Symposium on rationality and commitment: introduction
Peter, Fabienne and Schmid, Hans Bernard. (2005) Symposium on rationality and commitment: introduction. Economics and Philosophy, Vol.21 (No.1). pp. 1-3. ISSN 0266-2671
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0266267104000343
In his critique of rational choice theory, Amartya Sen claims that committed agents do not (or not exclusively) pursue their own goals. This claim appears to be nonsensical since even strongly heteronomous or altruistic agents cannot pursue other people's goals without making them their own. It seems that self-goal choice is constitutive of any kind of agency.
In this paper, Sen's radical claim is defended. It is argued that the objection raised against Sen's claim holds only with respect to individual goals. Not all goals, however, are individual goals; there are shared goals, too. Shared goals are irreducible to individual goals, as the argument from we-derivativeness and the argument from normativity show. It is further claimed that an adequate account of committed action defies both internalism and externalism about practical reason.
|Item Type:||Journal Article|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
|Divisions:||Faculty of Social Sciences > Philosophy|
|Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):||Sen, Amartya, 1933-. Rational fools, Rational choice theory, Choice (Psychology), Decision making -- Moral and ethical aspects, Motivation (Psychology)|
|Journal or Publication Title:||Economics and Philosophy|
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Official Date:||April 2005|
|Page Range:||pp. 1-3|
|Access rights to Published version:||Open Access|
|Funder:||Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung [Swiss National Science Foundation] (SNSF), International Students' Committee Foundation (ISCF), Universität St. Gallen (USG)|
Anderson, E. 2001. Unstrapping the straightjacket of preferences. Economics and Philosophy 17: 21–38.
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