Renzo, Massimo (2014) Fairness, self-deception and political obligation. Philosophical Studies, Volume 169 (Number 3). pp. 467-488. doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0203-x ISSN 0031-8116.

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Abstract

I offer a new account of fair-play obligations for non-excludable benefits received from the state. Firstly, I argue that non-acceptance of these benefits frees recipients of fairness obligations only when a counterfactual condition is met; i.e. when non-acceptance would hold up in the closest possible world in which recipients do not hold motivationally-biased beliefs triggered by a desire to free-ride. Secondly, I argue that because of common mechanisms of self-deception there will be recipients who reject these benefits without meeting the counterfactual condition. For this reason, I suggest that those who reject non-excludable benefits provided by the state have a duty to support their rejection with adequate reasons. Failing that, they can be permissibly treated as if they had fair-play obligations (although in fact they might not have them). Thus, I claim that there is a distinction, largely unappreciated, between the question of whether we have a duty of fairness to obey the law and the question of whether we can be permissibly treated as if we had one.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophical Studies
Publisher:	Springer
ISSN:	0031-8116
Official Date:	July 2014
Dates:	Date Event July 2014 Published 8 September 2013 Available
Volume:	Volume 169
Number:	Number 3
Page Range:	pp. 467-488
DOI:	10.1007/s11098-013-0203-x
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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