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Essays on the use of commitment and tough negotiation tactics in bargaining

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Massey, James (Researcher in economics) (2014) Essays on the use of commitment and tough negotiation tactics in bargaining. PhD thesis, University of Warwick.

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Official URL: http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b2754950~S1

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Abstract

This thesis analyses the role of commitment in bargaining. Chapter 1 looks at how players could use finite length commitment to affect the bargaining model in a multiperiod model. The idea of this is to complement the existing literature on infinite length commitment. In line with the infinite commitment literature, a rational player can mimic a commitment type to gain a considerable advantage, although, as will be seen, there are key differences.

Chapter 2 analyses whether one should take the opportunity to commit oneself when the opponent does not perfectly observe the decision taken. Logically, if one’s opponent sees no difference between a bluff and actual commitment then one may as well bluff, since the opponent acts the same and committing is a needless sacrifice of freedom. When the opponent may discover a bluff as such, the situation is far less clear and this Chapter analyses when a commitment outcome is likely to prevail.

Chapter 3 takes a rather different approach and analyses how hard one should negotiate when there are other parties who may enter the deal. The general finding is that one should follow the crowd and act the same way as everyone else. All three chapters heavily use the mathematical tool of game theory. However, while Chapter 1 uses non-cooperative game theory, the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 primarily use evolutionary game theory.

Item Type: Thesis or Dissertation (PhD)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): Collective bargaining -- Econometric models
Official Date: September 2014
Dates:
DateEvent
September 2014Submitted
Institution: University of Warwick
Theses Department: Department of Economics
Thesis Type: PhD
Publication Status: Unpublished
Supervisor(s)/Advisor: Muthoo, Abhinay ; Dutta, Bhaskar
Extent: ix, 148 leaves
Language: eng

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