THE DEUTSCHE FRIEDENS-UNION (DFU): A STUDY OF A MINOR PARTY OF THE LEFT IN WESTERN GERMANY, 1960-68

by

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INTRODUCTION

After the Bad Godesberg party congress of 1959, the Social Democrats had no left-wing dogmatic rival for nearly a decade. Many of their most likely challengers, including the banned Communist party, decided to avoid ideology and joined bourgeois elements in a united front against Bonn's newly bipartisan defence and foreign policies which the main opposition party had embraced the year after its revisionist programme.

The result was the Deutsche Friedens-Union (DFU) which was founded in late 1960. The new party avoided a formal dogma and concentrated on peace, democracy and the 'German problem'. In the process, the DFU kept leftist dogma out of elections for most of the decade. In 1968 this ideological interregnum ended. The Communist party was legalised once again. The failed DFU lost its umbrella role and became just another sectarian group. It is at this point that the study ends.

This is a study of a left-wing, fringe united front which was founded by people alienated by the changes in the German Left in 1956-60. The DFU collected unattached people, was the umbrella organ for eleven minor groups - collectively referred to as the UNION - and the electoral outlet for other fringe elements. Part I of the thesis traces the origin and aims of the DFU and covers its history of failure and dissatisfaction which eventually lost the party its umbrella role. Part II deals with the united front's structure, recruitment and work.
The DFU was also an important element of West Germany's political fringe during the 1960's. The united front was one of the four main strands of leftist fringe activism, and the most neglected. The party never won more than 610,000 votes but it was the main tool of the left-wing electoral fringe in 1960-62. This strand of leftist was separated from the 'New Left', overlapped with the extra-parliamentary opposition, and was linked to the underground Communists. The DFU also played an important part in the history of the West German Communist party during its period of illegality. The united front was a factor in Communist strategy and tactics but also conformed to earlier practices of some post-war neutralists. The aim was not a proletarian popular front but a united front of most of the protagonists of a cause which to some extent cut across the social and political cleavages of the Federal Republic. Elements from the extreme Left to the radical Right supported a version of this cause which from the late 1940's aimed for a neutralist solution to the 'German problem'.

Serious data problems affected this study of small and deviant groups. Information was invariably inadequate and in some instances extremely hard to secure. It was also often blatantly biased. Most of the groups around the DFU tended to be secretive, their records, if there were any, were usually incomplete or unavailable, their output of literature was limited and/or quickly became unobtainable. Several of the groups were already defunct at the start of this study. Despite an earlier promise, the DFU's federal office was not very helpful. Without the interest or news value of, for example, the 'New Left' the DFU grouping was usually
neglected by academics, the mass media and to some extent by official statistics.

Circumstances also helped the author. Some of the findings of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) are published, which made it easier for the author to locate underground Communist agents than would have been the case in some other countries. The author managed to interview 26 federal DFU leaders (see Appendix) who are the main source of information. Several of these leaders also held senior posts in organisations linked to the DFU. The leaders were a divided group. Some of them had earlier walked out of the DFU and their frank comments could be used in interviews with the other leaders. Often there were no other sources to confirm the data of the interviews, but when there were they usually supported the leaders' statements. With some notable exceptions, information from the leaders was not often at variance. In 1968 the author completed a short M.A. thesis on the DFU. He also found two similar German studies which cover some aspects of the party in its first year (see Bibliography).

I am grateful for their help to many people and institutions. I must thank in particular my supervisor Mr. Nevil Johnson of Nuffield College, Oxford, and Fraulein Gertrud Wolferts who loaned me her personal collection of DFU documents. I must also record my debt to Professor Malcolm Anderson of the University of Warwick, Professor Wolfgang Abendroth of Marburg University, and the 26 DFU leaders who let me interview them. Financial help came from the Social Science Research Council and the Fritz Thyssen Foundation.

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PART I

THE ORIGIN, FAILURES, CRISSES AND END OF AN UMBRELLA PARTY
CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF THE DFU

From the late 1940's West German politics were split by two conflicting responses to the 'German problem'. The disagreement was about the Germans' future; it was emotional, preoccupied the polity for many years, had many international ramifications and began after the Soviet Union and the three Western Powers had failed to agree on what to do with the defeated Reich. From this basic national cleavage, which was inseparably linked to the Cold War situation, the DFU emerged in late 1960. This Chapter is only concerned with those aspects of the confrontation which help to explain the origin of the DFU.¹

In the late forties and early fifties there was a great debate between the government and opposition on the future of the Germans. Adenauer and his coalition government faced a dismal situation. He

was Chancellor of a semi-sovereign rump state with a nascent democracy and with its economic and social structure shattered, a nation in the frontline of the Cold War with a Soviet military threat to the East and wary allies to the West on whose self-interest and goodwill West Germany's security and recovery depended.

To the Adenauer government all German interests pointed westward and, 'with the Cold War the dominant factor in European and world politics, it was the Western powers' overriding concern to secure a Western orientation of the new German state west of the Elbe'. Hence Bonn's unstinting commitment to the Western bloc and total support for the 'policy of strength'. The West gave Western Germany military security, underpinned her economic recovery, furthered her rehabilitation abroad and then in 1955 gave her independence. In return, the Western nations could mobilise the Federal Republic's potentially formidable resources against the Communist regimes and (to safeguard themselves against Germany's past) could absorb these resources in a supranational Atlantic and European framework. Adenauer and his Western allies were determined 'to deal with the German problem at its most essential'. They hoped 'to prevent the recurrence of both German nationalism and the ill-fated "see-saw policies" of the past' by denying Germany her historical 'pivotal position between East and West, fraught with uncertainties, temptations, and dangers, (which) had been at the root of Germany's insecurity, her frequent isolation and her quest for identity'. Hence West Germany's early rearming and her joining

1 Kaiser, op. cit., p. 20.
2 Ibid., pp. 20–21.
the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), the (abortive) European Defence Community, NATO and the Western European Union (1955) and the EEC (1958).

Adenauer gave greater priority to Western integration than German reunification but never admitted that the first could prevent the second. The future showed that the Chancellor's decision had not been simply an ordering of priorities but a choice between two incompatible goals. The defensive role of the 'policy of strength' was successful but its offensive role failed. The Chancellor wanted reunification on Western terms. He was content to wait until the overwhelming military build-up of the West would eventually force the USSR to evacuate her exposed position in East Germany and allow reunification in 'freedom and security'. Unity had to be achieved through the destruction of Communist rule in East Germany and several policies were pursued to prevent the international recognition of the German division until then. These included the policy that German reunification had to precede East-West detente, the ostracism of the Pankow regime and the claim that Bonn represented all Germans and their interests.

From the late forties, Adenauer faced many problems and much opposition at home. Some members, including a Cabinet minister, deserted his Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) over rearmament and the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) in the coalition was sceptical about his Westpolitik but usually voted with the Chancellor. Time and reality were not yet working in his favour.

Much of the public was hostile and the 1951–52 Land and local elections went against the Chancellor. The government was faced by a strong and diverse opposition embracing elements from the extreme Right to the radical Left, from the main fringe areas of politics, including the main opposition party, the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), and many smaller parties, including the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD), industrial unions and small pacifist and civil rights groups, ideologues and pragmatists, bourgeois radicals and workers.

This opposition embraced many motives, fears, prejudices and rational arguments, as well as calculated deceptions about Adenauer’s motives, some of which survived, sometimes modified by events, to be adopted by the DFU years later. Much of the opposition not only felt more urgency about reunification than the Chancellor but also insisted that it could only be achieved through German neutrality (see below). The neutralists were engaged in a broad attack on the various components of Adenauer’s foreign and defence policies. These components were often not simply seen as obstacles to reunification but became issues in their own right (e.g. rearmament) and were not opposed only by neutralists. Many opponents, including the Social Democrats and Communists, appealed to national sentiments (and insisted that their concern was to prevent a feared nationalist reaction against Bonn’s present policies). Their case was that Bonn was pursuing American and not German policies and that in return for quick benefits the Chancellor was sacrificing long-term national interests. Fears for reunification (see below), Bonn’s junior partnership in the West, and the French in the Saar were
linked to this case. Anti-Americanism was a strong factor. Pacifists, potential draft-dodgers, but also those who only resisted rearmament because the conditions for it were wrong, joined others in the 'Ohne mich' campaign against rearmament which opened a general attack on the arms race and Bonn's part in it. To many the 'policy of strength' did not offer military protection or maintain the peace but endangered both. Others saw Bonn as a 'restorative' regime whose brinkmanship, sabre rattling and fierce anti-Communism smacked too much of the past. The fringe opposition especially ignored Adenauer's own concern for the Bewaeltigung der Vergangenheit. Some right-radicals saw German neutralism as a way back to cultural isolation which would destroy the infant Bonn democracy. The Communists wanted to isolate the Federal Republic to prepare the way for a Soviet takeover. Anti-clerics disliked a Catholic, and Socialists a conservative, Western European unity.

Much of this diverse opposition shared a common goal. With hindsight, it was a clash between the unrealistic alternative of the opposition and the fundamental miscalculation of the government. The opposition rejected the argument that all Germans could be won for the West by its eventual military superiority over the Communists. Instead, Bonn would have to accommodate the fears and interests of the Eastern bloc and it had to straddle the Cold War bipolarity by normalising relations with not just one, but both sides of the Iron Curtain. Détente had to precede reunification, and not the other way round, and amidst a relaxation of tension the Soviet Union could be persuaded to accept a neutral reunified Germany. The basic flaws of the neutralists' case were that it neglected the West's vested interests in the Federal Republic and
overestimated Bonn’s room for manoeuvre on the international scene. But the USSR supported the case as a means of extending her influence westward, by bringing all Germany under Communist influence and pushing the Western alliance out of Central Europe.¹

This clash over the method of reunification was also a basic disagreement over the fate of the Germans. Adenauer wanted a supranational and democratic future in the West and insisted that German democracy and security depended on the protection of the West. His opponents generally wanted a national future between East and West and insisted that neutralism would not lead to a Communist takeover. The SPD, which was as anti-Communist as the governing parties, insisted like them on a free and democratic all-German state. But some fringe elements were prepared to accept a semi-Communist state as the price for reunion and others wanted a dictatorship.²

Time and events were on the Chancellor’s side and damaged his opponents’ case. The Korean War, the East Berlin uprising, the arrival of prosperity, and national rehabilitation in the West were


² These elements (and briefly the SPD) accepted the so-called ‘Dritte Weg’ which was a Communist proposal. At first only all-German consultations were demanded but from 1953 the Soviets insisted that a confederation of the two German states had to precede reunification. Not only did this involve de facto recognition of the Pankow regime, but it would also have guaranteed Communist interests in Germany. The result would have been a semi-Communist Germany open to a Soviet takeover, or Pankow could have opted out of full reunion after the East German regime had been recognised.
among events which quickly swung majority public opinion behind the government. Also, the failure of Adenauer's own plan for reunification became clear only years later. The public at large was in an anti-nationalist mood and did not give first priority to reunification until the mid-fifties. Widespread anti-Communism in the population made it easier for the government parties to damage their opponents. The rationale, that what is good for the Communists is bad for the Germans, could be effectively used against policies and groups which had Communist approval. Quite soon the main opposition party began to fall in behind the government line and in 1960 only fringe elements continued to reject Adenauer's basic answers to the 'German question'.

The DFU emerged from the Left. The party resulted when the 1956-57 upheaval in the leftist fringe party arena became linked with the SPD's changing position on the German problem in 1959-60.

The fringe opposition of the early fifties comprised many groups. With a few exceptions, the nationalist and neo-Nazi neutralists went their own way, formed pressure groups and study circles, had their newspapers, established small parties, and tried Sammlungspolitik among themselves. Quite a number of their group, especially those for ex-Nazis and former officers and soldiers, were (often unsuccessful) Communist cover organisations which the East Germans tried to use to resist Bonn's rearming and alignment to the West.¹

The elements of the fringe Left, who over the years were joined by deserters from the Christian Democratic, Liberal and Centre parties, embraced most types of political action, but they had a leaning towards broadly based 'single issue' collective action. They initiated their own extra-parliamentary movements, e.g. the 1948 *Volkskongress fuer Einheit und gerechten Frieden*, and gave support to the much more broadly based campaigns in which the SPD played a leading role, e.g. the *Kampf dem Atomtod* of the late fifties. But we are mainly concerned with the early parties which adopted this *modus operandi*. Their stories not only help to explain the origin of the DFU, but also show that it faced old problems and some new ones, that it enjoyed advantages which its predecessors did not.

These parties were first founded in the early fifties. There were two of them and at least one failed attempt to establish another. Within a few years left-wing interest in such parties had lapsed and the founding of the DFU represented its full revival. These parties were different from the other neutralist parties. They were 'single issue' parties, while the others were also Communist, Social Democratic, neo-Nazi or nationalist. Their functions were to help overcome the habitual splintering of the fringe elements and to give them an electoral role. They were based on the assumption that the cause of neutrality cut across the usual social and political cleavages. To collect these people, the parties minimised or ignored divisive social and economic policies and they were loosely structured organisations embracing heterogeneous individuals and/or umbrella organs covering several organisations.
From the late forties, one of the main tasks of German Communists was to initiate and assist West German Volksfront movements against Adenauer. Repelled by the SPD and the industrial unions, and with little response among right-wingers, the Communists had only some limited success on the fringe Left. Although rapidly declining, the KPD (aided by its Pankow comrades) had the resources—front organisations, money and personnel—to be the most influential element left of the SPD. The need for this type of protest action was also seen by some non-Communists, but their approach usually was not as comprehensive. The non-Communists were in a dilemma. They needed or could not avoid KPD help. This brought them additional resources but it also turned away anti-Communists and made it easier for their enemies to attack them, though these smear campaigns would probably have occurred anyhow.

The stories of the early specialised left-wing fringe parties are now briefly outlined. In March 1950 representatives of 35 fringe groups met to found the Deutsche Kongress which was seen as the kernel of a new party. The aim of creating an 'Einheitsfront von ganz rechts bis ganz links' had a setback when some nationalist groups refused to work with Communists and walked out. Seventeen fringe groups joined the Kongress which embraced as diverse elements as the Titoist Sozialdemokratische Opposition, the pacifist Internationale Versoehnungsbund, the nationalist Dritte Front and the KPD-led Deutsche Friedensakademie. The Kongress could only agree on German neutrality and the rejection of rearmament, and each

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1 Hans Kluth, Die KPD in der Bundesrepublik, Koeln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1959, pp. 18-57.
organisation retained its autonomy. Lack of money, poor recruitment, no realistic hope of founding a party, and the emergence of a new neutralist group caused the Kongress to disband in 1952. 

The new neutralist group, founded in late 1951, was the Notgemeinschaft fuer den Frieden Europas which had refused to work with the 'vorbelastete' Kongress. It was the first neutralist fringe group to recruit well-known politicians, namely Gustav Heinemann and Helene Wessel, and its core supporters were middle-class, Church-going Protestants, pastors from the Kirchliche Bruderschaften and the anti-Hitler resistance movement, progressive Catholics and pacifists. The Notgemeinschaft recruited few Social Democrats and Kongress people and no Communists and few 'fellow travellers'. At first the group saw itself as a nonpartisan organ hoping to work with the SPD, FDP and Zentrumpartei. But the SPD, which

hegt ein grosses Misstrauen gegen jede ueberparteiliche Sammlungsbewegung, die der Kontrolle der Partei entsogen ist, da sie fuerchtet, dass aus solchen Sammlungsbewegungen sich frueher oder spater politische Parteien entwickeln,


2 As an opponent of rearmament, he resigned as Federal Minister of the Interior in 1950 and left the CDU in 1952. Dr. Heinemann was also a President of the Synod of the Evangelical Church.

3 Chairwoman of the Zentrum party which she left in 1952.

4 Molt, op. cit., pp. 76-77.
isolated the Notgemeinschaft as did the other two parties. The group reacted by forming itself into a party, the Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (GVP), in November 1952. At once the new party was beset by problems. It had little money, recruitment was bad and its organisation was slow to get off the ground. The large pacifist and non-partisan Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft moved away from the group after it had turned itself into a party. Co-operation between the GVP and the extreme Right found no support on either side.1

Two befriended right-wing organisations, the Frei-Soziale-Union (FSU) and Freie Mitte, gave little assistance. Most reluctantly, the GVP had to turn for help to a Communist source, the Bund der Deutschen (BdD).

Until early 1953, the BdD had been the Deutsche Sammlung (founded in June 1952), the 'Dachorganisation der zahlreichen kommunistischen Tarnorganisationen'. 2 The Sammlung may have turned itself into a party to pressure the reluctant GVP into co-operation by threatening to split the fringe neutralist vote.3 In 1953 the BdD and GVP formed an electoral alliance. The BdD provided money, candidates and organisational resources but retained its autonomy. This link-up was used by the Frei Mitte to part with the GVP and the FSU refused to work with Communists. Some GVP members resigned, protesting that after the alliance the party was a lost cause because its potential Protestant middle-class vote had been driven

1 Ibid., p.90.
2 Ibid., p.121.
3 Ibid., p.122.
away. The press accused the GVP of having sold out to the Communists, but a smear campaign had already started before the alliance.

In the 1953 federal election Volksfront politics failed its first electoral test. The GVP/BdD alliance won only 318,473 votes. The Left-Right antagonism, anti-Communism on the Left and the existence of two neutralist rivals - the SPD and the KPD (which by now was reduced to 607,860 votes) - were important reasons. The June uprising in East Berlin could not have helped the alliance either.

Over the next four years circumstances changed and in the 1957 federal election the Left looked different. The fringe Left was now engaged in a last ditch stand against the Paris negotiations which in late 1954 linked the Federal Republic closer to the West. Six new fringe groups - three small parties and three pressure groups\(^1\) - took part in this rearguard action. A few years later they became allies of the DFU.

In 1955 West Germany joined NATO and won its independence. These two events and the 1953 East Berlin riots seem to have turned the Soviet Union against German neutrality and made her concentrate on strengthening the separate existence of East Germany.\(^2\)

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1 The electoral groups were the Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) of the Saar, the Wahlervereinigung gegen atomare Aufrüstung fuer Frieden und Verstaendigung (WV) of Bremen, and the Demokratischer Wahlerverband Niedersachsen (DWN). The other groups were the Freikirischer Kreis, the Deutsche Club 54 and the Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung. For details of these organisations see Chapter IV.

2 Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 57-68.
sources continued to make neutralist noises (until 1961) but now their aims were recognition of the Pankow regime, to blame Bonn for the divided Germany, and to keep the neutralists active. Thus the fringe Left had a cuckoo in the nest - the Communists.

After Western integration had been achieved, the opposition could not simply ask for its reversal. The economic advantages were too popular, so, with the exception of the Communists, the opposition restricted itself to demands for military neutrality. The difficulties of limited neutrality were bypassed by ignoring them. In 1956 the Bundeswehr was a fact and rearmament ceased to be an issue. The new targets for attack were compulsory military service and atomic weapons and the opposition adopted the 1957 Rapacki plan for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe.

From the early post-war years the SPD had been the core of the opposition if only by its size and proximity to power. But it was an unstable core. Faced with the realities of the situation, the Social Democrats soon began to steer towards the middle ground of politics. In the process, they moved away from the fringe opposition and ever nearer to the governing parties which had the formula that fitted majority public opinion, which had little taste for experiments at home and abroad. The 'economic miracle' had made radical economics disliked and won much support for the Social Market economy and Western integration. Most of the population

1 Even the SPD's 1959 Deutschlandplan managed only the following sentence: 'Die bestehenden Wirtschaftsverfassungen, Aussenhandelbeziehungen und langfristigen Verträge bleiben zunächst unberührt, soweit nicht ausdrücklich nachstehend Aenderungen vorgesehen werden'. Deutschlandplan der SPD. Kommentare, Argumente, Begründungen, Bonn: SPD, 1959, p.8.
trusted the West, distrusted neutralism and feared the Soviets. The SPD's federal vote had increased only little in 1953 while its main rival, the CDU, won an absolute majority of the Bundestag seats. This situation increased demands among Social Democrats for a reassessment of their party's image and policies. From 1953 the SPD no longer emphasised the socialisation of the means of production and over the next few years the party discarded its remaining Marxist dogma. The SPD's adjustment to an increasingly integrated society in which ideology and class-consciousness was becoming irrelevant, had little effect on the origin of the DFU. Much more important were the party's changes in its defence and foreign policies. But the early changes cannot be linked to the founding of the DFU. The Social Democrats' opposition to the Schuman Plan and the Council of Europe crumbled when both worked well, and they accepted rearmament and the Paris treaties which gave West Germany sovereignty and NATO membership. By the mid-fifties the SPD had accepted the main aspects of the government's foreign and defence plans. Opposition then turned to conscription, but while the SPD opposed the draft, its leaders refused to promise to end it when in government. The SPD still insisted that it was neutralist, arguing that if the right situation arose it would advocate the cancellation of Bonn's Western commitments in return for reunification. But any realism the neutralist case may have had was killed when the USSR turned against it around the mid-fifties.

At this time, when the differences between the government and the main opposition party over the 'German question' had become blurred, the new issue of atomic weapons caused an intense conflict
between them. From 1956 the Social Democrats, aided by fringe groups and some FDP elements who had temporarily left the Adenauer coalition, mounted a campaign inside and outside parliament, the Kampf dem Atombombe, against the testing and possible use of atomic weapons. In particular, the campaign was against the stationing of atomic weapons in Western Germany, Bonn's overreliance on US nuclear protection and its aim to gain some influence over the disposition and use of these weapons.

This new issue emerged during an upheaval on the fringe Left. After a lengthy legal battle, the Communist party was banned in 1956, went underground, and had to look for a new outlet for its federal votes. The following year the GVP disbanded after a disillusioned majority of its members had concluded that national politics could only be influenced through a major party.¹

The issue of atomic weapons won the fringe opposition new supporters, including some Christian Democrats.² It also made a link-up between the main and fringe leftist opposition possible. The GVP called upon its supporters to vote SPD in the 1957 federal election and some GVP leaders, including Heinemann and Wessel, joined the Social Democrats. The dispute over atomic weapons provided a bridge for its members to the SPD: here was an issue on which, despite other differences of opinion, the members of the GVP could identity themselves with Social Democrats.³

² Heidenheimer, op. cit., p. 212.
The illegal KPD also decided to throw its votes behind the SPD to avoid a split on the Left and to support the Social Democrats' anti-Bomb stance. Some Communists, however, preferred to spoil their ballot papers in protest against the banning of their party. Only the BdD remained active on the fringe. It contested the election, aided by some groups, including the nationalist Bund fuer Einheit. The party was neglected by its Communist mentor and it emphasised that the election must be against the Atomruestungsparteien which was the party's way of saying 'vote SPD if you can'. The BdD won only some 60,000 votes.

For the first time the bulk of the left-wing fringe vote was behind the main opposition party, and there remained no viable leftist minor neutralist party. The SPD increased its vote but the CDU/CSU, which also was helped by disintegrating minor parties, became the first democratic German party to win an absolute majority of the votes. The next few years showed that the combination of these events was significant in the history of the origin of the DFU. Stung by the success of its rival, the SPD was determined to reform itself further. In the process the Social Democrats lost

1 Kluth, op. cit., p. 57.
4 'Das Wahlprogramm des Bundes der Deutschen', Deutsche Volkszeitung, No. 25, 1957.
some of their own people and pushed much of the fringe opposition back into the political wilderness to search for a viable new umbrella party.

The 1959 Bad Godesberg Programme, which embodied the SPD's determination to change from Klassenpartei to Volkspartei, would not have resulted in the DFU. The latter had no intention of picking up the Socialist cause dropped by the SPD and strove hard to present a deideologised image. Though, in as far as the programme contributed towards a general alienation of some ideologues, it helped the DFU. The programme's foreign and defence policies were a resume of the party's position arrived at over recent years. The programme did not go as far as some members wanted it to, but neither did it provide them or the fringe opposition with the incentive to look for a new party.

To assist the new image it was trying to create for itself, the SPD expelled persistent critics of the new programme. The party, determined to defeat its opponents' argument that a Social Democratic government would be 'soft' on Communism because some of its people favoured the Pankow regime, also expelled embarrassing members with East German contacts.¹ The combination of the new programme and the party's clamp down on critics and 'fellow travellers' was an asset to the new DFU but not enough to cause its establishment. Some of the victims of the clamp down, the Socialist students and the 'Abendroth Leute', kept themselves apart from the DFU (see below), and many of the future DFU supporters,

¹ In 1958-59, 62 SPD members were expelled, mainly for this reason. Chalmers, op. cit., p.221.
including those who had voted Social Democrat in 1957, were outside
the SPD and not affected by the clampdown.

The impact of the Berlin crisis on the SPD was crucial in the
history of the origin of the DFU. In November 1958 the USSR
launched a diplomatic offensive to 'neutralise' West Berlin and
cut its links with the West. International tension increased,
military postures were adopted by East and West, and three years
later the Berlin Wall went up.

As a result of this crisis, the SPD first published (in 1959)
and then rejected its Deutschlandplan. The plan was not only the
last, but also the most radical Social Democratic reaffirmation of
reunification—through—neutrality. The SPD dropped its long-standing
refusal to compromise with Communists and insistence on reunifica-
tion on Western terms. Instead the plan adopted the so-called
'Dritte Weg' which the fringe opposition had advocated and which
the USSR once more proposed during the crisis. The SPD now proposed
de facto recognition of the Pankow regime and a confederation
between the two Germanies which would gradually lead to
reunification and German military neutrality, inside a Central
European zone of military disengagement, guaranteed and regularised
by a collective security agreement and a German peace treaty.¹

The plan was attacked by the government and much of the press.
A main criticism was that the SPD had offered the Communists a
loophole, since the East Germans, after having their sovereignty
recognised during the transitional confederate period, could under

¹ Deutschlandplan der SPD, op. cit., pp. 5-11.
some pretext or other refuse to go ahead with full reunification. Another criticism was that if Ulbricht actually went ahead with full reunification, the result would be a semi-Communist Germany facing the danger of a Communist takeover.

During this time the Liberals published their own 'German Plan', but neither plan survived for long. 'By launching these (Berlin) crises Khrushchev finally succeeded in lining up the German Social Democrats behind Adenauer's foreign policy'. On 30 June 1960, during a Bundestag debate, Herbert Wehner abandoned the Social Democrats' neutralism and promised unconditional commitment to NATO and the EEC. Henceforth, neutralism was only an issue of the fringe opposition. The SPD accepted the need for 'modern' weapons, withdrew its support from the anti-Bomb movement and a resolution was passed by the 1960 Hanover party conference which whittled down the blunt rejection of German production, stationing, or use of atomic weapons contained in the otherwise tame enough Bad Godesberg program of the previous year.

Some months before Wehner's statement, there was already some movement in the fringe opposition. In South Germany several anti-Adenauer groups met to discuss closer co-operation. In May the BdD was in contact with right-wing groups which were discussing a nationalist coalition. In June-July the founding of two future DFU allies was finalised: the Vereinigung fuer Frieden und soziale Sicherheit (VFS) of Baden-Wuerttemberg and the Demokratische WASMler Union (DWU) of Nordrhein-Westfalen. From March efforts were made

1 Windsor, op. cit., p.46.
2 Kirchheimer, op. cit., p.246.
3 See Chapter IV.
to organise Socialists who had been expelled or had resigned from the SPD since the late fifties. In November these efforts led to the establishment of the **Vereinigung Unabhängiger Sozialisten** (VUS). This group included people, especially around Viktor Agartz, who wanted a new Socialist party to carry on where the Bad Godesberg programme had left off. In late summer, the VUS, which was close to the Communists, decided to help found the DFU instead and to turn itself into a Socialist ginger group. As a result the Agartz faction walked out.¹ But the issue was not closed. For most of the sixties there was agitation in support of a new Socialist party both inside and outside the VUS. However, the origin of the DFU made a new dogmatic party most unlikely. This is one reason why some fringe Socialists did not like the DFU. The party’s refusal over the years to turn itself into a Socialist or working-class party was another. The DFU absorbed many of the fringe ideologues. It also split the fringe Socialists who were divided by hostilities.² The influential Communists did not want to challenge the Bad Godesberg programme but wanted to concentrate their attack on the ‘policy of strength’ and were convinced that a deideologised *Sammlungsbeken* would be more effective.

It took Wehner’s June statement and the Hanover conference to provide the initiative and support for a new national umbrella party. The illegal KPD no longer had any reason to give its votes

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² See Chapters II and IV.
to the SPD against the governing parties. It needed a federal electoral outlet and Volksfront politics was also 'a road out of isolation'.¹ The Communists did not want a workers front but a unity front of all the opponents of the 'policy of strength'. In November 1960, Max Reinmann, the KPD boss, declared:

'In der Bundesrepublik steht vor allem die Frage des Kampfes um Frieden und Demokratie an. Da sind Sozialisten, Kommunisten, Christen, da sind Menschen aus dem buergerlichten Lager, aus den verschiedensten Schichten. Sie alle gilt es zu sammeln und in eine Front zusammenszufuhren. Das ist die groe Aufgabe, vor der wir in der Bundesrepublik stehen'.²

The Communists were behind the DFU, which received money, votes, the guidance of Hintermaenner, the help of KPD cover organisations³ and became the main electoral outlet for the Communists during most of the sixties. Disgust with the SPD and a sense of urgency engendered by the continuing Berlin crisis, encouraged diverse elements to work together to keep open an old partisan split over the 'German question' which the Social Democrats were trying to close.

Following some initial contacts, a number of individuals and leaders of several fringe groups met on 30 September. They agreed that a new party was needed to contest the 1961 federal election, but

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² Quoted in Sproeho, op. cit., p.18.
³ See Chapters II, IV and V.
As the meeting represented too few interests and mainly left-wingers, it was decided that other opposition elements had to be first brought into discussions before the nature of the new party could be finalised. Less than a fortnight later, on 10 October, some radical clerics appealed to the politically active people in public life to unite against nuclear weapons and the arms race.2 Four days later a group of social elites, of whom the bulk were in the Deutscher Club 54, declared that:

Angesichts des Ernstes der Lage und des unverantwortlichen Verhaltens der SPD ist die Bildung einer neuen politischen Kraft notwendiger geworden, die im nächsten Bundestag der Stimme der rationalen Vernunft Gehör verschaffen kann.3

On 29 October, 1960, 36 people from the above groups as well as others met in Frankfurt. They agreed

eine nicht-sozialistische Unionspartei zu gründen, die alle Unfasson soll, die aus Gewissen und Verantwortung die bisherige Politik für ein Verderben halten und in der letzten Stunde dabei dereit sind, sich auf ein Notprogramm zu einigen.4

Then the 36 elected from their midst, a 'Committee of Fifteen' to draft a party programme and constitution, to recruit prominent opposition personalities, and to make preparations for the formal founding of the party. The committee included two experienced KPD

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1 Sieg, op. cit., p.19.
2 Ibid., p.19.
3 Ibid., p.19.
4 Deutsche Volkszeitung, 4.11.1960.
Hintermaenner, Helmut Bausch and Paul Neuhoeffer, and met about a dozen times in either the home of Renate Riemcke, the 'Paepstin' of the early DFU, or in a hotel in Frankfurt.

A number of reasons made the DFU founders opt for a new party. Available and potential support was seen as suitable for party politics. The KPD had to find another outlet for its votes and a more effective electoral role for several small parties already under its influence. Several pressure groups were keen to branch out into party politics. The founders estimated that they could recruit thousands of embittered SPD voters who wanted to hit back at the Social Democrats through the ballot box. Optimistic evaluations of the party's vote potential also helped. It was widely expected that the DFU would enter the Bundestag in 1961. Furthermore, DFU leaders, of whom many were new to party politics, frequently saw minor party politics per se as the most effective form of political action outside the main parties.

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1 See Chapter V.

2 Professor Renate Riemcke was the most publicised DFU leader during the early sixties. Some months before the Frankfurt meeting, the Professor was dismissed from her teaching post for deviant politics. She told the author that she drafted the 1960 party programme which was accepted by the Committee of Fifteen after a few changes. Several DFU leaders told the author that Renate Riemcke was the most influential leader in the party's early years and, to emphasise the point, one leader called her the 'Paepstin der DFU'.

3 Interviews with DFU leaders.

4 See Chapter II.

5 See Chapter VII.

6 See Chapter X.
Party politics was seen as having many inherent advantages.
Among others, it was felt that it achieved much publicity, was
the most legitimate form of group politics and was the best means
of preventing the major parties 'burying' embarrassing issues
during elections. DFU leaders dismissed illegal political action
as dangerous nonsense which did more harm than good to a cause,¹
but regarded normal pressure group politics as a useful addition
to partisan politics. After its first federal election, the DFU
combined partisan and non-partisan activities to reap the benefits,
and minimise the liabilities, of both types of work.

The DFU founders chose not only party politics but also a new
party. In 1960 several leftist parties existed - the BdD and
several Land parties which became DFU allies - which could not
fulfil the needs of the moment, which was an umbrella party which
could embrace diverse opposition elements. The BdD had shown its
electoral impotence, the appeal of the Land parties was too
localised and all were known as Communist cover organisations.
Anyhow it was considered wise to build an umbrella party afresh
and not around an existing party with vested interests so that
newcomers would not feel at a disadvantage.

The founders' estimation of their potential support
influenced some of their aims, which required a party. They wanted,
more than anything else, to exert electoral pressure upon the SPD.
They realised that their group could not become a major party and

¹ The author only interviewed non-Communist party leaders.
that a minor party could not affect national politics by itself but had to work through a major party. The founders knew that the governing circles were closed to them and that they had no leverage to use against them. The CDU/CSU were seen as having a fixed Cold War mentality, and the PDP was looked upon as their opportunist hanger-on. But the main opposition party was seen as another proposition altogether. For electoral reasons, the argument went, the rightist SPD leaders had pushed through the recent reforms against the opposition of many of their own people and the industrial unions. The DFU's task was to exploit this situation by taking many votes from the SPD. The DFU had to ensure that the reforms did not pay off electorally. If the new party could achieve this, it might be able to persuade the SPD leaders to take into account DFU arguments to win back their lost votes and/or help the anti-reform factions in the SPD by discrediting the leadership. DFU leaders were convinced that the mere existence of their party would help the opposition in the SPD in two other ways. The SPD leaders could be forced to be more tolerant with their critics so as not to push them into the arms of the DFU, and the new party could formulate ideas and keep old issues fresh for the use by the opposition in the SPD. The DFU founders were aware of the defeat the unilateralist campaign in and out of the Labour Party had inflicted upon the Gaitskellites during the Scarborough conference of 1960. They hoped that their electoral pressure and propaganda would contribute towards similar results in the SPD.¹

¹ Interviews.
The DFU's role was both to collect thousands of unattached people and to act as an umbrella party for a number of organisations which were determined to maintain their separate identity within a loose UNION around the DFU.¹

The party had to maximise support for a small number of issues. Policies had a crucial role to play. The DFU was a new party with old, but sometimes modified, policies (see below). In the short term, the policies were intended for those already converted. The DFU founders tried to appeal to the old opposition camp. The raison d'être of the DFU was to oppose the 'policy of strength'. Most social and ideological groups included such opponents. Hence the party had to deny itself a formal dogma and keep its programme narrow. The DFU wanted to recruit Social Democrats and Communists, but also bourgeois radical, Liberals, conservatives and nationalists. It had to avoid sectionalism to maximise its support among these diverse people. To avoid particular class, economic and ideological biases, the DFU was determined to ignore social and economic issues if they did not logically relate to the 'policy of strength', or were not of national concern. The party also did not want to get sidetracked by these issues and was keen to avoid potential sources of conflict among its own officers who could not agree on these matters.² To maximise its support, the DFU not only avoided a formal dogma but was also selective in its foreign and defence

¹ See Chapters IV and V.
² See Chapter II.
policies. It avoided, or did not emphasise, some emotional issues which were part of its general case but which was not dependent on them.

Right from the start the concept of an all-embracing Volksfront party ran into trouble. Mutual Left-Right hostilities, which were as persistent in the sixties as they had been earlier, made contacts with right-wingers largely fruitless and even impossible. The DFU's intentions anyhow clashed with its prejudices. It accepted individual nationalists but would not tolerate links with such organisations. The DFU was an anti-Rightist party, but tried to hide it. The small group of conservatives, liberals, nationalists and right-radicals in the DFU and UNION belied the latter's essential character which was a coming together of a part of the grouping 'links von der SPD'. Though basically left-wing the DFU and UNION were not homogeneous. They embraced part of the diversity of the Left: middle-class radicals and workers, regular fringe group activists and newcomers, Social Democrats, Socialists, Communists and 'fellow travellers', left-wing Catholics and progressive Protestant clerics, democrats, authoritarians, pacifists, opponents of nuclear weapons, and neutralists. Some of these were unattached at the time and others were already organised. The UNION was made up of small parties — BdD, DEU, DWN (banned in 1961), DWU, VFS, HV — and pressure groups — Deutsche Club 54, Fraenkischer Kreis, VUS and WFPB — which helped to found the DFU and most of them had strong Communist links.

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1. See Chapters II and IV.
2. See Chapter IV.
Followers of various groups, which did not formally link themselves to the DFU, also assisted in the venture. German Communists were the mentors of the DFU but the underground KPD kept itself organisationally apart.

Recruitment from the Left was also disappointing. Many critics of the 'opening to the right' remained in the SPD, including senior ex-GVP people. The DFU's image of being a KPD exercise reduced its appeal among disgruntled Social Democrats and trade unionists. The semi-dormant Zentrumpartei refused to work with the DFU. Even among the victims of the SPD reforms, the DFU found not always a favourable response. The Socialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), which was expelled by the SPD in June 1960 and became some years later the kernel of West Germany's 'New Left', made no contacts with the DFU. The 'Abendroth Leute' in the SPD, faced with the option of either cutting their links with the SDS or facing expulsion, decided to side with the students and founded, in early 1962, the Socialistischer Bund (SB). This anti-Communist group also made no contacts with the new party, nor did it have close links with the pro-Communist VUS which was in the UNION. These events reflected two basic divisions on the Left – the long-standing split within the 'Old Left' between those who were prepared to work with Communists and those not prepared to do so, and the nascent division between 'Old Left' and 'New Left' which was complete by the late sixties when even the SDS–SB link became tenuous.

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1 See Chapter IV.

2 See Chapter IV.
Some seven weeks after the first Frankfurt meeting, on 17 December 1960, 272 men and women met in Stuttgart and formally founded the DFU, approved its constitution and programme and elected its first federal executive. East German TV recorded the event.²

The new united front had too many structural and tactical characteristics of a Communist 'front' for them to have been accidental.³ The DFU's policies also reflected Communist influence. Under the guise of peace, democracy, freedom and unity, the party was intended to recruit maximum support for Soviet foreign and military interests.

The new peace party was neutralist. The DFU saw neutrality as the only alternative to war and nuclear weapons. The party emphasised that in 1961 its chief concern was security and peace.⁴ In 12 pages of election instructions, the DFU frequently mentioned neutrality but not once reunification.⁵ The party had removed the underlying assumption of many earlier neutralists - for example, the SPD⁶ - that peace needed a united Germany. To the DFU, neutrality was essential for peace but not reunification. The party frequently proclaimed, as did the other parties, that national

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1 See Chapter V.
3 See Chapter V.
5 Ibid.
6 Deutschlandplan der SPD, op. cit., pp. 5-11.
reunification the usual high priority. In the early fifties, German neutrality had been synonymous with reunification. Then the adoption of the 'Dritte Weg' approach, which was favoured by the Soviets, complicated matters. In this approach a confederation of two neutral Germanies would precede reunion. In 1959 the SPD accepted this transitional stage. However, the Communists seem to have wanted it as a permanent feature. As we noted above, from around the mid-fifties the Soviets seem to have turned against reunification, though this was not publicly admitted. They continued to advocate a neutral confederation and linked it to eventual reunification. A confederation would not have lost the Soviets the East German state, would have taken Bonn out of NATO and gained Pankow international recognition. The DFU's interpretation of neutrality would have made it easy for the Communists to exploit confederation and then refuse full union (see below). The party insisted that it wanted reunification. Neutrality alone could keep this option open, but it did not guarantee a united Germany. Neutrality was important because without it Germany would be permanently divided. The DFU's 'German plan' incorporated both the Communists' and part of the old neutralists' view of Germany's future. All the right emotive words were used, but only the discernible observer would have detected that the old neutralist

1 Ibid.
2 Gemeinsam fuer den Frieden, fuer das Glueck unseres Volkes, pamphlet signed Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, probably 1961.
cause was not being pursued.  

The party's early policies were embodied in its programme and 1961 federal manifesto. Some of the gaps were filled in by lesser statements. It seems that the party felt the need to explain to its committed followers its stand on the more 'sensitive' issues but to keep them out of the formal policy statements.

The DFU's policies were an attack on the 'policy of strength'. Every policy was somehow directed at the same target. The party accused the Adenauer governments of having failed

die from Grundgesetz angestellte Aufgabe, dem Frieden zu dienen und die Einheit zu wahren... 

The party saw twelve wasted and dangerous Cold War years which had denied reunification, distorted many facets of West German society, and had created the danger of a nuclear holocaust. The party claimed that many of its policies were based on the SPD's 1959 Deutschlandplan and castigated the Social Democrats 'opening to the right':

Der Versicht der SPD auf die Entwicklung einer politischen Alternative, ihre unverkennbare Zustimmung zur atomaren Bewaffnung und die damit verbundene Tolerierung der Politik der Staerke machen die Lage nur noch ernster. 

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1 The SPD was also concerned about peace and security. However, to that party only the end (reunification) justified the means (neutrality). op. cit.
4 Programm, op. cit., p.2.
5 Ibid.
In 1960/61 the DFU concentrated on foreign affairs and defence which were the sources of the 'policy of strength'. In this area the party offered a way out of Bonn's dangerous and futile situation and promised 'Peace', 'Security' and 'Reunification'. The party's case was that there could be no peace or security without political realism. The West could not defeat the East. Therefore, the 'policy of strength' could solve nothing and was a serious threat at the same time. German initiatives were needed, especially as in 1959 the USSR had threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans which would have permanently divided the nation. Bonn could no longer follow the West's futile Cold War strategy but had to persuade its allies to adopt attitudes and policies which, the DFU strongly implied, the Russians and East Germans already had. The West was at fault and a change of heart had to come from its side. According to the DFU, what was now needed was the spirit of conciliation and co-operation. The West had to normalise relations with the Eastern bloc, alleviate Communist fears about West German revanchism and give due regard to their interests. Moves in this direction would allow the Germans to withdraw from the East-West confrontation into military neutrality. Such a withdrawal would remove a major source of Cold War friction. Not only the Germans but all mankind would benefit from this move. Only through military neutrality, recognised and secured by international treaties, could the Germans avoid the dangers of a civil war and nuclear holocaust and eventually become reunited.

The party proposed the following conditions and sequence of events. Bonn had to be denied all access to nuclear weapons, must
opt out of the arms race and stop conscription at once. Weapons of mass destruction would have to be withdrawn from German soil. A nuclear free Germany would make the first break in the spiralling nuclear arms race and prepare the way for a Central European zone – embracing both Germanies, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary – free of the Bomb and foreign troops and partly disarmed. Such a zone would open the way for the gradual withdrawal of the two Germanies from NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The EEC and Comecon were not mentioned. The party just ignored these related problems of limited neutrality.

During this period of declining tensions, the two German states would discuss the reduction of their armed forces, prepare a 'vertragliche Verpflichtung' not to use force against each other, and join a two-state confederation. An all-German conference, with parity for both regimes, would discuss reunion and a peace treaty for Germany. Both states would join the Four Powers in preparing a peace treaty and a European security system which would protect Germany's security and frontiers and formalise the new situation.

Not the manifesto or programme but lesser policy statements emphasised the pro-Communist stance of the DFF's 'German plan'. Pankow and Bonn would ratify the German peace treaty on their own. Both Germanies would enter neutrality separately. Until reunification was finalised, each state would be represented in the United Nations. Only after the signing of the peace treaty,

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or perhaps while negotiations for it were in progress, would the two regimes discuss the gradual stages of reunification. The DFU demanded the sovereignty of East Germany and Bonn's partial isolation from the West. There were no real guarantees, the fate of national unity was left to the Soviets. After having achieved much, Pankow could have under some pretext refused reunification and dismantled or used the confederation to interfere in West Germany's internal affairs.

These lesser policy statements included two more controversial issues. The DFU was most concerned about East-West tensions. Yet while the Berlin crisis was going on, the programme and manifesto ignored the 'Berlin question'. Less publicly, however, the party sided with Pankow. It did not insist on the Western Powers' rights in the city and proposed an interim settlement negotiated by Bonn and East Berlin. In its formal statements, the DFU was vague about the 1937 frontiers but informally it abandoned them.

The forthcoming federal election affected the party's handling of foreign and defence issues. To maximise its vote, the party played down or ignored emotive issues which were not essential to its basic case. It ignored the EEC. The Common Market links were considered to be too popular with the public, and quite a number of the DFU's leaders were not opposed to them. The party's practice of dealing with some issues outside the

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1 Interviews.

Formal policy statements was probably also motivated by electioneering. For tactical reasons, the KPD was probably selective in its demands upon the party. The Communists had to help to keep a united front together and win its support. The DFU's programme did not reflect the KPD's anti-BBC policy, its demands to be legalised, or its opposition to reunification. Despite this, the KPD had a useful 'front' which did not criticise Communism but could be used to malign the public institutions of the Federal Republic (see below). Its formula for neutrality was vague enough to appeal both to national sentiment and reflect Communist goals. It could be used to attack the West's and Bonn's defence strategy.

A main theme of the DFU's internal programme was that the 'policy of strength' was continuing to erode an already unstable democracy and was poisoning society. The party distrusted and feared the state and wanted to exploit the symbols of liberalism. Hence it emphasised civil and political liberties, and increasingly so over the years. The party tried to use recent history to make its anti- Rightist sentiments less obvious. But it made no effort to hide its anti-Fascism. It wanted to show that Bonn could become Weimar because the forces of the past were still very much alive. The party's main preventative measure was a return to the spirit and letter of the constitution. The party saw many undemocratic features in Western Germany. It saw a federal parliament which had surrendered to party discipline and the Cabinet, attempts to hinder minor parties, blind anti-Communism.

1 Gemeinsam fuer den Frieden..., op. cit.
political justice, attacks on individual freedoms, and a bias
press. The party concentrated on two particular issues. It
warned against the Nazi and old economic interests and demanded
the denazification of senior State officials

im Interessen der Demokratie und der demokratischen
Erziehung der Jugend als auch im Interessen des
deutschen Ansehens im Ausland...¹

and the publication of party accounts to expose the hidden influence
of big business. The party also totally rejected the proposed
emergency laws, which it saw as a logical progression of the
"forcierten Rüstungspolitik"² and which "ermöglichen es, an
Stelle einer demokratischen Ordnung eine Diktatur zu errichten".³

With an eye on the organised workers, the party emphasised that
such laws could suspend or abolish the rights and independence of
the industrial unions. The DFU also insisted that such emergency
powers would threaten the property rights of everyone.

The DFU, which saw so much wrong with Western Germany, was
totally silent about Pankow's dictatorship. Very soon, this bias
became too much even for some of its own people.

The party's economic and social proposals were few,
generalised and offered something to everyone. They were used to
attack the 'policy of strength' and to appeal to the average
voter's material interests. The DFU's case was simple. Bonn's
excessive military expenditure created inflation and diverted

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¹ Wiesbadener Appell, op. cit., p. 10.
² Ibid., p. 9.
³ Ibid., p. 8.
resources away from domestic problems, and its foreign policy prevented or reduced exports to the East. In contrast, East-West detente and a smaller military establishment would help exports, stabilise the currency, and save 16,000 million DM which could be used to cut taxes, finance better pensions and schools, build more public housing, subsidise small businesses and the \textit{Mittelstand}, and so on.

By avoiding a divisive formal dogma and social and economic policies, if they could not be framed as being of national rather than class interest, and by appealing to shared values and fears, the DFU tried to attract supporters ranging from Communists to Conservatives. Essentially, the party tried to exploit the nationalist sentiments, anti-war fears and religious convictions of the population, the liberal, humanitarian values of the bourgeois radicals and the non-material Socialist morality of the working-class radicals. It wanted to recruit the prestige of the social elite and the numerical strength of the working-class. However, right from the start, the DFU's mood, policies and image restricted the scope of its recruitment. Not only did the party's anti-Fascism cut it off from the extreme Right, which the DFU did not mind, but its obvious fear and distrust of conservative-liberal State power must have put off moderate right-wingers whom the party did want to recruit. The DFU's known Communist links also added to its left-wing image. This not only moved it further away from the Right but also brought it face to face with the anti-Communism of the Left.
CHAPTER II

FAILURES AND DISSATISFACTIONS

The DFU had only nine months to get ready for the 1961 federal election. In this race against time the umbrella party was much helped by the expertise and resources of its partners. Within a few months the DFU had recruited some 5,000 members. By March ten Land parties had been founded and by May most of the constituency and local branches had been created. Money was quickly forthcoming.

During its early months the DFU was not only very active but also most optimistic about its vote potential. For a number of reasons most party leaders were convinced that they could conquer the general electoral trend against minor parties and enter parliament in 1961. The Communist vote had been promised, a large influx of other opposition elements was expected, and the DFU was fortunate not to have to compete with the KPD and/or SPD for the committed neutralist vote. A good omen was the two Saar Landtag

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1 See Chapter VIII.
2 See Chapter V.
3 See Chapter V.
5 For example, only two out of 18 senior DFU leaders did not think that their party would be in the fourth Bundestag. Interviews.
seats which had been won by the DDU, a DFU ally, in late 1960 with Communist help.¹

From its origin the DFU was subjected to serious attacks by its critics. Between them they labelled the party a Communist front organisation and the DFU never managed to shake off this damaging image. In February, 1961, the federal government included the DFU on its list of *kommunistische Hilfe- und Terrororganisationen*² and most of the press shared this opinion.³ But the party’s fiercest critics were organised labour⁴ and the SPD from which the DFU hoped to draw the bulk of its support. In January the SPD declared the DFU a proscribed organisation,⁵ for the next four months it pretended that the party did not exist, then took the offensive and finally, in July, encouraged the banning of

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¹ See Chapter IV.


⁴ In 1961 the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund* (DBG) and the powerful I. G. Metall rejected all contacts with the new minor party (KPDBU, see below) and in the 1962 Land election of Nordrhein-Westfalen the DBG assisted the SPD in an anti-DFU campaign which included the publication of the 72 page booklet *KPDBU: Kommentare zur Politik der DFU, DGB Landesvorstand Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1962*.

'Die Freunde Ulbrichts' while at the same time belittling their potential.1 The DFU saw the SPD's extreme reaction as evidence that its theme: 'Her Straus will, kam Brandt nicht wahlen' was exerting the intended pressure on the Social Democrats. This was the only consolation the DFU derived from the intense and damaging campaign against itself.

By July the DFU had picked most of its candidates and drafted its manifesto. On 10 July the party formally opened its election campaign. It was one of the few fringe parties which 'made any pretense at national coverage'.2 The party's electioneering was largely concentrated in the cities and towns and it relied heavily on some 180,000 posters (some carrying the portrait of Albert Schweitzer) and 13.2 million pamphlets.3 The party's main election slogans ignored reunification and made neutrality the alternative to insecurity and nuclear weapons. They also tried to appeal to the material instincts of the voters. The main slogans were:4

Her Frieden will, muss Frieden wahlen!
Moderne Politik statt 'moderner' Waffen!
Sicher gehen - besser leben - neutral werden.
Atomwaffen bei uns? Nein!
Auch morgen in Frieden leben!
Die neue Kraft - eine neue Partei -
eine Partei die weiss was sie will!

and particularly

Neutral - Atomwaffenfrei

Five weeks before polling day, on 13 August, the Berlin Wall went up. As in earlier federal elections, the Soviet bloc became an embarrassment to the neutralists.\(^1\) This traumatic event marginally helped the SPD\(^2\) and the DFU was convinced, and probably rightly so, that it was much hurt by it.\(^3\) The party's claim that "Die Absperrungsmassnahmen Ulbrichts sind die Früchte einer 12-jährigen verfehlten Deutschland-Politik der Bundesrepublik..."\(^4\) did not help matters. The DFU's election campaign faded rapidly, the party became embroiled in a dispute over its Communist links.

1 The 1948 Berlin blockade preceded the first federal election, 1953 saw the East Berlin uprising, and the 1956 Hungarian crisis preceded the third national election.


3 The high emotions of the time, the brutality of the act and the resulting worsening of the international situation did not help a party which advocated conciliation with the perpetrators of the act and which sought to remove the protection of NATO during a Communist threat. In the words of the DFU director Renate Riemeck:

"So hatten wir nach dem 13. August die ungeheuerliche schwere Aufgabe, in einer emotional erregten Situation mit vernunftsmässigen Argumenten den Wahlkampf zu führen, was ich fuer einen der schwierigsten Grundes fuer das unerwartete niederige Wahlergebniss halte".

Quoted in Sproho, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

which led to resignations and expulsions. Some of the open letters of these ex-DFU leaders were quickly published by the SPD which not only approved of their anti-Communist sentiments but also of their argument that votes for the DFU would only help the governing parties. The Wall hurt the DFU, but in the long run the Mauer helped to undermine the 'policy of strength' (see below).

On 17 September the DFU won only 602,000 votes (1.9%) but the suggestion that it probably ended with only the support of the hard-core Communists remaining in West Germany seems unfounded. The fact that the SPD had increased its vote to 36.2% (from 31.8% in 1957) compounded the DFU's failure.

The election fiasco hit the DFU hard. The brief spell of optimism was largely over, members drifted away, the party never again recovered the level of activity of its early months, and almost immediately the party was riddled by tensions and conflicts which may have been delayed by early success.

Serious internal rows hit the DFU early; they lasted a long time and their substance changed little over the years. The speed

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1 Interviews. The following leaders are known to have left the party: Franz-Josef Kuechler, member of the federal executive committee (KPDU, op. cit., pp. 53-55), Pastor Hartke, chairman of the DFU in Bremen, Frau Bornmann, member of the Land executive of Niedersachsen, Pastor Sanders and Juergen Riege, both federal election candidates, who were expelled. Hin misslungener Versuch, Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, probably 1961.
2 Ibid.
3 Barnes, et al., op. cit.
4 See Chapter IX.
5 See Chapter VIII.
by which many issues arose indicates that many elements had reservations about the party's structure right from the start. Its early failure ended inhibitions to criticise and demand alterations. The nature of the party and UNION caused some rows, some sprang directly from the DFU's electoral flops, others from external causes and they merged into a general dissatisfaction with the umbrella party which was with it over the years and played a large part in its history.

The DFU's nature both encouraged conflict and reduced their damage to the party. The DFU alliance was a motley crowd of organisations and people quickly thrown together and without much cohesion. Aggravating this situation were some factions which added little to the DFU's strength but were indulged by the party which was most keen not to lose any support. Because of this, small factions seem to have had an influence out of all proportion to their importance to the party. This made decision making more difficult and forced the party into a series of compromises which pleased hardly anyone. In the opinion of one DFU director, the party was sometimes in danger of compromising itself out of existence by trying to please too many factions and should have instead cut loose from some of its supporters. Other factors also encouraged disunity. It seems that many of the DFU's people were just 'passing through'. To them the party was a means of hitting back, of protesting, rather than a political home. In particular, to Communists the party was a tactical exercise and some had little liking for the deideologised party but stuck to it

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1 Interview with Renate Riemack.
because of orders. Some of the DFU's allies resented the party because it overshadowed them. Too few leaders depended on the party for a livelihood or career. 1

Other factors helped to pull the party together. Communists had an imposed rather than a natural loyalty towards the party which, however, was most useful to it until the KPF declared the DFU redundant. There were those leaders and members who left the party when it could not meet their expectations, but many others were prepared to put up with compromise, disappointments and infighting because they saw the DFU as the only serious attempt at overcoming the habitual splintering of the fringe left. However, many of these stout supporters were also dissatisfied with the party. Anti-Communism existed in the party, but to many members it was a tenet of faith, or just logical, that Communists and others must be seen to work together in a party whose programme called for East-West co-operation and understanding. The nature of its rebels also helped the leadership to assert itself and reduce damage. The critics were divided which made 'log-rolling' by them difficult or impossible and made it easier for the party to isolate individual factions. Rebels who shared similar views were often not active together but decided to take a stand at different times. This not only blunted their impact but also helped to prolong the same conflicts over many years. The rebels disunity is one explanation why no sizeable faction broke away to establish a rival organisation.

1 See Chapter VI.
The DPV was divided by several serious disputes which were usually about united-front politics. The party was determined to stick to its 1960 role while some of its own people wanted to reconstruct the party and move away from united-front politics or at least define it more narrowly. The essence of the party was at stake.

It was not possible to link each issue of contention to the relevant faction because not all the conflicting elements, their size, value-orientation and probable alliances between them could be identified. It appears that disputes occurred both within and between ideological and social groups in the party and UNION. The two outstanding clashes, which seem to have conditioned most of the other disputes as well, were between '... die der SED und KPDB verbundenen Inhaber von Schlüsselstellungen einerseits...' and '... unabhaengige Pazifisten, Neutralisten und Sozialisten anderseits' and between the 'expressive' and 'instrumental'.

approach to politics.\footnote{Pure' types of either approach are empirically rare.}

DFU collectively was not an inward looking, messianic sectarian group waiting for history to create its moment of importance. If it had been, many of its internal disputes would not have occurred. As a group it did not have the 'Lenin complex' and large elements in it and voting for it were not strong on 'expressive' politics. Because of this, the question of effectiveness was an important factor. Three main approaches to effectiveness seem to have been in the party\footnote{Based on interviews with DFU leaders about themselves and other members. The importance of effectiveness is also reflected in the nature of the intra-party disputes.}.

A large group of the party's personnel and voters seem not to have been equipped for a long-term uphill struggle of uncertain prospects. (The fact that a lot of party leaders were new to minor party politics may help to explain this.\footnote{See Chapter VII.}) These people

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
wanted a quick result largely measured in votes and had little
time for the DFU's non-partisan activities. Bad election results
caused frustration and apathy which may have been intensified by
the awareness that the vote was there (i.e. Social Democrats,
trade unionists, and other peace groups) but that the party could
not reach them. This seems also to have encouraged some members
to blame the party and not the voters for failure.

To other factions effectiveness seems to have had more than
one dimension. They accepted a long-term approach but also wanted
tangible results. They wanted good election results but also saw
electioneering as the best means of making propaganda. They
wanted to tap the reservoir of like-minded people, but were also
prepared to work on long-term Willensbildung. The existence of
many similar minded people outside the DFU alliance was to them
not a source of frustration but of hope for it meant that the
party had a receptive audience for its cause if not for itself.
Furthermore, future events might just push these people into the
party's arms and give it political weight.

To other elements tangible results seem to have had little
priority. Fighting the 'good fight' seems to have been largely
enough in itself. The very lack of the party's success was seen
as evidence of how much they were needed, of how worthwhile their
efforts were.
The IFU was founded when the Social Democrats accepted the solution to the 'German problem' of the other main parties. Eighteen months later, a reassessment of the problem and its 'solution' began both at home and abroad. For years, and despite some differences, the Western allies had accepted that any European settlement had to include a united Germany. Now, Kennedy's global 'strategy for peace' and de Gaulle's overtures to the East, posed Bonn with the threat that the division of Europe could be overcome without solving that of Germany. Bonn resisted this 'thaw' and became the last stronghold of Cold War orthodoxy.¹ However, the early sixties saw the tenuous beginnings of a new Ostpolitik when trade missions were established in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, but these links were also 'viewed as a means of building a better basis for Bonn's claim to represent all of Germany and to challenge and isolate the GDR'.² Further developments were blocked by the strong opposition in the government. However, much of the press and groups in all the main parties were critical of Bonn's orthodoxy. The Berlin Wall had triggered off a growing disenchantment with the 'policy of strength', by underlining its failure, and internal and external pressures sustained this critical mood. These dissenters argued that the parties should cease to see reunification as their immediate concern and instead aim at improving the lot of the East Germans, and prevent the two parts of the nation from moving further apart by establishing

2 Ibid., pp. 87-88.
regular contacts with Pankow, to find areas of co-operation.

An official revision, by the government and the parties, of the policy towards the East had to wait until after 1965. Only then did the bulk of the political establishment accept that rapprochement had to precede reunification and that Bonn could not solve the 'German problem' on its terms.

The events of 1962-65 were gifts to the DFU's propaganda because they gave support both to the party's pessimistic predictions of calamity and its 'Politik der Mitte und Verstaendigung'. The party saw no need to change its policies, but it gave less emphasis to reunification. The 1962 Cuba crisis could be used to emphasise the dangers of a Big-Power confrontation in the nuclear age. The *Spiegel* affair was used to prod the thin veneer of Bonn's democracy and as a stick with which to beat suggestions that the government needed extraordinary powers in times of emergency. The American MLF scheme for a multi-national nuclear fleet, which only had any real support in Bonn, was denounced as a 'Selbstmord-Drohung' because it would create a Cuban situation in reverse with the USSR having to respond to missile ships off her coastlines. The split within NATO was welcomed, and the disagreement between Bonn and its allies over

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1 *Politische Kommentare*, 3. 3. 1962.
2 Ibid.
3 See Chapter III.
4 *Ausweg*, December 1964.
rapprochement was used to appeal to the Germans traditional fears of estrangement and isolation and to show up Adenauer as the Cold war dinosaur who slowed down détente. The retirement of the Chancellor and the political difficulties of his successor were greeted. The Friendship Treaty with France was rejected as a military alliance.\textsuperscript{1} The Erhard/Schroeder 'policy of movement' was treated as a variation of the 'policy of strength'.\textsuperscript{2} In brief, Bonn was as Cold-War-orientated as ever. Foreigners alone were concerned with rapprochement. Improvements in East-West relations, particularly the hot-line accord and the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty of 1963 were greeted as important steps towards East-West détente.\textsuperscript{3}

While events suited the DFU's propaganda, the propaganda itself was criticised within the party. The party was plagued by its pro-Communist image which was probably as much, if not more, due to its comments on current events - both at home and abroad - as to its formal programme. What the rebels wanted was objectivity. The people also had to be told the truth about the Communists' blame for the post-war situation. It was not enough merely to blame the West and Bonn. This not only destroyed the party's credibility but also hurt the cause of peace and democracy (see below). The critics rejected what Hofstadter has

\begin{itemize}
\item[1] \textit{Ausweg}, August 1963.
\item[2] \textit{Ausweg}, November 1963.
\item[3] \textit{Ausweg}, September 1963.
\end{itemize}
called the paranoid politics\(^1\) of intense frustration.\(^2\) They also

saw the folly of extremism which, in Dahl's words, does

not produce debate and discussion but hostility and

rejection. The moderates close ranks against the

threat. In the end, the attack of the political
dissenter, far from clarifying alternatives by

debate and discussion, may actually reinforce the

prevailing ideology.\(^3\)

The DFU's pro-Communist propaganda was largely achieved in two

ways. Firstly, the party castigated Bonn for its political

injustice, intolerance of minority opinion, etc. But refused to

comment on the internal situation of East Germany. The party

explained this one-sidedness on the ground that a party from one

country must not interfere in the internal affairs of another.\(^4\)

But this explanation does not stand up to examination. The DFU

itself often emphasised how closely foreign and domestic events

were interwoven in the 'German question'. Also, the party was

willing to comment critically on the internal affairs of Western

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1 Richard Hofstadter, 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics',

2 One observer of the DFU's 1962 party conference described the

collective behaviour of the delegates, which may well be the basis

of paranoid politics, thus:

So viel rührender Idealismus, soviel ehrliche Begeisterung,
die dann plötzlich wieder umschlägt in blinden Fanatismus, in
gefaehrlichen Hass... Sie mit den Augen der Liebe – und dies ist
etwa nicht ironisch gemeint – nach Osten sehen, ihnen truht der
Hass den Blick, wenn sie im eigenen Lande umschauen. *Die Zeit*,
2.11.1962.

3 Robert A. Dahl, *The American Opposition: Affirmation and

Denial* in R.A. Dahl ed., *Political Oppositions in Western

Democracies*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966,
pp. 67-68.

4 Interview with the director Arno Behrisch.
nations\textsuperscript{1} and on the few occasions when the party did publish comments on domestic Communist matters they were most favourable.\textsuperscript{2} Secondly, in international affairs the party sided with the Communists. Their efforts of detente were seen as genuine, the West's, and especially Bonn's, were often interpreted as dubious. The Soviets wanted peace, while many Western nations did not.\textsuperscript{3}

\begin{itemize}
  \item For example, 'Keine Unterstüzung fuer Franco: Freiheit fuer das spanische Volk', Ausweg, May, 1962.
  \item 'Polen in Breslau', Ausweg, June 1963; 'Republica de Cuba' Ausweg, May 1964.
  \item For example, a highly intelligent DFU leader argued, and believed it, that in Communist states peace groups and the government never clashed, unlike in the West, because the Soviet regimes wanted peace. Interview with Heinrich Werner, DFU federal business manager.
\end{itemize}
The DFU's policies and propaganda contributed towards the prolonged and intense dispute within the party over its relations with Communists. This controversy began with the erection of the Berlin Wall and was still with the party when it lost its umbrella role seven years later. Infighting ranged from the federal executive down to the grassroots branches and this drawn out dispute had many sources.

For many reasons, the Communists were criticised. Anti-Red emotions were at work and the Communists were a handy scapegoat for the party's failures. There was apprehension as the Communists, who at first had adopted a low profile, moved increasingly to the forefront of party affairs over the years.¹ There was the feeling that the KPD and 'fellow travellers' had far too much influence in the party and used it not to pursue peace but Soviet defence and foreign interests. The DFU's Communist links were seen as the main reason for the public's rejection of the party.² Two particular complaints were that the Communists were responsible for the party's lack of objectivity in its public statements and its refusal to pay more attention to economic affairs (see below). Both were seen as main causes of the party's poor election results. Some of the critics wanted to exclude the Communists from the DFU, which would have resulted in the break up of the UNION which embraced mostly Communist front organisations, but others only

¹ See Chapter VII.
² Interviews.
wanted to reduce the KPD's influence.¹

Challenges to the Communists' position in the DFU had little chance of succeeding. The DFU was too dependant on Communist resources and Hintermeister were in key positions in the party.² Quite a number of the DFU's leaders were 'fellow travellers' and to them as well as to others co-operation with Communists was an act of faith and the only way of overcoming a basic split on the left. However, there was serious disquiet even among pro-Communist leaders. They were aware of the irony of the situation. Without the help of the KPD, the DFU could not have built its organisation and achieved its level of activity. But because of these Communist links, the DFU had no chance of escaping its political impotence. Most DFU leaders looked forward to the legalisation of the KPD, as this they felt, would lessen the public reaction that every leftist group with goals similar to those of the Communists was the illegal KPD in disguise.³

The first serious challenge to the DFU's Communist connections came in 1963 from a group of leaders in Niedersachsen. This Land party included no Communists among its leaders in 1961⁴ and was led by the nationalist Gerhard Bednarski who was also a member of the federal executive. In September 1962, the Land party conference authorised the drafting of a detailed domestic policy for the 1963

¹ Interviews.
² See Chapter V.
³ Interviews.
Land election. But this draft was 'torportiert' by the federal party before it could be presented to the Land election conference. Thereafter, Bednarski, the chairman, Hubert Korzekwa, the treasurer, and Albert Hoff, the Land agent, sabotaged election preparations, refused to work with Communists, and ignored instructions from the Land executive, the majority of which had sided with the federal party. In April 1963, Bednarski and Korzekwa, who publicly stated that the DFU was financed from East Berlin, were suspended and then resigned. Albert Hoff was suspended.¹

Some local leaders supported the chief officers of the Land party. In March 1963 eleven of them, including Dr. Colpe who also sat on the federal executive, had addressed an open letter, the Goettinger Erklaerung, to the federal executive listing their grievances. Their essential case was that the DFU had to save itself from the ruinous KPD embrace. They were convinced that the party was run by Communist agents and 'fellow travellers' who used the DFU for their ends and discredited it. Specifically, they attacked the party's pro-Communist propaganda and its refusal to adopt a more comprehensive domestic programme. The twelve proposed the following reforms which were intended to exclude Communist influence from the party: all power had to be invested in the elected leaders, members who broke the party rules and were of

anti-democratic sentiments should be expelled, the party should refuse all help from authoritarian groups and abolish multi-party membership.\(^1\) This open challenge was rejected by the federal executive,\(^2\) and in May Dr. Colpe, and probably all the other signatories, left the DFU.\(^3\) About a year later, in June 1964, the party agent of Nordrhein-Westfalen, Viktor Wynands, left the DFU complaining that he was surrounded by 'kommunistisch geschulten Kaderleuten' and suggested that they had their own unofficial command structure within the DFU.\(^4\) With Wynand's departure, the highly publicised resignations ceased for a time but the conflict was by no means over.

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4. Viktor Wynands 'open letter' of 5.6.1964, a copy of which is in the author's possession.
The DFU's electoral role was a source of continuous conflict. After its poor federal results, the party gave top priority to the Land and local elections of 1961-65.\footnote{See Chapter X.} The DFU was kept out of the Land parliaments and by 1965 it had elected only 27 local government councillors.\footnote{Ausweg, March 1965.} In 1965 the DDU of the Saar lost its two Landtag seats. Each election confirmed that the DFU could not hurt the SPD. The Social Democrats were improving their support by 3\% - 5\% in the Länder\footnote{Werner Kaltoufeiter, 'Wahlwerbung Parteien in den Landtagswahlen 1961-65', Zeitschrift fuer Politik, XII, 3, 1965, 224-40.} while, with one exception, the DFU's vote was static or declined,\footnote{See Chapter IX, Table VII.} compared with its federal results in the same localities. On several occasions, the DFU offered the Social Democrats electoral deals against the CDU which the SPD ignored.\footnote{For the 1963 Land election in Bremen the DFU offered the SPD 'Zusammenarbeit gegen CDU-Politik', Ausweg, September 1963. Before the 1963 Land election in Rheinland-Pfalz a similar offer was made. Minutes of Velbert DFU local branch, 31.5.1963.} During the elections the DFU also increasingly emphasised that its ultimate task was to help inflict a defeat on the CDU because only such a defeat would overthrow Bonn's 'policy of strength'.\footnote{For example, 'Aus dem Wahlaufruf der Deutsche Friedens-Union Richtiger Kurs in Bremen'. Zusammenarbeit gegen CDU-Politik, Ausweg, September 1963.} Unrelenting bad election results caused critical reactions within the DFU. The party was under attack from members who needed electoral progress and could not restrict themselves to moral...
issues. These critics reached totally different conclusions about the party's poor results. Some wanted the party to stop contesting elections and help the SPD. Others wanted to reconstruct the party to improve its vote.

The DFU had set out to threaten the SPD. It failed, and the small party was thereafter on the defensive. The big party seems to have had attractions for many of the DFU's own people. Only a year after the federal election, the DFU had to defend its decision to contest further elections. In late 1962 the party admitted that manche unserer Freunde sind der Auffassung wir sollten auf eine Kanditatur vernichten und stattdessen auf Wahl der SPD aufrufen. ¹

Such demands were more strenuously voiced with the passing of the years and they were in part encouraged by the DFU's futile electoral offers to the SPD. These offers at least implied that the SPD was the 'lesser evil' and showed that an electoral deal was not a practical proposition. The demands that the party stand down unconditionally in favour of the SPD were based on three main arguments. Firstly, the DFU had no electoral potential and could not exert pressure on the SPD. It was splitting the Left but only to help the governing parties. Instead, it had to make the most of its weakness by throwing its votes behind the SPD, the 'lesser evil', against the CDU/CSU, the real protagonists of the Cold War. Secondly, the DFU was inconsistent by calling for a defeat of the CDU while at the same time refusing to give its votes to the only party which could inflict such a defeat. Thirdly, by contesting further elections, the party only publicised how little support its

cause had among the public.¹

At a time when it had moved closest to the government in defence and external affairs,² the SPD gave some credence to the 'lesser evil' notion. To some DFU people, the SPD's dislike for an excessive reliance on nuclear defence and the spread of strategic nuclear weapons, and intra-party opposition to the MLF proposals, which the party however accepted in 1964, made the Social Democrats appear less determined in their nuclear stance and more open to change than the ruling parties. In 1963 and 1965 the Social Democrats refused to give the necessary large majority to enact the government's emergency legislation. These developments worried the DFU. It realised that many of its 1961 votes had been cast against the SPD. These protest voters, it was feared, wanted the SPD to be different and looked for every sign of it, especially as there was much talk of the 1965 federal election being a neck-and-neck race between the two main parties.³

The DFU attacked the notion of the 'lesser evil' by appealing to its members' sense of morality and democracy:

Die Metaphysik des 'kleineren' Uebels aber ist das Krebgeschwuer, das das freiheitlich-demokratische Bewusstsein der Staatsburger von innen her zerfrisst. Wer das 'kleinere' Uebel waehlt, um das grossere zu vermeiden, der wird stetig weiter von seinem eigenen Willen abgedrangen und schwindet mit in grossen Strom der entpolitisiernten und manipulierten Wahlermassen... Wer sich auf diesen Weg draegen lasst, der zerstoert systematisch seine eigene Moral, der entscheidet nicht

¹ Interviews.
³ Interviews.
mehr nach ethischen Massstäben, sondern in der
Unverbindlichkeit eines mehr oder weniger 'Gefallens'...

The party also denied that it was inconsistent. Its case
was that only a defeat of the CDU/CSU could bring about a basic
change in Bonn. However, the Social Democrats were no viable
alternative because they were too close to the government if not
as 'bad' as it. Hence, the DFU had to press ahead on its own.
The party also refused to acknowledge that it had failed electorally.
It insisted that it could still enter parliament and kept alive
the idea of some future electoral deal with the SPD. The party
promised success which secretly its leaders no longer believed in.
It had to promise good election results to bolster morale when
circumstances demanded that it should have emphasised, that
despite poor results the party's work was of value. The leadership
seems to have helped to demoralise its own supporters by promising
what the party could not achieve.

The DFU had no intention of giving up its most important
activity. To the party, elections were much more than just good

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1 Heinrich Werner in Politische Kommentare, op. cit.
2 For example, in 1963 Viktor Wynands, the Land party agent of
NRH, told party members: 'Nach wie vor ist die CDU die
gefährlichste, weil reaktionsarote Partei. Es geht also darum
(evtl. zusammen mit der SPD) die CDU zu bekaempfen... 1965 wird es
wahrscheinlich ein Kopf-an-Kopf-Rennen von CDU und SPD geben. In
dieser Situation wird es u.U. fuer die SPD nicht unmichtig sein,
wenn sie mit den 600,000 Stimmen der DFU rechnen koernte...
Allerdings wurde die DFU gewisse Minimalforderungen stellen fuer
diesen ihren Versuch auf eigene Kandidatur: 1) Ruckekehr zur
Pauluskirchen-Bewegung. 2) Wiederaufgreifen des SPD
Deutschlandplans in irgendeiner Form. 3) Verhinderung des
Bruderkriegs. 4) Personelle Forderungen.' Minutes of Valbert DFU
local branch, 31.5.1963.
3 For example, this was the opinion of the DFU's federal
business manager, Pfarrer Werner.
or bad results. Elections were its most prized propaganda venue and the party was determined to keep its issues before the voters.\textsuperscript{1} Furthermore, there were strong factions in the party, who insisted on electioneering and demanded that the party reconstruct itself to improve its vote (see below).

Among groups close to the DFU, the 'lesser evil' notion was also an issue. Reports on the 1963 Deutsche Arbeiterkonferenz in Leipzig stated that Pankow functionaries were aiming to improve West German working-class solidarity by helping the SPD against the governing parties in 1965, and that they had decided to withdraw their personnel and resources from the unwieldy DFU and use them to increase infiltration of the industrial unions. It was also said that some delegates resisted these intentions which they saw as a weakening of the peace movement.\textsuperscript{2} These reports proved incorrect in their predictions. After 1963, the presence of Communists increased among DFU leaders\textsuperscript{3} and in 1965 the KPD helped the DFU. Around the time of the above workers' conference, the VUS's central committee had before it a paper which proposed that

\textit{alle entspannungswillige Kräfte in der Bundesrepublik sollten sich das Ziel setzen, die CDU/CSU zu schlagen und der SPD zu einem Wahlsieg helfen.}\textsuperscript{4}

However, this proposal seems to have had little support and its

\textsuperscript{1} Interviews.

\textsuperscript{2} The report originated with the SPD's Ostspiegel and was carried by the German Press Agency, dpa 90 wi sep. 63 1433 and the \textit{Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt}, 29.9.1963.

\textsuperscript{3} See Chapter VII.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt}, 29.9.1963.
discussion was postponed.\footnote{1}

While some members asked the party to stop elections, others demanded that the DFU change its tactics to better its vote. Many members saw progress largely or completely in terms of votes. One of their main objections was that the DFU, as the core of the united front, was not enough a party "in " in ueblchen Sin." The DFU wanted to work with the fringe opposition both inside and outside the party arena. It wanted to work with most protest groups and knew that it could not reach many of them as a party. Hence it undertook non-partisan work and was determined "jede parteimessaige" 

Rage zu uaeberwinden. In its non-partisan work the DFU helped openly or secretly pressure groups outside its circle of allies, most notably the anti-Boeb movement, and in its time it adopted most forms of political action, including infiltration, petitions, open letters, pamphleteering and contacts with foreign groups.\footnote{2}

Many members felt that the DFU's vote was suffering because it tried to do too much, and resistance to non-partisan work seems to have been widespread.\footnote{3} The main argument was that by not

\footnote{1}{Ibid.}
\footnote{2}{See Chapter X.}
\footnote{3}{Interviews. Also the DFU agent of Schleswig-Holstein indicated that instructions about non-partisan work were not closely followed in his area:

Nach eigenen Erfahrungen mochte ich ueber den Bereich meiner Arbeit sagen, dass bei den meisten Bezirksvorstaenden die Tendenz besteht, die DFU vorwiegend als Partei zu sehen, und zwar als eine Partei in 'ueblchen Sin." d.h., eine, die sich in wesentlichen darauf beschrankt, Flugblatter zu verteilen, Mitglieder- und offentliche Versammlungen durchzufuhren und bei Wahlen fuer ihre Kandidaten zu werben. \textit{Ausweg}, November 1963.}
concentrating enough on being a party in between elections the
DFU paid the penalty on polling days. Some wanted the party to
stop its non-partisan work and others wanted to see it reduced.
Failing to see the possible value of this type of work, these
critics tended to become apathetic or angry in the face of
persistently poor results.¹

A more serious confrontation took place over the programmatic
limitations imposed on the united front. There was much
dissatisfaction over the party's limited concern for social and
economic matters and its insistence on using its federal programme
in all elections.

The DFU was contesting Land and local elections on
international and defence issues.² Detailed social and economic
policies of local relevance were often neglected if they could not
be blamed on the 'policy of strength'.³ The general theme was that
large military expenditure had impoverished the localities and must
be drastically cut. The party proposed that Born's share of the

¹ Ibid.
² DFU-Präsidiensat, 8.11.1961; Ausweg, March 1962;
Kommunalpolitische Grundsätze der DFU, Landesverband Nordrhein-
Westfalen für die Kommunalwahl am 27. September 1963; Ausweg,
September 1963; Ausweg, March 1964.
³ Some examples were: in Hamburg the DFU argued that the
burgers' prosperity was being undermined by Born's trade embargo
with the East which denied the city its historical hinterland. In
Niedersachsen the farmers' indebtedness was blamed on the 'war
economy' and EEC competition. In Nordrhein-Westfalen the closure
of coal mines was in part blamed on the Hallstein doctrine and the
EEC.
public purse should be reduced and that of the other governments should be increased to protect local democracy and improve local public utilities. The DFU also insisted that the localities should not be burdened with civil defence costs.

This was not enough for the critics. They came across too many voters who felt that the DFU was not in touch with their material problems, and these critics wanted more effort from the party. Beneath the DFU's exterior there was a class party trying to get out. Some of the critics specifically asked for a Socialist or working-class party, and these demands seem to have been a mixture of idealism and pragmatism. To some, only an openly left-wing party could win mass support among the Social Democrats and organised labour without which, the argument went, the DFU could not gain political influence. Among these people were also those who argued that the party had no real remedy because it concentrated on the symptom, i.e. the 'policy of strength', and ignored the disease, i.e. the social and economic structure. Some did not want Socialism to win more votes. They seem to have felt that now as the DFU had failed electorally, it could forget tactics and votes and become a Socialist moral force.\(^2\)

The confrontation over domestic policy began in early

\(^1\) Interviews.
\(^2\) Interviews.
1962. After the damaging Bednarski and Colpe affairs of 1963 (see above), which were partly over this issue, the DFU's federal executive gave two main reasons for refusing to give socio-economic matters more attention. Firstly, that the party's electoral failures could not be blamed on its narrow programme, because post-war experience had shown that elections did not revolve around detailed manifestos but specific questions of foreign policy. Second, the party agreed with its critics that it had to break through to the working classes. But the DFU insisted that it could not turn itself into a class party for that purpose nor that it had to because, unlike the SPD, it still represented Socialist values.

The party reminded its own people and SPD voters that the DFU and

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1 For example, in April 1962 Gerhard Bednarski, the chairman of the DFU in Niedersachsen, wrote:


3 Ibid.
DCB programmes agreed, that the basis for social and cultural progress was peace; that the proposed emergency laws were undemocratic and endangered the rights of the unions; and that all the means of mass destruction had to be banned.\(^1\)

Leading Communists and most bourgeois leaders agreed that the ideologised united front had to be maintained.\(^2\) Their main concern was that a move to the Left would lose them the middle class which they needed.\(^3\) They did not want to alienate the social group most receptive to the moral issues of peace, civil liberties, etc.\(^4\) Bourgeois leaders tended not to have much faith

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\(^2\) Interviews.

\(^3\) Interviews. Also, in 1963 the BDD's General Secretary emphasised the importance of the middle-class to the UNION:

> Es gibt nicht nur eine haimatlose Linke. Vielmehr ist die politische Retlosigkeit in allen Schichten unseres Volkes beängstigend verbreitet und das Bedürfniss nach sachlicher Orientierung gross. Inbesonders trifft dies zu auf den staatlichen Mittelstand; auf diejenigen Unternehmer, die an allseitigen Handel interessiert sind; auf die gesamte demokratische Intelligenz (einschliesslich der Wissenschaftler und Künstler); auf Offiziere die aus ihrem Erfahren gelernt haben... Josef Weber, *Der Bund der Deutschen und seine kuenftigen Aufgaben*, Duesseldor: BDD, 1963.

\(^4\) For example, Parkin *op. cit.*, pp. 33-59, 175-92. Selnack, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-49. However, Parkin's survey shows that the bulk of the GHD's middle-class radicals favoured some form of socialist alternative to capitalism. Most of the DPU's bourgeois leaders interviewed had similar leanings but they also insisted that some of the party's middle-class leaders and followers, and the bourgeoisie as a whole, disliked radical economics.
in the 'apolitical' proletariat and even some working-class leaders were disenchanted with their own kind. Also, the Communists seem to have resisted a radical DFU because they did not want to turn the party into a potential rival of the illegal KPD.

It was also the KPD which helped the DFU to defeat an external Socialist challenge, but this challenge was a nuisance and not a threat. One of the DFU's allies, the VUS, had always included an element which after Bad Godesberg wanted to form a new Socialist party. In 1960 the VUS lost some of its leaders, including Viktor Agarts, when it decided to help found the DFU and turn itself into a Socialist ginger group instead of a Marxist party. Over the years demands for a new dogmatic party continued. Some factions in the VUS saw themselves overshadowed by the DFU, were worried because the party sapped the VUS's limited strength and increasingly diverted it away from partisan Socialism. Furthermore, the DFU's failures and its refusal to adopt a leftist

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1 This opinion was most forcibly expressed by Professor Frans Paul Schneider, the Secretary of the Fränkischer Kreis.

2 Viktor Wynands, an ex-union functionary and the DFU's agent in NRW, told a group of party members: 'Der Gedanken der Koexistenz kommt bei der bürgerschaftlichen Intelligenz besser an als bei den Gewerkschaften'. Minutes of the DFU Velbert local branch, 31.5.1963. Dieter Hochne, a former SPD branch secretary, was of the opinion that 'in Kreisen der bürgerschaftlichen Intelligenz ist mehr Mut und Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit (i.e. opposition to 'policy of strength') vorhanden als in den Kreisen der Arbeitschaft'. Organ der VUS, December 1961.

3 Interview with Lorenz Knorr, a DFU director and federal business manager until 1963. Also, N.J. Ryszchkowsky, Die linke Linke, München: Olsoag, 1968, p. 68.
domestic programme encouraged agitation for a new Socialist party. However, these demands were always defeated by the Communists who were influential with the VUS.¹

Even less pressure was exerted by a small group of people who had been associated with the late Viktor Agartz and who in 1963 started the anti-Communist Initiativeausschuss zur Gründung einer neuen sozialistischen Partei which a few years later fizzled out. There was also the Sozialistischer Bund which kept its distance from both the DFU and VUS and which now and then talked of turning itself into a Socialist party.²

The DFU did not take these doomsday rivals very seriously. It had divided the fringe Socialists who were not only weak in number but also riddled by conflicts. The party was convinced that while it existed, and had the support of the Communists, no rival Socialist party could emerge. The DFU was more concerned about its own dissenters.³

The DFU could not squash demands for more concern with domestic issues. Much of the pressure seems to have come from the grassroots and it would appear that even some Communists were among those who were determined to end the programmatic tactic of which the Communists approved.⁴ It seems that the DFU and most of its allies had many working-class supporters who, according to Parkin, are more concerned with economic than moral issues.⁵ Some party

¹ See Chapter IV.
² See Chapter IV.
³ Interviews.
⁴ Interviews.
⁵ Parkin, op. cit., pp. 40-45.
branches took matters into their own hands and there developed a tendency

alle möglichen Fragen aufzugehen und auf Flugblätter in einer Weise zu beantworten, von der man sich bei der nächsten Wahl Stimmen verspricht, ohne zu prüfen, ob der Bündnisscharakter der Union auch nicht verletzt wird.¹

Some members had even suggested that the DBU should throw its votes behind the SPD in the 1963 Land election of Hessen because its social and economic policies were more acceptable than those of the CDU.²

Pressure from below and tactical considerations forced the DBU's senior leaders, who themselves were divided on the issue,³ to take half a step to the Left in 1965 (see below). The party had to reconcile itself to the fact that it did not have enough middle-class radicals with which to pursue moralist, 'expressive' politics. As a result, the party was soon forced to define its united front more narrowly.

In March 1964, Renate Riemeck resigned from the directorate on health grounds amidst rumours that she had been pushed out of her job. Renate Riemeck was forced to write an open letter ridiculing these rumours.⁴ At this time she also proposed that German reunification was no longer feasible. However, this proposition, which seems to have had much support in the party,

¹ Ausweg, November 1963.
² Heinrich Werner in Politische Kommentare, op. cit.
³ Of the first three DBU directors, Lorenz Knorr wanted a Socialist party and Renate Riemeck resisted change. Interviews with Knorr and Riemeck.
⁴ Liebe Freunde und Mitarbeiter! Letter from Renate Riemeck, 14.3.1964.
was still too daring to be openly adopted by the DFU which was getting ready for the 1965 federal election. ¹

In early October 1964, after 'tiefegreifender politischen Diskussion', the DFU's federal executive decided to contest the 1965 federal election.² But the party was on the defensive because it had to justify standing. The DFU decided to stand List candidates everywhere but not to oppose in selected constituencies the anti-Cold war direct candidates of the main parties. This unusual formula took note of the critics in the major parties who since the early sixties had demanded a reassessment of Bonn's foreign policy. But this development was probably more an excuse than the reason for the formula, which was a (largely empty)³ gesture towards the DFU's anti-election faction. The formula was used to justify the DFU's standing in the election. The party had to falsify the 'lesser evil' notion. By arguing that like-minded people could be found in all the main parties, and by insisting that there was nothing to choose between the SPD and the other parties, the DFU hoped to convince its supporters that its decision did not damage but rather helped the cause. Instead of giving its votes to the SPD, which would have amounted to a surrender on many issues, the party could keep all its issues alive during the election, win seats in the Bundestag and at the same time do

¹ Interviews.
³ In the event the party stood down for only four SPD candidates. Interviews and SPD pressemitteilungen und informationen, 17.8.1965.
nothing to prevent the anti-Cold war elements of the other parties from entering parliament.

The DFU was also engaged on several fronts trying to keep its votes. It wanted to increase its votes, but was more concerned with reducing its expected losses. There was the inevitable fight with the SPD. The DFU had the 'lost vote' syndrome against it and what made it worse was that the election was seen by many as a neck-and-neck race between the main parties. The DFU was very worried that these two factors, coupled with the 'lesser evil' sentiments in favour of the Social Democrats, could lose it many votes and the SPD exploited this situation. A SPD pamphlet argued that in 1961 the DFU had lost it 20 seats and that in the present

Kopf zu Kopf rennen ... wer sich ... wieder verführen lässt und gutgläubig DFU wählte, der verhindert diese sozialdemokratisch geführte Regierung, der stärkt damit Erhard, der stärkt F.J. Strauss.¹

In reply the DFU stressed that the SPD did not have the votes to become the government. At the most it could join the CDU in a coalition government which would simply perpetuate the 'policy of strength'.² As many 1961 DFU votes had been protest votes against the SPD, the cooling of tempers, the DFU's failures, the fact that the Social Democrats offered an alternative on some issues, probably made the SPD's appeal to DFU voters quite effective.³

¹ 'Wer DFU wählte...', Kurzinformation Nr 7, Bonn: Vorstand der SPD, H.d.
² Knorr and Backhaus, on cit., pp. 1-3.
³ See Chapter IX.
The KPD called upon its people to vote DFU. Nevertheless, the DFU was somewhat apprehensive about its Communist vote. It knew that many of these ideologues did not like the DFU with its bourgeois, intellectual leadership and lack of dogma. To help retain these people and to recruit new support, the DFU stood 'independent' candidates from outside the UNION. This scheme was used to cover up the influx of some 90 Communist candidates who were used to counteract the flagging loyalties of the Communist vote and to improve the standard of election candidates.

There was also trouble from another friendly source. In early 1965, Pastor Niemoeller, who was pro-DFU and a key figure among the progressive clerics and pacifists from whom the DFU recruited help, proposed that the fringe opposition should not work through a minor party in the federal election but cast spoiled votes to show the 'establishment' and the world that there were Germans who wanted peace. The DFU was furious, argued that this proposal was 'innere Emigration' which was not only bad for democracy but also tried to deny the party a useful opposition role.

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2 See Chapter VII.
3 Interviews.
5 Interview with Pfarrer Werner whose task it was to reply publicly to Niemoeller's proposal.
Finally, in early 1965 unsuccessful contacts were made between the DFU and the eventual founders of a new nationalist, neutral party, the Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher (AUD), which was established in May and had a programme very similar to that of the DFU. The incident showed that if the DFU had been faced with a real opportunity of creating an all embracing united front, which it claimed it wanted, it would have found it difficult, and most likely impossible, to practice what it preached. The nationalists made contacts with the DFU to discuss an electoral alliance embracing both Right and Left. However, discussions did not go very far because important people on both sides were implacably hostile towards such an alliance. In the DFU it was basically an emotional anti-Right reaction. Leading DFU people, though not all, could not subordinate their ideals and hatreds for a tactical consideration of this nature. If the Communists, who were so much more flexible in these things, did press for the alliance, the resistance among the nationalists (which however blamed the DFU for the failure) and the real fear of a walk-out in the DFU defeated them.

The DFU's response to the AUD and its new social and economic

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1 Das Notprogramm fuer Deutschland, AUD pamphlet, n.d.
2 Interview with Renate Riemann who took part in the discussions. Also, Fred H. Richards, 'Die "nationale Opposition" in der BRD 1965', Deutsche Studien, XVI, 4, 1965, 579.
3 Neue Politik, 6.3.1965.
policies for the election meant that the party was defining its united front more narrowly. In its domestic policies the DFU took half a step to the left. It wanted to offend the Right as little as possible. At the same time it had to respond to the agitation within its own ranks. The DFU was also determined to dent the Social Democrats' appeal among its own people and moderate Socialists by offering a domestic programme equal to that of the SPD.  

The DFU no longer restricted itself to savings on the military budget but also proclaimed:

Die Wirtschafts-, Finanz-, und Steuerungspolitik muss von den Interessen des überwiegenden Teiles unserer Bevölkerung ausgehen. Die DFU deshalb wendet sich daher gegen die einseitige Begünstigung und Förderungen der wirtschaftlich Mächtigen auf Kosten der Arbeiter, Bauern, Handwerker und Gewerbetreibenden sowie der kleineren und mittleren Betriebe. The party continued to propose fighting inflation by cutting military expenditure. However, unlike in 1961 these savings were not intended to benefit everyone but would contribute towards a redistribution of wealth. The party proposed to reduce by 20% the taxes on lower and middle incomes and shift a large tax burden onto the rich. In 1961 the DFU wanted more spending on education, now it demanded equal educational opportunities for all and (at a

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2 Interviews.

3 Die Bundesrepublik braucht eine neue Politik, op. cit., p. 11.
time when the SPD was accommodating Roman Catholic schools) it criticised Church-run education. As in earlier years, the manifesto opposed emergency powers, demanded the reform of the judiciary, and so forth. It also again demanded normal trade with Communist countries, more expenditure on pensions, better housing, etc. The manifesto also included earlier demands that the public purse should eventually be equally divided between federal, land and local governments.

The party entered the election with foreign and defence policies which were hardly different from 1961. German unity and neutrality, recognition of East Germany, East-West detente, disarmament and opposition to nuclear weapons (updated to include the MLP) were still its core demands. This continuity was achieved because the manifesto was not allowed to reflect the fact that by now even the bulk of its non-Communist party leaders seem to have ruled out reunification as impracticable but thought it unwise to declare this publicly.

The new manifesto was easily accepted by the DFU's March election conference. However, a much publicised row broke out over the six words: "Die DFU vertritt keine kommunistische Ziele," which a delegate, Professor Vogt, proposed should be included in the manifesto. The leadership backed the proposal but the delegates defeated it. Thereafter, the leadership called for further discussions and another vote which narrowly approved the proposal. The leadership saw the six words as a useful public

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1 Kirchheimer, op. cit., p. 244.
2 Ibid., p. 10.
3 Frankfurter Rundschau, 15.3.1965; Deutsche Tagespost, 16.4.1965.
relations exercise and as a sop to those of its people who insisted that the party must publicly assert its independence from the KPD. Opponents of the proposal saw it as a slight against a close ally, and also as illogical because DFU goals only had meaning if they were shared by the Communists.

In the federal election the main parties largely ignored the thorny issue of foreign policy. The DFU had forecast this, but could do nothing to change it. The DFU entered the election very much on the defensive and its results were a disaster. The party's 434,182 votes were down by about a third on its 1961 results. An alliance with the AUD, which won only 52,637 votes, would not have helped very much. What the DFU leaders feared, did happen. The SPD had managed to pull back some of its votes from its minor party rival, but the forecast neck-and-neck race, which had embarrassed the DFU, did not materialise. The Social Democrats did not do as well as widely expected but they improved their votes by about 3.0%, whilst the CDU/CSU did better than expected, partly at the expense of the FDP, increasing its vote by about 2.0%. A new minor party, the neo-Nazi Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD), with 664,193 votes did not yet show its full, if short-lived, potential. However, the NPD soon helped to give the DFU, which was badly shaken by the election's outcome, a new objective against which to unite.
CHAPTER III

THE END OF AN UMBRELLA PARTY

Post election exhaustion and apathy hit the DFU hard, more people began to drift away and the leadership took stock of the situation amidst acrimony. During a meeting of the federal executive in late 1965, the Communist party was accused of having let some of its people drift over to the SPD, and a group of leaders, determined to curtail the excessive KPD influence at the top of the party, tried to use the election debacle to remove the federal business manager, Pfarrer Werner. The latter was seen by them as the Communists' Trojan horse in the DFU. The attempt failed, but the anti-Werner faction won a compromise. A second director, Arno Behrisch, was made a full-time paid functionary. Behrisch and Werner had been on bad terms for years, and Behrisch was seen at that time as the tough ex-Social Democrat who could contain the influence of the Communists and their friends in the party.¹

The Communist party demoted the DFU. In late 1965 a SPD source reported that Max Reinmann, the KPD boss, had without first consulting the Pankow leaders decided "den Trennungsstrich zur DFU zu vollziehen, die er schon als laestige Konkurrenz und bloße Verwaesserung seines illegalen Bundesrepublik-Apparates bewertet hat."² The KPD did not desert the DFU, but it withdrew much of its financial support. Until 1965 the DFU had a lot of money for a

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¹ Interviews.
² Parlamentarisch-Politischer Pressedienst, 184, 23.9.1965.
small party. Now it became hard up and could not even afford its main journal, Ausweg, any longer and it ceased publication in December 1966.1 Furthermore, the KPD ceased to look upon the DFU as an electoral organ.

The DFU quickly abandoned elections. In December 1965, the federal party laid down that henceforth the DFU would undertake electioneering without standing candidates. That is, the party would have no candidates in the forthcoming Land and local elections, except in opportune moments, but contest the elections in every other way.2 The party did not want to lose its most prized propaganda venue altogether. The federal party also approved a similar decision reached by the Hamburg party a few days earlier.3 The factors which the DFU had used to justify contesting the 1965 federal election were unaltered when the party decided against elections. The DFU did not openly adopt the 'lesser evil' notion, but in practice it did just that. It stood no candidates and made it plain that the elections were against the CDU.4 In January 1966,

1 See Chapter V.
3 Ibid.
4 For example, in a press release for the Land election in Hamburg the DFU stated:

the DFU's federal executive stressed that while there were opposition elements in all the main parties they were strongest in the SPD, and that the influential unions, which were also against emergency powers, could exert pressure on the Social Democrats. The party also once more carefully distinguished between the SPD leaders and members and emphasised that the former did not reflect the views of the latter. The KPD, which controlled many of the DFU's votes, told its followers to vote SPD (see below).

The DFU's decision not to stand candidates was criticised. The Baden-Wuerttemberg Land party was opposed to it as were some leaders in Nordrhein-Westfalen. The DFU had the same arguments thrown back which used earlier to justify contesting elections. A main argument was that after years of attacking the Social Democrats, the DFU now proposed to help them although they had not changed. This was just too cynical and such a move would not only deny the voters an alternative choice in elections but would also alienate and muddle the party's voters who could not understand this unjustifiable turn about. This argument seems to have been most persistently pursued by those in the party who had always wanted an all out attack against the SPD and who in the past had been annoyed by the DFU's offer of electoral deals to the SPD and by it

2 Letter from Hamburg DFU an die Landesvorsitzenden des Landesverbandes Baden-Wuerttemberg, 2.2.1966. Also, Interviews.
distinguishing between the SPD's 'good' members and 'bad' leaders.¹

Some factors also favoured the decision. The run down state of the party, lack of money, widespread apathy in the ranks, and two bad federal elections seem to have cooled the election ardour of many. There was the sentiment in the party that it was wrong to split the Left and thereby help the Right. Over the years, the feeling had also increased that the DFU was not only incapable of pressuring the SPD but was at the same time isolating itself from other opposition elements who still persisted in seeing the Social Democrats as the only alternative to the conservatives and liberals.²

A change in Soviet strategy was most likely the decisive reason for the DFU's acceptance of the 'lesser evil' notion. In 1964, Moscow theorists gave the erstwhile 'Social Fascists', the evolutionary Socialists, the historical role of helping Communism overthrow Capitalism. In response to this 'new' policy, from late 1965 East Berlin began to suggest a working-class alliance against West Germany's bourgeois, reactionary forces and offered talks about the German problem. Pankow began to talk of a popular front with the Social Democrats, as it had done on previous occasions.³

Standing down the failed DFU was a gesture towards the 'new' policy. That is, the party which the SPD had accused of splitting the Left no longer did so. One type of united front was being sacrificed to

¹ Interviews.
² Interviews and see Chapter II.
the pursuit of another. In early 1966, Ulbricht proposed talks between his people and West Germany's Social Democrats. Brandt accepted but the proposed exchange of speakers did not materialise because of political, legal, tactical and propaganda considerations.¹

The UNION was used in support of the Pankow initiative. The KPD told its people to vote SPD in the 1966 Land elections of Hamburg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen and Bayern.² The Communists also sponsored 115 Deutsche Gespräche in 1966 of which most were held by organisations in the UNION.³ In these Gespräche, Communists from East Germany and usually KPD people and 'fellow travellers' from West Germany discussed intra-German problems, and not surprisingly they usually favoured Pankow's solutions.⁴ Another series of discussions were held in the following year, and again the UNION played a leading role.⁵

The DFU did not have time to settle down to its post-1965 pattern because new, and largely unforeseen, events required further reactions to changing circumstances. Too many events occurred in too short a time to trace their individual effect but their collective impact was profound. In December 1966 the Social

³ Ibid., pp. 8-9.
⁴ Ibid.
Democrats joined the CDU/CSU in a Great Coalition and the small FDP went into opposition; West Germany had a slight economic recession in 1966/67; a neo-Nazi revival took place; student unrest flared up early in 1966 and then intensified and continued for several years; in August 1968 the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia and the following month the Communist party was legalised once again.

In December 1966 the Great Coalition was formed and the DFU, which wanted a SPD-FDP coalition, was most hostile towards the new CDU/CSU-SPD government. At once, the party began to contest elections again. It just missed parliamentary representation in Bremen in 1967 with 4.3% of the vote, and did well in a few towns during local elections. However, unlike the neo-Nazi party on the Right, the DFU could not turn the Left’s discontent with the Great Coalition, economic recession and foreign affairs into votes for itself. Anyhow, the DFU was only intended as a stop-gap until another umbrella party could be organised. The Great Coalition had killed the 'lesser evil' notion, a proletarian front became even less unrealistic, and the incentive was now there to found another united front for the 1969 federal election. The survival of the DFU was assured, but within months of the formation of the Great Coalition efforts were being made to find a new umbrella party for a new united front. It was taken for granted that electoral politics was needed. This attitude made the UNION and the Communists the core of the decade's leftist electoral fringe and separated them from the other elements of the extra-parliamentary opposition and

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1 DFU Pressedienst, 8.11.1966.
the 'New Left'.

The federal DFU quickly accepted this demotion. It argued that the Great Coalition, the open 'Faschierungstendenz' and Bonn's aggressive foreign policy urgently required a new electoral united front of the Arbeiterchaft ... Bauern, Mittelstand, Studenten und Intellektuellen'. A few days after the founding of the Great Coalition, the DFU's federal executive stressed that not the shape of the organisational structure but the message of the new collective endeavour was the important thing. About a year later, the federal DFU gave its approval to the new Demokratische Linke which took over the DFU's umbrella role for the 1968 Land election in Baden-Württemberg. The federal DFU argued that

Es kommt nicht darauf an, alle diese Krafte unter dem Dach der Deutschen Friedens-Union zu sammeln. Entscheidend ist vielmehr, dass sie alle gemeinsam ihren ganzen Einfluss ausuben.

Four months later, in March 1968, the party stated that it was prepared to join unconditionally a new electoral united front for 1969:

Die DFU ist der Auffassung, dass ein gemeinsames Auftreten im Bundestagswahlkampf notwendig ist ... and ... ist vorbehaltlos und ohne Sonderwunsche bereit, sich in das Wahlbundniss 1969 einzuordnen. Sie erstrebt das Bundniss gleichberechtigter Partner ...
The Great Coalition gave the government the majority to revise its approach to Eastern Europe. Now

Bonn abandoned the most important tenet of its 'policy of strength'—namely, that Germany's reunification was a prerequisite for any East-West detente and accepted, instead, the argument that the best way to work for German unity was through a relaxation of East-West tension.1

This was what the DFU had demanded for years, but now the party was opposed to the government's Ostpolitik. Bonn saw detente as a means towards reunification; the DFU2 and East Berlin3 no longer wanted reunification in the foreseeable future. Pankow wanted its sovereignty recognised by Bonn and the West; Bonn refused this but was prepared to establish links with East Germany short of diplomatic recognition. However, now

every West German effort to make contacts and work for detente ... was denounced (a stance similar to Bonn's reaction to East German probes at the height of the Cold War) as aggression in disguise or as a tactical ruse, to pursue hidden imperialist goals.4

By 1968 Bonn had established diplomatic relations with

2 'der inhalt der deutschen frage ist nicht mehr die wiedervereinigung deutschlands, sondern die sicherung des friedens in europa. das erfordert die aufgabe des alleinvertretensanspruchs die anerkennung der addr und der bestehenden grenzen'. 
3 DFU Pressedienst, 7.4.1967.
4 Ibid.
Rumania and Yugoslavia. At the same time, Pankow, which, among other things, feared being isolated within the Communist bloc, and the Soviet Union, which was concerned about the status quo, launched a diplomatic counter offensive and within months 'every state in the Warsaw Pact had agreed not to expand its relations with West Germany beyond a point acceptable to the DDR'. In other words, further progress in the East depended largely on the recognition of Pankow.

Over the next two years, the DFU concentrated on discrediting the Ostpolitik and predicting its failure and on demanding the recognition of Pankow and the post war frontiers. The party's argument was that the Ostpolitik was the 'policy of strength' in disguise. Bonn tried to fool the public and its allies by pursuing old aims by new means. The Ostpolitik was expansionist because it refused to recognise the status quo in Europe. Now that a military solution had failed, Bonn was trying to use its economic power and sham detente to create unrest in East Germany and to isolate the nation, hoping to swallow it up eventually, and to make the economies and policies of East European states dependent on the Federal Republic. The Ostpolitik aggravated the sense of insecurity in Europe and (the DFU argued in 1968) was largely responsible for the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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2 Vorlage fuer den Bundesvorstand: 'Neue' Ostpolitik kein Element der Europaeischen Sicherheit, n.d.

3 DFU Pressedienst, 1.9.1968.
This same expansionism was also behind Bonn’s relations with the EEC and NATO (see below). Bonn’s determination to have the strongest conventional Armed Forces in Western Europe, and its delay in signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty which showed that the government still had nuclear ambitions, were the expressions of an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy.

The DFU was divided over the 1967 Middle-East war. Some of its leaders, including the Communists, wanted to side with the Arabs and others with the Israelis. In the end, the party took the public line that right was on both sides and that the Americans and West Germans, as the arms suppliers to an area of tension, had to shoulder some of the blame for the war. The DFU also took part in a large anti-Vietnam war movement. On this issue the party was united. It insisted that Bonn disassociate itself from the ‘Vietnamverbrechen’, support the appeals for peace of the Pope and UN General Secretary, withdraw its ambassador from Saigon, and stop the payments to offset the foreign exchange costs of United States forces in Germany which helped the dollar, which was under pressure, and which contributed towards the financing of the war. The party’s response to both wars displayed its anti-Americanism, and the DFU tried to use both conflicts as warnings about the German situation.

1 Interviews.
2 Arno Behrisch, Was will die DFU?, Köln: DFU, pp. 2-3.
3 DFU Pressedienst, 7.2., 4.1., 15.3., 20.3.1968.
From early 1967 the DFU concentrated on an anti-"organic"^ state campaign. Many of the party's themes were old or had been foreshadowed during the previous 18 months or so. The Great Coalition, student unrest, and the economic recession made such a campaign more urgent and opportune for the party. Since its origin, the DFU had distrusted State power and resisted its expansion. It had also always blamed the Right for most things it opposed. Now the party asserted that the swing to the Right was greater than before and that democracy was in greater peril than at any other time since 1945. All democratic forces had to resist this 'Rechtskure' and 'Faschisierungstendenzen'. As it had always done, the party insisted that Bonn's militarism hurt the economy, and this argument was pressed home much more elaborately during the recession and thereafter. However, now the DFU also linked the decline of democracy and the threat of expanding and oppressive State power to the economic structure of the nation (see below).

A main theme of the DFU now was that capitalism had to be reformed.

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^ The party usually used the term 'Formierte Gesellschaft' which was coined by Chancellor Erhard in 1965. According to the DFU leader Opitz, such a state or society would mean that

'die Bundesrepublik muss sich von ihrer heutigen, pluralistisch-demokratischen und foederalistischen Gesellschaftsverfassung losessen und sich umwandeln in eine Leistungsgemeinschaft, in der alle Kräfte in Kooperation an die Steigerung der industriellen Produktionskapazität bzw. der militärischen Macht hinwirken. Alle gesellschaftlichen Gruppen müssen darin unbeeinstimmend das Interesse des 'Ganzen' (der 'Allgemeinheit', des 'Gemeinwohls') erkennen und anerkennen und ihm ihre eigenen, andergerichteten Forderungen nachordnen.

Reinhard Opitz, Der grosse Plan der CDU: die Formierte Gesellschaft', Blatter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik, special issue, September 1965, 4.
The DFU's greater concern for economic matters, and its general reaction to the polity's move to the Right pushed the party further to the Left in its policies and statements. The party now came out into the open and showed what it had always been and was unsuccessful in hiding—a left-wing party. Earlier intra-party opponents of a move to the Left had to give way to internal and external pressures and they seem to also have been influenced by electoral considerations. It was now believed that the economic recession had radicalised sectors of the working-class, that the party had to make at least a token gesture towards the radical students and that many people wanted a leftist antidote to the contemporary swing to the Right. There was also a widespread argument that under prevailing conditions an embracing moderately left-wing united front was possible because the opposition elements had moved to the Left since 1960. It was stressed that this new approach could not be class orientated as such, because of the DFU's heterogeneity, but was aimed at the present power structure in the nation.

The SPD leaders were attributed much of the blame for the 'ernste Lage' but the CDU/CSU was still the real villain. The DFU, which had wanted a SPD-FDP coalition, criticised the SPD for

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1 See Chapter II.
2 Interviews.
3 THESSEN zur innerparteilichen Diskussion. Sitzung des Bundesvorstandes der Deutschen Friedens-Union 20/21.5.67 in Hannover.
4 Arno Behrisch, Was will die DFU?, Köln: Bonn, 1967, pp. 4-6.
working with ex-Nazis, and blamed it for not only having saved a crumbing and divided right-wing government, but also for giving it the stability and votes to proceed with its undemocratic aims, which included the enactment of extraordinary powers.

The Great Coalition agreed to enact the controversial emergency powers and in March 1968 the work was done. During these 14 months, as in earlier years, the DFU conducted a highly emotive campaign against these extraordinary powers. The moderate features of these powers were ignored, and in this the DFU was not alone.

The emergency powers have possibly aroused more passion and heated political debate — both in and out of the Federal Republic — than any other non-violent politico-legal issue; yet there is also probably no issue on which so much has been written purely as an emotional response in the fear of creating a loophole for a new Nazism...

The DFU, which distrusted state power and rejected Bonn's 'militarism', hated extraordinary powers. For years that party had insisted that the emergency laws could be used to militarise the nation and prepare it psychologically for war; that they could be employed to regiment social and economic life by suspending such things as strikes, property rights and individual liberties; that they would legalise the use of the military against the civil population and the tapping of phones and the interception of mail; that they could be used to suppress opposition at home; that they gave much new power to the government which included many people with authoritarian tendencies and thus were a serious threat to an

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already weak democracy; that they were needed to back up the
'policy of strength' and were as such a danger to peace. After
March 1968, the DFU insisted that these laws tried to legitimise
an illegal attack on the constitution and were as such not legal.
It also emphasised that during the revival of Nazism, parliament
had created the means for a 'legal' mutsch. The events of Weimar
were emphasised as was the recent military take over in Greece. The
rise of the neo-Nazi party, which by 1968 had 61 members in the Land parliaments, the concern over extraordinary State
powers plus the absence of a viable parliamentary opposition caused
disquiet among the politically active on the Left. Historical
memories were too recent and the DFU was determined to exploit
them. A great anti-emergency law campaign was under way. It was
hoped to pressure the SPD, as in 1965, into refusing its support
for these laws. The centre of this campaign was the Kuratorium
Notstand der Demokratie which was not only helped by the DFU, UNION
and Communists but also by some unions, including the massive I.G.
Metall, intellectuaals and students. For the first time, non-

1 For example, Hiebadener Appell. Wahlaufruf der Deutschen
Lorens Knorr and Heinz Nagel, Nach dreissig Jahren: Das zweite
deutsche Ernaechtigungsgesetz? Giessen: DFU Landesverband Hessen,
1963.

2 DFU Pressemitteilungen, 14, 6, 1967. 'Entschliessung fuer eine neue
Politik und fuer ein wahrbare Alternative', dokumentation, n.d.
(probably June 1968).

3 Reinhard Kuehn et al., Die NPD. Struktur. Ideologie und
Funktion einer neofaschistischen Partei, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag,
1969, p. 72.

4 The union's arguments against the emergency powers are set
Communist unionists allowed DFU personnel to work with them. To a limited degree, and only briefly, the unions' isolation of the DFU was breached. In March 1968, the emergency powers were part of the Basic Laws. The unions gave up their opposition to them, but fringe groups, including the DFU, began a campaign to annul the extraordinary powers.

Another target of the DFU's attack were the discussions to introduce a majority electoral system to replace proportional representation. The DFU argued that under the guise of stabilising the governmental system, Bonn was trying to exclude from parliament all small opposition parties, and not only the FDP. The DFU was also incensed by the Great Coalition's failure to ban the neo-Nazi NPD. The government was accused of using that party as an excuse to hasten their own movement to the Right. At the same time, the DFU was demanding the legalisation of the Communist party.

In its criticisms, the DFU no longer restricted itself to attacking policies and attitudes and asking for the reform of public institutions. It now also concentrated on, as it saw it, the economic cause of what it opposed. To the DFU, this was the unprecedented post-war concentration of economic power in the hands of a few large firms and banks and the government. Economic and political decisions were now so closely intertwined that the big economic interests had to take control of the government which, with its massive economic power, was used to further the interests of big business by allowing massive expenditure on armaments and by depressing the well being of the workers, bourgeoisie and small

1 See Chapter IV.
farmers and businesses. The political and economic establishments were against a democratic and social State. Their 'machtpolitische' system had to falsify the meaning of democracy to deceive the public and divert them away from their true interests, needed a 'formierte Gesellschaft' in which most social and economic facets of life could be regulated and subordinated to the system; needed extraordinary powers to still and isolate the increasing number of opponents of this oppressive system with its ever more unjust allocation of the national wealth. According to the DFU, the only treatment for this economic cancer was the democratisation of the economy and society.\(^1\) Democracy was not threatened by an external enemy or by the people, but by the leaders, and the present economic structure, and to a lesser extent the failure to democratise West Germany after 1945, were responsible for this worrying situation.

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\(^1\) For details, see summary of 1969 party programme at the end of the Chapter.
The Great Coalition, the neo-Nazi revival, and the economic recession revitalised the lethargic left-wing fringe and gave them the stimuli to look for a new party for the 1969 federal election. Some groups who had previously refused to work together now were prepared to think of co-operation. The DFU was ruled out for 1969. It was widely considered a spent force, though some people in the party did not accept this (see below). The DFU was associated with electoral failure, its image was too intellectual and bourgeois, it was thought that it had no working-class appeal, several of the groups which had to be recruited had in the past objected to the party. Furthermore, it was considered good sense to start an umbrella grouping from afresh and not around an old party so that everyone would feel equal and no one at a disadvantage.¹

The Socialist party versus united front question was again an issue. However, this time it was over how much dogma and not, as in 1960, over whether to have dogma at all. The problems which the DFU had faced had been learned by many. The slight economic recession of 1966/67 was used by some to argue that working-class solidarity and conscientiousness had reasserted itself and that a new Socialist party was now opportune. The opinion was also expressed that the only real antidote to the neo-Nazi revival was a rebirth of Socialist and democratic values. The united-front factions, including the Communist party,² wanted a democratic,

¹ Interviews.
anti-right-wing alliance which would appeal to both workers and the progressive bourgeoisie. They did not want a Socialist party which would keep away opposition elements. The aim was a more broadly based united front than the DFU alliance had been.

In the Summer of 1967 the first practical steps were taken to relieve the DFU of its umbrella role. Communists in Baden-Wuerttemberg sponsored meetings which in November 1967 resulted in the Demokratische Linke (DL). The new umbrella party, which took some members from the DFU and absorbed the VFS, was founded to contest the 1968 Land election. The aim of the party was to exploit the unrest of workers with lost and uncertain jobs. The DL founders insisted that the DFU, being without working-class appeal, could not exploit the economic recession. The new venture may also have been an experiment by the KPD to see how openly it could function. It was openly Communist: both its chairman and half of its early members came from the KPD. However, the DL chairman, Eugen Eberle, asserted: 'nicht den Sozialismus aufzurichtete sei sein Wunsch, nicht eine neue Weltanschauung zu bilden, nicht die Gesellschaft zu andern'. The party emphasised job security, workers' participation in industry, tax reform, the banning of the NPD, recognition of Pankow and the post-war

4 Die Zeit, n.d. (probably April 1968).
frontiers, opposition to nuclear weapons and emergency laws.\(^1\)

The regional DFU leaders tried to prevent the demotion of their party. They argued that the good election results of Bremen showed the DFU's parliamentary potential, and that the DFU was prepared to adopt left-wing domestic policies and more working class election candidates.\(^2\) They also stressed that the DFU was already known to the public and should therefore continue as the umbrella organ of the UNION.\(^3\) However, the federal DFU supported the DL venture and several directors came to Baden-Wuerttemberg to pressure their colleagues into accepting the new umbrella party. The deputy chairman of the **Land** party resigned in protest.\(^4\) The **Land** conference, in November, reluctantly accepted the DL alliance. The national party decided to postpone its fourth conference which was scheduled to meet in November in Stuttgart because of the crisis.\(^5\) Some members refused to work with the DL and others left the DFU. In April 1968 the DL won only 2.3% of the **Land** vote. The DFU of Baden-Wuerttemberg could not forget that it had been dragooned into this electoral arrangement. Months later it was persistently opposed to the DFU's link-up with the newly legalised Communist party (see below).

The DL was a regional effort. Elsewhere, many groups were

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1. Ibid.
2. *DFU-korrespondenz*, op. cit.
3. Interviews.
5. Ibid.
striving to find a new national electoral formation. Some demands for a new Socialist party came from elements of the Socialistisches Zentrum (SZ).¹ This loose alliance, created in February 1968, was the first coming together since Bad Godesberg of diverse fringe Socialists. The SZ embraced the VUS, which had been an ally of the DFU since 1960, and the Sozialistischer Bund (SB), which had refused to work with the Communist-influenced DFU and VUS. Both groups were outcasts of the SPD. The VUS was pro-Communist, ideologically orthodox, working-class, and looked to the East. The SB was anti-Communist, revisionist, intellectual and looked to the West. Both groups were now prepared to work together and they were joined by the new Aktionsgemeinschaft Sozialistische Opposition (ASO) and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischer Sozialisten. The SZ embraced some 1,000 Socialists of whom about half were in the pro-Communist VUS.² The SZ was an achievement in that it brought together people of the 'Old Left' who would not have worked together at the beginning of the decade. But it failed to embrace two Socialist fringe groups³ and, apart from a few tentative links, it was separated from the 'New Left'.⁴

¹ For more details see Chapter IV.
² Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwehr linksradikaler Tendenzen, op. cit., p. 15.
³ The Verband des Internationalen Bundes demokratischer Sozialisten and Neusozialistische Bund. See Chapter IV.
⁴ See Chapter IV.
The division between the 'Old and 'New' Left was fundamental and goes back to 1960 when the Socialist students (SDS) were expelled from the SPD and refused to help the DFU. The radical and 'anti-authoritarian' youth disliked the 'reactionary' authoritarian Communists and had little truck with groups linked to them. Many of them also did not like the partisan and parliamentary ways which the DFU and other fringe groups were engaged or interested in.\(^1\) The DFU and its partners produced their plans for Hochschulreform\(^2\) but because of their temperament and for practical reasons they, and even the SB which had some contacts with the Socialist students, could not keep up with the radical 'New Left'.

There was a lot of talk in the SZ about the creation of a new Socialist party. However, the new Socialist alliance was divided over this basic issue. The Communists worked against a dogmatic party within the SZ and its partners,\(^3\) and as the VUS, with half the strength of the alliance, followed the KPD line,\(^4\) a new

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1 Kurt L. Shell, 'Extraparliamentary Opposition in Postwar Germany', Comparative Politics, II (1969-70), 653-80. Shell suggests that there was a temporary 'united front' (Spring 1967 to Spring 1968) of fringe groups including the 'New Left' and DFU (pp. 669-70). Even then it was probably more a case of pursuing shared goals than working together.

2 For example, Erlauterungen zum Entwurf eines Universitäts gesetzes für die Landtage der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, DFU federal office, 20.1.1969.


Socialist party was doomed.

In the Spring of 1968 a more broadly based grouping, the Giessener Kreis, met to discuss what to do in the 1969 federal election. The first meeting included Socialists from the SB and ASO, activists from the anti-emergency law campaign and the anti-Bomb movement, some academics and Socialist students. The meeting agreed that it wanted neither 'DFU—noch KP-Hypotheken', rejected arguments (mainly from the Socialist students) for a spoiled-vote campaign, accepted the need for a party but could not agree on whether it should be Socialist or left-wing. The grouping was already breaking up but further meetings were planned. Personal differences between Professor Hofmann, the Secretary of the 'Kreis', and Helmut Schauer, a former chairman of the SBS, lost the grouping its Socialist students. People from the anti-Bomb movement withdrew from the venture as did probably most of the Socialists (but not Professor Abendroth the SB's leading figure), who saw the grouping as a 'Professoren Kreis'. Having lost much of its support, the Giessener Kreis had to turn to the elements from which it tried to get away—the Communists and the UNION. It is likely that the Communists worked against the 'Kreis' because it wanted to create an alternative to the DFU which would have split the fringe Left. The 'Kreis' now came under Communist influence. Its new co-ordinator was the Communist agent, Dr. Brender, who was a

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1 Nikolaus J. Rynschkowsky, Die linke Linke, Muenchen and Wien: Olzog Verlag, 1968, p. 64.
2 Ibid., pp. 63-65.
3 Interviews.
senior BdD leader and active in the DFU. However, not everyone in the UNION wanted the Giessener Kreis. During the DFU's fourth national conference, early in June 1968, a group of 'besorgter' members from Baden-Wuerttemberg distributed a pamphlet. The two-page paper reminded the delegates that the DL had done little better than the DFU and came out against a 1969 electoral alliance with the Communists which would be doomed to failure:

Wir brauchen keinen GIESSENER KREIS der die Rolle einer GRAUEN EMPIRE in Hintergrund spielen will. Unsere Partei kann im Interesse ihrer Wahlchance eben nicht 'vorbehalden' zu jedem Wahlbündnis bereit sein . . . DIE DFU MUSS DAFUER SORGEN, DASS SIE ZUM WAHLKAMPF 1969 NICHT ALS 'MAX REINHARD-PARTEI' ANGESEHEN WIRD! Wir halten es für grundlegend falsch und unehrlich, eine Einheitsfront mit der KPD zu bilden, weil dazu weder die ideologische Voraussetzung in unserem Volk noch die Bereitschaft bei der Mehrheit der DFU-Mitglieder besteht. Wir sind für ein Bündnis mit allen unabhängigen Demokraten . . .

Not many weeks later, leaders and members of the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land party continued this opposition on their home ground (see below). On 1 July the Giessener Kreis published an 'Aufruf zu einem Wahlbündnis für 1969'. The aim was an embracing united front which would give diverse individuals and the extra-parliamentary opposition access to parliament. However, before the 'Kreis' could develop into a new party, two significant events occurred which

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1 See Chapter V.
2 An die Delegierten des IV. ordentlichen Unionstags der DFU, from Eine Gruppe besorgter Parteimitglieder aus Baden-Wuerttemberg.
affected the new united front, the DFU and the fringe Left in general.

The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, on 21 August, and the legalisation of the Communist party, on 26 September, had a profound effect upon the leftist fringe. The invasion reopened old cleavages and caused new ones and the legal Communist party compounded these divisions. Within weeks, two years of negotiations, contacts and infiltration had been largely negated. The 'New Left' condemned the invasion as did some of the fringe groups friendly towards the Communists. The new alliance of fringe Socialists, the SZ, broke up; the anti-Bomb movement criticised the attack; the Nazi victims of the VVN regretted it. Within the UNION, the VUS and FK were split down the middle by the event, but the DL and DDU as well as the Communists justified the invasion as an anti-counter-revolutionary necessity. Quite a few of the pro-KPD groups blamed Bonn's Ostpolitik at least partly for the invasion.1

The DFU was split in its response to this traumatic event. The Baden-Wuerttemberg Land agent condemned the invasion outright, and lost his job.2 With most of the directors on holiday or out of touch, the director Arno Behrisch issues a press statement justifying the attack.3 A few days later, seven UNION leaders, including two Hintermaenner, visited the Russian ambassador.4 Behrisch had overstepped his authority and

4 Nachrichten aus der dfu, 9/68.
a meeting of the federal executive was arranged for the 31 August 1968 to decide the party line. The meeting was acrimonious and heated. About half of those attending were fighting it out and the remainder were waiting for a lead. The Communists, and some others, applauded the invasion but insisted that it had been delayed too long. Others argued that the event was most regrettable but that it must not distract the party from its work. Some leaders insisted that the DFU condemn the invasion outright. They argued that a party which denounced aggression in Vietnam and all military solutions, the Greek colonels' putch and all anti-democratic tendencies, could not excuse the invasion if it at all cared about its credibility.1 At the end of the day, the 68 assembled leaders and consultants agreed on a compromise statement which regretted the attack but also insisted that Bonn's Ostpolitik had to share the blame because it failed to accept the status quo in Eastern Europe.2

This statement did little to appease those leaders and members who wanted an outright condemnation. Less than a month after the executive's meeting, on 26 September 1968, a legal Communist party was unexpectedly established, and the dispute over the invasion became linked to the question of co-operation with the new Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP). Opponents of both planned to argue their case during the 1968 national party conference.

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1 This account is based on interviews, a document circulated during the meeting by two leaders who were most hostile to the invasion—Leitsatze fuer eine Stellungnahme zur CSSR-Krise, signed Gertrud Blenke and Friedhelm Guenneberg—and the Frankfurter Rundschau, 12.10.1968.

2 DFU Pressedienst, 1.9.1968.
In the meantime, the DFU of Baden-Wuerttemberg held its Land conference. The Schwaben came out against the Soviet invasion and were still smarting from having been dragooned into the unsuccessful DL alliance by the national party. Some conference delegates insisted that the DFU had lost its public credibility and could only restore it by disassociating itself from the DKP which had supported the invasion. And 'soll der Bundesvorstand jedoch dieses Buendniss erzwingen, werde die DFU sicherlich daran zerbrechen, wurde propheseeit'. Other delegates argued that co-operation with DKP was possible, but only after the party had condemned the invasion. However, after 'einer erregenten Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Bundesgeschaehtsfuehrer, Pfarrer Werner, und fuehrender Mitglieder der DFU Baden-Wuerttterbergs', the conference accepted an alliance with the DKP in a new united front; 'jedoch hatten zu diesem Zeitpunkt die meisten Teilnehmer bereits die Konferenz verlassen'.

At this point of time, some senior DFU leaders walked out of the party. They could not accept the DFU's attitudes towards the Soviet attack and the DKP. They included Toennies, Bachhaus, Kassel and Kirchhof. All had sat on the federal executive for many years, and Toennies and Kassel had been Land chairmen. Lesser leaders followed them as did members.

1 Frankfurter Rundschau, 1.10.1968.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Interviews.
On 13 October, the DFU held an extra-ordinary party conference. The DFU formally laid down its umbrella function and promised to become a member of the ADF alliance which was formed a few weeks later (see below). Electoral success was not emphasised as in the optimistic days of 1960-61, but the need for electoral opposition, criticism and alternatives was again stressed.

The conference also adopted a new party programme which formalised nearly nine years of change and consistency in policy. In 1960, the first programme tried to avoid dogma and neglected social and economic issues. Now at the end of its career as an umbrella party, the DFU formally adopted what its leaders liked to call 'Scandinavian Socialism'. As such, the second programme formally ended another chapter in the DFU's history begun by the first programme. This change was probably inevitable and started in 1965. Perhaps only the timing of the new programme was affected by the party's loss of its umbrella role. The programme's foreign and defence policies were those of the Communists, and the DFU accepted the KPD/DKP's insistence that the 'spaetkapitalistische

4 Interviews.
Gesellschaftsordnung mit ihren antidemokratischen, autoritätsen, imperialistisch-expansiven Tendenzen.\textsuperscript{1} were the curse of Western Germany. However, while the DFU’s programme called for the reform of capitalism, the DKP wanted its abolition and claimed that this was compatible with the Basic Laws.\textsuperscript{2} Attempts to replace the word 'Peace' by 'Socialist' in the DFU's name were rejected. The DFU now concentrated on the social and economic conditions which, it claimed, had produced the policies and political behaviour which it opposed. The new programme attacked the 'wirtschaftliche Machtkonzentration' and the polity's 'Rechtskure' and offered the democratisation of society as the remedy. Democracy was seen as the solution and democracy needed a moderate Socialist basis. The new programme aimed at those alienated from society and only in scope was it different from 1969. The appeal to moderate Socialist values and student grievances was new. Both programmes lacked objectivity about Soviet aims and methods and were pro-Communist. 

The new programme claimed that democracy and social welfare were being demolished. The situation was more alarming now than in the past. By encouraging nationalist sentiments, by decrying left-wing solutions and by falsifying the meaning of democracy, the 'Herrschende' tried to prevent the people from seeing their true interests and to channel their discontent into right-wing directions.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{did}, special issue December 1968, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{2} However, for legal reasons, the DKP (which the Communists did not see as the successor to but as a temporary \textit{Braats} party for the illegal KPD) had to avoid terms like the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' which had resulted in the banning of the KPD in 1956, and for tactical reasons it only listed moderate Socialist reforms. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
The political and economic establishments were striving for an authoritarian state, and the neo-Nazi revival provided them with both an alibi and an excuse to quicken their own move to the Right.

The lack of a root and branch democratisation after 1945 and especially the unprecedented concentration of economic power were, according to the DFU, responsible for this alarming situation. More and more economic power was being controlled by a few large firms and banks and by the State. Economic and political decisions were now so closely interwoven that the large economic interests had to control the government which regulated the economy. This 'machtpolitische' system needed undemocratic and socially unjust conditions to function smoothly. It required social and economic conformity and was undermining the constitution to extend the State's control over the citizens. To contain the increasing discontent with the system, the State had to restrict liberties, still critics and isolate the opposition. The State had to protect the interests of big business by making the distribution of wealth even more unjust, by depressing the economic well being of the masses, by diverting ever more of the nation's resources into parasitic ventures such as excessive military expenditure, by subordinating technical innovations and education to the needs of industry.

The economy and society had to be democratised. Widespread workers' participation in management, the nationalisation of key industries and banking and the protection of small and medium size businesses and farms would stop the dangerous and undemocratic power of big business. Education had to prepare youth for democracy, universities had to be autonomous, Mitbestimmung had to be extended
to students and pupils, members of the Armed Forces should have the right to unionise themselves, the voting age should be lowered to 18 and sex discrimination was to be unacceptable. The social and economic welfare of the population required a redistribution of wealth, more investments in socially beneficial ventures and far less expenditure on 'unproductive' activity, higher pensions had to be provided and the profit motive had to be excluded from some areas such as cultural activities.

The democratisation of the polity required the annulment of the anti-democratic emergency laws. The nation also needed no majority electoral system which would deny the voters the right to elect anti-establishment parties in parliament. Regional and local government had to be revitalised. Parliament's independence of the executive had to be reasserted. The influence of big business had to be excluded from government and the will of the people had to prevail. The courts should no longer be used to suppress legitimate criticism. Press monopolies should be broken up and publications which encouraged social conflict and international tension should be expropriated. Editors should be made independent of proprietors.

The alarming situation at home was reflected in the nation's foreign relations. The Great Coalition's Ostpolitik aimed to deceive Bonn's own Cold war allies by pursuing old aims by new means. The Ostpolitik was part of West Germany's expansionist aims which were spearheaded by the old military, political and economic forces which had caused the Second World War and which were trying to reassert Germany's old dominant position in Europe. Bonn aimed to push the frontiers of the Western values eastwards and wanted
to isolate and eventually absorb the East German nation by using its economic power 'um in jeder Weise in die osteuropäische Länder hineinspiralen und sie zunächst in wirtschaftlich, schließlich aber in politische Abhängigkeit zu bringen'. It was this refusal to recognise the post-war status quo which aggravated the sense of insecurity in Europe and which threatened peace. According to the programme, Bonn's expansionist aims were not only directed eastwards. The increasing neo-colonial character of West Germany's foreign aid, her determination to dominate the EEC, her aims of strengthening NATO and of creating for herself the largest conventional military force in Western Europe, her determination to turn allies against East-West rapprochement, were all expressions of the same expansionism as was the Federal Republic's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which also showed that the Great Coalition had nuclear ambitions.

The DFU offered many of its old remedies, but there were also important differences. Also, by more or less openly advocating aims which were taboo in 1960, the new programme reflected even more closely Communist military and foreign interests. The urgency of a general East-West detente and the total rejection of any nuclear ambitions by Bonn were still stressed as was the recognition of the post-war frontiers (from 1962), the need for a German peace treaty and a collective security system. The DFU also still mentioned two nuclear-free Germanyes outside NATO and the Warsaw Pact and inside a partly demilitarised Central European zone and continued to accept West German membership of the EEC.

1 Programm der DFU, op. cit., p. 4.
However, now 'die Kernfrage der westdeutschen Aussenpolitik ist die volkerrechtliche Anerkennung der DDR'. The party still mentioned neutrality but it no longer linked it to German confederation or reunification. The programme mentioned 'reunification' only once. For a party which a year earlier had dismissed the feasibility of reunification, reference to reunification and neutrality had become a token gesture. In 1960, the DFU had claimed that reunification was the 'wichtigste und nationale Anliegen'.

The new Communist party caused an upheaval among the left-wing fringe groups. The 7,000 members of the illegal party jumped to 15,000 for the legal party in a matter of months. The Communist party ended the UNION, took members from most of its groups and during the next few months absorbed four of its remaining partners. The amalgamation of the DFU and BdD, which had been initiated some months before the establishment of the DKP, continued. The remnants of the UNION joined the ADF alliance (see below). The DFU absorbed some members from disbanding ex-UNION partners but it lost more of its members to the DKP. Communist agents continued to operate in the DFU which was now seen as the fringe party for non-Communist opposition elements. The DFU ceased to contest elections on its own. By 1972 it had some 3,000 'Karteileichen'.

1 Ibid., p. 5.
2 Programm und Organisations-Statut der Deutsche Friedens-Union, Köln: DFU, 1965, p. 3.
3 See Chapters V and VIII.
4 Interviews.
and only about 400 active members. After having lost its umbrella role, the DFU was quickly reduced to a small group of pamphleteers.

On 2 November 1968 the Giessener Kreis turned itself into the Aktions-und Wahlbuendniss fuer demokratischen Fortschritt. Just over a month later, on 7 December, this body formed the Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt (ADF). The ADF was the umbrella organ of a new electoral united front. It was a single-election arrangement for 1969 and its chairman was Professor Werner Hofmann who had initiated the Giessener Kreis about a year earlier. The DFU joined the new united front as did the remaining UNION groups, the Communist party and its youth clubs and organisations, and various other fringe elements.

The ADF was a venture which had turned sour before it began. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the founding of the DKP, and its open association with the ADF, had turned some potential supporters against the united front. Some left-wingers were not prepared to work in the open with Communists and many could not

1 See Chapter VIII.
forget that the DKP had supported the invasion. Some DFU people resented seeing their party denoted and the DFU experiment with its failures and KPD high handedness had turned people against a similar venture. The fact that the ADF, which had a programme very similar to that of the DFU, was not a Socialist party also offended some ideologues. DFU and Communist leaders did not think that the ADF would enter parliament in 1969. The optimism of 1960 was missing.

The DFU lost its umbrella role because a more embracing united front was wanted. In the event, the ADF turned out to be less successful than its predecessor. The electoral fringe was more divided than it had been in 1961. Early in 1969 the

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1 The Giessener Kreis' Aufruf zu einem Wahlwenden 1969 listed 131 names. Karl Otto, the editor of the VUS’s sozialistische hefte, told the author that quite a few of these signatories withdrew from the venture after the invasion of Czechoslovakia and that he personally knew of 13 such cases. The Socialist alliance, the SZ, broke up after 21 August when the SB withdrew and refused to work with the DKP. The SZ remnants, which included the VUS from the UNION, came out in favour of the Giessener Kreis. While the SB kept itself apart from the ADF, one of its leading figures, Professor Abendroth, became an ADF leader. Baerwald, op. cit., p. 28 and Interviews with Karl Otto and Professor Wolfgang Abendroth.

2 Interviews, including with Professor Wolfgang Abendroth who was a founder member of the Giessener Kreis and a leading figure in the SB and SZ.


4 Interviews.

5 Interviews and Zum Thema, op. cit., p. 70.
Demokratische Linke (DL) was founded. The DL saw itself as the 
'antiauthoritäre Sammlung der APO'. It disliked the radicalism 
of the 'New Left' and included people who had shied away from the 
Communist-controlled ADF. The DL was joined by the nationalist 
AUD\(^1\) with which the DFU had refused to work in 1965. Several 
fringe Socialist groups were outside the ADF as well as a tiny 
Maoist party. The ADF was no more successful with the ZP (which 
was again active) and FSU than the DFU had been. The nationalist, 
working-class Unabhängige Arbeiter-Partei wanted nothing to do 
with the new united front.\(^2\) The ADF had probably more youthful 
supporters than the DFU, and some came from the 'New Left'. In the 
1969 federal election the ADF won fewer votes than the DFU could 
manage in the past. The ADF gained 0.6% of the votes compared to 
the DFU's 1.9% in 1961 and 1.3% in 1965.\(^3\) The SPD's new Ostpolitik 
and the Social Democrats' good electoral prospects may have hurt 
the ADF.

\(^{1}\) Demokratische Union (DU) – die antiauthoritäre Sammlung der 
APO – Zielvorstellungen-Hege-Organisation, Haagen and Hamburg; 
and 3.3.1969.

\(^{2}\) Frankfurter Rundschau, 4.11.1968.

\(^{3}\) See Chapter IX.
PART II

SUPPORT, STRUCTURE and MODUS OPERANDI
INTRODUCTION

The DFU alliance claimed diverse supporters: communists, conservatives, liberals, socialists, catholics and protestants, workers and bourgeoisie. In its first programme, the DFU wrote:

Wir sagen dem deutschen Volk: wir sind Christen, die im Glaubensgehorz nicht den Hass, sondern der Liebe, nicht der Zerstörung, sondern der Versöhnung dienen wollen.

Sozialisten, die aus Gründen politischer Vernunft und Ethik die Anwendung militarischer Gewalt im Atomzeitalter grundsätzlich verwerfen, liberal denkende Menschen, die wissen, dass Freiheit, Demokratie und Wohlstand nur im Frieden gedeihen.

Konservative, die das gute Erbe unserer deutschen Vergangenheit nicht erneut gefährden lassen wollen.

The 1961 federal election manifesto stated:

... Deutsche aus allen Berufen und allen Bevölkerungsschichten haben sich zu einer neuen Partei zusammengeschlossen: zur Deutschen Friedens-Union.

In 1965, the DFU’s federal executive declared:

In der DFU wirken Menschen katholischen Glaubens, ohne dass die DFU katholisch wäre; in der DFU sind protestantische Christen tätig, ohne dass die DFU protestantisch wäre; in der DFU koennen Liberale, Sozialisten und Kommunisten mitarbeiten, ohne dass die DFU deshalb liberalisch, sozialistisch oder kommunistisch wäre; in der DFU koennen Konservative fuer das Programm der DFU wirken, ohne dass die DFU deshalb konservativ wäre.


The main task of Part II is to test the DFU's claims about its support basis. Were its claims aspiration or achievement? Was it the umbrella party of a heterogeneous, if small, united front or of a left-wing grouping? Even a partial answer to these questions, and data problems allow for no more, will throw some light on other important aspects of the DFU alliance. The structure and some aspects of the modus operandi of the UNION are also discussed. Both the intention of this thesis and the available data make the DFU the centre of attention.

Chapter IV surveys the DFU's links with other organisations. Chapter VI examines some social characteristics and Chapter VII the political background of some DFU and UNION leaders. Chapter VIII queries the DFU's large membership claims for itself and the UNION. In Chapter IX the geographical location and some of the social characteristics of DFU voters are reviewed, as are likely sources of these votes. The remaining two Chapters are also partly concerned with support, because the DFU alliance's structure and modus operandi were geared to its recruitment policy. Chapter V outlines the structure of the DFU and UNION. The emphasis is on the structural needs of the united front and on the features which made the DFU a Communist front organisation. Chapter X outlines some features of the DFU's modus operandi and attempts to explain why being a party was so important to the DFU and why it undertook both partisan and non-partisan work.
CHAPTER IV

ORGANISATIONAL LINKS

This Chapter surveys the DFU's links with other organisations. The aim is to determine, at the level of organised groups, how embracing the party's support was. The organisations with which the DFU had links are divided into three categories: groups inside the UNION, associates outside it, and groups from which the DFU probably recruited extensively but which had no collective links with the party. Other groups which have been rightly or wrongly linked to the DFU are also included in the survey.

The DFU had no links with the major parties or their ancillary organisations (see below), or with the hostile industrial unions. DFU recruits from these sources had broken with the organisations, or, if this was not the case, their numbers were too small to even be of significant personal links between organisations. A Left-Right link up was, with rare and insignificant exceptions, not possible because of mutual
antagonism.¹ The DFU's area of recruitment was almost totally restricted to about 150² diverse groups variously described as 'links von der SPD', 'radikale Linke' and 'ausserraparlamentarische Opposition'.³

The UNION

The UNION comprised 12 organisations: the DFU, seven other electoral groups and four pressure groups. Eleven of the organisations were in the UNION from 1960 and one was founded in 1967. These were the groups which the DFU called Unionspartner. In the case of the parties, there were long-standing electoral arrangements. The eleven had, as of right, representatives among the DFU's leaders and/or consultants.⁴ There was open co-operation, co-ordination and pooling of resources.

1 1965 proposals for an electoral alliance between the DFU and the Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhängiger Deutscher (AUD) were defeated by prejudices on both sides (see Chapter II). DFU attempts in 1961 to recruit the support of the Freisoziale Union (FSU) failed because of the FSU's anti-Communism. (Interviews with DFU leader Gertrud Wolferts and FSU leaders B. Hasecke and A. Kokaly). The Unabhängige Arbeiter-Partei (UAP) had no links with the DFU. (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4.11.1968). A small nationalist group, the Aktion 61, appears to have lost its neutralist faction to the DFU. (Fred H. Richards, "Die"nationale Opposition" in der BRD 1965", Deutsche Studien, XVI, 1965, 579). The Hamburg branch of the Deutsche Saarbund, 'eine .... fuer den Gedenken der Wiedervereinigung in national-neutralistischen Sinne wirkende Gruppe', was associated with the DFU. Ladislaw Sprohe, Die Deutsche Friedens-Union in der Bundestagswahl 1961, unpublished Diplomarbeit, University of Koeln, 1963, pp. 35-39.


4 See Chapter V.
The DFU’s eleven Unionspartner

Bund der Deutschen (BdD)¹

The BdD was the only other national party in the UNION. The party was founded in 1953 by the Deutsche Sammlung which was the 'Dachorganisation der zahlreichen kommunistischen Tarnorganisationen'.² For the 1953 federal election, the BdD entered into an electoral alliance with the neutralist Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei (GVP). In 1957 the GVP disbanded and called upon its support to vote SPD, as did the underground KPD. Neglected by its mentor, and without the GVP, the BdD won only 0.2% of the 1957 federal election vote on a programme which called for a neutral, reunified Germany, which opposed nuclear weapons and NATO and which largely ignored domestic issues.³ Its known Communist links, its proven electoral impotence and the need for a new party as the kernel of the UNION caused the by-passing of the BdD in favour of the DFU. The BdD’s organisational resources and political expertise played an important part in the creation of the DFU. But the BdD also lost many members to the DFU and by 1963 it could no longer maintain a separate organisation resulting in a step-by-step fusion with the DFU which was finalised in 1970.

¹ For a more detailed early history of the party see Chapter I.


Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU)

The DDU was founded in 1955 as a party of the Saar. At the time the Saar was still outside the Federal Republic and the DDU insisted that the three German parts must be united. The party rejected West German rearmament and NATO membership on the grounds that they prevented national unification and that the Saar's future must not be linked to a militarist Federal Republic. Domestic issues were dealt with in a few brief generalisations. 1 From the beginning, the party was under the influence of the Kommunistische Partei-Saar (KPS) which gave financial aid and supplied some leaders, 2 and the DDU had links with the BdD. The party's chairman from 1957, the lawyer Dr. Erwin Gieseking, had been a KPD legal counsel. 3 The DDU won only 0.9% of the vote in the 1955 Land election and 0.5% in the local elections of the following year, compared to the KPS's 6.6% and 6% respectively. From the middle of 1957 the party was inactive. The 1957 banning of the KPS changed the fortunes of the DDU. In 1959 Communists revitalised the party - which soon had 25 branches and began to publish the Saarwoche - and used it to fight the 1960 Land election in which the DDU won 5% of the vote and two seats in the Landtag, which it lost five years later. 4 In the Saar, the DDU acted as the UNION's umbrella

1 Deutsche Demokratische Union: Parteiprogramm, DDU, 1955.
2 Most of the information on the DDU is included in the report Die 'Deutsche Demokratische Union' (DDU) in Saarland (Kurzanalyse), prepared for the author by the Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Saarland, in 1972.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
party in Land elections and the DFU in federal elections.

'Späterneat mit ihrer Reaktivierung, konnte die DDU als eine Kommunistische Tarnorganisation bezeichnet werden', 1 It had KPS functionaries among its leaders and members, and 32 of the party's 44 local government councillors, elected in 1963, were Communists. 2

After the founding of the new Communist party, the DKP, the DDU disbanded in 1969. The bulk of its members and councillors joined the DKP and the rest went to the DFU. 3

Wahlervereinigung gegen atomare Aufrüstung fuer Frieden und Versaetzendigung (WV)

The WV of Bremen emerged around 1955 when it contested its first election and did badly. 4 The name of the electoral group explains its policies. The group was 'kommunist gesteuert' 5 and a 'Funktionseragruppe', 6 and a former First Secretary of the KPD Bremen, Hermann Gautier, liaised between the WV and DFU before his arrest in 1961. 7 The time of the WV's founding - when it had

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1 Ibid.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 See Chapter V.
already become obvious that the KPD's banning would only be a matter of time — and its Communist links, strongly suggest that the NV, like the DDU, was intended as an electoral outlet for the underground KPD.

Demokratische Wachler Union (DWU)

The DWU was created in July 1960 to contest the forthcoming local elections in Nordrhein-Westfalen. The group's branches were largely concentrated in the Ruhr and the Aachen area; it published the weekly 

\[\text{tatsachen}\] it tried to appeal to the working-class vote; \(^2\) it had Communists among its leaders.\(^3\) Although a Land party designed to fight local elections, the DWU concentrated on national issues. The party condemned the 'policy of strength' and favoured the alternative to it embodied in the SPD's 1959 Deutschlandplan. Apart from this, the party made some generalised references to more social and economic justice, proposed laws to prevent the concentration of economic power in too few hands, and demanded that local government must have more money to strengthen grassroots

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1 Without the enactment of a new Law, in June 1960, (which was soon afterwards repealed) to hinder the formation of Ratausparteien by preventing them from standing list candidates in Nordrhein-Westfalen, the DWU may never have been founded. Instead, the DWU's widely dispersed supporters would have probably functioned as separate local electoral groups. Volker Sieg, Die Entwicklung der Deutschen Friedens-Union in Nordrhein-Westfalen von der Gründung der Partei bis zur Bundestagswahl 1961, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Marburg, 1966, p. 83.

2 Ibid.

3 See Chapter V.
democracy and improve local amenities.\(^1\) The DWU fought the 1961 local elections in only 18 towns and won two council seats in Bottrop and one in Neveges and Remscheidt.\(^2\) When the DFU moved into the Land, most DWU members and branches joined the new party. Within a few years, the DWU had been completely absorbed by the DFU, but the DWU initials were retained in a few towns for electoral purposes.\(^3\)

**Vereinigung fuer Frieden und soziale Sicherheit (VFS) and Demokratische Linke (DL)**

The VFS was founded in June 1960 to contest forthcoming local elections as an opponent of the 'policy of strength'. Its senior leaders were Communists,\(^4\) and the group had branches only in a few towns and cities of Baden-Wuerttemberg.\(^5\) The group immediately joined the new UNION.

The DL was established in 1967 to replace the DFU as *Dachpartei* of the UNION in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The DL aimed to appeal to the workers' resentment over the economic recession of 1966/67 which, it was argued, the deideologised DFU could not do. It absorbed the VFS and some other electoral groups, took members from the DFU which resented being replaced by the DL, and brought new support into the

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3. Interviews with DWU leaders Paul Stegmann and Hilde Westphal.
4. See Chapter V.
5. Interview with J.F. Toennies, Chairman of the DFU Land party of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
THE DL's chairman and many of its initial members were Communists. 1

Demokratischer Wahlverband Niedersachsen (DWN)

Nothing is known about the DWN except that it was banned as a Communist front, in 1961, shortly after joining the UNION, and that its personnel were absorbed by the DFU. 2

Vereinigung Unabhängiger Sozialisten (VUS)

The VUS was founded in November 1960 by several hundred dissident Social Democrats who had been expelled from, or had left, the reforming SPD, 3 and some Altkomunisten. 4 VUS members were renowned for their Communist contacts, and included a number of prominent former SPD figures, 5 and eventually half of the VUS members joined the new Communist party, the DEP, in 1968–69. 6

1 For a more detailed discussion of the DL see Chapter III.
2 Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961, and interviews with DFU leaders.
4 Interview with Karl Otto, editor of the VUS's sozialistische hefte.
5 Viktor Agartz, ex-SPD economic expert and leading intellectual in the industrial unions; Dr. Gerhard Gleissberg, former editor of the SPD's Vorwärts; Albert Berg, former SPD member of the Land parliament of Hamburg. In the late fifties all three were expelled from the SPD for contacts with East German Communists.
6 Interview with Albert Berg.
The group's image probably prevented it from attracting some anti-Communist Social Democrats opposed to the SPD reforms of 1959-60. The VUS issued the monthly *sozialistische hefte* (sh), published by the Plambeck Verlag which was owned by the Communist Paul Evert, and in 1970 the sh was incorporated into the *Marxistische Blätter*, which were also published by the Plambeck Verlag.

The VUS was always divided over its role. At the time of its origin, the group was split in its response to the SPD reforms. Some wanted to establish a new Socialist party and others wanted to help found the DFU and form themselves into a propaganda group and act as the Socialist conscience of SPD and union members. The latter argument won, and part of the pro-party faction around Viktor Agertz left. However, this disagreement was only temporarily stilled. Again and again there were demands for a break with the DFU. These people felt overshadowed by the DFU, they were concerned about losing more members to the party, and they were angry because an impotent peace party was preventing them from achieving their ultimate goal—a new Socialist party. They also criticised their group's approach to the SPD. The VUS was more interested in strengthening the opposition in the SPD than in recruiting Social Democrats, and this approach was criticised as an illusion which saw a worthwhile opposition in the SPD when there was none.

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2 Interview with Karl Otto.
3 See Chapter I.

VUS's pro-party faction wanted a break with the DPU, an all out attack on the SPD and a new rival Socialist party. The VUS leadership replied to these demands with the following arguments. Historical necessity may one day result in a new Socialist party, but this moment had not arrived. A new Socialist party now would be no more than a 'sektierische Gruppe' ....

weil wir der Meinung sind, dass ein solcher Schritt selbst von den heute noch als Spaltung der Arbeiterbewegung verurteilt werden zuerde, die wir fuer eine socialistische Partei gewinnen muessen, wenn sie mehr sein soll als ein Hasenfein diskutierender Socialisten, wenn sie ein politischer Faktor sein soll. 

The VUS also emphasised the disunity of the Socialists already outside the SPD:


The VUS leaders also insisted that the group had to continue to explain its policies to the working classes, not because they were labouring under any illusion but because ultimately only the workers could resist the CDU/CSU. Nor could the VUS afford to alienate the organised working-class which a new Socialist party would have done:

1 Die Entwicklung der VUS, op. cit., p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 5.
The arguments of the VUS were partly shared by other fringe Socialist groups without Communist links (see below), but the VUS leaders' persistent opposition to a new Socialist party is also explained by the KPD's opposition to such a party and its insistence on 'umbrella party' politics first through the DFU and then the ADF.

The VUS, though small, was with its 500 members the largest Socialist group outside the SPD.

Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung (WFFB)

The WFFB was founded in the winter of 1952-53 as a loosely structured women's peace movement. During the 50's the group opposed by means of conferences, public debates, resolutions, telegrams to politicians and deputies, pamphleteering and in its own Frau und Frieden German rearmament, compulsory military service, nuclear tests and atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. Notable pacifists like Else Niemoeller, Helene Wessel and Friedensklärchen

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1 Ibid., p. 11.
2 See Chapters I, II and III.
3 Sources of information on WFFB: Was ist, was will, was tut die Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung? WFFB, 1967. Letter from Elly Steinmann, member of the WFFB executive, to the author, 16.9.1971; interviews with two WFFB leaders in the DFU.
Professor Fassbinder was with the WFFB, but so were Communists. These latter links resulted in the 1956 banning of the WFFB in Rheinland-Pfalz, but after a lengthy legal battle the ban was removed in 1969. The WFFB immediately assisted the UNION and most of its senior leaders became DFU leaders as well.

**Deutsche Club 54 (DO54)**

The DC 54, established in 1954, was a small ginger group of social elites who largely worked through their monthly *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*. The DC 54 attacked the sterility of the 'policy of strength' and advocated a reunified, neutral Germany based on a 'segensreiche neue Staatsform die aus dem Guten von Ost und West entstehen'. This 'illusion' was attacked by a Communist source which, after acclamating the DC 54 as 'wertvolle Bundesgenossen der deutschen Arbeiterklasse und deren Mitstreiter', emphasised the essential conflict between German Communism and the ideas of the DC 54 which 'stehen auf bürgerlichem Klassenboden'.

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1 Communists wanted the 'Schaffung eines sozialistischen Deutschland!' and not the fusion of two opposing systems within a united Germany. 'Diese (DC 54) Illusionen nahmen sich zum Teil auch aus der Ansicht, kapitalistisches und sozialistisches System macherten sich unter den Bedingungen der modernen Technik und des Atomzeitalters in ihrem Wesen einander an und glitten sich schliesslich aus. Der Ausgleich von Ethos und Technik schaffe den Frieden; der Osten werde zu politischer Freiheit kommen, der Westen sich ethisch entwickeln ...' Also, 'Die Autoren der Blätter wollen nicht Antikommunist und Nicht-Kommunist sein. Dabei sind sie selbst keineswegs frei von antikommunistischen Vorbehalten; einige von ihnen setzen Kommunismus und Faschismus gleich oder unterstellen dem Kommunismus autoritärer Kollektivismus zu sein oder das Ende von Freiheit und Christentum zu bedeuten .... Sie suchen ... nach Möglichkeiten die Ethik das Westens zu staerken, um den Kommunismus widerstehen zu koennen. Werner Wenschmarr, "Die Einschatzung der Aera Adenauer Hinsichtlich der Losung des Deutschlandproblems in der Monatschrift 'Blätter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik', Koein, 1960/61", *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt-Universitaet*, Ges. Sprach W.R. XIV, 161, 162.
The DC 54 helped to found the DFU, and its head, the Graf von Westphalen, became a DFU director. In the late sixties the DC 54 disbanded, but the Blätter continued to be published.

Fraenkischer Kreis (FK)

The FK was a large body (some 2,000 members\(^1\)) of organised intellectuals opposed to the 'policy of strength'. It was founded in 1953 as a Petitionsbewegung to recruit the support of fellow academics and throw their public prestige behind demands for more and immediate concern for national reunion.\(^2\) Over the years these demands expanded into a general concern for international coexistence as the only alternative to mass destruction in the nuclear age.\(^3\) The bulk of FK members seem to have voted SPD or FDP before 1960, and after the FK had joined the UNION some of its people continued to vote for the two parties.\(^4\) In the 1957 federal election the FK published a public appeal in support of the SPD.\(^5\) The FK's mouthpiece was the monthly bulletin.

\(^1\) Interview with Professor Franz-Paul Schneider, Secretary of the FK.

\(^2\) With very few exceptions, FK members and signators had to be graduates. The FK was determined to maintain its intellectual profile as this was considered to be its biggest asset. In the opinion of the FK leader, the signature of one intellectual was worth that of ten workers. Interview with Professor Schneider.

\(^3\) Leitgedanken des Fraenkischen Kreises (Neufassung), 1968.

\(^4\) Interview with Professor Schneider.

Of the DFU’s 11 partners, nine were, or most probably were, Communist front organisations. Probable exceptions were the Ernakischer Kreis and the Deutsche Club 54. The inclusion of so few ‘independent’ organisations shows the UNION’s narrow support base and its dependence on German Communists.

With the exception of the VUS, VFS, and DNU, the DFU’s partners were long-time members of the post-war neutralist opposition. This was probably also true of the people in the first three groups, though previously they worked through other organisations.

Each of the DFU’s party allies had been used by the underground KPD before joining the UNION. The weakness of these electoral groups, shows how unprepared and ill-equipped the illegal KPD - itself unable to contest elections directly - was to partake in national elections after the SPD’s reforms. The need for a new electoral grouping for the 1961 federal election is apparent. The examples of the BbD, DNU, and DDU show that the DFU’s habit of neglecting domestic issues in favour of foreign and military matters was earlier followed by some of its allies at least. Yet some of these parties, and the VUS, specialised in appealing to worker.

1 KPD/U: Kommentare zur Politik der DFU, DGB-Landesvorstand Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1962, p.11; Sproho, op. cit., pp.44-45; Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961. In the early sixties the D054 and PK are listed as Terrorganisationen but not so in later years. For example, ‘Komunistische Tätigkeit in der Bundesrepublik im Jahre 1964’, aus politik und zeitgeschichte, beilage zur wochenzeitung das parlament, 18.6.1964, pp.31-33. Also, no DFU leader interviewed referred to the D054 or PK as Communist fronts although they were quite prepared to call other UNION organisations this. The Wunschheim survey (see above) emphasised the conflict between Communist and D0 54 ideas.
The Associates of the UNION

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD)

The illegal KPD, and through it the East German regime, was the mentor of the DFU, and the most influential organisation associated with the party. The KPD kept its underground organisation, '... klein, aber festgelegt ... von erfahrenen Funktionsaere geleitet ...', apart from the UNION, and pursued its own infiltration and propaganda activities, amidst hide and seek with the political police. The question of security alone would have prevented organisational links with an open party like the DFU. The KPD exercised its influence over the UNION in several ways. These included: its Hintermaeher, and some, but by no means all, of its 6,000 - 7,000 members within the UNION, through its control over much of the DFU's finance, and editorial control over some of the UNION's publications. Also, the decline or collapse of several UNION organisations after the founding of the KPD emphasised the UNION's dependence on German Communists.

2 For example, Ibid., pp.3-55; Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwehr linksradikaler Tendenzen im Jahre 1967, Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern, 1968, pp.7-49.
3 See Chapter V.
4 See Chapter VIII.
5 See Chapter V.
Vernichnung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes (VWN)

The 10,000 member, strongly Communist, VWN was friendly towards the DFU, but at the same time kept aloof from the party for reasons which could not be ascertained. The VWN leader, Dr. Josef Rossaint, sat on the DFU's Unionrat and stood as a party candidate but, it was emphasised, in a personal and not representative capacity. The VWN and DFU co-ordinated some of their activities, and the DFU recruited some VWN people, but seemingly not many. Richert's contention that the VWN was one of the DFU's main sources of recruits, is not supported by available evidence.

Other Associates

The DFU also worked with the Weltfriedensrat, the Friedensrat der DDR, which operated in both Germanies, members of the Republic's

1 Interviews.
2 Interviews.
3 Interviews.
4 Richert, op. cit., p.92.
5 A VWN person among DFU leaders was most rare (See Chapter V). Also, in the Landkreis Düsseldorf-Mettmann the VWN had about 130 members in the late sixties, and never more than a handful of them were in the local DFU constituency party. The local VWN leader, the Communist Karl Drewes, stood as a DFU candidate in the 1964 local elections and VWN people occasionally helped to distribute DFU literature and signed party petitions. Apart from this no help was forthcoming. When the new Communist party was founded in the Landkreis, VWN members at once aligned themselves to that party. Information from the DFU constituency Chairwoman, Gertrud Wolferts, and the VWN leader Karl Drewes.
Our Landesfriedenskommitte were also found among DFU leaders, and the party had assistance from members of the banned Friedenskommitte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, from the Staendiger Kongress gegen die atomare Aufruestung in der Bundesrepublik, the Zentraleausschuss der Landesbevolkerung gegen den Atomtodt, from a small group of teachers known as the Schueler Kreis, from the Gemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler zum Schutz der freien Forschung, from the Communist Bobel Gesellschaft of Frankfurt, and the Marx-Engel Gesellschaften, and several small groups of Freidenkern. The DFU also had the assistance of some Communist Rathausparteien, and other temporary or permanent local links between the DFU and small groups were also possible.

The DFU and other Pringe Groups

This survey is restricted to relatively large organisations.

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1 All these groups appear to have been 'kommunistische Territorialorganisationen' or 'gumindest kommunistisch beeinflusst', and are listed in Sproyo, op. cit., pp. 44-45; Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961. Also, Interviews.

2 Interview with Karl Otto.

3 During the local elections of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1965 the DFU shared a list with an established local party in Haslingen. In Stuttgart a coalition with a prominent (Communist) city councillor and a Rathauspartei was established. In Ludwigsburg some DFU candidates were placed on the list of a local party. Otto Hoeft, 'Nach den Gemeinderatswahlen', Ausweg, IV, 12, 1965, 23-24. Also, Interviews.

4 For the 1964 local elections the DFU Ortsverband Velbert was provided with several candidates by a local rent association. Afterwards the link was broken off. Interview with Gertrud Wolferts.
and to groups with which the DFU has been rightly or wrongly linked. Other organizations, such as the Aktionsgemeinschaft 'Deutscher Gebudemann', just did not appear in the life of the DFU and are excluded from the survey. All the groups examined shared with the DFU concern about civil rights, military policy, East-West relations and the 'German question'. The result of this survey, combined with the DFU's Unionpartner and associates, will indicate how much of the fringe Left the DFU embraced.

Other Minor Parties

Most of the left-wing minor parties of 1960-68 were in the UNION. The exception was the dormant Zentrum Partei (ZP) which the DFU had failed to recruit. There were also some local Communist electoral groups which contested local elections on their own, and sometimes in alliance with the DFU, and which probably assisted the party in Land and federal elections. The DFU came close to being the Dechpartei of the other leftist small parties, and its poor election results were, therefore not due to serious rivals splitting the vote left of the SPD, but the smallness of the vote.

The failure of the DFU and the nationalist AUD, in 1965, to agree to an electoral alliance perpetuated the post-war Left-Right

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1 The programmes of most of these organisations are published in Ryschkowski, op. cit., and Seeiger, op. cit.
2 During an interview, in May 1961, Arno Behrisch, of the DFU, and Herr Brockman, Chairman of the ZP, agreed on the weakness of recent political developments, but no electoral alliance resulted. Other contacts between the two parties also came to nothing, but the DFU won a few ZP people as election candidates. Volker Sieg, op. cit., pp.91-96.
split among the fringe opposition, and ensured the DFU's continuing left-wing character.

Kirchliche Bruderschaften

Dahm stated that the Kirchliche Bruderschaften had 'enge Kontakten mit der DFU', 1 These groups of some 1,200 radical Protestant clerics were 'insitierende Kritik der Wiederaufrüstung und einseitiger Westorientierung, an dogmatische Antikommunismus und Notstandspläne'. 2 However, Pfarrer Werner, the DFU's federal business manager and himself active in the Bruderschaften, who could organise over 1,000 clergymen outside the DFU and march them through Bonn, 3 was adamant that the party did not recruit many clerics from inside or outside the Bruderschaften 4 and that most radical clerics did not even vote DFU because they saw in the SPD the only meaningful alternative to the governing parties. 5 Very few clerics are Communists. 6

2 Ibid., 447.
3 See Chapter X.
4 See Chapter VI for the limited presence of clergymen among DFU leaders.
5 Interview with Pfarrer Heinrich Werner.
6 Only 50 of West Germany's 12,000 Protestant clergymen were members of the DKP in 1972. The Times, 21.6.1972.
Youth Organisations and the New Left

The DFU had little appeal among youth and the students did not think it worthwhile to found its own youth organisation.¹

Some youthful support probably came from the Arbeitsausschuss der Jugend aus Ruetten und Schaechten gegen den Atomtodt and from some future members of the Communist Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend and the Marxistischer Studentenbund Spartakus.²

One of the DFU’s directors, Lorenz Knorr, was the former Federal Secretary of the Sozialistische Jugend (Falken) who brought some young Falken leaders into the DFU.³ But the SPD’s Falken like the other party or union affiliated youth organisations adopted their parent bodies’ anti-DFU stance.⁴

¹ The subject of a party youth group was brought up on several occasions in the DFU’s federal executive and at national conference and defeated on grounds of economy and lack of support. Interviews.

² Interview with Karl Otto, and KDPFU, op. cit., p.11.

³ See Chapter VII.

⁴ For example, a history of the SPD’s Jungsozialisten up to 1969 does not refer to the DFU (Gert Boernsen, Innemarteiliche Opposition (Jungsozialisten und SPD), Hamburg: Runge-Verlag, 1969). Also, ‘Man soll es der DFU nicht ausmoglichen, langsam eine neue Tarnmaske aufzusetzen. Vielmehr gebietet die neue Situation, mit verstarker Nachsicht auf die Tatigkeit dieser Organisation zu blicken, die den Gegenen der Bundesrepublik und der die tragenden demokratischen Parteien manche Hintertuer offnet’. Juso-Kurrier. Politische Blatter der Essener Jungsozialisten, November/December, 1964. Even the Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), which was expelled from the SPD in 1960, rejected the DFU, and two SDS branches were expelled or left their group because they allowed contacts with the DFU. O.K. Flechtheim ed., Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945. Innemarteiliche Auseinandersetzungen, Vol.II. Part 2, Berlin: Dokumenten Verlag Dr. Herbert Wendler, 1969, p.175.
The New Left had no liking for the DFU or the Old Left generally. They saw the DFU as an inactive, staid group of Karteileichen who played the game according to the establishment's rules, who were content to criticise the symptoms but not the illness itself which was the diseased social and political system of the Federal Republic and which needed overturning. The party's links with the 'reactionary', authoritarian Communists also did not

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1 The main organisations were: Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS), Verband Deutsche Studentenschaft (VDS), Liberale Studentenbund Deutschlands (LSD), Sozialdemokratischer Hochschulbund (SHB), Humanistische Student Union (HSU), Aktionszentrum Unabhaengiger und Sozialistischer Schuler (AUSG), Republikanische Clubs.

2 "Dass diese vom SDS gefuehrte studentische Linke zu den beiden uberigen Linksauussen-Stroessungen, den Linksmarxisten um die VUS einerseits, die gewerkschaftliche Linke anderseits, sowie zu den Antifaschisten, Pazifisten und Neutralisten um die DFU, die Osterrmarxierer und die DFC den Weg nicht finden konnte, ist verstaendlich". Richert, op. cit., p.114.

3 Author's discussions with radical students of the universities of Tuebingen and Marburg. Also, eight SDS groups in Baden-Wuerttemberg opposed electoral help for the Demokratische Linke (which had replaced the DFU as Dachpartei of the Land) which they did not think radical enough. Ryschkowsky, op. cit., pp. 203-3. A few years earlier the SDS had justified its rejection of the DFU thus: 'In der gegenwartigen gesellschaftlich-politischen Situation der Bundesrepublik, die durch eine standige Verstaerckung der autoritaeren Tendenzen gekennzeichnet ist, ist eine Zersplitterung der Arbeiterbewegung nicht zu verantworten ... Die Deutsche Friedensunion (DFU) ist nicht fahig, die Arbeiterschaft wirksam in diesem Kampf gegen die reaktionare Entwicklung einzubeziehen und die Interessen der Arbeitnehmer wirksam wahrzunehmen ....' Fleethen, op. cit., p. 175.
help.\textsuperscript{1} The Communists managed to found a few Republikanische Clubs, but perhaps not too successfully.\textsuperscript{2}

Socialists outside the SPD

The DFU did not have the help of all Socialists outside the SPD. The Communist influenced VUS was the largest (some 500 members) Socialist group and in the UNION. After having decided against forming a new Socialist party, in 1960, the VUS lost the Agartz faction (see above) and three years later a group of people who had been associated with the late Viktor Agartz started the Initiativausschuss zur Gründung einer neuen sozialistischen Partei.

The group argued that the SPD and KPD had ceased to be 'sozialistische Arbeiterparteien', and that the DFU, being a Communist tool, could not develop into such a party.\textsuperscript{3} Four years later their call for a Marxist party, free from Communist influence, still fell on deaf ears.

\textsuperscript{1} For example, 'Die DKP betreibt die verunsichertesten und erfolglossten Taktik, die je eine bürgerliche Partei betrieben hat, um ins Parlament zu gelangen' in '5 Thesen und eine Schlussfolgerung zur DKP', Diskus Frankfurter Studentenzeiting, December 1968, 9; Also, Gabriel and Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Linksradikalismus - Gewaltkur gegen die Alterskrankheit des Kommunismus, Hamburg: Rowohl Taschenbuch Verlag, 1968.

\textsuperscript{2} In Volbert, the Communist Klaus Jann (formerly in the DFU) founded a RC in the late sixties. But the moment he left the district the Club collapsed. Letter from Gertrud Wolferts to the author, 18.6.1971. A rich DFU leader gave financial help to the RC of Freiburg, but he soon broke with the group. Interview with J.F. Toemies.

\textsuperscript{3} Ryschkowsky, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 55-56, 121-32; \textit{... und were vertritt Ihre Interessen?} Bergisch Gladbach/Koeln: Der Vorstand des Initiativausschusses zur Gründung einer neuen Sozialistischen Partei, n.d.
In 1960 the SPD expelled the Socialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund (SDS) and a group of party members formed the Socialistische Förderer-Gesellschaft (SFG) to give finance and guidance to the SDS. Soon thereafter 27 party members were expelled for aiding the SDS, including Professor Wolfgang Abendroth 'the leader of the academic opposition to the development of the Bad Godensberg Program'. In 1962 the SFG turned itself into the Socialistischer Bund (SB) which had some 200 members in 1968. The SB, like the Initiativausschuss, comprised Socialists who were independent of, or actively opposed to, Communists. Like the VUS, the SB was divided over the question of founding a new Socialist party, but unlike the VUS, the 'Abendroth Leute' (as DFU leaders called them) had no contacts with the DFU, regarding it as a misguided venture manipulated by the KPD for its own ends.

Relations between the SB and VUS were cool, despite their common origin and many shared policies. The SB did not like the other group's Communist links and other points of conflict were: the VUS showed anti-intellectual tendencies and the SB had strong university links; ideologically the VUS was 'orthodox' and the SB 'revisionist'; and the VUS looked mainly towards Eastern Europe and the SB to the West.

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3 Interview with Professor Wolfgang Abendroth.

4 Interviews with Abendroth, Albert Berg (VUS) and Lorenz Knorr (DFU); Richert, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
The Grand Coalition, the increasing strength of the right-radical NPD, and the economic recession of 1966-67 brought the SB and VUS together. These two groups as well as the Aktionsgemeinschaft Sozialistische Opposition (ASO), with some 300 members,¹ and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischer Sozialisten, with about 70 members,² formed the loosely structured Sozialistisches Zentrum (SZ) in February 1968. The Communist influenced (VUS) and independent (ASO, SB) Socialists had at last linked up,³ but some splits remained. The Verband des Internationale Bundes demokratischer Sozialisten (within which the Initiativeausschuss worked from 1967) and the Neusozialistische Bund kept their distance, in part because they refused to work with Communists.⁴ Also the SZ was essentially a body of the Old Left. By the time the VUS and SB worked together in the SZ, the SB was rapidly losing contact with the SDS, the core of the New Left.⁵

The SZ was not founded to assist the DFU but to look for an alternative to the old Dachpartei for the 1969 federal election.

² Ibid.
³ According to the Federal Ministry of the Interior the ASO and SB were not Communist Front organisations. Frankfurter Rundschau, 14.3.1969.
⁴ Rychkovsky, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
The founding of a new Socialist party was discussed, but eventually it was agreed to assist in the founding of a new 'umbrella party'. Then the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred and the SZ broke up.

**Humanistische Union (HU)**

The DFU had the assistance of two groups of intellectuals, the DO34 and FK. But another such group, the civil rights orientated anti-clerical HU, with some 4,550 members (in 1967) and no faith in umbrella groups, "... wird, wie mir scheint, zu Unrecht in der Nacho der DFU vermutet", despite some overlapping membership.

**Organised Pacifism**

Of West Germany's three largest pacifist organisations, the youngest, biggest (some 10,000 members) and SPD orientated Verband der Kriegsdienstverweigerer (VK) most likely had no links with the DFU. The VK founders had broken away from the Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft (DFU) when, in 1958, that group had refused to adopt an anti-Communist amendment to its constitution. The DFU did

---

1 See Chapter III.
2 Interview with Abendroth.
3 Seeliger, op. cit., pp. 89-93.
5 Interviews. Two federal DFU leaders had to resign from the VK on joining the DFU.
recruit quite a large number of people from the DFU and the
Internationale der Kriegsdienstgenehr (IdK), and both groups had
long-standing links with the WFFB, a member of the UNION. 1 The
DFU and IdK were not in the UNION, and formal or even close informal
links with the DFU were out of the question for fear of causing the
two organisations to break up. Both the DFU and the IdK (which had
some 7,500 members) included strong elements hostile towards the
DFU as well as people who firmly believed that pacifist groups must
be ueberparteilich. When Pfarrer Werner, the IdK's deputy chairman,
became the DFU's business manager in 1963, the anti-DFU faction led
by the IdK chairman managed, after a bitter controversy, to force
Werner to resign his IdK post. 2 The links with the DFU had become
too close. From about 1964 Communists began to infiltrate seriously
the IdK and DFU, and by the end of the decade the two organisations
were officially categorised as 'kommunistisch infiltriert'. 3
Whether this changed the two groups relations with the DFU could not
be determined. In 1967 Communist functionaries brought about an
IdK-DFU merger. As a result some IdK members left for the VK. 4

1 The late wife of Kirchenpraeident Niemoeller, who was honorary
president of the DFU and IdK, was honorary president of the WFFB
until her death in 1961. The late Fritz Kuester, a former DFU
chairman, published the WFFB's Frau und Frieden. The WFFB, DFU and
IdK also held joined actions as early as 1953. Was ist, was will,
was tut die Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung? WFFB, 1967, p.6,
2 Interview with Pfarrer Werner and other DFU leaders who included
five who were also in the IdK or DFU.
3 Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwahr linkeradikaler
4 Ibid.
The Kuratorium was founded in 1966 to resist the enactment of the proposed emergency laws. It was a remarkable body in that usually hostile groups were prepared to work together to arouse public opinion and exert pressure on the parties, especially the SPD. Elements close to the SPD - several unions, including the massive IG Metall\(^1\) and part of the intelligentsia - as well as people left of the SPD co-operated in this venture.\(^2\)

DFU leaders told the author that for the first time trade unionists allowed DFU people to work with them, that their party was only active at the fringe of the venture, and that the DFU itself won hardly any support from its involvement in the venture.\(^3\)

Kampagne fuer Abruestung (KfA)\(^4\)

The DFU invested much of its resources in the West German

---

1 In 1968 the IG Metall withdrew its financial assistance from the Frankfurt branch of the Kuratorium which had acted as the centre of the Motstand der Demokratie movement, which then ceased to operate. Rump factions which disagreed with the IG Metall's argument that the movement had been founded to oppose the enactment of the emergency laws and that as the latter were now law the Kuratorium had lost its raison d'être, founded a new group, the Kuratorium Republikanische Hilfe which probably relied for its support on elements 'links von der SPD'. The DFU's relations with this last body is not known. *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, No.1224, 1968, 1-3.

2 For an outline of the Kuratorium and its shortlived predecessor, the Kongress Die Demokratie for den Motstand, see Seeliger, *op. cit.*, 103-14 and Richert, *op. cit.*, p.101, p.124.

3 Interviews.

4 In 1968 the KfA adopted the name Kampagne fuer Demokratie und Abruestung.
campaign for nuclear disarmament (KFA). In some areas the DFU and the Communists were for all practical purposes the KFA. Over the years the KFA was increasingly seen as a Communist-influenced group. The UNION was most keen to work through and with the marchers, thereby hurting the KFA's public image. However, little support for the DFU itself seems to have been derived from this large investment in the KFA which included elements such as union members, Social Democrats and students who were indifferent or hostile towards the DFU.

Conclusion

The DFU aimed to be the centre of the opposition elements. Its contacts with right-wing fringe groups were rare and quite a number of left-wing groups were outside its embrace (see Table I). The party gained the help of elements from two large pacifist organisations but the VK was out of reach. The DFU was closely involved in the anti-Bomb movement and was linked to numerous pro-Communist anti-militarist groups. The VUS was in the UNION but other fringe Socialists kept their distance. The large HU was out of touch but the FK and DGO were with the party. Support from the progressive Protestant clergy seems to have been small. The Catholic, working-class ZP refused to co-operate. The 'New Left'

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1 See Chapter X.
3 Interviews.
TABLE I

The DFU Grouping and the Fringe Left

Organised Pacifism

KPD

From 1966

Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie

From 1968

Sozialistisches Zentrum

Organised Pacifism

IdK/DFG

Other Parties

ZP

FSU

Kirchliche Bruderschaften

VK

Organised Pacifism

HU

KfA

ASSOCIATES

UNION

DFU

VUS

SB

ASO

AdS

New Left

SDS, AUSS, etc.

Other Fringe Socialists
went its own way. Several factors, including anti-Communism, kept the DFU segregated from important fringe groups. The party's association with the Kuratorium Notstand der Demokratie was a marginal breakthrough to otherwise hostile elements. The KPD marshalled its organisations behind the DFU but kept itself structurally aloof for tactical reasons,¹ and the large VVN did not become much involved with the UNION. The DFU was essentially the centre of pro-Communist organisations, and more or less it achieved an electoral monopoly 'links von der SPD'. The UNION was essentially a left-wing united front. However, with the Communists behind it, it was the largest concentration of the fringe 'Old Left' in 1960–68.

¹ See Chapter V.
CHAPTER V

THE NATURE OF THE UNION

The DFU had the three basic features of a post-1934/35 Communist peripheral united front. Firstly, the umbrella party's neglect of working-class issues and the uncritical pursuit of Soviet military and foreign interests under the guise of peace, democracy and unity. 1 Secondly, the absence of open participation by the Communist party which relied on the covert manoeuvrability of its cadre and on the use of peripheral organisations as shields for this secret penetration and control. 2 Thirdly, the united front was for the Communists a 'road out of isolation' 3 and this was especially so for the illegal KPD. The DFU also had some of the features of the usual front organisation. The nature of the united front may not have been totally inspired by the Communists, 4 but it conformed to their tactics.

In 1960 the UNION was a grouping of 11 separate but closely co-ordinated minor parties and pressure groups. 5 The DFU was the

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2 Ibid., p. 147.
3 Ibid., p. 142.
4 Non-Communists have adopted similar practices. See Chapter I and Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London: Methuen, 1969, pp. 324-51.
5 See Chapter IV.
largest organisation and the structural core of the UNION. But the illegal Communist party, which remained outside the UNION, was most likely the main co-ordinator and the most influential factor in the alliance. With a few exceptions, the UNION contested elections as the DFU and the groups also worked together in between elections.

The DFU called the other groups in the UNION its partners and they emphasised their separation. Government sources, the press and some studies treated the DFU and its partners as separate groups. The organisations in the UNION had several indicators of a separate organisational existence: elected

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1 Interviews.


Secretary of the FK: 'An einem korporativen Beitritt des "Fraenkischen Kreises" in die "Deutsche Friedens-Union" sei unter gar keinen Umständen gedacht'. bulletin des Fränkischen Kreises, January 1961, p. 16.


4 For example, Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961.

leaders, members, dues, constitution and/or programme, conferences (see Table I) and publications (see Table II).

The nature of the UNION was largely shaped by the needs of its members as well as tactical considerations. As we noted in Chapter I, the neutralist predecessors of the DFU were also loose groupings. In 1960 the amalgamation of the UNION's groups into a single organisation was not even seriously considered.\(^1\)

Programmatically, the partners were close and only the VUS, with its Socialist programme,\(^2\) did not fit the general pattern. Probably all the partners were Communist front organisations or under KPD influence.\(^3\) The partners were weak and tried to gain influence through collective action. These were the factors which brought the organisations together. However, there were also tensions, group egotism and important tactical considerations which required a loose alliance.

The KPD wanted to use its existing front organisations as shields for its secret control of the umbrella party and as a means of helping to protect the DFU's public image (see below). An alliance of several organisations was a sort of multi-mirror trick which made the grouping look more impressive than would have done

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1 Interviews.
3 In 1961, the federal government included in its list of 'kommunistischen Hilfe-und Tarnorganisationen sowie einige kommunistisch beinflusste neutralistische und nationalistische Kreisen' all the then members of the UNION. Quoted in Ladislau Sproho, Die Deutsche Friedens-Union in der Bundestagswahl 1961, unpublished Diplomarbeit, University of Koln, 1963, pp. 44-46. See also Chapter IV.
### TABLE I

Organisational features of the UNION partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme/Constitution</th>
<th>Elected Executive(s)</th>
<th>Dues</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Held Conferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BDDB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DGB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. DDU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. DFU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. DL</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. DMD</td>
<td>No information - banned 1961</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. DNU</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. FK</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. VPS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. VUS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. WFFB</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. WV</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* No formal members but 'Freunde'.

**Sources:**


3. Deutsche Demokratische Union Parteiprogramm, 24.9.1955
Satzung – Deutsche Demokratische Union, 24.9.1955. Entwurf;
Satzung des Deutschen Demokratischen Unions, 1968. Die
Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) im Saarland (Kursanalyse),
Report prepared for the author by the Verfassungsschutz of
the Saar, in 1972.

4. See below and Chapter VI.

Erzahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwehr linkseradikaler

6. No information.

7. Parteiprogramm/Satzung der Demokratischen Wachter Union –
DDU – Nordrhein-Westfalen, Dusseldorf, 1960. Volker Sieg,
Die Entwicklung der Deutschen Friedens-Union in Nordrhein-
Westfalen von der Gründung der Partei bis zur Bundestagswahl,

8. Leitgedanken des Freikorps Kreises (Neufassung), March 1968.
Interview with Professor Schneider, Secretary of the FK.

Politik der KPDU, DGB-Landesverband Nordrhein-Westfalen,
1962, p. 35.

10. 'Satzung der VUS' and 'Aus dem Programm der VUS', VUS
Mitteilungen, May 1961. Die Entwicklung der Vereinigung
Interviews with Albert Berg and Karl Otto.

11. Was ist, was will, was tut die Deutsche Frauenfriedens-
bewegung? WFPB, 1967. Letter to the author from Illy

12. Letter from Dr. Heuer, of the Federal Ministry of the Interior,
to the author, 21.9.1971. 110 Jahre Bürgermeistereiwahlen in
Lande Bremen 1854 bis 1963, Bremen: Statistisches Landesamt,
### TABLE II

**Publications of the UNION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Main or Only Publications</th>
<th>Circulation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BdD</td>
<td>Deutsche Volkszeitung</td>
<td>weekly 42,200²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D054</td>
<td>Blätter fuer deutsche und</td>
<td>monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>internationale Politik</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDU</td>
<td>Saar-Mooshe</td>
<td>weekly 5,000³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFU</td>
<td>Ausweg</td>
<td>monthly 20,000⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DL</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DWN</td>
<td>Banned in 1961</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNU</td>
<td>tatsachen</td>
<td>weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FK</td>
<td>bulletin</td>
<td>monthly 6,000⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VFS</td>
<td>Rundbriefe</td>
<td>monthly 2,300⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUS</td>
<td>sozialistische hafte</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPPF</td>
<td>Frau und Frieden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>No information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. For other publications see Bibliography.
3. *Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) im Saarland (Kursanalyse)*. Report prepared for the author by the Verfassungsschutz of the Saar.
4. Special issues reached a circulation of 35,000. Interview with Arno Behrisch.
5. Interview with editor.
6. Interview with editor.
a unified structure. The DFU aimed to rise above sectionalism, but it also had to cultivate sectional appeals. Its programme was intended for everyone, but the 'packaging' had to take into account group biases. In a loose alliance the group appeal of the various organisations could be fully utilised. The DG54 and FK appealed to bourgeois liberals, the WFFB emphasised the needs of women and children, the VUS and some of the smaller parties could trade on their working class image. In fact, several of the partners needed their separate existence to follow their chosen specialisation. The FK was convinced that its social elitism was its strength; the VUS could only be a Socialist ginger group by retaining its identity; the DDU had electoral appeal which the DFU lacked. At least some of the organisations could not have brought all their members into a unified UNION. For example, while the FK was in the UNION some of its members continued to vote SPD and FDP. Emotional factors also demanded a loose grouping. Already in 1960, some partners felt themselves overshadowed by the DFU and were glad to keep their distance. Instincts of group identity and organisational egotism were also factors. Class prejudice also played its part as did to some extent anti-intellectualism. The socially and educationally elite DG54 and FK faced largely working-class partners. Other considerations also helped to keep the organisations apart: the DFU saw itself as a temporary emergency measure, and there was some fear that the party might be banned.\[1\]

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1 Interviews.
Those factors slowed down the structural rationalisation which gradually overtook the alliance. Until 1967/68 organisational fusion was rare and affected only the banned DVP and the DNW. Thereafter, changes occurred quickly and by early 1969 only four— the DFU, FK, VUS and WPFB—of the original 11 organisations survived. After 1960, only the DL joined the alliance.¹

The formal structure of the DFU (see Table III) is not very informative. We shall concentrate on its actual structure in as far as it was observable.

In less than nine months the DFU built a national organisation and prepared for a federal election at the same time. On 5 February, 1961, the first Land party was established and a month later all ten were ready.² The DFU kept out of West Berlin which it did not accept as part of the Federal Republic. By May most of the 200-odd constituency parties (Bezirksverbaende) were ready,³ as well as some local branches. A system of consultants was also in operation (see below).

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¹ See Chapters III and IV.

² On 5.2.1961 in Niedersachsen, 6.2 in Baden-Wuerttemberg, 11.2 in Hamburg, 18.2 in Bremen, 19.2 in Bayern, 26.2 in Nordrhein-Westfalen and Hessen, 5.3 in Schleswig-Holstein, Rheinland-Pfalz and Saar.

³ Interviews. Also, DFU korrespondenz, 14.4.1961. In July the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land party still needed two constituency parties. The DFU did not have a branch in every one of the 247 federal constituencies. Later amalgamations reduced their number and it is doubtful if the DFU still had some 200 constituency parties by 1965.
TABLE III
The Formal Structure of the DFU

- directorate
  - small executive
    - Unions Rat
      - joint meetings
    - c.a.
  - l.ex.
  - federal conference
    - delegates
    - federal office
    - Land offices
    - Land conference
      - delegates
      - constituency membership meeting
        - membership
        - local membership meeting
        - a
    - a

- a. = auditors of accounts
- c.a. = committee of arbitration
- s.ex. = small executive committee
- l.ex. = large executive committee
- election
- co-option
- appointment
- administration
The DFU created a nation-wide organisation as quickly as possible to be ready for the 1961 federal election. Hence, it formed constituency parties, which 'entsprechen den jeweiligen Wahlkreisen fuer den Bundestag' and did not adopt the boundaries of the kreis and kreisfreie local government areas which is the more common practice among the parties. Within the constituency parties were founded some local branches but these Ortsverbaende never really got off the ground largely because the party had too few members.

Without its partners the DFU could not have established its organisation as quickly as it did. The DFU took members from most of its partners, relied on their expertise, and quickly absorbed the banned DNM of Niedersachsen and the DNU of Nordrhein-Westfalen. However, much of the DFU's organisation was new. In some areas both the DFU and other UNION groups had offices and branches. But the DFU also had to cover large areas where its partners were not established.

The DFU had the largest organisation in the UNION. In nine months it only managed to outline its organisational structure. The intention was to fill in the details after the federal election.

2 See Chapter VIII.
3 Interviews.
4 See Chapter IV.
5 Interviews.
6 Interviews.
However, when the time came a declining and often inactive membership forced the party to be more concerned with keeping its existing organisation together and working than with improving it. Already in 1962, the Niedersachsen Land party, which had only some 500 members, had to simplify its organisation.\(^1\) From 1965 the DFU no longer insisted that every federal constituency had to have its own branch.\(^2\) In 1967 the party in Nordrhein-Westfalen, the DFU's stronghold, had 14 of its 57 constituency parties inactive.\(^3\)

The DFU's organisation covered a large area but was not effective. The party had too few members and many of them seem to have been inactive and/or inexperienced.\(^4\) With less than 5,000 members for most of the time,\(^5\) the party did not have the resources to run effectively over 200 constituency parties as well as local branches. Few constituency parties had more than 100 members and the majority seem to have had between 20 and 40

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1 Interviews.


4 Interviews.

5 See Chapter VIII.
members.¹ Many constituency parties could not cover the areas allocated to them.² The situation seems to have been at its worst in the rural areas and somewhat better in the large towns where the amalgamation of constituency parties was a common feature.³

The constituency and local parties were run on an amateur, weekend, after-work basis which contributed towards their ineffectiveness.⁴ Senior party organs seem to have found it difficult to impose standards.⁵ The DFU's practice of having a single Land party for each Land, irrespective of its size, created Land parties which on the one hand were no more than overgrown constituency parties (e.g. Bremen and Hamburg) and on the other, covered areas and populations the size of some of the smaller

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¹ Interviews. The case of the Kreis Duesseldorf-Mettmann, which was so large that it had to be divided into two federal constituencies for 1965, emphasises the DFU's problem. The DFU constituency party had never more than three local branches and 62 members from 1963/4 (See Chapter VIII). In contrast, the largest party in the area, the SPD, had 22 local branches and 2,820 members, the CDU had a similar number of branches and 1,345 members, and the FDP had 17 branches and 451 members. File on SFD Unterbezirks Konferens Duesseldorf-Mettmann 7, March 1970, supplied by local SPD agent. Letter from CDU Kreisverband Duesseldorf-Mettmann to author, 15.7.1970. Interview with local FDP secretary.

² Interviews.

³ Interviews.

⁴ Interviews.

⁵ Interviews.
European nations (e.g. Bayern and Nordrhein-Westfalen). This not only meant that the influence of the Land parties varied greatly, but also that the largest of them had problems of co-ordination within their areas.¹ The weakness of the grassroots branches may have, among other things, contributed towards the DFU's poor election results.²

For a small party the DFU had a large and expensive administrative apparatus at federal and Land level. The bureaucratic machine — through which Communist agents like to dominate a front organisation³ — was the DFU's most impressive feature. The federal party had a ten-room office in Köln. The federal business manager had a political staff of eight full-time and salaried officers, full-time secretarial help, at least one party car, and four to five part-time helpers during busy periods.⁴ Each Land party, with the possible exception of Bremen, Hamburg, and Saar, had a paid agent, secretary and car.⁵ The larger

¹ Interviews.


⁴ The author visited the office. Also interview with the director Arno Behrisch.

⁵ Interviews. The ten Land offices were in Hamburg, Bremen, Neumünster (Schleswig-Holstein), Hannover, Essen, Frankfurt, Mainz, Saarbruecken, Stuttgart and Muenchen.
regional parties had considerably more. The Land office of Nordrhein-Westfalen employed at least ten people in 1963 and had some six rooms.¹ In Hessen, the Land agent (monthly salary DM 950) had two political officers (salary DM 750–800), a full-time secretary/typist and a party car. The cost of this office, excluding propaganda, was some DM 50,000 a year.² The Land agent of Baden-Wuerttemberg had three paid people under him.³

All the available information points to a party controlled from the top. The great bulk of the DFU's literature was published by the federal party. The ten Land parties, the centres which really mattered, were controlled from Köln. (However, it seems that there were not sufficient resources to supervise the grassroots branches closely.⁴) The main control mechanism appears to have been money. Party dues were inadequate and the DFU relied extensively on donations (see below) which were almost completely paid to the federal party. As most of the donations probably came from East German sources, the Communists seem to have wanted financial centralism which facilitated supervision by a few KPD agents. The Köln office subsidised the Land parties and their elections. For example, only the party in Bayern seems to have paid its own Land agent,⁵ and the DM 50,000 cost of the Hessen Land office was largely covered by Köln.⁶ The Land agent of Baden-

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¹ The author visited the office. Also, open letter from Viktor Wynaude, the Land agent of NRW, 5.6.1964.
² Interview with Heinz Nagel, Land chairman of Hessen.
³ Interviews.
⁴ Interviews.
⁵ Interview with Land chairman.
⁶ Interview with Land chairman.
Wuerttemberg lost his post for criticising national party leaders. Koeln squashed the 1963 'rebellion' in Niedersachsen and dragooned the Schwaben into an electoral alliance with the DL.

The eight federal party conferences of 1960–68 were generally tame. For a party which was full of conflicts, the DFU's conferences were usually harmonious. This suggests that their delegates' election and/or the meetings were carefully manipulated. The outgoing federal executive nominated the candidates for the next one. These nominations were almost always

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1 See Chapter III.
2 See Chapters II and III.
3 At the 1962 conference, 'hatten die meisten Delegierten ... wenig Interesse an den usüblichen Kongressprozeduren. Als zwei Delegierte durch ihren Widerspruch die Parteileitung daran hinderten, ob er die Anträge en bloc abstimmen zu lassen, empfanden die anderen dies als lästige Störung'. Die Zeit, 2.11.1962. A comparison of the draft and final version of the 1965 election manifesto shows that conference accepted the draft almost word for word. The only dispute revolved around six words. The proposal that the words 'Die DFU vertritt keine kommunistische Ziele' be included in the manifesto was rejected by the delegates. The leadership, which was in favour of the alteration, then asked for more debate and another vote which accepted the six words. See Chapter II. Also, Wahlprogramm der DFU (Entwurf) and Die Bundesrepublik braucht eine neue Politik, Wahlprogramm der DFU fuer die Bundestagswahl 1965, Koeln: DFU, 1965.
4 A suggestion also made in Die Zeit, 2.11.1962.
accepted, although congress could make its own nominations. 1 Conference, which was formally the 'Oberste Organ der Gesamtpartei', 2 seems to have usually acclaimed the decisions of the federal leadership.

The directors were the DFU's top formal leaders. In 1960 the party felt that its diverse support could not be represented by a single head of the party. 3 Instead, it chose three directors and by 1963 the party had seven of them. Initiatives and policies came from the directorate. The DFU leaders interviewed were divided in their evaluation of the full federal executive (Bundesvorstand) which had 'die Leitung der Gesamtpartei'. 4 Some

1 1962 election of executive committee: 'Fuer die Wahl des Bundesvorstandes war eine Liste mit 60 Namen vorgesehen, Nieemand verlangte danach neue Kandidaten zu nehmen. So wurden all 60 gewahlt'. Die Zeit, 2.11.1962.

1965 election: The federal executive put forward 60 names. Two delegates were also nominated by Conference. Only the 'official' nominees were elected. Unionstag der Deutschen Friedens-Union am 13. und 14. Maerz 1965 in Duisburg: Wahlvorschlag fuer den neuen Bundestvorsitz, and Bundesvorstand der Deutschen Friedens-Union gewahlt 14.3.1965.

1968 election: 61 of the 63 'official' candidates were elected. Conference nominated another 14 successful candidates, and the executive was increased to 75 members, who for the first time included BDD leaders. Wahlvorschlag des Direktoriums fuer den zu wahlenden Bundesvorstand, and Direktorium, Bundesvorstand, Revisoren-und Bundesschiedsgericht der DFU gewahlt am 8.6.1968 in Dortmund.

2 Organisations-Statut, op. cit., p. 18.

3 Interviews.

4 Organisations-Statut, op. cit., p. 13.
saw it as a 'rubber stamp' which, with 48 to 74 members, was too large, met too infrequently, usually four times a year,\(^1\) and was not much more than a talking shop. Other leaders felt that it had some influence over the directors, especially when they were divided and looked for allies on the executive. This last picture seems to reflect the actual situation. On at least three occasions, the full executive was the place where a compromise solution on thorny issues was worked out. On each occasion, the Communist faction did not get its way but neither was it defeated.\(^2\) Similar divided opinions were expressed about the small federal executive (\textit{geschäftsleitender Bundesvorstand}) which met about eight times a year and was abolished in 1968.\(^3\)

The \textit{UNION} had two main 'open' systems of co-ordination. Both were based on the DFU.

1. Interviews.

2. After the 1965 federal election, a group of federal leaders wanted to dismiss the federal party business manager, Pfarrer Werner, who they felt was too friendly with the Communists. The attempt failed, but one of Werner's personal rivals, who also had the reputation of being tough on Communists, was made a full-time functionary to keep an eye on the federal manager (see Chapter III). During the 1967 Middle East war proposals to side with the Arabs were defeated and the DFU resolved to 'sit on the fence'. (Interviews). A row in the federal executive, in 1968, modified the party's earlier statements justifying the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (see Chapter III).

3. Interviews.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNION groups</strong></td>
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</table>
| BdD | Kuester - ex-federal executive member  
Wirtz - ex-party member |
| DC54 | von Westphalen - founder and chairman  
Rheinfelder - members of  
Riemann - executive  
Schneider - executive  
Wirtz - contributor to  
Toennies - the 'Klaeter' |
| DDU | Koenig - not members but stood  
Kuechler - as DDU election candidates in 1960 |
| DNU | Meissner - members of  
Wenzel - party's  
Westphal - executive  
Goertz - 'fuhrer tactic' |
| FK | Schneider - secretary  
Erbsmann -  
Gollmitzer - members  
Riemann -  |
| VUS | Berg - joint chairman  
Boening - members of  
Bremmer - central committee |
| WPPB | von Kuehlmann - members of  
Kuester - federal  
Steinmann - executive |
| **Groups outside UNION** | | |
| Friedenskomitee der BRD | Schneider - members of  
Wirtz - Presidium  
von Kuehlmann - member  
Kuester - active supporter |
<p>| Gemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler zum Schutz der freien Forschung | Hartsann - active supporter |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
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<tr>
<td>IdK</td>
<td>Werner — deputy chairman</td>
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<td>Bednarski — federal executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>June Aktion</td>
<td>Hoelsle — member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirchliche Bruderschaften</td>
<td>Bartsch</td>
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<td>Sbosny</td>
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<td>Schwelmer Kreis</td>
<td>Langer — temporary leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staendiger</td>
<td>von Kuchlmann — presidium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kongress gegen die atomare</td>
<td>Gollwitzer — member</td>
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<td>Aufruestung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volksbund fuer die Wiedervereinigung</td>
<td>Heydt — leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deutslands — Deutscher Bund</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVN</td>
<td>Westphal — member</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* No information on 19 of the 48 members of whom four were members for only a matter of months.

Sources: Organisationsstatut, Stuttgarter Manifest... op. cit.; Bundesvorstand der DPV of 17.12.1960 (duplicated list in author's possession); Kommentare zur Politik der **DPFDV, DGB-Landesvorstand Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1962, pp. 40-45; Nuenschmann, op. cit.; Interviews.
2) Consultants (Beiräte) who were co-opted on to the DFU's election campaign committees and special bodies mit 'beratender Funktion'. They did not have to be DFU members, though some were. Consultants were co-opted as 'Einzelpersonen oder als Vertreter von Organisationen ... wenn diese gewillt sind, an gemeinsamen politischen Aufgaben mitzuarbeiten'. The federal regional consultants sat on the Unionerrat (see below) and the regional consultants on Landesbeiräte. The constituency and local parties were entitled to have their own Beiräte, but usually they had less formal links with people outside the party. These bodies met separately and attended meetings of the DFU's full executives. To maintain the DFU's autonomy, at least in theory, consultants could not vote on decisions. They seem to have withdrawn when the executives discussed internal party matters, and the DFU's smaller executives seem to have met on their own. Consultants were often recruited from the same organisations as the executive committee members. All of the organisations were more or less friendly towards the DFU. For example, the 1961 Unionerrat (see Table V) included senior leaders from the BdB, DDU, VFS and MV who did not want to be too closely linked to the DFU, people from similar groups as on the federal executive, and some DFU

1 Organisations-Statut, op. cit., p. 9.
2 Ibid.
3 Interviews.
4 Interviews.
5 See Chapter IV.
## Table V

Organisational links of 1961 Unionerrat members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>KPD cadres</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
<td><strong>UNION groups</strong></td>
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<td>BdD</td>
<td>Elles</td>
<td>- chairman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Weber</td>
<td>- general</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- secretary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bausch</td>
<td>- head of</td>
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<td>- political</td>
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<td>- national</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- executive</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Gieseking</td>
<td>- chairman</td>
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<td>DWN</td>
<td>Behr</td>
<td>- initiator of</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- banned party</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNU</td>
<td>Matull</td>
<td>- deputy</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>FK</td>
<td>Weismantel</td>
<td>- central</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPS</td>
<td>Gerlacher</td>
<td>- chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VUS</td>
<td>Gleissberg</td>
<td>- joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- chairman</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behr</td>
<td>- central</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- committee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bethge</td>
<td>- member</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFPB</td>
<td>Fassbinder</td>
<td>- presidium</td>
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<tr>
<td>WV</td>
<td>Gautier</td>
<td>- responsible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- for links</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- with DFU</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DFU</strong></td>
<td>Behr; Bethge; Fassbinder; Miller</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*ex-functionary with federal KPD, trained at Parteihochschule Karl Marx*

*former KPD member*

*ex-first secretary of KPD in Bremen. Arrested in 1961. Member of DKP central committee in 1968*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>KPD cadres</th>
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<tr>
<td>Groups outside UNION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Friedenskomitee der BRD</td>
<td>Diehl - secretary</td>
<td>Sentenced to one year's imprisonment in 1960 for illegal political work. Member of DKP central committee in 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdK</td>
<td>Betage</td>
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<td>Kirchliche Bruderschaften</td>
<td>Hochalski</td>
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<tr>
<td>Schwelmer Kreis</td>
<td>Fassbinder - leading role (i.e. Arbeitsausschuss)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VVN</td>
<td>Rossaint - presidium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Welfriedensrat</td>
<td>Fassbinder - presidium</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diehl - member</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*No information on five of the 21 members of the Unionsrat.*

Sources: List of members provided by DFU federal office; *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, 21.7.1961 and special issue of November 1968; KPDEU *op. cit.*, pp. 35-40.
leaders. The four Communist agents on the Unionerrat were consultants representing groups openly linked to the DFU. The 1961 federal election campaign committee included, apart from ten DFU leaders, six Communists and the party stressed that most of these 'beratende Gaste' were representatives of the DFU's open allies (see below). In other words, the Communist party pursued the old tactic of disguising some of its agents as representatives of front organisations which preceded the united front. As we noted in the previous Chapter, the large VVN kept its distance from the DFU. No VVN leader sat on the 1961 federal executive or campaign committee and only one of them was in the Unionerrat and then, it was stressed, in a personal capacity. One VVN member sat on the federal executive.

The system of consultants provided for the united front's special needs. It was intended to help the KPD to use its existing front organisations as one cover for its control over the DFU.3

1 Selznick, op. cit., p. 147.
2 Interviews.
3 The author discussed the various methods of hiding Communists with several DFU leaders, including Pfarrer Werner the federal business manager. The word *Tarnorganisation* was never used, but the leaders described practices which conformed to the classic pattern of a front organisation. Werner was opposed to the practice of hiding Communists and wanted them to work in the open. He felt that open participation was less harmful in the long run because 'hidden influence' would always be uncovered and publicised by the authorities, and the public distrusted such influence more than an open alliance between Communists and non-Communists.
The system provided some Communists with access to the DFU's key leadership groups yet, strictly speaking, kept them apart from the DFU. The system was intended to give the impression that the Communists associated with the DFU were in no position to exercise strong influence over the party which therefore could not be a front organisation. This impression was intended for both the public and non-Communists in the party. The DFU could claim, when its KPD personnel was exposed, that these people were not even party members, only represented groups openly linked to the DFU, and that they could not vote on decisions.

The system of consultants also allowed the leaders of long-time front organisations to sit with the DFU's executives without being subject to the rules and discipline of the party. This was one of the main complaints of some DFU leaders who were concerned about the KPD's excessive influence in the DFU. Furthermore, the system allowed the DFU to recruit men and women who could not, or did not want to get too closely associated with the party.

The Communist party's investment and participation in the DFU were extensive. The illegality of the KPD and its need for an electoral outlet may, in part, explain the level of Communist involvement in the DFU. There were the Hintersaener in key administrative posts, other Communist personnel, SED-KPD money,

1 The DFU used these arguments in an attempt to dismiss a Spiegel article of 19.7.1961, which found six Communists on the DFU's federal election campaign committee, as 'bloße Gedankenempfänglerin' which had dreamed up a "KP-Kommandozentrale" DFU Presseabteilung, 24.7.1961.

2 For example, Professor Colpe (see Chapter II) who resigned from the DFU in 1963. Rheinischer Merkur, 24.5.1963.
and the Communists' influence over some of the UNION's publications. The Communists who were also the activists, had the political expertise and probably were the most cohesive group in the UNION. Finally, most of the DFU's senior leadership groups included a large proportion of 'fellow travellers', and they and the smaller number of Communists had a majority in some leadership groups.

In 1961, 53 (13.4%) of the DFU's 403 leaders, consultants and election candidates were ex-KPD functionaries and members¹ and another 49.5% were 'fellow travellers'.² Communists were found in most types of leadership groups (Table VI). However, the directors, the federal business manager, and the Land chairmen and agents were non-Communists. In 1960, the DFU founders had decided to exclude or keep to a minimum Communists among the DFU's

¹ Membership of the banned Communist party was illegal. Hence its people were often referred to as 'ex-KPD'. The 1961 Verfassungsschutz report on the DFU's personnel used this practice. As the object was to determine KPD influence in the DFU, there was little point of listing people who had lost contact with the KPD. The 1961 report was summarised in Der Spiegel of 23.8.1961 and the Communists were listed in KPDFU, op. cit., pp. 35-40. In some other official reports, which are used in Chapter VII, the term 'Communist' and 'illegal KPD member' are used. The fact that the following Communists with the DFU – Dihl, Gautier, Poliket, Shosny, Weber and Zimpelmann – sat on the Central Committee of the new open Communist party (DHP) in 1968-69, and that the DHP's First Secretary, Kurt Bachmann, was a DFU federal election candidate in 1965, shows that we are dealing with KPD agents. Interviews and Deutscher Informationsdienst, Special Issue, December 1968.

TABLE VI

Location of Communists among the DFU's Leaders, Candidates and Consultants in 1961

1 The 53 reported in Der Spiegel and Walter Diehl, Helene Weber and Otto Zimpelmann.

open and more senior leaders and to hide them as consultants representing peripheral groups linked to the DFU (see above) or in behind-the-scene posts. The aim was to help the DFU's public image, to give the State one less excuse to try to ban the party, and not to overcrowd the non-Communists in the DFU. However, the Communists and the DFU were torn between two conflicting demands: the need to hide the party's Communist links and the need to display KPD people. After its banning, the KPD had lost contact with many of its members and voters. The Communists had to advertise the DFU and display some KPD people in the umbrella party, especially among its election candidates, to win the DFU these people. Also, it seems that the ordinary Communists in the UNION needed to see some of their people 'where it mattered'.

Over the years circumstances eroded the policy of hiding Communists but it was never abandoned. The presence of Communists among the DFU's 'open' leaders increased over the years. For example, from 24 Communist federal election candidates in 1961, to 90 in 1965. However, no Communist ever became a director. Desertiions and apathy among DFU members seems to have made the party more dependent on Communist activists. The party also responded to the increasing dissatisfaction among KPD people with the DFU, by giving the umbrella party's leaders a more Communist profile.

---

1 Interviews.
3 See Chapter VII.
4 Interviews.
However, among the DFU's most senior and open leaders and functionaries were very few Communists. In 1960-68, the directors, federal party managers, and Land party chairmen and agents were, with rare exceptions, non Communists. Yet at every key policy and administrative point in the party, were one or more Communists in important functional jobs. The DFU conformed to the classic front organisation pattern of the Communist cadre leading from behind, and being strong in the bureaucracy, from which the Communists like to dominate peripheral groups (see above). These strategically located Hintermeimger appear to have formed an unofficial command structure within the DFU. One of their biggest assets was their political expertise which many DFU leaders lacked as they were amateurs in party and/or minor party politics. Below are listed the known full-time Hintermeimger in the DFU's bureaucracy:

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1 See Chapter VII, and interviews. A few Communists eventually became Land agents.

2 This conclusion is supported by the DFU's Nordrhein-Westfalen Land agent who, in his letter of resignation, wrote: "Fuer die Einhaltung der "richtigen Linie" sorgt der bekannte KP-Funktionair Helmut Reidl aus Offenbach a.M., der bei besonderen Anlaessen seine Kontakteute (in the Land office) besucht". Open letter from Viktor Wynands, 5.6.1964.

3 See Chapter VII.

4 The sources are: KPFU op. cit., pp. 35-40; DFU Pressedienst, 24.7.1961; Open letter from Viktor Wynands, 5.6.1964; Sproho, op. cit., p. 32; the author found a paper - 'Union von rechts bis links' - in the CDU archives which described Neumceiler and Bausch as 'klassische Hintermeimger'. 
1. Helmut Roedl was secretary to the directorate.

2. Heinz Dreibrodt (ex-FDJ functionary) was deputy to Lorenz Knorr, the federal business manager. His function was described by the DFU thus: 'Wahrend Herr Knorr Organisationsleiter ist, ist Herr Dreibrodt der für die Durchführung verantwortlich'. Dreibrodt was a student of the SEB-Landesparteihochschule Neisse and of the Karl-Marx Hochschule.

3. Paul Neuhoeffer (nine months imprisonment for illegal political activity) was personal assistant to the director and federal treasurer, von Westphalen.

4. The DFU's 1961 federal election campaign committee included the following Communists: Dreibrodt, Neuhoeffer, Dr. Brendler (ex-KPD functionary), Helmut Bausch (ex-KPD functionary with the national KPD and trained by Parteihochschule Karl Marx), Hermann Gautier (former First Secretary of Bremen KPD and arrested in 1961 for contacts with Oskar Neumann, a member of the KPD Politbüro in East Germany), and Georg Polikeit (former KPD functionary) who acted as advisor on election propaganda.

5. The 1961 Unimarat included Bausch, Brendler and Alfred Gerlach (ex-KPD member) and Walter Diehl.

6. Manfred Buder (nine months imprisonment for illegal political activity) was from the late 1950's responsible for liaison between the federal and Land parties.

7. In his open letter of resignation, the Land agent of NRW, Viktor Wymands, wrote that he was 'nur von kommunistisch gesuchten Kaderleuten umgeben. Die Namen Brousch, Tippkoetter, Becker, Bogdahl, Klein, Alexander, Schmetkort und Neuhammer sprechen für sich'.

A UNION network of Communists also existed. Ex-KPD and PDJ personnel held key posts in those groups of the alliance about which information could be obtained. Unlike in the DFU, these people not only held functionally but also formally senior posts. The Secretary of the DG54 was the Communist Paul Neuhoeffer (see

---

1 Communist youth movement.
above). The chief executive of the DDU was another KPD man. ¹

The VPS's chairman, deputy chairman, secretary, and treasurer came from the Communist party.² The BDD's deputy General Secretary, Dr. Brendel, the editor of the party's Volkszeitung,³ and the leader of the BDD's political section, Helmut Bausch were senior Communists (see above). The KPD man, Herman Gautier, was responsible for liaison between the WV and the DFU (see above).

The editor of the DNU's tetsachen and at least two members of the party's executive were from the KPD.⁴ Some of the DFU's groups, at least, included a higher proportion of Communists among its leaders and members than the DFU.⁵ With these strategically located Communists in the DFU and UNION, the Communist party was probably 'performing the general staff functions' in the UNION 'with the members of the network reinforcing each other'.⁶

For a small party the DFU had a lot of money. Its two federal elections cost about DM 2,000,000 each⁷ and one of its Land offices cost about DM 50,000 a year (see above). Party literature was of high quality and there was ample of it. The

---

¹ Interviews.
³ KPD FU, op. cit., p. 37.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 35-38.
⁵ See Chapters IV and VII.
⁷ Interview with Lorenz Knox, federal party manager in 1960-63.
dues of the party's 5,000 members provided only a small proportion of this money. The bulk of it came in the form of donations from outside the party. For example, in 1963 DM 70,000 a month were donated and most of it went to the federal party. It was an open secret that most of this money came from Communist sources. The DFU's very secrecy about the sources of its income is highly suspicious. For example, the federal treasurer even refused to divulge these sources to a federal leader. After 1965 the DFU's income was considerably cut. Its main journal collapsed and other literature was poorly produced. This occurred at a time when the KPD was losing interest in the DFU and was looking for a new umbrella party. Only from late 1968 was the DFU entitled to financial help from the state and the sum involved was estimated at DM 750,000.

1 Information from the DFU's federal treasurer told to a branch meeting by the Land agent of Nordrhein-Westfalen. Minutes of Velbert DFU local branch, 31.5.1963.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

4 Interviews.

5 Interviews. This was also the opinion of Bednarzaki, the Niedersachsen Land chairman, during a press conference announcing his resignation from the DFU. Hamburger Abendecho, 23.4.1963.

6 Interview with Carl Backhaus, a member of the federal executive.

7 This was because of a new ruling of the federal constitutional court. Der Sniegel, 26.5.1969.
At least some of the UNION's publications were under Communist influence or control. The editors of the Deutsche Volkszeitung and 
*tatsachen* were Communists¹ as was the compiler of the *DFU in Spiegel der Presse*.² Communists could also influence or decide the fate of a publication. The directors Behrisch and Knorr supervised the DFU's *Ausweg*, but the journal ceased publication in late 1966 after the KPD withdrew most of its financial help from the DFU. The editor of the VUS's *sozialistische hefte* was convinced that the Communists killed his journal by merging it in 1969, with the *Marxistische Blätter* which had a largely Communist editorial board. Both journals were published by the Planbeck Verlag which was headed by a Communist.³ The DFU's *Saar-Woche* came to an end when the group went over to the DKP in early 1969.⁴

The Communist presence in the DFU did not rest on a small group of strategically located people. The KPD had also numerical strength on its side. It seems that quite a few Communists were ordinary DFU members.⁵ Communists were also active supporters who, without being in the UNION, helped the DFU in elections and so forth.⁶ Some of the Communists in the DFU were members of the

---

¹ *KPD/DFU, op. cit.*, pp. 35, 37.
² Interviews.
³ Interview with Karl Otto, editor of the *sozialistische hefte*.
⁴ *Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) im Saarland (Kurzanalyse)*, *op. cit.*
⁵ See Chapter VIII.
⁶ See Chapter VIII.
illegal party, but by no means all 7,000 underground members were in the DFU and UNION. It seems that the DFU was a meeting place between ex-KPD members who had lost contact with their party, individuals who would have joined the Communist party if it had been legal, and elements of the underground party.

The Communists were in a position to exert influence in the DFU. All the DFU leaders interviewed, agreed that the Communists and their friends in the party were influential in the party. However, they disagreed about the extent of that influence. Some felt that the KPD's influence was excessive and dominating, and others talked of a 'partnership'. If the KPD's influence was decisive, as it probably was, it was not unchallenged as we saw in Chapters II and III and above. The author could not uncover a defeat for the KPD people, but it seems that they had to compromise on several occasions to carry the party with them.
CHAPTER VI
SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LEADERS

The Chapter examines several social characteristics of some senior leaders of the DFU and other organisations in the UNION. The characteristics are occupation, social class, sex and, occasionally, age. The analysis does not cover all senior leaders, and ignores the grassroots level, but the several hundred people involved probably reflect aspects of the social profile of the senior leaders of the UNION. At the end of the Chapter some of the leadership groups are related to social aspects of West Germany's political culture.

DFU Leaders

The DFU has been called the 'Partei der Pfarrer und Professoren', and the bourgeois, intellectual and clerical nature of its leaders has been commented on.\(^1\) DFU leaders were often convinced that the party's senior leaders gave it an elitist image which kept many of the working-class votes away on whose favourable response the party's electoral prospects most depended. The Chapter uses the leaders' occupation and social class to see if this alleged image had substance behind it.

Directors

The Directors were the DFU's most senior federal leaders and there were eight of them in 1961-68:

Professor Dr. Renate Riemann. Born 4.10.1920 in Breslau (Poland) the daughter of a Protestant German-Nationalist, property owner who went bankrupt; involuntary member of Hitler Jugend; after Gymnasium, Jena University (German language and Art History) and a doctorate; 1950 West Germany's youngest Professor; posts in Pedagogische Akademie of Oldenburg, Braunschweig and Wuppertal; dismissal from her last post for Eastern-contacts resulted in local student protests; 1946-57 SPD member; resigning in protest against party's acceptance of Cold War tactics; member of Deutsche Club and Freikircher Kreis and active in several Communist-influenced groups; founder member of DFU and most publicised director in the party's earlier years; resigned from Directorate in 1964 on grounds of ill-health but remained on federal executive; since middle 1960's employed as publisher's reader; unmarried.

Lorens Knoorr. Born 18.7.1921 in Czechoslovakia; father was a worker who became a minor trade union official and was a member of Czech SPD; Volkenschule and some vocational training in compositing and bookbinding; engaged in anti-Hitler activities and seriously injured during war-service; from 1945 SPD member and in 1950-60 Federal Secretary of Sozialistische Jugend (Falken); chief editor of Junge Gemeinschaft and an editor of Erreichung und Gesellschaft - both appointments ended with his break with the SPD in early 1961; author of several books on child rearing; director since 1961; chief party bureauocrat in 1961-63; responsible, with Arno Behrisch, for publication of DFU's Ausweg.

Karl Graf von Westphalen zu Euerstenberg. Born 12.9.1898 in Munster, Westfalen the son of a Catholic landowner and Landrat who was in the Zentrum party; Gymnasium and then army officer in 1918-20 and 1935-45 (Major); founder member of CDU in NRW, resigning from the party in 1952 when it rejected Adenauer's foreign and defence policies; 1954 founder member and long-time manager of Deutsche Club 54 which was opposed to Adenauer; founder-member of DFU and director and party treasurer since 1961.

Arno Behrisch. Born 6.6.1913 in Dresden (East Germany); father a bricklayer and smallholder; Volkenschule and apprentice compositor; in early youth joined SAJ and then SPD; opposition to Hitler and emigré (Sweden) for several years; active in SPD after war as Landtag deputy in Bavaria, Bundestag deputy (1949-61), deputy chairman of Bavarian Social Democrats, editor of Bavarian SPD newspaper, etc; no religion; joined DFU in early 1961, immediately became party chairman in NRW and member of federal executive; management expert and Bonn correspondent of Westdeutsches Tageblatt which had DFU's financial help; elected to directorate in 1964; full-time director from 1965; responsible with Lorens Knoorr for publication of Ausweg.

Pfarrer Heinrich Werner. Born 24.8.1933 into working class home; father was a fitter; university and as theology student joined DFU in early 1961; became Pfarrer in early 1960's (Evangelische Kirche of Rheinland-Pfalz); leave of absence from church, 1962-65, to work for DFU becoming its business manager (1963-68); after refusal to extend his leave of absence he resigned from church; chairman of DFU Rheinland-Pfalz and federal executive committee member since 1961; joined directorate in 1964.
Nira von Kusdlmnn. Born 1.9.1896 into a Protestant, landowning Bavarian noble family; pupil of Hoehere Tdschlerschule; married nobleman, housewife, mother; after war became politically active; joined CSU in 1946 and was member of the Land executive committee, and resigned from the party in 1951; joined GVP (1953-57), standing as a federal election candidate in 1953; leading member of Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung and Arbeitskreise Fragen des Zeitgeschehens; deputy chairwoman of DFU Bavaria, member of federal executive committee since 1960 and director from 1964.

Heins Nagel. Born 7.4.1923 in Hessen, the son of a commercial traveller who was SPD member; Protestant; Gymnasium and Paedagogische Hochschule; elementary school teacher and then headmaster; late fifties active in Kampf dem Atomtod which prevented him from joining SPD for which he had voted since 1949; joined DFU in June 1961; chairman of the Land party of Hessen and member of federal executive since 1962; 1967 elected director.

Josef Weber. Born 11.6.1908 into middle class family; Gymnasium; former professional army officer (Oberst); active in BfD since early fifties becoming its full-time General Secretary in late fifties and its Chairman towards the end of the decade; member of DFU Unionerrat since 1961; elected on to DFU directorate in 1968.

In several respects the directors lacked social cohesion. Three of them were self-made men from the working-class who had moved up the social ladder through party politics and the church, three had middle-class backgrounds, and two came from the nobility. There was also a generation gap. At the time of their election, three of the directors were in their sixties, one was 51, three were in their forties and one was only 31. In some respects the directors differed from the other federal leaders. The ex-military, female and noble element was higher as was the share of those born in the 'lost' territories. The middle-class and intellectual elements were even higher than among the other leaders. All the directors were intellectuals if only because they were professional and/or skilled
But as with the other leaders, the directors included a large element of teachers, 'political' journalists, and the 'statutory' clergyman. The DFU was keen to recruit clergymen and to display them in senior and public posts (see below). It was this public display of the cloth which, perhaps as much as or more than, the actual number of clerics involved, may have given the party a clerical image.

**Federal Executive Committees**

135 men and women sat on the DFU's four federal executive committees in 1960-68, of whom just over half (51.1%) were professionals (Table 1a). Professors, headmasters and teachers formed the largest (14.8%) professional group, followed by editors and journalists (11.1%) of whom most worked for the publications of the DFU and its allies, Protestant clergymen (7.4%) and doctors and dentists (5.9%). The professions also included five lawyers.

---

1 A broad and somewhat arbitrary occupational definition of intellectual is used. It embraces the following occupations which frequently imply high educational attainments and professional status: the professional communicators, the 'core' of intellectuals — academics, headmasters, teachers, clergymen, writers, journalists, artists; the 'marginal' intellectuals — doctors, lawyers, scientists, architects, Diplom engineers and businessmen; and Higher Civil Servants from 'Hat' upwards. See, among others, Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, London: Heineamm, 1969, 310-43; Daniel Lerner and others, *The Nazi Elite*, in Harold Laswell and Daniel Lerner eds., *World Revolutionary Elites*, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1966, 194-313.

2 The first committee (1960-62) had 48 members, the second (1962-65) had 59 members, the third (1965-68) had 60 members and the fourth (elected in 1968) had 74 members, including for the first time Bdd leaders as well.
### TABLE 1a

Occupations of the DFU Federal Executive Committee Members, 1963-65*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists, Authors</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, Dentists</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled, Unskilled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>135</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bednarski (editor of DFU's Neue Ruh); Bausch (legally responsible for content of BdD's Deutsche Volkzeitung and a regular contributor); Behrisch (former editor of Bavarian SPD newspaper and manager and Bonn correspondent of the semi-commercial Westdeutsches Tageblatt); Fritz Holstein (former editor of KPD's Freiheit and Freies Volk); Jandrowski (wrote for commercial youth magazine Elan); Knorr (former editor of the Sozialistische Jugend's and Junge Gemeinschaft, and responsible, with Arno Behrisch, for publication of DFU's Ausweg); Kuester (editor of MFPB's Frau und Frieden); Opitz (Federal spokesman of DFU and editor of DGF4's Blatter fuer deutscher und internationale Politik); Roedle (contributor to Ausweg and Deutsche Volkzeitung); Seeger (editor of the trade union Holt's Holzgarbeiter Zeitung); Steinmann (contributor and member editorial board of MFPB's Frau und Frieden).

In addition, Rossmann, Bader, and Furian, leaders of the BdD and described as journalists, probably worked for the BdD's Deutsche Volkzeitung or Bauernruf. It is not known for which publication Dr. Wenzel worked, but being a leader of the DNV he may have worked for that party's tattachen.

7 Professoren in institutions of higher education; 3 headmasters; 6 High School teachers; 4 other teachers.

5 lawyers; 5 engineers (including two Doktoren); 2 psychologists (both Doktoren); 1 physicist; 1 veterinary; 1 stage director.

1 Staatssekretar a.D.; 2 Regierungsräte; 2 Landwirtschaftsräte (i.R. and A.D.); 1 (unspecified) Beamte.

The entrepreneurs were one of W. Germany's largest mass tailors (Bentele of Stuttgart); owner of a fine engineering firm (annual personal income of DM 200,000); Herr Karl Backhaus, a well-to-do businessman (personal income of DM 250,000 p.a.), who created a firm owned by the workers; a large clothes wholesaler; the part-owner of a pharmaceutical firm. In addition there were 3 small retailers, a small market gardener; and a seemingly small publisher.
five engineers, two psychologists, a physicist, a veterinary surgeon and a stage director. The six Civil Servants - most of them of the higher grade and three in retirement - and the three retired military officers formed tiny groups. However, if teachers are included with other Public Servants, as is the German practice, then about one in five of the party's federal leaders was or had been in government employment. Just under one in ten of the party leaders was a businessman or manager. The existence of only two farmers in the group offers one of several indicators that the DFU was essentially an urban party. The other groups under examination also included only the rare farmer or none at all, even in strongly rural areas (see below). Just over 13% of the 135 federal leaders were white-collar workers and fewer (8.9%) were manual workers. The group also included two students. Despite the unusual feature of the minor party being publicly most associated with a woman, Renate Riemock, in its early years, the DFU's federal leaders included only 19 women (7.1%) of whom six were in the professions, eight white-collar workers, one a shopkeeper, and only five were described as housewives. With the exception of the leaders of the MPPB - a women's peace group - all other leadership groups too were male dominated. In every group only a minority of the women were housewives showing that the DFU and its allies recruited female leaders mainly from working-wives, widows, and spinsters.

A majority (59.3%) of the 135 federal leaders were intellectuals, including nine Professoren and 13 Doktoren (as well as nine medical doctors). The 135 had only one Graf and three Vors among them, were predominantly middle-class (over 80%) and included only a small working-class element (8.9%).
Although of the opinion that its senior leaders gave it the 'wrong' image among the working-classes on whose favourable reaction the party's electoral prospects most depended, the DFU did little to change the social profile of its federal leaders (Table Ib). Over the years the four committees underwent some changes without affecting their basic socio-economic sameness, despite the first-time inclusion of B&O leaders in 1968. Each committee was dominated by the middle-class (83.4% to 90%) and the small working-class element varied only slightly from 6.7% to 10.4%. Professionals were in an absolute majority (52% to 58.2%) on all the committees which also kept the intellectual element nearly static. Teachers and dons were persistently the largest professional groups (16.9% to 20%); the presence of journalists was on the decline until the influx of B&O publicists brought them back to their 1960 level of around 1.4%; there were four or five clerics on all committees but their percentage declined from 10.4% to 5.3% in 1968. The small number of businessmen, Civil Servants and retired army officers also varied somewhat. Only one farmer sat on the two committees of 1960-65 and none thereafter, which is one of the indicators of the DFU's rural weakness. White-collar workers nearly trebled over the years from 6.2% to 17.3%, but the presence of workers was even smaller in the second half of the decade (6.5%) than it had been in the first (around 10%). A single student sat on the last three committees, and young people under 30 were rare, comprising only 4.2% to 5.1% on the first three executives and sinking to 1.3% in 1968 (Table Ic). People over 50 dominated the committees, rising from 43% in 1960-62 to around 54% on the next two committees, but declining to 40% in 1968. That quite a number of the leaders were retired or close to
### TABLE 1b

Occupations of the Members of the DFU Federal Executive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>1960/61</th>
<th>Committees elected in:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists, Authors</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, Dentists</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled, Unskilled)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals                           | 48      | 99.9 | 59 | 100.1 | 60 | 100.0 | 75 | 100.0 |

* Same Sources as Table 1a.*


### TABLE Ic

Social Class and Age of the DFU Federal Executive Committees' Members, 1960-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class and Age</th>
<th>Years of Committees' elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Class&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>83.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age (Years)</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 30</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 plus</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (a + b)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>*</sup> Same sources as Table Ia.

1 Based on Janowitz's model reduced from four to two social strata. The essential distinction is between manual (working-class) and non-manual (middle-class) occupations. Morris Janowitz, 'Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany', American Journal of Sociology, LXIV, 1, 1958, 6-25. Differentiation within the classes into higher and lower strata was not possible (but see Table IIA) because of the frequent broadness of the available occupational categories.

2 Includes one Graf and three 'Vons.'
it is shown by the fact that about one in five of the committees' members was 60 or older.¹ Not only the federal leaders, but also the party's national vote and a group of party members show that the DFU was 'Panas Partei.'² Housewives were infrequently found on the committees; there were 11 women on the first three executives and later there were only 9. However, their presence declined more sharply in terms of percentage: from 22.9% in 1960-62 to around 18% in 1962-68 and 12% in 1968.

DFU Federal Executive Committee 1965-68: some more social characteristics

Information on the family background, education, religion and geographical origin of the party's federal leaders is restricted to some members of the 1965–68 committee.

Among 37 (61.7%) of the 60 members of the committee there occurred considerable social upward mobility. While 29.8% of the 37 leaders had working-class backgrounds (measured by the fathers' occupations) only 13.5% were still working-class as adults; while 35.1% of the leaders came from upper-middle class homes nearly twice as many (67.6%) were of that class later on, and at the same time fewer of the leaders (18.9%) were in the lower middle-class than their fathers (35.1%). (Table IIa).

Many of the leaders did not follow their fathers' occupations. (Table IIb). 54.1% of the leaders were in the professions but only

¹ It was DFU practice simply to list leaders' occupations without indicating if they were retired, the exceptions being Public Servants and the occasional Retriner.

² See Chapters VIII and IX.
### TABLE IIa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class*</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
<th>Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(35.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(35.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Lower</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>(18.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Lower</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(10.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>(100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 One student and housewife.
### TABLE IIIb

1965–68 DFU Federal Executive Committee: Occupations of 37 Members and their Fathers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Leaders</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(6.1)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(27.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(10.6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5.4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowners(^1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, self-employed Artisans</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives/Students</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>99.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table IIIa.

\(^1\) In addition there was a smallholder who switched to bricklaying.
10.9% of their fathers, and the increase of teachers was most noticeable. Substantially fewer of the leaders were manual workers than their fathers (8.1% against 29.7%) and twice as many of the leaders were white-collar workers. Public Service (excluding teaching) was also less prevalent among the leaders, but if teaching is taken into account then many more of the leaders were in government employment (37.4%). A larger proportion of the fathers (21.6%) were in business, mostly as shopkeepers and self-employed artisans, but more of the children were owners of large concerns. None of the leaders were farmers and only two of the fathers had connection with the land.

Of the 60 members 43.3% had university educations, 10% attended various other institutions of higher education, and another 13.3% had secondary education. Only 16.6% of the members went no further than compulsory state education, and no data are available on another 16.6% of the members (Table IIIa).

37 members of the committee included more Protestants (62%) than Catholics (16.2%), and 21.6% claimed to be non-believers (Table IIIb). The religious division of the committee prevented it in 1967 from taking a positive stand in the state versus church schools controversy.1

Of the same 37 members the great majority (81.1%) were born in the Federal Republic, only three in East Germany and another four in the 'lost territories' (three in Poland and one in Czechoslovakia). If geographical origin outside the Federal Republic contributes towards an individual's longing for German reunification, as Deutsch

---

1 Interviews.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Higher</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table IIIa.

**TABLE IIId**

1965–68 DFU Federal Executive Committee: Religion* of 37 Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious [None]</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table IIIa.*
and Edinger suggest, than this factor does not help to explain
the motivation of these leaders.

Land Party Chairmen

The occupational and class characteristics of the 21 Land party
chairmen in 1961–68 were in most details similar to those of the
federal leaders of whom they were ex officio a part. Ninety percent
of the chairman and around 85% of the federal leaders were middle
class. Around half the members of both groups were professionals
and in both instances journalism and teaching were the largest
professions (Tables Ia, III). The chairman included two clergymen
(both from Rheinland-Pfalz), two Professoren (both from Bayern) and
two Doktoren, and the percentage of intellectuals was somewhat
higher among the chairman (71.4%) than among federal leaders (59.3%).
The percentage of Civil Servants and business people was also higher
among the chairman, who included a slightly lower percentage of
white-collar workers and a similar percentage of manual workers.
No chairman was a farmer and there were only two among the much
larger body of federal leaders. No woman was a chairman (but
several were deputy chairwomen) in contrast with the federal
collective chairmanship – the Directorate – which included two
women among its eight members in 1960–68.

1 Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the
Powers, Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1959, p. 73.
2 For example, Mira von Kuehlmann in Bavaria and Gertrud Wolferts
in Nordrhein-Westfalen.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(14.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(14.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interviews with party leaders and same sources as Table Ia.
Members of Five Land Executive Committees

This survey is restricted to one committee of five DFU Land parties elected in different years and involving 129 members.¹ A comparison of these 129 Land leaders with the 135 federal leaders supports the hypothesis that the social status of party leaders increases as one climbs the party ladder.² About 85% of the federal leaders and around 69% of the Land leaders were middle-class and the working-class element was more than twice at Land (21.7%)³ as at federal (8.9%) level. Tables Ia and IV show that professionals comprised a third of the Land leaders and around half of the senior leaders; and there were fewer intellectuals (33.3% compared to 59.3%), Professoren (3 against 9) and Doktoren (2 compared to 13) as well as four compared to nine medical Doktoren among the Land as among federal leaders. Among the professions, journalism and teaching were the largest occupational groups, both at Land and federal level, but fewer were found in the Land. Also twice as many clerics were found among the federal (10) as among Land (5) leaders, and of the latter only one was not also on the federal executive. In addition, the two clergymen among the 21 Land party chairmen were also federal leaders.

In other words, the party’s scarce clerical resources were

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¹ The committees of Bremen (elected 1961), Niedersachsen (1963), Nordrhein-Westfalen and Schleswig-Holstein (1965) and Hessen (1968).
² Gerald Pomper, 'New Jersey County Chairmen' Western Political Quarterly XVIII, 1965, 137.
³ Sources as Table IV for social class, sex and academic distinctions of Land leaders. For 10% of the latter social class could not be determined.
### Table IV
Occupations of the Members of Five DFU Land Executive Committees *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists, Authors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, Academics</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, Dentists</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Service</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled and Unskilled</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>129</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sources: Deutscher Informationsdienst, No. 959, 1961, 4-5.
concentrated at federal level (see also survey of national candidates below) and weakly diluted elsewhere. The Land leaders included twice as many (21.7%) manual workers, but the presence of white-collar workers was about the same. There were six Civil Servants among the senior leaders and three at Land level. Business people were more strongly represented at Land (13.9%) than at federal (9.6%) level and both groups of leaders included an insignificant number of farmers (2 and 3) despite the fact that two of West Germany's most agricultural Länder - Niedersachsen and Schleswig-Holstein - are included in the survey of Land leaders. Both the federal and Land leaders included the same number of housewives (5) but there were more women at Land level (12.4% compared to 7.1%). One student was at Land and two at federal level.

Senior Leaders of the other Organisations in the UNION

The Minor Parties

The BfD was the second largest party in the UNION. The survey is restricted to its federal executives elected in 1960 and 1965, which comprised elected members and the ten Land party chairmen ex officio. For both committees the elected members are known but only the chairmen for 1960. The elected members increased from 53 in 1960 to 70 in 1965.

Professionals formed the largest single occupational group among the elected members declining from 37.7% in 1960 to 32.8% in 1965 (Table Va). Teachers and journalists formed the two largest professional groups but only one clergyman sat on either committee. The presence of business people increased from 13.2% to 21.4% by
TABLE Va

Occupations of the Elected Members of the BdB’s Federal Executive Committees of 1960 and 1965, and the Land Party Chairman of 1960 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>1960 Elected Members</th>
<th>1960 Land Party Chairman</th>
<th>1960 All</th>
<th>1965 Elected Members Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(7.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Sources: Wahlvorschlag des Fräsidiums fuer den Bundesvorstand (1960), Protokoll (1965), (supplied by BdB Federal Party Office).
1965. The few Civil Servants also increased from 1.9% to 4.3%, and both committees included a retired Oberst, the party's General Secretary. White-collar workers increased substantially from 13.2% in 1960 to 22.8% four years later, accompanied by sharp decline of manual workers from 19.9% to 7.1%. Women comprised 16.9% of the first committee and 14.4% in 1965 and the strength of housewives was similar in both years. Two students sat on the 1960 committee but none on the next one.

The elected BfD leaders of 1965 included considerably more middle-class people (82.8%) than those of 1960 (62.3%) and correspondingly the presence of working-class members declined from 20.7% to 7.1% (Table Vb). This change resulted largely from the decline of manual workers and the increase of white-collar workers on the 1965 committee.

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**TABLE Vb**

Class of BfD Federal Executive Committees elected in 1960 and 1965*  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>68.2%</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table Va.
The Bdd's Land party chairmen of 1960 were all men, half were professionals - two teachers, an editor, and an engineer, and a chemist - one was a business man, another a barber and three were skilled manual workers. The inclusion of these ten chairmen with the elected 1960 members made no significant difference to the committee's social composition (Table Va).

The federal executives of the Bdd and DFU in 1960 and 1965 show the DFU leaders as the more socially prestigious. The DFU leaders included more professionals - 58.3% and 56.7% compared to 39.7% and 32.8% - twice as many Professoren (8 against 4) and Doktoren (15 against 7), just under 60% of intellectuals as opposed to 31.4%, and the DFU leaders' middle-class predominance was more complete (but the difference had largely disappeared by 1965) and included fewer lower-middle class people. The DFU leaders included more clergymen and the Bdd leaders more businessmen and managers. In both parties there was only the occasional farmer; manual workers were on the decline and white-collar workers on the increase; professionals were the single largest occupational group and teachers and journalists the largest professions; there were few Civil Servants. On balance, the Bdd's federal leaders resembled more closely the DFU's Land leaders than its federal leaders.

The leaders of the DFU's four Land party allies had less social prestige than those of the DFU and Bdd. These also seem to have been the parties in which Communist personnel was most prevalent.¹ The Vps's top leaders were frequently manual workers —

¹ See Chapters IV, V, and VII.
which was not the case in the DFU and BdB — suggesting that the party's executive also did not have much social status. The VFB's founder and minutes secretary was a metalworker, the deputy chairman an unskilled manual worker, and the party treasurer, a locksmith. ¹

Some data about the DWU's executive also points to relatively low social status. The DWU deputy chairman was a metalworker, and the occupations of another 11 of the 16-member executive were: five manual workers, three white-collar workers, including a minor local government official, and three journalists, including the editor of the DWU's *tatsachen*.²

The WV of Bremen has been officially described as a Funktionärsgruppe³ and it, like the DDU, embraced many Communists.⁴ It is probable that the social profile of the leaders of the WV and DDU looked similar to that of the other two Land parties' leaders and also similar to the VUS's leaders who originally came from the SPD (See below).

The Pressure Groups

In June 1958 the DD 54 elected a 22 member executive which was

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² Interviews with Paul Stegmann and Hilde Westphal of the DWU executive, and letter from Clemens Kraenhorst, another DWU leader, to the author, 29.7.1971.
⁴ Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) im Saarland (Kurzanalyse) prepared for the author by the Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Saarland, in January 1972.
probably unchanged when the DFU was founded.\(^1\) The executive members were an elite group in terms of occupation, education and class. They included a \textit{Graf}, a retired general, two high court judges, (of whom at least one was retired), two higher civil servants, including a retired \textit{Staatssekretär}, two clergymen, a doctor, an author, two university \textit{Professoren} and a college of education \textit{Professor}, and one student. Of the 22 members seven were \textit{Professoren} and six \textit{Doktoren} and probably most of the others were also university trained.\(^2\) With these occupational and educational backgrounds most, and perhaps all, were upper-middle class and most were probably middle-aged and older. Two of the members were women, including the DFU's Renate Rimeck.

In 1968 the \textit{FK} elected a national committee of 45 members.\(^3\) Not surprisingly, the members were abounding with academic qualifications.\(^4\) Eleven were \textit{Professoren} and another 15 \textit{Doktoren}. The known occupations of 24 members were: ten academics in institutions

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\(^1\) Information on this committee was derived from Werner Wünschmann, 'Die Einschätzung der Aera Adenauer hinsichtlich der Lösung des Deutschlandproblems in der Monatschrift 'Blätter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik', Köln, 1960/61, 'Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Ges. Sprachw. R. XIV, 1, 1965, 155-156.

\(^2\) For example, the two clergymen, the \textit{Oberlandwirtschaftsrat}, and the doctor. But the education of one member ended in a \textit{Gymnasium}.

\(^3\) Information on this committee was derived from the \textit{FK}'s own bulletin, 16 December, 1963, 9.

\(^4\) The \textit{FK} considered itself a body of intellectuals, and its Secretary, Professor Franz-Paul Schneider, told the author that a university, or equivalent, education was the usual qualification for membership. Some rare exceptions were made. For example, Lorens Knorr, who had no higher education, became a \textit{FK} member because (according to Schneider) his writings had shown his academic calibre.
of higher education; three headmasters and a High School teacher; an author, a doctor, engineer, lawyer, two journalists, two clergy-men and two higher civil servants, including the Graf von Wedel, a retired Minister Rat. The above information points, as in the case of the DG 54 leaders, to a predominantly professional, intellectual, upper-middle class group, which included only five women.

The 18 federal leaders of the VUS in 1961-65 were different from those of the previous two pressure groups. The eighteen were predominantly lower-middle class (44.4%) and working class (22.2%) while the leaders of the DG 54 and PK were probably almost exclusively upper-middle class, a group which among the VUS leaders comprised only 22.2%. The eighteen also included a 'Von'. The high academic attainments of the previous two groups were also missing, for only two of the VUS leaders were Doktoren and a majority of their occupations did not reflect much formal education. Just over 40% of the VUS leaders were white-collar workers (22.2%) or manual workers (22.2%) who seem to have been exceedingly rare in the previous two leadership groups. The small group of professionals (16.6%) were all journalists, including Dr. Gleissberg, editor and publisher of the Andere Zeitung and Karl Otto, editor of the VUS's socialistische hefte. No clergymen or teachers were among the VUS leaders. The VUS's leaders also included the owner of a small printing firm, two men in managerial positions and a retired trade union official. Only two of the 18 leaders were women, including a housewife.

1 Organ der VUS, December, 1961, 22; VUS Mitteilungsblatt, December, 1963, 8.
Very little is known about the national leaders of the MFFB, a women's peace group, except that its leaders were all women, while in the other pressure groups women were a rarity, that in the MFFB was active the most senior aristocrat of any leadership group associated with the DFU, namely, the Princess Olga von Lippe, the aunt of Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, that, as was common practice among the leadership groups analysed, the journalists employed by the organization's publication were also among its leaders.¹

'Umbrella' Leadership Groups

Two of the DFU's most important 'umbrella' leadership groups were the Unionserat and the federal election candidates. Both by design and composition, these groups were multi-organisational and also included people from outside the UNIOH.²

Unionserat

The 21 members of the 1961 Unionserat met with the DFU's federal executive and both groups had similar social characteristics. In 1961 both groups had about the same proportion of professionals (61.9% and 58.3%), and in both journalism and teaching were the largest professional groups, but the consultants included more teachers and fewer journalists (Tables Va and VI). The federal executive included more clergymen (five against one) and the

¹ Was ist, was will, was tut die Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung? MFFB, 1967, p.7, p.11, p.19.
² See Chapters V and VII.
### TABLE VI

**Occupations of 1961 Unionagat members***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics, Teachers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>(28.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists, Authors</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>(9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(19.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers,</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 21 100.1

Unionarat included more business people (14.3% compared to 8.4%). Both bodies included a tiny element of white-collar workers and about twice as many manual workers. No woman or farmer was a consultant. Leaders and consultants included about 70% of intellectuals, with four Professoren and five Doktoren among the consultants and seven of the former and eight of the latter among the leaders. And 90.5% of the consultants and 83.4% of the party leaders were middle-class.

Federal Election Candidates of 1961 and 1965

The social status of the candidates was slightly on the increase. Middle-class candidates increased from 66.9% to 72.7% in 1965 and working-class candidates declined from 25.3% to 20.9% (Table VIIa). The intellectual element slightly expanded from 34.4% to 37.9%. The number of Young was similarly small (7 and 9) and only two Senator were present in both groups of candidates.

In both elections about a third of the candidates were professionals who formed the largest occupational group. Teachers were most numerical among the professionals, the smaller presence of journalists and medical people was slightly larger in 1965, the small presence of lawyers became even smaller in 1965, but clerical candidates increased from nine to 16 and in both elections the DFU had more clergymen than the other parties (see below). The number of Civil Servants remained small and retired army officers increased from three to five. The business element increased from 8.3% to 11.2% as did farmers from 11 (2.9%) to 15 (3.8%). White-collar workers declined from 17.2% to 15.5% and also manual workers—of whom the bulk were skilled—declined from 25.3% in 1961 to 20.9% four years later. Housewives among the candidates decreased from
TABLE VIIa

Social Class and Age of the DFU Federal Election Candidates in 1961 and 1965*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class and Age</th>
<th>Federal Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>66.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Age (Years)</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 29</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 - 69</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 plus</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals (a + b)</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Occupations of DFU Candidates in the Federal Elections of 1961 and 1965*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Federal Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists, Authors</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers, Academics</td>
<td>(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>(9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors, Dentists</td>
<td>(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>(35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs, Shopkeepers, Managers</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-Collar Workers</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual Workers</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled and Unskilled</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewives</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table VIIa.
7.1% in 1961 to 4.8% in 1965 and at the same time female candidates declined from 61 (61.9%) to 50 (12.7%). There were only three students in 1961 and one four years later (Table VIIb).

The DDV's candidates collectively were ageing (Table VIIa). Their average age increased from 43.6 years in 1961 to 51.2 years in 1965. Candidates of 50 and over increased from 44.8% to 52.1%. The small group of candidates in their twenties declined from 4.7% to 3.6% and candidates in their thirties and forties were also slightly on the decrease.

Conclusion

Socio-economic differences were more strongly pronounced between than within the groups of UNIOn leaders. The social elites of the DGG and PK contrasted sharply with the lower social status leaders of the VUB and DMV and probably also of the DDU, VFS and LV. These two social extremes broadly reflected the two socio-economic strands of the German Left. The VUB, etc., were part of the strong working class tradition of Social Democracy and especially Communism. The DGG and the PK were from the radical

---

1. For example, in the 1958–60 East German Bundestag, 17.1% of the deputies and 48% of their fathers were manual workers. 53% of the KPD federal list candidates in 1953 were workers. In 1956/57 40% of the SPD members but only 10% of the ODU members were workers. In 1953 a majority of workers, but more so the skilled than the unskilled, voted SP, and KPD. Of the initial 31 national leaders of the legalized Communist party (DKP), 42% were manual workers. Wolf Merchn, 'Volksvertreter in West und Ost', in Wolfgang Zapf, ed., Beiträge zur Analyse der deutschen Obergeschicht, Münchon: Piper, 1965, pp. 33–39. Fritz Saander and Klaus Liepert, eds., Wahlhandbuch 1965, Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1965 Part 2, pp. 26–72. Wolfgang Hartenstein, 'Party Members and Voters in W. Germany', Acta Sociologica, VI, 1, 1963, 50. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 240–41. Deutscher Informationsdienst, Special Issue, December 1968, 6–7.
middle-class. Because of their united front character, the BdB and DFU leaders had to embrace both strands. However, of the DFU's most senior leaders - the directors, federal executive members and Land chairman - only the few directors strongly reflected this duality, and this was specifically arranged.¹ Collectively, the DFU's most senior leaders shared with the GVP (see below), D534, FK, and the followers of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (see below) the social profile of middle-class radicalism, somewhat diluted by a tiny Communist and a larger Social Democratic faction.

As a minor party the DFU had little patronage and no political power. Nor could it offer many monetary, political or career incentives.² As the party was deviant, association with it could

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¹ The choice of the first three directors (1961-64) was influenced by their group appeal: Catholic bourgeois conservatives (Graf von Westphalen), intellectuals and students (Professor Renate Risseck), and Social Democrats, workers and youth (Lorens Knorr). Interviews with Renate Risseck and Dr. J.F. Toennies. As a businessman, Dr. Toennies stood down in favour of Knorr, a former SPD functionary, because the party needed working-class appeal at the top. The 1964 elections, which followed the resignation of Renate Risseck, were probably intended to strengthen the working-class (Arno Behrisch), clerical and pacifist (Pfarrer Werner) and middle-class (Hira von Kuehlemann) appeals of the directors.

² Exceptions were the UNION journalists, the Land agents, some other functionaries and three of the directors who were full-time, salaried personnel.
result in occupational discrimination against Public Servants.¹

The party also neglected sectional interests. The DFU could not offer the usual rewards available to the major parties, and its pro-Communist attitudes were also disliked by many. The nature of the party probably not only affected the availability of recruits but also the selection of senior leaders from amongst them.

Professional party activists were rare among the senior

¹ Some of the DFU leaders had already been discriminated against before joining the party. One Professor's deviant politics lost her post shortly before the founding of the DFU. Another academic had to face several Dienstzweifahreiten, dating back to the Hitler period, because of his politics. A high school teacher worked for the DFU from 1961 but did not dare to join the party until she retired in 1965. An Oberregierungsrat and headmaster were convinced that their promotion was delayed for years because of their work in the DFU. The author was told that one party leader resigned because he wanted to do research in the USA and felt that his links with the DFU would cause visa difficulties. Another academic left the DFU to win promotion and after having gained it returned to the party. The author also came across six instances of social discrimination. Interviews.
leaders, but they included a small core of professionals including *Hintermänner*. Among the DFU leaders were quite a few activists new to party politics and the bulk of them were part-time and unpaid officers. Depending largely on amateurs to fill senior posts, the DFU had to rely extensively on the better incomes and greater occupational freedom of the middle-class. To cater for its amateur leaders, the party's federal executive often met at week-ends and was unusually large. Only thus could an acceptable number of leaders attend meetings. Professional and family commitments and the burden of time and travelling were reasons for leaders stepping down. The monetary cost of leadership seems to have been largely in the form of lost income, but expenses were also refunded only in part.

The DFU was most keen to recruit clergymen and it had many intellectuals and a few nobles among its senior leaders - in other words, West German bourgeois groups with no pro-Communist history. It would be surprising if the Communists, who kept their own people to a minimum among the DFU's senior leaders for the sake of the party's image, did not also try to help that image positively by

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1 See Chapter VII.
2 Interviews.
3 Interviews with Pfarrer Werner and Pastor Sanss.
4 Karl-Wilhelm Dahn, 'Der Staat und die Pastoren', *Zeitschrift für Politik*, XII, 4, 1966, 429-50. Only some 50 of the West German Protestant clergy were members of the Communist party in 1972. *Times*, 21.6.1972. During interviews with two leading leftist intellectuals, the Professors Abendroth and Schneider, the unusual non-Communist character of West German intellectuals was emphasised. See also Lipset, *op. cit.*, p.119, footnote 58.
encouraging the recruitment of 'respectable fronts'. However, this point should not be taken too far.

The Communists have for a long time used the moral values and the 'psychological vulnerability' of the middle-class to recruit them into front organisations for peace and democracy. But bourgeois radicals were also strong in moral-issue groups which were not founded or led by Communists. The same pattern, with particular reference to intellectuals, was also found in two West German minor parties.

The DFU and the GVP, which was founded without Communist help, were both outlets for 'expressive' politics and shared goals. The senior leaders of both parties had a similar social profile.


2 For example, the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Frank Parkin, *Middle-Class Radicalism*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1963.

3 The GVP's 30 member 1953 national executive was totally middle-class and the DFU's national executives included only a 6.7% to 10.4% working class element. 26.6% of the GVP leaders were upper professionals (Freie Berufe) and 21.6% of the DFU's leaders. 26.6% of the GVP leaders were active in the anti-Hitler Bekennende Kirche and 7.4% of the DFU leaders were Protestant clerics. The GVP personnel included 58.3% Protestants, 17.7% Catholics and the religion of 28.5% is not known. Among the DFU's 1965 federal executive members 38.4% were Protestant, 10% Catholic, 20% had no religion and there is no information on 31.6%. See above and Peter Holt, *Die neutralistische Opposition*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Heidelberg, 1955, p. 89.
In the words of Greiffenhagen:

Eine merkwürdige und in gewisser Weise paradox Form intellektueller Politik ist die Bildung von Parteien, die sich ausdrücklich oppositionell verstehen, ohne wohl in Ernst bereit oder in der Lage zu sein, die politische Verantwortung also Regierungspartei zu übernehmen. Man denkt an die frühere Heimannspartei (i.e. GVP) oder an die DFU.\(^1\)

The D054 and FK in the UNION show the DFU's appeal to intellectuals and the bourgeoisie and their availability for recruitment to senior posts. The nature of the party probably helped much to produce the type of formal leaders the Communists wanted. KPD manipulation may have been used more to keep down working-class representation among the leaders.

The DFU's aim to appeal to all classes may perhaps be another explanation for its strongly bourgeois leadership. On balance, the working-classes (if only on deferential grounds) may find bourgeois leaders more acceptable than the middle-class finds working-class leaders.

These may have been some of the reasons why the party did not alter the social profile of its senior leaders, despite the likelihood that this profile was unacceptable to some anti-intellectual and secular workers and rank-and-file Communists.

The 'deviant' DFU leaders - the federal executive and candidates - and the 'establishment' leaders - in this case Bundestag deputies and candidates - shared similarities. Both recruited heavily from the educated middle-class. However, the intellectual element of the 'Partei der Professoren' was not outstanding. The DFU had more Professoren among its federal

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candidates, but only slightly more than the CDU/CSU. Only 53% of the DFU's 1965 federal executive members had higher education compared with the 80% (university only) of the 1949-63 federal cabinet ministers, and the 73% of the FDP, 70% of the CSU and 61% of the CDU federal deputies in 1961-66. Only the SPD's deputies (37%) fell below the educational attainment of the DFU leaders. Both the senior DFU leaders and the Bundestag were overwhelmingly middle-class.

It was not class and education but occupation which separated the senior DFU leaders from the deputies. Three prevalent occupations in the major parties, representatives from large

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economic interests, professional politicians, and Civil Servants were either missing or rare among DFU leaders. The DFU also had fewer business people than the CDU/GSU but slightly more than the SPD. The small party had more upper professionals, the bulk of whom were in creative and welfare occupations and included few lawyers, accountants, etc. By displaying its clerics at federal level, the DFU had more of them among its election candidates than the other parties. Only one or two Catholic priests were associated with the DFU. It is doubtful whether the DFU enjoyed

---

1. 15.9% in the fourth Bundestag, Zapf, 'Sozialstruktur' op. cit., Part III, p. 10. Even personal links with the anti-DFU industrial unions were rare among DFU leaders. Very few of them were more than Betriebevorsitzende and Betriebsrats. 6 on the 1961 and 4 on the 1965 federal executives and 36 among the 393 federal candidates of 1965. There were also some conference delegates and members of local union branches. A few DFU leaders once held more senior union posts: Heinz Seeger (Chairman of Baden-Wuerttemberg) was an ex-chairman of the Gewerkschaft Holz, and Viktor Wynnand (Land agent of NRW) was a former secretary of the DGB branch of Herne. Interviews, Auswag, August/September, 1965, Deutsche Tagespost, 1.10.1965, Wahlvorschlag fuer den neuen Bundesvorstand 1962 and 1965, Koeln: DFU.

2. 22.3%. Zapf, op. cit. Part III, p. 10.

3. 16.7% of the CDU/GSU and 7.4% of the SPD deputies. Ibid.

4. Only 10% of the deputies were upper professionals (excluding teachers, clerics, party journalists) Ibid. According to this narrow German definition, 21.6% of the members of the DFU's 1965 federal executive were professionals.

the clerical support of the earlier GVP. The senior leaders of both parties included more Protestants than Catholics (see above).

The senior DFU, FK and DC54 leaders and the followers of CND indicate that the social profile of British and German middle-class radicalism of the 1960's shared similarities. In both national groups the 'educated middle class' was strong as were professionals, especially from 'welfare' and 'creative' occupations. Teachers and dons, clergymen, physicians and scientists were well represented. The middle-class radicalism of both countries embraced clericalism and a secular element and Protestants were in a majority among the believers.

The comparison shows the CND rank-and-file and senior DFU leaders sharing socio-economic characteristics. However, the social basis of the two groupings was different. Unlike the CND (with a 12% working-class following), the DFU's members seem to have included a large proletarian faction. It also seems that, with the exception of the DC54 and FK, the DFU's allies were strongly

1 Dr. Heinemann, the GVP's most prominent leader, was President of the Synod of the Evangelical Church. Heinemann also claimed that the party's Church support comprised 'at least three leading Protestant Church dignitaries, fifteen professors of theology and hundreds of pastors'. Uwe Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960, pp. 53-54. Also, eight of the 30 national executive members had been active in the Bekennende Kirche. Halt, op. cit., p. 89.

2 For socio-economic data on CND see Parkin, op. cit., p. 27. pp. 80-81, pp. 176-77.

3 Ibid., p. 17.

4 See Chapter VIII.
working-class.¹ In other words, the DFU's middle-class radicalism most likely did not go very deep. Yet the party's senior leaders, aided by the Communists, pursued 'expressive' politics without seemingly having the socio-economic grassroots basis for it. This may well have been one of the main causes of conflict and dissatisfaction in the DFU.²

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¹ See Chapter VIII.
² See Chapter II.
CHAPTER VII

PRE-DFU PARTY BACKGROUND OF LEADERS

This chapter examines the pre-DFU party links of some groups of leaders. The survey is restricted to federal and Land level and covers two types of leaders: the DFU's own elected leaders and leadership groups which functioned inside the DFU but were largely recruited from outside the party and were formalised links between the DFU and its allies and supporters. The first type includes the eight directors of 1960-63, the 60-member 1965 federal executive committee, the 23 Land party agents of 1961-67 and some Land party executive committees. The second type includes the 'consultants' of the 1961 Unionsrat and the 1961 Beirat of Baden-Wuerttemberg, the 393 federal election candidates of 1965 and the 90 Rheinland-Pfalz Land election candidates of 1967. Data on the leadership groups is restricted to post-1945 and is often incomplete.

The Leaders in the Political Spectrum

The DFU frequently claimed that it embraced most political shades.¹ This survey shows that at leadership level the party was essentially left-wing. By ascribing to the leaders the political colour of the parties with which they had earlier links as leaders, members, supporters and voters, it is possible to evaluate, if only arbitrarily, their location in the party political spectrum. The

¹ See Introduction to Part II.
parties are divided into two groups: 'left-wing' (DDP, EPU, BWU, GVP, KPD, SPD, VPS, WV, ZP) 'right-wing' (BHE, CDU/GSU, FDP).

Seven of the nine leadership groups in Table I had a leftist presence ranging from 50% (despite a 42% 'not known' factor) to 88.2%. The lower 42% on the Unionsrat and 25% on the seven Land executives are almost certainly due to lack of information and there are no reasons to think that their left-wing profile was not similar.

The bulk of the DFU's most senior leaders and functionaries (who included few or no Communists to help the DFU's public image) came from the SPD: 75% of the directors, 63.3% of the federal executive's members (who included the directors as well as the Land party chairmen) and 65.2% of the Land party agents (Table II). On the federal executive, three out of four of these people were core SPD supporters. The others had earlier been with the CDU/GSU, FDP, GVP and KPD and went over to the Social Democrats in the 1953 and 1957 federal elections. The realignment pattern of the executive members as a whole suggests issue-orientation. The SPD which opposed the governing parties' 'policy of strength' until 1960 retained its 'DFU people' longest. In contrast, the governing parties lost most of them to the SPD or the neutralist GVP, and after that party collapse in 1957 some of its people moved over to the SPD and others waited for the origin of the DFU (Table III).

One result of this movement from the Right to the Left by some DFU

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1 i.e. people whose foci of party choice are intensely felt issues and not organisational loyalties. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, New York: Wiley, 1960, pp. 97-105.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Groups</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Pre-DFU Party Affiliations of Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>'Left-wing'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Directors, 1960-8</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Executive Committee, 1965</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Land Party Agents, 1961-7</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Land Executive of Hessen, 1968</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>76.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seven Land Executives, 1967</td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unionerrat, 1961</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beirat Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1961</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>88.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Federal Election Candidates, 1965</td>
<td>(393)</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Land Election Candidates in Rheinland-Pfalz, 1967</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes six nationalists whose party affiliations could not be determined.
1. Interviews with seven directors and a posted questionnaire to the other.


3. Interview with Lorenz Knorr, DFU Director and Federal Party Agent in 1960-63.

4. Interview with Heinz Nagel, Chairman of the DFU Land party of Hessen.


7. *Deutscher Informationsdienst*, No. 961, 1961, 5-6, and interviews.


### Table II

**Pre-DFU party links of Leadership Groups**

*(in percentages)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Groups</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>KPD</th>
<th>GVP</th>
<th>ZP</th>
<th>FDP</th>
<th>CSU</th>
<th>BHE</th>
<th>BDD-DDU</th>
<th>NV-VPS</th>
<th>Not Known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Directors, 1960-68</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Executive, 1965</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Land Party Agents, 1961-67</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Land Executive of Hessen, 1963</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seven Land Executives, 1967</td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unionrat, 1961</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beirat Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1961</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Federal Election Candidates, 1965</td>
<td>(393)</td>
<td>21.6 (22.9)²</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Land Election Candidates in Rheinland-Pfalz, 1967</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table I.*

1 Leaders with multi-party links are counted more than once.

2 Calculations based on 247 candidates only.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Executive Members</th>
<th>Federal Elections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>**</td>
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<td>spd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>spd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(P.o.W.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>spd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>fdp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>(P.o.W.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(n/v)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(n/v)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>KPD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**No Information**

Key: SPD = party member  
** = not enfranchised  
spd = party voter  
? = not known  
n/v = non-voter

*Source: Edgington, op. cit., Appendix II, pp. 126-31, and interviews with members of the 1965 DFU Federal Executive Committee.*
leaders was that 12.5% of the directors and 13.5% of the executive's members started with a right-wing party and ended up with a left-wing party before joining the DFU (Tables I and III).

As the other leadership groups were more open to Communists, the strength of ex-SPD supporters was less impressive. In three of these groups ex-SPD and ex-KPD supporters were about equally strong. On another group the Communists were much stronger and in two more groups they formed 25% and 49% of the personnel (Table II). Between them, people from the SPD and KPD comprised around 40% to 80% of the strength of the various groups of leaders. Only recruits from these two sources were strong on the larger groups of leaders where numerical strength counted.

Another important source of recruits was the DFU's party allies. Their people were strongest on the Unionerrat (33.3%) and the Beirat (47%) whose role it was to accommodate them as 'consultants'. Their tiny 5% presence on the 1965 federal executive was due to the fact that until 1968, when the BDD and DFU began to merge, BDD leaders could not be elected DFU leaders. On the other leadership groups their presence ranged from 9% to 20%. The fact that all the DFU's party allies between them could only provide 12% of the 393 federal candidates is one indicator of their collective numerical weakness by 1965.

The defunct GVP was the largest neutralist umbrella party of the fifties. Of the DFU's federal executive committee members, 18.3% came from the GVP as did one of the directors, but no former federal GVP leader was among the DFU's national leaders. The Beirat of Baden-Württemberg, which covered a former GVP stronghold, included 17.6% of GVP people. However, among the DFU's 1965 federal
election candidates only 4.1% had earlier been in the GVP. The smallest source of left-wing recruits was the tiny ZP which had refused to form an alliance with the DFU (Table II).

It was impossible to cover all the leadership groups for multi-party affiliations before 1960. However, the known cases of some leaders, especially those on the federal executive, show that this existed. This suggests that multi-party membership may have been more widespread. As quite a number of these people with known multi-party membership had once been with right-wing parties (Table III), it is possible that among the leaders of the DFU and its allies was a hidden 'rightist' element. But it is doubtful if such an element would substantially alter the known political profile of the leadership groups under discussion. ¹

Leaders with earlier right-wing contacts were in a minority. Most of these people were found among the directors (25%) and the federal executive committee members (20%). However, half of these directors and about two-thirds of the executive committee members had also contacts with leftist parties (Table I). In all instances they had moved from the Right to the Left (Table III). With a few probable exceptions, DFU leaders with earlier right-wing contacts had already moved to the Left before joining the DFU. The right-wing element on these two bodies was unusually large, seemingly because people with non-Left images were strengthened on these two

¹ Very little is known about the political background of the personnel of the BDU, BNW, etc., before they joined these allies of the DFU. However, the parties were working-class orientated (See Chapter IV), and as we shall see below their leaders included more Communists than the DFU's leadership.
senior groups to make the DFU's support base appear broader than it probably was. On another three leadership groups, the known right-wing connections of members ranged from only 3.3% to 5% (Table I). Among the directors all right-wing contact was with the CDU/CSU, and among the federal executive members 11.7% were once with the CDU/CSU, 6.7% with the FDP and 1.7% with the BHE. Of the 393 election candidates 1.5% were CDU/CSU members and 2.2% were in the Liberal party. Earlier contacts with the radical Right were exceptionally rare.

It was not possible to carry out a detailed study of likely changes in the political profile of the groups of leaders over the years. However, it was possible to detect an increase of Communists and BdD personnel among the DFU's leaders. It is doubtful if this change much affected the DFU's consultants among whom these people were always strong. Some of the DFU's leaders were clearly affected as Communist and BdD elements, who previously tried to keep away as much as possible, moved in amongst them. Some of the groups discussed above were already affected by this change, e.g. the 1968

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1 Interviews.

2 Georg Ebrecht, a former Lt.-General of the SS and Police and a NSDAP member from 1931, was chairman of a DFU constituency branch and a 1961 federal election candidate; Erwin Papper, a former functionary of the banned right-radical and anti-semitic Bund nationaler Studenten, also was a national candidate that year; Gerhard Bednarski, an ex-BHE member and a former editor of the neutralist Ruf, whose content differed only marginally from the right-radical DAP's Reichsruf, was until 1963 chairman of the DFU in Niedersachsen. Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961. The DFU's 1965 federal election candidates included six 'aus nationalen Kreisen'. Deutsche Tagespost, 1.10.1965.
Land executive of Hessen, and others were touched by it a few years later, e.g. the 1965 federal executive. All leadership groups whose composition in the early and late sixties could be compared showed this change. This meant that over the years more experienced and regular fringe operators joined the DFU leaders, that the Communists further strengthened their hold over the party, and that the party's leaders may have become even more left-wing with the passing of the years. This development also disproves reports of 1963 that the Communists were moving out of the DFU.¹

In 1961 few Communists were among the DFU's open leaders. A Verfassungsschutz survey of the DFU's 403 Parteikongresse in 1961 divided them into three broad groups: (1) Communists (13.4%), i.e. 53 ex-KPD members; (2) 'Fellow-travellers' (49.5%), i.e. members of pro-Communist groups; (3) individuals (37.3%), including 32 neutralists and pacifists, who had no previous Communist contacts.²

The small group of Communists increased over the years. Their gradual emergence into the open has been ascribed to the DFU's need for them³ and to the failure of the initial tactic of hiding them to help the DFU's image.⁴ Several leadership groups illustrate this

¹ See Chapter II.
² This survey of DFU leaders, campaign committee members, 'consultants' and election candidates was completed by the Verfassungsschutz in early 1961 and summarised in Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961.
³ DFU leaders told the author that their party's failures and loss of members made it increasingly dependent on Communist activists. The author was also told that many Communist members, supporters and voters were dissatisfied with the DFU which found it necessary to display more Communist leaders to retain the support of rank-and-file KPD people.
⁴ Interviews.
increase of Communists and BdD personnel. On the DFU's federal executive sat two Communists in 1960-62, three in 1965, and at least eight in 1968.\(^1\) Five of the eight Communists were also BdD leaders of whom altogether 13 sat on the federal executive for the first time\(^2\) - a move previously forbidden by the BdD constitution. That year, a BdD leader also became a director but the attempt to bring a Communist on to the directorate was defeated.\(^3\) In 1961 there was no Communist on the Land executive of Hessen,\(^4\) but in 1968 it included at least eight and for the first time BdD leaders as well.\(^5\) Only some 19 ex-KPD members sat on the ten DFU Land executives of 1961,\(^6\) but in 1967 about 46 of the 183 members of seven Land executives came from the KPD.\(^7\) The number of ex-KPD

\(^1\) Interviews.

\(^2\) These 13 BdD people on the 1968 DFU federal executive - Direktorium Bundesvorstand Revisoren und Bundesschiedsgericht der Deutschen Frieden-Union, 3.6.1968, (This list was provided by the DFU Federal Business Office) - appeared earlier on the membership lists of the BdD federal executives of 1961 and 1965 - Wahlvorschlag des Presidiums fuer den Bundesvorstand (for 1961) and Protokoll uber die Wahl des Bundesvorstandes durch die Delegierten des 7. ordentlichen Bundesparteitages des Bundes der Deutschen ... am 19. und 20. June 1965. (Both of these typed lists were given to the author by the Deutsche Volkszeitung).

\(^3\) Only the insistence of the directors Behrisch and Knorr prevented such an election which they considered as too damaging for the DFU's image. Interviews with the Herren Behrisch and Knorr.

\(^4\) Der Spiegel, 23.6.1961.

\(^5\) Interview with Heinz Hagel, chairman of the Land party of Hessen.

\(^6\) KPD/DFU: Kommentare zur Politik der DFU, DGB-Landesvorstand Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1962, pp. 35-40. In addition there were the Communists Helen Weber and Otto Zimpelmam.

members among the DFU's federal election candidates increased from some 24 in 1961\(^1\) to at least 90 in 1965.\(^2\) The 49% strength of Communists among the 90 DFU Land election candidates in 1967 (see above) shows to what extent, at least in Rheinland-Pfalz, the DFU had become dependent on KPD personnel.

During its first years the DFU's open leaders included few Communists but some of the party's allies seem to have embraced considerably more of them.\(^3\) Over the years this gap narrowed, though in 1967 it was not completely closed. For example, in 1967 about a third of the 169 members of nine BdB Land executives were Communists as opposed to around a quarter of the 163 members of seven DFU Land executives.\(^4\) Also, in the same year the Land election candidates of the Demokratische Linke included 73% of Communists\(^5\) while the DFU's election candidates in Rheinland-Pfalz included 49% (see above). In 1968 the BdB and DFU began to merge and Communist BdB leaders (see above) could have closed the gap or at least narrowed it.

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3. Interviews.


5. Die Zeit, no date available.
Nature of Pre-DFU Party Links

The instance of pre-DFU party membership ranged from 47.6% to 91% on eight of the leadership groups (Table IV). 75% of the directors and 91% of the Land party agents but just over half of the federal executive members had joined a party once before. The high 80% in the 1968 Land executive of Hessen was probably largely due to the influx of BdB leaders that year. Nearly two-thirds of the federal election candidates and at least 55% of the Land election candidates in Rheinland-Pfalz had a history of party membership. 82.2% of the Bezirat consultants and the lower 47.6% among their senior colleagues on the Unionerrat may in part be explained by the lack of information.

Among the directors, federal executive members and Land party agents with past party membership, most came from major parties but on all three groups were leaders with earlier minor party contacts which was as high as 40% on the federal executive. On the other groups with their Communist and BdB elements the majority had minor party contacts (Table IV). All earlier contacts with parties as members, supporters and voters followed a pattern roughly similar to that for membership only. (Table V).

Another dimension of pre-DFU party links was the experience in party affairs gained by the leaders during their earlier contacts with parties. This experience is measured by the frequency and type of office held. Party membership as such is not equated with experience¹ but the role of supporter is. This measurement has only

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¹ Duverger, among others, has emphasised the passivity among party members '... militants are somewhat restricted in number. In no party do they seem to exceed a half of the membership: when they reach a third or a quarter, the party may be considered to be active.' Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, London: Methuen, 1969, p.114.
**TABLE IV**

Pre-GFU Party Membership of Leadership Groups*  
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Groups</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Total Known Past Membership</th>
<th>In Major Parties only</th>
<th>In Minor Parties only</th>
<th>In Major &amp; Minor Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Directors, 1960-63</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Executive Committee, 1965</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>59.4</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Land Party Agents 1961-67</td>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Land Executive of Hessen, 1968</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seven Land Executives 1967</td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>0.25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unionerrat, 1961</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beirat Baden- Huarttenberg, 1961</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Federal Election Candidates, 1965</td>
<td>(393)</td>
<td>0.65.3</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>0.62.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Land Election Candidates in Rheinland-Pfauls, 1967</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same source as Table I.
# TABLE V

Pre-DFU Support of Major and Minor Parties by Leadership Groups*  
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Groups</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Major Parties only</th>
<th>Minor Parties only</th>
<th>Major and Minor Parties</th>
<th>Not Known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Directors, 1960-63</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Federal Executive Committee, 1965</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Land Executive of Hessen, 1968</td>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Seven Land Executives, 1967</td>
<td>(183)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Unionsrat, 1961</td>
<td>(21)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Beirat-Baden Wurttemberg, 1961</td>
<td>(17)</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Federal Election Candidates, 1965</td>
<td>(393)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Land Election Candidates in Rheinland-Pfals, 1967</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Same sources as Table I.
a minimum qualitative dimension. It also does not take into account personal traits or occupational expertise which in themselves could make an adequate party leader or at least compensate somewhat for inexperience in party matters. Furthermore, the measurement underrates the acquaintance with party affairs that a rank-and-file member may have had. This survey is largely restricted to the DFU directors and the other members of the 1965 federal executive committee.

In 1960–63 the DFU had eight directors who were the party's most senior leaders. This small group included the party's most experienced party politicians but also people who had held no party office outside the DFU and of whom two had not been party members before 1960/61. (Table VI). The first directorate (1960–64) comprised three directors. Renate Riemöck, the party's most publicised leader in the early sixties, had been in the SPD until 1957 without holding office. Lorenz Knorr, who was also the DFU's Federal party agent in 1960–63, came over from the SPD in which he had been the Federal Secretary of the Sozialistische Jugend (1950–60) and a member of the Federal Party Advisory Committee on Youth and Cultural Affairs. The Graf von Westphalen had been a CDU regional executive committee member before he resigned and left party politics in 1951.

In 1964 Renate Riemöck resigned from the directorate and three new directors were elected: Arno Behrisch, whose former offices included those of SPD Bundestag deputy (1949–61) and deputy chairman of the Bavarian Social Democrats; Mira von Kuehlmann, a former CSU party executive committee member and a GVP federal election candidate in 1953; and Pfarrer Heinrich Werner who was new to party
### TABLE VI

The Pre-DFU Party Offices and Election Candidatures of 21 1965 DFU Federal Executive Committee Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of Members</th>
<th>Offices and Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Behrisch</td>
<td>SPD member 1945-61; Bundestag deputy 1949-61; Bavarian Landtag deputy, elected 1947; Deputy Chairman of Bavarian Social Democrats; member of Bezirk Franken Executive Committee; Chairman of Unterbezirk Hof/Seale.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Finger</td>
<td>CDU member 1945-58; Landtag deputy in Nordrhein-Westfalen 1947-54.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Goettges</td>
<td>Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei/Unabhängige Wählergemeinschaft (Lower Saxony) member from 1952; UWG town councillor in Rheidt for 8 years; member of UWG executive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prof Dr. Grothe</td>
<td>SPD member 1913-61; Chairman of Arbeitsgemeinschaft sozialistischer Aezte of Hamburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Immayr</td>
<td>1957 Bund der Deutschen federal election candidate; did not join the party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jakob</td>
<td>Chairman of Bremser Wählervereinigung from late 1950's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Jendrowski</td>
<td>Land Chairman (in 1961) of Sozialistische Jügend (Falken) of Nordrhein-Westfalen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. Knorr</td>
<td>SPD member 1945-61; Federal Secretary of Falken 1950-60; member of SPD Federal Advisory Committee on Youth and Cultural Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Koenig</td>
<td>Local government councillor in Dudweiler, Saar, from 1961. (May have stood as Deutsche Demokratische Union candidate).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of Members</td>
<td>Offices and Candidatures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. von Kuehle</td>
<td>CSU member 1946–51; member of CSU party executive committee; GVF member 1952–57 and federal election candidate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Lanfer</td>
<td>ZP member 1951–61; member of Nordrhein-Westfalen Executive Committee; deputy chairman Kreis party Gosfeld; town councillor in Gosfeld 1961–64; Land election candidate in 1950’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Roedl</td>
<td>Active in Communist Youth Movement (FDJ) during 1950’s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Schwarz</td>
<td>SPD member; sat on Bremen Land executive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Toennies</td>
<td>Local election candidate for Freie Wähler of Freiburg, Baden-Württemberg; c.1956; Did not join the Rathauspartei.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Weber</td>
<td>Active communist. (Daughter of well-known Communist from Hessen; wife of editor of Communist Unsere Zeit; 1969 member of DEP’s central committee).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Weidenfeld</td>
<td>SPD member 1957–60; member of a local branch executive committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Westphal</td>
<td>Demokratische Wähler Union member from 1960; member of party executive committee; local government councillor 1961–65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Westphalen</td>
<td>CDU member 1945–51; member of a Bezirk executive committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Zimpelmann</td>
<td>KPD member; member of party leadership in Rheinland-Pfals; town councillor 1952–58.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

politics when he joined the DFU. Werner was almost immediately elected chairman of the Rheinland-Pfalz Land party and thereby became an ex officio member of the federal executive. In 1963, while still in his early thirties and with only three years of party experience behind him, the Pfarrer replaced Lorenz Knorr as Federal party agent. It has been alleged that this appointment contributed towards the ill feelings between Werner and Behrisch who felt that he, as the party's most experienced politician, should hold this important executive post.

In 1967 Heinz Nagel was elected as an additional director. This headmaster, who had not been in a party before 1961, became in 1962 the chairman of the DFU Land party in Hessen and a member of the federal executive. Finally, in 1968 Josef Weber joined the directorate, after holding important posts in the BÄD including those of General Secretary and Party Chairman. Only Weber and von Kuchlsam had had minor party experience before joining the DFU.

The 60-member 1965 federal executive committee (which also embraced seven of the eight directors) included only 21 members (35%) who are known to have held party offices and/or fought elections before joining the DFU. The offices and candidatures are listed in Table VI. Ten of these 21 leaders gained their experience in major parties, eight in minor parties, one in both types of party, and two assisted small parties without joining them. Excluding the two Communists whose activities could not be determined, experience at national party level was restricted to three leaders - Behrisch, Knorr and von Kuchlsamm. At Land and sub-Land level three DFU leaders had been Landtag deputies, one a party chairman, one a deputy chairman, five executive committee members, two had led party
youth movements, and another was chairman of an advisory body.

At district and local level one DFU leader was a chairman, another a deputy chairman, three were executive committee members, one was chairman of a party youth group, and five were local government councillors (of whom three were elected only a few months before the DFU's founding). Apart from the eight leaders who had held elected representative offices, another four had been unsuccessful election candidates, including two in federal elections.

Experience in elected public office was also rare among the DFU's 393 federal election candidates in 1965; two had been Bundestag deputies, five had sat in Land parliaments and 32 were or had been local government councillors.¹

Some party rebels accused the DFU's senior leaders of depending too much on Communist Hintermänner and 'consultants'.² The inexperience in party affairs among the DFU's senior leaders gives support to this accusation which was also confirmed by one director.³

On the federal executive only one out of three members had held party office outside the DFU and few of them at federal level. Even the party's most senior leaders, the directors, included amateurs who had to learn on the job. Most notably, the DFU's best known leader of the early sixties, Renate Riesmeck, and the federal party's business manager from 1963, Pfarrer Werner. The senior leaders included experienced party officers, especially Behrisch and Knorr, but many of them had gained their experience in major parties.

¹ Deutsche Tagespost, 1.10.1965.
² See Chapter II.
³ Interview with Renate Riesmeck.
Newcomers to party activities and/or minor party politics formed a large group in the DFU. This seems also to have been the case with the GVP. Both parties had similar goals, pursued 'expressive' politics, attracted the bourgeoisie including many intellectuals (but few individuals were leaders of both parties) and neither had a long history or traditional support basis. Scarcity of Berufspolitiker is not synonymous with German minor parties, and it seems that the nature of the DFU and GVP explains the widespread amateurism among their leaders. While some British middle-class radicals supported the GMD, some of their German counterparts joined small parties, others took to marching and some tried both. German Communists were keen to recruit these people into 'peace' parties, but this does not explain the phenomenon completely. The GVP was founded without KPD help.


2 See Chapter VI.

3 For example, in the first Bundestag all KPD and 58.8% of the Deutsche Partei deputies were Berufspolitiker compared to 60.3% in the SPD, 39.3% in the CDU/CSU and 32.7% in the FDP. In the fourth Bundestag, the professional element in the main parties was over 70%. Rudolf Holzgraever, 'Die DP, Partei eines neuen Konservatismus?' in N.G. Lange et al., Parteien in der Bundesrepublik, Stuttgart: Ring-Verlag, 1955, p. 434. Wolfgang Zapf, 'Sozialstruktur deutscher Parlamente', in Fritz Saender and Klaus Liepelt, Wahlhandbuch 1965, Frankfurt: Europäische Verlaganstalt, 1965, Teil 2, pp. 26-72.
though Communist assistance was eventually needed. ¹ However, the amateurs among the DFU's leaders were more prevalent than they would have been if the Communists had not limited or excluded their people from the party's senior leaders, for tactical reasons. ²

¹ See Chapter I.
² See Chapter V.
CHAPTER VIII

MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS

The DFU told the press that the UNION had about 50,000 members in 1961-68. This number was greatly inflated. Information on the

1. When the DFU publicly referred to members it meant the collective strength of the organisations comprising the UNION. Mistakenly some observers thought that the DFU's claims only referred to the new party. Hence, "Die DFU schätzt ihre Mitglieder auf etwa 50,000. Dazu kommen noch alle jene, die den vielen befreundeten Organisationen, wie etwa dem Bund der Deutschen, angehören." Die Zeit, 14.7.1961. Over the years, the press published the following membership figures: 'Wir sind auf die Beiträge unserer 50,000 Mitglieder angewiesen' - Lorenz Knorr quoted in the Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 11.7.1961: 'The DFU ... schätzt die Zahl der Mitglieder zur Zeit auf 50,000.' Die Welt, 6.12.1966. '47,000 Mitglieder' Der Spiegel, 2.9.1968. In private, senior DFU leaders were similarly misleading as well as evasive about membership figures. For example, Arno Behrisch, a full-time DFU director, wrote to the author on 8.2.1967: 'Die Zahl der Mitglieder ... beträgt etwa 50,000. Ich bin im Augenblick von hier aus nicht in der Lage, eine genaue Aufschlusselung über die Landesverbaende zu geben. Das ist daher etwas schwierig bei der DFU, weil wir als eine Union eine Menge anderer Organisationen kooperativ vertreten.' During an interview three years later, Behrisch was equally evasive about the membership of the DFU and UNION. The author found that only full-time UNION officers insisted on 50,000 members; other leaders often did not take the figure seriously. While the official DFU may not have had exact figures on the other organisations in the UNION, it should have had, and did have (see below), fairly exact data on itself, for it regularly collected dues, issued membership books and kept a record card of every member in the Land party offices. Other researchers too were faced by evasiveness and exaggeration: 'Die Mitgliederstärke der Deutschen Friedens-Union - selbst der Bundesaufsichtstelle liegen angeblich keine genaue Daten vor - wird auf 50 - 60,000 Mitglieder geschätzt.' Ladislaus Sproho, Die Deutsche Friedens-Union in der Bundestagswahl 1961, unpublished Diplomarbeit, University of Cologne, 1963, p.36. 'Das DFU Landesbureau (of Nordrhein-Westfalen) konnte keine genaue Mitgliederzahl angeben,' Volker Sieg, Die Entwicklung der Deutschen Friedens-Union in Nordrhein-Westfalen von der Gruendung der Partei bis zur Bundestagswahl 1961, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Marburg, 1966, p.22.
strength of the DFU and UNION resembles a jigsaw puzzle with important pieces missing. However, it was possible to relate enough pieces to each other to give an approximate picture which is sufficient to dismiss exaggerated claims of membership strength without, however, putting in their place an accurate alternative figure.

Apart from incomplete data and unrealistic claims, evaluation of the strength of the DFU and UNION is made difficult by several factors. One complication was declining memberships which also included a realignment of members within the UNION. Not only did the DFU's membership decline over the years, but the party also weakened some of its allies at the same time by poaching members from them. Another difficulty was overlapping membership within the UNION. Multi-membership was high between some organisations but probably not extensive generally. The fact that the second largest party in the UNION - the Bdd - forbade it and that the DFU absorbed another large UNION party worked against a high frequency of overlapping members. Two other factors probably also discouraged it. Among members there seems to have been the feeling that it was a waste of time and effort to work within more than one UNION organisation whose goals were so similar. This seems to have affected the parties more than the pressure groups which also had a more specialised role. The financial burden of overlapping membership also seems to have been a marginal factor. Some organisations offered reduced dues payments for people in more than one organisation of the UNION, but

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1 This point was made by several DFU leaders interviewed.
not all. These various factors often seem to have favoured the DFU which as the biggest, most publicized and probably also the most active group in the UNION managed to take people away completely from some allies. Only for the late sixties is there evidence that the DFU lost members to allies.

Below are discussed the number of members of the various organisations in the UNION to disprove the 50,000-member claims which have been frequently put forward.

**DFU**

The DFU was the largest organisation in the UNION. The DFU directors Behrisch and Knorr told the author that their party had about half the UNION's strength—that is, 25,000 'eingeschriebene' members. This figure was highly inflated. During a 1963 private party meeting in Karlsruhe the DFU's federal treasurer, Karl Graf von Westphalen, spoke of only about 4,000 'eingeschriebene Mitglieder'. Another source evaluated the DFU's strength at never more than 5,000 members, of whom about a third were recruited in Nordrhein-Westfalen.

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1 This point was made by Professor Franz-Paul Schneider, Secretary of the Fränkischer Kreis. This group made no dues-allowances for overlapping membership.

2 All UNION leaders interviewed agreed on this point.

3 Viktor Wynnand, the party agent of Nordrhein-Westfalen, gave this figure to a group of party members during a discussion on the Karlsruhe meeting of DFU functionaries. Minutes of the DFU's Velbert local branch, 31.5.1963.

4 *Aus politik und zeitgeschichte, B33/65, 18.8.1965, p.31.*

5 i.e., about 1,700 – 1,800 in 1961, Volker Sieg, *op.cit.*, Anhang, p.22.
By the autumn of 1961 – some eight months after its founding – the DFU reached its maximum membership of some 5,000. This period of rapid recruitment was partly due to the influx of members from other organisations in the UNION (see below). Thereafter, there were fewer recruits¹ and bad election results and intra-party conflicts lost the party members over the years. Overall losses were probably somewhat slowed down by some new recruits from outside the UNION and by the DFU taking more people from its allies. But by 1965 the DFU had grown sufficiently weak to admit formally that it had to simplify its organisation and two years later 14 of the 57 constituency parties in Nordrhein-Westfalen were out of action.²

In 1967 the Demokratische Linke (DL) was established to replace the

¹ Interviews. Also the recruitment of 199 members of two constituency parties shows that over 60% of their members joined the DFU in its first year. After 1961 few new members were recruited annually, though 1962 was a 'good' year in the Dusseldorf branch and in the 1965 federal election year both branches did better than in most other years. In the seven years after 1961 at least one in five (19.6%) of all the members in Dusseldorf-Nettmann joined and of the 97 Dusseldorfer about one in three (37%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>Years &amp; No. of members recruited*</th>
<th>1970 known</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dusseldorf-Nettmann</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>70(68.6%)</td>
<td>3 0 1 8 1 5 1 0 13</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusseldorf</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>61(63%)</td>
<td>11 4 3 10 2 1 3 2 0</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For sources see Table 1.

² See Chapter V.
DFU as umbrella party in Baden-Wuerttemberg and it took some members from the DFU but also brought some new people into the UNION (see below).

During 1968-70 the DFU's losses were unusually high. Members deserted when the party refused to condemn outright the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; the DKP took members from the DFU and most other groups in the UNION; and when the DFU joined the new united front, which also embraced the DKP, some anti-Communists walked out.¹ The DFU's losses during these years were partly hidden. It absorbed those members of the BdD and DDU who did not go over to the Communist party (see below) and later it may have recruited some members of the VUS which broke up in 1971. Until January 1970, Communists could be both DKP and DFU members.² In some areas this arrangement was widespread,³ but some Communists went at once completely over to the DKP⁴ which had some 15,000 members in late 1968 and some 36,000 in 1972.⁵ In that year the DFU had some 3,000 members of whom some 400 were active.⁶

¹ See Chapter III.
² Interviews.
³ For example, the members of the Duesseldorf-Wettemann constituency party declined from 61 to 34 in early 1970 (see below) and those of the Rheydt-Nicornenhadjadbach-Viersen branch fell by two-thirds at the same time. Letter from Fritz Goettges, Chairman of the R-N-V branch to the author, 13.7.1971.
⁴ Interviews.
⁶ Ibid., p. 88.
This party also made inflated membership claims: 13,000 for 1961, 1 more than 10,000 in 1965, 2 about 7,000 in 1968 and substantially fewer thereafter. 3 These claims cannot be treated seriously. Firstly, it was accepted that the DFU (with its 5,000 members) was much larger than the BDD. 4 Secondly, in 1965 the DFU stood 344 of the UNION's candidates and the other minor parties, the BDD, DDU, etc., only 49 between them. 5 It is most unlikely that a strong BDD would have offered so few election candidates, and the figures show how much larger the DFU was than its party allies.

The DFU drained the BDD of members in 1961-68. 6 The BDD's refusal to allow overlapping membership with the DFU ensured that its losses to the DFU were in the nature of a complete break. By 1967 the BDD had insufficient members to sustain a viable separate organisation making a fusion with the DFU a necessity. 7 This fusion was conceived and partly implemented before the 1968 founding of the DKP which also took members of the BDD. 8

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1 Interview with Josef Weber, the BDD Chairman.
3 Interview with Josef Weber.
4 Among others by Weber and the DFU directors Behrisch, Knorr and Riemack.
5 Deutsche Tagespost, 1.10.1965.
6 One DFU leader claimed that 70% of the BDD members in Nordrhein-Westfalen went over to the DFU. Volker Sieg, op. cit., p.59.
7 Interviews with Weber, Behrisch, Knorr.
8 Interview with Weber.
Demokratische Wahlverband and Demokratische Wahlverband Niedersachsen

Both Land parties were absorbed by the DFU in the early sixties. The DWN of Niedersachsen was banned in 1961 and an unknown number of its members went over to the DFU. The DWN of Nordrhein-Westfalen, which claimed some 1,200-1,500 members in 1961, speedily lost many of its people to the DFU and was soon absorbed by that party.

Deutsche Demokratische Union and Bremer Wahlvereinigung

Both parties operated in small Länder which by itself kept their memberships small. The DDU of the Saar (pop. 1,131,000) was electorally the most successful party in the UNION, but seems never to have had more than 200 members. The WV of Bremen (pop. 752,000) has been classified as a 'Funktionsausgruppe', which implies few members. The WV allowed overlapping membership with the DFU, the DDU may not have done so.

Vereinigung für Frieden und soziale Sicherheit and Demokratische Linke

The VFS was restricted to a few large towns in Baden-Wuerttemberg

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1 For example, the initiator of the DWN, Artur von Behr, became a DFU leader in Niedersachsen.
2 Four months after its establishment in Nordrhein-Westfalen, the DFU had recruited 1,700-1,800 members (Anhang, p.22) who came largely from the DWN's claimed 1,200-1,500 members (p.87) and from the Bdd (p.59). Volker Sieg, op. cit.
3 Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) in Saarland (Kursanalyse), prepared for the author by the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Saarland, in January 1972.
and probably had few members who were allowed to join the DFU. 1 In 1967 the VFS was absorbed by the new DL which was founded to replace the DFU as Dachpartei in Baden-Wuerttemberg. The DL took members from the DFU - the only known instance before 1968 when the DFU lost members to an ally - but the new party also brought new people into the UNION. That is, 40% of the DL's early members came from the DFU, but the new party also recruited 54% of its members from outside the UNION: 30% from the KPD and 24% who were 'anderweitig oder ueberhaupt nicht politisch organisiert.' 2

The four Pressure Groups in the UNION

Of these four groups the Frankischer Kreis was probably the largest. It claimed 2,000 members of whom a large minority seem also to have joined the DFU, but which also included a small faction which did not vote DFU but remained electorally with the SPD and FDP. 3

The Vereinigung Unabhaengiger Sozialisten had at one time some 800 members but for most of the sixties it had around 500. About half the VUS people seem to have carried DFU membership cards as

1 Interview with J.F. Toennies, Chairman of the DFU Land party of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
3 Interview with Professor Schneider.
well, but the group also lost some members outright to the party. In 1968-69 about half the VUS members went over to the new Communist party and two years later the group closed down.

The Westdeutsche Frauenfriedensbewegung had perhaps a few hundred followers of whom some were also with the DFU. The Deutsche Club 54 was a small literary circle of social elites which provided the DFU with some of its most senior leaders (e.g. the Graf von Westphalen) and disbanded in the late sixties.

In conclusion, it appears that the DFU had in its first year about 5,000 members and fewer during the rest of the decade. It was not possible to add up the memberships of the UNION organisations but available evidence suggests that a 10,000 to 15,000 collective membership before 1968 was much more probable than the claimed 50,000. To evaluate the party's true human resources it is necessary to look at its supporters as well.

Supporters

Supporters - i.e. active helpers from outside the UNION - played an important role in the DFU. The existence of a 6,000 to

1 Interviews with Albert Berg and Karl Otto, editor of the VUS's Socialistische Hefte.
2 Dieter Hoehn, Reise durch Sueddtschland 1962. This report claimed that some VUS branches in the South collapsed as their members went over to the DFU. The author read this confidential report in the home of Karl Otto.
3 Interview with Albert Berg.
7,000 member underground KPD, which formally kept apart from the UNION but saw the DFU as its main electoral outlet, partly explains the large scale help from supporters. The scope of this type of help could not be determined but a few examples are indicative.

For instance, 61 of the DFU's 393 federal election candidates in 1965 were supporters and it was an 'open secret' that many of them were Communists. In contrast, the DFU's party allies contributed only 49 candidates. In the same year 10 of the 24 members of two DFU election campaign committees in the Landkreis Düsseldorf-Nettmann were supporters and all of them were Communists. In 1964 the DFU's Velbert local branch recognised that it could not contest the local elections of that year without outside help. Only when a local Mieteverein agreed to provide some candidates, did the DFU go ahead with the election and of its 18 candidates 10 were supporters who included four Communists. In an account of the 1967 Land election of Rheinland-Pfalz the DFU's strong dependence on

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2 *Deutsche Tagespost*, 1.10.1965.
4 The members were listed in a letter from G. Wolferts, to the DFU Land office in Essen, 17.5.1965. Fraulein Wolferts, Chairwoman of the DFU Constituency Party of Düsseldorf-Nettmann, pointed out the Communists on the two committees. Reference to the lists of local party members, provided by Wolferts, showed that ten persons were not members of the DFU, DUV or WFFB, the three UNION organisations in the locality.
5 Minutes of the Velbert local branch, 26.7.1964.
6 The author has in his possession a list of the election candidates published by the town of Velbert. Fraulein Wolferts pointed out the supporters and Communists among them.
Communist help is clearly shown (i.e., 49% of its candidates were Communists), but the account does not make it clear to what extent this help came from outside the UNION.¹ The fact that the DDU of the Saar, which appears to have had only some 200 members, managed to stand 44 successful local election candidates in 1968, also points to the help of active supporters.²

**Communist DPU Members**

KPD influence in the DPU was not only exercised from the top by Hintermaerner in key administrative posts³ and by Communists on the executive committees and as consultants⁴ and supporters. It was also exerted from below by party members who had been with the KPD. Communists were among the most active party members and their group cohesion further increased their influence.⁵ Most DPU constituency parties seem to have had a large minority of ex-KPD people, a small number (e.g., Ludwigshafen) were almost completely

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² Die 'Deutsche Demokratische Union' (DDU) im Saarland (Kurzanalyse), prepared for the author by the Landesaat fuer Verfassungsschutz Saarland, in January 1972.
³ See Chapter V.
⁴ See Chapters V and VII.
⁵ Interviews.
Communists and a few branches could not abide KPD people and kept them out.\(^1\)

The constituency party of Duesseldorf-Nettmann was one of those branches with a large Communist minority. Few Communists were on the constituency party's executive: four out of 13 members in 1963 and one out of seven members in 1964 and 1967.\(^2\) However, an important Communist, Manfred Buder, was on the three-member inner executive in 1961-68.\(^3\) In 1961 Buder had refused the chairmanship because he felt that his election would be politically too embarrassing for the branch and would hinder recruitment. Instead a 'safe' local businessman briefly became chairman, and from early 1962 the post was held by Gertrud Wolferts, a high school teacher with a long and respectable peace background. However, Buder accepted the chairmanship of one of the constituency party's three local branches.

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1 Interviews.


3 Buder was a KPD Hintermann. He moved into the area in 1960 after 9 months in prison for illegal political action. By the early sixties he was on the DFU Land executive of Nordrhein-Westfalen, by the middle sixties he was the Land party's press officer, and by the end of the decade he was responsible for liaison between the federal DFU and its Land parties. Buder derived his livelihood from a small business looked after by his wife. A local DFU leader told the author that senior Hintermaenner frequently had small businesses behind them to give them an above-board income, occupational independence and much free time. In 1967, Buder left the area for a one-year study-course (probably in East Germany). About a year later his son became leader of the new DKP in Rating. Interviews. See also Chapter V.
The Communist faction was much stronger among the members of the constituency party's 102 recruits in 1961-68, 29 (28.4%) are known to have been Communists.\(^1\) Over the years the number of Communists was almost static but there was a turnover and decline of non-Communist members. As a result, there were 26 known Communists (42.6%) among the 61 branch members in 1963-68.\(^2\) In 1968-70 the branch lost 27 members to the new Communist party.\(^3\)

Communists were also among the activists of the branch. Nine of the 14 party members on the two local 1965 election campaign committees were Communists as were the ten supporters on the committees.\(^4\) Of the eight party members among the DFU's 1964 local election candidates in Velbert four were Communists.\(^5\) By no means all local Communists were in the DFU. Well known local KPD people kept clear of the party to save it embarrassment or because they did not like the deideologised DFU.\(^6\) But these people included willing

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1. Gertrud Wolferts pointed out the Communists from among the lists of party members which she gave to the author. At least 20 of them were Altkommunisten who had been in the legal KPD.


3. Interview with Gertrud Wolferts. Also, in 1970 the DFU Land office in Essen had only 34 members' record cards left for Duesseldorf-Mettmann.

4. The names of the 24 people on the committees were listed in a letter of 17.5.1965 from Gertrud Wolferts to the Land office in Essen. Lists of local party members in the author's possession as well as information from Wolferts made it possible to identify members, supporters and Communists and non-Communists.

5. List of DFU candidates published by the Stadt Velbert, and information from Wolferts.

6. Interview with Gertrud Wolferts.
supporters.

Another example of Communists in the DFU: in 1967 40% of the early members of the new Demokratische Linke came from the DFU 'davon die meisten "Abgesandte" der KPD'.

Many DFU leaders felt that proportionally there were more Communists in the other UNION parties than in the DFU. For the KPD connections of these parties see Chapter IV. It should also be noted that about half of the ex-SPD members in the VUS seem to have gone over to the DEP in 1968–69 (see above).

Hardly anything is known about the partisan backgrounds of the other DFU members. DFU leaders felt that most of them were left-wingers and that many came from the SPD. For example, the bulk of the 500–800 VUS members, of whom about half joined the DFU, were once in the SPD. The presence of 85 former SPD members among the DFU's 1965 federal election candidates points in the same direction. The former party affiliations of its senior leaders suggests that the DFU recruited from most parties, but people from the Right - CDU/CSU, FDP, and BHE - were a minority. It seems that the neutralists from a small nationalist group, the Aktion 61, joined the new DFU in 1961.

1 Helmut Baerwald, on. cit., p.8.
2 Interviews.
3 Interviews.
4 Interviews with Albert Berg and Karl Otto. The original name of the VUS was the Zentralausschuss ausgetretener und ausgeschlossener Sozialdemokraten.
5 Deutsche Tagespost. 1.10.1965.
6 See Chapter VII.
Social Characteristics of UNION members

Little is known. Available evidence shows that the members were mainly from large towns. The DNV's organisation was concentrated in the industrial areas of the Ruhr and Aachen. The VUS had some 200 members in Hamburg, about 100 in Frankfurt, 30-40 in Muenchen and another 200-250 in the Ruhr. The VUS claimed that most of its women lived in the Ruhr and Saar and in Hamburg, Bremen, Hanover and Stuttgart. The VFS of Baden-Wuerttemberg was probably restricted to a few towns such as Stuttgart, Mannheim and Freiburg. The IV operated only in Bremen and Bremerhaven. DPU leaders told the author that their largest and most active branches were usually located in large towns. The geographical location of DdD members seems to have been similar.

Of the DPU's allies, the almost totally bourgeois and strongly intellectual DC54 and FK were the strongholds of middle-class radicalism in the UNION. In contrast, the VUS was predominantly

2. Interviews with the VUS leaders Albert Berg and Karl Otto.
4. Interviews.
5. Interviews. The DPU had some 200 constituency parties and some 5,000 members which made the average branch membership small. Branches of more than 100 members in Koeln, Bremen, Hamburg and some other cities were exceptional.
6. Interview with Bdd Chairman Josef Weber.
7. Interviews. The qualification for FK membership was a university or equivalent education and few exceptions were made. Interview with the FK Secretary, Professor Franz-Paul Schneider.
working-class\textsuperscript{1} and this was most likely also the case with the DDU, DL, DDU, VPS and WV.\textsuperscript{2} It seems that only the DFU and BdD did not have this one-class domination.\textsuperscript{3} The author was told that DFU members included a sizeable bourgeois element but more workers and that there were few young people in the party.\textsuperscript{4} The BdD claimed that it was more middle-class than the DFU.\textsuperscript{5}

Detailed information of some social characteristics of DFU members is restricted to 199 members of two constituency parties. It cannot be claimed that this case study represents the whole party, but it provides detailed if localised data on aspects of the DFU membership about which party leaders spoke only in general terms.

The study covers the 102 members recruited during 1961-68 by the constituency party of Duesseldorf-Nettmann, and the 97 remaining members, in 1970, of the constituency party of Duesseldorf. The two branches were neighbours, both adopted the names of the areas in which they operated, and they were part of the Land party of Nordrhein-Westfalen which was the DFU's stronghold.

The Landkreis Duesseldorf-Nettmann has a population of 338,000 (1963), 25 communities ranging from a town with 56,000 inhabitants to villages with under 1,000 people. With its scenic beauty, deer shoots, castle, woods and farming enclaves it looks more like small-

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\textsuperscript{1} Interviews with Berg and Otto.

\textsuperscript{2} Interviews. These parties had Communists in them and tried to appeal to the working classes. See Chapter IV.

\textsuperscript{3} However, nothing is known about the class structure of the WPPB.

\textsuperscript{4} Interviews.

\textsuperscript{5} For example, the party's chairman.
town Germany than it really is. Only 2.9% of the population work on the land and industry is well established in the area which is increasingly becoming part of the commuter belt for Essen, Wuppertal, Solingen and Duesseldorf.\(^1\) Until 1965 the Landkreis returned the CDU minister Helmut Schroeder as its deputy. For the 1965 federal election the area was divided into two constituencies and Schroeder and a SPD candidate were returned. In 1969 two Social Democrats were elected. Touching the western boundaries of the Landkreis is Duesseldorf which, with its 688,503 inhabitants (1967), is West Germany's fifth largest city.

The 199 members did not have two characteristics sometimes associated with 'peace' groups: they were neither predominantly middle-class nor included a good number of young people.\(^2\) In both branches manual workers formed the largest occupational group – at least 45.5% and 40.2% respectively (Table 1) – and skilled workers, the most radical sector of West Germany's lower strata,\(^3\) were much more numerous than the less skilled. At least around 31% of both


\(^2\) For example, 63% of GMD followers were middle-class and 12% manual workers and 'one of the most characteristic and surprising features of GMD... was its success in mobilising adolescents and young adults...'. Frank Parkin, Middle-Class Radicalism, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1968, p. 17, 140.

\(^3\) West German election surveys of the 1950's show that skilled manual workers voted more frequently Communist and Social Democrat than the less skilled. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, London: Heinemann, 1969, pp. 240-41.
### TABLE I
Social Characteristics of 199 DFU Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Constituency Parties</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duesseldorf - Nettmann</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>a) Occupation:</td>
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<td>Skilled</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Social Class:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-Class</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working-Class</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclassifiable</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Sex:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Age Groups:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 20 years</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29 years</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39 years</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49 years</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 59 years</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 +</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Known</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Constituency Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Duesseldorf-Nettmann</th>
<th>Duesseldorf</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Average Age at Joining DFU:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.1 years</td>
<td>2(i)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals for (a) - (d) | 102 | 100.0 | 97  | 100.0 |

* Sources: Duesseldorf-Nettmann - lists of branch members provided by Frasulein Wolferts and 34 members' record card kept in DFU Land Office in Essen.

Duesseldorf - record cards of the 97 members from the DFU Land Office of Nordrhein-Westfalen.

1 Duesseldorf-Nettmann - six teachers, two journalists, one doctor, lawyer and translator.

Duesseldorf - two clergymen and engineers, one teacher, auditor, interior designer and chiropodist.

2(i) average age based on 84 members only.

2(ii) average age based on 87 members only.
branches' members were from the middle-class. Professionals formed only a small group in both Duesseldorf-Nettmann (10.8%) and Duesseldorf (8.3%) but their composition in the two branches was markedly different. Notably, the city party included the only two clergymen, and over half the professionals in Duesseldorf-Nettmann were teachers while the other branch included only one. Both branches also had a few business people, the rare Public Servant, and a larger number of white-collar workers who were stronger in the city branch (14.4% opposed to 7.8%) but underrepresented in both branches considering their numerical strength among the working population. The two memberships included no farmer or agricultural worker. Students were only found in Duesseldorf-Nettmann but they were much weaker even than their small number suggests.1 Housewives formed about a tenth of the members of Duesseldorf-Nettmann and around a fifth in the city. Known pensioners were few in both branches, but the (unavoidably somewhat distorted) age-picture of both memberships suggests that there were probably more of them and emphasises that collectively the two branches were far from young. (See below).

The two branches were strongly masculine, but both embraced a sizeable minority (21.3% and 20% respectively) of women. Evidence restricted to Duesseldorf-Nettmann also shows widespread family links among members. Twenty-seven of them (26.5%) were related by blood or law: nine married couples, including a father and son and their wives, two brothers, a father and son, and five male relatives of

1 Three of the five students joined the branch in 1967 and were never seen again by the party. Interview with Gertrud Wolferts.
when three came from the same family.

In the year of their recruitment only a small proportion of members (14.7% and 10.3%) were under 30 years of age, but people in their thirties formed about a quarter of the members (Table I). The bulk of the members were in early middle-age or older when they joined the two branches: at least 45.1% and 53.7% respectively were in their forties or older, of whom 15.7% and 22.7% were over 60.

At the time of joining the DFU, the average age of the two memberships was already 43.1 years and 46.5 years, and partly because recruitment slowed down after 1961 (see above) the party grew older over the years. For example, by late 1968 the average age of the Duesseldorfer had risen from 46.5 years to 52.4 years. The case study helps to confirm that the DFU was not a young party and suggests that its membership was ageing.

Richert thought that "... der Kern der (DFU) Mitglieder gehoert dem mittelstaendischen Buergertum an ..." This was true of the party's senior leaders but both the study of the 199 members and the opinion of party leaders point towards a strong, and perhaps a majority, working-class element in the DFU. It is probable that the UNION's members and supporters included a majority of workers. The bourgeois strongholds in the UNION were the DUS and PK and both the BDD and DFU probably included a sizeable middle-class element. This

1 However, the Duesseldorf-Nettmann branch established its own youth group, the Laimoclub, which had about a dozen active youth.

2 Ernst Richert, Die radikale Linke, Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1969, p.93.

3 See Chapter VI.
incomplete picture suggests the existence of a socio-economic cleavage in the UNION, and the strength of the working-class element is one likely explanation of why the DFU found it difficult to conduct the 'expressive' politics of middle-class radicalism.¹

¹ See Chapter II.
CHAPTER IX

FEDERAL VOTES

The DFU was umbrella party for the UNION in the first two federal elections of the sixties. In 1961 the party won 1.8% of the Erststimmen and 1.9% of the Zweitstimmen, and in 1965 1.2% of the first and 1.3% of the second votes. That is, the DFU won 35.3% fewer first and 30.1% fewer second votes in its final national election as umbrella party (Table I). The declining DFU was replaced by the Aktion Demokratischer Fortschritt (ADF) which won even fewer votes (0.6%) in 1969.

The Chapter deals only with second or List votes. Minor parties, including the DFU, nearly always win more second votes which reflect their true level of support in federal elections.

Geographical Distribution of Federal Votes

The DFU’s federal vote in the Laender, constituencies and largest towns had the pattern of a leftist party. It won usually more votes in the larger towns and industrial regions than in the rest of the country.

1 See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, London: Heinemann, 1969, 223-61.

In 1961 the DFU achieved its best results - over 3% - in the three smallest Land of Bremen, Hamburg and the Saar (Table I). The first two Land, comprising three cities, are commercial, industrial and shipping centres. The Saar has only one large town, but its many small mining and industrial towns explain its high population density of 430.9 per sq. km. (1961 national average 224.5 per sq. km.) and small (2.3%) rural population (1961 national average 7%). The party won over 2% in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hessen and Baden-Württemberg. The first Land is renowned for its industrial conurbations and only 1.9% of its population derive a living from agriculture and forestry. South Hessen is highly industrialised, but North Hessen has large forest and agricultural tracts giving the Land a 6.6% rural population which was just below the national average. Baden-Württemberg has a large rural population (9.4%) but its above national average population density (226.8 per sq. km.) and many technology-based light industries separate it from the 'rural' Land. The latter are Bayern, Niedersachsen, Schleswig-Holstein and Rheinland-Pfalz in which the DFU won less than its national average vote. In the early sixties these four Land had the lowest population density (139.6 to 196.9 per sq. km.) and the largest rural populations (10.6 to 14.1%).

In 1965 the DFU had 30.1% fewer second votes than four years earlier. In the various Land the losses ranged from one tenth to around half the 1961 vote, but the party continued to be relatively stronger or weaker in the same Land as before, with one notable exception. The Saar, where the party lost just over half its votes, moved from second to fifth place in terms of the DFU's electoral performance (Table I).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>1961 First Vote</th>
<th>1961 Second Vote</th>
<th>1965 First Vote</th>
<th>1965 Second Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-</td>
<td>17,399</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17,995</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holstein</td>
<td>12,894</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>14,503</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>42,670</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>43,942</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td>46,259</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>50,380</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>12,362</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>12,369</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordrhein-</td>
<td>184,218</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>188,442</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westfalen</td>
<td>111,823</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>125,202</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessen</td>
<td>62,507</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>65,989</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinland-</td>
<td>29,260</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>29,977</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pfalz</td>
<td>47,142</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>53,316</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-</td>
<td>90,287</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>95,137</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wurttemberg</td>
<td>62,540</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>70,209</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>83,946</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>87,388</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar</td>
<td>18,580</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>18,683</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Rep.</td>
<td>587,488</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>609,918</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>386,900</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>434,182</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more sensitive measurement is the DFU's constituency results. With few exceptions, in 1961 the party won more than its national average vote only in the constituencies of urban and industrial concentrations, isolated large towns, and the small mining and industrial towns in the Saar (Table II). Specifically, the party had above average success in the north German ports of Bremen, Bremerhaven, Bremen and Hamburg, in the constituency of Stormarn adjoining Hamburg, in the cities of Hanover and Kassel and in the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region and Aachen. A similar pattern of success occurred in the Saar, in the university town of Marburg, in the Frankfurt-Main industrial complex, in the industrial conurbation of Mannheim-Ludwigshafen and in the constituency of Bergstrasse which links these two industrial centres. Further south, the DFU did well in Karlsruhe, in the Stuttgart industrial area and in Ulm and Konstanz; in Freiburg and Loerrach-Muelheim hugging the western slopes of the Black Forest. In Bavaria the party did only relatively well in a few large cities – Muenchhen, Nuernberg-Fuerth, Augsburg and Nuernzburg – and in the small-town constituency of Miesbach.

The DFU won its average national vote and less in the constituencies of those areas where cities and large towns formed isolated islands against a rural backdrop of low population density, agriculture, forestry, villages and small towns, namely in most of Schleswig-Holstein and Niedersachsen; in the regions of the Sauerland and the Weser and Weser mountains, on the Ruhrueck and the Eifel with its small villages, and in the hilly country of North Hessen with its poor agriculture and vast forests. Further south the pattern was repeated in most of Bavaria; in the constituencies of South-Wuerttemberg, except Ulm, and in the constituencies facing
Areas in which the DFU had its best election results in 1961

Same sources as Table III.
France and Switzerland, except Freiburg, Lörrach-Muehlheim and Konstanz. The party gained its national average vote or less in 154 of the 247 constituencies. It won below 1% in 47, 1% to 1.9% in 107, 2% to 2.9% in 54 and over 3% in 39 constituencies (Table III). In rural Niedersachsen and Rheinland-Pfalz the party could not reach 3% in any constituency. In Hamburg it achieved 3% in every constituency, and in Bremen and the Saar all constituency results were above 2%. 

Four years later, and after a change of some constituency boundaries and a 30.1% drop in the party's vote, the DFU continued to do better in the urban than in the rural constituencies but the vote was down almost everywhere. 1

Quite a number of West Germany's large federal constituencies include a rural element as relatively few towns are large enough to embrace by themselves one or more constituencies. Therefore, the best measure of the urban character of the DFU's vote is a survey of the party's results in the Republic's largest towns. 

---

### TABLE III

The DFU's 1961 Constituency Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Total No. of Const.</th>
<th>0.9%</th>
<th>1.0 - 1.9%</th>
<th>2.0 - 2.9%</th>
<th>3.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessen</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saar</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Federal Republic**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

largest kreisfreien Staedten than in the rest of the country. In 1961 the DFU's national vote was 1.9% but its average vote in the 90 towns with over 50,000 was 2.6%. In 38 towns with 50,000 to 100,000 people the party won an average 2.2%; in 23 towns with 100,000 to 200,000 inhabitants 2.9%; and in 24 cities with more than 200,000 people it was 2.8%. The party's slightly lower average vote in the cities is explained by the notably low 0.8% in Braunschweig. The DFU's urban vote was not as good as the average results suggest. In 36 (40%) of the 90 towns the DFU did not surpass its national average vote, but fewer towns (28.9%) fell below the average federal

vote for the Land in which they are located, and the failure to win 1.9% decreased with the increase of the size of towns.

A survey of the DFU's 1965 federal election results in all the villages and towns of three 'rural' Laender, in which the party failed to reach its 1.3% national vote, show that the party's percentage of the vote generally improved with the increase in the size of the communities (Table IV). The DFU's support pattern was broadly similar in Bayern (Land vote 1.1%), Niedersachsen (0.8%) and Rheinland-Pfals (1.2%). The share of the party's vote generally improved with the increase in the size of villages and towns. The party's share of the votes differed widely according to size of community, ranging from 0.3% to 2.3 - 2.5% in Bayern, from 0.3% to 1.3% in Niedersachsen, and from 0.6% to 2.1% in Rheinland-Pfals. The party surpassed its national average vote in Bavarian towns with over 50,000 people, failed altogether in Niedersachsen (but here in towns with over 20,000 the Land average vote was passed), and achieved it in towns with only 10,000 people in Rheinland-Pfals.

---

1 In Schleswig-Holstein (Land vote 1.3%) not one of the four towns surpassed 1.9% but three of them produced more than the Land result; one of the 13 towns in Niedersachsen (1.3%) two went above 1.9% and nine over 1.3%; however, five of the seven towns in Rheinland-Pfals (1.5%) surpassed both the federal and Land average vote; in the 13 towns of Bayern (1.6%) seven surpassed the federal average and 10 the Land average; in Nordrhein-Westfalen (2.0%) 22 of 35 towns improved on 1.9% and 2.0%; in Hessen in all six towns; in the Saar's (3.4%) only large town; in Bremen (3.0%), where Bremerhaven fell below the high land result; in Hamburg.

2 In cities with over 200,000 people the party did not rise above its national average in 21% of the communities; in towns with over 100,000 inhabitants it was 30% and in towns with 50,000 to 100,000 it was 58%. 
TABLE IV
The DFU's 1965 Federal Vote in Bayern, Niedersachsen and Rheinland-Pfalz (by Size of Communities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bayern</th>
<th>Niedersachsen</th>
<th>Rheinland-Pfalz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayen,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-200</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>500+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 000+ 000+ 000+ 000+ 000+ 000+ 000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Wahlergebnisse in Bayern seit 1946, (Table of results supplied by the Bayerische Statistisches Landesamt).
The DFU's Land and federal election votes in Rheinland-Pfalz show that neither the time factor (1961-1967), nor the difference between federal and Land (1963-1967) elections and a slight decline of the vote from 1.5% to 1.2% disturbed the basic improvement of the DFU's vote in the larger communities (Table V). The same pattern was also found in the 1965 federal election and the 1967 Land election in Niedersachsen (Table VI).

The leftist nature of the DFU's vote is emphasized by its similarity with the SPD vote and its contrast with the votes of the right-radical NPD and conservative CDU/CSU which also shared similarities, except in Bayern. In Niedersachsen, Rheinland-Pfalz and Bayern the SPD and DFU votes broadly improved as the size of the communities increased. In the first two Leander the vote of the CDU and NPD declined with the enlargement of the communities, but swung sharply upwards in some of the biggest towns. But in Bayern the NPD as well as the left-wing parties did better in the towns than in the villages while the CSU followed the right-wing pattern of its sister party in the other Leander.\(^1\)

The DFU often achieved its best results in large urban and industrial areas. But in nearly 30% of the largest towns it did not surpass its national result or the party's vote of the Leander in which they are located. The party also had better results in some of the smaller towns of the Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland than in some larger towns elsewhere, but usually small-town and rural Germany gave the DFU its smallest vote.

---

\(^1\) Same sources as Tables IV, V, VI.
### TABLE V

The DFU's Vote in the 1961 and 1965 Federal Elections and the 1963 and 1967 Land Elections in Rheinland-Pfalz (by Size of Communities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th>1961</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE VI

The DFU's Vote in the 1965 Federal Election and the 1967 Land Election in Niedersachsen (by Size of Communities)

Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population of Communities</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another aspect of the geographical distribution of the DFU's federal vote was the total lack of electoral strongholds. Essentially, the party was less weak in some areas than in others. A minor party needs 5% of the national second votes to enter the Bundestag, but in the two federal elections the DFU only won 5% of the votes in one constituency in 1961.

The position was somewhat better in Land elections. The DDU (which acted as umbrella party for the UNION in Saar Land Elections) had two deputies in the Landtag in 1960-65, and in the wake of dislike for the Grand Coalition of 1966 the DFU won 4.3% of the votes in Bremen in 1967. This was the closest the DFU came to winning Landtag representation. In Land elections the party's vote was usually no better and often worse than the federal results (Tables I and VII). Even in 1967-68 the DFU could only capitalise in Bremen on electoral discontent with the Grand Coalition and economic recession. In the Saar alone was there a sharp difference between Land and federal results. In that Land both types of elections are held within months of each other. In 1960 the DDU Land result was 5.0% and the DFU 1961 federal vote was 3.2%; and in 1965 it was 3.1% and 1.5% respectively. For some unknown reasons the DDU could not bring its votes with it in federal elections.

Local election successes were also relatively rare. Under various names (DFU, DDU, DNU, DdD) the UNION elected only about 100 out of 220,000 councillors in 1961-68. ¹

TABLE VII

DFU Vote in the Land Elections, 1960-68 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordrhein-Westfalen</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hessen</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rheinland-Pfalz</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wuerttemberg</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.3 (DL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>5.0 (BDU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1 (BDU)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/C - election not contested.

### TABLE VIII

Minor Parties which won one per cent or more of the Federal Vote in 1949-69

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DFU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>(0.6 ADF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPD</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GVP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRP</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB/DHE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAV</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DFU did not win many votes but in 1949-69 it was one of only 11 minor parties, out of some 40, which gained one percent or more of the federal vote (Table VIII). Of the four post-war leftist Anerkennungsparteien - GVP, BDD, DFU and ADF - the DFU was the most successful. Having no serious left-wing rivals, the DFU was the largest leftist fringe electoral grouping of the decade, but it came second after the right-wing GDP in 1961 and after the right-radical NPD in 1965.

Sex and Age of DFU Voters

In both federal elections more men than women voted DFU. In 1961 2.2% of all male and 1.6% of all female electors voted DFU, and four years later 1.5% of the men and 1.1% of the women did so. In the two elections just over 53% of the DFU supporters were men (Table IX).

**TABLE IX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of DFU Voters in 1961 and 1965*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1 Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 2, 1966, p.92.
and this large masculine element was only surpassed by two right-radical fringe parties – the DRP's 58.6% in 1961\(^1\) and the NPD's 59.6% in 1965.\(^2\)

DFU voters were also among the oldest of any party. In 1961 24% of the DFU voters were 60 and older and only the CDU voters included a larger share (30%).\(^3\) In 1965 the DFU's share of these old people had increased to 30% which was the largest percentage of any party. In the same year the party had the smallest share (40.1%) of voters under 45 years which was not far different from the NPD's 43.7%.\(^4\) Minor parties won less votes from the youngest electors (age group 21 - 29) than did the major parties and the DFU's share – 13% in 1961 and 13.7% in 1965 – was not much different from that of the other small parties.\(^5\)

In both elections support for the DFU improved with the increase in the age of male voters. About twice as many men in their sixties voted DFU than men in their twenties. In 1961 the opposite was the case among women where the DFU's appeal improved with the decline in the age of female voters. However, four years later the DFU was also least successful among the youngest women (Table X).

4 The SPD had 50.5%, the CDU/CSU 46.4% and the FDP 45.5%.
TABLE X

DFU Support among the Electorate by Age and Sex in 1961 and 1965*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Federal Elections</th>
<th>Age groups in years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The DFU's male voters were older than their female counterparts. A comparison of the DFU's 1965 male and female votes shows that the latter included 5.6% fewer over 60, 3.7% more in the age group 45-59, 1.1% more aged 30-44 years, and 0.7% more in their twenties (Table XI) but in this age group of the electorate support for the DFU had slumped from 2.3% in 1961 to 1% four years later.

TABLE XI

Composition of DFU Vote by Age and Sex in 1961 and 1965*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 29 yrs.</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 44 yrs.</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 - 59 yrs.</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 + yrs.</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In its second federal election the DFU had 30.1% fewer second votes. By 1965 the party's appeal had declined among all age groups and sexes in the electorate (Table X) and its support was probably somewhat older than it had been in 1961. The percentage of the party's youngest voters had actually slightly increased from 13.0 to 13.7%, but the 30-59 years age group had declined from 63% to 55.6% and supporters in their sixties and older had increased from 24% to 30.6% (Table XI).

Sources of DFU Votes

DFU leaders were convinced that the new DFU won the bulk of its votes from the SPD.¹ This included not only Social Democrats but also other elements who in the 1957 federal election — the last before the origin of the DFU — were voting SPD because of the 1956 banning of the Communist party and the 1957 collapse of GVP.² The 1959-60 SPD reforms most likely forced much of this fringe Left, accompanied by Social Democrats, into the minor party arena to vote DFU.

The SPD's 1961 proposal that the new party should be banned, and its 1965 claim that the DFU was costing it Bundestag seats, shows that the Social Democrats felt that they were losing votes to their left-wing rival.³ The 'lesser evil' dispute in the DFU was based on the assumption that if the DFU were not to contest

¹ Interviews.
² See Chapter I.
³ See Chapter II. Also, Merkl estimated that the SPD lost about 5% (c. 400,000 votes) of its 1957 federal vote to the DFU. Peter H. Merkl, Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 321.
elections its votes would go to the SPD. The split tickets of DFU voters, especially in 1965, show a pronounced preference for the SPD over the other parties (see below).

Communists

Communists stood as DFU candidates and the SED/KPD told West German Communists to vote DFU in 1961 and 1965. A comparison of the second votes of the KPD in 1953 (2.2%) and of the DFU in 1961 (1.9%) in the federal constituencies shows a correlation between the two parties' results after eight years. (Table XII). The curves of the votes of both parties fluctuated in some approximate relationship. In those constituencies in which the KPD had won its best results in 1953 the DFU also had its highest vote in 1961, but usually not as high as the KPD's had been. In other constituencies in which the KPD had been least successful the DFU results were also lower. The link between the results of the two parties warrants the conclusion, also reached elsewhere, that the DFU won a sizeable bloc of Communist votes. Stiefbold's survey of void ballots also suggests that Communists who had refused their leaders' call to vote SPD in

1 See Chapter II.
2 See Chapters I and II.
3 The comparison is restricted to 242 constituencies for in 1953 the Saarland did not take part in federal elections.
TABLE XII

Constituency Results of the KPD in the 1953 Federal Election and of the DFU in the 1961 Federal Election
1957 gave their support to the DFU in 1961.1

However, the DFU also won a higher percentage of the votes than the KPD had done in 103 of the 242 constituencies. This was especially the case in Niedersachsen and Baden-Württemberg and shows the existence of a sizeable non-Communist DFU vote. The electoral fates of the ADF in 1969 and the DKP in 1972 support this conclusion. The ADF included the Communist party as an open partner, and for this reason rank-and-file Communists probably did not have the same reservations about this umbrella party as they did have about its predecessor, the DFU. Yet the ADF won only 0.6% of the vote in 1969. Three years later, the Communist party on its own could only manage 0.4% of the Erststimmen and 0.3% of the Zweitstimmen.2 In contrast, the DFU's support had reached 1.9% in 1961 and 1.3% in 1965. The weakness of the Communists, and the results of the 103 constituencies cast doubt on Barnes' conclusion that in 1961 the DFU 'probably ended with only the support of the hard-core communists remaining in West Germany'.3 If it had, it most likely would not have managed over 600,000 votes.

Social Democrats

Social Democrats were in the DFU but how many of them voted for the party could not be determined. A sizeable group of former

SPD supporters were among the DFU's leaders and candidates. The VUS's 800 members came mainly from the SPD, and about half of them were also in the DFU, and most likely all voted for the minor party. The Secretary of the FK told the author that the majority of the group's 2,000 members, like himself, had been regular SPD voters before 1961. The SPD probably did not mind losing its embarrassing Communist votes, and its attacks on the DFU may have been largely an expression of concern for regular SPD voters. DFU leaders felt that they recruited many Social Democrats. But it was also their firm conviction that anti-Communism among Social Democrats and trade unionists was one of the main reasons which prevented them from winning more votes from these quarters. This failure was probably the chief reason why the DFU failed to become an electoral force of consequence.

**GVP People**

One of the allies of the GVP in 1953 was the BdD which was also in the UNION from 1960, and ex-GVP members and voters formed small

---

1 See Chapter VII.

2 Interviews with Albert Berg and Karl Otto. It should be noted that the VUS's first name was Zentralausschuss ausgetretener und ausgeschlossener Sozialdemokraten.

3 Interview with Professor Franz-Paul Schneider. Also, 'Some 300 writers, actors, and artists of the Francoian Circle (i.e. FK) published an appeal six days before the 1957 election which went further than the SPD but which was obviously designed to aid the party'. U.W. Kitzinger, German Electoral Politics, Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1960, p. 149.


5 Interviews.
factions in DFU leadership groups. But apart from these organisational and infrequent personal links between the GVP and DFU, no evidence is available to show either the strength or weakness of former GVP voters (318,475 in 1953) among the DFU's support. The exception are the BfD people which once voted GVP (see below). It should be noted that the two most significant leaders of the defunct GVP, Dr. Heinesmann and Frau Wessel, remained in the SPD after the 'Unfall'.

Votes from the DFU's Party Allies

The BfD had 60,000 votes in the 1957 federal election of whom probably many voted GVP in 1953 and DFU in 1961 and 1965. The DFU's other party allies had fewer votes.¹ Because they were Land parties,

¹ The BDU won 5% (about 22,000 votes) in the 1960 Saar Land election but in the following year the DFU received only 13,683 federal votes in the Land. Werner Kaltefleiter, 'Wachler und Parteien in den Landtagswahlen 1961-1965', Zeitschrift fuer Politik, XIII, 3, 1965, 240, and Table 1.

The WV and another fringe party won between them 1.2% of the vote in the Bremer Buergerschaftswahlen; and in the 1959 local elections the WV won 1.9% in Bremerhaven, 110 Jahre Buergerschaftswahlen im Lande Bresem 1854 bis 1963, Bresem: Statistisches Landesamt, 1966, pp. 148-49; Die Wahl zur Bremischen Buergerschaft sowie zur Stadtverordnetenversammlung Bremerhaven am 1. Oktober 1967, Bresem: Statistisches Landesamt, 1968, p. 72.


The VFS was restricted to a few towns in Baden-Wuerttemberg, contested only the 1960 local elections on its own and had no successes. Interview with DFU Land party chairman.
their people most likely voted for other parties in federal elections which probably were the B&D and SPD. Also, at least in the case of the DDU the bulk of its votes were seemingly Communists, who have already been counted above, and not all DDU supporters voted DFU (see above).

**Split tickets of DFU Voters**

Table XIII shows the manner in which some DFU voters split their ticket in both federal elections. Those DFU voters who only cast their second vote for the DFU gave their first vote to every other party, including the CDU/CSU and NDP towards which the DFU was implacably hostile. Thus the left-wing DFU could win votes from people who at the same time also had links with parties of all other political colours. But the DFU was not unusual in this; the other parties also had this diversity of vote-combinations among their supporters.

As we saw above, the bulk of the DFU's vote probably came from the SPD which included a sizeable Communist element. The split tickets also showed a leftist leaning among DFU voters. In both elections the DFU-SPD combination occurred more frequently than any

---

1. When the Communist part of the Saar (KPS) still worked in the open the DDU could only win 0.9% in the 1955 Land election; but after the KPS's banning the DDU won 5% in the 1961 Land election. *Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) in Saarland (Kurzanalyse)*, prepared for the author by the Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz Saarland, in January 1972.

TABLE XIII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Other Parties</th>
<th>in 1961</th>
<th>in 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other minor parties (^1)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoiled First Votes</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^1\) In 1961 the other minor parties were the Deutsche Gemeinschaft, Deutsche Reichspartei, and Suedschleswiger Nachkraftverband (SSW); and in 1965 the Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhaengiger Deutscher, Frei-Soziale Union, and SSW.
other and in 1965 it was as large as 13.5% (which involved some 59,000 people or about one in seven of the DFU voters) compared with 5.2% of other combinations. In contrast, the voters of the right-radical NPD showed their strongest preference for the conservative CDU/CSU.\(^1\) The increase of the DFU-SPD combination from 5.1% in 1961 to 13.5% four years later occurred during the 30.1% decline of the DFU's votes, and these split tickets could point to the direction in which much of the party's losses went. DFU leaders gave several reasons for the party's 1965 losses: some felt that quite a number of the Communists went over to the SPD, others felt that the party was hit hard by a 'lost-vote' reaction because of its earlier bad election results, and the growing feeling among the party's own supporters that the 'cause' would be better served by helping the SPD to defeat the CDU/CSU than by splitting the left-wing vote in the hope of pressuring the SPD into abandoning the 'policy of strength'.

The DFU's 30.1% loss of votes shows lack of commitment to the party by large sections of its voters. And the increase of split votes from 13% to 22.1% (including half-spoiled ballots) illustrates the same thing. Yet the relatively small instance of split tickets among DFU voters - which was low for a minor party - shows a level of involvement in the party not often found among other minor parties.'

\(^1\) CDU/CSU 10.3%, SPD 5.5%, FDP 3.7%, DFU 0.5%, other minor parties 0.6%. *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, Heft 3, 1966, p. 170.
supporters. 1

The limited and sometimes circumstantial evidence available shows three aspects of the sources of the DFU's votes: probably the bulk of them came from the SPD; the party won many Communist votes but it also appealed to thousands of non-Communists; the party's vote was largely left-wing but it could also attract some people of most political colours. Evidence presented in this Chapter also shows that the DFU usually won more votes in the larger towns and industrial regions than in the rest of the country. The DFU's votes had a geographical location usually associated with leftist parties. The party was 'Fasan Partei'; its vote included a large elderly element and was strongly masculine. The existence of non-Communist votes made the DFU more than just the KPD's electoral disguise. It made it a united front, if only largely of the Left. The party's ability to win non-Communist votes and more votes than either the ADF or DKP could manage, made the DFU also a relatively successful front organisation.

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1 Minor parties have no realistic chance of winning constituencies, and because of this more minor than major party voters split their ticket and cast their first vote for another party - usually a major party - or spoil it. The relatively low frequency of divided votes among DFU supporters can be explained 'aus Gründen des Prestiges ihrer Partei', and, 'um auf dieser Weise ihre Existenz zu demonstrieren'. Wirtschaft und Statistik, Heft 2, 1962, p. 79 and Heft 3, 1966, p. 170.
CHAPTER X

MODUS OPERANDI

In Part I we looked at the policies of the DFU and the factors which shaped them. This Chapter concentrates on the two main methods used to pursue these policies. Essentially, we are concerned with why the DFU became a party and why it was determined, despite internal opposition, to do both partisan and non-partisan work.

Attitude or cause groups, of which the DFU was one, seem to have a leaning towards electoral politics. Many of West Germany's cause groups - the anti-nuclear protesters, pacifists, civil rights workers, neutralists - did not become parties. Some of them did

1 Castles includes minor parties among pressure groups and specifically puts them with attitude groups which he distinguishes from interest groups by their behaviour (including electoral politics) which is influenced by whether they aim to change parts of society or society itself. Francis G. Castles, Pressure Groups and Political Culture, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 1-2, pp. 88-99.

The DFU is also one of these groups because it neglected material and sectional aims and emphasized 'humanitarian' or 'moral' goals, and its recruitment policy was that of a cause group 'which must attract members because of a consensus of opinion on a specific issue... or because they share a more general disposition... and not primarily if at all, on the basis of their sharing certain other socially identifiable characteristics'. G.S. Moodie and C.S. Studdert-Kennedy, Opinions, Publics and Pressure Groups, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970, p. 63.
turn to elections and others worked through them. On the left, the DPU was preceded by the BdB and GVP and several smaller electoral groups¹ and succeeded by the ADF.² West German cause groups took electioneering more seriously than, for example, their British counterparts.³ They had narrow programmes, generally neglected material issues and the largest of them were loose groupings.⁴ In the case of the UNION, the needs of its partners and the Communists, and tactical considerations largely shaped its loose, but tightly co-ordinated, structure. The KPD wanted to use its existing front organisations for its hidden control of the DPU, and to help the party’s public image. An alliance of several organisations was a sort of multi-mirror trick which made available resources look more impressive than a unified structure would have done. The DPU aimed to rise above sectionalism, but it had to cultivate sectional appeals and the particular appeals

1 See Chapter I.
2 See Chapter III.
3 Castles gave the following examples:

'The ex-service movement after the First World War attempted to mobilize support for Parliamentary candidates, who subscribed to their aims and more important, they formed the small Silver Badge Party ... C.N.D. has on occasions contemplated running parliamentary candidates ... Another attempt to put up candidates was made by an organisation called INDEC, Independent Nuclear Disarmament Electoral Committee. The Racialists have also made forays into these fields... Another attempt at influencing Parliament was the attempt of the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear Warfare to organize a 'Voters' Vote' against non-unilateralist candidates'. Castles, op. cit., p. 97.

4 See Chapter I.
of its partners could be utilised for this purpose. In addition, there were group egoisms and inter-group frictions which required a loose alliance.¹

Why did the DFU founders opt for a party? There were several reasons. Available and potential support was suitable for electoral politics. The Communist party had to find another outlet for its votes and a more effective electoral role for several small electoral groups already under its influence. Several other groups were interested in branching out into electoral politics. The founders estimated that they could recruit thousands of SPD voters, who wanted to hit back at the Social Democrats through the ballot box. Optimistic evaluations of the party's support potential were a factor. The DFU founders not only chose to work through a party, but they also founded a new party because existing fringe electoral groups could not meet the need of the moment.²

To help answer this question, the author also asked 16 DFU leaders, of whom all were non-Communists, what they thought of different types of political action. All of them dismissed illegal political action as dangerous nonsense (see below). All but one of them considered pressure group work as less effective than party politics, but as a useful addition to it. All but two of the leaders considered a minor party as the most effective form of political action for a small group, which had no access to the major parties. All the leaders interviewed wanted good election results, and three of them lost interest in the party when

¹ See Chapter V.
² Interviews and see Chapter I.
these did not materialise. Below are summarised their reasons for considering a minor party (and not just the DFU) most effective for a small group. These reasons were considered equally applicable to a party with good and bad election results. A party with poor results was still seen as more effective than the alternative forms of political work available to a small group.

1. A party is the most legitimate form of political expression. Deviant groups should use the least objectionable forum as protection against the authorities. Parties have legal privileges and the public seems to believe that democracy manifests itself through them.

2. All things being equal, minor parties have more news value than other small groups. The press treats them more seriously and they have access to radio and TV during elections.

3. While a pressure group can tell the people what is wrong with the parties, it can offer no alternative to them. By offering an alternative choice, a minor party not only contributes more to the nation's political life but its efforts are also taken more seriously.

4. Most Germans are disinterested in politics and are only politically aroused during elections. A party can best utilise this temporary condition to propagate a cause and prevent the other parties from "burying" it.

5. Voting is the easiest form of political expression. It does not require the involvement or effort of most other forms of political activity. Being a secret exercise, voting also does not require a public commitment to a deviant cause. With relatively few resources, a minor party can therefore marshal large scale support. The DFU won over 600,000 votes but could not have collected 100,000 signatures for a petition. A party can also use the resources provided by the state - TV, radio, voting stations, etc. - while a pressure group had to rely solely on its own resources.

6. The need to contest elections at regular intervals imposes discipline and a level of activity upon small parties which are missing in small non-partisan groups.
A point of interest is that of the sixteen, seven were new
to all party activity, only five had previously been with a minor
party and five were ex-leaders or members of a major party.¹
That is, quite a number of them did not opt for a form of
political action which they knew beforehand. They were recruited
because to them a minor party was more effective than other forms
of fringe activity. Also, nine of the sixteen leaders saw the
DFU as an emergency measure, as a party of the moment which would
disappear when one or more of the main parties adopted its cause.

The DFU gave elections the highest priority. In 1961 the
party hoped to use the federal election to pressure the SPD into
reverting its foreign and defence policies. The DFU wrongly
assumed that it could take enough votes from the SPD to achieve
this. However, even during its most optimistic days, the DFU was
contesting elections against the main opposition party and not for
governmental power. The party was fully aware that it could not
affect national politics except through the SPD. At first it
wanted to convert the Social Democrats and then it tried to help
them against the CDU/CSU. The party also saw itself as helping
the opposition within the SPD. Some of the DFU leaders saw them-
selves as part of that opposition working outside the SPD because
its 'right-wing' leaders had made it impossible to work within the
SPD. The DFU also saw itself as a source of ideas which could be
passed on to the critics within the SPD. After the DFU's electoral
impotence had become evident, elections lost some of their

¹ One of the sixteen leaders had been active in both a major and
minor party.
importance. However, they continued to be the party's most
important activity. They were the DFU's most prized propaganda
outlet. When the party stood no candidates in 1966, it continued
electioneering.

The DFU fulfilled all the legal requirements of a West
German political party. However, it operated as a pressure group.
To the DFU, elections were not about governmental power but a
means of trying to exert influence and of making propaganda.
Even with poor election results, being a party and contesting
elections was seen as more effective in propagating a cause than
any other fringe activity. Also much of the DFU's energy was
channelled into non-partisan work (see below). The DFU was
determined to operate outside the party arena because its
effectiveness within it was limited.

Over the years the DFU was more concerned with public opinion
and the press than with ministers and politicians. Pamphleteering
was a main activity but the scope of this labour intensive work
was limited by the party's small membership. The pamphlets were
sloganised and aimed at the public at large. The party also
produced detailed documents which were circulated among the

1 Truman points to the 'pressure group' character of some US
third parties. David Truman, The Governmental Process, New York:
Knopf, 1951, pp. 280-82. In contrast, Castles suggests that the
'logical implication of candidacy is that one will attempt to
2 Interviews.
3 Interviews.
relatively small number of opinion leaders. The DFU and its partners published their news-sheets and journals. Party members were encouraged to write 'letters to the editor' which were seen as a cheap and effective means of answering charges levied against the party and of commenting on public events. The party issued many statements to the press. It also organised several petitions to parliament and addressed open letters and telegrams to ministers and deputies and the conferences of some other parties and industrial unions. It also organised public forums and meetings. The party established links with foreign organisations. The DFU held a few small torchlight parades and protest rallies, but most of its protest marching was done in the anti-Bomb movement (see below). Acts of civil disobedience were not allowed. The DFU tried to use the social prestige of some professions and the repute of public personalities. In its public appeals the party

2 See Chapter V.
3 Interviews. Also, Rundschreiben Nr. 4 Betr.: Vorschlaege fuer die weitere Arbeit, DFU Bundesgeschaeftsstelle, 6.4.1961.
6 For example, with the Haldane Society. Interview with Lorenz Knorr who visited the Society and Lord Russell in 1963.
7 Interviews.
concentrated on the signatures of professionals and intellectuals. It also specialised in 'name dropping'. For example, the telegrams and letters from prominent well-wishers were compiled and circulated. The most prominent well-wishers included Albert Schweitzer, Lord Russell, the poet Fritz von Unruhe and a host of academics and foreign parliamentarians from East and West.

The DFU aimed to rise above narrow sectionalism, but the 'packaging' of its policies had to take into account group biases. In part, the DFU alliance was loosely structured to allow the various partners of the UNION to utilise their own sectional appeal. The DGB and FK concentrated on the middle-class radicals. The WFFB emphasised the needs of women and children. The VDS concentrated on the Social Democrats. The DDU utilised its working class appeal in the Saar, and the various other electoral groups concentrated on their own followers. The partners

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1 For example, the party's very first public appeal comprised some 100 Akademiker but only 16 workers. Der Spiegel, 23.8.1961.

2 For example, the 32-page Grussbotschaften und Diskussionsreden in und ausländischer Gäste zur Unionskongress der DDU am 28. Oktober 1962 in Frankfurt a.Main.

3 See Chapter V.
had their areas of specialisation but, with some exceptions, their
common point of reference was the DFU's programme.1 Also the
partners worked closely together.2 The DFU itself undertook
activities which were aimed at particular sections of the community.
It organised, workers', farmers' and women's conferences. It aimed
literature and papal pronouncements at Protestants and Catholics.
It regularly addressed itself to academics and the bourgeoisie.
In particular, much of the party's work was aimed at the rank and
file Social Democrats and union members.3 The Communists influenced
the UNION's work but the KPD pursued much of its own extensive
activities outside the UNION.4

1 Interviews.

2 For example, in 1966-67 the Communists sponsored a series of
inter-German forums. In 1966 41 of them were held by the DFU, 21
by the BdB and some by the WFPB. In 1967, the DFU and BdB
organised 59 forums between them. aus politik und zeitgeschichte
Erfahrungen aus der Beobachtung und Abwehr linksradikaler
tendensen im Jahre 1967, Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern,
p. 11.

3 Interviews. Ratschlag fuer die Wahlkampf-Werbung DFU
Bundesverbeleitigung, 5.7.1961. Pressestimmen, Die Deutsche Friedens-
Union im Spiegel der Presse, Issues 1965-67, Federal DFU.

4 See, for example. Die komunistische Tastigkeit im Jahre 1965,
Bonn: Der Bundesminister des Innern, 1966. E. Harbach, Ostermarsch
1966 - ja oder nein? Geller-Pohl-Druckerei und Verlaganstaltung,
1966.
The DFU wanted the advantages and to minimise the drawbacks of being a party. It realised that partisanship divided like-minded people and that it had to devise the means of reaching groups which it could not be successfully approached as a party. The DFU wanted to be more than the umbrella party of an electoral united front. It aimed to become the core, the structural centre, of the extra-parliamentary opposition.¹ The DFU's (and therefore the Communists') ambition necessitated non-partisan work. The party saw that it could not ask the various opposition elements to choose between parties or to further all DFU aims, something which was expected of party members. Some factions in the DFU opposed non-partisan work or wanted to curtail it. Good election results were very important to them and they defined party work narrowly and saw other activities as being detrimental to the DFU's party role.

The distinction between the DFU's partisan and non-partisan work was not always clear. However, the non-partisan work had its own aims and characteristics. It was essentially cause-orientated. That is, it was not primarily concerned with winning support for the party or to get the DFU into the news. (This did not mean that

¹ Interviews, including with the DFU's two business managers in 1961–68. Also, 'Aktionsplan 1962', Aumnag, March 1962.
the party did not also hope to recruit supporters for itself at the same time). The DFU aimed to work in as many disguises and directions as possible to help give the impression that there was a ground swell of opposition against the government. The Communists had used their existing front organisations to exert influence in the DFU and that party was in turn used as a cover to help extend Communist influence into other groups. The KPD's undercover agents were most likely the 'vanguard' of this infiltration and the DFU and other fronts were used to back them up. To pursue its non-partisan work, the DFU was prepared to give secret and unpublicised aid to organisations outside the UNION. On at least one occasion, it organised some clerics outside the party whom it could not recruit as the DFU. The party was also keen to work with organisations on the basis of a single shared goal.¹

The DFU's non-partisan work began before its electoral impotence was known.² It was no substitute for poor election results but its importance increased over the years. The party tried to balance its partisan and non-partisan work. Too much of the first would have made the party too partisan; too much of the second would have seriously damaged electioneering.³ Some critics in the party were convinced that non-partisan work was partly responsible for the DFU's bad elections and they wanted the party

¹ Interviews.
² Interviews.
³ Interviews and 'Aktionsplan 1962' op. cit.
to stop or reduce this line of work, because it did not directly
promote the DFU. Some party branches neglected non-partisan work\(^1\)
while others did a considerable amount of it.\(^2\) Below are
discussed two non-partisan activities of the DFU. The first was
the DFU's main non-partisan activity in 1961-68 and the second
was of an ad hoc nature.

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1 See Chapter II.

2 The DFU in Duesseldorf-Mettmann was led by a senior DFU leader
and a Hintermann. The extent of non-partisan work in this
constituency party therefore suggests the high level of non-partisan
work expected by the DFU in a period without elections. In 1963-64
the constituency party concentrated on non-partisan work:

> Die Haupttätigkeit der DFU bestand aber, wie immer, in
der Unterstüzung gleichgerichteter Gruppen und ihre
Aktionen. Wir sehen ja unsere Aufgabe nicht darin, unsere
Partei nach vorn zu spielen, sondern wir versuchten, alle
Besuchungen um Verständigung, Entspannung, Koexistenz und
für die Erhaltung der demokratischen Grundrechte zu
unterstützen. Jahresbericht 1961-64. DFU-Bezirksverband
Duesseldorf-Mettmann.

In 1963

> ... die DFU als solche ist kaum in Erscheinung getreten.
Naturlich heisst das nicht, dass wir untätig gewesen
waren. Es gab immer vielerlei Anlass, mit den
verschiedenen Friedensgruppen im Kreis zusammenzuarbeiten,
von vor allem bei der Vorbereitung des Östermarsches, bei
Veranstaltungen zum Hirschauf und zum Antikriegstag
(IdE event) und kaum noch bei der Versammlung mit
Pastor Mommeier (IdE). Jedoch haben die Unionfreunde
mit der vorletzten Reihe gestanden und mitgetan. Letter
from constituency party to its members, December 1963.
The Anti-Bomb movement (KFA)\(^1\)

After elections, support for the KFA had the highest priority for the DFU.\(^2\) The KFA was one of the largest movements of the decade, entry to it was easy as it was loosely structured and had no formal membership, it offered the DFU access to new people, and the movement pursued one of the DFU's key goals. By 1964 the KFA had moved away from its single-issue, one-event-a-year stage and became more useful to the DFU. The link between the DFU and KFA was not publicised by the two bodies as it was not in the interest of either. The KFA insisted on having an 'above party' image and it recruited people - trade unionists, Socialist students, people from the SPD, etc. - who had little or no time for the DFU. The main parties were against the KFA whose public reputation suffered as Communist agents and DFU personnel within it were exposed by the campaign's enemies. In 1964 the KFA started

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1 Kampagne fuer Abruestung - Osternarsch der Atomwaffengegner.

2 Each year, the DFU told its members to assist the KFA. The instructions for 1962 read:

Unterstuetzung der Vorbereitung der Ostermarsche ... 
Zusammenarbeit mit allen Marschteilnehmern, auch mit denen die auserhalb der DFU stehen, in fairer und den Interesse der Osternarsch dienender Weise ... es soll for allem aber auch dafür besorgt werden, dass moeglichst viele neue Personen, besonders aus SPD und Gewerkschaften, aus christlichen und liberalen Kreisen in die Vorbereitschaft mit einbezogen und fuer die Teilnahme an den Marschden gewonnen zu werden. Zur Vorbereitung der Ostermarsche sollen in Zusammenarbeit mit anderen politischen Gruppen ... in jedem (DFU) Bezirk vorbereitende Aktionen stattfinden ... 'Aktionsplan 1962', loc. cit.
legal proceedings against the CDU-Fraktionen which had claimed that the KFA was under Communist influence and that the

'Hauptträger der Ostmarken sei die komunistfreundliche DFU'.¹

The KFA insisted that it had no links with the DFU.² However, the case of one KFA committee supports the argument of DFU leaders, that in some areas the DFU was the KFA and that the party was closely involved in the campaign.

The KFA organised itself in Duesseldorf-Nettman in November 1961. For the first three years a single committee based in Velbert, the area's largest town, ran the movement. In 1963/64 it was replaced by three local committees in Velbert, Nettmann and Hilden. This devolution was a failure and from 1966 almost the entire area was again run from Velbert. The committee in Velbert was for all practical purposes the KFA movement in Duesseldorf-Nettman.³

At the core of the movement, the presence of DFU members and Communists was strong. The officers of the KFA in 1961-63 were frequently from the DFU. Of the four KFA chairmen, two came from the party: Guenter Forst, in 1962-64, and Paul Stagsmann, from 1967. In the same period, the secretary (who was also the chairwoman of the constituency party) and the treasurer were DFU

¹ Informationen zur abrasutung, 24.1.1964.
² Ibid.
leaders. The other two members of the 1964–66 executive came from the DFU as did one of the three other members on the 1966–68 executive. The KFA press officer in 1961–63 was a Communist who was also a DFU member. The two auditors of accounts from 1966 were from the party. Of the three local delegates to the regional committee, one was in the DFU and another came from the KPD.1

The active DFU members also worked in the KFA. The Velbert based committee met at least 32 times in 1961–68, excluding 1962. Twenty-one of these meetings were attended once or more often by 83 persons. 38% of them were DFU leaders and members. Another 26% were known Communists of whom the great majority – 16 – came to the movement as DFU members. All the DFU members and the Communists outside the party comprised 45% of the persons attending the committee meetings.2 The bulk of the activists came from this group.3

The survey of local KFA activities is restricted to a single year. In 1966 the local KFA undertook several functions and much of the work was done by DFU members. The KFA committee met six times that year. As in other years, the Easter march was the big event. Preparations began in January. The KFA sold tickets and

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2 Information from the 21 meetings' minutes which had attached separate sheets with the signatures of the people attending. For sources of local DFU members and Communists see Chapter VIII.
3 Interview with KFA secretary.
arranged transport for local people attending the big KFA public meeting, in one of the cities of NW, which started the year's campaigning in the region. Over the next few weeks 140 signatures were collected including 8 from Jungsozialisten which was seen as a 'breakthrough'. A public meeting with speaker was arranged. Pamphlets were distributed. Finally, on three consecutive days the local KFA had to transport 50 marchers back and forth from the route of the march.¹

The march was an annual routine and occasional activities were also undertaken. During January, the local KFA ordered and paid for 22 hoardings and 1,000 pamphlets advertising a local exhibition of photos of the Vietnam war.² It also planned a public meeting for June or July but no speaker could be found and the event did not take place until October. On Hiroshima day, in early August, three local marchers distributed 1,000 copies of the special Vietnam war issue of the Communist-controlled Deutsche Volkszeitung. That is, UNION material was distributed during a KFA event. In December, 12 KFA people, of whom seven were BDU members, collected nearly £100 in the streets of Valbert for the Hifsnaktion Vietnam.⁴

¹ Interview with KFA secretary. Minutes, 31.3.1966.
² Minutes, 7.1.1966.
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kirche und Demokratie

Some Protestant clergymen worked in the DFU. However, even the bulk of the progressive clerics of the Bruderschaften kept away from the DFU. In 1966 the Arbeitsgemeinschaft was founded to organise clergymen outside the DFU for a protest action against the proposed emergency laws. The body was initiated and led by Pfarrer Werner, the DFU's federal business manager and a member of the Bruderschaften, it had its own letter headings, used Werner's private address, and was backed by the DFU.

In May 1966, the group sent an 'open letter' to all the Bundestag deputies, signed by 822 clergics, theologians and lay Church leaders. The letter warned the deputies of the undemocratic dangers of extraordinary State powers and asked them not to vote for the required amendment of the Basic Laws. On 31 October, 260 clergymen marched silently through Bonn in protest against the government's support for the Vietnam war, and on the following day the group held a conference whose theme was 'Die Kirche trauert Verantwortung fuer Demokratie'. Thereafter, the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fell into disuse, but in 1968 Werner organised its erstwhile supporters to march through Bonn as part of the Notstand fuer Demokratie movement.

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1 See Chapters IV, VI.
2 *Offener Brief an die Abgeordneten des Deutschen Bundestages.* (The author has a copy in his possession).
4 Letter from Pfarrer Werner to *Liebe Schwestern und Bruder!* 26.4.1968.
The DFU was pleased with the experiment. The I.G. Metall, which was a strong critic of the DFU, wished the DFU sponsored Arbeitergemeinschaft's activities 'muten Erfolg'. ¹

¹ Bericht von der Arbeitstätigkeit, op. cit.
CONCLUSION

The SPD's revisionist 1959 Bad Godesberg programme and expulsion of critics helped the DFU but would not have resulted in the origin of the party. Its founders were too preoccupied with defence and foreign affairs, and prepared to forego class politics to split with the Social Democrats, who had just adopted their Deutschlandplan, over ideology. The break came when in 1960 the SPD disowned this plan and accepted the essentials of the government's 'policy of strength'.

The DFU was the continuation of a post-war practice of the fringe Left. It was preceded by two similar national neutralist minor parties which also neglected divisive class and material issues and tried to appeal to the moral, humanitarian and national sentiments of diverse people. However, the DFU was also different. The Edd and GVP had been sideshows of the legal KPD while the DFU became the main electoral outlet and one of the major propaganda venues of the underground Communist party, and, unlike the two earlier parties, the DFU had no neutralist rivals on the Left. These were the two main reasons why the DFU had more support than the two other parties. In 1960 the DFU alliance embraced 11 separate but closely co-ordinated minor groups and recruited support from many others. It did not have as many members as it claimed, but in addition it had the active help of many supporters.

The DFU was the umbrella party of a KPD-sponsored united front which under the guise of democracy, peace and unity pursued the Soviet aims of winning Pankow's international recognition, taking
Born out of NATO, containing West Germany's military establishment, and discrediting her regime at home and abroad. Without the help of the KPD, the DFU could not have built its organisation and achieved its level of activity. Yet the DFU's Communist links were a continuous source of friction within the party and a most damaging liability in a fiercely anti-Communist nation. The DFU was a road out of isolation for the Communist party during its period of illegality. It not only provided the KPD with a legal electoral outlet, but also gave it access to non-Communists who accepted the DFU's declared aims at face value. The suggestion of Barnes et al. that the DFU only won what remained of the KPD's vote is unfounded. The Communists soon became dissatisfied with the DFU. However, as events quickly showed, the DFU could win more votes than the newly legalised Communist party.

The DFU claimed support ranging from communists to conservatives. It aimed to attract supporters from most social and political groups by rising above sectionalism and by concentrating on shared values and fears. The party tried to exploit the nationalist sentiments, anti-war fears and religious convictions of the population, the liberal humanitarian values of bourgeois radicals and the non-material Socialist morality of working class radicals. In particular, the DFU wanted to recruit the prestige of the social elite and the numerical strength of the working-classes. To make this possible, the party avoided a divisive formal dogma and economic and social policies except when they could be framed as being of national rather than class interest. However, even before it moved to the Left on socio-economic issues from 1965 onwards, the DFU's mood, policies, and
image delimited the scope of the united front's recruitment. Not only did the party's anti-Fascism cut it off from the extreme Right, which the DFU did not mind, but its obvious fear and distrust of conservative-liberal state power must have offended some moderate right-wingers whom the party did want to recruit. The DFU's known Communist links further added to its left-wing image.

The great bulk of the DFU's leaders, allies, voters, supporters, and most likely members as well, came from the Left. Not surprisingly, people from the extreme Right were very rare, but even people from the centre and moderate Right were weakly represented and most of them, at least among the DFU's senior leaders, had moved to the Left before joining the party. The DFU alliance had within it part of the diversity of the Left. It embraced middle and working class radicals, Communists, Socialists, authoritarians and democrats, pacifists, neutralists, Nazi victims, clerics and non-believers, some anti-Bomb and civil rights activists. This was the qualified success of the DFU. However, there were notable gaps in the DFU's left-wing support. Some fringe Socialists, many pacifists, probably most progressive clerics and humanists, many Easter marchers, all but very few industrial unionists, the 'New Left' and youth in general were outside the DFU alliance. The attitude towards the Communists was one of the basic dividing lines on the fringe Left, and the DFU largely recruited from that part of the Left which could, or thought it could, work with Communists.

The DFU's image as a bourgeois, intellectual party was at odds with its support basis. The DFU's most senior leaders and the DC54
and PK came from the social elite and the DFU was keen to exploit the prestige of these people, but most likely the bulk of the DFU's and UNION's members and active supporters were manual and white-collar workers.

Yet bourgeois and intellectual newcomers to minor party politics were an important source of leaders for the DFU. The party's humanitarian and moral values were attuned to the values of middle-class radicals. Not only the DFU, but also the GVP seven years earlier, had managed to recruit these people into active minor party politics. It seems that this type of party largely determined this particular type of support. As the founding of the GVP suggests, it did not take the KPD's recruitment activities to bring these people into this type of party.

In its recruitment, behaviour and programme, the DFU was a cause or attitude group. It fulfilled all the legal requirements of a West German party, but behaved like a pressure group. Elections were very important to the DFU. At first, the DFU was contesting elections against the SPD and then it tried to help the Social Democrats against the CSU/CSU. The DFU was fully aware that it could only hope to affect national politics through the SPD. To the DFU, elections were not about governmental power but a means of trying to exert influence and of making propaganda. Even with poor election results, being a party and contesting elections was seen as more effective in propagating a cause than any other form of fringe activity. Also, much of the DFU's energy was channelled into non-partisan work. To the DFU, being a party and elections were important, but it did not specialise in either. The DFU wanted to be more than just the umbrella party of an electoral
united front. It wanted to become the core of most fringe Left elements and knew that as a party it could not reach many of them. It wanted the advantages and to minimise the drawbacks of being a party and this required non-partisan work. It was also determined to operate outside the party arena because its effectiveness within it was limited.

The DFU did not have the early success which may have united its diverse components behind the formula on which the united front was based. Very quickly, various elements in the party wanted to move away from united front politics or at least define it more narrowly while the leadership was determined to maintain the formula. The dispute was about the functions of a party and elections. The DFU's preoccupation with these issues and its nature made it the electoral strand of the fringe Left. Collectively, the DFU was not an inward looking messianic sectarian group. Its supporters were motivated by a mixture of the symbolic and attainment orientated approach to politics which became linked to the dispute over the formula. Generally, the formula's critics were not equipped for a long-term uphill struggle of uncertain prospects and needed tangible results quickly. The supporters of the formula did not have the same need for speedy and visible results. They had a long-term view of things and also included those to whom the activity itself was drive reducing or satisfying. Yet in this group were also those, including the Communist party, who insisted on deploying their available resources effectively. The demotion of the DFU in 1968 and the collapse of the GVP after only five years, show the limits of 'expressive' politics.
Some dissenters criticised the DFU for not concentrating enough on being a party. To them election results were very important and they therefore defined the role of a party narrowly. They wanted an electoral united front and saw the DFU's non-partisan work as detrimental to its party role. In contrast, some intra-party critics searched for electoral effectiveness by demanding that the DFU should move out of electoral politics. From 1962, these people argued that as the DFU had no electoral potential, it should cease to split the Left, which only helped the governing parties, and throw its votes behind the SPD, the 'lesser evil', against the CDU/CSU. Others looked for a way out of electoral failure by rejecting united front politics. They wanted to give more attention to material issues which would have resulted in a working-class or Socialist party. They were rejecting the party's efforts to divert them away from materialism and ideology. Bad Godesberg was casting its shadow over the party. There was also a clash between the party's working-class majority and its programme which was more attuned to the values of middle than working class radicalism. Some of the party's own people were prepared to use the DFU's failure to turn it into a Socialist party. To some this was a matter of conscience and integrity, but there was also the argument that the DFU had to become a class party to win mass support among the working-classes without which it could not escape its political insignificance.

This internal pressure, but more so the Great Coalition, student unrest and the economic recession moved the party to the Left. In its anti-organic State campaign, the DFU no longer restricted itself to calls for changes in policy and the reform of
public institutions. It now also demanded a drastic reform of capitalism which it saw as the roots of everything it opposed. The party tried to present its assault on the politico-economic power structure as a national and not a class concern, and it assumed that the party's move to the Right had swung the opposition elements to the Left. It believed that a moderately left-wing united front was as opportune after 1965 as a 'deideologised' one was essential in 1960. As far as the party's public statements were concerned, the old formula had been moved to the Left but not abandoned. In practice there was little left of it.

In 1968 the DFU lost its umbrella role because it did not come up to the expectations of many of its supporters. The party's failure is evident, but the main reasons for it are less certain. The DFU was riddled by conflicts which did it damage but it is doubtful if they were more than a marginal factor. The party's failure was largely due to external factors. The DFU had only one traditional support basis to draw upon, the Communists, and they were a discredited and declining political force in Western Germany. The age of the party's members and voters show that it recruited little support among the new generations. Its appeal was to the discontent of small minorities - pacifists, academics, anti-Bomb activists, etc. - who lacked numerical weight. The party's attempts to appeal to the materially dissatisfied were probably unconvincing and amidst general economic well being of limited potential. The DFU had the satisfaction of being an irritant to the SPD, but the Social Democrats and the industrial unions succeeded in isolating the DFU. The party's pro-Communist image
made this easier for the organised working-class was as anti-
Communist as the rest of the nation. The DFU's failure to break
through to the support of these two mass movements defeated the
party's aim of exerting electoral pressure upon the SPD and made
it politically impotent.
APPENDIX

In 1969 and 1970 the author interviewed 26 leaders of the Deutsche Friedens-Union whose names and offices were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>DFU Offices in 1960-68</th>
<th>Offices in other UNION organisations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carl Backhaus</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
<td>VUS Joint Chairman</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-Chairman Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arno Behrisch</td>
<td>Director</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman NRW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albert Berg</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vice-Chairman Hamburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manfred Feustel</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Land Ex. Committee NRW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Land Agent NRW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fritz Goettges</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Land Ex. Committee NRW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman Bezirk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moenchengladbach-Rheydt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilo Hildebrandt</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Land Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Niedersachsen</td>
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<td>Vice-Chairman Bezirk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Buchholz</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rudolf Issayr</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman Bezirk Augsburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Werner Jording</td>
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<td>Land Ex. Committee NRW</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman Bezirk Paderborn-Wiedenbrueck</td>
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<td>Dr. Sophie Kirchhof</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vice-Chairwoman NRW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorenz Knorr</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>FK National Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fed. Business Manager</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Land Ex. Committee Hessen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mira von Kuehlmann</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>WFFB Chairwoman Bayern</td>
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<td>Vice-Chairwoman Bayern</td>
<td>Bayern; editorial board of WFFB's</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairwoman Bezirk</td>
<td>Frau und Frieden</td>
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<td>Muenchen</td>
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* Directors were members of Federal Executive Committee.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Lanfer</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
<td>Viessener-Bad Godesberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neinz-Joachim Nagel</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>FK National Committee</td>
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<td>Chairman Hessen</td>
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<td>Chairman Bezirk Gießen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vice-Chairman local branch Gießen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karl A. Otto</td>
<td>Landesbeirat NRW</td>
<td>Editor VUS's Socialistische Hefte</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter Pawellek</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
<td>VUS Central Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Land Agent Schleswig-Holstein</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Dr. Renate Riemack</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>DC54 Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Chairwoman Unionerrat</td>
<td>FK National Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pastor Werner Sanss</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Land Ex. Committee Hessen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Dr. Franz Paul Schneider</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
<td>FK Secretary DC54 Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Chairman Bayern</td>
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<td>Chairman Bezirk</td>
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<td>and local branch Würtzburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Stegmann</td>
<td>Vice-Chairman Bezirk</td>
<td>DNW Land Ex. Committee</td>
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<td>Duesseldorf-Mettmann</td>
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<td>Chairman local branch Neuses</td>
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<td>Helmut Steinkamp</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ex. Committee local branch Bielefeld</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dr. J.F. Toennies</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman Baden-Wuerrtb.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Chairman Bezirk Freiburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prof. Eckhardt Vogt</td>
<td>Fed. Ex. Committee</td>
<td>FK National Committee</td>
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<td>Vice-Chairman Bezirk</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and local branch Marburg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Josef Weber</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>BD&amp;D Chairman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Unionsrat</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Pfarrer Heinrich Werner
Director
Fed, Business Manager
Chairman Rheinland-Pfalz

Hilde Westphal
Fed, Ex. Committee
Chairwoman Bezirk
Remscheidt

Gertrud Wolferts
Fed, Ex. Committee
Vice-Chairwoman NRW
Chairwoman Bezirk
Duesseldorf-Mettmann
Secretary local branch
Velbert

DWU Land
Ex. Committee

WFFB Activist
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**General**


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* After 1966 the name 'ausweg' was used for a series of occasional pamphlets. The Land parties published their own news-sheets, e.g. *Der Neue Ruf* (Niedersachsen), *DFU Informationen* (Hessen), *DFU Korrespondenz* (Baden-Wuerttemberg), *die uebersicht aus NRW* (Nordrhein-Westfalen). The DFU was also strongly supported by the 'commercial' weekly *Westdeutsche Tageblatt* (circulation 27,000) whose Bonn correspondent and business consultant was Arno Behrisch, a senior DFU leader. The paper collapsed in 1963 or early 1964.

** The Land parties and some of their Bezirke issued their own press releases.


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* The author has in his possession over 300 directives, instructions, letters, lists of leaders, etc. Only the most useful are listed.


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* See also Molt, op. cit., pp. 117-29.
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** In 1972 the Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Saarland provided the author with the listed publications as well as with its own Die Deutsche Demokratische Union (DDU) im Saarland (Kurzanalyse).


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sozialistische hefte, 1962-68 (monthly)
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Ibid., pp. 133-38.

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