Gender Equality and Sustainable Development for Export? A Critical Study of EU Association Agreements in Latin America

By

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University of Warwick, Department of Politics and International Studies

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This thesis is dedicated to my grandmother Ragnvy Bergström
ABSTRACT

In June 2012 the European Union signed bilateral Association Agreements (AAs) based on a neoliberal economic growth philosophy with Central American states as well as with Colombia and Peru. In addition to free trade, these also include a political dialogue as well as an international cooperation pillar. This thesis explores empirical disconnects and contradictions in the EU’s efforts to combine these different aspects in its foreign policy. In particular, it investigates how successful the EU is in linking these AAs to its work towards sustainable development and gender equality at multiple levels. It does this by moving from a wide and international perspective to a local and more specific one. In doing this the thesis examines international trends, while concentrating on EU development policies in relation to trade with Latin America, using Guatemala as a case study. Most critiques against the AAs take place within a modernity framework but this research moves beyond these notions and considers how we may account for ‘the local’ and critically engage with Western mainstream development discourses. This thesis argues that there, in addition to the empirical disconnects in EU policy, is a disconnect within theory between gendered international political economy (GIPE) and theories on sustainability. Therefore the theoretical framework aim at bridging this gap by linking environmental feminist thought with feminist economics. In addition, this thesis includes Mayan cosmovision (worldview) and the concept of *buen vivir* (good life), which is inspired by indigenous people’s worldviews and is present in the Bolivian as well as the Ecuadorian constitutions. This way local forms of theoretical knowledge is taken into account and combined with complementing forms of feminisms, allowing for a critical analysis of trade, gender and sustainable development in Latin America.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBA</td>
<td>Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALOP</td>
<td>Association of Latin American Organisations for the Promotion of Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APRODEV</td>
<td>Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACIF</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFTA</td>
<td>Central American Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALDH</td>
<td>Centro para la Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Andean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARIFORUM</td>
<td>Forum of the Caribbean Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Convention on Biodiversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC-SICA</td>
<td>System for Central American Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEH</td>
<td>Historical Clarification Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIFCA</td>
<td>Copenhagen Initiative for Mexico and Central America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONAVIGUA</td>
<td>Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala CONIC Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPEM</td>
<td>Cooperativa Integral de Ahorro y Credito</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUC</td>
<td>Comité de Unidad Campesina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMI</td>
<td>Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Development DG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGs</td>
<td>Directorate Generals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Community Humanitarian Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EESC</td>
<td>European Economic and Social Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EP</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEDEPESCUSA</td>
<td>Federación de Cooperativas Pesqueras del Pacífico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIDH</td>
<td>International Federation of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMICA</td>
<td>Foro de Mujeres para la integración Centroamericana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOEE</td>
<td>Friends of Earth Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIPE</td>
<td>Gendered International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised scheme of preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE</td>
<td>International Political Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR</td>
<td>Mercado Común del Sur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINECO</td>
<td>Ministerio de Economía de Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFTA</td>
<td>North America FTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARLACEN</td>
<td>Central American Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODESSA</td>
<td>Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago-La Salle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTA</td>
<td>Regional Trade Agreements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPREM</td>
<td>Secretaria Precidencial de la Mujer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIECA</td>
<td>Central American Economic Integration System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPS</td>
<td>Sanitary and Phytosanitary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRIPS</td>
<td>Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMG</td>
<td>Union Nacional de Mujeres Guatemaltecas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCED</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Environment and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URNG</td>
<td>Unidad revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Dame permiso espíritu del camino

Dame permiso espíritu del camino
regalame permiso
para caminar
por este sendero de cemento
que abrieron en tú ombligo
por esta autopista de viento
que corta el silencio
permiso también a ustedes
pájaros que rompen el timpano del acero permiso
piedras
permiso plantas
permiso animales que resisten en la neblina. Dejame
pasar camino
deja que esta rabia que desorbita mis ojos
se me salga en palabras dulces,
palabras finas, zarandeadas, reventadas,
dejame pasar
que mi voluntad no se pierda
dejame cruzar el barranco, la hondonada,
dejame por favor regresar a mi casa antes
de que los volcanes canten
antes de que el discurso de los cerros
escupa en nuestras bocas.

-Rosa Chavez

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Indigenous Kaqchikel (mother) and K’iche (father) poet, was born in Guatemala in 1980. Source: PROMETEO (2009), Revista Latinoamericana de Poesía, Numero 84-85, Julio
Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to study the triangular relationship between trade, sustainable development and gender equality through analysing the European Union (EU)-Central American Association Agreements. These arrangements are some of the first region-to-region agreements to be successfully negotiated by the EU. Association Agreements (AAs) are based on multilateral World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements as well as key EU policy documents, such as the Lisbon Treaty. In other words, different expressions of the same logic can be found in EU foreign policy throughout the world. The special characteristic of AAs is that they include more aspects than just trade and therefore require deeper commitments on a series of social issues between countries, rather than just pure trade relationships. For the agreements with Central America and Andean Community, both signed in June 2012, there are three founding pillars, namely, political dialogue, cooperation and free trade. The combination of free trade, human rights and sustainable development in the same agreement makes the AA interesting to examine from a critical feminist perspective, since these touch upon issues of sustainability as well as gender equality. One could choose to study a variety of socio-ecological ends but the issues of sustainable development and gender equality appear particularly relevant in this context since both are issues that the EU aim to mainstream in all its policy areas, including its foreign policy. This thesis explores in what ways these issues play out in practice within one example of interaction between the EU’s trade and international cooperation policies. In order to do this, I use feminist environmental, as well as feminist political economy, perspectives together with the concept of buen vivir (see definition in Chapter one), to examine the gendered character of trade regimes. In other words, this study demonstrates one example of the ways in which the EU identifies gender and sustainability within a trade regime. The analysis of the triangular relationship between trade gender equality and sustainable

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2 Other agreements are the Economic Partnership Agreement with CARIFORUM and (the less substantive) agreements with the East African Community (EAC) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

3 Another area that the EU aims to mainstream is climate
development is a theoretical contribution. The way I analyse the AA by examining gender equality and sustainable development bridges research done on these two topics separately, and moreover it adds a gender perspective to the literature on human rights in EU trade agreements. Empirically, the study of the AA between the EU and Central America, and the more specific case study of Guatemala, augment our understanding of these interrelated phenomena and contributes to existing literature.

Research puzzle and research questions
The puzzle of this research is to address the gap between the discourse on sustainability and gender equality and the absence of these in the trade policy of the EU as reflected in the Association Agreements. Combined macro-meso-micro analysis and an intersectionality perspective help to further develop the understanding of how trade and sustainable development are gendered.

Research questions
The research questions in this thesis reflect my intention to make the connection between the macro, meso and micro levels of analysis. The key question - How is trade and sustainable development gendered? - Theoretically explores relationships, links and contradictions between concepts that have interested me for a long time. The second question- What kind of development does the EU promote through the AA? - leads us to examine a logic promoted by the EU at macro level through the AA and analyse what kind of development the EU endorses through trade agreements in Latin America. The third question - To what extent does this AA promote gender equality and sustainable development in Guatemala and which socio-economic and ethnic groups benefit from this agreement? - addresses the research to national level in Guatemala and allows us to examine the agreement from a meso as well as micro everyday international political economy (IPE) perspective. My understanding is that all three questions relate to an intersectional perspective, so even though socio-economic groups, ethnicity and gender is only mentioned explicitly in the third question this perspective will be present throughout my research. Since the EU promoted the participation of Civil Society Organisations (CSO) in
trade negotiations with Central America I have also chosen to examine the views of some of the relevant CSOs in Brussels as well as in Guatemala. The inclusion of these CSOs views’ (as explained in Chapter three) moreover allows me to better balance the content of the thesis avoiding a state centered analysis. The role of *buen vivir* in the theoretical framework also becomes clearer as a result of the explanation of some of the CSOs viewpoints.

**Methodology and Research Methods**

**Methodology**

Methodologically, this research is a qualitative study, meaning that it analyses concepts, meanings, definitions, characteristics, symbols, metaphors and descriptions of things. In this way, this thesis differs from quantitative research that aims to count and measure things, the distributions and extents of the subject matter. (Berg, Lune, 2012, p.3) Moreover, I use triangulation as a methodological tool in this research, which means that I include ‘multiple theoretical perspectives’ as well as ‘multiple data-collection procedures’. This usage of multiple research design strategies and theories enhance the understanding that an investigation can yield (Berg, Lune, 2012, p.8) Triangulation also resolves some of the problems of using a single case study by comparing multiple kinds of sources of data. Another methodological approach that I use in this thesis is intersectionality. The starting point of the ‘intersectionality analysis’ is the idea that different forms of inequality (based on for example race, gender or social class) are inherently entangled and therefore real conditions of social inequality cannot be grasped properly in isolation from one another. During my fieldwork I realised that I had been focused on debates on sustainability that made my work almost entirely Western centred (se discussion of sustainable development in Chapter one). I then began to explore and included the concept of *buen vivir* and Mayan cosmovision (these concepts are explained in Chapter one) to examine sustainability discourses from indigenous perspectives, which allowed me to critique mainstream approaches building on both Western feminist/sustainability and indigenous work. Moreover, the interviews both in Brussels and Guatemala confirmed the importance of an intersectional analysis that examines ethnicity in relation to gender and trade in a multicultural state such as Guatemala. There was
a division between interviewees who spoke about *buen vivir* and those who appeared content using the concept of sustainable development and this division links to interviewees’ views on development. When designing this research, I have tried to practise a feminist research ethic that takes into account “absence, silence, difference, oppression, and the power of epistemology” (Ackerly, 2010:24). This also signifies taking my particular gender, class and race into account since this puts me in a “political relation with the people and phenomena” I study (Ibid., p.24). My being a white Swedish young female scholar meant very different things when for example interviewing EU officials in Brussels and when interviewing representatives of women’s cooperatives in Sololá (Guatemala). In Brussels many of the EU officials that I interviewed exercise power through their jobs and they are well educated, well paid Europeans. This meant that I as a young scholar and woman was not treated as someone in a powerful position. Having said this, the officials were polite and generally treated me with respect. When interviewing women in Sololá on the other hand I was seen as a European and therefore more powerful person with a lot of access to information and I was asked several times how I could contribute to indigenous peoples’ struggles in Guatemala. Women in Sololá also asked if I was able to provide them with contacts in Europe, so that they could export their handcrafts. In addition to taking my own identity into consideration during the research, a feminist research ethic has moreover encouraged me to avoid privileging certain kinds of data or information in my analysis and not see the mainstream or privileged views as the correct ones without questioning them and consider more marginalised views.

**Research Methods**

The research process involves the use of primary and secondary sources for data on EU foreign policy with Latin America in general as well as more specifically in the case of Guatemala. For this thesis, I sourced data from official documents and academic publications from within as well as from outside of Latin America. Chapter one provides a review of secondary literature on trade in relation to gender equality and sustainable development. The official documents that I studied include: the different pillars of the AA, other official EU policy documents, UN documents, World Bank reports, WTO documents, documents from the Guatemalan state institutions INE, DEMI and SEPREM as well as documents from CSOs in Brussles and Guatemala.
Many of these documents I accessed online, whereas others I obtained as hard copies in the course of my field trips. Other sources include books, journal articles as well as news and social media publications. For the analysis of the different kinds of data I used description as well as comparison techniques. Moreover, I did critical readings of official documents and combined this with the above-mentioned techniques. Both descriptions of the three AA pillars as well as a comparison of gender equality and sustainable development between these pillars form part of the analysis. I also applied both description and comparison when examining Brussels based and Guatemala City based CSO’s views. When doing the analysis of printed documents as well as interviews, I examined how gender equality and sustainable is included as well as where these issues are absent. Moreover, I studied reoccurring themes across the sources. By carrying out 31 semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1 for interview questionnaires) during one field visit to Brussels (June 2012) and one field visit to Guatemala (August-September 2012), I obtained detailed qualitative data that I used to analyse the CSOs representatives’ views as well as the views of EU officials. Semi-structured interviews work well as a format for this research since it allows for flexibility for me as the interviewer to both ask a series of structured questions, which allow for comparisons across interviews, and to add follow up questions spontaneously initiated by the interviewee.

In other words, in these types of interview questions are asked of each interviewee but even so it is possible to have a format that allows for flexibility and move to questions of the interview that makes it feel more like a conversation for both the interviewee and the researcher. In semi-structured interviews the subject-participants are also able to give answers that do not necessarily conform to the researchers’ predetermined expectations. (Ackerly and True, p.168).
**Table 1**

**Distribution of the thirty-eight interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisation representatives in Brussels</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector representatives in Guatemala</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institution Officials</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Officials in Guatemala</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organisation representatives in Guatemala City</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own graphic

I conducted face-to-face interviews with EU as well as Guatemalan state officials, civil society organisation (CSO) representatives of Brussels based organisations as well as representatives of Central American and Guatemalan organisations in Guatemala city and in the Sololá county (these organisations are described in Chapter three). Moreover, I conducted one e-mail interview with the Guatemalan representative of the Forum of Women for the Central American Integration (FMICA). Generally the balance between the types of actors I interviewed worked well.
During my field trip to Guatemala I had the opportunity to carry out an observation of a meeting with ten women leaders active in cooperatives across the country, and this in turn contributed to the primary data collection I carried out. This meeting was organised by women working at the Latin America Faculty of Social Sciences (FLACSO) together with UN Women staff in Guatemala City. At this meeting the participants shared their experiences as leaders and the difficulties that their work entails in a male dominated society. The women talked about different forms of discrimination against them, supported each other and exchanged advice. I briefly explained what my research is about and why their work interests me. Several of the women invited me to visit them in their cooperatives across the country and I did visit two of them, Gliceria Saquie Batz at the bank cooperative ‘Cooperativa Integral de Ahorro y Credito’ (COOPEM) in Novillero and Mayra Velazquez at the fishing-cooperative, ‘Federación de Pescadores Guatemaltecos’ (FEDEPESCA) close to Iztapa on the Pacific Coast. These visits gave me the opportunity to better understand the everyday lives of these women.

In my interviews, I asked the interviewees similar questions about the topics of trade, gender equality and sustainable development. Moreover, I also asked about the work of the institutions and organisations. The questions were based on my readings of the AA, of other official policy documents on trade, gender equality and sustainable development as well as of CSOs’ documents. Due to the diversity among the interviewees the questions had to be adapted according to people’s knowledge about, for example the AA. The women leaders of cooperatives in the Sololá County did not know about the AA in particular but they had views on international trade and how this may affect them in their everyday lives (see Chapter three).

Case selection

The EU signed an AA with Central America (including Guatemala) in 2012 and it is interesting to study since it was the first AA that the EU succeeded to negotiate with a whole region of countries.
This AA represents a shift in multilateral trade in which countries negotiate agreements with one or several states as supposed to through the WTO where negotiations became difficult to peruse with the failure of the last Doha round that was launched in 2001. Moreover the AA between the EU and the Central American states demonstrate an alteration with a stronger emphasis on the relation between free trade and normative values such as human rights and environmental protection.

The relationship between the North/Industrialised and the South/Developing worlds also play out in this AA, which makes it an intriguing case to examine the debates about development in relation to trade, sustainability and gender equality. Even though Guatemala is the case study, the focus in this research lies on EU foreign policy rather than the actions taken by the Guatemalan government. Due to this chosen focus I do not write much about the role of the Guatemalan state but rather I focus on examining the logic promoted in the AA and its relation to different EU policy areas as well as the multilateral trade system. It poses some challenges to study an agreement that the parties signed so recently, since it is not possible to analyse the impact. This methodological challenge has nevertheless developed my research by encouraging me to study questions associated with the logic promoted through the AA. I believe that Guatemala makes the most interesting case among the Central American states to examine due to its complex socio-political and multicultural reality. About half of the country’s population is indigenous\(^4\) and suffers from significant political, economic as well as cultural discrimination. The majority of the population is poor and many women moreover suffer from gendered discrimination. In addition many women as well as men suffer from high levels of different kinds of violence. This reality is therefore a good starting point for an intersectional study of the policies promoted in Guatemala through the AA agreements. None of the other Central American countries have a large indigenous population and this is one of the factors to why Guatemala interests me as a researcher. The multicultural society deepens and diversifies the discussions of trade, development models, sustainability as well as gender.

\(^4\) According to the Guatemalan National Institute (INE) 40 per cent of the Guatemalan population identified themselves as indigenous in 2002. This is the most recent census (INE, 2012:13). It is difficult to know if people want to identify themselves as indigenous though, since there is still a lot of discrimination against indigenous peoples in Guatemala.
Moreover, I worked as a peace observer accompanying human right activists throughout Guatemala in 2007. I also spent one year working as a program assistant at UN Women (it was then called UNIFEM) in 2008. One of the programs I was working within at UN Women was a regional one called Women’s Economic Agenda (AGEM) and one of my tasks was to try and inform women’s organisations about the AA negotiations and encourage organised women from different economic sectors across the country to think about the effects an AA could have in their everyday lives. There were many challenges to this task, such as gathering people from rural spread out communities with bad infrastructure, raising awareness among women with very different levels of education as well as finding relevant literature on gender and trade in Latin America. It was the final challenge that made me interested in doing doctoral research on this topic. It seems worth mentioning here that my previous working experiences throughout Guatemala have helped me to better deal with power relations in the country and to be more sensitive to cultural difference. In fact, my previous experience working with human right activists was crucial for the levels of trust needed for some of the interviews with CSOs representatives. Moreover my former colleagues at UN Women were helpful in putting me in contact with people.

A Brief Sketch of Guatemalan History and Political Economy

In this section I aim to provide the necessary background information about the case study to better contextualise the research. The country’s national territory is 108,889.15 sq. km. of which 73,541.15 sq. km. is used for agriculture and fishing today (National Institute of Statistics, 2013a:13). This can be compared with the UK’s territory that is 241,930.0 sq. km. Guatemala is diverse geographically with fertile lowlands, mountainous highlands, cloud forest, and rainforest with remarkable biodiversity. The territory moreover has volcanoes, lakes and coasts facing the pacific as well as the Atlantic. In other words the country has the geographical preconditions to offer food security and the necessary resources for its population not to live in extreme poverty. Due to various factors explained in this section the reality looks different however. Below is a map of Guatemala with close up images of the areas
where I did the fieldwork

Figure 1
Map of Guatemala indicating the locations of fieldwork

Source: Own graphic

Trade Regime

In its ‘Trade Policy Review’ to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) from December 2008 the Guatemalan government wrote that,

...Guatemala needs to further decentralize its industry and generate sufficient economic growth, by creating a larger supply of qualified labour (...) and developing a diversified industry that would enable it to offer highly competitive products, expanding its export destination markets...(WTO, 2008, p.15).
In a report from 2009, World Bank rated Guatemala as 68 out of 125 countries on the Most Favoured Nation Tariff (MFN) Trade Restrictiveness Index (TTRI) with a score of 5.9 percent. This indicates that Guatemala’s trade regime is more open than that of an average lower-middle income country for which the score is 8.6. Also, the average for Latin American and Caribbean countries on the same scale of trade openness is 7.6 percent (World Bank, 2009, p.1). Despite the trade liberation efforts Guatemala, ranked 110th out of 183 countries in another World Bank index called the ‘Ease of Doing Business’\textsuperscript{5} the same year (2009).

In the June of 2013 version of that same index Guatemala ranked as 79 however. So, from this information we can see that the recent Guatemalan governments have made a big effort to open up the country’s economy and make it a friendly environment for investors. The Guatemalan key export sector is the maquila industry and garment export makes up more than half of this. The second largest export sector is coffee, which made up 12 percent of the export goods in 2009. After this follow sugar and bananas that respectively account for 7 and 6 percent Guatemala’s total export (World Bank, 2009). Guatemalan businesses do most of their trade with the US and its trade with the EU has not been substantial so far. In 2013, Guatemala exported goods such as knitwear as well as woven apparel, fruits, gold and coffee to a value of 3.08 billion Euros to the US. That same year Guatemala also imported US goods such as oil, machinery, and plastic for an even larger sum of 4.04 billion Euros (USTR, 2014). In other words Guatemala overall imports goods worth more than the goods it exports to the US and therefore carries a big deficit in this sector. This is not the case within the agricultural sector however, where Guatemala’s export exceeds the import. The trade between Guatemala and the EU has been on the increase since 2010 but is nevertheless minor to its trade with the US. In 2013 Guatemala exported goods worth 620 million Euros to the EU and imported goods to a value of 780 million Euros (EC, 2014, p.3). Guatemala’s key export goods for the EU market are; food and live animals, beverages and tobacco, crude materials, mineral fuels as well as animal

\textsuperscript{5} The index averages the country’s percentage rankings in ten areas; starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency.
and vegetable oils. The main goods that Guatemala imports from the EU are chemical and related products, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, miscellaneous manufactured articles and commodities (Ibid, p.3).

Table 2
Total goods: EU Trade flows by SITC section, annual data
2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SITC Sections</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Label</td>
<td>Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>S3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>Beverages and tobacco</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>Crude materials, lubricants and related materials</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>Chemical and related prod, n.e.s</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>Machinery and transport equipment</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S8</td>
<td>Miscellaneous manufactured articles</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>Commodities and transactions, n.e.c.</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S10</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>S12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Juan Carlos Paiz, the President of the Exporters’ Association of Guatemala (Asociacion Gremial de Exportadores de Guatemala AGEXPORT), considers that his country has a low level of trade with the European Union, and that the Agreement with Europe would encourage Guatemalan exports (Woolcock, 2012, p.14). The EU – Guatemalan relations do not only focus on trade however, rather these stretches back in history to the Guatemalan armed conflict and the following peace negotiations.

Guatemala’s violent past
The country has a violent past and suffered a thirty-six year long armed conflict (1969-1996) in which the army and police were responsible for 95 percent of 200,000 civilian deaths and the exile of 300,000 people (Comisión de Esclareimiento Histórico; see CEH 1999). Three out of every four victims were indigenous people and the army ravaged 400 Maya villages (Ibid.). I have not found systematized data demonstrating how many women that were killed during the armed conflict. There is data on violence against women during conflict in Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) from 1999, but not deaths. Between the 1979’s and the 1980’s, the Guatemalan military ruled the country and its state apparatus of violence wiped out an entire generation of political activists, intellectuals – university lecturers and students, trade unionists and political party members. Political as well as economic instability made domestic reorganisation a priority and as a result an elite led transition from military to civilian rule 1982-1985 (Brett, 2008, p.36). The civil governments providing a restricted form of democracy started with the election of Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo in 1985. The previous time Guatemala had a civilian President was 1966-1970 with César Méndez Montenegro. With this turn towards civilian government and the relative opening that came along, activists began to organise collectively (Brett, 2008, p.15).

In today’s Guatemala fifty per cent of the population lives in rural areas (World Bank, 2012). The agrarian question is one of the major issues that have not been resolved with the Guatemalan peace process and the absence of land distribution and the demand for land reform, was one of the key issues which unified the four different guerrilla groups into the ‘Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca’ (URNG) in 1982 (Jonas, 1991, pp.138-139). One problem is that the lack of land distribution is not properly dealt with in the 1996 Accord on Socioeconomic and Agrarian Issues that form part of the Peace Accords. Except for the continued concentration of fertile land ownership, insufficient income tax-increase is another example of a flaw in the peace accords.6

As Jonas states,

6 In the 1996 Accord on Agrarian and Socioeconomic issues obliges the government to increase the ratio of taxes to gross domestic product from 8 per cent to 12 per cent by 2012 (Jonas, 2000).
The compromises and omissions on these issues are not surprising, given the need to win the consent of the private sector, the government's conservative economic agenda, and the generally neoliberal policies coming from the international financial institutions (Jonas, 2000, p.17).

**Guatemalan Peace Accords**

The San José Dialogue in Costa Rica, initiated in 1984, represented the first major involvement between the EU as a united actor and the Central American states. Essentially, the purpose of this dialogue was to create a forum for political discussion, which could enhance conflict resolution and democratisation in Central America (Karadjova, 2003, p.7). The stated EU objectives of the San José process were to find peaceful solutions to the conflicts in Central America, to strengthen the democracy in the region and to work towards regional integration (EEAS, 2014). The objective of regional integration in Central America plays a significant role also in the AA. The San José dialogue played a significant role in the history of EU-Latin American relations and Youngs argues that the San José process is one of the “broadest and densest frameworks of cooperation in Latin America, involving NGOs, parliamentarians, unions, business organisations, and cultural bodies” (Youngs, 2002, p.115). This peace initiative contributed to the fostering of the signing of Peace Accords in both El Salvador and Guatemala and meant that the EU played a noteworthy role in the resolution to the armed conflicts in Central America7 (Martin, 2002, p.55).

In Guatemala, the peace accord led to three major achievements with the first being the signing of the human rights accord in March 1994. Technically, these rights were already guaranteed in the 1985 Guatemalan constitution, but this new accord made it easier to fight against the systemic violation of those rights in practice and was supported by a UN Verification Mission (MINIGUA) (Jonas, 2000). Secondly, the demilitarization accord signed in September 1996 led to a definite end of the armed conflict and requires extensive constitutional reforms to limit the army’s functions. This means that from the signing of this accord the only function of the army is to defend Guatemala’s borders and territorial integrity (Ibid.). This was a

7 Other important external actors in the Guatemalan peace process were the UN and Norway.
crucial moment in Guatemala’s modern history, since the Guatemalan state had converted into a ‘counterinsurgency apparatus’. The Guatemalan sociologist, Carlos Figueroa Ibarra, referred to this as the ‘centaurization’ of the state half-human and half-beast, with a fusion of civilian and military power, with the military element dominating (Jonas, 1998, p.48). Finally, the third major gain was the 1995 Accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This agreement acknowledges the identity of indigenous peoples and ensures their civil, cultural, social, political and economic rights (UN, 1995). In fact, if this accord were to be fully implemented, it would require changes in Guatemala’s political, judicial and educational systems and it gives indigenous peoples right to make claims on the state.

One of the worst flaws of the Peace Accords appears to be the lack of justice to the victims of the war. The Truth Commission that came out of the accords was not allowed to mention individuals responsible for human rights crimes nor was it permitted to take any kind of judicial action. Christian Tomuschat (2001, p.243) who chaired the UN supported CEH expresses that the prohibition of the “assignment of individual responsibility” was one of the most contentious aspects of the Oslo Agreement (1994) that outlines the objectives and guidelines of the CEH.

Also, despite serious attempts to shape justice by survivors from the armed conflict as well as human rights groups, the former dictator Rios Montt is still free. In fact, General Rios Montt, who is now 87 years old, was convicted of genocide and war crimes in May 2013 and sentenced to 80 years in prison. However, the conviction was reversed by the constitutional court, which argued that Rios Montt had been denied due process. A court official said that the judges were busy with other cases in 2014, but would restart the trial in January 2015 (Amnesty International, 2013). Many witnesses participated in the court and they feel betrayed by the Guatemalan judicial system now. It is often very difficult for these people to speak about what they experienced during the armed conflict and Amnesty International called this delay a
"devastating blow for the victims of the serious human rights violations committed during the conflict" (BBC, Nov., 2013).

As mentioned another major issue that has not been resolved with the Guatemalan peace process is the agrarian situation and the absence of land distribution. In relation to this Figueroa Ibarra also writes about this connection and argues that, there is no doubt about the business participation in the Guatemalan holocaust. They participated in the so-called Council of State, international advocacy to break the isolation of the military dictatorship, with the (...) economic contribution to fund counterinsurgency and finally the direct link of some businesspersons, with their aircraft and their pilots in the bombing in the conflict areas8 (Figueroa Ibarra, 2013).

This historical perspective of the power dynamics and coalitions between elites is also relevant for the negotiations of the AA, since the business elites and major land owners still dominate both political and economic spheres in Guatemala as well as influence the trade negotiations through the Business Commission of International trade Negotiations (CENCIT).

Sustainable development in Guatemala

Susan Baker (2007) criticises the EU for practicing ecological modernisation rather than sustainable development. The ecological modernisation discourse (as discussed in Chapter 2) recognises the structural character of environmental problems, but nevertheless argues that present economic, political and social establishments can assume the care for the environment (Hajer, 1995, p.25). The sustainable development model that the EU and the Guatemalan state promote through the AA, also does not question, for example, the export oriented economy, and the concentration of natural resources in the hands of few persons. Moreover, the section working with Guatemala at the External Action Service (EEAS) at the EU commission does not see these issues as their concern. Arguing that since Guatemala is a democracy and the government therefore in theory represents the people, the EEAS does not see the concentration of power as well as resources as something it

8 Author’s translation
should take into consideration when negotiating AAs (EEAS, interview, 13/06/12). The Guatemalan government, the Guatemalan economic elite (CACIF) as well as the European (BusinessEurope) business sectors’ interests groups and the EC all offer similar views on development and environmental protection. The focus on economic growth and exploitation of nature (primarily through mining and hydroelectric power plants) often causes conflict between indigenous communities and the state in Guatemala and this is a theme present in this thesis.

Rural Guatemala

As mentioned earlier in this introduction, half of the Guatemalan population live in rural areas and these people rely, at least in part, on agriculture and the environment to meet their daily needs. There are few jobs outside of the agricultural sector in rural areas, which means that landless peasants view international migration as one possible strategy that could allow them to access land and/or to secure property rights to their land, since remittances from emigrants may provide the financial resources for this. Emigration is very common also in Sololá where I interviewed representatives of CSOs. One of the CSOs’ representatives, Saquic Batz at the savings and credit cooperative COPEM, R.L (see Chapter 3) explains the importance of remittances (remesas) in her community, Aldea El Novillero (Sololá) and in the cooperative run by women (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). She says explains saying that “we have a travellers investment savings account that is exclusively for emigrants because here we have done an evaluation and that shows that 98 per cent of our deposits are from emigrants” She also mentions that the cooperative is looking into the possibility of opening offices in “Los Angeles, New York in Huston (...) to give a special treatment to the emigrant”(Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). Moreover, the cooperative has a special savings account for women since it is usually them who receive the remittance from sons or husbands who have emigrated. Saquic Batz explains how her and the other coordinators at COPEM, R.L “want to give priority to the women (...) by giving them a more attractive interest rate than with other accounts” (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12).

The agrarian census of Guatemala from 2004 (INE) classified properties smaller than 7
hectares as subsistence-level farms – in other words, farms that do not allow for surplus accumulation. In 2003, 23 per cent of the arable land was distributed among 92 per cent of the rural properties, most of which were below subsistence level (INE, 2004). The results from the latest agricultural census showed little change in regards to land concentration between 1979 and 2003 in Guatemala. The fact that investments in biofuel crops (particularly sugar cane and African palm trees) have grown during the past 20 years (Díaz 2012) does not reduce the land concentration. The agrarian elite dominates this segment of the agricultural sector and moreover exerts considerable power in policy-making and legislation. On the other hand agricultural policy and investment support for small-scale farmers in Guatemala is limited. There are governmental plans that refer to the promotion of rural development and this has been a hot topic in Guatemala for many years. Despite promises there have been few actions and there is little momentum or budget allocation towards small-scale farmers compared with the commercial and industrial sectors (Díaz 2012). The situation outlined above is the context that the rural population live in. Many of these women and men struggle for food security and food sovereignty. Cardamom and coffee are the main cash crops among Guatemalan peasants. The cultivation of crops for family consumption is a way to secure access to food in a context where there are few employment alternatives and consequently little cash for buying food. Cultivation of crops for family consumption is also a strategy to cope with uncertainties related to the flux of remittances from abroad (Aguilar-Støen, et al 2014). Furthermore, even though the area cultivated with corn in Guatemala has increased, the country does not produce enough corn to feed the population. Close to 30 per cent of the total corn consumed in the country is imported.

Indigenous economics

Corn and beans are the staple foodstuffs in rural Guatemala and these two crops are also cultivated in the communities where I did the fieldwork. In family gardens women cultivate vegetables and grow some fruits for own consumption. What can be referred to as indigenous economics is different from capitalist production and based in other values, such as, collectivist organisation, reciprocity in the communitarian life, cooperation, collective right to the land, territory and resources (qichin konojel),
austerity and forms of production and consumption based in self sufficiency. One expression of the indigenous economics is the *Paq’uch* practice (DEMI, 2011, p.30). And one participant in a focal group that formed part of a Defensoría de la Mujer Indígena (DEMI) study explains;

One form of *Paq’uch* was the exchange of pounds of corn for some poultry birds or garments, or when during the corn planting season or corn harvesting season, between neighbours and family members one helped out with the cooking without receiving any reimbursement. One also lends broody hens and male animals for the reproduction and one gets corn or birds in exchange. (DEMI, 2011, p.30).

The indigenous economics in Guatemala is based on interdependence (*jalwachinik*) and *buen vivir* (utz k’aslem) (DEMI, 2011, p.30) as supposed to capital accumulation (see further explanation of *buen vivir* and Mayan cosmovision in Chapter one). As we can see a different form of trade than the one we find in the formal economy, namely barter economy play an important role in the indigenous economics.

**Gender (in)equality in Guatemala**

**Gendered political and economic aspects**

In the case of today’s Guatemala, women continue to be discriminated against in different spheres of society. One illustrative example of this is that only 21 out of the 158 deputies elected to congress are women. Moreover, only 18 of the deputies were indigenous (National Democratic Institute, 2013). In Guatemala the economically active population (the fraction of a population that is either employed or actively seeking employment) in 2013 were 5.9 million people out of the total 9.7 million people above age 15 (National Institute of Statistics, 2013,p.5). Among people who count as part of the economically active population, women are underrepresented and only represent 40.6 per cent of the women whereas the figure for men is 83.9 per cent. For women living in rural areas the figure is even lower (35.5 per cent) (Ibid.). This does of course not mean that the rest of the women do not work. Rather, it reflects the problem of when the reproductive economy and the labour involved in social reproduction is not valued (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007, Griffin, 2007,
Moreover this also affects women when they are old, since they do not get pensions without having worked in the formal economy. The socio-economic situation in Guatemala is complex to analyse and includes intersecting types of discriminations and social exclusions based on ethnicity, social class and gender.

**Indigenous women’s situation**

Indigenous women in Guatemala are active and work in two different economies, namely the capitalist economy and the indigenous economy. Most indigenous women who form part of the economically active population (40.6 per cent of them as explained above) and therefore are active within the capitalist economy work in the agricultural sector, but we also find many indigenous women working with retail trade and manufacturing (DEMI, 2011, p.22). It is important to note that usually when women work with agriculture on small family farms they are classified as family assistants (*ayudantes familiares*) (Saucic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12 and DEMI, 2011, p.24). It is also becoming more and more common that indigenous women work within the public or private sector as teachers, technicians, secretaries and promoters in social programs. Indigenous women’s paid work does not exempt them from unpaid reproductive work that they do in the household and in the communities (DEMI, 2011, p.31). In other words many women in Guatemala sell their labour in the capitalist economy, participate voluntarily in collective work for their communities, for example as healers (*curanderas*) and midwives (*comadronas*) do reproductive work (such as caring for children and elderly). In 2010 indigenous women represented approximately twenty per cent of Guatemala’s population (DEMI, 2011, p.20). These women are discriminated both for being women and for being indigenous. DEMI’s study from 2011 shows how indigenous women who work as agribusiness workers earn less than their male colleagues. In the Guatemalan highlands it is normal for women to earn 25 quetzales (2.30 Euros) per day whereas men earn between 40 quetzales (2.6 Euros) and 60 quetzales (5.5 Euros).

The salaries for male agribusiness workers are already very low, which means that it is difficult to survive of what these women earn. Indigenous women in rural areas often spend less time doing paid work while they spend much of their time doing reproductive work and subsistence activities, such as, taking care of domestic
animals, growing medical plants as well as vegetables for family consumption. Moreover they often weave their own clothes (DEMI, 2011, p.41).

As explained above Guatemala has a history of discrimination against indigenous people and women. Moreover, different actors (national and external) promote different models of development that benefit distinct groups in society. In other words there are different views of what is best for the future. One approach is the dominant export oriented free trade based development model, promoted by the Guatemalan government as well as the EU and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). The AA forms part of this free trade logic despite its additional pillars on political dialogue and international cooperation. Within Guatemala however, indigenous organisations promote a distinct path based on the ideas of buen vivir and I consider this an important contribution. However, I also argue that we must include the work of feminists, especially indigenous feminists who question the idea of returning to some true culture or nature as reflected in part in the concept of buen vivir. I agree with Harcourt (1994, p. 20) when she writes that “the important thing is to acknowledge the different positions: it is not just a question of the West versus others; we will have to negotiate through a far more complex and difficult process if we are to confront and try to resolve social inequalities”, and I would add sustainability as well.

Violence against women

In Guatemala more than 700 women were murdered in 2008 and many of these women were brutally sexually abused and tortured before being killed (WHO, 2012, p.3). A 2009 human rights campaign reported that there had been more than 500 femicides per year in Guatemala since 2001(Ibid.p.3). From the statistics there is reason to believe that these are the same kind of numbers as during the armed conflict in the early 1980s (Sandford, 2008.p.105). Even though there are even more men killed than women in Guatemala, it is important to look at feminicide (when women who are killed for being women) and the particular types of violence that often precedes these killings. As supposed to murdered men the majority of women murdered are not linked to gangs or other criminal groups, but nevertheless they get killed in very brutal ways. I have not been able to find data showing the distribution
between indigenous and non-indigenous among the femicide victims.  

**Summary of Thesis**

The coming chapters build their analysis of the AA in Guatemala on the above description of the case study’s political economy and contemporary history since it would be unfeasible to study issues of trade, gender relations and sustainability in the Guatemalan society today without taking the effects of past political situation into account. Due to this the case study is presented in the introduction. As outlined in the table of contents, the thesis is set up to provide the necessary background for the reader through the introduction, before the theoretical framework explores links between trade and the concepts of sustainability and gender (Chapter one). Thereafter the following two chapters on first, the EU as a global actor (Chapter two) and then civil society actors’ (European and Guatemalan) views on trade in relation to gender equality and sustainable development (Chapter three) examine these different actor’s views of the concepts discussed in Chapter one. Chapter three gives a balance to the state actor emphasis and contextualises and explains some of the critiques that I later make of the pillars in the core empirical chapters. These following chapters of the three pillars (Chapter four, Chapter five and Chapter six) describe and analyse the AA and relate the issues of the different AA articles in light of the theoretical framework. Finally, the conclusion highlights the main argument and summarises the key findings. 

In Chapter one (Literature Review and Theoretical Framework) I discuss the major debates and important contributions within gendered international political economy (GIPE) and explore in what way GIPE as well as feminist literature on the environment and sustainable development may function as a framework for analysis of international trade and in particular the AA between the EU and Central America. Chapter one also includes ideas with their roots in indigenous cosmovision throughout the Americas (Abaya Yala). Here the chapter analyses the concept of *buen vivir*, its

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links to Mayan cosmovision as well as to what extent it is compatible with feminist and environmental debates. *Buen vivir* reminds us to take the local (people as well as ecosystems) into account, something that Western forms of feminism tend to overlook.

Chapter two (The EU as a Global Actor) presents a mapping and a historical contextualization of the EU’s international trade and international cooperation policies as well as examines development and trade issues within the EU-Latin American relations. Secondly, it provides some discussion of the EU as an actor in the multilateral trade system and gives examples of different types of EU trade agreements, in order to better situate the AA. Here US trade agreements as well as the Latin American socialist alternative to free trade agreements, ALBA, are explained. Finally, Chapter two explores some of the key theoretical critiques, focusing on sustainable development and gender equality, of the EU’s international cooperation and trade policies and links these to the theoretical framework explained in Chapter one.

Just as the theoretical chapter as well as Chapter two, Chapter three (Civil Society in the EU and Central America) also sets up the stage for the following three key empirical chapters, on the different pillars of the AA. Chapter three positions civil society organizations in relation to the AA in Brussels as well as in Guatemala City and the Sololá region. This chapter describes the different organizations that I visited for interviews with their representatives. These organizations have an interest in themes related to trade, gender equality and sustainable development but as explained in Chapter three, some of these organizations are critical to the concept of sustainable development itself and some of them also to the concept of gender. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the different views on civil society by various EU institutions (such as the Commission and the EU Parliament) and Guatemalan state institutions. It is important to discuss the standpoints of civil society organisations in relation to the AA, since the EU generally emphasises the significance of Civil Society participation and particularly asked for input from civil society organisations during the dialogue of the agreements. After examining the views of various EU and Guatemalan institutions Chapter three offers an explanation of the
choices of organisations that are represented empirically in this thesis. Moreover, the chapter explains what issues the organisations in these two different geographical settings lobby for in relation to the AA and finally, the chapter provides an analysis of the similarities and differences between the views and understandings of the European and the Guatemalan organisations.

The following three chapters - four, five and six - cover one AA pillar each. Chapter four critically examines the trade pillar (Part IV). In this chapter I first explain the negotiation process that took place between 2007 and 2010 with representatives from the European Commission and from Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras (Panama joined the negotiations as full member at the end of the process). Thereafter, I outline the structure of the AA and describe the institutional framework as outlined in the preamble of the AA, finally I explore the relationship between free trade, sustainability and gender equality. In other words Chapter four describes, examines and interprets the trade pillar.

After this follows Chapter five that presents an analysis of the co-operation pillar within the AA, the third and final pillar of the agreement (Part III). In order to do this analysis, I first explain the background and outline the structure as well as the contents of the pillar. Secondly, I examine the specific case of Guatemala in relation to the issues in this pillar. Finally, in this chapter I critically examine Part III by exploring the relationship between free trade, sustainability and gender equality within this context. Then follows Chapter six, the final empirical chapter with an analysis of the political dialogue pillar within the AA, which is the second pillar of the agreement (Part II). In order to do this analysis, I first of all clarify the background of political dialogue within AAs and outline the structure as well as the specific issues of this particular pillar. Secondly, I examine the pillar in the context of Guatemalan, focusing on gender equality, sustainable development and trade. Finally, I critically examine Part II by exploring the separation and marginalisation of issues related to sustainability and gender equality, while addressing ideas from Mayan cosmovisión and buen vivir as part of the critique.
The Conclusion highlights the key findings and summarises the different parts of the thesis. In doing this it contextualises and discusses the empirical findings in relation to the research questions as well as the theoretical framework. Here I moreover consider limitations of the findings as well as future research questions that have been brought to the surface during this journey. Having presented the research puzzle and research questions, methodology and methods as well as an introduction to Guatemala (the case study of this thesis) followed by a chapter-by-chapter outline, I now introduce the main argument before progressing to Chapter one (Literature review and Theoretical Framework).

In this thesis I will argue that there are two important disconnects one can identify in the literature, namely trade versus gender equality and sustainability and secondly gender equality versus sustainability. I argue that despite the EU’s stated goal to assure an appropriate balance between the three AA pillars (Article 1(2)), there exists an unbalance in which the Trade Pillar (Part IV) and its main goal of economic growth rules over the sustainability and human rights components. Furthermore, I argue that the two disconnects mentioned above exist empirically as well as theoretically. This thesis will identify and examine these disconnects, and propose the concept of buen vivir as a possible way to bridge the gap between gender equality and sustainability. By doing so I hope to build a framework of analysis that interweaves these frameworks into a new approach to comprehend sustainable development in Guatemala.
Chapter 1: Building a Theoretical Framework

Most mainstream economists tend to overlook gender equality and the environment within their analysis (Ferber and Nelson, 2009, Røbpke, 2005). Similarly, environmental economists tend to ignore issues of gender in their analysis despite the fact that being female is often linked to being poor and poor women bear the burden of household care including collection of water, fuel and research shows that they are most severely affected by natural disasters such as floods and droughts (Cannon, 2002). Furthermore, feminist economists writing on trade typically do not include an environmental analysis (see for example Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti, 2004) and there is also a lack of dialogue between feminist environmentalists and feminist economists. In order to analyse the local impacts on sustainable development and gender equality promoted through logic of the AA, I would argue that it is necessary to use insights and research tools both from environmental and feminist scholars. These theoretical approaches are particularly relevant in the context of an analysis of trade, since the EU claims that the AA regional trade agreement between the EU and Central America that I examine in this thesis, promotes sustainable development as well as gender equality. My contention is that the gendered international political economy (GIPE) framework in combination with environmental feminism can give us a better understanding of the gendered and ecological implications of the EU foreign trade policy orchestrated through free trade in Central America, as well as in other regions of the world. In studies on trade and gender, the focus tends to lie on women’s access to decent work and the effects that an export oriented model and neoliberal policies have on women in developing countries. Decent work is also promoted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and mentioned by EU policy makers as one of the key tools towards women’s economic development in developing countries. This thesis explores the implications of macroeconomic policies in free trade agreements, but instead of focusing on decent work in the industrial sector, such as sweat-shops (see for example Dominguez et al., 2010, Kabeer 2004 and Linda Lim

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10 Chapter 2 provides an overview of the different kinds of EU regional trade agreements
1990) it explores the possible effects these policies have on rural populations and analyses the situation of indigenous women. This focus relates to the lack of research done on the effects of trade agreements in rural Central America as well as the fact that the majority of the country's poor live in rural areas and belong to indigenous groups. Moreover, this thesis links trade and gender relations to the concept of sustainable development.

This chapter first relates sustainable development, gender equality and international trade to key multilateral agreements. Thereafter, it examines fundamental ideas within GIPE and environmental feminism, such as social reproduction, nature-culture dualism and the private-public dichotomy. Thirdly, this chapter analyses feminist work on trade as well as on trade agreements more specifically and subsequently it examines feminist scholarship on sustainable development and integrates feminist research on the social and the ecological in economic policy. It then considers the failure to incorporate gender equality and sustainable development dimensions into the core debates of IPE. The last section of the chapter examines the concept of buena vivir and Mayan cosmovision as an alternative vision of sustainable development and moreover, it studies these ideas from a feminist perspective and puts them in an international context. The conclusion aims at highlighting the usefulness of the combination of these different theoretical perspectives, when examining the claims of the AA between the EU and Central America.

The inclusion of gender and sustainable development ideas into discussions on trade are becoming more prevalent. Nevertheless, these discussions are not reflected much in trade regimes and trade agreements. The AA presents itself as an exception to this and therefore makes a good case to analyse from the theoretical perspectives outlined above. Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti direct our attention to the contradiction that states are facing when liberalizing trade on the basis of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade agreements, at the same time as agreeing to battle discrimination and promote equality between women and men in all areas, including trade, through regional and international human rights treaties (Tran-Nguyen and Zampetti, 2004, p.
354). In other words the pressure to liberalise undermines the capacity to regulate in order to correct gender inequalities and fulfil commitments to tackle discrimination. Similar contradictions can also be found in the tension between trade agreements and the environment. Below, follows an outline of key international agreements that states have signed to promote gender equality and sustainable development. This chapter argues that there is a need to have a more integral approach which unifies human rights with respect for the ecosystems and Mother Earth (as understood in indigenous cosmovisions) as a whole.

The Beijing Platform for Action is the outcome of the 1995 UN Women’s Conference and it is an international recommendation urging governments to ensure that trade agreements do not have a negative impact on women. In other words this platform clearly refers to trade policy as an area for gender mainstreaming. Moreover, this document encourages governments to monitor trade and other policies to prevent negative effects that might arise in the lives of women (UN, Paragraph 165 k, 165p, 1995). The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) from 1979 is an important tool for achieving gender equality. Nevertheless, it does not deal specifically with trade and gender, which underlines the disconnect in the thinking about gender and trade more generally. By accepting CEDAW, States commit themselves to undertake a series of measures to end discrimination against women in all forms, including, “to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises” (UN, 1979). More recently, in September 2000, at the UN headquarters in New York, the Millennium Declaration agreed upon by Heads of State at the first Millennium Summit reemphasised the urgency of poverty alleviation and gender equality as development goals. Moreover, this summit discussed how to better incorporate environmental issues and sustainable development. Furthermore, one of the major outcomes of the Millennium summit were the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and one of the eight goals is to ensure environmental stability. This goal focuses more specifically on reversing the loss of environmental resources, reducing biodiversity loss, improving people’s sustainable access to safe drinking water and sanitation and improving the
lives of slum dwellers (UN, 2000). Another international milestone when it comes to environmental protection is the UN conference on environment and development that took place in 1992. Agenda 21 is the action plan from this conference and includes the role of different sectors (for example women, the business sector, indigenous people, youth and non-governmental organisations) in delivering it. Moreover it contains guidelines for how to manage natural resources and socioeconomic dimensions of sustainable development (UN, 1992)

This brief outline of international recommendations demonstrates the urgency of including gender equality and sustainable development in policy as well as in practice. This chapter discusses these issues in relation to the effects of trade liberalisation, which have been extensively reviewed in the GIPE literature as well as other relevant feminist literature. I will review this literature below.

**Key ideas in Gendered International Political Economy**

GIPE regards gender as a vital axis for understanding IPE (Rai, 2013) and the feminists contributing to the field of GIPE share a set of common positions and perspectives despite the fact that they might come from different academic backgrounds. One shared key position is the importance of the labour involved in social reproduction and the idea that this labour should count as work and be included in the estimation and assessment of the economy (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007, Peterson, 2005, Griffin, 2007). Bedford and Rai give a good summary of three main aspects of social reproduction: “first, biological reproduction, the production of future labour, and the provision of sexual, emotional, and affective services (such as are required to maintain family and intimate relationships); second, unpaid production of both goods and services in the home, particularly goods and services of care, as well as social provisioning (by which we mean voluntary work directed at meeting needs in the community); and, third, the reproduction of culture and ideology, which stabilizes dominant social relations” (Bedford and Rai, 2010, p. 7). The division between the productive and the reproductive economy is linked to the gender division between the historically male public “sphere of serious politics” and “real” work and women’s family sphere of caring and emotional maintenance. The first sphere representing paid work and the second one unpaid work (Peterson, 2003, p. 79). Quiroga-Martinez, who has a Latin American perspective on this issue, argues similarly that the “devaluing of domestic,
family, and community work reproduces women’s subordination in distinct areas including the symbolic dimension – as seen, for example, in the false, but still common, notion of women’s economic inactivity” (Perkins, et al., 2005, pp. 114-115)

Feminists have for a long time challenged this private public division, which sustains gender inequalities by obscuring gender hierarchies. These hierarchies relate to changes that took place as a result of capitalist industrialization, since the gendered divisions of labour as well as the divisions of power and authority were altered. One important outcome of this alteration was that reproductive work was marginalized ideologically at the same time as it was institutionalized in formal theories of economics, politics and political economy. Peterson makes an interesting observation of how the usage of the words private and public changed with the development of the capitalist industrialization. She writes, “‘public’ retained its association with the state/government/coercion but in liberal discourse ‘private’ gained structure as reference to civic activities and/or economic exchanges (productive market relations). Sex/affective familial relations and the caring labour of reproductive work were cast as pre-contractual and pre-capitalist – as ‘natural’ and hence neither political nor economic” (Peterson, 2003, p. 80). These ideas are relevant to my research since much of rural Guatemala has not gone through capitalist industrialisation and promoters of buen vivir philosophy see a connection between the way the capitalist market takes over other spheres of society and the ways in which this development links to the devaluation of reproductive work. Buen vivir sees reproduction and subsistence of life as goals of the economy (Váscone, 2012, pp. 129-134).

One key idea emphasised by Mack-Cnty is that of nature versus culture. This nature/culture dualism is, just like the private versus public divide, a distinction fundamental to Western ideas that can be traced back to the Greeks. Man was seen as representing culture in the nature/culture dualism, and needed to be unconstrained by and to have domination over natural processes (Brown, 1988). Therefore, “men were identified with disembodied characteristics such as order, freedom light, and reason which were seen as better than and in opposition to,
women’s allegedly more “natural” and/or embodied characteristics such as disorder, physical necessity, darkness and passion.” (Mack-Canty, 2004, p. 155). Moreover the early modern philosophers, like Hobbes and Locke, continued the association of women with nature and men with culture when developing classical liberalism (Arneil, 1999). These ideas were further expanded with the development of science, which “broadened the concept of culture to include an even more enlarged notion of the human capacity to dominate nature” (Mack-Canty, 2004, pp. 155-156). Additionally, the rise of capitalism and spreading colonisation “in which the view of the colonised […] begins to intersect more thoroughly with the perceived “otherness” of women and nature. Man’s (i.e., white, Western, and middle- or upper-class man’s) freedom and happiness […] depended on an ongoing process of emancipation from nature, both human embodiment and the natural environment” (Mack-Canty, 2004, p. 156). As the second half of this chapter will demonstrate, this human-nature division stands in sharp contrast to indigenous cosmovisions\(^\text{11}\), as expressed in the concept of bueno vivir.

The historical overview above also provides part of the explanation as to why it has turned out to be a major challenge for feminists to bring the reproductive economy to the core of economic analysis and policymaking. Except for the struggles to deconstruct the nature/culture dualism and the public/private dichotomy as well as emphasising the importance of the reproductive economy, there is a third key idea within feminist literature, namely, the idea of combining the macro and the micro economic analysis. As Bakker and Silvey state, it is necessary to examine the vertical linkages between the macroeconomic sphere (international trade, investment and loan agreement) and the national, sectorial, household and individual levels, in order to effectively address policy coherence at the horizontal level (Bakker and Silvey, 2008). The issue of macro and micro as well as meso\(^\text{12}\) analysis is an important aspect in the GIPE theories of trade and this focus influences the research design of this thesis.

\(^{11}\) Cosmovisión can be defined as worldview or the way James J. Sheehy describes it as the “belief system that shapes people’s perceptions of their environment” (Hernandez, C., 2013).

\(^{12}\) The “meso-economy” concept can be defined as “comprising both the market mechanisms and administrative procedures through which policy decisions and market signals trickle down to the household level” (Zezza, 2002).
**Feminist trade analyses**

In this section I begin by introducing some of the GIPE literature on trade that presents arguments to why we should study trade issues from a gender perspective (Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti (Edit), 2004, Randriamaro, 2006). Secondly, I examine some of the GIPE discussion that specifically deals with trade agreements (Van Staveren, 2007, Hoskyns 2007) and therefore is relevant to analyse the AA from a gender perspective.

Like heterodox or critical trade theorists, feminist IPE theorists question whose interest specific trade practices serve\(^{13}\). Nevertheless, feminists take this analysis one step further and examine the impact of more factors, such as social, economic and political power between and within nations as well as what influence sex and other dimensions such as ethnicity have on the outcomes of trade policies. (Van Staveren, Et al., 2007, pp. 33-34) This is the approach that I take with this research when trying to answer the third of my research questions (as outlined in the Introduction), namely, to what extent does this AA promote gender equality and sustainable development in Guatemala and which socio-economic and ethnic groups benefit from this AA? In other words I examine how the relationship between trade, gender and sustainability play out at different levels as well as how social hierarchies based on gender and ethnicity influence the policies promoted through the AA. GIPE can be studied from different academic fields and one is that of feminist economics and this research is highly relevant also for this thesis despite its political science focus.

Feminist economists studying trade also assess the gendered impacts of trade performance and trade reform in terms of changing patterns and conditions of labour, including paid and unpaid work; changes in gender wage gaps, incomes, patterns of ownership, and control over material goods; technical change, shifts in consumption patterns, and use of technology by women and men; the gendered impacts of changes in the offering of public services, as well as the gender-differentiated empowerment that trade flows contribute to (Van Staveren, et al., 2007, p. 34, Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti, 2004, pp. 3-4). These are some of the crucial contributions that

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\(^{13}\) The relation between critical IPE and GIPE is better explained later in this chapter
feminists emphasise within the IPE study of trade and these may help us to better understand how trade is gendered, as asked in the first of the research questions of this thesis (see introduction for more details).

These contributions concretise the GIPE (and critical IPE) argument that trade, just like any other economic activity, is essentially social. Trade may, for example, positively influence the income distribution between women and men, by creating new employment opportunities. However, “as women’s vulnerability to adverse shocks is exacerbated by existing gender inequalities, any negative impact of trade liberalization and attendant adjustment costs is likely to be felt more by women than men” (Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti, 2004: x, introduction). This theme of negative impact of trade liberalisation is present in CSOs’ discourses both in Brussels and Guatemala and repeated in several of the interviews I did with these organisations’ representatives. From a gender perspective international investment and trade have a significant influence on working conditions and labour markets which means that women generally are more vulnerable because off having lower skills and less bargaining power. Ways that trade policies affect women and men differently are therefore the main argument for why trade should be analysed from a gender perspective and my reason for examining the AA through a feminist lens.

Hoskyns presents more specific arguments (based on research by various scholars, such as Gammage, 2006, Madrid, 2006, Kelsey, 2006 and Bossuyt, 2006) and explains ways in which trade have different impacts on women than on men. Some of the points she makes are, first, that ‘food security’ and ‘food sovereignty’ is especially important to women (Hoskyns, 2007, p. 5). This is becoming a very important topic in an era of trade liberalisation and globalisation and organised women in Guatemala make a connection between international trade of agricultural goods and food sovereignty at local level (Via Campesina, 2013). Shiva writes, “All aspects of everyday life are being transformed into globally-traded commodities. Food, land, seeds, plants, and animals are now all commodities on international markets” (1997, p. 22). This means that women can be negatively affected by trade liberalisation and cheap imports that affect the subsistence agriculture due to their vulnerability when it comes
to food security (McMichael, 2003). The issue of food security and food sovereignty are concepts that reoccur in the interviews from the field work of this research and therefore themes that will be discussed in Chapter 3 on civil society in the EU and Central America as well as in Chapter five on the international cooperation pillar of the AA. The second point that Hoskyns makes is that, despite the fact that women might get increased employment opportunities in the global production and service chains, they still suffer from low wages as a result of their vulnerability and disadvantageous bargaining position (Hoskyns, 2007b, p. 5). Finally, just like the rest of mainstream economic analysis, trade theory does not take the unpaid household work into account and in this way trade affects women negatively since they are generally the main contributors to social reproduction (Hoskyns, 2007a, p. 7).

As Fontana writes, the outcomes of trade are likely to differ among women since women’s ability to benefit from new economic opportunities depends on their, skills, education, social norms, age and their commitments within their communities and households (Fontana, 2009, p. 27). This means that some women benefit from trade liberalisation based on the theory of comparative advantage, whereas others do not. Therefore, I have chosen to have an intersectionalist perspective in my research that takes factors like social class and ethnicity into account too. Another related significant point is made by Floro and Hoppe, who argue that gender inequalities are ‘multidimensional’, which means that “women who gain in one dimension, such as employment or access to income, may lose in another, in the form of increased work intensity and reduced leisure and sleep” (Floro and Hoppe, 2008, p. 45). This argument links with the demand for unpaid reproductive work to be taken into account in the economy. Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas have developed these ideas using the concept of depletion (itself a concept they introduce in the context of environmental depletion) to study the gap between the output of social reproduction (reproductive, domestic and affective) and the inflows that help maintain the physical and mental health of those who provide it (Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas, 2014).

A useful separation when evaluating the gendered character of trade regimes is that between strategic and practical gender needs, which originates in Maxine Molyneux’s
notion of strategic gender interests versus practical gender interests. The strategic interests arise from the analysis of women’s subordination and the formulation of a better alternative. Practical gender interests on the other hand rise from the real conditions of women’s positioning within the gender division of labour (Molyneux, 1985, pp. 232-233). In other words “it is important to assess not only the impact on women’s current material status given their tasks and responsibilities under the established gender division of labour but also whether outcomes contribute to more egalitarian gender relations in the long term, by reducing the basis of women’s economic disadvantage and widening women’s options” (Fontana, 2009, p. 28). This idea of aiming towards more egalitarian gender relations relates to the feminist notion of transforming gendered social relations. As Hoskyns and Rai write feminist networks “choose to be overtly political and transformative in their approach to issues of gender equality” (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007). The following section demonstrates how this transformative notion in feminism also has implications for the analysis of trade liberalization and trade agreements (see for example True, 2009). Through my research I have found that this aspiration to alter gender relations is absent in the AA gender clauses that highlight “equal participation and opportunities for men and women...”(Article 47, Title III) but without questioning the present economic system and the undervaluing of the economy of care.

**Gender and Trade agreements**

Despite worries about the negative effects of trade liberalisation that have been raised, there has been little research done on the differentiated impact that trade agreements have on men and women (Van Staveren, et al. 2007). Van Staveren has examined previous studies on trade and gender in the areas of income, employment, wages and unpaid domestic work and, from a quantitative methodological perspective, she recommends that indicators for monitoring trade policy should fulfil the following four characteristics: first, “simple, to facilitate their use”, secondly, “comparable, to allow comparisons over different trading”, thirdly, “dynamic, to enable the monitoring of gender impacts of trade over time” and finally, “feasible, that is, constructed of variables for which information is available in national or international databases...” (Van Staveren, et al. 2007, p. 258). Based on this
information Van Staveren presents eleven trade and gender equality elasticities since she considers that elasticity indicators are likely to meet the four criteria that she set up for indicators monitoring trade policy. Van Staveren explains how “elasticity compares the percentage change in one variable, with the accompanying percentage change in another variable” (Van Staveren, et al., 2007, p. 258). Moreover, “an elasticity may be positive, indicating the change in both variables is in the same direction; or negative, indicating that the change in one variable is in the opposite direction to the other variable. The relationship is ‘inelastic’ when value of the elasticity is between plus one and minus one and ‘elastic’ when the value of the elasticity is greater than plus or minus one” (Van Staveren, et al., 2007, p. 258). These indicators are designed in such a way that positive elasticity refers to the cases when trade agreements have a positive effect on gender equality. The negative ones however refer to cases when the gender equality is not improving from the trade expansion. The eleven indicators can be used both during the trade agreement negotiations and after the implementation in order to signal possible gender impacts that the policies might cause (Van Staveren, et al., 2007, pp. 257-273).

Another similar initiative is the Trade Impact Review framework by Women’s Edge Coalition, which enables governments, trade negotiators and others to forecast the potential drawbacks and benefits of trade agreements. Moreover, Women in Development Europe (WIDE) developed a set of indicators that can be used to comprehend measure and monitor the relationship between gender and trade (Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti, 2004, p. 362). As the authors of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) publication ‘Trade and Gender: Opportunities and Challenges for Development’ argue these gender trade impact assessment may assist policy makers who want trade agreements to benefit more than just a segment of society since these have the potential to make sure that trade policy formulation responds to the reality of poor women in their everyday lives (Ibid., p. 262). Also, as the Central American Women’s Network (CAWN) explains, the EU included a gender perspective in the Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA)\footnote{The SIA is explained in more detail in Chapter 4.}
section on social impacts due to successful lobbying by Central American social organisations during the EU – Central America AA negotiations (Buzzi and Poyner, 2012, pp. 3-4). The European Commission uses to monitor all its trade negotiations. These take place during and after the EU trade negotiations. The SIA is based upon the sustainable development criteria that include social development, economic development and the environment (Ecorys, 2009). This understanding is in line with EU’s general view of the concept and similar to the one of the Bruntland Report (see next section of this chapter). In the SIA two gender criteria are included in a subsection of the social development part of the monitoring. One focuses on discrimination at work and the other criterion comes from the aspiration of the Millennium Development Goals to end gender inequality within education by year 2015 (Hoskyns, 2007). I agree with Hoskyns who argues that these SIA criteria seem fairly random and that it is not clear how these two became selected (Hoskyns, 2007). Besides this there is little evidence that the results from the SIA have any significant impact on the negotiation process, especially considering that the SIA was published in 2009, even though the parties started negotiation in 2007.

This thesis however does not aim at studying the impacts of the AA, but rather to analyse the model and the logic promoted by the EU through a gendered lens. Nevertheless, it is important to account for the work that feminist economists are doing on gendered impacts of trade. Women’s participation in trade negotiations can be vital when promoting a gendered understanding of trade. Hoskyns reveals how women’s participation has been minimal so far in this sphere (2007a, p. 7). She gives the example of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations between the EU and African and Caribbean regions of countries. These negotiations make an interesting case study in the context of this thesis, since these were also supposed to take social consequences into account. The Cotonou Agreement (2000) that made up the legal framework for the EPA negotiations includes a wide-ranging commitment to gender mainstreaming, for example, its integration at all levels in macroeconomic policies (Article 31)\(^\text{15}\). Nevertheless, these policy intentions failed in practice, women’s

\(^{15}\) The history of the EPAs are further explained and contextualised in Chapter two.
participation was low, and the European Commission itself called it ‘gender policy evaporation’ (Hoskyns, 2007b). So as we can see, these negotiations were supposed to take gender issues into account but in the end this did not happened in reality. As the Guatemalan women’s rights activist, Miriam Maldonado, explains the AA negotiations have also not been a success story when it comes to women’s participation and the highly technical language makes the AA it inaccessible for the majority of the population (FMICA, 2010, p. 31).

True also examines EU trade agreements (2009) from a feminist perspective and asks the question: to what extent has the EU grasped the opportunity for advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment by addressing the gendered implications of international trade in its policymaking? With this question True addresses the issue of transformation and the long-term egalitarian gender relations. She recognized that for women who are primarily responsible for caring for their families, from making a livelihood in a rural and agricultural area, it is no easy transition to start working in other economic sectors, such as processing and manufacturing industries (True, 2009, p. 727). In other words, women working in the poor rural areas and in the urban informal sector are usually not in a good position to compete on the market, and therefore have fewer assets to weather the shocks of trade liberalization (Tran-Nguyen and Beviglia Zampetti, 2004, p. 15).

Fontana demonstrates a positive case study of female workers in tea-producing regions in China. According to the study women have a positive advantage over men due to their height and seize of their hands and this is comparable to a barrier against the entry of male workers into the tea sector (Fontana, 2009, p.5). This does not reveal what kind of working conditions and salaries these women benefit from however, and as Elson and Pearson point out “women’s rates of pay tend to be lower than those of men doing similar or comparable jobs: and [...] women tend to form a ‘reserve army’ of labour, easily fired when firms want to cut back on their labour force, and easily re-hired when firms want to expand again” (Elson and Pearson, 1981, p. 96). Additionally, these authors argue that for men to compete successfully they would “also have to acquire the ‘nimble fingers’ and ‘docile dispositions’ for which women workers are
priced. But for this they would require to undergo the same social experience as women. In order to compete successfully men would have to experience gender subordination.” (Elson and Pearson, 1981, p. 98)

The GIPE literature of the gendered impacts of trade reviewed above shows that the effects of free trade agreements and other trade liberalization policies on gender inequalities in a country may be either positive or negative. Moreover, the women who make up part of the winners of free trade agreements are those who work in expanding economic sectors and have the required skills that the new jobs demand. Nevertheless, because of their weaker bargaining power, women are often the victims of international cost competition. Some general factors that appear to affect the outcome for women are, access to markets and information and systems of property rights. Now this chapter will move away from the feminist economics position and examine feminist thoughts on sustainable development.

Feminism and Sustainable Development

One of the most famous and established interpretations of sustainable development is that of the Brundtland Report that defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43). The report emphasises the importance of poverty reduction in the move towards sustainable development, arguing that it is a “precondition for environmentally sound development” (WCED, 1987, p.44). Here, the understanding is that economic growth is necessary to fight poverty and that poverty is a cause as well as an effect of environmental damage. In turn economic growth is presented as a solution to eliminate poverty, with the objective of protecting the environment (Escobar, 1995, p.13). The Bruntland Report is of liberal nature and has its origins in Western modernity. Some of the basic assumptions of the world that follows from this are the belief in objective scientific knowledge and a Western
understanding of economic culture. As Escobar explains this culture is a result of complex social historic processes, such as the “expansion of the market, the mercantilisation of land and labour, new forms of discipline in factories, schools and hospitals etc as well as philosophic doctrines based in utilitarianism and individualism...”(Escobar, 1995, p.9)

Moreover, the understanding is that the economy is a ‘real' autonomous sphere with its own laws, separated from the political, the social and the cultural (Escobar, 1995, p.9) A more detailed UN definition of sustainable human development based on the same liberal logic as the Brundtland Commission definition states that;

“Sustainable human development seeks to expand choices for all people – women, men and children, current and future generations – while protecting the natural systems on which all life depends. Moving away from a narrow, economy- centred approach to development, sustainable human development places people at the core, and views humans as both a means and an end of development. Thus sustainable human development aims to eliminate poverty, promote human dignity and rights, and provide equitable opportunities for all through good governance, thereby promoting the realization of all human rights – economic, social, cultural, civil and political. (UNDP, 1998, p. 5)

One important international agreement that links this idea of sustainable development with gender is the 1995 Beijing Declaration that states,

Eradication of poverty based on sustained economic growth, social development, environmental protection and social justice requires the involvement of women in economic and social development, equal opportunities and the full and equal participation of women and men as agents and beneficiaries of people- centred sustainable development (UN, 1995).

As part of their Western modernity heritage all of the above definitions of and claims about sustainable development and gender are human-centred and growth-oriented which makes them very different from the concept of buen vivir as explained later on in this chapter. In order to better understand the disparity of
understandings of sustainability this chapter now discusses a map of different positions.

*Mapping of Sustainable Development actors*

Sustainable development is a contested concept and different understandings of this concept are underpinned by the ideology of the actors that drive the debate. Their ideological conception also influences how these actors view the role of the state, markets, concept of power, and issues of gender, class and ethnicity (Davidson, 2011, p.5). One useful tool for understanding the wide variety of actors within the framework of political economy of sustainability is Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brian’s map of actors (see below). In the map below the socio-economic axes indicates the level of importance that the different actors give to equity and human wellbeing. Whereas the environment axis shows to what extent these actors prioritise the environment, moving from a scale between technocentered to ecocentered. The actors within the grey area act within the sustainable development debate while the ones outside of this area either focus on socio-economic issues or environmental issues without caring about the other (Hopwood, et al, 2005, pp.41-42). This map shows the position of various key actors in this thesis, such as the EU as well as ecofeminists and indigenous movements.
Moreover, this map visually illustrates the large disparity between EU institutions on the one hand and environmental feminist and *buen vivir* philosophy on the other. One factor that divides these actors not to be found in the map however is economic growth. The actors positioned closer to the bottom left corner focus on economic growth as a primary goal whereas the actors in the upper right corner take a critical stance against this goal.

The focus on economic growth has been criticised by, for example, Daly who writes, “It is precisely the non-sustainability of growth that gives urgency to the concept sustainable development” (Daly, 1993, p. 12). Growth is moreover a reoccurring theme among feminists writing about gender, ecology and sustainable development. The understanding is that the ecological limits to economic growth are becoming more present and express themselves through industrial pollution and serious health hazards for us humans (Braidotti, et al., 1994). Waring makes a critical point by stating that “it’s really good for growth to smoke lots of cigarettes, have lots of car accidents,
and wars are sensational” (1994, p. 155). She continues by discussing the usage of the word growth and relates it to development. “One of the real crimes of the colonisation of a perfect good language which economics is engaged in has meant that development now has come to be synonymous with growth” (Ibid., p. 155). Salleh writes, “where ‘development’ has not consumed local resources the labour of peasants or indigenous gatherers in the South demonstrates a good metabolic fit between human needs and biological growth” (Salleh, 2009, p.6). The difference here is that Salleh refers to biological growth as supposed to economic growth. Her reflection here links to indigenous cosmovisions analysed later in this chapter and these different views of development as well as critiques of development relate to the second research question of this thesis, which asks what kind of development does the EU promote through the AA?

Salleh, together with other feminists, makes a strong correlation between gender equality, environmental issues and sustainable development (Shiva, 1994, Braidotti, Charkiewicz, Häusler, Wieringa, 1994). Shiva relates this to one of the core ideas in GIPE, namely, reproduction and women’s unpaid labour. She argues that “the separation between production and reproduction, between innovation and regeneration, has been institutionalised to deny women and nature a productive role in the economic calculus” (Shiva, 1994, p. 5). The struggle for women small-scale farmers is often a joint struggle to protect nature and their own needs. Private property and the struggle for land is a fundamental issue for many peasants and the topic of rights is an area that feminists have linked to the protection of nature. One argument is that the notion of rights to protect property is contradictory to the rights to the protection of life, both in the case of plant reproduction and human reproduction16 (Ibid., p. 6). This argument becomes interesting in the context of

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16 Some people (among them are feminists) would argue that it is useful to think in terms of “my body is my property” in order to protect people from arbitrary harm, but I agree with Anne Phillips’ who questions this notion. Phillips is concerned the implications and consequences of thinking of the body as something that we own. Historically, property in relation to the body has a radical as well as a conservative history (Phillips, 2013, p.14). Her main argument is that “we do not need to assert property in the body in order to express what we mainly care about when we say ‘it’s my body’, which is bodily integrity. We have the right to stop other people from doing things to or with our bodies. (...) Framing threats to body integrity as if these are acts of trespass on private property is not, however, helpful.” (Phillips, 2013p.15).
free trade agreements, such as Part IV of the EU – Central American AA, that includes the service sector and encourages privatisation of public services, for example water distribution, schools and hospitals (for more detail see Chapter 4). Furthermore, Shiva argues that production is not restricted to the artificial production and creation of boundaries of patriarchal economics; rather production takes place in nature, in our homes and in our daily lives (Ibid., p. 5).

Salleh’s Marxist inspired model integrates three kind of subsumption. First, “the social debt over capitalist employers for surplus value extracted from the labouring bodies and minds of industrial, service, and enslaved workers (the focus on socialism)”. Secondly, “the ecological debt owned from the global North to the South for direct extraction of the natural means of production or livelihood of non-industrialised peoples (the focus on postcolonial and ecological politics). Finally, the embodied debt owed North and South to unpaid reproductive workers who produce use values and regenerate the conditions of production including the future labour force of capitalism (the focus of feminism)” (Salleh, 2009, pp. 4-5). Salleh’s approach enters into the top hand right corner in the typology of the political economy of sustainability map above. Davidson would define this approach as a radical (macro) one that favours “significant redistribution of resources from the privileged few to the masses, and demand that power differentials based on patriarchy, class, race or ethnicity be addressed” (Davidson, 2011).

Facing biases: Feminist Integration of the Social and the Ecological in Economic Policy Analysis

The unpaid social reproduction work is generally considered part of the domain of the ‘social’ and it is therefore a challenge to integrate it into what is normally thought of as ‘the economy’. This puzzle is also the starting point in much of the research done within both environmental feminism and feminist economics (Mellor, 2005). First, this section introduces some of the work done by feminists to integrate the social into economic policy. Then it presents some of the work aiming at integrating the ecological into economic policy. In this way this section aims at bridging the disconnect between feminist economic theory (in particular in relation to trade) and feminist environmental theory. As mentioned earlier I moreover introduce buen
vivir philosophy as a possible way of better bridging this gap.

In relation to ‘the social’ Elson and Cagatay (2000) discuss three major social biases that are present in much of today’s macroeconomic policy: ‘deflationary bias’, ‘male breadwinner bias’ and ‘commodification (or privatisation) bias’. These biases, they argue, must be overcome for social policy to be integrated with economic policy. The ‘deflationary bias’ refers to when governments adopt policies primarily to maintain their ‘credibility’ in financial markets. These policies include tight monetary policies, high interest rates, and fiscal restraints. This bias prevents governments from dealing successfully with recession and leads to underemployment and unemployment. As Elson argues “macroeconomic policies, which are ‘sound’ in the sense of balancing the budget, accepting the current balance of financial power, can be quite ‘unsound’ in the sense of exacerbating real resource constraints by destroying human capabilities as people are priced out of the market” (Elson, 2002, p.5). Feminists have also demonstrated how poor women bear these burdens more than other social groups. One of the explanations for this is that women confront demands to provide for their families, for example feeding and providing clothes for the children, with diminishing family budgets (Elson, 2002, p.5).

The second bias, the ‘breadwinner bias’ refers to the assumption that “the unpaid care economy is articulated with the market economy of commodity production through an income which is paid to a male breadwinner and which is assumed to be large enough to provide for the cash needs of a set of dependents (women, children, elderly people, sick people)” (Elson, 2002, p.6). This assumption does not take into account the fact that women in many cases, and sometimes even elderly people and children, must work in the commodity economy in order for the household needs to be met. The result of this, so called, ‘breadwinner bias’ is that many women have reduced or no access to entitlements which in turn make them dependent upon men. This dependency is heavier during times when women care for children and elders as well as when they are elderly themselves.

The third and final social bias is that of privatisation. This bias comes from the
assumption that the private sector per se is more efficient than other sectors. This bias tends to intensify both the breadwinner bias and the deflationary bias, and one illustration of this is the privatisation of pension provisions and social insurances. The privatisation of pensions, does for example, penalise those who have breaks in their employment records and longer life expectancy. In other words this pension system is disadvantageous for many women. In general the ‘privatisation bias’ has severe and problematic implications for the organisation of “social reproduction, and for the majority of women who currently disproportionately provide the unpaid care upon which social reproduction rest” (Elson, 2002, p.7). Privatisation and deflationary biases make up part of the neoliberal discourse that also includes free trade policies and has a negative impact on groups that do not benefit from this market oriented competitive economics and women in the south often fall into this category. Moreover, the environment also suffers from the increased pollution associated with free trade. One of the reasons for this is that “comparative advantage [sometimes] derives from difference in the stringency of environmental regulations and/or implementation, then the [...] effect of trade will exacerbate existing environmental problems in the countries with relatively lax regulations (i.e., the pollution haven effect)” (Gallagher, 2000).

Shiva on the other hand portrays what could be seen as a technological bias, namely the idea that technological and managerial fixes will solve environmental problems. This relates to the ecological modernisation discussed in Chapter two. She writes, “the official environmental response has largely been one of offering technological and managerial fixes which, rather than addressing or solving the basic ecological problems, often create new ones” (Shiva, 1994, p. 1) This view is in line with the feminist focus on transformation and demonstrates the ecological feminist close relationship with environmental and peace activism. According to Ecofeminism, as well as other forms of environmental feminism, we have to change our way of living in order to have sustainable development and economic justice. Shiva means that it is necessary for us to make peace with the planet as well as among people of different cultures (Shiva, 1993). This idea of harmony is also present in indigenous cosmovisions, as described later in this chapter.
A mapping of efforts to change the Gendered Character of Trade regimes

Coming back to the incongruity between working towards gender equality and sustainable development while promoting competitive trade liberalization, Hoskyns writes about a “disconnect between gender and trade in theory and in practice” (Hoskyns, 2007, p. 9) and argues that few positive changes are taking place. Some of the gender equity initiatives aim at taking real needs of women into account within the trade practices, as well as give other forms of support to for example women entrepreneurs, who often find it difficult to benefit from new market opportunities because of lack of knowledge, skills, credit and assets (Ibid., p. 9). An example of the first kind of initiative is that of gender mainstreaming within Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). Since 1998 a structure that monitors how women are affected by its trade and investment agenda is being applied within APEC. Moreover the forum works with a three-pronged action plan based on collection and use of gender-disaggregated data, gender analysis and increased participation of women. Nonetheless, these initiatives have not changed the core assumptions of the institution and are therefore not sustainable (Hoskyns, 2007).

These two examples, together with the introduction of a gender perspective in the SIA as mentioned earlier, can be seen as a start for positive change, but they could also be viewed as initiatives that legitimise trade liberalisation without questioning its basic assumptions (Hoskyns, 2007) and contradictions that follow. Based on the research for this thesis I would agree with Shaikh who argues that international trade “exposes the weak to the competition of the strong. And in most cases the latter devour the former” (Shaikh, 2007, p. 57). This can be seen both between states as well as between different sectors of society within each state. Several of the CSOs representatives of organisations (for example CONIC, UNAMG, CONAVIGUA, ALOP and APRODEV) who I interviewed in Brussels as well as Guatemala shared very similar views of international trade and more specifically the AA between the EU and Central America.

*Fair Trade*

A different way forward towards gender equality in trade processes is focusing on fair trade, rather than trying to make the free trade more just. The Fairtrade movement is built upon the notion of quality of life (in the South) in exchange for quality of products
(in the North). The Fairtrade system offers a minimum price to producers of some commodities in the developing countries. The prices are calculated on costs of production and should assert reasonable return to producers, as well as include a small social premium that has to be used towards development projects in the communities. Hoskyns draws our attention to some of the Fairtrade system’s strengths, such as its market-based arrangement between producers and consumers without involvement from government measures, which in turn implies that the WTO rules cannot stop it. Another advantage is that the Fairtrade mechanisms do not lead to overproduction like the agriculture price support within the EU might. This is not the case with the Fairtrade system since it is based around what producers sell as supposed to what they produce. One of the disadvantages then is that it is based on the willingness of consumers in the North to continue buying products at Fairtrade prices. (Hoskyns, 2007) In other words the lack of government involvement can be seen both as an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. Attempts to make free trade more just and sustainable and the idea of practicing fair trade within the existing capitalist trade structure are reformist practices that do not fundamentally transform the gendered character of trade regimes. As Stainkopf Rice points out “fair trade reinforces rather than challenges trade liberalization, fair trade does little to address the structural processes that perpetuate gender inequality” (Steinkopf Rice, 2009, p. 46).

This observation makes McMahon’s analysis of an attempt to change this character of the trade regime through organic farming relevant. She applied a feminist ecological economist lens that combines social justice and an ecological perspective and she studied the organic farming done by women in British Colombia (BC), Canada. These women resist the commodification of food by “redefining its meaning” (McMahon, 2005, p. 135). “They advocate local production, non-market subsistence, and reclaiming localized markets as ways of re-embedding food and farming in place, space, and moral relationships” (Ibid., p. 135). These women in BC reclaim the market at local level and try to transform it rather than remaining outside the existing structures. McMahon makes the connection with the transformative goals of feminism arguing that, “in a globalizing world, the processes of reclaiming the market,
and de-commodifying products through the reintegration of the cultural, political, ethical and economic, constitute resistance” (McMahon, 2005, p. 140) Here, Polanyi’s studies of the efforts made to set up the market system can also help us better understand why the questioning of the logic of this system causes resistance. He presents what can be perceived as a paradoxical understanding of lasses-faire liberalism as “the product of deliberate state action” involving “a conscious and often violent intervention on the part of the government…” (Polanyi, 1957, p. 250). In other words Polanyi demonstrates that the market economy and state intervention went hand in hand to develop and sustain market relations in society, which also explains why there is resistance when people try to dismantle that system and build alternatives. The kind of resistance based on local production explained by McMahon is also found in the Guatemalan indigenous peasant organisation National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples and Campesinos’ (CONIC) discourses (see Chapter 3 for further details).

The failure to incorporate Gender and Sustainable Development dimensions into the core debates of IPE

The so-called orthodox or mainstream IPE is historically based upon positivist thinking, rational-choice individualism and moreover it focuses on markets, states and the interaction between the two entities. (Bedford and Rai, 2010, Griffin, 2007). Much of the EU approach is based on this thinking and reflected in the AA agreements. This rational choice based approach argues that, “individuals try to improve their situation by calculating costs and benefits before choosing the best path to take action.” Moreover it “explains outcomes as the result of the choices of individual actors” (O’Brian and Williams, 2010, p. 32). This idea of rational choice is part of the neoclassical economics school of thought that relates supply and demand to individuals’ rationality and his or her ability to maximize utility or profit. The neoclassical turn detached the political from the economic and increased the use of mathematical equations in the study of the economy (O’Brian and Williams, 2010, pp. 10-12). This approach was developed in the late-nineteenth century and some of the early contributors are William Stanley Jevons, Carl Menger and Leon Walras. Penny
Griffin gives a strong critique of this theoretical approach and argues that for mainstream IPE thinkers “actors are both rational and individualistic, and social life (if it is indeed talked about as ‘social’) is organised entirely around the distributive mechanisms of the free market” (Griffin, 2007, p. 722).

Scholars who argue for the importance of non-elite actors, such as social movements and workers have criticised this neorealist and neoliberal mainstream focus. These critiques have grown into a critical IPE School (also called heterodox, globalist or transdisciplinary) that focuses on how social structures, especially structures of inequality, are formed and transformed. In other words critical IPE views states, markets and economic activity as socially constructed and this in turn also signify that these structures can be changed. Furthermore, critical IPE analysis of the economic world calls for a historical analysis that places actors and institutions within their social context (Waylen, 2006, p. 146). Robert Cox argues that, “critical theory is theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a continuing process of historical change” (Cox, 1981, p. 128). This statement relates to the Marxist idea of historical materialism and its historical reasoning that seeks to explain and promote changes in social relations. Other thinkers who criticise the neorealist and neoliberal mainstream economic focus are the ecological economists. One of their basic understanding links to the concept of sustainable development and is that “the human economy and the ecological systems are much more intertwined than is usually recognized” (Røbpke, 2005, p.266) Moreover, “the ecological economic perspective calls for an awareness of the human dependence on well-functioning ecosystems that provide the basic life support for human societies” (Røbpke, 2005, pp. 266-267). In other words ecological economics is much less human centred than neoclassical economics.

Feminist economics and feminist IPE have more in common with critical IPE and ecological economics than with mainstream IPE. For example, feminist IPE, just like critical IPE, place great importance on the construction of social relations (Waylen, 2006). Furthermore, a number of environmental ecologists, such as, Richard
Noorgard\textsuperscript{17} emphasise the social contradictions of globalisation, which ecofeminists also have pointed out (Salleh, 2009, p.22). Nevertheless, feminists question various important assumptions that are made both by mainstream IPE, critical IPE and ecological economics. As Bedford and Rai put it “both [mainstream IPE and critical IPE] see states and markets as actors, both fold individuals into systematic equations that render them invisible, and both disregard some structural social relations, such as gender, while reifying others, such as competition” (Bedford and Rai, 2010, p4). Moreover, Salleh comments on how “practitioners of ecological economics [...] are yet to acknowledge the value of reproductive labours, let alone the ideas of women scholars” (Salleh, 2009, p. 23). As we will see in the remaining part of this chapter, this is also true for many of the practitioners of \textit{buen vivir} and different forms of indigenous cosmovisions.

As demonstrated so far in this chapter, there is plenty of evidence of the importance of the incorporation of gender and sustainable development into the core debates of IPE. Throughout the chapter we find feminists scholars and activists demanding that academics, economists, policymakers and politicians integrate these important factors into their approaches to the economy and into the study of trade and international political economy generally. One of the aims of this thesis is to contribute to the GIPE literature, combining ideas on sustainability by environmentalist feminists with the ideas of gender and trade by feminist economists. Nevertheless, my field research reveals that there is something missing in the above equation, and that is ‘the local’. The local context needs to be taken into account when looking at international trade, gender equality and environmental sustainability. If not, local populations as well as the ecosystems in which they live are likely to be the losers in the implementation of a logic far away from their own understanding of the economy and people’s relationship with nature. The concept of \textit{buen vivir} and other ideas found in indigenous cosmovisions may give us tools to include also the local when examining topics related to the economy and the environment. As outlined in the introduction, this chapter will therefore now move on to a more regional Latin American theoretical perspective that has its roots in indigenous cultures but also includes ideas from western political theory.

Learning from Mayan feminists’ interpretation of *buen vivir*.
The rest of this chapter focuses on the concept of *buen vivir*\(^{18}\) (good life), the way it expresses itself in Guatemala and the way Mayan feminists view the concept. Additionally, it intends to bridge the gap between international and local debates and discussions by contextualising the Mayan feminists’ arguments in a Latin American and global context. The chapter also examines what can be learned from these arguments in the broader framework of feminist environmentalism and feminist IPE. The intention is to learn from these indigenous ways of thinking without idealising them by/or/and overlooking patriarchal structures.

Over the last few years various scholars, such as Arturo Escobar and Walter D. Mignolo, have written about the importance of indigenous ‘cosmovision’ and the idea of *buen vivir* in contemporary Latin American politics. This current debate in the Latin American context is an example of a philosophical and theoretical engagement with environmental issues. The following section of this chapter seeks to provide a better understanding of how *buen vivir* expresses itself in the context of Guatemala, as well as exploring what can be learnt from feminist views of the concept. It attempts to achieve this by doing three things. First, I offer an explanation of what *buen vivir* is and examine some of the ways in which people conceptualise and practise it in the Andean region as well as in Guatemala. Second, it introduces the concept of sustainable development in order to then compare and contrast this concept with that of *buen vivir*. Third, it analyses feminist, including Mayan feminist perspectives’ contributions to the debates on *buen vivir*. Moreover, the end of this chapter offers a reflection of what implications these indigenous contributions could have on the relationship between trade, gender equality and sustainable development.

*Exploring the concept of buen vivir*

The common English translation of *buen vivir* is good life. However, good life in Western cultures implies that the wellbeing is about the individual, whereas *buen vivir* perceives the individual “in the social context of their community and in a unique

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\(^{18}\) This is the way the Aymara concept *Suma Qamaña* is translated into Spanish in Bolivia. It is difficult to translate into English and I have chosen to follow Alberto Acosta (2012) in translating *buen vivir* as ‘good life’ in English.
environmental situation” (Gudynas, 2013). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this view of the community is very different from mainstream IPE theory, which focuses on the individual.

*Buen convivir* and *buen vivir* are Spanish translations of *Suma Qamaña* (Aymara) and *Sumac Kawsay* (Kichwa) from indigenous Andean languages. *Buen convivir* and *buen vivir* play important roles in the Bolivian (2009) and Ecuadorian (2008) constitutions. Article 71 in the Ecuadorian constitution, for example, illustrates this: “Nature or Pachamama, were life come about and is reproduced, has the right to have its existence and preservation as well as its vital cycles, structures, functions and evolutionary processes fully respected.” (Republic of Ecuador, 2008) Rather than treating nature as property under the law, this article acknowledges that nature has rights. And we – the people – have the legal authority to enforce these rights on behalf of the ecosystems. The ecosystems themselves can be named as the defendant and this constitution subsequently becomes less anthropocentric. This critique of the idea of development “signifies a turn away from a society and an economy based solely on market and profit-driven growth toward a new form of democratic development” (Martin, 2011, p. 103) The *buen vivir* concept is an important aspect of Latin American indigenous peoples’ *cosmovisions*, meaning worldviews critical of western ideas of modernity and progress.19 The most influential *cosmovisions* in Latin America are those of the Aymara, Maya and Quechua ethnic groups (Escobar, 2006, p. 314).

**Communalities across different cultural and ecological landscapes**

Although *Suma Qamaña* and *Sumac Kawsay* have attained the most influence in debates around development, these ideas are present in many indigenous languages throughout *Abya Yala*20: the Guaraní words for harmonious living is Ñandereko, the land without evil, *Ivi Maraei*, the path to noble life, *qhapaj ñan* and good life *Teko Kavi*.

In the Mapuche language in Chile there is also the concept for harmonious living,

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20 Abya Yala means, “land in its full maturity” in the Kuna language, spoken by the Panamanian Kuna people, and refers to the American continent since before the Columbus arrival.
namely, *Küme Mongen* (Gudynas, 2011, p.443). These ideas are expressed and put into words also in Mayan languages, for example the K’iche word *Utz K’aslemal* (Macleod, 2011, p. 249) and the Tzeltal word Lekil Kuxlejal (Ávila, 2011, p. 488), which both can be translated as *buen vivir*.

Organisations working in urban areas in various Latin American countries have also begun to discuss what *buen vivir* means in an urban setting. One of the participants in these discussions is Alex Levandro from the Bolivian cultural centre ‘Red de Diversidad: Wayna Tambo’ who works with youth in the city El Alto. He argues that *buen vivir* relates to socio-cultural contexts that we rebuild in our everyday lives, not only in rural spaces, but also in urban ones. Moreover, Levandro believes it is a mistake to see *buen vivir* as something merely indigenous, on the contrary it is “a philosophy of life that endorses a culture of life, which respects and is in complete harmony with nature, and all the beings that live there” (Guachalla, 2013) When analysing commonalities among the different expressions of *buen vivir*, Gudynas argues that “buen vivir is more than a simple coexistence or juxtaposition of different cultures, because they interact in dialogue and praxis focused on promoting alternatives to development.” (Gudynas, 2011, p. 445) Despite the fact that the different expressions of *buen vivir* are specific to cultural and ecological landscapes, there is a core set of ideas that unify them. Firstly, *buen vivir* is a platform where people share critical outlooks of development, and where the focus is a “replacement of the very idea of development” (Ibid.). This idea of the alternative to development, as opposed to, yet another development model is a standpoint that several of the organised Mayan civil society actors expressed when I interviewed them (Bocel, interview, 25/09/2012, CONAVIGUA board member, Interview, 21/09/2012, Tiney, Juan, CONIC, Interview, 13/09/12).

The program coordinator, Petronila Bocel at the National Union of Guatemalan Women (UNAMG) states that,

They (Western governments and businesses) sell us an understanding of development that we definitely do not share and we have completely different visions of the world. Here for example, from Mayan cosmovation we talk about how to live in balance with everything that we produce with Mother Earth, and not that humans are superior and has all the power. The kind of development that
"they" sell to us, saying that if you do not consume this, if you do not do this, you are underdeveloped. Therefore, I very much question it, when they call us underdeveloped countries or developing countries based on measuring parameters or indicators that they have established. We will definitely never manage to advance behind this logic that they have because it is not our logic... (Bocel, interview, 25/09/2012).

Secondly, all the approaches within the *buen vivir* philosophy react against the way economic values dominate all aspects of life and the commodification of nearly everything that this has led to. Moreover, *buen vivir* as a concept recognises that there are various ways to give value to something, for example, cultural, historical, esthetical, spiritual, and environmental value (Ibid.). Juan Tiney at the indigenous peasant organisation ‘Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina’ (CONIC) noted that:

The sustainability that I am looking at is human sustainability, sustainability of nature, but if they (the EU commission and the US government) see it as economic sustainability, that is cheaper in this sense. Well, I think we have two ways of thinking, two completely different visions, we have two entirely different interests... (Tiney, interview, 13/09/12)

Finally, nature is seen as constitutive of social life (Escobar, 2010, p.23) and becomes a subject (Gudynas, 2011, p.445). This signifies that humans are not the only source of value and that the economy makes up part of larger social and natural systems. This view links to the ideas of Western critiques of capitalism. In fact, *buen vivir* philosophy is dynamic and not isolated from Western ideas. Rather, there are linkages between the ideas that spring from indigenous cosmovisions and critical positions within modernity (Ibid., p. 444). Gudynas mentions three cases of Western critiques that link to the indigenous traditions, first, post-development with scholars such as Escobar writing critically about the ideas of development. Secondly, the different forms of radical environmentalism that opposes the anthropocentric perspective of modernity. The third case is feminist perspectives that questions societal hierarchies and domination over Nature. As examined earlier in this chapter however, these feminist perspectives link hierarchical structures to gender roles and this is not the case in most indigenous traditions. This last point is something that this chapter discusses later on.
**Sustainable development and buen vivir**

Sustainable development proposes a balancing act between promoting infinite economic growth while taking the needs of future generations into account (WCED, 1987, p. 43). In contrast to this, *buen vivir* promotes the practice of living within nature rather than dominating it, while trying to protect it for future generations. As we can see, both sustainable development and *buen vivir* perceive it as a moral obligation to care for the wellbeing of future generations. Nevertheless, *buen vivir* is critical of a linear development and emphasises complementarities, harmonious balance as well as rights to nature (Hernandez, Interview, 12/06/2012). Sustainable development, on the other hand, promotes a linear development that includes economic, social and environmental development. Moreover, social justice plays a more important role within *buen vivir* than sustainable development. The phrase ‘to live well but not better’ (than other people, or at the cost of other people nor nature) in *buen vivir* philosophy illustrates this. This phrase might be confusing in the English language though, since ‘better’ and ‘well’ have similar meanings (Thomson, 2011:6).

**Difficulties in implementing Buen Vivir**

Regardless of the success in positioning the *Buen Vivir* philosophy in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian constitutions, it has not been widely implemented so far. In the case of Ecuador President Correa has for example restricted the mining law, but nevertheless, it still violates certain parts of the 2008 Constitution. Likewise, this government’s agrarian policies support the use of agrochemicals and favour large agribusiness. In other words, neither the mining legislation nor the agricultural policies are in line with *buen vivir* (Acosta, 2009).

Additionally, Arturo Escobar discusses what he calls an asymmetry in the Ecuadorian National Development Plan, 2007-2010. The tension lies, according to Escobar, between the *buen vivir* understanding of development and more mainstream development concepts. The plan does for example question growth as a goal, but not as a means. The plan also includes strategic areas that would help to sustain human development and as Escobar demonstrates some of these areas, such as hydrocarbons and mining, are not in line with *buen vivir* (Escobar, 2012, p.22). This example from
the Ecuadorian development plan shows that in practice, it can be very difficult to articulate economics, culture, the environment and society in these new ways that promote social and intergenerational justice as well as give rights to nature.

*Buen vivir in the Mayan context*

Spirituality plays an important role in the Mayan cosmovision, and is therefore also present in Mayan interpretations of *buen vivir*. In this cosmovision it is not possible to disconnect the spirituality from other aspects of life, it forms part of the heritage from the ancestors and in this sense is passed on from generation to generation. One word that exemplifies this in the Kaqchikel language is *Raxnaqil*, which can be translated as happiness, physical, mental and spiritual health. It represents a perfect state with harmony and balance in the private as well as community sphere. Finding *Raxnaqil* requests an awareness of the relationship between people, nature and cosmos (Tedlock, 1992, p. 306).

The Mayan cosmovision emphasises the importance of nature and seeks balance between people, mother earth and the universe. A Mayan person is born with her/his *nawal* (one's character or personality) that combines with the energies of the other people in the community. Tito Medina writes, “The *nawal* is the main connection between the individual and her/his own consciousness, between the individual and her/his surrounding, between the individual and her/his relationship to cosmos.” (Medina, 2000, p. 11) The specific day a person is born on the 260-day Mayan calendar determines a person’s *nawal*. (Tedlock, 1992, p. 466) There are 20 *nawals*, one for each day of the month in the calendar, and these represent different energies and each relate to a different animal. This association to an animal moreover illustrates the interconnection between humans and nature. The idea is to keep the energy balanced between the members of the community, with nature, the cosmos and the creator (Bolaños, 2008, p. 303) These energies complement each other and work in pairs, such as, masculine and feminine, negative and positive, day and night, rain and sun as well as old and new. The Ixil spiritual guide Ana Lainez, describes a well-balanced community as one in which “nobody is excessively strong or superior, nor excessively weak or inferior” (Roberts, 2013).
Duality and complementarity

Morna Macleod argues, that the concepts of duality\textsuperscript{21}, complementarities and balance can be difficult to understand for someone who is used to a Western way of thinking. Virginia Ajxup\textsuperscript{22} undertakes the task of translating and communicating these concepts from her mother tongue k’iche to Spanish. Duality can according to Ajxup be explained as,

\begin{quote}
The integration of two elements for the conservation and continuation of life (...). It is not the opposite, but rather the other me, this completely different me, pertinent, imperative, comprehensive. This principle of understanding is what makes a person complete. The (different) elements are not contrapositions or excluding, but rather necessary, they express themselves at all levels and in all spheres of natural and social life (Ajxup in Macleod, 2011, p.124).
\end{quote}

Complementarity, Ajxup understands as,

\begin{quote}
The process and comprehension of integration for reaching wholesomeness and plentitude. No being and no action exist by itself, but rather in coexistence with its specific complement, which makes the matching element complete. Complementarity is the total experience of the reality. The ideal is not the extreme of one of the two opposites, but rather the harmonic integration of the two (elements), one dynamic and reciprocal unity (Ibid.).
\end{quote}

This relational view of feminine and masculine becomes interesting from a feminist perspective, since at least liberal feminists see gender as a dualist concept focused on the individual.

Feminism and buen vivir
The *buen vivir* philosophy links with both environmental feminisms and feminist economics.

One example of environmental feminist thinking is this statement by the ‘International Forum of Indigenous Women’ (FIMI) that makes a strong link between women and nature,

\begin{quote}
Indigenous traditions and Indigenous women themselves identify women with the Earth, and therefore perceive degradation of the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{21} Duality is also present in the Andean cosmovisions.
\textsuperscript{22} She is a Mayan spiritual guide, school-teacher focusing on intercultural education as well as active member of various Mayan organisations
Earth as violence against women. This conviction is more than a metaphorical allusion to Mother Earth. It is rooted in indigenous cultural and economic practices in which women both embody and protect the health and well-being of the ecosystems in which they live (FIMI. 2006, p. 17).

The above statement could be seen as portraying women as inferior to men in a Western context, in which material and spiritual realms of life are dichotomized but this is not the case in indigenous cosmovisions.

Interconnection and balance between Humans and Earth

As discussed earlier in this chapter ecofeminists, such as Ortner (1974) and Mack-Canty (2004) argue that the nature/culture dualism is, just like the private versus public divide, a characteristic crucial to Western ideas that can be traced back to the Greeks. As mentioned earlier, these ideas were further expanded with the development of science (Mack-Canty, 2004, pp. 155-156) and in addition, this period was marked by the rise of capitalism and the spreading of colonisation (Mack-Canty, 2004,p.156). I agree with Agrawal however, who criticises the essentialism of “woman” as a unitary category. As she explains:

The processes of environmental degradation and appropriation of natural resources by a few have specific class-gender as well as locational implications (...) ‘Women’ therefore cannot be positioned (...) as a unitary category, even within a country, let alone across the Third World or globally (Agrawal, 1992,p .150).

Moreover Agrawal stresses the importance of “women’s lived material relationship with nature” (Ibid., p. 151). Furthermore, Macleod points out how, FIMI’s identification with Mother Earth, undermines the ‘Is Female to Male what Nature is to Culture?’ (Ortner, 1974) discussion, since indigenous cosmovisions do not consider being close to nature as inferior to being close to culture (Macleod, 2012, p. 2).

Some Mayan women live in cities and identify themselves as indigenous. One member in the Mayan feminist group, ‘Kaqla’ (Rainbow) in Guatemala states, “Yes, I am Indian, I come from the capital, and what! I am still indigenous” (Mujeres mayas de Kaqla, 2004, p. 52). Many indigenous women do live in rural areas however and therefore do
have a close lived ‘material relationship with nature’. One example of women with such a relationship to nature is the women of the Maya Mam communities in San Miguel Ixtahuacán in San Marcos in Guatemala who protest against open-pit gold-mining in their territory. These women see the mining as a violent act since it destroys the environment, using enormous quantities of water and toxic chemicals. Moreover, hills that used to make up part of their collective identity no longer exist (Macleod, 2012, p. 9). This has significant consequences for people who highly value community and collective identity. One ‘Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala’ (CONAVIGUA) board member shared similar thoughts about her community (Interview, 21/09/2012).

The focus on interconnection and balance between humans and earth that we find in the buen vivir philosophy can also be found in other indigenous cosmovisions outside of Latin America. For example, central Australian indigenous populations, such as the Aranda and Walpiri peoples, have a concept called jukurrpa (dreaming) with similar characteristics as buen vivir. An all-encompassing principle in jukurrpa links flora, fauna, natural phenomena and people into one gigantic interfunctioning world (Bell, 2002, p. 91). Susan Hawthrone, who is inspired by jukurrpa, links feminist, ecological and indigenous thinking and calls it wild economics. In the same way as indigenous cosmovisions and the buen vivir philosophy varies in different cultural and ecological landscapes, “the wild is also multiple and can only be understood in relation to the things and processes around it. So, context and relationship are critical to understanding the wild.” (Hawthrone, 2009, p. 99)

Reproduction

Buen vivir sees reproduction and subsistence of life as goals of the economy. Consequently, this philosophy defends an economy of care based on solidarity, cooperation and reciprocity (Vásconez, 2012, pp. 129-134). As explained earlier in this chapter, this form of economics stresses the importance of the labour involved in social reproduction and supports the idea that this labour should count as work and be included in the estimation and assessment of the economy (Hoskyns and Rai, 2007,

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23 The chapters on the AA pillars in this thesis discuss the issue of mining in relation to sustainable development and indigenous people’s rights
Peterson, 2005, Griffin, 2007). This links to Quiroga-Martinez’s previously mentioned idea about how the devaluation of domestic and community work reproduces women’s subordination in different areas, including the symbolic dimension, as in the case of the ‘notion of women’s economic inactivity’ (Quiroga-Martinez, 2005, pp. 114-115).

There are various overlaps between forms of *buen vivir* as well as Mayan cosmovision and varieties of feminism. Such examples are the similarities in the understanding of equity and equilibrium within Mayan cosmovision and feminist thinking. Furthermore, both frameworks of thought work towards equitableness, peace, respect and harmony, which may allow for mutual exchange. Additionally, the idea of personal as political can fit in with the practice of Mayan values in everyday life (Alvarez, 2006). As demonstrated in this chapter the GIPE inclusion of the reproductive economy and the environmentalist feminist human/nature harmonic relationship both fit within the framework of *buen vivir*. The representatives of indigenous organisations in Guatemala, interviewed as part of the fieldwork for this thesis, do not identify with Western linear development nor the concept of sustainable development. Rather *buen vivir* is their understanding of a sound human/nature relationship as well as economy.

As mentioned in the introduction, this thesis argues that there are two important disconnects in the literature, namely trade versus gender equality and sustainability and secondly that between gender equality and sustainability. As the discussion of literature in this chapter demonstrates these disconnects are present in the different bodies of literature. The orthodox IPE focuses on markets, states and the interaction between these that has led to the growth of the critical IPE (heterodox) that instead focuses on how social structures come to being and how these change. Here it is argued that markets are socially constructed and therefore could transform. There is also the ecological economics arguing that the human economy is intertwined with the ecological systems. Feminist IPE on the other hand argues for the importance of making structural gender relations visible but does generally not include environmental sustainability in its analysis. An understanding of the gaps between the different bodies of literature as mentioned above and discussed earlier in the chapter was the reason for the making of the first
research question of this thesis that examines how trade and sustainable development is gendered. Empirically, the AA between the EU and Central America with its pillars on trade, international cooperation and political dialogue, together with the EU’s goals of mainstreaming gender equality and sustainable development in all its policies makes a good case to do research on links between trade, gender and sustainability.

Mayan cosmovision and *buen vivir* can help us envision an economy based upon solidarity and respect for the environment as well as for local populations and in this way it can facilitate a bridge between gender equality and sustainability. It shares a critique of economic growth as a goal with environmental feminists such as Salleh and the importance of the local and the understanding of as well as respect for specificities of local cultural and ecological landscapes with Agrawal (1992) and Hawthorne (2009), something that is missing within feminist economics. The focus on reproduction and an economy of care, based on values of solidarity rather than competition is something which *buen vivir* philosophy has in common with feminist IPE. This would be an economy without the three biases that Cagatay and Elson (2000) describe. This chapter demonstrates how the concept of *buen vivir* could help us bridging the gap between gender equality and sustainability, but at the same time it raises the issue of how its own framework limits it. In other words I propose that we include the concept in the discussions of trade, gender equality and sustainable development but that we remain aware of its problems from a feminist perspective.

One of the limitations of *buen vivir* as a practice is that it can be difficult to achieve social welfare while at the same time give rights to nature, since the funding of social policy programs often are funded through trade with natural resources that could have a negatively impact on the ecosystems. This conflict of interests is present both in Bolivia and Ecuador where *buen vivir* forms part of the constitutions. Another limitation is the way key concept such as complementarity and duality may be interpreted differently. Either to fight for equality between men and women, as Mayan feminists argue, or to naturalise asymmetric power relations between men and women as some Mayan men have used these concepts (Macleod, 2011, pp. 138-140). There are different marginalities and indigenous cosmovisions are marginalised within
feminist literature while gender is marginalised within mainstream IPE. The marginality of gender as well as of indigenous cosmovisions within theory as well as policy making is reflected in the analysis of the AA throughout this thesis. Now follows Chapter 2 that explains the role of the EU as a trade and an international cooperation actor globally, and more specifically in Latin America.
"The denominator can be calculated in at least four different ways for trade in any given period between two countries, blocks, or regions (in which subscript i refers to the country for which the elasticities are to be calculated, and subscript j refers to a trading partner, or to all trading partners, so that EXij stands for the exports from country i to country j or all other countries). The formulations all include the delta sign, which means change in a variable over a period of time". The four options are 1) “total value of trade of a country or a region (dEXij + dIMij) or separate values for exports and imports (dEXij) and (dIMij)”, 2) “total value of trade as a share of GDP of a country or a region (dEXij + dIMij)/dGDPi or separate values for exports and imports (dEXij/dGDPi) and (dIMij/dGDPi)”, 3) “bilateral or regional value of total trade as a share of total trade of a country or region (dEXij + dIMij)/(dEXi + dIMi) or separate values for exports and imports (dEXij/dEXi) and (dIMij/dIMi), 4) “openness measured as tariff reductions of x percent, hence dTariff” (Van Staveren, Elson, Grown and Çagatay, 2007:260). The ratio of female income to male (Yf/Ym) measures women’s personal income compared to that of men” (Van Staveren, Elson, Grown and Çagatay, 2007:262). The eleven trade elasticities of gender equality are the following:

1. “Trade elasticity of gender equality in personal income: d(Yf/Ym)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

2. “Trade elasticity of gender equality in labour force shares: d(Lf/L)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

3. “Trade elasticity of gender equality in shares of export employment: d(Lfex/Lex)/d(EXij)/GDPi”

4. “Trade elasticity of gender equality in shares of employment in import-competing sectors: d(Lnimc/Lmnc)/d(IMij)/GDPi”

5. “Trade elasticity of the gender gap in unemployment rates: d(Um/Uf)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

6. “Trade elasticity of the gender gap in under-employment: d(Lmx/Lfx)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

7. “Trade elasticity of gendered job segregation: d(1/DI)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

8. “Trade elasticity of gendered job segregation in the export sector: d(1/Dex)/d(EXij)/GDPi”

9. “Trade elasticity of gendered job segregation in the import competing sector: d(1/Dimc)/d(IMij)/GDPi”

10. “Trade elasticity of the gender wage gap in the export sector: d(Wf/Wm)/d(EXij)/GDPi”

11. “Trade elasticity of the gender wage gap in the import competing sector: d(Wf/Wm)/d(IMij)/GDPi”

9. “Trade elasticity of women’s wages in the export sector, relative to women’s wages in other sectors (Wf)/d(Wfex/Wf)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

10. “Trade elasticity of the gender gap in unpaid labour time: d(UNPTm/UNPTf)/d(EXij + IMij)/GDPi”

11. “Trade elasticity of food affordability in relation to exports: d(100/FPI)/d(EXij)/GDPi”

“Trade elasticity of food affordability in relation to imports: d(100/FPI)/d(IMij)/GDPi”

(Van Staveren, Elson, Grown and Çagatay, 2007:261-267)
Chapter 2: The EU as a Global Actor: International Cooperation and International Trade

Following the explanation of the theoretical framework in chapter one, this chapter aims at contextualizing the empirical research of this thesis, namely the Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and the Central American region. In order to do this the chapter first, presents a mapping of the EU’s international trade and cooperation policies examining development and trade issues within the EU-Latin American relations. Secondly, it analyses the EU as an actor in the multilateral trade system and gives examples of different types of EU trade agreements, in order to better situate the AA. Thirdly, this chapter explores some of the key criticisms of the EU’s international cooperation and trade policies, focusing on feminist perspectives and those scholars interested in sustainable development scholars. Finally, this chapter tries to link these critiques to the research puzzle of the thesis. The next section outlines the history of EU international cooperation, explains the EU trade structure and examines links between the two policy areas.

Mapping the EU’s international trade and international cooperation policies

Historical Background

The trade and aid relationship between the European Union (EU) and the South goes back to the colonial era. When the European Economic Community (EEC), with a common market in Europe was established through the Treaty of Rome in 1957, large parts of Africa were still colonised by European states. The European colonial powers wanted a work force as well as a continued flow of cheap raw materials from their colonies, and in exchange for this the Rome declaration included lower trade barriers and foreign aid to these new independent nations (CONCORD, 2008). This aid was transferred through what became the European Development Fund, which still exists today (EC, 2013).

As colonial nations gained their independence the European states expanded their trade and foreign aid programs to also include these new African nations. In July 1963 representatives from 18 African nations met up with EU officials. This meeting led to the so-called Yaoundé convention that formalised trade relations between the EU and ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific countries (ACP) (Hurt, 2003). The
expansion of the EU and consequent expansion of the Yaounde convention took place in different phases. The number of countries that formed part of the Yaoundé convention expanded when Great Britain became a member of the EU in 1973 and promoted the joining of its former colonies. In 1975 the Lomé convention, which replaced the Yaounde convention, allowed the ACP-countries to export to the EU without paying tax, but this did not apply to meat and grains however (CONCORD, 2008); in other words the EU was concerned about protecting its own agricultural sector right from the beginning of its relationship with the newly independent states. This protection of and subsidies to its agricultural sector continues still today and is the cause of one of the core criticisms of the EU as an incoherent international development actor that argues in favor of free trade at the same time as it uses protective measures itself. When Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986 the expansion of the EU’s international cooperation spread further by including the ex-colonies in Asia and Latin America. Finally, the end of the Cold War gave the EU the incentive to further expand its trade and aid programmes to also include former Soviet Union countries. Another major change took place in year 2000 when modifications were made and the Lomé convention changed name to the Cotonou agreement (European Commission, 2011). The Cotonou Agreement was the end of non-reciprocal preferences and the beginning of new negotiations on replacement arrangements (Bartels, 2007, p. 736). As demonstrated above there is a close correlation between the colonial historical relationships and the EU trade and international cooperation politics with countries in the South. After this historical context we need to understand the contemporary structures related to trade within the EU institutions in order to understand how the EU trade policy works.

The EU’s trade structures

EU’s evolving governance framework is reflected in its trade structures. The Commission, represented by the Directorate General (DG) Trade and the trade Commissioner, has the right of inventiveness with respect to international foreign trade negotiations. The trade Commissioner conducts the talks and is sometimes assisted by Commissioners responsible for other areas, such as agriculture, development or the environment. The Council of Ministers, decides the mandate,
which is to guide the Commission’s work with international trade negotiations. The scope and rules of the EU’s foreign trade policy are outlined in Article 133 of the Nice Treaty from 2001, and the so-called ‘Article 133 Committee’ of the council controls the execution of the mandate put forward to the Commission (Dür and Zimmermann, 2007). There are internal tensions over how to negotiate and ratify international trade agreements, especially since the different member states represented by the Council often have different views on trade issues. Another source of dispute is the variety of stances between the different DG’s. The DG Development does for example promote more pro-development oriented politics in comparison to the DG Trade (Dür and Zimmermann, 2007). The European Parliament (EP) also influences the decision making of EU foreign trade. Two examples of this influence are when Commission officials brief EP Members and when there members attend international trade negotiations as observers (Dür and Zimmermann, 2007). Moreover, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in late 2009 the EU Parliament needs to vote for approval of trade agreements for these to become ratified also the Commission is required to transmit documents and report about the status of negotiations on a regular basis to the European Parliament (EC, June 2011). In the case of the AA between the EU and Central America, the EU parliament voted in favor of the agreement in December 2012 (European Commission, Dec. 2012). This voting procedure also signifies that CSOs in Brussels meet with members of the EP (MEP) in order to try to affect their vote. Based on his own contact with MEPs Erik Van Mele, policy officer at Oxfam Solidaritét said that it is difficult to change the members’ opinions (Van Mele, Erik, Interview, 20/06/2012).

The EU’s International Cooperation Framework

Several different actors are also involved in the EU’s international cooperation practices, which are funded by the EU itself and not by individual member states. Some of the major actors in the EU’s development cooperation are to be found in the Commission. These are the Directorate Generals (DGs) for trade, external action service, the EuropeAid which is responsible for designing EU development policies and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), which works with humanitarian aid and civil protection. Field Offices (delegations) are entities within the
DG for external action service that implement the development policies (European Commission: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, 2011).

The decision making process for the EU international cooperation include individual member states, the EP, the Council of ministers and various sections of the Commission as explained above. The general practice is that the Commission presents a proposal, the EP and Council of Ministers process it and finally the Commission implements the policy. The Commission’s DG for external action service is responsible for designing country strategies in all parts of the world, except for Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) area. The DG EuropeAid is responsible for EU’s development work in these three regions of the world. As described earlier in this chapter the division of the EU’s international cooperation work relates back to its colonial history.

So, the international cooperation is done through different EU bodies depending on whether the funding goes to the ACP states or to other developing nations. The European development Fund (EDF) finances the international cooperation that goes to the ACP states. The rest of the development countries get international cooperation funding from what is called the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). Moreover, the DCI runs thematic programs in development countries across the world, including the so-called ACP states. These thematic programmes deal with food security, migration and asylum, sustainable management of natural resources, none-state actors and local authorities in development, human and social development focusing on the Millennium Development Goals (MDG’s) (European Commission, EuropeAid, 2012).

The connection between the EU’s Trade and International Cooperation policies

The EU’s external policies towards developing countries have always combined political, social development and trade issues (Bossuyt, 2006) and at least in theory the EU has augmented its dedication to social and environmental issues in recent years. In its official statements the EU argues that its “trade policy is closely linked to its development policy” (Europa, 2012), furthermore, it is stated that “while trade is not a guaranteed route to economic growth for developing countries,
evidence suggests that trade and openness to the global economy play an important role in creating jobs and prosperity in developing countries” (European Commission, Trade, 2012). Besides this, the Commission argues that it is important to tailor policies individually so that these reflect vulnerabilities and strengths in each developing country, since “there is no single model for trade and development” (European Commission, Trade, 2012). Nevertheless, the EU presents the strategy of “progressive openness to trade” as a universal solution for all developing countries, despite their different vulnerabilities and strengths. The Commission explains how it “sees progressive openness to trade as one part of a development strategy that has already lifted hundreds of millions of people in the developing world out of poverty, and can do the same for hundreds of millions more” (Ibid.). This is a very controversial strategy however, since critics would argue that many states have developed their economies with protectionist policies rather than through free trade (See for example Bello, 2004, De Vylnder, 2002). This idea of late comers and their economic development links back all the way to some of the mercantilist ideas and to the 19th Century writings by the German writer Friedrich List’s on infant industry. List argued that international trade is beneficial only between equally developed nations. In other words he was not opposed to international trade, but made the case that potentially competitive firms need protection initially in order for them not to be overrun by existing dominant producers (List, 1909). Today, it is mainly governments of the South that promote the protectionist ideas about international trade in order to defend their domestic industries. Despite its promotion of open markets and free trade, its critics argue that the EU is not following its own recommendations about open trade either when it protects its own agricultural businesses through market access restrictions, domestic support and export subsidies (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008). Nonetheless, both promoters and sceptics of trade openness argue that trade can be an important factor for economic development in poor countries. I would argue however that international trade in itself does not necessarily help to improve the lives of marginalised groups in society. Rather, an export-oriented economy would have to be linked to a set of domestic

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24 List possessed a very different view of the role of developing countries however; he argued that international specialisation in the global economy depends on climatic factors that make tropics suitable for agriculture and primary production and temperate zones fitted for manufacturing (Sen, 2009, pp 49-50).
Redistribution economic policies in order for these groups to benefit from the trade. Moreover, export oriented trade of agribusiness products typically promotes a concentrated land ownership and large monoculture cultivations that do not benefit small scale farmers and peasants who practice more traditional forms of agriculture. In my conversations with peasant leaders and NGO analysts in Guatemala they underlined a lack of faith in the trickle down effects of an export oriented economy and the struggle for land (Interviews, CONIC, 13/09/12, CONAVIGUA, 21/09/12).

The EU’s concern about the link between trade and development is also reflected in the doctrine of ‘managed globalisation’ which Pascal Lamy, who was trade commissioner at the time, introduced in 1999. Two of the cornerstones in this doctrine were multilateralism and the redistribution of the benefits and costs of globalisation (Meunier, 2007). Examples of this are the non-reciprocal trade policies, ‘Everything but Arms’ (EBA) from 2001 and ‘Access to Essential Medicines’ from 2005. The idea behind these programs is to use trade liberalisation to improve the economic development in the least developed countries (LDCs). The EBA regulation grants duty-free exports of all products from LDCs to the EU, except arms and ammunitions, for an unlimited period of time without quantitative restrictions. These regulations do not include bananas, rice and sugar for a limited period of time however (European Commission, EBA, 2012).

*International cooperation and trade within the EU-Latin American relations*

The EU has on average spent €500 million per year on development assistance to the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) states, which makes it the biggest donor in the region (Europa Press Release, 2009). The relations between the EU and Latin American nations on this set off issues take place at various levels. The first level is the bi-regional one that involves the EU and the Latin American region as a whole, including the Caribbean (LAC). For agreements with the EU however, the Caribbean countries form part of the Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific countries group (ACP) and the so-called Cotonou Agreement mentioned earlier in this chapter. The second level is sub-regional and encompasses Central America, the Andean Community and Mercosur. Below this level are the bilateral relations between the EU and specific
countries on particular topics (Huybrechts and Peels, 2008, pp.217-218). Representatives from the EU and Latin American states have met in bi-regional summits every two years since 1999. The years when there is not such a summit, the EU meets with the so-called Rio Group, which includes all Latin American countries and representatives of Caribbean states.

The joint action plan that the EU and Latin American states agreed on at the EU-LAC Summit in Madrid 2010 highlights many policy areas. Among these are innovation and technology, energy, environment, sustainable development, biodiversity, climate change, regional integration, migration, education, employment as well as the world drug problem” (EU-LAC, 2010). The overall theme of the summit was "Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership: innovation and technology for sustainable development and social inclusion" (EU-LAC, 2010). This theme is in line with the EU-Central America and the EU-CAN Association Agreements (AAs), as well as with the strategic partnership agreement between the EU and the LAC states. The focus on ‘technology for sustainable development’ follows the EU’s ecological modernisation ideology discussed later in this chapter.

Representatives of the EU and the LAC states launched the Strategic Partnership at the Rio de Janeiro Ministerial Summit in 1999, as an attempt to institutionalise the interactions between the regions. One of the EU’s reasons to promote regional integration is the idea that this also promotes developing countries’ integration into the world economy. Nevertheless, Icaza argues that, “particular neoliberal views on development and regionalism, and the role that private actors should play in it, lie at the heart of the strategic partnership” (Icaza, 2010, p.130).

The EU on the Global Trade Arena:

The Multilateral Trade Framework and Free Agreements

*The Multilateral trade framework*

An important agreement within the multilateral trade arena was the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that was set up by the allied nations in 1944, as part of their strategy to manage world trade after the end of World War II. This agreement limited and reduced custom duties and quotas in international trade,
especially those related to industrial goods, in order to encourage cross-border trade. During the so-called Uruguay round in 1995 the GATT was expanded and changed into what became the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Apart from the traditional issues of trade, such as import quotas and duties, the WTO also regulate other technical barriers of trade that might distort competition between countries. As a result there are over thirty agreements about everything from technical standards to the solving of disputes between nations (Olofin, 2002, CONCORD, 2010). The rules for free trade agreements (FTAs) are set out in the WTO, specifically in Article V of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and in Article XXIV of the GATT (European Commission, 2011).

In year 2000 it was time to renegotiate the agricultural WTO agreements and the EU succeeded in its push for a new broad round of negotiations. These negotiations were named the Doha round and have not been very successful. So, up till today the EU has failed to reach a comprehensive WTO agenda. This failure, which reflects the different interests between developing and industrialized countries especially in the agricultural sector, is one of the reasons to why the EU has shifted to a trade policy that focuses more on bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) (Woolcock, 2007, Whalley, 2008) as part of the Global Europe strategy.

*The Global Europe Strategy*

In 2006, with Peter Mandelson as the trade commissioner, the EU changed focus from managing globalisation to what it called ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’. This Global Europe Strategy complements the Lisbon Treaty’s internal policies with external trade policies that focus on how to create economic growth and jobs within the European Union. According to the European Commission “growth and jobs, and the opportunity they create, [...] are essential for economic prosperity, social justice and sustainable development and to equip Europeans for globalisation.” (European Commission, 2006, p.2) Moreover the European Commission argues that rejection of protectionism within the EU must be combined with the creation of “open markets and fair conditions for trade abroad” (European Commission, 2006, p.6). It is a bit ironic that this laissez-faire economy based conditions is referred to as fair trade by
the Commission, since other actors would see these economic practices as unfair because of the way these overrun small scale producers.

The Global Europe strategy promotes more traditional and offensive measures than the previous managing globalisation doctrine, and this alteration took place partly as a response to the rise of mainly China but also India and Brazil as economic powers. So, the European Commission created the offensive Global Europe strategy out of defensive interests. The EU continues to prioritise multilateralism and the WTO with Global Europe but it also expands its bilateral trade relationships. One of the EU’s major concerns is that “Europe needs to import to export”, which means that one important goal for the EU through the Global Europe strategy is access to cheap raw materials and sources of energy (European Commission, 2006, p.7).

This logic is in line with the priorities of the early European Union members at the time when these lost their former colonies and thereby free access to many raw materials. As could be expected from this, a general critique of Global Europe is that it produces winners and losers both in developing countries and within Europe. When opening up markets to European businesses, the new EU trade agreements may threaten people’s livelihoods in developing countries since they often cannot subsist when facing the competition from EU corporations (EED, et alt., 2009). Focusing on the EU, the European Commission itself “recognise(s) the potentially disruptive impacts of market opening for some regions and workers, particularly the less qualified” (European Commission, 2006, p.5).

As a result of this, the EU set up a globalisation adjustment fund in 2009 for European workers to find new jobs and develop new skills after loosing their jobs due to “changing global trade patterns, e.g. when a large company shuts down or a factory is moved to outside the EU” or because of a “global financial and economic crisis” (European Commission, European Globalisation Adjustment Fund). There is up to 500 million Euros available in this fund each year, but various European civil society organisations argue that “the scope and level of investment of this fund make it a completely inadequate consolation for an incorrect policy” (EED, et alt., 2009). The European Commission talks about globalisation as an uncontrollable global force that
the EU must adapt to and accept. Nevertheless, the EU participates in the design and promotion (through the WTO) of much of the liberal economic policies, such as FTAs, that civil society organisations criticise from a labour rights perspective (Oxfam, 2004). Among the FTAs that are criticised are AAs.

**Association Agreements**

The Association Agreements (AAs) were originally set up by the EU to promote economic development and political stability in countries geographically close to the EU and they were often a first step towards membership in the EU. Later on the usage of AAs became wider and the EU began to sign these kinds of agreements with countries that are geographically far away from Europe (Kommerskollegium, 2002, p.9). Sometimes they involve just one country and sometimes a whole region of countries. The EU AA with Chile (2002) was one of the early agreements of this nature. AAs are presented by the EU as an opportunity for economic development in poor countries in a similar way that the EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are, in other words both are supposed to work towards the development policy objectives. Another similarity between the EUs strategies with the AAs with the Andean Community and Central American region as well as with the EPAs is the emphasis on regional integration. One key difference between the two is that the latter are specifically aimed for the ACPs (Woolcock, 2007).

**Regionalism and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs)**

Federica Bicchi, argues that “the EU aims at promoting regionalism as the ‘normal way’ for neighbouring countries to address issues of common interests” (Bicchi, 2006, p. 287). There are several reasons to why the EU promotes regionalism. First, EU representatives argue that regionalisation promotes developing countries’ integration into the world economy. This view comes across in the Maastricht Treaty where the European Commission argues that developing countries can ‘gradually and smoothly increase their competitiveness’ by competing in regional markets before confronting the challenges of the world market (Robles, 2008, p.183). Secondly, the EU’s eager to encourage regionalisation is based upon the will to promote similar organizational
structures to itself as a means to legitimate itself internationally (Bicchi, 2006). Finally, the EU may also encourage regional integration as a means of promoting international trade and opening new markets for European investors, customers and for the export of European goods.

Regional trade agreement (RTAs) negotiations rounds mean fewer negotiations for the EU and it can be easier to negotiate with groups of countries, than with individual states. This is not always the case however; despite its interest in promoting regionalism, the EU still values the signing of trade agreements with individual states. For example in the case of the Andean Community (CAN), the EU signed bilateral AAs with Colombia and Peru (European Commission, 2011A), even though Bolivia and Ecuador left the negotiations that aimed for a regional trade agreement in 2008. Bolivia and Ecuador have more state centric economic policies than Colombia and Peru. The latter two practice more liberal economics in line with free trade policies. By signing the trade agreements with only two of the countries in CAN, the EU make the prospects for a common market within CAN very unlikely, since a common market requires a common external tariff. This is because in order to create common external tariffs, the existing agreements would have to be tailored by their signatories to include preferences to newcomers, or Bolivia and Ecuador would have to adapt both to Peru and Colombia’s existing trade agreements with other states, such as the EU and the US (Haubrich, 2011).

Gibb considers disadvantages of RTA from developing countries’ point of view and remarks that local firms might be incapable of complying with rigorous rules of origin and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations (Gibb, 2008, p.17). It may for this and other reasons be easier said than done for developing countries to fully benefit from improved market access provisions, including tariff cuts, due to their inadequate supply capacities and competitiveness. Another difficulty with RTAs that Gibb draws attention to are the extra costs involved for customs officials, regulators and traders in meeting multiple sets of trade rules, when countries sign overlapping memberships in RTAs (ibid.p.17). This is for example the case of Nicaragua, which has signed Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with the US, the regional AA between Central America and the EU and Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América (ALBA) with Venezuela.
**EU- Trade Agreements with regions in the South**

Among the Latin American states, the EU has signed bilateral trade agreements with Mexico and Chile as well as regional AAs with the Central American (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá and El Salvador) region and the Andean Community (as mentioned earlier only Colombia and Peru signed however). The AA between the EU and Central America signed in 2010 was built on the already existing EU-Central American political Dialogue and Co-operation Agreement. In other words the new addition in the 2010 AA was the FTA. The EU’s political dialogue with the Andean Community was set up in 1996 and is based on the Declaration of Rome. The EU-Andean Community political Dialogue and Co-operation Agreement from 2003 has not been ratified (European Union, 2012). In May 2010, the European Commission also expressed its desire to reinitiate the negotiations with MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Venezuela is in the process of integrating into Mercosur). The EU-MERCOSUR negotiations about an AA started in 1999 but were suspended in 2004 (Robles, 2008). The EU wants more market access for its manufactured products, while MERCOSUR wants more concessions on EU farm subsidies and tariff barriers (BRIDGES, 2011). Moreover, the 2008-2009 global financial crisis has created a difficult climate for free trade negotiations globally.

There is a similar situation with the ACP states, because the EPA negotiations have been at an impasse since 2007. The EU is still looking for a way forward to conclude these agreements. The negotiations started back in 2003 and the EU had planned to conclude them by 2007. So far, only one region, the 15-member Caribbean group of ACP countries (CARIFORUM) has signed a full EPA agreement however. All CARIFORUM countries except for Haiti signed the agreement in 2007. Collectively or individually another 18 ACP countries have agreed on so-called interim agreements (iEPAs) (Bilal and Ramdoo, 2010). The Cotonou agreement states that two of the main aims of the EPAs are sustainable development and the eradication of poverty in the ACP countries. So, the idea of economic cooperation through trade and development cooperation is applied in the EPAs as well as in the AAs with the Central American region and the Andean Community.
In the broader analysis of EU trade relations, it is interesting to note how the EU stresses normative concerns such as social and environmental issues when trading with some countries, but not with others that are important trade partners. The EU FTAs have generally included more areas than trade, such as, foreign policy, justice and home affairs (anti-terrorism, police co-operation and migration) as well as human rights and sustainable development issues. The negotiations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea and India do not include these issues however. In the EU-South Korean free trade agreement, signed in 2010, Chapter 13 deals with sustainable development and labour rights (European Union, 2011), but does not put emphasis on these issues, such as in the EPAs and the AAs. Originally the negotiations of a regional FTA started back in 2007 with all but three members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar did not participate). Seven negotiations rounds were held, but the talks moved very slowly and a halt were put to the negotiations in March 2009. In 2010 the EU started talks with Singapore and representatives from Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have participated in new discussions.

Other International trade actors and frameworks
US FTA and their influence

The EU FTAs are part of a larger trend within international trade in which the US plays an important role. The EU competes with the US for markets and this is one reason for the boom of new bilateral trade agreements and negotiations between the EU and countries around the world. A good example of this trend was when the EU signed an AA with Mexico in year 2000, after that the EU trade with Mexico had declined as a result to the North America FTA (NAFTA) that Canada, Mexico and the US signed in 1994 (Woolcock, 2007). This new EU trade agreement also changed the idea that the AAs were aimed for bilateral relations only with countries close to the EU. The US government uses the NAFTA as a role model for all its FTAs, where as the content of the EU agreements vary from case to case (Woolcock, 2007).

NAFTA includes chapters on labour and environmental protection, forcing countries to implement their already existing legislation. When asked in a survey, more than a quarter of companies stated that stricter environmental provisions in the USA affected
them when deciding to move the production to Mexico with weaker environmental law (French 1993).

The NAFTA has a commission that provides regular reporting on the state of the environmental situation and the impact of the FTA. Sanctions against persistent violators of environmental law are nevertheless avoided as much as possible. Instead, “the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation is empowered to summon technical advisers, mediate and make recommendations to parties aimed at finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the dispute” (Newell, 2006, p 10). So, in other words, both the EU AAs with Latin American countries and NAFTA take environmental issues and labour into account to some extent. When it comes to gender equality however the AAs deals with the issue more than the NAFTA does. In the NAFTA side agreement on labour cooperation gender is only considered as “equality of women and men in the workplace” (ILAB, 1993). The lack of inclusion of gender equality in the NAFTA agreement could in part depend on the pre 1995 Beijing conference timing of the signing. The statements on gender equality in the AAs will be discussed and analysed in Chapter 5.

Just like NAFTA, the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which was signed in 2005 as various bilateral agreements between USA and the Central American states, also includes the chapters on labour and environment (US Government, 2011). In 2007 the Assistant Secretary at the US Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, Daniel Sullivan promoted the US development assistance and CAFTA as integrated and complementary programs (La Prensa, 2007). Furthermore, he claimed that free trade and export-oriented growth will be the crucial factor to promote long-term development. This logic is the based on same kind of ideology of free trade that the EU promotes as a driver for economic development in poor countries, and the Association Agreements with their three pillars (trade, international cooperation and democratic dialogue) are examples of this free market driven development model. Despite their strong influence, the EU and the USA are not the only major actors in international trade and China’s trade relations with Latin American are fast growing.
China as a trade actor

The 16th EU-China Summit was held on November 21, 2013 and there both sides announced the launch of negotiations of a comprehensive so-called EU-China Investment Agreement. In the EC’s own words “the Agreement will provide for progressive liberalisation of investment and the elimination of restrictions for investors to each other’s market. It will provide a simpler and more secure legal framework to investors of both sides by securing predictable long-term access to EU and Chinese markets respectively and providing for strong protection to investors and their investments” (EC, July, 2014). China joined the WTO in 2001 and the EU is its biggest trading partner. China is the EU’s second biggest trading partner after the US (ibid.).

Since the beginning of the new millennium trade relations between China and Latin American countries have also grown rapidly, with the exception of year 2009 when the trade slowed down drastically due to the global economic crisis (Shuangrong, 2011). Generally, China exports industrial goods to Latin America and where as 67 per cent of the goods it imports from the region consists of primary products (Ibid. p. 61). In 2009 China signed free trade agreements with Chile (June) and well as with Peru (April). In Central America it is only Costa Rica that has committed to a free trade agreements with China, and they parties signed that one in April of 2010 (Ibid.).

Latin American Socialist alternative to Free Trade Agreements

Before examining some scholarly and civil society actors’ criticisms of the EU’s international cooperation and trade policies, I will give a brief explanation of the Alternativa Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra América (ALBA). Whereas FTAs aim at facilitating the integration of markets, the aim of ALBA is foremost to build organizations and institutions for collective state action and cooperation. The ALBA also calls for state intervention to decrease inequalities within and between countries (Bossi, 2005). Moreover, ALBA incorporates many different areas, including energy, sharing of knowledge and technology, health and education (ALBA-TCP, 2007). The FTAs laissez-faire economy is challenged by promoters of ALBA who argue that free
competition involving unequal players harm the weaker economy, so instead of comparative advantage ALBA is refers to “complementarity” (Bossi, 2005). The ALBA is a critical response to FTAs and the Cuban and Venezuelan governments were the first to sign the agreement in December 2004. Thereafter the Bolivian government formalised accession in April 2006 and in March 2007, Venezuela and Nicaragua signed their first ALBA agreement (ALBA, 2006; 2007).

Criticisms of the EU’s international cooperation and trade policies

Contradictions in EU Foreign Policy

In a special edition of the journal Third World Quarterly, Wil Hout states that he and the other contributors share the general understanding that “the EU’s approach to development and governance is essentially neoliberal in character and reflects technocratic, instrumental orientation premised on the need to deepen market-based reforms in the countries of the South” (2010, p. 8). It is the market actors that are assumed to be the primary drivers of development and regionalism, especially the multinational companies that are seen as the drivers of economic growth and employment in the EU’s Global Europe Strategy (Icaza, 2010, p.131, Andersson, 2007, p.17). This criticism draws our attention to the conflict between the EU’s profits from trade with countries in the South and normative values such as social welfare, human rights and sustainable development that the EU claims to promote. The gap between declaratory commitments to normative values and reality in EU foreign affairs is a reoccurring theme in the critiques of EU development and trade policy. One example of research on this topic is the work by Karin Arts and Anna K. Dickson who write about the EU in the twenty first century and its efforts to be a significant actor in the working of international relations. The authors demonstrate the dispersed range of interests within EU foreign policy and argue that, in addition to the general goal of forging good relations with (potential) political and economic partners across the globe, the Union also wishes to use its place in international relations, as a vehicle for advocating some of the values it considers important. Among these values are democracy, social welfare, human rights and liberalism (Arts and Dickson 2004, p. 1). The authors continue by arguing that the EU sees
development cooperation policy as a tool that serves both the missions of deepening trade relations and spreading the Union’s normative values. (ibid.p.1). These observations facilitate the understanding of some of the contradictions in the EU’s role as an international actor, especially in its relation with countries in the South. As argued earlier in this chapter it can be seen as very controversial to promote free trade with developing countries at the same time as encouraging social welfare and human rights.

Lorenzo Fioramonti and Arlo Poletti have studied southern perspectives of the EU in Brazil, India and South Africa. One of their findings is that the political elites of the South often view the EU as an inconsistent actor which, stresses the importance of the fight against poverty and the quest for sustainable development in its public statements, while it continues to perpetuate poverty in the so-called developing world through unfair practices and double standards in some of the most sensitive sectors for developing economies. (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008, p. 171) Fioramonti and Poletti argue that political elites in these strong economies of the South see the EU as a hypocritical actor, and give one example of this view from South Africa where politicians see agricultural subsidies within the EU as a confirmation of EU’s hypocritical attitude. The critique is that the EU promotes a free market philosophy while applying protectionist measures that interfere with international trade competition. (Fioramonti and Poletti, 2008, p. 172) Another critique of EU’s development and trade policies, with a different focus takes the internal dynamics of the EU into account. Maurizio Carbone does this arguing that the difference between the EU’s high ambitions and its practice remains large and that the search for better co-ordination between European donors has led to a further reduction of the policy space for developing countries. (Carbone, M, 2010, p 14)

Grugel studied how the EU, as part of its effort to extend liberal democracy abroad, has tried to promote its understanding of democracy among the MERCOSUR countries. She found that that EU policy in MERCOSUR is based on the assumption that it shares a common conceptual understanding of democracy “and that Mercosur elites aspire to European-style democracies”. (Grugel, 2007, p. 44) Nevertheless, she found that democracy is not understood in the same way in the EU and MERCOSUR
and that state actors in these South American countries seem less devoted to
democratic consolidation built on ideas of social inclusion and citizenship and than the
EU assumes. Moreover, Grugel discovered that local civil society actors, on the other
hand, do share their understandings of democracy with the EU. Her suggestion,
therefore, would be to change EU policies towards supporting and backing up the
CSOs’ activities (Ibid. pp.44-45). This finding also becomes interesting in relation to my
finding about how the EU addresses the topic of sustainable development and green
economy with the Guatemalan political and economic elite, without considering that
many CSOs (especially indigenous ones) have a very different understanding of
sustainability which links to Mayan cosmovision and buen vivir. So, in the case of
sustainability the EU appears to share a conceptual understanding with the
Guatemalan state actors, but in this case many of the local civil society actors have a
different understanding of the concept. In other words the EU does not pay much
attention to the civil society actors in either case. These multifaceted and sometimes
contradictory actions within EU foreign policy in developing countries presented
above, is what make the AAs interesting to analyse from gender equality and
sustainable development perspectives. These agreements represent on the one hand
the EU’s support for a free market philosophy and on the other hand the EU’s will to
promote normative values such as sustainable development, gender equality and
liberal democracy.

Feminist Critiques

Feminist scholars have critically examined what impacts the EU’s model of gender
equality has on the rest of the world. As a part of a bigger international wave, the issue
of gender equality gained terrain in the EU during the 1990s, when the EU officially
included gender mainstreaming among its general policy goals. The European
Commission defines the concept of gender mainstreaming as the ‘promotion of
equality between women and men in all activities and policies at all levels’ (European
Commission, 1996). In 1996 the European Commission stated that gender
mainstreaming was extended to every area of the EU’s internal as well as external
policy (Debusscher, and True, 2009, p 187). Over all, the EU made a significant effort
to implement gender equality in its internal policies but the same cannot be said for
the Union’s external policies. One of the reasons for this difference is that the capability in gender policy analysis varies a great deal between the different Directorates General (DG) within the European Commission.25

Debusscher and True discuss how making gender a “cross-cutting issue” by mainstreaming it means that the expectation is that it is addressed in budget support and therefore significant resources are not designated to gender equality goals or women any longer. This could have negative effects in developing countries in which women’s organisations are commonly understaffed and or under resourced or focus more on the implementation of projects rather than policy advocacy (Ibid. p.194). This was something that the regional network of CSOs working towards women’s rights, Foro de Mujeres para la integración Centroamericana (FMICA) experienced when participating in the space given to civil society participation during the AA negotiations between the EU and the Central American states (FMICA, 2010, pp. 51-52).

**Figure3 FMICA Meeting**

Guatemalan women at a FMICA meeting about the AA negotiations on 18th of September 2007 in Guatemala City, Source: FMICA, 2007, p. 10

One external EU policy area that has been neglected in terms of gender mainstreaming

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25 This was something I observed in the interviews I made with EU staff during my field-work in Brussels in June 2012. Several of the officials I interviewed in the EU Commission, External Action Service and DG Trade did not see the link between trade and gender equality.
is trade and one important feminist critique is that the impacts of trade agreements are not gender neutral. Gender inequalities that affect access to jobs, markets and other resources all influence the impacts of the post-agreement implementation on the ground (See for example Ulmer, 2008). None of the EU trade bodies, among them the European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade), has showed much interest in gender equalities (Hoskyns, 2008).

On the other hand, the Commission’s Development DG (DEVCO) demonstrates much more interest in the gender mainstreaming and has issued resolutions, policy statements and communications on development and gender since EU’s first commitment to a coherent gender equality vision in the mid-1990’s (Debusscher and True, 2008, p. 187). The DG on development has acknowledged the lack of policy coherence and the Council Development Co-operation Working Party (CODEV) calls for the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment in the different EU policy areas (Ibid., p. 191). This lack of coherence between the different EU policy areas when it comes to gender mainstreaming, demonstrate some of the gaps which this thesis examines through the study of the Association Agreements between the EU and Latin American regions. Just like gender equality, environmental sustainability is another policy area that the EU promotes in its discourses.

*Critiques from Sustainable Development and Environmental Perspective*

When it comes to environmental politics the EU is often presented as an international leader. One of the most apparent examples of this is the EU’s leadership role in multilateral environmental agreements, especially within policy areas such as climate change and biodiversity. Moreover, the EU has pushed for changes of international trade rules that would allow them to adapt to the EU’s environmental measures. These actions have led to conflicts between the EU’s environmental policy commitments and free trade rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and this behaviour can be seen as part of the EU’s strategy of promoting multilateral instruments designed to promote environmental norms among other norms (Kelemen, 2010). Despite the EU’s promotion of environmentally sustainable politics internationally, we find incoherence in the EU guidelines related to sustainable
development.

The EU refers to the concept of sustainable development in its discourses, which could be observed in year 2000, when the Commission President Romano Prodi expressed that “we must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development” and he continued by saying that “only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security” (Prodi, 2000). Furthermore, the EU demonstrates its declaratory commitment to sustainable development in treaties such as the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). Moreover, sustainable development became one of the objectives of the community with the second treaty and this standpoint was then confirmed again in the Treaty of Nice (2000) (Baker, 2007).

In official documents the EU states that the Brundtland Report and the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) guide its policies. As explained in Chapter 1 the Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43) and also emphasises the importance of and poverty reduction, arguing that poverty reduction is a “precondition for environmentally sound development” (WCED, 1987, p.44). Despite the EU’s official statements embracing sustainable development, scholars such as Susan Baker is critical of the EU’s portrayal of its environmental politics and argues that the sustainable development ideas that the Union mentions in its official statements on environmental policies are not reflected in its actions. Baker argues that the EU’s environmental politics is based on ecological modernisation ideas (Baker, 2007). Ecological modernisation can be defined as “the discourse that recognises the structural character of the environmental problematique but none the less assumes that existing political, economic, and social institutions can internalize the care for the environment” (Hajer, 1995, p. 25) The recent EU strategies for the near future, Europe 2020, follows this same logic of ecological modernization and promotes a “sustainable growth – for a resource efficient, greener and more competitive economy” (Europe 2020).
There are some issues with ecological modernisation that makes it problematic to use apply this model in local contexts in developing countries, such as Guatemala. First, ecological modernisation encourages growth as a solution to the environmental problems (Baker, 2007) that (as explained in Chapter one) originates in a Western economic culture. Secondly, ecological modernisation relates mainly to experiences in western industrial countries and does therefore not account for a North/South perspective nor social justice (Langhelle, 2010) Finally, ecological modernisation promotes technological and institutional change, but does not call for fundamental economic, social, cultural and lifestyle changes, especially in the high consumption societies in the North (Baker, 2007, p.304).

The EU argues that sustainable development can be combined with growth, which is in line with ecological modernisation ideas as well as with the Brundtland Commission’s report (WECD, 1987). One example can be found in the white paper called *Growth, Competitiveness and Employment*, in which the EU focuses on the link between environment and employment, arguing that environmental protection potentially could improve the competitiveness of the EU’s economy (European Commission, 1993). One of the fundamental problems with the concept of sustainable development is the idea of merging economic growth with the environment. As Escobar puts it “when taking on the concept of sustainable development, in effect, one tries to reconcile these two old enemies [economic growth and the environment”] (Escobar, 1995, p.11). The promotion of sustainable development becomes part of the construction of a new European identity that is grounded on the notion of shared European values and social responsibility (Baker, 2007). As Baker puts it “sustainable development acts as the meta-narrative, framing and legitimising the integration project” and “the promotion of ecological modernisation is the reflection of the reality of organised power and interest group politics in the EU” (Baker, 2007). In this sense it looks as if sustainable development works as a guideline in EU policy making and ecological modernisation is the guideline for the implementation of these policies.
Concluding Remarks

As shown in this chapter there are links between EU’s trade and international cooperation policy that reach back to colonial times. The contextualization of the EU Association Agreements on the global arena of international trade shows the importance of the US foreign trade policy for the EU. Moreover, it illustrates the link between the spreading of regional trade agreements and the stagnation of the WTO Doha round. It also illustrates the similarities in the EU’s trade policies with developing countries in Latin America and Africa. The examination of criticisms of EU trade and International Cooperation policies from various angles demonstrate dissimilarity between declaratory commitments to normative values and the reality of EU foreign affairs. This finding links to the key puzzle of this thesis, namely, the gap between the discourse on sustainability and gender equality and the absence of these in the trade policy of the EU as reflected in the Association Agreements with Latin America. Chapter 3 counterbalances the state actor led focus of this chapter by examining views of civil society actors both in Brussels and in Guatemala.
Chapter 3: Civil Society Organisations in Europe and in Guatemala: Campaigning for Change

The aim of this chapter is to analyse what the European, as well as the Guatemalan civil society organisations, focus on, what they overlook and what this tells us about their approach to trade, gender and sustainability. The constant interaction between the civil society actors, the EC and the Guatemalan state as well as EU’s emphasis on civil society participation in the AA makes the topic of this chapter highly significant for the analysis of this thesis. CSOs’ lobbying efforts are worth analysing because, even though corporate lobbyists are more successful at influencing EU policy output, organisations such as development NGOs, “can be influential in shaping individual policy outcomes by helping to construct the necessary ‘policy coalitions”’ (Warleigh, 2001, p.623). This chapter examines how European as well as Guatemalan CSOs understand the concepts of gender equality, sustainable development and trade in the context of the AA between the EU and Central America.

First it offers a discussion of the concept of civil society. Thereafter, it reflects on the state-civil society relations within the EU as well as in Guatemala, since I consider this necessary in order to better understand the environment in which the CSOs’ views are constructed. After examining the views of various EU and Guatemalan institutions follows an explanation of the choice of organisations that are represented empirically in this thesis. These are the organisations that I visited and interviewed in Brussels and Guatemala.

Two sections follow this, the first one introduces the various Brussels based CSOs and their understanding of sustainable development and gender equality in relation to trade, and the second one presents the Guatemalan CSOs, examining how these conceptualise the same concepts. The chapter also explains what issues the organisations in these two different geographical settings lobby for in relation to the AAs. Finally, the chapter provides an analysis of the similarities and differences between the views and understandings of the European and the Guatemalan organisations. Now follows the brief discussion of the concept civil society.
Civil Society: ‘power equations’ and the struggle for space
Since the 1980s many different types of actors, such as grassroots activists, social democrats, NGOs, feminists, environmentalists, international financial institutions, and multilateral development agencies all have embraced the concept of civil society in their own way (Howell and Pearce, p 1). Due to this situation I therefore consider it important to examine the ways in which academics and practitioners use the term, to reflect upon multiple meanings as well as reflect upon the political and ideological context in which the concept of Civil Society gained so many supporters.

From a global perspective there appears to be three related developments that have contributed in making the term Civil Society so widely used from the 1990s and onwards. These developments are, first, the fall of the Soviet Union and the 1989 revolutions in the ‘Soviet bloc’ countries (Fine and Rai 1997), in which the civil society played a crucial role. Here, I would also like to add that the transformations of the Latin American military regimes around the same time are other examples of when civil society played an important role in political change. Secondly, the end of state sponsored development in post-colonial societies, which in turn made intellectuals and social practitioners more attracted to the term Civil Society (Chandhoke, 2005). Finally, Northern donor agencies begun to grant funds to CSOs in order to promote what they saw as “good governance” (Howell and Pearce, p 4).

The view of civil society as “the natural counterpart of privatized markets and liberal democracies” (Ibid., p.4) relates to the history of when groups in the former Soviet Bloc and the military regimes in Latin America challenged authoritarian states through non-violent means, using methods such as, demonstrations, strikes, spreading of information through informal networks, clandestine discussion forums and reading groups. The outcome of this organising is well known: authoritative states collapsed as a consequence of mass protests (Chandhoke, 2007, p.607). The peaceful methods used, together with the right to freedom based key demands of these civil society groups explains why “civil society, as the antonym of authoritarianism, is on everyone’s lips...” (Ibid. p.608). The demands for civil rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association, are in line with the liberal idea of the individual’s right to stand up against the state institutions that surround her/him.
Furthermore, this means that political leaders have to be accountable and state power has to be watched by active citizens. The post-Washington Consensus expressed through the World Bank policies, put new emphasis on the role of the state, and pushed for a model in which the state shares its tasks with CSOs. This subsequently led to the formation of NGOs that could carry out these functions. Besides, I would argue that social movements that perform political struggles and participated in the non-violent transformations of authoritarian regimes do not fit in with this contemporary version of civil society.

Civil society is not necessary a democratic space in which people may participate equally. As Fine and Rai emphasise “we need to highlight the exclusionary aspects of civil society in relation to those who find no place in its system of needs or in its associational life, and therefore to question the description of civil society as a sphere of ‘uncoerced action’ for all” (Fine and Rai 1997, p.2) Howell and Pearce express a similar concern arguing that the social relationships within the market economy create exploitative relationships and inequalities that in turn weaken some and strengthen other groups in civil society (2001, p.3). These exclusionary aspects of civil society also came across during the interviews for this thesis. Most significantly, there were substantial differences between the European and Guatemalan civil society groups and organisations I interviewed in terms of their ability to participate and have an effect on the AA negotiations.

Theoretically this finding can be related to ‘power equations’ within civil society itself. These are for example unequally shared conceptual understanding, material deficiency as well as dominant and marginal languages. Some groups possess a coinciding variety of different kinds of powers, these include, material, political, social and symbolic. Other groups on the other hand do not possess any of the above. Groups that thrive in the ‘power equations’ find a space in civil society, whereas groups that are not empowered end up at the margin of this space (Chandhoke, 2007, p.613). In her article on civil society, Chandhoke makes an observation that relates to the local and global social divisions examined in this thesis. I would agree with her observation that “the irony is that even though most countries of the developing world
are primarily rural, it is the urban middle-class agenda that is best secured by the invocation of civil society” (Ibid. p.613).

State-civil society relations in Guatemala and Europe: ‘in and against’ the state

This section briefly introduces civil society-state relations in the EU and in Guatemala. As explained above civil society is not necessarily a democratic space in which people may participate equally but rather less empowered groups end up in the margins of the civil society space. Also, some CSOs reject collaboration with state institutions because these do not see a common ground for discussion since their agenda is too radically different from the mainstream hegemonic where as others enter in dialogue and negotiation with these institutions. This is something that I observed among Central American women’s organisations during the AA negotiations. Some of these organisations, such as FMICA, accepted the offer for dialogue from the EC where as others that are more explicitly anti free trade, such as UNAMG, chose not to take part in this forum (Bocel, 25/09/2012 and Maldonado, 18/09/2012). I agree with Rai’s idea of ‘in and against’ the state, which avoids reducing the analysis of state based institutions’ ability to advance interests of women to binary opposites (Rai, 2003, p.18). In practice this strategy includes both a mobilization of women’s interests in the civil society realm and an engagement with the policy making state institutions. This way, ideally, the achievements attained through mobilizations can be institutionalised (Ibid. p.18). Following this argument I believe that the two different approaches (as illustrated above by FMICA and UNAMG) to campaigning for change are complementary.

Guatemala

In Guatemala the civil society space was almost erased during the military dictatorships during the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s. Therefore, Guatemalans have created such a space again in peace time. The signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accords in December 1996 had major implications for the relationship between state and civil society and it was an important step towards democratization after the thirty-six-year long armed conflict. Nevertheless, CSOs lack of trust of state institutions remain and historically, one of the essential characteristics of Guatemala’s Maya movement is its lack of confidence in the Guatemalan state. Generally the state is perceived as
“homogenous, mono-ethnic, mono-cultural, partisan, and, above all unwilling or unable to deal with the Maya population’s basic needs and the distribution of public resources” (Casaús Arzú, 2009, p. 150). Despite the promises in the Peace Accords and the Mayan activists’ participation in official committees, “several factors conspired against the possibility of substantial advances in the area of indigenous rights, including the imbalance of competences, the foot-dragging of government representatives, the outright opposition of some government ministries, and the inflexibility of the accords themselves” (McNeish, 2008, p.42). One example that demonstrates the Guatemalan state’s lack of interest in civil society participation and mobilisation is the case of the local referendums (consultas populares) that civil society coalitions of organisations organised and supported in the summer of 2005. One of them was about the issue of the gold and silver mine in Sipacapa and the other referendum focused on the plans to build a hydro-electric dam in Alta Verapaz, Río Hondo. In these cases the Guatemalan government insisted that international contracts and development projects are a matter of national economic policy and that therefore both of the mega-projects should continue as planned (Ibid. p.44)

In relation to the EU Association Agreement, Guatemalan civil society participates in the so called the Consulting Committee (Comité Consultivo) within the System for Central American Integration (CC-SICA). This Committee was set up in 1996 with the aim of “achieving the active presence of the different sectors of civil society” (Gordón, Calderón, 2003, p.6) Some of the different sectors represented in the Committee are academic university staff, trade unionists, the industry sector, women’s organisations, African American minorities’ and indigenous peoples’ organisations, co-operatives and disabled people’s organisations. According to Celina Monterrosa, one of the problems with CC-SICA has been the Central American governments’ lack of interest in listening to the proposals coming from civil society actors (Ibid.) As FMICA highlights though there are problems also within the CC-SICA structure, in which the spaces for regional CSO representation are masculine and patriarchal and therefore women have to work hard in order to access and be effective in these spaces (FMICA, 2010, p.51). The Foro de Mujeres para la Intergación Centroamericana (FMICA), for example, experienced this during the AAs negotiations. From this the network then drew the conclusion that in order to be able to follow the advances within
negotiations in a systematic manner, as well as making concrete suggestions, it is crucial to have sustained financial resources as well as specialised human resources. Moreover, FMICA found that this was especially true for the negotiations of the trade pillar (FMICA, 2010, p.52). I would also argue that the presence of the industrial sector together with the other actors with less funding and other resources suggests that this structure is an example of when civil society is undemocratic and fits in with Chandhoke’s understanding of ‘power equations’ within civil society, as previously mentioned in this chapter.

**European Union**

In the European Union civil society is often treated as synonymous with the activities of “NGOs acting beyond the public sphere of the EU institutions” (Armstrong, 2002, p.108). There are some questions to be raised related to the idea of a European civil society and some academics have, for example, raised a fear that national civil society actors might be lost and marginalised as civil society becomes Europeanised (ibid. p.115). In EU official documents European civil society is seen as a support to representative democracy through the European Parliament. A working group from the EU Commission states that, “the aim is for participatory democracy to be reconciled as much as possible with representative democracy in order to increase the acceptability and effectiveness of European decisions” (Ibid. p116). DG Trade began to meet with NGOs in 1998 and this initiative eventually turned into a more structured dialogue with sectorial meetings on specific subjects (Smismans, p.478). Smismans argument that this invitation to dialogue was partly due to the massive protests first at the global trade and WTO summits (in Seattle, Sidney, and Davos), and then also at the European summits (in Nice and Göteborg) appears valid due to all the media attention (often focusing more on the violence than the demands) that the protests received (Ibid., 478). The protestors questioned the legitimacy of international decision-making structures and of the power of the international financial institutions. The EU politicians at the time had to ask themselves the question of “whether they would establish or strengthen a dialogue with the better-organised parts of the protest movement (i.e. the NGOs), or whether they would isolate themselves in
militarised meetings, risking violent outbursts of social protest” (Ibid. p. 478). This is at least part of the background of why CSOs played a role in the AA negotiations. Now, the chapter progresses to the views of the CSOs.

**CSOs in Brussels and in Guatemala: solidarity across the ocean**

Here I want to share some of the material that came out of the interviews I conducted. The reason for this section is that I want to be able to compare and contract views from CSOs with the AA negotiators on the one hand and the views between CSOs in Central America and Europe on the other hand. In order to do this I begin with a description of the CSO networks interviewed in Brussels. Thereafter, follows an analysis of these networks’ understanding of gender equality and sustainable development in relation to trade and the AAs. Subsequently, this section provides a description of the Guatemalan CSOs and their understanding of gender equality and sustainable development in relation to trade. This sets out the views of CSOs before analysing the three pillars in the coming chapters.

**CSOs in Brussels**

I have studied EU-CSO relations through examining several organisations in Brussels. I chose these networks because they are all based in Brussels, work closely with the different EU institutions on development related issues and share an interest in Central America as a region. These organisations coordinate their campaign and produce publications together. Specifically, I researched four development oriented organisational networks that work in the area of EU-Central American relations, through organisations such as the Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV), the Copenhagen Initiative for Mexico and Central America (CIFCA) ²⁶, the Association of Latin American Organisations for the Promotion of Development (ALOP)²⁷ and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam)-Solidariteit. The above networks cooperate in their lobbying and campaigning efforts concerning the AAs.

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²⁶ CIFCA uses its Spanish name Iniciativa de Copenhague para Centroamérica y México
²⁷ ALOP is an abbreviation of Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo A.C.
ALOP

Although all four above-mentioned coordinating offices are based in Brussels, ALOP represents Latin American development organisations. The network representatives refer to the office in Brussels as an “antenna” of their main office in Mexico (ALOP, online). Their objective is to strengthen the relations and improve the joint campaigning efforts between their own member organizations (Latin American NGOs from North, Central and South America) and networks of European development NGOs.

ALOP was created in 1979 and is made up by over forty NGOs across the Latin American continent (ALOP, Online). Its organisational structure is divided into three sub-regions, namely, the Central American, Mexico and the Caribbean (CAMEXCA) region, the Andean region and the Southern cone and Brazilian region. The ALOP executive committee consists of a president, representatives of the three regions, a fiscal representative and a director of gender policies. Key thematic areas for ALOP is democracy and development, EU-Latin American relations, gender and development, funding and efficiency in development work, migrants and development, regional integration and civil society, rural development and housing (ALOP, Online). The two Guatemalan member organisations are Centro para la Accion Legal en Derechos Humanos (CALDH) and Proyecto de Desarrollo Santiago-La Salle (PRODESSA). CALDH is a human rights organisation and is well known for its work with victims of human rights abuses from the civil war. The organisation works on gender in relation to violence and to labour rights but does not focus on trade, sustainable development or regional integration (CALDH, Online). PRODESSA, on the other hand, works with the education in Guatemala as a means of social transformation (PRODESSA, Online). In other words the Guatemalan ALOP member organisations do not focus on the AAs in the direct way that ALOP’s ‘antenna’ office in Brussels does. In other words the ALOP’s local member organisations in Guatemala were not involved in the AA negotiation process where as the antenna branch in Brussels actively participated in this forum.

APRODEV

European development and aid organisations formed this ecumenical association in 1990, in order to better coordinate the work they are doing. APRODEV uses a rights-
based development approach and a faith-based perspective (APRODEV, online). At present, APRODEV has 16 member organisations across 15 countries. The core objective of APRODEV’s work is “to influence decision-making processes in the European Union institutions as these affect developing countries, in order to promote justice and peace, and the eradication of poverty” (Ibid.). Below is an image from a briefing by ALOP, APRODEV and Grupo Sur on the AAs between the EU and Central America and Colombia/Peru and the dairy sector. In the illustration the big cow represents the EU diary industry taking over the Central American and Colombian local diary industry through the AAs. The CSO’s behind this publication argue that

“The surplus production and its subsequent distribution on the international market at prices inferior to its production costs yields serious circumstances. Indeed, it creates unfair competition which causes a displacement of domestic markets and strongly affects producers and consumers in developing countries, thereby endangering the sustainability of those countries’ dairy sector”. (APRODEV et. al, 2010, p.1)

Figure 4  ‘The European Union is the big Cheese’

Source: APRODEV et. al (2010), ‘The European Union is the Big Cheese’, p.1

Geographically, the APRODEV member organisations work with partner organisations in Africa and the Caribbean, Central America, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Caucasus, as well as in the Middle East. Thematically, APRODEV works with the issues
of climate change and development, the EC and international funding for development, food security and gender, migration and development, as well as security and development (Ibid.). The APRODEV also works on gender issues specifically in relation to trade, but focuses on the EPA agreements and their effects on agricultural trade (Ulmer, Interview, 11/06/2012). In other words, this thematic focus on gender and trade does not include APRODEV’s work with the AA between the EU and Central America.

**CIFCA**

Organisations across Western Europe formed the network CIFCA in 1991, and at present there are 37 member organisations in the network (Daag, Interview, 12/06/2012). The networks’ main objective is to follow up and influence the EU policies in Central America and Mexico. In CIFCA we find development and human rights NGOs, think tanks, solidarity networks as well as, individuals working as academics or consultants (CIFCA, web-page). The CIFCA concentrates its analysis and lobbying efforts on three broad themes, namely, EU-Latin American/Mexican relations, human rights, natural resources and food security (Ibid.). The AAAs fall under the first theme but there is no clear gender equality perspective in the way CIFCA structures its thematic topics. The CIFCA works closely with the other networks; APRODEV Advocacy Programme on Central America (PICA), Grupo Sur (with organisations from Spain and Italy), ALOP and the European NGO confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD) (Ibid.). The three networks, ALOP, APRODEV and Oxfam-Solidariteit all form part of CIFCA and their coordinated efforts within this constellation are divided in three thematic work-groups, namely, the EU’s development related policies, impunity in Central America as well as Mexico and Natural resources in this region (Daag, Interview, 12/06/2012).

**Oxfam-Solidariteit**

This is a local Oxfam affiliation in Belgium with its main office in Brussels. It forms part of Oxfam as an international confederation with 17 organizations networked together in over 90 countries. The confederation presents itself as part of a “global movement for change, to build a future free from the injustice of poverty” (Oxfam International, web-page). Oxfam International’s strategic plan 2007-2012 focused on four key issues,
namely; economic justice (focusing on secure and stable livelihoods), essential services (concentrating on the Millennium Development Goals), rights in crisis (protection and assistance to people affected by humanitarian crisis) and gender justice (aiming towards changes in attitudes, beliefs and ideas about gender relations) (Oxfam International, 2007). In this organizational context, Oxfam-Solidariteit in Brussels works together with the other networks mentioned above to campaign to the public and lobby the EU decision makers around social-justice issues related to the AAs.

To summarise, all of the organised civil society actors I interviewed in Brussels are networks of CSOs of between 16 and 40 organisations. These networks all form part of CIFCA and in relation to Central America and Mexico they work together in three thematic work-groups; the EU’s development related policies, impunity and natural resources.

*Gender Equality*

Out of these networks APRODEV is the one that has put the most emphasis on gender and trade related issues in their campaigning. Nevertheless, their geographical focus when working with these issues has not been Latin America, but rather, Sub-Saharan Africa in relation to the EPAs (Ulmer, Karin, Interview, 11/06/2012). Karin Ulmer, APRODEV’s policy officer for trade and gender, said that by focusing on the export sector one excludes 85% of the population and she sees gender as a way of addressing social issues that are not taken into account in the EU’s EPAs and AAs. She also emphasizes the importance of linking macro level (international agreements) with the meso level (national government) when analysing the situation of gender equality. Moreover, Ulmer stressed the link between food security and gender equality, especially in a context in which people depend heavily upon natural recourses. She told me that “the poorer you are the more you depend on natural recourses” (Ulmer, Interview, 11/06/2012).

Erik Van Mele, policy officer at Oxfam-Solidariteit, criticises free trade agreements and privatisation of social services. He also links this process to gender inequality, since the cutting of and increased charges of social services, such as, education and healthcare affect women more than men in view of the fact that women tend to be
responsible for coordinating these services in the families. This means that the macro
economic liberalisation model causes work overload for the women (Van Mele,
Interview, 20/06/2012). Here, Van Mele’s position links to academic discussions of
gender and development in which Elson has argued that “lack of attention to the
domestic sector in economic policy-making is particularly harmful to women, since
they currently have the responsibility for managing this sector” (Elson, 2000, p.28).
Moreover, the unpaid domestic sector “cannot be treated as a bottomless well, able
to provide the care needed regardless of the resources it gets from the other sectors”
(ibid, p.28). Van Mele continued by emphasising how rural women are often heavily
burdened with work since they do productive work, for example agriculture, fetch
potable water for domestic use and fuel wood for cooking, as well as reproductive
work, such as, care for children and the sick. Moreover they usually do volunteer work,
for instance by contributing with labour to communal events (Van Mele, Interview,
20/06/2012).

The CIFCA representative in Brussels, Susanna Daag, wished for trade and gender
issues to be more closely linked in the campaigning of the network (Daag, Interview,
12/06/2012). Even so, it is not the case that the CIFCA does not work with anything
related to gender, but the network has focused more work for women’s rights in the
area of feminicide, rather than economic rights (CIFCA, web-page). In the case of
ALOP, the association works actively to mainstream gender perspective in its plans,
projects and strategies. This does for example involve information and training to the
associated member organisations. The key themes for gender equality in ALOP’s 2011-
2014 plan is; women’s right to land, the fight against gendered violence, gender and
communication, women’s rights, gender and migration and women’s participation in
decision making (ALOP, 2011A). In spite of a real effort to mainstream a gender
perspective within ALOP, the association’s campaigning and lobbying efforts in
relation to the AAs have not emphasised the link between gender and trade
(Hernandez, Interview, 12/06/2012). The representative of the ALOP “antenna” group
in Brussels, referred me to ALOP’s director of gender policy in Peru, Molvina Zevallos
for further information on the CSO’s work on gender equality (Hernandez, Interview,
12/06/2012). Regardless of some lack of engagement with gender in relation to trade,
all representatives at the four networks I interviewed in Brussels see working towards gender equality as a goal and identify with the concept of gender. This is relevant because it was not the case with the CSOs that I interviewed in Guatemala, but I will come back to that later in this chapter.

The European development CSOs take a gender perspective when analysing the implications of the EU development and trade policies, focusing on food security and work overload or time poverty for women due to EU backed trade liberalisation and privatization. The CSO representatives put more emphasis on gender equality in relation to trade than the EU officials I interviewed, but nevertheless, both the EU and the CSOs seem to share a similar understanding of what is meant by gender equality and use the same kind of terminology.

**Sustainable Development from different perspectives**

The development CSOs in Brussels also share a common understanding of sustainable development with DG Trade and this definition includes social, economic and environmental aspects. The DG Trade sees sustainable development as an inclusive process and have meetings with CSOs on a regular basis through a platform for civil society participation (DG-trade, Interview, 19/06/12). Nonetheless, the CSOs criticise the so-called *Europe 2020* strategy, which according to the EU promotes a smart, inclusive and sustainable growth as well as aiming at a “greener and more competitive economy” (*Europe 2020*, EC web-page). The European development CSOs claim that the *Europe 2020* strategy focuses excessively on trade and export led economy and moreover, CSOs, such as APRODEV, argues that the EU put too much emphasis on economic growth (APRODEV, 2011, p.6). Their own understanding of development is not limited GDP increase. The APRODEV representatives mention the EU’s *Aid for Trade* project in Nicaragua as an example of the heavy focus on export led growth. Furthermore, the representatives for the various CSO networks maintain that the EU liberalisation development approach is not compatible with reality (Ulmer, 11/06/2012 and Van Mele, 20/06/2012, Interviews).

In the case of international cooperation with Central America, Susanna Daag at CIFCA contends that the EU neglects the long-term socio-economic development and that “much of the EU’s development politics is assigned to substantiate the trade
agreements” (Daag, Interview, 12/06/2012). Daag said “long-term socio-economic development drops out” from the EU policy agenda since the focus lies on implementing the trade agreement, budget support, judicial system assistance and green economy projects (Daag, Interview, 12/06/2012). In other words Daag argues that despite that the commission includes socio-economic development in its definition of sustainable development, it neglects it in practise.

All the Brussels based development CSO networks discussed above, together with two others - Grupo Sur and Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos- Accion Colombia (Oidhaco) - published a paper called ‘EU Trade Agreements with Central America, Colombia and Peru: Roadblocks for sustainable development’ (ALOP, 2011b). In the paper the networks argue that, “the agreements foster increasing dependency on exports of raw materials, intensifying the pressure on land and water” (Ibid. p.4). In relation to this situation, the networks draw attention to how the result of this competition for land and water is “greater food insecurity and social instability at the national and regional level and violations of rights of the most vulnerable people” (Ibid.p.4). This group of networks also wrote a paper about agrofuels and free trade agreements between the EU, Colombia, Peru and Central America. In the paper the networks give examples of several human rights abuses across Guatemala due to agrofuel production (ALOP, 2011C, p.6-8). In the paper it is stated that “agrofuel production is associated with various troubling human rights violations such as forced displacement, violent and illegal evictions, and violations to the right to dignified work and to food” (Ibid.p.9) Moreover, the networks argue that the biofuel production has a negative impact on fragile ecosystems in Central America and therefore affects the biodiversity as well as indigenous peoples due to pressure on their territories and their ways of life (Ibid.p.9) The agrofuel production is part of the EU’s so called ‘green economy’ strategy.

The ALOP representative in Brussels, Gustavo Hernandez, stresses that the European green economy strategies fit well in with the present-day multilateral development focus. The CSO participation in EU development policymaking “is as if the CSOs are

28 The European Environmental Agency (EEA) define green economy as “one (economy) that generates increasing prosperity while maintaining the natural systems that sustain us” in EEA, Green Economy, http://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/economy/intro [Online: 11/03/2013].
playing on a football field with the rules already made up” (Hernandez, Interview, 12/06/2012). In other words, there is no room for critical debate that questions the economic model for development. Hernandez also values the contribution of buen vivir and believes that this model resolves some of the major problems with sustainable development. The problems he refers to come from Western way of thinking and relate to focus on the individual and endless growth (Ibid.). These views overlap with the views of some of the CSO representatives I interviewed in Guatemala. Hernandez metaphor about playing a game with the rules already made up by the EU summarises much of these CSOs’ work in Brussels. All of the policy officers and representatives that I interviewed expressed a similar frustration about their dialogues with the EU institutions. Despite the EU’s work to promote human rights, women’s rights specifically and sustainable development the framework in which this promotion takes place still remains a liberal capitalist one. In this sense the development organisations’ aspirations towards social justice are constrained by the rules of the game that promote free trade agreements with developing countries and sees green economy as a way to work towards sustainability.

CSOs in Guatemala

In Guatemala I talked to representatives from various kinds of CSOs in order to listen to different perspectives. Some of these Guatemalan organisations are in the centre of the civil society space where as others are participating in the margins of it. For the purpose of this research I chose to interview actors that in one way or another work with women’s economic rights, in order to get the perspective of people who work with gender equality issues that can be related to trade. I interviewed indigenous as well as ethnically mixed organisations, all women’s as well as mixed organisations with both men and women among their members. In this sense the choice of organisations reflect the intersectional perspective that I apply in this research. I also chose to interview cooperatives (two women’s cooperatives and one mixed) since the these form part of a sector that the AA presents as an environment in which women’s economic participation could be strengthened and expanded.

The number of NGOs has continued to grow in Guatemala since late 1980s and some would argue that these have professionalized according to demands of funders,
leaving local, often rural NGOs with less access to financial resources, information and legal advice at the periphery. As Pearce argues “some NGOs have chosen to join the powerful and implement their policies. But others have struggled with this, and a few have opted for relative poverty in order to maintain their integrity” (Pearce, 2010, p.633).

Cooperatives/associations

Due to the violence against organisations and cooperatives throughout the Guatemalan civil war and to some extent still today, cooperatives often name themselves associations because of the leftist connotation that the word cooperative has (Mendizabal, Interview, 22/08/2012). The cooperatives/associations that I interviewed are; Cooperativa Integral de Ahorro y Credito (COPEM, R.L.), Artesanos de San Juan and the Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya. I decided to focus on cooperatives in the area of Sololá since this region of Guatemala is well known for its women’s cooperatives, especially handy craft (mainly textile) cooperatives. These fall into the category of micro, small and medium sized enterprise (MSMEs) that is identified as a sector that can contribute “to social cohesion through poverty reduction and job creation” in the AA (Article 70, Part III). In the AA-pillar on International cooperation the, “Parties agree to promote the competitiveness and insertion of rural and urban MSMEs and their representative organisations, in the international markets” (Ibid.). Due to the way the MSMEs are presented as a way forward for poor people in rural as well as in urban areas, I believe that it is important to hear some of the voices of women in these enterprises and learn about their views on the topics of trade, sustainability and gender equality.

In order to identify key women representatives within the cooperative movement in Guatemala who I could interview, I participated as an observer in a workshop29 at the research institute Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO). The workshop was intended for women who are active members in cooperatives linked to the Guatemalan Confederation of Cooperatives (CONFECOOP), and focused on gender mainstreaming in the confederation. Through this workshop I got to meet some of

29 The workshop was called "Desarrollo local con enfoque de equidad" and took place in Guatemala City on August 29th, 2012.
the key women leaders in the Guatemalan cooperative movement. One of them was Gliceria Saquic Batz who is the President of the national cooperative movement’s women’s committee (CNMC) and who is also the representative of the cooperative COPEM, R.L.

COPEM, R.L.

COPEM was founded in 2002 and is a cooperative with 800 members of which 453 are women. It is located in a village called Aldea El Novillero in the Solola region of Guatemala. Before this there was only one other savings and credit cooperative in the region, but the villagers of El Novillero did not feel comfortable going there since nobody spoke their language (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). Below is a photo of the cooperative’s bylaws booklet with a picture of the COPEM office.

Figure 5 COPEM

Source: COPEM, RL, Bylaws, 2007
Saquic Batz explains how it used to be the case that,

“the men did not let the women participate, the women prepared the lunch and then served lunch to the participants of the assembly (...) the women were really not in the assembly but then we made a small suggestion that we should not make lunch”. Saquic Batz continues “in the assembly the council of the administration, the commission of surveillance and other committees are chosen, some (men) said that this lady, but then the board of directors said, no we are sorry but we do not want women because women are very occupied, this intimidated the women. Sometimes women said well if you give me the opportunity then maybe (I could participate) but then they (the men) said well are you willing to travel to the city because we travel by night and sometimes if your husband does not give you permission. So, they intimidated the women so that they would not actually take responsibility. Then the women said oh no I cannot go to the city, I do not know where to go and how to find my way in the streets and avenues, and my husband does not give me permission at night”. Saquic Batz adds “this was something absurd since meetings never are held at night” (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12).30

By 2009, three women managed to get elected to executive posts in COPEM and these women leaders also got involved in the national women’s committee of CONFECOOP and this has additionally given these women access to UN-Women training sessions (Ibid.). By 2011 the women in COPEM formed a Women’s Committee in the cooperative (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). The other entities in the organisation are the committee for credit, the security commission and the board of directors (COPEM, R.L. p.18). The struggle that these women went through in order to be able to participate exemplifies some of the difficulties that women (especially in rural areas) experience in Guatemala due to the existing gender hierarchies.

The basic idea behind the cooperative is that members deposit their savings in COPEM and then other members borrow money from the cooperative. The representative, Saquic Batz, said the cooperative is built on the idea of mutual aid and trust between its members. She explained how “…the person who brings his deposit helps out in order for credits to be given, and in turn the person who takes out credit has to accomplish his part to the person who trusted and came to deposit his money” (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). COPEM is not a CSO that campaign as such, but a

30 Author translation.
cooperative from which women and men can lend money without paying high interests to profit making business. This cooperative makes an interesting case since the Parties in the AA state how microcredit and microfinance “generate autonomous employment and prove to be an effective instrument to help overcome poverty” (Article 71, Part III).

*Artesanos de San Juan*

This association was legally formed in 1988, on the volcano slopes next to Lake Atitlan, with the help of Liana Ward, a development activist from the US (Artesanos de San Juan, web page). Ward assisted the local women with organisational skills and marketing. In the beginning the association had 16 members, of which two were men who administered the group (Ibid.). The other members were all women weavers and today the women who work within the association make up a total of 75 (Artesanos de San Juan, Interview with representative, 05/09/12). Some of these women are in the picture below.

*Figure 6 Artisan from San Juan la Laguna*

Source: Artesanos de San Juan web-page:

Today there are only women members, including the administrators. The women weave many kinds of products with back-strap and foot-loom techniques and export to one store in the US. Some of the former members of the association left and held onto other contacts of clients in Canada and Finland. This has increased the competition between different artisan textile producing groups of women in San Juan La Laguna (Artesanos de San Juan, Interview with representative, 05/09/12). Except for creating an income for the women who weave, the members of Artesanos de San Juan state that they “want to rescue, value and conserve our tzútujil culture and our work as artisans” (Artesanos de San Juan, web page).

Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya
This association is based by Lake Atitlan near the village San Juan La Laguna in a small town called San Pedro La Laguna. The name of the association can be translated to ‘community development by a beautiful lake’.31 A group of men in the town founded the association in 2002, and their main focus at the time was to work with conservation of the Lake Atitlan. By 2007 the members left the association and the daughter of one of the founders, Wendy Navichoc, took over the leadership. Currently, there are six persons who run the association of which five are women; the only man is the founder (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012).

Navichoc says,

“my dad’s side of the family is from San Pedro la Laguna, and I have been basically here the last 17 years of my life, when I finished my studies in Guatemala (City) I moved here to live with my grandparents”. She continues, “my profession is within tourism and for a I long time I thought that I only wanted to do projects with tourism but the truth is that for the community to work with tourism, there are other fundamental needs that had to be addressed first, before an adequate tourism business could be set up. So, I took over the documents of the association to put it that way and began to create it physically right, making an office, looking for staff...” (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012).32

31 Ja’bel’ya is a Tz’utujil word that can be translated as beautiful lake.
32 Author translation.
The Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya now runs two programs, one that create job opportunities through production and a second one that focuses on the environment. In other words the association work both with gender equality through programmes that improve women’s economic rights and with sustainability in their programs on the environment. Navichoc’s words also tell us something about the difficulties of setting up a business in conditions of poverty. The women involved did not take part in the AA negotiations and were not aware of the AA. Nevertheless, Navichoc says,

“the only agreement that I know about, is CAFTA that we have between Central America and the US. Here they (Ministry of Public Finance) gave us a training and well I researched some because they left us the book in which it says practically everything. If you want to send a product, procedures and everything. The truth is that I do not see the benefit, because (...) the few associations that I know that send their products make a big effort, a big sacrifice in order to get the product out and then we see that in the country enter another five that lower the local production. Navichoc continues, “we are in a small country that want to get to a big country while they, the big ones easily enter in the small countries”. She ends, “surely there are things that we have not managed to understand (about FTAs), surely there will be benefits that we will get to see, in a way like, here is where the benefit is, but then I still say no because of lack of information. In the sense that at governmental level here no one in the country nor in the community will come to you and say in a clear way (...) look if you produce this much with all the conditions that they impose, the benefit for the community will be this much. No one tells you this, right, so one has to go venturing with one’s own means and this is not cheap at all” (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012).  

The frustration that Navichoc expresses about the market and FTAs links to Julissa Felipe’s, adviser on access to market issues at the Administrative Directorate of External Trade (DACE), experiences. In response to whether FTAs improve the situations of poor people in Latin America Felipe says,

“one of the main focuses that one should give is that the people first know what these (FTAs) are for and how they may help me, the instruments exists and there could be 10, 20 or 30 association agreements with different countries, but if the

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33 Author translation.
necessary focus does not take place, our country will continue to be the same. I think it is one out of many tools to reduce poverty in our countries but it does not advance on its own…” (Felipe, Interview, 17/09/12)

Furthermore, Felipe identifies low level of education among the work force in Guatemala as a difficulty when trying to benefit from FTAs. She also pointed out how the multi-lingual situation in the country is challenging when spreading information about the FTAs. She says, “it is a weakness that all the workshops are in Spanish since all of us who are here as trainers we only speak Spanish, we do not know other languages” (Ibid.). In fact lack of cultural diversity, racism and discrimination appears to be a big problem within the Ministry of Finance which DACE forms part of (MINECO, Interview, 17/09/12).

In Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya the women actively try to work with issues of diversity and therefore gender equality and interculturalism are two mainstreamed themes that work across all of their programs. One of the working areas where the association coordinators actively promote the ideas of interculturalism is within education. Intercultural education goes “beyond passive coexistence, to achieve a developing and sustainable way of living together in multicultural societies through the creation of understanding of, respect for and dialogue between the different cultural groups” (UNESCO,2006, p.18).

The Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya educators work with 35 children from age five to age twelve and teach them about, for instance, their language, clothing, and traditional dances. Intercultural education in this context means giving the children a locally oriented education that relates to their culture, as a complement to the formal education that does not include this part (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012). This is something which indigenous intellectuals promote across Abaya Yala and through the Indigenous Intercultural University Amwatay Wasi (Mignolo, 2013).

Parallel to working with the children, Asociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya tries to offer their mothers’ sources of income, since many of them are struggling financially and have problems paying for healthcare and their children’s education. Many of the
men in San Pedro La Laguna do not have a stable job and make very small earnings (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012). This association is an example of a local initiative that supports women’s economic development and links people’s well-being to environmental issues. Except for these local initiatives in the Sololá region I also interviewed people working within national and regional organisations. These larger organisations differ from the local ones in the sense that they have better access to information, funding and other kinds of resources. These larger organisations all have their main offices in the capital, where as the smaller organisations described above are based in the villages where the members live and work.

National Guatemalan CSOs

These nationwide organisations all have their main offices in Guatemala City and campaign for issues related to the AA, such as women’s economic rights and indigenous peoples right to control over territory and natural resources. The women’s organisations I interviewed are; Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVISMA), Foro de Mujeres para la Integracion Centroamericana (FMICA), and the Unión Nacional de Mujeres Guatemaltecas (UNAMG). The national indigenous peasant organisation I interviewed is called Coordinadora Nacional Indígena y Campesina (CONIC).

CONAVISMA
Widows from across Guatemala formed this organisation in 1988 during the armed conflict. Many of the women had lost their husbands and other family members in the civil war but others had lost their close ones due to for example diseases. The women got threatened by Guatemalan armed forces, who asked them to stop participating in protests against the killings and forced disappearances. Nevertheless, the CONAVISMA women kept fighting and rather than getting silences due to threats, they extended their struggle to include other social, political and economic injustices (CONAVISMA, web-page). Most of CONAVISMAS’s activities focus on improving the lives of indigenous women in rural areas, since these were the women who suffered most violence and repression, mainly from the state armed forces during the civil war. Nevertheless, the widows’ organisation welcomes the participation of Latinas, young
and old women who are not widows, as well as women based in urban areas (CONAVIGUA, web-page).

The women organised in CONAVIGUA struggle for equality between men and women, as well as between indigenous and ladino people. Moreover, they fight for the right to food, housing, medicines and education for themselves, their children and their families. Other issues that these women struggle for are the right to know what happened in the cases of the forced disappearances during the civil war, women’s political participation and for the international cooperation to be rightly used, and not end up in the pockets of a few people within institutions (CONAVIGUA, web-page). Today the organisation runs five programs, namely; the youth program, the justice and dignity program, the training and information program and *el programa organizativo*\(^{35}\). The widows in CONAVIGUA used to focus on individual and collective human rights, but now these women’s struggle also includes issues around the defence of mother earth and territory. CONAVIGUA’s strategic plan and the programs are in transition due to the Mayan cosmovision and the Mayan calendar. Therefore it is likely that there will be some changes taking place (CONAVIGUA, Interview, 21/09/12).

**UNAMG**

This is a women’s organisation with indigenous and Latina women that also was founded in the early 1980s. Several of the early members had to leave Guatemala due to the military repression and returned from the exile after the peace accords were signed in 1996. The secretary of the board of directors at the time, Silvia Gálvez, disappeared (Bocel, Interview, 25/09/12). In other words, the women in UNAMG have a personal and close relation to Guatemala’s violent past. In fact the members still receive threats due to their work, and their office was broken into and computers and files were stolen back in June 2006 (Amnesty International, web-page). The organisation describes itself as a “feminist, autonomous organisation, made up of women of diverse ethnicities, who are committed to social, political and cultural transformation. Seeking a just, fair and democratic society”\(^{34}\) (UNAMG, web-page).

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\(^{34}\) Within this program the women lead town meetings, discuss the political situation at local, national and international level as well as organise other women
Within UNAMG they work with three programs; Citizenship Participation and Politics, Non-Violence and Peace Building as well as Economic Justice. There are also two specialised teams; one in communication and the other in research. Moreover, UNAMG works with training as a crosscutting theme, based on a dialectic understanding of popular education. Meaning that the training also involves women constructing politics (Bocel, Interview, 25/09/12).

**FMICA**

This is another organisation of women working for economic justice. FMICA is a regional Central American network however and forms part of the Consultative Committee of the Central American Interaction System (CC-SICA). FMICA’s role is to promote regional integration from women’s perspective and to include this in different policy areas, such as, violence, migration, illegal adoptions and labour relations (Maldonado, Interview, 18/09/12). FMICA started in 1995, when women responded to the lack of women’s expression and representation in the Central American regional integration, and from 1997 the network forms part of the CC-SICA. FMICA is made up of 26 Guatemalan organisations, 38 Nicaraguan ones, 27 Honduran member organisations, 33 Costa Rican ones, and 11 Panamanian organisations (FMICA, 2010, p8).

**CONIC**

CONIC was formed in 1992, when indigenous peasants broke out of the Guatemalan national peasant organisation, Comité de Unidad Campesina (CUC), with the aim of creating their own autonomous and indigenous organisation. Now, more than 600 villages are active in CONIC across 16 out of the 22 departments in Guatemala. The formation of CONIC was a response to “domination, exploitation and discrimination of the indigenous peoples, by the state and the Guatemalan oligarchy. With the aim of promoting a movement of social, economic, political and cultural transformation, working towards a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual and including rule of law”37 (CONIC, web-page).
The actions that CONIC takes as an organisation are based around the respect for Mother Earth and the importance of Mayan Cosmovisión for living in harmony with nature and natural recourses. Moreover, CONIC promotes grassroots mobilisation and the strengthening of its women members’ political participation (CONIC, web-page).

To sum up, all of the CSOs I interviewed work for women’s economic rights in one way or another. Not all of them had an understanding of the AAs however. As expected, the national CSOs (and Central American in the case of FMICA) have more access to information and better knowledge about the AAs, than the local associations do. CONAVIGUA and UNAMG fight for people’s rights to find out the truth about forced disappearances and for the imprisonment of human rights offenders from the armed conflict. These organisations as well as CONIC fight for indigenous people’s rights to natural resources and for the respect for nature. These organisations also share a view of sustainability based on buen vivir and therefore very different to that of sustained economic growth promoted through the AA. FMICA is different from the other CSOs because it is a Central American network of organisations and because its...
representatives actively participated in the space for CSOs that the EU provided during the AA negotiations. One of the key questions of this thesis is how trade and sustainable development is gendered and through this research I examine this question at micro, meso as well as macro level. A better understanding of the Guatemalan CSOs views on issues of trade, gender and sustainability also help us connect the issues of international trade (macro) to the everyday lives of Guatemalans (micro).

Gender Equality

*Women in cooperatives: local perspectives*

At the association for credits and savings, COPEM, R.L the women have a clear understanding of gender equality in practice from their own personal experiences as members of the association. Moreover, one of their expressed goals is to empower more women cooperative members (Saquic Batz, Interview).

In the workshops that the Women’s Committee within this cooperative organises, the leaders focus firstly on strengthening the women’s self-confidence, and secondly on how to increase women’s active participation in COPEM, R.L. (Ibid.). As such most women in the cooperative do not identify with gender as a term but fight in order to take part in the decision making processes and to have access to resources.

The representative at Artesanos de San Juan defines gender equality as “that they treat us (women) as equals” (Artesanos de San Juan, Interview with representative). Moreover, she adds a class perspective when she mentions equality “between women and men is fine but (it is needed) also in trade, we have not been treated as equals. Big companies benefit more and this way there is not gender equality”35 (Ibid.) Overall, the association has a positive outlook on the advances in the area of gender equality and she remarks on how much things have improved over the last five years (Artesanos de San Juan, Interview with representative).

Wendy Navichoc, the representative at Acociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya explained that gender equality is not an issue within the association since all the work is being done by women. She continued by saying that “here we as women have to do

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35 Author translation.
everything; carry heavy things, paint, clean, so in other words we do not see that difference (between men and women) here”. Nevertheless, the women in the association see the need to work towards gender equality outside of their own group, such as in the community and on municipal level (Navichoc, Wendy, Interview). With gender equality they refer to them (as women) being taken into account and not excluded. Wendy mentions two examples to illustrate successful outcomes of their gender equality efforts; firstly, one woman from the board of directors of the association is now a participant with the right to vote in the Community Development Council (COMODE)36. Secondly, the local fishermen organize cleaning campaigns to improve the water quality of the lake together with the women in the Acociacion de Desarrollo Comunal Jabelya (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/12). It becomes clear from talking to Wendy that the women in the association want to be listened to and their views to be taken into account in local decision-making. This active participation and mutual respect is what they see as gender equality (Ibid.).

Overall, the women cooperative representatives I talked to are positive about the advances when it comes to gender equality. This does not mean that they still do not have much left to fight for however. Saquic Batz at COPEM, R.L. for example, mentions how it is still the case that women work the land with their husbands from five in the morning to seven o’clock in the evening. Nonetheless, the men own the land and the cultivation, so the women do the physical work with the men, but without having any power. Due to this situation, Saquic Batz, sees the agricultural sector as an area where there is a lot left to do before achieving gender equality (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). The above views are based on local experiences in these women’s lives. Now this chapter moves on to presenting the views encountered among the CSOs that work in different parts of Guatemala and have their main offices in the capital. These national organisations have better access to information as well as resources and therefore have more understanding of the AAs.

36 There is a critique arguing that, despite the decentralisation attempts and the creation of the COMODES, all the planning and financing for development is still in the hands of government- appointed Departmental Development Councils (COCODES) and district governors. See McNeish, J. ‘Beyond the Permitted Indian? Bolivia and Guatemala in an Era of Neoliberal Developmentalism’, Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 March 2008, p. 44
**National CSOs**

The women from CONAVIGUA’s national board of directors explain that they have discussed the concept of gender together with other members at meetings. International donors have suggested that the organisation take on board the concept of gender equality, but the women do not want to this, at least not yet. These representatives further explain that “in CONAVIGUA we are struggling to improve women’s situation, make them aware of their [Online, 04/03/2013] rights and improve their dignity. This is what we are fighting for in CONAVIGUA, improving women’s life situations and not directly talking of gender, since women still have not got to where we want to be. Some of us are getting to understand the word gender, but there are only a few of us...” Here it becomes clear that foreign organisations have introduced the concept of gender to the CONAVIGUA women, but these mainly indigenous women do not truly identify with this way of thinking, and therefore they prefer to continue to phrase their struggle as a struggle to improve the lives of women. Whereas most of the women in CONAVIGUA are indigenous, many of the women active in FMICA are Latinas and this is also the case of the representatives. Despite these ethnic differences, the two women’s organisations share a common understanding of what to focus on in their work on women’s rights.

Miriam Maldonado at FMICA also puts emphasis on women’s dignity, just like the women in CONAVIGUA. She says that “we need (Guatemalan) society to become conscious of that we (the women) have equality in terms of rights, but foremost that we have dignity as women, we are as worthy as any other human being” (Maldonado, Interview, 18/09/2012). Miriam adds that in Guatemala women are officially equal to men in terms of the law, the constitution and the political system. This is not the case in real life however. Therefore FMICA sees dignity as so important, because “if they recognize our dignity, and we have our worth, then they will recognise the equality”(Ibid.).

Moreover, Miriam mentions all the violence against women as a sign of that they are not treated as worthy human beings. She reminds us of that many women in Guatemala are mutilated and murdered by their husbands, boyfriends and ex-boyfriends. For example, in 2008, over 700 women were murdered in Guatemala and many of these women had also suffered from brutal sexual abuse and torture before
getting killed. Between 2001 and 2009 there had been more than 500 femicides\textsuperscript{37} per year in Guatemala (World Health Organisation, 2012). The women in UNAMG do not like to organize their work around the concept of gender equality, because they believe that women and men are different. By talking about gender equality we do not question an androcentric world in which the man is in the centre, according to Petronila Bocel at UNAMG. Therefore, UNAMG argues that men should accept women with the ‘differences that makes us distinct from them’ (Bocel, Interview, 25/09/12).

The CONIC representative, Juan Tiney, also focuses on the equilibrium and the participation of women, as supposed to gender equality. First and foremost women’s participation is valued in CONIC, because women represent fifty per cent of the organisation’s strength. Without women’s participation CONIC would lose strength to fight against the enemy and to sustain the communities’ own development (Tiney, Interview, 13/09/12).

From the interviews it became clear that these CSOs focus on the issue of dignity for women and improved participation of women, rather than on gender equality. CONIC, for example, stresses the importance of strengthening women’s organisational and political participation, but does not use the term gender in their manifesto (CONIC, p.10) CONAVIGUA focuses on the struggle for peace, dignity and unity between women and does not present these issues in terms of gender equality (CONAVIGUA, web-page). Nevertheless, UNAMG aims at strengthening women’s social movement and convert it into a social actor capable of transforming gender relations as well as improving women’s life conditions (UNAMG, web-page). So, in other words UNAMG does to some extent frame their struggle in terms of gender equality. FMICA formulated an ‘Agenda for gender equality in the Central American integration’ \textsuperscript{38}(FMICA, 2007, p.7), but their representative in Guatemala, Maldonado, rather highlight dignity for women and enhanced participation of women as goals (Maldonado, interview, 18/09/2012).

\textsuperscript{37} Femicide differs from male homicide in specific ways. For example, most cases of femicide are committed by partners or ex-partners, and involve ongoing abuse in the home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where women have less power or fewer resources than their partner” (World Health Organisation, 2012, p 1).

\textsuperscript{38} “Agenda para la Equidad de Género en la Integración Centroamericana”
Sustainable Development

Women in cooperatives: local perspectives

Neither the women in COPEM R.L nor the women in Artesanos de San Juan seem familiar with the concept of sustainable development, the way that it is defined by the Bruntland Commission. When asked to describe their views of the concept both representatives focused on the economic aspects of their business (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12 and Artesanos de San Juan, Interview, 05/09/12). Wendy Navichoc in San Pedro La Laguna also talks of sustainable development in economic terms, and she mentions that if the cooperative can generate enough funds, the women employed can do better financially, improve their education level and this does also benefit their children.

Despite the focus on sustainable development in terms of funding, the women in these cooperatives do practise a wider concept of sustainability. For example, some women in COPEM R.L produce eco-friendly products for sale. Such as, bags and other things made out of waste as well as bowls made out of pine needles (Saquic Batz, Interview, 03/09/12). The women in the association Artesanos de San Juan La Laguna make a conscious effort not to waste clean water and use rain-water for cleaning purposes. Besides this, the women in San Juan la Laguna practice sustainable agriculture by growing vegetables in family gardens for self-consumption. For this the women only use natural fertilisers and a medicinal plant with a strong smell as a non-chemical pesticide (Artesanos de San Juan, Interview, 05/09/12).

Navichoc in Asociación Jabelya gives an integrated view of how she and the other women in the association understand sustainable development. She says,

“we see sustainable development as something that should be integrated; for example our programs provide intercultural education and with this education we could manage to conserve the environment. With the conservation of the environment, and the participation of women, we could have better productive chains and this would improve the quality of life in this town” (Navichoc, Interview, 04/09/2012).
Asociación Jabelya has a drawing that represents the philosophy of the organisation that includes environmental, economic and social aspects. The drawing is based around the four cardinal points, where the North represents an appropriate environment with a volcano covered in forest, a clean lake and clean town (comunidad) with well-managed resources. The South embodies children who are educating themselves, because it is the future generations that will maintain these four cardinal points. East gets to be a symbol of healthy recreation that creates a better society and better cohabitation. West, finally, represents the whole family with children, a woman who participates, a man who participates adequately and gives love to the family (Ibid.). This image also brings us back to the point of

**Figure 8 Jabelya Association**

![Image](image.png)

This image visualises the image that Navichoc describes, See: http://jabelya.blogspot.co.uk/

equality perceived as complementarily between men and women, and respect for women playing their role different from men’s.

*National and regional perspectives*

The representatives from CONAVIGUA explain how they combine a literacy programme with a food program. The latter program was set up because the women who were learning how to read and write expressed how it difficult for them to use so
much time with the alphabetisation, explaining that they had to eat and work as well. Due to this CONAVIGUA began to introduce training in how to cultivate cabbage, beetroots, radishes, cucumber and other vegetables, in combination with the reading and writing. This is a program that the representatives highlight as one that promotes sustainable development.

Miriam Maldonado who represents FMICA in Guatemala presents sustainable development as a kind of development that can be practised at two levels. At the micro level cooperatives and small producers can develop auto sustainable productive projects. Whereas, at the national level a country can commit to promoting development without having a negative impact on the ecosystem or the biodiversity. Miriam also includes women’s autonomy in the economic production as well as social security and labour standards in the concept of sustainable development (Maldonado, Interview, 18/09/12).

The women in UNAMG are critical of the word development since they see it as being the same as developing countries becoming equal to industrialised countries. This is not the way to move forward according to the UNAMG program coordinator Petronila Bocel. She states that her and the other women in UNAMG are “constructing our vision of the world, which is different from that of development” (Bocel, Interview, 25/09/2012). Moreover, UNAMG uses the term sustainability, when referring to when women convert to political subjects and begin working towards transformation, as supposed to simply reflecting upon how bad the situation is (Ibid.). Concepts that UNAMG emphasises, rather than sustainable development, are food security, food sovereignty and buen vivir.

In CONIC the representative, Juan Tiney, also emphasises food security and buen vivir. In relation to this he criticises the export-oriented economy arguing that a sustainable development “only is possible if each country consumes what it produces” (Tiney, Interview, 13/09/12). Moreover, Juan and the other members in CONIC are critical of the export-oriented economy because they believe that it causes over-exploitation of the land and leads to the destruction of mother earth for the sake of making money. Juan says that “the sustainability that I am seeing is a human sustainability, sustainability of nature, but if they (the EU and US officials) see it from the economic
sustainability, that produces things cheaper. In this sense I believe that we have two ways of thinking and two visions that are completely different…” (ibid.)

None of the cooperatives or the national CSOs appears to use the term sustainable development. When asked to define the concept, the Asociación Jabelya gave a definition similar to the CSOs based in Brussels. Similar in the sense that it includes economic, environmental and social aspects. Both the women in the Artesanos de San Juan La Laguna and the women in CONAVIGUA mentioned growing vegetables in family gardens as a way of practising sustainable development. This local practice links in with CONIC’s focus on domestic food production and it also relates to UNAMG’s emphasis on food security and food sovereignty. Moreover, the FMICA representative, Miriam Maldonado’s understanding of sustainable development in terms of sustainable productive projects among small producers is in line with a similar way of thinking. Furthermore, FMICA’s fight for women’s economic autonomy as part of sustainable development relates to UNAMG’s struggle to make women active political subjects.

Similarities and Differences between the European and the Guatemalan CSOs.
The EU and the European development CSOs share a similar understanding of what is meant by gender equality and use the same terminology. The CSOs and the EU Commission have different views on the implications of free trade in relation to gender equality however.\(^{39}\) The understanding of the meaning of gender equality is not shared with the Guatemalan CSOs however. The CSOs based in Brussels all have gender equality as one of their explicit goals, but the Guatemalan ones focus more on women’s dignity and women’s participation as a goal. The two women’s cooperatives I interviewed by Lago Atitlan\(^{40}\) in Sololá do not question gender equality as a term, but in their discourses (for example the model with the four cardinals) women and men perform different gender roles. This makes their view similar to those of CONAVIGUA and UNAMG, who argue that women should be respected but remaining different from men and the goal is equilibrium between men and women.

Despite the different views on the concept of gender equality, the CSOs in Brussels

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\(^{39}\) This is especially true for APRODEV.

\(^{40}\) Artesanos de San Juan and Asociación Jabelya
and in Guatemala share various priorities and concerns when it comes to women’s rights. Both European CIFCA and Guatemalan FMICA have the fight against feminicide high on their agenda. Moreover, food security in relation to women, is a priority that Karin Ulmer at APRODEV in Brussels share with the women’s textile cooperative in San Juan La Laguna, with Glicerio Saquic Batz at COPEM R.L in Novillero as well as with Petronila Bocel at UNAMG. The discourses on sustainable development that the CSO networks in Brussels use are structured and positioned in relation to the EU statements on the concept. This is less the case with ALOP than the European CSOs however, and it is not the case among the Guatemalan CSOs. The ALOP representative in Brussels, Gustavo Hernandez stresses the contribution of buen vivir and argues that this model resolves some of the major problems related to the concept sustainable development.

UNAMG, CONAVIGUA and CONIC all relate to the Mayan Cosmovision and this affects these organisations’ views of development and humans’ relationship with nature. This view of the world and the critique of development as a concept that follows from it do not follow the rules of the game in EU trade agreement negotiations. The European development CSO networks are critical of green economy, but they still use a similar language to the EU officials and they follow the rules. This illustrates a gap between the grassroots views in Guatemala and the more professional oriented European CSOs. To some extent the latter do what they can in the context that they operate in, they try to affect the EU to do less harm because, as Toni Sandell at APRODEV expressed, to do no harm does not fit within free market liberal trade policies (Sandell, Interview, 11/06/2012). So far the thesis has explained the objectives and methods of the research, discussed existing literature as well as provided a theoretical framework and discussions on the EU as well as the Guatemalan State and civil society actors in Brussels and Guatemala. The following chapter takes the thesis to a different section that focuses on the three AA-pillars. Chapter four explains and analyses the AA trade pillar (Part IV).
Chapter 4: the Trade Pillar

The AA is made up of three pillars, namely, first the pillar on Political dialogue (Part II) focusing on political partnership, common values, strengthening the UN and an intensified political dialogue. Secondly, the pillar on Co-operation (Part III) that aims at supporting the implementation of the agreement. This chapter offers an analysis of the third and final pillar on Trade (Part IV) and in order to do this it first outlines the key moments during the negotiation process. Thereafter, it explains the structure and contents of the agreement and finally it explores the relationship between free trade, sustainability and gender equality.

The AA Negotiation Process
In the case of the EU, the EC negotiated the ‘region-to-region’ Association Agreement with Central America. The Central American states, on the other hand, were represented by one of the countries in their region that acted as a spokesperson on a rotating basis. The first round of negotiations took place in October 2007, in San José, Costa Rica, where the Parties spelled out their expectations and engaged in exchanges of views on the three pillars of the prospect Agreement (Trade, Political Dialogue and International Cooperation). The following year, in February 2008, the negotiators met for a second round in Brussels, but this time for “text based negotiations”. These were followed up during a third round in San Salvador, El Salvador in April 2008 and this was the first time that trade issues were negotiated. The fourth round of negotiations took place in Brussels in July 2008. Then Guatemala hosted a fifth round of negotiations in October that same year thereafter the negotiators went back to Brussels for a sixth round of negotiations that took place in January 2009. A seventh round of negotiations was planned from 30 March to 3 April 2009 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, but it was provisionally suspended on 1st of April.

The collapse came when Nicaragua left the negotiation table after that the EU rejected to discuss the creation of the regional credit fund that the Nicaraguan government proposed. The EU’s refusal as well as a lack of a Central American consensus regarding the same proposal made the Nicaraguan delegation leave the negotiations. The proposed joint credit fund would have included 60 billion Euros, 90
per cent funded by the EU and 10 per cent by Central America (APRODEV, 2009). After this breakdown, the negotiations continued through an informal meeting with representatives from all Central American parties and the EU Commission in Brussels on 23 and 24 April 2009 (EEAS, 2013).

On Sunday morning June 28th 2009, the political stability was jeopardised and there was a coup d’État in Honduras and the democratically elected President at the time, José Manuel Zelaya Rosales, was overthrown by the Honduran military. The UN General Assembly stated that the coup “interrupted the democratic and constitutional order and the legitimate exercise of power in Honduras” in a resolution on June 30th 2009 (UN News Centre, 2009). At the time of the event the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also expressed his,

Strong support for the country's democratic institutions and condemns the arrest today of the constitutional President of the Republic. He urges the reinstatement of the democratically elected representatives of the country and full respect for human rights, including safeguards for the security of President Zelaya, members of his family and his government (Ban Ki-moon, 2009).

The EU external relations commissioner, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, condemned the coup as well and insisted on “all parties involved to resolve their differences peacefully and to promptly engage in political dialogue” (Willis, 2009). She did not ask for Zelaya to be reinstalled however and therefore the EU commission differed from the UN general assembly. The day after the coup, the EU executive’s external relations spokeswoman, Christiane Hohmann, expressed that "the commission attaches great importance to the finalisation of the negotiations with central America and we still hope we can do this by the end of this year" (Ibid.). Furthermore, the EU was also passive when the Honduran Congress promptly moved to swear in the leader of a rival faction of Mr Zelaya's ruling Liberal Party, Roberto Micheletti, as the new President. The lack of EU actions after the coup appears to be contradictory to the aims of the AA itself, since as stated in the pillar on Political dialogue, it aims for “promotion of democracy, peace, human rights, the rule of law, good governance” (AA, Part II, Article 12:a). Given that one
of the stated key aims of the AA is to strengthen democracy, one would have expected the EU to put pressure on the Honduran military to reinstall the country’s democratically elected president. It therefore seems as if, in this case, the Zelaya government’s left leaning politics and his cooperation with Venezuela and Cuba might have affected the EU decision not to put more pressure on the coup makers.

There were different views within the EU on this topic and the Spanish member of the EU Parliament, Willy Meyer (representing a party that sits with the European United Left group in the Parliament), asked Ms Ferrero-Waldner and the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to exclude Honduras from the Association Agreement negotiations (Willis, 2009). Also EU based SCOs criticised the EU for being passive. The SCO networks, CIFCA, FIDH, FOEE asked the EU to suspend budget support and to do an investigation of the possibility of excluding Honduras from the GSP+ framework (APRODEV et al., 2012). These requests were not met by the EU Commission however.

So, despite the coup, EU-Central America Association Agreement negotiations were concluded in 2010, during the EU/LAC Summit in Madrid. They included Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras (Panama joined the negotiations as full member at the end of the process).

The Association Agreement was initiated in Brussels in March 2011. Since then, the Parties are working to bring the text through the various steps of their respective legislative processes in order to ratify and implement the agreement. The parties signed the AA in Honduras on June 29th in 2012.
The EU and Central American delegates sign the EU-CA Association Agreement, 29 June 2012 in Tegucigalpa, Honduras during the SICA presidential summit.

Some of the CSOs in the EU and in Central America found it provocative that the delegates signed the AA on the day of the Honduran coup three years earlier (APRODEV et al., 2012). This makes it look once again as if the EU did not take the military coup against Zelaya very seriously, despite that he had been democratically elected.

As already mentioned this Agreement has three pillars and key aspects highlighted by the EU in this structure are, first, the free trade that will open up markets for goods, services, procurement, and investments in both regions. Secondly, the reinforcement of regional economic integration in Central America, which the EU hopes will “have a positive spill-over effect on the overall political integration process and contribute to the stability of the region” (EC, 2012, MEMO/12/505). Finally, the guaranteeing of the defence of human rights and the promotion of sustainable development and the trade pillar has a specific section on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’ (Ibid.).

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\(^{41}\) This photo of the delegates illustrates the low participation of women in the AA negotiations. Something which Maldonado also highlights this in her interview (18/09/12).
Structure of the AA
This opening section of the AA is a Preamble that lays out the agreement and defines key concepts. Thereafter, Part I describes the general and institutional provisions, Part II is the pillar on Political dialogue, Part III the pillar on Co-operation, Part IV is the third and final pillar on Trade and finally Part V states General and final provisions. The Preamble states that the three pillars are interdependent and based on “mutual respect, reciprocity and common interests” (AA, Preamble, Article 2:a). In the first section (Preamble) the AA document clarifies some overarching principles, such as respect for human rights and commitment to sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals. It states that “the Parties shall ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the economic, social and environmental components of sustainable development” (Article 1, Preamble, p.10). Moreover the Preamble presents the objectives as well as the institutional framework (Title II) of the AA.

Even though the objectives are promoted as bi-regional cooperation, the importance of conformity with the WTO agreements is emphasised. This conformity is to be reflected in the Trade pillar of the AA, which according to Article 2 in the Preamble should “contribute to higher economic growth, to the gradual improvement of the quality of life in both regions and to a better integration of both regions in the world economy” (AA, Preamble, Article 2). This focus on economic growth in combination with improved quality of life is contradictory to the concept of *buen vivir* and therefore questioned by various CSO in Central America as well as the EU (See for example Friends of the Earth, 2009). Moreover, one of the objectives is to nurture increased trade and investments between the Parties in the AA “taking into account special and differential treatment in order to reduce structural asymmetries existing between both regions” (AA, Preamble, Article 2:h)

*Institutional Framework*

The institutional framework of the AA is explained in the Preamble, which explains the role of the so called Association Council that is responsible for overseeing the AA’s accomplishment, implementation, as well as improvements of the relations
established between the parties under the agreement.

Table 3
Institutional framework of AA:

Joint Consultative Committee

Association Council

Sub-Committees

Association Parliamentary Committee EP-PARLACEN

Intellectual Property

Market Access & Goods

Trade & sustainable Dev.

Technical barriers to trade

Sanitary & Phyto-sanitary Measures

Customs trade facilitation

Source: Authors graphic

This Council should meet regularly at ministerial level and the time between these meetings may not exceed two years. Moreover, an Association Committee assists the Association Council with its obligations and is responsible for the general implementation of the agreement. This Committee meets once a year for a review of the implementation. Furthermore, so called Sub-Committees assist the Association Committee with its duties. These Committees also meet at least one time per year and could meet more frequently if either Party or the Association Committee requests this. Specialised Sub-Committees are ‘Market Access and Goods’, ‘Technical Barriers to Trade’, ‘Customs, Trade Facilitation, Rules of Origin’, ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’, ‘Intellectual Property’ and the ‘Board on Trade and Sustainable Development’. As part of the institutional framework there is also an Association
Parliamentary Committee with members from the European Parliament as well as from the Parlamento Centroamericano (PARLACEN). This committee has the right to request information concerning the implementation of the AA form the Association Council. Moreover the Association Council ought to inform the Parliamentary Committee of its recommendations and decisions. In return, the Committee may make recommendations to the Council.

Article 10 of the Preamble mentions the establishment and outlines the role of the so-called Joint Consultative Committee. This Committee was set up as a “consultative body of the Association Council” and “its work shall consist in submitting the opinions of civil society organisations to this Council regarding the implementation of this Agreement without prejudice to other processes in accordance with Article 11” (Article 10, Preamble, p. 20)

Article 11 in the Preamble highlights the role of civil society, stating that the Parties (countries signing the AAs) shall encourage meetings of CSO representatives from the EU as well as Central America. It is furthermore explained that these representatives make up part of the social and economic partners, academic community and NGOs.

The role of the trade pillar

The trade pillar’s main aim is to establish a free trade area by gradually eliminating tariffs for manufactured goods, fisheries as well as services, during a phase-out period that is generally 10 years42. Moreover, the first paragraph of the Trade pillar in the agreement (Part IV) highlights the consistency with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from 1994, focusing on Article XXIV, and the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) (EC, 2012, p.56). The GATT’s Article XXIV states that;

"The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise

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42 Only 4% of products have a phase out period of their tariffs of 15 years. (European Commission, 2012, p.2
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories” (WTO, 2013).

As illustrated above this GATT article encourages free trade agreements and the integration of economies between countries. The GATS was set up during the Uruguay Round negotiations (1986-1994) and entered into force in 1995. In this agreement service is defined as, “any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of government authority” (WTO, 1995, p.286). One of the objectives of the trade pillar is the liberalisation of trade in services, in line with Article V of GATS. This article allows the parties to enter into free trade agreements (Ibid. p. 288).

The table above gives a good overview of the structure of the WTO agreements. A basic understanding of this structure makes it easier to understand the following section on the role of the different Chapters in the AA trade pillar.
The outline of the trade pillar

Title I of trade pillar (Part IV) outlines the Initial Provisions and Title II explains the issues related to Trade in Goods. The first Chapter of Title II deals with ‘National Treatment and Market Access for Goods’. UNCTAD provided a study on the practice of ‘national treatment’ and provide the following definition;

National treatment can be defined as a principle whereby a host country extends to foreign investors treatment that is at least as favourable as the treatment that it accords to national investors in like circumstances. In this way the national treatment standard seeks to ensure a degree of competitive equality between national and foreign investors (UNCTAD, 1999, p.10).

This definition provides a clear understanding of what ‘national treatment’ implies. Nevertheless, I would add that ‘national treatment’ only applies once goods, services or items of intellectual property have entered the market. Consequently, it is not a violation of national treatment to charge customs duty on an import, even if locally produced products are not charged an equivalent tax (WTO, 2013b).

So, the ‘national treatment’ practice by itself does not imply non-tariff measures. The question of tariffs makes up the other part of the first chapter of Part IV on Trade, namely market access for goods. Article 86 in the Part IV on Trade in the AA states that the nation states that have signed this agreement must not prohibit or restrict either the import or the export of any good from the other states. The only exceptions to this are to be found in Article XI of GATT 1994. This Article does for example state that “export prohibitions or restrictions [can be] temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting contracting party” (WTO, 1994, Article XI, 2:a). A Sub-Committee monitors the market access for goods and makes recommendations to the Association Committee (European Commission, 2010, p.62).

In the case of Guatemala and many other developing countries, the most fertile soils are used by the economic elite to produce export oriented crops, such as, sugar, coffee, palm oil, cardamom and bananas. This has led to “critical shortages of foodstuffs” in rural Guatemala but even so the country does not classify for
restrictions/export prohibitions. Rather, the AA agreement supports this export oriented economy and therefore indirectly also sustains the existing structures, land distribution and other resources.

**Trade remedies**

The second chapter in Part IV on trade is on trade remedies and more specifically on anti-dumping, countervailing measures and safeguard measures. By anti-dumping the EC means the measure to stop a situation when a company’s “export price to the Community is less than a comparable price for the like product, in the ordinary course of trade, as established for the export country” (EC, 2009, p.54).

The agreement includes bilateral and multilateral safeguard measures, but these might not be practiced simultaneously (EC, 2010, Article 100, p.65). The multilateral safeguard refers to Article XIX of GATT 1994 (Ibid.) and the conditions for a bilateral safeguard is explained as follows in Article 104 of the AA,

> ...if as a result of the reduction or elimination of a customs duty under this Agreement, a product originating in a Party is being imported into the territory of the other Party in such increased quantities, in absolute terms or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions so as to constitute a substantial cause or threat of serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive products... (Ibid.)

In such a situation, a case is subjected to a judicial review and the state affected might set up a tariff up to two years. Trade remedies are common practice in regional trade agreements (RTAs), but some RTAs have abolished these since these might lead to discrimination of non-members (Budetta, 2007, p.2).

Since these processes are done at state level and through a judicial review, it is questionable how the remedies could support small and medium producers, when their business is affected by an influx of foreign goods. The import of cheap genetically modified corn from the USA was one of the reasons for the indigenous peoples of Chiapas, Southern Mexico, to rise up against the Mexican government. This is an
example of when a social movement rose up against the politics behind free trade, in this case the NAFTA agreement (Morton, 2002, p.37). The peasant organisation, CONIC, in Guatemala as well as well as the organisation of indigenous women, CONAVIGUA, share this critique of the influx of foreign goods (Tiney, Interview, 13/09/12 and CONAVIGUA, Interview, 21/09/12).

*Customs and trade facilitation*

The third chapter of Part IV on trade explains what is referred to as customs and trade facilitation. More specifically chapter three states that the customs procedures should be based upon international instruments and standards, namely, the World Customs Organisation (WCO) Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade and the International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (EC, 2010, Article 117, p.71) Other issues mentioned in relation to customs are development of information technology systems and “modern customs techniques”, such as, simplified measures for entry and release of goods (Ibid.). These changes may benefit small and medium-size Central American businesses that see the rest of the region as a possible market for export. Several leaders of Guatemalan co-operatives and other CSOs expressed interest in developing the trade between the countries in Central America (for example Artesanos de San Juan, Interview, 05/09/12).

Article 120 of the AA articulates the importance of ensuring that the business community, as far as possible by electronic means, is informed of procedures, legislation and fees related to regional trade. Small-scale businesses, especially those based in rural areas, have less access to these information channels however. According to the EC “tariff elimination is only of real benefit if technical or procedural obstacles are also being tackled to ensure that they don’t become unnecessary obstacles to trade” (EC, 2012, p.4) Therefore, Chapter four of Title II in the Part IV on trade identifies technical barriers to trade (EC, 2010, Article 125, p.75). This, does for example, include replacing any national technical regulation with regional ones and using “relevant” international standards as a foundation. One kind of barrier is the
phytosanitary barrier and these are the topic of Chapter 5, which is dedicated to sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures relate to the protection of humans, health of animals and plants. As explained on the WTO web-site, the issues in relation to trade are how a state makes sure that its country’s consumers are supplied with food that is safe to eat, at the same time as it, ensures that strict safety and health regulations are not used as a pretext to protect domestic producers (WTO, 2010, p.9). This balance is reflected in Article 140 of the AA. Moreover, this article asks for further implementation of the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement under GATT permits governments to choose their own standards and the WTO recommends that the decisions about measures “should be based as far as possible on the analysis and assessment of objective scientific data” (Ibid. p.10)

As explained above Title II of the trade pillar outlines and explains the trade with goods in the AA. Title III on the other hand, is entitled ‘Establishment, Trade in Services and Electronic Commerce’. This Title is important since the GSP+ did not include the service sector. The general provisions establish that

Nothing in this Title shall be constructed to require the privatisation of public undertakings or public utilities services supply in the exercise of governmental authority or to impose any obligation with respect to government procurement (European Commission, 2010, Article 1590, p.92)

This means that each Party maintain the right to regulate and to implement new regulations in order to meet the national policy goals (Woolcock, S. et al, 2012, p.26).

Another issue worth mentioning in relation to Title III is its rules on movement of people. Basically, the free movement of services does not include what the Agreement text refers to as ‘natural persons’. One clear definitions of this legal term is “a person having legal status as an individual, as distinguished from a corporate body, representative” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). In practice this means that a person cannot move freely between the Parties and seek access to the employment market or residency in the other states. There are some exceptions for business purposes however, namely; key personnel, business services sellers, graduate trainees, contractual service suppliers and independent professionals, in agreement with the
objective, scope and coverage of Title III. Chapter four on ‘Temporary presence of Natural Persons for Business Purposes’ explains the specific rules for each of the above groups mentioned and outlines for how long these may stay and work in the other Parties. It varies between three years and 90 days.

Title IV of the trade pillar states that the Parties “shall aim at the liberalisation of current payments and capital movements between them” (AA, Part IV, Article 204) Moreover, Article 204 of Title IV states the synchronisation with the Articles of the Agreement of the international Monetary Fund (Ibid.). Proponents of liberal market policies would argue that free capital movement is crucial for supporting free trade. In other words, countries that want to benefit from free trade should, with this logic, liberalize their trade regimes and decrease or remove the foreign exchange restrictions (Drabek and Payne 1999, p.4) As the economist Williamson explains, another argument in favour of free capital movement “is a ‘freedom’ argument: that individuals ought to be permitted to do as they see fit with their own property, so there ought not to be restrictions at the national frontier which prevent them moving their money if they want to” (Williamson, 1999, p.7) I agree with Williamson who maintains that this argument works when we refer to small personal transactions, but not when we talk about transactions of billions of dollars (Ibid.) due to the negative effects that such movement of capital can have on small national economies that to a large extent depend on foreign investments.

When it comes to liberalisation of financial services there is empirical evidence that foreign banks bring superior technical expertise to local financial systems (Ibid., p.13) Nevertheless, foreign banks may escape and leave countries and local banks to their own destiny in times of economic crisis. Title V as well as Annex XVI of the trade pillar deal with the issues around Government Procurement. The Title V text is compatible with the WTO’s Government Purchasing Agreement (GPA) and so are the thresholds for the value of contracts established in the Annex (Woolcock, 2012, p.35). The Annex also state the procurement entities covered as well as key characteristics of the process for awarding procurement contracts, such as documentary requirements, contract awards and time periods (EC, 2010, Annex XVI).
As stated in Article 210 of the AA it covers “procurement for governmental purposes: of goods, services or any combination thereof...” (Ibid, Article 210, p. 123) In other words, Title V opens up a wide array of public procurement to businesses and these can be from any of the Parties and will be treated equally as national companies (EC, 2010, Article 211, p. 126). Title VI establishes the rules for Intellectual Property and the Geographical Indications (GIs) regulations. This Title restates the parties’ commitments to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and the WTO agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), (EC, Article 228, p. 140). The objectives of the Title have an international co-operation approach and states that the AA takes“ into the consideration the economical situation and the social or cultural need of each Party”. Moreover, an objective is to encourage and promote technology transfer between the EU and Central America, in order to facilitate the formation of “a sound and viable technological base” in the Central American states (Ibid).

Article 229 of Title VI assert that in the AA intellectual Property rights include rights to patents, copyright (including copyright in computer programs and in databases), and related rights, trademarks, industrial designs, layout designs (topographies) of integrated circuits, trade names, plant varieties and “protection of undisclosed information as well as geographical indications (including designations of origin), (Ibid, Article 229, p.141). Moreover, Title VI accords both the CBD and TRIPS most favoured nation and national treatment. That is to say that owners of intellectual property will be treated equally favourable as country nationals or those of any other country (Woolcock, 2012, p.33).

Despite the fact that the CBD is included in the AA it does not come with any specific enforceable commitments. Article 229:5 minimally expresses that “the Parties recognize the importance of respecting, preserving and maintaining the indigenous and local communities’ knowledge, innovations and practices that involve traditional practises related to the preservation and the sustainable use of biological diversity” (EC, 2010, Article 229:5, p.141). On the other hand Title VI deals with GIs in a much
more thorough and explicit manner. The definition of GIs provided in the AA is that these are

indications which identify a good as originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to geographical origin (EC, 2010, Article 242.2, p. 145)

As stated in Article 245 all parties must support the GIs are stated in Annexes XVII and XVIII as well as future agreed additions. Moreover the Parties must reject to register trademarks for suppliers of the same or like products from another place (EC, 2010, Article 245, p.146).

As pointed out in the study done by Woolcock and the co-authors, the commitments are symmetric in terms of obligations and as expected the list of goods that the EU wants to claim GIs is considerably much longer than the Central American states’ equivalent list (Woolcock, 2012, p. 33). To put it in perspective the EU has listed GIs products, with everything from Swedish vodka to Spanish manchego cheese, on 14 pages. The Central American states made a list of half a page however with various spirits, kinds of coffee and bananas as well as one Nicaraguan cheese, queso chontaleño. These products are all listed in Annex XVII, but the Annex with the list of the GIs already agreed on is blank. The authors of the above-mentioned study also indicate the limitations of an inter-governmental agreement like the AA. Namely that such as agreement only can achieve to

“establish the obligations of governments to ensure that the system for the administration of justice recognises intellectual property rights and that foreign rights holders have access to it as much as citizens” (Ibid., pp. 33-34)

Furthermore, numerous clauses only oblige parties to make certain that the judicial bodies have the power to take action, and in some cases it is simply stated that they ‘may provide’ such authority (loc-cit).

43 Section C of Chapter Two on Standards Concerning Intellectual Property Rights
44 At least the in the document provided by the EC web-page of the AA: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=689, [Online, 17/09/13].
Title VII establishes regulations related to trade and competition. Article 279:3 calls for the Central American states in the AA to set up a competition authority as well as competition laws, within three years since the ratification of the AA. Moreover, the Central American states have to establish a regional authority as well as regional competition laws within seven years from the ratification (EC, 2010, Article 279:2). State enterprises however, will only be subjected to competition legislation as long as this “does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them” (EC, 2010, Article 280:2). By the time these institutions and the legal framework are set up, the Title VII includes a framework for co-operation between the so-called competition authorities in the different countries. This does for example include exchange of information, even though the Parties are not obliged to follow this recommendation (EC, 2010, Article 281:1). Also co-operation to increase transparency is encouraged, but not mandatory according to Title VII (Woolcock, 2012, p.34).

Title VIII is interesting for the purpose of this research, since it establishes the rules and regulations of trade and sustainable development. The objective of this Title is outlines in Article 284 which states that

“The Parties reaffirm their commitment to promoting the development of international trade in such way as to contribute to the objective of sustainable development and to ensuring that this objective is integrated and reflected at every level of their trade relationship” (EC, 2010, Article 284).

Positive policies in which free trade and foreign investment could be argued to have a positive impact on sustainable development are mentioned in Article 288 of Title VIII. This article mentions specific measures, such as, organic production, eco-tourism, fair and ethical trade schemes, and corporate social responsibility (EC, 2010, Article 288).

Title VIII also contains Parties’ commitment to core labour standards based on the ILO Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998 (EU, 2010, Article 288). As well as various multilateral environmental rights, for instance the Montreal

In its publication named ‘EU-Central America: Trade Relations under the Association Agreement’, European Commission explains that

“in order to ensure effective implementation of these provisions, the Agreement establishes two mechanisms consisting of an arbitration system and an engagement process with civil society” (EC, 2012, p.10)

Woolcock and the co-authors of the study ordered by the European Parliament do not share this view however. These authors mean that despite that unresolved disputes related to Title VIII might as stated in Article 299 be referred to a panel of experts; the panel only has “the power to examine whether there has been a failure to comply with the relevant obligations” and may not make binding recommendations to solve the problem (Woolcock, 2012, p.40) In other words, there are no particular conducts for non-compliance. There is considerable overlap between the human rights clause and the Title on trade and sustainable development. In other words, core labour standards and some of the environmental rights found in Title VII also are to be found in the human rights clause and therefore are enforceable by ‘appropriate measures. The Woolcock study expresses that

“the weakness of the enforcement mechanisms in relation to non-human rights labour and environmental standards means that the EU bodies involved must make a concerted effort to ensure that the EU lives up to its own legal responsibilities with respect to human rights and poverty, and the protection of labour and environmental standards in third countries” (Woolcock, 2012, p. 41)

The human rights clause is established in Article 1(1) of the AA and as Bartels explain these are positive obligations. This implies that it is not enough for the Parties not to violate human rights and democratic principles themselves, rather they must make sure that these are respected within their jurisdiction (Woolcock, 2012, p. 38).
The remaining Titles of the Part IV of the AA outline the aims and regulations related to ‘Regional Economic Integration’ (Title IX), ‘Dispute Settlement’ (Title X), Mediation Mechanisms for Non-tariff measures’ (Title XI), ‘Transparency and Administrative Processes’ (Title XII), ‘Specific tasks in Trade Matters of the Bodies Established under this Agreement’ (Title XIII) and finally ‘Exceptions’ (XIV). For the purpose of this research however, this chapter will now focus of the topic trade and sustainable development, as outlined in Title VIII.

**Trade, Sustainable Development and Gender Equality**

*Sustainable development*

The understanding of sustainable development provided in Title VIII is in agreement with the ecological modernisation ideas discussed earlier in Chapter 2. As explained ecological modernisation encourages growth as a solution to the environmental problems, which is inconsistent with *buen vivir* philosophy. Furthermore, ecological modernisation relates largely to experiences in Western industrial countries and therefore does not account for a North/South perspective or social justice.

Article 288 of Title VIII establishes that the Parties ‘shall endeavour’, first, to consider situations in which free trade could benefit both trade and sustainable development. Secondly, to promote and assist foreign direct investment in renewable-energy and energy efficient products as well as other ‘environmental technologies’. Thirdly, the parties shall make an effort to promote trade in products in line with sustainability considerations, such as, products that make up part of eco-labelling, fair and ethical trade schemes, organic production as well as corporate social responsibility schemes. Finally, Article 288 declare that the Parties aim to promote and establish programmes and practices fostering suitable economic returns through conservation and sustainable use of the environment, for example ecotourism (EC, 2010, Article 288, p.166).

The Article outlined above exemplifies the EU’s ecological modernisation ideology in practice. In addition, the relationship between free trade and sustainable development described and promoted in the AA follows the ideas outlined in the EU
white paper ‘Growth, Competitiveness and Employment’, previously discussed in Chapter 2. As explained earlier in this thesis this document links environment and employment, arguing that environmental protection could help improving the competitiveness of the EU’s economy.

**Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA)**

The European Commission decided to carry out SIAs of its free trade agreements in 1998 (DG-Trade, 2006). Since then many studies of this kind have been done and the ‘Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association Agreement to be negotiated between the EU and Central America’ was ordered by DG-trade and executed by the research and consulting firm Ecorys. The consulting firm carried out the SIA study in 2009, so in other words halfway into the AA negotiations.

The SIA has two main aims, namely to “analyse the economic, social and environmental impacts of the trade agreement...” and to “involve civil society in a dialogue on trade policy and trade policy issues” The latter aim was achieved through active engagement with civil society at various phases of the report development, according to the Ecorys authors (Ecorys, 2009, p.23). From an economic perspective the overall image presented in the SIA demonstrates that Central America benefits more from the agreement that the EU. With Costa Rica being an exception, all Central American countries’ export is expected to increase as a result of the implementation of the agreement.

The study expects the biggest gains to come from export of fruit, vegetables and nuts in case of Central America. As is pointed out in the section on environmental impacts, the increase of the export oriented agribusiness and the expected changes in land use “can pose a significant threat to forest-areas and biodiversity” (Ecorys, 2009, p. 17). The SIA study then provides some recommendations to the EC, for how to reduce these possible negative effects. One such recommendation is that the “specific Sustainable Development provisions in the AA can stimulate the commitment to and implementation of international and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), thereby encouraging further progress on issues of international concern such as
climate change, biodiversity and natural resources” *(loc-cit).*

Many indigenous women in rural Guatemala produce food in a local and sustainable manner but these women are not likely to benefit from the AAs. Indigenous women in Guatemala grow food in their family allotments for subsistence and for selling on local markets. Generally the majority of sellers are indigenous women at the fruit and vegetable markets. These jobs usually form part of the informal economy and this means that these women do not have any labour rights. *(DEMI, 2011, p.40)* Women in developing countries, such as Guatemala, prevail in the traditional agricultural sectors and are likely to lose their income when trade agreements favour the commercial sector that mainly employs men *(True, 2011, p. 726).* In other words, government incentives for export oriented business farming is likely to have a negative effect on women farmers’ employment opportunities and EU agricultural imports may undercut these small-scale, traditional, rural farmers *(loc-cit.)*. A report on indigenous women’s contribution to the Guatemalan Economy from 2011 states that women (especially indigenous) are working with harvesting as well as the making food products for the export sector. Moreover, the agribusiness exporters prefer women for these jobs due to their patience and care. Women in this environment often have bad working conditions that affect their health with for example toxic chemicals *(DEMI, 2011, p.34).*

*Gender Equality*

In year 2000 the European Commission suggested that ‘ex ante gender assessments’ should be included in the SIAs. The SIA methodology establishes that either equity is a key indicator of the social sustainability of the free trade agreements or mainstreamed transversely social indicators of employment, income, poverty and health *(True, 2009, p.731).* In the case of the ‘Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Association Agreement to
be negotiated between the EU and Central America’, this study discusses ‘equality and gender issues’ as part of the analysis of social sustainability impact. In relation to wages and labour rights, the authors of this SIA study argue that

“The AA can stimulate the improvement of labour standards as EU firms make higher demands on Central American exporters and EU investors adhere to the ILO Decent Work Agenda. This is under the provision that firms in the Central American region do not lower wages and standards in a competition for scarce FDI and thereby start a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour regulations. Policy initiatives in this field have a large influence over which effect may come to dominate” (Ecory, 2009, p.16).

‘A race to the bottom’ in the name of competition and comparative advantage has a negative impact in many women’s lives because it may deepen gender inequalities, when combined with already existing inequities in access to resources, power and decision-making in society.

Women in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala might benefit from increased employment opportunities in the textile and clothing sector (Ecorys, 2009, p. 79). These jobs often involve harsh working environments and low wages however. Due to these existing inequalities, the ‘Central America Women’s Network’ (CAWN) recommended the EU Commission to support the creation of a regional centre for employment equity, in order to promote the annihilation of discrimination at the work places. This discrimination includes sexual harassment, and salary inequalities (Buzzi, 2012, p.4). This suggestion was brought up during the AAs negotiations, but the negotiators did not include any centre for employment equity. Instead they decided that the implementation of all labour standards is to be monitored by the Board of Trade and Sustainable Development45 (European Commission, p.167). This board has the overall liability for resolving disputes based on sustainable development obligations. The fact that the SIAs include gender equality in their analysis is good, but as True argues “the impact assessment findings on potentially negative gender impacts of trade liberalization need to be more widely

45 See Article 294 in the European Union Association Agreement with Central America
publicized and debated” (True, 2009, p.742) Based on my interviews with EU officials I do not have reason to believe that these findings have been taken on board and that the policies have been revised in the light of this critique.

Critiques from a feminist and buen vivir perspective

As noted above, European Commission’s ways of promoting sustainability is very different from recommendations offered by researchers and activists working with the concept of buen vivir. As discussed in Chapter two, buen vivir does not see economic growth as something desirable, the idea of promoting an economic system and a form of food production that entails overexploitation of Mother Earth is not desirable. Rather than further developing an agribusiness oriented economy and promoting multilateral environmental agreements that could reduce the negative effects of this, supporters of buen vivir encourages us to change our food production in a manner that our planet can sustain.

The logic of free trade agreements, economic growth and expansion of markets affect people in different ways. Eco-tourism is mentioned as one of the areas of the AA that could have a positive impact on sustainable developments well as on MSMEs. From a GIPE perspective however, we can see how generally speaking, indigenous women in Guatemala do not benefit a great deal from the tourism sector in their country, but the image of the indigenous woman (and to some extent man), is used to attract tourists (DEMI, 2011, p. 38). In relation to the export oriented free trade model promoted through the AA, a feminist environmentalist understanding of the trade pillar links the exploitation of and destruction nature, caused by large mono-cultures and extractivist industries, to the difficulties that rural women, especially indigenous women face, since they due to already existing gender hierarchies often are not able to benefit from international trade. A buen vivir perspective encourages us to join economic rights and social justice with environmental justice. This perspective also emphasises the importance of the local. So, for example examining how the local population is affected by industries and tourism that takes place in their territory. To some extent MSMEs may benefit from lower
trade barriers between the Central American countries but by and large, I would argue that the trade pillar benefits the actors that already were in a good position to export before the AA was signed and ratified. The following chapter discusses the international cooperation chapter of the AA.
Chapter 5: the co-operation pillar

This chapter offers an analysis of the co-operation pillar (Part III) within the Association Agreement. In order to do this analysis, the chapter first explains the background and outlines the structure as well as the contents of the pillar. Secondly, it examines the specific case of Guatemala in relation to the issues in this pillar. Finally, I critically examine Part III by exploring the relationship between free trade, sustainability and gender equality. The chapter argues that there are tensions between the neoliberal model that the AA promote and the policy areas of peace, security, gender equality and sustainability that the co-operation pillar is meant to encourage.

Background

The co-operation pillar of the AA is also referred to as Part III, and it is made up of nine titles with a total of 76 different articles. This pillar links to the EU’s promotion of normative values through trade, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. Moreover, it contributes to the principle of coherence, which is described in the “European coherence on development” declaration from 2005 (EC, 2005). This document states that;

“...the EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries, and that these policies support development objectives” (EC, 2005).

The declaration from 2005 identifies twelve areas of significant importance to developing countries and the background to this initiative is the EU’s interest in improving the chances of achieving the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Furthermore, it is in line with the work on coherency stated in the Paris Declaration backed up by the OECD also in 2005.
For this chapter it is significant that trade is considered one of the most important policy areas in the work towards poverty reduction in developing countries. The "European coherence on development" declaration asserts that the EU should support "equitable and sustainable growth, smooth and gradual integration into the world economy, and linking trade and poverty reduction or equivalent strategies" (EC, 2005). Here, once again, sustainability is combined with growth and this package is offered as a solution to reduce poverty in developing countries. Seeing this strategy it becomes clear why it would have been difficult for countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador to sign an AA with the EU (as explained in Chapter 2), since the Buen Vivir concept established in their constitutions disapprove of growth as a goal.

In line with the EC’s wider interest in the principle of coherence, as well as in relation to trade policy, Part III of the Central America-EU AA provides a legal basis for co-operation and technical assistance from the EU to the Central American states. Although a wide arrange of areas are included, the focus lies on good governance and the rule of law. In this sense the co-operation is for the most part, as expressed by Veljko Milutinovic, “an effort by all sides at improving their respective administrations.” (Milutinovic, 2013) This is illustrated in for example article 31 and 33 of Part III of the AA. Furthermore, the relationship between the two regions and the role of each of them is explained in Article 25 under the headline of principles. Despite the EU’s expressed will to work towards coherence, section (j) in Article 25 explains that;

Co-operation in the framework of this agreement does not affect the participation of the Republics of the CA Party, as developing countries, in the EU Party’s activities in the field of research for development or other European Union Development co-operation programmes addressed to third countries, subject to the rules and procedures of these programmes. (EC, AA, Part III, Article 25, p.2)
Outline of the Pillar

The co-operation pillar or Part III, as it is labelled in the AA document, starts of by explaining the general and more specific objectives and thereafter each of the nine so-called titles are listed and described. The ‘general objective’ of the co-operation pillar in the AA (Part III) is to support the implementation of the AA by facilitating resources, mechanisms, procedures and tools, so that the two regions may reach an ‘effective partnership’. Other more specific objectives are to strengthen peace and security, to contribute to strengthening of democratic institutions, the rule of law and good governance more generally. Gender equality, the respect for human rights and citizen participation are also mentioned (EC, AA, Part III, Article 24).

Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance

The first two titles proclaim traditionally liberal norms with conventional mainstream interpretations of the different concepts. Title I is entitled ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance’ and encourages the Parties to co-operate towards a full compliance of the international human rights and fundamental universal freedoms that are labelled as “indivisible, inter-related and inter-dependant”. Nevertheless, it is not specified what these fundamental freedoms are. The construction as well as the strengthening of democracy is also mentioned as important goals (EC, Title I, Article 29). In relation to awareness raising and education of human rights, Article 29 additionally mentions democracy and culture of peace. Article 30 refers to respect for the rule of law, the guarantee of the separation of powers as well as an independent and proficient judicial system, when promoting good governance. Moreover, transparent governance at local, regional and national level, as well as accountable, stable and efficient democratic institutions is promoted. Policy design capacity building is mentioned as one possible mean of supporting and reinforcing organisational changes related to regional integration. For this transparency and a good management of public resources to take place, a modernisation of the state and the public administration is encouraged. The support of the participation of civil society is also mentioned in relation to
good governance. Article 32, which promotes conflict prevention and resolution states that the peace policy shall;

“...ensure equal political, economic, social and cultural opportunities for all segments of society, reinforce democratic legitimacy, promote social cohesion and an effective mechanism for peaceful conciliation of the interests of different groups, and encourage an active and organised civil society, in particular making use of existing regional institutions”.

This peace policy seems ambitious but there is no clear evidence of how this policy will be implemented. The Parties agree on promoting and sustaining this “comprehensive peace policy”, but we are left with the question of how it is going to be implemented?

*Justice, Freedom and Security*

Title II reads ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ and includes personal data protection, illicit drugs, money laundering (including financing of terrorism), organised crime and citizen security, fight against corruption, illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons and fight against terrorism with full respect for human rights. Many of the issues mentioned, especially prevention of illegal trafficking of small arms and light weapons as well as the fight against organised crime are of great importance for the security of Central American citizens in their everyday lives. Nevertheless, the understandings of security in the AA are ideologically of a liberal nature and work well together with free trade policy. In other words these understandings of security do not question structures and do not relate insecurity to problems promoted by a neoliberal economic system. Moreover, this understanding of security does not see the social inequality as one of the causes of insecurity.

Increasingly contemporary research of security often uses a wider understanding of the concept that includes and links different forms of security issues, such as food security and environmental security (Jenkens, 2011, Rogers, 2012). This
more encompassing interpretation of the concept of security is also more in line with the philosophy of *buen vivir*, since this philosophy also makes a strong connection between human and environmental security and wellbeing. However, food security is not mentioned as an issue, even though social movements and other forms of organised civil society in Central America emphasise food security as a real insecurity problem for a vast part of the population. On example of this is the public statement made by a group ‘CSO against the AA and in defence of food sovereignty’ (REDSAG, 2013).

*Social Development and Social Cohesion*

Title III starts off with Article 41 stating that “social development shall go hand in hand with economic development” and affirms that the Parties agree on enhancing social cohesion through co-operation (Article 41, Title III). It is nevertheless difficult to identify exactly what the EC refers to, when writing of social development. The meaning of social cohesion is discussed in various EU policy documents and I will therefore try to provide an explanation of this term, from an EC perspective. Within the EU the concept of social cohesion is linked to the process of integration, a common European market as well as move towards a single currency. Moreover, the concept has over time become associated with the advancement and survival of what can be called the ‘European social model’ (Morazán, 2011, p. 51). In one of its documents focusing on Latin America the European External Action Service (EEAS) defines Social Cohesion as the “fight against poverty, inequality and social exclusion” (EEAS, Aug. 2008). The first time that the EU, Latin-American and Caribbean parties explicitly introduced the term was in the final statement of the second EU-LAC summit held in Madrid in 2002. Thereafter, social cohesion became a “priority axis for governing relations” in the EU-LAC partnership, during the 3rd EU-LAC Summit held in Guadalajara in May 2004 (Morazán, 2011, p. 60). This was also when the parties adopted the so-called EurosociAL programme, which they activated in 2005 and set up to promote the “appreciation, distribution and implementation” of social cohesion in Latin America. In other words, the starting point of this programme was the diffusion of a political concept. Now the programme is in its

So, what does the EuroSociAL programme mean by social cohesion? The definition of the concept used in the programme documents states that,

“Social cohesion is an attribute of societies which implies equal opportunities so that the population can exercise its fundamental rights and ensure its wellbeing without discrimination of any type, while at the same time addressing diversity. From an individual perspective, it involves the existence of people who feel part of a community, who participate in decision-making and can exercise active citizenship. It also involves the development of public policies and mechanisms of solidarity between individuals, groups, territories and generations” (Ibid.)

It is in this wider context that Title III reads ‘Social Development and Social Cohesion’ and includes the fight against poverty, exclusion and inequality (including gender equality). The title also explains that the overall aims relate to the fulfilment of the Millennium Development Goals and to the “internationally agreed objective” of encouraging “fair globalisation and decent work” for everyone (Title III, Article 41). Moreover, this title incorporates more specific policy areas such as employment and social protection, education, public health, the rights of indigenous peoples and other ethnic groups as well as youth. In order to reach these goals the Parties have agreed on co-operating in order to encourage and support the carrying out of economic policies with “a social vision”, including better income distribution which could lessen inequity and inequality (Article 41, Title III). Additionally, the Parties agreed to take the link between trade and sustainable development into account in their investment and trade policies.

Other areas which link to trade and therefore should be included in this policy making are fair trade, the development of rural and urban micro, small and medium enterprises, their representative’s organisations as well as the practice of corporate social responsibility (Ibid.). In relation to equal access to
social services, Article 41 includes nutrition, health, sanitation, housing, education, social security and housing. The European welfare-state social protection schemes are reflected in Article 41, (g), which asks for the execution of a model based on the “solidarity principle” and accessibility for all when it comes to health, accidents, pensions and unemployment. Equal treatment between men and women, abolition of child labour, non-discrimination, collective bargaining and freedom of association are some of the highlighted Core Labour Standards from the ILO conventions, highlighted in the Article on Employment and Social Protection (Article 42, Part III). Furthermore, the Parties have agreed to address issues
relating to the informal economy, which is crucial when working towards gender equality, since many women work in this economic sector and therefore completely lack access to any formal labour rights. Health and security in workplaces are also emphasised in Article 42.

**Indigenous Peoples and Other Ethnic Groups**

Two articles in Title III that prove relevant to this thesis are Articles 45 and 47. The first one entitles ‘Indigenous Peoples and Other Ethnic Groups’ and the heading of the second article is ‘Gender’. Article 45 declares what the Parties will to respect and promote their national, regional and international obligations in relation to rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples. Several of the problems affecting indigenous peoples and their territories are very similar in Latin America and in Europe. Mining, for example, causes problems for indigenous peoples both in Central America, South America and the Nordic Countries. The photo below shows protestors marching outside the castle in Stockholm during a demonstration named ‘National demonstration for solid land, clean water and a living cultural landscape’ which took place on October 26th 2013.

**Figure 10**

‘National demonstration for solid land, clean water and a living culture landscape’

This demonstration is a reaction against the Swedish mineral laws and the lack of protection of the environment and indigenous peoples and their territory. In the picture we see a banner in the defence of Mother Earth (Moder Jord in Swedish) made by the Chilean mural artist Ilich Galdamez, who uses the symbols of the Mapuche kultrun (spiritual drum) and the indigenous wiphala flag from the Andean region. In the background we also see the flag of the indigenous people in the Nordic region, the Sámi flag. This photo therefore gives a glimpse shot of some of the transnational resistance against an extraction-based economy and the involvement of indigenous groups in these struggles. In relation to these transnational indigenous struggles, it is worth mentioning that Article 45 of the AA states that:

“Relevant international documents and instruments addressing the rights of indigenous peoples such as United Nations Resolution 59/174 on the Second decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, and, as ratified, the International Labour Organisation 169 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, should guide the development of cooperation activities, in line with the national and international obligations of the Parties”. (Article 45, Title III)

In other words the guidelines in the co-operation pillar depend on which international instruments each state has ratified. During my interviews in Brussels, one of the officials in the EEAS who participated in these AA negotiations confirmed that this lack of stronger commitment for indigenous and Tribal Peoples rights has to do with Sweden’s unwillingness to sign the International Labour Organisation (ILO)169 Convention. The Central American states have signed it, but there is still a lot of work left in terms of practicing indigenous peoples’ rights in their states (EEAS, 21/06/12). Despite some of the EU states’ unwillingness to ratify the ILO convention, the Parties agree that the environment, sustainable management and use of land and natural recourses, health, education and cultural identity are areas relevant to indigenous peoples. Therefore, the Parties state that the effective participation of these peoples should be ensured as appropriate. Moreover, Article 45:4 states “co-operation shall
contribute to promoting the development of indigenous peoples.” Nevertheless, it is not clear what development means in this context and possibly it does not promote the same kind of policies as many of the indigenous communities would like to implement. In fact many indigenous leaders in Guatemala reject the idea of development itself as they see *buen vivir* as an alternative path. The agribusiness promoted through the AA involves monocultures and is geared towards an export oriented economy and this is not compatible with the views of many indigenous organisations (see for example CONIC in Chapter 3).

*Mining*

Extraction based industries such as mining is not mentioned in Article 63. Instead mining is briefly mentioned in Article 66, which states that the Parties should “take into account their respective legislations and internal procedures as well as aspects of sustainable development and including environmental protection and conservation…” (Article 66, Part III). The Parties’ initiatives in order to achieve this so-called sustainable mining are the promotion of exchange of information, experience, experts and transfer of technology (Ibid.). Just like the protestors in Sweden mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are many critiques of mining in Guatemala by people who argue that this industry is irreconcilable with sustainable development, environmental protection and conservation. For example at the II Continental Summit of Indigenous Women in Resguardo La María de Piendamó, Cauca in Colombia, 11-12 of November 2013, one of the key issues discussed was “models of development, extractive industries in indigenous territories and violation of women’s rights” (Waquib’ Kej, 2013).
The national indigenous network of organisations, Waqib’ Kej from Guatemala, writes,

The colonial structure is at present represented through neoliberalism, it is a structure which has plundered from all of our natural recourses, the countries called developed have been the ones to urge on this system of plunder, setting up various projects such as extractive mining industry, taking over the land and plundering villages (Waqib’ Kej, 2013)\textsuperscript{46}.

In other words the representatives of Waqib’ Kej describes mining as a colonial practice and situates it in a neoliberal structure. I see it as a problem the way that the AA Parties support extractivist based industries in the name of economic growth and often disrespect the human rights of the local population or their local habitat.

\textsuperscript{46} Author’s translation from Spanish.
Gender Equality

As explained earlier in this thesis, gender equality is one of the norms that the EU tries to promote and mainstream in its policies, including international trade policy. In the Association Agreement, the issue of gender has a stronger presence in the cooperation pillar than in the trade pillar. In Article 47 the Parties agree on that co-operation; that they

“Shall help to strengthen policies, programmes and mechanisms aimed at ensuring, improving and expanding the equal participation and opportunities for men and women in all sectors of political, economic, social and cultural life, in particular in view of the effective implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women” (Article 47, Title III).

The UN Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is a key document for women’s rights globally and was adopted in 1979. Most states have signed the agreement (the USA being one of the few exceptions) and it is often described as an international bill of rights for women. The CEDAW defines discrimination against women and establishes an agenda for national action to end these forms of discrimination (OHCHR, 2013). When accepting this convention states commit themselves to promote a series of measures in order to end discrimination against women. These measures include, first, incorporating the principle of equality of women and men in their legal system, eradicating all discriminatory laws, adopting appropriate ones that prohibit discrimination against women. Secondly, establishing tribunals and additional public institutions to guarantee the effective protection of women against discrimination. Finally, ensuring “elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises” (Ibid.). The CEDAW can in other words be used as a tool for implementing and monitoring the eradication of discrimination against women.
In more specific terms, Article 47 of the AA promotes affirmative action to support women “where appropriate” (Ibid.). The EU’s effort to mainstream gender equality also comes across in this article, when it states that co-operation shall integrate and promote a gender perspective in all its relevant fields, including development actions and strategies, public policies as well as indicators that can measure their impact. Equal access to resources and services for men and women is also mentioned as one aim which co-operation should promote. The examples given are health, education, employment opportunities, vocational training, governance structures, political decision-making as well as private undertakings. Violence against women is another concern that is highlighted in section four of Article 47 which promotes programmes to tackle this problem.

Migration

Article 49 of this title states that “co-operation shall be based on specific needs assessment conducted in mutual consultation between the Parties...” The first clause of this title includes various issues. For example, relevant international instruments, such as the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees as well as its Protocol of 1967. Other matters brought up are fair treatment of ‘legal residents’, brain drain, a humane and secure return of persons who do not hold a legal residence permit. The following article, Article 50 focuses of control of migration and the Central American Parties as well as the EU agrees to readmit any of its nationals who stay in the territory of the other region (Article 50, Title IV). In Article 19, Part II of the AA the parties mention poverty as a main cause for migration but the EU has no intentions to be more welcoming of Central American citizens within the framework if the AA despite the severe poverty that many Central Americans experience in their countries.
Environment, Natural Disasters and Climate Change

Title V deals with issues of the ‘environment, natural disasters and climate change’. This title is divided in two parts, namely co-operation over environmental issues (Article 50) and over the management of natural disasters (Article 51).

Co-operation on Environment

The co-operation on environment is based upon the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which is made up by twenty-seven non-legally binding principles for the environment and development. Principe 6 gives special priority to developing countries, especially the least developed countries and those most environmentally vulnerable (United Nations, 1992). In the AA, this principle is reflected in the second clause of Article 50 of Title V in Part III, when the clause mentions the “principle of common but differentiated responsibilities”. Moreover, this clause states that,

“...The Parties shall pay due attention to the relationship between poverty and the environment and the impact of economic activity on the environment including the potential impact of the present Agreement” (Article 50:2, Part III).

Like the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Article cited above is also non-legally binding, since it only states that the governments should pay “due attention” to possible negative environmental impact caused by economic activity. It does not state any obligations and procedures that the Parties have to follow, in case of observing environmental damage.

Article 50 gives priority to protection and sustainable management of natural resources (including forests and fisheries) and ecosystems. The fight against pollution of air, soil and water (fresh and marine) is another prioritised area. Also, climate change and other global issues, such as deforestation, desertification, depletion of the ozone layer and the conservation of biosafety and biodiversity form part of the high-lightened issues.
The final environmentally related area that the Parties focus on is joint initiatives of climate change mitigation and adjustment to the effects, for example, reinforcement of the carbon market mechanisms.

**Management of natural disasters**

This section (Article 51) of Title V is briefer than the previous one dealing with co-operation on environment. Here again, Principle 6 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development appears when the Parties agree that one objective of co-operation shall be to lessen the vulnerability of the Central American region to natural disasters by assisting national efforts, as well as a regional framework set up to reduce the vulnerability, respond to natural disasters and strengthen regional research. Harmonisations of legal standards in line with international standards, as well as the improvement of institutional co-ordination and government support, are other aims for this area of co-operation. In the second clause of Article 51 the Parties agree on encouraging capacity strengthening of local communities as well as institutions for disaster risk reduction.

**Economic and Trade Development**

Title VI, clearly illustrates the main goal of implementation of the AA in the co-operation pillar and is labelled ‘Economic and Trade Development’. Moreover, this Title constitutes almost thirteen pages (out of a total of thirty nine), which makes up a large part of the co-operation pillar. The articles in this title deal with issues such as co-operation in the field of competition policy, customs co-operation and mutual assistance as well as co-operation and technical assistance on intellectual property technology transfer. Furthermore, Title VI encourages co-operation and technical assistance for various production areas, such as fisheries and agriculture, artisanal goods and organic goods. These are areas of co-operation from which small and medium sized businesses could benefit.
Small-scale producers: ‘Cultural’ and Organic products

Article 60 and 61 recognise the importance of developing capacities to “facilitate market access opportunities for Central American goods”. This does also include capacity building of Central American bodies responsible for export promotion, focusing on support for the “micro, small and medium size enterprises” (Article 60 and 61, Title VI). Enterprises from both urban and rural sectors are included in this initiative and the capacity building includes customs procedures as well as technical requirements set up in the EU market (Ibid.)

The same article promotes the “preservation of these cultural products”, the development of infrastructure needed to support the small and medium scale producers of artisanal and organic goods, as well as the capacity building to improve the business performance of artisan and organic goods producers, through training programmes. (Ibid.) In other words, the EU and the Central American states want the artisan traditions to be kept at the same time as they want the producers of these organic and so-called cultural products to adapt and improve their business performance to better compete on a global market. Nevertheless, some forms of production are embedded in the local Cosmovisions and therefore incompatible with a capitalist style business performance. Weaving is for example important in the Mayan traditions and women pass on their knowledge as part of the cultural heritage (CONAVIGUA, Interview, 21/09/12).

Trade and Sustainable Development

Article 63 of Part III relates directly to Title VIII that deals with issues of trade and sustainable development in the trade pillar (Part IV). This article promotes the co-operation and technical assistance within the areas of trade and labour as well as trade and the environment. Moreover it is set up to complement the titles on ‘Social Development and Social Cohesion’ as well as the one on the ‘Environment, Natural Disasters and Climate Change’. In other words Article 63 promotes both decent work conditions and environmental protection. Decent work standards are encouraged through promoting the ILO conventions and by strengthening
institutional frameworks as well as implementing programs and policies. There promote freedom of association and collective bargaining as well as the fight against forced labour, child labour and employment discrimination. The above labour related issues are mentioned in clause (e) of Article 63. The other clauses focus on environmental issues and sustainable management of natural resources such as forest and fish stock. Therefore the article promotes trade with products derived from sustainable managed natural sources and initiatives such as certification of legally and sustainable timber. Other measures which the Parties promote in relation to trade and sustainable development are fair and ethical trade schemes including corporate social responsibility.

*Other areas of co-operation within Title VI*

The remaining areas of co-operation within Title VI are fair and sustainable tourism, food safety and animal welfare, energy, transport and industry, good governance in the tax area, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) as well as co-operation on microcredit and microfinance. Within Article 67 on tourism, there are a two clauses that directly refer to the support for rural community tourism and ecotourism as well as “protection and promotion of cultural patrimony and natural resources” (Article 67, Title VI) This could if implemented in practice also have a positive support on women in rural areas and give them more income. Co-operation on issues of food safety in this context refers to policies such as technical assistance on the EU sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory system (Article 62, Title VI). The co-operation on transport is ample and includes exchanges of information of policies, improvement of the safety and pollutions standards as well as the management of roads, railways, airports, ports and inland waterways. Co-operation on energy includes promotion of energy saving, management and training for the energy sector as well as transfer of energy and know how (Article 65, Title VI). In relation to the industry sector the Parties agree that the co-operation shall “promote the modernisation and restructuring of Central American industry and individual sectors” (Article 64, Title VI).
Regional Integration

Title VII covers co-operation in the area of strengthening regional integration in Central America. This includes reinforcement of common institutions in Central America such as PARLACEN, harmonisation of legal frameworks and policies within the areas of trade, agriculture, customs, energy, transport, competition and communications. Development and working of the Central American common market and the reinforcement of the participation of civil society in the integration process are other areas mentioned here. Other possible areas within the regional co-operation framework are the environment, social cohesion, prevention and response to natural disasters and consumer protection. Furthermore, clause four of Article 72 states; “a particular attention shall be given to the gender dimension” (Article 72, Title VII). Despite the fact that regional integration is one of the key aims with the AA, Title VII only takes up one of the 39 pages in the Part III document.

Culture and Audio-Visual Co-operation

The aim of the cultural co-operation is to develop mutual understanding and cultivate ‘balanced cultural exchanges’ as well as to promote the movement of artists, other cultural professionals as well as civil society organisations, cultural activities, goods and services related. This co-operation should be in line with UNESCO’s Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. It appears a bit unclear whether the way to support for example women’s artisan cooperatives through this cultural cooperation or through Article 60 and 61 in the co-operation pillar discussed above. In these articles these are seem more as goods and the way forward is seen to be improved business performance. Here under the label of cultural Co-operation these goods are valued as part of the ‘promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions’ however. In other words I can see a contradiction between valuing something for its contribution to cultural diversity or valuing something as a product on a competitive market. Co-operation within the audio-visual and media sectors is also included in Title VIII and this involves press and radio. Moreover, Article 74 states that co-operation in
area shall safeguard and promote cultural and natural heritage, both tangible and intangible. This also involves the prevention of and active fight against illicit traffic of cultural heritage.

**Knowledge Society**

The basic assumption behind this co-operation title is that communication and information technologies “are key sectors in a modern society and are of vital importance to economic and social development and the smooth transition to the information society” (Article 75, Title IX, Part III). This assumption is informed by research done that suggests that information and communications technologies (ICTs) play a key role for changes that have significant spatial effects on employment opportunities, working conditions and economic output. As a response to these new technologies and their impact on our societies, the EC ordered the so-called ‘Bangemann Report’ in early 1990’s. The authors of this report claim that;

“Throughout the world, information and communications technologies are generating a new industrial revolution already as significant and far-reaching as those of the past. (...)This revolution adds huge new capacities to human intelligence and constitutes a resource which changes the way we work together and the way we live together.” (Bangemann, 1994, p.5)

In this report, the authors urge the EU to put its faith in market mechanisms as the ‘motive power’ to carry the Union into the Information Age (Ibid., p.4).

“Communications systems combined with advanced information technologies are keys to the information society. The constraints of time and distance have been removed by networks (e.g. telephone, satellites, ca- bles) which carry the information, basic services (e.g. electronic mail, interactive video) which allow people to use the networks and applications (e.g. distance learning, teleworking) which offer dedicated solutions for user groups” (Ibid. p.21)

The European Commission has defined the ‘information society’ as the widespread use of information networks and information technology, the production of large
amounts of information and communication products, services, as well as a diversified content industry (Dabinett, 2013, p. 168). Dabinett writes about mainstreaming of the so-called information society within the EU regional development policy, and according to him the information society has become a key item of the EU policy agenda over the last decade. Moreover, this relates to information and communication technologies entering more spheres of our lives (Dabinett, 2010, p, 168). The above information explains why the concept of information society is present and so celebrated in Title IX, Part III. The focus lies on scientific and technological co-operation (Article 76, Title IX, Part III). Both science and capacity building programmes, as well as ways of increasing the quality and the quantity of extremely qualified human resources (Ibid.). The development towards an information society certainly has different implications in Guatemala than within the EU states.

The European Commission’s understanding of society as an information society makes sense for large parts of the population in the EU states, even though some of the population, especially older citizens and people in rural areas still remain disconnected from this ‘new industrial revolution’. This analysis still is very far from people’s reality is most parts of Guatemala, where some people still lack electricity as well as running water, and the mean years of schooling of adults is 4,1 years (UNDP, 2013). In its country strategy paper (CSP) for 2007 -2013, the European Commission promotes “social cohesion through the development an inclusive Information Society and fighting the digital divide...” (EC, 2007, p. 6-9). This is not mentioned in the co-operation pillar of the AA however.

As discussed above there is a wide range of issues included in the co-operation pillar. My critique however as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, is that there are some tensions between policy areas that protect social and environmental justice and the free trade policies that these are combined with in the AA. These tensions exemplify that the EU foreign policy within the AA is not coherent and that there are disconnects between their policies of trade on the one hand and the areas of gender equality and sustainable development that the EU wants to mainstream on the other hand.
The Guatemalan case
*The EC’s Country Strategy Paper*

The AA is a regional project but it needs to be integrated with the country strategy that the EC has established for each of the developing countries it has a history of foreign aid and international co-operation with. In its country strategy for Guatemala the EU puts emphasis on social exclusion, especially in rural Guatemala. In the *Country Strategy Paper* (CSP) the EC highlights that “the agro-model for exports adopted several decades ago has discouraged the internal production of basic food, diminishing its availability (EC, 2007, p. 2-13). Nevertheless, the trade pillar in the AA does not question this model, so here again we see a gap between two of the EUs policy goals. This model is instead reflected in the trade relations between Central American states and the EU, in which, Guatemala exports agricultural products to the EU and imports chemical products and machine tools. Germany is Guatemala’s primary trade partner on machines. Spain, on the other hand, has become the second-largest European foreign investor in Guatemala by being influential both in the energy and mobile phone sectors, as well as entering the banking sector (Ibid.).

The 2007-2013 EC country strategy for Guatemala focuses on improved social cohesion and human security. As discussed in the outline of the co-operation pillar, these are prioritised themes there as well. In this sense the EU policy is coherent, even though the main focus of the AA still remains on free trade and not on human rights. In the CSP the EC raises the issue of discrimination against indigenous peoples as well as against women and it accentuates the importance of reducing social, economic and political discrimination of indigenous women in particular. Two of the possible difficulties that the EC sees in relation to this are unwillingness at local and national levels to promoting effective political representation of indigenous peoples as well as fragmentation within the indigenous movements and organisations. This second point is relevant for indigenous feminists, who sometimes find resistance within the indigenous movement. The EC mentions gender equality in relation to economic trade and development, the fight against malnutrition and exclusion.
Rural Development

The key focus of the CSP in terms of economic growth and trade is on “long-term and inclusive rural economic growth and food security” (Ibid., 5-21). The demand for food security is also made by peasant movements in Guatemala, such as, the umbrella organisation ‘Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas de Guatemala’ (CNOC). The CNOC however, promotes food sovereignty as supposed to food security and explain that they, as peasants, “need to be the producers of their own food in order not to depend on imported food provisions” (CNOC, 2013). Moreover, CNOC mentions the access to water and no to the privatisation of water as part of the food sovereignty. Also, this peasant umbrella organisation comment on mining in relation to pollution of water and ask mining companies to pay for the environmental damage that they have caused. To demonstrate the importance of food sovereignty CNOC states "Un pueblo con hambre, es un pueblo sin paz", which can be translated as a hungry people, is a people without peace (Ibid.). This statement is relevant also in relation to the Guatemalan Peace Accords, because (as discussed in the introduction in this thesis) these accords did not provide a solution to one of the root causes of the long armed conflict in Guatemala, namely the distribution of land and other natural resources. The organised peasants want to produce their own food and therefore need access to more land, especially fertile land. One of the interviewees at the EEAS in Brussels however, argues that the export led economy in Guatemala is not a problem for food security, and used Holland as one example of a country with food security which exports many agricultural products. To me this comparison does not seem very useful however, since the two countries in question are very different in economic, social, political, cultural and geographical terms (EEAS, interview, 13/06/12).

The Business Sector

As might be expected, these power dynamics and conflicts over resources do not come across when speaking to representatives of the Guatemalan business elite, such as the representative of the Entrepreneur Commission for International Trade Negotiations (CENCIT) and when reading the Coordinating
Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations’ (CACIF) printed material. Instead, of unbalanced power dynamics, these elite networks claim to work towards harmony between all social groups and ethnicities in their official statements. Interestingly enough, CACIF published a document called ‘2012: the New Beginning’, referring to the Mayan calendar’s end of a whole cycle, as well as to NASA’s observations of a new sun cycle (CACIF, 2011). CACIF writes that Guatemalans are “sunken into a swamp which requires us (the Guatemalan people) to redirect our compass” (Ibid., p.2). In other words, the Guatemalan business elite makes it sound like everyone in Guatemala should work towards the same goals, but in doing this social, political and cultural injustices are ignored. Moreover, CACIF emphasised that the new beginning has to begin with “…sincere reflection, which starts from the individual and ends with the awareness of everyone” (Ibid.) Again, this statement takes away attention from social justice issues and puts the responsibility on individual level. It is also worth commenting on that the focus on the individual here is disguised in a framework of indigenous cosmovision, which itself is based on community and collective identity. This business sector has a strong lobbying force at national level and keeps itself informed of trade negotiations through CENCIT. The fact that the representative of CENCIT previously worked as a negotiator for the Guatemalan government, illustrates the close links between Guatemalan business and the state (Zamora, Interview, 11/09/12).

Both the CACIF documents and the AA describe a situation of cooperation in which all parties work towards a common goal. In the case of the AA, the states are encouraged to “explore together all practical possibilities for cooperation in their mutual interest” (AA, Part III, Article 26:k). In other words, the development of one state might mean the underdevelopment of the other. As with the example of the GI products (explained in Chapter 4), with page after page after page with EU based products protected, whereas Guatemala had very few products listed.

The Guatemalan business elite brings out statistics from UNICEF, saying that six out of ten Guatemalan couples divorce before five years of marriage and that seven out of every ten teenager in Guatemala have sex before the age of eighteen years (Ibid. pp.6-7). This can seem a bit far from the interests of a business elite,
but CACIF relates this situation to all social spheres, arguing that distractions in the home is reflected in the institutions and in the companies (Ibid. p.6). There is something in this discourse that brings us back in time to a patriarchal ‘latifunduim owner’ attitude of knowing what is best for his workers. This conservative understanding of society and the role of the family are also illustrated in the picture below showing a man standing together with his nuclear family while sustaining the house.

The same discourse of mutual interest between developed and underdeveloped appears in the case of CACIF proposing that all Guatemalans should “Begin by renewing the individual values and rediscover the principles that make us first class Guatemalans ...” (CACIF, 2011, p.10). This could be seen as a quite provocative statement, considering that indigenous peoples, of what is now Guatemala, were colonised over 500 years ago and in more recent times Guatemala passed through a 36 years long civil war with the society divided in fractions. It is therefore difficult to know where these principles which CACIF promotes come from. CACIF focuses on values aimed at transforming the whole society, but begins with the person and the family. The highlighted values are, for example; honesty, order, discipline, responsibility and above all respect. In light of this, CACIF argues that today’s Guatemalan family is far from being a guiding institution, is distracted and has lost its sense of guidance.
As previously mentioned in this chapter, Part III of the AA promotes the states to follow the recommendations of the CEDAW. In February 2009, the Committee considered the seventh periodic report of Guatemala (CEDAW/C/GUA/7) and in relation to poverty and economic empowerment the committee was:

“...concerned about issues relating to access to land for women in general and in particular women belonging to indigenous communities, who can be displaced as a result of new economic development plans “(CEDAW, 2009, pp.7-8).
This demonstrates the CEDAW committee’s concern over the implications of mega projects in the everyday lives of indigenous women in rural areas. This concern could also be raised in relation to European foreign investment in Guatemala through the AA. Already before the signing of the AA, the Spanish company Ecoener-Hidralia Energía wanted to build a controversial hydroelectric plant in Santa Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango. People in the local communities organized themselves and protested against the construction plans. This led to a conflict between people of the local population (mainly indigenous) and the Spanish company. The Guatemalan government’s response to this violent situation was to establish state of emergency for almost one month in May of 2012. As reported in the Guatemalan national newspaper Siglo 21, the Guatemalan President Otto Perez claimed that the conflict was resolved, when attending a conference in Madrid organised by Fórum Europa in mid-May of 2013 (Siglo21, 14-02-13). Nevertheless, the conflict has continued and the Guatemalan government entered a negotiation process with Presidents of the sixteen community development councils (COCODES) from the northern part of Huehuetenango (Siglo21, 18-11-13).

The gender and women’s unit at the Guatemalan ‘Ministry of Energy and Mines carried out four projects as part of the ‘National Policy for the Advancement and Development of Guatemalan Women: Equal Opportunity Plan 2001-2006’. The projects were (1) installation of community solar clothes dryers; (2) energy conservation in rural homes; (3) installation and operation of stoves; (4) energy for productive uses (CEDAW/C/GUA/6, p.10). As demonstrated above rural women’s participation in decisions that have implications for the territory they live in and their access to natural resources were not considered by the ministry.

Rather, the focus lies on improving women’s life quality by making the domestic duties they are expected to do easier. In other words, this gender and women’s
unit does not only ignore problems related to what CEDAW labels ‘new economic development plans’, but also the unit does not question the existing gender roles.

Local women in Huehuetenango organise to protect their territory however. One example of this the network called ‘Movement of Mayan women of Huehuetenango’ through which women from nine different linguistic peoples have organised peacefully against the construction of the hydroelectric power plant. Their messages follow the *buen vivir* philosophy and focuses on harmony and the respect for Mother Earth. The photo below shows five activists from the ‘Movement of Mayan Women in Huehuetenango’.

**Figure 13: Movement of Mayan Women in Huehuetenango**

Photo: Nelton Rivera Gonzalez,
[Online, 01-12-2013]
Despite the large and prolonged protests against the hydroelectric power plant in Huehuetenango, the Guatemalan Ministry of Energy and Mines defends the European business’ interests and argues that “it is not feasible to cancel the licenses of the mining companies, because this would violate the rights of the businesspersons and it would affect more than two million habitants who would be without electricity” (Siglo21, 18-11-13). This is an example of when European based foreign investment in Guatemala does not take Mayan cosmovisions into account by destroying the local habitat and contaminating the soil and water, violating the rights of the indigenous population. Therefore, it is preoccupying that the AA does not take a firmer stance to defend rural women and indigenous people’s rights. Besides, the EC stresses the importance of sustainable management of natural resources and how this would lead to improved water supply and increased economic development in its Country Strategy Paper for Guatemala. The follow up question however becomes what actors in rural Guatemala practice a sustainable management of natural resources? The Econer-Hidralia from Spain has not followed the ILO 169 and also not promoted sustainability in the lives of the people in the local communities.

In terms of sustainable development, the Guatemalan government, the Guatemalan business sector (CACIF) as well as the EC all offer a similar views on development and environmental protection. As explained in Chapter 2, it can be argued that the EU practices ecological modernisation in its implementation of its sustainable development discourses. Ecological modernisation recognises the structural character of environmental problems, but nevertheless argues that present economic, political and social establishments can assume the care for the environment (Hajer, 1995, p. 25). Both CACIF’s and the Guatemalan government’s policies fit into this discourse. The CACIF quotes the Pope Benedicto XVI, when writing;
“The technology allows for the reduction of risks, saves us from efforts and improves the living conditions, and this includes the mandate to cultivate and guard the earth” (Benedicto XVI in CACIF, 2011, p.24).

Just as the quote above, the picture below from the CACIF publication, ‘2012 Nuevo Principio: Vision transformadora de la realidad nacional’ can be interpreted as the sustainable coexistence between people, technology (industry) and nature. Both the above statement and the picture are related to the ecological modernisation discourse, rather than harmony with nature.

**Figure 14: Drawing by Alejandro Azurdia in CACIF folder, II**

[Image of the drawing]

Drawing by Alejandro Azurdia in CACIF, 2013, p.21
Critical Perspective

The AA: A liberal Project

In Part III of the AA, some of the key prioritised objectives are “gender equality, all forms of non-discrimination, cultural diversity, pluralism, promotion and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, transparency and citizen participation” So, what would be *buen vivir* and feminist perspective critiques of this in relation to free trade? *Buen vivir* as well as environmental feminism emphasise harmony and does not separate nature’s rights from human rights. Moreover, mono-cultures and an export oriented economy are not seen as promoting pluralism, cultural diversity and participation. As Cannella and Manuelito argue, the neo-liberal policies “have supported market orientations that institutionalize a capitalist ideology of commodification (over nature, environment, culture, gender, ideas and on and on)”(Cannella, 2008, p.54). This capitalist ideology of commodification is promoted through the AA, and I would argue, is incompatible with a sustainable management of natural resources and gender equality as defined within feminist economics. Examples of this commodification are the carbon market mechanisms which Part III aims to reinforce through Article 50:3 (d).

Just as forms of indigenism and *buen vivir*, feminist based environmentalism offers an epistemology that assume interconnection between human and nonhuman life (as well as nonlife) and avoids the construction of dualistic thinking and rational individualism (Ibid. p.53). The irony is that cultures that might be able to still live in harmony with nature are now struggling to survive in a world run by leaders focused on economic growth combined with sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The environmental organisation Friends of the Earth writes

“ An alternative approach needs to be developed, one that recognises the fact that concerns about environmental sustainability, climate change, and people’s rights are not ‘addons’ but absolutely integral to any successful and equitable forms of economic management” (Friends of the Earth, 2009, p.33).
Part III of the AA is based on rational individualism however and focuses on the rule of law and good governance. This focus is in line with a liberalism and does not focus on structural injustices (including gender hierarchies and class), nor socio-economic and cultural human rights. As declared by many CSOs in a public statement on June 25, 2013; “the ratification of the AA will deepen historically rooted discrimination, exclusion, marginalisation and poverty which the majority of the Guatemalan population live in” (REDSAG, 2013) In Guatemala gender inequalities and racism is historically clearly intertwined with social class.

*Separation and de-contextualisation*

The EC aims at making sure that its different policy areas are coherent and work towards the same goals, including the MDG. Nevertheless, the EC keeps separating issues that are related in the AA, such as the case of security (see Title II of Part III), where food security and environmental security is not included. Instead these types of securities are treated separately in sections on social coherence or environmental issues. In these cases the philosophy of *buen vivir* as well as feminist economics could help us understand the different issues in a more interlinked and coherent manner. Hopefully a more all-encompassing understanding could help us to find sustainable solutions to some of the major problems that people as well as ecosystems face today.

Also, if the EC is interested in mainstreaming gender equality through the AA (see Part III, Article 24:b) as part of the policy coherence, women’s participation in the negotiations could be a good starting point. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Hoskyns argues that women are under-represented during trade negotiations and that women’s organisations are not sufficiently involved nor appropriately consulted in the making of trade policy (Hoskyns, 2007, p.5). The AA is no exception to this and there were few women participating in the AA negotiations. This also reflects the national politics in Guatemala where the least represented group in the Guatemalan parliament is indigenous women. Civil society organisations were consulted at various stages during the AA negotiation process, but the business
sector was also included as part of the civil society in this consultation process. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Guatemalan representative of FMICA expressed her frustration and the difficulties of participating in the consulting process. Also, this was a consulting process, meaning that what the civil society groups agreed on and put forward in proposals did not necessarily have any impact in the making of the AA. In other words, there was a real lack of women’s participation, especially indigenous women, at all levels of the AA negotiations and moreover we may add the difficulties for rural populations to have their voice heard in these processes. For many people living in rural areas it is very difficult to travel to meetings in Guatemala City. This is due to the geography of the country, lack of funding, as well as commitments people have in their villages. This is even more so the case for women. This reality also means that in practise it was very difficult for many indigenous women to participate in the civil society strategy planning before and during the AA negotiations. The outcome of this is that we, all in all, have an AA that represents the interests of political and business elite’s interest in Guatemala as well as in the EU.

In terms of employment policies, the AA promotes “decent work for all and the creation of economic opportunities with a particular focus on the poorest and the most vulnerable groups and the most disadvantaged regions, and specific measures promoting tolerance to cultural diversity at work” (AA. Part III, Article 41) As the Nicaraguan feminist activist Martha Yllucas Altamirano explains however, the work young women can find through new economic activities such as maquilas and tourism, is often unstable and exploitative (Yllucas, p.19).

In Guatemala we see clashes between the understanding of development between the elite and indigenous peasants. The role of the AA is officially one that supports sustainable development, but it was negotiated by representatives from the political as well as business elites. Part III of the AA is there to promote policy areas such as peace and security, gender equality and sustainable development. Nevertheless, this comes is a neoliberal free trade package, hand in hand with, economic growth, extractive activities, an industrial export-oriented
agriculture, comparative advantages based on cheap labour as well as competitive
Chapter 6: the Political Dialogue Pillar

This chapter analyses the second pillar of the Association Agreement, the political dialogue pillar. In order to do this analysis, the chapter first clarifies the background of political dialogue within Association Agreements and outlines the structure as well as the specific issues of this pillar. Secondly, it examines the pillar from a Guatemalan perspective, focusing on gender equality and sustainable development. Finally, the chapter critically examines Part II by exploring the separation and marginalisation of issues related to sustainability and gender equality, while reflecting on ideas from Mayan cosmovisión and buen vivir as critique.

Background

The political dialogue pillar (Part II) of the AA is the shortest of the three pillars in the EU-Central American AA. This pillar is to some degree a result of the EU’s promotion of normative values, as discussed in Chapter two. Arts and Dickson argue that the EU combines its general goal of forging good relations with (possible) political and economic partners, wishing to use its place in international relations as a vehicle for advocating values it considers important (Arts and Dickson, 2004, p. 1). Broadly, these values are, democracy, social welfare, human rights and liberalism.

In 1991, soon after the end of the Cold War, the EU adopted a formal external human rights policy, a milestone in EU foreign policy. These operative human rights clauses were then applied in new cooperation and association agreements between the EU and Eastern European neighbours, as well as with other countries in different parts of the world. In the case of Argentina and the EU member states these parties included “a properly effective human rights clause” (Bartels, 2013, p.128) already in 1990, before the EU’s formal external human rights policy came to existence. In 1995, another key event in the history of human rights within EU foreign policy took place, with the EU Council’s formal set up of a concrete practice of including operative human rights clauses in all future trade agreements and international cooperation (Ibid, p.128). It is within this framework that we find agreements such as the Political Dialogue pillar within the AA between the EU and Central America.
As explained in Chapter two, the EU in addition to human rights also includes sustainable development clauses in its trade and international cooperation agreements. The EC Communication ‘A sustainable Europe for better World: A European Union Strategy for Sustainable Development’ (COM (2001) 264) from 2001 demonstrates the inclusion of sustainable development in EU policy (Bartels, 2013, p.133). The EU- Hungary Agreement from 1993 was the first free trade agreement to incorporate sustainable development clauses (Ibid. p.133). Nevertheless, the focus on sustainable development in EU foreign policy appeared more clearly in the EC 2002 communication called “Towards a global partnership for sustainable development’ (COM 2002 82) as well as in the Lisbon Treaty, article 3(5). In other words, the presence of sustainable development in EU foreign policy documents is a more recent phenomenon than the presence human rights clauses.

From a legal perspective it is worth noting that international law does not provide a binding definition of sustainable development, despite its ‘normative appeal’. Instead, most documents that refer to the meaning at an international level are what are called *soft law* (Andrade, p. 142). Moreover, this means that at present the closest there is to an international ‘sustainable development law’ is a set of “substantive and procedural norms” in a node of international social, environmental as well as economic law (Ibid., p. 142). As discussed in Chapter two, the EU is quite successful in integrating sustainable development in trade policy, viewing it from a global perspective. Some examples that illustrate this are the Global Systems of Preference (GSP) schemes, the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) and the Association Agreements (AAs). Guatemala is an example of a country that has experienced all of these EU policies.

Part II of the EU- Central America AA provides a legal basis for co-operation around a number of political issues and fits within the framework of human rights and sustainable development policy practices discussed above, as well as with the EC’s broader interest in the principle of coherence. The standard clauses mentioned are disarmament, weapons of mass destruction, fight against terrorism, and serious crime of international concern, migration, citizen security, tax issues and the environment.
Furthermore, the political dialogue pillar mentions good governance, international conventions of human rights and core labour standards. As mentioned in Chapter 4 and Chapter five, most of the above issues are also reflected in the AA pillars on trade and international cooperation. Besides, Part II is very similar to the previous political dialogue and cooperation agreement between the EU and Central America from 2003. In that agreement gender is mentioned in relation to economic and social development and the respect for indigenous peoples (and other Central American ethnic groups) as well as environmental conservation and protection are also mentioned (EEAS, 2003, p.4). This brief background of the political dialogue and the normative issues promoted through it helps us contextualise the content of this pillar, as outlined below.

**Outline of the Pillar**

The political dialogue pillar or Part II is a great deal shorter than the other two pillars within the same agreement. Nevertheless it has a similar structure and starts of by explaining the objectives (Article 12) that the parties have agreed upon. Thereafter, the pillar outlines the areas (Article 13) covered by the pillar. Finally, each of ten area specific titles are listed, defined and explained (though this pillar does not include Titles like the other two AA pillars).

**Objectives**

There are five objectives explained in the political dialogue pillar in the AA (Part II). The first objective is to create a ‘privileged political partnership’ founded on “respect for and the promotion of democracy, peace, human rights, the rule of law, good governance and sustainable development” (Article 12:a). Secondly, the parties agree to defend common objectives, values and principles by promoting them at the international level, especially within the United Nations. The third objective is interlinked with the second one and highlights the importance of reinforcing the United Nations Organisation “as the core of the multilateral system” in order to tackle global challenges more effectively (Article 12:c). Fourthly, the parties agree on
intensifying their political dialogue to promote a broad exchange of views and positions as well as “information leading to joint initiatives at international level” (Article 12:d). The fifth and final goal is joint co-operation within the field of foreign policy as well as security policy. Through this practice the parties aim to co-ordinate their positions and to take joint initiatives of common interests in the “relevant international fora” (Article 12:e). These objectives focus on the cooperation around shared policy interests at a multilateral level.

Areas

These areas are closely related to the normative values discussed in Chapter 3 as well as in the background section of this chapter. The key areas stated are also reflected in the three different pillars throughout the AA. In Article 13:1 (Part II), the parties state that political dialogue shall include all features of common interest on regional as well as international level. Despite the areas of mutual cooperation outlined, the political dialogue pillar, clause 4 within Article 13 states “the parties may agree at any time to add any other topic as an area for political dialogue”. Although the objectives (Article 12) as explained above focus on mutual policy interests on a global level, the areas stated in Article 13 focus on regional and bioregional levels. There is a diverse set of areas selected for “establishing common ground” and “pursuing common goals” outlined one after another in paragraph 2, Article 13.

A number of the areas relate to foreign affairs and governance; including regional integration, the structure and orientation of international cooperation, migration, good governance, fight against corruption and the rule of law. Other areas focus on the promotion and protection of international conventions on rights related to identity, such as the rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples and individuals (as acknowledged by the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Note that the International Labour Convention (ILO) 169, the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples convention from 1989 is not mentioned here. This convention is signed by most of the Central American States (Costa Rica, Guatemala,
Honduras and Nicaragua), and by Denmark and Spain (ILO, 2014). As mentioned in Chapter five however, Sweden did not want this convention to be present in the AA, since it has not signed it despite the demands from national Sámi representatives (Sápmi, 2014).

Various areas focus on social rights, including poverty reduction and social cohesion rights, core labour standards as well as equal opportunities and gender equality. Two other closely related common ground areas are protection of the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources. The remaining areas all focus on different kinds of security issues including regional security and stability (including the fight against citizens’ insecurity), drugs, transnational organised crime, small arms trafficking, light weapons and their ammunition, the fight against terrorism as well as the peaceful resolution and prevention of conflict. The multiple areas of common ground for political dialogue between the parties cover themes of democracy, governance, political, social, economic and cultural rights, environmental concerns as well as security issues. Paragraph 3 in Article 13 also includes international conventions on good governance, human rights, the environment as well as core labour standards and puts emphasis on their implementation, “in accordance with the Parties’ international commitments and raise”.

**Security**

The following five articles deal with security concerns; Article 14, Article 15, Article 16, Article 17 and Article 21. The first of the above explains the Parties cooperation on disarmament. This article, in line with the rest of the AA, states that the parties will “through full compliance with and national implementation of their existing obligations under national treaties and agreements...” (Article 14:1, Part II) cooperate and contribute to the strengthening of the multilateral system that works towards conventional weapon disarmament. The section on “existing obligations” means that there will not be any further obligations that different signatories of the AA have to worry about. This is a common approach throughout the AA, since it does not require states to sign any conventions they have not already signed. The approach is to ask
states to agree to work towards goals, rather than having mechanisms to enforce human rights and environmental related policies. In the disarmament article, the parties also proclaim their shared support for the convention against Anti-personnel Mines and the article promotes the full implementation and universalisation of it. Moreover, in Article 14 the Parties agree to cooperate in fighting the “illicit trade and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons, including their ammunition, and also agree to work jointly to regulate the illicit trade of conventional arms” (Article 14:3, Part II).

The issue of small arms and light weapons is a massive problem in several of the Central American states. The Small Arms Survey establishes that “higher overall homicide rates are frequently linked to higher proportions of firearm homicides” (Small Arms Survey, 2012, p.11). Among the Central American States, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala are among the Latin American countries with the highest rate of homicides in Latin America. Guatemala and Honduras are in the group of countries with the highest proportion of firearm homicides as well (Ibid. p.13). Although on a lesser scale than the countries in Northern Central America, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama all suffer from escalating homicide rates. In fact, Panama experienced the second-highest proportion of firearm homicides in 2010 in Latin America and the Caribbean, following Puerto Rico (Ibid. p.19). Costa Rica and Nicaragua both have relatively low homicide rates and Nicaragua is in the category of Latin American states with a comparatively low rate of firearm homicide rates as well (Ibid. p.13). The facts mentioned above are illustrated in the graph below, ‘National homicide rates and proportion of firearm homicides in 23 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010 or latest available year’.
Table 5
Homicide rate

| Source: Small Arms Survey Database |

Due to the high levels of violence and the close relationship between firearm homicides and homicide rates, disarmament is closely related to citizen security.
Article 21 states that the parties include citizen security in their political dialogue, arguing that it is essential to promote human development, good governance, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Parties moreover recognize that citizen security “transcends national and regional borders, and therefore requires the impulse of a broader dialogue and cooperation on this matter” (Article 21, Part II). The article does not further explain this issue however. The authors of the ‘Regional Human Development Report (HDR) 2013-2014 Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America’ argue that “citizen security is the protection of a nuclei of basic rights, included in the right to a life, the respect for the physical and material integrity of the person, and her right to a dignified life” (UNDP, 2013, p.5). This form of security focuses on the personal security and more specifically on threats such as crime and violence. This report also explains how citizen security forms part of the wider concept of human security that also includes health, education and food security (Ibid.). Moreover, this regional HDR identifies six main threats. This includes street crime (robberies in public places, threats and physical violence), youth violence, gendered violence (violence based on a person’s gender), corruption (theft of public funds), and illegal state violence (police abuse and state actors involved in organised crime) (Ibid. p.7).

Article 15 relates to the previous disarmament article but focuses on weapons of mass destruction. The AA Parties regard these nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as one of the most severe threats to international security and stability. Therefore, they agree to counter the proliferation of these weapons as well as their means of delivery (Article 15, Part II). This will be done through compliance with and national execution of the Parties’ already existing obligations under international treaties as well as effective national export controls that could prevent the movement of weapons of mass destruction and related goods (Ibid.). Another of the highlighted security concerns is terrorism and Article 16 concerns the “Fight Against Terrorism”. Here, the text is finely balanced between international human rights law and counter terrorism.

The Parties agree on following international instruments and draw attention to the

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47 Author's translation from Spanish
United Nations Global Counter Terrorism strategy, as outlined in the UN General Assembly Resolution 60/288 from 2006 (Article 16, Part II). This legal instrument aims at “tackling the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism” as well as “preventing and combating terrorism” (UN Security Council, 2006). Moreover, this resolution also strives for “building countries’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism...” (Ibid.). Last but not least Resolution 60/288 aims at “ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism” (Ibid.). In other words, this UN Resolution calls for the long term as well as short term prevention of terrorism, capacity building, combating of terrorism as well as the respect for human rights in counter terrorism activities.

In Article 17 the Parties reaffirm that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole should not go unpunished...” (Article17:1,Part II). Moreover, this article states that prosecution should be guaranteed either at the domestic or international level, in the International Criminal Court (ICC), or as suitable (Ibid.). The Parties continue by arguing for “the establishment and effective functioning of the International Criminal Court constitutes an important development for international peace and justice...” (Article17:2,Part II). The Rome Statue is an international legal instrument that the Parties agree to promote universal adherence to. Paragraph 4 of Article 17 becomes very important in this context. This paragraph states “it remains the sovereign decision of every State to decide the most appropriate moment to adhere to the Statue of Rome”. (Article17:4,Part II). The Coalition for ICC explain how in partnership with academics, civil society organizations, government officials and parliamentarians, advocacy efforts have mobilized different constituencies to establish Latin America as one of the Court’s devoted supporters (Coalition for the ICC, 2014). Nevertheless, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua are the only states that still have not finalized their ratification processes in order to ensure a fully committed representation from this region. In other words, out of the 17 States in the region, 15 have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Ibid). This is why paragraph 4 of Article 17 is so relevant. Honduras, on the other hand has ratified the Rome Statue, but is presently under preliminary examination by the
ICC to establish whether an investigation into suspected crimes linked to the 2009 coup is warranted (Ibid.). This coup was explained in Chapter Three.

Article 19 on Migration can also be interpreted as a security concern, security for the Central American migrants, who seek a safer and more economically secure life outside their own country. The Parties agree to guarantee the promotion, protection and effective enjoyment of human rights for all migrants (Article 19, Part II). Furthermore, the Parties recognise that “poverty is one of the root causes of migration” (Ibid.). As mentioned in Chapter five the parties agree to establish political dialogue on migration-related issues, such as refugee flows, brain drain, smuggling and trafficking of persons as well as the historic and cultural bonds that exist between the regions (Ibid.). In this article, the Parties raise concern for the security of the migrants and do not portray this group as a threat. This is important since it links to the question of ‘security for whom’. The reality appears different in practice however, since it is difficult for Central Americans to obtain residency within the EU, where as it is much easier for EU citizens to obtain residency in Central America.

**Tax and Finance for Development**

Articles 18, 22 and 23 within Part II, cover tax and finance for development issues. The parties recognise the need to develop new and inventive financial instruments (Article 18:2, Part II). The parties moreover agree to support international attempts to advance policies and regulation to finance development (Article 18:1, Part II). The main international instruments in line with these goals and highlighted in Article 18 are the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Monterrey Consensus (Ibid.).

The MDGs are mentioned throughout the AA, whereas the Monterrey Consensus is more specific to the pillar on Political Dialogue. This agreement springs from the International Conference on Financing for Development was held in March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico. This was the first United Nations-hosted conference that concentrated on key financial and development issues, and it attracted 50 Heads of
State or Government, more than 200 ministers, leaders from the private sector, civil society representatives, senior officials from the major intergovernmental financial, trade, economic as well as monetary organizations. These global discussions involved more than 800 participants in twelve different roundtables (International Conference on Financing for Development, 2014). The Monterrey Conference was the first “quadrirpartite exchange of views” between governments, civil society, the business community, and the institutional stakeholders on global economic issues (Ibid.).

The Monterrey Consensus is made up of a total of 73 Paragraphs and Paragraphs 26-38 are on ‘International trade as an engine for development’. The introduction to this section, Paragraph 26, reads as follows:

2A universal, rule-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system, as well as meaningful trade liberalization, can substantially stimulate development worldwide, benefiting countries at all stages of development. In that regard, we reaffirm our commitment to trade liberalization and to ensure that trade plays its full part in promoting economic growth, employment and development for all. We thus welcome the decisions of the World Trade Organization to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the heart of its work programme, and commit ourselves to their implementation” (United Nations, 2003, p. 11).

There are some noteworthy key terms in the above paragraph such as; ‘meaningful trade liberalisation’, ‘non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system’ as well as ‘economic growth, employment and development’. When reading these, it becomes apparent that the World Trade Organisation and the World Bank were major stakeholders at the 2002 conference in Monterrey. All of the above mentioned key terms are reflections of a neoliberal understanding of the global political economy and as explained in Chapter two as well as Chapter three, these ideals of free trade and economic growth are also in line with the EU Commission’s goals. In Paragraph 27 it is argued that ‘meaningful trade liberalization’ is an important element in the sustainable development strategy of a country (United Nations, 2003, p.11). It is not clarified what is meant by a ‘meaningful’ trade liberalisation and the interpretation of
sustainable development appears to neglect environmental as well as social aspects and focus on the economic one alone.

As part of the Finance for Development strategy the Parties have also agreed to set up a ‘Common Economic-Financial Credit Fund’. This credit fund was set up as an effort to “reduce poverty and support the development of Central America, in particular its poorest areas and populations” (Article 23:1, Part II). It shall promote ‘integral well-being’ of Central America, push for socio-economic growth as well as fostering a balanced relationship between the two regions. This initiative includes the intervention of the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Latin American Investment Facility (LAIF) as well as support from the regional Central American cooperation programme (Article 23:2, Part II). This Article uses the term ‘integral well-being’ (bienestar integral), which is not used throughout the rest of the AA.

In Article 22 the Parties acknowledge and commit to internationally established principles of good governance in the tax area. The aim developing and strengthen economic activities, while at the same time to develop a fitting regulatory framework. These principles were raised in a communication by the European Commission from 2009, which encourages EU states to promote good governance within the EU as well as in relation with third countries (COM (2009) 201 final). This ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee: Promoting Good Governance in Tax Matters’ promotes agreements in the tax area, provisions on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes at EU level. Moreover, this Commission communication calls on the EU Member States to adopt a coordinated and coherent approach in the promotion of good governance principles towards third countries, including, where suitable, harmonized action against jurisdictions that refuse to apply good governance principles (European Commission, 2009).

Environment

The environment is touched upon in Article 20, in which the Parties agree to promote dialogue in areas of sustainable development and the environment. This dialogue touches upon a diverse set of environmental issues related to environmental
protection, research and “environmental governance in view of increasing efficiency” (Article 20:2, Part II). In terms of protection this dialogue shall be aimed at battling the threat of biodiversity loss and work towards biodiversity conservation. The protection of basins and wetlands, hydro and marine resources are also emphasized. Other major issues are climate change, deforestation and forest degradation. The research priorities focus on development of renewable energy technologies as well as alternative fuel (Ibid.).

In Article 20, the Parties also recognise the ‘principle of shared but differentiated responsibilities’ as expressed in Principle seven of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (see below):

“States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment! (UNEP, 1992).

As explained above in Principle 7, developed countries such as EU states are responsible for a larger share of the pollution and climate change and should therefore take responsibility and work towards sustainable development accordingly. This Chapter will now continue by situating the Political Dialogue pillar in the Guatemalan context.

The Guatemalan case
‘The Northern Triangle’

When it comes to the security related Articles, the example of Guatemala (and in some cases the neighbouring states El Salvador and Honduras) is quite particular. As explained earlier in this Chapter Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala are among the Latin American countries with the highest rate of homicides. Moreover, Guatemala and Honduras are in the group of countries with the highest proportion of firearm homicides on the continent as well. Due to this particular reality El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras are sometimes referred to as ‘The Northern Triangle’ (Small Arms Survey, 2012, p.11)
The Northern Triangle is highly affected by large scale drug trafficking since it is located halfway between the cocaine-producing countries of South America and the consumers in North America. Central American drug trafficking organisations have been active since the 1970s but the prior decades were comparatively stable with a ‘pax mafiosa’. During the past ten years however, there has been a suppression on drug trafficking organisations in Colombia at the same time as a rise of prevailing Mexican cartels that fight for control in Central America (Bosworth, 2010). Since 2006, the so-called drug war in Mexico has further destabilised the region, as Mexican cartels have started to move further south. In fact, according to the International Crisis Group, an estimated 500 members of the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas were active in Guatemala in May 2001 (Small Arms Survey, 2012, p.17). An example of the high level of violence that the drug trafficking brings to Guatemala is a massacre of 27 farmers in northern Guatemala in May 2011 that has been described as a drug deal gone wrong between Los Zetas and another cartel (ICG, 2011, p. 2).

*Maras, drugs and firearms*

Drug-trafficking organizations within the Northern Triangle countries often cooperate with *maras* (gangs). Central Americans formed the *maras* in Los Angeles and many of their members sought refuge from the armed conflicts in El Salvador (1980–92) and Guatemala (1960–96). In the mid-1990s, US immigration law became stricter and between 1998 and 2005, the United States repatriated nearly 46,000 convicted gang members. Of which 90 per cent of them got deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Here, they gradually took over the territories from the local gangs, the so-called *pandillas* (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rogers, 2009). Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson argue that the transnational transposition of US gang culture may be causing more recurrent and crueler violence “due to the fact that it is less embedded within a local institutional context than traditional Central American *pandilla* culture, and therefore less rule-bound and constrained” (Rodgers, Muggah, and Stevenson, 2009, p. 9).

As mentioned earlier, the availability of firearms is another significant factor in firearm homicides in the Northern Triangle. While it is not known how many guns entered Central America during the civil wars, one study implies that up to two million AK-47s
were delivered at the end stage of the cold war (Agozino et al., 2009, p. 295). The deficient disarmament process after the armed conflicts resulted in the continuing existence of wartime firearms in the region. In the case of Guatemala 3,000 combatants were demobilized after the peace accord in 1996, only 1,800 firearms were returned (IEPAPDES, 2006, p. 12). In addition to these figures, the World Bank has found that between the years 2000-2006, the value of imported firearms in Guatemala nearly tripled, from around USD 3 million to around USD 8 million. Moreover, the bank estimates that 2.8 million small arms are at this time circulating throughout the Northern Triangle countries and the large majority of them are illegally owned (World Bank, 2011, p. 20).

These kinds of facts put things in perspective and illustrate some of the problems in Guatemala that are very difficult to overcome. Poverty in combination with a violent past and a militarised society affected by drug trafficking causes a complicated cycle of violence. The AA will most likely not change this situation for better or worse, but maybe the EU can put pressure on the USA to reduce some of the outflow of small arms from there into Mexico and Central America.

Nevertheless, there is an inherent contradiction in promoting free trade and regulating the movement of goods such as small arms at the same time. The increasing openness of the global economy has given a considerable increase also of illicit trade with small arms as well as drugs trade and as Efrat argues “from civil wars sustained by the supply of small arms to the social costs of widespread drug abuse the negative externalities of trade constitute a major threat to human welfare” (Efrat, 2010, p.126). Economic liberalisation and improvements in transportation as well as communication have facilitated international transactions of these goods and increased the destruction associated with them globally (Ibid.).

_Fighting Terrorism – Who are the Terrorists in the eyes of the Guatemalan state?_

Another issue within the Political Dialogue Pillar is the Fight Against Terrorism. In order to understand the Guatemalan state’s relationship to terrorism, it is important to understand the recent history of this country. As explained in the introduction of this
thesis, the Guatemalan state could be seen as a ‘counterinsurgency apparatus’ during the 1980’s. As Jonas remarks, it is important to keep in mind that in 1992-1993, hardliners among Guatemala’s military and civilian elites were determined not to negotiate a peace settlement permitting an officially permitted presence or political partaking by the insurgent left or its allies (Jonas, 2000, p.10). Jonas continues, “they regarded virtually all civil society organizations as the guerrillas' allies or "facades" (Ibid. p.10) Nevertheless, as we now know looking back, “the Guatemalan army and government found themselves involved in precisely such a process between 1994 and 1996”(Ibid. p.10). The first few years after the signing of the Peace Accords the UN Development Program, the UN Verification Mission (MINUGUA), and other UN as well as international agencies devoted vast amounts of funds and energy into institutional strengthening programs. Two of the key issues these actors focused on were the formation of a new civilian national police (autonomous from the army) and reform of the frail and corrupt system of justice (Ibid. p.31). One example that illustrates the strength of the military and the weakness of the system of justice is that of the military intervention in the small Guatemalan village Ixtaucan Chiquito close to the Mexican border. This area was badly affected during the civil war and many of the older villagers fled to Mexico as refugees during the military dictatorship and returned after the Peace Accords.

Post-armed conflict State Terrorism

Around 11 am on August 21, 200648, six helicopters landed in the small Guatemalan village Ixthuacán Chiquito in Ixcán. Another three military aircrafts circulated over the village. Heavily armed soldiers dressed in camouflage uniforms with their faces painted black separated the men and women and forced the children to stay in the school building for several hours without access to any food. The women were locked in the small house that they use for grinding corn. The operation lasted for about four hours (Solano, 2006). These kinds of tactics were also used during the military dictatorship when the soldiers massacred indigenous men and women in their villages. Therefore, several villagers fled for their lives and left all their belongings behind,

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48 I visited the village one week later to do a mapping of the events that had occurred, as part of my job as a peace observer with SweFor.
thinking that the military was there to kill them. The soldiers then dug up the dirt floors in peoples’ homes, saying that they were looking for hidden arms. Moreover, they also dug big holes in a holy Mayan archaeological site in the village that the Mayan priests use for their ceremonies. This action caused psychological damage among the villagers, who felt disrespected. Not only did the people suffer from the Guatemalan military’s terrorist actions, but also some military officials claimed that they were looking for arms which used to belong to the guerrilla, whereas others stated that the operation had been an attempt to capture the famous drug trafficker Otto Herrera (participant observation). The village representative did not want Ixtahuacán Chiquito to be associated with drugs or arms. Several villagers emphasised that they just want to grow corn and beans and finally be able to live in peace. On August 10 of the same year, a similar military operation took place not too far away at Finca Chailá (Ibid.).

This case is less known, since these villagers are not as well organised and connected to human rights organisations as the people in Ixtahuacán Chiquito. Various statements from Guatemalan state officials make this action even more of a state terrorist action. First, the minister of defence, Francisco Bermúdez, stated that the operation was carried out to find the drug trafficker Otto Herrera and three tons of arms. Then however, the minister of national security, Carlos Vielmann, stated that the action was a search for firearms only and had nothing to do with searching for Herrera, since he was moving in Petén and not in Ixcan (Solano, 2006). Furthermore, the presidential communications secretary, Rosa María de Frade, argued that it was all a military simulation exercise whereas the army spokesperson, Jorge Ortega, confirmed that it was a mission together with the police (Ibid.). Another even more contemporary example of state terrorism is that of a state of emergency for almost one month in Santa Cruz Barillas, Huehuetenango during May of 2012. As explained in Chapter 5 this was the government’s response to the conflict between the local indigenous population and the Spanish company Ecoener-Hidralia Energía that wanted to build a controversial hydroelectric plant.
Indigenous communities’ defence of their territory and Mother Earth

As explained earlier in this chapter Part II of the AA emphasises the need to follow the UN Counter Terrorism Strategy. As shown below, this strategy is not very clear when it comes to what is meant by terrorism however, and it leaves the meaning rather open when stating that the member states agree,

“to consistently, unequivocally and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security” (UN, A/RES/60/288).

In Article 16 of the pillar on political dialogue however declares that the Parties reaffirm the importance to fight terrorism and that this should be done in accordance with relevant UN resolutions. Article 16 does not name these, but the UN resolution from 1994 called, 49/60 ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism’ appears to be of great relevance. In this resolution the member states also made an attempt at defining terrorism:

“Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them” (UN, A/RES/49/60).

If we apply this definition there is a mismatch between what is stated in UN documents as well as the AA and the Guatemalan government’s interpretation of terrorism. The focus on defending human rights appear to fail in the Guatemalan domestic anti-terrorist acts, especially when it comes to indigenous peoples’ right to their territories. One aspect worth taking note of is that the Guatemalan state has used its military and judicial system against its indigenous population in the defence of foreign investment that makes profit from natural resources, such as hydropower and mining.

In the eyes of the current Guatemalan government, local activists opposed to mega projects are considered terrorists and “under the cover of martial law, the government began arresting community activists opposed to the mine, charging them with a laundry list of crimes such as robbery, kidnapping and terrorism” (GHRC, 2013). Men
in civilian clothing captured nine people on May 2, 2012 and two more persons were detained on May 4th the same year.

“The arrests of the 11 community members occurred under questionable circumstances, and the months they spent in pre-trial detention (all were denied bail) were fraught with irregularities and gross violations of due process” (ibid.).

This is moreover not the only case that illustrates how indigenous peoples defending their territories from foreign investors get treated as terrorists by the Guatemalan state. During the early morning of January 12, 2013, a group of people blocked the entrance to the mine with tree trunks. Private guards working for the Canadian mining company Tahoe Resources came to inspect the area and the anti-mining activists killed three of them during the encounter. Thereafter, President Otto Perez quickly labelled these activists terrorists,

“We as Guatemalans will not allow deterioration, we do not want an internal conflict to be repeated, as government we will not let this happened, our obligation is to bring security, it is one thing to oppose an activity, but this was a terrorist attack” (Gámez, 2013).

The above statement made it seem like the population in Santa Rosa have not protested peacefully before the killing of the private guards. In reality the Xinca (one of three indigenous peoples in Guatemala) communities organised a referendum on the mining issue already in 2012 and 93 per cent of adults voted no to mining. This referendum forms part of an initiative across Guatemala with a total of 62 referendums, in line with the ILO Convention 169 (Rivera, 2013). Moreover there was an armed attack by Tahoe Resources guards on peaceful protestors in San Rafael Las Flores, Santa Rosa on Saturday April 27, 2013 (ibid.). Despite the violation of the Xinca people’s right to their territory and the violent methods used by the Canadian company, only the anti-mining protesters who killed the guards are labelled terrorists.

A malfunctioning judicial system

Since the election of the retired General Otto Pérez Molina as President in late 2011, the process of dealing with the past atrocities and prosecuting former militaries faces a big challenge. Even before he took office, Pérez Molina appointed a number of wartime counterinsurgency officials to important positions and some of them,
including him, are linked to acts of genocide (Jonas, 2013, p.371). As explained earlier in this chapter, the AA Parties reaffirm that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole should not go unpunished...” through Article 17 (Article 17:1, Part II). Moreover, this article refers to the ICC and more specifically the Rome Statute as an international legal instrument that the Parties should promote universal adherence to. Nevertheless, every State gets to decide the most suitable time to adhere to this instrument. (Article 17:4, Part II). As mentioned earlier, Guatemala is one of few states that still have not finalized its ratification process of the Rome Statute and this is why paragraph 4 of Article 17 becomes important.

In the case of Guatemala, the lack of commitment to the Rome Statute signifies freedom for the former dictator Ríos Montt and human rights organisations around the world criticised the EU for signing the AA with Guatemala despite the lack of justice in the country. As outlined in the introduction, Ríos Montt is responsible for actions that most probably would be considered the most serious crimes of concern to the international community and following the logic in Article 17 he should not go unpunished. On May 10\textsuperscript{th} 2013 the Guatemalan High Risk Tribunal gave Ríos Montt an 80 years jail sentence for genocide and crimes against humanity. The court found him responsible for the forced displacement of 29,000 persons, the massacre of 1,771 indigenous Ixil people, at least nine cases of sexual assault as well as several episodes of torture carried out by the Army between March 1982 and August 1983 (FIDH, 2013). Nevertheless, only ten days later, on May 20\textsuperscript{th} 2013, the Constitutional Court ordered that the trial should start over on 19 April 2014, cancelling part of the debate and annulling the conviction. In addition, a first instance Court recently made a decision that could potentially return the proceedings to November 2011, when Ríos Montt had not been indicted yet, with the risk that the trial will not restart (Ibid.). The Ixil women on the photo below commemorate victims of the Ríos Montt dictatorship.

The case of the Ríos Montt trail and the decision by the Constitutional Court demonstrates the weakness of the Guatemalan judicial system. In addition this example also illustrates the difficulty in implementing human rights through the AA. Last year’s events in Guatemala are not in line with Article 17 of Part II, but the EU nevertheless went ahead and signed the agreement with Central America.
Karim Lahidji, the President of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) (a federation of 178 human rights organisations spread out across the world), commented on the human rights clause in the EU-Central America Association Agreement (ratified by Guatemala in June 2013):

“Considering the seriousness of the evidence and the gravity of the irregularities in the Constitutional Court’s decisions, and recalling the European Union’s commitment to fight against impunity for international crimes, including genocide, FIDH calls upon the EU member states not to ratify the EU-Central America Association Agreement, until the validity of Ríos Montt’s conviction is recognised, or a new trial is held, resuming the proceedings from 19 April 2013” (Lahidji, 2013).

As mentioned earlier, sexual assault is one of the charges against Ríos Montt, since sexual violence was frequently used by the military during the armed conflict. As we know, rape is often committed during war to terrorize the population, break up
families, and destroy communities (CEH, Tomo III). Unfortunately, as I explained briefly in the introduction, sexual violence and femicide have remained a big problem in Guatemala since the Peace Accords.

Citizen Security and Femi(ni)cede in “peacetime”

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Parties declare citizen security as one of the areas for political dialogue in Part II. Article 21 of Part II argues that citizen security is essential to promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy, good governance and human development. As mentioned previously in this chapter the regional Human Development Report (HDR) for Latin America 2013-2014 lists gendered violence as one of the six key threats towards citizen security. Guatemala is for sure no exception to this trend and due to high rates of violence against women in the Guatemalan Congress approved the law against Femicide and other forms of violence against the woman in 2008 (22-2008) (Guatemalan Congress, 2008).

Femicide refers to the murder of women within criminology, as well as to a hate crime of hate against women. Russell defines femicide not just as the murder of females but as “the killing of females by males because they are female” (Russel, 2011). Furthermore, Russell classifies femicide as “a form of terrorism that functions to define gender lines, enact and bolster male dominance, and to render all women chronically and profoundly unsafe” (Russell, 2001, p. 177). The Mexican feminist scholar Lagarde introduced the concept of femicide, which has its roots in the term femicide. She also relates this concept to impunity and the lack of state action to prevent women from being murdered (Lagarde, 2005, p.1). The term femicide moreover insists that the murder of women “must be problematized within larger structures of patriarchy and misogyny” (Sanford, 2008, p.12). Femicide is therefore a highly political term, which explains why the law 22/2008 in Guatemala does not use it. Conceptually, it encompasses more than femicide since it holds responsible not only the men responsible, but also the state as well as judicial structures that makes misogyny seem normal. The concept of femicide can also be used as a tool for disarticulating belief systems that place gender based violence within the private sphere as a result of gender inequalities. In this way femicide can reveal the
social character of the murdering of women, as an outcome of power relations between men and women. Sandford argues “Femicide leads us back to the structures of power and implicates the state as a responsible party, whether by commission, toleration, or omission” (Sandford, 2008, p. 113). In Guatemala more than 700 women were murdered in 2008 and many of these women were brutally sexually abused and tortured before getting killed (WHO, 2012, p. 3). A 2009 human rights campaign reported that there had been more than 500 femicides per year in Guatemala since 2001 (ibid. p. 3). From the statistics there is reason to believe that these numbers have been sustained since the period of the armed conflict in the early 1980s (Sandford, 2008, p. 105). Even though there are even more men killed than women in Guatemala, it is important to look at femicide and the particular types of violence that often precede these killings. The majority of women murdered are not linked to gangs or other criminal groups, but nevertheless they get killed in very brutal ways. Due to this severe situation, the recently developed legal framework (the law against Femicide and other forms of violence: 22/2008) and all the work done by Guatemalan women’s rights groups (such as Sobrevivientes) as well as international actors (such as UN Women), it is surprising that Article 21 in Part II does not encourage political dialogue on femicide.

Migration

In Article 19 the Parties agree to guarantee the promotion, protection and effective enjoyment of human rights for all migrants (Article 19, Part II). The parties agree to establish political dialogue on migration-related issues, such as refugee flows, brain drain, smuggling and trafficking of human being as well as national strategies for social and economic development in the areas where the migrants originate from (ibid.). In the same way as Article 21 on Citizen Security lacks gender sensitivity, Article 19 on migration does too, despite the fact that there has been a shift in migration patterns as women increasingly join migration flows as labour migrants. The term used to describe this trend is ‘feminization of migration’ (Dimmitt, 2013, p. 714), a concept which not only emphasises the importance of women as migrants, but also draws our attention to new sites of economic processes and work that are clearly gendered. As discussed in Chapter two, the incorporation of women in precarious
forms of work depends on existing gender power relations and ideologies that subjugate women. Moreover, women are often seen to be obedient workers who will not risk losing their jobs by questioning unjust labour conditions, and due to the severity of their economic situation many are indeed forced to conform. Pessar argues that the preference for female workers, many of whom have never participated in remunerated employment before, are based on “patriarchal and racist assumptions that women can afford to work for less, do not mind dead-end jobs and are physiologically more suited to certain kinds of detailed and routine work” (2005, p.3). Throughout the Americas as well as within the EU, the demand for foreign domestic workers has been stimulated by an increase in employment for women and a deficiency of social welfare policies favourable to parents working outside the home. It is hardly surprising then, that approximately half of all annual immigrant quotas have been designated for domestic workers in Spain. And a considerable number of these women migrate from Latin America (Pessar, 2005, p.4). Taking into account the manifold gendered factors conditioning international migration, it is problematic that Article 19 in Part II draws “universal”. Conclusions concerning migration, neglecting the important role of gender. This demonstrates a lack of gender sensitivity.

Critical Perspective

*Insufficient monitoring of Human Rights and a diluted Credit Fund*

Two critical issues related to the political dialogue pillar are monitoring and implementation. The AA between the EU and Central America as well as other agreements containing human rights and sustainable development clauses “have not established any specific organs for monitoring the implementation of these [human rights] clauses” (Bartels, 2013, p.130) Various networks of European and Latin American civil society organisations also address this problem and relate the respect of human rights and sustainable development to parliamentary control arguing that “the lack of parliamentary control is unfortunate taken that it is impossible to guarantee that the implementation of these agreements will in the future be coherent with the respect of human rights or sustainable development” (ALOP et al, 2011, p.16) The same network of civil society organisations moreover express their concerns over
Article 23. It was the Nicaraguan state that put the so-called ‘Common Economic-Financial Credit Fund’ on the agenda, in order to address the huge asymmetries between the EU and Central America. The original proposal was much diluted however, meaning that this Central American initiative will not receive any funding from the EU. Rather, it reinforces the focus on large-scale investments by private sector actors through already existing mechanisms, such as the Latin American Investment Facility and the European Investment Bank (Ibid. p. 15). Considering that Nicaragua also forms part of ALBA, as explained in Chapter two, it is not surprising that its negotiators put forward the idea of an credit fund. The kind of fund that Nicaragua suggested seems in line with the more solidarity based logic of ALBA, rather than the neoliberal logic of the AA.

Separation, de-contextualisation and marginalisation

Chapter five on the international cooperation pillar has argued that the EC keeps separating issues that are related in the AA, even though a stated goal is for its different policy areas to be coherent and work towards the same goals, including the MDG. Nevertheless, the EC keeps separating issues that are related in the AA, and one example of this is the separation between human rights and labour standards. Labour rights form part of human rights, but these are disjointed and treated separately in the AA (see for example Article 13:2, Part II). Moreover, the closest to protection of Mother Earth to be found in the AA, is disregarded and marginalised. One example of this marginalisation in that of extractive natural resources and foreign investment in this sector through free trade. This can be contrasted with environmental feminism and buen vivir that do not separate the Earth from humans.

Other less tangible separations are those in the security domain. Here, the Parties again disconnect humans from nature and separate the “environment” from “citizen security”. In this way people become decontextualized from their local habitat and from the local cosmovisions. As suggested in the previous chapter, the philosophy of buen vivir could help us understand the different issues in a more integral and coherent way, which hopefully could help us in finding more sustainable solutions for trade. In the AA “the principle of sustainable development has never been treated as
a concrete obligation in itself...” and therefore does not “admit the possibility of violating the principle of sustainable development” (Bartels, 2013, p.133). Gender equality is sorely missing in the political dialogue pillar. This chapter’s analysis of Part II policies applied on Guatemala, demonstrates how Article 19 on migration and Article 21 on citizen security cover highly gendered topics. Yet, both of these articles completely neglect gender as a variable. In these cases feminist scholars can contribute to a more comprehensive analysis of the two aforementioned topics. Now follows a conclusion that among other things provides a discussion of disconnects between trade, gander and sustainable development mentioned above.
Conclusion: Sustainable Development and Gender Equality for Export?

“I believe that these free trade agreements, instead of helping us, impoverish the population more and not just the general population (...) but especially it remarks again that poverty has a name and it is feminization, because poverty ends up once again in the bodies of women (...) Also, they sell us the idea that we are a Latin American corridor and that we have to export, because if we leave the region we end up excluded. So they have this idea of territories being so marked and this Western logic, especially the logic of consumerism that they are selling strong.

”49 (Bocel, Interview, 25/09/12)

The argument in this thesis is about disconnects within the theoretical as well as the empirical, and the lack of coherence these cause when analysing, making and implementing policy. This is important to take into account since disconnects within theory affect our understanding of the empirical cases we study and the incoherence within policy affect women and men in their everyday lives. In this concluding chapter I aim to review this argument in more detail and provide a chapter-by-chapter summary of the thesis and the key findings. I then offer a discussion on further research that could expand on the work I have done for this thesis. Finally, I consider limitations and well as contributions of this research. Below follows a review the main argument as it is outlined in the introduction of this thesis and discussed in each chapter.

49 Author translation
Main Arguments in Review

The main argument developed in this thesis is that there are two important disconnects in global trade regimes and their critiques: first, as exemplified in the AA framework, the disconnect between trade and gender equality and sustainability and secondly as outlined in the critiques of the AA framework, between gender equality and sustainability approaches. The two disconnects mentioned above are present empirically as well as theoretically and are to be found in the three pillars in the AA between the EU and Central America. This thesis identifies and examines these disconnects, and suggests that the concept of *buen vivir* is not only a trenchant critique of current trade regimes but also a possible bridge to fill the gap between gender equality and sustainability perspectives.

Article 1(2) in this AA states that, “the Parties shall ensure that an appropriate balance is struck between the economic, social and environmental components of sustainable development”. However, as we have seen in the thesis, the empirical evidence points to an unbalance between the different pillars, in which the Trade Pillar (Part IV) and its primary goal of economic growth dominates over sustainability and human rights components. In fact gender equality is not mentioned at all in the Trade Pillar. Furthermore, the detachment between gender equality and sustainability is also noticeable within the different pillars and these are not mentioned in relation to one and another. In light of this I would also argue that the above mentioned disconnects undermine EU policy since these illustrates a lack of internal coherence and inconsistency with its goals of mainstreaming sustainable development and gender equality. The way sustainability and gender equality are used in the AA now depoliticises these concepts and thereby reduces the possibility for transformative practice within the framework of this agreement.

In this thesis, on a theoretical level, I have argued that *buen vivir* has the capacity to be a link between sustainability and feminist approaches to political economy, and that it has a potential to expand the borders of what is desired as well as imaginable. The GIPE framework critiques mainstream political analyses by focusing on gender relations and their effects at micro, meso and macroeconomic levels and the
importance of the reproductive economy, but it generally overlooks issues of environmental sustainability in its analyses. Sustainability approaches on the other hand focus on the effects of micro, meso and macroeconomic regimes but often tend to overlook gender relations. As explained in Chapter 1, *buen vivir* and in the specific case of Guatemala, the Mayan cosmovision, both see principles of complementarity and reciprocity between humans and the rest of nature as well as among humans; this allows the possibility of combining with both feminist political economy and theories on sustainability. I argue that *buen vivir* has a potential for bridging because I also want to critically engage with the concept itself. From a feminist perspective it could be interpreted and used as a tool in multiple ways, either transforming gender roles or defending patriarchal traditions and normatively essentialize Nature and women’s relationship with it.

Forms of production and trade within the framework of Mayan cosmovision / indigenous economics (see the Introduction of this thesis) can take place in tune with ecosystems. A *buen vivir* economic perspective values the reproductive economy and therefore encourages an economic system that avoids depletion (see Rai, Hoskyns and Thomas, 2014 for further explanation of depletion) of people as well as of nature. As explained in the introduction many women in Guatemala today carry triple burdens by doing unpaid reproductive work in the household, volunteer work in the community and paid work in the formal or informal economy. Moreover, these women often do agricultural work on family owned/run farms. Indigenous perspectives combined with feminist political economy can guide us towards more sustainable and gender equal forms of trade that takes the local ecosystems as well as people into account. The model promoted by the EU through the AA is a one size fit all reproduction of WTO rules that does not problematize or question the combination of economic growth and sustainable environmental policy. There is the perception among some Mayan women that the indigenous economy based on cooperation has been overtaken by the “Western economy in which the free market rules and large companies dominate” (DEMI, 2011, p.31). The result of this development is that “the country’s economy becomes a liberal economy of consumption, that aims at economic growth without taking natural resources into account”. This statement in combination with difficulties
experienced by the Bolivian and Ecuadorian states when trying to implement the ideas of *buen vivir* from their written constitutions to practice across all policy areas (see for example Radcliffe 2012). Nevertheless, I would argue that *buen vivir* can provide us with tools to re-conceptualize our understanding of trade in relation to gender and sustainability.

**Looking Back to Look Forward**

Here in this section I will first briefly outline the chapters and then summarise what each chapter has accomplished. After the summary follows a discussion of key findings and an assessment of the research questions. So, in the introduction and the first chapter of this thesis (‘Building a Theoretical Framework’), I introduced the arguments, research questions, methods, the historical, cultural and political context of Guatemala as well as key concepts and the theoretical framework. The task of this first part of the thesis was therefore to ‘set the scene’ for the rest of the chapters. The following two chapters (‘The EU as a Global Actor: International Cooperation and International Trade’ and ‘Civil Society Organisations in the EU and Guatemala: Campaigning for Change’) offered significant background information that put the AA in a context and provided an understanding of the relevant actors for this research. Many of my insights in those chapters came from the interviews I carried out in Brussels and in Guatemala City. The empirical chapters (‘The Trade Pillar’, ‘The International Cooperation Pillar’ and ‘The Political Dialogue Pillar’) then described and analysed each of the AA pillars through a complex lens of GIPE, sustainability and *buen vivir*.

In the Introduction I explained how this thesis aimed to explore the triangular relationship of trade, sustainable development and gender equality theoretically as well as empirically by examining the gap between the discourse on sustainability and gender equality and the absence of these in the EU trade policy as reflected in the Association Agreements. Thereafter, the introduction established the main argument that this thesis set out to make and the key as well as subsidiary research questions. In other words, this is where the thesis ‘set the scene’ by outlining the puzzle, empirical, theoretical disconnects as well as methods and methodology. Framed in terms of research questions, I aimed to answer the following, (1) How is
trade and sustainable development gendered? (2) What kind of development does the EU promote through the AA? (3) To what extent does this AA promote gender equality and sustainable development in Guatemala? The sub-questions that followed reflected upon social class and ethnicity as well as the issue of coherence between the AA pillars. Thereafter, followed an explanation of my case selection - why Guatemala is a good case study and an outline of relevant aspects of its politics, economy, culture and history.

In Chapter One (‘Building a Theoretical Framework’) I provided a literature review of key concepts, such as gender, trade and sustainable development and this was followed by a discussion of these in relation to the research questions. Furthermore, the chapter examined GIPE in relation to mainstream IPE theory, feminist theory on trade as well as environmentalist feminist theory. Finally, Chapter 1 analysed buen vivir and Mayan cosmovision from a feminist perspective, outlined features in these philosophies and worldviews that could help us to bridge the disconnect between gender equality/justice and sustainability. These features are for example social reproduction, nature-culture dualism and the private-public dichotomy. In other words this chapter helped to explain the theoretical side of these disconnects explained above in the main argument and in it I also sought to contribute to a broader re-conceptualization of trade, gender equality and sustainability.

Chapter Two (The EU as a Global Actor: International Cooperation and International Trade) contextualized the AA and therefore began with a historical and analytical overview of EU international trade and international co-operation policy. Also multilateral trade agreements were discussed in relation to the AA. The chapter gave special attention to EU-Latin American relations and compared and contrasted these to the type of relations EU has with other parts of the world historically and in the present. In this chapter I also discussed the concepts of sustainable development and gender equality within EU foreign policy. So, this chapter provided the information necessary to understand where the AA comes from and how these fit with wider goals of EU foreign policy. Taken together, this chapter provided a contextual setting within which the findings of this thesis could be situated in their larger perspective. The latter part of Chapter 2 examined some of the existing
critiques against EU trade as well as international co-operation policy.

Chapter 3 counter balanced the previous chapter and its focus on state level actors by examining the views of civil society organisations in Brussels as well as in Guatemala. This chapter was to a large extent based on the interviews I conducted during my fieldwork and it explained where some of the views that have helped to form my critique derive from. To some extent this chapter gave voice to actors that the EU promised a space for dialogue, but that were not let inside behind the locked doors during the negotiation process. Some of the actors described in Chapter 3 participated in the spaces offered to civil society organisations during the trade negotiations, whereas others chose to manifest their discontent in other spaces and through other means. The chapter contained a brief discussion of views on civil society by various EU institutions as well as Guatemalan state institutions (even though there appears to be a gap in the literature on the contemporary state-civil society relationship in Guatemala). Thereafter, followed an explanation of the choice of organisations that are represented empirically in this thesis. Two parts followed this explanation, first an introduction of the various Brussels based CSOs and their understanding of sustainable development and gender equality in relation to trade, and secondly a presentation of the Guatemalan CSOs and an examination of their conceptualities the same concepts. Moreover, the chapter explained what issues the organisations in these two different geographical locations fought for in relation to the AA.

The following three chapters were empirical analytical chapters based on the AA pillars. This section of the thesis began with Chapter 4 that critically examined the trade pillar (referred to as Part IV in the AA). But, before examining this particular pillar however, the chapter first presented an outline of the AA negotiation process and then the structure as well as institutional framework of the overall agreement. Thereafter the chapter explained the content of each of the titles of Part IV and a discussion of trade in relation to sustainable development and gender equality follows this. One of the issues examined is the so-called Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) done by the consulting firm Ecory, on the behalf of the EC. This assessment argues that there is a danger that firms based in Central America lower
wages and labour standards in order to compete for foreign direct investment. From a gender perspective this kind of ‘race to the bottom’ is likely to have a negative impact on women, when combined with already existing inequalities in access to resources, decision-making and power in society. Therefore, the chapter argued that the free trade agreement outlined in Part IV is likely to deepen gender inequalities. Moreover, the sustainable development provided in Title VIII of the trade pillar is in line with ecological modernisation and sees economic growth as a solution also to environmental problems. Chapter 4 also drew attention to that this subsequently means that the trade pillar works according to a logic opposite to buen vivir and sustainability.

Chapter 5 examined the international cooperation pillar (labelled as Part III of the AA) and begins by setting the scene and linking this pillar to the EC “European coherence on development” declaration from 2005, which emphasises the importance of linking poverty reduction strategies with trade. Thereafter followed an outline, explanation and critical discussion of the thematic areas of the different articles in Part III. These areas are ‘democracy, human rights and good governance’, ‘justice, freedom and security’, ‘social development and social cohesion’, migration, ‘environment, natural disasters and climate change’, ‘economic and trade development’, ‘regional integration’, ‘culture and audio-visual cooperation’ as well as ‘knowledge society’. After this explanation and discussion I examined the EC’s Country Strategy Paper (2007-2013) for Guatemala and compare and contrast this policy document with the AA international cooperation pillar. Moreover Chapter 5 linked this pillar to a discussion on sustainable development and gender equality in Guatemala in which I argued that the AA does not improve rural women’s situation when it comes to their struggle for land, both as women and as indigenous peoples. Moreover, the chapter demonstrated that the EC, the Guatemalan business sector (CACIF) as well as the Guatemalan government all have a similar understanding of sustainable development. One common assumption that these actors share is that the present political, economic and social establishments can assume the care for the environment. Moreover, these actors promote monocultures and an export oriented economy, positions that vary drastically from those of buen vivir philosophy that rather promotes multiculturalism as well as local ecological diversity and sees
this export oriented model as a limit to pluralism, cultural diversity and participation. In Chapter 5 I argued that *buen vivir* and feminist economics could help us to understand issues in a more interlinked and coherent manner. In the case of the AA it has not managed to connect issues such as food sovereignty, security and environmental security. This argument in Chapter 5 is moreover interlinked with the main argument about theoretical as well as empirical disconnects.

In Chapter 6 I described and analysed the remaining pillar, namely the one on political dialogue (Part II of the AA). At a first glance this did not appear to be the most important pillar to study for this thesis, since there is more on trade, sustainable development as in the trade pillar and more on gender equality in the international cooperation pillar. When doing the analysis though, I began to think about what is missing within policy documents and why that is. This reflection allowed me to see the political dialogue pillar as highly relevant to my critique of the EU AA. The chapter, therefore, first gave a brief background of the political dialogue between the EU and the Central American states, in order to contextualise it within the AA. Then followed an outline of the pillar and an explanation of the objectives as well as different topic areas. The main objectives of this pillar focus on cooperation and an improved possibility to gather around shared initiatives for common policy interests at a multilateral level. One of the critiques of the pillar that I raised in this chapter is the lack of any specific organs for observation of the implementation of human rights and sustainability related clauses in the AA. This also illustrates the detachment of trade in relation to sustainability and gender equality between as well as within the different pillars. Moreover, the above mentioned disconnect supports the argument of undermining of EU policy due to a lack of internal coherence and inconsistency with its policy mainstreaming goals.

**Key findings and an assessment of my Research questions**

Having presented the main argument and as well as a summary of each chapter of the thesis, I now assess my research questions and findings. This brings me back to the introduction the introduction of this thesis I asked three questions,
(1) How is trade and sustainable development gendered?

(2) What kind of development does the EU promote through the AA?

(3) To what extent does this AA promote gender equality and sustainable development in Guatemala and which socio-economic and ethnic groups in the country benefit from this AA?

In an attempt to address the first question, my research as well as the literature review found that trade is gendered in multiple ways that relate to existing gender hierarchies in which women often are discriminated and disempowered. For example, women are often not able to exercise a range of market choices because of their social reproductive roles; their access to resources such as land and finance is limited by formal and informal constraints put upon them through inheritance practices; their access to markets is limited through constraints upon travel. And when they are mobilised into the labour market, their gendered roles have meant that they suffer from discriminatory practices in terms of pay and labour conditions. Finally, the reproductive economy (as defined in Chapter one) is to a large extent dominated by women doing unpaid work that sustains the formal economy. Due to this undervaluing of the reproductive economy women around the world today are disadvantaged at various levels (participation in the job market, career opportunities, and salaries) and the trade sector is no exception. Moreover, women’s participation in trade negotiations is low, which was something that civil society actors I interviewed both in Brussels and Guatemala City expressed concern about. The AA agreement is rhetorically better for addressing issues of gender equality than traditional free trade agreements without gender clauses. However, the concern with gender equality found in the AA is, I have found, undermined by its free trade approach, together with its focus on and support for economic growth, industrial export-oriented agriculture, extractive activities and a comparative advantage based on cheap labour. Another important observation from interviews with various actors from different sectors in Guatemala (ministry of economy, women’s organisations and cooperatives) is that this neo-liberal trade logic promoted by the AA supports big producers, rather than medium or small scale ones. This
affects women negatively since men control most big firms and moreover there is an ethnic aspect to this, since indigenous women and men living in rural areas most commonly are small-scale producers. This finding relates to the question of what kind of development the AA promotes.

Sustainable development is also gendered in various ways and existing gender hierarchies play an important role in this case too. The way sustainable development is linked to the green economy model for development in the AA, especially in the trade pillar, depoliticises the idea of sustainability and makes the concept unbalanced with a strong focus on economic growth. This has a big impact on small-scale producers since this sector does not fit in with large-scale monocultures and industrial production. Moreover, it has a negative impact on food sovereignty as well as food security since the best soils are used for cash crops for export. This priority may also impacts women in their everyday lives negatively since it might make it more difficult and time consuming for them to buy food items and do the cooking for them and their family members. In some cases free trade agreements lead to an influx of cheap food items, but various indigenous women working for women’s rights expressed their concern for these foods that they consider unhealthy. The trade pillar (Title VIII) encourages eco-labelling as well as fair and ethical trade schemes as part of its trade combined with sustainable development. Unfortunately, as I found through my research, these trade schemes are difficult to enter and the labelling is costly for the producers. Women, who in Guatemala, often have little access to credit, land and other property are therefore disadvantaged when it comes to obtaining these labels and participate in the international market. This model of sustainable development moreover encourages particular forms of renewable energy, which as discussed in Chapter 5 includes hydropower that has caused conflicts between foreign businesses and local populations in rural Guatemala.

The above assessment of question one and two is closely related to the final question that focuses on the case of Guatemala. An intersectional perspective that I have attempted to develop in this thesis brings awareness to the overlapping of exclusions as well as privileges in a society as socially and culturally diverse as the Guatemalan one. The AA supports a further liberalisation of the Guatemalan economy which
benefits already empowered social groups within the country. In everyday life this means for example that a rich white or mestizo woman who lives in an urban area is more likely to gain from the AA than a poor indigenous woman who lives in a rural area. These women have different access to information, education as well as capital for investments. Furthermore, the neo-liberal trade logic promoted in the AA privileges men over women since it does not provide policies that encourage a transformation of gender hierarchies.

As mentioned above, the key findings of this thesis relate to disconnects both within theory and within the practice among EU and Central American policy makers as well as civil society organisations. A more coherent approach that includes both sustainability issues and aims to change existing gender hierarchies could learn from both feminist economics and environmental feminism. A stronger link between sustainability and feminist economics would also permit us to think about trade in terms of solidarity as well as sustainability and *buen vivir* offers a perspective that takes local conditions into account whilst promoting multiculturalism as well as ecological diversity.

**Looking forward: Further Research, Limitations and Contributions of Research**

This research has been a journey over several years that took me to different geographical places but also expanded and developed my research interests. As a result of this journey I have begun to think about different representations of development through visual means of expression. This is an area of study that I believe could expand and enrich the findings presented in this thesis. Below I therefore explain some of my thoughts on the representations of development.

*Representations of Development: What does development look like?*

One way of analysing the European Commission’s views on development is by being attentive to not only the words on the pages of the AA but also the images that are found in the Commission’s publications on development. This allows us to read laterally the message that the EU gives out both in its text and its selection of visual images. As Rai has argued,
“political imaginaries represented in and through aesthetic production generate both cognitive and affective responses which are expressed in terms of history, the present as well as future aspirations. The excavation and representation of time is not innocent; social and political relations are reproduced through a variety of modes in specific spaces – narratives - verbal and written - ceremony and ritual, symbols, paintings and sculpture, poetry and dramaturgy. Together this forms the aesthetics of politics as well as of power. Second, aesthetics help us reflect upon the processes through which certain political representations become hegemonic – how the dominant modes of power are reproduced and how are the marginalised kept outside the spaces of performance of power, in the shadows, ‘out of place’. Third, it allows us to ask questions about the palimpsest of multiple histories and imaginaries – representations of power are not stable; they are contingent. Through asking these questions about the manifestations of power, its everyday presence and representation, we can analyse social relations and understand how these play out in our daily lives, which is where most of us experience politics” (Rai, 2014, p.1)

; in other words, images speak their own story. Attention to these images provides us with another mode of political analysis. The actual AA documents do not have any images, but there are plenty of visual illustrations in a document called the ‘EU-Central America: Trade Relations under the Association Agreement’ published by the commission in year 2012. The following section examines the illustrations in this document and contrasts these with the images from a report made by the environmentalist CSOS Friends of the Earth Europe and Friends of the Earth Latin America and the Caribbean. The illustrations below are from the European Commission document (EC, 2012)
These images focus on the metropolis without harmony with nature and create a sensation of impersonalisation. The photos of buildings portray a celebration of hypermodernity through a global, hegemonic architecture that is disconnected from the local. Moreover, the images of this architecture portray time (modernity), but not place. In these images the identity of local people does not matter, they represent modernity and not maternities, connection through sameness as supposed to celebration of multiculturalism and therefore diversity is not celebrated in these images. The only object that differs is the cheese, but despite the fact that it is food, it is still not close to people. Moreover it is interesting that the cheese is present considering the development CSOs critique of the EU support for European dairy industry and the unfair competition that this causes (see Chapter 3).

The following images are taken from the Friends of the Earth document called, ‘Calling the EU’s bluff: Who are the real champions of biodiversity and traditional knowledge in the EU-Central American and EU-Community of Andean nations Association Agreement?’ from year 2009.
The Friends of the Earth images are completely different from the European Commission ones, even though both documents deal with issues related to the EU-Central America AA. The Friends of the Earth photos portray place and locality more than time. Rather than a Western interpretation of modernity, these photos show traditions and indigenous peoples. The focus is on the rural sphere, as supposed to the urban one in the EC document. The second set of images also celebrates people’s relationship with nature. Indeed it does not come as a surprise that the Friends of the Earth document makes reference to Evo Morales, Bolivia’s President’s letter to the EU heads of states, in which he writes that

“...we want the Association Agreement with the European Union to give a priority to the protection of condition of life. These considerations are fundamental for “living well” [buen vivir], as indigenous communities propose for all living beings, and to which logic of productivity and profit must be subordinated” (Friends of the Earth, 2009, p.9)
During this research I have also come across the Kaqchikel (Mayan) artist Paula Nicho Cúmez’s paintings that illustrate Mayan cosmovision and mother earth. Below is an image of her painting ‘Our Mother Earth’.

Figure 18 Nuestra Madre Tierra (Our Mother Earth)

Nuestra Madre Tierra (Our Mother Earth), painting by Paula Nicho Cúmez, 2010.

Nicho Cúmez started with weaving and has taken up painting later. Her interest in weaving is reflected in her paintings that often include traditional patterns from Mayan textiles, as in the painting above. This Mayan artist’s visual representations show the integrity of nature and I would argue also represent a visual culture of resistance in contrast to the EC images in the beginning of this section which rather embody a visual culture of power.
I interpret the painting above, ‘destruction of nature’ as an illustration of the destruction of the values so present in buen vivir philosophy and Mayan cosmovision, the respect for mother earth and the lack of equilibrium between humans and the rest of the ecosystem. The link between women and nature comes across as very strong in this art through this visual representations of mother earth. I believe that this understanding of nature as gendered can be problematic and needs to be problematized since, as Agrawal argues, environmental destruction and the (ab)use of natural resources has social class as well as local implications (Agrawal, 1992, p.150). In the discussion of the visual representations above, of what I see as different cultures of power and resistance, I have tried to demonstrate that images are representations of our ideas and therefore matter in the study of IPE. Building on the work that I have done on textual and oral
representations of sustainability and gender equality in relation to trade for this thesis, it would be interesting to expand this research and include also aesthetical reproductions of these ideas.

**Reflection on Challenges and Achievements**

My original proposal for this research was of comparative nature and would have involved work on the EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with CARICOM and the EU-Central American AA. Due to time as well as financial constraints for fieldwork in three places (Brussels, Guatemala as well as the Caribbean) however, I changed the research topic to a single case study. Nonetheless, I consider this approach a possible limitation and I therefore identify a comparison between sustainable development, trade and gender equality in the EPAs and the AAs as an area for future research. This could give us a better understanding of patterns within EU foreign policy (trade as well as international cooperation) towards developing countries.

The multicultural aspect of the Guatemalan society makes it an interesting case to study since the indigenous presence also affects the debates about sustainability and gender equality. Nevertheless, the fieldwork becomes more challenging since there are twenty-three languages and some people (especially women) speak little or no Spanish. This limitation was not a severe problem for this research however, since I interviewed representatives from state institutions, the private sector as well as CSOs. These interviewees all spoke Spanish and my familiarity with the Guatemalan dialect and local expressions from having lived and worked in there also made the fieldwork easier. On the other hand the conversations about Mayan cosmovision and *buen vivir* would surely have been enriched if I had been able to speak the indigenous languages and understand the original words in their own cultural contexts, rather than interpretations and translations into Spanish. So, in this case the language barrier was a limitation for me as a researcher. The topic of *buen vivir* and its relationship with Mayan cosmovision in Guatemala is something that requires further research since research so far has focused on the Andean region. Also the relationship between feminism, *buen vivir* and Mayan cosmovision is an area of further research that I believe could fill gaps within feminist theory and improve the understanding of
tensions and exchanges in this relationship better.

In empirical terms this thesis makes several contributions. First, through a close examination of the AA agreement with Central America, it analyses the kind of development promoted by the EU through these instruments of trade by examining different actors’ perspectives at the micro, meso and macro levels. Secondly, whilst there is already a fair amount of discussion on topics such as regionalism and trade on its own, the focus on sustainable development and gender equality in relation to free trade has yet not been explored extensively in academic work. In my work I have not only critiqued the disconnects between trade, gender and sustainability that are being reproduced through EU’s AA agreements; my work then is relevant to a critical study of these trade governance regimes. Thirdly, human rights and sustainable development in the AAs has been discussed from a legal perspective (for example Bartels, 2007) but not, however, with a specific focus on gender. In studies on the gender impact of the AA there is moreover little mentioning of issues of sustainability (for example CAWN, 2007). Guatemala as a case study also makes for an empirical contribution since most studies focus on its own internal issues (for example Brett, 2008), rather than the country’s relationship with the EU. My thesis makes these connections – between trade, sustainability and gender and argues for a different vision of imagining the world of production and exchange. One of the strengths of this thesis is the strong connection between the empirical and the theoretical. This is in part due to my engagement with feminist theory’s interest in transformation and strong link of feminism to activism as well as buen vivir’s existence both as policy and philosophy. In other words the disconnects between theory and practice which I have noted to be present both in academia and in policy-making are addressed here in the form of an empirical approach which is deeply integrated with the background theory. Bearing these findings in mind, this thesis argues for the need to re-conceptualize the understanding of trade in relation to sustainability and gender equality. These issues need to be analysed in a coherent manner and buen vivir may assist us with this task.
APPENDIX I

Interview Questions

Outline for interviews with CSOs in Brussels, June 2012

Introduction:
- Brief explanation of my research and the purpose of the interviews.

Warm up Questions:
- Please, can you tell me a bit about what do you do in your job?
- Have you been involved somehow with the EU Association Agreements?
- In that case what other institutions/organisations have you worked with when doing this?

Trade:
- Would you say that FTAs generally is a helpful tool in creating better living conditions for poor people in developing countries?
- What social groups do you think benefit from the opening up of markets in developing countries?
- Does this vary in different parts of the world?

Sustainable development:
- Does the way the EU defines sustainable development vary from the way your organisation defines it?
- Why is it that the EU promotes sustainable development and trade together, according to your understanding?
- Do you see any problems or contradictions when promoting sustainable development and free trade at the same time?
- Are the Association Agreements (AAAs) in Central America promoting sustainable development according to your organization?
Gender Equality:
- Does the way the EU defines gender equality vary from the way your organisation defines it?
- Do you think that trade influences gender relations? In what ways?
- In general, do you think the transformation towards gender equality is compatible with the goals of EU trade agreements? Does this vary among different agreements?

Civil Society:
- Does the way the EU defines civil society vary from the way your organisation defines it? If it varies, why do you think that is?
- How would you describe the role of civil society in the making and implementation of EU trade agreements?
- What sort of alliances or disputes have you observed/experienced in relation to EU trade agreements?

Closure:
- Do you have any anything you would like to add or would you like to ask me any questions?

Outline for interviews with EU representatives in Brussels

Introduction:
- Brief explanation of my research and the purpose of the interviews.

Warm up Questions:
-Please, can you tell me a bit about what do you do in your job?
-Have you been involved somehow with the EU Association Agreements?
-In that case what other institutions/organisations have you worked with when doing this?

Main Body Questions:

Background Questions for, policy officers in EEAS
- What are the procedures for completing an AA?
- How do the negotiations begin?
- DG Trade had the right to negotiate without the council’s involvement on trade issues, but how is it dealt with when the association agreement includes topics such as sustainable development?

**Questions for staff at EU institutions:**

- What do you understand by *gender equality*?
- Do you think that trade influences gender relations?
- In general do you think the transformation of gender relations is compatible with the goals of EU trade agreements?
- Would you say that the AAAs have a positive impact on gender equality?
- What do you understand by *sustainable development*?
- Do you see any possible problems or contradictions when promoting sustainable development and free trade at the same time?
- Are the AAAs promoting sustainable development in Latin America according to you?

- Do you think there are any contradictions or incoherence between the cooperation pillar and the trade pillar of the AAAs with Central America?
- What social groups do you think benefit from the opening of markets?
- Would you say that the opening up of markets generally is a helpful tool in creating better living conditions for poor people in developing countries?
- What do you understand by *civil society*?
- How would you describe civil society’s role in the making and implementation of the AAs?
- What is your understanding of the effects of EU-Guatemala in Guatemala?
- Would you say that EU trade could affect Guatemala in terms of sustainable development and/or gender equality?
- Is your understanding that the AAAs support the EU international cooperation/development work in Guatemala? Does this vary in between the different pillars of the agreements?

**Closure:**

- Do you have anything you would like to add or would you like to ask me any questions?
Outline for interviews with state institutions in Guatemala City, August - September 2012

Introduction:
- Brief explanation of my research and the purpose of the interviews.

Warm up Questions:
- Please, can you tell me a bit about what do you do in your job?
- Have you been involved somehow with the EU Association Agreements?
- If yes, what other institutions/organisations have you worked with when doing this?

Trade:
- What social groups do you think benefit from the opening up of markets in Latin America?
- Would you say that FTAs generally is a helpful tool in creating better living conditions for poor people in developing countries?

Sustainable development:
- What does your institution understand by sustainable development?
- Why does the EU promote sustainable development and trade together, according to your understanding?
- Do you see any problems or contradictions when promoting sustainable development and free trade at the same time?
- Are the Association Agreements (AAs) in Central America promoting sustainable development according to your institution?
- In terms of sustainable development and gender equality, do you see any difference between the CAFTA (US_Central American free trade agreement) and the AAs?

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Questions translated from Spanish by Author.
Gender Equality:
- Is gender equality one of the goals of your institution? In that case, how do you work towards this goal?
- What does your institution understand by gender equality?
- Do you think that trade influences gender relations? In what ways?

Civil Society:
- What does your institution understand by civil society? Which civil society organisations have you worked with most when negotiating the AAs? Why?
- How would you describe the role of civil society in the making and implementation of the AAs?
- What sorts of alliances or disputes have you observed/experienced in relation to the AAs?
- How do you view the coordination between civil society organisations in Central America and the EU?

Guatemala:
- In light of the cultural and ethnic context of Guatemala, how does your institution view the policies promoted through the AAs?
- In what ways do the AAs affect the agricultural sector in Guatemala? What groups within this sector benefit from the type of policies promoted through the AAs?
- If any, what are the ways in which the AAs’ policies have a positive impact in women’s lives in Guatemala?

Closure:
- Do you have any anything you would like to add or would you like to ask me any questions?
Outline for interviews with CSOs in Guatemala City, August - September 2012

Introduction:
- Brief explanation of my research and the purpose of the interviews.

Warm up Questions:
- Please, can you tell me a bit about what do you do in your job?
- Have you been involved somehow with the EU Association Agreements?
- In that case what other institutions/organisations have you worked with when doing this?

Trade:
- What social groups do you think benefit from the opening up of markets in Latin America? And which ones do not benefit? Why?
- Would you say that FTAs generally is a helpful tool in creating better living conditions for poor people in developing countries?

Sustainable development:
- What does your organisation understand by sustainable development?
- Why does the EU promote sustainable development and trade together, according to your understanding?
- Are the Association Agreements (AAs) in Central America promoting sustainable development according to your organization?

Gender Equality:
- Is gender equality one of the goals of your organisation?
- What does your organisation understand by gender equality?
- Do you think that trade, particularly the AA agreements, influences gender relations?

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51 Questions translated from Spanish by Author.
- In general, do you think the transformation towards gender equality is compatible with the goals of EU trade agreements? Does this vary among different agreements?

**Civil Society:**

- What does your organisation understand by civil society?
- How would you describe the role of civil society in the making and implementation of the AAs?
- What sorts of alliances or disputes have you observed/experienced in relation to negotiation of EU trade agreements?
- How do you view the coordination between civil society organisations in Central America and the EU?
- In light of the cultural and ethnic context of Guatemala, how does your organisation view the social policies promoted through the AAs?
- In what ways do the AAs affect the agricultural sector? What groups within this sector benefit from the type of policies promoted through the AAs?
- Are there ways in which the AAs’ policies have a positive impact in women’s lives in Guatemala?

**Closure:**

- Do you have any anything you would like to add or would you like to ask me any questions?
APPENDIX II

LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED


BROLO, J. Departamento de Investigaciones Sociopolíticas (ASIES). Guatemala City, 22/08/2012.

CABNAL, M. Cordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) board member. Guatemala City, 21/09/2012.

Cordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) board member. Guatemala City, 21/09/2012.

DAAG, S. CIFCA. Brussels, 12/06/2012.


FORMENTINI, S. DG Trade, Trade & Sustainable development. Brussels, 19/06/12.


GORIŠEK, T. Trade Negotiator, EEAS, European Comission, Brussels, 19/06/2012.

HERNÁNDEZ, G. Asociación Latinoamericana de Organizaciones de Promoción al Desarrollo (ALOP). Brussels, 12/06/2012.

HOFMANN, B. Council of European Union, Direction 1 (Trade, Development, EU-ACP relations), Unit 1A – WTO/Trade Policy. Brussels, 19/06/12.

MALDONADO, M. Representative of the Guatemalan Chapter of FMICA, 18/09/12, Also interview by Johanna Bergström through e-mail correspondence. Guatemala City, 8/2013.


MENDIZABAL, M. Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), representative from their gender program. Guatemala City, 22/08/2012.


Ministerio de Economía (MINECO), Gender and Indigenous Peoples Unit. Guatemala City, 17/09/12.


PEREZ, L. Artesanos de San Juan. San Juan de la Laguna, Guatemala, 09/2012.


POPEȘCU, I. European Union Delegation, Gender and Indigenous Peoples Unit. Guatemala City, 19/09/2012.
QUIROA, E. Secretaria Presidencial de la Mujer (SEPREM). Guatemala City, 13/09/12.

QUARTO, R. European Comission, Direction General Trade, Policy coordinator working with Asia. Brussels, 18/06/12.


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