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Outside the Gate: A Study of Nietzsche's Project of Revaluation as Mediated via the Work of D. H. Lawrence.

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy and Literature.

University of Warwick, Dept. of Philosophy.

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Contents.

Acknowledgements and Declaration.
Abstract.
A Note on the Abbreviations used in the Text.

P.1. Outside the Gate: An Introduction.

P.25. Chapter I: Among the Ruins: Nihilism, Culture, and the Politics of Style.
P.31. Part II: Aspects of Nihilism as a Molar and Molecular Phenomenon.
P.31. II.i. Cash From Chaos: Nihilism and the Question of Capitalism.
P.43. II.iii. A Dry Soul is Best: Decadence, Sexuality, and the Subject.
P.49. II.iv. Closing Remarks: No One is Free to be a Crab.
P.51. III.i. Further Remarks on the Question of Culture.
P.59. III.ii. Art as the Counter-Nihilistic Force *par excellence*.
P.67. III.iii. Closing Remarks: From Among the Ruins to Beyond the Ruins.

P.70. Part I: Opening Remarks on How the Disease of Love Infects Modernity
and Its Politics in Relation to Lawrence's Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo.


P.79. II.i. Remarks on the Philosophy of Power.


P.95. II.iii. Problems, Concerns, and Dangers.

P.103. Part III: Beyond the Molar Level of Politics.

P.103. III.i. The Reconfiguration of the Subject as a Power-Formation.


P.119. I.i. Outside the Gate.

P.122. I.ii. "Jetzt war es Zeit, das Götter träten / aus bewohnten Dingen."


P.155. IV.i. Revolutions are so vieux jeu.

P.161. IV.ii. The Question of Fascism Once More.


I.i. The Significance of Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*.

I.ii. From Pollyanalytics to Schizoanalysis.

I.iii. Towards a Politics of Desire.

I.iv. The Body.

I.v. Towards a Philosophy of Becoming.

Part II: Schizoanalysis: Of Breakdowns, Breakthroughs, and Becomings.

II.i. The Case of Lady Chatterley: The Becoming of the New Eve.

II.ii. The Case of Lady Chatterley's Lover: The Becoming of the Old Adam.

Part III: Postanalysis: Towards a Democracy of Touch.

III.i. Opening Remarks on the Mystery of Touch and Lawrence's Notion of Democracy


Chapter V: *The Escaped Cock*: Revaluation and Resurrection: the Politics of Desire Part II.

Part I: Versus the Crucified.

I.i. Nietzsche as Anti-Christ.

I.ii. Lawrence as Apocalypsist.

Part II: Remarks on Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock* in Relation to Death, Sex, and the Resurrection into Touch.

Part III: Political and Ethical Considerations.

III.i. The Man Who Died and the Eternal Recurrence.

III.ii. The Man Who Died as Overman and Überchrist.

III.iii. The Man Who Died as Risen Lord.

P.272. IV.i. Nietzsche and Lawrence as Posthumous Thinkers.

P.273. IV.ii. Towards a Final Conclusion.

P.276. Outside the Gate: A Conclusion.

P.292. Notes and References.

P.354. Bibliography.
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Thanks are also due to my wife, my parents, and my friends.

Declaration.

I, Stephen Alexander Hall, being the author of this thesis, declare that the work contained within is my own and that it has not been published in any form, either in part or as a whole. I also confirm that the thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university.
Abstract.

The aim of this study is to illuminate in a novel and original manner the political and ethical character of Nietzsche's project of revaluation and to demonstrate its continued import and significance for thinking on culture and society today. In order to achieve this, I have placed Nietzsche's work in relation to the fiction, poetry, and prose of D.H. Lawrence, who, it is argued, provides the most imaginative and vital development of the above. In turn, Lawrence's thinking is exposed to more recent theoretical developments, thereby giving a good indication of the wider philosophical and political traditions within which the Nietzschean narrative of revaluation is produced, circulated, and maintained - and those against which it moves.

It is argued that this narrative, although now widely studied and debated, remains an illicit and marginalized form of philosophical discourse; one that is often derided and condemned by those whose own narratives form the dominant and legitimized language games within modern liberal society. Nietzsche's philosophy thus provides a vital counter-discourse which allows things to be said and voices to be heard that few other forms of philosophical discourse dare to allow. It is crucial, therefore, that such a text be explored, developed, and enabled to perform a role in as wide a social arena as possible.

In attempting to do this over the course of the five chapters that make up the work, several of the major themes and concerns of Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy, such as power and the reconfiguration of the subject, are examined at length and the thesis provides an exciting contribution both to Nietzsche studies and to the critical work on Lawrence, demonstrating the validity of Foucault's contention that the relation between philosophy, literature, and politics is permanent and fundamental.

It is concluded that Nietzsche's and Lawrence's political thinking is of most interest and use to us today when it becomes molecularized and minoritarianized; a politics of desire that frees itself from molar ambition and ascetic militancy, and, perhaps, opens the way not to fascism as is often feared, but, on the contrary, to a radically new notion of democracy: the democracy of touch.
A Note on the Abbreviations Used in the Text.

Where I have cited from Lawrence's novels at the heart of this thesis, the references are given immediately in the text and not in the Notes and References section, as is the case for all other writings. I have employed the following standard abbreviations for these novels:


NB: Titles marked with an asterisk are based on the text established in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of D.H. Lawrence.*
Outside the Gate: An Introduction.


The aim of this thesis is to illuminate the political and ethical character of Nietzsche's project of revaluation, by situating it within the context provided by the fiction, poetry, and prose of D.H. Lawrence, who, it is argued, provides the most imaginative and vital development of the above. In addition, Lawrence's thought is exposed to other strains of post-Nietzschean thought and theory where and when it becomes convenient and/or constructive to do so, giving an indication of the philosophical and political traditions within which the Nietzschean narrative is produced, maintained, and circulated – and those against which it moves. Most notably, the work of Deleuze is utilized here (including his studies in collaboration with Guattari), as is the thought of Heidegger. This is not to imply that the above all share the same political perspectives, social concerns, or philosophical approaches; quite clearly they do not and this work is not an attempt to produce a metanarrative that would suggest otherwise by illegitimately synthesizing the above in some manner. That said, it is my contention that there is a 'family resemblance' which is not merely coincidental among the above, and that there are obvious points of contact and signs of mutual infection worthy of investigation.

It is claimed that there are five main consequences of the death of God and that these form the five themes of Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy: 1. the destruction of the world (nihilism); 2. the dissolution of the subject; 3. the dis-organ-ization of the organism and the building of the body without organs; 4. the molecularization and minoritarianization of culture and politics; 5. the 'stuttering' of language. Coincidently, the thesis has been divided into five main chapters in which the above are crucial notions, although they do not determine the structure of the work. This, the structure, has been determined rather by
Lawrence's novels, following a chronological sequence that begins with *The Rainbow* and ends with *The Escaped Cock*, tracing out Lawrence's attempt to articulate and further the revaluation of values. The chapters are divided into parts in order to facilitate an easier reading, and each is provided with preliminary material and closing remarks in order to supplement the more general *Introduction* and *Conclusion* offered to the thesis as a whole. They are united by the above themes of power, subjectivity, and the need to form new relations and new ways of feeling, as well as by the central argument that both Nietzsche's and Lawrence's work is of important social and political significance. I shall say more concerning this latter point shortly. First, I wish to offer a brief reading and summary of the five chapters in this thesis, so that the thinking behind them is made explicit.

Chapter I sets out the central problematic of the work: modern European nihilism, and offers an initial response to this in terms of what we are calling here a politics of style; a politics which, as we show, bifurcates into a grand politics of evil and cruelty (examined in chapters II and III) and a molecular politics of desire (developed in chapters IV and V). Debate in this opening chapter takes place within a fictional environment (the Ruins) provided by Lawrence's two great novels of modernity and nihilism: *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love*. It touches on questions to do with economics, technology, culture and the subject. I argue that whilst industrial capitalism is fundamentally nihilistic (reducing as it does life to market value and the logic of the machine and destroying as it does the conditions needed for cultural greatness as Nietzsche understands it), it may nevertheless release flows and forces which enable the emergence of new forms of self and society. Simply put, there may be positive aspects to the so-called *crisis* of nihilism, and the *décadence* that is both causal and symptomatic of it may yet prove to be vital for the advancement (and, indeed, enhancement) of man. Besides which, as Nietzsche argues, 'no one is free to be a crab'; i.e., there can be no
side-stepping or going back, modernity cannot be reversed and modern European nihilism has to be confronted, explored, and experienced. The only way to move beyond the Ruins may be via an active acceleration of the processes now unfolding, thereby bringing nihilism to the point of its own consummation whereupon it reveals itself not simply as an End (of Man and History), but as that which provides the very womb of the future. For if nihilism devalues values on the one hand, so too does it provide the opportunity for a revaluation on the other, by enabling man to form a new and uncanny perspective on himself and the world. Thus, as I conclude here, at the very least nihilism is an ambiguous state of affairs in need of calm and careful consideration, free from the apocalyptic rhetoric that all too often surrounds it. If it remains in a very real sense the impasse that dominates our horizons and determines the limits of our thought, so too is it the promise of a newly open horizon and of a thinking that exists beyond the old conventions of moral-rationalism.

As mentioned, chapter I also examines a politics of style developed as a positive and appropriate response to nihilism; art being promoted as the counter-nihilistic force par excellence. For art, it is suggested, provides the possibility of another revealing for man (i.e., another way of being in the world) and allows him to regain connection with the physical (i.e., to come back into touch with the real). This construction of a new revealing, or what Deleuze calls a 'change of element', enables man to move from negation of the world to its total affirmation. It is my contention that a different revealing based upon art and an understanding of the tragic is a genuine possibility and not merely a form of utopian speculation; for when art allies itself with politics and ethics, then the revolt into style becomes very much a revolt into the real. Art helps us correspond to the nearness of things and the very thingness of things, awakening in us an intuitive awareness and a sensitivity to physical intensities. It is for this reason that art has long troubled a long line of moral idealists and political ascetics - from Plato to Stalin.
A radical politics of style would be characterized above all by plurality, heterogeneity, contradiction, and difference; a radical ethics of style would promote not only care and creation of the self (in the ancient Greek manner revived by Nietzsche and Foucault), but also a concern for others and otherness. At this point, the question of style bubbles over into and points towards the more profound notion of desire; the major theme of chapters IV and V, as indicated.

However, prior to this, in chapters II and III, we necessarily explore a different but related theme: Power and, in relation to this theme, a politics of evil and cruelty. This is examined in the context provided by Lawrence's so-called 'power-trilogy' of novels: *Aaron's Rod*, *Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent*; works which whilst experimental and speculative on the one hand (books for thinking – nothing else), seemingly fall into the programmatic and prescriptive on the other, concerning as they do the revolutionary seizure of history and the mechanisms of state power, and the imposition of a violent authoritarianism at a molar party-political level that is all too characteristic of modern political theory and practice on both the extreme-left and the far-right of the ideological spectrum.

In an attempt to move beyond the Ruins and overcome the impasse of nihilism, Nietzsche and Lawrence consider a transcendent and transgressive politics based on a theoretical and fictional terrorism and a radical aristocratism, the latter combining elements that are peculiarly pre- and post-modern, as well as modern and counter-modern at one and the same time. Such a politics is certainly suggested by their cultural and aesthetic thinking, as well as their understanding of power, and although many critics (such as Mark Warren, for example) have argued that Nietzsche's aristocratism has no intrinsic relation to his philosophy (and thus can be legitimately divorced from such and thence abandoned), we argue here that there is a closer and more intricate link than such critics allow; even
whilst conceding that, ultimately, the above politics proves strategically to be of limited use in forming a workable contemporary model.

Try as Nietzsche and Lawrence do to suggest the *radical* nature of their aristocratism, they frequently slip into a lazy and fundamentally conservative authoritarianism that reproduces not only the errors of classical political philosophy, but also several of the base stupidities of modern political theory. Somewhat disappointingly, it seems that neither Nietzsche or Lawrence could ever quite find the resources needed to endure the experience of nihilism, and thus each falls back into the quest for some dramatic means of transcending the Ruins and completing the history of Western metaphysics. This tendency in both writers to oscillate frantically from an advocacy of ever-further deterritorialization to desperate attempts to reterritorialize in the void; from a desire to accelerate the processes of decodification to a desire to recodify all the more completely, is, as will be illustrated, a marked feature of their writings. They too, at times, suffer from the condition of modernity which they set out to diagnose; i.e., their thinking is never quite as untimely or resentment-free as they would have us believe. Nietzsche and Lawrence are, one suggests, simply mistaken when each allows his preoccupations with the possibility of a new beginning to force him into assuming the role of an overly anxious mid-wife who prematurely attempts to induce the birth of such via inappropriate (and potentially disastrous) means. Only by abandoning the politics of transgression and hopes for a revolutionary transcendence will man save himself from the threat of fascism (an ever-present danger at both a macro- and micro-level, which is discussed in this work) and free himself at long last from the twin spirits of revenge and gravity; a crucial aspect of Nietzsche’s revaluation.

Chapters II and III are also both concerned with tracing that which lies outside of the political and, indeed, the human (i.e., outside of morality and reason). We
witness how the attempt is made by Lawrence in *Kangaroo* and *The Plumed Serpent* to bring a notion of the *Outside* into his thinking on politics and subjectivity; to reconfigure the latter in terms of the daimonic and the divine and to transform political thinking via the substantiation of mystery and the reintroduction of the gods back into history.

This making of the political into an 'occult' project and the stressing of the 'theosophical' character of the revaluation, is a vitally important aspect of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's work, and it shapes the structure and concerns of this thesis from the end of chapter II through chapter III and into chapter V. Ultimately, it is argued here, Nietzsche and Lawrence are religious writers in the widest sense of this word, more concerned with *Geist* and the dark gods who perhaps alone can 'save' us, than with the mechanisms of the *Reich* or any party-political programme. Thus although each repeatedly attempts to express his vision and philosophical insights in socio-political terms, neither wishes to imply that the social and/or the political provides the final horizon of meaning. As shown in chapters III and V, Lawrence attempts to make a daring combination of politics and a reactivated paganism in order to further the project of revaluation. According to Habermas, it is precisely the neo-pagan aspects of the above (i.e., the confronting of Occidental reason and Christian morality with its *Other*) that reveals the "political-moral insensitivity and ... aesthetic tastelessness" in Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean thought. Admittedly, there is an element of this in *The Plumed Serpent* of which criticism is perhaps justified. However, such an entirely negative assessment is challenged here, as I argue that Nietzsche's turning to Dionysus and Lawrence's resurrection of the man who died (Jesus) as Osiris (see chapter V), is a profoundly important (and profoundly beautiful) move. If Habermas feels uncomfortable with the 'spicing up' of political philosophy with talk of the dark gods, as poets, Nietzsche and Lawrence are surely entitled to "all kinds of emotions and sensations which an ordinary man would have repudiated"
(K., p.14) and, essentially, I am in broad agreement and sympathy with Heidegger's claim that it is to the poets that man must turn for guidance in this time of nihilism.

Chapter II is also an important examination of the critique of *Love* (i.e., moral-idealism), as developed by Nietzsche and Lawrence. It is shown how love infects all aspects of modern existence; including modern politics, as socialism, liberalism, and - crucially - as fascism also. All of these 'ism' narratives are rejected decisively by Nietzsche and Lawrence on the grounds that they are merely a making 'natural' of Christianity and behind each remains lurking the ascetic ideal. The critical and clinical analysis of love thus forms an important part of the genealogical project of revaluation; it is an analysis which brings Nietzsche and Lawrence into opposition not only with Christianity, but also the modern state and the reactive forces of civilization (forces they contrast to those productive of culture).

In chapter III, which is essentially a continuation of and a conclusion to chapter II, we analyse Lawrence's attempt to not only make politics grand, but also sacred; and also his final attempt in *The Plumed Serpent* to develop a notion of transgression, i.e., a deliberate violation of human limits and norms, promoted in the hope that man may be able to kick his way back into paradise. Clearly this idea develops the Nietzschean notion of new innocence via an active immoralism, and I argue that the politics of cruelty rests additionally upon three other key beliefs found in Nietzsche: Firstly, a belief in an anti-humanist philosophy of power; secondly, a belief that society and culture require acts of violence and a hierarchical power arrangement; thirdly, a belief in the need to affirm a 'general economy of the whole'. These notions are all examined in detail in the course of chapter III. The chapter concludes in agreement with Lawrence's own view; namely, that the leadership principle has ultimately to be recognized as obsolete.
and that the militant political ideal is redundant, no matter how one tries to dress it up. In contrast to many of his contemporaries, Lawrence realizes that the revolutionary politics of grandeur is as invalid and ineffective as it is nostalgic and romantic.

However, this is not to deny that in his own work post-Serpent Lawrence continues to seek out a politics that is beyond the limited option of liberal democracy, as well as a new ethic and model of self based upon an active understanding of power in its naked materiality, stripped from the negative and reactive representations of slave morality. Thus Nietzsche's thinking remains central, even if Lawrence identifies a need to reinterpret it and to challenge it at those points wherein the former's personal political preferences and prejudices do not allow sufficient freedom to think the future opened up by the collapse of old values. In other words, even if there is a need to move away from inflated political posturing towards a micropolitics of desire and the body, this does not mean a retreat into the private sphere of the bourgeois individual, or isolate subject; desire is not a 'personal' affair, but always a collective-impersonal one. Thus if Lawrence examines and promotes a different kind of politics in his later work, there is no absolute break from the politics of the power trilogy; more a strategic withdrawal and the forming of different tactics and approaches. Certainly the goal – of revaluation – remains the same, and certainly there is no retreat to the old ideals of liberal humanism. In fact, I suggest that such a retreat were it to be made, would not only be inappropriate, but potentially the most fatal loss of philosophical nerve imaginable. For it is not the denial of such values, but their positing in the first place, that leads to nihilism and political terror. This argument, as addressed by Heidegger in his Letter on Humanism, closes chapter III. It is in this essay that we can locate a clue to a new ethic; something that opponents and critics of (post) Nietzschean thought often suggest is impossible to locate within an 'irrationalist ontology' and/or a politics and philosophy of power.
Here, we develop this clue as an ethic of letting be and letting go and relate it to the notion of justice developed by Lawrence in *The Plumed Serpent* and to his thought in the *Lady Chatterley's Lover* trilogy and final major work of fiction, *The Escaped Cock*.

Just as chapters II and III essentially form one part of the thesis between them, so too do chapters IV and V. Leaving behind the power trilogy of novels, we place Nietzsche's project within the context of the above mentioned late works, radically reconfiguring and eroticizing his philosophy in the process.

Moving away from the politics of evil and cruelty, we suggest there are good theoretical and strategic reasons why molar political ambitions can be replaced with micropolitics at the level of desire and the forces of the body; a politics of touch. There is no need to move through geo-political space or cultural time searching for a 'solution' to the 'problem' of nihilism; the nomad thinker has merely to travel in intensity and learn how to listen to his 'blood'. This is not an abandonment of social and political concerns, merely the transference of them onto a different field of intensity. Nor is this a break from Nietzsche's philosophy; on the contrary, by returning to the body we are of course following Nietzsche, who was one of the first to fully appreciate that the revaluation would not be achieved without the 'resurrection' of the body and the rejuvenation of the body's most active forces. Today, the task is not to seize the power of the state, but to affirm the potency of the flesh and revive the passionate instincts. Today, the task is not to organize into political parties, but to dis-organ-ize the organism (or what Lawrence terms the 'corpse-body') and begin the building of the body without organs; we illustrate how this can be achieved and make clear its significance within both chapters IV and V.

Put simply, desire is a politics because desire is productive of and invests itself
within social reality. The body is a politics because it exists within history and history, of course, does not take place outside of bodies.

Essentially, in chapter IV, following theoretical remarks on the politics of desire and the philosophy of becoming upon which it rests (the latter being a quintessentially Nietzschean and anti-Christian ontology of difference), we argue that *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, can most usefully be read as a schizoanalysis concerned with breakdowns, breakthroughs, and becomings. Concerned, that is to say, with the flows of desire within industrial capitalism and the strange, inhuman becomings of the human being subject to such flows and the above socio-economic conditions.

It is argued that there is no longer a clear public/private dichotomy or distinction and that Richard Rorty's wishing to push Nietzsche's thinking into the 'private' realm is therefore untenable. Further, because the above dichotomy has broken down within late modernity, the work of the novelist becomes of increased relevance to political and social theory; for the novelist understands perhaps better than anyone the feelings, forces, and flows that constitute the subject as a subject. Certainly Lawrence has an uncanny insight into such and I argue in agreement with Deleuze and Guattari that his 'pollyanalytics' is of far greater use today than, for example, Freud's psycho-analysis, based as the latter is upon a reactive conception of power, sexuality, and the unconscious.

If in the earlier part of the work it was the hero as political activist (and the poet) who was posited as the most valuable type, in chapters IV and V this status is given to the lover and man of active desire. The lover, it is suggested, is he who knows best how to revalue values and to make the world anew, having submitted to his own passion and found a level of fulfilment and joy. Thus we examine the possibility that man may be able to attain the 'peace that comes of fucking', even
if he cannot kick his way into paradise. To achieve this, is the ultimate aim of a
politics of desire. But the latter, it should be noted, is not simply a form of sex
radicalism and does not call for sexual 'liberation', nor claim that sex alone is the
cue to everything (i.e., the great be-all and end-all). On the contrary, Lawrence
is explicit in his argument that the sex urge has to be subordinated to a still
greater urge, which he thinks of as a creative or religious impulse (and what he
calls the 'power-mode' in his earlier work); this is the collective drive and the
world-forming force in man.

In several ways, chapter IV looks back to chapter I. For example, it returns to
the idea that nihilism afflicts us as a physiological collapse of the healthy
instincts, robbing the body not only of its strength, but also its value and
meaning (making it sexless, sterile, rationalized). It also carries forward from the
opening chapter the question of style, but this time in its more radical and
profound form as a politics of desire, transforming Nietzsche’s thinking on
culture and society in the process. Understanding that the latter needs to become
more rhizomatic, more molecular and minoritarian (to become-woman), Lawrence
arrives at a social and cultural model that he calls a 'democracy of touch'. This,
his major contribution to political theory, is investigated at length and in detail in
chapter IV, where we relate the idea not only to the wider body of Lawrence's
thought, but to the work of Whitman, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. It is shown how
a democracy of touch is founded upon a new economy of bodies and their forces
and forms a vision of individual and communal regeneration; a democracy to come
- not a reactionary return to some pre-modern ideal. Prior to the establishment
of a democracy of touch, however, must come an opening up of a new field of
consciousness; what Lawrence terms 'phallic consciousness', or, elsewhere, 'cunt
awareness', the latter perhaps better indicating the non-logocentric nature of this
new way of thinking which is productive of a sensual and intuitive body of
knowledge that Nietzsche terms die fröhliche Wissenschaft. Like Nietzsche,
Lawrence sets out to arrive at a point of reckoning with the great saviours and teachers of Western metaphysics. If this means addressing 'the case of Socrates' and Plato on the one hand, so too does it mean confronting Christ; and thus we close the thesis with a chapter that explores the revaluation in terms that Nietzsche wished it to be understood: *Dionysus versus the Crucified!*

Chapter V is a final consideration of Nietzsche's project in which many of the earlier themes of the thesis (power, love, the human etc.) all return for a critical reexamination. The discussion takes place primarily around Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock* and his final prose work, *Apocalypse*. As for Nietzsche's own enigmatic formula above, this we interpret as shorthand for the great conflict of ideals at the centre of his philosophy and which characterizes Western history.

The chapter opens with a series of remarks on Nietzsche's and Lawrence's understanding of Christianity and their (non-dialectical) opposition established with the Crucified. In rejecting the latter and by saying yes to Dionysus (or the man who died as the risen Osiris), affirmation is given to the resurrection of the flesh, life as difference and becoming, and a plurality of norms. But, importantly, Dionysus also symbolizes for Nietzsche an urge to living unity; i.e., a principle which allows man to come back into touch with other men and women beyond egoism and the idealism which isolates him at present. In other words, Dionsyian magic (desire) is that which forms and seals the bonds between man and world; that which ultimately dissolves the little word 'and'.

Lawrence's figure of the man who died, like Nietzsche's Zarathustra, is prepared to retract his earlier teaching, having realized that immortality (i.e., creative fulfilment or blossoming) is achieved only via a coming into touch; for touch is the great atonement that puts us into vivid contact and allows us to affirm our lives as lived upon the earth and within time. I argue that Lawrence's
reinterpretation of Christ's resurrection is crucial to the project of revaluation; as is his and Nietzsche's new understanding of death, time, and our mortal relation to both. If the importance of resurrection into new life is stressed, so too do we emphasize the necessity of firstly finding the courage to embrace the void of oblivion and to die out completely from this life as one dominated by reactive forces and egoism; the personal life of what Lawrence terms the 'Lesser Day'. Each of us must prepare his or her own 'ship of death', or, as Heidegger writes, *Dasein* must be able to face up to its own mortality.

This does not mean, however, accepting the banal conventionality of a general biological extinction ('heat death'), and this reactive understanding of death is challenged and replaced with the positive notion of a 'fire death' (i.e., death as a true becoming, a flight, or passage). Courage is the key: the courage to live, to die, and to resurrect into new life. Men fail the test of the eternal return (examined in detail here) if they do not desire to resurrect back into life lived on earth and in time with all its limitations and problematic aspects (such as suffering and pain); if they long instead either for absolute oblivion, or an eternal afterlife of personal immortality.

Trapped within old ideals and corpse-bodies, the question is how and when man will leave the tomb of incomplete nihilism and rise into the new flesh. The danger is he won't. But Nietzsche and Lawrence do all they can to encourage us to rise up as 'risen lords' and to move towards a transhuman becoming. They demonstrate how rising thus into an active and affirmative life means the forming of many connections and a wide variety of relationships; sexual, social, and political. The man who died rises as a whole man, keen to become a lover, a husband, a father, a comrade, a friend. He is far removed from the Cross-burdened Christ figure he was; i.e., one who wanted to be loved, but knew not how to love himself except in the most ideal abstract-universal manner, afraid to physically touch or be
touched. The man who died also rises as a physician of culture, for he knows that there is a need for a collective healing of mankind (*not* its 'salvation') and that his own resurrection cannot be accomplished in isolation.

Chapter V closes by suggesting that whilst it remains debatable whether Nietzsche or Lawrence achieved their declared goal of a revaluation of all values, at its best their work constitutes an important and significant starting point that has, in some decisive sense, changed everything.

**Part II: Remarks on the Political and Social Concerns of the Thesis.**

"... the time is coming when politics will have a different meaning." - Nietzsche.²

As will already be clear, this thesis is intended as a contribution to political philosophy as much as it is to literary criticism, concerned as it is with the social aspects and significance of Nietzsche's project of revaluation and Lawrence's development and fictional illustration of it. I believe that one cannot fully appreciate either writer's work without recognizing that each is concerned to effect a fundamental change in our way of thinking about ethics, politics, and society. It is not because they follow the standard methods of sociological investigation, or ask the usual questions of political analysis that they deserve to be taken seriously as thinkers in the above areas, but, on the contrary, because they offer highly novel approaches, suggest new questions, and form different perspectives on old problems, thereby transforming our notion of what it is to think the political and address the social. Thus whilst I have argued earlier that Nietzsche and Lawrence are far more than simply political writers, and whilst it is certainly not my intention to reduce their work to the level of 'ideology' or propaganda, nevertheless I would echo Foucault's assertion that the relationship between philosophy, literature, and politics is "permanent and fundamental".³
If Nietzsche and Lawrence are betrayed by those readers who would use thought to ground a political practice in Truth, or seek out a systematic doctrine in their texts, so, on the other hand, are they sold short by those commentators who would deny there is any substantive content to their work relevant to contemporary intellectual debate concerning the public realm and collective activity (pretending that all is simply a playful and self-contained exercise in metaphor and symbol for private self-enlightenment). But, let us be clear, in stressing the relevance of Nietzsche and Lawrence to the above debate, I do not want to deny their unique status, nor in someway domesticate their thinking by abandoning the more contentious and controversial elements of their work. It is absolutely not my aim to bring them into line with a newly revised liberal humanism, for example. Hopefully, I manage to avoid this tendency to recuperative assimilation and succeed in discussing the radically mobile and un(der)determined new style of politics found in Nietzsche and Lawrence in and on their own terms, whilst still showing how their work has important significance for and relationship to the more conventional and dominant forms of socio-political narrative and practice.

Of course, it is true to say that in recent years Nietzsche's place in the history of political thought and Lawrence's relevance as a social commentator (for example on questions concerning the natural environment and man's relation to it), have become more widely recognized and more carefully studied. And yet one still frequently encounters the claim that neither should, in fact, be construed as public thinkers and that their primary import is an apolitical one concerned with "the fate of the existential individual who is far removed from the social world." In both cases, it is argued here, this is a profoundly mistaken view; one that not only misconceives the nature of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's respective projects, but also shows a pronounced ignorance concerning their notion of the individual. Whilst such a reading will be challenged throughout the course of this thesis, it is
important to briefly say something of it here.

There is, it is suggested by commentators hostile to the idea of Nietzsche and Lawrence as political thinkers, an 'irresponsibility' in their work that causes concern. Rorty and Habermas, for example, share the view that Nietzsche's influence upon social and political thought has been of a highly undesirable nature. But if liberal critics have a duty to express concern with the 'illiberal', 'irrational', and 'irresponsible' elements they detect in Nietzsche's thought and those related to him, surely Rorty is simply being crass when he suggests that whenever the above put forward a view about modern society, culture, or politics they become "at best vapid and at worst sadistic". For Rorty, Nietzsche et al are magnificent when they stick to celebrating their personal canons and invaluable in helping us with "our attempt to form a private self-image"; but "pretty much useless" (if not acutely dangerous) when they attempt to address us as public philosophers and promote views relevant to collective action. Rorty is prepared simply to dismiss views he finds objectionable as 'idiosyncratic' and to assert that projects of self-creation have "nothing in particular to do with questions of social policy."

If Rorty is right to criticize Nietzsche for attempting at times to suggest grandiose and ideal schemes to do with total revolution and for setting out on a quest for the sublime, he fails entirely to see why it is that Nietzsche cannot simply talk of overcoming the self as if the latter existed in isolated abstraction (i.e., asocially and ahistorically). For Nietzsche, self-perfection and socio-cultural concerns are not separable; they belong to one and the same project. In fact, as Keith Ansell-Pearson rightly points out and as is stressed in this thesis:

"For Nietzsche the degeneration of political and cultural life in modern Europe could partly be explained by the absence of a vibrant and vigorous public life. ...
Nietzsche ... would argue that Rorty's emphasis on self-creation as a private act represents a retreat from the social world, and is symptomatic of the degeneration of creative action that characterizes the modern period."8

Symptomatic of a variety of solipsism that other liberal critics, such as Leslie Paul Thiele, also collapse into. The latter's notion of a 'politics of the soul' is not only entirely alien to the Deleuzean micro-politics I attempt to develop here, but is quite falsely ascribed to Nietzsche. The philosopher, writes Thiele, is "fated to remain apart from social politics ... he is a solitary."9 In as far as this is the case, Nietzsche violently opposes such a 'fate' and describes such isolation as the 'sickness of the desert'. Lawrence too would condemn such twaddle as a form of depravity resulting from an atrophy of the senses. Both men never doubted that if the revaluation was to be accomplished it would require community, the proliferation of relations, and the development of a nourishing creative flow of desire and sense of physical kinship. They would have had nothing but scorn for Rorty's anaemic ideal of 'solidarity' between private individuals, each cultivating an inward sense of separateness and all the time afraid to touch one another.

Arguably, the real 'irresponsibility' is not Nietzsche's or Lawrence's in opening up a space in which to think and form a new style of politics, but, on the contrary, belongs to those who refuse the challenge of occupying such a space. For by so doing they allow those forces of virulent reaction and base stupidity which they rightly fear – and which Nietzsche and Lawrence also abhor – to have exclusive access to this new terrain. Fascists have no more qualms about occupying theoretical thinking space than they do geographical Lebensraum. Thus although I do not agree with the way that liberal commentators such as Mark Warren and William Connolly occupy Nietzsche's texts and put them to work, at least they are to be commended for not funkng the challenge of so doing. Unlike many critics, they do not mistakenly believe that Nietzsche's political visions can be ignored,
casually dismissed as poetic affection, or condemned as intrinsically too dangerous to be discussed and developed. They know that it is a question of finding the exterior forces that best put Nietzsche's writings to work in a manner that is faithful to the joyous and affirmative spirit that invests them.

**Part III: On Dissolving the Genre Distinction Between Philosophy and Literature.**

"It seems to me it was the greatest pity in the world, when philosophy and fiction got split ... the novel went sloppy, and philosophy went abstract dry. The two should come together again" – D.H. Lawrence.10

One consequence of the death of God and the subsequent collapse of values, is that genre distinctions and the dualistic hierarchies that support them become unprotected and thus vulnerable to challenge. The opportunity for philosophy and literature to reunite is thereby enlarged. Despite the best efforts made by the moral guardians of thought (i.e., those who would preserve the purity of genres), we witness today an increased level of intertextual promiscuity and intellectual miscegenation. Clearly Lawrence approves of this and actively promotes the union of fiction and theory, arguing that the world of thought needs to become inseparable from that of feeling.

Nietzsche in his writings is equally explicit about his desire to dissolve genre distinctions, setting out from early on to demonstrate how philosophy and literature can have "a more profound and congenial relation to each other"11 and to life. In order to help achieve this, he develops a new style of writing and presents himself as the first of a new breed of philosopher; the philosopher-as-artist. Such a philosopher produces a text that is radically and openly figurative, drawing upon all manner of considerations, including those previously regarded as unacceptable or irrelevant to 'serious' investigation. J.P. Stern rightly claims that
Nietzsche's devising of a highly personal literary-philosophical mode of language and thought and his application of such to "an almost infinite variety of contemporary issues"¹² is one of his greatest achievements.

In reviving a pre-Socratic model of philosophy as literature which dissolves the opposition between metaphor and concept, Nietzsche risks inaugurating a style of philosophy that can no longer be clearly distinguished from poetry. This is not a risk that Nietzsche finds troublesome, or regrettable. Far more regrettable for Nietzsche is the continued and fanatic separation between the 'real' and the 'imaginary' (or the 'true' and the 'false'); a separation that has divided and damaged human consciousness. In learning to think and speak once more in metaphor, we perhaps move some way toward healing this fatal division of man, allowing the greater intelligence of the body and the fullness of life the right to expression.

Certainly, for Lawrence, thought has to be what he calls "an adventure of the whole man"¹³ - mental consciousness which thinks purely in concepts (or what Nietzsche terms mummified metaphors) is not enough: and that is why he goes on to say; "we cannot believe in Kant, or Spinoza. Kant thought with his head and his spirit, but he never thought with his blood. The blood also thinks inside a man, darkly and ponderously. It thinks in desires and revulsions and makes strange conclusions."¹⁴ Of course, the effort to derive from 'blood-knowledge' a new reality principle which is capable of providing "standards for existential attitudes, for practice, and for historical possibilities appears as childish fantasy"¹⁵ to those critics such as Habermas, who regard Nietzsche's project as hopelessly infected with 'irrationalism' and 'aestheticism'. And yet Nietzsche and Lawrence both maintain it is vital that modern man learns how to listen to and write in blood; i.e., to think instinctively and intuitively outside the boundaries of moral-rationalism and to conduct thought-experiments, rather than construct
theoretical systems which betray a lack of integrity on behalf of the thinker. For Nietzsche and Lawrence, and those related to them, art too not only produces knowledge about the world, but retains a determinate relation to philosophy (realized as a passionate blood–experience) – this is what Plato missed and those such as Habermas continue to miss.

In a sense, then, I am arguing that literature is of far more use than theory in allowing one to "think through and move across established categories and levels of experience" and in transporting us outside the gate to those extreme places "where the highest and deepest truths rise up." Of more use also in providing a sense of genuine solidarity, as Deleuze and Guattari stress in their study of Kafka; "not at all for ideological reasons but because the literary machine alone is determined to fill the conditions of a collective enunciation that is lacking elsewhere". The novelist expresses another possible becoming via a creative storytelling or act of 'fabulation', that challenges the dominant myths and fictions of his time. Thus it is not merely because the novel forms a superior medium to theory for exploring notions of relativity and contingency that it interests us here, but because it also offers a form of resistance. Implicit in this claim is a belief in "the potency and relevance of the imagination ... as a way to step out of the political and intellectual stasis of these postmodern times." And, further, a belief that the novel, at its best, can help us live more fully by setting free alien forces within us and registering more fully than any other medium "the complex and shifting world of relationships which for [Lawrence], as for Nietzsche, is the essence of reality." critics such as Habermas, however, reject the above arguments and continue to claim that in levelling genre distinctions between philosophy, literature, and political theory and thereby interrogating the primacy of logic over rhetoric, Nietzsche and those who have come after him and radically extended his project.
(such as Derrida) fail to recognize important differences between the above, with the result that each discipline is lessened in a significant manner.

Habermas thus writes for example: "The false assimilation of one enterprise to the other robs both of their substance." He fears that if philosophy and literature are denied independent status and separate identity then the former becomes unable to operate successfully as a medium for problem solving; "robbed not merely of its seriousness, but of its productivity." The latter too is reduced, he claims, when enlisted into the battle against metaphysics. Quite simply, I do not agree with Habermas, nor share his concerns. Rather, I think that Derrida has shown how the former's prejudices which allow him to assume that rhetoric is simply an adornment to logic, stop him from reading and interrogating texts (not least of all his own) carefully enough. Nietzsche and Lawrence teach us to worry about the surface play of language and the question of style; this results in a radically different way of reading, writing, and thinking: superficial, but in a Greek sense (i.e., out of profundity). In casting the fear of incest aside, it becomes clear how extremely rewarding it is to explore the intertextual quality of writings and proliferate points of contact and mutual involvement between philosophy and literature, allowing thinkers from various backgrounds to come together. To 'rob' philosophy of its 'seriousness' and productivity, is to perhaps allow it to become gay and creative.

Similarly, to give to poetry and fiction a seriousness of purpose is not to betray the 'integrity' of art, nor to slide helplessly along a confused and dangerous path towards fascism, but simply to acknowledge that the above can be used as a medium of thought, intellectual exchange, and problem solving. To postulate the unity of thought and poetry, of theory and fiction, is to understand that the latter term does not stand for "an aimless imagining of whimsicalities ... a flight of mere notions and fancies into the realm of the unreal."
I am, then, prepared in this thesis to place Lawrence and his work on an equal footing with Nietzsche and his writings. And prepared methodologically to experiment with and to test the claim that:

"the most truly philosophical reading of a philosophical text ... is one that treats the work as literature, as a fictive rhetorical construct whose elements and order are determined by various textual exigencies ... Conversely, the most powerful ... readings of literature may be those that treat them as philosophical gestures".24

Finally, before closing this Introduction, I would like to indicate why Lawrence was specifically chosen as a literary machine to which Nietzsche could be connected; and why Deleuze is also assigned a particularly important place within this work.

By placing the Nietzschean project of revaluation within the fictional environment provided by Lawrence, I hope to ensure a metamorphosis of the former, sending it in a direction that is perhaps contrary to its own inner tendency (in as much as the latter can legitimately be said to exist and identified). But perhaps this could have been achieved just as well, some may argue, by placing Nietzsche's work within the space of literature provided by any of a number of other authors who have been 'influenced' by his work. Perhaps: but I think not. Rather, I would argue that Lawrence is the best author for our purposes here and that his relationship to Nietzsche is uniquely special. For not only is Lawrence the most self-consciously 'philosophicalish' of novelists, believing as he makes clear that "art is utterly dependent on philosophy"25, but so too, as has been widely recognized within the critical literature, is he the most profoundly Nietzschean. Each belongs to that "order of genius which beats out the boundaries of human experience and widens the frontiers of life".26 In fact, as Colin Milton shows, the intellectual kinship between Nietzsche and Lawrence is so "intimate and
pervasive" that "an awareness of Nietzsche's thought is essential for a full understanding of Lawrence's vision" constituting as it does a "subtle and powerful interpretive framework for reading the novels". This is illustrated here, but, in addition, so too is it argued that the reverse is equally true; i.e., a knowledge of Lawrence's work is essential for a full understanding of Nietzsche's project of revaluation. This I believe to be an original claim.

What I am not attempting to do, however, is offer merely another study in influence à la Milton. For one thing, the latter has already quite adequately produced such and I accept his conclusion that Nietzsche profoundly affects Lawrence. Nor am I simply seeking out a series of appropriate parallels between the two authors and other bodies of work. For whilst such undoubtedly exist, it is arguably more productive to develop 'inappropriate' parallels and offer inappropriate readings; to use a variety of authors not to supplement or bolster one another, but to stand one another on their heads from time to time and to pervert one another (Deleuze famously writes of buggering authors). This may mean having to mutate Lawrence's thought at certain junctures - just as he mutates Nietzsche. But whilst I am not overly concerned with remaining 'faithful' to an author or his texts (nor, indeed, the tradition of criticism surrounding him and his works), I sincerely hope to avoid falling carelessly into the trap of simply working out personal concerns on Lawrence et al. "without being able to relate [my] strictures to what it is that makes [them] positively interesting or important" in their own right. What, ultimately, I seek to do within this thesis is to give back to the authors central here via an intelligent and imaginative reading; "a little of the joy, the energy, the life of love and politics that [each] knew how to give and invent." And surely Foucault is right to claim that the only way one can do this, and the only valid 'tribute' to thought such as Nietzsche's, "is precisely to use it, to deform it, to make it groan and protest."
But why move from Lawrence to Deleuze? Because just as philosophical references abound within the former, so within the latter – the most Nietzschean of recent philosophers with the possible exception of Foucault – literary references are found everywhere. Deleuze defends his reliance upon literary figures from criticism by simply saying that very often novelists and poets know more about schizophrenia, politics, and desire than do psychoanalysts, philosophers, or sociologists. If the overt Nietzscheanism of his writings has frequently been remarked upon, the equally present Lawrenceanism has, so far, been widely overlooked. Part of the originality of this work is in showing how Lawrence's work as well as Nietzsche's enters into a vital relation with Deleuze's; and to show how one misses the mark in Lawrence if one simply ties his work to the tradition of English fiction, by ignoring the political, ethical, and philosophical dimensions that permeate his texts and give them such an important status in the history of both European and Anglo-American thought.

Lawrence suggests that very often the tale requires saving from an author's interference by the critic who knows how to put the tale to work in new and startling ways; this is particularly so when the author is prone to moralizing or engaging in the kind of metaphysical speculations that betray fatigue and résentiment, allowing blockages to form upon the lines of flight he himself has initiated. Deleuze, as the most intelligent reader of Nietzsche and Lawrence both, arguably provides such a service as critic in relation to them. He is also, of course, very much a political thinker and as such recognizes the importance of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's nomadic thought in contributing to the invention and invocation of a people yet to come. Thus Deleuze is the perfect figure to complete our unholy trinity and form an effective philosophico-literary assemblage.
Chapter I: Among the Ruins: Nihilism, Culture and the Politics of Style.

Part I: Opening Remarks on the Death of God and the Emergence of Modern European Nihilism in Relation to Lawrence's *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love*.

Nihilism is of crucial importance to Nietzsche's thought and central to his comprehension of modernity. If Nietzsche is one of the first to accept what Camus calls the "burden of nihilism"\(^1\) as his own, it remains for us today the great and unavoidable problematic dominating our social, cultural, and political horizons, determining the very limits of our experience. In short, "it stands like an extreme that cannot be gotten beyond".\(^2\) And yet, if we want to live, surely it has to be gotten beyond; if accepted meanwhile as a painful transitional stage through which we must pass. The question 'how?' is the one to which the fate of modern humanity is tied. What nihilism is, both in its original and modern sense, why and how it emerges, are relatively straightforward questions to address. But how it can be survived and eventually overcome – and at what cost – remains an intractable problem. For it may well be the case that in order to move beyond nihilism, both as a contemporary phenomenon related to what Nietzsche calls the 'death of God' and as an originary process which has been uncoiling throughout European history since the 'fall' into Western metaphysics, man has not only got to overcome his own past but also that which is usually identified as the 'human' element of his make-up (i.e., his reason and his morality).

Thus the advent or return of nihilism as an explicit phenomenon is a fate toward which our civilization has relentlessly been moving and it is an event which, as Nietzsche tells us, will determine our future for a long time to come. However, it is not a singular event that possesses its own meaning; rather, there are as many meanings as there are forces capable of offering an interpretation. Thus the
phrase 'God is dead' can be heard both as a "great cry of loneliness", marking the point at which man conceives of himself as a being "surrounded by nullity" and living in a world suddenly devoid of value and sense; and as a great shout of defiant independence in which man can find his own pride and joy and which marks the point at which he accepts the task of himself becoming the creator of all things: "For with God's death, the absolute centered perspective ... is shattered, forcing the decentered human perspective to emerge as the foundation of meaning and value." And, perhaps, beyond this, a transhuman perspective. But, as yet, man still doesn't know whether to laugh, cry, or rage; nihilism continues to afflict him as a disabling and disorienting condition which affects his ability to understand how to act in the new world in which he finds himself. This is illustrated by Lawrence in *The Rainbow* (*R*) and its sequel *Women in Love* (*WL*).

Set during the seventy year period leading up to the First World War, *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love* are Lawrence's two great books of modernity and apocalypse. Their potent mix of myth, social and cultural history, and post-Nietzschean philosophy make them essential reading for anyone concerned with developing an understanding of the 'crisis' of modern European nihilism. They are almost desperate attempts to think that which enframes us; i.e., to gain critical distance upon both the past and present, as well as attempts to speculate on the possibility of a postmodern and, indeed, transhuman future. Arguably, nihilism itself both obliges and enables us to do so. For, as Mark Warren writes: "Nihilism not only forces consciousness but also distances one from the conditions of one's existence that are no longer adequate." In other words, nihilism makes the world seem alien and uncanny and makes us strangers to ourselves. Lawrence clearly demonstrates this in the above novels, showing how the familiar world of the Brangwen family in the early part of *The Rainbow* has become a lost possibility for the protagonists of *Women in Love*; the death of
God ensuring that the comforting horizons of Christian-moral culture have vanished. Without any such horizons, without limits guaranteeing stability even of the self as a rational subject, access is suddenly granted to the Dionysian dimension as a "smaller system of morality, the one grasped and formulated by human consciousness" is once more subsumed within "the vast, uncomprehended and incomprehensible morality of nature or life itself, surpassing human consciousness."

If there is a mythopoeic quality to *The Rainbow*, there is a dream-like or nightmarish quality to the later work, as in a French surrealist text. Indeed, in a manner suggestive at times of Georges Bataille, Lawrence seems to celebrate and promote an elemental violence found in both the erotic and sacred realms of experience as he conceives of them; realms only fully opened up in a time of nihilism, as we suggest above, or in those explosive moments of transgression "when those categories fall apart that guarantee in everyday life the confident interaction of the subject with himself and the world." This insistence in *Women in Love* on those things and forces that modernity both releases and yet remains deeply troubled by - irrationality, cruelty, strange fears and desires (all of which flood the social field as Lawrence illustrates) - makes the novel a sometimes difficult and disturbing one to read. Plunging deep into negativity, Lawrence attempts to explode the established dualities of enlightened thinking, stressing like Nietzsche before him the significance of madness in the unfolding history of morality and its surpassing. The behaviour of Ursula and Birkin, Gudrun and Gerald, may no longer shock us, but it can still be disconcerting to be shown "'civilized' human beings as by no means fully under their own control, but impelled by forces within them well below the level of their conscious will or choice."

Not only, then, is the world of *The Rainbow* coming ever-further apart at an
ever-increased velocity, but so too are the characters coming apart as Lawrence challenges the belief in a stable ego and of the human being as a fixed and pre-determined entity; forever finding new ways to reveal man as a thing of forces, flows and becomings. This obliges him as a writer to find the language which can best "render and expose violence, disintegration and deadly excess". That he achieves this with consummate skill cannot be disputed. But as Mark Kinkead-Weekes points out in his perceptive Introduction to the novel: "This poses ... a crucial question for the critic: is this a destructively violent and excessive work, or is it a diagnosis of violence and excess, enabling its author and its readers to come through the experience with better understanding of themselves?" It is a question which can also be asked of Nietzsche's philosophy: is it a diagnosis of nihilism, or simply a symptom of such? Probably it is both (as Nietzsche recognized). And probably Lawrence's Women in Love is also a work written at the very point at which modes of disintegration encounter the possibilities of new life. Above all, it is vital to stress that if there is decadence and deathliness in all of the characters, yet the crucial discovery is made that there is an active nihilism to be accelerated and perfected, and that "there is a kind of violence that can heal, as well as a violence that destroys."

Thus despite the end-of-the-world tone of the novel, we find in Women in Love, as in The Rainbow, something affirmative; a revolutionary joy or indescribable delight which, as Deleuze says; "always springs forth from the great books, even when they present things that are ugly, desperate, or terrifying." If there is corruption and sickness here, so too is there a promise of tomorrow's health. And thus despite Birkin's insistence that we are all flowers of corruption living among the ruins, Ursula will "have none of his acceptance of deathliness (however necessary before new creation can come about). She isn't a flower of dissolution, but feels herself a rose, warm and flamy with life."
Finally, having for the most part offered comments on *Women in Love*, let us here say something specifically about the earlier novel, *The Rainbow*; a work which has a strong affinity to a German philosophic tradition that runs via Nietzsche to Spengler and Heidegger, concerned with "the breakdown of communal ties in favour of the competitive, self-seeking ethos of capitalism" and the triumph of 'civilization' over culture. Lawrence opens the novel in 'about 1840'; a date chosen to mark the arrival of the modern industrial era. The old world of farm, village, and church is about to be displaced and replaced by the world of canals, railways, mines, factories, schools and new housing estates. If, initially, the Brangwen family farm (Beldover) remains "just on the safe side of civilization, outside the gate" (R, p.14), nevertheless its womenfolk in particular look toward this new world and wish for their children to belong to its future. Lawrence is ambiguous about this new order. If, on the one hand, he regrets and at times condemns the turning away from a life lived on the soil, on the other hand his text shows an acute understanding of how the inert pressure of the past, when uninformed by the vigour of the present, can stifle and suffocate life. This is the danger of a stagnant 'antiquarianism'; the mindset of those who would preserve and revere the past, described by Nietzsche in his second untimely meditation. Keywords for such persons are tradition, contentment, rootedness, stability. Like Nietzsche, Lawrence knows that "when the historical sense no longer conserves life but mummifies it", then culture needs its seeds of discontent (its *décadents*), such as Ursula, who possess the "strength to break up and dissolve a part of the past", liberating the new and evolving forces and forms. Ursula, who, as Anne Fernihough points out, is as much a Nietzschean 'free spirit' as Birkin, deliberately and radically breaks from the word of her fathers and is transported from their world by the unfettered flows of modernity and modernization that push on toward an absolute threshold. Looking back more with shame and anger than love and loyalty, she knows, that for her, as for her sister, Gudrun, the old way of life has become something to escape and
overcome. The sisters are born of the forces of decodification and
deterritorialization among the ruins of the old socius; they are in every sense 'modern' women, and, as such, décadents. But, Lawrence knows, it is only via such independent and individual young women (as well as men like Birkin who belong to the "weak and quasi-feminine type of the dissatisfied")\(^\text{23}\), that life is advanced and made more profound. Culture, as Nietzsche realised, flourishes in times of corruption; the latter being "merely a nasty word for the autumn of a people."\(^\text{24}\)

Thus, ultimately, Lawrence supports the struggles made by his characters to become who they are and he welcomes the conditions in which this is made possible. And yet he also wishes to retain some form of socio-cultural unity; for, like Nietzsche, he believes that the individual will flourish only from out of the latter. Thus, in a manner similar to *The Birth of Tragedy*: "The Rainbow sets itself an impossible task, seeking out a social structure in which the full expression of the individual might be possible without causing the social fabric to fall apart."\(^\text{25}\) Arguably, this could be said to be Lawrence's central dilemma; and the political problem at the heart of Nietzsche's philosophy.

To reiterate and conclude, modern experience no longer corresponds to any old interpretive framework; "'seeing there's no God'" (WL, p.58), as Birkin says, and that all the old ideals and guidelines are consequently as "'dead as nails'" (Ibid.) The religion which had meant so much to Ursula and her contemporaries as children, becomes as they pass into adulthood "a tale, a myth, an illusion, which, however much one might assert it to be true in historical fact, one knew was not true - at least for this present day of ours" (R, p.263). And thus it is that the world of commerce and industry - 'the weekday world' - triumphs over 'the Sunday world'; because, quite simply, the latter has lost reality to modern men and women and can no longer provide them with "plausible subjective
identities in relation to everyday life." The question is whether the weekday world can provide the conditions for the emergence of new and genuine cultural forms and active selves; or whether the world of capitalism and technology merely deepens and furthers the experience and expression of nihilism. Let us now examine this world of money and machinery.

Part II: Aspects of Nihilism as a Molar and Molecular Phenomenon.

II.i. Cash From Chaos: Nihilism and the Question of Capitalism.

It is arguable that modern nihilism has not in fact resulted in the definite collapse of all values into zero, but, rather, the resolution of all values into one; in much the same way as original nihilism resulted in the replacement of many gods with just the One God. And this one value is commercial or exchange value:

"When Marx says other values are 'resolved' into exchange value, his point is that bourgeois society does not efface old structures of value but subsumes them. Old modes ... do not die; instead they get incorporated into the market, take on price tags, gain new life as commodities."¹

The consequence of this is not only that everything is equalized and made the same (one of the essential aspects of nihilism), but everything becomes permissible - providing it is economically possible and profitable. All modes of conduct are encouraged, all modes of consciousness allowed, if they pay, and people now look to the market place "for answers to questions not merely economic but metaphysical - questions of what is worthwhile, what is honourable, even what is real."²

Like Marx, both Nietzsche and Lawrence recognized the increasing dominion over
every aspect of modern life that money had acquired and both, whilst little interested in developing a detailed analysis of the workings of the market place, repeatedly voiced their concern with and opposition to this trend; equating the economic idealism and increasing mechanization of labour in the name of productivity with the unfolding logic of modern European nihilism.

Nietzsche's hostility to capitalism is evident from his very early writings. In *The Greek State*, for example, he claims that the "self-seeking, stateless money aristocracy" (i.e., the bourgeoisie) should be regarded as a "dangerous characteristic of the contemporary political scene", because they have undermined the "internally sturdy and sensitive" bonds between rulers and ruled that existed in noble, despotic society and which were based on an ethical component; replacing these with a purely abstract-economic relation between employer and employee that is productive of class conflict and social discord. In other words, like Marx, Nietzsche condemns the bourgeoisie on the grounds that they have left remaining "no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous 'cash payment'". Counter this, Nietzsche advocates a strong model of communal life, of the kind that Lawrence describes the disintegration of (and yet anticipates and hopes for the rebirth of) in *The Rainbow*.

For Nietzsche, then, the effect of the above all-dominant money economy is that society and culture are compromised and, ultimately, made impossible. In their place is imposed a systematic anarchy and aggressive philistinism which allows a man "only as much culture as it is in the interest of general money-making and world commerce as he should possess". Because today the "greed of the money-makers" infects every sphere of human activity ("in the minutest and subtlest detail") and dictates the standards and objectives of 'culture', Nietzsche feels obliged to conclude that capitalism is "the most vulgar form of existence that has yet existed." Ursula Brangwen, as a young student in *The Rainbow*, soon comes
to the same conclusion; realising the permanent substratum of money under everything causes a "harsh and ugly disillusion" (R, p.403) to come over her which, crucially, brings her to the political decision that she would rather "have an aristocracy of birth than money" (R, p.427). Like Nietzsche, she rejects liberal democracy as political degeneracy; for, like Nietzsche, she sees the latter merely as the political expression of capital and deeply resents how the bourgeois-class have not only ruined society and culture, but "learnt to misuse [the polity] ... as an instrument of the stock exchange, and ... as an apparatus for their own enrichment." As for the 'freedom' and 'equality' opened up by liberal capitalism, Ursula rejects this as simply the freedom to buy and sell one another and the "equality of dirt" (R, p.427).

The vital point is that whilst liberal democracy may produce and guarantee the 'rights' of the 'private citizen', it fails, lacking a genuine conception of culture and society, to produce the sovereign individual whom Nietzsche values and Ursula wishes to become. The non-emergence of such sovereign men and women who are masters of themselves, can largely be explained according to Nietzsche's and Lawrence's analysis, by the fact that the economic and political apparatus have today fallen "into strange hands" and that we lack a dynamic and vigorous public life. These two facts combine to signal the fall of man into an entirely herd-like state and the dissolution of culture: all greatness and all potential for greatness is lacking. "Human rights" - as Deleuze and Guattari say - "will not make us bless capitalism." For human rights say nothing about the "...meanness and vulgarity of existence that haunts democracies ... The ignominy of the possibilities of life that we are offered". Not only does the universal scramble for money ('competition') threaten to result in an anarchic free-for-all destructive of social order, but, naturally lacking in a 'societal instinct' or respect for otherness, the capitalist may even have a fatally weakened instinct of preservation and a suicidal lust for death à la Gerald Crich, who, as Lawrence shows would
ultimately prefer to "lie down and die on a sure nothing"\textsuperscript{13}, rather than struggle into a new way of being beyond the ruins.

We are among the ruins: and yet there remains standing one final barrier which serves to protect the capitalist class from the very flows they have themselves released and which also negate those lines of flight which promise a different and greater experience of life:

"Our last wall is the golden wall of money. This is the fatal wall. It cuts us off from life, from vitality, from the alive sun and the alive earth, as nothing can. Nothing, not even the most fanatical dogmas of iron-bound religion can isolate us from the vital inrush of life and inspiration, as money can."\textsuperscript{14}

How do we break down or surmount this 'golden wall'? The very idea seems to us today utopian and faintly absurd: "So what is the solution? Which is the revolutionary path? To withdraw from the world market?"\textsuperscript{15} - ask Deleuze and Guattari, rhetorically. And whilst Lawrence does advocate side-stepping and retreat in his work on occasion,\textsuperscript{16} Nietzsche makes it clear that "no one is free to be a crab"\textsuperscript{17} and that any withdrawal into private fantasy is to be decisively rejected. So what then is to be done? Perhaps, Deleuze and Guattari go on to suggest, adopting Nietzsche's solution to the problem of nihilism in general, there is nothing to be done today other than to offer an affirmation of market forces and accelerate the process of capitalism:

"To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization. For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough from the viewpoint of a theory and practice of a highly schizophrenic character."\textsuperscript{18}

What Deleuze and Guattari recognise is that money does not constitute a 'golden
wall’ in the way in which Lawrence appears to conceive of it; and is thus not something that can be broken down, or stormed like a barricade. Rather, money – i.e., that which has been substituted by capitalism for the very notion of a social code or ethic – has "created an axiomatic of abstract qualities that keeps moving further in the direction of the deterritorialization of the socius"\(^19\) and ever-toward its own self-destruction and self-overcoming. This constitutes the most characteristic and important tendency of capitalism: "It continually draws near to its [exterior and absolute] limit, which is a genuinely schizophrenic limit."\(^20\)

This theoretical understanding of capitalism in terms of flows and limits found in Deleuze and Guattari, is anticipated by Nietzsche, who even describes how capitalism both deterritorializes and decodifies, before then quickly attempting to reterritorialize and recodify: "Presupposing it knows itself sufficiently strong to be able not only to unchain energies, but at the right time also to yoke them .."\(^21\) By advocating an acceleration of this process, Deleuze and Guattari hope that this presupposition will prove itself to be fatally mistaken (an overestimation of its own power to recapture); they hope that one day energies will be released (of an active and schizophrenic character) that will prove impossible to rope back in and then exploit; that lines of escape will go all the way to the Outside and there meet up, reforming on an aesthetic plane apart from and in opposition to the wage-system; subversive of and fatal to the internal axiomatic of capital that can no longer contain them. It is ironic that perhaps: "Like all great historical systems capitalism will perish more as a result of its successes than failures."\(^22\) And that capitalism itself, the economic system of modern European nihilism, provides the enviromental zero-point in which new models of culture and self-formations, new relations, become possible.

To reiterate and conclude, we must, then, accelerate the process of capital in the
hope that we may yet be able to attain to a life established upon a different arrangement of forces. But let us not fool ourselves into believing that such an acceleration will have no casualties; the death of God is simply a beginning ("as Nietzsche puts it: in this matter, the truth is we haven't seen anything yet").

Bearing this in mind, it is perhaps legitimate to ask in closing who would dare to begin this process of acceleration? Who would have the courage and strength for such an act? Perhaps the 'perfect nihilist' whom Nietzsche himself sought to become (i.e., the active nihilist who affirms the negation of nothingness). Deleuze and Guattari call him the 'schizo' and conceive of him as the one who seeks out the external limit of capitalism beyond the golden walls; "he is its inherent tendency brought to fulfilment, its surplus product, its proletariat, and its exterminating angel. He scrambles all the codes and is the transmitter of the decoded flows of desire." He is as Birkin is to Gerald's arch-industrialist persona. This is the real reason that Gerald fears and feels threatened by Birkin; refusing the friendship offered by the latter, and yet continually drawn to him, seeking him out. Gerald dies because having pushed himself beyond his internal limit, he mistakenly believes that death is the only option; having failed to see the possibility of the new life, the greater health, the other love that was offered him.

II.ii. O Wonderful Machine: Nihilism and the Question Concerning Technology.

According to Blanchot, Nietzsche is quick to grasp "that from now on all the world's seriousness will be confined to science ... and to the prodigious power of technology." Whilst he does not deplore this fact, happy, for example, to accept and affirm the experimental practices of science, Nietzsche by no means feels able to embrace the above development without reservation, because, for Nietzsche, modern science is very much the descendant and heir of Christian-moral culture; i.e., a machine-embodied unfolding and advancement of the ascetic ideal and further expression of the will to truth. Thus science and technology remains
fundamentally nihilistic; full of thinly-veiled metaphysical prejudices and productive of reactive knowledge-forms which may yet prove fatal not only to the Christian-moral culture from out of which it has grown, but to the possibility of culture per se, as it 'puts on ice' all the illusions which are necessary, according to Nietzsche, to culture, and, indeed, to life itself.

In addition to this antipathy between illusion and the pure knowledge drive, Nietzsche claims science is incapable of serving as the foundation of culture because it knows nothing of "taste, love, pleasure, displeasure, exaltation, or exhaustion"\textsuperscript{27}, and so cannot evaluate, cannot command, and cannot create; all vital requirements which characterize the genuine cultural force. At best, when coupled to the huge resources and forces of capitalism, science is capable of building a tremendous industrial-technological civilization, such as our own, but this is not a cultural formation, because, whilst it organizes the chaos of existence and whilst it possesses a system, it lacks style.\textsuperscript{28} Whilst the latter involves the constraint of a single taste, it does not impose universal laws and other ideal-abstractions that seek to make all things and all forces familiar, similar, and predictable. These laws may very effectively allow for the manipulation of the world and the subordination of life to a tyrannical knowledge form (logic), but this is not the same as mastery and the artist of culture is more than a mere systematizer. Failing to make the distinction, the technocratic man of reason and will confuses bullying with a display of strength (force with power).\textsuperscript{29} This is illustrated for us in \textit{Women In Love} by the figure of Gerald Crich; a man driven to impose his will and authority over himself and his workers, just as he does over his red Arab mare.\textsuperscript{30}

Gerald's world, the world of industrial civilization, has been described earlier by Lawrence in \textit{The Rainbow}:

"The streets were like visions of pure ugliness ... that
began nowhere and ended nowhere. Everything was amorphous, yet everything repeated itself endlessly. ...The place had the strange desolution of a ruin. ... The rigidity of the blank streets, the homogeneous amorphous sterility of the whole suggested death rather than life. ... The place was a moment of chaos perpetuated, persisting, chaos fixed and rigid" (R, pp. 320-21).

If such a mechanical world essentially lacks style, so too does it entirely lack meaning according to Nietzsche. At best, it retains a strictly functional residue of the latter that allows it to continue to operate. How to give back to such a world meaning, value, and a little loveliness is the great concern of Nietzsche and Lawrence. They both know, however, that so long as the metaphysical-scientific perspective retains its authority, there can be no revaluation. For such a totalitarian perspective has not only brought on and "made unavoidable, the alienated, unhoused, recurrently barbaric estate of modern technological and mass consumption man"31, but it ensures the destruction of all other perspectives and modes of being. And yet, perhaps, there is hope to be found, as within the economic system of capitalism, where we least expect to encounter it. This is the great lesson of encouragement given us by Heidegger in his essay entitled *The Question Concerning Technology*. At the heart of this work are the following lines quoted from Hölderlin: "But where danger is, grows / the saving power also."32

Commenting on these lines, George Steiner writes:

"to realise that false technicity has edged the human race to the brink of ecological suicide, is to realise also that salvation is possible ...It is in the very extremity of the modern crisis, in the very time of nihilistic mechanism, that hope lies ready."33

But let us be careful not to misunderstand here; hope does not lie in the fruits of science and technology themselves and it is therefore not a question of
accelerating the production and proliferation of ever-more sophisticated machines in the erroneous assumption that only a machine can save us. If, on the one hand, technophobes who rebel naively against technology and "curse it as the work of the devil"\textsuperscript{34} can justly be challenged, then, on the other hand, the technophiles and neo-futurists who argue for an ever-greater technological manipulation of life deserve also to be met with resistance. For here we agree with Lawrence, who writes: "The more we intervene machinery between us and the naked forces, the more we numb and atrophy our own senses."\textsuperscript{35} If we are to find our way forward into what Heidegger calls a new 'revealing', then we will have to come back into living touch with and creatively manifest these 'naked forces'. If we are to deepen our questioning of nihilism and technology then we will need to keep our senses alert. And it is only via such a questioning – one that manages to touch on the essence of technology – that we can find hope. For the closer we come to the latter (i.e., to the danger) "the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine".\textsuperscript{36}

That an enhanced understanding of the essence of technology is crucial, Heidegger makes clear in the following passage:

"What is dangerous is not technology ... the essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger. ... The threat to man does not come in the first instance from potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience a more primal truth."\textsuperscript{37}

In other words, the essence of technology – something that exists long prior to the actual machine age of modern capitalism – is a way of revealing so monolithically powerful and inherently expansionist, that it may overwhelm man
and prevent him from discovering any other possible becoming. Heidegger calls this revealing *Ge-stell*; commonly translated into English as 'enframing'. Rather than allowing man and other beings and things to come forth in their own right and thence letting them be as such, the revealing that rules with technology is a 'provocation', or 'challenging' (*Herausfordern*); "which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such." Thus, for example, a tract of land "is challenged in the hauling out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district". But, more than this, it also reduces man and beings "to a sort of 'standing reserve' or stockpile in service to, and on call for, technological purposes."

Heidegger's own example of mining is convenient for a study related to Lawrence's *The Rainbow* and *Women in Love*; for Lawrence also illustrates his thinking on the question concerning technology in these novels via reference to the coal industry. In the latter text, for example, we see Gerald the industrial magnate acknowledge his destiny: "He had a fight to fight with Matter, with the earth and the coal it enclosed ... to turn upon the inanimate matter of the underground and reduce it to his will" (*WL*, p.227). Whilst in *The Rainbow* we encounter Tom Brangwen, another coal boss, who is of the view that men belong entirely to their jobs as a human resource; that outside of the great social-industrial machine of work man has become "'a meaningless lump - a standing machine'" (*R*, p.324). Ursula, forever seeking to question technology and find another possible revealing, nevertheless understands the horrible fascination of "human bodies and lives" (*ibid.*) subjected to the machine and is aware that there is a "perverse satisfaction" (*ibid.*) to be gained from such subjection. Even, we are told, via service of the machine, man achieves his consummation and immortality (see *TR*, pp.324-5 and *WL*, pp.230-31); Lawrence arguing not that technology makes us less human, but, on the contrary, super-human. Gerald Crich, for example, is transformed into a god of the machine, thereby fulfilling
the great promise of science; i.e., that man too can attain infinite power (or, at least, infinite knowledge, which for modern man is one and the same). The question is: what will man do with this unlimited power-knowledge? Will he transform himself; or destroy himself? If on the levels of utility and abstraction we have made ourselves into lords of production, then so too have we arrived at the point of supreme danger: "Present day man is of the lowest rank, but his power is that of a being already beyond man: how can this contradiction not harbour the greatest danger?" Rightly, Nietzsche predicts that modern European nihilism will be a time of great wars and violent upheaval on an unprecedented scale.

However, oblivious or indifferent to such dangers, men like Gerald push on in their quest to see life "wholly dominated by mind and will." A will that is negative in direction and composed of predominantly reactive forces, and which seeks the ego's triumph over all that lies external to it. By bringing everything into the realm of knowledge, Gerald is able to master and manipulate the world, determining its truth via reference to his own learning. Thus, in this manner, the self "becomes the hub of reality and relates to the world outside in an exploratory, necessarily exploitative way." But no matter how much Gerald 'knows', still he feels strangely empty; "as if the very middle of him were a vacuum" (WL, p.233). As this feeling becomes increasingly acute, his voraciousness grows: "And to stop up this hollowness, he drags all things into himself." Such rampant egoism and intellectual conceit and greed is condemned repeatedly in the texts of both Nietzsche and Lawrence, and yet it remains almost definitional of modern man, who, it seems, will not rest content until he has "killed the mysteries and devoured the secrets."

Clearly, if a change is to be made to a new way of living and the world 'saved', then man must find some way to overcome his vanity and "paranoid and phobic
anthropocentrism." To do so will not be easy and will involve the repudiation not only of our own metaphysical inheritance, but also the finding of a way into a new revealing. Yet, to return to Heidegger, we have already seen that hope lies ready at the moment of supreme danger where and when we might least expect to encounter it; the hope of a radically different revealing to the one that holds sway today. Heidegger names this with the Greek term *poiesis* and means by this a revealing that brings forth without provocation, having an entirely different relation to matter; a revealing which may enable us, perhaps, to confront the essential unfolding of technology and survive our engagement with modern European nihilism. And yet, to reiterate, it is this essential unfolding which harbours in itself the possible rise of the saving power. Thus instead of simply "gaping at the technological" and standing half in awe, half in dread, before the power of machine civilization, we must attempt to catch sight of that which is ambiguous and other contained in the essence of technology. Of course, to simply glimpse this does not mean that we are thereby saved, but "we are thereby summoned to hope in the growing light of the saving power." And we are reminded that, as Heidegger points out, there was once a time and place (i.e., ancient Greece of the tragic age) when *poiesis* was also called *techne* and the fine arts were not distinguished from technology. At this time and in this place, the "outset of the destining of the West ... the arts soared to the supreme height of the revealing granted unto them." They allowed man to enter into a direct physical relationship with the real (i.e., with things as things and not as objects of knowledge and representation); and they allowed man to 'dwell poetically' on the earth. Can they do so again? Heidegger is uncertain: "Whether art may be granted this highest possibility ... in the midst of the extreme danger, no one can tell." But he remains hopeful. For as long as there are those, like Nietzsche and Lawrence, who can still be astounded by and before this other possibility and who can continue to reflect upon the vital questions concerning man, nihilism, and culture in a manner that is full of radical astonishment and due reverence, there
remains a chance of inciting a new becoming and/or of opening a different revealing. And so there remains a vital task for philosophy: For whilst the latter cannot itself provide the new, merely prepare the conditions under which the new might emerge; and whilst such 'prepatory thinking' is neither able to predict or guarantee the future, still it allows for "the possibility that the world civilization that is just now beginning might one day overcome its technological–scientific–industrial character as the sole criterion of man's world sojourn."  

II.iii. A Dry Soul is Best: Decadence, Sexuality and the Subject.

Having critically examined modern European nihilism as a phenomenon at the level of culture, capital, and the question concerning technology, we are primarily interested here with how it unfolds at the micro-level of the subject; i.e., we are clinically interested in the forces (active and reactive) and the flows (sexual and excremental) that constitute, condition, and, indeed, breakdown the human being, determining as they battle for supremacy within the will to power the value of the soul. For nihilism is not simply about the death of God and the subsequent collapse of all values, but the collapse also within the body and 'psyche' of our healthiest and most primary instincts. It is in this sense that Nietzsche says nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage and is the expression of physiological decadence; and it is for this reason that he frequently uses biological and psychological language to describe the process.  

Lawrence illustrates this "anarchical dissolution of the instincts" in his fiction and, like Nietzsche, argues that one of the side-effects of such is an increase in mental activity, so that decadent individuals are a "wincing mass of self-consciousness" as well as corruption. In particular, according to Lawrence, decadents are prone to getting their 'sex in the head'; i.e., transferring unconscious physical feeling and creative intensity into mental sensation and
knowledge. Thus it is not the case that, following the death of God and the devaluation of the highest values, man plunges self-sacrificially into his previously abjected values (animality, sensuality, materialism etc.); rather, he seeks to idealize these latter values and therein maintain himself, securing the old 'white' psyche: "'Even your animalism,,'" - Birkin tells Hermione - "'you want it in your head. You don't want to be an animal, you want to observe your own animal functions to get a mental thrill out of them'" (WL, p.41).

Similarly, Hermione's 'passion' and 'spontaneity' are condemned by Birkin as deliberate and false "'and more decadent than the most hide-bound intellectualism'" (Ibid.) For Birkin, it is vital we overcome our conceit of consciousness and be stripped of ourselves if ever we are to enter into a non-decadent becoming and learn how to "'live in another world, from another centre'" (WL, p.45). But, as we have previously indicated, this is not something that decadents are prepared to do; they fight to maintain their corrupt selves, secretly enjoying the sensation of being "'threshed rotten inside"58 and of reducing "the complex tissue back through rottenness to its elements."59 Circumscribed within outer nullity and their own egoism, they surrender to the flux of corruption; rewarded with sensational gratification in the flesh via cheap sensuality (see WL chapter IX for Gudrun's experiencing of the latter), or sensational gratification in the mind via the liberation of the "static data of consciousness"60 or what Hermione calls "'the joy and beauty of knowledge in itself'" (WL, p.85).

For Lawrence, corruption is "'.. only divine when it is pure, when all is given up to it. If it be experienced as a controlled activity within an intact whole, this is vile. ... The static will must be subject to the process of reduction also.'"61

He continues: "Insofar as we fight to remain ideally intact ... we are obscene. ...
To destroy life for the preserving of a static, rigid form ... this is the lugubrious activity.\textsuperscript{62} But it is an activity which has become the dominant mode today; a 'pornographic' mode according to Lawrence's definition of this term, based upon the "grey disease of sex hatred" and the "yellow disease of dirt lust".\textsuperscript{63} Not only is this a desire to prevent the free flow of active forces, but it is also the lust to watch our own "naked animal actions in mirrors" (\textit{WL}, p.42); i.e., to trade away the physical intensity of lived experience for mental representation. Eventually, decadent individuals find themselves not only unable to differentiate between the real and the simulacrum, but unable to distinguish between sex and shit, or life and death. Lawrence comments:

"The sex functions and the excrementory functions in the human being work so close together, yet they are, so to speak, utterly different in direction. Sex is a creative flow, the excrementory flow is toward dissolution, decreation, if we may use such a word. In the really healthy human being the distinction between the two is instant, our profoundest instincts are perhaps instincts of opposition between the two flows. But in the degraded human being the deep instincts have gone dead, and then the two flows become identical. \textit{This} is the secret of really vulgar and pornographical people; the sex flow and the excrement flow is the same thing to them.\textsuperscript{64}

However, interestingly, in \textit{Women in Love} (and later in \textit{The Plumed Serpent} and \textit{Lady Chatterley's Lover}: see chapters III and IV respectively), Lawrence makes vital and strategic use of an act of anal sex to demonstrate something crucial to the project of revaluation as he conceives of it; namely, the overcoming of shame and bad conscience with regard to the body and its flows. Lawrence's attraction for this illicit sex act as a method of liberating the greater health and defeating the feelings of guilt which have become entwined with both sexual and excrementory functions, and his attempts to "distinguish between buggery which was wholly dissolute and buggery that was initiatory, the symbolic death before
rebirth" is clear even in *The Rainbow*, as revealed by the relationship between Will and Anna (see pp. 218–20). Exploring the full range of sexual pleasures enables them to discover the beauty and delight of their own bodies and to lose their fear and shame of themselves.

Like her mother before her, Ursula also finds liberation and a fundamental gratification via the defeat of shame, following her 'night of sensual passion' with Birkin (see *WL*, pp.412–13). But more than simply feeling free and happy once she has accepted the physical reality of herself (her inhuman and 'bestial' nature), she is also enabled to move toward a new becoming and new self. In other words, the anal sex between her and Birkin marks the death of her old established belief in herself as an ideal being; she realises that she is not merely a rational-moral machine, nor just a "creature of light and virtue" (*WL*, p.413), but also alive in 'corruption' with a different reality that she needs both to know and accept. Lawrence develops this idea in another 'Birkinesque' essay, *The Reality of Peace*, which he concludes:

"If we are ashamed, instead of covering the shame with a veil, let us accept the thing which makes us ashamed, understand it and be at one with it ... let us go down into ourselves ... and rise again, not fouled, but fulfilled and free."66

Crucially, this descent into ourselves and a coming to terms with our full bodily reality, is *not* the same thing as getting our physical selves into our heads and developing a hysterical and decadent obsession with our sexual and excrementory flows. There are ways of knowing which make sane and innocent; others which make mad and corrupt. Thus: "The forbidden acts of Gerald and Gudrun; or Birkin and Hermione ... are merely corruption within the rind; the same acts committed by Birkin and Ursula ... are the acts of healthy human beings."67 Anal sex is radically redemptive for the latter; reductive and deadly for the former.
Typically, and like Nietzsche, Lawrence relates his thinking on the individual's struggle to become full of good conscience toward their non-ideal selves, or, alternatively, their fall into corrupt egoism, to his thinking on culture and modern European nihilism. For eventually, according to Lawrence, the lugubrious activity becomes a collective process of reduction and social insanity; "till our whole civilization is like a great rind full of corruption ... a mere shell threatened with collapse upon itself." Thus whilst our world prides itself on the sparkle, the speed, and the sophistication of its machines and economic system: "Beneath the technical efficiency of modern culture, Birkin feels a decadent, regressive emotional drift."

Thus beneath the ruins runs the 'dark river of corruption': a river in which swim 'sewer rats' like Loerke "'gnawing at the roots of life'" (WL, p.428) and along whose banks grow beautiful but deadly fleurs du mal like Gudrun "'white phosphorescent flowers of sensuous perfection'" (ibid., p.172); marsh-lilies who lust for decomposition motivated by a nostalgia for mud. If the scent of such flowers of corruption smells "sick and unwholesome" (R, p.325) in the nostrils of Ursula and Birkin, having "the same brackish nauseating effect of a marsh, where life and decaying are one" (ibid.), nevertheless it is seductive to men like Gerald Crich. For whilst the latter is himself in the process of becoming-ice (i.e., of following the 'Arctic' or 'Nordic' process of abstraction), still he has a taste for the sensual perversity offered by those who have opted for the succulent moistness and turgidity of mud and the 'African' process of break-down. In fact, we would do well to remember Ursula's own adolescent attraction for Miss Inger and Birkin's reluctance to sever ties with Hermione and Halliday's 'bohemian' set. Birkin, perhaps more so than Ursula, cannot help having an ambivalent attitude toward decadence and corruption, and although he claims to profoundly understand, after Heraclitus, that 'a dry soul is best', he is also aware like the Greek thinker that 'souls take pleasure in becoming moist' (even whilst 'it
is death to souls to become water').\textsuperscript{72} Further, Birkin comes close at times to accepting that the river of corruption is our true historical reality; just as Nietzsche is prepared to accept nihilism as such. Perhaps there is therefore nothing to be done, he muses, but to follow the course of this river to its end.\textsuperscript{73}

Certainly this dark river of nihilism is nothing new; we have been drifting along in it for the last 2,500 years or so. That which we mistakenly believed to be the "silver river of life, rolling on and quickening all the world to a brightness, on and on to heaven, flowing into a bright eternal sea" (\textit{WL}, p.172) was always really the black river of death and nothingness. As for the 'eternal sea' (i.e. God), this has now been exposed as a vast dead swamp of stagnancy, rather than a source of life everlasting.\textsuperscript{74} Ought we then accept obscenity and pornography and affirm the process of reduction? Perhaps those such as Loerke who are, as Birkin notes, much further on in the above process, should be admired for their courage and thanked for undertaking the difficult and dangerous task of revealing to man his own essential condition. Is not Loerke the artist and exterminating angel whom Nietzsche awaited? No. For Loerke makes the fatal error of turning the process into a goal, thereby collapsing the possibility of a line of flight which could take us beyond the ruins into a black hole. As Birkin says, Loerke belongs to the river of corruption "just where it falls over into the bottomless pit" (\textit{WL}, p.428), and not where it promises to form a fresh tributary. Loerke is not a perfect nihilist because although he "hates the ideal utterly, yet it still dominates him" (\textit{ibid.}) Rather, Loerke is closer to being a form of 'last man'; i.e., an ultimate creature who, as Gudrun recognizes, is "the rock-bottom of all life" (\textit{ibid.}, p.427). So we must not make a 'dangerous misunderstanding' in the case of Herr Loerke.\textsuperscript{75} He is not in the least interested in the creation of new hopes, new habitats, or new forms of self; but only in the artistic interpretation of the old world in its death throes and in the preservation of the old self in its egoism, in order that he may sustain the experience of organic disintegration from which
he derives his greatest thrill. His notion of the overcoming of man is not thought of in terms of creative self-transfiguration and enhancement; rather, he opts to effectively abort the human race. Whilst the former is a furtherance of life and its evolution, the latter is simply life's termination and an indication that one has not only lost faith in one's ability to give birth to the future, but lost faith in the future itself. Thus it is that apart from delighting in "mocking imaginations of destruction" (WL, p.453) in which a death sentence is passed on life, Loerke and Gudrun never talk of a time beyond the ruins. Birkin may also have his fantasies of world destruction and human extinction, but so too does he always imagine a new future of some description for life, in which the "timeless creative mystery would bring forth some other being, finer, more wonderful .. to carry on the embodiment of creation." (Ibid., p.479)

II.iv. Closing Remarks: No One is Free to be a Crab.

"Overall insight - Actually, every major growth is accompanied by a tremendous crumbling and passing away ... every fruitful and powerful movement of humanity has also created at the same time a nihilistic movement. It could be the sign of a crucial and most essential growth, of the transition to new conditions of existence, that the most extreme form of pessimism, genuine nihilism, would come into the world. This I have comprehended." - Nietzsche.⁷⁶

It is the above insight which we have attempted to illustrate here. But whatever the 'truth' of nihilism, one thing is certain: there can be no turning back; the death of God, the rise of industrial and consumer capitalism, the triumph of science and technology, the dissolution of old and stable models of subjectivity etc. are not reversible events. As Nietzsche puts it; "no one is free to be a crab. There is nothing for it: one has to go forward, which is to say step by step into further décadence ".⁷⁷ This being the case, the question of how to move beyond
the ruins is no longer strictly pertinent to our present situation. Rather, we should be asking how best to survive among the ruins and how, perhaps, we may accelerate the processes of modernity to our own advantage. And yet although Nietzsche and Lawrence acknowledge this and claim that they are prepared when movement forward to a new epoch seems blocked (and movement back an impossibility) to sink deeper into the abyss, affirming corruption and chaos and the need for these things, still both writers refuse to abandon the hope that to do so is merely a necessary preliminary to a new period of growth and creation. As Lawrence writes in *The Crown*:

"If we have our fill of destruction, then we shall turn again to creation. We shall need to live again, and live hard, for once our great civilized form is broken, and we are at last born into the open day, we shall have a whole new universe to grow up into, and to find relations with."78

Essentially, then, modern European nihilism is and must remain an ambiguous state of affairs; one that signals the end of old hopes and old values, and yet also the distant (but distinct) promise of rejuvenation and revaluation. Provided, that is, we do not funk the great challenge of nihilism, either by looking in a moment of panic and pure folly to some extreme 'solution' (as Socrates looked to rationality), which merely postpones the moment of reckoning, or by opting to become passive nihilists and last men; i.e., those who are content to stay at the level of the ruins and perpetual fragmentation, adopting a complacent quietude in place of an anxious and agitated state of tension, still not knowing which way to turn, but no longer really caring, or, worse, mistakenly assuming they have, as it were, arrived at their destination; modernity being taken for the very zenith of history and culture.

Clearly what is needed is a little courage and a little intelligence; above all, the courage and intelligence to laugh at ourselves and our conceit of seriousness, and
to become *insouciant* in a positive manner about nihilism. This is not to deny that there is danger and uncertainty ahead, but simply to argue that "goodwill and fearlessness" is what is most needed in a period of transition.

If we are to live at all, then we have to agree to 'live dangerously'; accelerating the process of nihilism and transforming an 'incomplete' condition into a 'perfected' one. Undoubtedly there is something disconcerting about such a strategy, but for Nietzsche "the only hope for avoiding the catastrophe, for turning its reactive collapse into an active revaluation is to will it." Only if we succeed in perfecting nihilism will we be able to proclaim, like Jesus, 'consummatum est'. Only we will not mean that, for us, life is finished, but, rather, that our long journey into the void of moral-idealism has ended and we are ready to be born anew in the living flesh; shedding our old humanity like the tadpole that dares to abandon his tail and become-frog. For if we are not free to be crabs, neither are we free to remain the ideal creatures we have become and thus, crucially, the revaluation is "not simply a question of humans recuperating from the illness of nihilism." Dare we let go of who and what we are and become-other? Have we the one thing that, as Ursula Brangwen recognizes, really matters at last: courage. "'Courage for what?' asked her uncle. 'Courage for everything'" (R, p.270), she replied.

Part III: Aesthetics and Ideology.

III.i. Further Remarks on the Question of Culture.

It will have become clear that essentially Nietzsche is concerned with the question of culture and believes modern European nihilism as characterized by a "hugely contemptible money-economy" and the triumph of science and technology "pursued without restraint", signals the coming of a new dark age. In fact,
Nietzsche says that when the philosopher examines this today "he almost thinks that what he is seeing are the symptoms of a total extermination and uprooting of culture." Almost – but perhaps not quite. For even after the misplaced hopes of his first publication, Nietzsche continued to be preoccupied with exploring and delineating the possibility that modern European nihilism may also coincide with the rebirth of culture and tragic wisdom; if and when the former can be brought to perfection and finally left behind.

For Nietzsche, culture is the supreme way of ordering the Dionysian realm of chaos into a world in which man's highest form of agency (sovereignty) becomes a possibility. Culture does not simply allow a man to 'be', but, more, it is the means by which man becomes and self-overcomes. Culture does not merely guarantee to preserve and/or make safe. If these goals defined the species activity of culture then, as Nietzsche remarks ironically in the Genealogy, modern man could be said to have achieved a remarkable degree of culture; whereas he has merely developed a highly advanced level of civilization (two terms between which Nietzsche maintains an important distinction as we noted earlier: see f/n II.iii.28).

If the issue of culture contra civilization appears today to have become an urgent one, there can be no doubt that the struggle between the forces of culture and civilization has become so uneven, it is probably more accurate to say:

"History now appears as the act by which reactive forces take possession of culture and divert its course in their favour. The triumph of reactive forces is not an accident in history but the principle and meaning of 'universal history'."  

This 'degeneration' or becoming-reactive of culture and the triumph of civilization occupies a central place in Nietzsche's work. It is, as Deleuze reminds us, the source of his greatest disappointment and something he often thinks of as a becoming-German of that which begins Greek; i.e., whereas culture in ancient
Greece was something fundamentally concerned with Geist (the active and affirmative life of a people), it ends confused with Reich (the coordinating power of the state) in the modern world of late 19th century Europe. So successfully has the former been encased within the ideal molar formations of the latter, that the "social organizations, associations, communities of a reactive character, parasites which cover it and absorb it"\(^5\) have become mistaken for cultural formations in themselves.

If there is to be a new flowering of culture then at least two things need to be done: Firstly, we need to recognise that culture and the state are not one and the same; that they are, in fact, antagonists. As Nietzsche writes; "the 'cultural state' is merely a modern idea. The one lives off the other, the one thrives at the expense of the other."\(^6\) The state - that 'coldest of all cold monsters' as Zarathustra describes it\(^7\) - sucks the very blood out of the people over whose body it has grown like a face. Secondly, having recognized the above and having withdrawn our love and allegiance for the 'new idol', then we need to find a way to release Geist (as defined above), from the hard shell of civilization and its state-formations. In Nietzsche and Lawrence, and continued in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, the ultimate task of the philosopher and the artist remains the same: "It is always a question of freeing life wherever it is imprisoned"\(^8\) and overcoded by molar ideals. This may be a slightly forlorn hope, more suited to a young woman overcoming a period of trauma, such as Ursula Brangwen at the end of The Rainbow, but for those who refuse to accept that civilization goes all the way down, there will always remain the possibility that "the sordid people who crept hard-scaled and separate on the face of the world's corruption were living still" (\(R\), pp.458-9) and that they would one day find the strength, the soundness of instinct, and the courage to "cast off their horny covering of disintegration" so that "new, clean, naked bodies would issue to a new germination, to a new growth" (\textit{ibid}, p.459).\(^9\)
But how? How to throw off old selves and dead forms? It is here that Nietzsche once more looks to the phenomenon of modern European nihilism and declares 'accelerate the process!' Like Lawrence, Nietzsche welcomes the deluge and the flood, because only after such will the rainbow stand in the sky as a symbol of a new beginning and as a bridge toward a transhuman future. As Deleuze writes:

"Confronted with the ways in which our societies become progressively decodified and unregulated, in which codes break down at every point, Nietzsche ... makes no attempt at recodification."\(^\text{10}\)

In other words, Nietzsche forgets or throws aside his umbrella, just as Lawrence rages against the great social umbrella that man in his terror of elemental chaos "erects between himself and the everlasting whirl"\(^\text{11}\) of life. But let us be careful here. For whilst Nietzsche makes no attempt to recodify along old lines and Lawrence no attempt to repair the holes ripped in the great social umbrella by poets and other enemies of civilized convention, this is not to say that they do not hope to bring together newly liberated forces onto a plane of consistency. Thus if they are, on the one hand, rightly thought of as great iconoclasts and opponents of the *idée fixe*, rejecting most, if not all, of the legal, contractual, and institutional bonds relating to and founded upon the interior forces of the modern state, they are also, on the other hand, keen to reorder, revalue, and "regain mastery over that which has been totally released."\(^\text{12}\) Nietzsche and Lawrence are not anarchists and, in fact, the question of culture "is badly considered if it is posed in terms of anarchy versus organized molar politics"\(^\text{13}\)

However, this is not to say they are crypto-systematizers after all. Let us be clear on this point, as it is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Nietzsche's thinking on culture and his politics of style: Central to the notion of a 'healthy' culture, for Nietzsche, is the idea of "harmonious manifoldness or unity
in diversity"; culture is not an artificial homogeneity "imposed by external contraints ... but an organic unity cultivated on the very soil of discord and difference." In other words, as we indicate above, culture is the giving of what Nietzsche was fond of calling 'style'. For Nietzsche, this is both a 'natural' activity and an aesthetic process; art being understood by him as an organic function of the will to power. He writes: "Culture is, above all, unity of style in all the expressions of a life of a people." Adding that 'barbarism', the opposite of culture, is "lack of style or a chaotic jumble of all styles." Crucially, a little later on in the same essay he will clarify this distinction by stressing that systematic and "oppressive philistinism does not constitute a culture, even an inferior culture, merely because it possesses a system: it must always be the antithesis of a culture, namely a permanently established barbarity." For Nietzsche, the systematizer is a fraud; a mere play-actor pretending to be a "whole and uniform nature", but knowing nothing of the genuine discipline required for style. Gerald Crich is one such actor. Behind his 'composition mask' lies an iron will, but not integrity. He knows how to organize into a system, but he is not a man of culture. Rather, he is a pure German who imposes the former over the latter and translates the "mystic word harmony into the practical word organization" (WL, p.227); not only a sign for Lawrence of barbarism, but also indicative of the profoundest nihilism. Of course, from the mechanical systematization of life imposed by those such a Gerald, "there is vast material productivity to be gained." But it is only from culture that we shall "produce the real blossoms of life and being." That is, those sovereign men and women of active power and affirmative will, newly risen in the flesh, different one from the other and who acknowledge their differences as degrees of power across a 'pathos of distance', whilst at the same time accepting their place within an 'order of rank'.

55
One is obliged at this juncture to concede what has become obvious; culture, for Nietzsche and those related to him, is inherently an aristocratic notion and arrangement and his theory of culture has definite social and political implications: "Nietzsche himself clearly thought so and did not hesitate to draw them".\(^{21}\) And this is precisely where many of the 'dangers' and/or 'problems' of Nietzsche's work begin for those commentators who convince themselves (mistakenly I believe) that the above implications are, or are destined to become, 'fascist'. Mark Warren, for example, claims that when Nietzsche's notion of culture based upon the aristocratic model of ancient Greece is transplanted into the socio-political context of modern Europe it "goes beyond nostalgia for a vital hierarchical community and moves toward a cultural-aesthetic fascism."\(^{22}\) Such a claim is met and challenged in the course of our discussion in chapters II and III, wherein Nietzsche's 'politics of evil' and grandeur based upon his cultural aesthetic are examined at length. However, briefly, I would like to offer a preliminary response to this claim here and now. Firstly, one cannot and should not attempt to deny the 'cruel sounding truth' that for Nietzsche notions of mastery and hierarchy are at the very heart of culture and that he has no qualms about the need for exploitation and oppression. Simply stated:

"for Nietzsche, a choice must be made in the end between the needs and claims of noble culture whose goal is art, and those of a democratic one whose goal is justice and compassion, for the two cannot be reconciled".\(^{23}\)

But nothing in the above necessarily implies fascism; exploitation and oppression belong just as crucially to liberal capitalism, resting as it does upon a universal system of wage-slavery and debt. The ideals posited by a spurious form of democracy that Lawrence brands as 'robot' or slave\(^ {24}\), should not, as we quoted Deleuze and Guattari saying earlier, make us bless the present system without reservation. Nor should we be bullied into accepting the crass and simplistic
alternative of either liberalism or fascism. There is always a line of flight that escapes from in between such points of blackmail and Nietzsche's thought is founded upon and furthers such lines. If it carries us away from the vulgarity of liberal democracy, so does it carry us away from the stupidity of fascism. Thus it is, for example, that Rupert Birkin, no friend to liberalism, also dismisses the growing Italian nationalism that so seduces Hermione as no more than another expression of modern industrialism "and a shallow jealousy that I detest so much" (WL, p.299).

Nietzsche is saved from fascism because, like Birkin, he detests the petty nationalism, the réssentiment-ridden racism, and the state-idolatry of fascism. Nietzsche's philosophy of culture, art, and style does not only suggest the kind of politics that we examine in chapters II and III and which can, for one reason or another, be made to resemble and thereby be confused with fascism; also it suggests a new and radical politics (of desire) which we shall develop in chapters IV and V. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, from out of even the tightest knot of roots a rhizome can sometimes shoot; i.e., Nietzsche's arborescent and authoritarian model of culture engenders its own escapes and self-overcoming.

Finally, and above all, it is important to realize that, for all his talk of things Greek, Nietzsche is not advocating an attempted return to, or reterritorialization upon, an ancient model of culture; nor, as Warren seems to suggest, the transplantation of a classical model into the modern world. Nietzsche is fully aware that what cannot be built anymore is a culture in the oldest sense of the word (even whilst he would remind us of this sense); for modern man is fundamentally no longer suitable material for such. Nietzsche simply hopes to reanimate something of the Greek Geist (i.e., the creative spirit or potential) that lies dormant within the present as a different order of sensibility. He knows he cannot designate a new culture in advance and knows too, after The Birth of
Tragedy, that it cannot be imposed by force. But Nietzsche hopes that the philosopher can, perhaps, remove some of the restraints upon the formation of such and release the necessary forces via experimentation. Such experimentation (essentially of an artistic character), is primarily directed to the bonds that exist between people. Thus the goal of a politics of style is to proliferate and intensify relations; relations of a kind which are presently either dissolved or carefully regulated by capitalism "through its capacity to fragment, privatize, and segment the socio-economic field" and which has today overgrown and overcoded the political and cultural arenas.

Fragmented and isolated as modern man has become, he must endeavour to come back into touch with others and with the world; regaining what Lawrence calls his "living wholeness and his living unison". But this will involve submission, according to Nietzsche and Lawrence, to those men in whom life is more vivid and more powerful and presently our entire democratic sensibility rises up in protest at such a suggestion. Nietzsche insists, however, that "only he who has attached his heart to some great man is by that act consecrated to culture" and that only via such an act will man find his own sense of power-fulfilment (i.e., his value and joy).

When he is at a low ebb, Birkin wonders why he should bother striving for a "coherent, satisfied life" and asks himself: "Why bother about human relationships? ... Why form any serious connections at all?" (WL, p.302). But when feeling stronger once more, then he knows he must form connections between himself and others if he is to live seriously as a fulfilled and, indeed, as a free man; for freedom lies in having duties and obligations toward others (these are what the noble man understands by 'rights') and in having a place within a communal order. Birkin realizes that his individuality is a social and cultural effect that has to be striven for and that his 'singularity' means nothing outside of a
social and cultural context. Of course, it is possible to "deny connections, break them, and become a fragment." But then, according to Lawrence, one is wretched.

And so: "What we want is to destroy our false inorganic connections, especially those related to money, and re-establish the living organic connections" (i.e., form a culture that is based in physis and not upon capital). How to achieve this is the main concern of this thesis as of Nietzsche's project of revaluation.

III.ii. Art as the Counter-Nihilistic Force, par excellence.

We have seen in II.ii how the question concerning technology becomes a question 'answerable', perhaps, in terms of a different revealing (poiesis). And we have seen in III.i. how the question of culture understood essentially as a question of style, also leads us back to art; back, that is, to a process which via creative experimentation disengages forces that may carry us toward a new becoming and contribute to the formation of a 'people yet to come'. Art, then, is central to our concerns to do with nihilism, culture, and the self; the aesthetic critique of modernity playing an important role in the philosophical critique. In fact, for Nietzsche, art is the first and last great hope; quite simply, if we are ever to move beyond the impasse of the present and give birth to new forms of relation then "unheard of artistic powers will be needed to break the unlimited knowledge drive". Whether such powers will prove forthcoming in an age of nihilism is debatable. But that such powers will have to be 'artistic' is a point on which Nietzsche insists. For art alone is;

"the great means of making life possible, the great seduction to life, the great stimulant of life. Art is the only superior counter-force to all will to denial of life, as that which is ... anti-nihilist par excellence."
The above is not simply Nietzsche giving "hyperbolic expression to his private preference for art over science." Rather, he is, as Daniel Breazeale correctly claims; "drawing the logical conclusion from his analyses of culture and knowledge" and, indeed, from his understanding of life and art in terms of will to power. It is important if one wishes to form a clear understanding of Nietzsche's 'aesthetics' (and his politics of style) to appreciate the latter point. For ultimately, Nietzsche does not "inquire into art in order to describe it as a cultural phenomenon ... Rather, by means of art and a characterization of the essence of art, he wants to show what the will to power is."

This is why Nietzsche very rarely talks about specific art works; he is essentially interested in art as a process and a practice in which the will to power most clearly reveals itself. And thus it is that Nietzsche is also keen to understand art in terms of the artist and the artist's 'health'. For as an organic function of the will to power, art can only be understood in terms of the forces (not the 'intentions') present within the artist. For Nietzsche, the genuine artist, whilst very often of frail health in many obvious respects, nevertheless is full of active and excessive energy. Via his art, he not only copes with the tragic character of existence, but affirms it and demands more chaos, more suffering, more danger. For these things are not only the source of his work, and, indeed, his life, but via art they are transfigured; "the horror and absurdity of existence" becoming something which is "compatible with life" and not destructive or prohibitive of it. When man feels himself strong, then he takes delight in his ability to enrich everything from out of his own strength; his ability, that is, to make the world not merely significant, but sublime: "This compulsion to transform into the perfect is - art."

But of course: "It would be permissible to imagine an antithetical condition ... a mode of being which impoverishes and attenuates things and makes them
consumptive."\(^{38}\) To imagine, that is, the artist as decadent and art as something which serves reaction and corruption. This is what Lawrence imagines in *Women in Love*; portraying the two artists of the work, Gudrun and Loerke, as *fleurs du mal*. Unfortunately, to imagine the becoming-decadent of the artist is not very difficult. For as Nietzsche notes; "nothing is more corruptible than an artist."\(^{39}\)

Just like the philosopher or scientist, the artist can suffer from a collapse of the primary instincts and become a sick animal, in thrall to the ascetic ideal and ready to serve the "approaching barbarity".\(^ {40}\) Or, at the very least, be willing to accept a role in which he is reduced to the level of one who *interprets* nihilism, rather than struggling to create a new vision, form new hopes, and build new habitats.

Thus Herr Loerke, who, explaining to Ursula and Gudrun why he has accepted a commission to produce a great granite frieze for a factory in Cologne argues; "'since industry is our business now, then let us make our places of industry our art - our factory area our pantheon'" (*WL*, p.424). Gudrun asks whether he believes, then, that art should subordinate itself to industry and Loerke replies: "'Art should *interpret* industry, as art once interpreted religion'" (*ibid.*).

This, however, is clearly not Lawrence's view; any more than it is Nietzsche's. For both, art should *create* the world - not merely interpret, represent, flatter, or sustain it. Indeed, if need be, the artist should assume the role of world-destroyer; i.e., one who is prepared to challenge the present order by "returning it to its originally explosive character."\(^ {41}\) That is to say, artists are those who are obliged when life becomes stifled beneath the great grey umbrella of convention and the ready-made, to tear open the artificial sky that has been painted on the underside of this umbrella, allowing us to breathe a little fresh air and to form a new vision. For the artist, as for all men, the struggle against chaos (the struggle to give style to chaos), is a human necessity. But this is not the only necessity,
nor the limit of the artist's duty:

"It is as if the struggle against chaos does not take place without an affinity with the enemy, because another struggle develops and takes on more importance - the struggle against opinion, which claims to protect us from chaos itself." 42

For Deleuze and Guattari, quoted above, as for Lawrence whom they are paraphrasing here, the role of the artist goes far beyond simply holding up fifty mirrors to the world. If, on the one hand, the artist does have an obligation to "live out and give expression to the reality of his time" 43, so too, on the other hand, must he become 'untimely' and not rest content with serving the order of his day (be it the order of the Church or the Reich). Only by becoming in some manner untimely will the artist be able to bring to presence the greater reality that lies external to the clichés of motley-spotted modern man and his molar daubs painted crudely over himself and every living thing.

But alas, the becoming-decadent of the artist is far more common than his becoming-untimely; and thus there flourishes a style of art "whose secret essence is scatological" 44. For, as discussed earlier (II.iii.), decadence results in man's inability to distinguish between the creative and excremental forces and flows; all becomes dirt and foulness in his mind and he becomes paralysed with fear and hatred of his own body. According to Lawrence, this is doubly disastrous for the artist; because to lose his instinctual health and to become gripped by a horror of his physical being, both distorts his life and thwarts his artistic vision. For it is from out of our physical (specifically our sexual) being that arises an intuitive awareness of beauty and form. If, on the one hand, Lawrence claims that this hysterical fear has become particularly acute during the modern period, it is nevertheless the case that, on the other hand (and like Nietzsche), so too does he suggest that the slow-death of the healthy instincts and man's intuitive
consciousness (his phallic or blood consciousness), has been an on-going process since the triumphant rise of Socratic reason, Platonic idealism and Christian morality.

Lawrence writes: "The history of our era is the nauseating and repulsive history of the crucifixion of the procreative body". Adding: "Art, that handmaid, humbly and honestly served the vile deed, through three thousand years at least." This history is the history of man and nihilism; the slow death of culture and the body. As a result, we have become knowledgeable and productive, but we can no longer feel or create. Having lost our sense of live beauty, we have become radically impoverished in world and surrounded by ugliness which undermines our feeling of power and well being.

For Lawrence, then, we are all now to a greater or lesser extent born corpses; inhabiting a world of shadows or simulacra of the real. The number of genuine artists and artworks (i.e., works which exhibit a new becoming and which do not reterritorialize back onto the cliché), is extremely small. And yet Lawrence, like Nietzsche, retains a stubborn faith in the promise of art; if, on the one hand, avant garde artists such as Loerke represent the last word in self-consciousness and corruption, then, on the other hand, "it is through art that Lawrence seeks redemption from this 'fallen' condition." And - let us be clear on this point - the 'promise' of art (i.e., the redemption it offers) is a restoration of the real; that is, the restoration of the libidinally material realm of the physical and sensual; the resurrection of the flesh, be this the flesh of man, beast, or fruit. Naming Cézanne, and referring to the latter's attempts to overcome the cliché and resist the ideal forces of the dominant socius via the painting of an apple, Lawrence writes: "It seems a small thing to do: yet it is the first sign that a man has made for thousands of years that he is willing to admit that matter actually exists."
Thus, crucially, great art is not an escape into fantasy, or a move away from the world of experience. Rather, it is a way of coming into touch with things: be they apples, shoes, sunflowers, stars, vases, landscapes, or - ultimately - the bodies of men and women. Art, as Deleuze and Guattari write, is a means of awakening in ourselves a greater sensitivity to intensities. We do not retreat into it, so much as use it as:

".. a tool for blazing new life lines ... all those real becomings that are not produced only in art, and all those active escapes that do not consist in fleeing into art, taking refuge in art, and all those positive deterritorializations that never reterritorialize on art". 49

Loerke, of course, would find the above view anathema. For him, a work of art:

"has nothing to do with anything but itself, it has no relation with the everyday world of this and the other, there is no connection between them, absolutely none" (WL, p.430). And the greatest error is to "confuse the relative world of action, with the absolute world of art" (Ibid., p.431). Gudrun agrees. But Ursula still has the health and naivety to challenge this idealistic and ultra-sophisticated view of art preached by Loerke and subscribed to by her sister. She tells them:

"you have to separate the two [ie, the world of art and the world of reality] because you can't bear to know what you are" (Ibid.) For Ursula, art reveals the 'truth' of the artist and of the real world and only the decadent who is "too far gone to see it" (Ibid.) would wish to deny this. 50

Thus Cézanne's apple may seem, as Lawrence says, a small act, and yet "it is the first step that counts, and Cézanne's apple is a great deal more than Plato's Idea. Cézanne's apple rolled the stone from the mouth of the tomb ... he gave us a chance." 51 A chance, that is, to live and to "displace our present mode of mental-vision consciousness ... and substitute a mode of consciousness that was predominantly intuitive, the awareness of touch." 52 In other words, art forms not
only a tool for blazing new life lines, but also allows for the development of what Marcuse would call a new 'reality principle'; one that is fundamentally antagonistic to the principle which is currently central to Western industrial civilization. Freud, and others since, have disputed the possibility of such, arguing that art cannot supply or itself become a future reality without a serious human regression. That the magical images and sounds of art could point towards an "unconquered future of mankind rather than its (badly) conquered past ... seemed to Freud a nice utopia." But Freud's understanding of art is as seriously flawed as his understanding of sex and power; and, ultimately, he wishes to retain the great umbrella of civilization. The revolution affected by artists like Cézanne is not in line with the politics of his own project.

Arguably, Cézanne affects more than just a revolution; his work signals the beginning of an actual revaluation of values – not just between man and fruit, but between man and man (and man as fruit). Thus it is that:

"When he said to his models: 'Be an apple! Be an apple!' he was uttering the foreword to the fall not only of ... the Christian idealists ... but to the collapse of our whole way of consciousness, and the substitution of another way. If the human being is going to be primarily an apple ... then you are going to have a new world of men: a world which has very little to say, men that can sit still and just be physically there, and be truly non-moral."

That is, a world 'beyond good and evil', as Nietzsche would say; a world of men and women who have left behind their personal-egoic and human, all too human selves full of shame and bad conscience. The promise of art is that it alone can 'save' us and lead towards a delicious golden age in which we have become the apple plucked by Eve. When Birkin accuses Hermione of having the 'eternal apple' forever stuck in her throat (WL, p.40), he is implying that what she needs to do
is to swallow the thing at last and fully digest it; to become-apple herself, i.e., a creature who has had the full experience of good and evil (and not merely knowledge of such in her head) and is thus able to move beyond such to an extra-moral future.

A golden age: and why not? Nihilism is, in a sense, the *ne plus ultra*: "So why shouldn't it be a prelude to a golden age?" But let us not deceive ourselves on the likelihood of this. For if the return of the apple in Cézanne's work marks the promise of the above, it is worth noting that after a forty year struggle Cézanne himself only achieved limited success in his goal of revealing an apple; and never, according to Lawrence, managed to capture the appley quality of man or woman. It took thousands of years to kill the body and construct an ideal organism; who can say how long it will take to dismantle the latter and build once more a 'body without organs'? Cézanne, for all his efforts, was soon emasculated and his apple abstracted into 'significant form'; the resurrection of the flesh and the revaluation of values was postponed once more - as it will be postponed *ad infinitum* by the good bourgeois corpses in their cultured winding-sheets.

But art remains, we may conclude, the great counter-nihilistic force *par excellence* that Nietzsche recognized it to be. Certainly it can itself become a tool in the service of reaction. But those who would make art subservient rely, like the capitalist upon schizophrenia, on releasing chaotic forces in order to invest their systems with a certain necessary dynamism. The hope has to be that one day they will find they have allowed too great a hole in their umbrella to be repaired and there will be an irruption of desire the likes of which we have not yet begun to imagine and which will "bring forth miracles, create utter new races and new species, ... new forms of consciousness, new forms of body, new units of being (*WL*, p.453).
III.iii. Closing Remarks: From Among the Ruins to Beyond the Ruins; From a Politics of Style to a Politics of Evil.

We have examined how modern European nihilism manifests itself in various forms and why it must be explored at numerous points, in a number of ways. The revaluation of all values longed for by Nietzsche and Lawrence is achievable, if at all, only once the above has been perfected. But if the consummation of nihilism and the revaluation is essentially a cultural-philosophical concern, it cannot be divorced from a social, economic, and political context and thus the question of style is more than an abstract one to do with aesthetics or 'art for art's sake'.

Acutely aware of this, both Nietzsche and Lawrence show a pronounced interest in how power manifests itself at a political level and each seems attracted to the idea that a revolutionary solution to the problem of nihilism can be found that would enable man to gain control of the forces of history and forcefully push or kick his way beyond the ruins and over himself. If they do not wish to posit systematic metanarratives of the kind that characterize modernity, then still they are keen to arrive at a 'grand politics' of their own in which an uneasy balance is struck between a desire to 'take over' and a radical-nomadic wish to "wander away from the world's somewhere's" (WL, p.315). As strong as this latter desire to drift outside the gate is within them, like Birkin, Nietzsche and Lawrence realize that they cannot simply cut themselves off from a 'degenerate' society merely by taking flight and, in fact, all that they have gained in 'free, proud singleness' becomes meaningless and wasted without their being able to operate and create within a wider social context. Thus Nietzsche and Lawrence affirm an ethos, or way of living and relating, which is constructed ultimately in the bonds between people.
As artists too, Nietzsche and Lawrence cannot resist the temptation to give style to the ruins and dress the chaos of existence with new myths and illusions, thereby enabling man to form a new conception of reality or 'truth' (the latter not at all loving to go naked as romantics like Rousseau and scientific voyeurs choose to believe). This is not to suggest that Nietzsche and Lawrence argue for the reformation of a unified and centralized whole, reorganized out of heterogeneous bits and leftovers; but they clearly do wish to do more than merely play with these fragments in an 'ironic' fashion. Having recognized the danger of slipping toward totalitarianism or absolutism, in which all value is mistakenly assigned to the whole and one forgets that the latter is simply an abstraction that overcodes the parts, Nietzsche and Lawrence are also alert to the contrary (yet related) danger which mutates what is an undoubtedly healthy attitude of "incredulity towards metanarratives" (i.e., an unwillingness to accept any all-encompassing truth claim except as a possibly convenient fiction), into a hopeless relativism and a counter-belief in the ruins that invests the latter with some kind of intrinsic last value; the fragmented and heterogeneous becoming celebrated and promoted as the good-in-themselves. Croire dans les ruines! is ultimately no more than a nihilistic slogan mouthed by disappointed slaves on the recoil from a belief in the Whole. Robbed of the resources needed to move forward and the courage to do so, the latter "consider it ludicrous and shameful that they should be expected to restore order to the chaotic world" (or give it style) and thus opt to remain content at the level of disintegration, frustrating all attempts at revaluation and deriding all efforts to build new little habitats and hopes as 'reactionary'.

Nietzsche and Lawrence, to conclude, were both well aware that life is not predetermined and does not come ready made; i.e., that there are no ideal forms in the past to which we can return, nor any ideal forms in the future to which we can progress. Thus a move beyond the ruins must involve more than a vain attempt to reterritorialize along old lines, or the reconstruction of old unities and
old selves. Similarly, it must involve more than the desperate hope of a transcendent utopia to come. But it still seems doubtful to Nietzsche and Lawrence whether man can live without forming some kind of narrative concerning his origins and his destiny; without positing some kind of 'grand politics' that is founded upon the Nietzschean formula for human fulfilment ("a Yes, a No, a straightline, a goal"\textsuperscript{61}) and which understands that destruction, disintegration, and dissolution remain "merely the propaedeutic to [the] positive activity of creation and invention."\textsuperscript{62} Thus \textit{Women in Love} ends, but does not conclude. Having achieved an almost total devaluation of values, Lawrence looks for a way forward - but a way that doesn't rest upon the social optimism with which he concludes \textit{The Rainbow}. Like Nietzsche, he affirms a new philosophy of power and a politics of evil that furthers his thinking on art, culture, and society.

Part I: Opening Remarks on How the Disease of Love Infects Modernity and Its Politics in Relation to Lawrence's Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo.

Aaron's Rod (AR) and Kangaroo (K) are the first two novels in what is commonly known as Lawrence's 'power trilogy'; the third, The Plumed Serpent, forms the focus of our next chapter. Both works are written against a background of post-War crisis and collapse. Lawrence adopting an episodic style in order to reflect the chaos and uncertainty of the world in which they are set. The Great War itself, however, is regarded as an overt symptom - and not the cause - of the underlying cultural malaise that Nietzsche terms modern European nihilism (as discussed in chapter one). Nor does the War's end signify the termination of the latter's unfolding, for when peace finally returns in 1918 it results merely in the resublimation of violence back into "the general air" (AR, p.5). This is not to say that nothing has changed, the conflict did cause a break of some kind and for Lawrence "the world before the War is no longer thinkable; it has been deranged by a historical nightmare whose significance cannot be contained by the familiar categories of the world that has been disrupted."¹

Thus we see Aaron Sisson take up his 'rod' and abandon his old life as he seeks to embrace the 'incalculable'; and thus we see Richard Somers, the Lawrencian protagonist of Kangaroo, set off on a quest for a post-moral and, if need be, transhuman future, in which power, not love, is the key. Refusing all segmentation (husband/worker/citizen), Aaron and Somers go with the flow of desire, breaking away from one form of bondage after another and "everywhere setting the molecular charges that will explode, make fall what must fall, make escape what must escape"², rejecting slave values and conventions.
But as much as both characters want to move "almost violently away from everything" (AR, p.178) and are primarily concerned with reconfiguring the forces of the soul, Aaron and Somers are acutely aware that their individual quest for a new self and a more meaningful and fulfilling way of life is not "separable from a general political context". Thus each strives to form a new series of relations and accepts that whilst it is sometimes vital to be able to stand aside and stand apart from their fellow men, ultimately "you can't keep on being alone" (AR, p.241). Like Nietzsche, Lawrence does not promise or promote a liberation from all ties into an ideal freedom or individuality and he concedes that "implication in the 'horrible human affair' cannot be avoided by one who seeks the new age".

However, as indicated above, Lawrence wishes to suggest a new basis for individual and collective being: power - contra love. And the power trilogy of novels is essentially concerned with the struggle between these two life-modes, Lawrence developing Nietzsche's philosophy and politics of power on the one hand, his critique of love on the other.

If the power mode is our concern in Part II, here we shall examine 'love', by which we refer to a once healthy process of the "incomprehensible human soul" (AR, p.166), but which has now mistakenly been turned into a goal and , as such, become a disease to us. We refer also to the altruistic and egalitarian values of moral-idealism which are symptomatic of the love-disease; values such as pity and self-sacrifice which lie at the heart of Christian culture.

It is interesting to ponder why it is that so many still cling to the foot of the Cross following the death of God. For, after all, we are none of us obliged by any law to remain faithful to our old ideals; particularly once they have been shown to be born of base and reactive origins. It is not only unintelligent and
lazy to persist with such values, but, as Nietzsche points out: "through this faithfulness we are injuring our higher self".\textsuperscript{5} There is thus only one thing to be done: "we have to become traitors, be unfaithful, again and again abandon our ideals"\textsuperscript{6} if we are to advance from one mode of life into another. Of course this will involve a degree of pain and man will thus need to 'become hard' as Zarathustra demands of him. But if we do not do this, if, rather, we allow our excessive sensitivity which has produced many of the "enormous social problems today"\textsuperscript{7}, to grow still more acute, then we may possibly enter a terminal decline as a species.

Richard Somers understands this: "'Let's be hard, separate men", he tells Kangaroo, in order that they may meet and understand one another at a level "deeper than love" (\textit{K}, p.209). Kangaroo, uncomfortable with the request and so often mistaken in his attempts to understand Somers, is not wrong when he responds by accusing the latter of wanting to betray his human self.

Like Somers, Aaron too is prepared to abandon his ideal human status and social identity; he too wants to become hard and unlovable. But most men when shown God's corpse, refuse to surrender their old faith and old selves, preferring to burrow contentedly into the corpse and insisting that the stench of decay is the veritable perfume of love. Nietzsche knows this is how the majority of men are, which is why they are a threat to man's creative evolution and self-overcoming. Therefore he calls upon those who would preserve the promise of tomorrow to not only break the old law tables, but also "shatter the good and just!"\textsuperscript{8}, resisting the urge to show pity; as Somers resists when Kangaroo lies dying in his hospital bed still insisting that "'Love is the greatest" (\textit{K}, p.323) and imploring Somers to accept this. But Somers looks on impassively and in silence; refusing the appeal made to his pity. Refusing, that is, to give Kangaroo that which the latter wanted all along – his unconditional love. Ultimately, for all his talk of giving love,
Kangaroo has only ever wanted to be *given* love all along. As Deleuze perceptively writes: "The man of *ressentiment* does not know how and does not want to love, but wants to be loved."9

It’s not that Somers is incapable of pity, nor that he wishes to deny love altogether. In fact, he concedes: "Love is an eternal part of life. But it is only a part. And when it is treated as if it were a whole, it becomes a disease" (*K*, p.328). It is this monomaniacal, disease-producing insistence on love which Somers hates and resists, adamant that love is not and never can be "'the one and only, exclusive force or mystery of living inspiration ... There is something else'" (*K*, p.134). And this something else is power: that which love hates.

In expressing his discontent with the love-ideal, however, Somers finds himself in opposition to the great edifice of modern civilization which has attempted to found itself exclusively upon this ideal, most usually expressed as the command 'love thy neighbour as thyself' (i.e., practice universal consideration of others equally and impartially, recognizing no marks of difference or distinction). Of course, such a claim is anathema to Nietzsche and Lawrence, who would protest that it radically falsifies the nature of the relationship between men. Even Freud admits that this moral *diktat* is "impossible to fulfil"10 for beings who are not naturally inclined to be "gentle creatures who want to be loved".11 But civilization pays no attention to this fact: "it merely admonishes us that the harder it is to obey the precept the more meritorious it is to do so."12 Thus civilization is obliged from the outset to be oppressive, viewing man as a dangerous animal in need of taming via the expedient that is love. Freud says this is unfortunate, but necessary for man's own benefit. That which Nietzsche would regard as man's healthiest expression of will to power, Freud describes as man's 'primary hostility'; i.e., that which perpetually threatens destruction and chaos. Thus, for Freud, civilization is understood in the same manner that Nietzsche characterizes
liberal-democracy; as a sort of 'quarantine arrangement', forming "systematic protection against the unrelenting impulses of sex ... aggression, cruelty etc."\textsuperscript{13} Where these impulses cannot be usefully turned against themselves within the 'soul', they are denied expression (and, if possible, destroyed).

In addition, civilization uses various methods intended to incite people into identification with one another, attempting to merge "single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind."\textsuperscript{14} Nietzsche and Lawrence oppose this process; the latter declaring flatly that there "can never be love universal and unbroken"\textsuperscript{15} and arguing that the attempt to insist on such and deny the instincts of man results ultimately with a recoil at last into hatred, insanity, and violence (the so-called 'return of the repressed'). Whereas for Freud, all that does not conform with Eros (which he exclusively associates with life) is permeated with a 'death instinct', for Nietzsche and Lawrence it is the love-ideal itself that displays a nihilistic will to negate difference and becoming, thereby preserving a state of mechanical sameness and fixed being.

As Marcuse points out, the continual restrictions on man's instinctual life and the frustration of his most active forces (i.e., the 'civilizing' of man), ultimately has the effect of weakening the above and of thereby ensuring their becoming-reactive. Thus, ironically, the forces of nihilism are strengthened by those attempts to deny the active powers a place within the will. Thus it is that Freud's thinking comes "face to face with the fatal dialectic of civilization"\textsuperscript{16}; i.e., the very progress and triumph of the latter leads to the accumulation of increasingly destructive forces. Appreciating this, Lawrence characterizes moral-idealism as an extremely dangerous disease: "We think that love and benevolence will cure anything. Whereas love and benevolence are our poison."\textsuperscript{17} If, on the one hand, we have been made into 'interesting' animals full of potential via morality, so too
have we been turned into sick animals full of secret self-loathing and profound ill-will for all that is non-self, or other. Driven by réssentiment and the spirit of revenge, civilized man is willing to murder those who refuse to accept his love and give their love to him and prepared also to throw away his own life in an act of self-sacrifice.

This is illustrated by Lawrence in *Aaron's Rod* and *Kangaroo*. Jim Bricknell, a Christian-socialist character in the first of these novels, confesses to the Nietzschean-like Lilly that he would be happy to see "'crucifixions ad infinitum'" because for him "'love and sacrifice are the finest things in life'" and the greatest joy resides in "'sacrificing oneself to love'" (*AR*, p.77). To Lilly, this lusting for suicide is the sign of one who is world-weary and lacking in the strength to accept life as a continual struggle, and an inevitable consequence of turning love from a process into a goal. But ideal-love also becomes homicidal as well as suicidal, so that the murderer too is merely an "'extreme lover acting on the recoil'" (*AR*, p.294). Thus it is that Jack Callcott, the sentimental fascist paramilitary of *Kangaroo* is at his happiest when breaking heads with an iron bar and boasting of it afterwards with "indescribably gloating joy in his tones" (*K*, p.319). It is because ideal love cannot recognize limits of any kind that it ends by becoming deadly. Men cause or accept death not because they love too little - but too much. If this is bad enough at an individual level, it is obviously worse on a collective or mass-scale, such as happens when love infects our social organizations and Nietzsche warns above all we should be wary of underestimating "'the fatality that has crept out of Christianity even into politics!'"18 about which I wish to make a few remarks below.

According to both Nietzsche's and Lawrence's reading of history, there have been a series of 'slave revolts in morality'. Behind these they detect a spirit of revenge and what Nietzsche calls the 'ascetic ideal' (i.e., essentially a will to negate power).
The 'politics of love' in the modern period – particularly, though not exclusively in its liberal and socialist manifestations – is a continuation of this slave revolt and results, according to Lawrence in the triumph of "painfully inferior and even base politicians" all wielding the "insentient bullying power of mediocrity".19

In *the Genealogy* (II.16), Nietzsche tells his tale of the slave revolt; a story that unfolds in a manner suggestive of Hegel's philosophy of *Geist*. Only Nietzsche's is not a story of spiritual and intellectual progress made by man, but of physiological decline; a story of love's triumph, but also of revenge and hatred and the destruction of the classical ideal based upon an active and affirmative conception of power and life. Beginning and continuing at a micro-level of forces and values, the slave revolt nevertheless has molar political and social consequences, even though some critics have argued that there is in fact no conclusive evidence to prove a decisive link between Christian moral teaching at the metaphysical level and the demand for equal rights at the secular level of modern politics and socio-economics. Certainly it is true to say that Nietzsche's reading of European history in *the Genealogy* is an imaginative and highly speculative account, designed to emphasize in a dramatic and rhetorical manner his opposition to both the Christian moral tradition and modernity. But despite this and the seemingly reductive nature of an interpretation which characterizes liberal-democracy as being no more than a secularization of Christian-moral culture ("a demand that the actual world embody the Christian-moral promise"20), it has surely to be conceded that: "Nietzsche's views on the continuity of Christian and liberal democratic culture do reveal significant affinities. This suggests in important aspects he was justified in holding that liberal democracy was implicated in the crisis of modern European nihilism."21

In *Aaron's Rod* and *Kangaroo*, Lawrence, having already rejected liberal democracy, sets out to explore the two dominant alternatives on offer in the
1920's: socialism and fascism. Thus, for example, in chapter VI of the earlier work, Aaron falls in with some middle-class, would-be socialist revolutionaries, dreaming naively of liberté, égalité, and fraternité on the one hand, whilst thrilling to the thought of a violent upheaval and a whole drama of 'blood and crime' on the other. Lawrence is keen to show to what extent it is the latter that really motivates; a lusting for brutal spectacle and sensation, only thinly veiled behind the fairest idealism. Jim Bricknell, insists explicitly that the only hope for man lies in imitating Christ whilst hoping for social and political revolution. When Lilly pours scorn on his creed of love, Bricknell leaps up in a violent rage and gives the latter "two or three hard blows with his fists" (AR, p.82); a dramatic illustration of the return of the repressed rage and aggressiveness that lies in the souls of the good and just.

Later, Lawrence introduces another socialist character into Aaron's Rod, Levison; this time one of the Marxist-Hegelian variety, insistent that socialism is "'the inevitable next step'" (AR, p.279). Lilly agrees that if we continue along the present path of idealism, then this is indeed likely to be the case. And in Kangaroo, Somers will also conclude when considering this argument that "if the old ideal had still a logical leaf to put forth, it was this last leaf of communism - before the lily-tree of humanity rooted in love died its final death" (K, p.265).

Thus Levison is not wrong: but what he welcomes as the perfectibility of human society formed upon the logical development of an ideal, is what Lilly and Somers both dread; the final degeneration of mankind into "a sort of slime and merge" (AR, p.166). For the latter, the idea and the ideal of love and all that this implies (e.g., the unity of mankind, the sanctity of human life, the notion of self-sacrifice), has gone dead: "'And when the ideal is dead and putrid, the logical sequence is only a stink'" (ibid., p.280).
Unable to see anything other than the logic of his own socialist position, Levison asks Lilly what his (political) alternative is: "'Is it merely nihilism?'" (AR, p.281). If there is an undoubted irony in his asking of this question, nevertheless it is an important question which demands to be raised and deserves to be answered. And even if Lilly's quasi-Nietzschean aristocratism is meant to be counter-nihilistic, it does present problems in its own right to be addressed. In many ways, Lilly is as 'modern' in his political grandeur and aristocratic ambitions as Levison is in his socialism; and just as mistaken. It will fall to Somers in the later novel to begin to move away from the political and revolutionary altogether (and even then he doesn't get terribly far). For as he comes vaguely but increasingly to realize via his contact with the likes of Jaz, Struthers, Kangaroo, and Jack, all hopes for a seizure of history and all grand political projects are fatally contaminated with the same poison: even his own.

Having arrived in Australia already convinced of the connection between Christian-moral idealism and political liberalism, Somers initially aims his critique at the democratic world, which, he agrees with Jack Callcott, is "'fermenting rotten with ... the will of the people'" (K, p.89). But he eventually rejects also the revolutionary alternatives offered to democracy by Left and Right; realizing that it is not just liberals but also socialist workers and fascist paramilitaries who have "learned to consider [their] existence an injustice" and who seek revenge upon life accordingly. Somers recognizes, as we will see, that it is modern man per se who is the problem; that whilst those infected with the political virus and the disease of love may be particularly dangerous, the real issue concerns the nature of our humanity itself.

To conclude, we may say that if bourgeois civilization has become an impossibility, standing as it does upon a ruined moral support, so too have the traditional political alternatives become redundant. What is needed is something
radically different; a politics which works not to preserve man as he is, but to further his transfiguration and self-overcoming and a politics that opens up an order of rank between men, doing away with the aggressive overfamiliarity and "promiscuous mixing in" (K, p.36) that characterizes the virulently egalitarian and highly authoritarian politics of love. We travelled far in the direction of Christ but it turned into a dead-end at last: "No further progress is possible in that direction, we have reached breakdown and failure. If life is to continue, a shift must be made to the power-mode".23

Part II: Power: The Philosophy, Politics, and Problem Of.

II.i. Remarks on the Philosophy of Power.

Having reflected on "the conventionally honorific term 'love'"1 and found it to disguise a good deal of hatred and resentment, I wish now to examine the attempt made by Nietzsche and Lawrence to revalue the complementary term 'power' and form a critical conception beyond the reactive representations of moral and rational idealism. That is, a conception which is free from "the superficial contempt for power which most of us feel and express today"; contempt born of the fact that we moderns "only know dead power, which is force".2 But power, Lawrence insists, is not mere force and has nothing to do with bullying authority.

For Lawrence, as for Nietzsche, the distinction between power and force is vital, not least of all if they are going to be able to develop an effective critique that can be taken seriously once truth claims have been abandoned in favour of power claims. The former is usually construed as something predominantly active and affirmative that deserves to be esteemed, obliging as it does a man to act with profound obligation; the latter, force, is portrayed as reactive and negative which deserves to be devalued and regarded as fundamentally base and irresponsible.
Unfortunately, as indicated above, the traditional representations of power common within Western thought and modern political theory from Hobbes to Hegel, have been ones in which the latter is characterized in a:

"strangely restrictive way, in that, to begin with, this power is poor in resources, sparing in its methods, monotonous in the tactics it utilizes, incapable of invention, and seemingly doomed to repeat itself. Further, it is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of positing limits, it is basically anti-energy." 3

Deleuze anticipates Foucault's analysis above in his 1962 study of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, arguing that the problem resides in the fact that when we make power an object of representation, we necessarily make it dependent upon the factor according to which a thing is represented or recognized or not: "Now, only values which are current, only accepted values [i.e., herd values] give criterion of recognition in this way. 4 We need thus to form a new non-representational and energy-based model of power outside of accepted values and beyond the "negative and emaciated forms of prohibition" 5 that are currently mistaken as the only possible manifestations of power. Somewhat ironically, it is power itself which has today to be liberated from the 'repressive hypothesis' which assumes dominance within modernity and provides a generally acceptable model of thought. Power has to be allowed to regain something of its Dionysian and positive aspect. If this seems disconcerting to the modern mind, the fact remains that beneath the dull grey representations of power given us by the puritan, power has always remained gay, which is why as Foucault concludes: "What makes power hold good ... is simply the fact that it doesn't weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasures, forms knowledges, produces discourse." 6
In other words, and importantly, power is the great "productive network which runs through the whole of the social body"; i.e., power—and not love—is that which keeps us alive to one another and in touch. This is why Lawrence argues that power is not only prior to love, but that the latter is also ultimately a product and secondary form of power: "Even the phallic erection is a first blind movement of power. Love is said to call power into motion: but it is probably the reverse; that the slumbering power calls love into being." This reversal by Lawrence, in which power is now posited as the "first and greatest of all mysteries" behind our being and existence, brings us back once more to Nietzsche's assertion that we, like the rest of the world, are will to power "— and nothing else besides!"

Thus it is that despite Jesus, despite Freud and all the other moral-idealists and castrati, man wants more than simply to love and be loved and will always ultimately value as the good that which brings him a "deeper flow of life and life-energy", heightening his sense of power; whilst, on the other hand, branding as bad that which impairs this flow and "proceeds from weakness." At least this is what Nietzsche and Lawrence pin their hopes for a revaluation of values upon.

Thus power, to reiterate, so often thought of as 'evil' by the conventionally moral (the weak and tame), is affirmed by Nietzsche and those who follow him in their thinking as the good. So it is that when Nietzsche describes his politics of power as a politics of evil, we need not imagine fascist brutality or the torture chambers of the Marquis de Sade. Evil is simply Nietzsche's word for power, appropriated from the moral vocabulary of the meek and assigned a new meaning and a new value. As a philosopher of power, Nietzsche is affirming "those processes that flagrantly violate all human utility, all accumulative reason, all stability and all sense", convinced as he is that these criteria are rooted in the reactive impulses of self-preservation belonging to a "peculiarly sordid, inert, and
cowardly species"\(^{15}\) of man and herd animal who has learned to believe as Truth that: "Good is the passive that obeys Reason. Evil is the active springing from Energy."\(^{16}\)

Nietzsche, after Blake, wishes to argue that the above is not in fact the case; to demonstrate that: "Energy is the only life, and is from the Body" and that, ultimately: "Energy is Eternal Delight."\(^{17}\) He attempts to do this by stripping away the regulations that have been used to control and legitimize power within a philosophy of right; revealing thereby power in its 'Machiavellian' nature: "pur. sans mélange, cru, vert, dans toute sa force, dans toute son apreté."\(^{18}\)

Let us not, however, be mistaken into thinking that Nietzsche's understanding of power is one that somehow purifies the latter of all harmful and dangerous aspects, even if it does, in a sense, seek to sanctify power. Nietzsche does not, for example, deny that power even at its most life-creative and life-affirming contains within it a destructive element and is anything other than that which preserves life. Rather, when a man or animal is full of active energy, they are full of the desire above all to increase their feeling of power (Machtgefühl) and they achieve this, paradoxically, via an expenditure of strength and via the process of self-overcoming. Thus what a man most wants is not simply length of days; he wants intensity of life, not duration.

But how, it might be asked, does one acquire such active life and enhance one's power to begin with? Nietzsche answers by saying that one must first of all need strength; "otherwise one will never have it."\(^{19}\) This is also Lawrence's reply to the above. But as he and Nietzsche also both stress it is by no means a question of consciously seeking after power. As Deleuze rightly notes, to want or seek power is "only the lowest degree of will to power, its negative form, the guise it assumes when reactive forces prevail"\(^{20}\); i.e., it is the will of the slave who
understands power only as something he lacks. Radically, Nietzsche frees his notion of will to power from all egoism and consciousness; i.e., from all residues of philosophical humanism. We cannot know power, nor possess it, nor seek it out. We can only accept it as a gift which "flows into us from behind and below. We must turn our backs to it, and go ahead. The faster we go ahead, the stronger the river flows into us."21 That is, the more intensely we live, the more power we need, the greater the power we will receive.

"From earliest times, man has been aware of a 'power' or potency within him - and also outside of him - which he has no ultimate control over."22 Traditionally man has thought of this power in terms of the divine and/or the daimonic. The saying of Heraclitus - 'ethos anthropoi daimon' - more than simply meaning that a man's character or fate is determined by his 'demon', means too that a man is produced and constituted by the element of power; that is to say, he is formed between the forces that he contains in relation to and combination with those forces external to himself (solar-cosmic forces, environmental forces, social, cultural, and technological forces etcetera). Thus Richard Somers's confession to the all-too-human Kangaroo that he identifies primarily with his demon: "'It's my best me, and I stick to it'" (K, p.137), means that he prefers to essentially think of himself as a creature of power and not a spirit of ideal-love. And when, as we will see, Somers at the end of the novel declares it is his intention to seek out 'dark gods', he means that he wishes to find new and alien forces with which to forge a new relationship, thereby reconstituting the self. Somers knows what the pre-Socratic Greeks (and Nietzsche) also knew, namely, that it is only by listening to one's demon (the voice of active power and affirmative will inside one) that man will be able to move forward beyond the ruins and find new values. For as Zarathustra says; "man needs what is most evil in him for what is best in him".23
Thus once more we arrive at the equation power = evil. And once more we note the anti-humanistic element in the thinking which leads to such an equation. This should not surprise us; for what is humanism after all other than "everything in Western civilization that restricts the desire for power" and the flow of power. Everything which accustoms us to see the figure of Man (or a God made in the image of Man) behind every event, every phenomenon, blinding us to "the other realities, and especially the reality of power" in its active and life-creative form and as that which produces us. The culture of love which rests upon such humanism, is one that ultimately lacks the ability to give birth to the future; for it is the power which such a culture would deny that alone can "bring about that which may be" and produce the radically new and different. Thus such a culture ossifies into a fixed mechanical form (a 'civilization') which merely ensures the continuance and permanence of the present.

Similarly, the man who denies power fears change; the ego, being the automatic principle in a man, having declared 'I am', wishes to know nothing of difference and becoming. And it is right for the static ego to fear the active forces external to itself; for the latter are destructive of the former. Power is monstrous, immoral, unreasonable. But Lawrence, like Nietzsche, is adamant that it is preferable to experience the Dionysian nature of power even at its most destructive "than to live like a well-to-do American, and never know the mystery of power at all." What does it matter to secure all the benefits of civilization ('good food and good plumbing'), they go on to ask, if our lives are inglorious and without meaning? Men remain fundamentally depressed if they are not fulfilled in their 'power-souls', which is to say, in their collective selves. Only when a man feels himself satisfied here is he able at last to become "almost happy - as happy as man and demons can be." And this happiness, although not directly informing the will to power itself (which cares neither for pleasure or displeasure, but only for more power), is crucial to a Nietzschean ethic; for,
Nietzsche argues, contrary to Christian teaching, only if a man is happy will he be good (and that he is not happy feeling righteous, but powerful).

If Nietzsche's anti-humanist philosophy of power does not consider producing goodness as its primary aim (and clearly it doesn't), nevertheless there is a notion of joy connected with the exercising of power and of overcoming resistances from out of which the latter can flourish. The key, then, is surely to proliferate the "complex mechanisms and devices of excitation and inticement" via which feelings of fulfilment and pleasure can be increased and intensified. Deleuze rightly argues that due to the negative representations given to us by Christians and humanists of every description "what we in fact know of the will to power is suffering and torture, but the will to power is still the unknown joy, the unknown happiness, the unknown god." This is the dark god whom Somers seeks and affirms; the god whom Nietzsche baptizes as Dionysus.

III.ii. Remarks on the Politics of Power (or a Politics of Evil).

It is not simply the case that having developed a critical ontology of power, Nietzsche and Lawrence then seek to construct a political philosophy of power upon this. For in fact, their ontological speculation is entwined with their political thought in such an intimate and pervasive manner that one is dubious about the attempt to divide the one from the other. This is not to argue that there is necessarily an intrinsic connection between the philosophy of will to power and the 'natural aristocratism' of Nietzsche and Lawrence, merely that there is a much closer and more carefully thought out relation than is often suggested in some of the critical literature.

For Nietzsche and Lawrence, the need for the feeling of power gives rise to a call for such a 'grand politics'; this need is the strongest tide which carries the latter
forward and it "streams up out of inexhaustible wells not only in the souls of
princes and the powerful but not least in the lower order of the people." It is a
call, ultimately, for new social relations and new bonds between people formed on
the basis of a newly active conception of power and a newly affirmative will. They
simply attempt to give voice to this call – and answer it as best they can within
their work.

In Aarons Rod, for example, Lawrence hints that the "shadowy relation" between
Aaron and Lilly "is nothing less than the birth of a new society", as if he were
attempting to realise the "vision of fraternity between men that is glimpsed
momentarily in Fantasia". So argues Steven Vine in an introduction to the above
novel (1995). Essentially he is right, but his use of the word 'fraternity' is
unfortunate and careless, for Lawrence frequently and explicitly dismisses this
notion in his work, and as Somers makes clear in Kangaroo the relationship that
is sought as the basis of a new social and political order is a 'living fellowship'
not of "affection, not love, not comradeship. Not mates and equality and
mingling. Not blood brotherhood. None of that" (K, p.107). Upon what
foundation the new relationship of active power is then to be based is not
something Somers is sure of:

"Perhaps the thing that the dark races knew ... the
mystery of lordship ... The mystery of innate, natural, sacred priority. The other
mystical relationship between men, which democracy and equality try to deny and
obliterate. Not any arbitrary caste or birth aristocracy. But the mystic
recognition of difference and innate priority, the joy of obedience and the sacred
responsibility of authority" (K, p.107).

If there are key passages in Nietzsche's work, such as Beyond Good and Evil,
257, or The Anti-Christ, 56, which conveniently summarize much of his late
political thinking, the above must constitute such in Lawrence's mid-period; this
passage forming the heart of what it is he is attempting to explore in the 'power trilogy'. Essentially, we are given here almost the entire vocabulary of Lawrence's political philosophy at this time. If most of these terms (frequently employed by Nietzsche also), are regarded as 'politically incorrect' or simply redundant in this liberal-democratic (and secular) age, yet it would be impossible to discuss a politics of evil without recourse to them.

It is a vocabulary with which Rawdon Lilly would feel perfectly comfortable; for, like his author and like Nietzsche, he is prepared to accept the need for some form of slavery as a social and political necessity if culture and the cultural production of greatness is to be guaranteed. But cultural greatness is not the only concern of the above; they make the troubling leap from the latter to a concern also with biological advance or species development, often equating the two things under the general heading 'life', which in turn is then reduced to a political problem. Because they believe that culture and evolution both depend upon the subjugation and exploitation of weaker powers (without which, they argue, there can be no higher forms), Nietzsche and Lawrence are both prepared to see these things inscribed and reinforced socially as well as promoted politically. In the name of life as will to power, they insist on the need for "'a real committal of the life-issue of inferior beings to the responsibility of a superior being'" (AR, p.281) Not the submission of man to the will of the People, or to the State-machine, or to capital and industry, but to those others in whom a greater degree of active power is manifest and who are moving on toward a new consummation of some kind.

According to Lilly, we have little choice in the matter; "'once the love-mode changes, as change it must ... then the other mode will take place in us'" (AR, p.298); i.e., the power-mode, which demands life be lived on the basis of submission and obedience. Aaron is sceptical of this ever happening. But Lilly
insists that all men have the urge to submit and offer obedience; not because they have been 'Oedipalized' and had their desire so perverted that it has turned back upon itself as a desire for its own oppression, but because it is only via submission to the greater soul and by offering obedience that they can hope to find collective and individual fulfilment. And it is this, fulfilment within a relationship of power and a social order (not individual autonomy in an ideal sense), that man most passionately desires; that which Lawrence calls man's 'living wholeness'. Anyone who genuinely cares about man and his fulfilment will, argues Lawrence, wish to see "a society of power in which men fall naturally into collective wholeness" and can give obedience.

Thus obedience becomes an ontological and existential imperative for Lawrence, one inscribed in nature, as it is for Zarathustra, who says: "All living creatures are obeying creatures". In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche also writes at some length on the essential importance of obedience, suggesting that "from out of that there always emerges ... something for the sake of which it is worthwhile to live on earth". In addition, he claims that the people which has lost the art of obedience "shalt perish and lose all respect" for itself.

It should be clear, then, that it is absolutely not the sign of the slave to submit and give obedience; but, rather, the mark of a noble people engaged in the struggle to produce greatness, find fulfilment, and, ultimately, transfigure themselves via an act of self-overcoming. If such a people on the one hand accept their responsibility to master the inferior cycles and forces of life and give command, on the other hand, what really distinguishes them as aristocratic is their "pride in obeying", that is, their willingness to yield before those cycles and forces of life which are over and above and moving beyond them.

The danger is that the slave, although he cannot command and resents giving
obedience, does know how to bully and is only too happy to conform; the reactive aspects of command and obedience as understood in the negative representations of slave-morality. And this danger is compounded by the fact that the need to obey, practiced and cultivated among mankind for so long that it has become established as a sort of 'formal conscience', has been inherited far more successfully and at the expense of the much more difficult art of command. Nietzsche warns that if the above trend is taken to its 'ultimate extravagance', then there will be "no commanders or independent men at all", or, if a few such still remained, "they would suffer from a bad conscience". Arguably, this is exactly what has come to pass within the modern democratic political order, where nobody rules in their own name or accepts the obligation of power, and where the slave has assumed authority and control. What Nietzsche hopes to do via his attempt to revive a noble ethic and memories of aristocratic political culture, is restore a good conscience to commanders and those men who still feel themselves to be full of a degree of active power. For Nietzsche, it is vital that such men can be preserved; for without such, as even Freud concedes, there can be no healthy group formation, nor any higher collectivity than that of a herd (without meaning, without justification, without direction). Masters are not just a luxury formation; they are also a social necessity. Deny their existence – as the slave would – and you deny power. Deny power and you are not simply acting in an anti-social manner, but are also revealing a will that is anti-life (i.e., fundamentally nihilistic). This will, according to Nietzsche and Lawrence, is today uppermost, and thus we witness "a grim determination to destroy all mastery, all lordship, and all human splendour out of the world, leaving only a community of saints as the final negation of power, and the final power."

And the above is carried out in the name of what the slave thinks of as 'freedom'. Whilst Nietzsche and Lawrence do have a notion of such themselves (freedom = fulfilment within an order of rank), they rarely use the term, so vitiated has it
become by its usage within the vocabulary of idealism. For Nietzsche and Lawrence, the reactive conception of freedom (i.e., freedom from rather than freedom for) is simply of no value, even when achieved: "What is more hopelessly uninteresting than accomplished liberty?" asks Richard Somers of himself, adding: "The vacancy of this freedom is almost terrifying ... without any core or pith of meaning" (K, p.27). In an age of nihilism, freedom is simply another exhausted ideal and has no relevance to a politics of evil. Thus Nietzsche says explicitly: "My ideas do not revolve around the degree of freedom ... but around the degree of power ... and to what extent a sacrifice of freedom ... provides the basis for the emergence of a higher type."40

If freedom is thus dismissed as an empty and boring slave-ideal, so too does the politics of evil do away with the notion of equality. For, as Richard Somers argues, new values can only be reached via "an awakening of the old recognition of the aristocratic principle, the innate difference between people" (K, p.277). Critics such as J.A. Bernstein are therefore not wrong to identify the desirability of inequality as "the basic doctrine" of Nietzschean political philosophy.41 For it is certainly the case that Nietzsche thought it crucial that a pathos of distance be established not only within the soul, but in society too, so that men could form a sense of their own value and power in relation to, but also as a mark of distinction from, one another. Only a society which believes in and establishes an order of rank and difference between man and man, and which limits freedom, will produce the true blooms of culture. That is to say: "Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work of an aristocratic order - and so it will always be".42

In an ironic reversal of liberal thinking, Lawrence even goes on to suggest that freedom, if it is to mean anything at all, must mean the freedom to be different and unequal; not the right to sameness and equality: "How can there be liberty
when I am not free to be other than fraternal and equal?", he asks. Equality, which denies power differentials is thus too a form of decadence, or a principle of "dissolution and decay" which reveals a will to the denial of life. And this is why Nietzsche argues liberal institutions are subversive of a healthy will to power and democracy should be regarded as "a symptom of waning power, of approaching senescence, of physiological fatigue".

But if democracy and liberalism are to be overcome, what is to replace them? This is what Somers sets off to discover. At first his search for an alternative political creed leads him to militant fascism and revolutionary socialism. Ultimately, however, he rejects both of these options, recognizing the same decadence (the same reactive forces and negative will) behind them as behind the politics of equality and freedom; and an even more virulent form of acute réssentiment. What he wants is not merely something different from modern liberalism, but something other to modernity and its slave morality itself. Like Nietzsche, whom Lawrence indicates Somers is familiar with, he decides that what is needed is a revived and radicalized notion of aristocracy; for only this form of society and political culture breathes power in an active and affirmative manner. Thus in Lawrence's text Zarathustra's call is echoed: "O my brothers, there is a new nobility needed; to oppose all mob-rule and all despotism and to write anew upon law-tables the word 'Noble'." This new nobility - a natural aristocracy - shall form the "'cultivators and sewers of the future'"

What Zarathustra/Nietzsche wants is what Somers/Lawrence wants; a form of aristocracy in which power manifests itself inside a man and is acknowledged with reverence by all men. They do not want an economic élite, such as the bourgeois class of capitalism ("'a nobility that you could buy like shopkeepers with shopkeepers gold'"). Nor do they want an élite composed of a tiny handful of men all of similar type and disposition: "'for many noblemen are needed, and
noblemen of many kinds, for nobility to exist!" \(^{49}\)

This latter is an important remark, for it demonstrates how Nietzsche saw his new aristocracy as one founded upon difference and plurality; i.e., a multiplicity of types all in relation with one another within the communion of power. Difference does, for Nietzsche, as for Lawrence, imply 'higher' and 'lower' human types, but they posit an infinite variety of such within an ever-changing order of rank. For just as power continually flows and transforms, so the selves and the relations between selves formed on the basis of and by power change and mutate. Politics is, in fact, nothing other than the problem of these changing relations; an interplay of mobile power-forms and becomings. Ideal democracy, for all its talk of pluralism and opportunity for personal growth and self-expression, is actually far less dynamic (because based upon reactive and inactive forces) than the sort of society envisioned by Nietzsche and Lawrence. The former signals the end of politics understood in terms of the *agon* (i.e., struggle and change) and collapses at last into the "tyranny of No-power" that is nihilism.\(^{50}\)

Nietzsche's and Lawrence's political and social model is based upon caste and hierarchy "in which a people gradually culminates"\(^{51}\) and relates closely to the model Nietzsche finds support for in the 'Law-Book of Manu'. In this text, Nietzsche claims, noble values are to be found everywhere and it constitutes a magnificent affirmation of life as will to power, encouraging a people to "become masterly, to become perfect - to be ambitious for the highest art of living."\(^{52}\) The (religious) caste system posited by Manu, is praised by Nietzsche for sanctioning "a natural law of life of the first rank over which no arbitrary caprice, no 'modern idea' has any power"\(^{53}\), thereby returning us to an argument we found in Nietzsche and Lawrence earlier, namely, that there is to be found a categorical difference between classes which is also a distinction at the level of being or nature. Anne Fernihough reminds us in her study of Lawrence that as
soon as the 'decadent' forces of modernity are linked to democracy, then recourse is quickly and easily made by opponents "to 'natural categories' and to a 'natural hierarchy' grounded in biology"; the problem with this will be dealt with shortly.

Problematic or not, according to Nietzsche once society is divided into its essential classes of "divergent physical tendency", each can find their own happiness and fulfilment: Lawrence agrees. It is a classical division of man and society (almost Platonic in its claim that the great man justifies the existence of all men), which reveals Nietzsche at his most philosophically traditional and seemingly at odds with the more radical aspects and implications of his own theory of power. In order to resist this conclusion, it is necessary to assume that when Nietzsche insists on the radical nature of his aristocratism it is because he posits a different will behind his own thought to that found in Plato and political philosophy since Plato; thus his insistence on the importance of being able to determine the forces that compose a will and the direction that the will takes in a philosopher, or artist, or would-be leader of men. What is a healthy desire to command in one man, is an unhealthy wish to bully in another; what is an active desire to give obedience in one man, is a reactive wanting to conform in another; what is an affirmative will to social and political stability in one man, is a negative will to mechanical and ideal order in another. This is why it is crucial that Kangaroo, for example, who, like other fascists, at times sounds overtly Nietzschean in his pronouncements on power and politics, is not to be mistaken as such.

What, then, to conclude this discussion of the politics of power, is our primary task? It is to learn to perform genealogical investigations of our own and thus to recognize the difference between active and reactive forces in ourselves and in others. Or, as Lawrence puts it, we must learn to see; "the spark of nobleness
inside us, and let it make us. To recognize the spark of *noblesse* in one another, and add our sparks together to flame. And to recognize the men who have stars, not mere sparks of nobility in their souls, and to choose these for leaders."\(^{56}\)

Thus Lawrence terminates his political thinking with a vision of the stars and a rather wistful hope that men will be able to form a 'solar aristocracy' in which each man is adjusted to another and the small "are as perfect as the great, because each is itself and in its own place. ... And the joy of each is that it is so."\(^{57}\) That there could be a social order such as this may seem fanciful at the very least. But, as we will see in the following chapter, post-*Kangaroo* Lawrence looks to Mexico and the Aztecs to find support for the idea of an aristocracy of the sun; a social order based upon the materiality of power, a politics of cruelty, and a notion of a general economy.

Far from abandoning politics in favour of the gods, Lawrence reconfigures his political thinking in terms of the *daimonic* and the divine, reintroducing the gods back into history and seeking out those prepared to become 'the lords of the earth' and form a "new aristocracy, irrespective of nationality ... a confraternity of the living sun, making the embers of financial internationalism and industrial internationalism pale upon the earth."\(^{58}\) This again reflects Nietzsche's view that from now on politics will assume a different form and be absorbed into the larger question of competing moralities, or a "war of the spirits".\(^{59}\) And it is clear that whilst both authors were prone to speculate metaphorically and imaginatively, each also is genuinely concerned with developing a grand political project that involves the seizure of history, the domination of the earth, and a revaluation of all values. It seems appropriate before going any further, to discuss our concerns with the above and address the problems and dangers raised by such a philosophy of power and politics of evil.
III.iii. Problems, Concerns, and Dangers.

The philosophy and politics of power developed by Nietzsche and Lawrence poses a provocative challenge to modernity, standing opposed to the ideals shared by Christians, liberals, and humanists of all varieties. It is important to concede this point and mistaken to try and pretend otherwise by arguing, for example, that: "Even in Nietzsche's ostensibly most politically oriented and power hungry statements actual political power and leadership is not foreseen".60 Or: "Lawrence's distinction between 'aristocrat' and 'democrat' does not involve any of the undertones of authoritarianism or .. 'fascism'. Lawrence's view of man is deeper: it is not political but spiritual".61 We have hopefully shown why both these statements can be challenged as inadequate and misleading.

Here, then, in an attempt to be honest, we will say something in reply to the concern that Nietzschean political philosophy dispenses with a notion of 'human rights', and address the danger that by so doing it veers too far towards fascism. It should be noted, however, that this concern and the related danger are dealt with in rather more detail and at length in chapter three and that our primary concern here relates to the charge that Nietzsche's (and Lawrence's) politics of evil is not critical enough, resides on an untenable and potentially disastrous naturalism, and, finally, betrays the radicalism of their own thinking on power to which it has an uneasy relation.

For liberal commentators, the main difficulty is that a Nietzschean politics of evil will be vitalist at best; anti-humanist at worst. That is to say, it will concern itself primarily with flows and forces, 'dark gods' and strange desires, and not with the principles of Enlightenment or the defence of civilization and its values. Such commentators are convinced that such a politics will lead to monstrousness and barbarism: "This will be, they argue, the inevitable result of an analysis that
denounces all notions of subjectivity and all humanism while regarding society to be an arena of competing forces.”

Firstly, neither Nietzsche, Lawrence, or any serious post-Nietzschean thinker, denounces 'all notions of subjectivity'; as we will make clear in the first section of part IV of this chapter, the above are at pains to reconfigure the subject on the basis of an active conception of power – not denounce or do away with altogether. Secondly, whilst it is the case that Nietzsche does not allow space for the metaphysical notion of 'human rights' within his texts, he does not deny rights altogether. Rather, he simply argues that these cannot be thought as things which can be fixed eternally and made universal. Just as there is no 'man as such' outside of history, time, and culture, nor can there be acontingent 'rights of man' as such, outside, that is, of what Nietzsche terms the anthropomorphic vanity of idealism. Affirming as he does the world as will to power, means that Nietzsche is obliged to define rights as things produced by and coordinated within the continuous struggle of competing forces. In other words, rights are "recognized and guaranteed degrees of power" and, importantly, if "power-relationships undergo any material alteration rights disappear", to be replaced by newly created ones.

So, to reiterate, Nietzsche does not deny the subject and does not deny rights; he simply attempts to materialize these notions by showing their relation to his theory of will to power. Further to this, whilst celebrating and appearing to promote the 'Dionysian' aspects of power on the one hand, he also concedes the importance of reaffirming the human (all too human) need for a degree of stability, statute, and structure. The need, that is, to impose limits and to form habits; to give style to chaos. If the latter can no longer be legitimated via an appeal to God and the old values, then, Nietzsche argues, maybe it is possible to do so on aesthetic grounds; thus the vital importance of art as a counter-nihilistic
force *par excellence* (and as an organic function of the will to power) within his work (see chapter one where this was discussed).

Of course, it is precisely the attempt to turn philosophy into an art and to 'aestheticize' the political realm, coupled to an active and aggressive conception of power, which lays Nietzsche's thinking open to the charge of 'fascism'. And fascism is the great danger and most pressing concern for many commentators, disturbed by the potent mixture of art, ideology, and the *daimonic* in Nietzsche's texts. Again, we have said something about fascism in relation to Nietzsche's work in chapter one, and will say more in chapter three to follow. But let us make some additional remarks here.

It is perhaps best to once more begin with a confession: "Whether one likes it or not ... Nietzsche's thinking will always remain susceptible to fascist appropriation simply because, in its political mode, it does not conform to the liberal view of 'man' and 'society'". The same can be said of Lawrence's thinking: Both offer a non-egalitarian vision of the future in which hierarchy, discipline, and breeding all come far more into power and play, as we have seen; both argue for the establishment of a new master race, which, if predominantly thought of in cultural and religious terms, is nevertheless socially instituted and politically secured with violence where necessary; finally, both were prone to using an extreme and apocalyptic rhetoric and to advocate the sort of despotic terrorism that, when associated by Nietzsche in his mid-period works with militant socialism, he is quick to condemn. Is, therefore, their thinking not merely open to fascist 'appropriation' as suggested above, but also on some level essentially fascist in its own right? I think the answer here is no. If there are similarities as we have indicated, nevertheless Bataille is justified in his claim that: "Between the ideas of the fascist reactionaries and Nietzsche's notions there is more than simple difference - there is radical incompatibility." And this is because Nietzsche's
political philosophy and fascism express entirely different wills to power, the former, in stark contrast to the latter, having freed itself to a radical degree from the spirit of revenge and the poison of résentiment.

Thus it is, for example, that one does not find in either Nietzsche's or Lawrence's writings, justification for their political beliefs along either nationalist or racist lines; the former claiming that if he and his kind are not 'French' enough to love humanity, neither are they 'German' enough to resort to such base stupidities (described by him as "scabies of the heart"). And this is why, despite speaking in terms of the great man as commander and of the mass whose destiny is to serve, Nietzsche and Lawrence do not pervert desire; as fascists pervert desire and as all those who use the above figures to Oedipalize history pervert desire. For they do not seek to reduce the social field to the familial, or the level of the nursery (exactly the environment that Aaron, Lilly, and Somers wish to flee from). If Nietzsche and Lawrence encourage submission to the greater souls and promise fulfilment via obedience, they want men to submit as free men; not as infants or slaves. It is only by denying the new spirit (of innocence and affirmation) in their texts and by offering a reactive interpretation of the latter, that justification can be found by those political nihilists who would commit their crimes not beyond good and evil, but in the ethical void beyond good and bad. Fascism is not inherent in Nietzschean political philosophy; it is the cancerous mutation of it, if formed on the same (or at least a parallel) line of flight. Lawrence understands this, as is clear from a careful reading of Kangaroo.

If not inherently fascist, still Nietzsche's political thinking may be inherently flawed, or limited. J.A. Bernstein, for example, claims that Nietzsche ignores the problem which had so troubled Plato in The Republic, namely; "that those fittest to rule are those who genuinely do not wish to do so". But, as with many of the criticisms of Nietzsche, this seems to be based upon only a partial reading and
is thus of reduced validity. The fact is, as we have shown earlier in this chapter, Nietzsche does not ignore this dilemma; rather he emphasizes the crucial importance of being able to overcome what he terms the 'bad conscience of commanders'. Only when this is accomplished, will the best then want to rule and accept their obligation or duty to do so.69

A rather more serious charge is that Nietzsche fails to address the fact that his positing of a neo-aristocratic political order as a counter-modern alternative to democracy is self-defeating because, by reaffirming the master/slave dichotomy and a hierarchical ordering of society, he recreates the conditions that were originally productive of résentiment. In other words: "his great politics do not address the major cause of the rise of the metaphysics of resentment, namely, the experience of political alienation."70

Here again though, such criticisms can be challenged. For surely Nietzsche does address the problem of résentiment, arguing, rightly or wrongly, that the latter is only produced in those socio-political systems in which men feel themselves unfulfilled and impotent (i.e., feel their existence is lacking in meaning and direction). His aristocratic arrangement is specifically designed to make all men - even the lowest - feel fulfilled, and to allow each man the opportunity to experience and express his own degree of power; each will feel his existence justified by serving greatness. 'Alienation' and feelings of resentment will simply be dissolved within a vital community of power-relation and an order of rank which assigns each man a place within the former.

In addition, Nietzsche's model of society is designed to solve the problem of how those rich in power and health can give (of themselves) to others without the dishonour and debilitating effect of pity; another prime cause of résentiment. Christian charity and social welfare programmes make men feel small and paltry;
he naturally grows resentful at having to receive in such circumstances (and those who give are also denied pleasure in the act of bestowing). Nietzsche assumed, again, rightly or wrongly, that within the new order he envisioned where power could flow between all men (and be the property of none), that each would be enabled to a greater or lesser degree to give and receive with reverence and gratitude.

Admittedly, Nietzsche does at times sound more hopeful than convinced of his own arguments, and the latter are underdeveloped in his texts. Unfortunately, although Lawrence adopts many of these arguments as his own, illustrating and debating them in his fiction and essays, he doesn't do much to actually develop them in detail and in relation to the dominant realities of his time. Ultimately, one has to ask whether it isn't the case that their understanding of power, particularly the politics of power, lacks complexity. Critics claim that when the attempted move is made from a philosophy of power to a politics, Nietzsche and Lawrence betray their own thinking and expose its shortcomings; mistakenly employing the former as a "metaphysics of domination specifically to justify political domination". Too often, Nietzsche and Lawrence appear to slip back into thinking of power as some kind of essence which can be located within and possessed by the great man and from which all kinds of empirical manifestations follow. Clearly this is not the case; power is today disseminated and dispersed throughout an incredibly complex network of institutions, bureaucracies, and individuals, in a decentralized manner much closer to the Dionysian flux that Nietzsche imagines in his philosophy of power, but seems unable to coherently and consistently conceive of in his political thought. Mistakenly, he and Lawrence both resort to outmoded and redundant molar models which are of no use for conceptualizing the micro-physics of power or the molecular nature of politics. Thus, one is obliged to agree with Mark Warren here: "Nietzsche did not give his own philosophy a plausible political identity. He failed to elaborate the broad
range of political possibilities that are suggested by his philosophy in large part owing to unexamined assumptions about the nature of the political."

Failing to conceptualize in terms such as markets and bureaucracies, information and technology, relevant to the social, political, and economic realities of his own age, may have made Nietzsche an 'untimely' thinker on the one hand; but on the other, it had the unfortunate result of significantly reducing his critique of modernity.

Finally, and perhaps most damagingly of all for Nietzsche's social and political thinking, is its operating upon certain untenable conservative traditions of thought, such as the assumption that one could look to the 'natural world' to legitimate human practices and justify social and cultural arrangements. Nietzsche, although attempting to be radical and challenge traditional ways of thinking the political, nevertheless ends up subscribing to "the organic metaphor for society that was common to political philosophy from Plato through to Hobbes, and remains in use among conservatives even today." Warren suggests that he did so not due to any necessity internal to his philosophy of will to power, but simply because he lacked the conceptual categories of analysis appropriate to the late 19th century (as we have said above), and because by referring back to 'nature' (or 'life'), Nietzsche was able to find convenient justifications for his political ideas; but this is due to the fact that he used the same terms to cover both his philosophy and his understanding of the processes and 'laws' of nature. With undue confidence, Nietzsche moves back and forth from nature to society, claiming that his thinking on the latter is more valid and more vital than the decadent and 'unnatural' ideals of liberal-democracy, because he stays faithful to the former (understood as will to power).

The problem with this is twofold and has been identified by Keith Ansell-Pearson:
Firstly, seeking justification for the political in a theory of nature; i.e., seeking to
disguise the noble lie with the natural law, is precisely that which is no longer
credible in the modern age of nihilism; and, secondly, anyone who "attempts to
derive ethical and intellectual values from the 'laws of nature' is guilty of an'
'extreme anthropomorphism', and ... of an employment of reason that oversteps
the bounds of the permitted 

Here then is the major problem and illegitimacy of Nietzsche's political
philosophy; not only are all attempts to establish a 'natural' aristocracy untenable,
but may very well be as "philosophically dubious and pernicious as the attempt of
social Darwinism to derive social and political values from Darwin's original
theory of natural selection."

To conclude, we must concede that there are genuine problems, concerns, and
dangers with Nietzschean political thought; and that there is a disjunctive tension
between this and his Dionysian philosophy of power. This tension, however, often
categorized as existing between the postmodern style of the latter and the pre-
modern content of the former, cannot be solved – as liberal critics are wont to do –
by simply decoupling the philosophy from the politics and abandoning the
latter; they are too intimately connected for any such clean division. Besides
which, such tension need not be a problem; least of all for those who are strong
enough not to require harmony and intellectual consistency, and who know how
to use the tension to challenge thinking which fears paradox and self-
contradiction. Due precisely to its disjunctive and underdeveloped nature,
Nietzsche's political philosophy is of much greater value to us today in thinking
about our modernity than any grand narrative in which all loose ends are tied, all
solutions finalized, and all freedom to experiment prohibited. Those critics who
bemoan the fact that his aristocratism is incomplete and who apparently long for
the certainties provided by those totalizing blue-prints of Utopia so common to
modern theory, have missed the point of Nietzsche's work (or at least its advantage). If the relations of power (i.e., the politics) he proposes are today of no interest to us, then the way is still open for different relations, different models. It is our problem to decide upon these, to search for them, and to develop them.

Part IV: Beyond the Molar Level of Politics.

IV.i. The Reconfiguration of the Subject as a Power-Formation.

If the move made from love to power is played out by Nietzsche and Lawrence at a molar political level, so too is it described as a molecular process at the level of competing forces within (and constitutive of) the human subject. Indeed, in a very real sense Aaron's quest can be regarded primarily as an attempt to define and form a new 'single' self; the shattering of the blue ball symbolizing the breaking and loss of his old identity and the world which reinforced that identity (see chapter 1 of Aaron's Rod). With his old self exploded into a myriad fragments (i.e., deterritorialized back into a primal chaos of forces without form), Aaron is thrown toward a new becoming in which the above forces of the will to power recombine with the social, cultural, technological and other external forces to give rise to the form 'man'.

By developing a notion of the self that is not defined in terms either of consciousness or fixed essence (i.e., in the terms of rational and moral idealism), Nietzsche and Lawrence foreclose the possibility of positing any notion of a transcendent individual able to "attribute a senseless importance to himself".1 In other words, such a notion undermines the idea of a self as an eternal unity beyond temporality and contingency. Thus despite its celebrations of singular selfhood, "Aaron's Rod" refutes the idea that the self is a fixed or given entity;
instead it pictures the self as a movement or .. a blossoming."² Being is thus characterized as becoming; i.e., a travelling and a multiple phenomenon of difference. As Lilly insists; "there are lots of mes. I'm not only just one proposition" (AR, p.103).

Thus the self, as Lilly goes on to argue, can never be fully 'known' - only made manifest and lived; never perfected in conformity with an ideal standard or representation. One shows a Nietzschean 'love of fate' by accepting that one's singleness is one's destiny; i.e., that we have no duty other than to become who we are. As Lilly says: "The only goal is the fulfilling of your own soul's most active desire and suggestion" (AR, p.296). But become thyself does not mean assert thy ego; rather, and crucially, it means know that the mysterious inflow of power that generates the self comes from behind and below (i.e., it is not generated by one's own will), and, further, it means accept the unknown god or 'Holy Ghost' who develops your actions within you.³

Thus, to reiterate, we may say that the self is a product of power and a derivative of the Outside; not an inner essence. "I am myself", writes Lawrence, "and I remain myself only by the grace of the powers that enter me, from the unseen, and make me forever newly myself."⁴ If we want to bud as a species and overcome our present (all-too-human) status, then we need to find a way to increase our power and find new powers to form connections with (inhuman and alien forces). If love preserves and keeps safe, then power, more than simply moving us mechanically, transfigures us.

If in Aaron's Rod the possibility is raised of becoming 'single' (or sovereign), in Kangaroo Lawrence puts forward the more radical Nietzschean idea of becoming-other in the sense of overcoming our humanity. However, before we examine this latter possibility, we need to first make clear what Lawrence, following Nietzsche,
understands by the 'human' and why both of the above write of distinct classes within this form; i.e., master and slave types. In other words, we need to first see what hope, if any, lies in the animal man, before we perhaps prematurely speak of his death.

The Nietzschean idea of the overman presupposes, of course, the man. But, unfortunately for those who would will the former as Zarathustra instructs, there are within democratic and love-sodden modernity very few of the latter. As Lilly says, there are today for the most part only 'people', and people are not men; "they are insects and instruments, and their destiny is slavery" (AR, p.281).

Nietzsche claims that genuine philosophers despise such ideal representations of men who form a universal 'humanity' which reflects all that is sick and absurd. How much more valuable than "the 'desirable' man of any ideal hitherto" is what he calls an 'actual' man of flesh and blood. The latter "makes up for and redeems" man as a species and "enables us to retain our faith in mankind! " Such actual men are those whom Nietzsche and Lawrence also think of and refer to as 'natural aristocrats'; i.e., those who have attained their own singularity and are full of active power and an affirmative will.

"There is no getting away from it", writes Lawrence, "mankind falls forever into the two divisions of aristocrat and democrat"; i.e., master and slave. Crucially, he adds: "We are speaking now not of political parties, but of two sorts of human nature: those who feel themselves strong in their soul, and those who feel themselves weak." Likewise, Nietzsche primarily thinks of the division as an ontological one in terms of will to power and how one styles the forces that one is, even if he does also attempt to construct a sociology and a politics upon this in order to accentuate the pathos of distance between higher and lower types. This he regards as vital, because: "It is this operation in which certain men are

105
Importantly, having said this, we need to note that both Nietzsche and Lawrence recognize that no man is pure aristocrat, or pure slave. There is, as Nietzsche confesses; "master morality and slave morality ... even within the same man, within the one soul." And Lawrence, once more echoing Nietzsche adds: "Every man has two selves among his manifold self. He has a herd-self, which is vulgar, common, ugly ... And he has a better self," which is individual and noble. Such remarks save Nietzsche and Lawrence from the charge that they posited master and slave in terms of an untenable and lazy biological essentialism (i.e., a material idealism) and demonstrate that they were using what appear to be a set of binary concepts strategically, in order to challenge and subvert other dualistic models.

Because power is not stable, but, rather, constantly flows, and because the arrangement of forces within the individual is therefore constantly shifting, so man's status or rank can never be finally determined. However, still Nietzsche and Lawrence insist on the need to distinguish between those in whom active-noble forces predominate from those in whom reactive-base forces have the upper-hand. And they make such a distinction by observing whether a man seeks to possess power and preserve himself, or release flows of power in himself and in all men, thereby opening up the possibility of new becomings and providing life: "The providing of life belongs to the aristocrat. If a man, whether by thought or action, makes life, he is an aristocrat."

Without such men, mankind in general falls out of touch with desire and the flows of power, thereby "exhausting its human possibilities ... degenerating into repetition, torpor, ennui and lifelessness"; i.e., what Nietzsche describes as slavery and nihilism. The problem is, does mankind know of anything other than
this condition of becoming-reactive? To answer no to this question would be to reach what Deleuze rightly describes as a "distressing conclusion". But is there another possible answer; another possible becoming of forces (i.e., a becoming-active)? "Everything tempts us to think perhaps there is", says Deleuze hopefully: "But, as Nietzsche often says, we would need another sensibility, another way of feeling." That is, a way of feeling beyond moral sentiment and rational calculation; a way born not of love or logic, but of power. Can we achieve such—and if so, how? Politics and revolution we will suggest as Somers concludes, are not the answer; they do not and cannot provide a new sensibility. Thus we need to look beyond the political (certainly in its conventional and molar terms) and, indeed, beyond and over the human. And Nietzsche spends a good deal of time seeking out the signs of a different becoming; "an involution of forms and forces, in which novel kinds of self-overcoming can be cultivated." Here, with reference to Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo, let us briefly examine such novel kinds of self-overcoming as suggested by Lawrence.

Aaron–Lilly–Somers: if they are single and distinct, like stars, nevertheless each is in some ways the becoming and overcoming of the other. None of the above is ever quite at ease with themselves to be thought of 'sovereign' individuals in the classical sense; each is too restless and discontent and they are perhaps all three best thought of as characters convalescing from the disease of love and still struggling to shed their ideally formed selves. In other words, they are best described as 'free spirits' of the Nietzschian variety. Or, arguably, we can even see anticipated in the above trio the 'schizo-nomads' of Deleuze and Guattari; men fighting to be free of the Oedipal yoke and keen to liberate themselves from the last vestiges of slavery. Thus it is that: "They know incredible sufferings, vertigos and sicknesses. They have their spectres. They must reinvent each gesture." But ultimately, if successful in this, such men produce themselves as those who are "finally able to do something simple in [their] own name, without
asking permission ... a name that no longer designates any ego whatever."  

Such men make it clear that even in this age of universal wage-slavery, they do not believe for one moment in the 'dignity of labour', or that their pride resides in their pockets. Rather, they arrive at the conclusion that men of their class who would retain their dignity and pride must refuse paid employment and flee abroad; "to seek to become master in new and savage regions of the world ... to keep moving from place to place as long as any sign of slavery seems to threaten". 

Thus Aaron flees to Italy and Lilly decides to get out of Europe altogether, whilst Somers finds himself wandering in the Australian bush and, at the novel's end, on board a ship sailing for America. All three are thus on what Lawrence himself set out upon and termed a 'savage pilgrimage'.

"Good people say that we must not flee" - but the nomad knows that there is nothing else to do but to run and keep running (for the old world is behind him). As for the schizo, "continually wandering about, migrating here, there and everywhere as best he can", he pushes still further on with the process of deterritorialization; which does not simply mean travelling in foreign lands, but involves a trip along the Open Road in order to escape from the choice with which he is threatened by civil society "of being compelled to become either the slave of the state or the slave of a [political] party". 

Thus Aaron-Lilly-Somers all opt to step outside the gate and to flee; seeking new lands and strange regions "where the connections are always partial and non-personal ... where desire functions according to its molecular elements and flows." This is not, as Deleuze and Guattari add, a promised and pre-existing utopia, but is rather a world created in the very process of deterritorialization. For the above type, there is no option; all they can do is become hard, love their fate and live dangerously as they make themselves homeless in "a distinctive and
honourable sense". Like Zarathustra before them, Aaron-Lilly-Somers are men who feel "unsettled in every city" and thus look to "depart from every gate". And like Zarathustra they never dare speak of their love for present humanity; rather, they content themselves with the thought that: "There has been and will be life, human life, such as we do not begin to conceive" (AR, p.265).

To conclude, we may say that man is more than merely human being as defined within the moral-rational tradition and that he exceeds the definition homo sapien (i.e., a creature of 'same-wisdom' or common sense, and the known forces of reactive consciousness). Man is also beast and superbeast; a creature of difference and active power. Perhaps, therefore, the term hetero daimon defines him better; making Somers's identification with the demonic elements in his nature both significant and appropriate. It is this identification which obliges him to move from the humanistic politics of love and the revolutionary politics of grandeur, towards a concern with the daimonic and the divine and an altogether different type of politics.

IV.ii. No More Great Events.

Realizing that there were problems with left and right-wing attempts to formulate a grand politics (and perhaps uncertain how to address these), Lawrence begins to move beyond the political in conventional terms; indicating that revolutions and great events are not what are needed, if a new sensibility is to be evolved and new feelings produced. This is well illustrated in Kangaroo, as Richard Somers "comes to an understanding that his alienation from the currents of political history is something he has no choice but to sustain." Particularly if he is to safeguard the degree of freedom in his own thinking he has fought so hard to secure and be able in his writings to "transmit something that does not and will not allow itself to be codified" within the modernist political monologues.
subscribed to by party-men such as Kangaroo and Willie Struthers.

Thus Somers opts to stand aside and stand alone; remaining loyal to his own singularity and exercising, as Foucault would say, a 'decisive will not to be governed'. From early on in the novel it is evident that Somers does not feel comfortable within the realm of political action; despite the fact that he has made an international name for himself as a writer of essays on political and social themes. He tells Jack Callcott: "I never take any part in politics at all. They aren't my affair" (K, p.46). Later repeating this claim to an apolitical status to Jaz: "I really don't care about politics ... I'd rather have no country than be gulfed in politics and social stuff" (ibid., p.63). This being his so, it is not unreasonable for his wife Harriett to want to know why it is he is flirting with two would-be revolutionary political movements. His attempts to explain his actions to her fall far short of convincing. He says, for example, that he feels he must "fight out something with mankind" in order to "make some kind of opening" (K, p.68). With an increasingly desperate need to convince himself (more than Harriett) of the rightness of direct political action, Somers even suggests at one point that it may only be via militancy that a new life form can be created; i.e., he foolishly adopts the mistaken view that the revolutionary can seize control not only of the state and of history, but also impose human direction over the process of evolution. Harriett is quick to point out that such anthropomorphic conceit is in complete contradiction to what he himself has long believed and reminds him also that "life doesn't start with a form. It starts with a feeling, and ends with a form" (K, p.98). And you cannot create a new feeling via political violence (at most you may be able to shatter an old form). Further, Harriett also reminds Somers that that which has been truly of value in a cultural sense "has been apolitical, even anti-political ". She says: "You didn't change the Roman Empire with a revolution. Christianity grew up for centuries without having anything at all to do with politics - just a feeling, and a belief" (K, p.98).
Somers, even when his infection with the political virus is at its most acute, is not unaware of this; not unaware that he himself has said often enough that "a new religious inspiration, and a new religious idea must spring up and ripen before there could be any constructive change" (ibid., p.99). He knows that it is important to be patient and that education must also play an important part in producing change; that if one is to develop a 'second nature' and new sensibility one should endeavour to "build on the reason and virtue that already exists"\(^{30}\), not smash everything back down to an ideal zero-point. And yet, still Somers felt "that preaching and teaching were both no good at the world's present juncture" and so there had to be "brave action, brave, faithful action: and in action the new spirit would arise" (\(K\), p.99).

Clearly, this is a question at the centre of Lawrence's power trilogy: do we need men of action, or those who "know how to be silent, lonely, resolute, and constant in invisible activities"?\(^{31}\) Heidegger too is troubled by this question; particularly of course following the experience of national socialism and his involvement in it. For Heidegger, what he terms 'transcendence' is a distinctly human capacity which gives "to every single person the power to start over, to begin anew - to take up, reshape, and transform the world."\(^{32}\) However, following the war and his own 'turning', Heidegger "in effect tried to purge transcendence of its conventional ties, not simply to logic, morality, and metaphysics ... but also to the 'very possibility of taking action'."\(^{33}\) What was now required, he argued, was not action, but rather "a silent waiting, an essentially reverent contemplativeness that might keep open the (slight) possibility of a new neo-pagan religion".\(^{34}\) As we will see, Lawrence comes very close to anticipating this Heideggerean position. And yet, for one reason or another, it seems that attempts by both Lawrence and Nietzsche to work on a micro-political level and develop a genuinely ‘postmodern’ theory of power, self, and society, are always betrayed by their own modernist ambitions and molar concerns. It would
be left to a later generation of Nietzschean thinkers (with Deleuze and Foucault at the forefront) to finally abandon all dreams of a global and total revolution, which whilst perhaps involving a cosmetic reconfiguration of certain power relations tend to ultimately "leave untouched the very relations of power that make possible the functioning of the state apparatus." What does remain impressive, nevertheless, about Nietzsche and Lawrence, is the fact that they were able to intuitively anticipate this necessary surrendering of political sentimentality and prepare the way for a new type of political thought based upon the view expressed via Harriett in Kangaroo that revolutions were something that could no longer be taken seriously; that they were, in fact, "vieux jeu, out of date" (K, p.103).

Eventually, Somers is able to echo his wife's view, and to tell his friend Jaz that; "like Nietzsche I no longer believe in great events. The war was a great event - and it made everything more petty" (K, p.161). And later, Somers tells Jack that he cannot, after all, lend his support to "revolutions - and public love and benevolence and feeling righteous" (K, p.290) having clearly made the connection in his own mind between all of the above. Having tried so hard to become a revolutionary man of action, Somers ends at best as a rebel of the kind that Camus finds so admirable. Because of this, he ends by "taking sides against the revolution" and detecting in the revolutionary a mixture of policeman, judge, and hangman who is fundamentally opposed to all genuinely rebellious forces and flows which move outside of (and are subversive of) party politics and the state machine. In the end, Somers is more interested in how via a number of alien becomings and by following unfamiliar lines of flight he can make the present order explode:

"Well all right then, if I am finally a sort of bomb ... I hope the hour and place will come for my going off: for my exploding with the maximum amount of havoc. Some men have to be bombs, to explode and make breaches in
the walls that shut life in" (K, p.165).38

Mac Daly is right to refer to the 'spiritual vacuum' of modern European nihilism in his introduction to Kangaroo; but he is mistaken to claim that "Somers's problem is that ... he cannot summon up enough faith in any cause that might give this eventuality meaning."39 For actually this is Somers's strength and saving grace - not his 'problem' - it is what prevents him from deteriorating into something dreary and political, such as a fascist or socialist. If Somers cannot find the 'faith' to become a party-believer, a sign, as we have said, of his spiritual superiority, he finds what he is looking for by making a turn to the inhuman and non-human worlds and the dark gods outside the gate. Accepting life as a play of will to power, Somers refuses to limit or coordinate this by vainly attempting to channel it into an ideal political formation.40 Daly correctly notes in this case that: "The search for a satisfactory metanarrative is what has brought Somers to Australia ... but once there he discovers that 'life makes no absolute statement'".41

Thus, Somers finds an answer to the question asked of himself at the beginning of the novel: "Why had he come? ... What was he looking for?" (K, p.13); even if it isn't the political answer he had anticipated. Kangaroo and Struthers were, in their own way, "both right, both of them" (ibid., p.327); but something else was also true and more vitally so - something beyond (and beneath) the political. If sometimes when the reactive spirit of revenge is strong within him, Somers feels he would "give anything, soul and body, for a smash-up in this social-industrial world we're in" (ibid., p.161), at other times, when he realizes this would solve nothing and simply leave "just people - the same after it as before" (ibid., pp.161-2), then he doesn't care about bloody revolution, but feels "it's time to turn to the gods" (ibid., p.162).
IV.iii. Dig Deeper and You Will Find Yourself Standing on Pagan Ground.

If Nietzsche is to be believed and democracy is Christianity made 'natural', then perhaps the "sulphurous politico-theological speculations" offered by Somers/Lawrence in the latter half of Kangaroo is Nietzsche's own radical aristocratism made not so much supernatural as unnatural (alien, occult); i.e., transformed into a secret doctrine that the profane will condemn and dismiss as: "Jargon, rant, mystical tosh and so on" (K, p.297). What Lawrence seems to be suggesting is similar to Heidegger's claim that 'only a god can save us', and we here wish to explain what is meant by this and why they reach such a conclusion. This may not be easy, for "the language of Somers's musings regularly wanders into a semantic fog" as, arguably does Heidegger's philosophy. However, whilst conceding this point, one does not agree that the above thinking often collapses into "fatuous bombast".

Wittgenstein says in a well known section of the Tractatus (6.5.22) that: "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They are what is mystical." They are also the things which our electrically luminous civilization has attempted to banish to the outer darkness; those things deemed threatening because resistant to codification and therefore interpreted as evil, irresponsible, perverse. Most thinkers and writers choose to ignore that which falls outside of man's self-representation and belongs to the Unthought, but not Lawrence or Heidegger, both of whom display an uncanny and almost preter-human awareness that: "There is always something outside our [known] universe. And it is always at the doors of the innermost, sentient soul" (K, p.296), where it knocks and awaits entry. Unlike the majority who hear nothing (or pretend to hear nothing) of that which goes bump in the night, Lawrence and Heidegger strain their ears and attempt to find some way in which to think of such, experimenting with the full resources of language. I would argue that their efforts should be admired - not
dismissed as 'fatuous bombast'. For whilst it is easy "to regard Lawrence's dark
god as a piece of portentious flummery"\textsuperscript{46}, it is more becoming of the serious
critic or commentator to accompany the artist-philosopher as he ventures outside
the gate to that non-site where forces arise. If the language used takes on a
'theological' character, this is perhaps necessary if one is to express values
beyond the conventional political terms and "point up the inadequacy of the whole
sphere of the political in respect of the life-form which must ultimately underlie
politics. ... In particular the political cannot encompass the realm traditionally
addressed by religion."\textsuperscript{47}

Heidegger was fond of citing the following saying: "Dig deeper and you will find
yourself standing on Catholic ground."\textsuperscript{48} If this is the case, perhaps it is also true
to say; dig deeper still and you will find yourself standing on pagan ground. Both
propositions make clear that beneath the political paving stones, lies the sand of
religion. Thus whilst God is dead and the holy age has seemingly passed, Somers
nevertheless finds himself awaiting the arrival of a dark god who is coming from
the Outside to enter him from behind and below: "'The god you can never see or
visualise, who stands dark at the threshold of the phallic me'" (\textit{K}, p.135), as he
informs an irritated and shocked Kangaroo. We as readers should not be
surprised by this turning in Lawrence's thought, however, for there are clearly
pagan and occult elements in his work, as in Nietzsche's.

Of course, if readers should not be surprised by Somers's talk of dark gods, the
living unutterable, the phallic self, etcetera, nevertheless many will be quick to
repudiate such as dangerous nonsense. But Somers: "As a poet ... felt himself
entitled to all kinds of emotions and sensations which an ordinary man would
have repudiated" (\textit{K}, p.14). Lawrence, anticipating the response to this, playfully
concedes: "It is always a question whether there is any sense in taking notice of a
poet's finer feelings. The poet himself has misgivings about them" (\textit{ibid}., p.15).
But of course, Lawrence does think we should listen to our poets; particularly those poets who have in turn dared to listen to the voice of their daimon, as all truly great poets - and philosophers - have. Heidegger also reaches the conclusion that it is to the poets men must turn for guidance in this time of nihilism; that the poet, acting as an emisary of the gods, is he who can best show man a way back to himself and forward to a new revealing: "In the midst of nihilism and waste of spirit ... it is the poet who, supremely, perhaps even alone, is guarantor of man's ultimate Heimkehr ('homecoming')". 49 This means of course that salvation lies not within the political, but the poetical; "not praxis but poiesis". 50

Thus the man of action is forced to give way before the man of spirit; the poet, the artist, the philosopher. And thus it is that the god who can save us "that emerges in Heidegger's late writing is a profoundly poetic god"51 in the pagan tradition, and counter the Judeo-Christian idea of God as a being of logic, jealousy, and moral insistence. Nietzsche calls him Dionysus. Lawrence thinks of him as Pan, or, in The Plumed Serpent, as Quetzalcoatl. What we call this god and how we conceive of him is perhaps somewhat irrelevant, for he is: "The god who is many gods to many men: all things to all men" (K, p.266).

But still the question of how this dark god can save us remains unanswered; what does such a gnostic saying mean? The answer returns us to the problem of nihilism and how to move beyond it; and in making this return we simultaneously revive the political aspect. We saw how Somers, prompted by Harriett, reaffirmed that one cannot legislate a new understanding of being, or a new sensibility. But perhaps it is the case that;

"some of our practices could come together in a new cultural paradigm that held up to us a new way of doing things ... An object or event that could ground such a gestalt switch in our understanding of reality
Heidegger calls a new god, and this is why he holds that only a god can save us.  

In other words: "only by finding some set of shared meaningful concerns that can give us a new focus ... and enable us to resist acquiescence to a state that has no higher goal than to provide material welfare for all"\(^5\), can we overcome the nihilism of the modern age. Heidegger is essentially arguing that following the death of God we revolve around a void, lacking as we do any socially recognized meaning or goal "that would enable us to decide collectively what is the right course of action for humanity to pursue."\(^4\) If we are to change this, then we will need to find a new 'god' to save us in the above sense. But some of course do not see the absence of any unified centre as a problem; God's death is for them a liberating experience to be positively welcomed and affirmed. They would suggest that: "Not only is it futile, but it is also deeply unintelligent to lament the loss of a centre of gravity".\(^5\) As we saw in chapter one, even nihilism may be something to be explored and experienced, not postponed or defeated. Whilst Nietzsche supports the strategy of acceleration and affirmation (in order to reach the consummation of nihilism) on the one hand, on the other, he too seems, like Heidegger and Lawrence, to have hopes for divine and daimonic intervention and assistance. Leaving aside the question of whether such hopes are valid and legitimate philosophically (or merely futile), our task in the next chapter and in chapter five is to examine this turn to the gods and follow Nietzsche and Lawrence down the 'dangerous' pathways they choose to take (dangerous because they lead us outside of love and the light of reason, away from the moral autonomy so cherished by liberal-humanism).

In order to secure the promise of renewal, Nietzsche and Lawrence commit themselves to the demonic event that may well also bring disaster; in taking note of the immense changes taking place in the Godless world around them, they risk

117
concocting "a horrible mix of vague science, confused vision, and dubious theology". In order to initiate the revaluation of values and give back to man a renewed sense of "passionate religiousness and inward ... magnificence" (K, p.328), the political project in Nietzsche and Lawrence becomes 'mythical' rather than 'grand'; transferred to a "sacred primal site" outside the gate, so that modern consciousness can be decentred via contact with archaic and alien forces. It is, as Habermas says: "the dream of an aestheticized, poetic politics purified of all moral elements", directed towards "the god who is coming ". The question which arises once more is: "how the subversively spontaneous expression of these forces and the fascist canalizing of them really differ." This is the question we shall address in chapter three, as we examine Ramón's plumed serpent revolution and the politics of cruelty, abandoning still further the civilized world of welfare, good plumbing, and the happiness of the last man.
Chapter III: Only a Dark God Can Save Us Now: Quetzalcoatl and the Politics of Cruelty.


1.i. Outside the Gate.

Just as there is a hardening of attitude towards the political question in Nietzsche's work post-Zarathustra, so too in Lawrence's fiction and essays during the period 1915-26 is there a decisive move away from the liberal-humanist and Christian-moral tradition of the West. This move comes to a climax in *The Plumed Serpent* (*PS*); a novel which provides an interesting and instructive point of central reference to this chapter.

Richard Aldington says in an introduction to the above that it is "a curious and original novel with no affinities"\(^1\), but this is not so. For in fact, the novel has many affinities and does not appear to be half so curious if one has knowledge of the cultural, philosophical, and political context in which the book was written and first published. As Frank Kermode rightly argues in his study of Lawrence, even the novel's occult preoccupations were surprisingly common ones within modernist circles: "A blend of theosophy, socialism, sexual reformism, evolutionism, religious primitivism, was common enough in the avant-garde thinking of the time".\(^2\)

It is precisely the above blend of politics, religion, and art that I wish to examine here, via reading of *The Plumed Serpent*, a work that has remained controversial, not only due to its anti-democratic politics, but also because of its experimental
nature at the level of language, being at times as irritating in style as it is disquieting in content. Arguably, it is second only to Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* in this regard (a work to which it is closely related). Lawrence indicates his increasing frustration with the limitations of language when it comes to best expressing those powers, forces, and flows ('dark gods') that move outside of human consciousness. Just as the book's central character, Ramón, has difficulty in finding an appropriate method of articulating his new 'life-urge', so too does Lawrence struggle to articulate the novel, aware that modern man does not want to hear a new conception uttered in an alien tongue: "For the machine of the human psyche, once wound up to a certain ideal, doesn't want to stop" (*K*, p.297) and treats every new word as anathema: "Evil and anti-civilization" (*ibid.*) But Lawrence, like Nietzsche, pushes thought onto new territory regardless; each refuses to dwell within *doxa* and each reveals how "thought is impoverished when it fails to think relentlessly". Each also obliges us to adopt an alien perspective. By becoming-Aztec (even at the risk of becoming-fascist), we are able to gain a wholly other perspective upon modern European nihilism and critically examine those presuppositions and prejudices that characterize modernity. In other words, *The Plumed Serpent* allows us to interrogate and "loosen the aura of necessity and sanctity surrounding categories of the present". And we do this from a perspective that is strangely both in time and space (the novel takes place in the real Mexico of the 1920's) and yet is also outside of the above, set in the fictional universe that Lawrence creates within his own novels. The 'problem' is that Lawrence does not divide off one world cleanly from the other, so that, as Michael Bell points out, he constantly seems to advocate straying beyond any appropriate aesthetic limits, in order to explore new possibilities of action and new realms of knowledge. Via the use of idiosyncratic narrative techniques and radical literary devices which transgress the usual conventions of the novel, Lawrence manages to make plausible that which is improbable and transform a quest for the impossible into an apparently reasonable demand. Thus: "Who is to
say in just how speculative or literal a spirit its Utopian project is to be understood?"  

Again, for some critics this presents a problem with the work; for others, it is one of the strengths and attractions. In endeavouring to show how life-philosophy-art can have a more profound and congenial relation to each other, Lawrence brings together prophecy, fantasy, and politics in an attempted substantiation of creative mystery. Personally one would agree that "much of Lawrence's significance lies in his attempts to relate his ontological vision to the everyday and communal realms". Jürgen Habermas suggests that Nietzsche exclusively directs the gaze of those who, like Lawrence, do their thinking in his light to that which is extraordinary, so that they "contemptuously glide over the practice of everyday life as something derivative or inauthentic". But this is simply not the case. As we will increasingly see in this thesis, immanence is of great importance to Nietzsche and his 'successors'; for thinking overcomes metaphysics not by transcendence, but by grounding itself in the body and in the sensual realm of everyday things. What is true to say, is that by 'world' Nietzsche and Lawrence do understand something wider than simply the space in which man acts on a daily basis and likes to pretend he has his full being within. This latter, the known world, is not, they argue, the whole world; rather, it is simply a little clearing of morality and reason fenced off from the wider, darker, inhuman environment outside the gate. Unfortunately; "the wondrous Victorian age managed to fasten the door so tight, and light up the compound so brilliantly with electric light, that really, there was no outside, it was all in. The Unknown became a joke: is still a joke." (K, p.285).

It is because of this, because the outside and the extraordinary remain ludicrous notions to the majority of people today (not just writers and guardians of the interior such as Habermas), that we still find it difficult to take what Nietzsche
and Lawrence say seriously; we find their critical analysis of modernity stimulating, stylish, disturbing, but without ever really considering the possibility that they were right. Right, for example to seek a connection with and substantiation of the forces outside the gate and by so doing effectively shatter conventional political frameworks and models of political thinking. That is to say, Nietzsche and Lawrence are right to wish to form a new relation with what Foucault terms *espace d'une exteriorite sauvage*; i.e., that "still almost unexplored realm of dangerous knowledge" full of "tigers and palm trees and rattle snakes" and all the other marvels the hot sun hatches; the realm where King Kong still bristles in the darkness and human sacrifice remains the most sacred ritual. Nietzsche and Lawrence challenge us to do our thinking here; thinking which may have tragic results for man and yet may also help us restore to the world an aura of primordial mystery.

I.ii. "Jetzt wär es Zeit, dass Götter traten / aus bewohnten Dingen." 

Richard Somers, as we saw in the last chapter, ultimately realizes that politics, of whatever variety, is not enough. And so he turns from right-wing paramilitaries and left-wing revolutionaries to "the old dark gods, who had waited so long in the outer dark" (K, p.265). It is these pagan deities, older than and entirely other to those given us by the Jews - "a mental Jehovav, and a spiritual Christ" (ibid., p.206) - whom Lawrence invokes in *The Plumed Serpent*.

Initially, one is dubious about all mention of the gods and the 'god-stuff' roaring eternally; skeptical about the attempt to re-introduce them back into history and establish a politics upon some manner of post-Christian occult ontology. Essentially, one is tired of the gods. For as Nietzsche correctly recognizes, there is today an understandable "weariness in regard to religion: people have finally grown tired, exhausted by the weighty symbols". This weariness, itself a
symptom of course of our own decadence, is illustrated in *The Plumed Serpent* by Kate's reaction to Ramón's claim that one is always driven at last to search for God: "'I rather hate this search-for-God business and religiosity,' said Kate. ... 'And you can't really 'find God!' she said. 'It's a sort of sentimentalism, and creeping back into old, hollow shells'" (*PS*, p.73).

Even Ramón, who acts throughout the novel on the conviction that only religion will serve to bring about fundamental change in Mexico, or anywhere else, is obliged to concede this point: "'No!' he said slowly. 'I can't find God in the old sense. I know its sentimentalism, if I pretend to"' (*Ibid.*) But what he can do, he argues, is to locate the source of that which is god-given within himself; i.e., find the source of his own strength (or 'man-hood', as he calls it) and remain loyal to this, whilst also forming new relations with the wider world (both human and non-human) on the basis of this power. Further, and contentiously, he claims he can substantiate the mystery of power via a revolutionary politics which is counter-modern in its challenge to liberal-humanist arrangements and overtly Nietzschean in its aim of a revaluation of all values.

Thus if, on the one hand, *The Plumed Serpent* should be thought of as a work of art (and perhaps a religious text), on the other hand: "More than any other Lawrence work, this novel moves on a social level ... a spiritual revolution that becomes political when realized in pragmatic terms."¹² And this because, as seen earlier: "Lawrence's creative vision worked on at least two levels of truthfulness".¹³ That is, like Nietzsche, Lawrence is concerned both with the little, everyday things of the surface and with those things which are, in some way, extraordinary. For Lawrence cannot rest content with theosophical speculations that are entirely and artificially divorced from the 'real' world; he wishes to transform the Word back into the Flesh (i.e. back into that from which it originated); just as Nietzsche wishes to translate the Ideal back into a non-ideal

123
and immoral nature.

It is when this project of revaluation becomes materialized in terms of a politics of cruelty and evil, that many readers become uncomfortable. The mixture of political violence and neo-paganism detailed in The Plumed Serpent seems all too familiar to those with knowledge of Hitler's revolution. Indeed, it is interesting to note that one of the minor characters in the novel – a German hotel manager – dismisses the cult of Quetzalcoatl as merely another form of "national socialism" (PS, p.103), founded primarily upon the leadership fantasies of Ramón. It is therefore important to examine why it seemed so vital to Lawrence to bring together politics and religion and advocate a substantiation of mystery. There are perhaps several reasons, but I will focus on what appear to be the most important two: Firstly, (a) the belief that the regeneration of culture requires myth and the recognition of the 'holy lie' as a socially useful and politically expedient means towards this end. Secondly, (b) the belief that man can only achieve his full coming into being via a living connection to the sacred realm or what Lawrence sometimes calls the 'Fourth Dimension'.

(a) It is perhaps the case that Ramón is suffering from what Nietzsche terms a 'psychology of error'; i.e., from a form of delusion in which the religious mystic mistakes his heightened sense of power to be the result of the gods, rather than acknowledging that his belief in the gods is itself the effect of his elevated well being. But with Ramón, it is hard to tell. For on other occasions he appears to be much more of a 'noble liar', than a genuine 'holy fool'. If he genuinely believes in the unseen god outside the gate, he is prepared nonetheless to admit when pressed that Quetzalcoatl is "just a living word" (K, p.209) for the consumption of the people.

At best, we can perhaps think of Ramón as one of Nietzsche's 'higher types': a
combination of creativity, skepticism and ecstasy. A philosopher of the future who understands the importance of history, the people's need for displays of cruelty and transgressive spectacle and the usefulness of the holy lie in preserving political stability and cultural unity. Nietzsche writes: "The philosopher as we understand him ... will make use of the religions for his work of education and breeding, just as he will make use of existing political and economic conditions."  

Later, in *Twilight of the Idols*, he adds that no major religious teacher ever doubted "their right to tell lies." Thus Ramón acts with good conscience as he attempts à la Rousseau to "dissolve politics into unity and to ground unity in the faith of a religion inscribed in the fabric of civil society." But the problem that Ramón soon comes up against is that faith is no longer possible in this modern age of nihilism in which the holy lie has been revealed as such. As we saw in chapter one, the artist-philosopher may wish to preserve illusions as necessary to cultural life, but he is opposed in this by the unrelenting will to truth. This, says Henry Miller, is precisely the 'tragedy' of Lawrence's life: "THAT HE SOUGHT WHAT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR US ANY LONGER: A FAITH AND AN AUTHORITY." If this is so of Lawrence, then so too is it true of Nietzsche. Sometimes, each seems to delight in the very impossibility of their own demands. At other times, however, one senses a frustration and a despair in their texts; out of which grows their politics of excess and violent transgression. Although, again as we saw in chapter one, both men valued and stressed the importance of art, both also realized that art itself forms no substitute for religious faith and that you cannot take refuge in the former when one's religious responses are either fatally reactive (as in the Christian) or inactive (as in the Ugliest Man; i.e., the atheist). And this because, as Lawrence simply puts it, the essential feeling in all art is religious and therefore demands and requires an active religious response. Lawrence, like Nietzsche, does not therefore avoid the religious issue; he accepts it as still the primary issue - even after (if not especially after) the
death of God. He understands that the revaluation is ultimately to do with re-establishing the sacred character of life, in the knowledge that culture is born outside the gate (the very word deriving from 'cult', i.e., a system of religious belief, and related to 'occult', i.e., that which remains outside of knowledge and belonging to the dark).

"The true religious faculty", says Lawrence, "is the highest faculty in man, once he exercises it. And by the religious faculty we mean the inward worship of the creative life-mystery".19 But not dogma: for religion is always a question of feeling and not fixed belief; "and the only irreligious thing is the death of feeling, the causing of nullity".20 But how is modern man to be encouraged and enabled to exercise his religious faculty in an active and affirmative manner? Nietzsche and Lawrence both look for assistance to other peoples in other times; Greeks and Romans, Aztecs and Etruscans. It is not that they believe it possible or even desirable to go back to such a way of life, but that they think a clue can be found amongst these former cultures about how to live with vitality, faith, and feeling. Nietzsche, in an important passage, stresses:

"One, certainly very high level of culture has been attained when a man emerges from superstitious and religious concepts and fears ... Then, however, he needs to take a retrograde step: he has to grasp the historical justification that resides in such ideas, likewise the psychological; he has to recognise that they have been most responsible for the advancement of mankind and that without such a retrograde step he will deprive himself of the best that mankind has hitherto produced."21

In The Plumed Serpent, Kate recalls her former husband telling her that "evil was the lapsing back to old life-modes that have been surpassed in us" (PS, 137). Isn't this precisely what Nietzsche is advocating above, however? But isn't the
notion of a return to the primitive and "the old savage form of expression" (*PS*, p.138) also a form of romantic decadence? Wary of such a charge, Lawrence has Kate declare to herself and to us as readers: "No! It's not a helpless, panic reversal. It is conscious, carefully chosen. We must go back to pick up the old threads. We must take up the old, broken impulse that will connect us with the mystery of the cosmos again, now that we are at the end of our own tether."

(*ibid.*)

Of course, the question is 'how?' Are song, dance, and prayer the answer? Perhaps, but it would seem only a part of the answer, for, like Nietzsche, Lawrence refuses to let go of a belief in the need for political action. Kate may say that politics doesn't really matter and revolutions "are so, so stupid and *vieux jeu*" (*ibid.,* p.166), echoing Harriett in *Kangaroo*, but this is not her author's view at the time of writing *The Plumed Serpent*. And Don Ramón, for all his doubts about involving himself in the political sphere (displaying what Nietzsche would condemn as the 'bad conscience of commanders') ultimately feels there is a need for direct action: "The change has to be made. And some man has to make it." (*PS,* p.407).

Thus the turn to the gods is made within a social, political, and military environment and involves knives and guns, as well as song and dance. But the problem arises that the attempt to rekindle religious feeling via a political movement supposedly expressive of such, soon requires "manipulative controls and coercive regulations to sustain itself against those who resist or evade its strictures." And thus, as we will see, Ramón's vision collapses in the end into something sinister: "The whole country was thrilling with a new thing, with a release of new energy. But there was a sense of violence and crudity in it all, a touch of horror" (*PS,* p.420). Finally, the country falls into civil war. And this because for all his eloquence and showmanship (indeed, for all his *sincerity*),
Ramón can only ever speak to and for the few: the cult of Quetzalcoatl is not
generalizable in the modern age in which it is offered without the armed force of
Cipriano to support it and crush opposition. It is from necessity that although
Ramón's concerns "are religious and his affinities largely artistic, his practical
alliances are still military and political."23 And it is this combination which causes
the tension within the novel and a concern for those who hold the view that:
"Politics is not religion, or, if it is, then it is nothing but the inquisition."24

Thus whilst the regeneration of culture may or may not require violence and the
substantiation of mystery, it cannot be designated in advance, or legislated into
existence. A politically rubber-stamped culture supported by the threat of armed
force effectively violates the notion of what a culture is. We have again reached a
conclusion drawn in chapter one: culture and the state are irreconcilably opposed
to one another.

(b) Lawrence, we have seen, understands Nietzsche's project of revaluation as
fundamentally a religious question, as much as a philosophical or cultural one.
And certainly Nietzsche himself does not object to religion per se, as is often
assumed, in fact, he is happy to affirm the holy lie, providing that it serves a
noble and life-enhancing (and/or a politically useful) end. His main objection to
Christianity is that it does not serve such an end – quite the contrary. Nietzsche
argues that just as one can deny God in either an active or a reactive manner, so
too can one affirm the sacred in either a healthy or degenerate manner. His aim is
to free man from the disabling belief in 'other worlds' that are supposed to exist
'beyond' this one and 'after' life. He wishes to substantiate mystery and channel
religious feeling into a faith in this world, this life. Modern culture is decadent
for Nietzsche "because it has proved incapable of sublimating religious passions.
Consequently these passions have atrophied."25 Thus, to reiterate, revaluation is
an attempt to rekindle religious passion and to form a 'faith' in contrast and
opposition to the Judeo-Christian tradition; i.e., a neo-paganism and neo-pantheism in which man is offered the opportunity to regain 'paradise' here and now (paradise simply being another name for the earth itself).

Evidence for the above reading of Nietzsche is provided throughout his texts. But one of the most important sites is to be found in the second essay of his *Genealogy*. Here, Nietzsche speaks positively and unambiguously about the conception of the gods. As claimed above, he does not condemn the god-idea as such, only the Christian version of this, which strikes him as feeble and radically false: God as the denial of will to power, rather than as its highest expression. That there are other, non-perverse and non-decadent, ways of conceiving of the gods is proved, he argues, by the example of the Greeks; their gods being:

"reflections of noble and proud men in whom the animal in man felt deified, did not tear itself apart and did not rage against itself! Those Greeks, for most of the time, used their gods expressly to keep 'bad conscience' at bay so that they could carry on enjoying their freedom of soul ... They went very far in this, these marvellous, lion-hearted children".26

So too did the Aztecs of course, and many other pagan peoples around the world. The question is: can we go still further? Or did the above take the god-idea to its very limit (to the point at which it collapsed into the exhausted Christian notion)? Perhaps, in order to mature, these 'lion-hearted children' had to develop bad conscience and refrain from using their gods to keep it at bay. For although it is a sickness, so too is it a sickness 'like pregnancy' according to Nietzsche (from out of which we modern human beings have been born). Now, however, in order for us to mature, it may be necessary to overcome bad conscience and enter into a new innocence, even if this means having to overcome our own humanity as we have understood it within the rational-moral tradition. We cannot go back: our
post-Christian paganism will not be the same as the pre-Christian paganism of our forefathers; our second innocence will be an advance upon and something other than Greek naivety. We move beyond good and evil; we do not slip back before it.

Can there be a religious sensibility beyond good and evil? Nietzsche answers in the affirmative, suggesting even Buddhism is an example of such – albeit still a form of decadence in his view. In a note from *The Will To Power* he says that in principle it should be perfectly possible to conceive of a post-moral god: "God conceived as an emancipation from morality, taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antithesis and, in a divine torment, redeeming and justifying them. God as the beyond and above of the wretched loafers' morality of 'good and evil'."27

Such a god would be non-ideal, non-anthropomorphic, and non-humanitarian. A god rather like Quetzalcoatl; one of power who has been stripped of all other traits and sentimental trimmings:

"Let us remove supreme goodness from the concept god: it is unworthy of a god. Let us also remove supreme wisdom: it is the vanity of philosophers that is to be blamed for this mad notion of god as a monster of wisdom ... No! god the *supreme power* - that suffices! Everything follows from it, 'the world' follows from it!"28

This affirmation of the world is central as we have said to both Nietzsche and Lawrence. Yet it is arguably Heidegger who best illustrates what is implied by this and whose work plays an important role in helping us understand the revaluation as an overcoming of metaphysics and, indeed, allows us to develop a philosophically informed reading of *The Plumed Serpent*’s mysticism.

Firstly, and most importantly, it is crucial to recall that when Nietzsche refers to
'the world' he, like Heidegger, "does not in any way imply earthly, as opposed to heavenly being, nor 'worldly' as opposed to 'spiritual'."^{29} Likewise, man, a creature who has being in the world, is not "merely a 'worldly' creature understood in a Christian sense, thus a creature turned away from God and so cut loose from 'Transcendence'."^{30} Rather, man, as Heidegger puts it, 'ex-sists', that is, he stands out into the clearing of Being on the basis of his own essence, that which we saw Ramón call his 'man-hood' and which Nietzsche would identify in terms of power. In other words, man comes into his own outside the gate, bubbling over the confines of his own humanity. But outside the gate is not beyond the earth, any more than over-human is non-human. As Heidegger writes: "Thought in terms of existence, 'world' is in a certain sense precisely 'the beyond' within existence and for it."^{31} It is world in this wider sense which Lawrence sometimes calls the 'fourth dimension'; the sacred realm in which things - flowers as well as men as well as beasts - have their creative-being and fulfilment. Only in the fourth dimension does man achieve sovereignty, wherein "he knows himself royal and crowned with the sun".^{32}

The actual possibility or impossibility of the gods is not touched on by such a definition, which balances mid-way between theism and atheism, making any easy identification with one side or the other unnecessary and inappropriate. Unlike nihilistic indifference on the religious question, this opens up the opportunity "to reflect freely on the nature of the holy and hale, as of the malignancy and rage of evil"^{33}, i.e., to begin to think that which is today left almost entirely unthought and locked outside. But to do so does not involve thinking beyond lived-experience. Rather, it involves the substantiation of mystery in order that we are thereby able to think the sacred as the near at hand. To quote Heidegger once more:

"Thinking does not overcome metaphysics by climbing still higher, surmounting it, transcending it somehow or other; thinking overcomes
metaphysics by climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest. The descent … is more arduous and more dangerous than the ascent." 34

This important concern with the everyday and the close by is of course fundamentally Nietzschean, although it is a concern that can be traced back to Heraclitus who, concerning the everyday world of the familiar remarked: "Einai gar kei entautha theous" - i.e., 'here too the gods come to presence'. 35

Thus we see again how deeply mistaken Habermas is in his view quoted earlier. And we repeat that immanence is one of the key terms for an understanding of Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy; the giving back to things their fourth dimensional quality and allowing them to exist in their own right (à la Cézanne's apple: see chapter one). For Heidegger, the thing is the place where 'the Fourfold' (das Geviert) meet in correspondence; this fourfold consisting of earth, sky, mortals, and the gods - i.e., precisely the fourfold concern of Lawrence in The Plumed Serpent, symbolized by Ramón as the man-god and eagle-snake (sky-earth) assemblage Quetzalcoatl.

Such thinking to do with the mystery of immanence, forms an important part of Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy; i.e., a post-Christian doctrine of will to power and being which is being-in-the-world and being-in-the-flesh. We shall develop this at length in chapters IV and V. What is of interest to us here, however, is the way in which Nietzsche, Lawrence, and Heidegger, all insist on relating their onto-theological insights to the political. We are aware of course what this meant in the case of Heidegger during the 1930's, who unfortunately allowed his thinking to become entwined with German racial-nationalism. Without wishing to 'excuse', 'justify', or 'defend' Heidegger's political option (and without wishing to suggest that either Nietzsche or Lawrence would have made the same mistaken choice had they lived during the Nazi period), it does seem to be one which is
closely related to the above beliefs. And interestingly, if there is one area in
which both Nietzsche and Lawrence do allow themselves to think in racial-national
terms, it is when it comes to the substantiation of mystery. Like Heidegger, they
seem to believe that "every nation ... must find for itself, the grandeur and the
truth of its Bestimmung (its 'determination', its 'assignment through its
calling')."36 That is, its own national form of faith; its own gods. Thus when
Lawrence looks at Mexico he decides that Christianity has essentially failed there
- and failed with disastrous consequences for the native people thereof. In other
words, it has proved impossible "to graft an alien myth onto a native tree with
any lasting success, without damaging the tree beyond repair."37 There is a need,
Lawrence thinks, for each people to find its own myths: Ramón tells Kate toward
the end of the novel to spread the religious revolution he has begun in her own
country (Ireland) when she returns. When, not unreasonably, she asks how, he
replies: "'Let them find themselves again, and their own universe, and their own
gods. Let them substantiate their own mysteries'" (PS, p.427), having earlier
declared: "'if I want Mexicans to learn the name of Quetzacoatl, it is because I
want them to speak with the tongues of their own blood'" (ibid., p.248).38

Again, such thinking can be traced back to Nietzsche's texts. In The Anti-Christ,
for example, he writes:

"A people that still believes in itself still also has its own
god. In him it venerates the conditions through which it has prospered, its
virtues - it projects its joy in itself, its feeling of power on to a being whom one
can thank for them. He who is rich wants to bestow; a proud people needs a god
in order to sacrifice."39

Only when, Nietzsche goes on to say, a people feels itself weak do you get a
'cosmopolitan' god; poking his nose everywhere and moralizing:
"There is in fact no other alternative for gods; either they are the will to power - and so long as they are that they will be national gods, - or else the impotence of power - and they necessarily become good" (and universal).

Whether one decides such thinking is inherently 'dangerous' in its racial-nationalism, or a healthy (perhaps naive) religious response to the monotheism of Judeo-Christianity (a flowering into plurality and polytheism), may depend on one's political persuasion before anything else. However, the turn to the gods and the re-introduction of the gods back into history should not be regarded as something only longed for by the reactionary thinker. It is interesting to recall in closing the response of Michel Foucault to the Iranian Revolution of 1978. Here, the world was somewhat surprised to see one of France's foremost radicals greet a religious revolution positively, arguing that it "held out the promise of a welcome new form of 'political spirituality', unknown in the West 'since the Renaissance and the great crisis of Christianity.'" For Foucault, the Iranian attempt to substantiate the mystery of Islam signified an attempt to not only change government, but to transform their entire world. He wondered if the revolution might not represent "the first great insurrection against the planetary system, the most mad and most modern form of revolt." But of course, as soon as the Ayatollah assumed control in February 1979 then the "chimera of 'political spirituality' was dispelled by the reality of a ruthless theocracy."

Undoubtedly, the same would have happened in Ramón's neo-Aztec Mexico, had Lawrence chosen to follow the revolution through. Probably Ramón would have quickly become disillusioned with events and either removed himself from the scene, or found himself overthrown by Cipriano whom he distrusted and feared, for the latter, "whenever he was away on his own for sometime, slipped back into the inevitable Mexican general, fascinated by the opportunity for furthering his own personal ambition and imposing his own personal will" (PS, p.253).
Ultimately, Lawrence is too great an artist not to concede the truth of even his own revolutionary fantasy; i.e., it is doomed to failure. Thus, as we will see, he backs away from the edge of the abyss and ultimately rejects bloody revolution as an option, even whilst not surrendering his faith in the dark gods, his concern with politics, and his desire for a revaluation of all values.

Part II: The Politics of Cruelty.

If a non-metaphysical 'transcendence' of metaphysics is to be achieved then, along with a substantiation of mystery, Nietzsche and Lawrence suggest that a 'politics of cruelty' is also required, based upon: (i) an anti-humanist philosophy of power or 'evil' (see chapter two); (ii) the notion of a general economy of the whole; (iii) the belief that violence and oppression are essential to society and culture (see chapter one).

In other words, transcendence is accomplished via transgression; a deliberate violation of the norms of behaviour within liberal-democratic society and a forceful breaching of the limits of our own humanity. Through hell, the theory suggests, we shall reach heaven; or at least enter into a new becoming. Certainly transgression, by its very nature, opens up new possibilities of action and new fields of knowledge; for by shattering established limits and calling into question the status of established dualities which have largely determined our thinking, it allows us to tap into the Dionysian forces outside the gate and form a new understanding of the primal mysteries.

But if transgression always involves the grasping of new knowledge (à la Eve's plucking of the apple), so too does it always seem to involve murder (à la Cain's slaying of Abel) and, as we will shortly see, one of the key scenes in *The Plumed Serpent* is the ritualized execution-cum-sacrifice of political prisoners, Lawrence.
seemingly sharing the view that is found fully developed in the work of Bataille, namely that; "in a fundamental way the impetus of the sovereign man makes a killer of him" and this because "by killing he escapes the subordination that he refuses, and he violently rids himself of the aspect of a tool or thing."\(^1\) That is to say, he comes into his own full being, which, in the case of man, means achieving divine status: becoming a god in one's own right. I shall return to this essentially occult idea shortly.

Firstly, I wish to say something in addition to the remarks made last chapter about 'evil' and to discuss the three things upon which I have suggested a politics of cruelty is founded. In a letter, Lawrence writes: "The real principle of evil is not anti-Christ or anti-Jehovah, but anti-life."\(^2\) And what is life? Life is will to power, according to Nietzsche as we have seen. Thus when Nietzsche writes of evil, he simply means power and means life; means the world understood in terms of monstrous energy, without beginning or end; means all those forces and flows which violate human order and stability. He uses the word evil because it is the term which the Christian-moral world uses, in its fear, to describe these forces and flows. He calls himself an 'immoralist' and advocates the cultivation of evil, because he wishes to restore vitality and health to mankind; to make life strong once more and rooted firmly in the instinctive and intuitive (i.e., in the body), instead of feeble and sickly and based upon bloodless ideals which the impotent mistake as the 'good'.

In many ways, Nietzsche and Lawrence are both continuing a romantic tradition when they write positively of evil, a tradition which ultimately suggests that it is better to be one of the damned than to live a 'good' life in the Christian sense; i.e., a life which Nietzsche would condemn as a form of cowardice and sterility. Damnation becomes, paradoxically, a means of salvation; redeeming one from what T.S. Eliot calls the "ennui of modern life."\(^3\)
The evil of the slave may in practice be every bit as 'banal' as Hannah Arendt found it to be; just as the goodness of the slave is as insipid and rессentiment-ridden as Nietzsche described it, but the evil of the master is something else. In fact, the evil of the strong is, according to Nietzsche, man's best strength and it is this he wishes to see cultivated by a new social and political order in order to counter the Christian-moral tradition. He writes:

"What is mediocre in the typical man? That he does not understand the necessity for the reverse side of things ... that he combats evils as if one could dispense with them; that he will not take the one with the other ... Our insight is the opposite of this: that with every growth of man his other side must grow too ... That man grow better and more evil is my formula."4

Essentially, Nietzsche has gained this insight (as so many others) from his reading of ancient Greek culture, as founded upon what he terms a 'pessimism of strength'; i.e., a tragic philosophy which affirms life in its totality, or as what Nietzsche calls a 'general economy of the whole', in which the natural drives and instincts of man (his evil qualities) were regulated, but still allowed some measure of expression - not repudiated as within Christian-moral culture, which works for the extirpation of such drives and the complete taming of man.

The above notion of a general economy is crucial to an understanding of Nietzsche's politics of cruelty; arguably, as much linked to it as free-market economies are linked to liberal-democratic politics. According to Nietzsche, the festival of passions and evil inclinations staged within Greek society as spectacle, sport, and drama, constituted the real paganism of the non-Christian world and allowed instinct a clear place and value (if of the second rank) within social and religious life: "This is the root of all the moral free-mindedness of antiquity. One granted to the evil and suspicious, to the animal and backward ... a moderate
discharge, and [did] not strive for their total annihilation."  

And cruelty was central as "one of the oldest festive joys of mankind" and as a means via which man experienced "the highest gratification of the feeling of power."6 But of all the methods of producing this gratification and joy, one has long stood out: "it has been human sacrifice which has at all times most exalted and elevated man."  

Interestingly, _The Plumed Serpent_ contains acts of cruelty and human sacrifice. The novel opens in fact with an ancient ritual of public cruelty, a bull-fight, experienced by Kate as something sordid, however, rather than exhilarating and reflective of the "squalid evil" (PS, p.21) she senses crawling uncomfortably close to the surface of everyday life in Mexico, and which threatens to erupt in one form of atrocity or another at any moment. If Kate has been driven to the bull-ring by the modern 'will to happiness' (i.e., a will to find and experience life as thrilling and sensational), she nonetheless is not infected with what Lawrence calls the "insidious modern disease of tolerance" (PS, p.26) and is thus able to reject that which seems to her base and profoundly objectionable. Men! she thinks to herself: "They all had this soft rottenness of the soul, a strange perversity which made even the squalid, repulsive things seem part of life to them. Life! And what is life? A louse lying on its back and kicking? Ugh!" (Ibid.)  

Here we must pause for a moment, however. For whilst Nietzsche too rejects any notion of queasy liberal tolerance (tolerance as a form of decadence) he does insist with his notion of general economy that we acknowledge all aspects of life—even the squalid, the perverse, the repulsive, and the cruel, allowing each the right to find expression. For what is life? Life is will to power; and even a louse lying on its back and kicking, the thought of which makes Kate shudder, is life as will to power. Lawrence, who also formulates and subscribes to an economic
model of the whole in his work, nevertheless has as much difficulty as Kate in accepting the full implications of the notion. Like Kate, he sometimes insists that: "A thing isn't life, just because somebody does it." And this because, for Lawrence, true life is a creative flow and not merely sensational activity experienced within and worked from the fixed self; it has a fourth dimensional quality. It is this quality Kate is searching for; "a strange beam of wonder and mystery, almost like hope. A strange darkly-iridescent beam of wonder, of magic" (PS, p.58). However, as she is obliged to learn during the course of the novel, this quality grows out of something other than this - just as the lily grows from out of the marsh. For Lawrence concedes - even though he does not appear to be fully comfortable with the fact - that although certain forms and experiences are sterile, mechanical, or degenerate in some manner, nevertheless they have an important part to play in life as a whole and that there is no pristine life, purely active, purely affirmative, free from all taint of death and corruption, except in the ideal-realm, which is, of course, the greatest expression of hatred for the actual world ever conceived by sick brains.

Thus when Kate expresses concern about accepting a marriage proposal from Cipriano on the grounds that she is fearful of letting Mexican horror into her soul, Lawrence has the latter reply: "Horror is real. Why not a bit of horror, as you say, among all the rest?" (PS, p.235).

However, the oscilliation experienced by Kate to the very end of the novel (and not resolved even then); from attraction to repulsion and from acceptance to rejection of Ramón's plumed serpent religion and political philosophy, is shared by many readers. Even the most sympathetic to Lawrence and Nietzsche cannot simply discard their human, all too human selves and embrace the dark gods they offer us. Contemplation of cruelty and the reality of pain, is something modern man finds extremely difficult; it is his most dreadful thought. To admit that the
above is not only an essential part of life, but has also played a profound and intimate part in our own self-formation and history, as revealed by Nietzsche in the *Genealogy of Morals*, is a huge test of our own honesty and courage. The truth is hard; but the truth, for Nietzsche, is that the origin of man and the state is a violent one and that culture rests upon cruelty.

Perhaps the question might be asked why modern man is so afraid of physical pain and why he seems to suffer so at the thought of physical cruelty? For he clearly does not object to the internalization of cruelty and the suffering caused by bad conscience and all manner of torture within the confines of the soul. Sublimated and disguised violence raises little objection, even though the internalization of cruelty does not in any way lessen the pain caused; in fact, as Foucault shows in his studies of the treatment of the insane and the punishment of the criminal, by refining and 'spiritualizing' cruelty, suffering has been intensified and made more effective.  

No doubt part of the answer is to do with our fear and hatred of the physical; we cannot stand the thought of any kind of genuine physical interchange of passion and the touch of another is what we shrink from. Thus we are uncomfortable not only with genuine sexual contact (i.e., non-headbound), but also with corporal punishment, or any overtly physical discipline which strikes us as 'barbaric' and 'inhumane'. The most insidious forms of emotional-spiritual bullying and blackmail, are accepted as belonging to a morally just society, but the thought of a flogging sends us into a state of near nervous hysteria, even whilst the latter, if carried out within the context of passion, is, according to Lawrence; "a natural form of human coition." In fact, the argument is put forward by both Lawrence and Nietzsche, that it is far preferable to have a passionate politics of externalized power, desire, and cruelty, than an ideal politics of reason and will to love which suppress the above, causing the animal in man to become perverse and full of
self-loathing.

Like Blake, then, Nietzsche and Lawrence seem to be of the view that: "He who desires but acts not, breeds pestilence." However, there are times when Nietzsche writes approvingly of restraint and the internalization of cruelty; describing it as a positive advance upon the splendid but half-idiotic spectacles staged in the Roman arenas, because it was the moralization of man which made him an interesting creature full of tremendous possibilities for the future. But now is the time for man to once more direct his violence outward; for, according to Nietzsche, the crisis of modernity is so great and modern man so enfeebled, that we require "not merely war but the greatest and most terrible of all wars – thus a temporary relapse into barbarism if we are to overcome the above and find our best strength once more. New barbarism is necessary not only for the establishment of new culture, but for the survival of man as a species.

Lawrence echoes the call for a new barbarism in The Plumed Serpent, as elsewhere in his work. Thus we see Ramón declare it impossible for him to go on being "gentle, good, and loving, and trying to make the whole world more gentle, good, and loving" (PS, p.206). For despite the frenzied protests of his devoutly Catholic first wife, Carlota; "it was borne in upon him that the world had gone as far as it could in the good, gentle, and loving direction, and anything further in that line meant perversity. So the time had come for the slow, great change to something else." (Ibid.)

That is, something other than ideal-love worked from the white will which we discussed last chapter, and the 'cruel kindness' of Christian charity; something similar to the politics of evil and cruelty we have been attempting to describe here: "I serve Omnipotence!" (PS, p.343) says Ramón, at the opening ceremony of the church of Quetzalcoatl. And as such, as a man of power, Ramón belongs to
the type whom the world brands evil; dangerous individuals who are rightly
perceived as world-destroyers as much as culture-founders. Neither Nietzsche or
Lawrence would deny this, nor flinch in the face of such a truth; the former in
particular had a penchant for such figures in the Caesar-mould; a mixture of the
inhuman and superhuman. Perhaps the *predilection d'artiste* is always for the
natural aristocrat who puts us in touch with fire and ice.\(^1\) For Lawrence too sees
the greater danger presented not by the powerful and sovereign individual, but by
the vast herd of slave humanity: "It is not the leopard or the hot tiger, but the
masses of rank sheep"\(^14\) that are nibbling the face of the earth into a desert. And
they need, he thinks, this herd, to be either mastered – or slaughtered. Lawrence
writes:

"Sweet, beautiful death, come to our help. Break in among the herd, make
gaps in its insulated completion. Give us a chance, sweet death, to escape from
this herd and gather together against it a few living beings."\(^15\)

And he continues in the same vein of anti-humanist rhetoric so characteristic of a
politics of cruelty: "Smash humanity, and make an end of it. Let there emerge a
few pure single men."\(^16\) Whilst such rhetoric is probably not meant to be taken
literally, still the extremity and violence of the language used is shocking all the
same. And, as we saw in chapter one, there are times when Lawrence does seem
to view death as a genuine solution to the nihilistic frustration of life and life's
movement and becoming, arguing that before new forms and species can evolve
and "gain strength enough to assert their vitality" there will need to be "a
holocaust of individual deaths".\(^17\) For, as Lawrence puts it: dead men make good
mould.\(^18\)

But as we also argued in chapter one, death is only a pure thing when it is free of
egoistic self-will and "life becomes an echo of the sun, realizing its inevitable
destiny, which is pure loss."\(^19\) That is, when man no longer tries to save himself
inside an old form, but is prepared to let go and accept that he too belongs to the solar–Dionysian economy of energy and chaos; when man realizes that as he begins his descent from Pisgah he must once more use the 'ladder of religious cruelty' up which he climbed. For having attained the third rung (the sacrifice of God), he must step once more onto the second; the sacrifice of self from self. But if on the ascent he was obliged to sacrifice his instincts, passions, and desires, he is on the descent restored once more to his healthy, natural state and asked to sacrifice instead his ideal-illusions, his logical obsessions, and his static forms, along with all: "the obstructions to life" and anything that belongs to him and yet is an ugly impediment to the "free motion of life". Quetzalcoatl, the Aztec deity of life and death who demands human blood, wishes for man to "slay not the best bright proud life" that is in him - i.e., "not that which is noble and generous and spontaneous" - but that which is "mean and base and squalid and degenerate".

Sacrifice, then, is a central notion in Nietzsche and Lawrence. But not just sacrifice of and from the self, whilst the latter remains essentially unchanged, unharmed. For the final rung on the ladder of religious cruelty is human sacrifice. It is this, the death of man as human being, and this alone which fascinates Nietzsche and Lawrence as it does Richard Somers: "Human sacrifice! - he could feel his dark, blood-consciousness tingle to it again, the desire of it, the mystery of it" (K, p.238).

It would be comforting to once more insist that what Nietzsche and Lawrence are thinking of here is sacrifice in a purely philosophical and metaphorical sense; not as a real act to be carried out in the real world; to assimilate the notion of human sacrifice to the project of man's self-overcoming. However, in answer to the question what role ought cruelty and violence play within society once it is acknowledged that they cannot be done away with, Nietzsche and Lawrence seem
to suggest that a substantiation of the mystery of sacrifice is an appropriate measure.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, they do wish to see externalized acts of blood-shed and the projection of cruelty back into the world. They are both keen to stress that the great man must be able not only to sacrifice himself, but others; not only endure suffering, but inflict pain. As Nietzsche writes in an aphorism entitled \textit{What belongs to greatness:}

\begin{quote}
"Who will attain anything great if he does not find in himself the strength and the will to \textit{inflict} great suffering? Being able to suffer is the least thing ... But not to perish of internal distress and uncertainty when one inflicts great suffering and hears the cry of this suffering – that is great, that belongs to greatness."\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

The sacrificing of political opponents is more than an act of expediency and 'compassion', as Machiavelli argues.\textsuperscript{24} It also constitutes a test upon those who would be leaders; a test of their strength and greatness. And yet if a man's greatness and sovereignty makes of him a killer (as we saw Bataille suggest earlier), so too, paradoxically for the moral and rational-minded, does it allow him to achieve a state of grace; i.e., to come into a second innocence: for innocence too belongs to greatness and the final perfect strength. It is this fact which will, perhaps, enable the very greatest of men to not only kill in good conscience, but to let go and advocate a new justice and a new mercy. To become a Dionysian god and man who "cannot only afford the sight of the terrible and questionable, but even the terrible deed"\textsuperscript{25}, and who can also, finally, be capable of noble pity. Let us explore the above ideas in the context once more of \textit{The Plumed Serpent}.

Chapter XXIII of the novel, \textit{Huitzilopochtli's Night}, is perhaps the most infamous. At its centre sits a ritualized scene of political execution-cum-sacrifice. Prisoners, captured after a failed attempt on Ramón's life, are brought to the church of
Quetzalcoatl and then stripped, bound, and killed. Two have their necks broken with a cord; three are stabbed through the heart with a dagger by Cipriano. One man, however, is pardoned; having received the 'green leaf of Malintzi', and here lies a clue as to what kind of strong justice could possibly develop out of what appears to be the most reactionary form of punishment. Following the public executions, there is a private, male-only, ceremony held within the church, during which human blood is sprinkled onto a fire and prayers offered.

Understandably, Kate is at first horrified: "When the women were shut out of the church, Kate went home gloomy and uneasy. The executions shocked and depressed her. ... It seemed to her all terrible will, the assertion of pure, awful will" (PS, p.387). That is, something fixed and mechanical, something bullying – not at all an act of spontaneous passion. But Kate's initial reaction eventually gives way to an acceptance of her new husband's penchant to engage in a little ritualized murder, because, she realizes, he kills in good conscience and with an innocence that makes him truly one of the gods. Just as profound sexual experience of a transgressive nature (usually anal sex in Lawrence, as we have seen in chapter one) frees one from shame, so too it is suggested immoralism leads to innocence in a wider context; and cruelty to compassion. If the active cultivation of evil and a politics of transgression appears a dubious way of freeing oneself from bad conscience, nevertheless there are, as Kate realises, "more ways than one of becoming like a little child" (PS, p.393). And perhaps it is the least likely road which leads furthest; that we will become-children only by first becoming-wild beasts. This, surely, is what Zarathustra is teaching in his discourse Of the Three Metamorphoses, in which the child who is "innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning" is reached by way of the camel and the lion.

The hope of a new beginning (of reversing the myth of the Fall) is, as we have seen earlier in this thesis, crucial to Nietzsche's and Lawrence's thinking; only a
new beginning will allow us to arise as pristine beings, unashamed before ourselves and free of all guilt. Beings with evil desires and capable of cruel acts, but who are not made wretched and insane by the thought of such desires, or by guilt over one's own deeds. When one becomes newly innocent, one becomes as a child in spirit and, further; "one realizes one is among the gods" (PS, p.394).

It is this, the divine status of Ramón and Cipriano, who have become the living Quetzalcoatl and Huitzilopochtli respectively, which ultimately sanctions their 'swift cruelty' and murder of political prisoners in Kate's view: "when she remembered his stabbing the three helpless peons, she thought: Why should I judge him? He is of the gods ... what do I care if he kills people? His flame is young and clean." (Ibid.)

This is certainly a remarkable leap of faith made by the woman who demonstrated such a strong aversion to cruelty at the bull-fight which opened the novel. The question is: are we, as readers, also as convinced by Don Ramón and Cipriano, to the point at which we too can accept their divine revolutionary justice? Most readers are not. And it undoubtedly does not help matters when one recognizes that Lawrence himself is undecided on this question; seemingly losing faith in his own project as carried out in The Plumed Serpent. Typically, Lawrence leaves things radically incomplete so that we are never to find out whether the green leaf of Malintzi sprouts into something worth cherishing, or simply whithers away. Historical experience (gathered from such events as the Iranian Revolution we mentioned earlier) seems to suggest the latter is the more likely scenario. Ramón and Cipriano are never really given the opportunity to show that having learnt how to kill in good faith, endure and impose great suffering, they have learnt also to let go and show pity, not in a reactive manner, but in a truly noble fashion. They are, that is to say, never given the chance to sit Zarathustra's final test:
"I desire beauty from no one as much as I desire it from you, you man of power: may your goodness be your ultimate self-overcoming. I believe you are capable of any evil; therefore I desire of you the good. In truth, I have often laughed at the weaklings who think themselves good because their claws are blunt!"


"But we storm the angel-guarded
Gates of the long-discarded
Garden
... and as victors we travel
To Eden home.
Back beyond good and evil
Return we."

As we saw in chapter one, for Lawrence and Nietzsche it is imperative that man smash the hard-shell of himself and his civilization, so that he can be re-born beneath open skies. Both shared the belief that the gates of the latter and the selves we have been given do not protect us from evil and insanity, so much as lock us into morality and reason; i.e., that these molar overcodings form more of a prison to man than a genuine dwelling place, keeping us from the home outside the gate from which we have long been exiled.

And where is man truly at home? Only in the presence of gods and demons and in contact with other men and women, and with animals; his feet planted firmly on the non-ideal soil of a genuine blood-homeland. This, at least, is the idea that Lawrence continually returns to; even after having described the disintegration of and future impossibility of such in *The Rainbow*. Nietzsche too seems unable to
surrender the idea of paradise regained. Here, I would like to explore this notion by picking up once more the debate to do with innocence and the question of civilization which has been opened in the earlier chapters.

For Freud, in *Civilization and Its Discontents*, the problem is simple and straightforward and can be reduced to the "irremediable antagonism between the demands of instinct and the restrictions of civilization." Like Nietzsche before him, Freud argues that civilization is founded upon a repression of the instincts and the 'guilt' which results from this repression, achieved via an internalization of cruelty and the formation of a 'super-ego' (conscience).

For Freud, as we saw last chapter, this non-satisfaction of man's most powerful instincts is not only necessary, but positively a good thing; civilization working in the service of Eros and for the benefit of all men who are better off tamed in the name of a universal love-ideal which Freud associates with life itself, than allowed to give free expression to wild desires and passions which Freud claims are derivative of and 'representative' of the 'death drive', or will to destruction. As for the suffering caused by the development of guilt and the admitted loss of instinctive happiness, this, says Freud, is simply "the price we pay for our advance in civilization".

Effectively, then, Freud is arguing that we must choose between civilization - or death. The former is thus sanctified as the sole means capable of resisting man's destructive impulses and psychoanalysis reveals itself to be weakly pessimistic in its fear of the 'unconscious' whilst naively optimistic in its faith that it can prevail on behalf of civilization against the 'horror' it believes to be lurking there. Politically, for all its surface radicalism, it forms a conservative force and ends serving the powers of reaction and normalization. Thus Freudians ultimately part company with true radicals such as Nietzsche and Lawrence. Whilst the latter
accept the need for discipline and breeding (the active stylization of man and culture as an aesthetic project), they reject the taming and repression of man (the reactive subjectivation of man as a moral-rational machine). Further, they seek to liberate those forces presently denied; not because they wish for death and destruction, but because they wish to make people happier and free of bad conscience. Nietzsche writes:

"Why do we fear and hate a possible reversion to barbarism? because it would make people unhappier than they are? Oh no! The barbarians of every age were happier: let us not deceive ourselves!"

But there is a problem with hoping for a new barbarian force to come from the outside; a problem that Lawrence identifies: "there are not now as in Roman times, any great reservoirs of energetic barbaric life ... The world is very full of people, but all fixed in civilizations of their own and they all have our vices, all our mechanisms". This being the case, it falls to a few relatively strong and healthy 'barbarians' within to find a way forward. The meek have inherited the world and so, as Ramón realizes, he must act to somehow 'un-tame' his people and rekindle the active forces within them. But this will not be an easy task to accomplish, after man has, as Nietzsche says, "inherited millennia of conscience-vivisection and animal torture" inflicted on himself; viewing his most natural inclinations with an 'evil eye'. As Lawrence concedes: "it is nonsense to pretend we can un-tame ourselves in five minutes. That, too, is a slow and strange process, that has to be undertaken seriously."

But although the task may not be easy, it is not necessarily an impossible one. Providing there are those few with sufficient vitality, then a 'reverse experiment' should be possible, says Nietzsche, by which he means: "an intertwining of bad conscience with perverse inclinations, all those other-worldly aspirations, alien to the senses, the instincts, to nature, to animals, in short to all the ideals which up
to now have been hostile to life and have deformed the world."\(^8\)

This important passage not only provides us with a clear statement of what the revaluation of values means (i.e., not just an escape from morality and reason, "but an affirmation of and trust in all that has hitherto been forbidden, despised, accursed"\(^9\)), but reminds us once more that Nietzsche does not oppose all forms of cruelty and experimentation practiced on the self; merely those attempts made to devalue the flesh and life on earth.

Essentially, what Nietzsche is arguing -- and Lawrence follows -- is that both individual and collective health can be restored only by accepting back into our life as it is lived the repressed and rejected. This involves a sinking down into the "the darkness and elemental consciousness of the blood"\(^10\) and meeting one another there. It is in this rather special sense that Lawrence affirms a new 'dark age', which Henry Miller accurately describes as "a long night in which ... the few rare spirits work with knowing mystery for the resurrection of a new body, a new spirit, a new culture."\(^11\)

By suggesting that we need to listen to our blood and the dark gods which flow through our veins, Lawrence counters the Christian prayer of baptism: "O merciful God, grant the Old Adam in this child may be buried."\(^12\) For according to Lawrence, the 'Old Adam' or demonic aspect of man should be held in innermost respect. And while church fathers and Freudians may view the latter as a "monster of perversity", it is they themselves who see with "the perverted vision of the degenerate tame: tamed through thousands of shameful years."\(^13\)

Our task, then, is to seek out the Old Adam buried within; to become-blonde beast and new barbarian. But this does not mean become savage and degenerate. Rather, we seek the man whom Lou awaits in *St Mawr*, a short novel written by
Lawrence shortly before work on *The Plumed Serpent*. Sick and tired of well-domesticated modern man, Lou suggests to her mother that "'there's something else besides mind and cleverness or niceness or cleanness. Perhaps it is the animal.'"\(^{14}\) Her mother, Mrs. Witt, is not impressed. But Lou knows her mother misunderstands her position and attempts to stress she is not arguing for mindlessness, but, rather, for a complete animal-man (i.e., a combination of beast and superbeast) who lives from the body and not just the mind alone. Still Mrs. Witt is unconvinced, and suggests that her daughter is simply looking for a cave man to come and club her over the head before then carrying her away with him. To this, Lou replies:

"'Don't be silly mother! That's much more your subconscious line. You admirer of Mind. I don't consider the cave man is a real human animal at all. He's a brute, a degenerate. A pure animal man would be as lovely as a deer or a leopard, burning like a flame fed straight from underneath. ... He'd be all the animals in turn, instead of one, fixed automatic thing, which he is now, grinding on the nerves.'"\(^{15}\)

And if only, says, Lou, echoing Nietzsche's desire, such men were commanders in the world today!

Thus we can conclude that irrationalism and anti-humanism do not lead to brute stupidity; that the latter, like spiritual-intellectual over-refinement, results from a perversion of instinct and a falling away from the wholeness of complete being into degeneracy. And just as the Old Adam would be other than the fear-distorted caricature of the priestly mind, so too, Nietzsche and Lawrence insist as we saw in chapter one, would a genuine civilization be other than an institution for the taming of man, replete with barb-wire fences; it would be, above all, founded upon other than guilt - a culture of innocence and the mystery of lordship. A culture too formed upon the 'Morning Star' which rises between men
collectively. For one achieves one's own perfect strength only via relationship with others and as part of a living-fellowship.

The realization that we have no individual selves in isolation is one of the great shocks suffered by Kate: "She had thought that each individual had a complete self, a complete soul, an accomplished I. And now she realized as plainly as if she had turned into a new being, that this was not so" (PS, p.105). Hard as she finds it, Kate has to accept that there is no ideal-individuality; only a self formed in relation to others. Thus, as we have stressed throughout this thesis, for all their talk 'anti-civilization', Nietzsche and Lawrence posit community and relationship at the heart of their thinking; rejecting the very notion of the individual which is so central to liberal thought.

We find our best strength in relation to others and from out of this comes also the power of innocence; the power to accept oneself as a thing of forces and flows and to forgive oneself for past 'crimes' (from scrumping to deicide). Indeed, innocence also involves the ability to forget past deeds, past shames, past stupidities, past fears and uncertainties; to forget that there is anything to feel guilty about, or apologise for. When man can forget, then too can he rise innocent before each new moment as though the past had no claim over him. Man's self-overcoming is, then, in a very real sense, an overcoming of himself as a historical construct. By liberating himself from the past, he is able to interpret himself anew in the present and project himself differently into the future.

As we saw in chapter one, it is fatal to the living thing - be it the individual or the collectivity - if it cannot close itself from the past, learning how to discriminate and evaluate among memories (i.e., exercise a healthy will to power). The stronger an individual or a people, however, the more history it will be able to recall and assimilate without developing a bad conscience; the less it will be
obliged to forget. Nietzsche refers to this as the 'plastic power' of an individual or people. Those who could incorporate the entire historical experience of modern humanity as their own and endure such (i.e., exhibit plastic power of superhuman proportion), would constitute, according to Nietzsche, a new nobility: "the like of which no age has yet seen or dreamed of."\textsuperscript{16}

Not only would such a new nobility be innocent, but they would be happy too. Nietzsche claims, for "if one could burden one's soul with ... the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity; if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling - this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far: the happiness of a god .."\textsuperscript{17}

Essentially, Lawrence agrees with this; agrees that what is important having bitten and swallowed the apple of knowledge and fallen into self-consciousness and bad conscience as a result, is that we need now to digest the fruit (maggot and all). The revaluation is an attempt to help man over his indigestion. When this is achieved - when the Old Adam is able to be free of belly-ache - then, and only then, will man be free to re-enter Paradise and the New Eve pick fresh fruit and consort with serpents as she pleases.

Lawrence chose to discard the following passage from \textit{The Plumed Serpent}, but it is particularly pertinent to our study here and forms a good conclusion to this particular section of the work. Ramón tells Kate:

"Go! tell them the Cross is a Tree again, and they may eat the fruit if they can reach the branches. Tell them the snake coils in peace around the ankle of Eve, and she no longer tries to bruise his head. The fruit of knowledge is digested. Now we can plant the core" (\textit{PS}, appendix III, p.459).
'The Cross is a Tree again' — i.e., a symbolic instrument of torture and sacrifice upon which man has for the past 2000 years been crucified and self-divided into a fatal dichotomy of mind and spirit contra flesh and blood, has been transformed back into the sacred Tree of Life. And the fruit of this tree may be eaten; for there is no longer any divine law or categorical imperative to prohibit us (God is dead) — providing, that is, we can reach the branches; i.e., providing we are able to surpass ourselves as a species, overcoming our humanity as formed by the old morality and dare to live as giants and gods upon the earth.

'The snake coils in peace around the ankle of Eve, and she no longer tries to bruise his head' — i.e., the New Eve in her nakedness and her new innocence has overcome the burden of shame and fear which had robbed her and all the world of sunshine and happiness. The serpent of desire has been accepted:

"It has its own raison d'etre. In its own being it has beauty and reality. Even my horror is a tribute to its reality. And I must admit the genuineness of my own horror, accept it, and not exclude it from my understanding. ...

I must make my peace with the serpent of abhorrence that is within me. I must own my secret shame and most secret desire ... who am I that I should hold myself above my last or worst desire? My desires are me, they are the beginning of me, my stem and branch and root. ...

I shall accept all my desires and repudiate none. It will be a sign of bliss in me when I am reconciled with the serpent of my own horror, when I am free from the fascination and the revulsion. For secret fascination is a fearful tyranny. ...

The serpent will have his own place in me, and I shall be free."  

'The fruit of knowledge is digested' — i.e., not only can we at last move beyond good and evil, but so too can we overcome our obsession with having to 'know' everything in our heads; overcome our fanatical will to truth. For 'now we can
plant the core' - i.e., now we can be free to experience life directly and come into our own full being as creatures with bodies, not just minds. Now we can develop a new culture based upon innocence, laughter, and forgetting, as well as a wider (intuitive) consciousness and a new ethic; now at last we can have a true civilization in which men are more than house-pets.

Back then to Eden; the garden of earthly delight which lies just West of Nod, that twilight zone of sleep and death in which we have dreamt mad dreams and suffered from ideal-delusions for far too long: "'Who sleeps shall wake! Who sleeps shall wake!'" (PS, p.128) sing the men of Quetzacoatl. And men shall awaken they say in the way of the snake; i.e., into earthly, sensual life.

This, then, is what Nietzsche's revaluation as mediated and illustrated by Lawrence in The Plumed Serpent, means: the regaining of innocence and the flight back into Paradise. This is where a politics of evil and cruelty, transgression and the substantiation of mystery, is designed to lead us. But, as we concluded at the end of chapter two, there are dangers and concerns to be faced here, as well as delights to be won. For the road to Paradise is pitted with numerous black holes and I would like to reopen discussion of these and offer some closing remarks.

Part IV: Closing Remarks.

IV.i. Revolutions are so vieux jeu.

For a while at least, Lawrence was to insist in letters that he did mean what Ramón meant - 'for us all' - and that he regarded The Plumed Serpent as his most important novel. But before long, the reservations concerning Ramón's revolution, evident throughout the novel, resurface and Lawrence eventually concedes with direct reference to the above that:
"The hero is obsolete, and the leader of men is a back number. After all at the back of the hero is the militant ideal: and the militant ideal, or the ideal militant, seems to me a cold egg. We're sort of sick of all forms of militarism and militantism ..."¹

In part, the above was the result of Lawrence reacting to his own experience of Italian fascism and German militarism. It now seemed clear that the only sure outcome of revolution, be it of the fascist or the socialist variety, was an increase in the bullying power of the modern state over the individual. Even a predominantly religious revolution à la The Plumed Serpent, with its establishment of a "strange priest-controlled, ritual-fulfilled"² political order was now to be rejected.

I have mentioned last chapter how Nietzsche's political philosophy is insufficiently complex; his grasp of the economic and social realities of the modern world remaining superficial. Although Lawrence does make some attempt in The Plumed Serpent to accommodate his neo-Aztec revolution to the realities of modern Mexico, ultimately the same criticism can be made of his social and political thinking: naive and "no more trenchant or adequate than that of the typical 'romantic anti-capitalist'".³ W.H. Auden is not far off the mark therefore when he says the political musings of The Plumed Serpent are not so much dangerous, as silly, because they "treat the modern state as if it were a tiny parish and politics as if it were an affair of personal relations".⁴

Here, then, is a serious criticism of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's thinking: both seem unable to resist the temptation to blur the "categorical and experiential differences between the personal and the collective" and thus each frequently attempts to "recast the collective in terms of a unitary personal image rather than the difficult, plural realities of community."⁵ It seems that each felt justified in
doing this because each held onto the outmoded belief of conservative political thinking, that one can equate the organization of the soul with that of the city, or state. Thus there is a leaping back and forth from ontology to sociology and from physiology to politics, with either an unawareness of the illegitimacy of so-doing, or a wilful defiance of what is seen as a decadent notion of legitimacy. This becomes particularly problematic for some critics when the politics being advocated is one that 'promotes' cruelty, based on observations, experiences, and intuitions gathered in the personal realm. For whilst it may be the case that what doesn't kill the individual makes him stronger, this does not mean that we need to affirm and promote pain and suffering unreservedly, nor institutionalize them within society. Nor need our politics be based upon and reflect the fact that life is violent, immoral, and unjust. The mistake that Nietzsche makes is that he;

"rushes from the insight that every person's life and actions involve a necessary and sometimes desirable amount of suffering to the conclusion that misery, exploitation, and violence in social and political life are inevitable and perhaps desirable - so much so that their reduction ought not to be a goal of politics."  

By 1929, Lawrence was prepared to admit of his own limitations, saying that: 
"As a novelist, I feel it is the change inside the individual which is my real concern ... to know the feelings inside a man, and to make new feelings conscious."  

But as to then deciding what changes in the socio-political realm based upon these new feelings need to be made, Lawrence now concedes that he does not know. Or, at least, other men know better. 

But this is not to say that Lawrence turns away completely from politics; merely from politics on a macro- or molar-level and of a grand revolutionary nature. As we will see in the following chapters, his political concerns post-Plumed Serpent stay on the micro- or molecular-level to do with consciousness, the body, and
desire; a radical politics interested in exploring new pleasures and new forms of relation, in promoting new becomings and transformations for man, not in armed up-rising and seizing the power of the state; a politics of tenderness and touch, not terrorism and transgression. A politics also of survival and resistance, designed to help the Old Adam and New Eve struggle through the Ruins and their engagement with nihilism and the mechanical forces thereof.

Without wishing to anticipate too much of what is to be developed later on, or repeat what has been said so far, I would like to make a few remarks about the move from revolution to radical resistance. Perhaps the first and most obvious question that presents itself is resistance against what and against whom? The answer has to be against state power itself and against all those who serve the bureaucracy of state power, flirt with state power, and/or desire state power for themselves; including the would-be revolutionaries and ascetic political militants such as Ramón and Cipriano. Resistance also against the temptation to find an easy and absolute solution to the problems which face us; solutions of the kind offered by the above and all those who subscribe to and promote the ideal '-isms' of the twentieth century ("the various swindles of late modernity").

According to Daniel Conway, Nietzsche teaches us in *Ecce Homo* that one of the most important things we can do today is; "commit our remaining volitional resources to the resistance of idolatry and thus survive perhaps our engagement with nihilism. Nietzsche consequently advocates a politics of resistance rather than a politics of redemption or revolution."

By learning how to laugh at ourselves and those who would be our leaders, we may be able to offer at least a "temporary defence against our 'natural' impulse to implement a final resolution of our constitutive contradictions." One of the failings of *The Plumed Serpent* as a novel, is that it lacks this ability to laugh; even if it does veer towards the unintentionally self-parodic at times. Realizing
this, Lawrence allows a good deal more humour to enter into his post-<em>Serpent</em> writings, the only 'sane' revolution now being one made for fun.\(^\text{12}\)

But if Lawrence turns away from large-scale revolutionary politics it is not only due to a sudden distaste for the perceived puritanism of militant leaders such as Ramón, but also because he realizes that the above has to be if it is to be successful in the modern world a mass ideal. Ramón is prepared to reluctantly accept this, but Lawrence, ultimately, is not. And neither, for most of the time, is Nietzsche, who writes: "the demagogic character and intention to appeal to the masses is at present common to all political parties; on account of this intention they are all compelled to transform their principles into great al fresco stupidities and thus to paint them on the wall."\(^\text{13}\)

Nietzsche concludes the above passage by quoting Voltaire: "<em>Quand la populace se mele de raisonner, tout est perdu</em>"\(^\text{14}\) and, mostly, he argues that the noble few must not simply become shepherds to the herd (i.e., leaders of the People). Lawrence too stresses that the greatness of the great man resides in his ability not merely to step ahead, but also step aside and his realization that there is no need to concern himself with violent revolution and the smashing of city walls, when he can simply "walk through the gates into the open world"\(^\text{15}\) if he finds the courage to do so. The great man knows at last that a new order of life cannot consciously be pre-determined. Lawrence himself knew this before writing <em>The Plumed Serpent</em> and realized its truth once again upon completing the novel. That said, even after <em>The Plumed Serpent</em> Lawrence is not entirely able to conclude that revolutions and cataclysms are unnecessary. But he seems to hope rather that the cultivation of a new sensibility via education of the feelings is man's best hope for the future. Of course, this is not as dramatic as the call to arms, but if what we want is "to produce the new society of the future, gradually, livingly" then it will be "a slow job, but why not?"\(^\text{16}\) It is a question of hatching the egg and not
smashing it, or simply cleaning the nest in which the latter sits. In his stillest moments, Ramón knows this – even whilst half-tempted by Cipriano's desire to crush the whole world like an egg in the coils of a serpent. Lawrence writes; "if we are to break through, it must be in the strength of life bubbling inside us. The chicken does not break the shell out of animosity against the shell. It bursts out in its blind desire to move under a greater heaven."¹⁷

Nietzsche too, in his less hyperbolic mid-period, would agree that although revolutionary violence can be the source of stimulation in a mankind grown weak and decadent via the "resurrection of the most savage energies in the shape of the long-buried dreadfulness and excesses of the most distant ages"¹⁸ it can do no more than this. Thus for a change of a truly profound nature, it requires something other than this; not something bigger, more excessive, more violent, but, on the contrary, 'small doses' of change over a long period of time:

"If a change is to be as profound as it can be, the means to it must be given in the smallest doses but unremittingly over long periods of time! Can what is great be created at a single stroke? So let us take care not to exchange the state of morality to which we are accustomed for a new evaluation of things head over heels and amid acts of violence .."¹⁹

This crucially important passage on 'small doses' concludes with explicit remarks on the folly of revolutionary politics:

"It is now, indeed, also beginning to become apparent that the most recent attempt at a great change in evaluations, and that in the political field – the 'Great Revolution' – was nothing more than a pathetic and bloody piece of quackery which knew how, through the production of sudden crises, to inspire in credulous Europe the hope of a sudden recovery – and there with made all political invalids
up to the present moment *impatient and dangerous.*"20

The above has, one would argue, to form a central part of any discussion of Nietzsche's politics, particularly to do with the question of whether he is or is not a revolutionary. If the above is no more indicative of the 'authentic' Nietzsche, or any more quintessential than the later writings that do demand grand politics and the seizure of history, nevertheless it does seem to offer a much more useful and credible teaching at the beginning of the twenty-first century and can perhaps mark the end of politics as understood and practiced within the modern age. Having, in the twentieth century, seen both Russian and German revolutions collapse into state terror and stupidity, we must surely have learnt in a brutal and impressive manner that the greatest danger lies in accumulations of state power and in those political options which whilst calling for great change, merely recodify and reinscribe relations, leaving in place all the old mechanisms of the state-machine.

IV.ii. The Question of Fascism Once More.

Firstly, it is important to stress that if Lawrence abandons revolution and professes his distaste for militantism and militarism, he does so because he feels such tactics are doomed to failure; i.e., he makes a strategic withdrawal from his position in *The Plumed Serpent* and does not beat a horrified retreat, as is often suggested, tacitly conceding the fascism of his own text and the need to reaffirm a more liberal and humanist position. Those who argue that the letter quoted earlier provides evidence that Lawrence drops his concern with power are mistaken; or, as is frequently the case, deliberately misreading the above in order to bring Lawrence closer to their own philosophical and political positions. We often see this happening with Nietzsche too; liberal-humanist commentators fish around for edifying passages with which to somehow neutralize the material which
they find distasteful and disturbing.

The fact is, however, that neither Nietzsche nor Lawrence at any time renounce their philosophy of power, nor abandon hopes of overturning Christian–moral values and democratic political arrangements. They understand the risk that they run by advocating the philosophy they do, namely that by giving assent to life as will to power and the general economy of the whole "the way was open to others ... who would gather strength from lies and murder." And, indeed, they do make some attempt to ensure their work is not misused by the réssentiment-ridden, whilst ultimately accepting this risk; the risk of a fascist appropriation which sees their call for a new substantiation of mystery degraded into party-political dogma and a debased form of idolatry. However, the unfortunate fact is that *The Plumed Serpent* gives us an imaginative glimpse of a positive potential culture and an uncanny prefiguration of what is to follow in Nazi Germany.

For some critics of course, there is no distinction to be made between the philosophy and politics of *The Plumed Serpent* and national socialism; the latter is not the doppelgänger of the former, but one and the same. Both can be described as volatile mixtures of "rebellious emotions and reactionary social ideals". Admittedly, the novel does attempt to "retrieve old, supplanted faculties [and] use them to advance some form of cultural evolution." For in a very real sense, as we have mentioned earlier, *The Plumed Serpent* is Lawrence's fantastic and frantic attempt to recodify both the world within his own fiction and wider society, via his own mythology; i.e., to form neo-territorialities by "reintroducing code fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo-codes or jargons." Unfortunately, such neo-territorialities are, at best, "artificial, residual, archaic" and, at worst, fascistic. But, importantly, if the above forms a valid description of the process being carried out in *The Plumed Serpent*, it also provides a model by which the entire experience of the modern world can be
understood; a model of oscillation from one pole of delirium to another; from decodification to recodification; from deterritorialization to reterritorialization. Liberal-democratic society operates in this manner under capital, just as surely as does fascist or neo-Aztec society. As Deleuze and Guattari say:

"Born of decoding and deterritorialization on the ruins of the despotic machine, these societies are caught between the Urstaat that they would like to resuscitate as an overcoding and reterritorializing unity, and the unfettered flows that carry them toward an absolute threshold ... they are torn in two directions: archaism and futurism, neo-archaism and ex-futurism, paranoia and schizophrenia ... They are continually behind or ahead of themselves."26

Because there are numerous and "astonishing oscillations of the unconscious, from one pole of delirium to the other"27, however, sometimes an unexpected force of radical change can break free "even in the midst of the worst archaiams"28 or, on the other hand, revolutionary force can quickly turn fascist, reproducing old power-mechanisms and falling back into the most terrible stupidities of the past.

To reiterate and conclude, we are conceding the relation between fascism and Nietzschean philosophy; both involve intense lines of flight into the heterogeneous realm and both can legitimately be characterized as war-machines. Further, both offer a consummation of modern European nihilism; but it is here they differ radically. For whereas Nietzsche's perfected nihilism is a form of pure destruction in terms of self-overcoming and the negation of the negative itself, fascism is a form of decadent disintegration which refuses to surrender its own fixed will and self-identity to the process of death and resurrection. It is this will to preservation and love of self which differentiates fascism from Nietzschean thought. Ultimately, fascism is only another form of grand idealism acting in the
name of love (as we suggested last chapter): love of self, of nation, of race, of leader. Community-Identity-Stability: these are the ideals of the Third Reich (in theory, if not practice) as of Huxley's *Brave New World*; the literary counterpart to Lawrence's *Plumed Serpent*. The ideals in fact of utopian thinkers and prison camp builders; i.e., those who secretly lust after that which they fear most - anarchy and corruption.

Of course, again as we saw last chapter, if love can become corrupted from a divine process into a fixed goal and obscene ideal, so too can power. For it too can be transformed into a metaphysical 'thing' to be possessed and worked from the will. When power becomes degraded into something mechanical and an attribute of the human will, then it too has ugly consequences. And if Lawrence edges away from Ramón it is because he realizes the error made in fixing power into a revolutionary political form and substantiating the mystery of power in terms of the military.

**IV.iii. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism.**

If Lawrence does not move away from a philosophy of power, neither does he abandon his anti-humanism, unlike those post-war intellectuals who thought that the only possible response to totalitarianism and the only possible way to safeguard Europe from future tyranny was to make a retreat to the safety limits of rational-humanism (coupled to the politics of Marx). Of course, after all the many horrors and atrocities of the 1930's and '40's, it is understandable to want to hide behind the *tricolore* once more and reaffirm the principles of the Enlightenment. But it is a mistaken response nonetheless. And what is not understandable and what must represent the greatest loss of philosophical courage imaginable, is how a number of the so-called 'new philosophers' in the 1970's and '80's also advocated a return to old values; in order, they claimed, to counter the
threat of neo-fascism and to provide themselves with the grounds upon which to assemble a defence of 'human rights'. We feel as Kate felt when Ramón announced he was looking for God once more - it's a creeping back into old forms and hollow shells due to a sort of sentimentalism. I would argue that the very last thing we need to do today is make a return to the metaphysics of the subject and a humanist philosophy founded upon a revised understanding of the cogito.

Of course, it may well be that Camus is right in saying that if a man wishes to live and die as a man, then he must "refuse to be a god". Lawrence concedes this point after The Plumed Serpent, writing for example in Lady Chatterley's Lover with no doubt an ironic backward glance at Ramón and Cipriano that: "One has to ... have a heart and a penis, if one is to escape being either a god or a bolshevist - for they are the same thing: they're both too good to be true" (LCL, p.39). But if this marks a turning of some sort, it does not signify a return to the old understanding of the humanitas of homo humanus. Lawrence maintains as strongly after The Plumed Serpent as before it (in essential agreement with Nietzsche), that it is not the denial of humanism and humanist values that leads to nihilism, but the positing of such ideals in the first place. For when, inevitably, such values collapse and man is forced to realize that he has dedicated himself to nothingness all along (the nothingness he sought to avoid and counter), then love recoils into hatred and the malice of rage.

Thus it is not Nietzsche's philosophy of power (or evil) which is the real and continuing danger today, but the insistence on love and an old morality even when the latter has been exposed as the product of impotence and réssentiment. It is the 'new humanism' which constitutes the reaction within politics today; not Nietzsche's aristocratism. There may well be the need for a new ethic; but fear does not form such, any more than pain constitutes an argument. If we can no longer indulge in Nietzsche's somewhat romantic immoralism, still we can point
out that it is not the latter that leads to nihilism, but the metaphysics of love and reason.

The neo-humanists are not wrong to argue that a Nietzschean politics is vitalist and more concerned with power than 'rights'; not mistaken when they claim this will mean that questions of justice, for example, will be resolved upon the basis of strength. But they are wrong to automatically assume this is undesirable and inherently fascistic; as if somehow weakness is morally superior and that innocence equates with impotence and is more likely to guarantee the security and well-being of man. They either fail to grasp, or refuse to see, the crucially important lesson of Nietzsche's *Genealogy*: real goodness grows from strength; out of weakness comes spite, pettiness, fanaticism and the will to the denial of life. Ultimately, it is the strong alone who can grant and guarantee the rights with which the neo-humanists are so concerned. And ultimately, as we have seen, only those with claws can show compassion.

This entire debate is perhaps best summarized and, to my mind, resolved in Heidegger's *Letter on Humanism* which, in providing a magnificent response to Sartre's Marxist-existentialist brand of post-War humanism, gives a strong defence not only to his own philosophical position, but that of Nietzsche and Lawrence too. In a crucial section, Heidegger writes:

"Because we are speaking against 'humanism' people fear a defense of the inhuman and a glorification of barbaric brutality. For what is more 'logical' than that for somebody who negates humanism nothing remains but the affirmation of inhumanity? Because we are speaking against 'logic' people believe we are demanding that the rigor of thinking be renounced and in its place the arbitrariness of drives and feelings be installed and thus that 'irrationalism' be proclaimed as true, For what is more 'logical' than that whoever speaks against the logical is defending the
Because we say that the Being of man consists in being-in-the-world people find that man is downgraded to a merely terrestrial being, whereupon philosophy sinks into positivism. For what is more 'logical' than that whoever asserts the worldliness of human beings holds only this life as valid, denies the beyond, and renounces all 'Transcendence'?

Because we refer to the word of Nietzsche on the 'death of God' people regard such a gesture as atheism. For what is more 'logical' than that whoever has experienced the death of God is godless? ...

What is going on here? People talk about 'humanism', 'logic', 'values', 'world', and 'God'. They hear something about opposition to these. They recognize and accept these things as positive ... they immediately assume that that which speaks against something is automatically its negation and that this is 'negative' in the sense of destructive. ...

But does the 'against' which a thinking advances against ordinary opinion necessarily point toward negation and the negative? This happens ... only when one posits in advance what is meant by the 'positive' and on this basis makes an absolute and absolutely negative decision about the range of possible opposition to it. ...

To think against 'values' is not to maintain that everything interpreted as 'a value' ... is valueless. Rather, it is important to finally realize that precisely through the characterization of something as 'a value' what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for man's estimation."

In other words, valuing does not let things be in their own right; it allows things validity only when useful to man. This is what Nietzsche thinks of as nihilism and Lawrence describes as 'blasphemous living'. It is this they challenge via the project of revaluation. And it is in this challenge that one can locate an ethic;
something which those who oppose the revaluation say is impossible to find within an 'irrationalist ontology' and/or a politics of evil (philosophy of power).

Despite what some may choose to believe, there can thus be a post-moral ethic, just as, prior to Plato, even though thinking knew not of morality, it still had an ethical content and concern. Beyond good and evil, as Nietzsche emphasized on a number of occasions, does not mean beyond good and bad. As we saw in Part I of this chapter, there can even be a post-moral religion, with post-moral gods, should we desire to formulate such on the basis of a newly affirmative will to power. But any such post-moral ethic or religion will have to be grounded in two things above all: the body and the earth. This is not to posit a form of blut und boden idealism, or a spurious racial-national mysticism as the Nazis attempted; rather, it is to suggest the need for a genuine libidinal materialism which values the physical and sensual world of desire and which encourages a respect for all living things as things in their own right.

"Mortals dwell in the way they safeguard the Fourfold in its essential unfolding", says Heidegger. That is, mortals dwell in that they save the earth, receive the sky, await the gods, and, finally, in that they initiate their own becoming. As George Steiner says: "There are meaner metaphors to live by."
Chapter IV: Tenderness: The Philosophy of Becoming and the Politics of Desire.

Part I: Theoretical and General Opening Remarks.

I.i. The Significance of Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover.

We concluded the last chapter by arguing that there is a need ultimately to move away from theoretical terrorism and molar ambitions, toward a micro-politics at the level of desire and the body. It is precisely such a move that Lawrence makes in his late fiction, which includes his most controversial novel, Lady Chatterley's Lover (LCL), and the two-part tale entitled The Escaped Cock (EC), which forms the main point of reference in our next and final chapter.

Often, commentators have failed to understand the significance of the above move made by Lawrence. Thus it is that we frequently encounter the following sort of remark appearing in the critical literature: "tenderness is to be a private and sexual thing, without any of the political overtones we have become accustomed to in recent novels." This remark fails to appreciate what Lawrence means by 'tenderness' and misses the significance of what Lawrence is attempting to achieve. As I will argue and seek to demonstrate here, tenderness (essentially Lawrence's term for desire) is productive of social reality and sexuality far from being a private and apolitical matter is very much of social and political import. As Bataille says: "The world of lovers .. [is] .. no less true than that of politics" - in fact, it is one and the same world. We should not, therefore, fall into the error of thinking that Lady Chatterley's Lover is any the less a politically significant and engaged novel than the earlier works concerned with power, simply because it deals primarily with sensual pleasure. If this 'obscene miracle' of a book eroticizes Nietzsche's philosophical project, the central objective remains
the same (revaluation of all values) and it constitutes a radically experimental development of Lawrence's own earlier fiction. The concern is still to challenge customary constraints applied to the active powers of the body and to reconnect man woman with those forces and flows outside the gate, but without this time making the mistake of *The Plumed Serpent* and "surrendering to the archaic phantasms that had infiltrated our speech acts, our hearts and our deepest, most unconscious desires, functioning as the most sinister kind of fifth column".4

Ultimately, then, I wish to argue that Lawrence's *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, concerned as it is with examining the workings of desire within industrial capitalism and with the strange becomings of its central characters, is a 'schizoanalysis' of the kind fully theorized by Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*. It therefore makes sense and proves of great value to carefully relate the above novel to these works and to discuss it in the philosophical terms which they provide. Obviously there are differences between Lawrence and Deleuze and Guattari, but in all three we find before us those 'philosophical physicians' whom Nietzsche anticipated; i.e., those who muster the courage to push thinking to its limits and risk the proposition that: "what was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but something else. Let us say, health, future, growth, power, life."5

In other words, what Lawrence attempts in *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and what Deleuze and Guattari attempt in their work, is to "listen to the voice of the healthy body" which alone speaks "the meaning of the earth".6 An incisive reading of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is one that has in turn listened to this voice echoing within the text; the voice which affirms the body's own experience directed against all that is egoic and celebratory of all that belongs to impersonal joy. For joy is one of the most important words in the vocabulary of desire. Thus whilst there is horror and death in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, there is also much gaiety
and, indeed, as Bataille correctly claims: "It would be inexcusable to speak of eroticism without saying essentially that it centres on joy. A joy, moreover, that is excessive" and which takes place beyond good and evil. However, let us note in closing, that we are not suggesting that joy is the great be-all and end-all; nor that laughter is the great solution to the problems presented by the modern world. As Lawrence writes in *The First Lady Chatterley (FLC)*: "the world was so full of cant and spurious emotions, the most decent thing one could do was mock it all. One must be able to laugh at everything. At the same time, one cannot laugh everything away" (*FLC*, pp.211–12). And thus the politics of desire also retains the right to make war as well as love.

I.ii. From Pollyanalytics to Schizoanalysis.

As conceded above, there are differences between Lawrence's work and that of Deleuze and Guattari, but there are enough points of contact and similarity to allow us to legitimately move freely from pollyanalytics to schizoanalysis; perhaps the most important of these being the shared hostility to Freud's work, not least of all his understanding of desire. Lawrence claims to be grateful to Freud for insisting on an element of sex in all human relations; "thankful that Freud pulled us somewhat to earth." And yet, for Lawrence as for Deleuze and Guattari, Freudian analysis is ultimately unacceptable, founded as it is upon reactive interpretations, bourgeois fantasies and motifs, love of ego, and a false materialism. The above are not content to see sex reduced to the level of the 'dirty little secret' and desire constrained within oedipal mythology. Nor are they prepared to accept the reduction of the entire world to a series of representations formed by the consciousness of a rational human subject. For Lawrence, Deleuze, and Guattari, the oedipal and the egoic are precisely what must be overcome and they fight against them ferociously and unceasingly in their works with every weapon at their disposal.
Thus, whilst as Frank Kermode argues, Freud and Lawrence "were in a sense talking about the same thing, an epochal sickness with deep roots in the past and ... a malfunction of sexual relationships within the culture"\textsuperscript{10}, Lawrence soon parts company from Freud and evolves an essentially different (and opposed) project. For Lawrence, again as for Deleuze and Guattari, Freud does not go far enough; he is seen to be constantly retreating from the radical implications of his own theories and such conservative timidity is the reason that he fails to reach the unconscious that he initially sets off in search of with such courage; this and the fact that he does not know how to approach or handle the body, fearing the flesh in its naked materiality.

Because he has no real appreciation of the body and its active forces, Freud's unconscious is little more than a negative projection of consciousness itself, and it means that his understanding of sexuality is also formed by the reactive forces of rational consciousness and bad conscience. Deleuze and Guattari are keen to stress that Lawrence has a more accurate and profound evaluation of sexuality than Freud; one that is 'cosmo-illogical' rather than 'psycho-logical'. They write: "we admit that any comparison of sexuality with cosmic phenomena such as 'electrical storms' ... in the end appears to us more adequate than the reduction of sexuality to the pitiful little familialist secret ... even from the viewpoint of the famous scientificity."\textsuperscript{11}

What is particularly remarkable about Lawrence's reading of Freud, however, is how unusual it was for its time. As Anne Fernihough reminds us; "Freud was more commonly seen by his own contemporaries to have subverted, not reinforced, this rationalist tradition."\textsuperscript{12} That is to say, more commonly seen as a great liberator, not as someone who sets out to posit an ideal ego as the ultimate coercive and imperialistic force of occupation. Lawrence reacts with horror to the formula that reads 'where id was, there ego shall be', seeing in this the
declaration of the mind's ambition to triumph over and murder the body; "a subjection of the spontaneous sources of living to the 'psychic mechanical law'."  \(^{13}\)

Deleuze and Guattari agree; Freud offers a reactive and tyrannical model of the human 'psyche', from which he draws conservative political and social conclusions in works such as *Civilization and Its Discontents* (see chapters two and three). Today, perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, psychological categories and political categories continue to reinforce one another. As Nietzsche predicted (and feared), the state has entered the soul in terrifying and previously unimaginable new ways and thus needs to be engaged on a micro-political level. Marcuse writes:

"The traditional border lines between psychology on the one side and political and social philosophy on the other have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era: formerly autonomous and identifiable psychical processes are being absorbed by the function of the individual in the state – by his public existence. Psychological problems therefore turn into political problems."  \(^{14}\)

There is therefore no longer a public/private dichotomy or distinction to be made and "private disorder reflects more directly than before the disorder of the whole."  \(^{15}\) This is something which Deleuze and Guattari also stress in their work, as they seek to demonstrate how "almost all personal and private problems ... have social, political, and economic sources"  \(^{16}\) and how, on the other hand, the desires and drives which work through the individual also infect and invest social reality, producing subjects and cultures alike. Schizoanalysis exposes time and again "the influence of the unconscious on the conscious, the role of the preconceptual and nonconceptual in the conceptual, the presence of the irrational ... at the very core of the rational."  \(^{17}\) If we have become only too expert when it comes to examining the mechanical functions and reactive forces of consciousness
and then mistaking these for life in its entirety, schizoanalysis is a means by which we can begin to understand a little better the active forces that belong to the economy of desire mentioned above; those forces which we saw in chapters two and three branded by moralists and rationalists as 'evil' and monstrous (the forces of the Old Adam in his phallic glory and the New Eve in her cunt-triumph). If in this thesis we argue for the affirmation of these forces, it is because they alone have the potential to transform man (making lovers of us all) and bringing about the revaluation of values: And it is not only that they transpose the feeling of values;

"the lover is more valuable, is stronger. ... His whole economy is richer than before, more powerful, more complete than in those who do not love. The lover becomes a squanderer: he is rich enough for it. Now he dares, becomes an adventurer, becomes an ass in magnanimity and innocence ... this happy idiot grows wings and new capabilities".18

As we shall see in part II.ii., Mellors - the lover - provides a perfect illustration of this; via tenderness making the leap into the Fourth Dimension of bliss and the 'peace that comes of fucking', as well as back into the social world of existence. And we shall see also how he becomes, as a lover, a world-creator, as opposed to those who cannot love, merely bully with their will-worked benevolence, who become at last world-destroyers and life-haters. Today, to paraphrase Marcuse, the political fight is a fight waged by lovers for life itself - and this is a politics of desire.

I.iii. Towards a Politics of Desire.

We ask the wrong question if we ask the metaphysical question what is desire? For this demands a metaphysical response which cannot legitimately be supplied, as desire has no fixed essence to be identified as such. Better, then, to ask how
does desire work (i.e., what effects does it have)? Here we can answer by saying that desire brings into touch "things which are otherwise incommensurable" and functions primarily as a "strange current of interchange that flows between men and men, and men and women, and men and things." Crucially, this constant current of interflow is beyond the control of the ego; or, at least, it should be, even though decadents such as Clifford Chatterley invariably attempt to force the flow of desire via the ego, frightened as they are of all that isn't fixed and so cannot be known; of all that flows external to themselves. This fear convinces them to deny the evidence of their own senses and to believe that because they can build bridges across the greatest of rivers everything can thus be held in place and stabilized: "When water is planked over so that it can be walked upon ... truly, he is not believed who says 'Everything is in flux'." Only now, in this time of modern European nihilism, our bridges are falling down and our 'eternal values' have likewise collapsed. Like it or not, we are obliged to once more sink or swim within those rivers of desire which we thought we had integrated so perfectly into our industrial sewerage systems: "solar rivers, pathological rivers, rivers of sex, madness, literature, and plague which refuse to slumber wretchedly in their banks."22

We wish, then, to think of desire in terms of all kinds of flows; but perhaps above all in terms of sexual and social flows and the intimate relation between them. The politics of desire, certainly as developed by Lawrence and later in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, stresses how "beneath the conscious investments of economic, political, religious etc. formations, there are unconscious sexual investments that attest to the way in which desire is present in the social field".23

But we need to be careful here. For whilst the question of sexuality is central to Lady Chatterley's Lover as to Lawrence's work in general, he does not posit, unlike Wilhelm Reich, for example, sexuality at the core of his cultural and
political thinking. For unlike Freud and his followers, Lawrence does not argue that all is sex. In fact, Lawrence is at pains to point out in Fantasia and other works, that whilst an element of sex can be said to enter all human activity, this does not mean everything can or should be reduced to sex: "And a sexual motive is not to be attributed to all human activities." The politics of desire is not, therefore, simply another form of sex radicalism. It is far more subtle and much further reaching than this; just as desire is more than just the flow of sex alone, incorporating as it does a creative (or what Lawrence terms 'religious') impulse that is distinct from the sexual urge though related to it.

It is this creative impulse, which, Lawrence argues, is the world-forming drive, which not only does psychoanalysis deny, or obscure by its reducing all to sex, but which the reactive forces of corporate-media capitalism also seek to suppress. For whilst capitalism is perfectly content to eroticize society and oblige us to accept and believe in sex as the great truth of ourselves (as Foucault has demonstrated), it is not comfortable with the unregulated expression of the creative impulse; i.e., that drive which is übersexual and an urge towards "the great unison of manhood in some passionate purpose."  

What Lawrence argues is that after the act of coition, the blood of both parties is made new and there arises a subsequent desire to make the whole world anew. Thus, as we shall see, no sooner has Mellors fucked Connie Chatterley than his desire switches from a sexual desire for the woman, to a social desire to find male comrades with whom to fight the forces of industrial-capital and with whom he can found a new, non-slavish, community. Lawrence asks: "Is this new craving for polarized communion with others, this craving for a new vision, is it sexual, like the original craving for the woman?" and answers in the negative, insisting that the "meeting of many in one great passionate purpose is not sex, and should never be confused with sex. It is a great motion in the opposite direction."
Thus for Lawrence, and again contra the sex radicals, just as sex is not the great be-all and end-all of human existence, nor is 'sexual liberation' the great solution to our social, political, and cultural crisis of values. So keen is Lawrence to emphasize his difference from those who would argue otherwise, that he says if sex were ever accepted as the prime or exclusive motive in life, then the world would drift "into despair and anarchy". If we are to avoid this, then the sexual motive has to be subordinated to the greater creative purpose. This does not mean denial, however, and the politics of desire emphasizes that we cannot afford to ignore sex as a vital concern. It is crucial that we get our sexual life established on a new basis; a non-oedipalized basis. If we do not accomplish this then any attempt to create a new social order via a politics of desire is doomed to fail: "no great purposive passion can endure long unless it is established upon the fulfilment in the vast majority of individuals of the sexual passion." For sex, as Lawrence argues, is our deepest consciousness and a 'democracy of touch' - our main concern in this chapter - will only be initiated by those phallically conscious men and cunt-aware women who have risen out of the blood and into the new flesh as sexually transformed and fulfilled beings. In other words, the democracy of touch will be fucked into existence between man and woman both; a libidinal culture of desire (or, as Nietzsche would say, culture as physis). If sex as an end in itself leads to disaster, it remains the case on the other hand that: "ideal purpose which has no roots in the deep sea of passional sex is a greater disaster still", leading to the barren sterility of modern business and political life.

If the reactive distortion and commercial manipulation of our sex is an issue, perhaps the greater problem is the frustration of man's creative and social instinct. For when man experiences the denial of this latter drive, then "he feels lost, and is lost." And what is nihilism at last other than man losing his way from and to himself?
But if man is lost and 'alienated' from himself, still more is he cut off from others as our civilization perfects itself ideally via its technology and vibrates with a kind of 'anti-desire' that results in "physical recoil from every other living thing and every form of physical existence." Man makes a mistaken retreat into the isolation of his own ego, falling further and further out of touch and into the world of representation and the simulacrum. Deleuze and Guattari know that the first and most important task of schizoanalysis is that of: "tirelessly taking apart egos and their presuppositions; liberating the pre-personal singularities they enclose and repress". But, importantly, this can only be done on a collective level, as Lawrence also recognized:

"for it is only when we can get a man to fall back into his own true relation to other men, and to women, that we can give him an opportunity to be himself. So long as men are inwardly dominated by their isolation, their own absoluteness, which is after all but a picture or an idea, nothing is possible but insanity more or less pronounced. Men must get back into touch. And to do so they must forfeit their vanity and the noli me tangere of their own absoluteness: also they must utterly break the present great picture of a normal humanity: shatter that mirror in which we all live grimacing: and fall again into true relatedness."  

Essentially, the above sets the agenda for schizoanalysis and the politics of desire. In *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, Lawrence shows how Clifford Chatterley fails to do any of the above and thus ends in a state of degraded and infantile lunacy. Although his failure is instructive, we are not here concerned with Clifford's case. Rather, it is the positive-becomings of the lovers, Connie and Mellors, which we wish to examine in Part II; to see how they do manage to fall into 'true relatedness'. Following, in Part III, we shall go on to see how the lovers are carried by desire towards a new tomorrow and an ever-greater network of relations; how their tale hints at a 'revolution of desire' which promises a new
social body (without organs) which Lawrence terms, as we have seen, a
democracy of touch: "neither an ideal society, nor the result of an anticipated
historical development. Instead, it is immanent 'here and now', present in the
bonds that exist between people ... the aim of the politics of desire is to intensify
these bonds".35

I.iv. The Body.

All of philosophy to date has been, says Nietzsche, a misunderstanding of the
body. This would be regrettable enough if the above misunderstanding had
resulted merely in a stupid and unnecessary amount of suffering imposed on the
body (most obviously but not exclusively in its sexual aspect), but it has also had
a far wider significance and effect. Precisely because contempt has been taught for
the body and for the earth: "All questions of politics, the ordering of society,
education, have been falsified down to their foundations".36

The body, then, is never exclusively a question of biology. Not only does the
body not exist outside of history, but, perhaps more importantly, history does
not exist outside of bodies. Thus a concern with how the active forces of the
body have been 'tamed', 'silenced', and 'exploited' via a great many distinct
régimes (and how the body constructs resistances) obliges us to simultaneously
produce a political analysis. Radical political theorists are today not those who
instruct on seizing the power of the state, but on how to regenerate the body and
revive the passionate instincts, proliferating the number of resistances. If, as
argued in chapter one, nihilism is the logical outcome of what Nietzsche identifies
as a 'pathological condition', and sexual decadence is related to this, then perhaps
sexual regeneration may prove vital to the eventual overcoming of nihilism. Thus
to rethink the question of the body is imperative and is precisely what many
post-Nietzschean writers (including Lawrence) have attempted to do,
transforming philosophy in the process.

In *Lady Chatterley's Lover* the suggestion is given that we must return to the body and seek there other (active) forces and a different form of consciousness. If we are to establish a democracy of touch, then we will need to change the way we think, speak, and understand the world; including ourselves as part of - and not apart from - the world: "There are many ways of knowing, there are many sorts of knowledge", writes Lawrence. "But the two ways of knowing, for man, are knowing in terms of apartness, which is mental, rational, scientific, and knowing in terms of togetherness, which is religious and poetic." He continues: "When the great crusade against sex and the body started in full blast with Plato, it was a crusade for 'ideals' and for the 'spiritual' knowledge in apartness."

What Connie and Mellors attempt is to know in togetherness; accepting that the most vital knowledge comes, as Tommy Dukes (a minor but important character in the novel) puts it: "'out of the whole corpus of the consciousness, out of your belly and penis [or vagina] as much as out of your brain or mind'" (*LCL*, p.37). This, of course, is what Nietzsche refers to in *Zarathustra* as the 'greater intelligence' of the body. When man 'falls' he does so not into 'sin', but into abstraction and apartness; i.e., he falls out of touch and into the isolation of his own ego à la Clifford Chatterley. Lawrence, following Nietzsche, puts the blame for this on Socrates, Plato, and Christ, and he continually rages against a life lived outside of the flow of desire and which denies the body and the body's instincts; because such a life invariably becomes hateful and destructive of the physical world. It is this anti-physical will to negation which so shocks and depresses Connie as she drives through the mining districts of industrial England; "it was as if dismalness had soaked through and through everything, the utter negation of natural beauty, the utter negation of the gladness of life ... the utter death of the human intuitive faculty was appalling" (*LCL*, p.152).
It is such despair that forces Connie to do two things: firstly, seek out refuge in the arms of her lover, Mellors, a man in whom the 'intuitive faculty' was relatively unmaimed (certainly in comparison to her husband); and, secondly, set out on a quest to 'get back' her own body, hope residing in the mystery and complexity of the resurrected flesh. In fact, so convinced is Connie of this latter point that she imagines a whole future not just for herself, but for all men and women, based upon the body; a future contra Clifford's 'spiritual' life hereafter and a time of: "amazing physical awarenesses! and marvellous delicate contacts, touches, between men and women ... with quite different sorts of consciousness from ours: silent, and intuitive, and physical like perfume" (JTLJ, p.244).

Of course, such men and women of the future will be transformed beings; over and beyond their old humanity as defined and characterized by moral-rationalism. And perhaps equally obvious is that the first such 'over-human' men and women (as well as those higher human types who hint towards them) will be feared and hunted down by civilized modern man. Thus it is that we see Mellors, for example, forced out of his job, his home, and his community; regarded by the local people as "more monstrous and shocking than a murderer like Crippen" (LCL, p.267).40 This is not due to his sexual relationship with Connie per se, but more because of the fact that neither he nor Connie show any signs of guilt or shame even when the affair has become public; on the contrary, they find a source of pride and strength in their illicit lovemaking. It is the forming of a new sensibility (a new innocence) being beyond good and evil which is so intolerable; for it threatens to overturn 2,500 years of Christian morality, which, as Nietzsche says, has "taught deprecation, neglect, or tormenting of the body and men to torment and deprecate themselves on account of the drives that fill them".41 It is because of this that, even today, we still do not know what a body can do or is capable of; still cannot accept that the organism with which we have overcoded the body's forces is simply an invention and imposition of reactive consciousness.
Constructing a new form of consciousness and a 'body without organs' is one of the central concerns of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and this chapter. We shall illustrate how Connie attempts to achieve this in Part II.i., but let us offer a few brief theoretical remarks here first on this operation.

The organism, as indicated above, is an ideal imposition of the mind itself; an ideally organ-ized body that Lawrence refers to in his writing as the 'corpse-body'. The task that schizoanalysis sets itself is to dis-organ-ize the organism and to build a body without organs; delivering man from all his automatic reactions. Such a breakthrough can only be reached via a breaking down and a breaking open. But this is not accomplished with tricks and nor does it have anything to do with the modern pornographic desire to expose the body, which is a self-conscious "flaunting of the body in its non-physical, merely optical aspect" and which indicates simply how undesirable we have become to one another. The less individuals receive and transmit the flow of desire, the more desperately, according to Lawrence, do they expose their corpse-bodies, but without ever reaching their true nakedness (for they have none); in or out of her knickers makes very little difference to the desirability of the modern woman: "She's a finished off ego, an assertive conscious entity, cut off like a doll from any mystery. And her nudity is about as interesting as a doll's". Connie's greatest achievement is reaching her nakedness and reclaiming her mystery. And she does this by opening herself up to the flows of desire and allowing these to dissolve the organism and ideal self she was.

But it is important not be misunderstood here: the body without organs does not exist prior to the organism and so cannot simply be returned to; nor is it something we can own. Further, as Deleuze and Guattari say: "It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice: a set of practices." In other words, the body without organs is a work in progress; something one must create. All three major
characters in *Lady Chatterley's Lover* understand this and all three attempt to construct for themselves bodies without organs. But whereas Connie successfully achieves a body without organs full of gaiety and dance, Clifford manages only to build a body without organs that belongs to that "dreary parade of sucked dry, catatonicized, vitrified, sewn up bodies" that Deleuze and Guattari describe. And the reason that Clifford botches the job is because he refuses to surrender his ego. Ultimately, Clifford's real concern is to experiment with the disintegration of his physical self and increase his knowledge of sensation. Unlike his wife, Clifford closes himself off from the flow of desire that would put him physically into touch with others and the world and plugs himself instead as business-machine into the flow of capital. His is not a self-overcoming, so much as a willed self-destruction, and he constructs a body without organs over which only radio waves and the ecstasy of disintegration can pass: he becomes an untouchable with a heart as "'numb as a potato'" and a penis that "'never lifts his head up'" (*LCL*, p.39), as he recoils from the physical further and further into abstraction and towards death. This is why Clifford's story has no positive interest to us; for, as Deleuze and Guattari stress: "Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself; but rather opening the body to connections" and the nourishing creative flow of desire.

Thus when building a body without organs one must be sensitive, intelligent, and, above all, cautious. In an important passage Deleuze and Guattari write: "You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn ... and you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond to the dominant reality. - You don't reach the body without organs, and its plane of consistency, by wildly destratifying." Nor indeed by disintegrating into a squalid mess of obscenity à la Clifford Chatterley. Breakdowns must always be transformed into breakthroughs, and if one is to fail in building a body without organs, better to fail due to being overly cautious than reckless, for:
"Staying stratified - organized, signified, subjected - is not the worst that can happen; the worst that can happen is if you throw the strata into demented or suicidal collapse, which brings them back down on us heavier than ever." The worst that can happen, in other words, is that what begins as a line of flight turns back upon itself as something cancerous and oppressive and carries us still further into nihilism.

I.v. Towards a Philosophy of Becoming.

As is perhaps clear, a politics of desire rests upon a philosophy of becoming; the latter understood not as an unfolding of any essence in a process that terminates in the formation of an ideal self, but rather as something which involves "the affirmation of the positivity of difference, meant as a multiple and constant process of transformation." A genuine becoming is always, therefore, a becoming-other. And it is always an unwilled process; an opening up to the strange forces of desire, not a question of filtering these through the ego and attempting to know them as conscious sensation, or even of experiencing the process of becoming in one's imagination. Deleuze and Guattari emphasize that: "A becoming is not a correspondence between relations ... neither is it a resemblance, an imitation, or, at the limit, an identification. ... To become is not to progress or regress along a series. Above all, becoming does not occur in the imagination." It is important to realize therefore that becoming is a real process and that the very special becomings we shall examine here are real events at the molecular level.

Lawrence's fiction is particularly amenable to a reading in terms of a philosophy of becoming as Deleuze and Guattari recognize, declaring Lawrence to be "another of those writers who leave us troubled and filled with admiration, because they are able to tie their writings to real and unheard of becomings." But what
makes the philosophy of becoming quintessentially Nietzschean is that it is counter traditional ontology thought in terms of fixed 'being', and wholly anti-Christian; as Christian theology and morality is also founded upon a notion of an essential and eternal self (the 'immortal soul'). As Deleuze and Guattari write: "Theology is very strict on the following point: there are no werewolves, human beings cannot become animal. That is because there is no transformation of essential forms; they are inalienable and only entertain relations of analogy." 52

But Nietzschean philosophy does not worry about Christian law, happily concerning itself with the non-human and inhuman aspects of the human being, and whilst well aware that the latter cannot become animal at the molar level of reality, nevertheless insists that there is "a demonic reality of the becoming-animal of the human being." 53

Thus, suddenly, the supposedly 'occult' aspects of Nietzsche's and Lawrence's project of revaluation no longer seem quite so outlandish. Ultimately, becoming is as much a 'black art' as it is a gay science or radical ontology, and if it is designed to upset theologians, so too does it disconcert and irritate those secular priests the psychoanalysts. For, like Christianity, psychoanalysis understands very little of the nature of becomings; refusing to admit the fact that a man or woman can in a very real sense transmutate and wishing only to deal with the human, all too human. Schizoanalysis, on the other hand, fully recognizes that our 'thisness' at a sub-atomic level is not a question of the personal, but of "longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between unformed particles" 54, that men and women are no longer identifiable in human terms, but exist rather as a chaos of non-subjectified effects and what Lawrence calls 'vibrations'.

When thought in terms of will to power, being is always a process of becoming. Of course, the question that arises is: to what end do all these becomings move?
Deleuze and Guattari seem to be uncertain here; for, on the one hand, they insist that "a line of becoming has neither beginning or end, departure nor arrival, origin nor destination," whilst, on the other hand, they suggest that there is a becoming towards which all other becomings rush - what they term a 'becoming-imperceptible': "The imperceptible is the inherent of becoming, its cosmic formula." At this point the philosophy of becoming again resembles an 'occult' teaching of some kind, into which one can only be initiated via an experience in intensity. If it can be 'explained' or 'interpreted' at all, it can only be done so by relating it to Lawrence's thinking on the fourth dimension, which is itself far from clear and bordering on the mystical. The fourth dimension is the place wherein we arrive after travelling in intensity, according to Lawrence; "the realm of calm delight, it is the other kingdom of bliss" and here we "accomplish perfection" and have our greatest experience of being. Mellors and Connie reach this transcendent state via their relationship with one another and by surrendering to desire. But also, crucially, by affirming themselves as creatures of flesh and blood who belong to time and space. For, according to Lawrence, like a rose, man blossoms in the fourth dimension, but has to have his roots firmly planted and fed in the realm of existence. He writes:

"The clue to all existence is being. But you can't have being without existence ... Being is not ideal, as Plato would have it: nor spiritual. It is a transcendental form of existence, and is as much material as existence is. Only the matter suddenly enters the fourth dimension." - Or, as Deleuze and Guattari say, becomes-imperceptible. It is not a question of vanishing, but of establishing a new relationship with the cosmos, and can be accomplished by man, bird, beast, or flower: "It is into this perfected relation that every straightline curves" and towards which every becoming moves.

Part II: Schizoanalysis: Of Breakdowns, Breakthroughs, and Becomings.
II.i. The Case of Lady Chatterley: The Becoming of the New Eve.

Perhaps it is more accurate to say that Connie is not so much broken down, as stripped naked; stripped not only of her social status (for desire does not recognize her 'Ladyship') but also of her very humanity as defined in the rational–moral tradition. And thus she reaches what Lawrence terms her 'ultimate nakedness' and by which he means the state in which she is free of all shame and bad conscience concerning her body and all its secret openings, flows, forces and desires. Only when released from her white-faced personal self characterized by fear (her oedipalized subjectivity which some feminist commentators would mistakenly have her cling onto), does Connie become the New Eve and enter into the fourth dimensional realm of bliss, innocence and imperceptibility.

But this she achieves not by denying her womanhood and sexual difference from the man, but, rather, by affirming it and rejoicing in the fact that she is the: "'Best bit o' cunt left on earth'" (LCL, p.177). And, importantly, as we shall see, Connie learns also to submit before the knowledge of her absolute dependence upon the man; just as Mellors in turn is obliged to recognize that he needs her for his fulfilment and perfection. Individually the lovers may well exist as ready-made personalities, but only when united into what Lawrence calls the 'phallic body' do they become at last who they are in a greater (non-personal or egoic) sense. Thus sex does offer a vital clue to being within Lawrence's ontology; if Connie is transformed via the intrusion of the phallus into her body (via both vagina and anus), so too is Mellors transformed by his experience of 'cunt'.

Michael Squires says in his 1994 introduction to the novel, that Connie's cries at the point of orgasm "yield at last a 'life exclamation', an affirmation" and this is indeed so. But he is mistaken to suggest that these cries have 'human significance'
or some kind of anthropomorphic value; rather, they simply echo the ‘peep! peep!’ of the tiny chick that Connie balances in the palm of her hand (LCL, p.116) and demonstrate that she has learned how to make "weird, wordless cries, like the animals" (K, p.333).

Squires is wrong also to suggest that Connie achieves this becoming-animal simply by opening herself up to the "unknown, unexpected, unleashed forces that roil unconquerable in the self." On the contrary, it is by opening herself up to the forces that belong to that which is external and other to the self (forces partly destructive, partly regenerative) that Connie is transfigured. And central to this is, for Lawrence, the heterosexual coition and a genuine letting go of self within the flood of non-self induced orgasm.

This is why Squires is mistaken too when he informs us that throughout the process of physical awakening and sexual becoming, Connie retains her 'personal integrity'. For whilst, as we argued in Part I.v., it is vital to retain small amounts of subjectivity, the essential point is surely that in a very real sense the above is precisely what to a fateful (though not fatal) degree Connie surrenders and overcomes. In becoming-animal, becoming-elemental, becoming-woman (i.e., sexed and embodied), she becomes so much more than merely human in the sexless and abstract-ideal. And as for the nature of her 'integrity', it is anything but 'personal' (a word which Lawrence himself frequently uses in his texts, but always pejoratively); rather, it is a 'fertile integrity' (cf. Mellors's 'virile integrity'), i.e., a (pro-)creative sexual integrity founded upon difference and becoming, not unity of self and identity. Ultimately, 'personal integrity' can be nothing other than the sterile "integrity of the mind" (LCL, p.31) which Clifford and his intellectual Cambridge friends believe in defending.

Let us step back for a moment at this point: for it is important to avoid
confusion here. When we say that the forces Squires identifies are entirely outside of Connie’s self, we mean only her known-conscious self (i.e., external to her ego). This is not to deny that they were undoubtedly present within Connie’s body and Lawrence makes clear that they are responsible for a growing restlessness that was "taking possession of her like a madness" (LCL, p.20). Naturally, Connie is at least semi-aware of her condition: "Vaguely, she knew that she was going to pieces in some way." (ibid.) But, if disturbing to Connie, Lawrence makes clear that this is not, in his view, necessarily a bad thing, nor a process to be halted or reversed. Echoing Scott Fitzgerald in The Crack Up, Lawrence affirms that life itself is a process of breaking down and it is only via such that one can achieve a breakthrough to a new life. Nietzsche also stresses that übergehen proceeds via untergehen; i.e., those who would overcome must first be prepared to undergo a trial of some kind in which they sacrifice from the old self. But, to reiterate our earlier conclusion, the crack up or breakdown is not an end in itself; deterritorialization is a process, not a goal. And reterritorializations are a vital part of that process; not as goals reached or ends in themselves, but as temporary – though vital – arrests and formations en route.

It is not just physically that Connie is aware of herself going to pieces, she also experiences nihilism as a breakdown of values and beliefs: "All the great words, it seemed to Connie, were cancelled for her generation" (LCL, p.62). As this process increases in velocity Connie feels her life become more and more dream-like, less and less real, with no substance "to her or anything – no touch, no contact" (LCL, p.18), just empty signs and hollow men and women. This simulacrum of reality is challenged, however, when Connie chances upon Mellors washing himself; this is a great moment of revelation for her, a "visionary experience" which makes itself felt "in the middle of her body" (LCL, p.66). It is not that Mellors is particularly well-built, or even young and good-looking, but he has a creature's pure singularity; "the warm, white flame of a single life
revealing itself in contours that one might touch: a body!" *(ibid.)* In fact, the nature of Connie's visionary experience is of the kind craved for by Lou in *St. Mawr* and which we discussed briefly last chapter; a glimpse of the physically present animal-man.

When, following this secret encounter, Connie stands naked before her full-length bedroom mirror to gaze upon her own body, she is horrified to see that, in contrast, her flesh lacks any beauty or mystery; that there is nothing to wonder at or yearn to touch. Her body: "was going meaningless, going dull and opaque, so much insignificant substance. It made her feel immensely depressed, and hopeless ... She was old, old at twenty-seven, with no gleam and sparkle in the flesh" *(LCL, p.70).* Instinctively, Connie realizes that it has been the life that she has been leading at Wragby which is in a large part to blame; the sexless life of 'personal integrity' that leaves the body wretched and frustrated in its desire to be in touch with other bodies and the physical world: "The mental life! Suddenly she hated it with a rushing fury, the swindle!" *(ibid., p.71).*

She is contemptuous of the ideas expressed by two of Clifford's 'feminist' friends (Lady Bennerton and Olive), who argue for the 'immunization' of women against the sickness that is pregnancy and the future breeding of babies in bottles, to ensure that they need no longer be 'dragged down' by their reproductive 'functions', and will thus be 'liberated': "'So long as you can forget your body, you are happy ... So if civilization is any good, it has to help us forget our bodies, and then time passes happily, without our knowing it'" *(LCL, pp.74–5).*

But what sort of sleep-walking 'happiness' is this? It is, of course, the happiness longed for by the last man (or, in this case, the last woman), living in his (or her) brave new world; a civilization that wants to deny the experiences of the body (for these may bring pain and inconvenience) and live as exclusively as it
can do at the level of the asexual 'spirit'. It is a form of civilization that Connie instinctively feels in active opposition to and she becomes one whom Freud would brand as a 'discontent'. At first, realizing the necessity of her opposition to the social order she is very much a part of (as her title indicates), frightens her: "She was ... afraid of the horrible power of society and its commandments which she had broken" (FLC, p.155) and yet she cannot help but feel herself "dynamically an enemy of society" (ibid.) and refuses to apologise for this, or surrender to any sense of guilt. Consciously, she knows that our civilized industrial order is 'insane' and instinctively she wishes to flee from "the insanity of the whole civilized species" (LCL, p.110).

Does Connie's discontent and her becoming a woman of desire make her into a 'revolutionary' however? Deleuze and Guattari would undoubtedly answer 'yes' to this question, and they would do so because, for them: "Desire does not want 'revolution' ... it is revolutionary in its own right." Thus, to very slightly paraphrase what they argue in order to relate it to our study here;

"desire does not threaten a society because it is a desire to sleep with the [gamekeeper], but because it is revolutionary. And that does not at all mean that desire is something other than sexuality, but that sexuality and love do not live in the bedroom[s] of [Wragby], they dream instead of wide-open spaces, and cause strange flows to circulate that do not let themselves be stocked within an established order."6

Connie decides she has to break out from her old life and cut herself loose from the reactive forces of civilization that hold her in place: "She had been fastened by a rope, and jagging and snarring like a boat at its moorings" (LCL, p.86). But once loose and adrift, Connie does not simply float through life without aim. Rather: "She seemed to get into the current of her proper destiny" (ibid.) via a
listening to her blood and the greater intelligence of the body. If sailing against the tide, she has no thoughts of scuppering the little boat of herself; rather, she wants to find new seas and new lands (not sink and drown). However, she cannot achieve this alone; desire is a collective and social affair which at the very least joins together two things, two people. If securing her own freedom and constructing her own body without organs is to be achieved she needs to come back into touch with others. And sex, says Lawrence is the deepest form of touch. Thus Connie seeks out and takes in Mellors a lover.

But at first things do not seem to go well between them. During their first two sexual encounters, Connie remains bound within her egoic isolation: "And she knew partly it was her own fault. She willed herself into this separateness. Now perhaps she was condemned to it" (LCL, p.126). However, during their third encounter there is a significant breakthrough. Now, for the first time, she experiences an orgasm which has not been worked from her own will; *une petite morte*, rather than merely *un petit mal*. And this 'little death' is the death of the old Connie and marks the beginning of her becoming-woman and the New Eve: "Connie went slowly home, realising the depth of the other thing in her. Another self was alive in her, burning molten and soft and sensitive in her womb and bowels" (ibid., p.135). In the earlier second version of the novel, Lawrence makes clear that this other self refers not to the embryo conceived, but to the woman Connie is to become, by adding: "Why had no one warned her of the possibility of metamorphoses, or metempsychoses, the strange terror and power and incalculability of it all?" (JTLJ, p.135).

This other self is new not so much in its passion, as in its willingness to abandon willing and submit before that which it is not and those powers external to and greater than itself. Lawrence tells us that Connie had always feared adoration: "For it left her helpless. She feared it still. For if she adored him too much, then
she would lose herself, become effaced. And she did not want to be effaced. A
slave, like a savage woman. She must not become a slave" (LCL, p.135).

So, even in the midst of her 'awakening', Connie allows a certain willed resistance
to remain in place. Ultimately, however, Connie does not want to see the triumph
of the will: "It was known and barren, birthless", and she accepts adoration as
her treasure, sinking into "the new bath of life" (ibid., p.136).

The ideas of submission and adoration, touched on in chapter two, will be
discussed in relation to the democracy of touch later. Here, let us examine how
they relate to a philosophy of becoming.

Connie does not want to be 'effaced' we are told. Yet in having to surrender the
personal self this is precisely what she must be, as, at times, she knows. There is
an interesting passage on 'faciality' and the question of losing one's face in The
First Lady Chatterley: Connie asks Clifford if he doesn't think that "'it is rather a
pity that we never see anything of people but their faces?'" (FLC, p.29). When
Clifford replies that it is the face alone which reveals the personality, Connie then
asks: "'Mayn't there be something else besides the personality''' - meaning of
course - "'Mightn't the body have a life of its own - perhaps truer than the
personality?'" (ibid.) Clifford is deeply irritated. For talk of the body is
'dangerous ground' for those such as Clifford who would live in triumph over and
denial of the physical reality of man. But Connie discovers "a new vague idea to
ponder: the body, living a pure, untouched life of its own, apart from the face
with all its complexities and frustrations and vulgarity!" (ibid.)

Deleuze and Guattari theorize the above in their work: "If the face is a politics,
dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire
becoming-clandestine."8 Thus we see the proto-Connie of The First Lady
Chatterley retire to her bedroom one evening and: "put a thick veil over her face, like a Mohammedan woman ... And thus she stood naked before her mirror and looked at her slow, golden-skinned, silent body" (FLC, p.30). This Connie becomes after all the 'savage woman' that the later Connie half-fears, half-wants to become; the non-western, non-Christian, alien woman (even her skin is golden coloured in this scene, non-white). Connie becomes-minoritarian and, for a moment, escapes the tyranny of the face. But does she also become a slave? Many feminist commentators fear so and see this taking up of the veil and self-effacement in entirely negative terms; concerned as they are primarily with 'personal' freedom and 'individual' rights; not with impersonal fulfilment via the surrendering of one's individuality. However, I would argue that Connie does not become a slave - in fact, just the reverse. For as Lawrence writes, the modern slave is not she who escapes the face (i.e., the self she has been given), rather:

"The modern slave is [she] who does not receive [her] powers from the unseen, and give reverence, but who thinks [she] is [her] own little boss. Only a slave would take the trouble to shout: I am free! That is to say, to shout in the face of the open heavens. In the face of men, and their institutions and prisons, yes - yes! But in the face of the open heavens I would be ashamed to talk about freedom. I have no life, no real power, unless it will come to me. And I accomplish nothing, not even my own fulfilled existence, unless I go forth, delicately, desirous, and find the mating of my desire". 

And this requires submission: not of the woman to the man (nor of the man to the woman); but of the personal to the impersonal; the egoic to the cosmic; the human to the daimonic. Before these forces men and women must learn submission and reverence; forces symbolized in Lady Chatterley's Lover by the phallus, as Connie comes to appreciate: "Vaguely, she realised for the first time in her life what the phallus meant, and her heart seemed to enter a new, wide
The slave revolt in morals begins, arguably, as a revolt against the phallus; the free man and woman (free of fear, free of shame, and free of self-contempt) is happy to submit before the phallus and accept it as a bridge to the future. When the 'phallic wonder' is dead in us, we become wretched, Lawrence argues; and he means that without such an experience of wonder we can have no understanding of the beauty in things as things. Only when the phallic wonder is healthy and strong can man come into living touch with the physical world and transcend the subject/object divide which usually serves to sever us from the latter and frustrate our desire to actively participate in the mystery of life. By daring to acknowledge the phallus as she does, Connie slowly learns how to respond to and come into touch with not only the body of her lover, but with animals, trees, rain, moonlight and even the most seemingly mundane of everyday objects (such as the kettle in Mellors's cottage), all of which sparkle with a fresh glamour and delight.

Connie is thus obliged to accept that which Kate had also to accept in *The Plumed Serpent* (as we saw last chapter); the need to surrender any abstract notion of an independent and autonomous self and concede that an achieved wholeness is perfected between the two (and the two in relation to the many); i.e., is a sexual and social accomplishment. Desire is never about the one or that lonely grammatical fiction of the 'I', and a politics of desire is always in opposition to liberalism and capitalism in as much as the latter are based on the politics of the ideal individual and the economics of the self (isolation, egoism, and greed mistaken for freedom and happiness).

Becoming is never straightforward however, and thus it is that even after her experience with Mellors in the woods, Connie slips back into her wilful personal mode, so that when she and he next fuck she is struck by the absurdity of the
sex act: "Cold and derisive her queer female mind stood apart" (*LCL*, p. 172); i.e., Connie makes the error of surrendering a moment of sheer intensity and of translating experience into mere representation. As Lawrence would say, she gets her sex into her head (see chapter one). Not until she is fucked once more by the seemingly ever-virile Mellors, does she dare to again let go of herself within the flood of desire. Finally, when fucked for a third time in succession: "Her whole self quivered unconscious and alive, like plasm" (*ibid.*, p. 173) and she rises full now of scorn and contempt not for the body of her lover, but for the ideas of her husband. Thus when Clifford quotes to her from one of "the latest scientific-religious books" (*ibid.*, p. 233) that he is reading, that the universe is physically contracting on the one hand and spiritually ascending on the other, Connie is startlingly Nietzschean in response, saying of the author: "'It only means he's a physical failure on the earth, so he wants to make the whole universe a physical failure'", adding; "'the life of the body is a greater reality than the life of the mind: when the body is really wakened to life" (*ibid.*, p. 234). Clifford looks at her, once more, with astonishment and disgust: "'The life of the body'", he says, "'is just the life of the animals.'" Connie replies: "'that's better than the life of professorial corpses'" (*ibid.*), as she thinks of her own body and how she has danced naked in the rain with it, rejoicing with the "sound healthy selfishness that issues from a mighty soul" and a "beautiful, victorious, refreshing body".11

The above narcissistic joy - beyond all immature autoeroticism and which may "contain the germ of a different reality principle"12 - is made complete once Connie passes through the final stage of her 'initiation' into phallic wonder; the 'night of sensual passion', as Lawence calls it. Not surprisingly to readers of the earlier novels, this involves an act of anal sex as a transgressive and transforming means of consummation and becoming: "the reckless, shameless sensuality shook her to her foundations, stripped her to the very last, and made a different woman of her. ... She felt, now, she had come to the real bed-rock of her nature, and
was essentially shameless. She was her sensual self, naked and unashamed" (*LCL*, pp. 246–7).

As we have seen in chapters one and three, the overcoming of shame and bad conscience regarding one's physical self is crucial to the project of revaluation; above all men and women must liberate the mind from its "old grovelling fear of the body and the body's potencies."¹³ Connie accepts and affirms herself in full and, like her Lawrencean sister Kate, in *The Plumed Serpent*, allows the snake to coil in peace about her ankle as she rises as the New Eve: naked, innocent, joyful, and defiant.

II.ii. The Case of Lady Chatterley's Lover: The Becoming of the Old Adam.

In terms of becoming, Mellors is perhaps the least interesting of the central characters in *Lady Chatterley's Lover*. For although he too is 'broken open', his most profound transformation occurs *between* the three versions of the novel: Mellors is in effect the becoming of Oliver Parkin, which, as we shall see, is a becoming-woman and a becoming- *hors classe* (as well as a becoming apolitical at a molar, party-belonging level). Mellors is also the *overcoming* of Parkin, as the latter proves too limited for the role of advocate which Lawrence demands of him, as Nietzsche of Zarathustra.

Mellors makes a dramatic first entrance in chapter five of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* and somewhat frightens Connie as he emerges from the woods. His red-face and red-hair indicate he is very much a son of the Old Adam (the man of red earth). A man very different to her husband Clifford – but also very different from the man that he had once been; i.e., Oliver Parkin, as conceived by Lawrence in the earlier two versions of the novel. Even between the Parkin of *The First Lady Chatterley* (henceforth P1) and the Parkin of *John Thomas and Lady Jane*
(henceforth P2), there are crucial differences. Here we shall indicate some of these as we trace the becoming-Mellors of Oliver Parkin. It is a process which tells us something of import about Lawrence's changing thinking to do with politics, revolution, class, and the best strategies for engaging with and surviving in the modern world.

Towards the end of *John Thomas and Lady Jane*, Connie writes in a letter to P2: "I was afraid you were just going to deteriorate into a socialist or a fascist, or something dreary and political" (*JTLJ*, p.369). It is as if she were remembering what had happened to her lover in *The First Lady Chatterley*: for this is precisely what happens to P1, who ends by becoming a worker in a steel plant and secretary of the local communist league. P1 disappoints Connie by revealing himself to be as firmly class-conscious and class-entrenched as her husband Clifford is self-conscious and ego-bound. Fortunately for Connie, P2 does not fall back into political asceticism and sentimental militancy; on the contrary, he transmutates into the superior figure of Mellors.

There were two major problems presented by the semi-literate figure of P1: Firstly, he does not and cannot form a fully satisfactory lover for Connie; and, secondly, he does not and cannot form a fully satisfactory advocate for Lawrence. At times Lawrence does make a rather half-hearted and unconvincing attempt to suggest that P1 is a 'natural aristocrat', and yet clearly he is no Birkin or Aaron, Somers or Ramón. Connie sadly resigns herself to the fact that "culturally, he was of another race" (*FLC*, p.82) from herself; even she fears him and his class, for "perhaps they were the destroyers of her class?" (*ibid.*, p.93). And, indeed, as would-be communist revolutionary P1 is the destroyer of Connie's class and he admits that his intention is to make the upper-classes "'climb down an' be like other folks'" - even if he sees no need to kill them; "'except maybe a few'" (*ibid.*, p.237).
In some ways, PI doesn't interest us at all with his dreary political ambitions and posturings. And yet, in other ways, he is more interesting as a character than either P2 or Mellors, precisely because he seems believable as an uneducated working-class man during the mid-1920's; as readers we respect his refusal to become simply her Ladyship's lover, or Lawrence's mouthpiece. PI is undoubtedly a bore; but he is no fool and neither has he allowed the 'false consciousness' so often subscribed to by his class to blind him to the reality of work: "'Do you think a man loves draggin' his guts out all day long ..?'" (ibid., p.223) he asks Connie, naively unaware that some men (many men) do. His desire, then, has not been perverted into a desire for his own oppression within an industrial wage-system: "'But I'm a slave, doomed an' damned an' I know it!'" (FLC, p.224) he confesses with bitterness, his only hope residing in the collapse or destruction of capitalism: "'appen the bloody show'll smash up. It would if I could make it!'" (ibid.)

Of course, PI's anger and resentment is an understandable by-product of placing him within an economic system based upon profit via exploitation of labour (something we have seen Nietzsche fail to address in his thinking). When tied to a politics of revenge, such anger and resentment is undoubtedly a dangerous revolutionary force. However, rессeｍеntiment is something that is best overcome - not politicized. It is hopeless and mistaken holding out for socialist 'smash up', for either they don't come, or, worse, they do happen, but result in more slavery, more stupidity, and a huge increase in the bullying power of the modern state machine. Those men who genuinely wish to extricate themselves from the present system need to stand aside from it and come away from the herd; not get involved in mass movements and seek party-political solutions. Certainly this has been our conclusion so far in this study.

However, if PI is politically naive and personally stubborn, he is to be admired
for showing an awareness that any solution will have to be at some level a collective and not simply individual one. P1 is not wrong to express sympathy for his fellow men; merely mistaken in thinking that his sympathy should take the political form that he seeks to give it.

Essentially, this is where P2 is an overcoming of P1: for he is far less prone to allow his sympathy get the better of him and is not prepared to sacrifice his own integrity in the name of 'class solidarity'. There are, he knows, other ways, better ways, of showing sympathy with his fellows than becoming secretary of the communist league and calling for bloody revolution. If P1 cannot let go of the molar political struggle - and he admits: "'It's something as I've hold of, an' I can't let go'" (FLC, pp.239-40) - P2 decides instead to keep his hands placed firmly round the body of the woman and go with the flow of transformative desire.

P2 is much closer to the man Mellors he will become, than to P1. Much more aware of his own uniqueness and difference from other men, whilst not denying the vital need to remain in touch with others. This awareness relates very much to the fact that P2 overcomes P1 and moves towards becoming-Mellors via a becoming-woman. Throughout John Thomas and Lady Jane, P2 is described as and admits to being like a woman in his sensitivity, his consciousness, and his movements. And the production of a molecular woman within the molar male subject is something that Connie encourages in her lover. For Connie can see that it means a greater awareness of his own singularity and will thus assist in liberating him from his restricted and restrictive class-consciousness. Further, becoming-woman leads to the forming of a more intuitive intelligence; a greater appreciation of the near-at-hand, for his own body, for a tactile understanding of the world and the beauty of the world. Thus it is that the development of what Lawrence calls 'phallic consciousness' is closely related to the becoming-woman of
the molar male subject.

However, although P2 concedes that he needs to abide by the molecular woman within himself, the idea is not one he is happy or comfortable with. In fact, he speaks of his becoming-woman with "intense bitterness" and the notion is "terribly humiliating to him" (JTLJ, pp.332-33). But this is because P2 does not have a very good understanding of the process; he confuses becoming-woman at the molecular level with a loss of manliness at the molar level. Connie is rightly angry with his stupidity regarding himself and regarding the process of becoming-woman, or minoritarian. She knows that the process does not in the least involve a loss of manliness; merely a loss of the stupidity and unimaginative insentience that is all too often mistaken for and confused with being a man. As Lawrence writes: a man can become woman and still retain "the finest maleness, once it is put to the test."14

P2's becoming-woman, encouraged by Connie, obliges him to become more of an outsider; for woman is the gateway to otherness within phallogocentric culture. Specifically, P2 makes the move outside of social class, effecting a becoming-hors-classe. Michael Squires says in his introduction to Lady Chatterley's Lover that "class differences wither in the fires of physical attraction"15 and partly this is so. But in a very real sense by the time of writing the third and final version of his novel, Lawrence has already decided that such differences no longer exist within modernity.

Keith Sagar writes; "the class problems which had been so inescapable between Connie and Parkin disappear because Mellors is given all the credentials of a 'gentleman', including an education and culture which ... enables him to move freely through all classes."16 And certainly it is the case that Connie finds Mellors unlike a working man (whilst retaining something in common with the local
people). But Sagar is wrong to suggest Mellors represents a bourgeoisification of Parkin; the former is not a 'gentleman' and in fact we are told that he explicitly rejects an opportunity to move into the ranks of the middle class. Further, he does not move freely through all classes (in as much as they remain), but outside of them altogether.

"The lower classes of unlearned men are now our only hope. The learned and cultivated classes must be abandoned"\(^{17}\) says Nietzsche, and initially Connie acts in the spirit of this, turning instinctively away from the men of her own class and towards the working man Oliver Parkin. But it does not take her very long to discover that this doesn't form a viable option; that if Nietzsche is right in the second proposition, he is wrong nevertheless in the first. Hope, if it lies anywhere, as Connie discovers, lies only with the few individual men and women who can manage to move outside of social class. For if persons of Clifford's class are passionless and out of touch, then the working class are limited in another manner: "narrow in outlook, in prejudice, and narrow in intelligence."\(^{18}\) This again makes a prison, says Lawrence, who thereby arrives at the conclusion that one can ultimately belong to no class if one wishes to be free.

The bridging of the gulf between classes via tenderness was Lawrence's original goal when he began to write the story of Lady Chatterley and her lover. But quite simply, the first version of the novel fails to resolve the problem of how this can be achieved. The class gulf that is firmly established between Connie and PI remains unbridged. Thus Lawrence rewrites the novel and attempts to rethink the class issue. In John Thomas and Lady Jane we are suddenly informed:

"There was no longer any such thing as class. The world was one vast proletariat. Everything else had gone. The true working class was gone, as much as the honourable bourgeoisie, or the proud aristocracy. Bolshevist or fascist, the world
was proletariat, a vast homogeneous proletariat made up the whole of humanity" (*JTLJ*, p.293).

In other words, the whole of human society was – in a word used frequently by Lawrence at this time – 'robot'. If he was prepared to still acknowledge that "the homogeneity of the proletariat was divided between have-nots, owners and wage earners, capitalists and workers" (*JTLJ*, p.293), Lawrence now repeatedly argued that it was no longer helpful to think politically in terms of opposing classes. Such a view finds support in the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter ten of *Anti-Oedipus*, they write that there is only one class within the capitalist socius; though – *contra* Lawrence – they claim this should be thought of not as one huge proletariat, but rather as one vast bourgeoisie.

Whatever we decide to call this robot-mass, the key point is surely that it represents the negation of all genuine social order as exists in pre-capitalist and pre-modern society, and as Nietzsche wishes to see reinstated within a post-modern political culture. When all forms of status and caste have been decoded by the anarcho-nihilistic forces of capitalism, the end result is a non-society wherein the only distinction between people rests on how much money they own and/or earn. Slavery in the old, despotic sense, at least implies the existence of masters. But within capitalism there is instituted; "an unrivalled slavery, an unprecedented subjugation: there are no longer any masters, but only slaves commanding other slaves ... The bourgeoisie sets the example ... more utterly enslaved than the lowest of slaves, he is the first servant of the ravenous machine".19

Deleuze and Guattari continue (and again can be seen to offer support for Lawrence's analysis):

"It will be said that there is nonetheless a class that rules
and a class that is ruled ... the distinction between the flow of finance and the flow of income in wages. But this is only partially true, since capitalism is born of the conjunction of the two in the differential relations and integrates them both in the continually expanded reproduction of its limits."²⁰

Thus it is that Clifford, for example, doesn't really rule; he is no real master, merely another robot himself. Connie is right to say to him: "You don't rule, don't flatter yourself! You have only got more than your share of the money ... You only bully with your money" (LCL, pp.193–4). In fact, the whole of Clifford's class is now robot-degenerate and impotent (not just him personally) and so must be abandoned, as Nietzsche rightly says. But, unfortunately, so too is the whole of Parkin's class robot and rotten through with the money-disease: "Connie thought how extremely like all the rest of the classes the lower classes sounded. Just the same thing over again ... There was only one class nowadays ... the only difference was how much you'd got, and how much you wanted" (LCL, p.105). Realising this, i.e., that class is essentially a redundant notion to think in terms of, helps free Connie from her old fears and prejudices; she concludes that the only people who really matter for her are those "few individuals who have not been proletarianized" (JTLJ, p.294). As Deleuze and Guattari say: "the theoretical opposition is not between two classes ... [but] between the class and those outside the class. Between the servants of the régime, and those who sabotage it or its cogs and wheels."²¹

Thus a politics of desire is fought not by class warriors such as P1, but by those nomads such as P2 and Mellors, who do not belong or fit in - and who do not want to belong or fit in. These discontents and deviants are not so much déclassé as les hors-classe (the latter term having an affinity to both hors-caste (outcast) and hors-la-loi (outlaw)). It is with these men and women hope for the future lies; they, if anyone, will establish the democracy of touch. By daring to become-
woman and become-outsider, P2 avoids the fate of P1 and moves toward becoming the phallic man Mellors whom we can now return to and examine his attempt to form a politics of desire.

We know now that Mellors is a man in the process of becoming-woman and one who moves on the outside. As an outsider he is marked as if with the mark of Cain and feared as if truly a son of the Old Adam. But Cain - from the Greek kainos - means 'newness', and thus although Mellors is a transgressor of moral and social laws, so too is he a new man beyond good and evil; innocent in the radical Nietzschean sense. Thus Lawrence tells us that Mellors has: "No sense of wrong or sin: he was troubled by no conscience in that respect" (LCL, p.120).

Mellors - the shameless one - is broken open between his desire for Connie on the one hand and his dread of society on the other. He knows from experience that his affair with her ladyship will inevitably bring him back into contact and conflict with the latter; for just as a man alone can never finally withdraw into privacy, nor can lovers find sanctuary in a world of their own creation: "The world allows no hermits" (ibid., p.119) and couples do not fuck in isolation.

Sensing her lover's post-coital angst, Connie says cheerfully "'It's just love'" (ibid., p.118), but Mellors knows that love is never just something on its own; it means life and all the complications and entanglements of life, and, in a way, he regrets being thrown back into the struggle once more: "'I thought I'd done with it all. Now I've begun again'" (ibid.). Coming into touch means opening oneself up to suffering as well as pleasure and by taking Connie as his mate so too does Mellors consciously bring on himself a "new cycle of pain and doom" (ibid., p.119). But, crucially, Mellors also knows that it has to be thus - if he is to live and become a little human again then there can be no splendid isolation: "'There's no keeping clear. And if you do keep clear, you might as well die. So if I've got
to be broken open again, I have" (ibid., p.118).

In fact, as soon as Mellors emerges from an illicit piece of fucking with Connie, he begins to offer a critique of society; convinced that if he is to protect their love then he will have to engage with the world of the mechanical and greedy. Mellors wants to see a new order of tenderness and this is due, according to Lawrence, to the fact that a sexually fulfilling contact alters the very composition of the blood and gives rise to a new post-coital social urge: "Men, being themselves made new after the act of coition, wish to make the world anew"; i.e., the will to power in the lover craves a new affirmative and collective activity: "That is, for a new polarized connection with other beings, other men." This is why desire is of great social and political import; once he is broken open once more and alive within the flow of desire, Mellors longs for wider comradeship: "Oh, if only there were other men to be with, to fight that sparkling-electric Thing outside there, to preserve the tenderness of life ... and the natural riches of desire" (LCL, p.120), he thinks to himself. For alone he knows there is little or nothing he can do to defeat the 'vast evil thing' (Mammon); even he will not be able to protect himself and Connie for very long from the overwhelming forces of "the insentient iron world" (ibid, p.119).

But where can he find comrades? PI of course turned to members of what he identified as his own class and to the communist party, but Mellors doesn't have this option, existing outside of class and molar politics. He knows that the working people (even the communists) are as hopeless as the degenerate middle and upper classes, all glorying in the great social machine: "'All the lot. Their spunk's gone dead'" (ibid., p.217). During his bleakest moments he finds some solace in the fact that if modern man continues along his present path, he will end by killing himself in a grand suicidal auto da fe. But Mellors cannot help also having hopes for a (transhuman) mankind to come. For whilst he may at some
level be at war with society, he still wishes to retain his "deep peace with mankind ... preserving [his] peace of soul which is peace with the living, struggling real mankind"\textsuperscript{24}, i.e., the non-slavish mankind assembled upon active forces. This, ultimately, is all Mellors can do; keep his peace of soul and abide by the little forked flame fucked into being between himself and Connie. As much as he may like to personally "'wipe the machines off the face of the earth again, and end the industrial era absolutely, like a black mistake'", he realizes he can't "'an' nobody can'" (\textit{LCL}, p.220), so he had best hold his peace and try and live his own life as best he can, waiting, perhaps, like Lilly tells Aaron to wait, for another to come along with whom he, and he and Connie, can form a new society.

This society we are calling here, after Lawrence, a democracy of touch. And we are essentially in agreement with Mellors that such a society will grow out of a new economy of bodies and their pleasures and from a warmth of heart between men and women: "'I believe if men could fuck with warm hearts, and the women take it warm-heartedly, everything would come all right'" (\textit{LCL}, p.206). Admittedly, as a piece of 'political philosophy' – if it is this at all – this appears vacuous and banal. Can anyone seriously be expected to believe that it is possible not only to fuck one's way into bliss, but into new social and cultural arrangements as well? It is certainly the very last hope and one can detect a certain despair here. And yet, as Connie says, if there is to be a future at all for man there will have to be established a new touch between bodies and the development of a new sensibility which she calls 'tenderness'. Mellors picks up this term and employs it in his own thinking, agreeing with Connie that what is most needed is "'that natural physical tenderness, which is the best, even between men; in a proper manly way'" (\textit{ibid.}, p.277).

We should note, however, that this tenderness of touch is also a tenderness of strength: not weakness, and it bears little relation to the Christian ideal of love.
If Mellors is warm hearted in his fucking, so too is he passionate with anger against the Clifford Chatterleys of this world; not full of charity, forgiveness, or the rancid milk of human kindness.

Let us close this study as Lawrence closes the novel; i.e., with the letter from Mellors to Connie which sets out in further detail his vision of the world to come. In one of the most important passages, Mellors argues that the majority of people would be sound and healthy:

"If you could only tell them that living and spending aren't the same thing! ... If only they were educated to live instead of earn and spend ... if they could dance and hop and skip and swagger and be handsome, they could do with very little cash. ... They ought to be naked and handsome, all of them, and to move and be handsome, and to sing in a mass and dance the old group dances, and carve the stools they sit on, and embroider their own emblems. Then they wouldn't need money. And that's the way to solve the industrial problem: train the people to be able to live and live in handsomeness without needing to spend. ... They should be alive and frisky, and acknowledge the great god Pan. He's the only god for the masses, forever. The few can go in for higher cults if they like. But let the mass be forever pagan'" (LCL, pp.299-300).

The above is an extraordinary passage, incorporating at it does many of Lawrence's own concerns - cultural, political, and religious - and serves as a useful summary of his philosophy. It also, of course, returns us to many of the themes of this thesis; including, for example, the notion of a god who can save us (in this case Pan). As with the closing of The Rainbow, Lawrence offers us in the above passage a vision of "individual and communal regeneration in which the inhabitants of the contemporary industrial world are transformed into free, fulfilled and joyful beings". And, crucially, the vision in as much as it
anticipates a general transformation of society as a whole, can be said to be 'democratic'.

Of course, as we shall discuss shortly in III.i., Lawrence's understanding of democracy and his use of the term is particular. And, indeed, for many commentators there is nothing at all democratic about the above vision; on the contrary, they find it suggestive of something politically sinister, full as it is of the völkisch imagery that the Nazis were to employ and exploit so successfully. Admittedly, the communal singing and dancing, the handicrafts, the neo-paganism, and the obvious privileging of the physical over the intellectual, do make one think not only of Ramón's plumed serpent experiment, but of the 'strength through joy' programmes of the Third Reich.

Thomas Mann is said to have once described national socialism as: "an attempt to take over the world in the name of thatched roofs, folk dances, and solstice celebrations" and critics of Lawrence are quick to latch onto such (rather lazy if mildly amusing) characterizations and apply them to his political thought. But, just as when Heidegger, for example, refers to Black Forest farmhouses in his work he "in no way means that we should or could go back to building such houses", nor does Lawrence ever mean to suggest we could go back to a pre-industrial, pre-modern Volksgemeinschaft (any more than Nietzsche thought there could be a return made to ancient Greek culture). However, Lawrence, like Heidegger and Nietzsche, does hold out some hope for a future based upon another becoming for man (or, another revealing, a different will to power). Each dares to philosophically experiment and poetically explore; each dares to demand and advocate the impossible; each dares to dream, believing the answer to the question raised by André Breton in the first Surrealist manifesto - "Cannot the dream also be applied to the solution of the fundamental problems of life?" to be a profound Yes.
Of course, even dreams can, if we are not careful, dangerously mutate into nightmares and totalitarian utopias à la Fourier et al. But Lawrence and Nietzsche are saved from such fascist dreaming by their anti-idealism and by their thinking in terms of desire, difference, and becoming. Thus if Mellors wants people to sing, this is surely different and preferable to wanting them to *siege heil*; if he wants them to dance, this is because he dreads the thought of them marching in step; if he wants them to be naked and handsome, this is so they need never again be dressed in ugly uniforms. And by acknowledging Pan rather than the new idol of the state, people are saved from all manner of stupidity and able to affirm cultural and religious pluralism, as well as their own lives in the flesh as lived on the earth and within time. The vision, then, set out by Mellors in his letter to Connie, is of value; he gives us the first glimpse of a democracy of touch behind which lies not fascist idealism, but the "inexhaustible vitality of a common physical life." 29

**Part III: Postanalysis: Towards a Democracy of Touch.**

**III.i. Opening Remarks on the Mystery of Touch and Lawrence's Notion of Democracy.**

Mellors doesn't actually use the expression 'democracy of touch'; it is in fact a coinage belonging to Tommy Dukes, who is of the view that "our civilization is going to fall. It's going down the bottomless pit, down the chasm. And believe me, the only bridge across the chasm will be the phallus!" (*LCL*, p.75). This 'bridge' will lead us to a new social phase in which there will be 'genuine' men and women beyond the "'mechanical and intellectual experiments'" (*ibid.*) in decadence that modern men and women have become. This new social phase Dukes calls the 'democracy of touch', and he contrasts it with the liberal–capitalist 'democracy of pocket'. Connie is intrigued by Dukes and his talk of the 'resurrection of the
body' and the democracy of touch: "She didn't at all know what the latter meant, but it comforted her; as meaningless things may do" (ibid., pp.75-6). But is it simply a meaningless (if comforting) notion? And if not, what then does it mean and how can we use it theoretically in relation to other radical political notions? These are the questions I hope to address below.

Clearly, for Dukes himself the democracy of touch is just another piece of fanciful talk; this is his limitation as an impotent intellectual. But equally clear is the fact that Lawrence wants us to explore and develop the notion further as readers; to invest it with concrete meaning and put it to work as a productive idea. He himself also uses the phrase and expands upon it outside of *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, in both his poetry and essays and we shall shortly draw upon these in our attempt to substantiate the mystery of touch. Firstly, however, let us see what is said of the democracy of touch in the earlier versions of the novel.

In *The First Lady Chatterley*, it is not Tommy Dukes, but Duncan Forbes, who speaks of a democracy of touch; suggesting that what is needed in the future is not a soviet style communism (as Parkin wishes to see established), but: "'Contact! Some sort of passionate human contact ... a new relationship between men: *really* not caring about money, *really* caring for life, and the flow with one another'" (*FLC*, pp.242-3).

By *John Thomas and Lady Jane*, however, Dukes has taken upon himself the role of advocate for the mystery of touch. He says: '"We've never had proper human contact - we've never been civilized enough. We're not civilized enough even now, to be able to touch one another ... The next civilization will be based on the inspiration of touch'" (*JTLJ*, pp.64-5). And, according to Dukes, this will be the very antithesis of our modern knowledge-based scientific-industrial civilization; the democracy of touch will allow for the opening into existence of a whole new
field of consciousness and a new innocence, and present day man will either be swept away or "properly used in the next phase" (ibid., p.65) as material by a new breed of men born of active desire.

"I don't get your democracy of touch, you know,' said Olive in her casual, brutal way; 'touch what?'" (ibid., p.66). Of course, the answer is touch one another and all things as things; touch life and be touched by it. As Lawrence says, by touch he means: "The touch of the feet on the earth, the touch of the fingers on a tree, on a creature, the touch of hands and breasts, the touch of the whole body to body, and the interpenetration of passionate love: it is life itself, and in touch, we are all alive" (ibid., p.114): out of touch, we are merely walking corpses. To Olive and her kind, this is simply getting 'mystical', but as Dukes knows in attempting to substantiate and articulate the mystery of touch he is attempting to climb back down Pisgah; i.e., to come back down to earth, not lyrically ascend into the clouds, nor transcend into mysticism.

And just as this is not mysticism, nor is it an ideal materialism; but, rather, a genuine libidinal materialism of the kind that the ancient Greeks and Etruscans founded their cultures upon; the democracy of touch is an attempt to reactivate the idea of culture as physis (see chapter one). As to whether or not such cultures were 'democracies', that's another question.

In The First Lady Chatterley, Duncan Forbes stresses that coming into touch socially will have to be achieved via a democracy of some description: "I've hated democracy since the War. But now I see I'm wrong calling for an aristocracy. What we want is a flow of life from one to another - to release some natural flow in us that urges to be released" (FLC, p.243). It is difficult not to believe that this is Lawrence speaking directly here in his own text (as he was prone to do); Lawrence seemingly confessing his error in the power trilogy of insisting on the
need to smash democracy and establish a radical new order, based on broadly Nietzschean lines. But, as always, we need to be subtle in our reading and exercise caution before claiming that this late development in Lawrence's thinking marks a significant break with his earlier thought. In fact, I would argue that Lawrence's use of the term 'democracy' is as 'idiosyncratic' as Nietzsche's use of the term 'innocence' and needs to be carefully interrogated if one is to avoid confusion.

However, this is not to imply that Lawrence doesn't seek to clarify and reinterpret his earlier thinking on the question of what is the best social and political form, and in *John Thomas and Lady Jane* he goes still further than above in admitting past error on this question. Thus when Jack Strangeways – another of Clifford’s unattractive friends – is described as "a neo-conservative and a neo-aristocrat and everything that was anti-democratic" (*JTLJ*, p.61), just like many young intellectuals after the War including Lawrence himself, we are told that: "This bored Constance. Even in Clifford, when he kept saying democracy was a dead dog, most people should be put back into slavery, there should be a small and ruthless armed aristocracy, and so on, she felt it was mere stupidity, really ineffectuality" (*ibid.*, pp.61-2). Lawrence clearly wants us as readers to share Connie's 'boredom' with such impotent talk and ineffectual political posturing; wants us to question what type of will it is that motivates Clifford and company and, indeed, what type of will it is at work within his own (and by extension Nietzsche's) desire for a new political élite.

However, whilst Lawrence is daring in this manner to open up his previous political views to interrogation, he is most certainly not abandoning them entirely. Rather, he is seeking to make his position distinct from those who would vulgarize and brutalize his (and Nietzsche's) thinking with their own slavish reactivity and resentment (i.e., those who would 'fascisize' his thought). That
Lawrence still holds to an essentially non-democratic notion of democracy (i.e., illiberal and not founded upon the 'enlightened' ideals of the French Revolution), should not be doubted. As Frank Kermode rightly says: "Despite the change in tone, the basic diagram of Lawrence's beliefs is unaltered."²

Arguably, it is in his poetry where Lawrence makes his understanding of democracy clearest: in contrast to ideal or 'robot democracy' in which "nobody is willing to serve"³, Lawrence posits 'real democracy' based upon service and submission. For Lawrence maintains that there are those who have either "never fallen from life", or who have managed to resurrect back into life and that those who recognise the "clean flame of life" in these rare men and women should submit before them in "homage and pure passion of service"⁴, for only via service will this second class be restored into fulfilled being themselves and cease to be robot.

It becomes clear then, that when Lawrence says the world is moving towards a new democracy (of touch), he does not mean: "a democracy of idea or ideal, nor property, / nor even the emotion of brotherhood."⁵ Rather, he means a democracy with which we suggest below even Nietzsche would be comfortable. Firstly, however, let us explore the democracy of touch in relation to other writers and thinkers with whom Lawrence shares a certain affinity.


Whilst there are divisions between men within a democracy of touch, we should think of these primarily as based upon difference in 'soul'; not relating to cash distinctions as within a 'democracy of the pocket'. It is Lawrence's hope that within his democracy men will have pride in themselves and their strengths and
abilities and realise that if they have their bodies they lack nothing. In the democracy of touch, all men and woman learn how not only to be naked and handsome, but to walk naked and light. Lawrence writes: "If we are to keep our backs unbroken, we must deposit all property on the ground and learn to walk without it. We must stand aside. And when many men stand aside, they stand in a new world. ... This is the Democracy, the new order."6

And this is not only the democracy of touch, but also the democracy of the open road according to Lawrence's reading of Whitman, in which he examines the above vision of an open road in relation to his own thinking on the question of politics; subtly developing the former in line with the latter. For whilst Lawrence accepts Whitman's notion of the open road as "a great new doctrine" and perhaps even "the bravest doctrine man has ever proposed to himself"7, still he has problems with certain aspects of it. In order to indicate what these are, let us make clear first of all what the doctrine of the open road involves: Essentially, it involves a journey in intensity; a journey not dissimilar to the one undertaken by the Deleuzian schizo-nomad. A journey:

"Exposed to full contact. On two slow feet. Meeting whoever comes down the open road. In company with those that drift in the same measure along the same way. Towards no goal. Always the open road.

Having no direction even. Only the soul remaining true to herself in her going. Meeting all the other wayfarers along the road. And how? How meet them, and how pass? With sympathy says Whitman."8

It is here - at the point in which Whitman introduces a notion of 'sympathy' into his doctrine - that Lawrence balks; for he feels, not unreasonably, that Whitman thereby funks the radical nature of his idea by confusing it with Christian charity and the poisonous ideal of pity. Unable to move beyond good and evil, Whitman
confuses the open road with the highroad of love. But Lawrence insists: "The highroad of love is no open road. It is a narrow, tight way, where the soul walks hemmed in between compulsions." And ultimately, we know precisely where the highway of love is taking us: "The highway of love ends at the foot of the Cross"\(^9\), that is, in self-sacrifice, suffering, and death.

Lawrence is in little doubt that if Whitman’s ethic of sympathy and his vision of the open road is to be salvaged, it must be disengaged from Christian and socialist moralism and coupled instead to his own creed of phallic tenderness. When this is done, then sympathy, as a form of compassion, is understood correctly in terms of touch and a meeting within the flow of desire. It does not have anything to do with merging into oneness via an ideal identification with those who suffer, or self-sacrifice, as Whitman continued to mistakenly believe; and, indeed, as Parkin in *The First Lady Chatterley* believed.

Essentially, Lawrence’s post-moral sympathy is related to Nietzsche’s notion of ‘benevolence’ as developed in *Human, All Too Human* (see: vol. I., 2.49), and it involves ‘good naturedness’ and a ‘politeness of the heart’, but *not* pity; traits which Nietzsche argues are vital in the construction of a genuine (phallic-libidinous) culture (of touch). Once Lawrence has ‘demoralized’ the ethic of sympathy, he is happy to accept and affirm Whitman’s teaching of the open road as a vital contribution to the development of a democracy of touch and tenderness: "The true democracy, where soul meets soul ... and [is] passed by or greeted according to the soul’s dictate."\(^11\) And thus the democracy of touch becomes finally a glad recognition of souls; "and a gladder worship of great and greater souls, because they are the only riches."\(^12\)


If, as Blanchot says, courage consists in daring to flee along the open road
"rather than live tranquilly and hypocritically in false refuges"\textsuperscript{13}, so too does it involve sometimes straying off the above road and wandering instead along what Heidegger calls 'woodpaths' (\textit{Holzwege}). To be on a woodpath means in everyday German to be on the wrong track (to be confused and lost). Heidegger, however, does not quite mean this when he uses the term; and certainly he does not regard woodpaths negatively as dead-ends, or ways that lead nowhere. Rather: "woodpaths always lead somewhere - but where they lead cannot be predicted or controlled. They force us to plunge into unknown territory, and often to retrace our steps."\textsuperscript{14} So, at the risk of getting lost, let us briefly explore a woodpath and see where it takes us.

By retracing our steps somewhat, we return to the idea of a democracy of touch as one firmly rooted in the body and in the earth; it is an organic notion of culture as \textit{physis}. Rootedness and organicism may have very little to do with Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic and machinic thinking, but they are important notions in Lawrence's work and in Heidegger's philosophy. Ultimately, the democracy of touch cannot be fully understood without giving reference to these notions and without acknowledging that it has a closer relation at last to the nineteenth century \textit{Völkisch} German tradition than it does to the anarcho-surrealism of radical French thought in the twentieth century. Thus whilst the democracy of touch does involve fleeing and travelling along the open road, so too does it involve dwelling.

There seems to be a contradiction here: between fleeing and dwelling; nomadism and rootedness. But actually, when we start to think both notions carefully, we discover that there is no contradiction, or paradox. For the journey along the open road is in intensity, not space. The trip is real, but is one made within the fourth dimension, not necessarily in the realm of actual existence. Deleuze constantly attempts to stress this fact; "the nomad is not necessarily one who
moves: some voyages take place in situ 15; i.e., if nomads move in order to evade the codes and fixed ideals of settled peoples, this does not mean they are migrants forever wandering the face of the earth, nor that they do not, in their own way, dwell. For to dwell (Wohnen), in the philosophical sense developed by Heidegger, does not mean to be static and to stay put: "When we speak of dwelling we ... think of an activity that man performs alongside many other activities ... We do not merely dwell - that would be virtual inactivity - we practice a profession, we do business, we travel and find shelter on the way, now here, now there." 16

In other words - and to reiterate - we travel and we dwell in the fourth dimension, but we live all the while in this world too. To say that we dwell within the fourth dimension is perhaps still to leave the question of wherein this dimension we dwell. The answer is that man dwells within language and desire and thus the tremendous importance of developing a language of the feelings, as Lawrence attempts to develop in Lady Chatterley's Lover, so that we may thereby be able to touch one another with our words. Thus too the importance of responding to and moving within the flow of desire: "It is desire which keeps the whole world living to me, keeps me in the flow, connected", writes Lawrence, continuing: "It is my flow of desire that makes me move as the birds and animals move ... in a kind of accomplished innocence, not shut out of the natural paradise." 17

And so, as we suggested last chapter, it is possible for man to regain and dwell within paradise; even if the thought of paradise has become for most men today merely an 'inadequate fiction'. But this dwelling in paradise is not to reside in a state of lazy contentment, such as the last man longs for. Rather, it is to experience the peace that comes of fucking and which follows victory in war. This peace and fulfilment is the positive 'freedom' Heidegger refers to in his work and
which Nietzsche also promotes: "To free actually means to spare ... and takes place when we leave something in its essence, when we return it specifically to its essential being". This is illustrated in *Lady Chatterley's Lover* by Connie and Mellors, who 'free' one another in precisely this manner; the phallic body which they constitute between them does not compromise the integrity of either, nor does it bridge the pathos of distance between them as differently sexed creatures. Each finds peace and freedom within this sanctuary of tenderness and desire; peace as mortals who have intitiated their own being within the process of becoming and as those who preserve the fourfold under the sky, on the earth, and before the gods.


The question to be asked at last is to what extent Lawrence's democracy of touch is compatible with Nietzsche's own political philosophy and project of revaluation. It is, of course, easy to find in Nietzsche's writings statements which appear to support almost any perspective or argument; his aphorisms invite us as readers to occupy them and invest them with our own interpretations and forces. However, I do not feel that one has in some way to abuse the generosity of Nietzsche's texts, or bring shame upon him as a thinker, in claiming that Lawrence's notion of a democracy of touch is profoundly in keeping with the spirit of the above. It is not just that the democracy of touch is rooted in the body and nature, that it is based upon an aristocratic division of men into greater and lesser souls, or that it is vehemently opposed to the scientific-industrial modern age of liberalism and capitalism. It is also the fact that there are radical and positive aspects to the democracy of touch which resonate closely with the ideas Nietzsche puts forth in his mid-period work in particular. For example, in the poem *Future States* Lawrence claims that:
"Once men touch one another, then the modern industrial form of machine civilization will melt away and universalism and cosmopolitanism will cease ... and there will be a vivid recoil into separateness; many vivid small states, like a kaleidoscope ... and all the differences given expression." \(^{19}\)

Such pluralism is consistently supported in Nietzsche's writings; he would have been one of the first to attack the cant ideal of a 'global village' and seen that the 'new world order' (or California \(\text{\textit{über alles}}\)) threatens to become a monstrous super-state serving the interests of corporate-media capital and in which the great movement is towards a mass-standardized identity behind an illusion of 'multi-cultural' and 'individual' freedom.

When Lawrence in a related poem entitled \textit{Future War}, claims that the recoil into genuine multiplicity and difference will alone guarantee a meaningful peace, he can once again find support for such a view in Nietzsche. For Lawrence's desire for peace is not a 'rational' one based upon what Nietzsche calls the "liberal-optimistic world-view"\(^ {20}\), rather it is the desire for peace that comes from difference and from touch; a non-Christian longing for peace which Nietzsche - so often thought of simply as the advocate of war and struggle - himself speaks of with hope: the peace that is hard fought for and won by the brave and courageous; the peace that comes on that 'great day' when:

"a nation distinguished for wars and victories and for the highest development of military discipline and thinking ... will cry of its own free will 'we shall shatter the sword' ... and demolish its entire military machine down to its last foundations. \textit{To disarm while being the best armed}, out of an \textit{elevation} of sensibility - that is the way to \textit{real peace}." \(^ {21}\)
Later, in the same work, Nietzsche concedes that even democratic institutions as they are presently understood and operated, are valuable as "quarantine arrangements to combat that ancient pestilence, lust for tyranny: as such they are very useful and very boring." But ultimately, Nietzsche wants to see the overcoming of such a reactive and limited (and boring!) notion of democracy; i.e., to see a democracy of fear give way to one of exuberance and strength which, like the democracy of touch, will: "create and guarantee as much independence as possible; independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment." Such a democracy yet to come is in stark contrast to the modern ideal: "That which now calls itself democracy differs from older forms of government solely in that it drives with new horses: the streets are still the same old streets, and the wheels are likewise the same old wheels."

That is, the wheels of the moral-rational state machine which grinds man ever-smaller, ever more alike, ever closer to the level of the last man; that is the streets are the same ones that Connie found so hideous and depressing, lined with row after row of scab-like houses of the kind which, when Zarathustra saw similar constructions, caused him to ask: "What do these houses mean? ... Did a silly child perhaps take them out of its toy-box? ... And these sitting-rooms and bedrooms: are men able to go in and out of them?"

Zarathustra wants what Connie wants and Nietzsche wants what Lawrence wants: new houses and new streets; houses which are also dwelling places, streets which are also open roads. And they want too new social, economic, political, and cultural arrangements, in which the "three great enemies of independence in the above threefold sense" have been abolished as classes of men: these enemies being the indigent (i.e., the resentment-ridden poor and envious); the party-political ascetics and militants who call for revolution and lust for revenge (e.g., communists such as P1); and the rich who have lost touch and all understanding
of the aristocratic motto *Noblesse Oblige* (e.g., those like Sir Clifford Chatterley).

Thus, to conclude, we may say that Lawrence's democracy of touch is very much a model that Nietzsche would have approved of — and, in fact, anticipated in several ways. If it is a vision of a possible future, nevertheless it does involve a return to forgotten forces and past values; our task being to reactivate these in some manner and then construct new forms on the basis of them under the determining conditions and within the context of the present. The project of establishing a democracy of touch ties then closely to that of the revaluation; it is a call, ultimately, to:

"reestablish the great relations which the grand idealists with their underlying pessimism ... destroyed for us: Buddha, Plato, Jesus, they were all utter pessimists as regards life, teaching that the only happiness lay in abstracting oneself from life, the daily, yearly, seasonal life of birth and death and fruition, and in the 'immutable' or eternal spirit. But now, after almost 3000 years ... we realise that such abstraction is neither bliss nor liberation, but nullity. It brings dull inertia. And the great saviours and teachers only cut us off from life."²⁷

And thus the politics of desire expands into a 'reckoning' (*auseinandersetzung*) at last with the 'great saviours and teachers'; which means for us in the West, above all, a reckoning with Christ: the Crucified.
Chapter V: *The Escaped Cock*: Revaluation and Resurrection: the Politics of Desire Part II.

Part I: Versus the Crucified.

I.i. Nietzsche as Anti-Christ.

In an early note from the *Nachlass* material Nietzsche writes: "Even mockery, cynicism and hostility toward Christianity have run their course ... A considerate and seemly abstention seems to me to be the only appropriate attitude".1 And yet by the end of his intellectual career Nietzsche has publically styled himself as the 'Anti-Christ', and is only too full of mockery, cynicism, and, above all, hostility toward Christianity, which he now regards as "the extremist thinkable form of corruption ... the one great curse, the one intrinsic depravity ... the one immortal blemish of mankind".2

Daniel Breazeale notes with regard to this increase in hostility over the years that it suggests Nietzsche's later, more negative appraisal of Christianity, is "based upon a more profound analysis of religion in general and Christianity in particular, rather than being in any sense a vestige of adolescent rebellion."3 And certainly, if one traces the development of Nietzsche's attitude towards the Church throughout the course of his work, this is revealed to be the case. To trace such a development is to discover why Nietzsche is not simply being crassly reductive in declaring his entire philosophical project can be understood in the formula Dionysus versus the Crucified, nor simply being melodramatic to declare himself the Anti-Christ. Of course, to trace such a development in any detail is outside the scope of this thesis, limited as it is in length. However, we can and must make a few brief remarks on Nietzsche and his complex relation to Christianity.
Whilst Nietzsche is keen to retrospectively persuade us that he was already a crypto-anti-Christ in *The Birth of Tragedy*, the fact is that it is not really until *Human, All Too Human* that his attitude towards Christianity begins to decisively harden. For Nietzsche begins to realised that one cannot simply turn one's back upon a phenomenon such as Christian-nihilism. Ultimately, one has also to attack and offer an affirmative attempt at destruction (i.e., an active negation of the negative), expressing new feelings and new drives as they come to dominance within the will to power: "We negate and must negate because something in us wants to live and affirm".4

However, the overcoming of old ideals and beliefs, does not mean their complete denial; Nietzsche is not one to dispute his own Christian inheritance and moral background, no matter how great his hostility for the Crucified. As he confesses in *The Gay Science* (V.377), if he is one of those who has outgrown Christianity and who now feels adverse to it, this is "precisely because we have grown out of it".5 Nietzsche attempts to be as 'uncompromisingly upright' in his opposition to Christianity, as his forefathers were in their loyalty to the faith.

In fact, Hollingdale suggests in the introduction to his translation of *Zarathustra*, that in this work all of Nietzsche's ideas are an unconscious return of his youthful Christian (specifically Lutheran) beliefs, if now "transformed and distorted almost beyond recognition."6 Certainly the work is written in a quasi-biblical style and there is to be found a surprisingly positive portrayal of Jesus, in whose honesty and integrity Zarathustra expresses confidence, arguing that the latter would have, had he lived, recognized the error of his moral teachings and retracted them accordingly:

"'Truly, too early died that Hebrew whom the preachers of slow death honour: and that he died too early has since been a fatality for many. ..."
Had he only remained in the desert and far from the good and just! Perhaps he would have learned to love the earth - and laughter as well!

Believe it my brothers! He died too early; he himself would have recanted his teaching had he lived to my age! He was noble enough to recant!

But he was still immature. The youth loves immaturely and immaturely too he hates men and the earth."

This remarkable passage, in which Jesus is described as 'noble' and condemned only on the grounds of 'immaturity', is hugely important to our study here, essentially forming a foreword to Lawrence's The Escaped Cock, which it anticipates. For, as we shall see, what Lawrence attempts in this tale is to imagine a resurrected and mature Jesus living a full life on earth and in the flesh, who explicitly does retract his earlier teachings and renounce his mission.

Ultimately, Nietzsche and Lawrence cannot resist making an attempt (like William Blake and others) to save Jesus from the Christians. Deleuze comments: "A certain number of 'visionaries' have opposed Christ as an amorous person to Christianity as a mortuary enterprise. Not that they have an overtly accommodating attitude towards Christ, but they do feel the need to avoid confusing him with Christianity." This project of redeeming the Redeemer is not merely a theological one. Rather, Nietzsche and Lawrence hope that by 'saving' Jesus via a reinterpretation of his life and death, they may be able to secure and guarantee the entire human future, which they believe to be under threat from the sublime poison of morality. For Nietzsche in particular, it is imperative to unmask Christian teaching and reveal it as a form of anarcho-nihilism. That is to say, he wishes to meet the challenge of the Crucified at a political and cultural level, as well as on an ethical and religious level. In the works following Zarathustra, this becomes far more evident. Thus in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche is convinced of the fact that the above struggle must be intensified; for
if, on the one hand, we have inestimable benefits to thank Christianity for, on the other hand it has been responsible for the "corruption of the European race."\textsuperscript{10} via its revaluation of all antique values and its preserving (and deification) of that which and those who should be allowed to perish. The will within Christianity to make of man the most "sublime abortion"\textsuperscript{11} forces Nietzsche to conclude that it has been the most terrible of events: "without any exaggeration ... the real catastrophe\textsuperscript{12} in the history of the health of European man."

Having identified Christianity primarily in terms of sickness (a moral plague), the *Genealogy of Morals* offers a critical and clinical diagnosis of the above via the construction of a symptomatology (r\éssentiment, bad conscience etc.) and an aetiology (the tracing of its causes in terms of forces: the genealogical method). Nietzsche also offers us a prognosis (Christian morality will overcome itself) and a course of treatment (the revaluation). It is not without good reason, therefore, that Nietzsche thinks of himself as a 'physician of culture'. And nor is it merely coincidental that the man who died rises as a healer, carrying a cock under his arm à la Aesculapius.\textsuperscript{13} The man who died as Aesculapius determines to heal the soul of man which has been "voluntarily split within itself"\textsuperscript{14} in a diabolical process of "secret self-violation".\textsuperscript{15} When asked by one of his former disciples why he carries the bird, the man who died replies: "'I am a healer ... and the bird have virtue'" (*EC*, p.573). Undoubtedly the virtue of the cock is the virtue of life as active power and affirmative will; it is the Orphic bird of resurrection and fertility, symbolizing a different ideal to the ascetic ideal of self-division and self-denial. The crowing of the cock is a call for man to renounce his renunciation of worldly pleasures.

We cannot conclude this section without mentioning Nietzsche's most sustained polemic against Christianity and the figure of the Crucified: *The Anti-Christ*. Here too his real opponent is not Jesus, but that "genius of hatred"\textsuperscript{16} Saint Paul.
Deleuze writes:

"In Nietzsche, there is the great opposition between Christ and St. Paul: Christ the softest, most amorous of the decadents, a kind of Buddha who frees us from the domination of priests and the idea of fault, punishment, reward, judgement, death ... this bearer of glad tidings is doubled by the black Saint Paul, who keeps Christ on the Cross, ceaselessly leading him back to it, making him rise from the dead, displacing the centre of gravity toward eternal life, and inventing a new type of priest even more terrible than its predecessors."17

It is in their longing for judgement and retribution that those who call themselves 'Christians' (already a misunderstanding as Nietzsche says) are at their most unevangelic. But if Nietzsche did not consider Jesus as one full of réssentiment and the will to revenge, he does describe Jesus in The Anti-Christ as a decadent; also an 'idiot' and a case of 'retarded puberty'; a 'holy anarchist' and one suffering from a profound fear of being touched.

Of all these charges made against Jesus (repeated by Lawrence in his own work), it is the latter which most interests us here; the notion of touch being so central to a politics of desire as conceived in this thesis. Nietzsche argues that due to his "morbid susceptibility of the sense of being touched"18, Jesus shrank from every form of physical contact and developed an "instinctive hatred of every reality" coupled to a "profound discontent with the actual"19 world. In other words, Christ's retreat into idealism and symbolism is a consequence of his "extreme capacity for suffering and irritation".20 His not wanting to be touched (noli me tangere) is due to his feeling every contact too acutely. This is well illustrated by Lawrence in The Escaped Cock. Even towards the end of the tale, when the man who died wants more than anything to experience the touch of tenderness and form a sexual relationship with the woman of Isis, he is deeply troubled and
hesitant: "And inwardly, he was tremulous, thinking: 'Dare I come into touch'" (EC, p.585). The problem is that the man who died equates touch with compulsion and a violation of his intrinsic solitude (see p.574 of the tale). What he has to learn is that there are forms of contact which heal and liberate, and his relation with the priestess teaches him this. But it is not easy to come into living touch and it requires courage: "I have dared to let them lay hands on me and put me to death. But dare I come into this tender touch of life? Oh this is harder —" (EC, pp.585-6). Finally, however, the man who died does find the required courage, deciding that touch is the great atonement that puts one into vivid contact with all the world and lies beyond prayer; that touch is the great fulfilment for man; "'if I am naked enough for this contact, I have not died in vain'" (ibid., p.591).

The man who died thus finds the delight of physical love and the peace that comes of fucking; his only sorrow being that his Father kept the secret of tenderness and desire hidden from him for so long. But Christ as St. Paul would conceive of him, is forever denied such fulfilment in the flesh; he is left to find what satisfaction he can via a life of inner experience and sensation; completely out of touch with other men and women. Inhabiting the 'kingdom of heaven' which lies within as a condition of the heart, may result in blessedness understood as the absence of any contact or conflict, but it cannot lead to bliss as we defined it last chapter in terms of desire. And if Christ's understanding of life based exclusively upon inner truths, with "everything pertaining to nature, time, space, history" simply seen as "signs or occasion for metaphor" makes him into the greatest of all symbolists, so too does it make him a case of "retarded puberty", as Nietzsche memorably puts it, and by which he means to imply Christ lacks any adult desires (for sexual contact, for friendship, for work and active engagement in the social world), or complex and conflicting feelings. Michael Tanner correctly writes: "Christ didn't suffer from his passions, because he didn't have any, at any
rate not the ones that usually accompany adulthood."\(^{23}\) Adding: "to cultivate inwardness and nothing more, as Christ did, is to avoid life in an absolute ... ultimately perverse fashion."\(^{24}\) Again, this is what the man who died realises to his acute shame; that what he was ultimately offering was not live love, but, rather, the corpse of love. And what he asked for in return was a disembodied, abstract love full of death and betrayal (see EC, p.594).

To conclude then, we may say in agreement with Nietzsche that Christianity teaches one profound misunderstanding above all others: a misunderstanding of the body. And Christ's phobia has thus been interpreted as a sign of 'purity'; i.e., a sickness has been mistaken for holiness; a childish self-obsession for innocent wonder. The result has been to turn making sick and making infantile into the "true hidden objective of the Church's whole system of salvation procedures."\(^{25}\) The symbol of Christ Crucified is thus the symbol of "the most subterranean conspiracy there has ever been - a conspiracy against health, beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect"\(^{26}\) and adulthood.

But if Christianity is a revolt against everything natural, so too is it a revolt against the social order and culture, as we have indicated. That is, a revolt against all forms of hierarchy, caste, privilege, distinction etc. It is for this reason that Nietzsche brands it as 'anarcho-nihilistic' and accuses Christ of being "a holy anarchist who roused up the lowly, the outcasts and 'sinners', the chandala within Judaism, to oppose the ruling order".\(^{27}\) Jesus was therefore not just an 'idiot' on Nietzsche's reading, but also a political criminal ("in so far as political criminals were possible in an absurdly unpolitical society"\(^{28}\)). Perhaps not a particularly successful political criminal - he was, after all, captured, convicted, and executed by the Roman authorities, and that would have been the end of his revolt in morals if it had not been for a far more astute and politically capable figure: we refer of course to the apostle Paul. For Paul it was who latched on to
the fact that it is not the life and practice of Jesus that really matters; but his martyrdom and death. Unable to make little if any political capital out of the former, via an ingenious interpretation and exploitation of the latter Paul finds a way to "sum up everything down-trodden, everything in secret revolt, the entire heritage of anarchist agitation in the Empire into a tremendous power." 29

Nowhere is this hidden power-spirit within Christianity and the lusting for political revenge more in evidence that in the final book of the Bible: the 
Revelation of St. John of Patmos. And nowhere is this work better analysed than in Lawrence's study: Apocalypse.

I.ii. Lawrence as Apocalypsist.

"Remember I think Christ was profoundly, disastrously wrong." 30

"Jesus becomes more unsympatisch to me, the longer I live: crosses and nails and tears and all that stuff! I think he showed us into a nice cul de sac." 31

"I agree with you, in a sense, I am with the Anti-Christ ..." 32

These three brief extracts from Lawrence's letters tell us a good deal about his relationship to Christianity; a relationship which, like Nietzsche's, is marked by an increasing hostility over the years. His analysis of Christianity is in so many important respects identical to Nietzsche's own that we needn't here spend time tracing its development. Rather, we can concentrate our attention on what Lawrence has to say in his final work, Apocalypse: a text in which "Lawrence takes up Nietzsche's initiative by taking John of Patmos as his target, and no longer St. Paul. Many things change or are supplemented from one initiative to another, and even what they have in common gains in strength and novelty." 33
The essential argument of Lawrence's *Apocalypse* is that it is only in *Revelation* that we can hear the unmodulated voice of "popular religion as distinct from thoughtful religion." It is a voice that informs the Christianity not of Jesus, but of Paul and John the Divine. If the former opens the way for the possibility of a noble "Christianity of tenderness", this is closed down by the "Christianity of self-glorification" on behalf of the 'meek' and 'humble', as developed by the latter saints, who, as Deleuze says, succeed in grafting onto Christ "a monstrous ego". The almost Stoical teachings of Jesus, meant for the individual, are substituted by a base philosophy aimed at the masses ("Platonism for the people", as Nietzsche calls it): "And we must confess, it is hideous. Self-righteousness, self-conceit, self-importance, and secret envy underlie it all."38

One of the central lies upon which this Christianity of the 'middling masses' is constructed, is the lie of personal immortality. This, along with the deceit of equality of all souls in the sight of God, serves only to flatter those "little bigots and three-quarter madmen" who imagine themselves to be the great measure and meaning of all things and whom Paul knew needed to be seduced if a victory over Rome and Roman values was to be achieved. Via these and other such lies, Christianity "persuaded over to its side everything ill-constituted, rebellious-minded, under-privileged, all the dross and refuse of mankind".40

Nietzsche and Lawrence both deny and loathe the thought of personal immortality. In *The Will To Power* (166), for example, Nietzsche writes: "nothing was further from him [Jesus] than the stupid nonsense of ... an eternal personal survival. What he fights against is exaggerated inflation of the 'person'".41 It is fear, of course, as well as egoism, which sits behind this willingness to believe in the immortal I. Lawrence writes in *The Escaped Cock*: "It was fear, the ultimate fear of death, that made men go mad ... For men and women alike were mad with the egoistic fear of their own nothingness" (*EC*, p.574). But the Church plays on
and manipulates this fear; the symbol of God on the Cross explicitly promises
divine immortality to all those who accept Christ as their saviour: "Everything
that suffers, everything that hangs on the Cross is divine ... We all hang on the
Cross, consequently, we are divine"42; this is the absurd logic of the Crucified.
The Cross becomes not only the symbol of "the murdered Phallus" (FLC, p.157),
but also the symbol of the glorified ego. The enemy is not so much Jesus nailed
to the Cross, as all those who would keep him there and find their own triumph
and eternal self-preservation in the symbol of the martyred God. The last book
of the Bible is their book; a book of lies and réssentiment, full of the "vast anti-
will of the masses"43 (or the 'will to nothingness' as Nietzsche calls it). And yet:

"When we come to read it critically and seriously, we realise that the Apocalypse
reveals a profoundly important Christian doctrine ... perhaps the most effectual
doctrine in the Bible. That is, it has had a greater effect on second rate people
throughout the Christian ages, than any other book of the Bible."44

And this is because, argues Lawrence, if on the one hand it contains a will to the
destruction of "all mastery, all lordship and all human splendour"45, so too does
it reveal a "strange will to a strange kind of power".46 This may be a wholly
negative and negating power – the reactive power of the mass and of bullying
authority – but it is important we acknowledge it, for it is a will to power and it
is the dominant will within modern society, both religiously and politically.

Power: this remains the great problem that always returns to us. To understand
the puzzle of Revelation we must begin to understand the power-urge expressed
therein. For Lawrence, with this strange and disturbing book "there crept into
the New Testament the grand Christian enemy, the Power-spirit."47 And this was
as inevitable as the kiss from Judas: "Why? Because the nature of man demands it,
and will always demand it."48 Why? Because the nature of man is will to power
and not will to impotence. But, unfortunately, the will to power 'sanctified' within Revelation is a frustrated and perverted thing; a negative will composed of predominantly reactive forces. John of Patmos does not know how or what it is to affirm; he can only negate. His is a slave's conception of power; i.e., not the power of creation, but only of judgement and damnation; the power that belongs not to the living, but to the dead. Deleuze is not wrong to describe Revelation as a "book of zombies." 49

And yet, even when it is power at its most ugly and reactive, still one is glad in some manner to see some notion of power (other than the so-called 'power of love') raise its head at last in the Bible. For as Lawrence says, the nature of man demands such; that is, the collective nature of man. For perhaps, when he is alone, a man can be a Christian, but: "When he is with other men, instantly distinctions occur, and levels are formed. ... As soon as two or three men come together ... then power comes into being". 50

If Lawrence is pleased to see the return of what is repressed throughout the rest of the Bible, namely, power, he is even happier to see a reactivation of a pagan element; if massively distorted by and buried under Jewish and Christian strata. The Apocalypse of St. John is, in its wanting to judge and punish, in its call for destruction of the natural world, and in its almost limitless lust for revenge, essentially Jewish, and as Deleuze points out "it is not difficult to demonstrate the Jewish sources of the Apocalypse at every point". 51 But what interests Lawrence is the resurfacing from time to time of pre- and non-Judaic elements. Paul chooses to suppress pagan sources as far as possible; to disconnect Christianity from its religious background, and he exercises great skill and enthusiasm in doing so. But John reactivates and redirects pagan symbols and myths for his own end, and this excites Lawrence who, "with all his horror of the Apocalypse", nevertheless pushes on with his study of the work "experiencing an obscure
sympathy, even a kind of admiration for this book".52

But let there be no confusion here: although the Apocalypse of St. John does contain some hint of the true and positive power-spirit via its reactivated paganism, the use to which John puts this – namely, the destruction not just of Rome, but of the entire cosmos – is horrible and repellent, resounding as it does with "the dangerous snarl of the frustrated, suppressed collective self, the frustrated power-spirit in man, vengeful."53 John does not simply want to seize the power of the Roman Empire for himself, but to destroy such power and replace it with a wholly negative form of power (a sort of anti-power) that is both anti-social and almost anti-human: a final power belonging to the last men; i.e., the community of saints and saved brethren. As Nietzsche notes; "in Rome, the Jew was looked upon as convicted of hatred against the whole of mankind".54 Not surprisingly, therefore, Lawrence "soon recovers all his distrust and horror for John of Patmos"55, contemptuous of the will to revenge and self-glorification and the will to forever have the final word. But the question we must ask is: Is Christ himself blameless? That is, can we simply accuse Paul and John of constructing between them a faith based upon the promise (threat) of a new Jerusalem that violently distorts the Gospel of Love as taught by Jesus, or does Christ himself bear a degree of responsibility for the emergence and eventual victory of the Crucified? Perhaps his ideal and bodiless love was bound to issue in John's hatred just as it inevitably invited betrayal? Ultimately, Lawrence is brought to this conclusion. Thus for all his attempts to save Jesus and distinguish the bringer of glad tidings from the emaciated figure on the Cross, Lawrence acknowledges that the real problem begins with Christ's love itself; i.e., that which we have already seen to have been deathly and full of compulsion. It is this alone which permits a wholly negative religion to be built upon a noble and positive message of tenderness. Ultimately, writes Lawrence, Jesus and John are "two sides of the same medal."56
Above all, Jesus is profoundly and disastrously mistaken in his one-sided insistence on love and in his perverse inner-absorption. He succeeds in giving an impossible ideal for the ideal individual, but, by refusing to think of real men as social beings and in effectively abandoning any concern with power and politics (thereby surrendering such to the State and those individuals like John up against the reality of the State), he was, argues Lawrence, hugely naive and irresponsible:

"Jesus saw the individual only, and considered only the individual. He left it to John of Patmos ... to formulate the Christian vision of the Christian State. John did it in Apocalypse. It entails the destruction of the whole world, and the reign of saints in ultimate bodiless glory." 57

The Apocalypse shows us the Crucified in relation to Rome, the world, and the cosmos: "It shows him in mad hostility to all of them, having, in the end, to will the destruction of them all." 58 It is the other side of Christ's love, and it means suicide and murder en masse. Arguably, it is towards this time of fatal nihilism and world-destruction that we move today. This is why Mara Kalnins is right to say in her 1995 introduction to Lawrence's study that the latter remains far from simply being "an esoteric enquiry into an obscure book of the Bible, with which few people nowadays are familiar". 59 It is, like John's Revelation itself, a vitally important "book to conjure with." 60

It is also, despite its apocalyptic theme, a joyful message of hope for the future; "one last glad tiding", as Deleuze says. 61 For it expresses Lawrence's belief that man can, if he so wishes, find a way to come back into touch and reestablish the living connections which he has spent the last 2,500 years denying or attempting to break. Lawrence's final work challenges us to "institute, find, or recover a maximum of connections" 62 and to revalue values. But whilst we need to
proliferate all manner of relations, we must, warns Lawrence, also break those false bonds; particularly those which tie us to capital: "According to Lawrence's critique, money, like love, must be reproached not for being a flow, but for being a false connection that mints subjects and objects"63 and in this way keeps us separated off from the world around us.

To conclude, then, we may say that Lawrence's *Apocalypse* is a passionate call for man to rediscover an essentially cosmic-religious (God-free) way of living. Rejecting the promise of "petty little personal salvation, petty morality"64, he expresses his "immense yearning to be ... back in the far-off world before man became 'afraid'. We want to be freed from our tight little automatic 'universe', to go back to the great living cosmos of the 'unenlightened' pagans!"65 Lawrence is not being sentimental or reactionary here; for he is not naively advocating a creeping back into old shells; the old certainties, beliefs, forms, and connections are broken, or of little or no use to us. Lawrence is acutely aware of the fact that: "We can never recover an old vision, once it has been supplanted."66 But what we can attempt to do is "discover a new vision in harmony with the memories of old, far-off, far-off experience that lie within us."67 This is surely, in part at least, precisely what Nietzsche attempts within his Dionysian philosophy. What he and Lawrence tell us is that whilst God may be dead, we are not - and neither is the cosmos, even if we have fallen out of touch with the latter and into sterile and automatic egoism. By coming out of responsive connection with the sun and stars (as well as other cosmic bodies), we have made an essentially tragic excursion into the void of pure abstraction. Lawrence insists on the vital correspondence between ourselves and the heavens; in fact, he argues: "We and the cosmos are one. The cosmos is the vast living body, of which we are still parts."68 And this, he claims, is *literally* true, as men knew in the past (and will do again). If to the modern mind this sounds like mystical nonsense, "that is merely because we are fools."69 Our task today, then, is to
develop new forms of consciousness and new feelings, and to not only 'get back' our bodies, but to get back into relation with the cosmos: "and it can't be done by a trick. The great range of responses that have fallen dead in us have to come to life again. It has taken 2000 years to kill them. Who knows how long it will take to bring them to life?" The revaluation of all values is a project of generations and one of the key words remains the word of the unborn day: Resurrection.

Part II: Remarks on Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock* in Relation to Death, Sex, and the Resurrection into Touch.

We saw last chapter Tommy Dukes call for two things: firstly, a democracy of touch; secondly, the resurrection of the body. Only, it was argued, once the latter has been achieved will we be able to set about the building of the former. So it is that the resurrection of the body remains our central concern here. But which body? Whose body? Last chapter we formulated an answer to the first of these questions in terms of the phallic body (or what Deleuze and Guattari term, after Artaud, the body without organs); contrasting this with the metaphysical organism, or ideal corpse-body. We then related the building of such a body to the becomings within active desire of Constance Chatterley and her lover, Oliver Mellors. Here, however, it will be in relation to the man who died and his resurrection, his becoming, in relation to the Priestess of Isis.

*The Escaped Cock* is Lawrence's revaluation of the death and rebirth of Jesus. He provides a brief summary of the first part of the tale himself in a letter:

"I wrote a story of the resurrection; where Jesus gets up and feels very sick about everything, and can't stand the old crowd any more - so cuts out - and as he heals up, he begins to find out what an astonishing place the phenomenal world
is, far more marvellous than any salvation or heaven - and thanks his lucky stars that he needn't have a 'mission' any more."²

It is in the second part of the tale, however, where Lawrence attempts something far more daring and philosophically profound; namely, the transformation via desire and sexual contact with a pagan priestess of the newly risen man who died into a potent and affirmative man of flesh, as well as the man-god assemblage Osiris (Dionysus); i.e., an altogether different form to the Christ-figure he had been. The man who died gets back his body via a surrender of his old identity/subjectivity and by losing the face of Christ. In other words, not only does the man who died come down off the Cross and surrender the Crown of Thorns, so too does he rise into anonymity and forgetfulness (these belonging to innocence).

Lawrence is enabled and encouraged to attempt such a bold and overt revaluation of Christian teaching by his reading of Nietzsche, of pre-Socratic philosophy, and a wide range of works on religious mythology. For via the above, Lawrence had available to him "an older tradition of resurrection symbolism which had none of Christianity's bitterness against the earth and fear of the flesh. Christ is subsumed in the larger tradition of torn and regenerated fertility gods."³

The lesson which Lawrence hopes to teach via his attempt to put the man who died back into religious context and offer a glimpse of an older, pre-Christian, 'phallic' religion, is simple: each man must be willing to die and then resurrect into a new life having been dipped in oblivion. Unfortunately, this remains as difficult to accept today as it has always been.
Accepted or not by the majority, it is a lesson reflected in the work of other post-Nietzschean thinkers. Thus, for example, when Lawrence says in verse: "Sing the song of death, O sing it! / for without the song of death, the song of life / becomes pointless and silly"\(^4\), we cannot help but be reminded of Heidegger's insistence in *Being and Time* on the importance of *Dasein* facing up to its own mortality. George Steiner conveniently sums this point up:

"*Dasein* can come to grasp its own wholeness and meaningfulness ... only when it faces its 'no-longer-being-there' (*sein Nicht-mehr-dasein*). ... *Dasein* ... has access to the meaning of being because, and only because, that being is finite. Authentic being is, therefore, a being-towards-death, a *Sein-zum-tode*".\(^5\)

We first approach and gain an experience of death via the death of others and via the death of our gods. However, no matter how profound our understanding of the death of others is, each one of us must ultimately experience our own death: Each one of us must, as Lawrence would say, prepare his or her own 'ship of death'.\(^6\) To quote from Steiner's reading of Heidegger once more:

"an authentic death has to be striven for. A true being-towards-the-end is one which labours consciously towards fulfilment and refuses inertia; it is one which seeks an ontological grasp of its own finitude rather than taking refuge in the banal conventionality of general biological extinction."\(^7\)

Central of course to this taking upon oneself an authentic death in which the nearness of nothingness is acknowledged and one concedes the need to be made nothing, is the notion of *Angst*. *Angst* is a facing up to the fact that one's being rests upon non-being and the waters of oblivion. And it is vital: "those who would rob us of this anxiety - be they priests, physicians, mystics or rationalist quacks - by transforming it into either fear or genteel indifference, alienate us
from life itself. Or, more exactly, they insulate us from a fundamental source of freedom." For freedom, ultimately, is the freedom to die many deaths in one's own way and to rise anew, transformed like the phoenix, from out of death back into life and the greater health.

Essentially, this analysis of death found in both Lawrence and Heidegger, is a pessimistic and tragic one; but it is not romantic, nor "all too typical of Teutonic death-obsessions and portentious fatality." Those critics and commentators who dismiss it as such are often the same ones who miss its full philosophical significance; i.e., without finitude there can be no freedom or active life. As Steiner correctly points out, this conclusion means we have arrived "at the antipodes to Plato."  

The problem is, as we have said, most men even when seemingly full of the courage for death, lack the desire to resurrect once more into the flesh; i.e., they lack the greater courage for life (and thus fail the existential test of Nietzsche's eternal recurrence: see III.i.). Thus, thinking back to Sir Clifford Chatterley, we find a man prepared to make the descent for king and country into a man-made hell (i.e., the trenches of the Great War) and therein undergo a death experience, but lacking the affirmative will to then make the ascent into a new post-decadent (and overhuman) life; to achieve the resurrection of the body and an "immortality of the flesh" (*FLC*, p.66).

In fact, such a resurrection and such an immortality holds no interest to those such as Clifford Chatterley: what they lust after is something else entirely; "the private and egoistic resurrection of sprit, into the ideal eternity" (*JTLJ*, p.70). It is this personal salvation they value; not the vision of life and death imagined by Tommy Dukes wherein men rise up again "'with new flesh on their spirits, and new feelings in the flesh, and a new fire to erect the phallus" (*ibid*.). But it is this
latter 'immortality' which is achieved by both Dionysus and the man who died, who by dying 'authentically' amid the flames of a fire-death, are able to rise into the unborn day.

Clifford, like all the decadent-idealists related to him from Plato down, wants merely to explore the death that is within him; just as he toys with his sex in order to experience the thrill of disintegrative sensation and arrive at a new piece of knowledge. Not for one moment does he want to let go of his precious ego or his assertive (but non-affirmative) will. If he wants to know of death, so too does he wish to secure himself forever in an ideal self. Thus the immortality of the flesh desired by Dukes means nothing to Clifford. Such immortality is, as he rightly points out in objection, "merely temporal" (ibid.), and thus, to him, worthless and meaninglessness. For Clifford cannot conceive of valuing, loving, and affirming the temporal nature of existence; cannot begin to appreciate the very timeliness of time and its passing, or that: "Even eternity is in rhythms" (JTLJ, p.70). Ultimately, Clifford belongs to one of the damned; i.e., he is one of those unhappy souls "that cannot die and become silent / but must ever struggle on to assert themselves." Unhappy because: "No man unless he has died, and / learned to be alone / will ever come into touch." Unhappy because he cannot bring himself to love fate, but is one of those eaten up with having to care about what will become of him "and who dare not die for fear they should be nothing at all".

Here then, described in snippets of Lawrencean verse, is Clifford Chatterley: the nihilist obsessed with preserving his own vacuous ego and emotional emptiness. Death, the thing he wishes to know of but avoid, is the only cure for him and men like him; men, indeed, like Jesus who are entirely closed off and self-absorbed, concerned only with their own inner-sensations and entirely out of touch with the world external to themselves. Men with bodies over which nothing
can pass, desire cannot flow. When Christ cries out upon his Cross: 'Father, why hast thou abandoned me?' one does not doubt his pain and confusion; for understanding nothing of why he has been brought to the Cross, nor does he understand why he must die upon it. Doesn't understand, that is, that no one, not even God, "can put back a human life into connection with the living cosmos / once the connection has been broken / and the person has become fatally self-centred."14 Death alone in such circumstances can serve; death not only as that which results in disintegration, but also transfiguration (i.e., death as a process and not a goal, or consummation). Let us be clear on this point, if there is a negative representation of death ("death conceived as a judgement which denies, restricts and condemns"), so too is there a positive experience of death ("death experienced as transportation, a flight, a dissolution and passage, true becoming")15; a heat-death and a fire-death.

This is such a vital point, that we are obliged to discuss it further. The first negative image of death – death as a terminal fact which comes at the end of life – is of little interest to us here, even though it is and remains the predominant image of death "formed from the restricted point of view of the ego"16, and accepted by most people to be death per se. What we are keen to develop here is the latter; i.e., the death that Nietzsche in his Dionysian philosophy, Lawrence in his last poems and late fictional and prose work, and Deleuze in his philosophy of difference, are all interested in: a death which is, as Keith Ansell-Pearson recognizes; "exemplified in, but not restricted to, the death of the gods"17 and which takes place endlessly in a wide variety of ways. Similarly, when gods are reborn they rise in many different ways and there is a multiplicity of interpretations possible of any resurrection. Deleuze, whilst recognizing that there are many forces capable of seizing hold of Christ's story, insists that "we are still waiting for the forces or the power which will carry this death to its highest point and make it into something more than an apparent and abstract death."18
But one would argue that in *The Escaped Cock* Lawrence supplies such forces or power; that he gives us here an interpretation not only in an active and affirmative sense, but in the profound sense that Nietzsche means by the term; i.e., not merely a development of uninterrupted symbol with which, according to Deleuze, the dialectic invariably confuses interpretation. Lawrence's interpretation is arguably not only philosophically more developed than Paul's, but it is also truer both to the spirit of the Gospels and to the great pagan tradition out of which Christianity in part grew. Were his story of the man who died to be accepted and taught, it could possibly serve not only as an important foundation for a wider revaluation of values, but also, ironically, as a means by which the Church could itself achieve a resurrection and new becoming. However, as it is the Church of the Crucified prefers to go on either funking or deliberately distorting the story of Jesus, preventing us from knowing him as we may still perhaps one day know him; i.e., as a bringer of glad tidings and a "wonderful initiator into death for rebirth".19

Essentially, then, all three of the above (Nietzsche, Lawrence, and Deleuze) are each in their own way attempting to enter an element of difference into death, thereby engineering a revaluation of the latter by breaking up its homogeneity and unity. If Deleuze is most commonly associated with this project, he is anticipated nevertheless by both Nietzsche and Lawrence; the former demanding that we rethink our relation to the dead world of matter, understanding our own 'return to the inanimate' as a reconciliation with what is actual and a chance to perfect ourselves once more.

Death, then, signals change or transformation; it is not the opposite of life, or the end of life, but its true womb. *Consummatum est* does not mean 'all is finished', as Jesus thought, rather: "It means: the step is taken."20 That is, the step into death, but not the final step; for there is still another step – in fact, a
whole series of other steps— to be taken beyond the tomb and back into the flesh and new life. But not all men can take this step. Some, like Clifford Chatterley, are crippled in one way or another. Some like to remain on the Cross from which they can look down upon life and curse it: the Crucified. Some like to remain in the tomb, swathed and shrouded in bandages like an Egyptian mummy; they lack the strength or the desire to roll away the rock from the mouth of the cave, and besides, it's comfortable in the tomb, and safe. These latter are the last men that Nietzsche so despises. Between them—the crippled, the Crucified, and the cowardly—they constitute the vast majority of men today: herd humanity.

What hope is there, one might ask, for a resurrection of the body when it is negated by the dead weight of a whole legion of zombies and kept nailed to a cross, or wrapped in a tomb? Seemingly little. And yet some, like Connie, maintain faith in the possibility: "'The human body is only just coming to real life',' she gaily informs Clifford: "'With the Greeks it gave a lovely flicker, then Plato and Aristotle killed it, and Jesus finished it off. But now the body is coming really to life, is really rising from the tomb. And it will be a lovely, lovely life in the lovely universe, the life of the human body'" (LCL, pp.234-5). What Lawrence attempts in The Escaped Cock is to show that she is right: and if Jesus is the one who finished the body off with his fatal sayings and teachings, as Connie claims, then he has to be the one to bring it back to life. The really rather terrible story of Christ remains for us modern Europeans central to our self-understanding. The Christian era ends not merely with Jesus hanging limply on the Cross, but with the prolonged half-death of all men: we have all been crucified in one way or another: "No doubt the death was necessary. It is the long, slow death of society which parallels the quick death of Jesus and the other dying gods", writes Lawrence, who continues with the warning: "It is death none the less, and will end in the annihilation of the human race ... unless there is a change, a resurrection, and a return to the cosmos."21
Tommy Dukes understands this; he is painfully aware of how the men of his generation (including himself), having survived the death of God and the Great War, are "struggling for the life that should be theirs" (JTLJ, p.68). A life they are denied, trapped still as they are within the old ideals, conventions, and organisms: "Their bodies were the old tormented bodies which had died, but which had not yet come to life again. The spirit was struggling into new life, a resurrection. But the body was not yet filled with new blood and fire" (JTLJ, pp.68-9).

In Christian terms, Lawrence is arguing that now is the period between Good Friday and Easter Sunday; i.e., the time in the tomb, suspended between life and death. Nietzsche calls this the time of 'incomplete nihilism'; a strange, dim, grey era of uncertainty and confusion. The great and very real danger is that men will fail to find the resources to take them beyond this stage and over themselves, as every caterpillar must if she is to leave the chrysalis as a creature transformed and reborn: "perhaps they would never ascend really into life. They would remain the shadowy, almost incorporeal beings of the era between the rolling open of the tomb, and the ascending into the firmament of a new body" (ibid., p.69).

But, on the other hand, perhaps it will be the case that the man who died will show a few men the way forward, via his leap into the tide of new life and the unresolved wonder thereof: the future is uncertain. What is for sure, is that we have experienced death in the negative sense for too long; and for too long have we allowed ourselves to be bullied into accepting that only once we had enveloped "the world in a vast unison of death" could there be achieved the goal of 'universal salvation'. Now we begin to realize that it is impossible to all die the same death once and for all, because death is a multiple phenomenon and each man must be allowed and encouraged to die many times in many different ways if ever he is to live.
Of course, this is not to say that we can simply move from one understanding of death to another overnight. Death in its reactive representation must first be fully understood by those few who can "go through the final pain" of such knowledge and accept the "bitter necessity to understand the death that has been". When these initiators pass clear and transform death into something gay and joyous (a veritable festival of death), then, finally, perhaps we may all leave the old idea of death behind. Dionysus is one such Lord of Death; and so too the man who died.

We may conclude our thoughts on death by saying that it is not that one is necessarily reborn from one's time in the tomb a 'better' person, but one usually emerges a different person; often a more profound type as Nietzsche says, or, with reference to the case of Jesus, more mature. And this is so even when the sign of one's new profundity is a new-found delight in things of the surface; the sign of one's maturity is a certain playfulness. One becomes, in a word, more 'Greek', as Nietzsche understands the latter: Christ is crucified as a Jew, but the man who died resurrects as a Hellenic type. Thus we witness him coming into awareness of the 'phenomenal' world and learning how to affirm life "at the surface, the fold, the skin, to adore appearance". For the first time, the man who died learns how to see the world with eyes full of wonder, like the child, for "there is more child in the man than in the youth, and less melancholy: he has a better understanding of life and death." An understanding based upon a notion of difference and an affirmation of such: "Strange is the phenomenal world ... And life bubbles so variously. Why should I ever have wanted it to bubble all alike?" (EC, p.572).

If the man who died discovers wonder, so too does he find courage: the courage which is needed "to survive and flourish in the face of life, which by definition bears with it an enormous quantum of pain", as well as joy. Courage also to come into touch; sexually with a woman and socially with his fellow men. We
shall discuss the latter connection in part III.iii of this chapter, but let me immediately state my view that those who argue that in *The Escaped Cock* Lawrence is only concerned with "personal regeneration"\(^{28}\), and not attempting to offer an important cultural critique, or serious socio-historical reinterpretation, are profoundly mistaken. As we have argued throughout this thesis, Lawrence's political concerns, like Nietzsche's, are not merely an eccentric and insignificant "branch of his ideas about religion".\(^{29}\) They are, on the contrary, central to his work and remain of relevance to many of the present debates within political and cultural theory. Having reiterated this, let us now examine the erotic aspect of the man who died and his resurrection.

In *the First Lady Chatterley*, Connie asks Clifford: "Do you think it was right for Jesus to say to woman: 'Go, and sin no more'? After all, he was only a man! ... Not a woman himself!'" (*FLC*, p.133). Clifford is amused, but irritated by the question. Connie continues: "Supposing the woman had said: 'Come thou, and sin with me!' Wouldn't it have been better, do you think?" (*ibid*.). Clifford replies that Jesus wouldn't have gone - and probably he is right. But the man who died *does* go unto woman; does give in to the temptations of the flesh and surrender himself up to desire at last. And his going unto woman is the ultimate and most crucial stage of his resurrection as a man uncrucified; the means by which he overcomes his fear, his pain, the last traces of his old self and loses the "sour smell of entropic decay"\(^{30}\), i.e., the stink of death and the tomb.

By going unto woman, the man who died learns that there are many ways of entering into holy communion; many ways of serving and showing one's love for God, without having to be nailed to a cross. He realizes that the only 'sin' lies not in knowledge of sex, or the active engagement in carnal pleasures, but in "turning away from the world, from chance, from the truth of bodies".\(^{31}\) And he realizes that sexual abstinence is a form of greed and vanity; a withholding of that which
should be shared. One must give and take of the self, whilst not giving oneself away or holding oneself back entirely (see EC, p.565 where the man who died tries to make this clear to Mary Magdalene).

Like Connie Chatterley, the man who died also discovers his nakedness. Although stripped of clothes when put on the Cross, he was never really naked – merely exposed. For without having a body, only a face, naked he could not be. The woman of Isis helps him attain a living body replete with its own forces, its own beauty, and its own nakedness; a body without organs and without any facial overcoding. She gives him physical and sexual significance, awakening in him "an awareness of physical touch (touch of bodies, hands, moist lips)." 32

His wounds are sealed, and yet he is fully opened for the first time to the flow of desire; i.e., opened to all those strange forces external to himself, thereby allowing various intensities to pass across his body. Between the arms and legs of the woman of Isis he loses his old interiority, and in combination with her he forms a "circuit of intensities between male and female energy" 33 (what Lawrence calls the 'phallic body'). It is at this point that the lovers "lose themselves in sweet, shared slime" 34 and achieve a state of bliss; a form of joy that is immanent to desire and related to the jouissance of the greater day, not the plaisir of the common day, as understood by the slave and promised by the prostitute, whose pleasure is always "suffused by anxiety, shame, and guilt." 35

The priestess of Isis washes away the nausea and the tiredness of the man who died, not with tears, but with the secretions of her vagina; he is bathed and oiled by the woman, so that by the end of the tale he has rid himself, as we have said, of the odour of death and the ghostly anaemic look of Christ; the 'pale Galilean' is finally conquered. The skin of the man who died takes on a little colour, as well as the smell of the woman's scent, which, we are told, is like the "essence of
roses" (*EC*, p.600); i.e., the beautiful perfume of love and life.

Ultimately, the man who died rises into virile manhood and sovereignty; into his lordship. He has not escaped death, so much as left behind him the fear and anguish of death, as well as that which is most often coupled to these things, namely, the réssentiment directed towards a life which is mortal and lived within time. By giving us a Jesus who does not ascend unto Heaven in a cloud – and who does not want to ascend thus; a Jesus who rises in the flesh and acknowledges his Father as the Flesh (and not the Spirit or *Logos*), Lawrence gives us an important and radical new vision of Christ and of ourselves. The question remains: can we accept this vision of the man who died and of ourselves as risen lord? We have shown ourselves capable of accepting Christ on the Cross, Christ in the Tomb, Christ ascending to Heaven with a puff of smoke, Christ as a "unity of love and reactive life". But Christ risen in the flesh and in touch with the physical world, Christ who promises us not salvation, but "the unknown joy, the unknown happiness" and communion with the "unknown God", this Christ we still seem wary of and even hostile to. However, let us not conclude on a sour note. For while we may be certain that the reign of the negative has not yet moved towards completion, still in *The Escaped Cock* Lawrence gives us hope for the future: "Tomorrow is another day" (*EC*, p.600).

Part III: Political and Ethical Considerations.

III.i. The Man Who Died and the Eternal Recurrence.

"If the eternal return speaks of death and rebirth ... what kind of death belongs to the eternal return? A heat-death or a fire-death?" Whilst the answer to this question is undoubtedly both, here we will be stressing the latter as we examine the death and resurrection of the man who died in relation to Nietzsche's great
teaching of recurrence. This is not to deny, however, that for most men the eternal return seems to threaten only the crushing return and certainty of the former; it would hardly function as a cultivating idea or existential test if this were not the case, and this is clearly a vital aspect of Nietzsche's thought-experiment.

But there are other men, if lesser in number, who find the courage to pass the test of the eternal recurrence and uncover its secret, thereby finding themselves initiated into a different faith. For these men, wise in the way of the circle, the phoenix always rises in gleaming new feathers and the eternal return of death "does not mean that one undergoes the same death again and again", for the death belonging to the eternal return "is a plural one assuming multiple disguises".²

Likewise, one is not born and reborn into an identical life again and again; the same (das Gleich) is not a fixed essence and does not refer to a content in and of itself; "but rather must be taken to refer to the act of returning (revenir) itself."³ We leave the tomb as the man who died leaves it: transformed and in the process all the while of becoming-other. As Klossowski argues, the eternal return is, in a sense, Nietzsche's version of the transmigration of souls (metempsychosis).⁴ In as much as this doctrine does allow for the construction of a conception of identity, it is one that is "compatible with embodied experience and historicity ... constructed and reconstructed ... by means of engaging with the world."⁵

Essentially then, the eternal return forms a Dionysian ethic of repetition and the difference engendered by it. It is the culminating thought of Nietzsche's philosophy of becoming, incorporating but profoundly developing his earlier related formulations of living dangerously and loving fate. It is, of course, a post-moral and as such anti-Christian ethic par excellence in as much as it rejects judgement in favour of an affirmation of innocence and 'dead certainty' in favour
of chance. Appropriately, this ethic is introduced into Nietzsche's text by a demon (see *The Gay Science*, IV.341; a passage which remains central to an understanding of the eternal recurrence).

It is a teaching which is also well illustrated in theory and practice in Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock*. For if the man who died is portrayed as one who learns how to embrace a woman, so too is he shown as one who manages to think the thought of recurrence and ultimately to "crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal." And this because the man who died resurrects into a way of living that makes such a thought not only bearable, but beautiful. But this does not come easily; at first, just after awakening from his death-sleep, he is still very much full of pain and nausea; "the sickness of unspeakable disillusion" (*EC*, p.557). In an important passage, Lawrence writes:

"He could move if he wanted: he knew that. But he had no want. Who would want to come back from the dead? A deep, deep nausea stirred in him, at the premonition of movement. He resented the fact of ... the moving back into consciousness. He had not wished it. He had wanted to stay outside, in the place where even memory is stone dead.  

*But now something had returned him ... and in the return he lay overcome with a sense of nausea*" (*EC*, p.556 – my emphasis added).

Clearly the demon has crept after the man who died, crept into his tomb and into his 'loneliest loneliness', and whispered to him the thought of recurrence. And this thought almost crushes him with nausea and it seems at first as if the man who died will fail the test of the eternal return, for he doesn't want to be returned to a world which put him to death and caused him so much suffering. "To be back! To be back again, after all that!" (*EC*, p.557), he thinks to himself, and he is shocked to discover that after all the horror he has experienced, the
night to which he returns is still the same night, and the day the same day; i.e.,
that his personal death has not signalled the end of the world. The latter returns:
"the same as ever ... thronging with greenness, a nightingale winsomely,
wistfully, coaxingly calling ... the natural world of morning and evening, for ever
undying" (EC, pp.557-8).

But it is the song of the nightingale which awakens within him a new feeling
beneath his nausea; "a resolution of which he was not even aware" (EC, p.558). A
determination to live and to affirm the thought of the eternal return. Gradually,
the man who died realizes that blessed is the soul that listens to the voice of its
demon; for it becomes, as the Greeks knew, eudaimon, or joyful. And so he
leaves his tomb and, a little later, encounters the escaped cock; another bird full
of active life. Like the singing of the nightingale, the crowing of the cock awakens
in the man who died the courage to accept the return of his own life and to "see
as beautiful what is necessary in things". That is, to see as beautiful the will to
power in things and thus acknowledge life as a process of becoming and
overcoming (of struggle). And, importantly, as something lived and experienced
within time; it is crucial, if one is to embrace the teaching of recurrence as a
'divine idea', that one overcome any lingering resentment towards time and its
passing. For what is willed by the lover of fate is "not the literal contents of the
moment but the very momentariness of the moment: that is, time's desire and
time's perishing." This does not mean offering a weary and hopeless resignation
to the fact of one's own mortality and a positing of death as the final reality or
truth of being; rather, it means finding the courage to offer a positive affirmation
so that at the end of one's own life one will be able to say: "'Was that life? Well
then! Once more!"

Such courage, Zarathustra teaches us, destroys the negative
ideal of death and transforms the latter into a line of flight.

Of course, even Zarathustra, like the man who died, has to struggle hard to
overcome his own initial nausea at the thought of recurrence; to become the singer of the intoxicated song and one who knows that paradise is here and now, thereby becoming one with time and the event, affirming life as an economy of the whole. Prior to his collapse and subsequent convalescence, Zarathustra was unable to do this; unable, for example, to accept that even the little man recurs eternally.

The man who died likewise has trouble overcoming his disgust for the fact that the slave of the lesser day must also be returned. Even when accepting the food and shelter offered him by the peasant and his wife, he can't help seeing them as "limited, meagre in life, without any splendour of gesture" (EC, p.560). But he is able at least to accept that "they were what they were, slow inevitable parts of the natural world" (ibid.) and that it was not his mission, nor anyone else's duty, to 'save' them. However, his acceptance of the existence and eternal return of the slave-class and those poor in life, also convinces the man who died of the absolute necessity of rule and the need to abandon all ideal illusions concerning the 'equality of souls'. If there is not mastery, he now realizes, and an acceptance on behalf of the noble and strong in life of their obligation to rule, then the slave will assume authority and lead the world toward ever-greater tyranny and, finally, the abyss of anarcho-nihilism: "It was the life of the little day, the life of little people. And the man who died said to himself: Unless we encompass it in the greater day, and set the little life in the circle of the greater life, all is disaster" (ibid., p.589).

Whilst we shall follow this point up in more detail in part III.iii., let me stress here that to overlook this political aspect of the theory of eternal return is to miss an essential import of the teaching as Nietzsche conceives of it. All things, all forces, all men – great and small, active and reactive, sovereign and slave – return. This is not to say we should think of the eternal recurrence as
Zarathustra's animals mistakenly think of it; i.e., as a cycle of the identical being endlessly repeated like an ever-turning wheel of existence. For, as we have seen, there is undoubtedly an element of selection and cultivation within the theory and, ultimately, what returns is difference. However, we should equally be wary of those readings in which negative wills and/or reactive forces are entirely eliminated and only that which actively affirms is returned. To put it simply, the slave cannot be interpreted out of history any more than he can be crushed out of existence (the last man doesn't fail the test of the eternal return, for he fails to acknowledge any such test; the whispering of demons means nothing to him), or lifted up to heaven via the salvation procedures of Christ. He belongs to the earth and must be accepted as belonging thus and accommodated (ruled) accordingly.

If this is an unpleasant truth, nevertheless it is one that the man who died accepts; just as he accepts the joy of living in the moment and of looking upon life without any ill-will. He knows that in saying yes to this joy, so too does he say yes to everything, including all woe and unpleasantness, for, as Zarathustra says: "'All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love'".10 The eternal return does not just promise happiness, then, and there are harsh implications of this Dionysian creed, which is why one has to become hard in order to accept it and not simply free of réssentiment. As a tragic affirmation of pain and all that is problematic in our existence, it stands in contrast to a Christianity which seeks to escape from such things and thereby negate this world, this life, as it is. No doubt Nietzsche was in part attracted to the idea of eternal recurrence because it closes the gates on any hopes of an escape from reality "by denying the very possibility of transcending the past for an existence outside of history, whether projected into an afterlife, into a utopian future, or even into an image of what might have been, had the past been different."11

There can be no doubt that those who remain trapped within the tomb of
incomplete nihilism and regard the flesh as lacking in value due to its transience, will shudder at the thought of the eternal return and be quick to dismiss it as a form of lunacy. We have already seen Clifford Chatterley reject the 'immortality of the flesh' put forward by Dukes, precisely on the grounds that, in the face of death, the body doesn't matter: "Admitting the obvious fact of dust to dust" (*JTLJ*, p.71), as the former puts it. Clifford only understands heat and not fire; "the death 'of' being and the being 'of' death" and has no inkling of how to transform "the undifferentiated black-nothingness of the death drive [into] the differentiated fire-death of the eternal return." Instead he longs for a spiritual immortality as "the ultimate consolation of an alienated existence". Dukes does have an idea of how to stop death masquerading as a biological fact from operating as a force of repression and does oppose the preachers of death by reclaiming eternity for this fair earth. He declares: "ultimately, to me there is one body: the body of men and animals and the earth! And if this body is capable of newness, then that is my resurrection" (*JTLJ*, p.71). In other words, Dukes wants to see the continuous rebirth of life on earth; "not as mere repetition but as willed and wanted re-creation."

Death, then, to reiterate, has no 'isness'; no ontological stability, or unity. And time too is something that flows; there is no chronological fixity and whilst the present moment may give the impression that it can be pin-pointed, it is always a process and a passing away. Lawrence writes: "Life, the ever-present, knows no finality ... the perfect rose is only a running flame, emerging and flowing off, and never in any sense at rest, static, finished. Herein lies its transcendent loveliness." And herein lies the loveliness of man and all things, beauty resting on the fact that being is becoming; i.e., that being is manifest in the nowness of every moment and is not fixed eternally. If we can accept this, then we can think the thought of eternal recurrence. But alas, as we have said, most men do not want to stop believing "in being as something distinct from and opposed to
becoming" or to start believing "in the being of becoming itself." For most men, the experience of duration and continuity proves that there is stability and fixity. For most men, beauty does not lie within time, but external to it; the immortal flowers of heaven never-fading which so horrify Lawrence, are precisely what they long for and the transcendent loveliness of the actual rose means nothing to them, seeing here as they do only death and decay.

Before his death and subsequent resurrection, the man who died belonged to this majority of men; he too thought he could ignore and slander the world of things and their becoming (their transient and transcendent loveliness). But after he rises back into the flesh, he realizes that there is nothing more than what exists in the moment and is able to share Lawrence's own desire: "Don't give me the infinite or the eternal ... Give me ... the incandescence and coldness of the incarnate moment: the moment, the quick of all change and haste and opposition: the moment, the immediate present, the Now." It is this alone which matters - for it is this alone which 'is'. It is the source, the issue, the creative quick of time itself; that from out of which, into which, and through which the future and past both stream. Whilst for most men the mystery and the beauty of the pure present remains undiscovered and unrecognized, the man who died realizes that the memory of his past life lived and the promise of an ideal life to come, mean nothing in comparison to the blossoming reality of the moment. For what are the past and the future at last other than crystallized abstractions from the present, as Lawrence argues, both of which take us away from the immediate life of the present.

*The Escaped Cock* is rich in passages that suggest this new way of thinking. In fact, arguably, the whole tale is one of the moment and its celebration as fire and life; the latter seeming now to the man who died as more compulsive than the destiny of death: "The doom of death was a shadow to the raging destiny of life,
the determined surge of life" (EC, p.563). Sadly, it is this shadow which is cast by the Cross of the Crucified, which still falls over the modern world. We have all lived for so long within the shade that even some of the healthiest are possessed by the same spirit of revenge which "animates the desire of the despisers of the body and the preachers of death". Delivery from this spirit is Zarathustra's greatest wish for mankind and his teaching of the eternal return is directed towards liberating the will from its negative conception of time "which posits a seriality of past, present, and future events" and which has crippled our consciousness cruelly, making us feel powerless before time's passing and thus desirous of revenge. Lawrence argues that in contrast to the above model of time, we should reactivate a pagan conception of time as moving in cycles which "allows for a complete change of the state of mind, at any moment. One cycle finished, we can drop or rise to another level, and be in a new world at once."

Our present time-consciousness which leads us wearily along an eternal straightline, is another cross for us to bear, and thus belongs to what Nietzsche calls the spirit of gravity. When a man finds the thought of the eternal return to be the 'greatest weight' (das grösste Schwergewicht), rather than a liberating experience that allows him to take flight, then we can assume he is possessed by the spirit of gravity. Like Zarathustra, he must seek the exorcism of such a spirit and learn to put down those things that genuinely bend his back and make of him no more than a pack-animal. It is not life that is a burden, but the death-forces and the duties imposed upon him by a moral-rational subjectivity; these and a bad conscience are what genuinely weigh him down.

III.ii. The Man Who Died as Overman and Uberchrist.

Who could embrace and affirm the teaching of the eternal return? Only perhaps a man who, in some sense, was more than human or beyond the human: an
overman. Only one who had passed clear of death and reactivity and resurrected into a new life free of all bad spirits. Zarathustra is one such and the man who died is another.

But if the teaching of the eternal return demands the emergence of an overman, there can be no doubt that, paradoxically, in order to become transhuman one must first become more and not less of a man (or woman); i.e., one must discover one's wholeness or integrity, as symbolized by the rebirth of Osiris-Dionysus.

Critics who insist that the overman is not simply a progression of any type or level of humanity existing presently, are not wrong. The overman is not merely the highest of all possible higher men, one agrees with Deleuze here: "The overman and the higher man differ in nature, both in the instances which produce them and in the goals that they attain." Thus the overman is not the realization or determination of human essence. However, one would also wish to challenge, or at least carefully interrogate, the view that "the overman seems to correspond to the possibility of an ecstatic break away from humanity". For the man who died certainly does not make or seek any such transcendent break; on the contrary, he makes a 'counter-ecstatic' return to the mortal flesh and overcomes his ideal identity - his 'Christhood' - by recovering the virile integrity of his physical manhood. For Lawrence, the key to living an active and ethical life lies "in remaining inside your own skin, and living inside your own skin, and not pretending you're any bigger than you are." To surpass himself, man does not become more ideal (more hu-man), but less so; more animal, complete with guts and genitals and all those things which the idealists hope to see shrivel away.

One would argue that this is what Nietzsche also wishes to see. Indeed, for Nietzsche, it will mark a genuinely positive achievement when man learns how to
become whole again, rather than an ideal assemblage of human-like qualities, or a mere simulacrum: "Painted with fifty-blotches on face and limbs" and written over with countless empty signs. It is thus vital that the man who died realize that he is more than a mere salvation-machine, or Christ-figure, as his disciples and followers (‘Christians’) would have him be. His first priority is to recover his manhood and his mortality and overcome his past as ideal-divinity and God upon the Cross. More than wishing simply to become Übermensch, the man who died sets out on a process of becoming Überchrist (and, indeed, anti-Christ). Again and again he insists that his triumph is that he is not dead, has not been swept up to heaven, but has been reborn into the flesh upon the earth as man-alive. His ‘mission’ now is to heal and to become whole.

The first thing that the man who died does as part of this process is to renounce his universal concern with the souls of all men, in order that he may concretely care for his own soul; "'now I can go about my own business, into my own single life'" (EC, p.564). He recognizes that the desire he had to bring about the salvation of all men whilst disregarding his own physical well-being and needs, was itself a sign of decadence, just as Zarathustra accepts that "his own desire for a transfiguration of humanity into an overhumanity reflects his own sickness and morbid, dissatisfied condition." As we have seen, Zarathustra and the man who died both learn to overcome their nausea at the reality of man and accept him for what he is. Both also learn that their own task is to take care of and create themselves. This does not involve or lead to the kind of self-obsession that Jesus suffered from before his death; the self is not conceived as something to discover, dwell upon, confess, liberate, or preserve – but create and continually work upon. This ancient Greek conception, reactivated by Nietzsche and Lawrence, is not only different to the Christian idea or ethic of the self, but, according to Foucault, "diametrically opposed."
The man who died, having adopted this Greek ethic of the self, begins also to take an active concern with his appearance: "Therefore he cut his hair and his beard ... And he bought himself shoes, and the right mantle" (EC, p.571). But more than simply wanting to dress sharply, the man who died wants to physically heal and become strong; to rise in touch with the flesh he himself denied and lent to torture (the Crucifixion) and metaphysical cannibalism (the Eucharist). At the climax of the tale, the priestess of Isis helps him achieve this: "What was torn becomes a new flesh, what was a wound is full of fresh life" (ibid., p.593). She takes the death out of him and all the old fear and réssentiment, so that "gradually warmth began to take the place of cold terror, and he felt: I am going to be flushed warm again, I am going to be whole! I shall be warm like the morning - I shall be a man" (ibid., p.595). And, indeed, finally: "he felt the blaze of his manhood and power rise up in his loins, magnificent" (ibid., p.596). This - the phallic erection - is the symbol of his wholeness and recovered life.

To reiterate: as Christ the Redeemer, Jesus was something less than a man, not more; a kind of castrato. His becoming-Überchrist sets free the non-personal and inhuman forces and flows of life and liberates him as a sexual being of the kind problematized within the Judea-Christian tradition. "'I am risen!'" (EC, p.596) becomes the cry of triumph of not only the man who died, but of all those who have been reborn into the new flesh and rediscovered the body's potencies, whilst accepting its limits.

This feeling of power, of power's inrush and increase, results in great joy for the man who died; a joy great enough to enable him to affirm the eternal recurrence unconditionally. As man-alive and risen lord, he feels himself so well disposed toward life and so full of blazing indomitable power, that he is able to say yes to life in its totality and to desire nothing more than the eternal resurrection of the flesh. Confident and joyous, the man who died shines out like a star and provides
a new practice. Like his brother Zarathustra, he abandons any thoughts of preaching or teaching, having realized that whilst one profits from hearing the song of the nightingale, one profits from a philosopher "only insofar as he can be an example ... But this example must be supplied by his outward life". This takes both Zarathustra and the man who died some time to learn; but that they do learn it is an important part of their respective (but in many ways parallel becomings). As Daniel Conway writes: "Zarathustra's exemplification of Ubermenschlichkeit thus transfers the onus of authority from his discourse to his practices in the world. Here Nietzsche's insight echoes that of Plato and Aristotle; to be a virtuous exemplar is to promote the virtue of others."30

It is not that Zarathustra or the man who died say to those who look to them 'do as I do', or 'model your life on mine'; for neither ultimately wishes for followers of zombie-like disciples. On the contrary, they wish for living companions and friends who are masters over themselves in their own right and own fashion. The greatest and final lesson that Zarathustra and the man who died wish to teach is 'lose me and find yourselves'.31

Having spoken so far of the becoming-Uberchrist of the man who died in terms of a new practice of self, let us now examine the above from a slightly more 'clinical' perspective; for what enables the man who died to get back his body and affirm a new ethic is the fact that he attains the 'greater health' that Nietzsche writes of. When naked before the priestess, the man who died is revealed as painfully thin and frail, still very much full of death. And yet, miraculously, he heals (or, rather, is healed by the touch of the woman) and comes into a new kind of well-being; "an irresistible and delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, while nonetheless giving him the becomings that a dominant and substantial health would render impossible."32
In other words, the new health of the man who died is not the good health of the bourgeois who desires above all else to preserve himself. Such dreary and functional good health is merely a limitation and a blockage placed upon the life-forces imprisoned within man. Better death, says Deleuze, than the health we have been given and are continually told by the 'health authorities' we should look after.

Like a great artist or true philosopher, the man who died "returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums" and with an emaciated body full of nausea and full of holes. And yet still he returns with a deeper vitality and a greater health than with which he began his journey.

Zarathustra says he has seen the greatest and smallest of men naked and that they were revealed as "still all-too-similar to one another" in their nakedness. Yet we are forced to wonder whether Zarathustra would recognize a body full of the greater health if he were to see one; for Zarathustra understands the body and its nakedness badly (as we saw last chapter). One certainly doubts that he would have been able to see in the man who died what the woman of Isis sees in him and his body: "a true Priestess, she saw the other kind of beauty in it, the sheer stillness of the deeper life" (EC., p.582).

In fact, Zarathustra makes several remarks which reveal his poor understanding of the nakedness of the overman. For example, he thinks that it is within "the burning sun of wisdom in which the overman joyfully bathes his nakedness!" But this, as Lawrence shows and as the man who died learns, is not the case. Initially worried that the priestess will not be able to prove equal to the death within him because she lacks his understanding and knowledge of death, the man who died realizes as he bathes his nakedness in her sacred oils and the secretions of her vagina, that it doesn't require wisdom or knowledge, but the touch of
tenderness and the warmth of desire: "It doesn't need understanding. It needs newness" (*EC*, p.595).

The woman is not a philosopher in any sense such as Zarathustra would recognize; she acts and has her beauty from another consciousness ('cunt awareness' as Lawrence calls it in his *Lady Chatterley* writings). The man who died can only watch in awe as she performs her sacred mysteries which remain beyond him and his understanding: "How sensitive and softly alive she is! How alive she is, with a life so different from mine!" (*EC*, p.592). Zarathustra has never looked upon a woman thus; nor received from such a healing touch of passion and desire. Knowing not of woman, nor sexual fulfilment, Zarathustra remains a far more limited and far less interesting character than the man who died. Until he finds the woman with whom he can 'mingle his body' and overcomes the greed of his virginity, he will not make the move from knowing-in-apartness to creating in touch.

The man who died, we may say in conclusion, learns three things: to love, to laugh, and to dance. As Christ, he did not love sufficiently; otherwise, as Zarathustra says "he would not have been so angry that he was not loved".36 and he would not have demanded such an ideal and uncompromising love "with hardness, with madness, with fearful outbursts against those who denied it".37 The man who died acknowledges this and accepts the folly of attempting to "embrace multitudes" whilst having "never truly embraced even one" (*EC*, p.565).

But learning how to love in a new manner is only one stage of his self-overcoming; this self-serious man has also to learn how to laugh and to dance. The man who died achieves the latter by refusing the burden of the Cross and living in happy defiance of the spirit of gravity. And this shepherd of souls achieves the former by biting of the head of the black snake as depicted by
Nietzsche in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: Of the Vision and the Riddle*. By biting off and spitting out the head of this serpent of bad conscience, the shepherd stands: "No longer shepherd, no longer human - a transformed being ... laughing! Never yet on earth had any man laughed as he laughed!" At what does this Übermensch and Übermensch laugh? At all things; but perhaps most of all at his own former seriousness and bleating moral righteousness. Having learned how to laugh, the man who died now feels deep shame that he once preached that blessed are they that weep and mourn; cursed are they that laugh.

Becoming a man who is able to laugh, enables the man who died to leave all solemnity and will to vengeance to the authorities of Church and State; i.e., to Jewish priests and Roman judges who exist only to condemn life, love, and laughter. But by becoming-gay and insouciant the man who died doesn't cease to be any the less an opponent to these authorities; and, in fact, if they disliked his seriousness they despise his light-heartedness still more. For as Nietzsche notes, what really enrages the slave at last is "half-stoical and smiling unconcern with the seriousness of faith" and the importance of law and order. Thus it is, for example, that we observe the hostile reaction of his former disciples when the man who died meets them along the open road, disguised, and teases them with both his questions of them and his answers to their questions of him. The man who died knows now that "a dangerous phenomenon in the world is a man of narrow belief" (*EC*, p.573) who knows not how to laugh.

If the man who died understandably wishes to have little contact with those uncompromising men and women who cannot laugh, he realizes also that he wants to avoid those who have heavy feet as well as hard hearts; i.e., those who cannot dance and who mistakenly believe "that to affirm means to bear, to assume, to endure an ordeal, or to take on a burden", rather than to "set free that which lives." Lawrence illustrates this by showing us the man who died assist in the
escaped cock's quest for freedom and fulfilment: "I must toss this bird into the seethe of phenomena, for he must ride his wave" (EC, p.572), i.e., the bird must find his roost to rule so that his singularity takes on splendour "polished by the lure" of the hens he takes to his body (ibid., p.574). This is vital: love, laughter, dance and play all demand community; our singularity only shines out and has meaning within a community of touch or some kind of vital social and cultural context. Self-stylization and self-overcoming takes place within a wide world of otherness. This, finally, is the greatest realization of the man who died; that he rises and must rise as a man implicated within a network of power and politics.

III.iii. The Man Who Died as Risen Lord.

"Rise as the Lord. No longer the man of Sorrows. The Crucified uncrucified. The Crown of Thorns removed, and the tongues of fire round the brows."41

We have seen that the man who died overcomes his nausea at having to accept the fact that the slave of the lesser day returns eternally; seen also that he realizes that this necessitates the need for rule. And so the question of power and politics returns to us once more.

Nietzsche argues in the Genealogy (III.18) that true aristocrats belong to a solitary species of man and thus instinctively dislike organization(s) and feel ill at ease in groups, irritated at having to deal with the affairs of the lesser day. They are "accustomed to living on mountains – to seeing the wretched ephemeral chatter of politics"42 beneath them. But, just as they must overcome their nausea at the thought of the slave's eternal return, so too must they overcome this irritation and discomfort. For in order to be masters they have to learn how to rule over others and not merely over themselves. Eventually, such men as Zarathustra and the man who died have to descend from their mountain tops
(climb down Pisgah), if ever they wish to enter into the 'promised land' (i.e., a fulfilled life on earth) and not merely glimpse it from afar. Further, they have to realize that they will not be allowed the false security of a mountain top indefinitely, that the last men will not rest until all mountain dwellers and other solitaries have been exterminated: "The good have to crucify him he who devises his own virtue! That is the truth!" Of course, in exterminating the creators, the last men ensure that the future itself is sacrificed (to themselves). This is precisely what the man who died means when he argues that unless the lesser day is set within the context of the greater day and ruled over by the men of the latter, all ends in disaster. If he himself is to avoid being murdered once more (and innumerable times more) at the hands of the majority, then he has to accept the responsibility of power and the obligation of rule. In order to guarantee both his own life and the 'whole human future', the man who died realizes he must accept his duty to rise not only as man-alive, but as a power-lord.

In *The Escaped Cock*, the hint is given that the man who died is transformed via his contact with the priestess into more than a man who will simply make a good lover, or husband and father; i.e., will also become a solar-aristocrat or man of divine fire and affirmative will: "A new sun was coming up in him ... 'Now I am not myself - I am something new ...'" (EC, p.595). This is developed by Lawrence in an essay which effectively forms an outline for a third part to the tale of the man who died, entitled *The Risen Lord*. In this work, the man who died acknowledges his intention to engage with the world and resist those forces which would block the flow of solar energy and negate all warmth of heart. That is, those forces which Lawrence identifies as belonging to 'Mammon' (his term for the Crucified). Lawrence writes that if Jesus rose as a man on earth then his greatest test would be to find a way in which to continue the struggle against "the mechanical anti-life convention of Jewish priests, Roman despotism, and universal money-lust", as well as his own "self-absorption, self-consciousness, self-
importance".44

Crucially, the latter struggle against egoism relates closely to the former. For the man who died realizes that if he is to be successful in the fight against the conventional powers that be, he must learn to form relations with others. Nietzsche says: "It is not possible to be a philosopher completely for oneself. For as a human being a person is related to other human beings, and if he is a philosopher, he must be a philosopher in this relationship."45 But this is true also for the non-philosopher; true for all men in whatever capacity they act. No one can ever really lead an entirely isolated 'inner life' or ask in good faith of another 'what have I to do with thee?'

Acknowledging the bond between himself and all other men and women, the man who died rises to form a wide variety of relationships - sexual, social, and political - some based on love, others based on enmity (but all formed within desire and sealed by Dionysian passion). The man who died rises not only to discover family life, but also the world of work, for example. In The Risen Lord Lawrence suggests that if he remembered his first life then probably he would assume once again not his role as a preacher, but as a carpenter "with joy, among the shavings."46 But in The Escaped Cock, as we have seen, the man who died decides to become a healer-physician, realizing as he does that he can only achieve his own healing via a 'revolutionary' healing of mankind; that his resurrection does not take place in isolation. It is not that life itself is a sickness (as decadents like Socrates and those who posit death as a 'cure' would have it); but human life has been made sick by the forms of subjectivity and civilization man has devised for himself. As cultural physician, the man who died is also a 'schizoanalyst' - and who knows better than he of breakdowns, breakthroughs and becomings? But the nature of the schizoanalytic project is not merely therapeutic, or strictly clinical: it is also formative of a new type of critique. As
Mark Seem writes: "Once we forget about our egos a non-neurotic type of politics becomes possible, where singularity and collectivity are no longer at odds with each other"; what we have called in this work a politics of desire. This form of 'molecular' politics allows for new collective expressions of desire and seeks to destroy "the oedipalized and neuroticized individual dependencies" formed by a totalitarian system of moral and rational norms, via "the forging of a collective sensibility".

As we said earlier, this means that the man who died as risen lord must continue his fight with the reactive forces who have today granted themselves authority: "But this time it would no longer be the fight of self-sacrifice that would end in crucifixion." Rather, this time it would be the fight of "a freed man fighting to shelter the rose of life from being trampled on by the pigs." That is to say, this time the man who died will be strategically and tactically more astute, politically less naive. There can be no doubt, however, that the man who died intends to carry on the struggle. Declaring his intention at the end of the tale, when about to flee from the authorities who would capture and put him to death once more, to continue to pit his wits against theirs, one is reminded of Lawrence's own remark in a letter when asked of his plans following a period of relative silence and enforced withdrawal from public life due to illness: "I shall go into the world again, to kick it and stub my toe. It is no good my thinking of retreat. I rise up, and feel I don't want to. My business is a fight, and I've got to keep it up." Arguably, in all those who have attempted to rise up and live as lords (i.e., sovereign individuals), the fight against convention and slave morality has become second nature (i.e., a mixture of instinct and need).

In pledging himself to protect the 'rose of life' from being trampled on by the 'pigs', the man who died pledges to defend intelligence, sensitivity, love, laughter, and beauty from all forms of grossness and vulgarity. In other words, he is
declaring his intent to defend culture from the forces of civilization (the latter being a euphemism for mechanical barbarism). Above all, as risen lord the man who died wants to take the power and the riches of the world out of the hands of the mediocre and the greedy. In his first life Jesus "thought that purity and poverty were one. It was a fatal mistake." Now he knows that the riches and powers of the world must not be allowed to fall into the hands of the base and resentful. Power and wealth do not corrupt the pure in spirit ("it would thus not seem to be a necessity for a Caesar to become bad"; but the impure in spirit and the impotent use these things corruptly. The man who died as risen lord is determined that the earth shall not belong to the slaves of the lesser day, that it shall, rather, be governed by those who have had the courage to die out from their old lives and resurrect into the new flesh. Such men have not, after all, "died and risen again for nothing." 

It must be stressed, however, that the above do not lust for riches and worldly power in order to disguise their own poverty of spirit, or their own weakness. Both Nietzsche and Lawrence are keen to make this point clear. The former writes that true aristocrats are not merely ambitious slaves eager to expand their own egoism and authority, but those who "want power merely because it would otherwise fall into other hands upon whom they do not want to be dependent." And the latter has the risen lord tell Mammon that riches and power and glory ultimately mean very little to him as a man who, having died, has lost his self-importance: "That's why I am going to take them all from you Mammon, because I care nothing for them. I am going to destroy all your values, Mammon: all your money-values and conceit values. I am going to destroy them all."

In daring to destroy the old values, the man who died as risen lord marks himself out as a true creator; his joy comes from the thought of destroying whatever mutilates or prevents the flow of life and contact with life.
In some ways, the risen lord is the Jesus hinted at on occasion in the New Testament, but never fully developed: Jesus the power-lord who comes bearing arms with which to smite his enemies. Certainly the man who died as risen lord is not the gentle shepherd and saviour who preaches love and forgiveness and thinks he can abandon any concern with power and politics (the sword). This was the fatal error made by Jesus in his first life and one made much of by Lawrence in *Apocalypse*, where he argues that whilst "Jesus gave the ideal for the Christian individual ... [he] ... deliberately avoided giving an ideal for the State or Nation."57 This, Lawrence claims, was naive and irresponsible; for Jesus effectively left it to others to give such and thereby to fashion and operate such. Thus, in a way, Jesus handed us all into the power of the systematizers and the bullies: "Jesus made it inevitable, when he said that money belonged to Caesar. Money means bread, and the bread of men belongs to no man. Money also means power, and it is monstrous to give power to the virtual enemy".58

Christ's error here resulted in the universal crucifixion of man; not just his own death. For his refusal to accept the responsibility of power and provide rule, gave the opportunity to the base and mediocre to fashion a religion in his name founded upon self-glorification of the weak and the undermining and persecution of the strong and healthy (i.e., it allowed the slave revolt in morals). Incredibly, some readers of Lawrence and Nietzsche still fail to grasp this point and its significance. Michel Haar, for example, insists that the future 'masters of the earth' called for and imagined by Nietzsche "will possess neither political power, nor wealth, nor any effective governing force".59 Hopefully, the folly and dangerously utopian nature of this remark is now self-evident. The 'voiceless voice' who whispers into the ear of Zarathustra during the 'stillest hour' is right to tell him that it is unpardonable to have power and then to refuse to rule.60 It is not enough merely to perform miracles, one must also be able to *command* great things. Ultimately, Jesus not only let down Judas, but he betrayed us all by
leaving himself at the mercy of slaves and opening the way for the 'reign of saints'. But the man who died accepts the 'horizontal division of mankind' as the "eternal division between the base and the beautiful"\textsuperscript{61} and he affirms the necessity of cultivating a pathos of distance between them and of establishing the rule of the few over the ego-bound masses, or 'robot-hoardes'.

To conclude, I would like to refer to the series of points that Lawrence closes \textit{Apocalypse} with. Deleuze notes that these points, crucial to an understanding of Lawrence's late political thinking, form "a kind of manifesto"\textsuperscript{62} and he relates them to the \textit{Litany of Exhortations} found in \textit{Fantasia}. And, certainly, they do essentially argue something similar to that found in the above; namely, leave off ideal-loving in the abstract and start to form real connections. But this is not what they say in full, and Deleuze is careful not to mention the nature of the connections Lawrence advocates: active power-relations formed within and productive of aristocratic political relations (i.e., relations contrary to Deleuze's own quasi-anarchic political project, but very much in line with Nietzsche's philosophy and Lawrence's own earlier work: see chapters II and III).

With his dying breath, Lawrence seeks to defend and to affirm a political creed that many of his commentators remain keen to overlook, or pretend he abandoned decisively post-\textit{Plumed Serpent}. But although Lawrence does flood his late work with a greater level of radical desire and does begin to evolve a different political vocabulary of favoured terms, still he insists on the vital importance of political and social power relations. It remains his belief that the most fundamental truth is that: "No man is pure individual ... men live and move and think and feel collectively ... It has always been so, and will always be so."\textsuperscript{63}

For Lawrence, then, man is a unit of worldly power. And as such he is a collective being who "has his fulfilment in the gratification of his power-sense."\textsuperscript{64}
Therefore, as point six of Lawrence's 'manifesto' in *Apocalypse* concludes: "To have an ideal for the individual which regards only his individual self and ignores his collective self is in the long-run fatal."65 Either the collective self has its being in a power relationship, or it is doomed to live a reactive life "trying to destroy power, and destroy itself."66 As risen lord, the man who died is ready to accept the validity of this argument; ready to acknowledge his own duty to provide in himself the living embodiment of power: the hero or leader whom Judas sought in vain. To become an aristocrat means more than being able to display great tenderness; one must also be able to give expression to the "sense of divinity informing humanity" (i.e., become one who can "interfuse the earthly and the spiritual for the enrichment of the community").67

The risen lord is a power-lord, or solar aristocrat; a king-god who transmits vividness and the actual potency of the cosmos. To a greater or lesser degree, it is the need of all men to feel themselves such in their own way: "The *primal* need, the old-Adamic need in a man's soul is to be, in his own sphere and as far as he can attain it, master, lord, and a splendid one."68 But this can only be achieved via submission within a hierarchy of arranged power and by giving reverence and allegiance to the power-soul in other men; by conceding that fulfiment is something that can only be achieved collectively.

Part IV: Closing Remarks.

IV.i. Nietzsche and Lawrence as Posthumous Thinkers.

"The philosopher", says Deleuze, "is someone who believes he has returned from the dead".1 Someone, that is to say, who believes he must live in the world as a risen lord; that this is the necessary pre-condition for living a full and vital life of wonder and connection. Nietzsche calls such types 'posthumous' individuals and
includes himself amongst their number; "it is only after death that we shall enter our life and become alive, oh, very much alive, we posthumous people!"²

There can be no doubt that Lawrence too is another posthumous thinker. And perhaps it is the case that our hope today lies precisely with such people; i.e., with those who give us in their writings and their lives a new understanding of life and death and provide also what fewer than a handful of poets and philosophers have ever given us - a completely new vision of what man is and may yet become. Works such as Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* and Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock* which have been central to our study in this chapter, express a becoming-other to that which we are and that which is produced, perpetuated, and insisted upon as the ideal form by the dominant socius of this today. They allow us to glimpse, if only briefly and somewhat hazily, the "deeper blue of that greater day"³ which is the unborn day that lies beyond the ruins. Nietzsche's aphorisms and Lawrence's poems, at their best, tear open the grey skies of the present and form openings to the outside which is also the future, obliging and encouraging us as readers to "plunge into chaos, before returning as if from the land of the dead."⁴

IV.ii. Towards a Final Conclusion.

I have attempted here in this chapter to offer an understanding of Nietzsche as he would have us understand him; in terms of Dionysus versus the Crucified, which is to say as one who has 'unmasked' Christian morality. It is this, he claims, which sets him apart from the rest of mankind.⁵ It certainly sets him apart from Lawrence, who has a somewhat different (though clearly related) project; namely, to put Jesus back in touch with the wider religious context from which he emerged and to "put God and the Bible back into the enormous historical setting."⁶
For Lawrence and Nietzsche, the Judeo-Christian insistence upon an absolute and detached monotheism has been disastrous, and they wish to reactivate the pluralism and interconnectedness of the earlier pagan religions. Of course, it is certainly the case that: "A paganism haunted by Christianity is something inevitably different from a paganism that has never known it." Nietzsche and Lawrence would readily admit this (just as they would concede that a post-moral ethic beyond good and evil, is something other than a pre-moral ethic before good and evil). Zarathustra and the man who died attempt to show us possible ways forward; there can be no going back. And yet we might ask is the becoming-Osiris of the latter really an advance or in any way more significant than Ramón's becoming-Quetzalcoatl, or Cipiano's becoming-Huitzilpotchli in *The Plumed Serpent* (see chapter III)? One would argue that it is: For one thing, it is achieved via a process of phallic tenderness and an experience of desire; not political murder. The man who died fucks himself into a new life and thus his becoming resembles more closely the becoming of Oliver Mellors, than Ramón or Cipriano. The latter, for example, attempts to achieve divine status and breach the limits of his humanity by stabbing prisoners. The man who died, however, having himself been a political prisoner and himself been judged, condemned, and executed by the authorities, has had more than enough of such cruelty and state-stupidity.

This is an important point: Quetzalcoatl drinks human blood; Dionysus is a god of the grape. Whereas Jesus too once advocated the drinking of his blood and the eating of his flesh, this is now explicitly repudiated as a teaching by the man who died. There is in *The Escaped Cock* a counter-transubstantiation of blood back into wine to parallel the counter-transcendence back into the flesh of the body. The man who died no longer says drink blood like one of the undead, or feast like a zombie on corpses; but, rather, sip the wine of Dionysus and let it make you merry and gay so that you will want to dance and sing, not lust for revenge and
for death.

Whilst Lawrence retains notions of active power and radical aristocratism post-
*Plumed Serpent*, he does move significantly beyond the politics of evil and cruelty
as discussed in chapters II and III of this thesis. Lawrence ultimately condemns
the literature of transgression as being both romantic and decadent; a
pornographic mixture of the sentimental and the sensational. If in *The Plumed
Serpent* and other writings from his 'American period' he plays out his own
murderous fantasies, he eventually comes to question those writers and thinkers
who remain trapped at the level of crime and disintegration. In a letter to Aldous
Huxley he asks: "if you can only palpitate to murder, suicide, and rape, in their
various degrees ... however are we going to live ... it becomes a phantasmal
boredom and produces ultimately inertia, inertia, inertia and final atrophy of
feelings."8

Such negative limit experiences may help us 'escape' from our 'imprisonment'
within moral-rational consciousness, but if they fail to help us get beyond the
sensation produced by the experiences themselves then they are not very effective
escapes (mere masturbatory fantasies); we remain ego-bound. In wishing to
follow a line of flight that will transport us from bad conscience to new
innocence, we do not wish to end in a black hole of inertia and the atrophy of all
feeling (i.e., nihilism). In seeking to become hard, we do not wish to become
brutal and insensate. Lawrence, more than any other novelist of the last century,
helps us to move beyond good and evil without succumbing to the above
dangers. Of course, even his work takes place within the perspective of nihilism
and is thus far from free of reactive forces; but he, like Nietzsche before him,
comes closest to stuttering the first terms of a genuine revaluation of all values.
Outside the Gate: A Conclusion.

In this thesis I have made a critical and clinical examination of Nietzsche's project of revaluation as 'mediated' via the work of D.H. Lawrence and in relation to other bodies of post-Nietzschean thought. Primarily, I have been interested in the political and ethical aspects of this project, as well as its cultural and social implications; that is to say, I have been keen to argue Nietzsche and Lawrence at a public level, countering the reduction of their work's significance to a wholly private individual level (i.e., an essentially abstract and apolitical level). I have suggested that whilst it may be difficult and at times disturbing to modern sensibilities to imagine a culture dominated by active forces and noble values, or a model of the self 'beyond good and evil', this should not constitute an argument against attempting to do so.

By placing Nietzsche's project within the fictional environment provided by Lawrence's novels, I have hoped to stress that it achieves its main success as a provocative thought-experiment, best played by those readers and critics prepared to live dangerously and do their thinking outside the gate (i.e., outside of the usual moral-rational conventions); searching for a vocabulary of 'elementary' words with which to build a nest of flames in which old models of thought, self, and society can be destroyed, and new models created. I will say more on this idea at the close of this conclusion, indicating an important implicit concern of this thesis (the theme of language).

Firstly, however, I wish to formally bring together in a clearly summarized manner a number of the main conclusions that have emerged during the course of the preceding study. The following were reached in the context of and are relative to the individual chapters and I have roughly arranged them here according to this structural division of the thesis and not on the basis of merit or validity.
Fuller accounts of the points summarized can often be found in the closing sections of the chapters they are drawn from.

Our primary conclusion must be - contrary to our own initial expectations and prejudices - that nihilism, far from being the great danger and problematic of modern European culture to be solved at all costs, or the very limit of thought and experience to be moved beyond via a transcendent leap, is actually something to be affirmed. For nihilism, as indicated by all the talk of crisis that surrounds it, is a crucial moment of transition; a phenomenon which provides the opportunity to revalue values and effect an overcoming of ourselves. It does not merely mark the collapse of all values and the disintegration of agency. Those who understand it in exclusively negative terms have only partly understood it. Modern man, as Nietzsche shows, is born of 'original' nihilism; its unfolding constitutes our essential history. And, in all likelihood, we may conclude, postmodern man (the transhuman human being) will be born of modern European nihilism; the latter marking the end of one history and the beginning of a future narrative and new revealing. In one form or another, nihilism is coextensive with our being and becoming and provides both the tomb and womb of man and overman. Even the decadence which is associated with it (as cause and symptom) is necessary to us; vital for growth and the flourishing of culture. If strength and health are needed to preserve life, then sickness and corruption (deviation) advances it. Thus nihilism is an ambiguous state of affairs; one that ultimately demands and requires perfecting.

Secondly, and following on directly from the above point, those things which nihilism has most clearly and successfully manifested itself via - humanity, science and technology, capitalism - cannot simply be abolished. Nor can the above or their effects be reversed or undone; only overcome. And if there is an inherently negative will expressed in the above and a predominantly reactive accumulation of
forces; if they do form limits upon thought and experience and in some base
manner cripple us by inhibiting our becoming, then so too from out of the above
do some of our best hopes escape. Ultimately, they are not things to be opposed,
so much as forms to be reconfigured, processes to be accelerated, and forces to
be redirected. What needs to be done is to decodify and deterritorialize the self
still further (man must be overcome, not 'saved'); science must become gay and
technology questioned (not rejected in favour of a simple-minded and
technophobic 'New Ageism'); capitalism must be taken to its absolute limit, which,
as shown in chapter I, is a schizophrenic limit, and there transformed (not
countered by socialist idealism or hindered by state regulations and a series of
internal axiomatics). Nihilism, to reiterate the above conclusion, must be
consummated (not left incomplete and imperfect). Besides, as Nietzsche rightly
points out: 'no one is free to be a crab'. Thus nihilism cannot be side-stepped, or
reversed. But whilst we should resist the temptation to reactively deny it, so too
should we avoid falling into the trap of passive resignation à la the last man. The
four R's: reform, revolution, reaction, and resignation must all be met and
countered by a fifth: rejection. Affirmation alone is the key to the sixth and final
R-term: revaluation.

And the revaluation, we may conclude, will involve in an important sense the
becoming-minoritarian, or becoming-woman of politics, of the subject, of
knowledge forms, and of culture. Nietzsche refers to this process both positively
and with approval as the giving of style, or the making gay of the above; and
negatively in terms of décadence (although as noted above this is often only a
nasty word for something which provides tomorrow's health). It is a process
characterized by a return to, or, more precisely, a resurrection of the body (as
something without organs) and a transfiguration of the Word back into the Flesh.
Such thinking, which has been at the heart of this thesis, has often best been
developed within contemporary feminist theory and we can conclude that whilst
the project of revaluation is not explicitly presented by Nietzsche as a 'feminist' one *per se* (any more than the problem of the subject is openly portrayed as a crisis of adult-white-male-heterosexual male authority in particular), it can legitimately be read as such and there are clearly aspects of Lawrence's and Deleuze's work, as well as Nietzsche's own, which encourage and open the way for such a reading. In fact, this has been one way in which the writings of the above have had an important public role to play; i.e., by providing minority groups with the opportunity to develop a new style of nomadic thought and evolve a counter-discourse that is appropriate to the voicing of their concerns.

If Nietzschean and post-Nietzschean philosophy allows for the development of a radical politics as suggested above, then so too does it encourage the forming of a closely related new ethos and aesthetic; art providing a new practice of self as well as a counter-nihilistic force *par excellence* at the level of culture and society. 'Style' is a central term in the Nietzschean vocabulary. And yet because style involves above all else strict discipline and the formation of a singular taste, few will ever attain it. However, it remains crucial, Nietzsche argues, that every man and woman have some notion of style, if they are to achieve satisfaction (i.e., a feeling of pride in their strength and fulfilment as creatures able to command and obey themselves). Those individuals lacking in satisfaction will succumb to the poison of *ressentiment* and cast an evil eye on those others who do know joy and do possess a degree of style. These are the 'slaves' who make up the herd majority of mankind that Nietzsche speaks of; those unable to create laws of their own by which to live and who therefore subscribe to and seek to impose a universal morality; those who, unable to give birth to a culture and become a people, erect a civilization and form themselves into a state. Lacking the character and the strength to shape the chaos of themselves, they suppress and deny the latter by an act of will; shutting out all but the small handful of base forces they can organize a purely personal identity upon. One of the crucial tasks of
revaluation is, we may conclude, the liberating of daimonic and impersonal selves from the subjectivities and ego-bound selves we have been given and become all too familiar with. How man achieves this self-overcoming is vital. But, let us recall, it has been an important finding that this too is a fundamentally social and cultural task; it is not and cannot be something achieved in isolation. The care, creation, and enhancement of the self (as well as its overcoming) is a politics as well as an ethics, because our being is always a being with and for others and our becoming always a becoming-other.

Having mentioned the process by which the overman is produced, I would like to offer a few additional remarks in conclusion with specific reference to this important notion. In chapter II, I examined how as the move was made from the love-mode of moral idealism to the power-mode of libidinal materialism, the human subject (and political agent) is dramatically reconceived and reconfigured at both the level of forces and form; the ideal concept of the human being displaced by possibilities suggested by the greater reality of man as a being of will to power: inhuman and overhuman possibilities. Nietzsche and Lawrence both stress the immoral and non-rational nature of man and demonstrate how the daimonic forces of the Old Adam could come together with external forces – social, political, economic, and technological forces for example – to produce a new type of subject. But whilst their anti-humanism is far-reaching and thorough-going, it is not simply a reactive misanthropy; anymore than their wishing to make of man more than a logical machine is a flight into an absurd and romantic irrationalism. If, on the one hand, both authors do at times appear to invite misinterpretation on such points as these, so, on the other hand, do they demand and deserve the most careful and intelligent of readings.

The key question is: can man in his present form acquire a new sensibility (i.e., a new way of thinking and feeling); or must his present human status be abolished?
Nietzsche, rightly I would conclude, argues that man must be overcome. However, he remains at pains to emphasize that even in his present form man, for all his slave attributes (free-will, memory, accountability etc.), remains a creature worthy of hope and full of tremendous potential and is not simply to be aborted. Man himself must form the bridge to the future; or, more precisely, dormant forces within man. The overcoming of man is essentially a self-overcoming and will proceed via a deepening and furthering of what man is, as well as a connection with new forces external to him. The becoming—Übermensch does not involve transcendence and is not achieved via ecstasy. Of course, this is not to imply that Nietzsche is merely seeking a new turning for man based upon a development of the moral-rational subject. If he is not advocating an ideal leap over man, nevertheless he does wish in some manner to punctuate historical and evolutionary equilibrium and continuity via the development of a radical trans-human future. The overman may not be the absolute other that some critics have, mistakenly, suggested; but 'he' is certainly more than the superhuman.

Ultimately, this question of the overman is central to the project of revaluation because Nietzsche and Lawrence are interested in how, via a number of strange becomings and transmutations, they can make the present order explode. If this is a 'revolutionary' project, it is so on a primarily molecular level and in a manner most significantly developed by Deleuze and Foucault. Molar political revolution is something that Lawrence expressly rejects in two separate novels as vieux jeu. For the latter promises nothing more than a continuous repetition of the same; i.e., more men of slave-like and human, all too human status and their grouping into herd formations. Nietzsche and Lawrence are undoubtedly at their most interesting and most important when, realizing this, they begin to imagine and promote the possibility of a new kind of politics.

But if the revaluation involves the forming of a radical new style of politics, then
it has to be admitted that Nietzsche and Lawrence did not get very far in
developing such themselves; they merely hinted at it and opened the way for
others. Further, there are elements in the writings of both which seem at odds
with the radicalism of their work. In part due to his theory of culture -
arborescent rather than rhizomatic - Nietzsche, for example, finds himself obliged
to affirm a socio-political model that is strikingly similar at times to a
conservative tradition within philosophy that reaches back to Plato and his
*Republic*. When Lawrence attempts to reterritorialize his thinking upon such lines
in *The Plumed Serpent* (see chapter III), the result is a disturbing and quasi-
fascistic fantasy in which the underlying sensibility doesn’t fit into the political
form given it. This novel serves best, it can perhaps be concluded, as an
instructive failure.

However, if there are reactionary and authoritarian elements in Nietzsche’s and
Lawrence’s political writings (and clearly they were neither liberals nor democrats
in the usual sense of this term), it is important to be able to conclude that it is in
no way valid or meaningful to describe their work as ‘fascist’. On the contrary,
with its emphasis on cracks, ruptures, disjunctions, difference, and becoming (in
fact a whole ‘gargoyle aesthetic’ and radically active notion of power), it is
feasible to argue that their work is inherently anti-fascist. If the political thinking
of Nietzsche and Lawrence is sometimes limited and sometimes regrettably
distorted by the semi-rigid forms they attempt to impose rather awkwardly onto
their more fluid philosophy of power, never does either of the above betray *Geist
to Reich* or to any party-political *Machtpolitik*. Whatever else they were, neither
Nietzsche or Lawrence was a state-idolater and both were, in fact, prescient in
recognizing and warning against the danger of the totalitarian modern state. Being
artists, both were instinctively aware that there is no Absolute and that wholeness
and completion, or purity (be it of races or genres) can only rest upon illusion
and the exclusion of a vast field of otherness. A field which they wished to
explore and conduct their thought-experiments within, bringing out the temporal, contingent, and discordant elements within all certainties (to find value in that which the fascist mind fears most).

By abandoning fantasies of violent transgression and takeover we are perhaps all rescued from the black hole of fascism and the dangerously utopian longing for a New Jerusalem. As indicated, a grand revolutionary response to nihilism at the molar political level is simply inappropriate and demands to be decisively rejected; the revaluation is hindered rather than furthered by such means. It is important to be able to conclude, as Lawrence concludes, that the desire for bloody revolution and all sorts of horror and atrocity is both romantic and reactionary; a form of love-idealism on the recoil. Just as the challenge to rationalism does not mean the promotion of a mindless irrationalism, as said above, nor does an active immoralism and affirmation of nihilism require or justify a brutal and base inhumanity. The thrill of the negative limit-experience and of crime, belongs to the masturbatory variety that leaves one just as ego-bound afterwards as before, never really transforming the subject, despite the intensity of sensation. If the new innocence that Nietzsche and Lawrence seek lies 'beyond good and evil', it does not lie beyond good and bad: the immoralist is not unethical; becoming hard does not mean becoming insensate and falling into a state of emotional atrophy in which all finer feeling is denied (it means become honest and acknowledge the tragic nature of existence, affirming its eternal return); live dangerously does not mean abandoning all self-discipline and restraint, or refusing to exercise any degree of caution (it means, rather, avoid positing as far as possible any fixed ideals and beware of turning processes into goals). The key, then, to revaluation and self-overcoming is in the exorcising of the twin spirits of gravity and revenge; spirits which weigh us down with ascetic self-seriousness and self-righteousness and poison the blood with réssentiment.
But if transgression is rejected as a strategy and theoretical terrorism abandoned, it is nevertheless important to note in conclusion that, for Nietzsche, it remains vital that the great man or sovereign individual be allowed the opportunity to show that he can, ultimately, after having demonstrated an ability to both suffer and inflict cruelty, resist the desire to do so and thereby affect his own self-overcoming (become 'good' in the noble and generous sense). As we heard Zarathustra declare: "I desire beauty from no one as much as I desire it from you, you man of power: may your goodness be your ultimate self- overcoming. I believe you are capable of any evil; therefore I desire of you the good." To be able to show compassion - even a revalued form of pity - is undoubtedly an important test of greatness and central to Nietzsche's project. In The Plumed Serpent, Lawrence gives Ramón and Cipriano the chance to undertake this test. Whether or not they pass it by holding out the 'green leaf of Malintzi' (see chapter III once more), is debatable; and Lawrence soon after the end of this novel is ready to confess his loss of faith in the great man or hero. It may be, sadly, that in the present circumstances, even the greatest of men would fail to achieve the goodness desired by Zarathustra; and that we therefore need the 'quarantine' arrangements of democracy and the old morality for a long time yet.

However, one needs to be careful in drawing too many conclusions of this kind from Lawrence's publically confessed loss of faith in the hero. For if it signals a move away in his late writings from inflated political posturing and the ascetic militancy associated with it, towards a new politics of phallic tenderness and touch, it is vital to note that this represents a change of tactics and approach - and not a change of goal or core philosophical beliefs; the revaluation of values is still the great desideratum. Certainly Lawrence is not beating a retreat to the old ideals of liberal humanism, as some critics seem overly keen to suggest. Thus if the Lady Chatterley writings and those related to them allow for an opening up and critical reexamination of his own thinking in the power trilogy of novels,
Lawrence does not effect a complete break with the above. Rather, he seeks to make his position clearly distinct from those who would vulgarize and brutalize his thinking with their own inherent baseness and fascism. If Lawrence reconsiders his own philosophy of power, he does so, we can conclude, because he stays committed to it. And he moves away from an inappropriate politics of modernist ambition in which power is invariably conceived in negative and metaphysical terms (as something lacking but lusted after; something to be possessed and worked from the will in order to outlaw, prohibit, oppress etc.), in order to safeguard his positive notion of power. There is thus a greater continuity and subtle coherence in Lawrence's work (as, indeed, there is in Nietzsche's), than is sometimes recognized.

In rejecting grand politics and great events, Lawrence does not, however, withdraw into the private or the petty; i.e., make the solipsistic retreat into the politics of the soul as advocated by those such as Rorty (see the Introduction part II). The micro-politics of desire which became the concern of this thesis in chapters IV and V, remains very much a concern with the forces and flows that underlie, form, reform, pass through, over, and around the individual and society. A schizoanalysis is always a political analysis; the soul is never a private affair. And yet this is not to suggest that Nietzsche and Lawrence naively confuse the personal with the political due to a false equation between the organization of the soul with that of the state, thereby making invalid and illegitimate judgements to do with the latter on the basis of their insights into the former. Rather, Nietzsche and Lawrence radically anticipate the conclusion reached by later theorists that there is no longer a clear public/private dichotomy or distinction to be made. The modern state has entered the soul in a previously unheard of and unimaginable manner. Thus, as Marcuse rightly claims: "The traditional border lines between psychology and political and social philosophy ... have been made obsolete by the condition of man in the present era."2 It is because Nietzsche and
Lawrence grasped this – not because they held on to classical models of thinking that understood society as man writ large – that they successfully flitted back and forth from remarks on the body and consciousness, to remarks on society and culture, shattering the traditional language games of political and social science in the process.

If there are many different aspects to the project of revaluation, the erotic element is by no means the least important among them; particularly when linked to ethico-aesthetic and socio-political thinking. A theory of sexuality – and, in a much wider and more profound sense, desire – is vital to an understanding of Nietzsche's project. This is not surprising when one recalls that his central problematic, nihilism, is conceived of as a physical crisis of feelings, as well as one of values and beliefs, and that he identifies his own philosophy as 'Dionysian' in nature. For Lawrence too sex is central; understanding it as he does as our deepest form of awareness, and basing his thinking on touch and tenderness on this understanding. These two terms – touch and tenderness – we can conclude, are as crucial to the project of revaluation as Lawrence conceives of it, as they are to his politics of desire. The former, for Lawrence, means coming back into connection with one another, with other creatures, and with inanimate things of the physical universe. Nietzsche calls this desire for touch an 'urge to living unison'; but what he does not mean by this is a desire to negate difference or close distances (which is of course how nihilism operates, reducing all things to an essential sameness and valuelessness). Desire is that which brings into relation, joining together at least two terms, two flows, two forces; but without collapsing them into One Identity as within the ideal-love tradition that longs for merger.

Nietzsche and Lawrence differ from Deleuze and Guattari on the political implications of desire, however, as we indicated in chapter IV. Whilst the latter seem to believe that all relations and structures of servitude and hierarchy can
and have to be compromised and dissolved by desire, the former (maintaining the 'aristocratic' element of their own earlier thinking), argue that these are in fact the very things formed by desire and which we should value (and socially inscribe). Thus a libidinal culture of touch is not without distinctions and whilst, admittedly, desire may not recognize class differentials based on money, it accentuates power differentials. A democracy of touch therefore, whilst on the one hand enabling men to meet 'naked and light' along the Open Road, would, on the other hand, allow power differentials to become manifestly self-evident and for souls to be ranked accordingly, based on the degree of power they were. Of course, the way in which an individual styles the degree of power he is will also play a part in determining his rank within such a democracy, and, it should be stressed, power is a dynamic flow between individuals who are constantly becoming-other; it is not a fixed essence that determines being once and for all. Thus the above order is mobile and susceptible to continual change; one's rank indefinite.

We need, in conclusion, to offer a few further remarks on Lawrence's notion of a democracy of touch. It is, apparently, a libidinal arrangement within desire that is 'fucked' into being via the creative exchange between man and woman conceived of not simply as distinct 'sexes', in the manner common to thought based upon molar identities, but as two flows of energy vibrating at a different speed or pitch; or two streams of differently charged blood. It is certainly not something that can be established by non-molecular revolution; the raised fist punching the air of the party-political militant have been replaced by the holding of hands between lovers. Lawrence does not promote or even accept the possibility of liberation from social relations into an ideal individualism, nor the equally ideal notions of solidarity proposed by those such as Rorty. On the contrary, he seeks an escape from such liberal fantasy and an end to isolation via the establishment of physical relations on the basis of active power and affirmative desire.
But is Lawrence's notion of a democracy of touch compatible with Nietzschean philosophy? I conclude that it is; in fact, very much so – particularly with the mid-period works beginning with *Human, All Too Human*. When one reads these works, one understands how even the use of the word 'democracy' by Lawrence is not so peculiar. For whilst, admittedly, he, like Nietzsche, is an enemy of democracy as it is presently understood (by slave moralists), ultimately Lawrence, like Nietzsche, wants to see the overcoming of such a reactive conception of democracy (resting on fear, weakness, and envy), and the building of a 'true' democracy of exuberance and strength which will "create and guarantee as much independence as possible; independence of opinion, of mode of life and of employment". This, for Nietzsche quoted here, is the democracy of the future and what Lawrence calls the democracy of touch. As an arrangement of a people still to come, it involves rather more than just socio-economic and political change (important as these things undoubtedly are). It will demand great cultural transformation in addition, and, beyond this, a reckoning with the great saviours and teachers of the past; i.e., those grand idealists such as Plato and Christ. Or, as Nietzsche summarizes this reckoning: *Dionysus versus the Crucified!*

This brings us back to a claim we made in the *Introduction* and which we sought to demonstrate in the main text; namely, that Nietzsche and Lawrence are, in a sense, great religious writers, as much (if not more) than they are political thinkers: I would like to re-affirm this view here in conclusion. Although they are not mystics, or theologians, they understand the need to substantiate mystery and that the revaluation is an inherently anti-Christian struggle first and foremost; an attempt to overthrow moral idealism via a reactivated paganism. If they attempt to express their philosophical and religious insights in socio-political terms, so too do they frequently work in reverse and attempt to find the 'Dionysian' poetry in which to express those values they find impossible to contain within conventional language games. Lawrence achieves this perhaps most
beautifully in *The Escaped Cock*, his final major work of fiction which formed the focus of chapter V, having arguably failed to do so in *The Plumed Serpent*. Nietzsche does it with mixed success in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*; a book which, if not quite mankind's greatest gift, remains nevertheless one of the most valuable works of revaluation.

Dionysus versus the Crucified is rightly given by Nietzsche as the formula to understand him and his project. But his thinking is post-Christian as much as anti-Christian (in the same way that it is post- and not merely anti-modern). And Lawrence rightly recognizes that only a resurrected Jesus can play the role of anti-Christ to perfection (better even than Dionysus), and he suggests that via a revaluation of Christ's story it can be made to actively serve and enhance the life of the present.

There are, finally, just a few additional points that deserve to be emphasized in conclusion. Perhaps above all it should be said that Nietzsche's concern is with the question of culture and the cultural production of greatness; the revaluation can legitimately be read as a sustained call for cultural renaissance. The philosopher, Nietzsche informs us, in his guise as cultural physician, can diagnose the condition of culture, can help preserve it, or can assist in its destruction, thereby providing the space and the conditions for a new culture. But he cannot himself create this new culture; not unless, that is, he becomes an artist himself. For only as an artist is the philosopher able to create new models and practices, invent new ways of thinking and speaking, and, ultimately, revalue values. Combined, these new models and practices allow for a different ethos to be developed and a different revealing for man; one that makes possible a Dionysian celebration of life lived on earth, in the flesh, and in time; life as something mortal and yet valuable and worthy of affirmation precisely because of this.
In returning us to the flesh and to time, Nietzsche and Lawrence essentially return us to the real; the revaluation marks a counter-transcendence away from the Ideal and the imaginary and asserts that human and cultural greatness is not achieved via a denial of the thingness of things, nor an attempt to transcend the earth, the body, or the temporal conditions of existence, but by affirming the above and forming a multiplicity of direct connections with the real. Immanence, not transcendence, is one of the central words belonging to the vocabulary of revaluation. Man, as Lawrence puts it, must learn how to climb down Pisgah, which means, as Heidegger puts it, "climbing back down into the nearness of the nearest." This descent may well be arduous and perhaps even more dangerous than the ascent into abstraction, but if man is to come into fulfilment and blossoming as man-alive (and not dead-man-in-life), there is no alternative but to attempt a passage into the sacred moment which is here and now. As we concluded earlier, it is perhaps our poets and artists like Nietzsche and Lawrence themselves who are best able to guide us towards this fourth dimensional realm of the Greater Day; having retained their sense of wonder, of reverence, and of gratitude. The question is whether we will accept the gifts they offer and dare to follow the pathways beyond good and evil which they reveal; pathways planted with purple delights and, as Nietzsche says, with good sentences.

The revaluation of all values is a complex and multifaceted process that will not and cannot be achieved overnight: it will involve change culturally, socially, politically, and ontologically. The politics of style, of evil, of cruelty, and of desire which we have introduced here as possible responses to modern European nihilism, may or may not offer clues as to how these changes can be made. The crucial point to conclude is that Nietzsche's philosophical investigations cannot be divorced from his public and social thinking. If, as indicated, there are serious concerns with the above, it is our task to wrestle with these - not funk them. And if Nietzsche and Lawrence do not achieve a revaluation of all values between
them, they succeed nevertheless in constructing a powerful reckoning with slave
morality and in exposing the vocabulary of the above as something full of hate
and réssentiment; something destructive to man's well being and which infects not
just his soul, but his political and social forms. Nietzsche and Lawrence succeed
also in offering us the first stammered terms of a counter-vocabulary of
innocence and becoming for which we should be grateful; a vocabulary of
'elementary' words which will enable us to tear up the foundations of our souls,
reawakening feeble and dormant forces within us and liberating us from the old
ideal words of moral-rationalism. Undoubtedly, there will still be many who wish
to remain captives and servants of received conceptual schemes and moral-
linguistic conventions; souls enchanted by the spell and promise of metaphysical
language, enthralled by good grammar and comfortable with cliché. But these
persons will never create new ways of thinking, never enjoy new ways of
experiencing, never discover new worlds to inhabit. There remains no smooth
road into the future; we still have many obstacles to go round or scramble over if
we want to live. But surely, no matter how many skies have fallen, we do want to
live and live with a certain nobility. For whilst God is dead, we are not and, as
Lawrence concludes, this should be cause for rejoicing.
Notes and References.

Note that I give the full details of each title only on the first reference and after that simply the author, title of work, date of publication, and page number.

Outside the Gate: An Introduction.


Note that Ansell-Pearson is not here promoting such a view; on the contrary, he offers his own criticism and rejection of such thinking.

5. Richard Rorty; *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.120.


Of course, Nietzsche is not, in attempting to dissolve the genre distinction between philosophy and literature, doing something previously unimaginable; as Sarah Kofman reminds us: "If Nietzsche can venture a new kind of philosophy ... it is because it has always and already existed; such a philosophy is possible because it had already been alive for the pre-Socratics."


As we have seen, Rorty also develops a notion of 'solidarity' in his work, which he says is produced and sustained within works of literature. However, unlike Deleuze and Guattari who derive their understanding of such from a reading of Kafka, Lawrence, Miller, Fitzgerald, Kerouac *et al*, Rorty manages to define the above in human, all too human terms, based on a reading of novelists such as Dickens and Orwell, and upon his overriding dread of cruelty.


Earlier in the above (p.122) Milton writes: "The novel can help us live because it is capable of modifying as well as reflecting our feelings, and since these feelings are expressions of our fundamental values, by so doing it can bring about the revaluation of values which Lawrence and Nietzsche regarded as an urgent necessity."

22. Ibid.
See also Robert E. Montgomery on the relation between Nietzsche and Lawrence in; *The Visionary D.H. Lawrence* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Chapter I: Among the Ruins: Nihilism, Culture, and the Politics of Style.

Part I: Opening Remarks on the Death of God and the Emergence of Modern European Nihilism in Relation to Lawrence's *The Rainbow and Women in Love*. 

294


6. The transhuman aspect of Nietzsche's project is crucial and will be stressed throughout this thesis. Lawrence also frequently speculates on the overcoming of man, in both his fiction and non-fiction, and virulently opposes what he identifies as an anthropocentric egoism and ideal-humanism at the heart of modern culture. See, for example, pp.126-8 and pp.478-9 of *Women in Love*, (1995).


19. We will make more of this distinction between culture and civilization later in the text. And see also footnote 28 to Part II below.


22. In her 'Introduction' to *The Rainbow*, Fernihough writes that it is "impossible to overlook the fact" that in the above Lawrence "chooses to make a woman into a Nietzschean figure of sorts" (1995), p.xviii.


**Part II: Aspects of Nihilism as a Molar and Molecular Phenomenon.**


3. It is because this is the case, that their work needs to be supplemented with writings from those authors, like Marx and Weber, who have taken the time and trouble to study the economic field more closely. On occasion, Nietzsche and Lawrence do expose themselves to the charge that their critiques are no more worthwhile than the most lamentable and romantic of anti-capitalist texts. I shall comment on this later in the thesis.


296
7. Ibid., p.164.


10. Nietzsche; 'The Greek State', in; *On the Genealogy of Morality*, (1994), p.183. It is important to note how Nietzsche's concern for the well being of culture leads him into a rejection of both capitalist economics and the 'liberal-optimistic world view'; i.e., how his social and political views are closely related to his thoughts on the former.

11. Ibid., p.184.


16. See for example Lawrence writing in his 'Study of Thomas Hardy', in; *Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays*, (1985), pp.38-9.


From a viewpoint, that is, of their own theory and practice developed in the above work and in *A Thousand Plateaus* (The Athlone Press, 1996); their two-volumed study of capitalism and schizophrenia. What Deleuze and Guattari argue, essentially, is that: "capitalism, through its processes of production, produces an awesome schizophrenic accumulation of energy or charge, against which it brings all its vast powers of repression to bear, but which nevertheless continues to act as capitalism's limit" (*Anti-Oedipus*, p.34). For capitalism, therefore, it is always
a question of "binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with their interior limits. ... Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death" (ibid., p.246).

19. Ibid., p.33.
20. Ibid., p.34.
24. Ibid., p.35.
26. See Nietzsche writing in On the Genealogy of Morality (1994), essay III, section 25. He argues here that it is art, and not science, which is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic ideal, because it has a good conscience towards lying and an entirely different relation from science to matter and the physical world. It is art which allows man the possibility of a different revealing; a point developed in Part III of this chapter.
28. Nietzsche almost always relates science and material progress to civilization and not to culture; two terms between which he maintains a fairly strict and consistent distinction throughout his work (see for example his remark in note 121 of The Will To Power ). Mark Warren writes of this "uniquely German opposition" of the concepts kultur and Zivilization: "The distinction had an established polemical twist by Nietzsche's time. While civilization was seen to be materially progressive ... German's often emphasized that culture was ... a spiritual quality possessed by individuals and peoples, something growing from

29. See Chapter II where the distinction between reactive force and active power is analyzed in detail.


36. Heidegger; 'The Question Concerning Technology', in; *Basic Writings*, (1994), p.341. The problem is, as Heidegger notes in 'The End of Philosophy and the Task For Thinking': "The need to ask about modern technology is presumably dying out to the same extent that technology more decisively characterizes and directs the appearance of the totality of the world and the position of man in it." See *Basic Writings*, (1994), p.434.


This is an important passage, yet troubling also: Talk of man's 'essence' seems to imply that there can be found some fixed human nature; talk of a more 'original revealing' prior to technology would appear, as Keith Ansell-Pearson points out; "to underestimate massively the extent of technology's invention of the human animal and the nature and extent of its investment in mankind." See Ansell-Pearson writing in *Viroid Life*, (1997); p.153.

38. Heidegger; 'The Question Concerning Technology', in; *Basic Writings*, (1994),
41. For more on subjection and enslavement to the machine, see Deleuze and Guattari in; *A Thousand Plateaus: 13: 7000 BC: Apparatus of Capture*. To summarize very briefly their view, the following quotation from p.454 is helpful: "There is enslavement when human beings themselves are constituent parts of a machine ... But there is subjection when the higher unity constitutes the human being as a subject linked to a now exterior object".


44. George Steiner; *Heidegger*, (1989), p.36.


52. Heidegger; 'The End of Philosophy and the Task For Thinking', *ibid.*, p.437.

53. According to Nietzsche: "Every individual may be regarded as representing the ascending or descending line of life ... If he represents the ascending line his value is in fact extraordinary ... If he represents the descending development ... then he can be accorded little value". See 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', 33, in *Twilight of the Idols*, (1990), pp.95-6.
However, elsewhere in his writings, Nietzsche recognizes that things are by no means this straightforward; that, in fact, it is degenerate natures who often prove to be of greater value and significance wherever spiritual progress and the advancement of the species is to be effected (see Human, All Too Human, 1.5.224, for example).

Lawrence, particularly in Women in Love, is also far from certain what value to accord the role of decadence in the the total economy of life. And thus "paradoxes about corruption are dramatized at every level ... affirming but also calling into question (often simultaneously) the dichotomies of decadence and growth, purity and degradation". See Colin Clarke; The River of Dissolution: D.H. Lawrence and English Romanticism, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), pp.xi-xii.

54. See for example note 328 and the series following on decadence in The Will To Power, (1968). Despite what Nietzsche says here, many commentators still seem to confuse corruption as symptomatic of nihilism, rather than as cause of the latter.


57. For an interesting discussion of this key Lawrencean idea see Linda Ruth Williams; Sex in the Head, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), as well as her short study D.H. Lawrence, (Northcote House, 1997), particularly pp.29–30 and the section entitled 'Hermione's Mirrors' on pp.99–103.


59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. Ibid., pp.293-4.
62. Ibid.


64. Ibid., pp.68-9.

For another version of this 'two flows' theory, see Georges Bataille's second volume of *The Accused Share: The History of Eroticism*, trans. Robert Hurley, (Zone Books, 1993), particularly part 3.1: 'Sexuality and Dejecta'. Whilst there is a natural association between the sexual and excretory functions, Bataille concedes the point that the two worlds are radically distinct.


70. As Keith Sagar writes: "Gudrun's *nostalgie de la boue* is a desire to reverse the normal processes of human development, both in the species and the individual, towards integrity, responsible consciousness and 'productive happiness', and to break herself down with many spasms of extreme sensation, towards man's first slime. The obscene is what she thrills to." See *D.H. Lawrence: Life Into Art*, (Penguin Books, 1985), p.165.

It is vital to note that whilst both Nietzsche and Lawrence *do* suggest decadence may help both individual and cultural growth, so too can it mark a potentially fatal devolution as in Gudrun's case.

71. See *Women In Love* (1995) where this distinction is developed by Lawrence.

72. Philip Wheelwright notes that for Heraclitus; "soul has its natural place somewhere between water and fire, and contains within itself the possibilities of self-transformation in either direction ... Since soul is a dynamical something,
always tending by a sort of inner urgency to become other than what it was and is, it may (if it be wise and excellent) struggle upwards to become drier, brighter, and more fiery, or (if it yield to degeneration) it may slip downwards to become more sodden and moist."

Quoted by R.E. Montgomery; *The Visionary D.H. Lawrence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.155. The relation between Heraclitus and Lawrence is discussed at some length in this work.

73. Note that Birkin does not decide to affirm without reservation the process of decadence and the flow of this river. As Michael Bell points out; "his acquiescence is reluctant and conditional as well as inducing an element of conscious despair."


74. Nietzsche proposes the figure of the overman as a new sea: "In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea, to receive a polluted river and not be defiled. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea, in him your great contempt can go under." See *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale. (Penguin Books, 1969), 'Zarathustra's Prologue', 3, p.42.

75. In note 48 of *The Will To Power*, (1968), p.30, Nietzsche warns of the 'most dangerous misunderstanding', which essentially revolves around a confusion to do with exhaustion and the concern that "history contains the gruesome fact that the exhausted have always been mistaken for the fullest – and the fullest for the most harmful."

76. Nietzsche; *The Will To Power*, (1968), 112, p.69.


78. D.H. Lawrence; 'The Crown', in; *Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and Other Essays*, (1988), p.294. See the end of *The Rainbow* (1995) for Lawrence's greatest expression of this hope (voiced via Ursula). It is true to note, however, that: "By the time he came to write *Women in Love*, Lawrence saw ... the triumph of 'civilization' ... as much more likely than the renewal of 'culture'

79. See Keith Ansell-Pearson's essay; 'Toward the Comedy of Existence' in: *The Fate of the New Nietzsche*, ed. K. Ansell-Pearson and Howard Caygill, (Avebury Press, 1993). Following Nietzsche, Ansell-Pearson argues that: "In learning how to become postmodern human beings, who greet the earnestness of cries of crisis regarding our present condition with comic laughter, and who recognise the comic nature of the tragedy of human existence, we do not become 'better human beings', but only more 'profound' ones" (p.276).


**Part III: Aesthetics and Ideology.**


3. According to Howard Caygill, *The Birth of Tragedy* is "an analysis of a failed cultural revolution, one in which art and philosophy failed to achieve the alliance which might have founded a völkskultur." See 'Philosophy and Cultural Reform in the Early Nietzsche', in; *The Fate of the New Nietzsche*, (1993), p.112.


See Nietzsche's opening remark to the first of his *Untimely Meditations* and numerous other passages throughout his writings in which he expresses his displeasure at the idea of culture's becoming-German. See too Ansell-Pearson's
essay 'Geist contra Reich' in; *The Fate of the New Nietzsche* (1993), in which he argues that Nietzsche never betrays the former to the latter, nor confuses the two, and thus any characterization of his thinking as being continuous with the cultural and political aesthetic of fascism can be swiftly refuted (as it is in the text here).

7. See Nietzsche; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, (1969), 'Of the New Idol', p.75.
9. As indicated above in note 78 to Part II, Lawrence appears to abandon this notion of an 'immanent utopia' by the time he comes to write *Women In Love*.

Deleuze and Guattari make extensive use of this essay in their *What Is Philosophy?* (1996); see in particular 'Conclusion: From Chaos to Brain'.


Nietzsche’s insistence on culture as a ‘natural’ formation that assumes an ‘organic’ unity, is problematic for some readers in an age in which such notions have become "complacently dismissed as outworn, reactionary, and irresponsibly obfuscating", as Anne Fernihough puts it (see her *D.H. Lawrence: Aesthetics and Ideology*, (Clarendon Press, 1993), p.17). And yet, the fact remains that both Nietzsche and Lawrence repeatedly use organic metaphors in their work, and arguably do so in a manner different to that found within mainstream conservative thought; i.e., they use such metaphors and concepts in a radically counter-idealistic manner that attempts to retrieve the physical and inaugurate

305
culture in the body. For Nietzsche and Lawrence, 'nature' does not imply that which is, has always been, and should always remain as is (they have no reified ideal of Being); rather, it suggests a world of constant becoming (growth, decay, mutation).


16. Ibid., p.6.

17. Ibid., p.8.


Later, in Twilight of the Idols, (1990), 'Maxims and Arrows', 26, p.35, Nietzsche will write: "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. The will to a system is a lack of integrity."


20. Ibid.


See footnote 5 above.


24. See Chapter IV where we follow up and expand upon the notion of a robot or slave democracy in contrast to a 'true' democracy of 'touch'.

25. In section V.356, p.304, of The Gay Science (1974), Nietzsche writes; "what will not be built anymore henceforth, and cannot be built anymore is - a society in the old sense of that word; to build that, everything is lacking, above all the material. All of us are no longer material for a society, this is a truth for which the time has come."

26. Philip Goodchild; Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of
See too Lawrence writing in 'The Spirit of Place' which forms a preface to his Studies in Classic American Literature (1986). He says, for example: "Men are free when they belong to a living, organic, believing, community, active in fulfilling some unfulfilled, perhaps unrealizable, purpose" (p.12). The problem with this is that such communities are prone to becoming fixed and fatal, and, in the worst case, the desire for such leads to an abject reterritorialization along nationalistic and racist lines (as in Nazi Germany). If we are to lay claim to such a homeland and avoid the dangers, then it is vital to appreciate that it lies ahead of us in a future time – not behind us in the past – and will have to be invented and invoked by us. As Deleuze and Guattari say: "Art and philosophy converge at this point: the constitution of an earth and a people that are lacking as the correlate of creation." See; What Is Philosophy? (1996), p.108. As they also note, it is not populist writers but the most aristocratic (such as Nietzsche and Lawrence) who allow us to envision and lay claim to this future.


Some critics have been keen to point to Nietzsche's so-called 'positivism' of his mid-period writings as evidence of "a reaction against his earlier romanticism, and in particular his naiveté with respect to the potential of art as a cultural rehabilitator." – L.P. Thiele; Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of the Soul, (1990), p.126. But whilst it is the case that in his later work Nietzsche reconfigures his notion of art and pours scorn on his own 'artists-metaphysic' as displayed in The Birth of Tragedy, art always remained for him of vital
importance. Thus, as Thiele goes on to concede in the above cited work: "Even at the high point of [his] reaction, however, Nietzsche did not deny the necessity of art. He simply accentuated his suspicions of it." That is, he came increasingly to see that art too can (and very often does) serve in the interests of the ascetic ideal, as will be shown in the main text here.


34. *Ibid*.


37. Nietzsche; *Twilight of the Idols*, (1990), 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', 9, p.82.

38. *Ibid*.


41. Michel Haar; 'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language', in; *The New Nietzsche*, (1992), p.27.


46. In *Twilight of the Idols*, (1990) Nietzsche argues: "Reckoned physiologically, everything ugly weakens and afflicts man ... he actually suffers a loss of energy in its presence" (p.89). Echoing this, Lawrence writes; "where life is, there is essential beauty. Genuine beauty, which fills the soul, is an indication of life, and

47. Anne Fernihough; Aesthetics and Ideology, (1993), p.3.


Cf. this and other remarks made by Lawrence in the above essay with Heidegger’s musings in 'The Origin of the Work of Art', in; Basic Writings, (1994). Both men argue that the authentic art work – even of the most radical or revolutionary nature – will allow things to come forth into radiant being, providing a dwelling place and a sanctuary for them.


50. In his 'Chaos In Poetry' essay, Lawrence writes positively of the kind of naïveté displayed here by Ursula, declaring it to be the new spirit of art and life and belonging to the 'new innocence' which Nietzsche seeks. Both writers often contrast the playful naïveté of the ancients with the acutely self-conscious sophistication of we moderns. See the above essay in Phoenix (1961).


52. Ibid., p.50.


For Freud, utopia was always a transcendent notion and never an imminent possibility, as it was for Marcuse and, indeed, for Deleuze and Guattari, who also believed in a 'people yet to come' who would "constitute daily life according to an aesthetic paradigm", as Philip Goodchild says in his Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, (1996), p.195. By relegating real possibilities to the no-man's land of a transcendent utopia, those who would defend the present order make those interested in developing such possibilities
appear unrealistic and unreasonable.

54. D.H. Lawrence; 'An Introduction to His Paintings' in; A Propos of Lady Chatterley's Lover and Other Essays, (1961), pp.50-51.

55. See Heidegger's 'Origin of the Work of Art' in Basic Writings, (1994), p.333, where, controversially, he argues that to 'save' means a good deal more than merely to "seize hold of a thing threatened by ruin in order to secure it in its former continuance." Rather: "To save' is to fetch something home into its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its proper appearing." This idea is developed here in Chapter III.


57. The notion of a 'body without organs', first suggested by Artaud and developed philosophically by Deleuze and Guattari, is central to a politics of desire; see Chapters IV and V of this work.


Part I: Opening Remarks on How the Disease of Love Infects Modernity and Its Politics in Relation to Lawrence's Aaron's Rod and Kangaroo.

1. Steven Vine; 'Introduction' to Lawrence's Aaron's Rod, ed. Mara Kalnins,


In *Aaron's Rod* (1995), Aaron says he would rather have the world hate him and break his legs than love him; see pp.263-4.


22. Nietzsche; *The Birth of Tragedy*, (1993), 18, p.87.
Part II: Power: The Philosophy, Politics, and Problem Of.


Interestingly, Brian Massumi in his 'Foreword' to Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* (1996) whilst also making a distinction between power and force, suggests that the former is something negative and oppressive, whilst the latter is 'liberating'. He writes: "Force is not to be confused with power. Force arrives from the outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls" (p.xiii). If this is also Deleuze and Guattari's view, it is not Nietzsche's or Lawrence's. For Nietzsche and Lawrence, the building of walls is not objectionable *per se*, even if they both take pleasure in seeking out cracks.


7. Ibid.

Again, it is interesting and important to note that whilst Foucault never became 'enamoured of power', he arrived at a far more positive understanding of it in his late work, than the one expressed in his 'Preface' to Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus* (1994); an understanding more in line with Nietzsche's own. Deleuze and Guattari, even after having attempted to scourge the notion of power from negativity, still continue to regard schizoanalysis as a struggle against power-formations and power-effects.

8. D.H. Lawrence; 'Blessed Are The Powerful', in; *Reflections on the Death of a*

9. Ibid., p.327.


13. Camus is thus mistaken to suggest as he does in The Rebel (1971) that the only place in which we have seen Nietzsche's will to power as the driving force is in the fictional world of unlimited desire and domination imagined by Sade. The libertine as Sade pictures him is far removed from the Nietzschean free spirit.


15. Ibid.


17. Ibid.


The translation of the French is given by Kaufmann in the above as: "Pure, without admixture, crude, fresh, with all its force, with all its pungency."

19. Nietzsche; Twilight of the Idols, (1990), 'Expeditions of an Untimely Man', 38, p.103. Nietzsche calls this his 'first principle' of life as will to power.


24. Foucault; quoted by James Miller in; The Passion of Michel Foucault,
(Flamingo, 1994), p.199.


27. Ibid., p.327.


36. Ibid., p.112.

It is important to note how Nietzsche here ties not only self-respect, but even existence to being as a being-with and a being-for others. We should also perhaps note that Nietzsche goes on to say that what he here identifies as 'nature's imperative' is neither a categorical imperative à la Kant, nor one directed towards the individual, so much as towards "peope, races, ages, classes, and above all to the entire animal 'man', to mankind."


38. Nietzsche; Beyond Good and Evil, (1990), V.199., p.120.


Later in the above work, however, Bernstein does go very wrong with his
reading of Nietzsche; arguing, for example, that the latter is opposed to a social order "that permits or encourages all and sundry to develop their talents to the utmost" (p.105). That this is incorrect can be seen from a careful reading of section 57 of *The Anti-Christ* (1990); Nietzsche wants one and all to develop and display their talents, only he does not accord all men equality of potential and thus concludes that some men, being mediocre, will find their happiness and fulfilment as 'cogs'. I will comment on this point later in the main text.

42. Nietzsche; *Beyond Good and Evil*, (1990), IX.257., p.192.


Nietzsche also does what Lawrence is doing here; i.e., dismissing freedom in the conventional sense, only then to declare himself the defender of freedom in a 'truer', more 'authentic' sense.

44. Nietzsche; *Beyond Good and Evil*, (1990), IX.259., p.194.


47. *Ibid*.


53. *Ibid*.


64. Keith Ansell-Pearson; 'Geist contra Reich ' in; *The Fate of the New Nietzsche*, (1993), pp.79–80.


67. Here, as elsewhere, Nietzsche and Lawrence differ from Deleuze and Guattari, who seem to regard the giving of allegiance to the heroic and submission within an order of rank as a perversion of desire *per se* and the fundamental problem of political philosophy to be addressed. Whilst it is undoubtedly true that desire can be perverted (by all forms of idealism for example) and made to turn back against itself, I would argue that the will to reverence cannot be accounted for by reference purely to Oedipal factors and understood thus as an entirely negative phenomenon.


69. As a matter of fact, Bernstein is aware of this, though keen to discredit the idea by suggesting that the overcoming of bad conscience in commanders would
lead to the giving of good conscience to bullies and to hatred. Even if this were the case, still his claim that Nietzsche ignores the problem of how to ensure the best will want to rule is revealed as wilfully false.


72. Ibid., p.246.

73. Ibid., p.209.

See footnote 14 above to Chapter I, Part III, however, in which the idea of the organic as a conservative notion *per se* is challenged.

74. See Keith Ansell-Pearson; An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker, (1994), p.41.

Note also that this argument concerning the noble lie and the natural law is followed up here in Chapter III.


76. Ibid., p.106.

Ansell-Pearson continues: "It is curious that Nietzsche himself does not appear to recognize the predicament he is in. In Twilight of the Idols, for example, he is astute in recognizing crucial 'social' elements and historical determinations within Darwinian 'biological' theory. How is it possible, therefore, for Nietzsche to claim that his theory of 'will-to-power' is exclusively and solely a principle of so-called 'natural life'? With what legitimacy can he read off from the text of nature a social and political philosophy, as he claims he does? In neglecting to attend to these crucial questions Nietzsche has forgotten the earlier trenchant critique he developed of David Strauss in which he argued that any natural scientist or philosopher who sought to assert anything regarding the ethical and intellectual value of so-called laws of nature was guilty of an 'extreme anthropomorphism' that oversteps the 'bounds of the permitted'."

Part III: Beyond the Molar Level of Politics.
1. Nietzsche; *The Will To Power*, (1968), 765, p.401.


3. No doubt objections will be raised in some quarters to Lawrence's use of 'theological' language - and to my suggesting that a notion of the Holy Ghost relates to Nietzsche's critical philosophy of power. But as will become clear, Lawrence's language is justified and is, in fact, a necessary strategy; one later adopted by Heidegger. For Lawrence, to speak in terms of the Holy Ghost and the dark gods, is a convenient way of stressing the non-human and inhuman aspects of life as will to power. When one reads a passage such as the one following: "The Holy Ghost ... is many gods. Many gods come and go, some say one thing and some say another, and we have to obey the god of the innermost hour. It is the multiplicity of gods within us make up the Holy Ghost", one interprets this as meaning: The will to power ... is many forces. Many forces come in and out of ascendancy, some are active and some reactive, and we have to obey the dominant arrangement of forces. It is the multiplicity of forces within us make up the will to power.


It is interesting to note that Lawrence is writing here in his last work; i.e., well after his power trilogy of novels has been completed and he has, according to the myth perpetuated by some critics, abandoned his concern with power, leadership, politics etc.

8. *Ibid*.

9. Michel Haar; 'Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language', in; *The New Nietzsche*,

In *The Will To Power* (1968), 259, p.149, Nietzsche makes the same point this way; "a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives."


13. Ibid., p.370.


15. Ibid., p.166.


18. Ibid.


Of course Nietzsche knows that most men cannot - and do not want to - leave their jobs, their families, and their old selves behind à la Aaron Sisson; accepting that most men are slaves, he says that for the majority fulfilment lies in service. Nowhere in his work does Nietzsche advocate universal emancipation; but he does hope to see preserved a few exceptional individuals who do are destined for independence and command.


21. Ibid., p.95.

22. See Chapter IV Part III.ii. where the Lawrencean concept of the Open Road (borrowed from Whitman) is discussed at length.


29. Nietzsche; *Twilight of the Idols*, (1990), 'What the Germans Lack', 4, p.73.
34. *Ibid*.
36. Note that Somers is somewhat misleading here in this self-comparison with Nietzsche. He refers of course to the section entitled 'Of Great Events' in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in which Zarathustra says that our 'greatest events' are: "'not our noisiest but our stillest hours. The world revolves, not around the inventors of new noises, but around the inventors of new values; it revolves inaudibly '" (1969, pp.153-4). As will be clear from the above, Zarathustra is not saying that he doesn't believe in great events - as Somers implies - only redefining what constitute such. In fact, Zarathustra is saying what we saw Harriett saying earlier; that great events are changes in feeling, which take many centuries to develop and take effect.
38. Compare this with Nietzsche's confession in *Ecce Homo*, (1988), p.126: "I am not a man - I am dynamite!" And yet readers may also recall Nietzsche's earlier declaration from *The Gay Science* (1974), III.218., p.210: "I do not love people who have to explode like bombs in order to have any effect at all." This arguably provides evidence of how Nietzsche's position changes and becomes harder, more violent, over the years (more desperate? more vulgar?).
40. As Bataille notes: "Life's movement can only be merged with the limited movements of political formations in clearly defined conditions, in other


59. Ibid., p.87.

60. *Ibid.*., p.221.
Chapter III: Only a Dark God Can Save Us Now: Quetzalcoatl and the Politics of Cruelty.


10. Rainer Maria Rilke, quoted by David Farrell Krell in his 'Introduction' to Heidegger's 'Building Dwelling Thinking' in; *Basic Writings*, (1994), p.344. The translation given reads: "Now it is time that gods emerge / from things by which we dwell."
14. Kate refuses to accept the estimation of Ramón and his men of Quetzacoatl.
offered by the hotel manager, however, for "she had seen Ramón Carrasco and Cipriano. And they were men. They wanted something beyond. She would believe in them. Anything, anything rather than this sterility of nothingness which was the world, and into which her life was drifting" (PS, p.103). This though is surely one of the great dangers of nihilism: one searches desperately for something—anything—to hold onto; extreme political solutions offering themselves all too readily. Suddenly, even the most dangerous political invalids and religious fanatics find themselves taken seriously—as Nietzsche warned against.

15. Nietzsche; Beyond Good and Evil, (1990), III.61., p.86.

Capitalized emphasis given in the original.


28. Ibid., 1037, p.534.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.


One of the main dangers of such a descent is a fall into a gross (and ideal) materialism. However, that a descent has to be made is something that Lawrence is equally adamant upon; see for example his essay 'Climbing Down Pisgah', in; *Selected Essays*, (Penguin Books, 1981), which includes the little verse: "They climbed the steep ascent of Heaven / Through peril, toil, and pain; / O God, to us may grace be given / To scramble down again" (p.51).


38. Ramón goes on to say: "'I wish the Teutonic world would once more think in terms of Thor and Wotan, And the Tree Igdrasil'" (*PS*, p.248): According to Jung, writing in an essay entitled 'Wotan' (1936), this is precisely what does come to pass in Nazi Germany. He says: "We are always convinced that the modern world is a reasonable world, basing our opinion on economic, political, and psychological factors. But if we may forget for a moment ... our well meaning, all-too-human reasonableness, may burden God or the gods with the responsibility for contemporary events instead of man, we would find Wotan quite suitable as a causal hypothesis. In fact, I venture the heretical suggestion that the unfathomable depths of Wotan's character explain more of National Socialism than all the reasonable factors put together. There is no doubt each of the factors explains an important part of what is going on in Germany, but Wotan explains yet more."

Essentially, I think Jung is correct. It is interesting to also recall that Wotan is the Norse equivalent of Dionysus; a god of storm, frenzy, and excess.


42. *Ibid.*

If Jung is right in the above footnote (38), then Foucault is mistaken here; choosing as he does to ignore the phenomenon of National Socialism as an instance of 'political spirituality' that pre-dates the Iranian Revolution.

43. James Miller; *ibid.*, p.312.

**Part II: The Politics of Cruelty.**


13. In his 'Study of Thomas Hardy' Lawrence writes that the *predilection d'artiste* is always for the aristocrat, and that this taste is rooted in "every imaginative being", because; "the aristocrat alone has occupied a position where he could afford to be, to be himself. to create himself, to live as himself. That is his eternal fascination." See; *Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays*, (1985), p.46.


22. If this is so, then Bataille was not as mistaken as is often suggested when he attempted to establish a secret society (The Acéphale Group) founded upon an act of ritual human sacrifice; a group whose aim was to promote total revolution along Nietzschean lines.


24. Machiavelli argues that the murder of political opponents is justified on the grounds that it can, by avoiding the dangerous disorder and unrest likely to be
caused by these persons for everyone in the future, be said to be 'compassionate'.


3. Freud; *ibid.*, p.71.


The line is from *The Book of Common Prayer*, as used in the Church of England's baptism service. As Cushman interestingly points out, the term 'Old Adam' is also slang for the penis; revealing that what is hated and feared by the Church is the
phallic self (i.e., man as a physical and sexual being).


**Part IV: Closing Remarks.**


5. Rick Rylance; *ibid.*, p.170.

6. See Mark Warren; *Nietzsche and Political Thought*, (1991), who raises this as a criticism of Nietzsche's approach. But see also my remarks in Chapter IV re; the need to molecularize political thinking in an age in which traditional category distinctions have broken down.


10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. See for example Lawrence's poem entitled 'A Sane Revolution', in; The Complete Poems, (1977), p.517. See too the related poem 'Revolutions as Such' (ibid., p.517), in which Lawrence claims that only political 'robots' desire bloody revolution today.


14. Ibid.

The translation is given by Hollingdale as: 'When the mob joins in and adds its voice, all is lost.'


24. Deleuze and Guattari; Anti-Oedipus, p.257.

25. Ibid.

27. Ibid., p.277.
28. Ibid.
29. Huxley's *Brave New World*, is of course the utopia dreamed of by the last man; a world where science and technology have triumphed completely and all men are happy, content, and cared for. Huxley himself at the time of writing this novel (1931) is far from opposed to such a vision; in fact he comes close to accepting and promoting the triumph of rational-idealism. Only after 1945 does he begin to move away from this way of thinking. See the Flamingo edition (1994), which contains a useful Introduction by David Bradshaw.

Chapter IV: Tenderness: The Philosophy of Becoming and the Politics of Desire.

Part I: Theoretical and General Opening Remarks.

1. Lawrence in fact completed three versions of the novel he had originally thought of calling *Tenderness*: the first two versions have been published as *The First Lady Chatterley* and *John Thomas and Lady Jane*. It seemed appropriate to a study concerned with multiple becomings to refer cross-textually to all three versions when convenient and useful to do so, and although the final version – *Lady Chatterley’s Lover* – remains the central point of reference, I do not wish to claim for it any privileged or definitive status over and above the earlier versions.
8. The term 'pollyanalytics' is one that Lawrence imagines a 'respected critic' might use to describe his 'pseudo-philosophy'. See the 'Foreword' to *Fantasia of the Unconscious*, (1983), p.15.
26. Ibid., p.108.
27. Ibid., p.109.
28. Ibid., p.110.
29. Ibid., pp.110-11.
30. Ibid., p.187.
38. Ibid., p.122.
40. Note what Nietzsche says in The Birth of Tragedy, (1993), 18., arguing that the man of deeds (i.e., the Old Adam) has now become so incredible to the theoretical and impotent modern man, that he regards the former as a monster of unreason, in need of castrating and/or confinement.
42. D.H. Lawrence; 'Men Must Work and Women as Well', in; Assorted Articles, (1930), p.141.
45. Ibid., p.150.
46. Ibid., p.159.

47. Ibid., p.160.


51. Ibid., p.244.

52. Ibid., p.252.

53. Ibid., p.253.

54. Ibid., p.262.

55. Ibid., p.293.

56. Ibid., p.279.


58. Ibid.


60. Ibid., p.361.

Part II: Schizoanalysis: Of Breakdowns, Breakthroughs, and Becomings.

1. Although Lawrence strips Connie bare, seemingly like one of the old, lustful philosophic voyeurs who insist on seeing everything and knowing the 'truth' of woman (and hence the 'secret of life'), he nevertheless is Nietzschean in that he allows Connie to retain her modesty (and mystery), and, further, to regain her innocence, by freeing her of bad conscience and ignorance concerning her body and its sexuality. And unlike the above, Lawrence doesn't stare in horror at her exposed genitalia and see merely a wound; as if woman were no more than a castrated male. Rather, he posits her with beauty and meaning of her own and values her sexual difference in a manner which anticipates the work of Luce
Irigaray, coming close to forming a 'gynaecological' ontology of 'cunt' (see for example the exchange between Mellors and Connie on p.178 of LCL). This is not to say that Lawrence wishes to simply reduce woman to her sexual organs; he accepts that she is a cultural and social entity as well as a physical being. But by emphasizing her sexual being and sexual difference, Lawrence hopes to change the way that culturally and socially she is thought of and constructed. Above all, he wants woman to be accepted as a real creature; and not degraded into an ideal stereotype of purity, or a foul obscenity (woman as virgin, woman as whore). Traditional male representations of woman are countered by Lawrence in LCL as well as in essays such as 'Give Her a Pattern' (see Selected Essays, 1981, pp.19-23).


3. Ibid.

4. The centrality of heterosexual coition within Lawrence's thinking is one that has attracted much critical attention. He remains fairly adamant throughout his writings that: "Sex without the consummating act of coition is never quite sex" (Fantasia of the Unconscious, 1983, p.17); and so too does he insist on the heterosexual nature of this act: "Because the source of all living is in the interchange and the meeting and mingling of ... man-life and woman-life ... man-being and woman-being" (from a letter quoted by Bruce Steele in his 'Introduction' to Lawrence's Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays, 1985, pp.xxvi-vii).

For Lawrence, those who would decouple sex from coition are mistakenly turning it into an entirely head-bound affair of sensation and knowledge; essentially a form of masturbation. In Fantasia of the Unconscious (1983) he writes p.129 that the thought to such persons "of actual sex connection is usually repulsive. There is an aversion from the normal coition act. But the craving to feel, to see, to taste, to know mentally ... is insatiable. Anything, so that the sensation and
experience shall come through the upper channels. This is the secret of our introversion and our perversion today."

For Lawrence, the vital thing in heterosexual coition is the meeting of two different creatures; it is this, the flash of interchange between forms of polarized otherness, which causes a transformation in both parties and gives rise to newness. In what Lawrence regards as 'counterfeit' sexual activity, there is no loss or transformation of self; rather there is "merely a greedy, blind self-seeking" ('Review of The Social Basis of Consciousness', in; A Selection From Phoenix, 1979, p.471).

Again, it is arguable as I suggest in footnote 1 above, that Lawrence is close in his thinking here to the feminist philosopher of sexual difference Luce Irigaray (closer for sure than he is to Deleuze and Guattari, for example, on this matter). Like Irigaray, Lawrence posits a crucial difference between the sexes and is certainly not a "theoretician of the male homosexual and ... lesbian experience" (Rosi Braidotti; Nomadic Subjects, 1994, p.132). Not that Lawrence condemns homosexual contacts outright (and certainly does not do so from a moral perspective); and there are plenty of episodes of physical tenderness between same sex individuals in his work; from the naked wrestling of Gerald and Birkin in Women In Love, to the homo-erotic occult bondage practiced by Ramón and Cipriano in The Plumed Serpent, to give but two examples. Even, Lawrence argues, homosexual intercourse is less harmful than masturbation, which he always interprets negatively.

6. Ibid.
7. For Lawrence, in line with other bodies of radical thought, there is a vital distinction between sex and procreation; the former is not simply a means in the service of the latter. In his 'Study of Thomas Hardy' (see Study of Thomas Hardy and Other Essays, 1985), Lawrence writes, pp.52-3: "Am I here to deposit a security, a continuance of life in the flesh? Or is that only a minor function in
me? Is it not merely a preservative measure, procreation. It is the same for me as for any man or woman. That she bear children is not a woman's significance. But that she may bear herself, that is her supreme and risky fate: that she drive on to the edge of the unknown, and beyond. She may leave children behind, for security. It is arranged so. ... But the act, called the sexual act, is not for depositing seed. It is for leaping off into the unknown."

8. Deleuze and Guattari; *A Thousand Plateaus*, (1996), p.188.


10. Kate Millet claims in *Sexual Politics* (Virago, 1977) that Lawrence is guilty of transforming masculinity into a mystical religion founded upon celebration of the penis. But Millet fails to appreciate what Lawrence is attempting in *The Lady Chatterley* trilogy and related works: for one thing, when he writes of the phallus, he is not simply referring to the penis, which, as he says himself, is "a mere member of the physiological body" (*JTLJ*, p.238); i.e., a vulgar organ. The phallus, as Lawrence understands it, "in the old sense" (*ibid.*); i.e., the sacred-symbolic sense that the Greeks knew of and which Nietzsche acknowledges in his Dionysian philosophy, "has roots, the deepest roots of all, in the soul and the great consciousness" (*ibid.*) and belongs to man and woman both (as a bridge between them); not simply the male agent. The phallus is understood by Lawrence as a cosmic symbol of desire and relatedness; thus the fear of, or contempt for, the phallus, betrays the great modern horror of the physical and of being in touch. Lawrence writes: "This is the root fear of all mankind. Hence the frenzied efforts of mankind to despise the phallus, to nullify it" (*ibid.*, p.239); via an attempt to conflate and confuse it with the penis which more often than not belongs as just another mechanical organ to the well organ-ized body and thereby at the disposal and use of the mind and sensation seeking ego.

20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p.255.
23. Ibid.
   As Milton rightly points out, this vision is now desired, but not promised.

**Part III: Postanalysis: Towards a Democracy of Touch.**

1. It would perhaps have been better if Dukes had of used the word 'cultured', bearing in mind the distinction drawn in Chapter I between the forces of culture
and civilization.


4. D.H. Lawrence; 'Real Democracy', *ibid*.


See also the related poems in this series: *Future Religion* (p.611), *Future States* (p.611), and *Future War* (p.612).


Chapter V: The Escaped Cock: Revaluation and Resurrection.

Part I: Versus the Crucified.

1. Nietzsche; 'Philosophy in Hard Times', in; Philosophy and Truth, (1993), 38, p.103.
5. Ibid., V.377., p.340.

This is a contentious claim by Hollingdale to say the least, based as it is upon a rather dubious psychoanalytic interpretation involving the 'return of the repressed'. Contrary to Hollingdale's belief that in Zarathustra Nietzsche was essentially unaware of "the provenance of the grand and grandiose" (ibid.) conceptions which he elaborates, I would suggest that Nietzsche was acutely aware
of what he was doing (here, as elsewhere) and that in many respects one of the flaws of *Zarathustra* is the overly self-conscious attempt to do what Lawrence achieves with much greater skill and subtlety in *The Escaped Cock* (i.e., offer a reinterpretation and revaluation of Christian teachings and myths).


8. We recall that Jesus was only in his early-mid thirties when nailed to the Cross. The man who died reminds Madeleine upon his resurrection that he is still relatively a young man with over half his life still to live (*EC*, p.564). Nevertheless he has left behind him in the tomb his immaturity and, to Mary's bitter disappointment, the "enthusiasm and the burning purity" (*ibid.*, p.566) of rapt youth.


13. For more on this aspect of the tale (i.e., the becoming-Aesculapius of the man who died) see Evelyn J. Hinz and John J. Teunissen; 'Saviour and Cock: Allusion and Icon in Lawrence's *The Man Who Died*', in; *The Journal of Modern Literature*, 5., (1976), pp.279-96.


15. *Ibid*.


22. Ibid., 32., p.154.
24. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 62., p.196.
27. Ibid., 27., p.150.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 58., p.191.
31. Ibid., p.640.
Deleuze goes on to say, p.44: "St. Paul is the ultimate manager, while John of Patmos is a laborer, the terrible laborer of the last hour. The director of the enterprise must prohibit, censure, and select, whereas the laborer must hammer, extend, compress, and forge a material ... This is why in the Nietzsche-Lawrence alliance, it would be wrong to think that the difference between their targets - St. Paul for one, John of Patmos for the other - is merely anecdotal or secondary. It marks a radical difference between the two books [*The Anti-Christ* and *Apocalypse*]. Lawrence knows Nietzsche's arrow well, but in turn shoots it in a completely different direction".
This is why charges of 'pure plagiarism' sometimes made against Lawrence, are mistaken; critics who suggest such suffer from a form of myopia which prevents them from seeing the radical differences between the two books and the two authors, as indicated by Deleuze above.
35. Ibid., pp.64-5.
37. Nietzsche; Beyond Good and Evil, (1990), 'Preface', p.32.

Compare what Lawrence says here with what he writes earlier in 'The Crown': "One God, One Way, One Glory, one exclusive salvation. And this One God is indeed God, this one way the way, but it is the way of egoism, and the One God is the reflection, inevitably, of the worshipper's ego." See; Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and Other Essays, (1988), p.292.
40. Ibid.
41. Nietzsche; The Will To Power, (1968), 166., p100.
42. Nietzsche; The Anti-Christ, (1990), 51., p.179.
44. Ibid., p.66.
45. Ibid., p.70.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p.67.
48. Ibid.

Lawrence expands on this point on p.69 of the above, writing: "Judas had to betray Jesus to the powers that be, because of the denial and subterfuge inherent in Jesus's teaching. Jesus took up the position of the pure individual, even with his disciples. He did not really mix with them, or even really work or act with them. He was alone all the time. He puzzled them utterly, and in some part of them, he let them down. He refused to be their physical power-lord. The power-homage in a man like Judas felt itself betrayed! So it betrayed back again: with a kiss. And in the same way, Revelation had to be included in the New Testament, to give the death-kiss to the Gospels."
This important passage is followed up in relation to the question of power and politics in Part III.iii. of this chapter.


This forms a convenient opportunity to comment, briefly, on Nietzsche's thinking on the relationship between Christianity and Judaism. Essentially, for Nietzsche, Jesus the Redeemer represents a great seduction to the Jewish political project of revenge (i.e., the slave revolt in morals), and he is happy to allow the formula Dionysus versus the Crucified to also be read as Rome versus Judea. In the *Genealogy* Nietzsche argues that the Jews are a "priestly nation of r'essentiment par excellence, possessing an unparalleled genius for popular morality" (1994, 1.16., p.35) and he is adamant that Christian love grew out of Jewish hatred not as its denial, but "as its crown, as the triumphant crown" (1994, 1.8., p.19).

However, Nietzsche concedes that Greek moral philosophy "had already done everything to prepare the way for and to make palatable" to the Romans moral fanaticism of the kind subscribed to by the Jews, describing Plato as a "great viaduct of corruption". See *The Will To Power*, (1968), 202., p.118.

If Nietzsche's comments in the *Genealogy, The Anti-Christ*, and elsewhere, do unfortunately lend themselves to anti-Semitism, it should be remembered that Nietzsche himself abhorred the latter and made his opposition to such explicit in both his private correspondence and published work. For an interesting study relating to this matter see the essay by Yirmiyahu Yovel entitled 'Nietzsche, The Jews, and R'essentiment ', in; *Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality*, ed. Richard Schact, (University of California Press, 1994), pp.214-36.


See also chapter III of Lawrence's *Movements in European History*, (1971) which discusses the relation between Jews, early Christians, and Romans. Essentially Lawrence echoes Nietzsche's view, arguing that the Romans regarded the former as anti-social in their intolerance and monotheism; and criminally insane in their lusting for the destruction of the world.


59. Mara Kalnins; 'Introduction' to the above, p.27.

Deleuze offers an interesting take on the contemporary relevance of John's Revelation (and Lawrence's reading of it). He writes: "The modernity of the Apocalypse lies not in its predicted catastrophes, but in its programmed self-glorification, the institution of glory in the New Jerusalem, the demented installation of an ultimate judiciary and moral power." Deleuze is inviting us to see the comparison with the New World Order that is promised us by today's military-industrial-media corporations. Whatever the validity of so-doing, certainly it is the case that Western culture is founded upon the histories and religious mythologies of ancient Greeks, Roman, Jews, and Christians and thus "any analysis or critique of modern culture will be superficial unless it succeeds in tracing back the roots of our present crisis all the way back to certain features in the very foundations of our culture."


Part II: Remarks on Lawrence's *The Escaped Cock* in Relation to Death, Sex, and the Resurrection into Touch.

1. Obviously and undeniably the man who died is Jesus of Nazareth, but, interestingly, his name is never used in the tale and I will here, for the most part, follow Lawrence's practice and refer to the protagonist of *The Escaped Cock* as the man who died. The question of identity is, to some extent, made irrelevant in as far as the story concerns someone who has left behind in the tomb all that he was and is now in the process of a pure becoming, beyond his earlier self.

2. D.H. Lawrence; letter quoted by David Ellis in; *Dying Game 1922-1930*, vol. III of *The Cambridge Biography of D.H. Lawrence*, (Cambridge University Press,
I agree with what Ellis says of this letter; that whilst it does form an "accurate precis of the action of the story ... its tone hardly suggests how triumphantly Lawrence avoids bad taste in the handling of such delicate material, the power with which he is able to evoke a 'biblical' atmosphere, and how movingly Lawrence describes the pain and disillusionment of the Jesus figure." (Ibid.)


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p.103.

10. Ibid.


12. D.H. Lawrence; 'Initiation Degrees', *ibid*.


17. Ibid.


23. Ibid., p.34.

24. Whilst I acknowledge that anti-Semitic texts frequently attempt to Hellenize or 'Aryanize' Christ, I would hope and trust that it will be clear that it is not my intention to here further, or in any way lend support to, this tradition. In this work, as in Nietzsche's, terms such as 'Jew', 'Greek', 'Roman', 'German', should be understood to designate cultural-philosophical styles, or qualities; not racial identities fixed in terms of metaphysical being, or biology.


32. Ibid., p.78.


37. Ibid., p.173.

Part III: Political and Ethical Considerations.


2. Ibid., p.65.

3. Ibid.


Of course, as Warren also says: "Fundamental to historicity is that it does not consist in characterless passage of time, but rather in a series of recurring points of familiarity that we experience as recurrence of the 'same thing'.


Lawrence follows Nietzsche closely here in his 'Reality of Peace' essay in *Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and Other Essays*, (1988); arguing that if we can but will one moment of joy to return then we affirm life in its totality and transform everything (including ourselves). He writes; "if, in our heart of hearts, we can find one spark of happiness ... then we are converted to the new life the moment we accept this spark as the treasure of our being" (p.33).


Warren goes on to say, p.197: "The thought asserts the utter impossibility of escape from historical being into another world and another set of [transcendental] identities ... The only possibility for experiencing eternity is the absolute affirmation of history ... the eternal return becomes an existential imperative: it places the individual face to face with all the sufferings and limits of experience - nothing more and nothing less."


Marcuse writes in full: "Eternity, long since the ultimate consolation of an alienated existence, has been made into an instrument of repression by its relegation to a transcendental world - unreal reward for real suffering."


The above essay at this and other points, has a remarkable similarity to Heidegger's 'Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?', in; *The New Nietzsche*, (1992), pp.64-79.


22. It is not uncommon for commentators on Nietzsche's philosophy to make the connection between the eternal return and the overman, arguing that only the latter could fully will and affirm the former unconditionally. However, other commentators have identified what they claim to be an incompatibility between these two key notions, and attempted to demonstrate that they in fact contradict one another. This problem is addressed by Ansell-Pearson in his work on Nietzsche; see for example pp.185-6 of his *Nietzsche Contra Rousseau*, (1991).


27. Keith Ansell-Pearson; *An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker*, (1994), p.120.

Foucault suggests that between pagan and Christian ethics the opposition is not so much between license and austerity, but between conceptions of the self and different forms of austerity.


This providing of an exemplar is fundamental to Greek ethics concerned with the care and creation of the self. What is most striking about the above, according to Foucault's reading, is that it is an ethic concerned very much with daily conduct and social behaviour; and not with questions of religious metaphysics. Further, ethics were not related to or enforced by any institutional system. Lawrence also notices this and in Apocalypse writes with approval of a non-moral, non-oppressive ethic which is chosen by the individual and involves nothing more than simple good manners and an aesthetics of existence. It is precisely such an ethic that the man who died seeks for himself.


Earlier in 'Zarathustra's Prologue', 9, Zarathustra declares: "'A light has dawned for me: I need companions, living ones, not dead companions and corpses I carry with me wherever I wish. But I need living companions who follow me because they want to follow themselves ... Zarathustra seeks fellow-creators, fellow-harvesters, and fellow-rejoicers: what has he to do with herds and herdsmen and corpses!'" (ibid., pp.51-2).

In a similar fashion, Lawrence insists in his 'Risen Lord' essay: "If Jesus rose as a full man, in the flesh, he rose to have friends ... whom he could hold sometimes to his breast, in strong affection ... how much more wonderful, this, than having disciples!" See Phoenix II, (1968), p.575.

33. Ibid.

34. Nietzsche; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, (1969), 'Of the Priests', p.117.

35. Ibid., 'Of Manly Prudence', p.166.

36. Ibid., 'Of the Higher Men', 16., p.304.


Nietzsche concludes by saying that the story of Jesus is ultimately the story "of a poor soul unsated and insatiable in love who had to invent hell so as to send there those who did not want to love him".


48. Ibid., pp.xxii–iii.


50. Ibid.


52. D.H. Lawrence; 'Aristocracy', in; *Reflections on the Death of a Porcupine and
Part IV: Closing Remarks.


5. See Nietzsche; *Ecce Homo*, (1988), p.131, where he writes: "Have I been understood? What defines me, what sets me apart from all the rest of mankind, is that I have *unmasked* Christian morality."


**Outside the Gate: A Conclusion.**


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