Johnson, Samuel (2015) Escaping the tragedy of the commons through targeted punishment. Royal Society Open Science , 2 (8). pp. 1-9. 150223. doi:10.1098/rsos.150223

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Abstract

Failures of cooperation cause many of society's gravest problems. It is well known that cooperation among many players faced with a social dilemma can be maintained thanks to the possibility of punishment, but achieving the initial state of widespread cooperation is often much more difficult. We show here that there exist strategies of ‘targeted punishment’ whereby a small number of punishers can shift a population of defectors into a state of global cooperation. We conclude by outlining how the international community could use a strategy of this kind to combat climate change.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
Divisions:	Faculty of Science, Engineering and Medicine > Science > Mathematics
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Externalities (Economics), Carbon dioxide mitigation
Journal or Publication Title:	Royal Society Open Science
Publisher:	The Royal Society Publishing
ISSN:	2054-5703
Official Date:	26 August 2015
Dates:	Date Event 26 August 2015 Published 30 July 2015 Accepted 22 May 2015 Submitted
Volume:	2
Number:	8
Number of Pages:	9
Page Range:	pp. 1-9
Article Number:	150223
DOI:	10.1098/rsos.150223
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Open Access
Funder:	Spain. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad [Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness] (MINECO)
Grant number:	FIS2013-43201-P (MINECO)

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