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Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority
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Bernhardt, Dan and Graham, Brett (2015) Flexibility vs. protection from an unrepresentative legislative majority. Games and Economic Behavior, 93 . pp. 59-88. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.004 ISSN 0899-8256.
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Official URL: http://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economi...
Abstract
We derive the equilibrium institutional design of representative democracy by citizens who first vote on the supermajority required for a new policy to be adopted, and then delegate decision making to a legislature that selects policy given that institutional constraint. A legislature that can freely tailor policy to reflect society’s current preferences is good. However, the views of the median legislator or agenda setter may differ from the median citizen’s, and an unchecked legislature can implement bad policy. We characterize how the primitives describing the preferences of actors and the status quo policy affect the equilibrium degree of legislative flexibility.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||||
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Subjects: | J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General) | ||||||||||
Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Economics | ||||||||||
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Representative government and representation, Legislative bodies | ||||||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Games and Economic Behavior | ||||||||||
Publisher: | Elsevier | ||||||||||
ISSN: | 0899-8256 | ||||||||||
Official Date: | September 2015 | ||||||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 93 | ||||||||||
Page Range: | pp. 59-88 | ||||||||||
DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.07.004 | ||||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access | ||||||||||
Date of first compliant deposit: | 30 December 2015 | ||||||||||
Date of first compliant Open Access: | 29 January 2017 | ||||||||||
Adapted As: | Received 11 September 2012, Available online 29 July 2015 |
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