Melis, Alicia P., Hare, Brian and Tomasello, Michael (2009) Chimpanzees coordinate in a negotiation game. Evolution and Human Behavior, Volume 30 (Number 6). pp. 381-392. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003

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Abstract

A crucially important aspect of human cooperation is the ability to negotiate to cooperative outcomes when interests over resources conflict. Although chimpanzees and other social species may negotiate conflicting interests regarding travel direction or activity timing, very little is known about their ability to negotiate conflicting preferences over food. In the current study, we presented pairs of chimpanzees with a choice between two cooperative tasks—one with equal payoffs (e.g., 5-5) and one with unequal payoffs (higher and lower than in the equal option, e.g., 10-1). This created a conflict of interests between partners with failure to work together on the same cooperative task resulting in no payoff for either partner. The chimpanzee pairs cooperated successfully in as many as 78–94% of the trials across experiments. Even though dominant chimpanzees preferred the unequal option (as they would obtain the largest payoff), subordinate chimpanzees were able to get their way (the equal option) in 22–56% of trials across conditions. Various analyses showed that subjects were both strategic and also cognizant of the strategies used by their partners. These results demonstrate that one of our two closest primate relatives, the chimpanzee, can settle conflicts of interest over resources in mutually satisfying ways—even without the social norms of equity, planned strategies of reciprocity, and the complex communication characteristic of human negotiation.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Journal or Publication Title:	Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher:	Elsevier Inc
ISSN:	1090-5138
Official Date:	November 2009
Dates:	Date Event November 2009 Published 7 August 2009 Available 13 May 2009 Accepted 18 September 2008 Submitted
Volume:	Volume 30
Number:	Number 6
Number of Pages:	11
Page Range:	pp. 381-392
DOI:	10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.05.003
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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