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Information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive
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Dewan, Torun, Galeotti, Andrea, Ghiglino, Christian and Squintani, Francesco (2015) Information aggregation and optimal structure of the executive. American Journal of Political Science, Volume 59 (Number 2). pp. 475-494. doi:10.1111/ajps.12121 ISSN 0092-5853.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12121
Abstract
We model two aspects of executives in parliamentary democracies: Decision-making authority is assigned to individuals, and private information is aggregated through communication. When information is relevant to all policies and communication is private, all decisions should be centralized to a single politician. A government that holds cabinet meetings, where information is made available to all decision makers, outperforms one where communication is private: A multimember cabinet can be optimal; it need not be single peaked around the most moderate politician or ideologically connected. Centralization is nonmonotonic in the degree of ideological divergence. In a large cabinet, all power should be given to the most moderate politician. Even when uncertainty is policy specific and a single politician is informed on each policy, power should never be fully decentralized. Our model provides a justification for centralized authority and cabinet meetings that enhance the quality of policy.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | American Journal of Political Science | ||||||
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd. | ||||||
ISSN: | 0092-5853 | ||||||
Official Date: | April 2015 | ||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | Volume 59 | ||||||
Number: | Number 2 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 475-494 | ||||||
DOI: | 10.1111/ajps.12121 | ||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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