Skip to content Skip to navigation
University of Warwick
  • Study
  • |
  • Research
  • |
  • Business
  • |
  • Alumni
  • |
  • News
  • |
  • About

University of Warwick
Publications service & WRAP

Highlight your research

  • WRAP
    • Home
    • Search WRAP
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse WRAP by Year
    • Browse WRAP by Subject
    • Browse WRAP by Department
    • Browse WRAP by Funder
    • Browse Theses by Department
  • Publications Service
    • Home
    • Search Publications Service
    • Browse by Warwick Author
    • Browse Publications service by Year
    • Browse Publications service by Subject
    • Browse Publications service by Department
    • Browse Publications service by Funder
  • Help & Advice
University of Warwick

The Library

  • Login
  • Admin

Optimal stalling when bargaining

Tools
- Tools
+ Tools

Thanassoulis, John (2010) Optimal stalling when bargaining. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Volume 34 (Number 2). pp. 101-120. doi:10.1016/j.jedc.2009.05.003

Research output not available from this repository, contact author.
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.05.003

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, such as that for housing, in which another agent may come and compete for the right to strike a deal. The analysis allows the buyer and seller to have possibly differing views as to how likely such a competition is. Hence the buyer and the seller disagree about their respective bargaining powers. These views adjust to market realizations as the parties learn. It is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium which can be explicitly constructed: hence, conditional on market conditions, equilibrium prices and optimal stall lengths (that is, delay) can be found. Bargaining delay can only occur if there is optimism (not pessimism) and only if the parties are open to learning as time elapses. This delay can occur even for very small levels of optimism and the delay can be for economically significant periods.

Item Type: Journal Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Finance Group
Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): House buying, House selling
Journal or Publication Title: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publisher: Elsevier BV
ISSN: 0165-1889
Official Date: February 2010
Dates:
DateEvent
February 2010Published
29 May 2009Available
17 May 2009Accepted
4 September 2008Submitted
Volume: Volume 34
Number: Number 2
Number of Pages: 19
Page Range: pp. 101-120
DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.05.003
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item View Item
twitter

Email us: wrap@warwick.ac.uk
Contact Details
About Us