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Sex, power, and academia

Governing faculty-student relationships

Jude McNabb

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Warwick, Warwick Business School, September 2014
Volume 1
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Declaration

The material contained in this thesis is all my own work, and has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

This thesis considers how sexual and romantic relationships between academic faculty and students in higher education are governed. Using analytic techniques drawn from Foucault and discursive psychology to interpret a corpus of texts, which includes policy documents, interview transcripts, fictional accounts, newspaper articles, and computer mediated discourse, I explore how five discourses are mobilized to frame faculty-student relationships. I find that harassment discourse, which emerges as the dominant frame of reference in scholarly accounts, is taken up less readily in the accounts studied here. Rather, discourses foregrounding four alternative, but often imbricated, themes are more extensively mobilized: infantilization; religiosity; health, safety, and hygiene; and professionalism.

These discourses reinforce elements of the truth claims propounded by harassment discourses; notably, their gendered and heterosexist assumptions, and their insertion of a gap between academic and student, albeit one configured along subtly different lines. However, they also challenge them, positing alternative claims to truth, recasting the subject positions of academic and student, and re-orienting relations between the two. For example, infantilization discourses construct faculty-student relationships as a horrific relation between adult or parent and child which must be monitored, whereas religious discourses construct a pastor-flock relation, articulating relationships as a temptation to be resisted or atoned for.

The thesis offers contributions to research on faculty-student relationships per se, and is also understood as opening up analysis of organizational sexuality and the university more generally by arguing for the usefulness of a government approach to these phenomena.
If you want to get laid, go to college. If you want an education, go to the library.

(Frank Zappa, cited in Pattern, 2011)

That anyone would pluck such a topic [relationships between academics and students] out of thin air and be moved to write about it mystifies me, and I would be interested in hearing the author’s rationale.

(Anonymous student e-mail to ‘Subtext’, *Computer medicated discourse 3*, see Appendix 4)
Ideas of the university as a site for sexual adventure have gained popular and scholarly currency; campus fiction is replete with tales of sexual intrigue, and a handful of academic accounts (hooks, 1994, 1996; Gallop, 1997; Bell & Sinclair, 2014) depict higher education as a peculiarly erotic locale.

This intimacy is not only portrayed as flourishing amongst students, but also as occurring between students and academics; two recent Channel 4 TV shows, Campus, and Fresh Meat, have included faculty-student relationships in their dramatizations of academic life. Added to such depictions, a survey conducted in 2005 by the Teacher Support Network (TSN) and published in the Times Higher Education (THE), found that 18% of academic respondents reported involvement in a sexual encounter with a student (Fearn, 2008). Taken together, these accounts and findings suggest that faculty-student relationships are relatively commonplace.

Despite this, sexual and/or romantic liaisons between academic faculty and students have increasingly become targets for regulation. This is most notable in the US, where anti-fraternization policies have been adopted by many Higher Education Institutions (HEIs), but can also be observed in the UK, where universities are increasingly adopting policies and codes advocating the disclosure of close personal relationships (Fearn, 2008). As I explore later in the thesis, many of these policies construct faculty-student relationships (henceforth F-S relationships) as potentially exploitative or abusive.

Certainly there is some impetus for understanding relationships in this way: faculty-student sex has attracted negative press attention in recent years. In 2009, the smearing of poet and academic Derek Walcott prior to the election of the Oxford professor of poetry rested upon allegations of Walcott’s sexual impropriety with students (Kelly & Wansell, 2009). Moreover, in 2013 the Royal Northern College of Music (RNCM) hit newspaper headlines when a number of staff members were accused of sexual
misconduct with students, including charges of indecent assault (Pidd, 2013). Taken alongside universities’ heightened appetite for regulation, these cases have helped to place F-S relationships under the spotlight, even when they appear to be consensual.

My thesis takes as its starting point a problematization (Foucault, 1985; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011) of the view, propounded in much of the scholarly literature, that all faculty-student sexual and romantic relationships are unequal and are therefore examples of what Brewis (2001: 37; also Brewis & Linstead, 2000) terms ‘bad sex’. Whilst not denying their potential to be experienced as abusive, I want to consider whether and how the notion that such relationships are inherently asymmetrical, and thus exploitative or harassing, has gained credence in lay interpretations. I also want to explore alternative conceptions of relationships. This is considered important because it has the potential to tell us more not only about such relationships, but also about the university and its inhabitants, and about organizational sexuality more generally.

The two primary research questions underpinning the study are:

- *How are faculty-student relationships framed in text and talk?* In particular, I am interested in whether and how relationships are expressed as a problem requiring ‘government’.

- *How are faculty-student relationships deemed governable?* Specifically, what techniques are mobilized in the articulation of conduct relating to relationships? How much room for manoeuvre do they afford, and whom do they target?

The notion of ‘government’, by which I mean the concept derived from Foucault (1991b, 2009), which has garnered much support (Burchell et al, 1991; Dean, 1994, 1999b), is used here in preference to ‘regulation’ (pace Hunt, 1999). The concept of government is used by Foucault and his followers in two ways: a broad notion, used to refer to the ‘conduct of conduct’, and a narrower one used to designate a specific
‘mentality’ or rationality associated with the modern neo-liberal state (Gordon, 1991; Dean, 1999a; Kelly, 2009).

For Foucault, government in the broad sense involves ‘a range of multiform tactics’ (Foucault, 1991b: 95) which are inclusive of, but supplementary to, the laws, norms, and codes he associates with sovereign and disciplinary power (Foucault, 2009; Lemke, 2010). Governmentality, as a specific technique of governing, emerged out of an amalgamation of pastoral and diplomatic-military techniques (Foucault, 1982, 1991b). Evident in liberalism and social welfarism, it targets the population, claiming to protect the welfare of ‘each and all’ (Dean, 1999a: 133), just as the shepherd was understood in the pre-Christian East and Christian West to watch over omnes et singulatim (Foucault, 1981, 2007). Governmentality relies upon security apparatuses as its essential technical instruments (Foucault, 2009: 108). These apparatuses orient to the future in order to manage uncertainty; they consider probable events, undertake cost-benefit analyses, and organise the environment to promote wellbeing and contain damage (Foucault, 1991, 2009). Thus they may be understood as comparatively laissez faire; Foucault states that they are a technique of governing that ‘lets things happen’ (2009: 45). The two interconnected notions of government are both explored in the thesis. In order to clarify which of the two conceptions I am referring to I use the terms ‘governing’ and ‘government’ when I have in mind the broader meaning, and ‘governmentality’ or ‘governmental’ when I am discussing the narrower one.

In addition to Foucault, the writings of scholars working within and across different fields, but all influenced by Foucauldian thought, have been particularly instrumental in guiding the approach I take here. Joanna Brewis’s work (1998, 2001; Brewis & Linstead, 2001; Brewis & Grey, 1994, 2008) is concerned with my own field, management and organization studies (MOS). Meanwhile, Chloe Taylor’s (2009, 2011)
research is located at the intersection between women’s studies and philosophy; Alan Hunt’s (1999, 2003) at the point where legal theory meets sociological analysis; Mitchell Dean’s analysis of governmentality (1994, 1999a, 1999b) engages with sociological and political thought; and the discursive psychological approach used by Jonathan Potter (1996) connects social psychology with analytic philosophy and linguistics.

I use ideas and techniques taken from these multidisciplinary approaches to explore how the sexual conduct of academics and students is governed. I follow Brewis (2001) in her attempt to problematize notions of ‘good sex’, as the corollary of ‘bad sex’, a category within which sexual harassment, and F-S relationships as a presumed example of harassment, have been subsumed. Taylor is important for two main reasons. First, for her proposal that the university is a site dominated by disciplinary, as opposed to sovereign, power relations (2011). This casts doubt on the usefulness of understanding relationships as governable through prohibitive codes. Second, for her interest in confessional techniques as methods of guiding conduct (2010), which I apply in my analysis of the disclosure of relationships.

Hunt’s work is significant because of his interest in understanding the ‘regulation’ of morality in general, and sexual morals as a case in point. He does this by adopting a governmentality perspective that is attentive to everyday, as well as official, discourse (Hunt, 2003). This allows him to consider the more or less successful attempts of a variety of agents to direct the conduct of others from three broad positions; ‘from above, from ‘the middle’ and from below’ (Hunt, 1999: 5). Hunt also foregrounds the concept of risk management as a mode of government which he suggests may be reflexive and self-directed or other induced. This is supported by Dean’s (1994, 1999a, 1999b) work on risk and government. Although Dean and Hunt share many of the same
concerns, Dean’s work highlights a role for ethical self-relations which Hunt states are not a prime concern for him (Hunt, 1999: 17). Risk management and ethical self-relations become a focal point for analysis in Part IV of the thesis.

Finally, discursive psychology (DP) offers the potential to unpack the interactive elements of discourse, and to consider how broader discursive patterns are appropriated, modified, and rejected. The approach illuminates how subjects negotiate the topic of F-S relationships, providing clues about the stickiness of, and manoeuvrability within, particular discursive formations (see Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011: 1131).

Whilst they differ in terms of their topical and analytic emphases, each of the approaches outlined conceptualizes discourse as constitutive and/or power as relational. Thus they offer the potential to disturb the extant literature’s tendency to portray F-S relationships as necessarily asymmetrical and exploitative. This unsettling, or as Hacking terms it ‘unmasking’ (1999: 8), is a guiding principle underpinning the study; my objective is to interrogate the appeal and authority of these claims, rather than to overturn them.

Five discourses are identified as predominant themes for organizing talk and text about F-S relationships. These are: harassment; infantilization; religiosity; health, safety and hygiene; and professionalism. Within and across each of these discourses multiple techniques of government are deployed, a variety of practices are indexed, and different subjects and objects emerge as the primary agents and targets of government. Whilst there is significant overlap between discourses, I endeavour to tease out and highlight aspects considered most characteristic of their modus operandi.

The thesis is structured in five parts. Part I provides a critical discussion of relevant literature, and points to the contributions my thesis seeks to offer in relation to each.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on organizational sexuality, which I suggest has been under-utilized in scholarly accounts of F-S relationships. This literature has demonstrated the importance of considering the sexualisation and desexualisation of work as a route to understanding the dialectics of control and resistance (Burrell, 1984; Fleming, 2007). I suggest that this understanding might be extended by adopting a late Foucauldian perspective, which attends to how sexual conduct is governed.

In Chapter 2 I consider work on sexual harassment, the arena in which scholarly accounts of F-S relationships have typically emerged. I discuss what I term orthodox feminist narratives of harassment, before going on to consider critical accounts, which interpret the truth claims of ‘harassment knowledge’ as historical and discursive artefacts. Locating my study within this latter approach, I suggest that lay usage of harassment knowledge as a frame for understanding F-S relationships has not yet been subjected to empirical scrutiny.

Chapter 3 turns to writing about the university. I explore historical conceptions and contemporary debates, focussing on issues that are germane to my analysis. Thus I look back to the ecclesiastic roots of academe, as well as appraising recent debates concerning the effects of marketization on university life.

Part II explicates my methodology. In Chapter 4 I set out the overall approach, before going on to elaborate specific issues concerning data generation and collection. I also consider ethical issues. The chapter aims to highlight the inter-disciplinary and reflexive orientation of the study. Chapter 5 then elucidates how corpus texts - which include policy documents, interview transcripts, fictional accounts, newspaper articles and computer mediated discourse - have been selected and interpreted, emphasizing the iterative approach taken to analysis.
In Part III I set out two chapters of analysis. The first examines how harassment discourses are deployed within the data. Following Brewis (2001) and Taylor (2011) I observe that ‘harassment knowledge’ (Brewis, 2001: 37) adopts a top-down and reified notion of power – precisely the form of power that Foucault’s work calls into question (Foucault, 1978b, 1982; see also Taylor, 2011). In the second, which explores the discursive infantilization of students, I consider points of similarity to, and departures from, harassment knowledge. For example, I note how the excavation of a gap between academics and students based on age, as opposed to gender or organizational status, re-positions the academic not (only) as a harasser but, potentially, as paedophile or incestuous parent. Within this discourse, disciplinary techniques proliferate; academic and student behaviour is specified, monitored, and corrected in order to eliminate the ‘spectre’ of paedophilia that haunts pedagogical relations (Bauman, 1998: 31).

Part IV explores three further discourses that re-orient the ways in which sexual conduct is understood as being enabled and constrained, and which modify the targets and goals of government. These discourses seem less reliant on the idea of a ‘wrong’ or ‘danger’ demanding punishment or correction, and more on a series of risks requiring careful management in order to avert harm or catastrophe (see Castel, 1999; Hunt, 2003). Religious discourses have a goal of salvation, achievable through abstinence or confession of sin; health, safety and hygiene discourses are aimed at the promotion of wellbeing and the minimisation of contamination; and professional discourses construct the academic as being guided by principles relating to personal and ethical integrity.

In each of these discourses the continued presence of sovereign and disciplinary power relations can be felt. However, it is also possible to conceive of the subjects and objects of government in ways that recall other techniques, including the apparatuses of security and technologies of self that Foucault associates with liberal government.
Consequently, these latter discourses elucidate the benefit of exploring the conduct of sexual conduct as a form of ‘government’ hinging upon a plurality of aims, techniques, and tactics (Foucault, 1982, 1991b).

In Chapter 12 I summarise my findings and offer some conclusions. I suggest that research into F-S relationships would benefit from a more nuanced approach to power relations than is currently offered by the literature. I argue that work on organizational sexuality and on the university has tended to foreground hierarchical power relations, rather than considering its broader constellations and capillary-like mechanisms (Foucault, 1978b). This has meant that notions of both sexual and academic conduct as involving self-government have been neglected, as have the propensities of academic and other institutions to induce and harness individuals’ self-governing capacities. The concept of government thus advances knowledge about F-S relationships, but also offers new avenues for research on organizational sexuality and the university by encouraging considerations of power as ‘an action upon an action’ (Foucault, 1982: 789) which, importantly, includes ‘the exercise of self upon self’ (Foucault, 2005: 315).
Part I

Literature

Part I situates my study of F-S relationships in relation to three literatures. Chapter 1 provides an overview of work on organizational sexuality, considering how the extant literature has sought to understand the expression and management of sexual and/or sexualised conduct, whilst Chapter 2 hones in on the study of workplace sexual harassment. Both of these literatures, I argue, have been usefully contributed to by research taking a discursive approach to empirical materials. This contribution has the potential to be further extended through the application of a late Foucauldian approach, which considers the idea of ‘government’ and the varied technologies involved in the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982; Gordon, 1991).

In Chapter 3 attention turns to the study of academia. I begin by examining the history of the university in order to contextualise ‘contemporary’ debates about the role and nature of higher education (HE) in the UK, which I then discuss. These debates assess how the late modern university and its inhabitants are best understood, considering the effects of marketization on HE and, relatedly, different conceptualizations of relations between academics and students. As with Chapters 1 and 2, I find Foucault’s notion of government as an overarching concept (Dean, 1994; Lemke, 2010) instructive here.
Consideration of both historical and late modern perspectives is important. Later in the thesis I propose that the discursive resources drawn upon in empirical texts articulating F-S relationships summon historical and, occasionally, somewhat anachronistic frames of reference, rather than mobilizing discourses that have been presented in the literature as contemporary preoccupations. For instance, infantilizing and professional discourses reveal inheritances of the now formally outmoded *in loco parentis* role of the university and archaic oath-taking practices, rather than foregrounding discourses of marketization.

In addition to exploring the literatures on organizational sexuality, harassment, and the university in their own terms, I consider points at which they intersect. For example, how has sexuality and sexual harassment been studied and theorized within the university context? I also attempt to tease out some of the key concepts associated with these bodies of work in order to draw attention to their contested nature, and clarify how they are understood and operationalized within the thesis. In addition to ‘power’, these concepts include ‘harassment’, ‘gender’, and ‘sexuality’. 
The spectre of sex now haunts company offices and college seminar rooms: there is a threat involved in every smile, gaze, form of address.

(Bauman, 1998: 31)

“I gave up screwing around a long time ago. I came to the conclusion that sex is a sublimation of the work instinct. […] The nineteenth century had its priorities right, what we really lust for is power, which we achieve by work. When I look at my colleagues these days, what do I see? They’re all screwing their students, or each other, like crazy, marriages are breaking up faster than you can count, and yet nobody seems to be happy. Obviously they would rather be working, but they’re ashamed to admit it”.

(Professor Morris Zapp, Small World, David Lodge, 1985: 59, Fiction 6, see Appendix 4)
Introduction

It has been argued that all work is, to some extent, sexually organized (Hearn & Parkin, 1995; Pringle, 1989; Gherardi, 1995; Brewis & Linstead, 2000). Indeed, Gherardi contends that ‘Sexuality in organizations is not a residual phenomenon, nor can it be dismissed as folklore: sexuality is an extremely powerful and central impulse in the emotional structuring of work relations’ (1995: 57).

Claims that ‘sexuality is everywhere’ (Pringle, 1989: 162) have led to calls for more empirical research to be conducted in this area in order to explore the reaches of organizing with regards to, for example, the dialectics of resistance and control (Burrell 1984; Fleming, 2007; Sullivan, 2014), masculinity (Hearn & Parkin, 1995; Collinson & Collinson, 1989) and the ‘dark side’ of organizations (Brewis & Linstead, 2000: 183). Whilst they have diverse aims, these appeals share an interest in taking discussions of organizational sexuality beyond the remit of sexual harassment, delving into the manifold ‘locales and episodes’ (Burrell, 1984: 112) which occur at the interfaces between sex and work.

In reviewing the literature on organizational sexuality, I begin by attending to debates concerning the meanings and uses of ‘sexuality’ as an analytic construct in the study of MOS. I defend its continued relevance as a concept that is analytically distinct from ‘gender’, whilst acknowledging the ‘fuzzy edges’ (Witz & Savage, 1992: 47) between the two.

The chapter continues by highlighting some of the main contributions of the extant literature. This is divided into four sections. First, I examine scholarship that contributes to the ‘sex is everywhere’ thesis propounded by Pringle (1989) and Gherardi (1995). I critically examine the one large-scale study conducted on intimacy at work, as well as
discussing smaller scale research which has illuminated how sexuality flavours the everyday routines and practices of organizations.

This leads into a second section on the sexualization of organizing. Research in this area has emphasized how employees’ sexuality and/or sexualized behaviour may be appropriated or manufactured for organizational purposes. The third and fourth sections note the influence of Gibson Burrell’s work (1984, 1987, 1992) in elevating the importance of sexuality as an object of study for MOS. Specifically, the third section deals with the desexualization of organizations, whilst the fourth looks at the application of, and evaluates, re-eroticization theory.

I conclude by considering how my thesis might open up the study of organizational sexuality. I discuss how researchers adopting a Foucauldian perspective have already extended the field. Arguing for a further extension of Foucauldian thought, which incorporates elements of his *oeuvre* often referred to as the ‘later Foucault’ (Burrell, 1988; Bevir, 1999; Barratt, 2008), I propose to add to the literature in three ways.

First, I wish to supplement work that has emphasized the pervasiveness of organizational sexuality as an everyday feature of working life. This is primarily an empirical contribution, conceived of as a move away from the empirical sites of interactive service work around which research has coalesced, and towards the more professional setting of academia. Second, I want to contribute to understandings of how control and resistance are implicated in the management of organizational sexuality. My contribution here lies in widening the lens of analysis in order to examine not only top down and other-directed control mechanisms, but also to consider self-control. Third, I propose that there is scope to flesh out the notions of creativity and agency which emerge in some studies of organizational sexuality, particularly when issues of ‘power,
resistance and all that’ (Knights & Verduakis, 1994: 167) are placed under the spotlight.

**Organizational sexuality: sexing up the ‘gender paradigm’?**

In getting to grips with what is meant by the term ‘organizational sexuality’, Burrell & Hearn conceptualize it as a myriad of ‘discursive elements and practices’ (1989: 8) including, but not limited to, sex itself, desire, fantasies, sexual relationships, sexual orientation, and sexual violence. To this list Pringle (1989: 162) adds sexualized joking, gossip, flirtation, and self-presentation (see also Filby, 1992). In this sense sexuality is posited as something manifest in ‘physical displays, verbal exchanges and social relations’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 123).

The different ways in which connections between sex and work have been understood and operationalized are also dealt with by Warhurst & Nickson (2009). They conceptualize the extant research as following one of three lines of enquiry: that focussing on ‘sex as work’, such as prostitution and work in the sex industry; ‘sex in work’, which comprises studies of sexual harassment and consensual sexual relationships within the workplace; and - ‘bridging the two’ - a burgeoning academic interest in ‘sexualised work’, which examines how and why some work is imbued with a sexual dimension (Warhurst & Nickson, 2009: 385-6).

Whilst this threefold distinction lends clarity to the different ways in which organizational sexuality may be analytically visible, it obscures more nuanced understandings. It also omits other theoretical and empirical points of interest, such as the study of sexual orientation at work. Fleming’s (2007) research, undertaken at Sunray, an Australian call centre, is a case in point. His analysis foregrounds sexualized labour, but also touches upon sexual orientation and consensual sexual relationships at work. The works of Brewis & Linstead (2000), Tyler (2011), and Sullivan (2014) also
trouble Warhust & Nickson’s (2009) taxonomy, appearing to straddle or go beyond their tripartite categorization.

Brewis & Linstead (2000: 15) prefer to think of sexuality less as a set of discrete and individual practices, and more as ‘…a social field through which desire moves and which affects all of our behaviour’. Drawing from Bataille and Deleuze & Guattari, amongst others, they talk of a ‘heterotics’ of organization (ibid: 288) to describe how the unpredictable and excessive flows of the erotic inflect organizational life. Recognition of this heterogeneity, they contend, reveals both the light and dark sides of organizational sexuality, and foregrounds the multiple connections between desire, work, life, and death.

In theorizing organizational sexuality thus Brewis & Linstead offer a more sophisticated and fluid understanding of organizational sexuality than that proposed by Warhust and Nickson. They also implicitly reject critiques advanced by, for example, Witz & Savage (1992) and Adkins (1992), for whom the sexuality paradigm is merely a sexed-up substitute for the gender paradigm. These critiques draw attention to and, to varying degrees, side with, suspicions that interest in organizational sexuality is largely a post-structural project. This project, it is argued, diverts attention away from important issues concerning gender, and towards the fetishization of sexuality, despite the fact that studies of the latter may be conceptually indistinguishable from the former (Witz & Savage, 1992; Adkins, 1992).

These critiques also rely on pessimistic and gendered notions of organizational sexuality, configuring the ‘turn to sexuality’ (Witz & Savage, 1992: 47) as an ill-considered attempt to analytically elide, and so potentially valorize, the dominance of male (hetero)sexual discourses. However, as Hollway (1986), Leonard (2002), and Hearn (2011) all note, feminist research has tended to construct women’s experiences of
(hetero)sexuality as ‘universally pleasureless’ (Leonard, 2002: 75). It has also overlooked the diversity of female and male sexualities, including versions in which dominant organizational narratives of active male heterosexuality and female passivity might be subverted. Leonard identifies Pringle’s (1989) study of the boss-secretary relationship as exceptional in this regard, arguing that Pringle ‘invites us to see women as “sexual subjects”’ (Leonard, 2002: 75).

Pringle (1989) acknowledges that sexuality, in all its forms, can potentially be a source of pleasure, as well as displeasure, for women. Her research, which includes interviews with female secretaries identifying as straight and as lesbians, challenges the idea that sex intrudes on bureaucracy - an idea to which I return shortly. Further she seeks to expose ‘the masculinity that lurks behind gender-neutrality’ (Pringle, 1989: 102) within the workplace, and encourages women to refuse to be constructed as objects rather than subjects of sexual discourses. Her focus on discourses imbued with meaning through pornography and the rituals of sadomasochism means that sexuality amounts to more than gender. The two terms are not, for her, interchangeable, although the differential implications for men and women in the ways sexual discourses are constructed means that the relationship between the two is close.

Hearn (2011) has similarly underlined what he refers to as the ‘sexualed’ nature of organization (2011: 299), in which gender and sexuality are mutually implicated. For Hearn it is not only unhelpful to think of the two as separate paradigms, as Witz & Savage (1992) do, it is impossible, since they are inextricably linked. I share his view that the study of sexuality foregrounds ‘…desires, by and for others or for oneself’ (Hearn, 2011: 3000), which the study of gender does not adequately capture. Research on sexuality certainly implicates gender relations, but it does so in particular ways involving attraction and desire.
Consequently, my thesis is attentive to how sexual attraction is articulated as flowing through the university, inflecting the talk, routines, and practices of its inhabitants. In so doing, I foreground concepts covered in Warhurst & Nickson’s (2009) ‘sex in work’ category, whilst noting that distinctions between consensual sex and sexual harassment may be more problematic than they imply. I also consider how the study of F-S relationships surfaces issues relating to the sexualisation of work and the management of sexual identity. Consequently it is only Warhurst & Nickson’s category of ‘sex as work’ that is bracketed here, although its importance to the field (Brewis & Linstead, 2000) is acknowledged.

**Sex is everywhere: the prevalence and everydayness of organizational sexuality**

Despite endeavours like Pringle’s (1989) to rearticulate the workplace as an erotically charged space, sex and romance remain absent from most pictures of organizational life painted in MOS scholarship (Riach & Wilson, 2007). Thus, whilst a body of work has emerged which analyses different forms of organizational sexuality, Hearn (2011: 299) argues that these remain outside the ‘mainstream’.

Kakabadse & Kakabadse’s (2004) survey of workplace intimacy addresses this omission, and attempts to uncover the prevalence of sexual conduct at work. The study discusses interview and questionnaire data provided by 221 respondents of various nationalities, working across a diverse range of occupations and sectors. The authors declare a particular interest in gauging the attitudes of employees towards emotionally and physically intimate relationships between co-workers.

In their findings, Kakabadse & Kakabadse provide statistical data indicating that over 60 per cent of their respondents have been involved in ‘an intimate experience of sorts in the workplace’ (2004: 4). They also conclude that the incidence of such relationships
is increasing. Regarding attitudes, they suggest that relationships are largely regarded as unproblematic, although it is clear from their data that physically intimate relationships are considered more disruptive to the working environment than emotional attachments containing no overt sexual dimension (see also Wilson, 2014). This is an interesting point, and one I explore further in Chapter 8, where I consider how distinctions between sexual and romantic relationships are articulated in my empirical data.

Kakabadse and Kakabadse’s study is well cited in the MOS and wider social sciences literature (e.g. Fleming, 2007; Rumens, 2008; Di Domenico and Fleming, 2009; Warhurst & Nickson, 2009; Hakim, 2011). Whilst the study raises interesting questions, particularly in the authors’ consideration of historical and religious understandings of sexuality, some specious conclusions are drawn at times, and these call into question the study’s usefulness. Given the nature of my own research, the most pertinent of these relates to their analysis of a F-S relationship.

The first case study referred to in the study (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2004: 7) describes the development of, and reactions towards, a relationship between an American academic and a PhD student. Analysing this case, the authors comment:

…how unusual is the case of the US professor and his doctoral student (Case 1)? Not very, for in a survey conducted in 1998, 42 per cent of Britons reported having adulterous relationships in comparison to 37 per cent of Italians and 22 per cent of Spaniards (Global Sex Survey, 1998). […] So why did the professor in Case 1 attract such unwelcome attention? Because of the Teflon factor […] or the lack of it […] the real ‘sin’ of the university professor […] was his unwelcome manner. (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2004: 13-14)

This analysis is problematic for three reasons. First, in considering how common the case is, F-S relationships are conflated with extra-marital affairs; neither the professor
nor the student was married when they became a couple, although they subsequently married each other. Second, the case study comes from the US, but the authors generalise to a European population. Finally, in discussing why the professor was censured by his colleagues, Kakabadse & Kakabadse draw a somewhat simplistic conclusion. Noting the professor’s failure to project a ‘smooth’ personal style, they imply that, had he been a more likeable man, he would have received a less hostile response from his colleagues. Whilst this explanation may possess some merit, it remains little more than conjecture, since only two of their case studies (Case 1 and Case 7) deal with faculty-student relationships, and Case 7 (60-63) is not a sexual one.

Taken alongside less recent and typically smaller-scale research on workplace relationships (see Mainiero, 1986, Powell & Foley, 1998, and Wilson, 2014), Kakabadse & Kakabadse’s study emphasizes that romantic and sexual relationships between work colleagues are commonplace. However, their treatment of data is not as analytically rigorous as it might be, and this undermines its scholarly value.

Rather than surveying the extent of workplace intimacy, Filby’s ethnographic research into the role of sexuality and ‘sexualised exchanges’ (1992: 38) in betting shops positions sex as an intrinsic and routine aspect of organizational encounters. Filby’s research examines the deployment of sexuality by female cashiers in an otherwise predominantly male environment. He argues that ‘sexy chat’, banter and joking with both colleagues and customers prevail in what amounts to a ‘sexualised shop atmosphere’ (Filby, 1992: 38).

Filby’s work thus provides impetus for seeing workplace sexuality as prevalent because of its ‘everydayness’ (ibid: 33). He observes how easily the cashiers in the betting shops he visits switch between sexual and technical modes of conversation, and points to their readiness to respond to innuendo as a marker of the ritualised nature of sexual talk. The
workplace sexuality he finds is not extrinsic to production - what Witz & Savage refer to as an ‘add on’ (1992: 49). Rather ‘it appears to be part of the labour process itself’ (Filby, 1992: 37).

In arguing for its everydayness, Filby suggests that sex can be an important and mundane feature of people’s working lives. Thus he demonstrates the pervasiveness of organizational sexuality by arguing for its localised reach. This is achieved rather more convincingly than Kakabadse & Kakabadse’s (2004) attempt to reveal its global reach. I return to Filby’s study later in the chapter in order to explore its utility in understanding how research on organizational sexuality might shed light upon processes of control, resistance, and agency. In the next section I consider research that has followed Filby in examining the sexualized nature of work and, in particular, service work.

**Adding sex into the study of work: Organization and sexualization**

Studies examining sexualized work have tended to prioritize the experiences of interactive service workers, for whom the performance of emotional labour (Hochschild, 1984) is often perceived to be a prerequisite of the job. This requirement, it has been argued, is sometimes extended to incorporate the display of particular orientations to sex and sexuality (Warhurst & Nickson, 2009), whether this is with customers or colleagues.

Warhurst & Nickson (2009) propose a framework for differentiating between emotional, aesthetic, and sexualised labour, conceptualising the former as ‘implicit’ and the latter two as increasingly ‘explicit’ in terms of their analytic visibility. They also distinguish between sexualised labour that is ‘permitted’ or ‘implicitly constructed’ (Warhurst & Nickson, 2009: 394), and that which is more actively encouraged and
appropriated by management. This latter strategy is illustrated in their discussion of the American restaurant chain, Hooters.

Sexualised and aesthetic labour in Hooters restaurants, Warhust & Nickson contend, is ‘strategically prescribed’ (2009: 385). In other words, management explicitly promotes the sexual appeal of its waitresses in order to attract customers. The authors find this strategy neatly encapsulated in Hooters’ on-line promotional material, which carries the statement ‘Sex is legal and it sells’ (ibid: 396). Citing research conducted in the US on the sexualisation of female restaurant employees (e.g. Loe, 1996; Heyler, 2003), they note the success of deploying aesthetic and sexualised labour in order to generate profit. However, they also suggest that ‘many employees aesthetically labour for their own benefit’ (Warhust & Nickson, 2009: 399), thus implying that sexualized labour is not only undertaken as a managerial and commercialised endeavour, but also as a personal one. This last point is not developed by the authors. I return to it and explore some possible implications of the suggestion, and others like it, towards the end of the chapter.

Research on the sexualisation of interactive service work has often focussed on employees working in the leisure, hospitality, and tourism sector. The work of waiting staff (e.g. Hall, 1994; Crang, 1994; Guerrier & Adib, 2000) and flight attendants (Tyler & Abbott, 1998; Williams, 2003) has been particularly well documented. Ethnographic research conducted by Riach & Wilson (2007) on pub work and, outside these sectors, by Fleming (2007) on call centre work, demonstrates that even when work is not explicitly badged as part of a ‘sex sells’ proposition, as it is in Hooters, a relatively active approach to the management of sexualized labour may still be evident.

These scholars note that the promotion of cultural values such as ‘having fun’ and ‘being yourself’ (Fleming, 2007), alongside the recruitment of disproportionately
Youthful workforces (Hall, 1993; Riach & Wilson, 2007), can contribute to the managerial ‘co-option’ (Fleming & Di Domenico, 2009: 246) of sexualized labour. They also reveal that sex need not be an integral feature of the customer proposition for labour to be considered strategically sexualised, and thus it may not be as analytically visible as Warhurst & Nickson’s (2009) framework suggests. Rather, management may attempt to foster a culture considered conducive to sexual exchanges and encounters amongst employees, and between employees and customers, in an effort to secure employee consent and improve productivity (Riach & Wilson, 2007: 87; Fleming, 2007: 251-2). As Fleming (2007: 248) comments in his analysis of ‘gay friendly’ organization, Sunray, such a culture may be appreciated by some employees, but resented or resisted by others. Consequently any presumed benefits to employees, and thus management, of encouraging a sexualized work environment are contestable. The study of organizational sexuality is thus able to illuminate the ‘complex and multi-levelled admixture’ of control and resistance (Fleming, 2007: 240).

The research on sexualized labour outlined above goes some way to suggesting that in certain sorts of job, in particular organizational sectors, the forging of an alliance between sex and work may be a potentially productive one. This flies in the face of Weberian notions of the rational, bureaucratic organization, in which sexuality is ‘treated as an intruder’ (Pringle, 1989: 177), and is understood as antithetical to efficiency and productivity. Burrell (1992) refers to this as the separation of the reality principle and the pleasure principle. Following this line of argument, I now turn to the works of Burrell (1984, 1987, 1992) and others on organizational desexualisation, which consider how this Weberian ‘rejection of tenderness’ (Burrell, 1992: 71) is manifest at work.
Subtracting sex from work: Organizational desexualization

Roy’s study, *Sex in the Factory* (1974), predates the more influential works of Burrell by more than ten years. Roy outlines how what he terms ‘amatory behaviour’ (Roy, 1974:44) has ‘infiltrated’ (ibid: 46) the production line at one US factory. Whereas Filby (1992) sees sexuality as infusing everyday working practices, and as something which is potentially productive, Roy sees the meeting of ‘eros and vulcan’ (1974: 46) as incompatible in the long term, and his interest is in ‘the cyclical effects of the injection of sex into manufacturing processes’ (Roy, 1974: 46-7). So, sex may be an everyday conversational topic for the factory workers he observes, but Roy sees it as a foreign body - an ‘adjunct’ (Filby, 1992), ‘add-on’ (Witz & Savage, 1992), or ‘intruder’ (Pringle, 1989), rather than something which is, or can be, fully embedded in organizational life. Moreover, he claims that sex is a phenomenon that must be rooted out if the organization is to profit.

Roy’s study should be identified as an early example of research on organizational desexualisation. Despite this, it is largely neglected (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999). For example, Mainiero’s (1986) review of the literature on office romances identifies ‘management intervention’ as a pervasive theme, meaning that sex and romance are viewed as having an antagonistic relation with work, and may even be understood as ‘dysfunctional’ (Mainiero, 1986: 760). However, Roy’s study is not cited in her paper. Wilson’s (2014) more recent review of the literature does cite Roy’s work, but provides no details about the study or its findings.

Unlike Roy’s article, Burrell’s work on the desexualization of organizations (1984, 1987), seems to have piqued scholarly interest (Sullivan, 2014). Burrell analyses the control mechanisms developed by ‘superordinates’ (1984: 113) and ‘those in positions of authority’ (ibid: 97) in order to expel sexual activity from a variety of institutions
including prisons, factories and monasteries. In so doing, he proposes that the idea that sex and work are antithetical is neither inevitable nor universal, but rather has progressively developed out of a number of historical processes: industrialization; bureaucratization; professionalization; and the growth of capitalism.

These processes have helped to construct sexual activity as irrational and wasteful - a potential source of indiscipline, requiring containment through the disciplining of workers. Following mid-period Foucault (Burrell, 1988), Burrell details numerous disciplinary techniques; the use of ‘coercive punishments’ (1984: 105), such as the penitentials used by the Catholic Church against acts of fornication, and, in other organizations, the introduction of tighter controls over time and the bodies of workers, for example through restrictions on rest days and the close surveillance of factory workers. He goes on to document acts of resistance, noting the recalcitrant sexual activities of naval officers and concentration camp inmates, amongst others.

As Fleming (2007) observes, Burrell argues against theorizations that rely on a Newtonian metaphor, in which ‘primary action and reaction’ (Fleming, 2007: 241) are equal and opposite, so that resistance is understood as a direct response to managerial control. Burrell also emphasizes the conceptual difficulties in untangling the dynamics of control and resistance, and the concomitant empirical problem of trying to work out, ‘who is resisting what control emanating from what direction’ (Burrell, 1984: 100; also cited in Fleming, 2007: 242). In responding to these difficulties Burrell follows Foucault, insisting upon a dialectical view of resistance and control, rather than an oppositional one. However, in dividing his empirical material between two sections - the first on how institutional control of sexuality is manifest, and the second on resistance to it - it is this latter oppositional view that is, to some extent, reinforced.
Indeed, Burrell admits that in splitting the data out in this way, he ends up tearing ‘the intertwined from one another’ (Burrell, 1984: 102).

Nonetheless, Burrell provides a fascinating and important discussion of the historical emergence and disciplinary effects of power relations on workplace sexuality. Supporting Foucault’s refutation of the ‘repressive hypothesis’ (Foucault, 1978b: 10), his work also facilitates understanding of how attempts to desexualize or repress sexuality may serve, paradoxically, to sexualize work. Thus, and as the quotation from Bauman which prefaces this chapter also implies, desexualisation and sexualisation may be understood as coterminous.

Foucauldian ideas have been applied elsewhere to research on desexualization, notably in relation to female worker identity. For example, Bartky (1988) and Trethewey (1999) both adopt a Foucauldian feminist lens to study how women’s working bodies are disciplined in order to prevent their ‘excessively sexual’ (Trethewey, 1999: 437) and ‘leaky’ (Shildrick, 1997) bodies from being read either as a ‘professional liability’ (Trethewey, 1999: 445) or as insufficiently feminine. As Sullivan (2014: 349) notes, these interpretations place women employees in a ‘double bind’: they must possess sex appeal, but cannot be too sexy.

However, as with Burrell’s research these approaches emphasize the mechanics of disciplinary power, foregrounding surveillance, panopticism, and normalization in the production of docile female bodies. Burrell’s work hints at the possibility of self-control, thus alighting on the idea of agency, but this is glossed over as an adjunct of an individual’s attempts to resist the control of another (Burrell, 1984: 114). Consequently other, possibly less coercive or constraining techniques implicated in the sexualisation and/or desexualization of work are not explored in these studies; they do not significantly engage with Foucault’s later works on ethics, subjectivity, and
government. This is a point I return to in the final section of the chapter. First, I critically discuss the notion and implications of re-eroticization.

**Re-eroticization theory**

As already noted, Witz & Savage (1992), see the study of organizational sexuality as taking one of two forms: either researchers endeavour to ‘add in’ an analysis of sexuality which is always already there, or they see it as an ‘add on’ to their account of organizational life. The works of Pringle (1989) and of Hearn and Parkin (1997) exemplify the ‘add in’ approach and, arguably, most of the studies of the sexualisation of service work noted above could also be placed under its rubric. These studies sometimes view sexuality as a primary concern for the analyst to surface and explore (e.g. Pringle, 1989) or, more often, they arrive at the study of sexuality by accident because it pervades data collected in pursuit of other analytic aims (e.g. Filby, 1992; Fleming, 2007; Di Domenico & Fleming, 2009).

Noting his frequent references to organizational sexuality as an ‘underlife’ (Burrell, 1984: 110, 112, 114) Witz & Savage (1992: 50) maintain that the ‘add on’ approach is typified by Burrell. Understood thus, manifestations of organizational sexuality are posited as something supplementary to, rather than as something inextricably embedded within, the everyday life of organizations. Accordingly, Burrell (1992) is able to recommend that the workplace should be re-eroticized.

Re-eroticization theory, as articulated by Burrell, argues for the reclamation of diverse ‘joyous and playful’ (Burrell, 1992: 78) libidinal pleasures as a way of radically transforming work. Burrell emphasizes that it is the erotic, and not merely sexuality, that he wants to encourage; re-eroticization is not to be confused with resexualization. Following Bologh (1990), *eros* is broadly interpreted by Burrell as involving different and playful forms of sensuality, and does not just refer to sexual acts. Re-eroticization,
he contends, offers organizational members the means to resist managerial attempts to suppress or control sexual identities and behaviours. It also presents an alternative to Weber’s sterile bureaucracy. Having summarised the theory, I now examine it for its uses and limitations in understanding the forms and functions of organizational sexuality.

Re-eroticization theory has been taken up in two recent studies of organizational sexuality. In an article on love and eros in universities, Bell & Sinclair (2014: 277) echo Burrell’s recommendations in their suggestion that academe should re-value eros as an ‘antidote to the increasingly factory like experience’ of studying and working in universities. Sullivan’s (2014) work on massage therapists also draws on re-eroticization theory, although she advocates a diluted version of it. Acknowledging some of its limitations, re-eroticization is nonetheless presented by Sullivan as a potential route through which non-coercive and pleasurable forms of desire may enter and become ‘part of the conversation’ (2014: 360) both at work, and in the study of work. I consider Bell & Sinclair’s (2014) work further in Chapter 4, which examines scholarship on the university. Below, I focus on Sullivan’s interpretation and application of the theory.

Sullivan’s research makes insightful empirical contributions to the literature on sexuality. Her data confronts some of re-eroticization theory’s perceived pitfalls, such as its hetero-normative and masculinist tendencies (see Brewis & Grey, 1994; Brewis & Linstead, 2000). Observing that what counts as an ‘appropriate’ or ‘authentic’ expression of femininity and/or sexuality at work may privilege what she terms ‘male norms’ (Sullivan, 2014: 360), she argues that re-eroticization should recognize different forms of desire, including lack of desire. Following Ashcraft (2013), Brewis & Grey (1994), and Brewis & Linstead (2000), Sullivan also attends to the dangers of allowing
the erotic *carte blanche* within organizational settings. She points to sexual violence and harassment as examples of what Brewis & Linstead (2000) have referred to as ‘the dark side’ of organizational sexuality, in order to qualify her recommendations that organizational sexuality might be reclaimed.

However, in her concluding comments Sullivan seems to adopt the essentialist vocabulary that Brewis & Grey (1994) and Brewis & Linstead (2000) associate with re-eroticization. For example, she refers to sexuality’s ‘naturalness’ (360), and for more ‘liberating’ conditions which might enable therapists to ‘bring sexuality in’ (ibid; 359) to the work environment. She also speaks of ‘freeing’ clients (ibid: 361) from the vulnerable subject positions therapists place them in when they make sexual advances in the consulting room. Such conclusions seem to set up re-eroticization as an emancipatory project; sex is understood as something natural, which can be recovered and liberated. However, as Brewis & Grey (1994) have argued, such arguments seem to assume the existence of a sexual essence requiring authentic expression. This imbues the notion of sexual liberation with a disciplinary character, since it creates an ‘ideal’, and marginalizes ‘inauthentic’ or repressed sexualities (Brewis & Grey, 1994:71). Consequently, the logic of re-eroticization, as with many critical approaches to MOS, risks becoming as dogmatic and alienating as the managerialist logic it seeks to undermine (see Starkey & Hatchuel, 2002; Barratt, 2003).

In their critique of re-eroticization theory, Brewis & Linstead (2000) have further argued that re-eroticization transgresses the very notion of organizing: it heaps sex on to organization to such an extent that it becomes ‘orgiastic’ (Brewis & Linstead, 2000: 182). Following Bataille and Dollimore, they argue that the logical conclusion of fully unleashing the forces of desire would be to fundamentally and radically disorganize, because desire is conceived of as wasteful and excessive expenditure, whilst
organization requires purpose and stability. According to this view Burrell’s theory appears self-destructive - organization cannot co-exist with unfettered eroticism. Taken alongside the criticisms outlined above, re-eroticization theory thus seems to have been dealt some devastating blows.

The contribution of Foucault to studies of organizational sexuality

In order to address what they perceive to be re-eroticization theory’s ‘destabilizing flaws’ (1994: 80), Brewis & Grey suggest that scholars turn to Foucault for help out of some of the conundrums the theory presents. They argue that work espousing Foucault’s rejection of an intrinsically sexual core to the self may be a fruitful direction in which to take analysis of organizational sexuality. In such an approach, they state, the utopianism of re-eroticization theory may be avoided (ibid: 68).

As already noted in relation to research undertaken by Burrell (1984, 1987), Bartky (1988), Pringle (1989), and Trethewey (1989), Foucauldian thought has not been ignored by researchers interested in organizational sexuality. However, and as with the MOS literature more generally (see Burrell, 1988; Barratt, 2008; Bardon & Josserand, 2011), the focus in these studies is on Discipline and Punish era Foucault, and not on his later works.

This omission is unsurprising; the studies cited above predate the publication of English translations of Foucault’s most influential later works on government, ethics, and subjectivity. These include the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality (1986, 1990) and many of his lecture series (e.g. 1991b, 2005; 2009). Consequently my thesis is positioned, in part, as an attempt to pick up where these analyses leave off, incorporating the later publications in order to understand how additional techniques may be deployed to regulate sexual conduct. In this concluding section I outline how a later Foucauldian perspective might usefully contribute to the extant literature.
The first contribution lies in the potential of the broad notion of ‘government’, which I outlined in the introduction. Importantly, government incorporates diverse power relations and techniques, in which ‘technologies of domination’ intersect with ‘technologies of self’ (1993: 203). In line with such an approach I see the relations implicated in the government of organizational sexuality as multiple and unstable. Consequently, rather than understanding the control of worker sexuality as emanating from the top down, as I have argued Burrell (1984) does, or as both top down and lateral, as Fleming’s work (2007) indicates, I want to attend to its management through a myriad of different power relations. These include disciplinary and pastoral modalities, but also involve the mobilization of apparatuses of security, and of ethical self-relations. This latter technique, in particular, emphasizes the notion of the self as a field managed by the self.

It is an exploration of these latter kinds of relation that leads me to the Foucauldian notion of a critical ethos (Foucault, 2000; Barratt, 2003). I use this to explore and account for articulations of sexual agency, self-determination, and choice which, as I have discussed, are sometimes alluded to in the literature. So, rather than index the production of ‘docile bodies’, as Trethewey (1999) does, Burrell (1984), Filby (1992), Fleming (2007), Warhurst & Nickson (2009) and Sullivan (2014) all implicate agency in their analyses of how processes of control and resistance impact workers’ sexual conduct. However, the concept of agency is not developed theoretically or analytically by these scholars.

Fleming (2007) offers perhaps the most sophisticated analysis of control and resistance within the literature, highlighting their intersecting but different effects. However, his analysis follows Nancy Fraser in considering the political outcomes of struggles for
control, and thus his focus is on collective impacts rather than in exploring articulations of personal agency.

In contrast, Filby (1992) and Sullivan (2014) both alight on the issue of individual agency in their consideration of tensions between control and resistance.Whilst Filby (1992: 30) observes that management can only ever have a ‘tenuous grasp’ over worker sexuality, since workers are able to articulate their sexuality in ‘creative’ and ‘unpredictable’ ways, Sullivan notes how one massage therapist invokes ‘sexual agency’ (2014: 359) to articulate a non-normative stance on the issue of sexual encounters with clients. Thus these researchers both demonstrate that employees express themselves in ways which implicate creativity and self-determination, rather than subjection and docility. However, they do not explain how the production of ‘novel ideas’ (Sullivan, 2014: 359) is possible. Consequently, questions about how agency operates are not addressed.

The inability to theorize agency is a criticism that has sometimes been levelled at the work of Foucault and his followers (e.g. Mouzelis, 1995; Newton, 1998). Critics claim that if the Foucauldian subject is an effect of discourse, and is always already caught up in relations of power, there is no basis on which to act otherwise. However, other scholars (Brewis, 1998a; Bevir, 1999; Barratt, 2003; Bardon & Josserand, 2010; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013) have referred such critics to Foucault’s later work on government and ethics, and in particular his explication of a critical ethos or ‘limit attitude’ (Foucault, 2000: 315), which provides room for agency. From this perspective agency is understood as the practice of freedom, through which subjects reflexively question the practices that they inherit, and thus are able to stylize and modify themselves (Foucault, 1984, 2000). In so doing they may agentially ‘resist the normalizing effects of modern power’ (Bevir, 1999:78).
In addition to this Foucauldian notion of agency as residing in critical and self-forming practices, I also embrace the view of discursive psychologists regarding the rhetorical organization of agency (e.g. Billig, 1997; Edwards, 2007). Thus, rather than trying to infer from my data various underlying, cognitive processes which lead to agency, I am interested in how agency and critical self-forming practices are worked up within texts relating to F-S relationships. In other words, how agency is articulated takes centre stage. This is an argument I develop in Part II of the thesis. For now I propose that foregrounding the rhetorical organization of texts leads me to a different approach to the difficult work of disentangling the complex processes of control and resistance alluded to by Burrell (1984) and Fleming (2007). I am interested in how the texts studied articulate control, resistance, and agency, rather than in trying to decipher motives and ‘deep interiors’ (Silverman, 2007: 46).
Chapter 3

Harassment knowledge, power relations, and faculty-student relationships

We must not look for who has the power in the order of sexuality (men, adults, parents, doctors) and who is deprived of it (women, adolescents, children, patients)...Relations of power-knowledge are not static forms of distribution, they are ‘matrices of transformations’. The nineteenth century grouping made up of the father, the mother, the educator, and the doctor, around the child and his sex, was subjected to constant modifications, continual shifts.

(Foucault, 1978b: 99)

Physical intimacy with students is not now and never has been acceptable behaviour for academicians. It cannot be defended or explained away by evoking fantasies of devoted professors and sophisticated students being denied the right to ‘true love’. Where power differentials exist there can be no ‘mutual consent’.

(Dzeich & Weiner, 1990: xviii)
Introduction

Research on consensual F-S relationships has traditionally been situated within the extant literature on sexual harassment, as opposed to the broader literature on organizational sexuality in which it might also, arguably, be located (Bellas & Gossett, 2001). This is primarily because the F-S relationship has been understood as an asymmetrical one, in which the academic has power over the student. As the quote from Dzeich & Weiner (1990) prefacing this chapter indicates, this framing de-legitimizes notions of consent.

In this chapter I discuss research on sexual harassment. I begin by exploring what is meant by the term. In addition to examining legal definitions I consider research that has argued for its relevance as an analytically definable feature of organizational life (e.g. Hoffmann, 1986; McDonald, 2012). This research is critically appraised by drawing on the work of scholars who have conceptualized what we know about harassment (Brewis, 2001), and about the F-S relationship as an assumed exemplar of it (Taylor, 2011), as ‘historical artefact[s]’ (Brewis, 2001: 38.). Finally, I consider the advantages of adopting a discursive approach to study harassment and F-S relationships in order to address some of the concerns raised.

In reviewing the literature, I emphasize two issues. First, I highlight the main contributions and limitations of previous research on harassment and F-S relationships. In so doing, I argue for more interpretations of these phenomena in which a dynamic and nuanced approach to the power relations in which they are enmeshed is adopted. As with the last chapter, this entails consideration of the contributions of Foucault, and of scholarship influenced by his oeuvre. Second, and relatedly, I indicate how the thesis might extend the boundaries of the extant literature, highlighting new ways of understanding F-S relationships.
Defining ‘sexual harassment’

The naming of ‘sexual harassment’ (henceforth SH) in the 1970s by North-American psychologists and second-wave feminists such as Carroll Brodsky, Lin Farley, and Catherine MacKinnon (Fitzgerald, 1996; Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1995) brought concerns about certain kinds of institutional behaviour into the spotlight. Wilkinson & Kitzinger (1995: 32) assert that SH can, in some respects, be considered one of feminism’s greatest ‘triumphs’, giving shape to an experience shared by many women. They argue that workplaces have increasingly ‘been forced to take on board’ (ibid: 32) this ‘problem’ as a result of changes to employment legislation. Supporting this, McDonald (2012) notes that the term is now incorporated into workplace discrimination legislation in over 50 countries.

Initially coined to refer to the perceived intimidation and coercion of women by men in educational and work environments (Brownmiller, 1999), many of the countries legislating against SH now adopt legal and policy definitions which also cover the harassment of men by women and same-sex harassment (McDonald, 2012). However, despite this widening of the scope of legislation, SH continues primarily to be associated with men’s treatment of women (Brewis, 2001), and SH charges are disproportionately brought by women against men (Wilson & Thompson, 2001; McDonald, 2012). Scholarship has also foregrounded the harassment of women by men (McDonald, 2012). As I elaborate shortly, some have interpreted this as constituting a form of heterosexism, or victim feminism (e.g. Wolf, 1993).

McDonald states that, in legal terms, sexual harassment is typically understood as a form of discrimination involving unwelcome behaviour that has an ‘explicit sexual dimension’, and ‘which has the purpose or effect of being intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive’ (2012: 2). In the UK, the Equality Act (2010),
refers to ‘unwanted conduct of a sexual nature’ (s.3(a)) which either violates the dignity of the recipient of the behaviour, or creates an ‘intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment’ (s. 26. 1(b)(ii)). In determining whether or not an action might constitute ‘harassment’, the act states that one of the factors to be taken into account is the perception of the ‘recipient’ (s.26. 4. (a)).

This indexes the contingent nature of what gets labelled as SH, implying that judgements about whether or not an action by one person is labelled as harassing by another are subjective. As Wilson & Thompson (2001) observe, ‘all women will not interpret sexual behaviour in the same way. What can be defined as harassing for one may be exciting for another’ (Wilson & Thompson, 2001: 75). This resonates with scholarship noted in the last chapter (e.g. Pringle, 1989; Filby, 1992), which recognized that organizational sexuality is differentially experienced by subjects.

Certainly what is understood by the term SH is contested; a proliferation of definitions and typologies of sexually harassing behaviour abound in the literature (see McDonald, 2012 for an overview). Indeed, some commentators have argued that in order to achieve inclusivity, the scope of what counts as SH has expanded such that it has become an ‘accordion’ concept (Jafar, 2003: 44). In other words, what is understood as harassment has come to ‘stretch infinitely…a look, a violent assault, and a consensual relationship’ (Jafar, 2003: 44) can all fall under the rubric of harassment.

Despite its expansionist tendencies, some commentators (e.g. Hoffmann, 1986; Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995; McDonald, 2012) have observed how those writing about harassment continue to attempt to nail down what SH is. This has led researchers to develop classification systems for harassing behaviours, and to try and measure their frequency (Fitzgerald, 1996). In the US, *quid pro quo* harassment, in which accepting unwanted sexual advances is a condition of continued employment or work privileges,
is legally differentiated from *hostile environment* harassment, in which no overt condition is applied, but the behaviour is understood to create an intimidating work environment (Watts, 1996). However, the literature tends to break this twofold categorization down further still: Betts and Newman (1982) identify six types of harassing behaviour; Till (1980) locates five; and Fitzgerald (1996), divides her definition into four subcategories.

Researchers have also investigated the characteristics of harassers and the harassed (Gutek, 1985; Berdahl, 2007; Schweinle et al, 2009), and studied how the work environment influences the incidence of, and attitudes towards, sexual harassment (Gruber, 1998; de Haas & Timmerman, 2010). As Jafar (2003) and Taylor (2011) both observe, it is not uncommon for such studies to foreground campus harassment and, in so doing, incorporate F-S relationships as exemplars of SH (e.g. Stites, 1996a, 1996b; Zalk et al, 1991; Zalk, 1996; Eyre, 2000; Levenson, 2006).

For example, in their round up of research on campus harassment, Rubin & Borgers (1990) criticise research by Pope et al (1979) and Glaser & Thorpe (1986) on non-coercive relationships between educators and students. They write;

> In two studies, which are related to the topic of sexual harassment, researchers examined sexual behaviours between psychology educators and graduate students. Instead of identifying the experience as sexual harassment, the terms ‘sexual contact’ and ‘sexual intimacy’ were used. The behaviours identified in these studies would correspond to the more severe forms of harassment described in other studies. They were specifically defined as intercourse or genital stimulation. (Rubin & Borger, 1990: 405)

Despite the apparent implication here that the two studies cited by Rubin & Borger downplay the ‘severity’ of the conduct they report, both of the studies mentioned are
critical of F-S relationships. However, their authors assert that many relationships are not experienced by participants - initially, at least - as coercive. Indeed, Glaser & Thorpe (1986) state that only 28% of their respondents experienced a degree of coercion at the time of the relationship, although they observe that some later came to re-assess this judgement. Consequently, Glaser & Thorpe (1986) problematize F-S relationships primarily by understanding them as unethical, rather than by conflating them with SH (see also Skeen & Nielson, 1983).

For Rubin & Borger (1990) however, the nature of the sexual contact ‘uncovered’ by these studies means that they should be understood as harassment, even if the student entered the relationship voluntarily. These authors claim to be able to locate ‘severity’ by referring to the nature of the contact, allied to presumed asymmetries (ibid: 410) inherent within the educator-student relationship, rather than by referring to students’ evaluations of the degree of coercion experienced. In contrast to legal definitions then, SH is not judged here according to whether the behaviour in question is perceived as unwanted by respondents, but rather becomes a matter for scholarly interpretation. Thus apparently consensual relationships between university students and faculty are subsumed within discussions of harassment.

Jafar (2003) finds a number of problems with the research cited by Rubin & Borger. For example, she pinpoints methodological problems, noting that most of the studies they cite only consider relationships that have ended. Further, Jafar argues that the appropriation of consensual F-S relationships by harassment knowledge abases what she terms more ‘egregious’ (2003: 44) forms of SH. Her contention raises certain difficulties however, since, like many of the studies she condemns, she seems to imply that what ‘really’ counts as sexual harassment can be objectively measured and classified. As with Rubin & Borger (1990), by differentiating between more or less ‘pernicious offense[s]’ (Jafar, 2003: 55) the notion of a harassment continuum is
invoked (see also Eyre, 2000 and McDonald, 2012). This, however, is to underestimate
the multiplicity of ways in which harassment may be produced and understood, and
ignores the historically and relationally contingent character of harassment knowledge
(Brewis, 2001).

‘Harassment knowledge’, f-s relationships, and juridico-legal approaches to
power

Analyses like Rubin & Borger’s suggest that definitions of SH are theoretical and a
priori; they are not subjective, contingent, or contestable. Observing and critiquing
such a line of thought, Brewis coins the term ‘harassment knowledge’ (2001: 37) in
reference to what she considers the historically specific assumptions and ‘programmatic
ideals’ (ibid: 38) that have become associated with SH.

Brewis argues that discourses invoking harassment, including scholarly and wider
discourses, posit certain ‘claims to truth’ (ibid: 38). These include: a zero-sum
conception of power; a related commitment to the notion that ‘good sex’, which is
egalitarian and transparently consensual, is possible; and, as I have already implied,
gendered and (hetero)sexist assumptions about female and male subject positions and
relations. I now consider each of these points further. In so doing I align harassment
knowledge with what Taylor (2011:200), following Foucault, refers to as ‘juridico-
legal’ understandings of harassment. I use each of these terms throughout this chapter,
and also later in my empirical analysis of harassment discourse (Chapter 7), in reference
to ‘orthodox feminist analyses’ (McDonald, 2012). This latter term rather glosses
different varieties of feminism (see Tuana & Tong, 1995; Brewis, 1998a). Nonetheless,
I use it here because harassment is a topic that has elicited some convergence between
feminisms, although they are by no means united in their identification of, and
responses to, the issue (Thomas & Kitzinger, 1995). It also helps to distinguish it from
the critical and discursive views examined later in the chapter.
In common with other writers (e.g. Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995; Taylor, 2011; McDonald, 2012), Brewis’s unpacking of harassment knowledge finds power to have been isolated as a pre-eminently salient explanatory concept. In other words, SH is presented as less about sex, and more about power. Such claims are problematized by Brewis on a number of counts, which I consider below.

Power as zero-sum

First, harassment commentators, Brewis observes, have tended to represent power as if it were a resource which can be possessed or wielded by some against others. Thus power becomes a “zero-sum” game’ (Brewis, 2001: 44), with clearly identifiable winners and losers. Like Brewis, other critical analyses of the SH literature (e.g. Roiphe, 1994; Dank & Fulda, 1997; Mahood & Littlewood, 1997; Jafar, 2003; Taylor, 2011) have been attentive to how the deployment of a resource model of power enables consensual relationships between academic faculty and students to be written into harassment knowledge.

Taylor (2011) argues that theorizations of F-S relationships typically operationalize what Foucault refers to as a ‘sovereign’ or ‘juridico-legal’ (Taylor, 2011: 200) account in which power is understood as operating negatively and from the top down, either through aggressive domination or by proscribing certain kinds of activity. Consequently, power is seen as residing with academics, universities, anti-fraternization policies, and indeed with feminist commentators themselves. Each of these groups is then able to make use of their societal and/or organizational status in order to wield power, albeit in the service of putatively different ends. Students, on the other hand, are understood as powerless; they are ‘deresponsibilized’ (see Hunt, 2003: 205).

Dziech & Weiner’s provocatively titled book, ‘The Lecherous Professor’ (1984) is cited by Taylor (2011) as a case in point. Its authors advocate the banning of F-S relationships because they are perceived to be rooted in asymmetrical relations, thus
preventing them from being categorized as ‘consensual’ (see also Paludi & Barickman, 1991; Zalk et al, 1991; Zalk 1996; Stites, 1996a, 1996b; Levenson, 2006). Whilst scholars writing in this vein are overwhelmingly North American second-wave feminists (Dank & Fulda, 1997; Hunt, 1999) the one piece of academic research conducted in the UK on F-S relationships by Carter & Jeffs (1995) concurs. Arguing that ‘voluntary consent by the student in such a relationship is suspect’ (Carter & Jeffs, 1995: 54), they assert that universities need to publish clear and strictly enforced policies. They recommend that F-S relationships should be prohibited where the member of faculty is involved in teaching, assessing or supervising the student, in order to combat the sexual exploitation of students by academics.

Consequently, F-S relationships have become caught up in the rhetoric of harassment. They have also been consigned, alongside harassment in general, to the realm of, ‘bad’ (Brewis, 2001: 39) or ‘dangerous’ (Taylor, 2011: 200) sex. This is because they are perceived to represent an abuse of power, rather than emerging ‘on the basis of mutual attraction.’ (Brewis, 2001: 39).

Interestingly, Morgan & Davidson (2008) have made similar arguments in relation to mentoring relationships at work. Maintaining that such relationships involve asymmetries in power and status, they claim that, ‘A mentoring relationship which results in the mentor and the mentee having a sexual relationship is not a healthy one’ (Morgan & Davidson, 2008: 126). These authors emphasize the ‘risks’ of mentors ‘exploiting’ their positions (ibid: 126), concluding that organizations need to implement policies to deal with such relationships. In this sense they follow the trajectory of research on F-S relationships, and add impetus for considering such relationships in relation to the wider literature on organizational sexuality.
No ‘outside’ power

This leads to another of Brewis’s criticisms regarding how power is conceptually framed by harassment knowledge. Brewis (2001) rejects harassment knowledge’s implied notion of ‘good’ sex – sex that is somehow outside of, or free from, power relations – as a ‘chimera’ (Brewis, 2001: 40). This rejection stems from two related ideas, both arising out of Foucault’s work on power and sexuality. First, Foucault argues that since power is everywhere, one can never be outside it (Foucault, 1980: 141). Second, for Foucault, any overarching and unitary concept of sex is a construction; it is an effect of power, and not some natural state to which one can be returned through individual or collective emancipatory projects (Foucault, 1978b). Thus Brewis (2001) and Taylor (2011) argue that ‘good’ sex is not possible, and Taylor (2011) cites Foucault’s contention that sex and power are anchored to each other in ‘perpetual spirals of power and pleasure’ (Foucault, 1978b: 45) in support of this.

Both Taylor (2011) and Brewis (2001) claim that this observation that sex and power are inextricably linked, and may even be mutually reinforcing, is typically overlooked by the harassment literature. As a result, the possibility that harassment discourse might reproduce the very activity it seeks to denigrate, producing desire by constantly watching over it, is elided.

Heterosexist assumptions

As with the critiques of orthodox literature on SH in general, commentators noting how a harassment lens has been applied to F-S relationships have suggested that the adoption of such a perspective seems likely to result in something other than the emancipatory goals that second-wave feminism has set itself (Dank & Fulda, 1997; Hunt, 1999). Emphasizing the ‘powerlessness’ of students - and, in particular, female students - in fending off the advances of predatory (male) lecturers casts students as helpless, thus reinforcing their ‘victim’ status (Roiphe, 1994; Dank & Fulda, 1997; Dank, 2009; Jafar,
2003; Taylor, 2011). Brewis suggests that harassment knowledge ‘hysteresizes’ women, positioning them as ‘peculiarly, even pathologically vulnerable’ (2001: 44). Furthermore, the clichéd portrayal of the aggressive male academic who seduces and sexually exploits his female students works to deny the sexual desires of women/students who might actively seek out or welcome F-S relationships (Jafar, 2003; Taylor, 2011).

As a result, women/students are constructed as passive sex objects rather than active sexual and desiring subjects. Exploring the ways in which notions of consent have been undermined by feminist proponents of university ‘anti-fraternization’ policies, Gallop considers how this move, which she sees as paternalistic at best, turns feminist goals on their head;

Prohibition of consensual teacher-student relations is based on the assumption that when a student says yes she really means no. I cannot help but think that this proceeds from the same logic according to which when a student says no she really means yes. The first assumption is protectionist; the second is the very logic of harassment. (1997: 38)

In other words, the US ‘banning movement’ (Dank & Fulda, 1997) propagated by what Wolf (1993: 135) refers to as ‘victim feminists’, rests on conservative or even misogynistic assumptions about women (Mahood & Littlewood, 1997; Taylor, 2011). It is mired in understandings of sex in which women/students are passive, whilst men/faculty are active; women/students’ sexuality is de-legitimized; and women/students are constructed as incapable of understanding what they want or what is good for them, resulting in the need for feminists and university administrators to intervene on their behalf. Consequently, women/students’ implied helplessness is reinforced, thus rendering them potentially *more* rather than *less* vulnerable (Gallop,
Faculty, meanwhile, are vilified (Roiphe, 1993) for being ‘sexually obsessed predators’ (Dank & Fulda, 1997:112). This has the further effect of writing out of harassment knowledge cases in which female lecturers either date or sexually harass male students, or female students harass male academics. Studies exploring scenarios in which the gender roles constructed by harassment knowledge are reversed are scant (see Grauerholz, 1989, and Scarduzio & Geist-Martin, 2008, 2010 for two notable exceptions), as are those that consider same-sex relationships (Gallop, 1997; Bellas & Gossett, 2001; Taylor, 2011).

Perhaps part of the reason for neglecting such relationships stems from claims that SH is primarily caused by sociocultural rather than organizational power relations (MacKinnon, 1979; Gutek, 1985; McDonald, 2012). In other words, harassment is often conceived of as a manifestation of societal asymmetries between men and women (McDonald, 2012). Understood thus, the notions of women harassing men and same sex harassment are rendered virtually impossible.

Notwithstanding the heterosexism of such conclusions, they seem to imply that, where power is concerned, being male will always outstrip being female, even if the woman in question happens to occupy a more ‘powerful’ organizational position than the man. Yet many of the scholars who argue that SH is a result of patriarchy (e.g. MacKinnon, 1979; Zalk, 1986) are the same commentators who perceive F-S relationships as problematic because ‘The bottom line in the relationship between faculty member and student is POWER. The faculty member has it, the student does not’ (Zalk, 1996: 85, emphasis in original). Such contrary positions seem hard to reconcile - how can the male student and female academic be both powerful and powerless?

Re-framing ‘power’ to explore harassment knowledge

Wilson & Thompson (2001) and Taylor (2011) argue that the literature on harassment fundamentally misunderstands the dynamics of power relations. Wilson & Thompson
(2001) turn to Lukes’ theorization of power for a more three-dimensional model, in which power is not only ‘A over B’, but also considers the less visible processes of agenda-setting and structural power relations which are seen as shaping practices and perceptions of harassment. However, they suggest that Foucault’s conception of power adds something extra to Lukes’ model. This distinctive contribution rests in the Foucauldian rejection of essentialism, and in the conceptualization of power as ‘capillary like’, so that power, ‘is neither one-directional, nor flows from a single source to shape, direct or constrain subjects’ (Wilson & Thompson, 2001: 74). This conceptualization, they assert, challenges the restricted subject positions that are assigned or made available to men and women.

Similarly, in her analysis of how power relations operate in pedagogical institutions, Taylor (2011) critiques models in which power is reified. She claims that over-reliance on models where power is attributed a realist and quantifiable ontological status has led to consensual F-S relationships being defined ‘harassment’. In other words, if power is a ‘thing’ which professors possess, and which students lack, F-S relationships will always appear to be inherently unequal and thus prone to perceptions of abuse.

Rather than look to Lukes, Taylor’s critique of orthodox accounts of SH in general, and of F-S relationships in particular, draws more heavily on Foucault’s analytics of power, foregrounding disciplinary power relations. She writes ‘The university is … a disciplinary institution and not an institution of sovereign power, and so we might expect professor-student relations to be better theorized by a disciplinary rather than sovereign model of power.’ (Taylor, 2011: 194). Taylor also observes a role for self-care and care of others within academia (2011: 189). However, this concept is not significantly developed in the anecdotal evidence her paper discusses, and Taylor seems to posit self-care as a pedagogic ideal, rather than a reality, in the late modern university.
Taylor focuses on the ‘how’ rather than the ‘who’ of power, and emphasizes the subtle mechanisms through which disciplinary power operates. She cites educational evaluations as an example of the surveillance techniques at work in the contemporary university. Importantly, such techniques are often reciprocal. So, whilst professors evaluate students’ performance through feedback and grading assignments, students also evaluate their lecturers’ performance through formal and informal mechanisms, such as course evaluations and the use of on-line tools like RateMyProfessor (Taylor, 2011: 195). This evinces the networked nature of disciplinary power relations, which operate from the bottom-up and laterally, as well as top-down. In remarking that students’ evaluations of academics are often anonymous, whereas academics’ feedback to students is not, Taylor also exposes shortcomings in presumptions that power asymmetries will always favour faculty, and that students are uniquely vulnerable. She also calls to mind the panopticon (Foucault, 1979), in which the effects of disciplinary techniques are made more insidious by their invisibility.

Both Brewis (2001) and Taylor’s (2011) critiques of harassment knowledge are compelling. However, their contributions are primarily theoretical or analytic rather than empirical. In order to empirically address the limitations of research approaches operationalizing a juridico-legal conception of power, some researchers have argued in favour of a discursive approach to the study of SH (Clair, 1993; Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995; Eyre, 2000). In the following section I assess the contributions of this strand of research.

**Discursive approaches to sexual harassment**

It is important to note that discursive analyses of harassment are sparse. In this section I highlight three studies, noting how they open up possibilities for research on harassment. None of these studies deal with F-S relationships *per se*, although the first, conducted by Eyre (2000), considers campus harassment.
Eyre (2000) conducts a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the discourses mobilized around one case of campus sexual harassment in a Canadian university. Her study involves an examination of official statements and newspaper stories, which are ‘interrogat[ed] for practices of exclusion, distortion and marginalization’ (Eyre, 2000: 297). From this, dominant discursive formations, such as ‘masculinist’ and ‘academic freedom’ discourses, are identified. Eyre (2000) also attends to absences, suggesting that feminist discourses were excluded from public discussions of the case. Eyre recommends that universities adopt a more reflexive attitude towards their framing of sexual harassment. This does not simply amount to reproducing feminist truth claims about and against harassment, but rather involves the adoption of a Foucauldian ‘critical attitude’ and engagement in “‘self forming” activity’ (Eyre, 2000: 304). These practices, she suggests, enable individuals to act as moral agents and challenge relations of power.

Other discursive analyses of SH (e.g. Clair, 1995; Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995) have drawn less explicitly on Foucauldian thought. As with Eyre’s work, these analyses offer a counterpoint to research which has attempted to define, measure, and combat SH, because such work is understood as riven with ‘contradictions, ambiguities and progressive and regressive interpretations’ (McDonald, 2012: 2). However, these studies use a more fine-grained approach to analysis than Eyre.

Kitzinger & Thomas (1995) maintain that attempts to locate a ‘watertight’ definition of harassment, which exhausts all categories and is widely accepted by different interest groups, is likely to be ‘futile’ (1995: 46). Furthermore, the definitional creep of SH as it encroaches upon consensual relationships risks eroding any conceptual usefulness the term might possess, since the threat becomes sexuality in all its forms, rather than being confined to unwelcome sexual attention. In other words, whilst narrow definitions lead to disagreement, broad definitions that accommodate a wide range of conducts
ultimately operate as a form of generalised organizational desexualisation. As I have already argued, this is problematic because attempts at desexualisation have the potential to sexualize environments and behaviour (Foucault, 1978b; Burrell, 1984; Sullivan, 2014).

In response to these shortcomings, Clair (1993), and Kitzinger & Thomas (1995), examine how men and women discursively negotiate definitions and experiences of harassment. They observe that their interview respondents articulate far narrower conceptions of what constitutes SH than those outlined in orthodox scholarly research. Responding to questions about personal experiences and hypothetical scenarios, interviewees in both studies were more likely to exclude activities than accommodate them in their framings of harassment.

Clair (1993) draws on work by Goffman and Giddens, which she tethers to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, to analyse the rhetorical framing of SH. Of particular interest to her is how her 50 female interviewees participate in and resist hegemonic framings. This focus on identifying dominant narratives resonates with Eyre’s (2000) approach. However, Clair (1993) is more interested in exploring the range of techniques used by respondents to make sense of and ‘sequester’ (Clair, 1993: 114) behaviour that might otherwise be construed as SH. These techniques include what she terms ‘trivialization’, in which potentially harassing incidents are collectively joked about, and the relegation of incidents to the ‘private domain’, in which respondents report that an incident was too personal or embarrassing to discuss in public. Such framings, she states, subjugate and marginalize women’s interests in favour of patriarchal and organizational ones.

Similarly, Kitzinger & Thomas (1995), who interview males and females in their study, find that SH is often discursively erased. They maintain that women resist labelling behaviour as ‘harassment’ in order to avoid a status of victimhood, and also because of harassment’s perceived pervasiveness, which renders it everyday and, in the words of
one respondent, ‘just an accepted part of […] life’ (Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995: 40). In contrast, the men they spoke to were more inclined to see sexualized behaviour at work as the result of flawed communication or ‘mixed messages’ (ibid: 43) between men and women, in which the former misinterpret the actions of the latter as a come on.

In Chapter 6 I elaborate on how fine-grained research of this sort has influenced my study. For now, suffice to say that I share with these researchers an interest in looking at the terms and categories used by participants to make sense of F-S relationships. The studies referred to above also indicate the centrality of power and power relations in understanding how sexual harassment is institutionally managed (Eyre, 2000) and how it is articulated by research participants (Clair, 1993; Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995).

**Theoretical and empirical contributions**

The studies discussed in the last two sections question orthodox approaches to the study of SH, suggesting new directions for research. Drawing to a greater (Brewis, 2001; Taylor, 2011; Eyre, 2000) or lesser (Wilson & Thompson, 2001; Kitzinger & Thomas, 1995; Clair, 1993) extent on a Foucauldian approach to power and discourse, they facilitate an understanding of power as mutable power relations, and not as a resource to be possessed or wielded.

My thesis is influenced by these studies in a number of ways. I follow Brewis (2001) in problematizing the truth claims of harassment knowledge. This is extended by considering Taylor’s (2011) suggestion that F-S relationships have been incorporated into this body of knowledge due to misunderstandings about how power relations work, and how they suffuse both sexuality and academia. The contribution I wish to make in relation to each of these papers is primarily empirical; it consists of unpacking how the F-S relationship is articulated as, and through, different kinds of power relation. The juridico-legal and sovereign technologies typically deployed by harassment knowledge (Taylor, 2011) represent only one such relation. I am interested here in how
technologies of domination, such as surveillance and dressage (Foucault, 1991a) are bolstered by, and combine with, technologies of self (Foucault, 2000), including the self-forming practices noted by Eyre (2000) and caring relations alluded to by Taylor (2011). The intersection of these two is understood as comprising government (Foucault, 1993).

The final contribution relates to my focus on consensual relationships. As I have indicated, a number of researchers have studied campus harassment and, within this, consensual F-S relationships have sometimes been incorporated as *a priori* examples of SH. However, I wish to examine how this act of incorporation is discursively accomplished and resisted. This involves a more interactive approach to the study of F-S relationships than is evident in previous research on the topic. It also involves analysis of a wider range of strategies, tactics, and techniques for regulating these kinds of relationships than has hitherto been considered.

If, as Cornford (1908) suggests, the university can be understood as a microcosm of society, then analysing how harassment knowledge is worked up in articulations of F-S relationships might illuminate how this discourse operates elsewhere. This possibility should not be overstated, however. As I argue in the next chapter, universities are particular locales, with historical and sometimes idiosyncratic ideas about their purposes. Thus the understandings of harassment offered here should not be uncritically generalised from in order to draw conclusions about wider societal or organizational understandings of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, given the large numbers of people living and working in universities, allied to their role in educating and cultivating an increasingly large segment of the population, universities are considered an important locale for empirical investigation.
Term had just begun. Professor Treece […] sat at his desk, his back to the window, with the cold, clear October light shining icily over his shoulders on to the turbulent heaps of paper upon his desk, on to the pale young faces of his three new students…New terms and new students did not depress or excite him[…]…They appeared each year, to eat for three more years in the university refectory […]; to throw tomatoes at policeman on three successive rag days, to go out in three years with perhaps as many girlfriends, and finally to leave with a lower second or third class degree, passing on into teaching or business seemingly untouched by what, Treece thought, the university stood for – whatever that was.

*(Eating People is Wrong, Malcolm Bradbury, 1959: 11-14, see appendix 4)*

Of course, universities grew up out of monasteries, so…and there is something quite special about that I think.

*(Academic, speaking at training session for new academics, see Appendix 4)*
Introduction

In his work on desexualisation, Burrell contrasts ‘commercial, industrial and custodial institutions’ (1984: 112), which he argues have all faced pressure to desexualize, with universities and colleges. Higher education settings are posited as sites in which the permissiveness of the 1960s took hold, and thus his findings, he indicates, may be less applicable to HEIs.

However, harassment knowledge’s recent annexation of F-S relationships, and indeed of campus sex more generally, seems to suggest otherwise. Moreover, since the publication of Burrell’s piece, universities in the UK, and elsewhere, have become increasingly exposed to market pressures, causing them to operate more like businesses, or even factories (Halsey, 1992; Fairclough, 1993; Parker & Jary, 1995; Collini, 2012; Alvesson, 2013; Bell & Sinclair, 2014). Whilst commentators disagree about the extent to which marketization has transformed UK HE, many have mourned what is perceived as a gradual erosion of their ‘distinctive character’ (Collini, 2012: xi).

With this in mind, I now consider how university life has been understood within the literature. I begin by tracing the modern academy’s roots back to the medieval monastery, before going on to explore expositions of how university life has changed over time. Within this, I emphasize continuities and shifts in ideas and practices regarding the nature and purpose of the academy. This is followed by a brief discussion of how power relations appear to be modified across the four epochs discussed.

Having explored historical ideas, I go on to discuss two ‘contemporary’ debates. The first considers tensions between discourses of marketization and professionalism in HE. These are often pitted against each other within the literature because they are understood as operating according to different logics. The second explores the roles of, and relations between, tutors and students. I consider arguments that marketization has
transformed these relations around a consumer model. I also examine alternative conceptions, which locate care, affection, and even love as pedagogic ideals. As in the last two chapters, scholarship engaging with discourse and power relations is a particular focus, although other perspectives are considered. I conclude by indicating how the historical ideas and contemporary debates examined are relevant to my study.

**A history of the university**

The origins of the modern university extend back to 1100, the first institutions having been established in Bologna and Paris, with Oxford and Cambridge following soon after in around 1200 (Anderson, 2006). Given the expansiveness of academia’s history, this section is necessarily selective. I attend to four epochs, focusing on the British context. I begin with medieval universities, which emerged out of the expansion of church schools and monasteries, providing education to an elite cadre of men destined to serve church and state. Second, I consider the early modern era, noting a shift in which obligations to god, queen, and country become enshrined in law, and the universities are subject to purges of dissenters. Third, I move on to the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which I suggest mark a rupture, as laws governing Oxbridge fellows are relaxed, new universities are established, and the influence of the Humboldtian model of HE is felt. Finally, I consider the impact of recent legislation on the university, focussing on changes following the 1963 Robbins Report.

The events highlighted illuminate some of the historically embedded difficulties in defining a single purpose for the university, and specifying the conduct required of its inhabitants – a point alluded to by Bradbury’s Professor Treece at the outset of this chapter (p. 58). In addition to indexing a diversity of ideas, they also inform some of the more recent debates examined later in the chapter. Thus they provide a backdrop
against and towards which certain framings of academic life, and hence the conduct of sexual activity within it, might be usefully understood.

The emergence of the medieval university in Europe

The period between 1150 and 1250 saw the emergence and expansion of a number of super schools, such as those in Oxford and, shortly afterwards, Cambridge (Dunbabin, 1999). These gradually became known as universitas, but even at the outset they were not dominated by a single model defining their purpose or organization (Dunbabin, 1999; Anderson, 2006; Burnes et al, 2013). They were also funded differently; some were funded by the state (Cambridge), and others by students (Bologna), or the church (Paris).

Whilst there is a consensus in the literature that these institutions were all based on the monastic tradition of scholarship, not all writers agree with Burnes et al’s contention that ‘Despite their different organizational forms…as European universities developed, they came to be characterized as autonomous bodies devoted to the pursuit of knowledge and truth for its own sake’ (2013: 3). For example, Dunbabin (1999) argues that even in early institutions like Naples, founded in 1224 by Frederick II who required trained lawyers to implement his policies, the demand for skills was as, if not more, important in determining growth than an appetite for learning. Dunbabin thus highlights an ‘important fact about medieval universities: there was no tension in them between proponents of a liberal education and those of vocational courses. Both were considered to have their places’ (1999: 34).

Similarly, Anderson (2006) emphasises the vocational character of many medieval universities, noting that they served both church and state by providing an advanced curriculum in theology, medicine and law, following preparatory instruction in the arts. Students either paid for tuition or received scholarships, usually from the church, which
had an interest in recruiting as widely as possible (Anderson, 2006). Thus the priesthood was one of few avenues for social mobility; in general, the costs of a university education meant that it was the preserve of the wealthy elite (Collini, 2012).

Dunbabin (1999) states that many of the university’s rituals reinforced public perceptions of privilege. She draws attention to ceremonies, such as oaths of matriculation for new scholars, academic processions, and elaborate funeral arrangements, noting that, ‘Religious obligation touched many aspects of life’ (Dunbabin, 1999: 41). She also observes that the university was, even then, often seen as a rite of passage, affording students the experience and benefits of ‘growing up’ (ibid: 45) away from the discipline of home.

This indiscipline was manifest in students’ rowdy behaviour outside the confines of seminars; fights and riots were endemic (Dunbabin, 1999; Silver, 2004; Anderson, 2006). The university master was expected to vouch for the character and morals of his student if he went on to take examinations, although at this stage relatively few students did so (Dunbabin, 1999; Maringe, 2011; Anderson, 2006). Until around 1400 most students lived outside halls and colleges, meaning that references were likely to be based on attendance at lectures, seminars, and disputations, rather than any more intimate appreciation of a student’s character (Silver, 2004; Anderson, 2006).

In summary, research on the early university reveals a nexus of complex and sometimes contradictory ideas; elitism reinforced by religious ritual, but tied to a service ideal; scholarship in which the higher faculties of law, medicine, and theology were pre-eminent; and a system in which the pursuit of a higher education had diverse aims. A university education could legitimately be viewed as representing scholarly devotion to learning as vocational or as experiential, because it allowed young men their first taste
of freedom. Thus, right at the moment of its inception, the university might be better understood as a ‘multiversity’ (Collini, 2012: 6).

The early modern universities of Oxford and Cambridge

Anderson (2006: 5) considers Henry VIII’s accession to the throne in 1509 as a ‘decisive episode, putting both the English church and the universities under closer royal control’. Throughout the Reformation, and until its Settlement under Elizabeth I, the two English universities came under intense scrutiny, receiving regular visits from Henry’s commissioners due to their perceived role in upholding the new religious orthodoxy and, concomitantly, their potential as sites of dissent.

Increased control became manifest in three ways. First, through direct state intervention in the curriculum. Certain subjects, such as canon law, were excluded. The importance of scripture was emphasized instead, and appropriate texts were prescribed (Anderson, 2006). Second, through structural changes which impacted the organization of university life. Third, and relatedly, through changing relations between masters and students (Dunbabin, 1999; Silver, 2004; Anderson, 2006). The latter two changes are now elaborated further, since they help contextualize the contemporary debates I examine later in the chapter.

In terms of organization, Anderson (2006) notes that the growth of the college system in the sixteenth century meant that the university’s authority became decentralized. This resulted in a more intimate way of organizing teaching activities and living arrangements. Under the new system the surveillance of students was easier, and college masters assumed an in loco parentis role:

The rise of collegiate life reflected the desire of both university authorities and parents to impose more discipline on undergraduates; the college fellows now
acted as tutors supervising the morals and finances of their charges, and answered to families for them. Discipline at this period included corporal punishment as well as attempts to curb students’ activities outside the college walls. (Anderson, 2006: 6)

This new emphasis on cultural and moral development whetted the aristocracy and gentry’s appetite for university education; universities became ‘a kind of finishing school for the landed elite’ (Collini, 2012: 23). The importance of gaining qualifications receded, and more experiential ideas about pursuing higher learning to develop character came to the fore (Anderson, 2006).

Later, under Elizabeth I’s reign, the decree made by her father that universities must acknowledge royal supremacy and renounce the pope was revitalized with the passing in 1558 of the Act of Supremacy. One provision of this act was the requirement for tutors and matriculating scholars to swear to the 39 Articles of Faith of the Church of England and to pledge allegiance to the crown as supreme governor of the church (Leihy, 2011). Matriculating scholars were also to swear obedience to the university (see Figure 1, overleaf).

This legislation tightened up definitions of what constituted heresy, and served both to bar entry to dissenters who refused to swear oaths, and to justify successive purges of scholars from Oxbridge throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Anderson, 2006). Declaring that the universities’ role was ‘maintenance of good and godly literature and virtuous education of youth’ (Duckenfield, 2008) Elizabeth I also ruled that Oxbridge fellows should not marry; prior to this a custom of celibacy had been practised, but not enforced by statute (Abbot, 2001; Duckenfield, 2008).
Duckenfield states that in the middle ages the condition of celibacy was considered a sign of tutors’ monastic piety. Under Elizabeth’s reign, however, it rather reflected her suspicion of women, and was also deemed a prerequisite for the new statutory
requirement that fellows take college residence, which was intended to facilitate discipline (Duckenfield, 2008).

This period then witnessed the continued influence of the church over the university, but in England this was now vested in the crown. Increased techniques of control and surveillance were imposed. These were aimed at masters, who taught a revised curriculum and were required to swear vows to queen and country. They also targeted students, who were watched over more closely by college masters, and who now pledged obedience to the university’s statutes and customs. In such a climate, notions of what the university was for appeared to converge, since to question the orthodoxy was to invite charges of treason.

Many features of university life originating in this era proved tenacious; Vernon remarks that they ‘fossilised’ (2004: 11). Indeed, it was not until the mid-1800s that some of the anachronisms posed by the academy became issues for public and political debates. These culminated in the repeal of many of the laws and traditions established under the Reformation, and introduced new ideas about what, and whom, HE was for.

*Nineteenth century reform: A liberal education*

The politico-religious monopoly of English higher education was broken in 1826, when University College London (UCL) was founded by non-conformists refusing to swear allegiance to the crown and Canterbury (Leihy, 2011). Subsequently, pressure grew for reform in Oxbridge (Vernon, 2001, 2004). In 1850, the first Royal Commission was appointed to inquire into, and report on, the governance of Oxford and Cambridge.

The subsequent report resulted in a remodelling of Oxbridge (Anderson, 2006). The new system was greatly influenced by the German system, in which the Humboldtian principles of a liberal education aimed at the advancement of knowledge, pursuit of
truth for its own sake, and the union of teaching and research based on an ideal of academic freedom were imperative (Anderson, 2006, 2010; Burnes et al, 2013; Elton, 2011; Collini, 2012). Specific reforms included the Universities Test Acts in 1871, which removed the need for scholars to swear matriculation oaths (Leihy, 2011); the gradual relaxation of laws preventing fellows from marrying from around 1870 (Duckenfield, 2008); and the re-centralisation of university authority away from the collegiate system (Anderson, 2006). These changes made the two English universities more accountable and accessible, creating an environment in which greater tolerance of divergent ideas about what and whom universities were for became possible (Vernon, 2004).

This tolerance facilitated the establishment of new institutions, notably the civic red-bricks (Burnes et al, 2013). It also paved the way for the admission of women students to Oxbridge towards the end of the century (Brittain, 1960), first in Girton, Bedfordshire in 1869, and then in a number of new Oxbridge women’s colleges. Newnham opened in Cambridge in 1871, and Somerville and Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, both opened in 1879 (Anderson, 2006). However, whilst the arrival of women in universities may have heralded the democratization of HE, women’s role in the university was anything but equal, and they ‘remained outsiders’ at the red-bricks and, especially, Oxbridge, for some time (Anderson, 2006: 57).

Women’s outsider status was evident in a number of ways. Although they were admitted to take exams in the early 1880s, women were refused degrees from Oxford and Cambridge until 1920 and 1948 respectively. They were also offered a different curriculum to their male counterparts (Anderson, 2006). Duckenfield (2008) suggests that the differences experienced by men and women were not only structural but were also cultural. She cites one student, Margaret Murray⁵, who wrote about student life at
UCL in the 1880s thus; ‘everyone knew that women were anathema in a university, not only because of their inferior intellect, but also, on account of their innate wickedness, they would be a terrible danger to young men’ (Murray, cited in Duckenfield, 2008: 36). From her analysis of historical artefacts, Duckenfield concludes that women were constructed as ‘evil temptresses’ (2008: 35).

Consequently, although the university became more accessible, it remained a patriarchal and elitist institution. Whilst the new civic universities of the industrial North built their reputations on science and engineering, Oxbridge continued to offer entry into the learned professions of the law, medicine, and the church for those who could afford the fees (Vernon, 2001; Burnes et al, 2013). In addition to reinforcing the vocational role of the university, a nascent distinction thus emerged, discriminating between ‘old’ and ‘new’ universities. An academic hierarchy was created in which Oxbridge was placed firmly at the top, and the provincial universities trailed behind (Vernon, 2001). So, notions of tolerance did not extend to judgements of parity of esteem between institutions.

In this epoch, ideas of the university became more diffuse again. The process of modernization, which was to escalate in the twentieth century, overturned some of the most anachronistic practices of Oxbridge, and participation in HE widened. Moreover, valorization of the notion that academic study was an intellectual activity bound to the pursuit of knowledge and truth furnished academia with lofty ideals. However, universities continued to be seen by many as lethargic and reactionary ‘bastions of privilege’ (Vernon, 2001: 253), either retaining their links with established religion or, in the case of the ‘new’ universities, adopting their emphasis on tradition. The influence of the Humboldtian model thus expedited, but did not galvanise, ideas about the role and nature of HE premised on liberal ideals.
Twentieth century reforms: Democratization and neo-liberalism

The arrival of women in universities represented the early shoots of success for the democratization of HE (Brittain, 1960). After WWII, this gathered pace; the 1944 Education Act enshrined the principle of universal and free education, and in its aftermath many Local Education Authorities (LEAs) began to pay university tuition fees and offer maintenance grants to cover students’ living costs (Booth, 1999). The growth of the new plate-glass university campuses, which began with Sussex in 1961, marked what has since become known as the ‘Robbins era’, after Lord Robbins, chair of the committee commissioned in 1961 to review the provision of HE in Britain.

The main finding of this committee was that university places should be available to anyone with the ability, qualifications, and desire to take them. The 1963 Robbins Report outlined four objectives for HE (Anderson, 2010). These were; ‘instruction in skills’ considered vital for the UK to achieve competitive advantage; the production of ‘cultivated men and women’ in possession of ‘general powers of the mind’; teaching and research based on the ‘advancement of learning’ and the ‘search for truth’; and ‘the transmission of a common culture’, in which the university was pronounced to work ‘in partnership with the family’ influencing ‘common standards of citizenship’ (Robbins, 1963, Chapter II, Sections 22-29:6-7). Thus they identified a vocational, familial, and cultural role for the university.

This latter role was perhaps one of the most radical recommendations. However, despite its espoused desire to promote social cohesion and equality of opportunity, Anderson notes that whilst Robbins led to significant expansion of the sector, it remained wedded to a ‘luxury university model, based on Oxbridge, which emphasized residence and
close relations of teachers and taught’ (2010: np). This model, he says, became unsustainable when participation targets exceeded 15 per cent in the 1980s.

The election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1979 signalled an era in which the pace of change in the sector picked up (Foskett, 2011). Commentators note that these changes had a number of aims that broadly fit Thatcher’s neo-liberal agenda, including the promotion of competition, enhanced choice, and public accountability (Sauntson & Morrish, 2011; Jones-Devitt & Samiei, 2011). In such a system responsibility for services is transferred from the state to entrepreneurial individuals and corporations, exchanging in a ‘free market’, although the state retains an important auditing role (Jary, 2002; Sauntson & Morrish, 2011; Jones-Devitt & Samiei, 2011).

One of the most immediate consequences was that the funding of HEIs was substantially reduced, meaning that universities were forced to take more students for lower unit costs (Smith 1999). This resulted in HE moving, by the early 1990s, from an elitist to a mass system, improving access for students from diverse backgrounds, such as mature students and non-standard entrants (Smith, 1999). In 1992, the Conservatives implemented the Further and Higher Education Act, aimed at undoing the binary system which had erected a division between universities and polytechnics (Booth, 1999), and bringing them under one funding body, the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE).

On one hand, these changes appeared to make the objective of democratization espoused by Robbins more realisable than ever. On the other, some of the changes made to funding mechanisms in a bid to expose the sector to market forces applied pressures which ran counter to democratization (Smith, 1999). For example, the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise in 1986 (the RAE, now Research Excellence
Framework or REF), in which the research funding an HEI receives is based upon assessments of the ‘quality’ of its research output, has led to a system of ranking which even its funding body, HEFCE, has admitted correlates with institutional wealth (HEFCE 1996, cited in Booth, 1999). The Dearing report of 1997 also brought about a swathe of reforms that effectively ended students’ entitlement to free education. In 1998 maintenance grants were phased out, and replaced with student loans, and the introduction of top up fees in the same year meant that students now needed to contribute to the costs of tuition.

So, mass higher education came with certain costs (Neary and Winn, 2009): for students, who were expected to pay for their degrees through loans, and for universities, who were forced into competition with each other for funding and for students. The idea of ‘students as consumers’, increasingly able to shop around for degree courses with the aid of RAE or REF rankings as a guide to ‘quality’, gained credence under this system (Furedi, 2011), and continues to build momentum as successive Labour and Conservative administrations hike up tuition fees.

Foskett argues that the emergence of a quasi-market model of HE has meant that universities must now ‘review fundamentally what it means to be a university’ (2011: 36). This seems to assume that the university had, or can have, a ‘fundamental’ meaning, and implies that ideas about HE prior to marketization have been swept away. However, competing ideas of the university persist, with differences emerging, for example, between those regarding themselves as teaching or research led institutions (Smith, 1999; Anderson, 2010), and with the continued exaltation of Oxbridge and Russell group universities over other universities (Booth, 1999; Jones-Devitt & Samiei, 2011; Collini, 2012).
Moreover, commentators disagree about the extent to which the late modern university has become marketized, with some (e.g. Foskett, 2011) arguing that marketization is not, in any case, a new phenomenon. These are issues I return to shortly. What seems certain about this period is that the scope and pace of change increased, with neo-liberal ideas privileging choice and competition becoming increasingly evident (Jones-Devitt & Samiei, 2011). The emergence, or re-emergence, of a quasi-marketized higher education sector has implications for the role of academia and, concomitantly, the positions of students, academics, and the academic offering, as I discuss in more detail shortly.

*Power relations*

It is not possible here to explicate the power relations characterising the four epochs discussed above, or to specify how their configurations changed. This is a method of analysis often associated with Foucault’s genealogical work (Mahon, 1992; Burrell, 1988), although Foucault himself stated that his intention was always to reveal ‘reactivations and transformations’ of dominant techniques of government, and not to present ‘a series of successive elements, the appearance of the new causing the old ones to disappear’ (Foucault, 2009: 8).

However, it might be possible tentatively to identify three shifts in power relations. First, with the Reformation, a decisive movement away from the indiscipline of the middle-ages, towards a modality in which sovereign and disciplinary control were exerted over the university and its inhabitants. There also appears at this moment something like a pastoral relation, (Foucault, 1981, 1982, 2009); the master assumes moral responsibility and care for his student charges, who in turn owe obedience to the university.
By the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century an emerging liberal modality of power may be traced, emphasizing academic freedom and loosening the conditions that had compelled many academics to commit to perpetual bachelorhood and submit to god and the crown. By the late 20\textsuperscript{th} and early 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries the individualizing and totalizing techniques associated with neo-liberal government - considered by Foucault as derivations of pastoral techniques (Foucault, 1982, 2009) - preside. These commend market mechanisms for their ability to simultaneously enhance individual liberties, whilst protecting collective interests. Thus they deploy security apparatuses, auditing performance in the name of public accountability.

However, this is something of a gloss. Foskett (2011) is keen to emphasize that reliance on markets was always a sleeping giant - as early as the 13\textsuperscript{th} century, Europe’s first universities were in competition with one another for students. Furthermore, Howley and Hartnett (1992) have argued that a relatively unreconstructed version of pastoral power pervades the late modern university, an idea I consider more extensively later in this chapter. In any case, more detailed literature and archival research than has been provided here would be necessary in order to sustain these arguments. Nonetheless, I present them in order to underscore the need to consider power relations in universities - and elsewhere - as contingent and reversible. Moreover, they indicate how the ‘contemporary’ debates I now turn to reactivate historical concerns.

**Contemporary Debates**

The two debates discussed in this section develop a number of the historical themes outlined above. For example, critiques of the marketization of HE are often premised on declarations of the demise of academic freedom and autonomy, and the modern university contrasted with the Humboldtian model of HE, rather than the Oxbridge of the 1500s – 1800s (e.g. Collini, 2012). The debates also introduce issues that surface in
the empirical data collected for the study. So, examining competing definitions of professionalism is considered important because it is germane to my analysis of data, as are arguments about the infantilization of students. The issues discussed have thus been selected because they speak to contemporary understandings of the F-S relationship, but rest on constructions of academia that are precarious, contested, and, in some cases, anything but modern.

*Marketization and de-professionalization*

The perceived establishment of quasi-market conditions in HE under Thatcher’s administration ignited a debate about the impact of marketization on the university sector (Barnett, 2011). Prominent amongst the concerns raised in this debate are criticisms that a system based on autonomy, collegiality, and professionalism has given way to one in which creativity is stifled, work processes intensified, and the academic offering commodified (Halsey, 1992; Fairclough, 1993; Parker and Jary, 1995; Alvesson, 2013).

These arguments hinge on assumptions that free market principles represent an ‘assault’ on professional logic (Freidson, 2001: 179). They also present marketization and loosely associated concepts, such as ‘bureaucratization’, ‘managerialism’ and ‘commodification’ (Trow, 1993; Parker & Jary, 1995; Oplatka, 2009) as colonizing forces (Fairclough, 1993), which displace local practices and discourses, and increasingly subject academics to technologies of discipline and surveillance (Parker & Jary, 1995). In order to interrogate this debate further, I now explore the literatures on professionalism and marketization. My focus is on research relating to HE, although I also draw upon more general discussions, particularly in relation to the concept of professionalism.
There is some disagreement about whether academics should be considered ‘professionals’. In part, this is due to competing ideas about how best to define and operationalize the concept of professionalism, a perennial problem for the sociology of the professions (Brint, 1993; MacDonald, 1985; Dent & Whitehead, 2002; Saks, 2005), and one I return to shortly.

Hoskin’s (1986) genealogical analysis of the professions locates the university professor as the ‘proto-typical’ professional, emerging in ‘around 1200’ (Hoskin, 1986: 2) when licensing rights of the universitas were transferred from the local clergy to university examining bodies. Hoskin emphasizes the university’s historic importance in examining and licensing, thus giving rise to a whole ‘eco-system’ of professions (ibid, 6). The role of HE in providing training and credentials for other professions, such as doctors and lawyers, is also emphasized by Freidson (1986).

However, Hoskin asserts that, paradoxically, academia failed to capitalise on its position by creating an overarching professional body, such as those established for medicine (the BMA) and the law (the Law Society). Thus when academic professionalism is challenged by the ‘examinatorial state’ (Hoskin, 1986: 15), as he claims it has in recent years, there is a tendency to fall back on somewhat vague historical notions of ‘academic freedom’ in order to justify ‘standards’ rather than retreating behind the more tangible buffer of a formal association. According to Hoskin, one consequence of this has been that the ‘educational history of professionalism has been…overlooked’ (Hoskin, 1986:15).

Certainly, many studies of professional work have focussed on legal and medical professionals (Freidson, 1970, Dingwall, 1983; MacDonald, 1985, Saks, 2005). As a further illustration of Hoskin’s point, Leihy’s (2011) analysis of academic life questions whether academia should be considered a profession at all. He suggests that academics
are pretenders to the throne of professionalism; academia, he contends, does not easily ‘map on to’ what he considers the distinctive self-regulating features of the ‘definitive’ professions of medicine or law (Leihy, 2011: 312-313). Citing Weber’s 1919 lecture, ‘Science as a Vocation’, Leihy (2011: 312) prefers to think of academic life as a ‘calling’ or ‘vocation’ (see also Shils, 1997). However, if one accepts Hoskin’s (1986) genealogy, Leihy (2011) has made the error of reversing the evolution of professionalism. Nevertheless, this notion of academia as a ‘calling’ resurfaces later in the thesis, in my analysis of empirical data.

Leihy’s (2011) position appears uncommon; most commentators do locate a tradition of professionalism within academe. In their polemic on the McDonaldization of the university, Parker & Jary draw on Weber, Ritzer, and Foucault to argue that the university has moved away from, ‘elite specialization with strong professional controls towards a ‘Fordist’ mass production arrangement’(1995: 321). Asserting their intention not to be overly nostalgic about the past, Parker & Jary point to intensifying processes of rationalization and bureaucratization, which are understood as imbuing the university with calculative and managerialist logics. These logics emphasize the need to measure and compare institutions, courses, and individuals, and deploy panoptic surveillance techniques in order to monitor and judge the behaviour and outputs of academics. In such an environment, it is argued, the university becomes disenchanted, academic work is instrumentalised, and education is reduced to the processing of expanding numbers of students for increasingly less money.

Parker & Jary (1995) assert that the notion that academics have become ‘de-professionalized’, to which some commentators subscribe (e.g. Halsey, 1992; Trow, 1993), is too simplistic. They argue “‘professional’ is not merely an occupational category but a valued self-identity that implies both commitment and skill. It is one that
will not easily be given up’ (Parker & Jary, 1995: 328). Further, they are reluctant to vaunt the term ‘professionalism’, observing its potential as a discursive resource that summons and secures academics’ commitment in the face of worsening employment conditions. I return to the significance of these points for the study of professional work and for my thesis after discussing criticisms of the authors’ findings.

Prichard & Willmott (1997) claim that Parker & Jary (1995) have overstated their case. Analysing a series of interviews with senior post-holders in universities, they maintain that a variety of local tactics are employed to evade and subvert ‘imperializing management discourse’ (Prichard & Willmott, 1997: 304). More recently, Barry et al (2001) and Sousa et al (2010) have also examined the potential of academics to actively resist discourses of marketization. These studies find that collegiality and a ‘scholarly craft ethic’ (Millls, cited in Barry et al, 2001: 98) persist in UK HE, and thus the displacement of a professional ethos by a managerialist and marketized one is, as yet, unrealized. If one also considers Foskett’s (2011) contention that universities’ exposure to market principles is not a new phenomenon, it might seem sensible to concur with Prichard & Willmott (1997) that Parker & Jary’s polemical offers a partial and exaggerated characterization of the changing nature of academic life.

Despite these criticisms Parker & Jary’s (1995) piece is useful because it reminds us of the different ways in which the term ‘professional’ can be interpreted, both in the literature and in lay parlance. The sociology of the professions was dominated, until the 1970s, by the functionalist trait approach (MacDonald, 1985; Hodgson, 2005). According to this view, defining what makes an occupation or individual ‘professional’ comes down to the identification of ideal-typical characteristics. Occupational groups and individuals are then assessed against these to decide whether they are more or less professional. This approach, which is evident in the works of Parsons (1952), Millerson
(1964), and Etzioni (1969), commonly identifies ‘expertise, collective organization and collegial control, ethical standards, and work in a public service’ (Brint, 1993: 261) as critical elements of ‘professionalism’.

Parker & Jary (1995) invoke elements of the trait approach in their suggestion that professional controls are being eroded by marketization: if marketization threatens academics’ autonomy and skill then they are less able to meet the criteria provided by functionalists for ‘the professional’. However, they also implicitly index process and interactionist approaches to the sociology of professions, which have largely replaced the functionalist orthodoxy in the literature (Brint, 1993; MacDonald, 1985). I now briefly consider how these latter perspectives are appropriated.

Whereas most process theorists, such as Wilensky (1964) and Larson (1977), have examined how occupations seek and enact professional closure, for example over licensing and credentials, Parker & Jary (1995) offer a case in which the reverse appears to be happening. So, quality and standards of teaching, learning, and research are no longer left to universities to evaluate for themselves, but rather are transferred to external auditing bodies and frameworks, such as the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA) and Research Assessment Exercise (RAE, now REF; see also Jary, 2002). Thus academic work is presented as having experienced a quasi-deprofessionalization, as expertise is outsourced and autonomy lost.

However, Parker & Jary’s (1995) assertion that ‘professionalism’ remains an important discursive resource in academic work looks more to interactionist and discursive approaches to understanding the professions and professionalism. These approaches are diverse (MacDonald, 1985), but all emphasize how, and with effects, the term is deployed by actors, institutions, and in wider society. For instance, Brint (1994) notes a trend in the US away from professionals emphasising ‘social trustee professionalism’,
which foregrounds altruism and ethics, noting that professionals increasingly accentuate ‘expertise’ in order to establish their status.

More recently, and in the MOS field, Grey (1998), Anderson Gough et al (2000), Fournier (1999; 2002), Hogdson (2005), and Rumens & Kerfoot (2009) have all examined how discourses of professionalism can be used by actors and organizations to constrain and enable certain kinds of identity and behaviour at work (see also the collection edited by Dent & Whitehead, 2002). Fournier’s (2000) work on how professionalism constructs, shifts, and eliminates boundaries between the professional and others, including amateurs, lay persons, clients, and the market, provides an important contribution to this literature. She notes how professionalism, and the associated ideas of professional knowledge and boundaries, are ‘malleable, expandable and self-constituted’ (Fournier, 2000: 84). This means that professionalism can be rearticulated when it is threatened by external pressures.

Indeed, by turning to Fournier’s (2000) and Grey’s (1998) work, it might be possible to argue for professionalism’s enhanced usefulness to the academic as a discursive device. As Grey (1998) sees it, the rhetoric of professional behaviour may act as a substitute for the rhetoric of expertise - and vice versa. This point has resonances with Brint’s (1994) argument that different facets of ‘professionalism’ may be emphasized or de-emphasized by actors, although he sees this occurring at a national level, as opposed to a more localised occupational or individual level.

By extension of these arguments, it may be that when expertise and autonomy come under attack, as Hoskin (1986), Parker & Jary (1995) and others assert they have, certain behaviours are reinforced in order to defend the label ‘professional’. Fournier (2000) suggests that ‘the introduction of the market into professional domains is in some case providing professional groups opportunities to reaffirm their separation from
the market’ (Fournier, 2000: 82). Thus the importance of ‘boundary work’ may not diminish in these conditions. Rather, professionals rearticulate ‘professionalism’ in order to continue differentiating themselves from other groups and occupations, and so preserve a sense of difference.

Because of their multi-dimensional understanding of the term, Parker & Jary (1995) are able to argue that although features of ‘professionalism’ have been eroded by marketization, the latter does not totally erase the former. More recently, other scholars working in the discursive tradition, such as Sauntson & Morrish (2011), have argued more vociferously that marketization is a colonizing force. In their linguistic analysis of university mission statements, Sauntson & Morrish highlight the domination of a ‘neo-liberal discourse which extols marketization, commodification and globalization’ (2011: 83). However, they also note that the term ‘professional’ is still frequently deployed in these documents.

With this in mind, it is perhaps wrong to see marketization and professionalism as diametrically opposed logics, as Freidson (2001) has suggested. Neary and Hagyard (2011) observe that defences of UK HE against marketization tend to call upon principles brought about by the liberal reforms of Humboldt, such as freedom of learning (Lernfreiheit) and personal lifelong development (Bildung). For Neary and Hagyard such principles create fertile grounds on which to sew increasingly marketized conceptions of HE; both privilege individual autonomy whilst simultaneously asserting the importance of protecting public interest.

My analysis of the deployment of professional discourses in Chapter 11 follows Parker & Jary (1995) in noting the usefulness of ‘professionalism’ as a self-identifier and as a legitimizer for certain kinds of behaviour (see also Fournier, 2002). It is also influenced by interactionist and discursive studies of the professions and aspiring professions.
which have foregrounded the usefulness of ‘being professional’ as a performative
device producing, governing, and accounting for conduct (Grey, 1998; Fournier, 1999,
2000; Deverell & Sharma, 2000; Anderson-Gough et al, 2000; Watson, 2002; Hodgson,
2005; Sullivan, 2014). In particular, I follow Fournier’s (1999) interest in
‘professionalism’ as a governmental technology, in which technologies of domination
and of the self intersect in the activity of governing. It is primarily this understanding of
professionalism that is operationalized in my thesis in order to explain the continued
relevance of ‘being professional’ within academia.

Master or Servant? Conceptualising tutor-student roles and relations

Arguments in which HE is held hostage to the fortunes of marketization have tended to
position the student as ‘consumer’ (Parker & Jary, 1995; Morley, 2003; Furedi, 2011)
and the academic as ‘educational consultant’ (Parker & Jary, 1995: 329), ‘service
provider’ (Furedi, 2011: 4) or ‘delivery vehicle’ (Neary & Winn, 2009: 213).

In this section, these and other ways of conceptualising students, academics, and the
relations between them are explored. I critically examine conceptualizations which have
sought to fix student and academic identities, emphasizing asymmetries in the relations
between them. In particular, I contend that whilst the ‘student-as-consumer’ metaphor is
premised on ideas that students are becoming increasingly vociferous and ‘empowered’,
students are, concurrently, infantilized by this metaphor, in that they may be conceived
of as passive recipients of learning (Churchill, 1998; Maringe, 2011; Barnett, 2011;
Williams, 2011, 2013). Despite their contradictory nature, these differing
conceptualizations may have similar effects in that they endorse distance rather than
closeness between the student and academic, de-naturalizing friendship and intimacy. I
conclude the section by examining alternative understandings of tutor-student relations.
These include conceptualizations acknowledging the possibility of close, although not
necessarily benevolent, pastoral relations (Howley & Hartnett, 1992). In a more positive vein, I discuss arguments that education can and should create space for love and affection between educator and learner (hooks, 1994, 1996; Gallop, 1997; Zembylas, 2003; Bell & Sinclair, 2014).

The notion that students and educators should not be friends have historically appealed to notions that the role of the educator is to lead her or his students in the pursuit of knowledge (Shils, 1984, 1997; Alvesson, 2013) and/or provide moral guidance (Silver, 2004). Recalling HE’s ecclesiastic legacy, Shils writes; ‘The discovery and transmission of truth is the distinctive task of the academic’ (1997: 3). This crucial and foundational task is understood by Shils, much as Plato indicates it was by Socrates’ conduct towards his student Alcibiades in ‘The Symposium’, as being jeopardised by too close a friendship between tutor and student. Furthermore, Shils argues that it is the professor’s conscience that will guide him to fulfil this obligation, and not any externally imposed rule or regulation.

In contrast to this ‘truth-seeking’ model (Churchill, 1998: 46), Silver (2004) notes the historical importance of the university in shaping moral character. As I suggested earlier, this can be traced back to the development of collegiate life in Oxbridge, although Silver (2004) finds support for it up until the end of the liberal model of the 1960s; the in loco parentis role of tutors was emphasized until 1969, when the age of majority was decreased from 21 to 18 (Williams, 2013).

Churchill (1998) asserts that such views of education have largely disappeared; that arguments against closeness between student and tutor are increasingly predicated on the grounds of ‘social trusteeship’, ‘expertise’, and ‘moral duty’ (e.g. Griffith, 1992; Markie, 1990; Cahn, 1990). Thus they chime with the trait approaches to professionalism outlined earlier. According to this view, the academic and her or his
student cannot be friends because the student-as-client is contracting with the academic-as-expert for services. Friendship and intimacy are thus understood as *prima facie* wrong since students-as-clients have a right to be treated fairly and objectively, just as the clients and patients of lawyers and doctors are (Markie, 1998). Moreover, because of the growing threat of litigation, the tutor-student relationship is increasingly regulated as a contractual relationship – it is no longer enough to leave questions of propriety to individual conscience (Churchill, 1998).

Churchill finds the analogy between academia and other professions problematic, however. He suggests that, ‘in medicine and law clients are, by and large, passive recipients of skilled treatment, whereas, by contrast, students must contribute, at least minimally, in the acquisition of skills or knowledge’ (Churchill, 1998: 49). In so doing he alights upon recent debates that have grappled with whether students are, and indeed should be, understood as producers or consumers.

As already noted, researchers interested in the effects of marketization on HE have argued that the commodification of education creates conditions in which a consumer or customer model can be applied to students’ engagement with higher education, since the student can be understood as purchasing educational products. Morley (2003) observes that the onslaught of the student-as-customer metaphor has brought with it a customer care ethic. Following this, Williams notes that the decline in expectations for the tutor to act *in loco parentis*, which she notes extended to the imposition of curfews and provision of chaperones for female students, has been replaced by the rhetoric of ‘duty of care’ (2013: 133). She maintains that whilst students rebelled against *in loco parentis* restrictions on their freedom in the 1960s, an ideal of ‘customer care’ is more insidious, and has a greater impact on students’ sense of responsibility and ‘emerging adult autonomy’;
In the past, students had a distinct set of rules to fight against and spent their time devising ingenious methods for circumventing restrictions upon their freedom.[…] A duty of care is far more ambiguous and far more difficult to argue against, as it is bound up with notions of well-being, mental health and protection. (Williams, 2013: 133)

This chimes with notions of the disciplinary effects of health discourses (e.g. Brewis & Grey, 1994), which I further consider in Chapter 10. It also indexes the usefulness of discursive ambiguity or vagueness (Potter, 1996), a tactic that I find is frequently deployed in my empirical data.

Williams goes on to suggest that universities are now discursively positioned as an extension of schools, and that both foster student dependence. In addition to customer care she asserts that the notion of ‘safeguarding’ is increasingly emphasized in university promotional literature. The effect of this is to remove the threat of social or educational ‘risk’, and sell a ‘safe environment’ to students and parents as part of the educational offering (Williams, 2013: 50). The term ‘safeguarding’ is bound up with notions of abuse and child protection discourses. Its use has been empirically detected in a number of settings, including sports coaching (Piper et al, 2013), youth and social work (Parton, 2006) and schools (Sikes & Piper, 2009). Given its remit to protect ‘children and vulnerable adults’ (Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act, 2006: JISC Legal, 2003) its application in the university environment perhaps seems odd.

Williams (2013) suggests that the use of a ‘safeguarding’ discourse in universities infantilizes and/or pathologizes students, imbuing HE and higher educators with a therapeutic mission. However, if one considers the university as a site of pastoral power relations, as commentators such as Howley & Hartnett (1992) and Knowles (2007) have, this foregrounding of ‘care’ is perhaps less surprising. These writers have
considered, in different ways, how historically embedded university practices are tinged with pastoral power relations.

According to Foucault, pastoral relations, which are the precursor of modern governmentality (Foucault, 1982, 1991b, 2009), operate alongside other technologies of power, including sovereign and disciplinary techniques. However, the pastoral modality, which originates in the pre-Christian East and is later modified by the Christian West, has a number of distinctive features. It creates conditions through which members of a flock are guided by, and owe obedience to, the pastor, in order to achieve the salvation of each and all, or ‘omnes et singulatim’ (Foucault, 2009). Because the fate of the pastor is bound to his flock he must not only watch over the minutiae of their every move, but must also direct their inner-most thoughts and consciences. This is accomplished through confessional practices. Further, because the pastor is understood as both servant and master of the flock (Foucault, 2009: 179), and because he must exercise care for each and every sheep, pastoral power appears benevolent as opposed to coercive or constraining.

Howley & Hartnett (1992) refer to the defence of a doctoral thesis by viva and the induction of novice scholars as exemplifying the deployment of pastoral tactics in modern universities. They highlight how these practices compel doctoral students and aspiring academics to submit themselves to ‘continual scrutiny’ (Howely & Hatnett, 1992: 277), and commit to ‘truth-telling’ (ibid: 280) in order to enter the pastorate and achieve academic salvation. Meanwhile Knowles (2007) focuses on the supervisory relationship, noting how writing and feedback practices represent confessional techniques through which the student is guided along the ‘correct’ path, and brought back into the fold if s/he should stray.
These contributions facilitate an appreciation of the complexity of power relations at work in the university, and other educational institutions (Caughlan, 2005). They also illuminate how dynamism and reciprocity may be read into relationships between academics and students. This reading is largely absent from accounts premised on a ‘student-as-consumer’ model, which tend to construct the student either as passive (Williams, 2013) or as aggressively litigious (Churchill, 1998). However, because they focus on relationships between postgraduate students and universities, these studies do not offer alternative conceptions of undergraduate students and their relationships with academics and the academy. Further, although they note the possibility of developing anti-pastoral counter strategies, highlighting the cultivation of critical thinking as an example of this, their visions of academic life are relatively pessimistic.

Neary and Winn’s (2009) conception of the student-as-producer is more widely applicable to the student population, and is also more optimistic about the future of student-tutor relations. Observing that such relations can be, and in some university department, are democratized to such an extent that the student is less a consumer of academic products, and more a co-collaborator in the production of knowledge, Neary and Winn (2009) champion a model that creates space for new forms of collegiality.

This model, they state, requires a rethinking of the organizing principles of academia. Currently, access to knowledge is restricted, and its production and dissemination is tied to the exchange of capital. Neary & Winn (2009: 210) point to the potentiality of the internet, and especially to initiatives such as Open Access learning, as vehicles which can promote, ‘the values of openness and creativity, [and] engender equity among academics and students’. This is a utopian vision, which looks to the student protests in Paris in 1968 for its inspiration (see also Neary & Hagyard, 2011). Such a model is difficult to reconcile with the existing landscape of HE, in which fee paying, external
audit mechanisms, and competition for funding mean that HE appears to be inextricably tied to capital.

Zembylas (2003), hooks (1994), and Gallop (1995) have all argued that it is not just equality that should be pursued in tutor-student relations, but something closer to affection, passion, or love. hooks, referencing Foucault, writes ‘the academy is not paradise. But learning is a place where paradise can be created […] as we collectively imagine ways to move beyond boundaries, to transgress. This is education as the practice of freedom’ (1994: 207).

Meanwhile, in the MOS literature, Fotaki (2011) and Bell & Sinclair (2014) have observed that knowledge production in *academe* is both embodied and gendered, although academia’s valorization of the ‘life of the mind’ (Bell & Sinclair, 2014: 277) sometimes belies this. This Cartesian body/mind dualism has historically mapped on to gender divisions, so that women’s bodies are understood as ‘wrong’ (Bell & Sinclair, 2011: 274) or as ill-fitting. Women have also been constructed as less able to occupy the androgynous persona required of the academic (Fotaki, 2011: 47).

Bell & Sinclair (2014) follow hooks and others in recommending the transgression of boundaries as a way of transforming relationships in academia. As alluded to in Chapter 2, for them this involves the reclamation of *eros* in the academy, and the cultivation of more sensuous pedagogic relations. Like Burrell (1992), hooks (1994), and Sullivan (2014), Bell & Sinclair are insistent that *eros* should not be understood as a euphemism for sex. Nonetheless, their arguments imply that sexual F-S relationships are not inherently problematic.

hooks provides further impetus for this view, as she recounts a sexual relationship she had with a student. She goes on to argue ‘Just as it is important that we be vigilant in challenging abuses of power wherein the erotic becomes a terrain of exploitation, it is
equally important to recognize that space where erotic interaction is enabling and positively transforming’ (hooks, 1996: 51). Acknowledging that abuses can occur, hooks proposes that passionate pedagogy also has the potential to disrupt the masculinist and hierarchical environment of HE. hooks and the other scholars cited above acknowledge the ‘dark side’ of *eros* (Brewis & Linstead, 2000), but they also afford it a critical role in the production of pleasure and knowledge in academia.

It would seem, then, that whilst the student-as-consumer, academic-as-service provider model dominates the extant literature, it is not the only model for understanding the roles of, and relations between, academics and students. Some of the concepts outlined above are visionary; they imagine desired but as yet unrealized conditions. However, Neary and Winn (2009) suggest that student-as-producer can and does exist in pockets of academia, such as Centres for Excellence in Teaching and Learning. hooks also suggests that individual students and educators can actively reflect upon and alter their interactions with one another to promote transgressive learning opportunities. These suggestions offer remedies against Williams’ (2013) more pessimistic diagnosis of the infantilized and pathologized student, against which F-S relationships would seem implicitly to be construed as abusive.

**Concluding comments: Plural ideas, ancient ideals**

In many ways, debates about the late modern university have reactivated tensions that were perceptible even in the medieval system. However, rather than accommodating multiple ideas, as Dunbabin (1999) maintains was the case in the middle ages, marketization and associated ideas are opposed with Humboldtian ideals of a liberal education and academic professionalism in the extant literature. As many commentators have argued (Booth, 1999; Smith, 1999; Anderson, 2006; Collini, 2012), this need not be the case; the Californian model of HE, for example, shows that a system in which
differentiation is embraced has flourished elsewhere. Others have suggested that the
more radical model of the late 1960s, in which many students connected with politics,
might be a starting point for challenging consumerist models by enabling ‘collaborative
acts of intellectual enquiry’ (Neary & Hagyard, 2011: 214) to re-surface.

Whilst the university may be imbued with a plurality of meanings, it perhaps retains a
set of overarching and ancient ideals. In the UK the trappings of privilege associated
with the early monastic schools - aspects of the pomp and ceremony described by
Dunbabin (1999) - have not only persisted, but are often reproduced, even within ‘new’
universities. Similarly, the ancient teaching methods of lectures ‘from the pulpit’ and
seminars, devised for a medieval audience short on books (Dunbabin, 1999), remain the
default method of teaching and learning (Milliken & Barnes, 2002; Elton, 2011). This
has led some commentators to suggest that the university is best understood through the
metaphor of the church (Albert & Whetten, 1985).

In distilling the relevance of the ideas presented in this chapter for framings of F-S
relationships I want to conclude by highlighting that university life, as read here, is
characterised by a plurality of ideas about its purposes. These ideas often recall ancient
ideals, as well as reflecting contemporary concerns. Thus in discussing how
relationships in the university are articulated, one is reminded that women are a
historical anomaly in HE; that, prior to the late 1800s, institutional sexual relations
would have meant homosexual relations (Deslandes, 2005). Further, the empirical data I
present later suggests that the notion of female students as a ‘temptation’, potentially
leading to academic downfall, which Duckenfield (2008) observes, is not gone.
Moreover, oath-taking practices are also invoked. Such considerations are interesting
because they capture something about the university that is absent from the consumer
model; namely the more rareified and arcane aspects of academe.
In this part of the thesis I set out my overall approach to the study and detail my methods of analysis. Chapter 5 discusses the research orientation and influences. I also consider practical and ethical issues, such as how I accessed and collected data, consideration of informed consent, and protecting the anonymity of participants. Chapter 6 then hones in on the detail of the analytic process, highlighting how data extracts were selected, and explaining the techniques that have been used to analyse them.

Two ideas run through both chapters. First, I aim to foreground connections and complementarities between what might be perceived as the disparate discursive traditions of Foucauldian research and work with a more interactionist agenda, particularly DP. Second, I attempt to weave ethical, ontological, and epistemological concerns into the discussion, rather than dealing with them in separate sections.
Chapter 5

Studying F-S Relationships

So… what are your methods of study? Is it an… auto-ethnography? [laughter]. But… I do think… really for you to be studying this topic raises some serious ethical issues… I mean [2] how do you know all the people you interview haven’t been lying to you?

(Lars: Group interview 1, see Appendix 4)

An experience is always a fiction: it is something that one fabricates oneself, that doesn’t exist before and will exist afterwards.

(Foucault, 2000: 243)
Introduction

As the quote from doctoral student, Lars, prefacing this chapter indicates, the study of F-S relationships may be regarded by some as problematic, or even unethical. In this chapter I discuss how such questions, alongside others regarding how the thesis contributes to knowledge, have influenced the overall research approach and design. Subsequently I reflect upon the practicalities of the research process, clarifying how data has been generated and collected for analysis.

The approach to discourse: Finding allegiances between Foucault and discursive psychology

As already stated, my approach to the study of F-S relationships begins with a problematization of the view that F-S relationships are necessarily asymmetrical and exploitative. Thus I follow Foucault and those influenced by his work in understanding the government of conduct, including sexual conduct, as culturally and historically contingent.

With this in mind, the research approach adopted here seeks to examine whether and how scholarly framings of F-S relationships as harassment permeate lay articulations of relationships. It also considers alternative ways in which relationships may be expressed. To this end, my analysis is informed by a discursive approach, in which reality is understood as constituted through text, talk, and practice, and meaning as negotiated and contested. In this section I provide an overview and rationale of the research orientation. This is further explicated later in the thesis, particularly in the subsequent chapter, where I specify how my analysis of empirical materials has been conducted.
An important consideration influencing my research approach relates to how the thesis can contribute to knowledge. I have already alluded to a number of concerns relating to knowledge production in my discussion of critiques of the literature on F-S relationships (e.g. Dank & Fulda, 1998; Jafar, 2003; Taylor, 2011). These have highlighted tendencies for research to be conducted on past relationships, and also the near exclusion of the experiences of male students, female academics, and same sex couples.

An important and related consideration has been the extent to which data on F-S relationships could be understood as providing access to an objective ‘truth’. Most existing research, including studies questioning assumptions that F-S relationships should always be understood as harassment (e.g. Skeen & Nielson, 1983; Glaser & Thorpe, 1986), are based on analysis of survey and interview data in which respondents comment upon researcher designed scenarios and vignettes. Respondents’ answers are then treated as a direct route to their ‘real’ experiences and perceptions, and analysis is aimed at uncovering the truth or, occasionally, truths (e.g. Skeen & Nielson, 1983). Thus F-S relationships are understood as phenomena that can be revealed through language and then known independently of it. Discourse is thus conceived of as representational (Easterby-Smith et al, 2008).

In contrast, my orientation to the study of F-S relationships ‘rejects the possibility of producing one true interpretation’ (Kroger and Wood, 2000: 28) of events and opinions. Instead, and in common with a variety of discursive approaches, I understand ‘discourse’, broadly interpreted here as talk, text, and practice, as constitutive of truth claims. That is to say, language constructs and mediates reality and our understandings of it, rather than simply representing or reflecting an objective and pre-existing social world (Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Phillips & Oswick, 2012). Brewis, following
Foucault, writes; ‘contemporary discourses, masquerading as truths when in fact there is no enduring truth, produce our sense of who we are and how we should live.’ (1998: 61). This is not, however, to argue that the subject is ‘hyperdetermined’ by discourse (Dean, 1994:155). Rather, discourses operate as regimes or games of truth, within which ‘free’ subjects are able to move in ways that are more or less accepting of relations of domination (Foucault, 1994; Dean, 1994; Hunt, 1999).

Further, I have endeavoured to locate secondary texts and generate new data that might tell me more about the overlooked groups identified. Consequently, the study examines a range of textual genres in order to explore how different permutations of F-S relationship are articulated. I examine texts for how the language deployed renders a number of key constructs. In addition to the central phenomena of F-S relationships, these constructs encompass: conceptualizations of academic and student identities, and of the relations between them; ideas about the nature and purpose of academia; and notions about ‘appropriate’ or desirable sexual relationships. In addition to Foucault, my interest in understanding how these constructs are expressed has led me to consider research by those working in, or allied to, the field of DP. Both of these approaches are now critically discussed.

The works of Foucault, and particularly the lectures and written works comprising his middle and later periods, have been used in order to consider how power relations are implicated in the corpus. This exploration is conducted on two levels. First, I am interested in the ways in which F-S relations appear to be understood as power relations: do texts position one or other party as ‘sovereign’, indicate that the academic has a pastoral responsibility to care for the student, or suggest that the academic exercises disciplinary power over the student? Second, I consider the specific techniques that are mobilized within texts in order to enable and constrain conduct. Are
these suggestive of technologies of domination, involving interdiction, normalization, and surveillance, and aimed at the production of ‘docile bodies’ (Foucault, 1991a:135)? Or, alternatively, do they highlight a role for technologies of self and ethical self-formation? This interest in different power relations and apparatuses indexes the centrality of Foucault’s work on government to the project undertaken here.

The foregrounding of relations of power in Foucault’s work, coupled with his interest in the production of docile bodies, has sometimes been interpreted as resulting in an excessively ‘muscular’ or deterministic understanding of the role of discourse (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000: 1130). Within such readings, Foucauldian analysis is cited as an exemplar of a macro-discursive approach to discourse, which is insufficiently attentive to textual detail, ignores agents’ capacity to resist, manipulate, and modify discourses, and fails to examine discourse in action (see Newton, 1998; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000).

Whilst I accept that the last of these claims is largely true, I concur with those (e.g. Dean, 1994; Bevir 1999; Barratt, 2008; Kelly, 2009; Bardon & Josserand, 2011), who have argued that the first two are not. Interpretations which have Foucault and Foucauldians down as ‘Grand Discourse’ analysts, ‘with a capital ‘D’ (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000: 117; see also Dick, 2013) downplay Foucault’s later emphasis on the subject and subjectivation. This latter term is a Foucauldian neologism used to refer to the processes through which individuals are granted the capacity for creativity and reflexivity in processes of self-formation, albeit that this is never conducted in conditions of complete freedom. Differentiating it from the less agential term, ‘subjection’, Kelly (2009) notes that subjectivation implies that subjects are not simply ‘manufactured’ by discourse. Rather, ‘something…reciprocal and complex is going on:
subjects are creating themselves like pearls around the foreign particles of power” (Kelly, 2009: 89).

Additionally, these interpretations underestimate the extent to which Foucault’s work deals with the minutiae of texts in order to assess what is being accomplished, and how this is done. Alvesson & Kärreman (2000, 2011) present Foucauldian work as prioritising ‘over-arching themes’ and ‘paradigms’ above an interest in the more localised ‘delicacies and nuances’ that are embedded within texts (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2000: 1134). However, this conclusion appears somewhat at odds with the detailed analysis of texts found in Foucault’s work, particularly in some of his lectures and later writings.

For example, Foucault’s exploration of the theme of pastoral power as a form of government examines the techniques through which such power has been exercised in great detail (Golder, 2007). In the 1977-78 lecture series, ‘Security, Territory, Population’ (2009), Foucault considers how a range of metaphors for governing - including pilot, captain, and numerous different versions of the shepherd metaphor - are textually deployed, and with what effects. These differences are further elaborated elsewhere (e.g. Foucault, 1981, 1982) in his discussion of how the shepherd metaphor has been historically and culturally modified. Such discussions are meticulously attentive to the delicacy of language and its uses (Barratt, 2008), and are difficult to reconcile with Alvesson and Kärreman’s suggestion that, as an exemplar of a macro approach to discourse, Foucauldian research ‘glosses over the operations of discourse’ (2000: 1145).

Notwithstanding my defence of Foucault’s work as detailed and text-focussed, Alvesson & Kärreman (2000) are right to assert that Foucauldian research has typically emphasised standardised or aggregated discursive patterns and themes (e.g. Hollway,
1984; Pringle, 1989), and/or focussed on the historical emergence of discourses (e.g. Hoskin, 1986; Hoskin & Macve 1988; Hepworth, 1999; Lupton & Chapman 1995; Miller & Rose, 2008). Whilst I am interested in historical understandings of F-S relationships this is not my central concern here. Rather, my aim is to understand how a variety of individuals - academics, students, and other ‘stakeholders’ in, and documenters of, academic life - engage with the F-S relationship as a contemporary and on-going phenomenon, albeit one with historical and future orientated implications. To this end, my approach is also influenced by DP, and the allied fields of interactionism and ethnomethodology.

These latter approaches share in common an interest in language in use. That is, they explore how individuals actively, and often ‘artfully’ (Garfinkel, 1967: 32), use language in situated interactions in order to co-construct reality and meaning (Wood & Kroger, 2000; Miller & Fox, 2004). In contrast to other psychological approaches, DP considers how mental states - emotions, attitudes, and opinions - are linguistically accomplished, rather than foregrounding the cognitive and social processes that may operate behind the scenes of interaction (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). For example, the topic of racism has been studied by discursive psychologists not for how it implicates internal mental dispositions and/or social influences (pace Tajfel, 1969, 1981), but for how it is discursively justified and contested (e.g. Wetherell & Potter, 1992). In the field of MOS, techniques underpinned by DP have been used to analyse how management ‘ideas’ are translated into institutional practices (Mueller & Whittle, 2011), and to explore how morality is enacted in stories relating to the recent financial crisis (Whittle & Mueller, 2012). However, the approach remains uncommon in this field.

Whilst many proponents of DP follow the rigorous conventions of conversation analysis (e.g. Drew & Heritage, 1992), others have embraced less granular approaches (e.g.
Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Edley & Wetherell, 1997; Dick, 2013). Some have presented
the analytic devices they use as a kind of made-to-order ‘bricolage’ (Denzin & Lincoln,
1994; Wood & Kroger, 2000), in which resources are selected on the basis of utility
rather than being set in stone. This recalls Foucault’s oft-cited recommendation that his
work should be conceptualised as a tool-kit, from which to select what is most useful
and apply it to the given situation (Foucault, 1980: 145).

It is this approach that is embraced here, and it departs from the more systematic
approach adopted by some discourse analysts, including many proponents of CDA, such
as Fairclough (1993, 2001). Whilst the analytic orientation I take bears some
resemblance to CDA, not least because of my interest in examining discourse as both
text and context, and in the mechanics of power relations, a CDA approach has not been
used here. This is because of CDA’s focus on reading the reproduction of hegemonic
social relations into texts, and its often overtly ideological agenda, aimed at redressing
imbalance and promoting social justice (see Widdowson, 1995; Potter, 1996). My
research seeks to ‘problematize’ (Foucault, 2000: 114, 117-119) how F-S relationships
are constructed as taboo, but is not intended as a political project or call to arms.

The specific analytic techniques used in the study are set out in more detail in Chapter
6, where I discuss how I have analysed the corpus. For now, I concur with Miller &
Fox (2004) and Hacking (2004) in noting what I perceive as complementarities between
the approaches outlined. So, I use Foucault in order to interpret textual configurations of
power relations, and for his attention to how texts offer up subject positions and deploy
metaphor to establish truth claims. DP is used to augment the more close-range aspects
of this approach. It supplements a Foucauldian interest in practices of categorization and
metaphor (Miller & Fox, 2004) with a range of other techniques through which ‘fact
construction’ is achieved and social reality ordered (Potter, 1996: 2012). Within the
MOS literature Mangan (2009) and Finch-Lees et al (2007) have used analytic techniques which traverse the ‘discursive ladder’ (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000), combining Foucauldian work with other forms of DA. Whilst Finch-Lees et al align themselves with CDA, Mangan’s study has been influential here. Her work provides an example of how devices used by discursive psychologists can complement Foucauldian insights into organizational life, highlighting ‘the ways in which people negotiate diverse, often contradictory accounts of events’ (Mangan, 2009: 108).

**Empirics**

Having set out my overall analytic orientation, I now discuss how empirical work has been conducted. In the following sections I consider how data was collected and handled. Some issues, such as the ontological status accorded to artefacts, are dealt with generically, since the broad approach is relevant to all genres of data. However, in my discussion of specific textual genres I attempt to pick out issues which are of particular relevance to that genre. These include further consideration of the status of my sources, access, sample size and composition, ethical issues, and a discussion of debates comparing the use of ‘naturally occurring’ data with the use of researcher generated data.

*The status of empirical artefacts*

Each of the genres and items of data collected for the study are considered social constructions. Borrowing Potter’s (1996: 1) terminology, they are treated as instances of ‘fact construction, and to use Foucault’s they are analysed as artefacts involved in ‘games of truth’ (1994:16). In light of this, the ontological differences between, say, formal documents, interview narratives, and fictional accounts are minimised. O’Leary (2008) follows Foucault in commenting that, if experiences may be understood as fictioned, and fictional work has the potential to construct and transform experience,
then many distinctions traditionally drawn between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ can be collapsed; neither can lay claim to the truth, but both may indicate how truths are produced, reproduced, challenged, and modified.

Foucault’s work is instructive in this respect for its attentiveness to how truths are enmeshed and constituted in relations of power. What discursive psychologists claim to add to such analysis is a sharper focus on the ‘devices and procedure which contribute to the sense that a discourse is literally describing the world’ (Potter, 1996:88). So, how is it that a policy or newspaper article works up ‘facticity’, or an interview respondent admits to, or works against, inferences that they have a vested interest or stake in a particular topic? I develop my discussion of these techniques further in the next chapter of this part of the thesis.

Davidson (1997) notes a connection between Foucault and Wittgenstein’s concept of ‘language games’, which he traces back to a series of lectures delivered in Rio de Janeiro in 1973. There, Foucault described the study of discourse as the study of ‘the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedures, as ways of conquering, of producing events, of producing decisions, of producing battles, of producing victories’ (Foucault, 1974 2:631-32 cited in Davidson, 1997: 5). Aside from its emphasis on power, this statement has much in common with Potter’s (1996: 97) Wittgensteinian conceptualization of language as a ‘construction yard’. In other words, language is selected to build particular versions of events and things, meaning that what is constructed ‘could have been otherwise’ (ibid: 98). This echoes Foucault’s interest in alternative possibilities that may be condemned to silence, as in his exploration of madness (Foucault, 1965). For Foucault these possibilities are to be explored philosophically through the adoption of a ‘limit attitude’ (2000:315), which challenges oneself to ‘think differently’ (1985: 9).
With this in mind, the texts explored in my study are understood as materials with which the rendering of certain versions of truth - which could always have been otherwise - is achieved. DP adds an extra dimension to the Foucauldian framework: rather than highlighting historical and cultural patterns, it emphasises local interactions, as well as attending to how accounts are ‘recipient designed’ (Silverman 2007: 118). Thus data sources are understood as constructions on two levels: they are the building blocks used to construct a sense of reality, but because they always construct particular versions of reality, intended for particular audiences, they may also be considered constructs in and of themselves (Potter, 1996).

*Genres of data*

Given my interest in seeking out variety, both in terms of different permutations of F-S relationship and different kinds of engagement with these relationships, my approach to data here is broadly inclusive (Potter, 2012). In other words, most data sources were ruled in rather than out at collection stage. This was done in order to open the investigation out as widely as possible (Wood & Kroger, 2000).

From the outset my intention was to focus on fictional, documentary, and interview accounts of relationships. The first two of these were deemed particularly important because of my interest in utilising pre-existing, rather than researcher-instigated, data as far as possible. I return to and elaborate on this point shortly. During the course of the study other genres of data were added to this list. Thus the genres of text eventually consulted also includes: computer mediated communications or discourse, such as posts to on-line discussion forums; newspaper articles; and extracts taken from a training session aimed at new and would-be academics. A comprehensive list of each of the sources collected, organised according to genre of text and cross-referenced with extract and page numbers, can be found in Appendix 4. Below, I expand my discussion of each
genre, highlighting issues concerning access, data collection, and the status accorded to artefacts.

Organizational Data: Policies and training sessions

The organizational data comprises two sub-genres: organizational policies on F-S relationships, and the transcript of a training workshop facilitated by one HEI, which was aimed at new and aspiring academics. Each of these is now further examined in turn.

The organizational policies collected and analysed in the study are all publicly available via the internet. A search was initially undertaken by typing ‘staff-student relationships policy’ into a search engine. This was subsequently broadened by searching against the following terms: ‘consensual relationships policy’; ‘conflicts of interest policy’; and ‘personal relationships policy’. The results were then refined, so that only documents relating to HEIs in the UK (England and Wales) were obtained. Policy documents from 24 universities, as well as the UCU’s policy guidelines on F-S relationships (published prior to the merger of the AUT and NATFHE unions in 1995, which produced the UCU), were collected in this way. A further policy, also available on the internet, was emailed to me by one participant following an interview, giving a total of 26 policy documents.

In general, the policies collected tend to follow a fairly standardised format, with little variation across documents. This may be, in part, because many policies appropriate the wording of the UCU guidelines. It is interesting to note, however, that the majority of policies studied were either published or revised in the mid-to-late 2000s. This suggests the possibility that universities were responding not, or not only, to the UCU guidelines but also to the THE’s call to arms, made in a 2005 article, cited in my introduction to the thesis (Fearn, 2008), which urged universities to devise policies on relationships in
order to stave off potential charges of harassment. I contacted five universities in an attempt to discuss their rationales for putting policies in place, and explore how policy wording had been drafted. Unfortunately, none of the universities contacted responded to my requests. Nonetheless, consistency of message and wording across these documents is a striking feature of the policy data.

The corpus also includes a single and fully transcribed training session aimed at new and would-be academics at one UK HEI. I attended this session completely coincidentally as part of my continuing professional development, not intending to use it as a source of data. However, a number of comments which seemed germane to my research emerged during the course of the workshop. I made brief notes of these, but was concerned I would be unable to use them due to lack of informed consent, and because of my inability to transcribe speakers’ comments verbatim. However, the data was subsequently made public when it was posted on the university’s careers service web-site. Furthermore, after contacting two academics involved in the workshop, I was given permission to quote them in the thesis. Thus I was able to obtain both consent and accuracy. Whilst the training event was fruitful in terms of yielding some interesting data, I did not pursue access to further training sessions. This was partly for practical reasons, since the idea occurred late in the fieldwork process, but also because the study was never intended to be ethnographic.

The documents and ethnographic data outlined above are available to all inhabitants of academe, but they are primarily aimed at academics and students. Further, they are produced and verified by university administrators and senior post-holders in the name of ‘the University’. Consequently, they have a particular sort of status because they are in the business of issuing suggestions, advice, commands, and warnings to their audience. In this sense they may be understood as fundamentally top-down
communications, aimed at the codification and regulation of appropriate academic conduct. However, this notion is qualified in my analysis, where I consider how organizational documents both concede and undermine notions that they work as top-down approaches to the government of academic subjects.

Newspaper articles

The digital archives of *The Observer* and *The Guardian*, which store articles published since 1791 and 1821 respectively, were accessed via ProQuest. From this search, 20 newspaper articles were collected. Additionally, on-line searches of the *Daily Mail*, *The Telegraph*, *The Independent*, and the *THE*, as well as local and student newspapers, were accessed via archives extending back as far as 1800. Despite their potential as historical sources, the earliest article used in the study dates back to 1984. This is because no stories dealing with or discussing F-S relationships prior to this date could be found. This absence is, in itself, an interesting feature of the data, suggesting that F-S relationships were not deemed ‘newsworthy’ (Galtung & Ruge, 1965) prior to this period.

As Fowler observes, newspapers, and particularly broadsheets, are often accorded a certain authority, because readers tend to assume that press articles are ‘faithful reports of events that happened out there’ (Fowler, 1991: 10-11, emphasis in original). However, and as with the other data sources analysed, press reports are treated here as recipient designed artefacts. So, I am mindful of journalistic processes, such as adherence to principles governing the selection and inclusion of stories, often referred to as ‘news values’ (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; Fowler, 1991; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). Whilst Galtung & Ruge (1965) state that acting in accordance with these values means that references to people, and to activity which is likely to be negatively perceived are more likely to make a story newsworthy, Harcup & O’Neill (2001) find that references
to sex make a story a prominent candidate for inclusion. Both studies also maintain that references to elite institutions and to powerful individuals affect a story’s likelihood of making it into the news. My analysis of newspaper articles acknowledges that these principles impact reportage. For instance, I am conscious that stories depicting F-S relationships may be sensationalised (see Walby & Soothill, 1991), thereby encouraging interpretations of them as sexually deviant, and/or as abuses of power.

The supposed authoritative status of news stories has sometimes resulted in them being perceived as relatively ‘closed’ texts in comparison with other mass media outputs, such as TV shows and films (Worthington, 2008: 347). However, this does not mean that their status as factual and authoritative is easily secured. Indeed, as newspapers have become available on-line, often with opportunities for readers to post comments on ‘below the line’ discussion boards, the ways in which they may be subjected to challenge are increasingly visible (Worthington, 2008). Thus, as Hall (1999) has argued, just because a story seems to encode a certain meaning, there is no guarantee that it will be decoded by the audience in that way, indeed it may be subjected to intense audience critique (Fiske, 1989). In my analysis I am interested in how newspapers covering F-S relationships construct them as problematic and/or exploitative, even when the details of the story are ambiguous, absent, or seem to suggest something other than this. To do this I focus on language use considering, for example, how ‘facticity’ (Potter, 1996) is worked up. In my analysis of computer mediated discourse I also examine some of the aforementioned below the line comments, which audibly reinforce and undermine such attempts.

**Computer Mediated Discourse**

Computer mediated communication or discourse (henceforth CMD) provides further data for the study. As with organizational documents, CMD comprises a number of sub-
genres (Herring 2003). The sub-genres in my corpus include on-line discussion forums, below the line comments following on-line news stories, and emails written to and published in one on-line student magazine, *Subtext*. Some discussions were brief, with only two or three communications in a thread, whilst others generated more than 200 comments. 184 pages of CMD were collected in all, many from below-the-line discussions following pieces on F-S relationships published in the *THE*.

All the CMD collected was asynchronous, meaning that contributors did not need to be on-line at the same time in order to add comments to a thread. Whilst synchronous forums for CMC, such as *ICQ* and *WorldOfChat* were considered, none were used in the study. In part, this was because doing so would have increased the amount of researcher instigated data generated for the study. This is an issue I have already alluded to, and I return to it in the section on interview data below. Here, I reiterate that I have endeavoured to utilise pre-existing data as much as possible. This has primarily been done to preserve the conventions of Foucauldian and DP work, both of which emphasize the usefulness of studying secondary sources or ‘naturally occurring’ data in order to capture how discourses give shape to meaning and understanding. A possible further benefit was convenience, although CMD is relatively easy to generate if the researcher initiates or responds to chat-room conversations (Cora Garcia et al, 2009).

A final and important consideration related to ethical concerns. A number of researchers have argued in favour of confining on-line research to the harvest and analysis of archived data because it appears to be in the public domain (Taylor, 1999; Ruhleder, 2000). Whilst asynchronous CMD is typically open access, and comments are often posted anonymously, there are still debates about whether or not this means that they are in the public domain (Snee, 2008; Cora Garcia et al, 2009), with some (e.g. Waskul & Douglass, 1996) arguing that this is a decision for the e-participant, rather than the
researcher, to judge. Further, some on-line ethnographers, or ‘netnographers’ (Kozinets, 1997), have argued that using pre-existing data is against the spirit of netnography’s emphasis on promoting dialogic and collaborative research, which relies upon gaining participants’ informed consent.

In spite of these criticisms, others have argued that comments in open access forums are analogous to letters to papers and magazines (Cora Garcia et al, 2009). Further, using archived comments can head off accusations of researcher deception or enticement, as well as avoiding problems associated with lurking (Sveningsson, 2004). On a personal level I felt uncomfortable with the idea of eavesdropping on or instigating conversations without openly announcing and identifying myself, but worried that if I did I would be kicked out of the conversation, a perennial problem in netnography (see Snee, 2008; Cora Garcia et al, 2009). Additionally, whilst I have empathies with dialogic research my thesis is not ethnographic. In light of this I did not instigate new conversations or add to existing threads in order to yield any data.

Given the near impossibility of obtaining informed consent from historical e-participants, coupled with my unwillingness to risk compromising their anonymity, posts have only been included here if they fulfil two criteria. First, all comments come from websites with unrestricted access. Second, comments have only been quoted where an obvious pseudonym has been used. This avoids the possibility of readers typing quotations into a search engine and identifying the writer (see Snee, 2008). As an additional precautionary measure, new pseudonyms were allocated in order to further secure the identities of commentators. This was done because some users of on-line forums have well-established on-line identities, and thus might still be recognisable (Bruckman, 2004). Of course, it is possible that some commentators may have been
happy to be identified. However, in the absence of being able to ask them, these measures were deemed necessary.

The issue of identity play has been raised in relation to the use of CMD (Turkle, 1995). However, whilst the problem of establishing the authenticity of a user’s identity is acknowledged, it is not a primary concern here. This is because notions of an authentic experience or identity, and of an objective, impartial account are rejected; all of the accounts examined here are understood as more or less ‘fictive’ (O’Leary, 2008: 6), and the analytic focus is on how they are linguistically organised in order to produce certain truth effects. As Taylor (1999) has argued in relation to the problem of establishing the authenticity of e-participants’ input;

this issue is not specific to online research…[the privileging of offline forms of data, such as face-to-face interviews] tends to have shades of wishing to create a situation that allows for objective truth about subjectivity to emerge, something I also find theoretically impossible. (Taylor, 1995:443)

Nonetheless, the peculiar tendency for CMD to engender ‘flaming’ behaviour, whereby commentators post provocative messages insulting and ridiculing others (Franco et al, 1995), is acknowledged here.

Fictional accounts

The use of fictional texts in research on organizations is well established, although the ways texts have been used is diverse (Rhodes & Brown, 2005). Some have turned to popular culture in order to explicate themes of organizational life (e.g. Whyte, 1956; Bell, 2008; Godfrey, 2009), whilst others have used them as a vehicle for exploring particular analytic or theoretical concepts (e.g. Willmott, 1998; Parker, 2000; Wray-
Bliss, 2002). Others still have combined these two approaches (e.g. Brewis, 1998b; Rhodes, 2001; Godfrey et al, 2012).

Fictional accounts are considered a useful source of data on F-S relationships for two reasons. First, I am mindful of Burrell’s comment that whilst scholarly accounts of organizational life are bereft of accounts of sexuality and sexual relationships, literary works are ‘redolent’ with them (1984: 97). Second, I am interested in how fiction both shapes, and is shaped by, understandings of social phenomena. Gamson, whose work explores the representation and construction of sexuality in TV and film, argues:

> Sexual statuses, populations, behaviors and so on, all get processed through popular culture. Some become visible in it, others are rendered invisible; some are celebrated or treated as legitimate, others are denigrated or delegitimated. So popular culture affects who and what gets on the cultural map in the first place, and proposes ways of thinking about sexualities (2007: 337-8).

Like Gamson I am interested in how fiction picks up, plays with, and sets the agenda for cultural understandings of social phenomena. For this reason, novels, TV shows, plays, and films are all considered useful sites for discourse on F-S relationships.

A further benefit of studying fictional accounts is their potential utility in pinpointing historical shifts in the framing of values, attitudes, and relationships (McCulloch, 2004). This historical perspective was otherwise hard to access, since the documentary data begins in the 1980s (newspapers) and 1990s (policies), and interview respondents are overwhelmingly drawn from the under 40 age group. Consequently, fictional accounts provide an opportunity to locate historical traces of the discursive themes I identify. For example, I am interested here in whether constructions of students-as-children, which are prevalent in interviews and policies (see Chapter 8), are also detectable in the older literary texts studied, such as Bradbury’s *Eating People is Wrong*, published in 1959.
Initially, any fictional text depicting campus life was included within the remit of the study. This broad approach enabled me to consult texts in which F-S relationships were incidental rather than the focus of the texts - as with Bradbury’s aforementioned novel, and in films like Baumbach’s *The Squid and the Whale* - as well as those where relationships were a focal point, such as Prose’s *Blue Angel*. As with the rest of the corpus, a full list of the fictional sources used in the study can be found in Appendix 4.

An unexpected difficulty of using media sources related to viewing and transcribing filmed materials, which proved extremely time-consuming. To resolve this issue, only small sections of on-topic dialogue were transcribed from filmed sources. Whilst this may have resulted in the under-representation of extracts from films and television shows in comparison with those taken from novels, my immersion in the world of campus fiction through viewing and reading an array of fictional sources sensitised me to some of the discursive themes and devices explored in the thesis (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). My engagement with filmed data frequently produced light-bulb moments, surfacing new avenues for further analysis and helping to crystallize nascent ideas.

Literary sources also provide many of the most terse and occasionally ‘carnivalesque’ (Rhodes, 2001:376) depictions of relationships. The fictional texts studied often exaggerate or subvert discursive themes and devices that are presented more prosaically in other genres of data (see Godfrey, 2009). Commenting specifically on campus fiction, Womack notes that such works ‘often satirize and problematize the contradictions and sociological nuances of campus life’ (2002: 1). In this respect, fictional works can act as sources of inspiration (de Cock, 2000; Rhodes & Brown, 2005), as well as affording opportunities to punctuate the analysis with relatively pithy quotes which illuminate the ideas under discussion.
Interviews

As with the other genres discussed, my interview data may be divided into sub-genres. Broadly speaking, three kinds of interview were conducted: individual interviews, couple interviews, and group interviews. In this section I discuss how I handled interviews as a whole, before turning to particular issues relating to each sub-genre.

It is worth emphasizing that whilst interviews have been referred to as the default method for social scientific research (Silverman, 2007), they are not the chosen method of my main analytic influences. As already stated, Foucault engages primarily with historical archives, although a number of Foucauldian analyses (e.g. Hollway, 1984; Pringle, 1989; Grey, 1994) have undertaken interview work to explore discourse. Meanwhile, discursive psychologists have increasingly eschewed the use of interviews (Potter, 2002; Edwards & Stokoe, 2004), preferring instead to collect mundane talk and interaction, or ‘naturally occurring interactions’ (Shegloff & Sacks, 1973: 291). For Potter, the defining characteristic of such ‘naturalistic’ data is ‘whether the interaction would have taken place, and would have taken place in the form that it did, had the researcher not been born’ (1996: 135). In other words, rather than relying on data that has been ‘got up’ (Potter, 2002: 205) specifically for research purposes, such as interviews, surveys, and experiments, ethnographic materials and particularly audio/video data become the objects of analysis.

As Silverman (2007) notes, despite disagreeing over the usefulness of distinguishing between ‘naturally occurring data’ and ‘contrived’ interview data, there is broad agreement amongst discursive psychologists that, ultimately, the choice of method will primarily be influenced by the research topic (see Speer, 2002; Potter, 2002). With this in mind, it was hard to envisage how a large sample of naturally occurring data might be recovered for my study. Notes from, and recordings of, harassment hearings are kept by
universities, but these represent particular kinds of experience of F-S relationships which suggest the absence of consent. Furthermore, these documents are confidential and hard to access. In addition, it was considered unlikely that I would be able to record naturally occurring interactions with a camera or audio-device without significantly invading people’s privacy.

Consequently, it seemed logical to talk to those who had been or still were involved in relationships, as well as other inhabitants of academe with an interest in speaking on the topic, in order to explore how relationships are articulated by participants and bystanders. Acknowledging that these interviews may be interpreted as contrivances, I make no claim that they are instruments revealing the experiences of individuals (Denzin, 2001). Indeed, on more than one occasion I sensed that interviewees were not being entirely truthful with me, either omitting or fabricating details of events. Rather, I approach them as recipient designed events, in which meaning is co-constructed, and where the points of interest are found not only in what gets said, but also in how it is said (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004; Talmy, 2011). This is a point I elaborate in the next chapter, where I consider analytic techniques. Here, I want to justify my choice of interviews on two grounds: first, by stating an allegiance to interview approaches that treat meaning making as occasioned and enacted, rather than spontaneous and authentic (Holstein & Gubrium, 2004; Baker, 2004; Talmy, 2011); and second, because interviews facilitated access to accounts which proved otherwise hard to access.

This is not to suggest that interviews with participants and stakeholders were easy to come by; quite the opposite. My approach to recruiting interviewees for the study involved two overarching techniques. The first of these was to formally advertise my research, asking for volunteers - both participants and non-participants in relationships - to come forward and be interviewed. To this end, I placed adverts on the intranet sites of
three universities, as well as publicising my research in a student newspaper and on Facebook. This yielded 24 responses, although only three people who contacted me in this way were eventually interviewed. This was primarily because respondents either changed their minds or did not respond to follow-up calls when I tried to arrange interviews. A further two responses came from students whose age meant that they fell outside the remit of the study, since they were both 17. Whilst it might have been interesting to interview these students, I was concerned about the ethics of interviewing respondents who would, in effect, be discussing relationships that are proscribed by the law. The Sexual Offences Act, 2003, makes it an offence for educators, as people placed in ‘positions of trust’, to have sexual relations with anyone under 18 whom they are educating (SOA, 2003: 1, s21 (5)).

Although research has been conducted on the more sensitive issue of sexual relationships and allegations of harassment between educators and minors (Sikes, 2006; Sikes & Piper, 2009), the focus of my thesis is on relationships which are consensual, and which are not prohibited by legislation. As I discuss later in Part III of the thesis, F-S relationships are sometimes articulated in ways that expand the lenses of harassment and paedophilia so that they accommodate consensual relationships between academics and students. However, such relationships are not the target of criminal and judicial discourses in the UK, and thus the modes of government constraining and enabling them are reliant on alternative techniques.

Informal recruitment methods were the most successful way of enlisting participants. Speaking to students and academics at conferences produced further interviewees, as did discussions with friends and new acquaintances about my research during chance encounters and at social occasions. Whilst these informal approaches occasionally provided direct contact with the interviewee, they more often resulted in contact with
someone who knew of a potential interview candidate. I was then reliant on these third parties to establish whether individuals were willing to be interviewed. In this sense the third parties acted as rather rusty ‘gate-keepers’ (Miller & Bell, 2002) to access, often requiring persistent nudging in the form of prompts and reminders in order to gain access to respondents.

The trickiest access issue to negotiate was the recruitment of academics, and particularly male academics with direct experiences of F-S relationships as academics. Although the most common depiction of the F-S relationship - and this applies to both the fictional and scholarly literature - involves a male academic and female student (Taylor, 2011), the former group proved almost impossible to reach. I was frequently told by academics that ‘so-and-so’ was renowned for having had relationships or, in the words of one contact, being a ‘dirty old shagger’. However, when pressed many of these colleagues were unwilling to act as gate-keepers.

Reasons given for this reluctance usually hinged on the notion that the topic was ‘taboo’, or that it was ‘obvious’ that so-and-so would not want to participate. Those who were willing to act as gate-keepers were often unable to make the necessary contact and gain permission for me to make an approach and set up an interview. Thus only three such male academics were interviewed. Of these, one had been involved in a same-sex relationship as a student and another in a ‘romantic but never sexual’ relationship with a student as an academic, leaving just one male academic who was sexually involved with a female student. The group interviews that I discuss shortly were organised, in part, to make up for this deficit. However, they do not overcome the dearth of responses from male academics with direct experience of relationships, since all the group interviewees declared themselves inexperienced in the field.
In contrast to this, female students were the easiest to access group, and consequently my interview data is skewed in favour of their accounts. However, since my thesis makes no claim to have either identified or represented a relevant population, this issue should not be overstated. Regarding identification, I have already stated that the available TSN survey data indicates that over a quarter of UK academics report direct experience of F-S relationships. However, the TSN data does not drill down into the detail of this group of self-disclosing academics, nor does it provide equivalent data for students. Regarding representation, my small sample size, coupled with the opportunistic methods of recruiting respondents, means that my analysis cannot be used to generalise to a population. Rather, I use it to make inferences about the government of sexual relationships, and thus I am generalising to theory (Bryman, 2008). Nonetheless, the cliché of the male academic/female student permutation of F-S relationships is so dominant that to have only one interview with a male academic who had participated in a sexual F-S relationship was disappointing.

16 interviews were conducted in total, providing access to 29 respondents. Interviews were either semi-structured or almost totally unstructured. Broad areas for discussion were identified prior to each interview, but these were often abandoned, particularly in the individual and couple interviews. Instead, I followed participants’ concerns and interests, and asked them to steer the trajectory of the interviews. All of the interviews were digitally recorded and fully transcribed, using an approach used by Finch-Lees et al (2005), itself a simplified adaptation of the Jeffersonian convention often used in DP (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987).

The advantage of this transcription convention is that it captures pauses and emphasis, facilitating a reading that more faithfully represents what was said and, especially, how it was said than orthographic approaches (Wood & Kroger, 2000). This enables the analyst to consider organizational features of the account that might otherwise be
brushed over, such as self-repair, hesitation, and other conversational ‘troubles’ (Shegloff et al, 1977). I also took brief notes during interviews in order to capture facial and bodily gestures in case these turned out to be relevant during analysis. These notes were inserted into transcriptions in square parentheses. Full details of the transcription convention can be found in Appendix 2.

All participants’ names were changed during transcription in order to comply with requests for anonymity. Additionally, other markers that might identify participants, including all references to names of people, institutions, geographical locations, and disciplines of work or study were removed. Interviewees were asked whether they wanted to read and sign off transcripts, and the three individuals who said that they did were e-mailed copies.

Although two of the interviewees signed off the transcripts without comment, one participant returned the transcript with 16 points for amendment. The suggested amendments included typographicals and a request to omit a reference to an event they thought might compromise their anonymity; these details were changed without further discussion. However, the respondent also requested that I alter passages of the transcript in order to, ‘better reflect what really happened, and not be so harsh on [named individuals]’. I was duly provided with new quotations that the respondent felt were ‘fairer’ and ‘more accurate’.

Given my position on the status of interviews as recipient designed events, in which meaning is co-produced, I was uncomfortable with this suggestion. After exchanging a number of emails we eventually agreed that I would omit roughly half of the offending passages. The others, which we agreed could not conceivably compromise anyone’s identity, were preserved, and one of these is reproduced in my analysis.
As already mentioned, the interviews can be subdivided into three groups: individual, couple, and group interviews. Below I provide more detail on each of these sub-genres.

Individual interviews
Individual interviews were conducted with 10 people. Of these, one interviewee had been involved in a F-S relationships as a female academic, one as a male academic, two as male students, and five as female students. A further interview was conducted with a woman who had been involved in F-S relationships both as a student and as an academic. Interviews were almost all conducted face-to-face, at locations chosen by respondents. This frequently involved me turning up at the homes of interviewees rather than meeting them on-campus, having only spoken to them briefly over the telephone prior to this. Two interviews were conducted via Skype at respondents’ requests. Interviews all lasted between 45 minutes and two hours.

Couple interviews
Two couple interviews were conducted: one with a cohabiting same-sex female couple, the other with a married male academic/female student couple. The idea of interviewing both parties to the relationship was the suggestion of my respondents in both cases. I had initially approached the academic parties in these relationships, and they were keen to get their partners’ input. These interviews were amongst the most interesting to transcribe because of the ways the couples recounted their stories. Both accounts contain disagreements over specific events, attesting to the difficulty in establishing the ‘facts’ of such narratives. Phrases such as ‘You tell this bit,’ or ‘Oh, I love this part!’ pepper the transcripts, suggesting that these are stories that have been told, re-told, and refined. They also hint that some people make better raconteurs than others (Gabriel & Griffiths, 2004). These aspects of the interviews reinforce my understanding of interviews as occasioned and artfully produced constructions.
Group interviews

Group interviews were conducted with four groups of participants: undergraduate students; doctoral students, male academics; and female academics. Each group comprised between three and five participants, opportunistically recruited from amongst colleagues and acquaintances. Members of each group were already known to each other, although they were not always working or studying at the same institution at the time of interview.

There are clear advantages to using existing contacts for research purposes, one of which is convenience (Brewis, 2004). Some others emerge in the discussions of transcription and naturalistic interaction that follow shortly. However, there are also difficulties and limitations. Some researchers have identified ethical dilemmas associated with ‘using’ pre-existing friends as research subjects, whilst others have pointed to the alternate problem of ‘faking’ new friendships in order to generate data (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002). Ellis provides an interesting discussions of both of these dilemmas, and ultimately recommends the adoption of an ‘ethic of care’ (2007: 26) in order to deal with such questions. My research is sensitive to the advice she gives around letting participants read and have editorial rights over their accounts, as well as her assertion that the research process can be enjoyable and cathartic for participants, rather than (only) oppressive and objectifying.

As already indicated, one reason for undertaking academic focus groups was to address imbalances in the data, and therefore this method was also purposeful (Brewis, 2004). However, constructing the academic groups along gender lines was an unintentional consequence of practical constraints regarding group size and participants’ availability, rather than a design feature. Both of the student groups were mixed in terms of gender, nationality, and age, and all of the doctoral students were involved in teaching in some capacity (see Appendix 4).
I was particularly interested in this last group due to their liminal position as postgraduate students and also as part-time lecturers. Theirs was the longest interview conducted, lasting for just over two hours. The difficulties of transcribing group interviews are well documented (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999; Warr, 2005; Bryman, 2008), and include problems associated with group members talking at the same time, background noise, and difficulties in identifying who is speaking. Certainly I found them the lengthiest to transcribe. However, since the participants involved were all acquaintances of mine the difficulty of knowing who was speaking was minimised.

A further, and perhaps more important reason for using group interviews was to engage with people sometimes referred to in university personal relationships policies as ‘stakeholders’, which is to say students and academics not involved in relationships themselves. Returning to the notions of natural and contrived data explored earlier, researchers using group interviews have sometimes referred to this approach as more ‘naturalistic’, since they are ‘closer to everyday conversation’ (Wilkinson, 2004: 180) than one-to-one interviews. This is considered particularly applicable where pre-existing social groups are interviewed (Wilkinson, 2004; Warr, 2005). Thus focus group interviews offer the potential to capture conversations, albeit ones more or less staged for research purposes, in which participants actively agree and disagree with one another. This interactive dimension can then become an object of analytic attention (Brewis, 2004). Examining how group members orient to each other and take conversational turns can provide insights into how the discursive themes and devices implicated in the regulation of F-S relationships operate (see Warr, 2005). For instance, in my analysis I show how focus group participants build consensus and challenge each other in their navigation of discursive themes. This gives clues as to the purchase of the discourses, indicating how much room for manoeuvre they afford.
I expand my discussion of how empirical data has been analysed in the next chapter. Before summarising and concluding this chapter, however, I want to make some additional comments concerning my own position as researcher. In particular, I further reflect on an issue that caused some consternation during the course of the project. This relates to my ‘insider status’ as a doctoral student who became involved in a F-S relationship during the course of my research.

**Researching from the inside: Reflexivity and authorial positioning**

Problems associated with ‘insider status’ (Adler & Adler, 1987; Kanuha, 2000) or ‘going native’ (Glesne, 1999), such as over-identification with one’s respondents, or the inability to objectively analyse data, have typically been emphasized in relation to ethnographic research (Corbin Dwyer & Buckle, 2009). However, Corbin Dwyer & Buckle argue that, if these ‘problems’ are relevant at all, they are applicable to all kinds of qualitative research, since ‘the personhood of the researcher, including her or his membership status in relation to those participating in the research, is an essential and ever-present aspect of the investigation’ (2009: 55). They note that many post-structural and feminist researchers suggest that the ‘insider/outside’ dichotomy is overstated, since identity is fluid, and there are plenty of spaces in between and across these binary poles (see Hall, 1990; Acker, 2000). Further, some researchers espousing post-structural and/or feminist epistemologies have argued against the possibility or desirability of objective or ‘value free’ research (Stanley & Wise, 1983, 1993; Agger, 1991). Consequently, they take care to exhibit and discuss their membership identities and allegiances in relation to the communities being studied, and have advocated that others do likewise (Corbin-Dwyer & Buckle, 2009).

However, if one looks to Foucault, his writings and lectures are marked by a reluctance to take up a ‘definitive position’ (Barratt, 2003: 1080) on the issues he considers. Moreover, Foucault chose to wear the ‘mask of anonymity’ (Foucault, 2000: 321) for
some of his publications. Consequently, whilst his work invites the adoption of a critical stance and consideration of alternative modes of being and acting, his focus is on diagnosis or problematization, and not on offering opinion or remedy (Veyne, 1997: Barratt, 2003). This has led some to accuse him of political quietism (Lentricchia, 1983) in his scholarly work, if not in his practice - Foucault was involved in political activism on a range of issues (Halperin, 1995). I am sympathetic to both of these perspectives. Below, I elaborate my sympathies with Foucauldian quietism and with the more overt stance adopted by feminist and post-structural researchers advocating a ‘value-full’ sociology (Bailey, 1994).

As already stated, I have been concerned since the outset of the project with problematizing conceptualizations of consensual F-S relationships in which they are construed as harassment. As I embarked on my research this was not a subject I had any direct experience of. However, as I write this I have been involved in a three year relationship with an academic who taught me during the first year of my doctoral research. The relationship began shortly after he had finished teaching me a module on research methods, and whilst we were immediately open about our relationship with colleagues and friends, we have never disclosed it in the way suggested by university policies on staff-student relationships.

The extent to which my involvement in a F-S relationship has influenced the study is hard to estimate, though I am in no doubt that it has. However, and in line with calls for a value-full sociology, I acknowledge that my involvement may have caused me to be more predisposed towards a defence of such relationships than I might otherwise have been. Further, my interviews were not detached and neutral. Participants were all informed about my involvement in a relationship, and this sometimes resulted in them asking me questions about it. Thus the interviews might be considered dialogic rather
than one-way (Smith, 1992). Further, I accept that participants will have oriented to me as a female doctoral student involved in a relationship with a former lecturer, and that this orientation is likely to have had some impact on their responses to my questions (Talmy, 2011). Despite these acknowledgements, a personal account of my relationship is largely absent from the thesis. This is largely because my partner was reluctant for our relationship to become a focus of my analysis, and I understand and respect his view. Consequently, although I include excerpts of transcript in which our relationship is referred to by interviewees, it is not a substantive feature of the analysis.

There are a number of other ways in which I might be considered an insider. I have studied and worked at universities prior to and during the project, and thus have occupied the positions of ‘student’ and ‘lecturer’ that my analysis considers. I have also had privileged access to off-the-record conversations about F-S relationships, and have been privy to events which I could have used as data in my analysis had I adopted an ethnographic approach. However, I have not. For this reason, only the aforementioned training session is used as a source of data as a direct result of this insider status. All of the other genres of text analysed were publicly available or could have been collected by an ‘outsider’.

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter has sought to explicate my overall approach to the research topic, as well as exploring some of the practical and ethical issues encountered in collecting, generating, and handling empirical data. I have also begun to explore issues pertaining to analysis. These become the focus of attention in the next chapter, where I describe how data was selected for analysis, and explain the techniques used to examine how F-S relationships are articulated as governed and governable.
…the governed are, variously, members of a flock to be nurtured or culled, juridical subjects whose conduct is to be limited by law, individuals to be disciplined, or, indeed, people to be freed.

(Rose et al, 2006: 85)

Well…of course, with these types of relationships I think how you see it is all gonna depend on how you’re looking at it.

(Sally: Group interview 2, see Appendix 4)
**Introduction**

In this chapter I discuss how empirical data has been selected and analysed. I emphasise the recursive approach taken to these processes, indicating how ideas were refined as a result of numerous close readings of texts. I also develop my exposition of the analytic techniques used. Nicolini’s concept of a ‘zooming in and out’ (2009: 1391) approach to analysis is adopted to explicate my dual interest in exploring broader discursive patterns and characteristics, whilst also considering the particular ways in which these patterns are adapted by individuals.

The chapter sets out selection and analysis in five related phases, rather than splitting them out into two separate sections. This is to do to reflect how processes of selection always involved elements of analysis, and vice versa. It also highlights the incremental steps that were taken before the data extracts appearing in the thesis were selected for detailed analysis.

**Analysing and selecting data: a phased approach**

The data amassed through the methods outlined in Chapter 5 provided me with just over 3,000 pages of text. Rather than coding the data around themes through the use of computer software, such as NVivo, analysis was undertaken through multiple close readings of the corpus. This is because, as Wood and Kroger (2000: 141-42) observe, qualitative coding and analysis programmes have built in assumptions and hierarchies. Thus whilst they may be compatible with grounded theory, they are less well suited to analysis that is more text-focused. In order to select segments of data for detailed analysis my corpus was therefore subjected to a number of stages of review and analysis, which I outline below.
Stage 1: Initial reading, viewing and transcription

Analysis began as soon as texts were gathered. For example, I began to notice recurring ways of positioning subjects during my first viewings and readings of the secondary data, and during interviews. With secondary texts, such as novels and policy documents, these observations were pencilled in the margins during initial readings. With interviews and the one training session I use here as data, initial thoughts were written in a notebook during or immediately after leaving the interview or training environment.

For interviews, these notes were then added to during transcription. As I transcribed, I noticed further features and characteristics that had not struck me at the time. It is for precisely this reason that many researchers insist that verbatim transcriptions should be undertaken by the analyst rather than by a paid transcriber or research assistant (Atkinson, 1984; Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; Wood & Kroger, 2000). They argue that outsourcing transcription omits an important stage of analysis; that failure to transcribe interviews and other data in full can mean that data is too easily passed over as uninteresting since ‘it is impossible to specify in advance which features might turn out to be important’ (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 82). As stated earlier, the filmed fictional materials were not transcribed in this way. However, all of the TV shows and films were viewed more than once, and extracts containing dialogue focusing on F-S relationships were viewed several times, and transcribed using the same convention used for interviews.

Whilst initial readings were largely inductive, meaning that I came to texts with an open mind regarding what I might find, I also approached accounts with an interest in whether and how they might be inflected with a discourse of harassment. This is such a prevalent feature of the extant literature on F-S relationships that it was considered important to see how it might be deployed in lay, as opposed to scholarly, accounts.
Stage 2: Asking questions, reviewing, and identifying patterns

Having marked up texts with initial ideas and points of interest, I then further delved into sections of text in order to identify how particular subjects, objects, and ideas were being constructed within and across accounts. A number of initial questions relating to these constructs were identified. These foreground ‘how’ questions, relating to who and what is being worked up in texts. The questions were:

- Are F-S relationships being problematized, defended, or is something else happening?
- Who is the academic, and how are they positioned?
- Who is the student, and how are they positioned?
- How is the university understood?
- What is absent from the account?

These questions emerged through adherence to advice provided by discourse analysts regarding how best to become familiar with and explore texts (Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996; Wood & Kroger, 2000). This advice includes consideration of regularities and irregularities, and of what is missing in and across accounts. The questions were also influenced by discourse analytic work concerned with how certain objects are constructed and subject positions made available by discourses (Foucault, 1972; Hall, 1997; Fairclough, 2001), and with the rhetorical effects of textually positioning self and others (Davies & Harré, 1990; Korborov, 2010; Korborov & Thorne, 2009).

With these questions in mind, data was re-read and re-viewed in order to consider how subjects, institutions, and relations were being framed. From this I identified a cluster of reoccurring discursive themes. For example, the idea of the university as an extension of school, populated by students-as-children, and academics-as-adults, was quickly read
into the data. Other themes, such as the notion of the academic as pastor or medic, were arrived at more gradually after several readings. Six broad discursive themes were thus identified: harassment; infantilization; health; hygiene; religiosity; and professionalism. These six were later condensed to five, by merging health and hygiene discourses and also adding in safety. Sections of text in which each of these discourses could be traced were copied and filed in both hard and electronic copy. Six files were compiled in all: five pertained to the discrete discourses identified, and a further file containing texts in which a number of discourses seemed to intersect, or were hybridized.

However, given my interest in how individuals interact with and negotiate discourses, and in how power relations are configured, this level of analysis was not sufficient. Consequently three further stages of analysis were conducted.

**Stage 3: Discursive devices**

During the third stage of analysis, texts from each file were scrutinised further to explore how discourses were being taken up within particular accounts. So, where stage two analysis led me to examine whether F-S relationships were being problematized or defended, in stage three my interest was in how this orientation was manifest. Therefore, this stage of analysis involved ‘zooming in’ (Nicolini, 2009) to the data in order to explore particular tactics.

A repertoire of commonly identified discursive devices (DDs) provided the key analytic tools during this stage. These have been devised and used by those aligning themselves with DP, such as Potter & Wetherell (1987), Potter (1997), and Edwards & Potter, (1992). In the field of MOS they have been used by Mangan (2009), Mueller & Whittle (2011), Whittle & Mueller (2012), and Dick (2013). As Potter (2001) and Wiggins & Potter (2008) assert, these techniques developed out of variety of influences: the post-structuralist work of Foucault, Barthes, and Derrida; symbolic interactionism (e.g.
Goffmann, 1981); linguistic philosophy and pragmatics (e.g. Wittgenstein, 1958; Austin, 1962, Searle, 1969, Levinson, 1983); rhetorical analysis (e.g. Billig, 1996); and, increasingly, ethnomethodology and conversation analysis (e.g. Garfinkel, 1967; Shegloff, 1977; ten Have, 1999). Their purpose is not to examine how language use provides access to internal cognitive states or processes, as is the case with Lakoff’s work on categorization and metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987), but rather to see categories, metaphors, and other DDs as linguistic accomplishments that perform certain functions within accounts (Antaki, 1994; Edwards, 1997).

In addition to categorization and metaphor, the DDs analysed in the thesis include devices aimed at the management of stake and interest (Potter, 1996), making concessions (Antaki & Wetherell, 1997), and footing (Goffman, 1981; Potter, 1996). These devices are considered useful because of how they render accounts as factual, impartial, and reasonable. They also facilitate analysis of how blame and responsibility are apportioned. Consequently, they are understood as providing insights into how the work of problematizing, defending, or otherwise orienting to F-S relationships is accomplished, and thus as illuminating the sign systems or linguistic techniques involved in governing conduct that Foucault alludes to (1972, 2000).

The techniques discussed have been analysed where they shed further light on the five broad discursive themes identified earlier. For example, categorization devices are analysed for how the category ‘student’ is differentiated from that of ‘academic’. In order to assist the reader, a full and referenced glossary of each of the DDs considered is provided in Appendix 3. DDs are also emboldened in the text of my analysis when they are first referred to.
Stage 4: Power relations

This stage of analysis is most obviously influenced by Foucault’s genealogical and ethical works (see Burrell, 1988; Kelly, 2009). The Foucauldian techniques embraced here foreground two considerations. The first, already described in stage two, involves the identification of broad discursive themes, such as infantilizing or religious discourses. This is congruent with Foucauldian work involving analysis of interviews and the identification of paradigmatic discourses (e.g. Hollway, 1984; Pringle, 1989). The second is concerned with the characteristics of these themes in terms of how they express and deploy different sorts of power relation: are the relations implicated suggestive of sovereign, disciplinary, pastoral, or ethical modes of government? In other words, how are the governed articulated as governable (Rose et al, 2008)? In many respects these techniques involve ‘zooming out’ (Nicolini, 2009) from the detail, and taking a view on overall patterns of, and connections between, discourses. However, this is an oversimplification since, as I have said, Foucauldian analysis may also zoom in to textual detail.

As noted earlier, the examination of subject positions and metaphor have a role to play in the Foucauldian analytic toolkit, as does consideration of a text’s enunciative modality (Foucault, 1972), a concept I return to shortly. However, perhaps the most fine grained analytic device drawn from Foucault is my consideration of what Rabinow (2000: XXVII) terms ‘the ethical fourfold’, which Foucault referred to as a ‘grid of intelligibility for desire [and other ethical substances] as an ethical problem’ (Foucault, 2000: 268).

Foucault uses this grid in the last two volumes of his study of The History of Sexuality, and aspects of it are also referred to in some of his later interviews and lectures, such as On the Genealogy of Ethics (2000), and The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005). This
mode of analysis considers four tenets of ethical conduct: the ethical substance one works upon; the mode of subjectivation, which covers how one deals with this substance and orients to rules; ascetic practices, which detail the work that is performed on the self; and the telos, or goal, which specifies ‘the kind of being to which we aspire’ (Foucault, 2000: 265; see also Dean, 1994; Huijer, 1999; Rabinow, 2000). Thus it may be understood as zooming in to, rather than out of, the text. The utility of this grid emerges most prominently in Part IV of the thesis, particularly in Chapter 11, which deals with articulations of professional and ethical conduct. I also use it to consider how modes of subjectivation are implicated within and across the five discourses.

As with stage three, much of the analysis undertaken at this stage is geared towards ‘how’ as opposed to ‘why’ questions, and in this sense stages three and four were closely linked. However, rather than focussing on DDs as situated linguistic achievements, as discursive psychologists have done, this stage leads me to explore how they contribute to the textual configuration of power relations.

Within texts, this involves noting how accounts arrange language to enact facticity and authority. For example, the use of stake management (Potter, 1997), which denies interest and bias, and the deployment of particular enunciative modalities (Foucault, 1972), such as the imperative modality, which relies on auxiliary verbs such as ‘must’ or ‘cannot’ (Fairclough, 2013), are interpreted as lending an account authority. This, in turn, can help to construct sovereign or disciplinary power relations, emphasizing what must or must not be done and presenting opinion as fact. It can also be contrasted with texts that rely on the more hortative modality of advice and guidance. This modality accommodates, rather than inoculates against, notions of a vested stake or interest, often deploying apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2009) in order to guide behaviour within certain parameters.
Across texts, I consider which power relations are most evident in each of the five discourses identified. For instance, I observe that sovereign and disciplinary relations appear to be a characteristic feature of accounts mobilizing harassment knowledge, whereas professional discourses often invoke technologies of self. This is not to suggest that each of the discourses identified neatly map on to particular permutations of Foucauldian power relation. Rather, a number of different kinds of relation play out, and a variety of techniques of government are deployed.

Stage 5: Extract selection and analysis

Each of the stages elaborated resulted in data culls from the initial 3,000 pages of text. Large sections of off-topic or incidental talk and text were cut during stages one and two, and excerpts deemed particularly illuminating were flagged up in stages three to four. Excerpts considered most instructive in illuminating how DDs are deployed and power relations configured were thus identified. As a result, the corpus selected for detailed analysis was gradually reduced, until I was left with 98 pages of on-topic and analytically interesting text.

From this, a final stage of selection was undertaken in order to arrive at a series of key extracts for full analysis and inclusion in the thesis. This involved making judgements about which extracts of text seemed to typify, modify, or deviate from the rest of the data in some respect. Thus, my approach is informed by varieties of DA interested in variability and deviant case analysis, as well as in identifying commonalities and patterns (e.g. Jackson, 1986; Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Antaki & Wetherell, 1999). It also follows Foucault’s interest in how ‘things’ come to be ‘lump[ed] together’ (Foucault, cited in Kelly, 2009: 21), as well as in shifts, ruptures, and discontinuities in discourses (Foucault, 1972; Burrell, 1988).
Policy documents were perhaps the easiest texts to select extracts from. As already stated, these displayed remarkable consistency in terms of prose and formatting. Consequently, certain ways of articulating relationships were so prevalent that they warranted detailed examination. This was particularly so in relation to the deployment of discourses of professionalism (see Chapter 11). In other cases, policy extracts were chosen because they appeared to be atypical. For instance, harassment knowledge is more visible in certain policy documents than it is in many of the other genres of data considered.

In contrast, interview data was difficult to select extracts from. This was because interview data was highly variable, with respondents often displaying creativity, humour, and flair in the ways they dealt with questions and recounted events. The interview with undergraduate students was a particularly fruitful source of data, because this group was particularly apt to hypothesize scenarios, enabling them to mull over, question, and in some cases change their proclaimed ‘attitudes’ to F-S relationships. Consequently, their interview produced a transcript that was punctuated with metaphor, extremization, and other DDs. It also attests to the precariousness of subjects’ discursive positioning of self and other.

The extracts used in the study are of three broad kinds. 34 numbered and indented key extracts are included. These act as focal points for analysis. Where these extracts are seen as typical in some respect I either refer to or include subsidiary excerpts of data as evidence of similarity. Where they are considered atypical, I do the same in order to highlight points of difference. Finally, some extracts are used in the pairs of quotations used to preface chapters, often alongside quotations from scholarly works. The call about which extracts to use as foci for analysis often came down to certain nuances of the texts. Excerpts considered particularly illustrative in their use of DDs, or in their
constructions of certain kinds of power relation, were the prime candidates for inclusion as key extracts, whereas pithier quotations exemplifying aspects of the paradigmatic theme under examination were used to preface chapters.

Overall, the key extracts are skewed in favour of interview and, to a lesser extent, policy data. In addition, some interview texts are used as sources for key extracts on more than one occasion, whilst there are others from which no key extracts are drawn. Whilst a selection of extracts which more evenly covered the range of genres studied might have better represented the diversity of the corpus, the process of analysis outlined above was never likely to yield this kind of representation. Moreover, since the thesis makes no claim to generalizability, choosing data based on its ability to illuminate how discursive resources are marshalled in the negotiation of F-S relationships was considered more important than providing even coverage of the corpus.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter I have detailed how data was selected from an initially large and diverse corpus. I have highlighted the phased and iterative approach taken to analysis and selection, showing how this enabled me to condense my empirical materials and arrive at a number of extracts considered fruitful for analysis.

I have also described how analytic techniques derived from Foucault and from DP adjust the analytic lenses adopted. By switching between different lenses, and locating complementarities in what they offer the analyst, I use a ‘zooming in and out’ approach to data. Thus the analysis undertaken in Parts III and IV of the thesis considers both the fine-grained details of DDs, whilst also attending to broader patterns and disjunctures within and across the data.
In this part of the thesis I analyse two discourses that appear, overwhelmingly, to invoke technologies of domination. They predominantly operate by ruling out F-S relationships, framing them, in one way or another, as bad or abusive. For those appropriating harassment knowledge, which I discuss in Chapter 7, relationships are articulated as an abuse of the ‘power’ attributed to the male lecturer by dint of his sociocultural and organizational status. For the infantilizing discourses considered in Chapter 8, abuse is more perniciously worked up as the academic’s abuse of the other - the *student* - by taking advantage of his or her relative immaturity in ways that may be articulated as unnatural or dangerous.

Both discourses thus appear to rely heavily on sovereign power: first, in the ways in which they position relations between faculty and student as unequal, and second, in how they indicate that conduct can or should be directed. However, they also rely on disciplinary mechanisms, including normalizing judgement, dressage, and surveillance. This is particularly so for the infantilizing discourses analysed.
Chapter 7

Sexual Harassment

Through his jeans Chip [an academic] could feel the deliberate flexing of her [Melissa, a student] toes. He was trapped against the desk, and so, to escape, he had to take hold of her ankle and swing her leg back on the sofa. Her pink feet immediately grasped his wrist and pulled him toward her. It was all very playful, but his door was open, and his lights were on, and his blinds were raised, and somebody was in the hall. “Code” he said, pulling free. “There’s a code.”

(The Corrections, Jonathan Franzen: 58, Fiction 5, See Appendix 4)

Ross: I really like you too, but well…we can’t date. It’s against the rules…it’s forbidden.

Elizabeth: Wow.

Ross: What?

Elizabeth: It’s…hearing you describe it as…forbidden…it’s really hot.

(Friends, Series 6, Episode 18, Fiction 1, see Appendix 4)
Introduction

As observed in Chapter 3, much of the academic literature on F-S relationships has located them as exemplars of sexual harassment. This conflation occurs because of perceptions of inextricable asymmetries and power differences between female/students and male/faculty. Thus F-S relationships have come to be understood and defined in many scholarly accounts through the lens of harassment knowledge. In this chapter I offer analysis that attempts to unpack how this knowledge operates by examining corpus texts that seem reliant upon it in their framings of relationships. I attend to articulations recalling its emphasis on reified power differentials, and reinforcing its heterosexist assumptions (Brewis, 2001). Some expressions also index the feminist roots of harassment knowledge.

I concur with Taylor (2011) in noting that harassment discourses operate in a predominantly top-down, prohibitive way, and are thus reliant on the juridico-legal mechanisms of sovereign power. So, efforts are made to distil the essence of F-S relationships, badge them as a problem, and drive them out of academe. However, I propose that sovereign practices are bolstered by disciplinary techniques. Despite, or perhaps because of this - a point I elaborate in my conclusion to the chapter – the explicit take up of the term ‘harassment’ appears limited. Consequently, much of the data examined in this chapter represents deviant cases in certain respects.

The application of a harassment lens to F-S relationships is met here with expressions indicating acceptance, modification, and resistance. At times the texts follow the adversarial framing of the issue offered by harassment knowledge. At others - particularly within fictional accounts - they satirize or invert aspects of this body of knowledge. I begin my analysis by examining texts that reproduce elements of
harassment knowledge, before turning to those which are more critical of - although often still reliant upon - its logic.

**The problem of ‘consensual’ F-S relationships**

In the first two extracts and accompanying analysis I consider, in turn, the UCU guidelines on F-S relationships, and the policy of one University of Oxford college, Lady Margaret Hall (LMH). I suggest that whilst they differ in approach, both texts draw heavily on harassment knowledge in their problematization of F-S relationships, constructing them as a site for abuse, and undermining the extent to which they can be considered consensual.

It is important to note that these policy documents do not rely solely on this discourse for their construction of relationships. As I stress throughout the thesis, the discourses, power relations, and devices I locate frequently intersect or are hybridized. Nonetheless, I propose that dominant framings can be detected. Extracts 1 and 2 appropriate harassment knowledge, proscribing relationships by invoking a version of power that is always ‘power over’, and is thus expressed as repressive and constraining. So, faculty are construed as having power over students, and the university, with its rules and policies, as having power over faculty.

**Extract 1: UCU Policy Statement (Policy 1 - originally published 1995 by NATFHE)**

 […] staff are in a position of authority over students and their relationship is not an equal one. […] Such power imbalance rests on the fact that members of staff award grades, set examination papers, write references, grant or deny extensions for pieces of work, sit on examination boards, etc. The power gap is increased by the lecturer’s greater academic knowledge, experience of the institution and status within it. This reduces the student’s freedom of choice in the relationship. […] Investigations into consensual relationships indicate that, in the main, they involve male staff and younger female students. The fact that sexual exploitation of students is a gender issue needs to be accepted and confronted. […] Staff are strongly advised not to enter into a
sexual/romantic relationship with any student they are responsible for teaching, supervising or assessing.

This extract can be read as drawing on harassment knowledge in its framing of F-S relationships in a number of ways. Below, I explore how it works to secure certain truth claims, considering how these map on to Brewis’s (2001) theorization of harassment knowledge.

A number of techniques are deployed in Extract 1 to establish the claim that staff and students are not, and cannot be, equal partners in a relationship, and thus to imply that they can only engage in ‘bad sex’. The excerpt begins by declaring the existence of organizational status differentials, articulated as staff having ‘authority over’ students. It is unclear at this stage whether ‘staff’ includes administrative staff, or only academics.

This assumption of status differentials might simply be left as self-evident, as it is in some university policy statements, a point to which I return later. However, the UCU’s statement goes on to substantiate its claim by providing as evidence a list of activities performed by staff. These include setting assignments, assessing and moderating work, and providing references. Responsibility for tasks associated with ‘teaching, supervising and assessing’ is thus articulated as generating a ‘power imbalance’ which works in staff’s - and it now becomes increasingly clear that this means academic staff - favour, and places limits on students’ ability to choose relationships ‘freely’.

The text thus works against alternative readings of the ‘power imbalance’ between staff and students, in which the list of responsibilities staff have for students might render them servile by framing them as the providers of educational services. This latter interpretation might indicate a consumer discourse which, as du Gay & Salaman (1992) note, position the customer as sovereign. However, this is not the image being conveyed
here. Rather, staff are constructed as possessing knowledge, authority, and responsibilities which students lack.

Moreover, the excerpt’s mobilization of an evidential modality to index asymmetries seems partial; what of students’ responsibilities? Nothing is said of the power that Taylor (2011) suggests students can effect through the provision of module feedback, appeals against grades, and so on. Thus notions that power relations might be unstable and open are written out of the extract.

The ‘power gap’ identified is not solely attributed to the academic’s elevated institutional status and responsibility, but is expressed a result of his or her knowledge and experience of the organization. Again, contingencies such as how this applies to newly appointed staff, and to postgraduate students, who may have greater institutional experience, and in some circumstances perhaps even knowledge, are swept aside. The ‘issue’ of the ‘sexual exploitation of students’ is thus presented as ‘fact’.

This ‘fact’ leads us to the second claim; that sexual exploitation ‘is a gender issue’, involving male staff and ‘younger female students’. Again, this claim is substantiated by referring to ‘evidence’; ‘investigations’ are enigmatically alluded to. Although we are told nothing about the specific nature or findings of these investigations, the reference lends the statement a facticity that is difficult to challenge, unless one is aware of alternative investigations, with different findings. Readers are thus given little choice other than to ‘confront’ and ‘accept’ the claims made.

However, and as demonstrated in Chapter 2, alternative findings, for example those concerning the harassment of female lecturers by male students (e.g. Grauerholz, 1989), as well as highly publicised cases of same-sex harassment (Gallop, 1997), would have been in circulation at the time this policy statement was written. These have since been added to by research on the sexual harassment of male academics (Scarduzio & Geist-
Martin, 2008, 2010). That such evidence is overlooked by the UCU is unsurprising, given the dearth of academic interest in the study of F-S relationships, particularly in the UK. However, the existence of alternative studies and cases does pose some problems for the UCU’s rendering of truth claims, which appear to have been gerrymandered (Potter, 1996) in order to omit contrary evidence.

The authoritative stance assumed by the document, reinforced by its evidence-driven and declarative tone, creates fertile conditions for the UCU to administer ‘advice’ to academic staff. These appear on the final page of the document, and in the last two lines of the extract provided here; ‘Staff are strongly advised not to enter into a sexual/romantic relationship with any student they are responsible for teaching, supervising or assessing’.

It is important to note that this statement is not expressed as a straightforward interdiction. However, I would suggest that this is not the same language of ‘advice’ as that discussed later in Part IV of the thesis, where I examine the mobilization of advice and guidance in more detail. There, texts assume a less directive and more hortative modality. Here, the word ‘strongly’, and the taking up of a position against rather than for a certain mode of behaviour are conspicuous; to ‘strongly advise not to’ is to anticipate compliance with a negative sanction. In this respect the policy statement can be read as assuming at least an inhortative modality, and at most adopting a prohibitive stance, effectively proscribing F-S relationships, albeit under the guise of ‘advice’.

Thus the UCU policy statement draws upon Brewis’ (2001) conception of harassment knowledge in two ways. First, it renders harassment, and F-S relationships as a case thereof, as an issue involving power inequalities. This reifies power and relegates consensual relationships into the category of ‘bad sex’. Second, it sets sexual exploitation up as a ‘gender issue’. In so doing it ignores same-sex harassment, and
instances in which women or ‘low status’ males (Grauerholz, 1989) are the instigators of harassment, thus reinforcing sex-role stereotypes in which men are active and women passive.

These claims assume a doubly sovereign form; the academic is deemed ‘sovereign’ over the student, but the UCU, and hence the academy, on whose behalf it acts through the provision of model statements, rules over the academic. Consequently, the document’s mobilization of harassment knowledge can be read as repudiating faculty-student sex, even if this is veiled in a gossamer of ‘advice’ rather than the more explicit, ‘don’t do this, don’t do that’ (Foucault, 2009: 46), which Foucault maintains typifies juridico-legal language.

Having examined how harassment knowledge functions within the UCU policy I now move on to examine a second extract of data. I suggest that this both re-works and, to some extent, shifts the status of harassment knowledge in its articulation of F-S relationships. Extract 2, which is taken from the personal relationships policy8 in place at LMH, has been selected because it represents a deviant case; it is the only policy I found which expressly forbids F-S relationships. I am interested here in how it reconfigures power relations in its discussion of ‘professional relationships’, a theme explored more fully in Chapter 11.

**Extract 2: Code of Conduct on Professional Relationships, Lady Margaret Hall (Policy 2)**

To embark on a romantic/sexual relationship with a student involves serious difficulties rooted in unequal power, and hence choice, of the parties concerned […] At the extreme, these liaisons jeopardise professional relationships and can be an abuse of power. Problems also occur when a consensual relationship later becomes non-consensual, or a case of harassment. Such relationships between tutors or college lecturers and their current tutees, whether students at LMH or another college, and advisers and their current advisees, are not permitted because of the clear conflict with professional responsibilities. They will therefore be treated as disciplinary offences.
In some respects, the LMH policy seems to elaborate elements of the UCU statement. For instance, it continues the theme of ‘unequal power’. Once again, this is negatively linked to the notion of ‘choice’, thus relegating F-S relationships to the murky realms of coercive or bad sex, with its ‘serious difficulties’. Indeed, the policy seems to suggest that this bad sex might be further subdivided into bad and, ‘at the extreme’ end, presumably even worse sex. This evokes the notion of a harassment continuum, with moderate, bad, and extreme calibrations, which I discussed in Chapter 3.

Whilst the precise details of what moderate and bad forms of harassment involve are not explicated, more detail is provided regarding its ‘extreme’ end. This appears to comprise cases that constitute an ‘abuse’ of power, as well as those which morph from consensual sex into ‘non-consensual’ sex or ‘a case of harassment’. We are not told from whose perspective this shift is perceived to occur, although one might infer that it is more likely to be that of the recipient of the perceived harassment than that of the instigator or a third party. This recalls legal definitions of harassment in the UK, according to which a central criteria for defining what counts of harassment is ‘the perception of B’ (Equality Act 2010, S 26. 4 (a)), where B is the recipient. It also chimes with the research of Glaser & Thorpe (1986), who found that students often retrospectively judged relationships as coercive, although they claimed not to have experienced them as such at the time.

Extract 2 blurs distinctions then between certain kinds of consensual F-S relationship and harassment. It does this by hinting at the precariousness of consent, and alluding to the subjective and temporal nature of applying the harassment label to conduct. Although I have identified it as atypical, these features are not uncommon. For example, personal relationship policies published by the universities of Reading and Cambridge employ the phrase ‘ostensibly consensual’, which similarly problematizes consent.
Having established the potential for ‘difficulties’ to arise, LMH goes on to take a unique position on the issue. Given the potential for consensual relationships to become the worst kind of sex, LMH forbids any romantic/sexual relationship between tutors or lecturers and their tutees or, for graduate students, advisors and their advisees. As already stated, this is the only explicit interdiction deployed across the policy and associated documentary data. It is not possible to determine why LMH adopts this stance, although its status as a former women’s college might perhaps have some bearing on its unusually prohibitive approach.

Further, LMH’s approach of treating relationships as ‘disciplinary offences’ stands in sharp contrast with the UCU’s policy statement. The UCU states that universities should draft a clause to ‘suit its own particular [institutional] circumstances’ on how to deal with relationships. It recommends that, ‘This should make clear that declaring the relationship is not mandatory, and failure to do so will not lead to disciplinary action’ (UCU policy guidelines, my emphasis). This sets it apart from LMH’s zero tolerance approach. It also distinguishes it from the other policies studied, which take a half-way position between these two poles by making non-disclosure a potential disciplinary issue, as opposed to the existence of a relationship per se. The issue of non-disclosure is a point I elaborate in Part IV of the thesis, particularly in Chapter 9.

LMH’s policy directly connects consensual relationships with harassment by emphasizing their potential as sites of abuse. That other kinds of consensual relationship also possess this potential is elided. Consequently, F-S relationships, understood as bad and worse sex, appear to be set apart from other kinds of sexual/romantic relationship that are, or at least can be, good sex.

The erection of such a division is, however, an artifice. As Taylor (2011) following Foucault (1988) maintains, the notion of consent is always-already problematic since it
relies on a contractual notion of sex that few commit to prior to engaging in sexual relations. As she observes, contractual terms make sense in a legal context, but when they are applied to social relations this sense is often lost. According to Foucault, this legalistic view turns the field of sexual relations into, ‘a roaming danger, a sort of omnipresent phantom […] that will be played out between men and women, children and adults, and possibly between adults and themselves.’ (1988: 281).

Foucault takes an extreme position in relation to these concerns. He states that legislation on sexual relations should confine itself to issues of violence and coercion, rather than interrogating consent. This leads him to advocate the decriminalization of sexual relations with minors, since the imposition of an age limit is arbitrary and ignores situational contingencies. As Taylor (2011: 201) notes, Foucault’s comments about minors generate wariness. Whilst I share this wariness, I agree with her contention that his arguments may be less contentiously applied to university students, the vast majority of whom are past the age of legal consent.

LMH’s prohibition of relationships between academic staff and students with whom there exists an administrative or pedagogical relation exhibits the clearest indication in the data of something akin to the juridical apparatuses that Foucault, and others following him (e.g. Lemke, 2010; Taylor, 2011), align with sovereign power. This includes the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against offenders. Consequently, this college, more clearly than any other institution studied, imposes a rule repudiating F-S relationships, and seeking to punish transgression. In this sense it operates through the top-down and prohibitive technologies of sovereign power.

If policy statements such as these offer understandings of F-S relationships that draw upon harassment knowledge, configured within a sovereign model of power, to what extent is this reproduced in other genres of text? In the subsequent sections of the
chapter I consider this question, noting instances in which harassment knowledge is appropriated, modified, and contested.

**Reproducing harassment knowledge**

The full repertoire of harassment knowledge is not extensively drawn upon by interview respondents in their articulations of F-S relationships. This is in spite of the fact that I introduced the topic of harassment as a potential concern by referring respondents to the extant literature, in which relationships are typically understood as exemplars of SH. In most cases, my attempts to topicalize harassment were not taken up by respondents. Indeed, one participant actively rejected this framing. PhD student, Jane, who was in a relationship with a lecturer at the time I interviewed her, follows up my reference to harassment by stating ‘No…I don’t think that’s right…’cause sexual harassment implies non-consensual, right?’

I return to rejections of harassment knowledge shortly. First, I analyse an extract taken from Delia, another interviewee. This text is examined for how Delia’s account of her involvement in a F-S relationship reproduces a number of the truth claims which Brewis (2001) proposes are perpetuated by harassment knowledge. These include the insertion of a ‘power gap’ between academics and students, and gendered and heterosexist assumptions about relationships. Further, Delia invokes the juridico-legal regulatory framework that Taylor (2011) implicates in this body of knowledge.

In Extract 3, Delia, who had a relationship with her lecturer, Peter, whilst studying for an MA during the early 2000s, mobilizes the idea of academic power implicit in scholarly accounts of F-S relationships. The excerpt constitutes part of a longer discussion about how this relationship developed, and was not prompted by any reference to SH by me as interviewer.
Extract 3: Interview with Delia (Individual interview 1)

D: I didn’t come into university and feel all enamoured.

J: No? So what…

D: No, but I think there is a lot of that. Definitely. You come in, and somebody has knowledge, and there is power in that, there’s a definite power in that. You know…this person [the academic] really knows what they’re talking about, an’ there is some…you know there is um… you could say that they almost… it’s intoxicating for him, because there is a sense of power, and you could easily abuse that power, you know? An’ I mean…whether you think that (2) if it’s a male lecturer for instance, an’ he abuses that power by having a relationship with a…a student ya’ know, I think there is sort of…I think…we do have a code of conduct and um (2) and although… maybe it’s not the law in this country, it’s kind of (3) you know… lecturers know they aren’t supposed to have affairs with students, and… they just shouldn’t.

Delia’s account begins with an assertion that she didn’t enter academia ‘feeling all enamoured’. Her own position is then contrasted with that of unspecified others through her comment that there is ‘a lot of that’. This reference to the attitudes of others works as a membership categorization device. So, other members of academia - one might infer, other students - are somewhat vaguely categorized as being easily enamoured, perhaps even gullible (see Lakoff, 1973; Potter, 1996 on fuzzy or vague concepts). By positioning herself outside this category, Delia appears comparatively shrewd, and her account is lent a sense of detachment and authority.

Being ‘enamoured’ is articulated by Delia as a product of the ‘knowledge’ and, concomitantly, ‘power’ possessed by the academic. This echoes the policy documents analysed earlier, which followed harassment knowledge by inserting a power gap, based on differentials of status and expertise, between the academic and student. However, power is framed here as affecting both students and academics, the latter of whom may find it ‘intoxicating’.
The use of the word intoxicating is interesting; in constructing the academic as drunk or stupefied, his/her\textsuperscript{9} ability to act rationally appears to be thrown into some doubt. This might appear at odds with the idea of the academic as possessing power, knowledge, and expertise, since it seems to work against the image of the calculated and predatory lecturer constructed by harassment knowledge, diminishing the academic’s responsibility for their actions. However, the deployment of this metaphor in Delia’s account does not remove the academic’s responsibility to abstain from relationships with students. Delia makes it clear that having a relationship with a student is something even the intoxicated lecturer ‘knows’ they ‘aren’t supposed to’ and ‘just shouldn’t’ do. With this in mind, her assertion that power can be intoxicating might rather be read as positioning the academic as an egotist or megalomaniac; someone for whom power acts as a stimulant, and who, acting on this, ‘abuses’ his position by behaving predatorily towards students. This perhaps hints at the unintended and productive effects of harassment knowledge (Brewis, 2001; Taylor, 2011).

The use of ‘him’ to refer to the intoxicated academic raises a further issue. Delia’s account falls back here on the gendered assumptions of harassment knowledge by deploying the male pronoun and constructing a hypothetical male lecturer. This is a point worth elaborating. Where hypothetical scenarios involving F-S relationships are discussed in the corpus, and where they are referred to as a general rather than a particular phenomenon, the academic is almost always worked up as male, and the student as female. Thus these accounts are not only gendered but also heterosexist (Brewis, 2001). This is the case even in the interview responses of female academics and male students who had been directly involved in relationships, and by those with experience of same-sex relationships.
On two occasions interview respondents were challenged about their use of gendered and heterosexist formulations of relationships. These challenges came from participants in the group interviews. For example, Gill, who contributed to the group interview with undergraduates, reminds other respondents who continually refer to lecturers as ‘he’ and students as ‘she’ of the multiplicity of permutations of F-S relationships which exist. She asserts; ‘They could be gay, straight, mature students, men, women’. Despite this challenge, the participants in this group continue to use the male pronoun to refer to academics and the female to refer to students. Indeed one participant, Sean, seems to find it impossible to refer to an academic as a woman, interjecting ‘Come on...it’s always a bloke, isn’t it?’ In the interview with female academics, use of the male pronoun to refer to lecturers was also marked, but was corrected by Sally, who observes ‘We all keep saying ‘he’, but of course it could be the other way around’. Following this comment the group refrain from gendering relationships unless a particular case is being discussed.

Similarly, fictional accounts of relationships almost always involve a male academic and female student. The Channel 4 comedy Campus is exceptional in its depiction of a brief fling between a male postgraduate student, Flatpack, and female maths lecturer, Imogen Moffatt. Even here, however, it is Moffatt who is pursued by Flatpack. Meanwhile Campus’s resident lothario, the vain Professor Matt Beer, fits the active male role constructed by harassment knowledge far better. In Episode 1 of the series he comments on the perks of his job thus, “It’s like the best vending machine imaginable. Every September another bumper crop of gorgeous, impressionable girls drops into the drawer at the bottom...there for the taking.” The vending machine analogy, allied with the description of female students as ‘gorgeous’ but ‘impressionable’, constructs students as a sort of confectionary, which in turn denies them agency. Conversely, Beer is presented as a serial predator, whose agency is emphasized through his ability to pick
and choose from the available eye candy. The student emerges from this metaphor less as consumer, and more as consumed, and is thus assigned victim status.

Returning to Extract 2, Delia can be heard to falter regarding where the academic’s presumed knowledge about what not to do is derived from. She pauses frequently at this point in her account, subduing the strength with which she commits to her expressions through the use of the verbal *hedges*, ‘sort of’ and ‘kind of’. Conceding that refraining from having ‘affairs’ with students is ‘*not the law in this country*’. Delia now invokes the ‘*code of conduct*’ as the source of this knowledge.

Leaving aside her pejorative use of the term ‘affairs’, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 8, Delia’s reference to a code is ambiguous. Later in the interview, in an extract of transcript not reproduced for the thesis, Delia states that she has never seen a personal relationships code, and doesn’t know whether universities are required to have them or not. With this in mind it is unclear exactly what Delia is referring to here; is this a formal, written code, or something altogether more informal and tacit? Either way, according to Delia there *is* a code, and the lecturer *should* be bound by it. Delia’s words here seem to echo the contractual edifice of F-S relationships constructed by the LMH policy, since she signs the inhabitants of *academe* up to rules of conduct that mark relationships as bad sex and attempt to prohibit them. Thus the mode of *subjectivation* articulated here appears highly attentive to other imposed codes.

Consequently, this extract can be interpreted as appropriating and developing a number of the central tenets of harassment knowledge. However, it also sows the seeds of one of its ‘stumbling blocks’ (Foucault, 1978b: 101), namely its productive nature. In linking power with desire, Delia hints at the potential for harassment knowledge to encourage F-S relationships by reinforcing images of academic power. This idea is explored in more detail towards the end of the chapter in my analysis of the TV sitcom, *Friends*.
Fighting harassment knowledge: Deploying the war metaphor

In contrast to Delia’s apparent reproduction of harassment knowledge, there is a tendency amongst the fictional accounts of F-S relationships studied to lampoon or attack this prohibitive approach. *Oleanna, Blue Angel, Disgrace,* and *The Corrections* can all be read as sardonic accounts of how harassment knowledge suffuses campus life.

In each of these narratives feminist academics and students, often allied to various advocacy groups, are depicted as stirring up trouble for male academics. For example, professor Lauren Healey and the Faculty-Student Women’s Alliance in *Blue Angel,* and student Carol and her women’s group in *Oleanna,* can both be read in this light.

These texts thus appear to invert harassment knowledge by setting female academics, and perhaps more significantly, students, as potential harassers of male academics. In this section I trace how this move is accomplished, focussing on the *trope* of the aggressive female academic and vindictive female student. I also include an extract from the only interview account in which the issue of feminism arose as an explicit topic for discussion. In each of these extracts I locate the presence of fighting talk to articulate harassment knowledge. I also consider various forms of counter-conduct that may be set against it.

Francine Prose’s novel *Blue Angel* contains perhaps the most vehement opposition to harassment discourse found amongst the corpus texts. The novel traces the fortunes of Ted Swenson, a 47-year-old Professor of Creative Writing, and malcontent. The story is set in the mid-1980s at Euston College, which is in the midst of introducing an anti-fraternizing code prohibiting relationships with students. Although the college is fictional, many real-life US HEIs would have been developing such codes during this period (see Dank & Fulda, 1997).
Prose’s text emphasizes, and frequently returns to, Swenson’s derision of his feminist colleague, Lauren Healey, as well as other supporters of relationship bans. This is largely premised on the grounds that they are both ‘puritanically’ repressed (21) and ‘thugishly’ (270) repressive. One such example occurs in the early stages of the novel during a dinner party conversation in which staff discuss the newly introduced code. Having already described Healey as ‘pugnacious’ (p 98) and ‘bullying’ (p 100), Swenson now lays into supporters of the code.

Extract 4: Blue Angel, Francine Prose: 107 (Fiction 2)

“I think we’ve been giving in without a fight,” says Swenson. […] We’ve been knuckling under to the most neurotic forms of censorship and repression […] these…whiners bitching about sexual harassment. Lock them in a room and shout dirty words at them until they grow up.”

In this short excerpt Swenson posits two images of the supporters of Euston’s anti-fraternization code: first, they are ‘neurotic’ ‘whiners’; and second, they need to ‘grow up’. The first of these - their neuroses - is alluded to throughout the book. It emerges in Swenson’s derision of acts of censorship within the HE sector, which extend to the reprimanding of a lecturer’s use of the word ‘yum’ when remarking on a nude sculpture (ibid: 18). Their need to ‘grow up’ is an idea that remains undeveloped in the novel, although it is interesting because it inverts the notion of students-as-children which I discuss in Chapter 8, and which is also prevalent in the novel.

More often, however, Swenson presents the forces of ‘repression’, which he aligns with Healey and her ilk, as prudish rather than child-like or immature. There are also nods towards the image of successful academic women as ball-breakers. This is particularly evident in a later scene, where Swenson engages in some male bonding with his literary agent. Discussing the ‘poisoned’ pens of famous female scholars, his agent quips, ‘Better hang onto your balls’ (220). Prose tells us this is a sentiment with which
Swenson sympathises. Thus harassment knowledge is treated by these characters contemptuously; they frame its supporters as aggressive and unreasonable, thus undermining its credibility. Something similar emerges in one of the newspaper accounts analysed. In an article which ran under the heading ‘Students and lecherers [sic]’, an American academic writes: ‘I sense the hand of a vindictive variety of feminism’ (The Observer, 03/10/1993). However, this trope was uncommon in the corpus.

Importantly, Swenson’s deployment of the fighting metaphor plays on the idea that the academy, and in particular, feminist academics, have somehow provoked a war. This war is presented as one that is waged on not one but three fronts. Although its primary target is the F-S relationship, it also sets itself up against male academics, and even, through its prudishness, against sex or desire itself. Thus it operates not only as a vehicle for anti-fraternization, but for the general desexualisation of academe.

Apart from his agent, Swenson appears in the narrative as a lone voice resisting the unreasonable forces of repression. However, his resistance is always voiced through ill-judged and often aggressive outbursts: at the dinner party, when he suggests the answer is to lock up and shout at the agents of censorship; and later in a scene where he derides his daughter’s support of a sit-in in protest against the continued employment of a lecturer accused of making lecherous comments. This is significant because in attempting to discredit harassment knowledge in this way, Swenson may be read as similarly unreasonable and obstreperous.

Consequently, it is no surprise when Swenson loses his fight against the prudishness of academe. This loss has dire personal consequences for him. Found guilty at a disciplinary hearing of harassing one of his students, Angela Argo, with whom he has a one-off consensual sexual encounter, Swenson follows in the footsteps of the well-
trodren tragi-comic protagonist of the campus novel (Monnickendam, 1989). Argo accuses Swenson of harassment and, found guilty, he loses his job, wife, and family in one fell swoop. Argo’s duplicitousness, and the forcefulness with which she pursues the apparently false accusation against Swenson, turns the lecturer/predator and student/victim stereotypes constructed by harassment knowledge on their head; she is the powerful manipulator, and he the powerless victim.

The same might be said of Melissa, the female student who becomes involved with her tutor, Chip Lambert, in Jonathan Franzen’s novel, *The Corrections*. In a quote which I use to preface this chapter (p. 135), Melissa pursues Chip in a manner that parodies office harassment scenes depicted in TV and film comedies, such as *Nine to Five*, and the *Carry On*… films. In such scenes a female employee is typically chased around a desk by a male colleague or boss. In Franzen’s rendering, however, the genders are reversed. Rather than being overtly comic, the seriousness of this scene as a depiction of SH is minimized by the author’s description of Melissa: she is ‘playful’, curling the toes of her ‘pink feet’. Furthermore, we have already been told that Chip is sexually attracted to Melissa.

Nonetheless, such tactics redraw the battle between male academics and feminists, hinting at a more generalised campus gender war in which one sex must always vanquish the other. Consequently, whilst the novels of Prose and, to a lesser extent, Franzen disrupt harassment knowledge, they also preserve its overarching conception of power as a confrontation or zero-sum game.

As with many of the literary representations, *Blue Angel* caricatures both F-S relationships and the academy’s attempts at managing them. In my analysis of Extract 5 I trace a more subtle construction of this ‘feminists-at-war’ framing of harassment as articulated by one of the respondents interviewed for the study.
The excerpt is taken from one of the couple interviews conducted. Will, an academic, has been discussing how colleagues and friends have reacted to his relationship with Tara, a former student to whom he is now married. In so doing he alights upon the topic of radical feminism. This was the only direct reference to feminism in the interview data, and is perhaps explainable in part by Will’s experience of having worked in a North American university for a brief period during the 1990s. It is analysed here to draw attention to its unusualness as a way of articulating the attitudes of others towards F-S relationships, and also because it illuminates an alternative handling of the ‘feminists-at-war’ notion alluded to above, which has implications for the way power and resistance are worked up in the data.

**Extract 5: Interview with Tara and Will (Couple interview 1)**

W: Well…I can think of people…sort of ideologically certain kinds of people (2) perhaps certain kinds of American radical feminist, who were particularly prevalent in the sort of…mid-90s, and who are still…I think would still be very unhappy about it…I mean, I don’t know whether they’d think…we should be…put to death still [laughs]…but I think they would have thought this [his relationship with Tara] was a very…unsatisfactory way in which we’d ended up, and that…well, maybe we couldn’t do anything about it now, but nevertheless it was something that should not have happened. But anyway… we tend not to run into any…we run into plenty of feminists, but not feminists of that school of thought…I mean…we are feminists ourselves!

Will’s selection of the topic of feminism is prompted by a question I asked about whether the couple experience disapproval when people find out how they got together. Both Tara and Will reply that they haven’t experienced this much, at which point Will introduces a hypothetical scenario, presented to illustrate what a response from an ‘American radical feminist [in the] mid-90s’ might look like. This is interesting, since it engages with the origins of harassment knowledge. The scenario runs along these lines: if the sort of American radical feminists who were prevalent in the mid-90s were to comment on Will’s relationship with Tara, they would likely be ‘very unhappy’.
Moreover, whilst they might not want to have the couple ‘put to death’, they would be ‘ideologically’ opposed to the relationship’s existence.

The idea that feminists might want to kill participants of F-S relationships sounds frivolous or satirical, and indeed Will’s laughter seems to orient to such an interpretation. However, it echoes Professor Swenson’s depiction of feminists as ball-breakers, and also some of the critical scholarly analyses of ‘victim feminism’ (e.g. Roiphe, 1994; Gallop, 1996). Roiphe, for instance, alludes to feminists with an interest in ‘beheading [male] professors’ (1994: 98). Such extremizations may be intended as humorous. Nonetheless, they index a ‘juridical and warlike conception of power’ (Lemke, 2010: 33) characterised by ‘censure and constraint’ (ibid: 32), and leading to trial and retribution for transgression. In other words, Will’s account reinforces the notion, emphasized in Blue Angel, that harassment knowledge and its feminist proponents can be just as aggressive and predatory as the male academics they seek to condemn.

In his account, Will aligns both himself and Tara with feminism in general; ‘we are feminists ourselves!’. This is a concession-making move, which heads off potential counter-claims that Will is anti-feminist. This DD also imbues his account with an air of reasonableness; his affiliation with feminism, but not its radical variant, makes his distancing from ‘that school of thought’ appear considered and moderate, simultaneously undermining radical feminism as extreme. Coupled with his categorization of radical feminists as ‘feminists-at-war’, Will’s account undermines the logic of radical feminism, rejecting its legitimacy. However, whilst Will’s repudiation of American radical feminism in the mid-90s is oppositional, his undermining of it appears altogether more considered, and less war-like, than Swenson’s approach.
Laughing at harassment knowledge

Both Blue Angel and Will’s account engage with harassment knowledge on a satirical level, and the humour in Prose’s novel is particularly darkly drawn (Showalter, 2005). In the penultimate extract analysed in this chapter I consider how relationships are handled in the much lighter US TV sitcom, Friends.

I suggest that Friends condenses a number of key tropes associated with harassment knowledge. However, it also opens the issue out in two important respects. First, it disrupts arrangements in which relationships are framed as transgressions of prohibitive rules. Second, it elucidates the productive capacity of harassment knowledge, already alluded to by Delia in Extract 3. This is achieved by poking fun at rules, and by highlighting the role of the norm in the policing of relationships. Consequently harassment knowledge’s configuration and manipulation of power as sovereign power, with its war-like associations, is joined by the more subtle and strategic mechanisms of disciplinary power. Under its guise, attempts continue to be made to restrict the ‘field of possible actions’ (Foucault, 1982: 790) of subjects, but the apparatuses used appear less coercive and more diffuse (see Hunt, 1999, 2003; Foucault, 2009; Lemke, 2010).

As noted in Chapter 2, Taylor (2011) contends that to understand the university as an institution suffused with juridico-legal or sovereign forms of power, as she argues feminist commentators on harassment have tended to, is to misunderstand both power and HE. The university is, for Taylor a fundamentally disciplinary institution, and this is evident in its constant assessment, monitoring, and surveillance of students and academics alike.

To take this Foucauldian conceptualization of power relations further, the de-centring of power through the mobilization of multiple techniques means that power operates in what Foucault calls a ‘capillary’ fashion (Foucault, 1978b: 96). By this, he means that
power permeates local relations in complex ways via networks involving the ‘extremities’ (ibid: 96) as well as the centre. Thus individuals are ‘the vehicles of power, not its points of application’ (ibid: 98). In such a system, Foucault suggests, the importance of normalisation as a vehicle for shaping the conduct of others comes to the fore, whilst that of the law or code recedes. These different modalities of power are illustrated in *Friends*, where they are applied within the context of the F-S relationship.

In season six of *Friends*, Ross Gellar, a professor of Palaeontology at New York University (NYU), begins to date one of his undergraduate students, Elizabeth Stevens. The portrayal of the relationship is pertinent to my thesis for a number of reasons, and I discuss it further in Chapter 8, where I consider its construction of university students as children. However, it is useful to consider here because of how it juxtaposes regulation of relationships through the law and through the norm. In so doing it appropriates, modifies, and caricatures harassment knowledge.

In Extract 6, I follow an excerpt of dialogue involving Ross and his sister, Monica, taken from an episode in which Ross and Elizabeth go out on their first date. Earlier in the episode, when Elizabeth is introduced as a new character, she asks Ross if he’d like to go out with her after a lecture. As an aside, she jokes that she doesn’t need to date him since he has already given her an ‘A’ for her assignment. This joke relies on understandings of F-S relationships as a form of *quid pro quo* harassment, in which students are perceived as trading sex for improved grades. Having framed relationships in this way, the possibility of their relationship being construed as harassment becomes a recurrent theme in the show. With this in mind, Extract 6 hints at the subtleties involved in problematizing F-S relationships.
Extract 6: The One Where Ross Dates a Student, Friends, Season 6, Episode 18 (Fiction 1) [R = Ross; M = Monica]

The scene depicts a conversation between Monica and Ross following Ross’s first date with Elizabeth. During the date, Ross has bumped into a colleague. He pushes Elizabeth down a side alley to avoid being seen with her. The conversation with Monica refers to this event.

M: So…it’s OK to date a student?

R: Well…not really. I mean, technically it’s not against the rules or anything, but it is frowned upon, especially by that professor we ran into last night, ‘Judgey von Holier-than-thou’. [laughter]

M: Well Ross you just be careful, OK? I mean…you don’t wanna get a reputation as, you know, ‘Professor McNails-the-students’. [Laughter]

R: [looks worried] Yeah...what should I do?

In the extract, Ross responds to Monica’s question about the acceptability of dating students by contrasting rules with institutional norms, stating that such conduct is ‘frowned upon’ rather than proscribed at NYU. So, the norm of not dating students constructs dating them as abnormal. Monica then makes a joke which is underpinned by the predatory male lecturer cliché, as she warns Ross that he might be labelled ‘Professor McNails-the-students’ if he dates Elizabeth. This comment parodies Ross’s earlier naming of a sanctimonious colleague as ‘Judgey von Holier-than-thou’ - a nod, perhaps, towards the quasi-religious connotations of discourses on relationships, which I return to in Chapter 9. This act of naming works to undermine the legitimacy of the norm, by deriding Ross’s colleague and extremizing his attitude.

Despite this, Monica’s joke alerts Ross to the problem of being perceived as predatory. She also frames the relationship as potentially impacting his ‘reputation’, thus marking Ross himself as somehow wrong, and not only his behaviour. Ross’s response - ‘Yeah – what should I do? ’ reveals the gravity of this implication. That this was already a concern for Ross has been made clear through his unwillingness to be seen with
Elizabeth when they are out on their first date. As such, the regulation of F-S relationships is presented as operating, at least in part, through the ‘gaze’ of others (Foucault, 1991a: 96), who judge and inscribe academic bodies. These others include colleagues, and also students who are presented as measuring academics’ conduct against institutional norms; indeed, this particular episode opens with a discussion about students’ evaluations of their professors. Ross’s actions are portrayed, in part, as attempting to avert this gaze.

Despite Ross’s suggestion that dating students is subject to informal censure, he continues to date Elizabeth. However, he also continues to conceal the relationship. Later in the episode, upon confronting a group of colleagues in a café and publicly declaring that he is dating Elizabeth - perhaps in an act of ‘confession’ (see Chapter 9) - Ross learns that dating students is, in fact, against the university rules; ‘You’re so fired!’ his colleague tells him. This news recasts the relationship as transgression of a formal and hierarchically imposed code.

The shift from a perceived disciplinary power relation based on normalizing judgement to one based on a formal university imposed code represents a turning point in the trajectory of Ross and Elizabeth’s relationship. It is transformed from something that might, from Ross’s perspective at least, be unreasonably constructed by others as harassment, to something that becomes, as Ross comments later in the same episode, ‘wrong’ or ‘taboo’. This ‘wrongness’ has important implications. Having worked F-S relationships up as wrong, the couple go on to evince the productive capacity of mechanisms that have ‘the apparent objective of saying no to all unproductive or wayward sexualities’ (Foucault, 1978b: 45). In this way they take up one of the criticisms levied at harassment knowledge: its tendency to ‘produce the very desire which it forbids’ (Taylor, 2011: 204).
The second quote used to introduce this chapter (p 135) is taken from a scene in the same episode of *Friends*. It further illuminates one of the theoretically drawn criticisms of harassment knowledge made by academics working within a post-structural and/or Foucauldian tradition (e.g. Bauman, 1998; Brewis, 2001; Taylor, 2011). This hinges on its limitations as a vehicle for constraint by highlighting how vigilance towards F-S sex imbues pedagogical relationships with sexual connotations. Thus it may end up producing more, rather than fewer, F-S relationships. Although Foucault appears to link this paradoxical consequence primarily to disciplinary mechanisms, such as constant surveillance, his assertion that the ‘scandalizing’ (1978b: 45) nature of confrontation and resistance may kindle pleasure, much as attempts to evade surveillance fan the flames of desire, suggests that both sovereign and disciplinary power relations are productive as well as repressive. As we see from the dialogue set out on p 135, Elizabeth’s response to Ross’s announcement that there is a written rule in the university’s handbook forbidding relationships is that this discovery is ‘hot’ or sexy.

**Evading harassment knowledge**

Despite the differences in how the texts referred to above orient to harassment knowledge, one recurrent theme is their understanding of harassment as a phenomenon regulated by codes. Both of the quotations on page 135 refer to codes or rules, as do extracts 3, 4, and 6. Meanwhile, extracts 1 and 2 are extracts from codes.

Before closing this chapter I turn my attention to a further invocation of rules taken from *The Dying Animal*, by Philip Roth. In Extract 7, the novel’s protagonist, Professor David Kepesh, provides an account of his ‘one set rule’ on relationships with students. This reveals complexities that are belied by the extracts examined thus far. My analysis emphasises two particular features: a tension between framing rules as both other and self-imposed; and Kepesh’s hybridization of harassment knowledge with other
discursive resources located in my study. These features are elaborated further in subsequent chapters of analysis, where I consider texts in which the tensions and complementarities hinted at here are more visible.

**Extract 7: The Dying Animal, by Philip Roth: 5 (Fiction 3)**

Now I have one set rule of some fifteen years’ standing that I never break. I don’t any longer get in touch with them [students] on a private basis until they’ve completed their final exam and received their grade and I am no longer officially in loco parentis. In spite of temptation – or even a clear-cut signal to begin the flirtation and make the approach – I haven’t broken the rule since, back in the mid-eighties, the phone number of the sexual harassment hotline was first posted outside my office door. I don’t get in touch with them so as not to run afoul those in the university who, if they could, would seriously impede my enjoyment of life.

The highly sexualized nature of David Kepesh’s ‘private’ contact with students has already been explicated in the book prior to this excerpt; Kepesh tells us he is a ‘celebrity’ (1) academic, who makes numerous TV appearances and attracts a lot of welcome attention from female students (2). We also know that he acts upon this; after his first class of the semester he knows ‘almost immediately which is the girl’ for him (2). Further, he draws a literary analogy between his approach and that of a bull who, spying Mark Twain in a tree, says, ‘You are my meat, sir’ (2). All this seems to frame Kepesh as a lecherous predator, and is congruent with harassment knowledge’s heterosexist and gendered constructions of men/academics and women/students.

However, in Extract 7 Kepesh’s conduct with female students is articulated as being constrained, so that any ‘private’ - from which one might infer sexual - involvement with them must now wait until students have ‘received their grade’ from him. As with Friends, this seems to mobilize *quid pro quo* understandings of harassment, and indicates that such understandings may arise even where the student ‘make[s] the
approach’. It also attests to how Kepesh, like Ross Gellar, tries to evade the gaze of harassment knowledge.

However, the reasons Kepesh provides for waiting until students have graduated before becoming intimate with them are a little more complex than this reading suggests. Initially he describes his approach as arising from his ‘one set rule of some fifteen years standing that I never break’. One might infer from this a personal rule or ethos on relationships with students that Kepesh has developed for himself. This jars though with his subsequent statement that his rule has been in place since the ‘sexual harassment hotline’ was first posted on his office door, which frames his attitude as other related.

We do not know exactly who these others are, although Kepesh’s reference to the mid-eighties and to ‘those in the university who, if they could, would seriously impede my enjoyment of life’ perhaps aligns with the trope of ball-breaking feminists outlined earlier. However, it might also include senior staff, colleagues, and students. Consequently, the posting of the hotline number on his door invokes formal codification and possible sanctions, but may also implicate disciplinary surveillance.

Kepesh’s account of his behaviour thus hints at an interplay between the role played by others and by the self in the government of sexual conduct. The potential of disciplinary power to produce self-surveillance is well documented in the literature on disciplinary and governmental techniques (e.g. Miller & Rose, 1990; Rose, 1999; Fournier, 1999; Hunt, 1999). However, in Extract 7 Kepesh seems to articulate something more reflexive than the internalization of norms and resultant self-regulation which these scholars foreground. Rather, he distances himself from the norm, expressing his ‘set rule’ as a personal one that enables him to evade institutional disapproval or discipline by modifying his behaviour and initiating personal contact with students only after they graduate from his class.
This more reflexive and adaptive expression of a relation to rules and norms is unusual in the mobilization of harassment discourse where, as I have already argued, harassment knowledge is more often appropriated, refuted, or mocked. However, it emerges more clearly in my analysis of the discourses examined in Part IV of the thesis, where self-forming activities come into sharper relief. There, practices of abstention are more often expressed as being aimed at improving or perfecting oneself, rather than at escaping normalizing judgement, discipline, and punishment. Thus they may be understood as having an ethical dimension that is not visible in Kepesh’s account.

This may relate to a further feature of Extract 7. In addition to his references to harassment, Kepesh’s narrative seems to alight upon a religious discourse, with his reference to ‘temptation’. He also invokes infantilizing discourses when he refers to the ‘in loco parentis’ role of universities. These are tropes I explore further in chapters 8 and 9. Here, I want to stress that Kepesh hybridizes a range of the discourses and techniques that I propose constitute the government of F-S relationships. As Hunt (2003: 167) observes, instances of hybridization may be more effective regulatory tactics than reliance on a single discursive strategy, because establishing linkages can ‘blur boundaries’ between discursive domains, techniques, and devices. This shape-shifting character of hybridized discourses may render them irresistible. However, in navigating assemblages of discourses, fault lines and loopholes may also be exposed, which actors like Kepesh can exploit. Thus discourses can be understood as unstable, fragile, and incomplete (Foucault, 1978b; Hunt, 1999, 2003).

**Chapter Summary**

This chapter has considered how a variety of genres of text orient to harassment knowledge in their construction of F-S relationships. Where a harassment lens is explicitly used to view such relationships, they are often framed as ‘bad sex’, which is
unequal, or as ‘worse sex’, which is abusive. There are also suggestions that relationships cause harm. As such, a resource model of power is appropriated, a predator-victim binary is inserted, and relationships are understood as requiring external regulation in the form of institutional codes and rules. Attempts at codification work by regulating relationships in a more or less top-down and prohibitive manner, through the mobilization of juridico-legal discourses. All this resonates with scholarly conceptualizations of harassment knowledge (Brewis, 2001; Taylor, 2011).

However, this sovereign form of rule is supplemented by disciplinary techniques including normalizing judgement and surveillance. These operate from the top, the middle, and below (Hunt, 1999); relationships between academics and students are monitored for signs of harassment, and the academic body is inscribed as potentially harmful. This has two overall effects. On the one hand, the application of this lens to consensual relationships can be read as a call for the partial, or perhaps even wholesale, de-sexualisation of academe, since relationships are constructed as ‘wrong’. On the other, alertness to the problem of F-S relationships imbues all relationships between academics and students with sexual potential. This, in turn, may be framed as pleasurable.

Despite this, my research suggests that such articulations of F-S are empirically anomalous. For instance, rather than extracting aspects of this body of knowledge in order to criticise or censure relationships, a harassment reading of relationships is rejected outright by some of my respondents. Indeed, overt references to sexual harassment are more commonly deployed - particularly within the fictional accounts studied here - in order to do battle with, satirize, or expose the flaws in its logic, or to show how it may be evaded. One important caveat should be noted regarding this reading. Despite the lack of discourse explicitly reproducing the language of harassment
knowledge, gendered and heterosexist renderings of relationships remain the default mode of articulation across the corpus. As such certain features of harassment do suffuse lay discourse on F-S relationships.

As hinted at the outset of this chapter, it may be that it is harassment knowledge’s predominantly prohibitive and combative handling of relationships that prevents it from being taken up more explicitly in the corpus. Harassment knowledge, as analysed here, tends towards the suggestion that there is an aggressive and gendered campaign to be sustained, or a war to be waged, against the F-S relationship, the predatory male academic, and perhaps even sex or desire itself; the flame of faculty-student sex must be snuffed out. Unless one is willing, as with Oleanna’s Carol, to join this campaign, or, like Professor Swenson, one retaliates, its war-like mantle seems to render harassment knowledge a highly resistible discursive resource for framing F-S relationships.
She is wearing a slick yellow raincoat; in the car she lowers the hood. Her face is flushed; he is aware of the rise and fall of her chest. She licks away a drop of rain from her upper lip. A child! he thinks. No more than a child! What am I doing? Yet his heart lurches with desire.

*(Disgrace, J M Coetzee: 20, Fiction 4, see Appendix 4)*

[The university is] full of dirty old pervs who invade students houses and steal girls, like Attila the Hun in a fuckin’ v-neck.

*(‘Vod’, Fresh Meat, Series 1, Episode 8: Fiction 10, see Appendix 4)*
Introduction

In the last chapter I proposed that although understandings of F-S relationships have been colonized by harassment knowledge within the extant literature, they are rarely framed in ways that explicitly appropriate its terms within my corpus. This begs the question: if the taboo of F-S relationships is not sufficiently understood by mobilizing harassment knowledge, how else is it accounted for within the data?

In this chapter I trace a number of shifts away from the predator/victim dichotomy propagated by harassment knowledge. These shifts reconfigure the binary pairing around which the academic and student may be located, subtly recasting framings of, and responses to, F-S relationships. These pairings include: the adult/child; the old man/child; and the parent/child. In particular, I consider how the student-as-child metaphor pervades discourse. Even in texts in which the infantilization of students is contested, the truth claims of this discursive strategy still seem to surface, emerging as *prima facie* obstacles that require tackling if they are to be overcome. Thus it would appear that such constructions are trickier to laugh off or evade than the truth claims of harassment knowledge. Consequently, rather than presenting deviant cases as I did in Chapter 7, recurring patterns and themes are explored here.

I begin by outlining how the adult/child binary is worked up. I note that although this tactic shares similarities with harassment knowledge - for example, by opening up a power gap between academic and student - it modifies the framing of these relationships in important respects. One aspect of this inflection consists in the ‘naturalization’ of the dichotomy, which is accomplished by moving the focus of perceived power differentials away from gender role and organizational status towards perceived age differentials.

I go on to consider how the excavation of a power gap based on age works to deny students agency, implying that they are too young to be responsible. This places the
onus of responsibility for relationships firmly on the shoulders of academics, and insinuates that F-S relationships can harm students-as-children. Denials of students’ agency also face challenges, notably through the deployment of a ‘consenting adults’ idiom, which inserts some sense of reciprocity between academic and student.

I then trace a further shift, whereby academics are positioned not only as adults, but as old men. This extends the supposed age gap between faculty and students to its limits, and earlier hints that F-S relationships might be considered instances of child abuse become graver concerns. Framed thus, sex between academic and student elicits not just disapproval, but horror, since it may be tantamount to paedophilia.

Finally, I explore the transconfiguration of F-S relationships from paedophilia to incest. By positioning students as children for whom the academic has something akin to a parental responsibility, students are constructed not just children but as ‘our children’. A set of duties and prescriptions arises from this, particularly for the academic. Consequently, I propose that the metaphor of students-as-children works by detailing ‘what must be done,’ as well as ‘what must not be done’; this imbues it with a disciplinary character, as well as a sovereign one (Foucault, 2009: 46). Moreover, it transforms framings of F-S sex from bad or worse sex into dangerous sex.

**Infantilizing students**

The students-as-children metaphor, which I discussed in Chapter 4 in reference to research by Williams (2013), haunts the corpus. It appears, in one form or another, in all of the interview and CMD data, and also in many of the fictional accounts, press reports, and policy documents. Tactics typically deployed include labelling students ‘kids’ or ‘children’, and female students ‘girls’. In addition, there are frequent assertions of students’ immaturity or incompetence, as well as articulations which strip the student of his or, more usually, her agency. Each of these tactics is considered below. The issue
of labelling is discussed in somewhat general terms, in part because it is so commonplace, but also because it is a relatively straightforward device. I devote more time to how immaturity is worked up and to denials of agency, which I suggest are more complex accomplishments.

The naming of students as children, which Taylor (2011) provides some anecdotal evidence for, was evident across all genres of text studied. The label was often used casually and in passing; in Blue Angel Professors Healey and Swenson, and Swenson’s wife, Sherrie, all refer to students as ‘kids’ or ‘children’, as do many of my interview respondents. I examine one of these examples in more detail in Extract 8, where I also consider some of the more intricate ways in which the interviewee, Hannah, frames students as incompetent.

Hannah, an academic, married her university lecturer, Nigel, in 1972, when she was a first year undergraduate. In the excerpt Hannah is explaining why she thinks F-S relationships are, in her own words, ‘generally a bad idea’, and why contemporary students ‘wouldn’t be ready’ for such relationships.

**Extract 8: Interview with Hannah (Individual interview 2)**

They come *very* immature now…very *personally* immature. They… I think I saw my tutor *three* times, the first day of each year, and *never* at any other time, it wasn’t the done thing in my day… and now… they email you, you know, “Do you know what room I should be in for my lecture?” You know… be a *responsible person*. […] The difference now between an 18, 19 year old and a 23, 24 year old - when they *have* made that transition to adulthood – is *so much* greater than when I was 19 and he [Nigel] was 25. I mean…I got *married* when I was 19 … *they* [students today] wouldn’t be ready for a… that kind of (1) grown-up relationship […] they’re *kids*.

Hannah deploys a number of tactics here that have the effect of problematizing contemporary F-S relationships. The first lies in her articulation of contemporary students as immature and irresponsible, which she emphasises by drawing a contrast
between students ‘now’ and students ‘in [her] day’, who, it is implied, were more mature. Second, Hannah manipulates category boundaries, minimizing the age of students. These tactics support, and are supported by, her application of the label ‘kids’ to students, and her inference that students are incapable of having a ‘grown-up relationship’ such as the one she had as a 19 year-old. Each of these tactics is now further explored.

As noted, Hannah’s account juxtaposes students ‘now’ and students ‘in [her] day’. In the first line of the extract she emphasises the immaturity of students now through the repetition of the expression that they are ‘very immature’. This immaturity is articulated through an evidential modality; Hannah gives the example of students e-mailing academics about the location of their lectures, which is contrasted with her own practice, as an exemplar of students in her day, of only contacting tutors on the first day of term. Interestingly, this latter practice is used to signify contemporary students’ lack of maturity. It is not interpreted as indexing a sense of entitlement and demand for improved customer service, which Williams (2013) and others locate as part of a consumerist discourse.

The immaturity of contemporary students is further underlined by Hannah’s age categorization of students. Throughout the interview Hannah identifies ‘18-19’ as the more or less uncontested age of student-hood. These assertions, however, fly in the face of evidence. Statistics published by Universities UK indicate that 46% of undergraduates, and 87% of post-graduates studying at universities in 2010-11 were aged 21-24. Meanwhile some 20% undergraduates and 46% postgraduates were aged 25 or over (Universities UK, 2012: 13). Consequently, Hannah’s selective approach to defining the student population is an example of gerrymandering, which excludes older students from her definition and thus emphasizes the immaturity of the student population.
Although Hannah’s account belies the age diversity of students, her reasoning possesses common-sense appeal. Certainly, with age at first marriage having increased by approximately 8 years in the last 30 years\textsuperscript{11} it is hard to imagine a student today getting married in their first year of study, let alone that marriage being to their lecturer. Moreover, through appealing to a past golden age of student maturity, Hannah acknowledges the possibility that things could be otherwise; that immaturity is a social construct, and a student could be a ‘responsible person’. Such an attitude was exceptional across the data; age was more readily mobilized to fix, maximize, and naturalise the division between students and academics, as I demonstrate below. However, through her erection of a division between students now and students in her day, Hannah’s account establishes a ‘them and us’ approach (Potter, 1996). This enables students today to be written off as ‘kids’ in ways which she suggests would not, at one time, have been plausible. This division thus allows Hannah to preserve the logic of her position on F-S relationships; she can defend her own involvement, whilst remaining critical, on the whole, of similar relationships emerging today.

In many respects, Hannah’s account typifies the constructions of students-as-children that permeate the corpus. In particular, the business of gerrymandering the student category, which sees them confined to their late teens, consistently emerged in the interviews and CMD, as well as featuring in newspaper reports. Extracts 11, 12, and 13 all further evince this tactic. Moreover, a number of university personal relationships policies express similar doubts about students’ maturity, suggesting that an important reason for regulating relationships between academics and students stems from the latter group being ill-equipped to deal with such relationships. The policy on staff-student relationships in place at University Campus Suffolk is a case in point. It states: ‘Whilst most students at UCS are over 18 years old and regarded as adults in law, many students may yet be relatively immature in terms of their capacity to embark on adult
This chimes with Hannah’s account, insinuating that university students, or at least ‘many’ of their number, are insufficiently competent to deal with the sort of ‘adult relationships’ that academics are likely to engage in.

This construction operates in tension with another common depiction of F-S relationships as brief and casual affairs. This latter tactic emerged in Extract 3, and is also evident in extracts 9 and 10, which I analyse later. In categorising academic’s relationships as ‘adult’, they are imbued with a sense of seriousness or gravitas that jars with notions of an affair or fling. This categorization device also works to delimit the activity of purportedly young and inexperienced students, who are not legitimately able to participate in ‘adult’ activities.

Yet intimate relationships surely take numerous forms. They might be experienced or expressed as fun, light-hearted, non-sexual, and casual. A number of these alternative descriptors emerge in the accounts analysed for the study. As I note later in relation to my interview with Sam (see p. 184), I spoke to academics who recounted angst-ridden and non-sexual relationships with students. I also interviewed undergraduate students who described their relationships as serious and stable. These varieties of intimacy, which appear to transcend age boundaries, are elided by the concept of ‘adult relationships’.

Whilst Hannah implies that the infantilization of students might be a new trend, inapplicable to those studying in her day, my analysis of campus fiction indicates that the portrayal of students as ‘kids’ is not confined to the late modern era. For example, in Malcolm Bradbury’s novel, Eating People is Wrong, first published in 1959, and including a relationship between a professor and his PhD student, Bradbury describes undergraduate students as, ‘youths straight from some grammar school sixth-form’ student (1959: 14). The device is also detectable in Bradbury’s later novel, The History
Man (1975), in which students George Carmody and Felicity Phee are written as gauche and impressionable characters. If one goes back further still, traces of infantilization are apparent in Beerbohm’s Zuleika Dobson, first published in 1911: at one point Zuleika chides her suitor, the Duke of Dorset, for treating Oxford undergraduates as children (Beerbohm, 2008: 90). Perhaps Brideshead Revisited’s (Waugh: 1945) Sebastian Flyte, with teddy-bear in one hand and champagne glass in the other, personifies the liminal space occupied by the student, who is neither adult nor child.

Whilst these characterisations do not deploy the tactic of labelling students ‘children’, they nonetheless sit uneasily with Hannah’s identification of a lost academic idyll, in which students were more mature, responsible, and competent. Moreover, as stated in Chapter 4, the notion of students as errant, wayward children was, in part, the rationale behind the development of the college system at Oxbridge in the 1500s. Thus there appears to be a historical foundation for the metaphor of students-as-children which is belied by Hannah’s account, and this appears to significantly pre-date the origins of harassment knowledge, which were traceable back to second-wave feminism.

Constructions of students-as-children are not always as assertively established in the corpus as they are in Hannah’s narrative. I now turn to a further extract taken from the interview with Delia in order to explore some of the difficulties that might be encountered in working students up in this way. Delia’s account, I suggest, exposes further tensions elicited by the use of the metaphor, whilst also hinting at additional effects of its deployment.

**Extract 9: Interview with Delia (Individual interview 1)**

Well I mean I’m…I was a mature student, so… you know…but he was even maturer. [Laughter] But um….ya’ know, when I was at university there was always a lot of talk of…ya’ know…and certain men…lecturers… had reputations, and…but there was a lot of flirtation from a lot of the girls and…um…I’m not saying that justifies lecturers
having affairs with young girls… or women or whatever, ‘cause actually… at the time I was thinking, ‘Oh, I’m a grown-up, I’m making my choices’ you know, cause I wasn’t a child, I’m…I was a woman with two children, you know, but when I look back now I honestly think, ‘Oh my god!’…ya’ know? I was a kid…I was so young, an’ naïve (2) an’ I feel like… I was completely taken advantage of.

Delia’s positioning of students in general, and, more particularly, of Delia herself, as childlike appears less secure than was the case in Hannah’s account; her frequent pauses, ‘um’s and self-repair (Shegloff et al, 1977) suggest hesitancy. Moreover, her mixing of past and present tenses, alongside some apparent contradictions, rather destabilize her account. On this basis, this excerpt is interesting to analyse in some detail (see Foucault, 1972; Billig et. al., 1988; and Davies & Harré, 2001).

Delia makes comments that are hearable as constructing female students - and, in the penultimate sentence, Delia herself - as ‘girls’, ‘young girls’ ‘a kid’ or ‘child[ren]’. Labelling female students as girls is a prevalent feature of the data; the quotation from Vod in Fresh Meat, which prefaces this chapter, further exemplifies this DD. Alongside her gendering of academic and student subject positions, Delia’s deployment of this device aligns with aspects of harassment knowledge. However, Delia also articulates students - and herself - as ‘women’ or ‘grown-up’s. Further, she states, ‘I wasn’t a child’. In so doing she concedes the possibility of being interpreted as one, and the availability of infantilization as a framing device becomes apparent.

Although she admits that ‘girls’ may be ‘flirtatious’, Delia effectively writes students’ responsibility for relationships out of her account through her use of passive voicing, as in the phrase, ‘lecturers having affairs with young girls’. Such voicing operates as a form of agency management; in particular, the deployment of the agentless passive renders students as ‘patients’ and academics ‘agents’ (see Appendix 3, on the agent-patient distinction).
Delia’s application of the students-as-children metaphor in relation to herself is troubled by her mature-student status, a contradiction she orients to, stating; ‘I was a woman with two children’. Nonetheless, the metaphor is still pursued and she asserts how ‘young and naïve’ she was. Delia reconciles some of the tensions called forth by disparities between the students-as-children metaphor and her own age by shifting the footing (Goffman, 1981) of her narrative. In so doing she creates a sort of divided self, which enables her to pit the interpretations of Delia now - which is to say, the principal Delia, speaking in an interview - about and against the interpretations of her past student self. Delia then thus becomes a character embedded in her story, whom she animates and linguistically disassociates herself from. This embedded character can be understood as childlike, even though Delia tells us she would not have thought so at the time.

The principal Delia is articulated as having reflected on the relationship, meaning that she can now see it for what it ‘honestly’ was, and can conclude that she was ‘completely taken advantage of’. Her assertion of authenticity and use of an Extreme Case Fomulation (ECF) here urge us to concur with this reassessment. So, whilst her account is, overall, somewhat inconsistent in its deployment of the student-as-child metaphor, her ultimate denial of agency in this last statement facilitates a reading of the text which discredits the thoughts of the embedded Delia, who thought she was ‘making [her] choices’, and secures those of the principal Delia, whose opinions are expressed as more honest, and which come with the benefit of hindsight. Delia’s relationship is thus re-cast as coercive.

This strategy perhaps illuminates the findings of Glaser & Thorpe (1986). As indicated in Chapter 2, they find that students often retrospectively reappraise their involvement in F-S relationships as non-consensual. Glaser & Thorpe suggest that this makes it difficult to assess students’ ‘actual experiences’ (1986: 49), and they turn to psychoanalytic concepts such as dissociation in order to explain why such
reassessments might have occurred. Dissociation may be a valid explanation, but as with many psychological explanations, it is hard to prove without access to participants’ at-the-time internal cognitive states (Billig, 1997). By focusing instead on the rhetorical organization of Delia’s account, I re-specify dissociation as a linguistic accomplishment (Billig, 1997; Wiggins & Potter, 2008). This has the merit of bracketing questions about what really went on, and foregrounding accounting practices.

By positioning herself as having been childlike at the time of her relationship, Delia’s account of coercion is also hearable as indexing not harassment but child-abuse. She is not arguing that Peter took advantage of his hierarchical status, but rather that he took advantage of Delia-as-child. Later in the interview she corroborates such a reading, commenting, ‘someone should really have...asked what was going on...an’ checked I was OK with it...that it wasn’t like...harming me.’ This statement presents Delia as de-responsibilized and F-S relationships as a source of potential harm or danger. It also alights upon notions of the university as protectorate. These are ideas I return to and develop later in the thesis.

Having touched upon this shift in how F-S relationships might be constructed, it is worth drawing some further comparisons between infantilizing discourses and harassment knowledge. The mobilization of the students-as-children metaphor alluded to above has parallels with harassment knowledge’s construction of victim status. It seems to insist on the existence of an age, and therefore power, gap between the immature student and the mature and adult academic. As I have already stated, there is also a gendering of subject positions.

As such, infantilization also shares harassment knowledge’s conceptualization of power as sovereign, quantitative, and zero-sum. Indeed, in some ways, attempts to establish the existence of a power gap based on age, and not (only) gender role or organizational status further fixes and naturalizes this gap. This is because the gap is predicated on
ostensibly biological rather than socio-cultural or organizational differences. This point is, of course, contestable; the socially constructed nature of childhood and age has been persuasively argued for by Ariès (1962), and Hutchby & Moran-Ellis (1998), amongst others. Notwithstanding my own sympathies with such perspectives, age is typically deployed within the data as a means of locating and accentuating students’ lack of maturity and accountability. Consequently, the construction of students-as-children and, as I discuss below, academics as either ‘adult’ or ‘old’, essentializes differences between them, making consent not just problematic but impossible. This further transforms F-S relationships from bad or worse sex into unnatural and dangerous sex.

Before exploring this modification further, I now turn to texts in which the students-as-children metaphor is rejected.

Consenting adults?

One of the ways in which the availability of the metaphor of students-as-children is underlined emerges in texts where its legitimacy is questioned. The metaphor continually emerges in the corpus as a concern that must be attended to and countered in order to undermine accounts censuring F-S relationships. This is often accomplished through what I term the ‘consenting adults’ defence, which is a recurring feature of accounts which critique the problematization of F-S relationships.

In contrast to the frequent and explicit rendering of students-as-children, references to academics-as-adults are often implied by the data. One exception to this occurs where challenges are made to the students-as-children metaphor. Such challenges are often worked up through arguments invoking what Edwards (1995: 322) has termed ‘two-to-tango’ script formulations. These construct relationship troubles as reciprocal, rather than blaming them on the activities of one person.
Such formulations are evident in policy documents and in fictional representations of F-S relationships. For example, the University of Reading prefaces its personal relationships policy with the caveat, ‘The University does not seek unduly to interfere in relationships between consenting adults’. This statement presents the university as having respect for the private lives of its ‘adult’ inhabitants. Thus it works, as Edwards (1995) suggests such formulations do, by pre-empting counter-arguments that the university might ‘unduly’ understand them as non-consensual relationships between an adult and child.

Perhaps the strongest formulations of the consenting adults defence are found in online discussion forums. Given CMD’s capacity to elicit flaming behaviour amongst users this is perhaps unsurprising. Nevertheless, it is worth examining how such arguments are appropriated in CMD, and with what effects. Below, I provide excerpts taken from two different discussion forums. Extract 10a is a below-the-line response to an article published in the THE, which reported on a F-S relationship between a mature student and her lecturer at the University of Warwick. This relationship ended, and the student, who was pregnant at the time, terminated her pregnancy. Extract 10b comes from a prolonged on-line discussion responding to a purportedly satirical piece on lust in the academy, written by Terence Kealey, the vice-chancellor of Buckingham University, also published in the THE.

**Extract 10:** Two online discussions posts in THE (CMD 1 and CMD 2)

a)  Consentng adults have affair which ends badly - whoop de doo. Thank goodness these nannying policies weren't in place 15 years ago or my blissfully happy marriage to my then professor might never have happened.

   (Sabine, posted 19/12/2008: CMD 1)

b)  Grow up everyone - we're talking about adults at university, not children at school…

   (Derek, posted 23/09/2009: CMD 2)
Each of these posts operationalizes consenting adults defences in order to refute previous comments posted in which students have been positioned as vulnerable, although they have not (yet) been explicitly labelled children. This perhaps further attests to the commensurability of harassment and infantilizing discourses. In 10a Sabine describes staff-student relationship codes as ‘nannying’. Thus she implies that such policies treat students – and perhaps academics also – as vulnerable infants in need of protection. Her ironic use of the phrase ‘whoop de doo’, and reference to her ‘blissfully happy marriage’ to her former professor also undermine interpretations of F-S relationships in which they are marked out as unusual or different from other kinds of relationship. The implication here is that these are regular relationships; some end well, others less so. Thus they are deemed unworthy of institutional regulation, press attention, and lengthy on-line discussion space. In this sense Sabine’s comment sets her apart from Hannah (Extract 8), because no distinction is drawn between the writer and contemporary students; if she was mature enough to get involved with her lecturer, so, it is suggested, will other students be.

In Extract 10b, accusations of immaturity are turned back upon those deploying the students-as-children metaphor. Derek criticizes previous contributors to the discussion who have attacked Terence Kealey, directing them to ‘grow-up’, since students are not children and the university is not a ‘school’. This is despite the fact that the notion of the university as a school - a tactic I further consider later in this chapter – has not yet been raised in the discussion.

Extracts 10a and 10b are reminiscent of Professor Swenson’s outburst at the faculty dinner party, analysed in the last chapter. In Extract 4, Swenson rants that feminists and other repressive forces within the university need to stop whining and ‘grow-up’. As already observed, Swenson’s comments are met by his colleagues with shock, and
contribute to a sense of his inability to act in a considered manner. In contrast, the comments of Sabine and Derek are quite congruent with the overall tone of CMD; indeed they are relatively mild in comparison with a number of the online commentaries analysed for the study, some of which come under the spotlight in Extract 11. Notwithstanding this, Swenson, Derek, and Sabine challenge interpretations of F-S relationships as child-abuse. They do this by anticipating and resisting the students-as-children metaphor, and also by alluding to the potential for others, including contributors to CMD, to be similarly framed as immature.

Interestingly, accusations of being infantile are also applied to academics themselves; in a number of fictional accounts there are insinuations that academics are childlike. For example, in the comedy, *Fresh Meat*, Professor Jean Hales, the wife and colleague of English Professor, Tony Shales, discovers her husband is having an extra-marital relationship with ‘his’ student, Oregon. She meets Oregon in a café and tells her that she need not end the relationship; ‘I don’t see any reason why you can’t keep seeing Tony...we’re all adults...well, two of us are (2) not sure about Tony.’ (*Fresh Meat*, Series 1, Episode 7).

This joke hinges on the timing of the two second pause, which leaves the audience - and Oregon - just enough time to assume that it is Oregon who is being denied adult status, rather than Tony. This (potential) interpretation is then repaired by Jean. In a sense, this joke encapsulates how the consenting adults defence works; it opposes the infantilization of students, but also acknowledges its prevalence, and perhaps even legitimacy. Nonetheless, the defence constructs F-S relationships as a joint responsibility. Other variants of infantilizing discourse, notably, those in which the academic is framed as ‘old man’ or ‘parent’, re-insert asymmetries into F-S relationships. I now turn my attention to the first of these framings, considering the positioning of academics-as-old-men.
The old men of academe

Portrayals of academics as old appear in a number of the genres of text studied, including interviews, fictional accounts, and CMD. The latter genre emerges as one of the most prominent sites for constructing male academics as old. For this reason I return to the extended online discussion which played out in the THE, also the source for extract 10b.

In the original article published in the THE, Terence Kealey jokes about ‘affairs’ between ‘male scholars and [their] female acolytes’, and recommends a ‘look but don’t touch’ approach to any academic on the receiving end of ‘his’ students’ admiration. The piece sparked a frenzied on-line discussion, generating more than 250 posts, and running for over 18 months. An interesting and prevalent feature of the debate is the articulation of academics as ‘wrinkly’, ‘middle-aged men’, or even ‘dirty old men’. In Extract 11, I present a selection of CMD posts that employ variations of these devices.

Extract 11: On-line discussion thread in THE (CMD 2)

Bob: [Kealey comes out] smelling of old person like a pee-soaked slipper.

Guy: …how many times do I see sad, passed it [sic], old male academics stand around in the pub, declaring with a grin that their wives are at home so they can happily chat up 19 year olds.

Flo: [the piece is] obviously the ramblings of a middle aged man with delusional fantasies that his young female students would actually engaged [sic] in sexual relations with him.

Rona: Poor old Dr Kealey probably hasn’t had an erection in 20 years.

Kate: [Kealey] conjures up a somewhat unwanted and perverted insight into the intimate thoughts of male academics.

Stewart: I have known tutors approaching 60 years of age grooming girls as young as 18 for sex […] to suggest that these dirty old professors should ‘look but not touch’ is bordering on criminal.
**Dave:** Interestingly, the stories that seem to generate the most comment and forthright discussion [in the *THE*] are about [...] paedophilia.

The posts selected for Extract 11 follow the general trajectory of the debate, which builds from comments constructing Kealey, and other like-minded male academics, as ‘delusional’ (Flo) but relatively harmless old men, to those which attack more vociferously their sexual predilections (Rona; Kate; Stewart).

Bob’s initial characterization of Kealey as ‘*smelling of old person like a pee-soaked slipper*’ certainly calls forth an unsavoury image. However, this *ad hominem* attack frames Kealey as cutting a rather sad, pathetic figure, as do the other posts up to and including Rona’s. The portrayal of male academics who fail to condemn F-S relationships as ‘*past it*’ (Guy) resonates with some of the other CMD analysed for the study. For instance, an article published in the on-line student newspaper, *Subtext*, is followed up by an email from a reader suggesting that the author must be suffering from ‘*penile dementia*’. This portmanteau term has two effects: first it constructs male academics who write about F-S relationships - let alone have one - as old or senile; second, it constructs them as sexually inept. The latter effect also crops up in *Fresh Meat*, where Oregon’s friend, Vod, disparages Professor Shales by referring to his ‘*shrivelled bell-end*’ (Series 1, Episode 8).

Whilst Rona extends some sympathy to Kealey, in her use of ‘*poor old*’, Kate comes closer to branding male academics who think about sex with students as perverts. However, Kate conceptualizes her hypothetical male academic as a pervert in *thought* as opposed to one in *deed* – a ‘spiritual’ paedophile perhaps, if not a ‘carnal’ one (Foucault, 1990: 38). Moreover, her sentiments are tempered by her use of hedging (‘somewhat’). In comparison, Stewart’s comments appear vitriolic; his condemnation of Kealey and other ‘*dirty old professors*’ categorizes them in a way that maximizes the
sense of outrage and disgust conveyed. The coupling of ‘dirty’ with old is notable here; I further consider how dirt is invoked in articulations of F-S relationships in Chapter 10.

Referring to evidence regarding the habits of some of his personal acquaintances, Stewart’s post deploys a number of devices which construct certain male academics, including Kealey, as paedophiles, without ever explicitly using this label. First, he summons examples of older male academics ‘grooming’ young female students. The use of the word ‘grooming’ has clear connotations associated with paedophilia (Oxford English Dictionary). Moreover, Stewart’s maximisation of the age of his academic acquaintances (‘approaching 60’), and minimisation of students’ age (‘some as young as 18’), work together to extend the age gap dividing the two. This is a further example of gerrymandering the student category, and it has the effect of de-naturalizing F-S relationships.

If we are left in any doubt about the rights and wrongs of such activity, Stewart is not; to even suggest that ‘old men’ should look at ‘young girls’ is ‘bordering on criminal’. This comment can be read as the branding of male academics who engage in, or even just write about, sex with students not only as ageing fantasists but as actual or potential sex offenders. Dave’s comment, which immediately follows Stewart’s, responds to this post in a way that appears to interpret Stewart’s post, and/or the original THE article, as being ‘about paedophilia’. As Hunt (2003: 186) argues, the paedophile has come to represent the ‘most demonized’ figure in society, and an ever-present threat. Consequently, the framing of male academics as actual or potential paedophiles constructs them as dangerous individuals (see also Taylor, 2011).

The explicit rendering of the F-S relationship as a form of child abuse is less commonly found in my corpus than the more subtle technique of labelling students ‘children’, academics as (elderly) ‘adults’, and allowing inferences to be drawn about how this
impacts the legitimacy of F-S relationships. However, and as the quote from Disgrace prefacing this chapter illustrates, both the real and fictional subjects studied here sometimes appear to interpellate (Althusser, 1971; Hall, 1996), or recognise in themselves, the motifs of this discourse.

In Coetzee’s Disgrace, and also in Roth’s The Dying Animal, the problems of growing old are recurrent themes troubling the protagonists’ thoughts (Coetzee, 2000: 1 - 2, 23 104, 107; Roth, 2006: 35-44). Issues of age and ageing are also alluded to by others in these novels; for instance, when the relationship between Disgrace’s Professor David Lurie and student Melanie Isaacs is investigated by the university as a misconduct issue, his ex-wife reprimands him, saying; ‘you are too old to be meddling with other people’s children’ (45). Similarly, the construction of relationships between academics and students as paedophilia is a recurrent trope in Fresh Meat. For instance, male student, Kingsley, responds to his (male) Geology lecturer’s comment that he is his favourite student saying ‘Don’t say that, it sounds like grooming’ (Series 1, Episode 8). As with the CMD comments in Extract 11, something akin to revulsion is conveyed here, and this seems to extend not only to sexual relationships but also to non-sexual ones.

This possibility is also underlined in the interview with Sam, a male academic interviewed for the study. Sam spoke to me of his involvement in what he terms a ‘romantic but never sexual’ relationship with female student, Kim. Sam states that he deliberated over the appropriateness of his feelings towards Kim thus; ‘I did think, you know...argh...what would her friends think? Cause of the age gap an’...that I’m like...some old perv’? An’ in the end I think that’s probably why I put the brakes on.’ Unlike Coetzee’s Lurie, or Roth’s Kepesh, Sam is in his 30s, and could hardly be considered an old man. However, Sam seems to orient to the possibility that a relationship with his student could be construed as perverted because of the age difference between them.
Although the methods of problematizing relationships with students deployed in *Disgrace* and by Sam share some similarities, in that both Sam and Lurie appear to be hailed by a discourse of paedophilia, the consequences differ for Sam and Lurie. Sam reports that such considerations ultimately caused him to *put the brakes on*, preventing the relationship from developing a sexual dimension. His reluctance to be seen, or perhaps to see himself, through a lens which might cast suspicion on the age gap between a 37 year old man and a 20 year old student indicates the presence of the sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms of discourses aligning F-S relationships with paedophilia. So, relationships like the one he contemplates with Kim may be constrained by appealing to juridical notions, since paedophilia is a crime. Perhaps more obviously though they index the effects of normalizing judgements exerted over relationships where there is a significant age-gap between partners (Dank, 2009).

In contrast to this constraining effect, David Lurie’s act of questioning the appropriateness of a possible sexual relationship with Melanie does not prevent him from pursuing her. Thus whilst constructions of F-S relationships as paedophilia invoke laws and norms which de-naturalize their status and badge them as dangerous sex, this does not guarantee their efficacy as apparatuses for the constraint of desire and eradication of relationships.

As indicated earlier, constructions of women students as ‘girls’ and male academics as ‘old men’ are reproduced and resisted in corpus texts. In my analysis of Extract 12, which is taken from the group interview with undergraduate students, the notion that academics who become romantically and/or sexually involved with their students might be seen as ‘dirty old men’ is discussed and ultimately rejected.
Extract 12: Interview with undergraduate students (Group interview 3)

[G= Gill; S= Sean; T = Tyrone]

G: When you imagine it, right...when you imagine a lecturer having a relationship with a student...it’s a young...girl...18, 19 (2) with... an old man...with a beard [...] an’ kinda...eww [screws up face].

S: Yeah...an’ like... leather patches on his elbows. [laughter]

T: An’ I don’t think...nine times out of ten it aint gonna’ be like that, is it? Like with you [referring to interviewer]...you’re about the same as...there’s no real age gap an’...you’re like quite old...for a student I mean [laughter].

G: So...to kind of think of it as something...a bit paedo'-like...which I suppose I might do at first, is kind of a bit...unfair.

S: Mmm...it’s a distortion.

Prior to this excerpt, Gill has already introduced paedophilia as a relevant concern for those considering entering F-S relationships. In Extract 12 she elaborates this, and ultimately both she and the group seem to reject its applicability. To do this, Gill notes the likely fixing of ages in hypothetical scenarios of F-S relationships, stating that ‘you imagine a [...] young girl, 18-19 with an old man with a beard’. Tyrone further fleshes out this stereotype by referring to the fusty dress sense of the hypothetical lecturer with ‘patches on his elbows’. This causes the group to laugh, which, in turn, leads them to challenge the stereotype Gill and Tyrone have set up.

The participants in the group all exhibit agreement that the framing of F-S relationships as, in Gill’s words, ‘paedo-like’, unfairly influences how people - including them - come to understand them. In support of this, group members mobilize an evidential modality to counter the legitimacy of this framing. For instance, Tyrone offers some anecdotal evidence, referring to my own relationship with an academic, in order to overcome what he articulates as a potential misrepresentation. He notes that my age is
‘about the same’ as that of my partner, and that I am ‘quite old’. Thus our relationship challenges the stereotype that has just been articulated by Gill.

Tyrone also asserts that ‘nine times out of ten’ this stereotype will be inaccurate. The vagueness of Tyrone’s evidence here makes it hard to resist, and the group get behind the thrust of his argument. A consensus is built around Gill’s conclusion that constructions of F-S relationships as paedophilia are ‘unfair’, although Gill hedges this point by using ‘kind of a bit’. Sean’s assertion that the stereotype is a ‘distortion’ is more secure, and effectively concludes the group’s discussion of the topic.

Extract 12 thus illuminates understandings of relationships in which assumptions of age gaps are actively questioned. Gill is attentive to how the metaphors of students-as-children and academics-as-old men proscribe F-S relationships by likening them to child-abuse. Interestingly, in this extract the challenge to such constructions is predicated on evidence that seeks to overturn the student-as child metaphor rather than that of the academic-as-old man. Indeed, there are numerous remarks later on in this interview which reinforce understandings of academics as old. For example, Tyrone tells a story of spotting a lecturer at a night-club, a pursuit he considers the lecturer ‘way too old’ for. Another lecturer is measured up by the group against the norm of the ageing academic and found wanting; described as ‘only [looking] about 12’ this lecturer is assessed by the group as ‘useless’, since she lacks sufficient ‘life experience’ to teach them effectively.

Overall, the undergraduate interview indicates the existence of certain requirements for academics to both look and conduct themselves in particular ways. They seem to posit an ‘ideal-type’ tutor, equipped to help students as a result of their extensive knowledge and experience, but devoid of a social or sex life. In so doing, they prescribe rather than proscribe appropriate conduct. In the penultimate section of this chapter I attend to this
In Loco Parentis: Constructing dependency

Many of the constructions of students-as-children and academics-as-old analysed above work along predominantly negative lines, marking out the unacceptable. In contrast the last discursive strategy I draw attention to in this chapter operates somewhat differently. Rather than focussing on what academics and students must not or should not say or do, discourses in which the academic is parent and the student their child specify what must be said and done. Below I work through some examples exemplifying this shift, highlighting how, and with what effects, they reframe relationships.

I begin by commenting briefly upon a training workshop I attended, which was discussed in Chapter 5. During the course of the workshop two academics discussed with delegates their roles as senior tutors. In response to a question from a delegate about working with tutees who have personal problems, one of the tutors commented; ‘These kids are often... very unsure of things [...] a big part of the [personal tutor] role is to help them develop and make the right decisions by providing a sort of...listening ear...more, I would say, a parental rather than counsellor sort of take on things’. Students-as-kids are constructed here as being ‘unsure’, whereas the tutor is equipped to ‘help them develop’ and to ‘listen’ to them, rather as a parent might.

It is possible to see here a new kind of gap opening up between academic and student, based on the ability of the former to help and nurture the latter, who is again depicted as incompetent and vulnerable. As before, this maps onto the logic of harassment knowledge, insinuating the helplessness of students and assigning them potential ‘victim’ status. However, in articulating academics as quasi-parents, their responsibility
for student-as-children is accentuated, and the relationship is constructed as one involving dependency. This dependency more explicitly emerges in a number of university personal relationships policies. For example, UCL’s policy reads: ‘the teaching relationship is based on trust, confidence and dependency’. Meanwhile a policy drafted by Cambridge University states: ‘The University recognises […] the unequal status of staff and student […] the influence of the former, the need and dependency of the latter.

Dependency, I propose, is not a necessary feature of harassment knowledge. In cases of SH, the harasser does not do wrong by failing to help or support the recipient, but rather by subjecting the recipient to unwelcome behaviour. Consequently, the harasser’s error is one of commission. Similarly, in many constructions of students-as-children and academics-as-adults or old-men found in the corpus there is no suggestion of a necessary relationship of dependency between academic and student. Indeed, as accounts like Hannah’s seems to suggest, the mobilization of the former metaphor might as easily be accompanied by calls for students to become more responsible, rather than resigning them to a permanently infantile state. However, the deployment of the parent/child binary insinuates a new element into understandings of relationships between academics and students; dereliction of duty, and a willingness to harm s/he who should be protected. Thus the error is one of both commission and omission.

In Extract 13 I examine an excerpt taken from an article published in The Guardian, in order to tease out how this dependency relationship is tethered to some of the conceptualisations of students and academics considered earlier. The piece leads with a report on the acquittal of a lecturer charged with raping a student. However, the focus of the article soon alights upon the more general subject of campus sex and relationships between academics and students.
For the herd of 18 and 19 year olds who scramble, colt-legged and wet-nosed, into our universities each autumn term, the student room, small and grotty, is often the first of their own. There is a pervading smell of toast. The walls are thin and speckled with greasy blue-tack marks; your spider plant is half dead and a pair of cheap brown curtains mope around the window frame. You keep your milk outside on the windowsill, swathed in a Tesco carrier bag, and a packet of Durex featherlite under your lumpy mattress, in the half-hope, half-fear that you might get lucky [...].

The tutor can become a parent substitute: the elder figure to whom a student will always defer, the central person in her life, whom she strives to impress and to please with her academic efforts. [Student union president] Verity Coyle [...] confirms that the lecturer is a ‘glamorised’ figure, almost guru like in his appeal to female students. By comparison, their male peers seem immature and inexperienced. Any kind of sexual approach made by the tutor is unlikely to be rejected, she says.

It is possible to read into this extract a number of the features of infantilization discourses already discussed. These include the gerrymandering of the student age-category (‘18 and 19 year olds’) and characterizations of students as gauche and naïve (‘colt-legged and wet-nosed’; ‘in the half-hope, half-fear that you might get lucky’). In addition, a film of grime is draped here over the life of the new undergraduate; the piece imagines for the reader a ‘small and grotty’ room; the ‘smell of toast’; and ‘greasy blue-tack marks’. As in Extract 11 then, the issue of dirt emerges, although here it surfaces in relation to student life, and not to the academic. Thus a picture of students’ grubby ineptitude is conjured up by the text. Moreover, the conceit that students might not have had a room of their own before - even a bedroom? - frames them as habitually dependent on others.

This image of student-hood is juxtaposed with that of the ‘tutor’: at once both a ‘parent substitute’ and ‘elder figure’, but also ‘glamorised’ or even ‘guru-like’. The ideas invoked by these two notions - the parent and the guru - jar with each other, and also with some of the depictions of academics as old men examined earlier. In Extract 13 the parent-like tutor is not ‘pee-soaked’ and disgusting, but rather is alluring and sexually
compelling. This is the person, it is suggested, whom the student may ‘defer’ to, and who they will ‘strive to impress’. Furthermore, he is ‘unlikely to be [sexually] rejected’. Thus the relationship between academic and student is both dependent and, potentially, erotic. Charges of incest are not explicitly invoked here, but the set-up seems to summon an unnatural and irresistible relation that results when this peculiar mixture of glamour and fatherly benevolence is imbibed by the impressionable female student.

Referring to academics as parent substitutes, and to universities as custodians of students-as-children are recurrent corpus metaphors. Although, as stated in Chapter 4, universities have not legally acted in loco parentis since 1969, they are often articulated as if they are. In Extract 13 the journalist refers to ‘our universities’. This implicates the reader, giving her or him a stake in the activities of the university. Thus it creates the sense that ‘we are all in this together’ (Mueller & Whittle, 2012: 127), which in turn can build consensus and elicit empathy (Edwards, 1997).

Other DDs which work in a similar way in the corpus include the emergence of a ‘What if it were your daughter?’ argument. This technique features in the group interviews with academics, in the CMD, and also in fictional works. For example, in the THE discussion featured in Extracts 10b and 11, one commenter opines, “…if you have daughters, and they leave home at 18 and are promptly slavered over by a man as old as you…I hope you will begin to understand how […] the parents of those girls must feel reading this.” (Amanda, THE, 25/09/2009). Such rhetorical questions involve the reader, inviting them to share in the poster’s horror at the thought of their daughter being ‘slavered over.’ A similar tactic is deployed by David Kepesh’s son in The Dying Animal. In a letter sent to his father he writes; “I have two daughters, your granddaughters, and if I thought that my daughters were to go to college and have as a teacher a man like my father…” (Roth, 2006: 89).
Rather than appealing to the reader-as-parent - or even grandparent - some CMD draws more direct correlations between the tutor role and the parental role. For example, one contributor to an on-line discussion writes of a F-S relationship; “for this man to have interfered with [the student], who was basically entrusted to him to look after as you would a daughter... [he] has abused the parental role we as parents of students give all lecturers.” (Julie, Ethicalsalarms.Com, 26/04/2010). This excerpt appropriates a number of features of the in loco parentis discourse: Julie builds consensus by positioning herself as representing the sentiments of a concerned parent population; she constructs the student-as-child, despite the fact that the relationship under discussion involved a mature post-graduate student; and she reprimands the academic-as-parent for failing to ‘look after’ his student-as-daughter. In addition, she constructs the academic as having ‘interfered’ with the student, which connotes abuse or incest.

More rarely, insinuations of incest are humorously accomplished. In Friends, for example, Ross, now established in a relationship with Elizabeth, tells his friends he is meeting her dad. One friend, Chandler, quips, ‘You mean you’re not her dad?’ (Season 6, Episode 21). Likewise, in Fresh Meat, Vod tells Oregon, ‘It’s icky...screwin’ some sad dad substitute’ (Series 1, Episode 7). Although these comments are played for laughs, age-based concerns appear to be a cause of some consternation for both Ross and Oregon, ultimately contributing to the demise of their F-S relationships. When Vod tells Oregon that everyone will think she’s a ‘loser’ when they discover she has been seeing Shales, Oregon concedes, saying, ‘Oh god...what the hell am I doing?’ (Series 1, Episode 5). Consequently, the age gap between academic and student is presented as funny, but is also worked up as unnatural. Vod’s comments also evince the gaze of incest that falls upon F-S relationships, marking them out as ‘icky’ and labelling participants as ‘losers’.
In the final extract analysed for this chapter I elaborate the disciplinary effects of infantilizing discourses. In particular, I consider how the gap articulated as separating academic and student is policed in order to secure a safe distance, rather than a dangerous closeness.

**Mind the gap: Doing and disciplining difference**

Up to now I have unpacked how discourses in which students are infantilized, and academics variously portrayed as adult, old, or parental, insert a gap dividing category members. Such dividing practices (Foucault, 1982: 777), I have suggested, cast the F-S relationship as perverse. Acknowledging that there are rejections of such understandings in the corpus, I have suggested that this tactic exerts a normalizing gaze over the inhabitants of *academe*. Below, I attempt to tease out some additional ways in which this gaze functions.

The importance of proper academic conduct has been alluded to in a number of the key and subsidiary extracts explored above. Within this, dress has been touched upon, for example by the undergraduate students in Extract 11. I now want to develop the idea that dressing appropriately can be connected with a parent-child characterization of the relationship between tutor and student. I also consider how behaving circumspectly is recommended in order to avoid the ‘horror’ of F-S sex.

Extract 14 picks up a section of talk from the group interview with doctoral students, in which they consider appropriate and, by implication, inappropriate ways to conduct seminars. In so doing, the group advocates the creation and maintenance of a teaching persona. This persona is articulated as enabling them to position themselves as distinct from, and perhaps above, the undergraduate students they teach. The extract joins their discussion just as the issue of how to dress when they are teaching has arisen.
Extract 14: Interview with doctoral students (Group interview 1)

[A= Amrita;  T= Tom;  G= Gabriella;  J= Jude]

A: Well…I would wear something a bit smarter and I wouldn’t…not skinny jeans, or like…a short skirt, it’d be…a jacket…

T: Mmm…always wear a jacket.

A:…an’ like trousers, or (2) I’ve got this brown dress, and it’s…actually it’s my mum’s. I dress like my mum [laughter].

J: And…why is that, d’you think? ‘Cause it’s not like you normally dress particularly, like…provocatively or anything.

A: I dunno…I feel more like…proper, I guess…like…grown-up or whatever.

T: It makes you different from them [students]…like you’re in charge.

G: And…you’ve gotta…you don’t want them to see how you look as [1] I think in any way a…come-on.

A & T: Mmm…yeah.

Amrita’s comments that she would wear her mum’s ‘brown dress’ when she teaches humorously introduces a parental discourse. Nonetheless, the apparent need to adopt a more parental or adult personal style when teaching is underlined by her later comment about feeling more ‘proper’ or ‘grown-up’ when she dresses this way. These comments are responded to by Tom and Gabriella, who agree that how one dresses for seminars is an important consideration. So, Tom suggests that dressing appropriately signifies being, ‘in charge’. Using an ECF, Gabriella then states that she would not want what she wears to give the impression that she was ‘in any way’ coming on to students. Thus appropriate dress is articulated as a way of ‘doing difference’ (West & Fenstermaker, 1995: 8), and as preventing sexual connotations from being read into one’s actions.

Moreover, being ‘different’ from students is expressed as something that must be actively worked upon. It is not presented as an inherent characteristic of the act of teaching, but rather is ‘dramaturgical’ (Goffman, 1990: 60). When challenged later in the interview to explain why they feel the need to maintain this distinction, the group
refers vaguely to expectations. Tom, for instance, states at one point, ‘I dunno... in THLE [a course on teaching and learning] they talked about personal style...an’ I think it is expected of you [...] I wouldn’t want my lecturer to rock up in like...hot-pants’. The implication that aspiring academics are trained to dress appropriately recalls Foucault’s notion of ‘dressage’ and the disciplinary conditioning of behaviour (Foucault, 1991a: 136). In addition to influencing his own behaviour, Tom suggests that this notion of appropriate dress is something he monitors in others. Dressage, observation, and normalizing judgement thus facilitate compliance with organisational norms, helping to produce and reproduce the ideal-type lecturer.

If this discussion of appropriate dress suggests a fear of being seen as an academic imposter, other excerpts of data allude to a more specific fear; that of being construed as a paedophile or pervert. For example, one academic whose colleague had been romantically involved with a student, writes in a below the line CMD comment; ‘I was advised by [a colleague] to invite students to group tutorials or reading groups and never to my home. [...] I didn’t want to be tarred with the perv’ brush’.

Likewise, a number of interviewees mentioned the academic practice of keeping office doors open for one-to-one meetings and tutorials with students as kind of ‘nothing to hide here’ statement.

Normalizing judgement is also articulated by student contributors to CMD. One student participating in an online discussion, writes of a friendship with her personal tutor that it became, ‘too close for comfort’. Thus when her tutor asked her to go for a coffee; ‘I didn’t [go]. My mate said *what if he’s after you?* which made me feel horrible, he’s old enough to me [sic] my dad’ (TheStudentRoom, 04/05/2011, emphasis in original). Observations like these call upon the presence of the watchful eye of the other - the colleague, passer-by, or friend - whilst also summoning techniques of self-surveillance, in a joint vigil over ‘perv’y or ‘horrible’ relations between tutors and students. This
inscribes the academic body with a dangerous intent, which is captured succinctly by one of the quotations prefacing this chapter. Positioning the academic as ‘Attilla the Hun in a V-neck’, who ‘steals girls’, Fresh Meat’s Vod scathingly exemplifies how infantilizing discourses mark male academics out as ‘dangerous individuals’ (Foucault, 1978a:1).

Horror is further invoked in the data by Lars, a PhD student contributing to group interview 1. At one point, Lars implies that the gaze exerted over relationships extends beyond actions, monitoring both speech and thought; ‘If I had, as an undergraduate student, known that conversations such as this were taking place...that teachers are even kind of [...] contemplating and discussing the idea of sex with pupils [1] students... I find myself in a kind of...horror at even talking about this.’ Lars’ conflation of tutors with ‘teachers’ and students with ‘pupils’ - although, in the latter case he self-repairs this to ‘students’ - seems to turn the university into a school, a technique also noted in Extract 10b. He implies that the ‘horror’ of F-S sex is so great that it should be out of bounds as a topic of conversation. Thus infantilizing discourses cling to the vestiges of sovereign power by de-limiting and ruling out, whilst also creating space for disciplinary relations by specifying proper academic conduct, which is examined for signs of perversion.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter I have explored constructions of F-S relationships predicated on the related metaphors of student-as-children, and academics-as-adults, old men, and/or parents. I have also examined how the subject positions created by these metaphors are challenged, so that instead of foregrounding divisions, similarity and reciprocity are emphasized.

Articulations of relationships emphasizing difference and division appear to map onto aspects of harassment knowledge. For example, relationships are gendered, and consent
is problematized. In addition, they often work, like harassment knowledge, by constructing relationships as taboo or forbidden, although the taboo constructed by likening relationships to paedophilia or incest is, arguably, more insidious than that of harassment (Hunt, 2003), marking the academic body as dangerous.

However, infantilizing discourses depart from harassment knowledge in at least three respects. First, in mobilizing more readily the subtle mechanisms of disciplinary power, discourses appropriating the language of paedophilia or incest construct relations between students and academics as requiring particular kinds of conduct, and these include practices relating to dress and demeanour. Thus they are more prescriptive than those considered in Chapter 7.

Second, some of the accounts analysed seem to naturalize the power imbalance assumed to exist between academics and students. This is accomplished by identifying a gap based on age, as opposed to gender or status differentials, thus re-articulating the basis of division as ostensibly biological, rather than cultural or ideological. One effect of this is to sever problematizations of F-S relationships from their associations with the ideology of second-wave feminism, and insert supposedly neutral or ‘natural’ grounds for the excavation of differences. Consequently the horror presented by notions of paedophilia or incest needs to be attended to if F-S relationships are to be defended.

Third, the truth claims of constructions which position academics as either dirty old men, or as being in loco parentis, appear to have suffused the lexicon of F-S relationships in a way that harassment knowledge has not. If harassment knowledge emerges from the corpus as an unappetising strategy for articulating relationships, discourses that in some way infantilize students appear to possess greater rhetorical appeal, at least in the texts studied here.
Part IV

*Risky Sex: Care, precaution, and ethics*

Part III of the thesis was devoted to the analysis of discourses that I interpret as mobilizing primarily sovereign and - particularly with infantilising discourses - disciplinary power relations and tactics to govern F-S relationships. In Part IV I turn to discourses that deploy a range of additional relations and techniques. These relate to three distinct but often interconnected, themes: *religiosity*, in which what Foucault calls a ‘shepherd-flock game’ (1981: 239) emerges, and through which the importance of confession as a route to salvation unfolds; *health, safety, and hygiene*, in which the F-S relationship is linked to dirt, disease, and contamination, and which deploys a precautionary logic to de-risk the environment; and *professionalism*, which indexes the academic’s self-governing capacity to act according to tacit duties and boundaries, and/or to develop their own ethical practices.

Each of these discourses, I propose, is articulated as guiding the conduct of academics and students. As with Part III, such considerations sometimes summon formal, codified, and prohibitive methods for managing F-S relationships. At others, they specify required behaviours, particularly on the part of the academic. However, they also call upon apparatuses of security, in which probable events are hypothesised and costs assessed, so that a ‘bandwith of the acceptable’ (Foucault, 2009: 6) can be established.
Within this bandwidth, the inhabitants of *academe* may be located by others, and by themselves, as acting carefully, cautiously, and/or ethically in their relations with each other. Thus they speak not only of the dominating technologies of sovereign or disciplinary power, but also of the technologies of self involved in government (Foucault, 1993, 1997). For this reason Part IV increasingly looks to Foucault’s later work, foregrounding how technologies of domination and of the self are co-implicated in the government of conduct and the production of the ethical subject.

Chapter 9 is intended as something of an analytic bridge. It builds upon ideas introduced in Part III, attending to disciplinary techniques and indexing the dangers of F-S sex, whilst also introducing new concepts, such as pastoralism, a precautionary logic, and ethical self-relations. These latter concepts are then further fleshed out in Chapters 10 and 11.
Temptation, fall, redemption

Now…I’m not sure that I could stand up and teach somebody that I’m also having sex with because [2] that’s drama that I don’t even want to think about… I don’t think that I could go up there an’… it’s almost like being the preacher isn’t it? An’ having sex with your congregation?

(Linda: Individual interview 3, see Appendix 4)

‘Frankly what you want from me is not a response but a confession. Well, I make no confession. I put forward a plea, as is my right. Guilty as charged, that is my plea. That is as far as I am prepared to go’.

(Professor David Lurie, Disgrace: 51, Fiction 4, see Appendix 4)
Introduction

This chapter considers how religious language, metaphor, and imagery are mobilized in articulations of F-S relationships. I suggest that the tactics deployed here bear the hallmark of academia’s cloistered origins, and thus the roots of religious discourse extend much further back than those considered in Part III.

I begin by considering texts in which relationships are expressed as a temptation, particularly for the academic. I then analyse how various responses to this temptation are accounted for, noting how these align with either damnation or salvation. Responses indexing damnation invoke seduction, concupiscence, and obduracy, whereas those offering salvation look to abstinence, care, sacrifice, and confessional practices. I also unpack how religious discourses configure power relations, noting the existence of techniques aimed at surveillance and punishment, as well those implying a ‘subtle economy of merit and fault’, which permanently threatens and enables salvation (Foucault, 2009: 173). This leads me to suggest that they are infused with both a disciplinary and pastoral logic in their endeavours to steer conduct away from F-S relationships.

Finally, I assess how what are articulated as self-practices may place limits upon, or undermine, the docility (Foucault, 1991b: 135) and relations of obedience (Foucault, 2009: 175-179) implied by disciplinary and pastoral modalities of power. Practices of reflexivity and silence are expressed by interview respondents as available techniques with which a personal ethic may be developed, thus enabling the practice of freedom (Foucault, 1994; Taylor, 2010).

The data used in the chapter is primarily drawn from interview and literary accounts, in which religious discourses repeatedly emerge. Religious imagery did not feature significantly in the other data sources used in the study: it was not found in any of the newspaper articles, CMD, or policy documents.
Temptation

The idea of F-S relationships as representing temptation has already been touched upon. For example, it is suggested by David Kepesh, as analysed in Chapter 5 (Extract 7). The notion of a temptation to be avoided is also evinced in the extracts taken from Friends, where F-S relationships are presented as a ‘taboo’. I now further explore the notion of temptation by turning to excerpts of data which are more or less inflected with the Abrahamic iconography of the book of Genesis: serpentine seduction, original sin, and the fall of man. The primary focus in this section is on the first two elements, whilst the latter is considered in its own right in the subsequent section on damnation.

Extract 15 is taken from J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. I read Coetzee’s novel as archetypal in the way it embellishes its depiction of one F-S relationship with the biblical accoutrements of the Abrahamic creationist narrative. The story deals with the ‘disgrace’ of David Lurie, professor of communications at the University of Cape Technical University. It is partly an allegorical commentary on post-apartheid South Africa, and Coetzee’s treatment of disgrace, repentance, and forgiveness through his exposition of a F-S relationship should be read light of this. Notwithstanding this caveat, his plundering of biblical motifs to explore the downfall of the book’s academic protagonist expose and amplify certain possibilities for the application of religious imagery to the academic world in general, and to F-S relationships in particular. For this reason I return to the text a number of times throughout the chapter.

My analysis considers how Lurie is presented both as tempter and tempted; characterizations which emerge elsewhere in the corpus to inscribe the positions of academic and student. The excerpt selected follows a chance meeting between Lurie and his student, Melanie Isaacs, in the ‘old college gardens’ (Coetzee, 2000: 11), a scene which perhaps evokes an academic Eden. We are told Lurie is ‘mildly smitten’ (11) with Isaacs, and he invites her to his home for a drink. She accepts the offer but, on
this occasion, rejects his sexual advances. Coetzee narrates the close of the scene at Lurie’s house by alternating between his protagonist’s persistent but awkward attempts to inveigle Isaacs into bed by quoting Shakespearean sonnets to her, and Lurie’s private reflections on his words’ inefficacy.

Extract 15: Disgrace, by J. M. Coetzee: 16 (Fiction 4)

‘You’re very lovely,’ he says. ‘I’m going to invite you to do something reckless.’ He touches her again. ‘Stay. Spend the night with me.’ […]

‘Why ought I to?’

‘Why? Because a woman’s beauty does not belong to her alone.’ […]

Smooth words, as old as seduction itself. Yet at this moment he believes in them. She does not own herself. Beauty does not own itself.

‘From fairest creatures we desire increase,’ he says, ‘that thereby beauty’s rose might die.’

Not a good move. Her smile loses its playful, mobile quality. The pentameter, whose cadence once served so well to oil the serpent’s words, now only estranges. He has become a teacher again…

Lurie’s attempt at seduction produces Coetzee’s first allusion to Lurie’s serpentine qualities, and it is a device he redeployts later in the novel. For instance, Lurie makes self-conscious references to the story of Lucifer, the fallen angel - believed by Gnostics to be the true form of the serpent - during a lecture on Byron’s Lara (32-33). Shortly after this Isaacs’ father, having learned of his daughter’s liaisons with her professor, confronts Lurie, lamenting having sent his daughter into a ‘nest of vipers’ (38).

In the extract, Lurie is described as ‘oiling’ his words in a technique ‘as old as seduction itself’. He is presented, then, not so much as an easily charming lothario, as is the case with some other fictional academic philanderers, such as Campus’s Matt Beer, Roth’s David Kepesh, or Bradbury’s Howard Kirk. Rather, he is a manipulative snake, who plans to corrupt Isaacs’ apparent innocence as ‘beauty’s rose’ by tempting her into
doing something ‘reckless’. However, Lurie observes that his ‘move’ on Isaac is not a
good one, because by quoting Shakespeare to her he is returned, in her eyes, to the
position of ‘teacher’. Coetzee’s depiction of Lurie as a teacher, rather than an academic
or lecturer, encroaches on infantilization discourses, heightening the sense in which his
seduction of Isaacs can be read as inappropriate.

However, Lurie’s position as tempter is sometimes reversed. Elsewhere in the novel, it
is Isaacs who is positioned as (unwitting) temptress, in whose grip Lurie is held, so that
‘he does not own himself’ (18) and is, in some sense, taken over by what is later referred
to as ‘ungovernable impulse’ (52). This idea that Lurie has been beguiled by Isaacs’
loveliness and beauty is apparent in Extract 15; it is also underscored later in the text,
when, during a hearing called to consider his misconduct, Lurie deflects his inquisitors’
attentions to take sanctions against him for becoming involved with a student by
describing himself as having acted as a ‘servant of Eros’ (52). In this way Lurie
occupies the paradoxical role of tempter and tempted, and this duality seems to place
him at the centre of an agonistic battle (Foucault, 1985: 67) in which he wrestles with
his ‘conscience’ (58) over his inability to exert self-control. As I further discuss shortly,
Lurie’s weakness - his failure to master his passions, rather than serve them - coupled
with his initial recalcitrance and refusal to repent, cost him dearly. Indeed he is only
offered a glimmer of hope when, towards the end of the book, he is eventually prepared
to show contrition.

Having begun to consider how, and with what effects, the use of religious imagery
animates literary notions of temptation, I now explore how excerpts of the interview
data appropriate similar devices. It is worth noting that many of the interviews,
particularly with academics, make some explicit reference to students representing
temptation. Whilst some participants, such as the female academics involved in group
interview 2, insist that this has never been the case for them, others make it clear that
students are, or have been, a source of temptation at some stage.

In Extract 16 I consider a student’s perspective by analysing an account pertaining to a
(then) postgraduate student’s involvement in a relationship. In the excerpt Graham, a
male academic who had a six-month relationship with his personal tutor, Mike, whilst
he was studying for his masters degree, contemplates who ‘seduced’ whom.

**Extract 16: Interview with Graham (Individual interview 4)**

I didn’t find him [Mike] attractive at all to start off with, not the least bit, ya’ know. But
he’d be…always [1] hanging around…asking how I was, how were things going? Could he help with anything and especially…sort of…say… what was I doing that
evening or at the weekend? And dropping hints where he was going [2] And… I
suppose it did eventually… was all [2] quite flattering an’… tempting […] But [when
Graham ended the relationship] he did become terribly retributive, you know,
“Oh…you seduced me, you led me on”, an’… as if he was totally innocent, but…he
was worried about his job…an’ maybe I guess was afraid people would find out, an’
he’d be in trouble or [get]… kicked out?

As in *Disgrace*, Graham’s account falters in locating the source of temptation. Whilst
Graham suggests that temptation only arose for him after his tutor had been ‘hanging
around’ for some time and ‘flattering’ him, this flattery is couched in the language of
‘help’. Consequently, the tutor’s position is hedgeable; were Mike to be faced with
accusations that he was attempting to flatter Graham into a relationship, it is quite
possible that he might recast the questions and comments that Graham interprets as
reflecting a sexual interest as indicating instead a pastoral interest in his tutee. Indeed,
Graham goes on to explain that once the relationship ended, Mike positioned him as the
‘seducer’, portraying himself, using an ECF, as ‘totally innocent’. In this sense both
Graham’s account and, upon shifting his footing, his animation of Mike’s response to
the demise of the relationship, construct it as something blameworthy, reinforcing the sense in which the relationship is framed as problematic.

This problematization is further accentuated by Graham’s depiction of Mike’s stance as ‘retributive’. Later in the interview he explains that this retribution included Mike embarking on what he calls a ‘smear campaign’ against him - perhaps a further invocation of hygiene discourse - within the university’s LGBT community. Graham’s lay theorization of Mike’s desire for retribution is articulated in the extract as a product of Mike being ‘worried’ and ‘afraid’ that knowledge of the relationship might impact his career, and perhaps even cost him his job. Further, being ‘kicked out’ is offered as a likely consequence of people ‘find[ing] out’, and fear of this possibility is used by Graham to explain Mike’s behaviour. Since, as Graham asserts elsewhere, the couple were unaware of any formal university code relating to F-S relationships, this possibility is hard to connect to policy implications regarding failure to disclose a relationship, which might place the academic’s job at risk. As such, it may owe its debt more to informal and cultural understandings relating to the likely trajectories of F-S relationships, in which the fall of academic man is often presumed. Fictional texts are replete with such examples, which I outline in more detail in the next section on damnation. They also recall the historically precarious position of the academic discussed in Chapter 4; Oxbridge fellows were the subjects of successive purges during the reformation if they failed to obey the crown.

Graham’s invocation of the themes of temptation, seduction, innocence, and retribution, echo the biblical refrain of the temptation of Adam and Eve: the (hedgeable) seduction; the location of blame; and fears of expulsion. My attention now turns to this latter element - expulsion or ‘fall’ – further noting how the demise of the academic who succumbs to temptation is articulated as damnation.
The fall of academic man: concupiscence, sin, and damnation

Perhaps the clearest way in which the act of succumbing to the temptation of F-S relationships evokes a fall from grace emerges in narratives where the punishment of the academic is dealt with. In Graham’s account he suggests that his tutor both blamed and then punished him for the existence of the relationship. Graham was the student party to this particular relationship. However, within my corpus, blame and punishment - or at least, the idea of punishment - are more commonly meted out against the academic.

This punishment is often depicted, particularly within the fictional genre, as placing the academic in circumstances amounting to his - for it is never her - ruin. Ruin may involve the loss of a job, a home, and/or the destruction of relationships with family and friends. To provide some specific examples, both David Lurie in *Disgrace*, and Chip Lambert in *The Corrections* lose their jobs. *Fresh Meat’s* Professor Shales loses his relationship with his wife and son, as well as his home – in the third series of the comedy he is living in a caravan on a derelict part of the university campus. Meanwhile Professor Swenson in *Blue Angel* loses it all: job, house, and family.

The title of Coetzee’s novel explicitly constructs Lurie’s ruin as a fall from grace. This is further exemplified when Isaacs’ father rebukes Lurie, saying, ‘So […] how are the mighty fallen!’ (167). In order to further explore how ruin is tinged with religious meaning I now return to the text of *Blue Angel*, which makes extensive use of religious imagery in its portrayal of the fall of Professor Swenson.

**Extract 17: Blue Angel: 24 (Fiction 2)**

[At this moment] Swenson decides to take the college down with him. He’s not going to go down meekly. […] He’ll be damned if he rolls over. Meanwhile the implications are sinking in to him. His life is ruined, his marriage is finished. Sherrie will leave him, he’ll be all alone, jobless, out on the street. Sell the house, hire lawyers.
Destruction as damnation is suggested by Swenson’s ruminations on his position via a number of linguistic accomplishments. His references to ‘going down’ are, perhaps, ambiguous, since they might be interpretable as alighting on the metaphor of going down with a sinking ship. However, his use of the word ‘meek’, which has biblical associations (Good, 1999) and the phrase ‘he’ll be damned’ in relation to ‘going down’ are read here as indexing religious metaphor.

This latter interpretation is reinforced via two further features of Prose’s writing. The first of these concerns the rhetorical organization of the extract. Swenson intends to pull the university down with him, thus his demise is constructed as inevitable, whilst the university’s is not; this order would presumably be reversed if the sinking ship metaphor were being applied. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the author’s deployment of religious imagery permeates the novel throughout. For example, on learning that he is to be disciplined following Angela Argo’s allegations of sexual impropriety against him, Swenson’s wife rebukes him saying, ‘I hope they crucify you. I hope they make you pay’ (255). Shortly afterwards, when Swenson is dismissed from his job, he re-assesses his position, deciding that he is not, in fact, going to ‘hell’, but is ‘being promoted from the inferno [working for the university] to purgatory’ (313).

Swenson does not accept his punishment willingly, and retains much of the ‘fighting talk’ identified in Chapter 7. Similarly in Oleanna, John, who stops just short of attacking his student Carol, who has accused him of harassment, screams, ‘Go to hell […] you think you can come in here […] and destroy my life?’ (76-79, emphasis in original). Thus the fallen academic is not presented as easily acquiescing or submitting to his punishment, and in some cases turns damnation back on the student. However - and as I endeavour to show in the next section - it is precisely this obduracy or failure to repent which consigns Lurie and Swenson to the domain of the ‘condemned man’ (Coetzee, 1999: 190). Acts of retaliation aside, the portrayal of the academic’s loss as
ruin and damnation suggests a quasi-religious form of trial and retribution. This, in turn, constructs the F-S relationship as not only wrong but sinful. Again, this is alluded to in *Blue Angel* through Swenson’s description of his hearing as a ‘public mortification’ (Prose, 2002: 267).

Such constructions might seem hyperbolic; a demonstration perhaps of the novelist’s pursuit of artistic license. However, a similar vocabulary is deployed within some of the interview data. For example, in the group interview with female academics Alice states that she would never get involved in a relationship with a student, saying, ‘I’m Catholic, so for me... well...the guilt [1] it’d torment my soul forever [laughter]’. Thus Alice appears to rule out the possibility of a relationship because of its ‘torment[ing]’ consequences. A similar orientation, which alludes to the possibility of damnation as a factor determining the outcome of relationships, can be detected elsewhere. For example, interviewee Anne states that in considering whether to pursue a relationship with her lecturer, Jim, she had to consider what was ‘at stake’. This is framed in a way that explicitly references a ‘fall’; ‘I mean...it was low risk for me, I’d nothing much to lose...but he... I think we both knew it might mean a bit of a... fall from grace for him’.

In a slightly different vein, Delia’s account of her relationship with Peter imagines his torment. She recounts a recurrent dream she has about him thus: ‘I do have a dream occasionally that he’s dying [laughs]...and he, um [2] he wants to speak to me, and I say, ‘Rot in hell’ [loud laughter]. An’ I go, ‘Tell him I really’ ...I mean I’m not an evil person...but I go, ‘tell him I really hope he’s suffering’. This excerpt might be interpreted as touching on health discourses in its invocation of ‘suffering’, although it imbues this suffering with a sense of divine retribution that is absent from those I discuss in the next chapter. Delia’s declaration that she is not an ‘evil person’ is also hearable as implying that she is a good person and, possibly, that Peter is the evil one, who deserves to ‘rot in hell’. In constructing the academic’s suffering as a punishment,
as opposed to a fate, Delia’s account illuminates how the narrative of the damned academic preserves the sense of academic culpability for the ‘sin’ of the F-S relationship.

Taken together, the allied notions of temptation and fall appear to operate in a number of ways across the texts examined. First, they construct the academic as either weak willed (the seduced) or conniving (the seducer). Second, they seek to exact punishment on the academic who, even when potentially understood as having been sinned against by a student ‘tempter’, is yet portrayed as sinful. Punishment therefore operates as a kind of secular judgement day, with the lustful or concupiscent academic’s penalty as eternal damnation.

In mobilizing fall stories to predict or justify the punishment of the academic who engages in relationships with students, these narratives invoke the ‘punitive rationalities’ (Golder, 2007: 174) and ‘technologies of domination’ (Foucault, 1993: 203), familiarised through Foucault’s genealogical investigations of the prison (1991a). However, as David Lurie’s battle with his conscience suggests, fall stories also evince distinctions between serving and mastering, weakness and strength. I read these binary oppositions as indexing a more personal and agonistic contest than was evident with the discourses examined in Part III of the thesis. In plotting the concupiscent academic’s temptation and fall, *Disgrace* summons damnation as arising, in part, from the loss of a battle fought against oneself, rather than one waged primarily against others.

Moreover, damnation is just one possible trajectory for the academic confronted with the temptation of intimacy with a student. Alternative trajectories are available to the tempted academic, and these confer on him or her further scope within which to manage his or her own conduct. In addition, they suggest a place for what some have referred to
as a ‘precautionary logic’ (Ewald, 2002; Haggerty, 2003), through which potential and often catastrophic events are projected, and methods for mitigating these proffered.

I return to the idea of a precautionary logic in Chapter 10, where I discuss it in relation to health, safety, and hygiene discourses. In the following section I focus on techniques that are more or less tinged with pastoral modalities of power, and on those which create space for ethical self-relations.

**Salvation**

Analysis in which the university is understood as a site infused with pastoral power relations has been predicated on the notion that the university is an institution in which attendance, and thus compliance are - theoretically at least - voluntary (Howley and Hartnett, 1992; Knowles, 2007). Conceptualized in this way, the university sets up conditions in which inhabitants are directed to choose actions that are mutually beneficial for the academy and its inhabitants. In my analysis below, I consider techniques that seem to indicate the presence of a ‘complicated interplay of coercion and freedom’ (Howley and Hartnett, 1992: 272), which is characteristic of pastoral relations.

These techniques are often mired in the language and metaphor of salvation. The route to salvation, as presented within the corpus, is accessible via a number of different operations: those involving denial or sacrifice; those invoked in the name of care exercised by the shepherd-academic towards their flock; and those emerging through confessional practices, aimed at the guiding of conscience and enabling atonement for sin. Below, I attempt to draw out how each of these techniques is deployed. I consider the how they imply relations of obedience to others, as well as foregrounding relations in which duties of ‘care’ are articulated as self-related. I also note the importance of ‘truth’ in the government of academic souls.
Salvation through sacrifice, protection, and care

One of the ways in which the temptation posed by students is framed as being potentially avoidable or overcome relates to notions of sacrifice and denial. Extract 18 is taken from the group interview with male academics, all of whom self-identified as never having been involved in F-S relationships.

Extract 18: Interview with male academics (Group interview 4)

[R= Richard; D= Dominic; J= Jude]

R: Teaching is I think [1] a vocation, so [...] You make [1] kind of... sacrifices [laughter]...and I do...I think one of them is your personal life maybe a bit... in different ways I suppose, an’ [1] I think...you have to work against developing those kind of relationships or... feelings I suppose for the people you teach and [1] if you care about them, you want to look out for them [...]. So you kind of...veto it an’... if you can’t do that, or you won’t or whatever...it’s your funeral. [laughter]

J: And have you like… done that yourself? I mean (2) vetoing it?

R: Yeah… probably…not so much now but... a few times when I’ve got close to a student and you just...don’t let yourself even think about it...I think.

D: I’m in a permanent state of denial [laughter]. No [3] well if you care about what you do and care about your students [...] you can see that most likely it’s for their own good really and… to protect them… as well as for yours to…not get involved [1] that way.

This excerpt mobilizes two of the operations indicated above as offering what might amount to what Foucault calls a ‘worldly salvation’ (1982: 784); namely sacrifice and the exercise of care.

Turning to the first of these, the academic is framed by Richard as making ‘sacrifices’ relating to his or her ‘personal life’ and ‘feelings’. Although his rendering of sacrifice is frequently hedged through the use of ‘kind of’ and ‘a bit’, Richard appears to confer a sacred element upon the role of the higher educator. Sacrifice is also presented as part of the ‘work’ performed by the academic in order to avoid one’s ‘funeral’. This metaphor, which constructs the academic’s failure to abstain from F-S relationships as leading to a
kind of death, recalls the notion of the fall discussed earlier. As with narratives of academic damnation, the metaphor also suggests that the consequences of failing to abstain from having relationships are the personal and individual responsibilities of the academic, for which he or she may be punished, or at least held to account. Whilst he does not use the term ‘temptation’ in this extract - although note that he does later on in Extract 19 - Richard’s words convey something akin to temptation, since ‘close’ relationships with, and ‘feelings’ for, students are expressed as occurrences which one must ‘work against’ or ‘veto’.

The term ‘veto’ is interpretable as a juridical rather than religious form of discourse. It implies that relationships and feelings can and will emerge if they are not over-ruled. Richard constructs the act of allowing relationships to emerge as arising from two alternative modes of conduct. Either the academic is unable to, or ‘can’t’ veto relationships and feelings, or s/he is unwilling to or ‘won’t’ do this. He thus suggests that the work which is to be performed, and the sacrifices made, are both difficult to undertake, and a matter of personal will or choice. This is further accentuated by his suggestion that, ‘you don’t let yourself even think’ about relationships with students. By invoking thoughts, as well as feelings and relationships, Richard presents the academic as working upon inner-directed practices, involving the control or suppression of thoughts and feelings. Such accounting seems to reinforce ideas bound up with agonism, renunciation, and self-mastery which I alluded to earlier in relation to David Lurie’s character in Disgrace.

A few turns later in the conversation, Dominic’s admission that he is ‘in a permanent state of denial’ apparently orients to the religious tone infusing Richard’s words. However, the group’s laughter at Dominic’s espousal of what sounds like a monastic ideal of ascetic denial and, earlier, at Richards’s initial use of the term ‘sacrifices’, perhaps suggests that such language is considered anachronistic. Nonetheless, if the
group interprets the metaphor of sacrifice and denial as over-elaborate, Richard’s insertion of what I read as shepherdly ‘care’ into the work performed by academics seems to be taken more seriously. This caring duty is framed as continuous and pre-emptive; a constant ‘looking out’ for or ‘protection’ over students. It thus suggests a permanence that is characteristic of pastoral modalities of power (Foucault, 2009; Golder, 2007).

The version of ‘care’ invoked in the extract develops, but also perhaps points to some historical antecedents for, notions of ‘duty of care’ that were considered in Chapter 4. This is because it may be understood as a relic of the monastic roots of the university, and of Oxbridge fellows’ duty of celibacy. So, the academic who cares for his students is framed by Richard and Dominic as benevolent and as protecting others by not getting ‘involved [in] that way’. This positions the academic as chaste or strong-willed; able to deny what s/he may want in the interests of what is ‘good’, both for students and for him or herself.

Such phrasing recalls the totalizing and individualizing principles that Foucault (2009) associates with a pastoral modality of power. The power relations at work here appear totalizing, in that the ‘shepherd-academic’ who cares for his/her ‘student-flock’ is positioned by Dominic as protecting the entire student population by abstaining from F-S relationships. Abstention is also worked up as possessing an individualising function, in that the chaste academic can be framed, as he is by Richard, as having saved himself.

These two functions of pastoral techniques - their ability to both totalize in reference to the salvation of the population, and to individualize with regards to the salvation of individual souls - are further explored later in this chapter, and also in Chapters 10 and 11, where I consider the dual obligation to care for ‘each and all’. Here, I want to indicate that religious metaphor functions in the extract by equipping the academic with
duties recalling pastoral themes: caring for and protecting the student population and oneself, and in so-doing being prepared to make personal sacrifices.

Within the approach to HE espoused by Richard, these duties are expressed as arising from a sense of ‘vocation’. Consequently, whilst his account identifies a role for the self in taking responsibility for one’s personal actions, thoughts, and weaknesses, Richard also constructs the academic as one who serves others, thus implying relations of obedience. The idea of a ‘vocation’ is not explicated here by Richard or his colleagues. However, it is worked up in more detail elsewhere, for example in the group interview with undergraduate students (group interview 3).

In the undergraduate interview Sean, reflecting on the role of the academic, comments, ‘I think it’s like a vocation or…calling isn’t it? An’ you go into it because you have an ability to help other people and to… lead them to make a difference in their life […] ’an what difference are you making by sleeping with your students? You’re not.” Like Richard in Extract 18, Sean invokes the notion of an academic ‘vocation or calling’ to justify abstention from relationships. This abstention seems to feature within a somewhat servile notion of pedagogy, in which the academic-shepherd leads others to a better life because he or she is able and has been ‘called’ upon to do so, rather than because this path has been actively chosen. However, other respondents construct the academic’s duty of shepherdly care as a more personal and philosophical practice or ethic. I now turn to this latter way of framing the shepherd-academic by analysing a further excerpt of text from the group interview with male academics, which positions the academic as following a personal ‘creed’ in his exercise of care.

Extract 19 stays with the group of male academics featured in Extract 18, and comes two pages later in the interview transcript. The group has just been discussing a colleague, Andy, whom they describe as having had ‘serial amorous involvements’ with female postgraduates. There are murmurs of disapproval of Andy’s behaviour from all
the participants, but no outright condemnation of it. As the discussion progresses, Craig offers his views on educating. These resonate with, but also seem to differ from, those expressed by Richard and Dominic in Extract 18.

**Extract 19: Interview with male academics (Group interview 4)**

[C = Craig; R = Richard; D = Dominic]

C: Maybe… I dunno whether this is an unfashionable thing to say [2] it’s certainly not… I don’t think it would be a view held by everyone here [at the university], but I do see it kinda [1] ya’ know [I] take it seriously, the pastoral side an’ personal tutoring… an’ I’m first and foremost… I come here an’ do what I do for them [students]…an’ I have my own philosophy on that… (2) ya’ know, an’ that doesn’t include gettin’ ‘em into bed.

R: Haven’t you then…have you ever been tempted…to?

C: No. An’… I don’t see students that way [3] I mean… I don’t wanna’ come across as too sort of ‘holier than thou’, but like… it is kinda like that, you know…well, for me it is… it’s like… ‘My pedagogic creed’, or…however you wanna call it, ya’ know?

Craig draws a distinction here between his own attitude, which he suggests he shares with Richard, and that of Andy. The basis of this distinction is expressed by Craig in terms of their orientation to education; whilst Andy is constructed as ‘in it for himself’, Craig and Richard are in it for ‘the students’. This recalls Foucault’s distinction between the ‘bad shepherd’, who only thinks of good pasture and the fattening of sheep ‘for his own profit’, and the good shepherd, ‘who thinks only of his flock’ (2009: 128).

Craig summons various religious metaphors within the extract, and these accentuate the sense of sanctity he affords the role of the academic. These include his explicit reference to the ‘pastoral side’ of the academic’s job and, in particular, his concession that he might appear ‘holier than thou’. Further, Craig’s insistence that students do not represent a temptation for him implies that he is not troubled with the signs of impurity others appear to be vigilant against: to paraphrase Foucault’s account of monastic training, he can ‘look upon’ a student ‘without any feeling of desire.’ (Foucault, cited in
Carrette, 1999: 192). As with Dominic in Extract 18 then, Craig’s account is imbued with a monastic feel.

However, there is a shift in the way that the sacred nature of academic life is conveyed by Craig to those hitherto articulated. Craig deploys a number of devices which frame his role as shepherd-academic as something he has chosen, as opposed to something that he has been called to. For example, he suggests that his ‘view’ is potentially ‘unfashionable’, which renders it personal and rareified rather than commonplace and prescribed. Second, he articulates his view as a ‘philosophy’ or ‘pedagogic creed’. From this reference to ‘philosophy’ one might infer that Craig’s views are something to which he has devoted time and thoughts – a ‘personal credo’ (Willmott, 1998: 84) perhaps.

Craig’s reference to ‘My pedagogic creed’ seems to render his views as a set of beliefs. Later in the interview it becomes clear that Craig is referring here to the work of John Dewey, the American pragmatist, humanist, and educational reformer, whose treatise on education is organised as five secular articles of faith, entitled My pedagogic creed. Understood thus, Craig positions himself as having thought about and arrived at a philosophical position through study and reflection, rather than through the command of another or through the normalizing gaze. It is worth noting here Foucault’s notion that, in the Christian West, the pastorate displaced philosophy in defining the art of governing, and that philosophy’s preoccupation with the self gives it a distinctly anti-pastoral character (Foucault, 2009: 50-151).

Craig’s stance is thus expressed in ways that I read as resembling what Foucault (1985, 1986) suggests differentiates an ‘ethic’ of care from something more codified. That is to say, care is expressed by Craig as a concern that is fundamentally self-directed, as
opposed to a duty imposed by others and monitored through the use of disciplinary techniques.

Something similar can be detected in the words of academic protagonist, John, in Mamet’s *Oleanna*. John spends much of the first and second acts of the play explaining to his student, Carol, his ‘heterodox’ (43) pedagogic philosophy. This includes: rule-breaking (26); refusing to believe in the ‘good’ of a higher education as an ‘article of faith’ (28, 32); and asking students to ‘take off the “Artificial Stricture of “Teacher” and “Student”’ (21). However, despite his self-positioning as a reflexive and unorthodox educator, John, like Craig, exhibits elements of pastoralism. These include his assertion that he is ‘unassailable’ in his ‘unflinching concern for my students’ (46) and a declaration to Carol in which he opines ‘Look: I’m trying to **save** you…’ (57, emphasis in original). Thus, both John and Craig’s views of education, articulated as personal philosophies, accommodate the pastoral themes of devotion and salvation.

The articulation of care as a credo or philosophy, rather than a calling, subdue the relations of obedience that Foucault states characterize pastoral relations, promoting instead the importance of the relation one has with oneself in guiding conduct. However, pastoral undercurrents may still be detected. Understood thus, techniques for governing F-S relationships which mobilize religious language in the name of care and sacrifice appear quite complex, invoking notions both of service and of reflective practice in their construction of the academic pastorate. Either way, pastoral notions of the relation between student and academic emphasize that F-S relationships should be avoided for the good of ‘each and all’. 
I now examine how acts of contrition provide alternative trajectories for the academic to those explicated thus far: the concupiscent academic exiled to damnation; and the chaste academic exercising care over his student-flock. To this end, I consider how, and with what effects, salvation is offered to the academic who has failed to abstain from the temptation of F-S relationships. Extract 20 highlights how contrition may enable redemption, providing an escape route from the lustful academic’s ruin. The extract, taken again from *Disgrace*, indexes how confession and contrition might facilitate academic salvation.

**Extract 20: *Disgrace*: 51-52 (Fiction 4)**

“… what do you advise me to do? Remove […] the subtle mockery from my tone? Shed tears of contrition? What will be enough to save me?”

“You may find this hard to believe, David, but we around this table are not your enemies. We have our weak moments, all of us, we are only human. Your case is not unique. We would like to find a way for you to continue with your career.”

Easily, Hakim joins in. “We would like to help you, David, to find a way out of what must be a nightmare.”

They are his friends. They want to save him from his weakness, to wake him from his nightmare. They do not want to see him begging in the streets. They want him back in the classroom.

“Very well,” he says, “let me confess…”

This excerpt, and indeed much of the chapter from which it is taken, narrates proceedings of the hearing convened to investigate Isaacs’ complaint against Lurie, and it illuminates a number of tenets of pastoral power. Whilst, in the previous two extracts examined, the academic was configured as pastor, in Extract 20 Lurie appears not so much the shepherd of academia, but rather one of its sheep.

The disciplinary committee is presented as offering Lurie a route to salvation; a way in which he can ‘continue his career’ and which will keep him off ‘the streets’. This salvation is predicated on two criteria: first, as depicted in the extract above, and in the
quote prefacing this chapter (p. 200), he is required to admit his guilt to charges made against him relating to his pursuit of Isaacs. Second, Lurie is required to ‘confess’ to his conduct; to ‘remove the subtle mockery from [his] tone’ and, as one committee member later asserts, ‘express contrition’ (Coetzee, 1999: 54). In other words he must not only admit the truth of what happened, but must also reveal sincere remorse for it.

The committee thus invites Lurie to accept a relation of obedience to the university, and to submit to its will, since Lurie’s own will has proven ‘weak’. As with some other corpus texts, this relation is expressed by both Lurie - albeit sardonically - and by the committee members as involving the provision of ‘help’ and ‘advice’ to ‘save’ him from his ‘nightmare’. Lurie thus appears to be positioned by the committee as a lost sheep who, having succumbed to ‘weakness’, must now act in a ‘spirit of repentance’ (58) and be brought back to the fold, saving himself and the university from damage. As one of the committee members later asserts, ‘All eyes are on the university to see how we handle [the charges]’ (53-54). Although Lurie does not give the committee the confession they demand, he does eventually repent in other ways. This repentance takes the form of an apology to Isaacs’ father for his conduct and, through his voluntary work at a dog shelter, actions interpretable as atonement for his sins (Kossew, 2003).

In some respects, Disgrace presents an archetypical example of pastoral techniques, since they map on to what Golder (1997: 174) refers to as an ‘axis of salvation, obedience, and truth’. However, in others this case represents something of an atypical case. As already indicated, it is more usual to find in the corpus a pastoral relation operating between the academic-as-pastor and student(s)-as-flock, rather than between the university-as-pastor and academic(s)-as-flock. I return to these former, and rather more prevalent, illustrations shortly. First I wish briefly to consider another text, which contains the latter, more uncommon kind.
A number of interview accounts index a pastoral relation between the senior academic and his or her colleagues or ‘subordinates’. Sue, an academic in a long-term relationship with a former student, Adam, whom she began dating whilst he was studying a module she taught, is a case in point. Sue states that she felt ‘guilty’ after her first sexual encounter with Adam, but goes on to recount how she came to terms with this.

**Extract 21: Interview with Sue (Individual interview 5)**

S: I did wrestle with my conscience a bit […] as soon as something happened I went straight to my department head, and…who was really good…an’ listened …told me not to worry, and you know she was glad I’d said something because… an’ so we just kinda came out as a couple then, and… because we were up front with everyone I felt we’d absolved ourselves…there was no sneaking around.

J: And… why was that…d’ya think… did you speak to her…straight away?

S: I thought she ought to know and… I wanted her advice really on how we ought to deal with things…um [2] mostly practical things…like marking and stuff…but also…so it was all above board an’ [2] transparently fair to all the students an’ [2] no issues of favouritism…but also to be fair to Adam as well.

Sue’s words construct disclosure to her head of department as a confessional, which provides catharsis from her ‘wrestle’ with her conscience. So, being ‘up front’ is expressed as putting an end to her ‘worries’ and also as leading to the couple’s absolution. The alternative to this course of action is pejoratively articulated as ‘sneaking around’, so that non-disclosure amounts to deceitful concealment rather than simply allowing others to discover the relationship for themselves. Sue’s use of the phrase ‘we…came out’ is interesting, since it evokes the language of homosexual disclosure, which itself has been interpreted as a confessional practice in which the subject reveals the ‘truth’ about him or herself to another (e.g. Drazenovich, 2012). Thus framed, Sue’s conduct may be understood as obeying a duty to admit her ‘truth’ to the other, which in turn is redemptive.
The department head is positioned by Sue as benevolent and reassuring, but also as requiring knowledge of her relationship with Adam. As with most of the interview respondents, Sue was unaware of her institution’s policy on relationships, and so the existence of a formal code cannot be summoned to explain her actions. Rather, her account indicates the presence of mechanisms predicated on a multi-levelled pastoral relation. So, in saying that she ‘ought to’ speak to her head of department, Sue expresses herself as being exhorted or obliged to make herself known to her head of department, and to the academic community more generally. This is accomplished via confessional techniques that are articulated as appeasing her conscience and guiding future conduct. She is also obligated to her students not to favour, or be seen to favour, one student above the others.

This again recalls the principle of ‘omnes et singulatim’ (Foucault, 1981, 2009), perhaps sharpening the sense of the paradoxical position the shepherd-academic may find him or herself in. In order to protect and serve the student-flock, one must look after each and every individual sheep, but must also care for the flock as a whole. To abandon one for the good of all, or all for the good of one, is to abandon one’s position as ‘good shepherd’; both are necessary.

A similarly paradoxical relationship emerged in other interview accounts. For example, Will refers to a scenario in an exam board in which he felt the need to ‘protect’ the interests of his partner, Tara, whose academic performance was being discussed. He conveys tensions between protecting Tara’s interest by praising her ‘genuinely excellent’ performance, whilst not to being seen to privilege this above other students’ performance. Rather than expressing this as a ‘conflict of interest’, as it is in many university policies, Will articulates his position using language that touches upon the metaphor of the watchful shepherd, although it does not explicitly appropriate religious
language; ‘I wanted to look out for Tara, of course, but knew that had to be…never at the expense of the rest of my group and…even when I thought perhaps she was the better student […] I felt I had to ensure I was protecting all of their interests.’

Sue and Will’s accounts of their academic and sexual conduct both suggest the presence of complex pastoral relations. These operate from ‘above’ and ‘below’ (Hunt, 1999). So, Sue positions herself as both obedient sheep and caring shepherd. This multi-levelled pastoral technology can also be applied to the text of Extract 18. Richard and Dominic also appear to straddle the pastoral relation. They articulate their roles along lines that are reminiscent of the good shepherd protecting his flock, but also express themselves as not so much owed obedience by their sheep, but rather owing obedience to others by discharging their duty to serve and care for the student-flock. Again, this resonates with the Christian version of pastoral power, in which ‘The pastor must experience his responsibility as a service, and one that makes him the servant of his sheep’ (Foucault, 2009: 179).

Whilst I interpret Sue as having ‘confessed’ her relationship, she does not deploy this term herself to describe her actions. However, my reading of Sue’s account as alighting upon the confessional can be supported in a number of ways. First, as already observed, the literary data contains references to disclosure as confessional. Although Disgrace deals with different circumstances, since a ‘confessional’ is being sought during a disciplinary hearing, both accounts suggest the need to divulge or reveal the ‘truth’, thus placing the ‘confessor’ in a position of obedience. It is also theoretically warranted by turning to research on the use of confessional practices (e.g. Rose, 1989; Taylor, 2010, Drazenovich, 2012). Finally, it is lent credence via the words of another participant in my study, Linda, who does explicitly deploy the term in her framing of disclosure. However, Linda’s account differs from those considered above, because she rejects
confessional practices. In so doing, she indicates new possibilities for understanding the
government of F-S relationships. These hinge upon what Taylor (2010: 193), following
Foucault, describes as ‘silence as a practice of freedom’.

**Silence as counter-conduct**

Linda’s interview produces a number of statements that take up religious discourses. For example, in the quotation prefacing this chapter (p.200), she explicitly likens the academic to a ‘preacher’ in charge of their ‘congregation’. This framing is used by Linda to rule out the possibility, or at least propriety, of F-S relationships. However, Linda’s avowed stance in that excerpt appears at odds with her own involvement with a student, Edward, when she first became a university lecturer. It also jars with her proclaimed acceptance, discussed elsewhere in the interview, of the practices of colleagues who have been involved in such relationships.

In Extract 22 Linda discusses her relationship with Edward, which she has earlier described as a ‘brief and almost wholly sexual thing…for me anyway’.

**Extract 22: Interview with Linda (Individual interview 3)**

**J:** And did you ever… disclose the relationship? To anyone… at work, or….?

**L:** Mmm…no. One or two close friends knew…but not colleagues [2] I don’t [laughs]. He [Edward] may’ve told people…I’m not sure…if he did, it never got back to me.

**J:** And…did anyone ever ask? Or…d’you know if…would there have been any trouble if people had like…found out…?

**L:** I wouldn’t have cared…I was always…outside processes [2] an’ so worrying that I’d be discovered an’… baring my soul to someone in that way wouldn’t have been a thing for me… I mean…I don’t know even if there was a process [1] I assume there was, there is now…but I wouldn’t ever have been inclined to confess. An’ I did…I would avoid colleagues’ questions about what I’d done at the weekend… an’ I suppose… hid him [1] an’…like I said, quite literally some of the time [laughs].
J: And why were you so keen d’ya think…to keep it a secret?

L: I wouldn’t say secret because…that sounds serious an’… he wasn’t that important to me, so I suppose… an’ I didn’t want it to be seen as important, you know?[2] I really…I don’t take sex that seriously, an’ it was just sex…barter of the flesh an’…so there was nothing to confess to.

In the extract Linda shifts the terms of my questions, so that to ‘disclose’ is rearticulated as to ‘confess’, or ‘bare [her] soul’, whereas the relationship being ‘found out’ becomes Linda being ‘discovered’. These semantic modifications imply that the ‘processes’ to which she refers can provide others with access to, and knowledge of, the intimate interior life of the academic subject. However, Linda’s own position in relation to these processes appears somewhat contrary.

Having constructed acts of disclosure as a kind of confessional, Linda goes on to use an ECF (‘I wouldn’t ever’) to forcefully reject her own participation in such practices. This rejection is initially expressed as giving rise to other practices: of ‘avoiding’ colleagues’ questions; and of ‘hiding’ Edward. To expand on this latter practice, Linda has earlier recounted a story in which a visitor unexpectedly arrives at her house when Edward is at home with her. Not wanting the visitor to see him, she tells Edward to go upstairs and stay in her bedroom until her guest leaves. Consequently, Linda explains, Edward has to hide upstairs for ‘an hour or so…at least’. Responding to what appears to be an allusion to this story in Extract 22 (‘like I said’) I then probe Linda on her hiding of Edward, using the word ‘secret’. However, ‘secret’ is rejected by Linda since it is too ‘serious’, and her relationship with Edward, she insists, was not serious.

‘Seriousness’ provides Linda with grounds on which to defend practices of hiding and avoiding the issue of the relationship; if sex is not important or serious for her, and the relationship with Edward was ‘just sex’ or, to use the more religious metaphor Linda uses, ‘barter of flesh’, then there is no secret, no interior to be discovered, and nothing
to confess to. Hiding and avoiding are thus justifiable, because confessing would confer on the relationship a legitimacy that did not exist, at least not for Linda.

Such a stance rejects one of the truth claims of harassment knowledge: sex’s centrality to human existence (Brewis, 2001). It might also be indicative of what Taylor (2009), following Foucault (1978b), considers an alternative to the confessional mode; ‘silence as practice of freedom’ (Taylor, 2010: 193). Taylor does not deny the possibility that silence can provide a ‘shelter for power’ (Foucault, 1978b: 101) and, like Carrette (2000), she notes Foucault’s insistence that silence and speech are not binary opposites, but may each be effects of power as well as strategies of resistance. In light of this, Linda’s silence on the subject of Edward can be understood - as she seems to imply it should - as resisting the attempts of others to gain access to, and define as ‘serious’, her sexual conduct. However, it might also be interpreted as Linda denying Edward a voice, and as a technique which prioritises Linda’s own perception of the relationship as ‘just sex’ above alternative understandings, in which it might amount to something else.

Continuing this notion of how silence operates, if one were to return to the problem posed in Part II of gaining access to interview subjects, the responses of academics who declined to participate in my study might possibly be interpreted as acts of silence; a disavowal of the auto-biographical and confessional aspects of the interview process (Foucault, 1978b). Thus rather than understanding male academics’ silence as the closing of ranks to protect selves and others from exposure, as Carter and Jeffs (1992) do, silence might rather be interpreted as an ethic in which the duty to care for oneself takes precedence over that owed to the other. Foucault calls this ethic ‘asceticism’, and it is one of a number of forms of anti-pastoral counter-conducts he describes (2009: 204-10). I return to the idea of ascetic practices in Chapter 11. Here, I wish to
emphasize that, as with all forms of power relation, pastoral techniques can be evaded by subjects.

Having considered how pastoral relations may be established between the academic-as-sheep and the university-as-pastor, noting practices that accept, reject, or elude relations of obedience, I now return to the more prevalent formulations of pastoral power, whereby the academic is pastor and students his or her sheep. Extract 23 comes from the interview with Jane, a doctoral student who, at the time of the interview, was involved in a relationship with a male academic, Albert\(^\text{14}\). Jane has explained how her doctoral supervisor, Louise, reacted to having being informed by a third party – perhaps in an instance of ‘outing’ – of Jane and Albert’s relationship. Jane constructs her supervisor as trying to configure the supervisor-supervisee relationship along what I interpret as a pastoral line. However, Jane expresses herself as having been resistant to this attempt.

Extract 23: Interview with Jane (Individual interview 6)

[J = Jane; JM = Jude]

J: She [Louise] kinda gave me this sorta sermon about…I ought to be really careful that it doesn’t look like I’m kinda [2] sleeping my way to the top. That I might wanna kind of… think carefully an’ take precautions to make sure that that’s not true…and uh…she said I should’ve told her because she could’ve kinda…helped me and could protect me, basically. And…um… you know, maybe she’s right about that [2] But um…she’s kind of a prickly sort of person, an’ actually…not the sort of person you’d really wanna talk to. And in fact I don’t ever talk to her about it ‘cause really…I don’t feel I particularly want to or that it would help me.

JM: When you say help you….in what way exactly?

J: Um…maybe…just…thinking together about how it looks an’…who to tell…an’ I was a bit lost with that at first. I guess also what other people might think of me, how my peers and so on react. But we’ve…anyhow we don’t discuss it now at all.
Jane makes a number of comments in this passage that position her supervisor as pastor. This effect is most directly accomplished when she refers to the initial discussion with her supervisor as a ‘sermon’, thus constructing Louise as a spiritual advisor, as well as an academic one. Louise’s sermon is recounted by Jane as involving two elements: exhorting Jane to think about and modify her behaviour; and a reprimand, in which she expresses regret that Jane has not told her about the relationship.

The first of these is tied to the reactions of others to the relationship, and Jane animates Louise as voicing a concern that she might be perceived as ‘sleeping [her] way to the top’. Referring back to Chapters 2 and 7, where I discussed harassment knowledge, this idea summons a quid-pro-quo version of harassment, conceptualizing sex as a potential bargaining tool. However, the suggestion that F-S relationships might represent some kind of sex-for-status exchange is not connected here to an attempt to proscribe such relationships. Rather, it is part of an exhortation that Jane should take ‘precautions’. These, Louise advises, should be deployed to prevent the relationship from being regarded as a tactic Jane uses to advance her career.

This warning, coupled with Jane’s animation of Louise as repeatedly mobilizing a hedged hortative modality, such as ‘might wanna kind of’, and ‘probably should’, indexes a language of advice and guidance. This is in contrast with the directive modality which accompanies command and prohibition (Nordstrom, 2010), which appeared to be more prevalent in the discourses discussed in Part III. As such, the extract suggests the presence of a form of shepherd-flock relation in which obedience and confessional are solicited and volunteered, rather than obligatory or coerced (Foucault, 2009: 203; Howley & Hartnett, 1992).

The second aspect - the reprimand - initially deals less with the reactions of others, and more with Louise’s own reaction, at least as reported here by Jane. So, Jane animates
Louise as expressing disappointment that she has not told her about the relationship. Jane frames this attitude as being connected to her supervisor’s apparent willingness and ability to ‘help’ and ‘protect’ her. This part of Jane’s story has a more disciplinary feel, and could potentially be interpreted as Jane being constructed - by Louise and by herself - as a child. However, Jane’s reference to being ‘lost’, and her narrative’s emphasis on protectionism and the guiding of conscience as ostensible objectives are more evocative of ‘shepherd-flock games’ than parent-child relations.

Upon probing what this ‘help’ might consist of, Jane highlights three concerns: first, the outward appearance of the relationship, or ‘how it looks’; second, the issue of knowledge, or ‘who to tell’; and third, the inner thoughts of others or, ‘what people think’. These concerns echo pastoral power’s emphasis on guiding the public actions of the flock, as well as the need to have intimate knowledge of their intimate or ‘secret’ sins, which are elicited through confessional practices (Foucault, 1981: 142). Thus the pastorate can be understood as the government not only of public conduct but also of private souls (Rose, 1989; Dean, 1994; Blake, 1999).

Further, Jane’s account suggests that individual thoughts and actions are closely tied to collective ones. So, Louise is portrayed as offering her services as pastor in order to guide both Jane’s conduct and ‘soul’, and also the rest of the flock’s. This is achievable through Jane thinking about and modifying her own behaviour, and through allowing appropriate others access to the ‘truth’ of the relationship. By doing this, Louise suggests, she and Jane can modify how Jane’s peers ‘think’ and ‘react’. In this way Louise is portrayed as holding herself and Jane jointly accountable for the thoughts and behaviour of both Jane herself, as individual sheep, and for her peers as student-flock.

Despite this, Jane - rather like Linda - presents herself as having denied others access to any such interior world of ‘sinful’ thought or feeling. This denial is justified on the basis
that Louise is a ‘prickly person’, and Jane deploys two ECF’s in her reportage of not talking about Albert: ‘I don’t ever talk to her about it’; and ‘we don’t discuss it now at all’. This accentuates the sense in which the topic is placed off-limits by Jane, in spite of Louise’s advice to the contrary. Thus even when pastoral techniques are mobilized there is no guarantee that the flock will behave as it should. Consequently, and as with the other techniques examined thus far, pastoral power offers imperfect techniques for governing.

Chapter Summary

In this chapter I have suggested that religious discourses evoke a number of themes which present the F-S relationship as a concern. The pervasive theme of temptation constructs relationships as a potential threat to the academic’s security. By linking temptation to fall, a trajectory is plotted for the concupiscent academic; F-S relationships are constructed as a path to academic damnation, thus marking them out as dangerous.

However, it appears that damnation is just one consequence for the tempted academic. Two alternative paths are also suggested by the data. The academic may avoid the road to hell by remaining chaste. He or she may also confess to, and atone for, his or her sins to the pastor. The former practice suggests the renunciatory action of self upon self; asceticism as denial and abstinence. The latter suggests confessional practices. Both of these techniques are interpreted by Foucault (2000, 2009) as Christian technologies of self.

Considered in this light, F-S relationships configured as temptation differ from the framings considered in Part III. This is because they construct sex between faculty and students as a potential harm facing the academic, from which there are numerous escape
routes. Thus whilst F-S relationships may be understood as sinful, they are not necessarily dangerous, as long as sensible precautions or remedial measures are taken.

Further differences emerge. As with the discourses considered in chapters 7 and 8, a gap is inserted between the academic-as-pastor and students-as-flock. However, here the two are intimately bound to each other in a way that is absent from harassment discourses. Moreover, whilst infantilising discourses construct a bond of dependency, this works by marking sexual relations between academic and student as horrific and unnatural abuse. Pastoral relations, on the other hand, tie the fate of the sheep to the pastor and the pastor to the sheep, so that they become entwined in an ‘economy of faults and merits’ (Foucault, 2009: 171); the fate of one becomes the fate of all.

Furthermore, the pastor is configured along different lines in the data. The management hierarchy of the university may assume a pastoral role or, more commonly, it may be ascribed to the academic watching over her or his students-as-flock. Occasionally a combination of the two seems to emerge. Thus the relationship is not one in which the pastor is powerful, and the sheep powerless. Rather each has a role to play in the salvation of the other. In this way, the academic-as-good-shepherd may be understood as ‘humbled’ (Foucault, 2009: 172) as much as he or she is powerful.
Chapter 10

Health, safety, and hygiene

It is not the intention of the University to intrude on the privacy of individuals, however the University has a statutory obligation to safeguard the health, safety and wellbeing of all members of the university.

(Personal Conflicts of Interest - Guidance for Staff and Students,

The University of Warwick: Policy 8, see Appendix 4)

But yeah, I mean I can …they [F-S relationships] certainly cause headaches…and you know, also if one were to try and develop policies to try to govern this sort of thing…there are risks for everyone all along the way. And…I think we were quite good…and actually were scrupulous, but uh…perhaps others wouldn’t be.

(Will: Couple interview 1, see Appendix 4)
Introduction

In the last chapter I proposed that religious discourses are often invoked to problematize F-S relationships. Their deployment marks relationships out as potentially damning for the academic, but also suggests ways in which ruin may be avoided. This is accomplished by mobilizing technologies of self, such as confessional techniques, meaning that a relationship need not spell disaster as long as it is confessed to and atoned for.

In this chapter attention turns from godliness to cleanliness, safety, and health. I examine how the F-S relationship can become caught up in discourses invoking sexual and other kinds of healthiness, including mental and physical wellbeing. These are often pegged to the related concepts of safety and cleanliness. Acknowledging that such discourses may have profound disciplinary implications (Brewis & Grey, 1994: 74), I propose that their adoption may also index the presence of power relations that, paradoxically, are both less and more constraining than disciplinary regulation (Hunt, 2003).

They are more constraining in that they enlist the ‘responsibilized’ (Miller & Rose, 2008: 77) self in projects of governance, involving individuals in ‘critical scrutiny’ (Rose, 1993: 292) of self and others. Importantly, they also induce ‘prudent risk-managing measures’ (O’Malley, 1996: 200), an idea that develops the nascent interest in precautionary logic introduced in the last chapter. However, they appear less constraining because conceptualizations of what might be considered healthy, safe, and hygienic vary, and they are often guided rather than specified (Rose, 1999). Thus they leave the inhabitants of academe a degree of scope within which to calculate risks and precautions, and so avoid, or inoculate against, the contaminating presence of F-S relationships.
I begin by exploring how notions of health, safety and hygiene are invoked to articulate risk, before going on to assess how different aspects of these discourses serve either to pathologize or, unlike those considered in Part III, recommend the F-S relationship as a course of action. This latter framing, whilst far less common in the data than the former, suggests that this discourse can be understood as part of a counter-discourse or ‘point of possible reversal’ (Foucault, 1982: 794), rearticulating relationships as therapeutic.

Risky business

The related ideas of health and hygiene have well-established historical, religious, and cultural associations with understandings of sexual activity (Douglas, 2002; Foucault, 1978b, 1985, 1986). Douglas notes how, in some cultures, fears of pollution accompany certain kinds of sexual conduct, such as adultery, which are considered to cause impurity, disease, and even death. Likewise, Foucault (1985, 1986), examining the practices of Antiquity, traces how sexual conduct came to be understood as a potential source of danger. In the Greco-Roman period this danger was deemed sufficiently hazardous to warrant vigilance in an attempt to curb excessive uses of pleasure - excesses which might cause illness or loss of vitality.

In this section I address texts in which the idea of sexual activity between faculty and student is expressed as a hazard. The entry of discourses of health, safety, and hygiene into the university setting is perhaps harder to find historical antecedents for than is the case for discourses explored elsewhere in the thesis, although they may, in part, stem from the introduction of workplace Health and Safety legislation in the 1970s (e.g. Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974. See JISC, 2003, for further details on the application of HASAW in HE). This seems to be implied by a number of personal relationships policies referencing universities’ statutory requirements to safeguard the health and safety of their members; the universities of Warwick, Kent, Gloucestershire,
and Bangor all do this. Williams (2013) sees safety discourses as gaining a foothold in US HEIs in the 1990s, and looks to the introduction of drug use prevention programmes as heralding this change. She notes a similar trend in the UK, but does not explicate why or when this occurred. With this in mind, it is worth stating that instances in which these discourses emerge in my data come, in the most part, from the interview accounts, press reports and university policy documents dating from the early 1990s. I could not trace them further back than this.

I begin my analysis by considering how the concepts of health, safety, and hygiene are discursively mustered. I unpack how their assemblage is tethered to an implied need for care and vigilance, which recalls Douglas (2002), and Foucault’s work on sexuality. I then consider how particular aspects of this theme - being healthy, safe, and sanitary - are allied to questions of risk, attending to points of similarity and difference. Extract 24 comprises a section of talk taken from the undergraduate group interview. The discussion is analysed for how participants sew together concepts of health, and hygiene, and for how the resultant fabric gives shape to notions of ‘risk’ and ‘safety’.

**Extract 24: Interview with undergraduate students (Group interview 3)**

[G= Gill; S= Sean; A = Anastasia]

**S:** Cause a lecturer…doesn’t just have to *teach* do they? There are like…university *laws* or whatever that you know…*policies* that you have to uphold. You know there’s health and safety policies and you know… whatever. [2] What if there was a *fire* [at the university], and they’d like…they’d only save their *girlfriend*? [laughter]. I dunno, it…opens up *questions*.

**G:** You *do*…you need to be squeaky *clean* though.

**S:** Yeah…an’ [to Jude] with *your* situation…it’s not *dirty* exactly…but you’re still like…*tainted* by it, an’ I think…that can *rub off* on…an’ affect other people […] if you’re not *careful*.
A: Seriously though…there’s no reason why it should be a thing for anyone else to be bothered about… if it all goes wrong, they’re the ones who are gonna’ suffer, aren’t they?

This excerpt indicates how the running together of ideas relating to health, safety, and hygiene can have the effect of marking F-S relationships out as a risk. Risk is implicitly worked up in the text in a number of different ways. Initially relationships seem to be presented by Sean as being subject to the jurisdiction of health and safety ‘laws’ or ‘policies’, in what appears to be an appeal to sovereign power relations. Emphasizing the importance of codification, Sean provides a hypothetical scenario, ‘university on fire’. In this scenario he hypothesizes the risk of the male lecturer saving his student girlfriend from a raging inferno and leaving everyone else to burn. In so doing, the student is constructed as passive, and the lecturer as active and heroic. Sean’s appeal to formal codes, allied to the heterosexist assumptions of his scenario, recall both harassment and infantilization discourses.

However, the unlikeliness of ‘university on fire’ seems to be oriented to by Sean and the rest of the group, who all laugh at the scenario. Subsequently, Sean defends his point, stating that it ‘opens up questions’. Whilst Sean does not spell out what these questions are, one might assume that they extend beyond the possibility of the entire student and academic population being incinerated. Rather, Sean’s example indicates problems of bias in its staking out of risk and hazard. In other words, F-S relationships are expressed as a threat to fairness and equity, creating an environment in which the importance of the individual with whom the academic is having a relationship takes priority over their relationships with other students and colleagues. This possibility, Sean implies, can be understood as morally problematic and potentially dangerous.

Despite the group’s laughter, Gill’s next turn accepts that there is some validity in what Sean says. Her remark, ‘You do…you need to be squeaky clean though’ reinforces
Sean’s articulation of risk, whilst slightly altering its terms, so that the issue at stake segues from the prospect of widespread death and destruction, to exposure to dirt. Gill’s displacement - which is rather vaguely accomplished, thus masking the identity of the ‘you’ who ‘need[s] to be squeaky clean’ - seems to be accepted by Sean. In the next turn he concurs with Gill’s point, offering a counter-example that reinforces it. Referring to my own involvement in a F-S relationship, Sean comments that whilst my relationship may not be ‘dirty exactly’, I am still ‘tainted’ by it. This taint is articulated as hard to contain; it can ‘affect’ or ‘rub off’ on others.

Anastasia challenges Sean’s idea that taint need affect others and, in so doing, realigns the discussion with the issue of health. Appearing to dismiss ‘university on fire’, she constructs an outcome whereby it ‘all goes wrong’, which in turn causes ‘suffering’ for those involved in the relationship. The extremization and vagueness of this possibility makes this outcome appear both grave and hard to disagree with. However, the suffering Anastasia indexes is not articulated as affecting others, whom she says need not be ‘bothered’. Thus her construction of risk or harm is narrower in scope than Sean’s.

Is some ways Extract 24 is paradigmatic of health, safety, and hygiene discourses, in that it distils many of their component parts. So, the articulation of the F-S relationship as a contaminating presence, and deliberation of how far the risks posed by such relationships might extend, are recurrent features in the corpus. In Blue Angel, for instance, relationships are worked up by one character as a ‘cancer’. When confronting Professor Swenson with allegations of harassment, Bentham, Swenson’s Dean of school, says of F-S relationships, ‘You know, this sort of thing can function like a…malignancy in the community, spreading all sort of rot. Early detection, early cure’ (246). In depicting relationships thus, the university assumes a quasi-medical role; it
must diagnose and root out ‘malignant’ threats in order to prevent them from contaminating ‘the community’. I discuss the medical role of the university and academic further in the next section.

Suggestions that the scope of hazard posed by F-S relationships might be both wide and potentially dangerous - life threatening even – posits them as something requiring regulation. For Dean Bentham, appropriate regulation is a ban on relationships, but for Sean and the rest of the undergraduate group interviewed the issue of regulation is a thorny one. Although I have noted that Sean invokes formal codes and laws early on in the extract, the group does not favour US style anti-fraternization policies. Later in the interview Tyrone comments, ‘I dunno...you can’t ban...nor stop it...it’ll find a way out, so [...] you have to make the environment kinda’...safe.’ Tyrone’s words evoke the idea of an organism finding a means through which to sustain life. His further invocation of ‘safe[ty]’, which Garland (2003) and Hunt (2003) have suggested is widely summoned within risk discourses, is deployed here as a means of inoculating the environment against the risks posed by F-S relationships. This is seen as preferable to, and more effective than, banning them.

Indeed, the techniques articulated by Tyrone and Sean recall Foucault’s apparatuses of security, the ‘essential technical instruments’ of governmentality (2009: 108). Security technologies anticipate trajectories, surmise probable events, identify risk factors, and consider appropriate measures for the management of ‘populations at risk’ (Castel, 1991: 284). They are understood as giving rise to a calculative logic, although they may also activate a precautionary one (Ewald, 2002:274). The former is often associated with insurance practices, and it deploys statistical calculation to analyse and manage risk (Hacking, 2003). In contrast, the latter, which often emerges where the precise calculation of risks and benefits is not possible, imagines ‘catastrophic consequences’
(Haggerty, 2003: 202), however far-fetched these may be. This latter mode of forecasting produces cautious decision-making and constrains risk taking behaviour, thus regulating conduct.

Security apparatuses offer a more hands off approach to governing than rule and discipline (Foucault, 2009). Referring to the development of vaccination against smallpox, Foucault notes that these new medical interventions, which he describes as ‘typical practice[s] of security’ (2009: 60), project the disease’s trajectory and aim to nullify or cancel out its effects, rather than eradicating its existence altogether. Such practices are underpinned by a logic which ‘lets things happen’ (2009: 45). As a result, security techniques emerge as a governmental tactic that may be peculiarly acceptable to the population, because they appear benign and relatively nonintrusive (Hunt, 2003).

Interpreted in this light, F-S relationships, as articulated by Sean, can be read as making the university environment hazardous for its inhabitants. Rather than only invoking sovereignty, whereby breaking a health and safety law or policy results in damage and harm, Sean indexes questions raised by individuals’ moral conduct. Further, relationships are presented as risks exposing the wider community to harm if individuals are not sufficiently ‘careful’. In this respect risk can be managed through the deployment of the ‘precautionary principle’ aimed at protecting the university population, rather than (only) through appeals to the formal codes, sanctions, and norms that may - or may not - constrain the behaviour of individuals.

In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I further explore some of the ways in which notions of health, safety, and hygiene are deployed. In so doing I attend to the different techniques implicated in the management and avoidance of risk, highlighting the mobilization of security apparatuses. I also discuss texts that reframe relationships in a less hazardous manner.
Warning: This relationship could damage your health

As already asserted, the articulation of F-S relationships as a risk features in a number of texts analysed. In Extract 25, risk is expressed as affecting students, staff, and ‘third parties’, who may each face particular ‘problems’. However, these problems are only constructed as threatening the health of students.

Extract 25: Personal Relationships at Work policy, University Campus Suffolk (Policy 3)

…such relationships [romantic/sexual relationships between staff and student] carry considerable risk. The student may become isolated from their peers and may become extremely distressed if the relationship ends, adversely affecting their physical and mental health. The member of staff may find themselves the subject of a complaint of harassment if the student decides the relationship is not truly consensual or if the relationship breaks down. Such relationships can also impact adversely on other students and staff, since they can create tension, rumours and secrecy, and perceptions of preferential or different treatment. Problems of this kind result in complaints from third parties which may lead to formal investigations.

As with Extract 24, and the quotation on p.232 prefacing this chapter, ‘risk’ is pronounced assertively by University Campus Suffolk (UCS); the riskiness of F-S relationships is presumed and a priori. Further, relationships are expressed as ‘carr[iers]’of risk. This constructs F-S relationships as contaminants.

In contrast, the policy’s subsequent propositions are hedged, so that they are articulated as what ‘may’ or ‘can’ be, rather than what is, must, or will be. Notwithstanding this softening of their illocutionary force, UCS’s cataloguing of the possible events that comprise risk indicates different outcomes for different parties.

For the academic, there is possibility of a ‘complaint of harassment’. This highlights F-S relationships’ potential for appropriation by harassment knowledge. However, harassment is worked up here as a risk rather than a certainty, and thus it departs from
claims that F-S relationships are necessarily non-consensual and exploitative. The risk for students, meanwhile, ‘may’ impact their ‘physical and mental health’. Such framing is premised upon, and contains within it, two hedged assumptions: first, that such a relationship may result in the student being ostracised; and second, that the demise of a relationship may cause the student ‘extreme distress’.

Focusing on the first of these, in implying that these are relationships that erect barriers between the participating student and their peers, the student appears once again to be denied agency. In Extract 24 Sean’s hypothetical student was saved; here they are abandoned. Either way, the student assumes a passive role. Regarding the second, by suggesting that ending a relationship may be traumatic for the student, the notion that relationships can potentially be bad for a student’s health is secured.

This working up of relationships as unhealthy is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it presents distress at the end of a relationship as an experience impacting students, but not academics. This categorization device is further compounded by subsequent advice provided in the UCS policy regarding relationships between members of staff, which asserts, ‘such relationships need not present a difficulty and, indeed, may positively add value to the organisation […]they] only become a problem where there is the potential for a conflict of interest.’ There is no hint here of the distress or detriment to health that may occur when a relationship between two colleagues comes to an end. Rather, this is solely a matter of ‘conflict[ing] interest’.

However, my data indicates that the risks relationships pose to health and wellbeing are more contestable and complex than the UCS allows. For example, one interviewee, Anne, commented on the end of her relationship thus: “It was my decision… an’ although I was relieved when it was over [I] never regretted it.” Interviewees Otis and Sue both express similar views, in which the demise of their relationships with
academics are recounted as ‘fun’ experiences that ended amicably. Furthermore, in some of the fictional data it is the academic whose health is compromised by the end of the relationship: Professor Shales in *Fresh Meat* and *The Corrections*’ Chip Lambert both appear depressed following the demise of their relationships with students. These texts thus confound UCS’s construction of students as peculiarly vulnerable to mental and physical health problems.

Meanwhile, for ‘other students and staff’ the ‘problem’ articulated in Extract 25 is more enigmatically constructed as one concerning ‘tension, rumours and secrecy’. Although the deployment of the term ‘tension’ might be read as alighting upon health discourses, it is perhaps more readily interpretable as being bound up with ‘perceptions of preferential or differential treatment’, and thus reinforces concerns over fairness and bias, which also surfaced in Extract 24. In order to protect students and staff from the consequences projected by UCS, the policy advises the staff member to notify their line manager, with whom they should work to ‘ensure no inappropriate professional contact with or influence on the student’s activities occurs’. Thus, and in line with the idea of ‘government at a distance’ (Miller & Rose, 1990: 1), the support of the manager-as-expert is enlisted to decontaminate the F-S relationship and protect the wider academic population.

Other personal relationships policies refer to additional precautionary measures. The universities of Central Lancashire and Edge Hill both advise staff against socialising with students off campus and/or giving out home telephone numbers. This may be interpreted as de-risking the environment. Reading University also suggests staff enlist the help of additional sources of expertise, including HR, counselling and wellbeing advisors, if they are in any ‘doubt’ about the appropriateness of a relationship with a student. I examine Reading’s policy in more detail in the next chapter. Here, I refer to it
because it resonates with Rose’s (1989) contention that the psy-disciplines are instrumental in providing the expertise which governmentality depends upon.

Although this aspect of Reading’s policy seems to posit the F-S relationship as compromising the wellbeing of the academic, who is troubled by doubt, this is atypical. In general, policies follow UCS’s practice of delineating the impact of relationships on students and academic staff. Indeed, Reading’s policy also does this. It considers the possibility of students turning to behaviours which include, ‘self harm [and] overdoses’ when a relationship fails. In contrast to this, the consequences for staff are more likely to be ‘professionally damaging’. This distinction also surfaces in press reports. One newspaper article provides a further case in point, depicting F-S ‘affairs’ as leading to (female) students, ‘having an abortion [or] becoming anorexic’ whereas lecturers ‘have had to leave their jobs’ (The Guardian, 15/05/1992).

Consequently, it is generally only the student whose health is explicitly articulated as being compromised by F-S relationship; alternative discourses are taken up to predict the fate of the academic and other inhabitants of academe. Thus discourses of health, safety, and hygiene should be understood as interacting with other discourses. Notwithstanding this, such discourses mobilize the security apparatuses associated with governmental rationality; they predict worst case scenarios and advise the application of precautionary principles in order to avert risk. In the next section I further examine some of these interactions and techniques by focusing on the deployment of a doctor-patient metaphor and the concept of ‘duty of care’.

Duty of care

Constructions of the academic as some kind of medical expert, with the student as his or her patient, pervade the data, as does articulation of the academic’s duty of care. Each of these devices helps to construct the university as a safe environment. Extract 26 deploys
both techniques in a move which may seem straightforwardly juridical, but which, I contend, suggests that other forms of power relation are at work.

**Extract 26: Personal Relationships policy, The University of Reading (Policy 4)**

The tutor can come close to the professional confidant type relationship engaged in by physicians, psychologists, counsellors and others which over the years has attracted compulsory codes of conduct. Like those professionals it is clear that the ‘duty of care’ […] implies that a Tutor, in being informed by such considerations, should never mix professional and personal relationships.

(Quotation marks and capitalization in original)

This extract positions the academic as having a ‘professional’ duty to avoid ‘personal relationships’ with students. As such, it intersects with professional discourses, which I return to in Chapter 11. Here I want to foreground the way it sets the academic up as a ‘confidant’.

In justifying and elaborating this ‘confiding’ role, the text singles out three medical, or quasi-medical experts - ‘the physician, psychologist and counsellor’ - and the identification of these comparators can be read as having a number of effects. First, it positions the academic as having expertise and authority; they are ‘informed’ and things ‘should’ be ‘clear’ to them. This expertise seemed to have been stripped away in some of the policy data referred to in the last section, where academics were reliant on others’ expertise in order to determine appropriate behaviour. Second, as the text explicitly indicates, they establish the academic tutor as someone necessarily bound by a code of conduct - the Hippocratic oath comes to mind - which delineates professional and personal responsibilities. Third, the tutor is framed as owing a ‘duty of care’ to the student. Rather like the parent/child relationship discussed in Chapter 8, this erects a relationship of dependency, but here dependency is inserted between the academic-as-doctor and the student-as-patient.
Such framings were evident elsewhere in the corpus. For instance, in the CMD data one contributor comments, “Perhaps it [the lecturer-student relationship] is the same as relationships between patients and doctors?” (The Student Room, 17/04/2011). Likewise, in the group interview with female academics, Sinead, a senior-tutor, complains, “One student...she wasn’t even my tutee... went on about her bi-polar […]. I feel like [1] a bloody counsellor half the time.” The potential of academics occupying a counselling role was mentioned in Chapter 8, although there the academic facilitating the training session in which this possibility was mentioned rejected the counselling metaphor in favour of a parental one. It would seem then that a sort of medicalization or ‘psychologization’ (Rose, 1989) of the academic role is articulated in the corpus. This imbues the role with expertise and obligations that set the academic apart from the student, and which must be used to safeguard her or him.

In a sense, and as with infantilizing discourses, the doctor-patient relationship appears to operate as a disciplinary technique, in that it attempts to specify conduct: the necessity to care; to keep a distance; to listen to students, including their medical complaints. However, this imperative is typically couched in the language of advice rather than being asserted as a necessity. Further, individuals - particularly academics - are enjoined to calculate the risks and benefits of relationships. So, like many university policies, the University of Reading’s opening statement on relationships maintains that, ‘The University does not seek to unduly interfere in relationships between consenting adults. However, the university has a duty of care to its students’. It goes on to refer to ‘risks’ and ‘difficulties’, and the tutor’s ‘ethical responsibility to protect the interests of students’. The University of Warwick’s policy, a quotation from which opens this chapter (p.232), articulates a similar stance of not wanting to be perceived to ‘intrude’ in its bid to protect the ‘health, safety and welfare’ of students. This is different then
from the extracts studied in Part III of the thesis, where the language used was more assertive and declarative.

Consequently, whilst the university and, by implication, the academic, may be set up as protectorate of the health and wellbeing of the student population, this is often articulated as a matter of duty and personal integrity, rather than something that can be legislated for. For instance, in his consideration of how to avoid the ‘headaches’ caused by relationships, Will - also in a prefacing quote on p.232 - refers to having been personally ‘scrupulous’ - a term implying both painstaking care and morality - since the creation of a code or policy might, in itself, pose ‘risks for everyone’. Thus, propriety emerges through the administration of care, exercised in the name of self and other. This illuminates Taylor’s (2011) contention that pedagogy is a site for self-care and care of others. Taylor does not discuss pastoral power, but her argument is congruent with the notion that it may be at work; that the university guides the academic, who, in turn, guides the student along the path to ‘worldly salvation’ (Foucault, 1982: 784), just as a shepherd would his flock. I now further examine how pastoral power relations play out by analysing texts in which this perceived duty of care is expressed as having been abandoned.

The corpus includes texts in which the academic is vilified for failing to properly exercise his or her care for the student. One example of this is the reporting of, and subsequent CMD comments on, a highly publicised case (also analysed in Extract 10a), in which a mature student in her 30s is reported as having ‘suffered’ in various ways following a consensual relationship with her lecturer.

Whilst not wanting to deny the veracity of various newspapers’ claims, the press coverage of this case is not impartial. It causally relates the student’s ‘affair’ with the lecturer to her having an abortion and, consequently, ‘breakdown’, using language
which seems to entirely strip the student of her agency. Thus she ‘falls’ pregnant (*The Telegraph; Sunday Mercury*), ‘goes through with’ a termination (*The Telegraph*) and ‘suffers’ a breakdown (*The Boar*). The reportage of this series of events identifies the relationship as the catalyst for the students’ troubles, although this can only be conjecture since both the student and lecturer involved declined to speak to reporters. Only one student paper, *The Boar*, describes the student, ‘Eleanor’, as having had any ‘choice’, either in engaging in the affair or in deciding to have a termination. Thus these reports position themselves for the student and against both the pathological relationship and the negligent lecturer, who is blamed for failing to prevent consequences impacting Eleanor’s physical and mental health. This is oriented to in the subsequent on-line discussion in the THE, where the concept of the academic-as-negligent-physician also emerges; ‘If I dated my GP and he misdiagnosed an illness which had consequences for me, does the GMC or BMA say “Well we’ll write that one off to bad luck as they were dating?”’ (*THE*, 29/09/2008).

The fictional data also contains characterisations in which the academic is held to have failed in their duty of care to the student-as-patient. For instance, in the closing chapter of *Blue Angel*, student Angela Argo is revealed to be epileptic and to have suffered from depression (293). Consequently, one of the character witnesses Angela calls to the hearing in which Professor Swenson is accused of harassing her is the university health clinic’s practice nurse. The effect of this is that Angela is consistently referred to as ‘the patient’ in this section of text (292-293).

In other examples, we see the academic-as-doctor take on a more overtly medicalised or caring role as part of what I interpret as acts of penitence. For example, in *The Dying Animal*, serial philanderer David Kepesh supports his former student lover, Consuela, through cancer treatment. In other texts this caring role shifts away from the student and
on to others: *Disgrace* has the academic protagonist, David Lurie, caring for sick and abandoned dogs at an animal welfare shelter; Chip Lambert in *The Corrections* supports his dying father; meanwhile Flap, the college professor in *Terms of Endearment*, is seen by the bedside of his dying wife, whom he has abandoned for his student girlfriend. These acts of care, in which the academic looks after the sick or dying student, relative, or animal, function as a form of rehabilitation, through which the formerly recalcitrant protagonist repents for their failure to exercise proper care for others. Lurie orients to his work at the clinic as both a means to absolution through ‘giving himself to the world’ (Coetzee, 1999: 146), and as a ‘sentence’ (216), although he fails to save the dogs in his charge from being put down. Consequently the route to worldly salvation is by no means certain.

Like religious discourses then, discourses of health appeal to tactics that operate beyond techniques of domination. Rather, they are indicative of governmental and pastoral modalities of power, in which technologies of self are more thoroughly implicated (see Foucault, 1982; Dean, 1994; Hunt, 1999, 2003; O’Malley, 1996; Rose, 1989; Lemke, 2001, 2010; Golder, 2007). Understood thus, the F-S relationship is framed as being regulated not only through control from above, horizontally, and below, as was the case with the sovereign and disciplinary techniques adopted by harassment and infantilizing discourses, but also through techniques in which the self is called and held to account.

I now turn my attention to therapeutic discourses. These, I propose, radically reshape health discourses, revealing spaces in which F-S relationships can be understood as beneficial or healthy. As with the concept of duty of care, therapeutic discourses also offer insights into how the self is induced, or commits itself, to certain modes of action.

**Therapeutic Discourses**
F-S relationships are not always worked up as a health risk; sometimes there are suggestions that relationships may promote wellbeing. In Extract 27, taken from my interview with Sam, an academic, ‘erotic[ally] charge[d]’ relationships with students are formulated as being healthy.

**Extract 27: Interview with Sam (Individual interview 7)**

I have a friend […] she’s…always been…her idea of good pedagogy is that there needs to be an erotic charge there, and […] she wants students to be attracted to her, to find the work and her herself exciting and…stimulating…an’ I think there’s something in that…not (1) erotic exactly, but…a bit of passion and energy can…can sort of spark creativity and ideas…it can be…I guess, kind of a really healthy environment and… where good learning flourishes.

Sam’s articulation of good pedagogy appears to subvert those discussed earlier, in which a healthy learning environment and F-S relationships are framed in inverse proportion. His configuration of ‘passion[ate]’ pedagogy (see hooks, 1996) certainly mobilizes a different understanding of relations with others but, perhaps more importantly, it also introduces an alternative conceptualization of the relation with self to those considered thus far. I return to these points shortly. First, I explore how Sam’s account disrupts aspects of health discourses hitherto discussed.

In explaining how his ‘friend’ defines a healthy pedagogic environment, Sam’s account immediately signals that this environment is not the sterile and risk-free version alluded to in many of the university policies and interview accounts analysed. Instead, ‘passion’, ‘attraction’, and ‘stimulation’ enable ‘creativity’ and ‘good learning’ to ‘flourish’.

A number of the DDs deployed by Sam in the excerpt are of analytic interest. First, his turn to the lexicon of electricity - ‘energy’ ‘charge’ and ‘spark’ - signify that something pseudo-scientific, possibly even alchemic, is occurring in the lecture theatre or seminar
room. This can be interpreted as having a number of possible effects: conferring scientific legitimacy upon the practice; setting it up as in some way spiritual or magical; and both hinting at, and underlining, the atmosphere of ‘creativity and ideas’, suggested later in the extract.

Second, through his use of a personal intention promoting words, such as ‘her idea’ and ‘she wants’, Sam’s friend is articulated as having developed her own position on what makes a healthy pedagogic environment. Elsewhere in the interview Sam acknowledges that the F-S relationship is ‘taboo’, and as we have seen in Chapter 8, the age taboo is articulated as preventing him from turning a romantic connection with a student into a sexual one. Nevertheless, in Extract 27 he implies that it is possible to arrive at, and hold, an alternative position to those that either prohibit or advise against allowing personal relations to mix with pedagogic ones.

Whilst Sam’s footing prevents him from taking responsibility for, or fully committing himself to, the valorization of a passionate pedagogy, his account hints at reflexive practices and Foucault’s notion of asceticism. In his 1977-78 lectures, Foucault explicates how asceticism emerges as a form of religious counter-conduct practised by, amongst others, the Gnostics and Benedictines. Ascetic practices, such as fasting and self-flagellation, loosen the bonds of pastoral relations of obedience, but are nonetheless tied up with struggles involving self-denial and renunciation (2009: 204). In some of his later works and interviews (e.g. Foucault, 1985, 1986, 2005) Foucault shows how the Greek version of asceticism - askesis - is less about renunciation and more about preparation; ‘ancient askesis does not reduce, it equips’ (Foucault, 2005: 320). Thus it is a form of ethical self-care in which creation, transformation, or perfection is sought.

Ascetic techniques are further analysed in Chapter 11. For now, I propose that Sam’s friend, and to some extent Sam himself, are positioned here as having arrived at a mode
of being and relating to others which is indicative of the questioning and transformational processes that comprise subjectivation. These processes enable the subject to minimise relations of domination and, to some extent, ‘invent […] himself’ (Foucault, 1984: 11) In this sense, the approach may be interpreted as both ethical and ascetic (see Yates, 2010).

Other corpus texts contain similar traces of a therapeutic discourse in their framing of F-S sex, often implicating a pastoral modality of governing. Within the policy data, for example, a number of universities express an interest in fostering a ‘*healthy working environment*’ in which ‘*mutually rewarding professional and sometimes personal relationships*’ may develop between staff and students without need for ‘*intervention*’ (see Edge Hill University and The University of Exeter). The fictional and newspaper data also provides examples of therapeutic discourse. For example, in *Disgrace*, David Lurie tells press reporters standing outside the university that he has been ‘*enriched by the experience*’ (Cotzee, 1999: 56) of his relationship with Isaacs. Likewise, in one newspaper article, F-S relationships are defended by a male academic, who describes them as ‘*good and life enhancing*’ (*The Observer*, 17/05/1992).

Whilst this latter and rather global point on health appears to be made about F-S relationships in general, another male academic, commenting in the same newspaper a year later, is more specific in his articulation of the health benefits of F-S relationships. Referencing Freud’s *The Taboo of Virginity*, he writes, ‘*In some instances these affairs might be therapeutic for students. Sometimes a female student feels that her virginity has been unnaturally prolonged…a professor is not a bad choice here.*’ (*The Observer*, 03/10/1993).

This articulation differs considerably from the configurations of therapeutic discourses cited above; whilst it suggests that the female student may be hysterical or sick, the F-S
relationship is now posited as a cure for, rather than the cause of, her malady. Consequently, the professor is re-positioned as academic-as-therapist. This suggests a pastoral relation in which the academic’s duty of care extends to the provision of a sexual service - described in the piece as ‘defloration’ - alleviating her of her ‘burdensome’ virginity. This service is rendered for the good of each and all: it saves the student from ‘immediate immersion in marriage’, and other potential suitors from being exposed to her hostility when she experiences the ‘bereavement’ of her virginity (The Observer, 03/10/1993).

I read something similar into the sexual encounter between Howard Kirk and Felicity Phee in The History Man. Phee propositions Kirk during one of the Kirks’ parties, ‘which are famous for their happenings’ (Bradbury, 1987: 230), as a way of enabling her to throw off her ‘screwed-up’ and ‘uptight’ outlook: “Do something for me” she says to Kirk, “Help me, help me, help me. It’s a work of charity” (92-93). However, later in the book the relationship between Phee and Kirk is revealed as instrumental in enabling Kirk’s victory over student George Carmody, who is emblematic, to Kirk at least, of the ‘liberal reactionary forces’ against which Phee helps him ‘defend’ himself (229). Thus the relationship can be understood as leading to their mutual salvation, although ultimately it is Kirk who is portrayed by Bradbury as the novel’s true victor.

Having considered both the pastoral and anti-pastoral relations produced by therapeutic discourses, I now return to the concepts of hygiene and dirt. These are explored for how they formulate F-S sex as a pollutant, whilst simultaneously suggesting that they are pleasurable and alluring. Thus they may be understood as drawing upon notions of ‘abjection’ (Kristeva, 1982; Brewis & Linsestad, 2001; Tyler, 2011) and also as illustrating Foucault’s concept of the ‘devices of excitation’ associated with, amongst other things, pornography (Foucault, 1978b: 48).
Dirt, contamination, stimulation

The concepts of dirt and contamination have already been touched upon in my explication of risk, and also in analysis of texts constructing the academic-as-old-man. For this reason, the analysis below is relatively brief. My aim here is to draw attention to certain particularities illuminated through a close reading of texts in which the dirt attached to F-S relationships is not only depicted as a contaminant, but also as arousing stimulant. I begin by elaborating on the former, before going on to consider the latter.

Extract 28 suggests that the ‘risk’ presented by the F-S relationship as contaminant can be transferred via inanimate objects. The excerpt joins F-S couple Eloise and Una discussing an occasion where Una, a lecturer, accidentally brought home an exam script written by Eloise, a student, to mark.

Extract 28: Interview with Una and Eloise (Couple interview 2)

E: She [Una] put it on the table an’ I literally went, “Argh, drop it! Don’t let me look at it… and don’t let me touch it…don’t look at it yourself, don’t even get it out, just take it back tomorrow.” It was literally like…we were gonna get (1) infected. Cause like… if I’d had to redo it because of that, ya’ know, it could all be over for me… so I’d rather we do that than me risk losing my degree over it.

U: An’ I took it back in…[…] explained to the girls in the office…[to Eloise] but we both needed… a bit of a hose down after that one didn’t we? I wanna be whiter than white with this [relationship].

Earlier in the interview, Una has explained that, when disclosing her relationship with Eloise to her Head of Department, she agreed not to grade any of Eloise’s work. In other words, an undertaking had been made to mitigate against one of the contaminating risks alluded to in this chapter, namely the possibility of biased or unfair assessment practices. Consequently, the arrival of Eloise’s exam paper on the couple’s kitchen table can be understood as posing a problem. Here, however, it is worked up in extreme terms; it is a menacing presence that threatens to ‘infect’ the couple if they so much as
‘look at’ or ‘touch’ the script. In the excerpt, it is the paper itself that is articulated as posing a risk of infection. However, since it is difficult to imagine this object occasioning so much consternation in the absence of Una and Eloise’s relationship, one might interpret the risk posed by the script as a proxy for that generated by the F-S relationship itself.

Interestingly, although Eloise uses the word ‘infected’ to express anxiety about the presence of the paper, her articulation of the possible consequences of Una going ahead and marking it are not constructed as compromising Eloise’s health but, rather, her university career. So, she surmises, she might have to re-sit the paper or, deploying an ECF, it ‘might all be over’ for her, and she may fail to obtain her degree. As I have already noted, the risks relationships pose to one’s career are usually bound up with the fate of the academic and not of the student, and thus Eloise’s framing of risk may be considered atypical. Una’s closing comments in which she says that she and Eloise needed a ‘hose down’ after the event, and that she wants to be ‘whiter than white’, index a need for purification following exposure to the risk presented by the infectious and polluting F-S relationship.

Similar expressions emerged in two other interviews. Delia and Tamsin both refer to themselves, respectively, as having felt ‘sullied’ or ‘tarnished’ by their involvement in relationships with lecturers. In neither case do these respondents report their experiences as being connected to concerns about their health or wellbeing; rather, they are articulated as causing a sort of short-lived ‘soil[ing]’ as Tamsin puts it, which she says, ‘wears off’ - as opposed to heals - ‘with time’. In a similar vein, the first sexual encounter between Professor Shales and Oregon - whom Shales has been employing as a part-time cleaner - in Fresh Meat is dramatized as culminating in both characters, and their surroundings, being left caked in food, drink, and make-up. Moreover, as their
relationship progresses they meet in ‘grubby’ hotels (Series 1, Episode 5). This helps to construct the relationship as dirty. However, at no point is Oregon’s character depicted as mentally or physically suffering. As already indicated, it is Shales who is portrayed as heartbroken and mentally fragile after the relationship ends.

Fresh Meat’s dramatization of F-S relationships leads me to one final notion concerning hygiene; that in which the ‘dirt’ engendered by the F-S relationship is presented not as contaminant but as stimulant. The relationship between Oregon and Shales is depicted as dirty but also as highly passionate and sexual. This resonates with the interview with Otis, in which he frequently refers to the ‘fling’ he had with lecturer, Caroline, as ‘dirty’.

For Otis, this is articulated as part of the allure of their relationship, rather than - or, perhaps, as well as - the horror of it. For example, at the start of the interview he asks me whether he should include ‘the dirty bits.’ Having told him to include whatever bits he wants to, Otis proceeds to tell me that Caroline was ‘absolutely filthy’, and later divulges that his friends liked him to talk about the relationship because they thought it ‘quite sordid really’. Indeed, some parts of the interview with Otis might be described as ‘pornographized’ (Wolf, 2003); Otis relates in some detail how the couple had sex on the campus grounds and in Caroline’s office, and how this added to the sense of filthiness he conjures up, imbuing the relationship with what he describes as a ‘thrill’.

The excitement conveyed through these constructions of the F-S relationship as dirty stimulant, as opposed to (only) contaminant, indexes the productive effects of this discourse. These are not dissimilar to those highlighted in relation to harassment discourse; in inscribing such relationships with the taboo of dirt (Douglas, 2002), they may become doubly desirable. Consequently, understandings of the F-S relationship in which it is associated with taint can, perhaps, render it ‘as tempting as it is condemned’,
Kristeva uses the term ‘abjection’ to describe the superego’s simultaneous and perverse repulsion by, and fascination or desire for, ‘horrors’ such as ‘filth’ (see also Brewis & Linstead, 2000; Tyler, 2011; Fotaki, 2011). Whilst I do not locate myself within the psychoanalytic tradition to which Kristeva’s work contributes, the concept captures something of the paradox of dirt as stimulant and contaminant that infuses certain framings of F-S relationships. It also complements Foucault’s dialectical conceptualization of pleasure and power outlined in Volume I of *The History of Sexuality*. Foucault’s rejection of psychoanalysis as the ‘science of sexuality’ (Foucault, 1978: 53) has led some to argue that Foucauldian thought and psychoanalysis are incommensurable (e.g. Eribon, 2003). However, others (e.g. Butler, 1997; Huffer, 2010) have identified synergies, and the example above perhaps indicates one complementarity.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter I have proposed that notions of health, safety, and hygiene are invoked to both problematize and de-problematize F-S relationships. I suggest that the mobilization of these related discourses is nuanced, relying on different techniques and producing multifarious effects.

In some cases, the techniques used may be understood as preserving the vestiges of sovereign and disciplinary power. This emerges most visibly where health and safety codes are referred to, and in policies’ detailing of conduct aimed at protecting the welfare of students. However, they also summon apparatuses of security and a precautionary logic, aimed at de-risking the university environment in order to avert or manage F-S relationships-as-contaminants. The invocation of care further indicates the presence of pastoral power, already discussed at some length in Chapter 9. Finally, they hint at the idea of ‘governing at a distance’ in their insistence that codes should not be
overly intrusive, and that the responsibilized academic subject should alleviate doubts about the appropriateness of relationships by seeking advice from various experts, including managers, HR, and counsellors.

Thus the power relations invoked by the discourses of health, safety, and hygiene appear less constraining than those considered in chapters 7, 8 and 9. Whilst they continue to deploy dividing practices separating academic from student - for example in the mobilization of a doctor-patient metaphor - this can have numerous effects, since the academic-as-doctor is afforded discretion with which to judge how duty of care may be discharged. This, in turn, enables notions of pedagogy as ‘healthy’ and erotically charged, and of the pedagogue as administering sex-as-therapy to the hysterical or naïve student.

Within such framings, the role of the university is also modified. Attempts to constrain sexual conduct through the use of interdiction, or to specify conduct through normalization and surveillance still operate, but their emphasis recedes. This is because they may be construed as undue interference, or intrusion, and thus understood as counter-productive. Instead, the university is constructed as guiding or steering the behaviour of its inhabitants in ways that promote healthy and sanitary practices and subjectivities. Importantly, it is the academic population in its entirety that now becomes the target of government, and not only the academic and student. Thus the discourses analysed here are both individualizing and totalizing, and suggest the presence of a ‘govern’ ‘mentality’ (Dean, 1999: 16).

Furthermore, discourses of health, safety and hygiene index the reflexive and agential capacities of agents to assess and manage risks, to modify or refine discourses, and to define their own positions in relation to them. This aspect of government is now further explored by analysing the mobilization of professional discourses.
Chapter 11

Professionalism: Ethics, oaths, and boundaries
It is for the protection of staff and students that the boundaries and moral obligations of the professional role of staff must be fully recognised and respected. This is seen as the responsibility of the staff member.

(Brenda Billingshurst, AUT women’s officer, *THE*, July 1995: *Newspaper article 2*, see Appendix 4)

It’s perfectly possible for me to be 100 per cent professional and be in a relationship with a student or a former student and...you know, I don’t see that being professional is incompatible with that or with ... having students as friends, boyfriends, girlfriends, whatever, so at the end of the day I think maybe it depends on what you mean when you say, ‘professional’.

(Sue: *Individual interview 5*, see Appendix 4)

**Introduction**

In the last chapter I proposed that discourses of health, safety, and hygiene offer a number of alternative understandings of F-S relationships and how they are deemed governable. Whilst relationships are often framed as negatively impacting students’
health, there are also suggestions that students and, more particularly, academics can and should exercise judgement in deciding how best to conduct themselves and minimise risks. They also shift the focus of government; attention moves away from the individuals involved in relationships and considers the wider impact on the academic population as a whole. For these reasons I have suggested that health, safety and hygiene discourses possess a governmental character.

This chapter examines how professional discourses operate. I analyse how notions of the professional academic can be invoked to exclude the possibility of F-S relationships. However, I also note how professionalism is worked up as a tacit principle, guiding the academic towards conduct that is articulated as ‘ethical’. Such formulations often foreground the notion of social trusteeship emphasized within some definitions of professionalism (Friedson, 1994; Brint, 1994). I contrast these with texts emphasizing the skill or craft dimensions of professionalism. These latter articulations, I propose, provide scope for relationships to be simultaneously professional and personal. In considering these alternative conceptualizations I navigate the differences between ethics as code, ethos, and practice which Foucault discusses in his later work (Foucault, 1985, 1994; see also Dean, 1994; Brewis, 1998a; Crane et al, 2008; Bardon & Josserand, 2011; McMurtry et al, 2011; Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013).

The chapter is organized as follows. I begin by considering the tethering of ‘professionalism’ to questions of ethics, noting that the conflation of professionalism with ethics is a common discursive practice. I then explore the techniques of governing summoned by policies as an illustration of code based ethics. This is followed by analysis of what are articulated as more personally derived credos, and of ethical practices. The distinctions highlighted are developed in the subsequent section on boundaries, where I analyse the deployment of two closely related but subtly different
metaphors; ‘crossing the line’ and ‘drawing the line’. Following this, I consider how oath formulations are expressed as a means for holding the academic accountable for her or his professional conduct in the name of self and others.

Lastly, I attend to accounts in which professionalism is expressed as compatible with F-S relationships. This emerges when interviewees reject the importance of distance and boundaries as principles governing academic life, foregrounding instead the collaborative nature of HE. Rather than deploying dividing practices to categorize and separate the inhabitants of HE, these framings construct the university as a community of learners (Neary & Winn, 2009). I conclude by highlighting how the ambiguity of the term ‘professionalism’ facilitates the deployment of diverse tactics and techniques in order to accomplish different ends.

The extracts selected are drawn from university policies, interview data, and CMD. The other genres of text studied did not extensively mobilize professional discourses.

**Professional ethics: Code, ethos, and practice**

In this section I consider how professionalism is constructed as a domain in which the sexual conduct of the academic and/or student is circumscribed by ethical or moral considerations. My analysis points to a framing of professionalism which has two dimensions. The first of these presupposes and formalizes the existence of an implicit and normative code of conduct, guiding the academic-as-professional in their relations with others. The second foregrounds notions of agency, reflexivity, and self-control in the practice of professional ethics. Thus, following Dean (1994) and Hunt (1999), I note that individuals are induced to be professional by others, but also articulate themselves as creating their own ethical and professional subjectivities.
This is not to imply that being called to act professionally by a code of conduct hinges solely on self-other relations, whilst expressing a personal imperative to act professionally works only through self-self relations. Rather, both involve a matrix-like understanding of relations between self and other, in which the conduct of conduct is a complex and multi-faceted enterprise. Within this matrix, ‘professionalism’, functioning as ethical *code*, critical *ethos*, and/or reflexive *practice*, is expressed as a fundamental aspect of the government of F-S relationships.

*Ethics as code*

The notion of ethics as code has been interpreted as a normative ethics which prescribes and proscribes certain ways of being, and thus offers ethical imperatives (Foucault, 1985; Brewis, 1998a; Willmott, 1998; Crane et al 2008). These imperatives may be deontological, which is to say that they assert moral duties, or teleological, meaning they foreground consequences, or whether an action will result in good or harm (Dean, 1994; Legge, 1998). Foucault suggests that code based moralities offer other imposed doctrines, but qualifies this by noting that they also comprise ‘a complex interplay of elements that counterbalance and correct one another, and cancel each other out, thus providing for compromises and loopholes’ (1985: 25). Thus whilst codes offer a prescriptive ensemble, this ensemble is not always coherent or systematic. This qualification is illuminated by my analysis of data invoking professional and ethical concerns.

The elision of professional and ethical conduct is a prevalent feature of the policy data. For instance, exhortations that ‘*Staff should recognise a professional and ethical responsibility to protect the interests of students*’ (see universities of Manchester, Reading, Chichester, Cambridge, Central Lancashire, Goldsmiths, and Exeter) index ethical and professional duties and responsibilities. However, the detail of what it means
to act professionally or ethically is seldom explicated by these policies. Rather, acting ethically is vaguely conveyed as being about protecting student interests. Thus whilst such statements appear deontological, they also recall the often ambiguous protectionist and precautionary logics associated with pastoral and governmental modes of government, which I considered in chapters 9 and 10.

The possibility of conflicting interests is emphasized by the University of Kent, which asserts that ‘situations can arise where personal interests conflict with ethical, job or professional requirements’. Here the ‘requirement’ to be ethical is assumed to accompany job/professional requirements, and is opposed with ‘personal interests’. This has the effects of conflating professional and ethical concerns, and of implying that professionalism and ethics are impersonal or disinterested. I return to the notion of professionalism as impersonal shortly. For now, I want to suggest that collapsing distinctions between professionalism and ethics is a prevalent feature of the corpus; where it is evident in the texts analysed below I employ the term ‘professional-ethical’ to draw attention to the tactic.

In Extract 29 I explore how the University of Cambridge’s relationships policy similarly encourages academics and, to a lesser extent, students to acknowledge professional-ethical requirements. This leads me to further consider the meaning(s) attached to professional-ethical conduct. The extract provided is relatively lengthy; I include the policy in almost its entirety because references to being professional pepper the text so liberally. This affords numerous opportunities to unpick the truth effects of its invocation. It also offers the reader a more comprehensive rendering of a policy document than has hitherto been provided.

**Extract 29: University of Cambridge relationships policy (Policy 5)**

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The University of Cambridge regards the *professional* relationship between a member of staff and a student as critical to the student's educational development. *Professional* relationships are those involving teaching, learning, assessment, selection, advising on research, mentoring and other forms of personal support, administrative oversight and other technical advice and expertise. This policy covers situations where the *professional* relationship develops a romantic or sexual aspect. Any romantic or sexual relationship between a member of staff and a student raises serious questions of conflict of interest and equality of treatment. They may damage the teaching and learning environment for other students and staff, and may pose a risk to the University's reputation.

Implicit in the *professional* role of members of staff is a moral obligation to ensure that such conflicts of interest and risks do not arise, and that relationships with students for whom the staff member has direct responsibility in any way remain strictly *professional* in nature. Staff members have a *professional* and ethical responsibility to protect the interest of students in this way, to respect the trust inherent in the relationship, and accept the constraints.

Members of staff are obliged not to enter into any romantic or sexual relationship with a student whom they are responsible for teaching, assessing, advising or supporting; nor to accept any new responsibility for a student with whom they have an existing relationship of this kind. The University recognises however that such relationships do nevertheless develop occasionally, sometimes of long duration. In such circumstances, the staff member has an ethical duty to notify a superior (such as the Senior Tutor or President) of the situation in confidence. This person will try to assess the best means of protecting the interests of both parties, consulting in confidence as necessary for this purpose; wherever practicable, the outcome will involve the removal of the staff member from direct *professional* responsibility for and contact with the student. [emphasis added]

Without wanting to fall back on the logic of content analysis, this policy is notable for its heavy repetition of the term ‘*professional*’, which appears seven times in the excerpt provided. Consequently, professionalism is a clear focal point for the policy’s framing of F-S relationships; to paraphrase the opening lines of the policy, it can be regarded as ‘*critical*’ to understanding how such relationships are framed as objects of government.
Like those referred to earlier, Cambridge’s policy explicitly connects professional and ethical responsibilities. As already indicated, these dual responsibilities are often presented in the policy data as ‘implicit’ or ‘inherent’ so that their relevance is accorded an a priori inevitability. Thus rather than being clearly defined and/or understood as open to contestation or debate, staff are enjoined in Extract 29 to ‘accept the constraints’ of their position (see also Goldsmiths University, and the University of Exeter). The nature of these constraints and obligations are fleshed out in the Cambridge policy, although as Foucault suggests is often the case with moral codes, they are not always ‘plainly set forth’ (1985: 25).

One obligation relates to the preservation of the ‘strictly professional’ nature of relationships between staff and student\(^6\). Professional relationships, we have been told, are those involving; “teaching, learning, assessment, selection, advising on research, mentoring and other forms of personal support, administrative oversight and technical advice”. This series of activities chimes with those presented in Extract 1 (Chapter 7), where the responsibilities of tutors were outlined by the UCU. In both extracts academic work is explicated by referring to a series of tasks performed by the academic. However, whereas Extract 1 detailed the academic’s responsibilities as part of a construction of her/him as powerful, in Extract 29 they highlight professionalism as an activity involving ‘expertise’. Furthermore professionalism is articulated as something which needs to be actively preserved to enable the academic to fulfil his or her work as expert. This distinguishes it from Extract 1, in which a power differential was presumed and a priori.

The policy also hints at trusteeship by alluding to ‘personal support’. Professional relationships are expressed as being guided by a ‘moral obligation’ to avoid ‘risks and conflicts of interest’. These risks are presented as jeopardising ‘equality of treatment’;
possibly causing ‘damage’ to the ‘teaching and learning environment for other students and staff’; and placing the ‘reputation of the university’ at ‘risk’. Thus they invoke precautionary principles; the forecasting of potential catastrophe(s), and the need to proceed with caution in order to prevent students, colleagues, and the university itself from being compromised.

Professionalism is also expressed as being informed by a normative ethical agenda. This agenda alights on a consequentialist or teleological logic by seeking to minimize ‘damage’, but also recalls deontic moral imperatives by constructing the academic as ‘oblige[d]’ to avoid involvement in F-S relationships, irrespective of the consequences. Thus, rather than providing a set of coherent moral precepts, the policy suggests that academic conduct may be guided by applying vaguely established, complex, and sometimes contradictory ethical frameworks.

Despite its emphasis on constraints, the policy concedes that ‘relationships do nevertheless develop occasionally, sometimes of long duration’. When relationships do occur, remedial measures are thus available to secure the environment from damage. These include the removal of ‘professional responsibility for and contact with the student’. As with the Kent policy alluded to earlier, this indicates the need to separate the personal from the professional. It also evinces a mode of government that is permissive or ‘lets things happen’, which Foucault (2009) maintains is characteristic of governmentality. In a further hybridization of consequentialist and deontic logic, the staff member is also advised that if s/he does become involved, s/he is duty bound to disclose the relationship to a ‘superior’ in order to facilitate a resolution which can ‘protect […] both parties’. This recalls pastoral relations and confessional techniques.

My analysis of Cambridge’s policy should not be read as implying that it does not rely upon, or work as, a technology of domination. Although the policy does not explicitly
state that F-S relationships are unprofessional and/or unethical *per se*, the possibility of them being understood as such is heavily implied. Consequently, whilst relationships are not forbidden, there appears to be a good measure of normalizing judgement being exercised here since, as Dent and Whitehead persuasively argue, ‘no-one wishes to be labelled unprofessional’ (2002: 3). Thus the ‘appeal to professionalism’ (Fournier, 1999: 280) set out in the policy is perhaps ‘supra-hortative’ (Palmer, 2001) - in other words, it strongly urges. It stops short of prohibitive and prescriptive assertions, instead relying on a mixture of tactics and principles to guide professional-ethical conduct.

*Ethics as ethos*

My analysis above considers how the advice offered by policy documents construct the academic as being induced to act ethically. However, the invocation of professional-ethical principles may also accompany notions of the professional as agential and self-directing. Within some corpus texts academics are more audibly positioned as exercising discretion and judgement in their relationships with students. This shift often accompanies articulations of professional integrity.

One such example is evident in the personal relationships policies of the universities of Roehampton and Lincoln. Both of these insert identical caveats in their policy wording, which reads; *The policy depends for its action on the professional integrity of staff, the maturity of students and the good judgement and common sense of managers, and these qualities are always likely to be a more effective guarantee of probity than any set of rules*. This statement implies that inducements to act professionally may be excessive and unnecessary. ‘Probity’, read here as the quality of being morally sound or upright, is constructed as the result of actions which frame subjects as self-directing. So, the academic acts according to her or his ‘professional integrity’; the student - in a direct
challenge to infantilizing discourses - through her or his ‘maturity’; and the manager through her or his ‘common sense’ and ‘judgement’.

This is somewhat paradoxical, since Roehampton and Lincoln have published a set of ‘rules’ or guidelines, which they then appear to suggest are superfluous - an accomplishment which perhaps acknowledges what Rose et al (2006: 84), following Foucault’s exposition of the liberal art of government, refer to as the problem of ‘excessive government’. In other words, there appears to be recognition here that rules and codes on sexual relationships may come across as cumbersome and overly constraining. Instead, something akin to what Bardon and Josserand (2011: 510) refer to as a ‘prescribed asceticism’, encouraging academics and students to engage in ethical ‘project[s] of self’ (Grey, 1994: 479; see also Crane et al, 2008: 299) are outlined.

The insertion of this caveat in the two aforementioned policies draws attention to the interplay between codes and the more reflexive or practical elements of ethics that I now turn to. To this end, I explore data drawn primarily from interviews, highlighting further tensions and complementarities between professional-ethical considerations invoked as code, ethos, or practice(s).

A number of interview respondents marshalled professional-ethical duties in their articulations of F-S relationships. One such example emerges in the interview with Tamsin, who had a brief relationship with her lecturer, Mark, as an undergraduate. The extract, taken from a longer discussion about how F-S relationships should be regulated, jostles with different understandings of what it means to act professionally and/or ethically.
Extract 30: Interview with Tamsin (Individual interview 8)

J: So… how do you think universities should deal with these kind of things…flings or even…more longstanding relationships?

T: Um [1] I guess I see it as… not black and white an’ so… it is more a grey area… an’…yeah, maybe there has to be like a code or something, but in the main that’s to protect the university an’ like… cover their backs? But actually probably it comes down to how scrupulous you are, an’ I think Mark would have had…no qualms at all really about what he was doing, an’…he couldn’t have given a shit basically, even if there was a code, you know? ‘Move on to the next one’. Uh… but I don’t think most lecturers are like that…they’d be…have more professional integrity, and… because actually universities are bound to attract people who think deeply about things, an’… about what they do…how it affects other people, so hopefully that means they behave a bit better, on the whole. They take kind of…a more moral stance or like…have moral values. I mean…my brother’d be [1] he has very strong views on it, an’ his policy is… if you fancy a student you wait till they’ve graduated before [2] letting anything develop.

Tamsin’s interview picks up the double thread of professionalism and ethics which suffuses the data. However, she constructs these related concepts as governing less through observance of a university ordained ‘code’, which she frames primarily as protection or insurance of universities’ interests, and more through the academic’s possession of ‘professional integrity’ and the adoption of a ‘moral stance’ or ‘moral values’.

One effect of Tamsin’s distinction between a code and a moral stance is to further question the notion that professional-ethical judgements can be legislated for or codified. Tamsin suggests that the existence of a code would have made no difference in her case, since Mark lacked ‘professional integrity’ or, to put it more bluntly, ‘couldn’t have given a shit’. This attitude is, however, constructed by her as atypical; most lecturers, she suggests, are more ‘scrupulous’ than Mark (see also the quotation from Will on page 232 for a further invocation of being ‘scrupulous’).
Tamsin deploys an evidential modality to corroborate this idea. First, she suggests that the university is an environment populated by people who ‘think deeply’. Second, she refers to her brother, himself a young academic, as having a personal ‘policy’ on the issue of F-S relationships. The result of this marshalling of evidence is to construct ‘better behaved’ academics, exemplified perhaps by her brother, as independently and reflexively conducting themselves in ways that enact morality and professional identity. For Tamsin’s brother, having relationships with current students is against his ‘policy’. However, ‘fancying’ a student, and waiting to have a relationship with her or him upon graduation, is not. Consequently Tamsin does not attend to concerns about ‘grooming’ students, which I noted in Chapter 8.

Something akin to Tamsin’s brother’s policy is suggested by a number of other interviewees. For instance, Sally, one of the interviewees participating in the group interview with female academics, expressed how she might react if she developed feelings for a student; ‘I would say to myself...’C’mon an’ save yourself a load of grief [...] wait till he’s not your student’.” As discussed in Extract 8, David Kepesh also refers to a similar approach in The Dying Animal, referring to ‘one set rule of some fifteen years standing that I never break’. However, Kepesh’s approach is expressly connected to the introduction of disciplinary measures and the possibility of being perceived as a harasser, and thus I interpret it as other induced. In contrast, the interviewees cited above articulate waiting policies as something more personally derived. Thus they might be understood as constitutive elements of a personal ‘ethos’ (Foucault, 1984: 374; Kelly 2009: 147), whereby professional integrity involves the action of self upon self.
One interviewee, Hannah, provides a different take on the idea that parties wait until the student has graduated before embarking on a relationship. She told me ‘Some might say, “Well, wait until you’ve graduated,” but [...] sustaining a relationship that isn’t suspicious...you know, it’s hard work ‘cause how could you sustain that kind of close contact with somebody when there’s no real relationship going on? Either people would just assume and say, “Oh, it’s going on,” or...I don’t think you could keep it going’. Hannah thus presents waiting policies as problematic. Maintaining close contact without a ‘real’ relationship developing is ‘hard work’, which may ultimately prove unsustainable; either the relationship is likely to develop a romantic or sexual aspect before the student graduates, or it will fizzle out. Consequently, Hannah constructs the professional-ethical stance adopted by the likes of Tamsin’s brother and David Kepesh as involving a difficult and practical dimension; the problem of ‘keep[ing] it going’.

This problem is tricky because it is expressed as jarring with normative constructions of being professional-ethical, in which ‘close contact’ between academic and student is framed as arousing suspicion and thus potentially denting an individual’s professional-ethical reputation in the eyes of the other, if not of the self. I return to this idea shortly in my consideration of the ‘labour of division’ (Fournier, 2000: 69) involved in boundary work. Here, I want to draw attention to the notion of ethics as activity or work. As highlighted by the works of Dean (1994), Clegg et al (2007), and Weiskopf & Willmott (2013), amongst others, professional-ethical conduct as laid out in a code, or as developed into a personal policy or ethos, are abstractions without an understanding of professional-ethical conduct as a practice.

Returning toExtract 29, this notion of ethical work is detectable in the remedial measures suggested by the University of Cambridge in order to remove ‘professional
Responsibility’ or ‘contact’ between those who have become involved in F-S relationships. However, the work is to be done by a third party - the ‘senior tutor’ or ‘president’ - in order to ‘protect the interests’ of various stakeholders. This imbues it with a pastoral and/or governmental character. As alluded to in Chapter 9, some policy documents further recommend that a counsellor, wellbeing advisor, or HR professional may be called upon in instances where academics are unsure about whether or not to disclose information pertaining to F-S relationships. In a section entitled ‘When in doubt’, Reading University’s policy advises staff to contact a line manager or one of the aforementioned support services in order to discuss ‘the slightest doubt’ they might have and to ‘clarify their thoughts and feelings’. Such practices are articulated as a way of addressing ‘suspicions’ about the behaviour of others and ‘indeed of [the academic’s] own behaviour’. The idea of suspicion suggests a potential danger or risk, which must be identified, discussed, and mitigated via hermeneutics of self (Foucault, 1993, 2005) and through confessional practices. Again then, we have the notion of ethics as harnessing academics’ self-governing capacities under the guidance of another.

In contrast, Hannah suggests that the difficult work to be done is performed by the academic and student, who will struggle to achieve the fine balance between remaining close, but not so close as to appear ‘suspicious’. If we follow Foucault’s notion of ethics (e.g. 1994, 1985, 2005) Hannah’s suggestion that the work involved in avoiding suspicion is hard to sustain is consistent with notions of ‘asceticism’, understood as a deliberate and often agonistic action of self upon self, or ‘the forming of oneself as ethical subject’ (Foucault, 1985: 28). Such work need not involve self-denial, as suggested in the Christian version of asceticism, but is always aimed at some end goal or telos. In the texts analysed above asceticism does seem to incorporate self-denial, and is aimed at the production of professional-ethical conduct, and the preservation of ‘integrity’.
Professional Boundaries: Crossing the line or drawing a line?

Having begun to explore the idea of the professional-ethical formation of the subject as ‘work’, I now consider how boundary work is implicated in the government of F-S relationships. I focus on the analysis of two metaphors which re-occur in the interview data; *crossing* the line and *drawing* the line. The former, I propose, conceptualizes F-S relationships as conduct transgressing professional boundaries, which are either formally codified, or normatively prescribed. The latter, meanwhile, indicates that the erection of boundaries is a personal project of self (Grey, 1994; Crane et al, 2008). Thus understood, orientations to F-S relationships may be interpreted as invoking different modes of subjectivation, in which more or less importance may be attached to externally imposed rules or customs (Foucault, 1985: 27).

My analysis of boundary work begins with an examination of how the metaphor of ‘crossing the line’ is deployed. Extract 31 reprises the interview with Una and Eloise, who I introduced in Extract 28.

**Extract 31: Interview with Una & Eloise (Couple interview 2)**

U: We do recognise that there’s boundaries though, don’t we? ‘Cause…you’ve got to accept that there are limits…so we *don’t* tend to mix with each other’s *friends* much (2) socially.

E: Well, I mean…choosing to go out with a bunch of *lecturers* over choosing to go out with a bunch of *students* sort of…would *separate* me from the crowd. And… it’s not that I’m that *bothered* about being the black sheep, it’s just (2) in order to make this more *normal* for me, and normal for my … not so much my *friends*, but definitely my *classmates*, so they accept it, I try and keep it as …under the radar, and try and keep our personal life our personal life, and our *professional* life our professional life. So, you know… we don’t flaunt it and we wouldn’t *kiss* or hold *hands* an’ stuff like that at uni’… there’s a *definite* line there that neither of us would cross [U nods in agreement] an’ so we keep it strictly professional.
In this excerpt Eloise’s and Una both deploy the language of normalization in order to articulate their negotiation and preservation of ‘boundaries’. Whilst neither of them specify where the ‘boundaries’, ‘limits’, or ‘line’ they refer to emanate from, there are suggestions that they are pre-existing and/or other imposed. For example, Una utilises language similar to that deployed in the policy data examined earlier, which urged the inhabitants of academe to accept ‘professional constraints’. Indeed, her assertion that, ‘you’ve got to accept that there are limits’, seems to strengthen what is articulated in policy documents via a hortative modality by deploying an imperative one; it is no longer the case that one should or ought to accept limits, but rather one has ‘got to’.

The couple’s observance of limits is brought to life through a discussion of their social interactions. Following on from Una’s assertion that the two seldom mix with each other’s friends, Eloise details her reasoning for not ‘choosing to go out with a bunch of lecturers’. In so doing, she constructs the normal student as one who goes out with other students, and establishes going out with lecturers as abnormal – something which would position her as a ‘black sheep’, ‘separate’ her from her classmates, and undermine the extent to which they ‘accept’ her. As such, her account constructs a social boundary between students and lecturers which she monitors in the name of ‘normality’ for others – her ‘classmates’ and, to a lesser extent, ‘friends’ - and also for herself.

The couple’s emphasis on boundaries is underlined by Eloise’s articulation of a division between ‘personal’ and ‘professional’ life, a tactic I considered earlier in the chapter. Eloise states that the couple would not kiss or hold hands whilst on campus in order to keep the relationship ‘under the radar’. Some similarities might be drawn here between her espousal of such a position and the references to ‘hiding’ which Linda spoke of in Extract 22. However, whilst Linda justified ‘hiding’ Edward as part of a denial that the relationship was serious, Eloise appears to be doing something different; Una and Eloise
are serious about their relationship, and elsewhere in the interview they orient to a long
term future and having children together.

Instead, Eloise expresses the couple’s approach as part of a desire not to ‘flaunt’ the
relationship, which is aligned with a ‘strictly professional’ mode of being. Taken
alongside her demarcation of the ‘personal’ and ‘professional’, this reference constructs
the couple as being able to maintain professionalism despite the existence of their
relationship, as long as they are discreet. A similar notion of professionalism as
necessitating discreet conduct emerges in the policy data; for instance, the University of
Gloucestershire states that it ‘expects that the individuals involved [in F-S relationships]
will behave professionally and with discretion in the course of their employment e.g.
whilst in University or on field trips’.

As with Una’s earlier remarks, Eloise’s words suggest that the line between the
professional and the personal is pre-existing and other directed. So, the line is ‘there’,
and is observed, maintained, and reinforced through Una and Eloise’s refusal to cross it.
In this sense Eloise and Una construct themselves as the docile subjects of professional
discourses that insert *prima facie* boundaries between personal and professional
conduct.

A similar framing of lines and boundaries as normative and codified emerged
elsewhere. For example, in the chat-room data following Terrence Kealey’s piece in the
*THE*, which I discussed in Chapter 8, one participant comments ‘*I absolutely think
codes of ethics and professional boundaries are crossed when faculty engage in sexual
relationships with their students btw*’ (Javier, 19/09/2009, *THE*). Opening with an ECF,
this post more explicitly constructs the crossing of ‘boundaries’ as infringing a pre-
existing ‘code’ than Eloise and Una do. In so doing, it provides another example of the
conflation of professional and ethical conduct that I noted earlier in the chapter. It also
further evinces the use of the agent-patient distinction to articulate relationships, constructing faculty as active and agential, and students as passive objects or possessions.

I now turn to texts that present boundary work in a different light. Rather than articulating professional boundaries as emanating from formal codes or social norms, they are articulated as the product of ethical actions accompanying personal projects of self. Extract 32 offers an illustration of how what I read as a more ascetic version of professional boundary work can be accounted for. The extract reproduces part of my interview with Anne, who had been involved in a F-S relationship with her lecturer, Jim, when she was a mature MA student, and has since become an academic herself.

**Extract 32: Interview with Anne (Individual interview 9)**

I: But do you…think…feel differently about it now, or do you…?

A: Well…interestingly, when I finished my degree, an’ got a job in academia […] Um… I swore…an’ I vowed to myself…I made a mental note that I would never do it.

I: No?

A: An’ I never have [smiles] an’ I don’t quite know (2) why. But (2) I…I would no more have dreamt of having a relationship with a student once I became an academic than fly. Relationships with other tutors and colleagues? Yes. But not students, no. An’ there was a sense of…I wanted to be professional, and […] that was partly a moral thing. An’ my [laughs]… my friends used to talk about it (2) an’ say, ‘Oh, God, how do you…ya’ know, how do you resist? All those wonderful nubile young men? It must be a real temptation’. An’ I’d be, ‘Well actually, no, it isn’t at all.’

I: And …has it never been?

A: No.

I: You’ve…never thought…?

A: No. No…never let it cross my mind. Even when they’ve been… attractive young men. I have a very (2) I’m very good at putting up my veneer. And… the way you talk
to people, or…your body language…I’m acutely aware of that, an’ I just…I’ve learned to put the screen down [assumes blank expression and moves hand over face in downward vertical motion]. It’s a professional relationship, and…[loud] In fact I get really uncomfortable when some students, who…sit too close to me, or stand too close to me… I immediately pull back. I’m uncomfortable when…students get close. And afterwards I’ll be, “OK, gonna keep my distance there”. And it’s… it’s never been a problem…so I don’t get myself into those positions because…I’ve drawn a line, an’ I make that line very clear.

Anne accounts for her actions here using some of the language identified elsewhere in the thesis. So, for example, she dismisses the notion of students presenting a temptation, which was discussed in Chapter 9. Her references to swearing and vowing to herself might also be understood as having religious connotations. I attend to the concept of the vow or oath as a means of government in more detail in the subsequent section of this chapter. Below, I further unpack how Anne constructs her position on relationships as a project of self.

Throughout her interview and in the extract above, Anne constructs her position on F-S relationships as one produced without reference to rule. Elsewhere in the interview she points out that she had not experienced censure when, as a student, she became romantically involved with her own lecturer. Furthermore, there is no suggestion of adherence to prescribed rules and policies, or consideration of the disapprobation of others in the construction of her own need to ‘keep a distance’ from students. Rather, her position is expressed as the cultivation of a self-styled moral and professional identity; it is something Anne desires and has been able to choose for herself, although she says she does not ‘quite know why’ this is.

It may be that Anne’s conduct has been influenced by others more substantially than her account indicates. This would be unsurprising since self-practices are, as Foucault points out, just one of a range of techniques of government which ‘hardly ever function
separately’ (Foucault, 2000: 225). Thus the art of existence is always bound up with the connections that one ‘can and should establish with others’ (Foucault, 1986: 238; see also Brewis, 1998a). Nonetheless, Anne’s articulation of her conduct evinces a possibility of framing conduct towards F-S relationships as a personally styled and reflexive ethos, which gives rise to a set of emergent practices.

Regarding these practices, which are expressed as a series of concrete or ‘real behaviours’ (Foucault, 1985: 25), Anne catalogues the activities via which, she suggests, she has successfully navigated the ‘problem’ of relationships with students. She distinguishes workplace relationships she would consider entering into (with ‘colleagues’) from those she would not (with ‘students’). Here, her account suggests a process of sorting the acceptable from the unacceptable, evoked by the question and answer format in which her response is formulated. I read this part of her account as reminiscent of Foucault’s metaphor of the miller sorting through grain, to differentiate the ‘good’ from the ‘bad’ (1993: 217). Foucault refers to this metaphor as illustrating a kind of sifting of thought and feeling, which he maintains is characteristic of Christian practices of self-examination and the hermeneutics of self.

Like the accounts explored earlier, the activities Anne refers to are repeatedly worked up around the metaphor of a ‘line’. However, in showing that the line is something she works upon to make ‘clear’, and in referring to it as a ‘screen’ or ‘veneer’, it is presented by Anne as an artifice; it is not something natural, obvious, or given, as Eloise and Javier seemed to indicate earlier. Rather, it is something which must be ‘drawn’ and constantly worked upon by, for example, reflecting upon and modifying one’s talk and ‘body language’. Sustaining this line or veneer involves a continuous monitoring of self - notice the use of ‘never let it cross’ rather than ‘never crossed’ - in conditions which Anne acknowledges, through her allusion to ‘really attractive young men’, might be
perceived as testing. Consequently, I also read Anne as presenting herself as a stock-taker of her own actions (Foucault, 1993); she holds herself to account by examining her actions in relation to her self-styled moral and professional values.

Something similar emerges in one of the fictional accounts studied. In *The Corrections*, Chip Lambert looks back on a scene - referred to earlier in the thesis (see p.135) – in which his student, Melissa, makes a pass at him. Franzen writes of his protagonist: ‘He carefully examined every word he’d said, and he gave himself an A for correctness’ (2002: 59). However, this act of self-examination is immediately preceded by a reference to the university’s code which Chip summons to justify his rejection of Melissa; ‘“Code,” he said, pulling free, “There’s a code”’(58). Thus, whilst Anne and Chip both articulate their actions as involving self-control, Chip appears far more attentive to the ‘prescriptive elements that make up the code’ (Foucault, 1985: 26). In contrast, Anne does not position herself as having acted in compliance with an externally imposed precept. In this way, what Foucault terms the ‘mode of subjectivation’ (1985: 25; 2000: 264), in order to denote how one orients to rules, appears to differ markedly for Anne and Chip; Chip is attentive to the code, whilst Anne attends to her mental note and/or vow.

There are suggestions that, to an extent, Anne’s disposition has become ingrained. So, she says that when students get too close, ‘*I immediately pull back*’. Moreover, sex with students is not only banished from thought, it does not enter dreams. Anne’s assertion that she would ‘*no more have dreamt*’ of having such a relationship ‘*than fly*’ has two functions: first, it works against possible interpretations that her stance on relationships with students might be some sort of repressed desire; second, it indexes the ridiculousness or impossibility of Anne entering into such a relationship.
The ease Anne conveys in deploying these techniques may be interpreted as undermining the notion of her ethos as something she must work upon in order to sustain; if sex with students is impossible, is not repressed, and is easy to avoid, one might infer that this is not an aspect of herself which requires ethical work. However, if one considers Foucault’s comment that a successful ethos is one in which principles have been memorized and practised to such an extent that they come to speak spontaneously, ‘like the master who silences his dogs with a single command’ (1994: 6), Anne’s statement is compatible with Foucauldian notions of ethical work, since the techniques of self-mastery become habitual.

It is worth considering further how the boundary work articulated by Eloise and Una, Hannah, and Anne configures professional-ethical discourses as means of governing F-S relationships. Fournier (2000: 75) has suggested that boundary work involves a ‘labour of division’ through which professionals are set above, apart, or ‘isolated’ from their clients. In the texts examined above we hear allusions to such labours, and although there are no explicit references to students as ‘clients’ it is perhaps possible to infer a professional-client relationship from the texts. Moreover, in the case of Chip Lambert it emerges that these are labours for which one can be awarded - or one can award oneself - a grade. Boundary work therefore operates on a number of levels: it can involve disciplinary and examinatorial techniques (Hoskin & Macve, 1995) and dividing practices; and it can incorporate various technologies of self. In this sense it points to the intersection of techniques of domination and of self that comprise government (Foucault, 1991b, 1993, 2000; Dean, 1994).

As with many of the discourses examined thus far, discourses of professionalism can have the effect of undermining possible connections between students and academics, instead inserting a gap between them. Consequently, closeness may be construed as
suspicious, indiscreet, or as causing discomfort. Thus whilst discourses of professionalism may not present the F-S relationship as eliciting the same ‘dangers’ as some of the discursive themes hitherto examined, they nonetheless frame them as relationships to be approached with caution.

**Oath formulations**

I now want to return briefly to the concept of the vow or oath, which Anne’s account introduced. As I discussed in Chapter 4, universities have a long established history of oath taking practices. I proposed then that oaths of matriculation and vows of celibacy enthralled the student and academic into a relationship of obedience with the university, crown, and god, thus indicating pastoral, sovereign, and disciplinary power relations. Here, I want to consider how else they might frame relations of power.

Agamben’s (2010) archaeology of the oath emphasises how the oath implicates the self. He suggests that oaths work as acts of veridiction, binding us to ourselves – perhaps in the eyes of a higher authority or God – so that in failing to keep to them, it is our self-hood which is placed at risk. Agamben also argues that the oath should not be understood as a religious phenomenon, since its use predates religion; rather it is a linguistic phenomenon that has come to be applied in religious and legal contexts – the two foci of the professional complex (Hoskin, 1986). In Anne’s interview the idea of the vow as a technique of self is accentuated, since no higher authority calls her to account, and her vow of abstinence is made only to herself.

Oath or vow-like formulations appeared on three other occasions in the corpus. In the undergraduate group interview Tyrone suggests that academics should be ‘cautious’ about relationships with students, ‘because...you made an oath kinda thing...to uphold the standards of teaching’. Later on in the same interview Gill says; ‘It’s like with the
Hippocratic oath ...you’re protecting the reputation of the profession’. In a similar vein, John, the academic protagonist in Oleanna, specifies his orientation to teaching thus; ‘When I found I loved to teach I swore that I would not become that cold, rigid automaton of an instructor which I had encountered as a child [...] I’m a teacher. I am a teacher. Eh? It’s my name on the door, and I teach the class, and that’s what I do [...] I have a responsibility...to myself, to my son, to my profession.’ (Mamet, 2001: 34).

In each of these three short excerpts the importance of HE as a professional undertaking is foregrounded by vows which are expressed as guiding academic behaviour. Thus it is not only the self but also academia as a whole which is placed at risk by failure to keep to one’s oath or promise, even if this oath is articulated as a personal one (Anne and John) or is metaphorical (Tyrone and Gill). Thus the oath can be understood as a tactic that commits one to truth, and as having both individualizing and totalizing effects.

**Personal and Professional**

In Oleanna, John’s vow - ‘I swore’ - incorporates an attitude to teaching that departs from the somewhat detached view of the educator that Anne constructs. In this final section of analysis I want to consider two further accounts in which closeness between academic and student is de-problematized, so that developing more intimate relationships either does not threaten, or perhaps even enhances, academic professionalism. I begin by analysing an extract taken from the interview with Otis who, in reflecting on his attraction to his former lecturer, Caroline, considers what made her a good ‘teacher’.

**Extract 33: Interview with Otis (Individual interview 10)**

J: And...can you tell me a bit more about [Caroline]...what she was like and sort of...what first attracted you?
O: Uh...she was really friendly and approachable an’ like... let you in on all her personal stuff so you felt like you...properly knew her as a person (1) which was pretty unusual an’ most of my lecturers weren’t like that but ...were more guarded about their personal lives. An’ I don’t think...it didn’t make her a worse teacher, if anything it made her a better one, so (1) I think...you can be mates... lecturers and students can be mates, and talk about that kind of thing and (1) that connection definitely makes you... more interested in what you’re learning, an’ makes going to lectures more fun, so I would see it as a good thing, definitely. An’ maybe some people would see how she acted as... maybe less professional? But... I just thought it was a nice thing, an’ didn’t negatively impact her professionalism at all in terms of teaching us... an’ in fact probably benefited it. But anyway (1) we were both unattached, both single, and kinda (1) up for it [laughs] ... there was nothing wrong with it like (2) morally...an’ getting together just felt like an extension of how she was with everyone, an’... so no different to any other relationship really.

Otis’s account explicitly questions the idea that closeness between academic and student should be considered ‘morally’ problematic. He rejects the notion that Caroline’s approachability and friendliness towards him and other students should be perceived as ‘less professional’, although he concedes that ‘some people’ might perceive it in this light. Instead, he articulates the establishment of a ‘connection’ with students as an aid to good teaching and learning, which makes lectures ‘more fun’ and stimulates students’ interest. There are similarities between this extract and that analysed in Chapter 10, where academic Sam talked of the ‘spark’ underpinning good pedagogy. For Otis, the act of being close and sharing ‘personal stuff’ positively impacts student engagement, which, in turn, enables academic professionalism. In this respect his account foregrounds the craft elements of academic professionalism (Brint, 1994; Barry et al, 2001) rather than positioning the academic as a skilled but detached professional or trustee. Thus Otis suggests that academics can be simultaneously personal and professional.

This challenges the demarcation between the personal and the professional which emerged in the policy documents and interview data analysed earlier in this chapter,
where professionalism seemed to be worked up as implicitly impersonal. It also goes some way towards removing the gap between academic and student by suggesting that the two can be ‘mates’. Finally, having tackled both of these concerns, it presents his relationship with Caroline and, by extension the possibility of the F-S relationship in general, as being like ‘any other relationship’. In other words, Otis’s account normalizes such relationships.

Having considered these features of Otis’s account, I now focus on an excerpt taken from the interview with Sue, which also musters the personal and the professional to frame academic professionalism. Sue’s statement about the possibility of students and academics being ‘friends’, which I presented on p. 259 as a preface to this chapter, echoes Otis’s account. Like Otis, she questions what is expressed as a taken-for-granted incompatibility between being professional and becoming involved in a F-S relationship. Moreover, Sue hints at the capacity of professionalism to generate multiple meanings, thereby becoming a ‘floating signifier’ (Mausethagen & Granlund, 2012: 826).

Elsewhere in her interview Sue makes further comments which I consider instructive in understanding how alternative conceptualizations of professionalism may be invoked to frame F-S relationships. In my analysis of Extract 34 I highlight the processes of ethical self-formation her account evokes.

**Extract 34: Interview with Sue (Individual interview 5)**

S: When I started this job I wasn’t all that much older than most of the students… very close in terms of age and outlook (1) But I think in a way… I’ve tried to hold on to that, ya’ know? An’ not lose it, because it informs how I am and how I want to be (1) an’ I am totally committed to trying to be the best educator I can be…you know… relating to students as people, building really productive an’ collaborative relationships with them, an’ also… finding ways for them to relate to and engage with the subject […] an’ if doing that means barriers come crashing down that’s OK, that’s fine with me (2) My
responsibility is to make sure some fab’ learning’s going on, and… obviously that is for the students… but actually in an important way it’s for me because… you know, the worst thing someone could say to me… professionally would be, “Oh…she’s rubbish… a really rubbish teacher (1) stiff an’ boring”. I’d be (2) that’d be a real slur… an’ it’d blot my sense of professional identity, but… someone saying I’m a bit dodgy ‘cause I live with a student…ex-student? I wouldn’t really care.

As with Anne, Sue articulates closeness with students as a matter for personal reflection, and again this appears to be aimed, at least in part, at the production of professional identity. However, instead of casting closeness as a problem to be banished, as Anne does, it is loss of closeness which Sue works against, and it is this problematic upon which she says she must work to maintain her sense of ‘professional identity’. Moreover, closeness is allied here to what Sue expresses, using an ECF, as a ‘total commit[ment]’ to teaching.

Like Anne, the mode of subjectivation Sue mobilizes establishes her conduct as having little regard for codes or norms. For instance, in considering whether her relationship with a student might be perceived by others as ‘dodgy’, she states that she ‘wouldn’t really care’. This is despite the fact that Sue was one of the few interview participants who was aware that there was a formal relationships policy at her institution, and indeed who had disclosed her relationship to her manager. Nonetheless, Sue’s presentation of her conduct in this extract seems to be bound up with an idealised image of the good educator, which she is keen to stylise her professional identity in relation to. The hypothetical insult she ponders at the end of the extract imbues her stance with an aesthetic as well as ethical character (see Yates, 2010), since the words ‘stiff’, ‘slur’, and ‘blot’ evoke physical and unattractive qualities, perhaps also encroaching on hygiene discourses.

Sue expresses her position as being motivated by a sense of responsibility to ‘the students’, as well as to herself. However, I do not interpret this as insinuating a pastoral
relation. This is because Sue constructs her concept of education around cornerstones of
closeness and collaboration, as opposed to protection and care. Moreover – and
atypically - Sue refrains from using the possessive pronoun when speaking of the
students she teaches. Taken together, these DDs have the effect of levelling the
differences between educator and student so that, as with Otis’s account, the notion of a
gap between the two is diminished.

The work that Sue articulates herself as performing in order to maintain her
professional-ethical identity focuses on activity which is expressed as engendering ‘fab’
*learning*. It includes the fostering of ‘collaborative’ and ‘productive’ relationships, in
which the ability for tutors and students to ‘relate’ to one another, and to the subject
matter, are considered vital components. Sue does not go into detail about how she
performs and monitors this work, but it is clear it does not include the monitoring of
‘barriers’, which I observed in extracts 31 and 32. In contrast, she states that she is
happy to let barriers come ‘crashing down”. This accentuates the lack of care for rule or
convention Sue articulates.

As I have already suggested, Sue narrates her approach as being aimed at a goal
indexing professionalism. However, it does more than this. Sue expresses her conduct
as involving a kind of continuous improvement of her pedagogy: she acts in order to
become ‘the best educator’ she can be. Thus her conduct might be understood as
involving a constant and critical ontology of self (Brewis, 1998a; Crane et al, 2008),
which Foucault saw as characteristic of Greek ascetic practices.

The technologies of self that are highlighted by this critical ethos depart from the
hermeneutics of doubt, suspicion, and discomfort suggested in the extracts analysed
earlier in this chapter. Foucault (2005) states that the Greek *askesis* does not reduce, it
equips. Considering the utility of such an *askesis* for contemporary life, he proposes that
it might encourage individuals to question received wisdoms, and to go beyond the 
limits laid down in the practices and truths they inherit (Foucault, 1994, 2000). Both 
Sue and Otis appear to do something akin to this by actively questioning normative 
concepts of professionalism; Sue in particular produces a reflexive and ascetic account 
of her professional-ethical practice as pedagogue.

**Chapter Summary**

In this chapter I have attempted to unpack how discourses of professionalism are 
mobilized to articulate F-S relationships. My analysis sheds light on a number of 
strategies and tactics implicated in the government of conduct. These include 
disciplinary and pastoral techniques, and security apparatuses aimed at governing 
conduct for the sake of individuals and for the good of the academic community. In the 
latter sections I have emphasized how government incorporates technologies of self. 
These technologies may recall both Christian practices, in which the self is deciphered 
and monitored, and also ascetic practices, in which it is reflected upon and perfected.

The maintenance of professionalism, as accounted for here, thus invokes different 
modes of subjectivation. Further, it involves different types of work and can 
problematize different parts of the self as the locus for ethical work (see Foucault, 1985, 
2000; Dean, 1994; Crane et al, 2008). Whilst the elision of professional-ethical conduct 
is a prevalent feature of the data, and an overarching goal expressed in numerous texts, 
the exact definition of what it means to be ‘professional’ or ‘ethical’ in one’s academic 
practice remains elusive, as is so often the case when professionalism is invoked 
(Fournier, 1999; Dent & Whitehead, 2002; Mausethagen & Granlund, 2012). This 
means that different aspects of professionalism can be discursively foregrounded, 
illuminating different relations of power and producing a multiplicity of truth effects.
Chapter 12

Discussion & conclusions

Governing people, in the broad meaning of the word, governing people is not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by himself.

(Foucault, 1993: 204)

…power struggles are not [only] about the boundary between voluntary submission to authority and resistance against illegitimate power […] they are about the boundary between voluntary submission to authority and reframing this submission as something that comes from the subject’s own will.

(Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012: 318)
Introduction

This thesis has explored how five distinct but intersecting discourses frame F-S relationships. I have emphasized that discourses are used in variable ways. Thus, whilst they predominantly construct relationships as a problem requiring management, this is not always the case. Moreover, even where relationships are problematized, this is often accomplished in hesitant, creative, or even artful ways, indexing different techniques of government. Consequently, I have sought to attend to the agential capacities of subjects to rearticulate discursive themes, rejecting the notion that subjects simply internalize and reproduce dominant discourses, an accusation sometimes levied at ‘big D’ discourse analysis (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2000, 2011).

In the discussion below I draw together and discuss my empirical findings, highlighting how they relate to, and supplement, the extant literature. I begin by clarifying how my analysis unsettles constructions of F-S relationships as exemplars of sexual harassment. This unsettling is achieved by foregrounding a series of discursive shifts, each of which alters how subjects are positioned, and how relations between relevant actors are configured.

Following this, I consider wider implications for research on organizational sexuality and the university. I propose that the concept of government, and particularly its ethical dimensions, has considerable and untapped explanatory potential for the study of each of these areas. I also consider how my analysis resonates with issues discussed in my literature review. Research on the university, I suggest, has prioritized discourses of marketization at the expense of exploring alternative discursive themes. Meanwhile, work on organizational sexuality is expanded by my study in three ways. First, my research setting allows me to consider how sexual conduct is directed within a more professional environment than has hitherto been examined. Second, it further attests to
how sexuality inflects everyday talk, routines, and practices. Third, it goes some way towards theorizing agency, which I have suggested is under-explained in scholarly accounts of sexual conduct at work.

I close by offering some concluding comments. These acknowledge the limitations of my study and propose some possible directions for future research.

**Understanding F-S relationships**

My study began with an interest in F-S relationships and, in particular, in how they are articulated, problematized, and governed. I have been struck by how scholarly work on consensual relationships has subsumed them within the study of sexual harassment. Given the perceived shortcomings of this research, my study has aimed to explore whether such understandings of relationships are reflected in lay articulations of the phenomena, and to consider alternative framings.

**Harassment knowledge and other truth claims**

Harassment knowledge, as outlined by Brewis (2001), offers a number of relatively specific truth claims for sexual harassment as phenomenon. Amongst these are: its positioning of men as sexually active, and women as passive; its heterosexism; its adoption of a quantitative theory of power; and its valorization of ‘good sex’. My research finds support for each of these truth claims, particularly regarding the gendered and heterosexist nature of harassment knowledge. However, like Clair (1993) and Kitzinger & Thomas (1995), I find that the term ‘sexual harassment’ is rarely deployed explicitly, and indeed the notion that F-S relationships are *a priori* exemplars of SH is often challenged or satirized.

I have suggested that the juridical-legal power relations deployed by harassment knowledge, tethered to its grounding in second-wave feminist ideology, may contribute to lack of take-up. I return to the former issue shortly. Regarding the latter, Scharff’s
(2103) research on young women’s perceptions of feminisms finds that such perspectives are viewed as either dated or as extreme and ideological. This, she contends, can result in repudiations of feminisms’ value. My corpus seems to indicate such a repudiation. However, this cannot sufficiently be accounted for by the argument that feminism is anachronistic; ideas of the academic as pastor or medic seem similarly out of place in contemporary HE, yet these metaphors are taken up with greater enthusiasm in my corpus. This leads me to favour Scharff’s view that feminism is perceived as extremist in order to partially explain harassment knowledge’s lack of rhetorical appeal. This is a view evinced by Will in Extract 5, and is also suggested by the portrayal of feminists in Prose’s novel, Blue Angel and Mamet’s play, Oleanna.

Despite this, I find that the truth claims of harassment knowledge are propped up by alternative discourses. These reconfigure divisions between academics and students, so that the gap inserted between the two foregrounds differences in age, and/or accentuates the academic’s caring and therapeutic roles, expertise, and professionalism, rather than highlighting gendered power differentials, as harassment knowledge tends to (Brewis, 2001; Taylor, 2011; McDonald, 2012). They also, to a greater or lesser extent, construct a relationship of dependency, imbuing the academic role with an array of responsibilities for the incompetent and/or vulnerable student.

Thus, whilst supporting some of the truth claims of harassment knowledge, these discourses also generate new truth claims. For example, where harassment knowledge emphasizes a single permutation of the F-S relationship, conceiving of it as exploitation of the (female) student-as-victim by the (male) academic-as-harasser, discourses of infantilization offer a plethora of related, but nonetheless different, subject positions for academics and students to occupy. Consequently, this discursive theme offers greater interpretative flexibility, since individuals are able to use it to different effects.
Constructions of the academic as parent or old man have subtly but significantly different truth effects to the construction of academic-as-adult, heightening the sense in which relationships may be understood as unnatural and horrific. This leads me to suggest that the comparative inflexibility of harassment knowledge may be a further reason for lack of take-up in the corpus.

I also propose that the discourses examined in Part IV are more polysemic and elastic than harassment knowledge. So, where harassment knowledge invites acceptance of or resistance to prohibitive demands, the discourses analysed in chapters 9, 10 and 11 are often couched in the language of guidance, thus providing greater room for discursive manoeuvre. Consequently I consider them to be less confrontational and war-like, and more open and game-like (Foucault, 1982, 2000; Lemke, 2010).

Professionalism is a case in point. The definition of what constitutes ‘professionalism’ is highly contested (MacDonald, 1985; Mausethagen & Granlund, 2012), and this affords individuals scope to emphasize and de-emphasize different aspects of it. Whilst policy documents seem to foreground ethical responsibilities, or what Brint (1994) calls ‘professional trusteeship’, some interview respondents, notably Sue and Otis, highlight ‘professional expertise’, meaning that the ability to engage with students becomes the hallmark of the professional. Furthermore, professionalism invokes notions of autonomy and self-control (Fournier, 1999, 2000). These imbue the academic-as-professional with self-regulating capacities that are largely overlooked by harassment knowledge, which relies on prohibition and prescription to govern relationships.

**Bad, dangerous, and risky sex**

One interesting feature of the re-articulation of relationships away from discourses of harassment is that the ‘bad sex’ paradigm, which Brewis (2001) and Taylor (2011) associate with SH, is re-articulated. Viewed through an infantilizing lens, F-S
relationships can be (re)presented rather more perniciously as dangerous sex. Meanwhile religious, professional, and health, safety and hygiene discourses seem to work them up as only potentially dangerous, or as risky.

The effects of these adjustments are numerous. Notions of danger throw the spotlight on the academic, positioned as potential paedophile or incestuous parent, whose image provokes horror and disgust. The academic thus becomes the target of surveillance and training as means of correction. Meanwhile, the student is represented as a child. Sociologists have studied how the gaze of paedophilia leads to increased surveillance of children (Scott & Jackson, 1999; Sikes & Piper, 2009). However, my research indicates that, in relation to F-S relationships at least, the surveillance of students is secondary to that of the academic. Indeed students-as-children are typically not the subjects of the infantilizing discourses studied here, but rather are depicted as absent, agentless and/or inanimate objects. This objectification compounds the problematization of consent posed by harassment knowledge.

In contrast, the idea that F-S relationships represent risk emphasizes the need to manage the university environment, taking precautions in order to avert or compensate for the risks they pose to the academic community. Specific risk management or security techniques include academics limiting social contact with students; consulting line managers and HR when they have doubts about the appropriateness of relationships; and conducting relationships with discretion. Such measures are frequently doled out in policy advice, and are also alluded to by interviewees.

Hunt suggests that risk discourses constitute ‘moral enterprises’ requiring the exercise of calculative or prudent judgement in order to protect self and others (2003: 183). Following Ewald (2002) he notes that a precautionary logic is both individualizing and totalizing. This is because it has numerous targets: the individual who poses the risk;
individuals or groups who may be deemed particularly ‘at risk’; and the wider population (see also Dean, 1999a). Thus risk discourses extend the remit of potential damage. Moreover, Hunt proposes that they may be particularly appealing, because they appear to function less normatively than those invoking danger; ‘Risk discourses provide an apparently utilitarian grounds for regulatory intervention without appearing directly to institute a form of moral regulation’ (2003: 187).

Such discourses call upon the individual to exercise self-control, rather than relying solely on regulation from above or from the middle (Hunt, 1999). They also engage ethical self-relations, which Dean (1994, 1999b) suggests risk practices are bound up with. Consequently, they resonate more with the micro-physics of pastoral and governmental modalities of power, rather than sovereign and/or disciplinary relations, although the former may be understood as incorporating the latter (Lemke, 2010).

This is not to say that the notion of the academic as representing a threat or doing harm disappears; this is still evident in the discourses discussed in Part IV. However, harm is now framed as failure to act contritely, prudently, or ethically, rather than something more or less unforgiveable (see Hunt, 1999, 2003; Dean 1999a). Even in religious discourses, where F-S relationships may be constructed as sinful, the academic is offered the opportunity to confess and repent, thus restoring order and saving each and all from harm. This is not true of harassment or infantilizing discourses, which are heavily reliant on techniques of domination, and which seem to demand correction or punishment.

*Figure 2* (see page 296) provides an overview of how each of the five discourses operate, highlighting how power relations are configured, noting specific techniques, and considering different discursive uses and effects.
The utility of a government approach

My study thus carves out a role for wider understandings of F-S relationships than have previously been acknowledged in the literature. It suggests that rather than viewing relationships solely through the sovereign workings of a harassment lens, it is necessary to tease out other dimensions of government. Taylor (2011) points to disciplinary power and hints at self-relations, but she does not develop the second of these ideas. Further, her contribution is theoretical rather than empirical. Consequently, my thesis extends understanding by empirically analysing how the government of F-S relationships mobilizes additional power relations and techniques.

The notion of regulation as ‘government’ may also be applicable to the two other literatures discussed in Part I of the thesis. In particular, I have argued that organizational sexuality has privileged modes of regulation which operate vertically (e.g. Burrell, 1984; Adkins, 1992) and, more rarely, laterally (e.g. Filby, 1994; Fleming, 2007). This literature, in some respects, provides a more appropriate backdrop against which to study F-S relationships than the harassment literature, since it deals with both coercive and consensual aspects of ‘sex in work’ (Bellas & Gossett, 2001; Warhurst and Nickson, 2009). However, lack of engagement with Foucault’s later work on sexuality means that it does not fully account for references to a personal or creative orientation to sexual conduct at work (e.g. Filby, 1994; Sullivan, 2014). By considering reflexive and ethical self-relations my study endeavours to illustrate how a sexual government approach implicates self-crafting elements, as well as invoking juridical, disciplinary and pastoral relations.
### Fig 2 Summary of analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive Theme</th>
<th>Which genres of text?</th>
<th>Power relations invoked</th>
<th>Technologies, practices, effects</th>
<th>How are subject positions constructed and F-S relationships problematized?</th>
<th>How is this discourse deployed?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Harassment       | - Policy documents    | Sovereign; disciplinary   | Prohibition, normalization, surveillance, dividing practices, individualizing, subjection | - Academic-as-harasser  
- Student-as-victim         | - Mobilization is limited  
- Harassment knowledge sometimes reproduced  
- Mocked/satirized  
- Resisted |
|                   | - Fictional sources   |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - Interview accounts  |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          | Relationships are bad/wrong     |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
| Infantilization   | - Policy documents    | Disciplinary; sovereign; pastoral | Prohibition, normalization, surveillance, dividing practices, dressage, individualizing, subjection and objectification (of students) | - Academic-as-adult  
- Academic-as-old man  
- Academic-as-parent  
- Student-as-child | - Widely mobilized  
- Numerous permutations and reworkings  
- Anticipated and repudiated via ‘consenting adults’ defences |
|                   | - Fictional sources   |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - Interview data      |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - CMD                 |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - Newspaper reports   |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          | Relationships are child         |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
| Religiosity       | - Fictional sources   | Pastoral; Sovereign; disciplinary | Relations of obedience, confessional practices, asceticism as denial, dividing practices, surveillance, silence as counterconduct, individualizing and totalizing, subjection and subjection | - Academic-as-pastor  
- Student-as-sheep  
- University as pastor  
- Academic-as-sheep | - Mobilization is limited  
- Some variability in deployment  
- Mocked/satirized |
|                   | - Interview data      |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          | Relationships are potentially dangerous, especially for academic |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
| Health, Safety & Hygiene | - Policy documents | Governmental; disciplinary; pastoral | Security appurtenances, precautionary principle, dividing practices, confessional practices; individualizing and totalizing, subjection | - Academic-as-doctor  
- Academic-as-therapist  
- Student-as-patient | - Widely mobilized  
- Numerous permutations and reworkings, which articulate relationships as both unhealthy and (less commonly) healthy |
|                   | - Fictional sources   |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - Interview data      |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - CMD                 |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - Newspaper reports   |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          | Relationships are risky for students and wider academic population |                                                                         |                                 |
| Professionalism   | - Policy documents    | Governmental; disciplinary | Security appurtenances, technologies of self, asceticism as denial and self-formation, dividing practices, confessional practices, individualizing and totalizing, subjection | - Academic-as-professional expert  
- Student-as-(implicit) client | - Widely mobilized  
- Numerous permutations and reworkings, emphasizing different aspects of ‘professionalism’ |
|                   | - Interview accounts  |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   | - CMD                 |                          |                                  |                                                                         |                                 |
|                   |                       |                          | Relationships are unethical     |                                                                         |                                 |
The idea of regulation as ‘government’ also opens up the literature on the university. The onslaught of marketization has typically been understood as eroding academics’ autonomy (Halsey, 1992; Parker & Jary, 1995; Jary, 2002; Elton, 2011), although the extent of this erosion has been challenged by others (e.g. Prichard & Willmott, 1997; Sousa et al, 2010), who argue that academics still possess considerable ‘freedom’ (Sousa et al, 2010: 1455). Adopting a government approach to academia assumes that freedom and coercion are coterminous, since freedom and the possibility of resistance are essential preconditions for power relations and for ethical action (Foucault, 1994).

In one of his last interviews before he died Foucault states;

…if you try to analyse power not from the point of view of liberty, of strategies and of governmentality, but from the point of view of a political institution, you cannot consider the subject as a subject of rights. We have a subject who was endowed with rights or who was not and who, by the institution of a political society, has received or lost rights. You are thrown back to a juridical concept of the subject. On the other hand, the notion of governmentality allows one, I believe, to set off the freedom of the subject and the relationship to others, i.e., that which constitutes the very matter of ethics. (Foucault, 1994: 20)

In other words, the interplay between relations of self to self, and of self to others, must both be considered in analyses of power and control. To assume that academics have ‘lost’ control to centralized or outsourced expert services, such as managers, the QAA, REF panel, or administrative services like HR, is to gloss how power relations operate, underestimate their instability, and neglect the openness of games of power (Foucault, 1994). In attending to this openness, the possibility of a more reflexive ethics emerges. This, in turn, enables understanding of how the academic as ‘specific intellectual’ may adopt a critical ethos, and so practice their freedom (Foucault, 1988: 107-8; see also Weiskopf & Willmott, 2013: 487).
Having considered the utility of the concept of government, I now highlight how my findings recast other aspects of the literature. I begin by considering the university, before going on to reflect on organizational sexuality.

The university: Plural discourses, ancient ideals

In Chapter 4 I suggested that scholarly interpretations of the university have recognised it as an institution infused with different ideas about its purpose, noting how these preserve its ancient origins (Vernon, 2004; Anderson, 2006; Collini, 2012). However, I also observed that the trajectory of the literature since the early 1990s has been to pursue how the neo-liberal agenda imposed on HEIs in the UK and elsewhere has impacted the sector (e.g. Halsey, 1992, Parker & Jary, 1995; Barry et al, 2001; Sousa, 2010; Foskett, 2011; Sauntson & Morrish, 2011; Williams, 2013; Alvesson, 2013).

The studies cited raise important questions regarding the changing nature of academe, illuminating how marketization materially and discursively (re)constructs the university and its inhabitants. My research does not seek to challenge this body of work; indeed, I find many of its central arguments persuasive. Had I been studying a different aspect of university life, such as teaching and learning, I do not doubt that marketization discourses would have been more prominent. However, neo-liberal discourses and concomitant constructions of academics-as-delivery-vehicles and students-as-consumers (Neary & Winn, 2009; Neary & Hagyard, 2011) are largely absent from my empirical materials. They perhaps make cameo appearances; the ideas of customer care and student empowerment implicated in the commodification of HE (Williams, 2013) might be read into the data, for instance where duty of care and concerns about fairness are articulated. However, such concerns need not only follow conceptualizations of a university education as commodified (Williams, 2013: 9). Commentators have noted the ‘empowering’ or equalizing nature of the 1960s student movement (Neary & Hagyard,
2011; Williams, 2013), and an ethic of care can be traced back to Oxbridge’s adoption of the in loco parentis role in the 1500s (Anderson, 2006).

If marketization discourses had effectively transformed HE into a commercial enterprise one might expect problematizations of F-S relationships to subside. Sexual or sexualized relationships between service providers and customers do not attract the same critical attention as F-S relationships do. Indeed, as I noted in Chapter 2, in some occupations, sexual or aesthetic labour may be part of ‘giving good service’ (Hall, 1993: 452). In these exchanges it is typically the customer who is understood as ‘sovereign’, whilst the worker is understood as exploited. Configured along similar lines, relationships between academics and students might be viewed as less problematic, because more ‘power’ would be conferred upon the student. In such an environment relationships might be articulated as potential conflicts of interest, but it is difficult to imagine them being framed as abusive, incestuous, or sacrilegious.

My research indicates that fairness and duty of care are more likely to be invoked in discussions of F-S relationships as part of infantilizing, quasi-religious, therapeutic and professional discourses, through which the protection offered to the student extends beyond that owed to a customer. So, the academic may be understood as a substitute parent; as having some responsibility for a student’s health and wellbeing; as watching over students to ensure they don’t fall by the wayside; and as observing a professional or fiduciary duty of care. These understandings hark back to the university’s origins as monasteries (Dunbabin, 1999), to their role in the production of the professional matrix (Hoskin, 1986), and to in loco parentis responsibilities (Anderson, 2006; Williams, 2013).

Consequently, I concur with Willmott & Prichard (1997), and Sousa et al (2010), who contend that the university has not been colonized by the imperializing discourses of the market. Rather, HE is suffused with a multiplicity of discourses, each of which works to
establish a host of intersecting but different truth claims about the university and its inhabitants. These claims may construct the university as an extension of school; as a quasi-familial institution; as an ecclesiastic institution; and as a site for medical and therapeutic practice.

**Organizational sexuality: Professional settings, everydayness, and agency**

The thesis aims to consider F-S relationships in relation to the literature on organizational sexuality, and I propose that it adds to extant research in a number of ways.

First, the study leaves behind the interactive service work setting, in which analyses of sexualisation and desexualisation processes have typically been located. This shift is important, since interactive service work has been understood as exemplifying a ‘sovereign customer’ model (du Gay & Salaman, 1992; Korzynski, 2003), which increasingly calls upon workers to perform emotional, aesthetic, and sexualized labour (Warhust & Nickson, 2007).

My analysis examines a setting in which, as I have suggested above, a customer orientation to students has increasingly been observed. Nonetheless, academic work is still understood, on the whole, as professional work involving a considerable degree of autonomy, even in accounts where this autonomy is considered to be under threat (Parker & Jary, 1995; Jary, 2002). Away from the academic environment, research conducted on sexuality in the health services (Deverell & Sharma, 2000; Rumens & Kerfoot, 2009) has explored tensions between gay identity and professionalism, but the focus of these studies is on how professional identity is negotiated, rather than on how sexuality is regulated. In my thesis, professional identity is a subsidiary interest; my central concern is how sexual relationships are enabled and constrained.

My research also lends credence to the notion of sexuality as an everyday feature of organizational life (Filby, 1992). I find that whilst F-S relationships are understood as
taboo, awareness of them, or at least of their possibility, informs a number of practices which emerge in the study. Such practices include dressing ‘appropriately’ when teaching; academics leaving office doors open when holding meetings with students; and students refusing invitations to go for coffee with their lecturers. Thus they index the normalization and surveillance of the desexualized academic body (Fotaki, 2011; Bell & Sinclair, 2014). However, in so doing they simultaneously inscribe academic and student bodies with a disturbing sexual aspect that must be watched over and contained (Bauman, 1998). Thus, rather than desexualizing the environment, they may serve to sexualize it (Foucault, 1978b).

Finally, my analysis considers sexual agency, and particularly the ability of agents to claim a sexual identity that differs from that prescribed by the organization they work for. A number of studies have already highlighted possibilities for resisting the sexualisation (Filby, 1992; Fleming, 2007) and desexualisation (Burrell, 1984; Sullivan, 2014) of work. However, and as Burrell and Fleming both point out, it is often difficult to disentangle processes of control and resistance and so determine their flow. Thus non-normative stances on sexual conduct at work are typically viewed as resistance to a superordinate (Burrell, 1984), or to a prescribed culture (Fleming, 2007). Alternatively they are posited as personal and agential (e.g. Filby, 1992; Sullivan, 2014), with little consideration of how it is that some acquiesce whilst others do not. By considering how some interview respondents construct their orientation to F-S relationships as an ethos or reflexive practice, I have attempted to flesh out how such orientations are possible. This leads me to reject conceptualizations of non-normative sexual expression as a form of misbehaviour (Ackroyd & Thompson, 1999; Fleming, 2007); it may suggest indocility, but need not imply subversion. Rather, it may be indicative of the pursuit of a personal ethos. In the corpus analysed here this relates to teaching excellence, being professional, and caring for oneself and others.
Conclusions

Below I summarise the main contributions of the thesis. I go on to outline the limitations of the study, before reflecting upon the implications of my findings for future research.

Contributions

I have already outlined a number of incremental steps my thesis takes in supplementing understandings of F-S relationships, organizational sexuality, and the university. I now pinpoint the three primary contributions to knowledge the thesis seeks to offer.

First, I have highlighted new ways of understanding F-S relationships, extending their analysis beyond the remit of sexual harassment. By adopting a mid to late Foucauldian approach I have suggested that F-S relationships, like all relationships, involve the interplay of coercion and freedom. Understood thus, notions of such relationships as necessarily harassing are flawed, as indeed are notions of them as transparently consensual. This contribution is primarily empirical, since a similar argument has been advanced by Taylor (2011). However, it is also theoretical, because Taylor focuses on sovereign and disciplinary power, whereas I am interested in the broader mechanics of government.

Second, I present both the university and organizational sexuality as loci in which a constellation of discursive practices and power relations are assembled. This complex of relations may be usefully understood by adopting a view of regulation as government. Understood as the encounter between technologies of domination and of the self (Foucault, 2005), the idea of government provides an alternative to conceptualizations of control and resistance as a primary action, initiated by some (usually hierarchically dominant) other, on a subject who either complies or resists (Burrell, 1984; Filby, 1992; Fleming, 2007; Sullivan, 2014).
Finally, I elaborate Foucault’s contribution to MOS. This is an empirical contribution, augmenting the application of his much-cited genealogical work by turning to his later, and less extensively explored, interest in government, ethics, and subjectivity. I also use DP in order to attend to language-in-use. This enables me to recast some of the findings of previous research on F-S relationships. For example, I interpret emotional states, such as dissociation, as discursive accomplishments rather than cognitive processes. DP also facilitates analysis of how orientations to the discursive themes discussed are accounted for, and to address how agency is articulated. Attentiveness to the later Foucault, allied with DP, thus offers a novel approach to discourse that is both text-focused and which appreciates broader discursive paradigms (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011).

Limitations

Having discussed what the study has sought to achieve, it is necessary to consider what it does not. In this section I highlight two limitations.

First, I am mindful of what my analysis leaves unsaid. The dearth of interview accounts from male academics with experience of relationships, and also of historical data, restricts my ability to interrogate the cliché of the ‘lecherous professor’ (Dzech and Weiner, 1990), and to locate the origins of the discourses identified more precisely. These were both objectives I set for myself at the outset of the study, but they have proved difficult to achieve.

Attempts have been made to compensate for these shortcomings. The inclusion of CMD, group interviews, and fictional data facilitates analysis of the predatory male lecturer stereotype from a ‘male perspective’. The latter genre of data has also helped me to locate historical traces of the discursive themes identified, as has my
consideration of the history of the university, outlined in Chapter 4. However, the data remains skewed in favour of female and contemporary accounts of relationships.

The second limitation involves the extent to which my analysis may be generalised from. I have argued that my research offers the potential to open up the study of the university and organizational sexuality. However, I am cognisant of the difficulties involved in generalising from the small and opportunistically gathered sample presented here. Whilst the policy data provides a broad sweep of codes in operation at UK HEIs, the interview data is more restricted, and I am mindful that universities, departments, and individual academics vary in their orientations to students. Nonetheless, my findings may be generalised to theory. For instance, the notion that students are infantilized, and are increasingly positioned as ‘patients’ is lent support by the work of Williams (2013). Furthermore, Albert & Whetton (1985) and Howley & Hartnett (1992) provide impetus for understanding the university as a quasi-ecclesiatic institution.

**Future research directions**

Before closing, I want to suggest some possible directions for future research. The study of infantilizing discourses within academia, which were so prevalent in my data, might be one fruitful avenue of enquiry. The notion of students-as-children has received limited attention (Williams, 2013), but the effects of infantilization have not been considered in detail. Given the role of universities in fostering critical thinking and independence (Collini, 2012), constructions of students as de-responsibilized and incompetent infants is a concern, and one worthy of empirical scrutiny in its own right and away from the context of organizational sexuality.

Following a number of MOS scholars (e.g. Barratt, 2003; 2008; Crane et al, 2008; Bardon & Josserand, 2011) I also contend that the later Foucault is still under-utilized in research on organizations. Some of its possibilities have been highlighted above, and I
do not wish to repeat these. Suffice to say that I concur with the suggestion that the application of later Foucauldian ideas, and particularly empirical contributions adopting these, still have much to offer scholarship. Weiskopf & Willmott’s (2013) recent paper on ethics and truth-telling is testament to this view.

Finally, the notion of F-S relationships not as a priori exemplars of harassment, but as relationships that may be understood as harassing, joyful, thrilling, and/or problematic is not exhausted here. In particular, the historical dimensions my study touches upon, but does not empirically foreground, would be interesting to explore, as would investigation of the issue away from the US and UK contexts. The classicist Mary Beard has suggested that in Antiquity sex and teaching were ‘natural bedfellows’ (Beard, 2006). However, I have also noted that Oxbridge fellows were sworn to a life of celibacy and forbidden from marrying until the late 1880s. An exploration of historical and cultural attitudes to relationships would augment the understandings offered here, shedding light on how the problematization of F-S relationships has changed according to time and place.
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1 Brewis (2001) provides a different version of Chapter 3 of *Sex, work and sex work: Eroticizing organization*, (Brewis & Linstead, 2000). I primarily refer to Brewis’s later single-authored paper here, although her work with Linstead is also drawn upon and referenced.

2 The term ‘lay’ is used here in contrast to ‘scholarly’, and denotes discourses produced by and circulating in everyday life, as opposed to published scholarship (see Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Jones, 1995).

3 Foucault is usually translated as using the term juridico-discursive rather than juridico-legal, (e.g. 1978b: 82).

4 Named after Willhelm von Humboldt, founder of the University of Berlin.

5 Murray later became the UK’s first female lecturer at UCL in 1898 (Whitehouse, 2012).

6 The earliest published policy identified for the study comes from Royal Holloway, University of London. It was first published in 2000, and revised in 2006 and 2011.

7 Foucault refers to his work as providing analytic tools and frameworks rather than constructing theories Foucault, (1978b; see also Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994, Deacon, 2002), thus I generally refrain from referring to my research as attempting to advance theoretical understandings, although it might be interpreted as such.

8 The term ‘personal relationships policy’ is used throughout the thesis to refer to university codes of conduct, although the names for such policies differ from institution to institution. Appendix 4 provides full names of all policy documents analysed.

9 I use ‘his/her’ and ‘he/she’ in cases where there is some assumption that the subject being referred to is more likely to be a man, as in harassment knowledge. Where this is not the case, her/his and s/he is used.

10 Whilst I found no evidence of specific laws banning F-S relationships in any country, some kinds of relationships would implicitly be illegal as a result of age of consent regulations, which are as high as 20 in Tunisia, and 21 in Bahrain. It is also worth noting that in some countries,
such as Iran, Libya, Oman, Kuwait, Quatar, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, sex is illegal outside marriage (Waites, 2005).

11 According to the Office for National Statistics, ‘In 2011 the provisional mean age at marriage for never-married men was 32.2 years, while for never-married women it was 30.2 years. This compares with 24.6 years and 22.6 years respectively in 1971’. (Marriages in England and Wales Bulletin, ONS, June 2013).

12 The story of Adam and Eve.

13 I do not include any verbatim quotations from this part of Graham’s interview because it was considered a potential identifier.

14 Shortly after the interview I met Jane at a conference, and she told me that she and Albert were no longer together. Interestingly, the break-up had not caused her to re-evaluate the relationship as coercive.

15 This statement features in all of the policies cited, and thus exemplifies the consistency of wording across policy documents.

16 As with some other policies, it is slightly unclear in the policy which staff are being referred to, and whether the policy is aimed at administrative as well as academic staff.
Appendix 1: Abbreviations

CDA – Critical discourse analysis

CMC – Computer mediated communication

CMD – Computer mediated discourse

DA – Discourse analysis

DD – Discursive device

DP – Discursive psychology

ECF – Extreme case formulation

F-S relationships – Faculty-student relationships (sexual and/or romantic)

HASAW – Health and safety at work act, 1974

HE – Higher education

HEI – Higher education institution

HEFCE – Higher Education Funding Council for England

LEA – Local Education Authority

LGBT – Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender

LMH – Lady Margaret Hall College, The University of Oxford

NSS – National Student Survey

NYU – New York University
QAA – Quality Assurance Agency

RAE – Research Assessment Exercise

REF – Research Excellence Framework

RNCM – Royal Northern College of Music

SH – Sexual harassment

SOA – Sexual Offences Act

TSN – Teacher Support Network

THE – Times Higher Education

UCL – University College London

UCS – University Campus Suffolk
Appendix 2: Interview Transcription Convention

[...] Material deliberately omitted.

[Text] Added clarificatory information.

Text Words uttered with added emphasis or volume.

Text Emphasis added by author.

Text… Audible gap of short duration (less than 1 second).

(1) Gap of more than 1 second. Number denotes length to nearest second.

(Adapted from a convention used by Finch-Lees et al, 2005)
Appendix 3: Glossary of Analytic Terms

General terms

Many of these terms are derived from pragmatics and linguistics. They are drawn upon, in different ways, by a variety of approaches to discourse analysis, including the Foucauldian and discursive psychology approaches used here, and also by other approaches like CDA.

Categorization The ways in which certain actions, events, people, objects, and groups are constituted as distinct from others. Foucault refers to categorization processes by discussing techniques such as dividing practices whereas discursive psychologists often refer to membership categorization and gerrymandering.

Hedges Words which soften the illocutionary force of an utterance, such as ‘a bit’, ‘maybe’, or ‘sort of’ (Lakoff, 1973). Coates (2003) observes that some modalities work as hedges (e.g. ‘might’).

Illocutionary force The force with which a statement is uttered, often linked to analysis of a text’s modality. A statement or utterance’s force may be ascertained by identifying certain speech acts, such as declaratives, assertives, commissives, expressives, and directives (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), and by the presence of mitigating words or hedges.

Metaphor Consideration of how different metaphors are deployed within and across texts, and of how these frame people, objects, relationships and organizations. Metaphors may assist or lend detail to categorization practices (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987).

Modality Epistemic modality refers to the extent to which a proposition is articulated as factual or true. Examples include assertive or evidential modalities, which construct facticity, often through the marshalling of evidence, whilst judgement modality connotes the degree of confidence with which an assertion is made (e.g. a proposition might be true or must be true).

Deontic modality relates to how the world ideally ought to be, and signals actions, which may include duties and responsibilities, which are considered likely to bring about this ideal state. Deontic modalities include the commissive modality (‘I will’),
which commits the speaker to certain actions, *directive* modality (‘you will’), which issues commands and requests, and *hortative* modality (‘you ought to’), which encourages/discourages or urges. An *inhortative* modality strongly urges against, whilst the *suprahortative* modality strongly urges for (see Nuyts, 2001; Coates, 2003).

Some have argued that epistemic and deontic modalities are difficult to separate, particularly where the auxiliary verbs ‘can’, ‘could’ and ‘may’ are concerned, since these may relate to the truth of a proposition and/or the likelihood of an event (Nuyts, 2001; Stevanovic & Peräkylä, 2012).

**Normalization** A term associated with Foucault and Foucauldian work interested in disciplinary power, but also used by discursive psychologists (e.g. Potter, 1997). In both kinds of analysis it is used to refer to the ways that certain events, people and objects may be categorized, and presented as either natural and normal, or deviant and abnormal.

**Trope** Sense-making devices that project particular images of subjects, objects, and ideas (Oswick et al, 2004). Sometimes used to refer to specific rhetorical techniques, such as metonymy and synecdoche, but also used more generally to refer to re-occurring motifs and clichés, particularly within literary data.

**Foucauldian Analytic Terms**

*Given the wealth of work published on these Foucauldian ideas and neologisms the definitions provided here are brief, focussing on analytic concepts used within the thesis and summarising how they have been interpreted. Many of these summaries are further elaborated within the thesis.*

**Askesis or ascetic practices** Translated by Foucault as ‘an exercise of self on self’ (Foucault, 2005: 315), through which one works on, cares for, and transforms oneself into an ethical subject. In the second volume of the *History of Sexuality* (1985), the Greek term *askesis* is used specifically in reference to Ancient Greek practices relating to the training and preparation of mind, body, and soul in order to achieve a state of beauty, happiness or perfection. Elsewhere (e.g. Foucault,1982) these practices are contrasted with Christian practices or *technologies of self.*
**Biopower** A technology focused on the constitution and control of populations, via practices of mass surveillance and mass control (e.g. the census, eugenics, health campaigns). Kelly (2009) argues that in ‘Security, Territory, Population’, biopower is displaced by the concept of governmentality (Kelly, 2009: 60).

**Disciplinary Power** In contrast to biopower, this technology is focused on the training and control of individual bodies in carceral institutions such as prisons, factories, asylums, and schools. It operates by prescribing certain kinds of behaviour or activity which are monitored through individual surveillance. Thus it exerts normalizing judgement (Foucault, 1991a).

**Dividing Practices** The processes through which individuals are objectified, either by dividing them from others and/or from themselves. Foucault uses examples such as the isolation of lepers and the separation of the mad from the sane, the sick from the healthy, and the criminals from the ‘good boys’ (Foucault, 1982: 777-8). This is a form of categorization.

**Dressage** Foucault uses this term to refer to the techniques used to train and condition behaviour. The term is derived from the training of animals (Foucault, 1991a; Harrier, 2005).

**Ethics** Foucault distinguishes between three uses of this term: ethics as code, which is based on moral rules or precepts; ethics as a reflexive ethos or manner of being, through which one relates to self and other, and which guides one’s behaviour; and ethics as practices through which ‘individuals constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct’ (Foucault, 1985; 29). The latter is closely related to askesis and subjectivation.

**Governmentality** May be narrowly or broadly defined (see Gordon, 1991, Dean, 1999). Narrowly defined as a kind of ‘government rationality’, this is the term which replaces bio-power in order to refer to the control of populations (Dean, 1999; Kelly, 2009). More broadly, the term is used to refer to the ‘conduct of conduct’ (Gordon, 1991) and involves at least four techniques (Foucault, 1993, 2000): techniques of domination (e.g. sovereign and disciplinary power); techniques of signification (studied by linguistics); techniques of production (studied in the sciences and by Marxism); and techniques or technologies of self.
Pastoral Power  A technology used to organize individuals and populations by appropriating the metaphor of the shepherd caring for his flock. The metaphor can be traced back to the Pre-Christian East where it emerged in Hebrew and Egyptian cultures. This form of power was transformed by the Christian West to encompass principles of truth, obedience, and the salvation of each and all, or *omnes et singulatim* (Foucault, 1981, Dean 1994).

Technologies of self  The exercises through which one works upon and transforms oneself. These may include ascetic practices, such as those outlined above, which foreground self-awareness and self-care, and have a distinctly aesthetic dimension. However, they also encompass techniques which prioritise self-knowledge. These latter practices are inherited from Christianity, and prioritize temptation, sin, confession, and renunciation aimed at the purification of the soul and pursuit of salvation (see Yates, 2010).

Security apparatuses  Described by Foucault as the ‘essential mechanism’ of governmentality (1991: 102), these calculate risks and benefits, predict the reactions of power, and estimate what level of intervention the population will accept (Foucault, 2009). Foucault gives the example of variolation as one of the first security apparatus; others have focussed on how security apparatuses inform insurance techniques (e.g. Ewald, 1991; Defert, 1999) and the welfare state (Dean, 1999).

Sovereign Power  A traditional form of power, in which obedience is owed to the King, who rules through order and prohibition. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault exemplifies this kind of power through his depiction of the torture and execution of Damiens, which he then contrasts with the use of the penal system as an exemplar of disciplinary power (1991a).

Subjectivation  Foucault’s neologism for the processes through which individuals actively constitute themselves as subjects. The term is contrasted to subjection, which has more passive connotations, as in ‘the subject of the king’ (Kelly, 1999: 87).

Telos  The end goal of ethical action, or ‘the kind of being to which we aspire’ (Foucault, 2000: 265).  

11
Discursive Devices

The following devices are drawn from, and used by, different variants of discursive psychology (e.g. Potter & Wetherell, 1987; Shotter & Gergen, 1989; Billig, 1992; Harré, 2003; Wiggins & Potter, 2008). Many of the devices are clearly defined by Potter (1996), and an overview of devices and their uses is provided in the MOS literature by Mueller & Whittle (2012). The list below reflects devices referred to in the thesis.

Accountability & agency management How an account constructs and apportions accountability. Attention is paid to how responsibility, blame, permission, and agency are allocated, both by the author(s) of the text and by those to whom the text refers (Edwards & Potter, 1992). The use or absence of first-person pronouns, or of agentless passives, are common methods of grammatically encoding or restricting accountability (see Wood & Kroger, 2000), as are two-to-tango script formulations (Edwards, 1995).

Authenticity The working up of one’s views, feelings, or position as genuine or authentic (Potter, 1997), thus encouraging agreement.

Agent-Patient distinction A version of accountability construction in which one party - the ‘doctor’ - is constructed as responsible for the other - the patient (Wood & Kroger, 2000).

Agentless passive See accountability and agency management.

Concessions These are explicit acknowledgements of potential alternatives or counter claims. The use of concession makes the speaker’s claim appear more reasonable, informed, and balanced (Antaki & Wetherell, 1999).

Consensus Provides corroboration of a particular version of events by producing or alluding to the assent of others, as in ‘we all knew’. This works to transform description or opinion into ‘fact’. (Potter, 1996)

Counter-dispositionals Edwards (1995, 1997) uses this term to refer to the ways in which speakers attend to and avoid or counter particular interpretations of people or events in. For instance, saying, ‘I’m not biased’, or ‘Come on, you’re not a baby’ pre-empts and delegitimizes alternative views.
Declarative see illocutionary force.

**Extremization/minimization** Used to emphasise or de-emphasise a point, as in ‘He really kicked me’ versus ‘It was only a little tap’ (Potter, 1996). May involve **hedging** or the use of **extreme case formulation**.

**Extreme case formulation (ECF)** A version of ‘extremization’ in which speakers use the extreme points of relevant descriptive dimensions. This may strengthen, emphasize and/or legitimize a claim, as in ‘it was brand new’, ‘Mum’ll kill you’, or ‘I never do that’ (Pomerantz, 1986; Potter, 1996).

**Footing** Where the speaker aligns or distances themselves with an utterance, thus limiting or extending the sense in which they are accountable or responsible for the message. Goffman (1981) distinguishes between **principal**, **author**, and **animator** footings. The principal is the person whose position or voice is being represented or recounted in the text, the author is the person who scripts the text, and the animator is the one who speaks. For example, in a TV or radio news story reporting on Prime Minister’s Question Time, the presenter would be the animator, the script writer is the author and the politician whose speech is reported is the principal. Goffman (1981) also refers to ‘embedding’. Embedding enables one to take liberties in accounting practices, for example by spatially and/or temporally distancing or removing oneself from events.

**Gerrymandering** A selective or partial description of an event, person, or category, which emphasises certain features and omits others. This device enables the speaker to make a particular argument or work up a category or event in ways which ignore persons, cases, or events that do not support the argument (Woolgar & Pawluch, 1985; Potter 1996).

**Intention promoting words** These raise the level of responsibility or culpability for an action (Marlin, 2002; Potter, 1996). For example, saying ‘John made us lose the game’ implies greater intentionality and culpability than ‘John played badly, and we lost’. Intention promoting words may also refer to internal mental states, such as ‘I think’, ‘I want’ and ‘I feel’.

**Membership categorization** A **categorization** device used to elaborate details about a particular group, in which assumptions are made regarding their activities, knowledge or entitlements. The identification of someone as a member of a particular group (e.g.
‘mothers’ or ‘the unemployed’) may imply certain features about them. Conversely, descriptions of someone’s activities or entitlements (e.g. ‘mollycoddling’ or ‘scrounging’) may imply membership of a particular category (Sacks, 1972, 1992; Antaki & Widdicombe, 2008). Membership categorization also works to exclude people from a group.

Minimization See extremization.

Positioning The discursive, interactive, and occasioned production of self and/or other within a narrative. Positioning analysis examines how, and with what effects, speakers work up or ‘do’ identity within their accounts. This may involve attending to how speakers locate themselves, or others, within a particular membership category. Alternatively, it may involve examining how an available identity or category is resisted. Positioning understands identity as performed, fragmented, and dynamic (see Davies & Harré, 1990; Bamberg, 1997; Korborov, 2010).

Repair The processes by which conversational troubles in speaking and/or understanding are oriented to and corrected by the parties involved. Shegloff (1977) observes a preference for self-repair.

Stake and interest management How the notion of vested interest, stake, or partiality is discursively managed. Stake inoculation occurs when a speaker denies or heads off claims that they have a ‘stake’ in a particular view. This is often done by articulating a change of mind, or encoding reluctance, as in ‘I was sceptical at first, but I tried it and loved it.’ This is sometimes also a counter-dispositional. Stake confession occurs when speakers acknowledge a vested interest, as in ‘He’s a great musician, but I’m his dad, so I would say that wouldn’t I?’ Like inoculation, this can present the account as more honest and objective because the speaker is owning up to a stake rather than trying to ‘dupe’ his audience (Potter, 1996).

Vagueness The use of broadly defined or fuzzy claims and idioms, which make an argument hard to pin down and/or undermine. For example, referring to ‘some people’ rather than giving specific details or statistics about whom the people referred to might be (Potter, 1996).
## Appendix 4: Corpus and extracts analysed

### POLICY DOCUMENTS

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<td>Policy 5</td>
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<td>Policy 14</td>
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<td>N</td>
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**Other university policies analysed:**

- Bangor University: *Policy on personal relationships for staff and students*
- Goldsmiths University: *Policy on conflicts of interest (including those arising from personal relationships)*

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- The Open University: *Code on personal relationships between staff and students*
- Royal Holloway, University of London: *Guidelines on relationships involving staff, students and others closely associated with the college*
- Southampton Solent University: *Personal relationships at work policy*
- Swansea University: *Personal relationships: a code*
- University of Bath: *Personal and professional relationships policy*
- University of Bradford: *Policy and Procedures on Relations Between Staff and Between Staff and Students: Code of Professional Conduct*
- University of Cardiff: *Code of practice on close personal relationships*
- University of Central Lancashire: *Personal relationships at work*
- University of Chichester: *Policy on consensual relationships*
- University of Nottingham: *Policy on personal relationships at work*

### NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

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<td>Newspaper 3</td>
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<td>Newspaper 4</td>
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<td>Newspaper 5</td>
<td><em>Eleanor had a breakdown after the abortion; EXCLUSIVE University to make new ruling on staff dating students</em>, Sunday Mercury, 07/12/2008,</td>
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Newspaper 6

**Human rights professor has affair with student**
The Boar, 06/01/2009.

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**Other newspaper articles analysed:**

- *End of the ode: Why Oxford's top poet quit after alleged sex slurs against her literary rival*, THE, 26/05/2009
- *Female students must be made safer*, The Guardian, 26/06/2011
- *Be prepared for confusion and gropey lecturers*, The Guardian, 04/09/1984
- *The changing rules of student sex*, The Independent, 05/11/1993
- *Lecturer aged 44, wrote asking student for sex, trial told*, The Guardian, 14/09/1994
- *We must be clear about sex*, The Guardian, 07/09/1999
- *Sexual harassment in this area will not be reported. However it will be graded*. Times Literary Supplement, 24/09/1999
- *Sex row rocks elite academy*, The Observer, 30/06/2002
- *Sex on campus; Don Juan defend their droit de seigneur with students*, The Observer, 17/05/1992
- *Three kinds of relationship you should never have at uni*, ‘Blogging Students’ feature, The Guardian on-line, 01/05/2013
- *One to one music tuition ‘may be abolished’*, The Guardian, 01/03/2013
- *The seven deadly sins of the academy: Lust*, THE, 17/09/2009
- *Sex and the university*, THE, 22/05/2008

**OBSERVATIONAL DATA FROM TRAINING SESSIONS**

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**COMPUTER MEDIATED DISCOURSE**

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**Other CMD analysed:**

- Below line comments following article featured in ‘Blogging Students’ feature, *Three kinds of relationship you should never have at uni*, The Guardian on-line, 01/05/2013
- *Staff and students: Consensual relations*, Subtext, issue 43: October, 2008
- *To lech in the lab may be rude, but to lech in the THES is obscene*, on-line discussion forum in crookedtimber.com, 25/09/2009
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<td>Fiction 8</td>
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Other fictional works analysed:

Films
- *Terms of Endearment*: James L. Brooks, 1983
- *The Squid and the Whale*: Noah Baumbach, 2005
- *Elegy* (film adaptation of *The Dying Animal*): Isabel Coixet, 2008

Novels
- *Zuleika Dobson*, Max Beerbohm, 1911
- *Brideshead Revisited*, Evelyn Waugh, 1945
- *The Professor of Desire*, Philip Roth, 1978
- *Coming From behind*, Howard Jacobson, 1983

INDIVIDUAL INTERVIEWS

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<td>Individual interview 2</td>
<td>Hannah (61) – Married to her former lecturer, Nigel, whom she married in 1972 when she was a 19 year old undergraduate and he was 25.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 8 - 169</td>
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<td>Individual interview 3</td>
<td>Linda (41) – 7 month relationship with MBA student, Edward, when she was a 28 year old lecturer. He was in his ‘mid-30s’.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 22 - 224-225</td>
<td>Y: 200 (title page quotation)</td>
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<td>Individual interview</td>
<td>Graham (35) – Had 2 year relationship when he was a 20 year old undergraduate with lecturer and tutor Mike, who was 27.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 16 - 205</td>
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<td>Individual interview 5</td>
<td>Sue (39) – Currently married to former student, Adam (34), whom she has been with for 3 years. Previously had a relationship with lecturer, Bob, when she was a 25 year old MA student. Bob was ‘about 10 years older’.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 21 - 221; Extract 34 - 284</td>
<td>Y: 259 (title page quotation)</td>
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<td>Individual interview 6</td>
<td>Jane (26) – Doctoral student in co-habiting relationship with academic, Albert (33) who was working in a different department from her at the time.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 23 - 227</td>
<td>Y: 145</td>
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<td>Individual interview 7</td>
<td>Anne (61) – Had 5 year relationship with academic, Jim when she was ‘about 28’ and he was ‘about 32’.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 32 - 276</td>
<td>Y: 209; 241</td>
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<td>Individual interview 8</td>
<td>Sam (37) – involved in romantic but never sexual relationship with student, Kim (20) for ‘about a year’.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 27 - 249</td>
<td>Y: 184; 259 (title page quotation)</td>
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<td>Individual interview 10</td>
<td>Otis (34) – had a ‘fling’ with lecturer, Caroline, lasting for 3 months. At the time of the relationship he was 22 and she was in her late 30s.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 33 - 282</td>
<td>Y: 242; 255-256</td>
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## COUPLE INTERVIEWS

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<td>Couple interview 1</td>
<td>Tara (34) &amp; Will (44) – Began relationship when Tara was studying as an undergraduate and Will was her lecturer. 10 year relationship, the couple are now married.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 5 - 154</td>
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<td>Couple interview 2</td>
<td>Una (50) &amp; Eloise (26) – cohabiting couple, in 2 year relationship. Met when Una was Eloise’s lecturer.</td>
<td>Y: Extract 28 - 253; Extract 31 - 273</td>
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## GROUP INTERVIEWS

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<td>Female academics: Sally (32); Sinead (41); Alice (35)</td>
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<td>Undergraduate students: Sean (26); Tyrone (21); Gill (21); Anastasia (19)</td>
<td>Y: Extract 12 - 184; Extract 24 -235-236</td>
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<td>Male academics: Richard (38); Dominic (33); Craig (41)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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