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Migration Resistance as Border Politics: 
Counter-Imaginaries of Europe

A thesis submitted to the University of Warwick for the degree of Ph.D.

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September 2014

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University of Warwick
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I dedicate this work to Mr Blakaj, his family and their endurance in a climate of unwantedness.
Declaration

This thesis is entirely my own work and no portion of it has been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract

This thesis seeks to conceptualise and mobilise migration resistances as forces of animation through which contemporary forms of European border governance can be productively explored. By following different migration struggles ethnographically, it inquires into their emergence and asks what practices of government and control they reveal. Situated within the academic fields of ‘critical border and migration studies’ and Michel Foucault’s conceptualisations of power, resistance and the art of government, resistance is understood as a method. As a set of analytics and catalysts that sets socio-political processes and phenomena into frictional motion, resistance is developed as a mode of critical investigation. It is argued that, while always specific and situated, migration struggles form transversal resistances that bring to light particular aspects of the ‘European border dispositif’ which seeks to monitor, regulate and deter certain human mobilities. In a multi-sited ethnography, conducted in diverse borderscapes, heterogeneous struggles are explored. The first study follows the Non-Citizen movement that emerged in Germany and interprets their confrontational and provocative struggle as dissent. The second ethnographic study explores the Boats4People campaign that took place in Italy and Tunisia to protest migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea and focuses on their embodied practices of solidarity. The third study follows different individuals and groups in transit into three Greek borderscapes and conceives their attempts of border-subversion and escape as excessive practices. Dissent, solidarity and excess are mobilised and interpreted as three specific but interrelated facets of resistance that collide with and contest manifold diffused border practices and materialisations throughout and beyond European space. Furthermore, it is argued that migration struggles question the community in whose name unbelonging and exclusions are performed. The thesis suggests that these resistances not only expose certain dominant discursive frames through which Europe becomes continuously reproduced and recognised as united, peaceful and humanitarian, but also draw attention to questions of colonialism and race as well as to the various registers of violence that must always underpin Europe’s division-creating practices. Through migration struggles, Europe’s dominant frames and self-conceptions are decentered so that other imaginaries of politics, solidarity and community come to the fore.
**List of Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AoM</td>
<td>Autonomy of Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christian Democratic Union of Germany</td>
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<td>CEPOL</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
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<td>CBS</td>
<td>Critical Border Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dublin II&amp;III</td>
<td>Dublin Regulation II&amp;III</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASO</td>
<td>European Asylum Support Office</td>
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<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURO</td>
<td>EU-Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EURODAC</td>
<td>European Dactyloscopy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Police Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAMM</td>
<td>Global Approach to Migration and Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT</td>
<td>Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Schengen Information System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIS</td>
<td>Visa Information System</td>
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Excerpt from research notes

A run-down flat somewhere in Athens, Greece. Smoke fills the room, the single window is only slightly ajar. The TV is on, inadvertently drawing my gaze. Or, maybe, allowing me not to meet the many eyes curiously directed at me. Jasper explains that I helped with his papers. Or, at least that is how I interpret the nodding and smiling. I feel uncomfortable. Is this one of these fieldwork situations where I take out my black notebook and ask semi-structured questions? Where I inquire into their lives, their migration journeys, their experiences of racism and violence, their resistance? Have I gained their trust by helping Jasper and did I help Jasper to gain trust, to ask my questions, to write?

I came to Greece prepared for suffering. I came because of suffering. I had read about the Golden Dawn, the hunting, stabbing and killing of migrants, the detention cages for Europe’s unwanted, the corpses floating in the Aegean Sea.

Jasper prison. A room filled with smoke, no smiles, no nodding. “Where is he from?” he asks, pointing at me. “Germany,” my friend says, in Greek. They seem unconvinced. One rolls a cigarette, not looking up. The other one seems to listen through his headphones to music. We know that our contempt for them is a mutual feeling. “When will you release Jasper?” we ask. “Soon, go away.”

We now know one another. We have been to the Doctors of the World together, the migration service, the police, been in hospitals where the doctor explained to me and not the injured person that her injury was caused not from falling onto the edge of the coffee table but because she was hit by someone. Of course, “these people hit each other, especially their women,” is implied.

When one conducts interviews or observations during fieldwork, money should not be offered. There is an ethics of research. A displaced family of Syrian war survivors collects food from the garbage container of the local supermarket and prepares food for me, every time. I am their guest of honour, they even buy meat. I give money, of course.

Jasper cannot sleep at night. He is afraid that he will run out of cigarettes that help him stay relatively calm. The flat is noisy, hot, cramped. His injured ear is infected, throbbing, reminding him of an unfortunate encounter with a border guard.

I thought I knew him. I cannot reach him for days on the phone. He has four different numbers. I mention that to a friend, a migrant rights lawyer. She says he is a smuggler, this is what they do, how they operate. I tell her that this assumption is ridiculous, that she does not know him, that I do. But what if?

In the flat, with the Greek lawyer, with Jasper. One of the older women opens up for the first time to the lawyer. Jasper translates, as always, into German. I translate into English. Not a smuggler, my doubts now distress me. Her daughter had died during their journey, in the Greek region of Evros. She was pushed into the river by a border guard, her clothes pulled her down into the water. She disappears, drowns, dies. Jasper goes quiet, he cannot translate anymore. He covers his face, cries. This is the first time he heard that story first hand. Oh no. How often did I make him listen to and translate unknown stories of his family’s suffering? Is this research?
Introduction

In contemporary EUrope, questions over how to filter, regulate, monitor or deter migration, and of how to govern both the borders of an increasingly communalised political space and those of its respective member states, have become some of the most contested and fiercely debated issues of our time. Migration and the figure of the migrant as supposed threats to national cohesion, to welfare systems, to sovereignty, to economic stability, to security, to the idea of oneself, one’s identity, culture, race, traditions, norms and values, form a spectre commonly and widely imagined, voiced and enacted. As a sentiment and a politics of fear, it became successfully mobilised by a variety of conservative and right-wing groups and parties in the 2014 EU parliamentary election, pronouncing a marked shift to the xenophobic and nationalist right. Questions of how to govern human mobilities thus raise a plethora of interrelated political concerns that ultimately revolve around matters of inclusion and exclusion, belonging and unbelonging.

Often emanating from socio-political margins, migration resistances intervene into these political questions, controversies and struggles. While their subjects are often narrated as the problem or as a disturbance to be regulated, silenced, detained or deported, this thesis argues that, on the contrary, their struggles work to problematise that which is regarded unproblematic, commonsensical, even natural, the sovereign (supra-)state system and its edges, the nation and its limits, the people and their other. Contemporary migration struggles are more than momentary parasitic noises disturbing the ongoing sovereign sound. Situated physically, conceptually, discursively and symbolically in ‘in-between zones’, they have transversal resonance. As “border elements”, migration resistances implicate several spatialities and temporalities, raise

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1 This thesis speaks of ‘EUrope’ throughout. In this way it seeks to problematise frequently employed usages that equate the EU with Europe and Europe with the EU and suggests, at the same time, that EUrope is not reducible to the institutions of the EU.
2 In this thesis ‘migration resistances’ and ‘migration struggles’ are used interchangeably.
3 Michel Foucault briefly refers to the notion of transversality in ‘The Subject and Power’ which is further explored in Chapter II. See Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, Critical Inquiry 8:4 (1982), p. 780.
questions of un/belonging, and incessantly disrupt the presumed normalcy of divisions that are performed to include some and exclude others.⁴

These migration struggles appear inevitably in relation to borders and draw attention to the ways in which borders are articulated, justified and enacted, made and unmade. They animate how borders constitute not merely seemingly stable territorial demarcations but become everyday realities and practices. Borders materialise as much at the airport, the harbour or train station as in workplaces, universities and hospitals. They inscribe themselves into visa regulations as well as onto mobile bodies, and intrude ever-more forcefully into the lives of many, with particular implications for certain individuals, groups and populations.

Migration struggles are resistances that cannot be read reductively. Besides contesting certain border materialisations and effects, they also complicate the ways in which resistance can be thought. Desires to find resistance’s supposed formula or substance, to assign to it stable and heroic characteristics, to render it merely oppositional to ‘holders of power’, to acknowledge it only when it bears success or tragic failure, or to write it into a final stroke to come, the future revolutionary upheaval overturning the misery of the present, are desires that silence resistances’ pluralities, ambiguities and potentialities. They ignore resistance’s practices and performances that materialise all around, sometimes fleetingly, invisibly, inaudibly, excessively, sometimes loudly, publicly, dissensually, while at other times in gestures of solidarity, of togetherness, of being-with. When one accepts migration struggles’ politicality, one begins to think migrations, borders and resistances differently.

This thesis begins with migration resistances and asks, through them why and how they form, and in what ways their formations animate contemporary EUnorean border governance. These are the central research concerns of the thesis and inform the idea of resistance as method as an approach to political inquiry, developed in Chapter Two. Necessitating activist and ethnographic dimensions, this approach closely follows

migration struggles and examines what unfolds through their frictional motion. Rather than seeking to create a coherent account of these struggles, it attunes to diverse and plural modalities of resistance and regards them as forces of animation that shed light on the struggles themselves as well as the many divisions and exclusions that become visible and decipherable through them.

The three ethnographies conducted in three different borderscapes listen to the manifold openings that the Non-Citizen movement (Chapter Three), the Boats4People campaign (Chapter Four), and the struggles of people in Greek transit (Chapter Five) create. Their political interventions are interpreted, respectively, as dissent, solidarity and excess. Interpreting and organising the three cases around these registers allows to emphasise central elements and characteristics that asserted themselves in the different struggles as well as the conditions within and against which they came into being. Clearly, these struggles overlap, sometimes converge or transform in the process of their practicing, forming neither exhaustive nor necessarily paradigmatic instances. They draw attention to particular grievances and particular violences that, however, are more often than not expressions of general grievances and general violences. The three instances of migration resistance provoke and cut into the forces of contemporary migration governance that seek to police, manage, deter or detain human mobilities.

Migration resistances probe the political imaginaries of the present. As the three ethnographies and Chapter Six in particular show, they allude to Europe’s conceptions of itself, point to their edges, their inconsistencies and violences. These struggles reinforce reflections on the political community, its beliefs and ideas about itself and others, that always emerge when borders and migrations become governed. The growing Europeanisation or communalisation in matters of migration governance implies that these struggles occur not merely in ‘German’, ‘Greek’, or ‘Italian/Tunisian/Mediterranean’ borderscapes but are always-also impinged upon by Europe. Local actors, nation-states, trans-, supra-, and inter-national practitioners have become entangled in European migration politics, in complex and manifold processes,

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practices and knowledges that converge as epistemic communities around issues of migration and borders and compose clusters of power-relationalities, social hegemonies, or dispositifs. Migration resistances, however, disrupt dominant knowledge/power complexes that reduce human mobility to a problem to be governed.6 By calling for equality, political rights and inclusion, by subverting manifold border-obstacles without documents and permission, or by seeking solidarities beyond divisions, these resistances render strange our segregated world and allow for the potentiality to create other political collectivities as counter-imaginaries of the present.

Migration Resistance as Method

One of the main concerns of this thesis is to build toward an understanding of resistances as transversal socio-political forces that emerge in and through multifaceted practices, acquire different forms and shapes, and may even remain largely unseen or unheard without ceasing to form contestations to processes of subjugation and economies of violence and truth. The approach resistances as method focuses on what resistances actually do. It may allow not only to trace their emergence in global conditions of injustice but also to attune to the motions they create, the confrontations and collisions they produce and build up to, as well as the ambiguities that at times accompany their practices. In this sense, migration struggles form both the subjects and analytics of this thesis. By following them closely, the three ethnographies also examine aspects of EUropean migration governance that open up due to the political unrest that they forge. While seemingly always-already entangled in forms of governance and (border) control, these struggles develop disruptive potentialities even in the most precarious of spaces and situations.

What guides the thesis throughout is the work and thought of Michel Foucault. His conceptualisations of power, resistance and the art of government underlie the idea of resistances as method as developed in Chapter Two. Foucault’s attention to subjects considered marginal in society, the mentally ill, delinquents, sexual ‘deviants’ or prison inmates, whose subjugation often became rationalised in the name of order, peace,

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nature, truth, etiquette or norm, concerned itself with socio-political processes that converged in the problematisation, abnormalisation and government of particular subjects and populations. For him, not merely the oppressions but also the struggles of societal pariahs formed diagnostics of the past and present. Reflecting on his method of investigation, Foucault suggests:

[...] rather than asking what, in a given period, is regarded as sanity or insanity, as mental illness or normal behaviour; I wanted to ask how these divisions are operated: It’s a method which seems to me to yield, I wouldn’t say the maximum of possible illumination, but at least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility.7

In the contemporary world, migration constitutes a problem to be governed, with Europe at the forefront of developing governmental techniques that facilitate some movements and hinder, arrest or deter other movements. Europe’s desire to govern mobilities seems to reflect what Foucault pronounced in Discipline and Punish, although in a different context: “every system of power is presented with the same problem [...], the ordering of human multiplicities.”8 Inspired by Foucault’s ‘histories of the present’, the thesis listens to struggles that seek to protest or subvert being problematised, abnormalised or governed and thereby reveal some of the mechanisms through which their exclusions and abjections become operated.

Attempts to order human multiplicities do not simply translate into efforts to erect ever higher gates or barriers but, indeed, into the practice of filtering mobilities through increasingly sophisticated and complex rationales and systems. Migration resistances create openings for critical investigations into these rationales and systems, into clusters of power-relations that have formed social hegemonies without simply constituting ‘classical’ sovereign structures and hierarchical forms of authority. These struggles, it is argued, not only provide a grid of analysis to examine how social hegemonies function and to expose the violence that these hegemonies always entail, but also draw attention to the weaknesses, pressure points and fallibilities of governmental regimes. When elaborating on practices of counter-conduct, Foucault argues:

By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can grasp their genealogy, i.e., the way they are formed, connect up with each other, develop, multiply, and are transformed on the basis of something other than themselves, on the basis of processes that are something other than relations of power. [...] By de-institutionalizing and de-functionalizing relations of power we can [see] the respect in which and why they are unstable.9

This thesis conceives migration struggles as diagnostics and practices that de-functionalise relations of power that have connected to form a governmental border dispositif.

While every chapter draws from the thought of Foucault, it brings other authors into conversation with contemporary migration struggles, interpreted as desert, solidarity and excess. The Non-Citizen struggle speaks in many ways to the work of Jacques Rancière on dissensus and their disruptive practices productively relate to his ideas of politics, emancipation and subjectification. Similarly, Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed’s work help think through the Boats4People practices of solidarity, especially their acts of collectively grieving and engaging in difficult encounters with (unknown) others.

In order to better understand governmental techniques of bordering that become increasingly diffused, mobile, delocalised and performed by a variety of actors, the thesis also draws upon several interrelated literatures. Critical Border Studies, the Autonomy of Migration literature, Citizenship Studies as well as critical ethnographic accounts offer diverse perspectives and tools to interrogate the complex ‘stress fields’ that form around issues of migration and its governance. These literatures, introduced mainly in Chapter One, have paid particular attention to the progressive communalisation or Europeanisation of migration and border practices and discourses that have produced novel forms of inclusion and exclusion and constitute a regime, an assemblage or a dispositif that function through intersecting forms of relations of power, authority and knowledges. My thesis is situated in these internally diverse and often overlapping literatures, and advocates a greater emphasis on a nuanced reading and conceptualisation of resistance.

Researching Migration Struggles

In this thesis migration resistances will be explored ethnographically and politically. During the time of research, manifold migration resistances emerged or already existed in many, probably in all European member states and its neighbouring countries. Following the protagonists of some of these resistances required my own political implication in their struggles so that, during my investigations, research and activism intersected. The selection of the sites and struggles discussed in the three ethnographic chapters depended on various factors and criteria, including their different locations, emphases, protagonists, actualities and progression, as well as my links to existing (migrant) activist and rights networks. Some opened up through chance encounters, and others could not be followed due to the little available resources or due to time constraints.

The three struggles examined do not merely constitute the empirical ‘evidence’ of a theoretical problem or claim. Encountering those who resist has continuously shaped my understanding of resistance, questioned and modified what I thought it might be before or at the beginning of my research, and blurred often artificially upheld distinctions between ‘the theoretical’ and ‘the empirical’. In the process of research I began to understand some of their subtleties only in close encounters, in situations that necessitated political involvement. It was clear from the outset that there could not be an objective or unengaged form of research into struggles resisting contemporary processes of filtering, that subject many to illegalised, criminalised and violent, even deadly migration paths and precarious living conditions. When resistance is conceived as method, the method must necessarily be of the political. As Chapter Two shows, various critical ethnographic accounts provide perspectives and tools to engage in political and activist forms of research, and, most importantly, encourage to build toward creative and novel methods for ethnographic explorations.

Becoming, in one way or another ‘a part of the struggles’, as explained further in the last section of Chapter Two, has not been without difficulties. In my research I faced scepticism and criticism, voiced mainly by a few activists who felt that my engagement was problematic due to the supposedly ambiguous position that my role as both ‘researcher’ and ‘activist’ implied. While most suspicions and tensions were genuinely
resolved, mainly by simply being there and engaging, my own concerns about the form of research I was pursuing, lingered. The multi-sitedness of my research allowed me to investigate different contexts and engage in a variety of struggles but, at the same time, also reduced my capacity to become fully invested in one particular campaign which translated into a feeling of insufficiency, of always doing too little. Due to reasons of personal and financial nature or due to a lack of time, I could neither accompany Boats4People activists to Tunisia nor Non-Citizen campaigners on their many marches throughout Germany and Europe. I also had to leave Greece when I had grown close to a Syrian family ‘stuck in Athens’, living in precarious conditions. At the same time, modern technologies and a growing virtual network of migration campaigners allowed me to both follow many developments from afar and contribute to the struggles in different ways, for example by translating a variety of documents, by organising solidarity campaigns and workshops, or simply by staying in touch and remaining supportive.

In the attempt to research migration struggles I had and continue to have difficulties in ascribing names to those engaging in manifold forms of resistance. Throughout, the thesis speaks of migration struggles, not migrants’ struggles. Following Foucault’s rejection of an “a priori theory of the subject”, the figure of ‘the migrant’ could equally not be assumed.10 Who constitutes a migrant-subject, a refugee, an asylum-seeker, a person on the move, an activist, a citizen? What are the subjectivities one (implicitly) ascribes, the categories one (re-)establishes when employing these burdened names and descriptions? The Non-Citizen campaigners have drawn attention to the problem of naming. Initially referring to themselves as asylum-seekers and sometimes as refugees, they came to the conclusion that ‘Non-Citizen’ would be the most accurate way to describe themselves and to highlight the predicament they found themselves in. Nonetheless, now and then ‘asylum-seeker’ or ‘refugee’ as self-descriptions re-emerged, suggesting strategic compromises with, or appropriations of dominant public-legal discourses as well as the difficulty to abandon (habitual) modes of identification that may, at times, allow for greater comprehensibility or infer certain comforts, advantages

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or rights. Whenever feasible, this thesis sought to utilise the names that the struggles and individuals had chosen for themselves, thereby also problematising the governmental naming of subjects. In the lack thereof, those struggling were referred to as ‘(migrant) activists’, ‘people on the move’ or ‘people in transit’, depending on the different contexts.

Chapter Outline
This thesis is composed of six substantive chapters. Chapter One, ‘Migrations, Borders, Resistances’, introduces and reviews three literatures that have crucially intervened in the fields of ‘border and migration studies’. Critical Border Studies (CBS), the Autonomy of Migration (AoM), as well as Citizenship Studies problematise and complicate traditional understandings of borders, migration and citizenship and draw from a plurality of academic disciplines and methodologies to engage in more nuanced readings of practices of migration, performances of borders, and enactments of citizenship. As shown in the first chapter, the three literatures also open up conceptual space for the subsequent elaborations on Foucault’s body of work in Chapter Two. This brief survey of the literatures is designed to raise critical questions about how they, if at all, conceive of and study (migration) resistance. While by no means an exhaustive account, it is argued that they under-acknowledge forces of resistance (CBS), romanticise them by problematically assigning ontological primacy to them (AoM), and confine them by tying them to the notion of citizenship (Citizenship Studies). Addressing these tendencies and shortcomings in turn, the chapter argues that the study of migration resistance requires a wider and more nuanced understanding of resistance that Chapter Two seeks to advance.

Chapter Two, ‘Resistance as Method’, provides a close reading of the work and thought of Foucault. Focusing on his elaborations on resistance, it demonstrates that, for him, resistances emerge as situated practices and never as autonomous or fully independent forces. In his eclectic discussions, Foucault moves away from a dualistic logic that positions resistance as power’s stable counter-part and draws attention to the complex and entangled relations between forces of power and forces of resistance. Heeding Foucault’s conceptions, the first two parts of the chapter read resistance alongside power and the art of government. While he abandons a ‘juridico-discursive’ reading of power and the equation of power with domination, Foucault nonetheless explains how
power-relationalities can intersect to form clusters and social hegemonies.\(^{11}\) Locating shifts in the formation and exertion of political authority, he provides a genealogical account of the ‘art’ of government and traces significant transformations in the rationalities and enactments of political power that led to the emergence of governmental regimes or dispositifs.\(^{12}\) Importantly, Foucault shows that modern governmental rationalities surfaced also due to resistances, suggesting a complex entanglement of forces of resistance and those of power. Further, he gestures toward an experimental gaze of investigation that comprehends resistances as analytics. Situated within Foucault’s understanding of resistance, power and government, the third part of the chapter suggests an understanding of (migration) resistance as method. This method, it is argued, provides productive openings to ethnographically explore the ways migration struggles contest and thereby expose (some) governmental technologies, practices and truths that underpin and enact European migration governance.

Chapter Three, ‘Dissent as Border Resistance – The Non-Citizen Struggle’, forms the first ethnographic study of the thesis and follows the Non-Citizen movement that emerged in Germany in 2012. Responding to the suicide of Mohammad Rahsepar, a resident of a communal asylum-centre, fellow residents began to organise a protest campaign of unprecedented intensity, scale and duration that challenged, in often antagonistic manner the laws, actors, discourses and socio-political conditions that forced them into ‘non-citizenship’, a state of societal marginality and enduring deportability. The chapter interprets Non-Citizen resistance and rights-claiming as dissent and inquires into some of their disruptive movements and practices with the help of Jacques Rancière’s work. Throughout their struggle, the Non-Citizens sought physical, discursive and symbolic confrontations with authorities they deemed responsible for their unfreedom and subjugation. In various demonstrations, marches, occupations and hunger-strikes, they publically staged their political interventions, demanding to be heard and seen as political subjects. Non-Citizen protests pose a series of difficult questions not only to (border) authorities but also to (citizen) supporters, and demonstrate how

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\(^{11}\) Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, 1998, p. 82.
\(^{12}\) In this thesis ‘regimes’ and ‘dispositifs’ are used interchangeably while dispositif will be the term commonly employed.
the staging of demands for (sovereign) citizenship-rights can, nonetheless, constitute a politics of resistance.

In Chapter Four, ‘Solidarity as Border Resistance – Boats4People’, the thesis explores a solidarity campaign that took place in summer 2012. Boats4People activists travelled from Italy to Tunisia to protest the deadly conditions of the Mediterranean Sea that, as they argued, were direct consequences and effects of an ever-more restrictive and violent EUropean border regime. The campaign, organised by various NGOs and activist groups sought to create closer ties with activist and migrant groups in (Northern) Africa to collectively intervene in a (border-)space often considered empty, unpolitical or reserved exclusively for state and EU border practitioners. The Boats4People struggle revolved around the notion of solidarity, a sentiment that found expression in public commemorations and encounters with the families of those who had disappeared or died when trying to reach EUropean shores. Interpreting their practices of solidarity as facets of resistance and drawing from the work of Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed, the chapter explores how the Boats4People campaign sought togetherness in difficult, even ‘impossible’ encounters.

Chapter Five, ‘Excess as Border Resistance – Encounters in Transit’, follows migration struggles into three Greek-EUropean borderscapes. It listens to people in transit who successfully entered EUrope but decided, nonetheless, to move on. Having been stuck in Greece for months or years they sought to flee, somehow, often clandestinely and in dangerous and precarious ways. The island of Lesvos, the capital city of Athens, and the coastal city of Patras constitute particular but related sites of bordering where people in transit hope to find the paths and means for their eventual escape. Through the narration of their migration experiences and by mobilising Foucault’s short piece Lives of Infamous Men, the chapter explores whether their everyday contestations can be thought of as excessive struggles that subvert the EUropean border dispositif’s attempts to deter their movements beyond Greece. The idea of excess is closely linked to an (Foucauldian) understanding of freedom as the creative human potentiality to remain or become ‘otherwise’, to re-imagine and re-invent one’s possibilities, even in conditions of extreme violence and control. This chapter suggests that while excess cannot be measured, it can also not remain a hopeful assumption but, instead, necessitates ethnographic exploration. Listening in different Greek borderscapes to diverse migration narratives, it
inquires into whether there were stories, signs or movements that might gesture toward an excessive potential of (human) being and mobility.

The final Chapter Six, ‘EUnorpe in Question’, reflects on the ways in which the different migration struggles explored animate not only facets of the EUnornonan border dispositif but reveal also certain frames of EUronpe. It argues that in its migration and border practices, EUronpe’s idea/l of itself emerges. Drawing again from Butler’s work, the chapter shows how EUronpe’s divisionary practices become discursively framed in manners that seek to rationalise, explain or justify border practices that must inevitably enact who belongs to EUronpe’s community and who does not. The dominant (normative) frames of ‘EUronpe united in diversity’ and ‘humanitarian EUronpe’ become produced and reproduced in EUronpean border politics and were also articulated in each of the three ethnographies. These frames seek to create a particular and recognisable image of EUronpe and its role in the world. However, they do not remain uncontested. Migration struggles question, provoke and render strange EUronpe’s dominant frames and create counter-frames, ‘post-colonial EUronpe’, as well as other imaginaries, ‘collectivities in transit’. It is through these manifold modalities of struggle that counter-imaginaries become enacted, even if only fleetingly.

The three ethnographies in particular and the thesis as a whole speak of multiple resistances that acquire in dissent, solidarity and excess different performative dimensions and offer a critique. Their critiques were variously ‘openly voiced’ in confrontations with border practitioners, enacted in hidden border-subversions, or otherwise expressed in moments of despair or grieving that responded to, without fully comprehending, the incomprehensible violence that particular individuals, groups and populations faced, endured or succumbed to. While their critiques do not necessarily align with one another, they respond, in various ways, to the creation, practice and justification of exclusions and the inequalities that these entail or are based upon, rendering certain subjects particularly exposed to exploitation and subjugation.

This thesis seeks to draw out some of these critiques that migration struggles voice and embody, not only to point to related registers and sources of injustice and suffering but also to illustrate the formation of heterogeneous insubordinations, rebellions and
counter-collectivities. These critiques do not form manifestos or programmes but, rather, become instruments for struggle. As Foucault suggests:

Critique doesn’t have to be the premise of a deduction which concludes: this then is what needs to be done. It should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and refuse what is. Its use should be in processes of conflict and confrontation, essays in refusal. It doesn’t have to lay down the law for the law. It isn’t a stage in a programming. It is a challenge directed to what is.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13} Foucault, ‘Questions of method’, 1991, p. 84.
Chapter One: Migrations, Borders, Resistances

Introduction
The introduction to the thesis suggested that migration struggles, as transgressive socio-political practices, can be understood as forces of animation that draw attention to the ways in which differentiations amongst individuals, populations and spaces are created, (normatively) justified and enacted, not only by the state and its practitioners but by a variety of governmental actors, systems and discourses.

Forming diverse contestations to governmental subjection, these struggles expose related registers of violence, render several (sovereign) taken-for-granted assumptions strange and provoke re-conceptualisations of what it might mean to be political.¹ Their conflictual and ‘scandalous’ political potential emerges precisely in their practice of enforcing complex encounters at boundaries that seek to convey differences, distinctions and divisions. Migration struggles’ constitutive in-betweenness brings ‘onto-political’ questions to the fore and has, of course, also implications for the ways they can be read and thought.²

Questions and issues revolving around migrations, borders and resistances have been explored by a variety of scholarly traditions and disciplines, including International Relations, Political Sociology, Migration and Refugee Studies, Anthropology, (Critical/Political/Human) Geography and Security Studies, Philosophy, Political Theory, European-, Postcolonial-, Legal- and Cultural Studies, and Social Movement literatures. The boundaries that often artificially separate these fields have become increasingly porous with literatures emerging that situate themselves in-between academic traditions.

Amongst them are Critical Border Studies, the Autonomy of Migration and Citizenship Studies. This thesis draws from these three interrelated literatures as they provide both the theoretical nuance and critical methodological resources to better understand the significance and disruptive potential of migration struggles.

This first chapter forms a brief review that, instead of aiming to capture the entirety of what might be referred to as ‘critical border and migration studies’, seeks to locate and point to particular debates, tensions and openings, as well as possible shortcomings in these burgeoning bodies of work. Critical Border Studies, the Autonomy of Migration, and Citizenship Studies speak to each other in multiple, often overlapping ways while focusing on or emphasising particular aspects and can thus be productively brought into conversation.

I situate my thesis at the fluid and fuzzy junctures where the three literatures meet. They resonate with my central research concerns in that they critique traditional conceptions of borders, migrations and their governance, and thereby open space for an interrogation that begins with migration struggles to explore EUropean border governance. They also help create conceptual spaces within which I situate my particular reading of Foucault’s body of work in Chapter Two that, in turn, seeks to develop new directions of inquiry, beginning with questions of resistance.

While this thesis and its idea of resistance as method draws from these literatures, it, at the same time, departs from problematic aspects within them that the review highlights, such as the under-acknowledgment of questions of migration resistance in CBS, the questionable assigning of ontological primacy to migration in the AoM, and the limiting association of resistance with citizenship in Citizenship Studies.

This chapter is divided into three parts that respectively inquire into the literatures of CBS, the AoM and Citizenship Studies. While discussing three extensive and internally diverse literatures in one chapter must inevitably fail to do justice to them, these snapshots seek to allude to their many contributions, the productive tensions between them, as well as the potential silences and shortcomings within them, some of which my thesis attempts to address.
Part I - Critical Border Studies (CBS)

In *Politics and the Other Scene*, Étienne Balibar understands the impossibility of finding simple answers to the question of what a border constitutes as an opportunity to complicate and, in fact, “overturn the false simplicity of some obvious notions”. Instead of assigning essentialising characteristics to borders, Balibar suggests an investigation of their heterogeneous (re-)materialisations and meanings, the plurality of functions they serve at different times and in different places, their identity-generating capacities, and their (violent) effects for certain individuals, groups and populations.

Critical Border Studies can be thought as responding to Balibar’s call to problematise and complicate borders as well as that what they attempt to demarcate. Developing into an extensive literature that spans various academic fields and disciplines, CBS scholars have moved away from conceptions of borders as mere fixed physical entities that, as ‘points of reference’ designate exclusive spheres of sovereign authority, governance and ownership, or signal the beginning of a supposedly ‘anarchic beyond’. Instead of accepting borders as natural, neutral or static formations, critical border scholars have begun to rethink and deconstruct the border, its appearance, meaning and function.

This brief survey, without claiming to capture the totality of its multiple strands and perspectives, explores CBS’s main interventions and focuses on five interrelated (re-)conceptualisations of borders: Borders as *performances/processes/practices*, as *mobile* constructs, as *everyday* phenomena, as imbued with heterogeneous *meanings* and as *alternative spatial imaginaries*. The thesis shares these conceptions of diffuse borders and further elaborates on their different characteristics, dimensions and materialisations in the three ethnographies. This part also turns to CBS’s critical interrogation of processes of Europeanisation and communalisation in matters of migration and border politics that are pivotal for understanding the subsequent developments of European migration governance toward a *border dispositif*.

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Rather than constituting mere territorial ‘facts or lines on the ground’ (re)drawn exclusively by sovereign states, critical border scholars have suggested an understanding of borders as performances, processes, and practices. Noel Parker and Nick Vaughan-Williams call for border scholars to pay attention to “what and where borders are and how they function in different settings” by adopting “the lens of performance through which bordering practices are produced and reproduced.”

They advocate a shift from rather static to more dynamic conceptions in order to “[free] the study of borders from the epistemological, ontological, and methodological shackles of an ultra-modernistic, ‘territorialist’ Western geopolitical imagination.” As Vaughan-Williams argues:

> The notion that both the nature and location of borders have undergone some sort of transformation requires a quantum leap in the way we think about bordering practices and their effects. It also radically challenges the kinds of orientation hitherto provided by the modern geopolitical imaginary underpinned by the concept of the border of the state.

Thinking borders as performances contests and displaces traditional conceptions of the state as sole arbiter of and simply framed by sovereign territorial markers and moves the attention to the various actors that enact borders, referred to as ‘border practitioners’ throughout the thesis.

Relatedly, Chris Rumford argues that borders should be seen as processes of ‘bordering’ in which a variety of actors partake and not exclusively the state: “[O]rdinary people (citizens, non-citizens) are increasingly active in constructing, shifting, or even erasing borders.” What Rumford terms ‘borderwork’ denotes the capacity of a variety of subjects to engage in defining, questioning and performing borders. For him, theorising borders “involves an attempt to understand the nature of the social” as well

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as “questions of identity, belonging, political conflict, and societal transformation”, so that by seeking to ‘see like a border’, one recognises “that borders are woven into the fabric of society and are the routine business of all concerned.”

Mark Salter also argues for abandoning ‘the line’ “as the primary metaphor of border studies” and instead suggests ‘suture’, “a process of knitting together the inside and the outside”, as a more adequate way of thinking the performativity of borders.

Didier Bigo prefers to conceive borders as a ‘Möbius ribbon’, a strip that renders outside-inside distinctions inter-subjective, as within it, “zones of indetermination appear; zones of conflation (of violence and meanings) emerge”.

Seeking to escape the geopolitical imaginary pointed out by Vaughan-Williams and illustrated by John Agnew as the ‘territorial trap’ in 1993, CBS moved toward an understanding of borders as mobile and displaced forces, found and re-materialising throughout political space. Balibar’s announcement that borders were no longer ‘at the border’ but, instead, vacillating, did not suggest that they were disappearing:

[B]orders are being both multiplied and reduced in their localization and their function; they are being thinned out and doubled, becoming borders zones, regions, or countries where one can reside and live [sic].

Borders, for Balibar, have become dispersed, heterogeneous and ubiquitous entities, materialising “wherever selective controls are to be found”. He maintains that as borders multiply and become “transported into the middle of political space”, they create “problems at the heart of civic space where they generate conflicts, hopes, and
frustrations for all sorts of people, as well as inextricable administrative and ideological difficulties for states.”

Relatedly, Nicholas De Genova shows how border policing and immigration enforcements create ‘border spectacles’ throughout state space that “[render] migrant ‘illegality’ ever more unsettlingly ubiquitous.” De Genova detects in these acts of border policing not only performances of exclusion but also ‘obscene’ practices of inclusion. While the illegality and deportability of migrants is publicly visibilised and displayed, the performed border spectacle entails also “its shadowy, publicly unacknowledged or disavowed, obscene supplement: the large-scale recruitment of illegalized migrants as legally vulnerable, precarious, and thus tractable labour.” In this sense, deportable migrants become included as permanently precarious, subjugated and dispensable labour forces. For De Genova, it is the condition of deportability “that has historically rendered undocumented migrant labor a distinctly disposable commodity.”

The proliferation of border enforcements, enacted in the middle and throughout civic space, suggests the mobilisation of border controls as a governmental method of (re)stating the deportability and thus exploitability of undocumented migrants. At the same time, De Genova also suggests that these border spectacles can be reversed and subverted through (public) migrant mobilisations and acts of protest.

Various critical border scholars have pointed to the process of spatial and temporal border-displacement, the processes of outsourcing, offshoring, externalising, diffusing, or digitalising borders. Louise Amoore in particular emphasises the effects of border-

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21 Ibid., p. 1181.
technologisation and digitalisation. For her, the biometric border becomes pivotal in the turn toward 'scientific' border management as it constitutes “the portable border par excellence, carried by mobile bodies at the very same time as it is deployed to divide bodies at international boundaries, airports, railway stations, on subways or city streets, in the office or the neighbourhood.”25 The biometric border, for her, means “an extension of biopower” as mobile bodies become ‘carrying devices' inscribed with data that allows for their government with grave consequences for “a politics of resistance or dissent” as the supposedly unbiased biometric border “appears to foreclose the possibility of public critique”.26 As Amoore alludes to, the mobility of borders has, of course, also temporal aspects. As borders shift they can become (re-)enacted to pre-empt certain movements, for example through processes of risk-assessment, “designed to be as mobile as the subjects and objects in transit that they seek to control.”27

Their spatial and temporal displacement renders (performances of) borders everyday phenomena with a variety of practitioners engaging in ‘borderwork’.28 CBS's turn to the individual, personal and everyday reflects a wider tendency in the political sciences to engage sociological and anthropological insights which had hitherto been sidelined, while at the same time keeping in sight the ‘international’ dimension.29 Importantly, for

CBS, everyday experiences and materialisations of borders have both individual and international dimensions. As mobile and everyday processes, borders are imbued with multiple meanings; they never have the same meaning for everyone.\(^{30}\) John Williams argues that borders should not be seen “as a spatial fact with a sociological impact, but a sociological fact that shapes spatially.”\(^{31}\) For him, borders are socially constructed “meaning-making and meaning-carrying entities”.\(^{32}\) Similarly, Anssi Paasi suggests that the border is endowed with symbolic meaning in relation to the ‘other’. Through its socialisation in the media, education, administration, politics and state ceremonies, identity narratives are created that provide people with “common experiences, history and memories” that bind them together.\(^{33}\) The production of these narratives is political as “struggles over narrations are [...] struggles over identity”.\(^{34}\) For Rob Walker, imagining the outside as dangerous and mysterious fulfils a political function: “[K]nowing the other outside, it is possible to affirm identity inside [...] knowing identities inside, it is possible to imagine the absences outside.”\(^{35}\)”

When borders are conceived as complex, polysemic sites that constitute not merely devices of exclusion but of (differential) inclusion and encounter, that are imbued with multiple histories, meanings and implications and become performed by a multiplicity of actors, they form also alternative spatial imaginaries.\(^{36}\) Vicki Squire, for example, speaks of ‘borderzones’ that constitute “physical or virtual sites marked by the intensification of

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\(^{36}\) Vaughan-Williams, *Border Politics* 2009; see also Henk van Houtum, Oliver Kramsch and Wolfgang Zierhofer, eds., *By orders of Space* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 2-5.

The term \textit{borderscape} reminds one of the specter of other senses of the border, of experiences, economies, and politics that are concealed. The instrumental usage of the border as a tool of governmentality must always be incomplete. […] The borderscape is thus a zone of varied and differentiated encounters. It is neither enveloped by the state nor semantically exhaustible.\footnote{Rajaram and Grundy-Warr, Borderscapes, 2007, pp. xxix-xxx, emphasis in original.}

The EU, forming a border- scape, zone or land, has become of particular interest to CBS scholars. The gradual dismantling of Europe’s internal borders and the growing communalisation of immigration controls, most advanced in the Schengen Area, has drawn attention to the various (re-)bordering processes involved.\footnote{Christina Boswell, ‘The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy’, International Affairs 79:3 (2003), pp. 619-638.} In the harmonisation process, especially since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 both territorial controls over the common external borders and “deterritorialised control around the individual and the free movement of persons” have become reinforced, as Bigo et al note.\footnote{Didier Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild, and R.B.J. Walker, ‘The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project’, Research Paper No. 4 (2007), www.ceps.be, Accessed 25/11/2012, p. 18.}
Following the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 77 (1) of the ‘consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union 2010’ envisions the development of a union policy to “[c]arry out checks on persons and efficient monitoring of the crossing of external borders” and to gradually introduce “an integrated management system for external borders” while “ensuring the absence of any controls on persons, whatever their nationality, when crossing internal borders.”44 The developments toward greater communalisation were accompanied by the emergence of a complex landscape of interconnected agencies, systems, policies, rules, regulations, codes and agreements, directly or indirectly related to bordering processes (inter alia Frontex, Europol, Cepol, Easo, SIS I&II, VIS, Schengen Border & Visa Codes, Dublin II&III, Eurodac, Eurosur, ENP, GAMM, and other (bilateral) agreements).45

CBS has attuned to EUropean borderwork by following its bordering practices that, rather than attached to its geographical edges, materialise throughout and beyond what is commonly understood as EUropean space.46 Intensifying processes of communalisation and Europeanisation have prompted many critical border scholars to more closely investigate the complex ways in which EUropean borders become enforced and migrations governed. Squire refers to a proliferation and diffusion of EU border controls, their ‘explosion’ and ‘implosion’, through which it is sought to trace ‘irregular’ migration.47 For her, the “framing of irregular migration as a political concern [...] is thus intimately linked to processes of securitization and criminalization”.48

Instead of constituting a hierarchical system, the thicket of EUropean border and migration governance involves a variety of actors, systems and rationales, transforming traditional nation-state logics of sovereignty, authority and space. Serhat Karakayalı and Enrica Rigo demonstrate that the (institutional, legal, political) extension of EU

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46 Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, eds., Controlling Frontiers (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005).
48 Ibid., p. 3.
“authority does not coincide with the perimeters of the member states or with the sum of their territories” so that “the deterritorialization of the EU’s external and internal borders defines the European legal and political space as a space that is dedicated not to a sedentary community but to the government of mobility, both inside and outside official member states’ perimeters.”

Inspired in particular by the work of Foucault, CBS scholars (but also those associated with the AoM and Citizenship Studies) have increasingly conceived and defined Europe’s political authority in matters of border control as entangled relationalities, forming ‘networks’, ‘assemblages’, ‘governmental regimes’, ‘apparatuses’ or ‘dispositifs’. This shift toward alternative modalities of border authority seemed needed to better understand how migration governance operated. While Chapter Two will more closely trace the emergence of the‘biopolitical art of government’ in Foucault’s thought and point to the emergence of a European border dispositif, I will briefly allude to some of these different (thought) constructs here.

William Walters, for example, when analysing ‘Schengenland’, conceptualises its geopolitical formation as an ‘assemblage’ consisting of heterogeneous elements, including not only “police and military system, but cartographic, diplomatic, legal, geological, and geographical knowledges and practices.” Similarly, Luiza Bialasiewicz speaks of a “fluid assemblage of agreements and actors” through which Europe conducts the government of mobility “with considerable slippage between the bordering practices of Member States and what is done ‘on behalf’ of the Union.”

Bigo understands EU border practices as ‘configurations’ that have increasingly moved the exercise of controls away from the state and toward “networks of security professionals beyond the national frontiers.” Gregory Feldman refers to a migration management ‘apparatus’ that operates without a central authority but through indirect or ‘non-local’

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(bureaucratic) relations and particular rationales of government. For Feldman, this apparatus is

[...] composed of a bewildering array of actors, knowledge practices, technical requirements, labor regulations, security discourses, normative subjectivities, and repurposed institutions that create the conditions for the orderly movement of bodies by the millions.

Dimitris Papadopoulos, Niamh Stephenson and Vassilis Tsianos prefer the term ‘regime of mobility’ to describe “contemporary transformations from transnational governance to postliberal sovereignty”. While, for them, the notion of ‘system’ places too great an emphasis on the aspect of control, “the term regime allows the inclusion of many different actors whose practices, while related, are not organised in terms of a central logic, but are multiply overdetermined.”

De Genova, Paolo Cuttitta as well as Sabine Hess and Bernd Kasparek also adopt the notion of regime to conceptualise the ‘Europeanisation’ or ‘governmentalisation’ of migration (and deportation) politics. Others, such as Sonja Buckel and Jens Wissel, whilst utilising the term ‘regime’, mobilise more tradition imaginaries associated with the nation-state when speaking of the “European state project”. Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson introduce the idea of a “sovereign machine of governmentality” to draw attention to the border conceptualised as “a space where sovereign and governmental powers interact and are contested by the autonomous action of migrants themselves.”

James Scott and Henk van Houtum evoke the image of EUrope as a ‘gated community’

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57 Ibid., emphasis in original.
60 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, Border as Method (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), p. 188.
when criticising the restrictive nature of the EU’s external borders, and ‘bordering processes’ that create “distinctions between groups of peoples according to varying degrees of ‘EU-Europeanness’.”

As shown so far, in the pursuit of complicating ‘the border’, CBS scholars have reconceptualised borders as practices, processes and performances, as imbued with multiple meanings, as mobile and everyday phenomena, all of which have allowed for alternative spatial imaginaries to emerge, borderzones, -lands or -scapes. Their investigations of EUropean borderwork in particular have drawn attention to the manifold (re)bordering practices that progressive efforts toward communalisation imply. Attuning to the diffusion of borders enables to more closely scrutinise their (re)appearances and effects.

At the same time, thinking borders as contingent, ambiguous and dynamic everyday-phenomena that can potentially re-materialise ‘at any moment’ and ‘everywhere’, may entail the risk of losing sight of their violent dimensions that affect certain individuals, groups and populations particularly harshly, directly, even necropolitically. Corey Johnson and Reece Jones, for example, while welcoming the shift toward dispersed and dispersing borders, argue that the “expansive understanding of borders [...] has also obscured what a border is.” They insist on considering “the place of borders in border studies” as borders remain ‘real-life’ constructions with significant political consequences. Reminding CBS to think politically about changes in the relationship between state authority and space, Johnson and Jones argue that borders often, as in the case of EUrope’s external borders, remain “‘sharp’ markers of difference.”

Similarly, Alison Mountz also cautions not to “lose sight of the physical manifestations, material realities, and everyday productions of borders that function to include and

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64 Ibid., p. 62, emphasis in original.
65 Ibid., p. 61.
exclude a range of people.” Mountz argues that the discipline of CBS needs to pay attention to the ‘how’ and ‘where’ borders are moving and “how this movement can be conceived of as political.” While it constitutes a complex endeavour to trace ‘provisional’ and mobile border configurations, they have, for her, “not simply been relocated everywhere” but become “reconstituted with enforcement methods in strategic locations” so that CBS researchers need to “offer creative ways of mapping borders.”

Heeding these remarks of caution, this thesis attunes to migration resistances that point to border-effects which impact on the lives of particular individuals, groups and populations, and are experienced and felt by them in often painful ways. While these struggles have been noticed and acknowledged in the CBS literature as important elements in border politics, they remain underexplored. In the AoM and Citizenship Studies literatures, migration struggles have found greater resonance and attention, even if their discussions entail several problematic aspects, as pointed out in the following two parts.

Beginning with resistances emphasises the need to think concretely and ethnographically about the materialisations of borders that have become diffused only to re-emerge violently in the lives of many. Migration struggles do not emerge ‘everywhere’ but in certain locations where borders are performed in often exclusionary fashion. One way of ‘mapping the border’, then, is to attune to the many practices of resistance that currently contest certain European border performances, processes and practices, a crucial task also in order to counteract assumptions that assign lesser a degree of (sovereign) violence to diffused or biopolitical-governmental border practices. Whilst

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 See for exceptional examples the recent special issues in Postcolonial Studies and Citizenship Studies: Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli, ‘Challenging the discipline of migration: militant research in migration studies’, Postcolonial Studies, 16:3 (2013); Imogen Tyler and Katarzyna Marciniak, ‘Immigrant protest: an introduction’, Citizenship Studies, 17:2 (2013); see also Alexandra Zavos, ‘Moving relationships/shifting alliances: Constructions of migration in the leftist anti-racist movement in Athens’, Annals of Critical Psychohistory, 6 (2012), pp. 89-109; as well as the work of Anne McNevin, Nicholas De Genova, Peter Nyers, Kim Rygiel, and Enrica Rigo who all cross the disciplines of CBS, the AoM, and Citizenship Studies and whose work will be discussed in the following two parts.
CBS has drawn extensively from Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopolitics, it has paid less attention to the question of resistance. For Foucault, however, as illustrated in Chapter Two, resistances constitute crucial forces of friction, not only probing the fallibility, ruptures and instability of governmental regimes but also inventing other relations among struggling subjects, envisioning other communities. Migration struggles can be productively read alongside CBS as they, in confronting dominant practices of bordering, expose the paradoxes at the heart of border regimes and offer a different perspective to politically inquire into the functioning of the EUropean border dispositif and into EUrope as a communal space.

The approach of following migration struggles in and around the EUropean borderland contributes to the CBS literature by offering a perspective through which the inclusionary and exclusionary politics of the EUropean border dispositif can be dynamically explored and problematised. The intensification of struggles within and around EUrope indicates that its bordering processes have produced suffering on a mass scale which remains, however, not unopposed. Listening to migration struggles also means paying closer attention to the ways in which the differentiation function of borders separates out particular individuals, groups and populations. The polysemic characteristics of borders imply “different experiences of the law, the civil administration, the police and elementary rights” for different individuals and groups of people, not merely in terms of social class as Balibar notes, but also along racialised and gendered lines.\textsuperscript{70} This thesis is understood as a contribution to the growing field of critical border and migration studies within which CBS has provided crucial re-conceptualisations of borders and (other) political spaces and practices.

**Part II - The Autonomy of Migration (AoM)**

The Autonomy of Migration literature also forms an intervention in migration and border studies by challenging traditional ways of thinking and researching human mobility. Emerging from academic and political traditions associated with ‘Autonomist Marxism/Italian Operaismo’, the AoM, while closely related to CBS, begins political analysis not by investigating the diffusion and re-materialisation of borders but by

\textsuperscript{70}Balibar, *Politics and the Other Scene*, 2002, p. 81.
attuning to the ‘autonomy’ of migration, understood as the primacy of (migratory) mobility over (border) control. As an attempt to abandon dominant conceptions of migration as mere passive reactions to economic or social pressures, as objectifiable processes responding to ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors, the AoM understands migration as a dynamic social force and an excessively subversive process. In the AoM literature, subjects of migration are not primarily depicted as vulnerable, passive or abject victims but as subjects whose mobilities constitute political mobilities that often escape the forces that seek to monitor, regulate, capture or deter them.

In 1992, Yann Moulier Boutang was amongst the first to suggest that, despite “myriads of experts and officials” in state administrations and international organisations, forces of emigration and immigration and their independence would surpass attempts to regulate them.71 Notwithstanding forms of repression seeking to counteract migratory movements, Moulier Boutang argues that, ultimately, it would be impossible to fully tame them. For him, shifting the gaze toward the autonomy of migration allows for a departure from conceptions of migrations as negative practices that respond merely to socio-political pressures, toward migration understood as a positive political practice.72

Sandro Mezzadra, further developing these lines of thought, suggests that the perspective of the AoM “means looking at migratory movements and conflicts in terms that prioritize the subjective practices, the desires, the expectations and the behaviours of migrants themselves.”73 For him, the approach illustrates “how the ‘politics of control’ itself is compelled to come to terms with a ‘politics of migration’ that structurally exceeds its (re)bordering practices.”74 Mezzadra proposes the idea of the ‘right to escape’ which seeks “to highlight the elements of subjectivity which permeate the migratory movements and which must be kept in mind if one wants to produce an

74 Ibid.
image of these movements as social movements in the full sense.” 75 Michael Hardt and
Antonio Negri capture the sentiment underlying the AoM when they state:

A specter haunts the world and it is the specter of migration. All the powers of the
old world are allied in a merciless operation against it, but the movement is
irresistible. [...] The legal and documented movements are dwarfed by clandestine
migrations: the borders of national sovereignty are sieves [...]. 76

The spectre of migration, the AoM suggests, does not adhere to traditional conceptions
of the political to be political. For Angela Mitropoulos, ‘the Left’ tends to ignore the
politicality of migration in order to “[reserve] for itself the semblance and definition of
political struggle, movement, and representation”, thereby, however, recreating “the
structure of the sovereign decision”. 77 Important also for later conceptualisations of
(migration) resistance, Mitropoulos suggests that the AoM forms “an insistence that
politics does not need to be the property of the state and those who [...] can claim to
reserve for themselves the thought and action that is deemed to be properly political.” 78
She further argues:

[The AoM] amounts to a challenge to the sovereign and representational disposition
within what passes for the Left, to the very construction of what it means to be an
activist, to do politics, and to recognise movements and struggles as such. 79

Papadopolous, Stephenson, and Tsianos in particular advance the idea of migration as a
spectre, as a creative and imperceptible social force that excessively escapes and subverts
forms of control. 80 In Escape Routes, they argue:

[M]igration is autonomous, meaning that – against a long history of social control
over mobility as well as a similarly oppressive research in the field of migration
studies – migration has been and continues to be a constituent force in the formation
of sovereignty. Engaging with the autonomy of migration is primarily a matter of
acquiring a different sensibility [...]. 81

77 Angela Mitropoulos, ‘Autonomy, Recognition, Movement’, in Stephen Shukaitis, David Graeber and
78 Ibid., p. 132.
79 Ibid.
For them, this sensibility allows to focus on the many forms of subversion that always occur when people move, and they do move regardless of forces of control. These subversions need not be named or, rather, cannot be adequately named as, for Papadopolous et al, they constitute ‘escape’ which is “primarily imperceptible” and differs from ‘escape from’ as it is “only after control tries to recapture escape routes can we speak of ‘escape from’.” Imperceptible escape routes, then, are those paths that are found or to some extent ‘made’ by those on the move and in transit, creatively, strategically and excessively. Elsewhere, Papadopolous and Tsianos suggest that the AoM thesis “is about training our senses to see movement before capital (but not independent from it) and mobility before control (but not as disconnected from it).” Responding to the charge that the AoM would often tend to romanticise migration, they state:

There is no space for romanticisation of nomadism and migration in the autonomy of migration approach. Migration grapples with the harsh, often deadly, realities of control. However, the point is migration is not just responding to them. Rather it creates new realities that allow migrants to exercise their own mobility against or beyond existing control.

Papadopolous and Tsianos re-emphasise that migration is “not simply [...] a response to political and economic necessities, but [...] a constituent force in the formation of polity and social life” with “the capacity to develop its own logics, its own motivation, its own trajectories that control comes later to respond to, not the other way round.”

Relatedly, Manuela Bojadžijev and Serhat Karakayah argue that the idea of migration as a ‘water-tap’ that could be turned on or off depending on countries’ economic needs for labour forces is flawed, as migration could neither be reduced to economic rationales

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82 Ibid., p. xiii, emphasis in original.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
nor exhaustively directed. For them, instead of a ‘one-way-road’, migration conceived as autonomous allows to understand migration as emerging in social conflicts that inhabit new forms of cooperation, communication, life. They state:

The concept of the autonomy of migration connects to the persistence of migrant movements and the drive towards mobility on the basis of social networks. In the process of migration, migrants divest themselves of existing forms of sociality.

For them, migration and its control need to be seen as processes intimately tied to the history of capitalism:

The first proletarians in Europe were mobile workers. They were people who had fled the feudal mode of production to work in the cities, and were chased across Europe as vagabonds, crooks, and the poor.

In order to tame the ‘mob’, they argue, the proletariat’s societal integration became reinforced and “all characteristics that had been ascribed to them were transferred to the borders of the nation-state.” Complicating migration (control), for Bojadžijev and Karakayalı means also overcoming the metaphor of ‘fortress Europe’ which would simplify the processes and practices that give rise to “a complex system of limitation, differentiation, hierarchisation, and the differential inclusion of migrant groups.” For them, despite the complexification of a system of mobility control, the AoM approach allows “exploring migratory lines of flight as social movement in the intermediate zones, where migration slips out of the hands of regulative, codifying, and stratifying policies.”

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
Similarly, De Genova detects in the freedom of movement a “defiant reminder that the
creative powers of human life, and the sheer vitality of its productive potential, must
always exceed every political regime.” Conceiving migration as possessing a “moment
of independence vis-à-vis political measures seeking to control them” as Rutvica
Andrijasevic et al note, speaks also to Ranabir Samaddar’s conception of autonomy as
‘governmentality’s other’. Samaddar notes that autonomy functions as a “symbol for
the emerging patterns of new spaces in politics, spaces that speak of rights, and
justice”. He proposes an understanding of autonomy as “practices that give birth to
the political subject whose existence is in contradistinction to the existence of the
governmental realities of this world.” In accordance with many AoM scholars,
Samaddar ties autonomy to the idea of excess, for example when he notes that
“autonomy always points to the supplement that remains after (the task of) government
has been achieved.”

Underlying these accounts of the AoM, only briefly pointed out, is the idea of migration
as something excessive, always at work, actively transforming the social, making
not as a collective subject or political party implementing political programmes or
demanding political change, but as a multitude of people on the move changing politics.
When migration is regarded as an autonomous force that “[changes] history by
undermining the sovereign pillars of contemporary societies”, one can assume the
AoM’s scepticism toward (the framework of) citizenship. Instead of calling for the
expansion of citizenship and its capacity to include, as many advocates of Citizenship
Studies do, Papadopolous et al suggest that the force of migration would “create new
situations which cannot be conceived within the existing framework of citizenship”.

93 Rutvica Andrijasevic, Manuela Bojadzijev, Sabine Hess, Serhat Karakayali, Efthimia Panagiotidis and
Vassilis Tsianos, ‘Turbulente Ränder Konturen eines neuen Migrationsregimes im Südosten Europas’,
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
Contrary to the conception of citizenship as a potentially progressive and emancipatory space, Papadopoulous and Tsianos argue that it would “[operate] as a wall when it represents the ultimate horizon of political practice and social analysis.”99 Citizenship, for them, cannot be thought beyond sovereignty as “[t]he limits of citizenship are the limits of sovereignty”.100 However citizenship was defined, re-conceptualised, and re-interpreted, it would, Papadopoulous and Tsianos hold, still function as a “form of governance that regulates the relation between rights and representation [...]”101 His double-R axiom is the foundation of modern polity. They note that the question of who can be understood as the subject of rights is intimately linked to representation, and while this relation is always shifting, it is citizenship that constitutes the ‘cut’:

Imagine a scale where we have on the one pole full rights and on the other complete illegalisation and invisibility. It is somewhere between these two extreme poles that a cut is placed. This cut is citizenship. [...] Citizenship [...] regulates the balance between rights and representation and renders certain populations as legitimate bearers of rights while other populations are marked as inexisten.102

Since citizenship, functioning as a political technology needs to place the ‘cut’ somewhere, they argue, all-inclusive citizenship would be a contradiction in terms, or, at least, could only materialise in a borderless world without nation-states.

The AoM literature, internally diverse as noted and therefore not straightforwardly generalisable, could be outlined only in broad strokes. The AoM has found widespread support as a political intervention that seeks to shift conceptions of migration as passive, highly dependent and controlled movements, to (moments of) independence and uncontrollability that are ascribed as inherent facets of human mobility. Migrants, then, are not simply subjected to pull and push factors, victimised or objectified, but regarded as protagonists who decide to move without (necessarily having) reducible motifs.

At the same time, the AoM has attracted critique, in particular with regards to its ascription of ontological primacy to mobility and the interpretation of ‘control’ as re-

100 Ibid., p. 183.
101 Ibid., p. 181.
102 Ibid., p. 182.
acting forces, leading to a growing concern of romanticising tendencies within the approach. Mezzadra, for example, argues that “we were not really successful in creating a satisfactory theoretical framework that allows to present ‘the Autonomy of Migration’ as an approach that does not lead to a romantisation of migration.”

He criticises the tendency to counteract a negative depiction of migrants as exploited subjects with an image of migrants as the “cultural avant-garde of the present” and suggests that what he terms the “ambivalence of migratory practices” should become central in the AoM approach.

Martina Benz and Helen Schwenken, while supporting the initial shift away from traditional perspectives in ‘migration studies’ that would objectify migrants, caution that the AoM subsumes heterogeneous migration practices and experiences to the idea of ‘autonomy’ and thereby re-establishes simplistic ‘state versus migrants’ conceptions. Arguing from a feminist perspective, Benz and Schwenken criticise a lack of nuance in AoM approaches to understand gender differences and unequal subject positions within migratory networks which are, at times, hierarchically organised and composed of multiple internal dependencies. For them, the assumption of the autonomy of migration and its ‘stubbornness’ as an emancipatory force romanticises and falsely unifies various migration experiences by recreating untenable dualisms as well as sideling questions of sexism and racism.

In a related critique, when reviewing Papadopolous et al’s work, Nandita Sharma problematises the assumed commonality amongst ‘escaping migrants’ which would illustrate a lack of subtlety when engaging with the subjectivities of those on the move. She points out that there “is the lack of importance paid to people’s

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104 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
subjectivities” which would turn ‘imperceptible subjects’ into figures, not people. In this way, Sharma argues, similar to Benz and Schwenken, “migrants’ classed, racialized, gendered, sexualized, territorialized bodies, as well as people’s historical, geographical and metaphorical dislocations and relocations are emptied, both of people and meaning.” In her critique that certainly concerns many underlying aspects of the AoM, Sharma objects to the symbolic violence done to people on the move by turning them into romanticised symbols of escape and nomadism. She importantly notes:

[A]s with all forms of symbolic violence, it also ignores how the lives of many migrants are distorted, disfigured and often just plain destroyed, in the process of controlling them and containing their movements.

The problem of seeing migration as a symbol without attuning to its complexities and ambiguities has been discussed in detail by Sara Ahmed who suggests that “[using] migration as metaphor, is to migrate from migration, such that it becomes an impossible metaphor that no longer refers to the dislocation from place, but dislocation as such.” For her, the many experiences that migration entails become either flattened out due to such ‘fetishism of figures’ or, at worst, generalised as a supposedly common experience in a (post-)modern ‘world of flow’ in which ‘we’ all now ‘are migrants’: “strangerness is not simply ontologised, but it is universalised as that which ‘we’ have in common, in the presumed universality of homelessness.”

Anne McNevin also convincingly criticises the AoM and in particular Papadopolous et al for according ontological primacy to mobility while, at the same time, reading sovereign power reductively and narrowly. McNevin states:

The insistence on strategies that resist incorporation remains (ironically) reactive to the terms of sovereign power and fails to mobilise a genuinely alternative political

108 Ibid., p. 472.
109 Ibid., p. 474.
110 Ibid.
topography. The rejection of rights-based claims also comes with considerable political risks.\textsuperscript{114}

For her, Papadopolous et al’s scepticism toward rights-based claims would miss the political potential of these claims. Mobilising the notion of ‘ambivalence’ that resonates in many respects with the Non-Citizen struggle followed in Chapter Three, McNevin ethnographically explores migrants’ rights-claims as inhabiting transformative political potential at the inside-outside junctures of sovereign order.\textsuperscript{115}

Relatedly, Stephan Scheel seeks to contribute to the AoM literature by offering a (re-)reading of the notion of autonomy and by taking into account the embodied and relational nature of mobility that suggests diverse experiences of migration as well as existing inequalities in accessing resources “to realise [...] migration projects”.\textsuperscript{116} For Scheel, by emphasising the primacy of migrant mobility, the AoM fails to realise the impact of the progressive technologisation of border controls, such as biometric technologies, on experiences of migration. For him, similar to Amoore’s argument, biometric border control practices have crucially changed “the encounters and power relations between migrants and border control authorities” as the latter do not any longer need to rely on the former’s “narratives as a source of truth”, significantly reducing “migrants’ room for manoeuvre.”\textsuperscript{117} Scheel advocates a more complex understanding of autonomy that allows attuning to the capacities of migrants to ‘appropriate’ rights and mobility.

The primacy that many AoM scholars assign to migration sits uncomfortably with a Foucauldian understanding of migration and governmental authority developed in the thesis as entangled, even co-constitutive forces. The main critiques of the AoM approach, while expressed in various forms and contesting particular aspects, often relate to the ascription of ontological primacy. The problematic re-creation of simplistic state-versus-migrants dualisms, as Benz and Schwenken have shown, is a consequence

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 194.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 20, p. 22.
of an understanding of migration as a positively autonomous and independent force that comes prior to forces of control. This perspective, by ascribing the idea of excessive abundance to migration as such romanticises not only the migration experience as Sharma and Ahmed have pointed out, which, for many, is a particular, gendered, asymmetrical and diverse experience, but also reduces ‘control’ to a negative and reactionary understanding of power, ignoring its diffused and productive nature. As Scheel has indicated, the progressive (biometric) technologisation of border control crucially questions not only the primacy assigned to migration movements but also, and importantly, their very possibilities, or, at least, their ‘imperceptible’ possibilities. In particular Papadopolous et al, as pointed out by McNevin, by seeking to move toward imperceptibility as a political strategy with emancipatory potential, ignore the ambivalence that not only migration struggles entail when claiming citizen-righ
ts but also the ambiguities within the border regime, its internal contradictions and fallibilities, as well as its productivity.

Understanding contemporary European forms of border control as dispositif as proposed in Chapter Two, renders state-versus-migrants or migration-versus-control binaries unsustainable. Migration and forms of control are illustrated as co-constitutive forces, entangled in complex if conflictual ways. Migration struggles, in their different forms, are of the forms of border control and, of course, vice versa. Reducing forms of control to traditional, hierarchical and reactionary exertions of ‘power’ not only misses the governmentalisation of control, as convincingly shown by CBS, but unnecessarily narrows the potentialities for and of forms of migration resistance to assumptions of imperceptibility and autonomy. Especially Papadopolous et al seem to ignore the many forms of rights-claiming and their critical politicality as these struggles conflict with the idea of an imperceptible politics.

As this thesis shows, resistance comes in many more shapes, as forces that publicly demand citizenship or halt deportation, that form as difficult solidarities with others and that seek to remain hidden, imperceptible or ‘other’. So whilst the notion of excess is of great significance for this thesis and will be explored in Chapter Five, it is understood as a facet of resistance that may emerge in various moments and in different guises. At the same time, excess stands not in opposition to the ‘regime’ or ‘control’ but resides also in
border control practices that, themselves, at times, function through an excess of (productive, necropolitical, horrific) violence.

Despite the problematic ontological prioritisation of mobility, that, as Mezzadra has made clear, is not uncontested within the literature itself, the AoM approach has contributed significantly to a re-conceptualisation of migration by problematising and departing considerably from the taxonomies underlying contemporary border and migration regimes as well as traditional forms of migration research. The AoM does not regard migration as a problem that requires governance and is critical of accounts, produced and reproduced often in languages of policy and research that suggest how to ‘better’ understand, direct, monitor or deter migration (paths and patterns). As a political intervention, the AoM has avowedly turned against the many processes that seek to manage and discipline forces of migration and, in fact, many scholars associated with the approach have been involved in activist contestations of many aspects of the European border regime.\textsuperscript{118}

For this thesis that begins with migration struggles, the AoM provides critical resources, not the least to think through notions of imperceptibility and excess in relation to my conceptualisation of resistance. The ‘ unruliness’ of migration is explored in Chapter Five where excess becomes understood as one crucial facet of resistance. The AoM has drawn particular attention to the everyday realities of migration and has emphasised the importance of empirical, ethnographic and embodied research, also advocating the researcher-activist’s situatedness within the struggles of migration. Papadopolous and Tsianos note, for example, that the AoM approach is fundamentally about attuning to “the real struggles, practices, tactics that escape control.”\textsuperscript{119}

Importantly also for this thesis, migration is not perceived as a mere reactive force, responding to dominant economic and socio-political forces and events. Countering the victimisation and objectification of people on the move, the AoM assigns ‘world

\textsuperscript{118} The ‘Critical Network for Migration and Border Regime Research’ (Kritnet) based in Germany and of which I am a member constitutes a prime example for fruitful activist-academic intersections.

\textsuperscript{119} Papadopoulos and Tsianos, ‘After Citizenship’, 2013, p. 185.
making’ capacities to them, never reducible to singular rationales, factors or forces. As Andrijasevic notes:

To view migrants as actors and agents of the construction of the European community rather than its constituent ‘outside’ challenges the demarcation that defines the realm of the political and produces an interruption in the logic of ‘omnivorous’ sovereignty [...] which reinforces itself and its coherence through incorporating migrants within its boundaries.120

In the three ethnographies of the thesis, and discussed in greater depth in Chapter Six, those involved in migration struggles are, indeed, regarded as protagonists in the shaping and reimagining of Europe’s communal spaces, even if in conflictual, ambivalent, and often antagonistic ways.

Part III - Citizenship Studies

Citizenship Studies, closely associated with the work of Engin Isin, emerged in the 1990s as a distinctive field of scholarly investigation into and theorisation of citizenship, responding to processes of “‘postmodernization’ and ‘globalization’” that entailed a plurality of reconfigurations, amongst others “new rationalities of government, new regimes of accumulation of different forms of capital, as well as new social movements and their struggles for recognition and redistribution.”121 Within these processes, traditional conceptualisations of citizenship as the mere holding of the official legal status in a nation-state became challenged and broadened, progressively including manifold struggles that claimed citizenship without necessarily legally possessing the status.122

Citizenship Studies has grown ever since into a diverse and multidisciplinary body of work within which more and more adjectives were attached to the notion of citizenship: “ecological, global, cosmopolitan, lived, intimate, sexual, postcolonial, multicultural,

122 Ibid., p. 2.
transnational” and so forth.\(^ {123}\) The process of widening and deepening the understanding of citizenship toward heterogeneous everyday experiences and practices resembles the processes of ‘complicating’ the border in CBS, and migration in the AoM. As in the other two literatures, the developments toward the creation of EU citizenship gave impetus also to Citizenship Studies to reconceptualise citizenship, with some suggesting the dawn of “a postnational development occurring in a Europe ‘without frontiers’”.\(^ {124}\) Gerard Delanty, noting that these postnational sentiments were exaggerated, suggests that while EUropean citizenship has meant the “loosening of the tie between citizenship and nationality”, it has “utterly failed to bring about any degree of civic engagement as far as citizenship is concerned and has on the whole confined citizenship to rights.”\(^ {125}\) Granting EUropean citizens the ability to move and reside freely in the union and to vote or stand as candidates in EU parliamentary elections, EU citizenship remains, nonetheless, bound to the nation-state as only national passport holders become automatically also EU citizens.

Isin, Peter Nyers and Bryan Turner suggest that seeking “to define citizenship definitively is probably a serious intellectual mistake because we (almost) all know that citizenship is a contested site of social struggles.”\(^ {126}\) Instead of finding a definitive answer, they propose developing an understanding of citizenship by inquiring into what it does. For them, “[c]itizenship enables political subjectivity” or even becomes political subjectivity, “the right to have rights and obligations.”\(^ {127}\) While Isin and Turner encourage a broader understanding of citizenship, they are sceptical about its ‘global’ potential as “it remains a state institution, and it is based on contributions that presuppose a reciprocal relationship between rights and obligations, and imply a relationship between rights and territory.”\(^ {128}\) For them, citizenship should be regarded as

\(^ {125}\) Ibid., p. 67, p. 66.
\(^ {127}\) Ibid.
“an active domain of democracy and the principal expression of being political as belonging”, even “as a foundation of human rights and not as a competitor.”

Attempting to focus the study of citizenship around claims to and practices of citizenship, Isin advances the now widespread and popular concept of ‘acts of citizenship’:

> We define acts of citizenship as those acts that transform forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle.

Isin proposes three ‘principles’ of investigating or theorising these acts of citizenship:

> The first principle [...] is to interpret them through their grounds and consequences, which includes subjects becoming activist citizens through scenes created [...] The second principle [...] recognizes that acts produce actors that become answerable to justice against injustice; [...] The third principle [...] is to recognize that acts of citizenship do not need to be founded in law or enacted in the name of the law.

Acts of citizenship can thus be enacted by anyone, without the need to be accepted as belonging, formally and legally, to the community of citizens. For Isin, the “three ontic aspects of citizenship: extent (rules and norms of exclusion and inclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or thinness of belonging)” do not suffice to comprehend acts of citizenship. Actors, for him, are produced by acts which suggests that acts of citizenship “produce citizens and their others”. Isin notes that focussing on acts allows to recognise the political nature of various groups considered marginal and ‘voiceless’, who would, through their acts, become (activist) citizens. The activist citizen, for Isin, “calls into question the givenness of [the] body politic and opens its boundaries wide.”

129 Ibid., p. 13.
131 Ibid., pp. 38-39, original written in italics.
132 Ibid., p. 37.
133 Ibid.
Nyers in particular has sought to develop the concept of acts of citizenship by following diverse migration struggles. By repeatedly joining seemingly incommensurable notions (which suggests a Rancièrean influence), such as ‘abjection’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘irregularity’ or ‘accident’ and ‘citizenship’, Nyers inquires into the ways in which supposedly ‘precarious’, ‘voiceless’ and ‘marginalised’ subjects “assert themselves as political by publicly making claims about rights and membership, freedom and equality”. An understanding of citizenship as acts, for Nyers, does not require legal citizenship-status as a precondition for the capacity to be political but, rather, draws attention to the ways in which “non-status groups [...] extract themselves from the hegemonic categories by which political identity is normally understood.” He notes: “It is quite a wonderful paradox to say that publicly self-identifying as a non-status migrant is to engage in an act of citizenship.” For Nyers, thinking migration struggles around issues of regularisation, freedom of movement and deportation as acts of citizenship means leaving traditionally held conceptions of political subjectivity behind. In fact, he suggests that the mere stating of ‘no human is illegal’ is a deeply political pronouncement, “[calling] into question the entire architecture of sovereignty, all its borders, locks and doors.”

Referring to the AoM understanding of human movement, Nyers advocates an understanding of subjectivity that acknowledges “how migrants negotiate, contest and evade borders and, in doing so, constitute themselves as political subjects”, in order to depart from associating refugees and migrants “with victimhood, helplessness and dependency”. At the same time, Nyers does not believe that citizenship is possible “without accompanying acts of sovereignty”, since sovereignty is “shifting and


136 Nyers, ‘No One is Illegal’, 2010, p. 141.

137 Ibid., p. 141.


indeterminate, extraterritorial as much as territorial, and always ready to ‘re-take’ that which escapes its monopolistic hold over who and what counts as political.”  

Kim Rygiel, also associated with Citizenship Studies, importantly shows how citizenship can be conceived as governmental. She demonstrates how processes of globalisation and trade-liberation have led to border-transgressions of capital flows while, simultaneously, “citizenship as a form of governing has been strengthened through innovative strategies and technologies of power, becoming an increasingly effective way of controlling populations in a globalizing environment.” In order to contest the process through which “citizenship is becoming a globalizing regime governing global mobility”, Rygiel stresses how different forms of migration activism offer alternative modalities of what citizenship might mean or could become.

In her study of migrant activism in Calais, she wonders why citizenship should be the notion through which to understand such activism. While voicing her own doubts, she argues, similar to Nyers, that theorising these struggles through the notion of citizenship ascribes agency to those whose political subjectivity is commonly put in doubt. She further notes:

Describing migrant struggles in terms of citizenship focuses attention on how such struggles invoke a notion of politics based on the types of relations we develop in connection to one another as political, as human, beings, based on the possibilities of alternative (and disruptive) futures.

For Rygiel, migration struggles challenge the borders of the political so that border-transgressions potentially entail “new imaginings of political community that disrupts the sovereign imaginings of inside/ outside, insiders and outsiders.”

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143 Ibid., p. 6.
144 Ibid., p. 10; see also pp. 195-214.
146 Ibid., p. 6.
147 Ibid., p. 7.
148 Ibid.
In a similar manner, Enrica Rigo develops the idea of ‘acts of illegal citizenship’ performed by ‘unauthorised’ migrants.\textsuperscript{149} She argues that the artificiality of citizenship suggests that it “is constantly contestable and controvertible” so that listening to unauthorised practices means focusing “on the ruptures and contradictions that these inflict upon the institutional definition and codification of citizenship”.\textsuperscript{150} Similar to Rygiel and Nyers, Rigo regards human mobility and migrant (rights) protests as political interventions that “produce a new conflicting order of citizenship.”\textsuperscript{151}

Imogen Tyler and Katarzyna Marciniak, in accordance with Rygiel’s understanding, regard citizenship as an instrument of governance.\textsuperscript{152} They indicate that the claiming of citizen-rights by migrants and activists has, nonetheless, become “one of the main strategies […] however problematic or precarious this citizenship may have become.”\textsuperscript{153} For them, migrant rights activism, whilst often necessary and effective, “[risks] colluding with the regimes of illegalization which abjectify migrants and their children in the first place.”\textsuperscript{154} Similar to McNevin and in tension with Nyers, Rygiel and Rigo, they regard migrant protests not necessarily as acts of citizenship:

\begin{quote}
[I]mmigrant protests are ‘acts’ against the exclusionary technologies of citizenship, which aim to make visible the violence of citizenship as regimes of control. However, in order to effect material changes, protestors are compelled to make their demands in the idiom of the regime of citizenship they are contesting.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

Tyler and Marciniak’s analysis of migrant protests, relevant for the discussion of Non-Citizen resistance in Chapter Three, crucially questions whether citizenship can be understood as a progressive, even emancipatory horizon, space or instrument when, in

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{150}] Ibid., p. 210, p. 200.
\item[\textsuperscript{151}] Ibid., p. 212.
\item[\textsuperscript{153}] Ibid., p. 146.
\item[\textsuperscript{154}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{155}] Ibid; McNevin, ‘Ambivalence and Citizenship’, 2013.
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fact, “under neoliberalism citizenship has become a pivotal technique of biopolitical
governance”.156

Similar to my discussion of CBS and the AoM, this review can only provide a snapshot
of Citizenship Studies’ main features, some of its tendencies and tensions within. In this
necessarily brief review I have chosen particular authors and literatures to indicate
different stances on and conceptualisations of citizenship, showing a wide spectrum of
perspectives that range from seeing (acts of) citizenship as allowing for potentially
progressive shifts toward forms of inclusion and equality to sceptical sentiments that
regard citizenship ultimately as a technology of (biopolitical) control. Rygiel and Nyers
work is fascinating because in their close ethnographic readings of migration and activist
struggles they detect potential for transforming citizenship which, in the contemporary
form as \textit{gvernment}, has meant the violent exclusion and abjectification of many. The
work of both has been very valuable in finding a language also in this thesis that allows
addressing the subtleties and significance of migration struggles.

Nonetheless, while the idea of appropriating or re-appropriating citizenship for a radical
politics seems commendable, the question remains why citizenship needs to be re-
imagined as an emancipatory space when the practice of excluding and dividing seems
to be its very reason for being. As Tyler and Marciniak (as well as Rygiel) have argued,
when citizenship as a technology cannot be thought without the state, it must always
remain the state’s instrument of division. The critique by Papadopolous and Tsianos is
convincing when they argue that even if citizenship can be conceived more broadly,
through the claims of groups often considered marginal, the ‘cut’ will inevitably be
placed somewhere.

Citizenship is perceived in this thesis as a force that cuts, or that binds only to the extent
that it places cuts elsewhere. EUropean citizenship, a case in point, not only remains
necessarily tied to the nation-state but becomes also mobilised as a political technology
that creates new limits, new outsides that, as externalities of its communal insideness,

affect a large portion of the population of the planet. Citizenship cannot be thought without a clearly demarcated beyond, regardless of the adjectives attached to it. The limit of citizenship is, as Papadopolous and Tsianos show, the limit of sovereignty. Citizenship can function neither without migration policies that differentially include and exclude, nor without detention and deportation that enact citizenship’s constitutive other, non-citizenship. All-inclusive citizenship is a contradiction in terms, as all-inclusive borders would be. Not everybody can be a ‘citizen-in-the-making’; some necessarily remain disposable, excludable and deportable in the world of citizenship. Global (or maybe ‘cosmopolitan’) citizenship would not only suggest a borderless world but also the redundancy of citizenship and nation-states as such.

Similar to CBS and its conception of the diffused border, broadening and widening the notion of citizenship entails the risk to flatten out the notion of citizenship, its material realities and exclusionary consequences. Both CBS and Citizenship Studies pronounce a shift toward an understanding of border- and citizenship relations. Adding ever-more adjectives to the noun of citizenship (as well as the noun of border) has provoked questions in both literatures what citizenship and the border actually constitute as well as reminders not to lose track of their exclusionary capacities. However, while CBS can convincingly show that ‘the border’ has become mobile, plural and delocalised, not necessarily residing ‘at the (state) border’ anymore and not decided upon merely by representatives of nation-states, the same cannot be said for Citizenship Studies.

Citizenship remains one of many borders, and constitutes maybe the one most intimately tied up with the sovereign nation state, becoming for certain individuals and populations a ‘wall’ as Papadopolous and Tsianos have argued. Migration and border struggles, although often implying the state in one way or another, are, in contrast, not tied to the state a-priori with citizenship as their horizon, but can, instead, find other potentialities or imaginaries for being, as explored in the three ethnographies as well as Chapter Six. Furthermore, thinking EUropean border governance as a dispositif goes beyond questions of nation-state citizenship. As CBS has shown, EUrope’s diffused border practitioners may enact (EUropean) citizenship and its exclusions as well as many other divisionary effects that move way beyond the sum of its nation-state territories.
In this thesis, the migration struggles followed are not understood as ‘acts of citizenship’ even if some clearly strive toward citizenship. For me, beginning a critical investigation of the political through struggles means attuning to demands and practices without a prior association with something that is so intimately, even if at times ambivalently, tied to the state and sovereignty. Regarding the manifold forms of resistance examined in this thesis as citizenship-acts, would unnecessarily confine their potentiality to the (exclusionary) horizon of citizenship. As Glenda Garelli and Martina Tazzioli convincingly argue:

One such intervention [...] is the interruption of what we call a one-way politics of translation permeating critical migration studies, the scripting of migrant politics into the staging of citizenship [...]. [...] [W]e argue against the encoding of migrant struggle-fields into the discipline of the citizen, against the uncontested script for what counts as political that is embedded in such one-way translation.\(^{157}\)

As the ethnographies will show, migration struggles challenge state-citizenship even when citizenship is sought. It is through their disruptions and antagonisms that alternative imaginaries of community and ‘being-with’ are created whilst also struggling with the violence and precariousness that non/citizenship as a political technology must always produce. Mobilising the frame of citizenship for a radical politics seems limited and limiting, as it necessarily and inevitably remains bound to the state, as Isin and Nyers have noted as well.

As Chapter Three demonstrates, the Non-Citizen struggle to be included as members of the citizenry does not turn them into ‘activist citizens’. In fact, as they make clear, they remain deportable beings throughout their struggle and may, due to their struggle, even increase the risk of deportation.\(^{158}\) In this sense, thinking them as (activist) citizens in a struggle that, however, renders them more deportable, does not logically hold. The Non-Citizens are bound to citizenship only in the negative, due to the precariousness


\(^{158}\) During a ‘migration struggles’ workshop organised for a Kritnet convention in Munich in 2013, many participating migrant activists from the Non-Citizen movement, the Oranienplatz-Occupation and the Lampedusa in Hamburg collective complained that they became increasingly threatened by deportation the more ‘active’ and visible they became in the different protest movements. I helped organise the workshop with two other Kritnet members and we collectively wrote and distributed a pamphlet entitled ‘Learning from the struggles’ in which migrant activists reflected on years of struggle in Germany.
that non-citizenship (and therewith citizenship as its constitutive other) entails. Citizenship, for them, cannot be enacted by them but only by the state in granting them formal citizenship-rights. Their will to gain citizenship, then, is the attempt to distance themselves from the violence of non-citizenship. While even formal citizenship may not always offer protection, as Nyers has pointed out, it nonetheless allows for a (much) greater degree of protection from the state. As Chapter Three argues, it seems more productive to investigate the ambivalences and paradoxes within struggles for citizenship-rights, as McNevin and Tylor have pursued, without confining analyses from the very beginning to the notion of citizenship.

Citizenship Studies as a growing and diversifying literature allows, nevertheless, to more empirically follow movements and claims of those often considered marginal, abject or non-citizen, or maybe not-yet-citizen. Similar to the AoM, Citizenship Studies allows to depart from victimisations of migrants even when they legally reside outside of the realm of the citizen. Especially the work of Nyers and Rygiel provide critical resources for this thesis to listen closely to those who constitute themselves as political beings through manifold forms of struggle, including claims to become members of the citizenry, even if their practices are not conceptualised as acts of citizenship.

**Conclusion**

Critical Border Studies, the Autonomy of Migration as well as Citizenship Studies are interventions into traditional theories, discourses and practices that have dominated social science disciplines in general and ‘migration studies’ in particular. Opposing theorisations that suggest and reinforce static, neutral and reductive conceptions of borders, migrations and citizenship, the three literatures have, through their complications and problematisations, opened up spaces to explore the volatility and contestability of these interconnected phenomena. Many scholars whose work was briefly explored in this chapter could have also been located elsewhere, often in at least two of the literatures discussed. Through their different lenses and foci, they have offered multiple avenues for this thesis to explore migration struggles. They show that questions of migrations, borders and citizenship are closely connected to questions of

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power, control, governmentality and sovereignty as well as mobility, subjectivity, freedom and resistance.

The Foucauldian reading of resistance, developed in Chapter Two, can be situated in the three literatures as they have, in their particular approaches, moved the question of the political away from traditional or orthodox perspectives that define what it means to be political in narrow, often state-centric ways. Especially the AoM literature has intervened also in ‘the Left’ and opened up spaces to think of other political struggles and (migration) resistances that too often become ignored, even in supposedly critical or radical groups and movements that, as Mitropoulos and others noted, marginalised the politicality of migration. Of course, for many of the border, migration and citizenship scholars, the work of Foucault has been influential, sometimes pivotal. His investigations into bio/power, the art of government and resistance underlie also this thesis and are explored in detail in the following chapter. As indicated in the introduction and in this first chapter, a Foucault-inspired investigation of (migration) resistances must necessarily engage with their entanglement in forms of governmental conduction and control. For Foucault, questions of resistance are inevitably connected to questions of power and government. Through my ethnographic explorations of migration struggles and the EUropean border dispositif, I seek to contribute to the interrelated literatures of CBS, the AoM, and Citizenship Studies by adding greater emphasis on and a more nuanced reading of (migration) resistance.

CBS, whilst having drawn extensively from Foucault’s work on governmentality and biopolitics has not paid the same attention to his conceptualisation of resistance. For Foucault, as argued in Chapter Two, resistance constitutes a crucial and ever-present (counter-)force in governmental dispositifs. A closer reading of migration resistance in relation to contemporary border practices would benefit CBS, not the least as Foucault himself suggested that governmental regimes could be productively read and understood through forces of resistance. The AoM’s reading of resistance, while attending with great care to the subversive potentialities of migration (struggles), seems bound to the idea of excess or imperceptibility and (primary) mobility. As further discussed in Chapter Five, a wider understanding of resistance would add to the AoM’s ‘ephemeral’ contestations that seem tied to the notion of autonomy which, at times problematically, underemphasises the co-constitutive nature of migrations and forms of
control. Citizenship Studies offers a productive emphasis on how subjects can claim and enact their politicality, even when socially marginalised or illegalised. Relating these enactments directly to state-citizenship, however, sits uncomfortably with the manifold forms of migration resistance that also struggle with the violent aspects of citizenship, as Chapter Three further expands on.

This thesis seeks to bring CBS, the AoM as well as Citizenship Studies into conversation as there emerge a variety of productive tensions and insights. Situating my thesis at the junctures where they meet, every chapter speaks, due to the nature of the diverse migration struggles discussed, to all three literatures in particular, if not always explicit ways. Chapter Three and Chapter Five relate especially to Citizenship Studies and the AoM respectively, while CBS can be understood as the undercurrent of this thesis.

In their different ways and to different degrees, the three literatures ask how and by whom, in our contemporary condition, inclusions and exclusions become performed, experienced and contested, and what alternative, less violent, less exclusionary futures there might be. Through their diverse lenses and foci, they point to the necessity to rethink traditional notions and their “false simplicity”, as Balibar noted. In this vein, my thesis seeks to further complicate the ‘obvious’ notions of ‘resistance’, ‘power’ and ‘government’ and their ‘false simplicity’ to (re)think how migration struggles and their disruptive motions articulate, probe and challenge dominant conceptualisations of migrations, borders and their governance.

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160 Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, 2002, p. 76.
Chapter Two: Resistance as Method

Introduction
This chapter develops resistance as method as an approach to political and radical investigation that begins with migration struggles and explores, through them, contemporary forms of border governance. Moving away from the desire to ascribe unifying qualities to resistance, this thesis listens to manifold struggles, wonders whether and how they can be understood as resistance, and inquires into what becomes animated through their political disruptions. Drawing from Foucault, I argue that understanding resistance as an analytic allows interrogating not only how and why social resistances emerge in global conditions of injustice, violence and suffering but also the manner in which they come up against governmental rationales and truths in dynamically changing socio-political matrices. Following resistances means attuning to that which, by setting into motion, questioning and provoking, build towards and unravel in contestations and collisions. By animating power-relations, forces of resistance help trace associations in the complex corollaries of governmental dispositifs.

Migration struggles are the forces of resistance followed in this thesis. While they comprise several modalities of struggle and are connected to various registers of resistance, migration struggles constitute, nonetheless, particular struggles. Necessarily located at borders, understood in the plurality of ways CBS pointed to in Chapter One, these struggles cannot but raise questions of inclusion and exclusion. Emerging at limits - physical, sovereign, socio-political, legal, racial, philosophical, temporal, historical, or cultural ones - migration struggles imply friction at the points that seem to demarcate an inside formed around taken-for-granted truths from an outside that lies beyond the presumed norm, the commonsensical, the known. Through their practices, migration resistances draw attention to the ways limits are thought and exclusions performed. The thesis investigates three struggles that protest exclusionary differentiations and violent border enactments in heterogeneous ways and thereby animate the EUropean border dispositif, prompting re-imaginations of political life and potentiality.
At the time of writing this chapter, both the ethnographic and theoretical-conceptual work had been conducted, though not fully concluded. The migration resistances followed continue to exist in their own particular ways, sometimes changing direction and shape or momentarily disappearing only to re-emerge in different, sometimes surprising contexts, anecdotes and struggles. In a different but related way, conceptually following Foucault’s work, while providing some guidance and many tools for investigation, remains a task without a clear script and without any obvious finality.

In his extensive body of work, Foucault only occasionally and eclectically deliberates on ‘resistance’ named as such but the critical ethos underlying his thought suggests itself in various moments and passages where he speaks of ‘insubordination’, ‘counter-conduct’, ‘the will not to be governed thusly’, ‘voluntary servitude’, ‘deliberative indolence’, ‘excess’, ‘critique’, ‘desubjectification’, and the ‘impatience for liberty’. More than any particular lecture, interview, article or book, it was this ethos of incessantly searching for a freedom to remain or become otherwise in conditions of injustice and his method of unremittingly inquiring into subjugated knowledges that inspired my investigations. For Foucault, a critical attitude occasions an “analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them” and migration resistances, as will be shown, indeed, are experiments at imposed limits. It is, then, both Foucault’s ethos and migrations’ struggles that, with no a-priori but complex syndetic interferences, form the theoretical-methodological composition of the thesis.

Part I, ‘Resistance and Power’, illustrates how Foucault sought to take both power and resistance their often assigned stability, spectacularity and characteristic dichotomy to inquire more closely into how productive relations of power could, as clusters, form social hegemonies and how manifold practices of resistance would develop means to tear at these clusters, to question and provoke them, or to try and find other spaces to remain (somewhat) unencumbered by their oppressive effects. For Foucault, both

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power and resistance are microphysical, operating as material enactments and as everyday phenomena in the world.

Part II, ‘Resistance and the Art of Government’, further examines forces of resistance and their contextuality. In much of his later work Foucault establishes genealogies of authority and power, tracing how rationales of government evolved from ‘classical’ and ‘disciplinary’ sovereigns to ‘governmental-biopolitical’ modes of authority. The historical processes in which sovereign power developed from a power to kill to a power that, besides killing, cares for life also implies changes in the context in which resistances emerge, what contours they develop, or how they enact themselves. This is not to ascribe primacy, or even distinctness to the formation of contexts or situations in which resistances then emerge. As Foucault shows in his elaborations on counter-conduct, it was also due to resistances that conduct as a governmental technique moved beyond ecclesiastical institutions to become inscribed into the modern state form. Understanding the context of resistance means acknowledging the entanglement of forces of power and forces of resistance as well as attuning to the complexity that attempts to resist contemporary modes of governmentality always entail. Sketching the emergence of the liberal art of government proves pivotal for later elaborations on the ways the European border dispositif functions as well as the underlying rationales and ‘urgent need’ to which it responds.

Part III, ‘Resistance as Method’, builds upon the discussion of migration struggles, resistance, power and government to develop the approach resistance as method enacted in the subsequent ethnographies. Beginning with resistance as a methodological device opens up the socio-political field in particular but dynamic ways, animating the struggles themselves as well as the ‘situation’ within or against which they form. Drawing from several critical ethnographic approaches, including multi-sited and auto-ethnographic registers, resistance as method is conceived as a politically involved and openly subjective approach. In my multi-sited ethnography, I follow instances of resistance where they emerge. The idea of ethnographic following implies not only a flexible and active

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research design and lens but also an awareness of one’s partiality and subjectivity in the process of selecting certain sites of struggle and not others. Rather than expecting the ‘organic’ convergence of the fragmented empirical cases into a totality or the capturing of ‘emblematic’ manifestations of contemporary forms of migration resistance, the heterogeneous ethnographies form partial, distinct, internally problematic, and ambiguous border interventions. Nonetheless, every struggle, in its own way, raises significant questions about the European governance of borders and migrations as well as the potentialities of different forms of political contestation to provoke, subvert or resist such governance. While particular and reflecting context-specific practices of governance, domination and violence, acts of resistance are transversal, also always animating something beyond their strategies. As analytics and diagnostics of power-relations they render visible (some of) the European border dispositif’s governmental techniques of policing, ordering or regulating “human multiplicities”.

Part I - Resistance and Power

In The History of Sexuality I, Foucault famously states: “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.” Seeking to abandon the juridico-discursive representation of power as a totalising force deriving from locatable sources or centres – the king, the sovereign, the law – he conceptualises power as “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate.” Power, for Foucault, becomes a relation, is microphysical, omnipresent and can be found everywhere, “not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.” Power is not a substance that can be passed on or inherited but constitutes a force that circulates in social relations and practices:

[What defines a relationship of power is that it is a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action

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8 Ibid., p. 92.
9 Ibid., p. 93.
upon an action, on existing actions or on those which may arise in the present or the future.\textsuperscript{10}

In splitting power into shifting and productive micro-formations, Foucault moves the operation of power away from singular centres: “let us not look for the headquarters that presides over [power’s] rationality.”\textsuperscript{11} He argues:

It is this image that we must break free of, that is, of the theoretical privilege of law and sovereignty, if we wish to analyze power within the concrete and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analytics of power that no longer takes law as a model and a code.\textsuperscript{12}

Foucault renounces traditional and centralised conceptions of Power as something to be imposed or a substance reserved for the dominant and moves to an understanding of power as always-already implicating the ability to act as power only ever emerges in and as relationalities. While departing from traditional ideas of power as something held by the ‘powerful’ and longed for by the ‘powerless’, Foucault does not foreclose the possibility for power-relations to manifest forms of domination, as further shown in the third section when examining dispositifs As force relations, power can form “a chain or a system” or “strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.”\textsuperscript{13} The state, sovereignty, the law, or apartheid systems hence do not constitute Power but “only the terminal forms power takes”.\textsuperscript{14}

At the same time, and crucially for the thesis, Foucault also departs from traditional and centralised conceptions of resistance as Power’s great other: This shift is detectable in his formulation of the phrase “[w]here there is power there is resistance”, when he suggests “\textit{and yet, or rather consequently}, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.”\textsuperscript{15} Gesturing with the ‘and yet’ to an orthodox understanding of both Power and Resistance as delimitable forces that he seeks to leave behind, the ‘rather

\textsuperscript{11} Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality}, 1998, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 90.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., pp. 92-93.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 92.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 95, emphasis added.
consequently’ signals his presumption of the complex interplay between forces of power and forces of resistance. Rather than beginning an analysis of power or resistance based on rigid assumptions and definitions, Foucault draws attention to the ways in which they emerge in social relations, become entangled, and relate to one another in complex form. By moving away from images of power as domination and resistance as the equally stable and locatable opposite (‘The Cause’), he indicates that there can be no great divide between forces of power and those of resistance.

Resistances are not autonomous from power but instead “coextensive with it and absolutely its contemporary.”16 This, however, does not mean that resistance constitutes a mere reaction, “forming with respect to the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat.”17 Although no form of resistance can ever lead to liberation from power, Foucault suggests that power-relations can be reconfigured by “individuals and collective subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments, may be realized.”18

Resistance, following Foucault, is not a substance that can be acquired or held but comprises a force that comes up against intersecting power-relations that form or maintain social hegemonies.19 Resistance is something dynamic, not static, that sets into motion the forces it confronts, even in not-so-visible spaces. As a practice, resistance does not produce stable subjects of resistance, subjects who retain resistance conceived as a substance or a perpetual (and heroic) state of being, but implies continuous processes of resisting and subjectification. Resistance does not make subjects as if the subject had been absent (or ‘unconscious’, ‘falsely conscious’) before resisting but can induce changes inside of her and in her politicality in the world. Resistances, then, form

[... ] mobile and transitory points [...], producing cleavages in society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing across individuals themselves,

cutting them up and remolding them, marking off irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds.\textsuperscript{20}

The subject practicing resistance does, therefore, not become a stable ‘revolutionary subject’ but a subject through whose practices revolutionary upheaval can become imaginable. If subjects themselves are ‘cut up’ by the ‘mobile and transitory points’ of resistance, this, in turn, suggests that those who practice resistance are not exempt from their own implication in forms of oppression. A subject resisting at one moment can oppress the next moment.

Foucault himself gestures to the re-creation of dominant structures within supposedly progressive or radical spaces. Presumably referring to the French Communist Party, he notes:

\ldots it cannot fail to function to a certain extent as a counter-society, another society, even if in fact it only reproduces the society that exists, and consequently it appears and functions internally as a sort of different pastorate, a different governmentality with its chiefs, its rules, and its principles of obedience, and to that extent it possesses \ldots a considerable capacity both to appear as a different society, a different form of conduct, and to channel revolts of conduct, take them over, and control them.\textsuperscript{21}

Instead of regarding resistance as a given and ever-present substance in radical spaces, even if so declared by some, Foucault’s shift toward practices is pivotal to attune to reconstitutions of hierarchies, exclusions and violences. Conceiving resistance as enactments also dispenses with questions of (rational) intentionality and (false) consciousness that, while significant, remain endurably undecidable. Relatedly, resistance as a process necessarily must be dynamic and energetic, never static. Focussing on processes and practices of resistance thus always questions any teleological linearity and finality that ‘The Cause’ seeks to lead to, such as an imagined final revolution, thereby all too often silencing internal agonies.\textsuperscript{22} As Foucault argues:

\textsuperscript{20} Foucault, \textit{The History of Sexuality}, 1998, p. 96.
\textsuperscript{22} Sentiments that understand resistance reductively or as dualistically opposed to ‘power’ holders are not merely those of the time of the French Communist Party in the 1970s and 80s when Foucault was still alive. They prevail, while arguably in more nuanced articulations, in many contemporary discussions of social movements and ‘global’ resistance. Charles Tilly, for example, speaks of global social movements as
Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations.23

It follows that practices of resistance are always situated, concrete and context-specific. This does not, however, preclude their relevance beyond the local, beyond themselves. Effects of codifications of power-relations that are felt and resisted often span particular and general conditions and injustices.24


inter-relationality of spatial or temporal registers that too often become understood as cleanly delimitable and distinct. Resistance's transversality leaves behind structure-agency dualisms by always implicating both and seeing both as inherently entangled. A departure from narrowly defined and segregated spatialities (the local, the national, the transnational, the regional, or the global) toward transversal registers of spatial inter-relationality does not concede to the idea of a 'neoliberal world of flow'. Rather, transversal practices of resistance implicate plural spatialities as connected registers of particular inequalities and structural injustices, individual pains and global violence. At the same time, resistances also implicate a transversal temporality. While resistance conceived as practice is of the present, it sets into motion past, present and future. Enactments of resistance relate to a prior feeling, experience, or understanding of injustice, subjugation or unfreedom, and may envision another future. Both resistance's historicities as well as futurities emerge in the present scene.

If both power and resistance are contemporary and situational relations and practices, an understanding of ‘the situation’ is required. Resistance needs to be thought in the context of power-relations that collude and cluster to form ‘social hegemonies’. The following part traces the emergence of governmentality as a mode of contemporary authority with several significant implications for the way resistances can be thought, including migration struggles that resist governmental dispositifs.

**Part II - Resistance and the Art of Government**

This part elaborates on the relationship between resistance and the ‘art of government’ in Foucault's thought and draws from a cluster of literatures, lectures and interviews that roughly appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s.26 A close reading of this relationship is crucial for developing the idea of resistance as method in the third part of this chapter and in the subsequent ethnographic studies. By complicating conceptions of power, Foucault conceives of the exercise of political authority in novel ways which, in turn, impacts decisively on potentialities of resistance. In fact, what Foucault proposes several

times, while often not acting upon it himself, is a reading of governmental regimes through forces of resistance, which has found only little attention so far.

In an interview, Foucault argues: “Resistance really always relies upon the situation against which it struggles.”27 If one departs from an understanding of power as domination, resistance’s stable opposite, or a substance held by the ‘powerful’, and dispenses with simple ideas of oppressive ‘structures’, what, then, is this ‘situation’ against or within which one struggles for change? Foucault further states:

We cannot jump outside the situation, and there is no point where you are free from all power relations. But you can always change it. So what I’ve said does not mean that we are always trapped, but that we are always free – well, anyway, that there is always the possibility of changing:28

Not autonomous or abstract forces, resistances occur within often violent conditions that, however, do not succeed in suffocating the will or the ability to struggle and change the ‘situation’. Foucault, while not necessarily prone to begin his analyses and theorisations with resistances, often speaks of episodes of insubordinate moments, rebellious gestures, hidden freedoms that emerge as resistances, forming even in the darkest prisons and confinements and shedding light on shifting discourses, truths and governmental technologies. Inspired by these episodes, part III will build towards a method that begins with resistances, with “the art of voluntary insubordination”.29 In three interrelated sections, this part examines the emergence of the art of government, and the entanglement of forces of resistance therein.

Emerging Government

In Society Must Be Defended and The History of Sexuality I, Foucault traces a transformation from “sovereignty’s old right – to take life and let live” toward a “right to make live and let die”.30 For him, the ‘old right’ referred to the sovereign’s privilege to decide over

28 Ibid., p. 167, emphasis in original.
matters of life and death to an extent that it was only “thanks to the sovereign that the subject has the right to be alive or, possibly, the right to be dead.” In this sense, the subject came into being only through the sovereign will and decision to either end or allow life. It was even due to the sovereign’s right to kill that a previously ‘neutral’ or ‘absent’ being transformed into a subject at all: “it is at the moment when the sovereign can kill that he exercises his right over life.”

While the lives of those captured by the might of the sovereign king often found an abrupt and violent end, Foucault, nonetheless, gestures to the potentialities of freedom in the time of the ‘old’ sovereign rule. In his short story Lives of Infamous Men, further explored in Chapter Five, Foucault points to collisions between the king and some subjects unfortunate enough to have drawn the attention of the sovereign. Despite often gruesome episodes of punishment, Foucault notes that many more, even “billions of existences” escaped by remaining outside the sovereign’s view, by not coming into ‘being’ through the sovereign’s right and might, leading their un-famous, untraceable and excessive lives in the anonymous void of history.

This ‘classical’ sovereign right, however, saw two wide-reaching ‘adjustments’ that Foucault awkwardly terms: “the body-organism-discipline-institutions series, and the population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State.” The former series, starting in the seventeenth century, can be conceptualised as the introduction of a disciplinary technique that “centers on the body, produces individualizing effects, and manipulates the body as a source of forces that have to be rendered both useful and docile.” Regarding the body as an (economic) resource, a machine, and integrating it “into systems of efficient and economic controls”, required its disciplined and

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31 Ibid., p. 240.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 161.
36 Ibid., p. 250, p. 249.
supervised docility.\textsuperscript{37} Institutions such as the army, university and school embodied this disciplinary power, the “\textit{anatomo-politics of the human body}.”\textsuperscript{38}

The second series “formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as a basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity.”\textsuperscript{39} Foucault argues:

\begin{quote}
For the first time in history, no doubt, biological existence was reflected in political existence [...]. Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over who the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery it would be to exercise over them would have to be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more than the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body. [...] [O]ne would have to speak of biopower to designate what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

What Foucault terms ‘biopower’ forms a technology of power that does not primarily seek disciplinarisation but the regulation of ‘man-as-species’.\textsuperscript{41} Biopower, for him, is a force that “exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.”\textsuperscript{42}

While anatomo-politics individualises bodies, trains and disciplines them, and subjects them to surveillance, the second mechanism coordinates populations, and interferes in ‘bio-sociological’ processes. Importantly, for Foucault, these two series, disciplinary and regulatory, that evolved into a ‘power over life’, are not antithetical but constitute “two poles of developments linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of relations.”\textsuperscript{43}

With the emergence of what Foucault hints to as a “fine, differentiated, continuous network”, the potentiality to resist or escape the old sovereign’s punishments by

\textsuperscript{37} Foucault, \textit{History of Sexuality}, 1998, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., emphasis in original; see also Foucault, \textit{Discipline and Punish}, 1997.
\textsuperscript{39} Foucault, \textit{History of Sexuality}, 1998, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 142-143, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 139. Foucault shows in his discussion of the government of a town how these mechanisms intersect. See Foucault, \textit{Society Must Be Defended}, 2004, p. 251.
remaining excessively untraceable or unencumbered, waned. For Foucault, this novel biopolitical concern for life, developing in the eighteenth century, corresponded with several interlinked processes, including demographic growth and agricultural expansion that resulted in a shift to population “as the final end of government.” For him, the birth of this mastery, this new art of government can be traced back to four crucial and interrelated developments.

First, Foucault suggests, the emergence of civil society caused a fundamental break in the awe-inspiring sovereign-obedience scheme. The state’s raison d’être became grounded not on the production of docile subjects but on its responsibility for the well-being of the state’s necessary correlate, society. Second, a new scientific knowledge appeared:

This knowledge is political economy, not as simple knowledge of ways of enriching the state, but as knowledge of processes that link together variations of wealth and variation of population on three axes: production, circulation, consumption.

Third, population became seen as a ‘natural’ problem. Understanding the existence of population as a natural phenomenon, so Foucault, meant that its regulation required a concern for the population’s well-being. A sense of the state’s responsibility for its population emerged and necessitated interventions to support and foster life, for example through social medicine and public hygiene. Fourth, due to this ‘naturalness of population’, Foucault suggests that state interventions had to refrain from “trying to impose regulatory systems of injunctions, imperatives, and interdictions on these processes.” Instead, respect for certain freedoms became inserted into the new art of government.

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46 Ibid., p. 350.
48 Ibid., p. 352.
49 Ibid.
Foucault suggests that the classical sovereign turned into a public administrator or manager of life, exercising “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death.” 50 Although seemingly paradoxical, the ‘new’ sovereign power seeking to foster (some) life had to, at the same time, disallow or kill (other) life. For Foucault, it is through racism that a biopolitical system can exercise the death-function. 51 The racism that he alludes to, exemplified by Nazism and its “eugenic ordering of society”, constitutes a political technology that creates subdivisions, races, within a population. 52

Biopower’s racism, then, significant for the thesis as a whole and further explored in Chapter Four, is “a way of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain.” 53 By subdividing a species into races, such racism not only fragments but also ‘purifies’ which, for Foucault, is racism’s ‘second function’: “Its role is [...] to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: [...] “The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more”. 54

In Abnormal, Foucault distinguishes between this ‘new’, ‘neo’, ‘state’ or ‘internal’ racism and ‘traditional’ or ‘ethnic’ racism, as for him its “function is not so much the prejudice or defense of one group against another” but, rather, “permits the screening of every individual within a given society.” 55 The individualising function of racism needs to be understood, however, alongside its totalising function which assigns degenerative potential to particular societal groups, turning them into stigmatic populations that supposedly endanger the species of the human as such. Eliminating biopolitical threats, then, becomes a matter of governmentality and survival.

**Governmentality and Resistance**

The concern for population and its security, Foucault argues, implied an explicit shift in the method of governing, and thus, in the conception of power and authority as well as

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54 Ibid.
in the modalities of and potentialities for resistance. While classical sovereigns and later disciplinary authority relied on “the exercise of a will over others in the most homogenous, continuous, and exhaustive way possible”, requiring docile, passive and punishable subjects, the emergence of population as a problem of government demanded different modes of intervention and regulation.\textsuperscript{56} For Foucault, it was in these transformations that the state’s modern art of governing, or \textit{governability}, was born.\textsuperscript{57} This art implies different forms or systems of authority, ones that also care and benefit those subjected to it, while, nonetheless retaining the ability to discipline and kill.

In \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, Foucault locates the Christian pastorate as the background of and the prelude to the emergence of a power that cares and that later merged, in complex ways, with (secular) political or governmental power. Pastoral power forms, for him, a power “from which we have still not freed ourselves.”\textsuperscript{58} Emerging first in Hebrew society and then becoming introduced to the ‘West’ through the spread of Christianity and its institutions, Foucault regards the metaphor of the shepherd guiding his flock as suitable to reflect on the rationalities of pastoral power.\textsuperscript{59} For him, the authority of the shepherd (and pastor) does not derive primarily from the disciplining of the souls that he governs but from his duty of care. The duty of the shepherd is to “provide the flock with its subsistence, to watch over it every day, and to ensure its salvation”.\textsuperscript{60}

Keeping watch over the moving flock as well as every individual sheep, the shepherd’s power is both individualising and totalising.\textsuperscript{61} Since the shepherd cares for the well-being of one and all he must know his subjects and be able to detect potential dangers or hazards that may affect the preservation of the entire flock. Foucault suggests that the pastorate establishes

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{56} Foucault, \textit{Security, Territory, Population}, 2009, p. 66.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 165.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., p. 148.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 364.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 364, p. 128.
\end{enumerate}
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[...] a structure, a technique of, at once, power, investigation, self-examination, and the examinations of others, by which a certain secret inner truth of the hidden soul, becomes the element through which the pastor’s power is exercised, by which obedience is practiced, by which the relationship of complete obedience is assured, and through which, precisely, the economy of merits and faults passes.62

As a prelude to governmentality, the Christian pastorate introduces techniques of governing that revolve around the interrelation between the individual and the multiple, both which have to become knowable, listened to, cared for, and watched over.

Pastoral power seeks to understand its subject, “a subject whose merits are analytically identified, who is subjected in continuous networks of obedience, and who is subjectified (subjectif) through the compulsory extraction of truth.”63 These ‘acts of truth’, for Foucault, “have the peculiar requirement not just that the subject tell the truth but that he tell the truth about himself, his faults, his desires, the state of his soul”.64 Pastoral power implies the conduct of conduct of its subjects:

Conduct is the activity of conducting (conduire), of conduction (la conduction) if you like, but it is equally the way in which one conducts oneself (se conduit), lets oneself be conducted (se laisse conduire), is conducted (est conduit), and finally, in which one behaves (se comporte) as an effect of a form of conduct (une conduction) as the action of conducting or of conduction (conduction).65

Foucault argues that while these pastoral rationalities and methods of governing were not simply translated into a secularised power of government they, nonetheless, spread beyond ecclesiastical institutions.66 It was due to a crisis that the “pastorate burst open, broke up, and assumed the dimension of governmentality.”67 Following Foucault, this crisis emerged as a result of manifold forms of resistance that appeared within the pastorate in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.

[62 Ibid., p. 183.
63 Ibid., pp. 184-185, emphasis in original.
66 Ibid., p. 229.
67 Ibid., p. 193.]
Searching for a specific notion to define these resistances, he considers several variants. For him, ‘revolt’ is “too precise and too strong”, ‘disobedience’ too weak, “insubordination” “attached to military insubordination”, ‘dissidence’ too historically loaded and localised, ‘misconduct’ too passive. Foucault asks: “How can we designate the type of revolts, or rather the sort of specific web of resistance to forms of power that do not exercise sovereignty and do not exploit, but “conduct”? For him, then, while never abandoning the notion of resistance, the term ‘counter-conduct’ seems appropriate as it designates the “struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others.”

These resistances to conduct, besides other developments already mentioned (‘civil society’, ‘political economy’, ‘problem of population’, ‘mechanism of security’), led, so Foucault, to the crisis of the pastorate. While seemingly counterintuitive, for Foucault it was due to struggles against the ecclesiastical institutions that pastoral power spread and became (ingrained in) governmental power. Movements surfaced objecting to their conduction and seeking “to be conducted differently, by other leaders (conducteurs) and other shepherds, towards other objectives and forms of salvation, and through other procedures and methods.” Importantly, Foucault suggests that when observing the emergence of resistances and counter-movements, the endurance of the rationalities of pastoral power within governmentality become intelligible. He points to these struggles as diagnostics when he notes:

We may even say that the importance, vigor, and depth of implantation of this pastoral power can be measured by the intensity and multiplicity of agitations, revolts, discontent, struggles, battles, and bloody wars that have been conducted around, for, and against it.

Elaborating on five forms of counter-conduct, asceticism, communities, mysticism, the problem of Scripture, and eschatological beliefs, Foucault shows how movements emerged within Christianity and its institutions against the dominant ways of being

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68 Ibid., pp. 200-201.
69 Ibid., p. 200.
70 Ibid., p. 201.
71 Ibid., pp. 194-195, emphasis in original.
72 Ibid., p. 148.
conducted. These counter-conducts and anti-pastoral struggles were not exterior to Christianity but “border-elements” that developed tactics of contestation to resist (certain) forms of conduction. He refers to their transversality when he says:

But the specificity of theses struggles, of these resistances of conduct, does not mean that they remained separate or isolated from each other, with their own partners, forms, dramaturgy, and distinct aim. In actual fact they are always, or almost always, linked to other conflicts and problems.

What, then, were the characteristics of the art of government, emerging on the basis but not confined to the logic of pastoral power? For Foucault, it was through the problematisation of the form of conduct, the questioning of the pastorate's demand for exhaustive obedience and its promise of salvation that more became demanded of the sovereign. And, for Foucault, this was government:

It is more than sovereignty, it is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something other than the pastorate, and this something without a model, which must find its mode, is the art of government.

Political institutions appeared that took on the responsibility and task for the conduction of people within the form of the modern state and its 'raison d'État'. For Foucault, this 'reason of state' took shape in two, 'external' and 'internal', assemblages of political knowledge and technology: first, “a military-diplomatic technology that consists in securing and developing the state's forces through a system of alliances and the organization of an armed apparatus” and second, 'police'. Turning to the meaning of police before the end of the eighteenth century, Foucault demonstrates how police as a political technology had to concern itself with society, and thus govern “all the forms of [...] men’s coexistence with each other.”

73 Ibid., p. 214.
74 Ibid., p. 215.
75 Ibid., p. 196.
76 Ibid., pp. 236-237.
77 Ibid., p. 365.
78 Ibid., p. 326.
So, it seems to me that the objective of police is everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce this well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s strength.\(^79\)

For Foucault, it was when these different facets came together that the new governmental reason was born, the art of directing human conduct: “Government of children, government of souls and consciences, government of a household, of a state, or of oneself.”\(^80\) However, rather than regarding this new art as “the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government”, Foucault emphasises that it should be understood as “a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management”.\(^81\)

The notion of ‘triangle’ chosen by Foucault to comprehend the intersecting of different forms of authority – sovereignty, discipline, governmental management – is unfortunate as it seems to designate them to an enclosed space, and while connected, positioned at other ends, exerting authority in their specific ways. However, and importantly for later elaborations of the (EUropean border) dispositif, in his definition of governmentality Foucault already departs from such geometrical shape towards a conceptualisation of an ‘ensemble’, signifying the diffuseness of power (relations) in governmental regimes. Defining governmentality, he holds:

First, by “governmentality” I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument. Second, by “governmentality” I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power-sovereignty, discipline, and so on - of the type of power that we can call “government” and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other] to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by “governmentality” I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the

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\(^{79}\) Ibid., p. 328.


Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually “governmentalized”.  

Governmentality implies the coming-together of a plurality of microphysical power-relationalities and the process of their formation into regimes, or clusters, of power marked by a degree of stability and orientation. Besides the shift to the ‘problem of population’ and apparatuses that focus on securing the population’s well-being, as already discussed, Foucault specifies ‘political economy’ as governmentality’s ‘major form of knowledge’.

In *The Birth of Biopolitics* Foucault situates liberalism within the emergence of the art of government and biopower. As a political rationality, liberalism conflicts with the rationality of the state as the progressive and overbearing regularisation of population, its meticulous recording of as much as possible, from birth rates to public hygiene. As a critique to excessive government, liberal governmentality seeks to regulate through (individual) freedoms. For Foucault, liberal thought poses a question to government: “What makes government necessary, and what ends must it pursue with regard to society in order to justify its own existence?”

Liberalism and political economy question the state as an end in itself and the governability of (economic) subjects as such. The sovereign state and its reason cannot account for the subject of interest, the economic man. The figure of the *homo œconomicus*, in contrast to the rights-bearing *homo juridicus*, is incompatible with juridical sovereignty as Foucault shows:

> [The *homo œconomicus* tells the sovereign: You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. [...] You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know.]

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82 Ibid., pp. 108-109, emphasis in original.
84 Ibid., p. 319.
85 Ibid., p. 283.
The sovereign cannot know because the economic man ultimately follows his own instincts and interests “and whose interest is such that it converges spontaneously with the interest of others [… ], homo œconomicus is the person who must be let alone.”\(^86\) Only when left alone, he can pursue his interests, thereby (supposedly) benefiting all. Foucault argues that it is “this essential incompatibility between the non-totalizable multiplicity of economic subjects of interest and the totalizing unity of the juridical sovereign” that is overcome by the liberal art of government.\(^87\)

Rather than signalling the end to governmental reason, the \textit{homo œconomicus} in fact allows for intensified interventions.\(^88\) Instead of becoming ungovernable due to his excessive or eccentric ‘freedom’, he becomes manageable as “he responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially introduced into the environment.”\(^89\) Liberal governmentality, then, is the art of governing as little as possible whilst nonetheless retaining the sovereign power over its territory, understood as its taxable property.\(^90\) Instead of impositions of its will, liberal government’s laisser-faire rationality, so Foucault says, “[acts] on the environment and systematically [modifies] its variables” and finds in the economic man its rational and ultimately governable agent.\(^91\) Self-governing subjects that conduct themselves as subjects of freedom become conducted by a myriad of governmental technologies, knowledges and strategies.

The art of government then is the art of combining elements that, at first sight, seem contingent, unrelated, or distinct. Leaving the economic man alone does not imply ungovernability or the absence of sovereign or disciplinary technologies inasmuch as neoliberal rationalities do not imply the freedom of movement. These different forms of power, as an ensemble, complement and permeate one another, penetrate different realms but generate certain effects based on specific rationales, truths and knowledges. Various social, economic, religious, pedagogical, scientific, institutional and political processes, while disparate, establish a degree of integrity, a consistency that allows for

\(^{86}\) Ibid., p. 270, emphasis in original.  
\(^{87}\) Ibid., p. 282.  
\(^{88}\) Ibid., p. 270.  
\(^{89}\) Ibid.  
\(^{90}\) Ibid., p. 284.  
\(^{91}\) Ibid., p. 271.
the ‘pre-eminence’ of a particular power, supported by specific means and knowledges. It is through the process of clustering of power-relations that social hegemonies emerge, that, while not exhaustive, become dominant.

Power-relations that stratify can be understood as governmental dispositifs. Based on assumptions that power is a diffuse force, that contemporary forms of government are more than imposing or disciplining sovereigns, that the modern condition of government is one of liberal governmentality, and that social hegemonies do exist, dispositifs emerge through which contemporary forms of dominance and oppression are practiced, including the governing of mobilities. Thinking resistance becomes more complex when the image of a singularly ‘powerful’ sovereign becomes displaced, as the following section further explores.

**The Dispositif and Resistance**

In the interview *The Confession of the Flesh* Foucault elaborates most explicitly on the notion of the dispositif.\(^92\) For him, a dispositif is that which creates systems of relations within “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions”.\(^93\) Not a triangle, a dispositif is a formation that subsumes the different rationales of authority: sovereignty-discipline-governmental management. More heterogeneous than the episteme which Foucault understands as a discursive formation, the dispositif is both discursive and non-discursive, including “the said as much as the unsaid”.\(^94\) Foucault states:

> [The dispositif] is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular direction, blocking them, stabilising them, utilising them, etc. The [dispositif] is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what the [dispositif] consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge.\(^95\)


\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 194.

\(^{94}\) Ibid.

\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 196, emphasis in original. The notion of ‘apparatus’ was replaced with ‘dispositif’ which reflects Foucault’s own use of the term in the original version of the text.
While markedly complex, the dispositif is not established arbitrarily but strategically and while power ‘comes from everywhere’ it can form stratified relations and clusters. Maybe most importantly, a dispositif is a response its “major function at a given historical moment [is] that of responding to an urgent need.”

Dispositifs form around specific issues that, regarded as problems, seem to require remedy. As in his investigations into madness, sexuality and delinquency, Foucault shows “how the coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division between true and false.” The dispositif, then, is a complex ensemble of heterogeneous elements, discursive and nondiscursive, that acquires, through the strategic interplay of these elements (diverse power-relations and relations of knowledge) and due to an ‘urgent need’ a degree of integrity.

For Foucault, exhaustive integrity or unity can never be achieved since ‘functional overdetermination’ implies continuous friction in the interplay of the elements that can lead to new ‘fields of rationality’ but never to a complete reconciliation of the diverse elements.

The dispositif as a system, ensemble or cluster of power-relations therefore exhibits both a degree of volatility due to intrinsic contradictions and alternations as well as a degree of systematicity and formation due to ‘certain coordinates of knowledge’ that act as points of orientation and ‘strategic elaborations’. Rather than expecting synthesis, Foucault’s analysis seeks to replace a “dialectical logic with [...] a strategic logic.” He argues:

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96 Ibid., p. 195, emphasis in original.
97 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 2010, p. 19, emphasis as well as reference to dispositif in original.
100 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 2010, p. 42.
A logic of strategy does not stress contradictory terms within a homogeneity that promises their resolution in a unity. The function of strategic logic is to establish the possible connections between disparate terms which remain disparate.\(^{101}\)

As pointers to the dispositif’s orientation, strategies can be conceived as the manipulation or (partial) coming together of power-relations toward a certain target.\(^{102}\) While, for Foucault, “[t]here is no single, all-encompassing strategy” and no singular strategist, the dispositif is the (always fragmented) consolidation of power-relations, the “locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interaction”, making domination a reality.\(^{103}\)

And by domination I do not mean the brute fact of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society; so, not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social body.\(^{104}\)

Thinking contemporary forms of domination as maintained and generated by governmental dispositifs means paying attention to the different elements of which they are composed and their inter-relationality, the myriad ways in which they function, and their underlying rationales, truths and needs.

With the transformation of political authority and the emergence of governmental dispositifs that, as Foucault argues, subjugate and oppress in multiple ways, and necessarily entangle the modern subject in some way, where lies the potentiality for resistance? While the following chapters will explore this question by ethnographically inquiring into the potentiality of migration struggles in the EU border dispositif, Foucault provides a few eclectic pointers to how resistances in dispositifs (could) manifest.

From the discussion so far it emerges that, for Foucault, the question of resistance inevitably relates to a concern with government, not the least as he locates rebellions of

\(^{101}\) Ibid.


\(^{104}\) Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 2004, p. 27.
conduct as the forces that propelled modern governmental rationalities beyond ecclesiastical institutions. Contemporary forms of governmentality increasingly disband the likelihood of lives to remain unnoticed or to excessively escape political authority as Foucault’s un-famous lives in the times of the king. The entanglement of the modern subject in governmental grids does, nonetheless, not exhaust the possibilities for resistance.

Foucault, when asked to elaborate on a remark of his in which he referred to a “decision-making will not to be governed” stresses, that this expression was an error on his part:

I was not referring to something that would be a fundamental anarchism, that would be like an originary freedom, absolutely and wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization.  

Although impishly adding that while he did not say it “this does not mean that I absolutely exclude it”, Foucault suggests that he was rather referring to a will “not to be governed thusly” to which he adds elsewhere, “how not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them”.

This will to not be governed in particular ways presupposes one’s situatedness in governmental forms of authority and the confrontation with various forms of subjugation. Marked in one way or another by the dispositif, political resistance as the attempt to become fully (or excessively) anonymous seems dubious. Instead, in What is Critique?, Foucault proposes a critical ethos or attitude that develops distrust in governmental truths:

I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. Well, then!: critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected

105 Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 1997, p. 73.
106 Ibid., p. 73, p. 28, emphasis in original.
intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.\textsuperscript{107}

In order not to be governed thusly, the insubordinate subject questions, discursively or practically, governmental truths and rationales that also-always underlie dispositifs. The dispositif forms as a response to a problem and a supposed anomaly and develops, driven by its ‘urgent need’, strategies and technologies of government and control.

For Foucault, besides critiquing governmental truths, or maybe rather through such critique, the subject sets in motion processes of desubjugation and becoming. He suggests in \textit{The Subject and Power} that such intractable refusals are linked to other forms of being or becoming:

Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we could be to get rid of this kind of political “double bind”, which is simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. [...] We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.\textsuperscript{108}

Resistance, it seems for Foucault, does not seek categorical and absolute ungovernability but, rather, forms a stance of critique of and distrust in the mechanisms that act on certain underlying truths in order to govern, kill, discipline and conduct.

The potentiality of resistance, then, lies also in processes of desubjugation that counteract the urgent need for knowable, predictable and confessing subjects and that might, through acts of refusal, foster alternative forms of being. When elaborating on the idea of the dispositif and a conceptualisation of power-relations as clusters, Foucault suggests that “the only problem is to provide oneself with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power.”\textsuperscript{109} As the following part proposes, such a grid of analysis can be formed around an idea and practice of resistance, suggesting resistance as method

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\textsuperscript{107} Ibid., p. 32. \\
\textsuperscript{108} Foucault, \textit{The Subject and Power}, 1982, p. 785. \\
\textsuperscript{109} Foucault, \textit{The Confession of the Flesh}, 1980, p. 199.
\end{flushright}
Part III - Resistance as Method

This final part of the chapter conceptualises resistance as method. The first two parts demonstrated not only Foucault’s eclectic conceptualisations of resistances and their significance for his thoughts on power and the art of government, but also pointed to an understanding of resistance as a force through which certain phenomena become animated and opened up for interrogation. It is argued here that following forms of resistance allows to inquire into dynamic social fields and governmental dispositifs that unfold in particular ways when inspected through resistance, often exposing forms of violence, subjectification and underlying needs and truths, but also the instability and fallibility of governmental regimes. Beginning social analyses with resistances means paying attention to the ways in which their enactments set taken-for-granted truths in motion, question and provoke them, upset and disrupt them. Since thinking resistance as method necessitates a situated reading of practices of resistance, an ethnographic lens is proposed in the second section of this part.

In Foucault’s discussion of anti-pastoral revolts in ecclesiastical institutions, as shown in part II, he broaches the topic of resistance as a force through which historical shifts emerged and various power-relationalities became visibilised. When discussing forms of counter-conduct, he argues:

[I]t is entirely possible to arrive at overall effects, not by concerted confrontations, but also by local or lateral or diagonal attacks that bring into play the general economy of the whole. Thus: marginal spiritual movements, multiplicities of religious dissidence, which did not in any way attack the Catholic Church, ultimately toppled not only a whole section of the ecclesiastical institution, but the way in which religious power was exercised in the West. These theoretical and practical effects suggest that it may be worth the effort to continue with experiment.110

What Foucault seems to mean by ‘experiment’ is a different way of examination, one that locates and follows these ‘local, lateral, diagonal attacks’ instead of ‘concerted confrontations’ to investigate their ‘theoretical and practical effects’, and to inquire into

110 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 2009, p. 120, footnotes.
how governmental dispositifs, social hegemonies, or the ‘general economy of the whole’, function, become contested and modified.

He suggests “an adaptation of the gaze, a way of turning round the support of things by moving the person observing them”, which would make intelligible micro-practices as they form and fracture. Importantly, while these micro-practices have their locality and specificity, they connect to registers beyond themselves. As Foucault suggests in the interview Remarks on Marx: “Localizing problems is indispensable for theoretical and political reasons [...] but that doesn’t mean that they are not, however, general problems.”

In the course of explaining his interest in insurrections of conduct, Foucault briefly mentions similar insurrections in the English, French and Russian revolutions and suggests:

It would be interesting to see how these series of insurrections, these revolts of conduct, spread and what effects they have had on revolutionary processes themselves, how they were controlled and taken in hand, and what was their specificity, form, and internal law of development. Well, this would be an entire field of possible research.

While voicing interest, Foucault himself never seems to have acted in great depth on these methodological insights. He, nonetheless, sketches a research agenda that investigates power-relations beginning with forms of resistance and further states in The Subject and Power:

I would like to suggest another way to go further toward a new economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, and find out their point of application and the methods used. [...] In order to understand what power relations

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111 Ibid., p. 119, footnotes.
are about, perhaps we should investigate the forms of resistance and attempts made to dissociate these relations.  

Inspired by and situated within Foucault's work, this thesis understands the tracing of resistance as a method that allows explorations of socio-political phenomena set in motion by its practice. Resistance conceived as a catalyst, considered "any substance that increases the rate of a reaction without itself being consumed", triggers continuous motion that upsets.

Instead of being conceived as a substance, a solid matter with uniform properties, however, resistance can be understood as a force, as something that pushes or pulls, collides, and as something that can only emerge in interactions. Exploring these dynamic interactions can yield insights into how both resistances and governmental dispositifs function. In the motions that they create, forces of resistance animate themselves, that with which they collide, and the many reverberations that they cause, all of which are intimately interrelated. In this sense, as forces of animation, resistances shed light on various aspects that were in the dark prior to its frictional movement.

The value of such an analysis is highlighted by Foucault when he argues for a dynamic gaze to explore power-relations, which also holds true for forces of resistance:

\[ R \text{ather than looking for the single form or the central point from which all forms of power derive, either by way of consequence or development, we must begin by letting them operate in their multiplicity, their differences, their specificity, and their reversibility; we must therefore study them as relations of force that intersect, refer to one another, converge, or, on the contrary, come into conflict and strive to negate one another.}\]

The idea of resistance as method has several implications for conceptions of both resistance and method that the previous parts have highlighted and that are briefly restated here. Resistance cannot be conceived as an analytic without a concomitant conceptualisation of power and government. The entanglement of forces of resistance in governmental

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dispositifs suggests that there is always a ‘situation’ within which or against which resistances become enacted, and that, in fact, they may have helped shape. Resistance does not operate autonomously or in contradistinction to power and vice versa. Power and resistance do not constitute substances that can be held, won or lost, but relations. Power and resistance as relations both exist and function only as practices.\textsuperscript{117} If the relationalities between power, resistance and dispositif are enacted, an analysis of these relationalities necessitates a focus on practices.

In \textit{Questions of method} Foucault explains that his “target of analysis wasn’t ‘institutions’, ‘theories’ or ‘ideology’, but \textit{practices} – with the aim of grasping the conditions which make these acceptable at a given moment.”\textsuperscript{118} Practices, for Foucault, are “places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reason given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect.”\textsuperscript{119} It is in enactments and not in abstract renderings that resistances as well as governmental dispositifs become articulated in their sociality and complexity.

It follows that the practice of resistance does not create a stable and heroic subject of resistance but that the modern subject is always-already ‘cut up’. Resistances are local, specific and situated but always also transversal and general, setting into motion both past, present and future, as well as the local and the beyond. Resistance as a process is necessarily dynamic and energetic, never static. Furthermore, contemporary government is not composed of a singular sovereign centre but of plural governmental dispositifs which reinforce existing social hegemonies. Disciplinary, sovereign as well as governmental-managerial techniques can all be found in governmental dispositifs.

These considerations, however, seem to prompt a conceptual problem: if resistance is understood as a method, exists only as practice, and if it becomes detectable only when materialising in the process of its practicing, then there can hardly be a conception of what resistance might constitute prior to its emergence in practice. So, when following this ‘experiment’, where does one begin to look? Also, would not an a-priori conception

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{118} Foucault, ‘Questions of method’, 1991, p. 75, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
of resistance, regardless of its broad contours, endanger that which can be seen, prematurely setting the terms of debate, narrowing the focus, delimiting resistance’s potentiality?

Certainly, what is needed is an initial assumption of what forces of resistance might be, where they might materialise and what they might do. One has to be drawn somewhere. However, while these questions remain relevant and probing, the inquiries conducted in this thesis need to be understood as shaped not in a vacuum but through one’s theoretical-empirical engagement and implication in socio-political matrices, in that ‘what there is’, and through one’s politico-subjective entanglement in a world that is, amongst everything else, marked by radical inequalities and abyssal violence. Moving away from the presumed possibility of objectively inquiring into politics, one’s politicality, shaped inter alia through sexuality, gender, class, religion, nationality, race, and experience always-already impacts on one’s positionality in and renderings of the world.

These assumptions that underlie the idea of *resistance as method* complicate investigations beginning with forces of resistance into social situations as they discard the often maintained dualisms between *Power/Government* and *Resistance*, and point to their complex inter-relationals. At the same time, they open a space for a nuanced interrogation of resistances and their disruptive potential as the following section demonstrates.

**‘Being of the struggle’ - Toward an Ethnography**

*Resistances as method* is an avowedly political method. It is important to point out that my elaborations on resistances as (analytical) catalysts do not suggest an approach that reduces practices of resistance to the functionality of serving the opening up of socio-political phenomena for purposes of knowledge production. While regarding resistance as a method necessitates a degree of instrumentality, it equally requires political implication and demands ethico-political considerations. Foucault, when elaborating on ‘critique’ argues:

After all, critique only exists in relation to something other than itself: it is an instrument, a means for a future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be [...]. [...] The identification of the acceptability of a system cannot be dissociated from
identifying what made it difficult to accept: its arbitrary nature in terms of knowledge, its violence in terms of power, in short, its energy.\textsuperscript{120}

This thesis explores politically, through migration struggles, what makes the European border dispositif so difficult to accept, and, in this vein, it reflects the concerns of these struggles.

The struggles introduced in the subsequent chapters could not have been followed ethnographically without my own implication in them. This, again, is not reducible to the question of access but relates much more to a shared political commitment that this thesis is an expression of. This shared political commitment does not translate into assumptions of easy (ideological) commonality. Assumed commonality carries with it the violence of ignoring existing differences and privileges that always-already condition and saturate the encounters of those who face different registers of violence and governmental subjugation. Rather, a shared commitment is formed in a practical and theoretical opposition to the contemporary practices of inequality and exclusion that render some individuals, groups and populations disproportionately exposed to differentiation, precarisation and violence as well as a practical and theoretical siding with those who struggle, in diverse but always political ways, against their exclusion, immobility, subjection and governance.

This stance does neither preclude a critical engagement with these struggles nor necessitate the staging of “a spectacle of proximity” within these struggles.\textsuperscript{121} Instead, as De Genova suggests, it implies that there is no neutrality when writing about migration struggles since those who conduct research are necessarily “‘of the connections’ between migrants’ transnational mobilities and the political, legal, and border-policing regimes that seek to orchestrate, regiment, and manage their energies.”\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{120} Foucault, ‘What is Critique?’, 1997, p. 54.
\textsuperscript{122} Nicholas De Genova, “We are of the connections’: migration, methodological nationalism, and ‘militant research’, \textit{Postcolonial Studies}, 16:3 (2013), p. 252.
In the contemporary condition of injustice, described by some as ‘global apartheid’, those who write about migration struggles are not only ‘of the connection’ but, equally, ‘of the struggles’. The purportedly objective and neutral research conducted by some in ‘migration studies’ ignores not merely the inter-linkages between (academic, policy) knowledges and global practices of people-filtering, the criminalisation and illegalisation of mobility, and the production of ever-more dangerous migration paths, but also effaces one’s own political responsibility for the knowledges that are produced and circulated. The danger, even for ‘critical’ scholarship “to be reabsorbed by the ‘deportation regime’”, as Garelli and Tazzioli have pointed out, compels a reflexive and political dimension in processes of knowledge production.

In that sense, following migration resistances in this thesis does not render them mere instrumental analytics to explore the EUropean border dispositif but means, instead, my own implication within the struggles in the shared commitment to counter-act, in various possible ways, the government of migration and mobility and its processes of ‘othering’ through which divisions are erected between what is and is not conceived as ‘rightfully’ belonging.

This commitment grew also out of several personal experiences of ‘being othered’ due to my partly non-EUropean family background and during the many years I spent in various non/EUropean countries as a migrant. As a holder of German-EUropean citizenship and as firmly located in what could be understood as the ‘middle class’, my experiences of othering remained relatively negligible and, at times, my Asian background was even regarded favourably, especially when contrasted to other ‘racial/cultural/ethnic’ groups. Nonetheless, racial affronts, insensitivities and prejudices, while by no means everyday experiences, accompanied my upbringing in Germany, later influenced my decisions where to move, live, work and study, and drew my attention continuously to different forms of othering and racialisation to which this thesis seeks to respond.

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My involvement in the three struggles explored translated into various forms of activism, at times from great distance, protesting, filling out papers, translating documents, listening to life stories, researching together, publicly shouting or collectively grieving. Many times, the numerous encounters I have had throughout my research resulted in friendships. At the same time, my implication and activism formed a permanent source of anguish, as it seemed to never suffice, to always fall short of what was needed in the face of violent abjection and precariousness.

When resistance as method implies 'being of the connection and struggle', method is in and of itself performative and political.\textsuperscript{125} It can be, as John Law suggests, a way of opening up socio-political phenomena and of creatively producing realities.\textsuperscript{126} Various critical scholars have developed methods that leave behind assumptions of neutrality, objective distance, or absolute embeddedness and moved toward relational, situational and subjective inquiries.\textsuperscript{127} As Squire notes, critically designed research ‘attunes to mess’, is sceptical of ‘problem-solving’ approaches with its preformed objectives and rigid categories, and “challenges the notion of “research design” in the conventional sense […], which implies rationalist modes of knowing and a linear or neatly cyclical conception of the research process.”\textsuperscript{128} For her, criticality and reflexivity imply a problematisation of the modalities of research and knowing with distinctions between subject/ object and researcher/ participant becoming blurred.

The thesis conducts three ethnographies and has drawn eclectically from different critical ethnographic registers. In order to follow migration struggles in EUropean borderscapes, George Marcus’ ‘multi-sited ethnography’ proves valuable in order to account for dynamic social practices that classical research paradigms fail to capture.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127} John Schostak and Jill Schostak, \textit{Radical Research} (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 6-8.
Researching heterogeneous socio-political phenomena and actors, he envisions an ethnographic method of ‘following’. The ethnographer as a ‘circumstantial activist’ follows ‘people’, ‘the thing’, ‘the metaphor’, ‘the plot, story, or allegory’, ‘the life or biography’, or ‘the conflict’. Marcus argues:

Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the ethnography.\(^\text{130}\)

A multi-sited research design was needed to trace the materialisation of struggles as well as borderwork throughout and beyond European space.

Relatedly, Wanda Vrasti uses ethnography as “a textual strategy for building theory from the disparate events, statements, experiences, dilemmas and surprises I encountered during my travels, but also at home, at my desk, in libraries, at conferences and during seminars.”\(^\text{131}\) Her ‘ethnographic improvisation’ challenges a traditional understanding of method and of research as “the result of a linear accumulation of knowledge.”\(^\text{132}\) Rather than finding definitive answers in ‘the field’ that are merely transcribed into accurate accounts of the experience ‘on the ground’, Vrasti’s ethnography “requires constant travelling back and forth between the part and the whole, experience and text, fieldwork and theory”.\(^\text{133}\)

Other ethnographic trajectories welcome, besides greater methodological pluralism and spatial displacement, the explicit political nature of social science research.\(^\text{134}\) Soyini Madison, for example, envisions an ethnography that “begins with an ethical responsibility to address processes of unfairness or injustice within a particular lived

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\(^\text{132}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{133}\) Ibid.

domain.” For her, critical research needs to move away from the researcher’s static ‘monologue’ toward an engaged dialogue which “emphasizes the living communion of a felt-sensing, embodied interplay and engagement between human beings.” ‘Militant ethnography’ as advocated by Jeffrey Juris enacts ethical responsibility by turning to collective practices of knowledge production and seeking “a politically engaged and collaborative form of participant observation carried out from within rather than outside grassroots movements.”

Similarly, for George Noblit et al, ‘postcritical ethnography’ is an enacted moral activity: “Postcritical ethnographers acknowledge that our autobiographies, cultures, and historical contexts, matter; these determine what we see and don’t see, understand and not understand.” Since no one is a ‘blank slate’, postcritical researchers would have to take on responsibility for the “world they are producing when they interpret and critique.” A related point of emphasis is placed by proponents of ‘autoethnography’. For Morgen Brigg and Roland Bleiker, the autoethnographic objective is “to (re-)introduce the self as a methodological resource.” This methodological move, as Elizabeth Dauphinee holds, allows for the “possibility of conveying something that we would not otherwise have been able to hear.”

While conceptually and methodologically diverse, these renderings of ethnographic research signal several departures from traditional ethnographic practices with regards to scale, means, and ends: the researcher does not necessarily have to be (physically or conceptually) embedded in one delimited field of study, researching multiple sites is possible as is a ‘constant travelling back and forth’ between (spatial and conceptual)

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139 Ibid., p. 24.
sites, even sites that are nonlocal and virtual.\textsuperscript{142} The researcher does not necessarily have to be ‘respectfully detached’, indeed she is encouraged to be politically engaged, an advocate and activist, increasingly blurring the false distinctions between subject/object and researcher/participant while retaining a reflexive interrogation of one’s own involvement, position and effect.

\textbf{Resistance as method} draws from these ethnographic accounts that also imply a departure from a dualist understanding of theory and method. Marysia Zalewski’s proposition to overcome “theoretical imperialism” by regarding theory as an ‘everyday practice’ and a ‘verb’ is particularly relevant here: “thinking of theory as verb implies that what one does is ‘theorise’ rather than ‘use theory’.”\textsuperscript{143} Theorising seen as an everyday process and not a finished substance also implies that it “is not confined either to policy makers or to academics.”\textsuperscript{144}

The reflections in this chapter do not simply precede the following ethnographic investigations but have been informed and shaped by them, making straightforward separations impossible. The method introduced in this chapter does not propose to test an a-priorily established ‘theory of resistance’ but, as Foucault gestured toward, adapts an experimental and dynamic gaze that allows attuning to resistances, their subjugated knowledges and practical theorisations.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A method, Foucault holds, should not “be a stake in itself” but, rather, “be made in order to get rid of it.”\textsuperscript{145} The proposition that this chapter made, to see resistance as \textbf{method} is, of course, conditional on its value to provide a (experimental) gaze through which insights into practices of resistance and governmental dispositifs can be won. Resistance, it was argued, as a relation and practice, as a force that stirs and disrupts, and that fractures individuals themselves, can emerge and be performed in various ways and

\[\text{\textsuperscript{142} Feldman, \textit{The Migration Apparatus}, 2012, p. 192.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., p. 346.}\]
guises, not simply in opposition to what is considered Power as domination but on a micro-physical level, in everyday social inter-relations that connect, nevertheless, always to a transversal beyond.

Resistance resists a reductive reading that demands it to be effective, functional or successful, coherent, concrete or concerted, audibly and visibly heroic, or directly confrontational. Migration struggles in their diversity are reminders of resistances’ pluralities. They emerge as disruptions, sometimes seeking to quietly subvert this or that border, sometimes hunger-striking in the centre of public attention, sometimes forming solidarities, relationships and friendships that subvert in-themselves the divisions that governmental dispositifs generate and maintain. If there are commonalities, they seem to emerge as a stubborn will to a life less defined by violence, differentiation, paternalism, and as the potentiality to remain or become otherwise.

The following three chapters listen to struggles that enact their disruptions differently, and that, conceptualised as dissent, solidarity and excess, form performative dimensions of resistance. While they are explored in the Foucauldian analytical grid developed in this chapter, several authors and thinkers will be brought into conversation to further explore their different facets of resistance. Listening to migration struggles necessitated me to ‘be of the struggles’, subjectively and emotionally implicated, grateful for the trust and generosity that I experienced in the most difficult and precarious of places and encounters.
Chapter Three: Dissent as Border Resistance - The Non-Citizen Struggle

Introduction
This chapter follows the Non-Citizen movement that emerged in early 2012 in Germany and developed into one of the most vocal, radical, concerted and persistent migration struggles in contemporary Europe. Through their protest, the Non-Citizens open up, in the public sphere, a series of questions concerning societal belonging and unbelonging, and set into motion governmental techniques of (border) control. While contesting the violent conditions that force them into societal marginality, they seek to enter the community of citizens as, in their perception, it is the condition of non-citizenship that renders them rightless, exploitable and oppressed. Their contested strategy of (re-)creating citizen/non-citizen binaries seems, at first sight, difficult to accommodate into a politics of resistance that questions, challenges and might ultimately seek to overcome (sovereign) forms of domination. Their resistance, conceived and interpreted in this chapter as dissent, shows, however, how Non-Citizen practices of confrontation disrupt and unsettle dominant boundaries that seem to commonsensically demarcate the sovereign inside from a feared outside, even when seeking entrance to the community of citizens.

My attention was first drawn to the struggle when the inhabitants of an asylum-centre responded to the suicide of a fellow resident by organising a protest campaign in the centre of the Southern-German town of Würzburg. The movement grew, quickly gathered traction, and soon gained wide-spread public attention. I followed their struggle in the first months virtually through their savvy media campaigns and activist circles, and met some of the protesters for the first time at the Non-Citizen Congress in Munich in March 2013 and in the months afterwards during short visits to Germany.

Through my efforts as translator of many of their statements I sought to stay as involved and supportive as possible. However, being physically distant to the struggle for long periods of time rendered the task of ethnographically tracing the campaign complex. This suggests, of course, that this chapter presents a partial and subjective, and not an exhaustive study of a movement that underwent various reorientations,
transformations and painful setbacks. Nonetheless, it seeks to capture significant moments, practices, discourses, gestures and strategies by listening to its protagonists and by following their resistances attentively.

This chapter brings Jacques Rancière into conversation with the Non-Citizen struggle and the Foucault-inspired elaborations of the previous chapter. Despite many differences between Rancière and Foucault’s bodies of work, some of which seem irreconcilable, Rancière adds important dimensions to the ways (migration) resistances can be thought. It was, in fact, the Non-Citizen struggle itself that prompted me to engage with Rancièrean concepts and terminologies. Having followed their campaign for several months, it emerged that the visible, public and radical nature of their practices, and, in particular the confrontational demeanour and intransigence that underpinned them, resonated in various ways with Rancière’s understanding of dissensus, thought as the merging of two incommensurable worlds into one.¹

In their actions, the Non-Citizens seemed willing to provoke collisions, or at least encounters between many (thought-)worlds that seemed incommensurable, thereby creating conflictual dynamics that opened up, questioned and deformed these worlds as well as the boundaries that sought to demarcate them. Importantly, the Non-Citizen campaign is not ‘theorised’ through Rancière’s concepts but, rather, accompanied by his philosophy. While his ideas help to understand the significance of the Non-Citizen movement, their dissenting practices, in turn, probe and problematise Rancière’s understanding of dissensus. As discussed later, Rancièrean dualisms and purisms that emerge in his elaborations of acts of dissensus leave little space to explore the ambiguities and agonies that emerged within the Non-Citizen struggle.

Part I, ‘The Struggle of Non-Citizens’, begins by recounting the formation and progression of the movement before turning to Rancière’s elaboration on dissensus in part II, ‘Two Worlds in One’. Adding to the Foucauldian account and the idea of resistance as method developed in Chapter Two, Rancière’s investigations, by beginning with political disruptions, provide valuable insights and resources to conceptualise

migration struggles specifically and questions of resistance more generally. Part III, 'Enacting the Wrong', discusses Non-Citizen practices of enacting the wrong through the occupation of 'wrong places', the allocation of 'wrong names' and by 'behaving wrongly'. Part IV, 'Transversal Border Dissent', explores the transversality of Non-Citizen resistance, illustrating how their practices always relate to and animate the beyond, the EU border dispositif.

Part I - The Struggle of Non-Citizens

On the 28th of January 2012, Mohammad Rahsepar locks himself into his room of the communal accommodation for asylum-seekers (Gemeinschaftsunterkunft) in Würzburg, South-Germany, and commits suicide by hanging. As a response to his death about eighty migrant activists from the asylum-centre demonstrate in front of the town hall and later, in March, begin the 'refugee tent action'. In a tent erected in the centre of the town, ten protestors decide to go on hunger-strike which lasts for seventeen days.

After disappointing negotiations with the Ministry for Migration and Refugees as well as the Bavarian government, the activists enter into another hunger-strike which results in the accelerated processing of the asylum-claims of some but not all. Out of solidarity, most migrant activists continue with their struggle. They have ten demands, amongst others, the shortening of the asylum processing, the right to access professional German language courses, the ability to secure one’s their living conditions through work and to freely choose medical care, the possibility of family reunification as well as the abolition of communal accommodations, allocated food packages and the residential law (Residenzpflicht), a law unique in Europe that immobilises asylum-seekers’ freedom to

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2 While 'Non-Citizen' could be employed throughout, this term became a widely used denotation only after a few months of struggle and remained a contested concept. It will hence be used only after it emerged discursively at the Congress in Munich, March 2013, which was first referred to as Refugee Struggle Congress and later, at times, as Non-Citizen Struggle Congress. Thus, for some of the chapter the term ‘migrant activist’ will be employed and subsequently ‘Non-Citizen’ to reflect also the transformation in the self-conceptions of the struggle.

3 Information about the Non-Citizen struggle was obtained through my participation at the Non-Citizen Struggle Congress in Munich, March 2013, and several visits to Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich afterwards, through email correspondence with activist supporters and other informants, as well as through my role as translator and reviewer of statements, call-outs and other publications. I also functioned as an interpreter at the Congress. Information, especially in the first months of struggle was obtained from their very active blogs. The information provided about the early phases of their struggle derives mainly from these two blogs, if not indicated otherwise: Iranische Flüchtlinge im Hungerstreik/Würzburg, http://gustreik.blogspot.eu/page/6/, and Refugee Tent Action, http://refugeetentaction.net.
roam by requiring them to stay within strict boundaries, defined by the ‘local office for foreigners’ (Ausländerbehörde). After 80 days of protest the migrant activists begin a third hunger-strike and sew together their lips. Some go on dry hunger-strike, refusing food and water. They state:

We are the voices of all asylum-seekers who demand their rights. We have screamed loudly but nobody has listened. Now we have sewn our lips together because everything has been said.⁴

In a statement entitled ‘Why we practice resistance’, published in August 2012, they explain how those deemed ‘refugees’ become systematically pushed to the margins, unable to partake in the societies they have entered.⁵ What emerges in the statement is a first elaboration on the notion of non-citizenship. They state that the refugee is classless in the sense that she falls out of traditional social categories, a disposable and exploitable subject at the underside of society. They advocate the destruction of the divide or antagonism between citizenship and non-citizenship through their being-citizen. Their central demands are:

1) The recognition of all asylum-seekers as political refugees; 2) The halting of all deportations; 3) The abolition of the residency-law; 4) The abolition of the duty to remain in communal accommodations (“Lagerpflicht”) which denies the asylum-seeker the ability to choose his or her place of residence.⁶

After months of protest, hardship and repeated hunger-strikes, migrant activists from various German cities come together as the ‘refugee coordination committee’ in Frankfurt to strategise about future collective struggles. There the decision is made to coordinate a joint protest, starting on the 8th of September 2012:

On this day asylum seekers will move towards Berlin from 2 different routes and after gathering in this city they will show to the German government that any action towards implementation of the inhumane deportation law will be responded back by

⁶ Ibid. ‘Lagerpflicht’ is a law specific to Bavaria that obliges asylum-seekers to remain in specific communal accommodations.
the asylum seekers’ movement and will not remain unopposed. They will shout louder than ever that they will continue their struggle until the asylum seekers’ camps with their catastrophic conditions are abolished. In fact by gathering in Berlin, the asylum seekers will actively disobey the discriminatory law of limited travelling range [residence law], which forces the asylum seekers to remain within a certain area.

[...] To all asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants in Germany: we have all left our countries for different reasons, and we all came to this country hoping for a better and safer life. Most of us have come from thousands of kilometres away to this place, going through all sorts of agony, danger and suffering to get here. We have tolerated all the hardship hoping for a better life in future. It is perhaps now the time to wear the same shoes we were wearing when we crossed all the borders on the way to here, it is perhaps now the time to travel for some more tens of kilometres ahead, this time not alone but all together towards creating a better world.\(^7\)

Throughout Germany the struggle gains momentum, grows in size and receives wide media coverage as well as solidarity avowals from a variety of social movements. The ‘Refugee March’ takes off in South-Germany and, when the first ‘local state border’ is reached, migrant activists tear apart their residency permits and post them to the Ministry for Migration in an act of defiance. While breaking the residential law can entail heavy fines, arrest and imprisonment up to one year, police forces do not intervene.

After 28 days on the road, sleeping in ‘tent cities’, visiting and protesting isolated detention centres, and covering 650 kilometres afoot, migrant and solidarity activists arrive in Berlin. On October the 13\(^8\), organised by the struggling migrants and a broad solidarity coalition, about 6000 people come together in Berlin, forming, up to then, the largest demonstration in history for the rights of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in Germany.\(^8\)

However, tensions within the struggle, also between migrant and solidarity activists grow. Some migrant activists decide to leave the main camp at the occupied Oranienplatz in Berlin and set up another camp, at the Brandenburg Gate. The following weeks are marked by police brutality, arrests, harassment by right-wing groups, deteriorating health conditions and exhaustion of hunger-striking migrant

\(^7\) Ibid.
activists, failing negotiations between protesters and government representatives, internal tensions and changing weather conditions.

Especially the Brandenburg Gate camp, due to its highly visible, touristic and symbolic location becomes a matter of constant police surveillance and control. Tents are not allowed, sleeping bags and pads become banned, hot-water bottles and donated wheelchairs taken away. At times, even umbrellas and what the police considers ‘excessive clothing’ are banned. Throughout the night police forces intervene, wake up migrant activists by making ‘announcements’ or asking, repeatedly, for identification. In December 2012, the activists leave their camp and occupy the empty Gerhart-Hauptmann school building in Kreuzberg, Berlin.\textsuperscript{9}

Throughout their struggle, in innumerable discussions, demonstrations and plenaries, some of the migrant activists develop the concept of \textit{non-citizenship} that is then presented at the autonomously organised ‘Non-Citizen Struggle Congress’ in Munich in March 2013. In their understanding, Non-Citizens, in brief, are those who do not have citizen-rights, those exploited and abject-beings that are forced into the margins and lowest strata of society, exposed to the constant fear of deportation. They suggest that, in contrast to other marginalised groups in society (‘the workers’, ‘LGBT’, ‘foreigners’), only Non-Citizens can experience residency laws, detention in camps, and deportations.\textsuperscript{10} It is, hence, due to the constant limbo in the asylum system and their everyday deportability that Non-Citizens are exposed to such forms of sovereign oppression.

Their struggle, simply put, seeks to unify Non-Citizens across the country and Europe to fight the asylum systems that prevent them from obtaining citizen-making documentation and to enter society as equal members. In their first official statement they hold:

\begin{quote}

\textsuperscript{9} Information obtained through their blogs as well as an informant who was actively supporting the protesters at the Brandenburg Gate.
\textsuperscript{10} Notes taken during the Non-Citizen Congress, March 2013.
\end{quote}
The first step consists in the formation of refugee resistance cells within the refugee camps and the connection of these cells with each other. The second step shall be the broad expansion of the resistance cells. This will lead to more participation of refugees in the protest and it will put an end to the centralistic orientation of the protests.\footnote{Non-Citizen Struggle Congress Munich, ‘First Statement’, http://refugeecongress.wordpress.com, Accessed 04/ 03/ 2013.}

In February and March 2013, as part of their political campaign, migrant activists on the ‘Refugees Revolution Bus Tour’ visit asylum-centres in twenty-two cities to “exchange experiences, put aside our common fears and start fighting together”, spreading the news of the protest “from camp to camp, room to room”.\footnote{Non-Citizens, Bus Tour Flyer and Travel Blog, http://refugeesrevolution.blogspot.de/more-reports/, Accessed 06/ 07/ 2013; quote noted down during the Congress in March 2013.}

Met with a considerable police presence, many Non-Citizens become repeatedly arrested in their attempt to enter the centres. In their travel blog, one of them reflects on encounters with the police, towards the end of their tour:

We end another day of police attacks. But this is the reality. Whoever fights the isolationist system will be attacked by the European police. [...] These assaults are no surprises anymore. [...] But, at the same time, these assaults remove Germany’s democratic mask. [...] They attack quickly and aggressively anyone who crosses their boundaries.\footnote{Non Citizen Travel Blog, my own translation.}

Also in March 2013, the Non-Citizens organise the ‘Revolution Demonstration’ in Berlin to draw attention to their three main demands: the halting of all deportations, also the ones within the EU that are practiced under the Dublin II&III regime, “an apparatus aiming to establish a Europe wide internal deportation system”; the abolition of ‘Residenzpflicht’, the law denying freedom of movement accompanied by an asylum identity card (Asylausweis) which “functions as a tool to limit and control our movement”; and the closure of all ‘Refugee Lager’ (asylum-centres) that are “often located in the middle of nowhere.”\footnote{Non-Citizens, ‘Refugees Revolution Demonstration,’ http://refugeesrevolution.blogspot.de, Accessed 06/ 07/ 2013.}
No one sees us, we cannot see anyone. No one hears us, we cannot hear anyone. [...] We are invisible. [...] We spend long hours lying in our beds. There is nothing to do, nowhere to go, no work, no dreams, no hope. The Lager is a prison where we face our reality and destiny without any chance to work except for a 1€ job, which we are being forced to do – this is slavery!15

In June 2013, the Non-Citizens escalate the struggle, occupy a square in the city centre of Munich, and about 86 of them go on hunger-strike. In an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel they demand the approval of their asylum-claims and declare the German state responsible for their lives. In their second statement, the Non-Citizens announce that their demands were not met and 55 of them decide to go on dry hunger-strike. With negotiations between the Bavarian government and struggling migrants repeatedly breaking down and time passing, more and more Non-Citizens collapse and require medical care. Out of solidarity a group of supporters joins the hunger-strike. In their fifth and most controversial statement entitled ‘When our bodies become our weapons’, the Non-Citizens state that the time for “political games is over”, either their demands are met or they would end up like “Bobby Sands and Holger Meins on Munich streets”.16

When last-minute negotiations between Non-Citizens and a special delegation of senior politicians fail, the police raids the camp in the early hours of Sunday the 30th of June, arrests a number of Non-Citizens and supporters, and demolishes the camp. Non-Citizens and supporters report of excessive use of force, degrading treatment of hunger-strikers and of cynical remarks uttered by police forces. The independent medical team, present in the camp throughout the hunger-strike later states:

The proposition of ‘humanitarian grounds’ [for the eviction] cannot have been the decisive factor as the eviction itself threatened the already compromised health conditions of the wet and dry hunger strikers, consciously endangering their lives. Additionally, in up to seven hours in police custody after the eviction, no medical attendance was offered to the hunger strikers.17

15 Ibid.
The violent intervention of the police ends what the dominant political discourse had fabricated, both the ‘blackmailing’ of the state by migrants and the ‘inhumanity’ of letting someone die on Germany’s streets could not be tolerated.

Forced into a state of deportability and desperation, the Non-Citizens must nonetheless survive, their voluntary death had to be disallowed. Months later, also as a consequence of their hunger-strike, Bavaria’s government abolishes food vouchers in communal asylum centres and starts granting asylum-seekers money in cash instead. At the same time, the promised speeding up of their individual asylum-cases results in several rejections. Thinking back to the aftermath of the hunger-strike in Munich, one Non-Citizen notes:

The situation after Rindermarkt was hard because of the brutality of the police; we had to treat our wounds and recover. We came together to think about how to go on, we have to fight, there is no alternative.

After more than two years of struggle, the Non-Citizen movement does not cease to exist but remains disobedient, regroups and continues their dissensual practices throughout and beyond Germany.

Part II - Two Worlds in One

The Non-Citizen campaign provoked considerable debate in Germany and beyond, inspiring a variety of connected struggles throughout Europe, eliciting support from diverse societal groups, drawing (media) attention to ‘life in the camp’ and, more broadly, to the realities of precarious non-citizen-refugee-asylum-seeker lives in Germany and Europe.

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20 Non-Citizen activist quoted at the ‘No Border Lasts Forever Conference’ in Frankfurt, 21/02/2014, name intentionally omitted.
At the same time, the protest campaigns caused great controversies and outrage, within and outside of the movement, effecting disappointment, condemnation, violent reactions, and racist abuse. Seeing the Non-Citizen struggle as a catalyst sheds light both on their form of resistance and the situation within and against which they struggle. When thinking of resistance as a method as proposed in Chapter Two, how can one understand Non-Citizen resistance and when one follows their struggle, what becomes animated and set in motion?

Maybe no other notion captures Non-Citizen resistance better than dissent. From the outset, the struggle was marked by the will to openly disagree and confront the discourses, laws and practitioners deemed responsible for their subjection to non-citizenship. The methods of struggle employed were disruptive and strenuous: the sewing together of lips, several hunger-strikes, months-long occupations of Germany's streets and squares, intrusions into detention centres, repeated clashes with police forces and arrests. Their discursive interventions were no less radical, marking an antagonistic division between citizenship and non-citizenship. Seeking confrontation, Non-Citizen politics provoked regional governments, the federal state and their police forces to respond in various, often uncompromising ways to their actions.

Alongside the conceptualisation of resistance proposed by Foucault as analytic, practice, relation, and as something situated but transversal, this part offers a reading of Rancière's work on dissensus. Rancière oftentimes begins his investigation with the struggle and draws attention to the moment of intentional confrontation, the collision between dissensual practices with the dominant order, which is one of the reasons why his writings have become prominent in discussions of political interventions performed by groups considered marginal in society.21

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When Foucault speaks of mobile and transitory instances of resistance that “[produce] cleavages in society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings”, it is Rancière who focuses more explicitly on how these cleavages and fractures are produced in the moment of dissent and offers conceptual resources for their investigation.\(^{22}\) Allowing for marginal moments to emerge as central moments, moments of ‘dissensus’, ‘equality’, ‘emancipation’ or ‘politics’, Rancière’s work speaks to the Non-Citizen struggle in insightful ways, adding to and advancing the Foucauldian frame of resistance advocated so far. For him, the political subject emerges within dissensual movements situated in conditions of pervasive inequality and governmental subjection. Instead of turning inwards to themselves, seeking to find (ontological or identitarian) stability in known and secure spaces, these subjects practice dissent always as a transgression, experimenting with the unknown, with anxiety, danger and that which is not considered theirs.

At the same time, by concentrating on the event, the spectacular staging of acts of dissensus, Rancière ignores the wide and nuanced spectrum of resistance that Foucault’s work alludes to. The dualist paradigms that Rancière (re-)creates and the sense of (messianic) purity in his thought arguably fail to come to terms with the entanglement of forces of government and resistance and, therefore, the complexity and messiness of contemporary (migration) struggles.\(^{23}\) However, it is precisely because the Non-Citizen struggle often utilised antagonistic and dualistic rationalities, discourses and practices that Rancière’s work provides useful insights when exploring their contestations. And, in turn, the problematic dualisms in Rancièren thinking also draw attention to problematic aspects of Non-Citizen dissent. In this sense, this chapter interprets the Non-Citizen struggle with, rather than through, Rancière’s work.

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Rancière’s Dissensual Subject

In his work, Rancière turns repeatedly to the revolutionary practices of Olympe de Gouges, a French playwright and feminist activist during the time of the French Revolution who was executed at the guillotine in 1793. As a response to the French constitution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, de Gouges wrote the Declaration of the Rights of Women and the Female Citizen in 1791, demanding in an often ironic tone equality between men and women.

Rancière points to the famous statement of de Gouges “that if women were entitled to go to the scaffold, then they were also entitled to go to the assembly.” While born equal, women were not equal as citizens, “[they] could neither vote nor stand for election. The proscription, as usual, was justified on the grounds that women did not fit the purity of political life, because they belonged to private, domestic life.” Rancière argues: “If they [women] were as equal ‘as men’ under the guillotine, then they had the right to the whole of equality, including equal participation in political life.” While de Gouges’ enunciation did not directly effectuate alterations in law, she set in motion the “process of a wrong, in the construction of a dissensus.” Rancière notes:

A dissensus is not a conflict of interests, opinions or values; it is a division inserted into ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is given and about the frame within which we see something as given. [...] They [the revolutionary women] acted as subjects that did not have the rights that they had and that had the rights that they had not. This is what I call a dissensus: the putting of two worlds in one and the same world. [...] A political subject is a capacity for staging scenes of dissensus.

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25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 69.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
For Rancière, de Gouges’ political activism and her ability to set in motion a ‘process of a wrong’ exemplifies politics as dissensus, “an intervention in the visible and the sayable.”

In *Ten Theses On Politics*, Rancière unmasks a fundamental paradox in the understanding of politics as the ruling of equals, where the political subject participates in ruling as well as in being ruled. Based upon what Rancière refers to as the logic of ‘arkhēin’ (‘the power to being anew’, ‘to lead’, ‘to rule’, ‘to walk at the head’), ‘politics proper’ presupposes, paradoxically, “a being that is at once the agent of an action and the matter upon which that action is exercised.” In contrast, politics, for him, is a rupture with the “‘normal’ evolution of society [...] [as] a progression from a government of birth to a government of wealth.”

Politics, then, is not a specific place or order made up of ‘pre-existing subjects’ with pre-allocated positions but its essence is, instead, “the manifestation of dissensus as the presence of two worlds in one.” For him, one world is the world of the ‘police’: “The police is a distribution of the sensible (partage du sensible) whose principle is the absence of void and supplement.” The ‘police’ carves out parts of the community “by difference in birth, and by the different functions, places and interests that make up the social body to the exclusion of every supplement.” Dividing up the world and its people, the ‘police’ attempts to exhaust that which is, by categorising and allocating ways of being, by disciplining community into clear units, by finding ‘consensus’.

Consensus, for Rancière, is not “peaceful discussion and reasonable agreement”, but something oppressive:

Its essence lies in the annulment of dissensus as separation of the sensible from itself, [...] the nullification of surplus subjects, [...] the reduction of the people to the sum of

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32 Ibid., p. 29.
33 Ibid., p. 35.
34 Ibid., p. 37.
35 Ibid., p. 36.
36 Ibid.
the parts of the social body and of the political community to the relations between the interests and aspirations of these different parts. Consensus consists, then, in the reduction of politics to the police.\textsuperscript{37}

The distribution of that which is there through the ‘police’, that which can be seen and heard, is the attempt to exhaust that what can be. The practice of consensus seeks to fill a prefigured form to its limits with no beyond, no supplement, excess or void. For Rancière, it is through this police-consensus-logic that ‘politics proper’ comes to be seen as existing in delimited spheres with distinct functions and logics, which, when summed up, become a complete arrangement.

Rancièrean thought proves useful when arguing against something that is very difficult to argue against: the logic of consensus in liberal ‘democratic’ societies. In showing how such logic suffocates by attempting to incorporate everything, thereby silencing that which does not lend itself to incorporation, Rancière reverses the logic of consensus as a democratic virtue and goal into the opposite, the pending death of politics. Against this logic, he develops politics as dissensus. As “a gap in the sensible itself”, dissensus “makes visible that which had no reason to be seen.”\textsuperscript{38} Instead of residing in a particular place and being the prerogative of a particular subject, dissensus as an interruption, and practicable by anyone, disturbs the police arrangement of the visible and sayable and supplements it “with a part of those without part.”\textsuperscript{39} For him, acts of dissensus provoke the police logic as they confront a logic of consensus and exhaustive order by being that which should not exist, bringing ‘two worlds into one’ and undermining the logic of ‘arkhēin’ through the performance of equality.

In \textit{Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization} Rancière states that ‘the political’ “is the encounter between two heterogeneous processes”, the process of governing and the process of equality.\textsuperscript{40} These processes, brought into conflict through acts of dissensus (or ‘emancipation’), reveal that equality has been ‘wronged’ through the police logic of distributing the sensible. Equality, then, as a presupposed condition, is enacted through

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 42.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 38.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Ibid., p. 36.
\end{itemize}
dissensus: those without part take part when they are not supposed to and thereby verify “the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being.”

Rather than seeing equality as a future condition to be obtained or as something that can be distributed by government institutions through ‘consensual’ decision making or ‘just policies’ (which, in fact, are part of ‘the police’), Rancière conceptualises equality as an act by those who are not ‘qualified’ to act and who, by acting nonetheless, demonstrate their equality to anyone else. Equality, then, is not a matter of governmental distribution of some substance to passively receiving subjects but a provocation of the logic of ‘arkhēin’ by refusing one’s partaking in the following of the one who ‘walks at the head’, thereby exposing the ‘wronging’ of equality and highlighting the always-existing (but absent) condition of equality.

Following from this understanding of equality, democracy becomes something other than “a political regime in the sense that it forms one of the possible constitutions which define the ways in which people assemble under a common authority.” In tracing the ‘invention’ of democracy, Rancière argues that it was created by its opponents, by those ‘entitled’ to govern on the basis of wealth, birth or knowledge:

In using the word democracy as a term of derision, these opponents marked an unprecedented reversal in the order of things: the ‘power of the demos’ referred to the fact that those who rule are those whose only commonality is that they have no entitlement to govern.

The demos, in Rancière’s thought, is not the category of people passively partaking in their own governmental subjection through the police, but, rather, people staging equality by rupturing the police order: “The one who belongs to the demos, who speaks when he is not to speak, is the one who partakes in what he has no part in.”

This is why, as Rancière notes in *Hatred of Democracy*, democracy conceived of as “the ‘government of anybody and everybody’ is bound to attract the hatred of all those who

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41 Ibid.
43 Ibid., emphasis in original.
44 Ibid., emphasis in original.
are entitled to govern men by their birth, wealth, or science.”⁴⁵ What is feared, then, is that the police’s distribution of the sensible becomes challenged, therewith also the presumption of its ‘unchallengeability’ since its distribution was deemed comprehensive up to the moment when public life became ‘impure’ and ‘scandalised’ by “the movement that ceaselessly displaces the limits of the public and the private, of the political and the social.”⁴⁶ Declaring equality, the demos not only reveals that “the practice of ruling rests on its own absence of reason” but, in the process of dissensus, invents itself in new ways of (collective) being.⁴⁷

Interpreting dissent as a practice of resistance that inserts a division into dominant truths and enforces a conflictual encounter between two incommensurable worlds speaks in many ways to the Non-Citizen struggle. The following part discusses their radical practices and their demand to become fully included members of a political community. Through their practices the Non-Citizens break with the logic of consensus and stage an intervention that cannot be easily accommodated but instead remains an embarrassment within the dominant order. Various strategies of their protests are public provocations that aim to disturb and incite reactions, of which three in particular will be discussed: the practice of ‘behaving wrongly’, the occupation of ‘wrong places’, and the allocation of ‘wrong names’.

Part III – Enacting the Wrong
The Non-Citizen struggle emerged as a response to the suicide of a resident of the communal accommodation for asylum-seekers. Rahsepar’s mental health problems resulting in his self-inflicted death, the protesters and friends argued, were a direct consequence of his subjection to a life as asylum-seeker in Germany. When the Non-Citizens held a demonstration on the first anniversary of his death, they stated: “He was searching for freedom. This is the result. He hung himself on the 28th of January 2012 in his room.”⁴⁸ Reacting first to the loss of a friend and neighbour, the protest soon turned into a struggle against factors and conditions that made his and their lives unbearable:

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⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 62.
the allocation of food packages, the absence of educational opportunities, ascribed medical care, the inability to move and reside freely, the constant threat of deportation.

From the very beginning of their struggle, the Non-Citizens sought to ‘break the isolation’, a slogan with metaphorical and practical connotation, employed throughout their campaign. This part explores the ways in which they left isolated spaces to intrude, discursively and corporeally, into wrong spaces by behaving wrongly and by giving themselves wrong names. As the previous part has shown, for Rancière, “[t]he essence of politics resides in the modes of dissensual subjectivation that reveal a society in its difference to itself.”

Dissensual acts intrude into commonsensical normality by inserting the alien, strange, or wrong – that which does not seem to belong.

What Rancière terms a ‘heterology’ refers to a form of political subjectivisation in which the subject refuses the ‘right names’ assigned to her by the dominant consensual order. Rancière holds:

First, it is never the simple assertion of an identity; it is always, at the same time, the denial of an identity given by an other, given by the ruling order of policy. Policy is about “right” names, names that pin people down to their place and work. Politics is about “wrong” names – misnomers that articulate a gap and connect with a wrong. Second, it is a demonstration, and a demonstration always supposes an other, even if that other refuses evidence or argument [...]. Third, the logic of subjectivization always entails an impossible identification.

Political subjectivisation, for Rancière, is the merging of two worlds in one, and is, as a heterology, based on “a logic of the other”.

Non-Citizen resistances conceptualised as heterologies disturb so profoundly through their capacity to intrude discursively and corporeally into spaces not deemed theirs, thereby (re-)performing both these spaces and the boundaries that seek to delimit them. While ‘spaces, names and behaviour’ are, of course, closely interrelated, at times presupposing one another, each side helps to shed light on important dimensions of

51 Ibid.
their struggle. The Non-Citizens experiment with ways of being that break dominant (consensus) politics in order to gain ‘an other’ name, a name besides the one that allocates their bodies to particular places and subdues them to certain forms of behaviour, even if that other name, or maybe the name that enables other names, is citizen.

**Wrong Behaviour**

Throughout their many months of struggle, the Non-Citizens caused anxiety by behaving in ways deemed offensive, threatening, confusing, unrealistic, utopian or naive. At the Non-Citizen Struggle Congress, migrant activist Napuli stated that she was “tired of sleeping”, that “we have to come out to be visible, we are not illegal”, and that Non-Citizens “have to take the fear from your heart and give it back to the owners.”\(^{52}\) For her, it seems, being tired of sleeping meant being tired of the boredom and depression of asylum-centres, of isolation, allocated food packages and passivity, of categorisation and confinement, of precarity and everyday deportability. Tired of their imposed existence, they decided to practice resistance by “[refusing] to remain in their situation.”\(^{53}\)

Leaving isolated spaces, Non-Citizens repeatedly broke the residential law by transgressing inner German borders, intruded into detention centres to spread their message, loudly stated their demands in public demonstrations and occupations, and enforced unsettling silence by sewing their lips together and hunger-striking. While various Non-Citizen strategies of resistance could be discussed, the act of refusing food and water during their occupation of the Rindermarkt square in Munich, arguably their most controversial act of ‘behaving wrongly’, will be explored here.\(^{54}\)

In a statement, the Non-Citizens comment on their nine day long hunger-strike in the city centre of Munich:

\(^{52}\) All direct quotes were noted down at the Non-Citizen Struggle Congress, Munich 2013.


\(^{54}\) During the Non-Citizen occupation of the central square in Munich I was conducting fieldwork in Athens and had to rely on their public statements and activist circles.
On the 22nd of June 2013, we started the “No Border, No Nation” non-citizen demonstration, at Karlsplatz in Munich. Yet, midway through the demonstration, we collectively decided to stop at Rindermarkt and 86 of us sat down on the street.\(^{55}\)

The occupation of the central square caught police forces off-guard who failed to prevent the erection of makeshift tents. The Non-Citizens gave the German government an ultimatum of three days to accept their asylum claims and declared a Hunger-strike. On the 25th of June, when the ultimatum passed, “we announced that we were going on a dry hunger strike (no food, no water) and that the responsibility of our lives was now in the hands of the authorities and legislators.”\(^{56}\) Through their decision to commence a dry hunger-strike the Non-Citizens intentionally escalated the struggle, prompting representatives from the Bavarian government to denounce such method as ‘blackmail of the state’.\(^{57}\)

The public square became a space of agitation and debate, spontaneous solidarity avowals but also abuse by pedestrians and residents. Non-Citizens and supporting activists report of German citizens (especially older generations) repeatedly approaching the occupied space to pronounce threats and racist remarks, even ostentatiously consuming food in front of hunger-strikers.\(^{58}\) With health conditions of the strikers rapidly deteriorating and several rounds of negotiations between government and Non-Citizens failing, the camp became evicted on ‘humanitarian grounds’.

On early Sunday morning, June the 30th, at 4:30am, more than 300 riot police forces attacked our camp. The hunger strikers of the camp got evicted; some of us were sent to hospital, some to prison.\(^{59}\)

Inflamed political rhetoric from the Bavarian government and misinformation, spread in the mainstream media, had contributed to the denunciation of the protest. Government representatives accused Non-Citizens of denying access to doctors when, in fact, they


\(^{56}\) Non-Citizen Rindermarkt Analysis, July 2013.


\(^{58}\) Activist informant who was present in the camp during the hunger-strike; name intentionally omitted.

\(^{59}\) Non-Citizen Rindermarkt Analysis, July 2013.
had organised their own medical team that remained in the camp throughout the occupation.\textsuperscript{60} They were denounced for ‘allowing’ a pregnant woman to participate in the occupation while her two children were present, when, in fact, the pregnant Non-Citizen was protesting but not hunger-striking.

Also, Non-Citizens were repeatedly portrayed as naive subjects who did neither understand Germany’s legal system nor cultural references (‘how could they even know who Bobby Sands and Holger Meins were?’), and who were instrumentalised by radical left wing groups but mainly by their “gang-leader” Ashkan Khorasani.\textsuperscript{61} Khorasani, chosen as the messenger for the strikers, while not being “allowed to take any decisions, voice her/his personal political inputs or even act as the speaker”, as the Non-Citizens made clear, became portrayed by the Bavarian government as the central figure.\textsuperscript{62} Herrmann, the Bavarian Minister for the Interior, stated: “He [Khorasani] used the lives of others to accomplish political goals.”\textsuperscript{63} Depicted as “a confrontation between the government and one individual person”, the Non-Citizens suggest, the government sought to turn them into “weak objects [...] without any independent will so that a person is required to lead us.”\textsuperscript{64} After the eviction of the camp, Khorasani became arrested by the police and interrogated by the homicide division who began an investigation, accusing him of manslaughter. More than a year later, the charges were, unsurprisingly, dropped.\textsuperscript{65}

The dominant discourse, propagated by government and mainstream media, in the end justifying the violent eviction of the camp, revolved mainly around the notions of ‘blackmail’ and ‘humanitarian responsibility’. Social Minister Haderthauer remarked: “In this country ‘politics’ cannot be blackmailed, we live in a state based on the rule of law

\textsuperscript{60} Non-Citizens, ‘Medical Team Report’, 2013.
\textsuperscript{62} Non-Citizen Rindermarkt Analysis, July 2013.
\textsuperscript{64} Non-Citizen Rindermarkt Analysis, July 2013.
where a hunger-strike cannot enforce preferential treatment."\footnote{No name, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2013, ‘Haderthauer fordert Abbruch des Hungerstreiks’, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/muenchen/fluechtlinge-demonstrieren-in-muenchen-haderthauer-fordert-abbruch-des-hungerstreiks-1.1706405, Accessed 26/06/2013, my own translation. Politics (‘Politik’), here, needs to be understood as referring to political decision makers, the government, the state. Also, and ironically, Minister Haderthauer stepped down from office on the 1\textsuperscript{st} of September 2014 as a consequence of a political scandal in which she had sold on ‘model cars’ for large sums of money, built by sectioned residents of a closed psychiatric institution who were ‘looked after’ medically by her husband.}

Also, Minister Herrmann, by pointing to the Non-Citizens’ reference to Holger Meins and Bobby Sands, stated: “The gang-leaders have placed themselves on a level with terrorists.”\footnote{Halser, 2013, ‘Der Münchner Rädelführer’, TAZ, my own translation.}

The implication of blackmail and terrorism allowed governmental authorities to revert to harsh countermeasures, leading to the eviction. At the same time, however, the forceful clearance of the camp was also legitimised on ‘humanitarian grounds’, the state, so the prevalent discourse of government representatives went, would not allow deaths on its streets.

The ambivalent stance of the Bavarian government and political elite, veering between aggressive and humanitarian rhetoric, what could be interpreted as a conflict between ‘classical sovereign’ and ‘pastoral’ modes of governing, suggests an inability to find an adequate strategy to respond to the ‘wrong behaviour’ of the hunger-striking Non-Citizens. As Ewa Ziarek notes in her discussion of the use of hunger-strikes by British suffragettes:

> By reversing the roles of the defendants and the accusers, the hunger strike performs a double chiasmatic transfer. On the one hand, it transforms the private act of starvation into a collective contestation of the law; on the other hand, it summons the yet nonexistent authority of the new law by risking the physical life of the body.\footnote{Ewa Płonowska Ziarek, ‘Bare Life on Strike: Notes on the Biopolitics of Race and Gender’, South Atlantic Quarterly, 107:1 (2008), p. 102.}

For her, hunger-strikes cause anxiety in the dominant order by staging “a political trial of existing law and political authority” through the starvation of one’s own body, thereby collapsing “distinctions between passivity and activity, actuality and potentiality, victim and enemy.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 100.} As a “catarchrestic movement”, the hunger-strike, Ziarek suggests, “repeats, mimics, and exposes in public the hidden irrational violence of the sovereign state” and, at the same time, as a ‘non-act’, “negates women’s [or Non-Citizens’]
exclusion and calls for the transformation of the law.” Non-Citizen hunger-strikers passed the responsibility for their survival to German authorities, forcing them to re-act to their active non-act.

The government’s reaction to the struggle, the attempt to reproduce the ‘logic of arkhēin’ by turning a collective struggle into a confrontation with a supposedly lone, reckless enemy leader (Khorasani) exposed its inability to adjust to the confusing situation that the hunger-strikers had imposed. Inducing transformations in both the subject of struggle and the dominant order, the hunger-strike enforced a blurring of the roles of state and government as humanitarian protector and violent punisher, putting the Bavarian government and the German state on trial.

In the demonstration of hunger-striking not only the protesting subject and her body became transformed but the addressees of the strike, too. When the Non-Citizens asked state authorities to react to their near-death, representatives awkwardly veered between denouncing the protest as terroristic blackmail and voicing concern for the health of the subjects involved. Even though they could not, following Foucault, in the ‘classical sovereign’ fashion ‘take life’, they could equally not ‘let die’. They had to, instead, care for life, in fact save life, and at the same time discipline and punish those lives demanding care, a level of care not meant for them. While expendable in depression-inducing asylum-centres, where suicide goes nearly unnoticed and unheard, the forceful intrusion into public space and their visibilisation turned starving Non-Citizens into indispensable lives, even if only momentarily.

The Non-Citizen spectacle of the hunger-strike functioned as a heterology, a form of political subjectivation through the practice of self-harm that merged seemingly incommensurable worlds, the world of the living and the world of the dead, the citizen-presence and the other’s-absence. Through their practice of starvation, or their “assumption of bare life”, the Non-Citizens addressed government and state with the

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70 Ibid., p. 102, p. 100.
question of where their authority to decide over their lives and deaths derived from. Clearing the camp in the early morning was the pronunciation of sovereign authority accompanied by the will to not allow for publicly circulating images of resisting, weakened, hunger-striking bodies, dragged away by police forces in riot gear.

While the eviction succeeded, it did not go unnoticed. In public a debate was sparked and after the Rindermarkt occupation, the wrong behaviour of hunger-striking circulated amongst migrant activist and rights movements throughout Germany, ceaselessly confusing and blurring protector-punisher roles. Paradoxically, in a state between life and death, the Non-Citizen who usually has no part suddenly demands all attention, forces state and border practitioners to respond. Crossing names, the one ignored and discarded as not-really-existing becomes the one to be saved by all means. In modifying de Gouges’ famous statement, their protest can be said to suggest that if Non-Citizens are not allowed to die on Germany’s streets through their own will and practice, and if the state forces them to live, then they are entitled to the right to have citizen-rights.

Wrong Spaces
As a key strategy in their campaign, Non-Citizens repeatedly occupied central squares and spaces in various German cities and erected ‘protest tents’. Referred to as ‘Refugee Tent Action’, tent cities were set up in invaded spaces, suggesting elements of forcible appropriation, obstruction, siege, as well as ephemerality, transmissibility, nomadism. Their intrusions into public spaces of leisure, consumerism, tourism and citizenship were intentional confrontations with their presumed absence and invisibility in these spaces. With some tent camps lasting only for a few days, others remained for many months. Non-Citizen camps became communal centres, spheres of discussion, information, retreat, food, shelter, and artistic interventions as well as complaint, conflict, harassment, violence and racism.

72 For example, both the portable washroom at the Oranienplatz as well as the later erected information tent became burned to the ground, with the police quickly discarding suspicions of racist motivations.
The appropriation of space at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, the symbol of German reunification and European unity, temporarily transformed a site of historic relevance, frequented mainly by tourists, into one of present day political contestation over questions of inclusion and exclusion. Reacting to the public occupation and hunger-strike, Berlin’s Minister of the Interior Henkel announced that the police would not tolerate the emergence of a ‘wild camp’ at the Brandenburg Gate.73

Police forces began to execute bizarre forms of harassment and forbade ‘camping equipment’. Preferably during the night, when temperatures fell below zero degrees Celsius, police forces would repeatedly invade the camp, conduct identity checks, wake up protesters, remove tents, sleeping bags, thermos flasks, and umbrellas that supporters had collected. Minister Henkel justified the removal of donated wheel-chairs on the grounds that their use would taunt people with special needs and detrimentally affect the Non-Citizens’ political cause.74

After the eviction of the Brandenburg Gate camp in November 2012, some of the Non-Citizens moved back to the occupied Oranienplatz and others into the empty Gerhart-Hauptmann school building, both in the Berlin district of Kreuzberg. The Oranienplatz occupation lasted for more than one and a half years and formed the central space for the movement, its “political centre [and] space for struggle”, as migrant activist Napuli Langa put it, while the school became the space “to refuel our strength”.75 From Oranienplatz various actions were organised, amongst others intrusions into the EU Commission in Berlin and protest campaigns at the embassies of Iran, Nigeria and Mali.

While, at first, the district council, held by the Green party tolerated the presence of Non-Citizens in both occupied spaces, multiple attempts were undertaken subsequently, by Berlin’s Mayor Wowereit (SPD), Interior Minister Henkel (CDU), Kreuzberg’s Mayor Herrmann (Greens), or Minister for Integration Kolat (SPD), to evict the camp

74 Ibid.
and convince the Non-Citizens to move into communal accommodations provided by Caritas. Achieving an agreement with about 80 of the occupiers, the camp became taken down in March 2014 by some migrant activists themselves, while others sought to stay, denouncing the offer as an attempt to break up the movement. Unprecedented scenes of conflict flared up amongst migrant activists, mainly between a group of those who came via Lampedusa and other occupiers, with police forces happily disengaging. Despite Napuli’s five-day long ‘tree-occupation’, Oranienplatz as a communal space and nodal point, known by migrant groups throughout Europe, ceased to exist.

In the meantime, the occupied school had become a refuge for the remaining migrant activists as well as (other) asylum-seekers, refugees and Roma families. When an inhabitant reportedly stabbed and killed a fellow resident, the will to evict reemerged in the political ranks. With pressure mounting, in June 2014 about 160 inhabitants decided to accept the offer of relocation and left the school while about 40 migrant activists remained inside. Barricading themselves and climbing onto the roof, the occupiers demanded the right to stay, following article 23 residence law (Aufenthaltsgesetz), and threatened to jump off or burn themselves were the police to enter the building.

An unparalleled stand-off in the centre of Kreuzberg ensued, with about 1700 police forces on duty surrounding the school and staging a siege of the entire district, day and night. Reinforced police lines were only overcome by inhabitants of Kreuzberg able to identify themselves as such, and journalists were prevented from speaking to the protestors, due to ‘security reasons’. Up on the school building, migrant activists often stood on the very edges of the roof, looking at the unfolding scenes below.

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76 Weeks later it became clear that the signed agreement which had promised the migrant activists an individual case-by-case review was undermined by Minister Henkel who, after finding a legal loophole, argued that the agreement was not legally binding. See open letter written and signed by a variety of migrant rights groups, lawyers and activists. Republikanischer Anwältinnen- und Anwälteverein e.V., ‘Wollen Sie Flüchtlinge schützen – oder wollen sie es nicht?’, 22/07/2014.
78 The ‘first generation’ of the Non-Citizens was, to my knowledge, not involved in the school occupation and hence ‘migrant activist’ will be the term mainly used to refer to those involved in the most recent protests as the self-description of Non-Citizen became less prominently used in the published statements.
In the night, so the roof-occupiers reported, police forces positioned themselves on opposite buildings, observing them and shining light into their eyes, making it impossible for them to find sleep:

During the night of 27/28 June police was shaking the door and made different statements so we could not get [...] rest. Deprivation of sleep is only one of the methods through which they were trying to break our resistance. As Ramadan has begun, many of us must fast. The lack of sleep due to the police and demands of fasting make the situation more precarious. During the day the police insulted [us] in racist ways. They were watching us from another roof and waving, not only with handcuffs, but also with bananas. We continue to fight for freedom of the press. We still demand that the press be allowed inside.80

In solidarity with the roof-protesters, thousands took to the street, migrant groups, supporters and residents, clashing several times with police forces. The farcical and confusing decision making process by the district mayor, the municipal councillor and Berlin’s government, all denying responsibility for the critical situation and showing unwillingness to give the final go-ahead for eviction, prompted the president of the police forces Kandt, in an unprecedented and democratically-dubious move, to set an ultimatum for a final decision to either evict or retreat.81 On the 2nd of July, the protesters held:

For nine days the police and the Bezirksamt (district council) have been massively pressurizing us psychologically by repeatedly announcing and withdrawing the eviction notice. While this is happening we are holding out on the roof, surrounded by more than 1700 police officers from many federal states as well as the German Federal Police Force, and emotionally preparing ourselves to see our friends die at any moment.82

It did not come that far as an agreement was found later that day. The migrant activists were not granted the right to stay following article 23, but allowed to remain on the

80 Ibid., Accessed 28/06/2014.
81 Ibid., Accessed 01/07/2014.
82 Ibid., Accessed 02/07/2014.
third floor of the school building without being criminally prosecuted. The police operation, estimated to have cost over five million Euros, was called off.\textsuperscript{83}

Migrant activist and Non-Citizen intrusions into wrong spaces incited debate, support and solidarity but provoked also harsh countermeasures and violence, at times even amongst the activists themselves. The wronging of public space enforced encounters that would not have occurred otherwise, encounters between irregularity and citizenship. The many migrant activist occupations, including the most recent ‘roof-occupation’ performed what David Harvey has termed ‘the right to the city’, or, rather, the right to the country.\textsuperscript{84} While, for Harvey, social movements demonstrate the capacity to use their collective bodies to change and reinvent cities, the presence of migrant activist/ non-citizen bodies in public challenged the absence of the very right to exist in that space in the first place. For Harvey’s protest movements not the presence of bodies but their performance is of significance: instead of functioning as tourist, consumer or banker bodies, their transformation into occupying bodies stages the right to the city. However, whereas ‘citizen bodies’ can take on many roles and functions and may or may not performatively turn touristic spaces into occupied territories or into ‘temporary autonomous zones’, Non-Citizen bodies are always-already subjected to particular, marginal and confined spaces, foremost asylum and detention centres.

For Non-Citizen bodies, their presence in public spaces is in itself a performative and heterological act that challenges their de-functionality, their unwantedness, their presumed absence in ‘consensus’ society. In order to be present in these spaces, the Non-Citizens must have already wronged the law of confinement - their very presence turns them into escapees and criminals, deportees to be. As aberrations, the Non-Citizens intrude into citizen-spaces and thereby disrupt the citizen-nation-state nexus. The Non-Citizens turn public spaces into heterotopias, spaces that not only “have the property of being in


\textsuperscript{84} David Harvey, \textit{Rebel Cities} (London: Verso, 2012), p. 4.
relation with all other sites” but that distort other sites, sites deemed normal and commonsensical, citizen-sites, and open them up, for interrogation.  

**Wrong Names**

During their campaign, the Non-Citizens appropriated not only spaces but also names and concepts. After eleven months of struggle they presented their concept of ‘non-citizenship’ at their autonomously organised Congress in March 2013 and published a statement entitled ‘On the position of asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers’ struggles in modern societies’.  

Therein they elaborate on their socio-political status and hold that “asylum seekers belong to the hidden layers of the society [...] and the term of ‘under-class’ is more appropriate to describe their position.” For them, “contemporary governments and societies have internalised the ‘citizen’/ ‘non-citizen’ dichotomy to the extent that the non-citizens can do nothing but to strive to become a citizen if they want to change their marginalised condition.” Their confinement to the non-citizen condition and the persistent threat of deportation are “the utmost problem[s] of asylum-seekers and sans-papiers (non-citizens) in Europe.”

At the Congress, the non-citizen/citizen dichotomy became enacted. Two exclusive plenary sessions were organised, dividing the participants into groups of ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’. Some solidarity activists complained that such practice would resemble or re-create sovereign categorisations and divisions, jokingly wondering whether identity controls were to take place during the Congress. Those who had long struggled and obtained citizenship-making documents had to, as a result, participate in the ‘citizen’ plenary, some of whom criticised the organisers for a lack of nuance and an exclusionary politics. Others objected to the hierarchical organisation of the Congress, the assertive

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85 Heterotopic spaces, for Foucault, “have the curious property of being in relation with all other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect.” As ‘other spaces within’ heterotopias can function as mirror images, distorting and calling into question the presumed normalcies and the distinctness of spaces. Michel Foucault, ‘Of other spaces’, *Diacritics*, 16:1 (1986), p. 24.

86 Non-Citizens, ‘On the position of asylum-seekers and asylum-seekers’ struggles in modern societies’, [http://refugeetentaction.net](http://refugeetentaction.net), Accessed 20/06/2013. Please note that I not only translated the statement for the Non-Citizens from English into German but also corrected/changed some of the sentences and structures but always in close cooperation with a Non-Citizen activist and a solidarity activist.

87 Ibid.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.
participation of predominantly masculine Iranian Non-Citizens conceived by some as ‘authoritative’ and ‘lecturing’, as well as their suggestion that the struggle would not primarily be directed against ‘racism’ but ‘capitalist exploitation of peripheral societies’ instead. Many held that the Non-Citizen positioning would complicate or even forestall the formation of alliances within ‘the left’ in Germany and Europe.  

Defending their practices, the Non-Citizens argued that in the course of their struggle ‘solidarity activists’ had repeatedly sought to appropriate their campaign for their own political ends and divided plenaries would ensure that Non-Citizens could make their voices heard and strategise amongst themselves. In a statement reacting to critique, circulated after the Congress, they noted that while, eventually, it would be desirable to overcome the citizen/non-citizen dichotomy, supporters had to accept the reality of existing differences. Demanding the erasure of categories and differences, they held, would be a task simple enough for (white) citizen-subjects to call for but not for those who bore the brunt of non-citizenship’s violence.

During the Congress, one Non-Citizen held: “Some activists asked us: ‘when will you stop your protest?’ But this is our life; we cannot go home like you can! I wake up and my first thought is about deportation.” And later, “[d]o not ask the lowest class to struggle for the empowerment of privileged classes. We don’t even have the time to think about these other struggles. We are threatened by suicide and oppression.” Another Non-Citizen added: “Activists saw ‘passport issues’ as ‘personal’ and wanted to focus merely on racism, a lot of tension emerged.” And further: “Activists stated that asylum-seekers were not ‘radical enough’ or not ‘politically active’; however, asylum-seekers are active but in their actions they have to face different consequences than citizens.” In their statement, the Non-Citizens insist that “anti-racist and anti-fascist groups and activists should rethink and perhaps revise the concept of anti-racism and should also revise their interaction with asylum-seeker issues accordingly.”

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90 Sentiments noted down during the Congress, March 2013.
92 All direct quotes were noted down at the Non-Citizen Struggle Congress, Munich 2013. Names are intentionally omitted.
The controversial conceptualisation of their activism was addressed, hence, not only to the state and society in general but also to activist supporters and migrant groups on the left German and European political spectrum. Their practices were meant to carve out a space in which they would constitute the protagonists of their own struggle, even if that space would become demarcated by novel boundaries and exclusions. Reflecting on the emergence of the Non-Citizen name and concept, one of the hunger-strikers from the Rindermarkt noted, months later:

We decided to give us the position to outline our own struggles based on our experiences of our lives and within power structures. We wanted to go beyond the names, such as ‘criminal’, ‘asylum-seeker’, ‘refugee’. These names already have a position.

‘Non-Citizen’ is a wrong name, a misnomer. Although Rancière suggests that ‘an other’ (political) name for the migrant has been lost and that “an other that has no other name becomes the object of fear and rejection”, the Non-Citizen appropriated another name. Choosing a name for themselves, the Non-Citizens refused the many names assigned to them by state, society, and some activist circles. Their self-ascribed name was one they sought to leave behind, through struggle. As a temporary condition, non-citizenship and its subjects would cease to exist with their entry into the citizen-community.

In many ways, the Non-Citizens engaged with the question posed by Rancière: “Do we or do we not belong to the category of men or citizens or human beings, and what follows from this?” At the Congress and in their statements it emerged that many Non-Citizens regarded citizenship and humanness or, rather, non-citizenship and inhumanness, as intimately interrelated. In the various discussions and proclamations, no other analogy was as prominent as the one between asylum-seekers and animals: “We are kept like animals in cages”, “in Germany even animals have more rights than

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95 Non-Citizen activist quoted at the ‘No Border Lasts Forever Conference’ in Frankfurt, 21/02/2014, name intentionally omitted.
97 Ibid., p. 60.
asylum-seekers”, or “they treat us like animals, but we are human beings”.

For them, the dehumanising condition of non-citizenship meant that only through citizenship their lives could become fully ‘human’.

We believe that we are Non-Citizens, Non-Citizens who are prevented from accessing the rights that citizens hold in this society. Of all the fundamental rights of the human remain, for Non-Citizens, only a place to sleep, food parcels to eat, nightmares of deportation and a life in fear and terror.

Whilst their political interventions aimed toward citizenship, they constituted, more than anything, movements against non-citizenship. Escaping non-citizenship meant escaping the lack of fundamental rights and the most immediate dangers, such as imminent deportability. Through their struggle, the Non-Citizens did not celebrate citizenship but sought to become citizens out of fear of the state and European deportation practitioners. The Non-Citizens regarded those endowed with sovereign citizenship as subjects who had already made it to ‘the other side’, more protected than them, and less deportable.

What became effaced through their emphasis on citizen/non-citizen dichotomies were, of course, those subjects who fell in-between these categories, those who were only temporarily ‘tolerated’ by the state but not fully accepted, or those who were merely granted work permits without other fundamental rights. Understanding the co-constitutive nature of citizenship and non-citizenship and the functioning of citizenship as a political technology that moderates sovereign inclusions and exclusions, the Non-Citizens argued that “in principle, our efforts should be towards building a society that does not need this [citizen-non-citizen] dichotomy”.

Aware of these grey areas, Non-Citizen resistance sought, nonetheless, to relentlessly create confrontations between the worlds of citizenship and non-citizenship, confrontations that functioned the more vigorously the more incommensurable the

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98 All direct quotes were noted down at the Non-Citizen Struggle Congress, Munich 2013. While this chapter focuses on the question of citizenship, the important post/colonial dimension of the Non-Citizen struggle is explored in Chapter Six.
99 Non-Citizen leaflet, obtained 2014, no date.
100 Ibid.
confronting worlds seemed, even if at the cost of creating new and rigid lines. In one of their publications, the Non-Citizens inserted lengthy parts of Giorgio Agamben’s ‘We Refugees’.\textsuperscript{101} Agamben therein suggests:

In the nation-state system, the so-called sacred and inalienable rights of man prove to be completely unprotected at the very moment it is no longer possible to characterize them as rights of the citizens of a state.\textsuperscript{102}

The insertion of Agamben’s words into conceptualisations of their struggle is indicative of their conviction that the nation-state, and therewith citizenship, while conditioning their violent exclusion, nonetheless (or rather, therefore) provide for a greater degree of protection.

They regarded this entrance into the citizenry as the utmost priority in order to remedy their immediate unprotectedness and permanent condition of deportability. In such situation of injustice, the questions that the Non-Citizens seemed to pose were: Where, in our present situation do we turn to protect ourselves from the threats that endanger our lives the most? How do we reduce the violence that is done to us at this very moment? Are citizens threatened by deportation, do they live in asylum-centres, are they forced to eat what is put in front of them and to be where they are told to be? No, or if they are, at least not to that extent.

In this light, the insistence on de-identification with sovereign citizenship, often voiced by those (activists) who securely resided within the community of citizens, seemed abstract and far removed from the realities of those whose formal lack of sovereign identification rendered them particularly exposed to sovereign violence. Their resistance highlights that while citizenship rights can be claimed by those not ‘fully citizen’ as the Citizenship Studies literature and the idea of ‘acts of citizenship’ suggest, the condition of deportability means that sovereign enforcers can and do appear during the night, order to pack one’s belongings within thirty minutes, and sometimes at gunpoint force Non-Citizens into a car and onto a plane.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
When deportation is imminent or forms a constant threat and nightmare, those without legal recognition as citizens can pretend to belong, act as if they do, and claim rights that they do not formally hold, but the exclusionary sovereign ‘cut’ has been placed regardless. In these moments, how would one enact citizenship if one has been declared to not belong to the citizen-group? Also, more generally, how can one ever escape the condition of deportability, apart from by entering citizenship? Instead of acts of citizenship, thought as citizen-making performances without the need to be accepted as belonging, formally and legally to the community of citizens, Non-Citizen resistance constitutes acts toward citizenship and acts against non-citizenship. Resisting non-citizenship, the Non-Citizens expose the violence that not belonging to the group endowed with sovereign citizenship entails.

The Non-Citizen movement can then be understood as a struggle for other than colonial-, passive-, animal- or non-citizen identities and names. Subjected to oppressive spaces and governmental names, they seek to intrude as future citizens into sovereign spaces. For them, members of the citizenry possess the fundamental rights that were violently taken away from them. It is citizenship, then, that allows for other names, different names, enabling reunification with families, independent movements, self-chosen food and medical care.

Non-Citizen as a non-name would then be left behind, and replaced by other names. Whilst at first sight seemingly paradoxical, their struggle for nation-state-rights does not constitute a politics merely seeking a sovereign identity but, rather, a politics resisting their marginality and abjection. The Non-Citizens protest the biopolitical conduction of their everyday lives in asylum-centres and their disciplinarisation therein, as well as the ‘classical sovereign’ threat of forcible eviction. They are aware that their arrival in the citizen-community, or what Rancière might call consensus society, would not undermine the logic of the sovereign state system that produces non-citizenship – hence the often uttered hope for a future world without sovereign differentiations. Entering

citizenship would, nonetheless, allow them a break from their permanent condition of deportability and governmental conduction.

It would be erroneous to suggest that while their practices of resistance were radical and disruptive, their political demands were not. Their insistence on collective regularisation and the abolition of deportation, if granted, would have undermined citizenship as an exclusive political technology. The cut, however, was placed. Thousands of police forces violently assaulting and evicting a few dozen Non-Citizen bodies attest of the panic that their practices induced into regional and state governments. Even if most of their demands were never met, Non-Citizen resistance inserted a division into commonsense, inciting mass mobilisations and finding support amongst those discarded into asylum-centres as well as those within the citizenry. In their movement toward citizenship, their dissent performed and deformed both their constitutive outsideness as well as the presumed purity of the inside/r.

Part IV – Transversal Border Dissent

Dissent as a form of resistance in border struggles is, of course, not merely enacted by the Non-Citizens but a widespread practice employed by migrant groups in and beyond Europe. *Border dissent*, as interpreted in this chapter, is confrontational, loud, visible, antagonistic, demanding and public, forcing sovereign border practitioners and European citizens to respond to subjects unwilling to remain in their often precarious situations. Non-citizenship as the constitutive condition of citizenship intrudes into the latter, exposes that its raison d’être is founded upon violent exclusions and inclusions, and provokes the guardians of sovereign gates to, at times desperate, bizarre and, indeed, costly (re-)actions. The collisions that dissent produces transform the enacting subject, her supporters, even passer-by as well as the boundary-enforcers seeking their containment. In this sense, border dissent is by itself always-already transversal, relating in various ways to the beyond, spatially, temporally, ideationally.

As the first site of my multi-sited ethnography, the Non-Citizen struggle within a central European country may seem to have particularly ‘local’ dimensions. The Non-Citizens contest specific German laws, face German police forces and governmental authorities, struggle against conditions in German asylum-centres, and find support in political groups in Germany. They are, however, transversal struggles that always-also implicate
the beyond. The Non-Citizen campaign is one amongst many ongoing migration struggles in Europe and its border-regions. Demonstrations, occupations or hunger-strikes have occurred in, amongst others, Austria, France, the UK, Denmark, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, Turkey, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia.104

Many of the Non-Citizen demands are currently voiced throughout Europe: the abolition of detention centres, the halting of deportations, freedom from persecution, refoulement, torture, police or borderguard violence, the right to reside legally, to education, to work, to vote and move freely, the ability to re-unify with family members, to choose food and medical care freely, to be seen and heard as equals. Without suggesting their interchangeability, the amplification and circulation of struggles indicates growing unrest against European border practices, exposing and inciting the dispositif.105

There is also a collectivisation of movements emerging, a growing transborder community practicing dissent, prompting confrontations with heterogenous border practitioners. Whilst, obviously, (legally) restricted in their movements, some Non-Citizens not only repeatedly transgressed local boundaries within Germany but also inner European borders. In their so-called ‘Transnational Tour 2013’, a few migrant activists travelled ‘illegally’ from Berlin to Austria, Italy, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.106 At every stop they met local migrant activists, discussed their country-specific or Europe-related grievances and spread the message of their attempt “to build a transnational network of refugee protests to prepare for an uprising before the EU-[parliamentary elections] in May 2014.”107

104 Information obtained through various activist circles, as well as during the ‘No Border Lasts Forever Conference’ in Frankfurt, 21/02/2014.
107 Ibid.
In May and June 2014, then, hundreds of migrant activists and supporters came together for the ‘March to Freedom’ from Strasbourg to Brussels.\(^{108}\) Referring to themselves as “Europeans with a ‘migration background’”, they stated:

We have a dream: Freedom of movement and of residence for all asylum seekers; Stop the Dublin trap and the obligatory residence in Lagers throughout Europe; Permanent documents without criteria (not depending on working contracts or individual state prosecution); Stop the imprisonment and deportation of migrants; Same working conditions for all; Same political, social and cultural rights for all: right to study and to work; Stop the European imperialist policies: no more free trade treaties and NATO—wars; Abolish Frontex, Eurosur and other antimigration policies and measures.\(^{109}\)

These demands were posed to EUrope and its dispositif that constitutes the connections between local, regional, national and supranational actors and systems, the dispositif that is constituted of these connections and responds to EUrope’s urgent need to filter, monitor and control human mobility. These transversal migration struggles animate the conditions of injustice that may take on particular shapes in individual member states but nonetheless underlie EUrope as a political and communal borderscape.

While moving towards greater communalisation, this governmental EUropean border dispositif is, of course, never total but also replete with internal contradictions and failure. The sheer presence of many of the Non-Citizens in Germany attests to gaps in the dispositif and practices of open dissent animate these failures further. Many of the Non-Citizens succeeded, somehow, to reach a country they should have been prevented from reaching or that as ‘visa-overstayers’ they should have left already. Their struggles shed light on EUropean border practices even if, or maybe rather because, such borderwork becomes increasingly dispersed, fragmented and mobile.

Through practices of border dissent, the contradictions within the EUropean border dispositif crystallise and become reinforced, in Kreuzberg, Berlin, Germany, EUrope

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\(^{108}\) I participated in the migration protests in Brussels but decided to not conduct interviews, 26th-28th of June 2014.

and beyond. Non-Citizen dissent provokes frustrations and crises amongst and within EUropean member states, casting doubt not only on the effectiveness and raison d’être of some of its practices, for example the Dublin system, but also on the genuineness of the belief in solidarity amongst EUropean member states and thus in the EUropean community.\(^{110}\) In these ways, their dissent is performative of EUropean borders, cuts into the dispositif, stirs and disrupts it, and prompts paradoxes to appear. These local but transversal struggles set in motion the process of the wrong for the EUropean community as such. They disrupt EUrope’s rhetoric of human rights, justice and freedom by merging it with their agonism, their anger and plight, enforcing incommensurable encounters.

The merging of seemingly incommensurable worlds shows, at the same time, that both worlds are always-already implicated with one another and mutually constitutive. Rancièrian purity fades in practices of transversal border dissent. Whilst Non-Citizen resistance is performative of German and EUropean borders, these border are, of course, also performative of Non-Citizen dissent. EUropean border-traces have imprinted themselves onto Non-Citizen bodies in their movements toward and within EUrope. Those who publicly voiced and enacted dissent have already been marked, in one way or another, by the EUropean border dispositif.

In many ways it was this ‘marking’ that conditioned their dissent.\(^{111}\) Many of those implicated in the various dissensal migration struggles in Germany and other

\(^{110}\) Maybe no other migration struggle animates EUropean border failures and inconsistencies better than the ‘Lampedusa’ collectives forming throughout Germany, and particularly in Hamburg, that also became part of the Oranienplatz occupation in Berlin. Having fled Libya during the NATO-led war in 2011, many, mainly Sub-Saharan migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea, reached Italy, were accepted as war refugees and received initial support through EU funds. Once the funding ended the Italian government, contrary to the Dublin spirit, issued travel documents to approximately three hundred migrants, allowing them to move freely within the Schengen area. On their website, Lampedusa in Hamburg activists state: “At that point many refugees did not realize the consequences of the conflict between European governments being carried out on their backs.” Travelling on to Germany, and many to the city of Hamburg, they soon became destitute and threatened to be returned to Italy. In the midst of German-Italian governments haggling over their fates, they, as the collective ‘Lampedusa in Hamburg’ initiated mass protests that, thus far, successfully resisted deportation. See: Lampedusa in Hamburg, \url{http://www.lampedusa-in-hamburg.org/}, Accessed 20/07/2013; BBC, 2013, ‘Hamburg blames Italy over 300 homeless African refugees’, \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22694022}, Accessed 21/07/2013.

\(^{111}\) Non-Citizens, ‘Flyer’, \url{http://refugeesrevolution.blogspot.de/more-reports/}, Accesssed 06/07/2013.
EUropean countries have left traces elsewhere, sometimes in several of the member states they overcame in their journeys. Germany’s geographic location suggests that those travelling over land have necessarily gone through EUropean space. During their journeys, they experienced at least some of the facets of an increasingly communualised EUropean border regime: being steered or deflected already through the EUropean visa regime and its biometric information system onto increasingly dangerous routes, becoming harassed by transnational police forces or borderguards, possibly screened by Frontex personnel or chain-deported through the Dublin II&III absurdity within EUrope. Inscribed into interlocking EUropean and national data sets, such as Eurodac, these traces may result in their criminalisation or illegalisation not only locally but in the EU as a whole, and therewith in their future immobility, in the rejection of their asylum-claims or inner-EUropean deportations.

Local injustices have connected and explicitly EUropean registers, past collisions intrude into the present and gesture towards a precarious future. Those who publicly practice dissent seem to be amongst those ‘marked’ subjects whose dissent disrupts EUropean borders but whose lives continue to be disrupted by the dispositif to an extent that leads to increasingly desperate and self-harming political practices. This is not to suggest that the dispositif creates its subjects, is fully constitutive of their political actions and that dissent results merely from hopelessness and desperation but, rather, that within Non-Citizen dissent one can always-also find traces of the violence that EUropean borderwork entails.

**Conclusion**

Dissent is one facet of resistance, maybe its most visible one. This chapter followed Non-Citizen resistance that heralded a wave of migration struggles hitherto unseen and unheard of in Germany. While many of their forms of protest had been practiced before in other contexts and struggles, the Non-Citizens’ intransigence and radicality drew unprecedented support, attention and disapproval.

Thinking their resistance as method throughout this chapter has shown how Non-Citizen practices of dissent were performative of the borderwork seeking to ban them to certain spaces, expecting a certain behaviour of them, and ascribing ‘right’ names to them. Their discursive and physical intrusions into spaces not deemed theirs provoked
agonism and merged multiple worlds that seemed incommensurable. Not wanting handouts or pity, the Non-Citizens demanded something that was taken away from them, their rights, their freedom to choose, their dignity.

Through their heterological interventions the Non-Citizens animated not only their reasons for struggle but also performed, in frictional ways, German and EUropean border politics. The question of whether or not their interventions were successful cannot be decisively answered but what is certain is that they set into motion scandalous scenes of inclusion and exclusion. The brutal force used to break up their protests, the malicious and obscure justifications by politicians, standoffs between thousands of special police units and a few dozens of hunger-strikers, square- or school-occupants, as well as small legal concessions and inter-governmental controversies amongst EUropean member states indicate what is at stake – the authority to decide over questions of belonging and unbelonging. Practices of dissent seem always risky and precarious; confrontations with state and EUropean border practitioners often increase the risk of deportation. At the same time, such practices create novel communities of dissent and support, as the (solidarity) networks of EUropean non/citizens vividly show.

Rancière’s thoughts on dissent have contributed to understanding the significance of Non-Citizen protest by providing conceptual resources to explore what occurs in these moments of confrontational encounter. Similar to the disruptive actions of the feminist activist de Gouges, the Non-Citizens inserted a division into commonsense, into that which seemed unquestionable, even natural. Through their dissent that “ceaselessly displaces the limits of the public and the private, of the political and social”, Non-Citizen resistance can be conceived as chiasmic motions, crossing over and thereby deforming the worlds of citizenship and non-citizenship.112

Thinking the struggle with Rancière and within a Foucauldian frame has allowed to focus on how dissenting forces, as practices, engage and contest existing forms of violence that have acquired normalcy under the cloak of citizenship. Disrupting while seeking citizenship means transgressing dominant norms that are maintained by what

Rancière might refer to as the ‘police’ order and what Foucault may call ‘regimes of truth’. At the same time, Non-Citizen dissent complicates Rancièrean terminologies and concepts. Stating that “[a] political demonstration is [...] always of the moment”, Rancière conceptualises ‘equality’, ‘politics’ or ‘dissensus’ as momentary ruptures, as profound but fleeting public contestations.\textsuperscript{113}

The Non-Citizens demonstrate, however, that a radical politics encompassing scenes of dissent requires preparation, organisation, planning, re-adjustments, endurance, innumerable plenaries and discussions, strategising and experimenting. In hundreds of meetings, actions were meticulously planned and the confrontational discourse of non-citizenship developed over many months of struggle, based on, at times unspectacular everyday politics. Furthermore, for the Non-Citizens, equality is not staged in the moment but only acquired through their entrance into citizenship. Dispensing with the consensus/dissensus dichotomy that Rancière advances, the Non-Citizens seek to enter consensus society through dissensus. This however, does not suggest that they seek to leave behind ‘politics’ to enter the universe of ‘police’. As explained before, in their understanding it is only through citizenship that they can obtain other-than-that-identities, freeing themselves from being subjected to certain spaces, behaviours and names.

It is their dissensual movement toward citizenship that deforms, nonetheless, seemingly incommensurable worlds. Dispensing with Rancièrean dualisms means also complicating the idea that the world of police establishes the ‘distribution of the sensible’, opposed to politics which forms the ‘gap in the sensible’. What amounts to a governance-subversion dichotomy, criticised in Chapter Two, cannot account for the many ways in which the police, as shown throughout the chapter, \textit{engages in subversive politics themselves}, and employs tactics that demonstrate the productivity of (sovereign) power, as acknowledged by Foucault.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{114} This is what Nyers referred to as the “subversive elements of sovereign power - its non-democratic re-takings”, in Nyers, ‘Abject Cosmopolitanism’, 2003, p. 1087.
Governance and resistance are not diametrically opposed to one another but rather intertwined and contaminated with one another. Further, the many internal agonies that the Non-Citizen campaign produced indicate that practices of dissent can entail their own exclusions, their own violence. Those who fall in-between the citizenship and non-citizenship dualism became categorised during the Congress as one or the other, based on the logic of inclusion/exclusion that underlies the political technology that is sovereign citizenship. While often productive, a politics that creates confrontations seems to necessarily conflict with the ‘messiness’ and ‘greyness’ of the contemporary condition. Instead of the merging of two seemingly incommensurable worlds of consensus and dissensus, multiple worlds come together in the practice of resistance. Focusing on the spectacle, Rancière’s work on dissensus can account neither for these internal agonies and nuances that always inhabit disruptive politics, nor for the very politicality of governmental dispositifs.

Thinking the Non-Citizen struggle with, rather than through Rancière has opened a variety of productive avenues for interpreting resistance as dissent whilst also showing that dissent remains merely one aspect of resistance’s plural enactments. For Rancière, “[a] political subject is a capacity for staging scenes of dissensus”.115 However, the following ethnographic explorations show that political subjects who practice resistance need not engage in public and loud contestations but can create silent moments of solidarity or excessively hide away while, nonetheless, contesting the EUropean border dispositif. In this sense, a political subject can be conceived, rather, as a capacity for practicing resistance where the aim of obedience, “the mortification of one’s will” fails, and where resistance emerges and is thought, voiced and enacted in a plurality of ways.116 As Foucault states:

The relationship between power and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot, therefore, be separated. The crucial problem of power is not that of voluntary servitude (how could we seek to be slaves?). At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom.117

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Chapter Four: Solidarity as Border Resistance - Boats4People

Introduction
This chapter explores the Boats4People solidarity campaign of 2012 and, through it, the EUropean borderscape of the Mediterranean Sea. Advocating the freedom of movement, activists travelled from Italy to Tunisia to protest the many migrant deaths that unabatedly occur along the maritime borders of EUrope. For them, EUrope is complicit in the loss of lives that, rather than mere fateful tragedies, are consequences of EUrope’s expanding border security practices, policies, and infrastructure that curtail secure migration routes ever-more, leaving for particular individuals and groups only the most precarious and dangerous paths and corridors.

Through their campaign, Boats4People intervened in the Mediterranean Sea that, whilst being one of the best monitored seas in the world, witnesses year after year the disappearance and drowning, starvation and death due to dehydration or injury of hundreds, even thousands of people. Boats4People sought to respond to EUrope’s politics of division and (biopolitical) abandonment with a politics of solidarity, bringing together a variety of individuals and groups, demands and struggles.

As part of the campaign I travelled with Boats4People activists through Italy and took part in many of their meetings and actions. I had learned about the solidarity action

1 Groups and organisations participating in the Boats4People campaign: Afrique-Europe-Interact, Euro-African network, Migreurop, FIDH (International Federation For Human Rights), Flüchtlingsrat Hamburg, Welcome to Europe, Terre solidaire (Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement), FASTI (Fédération des Associations de Travailleurs Immigrés), Cimade, GISTI (Groupe d’Information et de Soutien des Immigrés), RESF 13 (Réseau Éducation Sans Frontières Bouches du Rhône), ARCI (Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana), AME (Association Malienne des Expulsés), ARACEM (Association des Refoulés d’Afrique Centrale au Mali), ABCDS (Association Beni Znassen pour la Culture, le Développement et la Solidarité), GADEM (Groupe Antiraciste de Défense et d’accompagnement des Étrangers et Migrants), All Included, CETUMA (Centre de Tunis pour la Migration et l’Asile), FTDES (Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux), as well as various (other) activist groups.

2 Due to personal and financial reasons I was, unfortunately, unable to continue the trip to Tunisia and had to rely on activist sources for the re-narration of that part of the journey. The documentary ‘Against the Tide’ by Nathalie Loubeyre who followed the campaign provided also valuable insights. Please note also that I obtained a part-time position in the project WatchTheMed in summer 2014.
months earlier through activist circles and closely followed the organisation of the journey. At that time I had not decided whether or not to write about the campaign as I then focussed on struggles led by non-EUropean migrant groups, such as the Non-Citizens in Germany. However, during the journey I began to more closely think about the significance and complexity of questions of solidarity in migration struggles that, of course, had also emerged at various other moments in the different campaigns and struggles I followed.

Solidarity, it seemed, as concept, idea and practice, was a crucial but often taken-for-granted assumption in migration activism that, at times, lacked sufficient engagement with. After having followed the campaign I felt that the Boats4People practice of being in solidarity with (unknown) others, even the dead, opened up a series of ethical questions concerning relationality, subjectivity and privilege, and it occurred to me that these practices were not merely solidarity avowals but, indeed, practices of resistance.

Solidarity, then, is interpreted in this chapter as another facet of resistance, one that can be as disruptive as practices of dissent that employs, however, other methods and strategies. This is, of course, not to suggest that the Non-Citizen movement can be reduced to the notion of dissent and Boats4People activism to the one of solidarity. They are interwoven and at times mutually constitutive. Solidarity was inasmuch a characteristic of the former struggle as dissent was of the latter. Without a strong bond within and beyond their group, the Non-Citizens could not have taken to the streets so relentlessly to stage their disruptive scenes of dissent. Equally, the Boats4People campaign could not have been as provocative without angry confrontations and antagonisms. Placing different emphases in both struggles, however, seemed productive to think through what suggested themselves as the most characteristic traits in their practices and discourses of resistance.

Practicing solidarity as a form of border resistance is not a simple task. Togetherness at the margins, and often despite the margins, is necessarily riven and problematic from the very beginning. Spatial, cultural, linguistic, racial, political, historical, economic, or gender differences often underlie and impact on solidarity attempts, turning questions of power-relationalities, hierarchies, privilege and paternalism into central concerns. As the previous chapter has shown, the Non-Citizen emphasis on the importance of
acknowledging existing differences between those with and without citizenship indicates that only when seeking to understand the life-worlds (Lebenswelten) of others, even if far removed from one’s own reality, togetherness in border politics can become meaningful, can become solidarity.

This chapter brings Judith Butler and Sara Ahmed into conversation with the Boats4People campaign and the previous (Foucauldian and Rancièrean) conceptualisations of (migration) resistance. Butler’s work on solidarity, vulnerability and grievability and Ahmed’s elaborations on ‘strange’ encounters help to think through the ways in which the solidarity movement sought togetherness with those subjected to the violent, even deadly effects of the EUropean border dispositif.3

By creating spaces for surprising encounters, Boats4People activism struggled against a regime of racialisation, objectification, illegalisation and instrumentalisation of ‘the other’. Later conceptualised as a ‘politics of impossible solidarity’, such activism, whilst having faced (internal) problems and several setbacks, offered and performed other political imaginaries by inventing novel ways of being-together. While despair and death are commonplace in EUrope’s maritime borderspace, Boats4People activism intervened and recast the Mediterranean as a space also of political struggle and solidarity, ‘beyond borders’.

Part I, ‘The Boats4People campaign’, recounts the campaign that took place in summer 2012 in Italy and Tunisia. It explores in detail the various encounters that were enabled by the campaign as well as the activist practice of grieving for those who have died along EUrope’s maritime borders. Part II, ‘Necropolitical EUrope’, explores that what the campaign unmasks and animates, the deadly and racist condition of the EUropean border dispositif. It first listens to the testimonies of the survivors of the Left-to-Die-Boat, collected by WatchTheMed, which offer rare insights into the Mediterranean borderscape and its deadly dimension.4 Drawing from Foucault’s conceptions of biopolitical racism, it explores the biopolitical abandonment of those marked as always-

other. Part III, ‘Solidarity as Border Resistance’, thinks through Boats4People’s different pronunciations of solidarity. The practice of encountering families of the disappeared is discussed with help of Ahmed’s work on ‘modes of encounter’ and the practice of commemorating those who passed away by drawing from Butler’s work on grievable and precarious lives. The third part then develops the idea of a ‘politics of (impossible) solidarity’ and shows, also through Rancièrean and Foucauldian accounts, how solidarity can be thought as a practice of resistance in migration struggles.

**Part I - The Boats4People Campaign**

Boats4People formed as an international coalition and included groups and organisations from various EUropean countries, as well as from Mali, Niger and Tunisia with the aim “to end the dying along the maritime borders and to defend the rights of migrants at sea”. The campaign denounced the EUropean border regime for its “repressive policies which seek to criminalize migration towards Europe more and more each day”. The idea for the solidarity campaign first emerged in summer 2011 as a response to the growing number of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean Sea at a time when the turmoil of the ‘Arab Spring’ prompted many to leave Northern African countries.

With the authoritarian regimes of Libya and Tunisia crumbling in the wake of revolutionary upheaval, their ability to continue cooperation with the EU and its member states in matters of migration defense waned. The civil war in Libya, NATO’s military intervention and “the active role of Gaddafi’s regime in forcing migrants onto boats” prompted an estimated 26,000 people to cross the Mediterranean Sea toward Italy, some of whom would later be ‘asked’ by the government to leave Italy, then travel to Germany, join in the occupation of Oranienplatz in Berlin and create the ‘Lampedusa

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6 Ibid.
7 Boats4People, ‘Boats4People’s first campaign is a success, the maritime borders of the EU remain are as deadly as ever’, Final Press Release, 20/07/2012.
in Hamburg' collective. Also, in the same year, about 28,000 people who had left Tunisia reached Italian shores.

Those who did not arrive were most certainly more than the 1,500 migrants who are known to have died in the Mediterranean Sea in 2011. European institutions and governments fail to count the dead so that the real figure is presumably much higher. Amongst the dead were most of the passengers from the so-called ‘Left-to-Die’ boat, whose fate will be explored in greater detail later. Seeking to reach the island of Lampedusa and despite several encounters at high sea, most of the passengers were left to die, leaving only nine survivors.

The Boats4People campaign, when first conceived was envisioned as an intervention at sea with a fleet of boats that would possibly be able to enforce encounters with European coast guards or Frontex in order to monitor their activities. When the campaign was launched in 2012, it was only the Oloferne, a small sailing boat with limited capacity that embarked on the journey. While the desired intervention in maritime space remained largely symbolic, the Oloferne became, as Boats4People activist Lorenzo suggested, a “good catalyst to bring together people from all the different places.”

Activists followed the boat by other means of transport and organised events along the route that would allow for diverse encounters. As activist Christoph recalled, the underlying idea of the campaign was “to connect with people on the other side of the

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9 Ibid.  
11 While 2011 was the deadliest year so far, 2014 will become the deadliest year ever recorded. FFM and WatchTheMed have collected news reports and accounts of survivors, indicating between 1280-1480 deaths since May 2014 alone. Please note that I translated and worked on the report. We have collected further accounts that report of several hundreds of deaths that were not yet added to the report, so that the number has presumably already gone far beyond 2500 fatalities. The most recent incidents occurred in September 2014 with up to 700 migrants feared dead in two shipwrecks, south-east off the coast of Malta and off the coast of Libya. FFM/WatchTheMed: ‘1280-1480 People Dead in the Central Mediterranean since May 2014’, 2014, http://watchthemed.net/reports/view/54, Accessed 15/08/2014.  
12 Interview with Boats4People activist Hagen, conducted on the 12th of March 2014, my own translation.  
13 Interview with Boats4People activist Lorenzo, conducted on the 19th of March 2014.
Mediterranean Sea and to show presence in the space where struggles do take place.”  

Nicanor, one of the coordinators explained that the project also sought to create a presence in the maritime space in order to “control the immigration controllers” and challenge the impunity of states.

In July 2012, the Boats4People campaign was launched at the international annual anti-racist conference in Cecina, Italy where various activist groups and organisations came together. Amongst them were survivors of the ‘Left-to-Die’ vessel as well as Father Zerai, an Eritrean priest who had received their distress call and had notified the Italian coast guard, without success. Researchers and activists Lorenzo and Charles, also part of the campaign, had investigated the ‘Left-to-Die’ case through their online mapping platform WatchTheMed. WatchTheMed seeks to allow others than EU and state actors to watch the Mediterranean borderscape, thereby potentially democratising the sea space through, as they suggest, ‘the right to look’: “[I]t has the potential [...] to tell the story that the government of migration does not want to tell or to draw the map that the government of migration does not want to draw.” The founders hoped that through Boats4People, WatchTheMed would become a participatory tool, operated by a variety of actors to bring to light violations of migrants’ rights at sea and to assign responsibility to border authorities.

On the 7th of July, a small group of activists boarded the Oloferne and embarked on a journey to Palermo and Pantelleria in Italy, Monastir and Ksibet El Mediouni in Tunisia, and finally to the island of Lampedusa, carrying survival rations in case of encounters with migrant vessels. Farouk Ben Lhiba, spokesperson for the families of the dead, whose son had died when trying to emigrate, was one of the activists on board. At a press conference, activist Nicanor explained that Palermo was chosen as the boat’s first stop out of protest against the treatment of those who had helped migrants in distress and had, as a consequence, stood trial before a Sicilian court: “In Sicily, there was the

14 Interview with Boats4People activist Christoph, conducted on the 07th of March 2014, my own translation.
15 Notes taken during Boats4People press conferences in Cecina and Palermo, July 2012.
16 Interview with Lorenzo, 19th of March 2014.
Cap Anamur trial in 2004 and the Tunisian fishermen trial in 2007. Part of the mission of Boats4People is to help defend sailors against such repression.”

The Oloferne was accompanied by activists on land who sought to turn the different stages of the journey into sites of political intervention, by organising commemorations and demonstrations, visiting the detention centres Milo in Italy and Choucha on the border between Tunisia and Libya, and by establishing links with migrants, local human rights and migrant solidarity groups. During the campaign, the actuality of migrant plight was, once more, cruelly confirmed when fifty-four people died of dehydration or drowned on their way to Italy with only one man surviving. In his testimony to Lorenzo and Charles, given in a hospital of the Tunisian coastal town Zarzis, the survivor recounted the odyssey in which he lost two brothers and his sister. Waving to vessels that passed by without coming to help, he survived by tying himself to the remains of the boat.

Campaigners not on board of the Oloferne travelled by ferry from Italy to Tunisia and sought to use the time and space for exchanges with Tunisian passengers. Organising a well-attended public forum on the upper deck, Christoph felt that “right there on the Mediterranean Sea that symbolises a rift that is difficult to bridge, to approach and talk to one another, and listen, was very special.” Those who attended the forum were mainly Tunisian migrants living in Italy with more or less secured residency status, some of whom had to fight for years for their legalisation. For activist Nina, the forum was remarkable in that it brought together (mainly Western) activists and legalised Tunisian migrants, some of whom “spontaneously decided to speak up and position themselves

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19 Interview with Christoph, 07th of March 2014.
against the migration regime”, as well as showing interest in, supporting, and encouraging the Boats4People project.\textsuperscript{20}

In Palermo and later in Monastir many Boats4People activists encountered Tunisian families, mainly mothers, whose children, most (or possibly all) of them sons, had disappeared on their journeys to Italy. In workshops we had been prepared for difficult moments that demanded awareness of the parents’ enduring hope to find signs of their sons’ lives. One activist re-called an encounter in which a Tunisian mother demanded answers, and said: ‘You Europeans know the truth, do you know something about my child?’

There had been past incidents where, facing distraught and traumatised relatives of the disappeared, activists had promised help which both renewed the mothers’ hope and burdened the activists with a nearly unfeasible task. Activist Hagen recalled:

Of course it was difficult as it was a time when many of the mothers still had hope that their sons would reappear and some of the mothers were convinced to have seen their sons on Italian television, alive, and could or would not believe that they had died and disappeared somewhere in the Mediterranean Sea. [...] So for them it was even harder than for those who could bury the bodies of their children and mourn for them.\textsuperscript{21}

Thinking back to these encounters, also Nina noted:

Encountering the mothers was [...] challenging, already due to language difficulties but also due to the understandable emotional involvement of the families. I think the exchange was very important but at the same time it was difficult to realise how little I could do to alleviate the uncertainty and suffering of the mothers and fathers. Of course solidarity is important and we did, I think, demonstrate that, but of course the families wanted to know, above all, the fate of their children.\textsuperscript{22}

Meeting the parents’ desperation was a nearly impossible task, with mothers ceaselessly pointing to, and us looking at, and sometimes looking away from, large images showing faces of their sons that, all young, mostly smiling, offered glimpses of a past, a time

\textsuperscript{20} Email exchange with Boats4People activist Nina, 19\textsuperscript{th} of March 2014, my own translation.
\textsuperscript{21} Interview with Hagen, 12\textsuperscript{th} of March 2014.
\textsuperscript{22} Email exchange with Nina, 19\textsuperscript{th} of March 2014.
before they left, fled, escaped and got onto those boats. Language difficulties turned communication into mere bodily gestures and awkward sounds of support.

The situation that brought together those who suffered and those who came in solidarity seemed to straightforwardly assign helper roles to mainly white activists, citizens of Europe, and victim roles to those who had come for answers, whose sons had sought to come to Europe, to ‘us’. These roles could neither be fully overcome nor lived up to; hope could neither be offered nor taken. The families’ demands to know about the fates of their children, posed of course more to the governments of Italy and Tunisia than to Boats4People activists, were unanswerable, and everything that was said or that could have been said remained insufficient. Clinging onto the faintest of chances that, even after many months, their sons were still alive, still somewhere, still trying to get in touch with them, nothing could be offered to the families but these helpless gestures and sounds.

That which had brought the families and campaigners together was that which kept them apart the most - the death of their children, and our incomprehension of what their loss meant. At the same time it was that loss and the continuous loss that needed ‘us’ to come together, to listen to the parents’ pain and demands, to not forget what suffering Europe’s border politics entailed for certain individuals, groups and populations.

In my interview with Christoph, he voiced his personal discomfort about these organised encounters, stating that they were too distressing and exhausting for him. Referring to a particularly memorable encounter that occurred during a meeting organised by Boats4People and WatchTheMed in Tunisia, Christoph noted:

One of the WatchTheMed coordinators [...] tried to explain that the project was looking into how to change the situation [for migrants in the Mediterranean Sea] in

23 It is very important to note, as mentioned earlier, that not all the Boats4People activists were ‘Europeans’. Some participants had survived their migration journeys years earlier and formed activist groups/campaigns/NGOs in Europe, others were active in the different African countries mentioned. However, in these encounters that I experienced in Palermo (but not in Monastir), the majority of activists were (white) Europeans encountering Tunisian families.
the future, but when he said ‘future’, the relatives of the disappeared all got up and left the room. For them, the fact that people were discussing the future meant that the past, and their children, had already been forgotten and were not of interest anymore.\textsuperscript{24}

Boats4People solidarity activism sought to bridge something seemingly unbridgeable – a politics for future change with a politics of not forgetting and continuously searching when, for many of the families, the future remained unimaginable. While Christoph avoided close encounters with family members due to personal and emotional reasons he voiced admiration for those activists and Tunisian families who sought, “by speaking, listening, thinking, understanding, to keep the exchange alive”.\textsuperscript{25}

In Palermo, Monastir, Lampedusa as well as months later in Berlin, public commemorations were held for those who had lost their lives on their journeys to EUrope.\textsuperscript{26} Candles were lit, banners held, speeches given. The long list of documented deaths, collected by UNITED, was unrolled, showing times, places and causes of death, countries of origin, and names, if known.\textsuperscript{27} (Migrant) Activists started reading out the few fragments of lives that were revealed through their death:

On the 2\textsuperscript{nd} of May 2012, name unknown, 16 year old boy from Afghanistan, stowaway, suffocated in a truck into which he had hidden to avoid the border police checks. [...] On the 1\textsuperscript{st} of May 2012, name unknown, from Somalia, died in a boat during a week-long voyage from Libya to Malta, boat came ashore at Rivera Bay. [...] On the 12\textsuperscript{th} of April 2012, Alain Hatungimana (man), Burundi, suicide, killed himself in the Netherlands in fear of being deported with his two children. [...] Names unknown, 9 year old girl, 55 year old man, Afghanistan, missing after they tried to cross the river Evros between Greece and Turkey, part of a group of 15.\textsuperscript{28}

The list that keeps growing and the reading out of names in public had a performative effect on those participating but also on those passing by. In Palermo and Berlin,

\textsuperscript{24} Interview with Christoph, 07\textsuperscript{th} of March 2014.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} I participated in commemorations in Palermo and Berlin, as well as on Lesvos during the activist campaign ‘Traces Back’, illustrated in Chapter Five.
\textsuperscript{27} United For Intercultural Action, \texttt{http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/}, Accessed 23/03/2013.
\textsuperscript{28} This is not a direct quote but reflects the way the names and fates were read out during the commemorations. Quoted from: United For Intercultural Action, \texttt{http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/}, Accessed 23/03/2013.
passers-by listened for a moment, engaged in conversation and scrutinised some of the listed fates, or quickly turned away, ostensibly discomfited by the deads’ written presence. In the busy main train station of Berlin, many travellers had to awkwardly step over the list, an act often pursued with such caution as to demonstrate, to everyone else, awareness and respect for the dead. The commemorations were both solemn vigils and public protests, marked by outspoken anger and strong denouncements of the EUropean border regime.

In Monastir, however, the commemoration went astray. Accompanied by many mothers of the disappeared, the commemoration was planned as a way to engage with the local community. However, the idea of having the Oloferne arrive in the harbour for the ceremony did not materialise as water-levels were too low and the paper lanterns that activists had provided as a symbolic gesture of grief were lit by Tunisian youths and carried by strong winds into the crowd of people. Nina recalled:

The memorial in the harbour was a particularly difficult moment, when some of the weeping women collapsed on the rocks and I had the feeling that necessary structures to support them were not there. We could not talk to them and hardly knew them and thus might not have been the right contact persons anyways, and at the same time, this emotionally charged moment was a common experience. So it was less about what we could do collectively but more about what one asked of the mothers in a situation where support does not work as well as it should.29

Also for Christoph, the situation in Monastir was particularly problematic:

The locals did not really understand what we were there for. [...] This form of activism needs to be handled with caution and in Monastir it became grotesque. It was not a commemoration.30

Overburdened by the many tasks at hand, the activists had only hastily organised the commemoration. The attempt to reach out to the local community and to grieve collectively failed.

29 Email exchange with Nina, 19th of March 2014.
30 Interview with Christoph, 07th of March 2014.
The journey of Boats4People activists enabled various encounters, only some of which were recounted here. The (re)narration of them, based on notes taken during or after the campaign, online research and interviews with activists conducted sometimes months later, reveal mere fractions of their initial nature, the affective and emotive dimensions often remain distant memories, difficult to recount. The campaign enabled also various internal encounters as many of the activists and representatives of participating organisations had never met before the journey. As Lorenzo put it when the Boats4People journey came to an end in Lampedusa:

[I]t was also an important moment to see this boat, this link between different fights and organisations defending the rights of migrants. In a way, it sailed through what little space remained to imagine a Mediterranean civic spirit, different from what European governments picture.\(^{31}\)

Boats4People was, however, in itself never a harmonious group and the encounters were narrated mainly through accounts from ‘freedom of movement activists’ and need, therefore, be understood as partial reflections on the campaign. The attempted coalition of activists and NGOs through the project did not thrive, too many conflictual dimensions opened up and many of the activists have left Boats4People since.

Nonetheless, it was through the campaign that new avenues for cooperation emerged. Besides WatchTheMed which grew into a larger collective due to Boats4People, the established connections with Tunisian activists were particularly interesting. After the campaign in summer 2012, Tunisian activists came to Germany to foster links with (some) of the Boats4People activists they had encountered in Tunisia. In Berlin they visited the Oranienplatz and had vivid exchanges with the migrant activists who had occupied the square (see Chapter Three). When the inhabitants of a Tunisian refugee camp in Choucha began a protest campaign, the activists drew from their experiences and encounters with the migrant activists and helped organise a ‘tent camp’ in the heart of Tunis. For Christoph, a cycle of struggle was created and set in motion: “I thought

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\(^{31}\) Lorenzo quoted in ‘Against the Tide’, a documentary by Nathalie Loubeyre, 2014.
now something of what I hoped for became reality, information-exchange, getting to know one another, building trust, broadening possibilities for future actions.”

**Part II - Necropolitical EUROpe**

The Boats4People campaign intervened in and thereby animated one of the deadliest borderzones in the world in order to strive “for a Mediterranean that will become a place of solidarity and cease to be a mass grave for migrants.” Activists accused EU border practitioners of violating their obligation to rescue at sea and the principle of non-refoulement and, more profoundly, of having created the very conditions that allowed for these many deaths to occur in the first place.

Their solidarity actions, such as the encounters with families of and commemorations for the disappeared were responses to these deadly realities. While part III returns to Boats4People practices of solidarity, this part explores what they so vividly contested, namely the deadly maritime borders of the EU. This part begins by listening to the witness accounts of some of the survivors of the Left-to-Die-Boat before turning to Foucault’s exploration of race and biopolitics in order to then discuss EUrope’s borderwork in the Mediterranean Sea.

**Left-to-Die**

Besides the general condition of despair and record numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, the Boats4People campaign was evoked by a particularly harrowing incident that had occurred in March 2011 and offered a rare glimpse into the necropolitical dimension of the Mediterranean Sea. A small rubber vessel with seventy-two people on board had fled war-torn Libya, hoping to reach EUropean shores in Lampedusa.

Having lost orientation and drifting uncontrollably in the sea for fourteen days with hardly any food and water, sixty-one migrants died on board and of those eleven who were washed up back in Libya alive, one died shortly after and another person days later

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32 Interview with Christoph, 07th of March 2014.
in Gaddafi’s prison, leaving only nine to tell their story. In several encounters with the survivors, WatchTheMed researchers Lorenzo and Charles as well as Guardian journalist Jack Shenker collected testimonies that document the odyssey.35

These accounts are rare as survivors are often too scared to turn to authorities and the media, or are promptly detained and ‘repatriated’ to avoid allegations and suppress witness accounts.36 The testimonies of the survivors reveal that their journey had not remained unnoticed, but that, in fact, several close encounters had taken place.37 Despite noticed distress calls and various direct contacts with various vessels and a helicopter, no one came to the aid of the migrant boat.38

Recalling one encounter, survivor Abu Kurke Kebato, said:

The helicopter came very close to us down, we showed him our babies, we showed them we finished oil, we tell them ‘Please help us’ [...] I think I saw them take our picture. I think I saw a photo camera or something like that.39

The encounter with the helicopter had given the passengers false hope as they believed rescue was imminent. As a reaction, the ‘captain’ threw his satellite phone overboard in order to avoid identification as being involved in a trafficking network.40 Kebato stated:


36 Exemplary of this strategy of silencing is a case that was brought to light by the Spanish radio station Cedena SER in March 2013. On the released video a Spanish “Guardia Civil patrol boat [runs] over a dinghy, resulting in the death of one migrant, the disappearance of seven others and 17 people rescued from the water who were subsequently detained.” A coalition of NGOs condemned “the expulsion of the people who were rescued after this incident for the only purpose (after seeing the video) of avoiding the presence of witnesses of these events.” PICUM, ‘Bulletin’, http://picum.org/fr/actualites/bulletin/39764/, Accessed 23/03/2013.

37 I encountered some of the survivors in Cecina/Italy during the opening of the Boats4People campaign but rely here on their statements given to WatchTheMed researchers Heller and Pezzani.


39 Ibid., p. 20.

40 Ibid., p. 10.
“Oh my God, we felt so happy at that time [...]. People were thanking the lord that we were going to survive and were about to reach Italy.”

After several hours with no sign of rescue, the passengers sought to ask fishermen for help, but as they “attempted to reach those boats”, the researchers’ report states, “the fishermen too left without providing any assistance.” When the helicopter re-appeared, onboard personnel “threw down 8 bottles of water and a few packets of biscuits before leaving”, never to return again.

Drifting without fuel, with no food and water left on board, people started dying. Kebato recalled:

Every morning we would wake up and find more bodies, which we would leave for 24 hours and then throw overboard [...]. By the final days, we didn't know ourselves. Everyone was either praying or dying.

On the third or fourth of April, the boat encountered a large military vessel. Dan Haile Gebre observed:

At first the ship was very far. Maybe 700 metres. They then circled around us, three times, until they came very close, 10 meters. We are watching them, they are watching us. We are showing them the dead bodies. We drank water from the sea to show them we were thirsty. The people on the boat took pictures, nothing else.

Reporting on the same encounter, survivor Ghirma Halefom stated:

Initially, we thought that this vessel was pointing in the right direction by sailing off, expecting us to follow [...]. But then, you know, they kept wandering off [...] and in spite of our many gestures, they were not responding at all. And gradually, they just disappeared, and we realised that they were not responding, replying to our distress calls at all.

41 Shenker, ‘How a migrant boat was left adrift on the Mediterranean’, 2012.
43 Ibid.
44 Shenker, ‘How a migrant boat was left adrift on the Mediterranean’, 2012.
The personal accounts of the survivors expose the violence of their abandonment, the active rejection of their basic gestures of distress, calling out, pleading, drinking seawater, pointing to dead bodies, holding up babies. The death of the sixty-two and of thousands of others in the maritime space suggests a necropolitical condition of the European sea space – "death worlds" as Achille Mbembe has termed the effects of necropolitics, the "subjugation of life to the power of death." 47

Biopolitical Abandonment

In scenes of encounter between the passengers of the Left-to-Die vessel and various other parties, the decision was made, by most, to disengage, to abandon those struggling for life. The frequency of these scenes suggests that abandonment at high sea does not constitute an exceptional phenomenon but, rather, a practice that creates the necropolitical condition of the Mediterranean Sea, the sea as a 'death world'. However, if biopoliticality, as suggested in Chapter Two, forms an underlying condition of dispositifs and seeks "to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings", how can it also produce these death-worlds that the survivors of the Left-to-Die-Boat experienced and only just escaped? 48

Foucault himself asks: "Given that this power's objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?" 49 Seemingly conflictual, necropolitical and biopolitical accounts of power need to be thought together through racism as not every life is deemed worth optimising or, indeed, as some life can only be optimised if other life is not, if other life is rendered disposable, is abandoned or killed. Foucault suggests:

[R]acism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality. [...] We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work. 50

47 Mbembe, 'Necropolitics', 2003, p. 39, emphasis in original.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid., p. 254, p. 258.
The racism that Foucault alludes to functions as a (bio-)political technology that allows marking out individuals and groups within a population conceived as a “biological domain”, and subjecting them to a positive relationship with those deemed normal, worthy of life and saving:

The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I – as species rather than individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be.\(^{51}\)

The individualising function of racism needs to be understood alongside its totalising function which assigns degenerative potential to particular societal groups, turning them into stigmatic populations that supposedly endanger the species of the human as such. Mbembe, seeking to emphasise the necropolitical dimension within forms of biopower, suggests:

That race (or for that matter racism) figures so prominently in the calculus of biopower is entirely justifiable. After all, more so than class-thinking [...], race has been the ever present shadow in Western political thought and practice, especially when it comes to imagining the inhumanity of, or rule over, foreign peoples.\(^ {52}\)

The shadow of race haunts encounters in the Mediterranean Sea. The stigmatic inferiority of the passengers of the Left-to-Die-Boat is certainly not reducible to biological traits alone but connects to legacies of ethnic and cultural racialisation, to colonial imaginaries.\(^ {53}\) While race seems to be something largely unspoken of in contemporary Europe, it, nonetheless, “refuses to remain silent”, as David Goldberg notes.\(^ {54}\)

Those on board became racialised in their many encounters as those whose absence would not be a loss, and need not be mourned. Travelling on unseaworthy vessels


\(^{52}\) Mbembe, *Necropolitics*, 2003, p. 17, emphasis in original.


towards Europe, they are always already stigmatised as a (biopolitical) threat, as orientalised-others, cultural-deviants, religious-fanatics, poor-welfare-scroungers, reproductive-machines, pitiful-victims, sexual-harassers. The passengers on these boats constitute both “an emptiness, an incompleteness” as those already missing, as well as an overdetermined figure that is already known because of the method of transport chosen. On these precarious vessels, and in-between states, the passengers are anomalies, existing in a ‘bastard place’, as Pierre Bourdieu has noted, seemingly ‘polluting’ sovereign orders and causing anxiety.

Contemporary biopolitical racism functions as a technology of division that, based on multiple registers, traits and characteristics, filters out inferior individuals and groups that seemingly constitute a threat to the future viability of the population. Such racism, as Ash Amin aptly puts it, relates to “the power of bioscopic regimes” that “[link] normality and abnormality, beauty and ugliness, civilization and barbarism, strength and weakness, health and disease, to particular bodies and bodily states.” Amin adds:

The new biopolitics focusing on taming or punishing the body judged to be errant provides an opening for past ethnic and racial hierarchies to return, wherever a politics of the social/communal is redefined as a politics of disciplining minorities and strangers.

The abandonment of the Left-to-Die vessel was a consequence of racist stigmatisation that connects biopolitical abnormalisations with histories of racial hierarchisation and differentiation.

The silence and avoidance in the encounters were verdicts without need to be spoken, ‘we are watching them, they are watching us’, ‘they took pictures, nothing else’. Their

59 Ibid., p. 11.
abandonment was a death-sentence without execution, merely requiring turning one's back, sailing or flying off and leaving the passengers behind in their precarity. In these actively passive maritime encounters, abandonment constitutes “every form of indirect murder”:

When I say “killing,” I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on.\(^{60}\)

Not every migrant vessel is abandoned, of course. Maritime engagements can translate into rescue efforts or ‘push-backs’, into assistance or even more ‘direct’ forms of murder.

The Left-to-Die case and probably hundreds of other incidents, however, show that Europe’s maritime border space can always be turned into a necropolitical space. As a vast space, there always exist the potential for the sea to become a void. As William Walters argues:

[H]owever much the ocean may have been striated by the modern forces of commerce, geopolitics and international law, however much it has been rendered predictable, navigable, exploitable, etc. by these interventions, there exist circumstances under which the ancient idea of the high sea as a lawless space beyond sovereignty and justice is capable of being reactivated.\(^{61}\)

It was the act of non-assistance, racist silence, the active passivity that created the boat’s destitution and reactivated the sea as a lawless space.

“During the night” survivor Dan Haile Gebre recalls, “we would see the lights of other big boats in the distance, we could not see them but the reflection of their lights looked like a city in the distance.”\(^{62}\) The city on the sea was in reach, promising safety. The ‘elemental opposition’ in these encounters was not one between the elements of land

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and sea but between forces of life and death. Decisions made in these moments could signify both rescue and the continuation of lives or abandonment and the probable end of lives. The opposition in the Left-to-Die case was one between those who, in their precarious situation sought to appeal to their common humanness and their right to belong to the living, and those who enacted a distinction within humanness, denying the passengers on the boat the worthiness to live, and allowing their death.

In contrast to a central public square in the heart of Munich where the death of the hunger-striking Non-Citizens had to be disallowed by all means, the potentiality for ‘reactivating’ the sea’s lawlessness allowed for (indirect) murder through neglect and abandonment. The accounts of the survivors of the Left-to-Die-Boat offered crucial insights into biopolitical abandonment at high sea and prompted others to ‘follow the violence’. Survivor Kebato says:

> Every night I can see exactly what’s happening once again, the hunger, the thirst, the falling [dying]. These powers, they knew we needed help and they did nothing. They must face justice.  

**Europe’s necropolitical Dispositif**

Boats4People and WatchTheMed responded to the demands for justice voiced by the survivors and began legal proceedings against those who failed to assist the vessel in distress. For them, the Mediterranean lawlessness was actively practiced, and not a mere apolitical, ‘natural’ condition. Indeed, they claim that it was due to the European border dispositif’s **activities** that non-assistance, abandonment, and death in sea encounters were and continue to be enabled. As activist Nicanor pointed out: “European policy assumes that the more monitoring is conducted, the fewer people will leave. That is not true, people still leave. But it is more dangerous, more lethal.”

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Europe's maritime space has drawn the attention, or rather obsession, of European border practitioners who, for many years now, seek to develop ever-growing security infrastructures despite the fact that 'irregular' immigration by boat is rather insignificant compared to other forms of 'illegally' entering or (over-)staying in the union.\(^67\) Europe's (maritime) border practices are becoming increasingly harmonised as well as externalised, through processes of European integration, common legal frameworks (especially the Schengen Agreement, Dublin II&III, Visa Information System, (bilateral) agreements with non-European countries, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility), joint border practitioners (especially Frontex that is also spearheading the European Patrols Network), and new monitoring systems (such as Eurosur).\(^68\)

As Alun Jones points out, Europe seeks to 'Europeanise' the Mediterranean space in order to turn it into its 'region':

Within many of the geographical imaginations mobilized by European policy elites, the Mediterranean is represented as a fragmented, problematic, and often conflictual space; a space in which the European Union regards itself as having a natural legitimacy to act in order to ensure its own security, promote good neighbourliness, and stave off potential threats to European and global order.\(^69\)

As Jones shows, the problematisation of the Mediterranean Sea, “depicted as an unsettled space with potentially unsettling consequences for ‘EU’rope” has justified

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\(^{67}\) See Guild and Carrera, ‘EU Borders and Their Controls’, 2013, p. 6. Note that boat-migration has quite dramatically increased in 2014, also due to the Italian Mare Nostrum operation.


various European interventions: “the product of a ‘Mediterranean region’ by European elites has mobilized the EU project and permitted its deployment politically and normatively in the delimitative and descriptive mapping of Mediterranean space.”

Also, as Bernd Kasparek suggests, Frontex’s special attention to Europe’s maritime borders rests in particular on the fussiness and the diffuseness of these borders, ideal and challenging spaces to experiment with “a new form of ‘border management’.”

At the same time, legislation is created that seeks to discourage maritime interventions by anyone but official border practitioners. European anti-smuggling and trafficking legislation “often creates a presumption that a captain is committing the offence of smuggling or trafficking if he or she brings unauthorized people into harbours” as Elspeth Guild and Sergio Carrera argue. Despite the extension of Europe’s border practices and legislation there is, tellingly, a peculiar absence of regulations concerning the (policing of) space of and around the external maritime borders of the union.

As Silja Klepp points out, whilst the activities of EU border control have been extended to include, in practice, international waters as well as waters and territories of third countries, it is unclear “where and to what extent the cornerstone of international refugee law, the non-refoulement, is valid in the Mediterranean Sea.” Furthermore, as Klepp shows, it is due to the absence of clear legal provisions for European practices within international waters that violations of international (humanitarian) rights at sea are increasing.

Multiple, even contradictory logics seem to be at work. The maritime expansion of Europe’s border dispositif officially responds to the ‘tragedies’ at sea, allegedly seeking to create a tighter network of surveillance of the Mediterranean in order to protect travelling migrants from harm. Understood as such, migration control then becomes a

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73 Silja Klepp, Europa zwischen Grenzkontrolle und Flüchtlingschutz (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2011).
74 Ibid., p. 16, my own translation.
75 Ibid., p. 64.
humanitarian act. For example, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström, when welcoming Eurosur’s launch in December 2013, states:

It is a truly European response to save the lives of migrants travelling in overcrowded and unseaworthy vessels, to avoid further tragedies in the Mediterranean and also to stop speed boats transporting drugs. 76

The Left-to-Die case and the unabated dying at sea, however, show that a supposed lack of surveillance in the Mediterranean cannot explain its deadly condition. To the contrary, it is a space within which multiplicities of actors engage in practices of border control. 77 Recounting the Left-to-Die-Boat’s many encounters, Heller and Jones argue that it was

[...] sailing through waters that at the time were being monitored by over 40 naval assets charged with enforcing the arms embargo imposed during the international military intervention in Libya. In the early afternoon of the same day, the boat was identified by a French aircraft, which informed the Italian authorities. A few hours later, the passengers sent out a distress call to the Italian rescue agency, which, because the boat was still located in the Libyan Search and Rescue (SAR) zone, simply passed on the information to Malta and NATO command. The boat was flown over twice by a military helicopter of unknown nationality which assisted only by providing biscuits and water, probably hoping that the boat would be able to continue far enough to enter the Maltese and Italian SAR zone. It never did. 78

The Council of Europe report ‘Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea’ responding to the Left-to-Die case clearly notes that the Mediterranean constitutes not “a deserted sea” but instead “a sea with a complex and dense network of maritime traffic, with a

77 “In February 2011, Frontex deployed a joint operation “to assist the Italian authorities in managing the influx of migrants from North Africa”, with ships as well as aerial patrols. In the second half of March 2011, NATO launched Operation Unified Protector to enforce the arms embargo on the Gaddafi regime, with as many as 21 ships in the Mediterranean at the height of operations. NATO command in Naples boasted of relentless surveillance, including through use of sophisticated sea and land-based technology, to ensure that no ship was able to transit the embargo area without permission.” Judith Sunderland, ‘Hidden Emergency, Migrant Deaths in the Mediterranean’, Human Rights Watch, August 2012, p. 6.
developed system of monitoring movements and dealing with boats in distress.\textsuperscript{79} In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the maritime space became increasingly monitored so that travelling from “Libya towards Italy should be a bit like doing a slalom between military ships” as an Italian official, quoted in the report, remarked.\textsuperscript{80}

The manifold evidence that the Left-to-Die case provides, showing that multiple encounters did take place that Search and Rescue (SAR) guidelines were known and distress signals were noticed, becomes wilfully ignored in official European discourses, as well as in the Council’s report, so that the question of why vessels were abandoned despite several encounters, remains unasked. As activist Hagen argues:

It is absurd that a further upgrade and militarisation of Frontex through EUROsUR is justified by the claim to make the Mediterranean safer. The responsible authorities know very well, from the experience of twenty years of what they call ‘border management’, that increased controls mean more death and suffering. [...] It [follows] the logic of a politics of deterrence, inhumane and brutalised.\textsuperscript{81}

What may seem counter-intuitive at first, the expansion and militarisation of Europe’s maritime border practices creates necropolitical spaces. The border dispositif’s increasing activities foster ever-more dangerous migration routes so that brutal border-encounters become more common. At the same time, the dispositif’s in-activities create legal voids so that impunity for human rights violations in international waters persists. Besides abandonment at high sea, the unofficial ‘shunting’ or ‘push-back’ policies through which “member states seek to physically push migrants outwards toward or across the external borders of the EU” thus remain unaddressed.\textsuperscript{82}

The Mediterranean’s necropoliticality and its many scenes of biopolitical abandonment are practices, not effects of a ‘naturally lawless’ sea. These practices do not remain unopposed, the survivors of the Left-to-Die-Boat, the Boats4People campaign, and the WatchTheMed project reclaim, in different ways, the sea as a space of struggle. When

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Hagen, 12th of March 2014.
the EUropean border dispositif incessantly creates and maintains divisions, practices of solidarity speak back and attempt to overcome separation in encounters of solidarity.

Part III - Solidarity as Border Resistance

Why do our children emigrate? Because they do not have a future! They study, they get their diplomas, and nothing happens. They learn a job and then sit around waiting. That is why our poor children emigrate [...] Our sons are the children of the revolution. They started it. They stayed up day and night.83

Solidarity was enacted by Boats4People as border politics. Not a mere avowal, the campaigners sought to be in solidarity with those who had experienced the violence of EUrope’s border regime and sought answers. Through their campaign, the activists may not have succeeded in creating the presence at sea they had wished for; in the end unable to enforce encounters with EUrope’s border authorities, mainly due to a lack of resources. Nonetheless, their intervention proclaimed the Mediterranean Sea as more than a violent space exclusively reserved for EUrope’s and Northern African border practitioners.

This part inquires into what solidarity does in Boats4People activism and what it enables. Whereas the practice of dissent might be more easily understood as a facet of resistance, solidarity equally constitutes a significant aspect of resistance. As a force that creates bonds and invents relations, embodied solidarity inflicts something onto the subjects involved and, at the same time, animates and counters spaces in which solidarity seems absent, spaces characterised by abandonment and division. Boats4People solidarity activism was, of course, also dissensual, loudly protesting a politics of distance in maritime encounters, the turning of one’s back, the watching but not intervening, the leaving to die. They sought to confront and speak back to biopolitical abandonment by being with someone who had suffered its consequences.

The moments where solidarity was maybe the most needed but also the most difficult to enact are explored in the following three sections. First, the encounters with the parents

83 Tunisian woman, name unknown, during a meeting in Monastir, quoted in the documentary ‘Against the Tide’ by Nathalie Loubeyre, 2014.
of the disappeared, for many campaigners the most memorable, challenging, and discomforting encounters during the journey, are interpreted with help of Ahmed and her elaborations on ‘modes of encounters’. The subsequent section inquires into the activist practises of publicly and collectively commemorating and draws from Butler’s work on grievability. The third section argues for a ‘politics of impossible solidarity’ and brings Butler and Ahmed, but also Rancière and Foucault into conversation with the campaign. It is Foucault’s modified question that best captures the sentiment of this part: “What relations, through [solidarity], can be established, invented, multiplied and modulated?”

**Solidarity Activism as a Politics of Encounter**

In Italy and Tunisia, Boats4People campaigners sought to express their solidarity in close and embodied encounters with the many families who had lost their children, sometimes many weeks or months earlier. Mainly Tunisian mothers came to Palermo to prompt the Italian government to investigate the circumstances of their sons’ disappearance and Boats4People supported their protests also in Tunis to pressurise the Tunisian government to release the few available details and information concerning their children’s emigration attempts. In these encounters, and as often, or rather always, in acts of solidarity activism, questions of subjectivity, positionality and privilege, thus ultimately questions of power relationalities and hierarchies emerged.

In *Strange Encounters - Embodied Others in Post-Coloniality*, Sara Ahmed asks to look more closely at what occurs in situations of encounter in order to inquire not merely into the very moments of encountering but also into their temporal and spatial transversality. For Ahmed, encounters with others open up existential questions and are even “ontologically prior to the question of ontology (the question of the being who encounters)”: 

These others cannot be simply relegated to the outside: given that the subject comes into existence as an entity only through encounters with others, then the subject’s existence cannot be separated from the others who are encountered.\textsuperscript{85}

The encounter, for her, never stable and predictable, forms “a meeting which involves surprise and conflict”, and is pivotal to engage questions revolving around the constitution of identity.\textsuperscript{86} Encounters, Ahmed notes, are complex, embodied and always-already have a past, a historicity, since “each encounter reopens past encounters”.\textsuperscript{87} Encounters are mediated and framed as there are “social processes that are at stake in the coming together of (at least) two subjects”.\textsuperscript{88} At the same time, there is a particularity to every encounter:

\[\ldots\] encounters between embodied subjects always hesitate between the domain of the particular - the face to face of this encounter - and the general - the framing of the encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism.\textsuperscript{89}

Every particular encounter is marked by its transversality, as it “always carries traces of those broader relationships.”\textsuperscript{89} It is, therefore, the presence of and the interplay between the particular and the general that imply the unpredictability that inhabits encounters.

Who are these embodied subjects encountering one another? Ahmed suggests that introducing the particular to face-to-face encounters does not imply gaining “access to the individual expression of the ‘real’ of her body.”\textsuperscript{91} Particularity cannot just be ‘read’ into these moments of encounter with others as that would “[locate] the particular in the present moment (or present body), and hence [associate] the particular with the here and now (with what I am faced with).”\textsuperscript{92} Instead, Ahmed seeks to move to modes of encounter that inquire into the temporal and spatial circumstances and movements that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{85} Ahmed, \textit{Strange Encounters}, 2000, p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} Ibid., p. 6.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Ibid., p. 8.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} Ibid., emphasis in original.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Ibid., p. 144; see also Jenny Edkins, \textit{Missing Persons and Politics} (London: Cornell University Press, 2011), p. 197.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Ahmed, \textit{Strange Encounters}, 2000, p. 8.
\end{itemize}
mediate encounters: “we can move our attention from the particularity of an other, to
the particularity of modes of encountering others.”

Ahmed adds:

We could ask, not only what made this encounter possible (its historicity), but also
what does it make possible, what futures might it open up? [...] We need to ask, not
only how did we arrive here, at this particular place, but how is this arrival linked to
other places, to an elsewhere that is not simply absent or present? We also need to
consider how the... of this encounter might affect... We need to ask, not
only how did we arrive here, at this particular place, but how is this arrival linked to
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consider how the... of this encounter might affect... We need to ask, not
only how did we arrive here, at this particular place, but how is this arrival linked to
other places, to an elsewhere that is not simply absent or present? We also need to
consider how the... of this encounter might affect...

For Ahmed, the ‘strangeness’ of encounters is “premised on the absence of a knowledge
that would allow one to control the encounter, or to predict its outcome.”

Solidarity
and the encounter are intimately interrelated and especially those encounters that seem
enabled because of someone else’s solidarity need close scrutiny.

When reflecting on her own solidarity with indigenous women in Australia even “as a
non-indigenous person, historically implicated in the dispossession of indigenous
peoples”, Ahmed suggests that her solidarity was a strategic gesture, possible only if she
“[refused] to assume solidarity by speaking of or for indigenous women.” For her, the
question of solidarity revolves not merely around the question of ‘who speaks?’ but,
rather, ‘who knows?’:

Such a shift opens out the contexts in which speaking and hearing take place: what
knowledges are already in place which allow one to speak for, about or to a ‘group of
strangers’.

For Ahmed, solidarity materialises in encounters only if it is not assumed, if it is not
taken for granted, and if the context of the encounter and that which made it possible
are reflected upon. In The Cultural Politics of Emotion she proposes to practice solidarity by
“speaking for something, rather than someone”. Ahmed notes, nonetheless, that the

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93 Ibid.
94 Ibid., p. 145, emphasis in original.
96 Sara Ahmed, ‘Who Knows? Knowing Strangers and Strangerness’, Australian Feminist Studies, 15:31
(2000), p. 50, emphasis in original; Sara Ahmed, ‘This other and other others’, Economy and Society, 31:4
incongruence of the life-worlds of those encountering one another does not necessarily hinder the formation of common struggles.

Importantly, as discussed also in the Non-Citizen struggle, solidarity, then, does not (always) depend on (ideological) similarity but can be sought in difficult and uncomfortable encounters where the need for the encounter is felt despite difference, where there is ‘something’ that impinges on the subjects involved and draws them to encounter one another. Ahmed argues:

Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our pain is the same pain, or that our hope is for the same future. Solidarity involves commitment, and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on common ground.  

Following Ahmed’s suggestion, thinking Boats4People solidarity in ‘modes of encounter’ means attuning to the factors that enabled and conditioned the encounters, their historicity, as well as their futurity, the question whether the coming-together entailed more than the momentary crossing of paths.

Solidarity activism understood as a politics of encounter suggests that solidarity is constituted both by the general and the particular that always inhabit and mediate encounters. The Boats4People encounters in Palermo, Monastir and elsewhere, were transversal encounters, carrying traces of the past and the beyond. The families of the disappeared and dead had suffered the loss of their irreplaceable sons, a particular loss conditioned, however, by a general economy of violence that disappears people and creates asymmetrical experiences of violence for differentiated, racialised individuals, groups and populations.

Boats4People protested general pains in particular and embodied encounters which, however, did not make the families fully ‘readable’. Neither marked by ‘otherness’ in

99 Ibid.
their entirety, nor as ‘particular others’ fully understandable and known, the encounters meant one’s exposure to an other and the other’s exposure to oneself.

The encounters with the parents were enabled, before anything else, by both the disappearance of their children and Boats4People’s indignation about EUropean border violence. While the sentiment of indignation toward EUrope’s border politics (the ‘something’) was shared, no commonality could be assumed, maybe not even a ‘common ground’. The very reason for the encounter rendered attempts to imagine future trajectories uncertain, the children’s disappearance made the question of ‘what (collective) futures might be opened up’ difficult to even pose.

Boats4People campaigners did not have the answers the parents longed for the most. Of course, we did not know about the fate of their children. Language barriers and the different experiences of border-violence turned our encounters into helpless gestures, sounds of sorrow; we could neither speak with one another nor for another. Our mutual unknowing of what had occurred to their children meant that hope could not be offered, that hope could even lead to more suffering.

The face-to-face encounters with the parents were, in some ways, ‘impossible’ encounters. As activist Nina noted when reflecting on encountering the families:

It was not necessarily a common political struggle throughout but [the families’] personal struggle that is somehow interwoven with our political struggle. This is fine, important, and anyways unavoidable (there just are those who are directly affected and those who are in solidarity) but can, of course, also complicate collective action. While we sometimes work towards long-term political contestation these families are concerned in that very moment with something else, which is understandable. Not everyone is in the luxurious position to join a long and grueling political struggle; oftentimes the concrete and pressing problems are more immediate.100

While the parents’ personal-political struggles were, at times unreadable to many of ‘us’ as their pain could not be felt in the same way, and as a common ‘we’ could never be

100 Email exchange with Nina, 19th of March 2014.
assumed, they were necessarily connected to the Boats4People struggle as their individual pains connected to general registers of violence.

In the conducted interviews, many of the Boats4People campaigners responded to the question of what prompted their activism by stating that they felt something was fundamentally wrong or unjust and needed to be addressed, something that needed a response. For Ahmed, “the intimacy of response and responsibility needs to be rethought”:

To be responsible for the other is also, at the same time, to respond to the other, to speak to her, and to have an encounter in which something takes place. While responsibility is infinite - and cannot be satisfied in the present encounter - to respond is to be in the order of the finite and the particular. We need to recognise the infinite nature of responsibility, but the finite and particular circumstances in which I am called on to respond to others.\(^\text{101}\)

Taking responsibility by responding to a general violence in particular encounters that, in turn, may open up other, common futures, enacts solidarity. It was the families’ suffering that required a response, that needed ‘us’ to meet, to invent and foster connections.

This form of solidarity also always implies the possibility of breaking down and of not coming together, a horizon of failure. Solidarity conceived of as something that may fail is discomforting as it leaves the realm of easily assumed (political/ideological) commonness, of assumed readability of one another, and necessitates a challenge to one’s grounding that becomes destabilised through the encounter with an other.

If thought as such, the many ‘encounters’ of the abandoned Left-to-Die vessel in the Mediterranean Sea were not encounters in the full sense as the act of non-assistance signalled that an (racialised) identity had already been assumed, prescribed, or, rather, imposed onto the other, based on a ‘knowledge’ through which the encounter became controlled and its outcome predictable, disallowing, by abandoning, one’s exposition, vulnerability, surprise and conflict.

\(^{101}\) Ahmed, Strange Encounters, 2000, p. 147, emphasis in original.
Solidarity Activism as a Politics of Grief

Would they bring me my son's body, I would bury him, I’d know where he is. I cannot spend my life choked up not seeing my son. Even a body, a skeleton, I need it.102

The death and disappearance of so many along Europe's maritime borders were reason for and intimately interwoven into the Boats4People campaign. In public commemorations held in Palermo, Monastir, Lampedusa and Berlin, Boats4People created spaces to grieve collectively. This section, with Judith Butler, explores this form of grief-activism and the question of how solidarity can be understood in these encounters with death.

In Frames of War, Butler shows how certain populations are framed in ways that make them 'lose-able' so that their loss need not be mourned as they never counted as lives in the full sense. Butler argues:

In fact, a living figure outside the norms of life not only becomes the problem to be managed by normativity, but seems to be that which normativity is bound to reproduce: it is living, but not a life. It falls outside the frame furnished by the norm, but only as a relentless double whose ontology cannot be secured, but whose living status is open to apprehension.103

Having fallen out of the frame, most of those who die along Europe's borders constitute ungrievable lives that, "not conceivable as lives within certain epistemological frames, [...] are never lived nor lost in the full sense."104

Butler notes that "racism instituted and active at the level of perception tend[s] to produce iconic versions of populations who are eminently grievable, and others whose loss is no loss, and who remain ungrievable."105 Resonating closely with Foucault's biopolitical understanding of racism, she states that "the loss of such populations is

102 Farouk Ben Lhiba in Monastir, quoted in ‘Against the Tide’ by Nathalie Loubeyre, 2014.
104 Ibid., p. 1.
105 Ibid., p. 24.
deemed necessary to protect the lives of “the living”. In *Precarious Life*, Butler argues that while violence against those losable always fails as it cannot negate lives that were already negated, it never ceases but continues to kill these unreal lives “since they seem to live on, stubbornly, in this state of deadness.”

Grievability, then, is differentially distributed and affects the ways in which political responsibility is felt and acted upon. The process of grieving, for Butler, is an affirmation of a life that has been lived and that has been lost. Grieving for others means that their lives have become somewhat intelligible and “conform to certain conceptions of what life is, in order to become recognizable.” The process of grieving is personal inasmuch as it implies sociality and relationality:

Many people think that grief is privatizing, that it returns us to a solitary situation and is, in that sense, depoliticizing. But I think it furnishes a sense of political community of a complex order.

While, in the case of Boats4People, ‘community’ may assume too much, the commemorations organised by the campaigners responded to Europe’s divisionary politics with other forms of togetherness. Grieving publicly together with the parents of the disappeared sought to foster a sense of togetherness while also openly accusing the European border regime of its complicity in the loss of many lives. This is not to suggest that through activist grieving the dead become, in one way or another ‘rehumanised’ or made fully recognisable. Of course, most migrants who die on their journeys have families and friends and become *mourned as full lives* by them.

Also, grief-activism must remain cautiously aware of the possibility of slipping “between empathy and pity in white Western consideration of ‘global others’” as Clara Hemmings has pointed out. For Hemmings, empathy that fails “may lead to sentimental attachment to the other, rather than a genuine engagement with her concerns”, or may

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106 Ibid., p. 31.
even “signal a cannibalisation of the other masquerading as care.”\textsuperscript{111} Boats4People activists commemorating the dead other could, however, never find out “if the other refuses [or, rather, would have refused] the terms of empathetic recognition.”\textsuperscript{112}

Their act of recognition was a response to an other’s disappearance. Grievability not only entails recognition of lives as full lives but also “makes possible the apprehension of precarious life.”\textsuperscript{113} One encounters an other’s life by mourning its loss, and senses a shared precariousness. As Butler suggests:

Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all. Reciprocally, it implies being impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom remain anonymous.\textsuperscript{114}

While every life is precarious and precariousness a shared human condition, some life is (made) more vulnerable than other life. Grieving can thus also form a political act of protesting the injustice of created (‘general’) conditions that expose some to heightened vulnerability and inequality, maintained by regimes, or frames, of power and truth. For Jenny Edkins, “the missing reveal the status of the rest of us” and in such status, in the dominant EUropean frames of recognisability, the other continues to be losable, disposable, and killable.\textsuperscript{115} Those left to die in the Mediterranean Sea “go uncounted”, just as deported asylum-seekers or those who worked ‘illegally’ and disappeared in the Twin Towers of New York.\textsuperscript{116} They constitute, as Edkins notes, “the missing missing, the doubly missing” and form a fundamental absence in “our parochial picture of the world”.\textsuperscript{117}

The banner listing thousands of deaths that is unrolled during commemorations notes the deaths that EUrope does not count, that remain un-noteworthy. Increasingly

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Butler, \textit{Frames of War}; 2009, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., p. 14.
\textsuperscript{115} Edkins, \textit{Missing Persons and Politics}; 2011, p. 14, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
sophisticated and centralised security infrastructures gather more and more data and information and create nuanced identities of traveller histories but fail to acknowledge the thousands who pass away while travelling. The reading out of the little that is known of the deceased, sometimes their names, places or causes of death, is an attempt to find traces of those who risked and lost their lives for an anticipated but violently denied future.

When Italy held an official memorial service on Sicily for the hundreds of migrants who drowned near Lampedusa in October 2013, survivors of the shipwreck were prevented from attending the ceremony while representatives of the Eritrean government as well as EUropean Commission president Barroso and Italy’s prime minister Letta were present. In protest, Eritrean protestors held a banner reading: ‘The presence of the Eritrean regime offends the dead and puts in danger the living’ and Barroso and Letta were heckled on their way to the service.118

What the protestors exposed was a memorial service that did not grieve the dead but instrumentalised them instead, taunting survivors, relatives and supporters. The cruel exclusion of the survivors from the ceremony, who, in addition, faced fines and deportation, excluded those to whom these losses meant something so that the stage was set, not for a memorial, but a humanitarian event. After his visit to Lampedusa, Barroso publicly stated:

That image of hundreds of coffins will never get out of my mind. It is something I think one cannot forget. Coffins of babies, coffins with the mother and the child that was born just at that moment. This is something that profoundly shocked me and deeply saddened me. I also saw the desperate eyes in many survivors, [...] [in] the reception centre, [...] I saw in some of them [...] also some hope, and I believe now we have to give reason for that hope. To show that that hope in the middle of this suffering can be justified.119


The hope, besides the desperation, that Barroso so adeptly detected in the ‘eyes of the survivors’, was ‘justified’ by the president’s promise to enhance Frontex’s responsibility and maritime surveillance through Eurosur. The many paradoxes, however, for example that the shipwreck occurred, in fact, less than one kilometre off the coast of the island in an area saturated by (Eurosur) surveillance, remained unaddressed.¹²⁰

The peculiar statement by Barroso followed not only a deeply flawed logic but constituted an emotive and humanitarian appeal for a future marked by less suffering of ‘the other’. His suggestion that there would always be hope seems inappropriate, astonishing, perverse. Both the dead and the excluded became objects of this event, stripped of their subjection. As bell hooks makes clear:

As subjects people have the right to define their own reality, establish their own identities, name their history. As objects, one’s reality is defined by others, one’s identity created by others, one’s history named only in ways that define one’s relationship to those who are subjects.¹²¹

The condition of the European border dispositif exposes many not only to death but subjects their death to objecthood and a political calculus that seeks to cloak its necropolitical condition in humanitarian rhetoric. Europe, then, becomes more humane through these false memorials and through Barroso’s rhetoric that shamelessly exploits the dignity of the survivors by detecting glimmers of hope in their eyes when walking through the ‘reception’ facility into which they become discarded. This form of false grief, following Edkins, constitutes a politics of substitutability, “a politics that misses the person, a politics of the what, not the who.”¹²²

These memorials are false as they, unlike the form of grieving practiced by Boats4People, do not prompt a consideration of the shared, though unequal human condition of vulnerability, of others and the self. In these staged memorials, the other’s vulnerability becomes a sign of (racial) weakness, exploitation and degeneration that can

¹²⁰ While Eurosur became officially operational only in December 2013, Heller and Jones show that it was already in partial operation when the shipwreck occurred. Heller and Jones, ‘Eurosur’, 2014, p. 9.
¹²² Edkins, Missing 2011, p. 9, emphasis in original.
be responded to with humanitarian generosity. In this conception, the ‘other’s’ vulnerability is tantamount to ‘one’s own’ strength. As put forth by Foucault, Butler and Mbembe, the biopolitical-necropolitical condition not only suggests that the continuous extermination of an enemy seeks to remove an allegedly existential threat but that, in fact, extermination is in itself a process of purification and improvement. In that, perverse, sense, the furthering of Europe as a progressively humanitarian project is not achieved merely by the intensification of maritime border controls and the ritual of official mourning but, indeed, by acts of (biopolitical) abandonment.

During the Boats4People commemorations, the suffering of an other was not turned into a moment for false hope. The abyss of suffering of the relatives of the disappeared or deceased remained unfathomable to those who did not experience its violence. While unsettling and inapproachable, the pain of the relatives was encountered, not instrumentalised, their outrage not appeased by emphatic phrases of hope or avowals of good will, but shared in acts of (impossible) solidarity.

The process of activist grieving is, as such, an expression of the potential to invent a different politics, one that mourns the irreplaceability and singularity of the person lost, in solidarity with those who are absent in contemporary (Western) frames of recognisability. Such different politics is always marked by the possibility of failure, as the commemoration in Monastir has illustrated, where, due to organisational shortcomings, needed structures of support were missing.

Unlike the memorial service as humanitarian event that seeks to disguise and thereby foster the dispositif’s necropoliticality, however, the encounters with an other in grief were attempts to practice a politics of the who responding to general conditions of violence, whereby the particular other, nonetheless, never became fully known. In many ways, Boats4People solidarity activism resists the necropolitical-humanitarian inhumanity that the EU continuously creates, maintains and thrives upon. Encounters in grief respond to a call for responsibility, and identify with an (unreadable) other. Grieving, as Butler notes, as a political act in solidarity activism “is bound up with
outrage, and outrage in the face of injustice or indeed of unbearable loss has enormous political potential."123

A Politics of (impossible) Border Solidarity as Resistance
The politics of Boats4People activism, illustrated through its journey in 2012 and its practices of encountering and grieving, constitutes a form of solidarity that responds to, or resists, abandonment and the necropoliticality of EUrope’s borders by creating relations beyond geographical, socio-political, racial, and cultural divides. Resistance in migration struggles, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, articulates in various forms a radical critique of the ways in which the EUropean border dispositif inflicts suffering on certain populations, making some more vulnerable than others.124 Such resistance, however, not only animates what it opposes but demands and often practices a different, less violent way of being together, seeking to transcend both the dominant material and ideational realities of a world of segregation. In this way, solidarity constitutes a facet of resistance even if its attempts to be-with others are, at times, ‘impossible’. By bringing Foucault, Butler, Ahmed and Rancière into conversation, this final part conceives resistance as a politics of (impossible) solidarity.

In 1981 at a press conference in Geneva, and as part of the inauguration of the ‘Comité International contre la Piraterie’, Foucault reads out a statement voicing solidarity with the Vietnamese ‘boat-people’ who were targeted by pirates when fleeing Vietnam and were left unprotected by the international community.125 Therein Foucault speaks as one individual with “no other reason for speaking, and for speaking together, than a certain shared difficulty in enduring what is taking place.”126 He rhetorically asks: “Who has commissioned us, then?”, to state: “No one. And that is precisely what constitutes our right.”127 Foucault argues:

126 Ibid., my own translation.
127 Ibid., my own translation.
There exists an international citizenry, which has its rights, which has its duties, and which promises to raise itself up against every abuse of power, no matter who the author or the victims. After all we are all governed and, to that extent, in solidarity.¹²⁸

Foucault continues by declaring that the duty of the ‘international citizenry’ would be to protest people’s misfortunes and assign responsibility to governments. These misfortunes, he holds, should never constitute “a silent remainder of politics” but, to the contrary, form the reason for “an absolute right to rise up and address those holding power.”¹²⁹ Referring to the NGOs Amnesty International, Terre des hommes, and Médecins du monde, he alludes to the creation of the “new right” of individuals to intervene in the “order of international politics and strategies”, thereby wresting the monopoly to engage in such politics from governments that seek to reserve that right for themselves.¹³⁰

Foucault’s statement speaks to Boats4People activism in several ways. As a coalition of activists and organisations, not commissioned by anyone, the campaign responded to the plight at high sea by taken the right to intervene in a space seemingly reserved for state actors and EU institutions into their own hands. Not wanting to endure what was taking place anymore, Boats4People voiced solidarity with those escaping for whatever reason and denounced states and institutions for their complicity in the ongoing misery. Their solidarity with those suffering formed the reason for engagement, for their resistance.

At the same time, Foucault’s statement is surprising not merely because he speaks the language of legality and seems to have (maybe only momentarily) left behind his well-known scepticism toward (human) rights discourses, but also because of his phrase ‘we are all governed and, to that extent, in solidarity’. Of course, the scene of Foucault’s statement, a press conference during a humanitarian event would presumably not have allowed for an extensive and nuanced elaboration, and it also is not quite clear whether Foucault was the single author of the statement, so that it will be dealt here with

¹³⁰ Ibid., my own translation.
caution. Nonetheless, the phrase seems striking as Foucault positions solidarity as a response to the presumed general condition of ‘everyone being governed’. Solidarity, in that way, and warned against by Ahmed, becomes an assumption and somewhat flattened out as a mere negative response to the prevalent condition of government.

In some sense, Boats4People also assumed solidarity by declaring it before and throughout their campaign. In their encounters and actions, however, they enacted their declaration and in these enactments solidarity proved to be a difficult practice, entailing a horizon of failure and the exposition of everyone involved to the possibility of becoming unsettled. Encountering the parents as well as mourning the dead seemed at times problematic or unfeasible, and both Ahmed and Butler have gestured to the impossibility that at least impinges upon these practices. Commonness and unity could not be assumed but the need for being-with one another seemed nonetheless imperative.

The general condition of being governed by the border dispositif does not prompt solidarity by itself - too different and unequal are the experiences of ‘being governed’. Marked by asymmetrical power-relations, different objectives and experiences of ‘border-violence’ (or the lack thereof), the coming-together of these different struggles in solidarity could not be assumed. As the recollection of (some) encounters with the parents and especially the commemoration in Monastir has shown, at moments, solidarity failed. The horizon of failure that seemed to always loom in these encounters, however, did not deny the necessity of coming-together. The idea of a politics of ‘impossible’ solidarity, as suggested in this part was, besides the Boats4People campaign itself, of course, inspired by Rancière’s concept of heterology, as discussed in Chapter Three already, in which he points to ‘impossible identifications’.

Providing an example of an ‘impossible identification’ with Algerians beaten to death in France, Rancière states:

To take a personal example, for my generation politics in France relied on an impossible identification – an identification with the bodies of the Algerians beaten to death and thrown into the Seine by the French police, in the name of the French people, in October 1961. We could not identify with those Algerians, but we could question our identification with the “French people” in whose name they had been murdered. That is to say, we could act as political subjects in the interval or the gap between two identities, neither of which we could assume.\(^{132}\)

Identifications were ‘impossible’ because they implied neither the process of becoming or embodying an other, nor the process of turning inwards to oneself in the attempt to secure some form of identitarian stability. Impossible identification as something that is sought in practices of solidarity suggests, for Rancière, not the accommodation of one with/in an-other but the merging of ‘two (incommensurable) worlds in one’, a process of continuous uncomfortable movement.

Solidarity conceived as ‘impossible’ does not assume sameness or expects common objectives but recognises the interwoven nature of different struggles and seeks forms of being-with one another despite differences. Its impossibility may, in some ways, even allow for its strength, its inventive capacity as it counters the idea of ‘full identification’, ‘unity’ or even ‘becoming-the-other’ as a precondition for collective political action. As Butler asks somewhat rhetorically in *Gender Trouble* with reference to ‘coalitional action’:

Does “unity” set up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity that rules out the possibility of a set of actions which disrupt the very borders of identity concepts, or which seek to accomplish precisely that disruption as an explicit political aim?\(^{133}\)

Impossible solidarity does not preclude the possibility of finding commonness, but questions easy assumptions, easy identifications: ‘all those governed stand in solidarity’, ‘we are all illegal or Non-Citizens’, ‘we are all the families of the dead’, ‘we are all Algerian police victims’.

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Being-with despite differences constitutes a politics of solidarity that does not ignore the particularity and the generality of embodied and transversal encounters. The idea of impossible solidarity resonates in several ways with Butler’s work on the ‘question of ethics’:

[T]he question of ethics emerges precisely at the limits of our schemes of intelligibility, the site where we ask ourselves what it might mean to continue in a dialogue where no common ground can be assumed, where one is, [as] it were, at the limits of what one knows yet still under the demand to offer and receive acknowledgement: to someone else who is there to be addressed and whose address is there to be received.\footnote{Butler, \textit{Giving an Account of Oneself}, 2005, pp. 21-22.}

We must recognize that ethics requires us to risk ourselves precisely at the moments of unknowingness. [...] To be undone by another is a primary necessity, an anguish, to be sure, but also a chance - to be addressed, claimed, bound to what is not me, but also to be moved, to be prompted to act, to address myself elsewhere, and so to vacate the self-sufficient “I” as a kind of possession.\footnote{Ibid., p. 136.}

In the commemorations for the dead and disappeared, Boats4People campaigners could, of course, never fully identify with them and their fates. However, by encountering the families of the disappeared, they continued a dialogue by risking themselves, without the assumption of a common ground. By enacting solidarity they both questioned their identification with EUrope’s border politics (often said to be practiced in the name of ‘EUrope’s people’) and, going a step further than Rancière by recognising that merely ‘identifying’ would not suffice, worked toward building a struggle that allowed imagining collectivity, even if in a conflictual, ‘risky’ form.

Activist Hagen, when denouncing the externalisation of EUrope’s border regime which has “its roots in Berlin and Brussels and creates consequences at the external borders”, also emphasised the difficulty of finding ‘common ground’ between those directly affected such as the families of the disappeared and ‘Western’ activists:

I think that there is a difference between supporting activists who decide to engage due to their political conviction and those who are directly affected, who seek to organise in these situations. But I am convinced that through common activities and
by thinking about how a commonly organised decision-making process can look like these categories can be progressively dissolved, although it of course remains important to be conscious of the differences, our privilege [...]. So it is about a form of solidarity that should not deny these differences but that nonetheless seeks to create common struggles and structures, to be in regular exchange.  

A politics of impossible solidarity, then, is (also) a politics of resistance. The parents of the disappeared, who despite their immediate grievances open themselves up towards a group of activists who may have other immediate concerns, and vice versa, resists EUrope’s divisionary politics. Instead of allowing divisions, they are sought to be bridged and instead of forgetting the dead, they are grieved.

Through encounters, solidarity responds to EUrope’s biopolitical abandonment, enacts responsibility rather than neglect. In the process of encountering a different way of being-with is sought. Whether or not they created a ‘community’ in these moments may remain open as a question but, at least, it was in these encounters that a ‘we’ could cautiously be imagined, even if only momentarily.

Conclusion
This chapter followed the Boats4People campaign that took place in summer 2012. Similar to Non-Citizen dissent, their struggle formed as a response to death, to the thousands of migrants who passed away when trying to reach EUrope. Through their practical and symbolic actions, the activists intervened in the Mediterranean borderzone and enacted solidarity in multiple encounters. Their journey to both sides of the sea connected a variety of struggles and created the possibility to envision “where we might yet begin”.

After listening to the testimonies of the Left-to-Die-Boat survivors, the Mediterranean Sea was discussed as a necropolitical space by drawing from Foucault’s account of race and biopolitics as well as Mbembe’s notion of necropolitics. By showing how the EUropean border dispositif expands its reach deep into and far beyond its maritime

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136 Interview with Hagen, 12th of March 2014.
borders, it was argued that the many activities of EUrope’s border practitioners created increasingly hazardous travel routes and enabled lethal border-collisions and acts of biopolitical abandonment at sea. Turning, then, to the difficult encounters between the families of the disappeared and Boats4People activists, as well as their practices of grieving in public commemorations, it was illustrated how a politics of solidarity at the margins always entails friction and difficulty but also the potentiality for the invention of new relations and collective subjectivities. Such politics responds to the inhumanity of the EUropean border dispositif by responding to others who have suffered its effects. Ahmed’s ‘modes of encounter’ and Butler’s account of grievability helped to consider both the ‘impossibility’ of as well as the necessity for these practices. The final part developed Rancière’s notion of ‘impossible identification’ into ‘impossible solidarity’, a practice that inhabits the willingness to seek togetherness even in encounters at the limits of intelligibility. A politics of solidarity that dares novel forms of being-with was then conceived as a facet of resistance that counter-acts the divisions that the EUropean border dispositif creates.

Solidarities are enacted differently in the three migration struggles followed in this thesis but, nonetheless, they are always ‘of the struggles’. The Non-Citizens created a strong bond amongst themselves and with (some) solidarity activists and the many migrants who sought to escape Greece, as discussed in the following chapter, form ways of being-with in a climate of fear and antagonism. Solidarity comes in many forms but needs enactment especially in situations when struggles are somehow interwoven with one another, though in complex ways. As ‘method’, Boats4People activism opened up and set into motion a variety of phenomena. Their solidarity “established, invented, multiplied and modulated” a variety of relations and thereby performed, or maybe counter-performed the Mediterranean space, animating its space as a space of necropolitical-racist politics and biopolitical abandonment, but also as a space of struggle, encounter, and maybe even community.138

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Chapter Five: Excess as Border Resistance - Encounters in Transit

Introduction
This chapter, in itself a multi-sited ethnography, traces migration struggles that sought to transgress EUropean spaces and subvert its border practitioners in diverse, often hidden, clandestine, undocumented and ‘illegal’ ways. It listens to those who decided to move and successfully entered Greece, sometimes at great cost, only to find that their everyday experiences of Greek EUrope did not match their idea/l of EUrope. For many only a stepping stone, Greece then becomes a transit point, a temporary gateway or obstacle to a beyond that promises a future of work, family, security, arrival, freedom.

Migration struggles within and beyond EUropean borderspace follow various patterns and logics, and are composed of a multiplicity of strategies that can never be fully captured or contained. While the first two ethnographies examined dissent and solidarity as forms of resistance, this last study attunes to another facet, namely excess. Through an engagement with the narration of diverse migration experiences it is explored how, if at all, practices of migration and everyday contestation can be understood as struggles that are the less capturable and traceable the more diverse, unruly, unforeseeable, flexible, stubborn, imperceptible, or, in one word, excessive they are. How do these everyday inordinate forces of migration, as forces of resistance animate or collide with the EUropean border dispositif and what forms of violence do they unmask?

Excess can obviously and by definition never be measured. Nonetheless, it seems to constitute a force that is underpinned by an understanding of a potentiality and creativity to be, remain, or become ‘other-wise’. Excess inhabits freedom and vice versa. In Foucauldian and poststructuralist tropes, as well as in much of the Autonomy of Migration literature, excess is located in meaning and practice as a force that renders the human subject not fully readable, nameable and determinable, that constitutes a remainder, a surprise, a supplement, a void or madness allowing for the possibility to redefine, reinvent, re-imagine one’s being, one’s pasts, presents and futures even when confronted with abyssal violence, forms of domination and regimes of control. For Sergei Prozorov, Foucault’s “ontological conception of freedom” can be thought as a
"potentiality for being otherwise that exceeds every historical determination of being through the constitution of an identity, the articulation of a discourse or the construction of a diagram."¹ However, while excess can never be measured, it can also not remain a mere assumption.

In this chapter, excess is explored in many encounters in Greek borderscapes. Even if, as the previous chapter has shown by drawing from Ahmed’s work, these encounters were never fully readable, I wondered whether the hopeful idea of excess would articulate itself in some guise or, instead, become contradicted and challenged and remain an idealised, romanticised assumption. A further question that emerged in these encounters was whether the supposedly ‘excessive’ practices that people in transit invented to cope with the situation they found themselves in could be conceived as practices of resistance.

This chapter is an account of how Greece became experienced by those who came from somewhere and sought to settle elsewhere. Without doubt, those for whom this elsewhere is not Greece constitute a particular, though considerable group of people on the move. While their stories are indicative of how many migrants experience Greek Europe, they are not necessarily exemplary. Stories of migration struggle, similar to the ones examined in the previous chapters, are neither collected to be ordered in any ‘coherent’ fashion nor to suggest that they necessarily form typical instances of resistance. Rather, as transversal life stories they form assemblages that relate to the European border dispositif in multifarious ways, and expose some of its functions, some of its techniques of control, its geographies, its violence, injustice and truth.

My research took place on the island of Lesvos, in Athens and Patras as these three places were evoked, in (migrant) activist circles, time after time as memorable places of migration struggle. These different geographic sites also allude to different dimensions of the European border regime and it is both through migration struggles as well as the regime’s performance of borderwork that novel European geographies, trajectories and mobilities become produced.

Contemporary Greece constitutes an agglomerate of Europe’s border-dilemmas. As Balibar suggests:

[B]order areas – zones, countries, and cities – are not marginal to the constitution of a public sphere but rather are at the center. If Europe is for us first of all the name of an unresolved political problem Greece is one of its centers, not because of the mythical origins of our civilization [...] but because of the current problems concentrated there.\(^2\)

Its geographical location close to Turkey has turned Greece into one of the main entry points to Europe for people on the move and has subsequently drawn the heightened attention of Europe’s border practitioners. The ‘current problems’ that Balibar alludes to, at least for these practitioners, were the many intrusions into European space so that Greece, while a peripheral country, drew the gaze of Europe’s border dispositif and became one of its centres where the filtering, managing or deterrence of migration movements were deemed a European priority. Frontex began to operate along the northern Greek land border and in the Aegean Sea, ‘returns policies’ with Turkey were enacted, the building of EU funded detention facilities became reinforced, and political pressure on the Greek government to shut both their internal and external borders mounted.\(^3\)

Despite all these intensified developments, this ethnographic research could have been conducted elsewhere. Greece is merely one of many centres of the ‘unresolved political problem’ Europe. These centres shift in time, space or discourse, can fold or become dispersed. Importantly for this chapter, mobile subjects vividly expose not merely Greece’s but also Europe’s ‘current problems’ throughout and beyond its space and if thought as such, the idea of ‘centre’ may have to be discarded altogether.

Migrant experiences often highlight ‘European problems’ and while always local and context-specific these experiences are not reducible to delimitable spaces, to

\(^2\) Balibar, *We the People of Europe?*, 2004, p. 2, emphasis in original.
‘problematic centres’. They occur in the ‘reception centre’ on Lesvos, in the urban landscape of Athens, in the (not so) abandoned factories of Patras, along the Evros river, and thousandfold elsewhere, where migrant bodies (seek to) transgress European space.

This is not to say that Greek spaces are interchangeable with other European spaces. One does witness a concentration of (socio-economic) problems and (racist) violence in Greek borderscapes. It is, however, to suggest that Greek borderscapes are not ‘Greece’ when in some or other ways added up. They are Greek European and even non-European, Turkish-Greek, Senegalese-Greek, Afghan-Greek-European. They are not stable ‘centres’ that have generated problems for and violence within the wider European community but are, as borderscapes, transversal spaces of intensified antagonism and struggle because it is there that the question of Europe is posed, fought over, played out and negotiated.

I travelled to Greece knowing about the harrowing violence migrants there faced, the rise of the fascist Golden Dawn party, and Greek-European policies and practices that rendered many captive in a space that they could not wait to escape. Instead of following particular (activist) groups as I had done in the previous two studies, I engaged in encounters with various individuals, families, or groups of travellers seeking to leave Greece in different ways, through different corridors. It would have been impossible to meet the many protagonists of this chapter and gain their trust without an involvement in some form of solidarity activism. While meeting Jaser in Athens was a chance encounter, the encounters on Lesvos and in Patras were only enabled through the help of migrant groups, activist supporters, and solidarity networks for which I am grateful.

The task to ethnographically explore migration struggles in these spaces has proven to be complex and challenging, continuously demanding critical reflection on my own involvement and the (re-)narration of encounters with others. The questions of why I

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4 I first travelled to Greece in the summer of 2013 for about two weeks. I returned for about two months in the autumn of the same year.
would try to capture something in written form that necessarily resists capture and how I would conduct myself in social situations marked by suffering and despair, return in every part of this chapter but may find only partial answers.

Many of the encounters I had are not re-narrated and were left out. Some occurred in situations of intimate trust and even though I obtained the permission to write about them, I felt that something would be violated if I did. Others can only be recounted through the notes that I took hours or days later as, in the moment of encounter, it seemed unadvisable or impossible to take notes. The stories chosen for this chapter form its core, and as a consequence are presented, at times, as lengthy quotes. The identities of those I encountered were anonymised if they had not explicitly asked to be mentioned by name or by a different name, often chosen by themselves. Luckily I was able to remain in contact virtually or to even meet some of them again in person, months later, so that I could not only inquire into some of the details I had missed during our initial conversations but also hear about their whereabouts, well-being and continuous struggle.

Part I, ‘The External EUropean Borderscape of Lesvos’, follows the migratory movements of the three young Afghans, Jawad, Arash, and Azadi who succeeded not only in entering EUrope but also in escaping Greece towards Germany.5 Years later, in October 2013, they return to the island of Lesvos where they had arrived in EUrope for the first time, to trace their steps and protest the enduring EUropean violence against migrants.

Part II, ‘The Urban EUropean Borderscape of Athens’, follows Jaser, a Syrian resident of Germany, whose predicament it was to be turned into an undocumented migrant while seeking to leave Greece ‘legally’. Through encounters with him, his family and other (Syrian) migrants, Athens is explored as a borderscape shaped by a politics of fear, violence and racial discrimination.

5 All names changed. They chose these names for themselves.
Part III, ‘The Internal EUropean Borderscape of Patras’, follows the movements of young migrants who seek to leave Greece hidden in lorries that travel on ferries to Italy. Living in an (un-)abandoned factory they form a close community of subjects in transit that has to endure hunger, homelessness and police harassment on a daily basis.

Part IV, ‘Lives of Infamous Migrants’, first discusses Foucault’s short piece ‘Lives of Infamous Men’ written in 1977 as it was incisive for my ethnographic explorations in Greece. In his story Foucault seems to point to excessive and unruly ‘infamy’ as a force below the surface that resists by remaining unidentifiable and anonymous. I then briefly turn to the Autonomy of Migration literature which, in various ways, conceives of migration as an excessive practice before exploring the question of whether and how excess can be understood as another facet of resistance.

Part I – The External EUropean Borderscape of Lesvos
The island of Lesvos, the largest of the Greek islands in the North-Eastern Aegean Sea, is for many the ‘first point of entry’ into EUropean space. Lesvos is separated from mainland Turkey only by the narrow Mytilene Strait. Standing at the shores of Lesvos, Turkish buildings and infrastructure on the other side, roughly six miles away, are easily visible. Ferries with tourists on board travel frequently back and forth, return trips can be purchased for as little as ten Euro.

It is here, in the strait, that in December 2012 twenty-one Afghan migrants drowned and at least six went missing between the shores of Turkey and Greece. The twenty-one bodies were recovered in the sea or washed up in Thermi, near the island’s capital Mytilene. In March 2013, six Syrian nationals died in their attempt to reach the Greek island. Another tragedy occurred on the 21st of January 2014, with 12 migrants drowning, after what seems to have been yet another illegal ‘push-back’ operation by Greek border forces.

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They are amongst hundreds of counted persons who have lost their lives in the Aegean Sea. Since the erection of a border fence in the Greek region of Evros in 2012, migration movements have shifted to more dangerous sea routes, prompting greater efforts to control by Frontex and Greek border guards. For most of those who survive the perilous journey that can cost several hundred Euros, Lesvos is a point of transit, not of settlement, and it is here that many experience Europe for the first time. As one of Europe’s outposts, Lesvos is becoming, more and more, another symbol of Europe’s violent border practices and migration struggles, just as Lampedusa, Ceuta and Melilla already are.

This first part of my ethnographic investigation was conducted during the project ‘Traces Back 2013’, organised by the networks Youth without Borders and Welcome to Europe. The project allowed those who had once passed through Lesvos to trace their first steps in Europe, to meet friends still ‘stuck in Greece’, and to come together in protest against continuous violence against migrants. Those who came back to Lesvos now reside in several European countries, work or go to school, and are granted the freedom to move within the EU. They come back as Afghan migrants, but inasmuch so as European residents and activists, as carpenters, pupils, fathers, friends, cricket-players, world travellers, as those who resisted and survived the European border dispositif.

Having gone through Greece constitutes only a facet of their lives. Some, however, remain in (legally) precarious conditions and this is why we decided to anonymise their identities. The names used are the ones they chose for themselves. This ethnographic study developed along the ‘Traces Back’ project, remained in the background of the events that unfolded on Lesvos, and many important but sensitive exchanges will not be

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9 Pro Asyl, ‘Pushed back, systematic human rights violations against refugees in the Aegean Sea and at the Greek-Turkish land border’, 2013, p. 4.
10 I am deeply grateful to the three for their permission to re-narrate their stories and experiences in this chapter. I am also grateful to the activist networks for allowing me to take part in the struggle on Lesvos, both as activist and researcher: Welcome to Europe, http://www.w2eu.info/about.en.html, Accessed 08/11/2013; Jugendliche Ohne Grenzen (Youth without Borders), http://jorgspace.net/, Accessed 05/01/2014.
considered here. This part of my multi-sited research is based solely on accounts that were given ‘publicly’, at the local radio station of Lesvos, during an exhibition in Mytilene, and those that were narrated to be subsequently published on the blog ‘Birds of Immigrants’.  

For many participants of the project, Lesvos and Greece as such remain places of traumatising experience, abuse, fear and violence, but also ones of encounter, support, hope and friendship. Most arrived on the island between 2005 and 2010 and many were imprisoned in the notorious detention centre Pagani, described (even) by the Deputy Civil Protection Minister Vougias as “Dante’s Inferno”. The centre was shut down end of 2009, after protests inside and NoBorder activist solidarity outside.

This ethnography listens to the stories of Jawad, Arash and Azadi who came to Lesvos as young and unaccompanied migrants. These are the stories of those who made it, who managed to escape Greece to arrive in relative safety in Germany. These stories show how they clashed multiple times with Europe’s border dispositif, how their lives were put on hold, how they had to imagine their futures several times anew and how, in all cases, they remained unyielding in their will to move on and away from Greece.

Three Stories

Jawad

Jawad is four years old when he flees war-torn Afghanistan. In Iran his family becomes subjected to constant harassment, humiliation and regular police controls. His father remains in precarious working conditions throughout, unable to send the children to school. Jawad’s family returns to Afghanistan in 2003 only to find that “there was no security, still blood, still problems.”

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11 The blog ‘Birds of Immigrants’ “displays a platform for unaccompanied young refugees on the way to Europe. Some of the posts are written in Greece, others are posted in some Internet-Cafe on the run. This page should be a way for young refugees to display their view on Europe and of course all the experience on their way.” See: http://birdsofimmigrants.jogspace.net/, Accessed 10/02/2014.
13 Jawad told me the story in German which I then translated into English for the blog ‘Birds of Immigrants’. Both versions can be found there: http://birdsofimmigrants.jogspace.net/, Accessed 10/02/2014. We also met again in Hamburg on the 20th of April 2014, where he expanded on some of his experiences.
A few months later the family moves back to Iran but the situation does not improve. Jawad decides to flee. Europe is not his wanted destination, he has never heard of it. After six months of organising, he finds somebody to get him over the border. He leaves Iran and travels through Turkey. From its Western shores Jawad and some friends cross the Aegean Sea.

The person who brought us [to the Turkish shore] told us ‘there is a light, this is Greece, until then you have to paddle’. [...] From the middle of the distance onwards we had only one paddle. We started at 10pm and arrived at 8am, paddling with hand and foot.

Arriving on the Greek island of Lesvos he is chased for the first of many times by the police. They escape by jumping off a tall building but the friends lose each other. Jawad finds a travel agency but failing to buy a ferry ticket to mainland Greece without travel documents, Jawad turns himself in to the police.

I said, I am an Afghan, I don’t have a passport. [But] they did not want to arrest me. [...] I went to the travel agency and sat there from the morning to the evening. I said the police does not want to arrest me, I cannot leave, I somehow need to get a ticket.

In the end, they give in. He travels to Athens, then Crete. He spends many months in a centre for under-aged and unaccompanied migrants, learns Greek and becomes the assistant of the interpreter at the centre.

When he wants to visit his family in Iran and is not allowed to do so, he decides to leave Greece. He then travels to Patras:

One has to hide the whole time. In lorries, beneath lorries, in the time when they stop at traffic lights while the police and racists hunt you. It was also psychologically very difficult. One was all alone and worthless.

Unsuccessful, Jawad leaves Patras, travels back to Athens and then to Corinth.

From there I went to Italy in a lorry on a ferry, two days and nights. I arrived in Venice and went to Austria where the police controlled us and arrested us. They said we would have to go back to Greece.
Resisting deportation, Jawad begins a hunger strike at the removal centre that would last for ten days and during which he loses about 15-16 kilos.

The doctors decided that me and my friends had to be released. But they tricked us. They told us, you are free, you can go claim asylum. When we went to the administration they brought us food but then two police officers came with handcuffs and said that we would have to return to the prison to be deported. I was so disappointed and the whole world was so dark, I lost my hope.

Spending three months in a prison in Vienna, Jawad is prescribed anti-depressants and sleeping pills.

I only ate and then went back to sleep. Sometimes I was only up for about two hours per day. The day came when they wanted to bring me to the airport. I refused. There was a radiator in my prison cell. I locked myself behind it so that I could not even get out anymore. They came in and shouted and hit me but I could not leave. When they noticed that they called professional help and they cut me out. Then about ten to twelve police officers came in and beat me up. They put me into a car and brought me to the airport. A few hours later I was back in Athens.

Jawad takes a deep breath and struggles before continuing his recollection of the place that he had once successfully escaped.

When I arrived I was not really conscious, I could not think or do anything. I did not want to live anymore. Fortunately I had a friend here and I met him on the street and he took me back to his home. I sometimes left the house to go for a walk and sometimes I went so far that I did not even know anymore where I was. I also did not care for the cars. I always went to the sea and sat there and looked at the water. I also watched the people next to me and I always wanted to know what the difference was between me and them. What did I do wrong? And why is life so hard for some people? There are so many people here, millions, and the city has such a long history and culture but I am all alone.

In the following months Jawad works himself out of depression, improves his Greek, finds accommodation, and begins the job as an interpreter back in Mytilene where he spends two years.

That was a nice time but I still could not stay in Greece as I was not allowed to travel and meet my family in Iran. I decided to go to Germany. I flew to Germany illegally. I thought I would maybe go back to Mytilene but then I stayed in Germany. I went to school and now I am doing an apprenticeship. I met amazing people who help me. It is like a family, they always support me. And I feel great in Hamburg.
Arash

Arash came to Europe in 2006. On the 16th of October he arrives in Mytilene when he is 14 years old. He spends a few days in detention in Pagani and then leaves for Athens.

There I stayed for two days and had no place to sleep. I had to sleep in the Alexander Park. I then went to Patras and just wanted to leave. I tried for two weeks to leave but unfortunately it did not work. I decided to go back to Athens.

Arash gets in touch with an Afghan acquaintance who lives in Lavrio and moves there for more than three years. “In my first year I was not allowed to go to school and I was not allowed to work and I did not receive any help.” Arash’s attempted suicide fails.

He enters school in his second year in Lavrio, and works on the weekends. While his situation improves, he decides to leave Greece.

I called my sister in Iran to ask for some money. She helped me and somebody took my money and sent me to Italy. After one night there I went straight on to Paris. I spent two weeks in Paris and I tried to learn the language. But I did not like it, both the city and the language. I met a boy from Afghanistan who wanted to go to Sweden and he offered me to come along. I then just went with him but stayed in Hamburg. I registered with the social agency there. I was 17 years old then. [...] At the social agency they did not believe that I was 17 years old and they sent me to a doctor to see how old I was.

To his surprise, Arash’s age is altered to 18.

Afterwards the social agency called to tell me that I had to give them my fingerprints. I had already given my fingerprints in Greece and knew what would happen with them. [...] I did not want to give my fingerprints and they sent the police. They came to get me but I decided to go by myself. At the social agency I closed my eyes and out of protest formed fists so that they could not take my fingerprints. Then they suddenly said that I could just leave.

Arash claims asylum in Germany and is granted the right to stay several months later.

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14 Arash told me the story in German which I then translated into English for the blog ‘Birds of Immigrants’. Both versions can be found there: http://birdsofimmigrants.jogspace.net/, Accessed 10/02/2014.
Thank God I received a residency permit [Aufenthaltsgenehmigung]. Right now I live in Kiel and I have done a language course and I am about to get my school degree.

**Azad**

Azadi, who now lives and studies in Berlin, entered Europe also through Lesvos.  

> It was the 19th of January 2008 when we were at sea and when the coast guards caught us. It was the same day of my birthday. I had never seen the sea before and I had great fear to drown. When the boat tips over, how will I save myself? I thought: my god, you brought me on the same day to the world, you will take me away on the same day.

Azadi is sent to Pagani where he spends about two weeks.

> We saw that there were 80 people in one room. There were no beds to sleep. [...] I met people who I knew from Istanbul and they gave me some food. It was really dirty [...], one had to wait for a long time to go to the toilet. Two weeks later they gave us the paper that says that we have to leave the country in 30 days.

Able to move on, Azadi travels to Athens where he claims asylum and receives the ‘red card’ proving the asylum application. ‘I was happy that I could go out on the street without being arrested by the police.’

A few months later he decides to go back to Lesvos where he stays in a centre for unaccompanied minors for five months. He learns Greek but then has to leave as he is with 19 years too old to be accommodated in the centre. Azadi hears about the NoBorder activist camp on Lesvos. “I read [...] that they were fighting for the rights of refugees and migrants and it was the first time in my life that I saw that people were fighting for something like that.” He becomes the interpreter in the camp and is even allowed to enter Pagani: “I saw that there were 800 people. I had the red card and could move freely. They did not, which hurt me a lot.” Afterwards Azadi returns to Athens.

> It was very difficult in Athens, there were racist attacks, I had a lot of fear and no hope to find work or be allowed to go to school. I decided to leave. I tried it in a

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15 Azadi told his story at the exhibition ‘Traces from Lesvos through Europe, Respect only with passport? Muhajer Tour is back’ in Mytilene on the 11th of October 2013. He spoke in Greek and was translated into English. I recorded his story there and he subsequently allowed me to re-narrate it.
lorry once but they caught me. At the airport they caught us again and put us in prison. I managed at the third time to leave Greece. I was in the aircraft and I waited until we took off. Then I called my friend [...] and said that now I am gone. [He] was so happy that he broke his mobile phone. Then he went outside and cried because he was left behind alone. I was scared that they would catch me in Germany and send me back to Greece.

He is not caught and claims asylum. However, the first months in Germany are difficult; Azadi misses his friends, the islands, and 'his love' in Greece. “I decided to go back to Greece, to buy a ticket via France and Italy and then back to Patras.” In the end, he does not go, he is ‘patient’ as he says and receives asylum in Germany six months later.

**Turbulent Migrations**

The struggles of Jawad, Arash and Azadi are, more than anything, turbulent. Through their many movements they collided at various temporal and spatial trajectories with border practitioners but moved on. They fled Afghanistan, passed through Turkey and entered Greek Europe. On Lesvos Arash and Azadi became detained and moved on, they became beaten, humiliated, fingerprinted, deported, but they moved on, through Greece and other European countries and prisons. Some lived in Greece for several months, others for years. Their movements were not unidirectional. They travelled somewhere, rested, learned Greek, met friends, earned money, went to school, moved on and sometimes back to where they had been before. They were successful. They reached a place of relative safety within Europe but it came at great cost. They left their families behind, uncertain when they would reunite, as well as friends who they met along the way, some of whom are still stuck in Greece.

The stories of the three also manifest struggles against the imposition of an identity. Their reasons to migrate were too complex for policy-regulations and render every policy-figure of ‘the migrant’ a naïve fantasy, a distorted image always in violation of human diversity, subjectivity, motion, surplus. Azadi’s Greek asylum claim did not turn him into an asylum-seeker. He sought escape, not asylum. His claim was merely a strategic decision, allowing him the freedom to move without the constant fear of detention and to locate possibilities for his eventual flight. Dublin-II determined that

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Jawad’s future was to be in Greece. He escaped Greece twice and therewith also an imposed life-plan. He now works as a carpenter in Hamburg. Arash had also left his fingerprints in Greece. German authorities and doctors rule that he was 18, a lie, a manufactured identity. Arash protested, in vain, but successfully resisted fingerprinting. He refused to open his fists, preventing German-European border practitioners from feeding yet another false identity into yet another database.

At the same time, their turbulence was met with forces seeking to order it, to understand it, to limit its indeterminacy, its excess. In Europe all of them experienced incredible violence, imprisonment as minors, traumatising encounters with brutal police forces, border guards, (Golden Dawn) fascists. Often the memories of humiliation, of being treated as less-than-human while ‘we are human’ were narrated with enduring disbelief and incomprehension. They experienced homelessness and hunger, and many were constantly accompanied by the fear of being returned to Afghanistan and its poverty, its unemployment and war, its Taliban. Often they spoke of how tired they were, physically and mentally, of how the border regime wasted their time and energy. Many had suicidal thoughts and suffered from depression.

The cynical European border-violence they experienced in its many guises left scars. Its violence inscribed itself onto the three even before they sought to flee. Europe had already intruded into their ‘local’, into their ‘everyday’. Europe begins where it divides. Through its visa regime, that white-lists few and black-lists many, they were always already banned to the local. In many ways, Europe conditioned their very ability to become migrant and determined who could be what kind of migrant. When I asked Jawad what his ideas about Europe were before his departure he laughed, he did not know of Europe: “I only knew that one could enter other countries via Iran, that’s all.” Even if he had known of Europe and had applied for a visa, he and the others would not have obtained it. Even prior to departure they formed Europe’s unwanted.

Finding someone to get them over the border was their only option. And Europe followed their movements to and throughout Turkey. Unofficial agreements between

[17 Interview with Jawad in Hamburg on the 20th of April 2014, my own translation.]
Greece and Turkey concerning the returning of migrants have long existed but recently the EU officially manifested its externalised border through an agreement that turns Turkey into an alleged safe place for EU deportees. Turkey becomes, now officially, a dumping ground for Europe’s unwanted, and, for some, only a ‘country of transit’ back to the place they had once escaped.

Once on mainland Greece, the three had entered Europe’s labyrinth of overlapping borderscapes. Jawad’s first successful attempt to escape Greece brought him to Austria. Waiting with fellow travellers at a bus-stop, police forces came to arrest them. In contemporary Europe the sheer presence of young Afghans seems reason enough to notify border practitioners. In one of Europe’s many prisons Jawad experienced detention and suffered from depression. The Dublin II&III absurdity, moving biometrically inscribed within him, subjected Jawad to inner-European deportation. His hunger-strike in an Austrian prison was broken with a false promise, his stubborn resistance met with physical aggression. Years later, in his second successful attempt Jawad arrived in Germany where the border police arrested him – Europe’s right to free inner movement applies not to all, in particular not to the non-white one racialised as always-other.

Jawad, Arash and Azadi tell the stories of Europe’s border policies and practices that, externalised and out-sourced, bound them to the local and illegalised their movements beyond, enforced by diverse and multiple border practitioners, ranging from citizens to harbour police, from fascist groups to border guards. They show how a biometric data double followed their movements in growing Europe’s data-sets. They revealed how both the communalisation of Europe’s borders, through EU funded detention, Frontex missions and Dublin II&III, as well as the re-nationalisation of its borders, through re-emerging border controls for selective others, higher border-fences, and again Dublin.

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entail suffering for people on the move. Their struggles animate shifting EUropean borders that always entail related registers of violence: the violence of subjectification that turned them into economic migrants, welfare scroungers, criminals, detainees and deportees, and the violence of dangerous migration paths, of hunger and homelessness, of incarceration, psychological abuse, racist attacks and deportation. EUrope's violent border practices function, it seems, as filters through which only those pass who, while scared and scarred, somehow endure.

In autumn 2013 all three return to Lesvos as ‘tourists and activists’ as Jawad says. This is where we meet. They are shocked to hear that a new detention centre has opened on the island. One day, as part of the group of activists, we visit the new detention centre near the village of Moria. Activists call it the detention centre ‘of the troika’ to incriminate not merely Greece but also EUrope's doing. We gather in front of the centre, ready to shout. Unexpectedly the gates to the centre are unlocked. We enter and run up to the fence behind which we encounter newly-arrived migrants, families with children, and many young men. The two guards who emerge panic, shout around, but fail to impress us, we are too many, they are too few. We talk to the prisoners, share information, and invite them to stay in our tent camp after their release.

For the three, the encounter with the migrant prisoners was uplifting but also difficult; memories of their own incarceration appear. Released from the prison a few days later, some young Afghans stay in our tent camp. They do not want to stay too long; they are driven by the desire to move on, to enter ‘real Europe’, via Athens. But they seem glad that their second welcoming to EUrope came with smiles and food, music and dancing, not incarceration. When we send them off, at the harbour of Lesvos, we feel torn. They have overcome another obstacle but we know that EUrope’s many forms of violence, experienced by the Jawad, Arash and Azadi and many other people in transit, still await them.

Part II - The Urban EUropean Borderscape of Athens
Athens constitutes another site of bordering and struggle. The Greek capital has become an important site for those who succeed in entering the Greek mainland and consider the capital either a crossing point towards other EUropean countries or attempt to settle there. For those who see Greece mainly as a point of transit, Athens
becomes a significant urban site of rest, (re)orientation, sometimes work, new identities and papers, but also increasingly one of homelessness, hunger, unbelonging, racist attacks, and police sweeps. Jawad, Arash and Azadi passed through Athens on their journeys and all report of the ‘difficulties’ they encountered there. Before turning to Jaser and his family’s experience of Athens, this part will briefly tie together developments in European-Greek migration politics and policies that directly impact on the situation of people in transit in Athens.

In 2008, the Afghan interpreter ‘MSS’ entered Greece and was fingerprinted. He travelled on to France and claimed asylum in Belgium in 2009. Registered on the Eurodac system, MSS’s fingerprints indicated that he had first entered European space in Greece and following the Dublin Regulation, Belgian authorities ordered his return. In 2011, MSS complained to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) about his treatment by Greece and Belgium, and the Court found both countries in violation of Articles 3 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, concerning “MSS’s conditions in detention, his general living conditions and the inadequacy of the asylum determination system.” The MSS ruling had far-reaching consequences as most EU member states suspended deportations to Greece.

In 2012, Frontex reported that it was in Greece, along its border with Turkey, “where two-thirds of all detections at the EU-level were reported, [...] a 29% increase compared to the year before.” Austrian Interior Minister Leitner referred to the Greek border as an ‘open barn door’ while Germany’s Interior Minister Friedrich threatened to reinstate Schengen border controls with Greece. Shortly afterwards, the Greek government deployed 1800 police officers to the Greek-Turkish border (‘Operation Shield’), where.

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20 Ibid., p. 763.
Frontex had already continued its joint operation ‘Poseidon’ in March 2012. At the same time, Greece erected new or enlarged existing detention centres, “for the most part financed by the European Union”, and completed in December 2012 the construction of the Evros border fence. Before becoming Prime Minister, Samaras suggested in April 2012:

Greece today has become a center for illegal immigrants. We must take back our cities, where the illegal trade in drugs, prostitution, and counterfeit goods is booming. There are many diseases and I am not only speaking about Athens, but elsewhere too.

In August 2012, under Samaras, the Greek government launched the police operation ‘Xenios Zeus’, first in Athens and two months later also in Patras. Referring to the ancient Greek god of hospitality, the operation sought to detect ‘illegal’ migrants and fight crime. Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection Dendias held that Greece ‘perished’ due to ‘illegal’ migration:

Ever since the Dorian invasion 4000 years ago, never before has the country been subjected to an invasion of these dimensions [...]. This is a bomb on the foundations of the society and the state.

The fascist Golden Dawn party, currently the third strongest political force in Greece, applauded Dendias’ statement. Large scale police sweeps and identity checks based on ethnic profiling ensued.

While seeking to close the ‘barn door’ at its external borders, the Greek government, pressurised by member states and the EU, also attempted to seal its internal borders. In less than six months, police forces stopped “almost 85,000 people of foreign origin on

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27 Ibid.
28 Interview with Elias Anagnostopoulos, Director of Amnesty International Greece, on the 15th of November 2013, Athens.
the streets of Athens [who were] taken to a police station for examination of their identification papers and legal status” and “4,811 [were] arrested for illegal entry and stay in Greece – a criminal offence – and detained pending deportation.”\textsuperscript{29}

Also in 2012, Greece extended the duration of possible incarceration of asylum-seekers in overcrowded detention centres from three or six months to 18 months.\textsuperscript{30} The Greek Chief of Police is quoted stating that “[we] aimed for increased periods of detention […]. We must make their life unbearable.”\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, migrants were “being held for months in police holding cells and border guard stations, although these facilities were designed for a maximum stay of 24 hours.”\textsuperscript{32}

While violent attacks against migrants had already been frequent before, it was in 2012 that the number of racially-motivated assaults rose dramatically.\textsuperscript{33} Nils Muižnieks, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe noted:

A significant share of the reported attacks against migrants take place in public places, especially in areas where large numbers of migrants live. They are reportedly often perpetrated by “patrols” of motorcyclists, dressed in black and with their faces covered.\textsuperscript{34}

The Racist Violence Recording Network showed that in 2012, 151 incidents of racist violence and physical attacks against migrants were recorded, many in the city centre of Athens, perpetrated by members of the Golden Dawn.\textsuperscript{35}

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\textsuperscript{34} Council of Europe, ‘Report by Nils Muižnieks’, 2013, p. 6.
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In many cases victims report the use of weapons during the attacks, such as clubs, crowbars, folding batons, chains, brass knuckles, spray, knives and broken bottles, while the use of large dogs has been repeatedly reported in the area of Aghios Panteleimonas and Attica square. The victims suffer multiple injuries such as fractures, sprains, contusions, lesion injuries, abrasions, eyesight and hearing damages, symptoms of post-traumatic stress, etc.\(^{36}\)

Moawia Ahmed, Coordinator of the Greek Forum of Migrants estimated that the number of unreported cases was, however, much higher. He suggested that in order to record racially-motivated attacks one would have “to find the victims which is very difficult. Some victims see this as a normal side of their lives. So that is one of our problems, the undocumented are afraid of the police.”\(^{37}\)

The European-Greek external and internal border measures of the last few years have made it increasingly difficult and dangerous for people in transit to enter and leave European space through Greece and to live in Greece. And it is often in Athens where many ‘get stuck’ and experience various forms of violence, racism and social marginalisation. The urban space of Athens has its own geography of fear, with no-go areas for those who do not seem Greek enough, areas known for police sweeps, as strongholds of Golden Dawn fascists or civil patrols who mark their territories by hanging up Greek flags or leaving ‘Greece for Greeks’ messages in public squares.\(^{38}\)

One’s mobility depends on both the colour of one’s skin and the sorts of document one holds. It is, however, also here in this urban borderscape that migrants ‘refuse to remain in their situation’ and struggle for other presents and futures.

**Jaser**

I first meet Jaser in front of the Greek Council for Refugees in Exarcheia, Athens.\(^{39}\) Waiting in the line to request an interview with lawyers of the Council, I notice a man in his early thirties who tries several times to get the attention of the Council’s doorman,

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\(^{36}\) Ibid.

\(^{37}\) Interview with Moawia Ahmed at the Greek Forum of Migrants, on the 1st of November 2013, Athens.

\(^{38}\) After a discussion with Nasim, a local migrant rights activist and friend, I decided against visiting these ‘contested’ areas, as my looks, as he suggested, were not ‘Greek or white European enough’, something that, unfortunately, became verified multiple times during my stay in Greece.

\(^{39}\) Jaser assured me that I could use his name. I will, however, only use his first name and change the names of his family members.
but fails. Standing quite close to him I can see the pile of documents in his hands. They are all in German, including an insurance card of a German insurance company.

I approach him and ask him in German what he came here for. He turns around, his face lights up, "you speak German?" he asks in German, "I am Jaser." He says that he has visa problems but that he is a resident of Germany. I express my astonishment; he indicates that this is a longer story. We step aside, leave the queue, and go to a café around the corner. He is eager to tell his story.

I have lived in Germany for 17 years and have not seen my family in Syria for 17 years. I asked to see my family in Greece who came due to the war and violence. I came to Athens to hug my family but became convinced that in Greece it is very difficult to live. On the 10.10.2013 I came via Switzerland to Athens and on the 23.10. I had to return to Germany. At 11am in the morning I went to the airport in Athens, I got my boarding card and when I went through the police control the police said that my documents were not my documents. They said these papers belonged to somebody else. I asked him to return my papers but he said no. They took me to the police station in the airport and I spent 6 hours there. In the end they hit my ear really hard. I have witnesses; my cousin and a good friend were there for example. He could not react as he was scared to be arrested. I went to the German embassy but they said they could not do anything about it. I have work and appointments in Germany. Now I had to apply for new papers and I will lose my job and miss my appointments. I will be in difficulties in Germany.

I read through the documents, they are issued by the German embassy in Athens in case of lost visa documents. Jaser can read and write but not enough to fill out six pages of complex officialese. Following residence law paragraph 25, Jaser obtained a temporary right to reside in Germany due to humanitarian and personal reasons. His local administration granted his 'vacation in Greece' and issued the relevant papers. We try to complete the embassy forms but Jaser's case is different, there is no box asking for details on loss of visa documents due to police abuse.

We take a taxi to the German embassy and together we ask for advice. The staff members of the embassy know Jaser; he has been there several times before asking for help but had been referred to the Greek Council which referred him back to the

40 Jaser told me the story twice, first in a café in Exarcheia/Athens on the first day we met, the 29th of October 2014, and then again a few days later when I recorded it. I translated it from German to English.
German embassy. The Council is a special charity offering “legal and social advice and services to refugees and people coming from third countries who are entitled to international protection.”\textsuperscript{41} The fact that Jaser does not fall into this category and that the Council is presumably not capable of helping him fill out German visa documents should be blatantly obvious to the German embassy.

We indicate that several passages of the form do not apply to his case, the staff member asks why. Jaser recounts his story, not for the first time. Unimpressed, the staff member notes: “If the police control migrants they usually fill out a protocol that the migrant then receives.” Surprised, we indicate that the police recording an incident in which they used excessive force, tearing both Jaser’s travel documents and his ear drum, seems unlikely.\textsuperscript{42} “I have not heard of such problems before, he needs to fill out the form saying he lost his visa.” While tempted to cite the very many reports on police abuse in Athens and Greece, it seems wiser to do what she says. Although the embassy is aware of his residency in Germany, issuing a visa would take a “couple of weeks, maybe longer.”

Jaser invites me back to the flat in the area of Neos Kosmos, where his family stays. The flat is tiny, three rooms for 25 people. They are all from Syria and came to Greece in the last three years, some as recently as two months earlier. As religious Yazidis they belong to the wider Kurdish community, a non-Muslim minority frequently persecuted in the Middle East, most recently and harrowingly by ISIS militias in Iraq and Syria. Jaser translates for me and his brother-in-law, Nihad, recounts their story.\textsuperscript{43}

“Assad’s soldiers came to my house and demanded money.” Wanting to escape the constant harassment by Syrian authorities, instead of paying, Nihad decides to flee with his two wives and eight children. They travel via Turkey and are smuggled into the Evros region, Northern Greece. “We were just let out in a forest and were then caught by the police. We had 30 days to leave the country and stayed at the police station for 7

\textsuperscript{42} Doctors of the ‘Doctors of the World’ confirm a few days later that the impact of the blow had been severe, needing further professional medical treatment, antibiotics and possibly surgery. Jaser underwent an operation when he returned to Germany.
\textsuperscript{43} The name was changed.
days.” They travel on to Athens where they stay homeless at a playground for a few days until they meet other Syrians and find a flat. The police evict them, and again they stay at the playground. They beg for money, find food in garbage containers and eventually move into their current flat in Neos Kosmos. Nihad gets arrested and stays in detention for several months.

My family ate from the garbage or cooked grass from the forest. Then I was arrested three times and put in prison for three months each time because my papers had expired. (...) Now I am scared to leave the house.

Nihad’s recollections come to a close and a relative of his, Ziad, tells the story of how he had fled the war in Syria with his family, only six weeks earlier. In the Evros region he had to leave his parents behind, they were too weak to walk on and they have not heard of them since.

We exchange numbers and promise to meet again, two days later, at the Doctors of the World for health check-ups on some of the children. A day later I get a phone call, “Jaser prison, Jaser prison.” Accompanied by a friend capable of the Greek language we hurry to the police station where the police enquire repeatedly about my origin and seem not fully convinced by ‘Germany/EU’. Their disinterest in our presence is palpable; rolling cigarettes, joking around, and listening to music, their contempt for us is hardly concealed. We seek to explain Jaser’s particular situation. They seem to know but state that they would have to make some background checks first before releasing him. He gets out of prison the same night, after having been Kafkaesquely imprisoned for not having the documents that the police had taken away from him.

In the following weeks Jaser, his family and I meet frequently, talk to doctors, lawyers, journalists and activists. Walking down the road, always looking out for the police, Jaser

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44 A report by the European Legal Network on Asylum (ELENA) refers to Major General Emmanuel Katriadakis of the Greek Ministry for Public Order and Citizen’s Protection who stated “that an order has been in effect since 9 April 2013, according to which Syrians may only be detained for ‘a few days’ in order to identify their origin.” However, various cases during my fieldwork as well as statements by legal practitioners and activists demonstrated that in many instances the order was ignored. ELENA, ‘Information Note on Syrian Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe’, November 2013.

45 Here I would like to thank Carolina for her linguistic and moral support.
points to ‘the smugglers’ who had asked whether he wanted to pick up people from northern Greece. “Look into my wallet, I have two Euros left and they told me I could earn 2500-3000 Euros by driving up once but I won’t do that, I am not a criminal.” Jaser introduces me to the ‘Syrian community’ of Neos Kosmos and thereby opens up the ‘field’ for me. In many encounters, too numerous to summon and mostly too delicate to record, I am exposed to the plight of Syrian migrants who escaped war only to live in poverty and social marginalisation in European Athens.

Nizar is one of them. In one of the most difficult encounters of my fieldwork, he recounts, tormented and traumatised, in the presence of his ten year old daughter, how she was raped by smugglers when he could not immediately pay the money they requested. “Back in Asia, where we live, so many people die, there is no god. I thought god would be in Europe but if he is not here, he does not exist.” Also scared to be arrested, Nizar and his family hardly ever leave their small, run-down but overpriced flat.

Jaser just wants to leave Greece. His papers, however, are not ready for weeks. Living amongst his many relatives in their noisy flat causes pain to his damaged ear, he is constantly tired and scared to use up all the cigarettes he has left. We meet, once again, in the flat with a lawyer and human rights activist who inquires into the different legal situations of the family members. There are cases of family reunification with relatives who already reside in Germany. The question of whether or not to apply for asylum, however, remains resolvable. A registration would allow family members to move around Athens without becoming arrested and detained but what if they escape to central Europe and the deportation-stop to Greece gets lifted in a few months or years time?

The lawyer takes note of every case, and then, suddenly, Jaser’s aunt, who had remained silent in my previous encounters, starts speaking. Yes, she has a case as well, a case against the Greek state and its border guards who pushed her child into the Evros river

46 The name was changed.
47 I visited Nizar two more times, once accompanied by my friend and migrant rights activist Salinia. Thanks to the Welcome to Europe network we were able to support the family financially.
right next to her, drowning and disappearing her soon to be married daughter. Everybody in the flat goes quiet, the older women in the room start sobbing. Jaser has difficulties translating. we have difficulties listening. Cautiously, the lawyer expresses her deep sympathy, asks about dates and times, whether the body had been found or not. No, it has not. The Greek state did not really search for her but migrants did. Many, about thirty travelled up North from Athens to search the Evros river for the body. It remains unfound and obsequies have already taken place both in Germany and Syria. The mother does not want to start legal proceedings; she does not want to mention her daughter again.

Jaser escapes Greece about five weeks after his planned departure. This time he is not stopped. He has lost his job in Germany, has trouble with the job agency, the local administration for foreigners, and his girlfriend who have difficulties believing his story, and he lacks the money to pay the bills that pile up in his flat. But at least he made it out of Greece. He speaks to his family in Athens every day. He tells me in December how his old uncle had died in the tiny flat and for days the police and emergency services refused to pick up his body. In January 2014, Jaser calls me up with good news:

Remember my brother-in-law’s second wife? She left Greece with her mother and two children and is now in Serbia and I expect them to be in Germany in three days. [...] And I have more news. Remember my niece? She arrived in Germany yesterday. She went through Serbia, Romania, and so on, Hungary, you know, but anyways, she is now at mine, at home.

A few months later, in May, Jaser tells me: “they are all now in Germany, not a single person remains in Greece.”

**Urban Unbelonging**

As thousands of others, Jaser’s family is not prone to draw the attention of authority to them other than through their physical appearance that may suggest non-Greek, non-European origins (whatever that means). For Jaser, even his documented residence in Germany did not spare him police brutality and racial discrimination, stripping him off the rights he had long (officially) held, subjecting him to the violence inhabiting undocumentedness in Greece. For weeks he became trapped in Athens and had to hide, just like his Syrian relatives had to, for months and years.
These stories of those struggling to leave the urban borderscape of Athens animate the EUropean border dispositif in many ways. They show how the border runs throughout urban spaces and is performed there through violence, fear and racial discrimination. Violence is ever-present in the lives of people in EUropean transit. Many of the Syrians I encountered were haunted by the horrors they had experienced in the atrocious war in Syria, during their journeys to EUrope and within Greece. The beating, torturing, raping, killing and dying does not stop at the gates of EUrope but continues along the external Greek borderscape and within the urban borderscape of Athens. ‘If we had known what happened here in EUrope we would not have come’ is a phrase uttered uncountable times.

Stories of migration struggle also highlight the politics of fear at work that enforces non-clashes, that pushes people into social isolation. The circulating knowledge of psychological and physical everyday violence against migrants, the always-existing possibility of detention and deportation mean that many seek to remain unnoticed, to live under the radar. They are those who decide to minimise the possibility of clashing with border enforcers by confining themselves to their homes, if they have one, by restricting their movements, their perceptibility.

A recent report focusing on Syrian migrants in Greece notes that in 2012, “only 275 Syrians claimed asylum in Greece [...] while close to 8,000 arrests of Syrian nationals for irregular entry were recorded by the Greek authorities.”

Not a single one of the 275 claims led to a positive decision.

While the Greek state is currently seeking to implement a new asylum service, the dysfunctional asylum system in combination with the Dublin-II&III-deportation-fear mean that thousands of Syrian migrants fleeing the war, and amongst them Jaser’s family, “cannot or choose not to submit an asylum claim in Greece” which, in turn, exposes them to the constant danger of imprisonment in degrading centres.

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49 Ibid., p. 24.
Especially since the Xenios Zeus police operation and its modus operandi of stopping and searching anyone who appears foreign, as well as the rise of the Golden Dawn, those who are undocumented seek to remain unseen. Self-confinement comes at great cost. Jaser’s family hardly ever utilised the few existing social services as they were located beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Prompted by Europe’s pressure and the Greek government’s request to cleanse the streets of Athens, police and border forces as well as Golden Dawn fascists enact Greece and Europe every day by identifying what is considered non-Greek and non-European, thereby enforcing violent encounters, collisions and non-clashes.

In defiance of their oppression and social marginalisation in Athens, Jaser’s family located ways to escape their precarious situation. Information and resources for fake passports and travel tickets circulated through family and community networks. With one sick child residing in Germany some, through the legal route of family reunification, could follow him there. In my many encounters with the family I was impressed and affected by their continuous hope for something I thought was improbable or outright impossible at the time. Jaser’s repeated messages announcing the arrival of more and more, and, in the end, all relatives proved me, fortunately, wrong.

Part III – The Internal European Borderscape of Patras

The coastal city of Patras is an internal European borderscape. Often considered the Greek ‘gate to the West’ due to its important maritime trade relations with other European countries and as the historic point of exit for Greek migrants, Patras has become a site of migration struggles for more than the last decade. For many ‘on the move’, the city is an important transit point on their journeys to Italy and beyond: “The daily ferry connections between Patras and the Italian ports of Venice, Ancona, Bari and Brindisi attract those who want to leave Greece hidden inside or under trucks.” In most cases, those who come to Patras to escape Greece are

young, homeless and male, travelling alone or in small groups. Some failed to obtain asylum in Athens, others were always determined to go beyond Greece, and many have tried several times to leave the country.

Especially in the last years, Greek authorities began to respond to the arrival of people in transit by securitising and militarising the port area. “Both the city and the port are constantly patrolled and monitored by the police and the coast guard” but, nonetheless, “the transient population continues to search for [...] new ways to go to Italy.”\(^{53}\) However, even if they succeed in leaving Greece by ferry, many will be subjected to summary returns executed by Italian authorities though violating a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.\(^{54}\)

In May 2012, a Greek national is killed, allegedly by young Afghans near an occupied factory.\(^{55}\) Hundreds of city residents and members of the Golden Dawn march to the factory, seeking to burn it down; their attempt only thwarted by intervening riot police forces.\(^{56}\) After the attack, migrants are warned by the police that their safety cannot be guaranteed and urged to leave Patras.\(^{57}\)

It is, however, more often than not the police that acts as perpetrator of violence. Ill-treatment of migrants by police and port authorities range from racial insults or destruction of personal belongings, including travel documents, to stabbings, beatings with electroshock batons, and mock executions.\(^{58}\) As a recent report notes:

Complaints often concerned incidents where migrants were forced into the sea, with their clothes on and in freezing weather conditions, to stay in cold water up to their necks and then once out of the water were made to stand still for hours in their wet clothes, until they freeze [...]. In addition, there were reports of migrants who were forced to stay on their hands and knees, while port authority officers would sit on

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
\(^{56}\) Interview with Jorgos Papaleonidopoulos at Praksis, Patras, on the 07th of November 2013.
\(^{58}\) Ibid.
them. In other cases, the victims were forced to take off their clothes, stand still with their legs extended, and beaten every time they moved.\textsuperscript{59}

The increased securitisation of the new Southern port, combined with continuous raids and violence by police and port forces as well as fascist attacks have led to a decrease in the transient population of Patras. Those who remain, live more scattered and hidden but in close proximity to the port.

\textbf{The (not so) Abandoned Factory}

In darkness we enter the factory for the first time.\textsuperscript{60} Sneaking through the wooden fence we hope not to be seen by police patrols. Since the opening of the new port in the south of Patras in 2011, the factory on the opposite side has become a shelter for people on the move, mainly from Afghanistan. We are told that the ‘African factory’ is nearby. Our visit was announced and agreed upon beforehand but, nonetheless, some unease towards our presence is noticeable, but only at first. Many laugh when they tell me that they were convinced that I belonged to the Hazara people, the third largest ethnic group in Afghanistan of Asian descent, many of whom fled the Taliban.

I decide, also for the following days, not to take down any notes. A few weeks earlier an Italian camera team had sought to film the factory, thereby drawing the attention of the police. The film crew became briefly arrested while, so the migrants report, police forces raided the factory as ‘punishment’ a few days later. Although the presence of the homeless migrants is well known by the police, every excuse is used for raids.

Two young men welcome us, show us where they prepare food, where they play football and how they hide when police forces arrive. There are about 40 migrants and amongst them many minors. We are told that during police raids officers beat them, humiliate them, take away their belongings. Those who have so-called red cards that suggest their registration will only be beaten, those who are undocumented will both be

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{60} I am very grateful to the group “Motion for the defence of refugees’ and migrants’ rights” in Patras. It would have been impossible for me to enter the factory without their support, their presence and their prior exchanges with the inhabitants of the factory. One of their members accompanied me into the factory.
beaten and detained. They say that in the previous month, although trying every day, nobody managed to get onto the lorries and ferries. We climb up a ladder and enter an elevated room where about ten people can sleep at night. They show us, smiling, how they would lift the ladder when police forces arrive and then jump out of the back window to escape over the railway tracks. On the walls they have hung up prayers, images and names of friends who made it out of Greece, depicted as figures clinging onto lorries.

We meet many of them again the next day at the NGO Praksis that runs a drop-in centre for unaccompanied minors. Here, if needed, they receive psychological and medical help, legal advice, one meal a day and have access to the internet. They invite us to walk back to the factory with them, over the railway tracks to remain unseen. Without an interpreter, communication is difficult. “This is my life, going there and back, every day” says one of the older Afghans, in his late twenties, who spent ten years in Greece. We enter the factory by climbing over a side gate. Sitting in the corner of the largest hall of the factory some reveal fragments of their stories.

Some have experienced many months of detention, most of them police brutality, and others had already made it out of Greece through Patras but were caught either in Italy or further north. At an Italian sea port, coast guards took away their money and belongings, humiliated them and threw their phones into the sea. One young Afghan points to himself, says ‘Dublin’, and recounts in a few English words his deportation odyssey from one EUropean country to the next, ending up back in Greece. Many mention their fear of the Taliban and the lack of prospects in Afghanistan. They also tell me about ‘mum’, a Greek woman who comes into the factory every week with her children and food. Unfortunately I do not meet her.

I do not conduct interviews, take down names or ages, ask many questions or seek summaries of their experiences. By being invited into the factory, by sharing food and drinks, joking around, and by playing football together I gain glimpses of their lives.

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I am also grateful to the NGO Praksis in Patras who allowed me to conduct an interview with Jorgos Papaleonidopoulos and observations at the desperately needed centre. See: http://www.praksis.gr/en/, Accessed 06/11/2013.
One of the Afghans who had shown us around starts to collect mobile phones; their owners slowly disappear individually or in small groups while he stays behind. He explains that they are off, seeking to jump onto lorries and as they are scared of the police to steal or destroy their phones when caught, they leave one of their most valued possessions behind. The solidarity and friendship within the group and the support they give one another is palpable.

They all know of friends who made it and are regularly in touch with them, through Facebook. They know others who are stuck elsewhere in Greece, in Athens or Evros, and even recognise some of their friends on the pictures I had taken on Lesvos, in a reception centre for unaccompanied minors. The inhabitants of the factory form a community that thrives even in an environment of unwantedness. Even after a few hours in the factory I begin to understand why Azadi, feeling lonely after finally arriving in Germany, was about to return to Patras, into poverty, homelessness and police harassment, but also into a close-knit community of travellers.

We enter the factory again to thank them and say goodbye. We are greeted only by a few; they say that some had a very long night, trying to escape Greece and are still asleep somewhere. They cook and offer us food. With some we exchange Facebook details. And yes, they tell us with a grin, two made it, ‘inshallah’, they are right now in the lorries behind the fence of the port, waiting to board the ferry to Italy.

Social/ Movements
The transitory migrants of Patras are a social force. Their individual and collective struggles continuously challenge the European border dispositif, repeatedly provoke collisions with its practitioners and, at times, succeed in escaping Greek Europe. Some will follow Jawad, Arash and Azadi who made it years ago, who arrived somewhere and returned to Greece as activists, tourists. Through their movements they unmask, at every point of their journey, the many forces that seek to arrest them, that deem their

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62 I visited the reception centre in Agiassos on Lesvos three times as part of the ‘Traces Back’ journey and met the few young migrants, sometimes referred to as the ‘lost boys’ there, who were left even after the centre closed, on the top of a mountain in a vast, run-down, and ghostly former military base that inhabitants (some of whom were part of the Traces Back project) called ‘Villa Azadi’, the villa of freedom.
movements dangerous. Their sociality supersedes images of lonesome, economic, hyper-rationalist, entrepreneurial migrants and brings to the fore the relationality that inhabits migratory movements.

Subversive and subjugated knowledges develop and circulate within the community of travellers, modern day hoboglyphs, that point to the many traps that the border dispositif construes: ‘how do I jump onto a lorry and how do I hide therein’, ‘should I take my mobile phone with me or will the Greek-Italian coast guards steal or break it’, ‘what happens to fingerprints, to asylum claims’, ‘where can I find shelter, food, work’, ‘how can I avoid police controls, fascists’, ‘where do they make fake passports’, ‘when in Albania/Italy/Austria where do I go’?

There is, however, the danger of a romanticised reading of their struggle, their ‘autonomous migration’, for what they highlight, besides the always-present excess of their identities, are interconnected registers of violence that seek to arrest their unruly movements with increasing potency and rates of ‘success’. Their suspicion toward journalists, researchers and activists is a consequence of cynical police tactics that have sought, with growing effect, to drive wedges between migrant communities and supporters. Expanding police sweeps within the city of Patras have pushed transitory migrants further to the margins and into hiding, making access to social services even harder.

The fortification of the port area, the erection of ever-higher fences, constant patrols by port security and police forces, devices that detect fluctuations in oxygen levels in lorries, on-the-ground mirrors that reflect the undersides of lorries to expose unwanted passengers, as well as resentment within the citizenry and a strong fascist presence have turned Patras into a violent borderscape in which the attempted burning down of a factory inhabited by migrants becomes “a logical extension of prevailing exclusion, marginalisation, stigmatisation, illegalisation and dehumanization of refugees and migrants in Patras.”63 The complete impunity in which police, port, and private security forces act, torture and humiliate transitory people also suggests “a wider policy of

repression and fear [...] aimed at discouraging undocumented migrants and refugees from coming to the port cities and trying to reach Europe through these “gates”. #64

Many had to leave their fingerprints somewhere along the way that follow and at times pre-empt their movements. Some are registered as (failed) asylum-seekers, European ‘visa-shoppers’, former detainees or criminal offenders. Police and port authorities know their whereabouts and can raid the factory at will, hunt them on motorbikes and with dogs, degrade and torture them. Patras’ people in transit do constitute an excess despite these many clashes but the odds are not in their favour. Many have moved away from Patras as they see their chances wane. The transitory population has rapidly decreased in the past years and many of those who come nonetheless do so out of desperation. They have not given up and try every day to jump onto lorries, risking their lives time and again.

The internal European borderscape of Patras is a peculiar site of migration struggle, one of both grotesque violence and friendship, of immobility and unruly movement. It is, nonetheless, only one more European borderscape. What await the few who succeed to escape are the illegal push-backs of Italian Europe, the prisons of Austrian Europe, the rough streets of German Europe and the constant deportation-limbo of Dublin Europe.

**Part IV - Lives of Infamous Migrants**

Before I went to Greece I read Foucault’s *Lives of Infamous Men* and I had to re-read it several times afterwards as I felt there were elements that related in many ways to my inquiries, the question of excess and control, as well as the Autonomy of Migration literature. #65 Foucault’s short piece speaks of the changing relations between excess and violence and the entanglement of ‘infamous wo/men’ in the nets of power and authority who could, maybe should have remained uncounted. While at first sight exploring those lives unfortunate enough to clash with forces of authority, Foucault’s story also alludes to all those lives that were not captured, that escaped punishment, or the imposition of

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#64 Ibid., p. 6.
an unwanted identity. This part first explores these infamous lives before turning to the ways in which the dispositif, to which Foucault gestures, increasingly disallows anonymity, to then return to the question of excess (as resistance).

In his piece, Foucault compiles an “anthology of existences” from books and documents that tell the stories of “[l]ives of a few lines or a few pages, nameless misfortunes and adventures gathered into a handful of words.” He states:

I was determined that these texts always be in a relation or, rather, in the greatest possible number of relations with reality: not only that they refer to it, but they be operative within it; that they form part of the dramaturgy of the real; that they constitute the instrument of a retaliation, the weapon of a hatred, an episode in a battle, the gesticulation of a despair or a jealousy, an entreaty or an order.

Foucault’s infamous lives were “destined to pass away without a trace” had they not been “snatched [...] from the darkness in which they could, perhaps should, have remained.” It was their “encounter with power” that illuminated their lives and left a trace; “without the collision, it’s very unlikely that any word would be there to recall their fleeting trajectory.” Their trajectories were fleeting, un-famous, never prone by themselves to draw the attention of authority to them.

It first required a combination of circumstances that [...] focused the attention of power and the outburst of its anger on the most obscure individual [...], aimed no doubt at suppressing all disorder; to pick on this person rather than that, this scandalous monk, this beaten women, this inveterate and furious drunkard, this quarrelsome merchant, and not so many others who were making just as much of a ruckus.

The collisions in Foucault’s anthology always relate to the figure of the king, “the source of all justice and an object of every sort of enticement, both a political principle and a magical authority.”

66 Ibid., p. 157.
67 Ibid., p. 160.
68 Ibid., p. 161.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., p. 163, emphasis added.
71 Ibid., p. 171.
One day, Foucault suggests, the theatricality of these clashes subsided, the omnipotent king disappeared, and

[power] would be made up of a fine, differentiated, continuous network, in which the various institutions of the judiciary, the police, medicine, and psychiatry would operate hand in hand [...] [and discourse] would develop in a language that would claim to be that of observation and neutrality.\textsuperscript{72}

This ‘differentiated network’, pointing to the dispositif as discussed in Chapter Two, operates without recourse to the exuberant and comical exchanges of the ‘lettres de cachet’ or the exercise of ceremonious punishments; “[the] commonplace would be analyzed through the efficient but colorless categories of administration, journalism, and science.”\textsuperscript{73}

The simplicity of the absolute authority of the king to pick out, punish or eliminate infamous subjects has long gone. While the king’s theatricality vanished and a more nuanced administrative system developed, impacting on ordinary life, clashes between ‘subjects of disorder’ and the zealous power that sought “to prevent the feebleminded from walking down unknown paths”, persists.\textsuperscript{74} In his search for these infamous fates in historic texts, Foucault suggests that these “particles [were] endowed with an energy all the greater for their being small and difficult to discern.”\textsuperscript{75} He found the infamous existences only as they had clashed with power and what is known of them are merely the fragments that the collisions had produced. What remains unknown is how their lives unfolded after clashing with power.

What certainly also remains unknown are all those lives that were not accounted for, that fleetingly bypassed and continuously bypass the king, state authorities, and maybe even governmental border practitioners. While some of the infamous men became “describable and transcribable, precisely insofar as they were traversed by the mechanisms of a political power”, many more did not.\textsuperscript{76} Foucault’s short piece is not

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., pp. 171-172, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 172.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. 158.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 169.
merely an account of transforming political power, its changing desires and those who were unfortunate enough to collide with it. It also speaks of those unspeakable ones who never left a trace, who excessively remained in the void of history, never documented or accounted for.

**Autonomous Migration?**

Foucault’s figure of the infamous ‘feebleminded’ is the contemporary figure of the undocumented migrant. It is her movement and excess that need governmental intervention, examination and identification, her unknown paths must become knowable for in her motion and being lies an unpredictability that seems to challenge the mechanisms of political authority that require categorisable subjects. The clashes between those who seek to remain unnoticed and those who seek to notice intensify as the dispositif’s differentiation increases. Foucault’s infamous men were those who could, maybe should have been among the “billions of existences destined to pass away without a trace” and yet they were not. They were caught in the nets of authority that arrested their movements and exposed them, in many cases, to punishment.

Many of the accounts of struggle in this chapter as well as Foucault’s infamous men resonate with the AoM literature which has dealt in great nuance with questions of excess and escape, as Chapter One illustrated. The AoM approach offers a perspective radically different from all those attempts that seek to detect reducible rationales for migration, their ‘mixed’ or ‘singular’ motives, the factors that ‘pushed some out’ or ‘pulled some in’, that made some ‘circulate’ and others ‘settle’. It sees migration as such as a social dynamic and political force that does not wait for an ‘orderly’ path to be created by policy-makers and border practitioners so that its subjects can walk towards ‘integration’ or swiftly into labour markets. Also, the autonomy of migration is not thought as a force independent from socio-economic pressures but, rather, based on the insistence that, as Mitropoulos suggests:

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77 Ibid., p. 161.
The other is autonomous, particularly where one’s self is most liable to assume the pose of deciding on such matters for an other, either because one’s own belonging is not in question or as a means to prove that it should not be.\textsuperscript{78}

As a force that stirs and pulls, even if no one looks, that finds ways to subvert many border-obstacles in its path, (undocumented) migration, indeed, is a social force that creates ‘new worlds’ through its movements.

While this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, resonate a great deal with the AoM literature there remains some discomfort about its tendency to assign ontological primacy to migration and mobility as pointed out earlier. As a political intervention, countering the presumption of migration as a mere response, and more often than not a reaction to economic need (or greed), the attempt to think migration as an autonomous force that exists due to a plurality of reasons, is laudable. Nonetheless, the discomfort arises when, as the stories in this chapter have shown, the life-words of so many seem to be saturated by practices of the border dispositif.

For the three minors, Jaser’s family, and the inhabitants of the abandoned factory, while demonstrating an ability to find ways to cope in the most precarious situations, it seemed as if the border always materialised before them or even within them, directing and often blocking their paths, tying them to places they sought to escape. Seeing them as “new elusive historical actors [who] dwell in the world of imperceptibility and generate a persistent and insatiable surplus of sociability in motion” as Papadopolous et al suggest seems to sideline the increasingly brutal, intrusive, even necropolitical condition of EUrope’s border dispositif that, though never fully, conditions mobility \textbf{and} immobility, perceptibility \textbf{as well as} imperceptibility.\textsuperscript{79}

The dispositif, it seems, is excessive in its own right. Jaser’s family, having experienced violent confrontations and deadly loss, hid in a shabby flat in Athens for months, trying to be imperceptible to the police but remaining stuck also due to their imperceptibility, due to their racialised perceptibility. The inhabitants of the factory were known to the

\textsuperscript{78} Mitropoulos, ‘Autonomy, Recognition, Movement’, 2007, p. 132, emphasis in original.
\textsuperscript{79} Papadopoulos, Stephenson and Tsianos, \textit{Escape Routes}, 2008, p. 221.
police. The fortification and securitisation of the harbour rendered them mere nuisances, not challenges, who, more and more desperately, and less and less frequently, entered ferries to Italy. The three Afghan minors did succeed in reaching a desired place but only after years of hardship and several close encounters with death. Their racialisation as those always in violation of EUropean space meant that a strategy of imperceptibility would translate into a life in hiding, and, in times of the ‘differentiated network’, even that seemed hardly possible. Furthermore, the different possibilities of struggle and mobility open to the different people in transit, on the one hand young males and families on the other, also make one wonder whether there exists a youth- and gender-bias in the AoM literature, where the narrated excessive movements seem, more often than not, the movements of (young) men.

Migratory excess did not remain an assumption during my fieldwork but expressed itself in a variety of ways. After my stay in Greece, the hopefulness underlying the idea of excessive movements in Greek borderscapes could, however, only be retained with reservations. The possibility of residing in the dark as many of Foucault’s infamous subjects has vanished due to EUrope’s delocalised network of migration control that implies a multiplication of points of encounter with governmental authorities. The ramification of EUrope’s border dispositif, reaching far beyond EUrope and inscribing itself onto bodies questions suggestions that assign ontological primacy to migration. The stories of struggle recounted here have animated the EUropean border in multiple and conflictual ways, pointing to its externalisation, fortification, digitalisation, diversification and racialisation. Some of these dimensions, many of which have been pointed out by CBS as shown in Chapter One, will be briefly recounted here.

EUrope’s borders become increasingly externalised. Through EUrope’s visa policies, its (bilateral) agreements and material border fortifications, many people are bound to the local, never able to escape, never able to move ‘excessively’. For those who are not able-bodied and more often than not, young and male, the chances of escaping the local are slim. For others who do leave, as Chapter Four has shown, migration paths become increasingly restrictively drawn, often leaving only the most precarious routes. The three minors, Jaser’s family and all of the inhabitants of the abandoned factory had no choice but to travel ‘illegally’ as a EUropean visa remained unreachable. Most of them came to Greece via Turkey. Rumours about unofficial agreements between the two countries.
concerning the return of migrants who travelled through Turkey have long existed but the EU has recently officially manifested the externalised EU border through an agreement that will enable European member states to return ‘illegal’ migrants also to Turkey, another supposedly safe place for EU deportees.  

European borders become increasingly fortified and militarised. Even if migration ‘came first’ and subsequently drew the attention of the dispositif to its many movements in the Greek-Turkish borderzone, the Evros fence, Frontex forces and thousands of Greek border guards have effectively turned Greek-Turkish land and sea borders into highly monitored and ‘shielded’ spaces. The EU Commission notes in 2012 that it has “encouraged the Greek authorities to improve its border management” resulting in Greece’s operation ‘Shield’ and the continuous engagement of Frontex’s joint operation ‘Poseidon’.  

While the numbers presented by Frontex need to be scrutinised with suspicion, according to its ‘Annual Risk Analysis 2013’, “[d]etections in the Aegean Sea, between Turkey and Greece, increased by 912%.” Also as a consequence, migration movements have shifted to Bulgaria which equally responded by building a long border fence.  

European borders become increasingly digitalised. As the migration narratives have shown, data doubles follow and sometimes pre-empt movements. The growing architecture of biometric databases such as Eurodac, the Visa Information System and the Schengen Information System, as Scheel notes, “significantly [alters] the encounters and power relations between migrants and border control authorities […]; [they] no longer depend on the cooperation of migrants to re-identify them, because their data

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80 BBC, 2013, ‘EU and Turkey agreement on deporting migrants and visas’.  
doubles replace their narratives as a source of truth."84 Relatedly, E Uropean borders become increasingly specified and localised. The registered fingerprint binds many to alleged points of entry despite their accounts that suggest otherwise. Once determined by the border dispositif, even if incorrectly, it becomes the first point of entry, a ‘made (up) fact’ that can be resisted only with great difficulty. Through these distorted digital identities and Dublin II & III, bodies often become chain-deported until they reach the place where they have presumably entered E Urope, where they were forced to leave a trace.

As the encounters on Lesvos, in Athens and Patras have demonstrated, the E Uropean border becomes also internalised, diversified, delocalised, racialised and G reece therewith a E Uropean borderscape that functions as a labyrinth of holding cells, of EU funded detention centres, interning those who wish to escape, abusing them, and wasting their time. The E Uropean border runs throughout Athens and Patras, thickens in certain neighbourhoods, and can temporarily appear around every corner. Mobile practitioners employ racial and ethnic stereotypes to perform the border at will. Contemporary border collisions suggest that “the most intense point of a life [...] is where it comes up against power, struggles with it, attempts to use its forces and to evade its traps”, turns into numerous points of violent encounter that exhaust those seeking to move, and (temporarily) arrest their movements.85

The pluralisation and ramification of E Urope’s borders then also implies the increasing disallowance of anonymity, turning many spatial and temporal trajectories of migrant journeys into spaces and moments of possible collision. The entanglement of Jawad, Arash, Jaser and others in the nets of E Uropean border authority show how migration and control are co-constituted, how imperceptibility and mobility do not, unlike in the time of the king, easily translate into excessive freedom but are ambiguous and can, inasmuch carry or entail multiple forms of violence. While, in these entangled

conditions the question of (ontological) primacy becomes less significant, questions of resistance become central.

(Excessive) Resistance

The three minors, Jaser’s family, the inhabitants of the factory all decided to leave their precarious situation. Whether or not their (initial) movements came ‘before control’ or not did not change the fact that they were subjected to a situation of great confinement and violence that they sought to escape. When Foucault’s infamous men collided with authority, their fates seemed decided, the verdict spoken, punishment ‘to suppress all disorder’ immanent, resistance improbable. The forms of punishment that the EUropean border dispositif has devised for (attempted) border transgressions come in many guises, and all of the protagonists in this chapter were hurt or punished, in one way or another but, nonetheless, found the strength to continue to struggle.

EUrope’s borders form an obstacle course that is, to a degree, productive of subjects that endure pain and tenaciously continue to resist. When I, after another encounter with Jaser’s family, shared my doubts about their chances to overcome Greek borders with an experienced migrant rights activist, she suggested that, eventually, they would probably succeed in escaping but that in their journeys ahead they would have to live through more traumatising pain, more loss, and violence.

The violence of the dispositif, it seems, is also—always in excess. Or, maybe, through its excessive violence and necropoliticality it seeks to progressively arrest what it cannot quite capture. While finely stitched, EUrope’s network of population control is, of course, never total but also fallible in the light of the many people on the move who succeed to exceed, eventually, (some of) its enforcements. Colliding with the dispositif does not mean capture. What happens before, during and after collisions with border enforcers is not predetermined but often allows for manifold practices of resisting, appropriating, behaving—otherwise even in times of biometric control. The co-constitutive and ambiguous nature of migration and control renders it necessary to closely examine rather than assume how people on the move create strategies to endure and overcome the situation into which they moved themselves and into which they were forced to move.
The protagonists of this chapter, by falsifying identities, taking on new names and stories, buying passports, running away, hiding, or using legal avenues have found diverse ways to resist the dispositif’s urgent need to subjectify them to narrow categories that tell them who or what they are and where they will be going, as deserving, undeserving, economic, temporal, circular, visa-shopping, asylum-seeking, poverty-escaping, welfare-abusing migrants. They practiced resistance also as dissent, by speaking back, by confronting border enforcers, by hunger-striking. Solidarity, as well, was a force always present.

When Jawad and Azadi after finally arriving in Germany thought about returning to Patras or Lesvos, it was due to their experiences of collective solidarity and friendship with others in transit. The inhabitants in the abandoned factory stuck together and formed a community of pariahs at the outskirts of Patras in stubborn defiance of the many forces that attempted to force them out of the city. Resources and information circulated within Jaser’s extensive family and the greater community of Yazidis that stretches from Syria to Germany, a significant factor that allowed more and more family members to follow him ‘home’ to Germany.

Excess, something that seems unmeasurable and uncapturable, necessarily remains elusive. At times, the violence of the dispositif seems excessive itself, that, as a force of horror, is something “one is forced to witness, and that haunts one’s mind, psyche, and body”.86 This chapter prioritised, nonetheless, excessive practices of resistance. When one examines excess as a force of resistance in migration struggles one is drawn to the processes of (excessive) abjection that seek to quench disorder, unruly movement, falsified identities as well as the manifold possibilities for resisting, for spontaneous decisions, for dissensual confrontation, for collective solidarities.

While the Non-Citizen struggle proclaimed its dissent and Boats4People its solidarity, none of the many people I encountered described their motions, strategies, life-plans ever as ‘excessive’. Excess may, however, suggest itself in certain moments, in certain

gestures. It may have momentarily appeared when, for example, Jaser’s family recounts, with great laughter, how Jaser’s niece, carrying falsified papers failed to board the plane when, already in the airport, she could not find the gate of departure. Somewhat tragic but also funny and by far not the end of the road. She tried again and lives now in Germany. Excess, while ambiguous and indeterminable, resides, it seems, somewhere within practices of resistance, within forms of solidarity and dissent. It traverses them as a potentiality that lives on even in a climate of increasing suffering.

Conclusion
This chapter listened to several stories of people in transit in the Greek borderscapes of Lesvos, Athens, and Patras that animated not only their practices of everyday resistance but also the tremendous violence that the European border dispositif unleashes against unwanted subjects on the move. Recounting ethnographic encounters can, like Foucault’s infamous men, only reveal fragments but fragments that are ‘in the greatest possible number of relations with reality’. While every story had its distinctive character and history, the will not to remain in their precarious situations was common to all.

Their struggles, ‘dramaturgies of the real’, were driven by despair, resentment, and the fear to be detained, deported or drowned, but also by the hope to enter a less violent future, to reconnect with family and friends, to find work, education, and a place of safety to treat the pain that the journey, and all the reasons for the initial escape, had caused. While every of the three sites retains its specificity and can be read as external, urban, and inner European borderscapes, the stories of migration struggle suggest their intersection. The mobility of migrants and the forces of control that intersect with them turn these detached sites into connected border-geographies that entail both different possibilities for escape and different registers of violence.

Lesvos, the first experience of Europe for Jawad, Arash and Azadi meant, for two of them, incarceration in the ‘hell of Pagani’. While the notorious centre is no longer in use, Greece is in the process of erecting a new detention centre near the village of Moria that, mostly funded by the EU, will be able to detain up to 700 people for up to 18
months. As ‘Pagani’ had once been, ‘Moria’ will become a synonym for EUrope’s treatment of the unwanted other who, after having been greeted by G reek coast guards, often in “black uniforms, [carrying] guns and [wearing] full face-covering masks”, will be forced to leave their fingerprints, to then disappear for weeks or months in detention.

Once released, many will probably take the ferry to Athens where they might ‘get stuck’, go into hiding, and become subjected to practitioners who perform the border through racial discrimination and fear. Some, especially young men may decide to travel on to Patras or Igoumenitsa where they live precariously in occupied factories, seeking to escape Greece hidden in lorries and ferries.

There are, however, no prewritten scripts.

Lesvos, the first experience of EUrope for Jawad, Arash and Azadi meant hope and friendship, solidarity, activist and local support, forming, months after their escape, the reasons for their desire to come back, despite homelessness and precariousness. When they returned to Greece in 2013, Jawad could not wait to explore Athens. In some ways, despite it all, Athens was his home for a while. When I tell the three of my plans to visit Patras they veer between past stories of horror and adventure, of loneliness and community. Maybe excess in migration struggles, then, also resides within these counter-stories of solidarity, friendship and love that the dispositif does not care for, of which police forces and border guards fail to grasp the significance, forming that which remains an indescribable, in-transcribable, in-traversable potentiality.

87 See also: Joint declaration of the Euro Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), Migreurop, Welcome to Europe and Youth without Borders, ‘Lesvos/ Greece the new European cage for migrants’,
Lesvos October 2013, http://www.euromedrights.org/eng/2013/10/17/lesvos-greece-the-new-
european-cage-for-migrants/, Accessed 05/11/2013; note that I contributed to writing the statement.
Chapter Six: EUROpe in Question

Introduction
This final chapter inquires into what the different migration resistances followed in the thesis ask of EUROpe, demand of EUROpe and how they may create imaginaries or communities beyond EUROpe. Posing questions suggests the expectation of a response. EUROpean responses to migration struggles are enacted in various ways, by disciplining and deporting, by silence and abandonment, by offering humanitarian gestures, new policies and categories, and, at times, by listening. And while these responses are in themselves depended on the particular question, they carry, inasmuch as the questions posed, elements of transversality that relate to a greater truth that underlies contemporary EUROpe.

Migration, in this thesis, is not regarded as ‘a problem for EUROpe’ to be governed but something that, in its movements and struggles, problematises EUROpe. What emerge through migration struggles are different frames of EUROpe. As forces of animation, these resistances not only unmask the ‘particular’ and ‘general’ ways in which EUROpe practices its borders, and therewith its ‘others’, but also the rationales and (normative) truths, the discourses, explanations, and motifs that underlie EUROpe’s divisionary practices and its attempts to foster a community. These (dominant) frames are not only exposed but become also questioned, problematised, challenged and resisted.

Conceiving resistance as method, the many (re-)narrated practices of migration struggle were explored for what they reveal, for what they animate and articulate. The transversal struggles, though distinctly diverse, spoke of related conditions of suffering and related registers of violence that were produced, performed, and maintained by EUROpe and its border dispositif. Of course, EUROpe as an amalgam of at times contradictory and fractured traits does not constitute a coherent singularity. Nonetheless, even if in conflictual ways, EUROpe thought as a dispositif responds to its need that desires the ordering, directing, filtering, managing, monitoring, dividing, and deterring of certain individuals, groups and populations.
When listening to those who resist being ordered, divided, or deterred, EUrope becomes traceable, if only as a frame of reference. It is through these resistances that EUrope is posed as a question: When seen through forms of struggle that resist the ways human multiplicities become regulated, what does EUrope become?

Part I of this chapter, ‘Frames of EUrope’, explores how migration struggles reveal different frames of EUrope. Judith Butler’s elaboration on ‘frames’ helps to inquire into the ways EUrope becomes constituted, discursively and practically, in different frames that seek to produce an image of EUrope and its role in the world. While frames can and do shift, some dominant frames become continuously reproduced and are thereby made recognisable.

Part II, ‘EUrope, divided in (Peaceful) Unity’, interrogates one of these dominant frames. It is argued that this ‘unity frame’ creates an ostensible coherence among EUropean states and people, suggesting a shared historic tragedy as a mandate to Europeanise the future. The reproduction of such frame of EUrope and its mythical idea become contested through migration struggles. While its unity is grounded on a discourse of (internal) peace, these struggles displace and decentre EUrope by showing how its division-making practices have violent effects on others, within and beyond what is typically understood as EUrope.

Part III, ‘Humanitarian EUrope’, intimately related to the second part, shows how EUropean border practitioners become portrayed as humanitarian actors. The humanitarian argument and reason were traceable in all ethnographic studies, seeking to create a frame through which EUrope becomes perceived as a humanitarian force and a benevolent community. Migration struggles expose the selectivity and paradoxicality of the ‘humanitarian government of borders’ so that the frame becomes equally questioned and disrupted.

Part IV, ‘Post/colonial EUrope’, illustrates how migration movements and struggles create a ‘post-colonial counter-frame’ that forcefully disrupts dominant frames of

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1 Butler, Frames of War, 2009.
EUrope. Both the unity and humanitarian frames can reproduce themselves only if questions of coloniality, imperialism, and racism are side-lined and ignored. Migration struggles, carrying within them a postcolonial dimension tell other stories of (colonial) EUrope.

Part V, ‘Collectivities in Transit’, shows how migration struggles create imaginaries beyond EUrope. EUrope is not the model or telos for a community to come but a violently defended political space in which, nonetheless, different solidarities and collectivities can and do emerge.

**Part I - Frames of EUrope**

Contemporary migration struggles are key sites to evaluate not only how EUrope’s many borders are practiced and resisted but also to explore the different frames into which EUrope becomes placed. What the three forms of resistance discussed in this thesis reveal is that while they occur in diverse geographic sites and various temporal trajectories, differ in constitution, scale, scope and effect, they all are implicated in dynamic processes for which EUrope, implicitly or explicitly, constitutes several frames of reference.

These struggles tell (counter-)stories of EUrope. This is neither to suggest that every struggle is (‘anti’-)EUropean, nor that every response to migration struggles is a EUropean response or performed in the name of EUrope. EUrope is not a ‘point’ of reference that can be easily localised and defined as a static entity that serves border practices as an orienting device. Nonetheless, in these practices, EUrope’s traces can be found. Migration struggles, in this sense, help find EUrope in border practices. They make EUrope traceable even if that what becomes recognisable does not correspond with its dominant self-conceptions.

Exploring EUrope through different frames follows Butler’s conceptualisation of frames as mediating devises that engender collective interpretations and apprehensions. The frame suggests a certain order and stability of that which is framed; it “seeks to
contain, convey, and determine what is seen.”² For Butler, frames themselves are “operations of power” and while they cannot “unilaterally decide the conditions of appearance [...] their aim is nevertheless to delimit the sphere of appearance itself.”³ The frame and the act of framing are commentaries “on the history of the frame itself” and guide interpretations on what that is that the frame frames.⁴ The frame seeks to allow certain images, norms, interpretations, or truths to become recognised and recognisable. For Butler, “recognizability describes those general conditions on the basis of which recognition can and does take place.”⁵ Some frames are more recognisable than others as they succeed in establishing “conditions of reproducibility.”⁶

These frames, in this chapter referred to as ‘dominant frames’ are able to discursively, visually, and practically invent and reproduce a truth about themselves. As shown later on, the frame that casts EUrope in a humanitarian light is more recognisable and dominant than necropolitical or post-colonial frames of EUrope. Nevertheless, the frame, even if dominant, never is static and exhaustive but unstable. As Butler argues:

[T]he “frame” does not quite contain what it conveys, but breaks apart every time it seeks to give definitive organization to its content. In other words, the frame does not hold anything together in one place, but itself becomes a kind of perpetual breakage, subject to a temporal logic by which it moves from place to place.⁷

Even the dominant frame, in its attempts of self-framing, is unable to reproduce itself without contestation. The frame’s reproducibility, its attempt to re-narrate itself and its truth in a novel context exposes “its vulnerability to reversal, to subversion, even to critical instrumentalization.”⁸

For Butler, the circulation of Abu Ghraib images of torture and abuse or poetry written in Guantanamo are moments in which dominant frames (of war) become questioned, subverted, and possibly broken.

² Ibid., p. 10.
³ Ibid., p. 1.
⁴ Ibid., p. 8.
⁵ Ibid., p. 6.
⁶ Ibid., p. 10.
⁷ Ibid.
⁸ Ibid.
The movement of the image or the text outside of confinement is a kind of “breaking out,” so that even though neither the image nor the poetry can free anyone from prison, or stop a bomb or, indeed, reverse the course of the war, they nevertheless do provide the conditions for breaking out of the quotidian acceptance of war and for a more generalized horror and outrage that will support and impel calls for justice and an end to violence.9

The taken for granted image, norm, or truth becomes questioned, distorted, contradicted, and attempts to reproduce the dominant frame can turn into grotesque performances. When, for example, Commission President Barroso sought to reiterate EUrope’s image as a humanitarian saviour while ‘mourning’ the dead of Lampedusa, his framing of EUrope turned into a bizarre spectacle (as shown in Chapter Four).

Migration struggles reinforce these processes of breakage by putting forward alternative realities, rendering reproductive efforts of dominant frames inept, paradoxical, and grotesque. Through the shaming of Barroso by Eritrean migrants and activists during his mission of official mourning, the necropolitical condition intruded into images of humanitarian compassion and the dominant frames of EUrope started to crumble.

Thinking EUrope as several socially constructed frames allows moving away from conceptions of EUrope as a singularity and toward a EUrope that, while framed in dominant ways, also entails plurality and breakage. EUrope, then, is not something static but something that emerges in processes of truth-making and truth-reproduction. Exploring frames of EUrope through border practices and migration struggles also (partly) responds to Jacques Derrida’s puzzle as to what EUrope is “even if we no longer know very well what or who goes by this name.”10 Derrida asks: “Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?”11

9 Ibid., p. 11.
11 Ibid.
While this EUropean question is sometimes purportedly solved by imagining EUrope as a political structure emanating from a core (or ‘root’ in a Deleuzian sense), for example from certain ‘core’ member states, nation-states as such, the European Commission, the Council, EUrope’s citizens or elites, the various definitions of EUrope disclose its plural nature. The attempt to reduce EUrope to a core, or to suggest, for example, that it simply is intergovernmental, supranational, post-national, or a normative ‘soft power’ must always fail as one eschews conceptualising EUrope in its plurality and complexity. The inability to name EUrope as a singularity becomes part of its very definition.

Imagining EUrope as a heterogenous assemblage as this thesis has done is not meant to claim uniqueness or to celebrate its (allegedly cosmopolitan, post-national, neo-liberal) diversity but is, instead, a necessary step to come to terms with the variety of practitioners that enact its many divisions and exclusions. The unnameability of EUrope as a singularity has allowed for deniability in enactments of violent border practices. Greek national border guards can be blamed for deadly push-backs in the Aegean Sea but not Frontex that operates in the same region, even regularly accompanying Greek coast guard vessels. Guards of German/Hungarian/Italian/Greek detention centres can be criticised for abusing detainees but not EUrope’s Dublin system that enables chain-deportation, and therewith chain-detention. Shipmasters, traffickers, and North African militaries can be scolded for abandoning migrants at high sea but not EUrope’s border defense system that barricades the remaining safe paths into EUrope (for particular groups), and criminalises those who rescue people in distress. Violence, it seems, is never of EUropean origin but is something produced by others elsewhere, member state nationals or foreigners, who fail to live up to the humane way, the EUropean-humanitarian way, of practicing borders. Violence conflicts with the idea of EUrope.

This is where migration struggles intervene. They intervene by articulating and animating EUrope and its violence while, at the same time, calling EUrope and its dominant frames into question. They contest, as Gurminder Bhambra states, “the exclusion of others from the narratives of Europe, European modernity, and European

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integration.” Exploring EUrope through these struggles always entails several dynamically intersecting movements: The movements that trigger resistance, the movements that were triggered by resistance, the movements that unfolded due to colliding forces of resistance. Within these movements EUrope emerges or, rather, EUrope emerges as a question in a plurality of frames.

Migration struggles expose and unravel dominant frames of EUropean recognisability and create images through which EUrope becomes recognised differently. In this sense, they respond to two questions posed by Butler:

What might be done to produce a more egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability? What might be done, in other words, to shift the very terms of recognizability in order to produce more radically democratic results?

The struggles’ articulations of EUrope do not reduce EUrope to a singularity or a totality but question its dominant frames by revealing the interrelated forms of violence that are sought to be hidden away or veiled in its humanitarianism or in its inarticulability. In this way, they show how EUrope always breaks with its own dominant frames in border practices.

What happens when a frame breaks with itself is that a taken-for-granted reality is called into question, exposing the orchestrating designs of the authority who sought to control the frame.

With the contemporary rise and circulation of migration struggles, the ability to ‘control the frame’ recedes. Migration resistances shift the terms of recognisability by juxtaposing different EUropean frames. In this way they question and un/democratise the image of EUrope. EUrope begins to be recognised differently, turning from ‘EUrope, united in peaceful diversity’ and ‘humanitarian EUrope’, to ‘post-colonial/racist EUrope’, and maybe also to ‘non-EUrope’. These different EUropean frames are explored in turn in the following parts.

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15 Ibid., p. 12.
Part II - Europe, United in (Peaceful) Diversity

In October 2012, the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Nobel Peace Prize to the EU for its contribution “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” and the transformation of Europe “from a continent of war to a continent of peace.” The Committee emphasised the legacy of the Second World War that drove the growing desire for reconciliation between European nation-states and the unification of the European continent. In his speech, the chairman of the Committee Thorbjørn Jagland concluded with pathos:


The announcement of the Committee prompted the ‘Collective of Venticinqueundici’, a group of Italian women and Tunisian mothers, some of whose children had disappeared on their journeys to Europe, to “express our deepest opposition to this award decision which hints at a conception of peace which is different from ours.”

The collective held that while there were multiple grounds for criticising the award, they contested it on the basis of the EU’s

[...] migratory policies which have been causing the disappearance and the death of thousands of people in the past decades, transforming the Mediterranean into a maritime [...] cemetery. We contest this prize because a peace that implies those disappearances and deaths can’t be our peace.

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19 Ibid.
In their contestation, the Collective not only offered a different understanding of peace, something often considered a universal value, but also suggested that it was the EUropean peace that implied the disappearance of people on the move and their suffering. In this way, EUrope’s peace became articulated differently, as an exclusionary peace that prospered only at the expense of other life.

The diverse forms of resistance examined in this thesis articulate and contest EUrope’s dominant frames in similar ways, by implicitly or explicitly asking ‘whose unity, whose peace, and whose humanity is at stake?’ and ‘at whose expense were and are these won?’. The Non-Citizens in Germany proclaimed that EUrope’s freedom meant their incarceration, its prosperity their exploitation, its citizenship their non-citizenship. The Boats4People campaign contrasted EUrope’s humanitarian rhetoric to necropolitical realities and the Afghan travellers, being ‘stuck in Greece’, exposed how EUrope’s ‘Dublin-solidarity’ (re-)created divisions. What is this ‘EUrope united in (peaceful) diversity’ frame that the Noble Peace Prize is an expression of?

The statement of the Nobel Committee, in which Europe and the EU are equated, suggests that processes of EUropean enlargement and integration have unified a war-torn continent and given rise to decades of peaceful coexistence of its nation-states and populations. The Committee awarded EUrope’s past achievements of building bridges between former enemies and cautioned that in the current financial crisis more EUrope, a EUrope ‘standing together’ would be needed more than ever. 20

In the Nobel Prize acceptance speech, ‘From war to peace: a European tale’, jointly delivered by Commission President Barroso and Council President Van Rompuy, they state:

So what a bold bet it was, for Europe’s Founders, to say, yes, we can break this endless cycle of violence, we can stop the logic of vengeance, we can build a brighter future, together. What power of the imagination. [...] It worked. Peace is now self-evident. War has become inconceivable. [...] Our continent, risen from the ashes after 1945 and united in 1989, has a great capacity to reinvent itself. [...] Peace cannot rest

only on the good will of man. It needs to be grounded on a body of laws, on common interests and on a deeper sense of a community of destiny. [...] My message today is: you can count on our efforts to fight for lasting peace, freedom and justice in Europe and in the world. Over the past sixty years, the European project has shown that it is possible for peoples and nations to come together across borders. That it is possible to overcome the differences between “them” and “us”. 21

For Van Rompuy and Barroso, the European project was born in times of great suffering when peace seemed unimaginable. It was due to the coming together of enemies, transcending borders and overcoming us-them distinctions that Europe could reinvent itself, uniting a torn continent.

This frame, in which unity is tied to lasting peace as well as diversity, is also repeatedly evoked by important ‘public intellectuals’, including Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck. In ‘What Binds Europeans Together’, co-signed by Derrida, Habermas states:

Contemporary Europe has been shaped by the experience of the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century and through the Holocaust – the persecution and the annihilation of European Jews in which the National Socialist regime made the societies of the conquered countries complicit as well. Self-critical controversies about this past remind us of the moral basis of politics. 22

Beck speaks similarly of Europe’s unique historic responsibility:

[T]he memory of the Holocaust is not just a monument to Europe’s sense of the tragic. It is a memorial specifically to the European barbarism that was made possible by the marriage of modernity and the nation-state. It is a mass grave upon which the new Europe made an oath and chose a different path. Europe’s collective memory of the Holocaust provides the basis of the EU. 23

For Beck and Habermas, the Holocaust is Europe’s lieu de mémoire, a place of tragic memory out of which a new community emerged, a Europe of peace and cosmopolitan

22 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’, Constellations, 10:3 (2003), p. 296.
values, of “radical tolerance and radical openness”.24 EUrope has learned from its past failures and its past barbarism, they seem to argue, to become a unique and successful cosmopolitan entity that, now, “teaches the modern world” how to deal with “global problems that are gathering ominously all around”.25 Beck enthusiastically announces:

Europeanization means creating a new politics. It means entering as a player into the meta-power game, into the struggle to form the rules of a new global order. The catchphrase for the future might be, Move over America – Europe is back!26

EUntrpe, Beck holds, has returned after many decades of grief and blame (maybe similar to Germany), of humble Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘struggling to come to terms with the past’), of reconciliation among neighbours. EUntrpe, they seem to argue, is progressively Europeanising itself, and its remaining shortcomings, such as its ‘democratic deficit’ exist due to the fact that EUntrpe “isn’t European enough.”27

For Van Rompuy, Barroso and Jagland, as well as Habermas and Beck, EUntrpe constitutes more than a marriage of convenience. EUrope is guided by “the will to remain masters of our own destiny, a sense of togetherness, and in a way [...] speaking to us from the centuries [...] the idea of Europe itself”28. What is this idea of EUntrpe that echoes through these accounts? EUntrpe, it seems, has a mythical quality to it, something that, while always there, had been lost in the turmoil of fascist wars and has now been re(dis)covered.29 As Bhambra argues:

‘European culture’, the ‘European spirit’, the ‘ethos of Europe’, ‘Europe’s unique creativity’ – these are some ways of identifying the deep rooted unity of Europe and pointing to a common destiny that emerges from the actions of Europe constructed as a singular subject [...].30

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Van Rompuy and Barroso, ‘From war to peace: a European tale’, 2012, emphasis added.
EUrope is ‘back’ to become the model for the future, a model for the world that other continents should ‘follow’.\textsuperscript{31} In these accounts, EUropean unity becomes a frame within which EUrope conceives itself. Unity means the overcoming of war, of self-centred nationalism, and of cultural antagonisms. Unity suggests past divisions and their resolution in peace. It frames a history of successful enlargement and integration by ‘soft power’, Enlightenment rationality, normative means, and humanitarian values. Only in unity can EUrope be thought and only through unity can EUrope’s destiny unfold. Unity through progressive Europeanisation refrains from impositions and respects diversity.

EUrope’s motto ‘united in diversity’ has, as Delanty and Rumford show, “become the most influential expression of European identity today.”\textsuperscript{32} This motto “reflects a broader debate about universalism and relativism and, too, the much deeper philosophical theme in European thought of becoming and oneness.”\textsuperscript{33} While ‘united in diversity’ seems to successfully combine oneness and difference, it forms a problematic idea.\textsuperscript{1} Delanty and Rumford argue:

\begin{quote}
The EU is now caught in the contradictory situation of having to define a common European culture that is universal – but not so universal that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the same time does not negate national and regional cultures. On the one side, the condition of universality must be satisfied and, on the other, the principle of diversity must be upheld.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

If EUrope is principally marked by diversity, a difference or pluralism that needs to be cherished, what is it that holds it together? Its motto seems to assume that “a higher unity derives from an underlying one and will attain a degree of coherence out of the recognition of diversity and ultimately manifesting itself in a collective identity.”\textsuperscript{35} For Rumford and Delanty, EUrope understood as united in diversity is highly limiting as it accepts the persistence of static (national, regional, cultural) differences, and may even

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., p. 57.
\item Ibid., p. 60.
\item Ibid., p. 64.
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be “close to a legitimation of xenophobic nationalism whereby the unity of Europe consists in the separation of peoples into difference cultures.” 36 While these concerns ring true, the phrase ‘united in diversity’ alludes also to something else, something that folds into the European idealism and its myth referred to above. Suggesting an acceptance of difference as the unifying element of contemporary Europe, the phrase signals post-national humility and modernity.

For Habermas, Europe has left behind its fanatical divisions and “had to painfully learn how difference can be communicated, contradictions institutionalized, and tensions stabilized.” 37 Accepting difference, for him, does not imply the impossibility of community. To the contrary: “The acknowledgement of differences - the reciprocal acknowledgement of the Other in his otherness - can also become a feature of a common identity.” 38 And Beck holds:

The European conception of humanity doesn’t contain any concrete definition of what it means to be human. It can’t. It is of its essence that it be anti-essentialist. Strictly speaking, it is a-human, in the sense that one can be a-religious. The European idea of “man” was formed precisely by casting off all the naïve conceptions of what it meant to be human that had been imposed on it by religion and moralizing metaphysics. 39

Having learned from its supposedly unique and cruel past where millions died as a result of intolerance to diversity, a totalitarian conception of ‘the human’ and therewith ‘the sub-human’, Europe, so Beck and Habermas, now not only accepts but promotes (acceptable degrees of) difference.

Europe, it seems to be suggested, has left behind its history of violence, has reflected, reconciled, and ‘come back’, risen to the task to teach and enlighten the world (once again) about ‘its’ conception of humanity, ‘its’ idea of man, ‘its’ destiny. Referring to the overcoming of past suffering as foundational moments, these conceptions avoid explicitly exclusionary self-definitions, such as those grounding Europe in its religious

36 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
38 Ibid.
Latin Christian heritage and, rather, emphasise humanist values and liberal (democratic) virtues.\textsuperscript{40} Habermas and Beck’s EUrope could be summarised as follows: ‘Its essence is that it be anti-essentialist, its human is that it be a-human, its unity is that it be diverse’. These juxtapositions, while in themselves incompatible make sense only in the context of non-EUrope and EUrope’s other, for the juxtaposition ‘EUrope is that it be un-EUropean’ does not hold.

Even if, as Bo Stråth shows, Europe is referred to as ‘the continent’ in countries such as Britain, Sweden, or Norway and therewith marked “as belonging to the Others”, EUrope’s diversity is different to what becomes considered as non-EUropean diversity.\textsuperscript{41} EUrope’s diversity unifies as it is its internal diversity that is acceptable, that must be accepted due to its peculiar and violent past that grounds its future. EUrope’s ‘empty essence’ allows, following Beck once again, for “radical openness” but, of course, only within what is understood as EUrope and EUropean.\textsuperscript{42} Such cosmopolitan Eurocentrism implicitly relates to the outside’s lack of EUropean tolerance for difference, for a-humanness, for a-religiousness, for anti-essentialism. EUrope’s internal difference is different to the outside’s difference and in order to maintain its unifying diversity it must foreclose the intrusion of the other’s otherness that is incompatible with its own internal otherness.

As shown in the previous part, Butler conceptualises the frame as being always in relation to a beyond. This relation entails two somewhat contradictory processes. While, on the one hand, it is the frame’s outside that makes the inside possible and recognisable, it is, on the other hand, the intrusion of the outside into the frame that shakes the (united in diversity) frame, questions its authority to order the inside, prompts continual breakage and therewith a distortion of what was assumed to be easily recognisable.

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\textsuperscript{40} See Delanty, \textit{Inventing Europe} 1995, p. 2.
\end{flushright}
While the age-old query of where Europe begins and where it ends remains a contested and unresolved political problem, the question of where Europe begins and ends seems to have found an obvious answer: the combined territories of the member states of the EU constitute, even if provisionally, the realm of Europe. In such understanding, processes of EU enlargement and integration could well change its shape, extend its reach, and move its geographical borders further out but Europe would, nonetheless, remain the sum of its territorial parts within the continent of Europe. Peo Hansen shows that this assumption is flawed as these common conceptions of Europe disregard European possessions elsewhere, such as Melilla and Ceuta in North Africa or the French Overseas Departments, and contends that it is due to its colonial legacy that it is “impossible to confine a discussion of Europe to what is presently considered Europe’s own ‘turf’.” While the displacement of Europe is discussed in greater detail in part IV, Europe becomes also displaced through the way it practices its borders. One could say that Europe begins not where it unites but where it divides.

When one imagines Europe through the different migration movements and struggles discussed in this thesis, it becomes not a peacefully unified singularity but a violently dividing plurality. When following these movements and struggles, patterns of Europe beyond its (internal) ‘unity frame’ become visible and traceable. Even before the three Afghan minors, the passengers on the Left-to-Die-Boat, the Syrian family in Athens and many of the Non-Citizens embarked on their journeys, Europe had already intruded into their ‘local’ and into their ‘everyday’.

Europe, in Syria, Afghanistan and Africa, had already conditioned possibilities of migration. Its practices of division-creating bind many to the ‘local’, preventing or at least influencing their departure, structuring their ability to become migrants and determining, if only partially, what kind of migrant they can become. Europe’s borders, off-shored and outsourced, have global reach. The EU’s Schengen visa regime, for example, “inscribes an unambiguous di-visionary borderline on the planet” and thereby “slows down, illegalises, or immobilises the mobility of a significant part of the world.

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population and prioritises and mobilises the travelling speed of a select human segment.”

Such regime bans some to the local while facilitating the beyond for others. When some of those many millions who are sought to be immobilised decide to move nonetheless, their movements are precarious, illegalised, and criminalised. EUrope’s attempts to “secure the external”, range from visa regimes to Frontex deployment in West African territories, from the creation of policy-frameworks such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) with its ‘mobility partnerships’, to cooperation with inter-governmental organisations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), from agreements with so-called ‘sending’ and ‘transit’ countries to (private) deportation enforcers that return unwanted intruders back to their ‘countries of origin’.

While many of EUrope’s practices of division are dispersed and externalised, some remain securely attached to its material and territorial inside. In order to claim asylum one needs to have accessed EUropean soil. EUrope’s immediate outside, the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, the Strait of Gibraltar and certain land borders have thus become militarised borderzones. For Jaser’s family, the passengers of the Left-to-Die-Boat, and the Afghan minors, this passage to the inside was costly, traumatic, and violent. The Syrian family lost one of its members in the Evros river and others disappeared or had to be left behind during the journey. When EUrope’s other others succeed in entering its inside, EUrope becomes a labyrinth of overlapping borderscapes in which divisions materialise in various temporal and spatial fashions. As Jawad told me: “Europe is a real trap! One leaves one trap and falls into the next one.”

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46 Interview with Jawad in Hamburg on the 20th of April 2014, my own translation.
The ethnographies conducted in Germany, Italy/Tunisia, and Greece demonstrate how the ramification of the border dispositif implies that every spatio-temporal trajectory of migrant journeys can turn into moments of possible collision with European border manifestations, practitioners, and systems. Border collisions do not occur indiscriminately; traps are not laid out at random. There is a greater density of border control practices in strategic locations which, however, does not mean that borders cannot (re-)materialise in the most diffuse and surprising ways.

When those who were supposed to remain excluded intrude into Europe, its ‘united in diversity’ frame acquires a different meaning. Both dimensions, European unity and diversity have potentially detrimental and violent effects. Through the Europeanisation of European borderspace, for example through the Dublin II&III regulations, new biometric data systems and Frontex missions, Europe becomes both united as well as divided. It unites by casting migration as a problem that requires concerted European (policy) answers and government which, in turn, however, reinforces internal divisions among member states. It is due to the Europeanisation of migration policies and politics that Greece’s internal and external borders are fortified, turning Greece for people in transit into a space of imprisonment. While Rumford and Delanty are rightly concerned that the ‘united in diversity’ frame could reinforce nationalist xenophobia and the separation of people within Europe, contemporary European divisions are already practiced through processes of unification against an ‘other other’.

What migration movements and struggles, as well as border practices show is that even though Europe’s inside has never been an ordered but a highly unequal realm, the idea of Europe as united in diversity requires processes of differentiation with something that lies beyond. There is always an outside to Europe’s unity, even if that unity seems itself divided. It is the ‘other other’ who helps reproduce the ‘united in diversity’ frame and makes Europe more recognisable.

It is, however, also due to the intrusion and struggle of the ‘other other’ that European frames become articulated and distorted. What the women of the ‘Collective of Venticinqueundici’, the Non-Citizens and other migration resistances show is that Europe’s peace, its unity, and even its diversity are not ‘theirs’. More than that, they claim that Europe’s peace and unity have created the conditions that led to their
suffering and exclusion. While Europe’s ‘unity frame’ imagines itself mainly as an inward-looking singularity, it is through its ‘humanitarian frame’ that EUrope looks outward and relates to the other other, within or beyond what is commonly considered to be EUrope.

Part III - Humanitarian EUrope

When in June 2013 Non-Citizen activists become expelled from the square they had occupied in Munich for a dry hunger-strike (as discussed in Chapter Three), the eviction is justified on humanitarian grounds. Munich’s mayor Ude states that “the absolute priority is to protect life and limb” and Minister for the Interior Herrmann maintains that “it was right and necessary, in the interest of rescuing human lives, to bring [them] today to a hospital and not to wait any longer.” Referring repeatedly to the alleged denial of access of doctors assigned to the camp by the city, Ude and Herrmann allude to an unfolding humanitarian crisis at their doorstep that necessitated a response by the state, due to its “duty to protect”. About 350 police forces raid the camp in the early hours of the 30th of June. The medical team present in the camp reports of brutal police tactics endangering the lives of the weakened hunger-strikers and describe the humanitarian justification for eviction as farcical.

The Mediterranean Sea is deemed a site of continuous humanitarian crises. The Boat-Left-to-Die was merely one of many instances that have subsequently become regarded as humanitarian tragedies (as shown in Chapter Four). Referring to a shipwreck of October 2013, Barroso, for example, states:

As I saw for myself, when I visited Lampedusa [...] the scale of the human tragedy in the Mediterranean means we have to act now. The European Union cannot accept that thousands of people die at our borders.

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Believing that there now is “a sense of urgency that will make things happen”, Barroso’s European Commission task force proposes to “[r]einforce search and rescue operations to save lives”, to assist frontline EU member states, “to work with the countries of origin and transit so that we can manage migration flows”, and to “fight against organised crime and human trafficking.”\textsuperscript{51} Europe, Barroso seems to suggest, cannot ‘remain passive’ in the light of human suffering but must actively intervene to prevent the deaths of those who risk their lives to come to Europe.

The inhabitants of the abandoned factory in Patras attempt daily to escape Greece but are aware that the border with Italy, once porous, has been strengthened in the past few years. While some succeeded in leaving and subsequently experienced chain-deportation back to Greece, most have been ‘stuck in Greece’ all along as a common phrase amongst people in transit goes. The hardening of Greece’s internal EUropean borders needs to be seen in relation not only to an increase in migration movements via Greece (as explained in Chapter Five) but also to a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that led to a halt in deportations back to Greece due to the “inhuman and degrading treatment” of migrants in Greek detention.\textsuperscript{52} As a (probably unanticipated) consequence of the MSS vs. Belgium and Greece ruling, the pressure of member states and EU on Greece to seal its internal borders intensified, and the Greek government’s response, in effect, imprisoned thousands of migrants who sought and seek to move beyond Greece. In some sense, the ‘humanitarian act’ of the Court of Human Rights and the member states’ adherence to its judgement rendered the inhabitants of the factory, and thousands of other people on the move exposed to the everyday inhumanity of Greek border practices and spaces.

These brief examples, in relation to the three ethnographic chapters, point to moments in border practices and struggles in which a humanitarian logic comes to the fore. The Non-Citizens’ exposure to death evoked the eviction of the camp justified by humanitarian arguments that prioritised the protection of ‘life and limb’ over the right to

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} European Court of Human Rights, ‘Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application no. 30696/09’, 2011.
assemble, protest, and hunger-strike. The many tragedies in the Mediterranean, as Barroso held, prompted the EU to ‘urgent’ action in order to save future lives that would otherwise also perish in the sea. The EUropean accord to (temporarily) halt deportations to Greece responded to human suffering experienced in Greece’s evidently inhuman detention centres. These examples, while eclectic, are not unique and point to a humanitarian logic at work in contemporary EUropean border practices that produces a frame of EUrope as humanitarian actor.

Gregory Feldman convincingly shows how the EUropean border regime becomes commonly justified in humanitarian terms: “EU officials speak fluently in the language of human rights with regular references to fair treatment, due process, and personal dignity.”53 He suggests, for example, that while Frontex officials understand their mission as militaristic in form, “they stress their commitment to the liberal virtues of humanitarianism and legalism in all their practices.”54 Novel (biometric, maritime) systems of control are “justified as a humanitarian measure to protect, rather patronizingly, individuals from themselves, invoking a neo-colonial register.”55 Feldman argues that “[t]he degree of humanitarianism increases in inverse proportion to the migrant’s impact on the EU polity.”56 Humanitarian care, he argues, presupposes political passivity on the part of the receiver and “is extended only when the migrant is removed from the body politic or when the migrant’s body becomes incapacitated to the point of political impotence.”57

In both the eviction of the Non-Citizen activists and Barroso’s call for intervention, the use of humanitarian rhetoric could certainly be seen as “no more than a smoke screen that plays on sentiment in order to impose the law of the market and the brutality of realpolitik.”58 But, as Didier Fassin asks, “even if this were the case, the question would remain: Why does it work so well?” Fassin argues:

54 Ibid., p. 87.
55 Ibid., p. 147.
56 Ibid., p. 107.
57 Ibid., p. 11.
Moral sentiments have become an essential force in contemporary politics: they nourish its discourses and legitimize its practices, particularly where these discourses and practices are focused on the disadvantaged and the dominated [...]. By “moral sentiments” are meant the emotions that direct our attention to the suffering of others and make us want to remedy them [...].  

For Fassin, the term ‘humanity’ denotes two senses: First, humanity conceived as mankind supposes an entire human species while second, humanity thought as humanness supposes a feeling of sympathy for one’s fellow. Humanity thus “implies that all lives are equally sacred and that all sufferings deserve to be relieved.” In the words of Van Rompuy and Barroso:

We all share the same planet. Poverty, organised crime, terrorism, climate change: these are problems that do not respect national borders. We share the same aspirations and universal values: these are progressively taking root in a growing number of countries all over the world. We share [...] the irreducible uniqueness of the human being. Beyond our nation, beyond our continent, we are all part of one mankind.

Barroso and Van Rompuy evoke both humanness and mankind when discussing ‘global problems’ and demanding humanitarian solutions. Interestingly, they fail to mention ‘migration’ as a force that does equally disrespect national borders.

Not a mere smoke screen, Fassin regards such humanitarian reason as a “moral economy” that emerged in the twentieth century and continues to underlie contemporary governmental rationales. Fassin even speaks of ‘humanitarian government’,

[...] defined as the administration of human collectivities in the name of a higher moral principle which sees the preservation of life and the alleviation of suffering as the highest value of action.

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59 Ibid., p. 1.
60 Ibid., pp. 247-248.
61 Ibid., p. 248.
Government, here, needs to be understood in a broad Foucauldian sense (as discussed in Chapter Two) and not as the hierarchical, ‘top-down’ exercise of authority. Humanitarian government then is something that fluctuates and can take on different forms in different situations, and be practiced by a variety of actors. When Feldman speaks of a ‘schizophrenic discourse’, for example when “medical care is available to residents in the holding center, even if it requires their shackling to a gurney” this does not imply the absence but the selective application of ‘humanitarian reason’.\textsuperscript{65}

The schizophrenic humanitarian narrative in border practices is also pointed out by Fassin. While, for example, both refugee and asylum-seeker populations are governed by humanitarian sentiments, their government takes on different but related expressions. Refugees (in poor countries) are governed as “large and often undifferentiated populations, for whom mass initiatives are set in place” while asylum-seekers (in rich countries) become individually scrutinised.\textsuperscript{66} Fassin argues:

But in order for this double register of humanitarianism to work, both the territorial and the moral boundaries between the two worlds must be sealed as tightly as possible – for example, preventing refugees from the South from claiming the prerogatives granted to asylum seekers in the North.\textsuperscript{67}

Even though humanitarian principles are present in the government of both refugees and asylum-seekers (in poor and rich countries), they are evoked in radically unequal settings and take on different forms. The humanitarian argument can be utilised and applied selectively, thereby side-lining larger questions of structural and global inequality.

When the eviction of the camp of hunger-strikers in Munich is justified on the basis of allowing life and preventing death, and the hunger-strikers are promised a re-assessment of their individual asylum claims, the (normalised) conditions that gave rise to their actions and despair do not become questioned. When Barroso proposes humanitarian interventions in the Mediterranean Sea to rescue migrant lives he ignores the general

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\item \textsuperscript{65} Feldman, \textit{Migration Apparatus}, 2012, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Fassin, \textit{Humanitarian Reason}, 2012, p. 253.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
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(necropolitical) condition of the EUropean border dispositif that creates border crossings as struggles against death. When the Court of Human Rights judges over Greece’s inhuman treatment of an individual asylum-seeker in detention, the general condition of inhumanity inscribed in the EUropean Dublin detention and deportation system is ignored, as is EUrope’s continuous funding of Greek detention centres.

Selectivity, it seems, is needed for humanitarian reason to function in contemporary borderwork even if it conflicts with humanity’s universal doctrine of equality among mankind. This is not surprising as acts dividing humans that must underlie (or constitute) borderwork presuppose and (re-)produce radical inequality. However, the global and structural forms of inequality do not become questioned but seen as (quasi-natural) preconditions within which the humanitarian logic can function to preserve life and alleviate suffering. In this sense, humanitarian reason can be conveniently applied and adapted to particular crisis or emergency situations within spaces of structural injustice: The eviction responds to the crisis of the near-death of hunger-strikers, not Germany’s/ EUrope’s asylum-system; Mediterranean interventions respond to maritime emergencies, not to EUrope’s border-militarisation and externalisation efforts; the ECtHR responds to an individual predicament in Greece’s inhuman detention estates, not to EUrope’s Dublin II&III absurdity and the thousands who remain detained.

What emerges through migration struggles and their animation of contemporary border practices is a humanitarian frame of EUrope. EUrope responds to migration struggles by speaking a humanitarian language. EUropean border practices that must necessarily violently enact divisions between people are framed, though schizophrenically and selectively, as humanitarian missions. More than that, these practices and their (discursive) justifications reveal a ‘EUropean-humanitarian complex’ where EUrope is understood as humanitarian and humanitarianism as EUropean. Fassin maintains that “humanitarian government has a salutary power for us because by saving lives, it saves something of our idea of ourselves.”

Such government “endows us with our own share

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68 Ibid., p. 252.
of humanity. We become more fully human via the manner in which we treat our fellows.\(^{69}\)

The idea or self-conception of Europe as humanitarian saviour emerges in border practices (or rather, in their official depiction), is rehearsed and reproduced there times and again and thereby becomes a recognisable and dominant frame. In the words of former Commission President Romano Prodi, in 'Europe as I See It':

The tradition that we have inherited has dominated history for this reason – this ability of ours to lead and to set an example to other peoples and races. Without the profound values of tolerance and respect for human rights [...] the world would be less civilised and Europe would be the poorer and less able to meet the demands of the future.\(^{70}\)

Europe's humanitarian image as “epitome of goodness” connects historically and genealogically, as Fassin shows, to its Christian legacy.\(^{71}\) Indeed, he argues, “[humanitarian government [...] clearly represents the religious aspect of the contemporary democratic order.”\(^{72}\) Europe's Christian legacy, though rarely mentioned, lives on through a humanitarian ethos that connects with a wide register of Enlightenment values, deemed defining characteristics of contemporary Europe: “ideas of progress, reason, science, tolerance, liberty and democracy.”\(^{73}\) Humanitarian Europe mirrors its idea of itself and its mission in the world. Prodi, connecting the ‘unity frame’ with the ‘humanitarian frame’, argues:

We are not simply here to defend our own interests: we have a unique historic experience to offer. The experience of liberating people from poverty, war, oppression and intolerance. We have forged a model of development and continental integration based on the principles of democracy, freedom and solidarity and it is a model that works. A model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty [sic] in which every one of us accepts to belong to a minority.\(^{74}\)

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 253.
\(^{70}\) Romano Prodi, Europe as I See it (New York: Wiley, 2000), p. 34.
\(^{73}\) Hansen, 'In the Name of Europe', 2004, p. 49.
Prodi’s remarks (though in a more drastic, less nuanced way) resemble Beck and Habermas’ celebrations of EUropean diversity: Since everyone belongs to a minority, it is a task, even a duty, to show the world how a model of humanitarian liberation functions.

EUrope’s frame seeks to contain a reproducible scene of humanitarianism that makes EUrope recognisable. The outside that serves the inside’s recognition must then be marked by the absence, or at least a lesser degree of humanity, as further explored in the following part. In that sense, those intruding into EUrope’s humanitarian inside and escaping the inhuman outside are offered protection from themselves, from their own risky and irrational actions, from their own inhumanity. Feldman shows how EUropean justifications for border practices revolve mainly around the migrants’ own good: “The EU solves the humanitarian crisis at its doorstep with benevolent border control practices.”75 These justifications based on a humanitarian fantasy allow to avoid both “portraying the migrant as evildoer, which is not politically correct [...] [and] acknowledging the structural inequalities at work, because this could lead to a moral justification for illegal migration.”76

More often than not, the life that needs to be preserved through humanitarian efforts is reduced to biological life, the ability to (physically) survive. When hunger-strikers become evicted and forced to live, when the Mediterranean becomes a space of humanitarian intervention, when MSS is not returned to Greece, justifications revolve around the protection of life. The duty and prerogative to protect biological life seems unquestionable, overriding the political, even if the necropolitical condition that subjects some to (near-)death persists to create human suffering and death. Being reduced to the biological, the Boat-Left-to-Die passengers’ as well as the hunger-strikers’ politicality becomes elided. That the survivors are subsequently subjected to various registers of violence, ranging from detainment to deportation is ignored – their biological survival is the prerogative of humanitarian gestures and sufficient to demonstrate humanitarian care and reason.

76 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
EUrope’s humanitarian frame, even if continuously reproduced, is subject to contestation and breakage within the moments of humanitarian enactments themselves, and in their responses to migration movements and struggles. The schizophrenic or paradoxical employment of humanitarian reason cannot but entail moments of contestation. As Butler argues:

The frame never quite determined precisely what it is we see, think, recognize, and apprehend. Something exceeds the frame that troubles our sense of reality; in other words, something occurs that does not conform to our established understanding of things.\(^\text{77}\)

While Fassin suggests that “[h]umanitarian reason is morally untouchable”, and while Feldman conceptualises humanitarian care as the inclusion and exploitation of the passive other in EUrope’s humanitarian project, the humanitarianisation of EUrope through divisive border enforcements must necessarily entail contradictions.\(^\text{78}\) Walters, for example, shows by alluding to the ‘humanitarian border’ that it forms an “uneasy alliance [of] a politics of alienation with a politics of care” and therefore constitutes “a site of ambivalence and undecideability.”\(^\text{79}\)

The hunger-strike of the Non-Citizens staged in public a collision between a discursive framing of the eviction as a humanitarian necessity with the violent practice of enforcement. Pulling weak Non-Citizen bodies out of the tents on the occupied square, even though strategically enacted in the early hours of the day with little media presence, the obvious police brutality stood in stark contrast to the humanitarian discourse framing the intervention. The testimonies of the survivors of the Boat-Left-to-Die and Boats4People activism (re-)connect violent and necropolitical registers with EUrope’s humanitarian reason. The ambivalence of humanitarian reason is also tactically exploited and appropriated by people in transit. For example, in the Aegean Sea and elsewhere, the destruction of vessels in EUropean territories by migrants themselves in EUropean

territorial waters when in sight of the coast or other vessels is a risky strategy to enforce (humanitarian) rescue efforts by European border authorities.

Europe's humanitarian frame becomes reproduced in contemporary border practices and it is through such reproduction that humanitarian Europe becomes recognisable. However, as this part has shown and as the following parts will demonstrate further, these reproductive efforts do not remain without contestation. While the frame of Europe as humanitarian actor, power, and saviour is questioned through other political manifestations as well, it becomes particularly contestable in European borderwork. This is due to the ambiguities and paradoxes that a selective application of humanitarian reason at the juncture where humans are divided, differentially included or excluded, must entail. Selectivity defies the universality of humanity conceived as the entire human species and border brutality defies humanity thought as humanness, a feeling of sympathy for an other. Through migration struggles the humanitarian frame of Europe breaks in manifold ways and while it becomes re-assembled, the idea/l's of Europe, often taken-for-granted, are called into question as are those who seek to govern and control its frame.

**Part IV - Post/Colonial Europe**

Migration resistances do more than animate and expose the dominant frames of 'peacefully united' and 'humanitarian' Europe. The struggles of the Non-Citizens, the passengers of the Left-to-Die-Boat, Boats4People campaigners and those in Greek transit force these frames to become questioned, even to break in view of the human suffering that underpin the enactment of their exclusion. At the same time, these struggles create different narratives of Europe, different frames: postcolonial Europe and collectivities in transit.

Europe, it has been shown, moves with its border practices deep into spaces considered non-European territories and hence, in that way, begins where it divides. However, at the same time, what is considered non-European, the struggling 'other other', has already moved into and become a constitutive part of (other) frames of Europe. What was deemed outside intrudes, becomes the other within, and disrupts an inside that was thought to be controlled and organised.
In its dominant frames, EUrope's unity became a response to war horrors and the experience of the holocaust, its humanitarianism a gesture to the world of a different EUrope, one that cared about suffering ‘others’. In these frames, the unity that was gained following the Second World War became the lasting responsibility of all EUropean institutions and governments to come, to be preserved and cherished. The holocaust was of Europe and grounded future EUrope as a reminder of a past of ideological division, racial hatred, and brutal warfare. EUrope since has learned its lesson, so it is said, to become a normative soft power, teaching the world its humanitarian, non-violent reason and virtue.

However, in these “elite deliberations on Europe”, exemplified by leaders of EUropean institutions and intellectuals such as Habermas and Beck, EUropean colonialism rarely features in accounts of the making of EUrope.80 As Goldberg argues:

Colonialism [...] is considered to have taken place elsewhere, outside of Europe, and so is thought to be the history properly speaking not of Europe. Colonialism, on this view, has had little or no effect in the making of Europe itself, or of European nation-states.81

The silence on EUrope's colonial legacy and its role in constituting contemporary EUrope will persist, Bhambra argues, as long as Europe is not thought from global and other (non-EUropean) perspectives.82 For her, “it is precisely the failure of Europe to understand itself in terms of colonialism that makes it impossible for it to understand itself as postcolonial.”83

As the elaboration of EUrope’s ‘unity frame’ has shown, EUrope’s self-conception silences its colonial raids elsewhere by referring exclusively to an inner-EUropean history: from the Holocaust to 1945 to 1989, from war toward lasting peace. Bhambra criticises Habermas’ “representation of an inclusive Europe, formed around a project of peace [as it] effaces the history of domination in the past, as well as exclusions [...] in the

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80 Hansen, ‘In the Name of Europe’, 2004, p. 53.
83 Ibid.
Hansen suggests that Europe can only be articulated around discourses of peace (and one might add unity and humanitarianism), “if a whole range of atrocities, wars and structures of exploitation directly tied to colonialism are excluded from consideration.” The contemporary enactment of Europe’s borders belongs to these atrocities and structures of exploitation, (re-)creating “global apartheid” conditions by filtering, in neo-colonial registers, “wanted from unwanted, the barbarians from the civilised, and the global rich from the global poor”.

In many ways, the migration struggles examined in this thesis are echoes of European colonialism and it is due to their continuous resistance and movement that these echoes are not fading but reverberating throughout contemporary Europe. The migration struggles that circulate within and beyond Europe ensure that the racial violence of border enforcements and its neo-colonial characteristics cannot be ignored.

In a Non-Citizen pamphlet entitled ‘European States are not in the position to render a judgement about our forced migration!’, the activists state:

We are here because we were forced here. We come precisely from those countries that Western states regard as primary resources and a market for cheap labour forces; countries in Africa, South-Asia, the Middle East, Central- and South-America. Countries whose identities are interlinked with exploitation, colonialism, war, poverty, tyranny, sanctions, discrimination. Our history is a testimonial of these crimes. We are ourselves the living and talking evidence for exploitation and oppression.

In their account, the Non-Citizens regard themselves as subjects of lasting colonial exploitation. Their being and their presence within Europe is ‘evidence’ itself of European/Western oppression: “Looking carefully at the asylum-seeker’s face, we will see the traces of Imperialism.” For many, they state, entering contemporary Europe

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85 Hansen, ‘In the Name of Europe’, 2004, p. 59.
87 Non-Citizens, ‘European States are not in the position to render a judgement about our forced migration!’, Flyer, 2014.
“is equivalent to entering the camps and confinements.”

Forced to flee, because you were there, they have found refuge in Europe and its so-called “safe countries’ that in the moment in which our feet touch their holy soil assign to us the name ‘asylum-seekers’.” For them, ‘asylum-seeker’ is an imposed condition, an extension of colonial rule. Naming themselves differently becomes an act of desubjectification and decolonisation.

Drawing attention to persisting global inequalities and the forces that sustain them, the Non-Citizens reject European humanitarian benevolence. European states are not to judge them, not to tell them what they are entitled to do, who they are entitled to be: “The countries whose armies are in our countries do not have the right to ask why we are here.”

The Non-Citizens are not grateful to be tolerated, Europe is not their saviour, and they do not owe Europe anything, neither their ‘assimilation’ nor their ‘integration’ into a Leitkultur (dominant culture). Their resistance always is post-colonial and transversal in that it connects Europe’s lasting presence elsewhere with their own presence in Europe, in that it exposes global inequality and its proliferation through economic exploitation or violent border practices, and in that it points to racial stigmatisation within a Europe that does not speak of racism anymore.

The Non-Citizens turn European frames of unity and humanitarian virtues upside down. They see themselves as the ‘harvest of empire’. They reject being turned into ‘the migrant problem’, while at the same time problematising Europe, its colonial legacy, its host-ility, and its neo-colonial practices of division-creating that entail categorisation, subjectification and confinement of Europe’s others. Goldberg traces the unspeakability of race, the ‘racelessness’ in contemporary Europe back to the experience of the holocaust, the crime that underlies the ‘unity (in diversity)’ frame of Europe and is intimately connected to its ‘humanitarian’ outlook. He argues:

89 Ibid.
90 Non-Citizen Statement, 'No Justice No Peace', obtained 2014, no date.
91 Non-Citizen quoted at Non-Citizen Congress, Munich 2013, name intentionally omitted.
For Europeans generally, then, race is not, or really is no longer. European racial denial concerns wanting race in the wake of World War II categorically to implode, to erase itself.93

For Goldberg, after the racial fanaticism underpinning the holocaust’s ‘final solution’, the question of race was deemed overcome by a EUropean community transcending enmities: “There is no racism because race was buried in the rubble of Auschwitz.”94 What he terms ‘racial Europeanisation’ “concerns itself overwhelmingly with racial avoidance as denial of or at least failure to acknowledge its own racist implication.”95

‘EUro-racism’ was encountered in all three ethnographic studies and in almost all encounters with struggling migrants in Germany, Italy and Greece. Experiences of racism due to non-whiteness were everyday experiences. When Jawad escaped Greece via Italy, travelling in a lorry to Austria, he and his friends were arrested as smirne had alerted police forces at the sight of a group of young Afghans at a bus stop. The abandonment of the Left-to-Die-Boat passengers was the abandonment of racialised others who did not count, who had fallen outside the norm of what could be regarded as life worth rescuing and grieving. Jaser, a German resident travelling to Greece as a tourist was stopped by Greek police officers, beaten and stripped off his documents and rights. His racialisation as someone not quite EUropean, not quite white trumped his documented (legal) belonging in Germany.

While racism is a EUropean problem and condition, exemplified by the resurgence of far-right political parties throughout EUrope, it is rarely discussed as such. Through the attempted erasure of the question of race, and the remarkable side-lining of its colonial legacies, EUrope, it seems, does not have a ‘race problem’ but merely an ‘immigrant problem’. The immigrant constitutes a ‘challenge’ or ‘burden’ for EUrope, for its cultural, linguistic, socio-economic unity and coherence. Anti-immigrant rhetoric functions under the veil of not being necessarily ‘racist’ as it may or may not include ‘white others’ and as it is primarily linked to ‘economic concerns’.

94 Ibid., p. 156.
95 Ibid., p. 162.
Diverse but related and at times contradictory processes of racial differentiation and identity production are at work in contemporary EUrope. Whiteness functions not as the sole but significant marker of difference which, however, does not mean that there are clearly demarcated categories of ‘white’ and ‘non-white’. Instead, logics of differentiation, while most easily used to distinguish between white Europeans and non-white others, can seep into nationalist projects that make distinctions (even) among EUropean whites. In that sense, the Bulgarian or Polish other can become a resented white other within EUrope. The mechanisms of racial differentiation remain, nonetheless, deeply entrenched in a legacy of post/colonial imaginaries that indicate what does or does not constitute EUropean in any case.

The white Polish migrant may or may not be abused as a threat to national homogeneity and economic prosperity, but the Afghan minor, the Syrian-German tourist, the African passenger, the Roma is always already that. She constitutes the ‘other other’, not belonging to EUrope’s “transnational white ethnicity”, 'legally' in the space of EUrope or not.96 She is the one stopped on German, Italian, and Greek streets as a target of ethnic stereotyping and profiling. Around the racialised figure of the non-white other, as Walters shows, “[a] security field has been assembled through elite and public discourse which brings together crime, drugs, asylum seekers, human smugglers, terrorists, and so on, as though their association were quite natural.”97 And against her it is that EUrope’s inside can be defined as an ordered political and cultural community of predominant whiteness.

The thesis has sought to listen to some of these other, non-dominant narratives that contest and decentre EUrope. Producing different frames and imaginaries of EUrope may contribute to creating “a more egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability” as Butler called for.98 Migration movements and struggles break EUropean frames of ‘unity’ and ‘humanitarian reason’ by carrying the postcolonial condition with them into and throughout EUrope. Blurring inside-outside distinctions they draw attention to the

96 Hansen, 'In the Name of Europe', 2004, p. 50.
many exclusions that occur within and beyond what is commonly considered European space. They bring questions of colonialism and race back into the image of Europe as its constitutive elements, as conditions of its ‘unitarian-humanitarian’ possibilities. They shatter Barroso, Van Rompuy and Prodi’s EUro-nationalism that glorifies a history and culture saturated with stories of colonial exploitation and imperial conquest. The European noble peace is not their peace if it becomes the reason for their violent exclusion, their racialised othering.

These struggles, individual and hidden, or loudly protesting their existence and presence in Europe refuse to accept Europe’s amnesia of its implication in continuous apartheid violence. Postcolonial migration struggles question Europe’s frame of peaceful unity by showing that it was created, amongst others, “at the cost of African lives, labour, and land; a cost that the architects of the time did not see as a cost and the apologisers of Europe today fail even to acknowledge.” Celebrating a peaceful European unity “simply on the basis of them having refrained from killing other white Europeans” is cynical. The colonial condition of Europe continues to exist through its border practices. Its unity is bought at the cost of ‘other lives’, those non-white lives that can be abandoned as they do not constitute full lives.

When the frame breaks, Butler suggests, a taken-for-granted truth is called into question and therewith also the guardians of such truth. Struggling migrants are the protagonists of this spectacle in which Europe is confronted with its own doing, with its condition for being. Contemporary Europe is a force of division, subjecting many to the local or to illegality and criminality, to the necropolitical spaces of its externalised border regions, to violent borderscapes within, to detention centres and asylum housing, to categories of deserving and undeserving, to rituals of confession where people on the move are forced to tell Europe why they came, what they can contribute, and who they really are. Manifold forms of resistance unmake Europe as it is traditionally conceived, challenge and contest the ways it reproduces itself as the embodiment and source of trans-border unity, democracy, culture, progress, and humanity.

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Part V - Collectivities in Transit

It is perhaps because of such internalization of difference that marks Europe’s condition that [...] Europe came to be the birthplace of a transgressive civilization - a civilization of transgression (and vice versa). We may say that if it is measured by its horizons and ambitions (though not always by its deeds), this civilization, or this culture, was and remains a mode of life that is allergic to borders - indeed to all fixity and finitude. It suffers limits badly; it is as if it drew borders solely to target its intractable urge to trespass. 101

What an idea this Europe is, this transgressive adventurer, mythical cradle of human culture and civilisation, champion of diversity, homeland to the united multitude. Europe and its contemporary border-trespasser, less in imperial demeanour than in past conquests come as partners, even friends, seeking to build trust in order to manage the borders they so regularly redraw and overstep. Of course, more than managing borders, Europe’s practitioners seek to manage migration, even migrants through migrant-centered approaches since, as the European Commission notes, “migration governance is not about ‘flows’, ‘stocks’ and ‘routes’, it is about people.”102

The Non-Citizens, the Left-to-Die-Boat passengers, and people in Greek transit suffered the consequences of Europe’s border trespassing when they sought to trespass Europe’s borders. The three ethnographies have shown that, for many people on the move it becomes increasingly difficult to escape Europe on their paths to Europe, as the border dispositif evolves in ways that individualises and totalises, that inscribes itself onto bodies and marks whole populations, that externalises, multiplies, mobilises, delocalises, racialises.

The migration struggles followed in the thesis, while wrestling in one way or another with Europe’s borders, have also demonstrated the capacity to practice other forms of communal ‘being-with’ beyond the idea of integration or assimilation into Europe’s

dominant community, with Europe as telos or model. Their idea of Europe is different to Bauman’s, Barroso’s, and Beck’s idea, their peace is different to Europe’s violently noble peace. While for the ‘public intellectuals’ referred to in this chapter community seems synonymous with Europe and vice versa, the struggles have shown not only how Europe as a political formation entails a colonial legacy, nationalist features, a constitutive other, and a divisionary present but also how alternative communities with other imaginaries emerge or exist already throughout and beyond Europe.

These counter-imaginaries need not be grounded on a foundational event, an invented and exclusionary solidarity amongst some (Europeans) and against (non-European) others, or around a common (Christian) heritage, race or destiny. Migration struggles engender imaginaries that, while contesting dominant frames, also prosper in ‘deviant spaces’.103 Certainly, these deviant or heterotopic spaces exist not in clear opposition or removed from the dominant frame or order but rather in close proximity, threatened to be co-opted, criminalised, banned, or deported. Nonetheless, these struggles create spaces in which Europe and Europeanness become displaced, decentred, where European self-frames around peace, unity, and humanity do not matter as much or even become ridiculed. The intensification of struggles throughout Europe and the multiple connections that are established, also beyond Europe, suggest that there is something growing, collectivities of struggle.

The many instances of resistance examined in this thesis make clear that easy commonalities cannot be assumed. The situations and life-worlds struggling subjects create and find themselves in are different and at times incommensurable. The resistances of young homeless Afghans in Patras, Syrian families in Athens, Non-Citizens in Munich, and Boats4People activists in Tunis have grown out of different experiences of injustice and inequality. Nonetheless, these struggles do not occur in isolation. Every single one is transversal, responds to the dominant political order of migration government and connects through a mutual desire for the ability to move and reside freely.

While it is not possible to create a common political agenda, a ‘we’ that bridges and unifies these dispersed (everyday) struggles, they voice or enact the desire for the freedom of movement and thereby, implicitly or explicitly, the desire to remain or become otherwise. As Foucault suggests:

[T]he problem is, precisely, to decide if it is actually suitable to place oneself within a “we” in order to assert the principles one recognizes and the values one accepts; or if it is not, rather, necessary to make the future formation of a “we” possible, by elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the “we” must not be previous to the question; it can only be the result – and the necessarily temporary result – of the question as it is posed in the new terms in which one formulates it.104

These collectivities of struggle are collectivities in transit. They may assemble only temporarily as a ‘we’ for the overcoming of that specific border, that act of hunger-striking, the halting of a particular deportation flight, the finding or mourning of one disappeared person.

Even if these struggles, ranging from everyday resistances to concerted public contestations do not lend themselves to be easily situated into an emerging ‘social movement’ or an ethos, the intensification of migration protests make formations of future communities imaginable. These cycles of struggles gesture toward the possibility of a collectivisation of struggles through which a community may emerge, even if only temporarily or ambivalently. A ‘we’ can only be formed cautiously in border struggles that operate at the limits of commonality and intelligibility, where solidarity emerges in difficult, even ‘impossible’ or failing encounters.

Through the many encounters that the migration struggles allow for, however, some surprising ties and affinities have already formed. For example, as mentioned before, when Boats4People campaigned in Tunisia and received support by local activists, some of these Tunisian activists came subsequently to Germany where they were inspired by the migrant activist protest camp in Berlin so that similar ‘tent actions’ were formed in the city centre of Tunis. Some of the Boats4People activists were also involved in the

campaign on Lesvos in 2013, and many had already struggled there in 2009, inside and 
outside of Pagani, successfully closing down the detention centre. Some people on the 
move, who rebelled against their incarceration in Pagani then encountered NoBorder 
activists and, after overcoming many more European border obstacles, became 
members of collectives such as Youth Without Borders or Welcome to Europe.

During the activist conference 'No Border Lasts Forever' in Frankfurt in 2014, I 
encountered former detainees of Pagani, former inhabitants of abandoned factories in 
Patras and Athens, current inhabitants of asylum-centres, as well as Non-Citizen, 
Boats4People, Welcome to Europe and Youth Without Borders activists. A week later a 
group in Munich debated over past and future struggles, including members of the 
Oranienplatz-occupation in Berlin, Non-Citizens from Munich and elsewhere, the 
Lampedusa in Hamburg collective, as well as refugee struggles based in Austria and 
Switzerland. Many of these individuals and groups joined the ‘Freedom March’ to 
Brussels in May and June 2014, enacting their demands for an other future.

It is through these various resistances that counter-imaginaries and different frames are 
produced that become reproduced and recognisable with the intensification and 
circulation of struggles. Thinking the different resistances as enactments of transversal imaginaries of a future to come avoids simple generalisations and a unification of these struggles while nonetheless suggesting that there exists a shared desire for conditions that allow subjects to remain or become otherwise. This desire is inherently inventive. In times in which not only borders but ‘the migrant’ herself have become over-determined, subjected to the ascription of various ‘migrant-centric’ names, characteristics, places, biometric doubles, racial stereotypes, behaviours, and threats, this being-otherwise, this always being-excessively-more contests regimes based upon the knowability of its regulatable subjects and refuses to be made fit into frames of Europe, neither the constitutive outside nor the beneficiary or abject victim that make Europe recognisable as peacefully unified or humanitarian.

105 Migration struggles workshop at the Kritnet Convention in Munich, 1st-2nd of March 2014.
Non-Citizen resistance, rejecting demands to know who they are and why they came, renouncing ascribed names of the detainee, asylum-seeker, refugee, and choosing a name for themselves, a name to overcome through dissent, is a struggle for otherness even if that means moving toward citizenship. The young Afghan migrants in Patras, who have travelled or still seek to travel under other names, hidden in lorries and ferries, to build a life somewhere else, are expressions of a desire to not become imbued with ascriptions of illegality, criminality, and threat. Boats4People activism drew attention to the relation between ascribed poor, racialised, migrant identities and abandonment at sea. Advocating or practicing the freedom of movement is based upon the desire to create conditions that allow anyone to move and reside anywhere for whatever-reasons. Defying the governmental demand and the dispositif’s need by seeking to become or remain other-subjects does not necessarily translate into the will to be imperceptible or to live as Foucault’s un-captured subjects in the dark of history.

Being-other does not mean being autonomously anonymous or anonymously autonomous. As the ethnographies have demonstrated, the multiplication of border control practices and systems increasingly forces people in transit into unwanted collisions, rendering the ability to remain unnoticed improbable. Being-other, rather, translates into a continuously maintained posture of intractability in the face of governmental subjection and violence.

It can be practiced by obtaining falsified papers, by hunger-striking repeatedly, by surviving dangerous migration paths and by building up a life where one was not supposed to be. Someone who moved throughout E Urope ‘illegally’, contested imprisonment and deportation several times, obtained residency status in Germany, and returned to Greece as a freedom of movement activist and tourist is a subject who, while scarred, cannot be fully captured by governmental regulation.

Solidarities and activist communities exist beyond national- and E Uropean imaginaries and frames. They ‘break the isolation’ as the prominent Non-Citizen slogan goes. They interrelate, connect, learn from one another, and grow. They engender imaginaries that cannot be easily subsumed other than a common quest for conditions and a politics that allow subjects to remain or become otherwise. As transitory and mobile points of
resistance they stir and fracture, challenge and upset, denounce and move, and remain intractable. They resist similar to Butler's poems that escape the cages of Guantanamo:

[…] Emerging from scenes of extraordinary subjugation, they remain proof of stubborn life, vulnerable, overwhelmed, their own and not their own, dispossessed, enraged, and perspicacious. As a network of transitive affects, the poems - their writing and their dissemination - are critical acts of resistance, insurgent interpretations, incendiary acts that somehow, incredibly, live through the violence they oppose, even if we do not yet know in what ways such lives will survive.106

It is through the intractability of the struggles explored in this thesis that the reproduction of dominant EUropean frames becomes disrupted. With every struggle the image of EUrope, its idea, is fractured and made less recognisable. At the same time, there emerge social bonds, friendships, political solidarities, and communities as imaginaries beyond EUrope, as collectivities in transit.

Conclusion

Border and migration resistances as forces of animation shed light not only on the way boundaries are practiced and contested but also on the community that enacts and rationalises division-creating practices. What emerges are socially constructed, discursively and practically (re)produced frames that seek to create and contain certain realities and truths through which the community itself becomes recognisable and justifiable, but also contestable. In its dominant frames, EUrope's idea of itself revolves around narratives of peaceful diversity and unity that are rendered mutually constitutive. Without its unity there would be no lasting peace but that peace could also only survive if existing cultural differences within were tolerated, even cherished as that which unites.

Differences that unite EUrope or a EUropean unity of differences, however, are forged by excluding, regulating, and abandoning ‘other differences’, those that seem to always remain beyond that which can be included without endangering the internally tolerated level of otherness. As argued in this chapter, EUrope's frame of unity suggests a EUropean singularity and coherence that never existed. EUrope cannot be dissociated from the crimes of EUropean colonialism and imperialism, from border interventions

deep into other territories, from racialised processes of (internal) othering and policing. EUrope's narratives of itself in the world become humanitarian narratives, those that suggest compassion for and a genuine concern with the suffering of others.

EUropean frames of unity and humanity are, of course, related registers. Its internal unity in peace can be exported and reproduced elsewhere in humanitarian missions 'abroad' or in interventions relating to the internal 'other other'. Non-Citizens are not allowed to die in the streets of Munich – this is not what EUrope does. An individual asylum-seeker will not be sent back to an inhuman Greek detention centre and migrants at sea need to be saved in the name of EUrope, in the id

EUrope is often conceived through the different registers of resistance that were explored in this thesis: dissent, solidarity, excess. Indeed, these are notions around which the idea of EUrope often is assembled. EUrope is said to have emerged in dissensual resistance. For Beck, "[c]osmopolitan Europe is [...] a project born of resistance". And Commission President Barroso emotively recalls:

I remember vividly in 1974 being in the mass of people, descending the streets in my native Lisbon, in Portugal, celebrating the democratic revolution and freedom. This same feeling of joy was experienced by the same generation in Spain and Greece. It was felt later in Central and Eastern Europe and in the Baltic States when they regained their independence. Several generations of Europeans have shown again and again that their choice for Europe was also a choice for freedom. I will never forget Rostropovich playing Bach at the fallen Wall in Berlin.107

Europe overcame Nazism and dictatorships through acts of resistance and a longing for freedom and contemporary EUrope claims to be its heir. Solidarity beyond EUrope's internal borders was to be the mechanisms through which a union of diverse people would be operated and maintained. Solidarity became even a fundamental EUropean principle, based on the idea of fairly sharing both prosperity and burdens among member states. Excess as a EUropean-liberal characteristic of tolerance, allowing for sexual, religious, cultural, racial otherness and 'radical openness' are held high as its modern and progressive virtues.

The migration struggles in this thesis, narrated through these notions of EUrope and ask the EUropean question differently. Their dissent is met with police brutality, abandonment, deportation, detention, their excess with dispersed border enforcements, biometric databases, and the imposition of unwanted subjectivities. Their solidarity is not understood as a communal and freedom-longing ethos but regarded as an annoyance or a threat to the social cohesion and identity of EUropean societies.

Migration struggles, however, are growing in size and intensity. They show how EUrope’s legacies of resistance become fading echoes, inscribed in EUropean programmes of population governance, while echoes of colonialism become louder through migration resistances. They shift EUrope’s dominant frames, expose their hypocrisy and violent exclusions, and disrupt their truth-reproducing practices. By enacting counter-imaginaries in dissent, solidarity and excess, collectivities in transit are invented that may only come together fleetingly as common struggles, that, in contrast to EUrope, however, think and enact the ‘we’ as a question and not as an imposition.
Conclusion

In Franz Kafka’s parable *Before the Law*, a man from the country seeks admittance to the law and encounters an open gate, guarded by its keeper. Told that he could not pass, not yet, the man decides to wait but his desire draws him to peer to the inside, to catch a glimpse of what lies beyond the gate. The doorkeeper, noticing his attempts, suggests:

If you are so drawn to it, just try to go in despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And I am only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to hall there is one doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last. The third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I cannot bear to look at him.¹

For months and years, the man from the country fails to overcome the gate and its keeper, and, eventually, dies before the law, before the gate that was made exclusively for him.

Interpreting the underlying ethos of Michel Foucault’s writings as a longing for an ‘anti-diagrammatic’ freedom, Sergei Prozorov re-writes Kafka’s parable, and composes a new ending.² In this altered ending, the man from the country realises all that he could have been and could have become, had the ‘majesty of the law’ not gripped him, had he not accepted his ‘attachment to the law’.

Turning away from the gate, the man also turns away from his desire for the law, from his fascination with ‘power’, from his need for biopolitical care. The man refuses the gaze of governmental authority, decides not to live a life seemingly imposed on him, imposed by others but also by himself. He walks away from the gate and its keeper. He refuses an identity, realises the “infinite expanse of possibilities now available” and is

“eager to return to a life he never had. It begins to look like a beautiful day.”

For Prozorov, this new ending is not an ending but, rather, a beginning to an other life.

The story, however, cannot end with this beginning. While walking away, the man from the country walks towards many other gates and their keepers. His life continues, not as a life of unencumbered freedom but as one of obstacles, governmental traps and violences, where the turning away from that particular gate could have never been the definitive act setting an end to an unwanted life.

Contemporary gates, barriers, obstacles, divisions or borders do not necessarily have keepers that stand before them but become inscribed even into (moving) bodies themselves, the self as a container of others’ knowledge. Maybe the gate was within the man from the country also all along. In Prozorov’s reading, it was, so that the man, by deciding differently, by overcoming his own desires and fears, could move on.

That excessive capacity, however, is no longer, if it has ever been, the exclusive capacity of the self, as others now have entered gated selves, seeking to progressively harvest bodily information. For many in transit and on the move, escape forms not necessarily a political moment of autonomy or anonymity, a decision away from the law, from sovereignty, from governmental care and citizenship, but, rather, escapes, several moments that demand several decisions.

The people in transit followed in this thesis formed manifold struggles and contestations and were impinged, times and again, by the gazes and practitioners of the many gates that border Europe and the world. Moving from hall to hall, doorkeeper to doorkeeper, that which they had in common was the will to undo (some of) the borders, open, cross and overcome them, in a practice not necessarily of imperceptibility but of intractable resistance.

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3 Ibid.
This thesis explored migration resistances as border politics and followed those struggling for rights, mobilities and freedoms into different but connected borderscapes. Regarding migration struggles as forces of animation, it ethnographically inquired into what became set in motion through their practices of dissent and solidarity, and their gestures toward excess.

Dissent, solidarity and excess were mobilised as different facets of resistance and explored in three borderscapes through the struggles of the Non-Citizens, Boats4People campaigners, and people in Greek transit. It was argued that while one of the facets of resistance may be more easily discernible than others in the particular cases, they could not be understood as separate but, rather, as interrelated and interwoven human movements and practices that fold into one another at particular trajectories, disclosing resistances’ complexities.

The thesis also advanced migration resistances as transversal struggles that, as everyday practices, collective movements or something in-between, always exceeded the local and the present. Through their protests and movements, their solidarities but also their grievances, these struggles responded to particular injustices that formed always-also general injustices, animating human-made divisions that become ever-more sophisticated, differentiated, intrusive and everyday.

The three ethnographies explored how EUrope creates increasingly fine but violent obstacle courses for certain individuals, groups and populations, subjects them to collisions with mobile border practitioners, inscribes them into biometric data sets, and renders them (partially) knowable, rightless, exploitable and deportable. EUrope’s governance of borders and migration became scrutinised through the different struggles that set in motion the plurality of ways movements and mobilities become acted upon in contemporary EUrope. Conceiving of EUropean border governance as a dispositif, the thesis sought to attune to and acknowledge the heterogeneity of actors, technologies and discourses that respond to an urgent need and that intersect in complex ways to perform belonging and unbelonging.

Besides pointing to the (re-)materialisation of diffuse borders, migration resistances also alluded to dominant discursive frames that were mobilised to enact, explain or justify
the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. Europe's frames of peaceful unity and humanitarianism became disrupted and made less recognisable through migration struggles and their counter-imaginaries of Europe, their other forms of 'being-with' in a world of division.

In order to closely inquire into migration resistances, the thesis drew critical conceptual resources from the interrelated literatures of Critical Border Studies, the Autonomy of Migration, and Citizenship Studies. Chapter One briefly reviewed these three literatures and pointed to both their productive openings and areas that the thesis sought to further advance. Chapter Two provided an in-depth account of Foucault's understanding of power, resistance and the art of government that inspired the idea of regarding resistance as an analytic through which socio-political phenomena, such as the European border dispositif, could become investigated. Proposing resistance as method, it further developed the idea by bringing together a variety of critical ethnographic accounts that productively suggested ethnographic explorations as a deeply political and implicating approach of research.

Following on from these initial elaborations, Chapter Three formed the first ethnographic study. It followed the Non-Citizen movement that emerged in a small German town and became a broad struggle, enacting their protest in a provocative and confrontational manner. Their resistances were interpreted as dissent and read with Rancière's work on dissensus as 'enactments of the wrong'. In the second ethnography, Chapter Four, I followed the Boats4People campaigns from Italy to Tunisia. Boats4People practices of seeking difficult encounters with families of the disappeared or dead and of mourning publicly for those who have passed, was interpreted with help of Ahmed and Butler's work as a politics of solidarity, a form of resistance that seeks togetherness 'beyond borders', beyond divides that the dispositif creates and fosters. In the final ethnographic study, Chapter Five, I travelled to different sites of bordering in Greece. On Lesvos I took part in an activist project and listened to three stories that told of the experiences of Jawad, Arash and Azadi who had once successfully escaped Greece. In Athens I encountered Jaser and his family of Syrian travellers who desperately sought to leave Greece and in Patras I visited young homeless Afghans in transit who sought to travel to Italy, hidden in lorries and ferries. The underlying question of the chapter was whether these many movements of people in transit could
be understood as excess, a facet of resistance that subverts forms of migration government by finding various (creative) ways to overcome the European border dispositif. In the final Chapter Six, the different European frames that emerged through these various forms of migration resistance were examined. Discussing first the two dominant European frames of ‘united in diversity’ and ‘humanitarianism’, it moved to other frames and counter-imaginaries, ‘post-colonial Europe’ and ‘collectivities in transit’.

The thesis has made several substantive arguments and contributed to the academic fields of critical migration and border studies in particular ways. These arguments are briefly re-stated here before turning to the contributions, future research endeavours, as well as issues that, unfortunately, remained under-acknowledged.

First, I argued for a wide but nuanced understanding of forces of resistance. Offering a particular reading and interpretation of Foucault’s original writings and his discussion of both power and resistance helped to focus on their subtle but important relationalities, performances and effects. Through this initial move, manifold ‘everyday’ struggles opened up, forming significant political moments in their own right. Connecting migration, something that often becomes either hyper-politicised or depoliticised with resistance, something that times and again comes to be understood as the often heroised, manifestation of the political, complicated an understanding of both migration and resistance. The personal, political and entangled struggles performed by the many subjects that the thesis listened to, opened diverse registers of resistance that were interpreted and mobilised as dissent, solidarity and excess. These facets were, of course, overlapping, but they also retained their particular characteristics and potentialities.

Second, I argued for an understanding of these pluralities of resistances as catalysts that animate and set in motion a variety of socio-political dynamics, phenomena and processes. The idea of resistance as method was proposed as a productive mode of critical investigation that, by following resistances, would inquire into the ways in which they disrupted and thereby animated governmental power-relationalities, technologies and truths. The migration resistances introduced in the ethnographic chapters have shed light on many aspects of the European border dispositif by contesting some of its
practices of conducting, monitoring or deterring mobilities. Border resistance interpreted as dissent challenged German-EUropean border practitioners head-on by seeking antagonistic confrontations in public demonstrations, marches, occupations and hunger-strikes. Through their provocations, the Non-Citizens prompted frustrations and violent counter-measures but created also large solidarity coalitions, discursive and conceptual interventions, and an unprecedented proliferation of migration struggles in Germany and beyond. Border resistance understood as solidarity invented, in difficult encounters and collective practices of grieving, relationships 'beyond borders'. The Boats4People campaign animated the Mediterranean Sea as a space of brutal abandonment but also as one of political struggle, encounter and solidarity. Border resistance thought as excessive practices drew attention to the often hidden contestations performed by people in transit as well as the intrusive, racist and increasingly violent forms of border-policing occurring in Greek EUrope. While the Syrian family and the inhabitants of the factory were seemingly caught in their predicament, their many attempts to subvert the border dispositif gestured, while ambivalently, toward excessive potentialities.

These border and migration struggles animated also different (self-)frames of EUrope that were mobilised to legitimate and morally justify the eviction of hunger-strikers or militaristic Mediterranean border interventions to supposedly rescue people in protest and transit, also 'from themselves'. What emerged was an image of a EUrope of tolerance, a political community accepting difference in peace and advocating humanitarianism for the world beyond. Migration struggles, however, distorted these images by bringing coloniality and race back into the question of EUrope, by juxtaposing peaceful rhetoric with their life-situations and by revealing the seemingly obvious fact that processes of people-filtering and deterring must inevitably entail related registers of violence – the violence of (policy) subjectification that reduce a person to a knowable, determinable, countable figure, the violence of necropolitical migration paths, of differential treatment and rights, the violence of economic exploitation, hunger and homelessness, of incarceration, psychological and physical abuse, torture and racist humiliation, the violence of never having been able to leave, of being tied to the local, and also the violence of not being able to return to family and friends who often remain in an unreachable distance.
Third, I argued for an ethnographically involved, reflexive and critical form of research on borders and migrations. Encouraged by critical and ‘ethical’ ethnographic accounts, resistance as method was developed as a practice of investigation that allowed for methodological pluralism and an experimental, implicated and performative gaze. A research method that involves political implication is relevant and significant for several interrelated reasons. The many subjugated knowledges that circulate amongst struggling individuals or collectivities, the various ‘on the ground’ theorisations that materialise in and through struggles would remain insurmountable without active involvement. ‘Becoming of the struggle’ can and does, of course, translate into a variety of stances, dispositions and attitudes, with activist-implication being only one possibility amongst many. Relatedly, researching migration and borders is in and of itself political, always threatened to be co-opted by the border dispositif that draws increasingly from academic research and knowledges to create and foster people-governing rationales and policies. This is why a situated research comes with a responsibility toward those whose stories are re-narrated. The trust and vulnerability that the sharing of often intimate and painful life-stories entailed, implied, at times, a difficult deliberation about whether or not the use of these stories would be too intrusive or could affect ‘migration-projects’ in any way.

Migration governance is becoming increasingly a knowledge-based endeavour and business, not only implicating universities in schemes of migration policing but also drawing from economic and managerial discourses, languages of human rights and good governance, often emanating from academic disciplines and their research outputs. Attuning to migration struggles necessitates an awareness of these processes and of the political nature of one’s research since supposedly objective and neutral investigations into the exclusion of particular individuals, groups and populations render produced knowledges more easily co-optable. In this thesis I sought to cautiously produce policy-irrelevant knowledges, or at least those that could not be easily translated into policy discourses and figures of migrants and their movements, even if the ways in which research can be ab/used may never be fully predicable.

These three substantive arguments also form contributions to the academic fields of critical migration and border studies, and speak in particular to the burgeoning literatures of CBS, the AoM and Citizenship Studies but also to the orthodox field of migration studies into and against which these literatures intervened. As argued in Chapter One, these three literatures form departures from traditional migration and border studies and constitute avowedly political interventions that reject reductive readings of migrations and borders, oppose the victimisation as well as the objectification of people on the move, and draw attention to the politicality of their practices. The thesis sought to contribute to these interventions by arguing for a greater focus on migration resistances that expose and contest (EUropean) border performances and policing. By bringing migration and resistance together, not only migration, resistance, and border governance became complicated but also particular aspects of the three literatures.

It was suggested that CBS as well as the other two literatures would benefit from a more nuanced reading of resistance. While Foucault’s notions of biopower and governmentality have become commonly and widely used concepts, the significance of resistance in Foucault’s work remains arguably under-acknowledged. Resistance, as understood in the thesis, appears in his body of work not only when he names it as such but emerges as a critical ethos that reverberates throughout his work and speaks of always-existing episodes of critique, rebellion, refusal, desubjectification, struggle, friendship and the potentiality to become other. Emphasising the significance of resistance in Foucault’s work is important also because he himself thought of it as a catalyst and diagnostic through which critical investigations could be pursued.

Bringing together this reading of resistance with migrations problematised the ontological primacy ascribed to forces of migration and mobility often pronounced in the AoM literature. Beginning social analyses with migration resistances that are always entangled rather than ontologically primary might help allude to both the many potentialities of struggle but also the increasingly cynical and violent border enforcements that they animate. A critical reading of migration through multifaceted resistances opens the scope toward heterogeneous registers, including rights-based campaigns and solidarity movements, inasmuch as excessive or ‘imperceptible’
subversions. Further, thinking resistance widely allows moving beyond imaginaries attached to state sovereignty and citizenship, even when exploring struggles for citizenship. The struggles of Non-Citizens, Boats4People activists and people in Greek transit were not interpreted as acts of citizenship but as forces forming collectivities in transit and creating other imaginaries of community and togetherness. The thesis indicated that the frame of struggle need not be citizenship as Citizenship Studies tends to argue, and that, in fact, citizenship conceived as a divisionary political technology would be an awkward and unsuitable horizon for a radical or resistant politics.

The thesis sought also to contribute to (freedom of movement) activist practices and knowledges of struggle, though in a rather indirect fashion. By elaborating on the many facets of resistance, it argued for an appreciation of the different struggles that emerge in various but always critically political forms. Without going into detail here, in some activist circles, as experienced in Greece, Germany but also in the UK, there remains a lack of acknowledgement of the many possibilities of struggle which, at times, translates into paternalistic rhetoric that depoliticises and marginalises migration (movements). Non-Citizen dissent seeking citizenship, Boats4People encounters in solidarity, as well as subtle border-transgressions in Greece can all constitute radical politics.

Thinking migration resistance widely, with greater nuance, and always politically may contribute to an activism that need not be heroic or visible, need not rest on easy (ideological) commonalities, and not even on congruent registers of what it might mean to be/come free/r. At the same time, understanding resistance not as Power's great other opens up diverse avenues for a resistant politics cautious of the entangled nature of forces of power and forces of resistance. Understanding the practices of the dispositif and its underlying rationales draws attention to the many re-materialisations of governmental pastorates and novel forms of conduction and control.

Contributions to activist practices were voiced indirectly in the thesis, in the knowledge that many of these concerns are acknowledged and acted upon, especially in the activist circles in which I participated and from which I learned during and beyond my research. In this vein, and echoing Foucault, the aim of the thesis was not to create an “imperative discourse that consists in saying ‘strike against this and do so in this way’” but to point to productive openings that a refined understanding of resistance could
create: “If you want to struggle, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some constrictions and blockages”.\(^5\)

Many of the arguments and contributions developed in the thesis also gesture to several possible future research endeavours and concerns. The struggles followed in this thesis do not cease to exist but carry on, even if in different forms and places, and possibly with altered names, practices or methods of resistance. The Non-Citizen interventions have set in motion a cycle of struggle that continues to provoke German-EUropean authorities and people in Greek transit will seek out novel paths for escape, despite growing fences and data-sets. Many of the activist groups continue to find ways to connect beyond borders and have, for example, established a EUro-African network of individuals and groups, language specialists, lawyers and technical experts that will call into life the Watch The Med Alarm Phone in October 2014.\(^6\) As an alarm hotline for people in immediate distress at sea, the network seeks to establish a wide coalition of activists that, while not able to physically intervene at sea, has the capacity to react to distress calls by pressurising EUropean states and coast guards into rescue missions or to, at least, hold them accountable for failures to act. These resistances to the governance of migration and mobility incessantly raise novel questions and concerns and, if understood as diagnostics, continue to shed light on EUrope’s border politics and on the idea of EUrope itself.

Further, and related, resistances thought as analytics continuously expose EUropean border diffusions and thus allow to pay closer attention to the ways in which EUrope’s border practices rematerialise in surprising settings, often also far beyond of what is traditionally considered EUropean space. As a future ethnographic activist-research project, the idea, also emerging amongst activist circles, to follow those who struggled to remain but were forcefully removed from EUropean space, would provide important insights into the ways lives unfolded after painful collisions with the EUropean border dispositif. How do subjects continue to struggle, even after ‘failed’ attempts to resist

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deportation? Do they choose or are forced to remain ‘bound to the local’ or do they attempt the dangerous journey to return?

Future research endeavours could also further develop the idea of resistance as method and probe other ways to mobilise questions of resistance in EUropean border politics. If resistance is thought widely, it might be detectable even in institutional settings, for example, in the often strained relationship between the EU Parliament and the Commission when it comes to questions of im/migration control. A few EU parliamentarians from the Left have collaborated with or supported ‘freedom of movement’ campaigns. Would they consider their engagements in terms of resistance? An how do they perceive of their entanglement within the institutions, and what (counter-)imaginaries of EUrope do they hold? In turn, are there other facets of resistance that were not captured in the three ethnographies and if so, what does that imply for an understanding of resistance in general and for the conceptualisations of resistance developed in this thesis in particular?

There were, of course, also aspects that remained under-acknowledged in the thesis and that may point toward future considerations and research, as well as aspects that were intentionally not engaged with.

First, and problematically, the gender dimensions of migration struggles could not be adequately explored. In many ways, the resistances followed in the ethnographies, apart from the Boats4People campaign, were ‘masculine’ resistances. Not only were nearly all of the Non-Citizens men (especially the ‘first generation’), even though many supporters were women, but several participants at the Congress in Munich also complained about the ‘masculine’ demeanour of the Non-Citizen organisers, and the dominant manner in which they ran the Congress. The Non-Citizens themselves reacted to criticism concerning the small number of women and masculinist tendencies in the struggle, stating that they were aware of discriminatory and patriarchal social structures so that also “the field of the struggle [was] conquered by male bodies”.7 They advocated the

creation of spaces in which women could “independently organize and empower themselves” and argued that “male bodies [would have to] leave the dominant positions they inhabit.” Even though they did not live up to these pronouncements during the Congress, the Non-Citizens importantly pointed to societal hierarchies, structures and norms that restrict the ability of many (migrant activist) women to engage in (public) social struggles in the first place.

An interesting case in point was the controversy revolving around the participation of the pregnant Non-Citizen activist and her children during the hunger-strike in Munich. While none of them took part in the hunger-strike, rumours and misinformation spread in the mainstream media, leading to public denunciations of her supposed irresponsibility and negligence and well as criticism toward other Non-Citizens for ‘allowing’ her to be part of the occupation. The underlying sentiment was, of course, that a responsible and loving mother would not protest in public but prioritise caring for her children and the unborn baby, presumably ‘at home’, in the asylum-centre.

During my fieldwork in Greece, most people in transit I spoke to were men. All the inhabitants of the factory in Patras were young male Afghans and most of those I encountered in Athens and on Lesvos were predominantly male. This is a reflection on cultural norms, practices and hierarchies, with young men much more likely to emigrate, often also alone or in small groups, than young women who I encountered, if at all, as part of families in transit.

There are two interrelated points to make that can only briefly be mentioned here. When the thesis argued that many were bound to the local due to externalised EUropean border practices and policies and increasingly dangerous migration paths, it also thought about the gendered impact of the dispositif. Those who are less likely to travel ‘irregularly’ and precariously in any case, hence often (young) women, are progressively deterred from emigrating. The border obstacles that EUrope creates for certain individuals, groups and populations are thus also-always gendered obstacles. Further, during my fieldwork in Greece, my own (masculine) presence meant that even

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8 Ibid.
in the rare situations in which female travellers were present, exchanges especially with the Syrian community were mainly conducted between the men of the families and me. Some of Jaser’s female relatives only told their stories when I was accompanied by a female migrant rights lawyer who engaged in conversations, with me merely listening in the background. While the situation could not be easily changed, it remains a shortcoming in the thesis. It is, therefore, even more important to emphasise the particularities of the struggles and to not regard the protagonists of the ethnographies as paradigmatic figures of the migration experience and resistance.

Second, while I sought to provide spaces for the voices of many to be heard, preferably as direct quotations, often only glimpses into their complex life and travel stories remained in the thesis. At various moments difficult decisions were made to not include many observations and exchanges in order to allow more space for some of the narrated stories, even if that, nonetheless, still did not seem to suffice. The multi-sitedness of ethnographic research, as suggested before, while entailing many advantages also comes with the drawback of having to, at times, abruptly and uncomfortably cut stories short. Relatedly, many of the exchanges that occurred during my fieldwork were noted down only after the encounters and therefore do not constitute ‘interviews’ traditionally conceived. This is a reflection on both the method chosen for the conducted research and the realities of migration struggles. As a consequence, no ‘list of interviews’ was attached to the thesis.

On a conceptual level, and third, more space would have been required to discuss the tensions between the different authors who were brought into conversation with one another. Especially the work of Rancière, while helpful for the reading of Non-Citizen dissent and certain dimensions of Boats4People solidarity, sits in tension with Foucauldian conceptualisations of power and resistance that this thesis drew from. In an essay, Rancière himself alludes to some of these differences and tensions. Rancière notes that his understanding of politics was, in many ways, the exact opposite of Foucault’s conception of biopolitics as, for him, “[the] question of politics begins when the status
of the subject able and ready to concern itself with the community becomes an issue."^9

Rancière argues:

[Foucault’s] conception of politics is constructed around the question of power, [...] he was never drawn theoretically to the question of political subjectivation.

[...] Foucault conceives of the police as an institutional apparatus that participates in power’s control over life and bodies; while, for me, the police designates not an institution of power but a distribution of the sensible within which it becomes possible to define strategies and techniques of power."^10

Creating a dualist understanding of politics and police, and assigning Foucault’s work to the latter not only misrepresents Foucault’s body of work but also indicates problematic dimensions of Rancière’s own work. By assigning Foucault’s biopolitics merely to ‘police’, Rancière re-creates an understanding of power that Foucault sought to escape: power equated with domination and (a Rancièrean) police.

As Chapter Two has shown, Foucault’s development of the art of government dispenses with easily held dualisms and complicates the notion of power so that purist distinctions between politics and police become untenable. Foucault’s subject is necessarily entangled in forms of governmental authority:

[The subject] has to take into account the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself. And conversely, he has to take into account the points where the techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion and domination."^11

While for Rancière the subject seems to emerge only in the (momentary, messianic, heroic, public) act of staging equality, as problematised in Chapter Three, Foucault’s subject is already imbued with several names that were assigned through governmental subjectivisation (including the naming of asylum-seeker and refugee) but retains the possibility to resist, to refuse to be ‘governed thusly’, by questioning regimes of truth by

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10 Ibid, p. 93, p. 95.
“[insuring] the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth.” Desubjugation may translate into ways of hiding or escaping but inasmuch in speaking back or in finding other, maybe collective, ways to live less exposed to governmental subjugation. Foucault does not speak of an originary freedom that needs to be recovered but a struggle within and against the (governmental, biopolitical, necropolitical) ‘situation’:

My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism.

Only briefly pointed out here, there are also interesting tensions between Butler’s work and Rancière’s account of dissensus. In Antigone’s Claim in particular, Butler both mobilises and complicates an understanding of dissensus. She suggests that before engaging with Antigone’s tale and her defiance of Creon, she thought of her as a feminist (counter-)figure but then realised that Antigone’s political practices were complex, problematic and not detached from (Creon’s) sovereign power, even assuming “the voice of the law in committing the act against the law.” In striking resemblance to Rancièrean terminology, Butler holds:

Who then is Antigone within such a scene [...]? She is not of the human but speaks in its language. Prohibited from action, she nevertheless acts, and her act is hardly a simple assimilation to an existing norm. And in acting, as one who has no right to act, she upsets the vocabulary of kinship that is a precondition of the human, implicitly raising the question for us of what those preconditions really must be.

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14 Antigone, daughter Oedipus, defies the decree of Creon, Oedipus’ brother-in-law and king of Thebes to leave Polyneices, Antigone’s brother and Oedipus’ son, ungrieved and unburied. Fighting over Thebes, Polyneices had attacked the polis, defended by his brother Eteocles, leaving both dead in the confrontation. Although their uncle Creon prohibits the burial of Polyneices’ corpse, Antigone decides to bury the body and is discovered in the act, confesses her deed to Creon and commits suicide, escaping thereby her death sentence of being entombed alive. Judith Butler, Antigone’s Claim (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
15 Ibid., p. 11.
16 Ibid., p. 82.
For Butler, Antigone’s performative acts provoke and subvert Creon’s authority, and encroach upon his (sovereign) masculinity by appropriating a (‘masculine’) posture of defiance. Butler, while (implicitly) evoking the notion of dissensus, shows how Antigone and Creon function not as stable opposites but as characters contaminated and intertwined with one another from the very beginning. Antigone’s hereditary impurity and her contamination with sovereign power through her act of dissent as well as Creon’s kinship ties and his ‘unmanning’ through Antigone suggest that Antigone and Creon do not represent pure ‘politics’ and pure ‘police’ respectively but always already transcend these spheres due to their impurity.\(^{17}\) Butler’s interpretation of Antigone as an ambivalent subject of resistance, similar to Foucault’s entangled subject, breaks with Rancièrean dualisms. As the Non-Citizen movement has shown, the spheres of citizenship and non-citizenship were intimately interrelated, overlapping sites of ‘consensus’ and ‘dissensus’, in which the protagonists of the struggle assumed the language of (citizenship) law while, nonetheless, disturbing the sovereign realm of citizenship.

Before closing, one more issue needs referring to, an issue that remained intentionally unaddressed in the thesis but emerged in various discussions and at conferences as questions wondering why I did not inquire into movements that formed as responses to migration, that challenged the (selective) opening of (some) borders, that demanded (even) more rigid (state) barriers, and would, in fact, constitute forces of border resistance or migration struggle in their own right. They are, without a doubt, political phenomena that demand an in-depth exploration.\(^{18}\) All over Europe and beyond these groups, movements and parties are emerging, seemingly growing stronger and louder every year. However, while a wide reading of resistance may well include these political movements, the understanding of resistance advocated in the thesis was one of opening, one that could not be reductively read.

The ‘resistances’, however, that individuals and groups engage in to block certain movements and people, to maintain global (economic, racial, colonial) inequalities, to

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 6.

retain mobility prerogatives over immobilised others, to defend certain barriers in the name of a narrowly conceived idea of community, a population, a nation, a state or sovereignty, constitute political projects of closure and distance, of fear and exclusion. These movements pursue a politics that stands in opposition to the facets of resistance advanced in the thesis. They may engage in 'dissensual confrontations' but with the aim of turning inward to an idealised identity or frame, not outward. They object to surprising and unsettling encounters that expose the vulnerability of everyone involved so that their 'solidarity' remains within narrowly defined bounds. They also seek to restrict the potentiality of many to become otherwise, to 'excessively' escape and build new lives elsewhere. These are not counter-imaginaries or alternative frames but reinforced images of what is, of the bordered contemporary world we live in.

The three ethnographic studies of this thesis provided insights into counter-imaginaries, even if offering mere glimpses into the diversity of existing migration struggles. Tracing these imaginaries by listening to many individuals and groups in the past three years has not only raised the question of whether and how their practices could be conceived as resistances but also whether and how my ethnographic implication could be conceived as 'research'. When one returns to the run-down flat in Athens and my encounters with Jaser and his family, the latter questions cannot be conclusively answered but remain open, displacing reductive ideas of research and unrelentingly requiring an engagement with the 'modes of encounter' when researching: what made the encounters possible, what occurred in the moment of encountering, and what futures might they open up?

Migration resistances in our contemporary world of borders are not to be romanticised, they often occur in the most precarious of spaces, they often occur due to precariousness. Nonetheless, in contemporary EURope and beyond, migration struggles are proliferating, forming collectivities in transit that perform borders differently, thereby disrupting the government of human multiplicities as well as the communities in whose names many of these exclusions are enacted. The counter-imaginaries of those resisting emerge and are invented in lived and embodied experiences, and as such entail ambiguities, inconsistencies or uncertainties, forming a complex politics of resistance of the many. Migration struggles are not performed by figures but practiced by subjects whose dissent, solidarity and excess confront, contest and render strange the many exclusions that seem to define our present condition and truth.
[...] I am not in agreement with anyone who would say, “It is useless for you to revolt; it is always going to be the same thing.” One does not dictate to those who risk their lives facing a power. Is one right to revolt, or not? Let us leave the question open. People do revolt; that is a fact. And that is how subjectivity (not that of great men, but that of anyone) is brought into history, breathing life into it. A convict risks his life to protest unjust punishments; a madman can no longer bear being confined and humiliated; a people refuses the regime that oppresses it. [...] A question of ethics? Perhaps. A question of reality, without a doubt. All the disenchantments of history won’t alter the fact of the matter: it is because there are such voices that the time of human beings does not have the form of evolution but that of “history”, precisely.

(Michel Foucault, 1979)
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