlights three groups of ‘subjects’ that the state sought to theorise and shape: democratic, observable and military subjects. Taken together, these three overlapping strands (separated here for analytical ease, but often intermingling with one another) show the varying ways in which state practices sought to influence individual subjectivity in the mid-twentieth century. As an aside, it is important to note the complications in treating military authorities as representatives of the state. Although military authorities largely acted

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upon state wishes, this chapter explores the particular mechanisms through which state’s priorities were put in place and the debates surrounding certain measures (for example, the presence of psychiatrists in the military). So whilst military authorities frequently reflected the view of the state, we must be wary not to conflate the two unnecessarily.

Before exploring democratic, observable and military subjects in detail, this chapter first addresses the broader theoretical issues at stake in the formulation of a ‘modern subject’ in more detail. Scholars including Rose, Giddens and Savage have written extensively on formation of the modern individual and they show the dominant influence of the state in creating subjects. However, whilst these assessments provide some of the most important frameworks through which to understand the modern self, this chapter highlights the limits of what can be termed ‘state-directed subjectivity’.14 In doing so this chapter, and thesis as a whole, argues that any study of the relationship between state and individual from the late 1940s must be informed by a comprehensive analysis of culturally contingent selfhood, the agency of individuals in their relationship with the state and the nature of the historical evidence used to explore the ‘modern self’. In this way, it mirrors the work done by scholars of ‘Soviet subjectivity’, most notably Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck and argues that such interpretations should be extended to other contexts.15

Modern Subjectivity: the ‘Reflexive Project of the Self’ and the Limits of the State

Subjectivity is frequently manacled to the ‘project’ of modernity; the creation of knowledge, hierarchies of expertise and individual accountability are deemed to be the hallmarks of the

bureaucratic state.\textsuperscript{16} John Meyer writes that the ‘concern to construct individuals in a way appropriate to society’ needs is as intrinsic a component of the modern social structure as are large-scale economies and bureaucratic states.\textsuperscript{17} As Giddens notes, this is not to presume that ‘the cultivation of individual potentialities’ has not been, to some extent, a concern of all societies, but rather that the control and even the creation of subjects is particularly integral to modern systems of power, none more so than the nation-state.\textsuperscript{18} Giddens then argues that the privileged position of experts, from doctors to engineers, ratifies certain systems of knowledge, which in turn become embedded in modern society as ‘common sense’.\textsuperscript{19} Giddens and Meyer both imply that such knowledge systems fundamentally influence how individuals perceive themselves: the mechanisms of ‘governmentality’ provide the categories through which people view themselves.\textsuperscript{20} Consequently, according to such arguments, the individual is both moulded by the mechanisms of the modern state and is a crucial component in its structure. As Rose and Peter Miller summarise, the ‘mental lives of citizens, their emotions, capacities and propensities’ form both a building block and an observable variable of state control.\textsuperscript{21}

A further component of Giddens’ paradigm is the ‘reflexive project of the self’. In other words, one of the overarching features of modernity is that ‘self-identity is constituted by the reflexive ordering of self-narratives.’\textsuperscript{22} Giddens in fact argues that, in its broadest

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Nikolas Rose, \textit{Governing the Soul. The Shaping of the Private Self} (London and New York, 1990); Michel Foucault ‘Technologies of the Self’ in Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick H. Hutton (eds), \textit{Technologies of the Self. A Seminar with Michel Foucault} (Amherst, 1988), pp. 16–49.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Giddens, \textit{Modernity and Self Identity}, p. 75.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Meyer, ‘Myths of Socialization and of Personality’, p. 208; Rose, \textit{Governing the Soul}, p. 5; Michel Foucault first set out the concept of ‘governmentality’, see Michel Foucault, ‘On Governmentality’, \textit{Ideology and Consciousness}, 6 (1979), pp. 5–22.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Miller and Rose, ‘The Tavistock Programme’, p. 171.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Giddens, \textit{Modernity and Self Identity}, pp. 243–44.
\end{itemize}
sense, autobiography is not simply a genre of writing but a mode of modern existence. Whilst Giddens’ critics note that he aligns himself too much with an agenda of ‘liberal individualism’ or else that he discounts the role of the unconscious dimensions of the self, sociologist Anthony Elliott defends Giddens’ dual focus on the pre-eminence of experts and reflexive subjectivity. Modernity may well have rendered its subjects more ‘self-aware’, but their subjectivity is arguably still contingent on social and institutional developments (pioneered by experts) of their age. Elliott defines this reflexivity as ‘a self-defining process that depends on upon monitoring of, and reflection on, psychological and social information about possible trajectories in life.’ In short, in the contemporary world subjects are aware that they possess an inner essence, a ‘self’, that is shaped, scarred and saturated by external phenomena.

Some scholars argue that in the second half of the twentieth century the modern, Western state paid great attention to its ‘subjects’ and to individuals’ awareness of themselves. The use of the term ‘subject’ here and throughout this chapter implies ‘subjectification’ – ‘the circuits that shape and modulate everyday experience’ as Rose describes it. Rose uses Michel Foucault’s concept of a genealogy of selfhood together with, this thesis would argue, neo-Marxist Louis Althusser’s idea of ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’. In basing his work on these two theorists, Rose epitomises the post-structuralist approach to the state which appears in manifold studies. Yet these two models, and by implication Rose’s, are open to criticism and lead us to question any theory of state-directed subjectivity. In a reworking of Marx’s concepts of base and superstructure, Althusser argued that ‘Repressive State Apparatuses’ (such as the army) were supplemented

26 Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 264.
by institutions of ‘ideology’, such as education, religion, the family and culture. These Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) thus form a crucial part of Althusser’s reappraisal of Marx. His ‘elaborate verbalisations’ were criticised: in a detailed, vituperative essay entitled ‘The Poverty of Theory’, E.P. Thompson famously lambasted ‘Althusserians’ as both determinists and careerists, who reject the agency of the human subject and misunderstand the profundity of Marx’s schema. Rose’s other theoretical progenitor, Foucault, was similarly questioned. Some critics described his *Discipline and Punish* (1975) as deterministic, as it sketched such totalising mechanisms of modern power.

Despite these tensions, Rose overtly pays homage to Foucault, if not to Althusser. Rose argues that in the twentieth century the protrusion of psychological disciplines into people’s lives, through psychiatry and therapy but also through more diffuse psychological language, rendered the population of Western democracies ‘governable subjects.’

Roger Smith takes this further, arguing that by the mid-twentieth century people perceived themselves and their quotidian actions in profoundly psychological terms as a consequence of the pervasiveness of ‘psy’ language. Similarly, Savage links the ascendancy of the social sciences in the post-war period to the Western emphasis of democracy: ruling by consent, but also through in-depth knowledge of the populace. In the context of the early Cold War therefore, one might argue that ‘subjectivising techniques’, from psychology to the pre-eminence of social scientists, meant that the state had a crucial role in forming subjectivity.

However, it is the task of the historian to understand how such models exist within a historical context. As Timothy Mitchell argues, these sociological assessments of the

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32 Rose, *Governing the Soul*, p.5.
33 Ibid., pp. xviii–ix. However, Rose maintains that language ‘is only one aspect or element of the ways in which the human being’s relation to itself is shaped and reshaped historically.’
formative influence of the state can artificially separate the state from ‘society’. In his critique of ‘statist’ interpretations, such as Theda Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* (1979), Mitchell inadvertently also highlights the weaknesses of the overly deterministic approaches to selfhood provided by Rose and others. Mitchell argues that the demarcation of the boundaries of state and society is in fact itself a political act to maintain order. In highlighting the statist influence in the ‘psy’ disciplines, Rose perpetuates the discourse of state power which circulated at the time, rather than interrogating its origins or considering the ‘psy’ beyond ISAs. As Richard Aldrich notes, the historian of modern state institutions must always be alert to the fact that their archive has been created by precisely those they wish to study.

Other historians have responded, if indirectly, to the tension between state and society raised by models of state-directed subjectivity. In her analysis of early twentieth-century British society, Jose Harris remains acutely aware of the inherent tensions in the changing powers of institutions. She notes that in Victorian and Edwardian society, ‘self-restraint was increasingly at war with the new notions of “individuality” and “self-expression” that were coming to the fore in the 1890s and 1900s’. One returns again therefore to Giddens’ uneasy concatenation of increased, modern self-reflexivity on the one hand, and the rise of state institutions and agencies on the other. The dichotomy of ‘public’ and ‘private’ does not fully address this tension, as gender historians have also noted. In the case of certain trends, such as religious expression, such a division awkwardly separates public institutions and more individual belief. Indeed Louis Althusser himself noted that private/public dichotomy was a bourgeois division within a particular ISA.

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37 Mitchell, ‘The Limits of the State’, p. 82.
38 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions. A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 29. Skocpol demarcates the state as ‘a set of administrative, policing and military organizations’ which has the potential to be completely autonomous from class control.
How then is the historian to approach the relationship between individual and the state without resorting to crude, ‘statist’ determinism or isolating the self as part of the ‘private’ domain? Recent studies of subjectivity in the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1989 perhaps provide a template for future studies of the relationship between self and state. Principally using letters and diaries, scholars have attempted to piece together Soviet subjectivity in an innovative way which highlights both the role of the state in forming people’s perception of themselves (and the socio-economic and cultural parameters in which they can form such a perception) and human agency. In his study of diaries written in the 1930s, historian Jochen Hellbeck uses various case studies to explore the seemingly contradictory notions of individual expression and state interference. Hellbeck argues that we tend to see people as intrinsically ‘liberal subjects’ and therefore see the diary as a ‘sphere of free self-determination’, epitomised by literary diary-writers like Winston Smith in George Orwell’s *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1949).44 This was not the case with writing from the Soviet Union: Hellbeck questions this illusion of the diary and the ‘private’ sphere as the epitome of ‘unfettered and authentic subjectivity’, because autobiography was actually *taught* in youth institutions and as part of ‘historic’ economic projects.45 Elsewhere, historian Igal Halfin explores how individuals described themselves when interrogated, like when the Soviet regime tried resisters from the United Opposition at the Tomsk Technical Institute in 1928.46 Eric Naiman argues that this Soviet subjectivity literature is inconsistent in its treatment of ‘subjects’, but as Naiman also admits this inconsistency is arguably the result of slight disciplinary differences rather than a fundamental oversight at the core of this emerging field.47

The work on Soviet subjectivity offers the historian several critical tools which could be of value in other contexts: firstly, it explores the nature and operation of

45 Such as the construction of the Moscow Metro, see Hellbeck, *Revolution on my Mind*, p. 86; Hellbeck, ‘Working, Struggling, Becoming’, p. 343.
‘subjectivising technologies’. While Foucault was the first to posit the ‘technologies of the self’, later replicated by Rose, Hellbeck gives higher credence to the role of writing and the lived actuality of keeping a diary. For instance, he argues that these ‘logbooks of the Soviet self’ were both ‘records and tools of psycho-physical training’, as authors used diaries to monitor their own psychological development as Soviet subjects: one writer used her diary to ‘systematize’ her confused ‘unconscious feelings’, so she might make her life more ‘plan-like’, following the example of economic and social development in the country at large. While Foucault was the first to posit the ‘technologies of the self’, later replicated by Rose, Hellbeck gives higher credence to the role of writing and the lived actuality of keeping a diary. For instance, he argues that these ‘logbooks of the Soviet self’ were both ‘records and tools of psycho-physical training’, as authors used diaries to monitor their own psychological development as Soviet subjects: one writer used her diary to ‘systematize’ her confused ‘unconscious feelings’, so she might make her life more ‘plan-like’, following the example of economic and social development in the country at large.

The individual is firmly at the centre of this analysis. Furthermore, Hellbeck considers the limitations of the centrally enforced autobiography, noting the deeply ambivalent relationship many Communist officials had with this typically ‘bourgeois’ form of self-expression. This nuanced approach to politicised selfhood is not without precedent: Giddens is aware that the construction of the self has political implications and that the self is in fact part of the ‘political endeavours’ of high modernity and Steedman describes how autobiography was often ‘state-sponsored’ through the writing of British schoolchildren. Yet scholars of Soviet subjectivity more convincingly marry the polity, the state and the individual. Life-narratives are treated as both personal records and products of a centrally-orchestrated practice to instil particular values, at once ‘introspective, controlling and regulating’.

One might argue this is simply because polity, state and individual were more interconnected in the repressive Soviet system. This is inaccurate for two reasons: first, it reduces the agency of individuals in forming their own sense of themselves under particular regimes (usually those deemed undesirable), assuming that state monolithism translates into ‘brainwashed’ individuals. Second, to localise these conclusions about the construction of subjectivity assumes that individuals do not create powerful political selves under Western...

democracies. In her oral history study of Young Socialist men in 1960s Britain, Celia Hughes notes that ‘[f]or these individuals the process of understanding oneself, of creating an identity, occurred not only in a local familial context, but also in a national and international setting of expanding social and political boundaries.’ The political contexts of both the Cold War and post-war British socialism informed Hughes’ interviewees’ perception of themselves. In an interwar British context, Catherine Feely gives the remarkable example of Frank Forster, labourer and self-taught Communist, who applied the concepts of dialectical materialism put forward by Joseph Dietzgen to his everyday life.

Whilst the typicality of these cases should be not be overestimated, Hughes and Feely demonstrate the agency of individuals in self-formation and the political parameters that might inform such a process. Overall therefore, the emerging work on Soviet subjectivity, and political subjectivity more generally, can provide historians with a paradigm (if not yet a uniform method) for understanding the vibrant relationship between state and individual.

**Democratic Subjects**

Soviet subjectivity can also inform studies of other political formations, such as democracy, and the unique role of the subject in it. Patrick Joyce’s study of ‘democratic subjects’ in the nineteenth century reinforces the ideas of Rose, Foucault and Norbert Elias, arguing that self-conscious, ‘collective selves’ influenced the very foundations of a democratic polity.

Joyce summarises the post-structuralist re-evaluation of the highly loaded term ‘identity’ in favour of subjectivity: his summary is that ‘[m]eanings make subjects and not subjects meaning.’ The use of the term ‘subject’ is important, at once emphasising the individual’s role as a historical actor but also the constraints which ‘subject’ (and subjectivise) him.

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Crucially, these subjects were also democratic citizens, implying an individual must think of his duties as well as his rights. Sonya O. Rose echoes Joyce’s argument, noting that the multidimensional, discursive framework of citizenship produces legal and political subjects, as laws specify who belongs to state and the responsibilities those who belong have. But does democracy ever truly engender collective, socially constituted selfhood? How does the subject fare when democracy itself is under domestic and international scrutiny, as in the early Cold War? Savage argues that in the mid-to-late twentieth century ‘[t]he project of managing democracy involved the creation of “responsible” individuals who were capable of self-regulation and thus automatically aligned themselves to the social order of neo-liberal democracies.’ A ‘democratic subject’, made aware of his duties by the state and its agencies, corroborated the vision of ‘free’ liberal existence which was said to exist in Western society. Here, this section argues that the idea of an individual as a democratic subject was equally important in the early Cold War period. The conceptualisation of the democratic subject – the citizen – had multiple origins: in the definition of active citizenship which emerged in the Second World War, in the reassertion of British national character during the Cold War and in the characterisation of the Communist subject as ‘unquestioning’ in Cold War British culture. As the following section suggests, the soldier-citizen had a specific significance in this democratic subjectivity. Once again however, this thesis tests the salience of centrally-espoused ideas in the populace at large: for instance, this chapter examines both the piecemeal nature of particular state-backed citizens’ organisations and how the continuing tradition of popular dissent undermines the view that the modern

57 The uneasy connection and overlaps between subject and citizen have a complex historiography. For instance, in an imperial context, postcolonial scholar Mahmood Mamdani argues that the state structure, responsibilities and discourse of European ‘civilized’ society were imposed on African colonies. In other words, Africans could theoretically become ‘citizens’, but were excluded as they were deemed ‘uncivilised’ and were thus merely ‘subjects’ of this system. See Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton, 1996), pp. 16–17. Discourses of subjecthood and citizenship thus often run parallel. In this thesis the term ‘subject’ is used to imply the presence of subjectifying techniques, rather than the designation of an individual as a subject to a particular polity, as the genealogy of the political ‘subject’ is beyond the scope of this analysis.


59 Savage, Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940, p. 68.
democracy was simply a system of ‘governmentality’ and centrally orchestrated projects to shape the self.

To some extent the international context of the early Cold War adds prescience to discussions of democratic subjectivity, as was evident by the increasingly transnational definition of democracy and democratic citizens. In the intellectual context of the 1950s, there were many studies of ‘national character’, extending an avenue of research which was at its height in the 1930s. One of the most notable studies appeared in 1955 by British anthropologist Geoffrey Gorer (1905–1985) entitled Exploring English Character (1955) in which he investigated the familial relations, social habits and beliefs of ‘the English’ based on extensive questionnaires issued to readers of the People newspaper. Gorer was well-known for his studies of national character, including in the USA and Russia. Peter Mandler argues that Gorer used this study to test the psychoanalytical ideas of anthropologist Margaret Mead (1901–1978), but also highlights the influence of his collaborator on The People of Great Russia (1949), the psychoanalyst John Rickman (1891–1951), whose theories of group dynamics were used in the military from the 1940s and are explored below. Gorer’s study also used the psychological term ‘personality’ to analyse the British nation and the individuals within it: particular nations had particular characteristics or ‘personalities’, all of which contributed to global discord and harmony.

However, Mandler uses a case study of Gorer’s associate, Margaret Mead, to argue that these interpretations of national character had little place in the Cold War: where nationalism was once seen as an anthropological staple, ‘neither policymakers nor … the general public wished to believe that people in other nations were different; on the contrary, they wanted to see them as very much like themselves, just misguided, or misled, or

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suffering under the yoke of tyranny.” Mandler does argue that Mead attempted to make the study of national characteristics relevant to the Cold War period, as in the ‘handbook’ she produced with a team from Columbia University in 1953 to assess the potential sparks that might lead to a conflict between the USSR and USA. Yet on the whole democracy was increasingly deemed to be not a national trait, but rather a proclivity of all mankind. Gorer’s and Mead’s views were therefore increasingly old-fashioned in the Cold War intellectual context.

The belief in the universalism of democracy translated into other areas of scholarly and state research, most notably in exploring ‘propaganda’ and ‘brainwashing’. Whilst the second term quickly lost academic currency (but enjoyed continuing popular currency, as the third chapter of this thesis demonstrates), studies into ‘propaganda’ abounded in the 1940s and 1950s. Daniel Pick argues that the interest in the ‘limits of reason and of individualism’ accelerated in the nineteenth century and continued after the First World War, when sociologists and psychoanalysts sought to understand why individuals acquiesced to the modern ‘war machine’. The emergence of totalitarian regimes in the 1930s and the 1945 trial of senior Nazis at the Nuremberg trials further increased this attention. The post-1945 intellectual scrutiny of individual volition and ‘rationality’ substantiates Mandler’s argument that the Cold War universalised the democratic subject. Propaganda was one of the tyrannical methods used to suppress people’s natural behaviours, to induce them to behave contrary to their instincts and interests. Democracy was regarded as a default in human behaviour and its absence must be the result of external manipulation. Colin Flint links this

65 The extent to which this continued to remain a feature of American policy has remained a contentious source of debate, for example see William Blum, America’s Deadliest Export. Democracy (Halifax N.S. and London, 2013), p. 16.
66 Lindley Fraser, Propaganda (London, 1957); Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, Factors Used to Increase the Susceptibility of Individuals to Forceful Indoctrination. Observations and Experiments (New York, 1956).
69 Fraser, Propaganda, p. 1.
universalist discourse to the construction of the ‘soldiercitizen’ in the USA (and Flint argues the two figures are so interconnected that the term does not even need to be hyphenated). US conservatives were keen to use the Korean War to put forward the notion that the ‘nation-state’ was the only legitimate form of political imagination, in the face of Communist ‘class warfare’. As Flint puts it, ‘[t]he soldiercitizen at home and the citizen-soldier abroad fight the nonterritorial political imagination of class warfare by protecting values and institutions that the hegemonic power deems universal and final, in the sense that none better have existed or will exist.’\(^70\) In other words, the soldier not only ‘defended’ democracy but he embodied an institution which was wedded to the idea of the nation-state and the democratic subject in it. Like democracy therefore, the ‘soldiercitizen’ had similarly universalistic overtones in the context of the early Cold War.

Yet to assume that national characteristics were superseded by this universalising discourse (and its geopolitical ramifications) underestimates the strength of national sentiment in Britain in the wake of the Second World War and the continued attempt in the early Cold War to differentiate both British foreign policy and the British character from the USA. Critics of the USA included members of the government, but also those who opposed the war in Korea frequently lambasted the US national character. In a poem entitled ‘Cold Warrior’ published by the \textit{Labour Monthly} in 1950 James Aldridge wrote, ‘Listen America:/Death is a braggart/In their apple-pie hands, and/Liberty is beggared/at their milk-fed lips.’\(^71\) Anti-Americanism was rife in intellectual circles in the 1950s, even amongst writers who were funded by the CIA-backed Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign Office.\(^72\) This differentiation lends weight to the numerous historical interpretations which

\(^70\) Flint, ‘Mobilizing Civil Society for the Hegemonic State’, p. 351.
\(^72\) The IRD, the largest department in the Foreign Office in the 1950s, was founded in 1948 to coordinate British ‘propaganda’ efforts. Its tasks included infusing the British trade union movement, youth movements, radio broadcasts and book and journal publishing with anti-communist material, in co-ordination with the British Society for Cultural Freedom (BSCF). However, intelligence historian Richard J. Aldrich concludes that British contributors (including Bertrand Russell and Robert Conquest) were ‘ineffectual Cold Warriors, accepting substantial subventions but projects that turned out to have little connection with cultural freedom or anti-communism.’ See Aldrich, \textit{The Hidden Hand}, pp. 443–63; Andrew Defty, \textit{Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–53. The Information Research Department} (Abingdon and New York, 2004), pp. 1–5. The Korean War prompted much closer alliance between the IRD and the CIA and other US bodies, as well as

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state the role of an ‘other’ in cementing national identity. Furthermore, the vast majority of ‘propaganda’ and ‘brainwashing’ studies emerged from a US Cold War context, rather than a British one: as Chapter Three of this thesis demonstrates, ‘brainwashing’ was an important cultural import from the USA, but did not necessarily reflect the same concerns about the democratic subject. Therefore, whilst on the whole the democratic subject was increasingly interpreted as a universal and transnational phenomenon in the Cold War period, important national dimensions to these debates remained.

Due to these reformulations of British national character in the Second World War, the democratic British citizen became an even more significant component in how the state interpreted individual subjectivity. In 1943, C.B. Fawcett wrote of a ‘Distinctive Race’ in British Way and Purpose (known as BWP), the pamphlet issued to soldiers as part of citizenship education. He noted that: ‘Geography and history are foundation studies for the citizen … intelligent citizenship must rest on appreciation of both our natural resources and our heritage.’ Temporal and geographical location fed into an informed sense of Britishness, and indeed citizenship. The concepts of citizenship and ‘civil defence’ became widely disseminated in the midst of mid-twentieth war and international tension. Lucy Noakes and Susan Grayzel argue that in the Second World War British citizens were encouraged to take an active role in the defence of the democratic system: defence thus became an agreement between individual and state, which stressed the duties rather than rights of the citizen and which was ratified by the participation of citizens in work such as Air Raid Precaution (ARP). As an aside, the Ministry of Defence Act of 1946 combined the departments of the Air Ministry, War Office and the Admiralty under the auspices of accelerating the IRD’s Asian operations. In particular, the IRD were keen to spread an anti-communist message from its base in Singapore, as ‘the Korean situation’ had made counter-insurgence operations in Malaya more challenging. See Paul Lashmar and James Oliver, Britain’s Secret Propaganda War (Stroud, 1998), p. 46.


This conceptualisation of citizenship had been profoundly gendered since ‘civil defence’ emerged during the First World War, as ‘active’ citizens were frequently characterised as men despite the range of female activities in wartime. Sonya O. Rose notes that by the Second World War, this reconfiguration of citizenship made it a ‘moral or ethical practice’, where active citizenship was based on one’s ‘participation in civil society’ to aid national survival.

The growing tension between the US and the Soviet Union from the mid 1940s arguably changed the position of the democratic subject as a citizen and as an active (male) defender of the democratic polity. Various citizen organisations were established to address the possible domestic repercussions of the Cold War. For example, the Civil Defence Corps (CDC) was established by the government in 1949 (alongside other civil defence groups), as a group of volunteers to assist the population in the case of a nuclear attack: in October 1952 Britain, after all, was the third nation, after the US and the Soviet Union, to test the nuclear bomb and needed to prepare for the eventuality of nuclear war. Matthew Grant defines this period as part of the ‘atomic age’ of civil defence, where plans were similar to those laid down in the Second World War and emanated from the experience of evacuation and shelter policy. Civil defence came to be ridiculed by the 1960s as an ineffectual response to the nuclear threat and the CDC was disbanded in 1968. Nevertheless, Grant argues that in the 1950s at least, the Korean War made civil defence concerns more pressing, although a major £936 million civil defence plan was ‘dead in the water’. However, as later chapters of this thesis will demonstrate, evidence suggests that ordinary British people did not feel that the largely conventional conflict in Korea was the start of a ‘Third World War’, even when

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78 Rose, Which People’s War, p. 20.
80 Ibid., pp. 34–35.
81 Ibid., p. 74.
82 Ibid., p. 38.
General Macarthur threatened to use the atomic bomb. Macarthur’s subsequent dismissal by President Truman meant that such concerns were fairly short-lived.\textsuperscript{83} Therefore to frame this period as an ‘atomic age’ is to overlook both the highly conventional (even trench) warfare used in Korea and the extent to which the conflict was associated with atomic weapons in the public mind.

Grant’s discussion also underplays the actual mechanisms which constructed citizenship through defence and the complexity in such construction, particularly with regards to gender.\textsuperscript{84} Noakes and Grayzel highlight that citizenship remained persistently gendered in the twentieth century and split along ‘passive’ and ‘active’ lines – ‘with women and children largely as victims and men as defenders of the home’.\textsuperscript{85} British citizens arguably did not see the CDC as the active frontline of defence in Cold War, particularly when compared with the far more ‘active’ regular soldiers and National Servicemen fighting ‘Communism’ in Korea and across East Asia.\textsuperscript{86} Grant himself acknowledges that civil defence funding and individual recruitment motivation were frequently contingent on the international, military situation.\textsuperscript{87} By contrast, civil defence itself often focused on ‘women and children first’ in domestic strategies of evacuation and protection.\textsuperscript{88} James Stafford argues that the successor to the CDC, the government’s Protect and Survive booklet, similarly cast those at home as passive and it was only through campaigns against these measures and through anti-nuclear protest that those in a domestic context began to forge their own ‘active Cold War citizenship’.\textsuperscript{89} In this case, citizenship could actually stand against the state. Furthermore, some critics in the 1950s railed against the association of citizenship with essentially militarised defence. The Socialist Leader criticised this

\textsuperscript{83} By contrast, politicians used the phrase frequently: Mr Frederick Cocks noted that ‘I support the Government in its determination to avoid a large scale war with China, because, if we are dragged into such a war, it is almost inevitable that it would mean the start of a third world war, in which millions of people of all races would perish in an atomic blaze’, see Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, vol. 484, cols 41–158.

\textsuperscript{84} Grant does address the use of gender in recruitment ‘propaganda’ elsewhere, see Matthew Grant, ‘“Civil Defence Gives Meaning to Your Leisure”. Citizenship, Participation, and Cultural Change in Cold War Recruitment Propaganda, 1949–54’, Twentieth Century British History, 22, 1 (2011), pp. 52–78.

\textsuperscript{85} Noakes and Grayzel, ‘Defending the Homeland’, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{87} Grant, After the Bomb, p. 43.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., pp. 62 and 143.

Aldous Huxley criticised such mobilisation in *A Brave New World Revisited* (1959), noting that much of the dystopic future he had imagined in his 1931 novel had been realised in the early Cold War context. He particularly lamented ‘the cost of what every nation refers to as “defence” … those endless columns of uniformed boys, white, black, brown, yellow, marching obediently towards the common grave.’

Huxley rejected the idea that militaries should be used to protect political freedom, but nevertheless used the gendered language of active citizenship (‘uniformed boys’) to root his distaste in a social reality his readers would recognise.

Huxley’s diatribe also highlights another complicating factor in the discussion of the citizen: that of independent thought and therefore, by implication, self-reflexivity within the democratic system. ‘Thinking’ was one of the overarching themes of citizenship in early Cold War Britain and potentially substantiates Giddens’ ‘reflexive project of the self’ paradigm. In describing the advances of the 1944 Education Act, the Labour Party Manifesto of 1945 noted that ‘the great purpose of education is to give us individual citizens capable of thinking for themselves.’ This capacity had direct implications in the setting of the Cold War. In the War Office film *Two Ways of Life* (1958), a distinct comparison was drawn between the armies of Britain and the USSR:

Unlike the forces of the USSR, every British serving man has a freedom of thought and choice that would be unthinkable under Communism. He has the right to know the reason for his service in the forces and to be informed on national and foreign policy, and, what is more important, to ask questions on that policy which is more than the Soviet soldier or citizen can or dare do.

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94 *Two Ways of Life* (dir. Peter Bryan, War Office, 1958). This film was a War Office Production, Crown Copyright July 1958. It was produced for the Army Kinema Corporation by Associated British-Pathé.
The British soldier was encouraged to be as thoughtful as his civilian counterpart. His thoughtfulness was also juxtaposed with British traditions of longer-standing: immediately following the above declaration in *Two Ways of Life* is a shot of an Army Chaplain by a crucifix talking to a soldier as the narrator notes that ‘it is important that everyone knows as much as possible if he is to obtain the right set of values and to feel that he is an individual with personal ambitions, personal problems.’\(^95\) Religion is depicted as one of the sources of information that a sensible man should consider when learning more about his role with the services and society at large. Such emphasis on religion and morality highlights a further element of democracy in the 1950s. Extra-mural lecturer at the University of Hull and advisor on religious education to the armed forces Professor T.E. Jessop (1896–1980) noted that ‘democracy is a moral idea, and can be embodied only by a highly moralized people. To describe its machinery without talking also of its spirit … is like describing all parts of a motor car without mentioning the petrol’.\(^96\) Advice on religious education in the Armed Forces in 1947 pursued this point further, noting that ‘[t]he goal of Christian instruction is to produce an individual soldier of independent character’.\(^97\) Religion had an important, if complex, role in military subjectivity and is discussed further in Chapter Three.

Reasoned discussion and judgement had been formalised in the British Army during the Second World War with the Army Bureau of Current Affairs (ABCA) set up in 1941 under the orders of Sir Ronald Adam, Adjutant-General, who sought to innovate British Army education and recruitment to improve morale and the ‘quality’ of British servicemen.\(^98\) The format of group discussion both reinforced the value of the group over the individual and encouraged self-reflection. As the accompanying discussion handbook noted:

> A discussion is simply a joint effort by a group of people to arrive at an understanding of some problem; one might even say that discussion is the group’s

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\(^{95}\) Ibid.


means of thinking and communicating thought. This repeated reference to the group is intentional. For it is this aspect of discussion which makes it so relevant an activity today. Most people, in industrialized society like ours, live in great impersonal cities or in suburbia[,] ... It is in this social context that group discussion becomes so valuable.99

Indeed, the model was deemed so successful that a civilian counterpart, the Bureau of Current Affairs (BCA) was established in 1946 by the Carnegie Foundation to ‘to encourage a civilized and liberal interest in current affairs’.100 The BCA published discussion pamphlets on a range of political topics, including summaries of the situation of Korea, the nature of Chinese Communism and the Cold War.101 Closer to home, thoughtful judgement was once again encouraged: one discussion booklet entitled Think Before You Vote (1950) listed the different types of political argument, reasons for voting and questions one should ask before casting one’s vote. Discussants were even encouraged to consider the personal characteristics needed for a Member of Parliament and to assess the merits of their speeches and statements.102 As an article in the Army Education Corps journal noted: ‘Today, more than at any other period in world history, [the] aims and ideals of civilization are the concern and topic of discussion among all types of citizens.’103

The achievements of the ABCA and BCA must be contextualised: the BCA journal was discontinued in 1951 and servicemen continually made light of the discussion format. In March 1953, Labour MP for Newcastle Arthur Blenkinsop referred to discussion groups as the ‘frills’ of Army education.104 In 1988, National Serviceman Sam Mercer repeated the old Army adage in an oral history interview that ‘there are two things which you never discuss

100 Ibid., pp. 6 and 8.
in a barrack room, religion and politics." Furthermore, these discussion groups did not dispel the idea some had that the soldier was a thoughtless automaton in the modern bureaucratic state machine. The following cartoon appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* in August 1951 as military leaders in Korea first sat down to peace talks at Kaesong and it criticised the military’s ability to get its servicemen to think for themselves:

![Illustration 3: David Low, ‘The Battle of Wits (Continued)’, Daily Herald, 24 August 1951.](image)

As Chapter Three demonstrates, some British prisoners of war in Korea even saw any feelings of doubt over their role as antithetical to their duty as a soldier.\(^{106}\) The piecemeal and variable impact of the BCA (much like the CDC) counters some of the most dominant interpretations of the modern subject in a democracy. Self-reflexivity was evidently present and promoted, but far from ubiquitous. Geoffrey Gorer wrote that when researching *Exploring English Character* there were no parallels in England of the ‘self-analysis, self-criticism and self-discovery which so many Americans seem to find congenial’.\(^{107}\)

From another angle, terms like brainwashing and propaganda once again represent a profound tension in the formulation of the democratic subject. These terms testify to

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105 NAM, Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, 8905-261.
intellectual and societal unease about the possibly nefarious influence of the state, but they contrast with the idea of thinking citizens. If every human being had the potential to become a democratic subject, as Western policymakers argued, then they also had the potential to be manipulated. There was thus a contrast between active, thinking citizens and passive, ‘brainwashed’ drudges in this period.

Yet ‘thinking’ could involve questioning and even opposing the government. Unlike disinterest (as with the CDC and BCA), dissent has often been taken to show the success, rather than failure, of democratic institutions. The political context of the Korean War perhaps demonstrates the importance of such opposition. In 1952, journalist Andrew Roth wrote about many left-wing activists’ opposition to the war, both in parliament and beyond:

At all times … Britain has a substantial body – probably the largest in any Western democracy – of public-spirited citizens who act purely as their conscience dictate. They organize small bodies and protest meetings and – in the classic British tradition – write restrainedly indignant letters to The Times.108

Elsewhere, in Two Ways of Life, Hyde Park Corner is prized (if somewhat condescendingly) as a bastion of free speech, no matter how amusing your views may seem to the assembled audience.109 British philosopher and novelist Olaf Stapledon (1886–1950) also stressed the cumulative power of such collective action, writing for the National Peace Council: ‘There can be no community worthy of the name save a community of self-aware and other-aware, mentally free and mutually responsible persons’.110

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108 Bishopsgate Institute Library, Andrew Roth Papers, Andrew Roth, ‘Britain’s Stage-Whisper on Korea’ (article manuscript), 24 May 1952, ROTH 3/24.
109 Two Ways of Life (dir. Peter Bryan, War Office, 1958). As the narrator implies, speaking through such mechanisms, dissenters (notably Communists) bolster the democratic tradition still further; it is impossible to speak against the system other than from within it. See parallels in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, 1988), pp. 271–313.
However, to some extent the opposition to the Korean War counters the idea of a Cold War citizen, as those resisting the war questioned both Britain’s involvement and the legitimacy of the state to send its servicemen, especially conscripts, to such an unjust war in the first place. In 1950 the Labour Monthly editorial board referred to the conflict as ‘the Korean War of Independence’ and drew a parallel between it and the Spanish Civil War, arguing that ‘[p]rogressive opinion all over the world has recognised a common cause with the people of Korea in their heroic struggle.’ The extent to which this was a valid assessment of the international left is debatable: many figures opposing the war were Communists or expressed rather radical opinion in comparison with the public mood more generally, such as town planner for the Stevenage Development Corporation and an alleged Communist sympathiser Monica Felton, journalist Alan Winnington, Communist Party secretary Harry Pollitt and radical lawyer D.N. Pritt. Roth noted that Communists were not generally part of the restrained tradition of opposition in Britain. These figures were more critical of the legitimacy of the British state per se, not simply the current government. However, there was also significant resistance to the Korean War from trade unions, suggesting resistance did not simply come from members of the Communist Party of Great Britain alone. The political impact of such resistance to the Korean War in Britain remains under-researched; however, these debates mentioned (both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary) suggest a very different political landscape from that described above by Colin Flint for the USA. There, powerful conservatives used the war to militarize US society around the idea of ‘homeland defense [sic]’, an idea so wedded to the nation-state as to make the ‘class warfare’ paradigm presented by Communist countries completely alien to political

imagination.\textsuperscript{115} Due to the historical legacy of class politics in Britain, the voluntarism Roth describes and the localised resistance through certain trade unions, the idea of class warfare was arguably not as alien to the British public during the Korean War. This perhaps explains the nature of resistance in Britain and the claims it makes on the role of dissent within democracy.

Overall therefore, we can see that the democratic subject was important to Cold War democracies as an oppositional category, but that in Britain it was also based on a re-evaluation of British ‘national character’ following the Second World War. Profound tensions prevailed though: over the contradictory ideas of what constituted national character, the notion of universal democracy and the extent of corrupting influences like ‘propaganda’. Similarly, resistance to the war in Korea legitimised freedom of speech in a democracy, but the nature of that resistance did call into question state legitimacy and thereby its power to shape and direct its subjects.

\textbf{Observable Subjects}

What form did this state interest take and to what extent did those methods in turn shape the individual? The emphasis on thinking citizens and soldiers in Cold War Britain substantiates Giddens’ assessment that modern, self-reflexive subjectivity forms a crucial component of modern life. Yet the projected ideals of a Cold War democratic citizen also coincided with a change in how the government \textit{acquired information} on its subjects. Making heavy use of Foucault’s assessment of disciplinary power, Rose argues that from the late 1940s psychology became the prime method though which the state ‘knew’ its citizens and therefore controlled them:

\begin{quote}
To rule citizens democratically means ruling them through their freedoms, their choices, their solidarities rather than despite of these. It means turning subjects, their
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{115} Flint, ‘Mobilizing Civil Society for the Hegemonic State’, p. 346.
motivations and interrelations, from potential sites of resistance to rule into allies of rule[.] … Social psychology as a complex of knowledges, professionals, techniques, and forms of judgement has been constitutively linked to democracy, as a way of organizing, exercising, and legitimating political power.\textsuperscript{116}

Psychology, however, was not the only influence on the democratic citizen. Though vital to analysing subjectivity, the rise of the ‘psy’ disciplines alone does not convey the full range of ‘subjectivising techniques’ which sought to shape the individual in the post-1945 world. Char Miller notes that with the development of new managerial concepts in the 1950s in the US and Europe, the state ‘increasingly emphasized the citizen’s role as the object of state management over the citizen’s role as the legitimizer of government.’\textsuperscript{117} In charting the post-war rise of the social sciences, Savage links this development to both the increase in ‘technical, scientific cadres’ as a result of the Second World War and the social fluidity created by demobilization.\textsuperscript{118} Savage and Miller, like Giddens, thus argue that the citizen was rather an\textit{ observable variable} in a modern bureaucratic system in the second half of the twentieth century, which at times eclipsed the citizen’s democratic role.

This section of this chapter focuses on the specific ways in which the individual was ‘observed’ in the 1950s, by examining the impact of three influential theories in early Cold War Britain: the industrial model provided by Frederick Taylor (1856–1915), the sociological research of Erving Goffman (1922–1982) and popular psychology of Hans Eysenck (1916–1997). Their work is significant for several reasons: first, their respective works offer contemporary perspectives on the formation of the modern self, whether it was formed on the factory floor, in the county asylum or in conjunction with psychiatric and psychological examination. Second, whilst they were certainly not the only theories to influence the development of modern bureaucratic structures, these three works arguably

\textsuperscript{117} Miller,\textit{ Taylorized Citizenships}, p. 29.
\textsuperscript{118} Savage,\textit{ Identities and Social Change in Britain since 1940}, p. 69.
percolated official thinking in a number of institutions and at different levels. In the cases of Taylor and particularly Eysenck this notoriety was accompanied by a high profile amongst ‘lower cadre’ workers and even the layman had an appreciation of their ideas of ‘personality’. Third, we can use the works of Taylor, Goffman and Eysenck to assess the relevance of three disciplines widely hailed as the most formative in shaping modern subjectivity in Europe and North America: industrial theories of human relations, ‘everyday’ psychology and personality profiling, and sociology and the rise of the social sciences. These works thus also prompt analysis of the historical assessments of Rose, Savage and Miller who firmly root these ‘technologies of the self’ in a post-war democratic context. Examining the ‘observed subject’ can be used to nuance Brian Harrison’s claim that ‘[a]ll the postwar running, practically and intellectually, was made by planning, public welfare, and the management of demand by politicians, administrators and experts.’

Finally, the differing but interconnected corpora of these three ‘experts’ provide a good platform upon which to test ideas of state-directed subjectivity and to offer an early reflection on the views of individuals themselves, which are examined in more detail later in this thesis.

In the early twentieth century US engineer Frederick Taylor conceptualised men as part of an industrial model of production, known as ‘scientific management’ which provided a template for subjectivity into the 1970s and beyond. Taylor’s seminal text *The Principles of Scientific Management* (1911) stated that the interests of management and employee were interdependent: the prosperity of manager and employee relied on the other’s prosperity. That prosperity was in turn built on ‘maximum productivity’ of the employee, which necessitated a system of controls and *incentives*. Taylor, writing in a context of US engineering, was also keen to offer ‘rule-of-thumb methods’ for practical use. Taylor also argued that ‘[t]hey [workers] worked to the best of their ability through the time that they

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119 Harrison, *Seeking a Role*, p. 43.
120 Miller, *Taylorized Citizenships*, p. 175.
122 For example, he explored the popular belief amongst workers that any improvement in productivity might in the long-run impact on their trade and employment, a belief that could only be combated by education Taylor, *The Principles of Scientific Management*, pp. 16–18.
were being observed." Brooke Whitelaw argues that post-war British industry organisation owed much to this ‘participant observation’ at the core of US sociology. From the position of the manager’s office in industry to the organisation of the working day, observation was arguably a key component in the working man’s life from the early twentieth century.

Taylor’s model had a significant impact too on the relationship between state, industry and military. The Manual of Army Education in 1959 echoed the principles of scientific management, noting that ‘Army Education increases the soldier’s efficiency by improving his professional competence and building up his morale.’ One BCA edition concerning ‘Human Relations in Industry’ argued that the war, despite the loss of life, had made employers more concerned with industry and the value of ‘community’. Similarly Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Rendel remarked at a conference of Allied psychiatrists in 1944, that it was now established that worker happiness was a prerequisite in modern society, with industrial psychology representing a renewed and scientific welfare project.

An important element to such organisation was the effective observation and categorisation of workers according to skill and suitability. Industrial psychology had become so pervasive in the early twentieth century that in 1945 Charles Oakley, an industrial psychology specialist at Glasgow University, noted that ‘psychological testing is no longer a novelty’. Industry was one of the main influences on the post-war military in its project of moulding individual subjectivity. The depth of the connections between industrial management (and specifically ‘scientific management’) and the military had direct repercussions for individuals. Michael Roper analysed the life narratives of thirty ‘management men’ in a psychoanalytically-informed study in the early 1990s and argued that management strategies gave men a new language through which to define themselves,

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129 Parmenter, ‘Human Relations in Industry’, p. 3.
but that this management language was also inexorably tied up with their experiences of military life. A distinct, even recognisable, generation of managers and executives were shaped by training in the Second World War or as part of National Service: these men (and women) used military metaphors together with industrial notions of observation and categorisation (which also informed their military experiences) in their management of British and international businesses and their self-perception well into the 1980s.\textsuperscript{130} Observable subjects were thus of both industrial and military concern, with long-term consequences.

One of the core concepts in this new psychological approach in industry was the emphasis placed on the ‘group’. The individual worker was defined in relation to his functional role in both industry and society at large.\textsuperscript{131} In the wake of the Beveridge report of 1942, Rendel noted that society was ‘engaged now in England on massive schemes of Social Insurance to ensure security to the people and happiness [but] … no compromise is necessary between the needs of society and the needs of the individual; what suits one will suit the other.’\textsuperscript{132} Self-reflexivity underpinned this categorisation of the individual to a certain extent: Charles Oakley argued that: ‘If a man has a lot higher than that of an ant, it must be linked up with capacity to know what he is doing’.\textsuperscript{133} However, some argued that beneath these effusive endorsements the deeper directive was simply to improve efficiency and productivity, shown by the mechanistic overtures of Taylorist thought earlier in the century.\textsuperscript{134} In the case of the United States, Miller argues that Taylorist ideas were given a new pertinence in aftermath of the Second World War, particularly in redefining the individual at the core of ‘scientific management’:

\textsuperscript{130} Michael Roper, \textit{Masculinity and the British Organization Man since 1945} (New York, 1994), pp. 5 and 116–17. One notable example is that of Sir Peter Holmes, later CEO of Shell, who served as a National Serviceman in Korea, see IWM, Papers of Sir Peter Holmes, Documents 12515.

\textsuperscript{131} British Psychoanalytic Society Archives, Main Papers T.F. Main, ‘Some Thoughts on Group Behaviour’, July 1958, PO7/A/12, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{132} Papers of John Dalziel Wyndham Pearce, Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Mendel, ‘Some Reflections by a President of a War Office Selection Board’, Minutes of Military Psychiatrists Conference, York Medical Society, 7–8 October 1944, GC/192/18, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{133} Oakley, \textit{Men at Work}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{134} Smith, \textit{The Norton History of the Human Sciences}, p. 607.
The direct result of the application of Taylorized divisions of labor [sic] to national civic life, required the formulation of the individual. Rituals supported by time schedules, desk row, playgrounds, lunch hours ... played a role in the construction of a political citizenship or subjectivity predicated on a powerful individualism in which even the most personal of experiences (interest and attitudes) became much more public.\(^\text{135}\)

In other words, the observation of the individual at the core of Taylor’s thought, writ large in the Anglo-American organisational practices of the 1940s, made subjectivity a topic of concern for central government. Citizenship discourse too augmented this trend. This is not to argue that Taylor’s ideas remained unchanged by the 1950s. Social psychiatrist J.A.C. Brown noted that modern industrial psychology was far more interested in why workers were productive or ‘lazy’, rather than invasively monitoring their breaks and movements.\(^\text{136}\)

Yet this shift made subjectivity and human motivation even more established at the core of psychological investigations in industry. Overall, whilst Taylor’s earlier theories of ‘scientific management’ had a less direct impact upon early Cold War subjectivity than we might at first think, his schema nevertheless laid the ground work for both industrial psychology (and its pervasive language) and for the importance of observation in modern state institutions.

The work of leading post-1945 US sociologist Erving Goffman provided a different perspective on subjectivity, but like Taylor’s was also concerned with the practical ramifications of theories of organisation. Based on research carried out earlier in the 1950s (much of which was based on fieldwork on the Shetland Islands in Scotland between 1949 and 1951), Goffman’s best-selling *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life* (1959) depicted the self as a drama, performed in the social sphere and constituted by the social sphere alone. Self-control, ‘the front’ and ‘expressive coherence’ in performance could all, 

\(^\text{135}\) Miller, *Taylored Citizenships*, p. 172.

according to Goffman, be interpreted as ‘interaction constraints which play upon the individual and transform his activities into performances’. Drama, as well as an idea of a ‘game’, functioned as an enthralling metaphor in the text and implied the different roles acted out by people in social contexts.

Goffman’s other canonical work, *Asylums* (1961), described the parameters that underpinned the nature of the human subject produced in ‘total institutions’, whether they be caring, educational or confining spaces. Although Goffman had not served in the Second World War he was drawn, like psychoanalysts of the period, to the highly observable institution of the Army (by nature of its internal organisation and bureaucracy) as a case study for such work. He describes the initial ‘mortification’ new recruits underwent when they entered this total institution and reflected on the systems of reward and hierarchy that bolstered the routine, and from there the identity, of military men. The prominence of Goffman’s work also demonstrates that the voice of the social scientist, as well as the psychologist, had become an authoritative source of knowledge in the 1950s. Savage highlights the impact of military experience (in particular through ‘cultures of war, mobilization, and demobilization’) on sociological study, but also points out the ascendant position of these disciplines by the 1950s, as the social sciences were ‘themselves implicated in new forms of governmentality, regularity, and social imaginary.’ Social scientists such as Goffman, according to Giddens’ formulation, were the ‘experts’ of the modern state.

Goffman made few direct references to the Cold War context in which he was writing. However, Stephen J. Whitefield argues that his work was nevertheless a significant part of Anglo-American Cold War culture, questioning the ‘pressures of conformity’ and the manipulation of ‘personality’ in a heightened political context of

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international rivalry. Goffman’s views both exemplified and formed part of fraught discussions over the nature, changeability and subjectivity of individuals in the post-1945 Western world.

Such debate was concentrated around the figure of the serviceman, as suggested by the early work of Hans Eysenck. German-born Eysenck came to England in 1934 and finished his doctorate under educational psychologist Cyril Burt at University College London in 1940. He began work as research psychologist at Mill Hill Emergency Hospital in the Second World War. Mill Hill was in many ways a pioneering establishment: under Aubrey Lewis, Eysenck and other leading psychologists extended their knowledge of war trauma through various experiments, amongst both civilians and military personnel. Eysenck later noted that, in conducting his earliest psychological tests on soldiers, he ‘just wanted them as subjects, but they wished to discuss their problems with somebody and apparently didn’t get much of a chance to do so with their psychiatrists.’

Based on these experiences in research at Mill Hill, Eysenck began to work on his book *Dimensions of Personality* (1947) and developed a complex questionnaire system by which to understand personality, later compiled into a personality index. Daniel McAdams places these achievements alongside those of psychologists Raymond Cattell and Gordon Allport, arguing that all three led to the modern appreciation of personality ‘traits’.

Eysenck’s work epitomises the increasing sophistication with which psychologists, but also a growing number of non-specialists too through popular texts like Eysenck’s *The Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (1953), categorised individual characteristics in the latter years of the

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Second World War and beyond. Eysenck’s work was not restricted to an academic context: newspapers increasingly ran ‘personality’ tests and quizzes for readers to categorise themselves. The term ‘personality’ had been used in a psychological sense since the 1920s and was ‘a clear sign of the creation of a psychological society’ according to historian Roger Smith. Yet the post-war period saw the concept truly embedded in political and cultural language. Eysenck’s highly popular Uses and Abuses of Psychology disseminated the idea of personality testing and types to the broader reading public and built on some of his wartime work at Mill Hill. Indeed, Eysenck’s ‘Personality Profiling’ is still used today by military psychologists. Many psychologists defined personality as a relational concept; John Raven, a Scottish psychologist who studied under Charles Spearman, summarised personality as ‘the qualities of a person’s thought and conduct as they are apprehended by another person’. The impact of these changes should not be underestimated: increasingly, the subject was understood as made up of various ‘traits’ which could be identified and observed under controlled test conditions. Furthermore, Eysenck’s career potentially indicates the spread of psychological language amongst non-specialists. The extent to which soldiers themselves used such language, discussed in later chapter, can therefore assess the impact of these academic and often state-led investigations into ‘personality’.

Are we therefore to presume that a model of state-sponsored subjectivity, originating in the societal sway held by an elite group of experts, operated in British society in the post-war period? At a time of war political and psychological subjectivities often collide, favouring a temporary ‘top-down’ percolation of central policy. In this way, and in alignment with Rose’s paradigm, the Second World War may have created the conditions

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under which psychology and psychiatry became popular in the military and society at large. But did these conditions continue into the 1950s and if so how did they operate in a Cold War military context where, as we have seen, citizenship and participation were under intense discussion?

Military Subjects

In the citizenship ‘textbook’, *British Way and Purpose* (BWP) produced in eighteen pamphlets during the Second World War for use by British servicemen, the manifold influences upon an individual’s life were described at length, from parliamentary democracy to healthcare. In 1944, the following diagram summarised these processes:

![Diagram](image)


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157 Smith, *The Norton History of the Human Sciences*, p. 613; Smith calls the Second World War the ‘psychologists’ war’. 
The principal factors nourishing the individual were the home, school and neighbourhood: all three included the prominent interpersonal relationships and socio-economic structures informing each of these spheres. More abstract concepts such as government, history, religion and commerce ultimately encircled these three areas.

This depiction of subject-formation stands at odds with the view presented by standard military sociology and history: following the Weberian view that ‘[t]he discipline of the army … gives birth to all discipline’, the soldier is typically depicted as the archetypal servant of the state.\textsuperscript{158} Like many late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century intellectuals, Weber characterised war as a rational component in the development of humanity, a teleology which Daniel Pick argues was profoundly shattered by the First World War.\textsuperscript{159} Yet until relatively recently, many historians had not really questioned the theoretical association between the individual soldier and state in full, preferring to use the ‘military’ as an uncomplicated synonym for state power and intervention in their historical analyses. The influence of Foucault’s \textit{Discipline and Punish} in the historical study of central organisations and bureaucracies has furthered this approach. According to Foucault, the eighteenth-century soldier is the epitome of the observed subject:

\begin{quote}
[T]he soldier has become something that can be made; out of a formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently into the automatism of habit.\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{159} Pick, \textit{War Machine}, pp. 1–2.

\textsuperscript{160} Foucault, \textit{Discipline and Punish}, p. 135.
Through disciplinary procedures focused on the body, the military (but also other ‘projects of docility’ operating in workhouses, schools and prisons) moulded its subjects to a given purpose in an unprecedented manner.

However, Timothy Mitchell problematises the image of the ‘automatism of habit’ in the military, arguing that this ‘new army seemed something two dimensional. It appeared to consist on the one hand of individual soldiers, and on the other of the machine they inhabited.’ In other words, any study of military subjectivity must find a way to integrate the multiple influences displayed above in BWP with Foucauldian assessments of the function of a military man. The later chapters of this thesis demonstrate the possibility of deviation from, syncretisation of, or simply ambivalence towards the central directives of military and state from amongst a diverse group of men.

Treading the line between the ‘statist’ emphasis on men shaped in accordance with the military’s need and the growing appreciation amongst military historians of the social, cultural and personal variation within such an organisation, the final section of this chapter turns to the formation of the military subject in detail. In order to do so we must first identify the key ideas informing military models of subjectivity: this final section examines the influence of both psychology and industrial theories of management in the military from the early-1940s to the end of National Service in early 1960s. Rose identifies five ‘psy’ mechanisms used by central authorities to shape the military subject: recruitment, training, the maintenance of morale, psychiatric treatment, the treatment of returned prisoners of war. Although this thesis refers to the other four categories, the final section of this chapter explores recruitment in particular detail, using it as a case study to explain the emphasis placed on the role of the individual in a group and the ramifications of these ideas for self-definition of soldiers themselves. In doing so, this section uses the case study of the recruitment practices of the British military from 1941 to understand the categorisation of men within the military, but also the typologies of civilian candidates which the military

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162 Miller and Rose, ‘The Tavistock Programme’, p. 179.
163 Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 40.
used. This section highlights once again the complex interaction between military and civilian spheres in this period: indeed, no civilian-military dichotomy can be wholly applied to the 1950s, where war, peace, civilian, citizen and soldier were overlapping and integrated categories.

In order to understand Rose’s demarcation of these five categories and recruitment in particular, it is important to understand the position of the ‘psy’ disciplines at this time. Like Savage, Rose describes the influence of psychologists in the military during the Second World War, but also the impact of war on the ‘psy’ disciplines in the post-war period. Many psychologists’ careers had been ‘forged in the study of war’, including psychiatrist John Bowlby (1905–1990), Gorer’s collaborator John Rickman and those associated with founding the highly influential Tavistock Institute of Human Relations in 1947. In 1951 Rickman noticed the connection between ‘psy’ disciplines and the military when he addressed the British Psychoanalytical Society, remarking of recent membership that ‘among the students in one year there were more Lieutenant Colonels than any other category[,] … Students and members … [have] been busily and responsibly employed during the years of war struggle in many and diverse psychological duties’.

Yet the relationship between the military and psychology which had intensified during the Second World War was not as unproblematic or total as Rose’s model perhaps implies. Indeed, there was much debate in the British Army over the use of such professionals: Prime Minister Winston Churchill, for example, criticised the presence of psychiatrists in the military in the early 1940s and he was not alone. After the Second World War, there was a lingering suspicion in Britain that personnel selection was based on models which were essentially German and there was a commonly held belief that the

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164 Rose, *Governing the Soul*, pp. 16–17 and 89; Tavistock IHR formed when Tavistock Clinic under NHS in 1947; Wellcome Trusts Collection, Bowlby Papers, Memoranda on Officer Selection and on the Selection of Civil Servants, no date given, PP/BOW/C/5/3/8.
Luftwaffe’s strength was built on stringent and intrusive recruitment processes. In 1946 the Army Council defined a limited role for the psychiatrist, stating that the ‘function of the psychiatrist is to advise the executive authorities when matters of mental health and adjustment are in question’. Consequently the initial position of the psychiatrist in War Office Selection Boards was only advisory, although the Army Council was keen to stress their utility in highlighting ‘individual variations in personality structure’. The personal narrative-based investigations of the psychiatrist and the perceived ‘unknown’ element to his work were not easily subsumed in military thought, either at a strategic level or amongst the rank-and-file recruits. Dr. J.R. Rees, the ‘father of Army psychiatry’ argued that resistance to psychiatry was in fact a resistance to the selection process itself and the aspirations it dispelled:

The main opposition to selection procedures is based on the fact that the average man rather dislikes to have his phantasies destroyed. The commonest of all human daydreams is the Cinderella motif or, translated into military terms, the idea that every soldier has a Field-Marshal’s baton in his knapsack. Selection hits at this because it implies that someone can demonstrate this in most cases not true. Many people object strongly to facing this reality even though it may be pointed out to them how much better it is to make full use in the best possible way of whatever intelligence and capacity they have got.

This is not to suggest that the psychiatrist was wholly side-lined in the institution; on the contrary, the Army Council was keen to raise awareness of the psychiatrist’s role. Nevertheless, this initial uncertainty and even suspicion both in the senior echelons and the

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rank-and-file partially nuances Rose’s model of the unassailable ‘psy’ expert in the organisation. The debate over psychiatrists in the Army questions the assumption that the military was an uncomplicated arm of state power. Once again therefore, to simply assume that the military was an unfettered microcosm of state authority ignores the reception of such ideas from within the institution itself.

By the time of the Korean War, psychiatrists’ position in the military showed the increased significance placed on subjectivity by the military and, in particular, the still-growing importance of ‘the group’. Psychiatry in the Korean War, although not the focus of this chapter, provides important context for these developments. Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely argue that as the post-war military curtailed its psychiatric contingent, with the number of professionals employed almost halved between 1948 and 1958, the Korean War saw few innovations in psychiatric care.170 Indeed, the ideas of ‘Forward Psychiatry’ (treating combatants as close to battle as possible) which had been tentatively expounded since the First World War were still used in treatment of cases of psychiatric breakdown.171 Conversely, however, military authorities predicted more psychiatric casualties in the Korean War owing to the large number of conscripts, and indeed in the first stage of the war high rates of psychiatric casualties (35 per 1000) were recorded.172 This discrepancy between psychiatric provision and actual need can perhaps be explained by the concomitant growth of psychiatry in the fledging National Health Service (established in 1948) which sapped military personnel resources, but it also reflects the continued uncertainty over the role of the psychiatrist in the British Army.173 Yet despite this apparent stasis in psychiatric innovation, the position of the individual was different from other conflicts. Studying US psychiatric treatment, Ben Shephard writes that the Korean experience confirmed that the ‘interests of

170 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 98–99.
171 Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, “Forward Psychiatry” in the Military, Its Origins and Effectiveness, Journal of Traumatic Stress, 16, 4 (2003), pp. 411–15. However, the idea that breakdown in the field was a failure on the part of the individual or a sign of ‘social degeneration’ had largely been discounted by this time by psychologists and the public, see Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, p. 101.
172 Jones and Wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD, pp. 102–03.
the individual and of the military were one and the same.\textsuperscript{174} This appreciation of individual needs in order to maximise efficiency reflected Taylorist ideals and shows the merging and cross-pollination of military and industrial thinking on subjectivity by 1950.\textsuperscript{175}

Yet Korea raised a further problem as the conflict was composed of two distinct phases of battle. From June 1950 till summer 1951, the British were engaged in highly mobile fighting where both military and psychiatric policy had to operate under high levels of stress and unpredictability. British servicemen were also confronted with a particularly harsh winter in this period. By contrast, the second stage of the war had far fewer psychiatric cases, as it was more static warfare with adequate provision of rest and time away from the frontline.\textsuperscript{176} By 1952, the Chief of Imperial General Staff noted that there was ‘nothing very unorthodox’ in the war in Korea.\textsuperscript{177} Similarly, the procedure of evacuation of psychiatric casualties was far more effective at this time, integrated into the system of Field Dressing Stations, followed by American Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) units and then hospitals in Kure, Japan. Psychiatric cases were first sent to the Field Dressing Station, a decision once again underwritten by the presumption that servicemen should be treated as close to the frontline as possible.\textsuperscript{178} In arguing that the Korean War was the first full-scale enactment of this policy, Jones and Wessely’s work perhaps suggests that the continued use of forward psychiatry forms part of a wider medical policy toward British servicemen. Whilst such a decision reflects gradual changes in the efficacy of military medicine to provide care closer to the front line, this policy was also influenced by the tacit assumption that the best way to treat and then to reintegrate the servicemen into the military system was that he remain with the ‘group’ and within the conflict area, with all its attendant dangers, expectations and regulations. Military psychiatry during the Korean War demonstrates that

\textsuperscript{174} Shephard, \textit{A War of Nerves} pp. 342–43.
\textsuperscript{175} Papers of John Dalziel Wyndham Pearce, Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Mendel, ‘Some Reflections by a President of a War Office Selection Board’, Minutes of Military Psychiatrists Conference, York Medical Society, 7–8 October 1944, GC/192/18, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{176} Wellcome Trust Collection, Royal Army Medical Corps Papers, Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Marks RAMC, ‘A Medical Picture of the Forward Areas in Korea’, 10 June 1953, RAMC/1761.
\textsuperscript{177} Wellcome Trust Collection, Royal Army Medical Corps Papers, Reactions to the Korean Campaign during 1951, RAMC/761/4.
\textsuperscript{178} Royal Army Medical Corps Papers, Lieutenant Colonel R.L. Marks RAMC, ‘A Medical Picture of the Forward Areas in Korea’, 10 June 1953, RAMC/1763.
contemporary constructions of soldierly subjectivity were felt to be highly contingent on the proximity both to other military men and to the combat situation itself. Yet one should not overstate the case for the Korean War. As Commander of 26 Field Ambulance (one of three field Ambulance units) in 1952, Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Marks noted that ‘[b]ecause of the comparatively quiet nature of the fighting psychiatric casualties were minimal, the majority rising from home troubles. A psychiatric specialist was attached to the FDS and visited field ambulances once weekly’. The comparatively quiet second stage of the war therefore suggests that psychiatric care was not the primary catalyst for a change in military thinking on subjectivity. Nevertheless, the policy and ideas underwriting such medical care still remain relevant; the serviceman had to find his cure within the confines of the group.

Running parallel to these developments, the ‘psychological warfare’ techniques used by the US are also important in understanding subjectivity in the Korean War, although again worthy of a separate study. In theory, all psychological warfare (non-combative techniques used to undermine morale in the enemy) was the responsibility of the United Nations Command, yet the United States promontory role in that force meant that they were largely in control of both offensive and defensive psychological policies. The War Office was acutely aware that the superior resources and substantial academic attention paid to psychological warfare by the United States would eclipse their own efforts, noting informally that ‘we could hardly be better than a poor duplication of the American effort [...]... There would seem to be no case for establishing a British psychological unit in Korea’. As a result, most definitions at the time of psychological warfare were also American. In 1951 a US publication entitled ‘Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare’ was sent to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Slim, and in it psychological warfare was described as a set of activities, not combat, ‘which communicate ideas and information intended to affect the minds, emotions, and actions of the enemy, for the purpose of

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179 Ibid.
disrupting his morale and his will to fight."\textsuperscript{181} In Korea, the US Army also had various companies with specific, offensive ‘psy-ops’ tasks, such as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (used at a strategic level to persuade North Koreans at large) and a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (used at tactical and operational levels).\textsuperscript{182} The British, by contrast, lacking their own psychological units and any organisation comparable to the US Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), had no option but to follow the American lead and use US definitional parameters. The best the War Office could suggest was to second two British officers to the psychological warfare units on the ground, although they had little hope that they would have much influence over any decisions.\textsuperscript{183} It was estimated that the UN leaflets ‘decisively’ led to the surrender of between 6,000 and 18,000 prisoners of the total 120,000 prisoners taken by 22 October 1950. Not only does such a figure represent a small fragment of the total number of prisoners, but its broad lower and upper limits highlights the difficulty researchers found in quantifying the influence of psychological warfare.\textsuperscript{184} Therefore whilst the Korean War might not have seen the deployment of British psychological warfare units it was instrumental in the definition of subjectivity and in establishing the foundations for future British psychological warfare projects.

These developments ran alongside the new mechanisms of psychological testing in recruitment practices. International precedents had done much to normalise psychological approaches, with a report from as early as 1941 noting that ‘psychological tests have been used in the Armies of practically every country in the World.’\textsuperscript{185} The emphasis on the individual’s role in a group which underpinned many of these psychological tests fitted more easily with military thought than other aspects of psychological investigation. After all, during the First World War even junior officers and NCOs had been concerned with refining recruitment processes: indeed, the Southborough Committee examining ‘Shell Shock’ in

\textsuperscript{182} TNA, War Office, Notes on the American Army Views on Psychological Warfare, WO 216/425.
\textsuperscript{183} TNA, Foreign Office, Psychological Warfare in Korea, Note by PA Wilkinson, 29 June 1951, FO 1110/405.
\textsuperscript{184} War Office, Army Operational Research Group, A Preliminary Evaluation of Psychological Warfare as a Tactical Weapon, December 1952, WO 291/1237, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{185} TNA, War Office, War Office Selection Boards (Officer Cadets Training Units), 1941, WO 32/9681.
1922 concluded that more rigorous selection might help prevent illness in the front line. The increased responsibilities of psychologists and psychiatrists in the British military were also due to the unparalleled impact of the generation of eminent psychologists and in particular psychoanalysts during the Second World War, radically shaping the terrain of the post-war military establishment. Sir Ronald Adam, appointed Adjutant-General of the British Army in 1941, was highly impressed by the work of Tavistock clinicians and sought to incorporate their approaches into British Army recruitment in his newly created Directorate of Personnel Selection. In addition to Rickman, Eysenck and Bowlby, Adam sought to include Wilfred Bion (1897–1979) and Tom Main (1911–1990). The work of Bion, Rickman and Main at the Northfield Military Hospital set the agenda for both post-war psychology and the position of the individual in the military. The work of these practitioners, set out in the examples below demonstrates how the military not only engaged with psychological techniques, but used them after the Second World War to define a new military subject, an individual whose very self-perception was crucial in the ongoing conflict with the emerging Communist enemies.

Recruitment processes, pioneered before the Korean War and reaching fruition in that conflict, exemplify the individual which the British Army wished to create. They also form one of the most important, if overlooked, components in the relationship between state, army and individual. The first recruitment process to consider is the initial medical assessment under the PULHEEMS system, an invention of the late Second World War but which fully came to fruition with the influx of young National Service conscripts in the initial post-war period and which, through various mutations, still exists today in the British military. PULHEEMS was a mnemonic system denoting seven key parameters for general

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187 Shephard, A War or Nerves, pp. 188–89; David French, Raising Churchill’s Army. The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919–1945 (New York, 2000), p. 68.
188 Many of these psychologists were associated with the Tavistock Clinic, founded in 1920. Eysenck’s exponential rise to fame outside academia perhaps substantiates Giddens’ claim that modern society’s reliance on ‘experts’ leads to the absorption of certain types of knowledge Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, pp. 17–18; Mathew Thomson, ‘The Popular, the Practical and the Professional. Psychological Identities in Britain, 1901–1950’ in G.C. Bunn, A.D. Lovie and G.D. Richards, (eds) Psychology in Britain. Historical Essays and Personal Reflections (Leicester, 2001), p. 126.
military fitness: physique (P), upper and lower limbs (U) (L), hearing (H), ears and eyes (EE), mental (M) and stability (S). Each faculty was given a ranking of one to eight (one being the highest), although the full scale was not used for all. This complex system meant that there were potentially thousands of different combinations of ranking recruits could possess.\textsuperscript{189} The PULHEEMS system officially adopted by the Army on 1 April 1948 and by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force, and the Ministry of Labour and National Service on 1 June 1948 and it was described as an attempt to both rationalise and unify medical entry tests. In this way, it was heralded as the ‘first time … of expressing on paper in a concise and easily recognizable form the physical and mental capacities of an individual.’\textsuperscript{190}

Aside from greater appreciation of the nuances of a man’s health, the intricacies of the PULHEEMS system are significant with regards to subjectivity in a number of ways. In the most general sense, it demonstrates once again the increasing sophistication of the typologies employed by the post-war military. For example, an interesting comparison can be made with the First World War: Joanna Bourke argues four categories of fitness were introduced which used loose parameters such as being ‘able to walk six miles “with ease”’ and originated in the pre-war context of eugenicist anxiety over physical degeneration and class disparities in health. Yet Bourke argues that the National Medical Boards frequently passed the unfit due the pressures of the First World War.\textsuperscript{191} In contrast, thirty years later the indices used to test fitness, but also mental well-being and ‘personality’, had changed in focus and level of detail. In ‘unifying and rationalizing’ recruitment, the PULHEEMS system ratified the Foucauldian premise that the gathering of detailed knowledge represented a state attempt to render its subjects both observable and governable.\textsuperscript{192} However, there was far from universal agreement on the faculties that might preclude an individual from military

\textsuperscript{189} Wellcome Trust Collection, Royal Army Medical Corps Papers, Sidney Rosenbaum, ‘Statistical Studies of the Health and Physique of Young Soldiers during the Period of National Service’, 1959, RAMC/833.  
recruitment. For example, referring to the most ambiguous of categories, stability (S), one preliminary British Army report noted that ‘[i]t is difficult to say what degree of instability is allowable in an officer. If we were to take out all the unstable, we might lose many geniuses and potential V.C.s [Victoria Cross winners].’\textsuperscript{193} Nevertheless, despite this disagreement, stability demonstrates how psychological elements to human subjectivity were taken into account in a holistic assessment of a recruit, more so than had previously been the case.\textsuperscript{194} The all-encompassing assessment of the candidate under the PULHEEMS test represented a small, but significant, change in the conceptualisation of military subjectivity.

However, selection processes went further than the PULHEEMS test. In the case of recruits for ranks in the services, it was not until July 1940 that tests were introduced to all establishments receiving ‘direct recruits’ (ones with no prior military experience), with the caveat that they were to help, not dictate, the judgement of the commanding officer at training centres. The most widely used was the Progressive Matrices test, pioneered by Lieutenant GR Hargreaves and Dr. John Raven, which was designed to measure ‘innate intelligence’.\textsuperscript{195} The matrix test might involve, for example, fitting the correct piece into a puzzle. By 1944, recruits had to sit six tests including technical expertise, agility and instructions tests. The resultant scores and ‘aptitudes’ were recorded and the recruit could be placed in one of seven different ‘training recommendations’ which corresponded with different jobs in the services. In an information film from 1944 on recruitment processes, candidates were told (perhaps to counter Rees’ assessment of dissatisfaction mentioned earlier in this chapter) that at the end of this lengthy process, ‘[t]he army is made up of millions. Each man has his own individual qualities which have to be considered for his sake and for the army’s.’\textsuperscript{196} Accepting your given role in the military was therefore part of a civic duty towards both the smaller groups within the organisation, but also the larger group – the

\textsuperscript{193} War Office Selection Boards (Officer Cadets Training Units), 1941, WO 32/9681.
\textsuperscript{194} Fletcher, ‘A New System of Medical Classification’, p. 83; Shephard, A War of Nerves, pp. 188–89. Shephard argues that Hargreaves and Sir Ronald Adam, Adjutant-General of the British Army, ‘shared a vision of “personnel selection”...They were out to create a new kind of Army altogether: mechanised, technocratic and specialised, an aspiration widely shared at the time.’
\textsuperscript{195} Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War, pp. 33–36.
\textsuperscript{196} Personnel Selection in the British Army (Shell Film Unit, 1944), UKY 591.
nation. The soldier’s specific task and function, as well as his broader commitment to protect democracy, formed part of active citizenship in the early Cold War era.

The civic dimensions of recruitment tests (and thereby the subject they sought to create) were even more evident with officer recruitment. Introduced in 1941 War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs or ‘wosbees’) were, as one proponent put it, designed to ‘ensure that no potential officer material shall slip through the net.’ WOSBs were born out of both practical need and an adjustment in the military’s relationship with the ‘psy’ disciplines: by 1941 Hans Eysenck argued that the British Army especially was witnessing ‘the obvious and catastrophic breakdown of traditional procedures’ as an ever-increasing number of officers was needed. According to some observers, wartime recruitment, which drew upon a far wider array of social classes than before, meant that previous (heavily class-based) indicators were no longer suitable ‘signposts to leadership’ that could be used to judge the calibre of a candidate. For example, in a piece written shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, Ben Morris, a member of WOSB psychological research staff, told the British Psychoanalytical Society that the perceived failure of the traditional recruitment interview (usually about twenty minutes in length) had deeper social causes. Not only, he argued, did massive wartime recruitment undermine ‘the accepted kind of procedure for recruitment to group with special social functions and high social status’ but that it was ‘scarcely surprising’ recruiters had difficulty in ascertaining whether individuals merited commissions: such indications had previously included one’s former (public) school and positions of responsibility held there. From the potential officers’ perspective too, there was a belief that those from the middle or working class were at a disadvantage. Morris argued that any procedure was based on ‘existing social norm[s]’ and created by both

civilian and military expectations. In short, WOSBs were contingent on a particular social context, one of meritocracy, but also one of critical engagement (the idea of ‘thinking’ once again). Furthermore, Morris argued that military recruitment had to be socially sanctioned in order to be understood as a legitimate mechanism of selection, revealing again the connections between civilian and military spheres. Moreover, Morris’ argument also partially intersects with Goffman’s claim that the self was a performative concept developed in a social context: the self, performed to a group of selectors, had to fit with the social needs and demands of the military and wider Cold War contexts. Morris argues that officers, or more specifically the characteristics popularly thought to be possessed by officers, were created solely through a socially informed process, a process whose very existence depended on its legitimacy in the public eye. WOSBs therefore demonstrate that the topicality of discussions about the human subject and developing theories about its construction in various functional settings.

WOSBs were composed of several stages: spanning two or three days, candidates were put through a number of outdoor tests resembling military situations, designed to demonstrate leadership potential. Rejecting the premise that ‘traits [act] as constant qualities of a person independent of context’, Wilfred Bion and his colleagues asked candidates to perform various tasks (e.g. bridge building) as a team and thereby exhibit particular tendencies, such as leadership, cooperation and discipline. The candidate was also asked to fill out a biographical questionnaire and to partake in group discussion. Some candidates also underwent a psychiatrist’s interview, demonstrating again the pervasiveness of this technique. WOSBs continued in this form well into the post-war period (and their legacy is even felt still today), assessing both regular and conscripted officers. Similar tests were extended to sergeants in 1950.

201 Ibid, p. 6.
203 Oakley, Men at Work, p. 66.
WOSB were therefore highly influential and established by the time of the Korean War, the first conflict where such recruitment techniques had been used from the start.

Such criteria were also increasingly important beyond the military sphere in the 1950s, as the ideas of Eysenck and Bion were almost immediately used by civilian authorities for their own selection processes, including the Civil Service and commercial management. The popularity of military expertise amongst civilian populations merits further analysis. Whether due to the familiarity of military systems to many of the post-war senior management class or due to the endorsement of military knowledge in this specific era through the victories of war, military models were frequently picked up by civilian organisations. The post-war period extended, rather than curtailed, the connections between military and civilian systems of knowledge. Post-war (and specifically Cold War) WOSBs thus mark an important chapter in the history of both military subjectivity and in the epistemological transfer between military and civilian spheres.

To what extent did these processes inform a new definition of subjectivity? The individual was defined in several key ways by WOSB procedures, firstly in terms of ‘personality’. Rickman noted how the psychiatric interview assessed the ‘positive (constructive)’ elements of personality as well as the ‘negative (obstructive or destructive)’. As noted above, the term personality was widely used by both professionals and broader society during the 1950s, with great debate over whether it represented the innate essence of a person or whether it could change according to external stimuli. John Rickman fused these two views, arguing that ‘personality is a composite structure growing around a central, ever-developing ego-nucleus.’ In this conceptualisation, the ‘ego-nucleus’ remains constant, but the personality could be embellished in the course of life experience. It was this viewpoint that Rickman and others sought to perpetuate through recruitment processes and through military psychology more generally. The use of

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205 Highhouse, ‘Assessing the Candidate as a Whole’, p. 375.
206 Roper, Masculinity and the British Organization Man since 1945, p. 112.
‘personality’ in the WOSB procedures thus marks another subtle shift in the broader understandings of subjectivity in the period.

Yet the individual was not solely defined with reference to the constituent parts of his personality. WOSB procedures utilised a specific typology of individuality and recruited officers according to these models. For example, Rickman noted the differences in psychiatric interviews between the ‘pushing ambitious type of fellow’ and ‘the shy type’.209 Rickman’s typology was not without precedent; when giving evidence to a conference of Allied psychiatrists in 1944, Captain Mustardé, an officer of no special psychological expertise, said that in prisoner-or-war camps there were ‘extroverts’ and ‘introverts’, terms which had been popularised by Carl Jung earlier in the century.210 This percolation corroborates Smith’s argument that laymen increasingly used psychological language in the second half of the twentieth century.211 In an assessment of the British soldier Tom Harrisson, ethnographer and founder of Mass Observation, was at pains to stress that ‘all types serve’, a sentiment that was expressed in wider civilian society with Korean War novelist Max Catto noting ‘the old, blind, democratic army[,] … [i]t has to have everyone.’212 Psychoanalyst Tom Main framed this in terms of the needs of the group ‘for sexual libertines, for tranquillisers who can resolve quarrels, for saints to be worshipped, for brave men and for cowards’.213 On the other hand, the introduction of WOSB was preceded by intensive investigation into the qualities an officer was said to need, although naturally there were variations in opinion on the subject of an officer’s personality.214 Clearly, the egalitarian military spirit evoked by Tom Harrisson must at the same time be contrasted with the specific search for a set of characteristics, however loosely defined.

210 Wellcome Trust Collection, Papers of John Dalziel Wyndham Pearce, Captain Mustardé, ‘Adjustment and Mal-Adjustment within the Camp’, Minutes of Military Psychiatrists Conference, York Medical Society, 7–8 October 1944, GC/192/18, p. 3.
213 Main Papers T.F. Main, ‘Some Thoughts on Group Behaviour’, July 1958, PO7//A/12, p. 6.
However, WOSB procedures also highlighted pathology in personality rather than simply normality, with one psychiatrist noting that ‘officer selection from the start was essentially a rejection process’. Assessments of National Service conscripts followed similar lines, with officer candidates sent to Eaton Hall Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) in Cheshire for training in infantry leadership or to Mons OCTU in Aldershot to form part of the artillery, engineers or intelligence corps. Yet National Service conscription presented the military authorities with a more serious problem, that of illiteracy. Due to the disruption caused by evacuation and dislocation during the Second World War, many of the young men recruited under National Service could not attain the necessary Third Class in the Army Certificate of Education. Lieutenant Colonel Archibald White of the Army Educational Corps estimated that more than twenty per cent of recruits were ‘nearly illiterate’ and two per cent of those ‘wholly so’. In response, the British Army set up Preliminary Education Centres (later amalgamated into one centre at Tidworth in 1955) to teach basic literacy but also once again to inculcate the principles of individual integration into a group, as with basic training more generally. This move was arguably motivated by more than practical necessity: the thinking soldier-citizen had to engage with written texts like newspapers in order to engage with British democracy and the Preliminary Education Centres ‘equipped soldiers to be involved in such a way: one recruit reputedly called his centre a ‘dream factory’.

These WOSB typologies promoted a particular characterisation of the officer-figure. Models for particular individuals within the organisation also applied to the ranks, none more so than with the figure of the Regimental Sergeant-Major. Psychoanalyst Tom Main wrote in 1958 that ‘without him the location of evil would be unknown – both men and

215 Wellcome Trust Collection, Service Psychiatry Monographs, The Role and Status of the Psychiatrist in the War Office Selection Board, September 1943, GC 135/B1/3/62.
officers would have to find it in each other – and worse, perhaps even in themselves.’ The extent to which this image was internalised (or perhaps itself partially created) by soldiers themselves will be explored in later chapters, but needless to say this ‘character’ emerged as a stock figure in popular culture during this period, from novels to The Goon Show. Furthermore, the ‘type’ that the WOSB procedure was designed to showcase most obviously was the ‘natural leader’, with Wilfred Bion’s ‘Leaderless Group Test’ providing the backbone for detecting (or rather revealing) the characteristics that would be most suited to leading men into battle.

The recurring psychoanalytic ideas of ‘projection’ and ‘introjection’ abounded in the WOSB. Focusing again on the figure of the sergeant-major, Main writes that this man willingly internalised the need of the group to have a common scapegoat:

The group can be said to project its feelings onto one or other of its members; and the member who identifies with and performs this special task for the group can be said to introject the group’s projected feelings. Interplay between those who project and those who introject is unceasing.

Whilst these ideas were by no means confined to the 1940s and 1950s, WOSB arguably marked their first widespread inclusion into military conceptualisation of individuality and Korea the first moment of their widespread implementation. Furthermore, narrative was implicit in the psychoanalytical technique; psychoanalysis in many respects is narrative.

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219 Main Papers, T.F. Main, ‘Some Thoughts on Group Behaviour’, July 1958, POT/A/12, pp. 5–6.
221 In this test, a task is set but no leader assigned, leaving individuals to put themselves forward as leaders. Hugh Murray, ‘The Transformation of Selection Procedures’, pp. 54–55; Eric Trist, one of the founders of the Tavistock Clinic, states that the method lead to ‘the sharing of common “here and now” experiences of the candidates instead of conducting acrimonious and unresolvable debates on independently[...] based judgements’, see Eric Trist, ‘Working with Bion in the 1940s. The Group Decade’ in Malcolm Pine (ed.), Bion and Group Psychotherapy (London and Philadelphia, 2000), p. 9.
222 Main Papers, T.F. Main, ‘Some Thoughts on Group Behaviour’, July 1958, POT/A/12, p. 5. Emphasis added.
Telling one’s life was arguably a key part of military experience even before the recruit was properly subsumed into the military.224 The centrality of soldierly narratives was explicitly evident in two sections of the initial WOSB process, the ‘life history obtained by interview’ and the ‘self-description’. The former was introduced to gain information on each candidate’s ‘emotional maturity’, ‘temperamental stability’ and ‘military qualities’. Questions ranged from the fairly simple enquiry about family background to asking candidates how they felt they reacted around other people, their assertiveness and their scrupulousness. Once again answers helped interviewers to place them into four different ‘personality’ groups which took into account all these factors and to gauge an image of the candidate. The second life-history was based on a questionnaire, where candidates were given one hour to write about themselves, but were asked to ‘give the facts asked for but avoid over-elaboration.’225 This reiterates the pre-eminence of the autobiographical form in the 1950s which Steedman and Meyer describe with reference to education.226 As the rest of this thesis suggests, telling one’s life story was an important part of being a soldier.

However, we must interpret the state emphasis on autobiographical self-analysis within a wider, collective setting and in the contemporary terms of the group and individual.227 Industrial psychologist Charles Oakley argued that at the core of modern psychological endeavours was the motivation to promote better relations between people.228 Bion and Rickman, in their capacity in psychiatric institutions during the Second World War, felt that military patients should be treated as part of a group, brought together against a common enemy (‘the existence of neurosis’) in a pseudo-military scenario.229 Two famous ‘experiments’ at Northfield Hospital, for instance, gave patients a say in their treatment through a system of ward representatives and they were encouraged to work as a group in

224 Future chapters will investigate the effect of such narrative structures on soldierly subjectivity in greater detail.
225 War Office Selection Boards (Officer Cadets Training Units), 1941,WO 32/9681.
227 Miller and Rose, ‘The Tavistock Programme’, p. 185.
228 Oakley, Men at Work, p. 8.
running their wards, returning to health and from there to the war. Historian Mark Harrison argues that Northfield ushered notions of ‘democratic representation and social reconstruction’ into psychiatric care and ‘captured the mood of Beveridgian Britain.’ Such emphasis on the group resonated with the social democratic context of the 1940s and 1950s. Rickman wrote that ‘intra-personal forces do not have to be altered: the problem is to assess inter-personal forces or relationships.’ The legacy of group therapy on psychiatric care is perhaps beyond the scope of this analysis, but it nevertheless demonstrates the relational definition of the individual once again: state agencies were at pains to define the individual as part of a broader framework, a constituent element of the ‘social organism’ of the group.

Tom Main also defined the figure of the leader with reference to the group, arguing leadership was conferred by the group and built on the assumption that this person would help them best achieve their aims. This perhaps contrasts with the set of officerly characteristics that assessors had devised. The emphasis placed on the group in WOSBs links back to the tensions in industrial psychology about the position of the individual as a member of a group in a democratic state: Western individuality was prized, but its constituent members were more often defined with reference to a group, whether a functional group or broader society. As a former US intelligence officer wrote in 1959, ‘the lack of regard for the individual as individual, which is part and parcel of pragmatic military calculation, irritates our modern mentality deeply.’ As will be made evident in later chapters, this tension was writ large when face-to-face with the Communist enemy in Korea.

233 Main Papers, T.F. Main, ‘Some Thoughts on Group Behaviour’, July 1958, PO7/A/12, p. 1.
234 Ibid, p. 3.
Conclusion

The soldier-citizen of the early Cold War period demonstrates the importance of military subjectivity to state authorities in the years following the Second World War. Self-reflexivity was an important component of this subjectivity: as the Army Education Report from 1948 noted, ‘you cannot educate a man to think for himself without causing him to pass through the stage of thinking of himself.’\(^{236}\) Civilian organisations similarly emphasised the ‘capacity for clear and responsible thought’ amongst the populace at large.\(^ {237}\) In exploring the overlapping models of selfhood prevalent in the late 1940s and early 1950s, this chapter has sought to highlight the interaction between civilian and military worlds in the wake of the Second World War and facing a new threat in a Communist ‘other’. The military subject remained relevant in this period and presented an identifiable set of behaviours for soldier and civilian alike. The Communist threat gave discussions of democratic duties and rights an added urgency in this period, although these retained an enduring sense of British exceptionalism rather than wholeheartedly embracing the idea of a transnational democratic subject. Calls for increased active participation in the democratic polity also coincided with increasing knowledge of state subjects through the development of industrial management and the protrusion of the language of social science and psychology into people’s lives. Such discussions of relationship between the individual and the state have had an enduring political significance in British politics till the present day.

However, as Mathew Thomson argues, the development of the ‘psychological subject’ was in fact far from a simple universal model: subjectivity was not necessarily wholly built around control and regulation.\(^ {238}\) This chapter has thus sought to problematise Rose’s assessment of the influence of the ‘psy’ disciplines on the military sphere. Undoubtedly, the introduction of group theories of human interaction in the 1940s had

\(^{236}\) Archibald Wavell, ‘Minerva’s Owl, or Education in the Army’, Army Education. The Journal of the Army Educational Corps, 22, 1 (1948), p. 5.

\(^{237}\) Ford, The Bureau of Current Affairs, p. 25.

\(^{238}\) Thomson, Psychological Subjects, pp. 6–7.
broader consequences in the early Cold War period, where the individual had a collective
duty but whose singularity was also an emblem of democratic freedom. As Nancy
Chodorow notes, the influence of psychoanalysis in this period perhaps represents the
‘apogee of individualism.’ But nuancing Rose’s argument inevitably poses a question:
does this state-directed subjectivity model adequately describe the process of self-formation
in the Korean War? In short, did British soldiers actually identify with the models presented
to them? We must be cautious not to cast the self as a passive recipient, a ‘palimpsest’ of
modern projects of governmentality. The soldier of the Korean War, exposed to new
political ideas, demonstrates the ability to think beyond the limits of the state-directed
subjectivity, even for a brief period of time. The following chapters suggest that whilst the
concatenation of state and self is highly applicable to the history of subjectivity, the
capability of the individual to react to situations in non-prescribed ways should always be
considered.

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239 Nancy Chodorow, ‘Toward a Relational Individualism. The Mediation of Self through Psychoanalysis’ in
Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sonsa and David E. Wellbery (eds), Reconstructing Individualism. Autonomy,
YOU’RE IN KOREA MY SON | EXPERIENCE AS A RESPONSE TO STATE-DIRECTED SUBJECTIVITY

If you can work on trucks when spanners freeze you
With bolt of [sic] it’s agony to touch
When a mug o’ char’s the only thing to please you
And news of note is never very much
If you can wait in some towns for one minute
While other people burn and run
Yours is the stores and everything that’s in it
And which is more, you’re in KOREA my son

— ‘Rudyard N.G. Norton’, ‘Korea. A Lament on a Looted Typewriter’¹

Subjectivity is not solely shaped by states or governments. This chapter demonstrates that in the Korean War the measures taken by state and military authorities to mould ‘soldier-citizens’ were partially adopted by British servicemen themselves, but that these men also interpreted their role, as agents of the state, in varying and often unexpected ways. In 1959 US academic Jesse Glenn Gray (1913–1977) wrote of soldiers’ feelings of belonging during war:

The light-heartedness that communal participation brings has little of the sensuous or merely pleasant about it, just as the earnestness has little of the calculating or rational. Both derive instead from a consciousness of power that is supra-individual. We feel earnest and gay at such moments because we are liberated from our individual impotence and are drunk with the power that union with our fellows brings[..] ... With the boundaries of the self expanded, they sense a kinship never

known before. Their ‘I’ passes insensibly into a ‘we’, my’ becomes ‘our’, and individual fate loses its central importance.\(^2\)

According to Gray, soldiers give up their individual responsibility through service to a ‘supra-individual’ power. In doing so, soldiers find comfort in their small community and the bonds of friendship and comradeship in their units. A leading translator and philosopher, Gray also served as a counter-intelligence officer in Europe during the Second World War and wrote that his theories on violence and war owed much to this period of his life.\(^3\) Gray’s assessment complicates Timothy Mitchell’s claim that modern armies are typically depicted as two-dimensional: the idea that individual soldiers and their stories are separate from the ‘machine they inhabit.’\(^4\) Gray’s ideas on comradeship also continue to resonate in modern scholarship. Political geographer Rachel Woodward notes from an oral history interview with a soldier who served in Northern Ireland (as part of Operation Banner), that soldiers do not necessarily fight “‘for Queen or country, or any of that shit’”, but for their ‘mates’.\(^5\) But did servicemen in Korea ever wholly overlook the wider project in which they were involved or exclude it from their sense of self? Did alternate bonds form amongst servicemen instead, separate from the ‘supra-individual’ cause of defending democracy? The ways in which the soldier thought about himself in regard to the Korean War, the Cold War and the British state are the topic of this chapter.

This chapter, marking the beginning of the second, more substantial part of this thesis, illustrates how subjectivity was not wholly built around regulatory systems and state-directed processes. As the previous chapter demonstrated, state attention to democratic, observable and military subjects was certainly evident in mid-twentieth century Britain and

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remains an important way of characterising the relationship between state and individual in the years after the Second World War. However, if one considers the response of individuals themselves to the methods described in the preceding chapter, a different component in this relationship emerges. Citizenship education and recruitment practices clearly highlighted the importance of the individual (particularly the active ‘soldier-citizen’, masculine defender of Western democracy and British ‘way of life’), yet these efforts seldom differentiated between individuals, unless determining one man’s particular function in a group. As social scientist James C. Scott summarises, modernist projects, from French *encyclopedists*’ schemes of equal, rational citizens in the eighteenth century to Le Corbusier’s twentieth-century architecture, made individuals all the same. He writes that: ‘[s]tandardized citizens were uniform in their needs and even interchangeable ... for the purposes of the planning exercise, no gender, no tastes, no history, no values, no opinions or original ideas, no traditions, and no distinctive personalities ... contribute to the enterprise’. This failure to differentiate, in Scott’s view, led to the failure of ‘modernist’ projects at a strategic level.

The second chapter of this thesis does not attempt to label projects of state-directed subjectivity as ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ like Scott. Instead it seeks to address Scott’s criticism of the unrealistic uniformity of modern state-led projects (and arguably many subsequent theoretical interpretations of such projects), by focusing on *individual responses* to centralised measures aimed at moulding self-perception in the 1950s. In line with Hellbeck’s work, it seeks to recast state projects as ‘subjectivising force[s]’ rather than just acts of ‘oppressive power’.

To do so, this chapter examines three different bodies of source material produced by British servicemen during the Korean War: letters and diaries, poetry and creative responses (including reading practices) and finally responses to ‘battle experience’ questionnaires. It argues that all three of these (particularly the seldom-studied battle

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experience questionnaires) can be understood as forms of life-narrative, which in turn can illustrate individuals’ responses to the military and the state. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, life-narratives are not necessarily an uncomplicated or direct reflection of the exact thoughts and feelings of servicemen in Korea, nor should the ‘ordinariness’ of such material be overstated in order to make the historian’s own sample seem more representative or more indicative of a lived ‘social reality’. Nevertheless, the life-narratives considered in this chapter show soldiers endeavouring to make sense of the situation in which they found themselves. In other words, life-narratives may not fully answer our questions about the state’s influence over the self, but it nevertheless shows servicemen themselves endeavouring to answer these same questions.

This chapter uses these life-narrative sources to show several different responses of British servicemen to their role as ‘soldier-citizens’. Letters, diaries, poetry and even responses to a standard questionnaire demonstrate a high level of self-reflexivity, which was championed as one of the characteristics of a thoughtful, engaged and active member of a Western democracy. It is also worth noting that the recollection of their experience was framed by the state and the skills and information it required, particularly in the cases of letters and battle experience forms. However, these sources also show that there was some confusion, in practice, over what constituted an authentic soldier-citizen. This response is best understood through consideration of the category of ‘experience’. The soldier ‘on the ground’ was less convinced by notions of active, democratic citizenship than by the more practical concept of ‘experience’, which recurs in numerous forms of life-narrative. As this chapter argues, the concept of experience grew in importance in the immediate post-1945 world, originating in adult education. It is used here both historically and conceptually to understand the subjectivity of servicemen.

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Experience and Subjectivity in the 1950s

Typically we associate ‘experience’ with the ‘history from below movement’ of the 1960s and 1970s, as an antidote to state- or elite-focused, empirical history. Experience proved a vitally important concept for historians seeking to provide a history for groups frequently overlooked by the mainstream historical narrative, exemplified by E.P. Thompson’s famous quest ‘to rescue the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper ... from the enormous condescension of posterity’ in The Making of the English Working Class (1963). Gender historian Joan Scott wrote of The Making of the English Working Class that ‘the ideas of external influence and subjective feeling, the structural and the psychological’ came together, meaning that experience could include feelings (or, at the very least, more expressive attachments to structures such as family or religion), as well as situations emanating from ‘material life’.

Yet there was both academic and popular discussion of experience before this, in the 1950s, although seldom in a published form. The most obvious example is perhaps Thompson himself. Between 1948 and 1965, Thompson taught history and literature at the Extra-Mural Studies Department at Leeds University and this proved a crucial context for the evolution of his thinking on class, experience and culture. Teaching working adults, Thompson was, even in the 1950s, beginning to formulate his later published ideas on the relationship between experience and education. He wrote in 1950 that the tutor must be ‘prepared to have hitherto accepted academic judgements corrected in the light of the student’s experience: but not to abandon his teaching to the over-simplifications or distortions liable to arise from the limitations of his experience.’ In 1968 he noted that

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10 Joan Scott, ‘The Evidence of Experience’, Critical Inquiry, 17, 4 (1991), p. 776. Scott notes that the challenge to ‘normative history’ was seen by many as ‘an enlargement of the picture, a correction to oversights resulting from inaccurate or incomplete vision, and it had rested its claim to legitimacy on the authority of experience’.
‘experience modifies … the entire educational process’. Thompson was keenly aware of the use and challenges of experience in an adult educational setting, but also of the relationship between experience and belonging to a particular group or class and the pertinence of these issues during the Cold War. He noted in *The Making of the English Working Class* that ‘class-consciousness is the way in which ... experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms.’ The ‘experience’ of a specific social context (in Thompson’s formulation this context derived from one’s relationship to the means of production), rather than the historical situation itself, made one part of a particular group – with a particular ‘consciousness’. In short, experience was a vital part in bringing a group or class together.

How then can this category prove useful in disentangling the complex relationship between state and soldier in the early 1950s? Like Thompson, the Royal Army Educational Corps (RAEC) was also wrestling with the relevance of experience to teaching and to ways of belonging to a social group. Professor T.E. Jessop, writing in 1949 in the RAEC journal on the role of religion in the Army, worried about the generation of men now joining the service, particularly National Servicemen:

Ideas that are familiar to us are altogether strange to them, either because [they were] never put into them, or because of the lack of the relevant ‘apperceptive background’[.] ... They lack a whole range of emotional and intellectual experience that has come naturally to those of us who are old enough to have been given, at home as well as school, the rich mental and spiritual legacy of our nation’s past.

There is a fine challenge here to those who have to educate them.

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15 The Cold War increased pressure on adult extra-mural education, such as the Workers’ Educational Association, see Roger T. Fieldhouse, *Adult Education and the Cold War. Liberal Values under Siege, 1946–51* (Leeds, 1985), pp. 6–7.
Jessop argues, like Thompson, that shared experience is necessary in bringing a group together. A committed Methodist and frequent contributor to debates on Armed Forces education, Jessop was Professor of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of Hull between 1928 and 1961 and, like Thompson, also taught literature in the Department of Adult Education at his university.\(^{18}\) Unlike Thompson, however, Jessop explicitly frames experience using psychological language, such as the Jungian idea of “apperceptive background” and taught such concepts in his extra-mural classes.\(^{19}\) To a certain extent, Jessop’s interpretation substantiates Rose and Smith’s claims that the psychological disciplines (and particularly psychological language) became an embedded part of academic popular discourse in the 1940s and 1950s.\(^{20}\) Yet Jessop’s contribution to the Army Forces education (for which he was awarded the Order of the British Empire) highlights a further crucial element to the discussion over experience and the soldier. The soldier was a group member of the Army and the nation, but Jessop also alluded to generational experience and the authority that ‘emotional and intellectual experience’ conferred. Soldiers themselves often interpreted experience in this way, as the life-narratives of servicemen studied in this chapter demonstrate. Servicemen used authentic experience in the military as a marker of authority, demonstrated by the veneration of the generation who had served in the Second World War.\(^{21}\)

Furthermore, soldierly claims of experience highlight a debate about what constituted legitimate war service.

Yet there are difficulties in using experience as a category, as well as studying it historically. Smith and Watson argue that experience can be ‘constitutive of the subject’ and ‘is the very process through which a person becomes a certain kind of subject[,] owning


\(^{19}\) Hull History Centre, T.E. Jessop Papers, Course Notes on History of Psychology, c. 1930, UDJP/1/15.


certain identities in the social realm, identities constituted through material, cultural, economic, and psychic relations.²² Joan Scott wrote of Thompson’s *The Making of the English Working Class* that ‘[t]he unifying aspect of experience excludes whole realms of human activity by not simply counting them as experience at least with any consequences for social organization.’²³ Those excluded ‘realms’ included the activities of women, children and complicating factors such as ethnicity, age and region. Scott highlights that some interpretations of experience, on both an academic level and in its everyday usage, have the tendency to be totalising and exclusive. In this way, the very definition of experience is crucial to subject-formation and, as Scott argues, is deeply political (in its broadest sense).²⁴

This chapter asks whether experience can provide another way to construct subjectivity; whether experience gave a variety of servicemen alternate tools and material upon which to develop a sense of self. Servicemen, it argues, used the concept of experience to validate or dismiss their role in Korea, far more than notions of democratic subjectivity or group theories. In the final section of this chapter, for example, a large proportion of British officers shun the phrase ‘battle experience’ used in questionnaires, stating that their ‘job’ had not involved any contact with the Chinese or North Korean enemy and could therefore hardly constitute battle experience. This perhaps corroborates Smith and Watson’s claim that experience is ‘negotiated’ within social, cultural, political and (as the final chapter of this thesis demonstrates) historical spheres.²⁵ In short, some servicemen used experience to underline or to refute their commitment to the military cause and authorities. We can therefore further unpick the concept of an active ‘soldier-citizen’ in early Cold War Britain by analysing how servicemen understood and used the concept of ‘experience’ in their life-narratives.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 34.
‘Morale is Mail’: Letters and Diaries from Korea

Social and new military historians have made great use of letters and diaries to explore the war experience of soldiers. Michael Roper argues that the ‘exploration of writing as a psychological activity allows us to see more clearly the articulation points between cultural scripts and subjectivity without collapsing one into another’, negotiating between the public discourses which shape writing and the ‘unconscious motivations’ which shape people’s responses to particular events. The use of language in these letters is also historically significant. Penny Summerfield calls for historians to locate their discussions of experience in language as ‘experience cannot exist outside discourse, agency cannot exist independently of language.’ By this logic we must study the language available to writers if we are to use letters and diaries to explore subject-formation. Any analysis of soldiers’ letters and diaries must therefore first address the linguistic components of this life-writing, as well as the particular military context in which they were written.

The decision here to examine both letters and diaries as a way to understand experience and subjectivity is intentional, but not unproblematic. Historians frequently conflate the two forms, despite the unique processes at work in each. Yet there is a case for studying both in parallel. Literary scholar Hope Wolf argues that both letters and diaries are selected by historians as they are deemed ‘immediate’ and ‘unmediated’. However, by using letters written to the BBC following the airing of The Great War television series (1963–4), Wolf argues that many letter and diary writers create immediacy through their writing. Furthermore, these sources use both proximity and urgency to claim legitimacy and connection with an event, rather than representing a direct conduit into military life. Letters and diaries are thus connected by their claims to immediacy, both in the hands of scholars

using them (Wolf is critical, for example, of diary and letter anthologies) and by the authors themselves. Elsewhere, Diana Gill argues that letters and diaries act as dialogical ‘act[s] of communion’, as the interaction between writer and audience creates and develops a sense of self in the writer.\(^{30}\) Both letters and diaries are written *in situ*, with the same material constraints.\(^{31}\) Furthermore, despite their apparent differences in audience, both are created within similar temporal parameters. Philippe Lejeune notes that, like the letter, ‘the modern diary does not really become what it is until the day it begins’.\(^{32}\) In other words, both forms are legitimated by their location in a specific time and place. On one level therefore, letters and diaries are both acts of ‘dialogical communion’ between writer and reader. But on a further level, their very form is also underwritten by claims to experience and backed up by a sense of *proximity* to events. It is therefore productive to study them alongside one another.

The specific place of letters and diaries in the military is also significant, as it suggests that military (even state) priorities framed the experiences of soldiers in Korea to a certain extent. On one hand, Field Marshall Lord Wavell wrote in 1948 that ‘[t]he average fighting soldier has a natural suspicion of cleverness [,] either of the tongue or of the pen, and is inclined to condemn it.’\(^{33}\) As historian Samuel Hynes writes, those soldiers who gained notoriety from their writing were often seen by the military as outsiders, who had not fully taken on a military outlook.\(^{34}\) Rachel Woodward also notes that: ‘To ponder extensively on the reasons for joining up is simply unsoldierly’ and that training reinforced the view of ‘the dangers of too much intellectual introspection’.\(^{35}\) However, one of the central points of this thesis is that soldiers were repeatedly asked to provide accounts of their lives, from recruitment processes to battle experience reports, letters home or prisoner of war repatriation interviews. Furthermore, as the final chapter of this thesis shows, this reticence

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\(^{31}\) Prisoner of war diaries are not included in this chapter as the specific material constraints of writers make them different, if not unique, pieces of life narrative.


\(^{35}\) Woodward, ‘“Not for Queen and Country or Any of That Shit”’, p. 374.
over ‘cleverness either of the tongue or of the pen’ did not preclude veterans from writing about their experiences or dwelling upon their role in the metanarratives of international and military history. To describe one’s life was not unsoldierly: it was an integral part of soldierly life and one of the most well-established stories in Western literature.36

Furthermore, the soldier’s ability to write a letter also occupies a significant part of the history of the state’s intervention in education. David Vincent writes that state-driven literacy projects in the late-nineteenth century wished to ensure that soldiers could do two things: write a letter home and read the instructions of a weapon.37 The European mass literacy movement was therefore partially conceived with the soldier in mind. Such skills were still of concern to the post-war state and military: at Army Basic Training Units, letter-writing was a crucial part of the syllabus and soldiers had to be able to write both ‘formal’ and ‘friendly’ letters to attain an Army Certificate of Education (Third Class).38 In this way, training underscored the necessity of being able to write a letter and to engage in what Gill terms a ‘dialogic communion’ with those back at home. The state, of course, was ultimately the reason behind soldiers’ separation from home, by sending its soldiers off to war and writing letters in the first place. Due to this factor, the state has another contributory, if implicit, role in the life-writing of servicemen. Once again therefore experience was framed by the specific context in which the letter or the diary was produced.

Letter-writing and the relaying of experience in Korea was also framed in terms of ‘morale’, with one soldier noting that ‘mail is morale’.39 This term, part of the Army’s group management theories and the government’s response to civilian air raids during the Second World War, entailed in its simplest sense, ‘keeping soldiers as happy and contented as possible’.40 As noted in the previous chapter, soldiers’ activities and mental states were frequently framed in terms of the ‘group’, from discussion groups to leadership tasks. Rose

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argues that the governmental concern with group morale emanated from a reconfiguration of democracy and the citizen within it: ‘Citizenship had acquired a subjective form ... [and] required the active engagement of the civilian in the social and political proves, a shaping of wills, consciences, and aspirations’. Rose thus argues that morale had a contributory role in creating good citizens and, yet again, how subjectivity mattered to governments of the 1940s and 1950s.

The attention paid to the mental well-being of citizens by central authorities was also extended to the soldier and his written word. For example, military authorities acknowledged that the letter (a ‘subjective form’) was a crucial component in the well-being of soldiers and their productivity. Psychiatrists, the vanguard in Rose’s theory of the rising power of the ‘psy’ disciplines, and military authorities alike employed the concept of morale. Psychoanalyst John Rickman argued that even from recruitment, men should be assessed on ‘their capacity to endure and manipulate intra-group tensions so that hostile impulses will strengthen morale in their unit.’ In 1950 Captain CJS Meade, who later became Commanding Officer of Mons OCTU, described morale in less abstract terms, linking it to pay rates, effective training and effective planning by officers: suitable mail provision too was one of the many practical considerations that ensured good morale. Meade concluded that officers should ‘[a]llow reasonable conditions of service. Give the soldier faith in his leaders and pride and interest in his job and that high morale gained him success in the last war can help him to face the dangerous and uncertain days of Armageddon yet to come.’ Morale represented the authorities’ (both civil and military) concern with the subjective construction and well-being of its citizens in the mid-twentieth century, but it also had roots in everyday military practice and infrastructure and can further indicate the structural factors surrounding experience in letter-writing.

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41 Rose, Governing the Soul, p. 32.
42 Kenneth Howard, Sex Problems of the Returning Soldier (Manchester, c. 1945), p. 45.
44 NAM, Papers of Lieutenant Colonel JG Meade, Captain CJG Meade, ‘Winter Essay. The Best Method of Improving Morale in the Army as a Whole with Due Regard to the Need for Economy’ (c. 1950), NAM. 1980-09-79.
The relationship between the military concern with morale, the letter and experience can also be understood through the lens of epistolary theory. In conflict, the letter arguably becomes a symbol of distance and separation from the recipients. In fact, as sociologist Liz Stanley writes, the letter in fact becomes the *full extent* of relationships, because it is both the fullest means of communication between the writer and recipient and because of the writer physically created in the letter. Taking the concepts of metonymy and *simulacra*, Stanley frames the letter in this way:

Metonymy involves substituting an attribute or characteristic for the whole or entirety, referring here to how letters seemingly take on some of the qualities or characteristics of the writer; they involve a simulacrum of presence by ‘standing for’ or conjuring up the writer: their characteristic phrases or mistakes, their hand having folded the paper and sealed the envelope, or their coffee stains marking the page, all referentially signal ‘that person’[.]… Letters have similar effects concerning the relationship between the correspondents; they signify the relationship itself.45

In the most personal letters, the researcher is profoundly, even uncomfortably, aware that the letter *is* the full extent of that relationship at a given time, as with a set of letters between one National Servicemen and his fiancée held in the Imperial War Museum.46 Furthermore, in 1945 psychologist Kenneth Howard advised wives that ‘[n]o scrap of news, of domestic detail, of friends and of local events is too trivial to be interesting. These things make him feel that he belongs, that he is still there and in touch with all that is going on.’47 The letter was thus a microcosm of an entire relationship and the social world the soldier had left behind. For instance, Mabel Baker wrote to her husband about the disputes and allegiances

of other wives on the British Army base, a sale of cosmetics at the NAAFI and, in line with Howard’s advice, ended every letter by stating how he was greatly missed and needed. In this sense (and through its often communal circulation amongst other family members), the letter transcends the public/private dichotomy. The letter is also more directly mediated by the state: during the First and Second World Wars officers were permitted by law to read their soldiers’ letters, although there are few instances of direct censorship in the Korean War (other than prisoner of war letters censored by the CPV). Jochen Hellbeck argues that diaries should not be regarded as inherently ‘private’; for the reader alone.

Like the letter, the diary also cannot be framed as conceptually private. In a much earlier example of soldierly writing from the 1840s, Steedman notes that the diary of John Pearman, a Sergeant in the King’s Own Light Dragoons, was a complex mix of private and public. Pearman’s life story as a soldier and later a policeman is ‘framed and bound by public events’, yet he often uses a ‘private’ relationship (his marriage) as a metaphor to express his wider discontent with his life and role in public life. As scholars of Soviet subjectivity also imply, it is almost impossible to demarcate ‘public’ and ‘private’ domains in the writing of this public servant whose professional life and sense of self was predicated upon ‘public’ events. This has consequences for the recounting of experience too. Smith and Watson argue that ‘public’ claims in life-narratives bring into question issues of ‘verifiability and authenticity’, as it not simply a matter of the writer’s own personal feelings. This means that experience does not necessarily belong to the realm of the ‘private’ either and can be used to form a sense of self, again built upon involvement with ‘public’, political events, such as the waging of war.

50 Steedman, The Radical Soldier’s Tale, pp. 103–04.
51 Hellbeck echoes this in his description of ‘Red Army Notebooks’, written during the Civil War, although argues early Soviet authorities favoured finished memoirs to ongoing diaries, see Hellbeck, ‘Working, Struggling, Becoming’, p. 345–46.
52 Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, p. 36.
These factors frame the writing of letters and diaries and mediate the experiences described therein. But to what extent were they evident in Korea? Some communicants developed complex systems of letter numbering due to the potential irregularity of post (particularly in forward battle positions and during the first very mobile year of the conflict): National Serviceman Second Lieutenant Julian Potter began numbering his letters in November 1951, based on his fellow officers’ behaviour, but lost count so had to begin again by the end of December.\(^{53}\) In writing back, his father wrote his son ‘diary’ extracts on events at home, an idea enthusiastically supported by his son.\(^{54}\) Private CBL Barr of the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) described an even more complex process in August 1954 on his mother’s birthday: ‘I do hope that you opened letters 35 and 35A in the correct order, the latter not till your celebrations on the 13\(^{th}\), and also that the flowers were delivered as ordered through the WVS [Women’s Voluntary Service] here’.\(^{55}\) Studying nineteenth-century conflicts, Mary Favret even argues that ‘the time of the post boy’ was one of four possible ways to ‘tell the time’ in modern warfare, the delivery of mail representing a specific, regular occurrence in wartime (and ‘war-time’).\(^{56}\)

The first letters written home were typically those written on the way to Korea. Soldiers’ stories have, since at least the nineteenth century, featured detailed and emotive descriptions of their journey to war.\(^{57}\) Servicemen bound for Korea remember leaving city ports with relatives wishing them well and regimental bands playing.\(^{58}\) The voyage to Korea also followed a well-established route, one of the so-called ‘Empire Routes.’ The majority of

\(^{53}\) IWM, Papers of Julian Potter, Letters to Parents, 29 November 1951 and 31 December 1951, Docs. 6882/8 and 12.
\(^{54}\) Papers of Julian Potter, Letter to Parents, early October 1951, Docs. 6882/1.
\(^{55}\) IWM, Papers of CBL Barr, Letter to Parents, 7 August 1954, Docs. 7178. The Women’s Voluntary Service (for Air Raid Precautions) was set up by the Home Secretary in 1938 and provided support to civil defence organisation and army welfare at military bases across the world, including Korea. Known as ‘weaver’s ladies’ or ‘NAAFI girls’, they had a significant role in army welfare provision at this time. The American company Interflora commercialised the use of telegraph technology to send flowers as early as 1910, but it is seldom addressed in epistolary theory.
\(^{57}\) Sergeant John Pearman wrote in 1845 that, ‘[i]t was a fine day and many people accompanied us[,] …The Bands playing Fare thee well…’ as they left for India on a ship from Maidstone. See Steedman, *The Radical Soldier’s Tale*, p. 112.
soldiers made the trip to Korea aboard one of Britain’s Empire transport ships: *Fowey, Halladale, Orwell, Pride, Windrush, the Asturias* and the *Dilwara.* These troopships encapsulated the last age of imperial sea travel and Britain’s changing international position. *HMT Empire Windrush,* for example, had formerly been a German troopship and was renamed and relaunched in 1947 after the British had claimed it during the Second World War; one of its most famous journeys was bringing West Indian immigrants to Britain in 1948 and it held an iconic place in the imagination of many first-generation immigrants. The ship held a similarly symbolic position in Korean War veterans’ memory of their wartime service.

It typically took up to six weeks for these ships to do the Southampton-Gibraltar-Suez-Aden-Colombo-Singapore-Hong Kong route, with some continuing onto Kure in Japan. Soldiers were able to post letters at the ports of call along the route: many letters written at sea and in Korea were therefore composed over a number of days, with numerous entries (a practice echoed by those at home). Soldiers’ responses to these places are revealing in a number of ways. First, these ports were often the first time that many young soldiers came into direct contact with such a wide range of nationalities. Sailing to Korea aboard the *Empire Hallidale,* National Serviceman John Gerrard, serving with the Royal Artillery (RA), wrote to his family (‘Dear All’), describing Aden in December 1953: ‘The western-style shops are really only a façade to the native houses behind – I ventured in a for a short while, but the smell was too much I’m afraid. There are all sorts of races – Arabs mainly, but a lot of Indians, some Chinese and Malays too’. One National Serviceman even expressed disappointment in a letter home that Port Said in Egypt did not look ‘particularly Eastern’, going against his expectations. In some ways this racialised

language foreshadowed later interaction with South Korean servicemen and Korean civilians.  

Both experienced soldiers and National Servicemen stressed racial difference in their life-writing. This reaction had historical precedent. Philip Edward argues that the encounter with difference in eighteenth-century voyage literature ‘made philosophers’ out of the men and women making sea voyages, however brief this ‘illumination’ proved. Linked to this language of racial difference, these ports (particularly Port Said) also had a long-standing, exotic reputation amongst British soldiers. Private Sam Mercer remembered in a later oral history interview that they were not even allowed to go ashore in Port Said, as the Royal Ulster Rifles (RUR) had ‘painted the town a bit of a lurid colour’ on a previous visit. Typically, references to sexual topics were restricted to diaries, rather than letters. For example, Private CBL Barr wrote in 1954:

Most of our time was spent travelling between one camp and the other, and being lectured on one single solitary lonesome subject time and time again until we were fed up to the teeth with hearing about VD – and it all did no good at all to the people at whom it was aimed. Last year of 30 per cent of the British troops returning home from the Korean theatre were suffering from it, and the figure is still going up. The trouble is that the Kure area especially has the highest proportion of prostitutes and VD in the world, and very little can be done to control it while so many troops are stationed in the district or passing through.

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64 For instance, when later describing his chances of escape from a North Korean prisoner of war camp, Sergeant Henry Tyler noted in an oral history interview: ‘the odds were completely against you in escaping … you didn’t look like an oriental, the natives were distinctly hostile, erm, as I say the country was against you, the climate was against you.’ See Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Henry Tyler, 14 April 1989, NAM 8905-167.
67 NAM, Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, NAM 8905-261.
68 IWM, Papers of CBL Barr, Diary, 11 May 1954, Docs. 7178.
Servicemen also made frequent reference to being on a ‘Cook’s Tour’ and associated their exotic travels with this famous tour company. These descriptions support Rachel Woodward’s description of the initial adventurousness in soldiers’ stories (particularly for those who later become disillusioned with the military). Describing enlistment as a voluntary process is essential in this formulation, as ‘this idea of self-initiated escape is significant in setting up the narrator as an adventurer; subsequent actions stand on the foundations established by the transcendent acts of their protagonists.’ For those critical of their later actions, this sense of adventure could also represent their comparative immaturity or naivety, thus framing the journey to war and into battle as a gradual ageing process. However, a number of National Servicemen set themselves up as ‘adventurers’ too, despite the lack of choice in their enlistment. Henry Tyler said that ‘I was young and foolish in, err, the first instance that, err, I felt that, okay it’s adventure, it’s high adventure and the opportunity to travel. I mean at that time [pause] it’s fair to say that my horizons had been, quite limited really’. Interestingly therefore, conscripts also used the appeal of adventure to justify their joining the military (as Woodward argues regular soldiers do), even if it does not logically apply to their forced conscription. In a letter to his parents, National Serviceman Lieutenant Gary Smith expressed his excitement at leaving the base in Yorkshire: ‘It is a wonderful opportunity to travel which I probably wouldn’t have had otherwise. It means my demob [demobilisation] being deferred for about eight months or more, though I expect everything will be over by the time I get there except policing.’ For many men, the voyage to Korea thus represented their first (and sometimes final) brush with ‘adventure’ before entering the theatre of operations in Korea.

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69 Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, NAM 8905-261; NAM, Oral History Interview Cpl DR Milbery, undated, NAM 1989-05-259. John Gerrard even read The Thomas Cook Story, which brought ‘a lot of local colour’ to his experience in Korea, see Papers of John H.A. Gerrard, Letter to Family, 19 July 1954, Docs. 17199. 70 Woodward, “‘Not for Queen and Country or Any of That Shit’”, pp. 372–73. 71 Also demonstrating, as some sociologists have argued, the state’s influence over the development of the life course Karl Ulrich Mayer and Urs Schoepflin, ‘The State and the Life Course’, Annual Review of Sociology, 15 (1989), p. 200. This idea is explored in further detail in Chapter Four. 72 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Henry Tyler, 14 April 1989, NAM 8905-167. 73 IWM, Papers of Lieutenant LGG Smith, Letter to Parents, 7 July 1951, Docs. 3368. 74 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that adventure had a different significance for women. QARANC Nurse Betty Smith, who served aboard the Empire Fowey during the Korean War, stated that
simultaneously interpreted this journey in a passive way. In all stories there is ‘an unacknowledged recognition ... that what they were doing on these long journeys, and during those years of war, was something not to do with them.’ Steedman dismantles the argument that soldiers and policemen fought for king, country or empire and highlights that they could hold different, even antithetical, opinions about the causes for which they supposedly fight. Soldierly texts are thus underwritten by both an early sense of adventure and enthusiasm and a simultaneous emphasis of their own lack of volition. In short, many soldiers see their movements as dictated by both the state and by their own wanderlust, unconnected with the objectives of war.

The sense that war was ‘something not to do with them’ is reinforced by descriptions of pre-Korea training. Servicemen describe their training aboard ship, consisting rifle drill and ranges when out in open water. Despite restrictions in space, officers and NCOs also led soldiers in physical training (P.T.) sessions. P.T. occupied a significant place in the history of the British Army. Sports historian J.D. Campbell argues that training programmes which took into account total body fitness, as opposed to upper body strength, were a key development in the modernisation and professionalization of the British Army in the early twentieth century and this training undoubtedly had an enduring impact upon training structures and the soldiers themselves. P.T. was thus continued, even aboard ships bound for Korea. In one of many letters home, dissatisfied Lieutenant Julian Potter complained about the on-board training:

Unfortunately this is very little use to anybody, partly because the normal aids to training, such as open country and in my case, light Ack Ack [anti-aircraft] guns are lacking; and because there is hardly any space to train in. There is no place on the

she too wanted ‘adventure’ and that a nursing career would take her away from home, although she also reflects that not being at home was for her an adventure, as her family expected the role of daughters to be at home. See IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Betty Smith, 29 September 1998, 18526.

Steedman, The Radical Soldier’s Tale, p. 42.

main deck where at least five lectures are now audible at the same time. The men
like this farcical training even less than they like doing nothing.\textsuperscript{77}

Potter was not alone in expressing dissatisfaction about the training on board. Looking back
on this training, Corporal Milbery of the Royal Fusiliers (RF) noted that ‘that was the only
real time, err, that I felt, that I felt we ought to have been told a bit more[,] ... I dunno
perhaps it would have been bad for discipline or something [interviewer and interviewee
laugh].\textsuperscript{78} Soldiers, and particularly conscripts, felt that this journey was their last
preparation for war and that they ought to be fully prepared for their future roles during this
time. The uncertainty and boredom in their letters and diaries show how important
conscripts regarded this journey and in some cases even a slight malaise at their suitability as
soldiers. Their ‘written journey’ aboard ship did not necessarily lead to a greater affirmation
of their role as servicemen or a greater sense of ‘purposefulness’, as Philip Edwards ascribes
to earlier sea voyages.\textsuperscript{79} This doubt also indicates servicemen’s feelings at a perceived lack
of experience. This in turn destabilises the autobiographical act of letter writing itself for, as
Smith and Watson note, the writer must set up his/her experience as authoritative in order to
gain the trust of the reader.\textsuperscript{80} Like the battle experience forms discussed later in this chapter,
letter-writing aboard ship shows servicemen’s uncertain relationship with military
experience and how they used this uncertainty to distance themselves from state-directed
military subjectivity itself.

When on the frontline, the practical circumstances of letter- and diary-writing
changed. Numerous letter-writers apologise for not writing while in frontline positions,
implicitly acknowledging the importance of a regular letter. Liz Stanley argues that this
stems from the fact that a letter is usually part of a sequence and ‘there are always things not
present in any one letter, with an incremental and fragmented emplotment existing across a

\textsuperscript{77} Papers of Second Lieutenant Julian J. Potter, Letter, early October 1950, Docs. 6882.
\textsuperscript{78} NAM, Oral History Interview with Unnamed Interviewer, DR Milbery, c. 1989, NAM 1989-05-259.
\textsuperscript{79} Edwards, \textit{The Story of the Voyage}, p. 224.
\textsuperscript{80} Smith and Watson, \textit{Reading Autobiography}, p. 33.
series concerning what happened before.’

This incremental emplotment became even more fragmented and less sequential on the frontline. For example, on 26 March 1951, Lieutenant Potter wrote to his parents that: ‘I am sorry this letter is a day late, but yesterday (Easter Sunday) I did not get a spare moment. Ever since I joined this troop it has been on the hop trying to keep up with the 45 Field Regt. who themselves have been trying to keep the Chinese in range.’ This is not to say that it was only frontline difficulties in finding time to write that restricted soldierly writing. One sergeant wrote to another that ‘I’m late in writing, but as usual with me I have no excuse. Except maybe laziness.’ Soldiers spoke to each other with the candidness of shared experience, or lack of it, in this case. However, on the whole, servicemen felt that they must write regularly (whether they did in practice or not). It was an expectation that worked both ways: Private Barr wrote to his family when aboard the Empress Orwell that: ‘I am looking forward to hearing something from you by every post, so please try to write something every few days so that I do not have to attend too many post queues in vain.’

The frequency and fullness of diaries kept in Korea demonstrate even further the role of regular writing (and regular reflection on experience) in informing a sense of self. As a pay clerk in the Royal Army Pay Corps (RAPC) from 1947, Private Anthony John Baker travelled extensively around the reserve areas in Korea, even noting that: ‘I have only to see Jock Turner then I’ve seen all the Pay Corps in Korea.’ Baker’s diary was filled with long, but irregular entries, according to the time he had to write. It ended with a despondent entry in August 1951: ‘The events of spring have gone, the summer has come with its ... mugginess, torrential rains, making rivers out of streams[,] ... huge insects, sweat, dirt and general unpleasantness, the peace talks go on, so does the war and the ... futility of it becomes more & more apparent every day.’ As Philippe Lejeune notes, the diary can end

84 Papers of CBL Barr, Letter to Parents, 20 April 1954, Docs. 7178.
because it is being kept for a specific length of time (such as service in Korea in these examples) or because the writer gives up on the venture. Baker’s final entry suggests the latter reason: he was unconvinced by the effectiveness of peace talks, but concluded that the real ‘events’ of the war were now over. Yet the diary was not necessarily used as a repository for private emotions or dissatisfaction with the military and progress of war. Second Lieutenant B. Reed of 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion the Middlesex Regiment kept a diary between October 1950 and May 1951 which was filled with small entries, almost entirely full of military positions and activities (with occasional notes on the weather). When attacked by the Chinese, his entry read: ‘Fri 16. Feb. Banzai at 0500hrs! A Coy [Company] had number of casualties. Bugles and mortars.’ Aside from the difficult circumstances (or perhaps a personal disinclination to lengthy writing), Reed’s diary is significant in showing the impact of state-driven writing practices on soldiers. Elsewhere, Steedman argues that Sergeant John Pearman’s experiences as a policeman after his military career taught him the skills of succinct and accurate record-keeping, which had repercussions on his later writing style. In the same way, junior officers such as Reed were tasked with keeping the unit ‘war diary’, a daily document accounting for a company or regiment’s actions that day. It is perhaps understandable therefore that both military terms and a short, official style infused Reed’s own personal diary: he positioned himself in the military actions for that day, rather than in terms of individual feeling. The impact of the military on self-reflexive writing practices thus extended to diary writing too and further substantiates the blurring of ‘private’ and ‘public’ in life-narratives. The frequent use of military acronyms and writing protocols also demonstrate again the centrality of military language to the category of experience. ‘Subjects’ (i.e. those who are subjectivised) are confined to expressing themselves in the language and discourse available to them. As Joan Scott summarises, ‘[e]xperience is a

88 NAM, Diary of Second Lieutenant B St GA Reed M.C., 14 October 1950–14 May 1951, NAM 1994-04-495.
subject’s history. Language is the site of history’s enactment. Historical explanation cannot, therefore separate the two.\footnote{Scott, ‘Experience’, p. 34.}

The recipients of soldiers’ letters and diaries further suggest the value placed on experience in wartime letter- and diary-writing. Historians of a number of different conflicts have argued that the gulf between civilian and military worlds is exemplified by letters home.\footnote{Jeff Keshen, \textit{Saints, Sinners, and Soldiers. Canada’s Second World War} (Vancouver, 2004), p. 229; Earl J. Hess, “‘Tell Me What the Sensations Are’. The Northern Home Front Learns about Combat”, in Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller (eds), \textit{Union Soldiers and the Northern Home Front. War Experiences, Post-War Adjustments} (Fordham, 2002), p. 123.} However, as argued in the previous chapter, it is inaccurate to apply this dichotomy to post-war Britain, where the state called for ‘thoughtful’ soldier-citizens and where military experience had touched so many in the Second World War. The letter home adds to this idea of connected civil and military spheres, particularly letters to and from young servicemen’s fathers, as it frequently tempered by their experience in the Second World War. Using military slang and abbreviations, Private Baker’s father made a direct enquiry about an officer he knew in ‘his’ war, as well as the quality of the food in both:

\begin{quote}
It is funny how we have different grousers in our wars, in mine it was all tinned jam and bully, yours seem to be chicken and fruit, still it all goes down in the same old way and we still grouse. I was wondering if you have met the Gloucesters yet and spoken to the R.S.M. Hobbs. Major E.D. Harding is also there if you get a chance to say to him[:] ‘My father asks me to tell you that a good officer always has a crate of beer in the back of his P.O.,’ he is bound to ask who your father is and you can tell him, also tell him I only drink at weekends now unless somebody takes me out, I am too broke.\footnote{Papers of Anthony John Baker, 3 December 1950, NAM 1990-12-34; ‘grouse’ in this instance means complaint/complain.}
\end{quote}

Elsewhere, Robin Bruford-Davies, an officer taken as a prisoner of war during Korea, mentioned in an oral history interview that his father, who had been a soldier before him
and ‘had just finished a war said “right, you must go out with some proper clothes”,’ knowing the particular importance of keeping hands and feet warm.\(^{93}\) Nor were these isolated incidents restricted to service families: the generation of young men who fought in Korea were fighting in the shadow of their fathers’ war, a war which was subsumed far more easily into the public metanarrative of British post-war identity. As Paul Ricoeur notes, generational relations can complicate the relationship between individual and state, an idea explored in further detail in Chapter Four.\(^{94}\) The battles in which their fathers had fought were already becoming legendary and were even more so when recounted in later oral history interviews.\(^{95}\) Experience in this case was again marker of authority, but it was not the experience of the serving soldier that was referenced; it was that of the recipient. These letters testify, to a certain extent, to the idea of a ‘long Second World War’, whose influence overshadowed the military service of those after 1945.\(^{96}\)

The blurring of civilian and soldier did not necessarily lead to a complete abandonment of tact in letter-writing. Reservist Lieutenant Malcolm Cubiss, wrote to his parents of a serious injury he sustained, but couched it in light-hearted, even humorous, terms, so as not to alarm them:

Thank you very much for the two cables, which you so kindly sent, and for the letter, which I received this afternoon. I am sorry for not writing before but I have not had a pen. I am quite all right and there is no need for worry. I have however been knocked about a bit worse than last time and I’m afraid that I have lost my right hand [.] However the Brigadier and C.O. are finding out from the War Office what difference, if any, it will make to my Regular Commission. The medical people

\(^{93}\) NAM, Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Robin Bruford-Davies, 10 February 1989, NAM 1989-05-163.


\(^{95}\) Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Jarlath Donnellan, 4 August 1988, NAM 1989-05-160. Jarlath Donnellan lists the military achievements of his father in the Second World War and his brothers as National Servicemen, all of whom volunteered to go in his place to Korea.

\(^{96}\) My thanks go to Dr Mathew Thomson for his observations on the concept of a long Second World War.
say that it probably will not make any difference. Anyhow, shall have to close now as the man wants his typewriter back. Love Malcolm.97

On the whole, however, letters demonstrate that a civilian-military division which had perhaps characterised previous conflicts did not apply as strongly to Korea. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the division between civilian and military spheres is perhaps even inappropriate to the context of Cold War Britain.

Overall therefore, we can make several conclusions about the impact of state, soldierly experience and self-formation based on an analysis of a selection of letters and diaries. The critical engagement which governments and military authorities wished to inculcate in the British populace was evident in some soldiers’ letters and diaries in Korea. More often, however, state influence was more implicit: military educational objectives underpinned the very practice of soldierly letter-writing and military language infused even personal diaries. These life-narratives therefore nuance our understanding of self-reflexivity and self-formation in the context of service in Korea. Furthermore, the category of experience is used in letters and diaries to respond to state-directed models of subjectivity in a number of ways, including as a marker of feelings of distance or inadequacy and as an ongoing symbol of the previous generation’s wartime service.

‘A Vocabulary of His Own’: Reading and Creative Responses of British Servicemen

Is experience as significant in other forms of life-narrative? Soldiers’ reading and writing practices, beyond the letter home or the manuscript diary, are a further area in which the state’s impact on self-formation can be analysed in detail. In her study of the intellectual life of Australian soldiers in the First World War, Amanda Laugesen notes that reading choices

were influenced by charities, publishers and military authorities, but can also help show a measure of ‘intellectual resistance, and escape from, the military and the machine in which men were caught up.’ As mentioned above, the state had long taken an interest in military literacy. As described in Chapter One, National Service recruitment prompted official concern over this literacy, as a significant minority of recruits were unable to read and write sufficiently (to attain the minimum standards for the Army Certificate of Education, Third Class) due to the wartime disruption of their education. Reading and reflection were encouraged through the Army Bureau of Current Affairs and adult education more generally. In *British Way and Purpose*, Professor F.A. Cavenagh highlighted the way in which the government continued to maintain public libraries even during the war to help ‘morale’ and to help citizens to remain informed. Cavenagh further argued that:

An educated man is better able to provide his own entertainment, and is not bored or at a loose end when cut off from cinemas or the pools: he can distinguish between good books or films or music from the bad [...] He will spend his leisure on interests that mean some effort on his part, in which his mind or body or hands are actively engaged.  

Reading demonstrated an ability of the (male) citizen to keep himself amused and engaged. Alice Langen, a forces librarian in the Second World War, noted that ‘the world of the book ... is, with rifle and barracks, part of the soldier.’ She noted that whilst fiction books were always the most popular books, soldiers then policing post-war Germany were also interested in non-fiction about the previous war, showing yet again the enduring significance of the previous generation in mediating the experiences of servicemen in the 1950s.

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[T]hey do not know anything about those six years of a burning world. Now, being themselves soldiers, being in Germany, the so much hated country during those six years, their interest increases and they want to build their own opinions. This is not any longer the lover of adventure stories in the soldier but the young British person who wants to know how it all came about, what it all really looked like. He wants to know where he stands today.101

Reading therefore underpinned the state idea of an informed soldier-citizen, particularly those in theatres across the world which reflected the changing international position of Britain. Military educational specialists considered history and literature vital in this regard. T.E. Jessop wrote that ‘if we are to make history and geography walk hand in hand’, then it needed to be taught properly through military education provision.102 Revealing more about his own motivations in extra-mural education, Jessop concluded that ‘lads who see squalor round them will not be fitted to remove it, if they are not introduced to the splendours of imaginative art.’103

To what extent did the British serviceman in Korea take part in such leisure activities? Frontline servicemen had access to a small but sufficient supply of books. Each RAEC library obtained a Standard Unit Library and fiction and a mobile library visited twice a month.

101 Ibid., p. 18.
103 Ibid., p. 19.
Servicemen also requested that reading material be sent out to them. John Gerrard (RA), taking part of the force policing the 38 Parallel in 1954, asked to be sent copies of the *Listener* and *Times Weekly* so he could keep updated on radio shows and music and even asked his mother to send a Penguin paperback copy of *The Thunder Carnival* (1945), as he lost the copy available in the WVS. reading section.\(^{104}\) Gerrard also noted that: ‘I’ve found quite a lot of time for reading, and have found quite a respectable library to supply my needs at the local Education Centre.’\(^{105}\) Yet if servicemen were responding to the government’s call for reflexive, critically engaged soldier-citizens, then many did so with a rather irreverent attitude to what was expected of them. For example, Lieutenant Julian Potter wrote home that: ‘Among the books I have been reading was “I Chose Freedom”, which I have read to pep up my lagging anti-Communist zeal. My purpose was surprisingly well accomplished. Perhaps I should hasten to read a book by Zilliacus or someone?’\(^{106}\) Indeed Alice Langen argued in 1951 that the choice of book is significant. She stated that ‘I never

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\(^{104}\) Papers of John H.A. Gerrard, Letters to Family, 24 January and 14 March 1954, Docs. 17199; James Thurber, *The Thunder Carnival* (New York, 1945). This book was one of the ‘Armed Services Editions’ published by the US Council of Books in Wartime, a publishing initiative established during the Second World War to provide soldiers with free books.

\(^{105}\) Papers of John H.A. Gerrard, Letter to Family, 15 April 1954, Docs. 17199.

gave a crime-book or a Western to a soldier who was uncertain himself’ and that the
majority preferred ‘supernatural’ fiction, as ‘it is important for the soldier to live from time
to time in this world of imagination without contact with real life; that it brings him, in a
way, near to his own childhood or his home’. Overall therefore, whilst reading certainly
featured in soldiers’ lives and partially chimed with government ideas of a critically engaged
soldier-citizen, reading could also take soldiers away from their immediate environment and
war.

A further dimension to reading practices also reveals more about soldier-citizens in
practice. Due to the distance between Britain and Korea, frontline serviceman had poor
access to recent newspapers and periodicals. Soldiers had no access to daily newspapers
during the war and magazines were not provided until August 1951. Soldiers were provided
with Sunday editions of national newspapers, with 2,780 copies distributed weekly, which
was ‘highly appreciated in this theatre.’ Nevertheless, after the initial dramatic events of
1950, most national newspapers made little mention of Korea. Soldiers thus published their
own newspapers, which included home news provided by the British Army News Unit or
gleaned from British or Commonwealth programmes on the wireless (one member of the
team later noted that ‘U.S. news sources were taboo’).

Three main newspapers were produced this way: the Korean Base Gazette, Circle News and
Crown News. RAEC members of 29 Division produced Korean Base Gazette (with its Sunday edition The Weekly
Round Up), at the Rear Headquarters just outside Pusan and 320 editions of Circle News,
before it was absorbed into Crown News, journal of the Commonwealth Division in October
1951. Crown News was published from Gloucester Camp at Solma Ri, two kilometres
south of the 38 Parallel. News was gathered through the night (due to the time difference),
so it could be ready for breakfast each morning. Newspapers contained a mixture of
‘world’, ‘home’ and sporting news. Crown News provided more detailed news for

107 Langen, ‘Soldiers’ Reading’, pp. 18–19.
108 Adjutant General Corps Museum, Army Education Corps Papers, Report No. 31, Army Educational Activities
109 IWM, Papers of Peter M. Clayburn, Notes on Newssheet Production in the Field, Docs 95/302.
111 Clayburn, ‘Notes on Newssheet Production in the Field’, Docs 95/302.
Commonwealth troops, as well as transcripts from BBC programmes.\textsuperscript{112} Topics of home articles ranged from the economy (‘U.K. Beer Consumption Still falling’) and rationing to sport, including detailed coverage of Test Matches and England’s 1953 Ashes win.\textsuperscript{113} To some extent, these newspapers afforded soldiers a greater sense of connection with news from home, particularly for Commonwealth troops. Military milestones were often seen in parallel with events at home. For instance, servicemen worried that the Battle of the Hook (28–29 April 1953) would ruin their Coronation parties and one argued that it was ‘propitious’ that Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay should successfully climb Everest at the same time that ‘British men and Commonwealth cousins’ were victorious at the Battle of the Hook.\textsuperscript{114} The battlefield was still far from home, but the detailed work of newspaper production lessened the sense of isolation.

Lieutenant Colonel C Murphy (RAEC) argued that soldiers had ‘a vocabulary of their own’ and these newspapers potentially proved this through their use of military acronyms and


\textsuperscript{114} NAM, Papers of W. Bull, unpublished autobiography, c. 1989, NAM 1989-05-216, p. 83; IWM, Papers of Thomas Nowell MM, typescript unpublished memoir, p. 97. See Appendix A for further information on these military and national events.
terminology.\textsuperscript{115} Once again, experience was couched in terms which were recognisable to other servicemen and available within a particular discourse.

The language of experience (and its role in subject-formation) is also evident in poetry. It is not an understatement to say that discussion of war poetry has dominated analyses of the literary outputs of war.\textsuperscript{116} Scholars perhaps overstate the profound ‘divide’ between civilian and military experience, and private and public.\textsuperscript{117} Some poetry produced during the Korea supports this idea. Ashley Cunningham-Boothe wrote poetry under the pseudonym ‘John Briton’. Cunningham-Boothe referred to his alias as ‘the Schizogenesis’, noting in one undated poem the divide between his military and civilian selves:

\begin{verbatim}
John
Briton
Is not my
Given name;
Nor is it my
Father’s name.
It is a name that
Has been chosen rather
Carefully for the split
Off – the schizogenesis
Conceived out of the part-
Soldier and the part-civilian
In me; out of the Jekyll and
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{115}CCR Murphy, ‘Words Used in the Army’, \textit{Army Education. The Journal of the Army Educational Corps}, 22, 2 (1948), p. 62. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy notes that ‘[t]he soldier, like the sailor and the airman, has a vocabulary of his own.’

\textsuperscript{116} Notable examples include: Paul Fussell, \textit{The Great War and Modern Memory} (New York and London, 1975); John Silken, \textit{Out of Battle. Poetry of the Great War} (New York and London, 1972); such material was deemed so important to the study of war that thousands of pages of archive material have been made available through the First World War Poetry Digital Archive at Oxford University, see Stuart Lee ‘First World War Poetry Digital Archive’, 11 November 2008. <http://www.oucs.ox.ac.uk/ww1lit/> (Accessed: 6 June 2014).

Hyde inside of me. The schizo-

Genesis is the real me; the real me

Is John Briton. I have no name for the

Boy, the young soldier or the civilian.118

For Cunningham-Boothe, there was an evident split between civilian and military life and the experience of his service necessitated a new identity, John Briton. This patriotic name suggests an attachment to the nation whom he served (much like a young Eric Blair who used the River Orwell as the basis for his famous pseudonym). Yet Briton was not wholly an agent of that nation and the split between his lives was at the core of his sense of himself: in his words, ‘the schizogenesis is the real me.’ Schizogenesis, referring to a split, was typically used since the mid-twentieth century to refer to causing schizophrenia (for example, a ‘schizogenic family’).119 Even if he did not identify with this medical category, Briton nevertheless still used psychological language to define himself, again potentially strengthening Smith’s claim about the pervasiveness of such terms.120

There are clearly difficulties in interpreting Korean War poetry as simply evidence of a chasm in the experience between civilian and serviceman. Furthermore, many of these servicemen, both officer and soldier, were also National Serviceman, to whom the differences between their service in the armed forces and their previous livelihoods seemed far starker. Indeed, some of John Briton’s poetry was written after the war (and produced by a veterans’ publishing company), where the contrast between military and civilian life seemed even deeper. Moreover, as explored in Chapter Four, writers were acutely aware of their literary predecessors in the military, meaning they repeated older tropes rather than reflecting their own experience in Korea. In a letter home (and reiterated in a later memoir) National Serviceman Lieutenant J Whybrow described his brigadier, as “[b]ald and red of

118 Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (John Briton), Shapes of War by the Schizogenesis John Briton (Leamington Spa, 1999), unnumbered pages. Many of Cunningham-Boothe’s poems are ‘concrete’ or visual poetry, forming a shape on the page (here a right-angled triangle). The term concrete poetry was in fact first used during the 1950s.
face and short of breath”, quoting Siegfried Sassoon’s 1918 poem ‘Base Details’ almost exactly. Some writers were not quite so reverent in their references. In the poem included at the start of this chapter entitled ‘Korea: A Lament on A Looted Typewriter’, the poet, ‘Rudyard N.G. Orton’ (almost certainly Lieutenant Geoffrey Norton, 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment) subverted Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem ‘If’. He described various privations of life in the Korean theatre, concluding that if you can survive all this ‘[y]ours is the stores and everything that’s in it./ And which is more, you’re in KOREA my son.’ Norton subversion of Kipling’s paean to martial masculinity and stoicism shows a humorous resistance to the ‘high diction’ of earlier military writing and a desire to rewrite it in terms of the Korean War and the more mundane aspects of everyday life. Nevertheless, writers in the Korean War were conscious of the famous generations of war writers and commentators who had preceded them and whose work was becoming part of the literary canon of the 1950s. To some extent then, ideas of civilian-military division do not necessarily originate in the Korean War and are potentially a product of repetition and reflection on work from earlier conflicts in the century.

However, the most significant problem of marking a divide between military and civilian in this material is that it reifies one specific, narrow definition of experience. Material written on the ‘front line’ was treated as the pinnacle of authenticity and legitimacy, with servicemen’s authority diminishing by degrees the further away they were from it. By this logic, spatial location infers authorial power and frontline ‘experience’ is prized as the most authentic in wartime experience. Aside from the continual movement of troops from frontline to reserve areas, this interpretation overlooks the multitude of situations in which a serviceman fighting a war can find himself. Whilst soldiers themselves did employ this hierarchy, it is important that the historian analyses this in detail instead of perpetuating it.

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Following the argument of Joan Scott, this privileging of frontline ‘experience’ is also profoundly gendered. As a consequence of the enduring legacy of the soldier’s story with Western literature, frontline serviceman, but also men more generally, are the only ones permitted to make claims about war, a trend that continues to present war-reporting and military history writing.¹²⁴ Indeed, this privileging was profoundly institutionalised through the enforced autobiographies which underpin military life. As other chapters demonstrate, recruitment practices and repatriation interviews demand the soldier to produce a life story, making reference to his role in military and world events. But in the final section of this chapter, it is evident that soldiers could subvert or dispute the institutionalised privileging of frontline experience, as demonstrated by the responses to ‘battle experience’ forms completed by British officers upon returning to the UK. This section also calls into question the historiographical tendency to value frontline material over other material and provides a further perspective on how the category of experience might be used to understand individual responses to state projects aimed at moulding soldierly subjectivity.

‘Not Applicable’: Experience and the Autobiographical Subject in ‘Battle Experience’

Responses

Form-filling has generally been excluded from studies of life-writing, despite the large amount of autobiographical content many forms contain. The potential reasons for this exclusion include the rigid question and answer formats of modern pro forma, the apparent physical lack of space in it for lengthy answers or self-reflection and the overriding perception of it as a simply a bureaucratic tool. Historians of life-writing may also omit the study of such material as it seems to serve only external agencies or groups intent on gathering information, rather than being an authentic articulation of self.

The notion that forms are simply the tools of government is the result of prominent historical arguments charting the development of modern Western bureaucracies. Historians

of nations and nationalism, most famously Benedict Anderson, have argued that the modern nation state came into being through the stabilisation of language through print technology. This technology was used in turn to govern, particularly with the development of the census in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Europe (the first taking place in Britain in 1801). Eric Hobsbawm explains how a question on one’s spoken language could prompt individuals to identify with a particular national grouping: ‘By asking the language question censuses for the first time forced everyone to choose not only a nationality, but a linguistic nationality. The technical requirements of the modern administrative state once again helped to foster the emergence of nationalism’. Ian Hacking argues that through enumerating and categorising people, the census created ‘new ways for people to be’. Yet the census was not the first form to be used to garner information on populations. Earlier examples in Britain include standardised forms filled out by overseers of the Poor Laws (from the sixteenth century) to describe and locate beneficiaries of aid within the English parish. These documents, together with testimonies made in court, were not written by the informant (nor indeed always voluntarily given) but provided a space, however small, for a life story to be told. Overall, therefore, the use of forms within modern bureaucratic systems was perhaps part of a more gradual history of what Edward Higgs has termed the ‘information state’ than historians of modern nationalism have allowed.

Yet there is an even more influential strand of scholarship which has skewed our interpretation of the modern pro forma, that of ‘governmentality’ and control. Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ dominates discussion about information-gathering by the modern state. Foucault’s concept emphasised the controlling nature of modern systems for

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collecting information (such as the census), which quantify the population so as exert power over it. Foucault notes:

[I]t is the population itself on which government will act either directly through large-scale campaigns, or indirectly through techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the people, the stimulation of birth rates, the directing flow of the population into certain regions or activities, etc.\textsuperscript{130}

Information is gathered to exert control, through ever more efficient means. Foucault’s concept has been widely used in a number of different historical contexts. Historians of colonialism, including Benedict Anderson and anthropologist Bernard Cohn, have noted the use of the census to ‘know’ and thereby control indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{131} Revitalising Hobsbawm’s interpretation of the census (noted above) and Louis Althusser’s notion of ‘interpellation’, imperial historian Nicholas Dirks even argues that subjects came to internalise categories featured in the census forms. For example, British rulers put great emphasis on ‘caste’ in colonial India and this importance was internalised to a great degree by Indian subjects, who had until then, Dirks argues, preferred others markers of identity.\textsuperscript{132} This argument is one of the very few instances where the individual experience of form-filling itself is under analysis: forms gave states the power to control and categorise individuals, but it also gave individuals the terminology, however loaded, with which to speak about themselves.

According to Foucault’s logic of ‘governmentality’ therefore, form-filling constituted a small component in a modern knowledge system, which in turn provided the basis for social organisation. Rose concurs, noting that through such practices people ‘were turned into figures, and collected together at central points; the unruly population was

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\footnotesize
\item \textsuperscript{131} Anderson, \textit{Imagined Communities}, pp. 163–85; Bernard Cohn, \textit{An Anthropologist Among the Historians and Other Essays} (Delhi and Oxford, 1990), p. 250.
\end{thebibliography}
rendered into a form in which it could be used in political arguments and administrative decisions.'\textsuperscript{133} As Mary Poovey argues in \textit{A History of the Modern Fact} (1998), new ‘knowledge practices’ came to underpin particular institutions and ways of thinking. Rather than use the census, Poovey herself uses the example of double-entry bookkeeping by seventeenth-century merchants to demonstrate the changing epistemology of modern Europe, arguing it was ‘both a system of writing and a mode of government’.\textsuperscript{134} Once again, however, historians debate the moment of change and many locate the major epistemological shift in the early twentieth century. As explored in Chapter One, some historians have interpreted the rise of ‘Taylorist’ thinking as the major turning point in the relationship between information-gathering, governments and individuals, with ‘standardization, collaboration, efficiency and scientific management’ becoming the hallmarks of the modern state.\textsuperscript{135} Edward Higgs argues that between 1914 and 1960 the dual institutions of ‘total war and total warfare’ caused an unprecedented increase in the information gathered through forms by the state. Projects included national registration for wartime service (as with the National Registration Act (1915) and the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939), wartime identity cards and NHS registration, all of which gathered large amounts of personal information. The form was thus a common, if not the most common, life-narrative document in modern western society, however unglamorous it might seem.

The international context of the Cold War adds a further dimension to these arguments, which have typically focused on domestic developments alone, particularly the gathering of secret ‘intelligence’ (as opposed to information gathering). Examining the expansion of the security services in the twentieth century, Richard Aldrich argues that the early 1950s information was increasingly gathered by ‘the hidden hand’ of the British

\textsuperscript{133} Rose, \textit{Governing the Soul}, p. 8.


Elsewhere Ron Robin argues that ‘quantification’ underpinned Anglo-American academia, such as with the development of ‘area studies’ where foreigners became ‘measurable ideal types’, as seen in Chapter One. This gave ‘behaviouralists’, and the governments who took up their ideas, a comforting lens through which to see the world in turbulent times: ‘Gone was the world in which human conduct was obscure, the product of undiscovered motives and unpredictability.’ One might even argue that the intense interest of collecting personal information that characterised the early Cold War years mirrored the establishment of the first British census in 1901, which Kathryn Levitan argues was partially ‘to determine strength on an international stage’. An international perspective can thus perhaps nuance our understanding of bureaucratic developments in post-war Britain.

However, as social scientist James C. Scott notes, modernist projects typically create a uniform citizen, taking no account of variations in age, region, gender or class. There might be a tendency therefore to see the questionnaire, survey or proforma, all of them technologies of the modern state, as producing similarly uniform subjects or ones that can be organised under particularly discrete categories. Yet these technologies provide much more information about people’s lives than their resultant statistics suggest. In her cultural history of the British census, Kathryn Levitan seeks to nuance the rather ominous interpretations of ‘governmentality’ by assessing the wider cultural impact of such information-gathering in nineteenth-century media and culture. In doing so, Levitan calls for us to look beyond the machinistic overtures of the state, to the populace who provided personal information in the census form. Like Hobsbawm, Levitan seeks to bring the agency of the individual and the personal consequences of their response back into the historical study of government

139 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 346.
technology. Edward Higgs too notes the cultural reaction to form-filling and information-gathering in the Ealing comedy *Passport to Pimlico* (1949). Released in the same year as Orwell’s indictment of identity control in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Higgs argues that *Passport to Pimlico* associated national registration projects ‘with the totalitarianism of the Left’, as the residents of Pimlico discover they are in fact their own foreign territory in the heart of London and institute a passport control system.\(^{1\text{41}}\) Once again, the cultural context of the 1950s suggests an alternative narrative to the concepts of ‘governmentality’ and state information-gathering.

In analysing battle experience forms, the final section of this chapter seeks to add to this more nuanced assessment of the accrual of information by government and to explore the consequences of form-filling for an individual’s understanding of their experience war. The term *experience* is again crucial in this context: experience was not only an emergent academic concept in the early 1950s, but it was an implicit part of discussions of active citizenship. Did involvement and civic duty in the domestic context constitute the ultimate demonstration of an active citizen, or was that label only merited by frontline experience? As these forms demonstrate, this distinction was an ever-present issue for officers describing their ‘battle experience’.

The sample of battle experiences forms available from the Korean War number just over two hundred and cover 1951–1952, two years with contrasting events in war: in 1951 the war was highly mobile whereas by 1952 it had settled down to concentrated fighting around the 38 Parallel. The Directorate of Tactical Investigation (Questionnaire and War Diary Section) at the War Office produced a standard form of ten questions, which was extended to eleven questions in the second half of 1952, the eleventh question being ‘[g]ive a couple of tips which you think would help an officer of your rank when he is posted to Korea’ (See Appendix B for full form).\(^{1\text{42}}\) Of the respondents, 7 per cent were Second


Lieutenants, 32 per cent Lieutenants, 36 per cent Captains and 21 per cent Majors, with remainder Lieutenant Colonel or above and one stray Sergeant Major. One of the longest service lengths was twenty-two months, of Lieutenant R Spittle (REME), but all officers were given the same form in which to respond to their ‘battle experience’ regardless of service length. Responses were mostly handwritten and completed within four months from Korea (with a few exceptions), then they were returned to the War Office for analysis by Major Philip Hugh Godsal. Godsal even replied to respondents, sometimes with detailed letters assuring officers their opinions would be taken into account when considering future provision in Korea.

Historians have made some use of battle experience forms. In his recent study of the British Army in the Cold War, David French used a selection of battle experience forms from the Korean War to sketch the equipment shortages of the British Army, including the lack of available four-wheeled drive vehicles and automatic weaponry needed to withstand Chinese assault. In terms of equipment, one might add to French’s assessment that equipment complaints changed over time. Major AE Younger (RE) noted in 1951 that ‘[a]part from ammunition, almost every item was in short supply’, including winter clothing, tentage and suitable boots. By 1952, Captain GR Hill felt so well-provisioned that he noted that: ‘I would say that 1 Commwel Div is by far the best equipped Division ever known in the annals of our history’. However, although useful to consider when reading the questionnaire from the War Office’s perspective, the forms’ usage goes beyond simply empirical analysis of shortages. The most comprehensive use of battle experience forms as a source of qualitative information comes from outside the British Army, in Robert Engen’s

143 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant R Spittle, 11 November 1952, WO 308.90.
144 Godsal was formerly of the Ox and Bucks Light Infantry and was well-known for escaping from a German prisoner of war camp in 1917 see TNA, Foreign Office, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Germany, Report by Captain PH Godsal, 30 April 1917, FO 383/266.
145 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Letter from Major PH Godsal to Captain RWB Oatts, 21 May 1952, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Letter from Major PH Godsal to Captain FHB Matthews (REME), Essex, 19 May 1952, WO 308.89.
147 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major AE Younger, 25 July 1951, WO 308.89.
148 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain GR Hill, c. 1952, WO 308.90.
Second World War history, *Canadians under Fire*. Engen uses theories of questionnaire writing (although omits a discussion of their historical significance in mid-twentieth century culture and thought) and uses the questionnaires to gain a different perspective on ‘infantry effectiveness’ in the Second World War. As a result, Engen still approaches the battle experience forms for the empirical data they can yield, although does acknowledge that they ‘reflect a multiplicity of subjective experiences’ and makes skilful comparisons between the questionnaire and the oral history interview.\(^{149}\) However, his mild dissatisfaction with the lack of reliable information on ‘specific actions’ or battles in the questionnaires is perhaps the product of reading the questionnaires in the wrong way. Engen is expressing discontent with the ‘public’ version of events, which Smith and Watson argue is a common response to life-narratives concerning specific ‘historical events’.\(^{150}\) Rather than reading these questionnaires for empirical data they can provide and the general trends they reveal (which Engen notes is the War Office’s aim), historians can use battle experience questionnaires as a source of life-narrative. In short, instead of uncovering ‘standardized citizens ... uniform in their needs’, as modernist projects attempted to do at the time, we can use these sources to understand subject-formation on a personal level; to understand the reactions of individuals to being asked to summarise their war experience under eleven question headings.\(^{151}\) This analysis can then in turn help us to understand the relationship between subject, state and institution in a less abstract and more grounded fashion.

The physical form itself is the first way we can analyse this connection. Robert Engen notes that officers were encouraged to attach addenda for further clarification or personal notes and just over 10 per cent of British recipients from Korea did so.\(^{152}\) These addenda are the first indication of the difficulties officers faced in committing their battle experience to paper. Some used extra paper to describe the effect of a particular enemy weapon or tactic in details, to give details on their own unit, or to list shortages (which for

\(^{149}\) Engen, *Canadians under Fire*, p. 34.  
\(^{150}\) Smith and Watson, *Reading Autobiography*, p. 36.  
\(^{151}\) Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, p. 346.  
\(^{152}\) Engen, *Canadians under Fire*, p. 29.
some officers were too numerous to fit in the standard answer space provided.\textsuperscript{153} These even included diagrams in some instances.\textsuperscript{154} However, others used addenda to express their dissatisfaction with the questionnaire’s format and its rigid questions. Captain JW Wheatley (RE) attached a letter to his near-empty form, noting that ‘owing to my service in Korea being only in a Works Services capacity, it is only possible for me to report on such’ and then provides a detailed description of the provision of hutting (including Nissen and Romney huts) in Korea.\textsuperscript{155} Godsal even wrote to one respondent that he ‘realise[d] that the proforma is not applicable in every case; it is part of the system[,] however; to make sure that the people who really have got something to say get a copy, it has to go to everybody.’\textsuperscript{156} Yet the standard questionnaire did not match the battle experience of a small, but significant number of servicemen and their responses reflect unease with the term ‘battle experience’ to describe his service in Korea.

The regimental distribution of forms is significant here, simply because not all of those who were sent the form had necessarily been near the front line (in its strictly military sense) in Korea, due to the regiment in which they served and its function. For example, almost 10 per cent of respondents of the sample available from Korea were in the RASC, who provided a variety of support functions in all areas of Korea and Kure, Japan. Military engineers from the Royal Engineers (RE), technical specialists from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (REME) and clerks from the RAPC were sent forms too.\textsuperscript{157} As well as writing ‘N.K’ (not known), officers provided a variety of responses about the inadequacy of the questionnaire. Captain GR Hill (RAOC) writes: ‘During my whole service in Korea I was situated in rear div. area and never actually had battle experience in the sense of the

\textsuperscript{153} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant JRR Eddington, 26 February 1951, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major RI Gordon Ingram, 23 April 1951, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain RWB Oatts, 14 May 1952, WO 308.89.

\textsuperscript{154} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant PW Cuming, 25 February 1951, WO 308.89.

\textsuperscript{155} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain JW Wheatley, 28 August 1952, WO 308.90.

\textsuperscript{156} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Letter from PH Godsal to Lt Col CL Thomas OBE, 21 April 1952, WO 308.89.

\textsuperscript{157} Engen argues that there was a pre-screening of forms – a CFA 276 form – sent to servicemen in the Second World War, but that largely did not happen in the Korean War.
word’, whilst another noted that he had ‘no real firsthand knowledge of the actual front line tactics except at second hand and occasional visits to the front. I shall avoid “hearsay” knowledge.’ These responses show the desire to provide an authentic account of battle, but also how some officers simply did not see their job or function in the Army as having much relationship to enemy combat at all, let alone protecting democracy as a dutiful ‘soldier-citizen’. The term ‘battle’ for many entailed a specific term for action between combatant forces, planned and carried out on an operational level. Again, as Steedman notes, war and its highfalutin ideals were ‘not to do with them’.

Some did their best to reproduce the answers they felt the War Office wanted, despite their lack of personal experience: one Captain admitted at the very bottom of his quite detailed questionnaire that ‘much of this proforma … [was] not compiled from personal experience.’ All these responses demonstrate that officers had an idea of what constituted ‘battle experience’ (contact with the enemy or actual work on the front line itself). This reveals again the growing knowledge of the category of experience at this time and the authority it could confer, but also how some officers used their questionnaires to remove their own experience from the arena of battle.

Three areas of the questioning in the forms are also important if we are to understand the battle experience questionnaire in a broader context of life-narratives and subject-formation. The first is the level of training British officers felt that received when asked: ‘In action, did you experience any shortcomings in the training you received prior to going into battle?’ Overall (by a small majority), officers felt that they had no deficiencies in their training, particularly those filling in the form in 1952. These officers had in many cases benefited from training in Hong Kong prior to arrival or in one of the British Army’s other overseas bases. Lieutenant Marshall (RSF) noted that he had participated in four large-scale exercises as part of the British Army of the Rhine and Captain CW Woods (RE) wrote that

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159 Steedman, *The Radical Soldier’s Tale*, p. 42.
160 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain P Benn, DCLI, 21 July 1952, WO 308.90.
his regiment had embarked straight from Cyrenaica (in present-day Libya) where they had
had space to train prior to leaving for Korea. 161

However, the complaints about lack of training demonstrate areas where officers felt
the British Army was lacking and reflect some of the worries we have already seen in the
letter-writing of British servicemen on the way to Korea. Some called for more specific
training to be given, such as night training, mine laying, general living in the field and for
more information on the other branches of the military. 162 There were also calls for more
integration with UN Allies. Captain PR Hadden (RASC) stated that ‘more information about
other armies … [was] necessary when operating as an integrated force in Korea’ and
Lieutenant Colonel AW Vickers of the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI)
argued that all young officers needed a thorough grounded in US Army organisation, so
important were they to the Korean theatre. 163 Nevertheless, some noted that, ‘most tasks
were peculiar to Korea’ and thus had to be ‘learnt the hard way’, by doing the job itself. 164
This attitude is one indication of British officers’ understanding of the term experience in
Korea. Experience was something which had to be gained in order to do a job proficiently;
experience was a marker of a soldier. Lieutenant E Watkins (RA), for example, stated that
his training had a few deficiencies, but ‘[o]nly in constructing dug outs, shelters and gun
pits’ as they were ‘soon learnt by experience the best ways of doing this.’ 165 Similarly,
Lieutenant EC Waterhouse (RA) noted that his job was a relatively new on in 29 Brigade, so

161 War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant Marshall, 15 December 1952, WO
308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major CW Woods, 31 August 1952,
WO 308.90.

162 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Second Lieutenant J Wright, 27 July 1952,
WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major CLB Walwyn, 15 April
1951, WO 308.89; War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain RWB Oatts, 14 May
1952, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lt WR Tolputt, 17
September 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain MC
Snow, 21 April 1952, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain
Crossland, 10 November 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire,
Captain J Munro WO, 24 July 1952, 308.90.

163 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain PR Hadden, 21 May 1952, WO
308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant Colonel AW Vickers, 15
October 1952, WO 308.90.

164 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant J Scott, 9 December 1952, WO
308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant MO Connor, 5 November
1952, WO 308.90

165 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant EH Watkins, 26 September
1952, WO 308.90.
‘had to be learnt by experience’, but he ‘felt no serious lack of training.’ There are important variations to take into account when analysing responses to training in battle experience forms. As noted in the above discussion of letter writing, National Servicemen often felt particularly lacking in military experience when sent to Korea. Second Lieutenant J Stirling (A&SH) wrote that ‘[t]here was no “battle inoculation” and I had no idea how near a bullet was or what it sounded like.’ National Servicemen were not the only ones to feel this way. Major CH Mitchell argued that reservists ‘only had one month to pick up the threads after four years of civil life’. One reservist, who used the form to give full details of being recalled to the Army and when he sailed to Korea, wrote that: ‘I feel that the nine days training I had at Stanford Training Area were insufficient to adapt me from two years of civilian life to an active unit command especially as there were several new weapons to be mastered and new theories to be put into practice.’ However, as has been argued above, the gulf between civilian and military was not necessarily felt by all and some reservists noted that it did not take them long to adapt to their new circumstances.

The majority of questions on the battle experience form, however, concerned the efficacy of enemy tactics. Four questions focused on enemy tactics; those which surprised respondents the most, their general tactics, weapons to which ‘we had no answer’ and which weapon had the greatest effect on morale. The overwhelming majority of responses to these questions highlighted the ‘mass’ tactics of the Chinese, termed by some as the ‘red flood’ or ‘human wave’. Captain HJ Bengin (RF) exemplifies a view held by many officers, from a range of ranks, when describing the apparent flagrancy with which ‘the enemy’ treated its soldiers. He wrote that: ‘The only enemy tactic which really caused surprise I feel were the

166 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant EC Waterhouse, 18 November 1952, WO 308.90.
168 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major CH Mitchell, 24 July 1951, WO 308.89.
169 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain HJ Bengin, 11 September 1951, WO 308.90.
170 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major CWA Bath, 2 April 1951, WO 308.89.
171 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major JL Bromhead, 27 April 1952, WO 308.89; War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major CW Woods, 31 August 1952, WO 308.90.
attacks which were carried out by masses of troops, masses which seemed to come on quite regardless of casualties. The most experienced soldiers in my unit said they had never come up against anything like it before.’¹⁷² This depiction is significant as the enemy is depicted an unindividuated mass, in contrast to how the British officers saw themselves and in contrast to the group theories prevalent in the Army at the time noted in the previous chapter. The enemy were a group: the British Army was a collection of individuals. Some describe this difference between the mass Chinese enemy and the army of British individuals in more hyperbolic terms. Lieutenant LC Sharpe (Middlesex) wrote that ‘[t]hey appeared to have no concern for their own lives, and many appeared to be drugged’ and Lieutenant IG Minto (Buff’s) claimed that ‘The Communist troops appear to well [·] endowed with an almost animal cunning in hiding his movements’.¹⁷³ A further sub-question on general tactics – ‘Were they orthodox by our teaching?’ – brought forth, in some cases, statements about racial differences between the two armies. This question proved a confusing one for respondents on the whole, which Robert Engen argues can be an unfortunate consequence of a ‘postal questionnaire’.¹⁷⁴ Some defined orthodox as operating according to at least some British military strategy, and identified the Chinese use of outflanking and heavy artillery bombardment followed by infantry attack.¹⁷⁵ Others saw Chinese methods as totally alien to British methods, particularly the use of large numbers of troops in offensives and saw this as unorthodox, where ‘men appear to be expendable a greater rate than equipment’.¹⁷⁶ Many opted to not write anything at all about whether these tactics were orthodox, providing only information on tactics and leaving it to the War Office to assess their orthodoxy. However, a final group regarded enemy tactics as orthodox according to the Chinese themselves, seeing

¹⁷² War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain HJ Bengin, 11 September 1951, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Second Lieutenant Paterson, 22 May 1952, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Brigadier JFM Macdonald, 8 August 1952, WO 308.90.
¹⁷³ TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant LC Sharpe, 24 July 1951, WO 308.89; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant IG Minto, 24 September 1952, WO 308.90.
¹⁷⁴ Engen, Canadians under Fire, p. 35.
¹⁷⁵ TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major AJS de S Clayton, 12 September 1951, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain IC Stuart, 12 December 1952, WO 308.90.
¹⁷⁶ TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain FAB Matthews, 9 May 1952, WO 308.89.
it as an ‘Asian’ way of waging war. For example, Major T Little of the King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB) compared their general tactics with his experience in the Second World War, writing that ‘Yes in many ways similar to tactics employed by Japanese in Burma.’

The battle experience forms thus show us how British troops conceptualised the Chinese People’s Volunteers (few mentions are made of the North Koreans) as a mass force, who use their superiority in numbers in an ‘Eastern’ way.

In characterising the Chinese in this way, the responses to battle experience forms demonstrate again the enduring importance of the Second World War to British servicemen in the Korean War, influencing how they in turn interpret their own military experience. When describing the weapons that had the greatest effect on morale, Captain Bengin noted: ‘The enemy had nothing in my opinion that had any great effect on morale. The general opinion was that their weapons were nothing in comparison to those used against us in 1939–1945.’ The majority of responses tallied with this statement, although many noted the destabilising effect of accurate mortar fire, as well as factors such as ‘lack of info’ to troops, the weather, lack of support from newspapers at home and even ‘the use of women as infantry by the Communist’.

The cultural memory of the Second World War, however, permeates these forms to a very great extent. Major WH Skinner (RA) warned, in the final question asking for tips for fellow officers, ‘[d]on’t rely on experience from [the] last war, but think every operation out from [the] point of view of Korea’. Others also noted how ‘things are done a little differently in Korea’ and the importance of treating it as a unique theatre of operations. These responses acknowledged both the significance of the older generation of servicemen’s experience in the Second World War, but also the need to not let

177 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major T Little, 24 September 1952, WO 308.90.
178 War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain HJ Bengin, 11 September 1951, WO 308.90.
179 War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major AJS de S Clayton, 12 September 1951, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant HL Ackers, 17 September 1952, WO 308.90; in a few limited instances, women did occupy combat roles in Communist armies, see Paul M. Edwards, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (2nd edn, Plymouth, 2010), p. 337.
180 TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Major WH Skinner, 19 August 1952, WO 308.90.
that experience colour one’s approach to Korea. Experience once again was an implicitly acknowledged category in the serviceman’s attitude to war by the mid-twentieth century.

This final question on tips to fellow officers reveals other information about how the officer regarded both their own experience and the War Office as the authority to whom that experience was relayed. The answer to this final question in forms from the second half of 1952 onwards are invariably written in the second-person imperative, suggesting that officers felt their tips would be given to those taking over their jobs once their service in Korea was over. This advice could be quite personal in tone too. Captain JW Donaldson (RA) heeded fellow officers ‘not to be ashamed of taking a nap when opportunity offers’, whilst several of officers state the importance of checking your men have dry feet in the winter or (reflecting the social class of many writers) of bringing a shotgun, as there were plenty of pheasants in the rear areas.\textsuperscript{182} One disgruntled officer even wrote, ‘[d]on’t trust all the bloody porters.’\textsuperscript{183} However, as Engen points out, the DTI at the War Office were not keen on distributing the information provided in battle experience forms and typically used them to produce documents on tactics or provisions for consultation by high-level military authorities.\textsuperscript{184} Officers’ perception of who would read about their experiences was therefore misplaced in many instances; their questionnaires were most likely used to inform policy, not to provide their fellows with handy tips on living in Korea.

Battle experience questionnaires therefore raise important issues about how to interpret the experience of British servicemen in Korea and of how they themselves interpreted experience, using it as a sign of authority, an emblem of soldierly proficiency or to remove themselves completely from the wider ‘supra-individual’ project which Gray cites at the beginning of this chapter. This also raises important questions for life-narratives and

\textsuperscript{182} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain JW Donaldson, 1 September 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant AM Allison, 19 August 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain EL Patridge, 4 December 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant Colonel JH Slade Powell, 14 November 1952, WO 308.90; War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain EL Patridge, 4 December 1952, WO 308.90; TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Lieutenant Colonel JH Slade Powell, 14 November 1952, WO 308.90; War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Captain EL Patridge, 4 December 1952, WO 308.90.

\textsuperscript{183} TNA, War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Second Lieutenant B Moore, 5 October 1952, WO 308.90.

\textsuperscript{184} Engen, \textit{Canadians under Fire}, p. 39; War Office (DTI), Korea: Battle Experience Questionnaire, Loose Minute, by PH Godsal, 1 May 1952, WO 308.89.
the potential material in topics previously characterised as ‘governmentality’. This is not to argue that all forms can be read as life-writing sources, but that the historian can gain far more than simply empirical data from this material.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that experience, a category with which British soldiers were familiar, was used as a response to state-directed subjectivity and could therefore be an alternate way to understand oneself in war. Teresa de Lauretis summarises this subject-formation (as well as demonstrating the continuing utility of feminist theory in examining subjectivity), noting that experience ‘is a process by which, for all social beings, subjectivity is constructed[.] ... The process is continuous, its achievement unending or daily renewed.

Life-writing epitomises this everyday construction, such as through the regular writing of letters and diaries. This writing was framed by the state (sometimes even demanded by it), but this chapter has shown important instances of syncretisation of life-narratives and the blurring of civilian and military categories. Furthermore, servicemen’s use of experience could both confer military authority and reject it, simultaneously highlighting the enduring legacy of the Second World War in early Cold War military mindsets. But how does this sense of self change when not in a military setting and when servicemen are removed from military hierarchy, far behind enemy lines, as prisoners of war? The next chapter explores what factors influence the construction of selfhood in prisoner of war camps in Korea. Furthermore, it considers the specific questions prisoners of war from the Korean War raised, as a whole, for subjectivity in 1950s Britain and further emphasises the compulsion implicit in life-narratives and in the relationship between state and individual.

185 Teresa de Lauretis, Alice Doesn’t. Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema (Bloomington IN, 1984), p. 159; also quoted in Scott, ‘Experience’, p. 27 and Smith and Watson, Reading Autobiography, p. 31.
In September 1953 Lieutenant Colonel James Power Carne of the Gloucestershire Regiment, the most senior British officer captured during the Korean War, returned to great crowds welcoming prisoners of war back home. There was a great deal of public interest in Carne’s experiences: 1,060 British servicemen had been taken prisoner by the North Koreans and Chinese and Carne himself was singled out by the CPV for special interrogation. One of the few things Carne said to the assembled journalists at Southampton Docks that day was he had ‘gained a great pride in being British and ... [had] lost a little weight’. Perhaps due to the expectations of public decorum, the prevalence of understatement amongst the generation who fought in the Second World War or simply due to personal reserve, Carne refused to tell his story of imprisonment to the press.

However, despite this reticence on the dockside, Carne and other British prisoners of war in Korea were some of the most prolific life-writers, or life-tellers, in modern conflict. Their ‘autobiographies’ were crucial ideological components in the waging of the early Cold War. As this chapter demonstrates, British prisoners of war were repeatedly forced to tell their life stories by their Chinese captors, through autobiographical forms, diaries and public confessions. Prisoners’ life-writing in many ways fits uneasily in the modern literary canon of war writing; far from voluntary pieces of self-expression, life stories were extracted and used for political purposes. This chapter first explores historical interpretations of ‘enforced narratives’ and seeks to extend their relevance beyond the

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3 This reticence was noted in the press see, Anonymous, ‘A Story Carne Would Not Tell’, *News Chronicle*, 28 October 1953.
eighteenth and nineteenth century, where historians have hitherto located the concept. Following an examination of the material British prisoners produced, it will become clear that, in the face of such orders, the discourses of religion, literary precedent and military and regimental loyalties continued to influence even the coerced life story. Through an investigation of enforced narratives in the Korean War, this chapter argues that the prisoner of war could tell his life in a variety of ways. His telling could even result in overt criticism of the military and the West or, more commonly, a subtle resistance to the models of subjectivity forced upon him, or forced from him, within the military system.

Nor were enforced narratives simply the preserve of the Chinese. As the second half of the chapter demonstrates, enforced narratives were used for political purposes in Britain and most frequently in the interrogation of returned prisoners. The popular concern with ‘brainwashing’ (a term first used in Korean War) suggests too that it was not only governments who were concerned with subjectivity of servicemen. Whilst this chapter argues that the returned British prisoner of war was not treated with as much suspicion as his American counterpart, he nevertheless prompted anxiety in post-war Britain and had the potential to destabilise the still relatively unstable construction of the democratic self. The Korean War in this sense was a deeply unsettling, if brief, moment in the history of state-directed subjectivity.

A detailed examination of prisoner of war life-narratives further reveals the factors which affect subjectivity in the era of the Korean War. As Chapter One indicated, post-war social science and the approaches of Second World War psychoanalysts sought to inculcate servicemen with a specific sense of self which rested on democratic, active citizenship. However, as seen in Chapter Two, the everyday construction of selfhood (through letter- and diary-writing, for example) meant that servicemen often only partially adopted, or simply ignored, the broader ideals with which they were encouraged to identify, preferring concepts like ‘experience’. The life-narratives of the prisoner of war, particularly the enforced life-

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telling which this chapter analyses, provides a further insight into the range of self-expression and self-understanding of British servicemen. The circumstances of captivity in Korea were unlike anything that the modern British Army had faced before: prisoners had never been forced to take part in such wide-scale, organised classes of political re-education or been encouraged to effectively change sides. Even more than the battles with Communists on the 38 Parallel, the treatment of captives raised questions about whether the Western serviceman truly was, or could ever be, an intelligent, informed citizen. Furthermore, was receptivity to the Chinese call for servicemen to become ‘thinking soldiers’ actually evidence of disloyalty or diversion from the Western ideals of duty and citizenship – of ‘brainwashing’? Military captivity could therefore be seen as the main area of ideological confrontation in the early Cold War. This chapter addresses several of the overarching questions of this thesis: the interaction between military and civilian selves; the contentious, and not always successful, role of the state in moulding subjects in the early Cold War period; and the importance of analysing the Korean War as part of the wider history of subjectivity in this period.

**Enforced Narratives**

Voluntary autobiography is an implicit assumption of the majority of scholarship on wartime life-writing. Samuel Hynes writes that the ‘soldier’s tale’ is one of gradual disillusionment, from the initial euphoria of enlistment to the moment of bitter epiphany in the carnage of modern warfare.⁶ The soldier feels compelled to write to report or reflect on his own experience and the change it has wrought in him. The canonical autobiographical works of modern conflict seemingly corroborate this assessment. Yuval Noah Harari argues that the ‘quintessential later modern Western war story’ is one of learning the truth about the world and oneself, citing Ernst Jünger’s *Storm of Steel* as the typical story of ‘epiphany’.⁷ From the works of Siegfried Sassoon and Robert Graves to war memoirs from Iraq and Afghanistan

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life-writing is characterised by the idea of personal motivation, whether to debunk the Victorian narrative of the glory of war or to profit from the twenty-first-century public appetite for tales of danger and video-game violence.

However, Steedman argues that at the other end of the ‘life-telling’ spectrum narratives were frequently extracted or ‘enforced’. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries bastardy examinations, court appearances or the forced testimonies of ‘subaltern’ subjects all extracted a form of life-narrative, even from the illiterate. The self in these cases was not revealed through self-introspection and writing: rather it was ‘a thing that could be fashioned according to requirement, told and sold, alienated and expropriated.’ Dana Rabin notes how this self was often defensively constructed in courts of law, with defendants keen to distance themselves from their crime and to re-identify with a set of normal, upstanding characteristics. The self and subjectivity were therefore not dormant, stable entities waiting to be uncovered by a careful process of excavation; rather they were created in moments of plaintive interrogation and cross-examination and were often far detached from the process of writing.

Other examples of enforced narrative from the realm of fictional writing further question individual volition in life writing. Danish author Karen Blixen’s short story ‘The Blank Page’ (1957) powerfully recalled the common early modern practice of displaying marital bed sheets after the first night of marital co-habitation. Sidonie Smith argues that these ‘blank’ spaces were essential for women’s voices to be heard as the ‘scriptocentric’, male-centred practice of ‘autobiography’ or memoir-writing so often curtailed female opportunities to speak. Alternatively, the blood-soaked sheets represented an involuntary testimony to a key life event and were primarily defensive, like a court testimony. The

9 Ibid., p. 36.
virginal bride was forced to testify her purity in order to sanction her marriage and position herself within societal norms. The broader function of this ‘narrative’, to legitimise a union, also shows that the self was once again ‘fashioned according to requirement’. Whilst this chapter primarily concerns the life writing of men, Blixen’s story remains a useful tool to understand enforced life-narratives as both written and non-written. Furthermore, it underscores the way in which those forced to produce a narrative could attach a purpose to such stories, whether to defend, exonerate or realign themselves with a social order. Writing in 1957, Blixen’s emphasis on the involuntary also highlights that mid-twentieth century critical thought had tentatively begun to discard the assumption that personal desire alone underlined the life-narrative.

Steedman’s concept of enforced narrative is also applicable to areas more intimately connected with war writing, such as the study of ‘trauma’ which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. War trauma is by definition unspoken and elusive. Jenny Edkins evokes Sigmund Freud when she writes that ‘[t]here is no language for it [trauma]. Abuse by the state, the fatherland, like abuse by the father within the family, cannot be spoken in language, since language comes from and belongs to the family and community.’ Nigel Hunt, taking a more anti-Freudian stance by focusing on adult rather than childhood trauma, argues that trauma causes a loss of coherence, as people cannot integrate their traumatic experiences into their conception of themselves or wider trajectory of their lives and society. Witnessing to war was therefore inhibited by an inability to speak, whether because of personal factors, such as guilt, or a post-war society unwilling or unable to listen. Susannah Radstone has argued that since the early 1990s, historians and literary theorists have increasingly explored trauma and silence in narratives, reflecting both the growing neurological understanding of memory and the academic rise of ‘deconstruction’. For example, literary scholar Kate McLoughlin explores the ‘dizzying variety’ of literary

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techniques employed in ‘the project of not telling’. Elsewhere, Richard Badenhausen argues that Vera Brittain initially embarked on writing her memoir of the First World War, Testament of Youth (1933), to address her wartime trauma. Like the eulogised canon of First World War poet-memoirists, she tried to use her memoirs to ‘“get outside it all”’, but as a woman she ultimately found this combat-focused model of a trauma memoir restrictive.

Medial attempts to address the problem of silence also emerged in the late nineteenth century with the development of psychoanalysis. However, it was after the Second World War (as the first chapter of this thesis argued) that the ideas behind psychoanalysis gained ascendancy in British society and institutions (even if the technique was never widely used). Wartime trauma can thus demonstrate two important elements in the study of enforced narratives. First, trauma shows how life stories can be left purposefully unspoken, and second, it underscores how methods such as psychoanalysis have tried to extract that story in order to address deep trauma. Other elements of psychoanalysis can improve our understanding of the enforced narrative still further. As Juliet Mitchell writes, psychoanalysis does not prompt the subject to uncover his/her ‘self’, but instead calls on them to ‘make a new history’ in dialogue with an interlocutor. Similarly, Adriana Cavarero, in interpreting the storytelling practices of Italian feminists, argues that the ‘narratable’ self is made in relation to others (and agrees with Hannah Arendt that the self is always political in this sense). As Kay Souter summarises, the ‘presence of another mind for psychic survival’ is essential. In Freud’s schema (and in contrast to later work of Melanie Klein on the unconscious), the self does not exist outside of the life story told to

17 Kate McLoughlin, ‘Not Writing About War’, in Elena V. Baraban, Stephan Jaeger and Adam Muller (eds), Fighting Words and Images. Representing War across the Disciplines (Toronto, 2012), pp. 47–48. McLoughlin explores, for example, the specific significance of silence in Wilfred Owen’s ‘Anthem for a Doomed Youth (1917) which is in fact ‘a hole where an anthem should be’, epitomised by the missing bodies in his poem.
19 Lyndsey Stonebridge, The Writing of Anxiety. Imagining Wartime in Mid-Century British Culture (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 1–2.
another person. As Mitchell writes, ‘the story is the whole truth and nothing but the truth – the story is all.’23 In these assessments, the life story is once again not a pre-existent entity: rather a sense of it is revealed through a specific practice of extraction.24 Furthermore, psychoanalysis has provided the basis for many significant works looking at individual and collective trauma. In the wake of the Second World War, post-war violence against ethnic minorities, and the subsequent rise of Holocaust studies, scholars have increasingly used psychoanalytical language to describe collective silences as ‘cultural’ trauma.25 Yet whilst psychoanalytical interpretations address the involuntary nature of life stories, trauma still has a possible destabilising effect for historians of life writing. Trauma is the inability to tell a life story, which is a potential problem for the historian who must use evidence, rather than its absence, to reconstruct historical realities.26 We shall return to this problem in detail in the final chapter of this thesis.

Nevertheless these interpretations reveal the depth and utility of the concept of the ‘enforced narrative’. These approaches also undermine the assumption that personal compulsion infuses all life-narratives and provide a hitherto under-used analytical framework through which to view material produced by British prisoners of war in Korea. Non-written elements of life stories, processes of extraction and the role of an interlocutor all inform a more nuanced reading of life-narratives. By applying these models to a range of prisoner-of-war material it will become evident that an individual’s need for self-expression was only one of many reasons to write a life or part of a life in this conflict.

23 Mitchell, Women, p. 311.
26 Dominick La Capra disagrees with those whom he argues actually equate history and trauma in La Capra, Representing the Holocaust, p. 14.
‘To be a Prisoner is to be Variously Written’: Captivity and Life-Narratives

As Paul Gready writes, ‘[t]o be a prisoner is to be variously written’.27 Whilst tales of the male lone prisoner writing in captivity undoubtedly are of long-standing precedent in Western literature, from John Bunyan to Oscar Wilde, critical attention toward the modern prison as an institution and other captive situations first emerged definitively in the second half of the twentieth century. The compilation of Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks between 1948 and 1951 made the historical discipline acutely aware of writing that could take place within prison walls, as did the publication of Marc Bloch’s The Historian’s Craft (1954) which had been written ‘amid sorrows and anxieties personal and collective’ in Occupied France in 1941.28 Thus, even as the Korean War was still raging, academic disciplines were beginning to consider the writing and the position of the prisoner. By the 1970s British and American critics were examining the literary attributes of prison writing.29 Writing produced by political prisoners under the Apartheid regime in South Africa prompted further debates. For example, Paul Gready argues that South African prison authorities used methods such as interrogation to violently destroy the prisoner’s own life story and sense of self. Subsequently any material produced by prisoners, from graffiti on prison walls to later autobiographical accounts, was an attempt to regain ‘control’ in response to this violence towards their life narrative.30 Gready’s interpretation testifies to the enduring importance of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish to the study of captivity. Foucault’s genealogy traces modern disciplinary methods from the gruesome punishment of regicide in 1757 to Bentham’s Panopticon and the Western prison system and to the 1970s.31 Whilst Foucault’s critics have questioned his chronology and use of source material, his

terminology has had a profound and pervasive impact, not least in studies of captivity. The appeal of his paradigm to prison studies lies in its wider claims about subjectivity. As Daniel Roux has recently noted: ‘The prison is a rich site for speculation of subjectivity with institutional culture and time because the modern penitentiary... seeks to govern and produce subjectivity – that is, it works on the mind through the body.’ This widespread assumption that methods of punishment inculcate particular modes of behaviour and self-perception is the legacy of Foucault’s work.

However, the Foucauldian framework has some limitations in the context of the prisoner of war camp, especially in the Korean War. In contrast to the popular perception of the prison camp, few in Korea had barbed wire around them or surveillance models akin to the ‘modern’ prison; camps were often abandoned villages or buildings and their remoteness and the inability of the prisoners to assimilate easily into the local population made wire largely unnecessary.34

The prisoner was often far removed from the confines of military hierarchy and the ‘automatism of habit’.35 Furthermore, as Daniel Branch argues in his study of prisons in


35 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 135.
colonial Kenya, Foucault’s model is highly specific to Western Europe and overlooks non-Western conceptions of captivity. Branch argues that ‘confinement is a culturally specific hallmark’ of a free society and that the Kenyan prison was a place of punishment, not a panopticon. Elsewhere, Frank Dikötter argues that whilst the prison was a suitably ‘multivalent’ concept with a universal meaning, it had also had a specific meaning in a local Chinese context for example. In the early twentieth century Chinese authorities conceived the prison as an educative project, but with the advent of the Communist regime in 1949 any ameliorative structures broke down, largely due to an increase in the number of political prisoners. Prison guards lacked training and the prison became a tool of political power rather than an institution of improvement. As the CPV ran the majority of camps in Korea from 1951, these alternate understandings of captivity must inform any study of the prisoner of war camp. Roux’s claim that the modern prison ‘seeks to govern and produce subjectivity’ must therefore always be contextualised within the particular setting of captivity.

Yet until recently the study of military captivity remained a small part of wider empirical military history. With the advent of ‘new military history’, the growth in interest in prisoner of war studies in the last ten years has been exponential. For example, Heather Jones and Harold Mytum have analysed cultural exchange, class, and racial dynamics in captivity in the First World War, a conflict in which captivity is frequently overlooked. Elsewhere, Iris Rachamimov has examined gender inversion in camps, from same-sex unions to female impersonation. Gender inversion in the Second World War has also come

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under scrutiny, with studies by Elena Bellina and Donato Somma exploring the meaning of femininity in the music performed by Italian prisoners of war in Africa.\textsuperscript{41} Studies of the Second World War undoubtedly dominate the cultural memory of captivity. Schoolboy-like cunning and escape stories are caricatured by television programmes and films, from \textit{The Captive Heart} (1946) to \textit{Colditz} (1972–4), and have a pervasive influence in the memory of the military captivity starting during the war itself.\textsuperscript{42} The dominance of Second World War prisoners of war in cultural memory therefore partially explains the comparative oversight of Korean War POWs. Historians have only recently turned to captivity in the Korean War. Susan Carruthers explores the impact of captivity in the Korean War on US conceptions of national identity, freedom and ‘brainwashing’.\textsuperscript{43} S.P. Mackenzie’s recent analysis of British prisoners of war provides a highly detailed description of the many varied aspects of military captivity, based largely on state-produced material and recorded oral history interviews.\textsuperscript{44}

Rather than provide a further political or empirical account, it is the aim of this chapter to instead assess the subjectivity of British prisoners in the Korean War and to focus on the plentiful life-narratives produced before and after captivity. Following a sketch of key features of prison life, this chapter examines several areas of enforced narrative, balancing these with more personal reflections on the prisoner of war experience.

\textbf{British Prisoners of War in the Korean War}

British prisoners of war were taken in four stages, loosely correlating with the action of the British Army on the peninsula. Twenty-five Royal Marines (of whom sixteen survived) were taken in November 1950 at Chosin, eighty officers and other ranks (most RUR) were taken

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item Bernice Archer, \textit{The Internment of Western Civilians under the Japanese 1941–1945. A Patchwork of Internment} (Hong Kong, 2008), p. 17; NAM, Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, 8905-261.
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in the first Chinese Offensive in January 1951, 527 officers and men of the Gloucester Regiment were taken at Imjin River in April 1951, and small numbers of others were taken in minor engagements in November 1951. The majority of British prisoners were therefore held for over a year until the cessation of hostilities in July 1953, returning to Britain at least two months later after debriefs and a return sea voyage. The large increase in prisoners in 1951 also necessitated a more rigorous infrastructure to deal with them and the Chinese People’s Volunteers assumed responsibility for all prisoners from the NKPA during this year.

Upon capture or surrender the majority of prisoners were marched four hundred miles north to camps along the Yalu River, although the first three groups did not reach the camps until three months after their capture. Survivors of the ‘Long March’ testify to the harshness of conditions, small amounts of food and poor provision for the wounded. Some survivors looked back on the journey as a test of military fitness; in an oral history interview in 1987 Edward Beckerley of the Eighth King’s Royal Irish Hussars proudly noted that even after the four hundred mile march to the banks of the Yalu, the British wanted to use the parade ground for daily exercise from the start of their captivity. As Rachel Woodward argues British Army fitness often emphasised a mastery over one’s physical terrain, an ideal that was even more important for the defeated prisoner of war far behind enemy lines.

Some prisoners were not taken directly to camps along the Yalu River, but were instead taken to camps near Pyongyang, including ‘Bean Camp’ (the name deriving from its monotonous menu) and the more notorious camps: ‘The Caves’ and ‘Pak’s Death House’. It was at these latter two camps that Lieutenant Terrence Waters and Captain Acton Henry Gibbon won their George Cross medals for bravery in captivity, two of the three awarded under such circumstances. These camps were poorly equipped and many died here from

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46 Ibid.
48 IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Edward Beckerley, 8 November 1987, 10982.
wounds or malnutrition; in addition, guards at ‘Pak’s Death House’ (run by camp
commandant Major Pak of the NKPA) used violent interrogatory methods on prisoners. As
the final part of this chapter shows, much of the information on these camps derived not only
from military intelligence but from former prisoners themselves. From interviews
(‘interrogations’) with returned prisoners, scientific advisor Cyril Cunningham was able to
draw up a detailed map of camps and their respective treatment of prisoners. It was through
this topography of captivity (analysing thirteen prison camps) that he was able to identify
those prisoners who were deemed most ‘progressive’ by the CPV and receptive to
Communist ideas, many of whom were imprisoned in Camp Five at Pyoktong, near the
Suiho Reservoir. Officers formed a small minority of those taken prisoner and after the
initial march north the Chinese separated them and senior Non-Commissioned Officers
(NCOs) from the other ranks in an attempt to undermine the traditions of military hierarchy
and deference. Conditions varied, although there was widespread malnutrition, poor
housing, hygiene problems and disease across all camps. It is within this network of prison
camps that we must situate the writing of the prisoner of war.

The range of life-writing instituted by the Chinese, hitherto interpreted only as part
of ‘indoctrination’, must first be balanced with the wider educative aims of the CPV.
Political consciousness was a central part of the Chinese ‘Lenient Policy’ promulgated in the
first year of captivity (1951–1952). The ‘Lenient Policy’, as it was described to prisoners,
was built on the Chinese view that British servicemen were war criminals for their
involvement in a war of American imperialism, mitigated by the fact that they were duped

51 Major A.N. West-Watson, Commander of the British Repatriated Prisoners of War Interrogation Unit
concluded that this conglomeration of ‘progressives’ in Camp Five was largely coincidental. See Ministry of
Defence, ‘Report on the Success of Communist Indoctrination among British PW in North Korea’, October 1953,
WO 32.20495; Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, p. 16.
52 Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, pp. 70 and 87.
53 Both the Chinese infrastructure and smaller proportion of prisoners meant that UN prisoners had far greater
supervision than the 132,000 prisoners in UN Hands (by 1952). Callum McDonald estimates that the ratio of
guards to prisoners on Koje, the infamous UN prison island, was 1:33. See Callum McDonald, “Heroes Behind
Barbed Wire”. The US, Britain and the POW Issue in the Korean War’, in James Cotton and Ian Neary (eds), The
54 Prisoners describe ‘phases’ of captivity in Korea. For example, NAM, Oral History Interview by David
by their governments. As a result, the Chinese had decided to adopt a ‘lenient’ approach, educating soldiers in Communism and thereby helping them to realise the folly of their involvement and encouraging them to call on their government to end the war. The clarity with which veterans were able to remember this policy reflects its pervasiveness within the camp and even the ordinary soldier’s awareness that this was ‘a political type of war’. Political understanding was a key aspect of the CPV itself, although American histories of the Chinese armies, written later in the Cold War, uncritically labelled this approach ‘indoctrination’. The Adjutant of Gloucestershire Regiment and later official historian Anthony Farrar-Hockley remembers nine and a half hours a day of ‘compulsory study’, although by 1952 this had been reduced to four. Lectures offering a Marxist chronology of history were followed by group discussions, where ‘monitors’ had to report back to Head Quarters on the salient points made by each squad. Edward Beckerley noted that as nobody in his squad ever discussed the lecture afterwards, he came up with suitable answers and in the process became quite well-versed in the details of Communism.

Discussion groups were not unfamiliar to soldiers, as noted in Chapter One, particularly to reservists and regulars who had served in the Second World War and had attended Army Bureau of Current Affairs discussion sessions (although these groups had largely been discontinued by the Korean War). Political education could take place outside of the formal lecture setting, particularly when the lecture system was replaced in 1952 with an emphasis on independent study. Life-writing formed a part of this political education and we shall return to the efficacy of this system at the end of this chapter. A further area of concern for the Chinese was prisoners’ reading material. One prisoner, who had been

56 Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, p. 1.
57 IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
60 Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Edward Beckerley, 8 November 1987, 10982. By contrast, in UN prisoner of war camps, the authorities relied on prisoners to actually guard one another. Callum McDonald argued that many were brutally policed by former Chinese nationalists (ex-Kuomintang soldiers), see McDonald, “Heroes Behind Barbed Wire”, p. 136.
imprisoned by the Germans in the Second World War, imagined that they would be returning to ‘Shakespeare, the Bible and how to pass our time as POWs’. 62 However, the libraries did not stock either of these texts and instead included works by Victor Hugo, Charles Dickens and playwright Sean O’Casey. 63 Dickens was a popular choice for the soldiers, as some remembered reading his work in earlier civilian life. 64 This affection for Dickens mirrors Edmund King’s analysis of the reading of Shakespeare by British soldiers in the First World War; reading could ‘be a prompt for creativity, an act of nostalgia and a way of maintaining bonds with family and a pre-war remembered self’. 65 The limited choice of reading was in stark contrast to frontline troops, who as we have seen benefited from small Education Centre libraries, books and periodicals sent from home, and the libraries of the Women’s Voluntary Service. 66

It was hoped that other reading material would have a transformative effect on the subjectivity of prisoners. In addition to books, the CPV permitted soldiers to read the Communist Party of Great Britain’s Daily Worker (the only British newspaper they were permitted to read). In many ways this left-wing daily also functioned as a dialogue between prisoners and those at home. One officer’s young wife describes in a letter how she has been reading the Daily Worker for more news on her husband and had even been in contact with the editor. 67 On the other side of this exchange, soldiers too read the newspaper greedily. Although one soldier said that he was once punished for using it as cigarette paper, it seems that this act of bravado was not widespread and that many soldiers read the newspaper in

64 Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
67 IWM, Papers of V.P.C. Whitamore, Letter from Heather Docker to Mr. and Mrs. Whitamore, 23 June 1951, Docs. 8462.
detail. For example, Private Wood (RUR) was able to use the sports pages to keep a log of important sporting events back home in a diary issued to him by the Chinese, including Randolph Turpin’s victory at the world middleweight boxing championship. Wood supplemented this log with notes about sport in the camp itself including outcomes of boxing bouts and the famous Prisoner of War Olympics (1952), held at Camp No. 3 (Pyuktong), where Tony Eagles won the 400-metres. The Daily Worker thus functioned much like a letter, acting as a channel of ‘communion’ between the prisoner and the outside world. Furthermore, in 1951 the prisoners themselves featured heavily in the Daily Worker. In April for example, prisoners were mentioned amid the furore over the trip to North Korea by suspected Communist sympathiser Mrs. Monica Felton and her subsequent high-profile dismissal as town planner from the Stevenage Development Corporation. Similarly, prisoners would have read about themselves in the newspaper when the legitimacy of the war was questioned by reporters such as Alan Winnington, who visited the camps himself. The newspaper was therefore read to keep contact with those at home, rather than for broadening their political education.

**Diary Writing and the Prisoner of War**

Prisoners produced a variety of life-writing in the prisoner of war camps in Korea, most notably documents we can interpret as ‘enforced narratives’. Upon capture British prisoners

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69 NAM, Papers of J.W. Wood, Diary (embossed with ‘A Merry Christmas, 1952’), NAM 1988-12-1; Daily Worker, 11 July 1951. Much of the Daily Worker on this day was dedicated to Randolph Turpin’s win over ‘Sugar’ Ray Robinson; see Appendix A for other key sporting events in the era of the Korean War.
were first asked to fill out autobiographical forms. This presented many new captives with a dilemma, for standard British Army guidance dictated that servicemen should only give their name, rank, date of birth and number, and no other autobiographical information, as summarised in the War Office leaflet summarising the Geneva Convention that soldiers carried with them.\textsuperscript{74} This rule remained in place after the conflict, despite some official discussion about extending permitted information to ‘an agreed list of innocuous subjects.’\textsuperscript{75} Although hard to gauge, it is likely that the majority of soldiers seem to have gone beyond these three markers of identity in the course of their incarceration.\textsuperscript{76} Based on the evidence given by prisoners of war upon their return to Britain, Cyril Cunningham (scientific advisor to AI9, the unit tasked with overseeing prisoner repatriation) identified six areas the Chinese questionnaire typically covered. These included: brief self-description, financial position and familial financial position, social relationships, life before joining the forces and military career, social activities and political affiliations, and impressions whilst in captivity.\textsuperscript{77} In describing these forms, ex-prisoners stressed that whilst some answered all the questions, others only answered the personal questions or gave cautious and even flippant responses.\textsuperscript{78} It is possible that these claims were exaggerated when speaking to Cunningham, who was tasked with ascertaining former prisoners’ loyalties and behaviour in captivity. Nevertheless, this form was a clear attempt to extract a life chronology from prisoners, as well as asking for reflections on military identity and on being a prisoner of war under the Chinese.

More innovative forms of autobiographical questioning prompted, and indeed demanded, a greater autobiographical output. The CPV issued some prisoners with diaries to

\textsuperscript{74} NAM, Standard War Office leaflet relating to the Rights of Prisoners of War under the Geneva Convention, NAM 1992-04-28; Stanley James Davies, \textit{In Spite of Dungeons. The Experiences as a Prisoner-of-war in North Korea of the Chaplain to the First Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment} (Stroud, 1992), p. 31.


\textsuperscript{76} Cyril Cunningham, Scientific Advisor to AI9, noted that all British prisoners were compelled to fill in autobiographical forms (and only 8 per cent of serviceman resisted the CPV in every way possible) and most of those singled out for special interrogations were forced to sign confessions, see Ministry of Defence, ‘Report of the Advisory Panel of Prisoner of War Conduct after Capture’, August 1955, AIR 8/2473 pp. 4, 31 and 34. Nevertheless, Edgar H. Schein, a US psychologist and former soldier, was keen to stress that most gave inaccurate autobiographical information, see Edgar H. Schein, ‘The Chinese Indoctrination for Prisoners of War. A Study of Attempted Brainwashing’, \textit{Psychiatry}, 19, 2 (1956), p. 158.


\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., pp. 24–25.
record their daily activities and reflections. These compositional enterprises were intended to complement the political education they were receiving on the virtues of communism and the excesses of American imperialism. Accordingly the entry pages of the standard diary produced in 1951 by the CPV for use by prisoners was adorned with sayings like: ‘Don’t be fodder for the war profiteers’; ‘This war is senseless, get together to stop it’ and ‘British soldiers! Don’t risk your lives for the Yankee bosses’. The CPV intended diaries to chart an individual’s political education and improvement. The discourse of self-improvement is significant here. John Shaw (RUR) noted in his weekly diary entries how he was learning to dance, play chess and even improve his grasp of trigonometry under the tutelage of a fellow prisoner. Self-improvement was also evident in physical activity; once rations improved, servicemen began to perfect their swimming, boxing and football. Some British servicemen even contrasted their sporting endeavours with those of US prisoners. They cited lack of physical activity and unfamiliarity with poor food as the main reasons for the higher US death rate in prisoner of war camps: the British soldiers had after all come from a country still under rationing. In many ways therefore these diaries mirror the hermeneutic projects of diary writing which had developed in Western autobiographical writing since the Reformation. Yet these diaries also reflect the disciplinary power of life-narratives in Chinese culture. Aaron William Moore notes that Japanese captives of Chinese Nationalists had been compelled to keep ‘guided diaries’ during their imprisonment in the post-war period. The ‘Lenient Policy’ itself originated in the civil war in China, where Mao Zedong had used such re-education to increase the number of his own troops. Even since the nineteenth century the use of life-writing was seen as a sign of discipline and self-control in
the Chinese military.\textsuperscript{85} In analysing these sources produced by British servicemen one must thus also consider this history of Chinese life writing.

The Chinese attempt to transfer their life-writing traditions to British servicemen also shows how they invested a great deal of manpower to effect political re-education. In order to read these diaries (or at least summaries of discussion groups in English), the CPV had to integrate a large number of English speakers into the camp infrastructure. In Camp Ten (Kangyee) alone, there were fifteen two-person teams of translators and political aides at work every day during the initial phase of education between 1950 and 1951.\textsuperscript{86} Language has a broader significance in the history of soldierly experience: soldiers in modern warfare have long made rudimentary (and sometimes ineffectual) attempts to communicate with local populations, foreign allies or captors. English-speaking UN soldiers in Korea were issued with ‘Pointie-Talkie’ guides, where lists of common phrases in Chinese and English could be matched up with one another.\textsuperscript{87} Elsewhere one British prisoner of war resorted to basic Arabic, in an abortive attempt to solicit help from the local population.\textsuperscript{88} Other prisoners attempted to learn Korean and Chinese (and even Russian) in the prison camps.\textsuperscript{89} Translation thus formed a crucial part in the relationship between captor, captive and enforced narratives.

Time also had particular significance in diaries written by the prisoner of war. John Shaw notes in his diary the state of the Yalu River, using its changing form from ice to water as a broader indicator of time.\textsuperscript{90} As philosopher J.C.C. Smart noted just two years previously, the river as metaphor for time has long appealed to human beings and his statement that we sometimes ‘think of ourselves as stationary, watching time go by, just as we may stand on a bridge and watch leaves and stick float down stream’ perhaps explains

\textsuperscript{86} Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{87} NAM, United States Army, ‘Pointie Talkie in Chinese. Booklet for use in communicating with the Chinese issued to UN troops’, 1994-02-44-5. Presumably this guide was principally for those troops tasked with guarding Chinese POWs.
\textsuperscript{88} Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
\textsuperscript{89} NAM, Papers of Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, Notebook, c. 1951–2, 1988-08-75-1.
\textsuperscript{90} Papers of John Whittaker Shaw, Manuscript Diary for 1951, Docs. 7803.
Shaw’s fixation with the Yalu: the river highlights his own immobility. An alternative explanation could be offered which is far more state-orientated: son of a Protestant policeman and member of the Royal Ulster Rifles, it is unlikely that Shaw was unaware of the significance of rivers, notably the Boyne and the Somme, in Ulster memory. However, Shaw’s diary once again shows how life-narratives were often contingent on far more quotidian observations and concerns than on political persuasions. For example, due to a shortage of space in the diary (and paper more generally), Shaw limited himself to weekly entries and noted that: ‘In the Next 52 Pages I am Going To Keep A Record of My Life Here in This P.O.W. Camp. I only Hope I shall Not Have to Spend All This Year A P.O.W.’ Elsewhere, encouraged by the Chinese lectures on American diplomats’ purposeful efforts to extend the peace negotiations to profit from the war, many British servicemen used the peace talks to indicate the slow passing of time. This temporal awareness was also reflected in a short piece entitled ‘A Summer’s Day’, published by the Chinese a short time after the war, where an anonymous British trooper guides the reader through the daily life of the prisoner of war. These included sports events and listening to the frequent ‘disappointments from Panmunjom’ and the Blue Danube Waltz on the PA system (a song whose daily airtime caused great annoyance amongst many prisoners). The story begins with a direct address to the reader, ‘why not spend a day with me[,] ...We will make our day a Saturday in August, 1952. Saturday is no particular day; except in a slight variation of games, every summer’s day is the same.’ The importance of ‘keeping time’ to the monotonous everyday existence of the prisoner is highly apparent, but so too were Chinese attempts to use time for political purposes. Chinese-issued diaries encouraged enumeration: one page of the 1953 issued diary included ‘Days and Dates’ for the year including

92 Papers of John Whittaker Shaw, Manuscript Diary, 3 January 1952, Docs. 7803.
95 Condron, Corden, and Sullivan (eds), Thinking Soldiers by Men Who Fought in Korea, p. 150.
Christmas Day, Thanksgiving and Easter Day. It also listed key dates in the Korean War so far and the date for ‘Korean Armistice’ was left internationally blank, with the note: ‘Fill this in yourself when it comes. You can make it soon by speaking up for peace.’ The diary also included blank spaces for dates such as ‘first letter home’, ‘first battle’ and even ‘back home (Thank Goodness).’ These diaries presupposed that battles and wounds were crucial to the soldier’s narrative of wartime experience.

However, the inclusion of these military milestones and a war chronology in the 1953 diary also indicated that the Chinese captors were aware that soldiers linked their life-writing to another sense of time, to ‘history’. In his study of photography of First World War German prisoners of war, Harold Mytum argues that earlier photographs often included an indication of the date. By contrast, images from later in the war show ‘a certain acceptance of the repetitive camp routines [which] led to a form of timelessness and perhaps also a feeling that ... they were not a part of history but onlookers’. Dates became less significant as prisoners became more aware of their own increasingly peripheral status in a conflict; they were less a part of History and more a sideshow to the main action. One National Serviceman who was imprisoned in Korea noted that ‘the war was over for us now’ and that his thoughts often strayed to what was happening at the front. The diary thus chimed the use of time in the camp, but it also conflicted with servicemen’s desire to be part of a more legitimising a notion of time where military life did not consist of the daily grind of existence but formed part of pivotal events – part of history. Prisoners thus negotiated between two different notions of time in their diaries, with daily timekeeping often gaining precedence over a more grandiose chronology of conflict. The diaries of British prisoners thus reiterate Paul Ricoeur’s argument that the narrative and temporal cohesion of ‘emplotment’, of putting one’s life into narrative form, sharpens self-conception. Whilst on the surface it would seem that Ricoeur’s model is at odds with the enforced narrative,

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96 IWM, Diary for 1953, produced by Chinese People’s Volunteers, Docs. 12481.
Catriona Mackenzie writes that Ricoeur’s ‘narratives’ are always made in the presence of others and do not imply well-crafted, literary or written life stories.\textsuperscript{100} In contrast to the diaries seen in the previous chapter, the prisoner of war diary tends to end abruptly; few make concluding notes on the end of their captivity. This reflects the charged context in which the diary was written; boredom was replaced by the hubbub of prisoner exchange and debriefing. As Philippe Lejeune argues, the diary is a profoundly ‘unfinishable’ piece of autobiographical writing as there is ‘always a time lived beyond the writing’.\textsuperscript{101} The centrally prescribed prisoner-of-war diary helps us understand the meaning of this temporal dislocation in prison life.

Nevertheless, as with other directed forms of life-writing, incidences of subversion are evident. Many diaries were not used the way they were intended. Lt. Donald Gallman of the Gloucestershire Regiment used his diary to write down the addresses of American servicemen he had met in the camp and with whom he wished to keep in contact after the war. Military connections and friendships thus countered the political education Gallman had received. Another former prisoner wrote in a poem entitled ‘POW Camp No. 3’ of the emotional impact of finding these names many years later in that ‘[p]recious book in a boot leather cover,/ ... made long ago in a foreign land/ Hand stitched down the jacket’s spine’.\textsuperscript{102} Gallman also jotted down extracts of the poetry he could remember, including William Ernest Henley’s ‘Invictus’, a poem later made world famous when Nelson Mandela also took comfort from it during his captivity.\textsuperscript{103} Despite the Chinese discourse of self-improvement and criticism, prisoners could evade enforced narratives to some extent. That this protest took the form of poetry is also historically significant. Poetry was an important part of the school curriculum in the 1930s, when the majority of the younger servicemen grew up. Children were encouraged to write their own verse on their own experiences and also to consider that poetry was the ‘most concentrated and evocative form’ through which

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item D.S. Anderson in Reuben Holroyd (ed.), Poetry of the Korean War (Halifax, 2003), p. 62.
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to express the views of ‘life, man and society’.\textsuperscript{104} From an early age this generation saw poetry as a way to reflect their own experiences and as a powerful way of expressing wider changes and turning points of ‘great’ past events.\textsuperscript{105}

As well as personal deviation, two further elements of soldierly life in captivity undermine both the Chinese models of new ‘progressive’, self-reflexive soldiers and even to some extent British models of soldierly subjectivity: the persistence of service or regimental affiliation and of religious sentiment. Despite the wealth of scholarly attention devoted to war writing and the construction and control of modern subjects, the relationship between the regiment, corps or service and the individual remains chronically under-theorised. The majority of studies on the regiment focus on the wake of late-nineteenth century British Army reforms.\textsuperscript{106} Frequently descriptions of regimental loyalties are only found in empirical, small-scale studies of regiments, often put together painstakingly by veterans of that group.\textsuperscript{107} Even histories of the most well-known regiments take for granted the connection between individual and regiment.\textsuperscript{108} Yet life-narratives in prison camps demonstrate the importance of the unit. Whilst attachment to the regiment can be considered part of an affiliation with state apparatus or the polity behind it, it also provides an alternate identity. Indeed, one veteran noted that his regiment, 1\textsuperscript{st} Royal Tank Regiment, were on the side of the Gloucesters, whom he felt had been betrayed by the Americans at the Battle of the Imjin in April 1951.\textsuperscript{109} Many veterans later note their attachment to their regiment and even how their ‘characters’ were moulded by that group: they further situate their own ‘exploits’

\textsuperscript{105} As the final chapter of this thesis demonstrates, the poetic form continued to play a role in the expression and subjectivity of veterans.
\textsuperscript{109} NAM, Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Jarlath Donnellan, 4 August 1988, NAM 1989-05-160.
within the broader history of the regiment. Regimental and even inter-Regimental loyalty provided alternate markers of identity that occasionally countered official standpoints, in this case questioning the depth of Anglo-American co-operation. Personal attachment to the regiment complicates military subjectivity in the Korean War and indeed represents one instance where military writing is distinct from civilian writing.

Religion once again offers a different perspective on the construction of an alternative to state subjectivity. Cyril Cunningham argued that the religious prisoner was more resistant to interrogation and persuasion:

“The personal qualities which lead to a high standard of conduct in normal times and which inspire courage, determination and self sacrifice in a crisis are by nature spiritual, not physical, and will therefore be fostered and perhaps engendered by a firm faith in the existence of God and in the efficacy of prayer.”

Cunningham’s assertion that the qualities which best protect a man in crisis emanate from religion is revealing. Keith Robbins argues that Christianity was in decline in the 1950s: the perceived Protestant revival associated with Queen Elizabeth’s coronation in 1953 marked a brief peak in religious sentiment and could not contend with the identities produced by growing culture of affluence and modernity: even the monarch herself went to the horse races on Whit Sunday. By contrast, other historians have associated the socially tumultuous years of the 1960s with the ‘death of Christian Britain’, in comparison with the somewhat staid, if not devout, 1950s. Evidence suggests that religion did form a mainstay in the subjectivity of British servicemen in the Korean War. For example, Lieutenant

Colonel Starr of the Corps of the Royal Signals estimated that there were over one hundred officers and men who attended the Regimental church each week, built by a team led by Reverend Alan Bowers even in the midst of war.\textsuperscript{114}

Yet gauging religiosity amongst the soldiery is complex, for as Callum Brown noted in his controversial study of ‘discursive Christianity’, church-going statistics do not necessarily show the breadth or depth of religious sentiment.\textsuperscript{115} Two factors further complicate any assessment. First is the close institutional relationship between the established church and military. Whilst Starr was keen to stress that ‘[n]o persuasion … [was] needed on Sunday mornings’, the relationship between the services and the Church of England was long-standing.\textsuperscript{116} The Army had employed chaplains (Church of England, Presbyterian and Catholic) from 1858, amid worries of seditious preaching by local Roman Catholic priests to the Army in Ireland and was also an attempt to lower crime rates amongst the rank-and-file. From this time every recruit was required to give his religious affiliation from this choice of three and had to attend a Church parade on Sundays. Alan Skelley argues that the majority of recruits were apathetic toward this choice and identified themselves as Anglicans simply because the band went to the Church of England parade.\textsuperscript{117} This close institutional affiliation was still evident during the Korean War. For example, although regiments were frequently composed of men (particularly reservists) from a wide range of home towns, the return of a locally-named regiment from Korea would be marked by marches through towns, culminating in a church service.\textsuperscript{118} The homecoming parade brought together the ideas of military victory, religious sentiment and civic duty.

The second complicating factor that offsets claims of religiosity was that, on the whole, those in captivity or peril seemed to evoke religious sentiment to a far greater extent in their life-narratives. Padre Stanley ‘Sam’ Davies of the Gloucestershire Regiment noted

\textsuperscript{117} Skelley, \textit{The Victorian Army at Home}, pp. 165–66.
\textsuperscript{118} For example, in Gloucester when some of the regiment returned home after their tour in Korea. See Anonymous, ‘Three Qualities’, \textit{The Citizen}, 28 April 1952.
the power of prayer in his captivity in the best-selling *In Spite of Dungeons* (1954).[^119] Yet religious sentiment was also more widely evident. On one of the first few pages of his 1951 Manuscript diary John Shaw printed an accurate extract from Psalm 23 from the St. James Bible in strident capitals: ‘YE A THOUGH I WALK THROUGH THE VALLEY OF THE SHADOW OF DEATH I WILL FEAR NO EVIL: FOR THOU ART WITH ME; THY ROD AND THY STAFF COMFORT ME.’[^120] Such a religious frontispiece not only brought comfort to Shaw when he made his weekly entry but could be interpreted as an act of resistance to his CPV guards who could ask to read this diary. However, even quite ‘progressive’ prisoners continually referenced Christian discourse in their captivity. ‘Progressive’ Edward Beckerley remembered reciting the first verse of ‘Abide with Me’ to himself each night on the march northwards, ‘the words being appropriate to the situation I found myself in.’[^121]

Ideas of struggle, perseverance and godly protection thus had an appeal to the prisoner of war and to the soldier that did not necessarily reflect the norm in Britain itself. In June 1953 Captain James Majury was presented with a hand-made prayer book ‘by the many Protestants of Number 2 Company, Prisoner of War Camp Number 2 ... who have found comfort in the Church services he has conducted for them’.[^122] Apart from several well-known prayers such as St. Francis’ Prayer and the Lord’s Prayer, the attendees devised several prayers themselves including a prayer ‘For Our Wives’ and ‘An Alphabet of Intercession’. This second prayer wrote a short verse on twenty-six subjects, from A to Z. Topics included the bereaved, canteens, the dying, the infantry, parents, wounded and ‘zero hour’. The verse for X, a potentially difficult letter to match to soldierly experience, represented ‘a mystery to be solved’, the troublesome void of the unknown which troubled prisoners awaiting the end of their captivity, one way or another. They also pray for ‘European Jewry’ and for the ‘injustice and contempt of human rights’, reflecting the

[^120]: Papers of John Whittaker Shaw, Manuscript Diary for 1951, Docs. 7803.
[^121]: IWM, Papers of Edward Beckerley, Unpublished Memoir, p. 15.
growing popular awareness of Jewish experiences in Nazi-run concentration camps by the early 1950s. Religion was thus intimately connected with times of peril and crisis. It also coincided with boredom. Carne, for example, carved a wooden Celtic cross when in solitary confinement (which was later placed in Gloucester Cathedral). Crafting religious ephemera formed one activity in the suspended time of captivity. On balance, religious sentiment constituted an important part of soldierly life in captivity: whilst this might originate in the close connection between church and military, life-narratives demonstrate the widespread recourse to religious language and ideas as a way of framing subjectivity whilst imprisoned.

Confession and Interrogation

Whilst the soldier remained attached to regimental and religious affiliations during captivity, the Chinese attempted to use even more public forms of life-narrative sought to mould subjectivities. In 1951 the Chinese forced Carne to write a ‘confession’ detailing his complicity in a ‘subversive sub-committee’ of British prisoners. He was then forced to read out his confession to other prisoners on the parade ground. Confessions were often supplemented by additional questionnaires and ‘self-criticisms’. The soldier was called on to cast aside his former self and to reconstruct himself anew through confession. In this way one might argue that the Chinese used confession in a way we would today label as Foucauldian; in other words, as a subject-forming process. The confession in the prisoner of war camp acted as a highly prescriptive form of enforced narrative which demanded a new self to be constructed.

To some extent, the term ‘confession’ also implies the breaching of public and private. Feminist critic Rita Felski argues that confessions straddle the dialectic of intimacy

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125 Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, p. 3.
and alienation, making ‘public that which has been private.’ Yet Soviet subjectivity scholar Jochen Hellbeck shows in his study of diary writing under Stalin in the 1930s and 1940s, that the use of this artificial dichotomy is simply inaccurate in a society consumed with the construction of ideal subjects. Life-narratives no longer remained in the realm of the ‘private’. As seen above, the Chinese issued diaries to aid ‘students’ in their political education and challenge their models of soldierly subjectivity. A quintessentially ‘private’ document in Western imagination thus had a different meaning in the Chinese-run prisoner of war camp. Similarly, Carne’s ‘confession’ was intended to be a profoundly public declaration of wrong-doing.

Yet speaking in oral history interviews three decades afterwards, some veterans remembered these ‘confessions’ in a more jovial light, recounting how plaintiffs generally produced tongue-in-cheek confessions, much to the amusement of others. The discontinuation of the confession as part of Chinese policy towards the end of the war implies its inefficacy as a method, but nevertheless one should not discount the full significance and gravity of this form of enforced narrative. Speaking about his own confession, Carne noted later (in a British interrogation) that ‘everybody knew the form all right’. Furthermore veteran recollections were heavily influenced by the genre of Second World War prisoner-of-war films, which frequently depict the almost debonair wit and humour of prisoners in the stony face of authority. The Wooden Horse (1950) marked the start of a post-war veneration of the bravery, charm and daring of the British prisoner of war. This popular genre might therefore have encouraged these more humorous recollections of ‘confession’ in the Korean War.

129 Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Edward Beckerley, 8 November 1987, 10982; US psychologist Edgar Schein noted that a common humorous sentiment in confession was to promise ‘never to get caught’ committing another crime. See Schein, ‘The Chinese Indoctrination for Prisoners of War’, p. 159.
130 War Office, Special Interrogation Reports on British Officer POWs and Methods Used in Communist Interrogations, Preliminary Appreciation of the Chinese Interrogation of Lieutenant Col. J.P. Carne by Cyril Cunningham, 21 December 1953, WO 208/4021.
131 The Wooden Horse (dir. Jack Lee, Wessex Film/British Lion/London Film, 1950).
Whilst confessions were typically made by those who had apparently transgressed the Chinese rules under the ‘Lenient Policy’, interrogations were far more common.\textsuperscript{132} In oral history interviews in the late 1980s, ex-prisoners remembered these interrogations. George Richards recalled that:

Yeah, err, we were, our first interrogation was by a little Chinese man who didn’t speak very good English and ... he said ‘You nam’ which meant ‘Your name’ you see [laughter], we told him the name. ‘You live?’ he wanted to know where we lived, it was broken English, it was terrible, you know, eventually we found out what he wanted and he said ‘How many pigs have you?’ [laughter] ‘How many cows have you?’ you know and it seemed so ridiculous to us, you know, so we were all giving him different figures, about ten pigs and four cows, and the richer you were, that’s what he was after I suppose.\textsuperscript{133}

Once again veterans used humour to explore their captivity and saw it as an emblem of British national identity.\textsuperscript{134} Similar to Richards’ story, Anthony Farrar-Hockley described explaining each joke in a pantomime script to the Chinese guards who assumed each line was ‘some plot against the Chinese People’s Volunteers’.\textsuperscript{135} Richards’ description also highlights the prevalence of racial stereotyping in prisoners’ accounts; whereas soldiers previously described the Chinese as an amorphous mass, as ‘waves’ or ‘hordes’, they described guards and interrogators as ‘little’ and singular.\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, as later chapters of this thesis demonstrate, interviewees responses have been mediated by the question they were initially asked. In Richards’ case, the interviewer, Dr. Conrad Wood of the Imperial

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Based on his psychiatric interviews with former US prisoners soon after their release in 1953, Schein notes that ‘almost all’ were interrogated to some degree, see Schein, ‘The Chinese Indoctrination for Prisoners of War’, p. 157.
\item Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
\item See later chapters for more on the significance and use of humour; Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, 8905-261.
\item Farrar-Hockley, \textit{The Edge of the Sword}, p. 224.
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War Museum, consistently asked about interrogations, meaning that its prevalence in oral histories might owe as much to the interests of the historian as to its importance to the ex-prisoner.

However, evidence suggests that senior officers were singled out for more one-on-one interrogations than other ranks. Dennis Lankford, a Lieutenant in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was captured on 28 November 1951 during a mission to an island off the West Coast of Korea. He was kept first at Pyoktong camp, then moved to various locations where he underwent severe interrogation for twenty three months. He describes one incident where he was made to write his life story:

‘Write’ I was told. ‘Write your autobiography to begin with. Write your life story from the age of five through your schooling...right up to the day of your liberation by the Chinese People’s Volunteers.’... I decided I would not be giving anything away by playing along with them, so I started to write my life ... There could be no harm in that – it might do some good...[but] I was surprised how little I knew of my family history... and filled out the gaps with guesses and pure fiction. By the time I had finished, dear old father had become a millionaire, who lived in a mansion ... [and] my mother had become an ex-Gaiety girl, who still at times drank champagne out of a slipper.137

Unfortunately Lankford was forced to produce this ‘autobiography’ more than seventeen times during his captivity. In a subsequent interrogation he was punished when he was unable to remember the sensational details of his imagined life.138 Lankford’s text, expertly and humorously written despite the often unbearable conditions of his captivity, is significant in many ways. Firstly, not only did Lankford’s Chinese interrogators hope to use

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138 Lankford, I Defy!, p. 100; see Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859; consistency was seemingly one of the key features Chinese interrogators sought when analysing life-stories, see Schein, ‘The Chinese Indoctrination for Prisoners of War’, p. 158.
life-writing as a potential source of military information, but they were aware of the psychology of writing an autobiography – the formation of subjectivity through the production of narrative. As Daniel Roux notes in his study of prison writing, perhaps all imprisonment ‘demands a narrative ... to explain how one ended up there’.139 Accompanied by intensive political education and a range of self-criticism, the narrative of the self became a battleground; interrogations sought to break down narrative and to use confession to make the prisoner’s voice that of the interrogatory regime.140 The prisoner meanwhile desperately clung to his own chronology and sense of self (however far from the model of the democratic ‘soldier-citizen’ that might be), to ground himself in the harshest of circumstances.

Enforced life-writing was not necessarily unwelcome: Carne described responding to requests for writing as an occupation, a break in the monotony of captivity.141 Similarly, Lankford warmed to writing, describing another time when he was asked to fill out his autobiography:

As usual, I filled in from my imagination the parts I didn’t know. When I finished that I was so comfortable, the atmosphere so pleasant, it was all such a change that I just went on writing. I found a match in my hand. I had just used it to light a cigarette. So now I wrote the life story of a match. I traced it all the way from a forest in Scandinavia, through all sorts of interesting adventures until the moment it curled up and died in a film star’s hand at a New York night club. I got a lot of quiet amusement out of it all. I covered nearly seventy sheets of foolscap paper with my closely packed scribbling.142

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141 TNA, Special Interrogation Reports on British Officer POWs and Methods Used in Communist Interrogations, 1954, WO 208/4021.
142 Lankford, I Defy!, p. 96.
Writing life stories became a common activity for Lankford in captivity, perhaps explaining the adeptness and style of his later published memoir. Lankford’s ‘story of match’ similarly highlights the creativity that flourished in prisoner of war camps.\(^{143}\) It mirrors the ‘Life Story of a Penny’, a storytelling practice originating in the late eighteenth century, used by adults and children alike into the late-twentieth century.\(^{144}\) It also subtly references the recurring motif of a lit match in Graham Greene’s 1935 novel \textit{England Made Me} (republished as \textit{The Shipwrecked} in 1953), demonstrating both the writing conventions and reading habits that prisoners brought with them.\(^{145}\) Furthermore, Lankford’s paean to a match shows that he, unlike others, was not short of paper to write thoughts down on: elsewhere Padre ‘Sam’ Davies had to use lavatory paper to write his private notes which later formed the basis for his book, \textit{In Spite of Dungeons}.\(^{146}\) Whilst interrogation’s aim was not to elicit creative endeavours, the prisoner of war camp provided the time and space, both real and imagined, to pursue them.

\textbf{Prisoner of War Letters: Censorship and Circulation}

The enforced narrative was not restricted to the Chinese prison camps: the second half of this chapter charts two key examples of enforced narrative demanded by British interest groups or authorities. It therefore explores public perceptions of the prisoner of war and analyses how the prisoner’s subjectivity itself came under the spotlight in 1950s Britain.

The public manipulation and use of prisoners’ letters was the first instance of enforced writing at home. The treatment of prisoners’ letters differed tremendously from the letter-writing and letter-reading practices detailed in Chapter Two. One might argue that it is inaccurate to characterise all life-narratives produced in the Korean War as centrally enforced. As Diana Gill notes, the letters written by servicemen not only provide a chronicle

of events and feelings, but are also voluntary, concerted acts of ‘communion’, allowing a soldier ‘a tenuous purchase on a world with which they no longer have a sensory connection.’\textsuperscript{147} For instance, in 1953 one officer received a series of Coronation postcards from his mother, to give him ‘some idea of the beauty of the Coronation Service’ of Queen Elizabeth II.\textsuperscript{148} Clare Makepeace describes the importance of the material exchange of letters and parcels in the prisoner of war camp in the Second World War; letters provided both an ‘imaginative’ connection with home and a tangible, sensory reminder of loved ones.\textsuperscript{149} However, to assume that such personal missives are completely unfettered by wider influences overlooks two key features in their construction and use: the role of censorship and the public use of letters.

Prisoner of war letters were routinely examined by the CPV and returned to their authors for a more sympathetic redraft. By 1953 the Chinese censored letters then sent them to Panmunjom where they were exchanged and sent to Tokyo, from whence the British Overseas Airways Corporation flew them back to Britain. The Base Censor then ‘scrutinised’ the prisoners’ letters. A report in the magazine of the Gloucestershire Regiment, \textit{Back Badge}, states that: ‘It is important to note the difference between censoring and scrutiny. Censoring means the cutting out or obliterating of information in a letter that it is considered should not be conveyed by the writer[...]. The letters from P.W. in Korea have never been censored by the Base Censor.’\textsuperscript{150} This insistence of the uncensored nature of letters ties this form of life-writing to the wider discourses of citizen and state at the time. Letters epitomised freedom of speech and any indication that they were edited by British authorities could have potentially destabilising effect on the relationship between citizen and state. However, there are instances of edited letters sent to prisoners of war. One family photograph sent to Major Harding by his wife had a secret message from the Air Ministry contained in the paper and his subsequent replies to her contained coded messages included

\textsuperscript{147} Gill, \textit{How We Are Changed By War}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{148} Papers of V.P.C. Whitamore, Postcards from Mrs Whitamore to V.P.C. Whitamore, 25 July 1953, Docs. 8462.
\textsuperscript{149} Makepeace, ‘Living Beyond the Barbed Wire’, p. 3.
‘IN JAIL TO JULY REPLY SAME WAY’. The letter could therefore act as an act of ‘communion’, but the connection was profoundly shaped by the state, which used this writing for the purposes of military intelligence gathering.

Yet the letter-writing of British servicemen and the subjectivity they expressed within them were used by non-state actors too. Lance Corporal Bill Tyler’s letters home were published by the Socialist Outlook following his death in Korea in order to hasten calls for peace. Tyler, a disgruntled reservist committed to socialism, noted in one letter that ‘[t]he general mood of the men is not conducive to another war, believe me.’ Whilst Tyler’s convictions gave his letters obvious political capital for left-wing resistance organisations to the Korean War in Britain, more ambiguous letters were used in a similar way. Mrs. Monica Felton, then town planner for the Stevenage Development Corporation, was asked to visit North Korea by the Women’s International Democratic Federation as part of an investigatory delegation. During the course of her visit, North Korean authorities took her to various locations and she returned home with twenty-six letters for relatives initially and more on subsequent visits, many of which were addressed to the British people. In a pamphlet from January 1953 published by the Britain China Friendship Association, Felton recounts meeting prisoners:

Many of them, during their enforced idleness, have been studying the Charter of the United Nations, and this study has convinced them that they and their fellow prisoners have been forced to take part in an act of aggression against the Korean people for which there was neither legal nor moral justification[.] … How deep this concern is can be seen from the letters of P.O.W.s John Underwood and George Richards … who write ‘As regards the Korean War, we cannot but express our bitter disappointment at the way the Peace Talks at Panmunjom have developed,

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152 Elsewhere, Robin Bruford-Davies noted that the venture of coded letters was ‘doomed for failure’, as he himself received a letter he did not understand and simply threw it away. See Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Robin Bruford-Davies, 10 February 1989, NAM 1989-05-163.
154 Felton, What I Saw in Korea, p. 3.
especially with the latest issue, the voluntary repatriation bluff[.] … It is so easy to lose hope and sit back and say “we are forgotten”[.]… [I]f we were to be forgotten it would be an easy way to keep us quiet and to hide the truth.”

Felton and others used prisoners’ letters to hasten calls for peace and to undermine British policy in Korea. Yet to some extent the above letter is an involuntary missive, an enforced testimony used to legitimate the Communist stance on the peace negotiations. One of the letter writers, George Richards, remembers that Monica Felton never stayed for long nor did she interview any prisoners at length. Felton’s public use of letters must also be considered alongside a series of meetings she held in London in June 1951 which attracted hundreds of attendees, reputedly 700 at a meeting at Holborn Hall on 11 June. This popularity was due to her high-profile dismissal following her initial visit to North Korea.

Not all the audience supported Felton. Miss Christine Knowles (1890–1965), who had set up the British Prisoners of War Fund during the Second World War to provide reading material for British prisoners in Germany and Italy, had continued her practice of visiting the families whose husbands or sons were in captivity and was aghast to find that Felton, and even the Chinese themselves, had also corresponded with relatives too. In one letter to the War Office Knowles writes that: ‘I feel very glad that I have been able to speak in various places where Mrs Monica Felton had been active and to counteract, I hope, some of her propaganda.’ Rifleman John Shaw’s family wrote that they had received books from the

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156 Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
158 Others speculated that Chinese even secretly paid for the return fares for wives and mothers to attend such peace rallies, see NAM, Papers of D.F. Barrett, ‘The War in Korea, 1st Battalion the Middlesex’, NAM 2005-05-86, p. 23. One angry wife of an officer records in a letter to the mother of another prisoner that she ‘asked her [Felton] if there was any evidence that P.O.W.s were in fact receiving the letters sent by relatives in this country…She replied that some were…she could give no satisfactory reply as to why the Red Cross were not allowed to operate in N. Korea’, see Papers of V.P.C. Whitamore, Letter from Heather Docker to Mr. and Mrs. Whitamore, 23 June 1951, Docs. 8462.
160 TNA, War Office, Letter from Christine Knowles to Major Young (Border Regiment), 8 September 1953, WO 208/4007.
Chinese Peace Committee, complete with quotes from prisoners about fair treatment. To combat this use of prisoners’ words, Knowles began to produce her own newsheets with letters that she had been sent or been permitted to read by relatives. Knowles therefore represents an alternate way that letters were used beyond personal communication. Letters – both their content and circulation – were highly politicised and were scrutinised and re-appropriated in Britain as well as by the CPV. Subjectivity was again part of the war, and even part of resistance to war, not simply a reflection of it.

Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter Two, the historiographical tendency to polarise home and war ‘fronts’ oversimplifies the connections which transcend this dichotomy. The treatment of prisoners of war upon return to England similarly complicates the temporal and geographical demarcation of ‘fronts’. Upon his return to Britain, the prisoner of war was a controversial figure. Prisoners were again forced to give an account of their lives by British authorities and military subjectivity continued to concern governments and society.

**Enforced Narratives of Returning British Prisoners of War**

The Korean Armistice Agreement was signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953, leading to the cessation of hostilities. Although the war itself was now over (although no peace treaty was ever signed), the war ended far later for frontline soldiers, who had to remain to police the 38 Parallel, and for prisoners of war, who were repatriated later that summer. Throughout the war, the progress of the peace talks had been hampered by protracted wrangling over the issue of prisoners of war: the Chinese favoured immediate, complete and forced repatriation of all prisoners of war, whereas the Americans did not wish to force...
NKPA or CPV prisoners (many of whom had been forced to join those armies in the first place) to return.\(^{165}\) Callum Macdonald notes the irony of these respective stances as the Chinese accused the USA of going against Article 118 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, despite being a non-signatory. The USA, by contrast, called for greater flexibility in this Article, which called for all prisoners to be repatriated, but which, they argued, was built on the assumption that all prisoners would want to return.\(^{166}\) Despite Syngman Rhee’s sabotage of the talks (releasing 25,131 non-repatriated prisoners without any authorisation, a move subsequently criticised by many Western historians), both sides eventually agreed that non-repatriates should be handed over to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Committee in the interim.\(^{167}\) Repatriation thus took place in a charged political context: in the end, 14,235 Chinese and 32,500 North Koreans opted not to return, compared with 325 South Korean, 22 American and one Briton (Royal Marine Andrew Condron) opting to stay in Communist countries.\(^{168}\) Charles S. Young has explored why these statistics were never used by the USA as propaganda: prisoner defection was never stated as an American war aim and thus the comparative success of the Americans in convincing North Korean prisoners not to return to their Communist homeland was not publicly celebrated.\(^{169}\) Furthermore, the charged context of repatriation in the USA, but also in Britain, eclipsed the other side of the exchange, although non-repatriates from Korea and China were more numerically significant.

Prisoner exchange took place at two intervals: once following the cessation of hostilities as detailed above, but also once earlier in 1953, as part of a potential ‘propaganda’ campaign by the Chinese, who were keen to repatriated ‘progressive’ prisoners ready to speak to press of their good treatment under Communism. In ‘Operation Little Switch’, between 20 April and 3 May 1953, the United Nations Command returned 6,570 sick or wounded prisoners of war (5,194 NKPA, 1,030 CPV and 446 civilians) in exchange for 684

\(^{165}\) Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, p. 134.


\(^{168}\) Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, p. 134.

sick or wounded United Nations prisoners of war (471 ROK, 149 American, 32 British, 15 Turkish and 17 other). Between July and September 1953 the main body of prisoners of war were exchanged in ‘Operation Big Switch’: United Nations Command returned 75,823 prisoners (5,640 CPV and 70,183 NKPA) in exchange for 12,773 prisoners of their own (7,862 ROK, 3,597 American, 946 British, 229 Turkish and 140 other UN personnel).

Former prisoners recount hearing of the news from their guards. Sebastian Mercer remembered the Chinese inexplicably reading out names to them when they were close to Panmunjom (location of ‘Operation Little Switch’). He noted that: ‘All this was to keep you absolutely keyed up, are they going to repatriate me, aren’t they.’ Prisoners were then taken by truck to either Panmunjom or Kaesong where they were then handed over to United Nations authorities and then to British authorities (led by Major A.N. West-Watson).

The figure of the returning prisoner of war had wider political and cultural consequences which reveal deeper uncertainties over the democratic subject in the early Cold War period. At first glance, the prisoner of war was a hero who represented the perseverance of the British military. The depiction of Carne and the other ‘Glorious Gloucester’ prisoners reflects this: Carne’s reticence was put down to the British disinclination to gloat about oneself and he was described by the Illustrated London News as ‘An Inspiration to his Men in Battle and Captivity’. Such imagery coincided with the burgeoning cultural attention to prisoners of war from the Second World War. Similarly, ‘local boy’ stories in regional newspapers also reflect the heroic stance of the prisoner of war. The triumphant, returned prisoner of war also took on a political significance; US forces at Kaesong erected a tent for repatriated prisoners adorned with the banner ‘Welcome Gate to Freedom’.

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172 Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Sebastian ‘Sam’ Mercer, 18 July 1988, 8905-261.
Such an ostentatious banner reminded prisoners of the political system for which they had fought and to associate their return with the restoration of democratic values. The slightly incredulous reaction from British servicemen to this banner suggests that this centrally orchestrated welcome was incongruous with their own reactions to returning home.\footnote{Lankford,\textit{ I Defy!}, p. 159.} Similarly, EUSAK produced advice pamphlets for repatriated prisoners including details of the process of repatriation and key political events between June 1950 and June 1953 in a booklet entitled ‘What has Happened since 1950’. Such publications acknowledged the temporal dislocation felt by prisoners of war and the central attempt to locate their efforts within a broader framework of the war and the fight against Communism.

Yet the process of repatriation itself reflects the more liminal position of the prisoner of war: the administrative processes facilitating prisoner return betrayed a greater uncertainty over the loyalty of the British soldiery. Cyril Cunningham utilised psychoanalytic techniques in his investigation, such as ‘projection’, asking the interviewee what he expected from their meeting before they began.\footnote{Cunningham argued that asking interviewees what they expected gave him a further layer of meaning through which to ascertain their psychiatric state and loyalty, see War Office, Special Interrogation Reports on British Officer POWs and Methods Used in Communist Interrogations, Preliminary Appreciation of the Chinese Interrogation of Lieutenant Col. J.P. Carne by Cyril Cunningham, 21 December 1953, WO 208/4021.} As Mike Savage argues, such techniques show the pervasiveness of psychotherapeutic approaches. Indeed the emergence
of the interview as a qualitative research method changed how the state gathered qualitative information about its subjects and how those subjects viewed themselves during the process.

Questions in these interrogations covered military matters, but there were also queries to ascertain the political stance and mental state of the returned prisoner of war. The life stories that British servicemen had told in captivity also came under scrutiny in these interrogations. Whilst the majority of transcripts remain closed, the record of Carne’s interrogation is open to historians and provides a first insight into the composition of the prisoner of war narrative as well as the types of questions Cunningham asked. Unlike the other prisoners, Carne was not required fill out an autobiographical form by the CPV, but was instead asked to produce a detailed history of the British Army, in addition to periodic self-criticisms and confessions. Carne reiterates the appeal of life-writing to the prisoner of war: ‘Answer: … one strung it out as much as one could, like all things. I don’t know – many days, I think. Question: Were you glad of something to do? For an occupation? Answer: Well, of course, there was nothing else to do, but it was a tiresome thing to have to do.’ In associating life-writing with boredom rather than political acquiescence with the interrogatory regime, Carne was also perhaps attempting to excuse his actions and apparent transgression from the standard name, rank and number rubric. However, Carne’s responses to questions about the written autobiography he was asked to produce were one-word confirmations, reflecting his well-known reticence but also showing a subtle resistance to having his life story extracted once more. His unwillingness to divulge seems almost hostile in the face of Cunningham’s questioning:

Question: Did they try and make you write out a chronological history of your life?

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176 The psychiatric assessment element to the interview is the principal reason why these transcripts remain closed to the present day.
177 TNA, War Office, ‘Verbatim Transcription of Re-interrogation of Carne’ with Lieutenant Colonel J.F.D Murphy, (Psychiatric Department of the Royal Army Medical Corps) and Cyril Cunningham, c. December 1953, WO 208/4021.
178 Ibid.
Answer: Of my Service, yes.

Question: Of your service?

Answer: Yes, and my own life.

Question: This was on the set form?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Did you have to answer every question?

Answer: Yes. They were all ones that they couldn’t check up on, so it did not matter really what one said.180

It is tempting to view Carne’s clipped responses as evidence of trauma, of being unable to speak. However, Carne had long been known in the regiment for his taciturn nature and the interview with Cunningham shows nothing particularly unusual in this regard.181 Nevertheless, Carne’s testimony suggests that British authorities were concerned with the methods of enforced autobiography used by the Chinese and the information divulged. This example further demonstrates the detailed knowledge of life-writing practices in captivity that Cunningham and AI9 had accrued in the course of these repatriation interrogations. Cunningham’s interrogations and subsequent report thus provide an insight into how central authorities viewed the subjectivity of the soldier and acknowledged the limits of its power to mould those subjects fully.

Based on these interrogations Cunningham was able to construct what he felt were eight key factors influencing the individual’s ‘breaking point’ and the ‘efficiency of his unit’: fighting efficiency, initiative, what to expect and do, esprit de corps, sense of discipline, belief in cause, knowledge of communism and religion. The first five attributes linked the individual’s capacity to survive to his position in a military unit and a group more generally. The soldier must display ‘toughness and stamina’ and a lack of attachment to the ‘material benefits which modern civilisation can provide.’ The common complaint from

British servicemen that their American counterparts, ‘living off the fat of the land’ in the United States or stationed in Japan emanated in this entrenched military belief that British austerity in the Second World War and immediate post-war period had equipped them for further hardships. Using their material deficiencies, the British in Korea thus constructed themselves the image of battle-hardened veterans accustomed to ‘living hard’ using their resourcefulness and wit. Cunningham did acknowledge that these skills varied among reservists, regulars and National Servicemen, suggesting these needed to be developed more during their training. Elsewhere, reports suggested that the Commonwealth Forces in Korea had received no general briefing on what to expect in the event of capture.

Cunningham also maintained that discipline and esprit de corps must be inculcated into the conscript, as both would ‘encourage him to continue to regard his captors as his enemy’. In the aftermath of the war, this discipline was viewed as a singularly British phenomenon. For example, a subsequent history of the 1st Battalion the Middlesex Regiment cited ‘British discipline’ as maintaining prisoners across two and a half years of captivity.

British discipline was not necessarily simply a military phenomenon, as Char Miller argues that Max Weber’s claim that ‘[t]he discipline of the army ... gives birth to all discipline’. Connected to this sense of discipline, Cunningham notes that: ‘It was clear from the evidence in relation to Korea that, where an individual did not feel “part of the main group” he became “an island unto himself” and rapidly succumbed to illness and often died.’ Once again the soldier-citizen and his sense of self were interpreted to be part of the group – whether that was his unit or wider British society. Whilst descriptions of the demise of isolated men were understandably missing from the life-writing of servicemen, there were

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184 TNA, Admiralty, ‘Korea, Commonwealth Prisoners of War: Resistance to Interrogation and Indoctrination Carried Out by the Communists. Special Briefing for Officers and Other Ranks by Evasion and Escape Sub-Committee’, April 1952, ADM 1/27310.
references to isolation from the group in popular culture, as with the dubious character of Private Wyatt in Max Catto’s novel (and later film) *A Hill in Korea* (1954).

This emphasis on the role of the group once again originates in the academic context of group theories in which Cunningham produced in his report.

Other reports were produced as a result of the AI9 interrogations, which further suggest that the prisoner of war was seen as a problem, not the embodiment of bravery and resistance. Among the reports completed by Major West-Watson’s team were classifications of political allegiances of returned prisoners of war. Those who had been classed as ‘progressive’ were the subject of particular interest and analysis. The official report into prisoner of war treatment stated that 12 per cent co-operated politically or militarily, 17 per cent did so to a minor degree, 63 per cent neither co-operated nor resisted and the remaining 8 per cent ‘resisted in all possible ways’. This advisory committee report noted that ‘[a]lmost every man has his breaking point. This point varies individually and depends on basic personality.’

‘Breaking point’ was a common term used in describing the transgression from state subjectivity and the use of ‘personality’ once again highlights the widespread use of this term in assessing individual traits, including proclivities to co-operate or resist the enemy.

Elsewhere, officers who had been in the camps analysed the role of ‘progressives’. Lieutenant Cooke of the Eighth King’s Royal Irish Hussars noted that some of these progressives were well-known to their fellow prisoners, whereas others surreptitiously passed information onto the CPV about secret prisoner committees or the few escape plans.

The attitudes of fellow soldiers to ‘progressives’ is unclear: most (particularly ‘reactionary’ prisoners) held these men in great distaste as they maintained that it was the

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duty of the prisoner of war to continue fighting.¹⁹² For example Lieutenant Cooke did not wish to name these men, but makes exception for Trooper Ronald Cocks (Camp Number Five), who he describes as a ‘card-carrying Communist from before the war’, possessing a ‘persuasive personality’ and ‘one of the worst types of “go-between, or without sparing words – traitor.”¹⁹³ The language of treachery is revealing here: not only had Cocks gone against the military doctrine of resisting the enemy in captivity, but his affiliation with the political ideology of his captors was viewed by his officers as a disavowal of British values and an alignment with the enemy. Cocks was heavily involved in producing Chinese propaganda and featured in one booklet for distribution in the West, allegedly writing of the repatriation: ‘Today we were leaving as close friends and comrades, with happy memories that would forever remain in our hearts.’¹⁹⁴ Mackenzie even identified several instances of progressives being ‘victimized’ on their way back to Britain and how officers had to intervene to prevent some being thrown overboard.¹⁹⁵

On the other hand, progressive status did not always mean isolation from fellow prisoners: George Richards remembers Ronald Cocks good-naturedly painting scenery for theatrical performances in the prison camp and also Andrew Condron helping massage his fellow soldiers’ feet on the ‘Death March’ northwards.¹⁹⁶ Condron is particularly significant in the history of British prisoners of war, as he was the only servicemen to opt to stay in China after the war. In an oral history interview he said he was ‘quite interested in the, the ideas that, Marxism if you like, put forward as, err, as an answer to man’s problems, basically’ and he ‘thought well it might be an idea if I can go to China, for a little while, just to see if the theory worked out in practice.’¹⁹⁷ On balance therefore, having Communist

¹⁹² Mackenzie, British Prisoners in the Korean War, pp. 140–41.
¹⁹⁴ Chinese People’s Committee for World Peace, Shall Brothers Be ... An Account, Written by American and British Prisoners of War, of their Treatment in P.O.W. Camps in Korea (Peking, 1952), p. 51.
¹⁹⁵ Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, p. 140. Although very uncommon, Ashley Cunningham-Boothe even insinuated that a tyrannical NCO was thrown overboard on the way to Korea, see IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, 8 December 1999, 19913.
¹⁹⁶ Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859.
¹⁹⁷ IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Andrew Condron, 1 February 1987, 9693.
sympathies did not necessarily mean exclusion from the group. Cooke himself noted this and offered a reinterpretation of the group theory so prevalent in the British Army at this time:

The picture as I have painted it, may seem a rather depressing one, but I am satisfied that it was solely due to the fact that we had this wretched man in our midst and his natural prey were the people he knew best – his own Regiment. The people he influenced most were the younger regulars and the National Servicemen...\(^{198}\)

Others viewed the situation even more pragmatically, arguing that these men paid special attention in lectures or gave information to the CPV so as to get extra food to supplement the meagre diet of sorghum (grain), rather than out of any special identification with the values of Communism. Their fellow soldiers simply took care not to not divulge sensitive information to those people who suspected of speaking to the CPV.\(^{199}\) Short-term gain rather than long-term commitment explained their actions.\(^{200}\) West-Watson came to a similar conclusion:

It is probable that all “Progressives” have been and still are loyal to their own country particularly now they have returned home[,] ... Others on the other hand may consider their sympathy with the World Communist Movement sufficient to warrant their assisting the Communist party when asked to do so. It is evident therefore that unless any ex-PW report that they have been contacted by a member of the Communist Party to do something for them, however small, they will be a danger to security if they are employed where they could do so. Once they have


started giving assistance it will be difficult for them to stop and easy for the
Communists to increase their demands.201

Whilst most therefore held no strong beliefs, there was nevertheless still a future threat of
blackmail or Chinese interference.

These interrogations were the only instance of enforced narrative once they had
returned home. British prisoners were not permitted to be interviewed by the press following
their initial release and there was great reluctance from the War Office for them to provide
any report of their experiences.202 A few select British servicemen were also requested to
give evidence into whether any combatants took part in war crimes. Whilst these trials were
by no means commonplace and were internal rather than international hearings, EUSAK
were keen to investigate instances where they felt the Chinese had perpetrated war crimes,
drawing parallels between the trials of Nazi war criminals and this new ‘dark period in the
history of free nations... [when] there was unrolled a sordid, unbelievable tale of bestial war
crime committed against South Korean civilians and military prisoners of war.’203 It should
be noted that accusations came also from the enemy: there were vehement accusations of
mass murders and rape by the Americans from the Chinese and North Korean authorities, as
well as by some Western journalists and activists.204 Nevertheless in one EUSAK trial
Captain Thomas Hedley Craig (RUR) testified that the Chinese had shot prisoners of war
even after they had surrendered, a story corroborated by the testimony of Rifleman Richard
John Geach.205 Asked to submit these testimonies as written reports to the War Crimes
Division of the US Army in Korea, they could be interpreted as another instance of the
enforced life narrative. More generally, recent studies in international criminal law argue

201 Ministry of Defence, ‘Report on the Success of Communist Indoctrination among British PW in North
Korea’, October 1953, WO 32.20495.
202 TNA, Admiralty, Minute by Donald R. Nugent (Public Information Officer), 14 December 1951, ADM
201/109.
203 TNA, War Office, Extract from the Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, 30 June 1953, WO
208/4005.
204 For example, Winnington, I Saw the Truth in Korea, p. 3; Ministry of Defence, ‘Report of the Advisory Panel
205 War Office, Extract from the Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, 30 June 1953, WO
208/4005.
that the testimonies at war crimes trials bring into question what it means to have ‘human rights’, particularly in the early Cold War period. These relatively small-scale investigations sought to define the rights of the defeated soldier in wartime (Geach and Craig both having surrendered), in conjunction with the oft-quoted Geneva Conventions. Subjectivity was once again to the fore. Furthermore Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam argue that the individual aspects of ‘stories’ told at war crimes trials risk being overlooked due to the constraints and conventions of giving evidence. In this case for example, Craig and Geach’s testimonies were book-ended by declarations of honesty and the claim that they were given ‘without threat of fear, or hope or offer of rewards’, to give their testimonies a sense of both authority and authenticity. Once again therefore, the soldier was forced to construct a life story in response to questioning from a central authority and in a form that is not his own. These trials therefore provide another example of enforced narratives the soldier was forced to produce. Kay Schaffer and Sidonie Smith provide further context for these internal war crimes trials, as the immediate decade following the Nuremberg trials was characterised by ‘an international climate of moral indignation’, in which the life narrative of witnesses occupied a high-profile position.

Anxiety over prisoners of war percolated several layers of central authority, highlighting a broader concern over the loyal democratic subject in early Cold War Britain. Within the military, those who had been prisoners of war were treated with caution and, if they remained in the military following their service in Korea, unlikely to be given jobs that involved a high level of security clearance. Ten years after the end of the war in 1963 the War Office implemented Viscount Cyril Radcliffe’s Recommendation (XXII) regarding ex-Korean Prisoners of War which reiterated that only those officers who passed the Positive Vetting (PV) procedure could be promoted to senior officer posts. These officers had to have

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208 War Office, Extract from the Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, 30 June 1953, WO 208/4005.
worked in a non PV post for three years under close scrutiny of a senior officer before passing and had to display the ‘qualifications and personal character which were likely to lead to a high rank’. Uncertainties remained despite these precautions, as even ‘a careful Positive Vetting could not ascertain whether the subject had been brainwashed.’ Although only twenty five officers from the British Army were still serving in September 1962, a War Office meeting on 25 April 1963 concerning Radcliffe’s recommendation noted that only ‘a few unimportant posts’ were open to those without PV, so theoretically the potential posts under debate were the vast majority of senior jobs in the British Army. Lord Radcliffe’s recommendation also shows the political concern over the prisoner of war. This fraught political situation was exacerbated by the revelation in 1961 that British spy George Blake had turned ‘double agent’ when imprisoned as Vice-Consul in Korea. Blake’s forty-two year sentence and subsequent escape from Wormwood Scrubs prison augmented these concerns, as well as feeding popular worries over Communism.

To some extent, one can interpret British concerns as a variant of the societal unease in the USA in the wake of the Korean War. Following the war, there was a flurry of publications about the twenty-one US servicemen who ‘chose China’. Historians also concur that the Cold War was an indelible and pervasive element in cultural life in America, exemplified by films such as *The Rack* (1956), *The Brink of Hell* (1957) and *The

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211 Ibid.
However, such interpretations overlook the unique set of historical factors that came together in the context of Britain in the early Cold War period. Furthermore, it overlooks a different concept of the individual in Cold War America: as Peter Knight notes, the American ideal of a ‘free’ individual explains its unease with a host of ‘others’ in the twentieth century and the popularity of ‘conspiracy theories’ in US discourse up to the present day. As seen in the first chapter of this thesis, the British citizen was not conceptualised in this way. In his regimental history D.F. Barrett notes that unlike their American counterparts, the British did not try their suspected ‘collaborators’ owing to an infrastructure less inclined to deal with prisoners of war in this way but also due ‘a more tolerant attitude to Communism [in a country] where it was not a banned party’.

S.P. Mackenzie also notes that MI5 never launched an investigation into any returned prisoners who were involved in the Communist Party of Great Britain, arguing that Christopher Andrew’s recent history of MI5 *The Defence of the Realm* (2009), which had unparalleled access to closed sources, makes no mention of such involvement. Mackenzie also notes that subsequent career of Anthony Farrar-Hockley disproved the concerns of the Radcliffe Recommendation, although Farrar-Hockley’s illustrious post-Korea employment was perhaps the exception, rather than the rule.

This disinclination to try prisoners of war did not minimise the cultural impact of their return, nor did it assuage the uncertainties of Britons in the early Cold War period. For example, the US concept of ‘brainwashing’ was increasingly used in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. The term itself is attributed to the American journalist Edward Hunter who reported on persuasive techniques in Communist China in 1950. The first widespread

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usage of ‘brain-washing’ in a British context was at a similar time: the British press used it initially in the context of Communist aggression and were keen to stress that it was an American term. Nevertheless by the 1960s, the term was used in a less specific context, most often in a pejorative sense to describe sudden, unwitting (and largely non-consensual) adherence to a belief system. The fear of ‘brainwashing’ by communist states and by the British military itself culminated in the perceived scandal of the Intelligence Corps depot at Maresfield, Sussex. The *Daily Mail* headline of 9 March 1960 ran ‘Brainwashing Shocks: War Office admits grilling tests on elite troops’ and described the use of various gruelling (and possibly illegal) physical tests ‘designed to “case-harden” elite Service units against Communist-type interrogation.’ The Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was prompted to deny such allegations in parliament. Yet this was not an isolated incident; earlier in the year an article in the *Observer* was similarly captivated by Soviet interrogation methods and their possible transposition into a British context. Alexander Kennedy, Professor of Psychological Medicine at Edinburgh University, argued that ‘brainwashing’ techniques used against prisoners of war (but not stating by whom) in the ‘last war’, such as personal-history taking and the effect of isolation and irregular visits, could perhaps be used to help mitigate the effects of senility and delinquency. As was noted, ‘psychological swords were now being turned into ploughshares.’ Whilst this approach was by no means unquestioned, the language of brainwashing and psychological warfare had clearly percolated beyond the military sphere by 1960, aided by the figure of the prisoner of war in Korea.

What then is the significance of ‘brainwashing’ to the construction of subjectivity in early Cold War Britain? First, it indicates a deep uncertainty over the subject: people were

221 Roy Willis, ‘They’re out to Brain-wash You’, *West London Observer*, 5 July 1957, p. 4; Anonymous, ‘Voyage of Discovery’, *West London Observer*, 10 September 1954, p. 6. One of the earliest references to ‘brainwash’ before the Korean War was made in 1874 when a poet sought to criticise a fellow poet’s verse in the local West Yorkshire press: ‘Peace, Reuben – for we would not now be cynical, Could not the Faculty invent a good brain-wash, For Persons unaware that thy pen trash’, see J.E.P., ‘Local Notes and Queries’, *Bradford Observer*, 7 March 1874.

222 D.J. Morey, ‘A Vicar Defends Dr. Billy Graham’, *Somerset County Herald*, 6 May 1961, p. 6. Morey defends American evangelist Dr. Billy Graham against claims that his followers are ‘brainwashed’.


seen as malleable, susceptible to influence through psychological and even chemical manipulation. Furthermore, the idea of ‘washing’ or cleansing was a powerful domestic trope in the early Cold War period with the advent of washing detergents and an equation of home, cleanliness and citizenship.\textsuperscript{226} ‘Brainwashing’ thus emerged at a crucial juncture in the development of ‘modernity’ and the subject within it. However, despite the fear of novel approaches in manipulating the soldier and the citizen, there was a degree of continuity. For example, Dutch psychiatrist Joost Meerloo wrote that whilst the Korean War represented new persuasive techniques: ‘From time immemorial tyrants and dictators have needed these “voluntary” confessions to justify their own evil deeds.’\textsuperscript{227} Whilst Meerloo associated these confessions with historical despots, this chapter has argued that such enforced narratives were common in a military context. More colloquially British soldiers used the phrase ‘give-up-itis’ to describe people (often Americans) who stopped resisting their enemy.\textsuperscript{228} Soldiers themselves also made fun of brainwashing, one noting in a later oral history interview that he was fine as ‘[y]ou’ve got to have a brain to start with’.\textsuperscript{229}

Brainwashing cannot simply be interpreted as an American import: its usage in Britain suggests that it formed a part of a changing definition of subjectivity in the period. British philosopher Olaf Stapledon explained how manipulation of individuals was not seen as very Western, let alone British: ‘In the West the individual is generally regarded as concrete, and society as the abstract form of individual relationships. In the Communist East, society is concrete, and the individual’s vaunted individuality is a relatively abstract factor within the total concrete society. The individual’s whole character is an expression of society.’\textsuperscript{230} Not so in democratic Britain. The perceived harmful impact of brainwashing suggests an uncertainty over the individual’s tenacity, resistance and loyalty. Also at the core

\textsuperscript{226} This was certainly in the case in America and is perhaps exemplified by the Nixon-Khruschev ‘kitchen debate’ in 1959. See Lary May, ‘Introduction’ in Lary May (ed.), Recasting America. Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War (Chicago and London, 1989), p. 5.
\textsuperscript{227} Meerloo, Mental Seduction and Menticide, pp. 19-25.
\textsuperscript{228} Oral History Interview by David Smurthwaite, Robin Bruford-Davies, 10 February 1989, NAM 1989-05-163; Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Andrew Condron, 1 February 1987, 9693.
\textsuperscript{229} Transcript of Oral History Interview with Corporal Donald Griffin, Westward Television Limited (Plymouth), 1976, NAM 2006-10-5-13.
of the concept of ‘brainwashing’ were assumptions of voluntary service and commitment to a military cause: the soldier confessed or defected because he no longer remained completely loyal to the cause for which he was fighting. Like studies of ‘propaganda’, the model of brainwashing assumed fidelity to be the norm, only subverted by active manipulation: agency featured seldom in such accounts, as described in Chapter One.

Conclusion: Thinking Soldiers?

The interrogations conducted by Cyril Cunningham provide a different perspective on subjectivity in the prisoner of war camp and validate Daniel Roux’s claim that the modern prison ‘seeks to govern and produce subjectivity.’ Cunningham reports on the lack of awareness amongst troops of why they were actually fighting in Korea in the first place. Servicemen later reported that they did not know where Korea was on a map. Eric Linklater summarised that: ‘The world as a whole, was ill-informed about Korea[.] ... [T]here was at no time any powerful sympathy – fed on sentiment or knowledge – for the Korean War...’

The Americans were worried enough about this lack of knowledge for General Ridgway to issue a directive to be read to all troops (mentioned in the introduction to this thesis), stating clearly that Korea was the front line against Communism. How was the prisoner to resist the political advances of his captors if he did not know why he was in Korea? The Chinese also built on these uncertainties, from the diaries issues to prisoners to political propaganda fired at frontline troops. However, studies of soldiering frequently (though seldom overtly) recognise that soldiers do not necessarily whole-heartedly support reasons for war or the polity behind it. The incentives of personal gain, a wish to travel and conscription undermine the discourse of volition which any military necessarily propagates but never fully achieves.

233 IWM, General M.B. Ridgway. ‘Why We Are Here’, Memorandum by HQ Eighth Army United States Army Korea (EUSAK), 21 January 1951, Docs. 13204.
234 Diary for 1951, produced by Chinese People’s Volunteers, Docs. 12481.
In light of this therefore, the prisoner of war camp offered servicemen the space and time to ponder these allegiances, even if they never acted on their musings. Subjectivity itself was the battleground in the Korean War prisoner of war camp. Self-reflection was demanded by the CPV and then by British authorities in 1953. Writing in 1955 in a book entitled *Thinking Soldiers*, Royal Marine Andrew Condron’s reflections are one example of this critical reflection of the modern soldier’s relation to the state:

Soldiers are ordinary people in uniform. Of course, soldiers have always thought. To survive, they’ve had to. But their thoughts are not often found in books about war, which are much more frequently written by generals, war correspondents, and so on. Would such men know what is truly in the soldier’s heart; and if they did, would they dare to make it public? ... The soldier today can no longer be viewed as a robot. The more different kinds of experience he has, the more he fits them together in his mind. That is why all those who consider the soldier merely as a thing to be used, like the rifle he carries or the pack he wears, are bound to come out very badly in their calculations. Our experience, and that of the men who wrote this book, included battle, capture and much thought in Korea. We were a few among many thousands.\footnote{235} Although this piece Condron wrote with two other former prisoners in 1955 is a political and personal justification of their defection, his declaration exemplifies the state’s formative role in shaping subjectivity in the Cold War period. A ‘reservist’ later in the book notes that ‘men ... [are] not machines who ... [can] be directed to fight, without an explanation as to why.’\footnote{236} Whilst *Thinking Soldiers* was evidently intended as a political critique of Western militaries and democracies, it nevertheless exhibits some of the broader trends identified in the life-writing of British prisoners of war: although isolated, prisoners of war and soldiers

\footnote{235} Condron, Corden and Sullivan (eds), *Thinking Soldiers by Men Who Fought in Korea*, pp. 1–2.
were not divorced from the societal context of early Cold War Britain, nor were they unthinking automatons who replicated the models of subjectivity promoted to them by the military authorities. Servicemen expressed alternate affiliations, whether to religion or to their smaller unit, which provided different outlooks on personal character and development. Aaron William Moore argues that when a servicemen ‘developed a coherent voice in a diary, he was ... piecing together an entire identity and worldview’ and that this subjectifying process had ‘profound implications for social discipline in times of total war’. \(^{237}\) Politicians and military authorities thus worried that servicemen might express loyalty to alternate state systems altogether, whether through their own interest or through the pernicious mechanisms of ‘brainwashing’. The extent to which these concerns dogged British servicemen beyond the Korean War and their post-war writing is the subject of the next chapter of this thesis.

It is instructive to consider Condron’s idea of ‘thinking soldiers’. His assertion that ‘the soldier today can no longer be viewed as a robot’ was undoubtedly a political statement, criticising Western government, which the Chinese had encouraged him to pen. \(^{238}\) Yet there were ‘thinking soldiers’ in Korea: British servicemen were asked by military authorities to define themselves as part of a group and a democracy. Again, as Robin Oakley had noted in 1945, ‘if a man has a lot higher than that of an ant, it must be linked up with capacity to know what he is doing’. \(^{239}\) Nevertheless ‘thinking’ could also transcend the models offered by the state: ordinary rank-and-file servicemen did not identify with the central models forced upon them by either the British or Chinese. The concept of the enforced narrative, far from unsettling agency in self-narration, demonstrates the instances where soldiers developed their own alternate sense of subjectivity, using some concepts provided for or taught to them, but also other strands far removed from Cold War politics. Thinking soldiers were also central to debates over behavioural modification in the 1950s. Anxieties in British

\(^{238}\) Condron, Corden and Sullivan (eds), *Thinking Soldiers by Men Who Fought in Korea*, p. 1.
society at large further indicate an awareness that the prisoner of war in Korea was far from the archetype of loyalty: he too could be subject to (and subjectivised by) external, nefarious influence.

Yet subjectivity did not remain static over time. Andrew Condron himself became disillusioned with the Chinese Communist regime and returned to Britain in 1962, remarkably to no court martial.\textsuperscript{240} In an oral history interview in 1987, Condron stated that even enjoyed his five days of interrogation by Foreign Office officials, noting how he defied military categorisation: ‘I wasn’t a deserter, I never deserted from anything in my life, but that was the only classification they could put down.’\textsuperscript{241} Yet Condron’s interview was also a defence of his actions and a critique of contemporary Communist China, the roots of which he claimed to see in the late 1950s. Returning to his experiences thirty years later in an oral history interview, Condron reviewed his own relationship with the British and the Chinese states. How then did subjectivity change over time, not simply across different contexts during the war itself? This is the topic at the heart of the fourth chapter of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{240} Mackenzie suggests this was due to the fortunate timing of his return in the early 1960s, before the collaborators were more strongly sentenced, see S.P. Mackenzie, ‘The Individualist Collaborator. Andy Condron in Korea and China, 1950–62’, \textit{War and Society}, 30, 2 (2011), pp. 163–65.

\textsuperscript{241} Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Andrew Condron, 1 February 1987, 9693.
The young soldier screamed inside himself
For time to rush to get the battle done,
Then with his pen record his mind’s torment
Of that awful day’s event.

Time obeyed: studiis et rebus honestis:
In honourable pursuits and studies. Thus,
When it stopped – just as the battle had –
For him to write of War’s experience,
Three decades of time’s passengers disembarked.

The soldier rushed to pen his words of War
As though time had, for him, stood still.
When he finished writing, he looked into
Life’s reflections and cried – for time had
Cheated him and travelled too fast; leaving
A young man’s memories under an old man’s hat.

— Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (John Briton), ‘The Old Man’s Hat’.¹

Subjectivity changes over time. Change occurs in both the prevailing structures which shape subject-formation and in an individual’s relationship with those structures. These shifts are particularly evident in the case of the veteran. Sociologist Paul Higgs argues that modern citizenship, predicated on both state and individual responsibilities, excludes those who

¹ Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, ‘The Old Man’s Hat’, in Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (John Briton), Shapes of War by the Schizogenesis John Briton (Leamington Spa, 1999), no page given.
cannot fulfil their duties and denotes a very different relationship with the state.\(^2\) How then does the veteran, formerly an active defender of a polity (in theory at least), position himself with reference to the state when he no longer fits that role? How did the subjectivity of returning servicemen from the Korean War change after 1953? Whilst sociologists such as Rose have explored the transformation of civilian \textit{into} soldier in depth, few consider the inverse process or how that state-directed subjectivity alters over time.\(^3\) Similarly, as the previous chapter suggested, historians and literary theorists have made great use of the idea of ‘trauma’, but often fail to contextualise painful memories in a wider subjective framework. Furthermore, seldom do they address veterans of ‘forgotten conflicts’; those whose war was neither famous nor infamous. The Korean War veteran’s story fitted neither into the post-war historiography of national victory in the Second World War nor into the British patriotic revivalism of the early 1980s. The conflict has not even featured extensively in recent historical fascination with the cunning and codes of Cold War espionage.\(^4\) This chapter suggests that the awkward nature, purpose and outcome of the Korean War led to its relative neglect in British history and popular culture, unlike in the United States where both its anti-Communist rhetoric and proximity to the Vietnam War gave its veterans greater prominence.\(^5\) Largely, however, this chapter explores the impact of the national and popular omission of Korea from the mid-1950s on British veterans’ life-narratives. It uses both memoirs and recorded oral histories to explore male veterans’ attitudes towards the state and the military and how they ‘compose’ their narratives accordingly. These recollections highlight a war that ‘never happened’, but are also testament to a war that is almost entirely ‘owned’ by the veteran community, not by the British public. Uniquely in modern British conflict, a major war has been largely written by and \textit{for} those who took part in it. As


\(^5\) Charles Young recently argued that war aims were not clearly stated in the United States either, meaning that the US could not capitalise on North Korean prisoners of war not wishing to return to the DPRK (as it had not been stated as a war aim). See Charles S. Young, ‘POWs. The Hidden Reason for Forgetting Korea’, \textit{Journal of Strategic Studies}, 33, 2 (2010), pp. 317–32. Also see Chapter Three.
described in the previous chapter, feminist theorists have underscored the value of ‘blank spaces’ for those whose stories are excluded from the dominant narrative.\(^6\) The memoirs in this chapter are attempts by veterans to write themselves into a more meaningful historical narrative, but are also personal attempts to include possibly traumatic memories of war in a broader life trajectory.\(^7\) Poetry similarly raises individual stories to the level of the epic. These stories do not necessarily corroborate each other. In their collection of the literary and filmic aftermath of the Second World War, Danielle Hipkins and Gill Plain argue that war ‘stories ... tell not one tale of war’s gradual assimilation into cultural memory, but rather a series of dissonant accounts of a conflict so diverse and far-reaching that there can be no definitive history to represent or recount.’\(^8\) Although their war was far smaller in scope, veterans of the Korean War still disagree over their experiences: some see their stories as alternative empirical studies of the war, while others interpret their experiences as personal addenda to the main events of war or even self-proclaimed rejections of ‘history’ – a discipline they see as too full of deceit, neglect or simply unbearably removed from events. This chapter explores the way in which subjectivity changed when servicemen left the military and how this can nuance notions of state-directed subjectivity. Furthermore, it analyses the veteran’s relationship with history and the often ambiguous boundaries between ‘popular’, ‘public’ and academic history. Claims that television history has now become a repository of history, not just a representation of it, have added piquancy to contemporary discussions about whether public history is a form of memory, an articulation of historical consciousness or a usable set of ideas for ‘Mr Everyman’.\(^9\) Veteran history-writing again raises questions about authority in war writing, but also suggests there is a wider discomfort


\(^8\) Hipkins and Plain, ‘Introduction’, p. 12.

with the historical discipline. As Mick Taussig notes ‘the soldier’s tale serves in some way
to de-mythologize and hence de-narrativize history’.10

The use of the word ‘veteran’ over ‘ex-serviceman’ in this chapter is deliberate, but
not unproblematic. Christopher Dandeker, Simon Wessely and others have noted that the
term ‘ex-serviceman’ is preferred to ‘veteran’ in Britain, as the former can describe anyone
with military experience whereas the latter implies active (usually front-line) involvement in
military operations.11 Yet, as Bob Connell notes, the majority of servicemen in twentieth-
century warfare could be categorised as ‘technical specialists’, not infantrymen in hand-to-
hand combat.12 Paul Higate argues that ‘it is difficult to identify ex-service people through
their common stock of military-biographical experiences as these are too inconsistent to
serve as an anchor.’13 The usage of the two terms is also political. In the United States, for
example, veteran organisations in the late twentieth century acted as an important political
force, calling for fairer treatment and memorialisation, as with campaigning for the Vietnam
Veteran’s War Memorial.14 The term veteran, although still reliant on military service,
implies a new political position (and power) in society after that service ends. By contrast,
British ‘ex-servicemen’ have historically wielded no such collective power in society.

However, by analysing life-writing (and in particular publishing conditions), this
chapter argues that military experience in Korea brought men together into a ‘community’
which, although not overtly political, acted collectively and offered frequently damning
statements on contemporary governments. The term ‘ex-service’ therefore does not fully
describe the change that retirement and old age wrought in their views on the state, younger
generations and themselves – key themes explored by this chapter. Furthermore, those who
served in Korea referred to themselves as veterans. This was exemplified by the founding of

11 Christopher Dandeker, Simon Wessely, Amy Iversen and John Ross, ‘What’s in a Name? Defining and Caring
p. 445. Dandeker et al. note that the British public support this distinction, with 57 per cent believing that the
term ‘veteran’ should only be used to describe those who fought in the World Wars, see Dandeker et al., ‘What’s
in a Name?’, p.166.
14 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 73–79.
the British Korean Veterans Association (hereafter BKVA), an organisation which, through its strong links with US and particularly Korean veteran organisations, defined itself in a transnational setting rather than simply a British ‘ex-service’ tradition.\textsuperscript{15} Claims to veteranhood are also part of wider endeavours to legitimise their military experience in Korea.

To explain veteran subjectivity further, this chapter first explores the potential theoretical significance of the veteran in the formulation of ‘state-directed subjectivity’, an important concern to governments and militaries in the Cold War era. It then explores the practical application of these concepts in two types of source – memoir and oral history – before examining the oral histories and memoirs of two veterans in detail. In doing so it uncovers the complex, often fraught, relationship individuals had with ‘history’ (the academic discipline, not ‘the past’) and the role of life-writing in forming a community in the face of apparent popular – and state – ambivalence. Korea’s ‘thinking soldiers’ thus continued to take an active role in their own subject-formation, even after their demobilisation.

State-Directed Subjectivity and the Veteran

The veteran has long had an uneasy relationship with the British state.\textsuperscript{16} Joany Hichberger argues that ‘old soldiers’ in the nineteenth century served as a reminder of the ‘potential violence of the mob’ and that these ‘uncontrolled fighting men’ were subsequently excluded from many popular artistic forms.\textsuperscript{17} One can take this a step further. Political theorist Jenny Edkins argues that the modern state is profoundly contradictory, as it compels its citizens to

\textsuperscript{15} The British Korea Veterans Association BKVA was formed at Imphal Barracks, York, on 26 September 1981 and was an amalgamation of the National Association of Korean War Veterans (UK), and the small British Korean Veterans Association. The first edition of its regular newsletter, \textit{Morning Calm}, had been produced in 1979, prior to its amalgamation, but continued to be by the BKVA until late 2013. See John Dutton, \textit{The Forgotten Punch in the Army’s Fist. Korea 1950–1953. Recounting REME’s Involvement} (2nd edn, Aborfield, 2007), p. 225; Reuben Holroyd, “‘In the Beginning’ – The Morning Calm’, \textit{Morning Calm}, 60 (2009), p. 3.


fight (and even die) for their country, but simultaneously requires obedience and social order from its people. The veteran, in returning to ‘civil society’, is a troubling embodiment of that contradiction: he is, to use Edkins’ words, ‘a promise of safety and security’ but also of ‘abuse, control and coercion.’

Hichberger’s work was part of a wider reaction to the veteran and the state in the 1980s. The article featured in Raphael Samuel’s collection *Patriotism* (1989), the product of a 1984 History Workshop conference aimed at contextualising national identity, which Margaret Thatcher, amongst others, had attempted to claim as the preserve of the political right during and after the Falklands War (1982). As Stephen McVeigh and Nicola Cooper have noted ‘[t]he soldier is a national avatar, a foundational figure and is evocative of the history, self-image and identity of the nation.’ However, as previous chapters of this thesis have shown, the soldier’s view frequently differs from the models of subjectivity which were meant to govern his military life. The uneasy position of the old, injured or embittered veteran can further counter the rather ahistorical view that modern systems of governance produce particular types of military subjects.

Debate about the relationship between veteran and state has been dominated by political theorists and policy-makers. Paul Higate argues that the concern with injured servicemen emanates from media exposés in the 1990s about homelessness amongst ex-servicemen. McVeigh and Cooper have highlighted the uneasy tension raised by twenty-first-century organisations such as Help for Heroes (established to financially support veterans of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) about whether the state or society should ‘care’ for former soldiers. Nigel Hunt historicises this care within British culture, arguing that by the

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18 Edkins, *Trauma and the Memory of Politics*, p. 6.
20 McVeigh and Cooper, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.
21 Although Julie Anderson notes that there has been a distinct ‘culture of rehabilitation’ throughout the twentieth century, which sees the serviceman returning to war as a completed rehabilitation. See Julie Anderson, *War, Disability and Rehabilitation in Britain. ‘Soul of a Nation’* (Manchester, 2011), p. 2.
end of the twentieth century, society even expected its servicemen to need care, particularly with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).\textsuperscript{24}

Hunt’s work on trauma is particularly significant for understanding veteran subjectivity historically. Hunt’s underlying assumption is that any study of trauma must be contextualised within societal norms and culture. This contextualisation is vital as all post-war societies ‘construct’ the meaning of wartime events and an individual participant forms their sense of selfhood in this context.\textsuperscript{25} As explained in the previous chapter, trauma largely refers to the inability to articulate a particular wartime event or to fit it into a wider life trajectory. Hunt uses his interviews with 731 Second World War veterans to argue that serving soldiers used five coping mechanisms to deal with such moments: avoidance, fatalism, accepting they had ‘no choice’, viewing war as a ‘justifiable cause’ and comradeship.\textsuperscript{26} On one level, these factors all indicate how a serviceman’s subjectivity can interact with the state. For example, by both accepting ‘what is going to happen as inevitable, so there is little point in worrying about it’ and that war is a ‘justifiable cause’, servicemen subsume their own agency to the aims of the state. More significantly, Hunt argues that the strategy of ‘avoidance’ continues after military service, throughout busy working and family lives, which means that retirement is often the first moment that former servicemen and women address these troubling moments. This perhaps explains why veteranhood is frequently associated with old age: it is at this moment that former servicemen seek out others who underwent the same experience or return to their own war experience in earnest. For instance, Dan Raschen, a junior officer in the Royal Engineers in Korea, mused about his retirement: ‘Perhaps it was due to the silence, but now that I had time to reflect on my excursion to Korea, gunfire came quickly to my mind’.\textsuperscript{27}

As this chapter suggests, the retirement of Korean War servicemen not only prompted personal introspection, but it also entailed a new, specific relationship with the

\textsuperscript{24} The term PTSD was ratified by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980. Edkins, \textit{Trauma and the Memory of Politics} p. 3; Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, 123.

\textsuperscript{25} Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, p. 121.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 149–50. Hunt also mentions twenty-two interviews with Korean War veterans, but does not look at these in detail and incorporates them into his wider thesis on trauma without any differentiation.

\textsuperscript{27} Dan Raschen, \textit{Send Port and Pyjamas!} (London, 1987), p. 245.
state. Typically, this relationship has only been examined by sociologists, not historians.

Jenny Hockey and Allison James argue that in a welfare state, on the whole, when people reach old age they become less active citizens of the state and more objects of surveillance.28 During the Korean War these servicemen certainly had a particular significance in the welfare state of post-war Britain. As this thesis has suggested, ‘democracy’ was viewed as both an important component in the governance of the postwar welfare state and entailing specific civic responsibilities (as sociologist Mike Savage argues), but it was also characterised by the soldier fighting abroad, like the British serviceman in Korea.29 But these servicemen had seldom been the object of such welfare. Old age is therefore even more significant to veterans of Korea. Psychologist Joan Cook lists the various developmental changes which affect the veteran at this stage in life, including ill-health, reduced wealth and social status, loss of friends, reduced mobility and frailty.30 As shall become apparent, these factors are particularly pertinent in this chapter, as the sample largely consists of men over seventy years of age. Furthermore, they highlight, as Hockey and James note, that the individual’s relationship with the state is a highly embodied one. They argue that ‘embodiment across the life course has to be understood in terms of an active self, inhabiting a body within particular social structures, producing and reproducing those structures as a set of particular cultural understandings of the ageing process.’31 In other words, the physical, developmental process of ageing takes on a specific meaning in a particular cultural context: as writer Penelope Lively noted in her recent autobiography, ‘old age is in the eye of the beholder’.32 Sociologists Karl Mayer and Urs Schoepflin expand on this further, arguing that in ‘advanced societies’ the cultural context of ageing is deeply caught up with the state and its activities (whether legal, social or social) and these affect an

28 Hockey and James, Social Identities across the Life Course, p. 74.
31 Hockey and James, Social Identities across the Life Course, p. 214.
individual’s ‘life course’. The question of when veteranhood starts is also complicated by the state’s relationship with the injured and the elderly, as well as the changing strategies used by the veterans themselves.

Using these insights from sociologists, this chapter offers a historical perspective on ex-servicemen, particularly those from Korea, and argues that they occupied a particular cultural context which in turn framed how they view themselves and their bodies when they came to analyse their past experiences of war. A further complicating, yet even more fundamental, question is who was defined as a veteran by the state, society and individuals in the aftermath of the Korean War? As noted above, the difference between veteran and ex-serviceman is influenced by popular perceptions of what constitutes military experience.

Korean War servicemen included regulars, volunteers for the Korean campaign and conscripted National Servicemen. As Peter Reese argues, one was less likely to categorise a healthy young man who served two years in his late teens as a veteran, particularly in the immediate aftermath of war. Reese, himself a former National Serviceman, notes that ‘[a] veteran needed some grey hairs and a limp; a National Serviceman joining at eighteen would be released before his twenty-first birthday.’ National Serviceman Donald Barrett corroborates this in his later unpublished memoir through his description of his initial medical inspection:

Have you a scar they say? As we search around for some old scar tissue on the knees, the veteran carrying out this task pulls up his sleeve and indicates the type of scar he is looking for. It is about nine inches long, roughly sewn up and apparently

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34 Christopher Dandeker et al. also identify more external factors which affect who should be classed as a veteran, including pre-existing civil-military relations and resource allocation. Their case study of UK provision for veterans in 2006 showed the appeal of classing a veteran as anyone who served ‘more than one day’ in the military, both for the Labour Government’s wider political agenda of tackling social exclusion and its easiness to implement, see Dandeker et al., ‘What’s in a Name?’, pp. 168–69.
caused by a German bayonet. All rather embarrassed we quickly hide our tiny skin blemishes and he enters on my card no ['']distinguishing marks[''].

As with serving personnel, experience once again forms a pivotal part of veteran identity, in this case embodied by physical scars. In this recollection, scarring represents experience and battle-hardiness and corroborates Hockey and James’ argument that people inhabit their bodies in particular social structures which give meaning to their bodies and selves, changing as they get older. Barrett places great emphasis on his young, unblemished body, in contrast to the body of the veteran (the body he theoretically now occupies too). The body is highly significant in veteran recollections. One of the most prominent theories of embodiment in war narratives is offered by Yuval Harari, who describes the concept of ‘flesh-witnessing’. Harari argues that many who live through war or traumatic events see themselves as ‘flesh-witnesses’, rather than eye-witnesses, as they have experienced conflict in a way that those not present cannot access and which cannot ever be fully described. As this chapter suggests, flesh-witnessing is an ever-present component in veteran writing. For instance, Rachel Woodward and K. Neil Jenkings have extended Harari’s notion of ‘flesh-witnessing’ by giving examples of military memoirs (from the 1980s onwards) which describe how individual bodies were trained, honed and even rendered collective. Once again, the body occupies an important space in the memoir.

Barrett’s recollection again shows the dominance of Second World War. For Barrett, even in later memoir-writing, the veteran was a product of that earlier global conflict, not the Korean War. McVeigh and Cooper note that the ‘wars of the twentieth century have produced generations of veterans, connected in their experience of combat’ but that it ‘is in

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39 In the recent case of Afghanistan, maimed bodies are at ‘the very centre of ... [the] narrative arc’ of that conflict and profoundly influence how the war has been written and widely perceived, see Woodward and Jenkings, ‘Soldiers’ Bodies and Military Memoirs’, p. 159.
the aftermath of war that the nature of their social status as veterans diverges because wars are interpreted. Judgments are made on what constitutes victory and defeat and heroism and atrocity’.\textsuperscript{40} In her study of Falklands War veterans, Lucy Robinson also notes that veterans are forever associated with the war in which they fought and how ‘the veteran self ... came to stand for the war as a whole.’\textsuperscript{41} The definitive outcome of the Second World War and the post-war revelations of Nazi concentration camps legitimised the conflict beyond all doubt in Western culture. Mark Connelly highlights its specific significance in British culture in the 1950s, describing it as ‘the nation’s last glory’ against which all other wars are compared.\textsuperscript{42} Geoff Eley argued in 2001 that the Second World War ‘suffused’ popular culture and the everyday life of the immediate post-war generation, and beyond.\textsuperscript{43} The Korean War coincided with this interpretive ‘aftermath’, which further highlighted its seemingly ambiguous aims, in both a moral and geopolitical sense. Against this background, Korea’s distance from Britain and its apparent irrelevance to its domestic and international affairs became even starker. Korean War veterans became like ‘their’ war: ‘forgotten’.

This chapter considers how far the interpretive aftermath of the war impinged upon the creation of the narratives, whether through memoir-writing or oral history. The concept of ‘composure’ explored in the introduction and used by oral historians Graham Dawson, Penny Summerfield and Alistair Thomson, is particularly useful in understanding veteran subjectivity.\textsuperscript{44} This chapter also seeks to test Hockey and James’ hypothesis that the body, the self and society form a ‘triangle’ through which to view the life course within the specific social, cultural and political (and thus historical) context of the aftermath of the Korean War. By focusing once again on the life-narratives produced by men (and women)

\textsuperscript{40} McVeigh and Cooper, ‘Introduction’, p.7. Emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{42} Mark Connelly, \textit{We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War} (Harlow, 2004), p. 11.
who served in the Korean War, this chapter substantiates the claim that the soldier is repeatedly forced to tell his life throughout his career and beyond. However, whilst the notion of an ‘enforced narrative’ can still apply to memoirs and oral histories (particularly when veterans are pressured by family members or museums into producing these narratives), the parameters shift slightly in that many ex-soldiers do indeed feel personally motivated to tell their story and that of the Korean War. The following section of this chapter sets out the significance of the memoir to veteran subjectivity and explores examples from the Korean War, particularly numerous unpublished veteran memoirs.

‘The Korean War Never Happened’: Memoir, History and Remembrance

In his review of Hobsbawm’s autobiography Interesting Times (2002), James Cronin notes how Hobsbawm chooses to set his life alongside the momentous geopolitical events that he describes in his earlier book The Age of Extremes (1994). Hobsbawm himself describes his autobiography as the ‘flip side’ to that book – ‘an introduction to the most extraordinary century in the world’s history through the itinerary of one human being.’ Describing Hobsbawm’s hard early life in Nazi Germany, Cronin notes that ‘it is not difficult to see the deliberate turn toward objective fact, toward detached, scientific and unromantic explanation as the quintessential response of the deeply intellectual to a life that would surely defeat you if you did not stand up and take the measure of it.’ Although Hobsbawm’s commitment to Marxism, both personally and as a professional historian, was undoubtedly the overriding paradigm through which he interpreted his life experiences, Cronin highlights the appeal of the ‘detached, scientific and unromantic explanation’ to Hobsbawm as an autobiographer and historian. Hobsbawm himself acknowledges the psychological and potentially traumatic

implications of his early upbringing on him and his sister.\(^{48}\) However, his autobiography was not an attempt to ‘cure’ this trauma by putting the indescribable into words: ‘historians’, he notes, ‘are not gossip columnists’.\(^{49}\) Instead Hobsbawm decided that his life course was best represented through reflection upon external socio-political developments, as these had been some of the most definitive events in his life and reflected his stance as a Marxist historian and as a committed Communist. Yet his early, unplanned proximity to events (such as the rise of Hitler’s Germany) as a ‘flesh-witness’ endowed Hobsbawm with an authority to comment on wider geopolitical events.

This mixture of the personal and the historical, however, is not simply the preserve of social historians. Martin Heidegger first used the concept of ‘historicality’ as early as 1927 to describe an individual’s awareness of themselves with the past (and as a way to understand time).\(^{50}\) Paul Ricoeur later also used the term to understand time in various narrative forms. Ricoeur notes that ‘there is a kind of inner intelligence, an intelligibility of the historicality that characterizes us.’\(^{51}\) This ‘historicality’ is a common process through which people endeavour to anchor their experiences in historical time or ‘the past’. It forms part of Ricoeur’s wider thesis that narrative is the way through which humans understand their relationship with time. Similarly, Mary Favret argues that nineteenth-century historicism in Britain was a way of dealing with continual war with the French: ‘it [historicism] lifts time within war to this higher, impersonal and universalizing level; the sequence of dates, passing in a “more or less autonomous and stable” order, detaches itself from the instability and disorder of war’.\(^{52}\)

Both historicism and historicality have implications for the study of military subjectivity and memoirs in particular. Memoirs especially, often self-published or

\(^{48}\) Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times*, p. 41.

\(^{49}\) Hobsbawm, *Interesting Times*, p. xii.


unpublished, can have the powerful grasp of ‘history’. As noted in the introduction, Jeremy Popkin, adhering to the traditional, rather august, definition of memoir, even suggests that the very term ‘memoir’ implies some sort of commentary on external events.53 Memoir and life-writing had become increasingly popular and common activities by the late twentieth-century. Practical guides to writing autobiography (although not without precedent) proliferated and formed an important part of the ‘community publishing’ movement in Britain and the United States.54 Since the 1960s, community publishing has flourished alongside adult literacy education with, as Chapter One suggested, its roots in the Second World War.55 Dave Morley and Ken Worpole also detail how the movement emerged out of working-class attempts to ‘disestablish literature’.56 The movement initiated the production of autobiographical material by those who traditionally had limited access to publication and continues to be written to highlight inequality or to initiate social change.57 Publications are generally produced by local firms, as community publications are usually made by people in specific geographical location.

Community publishing is a useful framework in which to situate veteran memoirs. One might argue that the soldier has historically not had any difficulty in publishing his experiences; the soldier’s story, full of adventure and the pinnacle of masculine endeavour, is one of the most well-established tales in Western literature. However, as this chapter will suggest, the Korean veteran memoir did not generally have an audience beyond other veterans. Furthermore, those veterans whose stories did not map onto the standard template of masculine adventure were excluded by popular culture and most mainstream publishing firms. Korean veterans even set up their own publishing firm to counteract the lack of wider interest in their story. Furthermore, through their publications and organisation at branch and national level, Korean veterans formed a ‘community’, even if it was more geographically

54 Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), for example, aims for his autobiography to be an example of such writing for others to follow, see Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography and Other Pieces (Oxford, 1970).
dispersed than is typical in community publishing projects. Benjamin Kuberich argues that ‘community is made or enriched in the process of publication.’ In communicating with fellow veterans, in preparing memoirs or in reading other memoirs, the Korean War veteran community developed a distinct stance and style, which members often contrasted with the wider lack of public interest. This is not to say that veterans did not see their work as unique. As Lauren Berlant notes, the border between exemplarity and singularity is a fine one. In many cases, veterans claim that their experience is representative, but many also simultaneously claim that their story is uniquely important in understanding the Korean War. Reflecting on this problem, Harold Rosen argues that collective memory does not necessarily make autobiography simply ‘a channel through which one or other social voice is speaking or a mere pen being inexorably pushed by social forces.’ Instead he argues that ‘[w]e all incorporate within ourselves many voices, loud and soft. Each one of us becomes a unique assemblage in a constant dynamic state’. Thus the veteran memoir reflects a number of social factors but the convergence of these forces takes a different form in every writer. The concept of community remains useful in understanding veteran publication and intersects with both the collective memory of particular groups and individual expectations of this autobiographical format.

Surveying a range of memoirs, there are several common features we can identify in both the published and unpublished veteran memoir. Many memoirs begin with a foreword by a former senior officer of the serviceman. The inclusion of these forewords simultaneously seeks to authenticate and legitimise subsequent autobiographical accounts, testifying to the military experience of the author and his authority to speak on the conflict. Dave Brady, formerly of 41 Independent Commando Unit, Royal Marines, included a foreword from his Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Thomas, who summarised his military career and described the book as ‘one Britisher’s story of the

58 Ibid.
60 Harold Rosen, Speaking from Memory. The Study of Autobiographical Discourse (Stoke-on-Trent, 1998), p. 132.
greater fighting withdrawal of the fine Marine Corps Division from the mountains to the
sea. Even critical memoirs, such as that of National Serviceman Derek Halley, include
such forewords. In Halley’s case his former OC David Rose described his account as a
‘graphical description of his experiences with the Black Watch during his time in Korea.’
This was not always the case: Thomas Catlow, who served forty-one years in the Navy
including in Korea, included in his memoir a deliberately non-military reflection written by
his eldest daughter. Nevertheless, forewords form an important component of military
autobiography, with many summarising the author’s military career. This is both a useful
device to the memoir as a whole and legitimises the author’s claim to comment.

The opening of the memoir itself is equally significant. Some former servicemen
begin their story with an incident from ‘Civvy Street’. In his memoir Signals to the Right
(1993) Ron Larby described his transformation from ‘Ronald Larby of Hanover Road,
Kensal Rise’ into ‘22429040 Signalman Larby R.’ and recorded his admiration for those
who faced ‘the impossible task of turning us into something resembling soldiers inside four
short weeks.’ In an oral history interview, Jarlath Donnellan described how his senses
where dormant as a ‘civvy’, only to be awoken when he joined the British Army.
National Service memoirs in particular dwelled upon the change that the military had wrought
in them; in the training they received as much as in the campaigns with which they were later
involved. The concept of ‘bull’ was a commonly expressed idea at the time. Literary scholar
and veteran Paul Fussell explains its American parallel, ‘chickenshit’, describing it as
‘behaviour that makes military life worse than it need be ... and insistence on the letter rather
than the spirit of ordinances.’ ‘Bull’ was widely used in memoirs too. David Green, a
National Serviceman who volunteered to serve in Korea, argued that through these tasks he

61 Lieutenant Colonel Peter Thomas, ‘Foreword’, in Dave Brady, One of the Chosin Few. A Royal Marine
63 T.N. Catlow, A Sailor’s Survival. Memoirs of a Naval Officer (Lewes, Sussex, 1997).
64 Ron Larby, Signals to the Right, Armoured Corps to the Left (Leamington Spa, 1993), pp. 6–7. A sentiment
also echoed in David Green, Captured at the Imjin River. The Korean War Memoires of a Gloster 1950–1953
(Barnsley, 2003), p. 5.
p. 80.
came ‘to learn the meaning of unquestioning obedience to orders.’\textsuperscript{67} Other veterans were not so complimentary. In an edited collection entitled \textit{All Bull} (1973) twenty-four veterans (including Alan Sillitoe and David Hockney) reflected on the range of seemingly pointless tasks they were asked to fulfil during basic training, including polishing the barrack-room bucket and cleaning toilets.\textsuperscript{68} Former National Serviceman Neville Williams described the ‘nut case’ NCO who took him in basic training, adding that he ‘had a face like chilled iron and an army rule book for a brain.’\textsuperscript{69} The lack of enthusiasm in the Army was in fact parodied by men themselves at the time. Commando Fred Hayhurst described Dave Brady, a renowned joker in 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines, on his departure for Korea from London Heathrow Airport:

Everything was going well until Brady mounted the steps. At the top he turned and screamed ‘I’m not going, I’m too young to die.’ The military observers turned purple, the newsmen’s flashbulbs rapidly exploded. With that Brady smiled and said, ‘That fooled you, didn’t it?’ then disappeared into the plane. The journalists’ sensational story also vanished.\textsuperscript{70}

Dave Brady’s embarkation for Korea was in fact a direct allusion to Spike Milligan’s description of his recruitment into the Royal Artillery during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{71} Humorous anecdotes like this subverted the idea that the soldier is a willing participant in war, but they also simultaneously stressed the recruit’s lack of individual volition. Their lack of choice, as Nigel Hunt argues, was often used as a coping mechanism at the time and subsequently.\textsuperscript{72} Memoirs by regular servicemen also stressed the changes that the military brought about them in their behaviour and sense of self, although descriptions of becoming a

\textsuperscript{67} Green, \textit{Captured at the Imjin River}, p. 7.


\textsuperscript{69} Neville Williams, \textit{A Conscript in Korea} (Barnsley, 2009), p. 9.

\textsuperscript{70} Fred Hayhurst, \textit{Green Berets in Korea. The Story of 41 Independent Commando Royal Marines} (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 26–27.


\textsuperscript{72} Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, pp. 149–50.
soldier tend to be less abrupt. Dave Brady, the famous joker of 41 Independent Commando, included few notes on his original enlistment in the Army and stated of his subsequent interview for the Royal Marines that ‘[t]he interview was short, a general probe of my experience and capabilities. I was reasonably confident [:] I did know my job well.’ Elsewhere Dan Raschen emphasised the effect of Korea on his subsequent service life, rather than the effect of enlistment and training. Enlistment therefore still constituted important moment in the regular or reservist’s memoir, but it was less at odds with the rest of their lives.

The language used in these texts further illuminates the importance of particular events in a life narrative. In her study of letters sent into the BBC following the screening of The Great War (1963–4), Hope Wolf argues that a degree of ‘virtue’ is attached to veteran accounts that are deemed most ‘immediate’ to the events of battle, by scholars, journalists and wider society. In particular, popular culture (in this case the BBC) frequently calls for the veteran to produce ‘a form of life writing that steers a particularly clear and bounded course: the anecdote.’ To some extent, the anecdote is at odds with the veteran’s psychological (as set out above by Hunt) and literary need to contain all his memories in a life narrative. Yet the anecdote, socially expected and demanded, had an enduring impact upon veteran language. For example, some authors used both past and present tenses in their writing. Donald Barrett described his battle experience on ‘Boot Hill’ in 1950 in the present tense, but added knowing comments in the past tense and ended with a cliff hanger for the reader: ‘With time now to take in the pungent smells around us, it is the sickly sweet smell of rotting flesh that dominated all else. There is little doubt that in the morning we shall find that the source of this strong unpleasant smell is the dead, but to whom do they belong?’ This inconsistency is perhaps due to Barrett’s use of his diary to inform his memoir. However, it is also evidence of Barrett’s claim to ‘immediacy’ (as exemplified by the battle

73 Brady, One of the Chosin Few, p. 8.
74 Raschen, Send Port and Pyjamas!, p. 245.
anecdote). By writing this way, Barrett positioned himself close to the events; he made his text immediate and close to the battle, thus legitimising his version of events and authority to speak.

The value of ‘immediacy’ among veteran memoirists is evident particularly in accounts of the Battle of the Imjin River in April 1951, the most well-known battle of the war in Britain, where the British (in particular the Gloucestershire Regiment) were cut off as the UN forces rapidly withdrew down the peninsula in the face of a massive Chinese offensive. Norman Davies uses the Imjin rhetorically, as a cloud on the horizon of his military life, noting that: ‘Little did any of us know that within a couple of weeks we would be facing a massive Chinese onslaught at the Imjin River.’ 77 Harry O’Kane, who was captured by the Chinese after the battle, refers to the Imjin in a similarly apocalyptic way, describing it as ‘that fateful day in April’. 78 Derek Kinne, also taken prisoner, goes still further in describing his actions immediately prior to the battle, noting dramatically that with ‘[t]he house and barn behind us, the road crossed, we ascended the slope on the far side. It was St. George’s Day.’ 79 The Imjin proved so pivotal to writers that it was sometimes written about by those who were not present. 80 Georgina Johnstone, a nurse with the Queen Alexandra Royal Army Nursing Corps (QARANC) in Korea and Japan, offered a summary of the Imjin River battle (which occurred before she went to Korea) and described how she wished to visit Gloucester Cathedral to see the commemorative plaque to the soldiers who fought there. 81 In these cases, writers (both combatant and non-combatant) were attempting to contextualise their experiences not simply in their own lives, but in British culture and, more significantly, ‘history’. Major A.E. Younger (RE), later a Major-General, argued that:

It is a matter of some debate to decide who really won the Battle of the Imjin, as it came to be called. We were driven from the battlefield, which is the usual indication

77 Norman Davies, Red Winds from the North (Knebworth, 1999), p.78.
80 Brady, One of the Chosin Few, p. 186.
81 NAM, Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Georgina Johnstone, c. 2010, NAM 2010-01-54.
of the losing side. However, undoubtedly the Chinese expected to swamp all opposition and retake Seoul and this was a major effort by them to win the war[.]. ... So, on balance, whilst the battle was a severe setback for us, it was disastrous for the Chinese.  

Younger referred to the process through which this event ceased to be a battle and became a Battle; a part of history and therefore subject to debate about tactics, strategy and operations. However, as Younger demonstrates, veterans sought an active role in this historical interpretation.

The first major example of this intervention in history-writing has been the widespread veteran claim that Korea was a ‘forgotten war’. Popular military history has an abundant supply of books claiming to reclaim ‘forgotten’ voices of modern conflict. Cold War historian David French argues that the post-1945 British Army have truly become a ‘forgotten army’, overlooked by both military and wider history. Veterans respond to the term ‘forgotten’ in a number of ways. National Serviceman Private Russell Edwards noted in his 2008 unpublished memoir that, until he became involved in the BKVA, his medals lay ‘cast aside in a drawer, forgotten, from a forgotten war’. Former intelligence officer Anthony Perrins noted that the ‘forgotten’ status of the Korean War ‘does not make me unhappy, except that there were those whose selflessness and courage should not go untold; and if the inevitable mistakes made by the politicians and the military are forgotten, they will surely be repeated.’ Similarly S.G. Buss noted, in an edited collection on the Korean War, that he would not be angry at the ‘forgotten’ status of the war if it was not for the fact

82 A.E. Younger, _Blowing our Bridges_ (Barnsley, 2004), p. 205.
that the same ‘mistakes’ were being made by contemporary governments. Ron Larby offered a reflection on the position of the Korean War in British culture toward the end of his memoir, *Signals to the Right*:

> Everything and everybody connected with ... Korea just simply sank out of sight. Years went by during which time I never met anyone who had served in Korea. There were no books in the library and no films about Korea. There was nothing. It was as though it – the Korean War – had never happened. A truly forgotten war.

Larby was alarmed at the omission of the Korean War from British popular culture, in contrast to the dramatic change that the war and the British Army had wrought in him. He noted that he had become ‘[a] much more worldly-wise person’ than when he joined as he ‘had seen a lot of life and a little of death.’ Larby argued that the BKVA filled this void and he himself wrote for their newsletters on his re-visits to the Korean peninsula. *Signals to the Right* was even produced by the Korean veterans’ publishing company based in Leamington Spa, Korvet. He was therefore able to find the recognition which he sought (and which he needed) in the veterans’ organisation.

Larby’s assertion that ‘the Korean War ... had never happened’ has a still greater significance. In one sense, Larby meant that the Korean War had become a ‘forgotten war’, a sentiment widely felt by British veterans. Yet the idea that the Korean War never happened also echoes Jean Baudrillard’s argument of 1991 that ‘la Guerre de Golfe n’a pas eu lieu’.

Baudrillard’s controversial argument was that the conflict primarily took place through hackneyed media representations of war. The ‘fake and presumptive warriors, generals, experts and television presenters’ used familiar ideas to ‘signify’ the event of the war, meaning that the conflict in the Gulf had ‘been anticipated in all its details and exhausted by

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89 Ibid., p. 171.
91 Translated as ‘the Gulf War did not take place’.
all the scenarios’. Baudrillard’s highly abstract claim has proved useful for historians and literary theorists. Kevin Foster has explored soldier narratives from the Falklands war, arguing that it was ‘written before it took place’ as the majority of narratives mirrored those which had come before. Foster suggests, by way of an example, how George Orwell’s memoir of the Spanish Civil War, *Homage to Catalonia* (1938), echoed First World War memoirs as it was in many ways a ‘conventional rites of passing narrative[;] ... a political coming of age’. Not only do other former servicemen use this model (as did Ron Larby), but it mirrors the presumption that the soldierly narrative must be a *Bildungsroman* and see a movement from naivety to knowledge; from inexperience to experience. Foster argues that Orwell’s generation lived in the shadow of their parents’ (or more explicitly, their fathers’) involvement in the First World War and that Orwell used their language in order to make his experience seem legitimate. Although Foster argues that the men who fought in the Falklands similarly harked back to the ‘moral and behavioural model’ of their fathers’ and grandfathers’ experiences in the Second World War, this argument can be made as early as the 1950s when, as we have seen, young men used their fathers’ experiences to legitimise (or, indeed, delegitimise) their own role in Korea. Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson argue how cultural memory can even erase certain aspects of relatively well-known conflicts, leading, for example, to the omission of the Far East Campaign in the memory of the Second World War. In the light of Baudrillard’s argument therefore, Larby’s claim that the Korean War never happened takes on a different significance, indicating again the imaginative dominance of the Second World War.

Baudrillard’s claim that war takes place through media representations as much as it does on the battlefield is further legitimated by Korean War veterans’ awareness of the

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Looking back on his arrival in Spain in December 1936, Orwell describes himself as generally anti-fascist but rather politically naive or unaware.  
textual tradition in which they were writing. As seen from the letter-writing in Chapter Two and the material produced by prisoners of war in Chapter Three, soldiers were aware of the precedent of men like Sassoon as their literary and military forbears. Perrins acknowledges the expectation that war must have a cultural output in order to be a legitimate conflict: ‘Regrettably, no Robert Graves, Wilfred Owen, or Siegfried Sassoon has emerged. Neither has a Pat Barker, Sebastian Faulks or Louis de Bernières been inspired to write of life in Korea during the period.’96 Similarly, upon his return home, Norman Davies commented on the discomfort he felt compared to his military-literary forebears: ‘Being an avid reader it seemed to me that fictional characters, when they arrived home from a distant land or a distant war, enthused over the journey as they neared their homes and their loved ones. So what was the matter with me?’97 Aside from the discussion of ‘silence’ in the previous chapter, the lack of a literary or cultural output following the Korean War reveals a further facet in the changing subjectivity of its participants. In particular, their apparent omission from broader narratives has led to different responses to ‘history’ from within the veteran community, which can loosely be divided into three categories.

The first group of veteran memoirs aimed to provide an addendum to mainstream military history. Writing in the BKVA newsletter, Morning Calm, in 2011, Ted Stokes, situated his experience as a batman during the war in this way:

We must all have moments in history that at the time were just events and only later blossomed into world affairs or significant experiences. Like many others of my generation fortunate enough to escape the World War conflicts due to age. I got on with my schooling only vaguely aware of the future requirements to leave the comforts of hearth and home and do my stint of National Service. It was from this need to contribute part of my life to ‘King and Country’ that I found myself standing

97 Davies, Red Winds from the North, p. 150.
on the border between the Free World and the oppression that was the spread of Communism.\(^{98}\)

Although Stokes is unusual in claiming that he was ‘only vaguely aware of the future requirements to leave the comfort of home and hearth’, he describes his story as a small part – a sideshow – to the main events of the war. Other writers also frequently contextualised their experiences as an extra chapter in the history books.\(^ {99}\) Many quote the most notable histories of the Korean War, including Max Hastings’ *The Korean War* (1993) and Anthony Farrar Hockley’s official history.\(^ {100}\) Dave Brady recalls reading ‘avidly’ about the British in Korea in later life, as he was keen to learn more about the famous Gloucestershire regiment, concluding that ‘they really did have a tough time.’\(^ {101}\) When National Servicemen Julian Potter deposited wartime letters with the Imperial War Museum in the early 1990s, he provided them with an account of ‘his’ Korean War, contextualising each letter within the wider trajectory of the war.\(^ {102}\) Both David Green and John Shipster include detailed historical summaries of the Korean War, quoting from Hastings, in their memoirs.\(^ {103}\) These claims to history were supported by the use of exact dates (such as embarkation dates) in both memoirs and oral history interviews.\(^ {104}\) Dan Raschen also uses his letters home (later collated) to provide these dates, whilst others used diaries, pay books or enlistment documents.\(^ {105}\)

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\(^ {99}\) Including those based in Japan rather than Korea, such as Jilly McNair who began each chapter of her 2007 memoir with a brief summary of action in Korea as a backdrop to her work in Kure, Japan, see E.J. McNair, *A British Army Nurse in the Korean War. Shadows of the Far Forgotten* (Stroud, 2007).


\(^ {101}\) Brady, *One of the Chosin Few*, p. 186.


Veteran writing style was influenced by history-writing too: for example, Colin Walker Downes, who flew USAF jets during the Korean War, described his experiences through the actions of his unit, rather than personal experience, and indeed largely omitted personal pronouns, as did Commando Fred Hayhurst in his memoir.\textsuperscript{106} For Harold Davis, his regiment, the Black Watch, stood for a set of transhistorical values which continue to be relevant: ‘Afghanistan has been the latest port of call, and the skills the regiment is renowned for – discipline, versatility, determination and efficiency – are as relevant now as they when I signed up in the 1950s.’\textsuperscript{107} These former servicemen preferred to use regiments or units to provide a suitably ‘historical’ account, but also to situate their actions within a broader, seemingly more meaningful, framework. Russell Edwards incorporated (and perhaps thereby attempts to legitimise and ‘compose’) the Korean War in the wider history of British military involvement in the twentieth century:

The First World War we went to help France
The Second World War we went to help Poland
The Korean War we went with the United Nations
The Gulf War we went to help Kuwait
The Falklands War was the only one where we actually went to war for ourselves and no-one helped us then, I wonder why, are we invincible?
Iraq was to help the Americans
Afghanistan [,] I know not who instigated that, against terrorism.\textsuperscript{108}

Edwards mirrors the standard narrative of the Korean War (set out in the introduction to this thesis) that Britain were supporting the aims of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{109} In Edwards’

\textsuperscript{106} Colin Walker Downes, \textit{By the Skin of My Teeth. Flying RAF Spitfires and Mustangs in World War II and USAF Sabre Jets in the Korean War} (Barnsley, 2005); Hayhurst, \textit{Green Berets in Korea}.
trajectory, the Falklands War once again provokes a particularly vehement response: the
conflict coincided with the introspection of the majority of Korean War veterans, as many
were retiring (hastening the end of the ‘avoidance’ strategy set out by Hunt) and the
Falklands highlighted the ambiguous aims and the war in which they fought and lack of
public interest.

A second group of veterans showed an equal awareness of history-writing on the
Korean War, but hoped that their account could provide an alternative, rather than a
supplementary account. Again, as Mick Taussig notes the individual soldier’s tale can ‘de-
narrativize history’.110 Dave Morley and Ken Worpole suggest that community publishing (a
category under which veteran publishing potentially falls) aims to provide a more ‘readable’
alternative to the ‘dominant forms of history-writing’ (i.e. academic history writing).111
There are numerous examples of this from the veteran community. National Serviceman
John Whybrow stated that Max Hastings’ history of the Korean War matched his own
experiences as a platoon commander in the King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI), adding
that ‘as Max Hastings observes [it was] “a platoon commander’s war”’.112

However, later in the memoir, Whybrow queried Hastings’ account of events: ‘The
weather was hot (but not the unbearable heat which Max Hastings speaks of) and it rained
frequently and heavily.’113 Revealingly, in criticising Hastings’ description of the climate,
Whybrow questions a particularly embodied part of the Korean War experience. As Yuval
Harari notes, veterans or ‘flesh-witnesses’ tend to treat war ‘as a revelatory experience ...
and] see the bodily experiences of war as superior to the intellectual mediations of
peacetime’.114 Temperature and bodily discomfort are treated as experiences which a
historian cannot hope to fully understand, both due to their distance from events and the
inadequacy of the written word in the capturing such sensations. John Newsinger has argued
elsewhere that military memoirs from the Malayan Emergency (1950–1960) similarly place

112 IWM, Papers of J. Whybrow, unpublished memoir, Docs. 12723, pp. 1 and 4.
113 Ibid., p. 3.
greater emphasis on scrabbling through the jungle in the heat than on battle and fighting itself. The enemy, of course, features in the text, but only as a final violent act after the inhospitable environment has itself been conquered.115 Sweltering heat, itchy uniforms and the weight of one’s webbing are part of an ‘experiential history’ which only those who were there can possibly understand fully.

A heightened variant of this dissatisfaction with historians is found among a third group of veteran memoirs. At the start of his published memoir A Conscript in Korea (2009), Neville Williams described how he visited the Imperial War Museum in 2000 (after a chance meeting with two South Koreans on holiday in Switzerland who thanked him for ‘saving’ their country) and his wife spotted his photo in the Korean War section in the ‘Wars Since 1945’ gallery.116 The photograph, displayed as part of ‘history’, prompted Williams to tell the story behind this exhibit. Derek Kinne, taken prisoner at the Imjin, noted how this sort of display did not fully correspond with the battle itself. He stated that when ‘you go into a museum showing paintings of old battles, you see the horses prancing, the sabres slashing, the infantrymen firing volleys or locked hand to hand[,] ... This is not enough to give you any idea of how it really comes to pass’.117 Similarly Major W. Bull, who served in the Divisional Headquarters between November 1952 and November 1953, stated that his typescript memoirs ‘are not history, [but] personal recollections’.118 Elsewhere, Donald Barrett used his own personal notes to contradict the ‘official’ version of events, focusing on disputes over a specific date in the fighting. He argued that ‘all three War Diaries’ differed on when 27 Brigade entered Songju in 1950:

The Middlesex War Diary is as always brief, suggesting it was entered on the 25th, [but] Brigade notes the advance by both battalions on the 26th, whilst 1 A&SH [Argyll and Sutherland Highland Regiment] record entry on the 27th. My personal

116 Williams, A Conscript in Korea, p. 3.
diary has entry on 26th September, sometime during the morning. There being no specific event that can identify final entry other than by patrols on the 25th [and] the Brigade War Diary[,] being more extensive than that of 1st Middlesex[,] is probably more likely to be correct.\textsuperscript{119}

The Brigade War Diary and the personal diary of Barrett himself are therefore the only records deemed to be accurate on this occasion and counter other historical judgements. These debates over dates are not trite either. As Smith and Watson note, ‘autobiographical claims’ can be verified easily, but claims over ‘autobiographical truth’ go deeper into the ‘intersubjective exchange between narrator and reader aimed at producing a shared understanding of the meaning of a life.’\textsuperscript{120} Barrett’s statement shows his attempt to claim both proximity and authority, but also conveys the ‘meaning of a life’ governed by these three different, but overlapping, war diaries and their writers: the brigade, the regiment and himself. It is over this meaning which ‘flesh-witnesses’ ultimately seek to claim authority.

However, authority was not merely an abstract concept in the veteran community but one ingrained in the military hierarchy. In 1976 Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Man (1907–2000), former Commanding Officer of the Middlesex Regiment, was dismayed when reading John Shipster’s (1922–2001) collection of essays on the regiment, \textit{The Diehards in Korea}. Not only was Man aggrieved that the epilogue he had been ‘permitted’ to draft had been edited without his agreement, but he felt Shipster’s book lacked the background knowledge which only he, as Commanding Officer, possessed (Shipster himself being only a Major during Korea). He wrote to Shipster that: ‘I have this knowledge and would have assisted you, but you would not let me – because you were in a hurry[.]... Furthermore, there are inevitable errors and omissions which I could have seen to as well’.\textsuperscript{121} Shipster allowed Man to include his ‘reminiscences’ (as well as correcting his detailed list of ‘errors’)

\textsuperscript{120} Smith and Watson, \textit{Reading Autobiography}, p. 16.
in the 1983 edition of *The Diehards in Korea*.\(^{122}\) In their correspondence, Shipster endeavoured to explain his reasoning: the essays he compiled were originally written by veterans Roly Gwyn (Man’s Second-in-Command) and John Willoughby shortly after the Korean War and Shipster wished to compile them into a book form. He wrote to Man:

> What I wrote was never intended to be a history in the real sense of the word but rather a simple effort at just editing and putting together what had already been written[]. ... I actually didn’t consult anybody at all for I was quite determined to avoid receiving any comments which might detract ... from the original writings.\(^{123}\)

Shipster shunned the term ‘history’ in favour of compilation veterans’ accounts, unadulterated by the opinions of others. Man and Shipster’s exchange indicates that there were debates even among veterans themselves about who had the authority to write the Korean War, complicated by rank and command structures. It also suggests that ‘history’, where it was written, had to be a collective effort, not of an individual ‘in a hurry’.

Sometimes this desire to tell the truth took on an embittered tone. Derek Halley, who served as National Serviceman in Korea, Kenya and Malaya described his motivation to write his memoir:

> It’s more than a diary of death and despair – I was certainly little more than a child, barely having kissed my first sweetheart when I was uprooted in a way which to this day defies my understanding, but I saw the world, magical places, marvellous people I would never have otherwise known[]. ... I know it’s time I marked my deliverance, not with the learned discourse of a war historian or the strategies of a

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Like so many others, Halley described the Korean War as ‘forgotten’, but he also argued that the innocence of his younger self and the unadulterated way in which he viewed the world allowed him to write a similarly simple and true account of the war. Rather than claiming his military experience outright (as seen in the second chapter of this thesis), Halley echoed the standard *Bildungsroman* narrative of the soldier’s tale. His was a story of the transition from inexperience to experience. Moreover, by stating that the Korean War was the definitive moment in his development, Halley staked his claim that the ‘story of a country boy’ could be emblematic of the whole conflict. This was a direct challenge to both the ‘war historian’ and the ‘retired general’ about the authenticity (and simplicity) of the stories they write. As Harari writes, veterans frequently claim that only ‘flesh-witnesses’ of an event can truly judge it. In Halley’s case, this led to a powerful, directionless anger at non-combatants and politicians in his memoir:

I remember the forgotten war. Disraeli was wrong: if time were the ‘great physician’ I would have forgotten long ago. But who was he, anyway? Just another politician who never saw Korea. For all the veils drawn over it, my memory is photographic[.]. . . The government may have locked their records away but mine are staring me in the face. I can’t forget the madness which savaged more people in three years than Vietnam did in ten.

Halley’s anger at politicians and non-combatants may be an attempt to distance himself from what he saw as a rather dubious conflict. Indeed, Samuel Hynes suggests that it is sometimes easier to remember oneself as an outsider in war, in order to disclaim any responsibility and

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thus any blame or guilt.\textsuperscript{127} Yet Halley criticised politicians (past and present) because of their distance from the conflict, but also because of their apparent refusal to acknowledge the Korean War. Halley saw his story as exemplary, not peripheral, and sought to use it to call for more recognition by the government. This agenda suggests that veterans used their narratives, as in community publishing, to initiate social change. Nigel Hunt also argues that this anger towards present-day governments often stems from the veteran’s increasingly precarious socio-economic position. In other words, a sense of ‘bitterness towards the present-day government ... stems from a sense of unfairness at the government’s refusal to assist ageing veterans.’\textsuperscript{128} The resentment towards present-day governments in these narratives reflects the views and social position of veterans at the time of writing and calls for improvements to their situation. However, many veterans could not be classed as dependants in this way: not only is there a high degree of variation amongst veterans’ lifestyles in their retirement (as demonstrated below in the two case studies), but the majority returned from Korea to an active working life. Veterans Brian Hough and Roy Cox states that there was an expectation that working men return to full employment after National Service.\textsuperscript{129} Veteran social status is therefore an important but not overriding factor in the composition of memoirs. Indeed, Halley’s case may exemplify Smith and Watson’s claim that authors use memory to anchor ‘that experiential history within the present’.\textsuperscript{130} Halley highlights that, unlike others, he can remember. In this way memory itself can be a significant theme in military memoirs.

To some extent, these attempts to incorporate individual stories into wider history mirror the writing of prisoners of war seen in the previous chapter. Side-lined from the main events of the war, prisoners used their narratives to reinteegrate themselves into the conflict as much as they could, as exclusion would delegitimise their position as active soldier-citizens. Mary Favret’s discussion of nineteenth-century historicism is relevant again here,

\textsuperscript{128} Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, p. 144.
\textsuperscript{129} Brian Hough in Stephen F. Kelly, \textit{British Soldiers of the Korean War in their Own Words} (Stroud, 2013), p. 210; Roy Cox in Kelly, \textit{British Soldiers of the Korean War in their Own Words}, p. 217.
\textsuperscript{130} Smith and Watson, \textit{Reading Autobiography}, p. 22.
as she highlights how individuals align themselves with ‘clock-time’ to remove themselves from the ‘instability and disorder of war’. Favret also implies that this ‘clock-time’ is also state-time, echoing both E.P. Thompson and James C. Scott who argue that modern (industrial) mechanisms of time-keeping are hegemonic; they are controlled and monitored by the powerful. On the surface therefore, an individual’s agency is removed when they attempt to align themselves with state-time. At the same time, as Scott points out, the standardisation of measurements underpins the very essence of citizenship (as it was first set out by eighteenth-century French Encyclopedists): ‘codified laws, measures, customs and beliefs’ would make all citizens equal, accountable and united. Soldier-citizenship was thus predicated on a specific standardised, military (state) time.

Veterans similarly tried to include themselves in present-day state-time. In contemporary society, the primary way a veteran (from any conflict) integrates himself into this narrative is through memorialisation culture and the remembrance calendar. Yet Korean War veterans’ attempts to do this were stymied by apparent public apathy towards ‘their war’. Veterans’ memoirs show resentment toward their cultural exclusion, during the war and afterwards. Brian Hough noted despondently that in post-war Britain ‘[p]eople didn’t want to know’ as ‘[l]ife was grim enough.’ The phenomenon of ‘rewriting’ history was not perhaps unique to Korea: many First and Second World War veterans expressed dissatisfaction during the twentieth century with the ‘official’ version of events presented by historians. However, unlike these veterans, the Korean War has attracted little subsequent popular attention. Anthony Perrins’ claim that the British in Korea had ‘no Robert Graves’ was to some extent true, because although this thesis testifies to the large amount of creative material produced by servicemen, few examples are widely known beyond veteran or military history circles. Many theorists argue that individual remembering is collective and

131 Favret, War at a Distance p. 53.
133 Scott, Seeing like a State, p. 32.
134 Hough in Kelly, British Soldiers of the Korean War in their Own Words, p. 212.
135 Fussell, Warwime, pp. 267–68.
social, a means of ‘passing on’ a ‘social past’. Yet what happens when this is not done effectively?

There was certainly a scarcity in media representations immediately following the ceasefire in 1953. The most well-known representation was Max Catto’s *A Hill in Korea* (1954), made into a film (starring a young Michael Caine, fresh out of National Service and the Korean War himself) in 1956. The novel and film follow an ambushed British patrol who become trapped on a hill near a Korean temple. The sixteen men only escape when the area is bombed by Allied planes and Private Wyatt (an unpopular National Serviceman) mans a machine gun to enable their escape. The novel is largely written from the standpoint of Lieutenant Jeff Butler (the reluctant platoon commander) and Private Rabin, a cockney whose commentary is intended to provide comic relief to the isolated troop and the reader. Catto’s novel, rather than the film, draws attention to the obscurity of the war in which they are engaged:

They were here for that purpose; had been equipped, trained, hardened, indoctrinated, transported these many thousand miles so that they might make this fleeting contact with the enemy and destroy him. It didn’t matter now. There had once been a certain chivalrous sound to the trumpets of war – but that was an ancient bugle call. Today it had a hollow, old-fashioned sound! Today you ambushed the enemy, trapped him, you gave him no warning, and with cold efficiency you shot him down.¹³⁷

Private Rabin also describes how ill-fitting the martial masculinity of their fathers and grandfathers was to Korea. He irreverently borrows the high diction of remembrance by describing himself as ‘The Immortal Soldier. Died, avoiding action. Unwashed and

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undefeated. Profane in victory, loused up in retreat’. The film is similarly glum, highlighting the men’s ambivalence, although it does include an introductory dedication to the National Serviceman of the post-war military. Overall, both film and novel set the tone for the subsequent cultural obscurity of Korea: the conflict’s vague war aims excited little popular support amongst subsequent generations (unlike the Second World War), but neither did its ambiguity provoke the level of hatred that was later seen against Vietnam War. It was neither lauded nor vilified. In many ways, the latter conflict in Vietnam eclipsed the memory of the Korean War from the 1960s onwards, certainly in the USA, just as the Second World had eclipsed it in the 1950s. Critics note that even the US film *M*A*S*H*(1969) and later popular television series (1972–83), following the exploits of a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital in Korea, was in fact more concerned on social commentary on the war in Vietnam and contemporary US politics than with Korea. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that some British veterans confused the 38 Parallel in Korea with the more infamous 48 Parallel in Vietnam in their life-narratives. A conclusive dismissal of Korean War experience came in 1975 in the BBC television series *Fawlty Towers*, when the irate hotel manager Basil Fawlty whispers to his wife Sybil: ‘I fought in the Korean War you know, I killed four men’. Sybil simply says: ‘He was in the Catering Corps – he used to poison them.’

It was against this background of apathy that British servicemen explored their experiences in Korea. The Korean War had seemingly ‘not happened’, although not in the Baudrillardian sense of a media outpouring obscuring the actual conflict. In fact the opposite was true: the public’s apparent apathy meant that the war had not been reproduced or represented enough. Television, so integral to public history, similarly overlooked the

142 *Fawlty Towers* (BBC Two, 3 October 1975).
Korean War. Yet Max Hastings presented the BBC programme *The War in Korea* (January 1988) and historian Bruce Cumings produced Channel 4’s *Korea: the Unknown War* (July 1988). Yet these two programmes were insufficient in representing the Korean War: for instance, *The Unknown War* only had 669,000 viewers for the first programme.

The memoir also shows the complex relationship between the veteran and younger generations. In some recollections, veterans state that they want to tell their story to prevent another generation from having to take part in conflict. In a collection of oral histories, letters and emails from former US servicemen who served in Korea, Linda Granfield described how veterans wanted to provide an account of their experiences for ‘younger readers’. Yet on other occasions British veterans were much more critical of younger generations. National Service memoirs criticised young people in the 1990s and 2000s, especially older teenagers (the age at which these veterans began their military service). Some echoed the (largely journalistic) claim that National Service would ‘sort out’ today’s youth.

In a letter accompanying the deposit of his 2003 unpublished memoir in the National Army Museum, former National Serviceman Ron Laver stated that: ‘I agree it is a pity that some of National Service is not now in force – today’s youngsters are the losers[,] ... I have always believed – I am better man for having been given the opportunity to play a very small part in the history of the British Army.’

As implied already, National Service was seen by many veterans as part of a growing up. Alan Sillitoe referred to it as ‘a fact of life’ and Ron Larby framed it as a rite of passage, arguing that ‘military service was ... just another phase of life, like leaving school,

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143 Gray, ‘Contexts of Production. Commissioning History’, p. 75.
144 The War in Korea (prod. John Gau, January 1988); Korea: the Unknown War (prod. Philip Whitehead, July 1988). Bruce Cumings has described in detail how Channel 4 constrained him as a historian in the production, editing and scheduling of Korea. The Unknown War as well as the negative feedback he received from the press about their even-handed discussion of the potential causes of the conflict. See Bruce Cumings, War and Television (London and New York, 1992), pp. 231–67; David Rees, ‘Truth is the Victim in this TV Distortion of the Korean War’, Sunday Telegraph, 3 July 1988.
145 Cumings, War and Television, p. 236.
your first job, your first girlfriend.' Nor was it just serviceman themselves who saw National Service as a process of growing up. Nurse Georgina Johnstone characterised all the young National Servicemen she met on her way to Korea as inexperienced youths, who did not ‘know one end of a gun from another.’ Ron Larby opened his memoir by stating that ‘here is the record of my National Service; an experience shared by millions, who, should they read this humble manuscript, may recognise and identify certain situations as those that they once found themselves in’. His story was one that he wanted his peers to recognise, rather than to inspire a further generation; a singular story, not an exemplary one. Some veterans interpreted the lack of military experience of younger people as a sign of ambivalence. Jim Jacobs, a former National Servicemen, wrote of this void in a BKVA poetry collection and described how his alienation from the youth ‘today’ was both a bad and a good thing, as ‘today’s youth has never heard my ghostly piper play/ On that hill in North Korea, nor the Chinese bugles bray./ And we should pray that they never will, at the Cenotaph, today.’

This generational tension is revealing in several ways. First, it shows that the generation who served in Korea was one of the last to whom direct military experience seemed the norm. Ron Larby’s claim that ‘uniforms were no stranger to us’ was not echoed by younger generations. Although not all participants thought National Service was the making of them (Brian Hough describes conscription as an ‘army on the cheap’ and others describe the ‘bull’ as ‘bullying’), military experience was nevertheless a commonly shared experience for this generation of men. Patrick Wye referred to it as the ‘great cloud on the horizon of our youth.’ Second, it highlights once again the connection between citizenship and active military service in the mid-twentieth century. The ‘soldier-citizen’, however distorted in practice, was a pervasive discursive figure during these veterans’ boyhoods.

Larby, Signals to the Right, p. 3.
150 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Georgina Johnstone, c. 2010, NAM 2010-01-54.
151 Larby, Signals to the Right, p. 1.
153 Larby, Signals to the Right, p. 3.
154 Hough in Kelly, British Soldiers of the Korean War in their Own Words, p. 215.
Donald Barrett noted in his memoir that ‘[t]he period between 1944 and 1964 is typical of the lot of many of my generation and not spectacular in any respect or out of the ordinary[.] ... Like so many before and since, we did our bit and then returned to a life of relative obscurity.’\textsuperscript{156} It was a commonplace, even mundane, part of a young man’s life and the definitive event of his early years. Many lament the change in this relationship between young people and the military. Anthony Perrins nostalgically ends his collection of letters by noting that ‘I for one look back with a deep sense of loss to the England and the Regiment of my youth; the England of fair play and self-effacing humour and unchauvinistic patriotism.’\textsuperscript{157} The decrease in military experience is treated as emblematic of broader change with the nation.

Finally, veterans’ dissatisfaction with the youth of the 1990s and 2000s was specifically directed at young men. Whilst their fathers’ Second World War experiences had, even in the 1950s, eclipsed their own experiences and continued to dominate popular and national discourse, their experience in Korea formed no such shadow over future generations of British men. Many former servicemen lamented modern masculinity at the end of the twentieth century. Penny Summerfield has highlighted the importance of intergenerational relationships in the memory of conflict, specifically the Second World War.\textsuperscript{158} The simultaneous sense of obligation to a former generation and bafflement at subsequent generations which Summerfield describes also resonates with Korean War and particularly National Service memoirs. Harold Davis wrote in his memoir that National Service ‘is the best thing a young man can do[,] ... I can say that being in the Army stands you in good stead for the rest of your life’.\textsuperscript{159} Some servicemen credited the military with making them into ‘men’.\textsuperscript{160} Davis saw duty and discipline as standard markers of masculinity, echoing the

\textsuperscript{157} Perrins, ‘A Pretty Rough Do Altogether’, p. 337.
\textsuperscript{159} Davis, \textit{Tougher than Bullets}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{160} NAM, Papers of Ron Laver, Letter from Ron Laver to Mr Miller, 31 August 2003, NAM 2005-04-19/1; Mel Calman remembered a sense of hitherto unknown manly friendship through the communal use of foul language to describe women, see Mel Calman in Johnson, \textit{All Bull}, p. 125.
definition of active citizenship prevalent in the mid-twentieth century. Interestingly, the
gendered subjectivity of the veteran is seldom considered in any great detail by researchers,
except by healthcare professionals.\textsuperscript{161} Ruth Jolly’s study of servicemen leaving the military,
Changing Step, purposefully makes no distinction between male and female veterans.\textsuperscript{162} Yet
as gender theorist Bob Connell argues, the fighting man (‘the murderous hero, the supreme
specialist in violence’) is an enduring central image of masculinity in modern society, even
given the reduction in military service.\textsuperscript{163} It is unlikely that the veteran was unaffected by
this characterisation of masculinity and exclusion from active citizenship. The characteristic
image of the veteran is one of an old, infirm man or the broken body of a young man, both
of which evoke allusions to impotence and feminization.\textsuperscript{164} It is from this standpoint then
that the veteran criticised subsequent generations of young men.

Overall therefore, the memoirs of British Korean War veterans express
dissatisfaction with contemporary society and their lack of recognition by it. This did not
always prompt anger: in fact, veterans arguably formed closer ties with one another as a
result. Nigel Hunt describes how veterans’ organisations provide social and practical support
for older veterans, but potentially evoke traumatic memories from the conflict in which they
were involved.\textsuperscript{165} According to Hunt these organisations therefore provide both comfort and
disquiet for veterans. One can perhaps draw parallels with serving military personnel.
Rachel Woodward argues that the idea of ‘mateship’ or comradeship attempts to remove
military life (and death) from the state.\textsuperscript{166} It endeavours to legitimise fighting by assigning it
a different purpose (in this case, the defence of one’s friends). However, the extent to which
this can be applied to veteran comradeship is unclear. Korean veterans more often decry
their relationship with the state, both during the war and as veterans, and so are not inclined

\textsuperscript{161} S.M. Frane et al., ‘Gender Disparities in Veterans Health Administration Care. Importance of Accounting for
\textsuperscript{163} Connell, ‘Masculinity, Violence and War’, p. 177.
\textsuperscript{164} Bob Connell argues that even in training the inability to complete a given task or to be suitably ‘soldierly’
prompts instructors to call recruits ‘girls’ (or similar) as a term of abuse. See Connell, ‘Masculinity, Violence and
War’, p. 177–79.
\textsuperscript{165} Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, pp. 156–57.
\textsuperscript{166} Rachel Woodward, ‘“Not for Queen and Country or Any of That Shit”. Reflections on Citizenship and
Military Participation in Contemporary British Soldier Narratives’, in Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert (eds),
to use veterans’ organisations to distance themselves even further from it. Most importantly for Korean veterans therefore, organisations provide what they feel they miss most of all – an audience. In a BKVA poetry collection, Fred Almey (formerly RAF) describes all these functions:

Cold days then, paid a shilling
Pension now just as chilling,
Known as the forgotten war
Shoot outs, but no final score.

Meet with your Veterans’ Branch
Make the effort at every chance,
Enjoy the company of yesteryear
Just a chat and one more beer.¹⁶⁷

Once again this poetry is not directed at younger generations, but at other veterans. The BKVA and smaller publishing companies produced anthologies and histories primarily for those who had experienced Korea and wished to reminisce or learn more about the conflict. Former Commando Fred Hayhurst describes the ‘cock-up’ of a beach landing in Korea by British Commandos, providing a very technical explanation of the landing.¹⁶⁸ This recollection was not intended to educate future generations; it was specifically for those who had already experienced military life. The concept of ‘community publishing’ is significant here again, for the community (of veterans in this case) are ‘made or enriched in the process of publication.’¹⁶⁹ Writing was not merely an offshoot of veteran welfare organisations, but often a pivotal process in bolstering veteran subjectivity. It prompted veterans to see themselves as such and to seek out, as Fred Almey writes, ‘the company of yesteryear’ for

¹⁶⁸ Hayhurst, Green Berets in Korea, p. 71.
¹⁶⁹ Kuebrich, ‘Keywords’, p. 142.
‘just one more beer.’\textsuperscript{170} In Almey’s case, the lurking question of ‘why poetry?’ is one that historians seldom pursue.\textsuperscript{171} As Alex Vernon notes, the form in which an individual chooses to describe his war experience reveals how a veteran conceptualises his life trajectory and his war. As noted in Chapter Three, reading and composing verse would have formed a significant part of the education of younger servicemen. Poetry formed an important part of national consciousness after the Korean War too: Philip Larkin’s well-known poem ‘MCMXIV’ (written between 1958 and 1960) describes an imagined pre-First World War pastoral idyll and reflected broader anxieties of the 1960s about British social disintegration. War poetry in this way served a particular societal function and also grew further in prominence from this time.\textsuperscript{172} Andrew Duncan also argues that there was a growth in amateur poetry from the 1950s, with large numbers of people turning their hand to poetry.\textsuperscript{173} Korean War veterans arguably formed part of this amateur movement and by the 1980s the triangle of war, amateur poetry and experience had become cemented in national popular culture, from education to ‘Remembrance Day’ commemorations (which in turn promoted poetry as legitimate form of war writing). Poetry was an accepted, even expected, form of war recollection. Almey’s poem above was therefore a product of a historical period in which poetry and war became increasingly intertwined, on both personal and collective levels.

Subjectivity and Composure in the Recorded Oral Histories of Korean War Veterans

The memoir is not the only narrative form which encapsulates a realigned subjectivity amongst the veteran community. Like the memoir, oral sources were produced in the interpretive aftermath of Korea and often made in conjunction with an interlocutor, whether

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{170} Almey, ‘Korean Veterans’ in Holroyd, \textit{Poetry of the Korean War}, p. 87.
\item \textsuperscript{173} Andrew Duncan, \textit{The Long 1950s. Morality and Fantasy as Stakes in the Poetic Genre} (Bristol, 2012), p. 7.
\end{itemize}
that was a relative editing their final manuscripts or oral history interviewer.\textsuperscript{174} Sizeable numbers of the Korean War veteran community have been involved in oral history projects from the 1980s.\textsuperscript{175} This section explores two of these projects, carried out by two of the UK’s largest war museums: the Imperial War Museum and the National Army Museum. As seen above, these institutions often provoked responses from the veteran community, who were either inspired or annoyed by exhibitions on ‘their war’. This section explores the relationship between veterans and these two projects in greater detail. Although these interviews do depict the relationship between Korean War veterans and the ‘heritage industry’ in Britain (a pervasive narrative through which much of ‘the past’ is relayed to the public), more significantly they also deepen our understanding of how veterans viewed themselves with regards to the state, the Korean War and the boundaries between memory and history.\textsuperscript{176}

The recorded interviews examined in this section have not been widely transcribed or published in textual form. In the USA, many oral history projects with Korean veterans have been published, yet to date in Britain only one oral history project concerning British Korean War veterans has been published, in a book by Stephen Kelly.\textsuperscript{177} Kelly, a sports historian and biographer, interviewed veterans (whom he contacted through the BKVA) to understand ‘what life was like on a daily basis for those who served’ and included this in a broad, ‘popular history’ of the ‘forgotten war’.\textsuperscript{178} In addition to using overly sanitised transcripts, Kelly’s project makes little attempt to understand these interviews in the context of their creation, particularly as his interviewers were all actively involved in the BKVA.

\textsuperscript{174} McVeigh and Cooper, ‘Introduction’, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{177} Granfield, I Remember Korea; Rudy Tomedi, No Bugles, No Drums. An Oral History of the Korean War (New York, 1993); John Gardam, Korea Volunteer. An Oral History from Those Who Were There (Burnstown, Ont., 1994).
\textsuperscript{178} Kelly, British Soldiers of the Korean War in their Own Words, p. 15.
Historian S.P. Mackenzie uses both museum collections in his study of British prisoners of war in Korea and in his case study of ‘defector’ Royal Marine Andrew Condron, who opted to stay in China at the end of the war.\(^{179}\) Mackenzie’s skilful investigation also includes details of everyday life in the Korean War, yet due to scope of his study the interviews are not fully contextualised in relation to veteran subjectivity. There remains a historiographical need to examine the context and components which make up an interview, not simply the empirical data it can provide.

Following the work of April Gallwey and others, this section shows that there is also a convincing methodological case for using this material to understand veteran subjectivity. Dave Morley and Ken Worpole argue that memoirs and oral history interviews are intimately connected, particularly in the context of community publishing. Here, the experiences of marginalised groups, who are sometimes unable or prevented from contributing to conventional publishing, are often best recorded through oral history and transcription.\(^{180}\) The oral history interview is transcribed through an interlocutor with specific aims and consequences for the cohesion of a particular social group. The two processes are therefore often intimately connected. As with memoirs, analysing the interviews produced by the National Army Museum and Imperial War Museum can help us to better understand the formation of a particular community; one which perceived itself as cut off from wider national memory.

The two are also connected in terms of ‘composure’. As seen in this thesis, soldiers and veterans do not necessarily take on the models which are provided for them or, at least, not fully. However, they are not completely divorced from social context. Returning to the arguments of Graham Dawson, Alistair Thomson and Penny Summerfield, there is convincing evidence that individuals ‘compose’ their memories using dominant cultural discourses, which might include overarching discourses about war and masculinity, but they


also do so to ‘compose’ themselves emotionally. 181 Similarly, gerontologist Peter Coleman argues that the interview or writing process aims at achieving ‘coherence’ between experience and narrative. 182 Composure in both senses is often partial, shifts according to context or changes due to the intersubjective relationship between interviewer and interviewee, which may differ according to the respective age, gender, class or even the bodies of those involved. 183 Composure and intersubjective responses represent a final area where ‘re-analysis’ might usefully add to oral history methodology, as it can further contextualise the interview in the historical situation in which it was produced.

As Dawson writes, ‘composure is in an inescapably social process’ which depends on ‘social recognition’. 184 Composure demands recognition, by both interviewee and interviewer, of themes and questions which are of most interest to the present-day. For example, in the National Army Museum interviews, interviewees were repeatedly asked if they believed ‘World War Three’ had begun with the Korean War, guided by the context of the collapse of the Soviet system at the time of interview. 185 The questions asked during an interview were created with an eye on ‘the present’. As Alessandro Portelli points out, oral histories are ‘always the result of a relationship, a common project in which both the informant and the researcher are involved, together.’ 186 As the final section of this chapter shows through the case study of veteran Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, this relationship is not always easy, resulting in a very specific narrative. Therefore, the analysis of archived interviews can deepen our understanding of the construction of a veteran community through the creation of written and oral narratives, the ‘silences’ in an interview and the process of ‘composure’ forged in the relationship between interviewer and interviewee.

To achieve these aims, the researcher must be aware of the policies of oral history projects themselves. As Malin Thor Tureby has recently noted, evoking Jacques Derrida, ‘to see and hear with the archive and the collection allows us not only to interpret the narratives of those interviewed by also to hear the tacit narratives of the archives/collections.’\textsuperscript{187} The two museum-led projects examined here are quite different. In 1988 the National Army Museum (NAM) decided to mark the thirty-fifth anniversary of the cessation of hostilities with a special exhibition, Project Korea. The exhibition was held between 17 December 1988 and 16 April 1989, the first ever exhibition on British soldiers in Korea in the UK. As part of Project Korea, the Museum also interviewed around twenty British servicemen, involving a team of interviewers led by David Smurthwaite, and planned to publish the interviews in a volume.\textsuperscript{188} The publication never happened and only excerpts were used in a small book to accompany the project.\textsuperscript{189} The ‘afterlife’ of material produced by the Imperial War Museum is very different. The interviews conducted by Dr Conrad Wood of the Sound Recordings Department formed part of a wider project to capture war experience more generally. Wood conducted hundreds of interviews with veterans from the First and Second World Wars and Korea over a twenty-five-year career at the museum. The 371 servicemen who were in some way involved in the Korean War and were interviewed during the 1990s and early 2000s therefore form part of a larger (and ongoing) oral history project at the Imperial War Museum.\textsuperscript{190}

The two sets of interviews took place across three decades and show how veterans interpreted the Korean War, and war more generally, from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. To some extent, the interviews again corroborate Hunt’s claim that individuals engage more with their war stories once work and family commitments lessen.\textsuperscript{191} The majority of veterans

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\textsuperscript{188} This was followed by a second group of twenty interviewees in 1996.
\textsuperscript{190} As part of the museum’s digitisation project, many hundreds of these interviews are now freely accessible online. From these interviews, the current chapter samples fifteen interviews from across both projects, selecting interviewees from across ranks and ages.
\textsuperscript{191} Hunt, \textit{Memory, War and Trauma}, p. 158.
\end{flushleft}
retired in the 1980s and many become active in veterans organisations such as the BKVA and British Legion. As noted above, both the Falklands War (1982) and the end of the Cold War (1989–1991) coincided with their retirement and both feature in the recollections of veterans in the NAM project. Jarlath Donnellan was proud to mention how the model of machine gun he used in Korea was also used in the Falklands. Veterans also noted the difference between the popular reception of the Falklands War and the Korean War. The heightened patriotism of the Falklands War, coinciding with the retirement of Korean veterans, initiated a great deal of comparison with ‘their war’. Jim Jacobs noted at the end of his memoir:

But will the public at large retain an interest? ... Like Korea, will the Falklands and Gulf have faded from public memory all by excepting those who will proudly proclaim, ‘I was there, that was my war’; regardless of the reason they believed they were there. Whether for Sovereign and Country, or for the politicians, secure at home in their Whitehall bunkers.

Other veterans reflected upon intervention more generally. In an interview with Conrad Wood, George Richards mused that:

[I]t [the Korean peninsula] should have been left and really, I suppose, it would have been a sensible thing if the country really had been left, I mean, look at the trouble we’re getting in Ireland today, through separation isn’t it? Really. If it had been all one country I can’t see them having this sort of problem there can you? [Pause] Err, I think it’s a bad thing to separate any country, East and West Germany will never last like that, for sure.

Once again, veterans make some use of the discourse of masculine duty and active democratic citizenship in legitimising their involvement in the war. The end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany led to further reflection upon the rivalry between East and West. The question asked by NAM interviewers as to whether they or their fellows thought the Korean War was the start of ‘World War Three’ initiated a range of responses. D.R. Milbery responded: ‘I don’t think they did, no, no’. Frank Wisby offered an unusual defence of the war by stating that they were protecting ‘a bullied people who were the third biggest rice producing country in the world and that their greedy neighbours had come down and just wanted to take it from them and ... the United Nations had decided that they should be defended and it was our job to go and do it.’ Robin Bruford-Davies, who had joined as a regular British Army officer in 1946 responded to the question by linking it to the previous world war:

Err, we thought it was another job, I think perhaps at that age I was somewhat, wasn’t questioning things very much [laughter] and, and, we were going to war and after all we were in the army and we’d joined up and everybody else had just had a war and could see some point about it I think, so, we didn’t question it too much.

The majority of responses were similarly disparaging of the idea of a third world war in Korea. The dwindling power of Soviet Russia in the late 1980s had prompted interviewers to ask combatants whether they had ever thought of the conflict in apocalyptic terms. Indeed, historians today continue to ask this question and to understand the experiences of those living in a supposed ‘atomic age’. However, at least based on these interviews and the

198 Matthew Grant, After The Bomb. Civil Defence and Nuclear War in Cold War Britain, 1945–68 (New York and Basingstoke, 2010).
published material from the Korean War, it seems that the spectre of a third world war, was not widely believed.  

Asking veterans to contemplate what their younger selves had felt about the Korean War caused interviewees to directly confront their memories of the conflict. Some interviewees apologise about their poor memory (‘you are asking me to remember something that happened over forty years ago’). The interviews of both museum projects followed a ‘life history’ approach, asking veterans to describe their life before the military or before the Korean War. This was true of non-combatants too: Georgina Johnstone began her interview by stating that: ‘I think you should know what I was doing before.’ Whilst this substantiates the notion that combat is only one of many phases in a soldier’s life, this approach is problematic too.

Veterans had been selected for interview based on their war experience and this inevitably shaped their description of their youth or pre-Korea service. Conrad Wood’s interview with Anthony Farrar-Hockley in the following section is just one example of how the interview can be dominated by the aims of the oral history project itself. He purposefully began his interview with a description of the Battle of the Imjin River, getting straight to ‘the point’ of the interview and providing little personal information.

Some interviewees also expected their interview to end once they had described their war experiences. Georgina Johnstone stopped suddenly once she had described her wartime experience, noting that: ‘I don’t know what else I can tell you’ and she had to be prompted (off-tape) to describe her life after Korea. Barry Smith apologised repeatedly for ‘digressing’ and omitted details he felt were already ‘well-documented’.

Sometimes a whole life was framed in terms of war experience. Jarlath Donnellan describes how his early life rendered him ‘tailor-made for the Korean War’:

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200 NAM, Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, George Cooper, 18 August 1988, NAM 1989-258.

201 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Georgina Johnstone, c. 2010, NAM 2010-01-54.

202 Forbes Tripp, Surviving Iraq, p. xvi.

203 JWM, Oral History Interview with Conrad Wood, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 2 April 2000, 20270.

204 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Georgina Johnstone, c. 2010, NAM 2010-01-54.

205 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Barry Smith, 1990, NAM 1990-08-1.
It was probably your upbringing from World War One [sic], from being born in the Blitz and being brought up to that sort of thing. As a child of the Blitz and being evacuated and back into the Blitz of London in World War Two – I said One a moment ago, I meant Two – World War Two and erm you’ve more or less, how can I say this, processed at that, being six years old at the outbreak of World War Two, being, well, you were tailor-made for the Korean War, ‘specially by the end of it being entrenched and high explosive and blasting and all that. Well you’d had all of that as a child, didn’t you, in the Blitz of London … the ideal people to have out on the Korean Front at that time.206

Interviewees were also aware of the role of the museum itself in the preservation of collective memory and ‘history’. Smith mentioned how he had given his written papers to the NAM for ‘safekeeping’ and, when asked where his prisoner of war camp was located, Frank Wisby replied: ‘I can’t remember, you’ve got it in your records.’207 Veterans sometimes used their interviews, as with their memoirs, to counter the mistakes in other representations of war. George Richards, a former POW, was slightly incredulous at Derek Kinne’s description of Chinese ill-treatment in Kinne’s memoir Wooden Boxes (1955).208 Richards was reluctant to directly contradict the word of another veteran, but also clearly doubts the veracity of Kinne’s story. Yet variation amongst veteran recollections must be acknowledged. The following section explores two cases in particular detail, exploring the concepts of memory, history-writing and the self in veteran life-narratives.

208 Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, George Richards, 12 July 1987, 9859; Kinne, Wooden Boxes, p. 79.
‘One’s Own Private War’: Two Veteran Case Studies

The two cases investigated here are very different examples of negotiating first-hand ‘experience’ and interpreting ‘history’. The first, General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley (1924–2006), was famed for his escape attempts from the Chinese forces when he was taken prisoner in April 1951 at Imjin River and later for his two volumes of the official history of the Korean War.\footnote{Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War*, vols. I and II.} The second, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (1927–2001), left the British Army in 1953 following ill health and was subsequently diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis, a condition that was to have a significant impact on his later life. Cunningham-Boothe also wrote histories of the Korean War, under the auspices of a small veteran company, Korvet, based in Leamington Spa, Warwickshire. These two men’s trajectories following the Korean War were in many ways highly different, despite their common ‘experience’ of wartime involvement and even the same battle – the famous Battle of the Imjin. Drawing a comparison between them is perhaps even rather inappropriate: both came from different social backgrounds and occupied very different socio-economic positions after the war. Yet the comparison between them is not arbitrary: Farrar-Hockley and Cunningham-Boothe were both interviewed by Dr Conrad Wood in the early 2000s, both wrote empirical ‘military histories’ of the Korean War and both produced personal accounts of their experiences in the war. The contrast between these common projects is therefore all the more apparent and epitomises the important variations in veteran subjectivity. There is clearly far more variation between individuals subsumed into ‘total’ institutions than many theorists have accounted for: through contextualising and understand veteran life-narratives in detail we can further explain and account for such difference.

Dave Morley and Ken Worpole ask if ‘writers are special people?’\footnote{Morley and Worpole, *The Republic of Letters*, p. 60.} The first veteran was certainly seen as special within military history and governmental circles. General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley was born in Coventry in 1924 and entered the British...
Army as an under-age private in 1940 and received his commission in 1942 in the Parachute Regiment. He joined the army as a regular again in 1946 in the Gloucestershire Regiment and, in addition to Korea, he served in a number of other post-1945 conflicts. One obituary writer noted that his career ‘reads like a guidebook to the withdrawal from empire’, serving in Palestine, Cyprus, Suez, Aden, Borneo and Northern Ireland. Farrar-Hockley often commented on contemporary military affairs and even attempted to start a new ‘Home Guard’ in 1983 to defend Britain against Soviet aggression. He was also the target of an IRA bomb plot in 1990. Yet little of this biographical information about Farrar-Hockley (‘Farrar the Para’) features in any of his own writing or interviews. Farrar-Hockley’s autobiography of his role in the Korean War, The Edge of the Sword (1954) is similar to the other examples noted above, in that he preferred to frame his experiences in terms of his regiment. The book opened on 22 April 1951, the day before the Battle of the Imjin River (when ‘all of us were waiting’), and contains little exposition on his fellow protagonists in the Gloucestershire Regiment or on the author. All characters were described in terms of their actions on the battlefield. This approach was no doubt a stylistic choice too: Farrar-Hockley’s blow-by-blow account, often alternating between past and present tenses, conveyed the ‘immediacy’ which Hope Wolf has argued was so prized in war writing. The autobiography also echoed earlier Second World War writing, which literary theorist Philippa Lyon argues stresses necessity, duty and defence of British values. For example, he recounted one instance when a Chinese interrogator argued that Britain oppressed its people:

I could take no more. A great flood of words burst from me, which no protest of his could dam. I assured him that we did not believe every word published in the newspapers that we read – not even those who read the London Daily Worker... I reminded him that we had no political prisoners ... I said a great deal more and I fear I spoke with a good deal of passion.²¹⁷

Far from a Bildungsroman or a story of gradual disillusionment, Farrar-Hockley’s autobiography affirms his belief in the British system of democracy and order. Yet there were very few personal digressions like this in his autobiography, which was a largely empirical account of the Gloucesstershire Regiment. His interview with Conrad Wood was similarly focused on military history. By the time of his interview in 2000, Farrar-Hockley had published his two volumes of the official history of the Korean War, replete with painstaking details of the units involved and the part they played in the conflict. He had also produced a number of military histories on leading military figures and campaigns.²¹⁸ Farrar-Hockley’s vast military historical knowledge of the conflict certainly showed in the interview. After a perfunctory biographical question at the start (‘When were you born?’), Wood asked Farrar-Hockley (presumably by prior agreement) to describe his ‘personal memories of the Battle of the Imjin’.²¹⁹ Farrar-Hockley answered this question for almost the entirety of the interview, tracing the actions of the various companies of the Gloucesstershire Regiment in the hours before, during and after the battle and describing the Chinese positions and advance across the river. Although there were a few brief moments of personal reflection and use of ‘I’ rather than ‘we’ – such as noting how it was a ‘painful moment’ to destroy his weapons as the Chinese advanced – the narrative followed a largely military historical pattern, mirroring Farrar-Hockley’s magnum opus. Farrar-Hockley encapsulated the way in which some veterans preferred to frame their experiences around collective action

²¹⁷ Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 111–12.
²¹⁹ Oral History Interview with Conrad Wood, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, 2 April 2000, 20270.
in specific battles. This is not wholly surprising, as outsiders noted how frontline time was often interpreted in terms of battles and action at the time. Georgina Johnstone found her brief period in Korea contrasted with her nursing in Kure in Japan, as there was ‘no routine like you have in hospital[,] ... That wasn’t easy ... because you didn’t know often what’s going to be there.’ Battles, rather than routine, thus formed a central point around which to structure lived (and written) experience.

The second veteran, Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, provides a very different example of veteran subjectivity, both in his candidness and in his relationship to the state as a veteran of the Korean War. (Thomas) Ashley Cunningham-Boothe was born in 1927 in Manchester and described his subsequent upbringing in Coventry during the Second World War to Conrad Wood. In his interview he described how his house was bombed on the night of 14 November 1940 and how his mother and sister escaped from the rubble. Speaking of the devastation, Cunningham-Boothe concluded that:

In spite of having served in the British Army of the Rhine, Malaya and Korea, I saw more [pause] enemy action, more devastation in that one night, November the fourteenth 1940 in Coventry, than during any of my military experiences. And as an infantry soldier, err, you can imagine that, the Imjin for example, was one hell of an experience.

He also reflected on the difficulty of writing about the potential trauma of his earlier years in greater detail in his autobiography, One Man’s Look at Arthritis (1993):

The challenging of meandering through the eventful years of my youth; the discoveries with approaching manhood; the survival learning of infantry soldiering; the two wars … God! How it seemed that there had been nothing but violence

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220 Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Georgina Johnstone, c. 2010, NAM 2010-01-54.
221 IWM, Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, 8 December 1999, 19913.
through my young years[,] … Then, much later one’s own private war experiences as a front-line infantry soldier.\textsuperscript{222}

Cunningham-Boothe’s recollections of his youth display awareness of, even a familiarity with, violence and he chooses to map his own life experiences onto wider cataclysmic geopolitical events. Like Farrar-Hockley, Cunningham-Boothe used the discourse of duty and necessity when describing his military experience, saying it ‘was right at the time’, but also claimed that ‘[all that] glory business, all this for King, Queen, the flag, doesn’t mean a thing’.\textsuperscript{223} Cunningham-Boothe also described more unpleasant aspects of military service. He gave details of violence against German citizens when he served with the British Army of the Rhine and even insinuated that British soldiers drowned an unpopular NCO on the way to Korea. He described witnessing a potential war crime, where three hundred South Koreans were executed close to their camp and how he and his fellow British soldiers stood in the way of the Canadian Major ordering executions. Despite standing up for the Korean population in this instance and saying ‘enough was enough’, Cunningham-Boothe also claimed that he had been ‘totally brutalised by the war’. In his interview with Conrad Wood, Cunningham-Boothe explained how a civilian (and a historian) like Wood might not be able to understand his enjoyment of certain aspects of the war:

[CW]: So you just went because you were sent?  
[ACB]: Yes and in my case I volunteered because my, all my friends were going and, I just seemed to have a [pause] I was always volunteering for one thing or another so, it just seemed the natural thing to do[...] I don’t regret the experience you understand. I don’t. In fact, I have written extensively, err, on the Korean War, err, and err, I would not have been able to have done that without that experience.  
[CW]: Why don’t you regret it then?

\textsuperscript{222} Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, \textit{One Man’s Look at Arthritis} (Leamington Spa, 1993), p. 25.  
\textsuperscript{223} Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, 8 December 1999, 19913.
[ACB]: Erm [pause] Well I don’t have any regrets, err [pause] I think I have to say that I discovered [pause] with my make-up, err, an unpleasant part of me that enjoyed certain aspects of the war.

[CW]: What did you enjoy about it?

[ACB]: Oh, I enjoyed killing people. That, that was a good feeling. In fact [pause], one of the most [pause], one of the strongest impressions I have is that when a battle is over, the, you’re sitting there having a mug of tea and a cigarette and you’re exchanging your experiences and the honesty that you find in that brief moment of time is incredible because none of you are trying to impress, you’re just simply relating your experiences of how you coped with the battle[.] ... Err, it might appear to one who has not been in a war situation, it might appear that, erm [pause], if you like, extraordinary. But to me it was not extraordinary, it was just natural to be the way I was, because that’s the way most of the men that are soldiers were. We were there to kill the enemy and we did it.

[CW]: But what was in it that would have appeared extraordinary to some like myself?

[ACB]: Oh the fact that, that, err, there was a degree of enjoyment in it, for me anyway. Yeah there’s a great, err, the adrenaline rush and the sense of, erm, having been in a major battle and survived. It’s, err, it’s, it’s err, err, err, it’s a shot like nothing and I imagine that even cocaine, whatever that is like, couldn’t vie with it for experience. It’s err, I would imagine it’s a bit like having been, erm, a gladiator, whose been in the arena.224

Cunningham-Boothe asserted that this is ‘the way that most of the men that are soldiers were’ and that killing was an enjoyable part of conflict or at the very least part of the ‘experiences you coped with in the battle.’ Joanna Bourke has studied the life-writing of servicemen from the First and Second World Wars, noting how many derive pleasure from

224 Ibid.
killing in wartime. After all, ‘the characteristic act of men at war is not dying, it is killing’. Bourke is correct in asserting that this enjoyment is frequently accompanied by the seemingly contradictory feeling of disgust. There is thus often a profound tension in war writing. These stories of killing also interact with the prevailing discourses and definitions of how soldier should feel and express himself. As Nigel Hunt notes, by the end of the twentieth century there was an expectation that servicemen should be traumatised. Cunningham-Boothe also espoused this view, which contradicted and jarred with his description of the pleasure of killing. His exchange with Conrad Wood is very revealing of this tension:

[ACB]: Well, I, I, for years I had my nightmares about Korea and then, err, they modified and became less war-like if you like and, err, but, I have to go to bed at least twice during the day because I suffer from chronic fatigue syndrome and I sleep for about an hour and I get up and I’m absolutely exhausted because I’ve had nightmares. Every time I put my head to a pillow I have nightmares. So there’s a price to pay for my peculiarities.

[CW]: But in this interview in recounting it all, you don’t appear to have been upset.

[ACB]: No.

[CW] Why’s that?

[ACB]: [pause] err.

[CW]: If you have nightmares?

[ACB]: Well, I can’t answer that, erm [pause] I don’t know why. But I’m not offended by my military, my military service or my conduct as a soldier. I [pause]. Just a couple of times when what I’ve done is questionable [cough]. But for most of

226 Ibid., p. 13.
227 Hunt, *Memory, War and Trauma*, p. 121
the time, err, I’m quite proud of the fact that I went into the arena in spite of the fact that I was frightened out of my wits quite a lot of the time and I did my job.\textsuperscript{228}

Cunningham-Boothe was simply doing his ‘job’ in the ‘arena’, as was socially expected of him at the time, but war also took its toll, as was expected by the time of his interview. He posits his experiences within two different contexts and sets of expectations. Aaron William Moore argues this was the case for East Asian Second World War veterans too, as the language of the veteran has to adjust to the postwar setting if it is to be heard. Implicitly echoing Gayatri Spivak’s conceptualisation of how the subaltern ‘speaks’, Moore notes that ‘servicemen had to learn to speak in a way that they could be understood; in other words, they would have to narrate the war by using the language of those who experienced the war at home (or remain silent).’\textsuperscript{229} Cunningham-Boothe had to use the language of subsequent generations who defined war in a markedly different way. His apparent inconsistency in describing trauma, enjoyment and duty simultaneously (which Wood seems determined to highlight), was not unusual and was indeed a common response to the contradictory discourses with which the soldier and later the veteran was confronted. Wood’s challenging questioning technique perhaps prompted a defensive, rather than reflective answer, but in doing so highlights the discursive expectations that were present at the time of interview. Put simply, Portelli notes that confrontation ‘is one of the things that make oral history interesting’.\textsuperscript{230}

Cunningham-Boothe’s relationship with the state that sent him to war has a further layer of complexity. He argued that his arthritis originated in the cold winter in Korea in 1950/1951, where there was poor provision of warm clothing.\textsuperscript{231} In his autobiography, he also blamed his condition on malnutrition, malaria, dysentery and other illnesses he

\textsuperscript{228} Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, 8 December 1999, 19913.
\textsuperscript{229} Aaron William Moore, \textit{Writing War. Soldiers Record the Japanese Empire} (Cambridge MA and London, 2013), p. 244.
\textsuperscript{230} Alessandro Portelli, \textit{The Death of Luigi Trastulli and Other Stories} (Albany, 1991), p. 58.
\textsuperscript{231} Oral History Interview by Conrad Wood, Thomas Ashley Cunningham-Boothe, 8 December 1999, 19913.
contracted during his military service.\textsuperscript{232} He noted that: ‘I found it was helpful to place the blame for all that ailed me on the life-style I had lived as an infantry soldier; the measure of my misfortune being found in the “Law of Return”. It was the price to pay for all my mischief’.\textsuperscript{233} Following Korea, Cunningham-Boothe served in Hong Kong and spent a year in Canada after leaving the British Army. Upon returning home to his mother’s home in Leamington Spa in the late 1950s, he started to experience great joint pain, keeping to his room and occasionally shouting embittered insults at passers-by. ‘My life became one long introspection, serving to distract me from my misery’, he noted; it was an existence full of ‘Walter Mitty-like escapism’.\textsuperscript{234} Cunningham-Boothe met his future wife, who was a nurse at the Warnesford General Hospital in Leamington, where he was later admitted with rheumatoid arthritis. In his autobiography, he was open in describing their difficulties in conceiving and their adoption of three children, one of whom he named after his Commanding Officer who was killed at Imjin River.\textsuperscript{235}

Cunningham-Boothe’s frank description of his life after Korea and his chronic illness reveals the way in which illness and dependency affect veteran subjectivity. As Hockey and James note, in contemporary Britain the aged or sick body is the object of state surveillance, no longer the protector of the state.\textsuperscript{236} Yet there are also similarities in the narratives available to ill people and to veterans. Arthur Frank argues that ill people write their stories to regain the agency they have lost, an argument that is also made about the soldier.\textsuperscript{237} Frank notes that narratives are also a personal method of understanding ‘survival’, a concept that Anglo-American scholars and commentators increasingly used in the late twentieth century.\textsuperscript{238} Cunningham-Boothe’s reflection of his survival in war, at the cost of his humanity and health, was similarly an attempt to understand his incomprehensible survival.

\textsuperscript{232} Cunningham-Boothe, \textit{One Man’s Look at Arthritis}, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{233} Ibid., p. 77.
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid., pp. 18–25.
\textsuperscript{235} Ibid., pp. 65 and 76.
\textsuperscript{236} Hockey and James, \textit{Social Identities across the Life Course}, p. 74.
\textsuperscript{238} Frank, \textit{The Wounded Storyteller}, p. xiii.
His own damaged body also featured in his memoir, although its expression was limited. For instance, he used illness metaphors (in this case cancer) to describe his own memory: ‘These recollections pustulate [sic] the memory cells with unwilling recall. Then there were the places and the faces, which were legion.’ Frank contextualises such storytelling by noting ‘all the rhetorical expectations that the storyteller has been internalizing ever since he first heard some relative describe an illness … or was instructed to “tell the doctor what hurts” shape the story he tells. Like illness memoirs, the soldier’s story is similarly enmeshed in cultural expectation and limited by the terms in which he can express his experience. The body itself, damaged in illness and war, is silent and inexpressible, its language diffuse and inarticulate. In short therefore, the chronically ill veteran (as in Cunningham-Boothe’s case) has a particular story to tell as well as a particular story left untold. As with descriptions of war, only a ‘flesh-witness’ feels he can tell the true story of illness. Cunningham-Boothe’s memoir and oral history therefore highlight the societal framework in which a story, one in which the body was so important, was created.

Cunningham-Boothe and Farrar-Hockley also exemplify the way in which the context in which veterans tell their stories influences their perception of history. Their two cases are very different, but overlap slightly. Farrar-Hockley followed in a long line of British ‘official historians’ commissioned and published by government. Official history (in the sense of government-commissioned historical research) began in Britain in 1908 with the establishment of the UK Official History Programme, which was a response to the military/state crisis following British difficulties in the South African and Russo-Japanese wars. Official histories of the World Wars were written by illustrious military men or civil servants who lived through them and were designed to have policy implications, teaching

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239 Cunningham-Boothe, One Man’s Look at Arthritis, p. 25.
future generations about what worked well in particular operations. The Korean War official history was commissioned in 1978 and Peter Hennessy noted in The Times that he and those in Whitehall hoped this official history would counter the new “revisionist” US histories which (wrongly in their opinion) characterised South Korea as an aggressor, not Communist North Korea.

Veterans interacted with this official history in a number of ways. As seen above, veterans often criticised the historian’s inability to capture war’s experiential (often embodied) elements. However, Farrar-Hockley, as veteran himself, enjoyed not only the support of the veteran community, but its practical help too. Farrar-Hockley received information from fellow officers and BKVA members, but also unsolicited letters and notes. Donald Barrett wrote to HMSO, praising Farrar-Hockley’s volumes but was keen to correct the historical record in line with his own experience and knowledge:

Bearing in mind that Anthony Farrar-Hockley’s excellent Official History will become a definitive work for future historians to study, ... I enclose five easy to verify examples from my own list that have no doubt already been amended in later editions[.] ... There are of course, others more complicated to explain, and no doubt over the intervening years other interested readers will have found more in Volume II[.] Official history, with its access to closed documents and the veteran status of its authors, is often therefore imbued with more authority than its academic counterpart (although it clearly remains open to correction). In the case of the Korean War, the official history represents

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243 Peter Hennessy, ‘History Planned of Britain’s Role in Korea’, The Times, 26 June 1978.
245 Papers of D.F. Barrett, Letter from Donald Barrett to HMSO, undated, NAM 2001-10-111. Barrett’s corrections included the misnaming of the King’s Shropshire’s as the King’s Own on one page and the losses of particular companies.

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another example of veteran writing for the veteran community. The official history was not the singular writing of a privileged officer and military historian, but was instead the collective endeavour of a community and one of their few cultural legacies. Whilst the criticism that official history tells the story of winners (and men) alone still stands, it did, in this instance, provide veterans with the memorialisation they felt was lacking elsewhere. As Leonard Smith has argued, a publication can itself become a *lieu de mémoire*. Taking the case of Paul Fussell’s *The Great War and Modern Memory* (1975), Smith argues how this now seminal piece of literary criticism encapsulated the growing view in the 1970s that the First World War was a pitiable tragedy and was best written about by looking at ‘experience’. It became a locus of memory; not memory that was lived and practised (as with a *milieu de mémoire*), but a form which represented and exemplified a broader discursive understanding of conflict. In a similar way, Farrar-Hockley’s volumes potentially became a *lieu de mémoire*, not lived out or celebrated beyond a small community of veterans, but nevertheless an attempt to chronicle the events of the war and to remember them.

As a frequent VIP guest at BKVA events, Farrar-Hockley further helped define that community. In an address at the dedication of the BKVA memorial at the National Arboretum, Farrar-Hockley addressed veterans’ feelings of exclusion:

> Why should you feel in any way embittered or left out when you are a member of an exclusive club – it’s a finite club, we shall eventually all fade away. But while we are wearing those medals, we are members of an exclusive club, we have that wonderful advantage[,] … I doubt very much if there is a single one of those who went to Korea who did not have some change for the better [,] … And that suggests to us whereas we think we can control our own destinies throughout our lives, we

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246 Farrar-Hockley himself had already organised a fund to buy a memorial stone to the Korean War dead in St. Paul’s Cathedral, see Anonymous, “‘Forgotten’ Fighters Are Reunited’, *The Times*, 12 March 1987, p. 3.
discover in such occasions a capacity within ourselves to do something really big, where we don’t ask ourselves what’s in this for me, you do something without thinking. And that might suggest to us that we have done something, for a few minutes, with a glimpse of the Almighty who has given us that spirit."²⁴⁸

Farrar-Hockley stressed that like other soldiers before them, Korean War veterans gave themselves up for a greater cause. Despite the written evidence in this thesis which shows that soldiers rarely gave much thought to this cause at the time, it clearly provides a helpful, if sometimes ill-fitting, discourse of remembrance. More significantly, Farrar-Hockley argues that Korean War veterans form an exclusive, finite community bound by an ‘experience’ which gives them an ‘advantage’ over others. It is to this community, and from it, that The British Part in the Korean War speaks.

Cunningham-Boothe also produced books for his fellow community of veterans, although on a different scale and with a much smaller distribution.²⁴⁹ In 1993 he was even awarded a CBE for his services to the BKVA and maintained a long-standing interest in veteran illnesses and the use of bacterial warfare by UN forces during Korea.²⁵⁰ Cunningham-Boothe also wrote an empirical history account of the Korean War, a poetry anthology of his own writing under the pseudonym John Briton (explored in Chapter Two) and his autobiography about living with rheumatoid arthritis, all with the veteran publishing company Korvet.²⁵¹ A significant number of Korean War veterans published their memoirs with this publishing company too.²⁵² The publishing endeavours of Farrar-Hockley and Cunningham-Boothe, as well as their oral history interviews and memoirs, show the range of

²⁴⁹ As Ken Worpole notes, distribution and sales are as significant as the literary content of contemporary publications and the history of this struggle over publication, distribution and reading is a pivotal part of our political culture. See Ken Worpole, Reading by Numbers. Contemporary Publishing and Popular Fiction (London, 1984), pp. 92–94.
²⁵¹ Ashley Cunningham-Boothe and Peter Farrar (eds), British Forces in the Korean War (Leamington Spa, 1988); Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (ed.), Marks of Courage (Leamington Spa, 1991); Ashley Cunningham-Boothe (John Briton), Shapes of War by the Schizogenesis John Briton (Leamington Spa, 1999); Cunningham-Boothe, One Man’s Look at Arthritis.
²⁵² Larby, Signals to the Right; Ed Evanhoe, Dark Moon (Leamington Spa, 1995); John Martin, K-Force. To the Sharp-End (Leamington Spa, 1999).
positions veterans took in relation to the war and how writing their ‘history’ might be further response to their wider cultural exclusion.

Conclusion

Veterans of the Korean War have responded in a variety of ways to their exclusion from state practices of remembrance and history-writing. Some rally against the state, particularly contemporary government, whilst simultaneously espousing mid-twentieth-century civic ideals of necessity and duty. The contradictions at the core of veteran subjectivity are often painful, both to the veteran and to researcher: in the case of Cunningham-Boothe, these contradictions are deepened owing to the debilitating illness he felt was a consequence of the Korean War. Ageing too affects the relationship between state and former soldier, replacing active citizenship with dependency or prompting specific forms of social organisation and life-narratives. This chapter has also raised the issue of exemplarity versus singularity. Veterans of the Korean War sought ‘recognition’ from present generations, politicians and popular culture more generally, as shown in their life-narratives and veterans’ associations. Finally, this chapter has shown the implicit annoyance with, or even animosity toward, ‘history’ – as both the arbiter of their actions and as the ineffectual the mouthpiece of historical record. Jay Winter, the leading historian of remembrance, remembers a kindly survivor of the First World War telling him to choose another profession, as he could never truly know war. Winter argues that veterans and others have sought to enforce these ‘essentialist silences’: silence, as much as the written or spoken word, is produced in the political and interpretive aftermath of war and is a ‘powerful constitutive element in representations of war.’

Yet in the case of the Korean War, commemorative silence has been interpreted as ambivalence. Veterans have sought to fill the gap that history has left in

a number of ways but, as Cunningham-Boothe concludes, these efforts are perhaps in vain, leaving nothing but ‘[a] young man’s memories under an old man’s hat’.254

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254 Cunningham-Boothe, ‘The Old Man’s Hat’. 
This thesis has argued that British servicemen in the Korean War were ‘thinking soldiers’ in two interconnected ways. It has explored the idea that soldiers were told to think, from group theories in their recruitment to citizenship ideals in their training. On the other hand, it has also detailed the innovative responses to these ‘subjectivising techniques’ from soldiers themselves. As Andrew Condron noted, ‘the thoughts of soldiers went a good way deeper than the ordinary problems of survival.’¹ This thesis investigated how servicemen interpreted the call to think and their individual reactions to the situation in which they found themselves. In doing so, this thesis has highlighted both the domestic and international significance of a conflict often forgotten by British historians and has attempted to test the applicability of theories of modern subjectivity, so integral to the historiography of post-war Britain, in the complex context of the Korean War. As scholars of Soviet subjectivity have also done, this thesis has aimed to re-orientate and re-examine the history of selfhood in relation to twentieth-century states. It has sought to sketch the preoccupations and complexities of self-perception and subjectivity in the era of this ‘forgotten war’.

As noted in Chapter One, subjectivity was an important component in modern social democratic state but it was also a variable of it, one that many observed and tried to manipulate. Rose and Smith argue that this interest in the subjective make-up of the population came through the protrusion of the ‘psy’ disciplines into everyday life and language, while Meyer and Steedman note how the use of autobiography in education introduced new methods through which to construct and understand selfhood.² Yet this tells only half the story, albeit an important half. Writing about Giddens’ conceptualisation of modern, self-reflexive subjectivity and the ‘disembedding’ power of experts, Ian Burkitt

notes that we need to study the relations between individuals and the power that comes from self-reflexivity. He notes that in ‘a world of unequal power balances, some groups and individuals have more time, space and resources than others to actualize themselves to greater degrees.’ In short, we need to interrogate the consequences of demanding self-reflexivity from individuals, in a range of concrete historical contexts, in order to fully understand the influence of states and institutions in shaping the modern self.

This thesis has sought to demarcate the limits of ideas of ‘state-directed subjectivity’, as servicemen responded in a host of ways to centralised attempts to categorise them. The second chapter of this thesis examined the responses of servicemen to the citizenship ideas of the early Cold War. It used letters and diaries to show not simply the variety of responses to being an active, democratic citizen but also to reveal the residues of older concerns, such as the enduring significance of race and empire to servicemen travelling to Korea. However, more than anything else, these letters, diaries, poetry and other creative responses reveal the omniscience of the Second World War during the Korean War. In the writings of servicemen to their parents, in their conceptualisation of what constituted legitimate military experience and in their understanding of the UN’s war aims in Korea, servicemen made constant reference to that earlier, global conflict. In many ways, the memory of the war broke down the boundaries between the citizen at home and the soldier-citizen in Korea: after all, the majority of the population were familiar with military life, either directly or indirectly, in the 1950s. The academic and popular privileging of ‘experience’ further cemented the importance of the Second World War. The persistent, even overbearing, memory of the Second World War is particularly evident in the sample of battle experience questionnaires analysed in this chapter. The analysis of these questionnaires revealed how subjectivity could be wrought through state interpellation, but it also demonstrated the unique ways that servicemen circumvented the neatly demarcated answers demanded of them. In doing so, this chapter reiterated another underlying theme of

this thesis: that the serviceman was forced to produce his life story again and again, during and after his military career.

Chapter Three explored compulsion in life-narratives in even greater detail and, by focusing more explicitly on the mechanisms behind life-writing, this chapter refuted the well-entrenched assumption that writing one’s life is the apogee of individualism; the freest and truest expression of subjectivity. This chapter makes use of the under-utilised concept of the enforced narrative to understand the material produced by British prisoners of war in Korea. The life-writing produced by prisoners was unique in modern conflict, both in quantity and content, and was the first moment that British servicemen encountered distinct Chinese practices of life-writing. The emergence of the term ‘brainwashing’ during the Korean War also added urgency to the interrogations of prisoners of war when they returned back to Britain. Condron’s bold claim that the British soldier was ‘no longer a robot’ suggested that imprisonment was one moment, perhaps one of many, in which servicemen thought beyond the parameters which were set from them by central government. In producing a distinct body of life-writing, British servicemen were self-reflective (as both British and Chinese authorities insisted they must be) but this reflexivity frequently veered into discussion of regimental rivalry or personal religious commitment, often far removed from the messages they had received. Giddens’ argument that self-reflexivity was the core of modern subjectivity is perhaps validated by this case, but the state did not necessarily direct such reflexivity nor could it fully anticipate the form it took.

The final substantive chapter of this thesis investigated the continued ability of veterans to write around the ideas of citizenship, duty and democracy after 1953, not altogether peaceably. More so than the other chapters, this study of veteran-writing aimed to analyse how subjectivity changed over time and therefore addresses more directly the historical dimension of subjectivity, remedying some ahistorical sociological interpretations of mid-twentieth-century selfhood. Social sciences undoubtedly occupy an important place in the history of selfhood in the mid-twentieth century: as Peter Mandler argues, the 1950s were a ‘peak period’ for social scientists’ influence in public policy and in the popular
imagination. Centrally-supported models of behaviour and action did to some extent influence how people thought of themselves. But, as this thesis has endeavoured to show by its focus on life-writing, reactions to these powerful, pervasive ideals were complicated and cross-sectioned by a variety of variables which complicate assessments of subjectivity, including age and social background.

In using life-writing, this thesis has also put forward the case for the importance of life-writing scholarship in the historical discipline, and vice versa. All the chapters in this thesis show different ways in which selfhood could be expressed through life-narratives. Although an imperfect, even artificial, indicator of selfhood, this thesis has sought to show that life-writing remains one of the best tools through which to analyse subjectivity. As Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer Pierce and Barbara Laslett argue, the analysis of life-narratives will always be ‘complex, contingent and subject to revision’, but that ‘the value of personal narrative analyses lies in their potential to see people and their actions as both individual and social’ simultaneously. The complex relationship between individuals and their social context is further investigated in Chapter Four. It showed the various, often contradictory, reactions to ‘history’ and to the apparent ambivalence with which popular culture treated the Korean War. This thesis has also sought to remedy the absence of the Korean War in domestic assessments of the period. It has aimed to highlight the war’s significance in modern British history by exploring its place in the history of subjectivity. The Korean War is a case study through which we can understand broader processes of subject-formation, but it also initiated shifts in how the self was perceived.

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5 Mary Jo Maynes, Jennifer L. Pierce and Barbara Laslett, Telling Stories. The Use of Personal Narratives in the Social Sciences and History (Ithaca and London, 2008), pp. 69 and 156.
Untold Stories

Inevitably, however, by focusing on modern subjectivity in a British context, this thesis has left certain strands of the story of the Korean War untold. First, although the influence of the USA infuses every chapter, a comparative study of American subjectivity would be revealing. There has already been important work along these lines, particularly in analysing the impact of the Korean War on American identity and politics. The political theorist Colin Flint notes that the US conservatives used the Korean War and the ‘overreaction to the POW’s susceptibility to Chinese propaganda to build a neoliberal agenda whose foil was a new soldiercitizen required to fight the extraterritorial conflicts of the new hegemonic power.’ He too analyses the importance of subjectivity to central authorities, worried about the apparent malleability of its servicemen. Others, including Charles Young and Susan Carruthers, have also examined the response of the US public to the return of prisoners of war from Korea. Once again, the cultural reaction to subjective manipulation demonstrates that the emergence of the ‘psy’ disciplines and ‘subjectivising techniques’ in the 1950s was far from smooth: the ability to manipulate people’s outlook of themselves and of the world and to potentially turn them into unfeeling, unquestioning automatons of a central authority was a widespread fear, augmented by the military approach to subjectivity.

A further dimension of US dominance in the war is an understated, but commonplace animosity between British and US soldiers in modern conflict. References to the difficult relations between UN allies are sparse in histories of the Korean War, but are redolent in British life-writing. Coming from their comfortable bases in Japan, the Americans were criticised for their lack of discipline and resistance to hardship. Former Black Watch Officer David Rose even used his descriptions of the Americans to criticise the

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premise of citizenship itself: ‘The American Army is really a Citizen Army. How can you hope to become “professional” when your Officers and men rotate on a points system, even when they are in the front line? This is democracy gone mad.’ By studying these British-American relations, future studies might find out more about differing interpretations of what it meant to be a soldier and a citizen in this era for British and US soldiers alike. Furthermore, in a US context, official memories of Korea had a direct impact on the later war in Vietnam: as historian of the Cold War Heonik Kwon notes, the ‘memory of a war ... [was] an instrument of waging another war’.  

Similarly, Chapter Three touched on the importance of subjectivity and life-narrative in Chinese culture, making use of the innovative work of Aaron William Moore, but more remains to be said about the importance of subjectivity in a North Korean context. Kwon notes that the history of the Cold War must acknowledge local, civil violence and mass death, particularly in Korea and the impact of this on kinship and individual relations. Kwon’s work is important in this respect in highlighting the multitude of national contexts where one might study the meaning of subjectivity in the Cold War era. Although studying subjectivity can shed light on different national histories, selfhood should never be studied in isolation and revealing studies of subjectivity from across the world can be theoretically useful to one another (as with the advances in Soviet subjectivity referred to throughout this thesis). As this thesis has implied, the connections between Britain, Commonwealth countries and the US are vital in understanding centralised models of human behaviour and people’s responses to such models.

The Future of the Korean War

A final story left comparatively untold is the future of the Korean War. The British Korean War Veterans Association (BKVA) is a good example of the evolution of the Korean War

11 Ibid., p. 116.
within British culture. In 2004 there were fifty-nine branches across the country.\textsuperscript{12} Veterans have noted how each branch had a distinct history and character, depending on those involved. Tony Eagles, famous for his role in the 1952 Prisoner of War Olympics described in Chapter Three, chaired the Devon and Cornwall Branch from its establishment in 1986. Ron Larby, with characteristic flair, described how the Herts and District Branch came together:

\begin{quote}

The forming of the branch came out of rather bizarre circumstances. Two Croxley Green RBL [Royal British Legion] members, Bill Armstrong (ex Glosters) and Eddie Carter (ex-Royal Norfolks), were watching the 1981 ‘Miss World’ beauty contest, when on came a drop-dead gorgeous oriental beauty – ‘Miss South Korea’! Quite actually who said the following is not clear. ‘Never saw anyone like that when I was out there!’ The other replied, ‘You were in Korea? Well, so was I.’ Bill and Eddie got chatting, found they knew of other local Korea Vets and proceeded to form a branch of the newly created BKVA.\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

Larby’s account shows how BKVA members were often also members of the Royal British Legion. Membership numbers corroborate Nigel Hunt’s argument in Chapter Four that veterans seek out organisations once their lives are less busy with family or work commitments: the Wessex Branch membership alone was 60 in 1989, increasing to 151 in 2005 and 185 in 2009.\textsuperscript{14} From its inception the BKVA branches have aimed to provide welfare support to former servicemen and women who served in Korea and their families.\textsuperscript{15}

Lucy Robinson argues that events which follow a memoir can be just as significant in influencing subjectivity as those in it and the activities of these branches endeavoured to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ron Larby, ‘In the Beginning. Branch Formation Histories: Herts and District Branch’, \textit{Morning Calm}, 60 (2009), p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Brian Burt, ‘In the Beginning. Branch Formation Histories: Wessex Branch’, \textit{Morning Calm}, 60 (2009), p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Dutton, \textit{The Forgotten Punch in the Army's Fist}, p. 225.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
fill the void described in memoirs.\textsuperscript{16} In particular, the BKVA have established strong links with the Republic of Korea through the ‘revisit programme’ for veterans and commemorative events. Many veterans have been able to return to Korea from the early 1980s and recall the changes in South Korea, but also the ‘gratitude’ of their government.\textsuperscript{17} Sergeant Henry Tyler (RF) described how he visited regularly from 1974 onwards and that the Koreans had ‘really pulled themselves into the twentieth century and whereas admittedly we used to kick them around in those days.’\textsuperscript{18} One veteran wrote in \textit{Morning Calm} in 2010 that: ‘It’s worth noting that while the Koreans are treating 2010 as a key war anniversary and are treating it as such, the British government is not.’\textsuperscript{19}

The transnational character of BKVA events in the UK further reflects the strong connections with the Republic of Korea. In 1999 veterans from around the world gathered in London for the International Reunion of the Korean Veterans Association (KVA) and General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley noted how the BKVA were looking forward to reciprocating the ‘friendship and hospitality shown ... by veterans in countries across the world in the intervening years, particularly in the Republic of Korea.’\textsuperscript{20} The strong relationship with the Republic of Korea continues to the present-day. In conjunction with the Korean Cultural Centre, the Royal British Legion and Choo Kyu Ho, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, Sotheby’s hosted a charity auction of contemporary Korean art to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War in October 2010. All the proceeds went to the BKVA Relief Fund.\textsuperscript{21} Choo Kyu Ho thanked the veterans for devoting ‘their youth for the Korea War’.\textsuperscript{22} Major General Mike Swindells, President of the BKVA, reciprocated by thanking ‘our friends from the Republic of Korea [who] have never forgotten.’\textsuperscript{23} Another

\textsuperscript{18} NAM, Oral History Interview by unnamed interviewer, Henry Tyler, 14 April 1989, 8905-167-1.
\textsuperscript{21} The event raised over £20,000. Venetia van Kuffeler, ‘Korean Auction at Sotheby’s’, \textit{Diplomat}, November 2010.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., p. 9.
notable recent event was the award in 2012 of the Royal Horticultural Society Chelsea Flower Show Best in Show to Jihae Hwang for ‘Quiet Time: DMZ Forbidden Garden’. Alan Guy noted in *Morning Calm* that “[t]he final chapter of this story is that the Korean War has been brought to the attention of the public via television, the radio and the Internet and her team are to be commended for their fine effort to make sure that “We are NOT Forgotten”. "24 Until 2006 the BKVA also continued to fund undergraduate students from Britain to attend South Korean universities.25 Through such events, the BKVA has defined itself as both a transnational and highly active veteran organisation. The state-directed model of the military subject as a national and transnational defender of democracy (however flawed it was in practice) thus morphed over time, retaining its international focus, but developed a sharp resentment towards the British state and public.

The meaning and function of the BKVA has not been static. As the generations of First and Second World War pass away, in recent years Korean War veterans have enjoyed a slightly greater prominence in national remembrance. Most notably, Korean War veterans took a high profile role in Armistice Day commemorations in Whitehall on 11 November 2013. Prompted by the anniversary of the ceasefire at Panmunjom, veterans were invited to march past in Cenotaph, the commemorative centre of ‘Remembrance Day’ events. Five hundred veterans, the largest group on the day, took part.26 This was accompanied by the unveiling of plans for a Korean War memorial in Victoria Embankment Gardens on 6 November 2013, attended by the Duke of Cambridge and South Korean President Park Geun-hye.27 However, these changes are unlikely to reverse the status of the Korean War as ‘forgotten’, as the age of even young BKVA members precludes many more years of active involvement in veterans affairs. Furthermore, following an Annual General Meeting at the end of 2013, it was decided that the BKVA would dissolve during 2014, ‘once the New

27 Richard Palmer, ‘Prince William ‘Steps Up to the Plate’ at Korean War Memorial Ceremony’, *Daily Express*, 6 November 2013. This was the first state visit where the Duke of Cambridge represented the Queen.

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Korean War Memorial has been installed and dedicated on the south bank ... and after the “Laying Up” of our National Standards. The decision was made on the basis: “We go out with our heads held high rather than just fade away”.

However, some members have greeted this decision with indignation and viewed this vote as unrepresentative (100 out of 2600 members) and, at the time of writing, ‘hundreds’ are reputed to be joining an unofficial British Korean War veteran organisation set up by William Speakman VC. This organisation, its new members claim, ‘far from being a “last man standing” organisation’, seeks open membership to other Commonwealth countries, as well as relatives of veterans. For the time being therefore, veteran activity continues to occupy an important part of the lives and subjectivity of the generation of men who fought in Korea.

Veterans are not the only ones who have ‘revisited’ the Korean War. In the post-Cold War world, the Communist curio of North Korea continues to invite intrigue and speculation. In language reminiscent of 1950, journalist John Sweeney recently investigated claims of ‘brainwashing’ in North Korea. Once again, democracy was treated as a default and its absence a sign of political and psychological manipulation. Nor is the term ‘brainwashing’ restricted to Korea. The term is frequently used to describe religious fundamentalists and terrorists in the post-Cold War era, evidence of Western culture’s continued unease with ‘subjectivising techniques’. People’s responses to attempts to shape their outlook and self-perception are therefore as pressing now as they were in the era of the Korean War and worthy of further academic study.

The concerns raised in this thesis and the persistent distrust of subjective manipulation today perhaps indicates more powerfully than anything else the reason why studying subjectivity matters. Barbara Taylor argues that ‘the cultural anchoring of

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30 BBC Panorama (prod. Howard Bradburn, aired 15 April 2013, BBC One).
subjectivity precludes any easy “meeting of minds” across time’. However, this thesis has endeavoured to show that the ‘anchoring of subjectivity’ ultimately allows for those ‘minds’ to be understood on their own terms. Joanna Bourke writes in her recent book What It Means to be Human (2011) that delimiting the boundaries between human and ‘the rest of sentient life’ is frequently ‘contested and policed with demonic precision.’ Defining humanity and human subjectivity is a fraught process. Bourke reiterates Timothy Mitchell’s claim that marking the limits of what constitutes the state, society or innate human behaviour is a profoundly political act. In contextualising these historical debates, the historian, as Bourke writes, keeps these acts ‘resolutely in the real world, with all its suffering, joy identification and struggles.’ Analysing the subjectivity of the thinking soldier is thus an important tool in uncovering the sense people had of themselves and their world. It cements human action ‘resolutely in the real world’ and provides a vital prism through which to examine historical change.

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34 Bourke, What It Means to be Human, p. 385.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1945</td>
<td>US and USSR agree to temporary division of Korean peninsula along 38 parallel, following the Japanese surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul 1945</td>
<td>Labour win general election with 47.7 per cent of the vote; Clement Attlee becomes Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1946</td>
<td>US-Soviet talks over the Korean unification stall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 September 1947</td>
<td>New round of talks end in deadlock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1948</td>
<td>Separate elections in South Korea lead to Syngman Rhee’s inauguration as President of the Republic of Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July 1948</td>
<td>The establishment of the National Health Service in Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September 1948</td>
<td>Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) established in Pyongyang under Kim Il Sung.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1948-June 1949</td>
<td>USSR troops withdraw from DPRK; US troops withdraw from ROK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1948</td>
<td>Revised version of 1947 National Service Act made eighteen-month national service compulsory for 17 to 21 year olds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January 1950</td>
<td>Britain recognise Chinese Communist rule, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 February 1950</td>
<td>Labour win general election and returning with small majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 June 1950</td>
<td>North Korean (DPRK) forces cross the 38 Parallel DPRK into South Korea (ROK). UN Security Council calls for their withdrawal (and asks for military assistance to the ROK on 27 June).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 June 1950</td>
<td>Britain sends thirteen naval ships to Korea and an Australian frigate and destroyer. Two New Zealand frigates committed to join.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1950</td>
<td>Britain agrees to raise 29 Brigade to assist UN Command.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 1950</td>
<td>North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) drive UN Command to Pusan perimeter in south-east corner of peninsula.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1950</td>
<td>US landing at Inchon successfully outflanks NKPA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October 1950</td>
<td>UN General Assembly passes resolution on unifying Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 October 1950</td>
<td>US forces cross 38 Parallel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 October 1950</td>
<td>PRC enters war and sends troops to North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1950</td>
<td>Chinese halt UN advance, forcing them to retreat from North Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 March 1951</td>
<td>Seoul is recaptured by UN forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 1951</td>
<td>MacArthur is relieved from UN Command by US President Harry Truman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April 1951</td>
<td>Resignation from Anuerin Bevan from cabinet over rearmament budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late June 1951</td>
<td>Consolidation of UN positions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 July – 23 August 1951</td>
<td>Truce negotiations at Kaesong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July 1951</td>
<td>Formation of 1st Commonwealth Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 1951</td>
<td>Herbert Morrison and Dean Acheson meet in the US; High Gaitskell calls for reduction in rearmament.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 October 1951</td>
<td>Talks resume at Panmunjom, suspended by US in October.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 May 1952</td>
<td>Uprising by prisoners at UN-run Koje prison camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 February 1952</td>
<td>Death of King George VI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 February 1952</td>
<td>Wartime identity cards abolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 November 1952</td>
<td>Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower elected US President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October 1952</td>
<td>Tea rationing ends.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>15–27 November 1952</td>
<td>Prisoner of War Olympics at Prisoner of War Camp No. 5 (Pyuktong).</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 December 1952</td>
<td>UN General Assembly back modified version of peace plan devised by India. Rejected by China and DPRK.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 1953</td>
<td>PRC and DPRK agree to exchange wounded POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 April 1953</td>
<td>Peace talks resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 1953</td>
<td>PRC and DPRK accept US proposal over POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April – 3 May</td>
<td>‘Operation Little Switch’. Sick and wounded POWs exchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April – 3 May</td>
<td>‘Operation Big Switch’. Majority of POWs exchanged. POWs not wishing to return to DPRK or PRC held under Indian supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29 April 1953</td>
<td>Battle of the Hook (near Kaesong).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 July 1953</td>
<td>Armistice signed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1953</td>
<td>Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay reach the summit of Mount Everest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1953</td>
<td>Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 August 1953</td>
<td>England win the Ashes for the first time in thirty years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1954</td>
<td>All rationing ends in the UK.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. What battle areas were you in and from what dates?

2. In action, did you experience any shortcomings in the training you received prior to going into battle?

3. What enemy tactics, and/or enemy weapons, took you by surprise or came as something quite unexpected?

4. What general tactics were employed by the enemy? Were they orthodox by our teaching?

5. Did the enemy possess any arms or equipment to which we had no answer?

6. Were we short of any arms or equipment?

7. How did the enemy manage to compete against our air superiority?

8. What limitations, if any, did our equipment impose on our mobility?

9. Were the normal methods of intercom satisfactory under all conditions?

10. What enemy weapons had the greatest adverse morale effect upon our own troops and why?

11. Give a couple of tips which you think would help an officer of your rank when he is posted to Korea.
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