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Elite co-optation, repression, and coups in autocracies

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Bove, Vincenzo and Rivera, Mauricio (2015) Elite co-optation, repression, and coups in autocracies. International Interactions, 41 (3). pp. 453-479. doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727

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Abstract

This article provides an explanation for the significant variation in coups in autocracies. The existing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies that leaders use to thwart mass mobilization and survive in power. However, most autocratic leaders lose power through a coup, indicating that the main threats to political survival in autocracies emerge from insiders and not from outside the incumbent coalition. This article focuses on leaders’ strategies to mitigate elite threats and argues that autocrats’ strategies of co-optation and repression within the ruling elite and the armed forces affect the risk of coups in opposite ways. Elected authoritarian legislatures are instruments that leaders employ to co-opt members of the incumbent coalition and are expected to decrease the likelihood of coups. In contrast, purges of insider actors constitute a repressive strategy that depletes bases of support and increases the risk of coups. We find empirical support for these hypotheses from a sample of all authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2004.

Item Type: Journal Article
Divisions: Faculty of Social Sciences > Politics and International Studies
Journal or Publication Title: International Interactions
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISSN: 0305-0629
Official Date: 2015
Dates:
DateEvent
2015Published
1 May 2015Accepted
Volume: 41
Number: 3
Page Range: pp. 453-479
DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727
Status: Peer Reviewed
Publication Status: Published
Access rights to Published version: Restricted or Subscription Access

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