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Epistemological disjunctivism and the new evil demon

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Madison, B. J. C. (2014) Epistemological disjunctivism and the new evil demon. Acta Analytica , Volume 29 (Number 1). pp. 61-70. doi:10.1007/s12136-013-0194-4

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0194-4

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Abstract

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New Evil Genius thought experiment is incomplete at best. Therefore, as presented, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title: Acta Analytica
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
ISSN: 0353-5150
Official Date: March 2014
Dates:
DateEvent
March 2014Published
19 June 2013Available
Volume: Volume 29
Number: Number 1
Page Range: pp. 61-70
DOI: 10.1007/s12136-013-0194-4
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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