Roberts, Pendaran and Schmidtke, Kelly (2012) In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Volume 3 (Number 4). pp. 547-558. doi:10.1007/s13164-012-0114-3

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Abstract

Are the following propositions true of the colors: No object can be more than one determinable or determinate color all over at the same time (Incompatibility); the colors of objects are mind-independent (Objectivism); and most human observers usually perceive the colors of objects veridically in typical conditions (Veridicality)? One reason to think not is that the empirical literature appears to support the proposition that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors of objects amongst human observers in typical conditions (P-Disagreement). In this article, we defend Incompatibility, Objectivism, and Veridicality by calling into question whether the empirical literature really supports P-Disagreement.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Color -- Psychological aspects, Color vision
Journal or Publication Title:	Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Publisher:	Springer Netherlands
ISSN:	1878-5158
Official Date:	21 October 2012
Dates:	Date Event 21 October 2012 Published
Volume:	Volume 3
Number:	Number 4
Number of Pages:	12
Page Range:	pp. 547-558
DOI:	10.1007/s13164-012-0114-3
Institution:	University of Warwick
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

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