CARTOGRAPHIES
OF
SUBJECTIFICATION.

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## CARTOGRAPHIES OF SUBJECTIFICATION.

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SYNOPSIS

The project of this thesis is multi-faceted. Starting with an examination of Kant's First Critique, it outlines the inextricable linkage between our understanding of subjectivity and a notion of space. Once such a connection has been made, it describes the approach necessary to reorient the notions of space and subjectivity that have culminated in the postmodern cry that The Subject is Dead. This approach is named, "Cartography" and is borne out of an examination of the works of Bachelard, Deleuze and Guattari. Given the bases of the area of study, and the way that it will be studied, the next move made in this thesis is to examine the possible and desired outcomes of such an approach. Thus, from reading both Deleuze and Guattari, we will see that a Cartography will reorient that which constitutes subjectivities in such a way as to disable any effort of oppression, and it will redefine our understanding of the space constitutive of these subjectivities as a material one. In a single phrase, then, this thesis can be described thus: To provide for an understanding of a material space and vectors of subjectification, in a way that enhances their mutual construction, so that the active formation of the two can destroy that which organises the subjective oppression currently experienced.
Two of the most important moments in the production of contemporary cultural criticism are space and subjectivity:

1. Space. Space reigns; time has had its term of office in the government of western cultural thought. Postmodernism eulogises space; it spends much of its time describing the fragments of space, or fragments of places in space, that go to make up the spatial whole defined also by the global effects of capitalism.

2. The Subject. We live in an age in which the Subject is Dead - or has died - in which the only possible way of understanding subjects is as fragmented, and fragmenting, beings undercutting the very premises according to which they are articulated. Contemporary life is one of media induced stupor, where interventionist politics and individualist thought have been irredeemably lost and dissipated and asignifying flows are dominant.

The postmoderns, for example, shout such theses at the tops of their faltering and fragmentary voices; and though they try to give a genealogical description of their own historical position, the attempt often fails according to its own slippery paradigms.

Cartographies of Subjectification.

It is often difficult to see the differences between modernism and postmodernism, or even between romanticism and postmodernism, upon an examination of the theoretical bases of each 'movement'. Cultural Movements, rather than merely emphasising a programme according to which
(critical) practices should be undertaken (that is, a force understood as constituted only by a vector of prescription) are on the whole constructed as projects descriptive of their milieux. (This having been stated, we should not ignore the prescriptive, manifesto-producing moments of any such movements.) Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism; Realism, Symbolism, Cubism, Expressionism...and the like, all describe ways in which the world, society and psychic events of the times can be understood. In all cases these "events" are understood as amorphous, heterogeneous, fluctuating, compressive and fragmentary of space-time; and in all cases, the epistemological structures built to comprehend, or allow comprehension of, such events follow the pattern laid out by the Enlightenment Tradition. These schools of thought, or Cultural Movements, base their interpretive structures (and, where appropriate, their prescriptive structures) upon the idea of the subject as a unified whole, locus of experience, or focus for the interpretation of such.

Romanticism's subject - as has been fully examined by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in their *L'Absolu littéraire* - was one felt as either irredeemably fragmented or lost, within a crisis announced by (or culminating in) the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. The response to this crisis was articulated by Kant's Copernican Revolution. Modernism's subject was that capable of coping with the crisis in Liberalism experienced throughout the latter stages of the nineteenth century and culminated in the First World War. Cubism, Expressionism and later-Modernism all defined attempts to understand the representation and concatenation of experience in a world of increasing fragmentation leading up to and immediately following the tumult of the Great War. In these
cases, the Subject functioned as the epistemological and metaphysical basis, or nexus, according to which the experience of an increasingly fragmented world could be rationalised, understood, or organised.²

The relationship of interdependence between a world of flux and the situation of the production of experience, has been further endorsed in the name of postmodernism. This may seem strange considering that the archetype of the contemporary postmodern age has been the dead subject - in which case there should be no possible unified site for the understanding and concatenation of data gleaned from a fragmented, multiplicity of sources. When the Dead Subject was stumbled upon, philosophical attention focussed upon language (though not for the first time this century) and reflexivity, upon "presence" and "absence", Being and The Other: all various attempts to reinscribe the functions of the Kantian Subject but within a world of media-induced, television-exacerbated fluctuation. The postmodern postmortem upon this Subject pronounced that though dead it could be reinscribed within the contemporary spatial organisation; "The Subject", however, was no longer an apt description of its state, its name would now be "schizophrenic". The fragmentations offered by the postmoderns are born astride the grave of a foetid, asphyxiating space.

To give it its due, postmodernism does not neglect the relationships between the state of the subject and the types of space in which it is found. It is the project of the pages which follow, to describe the development of a space which has come to produce dead subjects. In so doing, we will find many ways in which such a dominant and oppressive space can be dissolved in order that a new understanding of space, or spaces, can
be produced. Similarly, and simultaneously, we will be able to provide analyses of the processes constitutive of subjectification such that, as we announce new space, we can announce new subjective constructs too. Postmodernism, then - seeing as this movement has provided the basis for the discussion so far -, will not be shown to be necessarily false in its outlook, descriptions or conclusions; but rather, it will be characterised as weak. The postmodern space and dead subject may not be wrong, it's just that they don't do much.

This thesis, then, begins with Kant's space and subject as constructed in his *Critique of Pure Reason*; moves through Deleuze and Guattari's *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes and Bachelard's *The Poetics of Space* in order to define the critical motor which motivates this thesis; continues by describing the material outcome of such a critique; and concludes by describing the new spaces and subjectivities prescribed at the outset.
Introduction.

Just over two hundred years ago Kant published the first edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason* (the second edition followed after a gap of six years). Many claims have been made as to its influence on subsequent philosophical thought, on equally as diverse subjects. Nevertheless, one of its most important consequences, especially in terms of the way the history of philosophy has been read since the publication of the First Critique, must be the attribution of a Copernican Revolution in philosophy. The notion of such a Copernican Revolution presupposes particular readings not only of Kant's text - and its relation with his previous, so-called, pre-Critical writings - but also of the history of philosophy leading up to Kant (and possibly the history since Kant...); what I hope to concentrate upon, however, is the function of this revolution in *The Critique of Pure Reason* insofar as it is related to his discussions of space and subjectivity. Whether or not what Kant was doing in the First Critique deserves the name Revolution will be discussed obliquely in terms of the relationship between both Kant and Hume's writing's on subjectivity, and more specifically in terms of the claims Emilio Bencivenga makes in his book *Kant's Copernican Revolution* (1987)².

For Kant space (and time³) are - to put it very simply for now - 'in us'. Space (and time) are subjectivised. This is a consequence of (or an
intrinsic part of) Kant's Copernican Revolution. As the subject (however much it is emphasised that such a notion is a construct; to this problem, and its connection with The Critique of Pure Reason, I will return later) is positioned firmly at the centre of Kant's epistemological/architectural system, so must the faculties which allow of its construction, comprehension, consciousness be similarly repositioned. Space (my concern) is situated 'within' as part of the a priori forms of intuition. Briefly, space is a mode of structuring sensations/representations in accordance with geometric, dimensional paradigms, and so is purely formal. Space is here understood only insofar as it can be given (in) co-ordinates, or, rather, how it can be co-ordinated as it co-ordinates. Space is an organised system of differences which serves only to articulate the relative positions of objects and events - as those differences - into a system which can then not only become understandable, but define what constitutes experience (or the act of passing/the ability to pass judgement) itself. Furthermore, space cannot be intuited because it isn't/has no matter.

This space is in need of re-directing. What will happen to the subject - indeed, what will happen to subjects - when space becomes material? when space (still with its role of delimiting the boundaries of subjectivity) is forcibly wrenched from its cosy, co-ordinated work-place as formalising faculty and plunged into the realms of the material? What will happen when space is sucked like smog, sipped like tea and stroked like skin? when space describes that which is already existentially valorised and existentially valorises? When we have seen that space is lived in rather
than merely moved through, hopefully we will have simultaneously re-written a new story about subjectivity.

Space is no mere distancing, nor merely difference. This is the fallacy into which many of the more contemporary thoughts about space - as spacing - fall; spacing already implies distance and differentiation only. Such thought is still rigidly Kantian. Though these philosophies may have deconstructed oppositions and shown up the subject as the fiction it is, they still move within the framework articulated by Kant; Kant's Copernican Revolution is today's Copernican Reaction. The constellations which make up the Kantian Astrology may have been shown to be simulacra but we are still being told (how) to live according to them. The Subject Is Dead! is the cry, but it still spins like a dead star in the same old space; only now, it has become a black hole and goes by the name of Other, or Being... or whatever.

What is needed is a re-orientation of the discussion; instead of (re-) writing the same old astrologies around the same old constellations, these constellations should be destroyed. The new space will provide the possibility of taking just such a parallax view. All schema are sent spinning forever, over the shifting surfaces of space; sometimes regrouping, sometimes even giving the fleeting impression that the old configurations are still in place, but they will spin all the same.

Why, then, is it necessary to pay any attention to what Kant wrote in the *The Critique of Pure Reason* just over two hundred years ago? Kant's Copernican Revolution is important insofar as it relates the discussions of
spatiality and subjectivity; therefore, if a further turn is to be made, it would be helpful to base our discussion upon Kant's subjective turn. We should, then, look at what Kant wrote about space in the First Critique, taking account of his earlier, pre-critical, thoughts on space in an attempt to spatially determine his Copernican Revolution. All the while reference will be made to Kant's thoughts on the Subject, thereby marking the link between it and space.

Kant's Copernican Revolution

For hundreds of years the philosophical world lumbered under theological strictures which bound human rationality to God and Christianity. Then along came Kant. Singlehandedly - but maybe with some help from Hume - he wrenched epistemological problems away from the theologians and thrust them deep into the Subject. His Copernican Revolution is the crowning glory of the Age of Reason; the quasi-mystical insights Kant instigated in the First Critique, of the role and construction of the Subject, qualify him for status as a genius...at least! This is how Bencivenga would have it anyway.

In his book *Kant's Copernican Revolution*, Bencivenga analyses what it is that allows the title 'revolution' to be given to changes identified in Kant's thought by the publication of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. With the figure of Thomas Kuhn ever present throughout his discussions, Bencivenga explains that the scientist or philosopher we can call revolutionary is the one who has become ill at ease with the existing conceptual frameworks, or paradigms, and whose subsequent work can denote a considerable shift of vision. The revolutionary thinker is the one with the ability to extricate
Introduction

him/herself from the cultural and historical specificities which determine the thought of others and rise above them in order to comment upon and surpass them. Such a figure seems to shift between a messiah (in its most spiritual enunciation) and an outsider (in its most existential).

Bencivenga's book is useful insofar as it historically positions Kant's thought. Now and again, though, his view of revolution, and its consequential view of the revolutionary, seems to marr the work. At one point he argues that one major difficulty a scientific revolution (a 'conceptual' shift of ideas) runs into, involves language: because a revolutionary text will want to break with existing linguistic-forms in order to articulate its 'new' thoughts; the problem thus confronted concerns the possibility of being understood. The dichotomy set up becomes: does the revolutionary risk incomprehensibility in order to be innovative? or remain reactionary by being understandable?

Bencivenga's is an idealist notion of revolution. He seems to forget that - in most revolutions - the revolutionary act is the final part of a general movement toward change. Therefore the linguistic community within which such revolutionary ideas/acts take place, will have already been constructed; indeed, one could say that the final revolutionary act would be impossible without such a community having been formed. To insist upon the role of the individual revolutionary (writer, philosopher or even general political figure) is to already take on board particular cultural, political and critical assumptions: for example, that of the creative genius responsible for redirecting the course of (western) thought/politics, singlehandedly constructing a new culture from the ruins
of the old (even though many contemporaries cannot see the ruins). This revolutionary is a christ-figure: a mystic, a visionary, a miracle-worker and disciple-maker. Bencivenga's Kant saw water and created wine, sips of which we may still be lucky enough to take today. This figure is more than idealist, it is noumenal.

Such a reading would interpret Kant's famous assertion of an "awakening from the dogmatic slumbers", as a realisation of the attainability of a future goal, as the walking from the cave into the sunlight or as the striving for a utopia. On the other hand, I would argue, this awakening signifies more than the realisation of the paucity of contemporary beliefs/practices, personal and communal. It is not that relevant from where the realisation sprang, except to say that it did not bubble solely out of the Great Mind of the individual revolutionary. On its most fundamental reading, the reference to "dogmatic slumbers" indicates the already happening of a paradigm shift: insofar as Kant was acknowledging a debt to Hume, we can see that a conceptual revolution is already part of a contextual, socio-'intellectual' whole/community, rather than as an Ursprung, or even a leap of faith, made by an individual genius. In this way, then, the dichotomy set up by Bencivenga in order to describe the linguistic problem faced by the revolutionary, becomes redundant; because as Kant was working within paradigms already articulated by Hume, and as he was working away from those instigated by the likes of Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten, he already had a definite linguistic and philosophical universe in which to work. The question we should now ask becomes: what is it in Kant's thought - for my purposes specifically The Critique of Pure Reason - that deserves the name "conceptual revolution"? and how does it relate to
the thought of previous philosophers (including himself)? In order to provide the answer to such a question, I believe it is necessary to explicate, on the most basic level, Kant's notions of space and subjectivity as propounded in the First Critique.

The Subject of Space in Kant's First Critique.

Space is one of the two main topics of discussion in 'The Transcendental Aesthetic', the first part of the Critique of Pure Reason, (the other being time). Kant attributes to the 'concept' of space (we shall soon see why it is a misnomer to call Kantian space a concept) particular traits: it does not inhere in things themselves, or in the sensations of things; it is a priori of all sensually experienced data; as such, space is that property of the mind which orders sense-experience. Space, Kant asserts in this part of the First Critique, is a Form of Intuition (intuitions naming everything that is, or has been, gleaned from sense-experience, be they direct or remembered representations) the Form of Outer Sense. How is it, though, that Kant comes to make the assertions he does about space?

Kant provides five arguments (and a conclusion) in the section of 'The Transcendental Aesthetic' which deals with the subject of space, one of which he calls a Transcendental Exposition, the others Metaphysical. The first argument begins, "Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences." (A23/B28) This identifies the most basic assumption that Kant makes about space, and the one upon which all his other assertions will depend. In no way, he asserts, can space be the
content of experience - for space signifies only that which differentiates and co-ordinates the objects of our experience in order that we can have knowledge of them (but this is looking too far ahead into the First Critique for the moment). It is only in terms of space - or, rather, in terms of spatial ordering - that we can be said to have outer experience whatsoever. The first argument, then, seeks to provide the most basic enunciation of the notion of space as a form of intuition; it sets out to define space negatively - that is, as that which is not empirically acquired - and in so doing yields a positive, psychological description of its origin. Space is an a priori form of receptivity which co-ordinates our intuitions so that they are adequate for Synthesis. Kemp Smith, in his weighty A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' (1923), identifies two possible psychological statuses for this form of intuition, with regards to the ways in which space can be inferred: 1) As space exists as a co-ordinating power, and as it precedes experience as a potentiality, it "will come to consciousness only indirectly through the addition which it makes to given sensations." (Kemp Smith, p.101) Thus, space is known insofar as it is injected into the ordinary sensual representations. 2) On the other hand, the mind possesses an original "representation of space, and that it is in light of this representation that it apprehends sensations." (Kemp Smith, p.102; Kemp Smith's emphasis.) According to this latter scenario, space provides a kind of template representation upon which outer-experienced representations can be articulated. This two-way distinction becomes important for Kemp Smith's emphasis of the difference between space as a form of intuition and as a formal intuition, to which I will return below.
Kant's second argument I shall quote in full:

Space is a necessary \textit{a priori} representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects. It must therefore be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an \textit{a priori} representation which necessarily underlies outer appearance. (A24/B38-39)

Kant here gives another psychological argument why space is a form of intuition. We can think of space as empty but not the non-existence of space; and so space must be already organised within our psychological structure. To think in terms of space is, for Kant, a brutal fact. Kemp Smith provides a rather neat little summary of the first two arguments, he writes, "The [first argument] proves that space is a necessary \textit{subjective antecedent}; the [second] that it is a necessary \textit{objective ingredient}." (Kemp Smith, p.104: Kemp Smith's emphases.)

What, in the second edition of \textit{The Critique of Pure Reason}, is called the third argument sets out to show that space is not a concept but rather a pure intuition. Kant provides two explanations to this end: 1) "[W]e can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space." (A25/B39)

Thus, insofar as space is singular and unique — and as Kemp Smith writes, "intuition stands for multiplicity in unity, conception for unity in multiplicity" (Kemp Smith, p.105) — space cannot be a concept and must therefore be an intuition. 2) "[T]hese parts cannot precede the one all
embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it." (A25/B39; Kant's emphasis.) Now, as the whole of space must precede the parts, space must be an intuition rather than a concept; furthermore, as the whole precedes the parts, the intuition of space cannot be empirically acquired, for in no way can such an intuition be represented.

The fourth argument also shows that space is an intuition not a concept; it begins, "Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude." (A25/B39; Kant's emphasis.) If space was a general concept then all/any common properties would be abstracted and so no magnitude could be determined; moreover, no concept can contain within itself an infinite number of (possible) representations. Therefore space must be an a priori intuition not a concept. Kemp Smith adds, as a final paragraph to his commentary on this argument, the following passage:

There are apparently, on this point, two views in Kant, which were retained up to the very last, and which are closely connected with his two representations of space, on the one hand as a formal intuition given in its purity and in its completeness, and on the other hand as the form of intuition, which exists only so far as it is constructed, and which is dependent for its content upon given matter. (Kemp Smith, p.109; Kemp Smith's emphases.)

The first representation sees space as that which can be abstracted as the formal ground of all intuition, in which case Kant's assertion that space is a "subjective antecedent" of outer experience would be justified; the
second, identifies space as the form of intuition which accompanies all outer experience in order that it can enter synthesis, in which case the assertion that space is an "objective ingredient" is justified.

The 'Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space' is one of the few places where space is called a concept - mistakenly so, it seems. Nevertheless, this section differs from the Metaphysical expositions insofar as it does not seek to determine the nature of space, but rather to show how space makes possible synthetic a priori knowledge - in this case, to show what understanding of space we should have in order that it will correlate with our understanding of geometry. Kant writes,

It [our representation of space] must in its origin be intuition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be obtained which go beyond the concept - as happens in geometry. ... Further, this intuition must be a priori, that is, it must be found in us prior to any perception of an object, and must therefore be pure, not empirical, intuition. (B40-41)

These, then, are the arguments Kant gives with respect to the notion of space. These are followed, however, with a section titled, 'Conclusions from the above Concepts', wherein two paragraphs, (a) and (b), are followed by a couple of pages of argument. The former begins thus, "(a) Space does not represent any property of things in themselves, nor does it represent them in their relation to one another." (A26/B42) The conclusion is that as space does not inhere in things themselves, and as it does not represent the relation of things in themselves to each other, then its a priority
must be subjective. Which leads into the straightforward statement of conclusion (b): "Space is nothing but the form of all appearances of outer sense. It is the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us." (A26/B42)

The rest of this section, which itself concludes that part of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' dealing exclusively with space, reiterates various of the points already discussed. One is, however, particularly emphasised: that space is a purely subjective form of intuition. Kant writes, "If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can have outer intuition, namely, liability to be affected by objects, the representation of space stands for nothing whatsoever." (A26/B42-43) This marks the beginning of the subjective turn announced by *The Critique of Pure Reason*, which in turn designates the Copernican Revolution.

Before I turn to deal in more detail with the idea of the Copernican Revolution and its relation to Kant's notion of subjectivity, I would first like to look at the sections of the First Critique called, the 'Refutation of Idealism' (B274-279) and 'General Note on the System of Principles' (B288-294) - both of which were added in the second edition to the section 'Postulates of Empirical Thought'.

Kant felt the need to produce these addenda in order to counteract charges of idealism that were levelled at the first edition of the First Critique. The introductory paragraph to the 'Refutation of Idealism' identifies two types of idealism: 1) Problematic Idealism - which holds that the only empirically certain assertion is 'I am', and which thereby asserts that the
existence of objects in space is doubtful and indemonstrable. Such a position is exemplified by Descartes. 2) Dogmatic Idealism - which says that space is itself impossible, maintaining, therefore, that things in space are merely imaginary entities. This position is exemplified by Berkeley. Kant says that Dogmatic Idealism - insofar as it rests upon the assumption that space (and spatiality) are properties of things in themselves, by equating the existence of objects in space with the existence of space itself - has been shown to be false in the 'Transcendental Ästhetik'. His project in this section is to argue against the Cartesian position and to show that having inner experience (of the type 'I am') is necessarily bound up with having outer experience (of things in space). Kant's thesis runs thus:

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me. (B275; Kant's emphasis.)

For Kant, outer experience - insofar as it has already been determined, or, rather, formalised according to the form of outer sense - is itself the determination of the possibility of inner experience. Inner experience - the apperception of something as existing permanently (that is, across time) - can only have any kind of reality if such an apperception is articulated in accordance with intuitions, and therefore in accordance with representations that have already been spatially ordered. Kant explains:

For this [knowledge of the subject] we require, in addition to the thought of something existing, also intuition, and in this case inner intuition, in respect of which, that is, of time, the subject must be
determined. But in order so to determine it, outer objects are quite indispensable; and it therefore follows that inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience. (B277)

It appears, then, that any representation ordered according to the form of inner sense - that is, anything with a temporal determination - can only have meaning if it has already been spatially ordered; and for anything to have already been so ordered, as we have seen, we must assume the existence of externally existing objects, of which we can have intuitions. Furthermore, Kant writes, "Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time save through change in outer relations (motion) relatively to the permanent in space...we have nothing permanent on which, as intuition, we can base the concept of substance, save only matter." (B277-278; Kant's emphasis.)

It is here that Kant brings into play the full range of his epistemological arguments; of which I will give a brief representation now. The 'Transcendental Aesthetic', with which I have dealt - in part - above, sought to detail the workings of the Faculty of Sensibility. This faculty furnishes intuitions - representations gained from immediate perception, or representations imagined or remembered - ordered according to its Forms (space and time). These intuitions are then able to enter into synthesis with concepts. Concepts are furnished form the Faculty of Understanding, and have, themselves, already been ordered according to the Forms of Understanding (otherwise known as, the Forms of Thought, or, the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, or, the Categories). This, then, is the background to, probably, the most famous sentence in The Critique of Pure
Reason, that "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." (A51/B75) Kant's contention is that we can only be said to have knowledge when an intuition has been brought together with a concept; this bringing together Kant terms Synthesis, and the power which works such synthesis is the Imagination. This notion of synthesis is very important in Kant. For, the combination of intuition and concept is not grounded in a primal possibility of unity - that is, subjective unity (the soul) or, the transcendental unity of apperception as Leibniz formulated it - rather, self-consciousness, the ability to think all representations as 'mine', can only be based upon synthetic unity:

Only in so far...as I can unite a manifold of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible for me to represent to myself the identity of the consciousness in (i.e. throughout) these representations. In other words, the analytic unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of a certain synthetic unity. (B133; Kant's emphases)

That which we call the conscious subject, even insofar as we can posit an 'I' to every act of thought, is based solely upon the synthesis that is the joining of a concept with an intuition. So we are brought immediately into the 'Refutation of Idealism' section, which itself posited that we can only base inner experience upon the supposition of outer. These thoughts are reiterated in the section that follows the 'Refutation of Idealism', to which I will now turn.
In the opening paragraphs of this section Kant repeats his assertion that knowledge can only come from the joining of intuition and concept; moreover, "no synthetic proposition can be made from mere categories." (B289) He goes on to provide examples to prove this assertion; examples which refer, mainly, to the categories of relation, and in passing, to the categories of quantity. Each time, Kant says that in order to fill out each of the various concepts provided by these categories, that is, to be able not merely to think things but to pass judgement upon events, there must always have been synthesis with an intuition. He concludes:

The final outcome of this whole section is therefore this: all principles of the pure understanding are nothing more than principles a priori of the possibility of experience, and to experience alone do all a priori synthetic propositions relate - indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this relation. (B294)

Kant's hope, then, is to have shown that any form of inner experience is tenable only on the basis of outer experience; that self-consciousness - and self consciousness - are grounded on the imaginative synthesis worked upon intuitions and concepts, thereby ensuring that all knowledge must be based upon the perception of things as existing in space.

It is quite clear that Kant's epistemology underrites the importance of the role of the individual subject in his critical project; and in so doing identifies the content of his Copernican Revolution. What is also particularly interesting about this turn, is the important position space plays in Kant's system. As we have seen, in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic'
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and especially in the 'Refutation of Idealism', it is only upon the basis of the positing of outer intuition that all else has sense. As I have already quoted above, Kant says that "inner experience is itself possible only mediately, and only through outer experience." (B277) Space, in formulating all possible representations so that they are able to enter into imaginative synthesis with concepts, is not merely the ground of all possible experience, nor is it merely the provider of that which will allow us to have an idea of ourselves as an individual subject; rather, it is only insofar as we can ever have spatial, outer, representations that we can have temporal, inner, representations at all. Inner sense, of ourselves as permanently existing, can only be understood on the basis of a primary spatially organised relationship with (outer) objects. Kant's subject is always already spaced.

What remains to be discussed, however, is the relationship this formulation of space has in its immediate cultural and philosophical context. For it is only after such an analysis that we can co-determine Kant's views on subjectivity and thereby situate our understanding of the Copernican Revolution.

Space and the Copernican Revolution.

In an article entitled 'The Meaning of "Space" in Kant's' Ivor Leclerc presents an historical analysis of the term 'space' (or, particularly, 'spatium' and 'der Raum'). The Sixteenth, Seventeenth and early Eighteenth century uses of the term(s), in accordance with Aristotelian tradition, centred upon the equation of space with place ('locus'). Such a notion of
spatiality, Leclerc explains, revolved around 'space' as a concrete noun; later Eighteenth and Nineteenth century notions, involved the use of the term 'space' as an abstract noun. Leclerc's project in this article, then, is to determine whether Kant's Critical use of 'der Raum' was concrete or abstract.

In using 'space' (etc.) as a concrete noun, that is in adhering to the Aristotelian definition of 'place', early Classical-Modern philosophers focussed their attentions upon bodies; for such a definition situated place as the "innermost bounding surface of the containing body - which of course coincided with the outer boundary of the contained body." (Leclerc, p.88) Leclerc identifies further, that early criticism of such a position on space was aimed at this rigid tying of the doctrine of place to bodies; in such a vein, Leclerc cites Scaliger: "Thus place is not the encompassing surface of the exterior of the body: but it is what is contained within this surface." (ibid.) Hence the notions of space (as place) became ones which defined it in terms of the area within boundaries, rather than with the surfaces of bodies. Leclerc explains:

To put the emphasis on this internal event or room as opposed to the boundary, the word spatium, i.e. extent or extended area, room, came gradually into use with the meaning, in this context, of 'the extent or room in which a body is or might be as the place of the body'.... In general, because this use of the term spatium was new, it was common to explicate it by the phrase 'spatium vel locus internus'. (Leclerc, p.89)
Descartes disturbed the identification of *spatium* with *locus* by writing (in Principle XIV of his *Principles of Philosophy*, quoted by Leclerc on p.90) that whereas place indicated situation, space had more to do with magnitude or figure. And so, the abstraction of space begins. Leibniz took the notion further; he identified such a *spatium* not only with all places in their totality, but also the abstracted order of all such places. So, we can see that two moves towards abstraction have been performed: by Descartes, on the one hand (a formalisation), and by Leibniz on the other (an abstracted totalisation). It is into this arena that Kant brings his idea of space. We shall see that if, at first, it looks extremely like that of these two thinkers - or even something of an incongruent counterpart to them - Kant's space soon turns into something quite peculiar.

In his 1768 treatise, 'Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space', Kant is wholly preoccupied with questions of relative size and shape. The problem he identifies, and endeavours to solve, is one of "incongruent counterparts"; that is, it concerns the question: how is it that two identical bodies cannot occupy each other's space? Kant writes:

the figure of a body can be completely similar to that of another, and that the size of the extension can be, in both, exactly the same; and that yet, however, an internal difference remains: namely, that the surface that includes the one could not possibly include the other. (Kant, p.42)
This, then, provides Kant's (pre-Critical) opposition to the Aristotelian notion of *spatium/locus* identified above, in accordance with Leclerc. That is, if space is to be understood merely in terms of the relative surfaces of containing/contained bodies, then how is it that, in some cases,* two identical bodies cannot fill the same space? Kant's proposal for overcoming such a problem—simultaneously providing himself with a notion of space—is one which specifically argues against the teachings of Leibniz ("If one accepts the concept of modern, in particular, German philosophers, that space only consists of the external relations of parts of matter..." Kant, p.43). Kant's answer, then, is intimated in the following passage:

As the surface limiting the bodily space of the one cannot serve as a limit for the other, twist and turn it how one will, this [internal] difference must, therefore, be such as rests on an inner principle. (Kant, p.42. My emphasis)

It is an answer which wears its pre-Critical heart on its sleeve; for space, as that which organises the differentiation of bodies, is a mode of differentiation which is determined wholly upon an internal principle governing those bodies. That Kant's spatial theory is articulated as follows, seems almost superfluous:

[S]ince absolute space is not an object of external sensation, but rather a fundamental concept which makes all these sensations possible in the first place, we can only perceive through the relation to other bodies that which, in the form of a body, purely concerns its relation to pure space. (Kant, p.43)
For pre-Critical Kant "absolute and original space" is that which is connected "purely" to the differences between things. Such a notion is overturned within two years by the time he writes the 'Inaugural Dissertation' (1770). For in this text Kant is beginning to touch the space of the First Critique, insofar as now he writes that space is not something which comes from things (in themselves), but is, rather, a subjective mode of ordering the objects of perception. I am here not concerned with the merits of the argument about incongruent counterparts (as D. E. Walford is in his introduction to the translation of the 1768 treatise) but merely with the orientation of the argument about space with respect to the First Critique and its revolutionary stance.

On a superficial level one can see, almost immediately, that the striking difference there is between the 1768 text and the Critical stance induced by the 1770 Dissertation, is one revolving around the objective-subjective dichotomy. (That Kant rejects the idea that space is a property of the thing in itself, rests upon such a move.) Thus, we could say that the Copernican Revolution stands in space, as evinced by looking at the texts already mentioned. Indeed, this is all that the Copernican Revolution claims to be: the subjectification of epistemological-metaphysical concerns. Yet there is a resemblance between the relative notions of space that is as striking as the difference: namely, that "space" articulates that which organises and co-ordinates relative differences between objects. Space equals organisation and co-ordination whether objectively or subjectively oriented. We have seen that in the treatise 'Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space', Kant
writes that "absolute space is not an object of external sensation, but rather a fundamental concept which makes all these sensations possible in the first place," (Kant, p.43). This assertion is not far from those made in the 'Transcendental Ästhetic' and the 'Refutation of Idealism' regarding the primacy of the ordering outer sense.

What, then, is the import of the idea of the Copernican Revolution with respect to Kant's views on space? This question will be answered more fully in the concluding section, below; suffice it to say now, that Kant's notion of space does not really change, except to undergo its own spatial displacement from objects to subjects.

The Subject of the Copernican Revolution.

In his Treatise of Human Nature (Book One) [1739]*, David Hume writes the following, concerning the question of personal identity:

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception. (Hume, pp.301-302. Hume's emphases)

and further:

...I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. (Hume, p.302)

To this analysis, Hume appends the following passage:

The mind is a kind of a theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only, that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, or of the materials of which it is composed. (Hume, p.302. Hume's emphases)

Nowhere, at least before Nietzsche\(^\circ\), is the fluidity of the subject either more apparent or more emphasised. All that subjectivity is, for Hume, is the habitual concatenation of a myriad of pulsating impressions, ideas and perceptions; with neither necessary connection or identity, nor one overseeing perception of the (concatenating) self. Possibly the most unfortunate aspect of Hume's account of subjectivity, is his use of the term "bundle". Not only does it beg the question of the connecting of perceptions to form the self, but it also leads to the traditional - and in my view misguided - rejoinder: Hume says that the self is merely a bundle of perceptions, however he provides no account of the string which ties such a bundle together, and this is where Kant's analysis is better. However, Hume's analysis, like Kant's, is one which recognises the active
power of the imagination in the production of an idea of the self (see Hume, pp.308-312). I have mentioned Hume's misuse of the term "bundle"; it seems to me that he should have used a term like "jumble", for such a word adequately accentuates the disparate and diverse nature of the perceptions it seeks to describe. A "bundle", then, is merely that which constitutes the self for a subject and does not explain that from which the subject is ordered.

We have seen that, for Kant, the subject is the name we give to the production, and the producer, of knowledge/experience. We can now see that Kant's view adds very little - apart from its mode of articulation - to Hume's. For both, the subject is a post-production addendum to the process of experiencing; for both, there can be no experience of a thing we call the subject, and such a thing can thus either be called a "fiction" (Hume, p.308) or an "idea" (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, passim). What we can see in both, is the subjectification of the imaginative ordering process by either Humean Habit or Kantian Rationality. It seems, then, that the Critical Subject - that upon which the revolutionary aspect of the system resides - is very much like Hume's. The results of such a comparison will be explained in the following, concluding section.

Conclusion.

We have seen how the Subject is instigated by Kant as the site of Knowledge and Rationality; and, insofar as Kant's Critical position is one of the primacy of the subjective over the objective, then - along with the qualification "Copernican" - we can say, with Bencivenga, that such a move
identifies a conceptual revolution. Yet, in keeping with the stipulations upon the use of the term "revolution" that I gave above, such a paradigm shift already has its roots in earlier philosophical views. Kant's subjective move, then, is not one made in total, messianic isolation. I hope to have shown not only how Kant's Revolutionary, Critical space is one whose germs can be found in his own pre-Critical work (even if the force of the earlier theory has a different, if not opposing, direction), but also how his views on the constitution and construction of the subject have an important predecessor.

But, to recap in more detail: we have seen how Kant produced a theory of spatiality which provided the ground upon which the Critical subject could be constructed. This subject was not merely the ordinary subject of philosophy - one whose reflexive awareness provided the parameters of The Self - but was the subject upon which all epistemological and metaphysical concerns could be balanced, like the world on the shoulders of Atlas. The Copernican Revolution announces more than the conventional understanding of it - as the subjectification of philosophical matters; it epitomises the inextricable link that must now exist between spatial and subjective concerns.

This, I feel, is the primary importance of an analysis of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; and, indeed, this assertion provides the motive force for this thesis as a whole. However, two considerations must be attended to, when adopting and expanding upon the Kantian contention of the necessary link between space and the subject: the first concerns Kant's space, and
has been mentioned briefly, in the opening section of this chapter; the second concerns his subject.

Kant's space is still an old space. It is the dusty, old arena which only allows of formalisation, of co-ordination, and of ordering. Space is only that which makes things be arranged in proper distinction; this space is empty, because all it does is to denote the differentiation of things with respect to each other. (It is interesting to note that the edifice most valorised by other Romantic figures, Caspar Friedrich and William Wordsworth for example, is the ruin.) Kant's critical exegeses on space, provide subjective foundations that are full of holes. To build a subject upon Kant's space is like trying to build a sandcastle on a cattle-grid. It is this space, and the corresponding subject, that have dominated philosophical and cultural thought for the past two hundred years. I do not wish to endorse the Bencivengan view by placing Kant at the spring of this type of thought - my views on the role of the 'individual' philosopher within a cultural milieu are well documented in this chapter. However, the types of late-Enlightenment, early-Romantic/Modernist space and subjectivity, articulated so well by Kant in his *Critique Of Pure Reason*, have been those which have informed the capitalist condition in which we are now so well entrenched. The subject we have inherited, then, has been tightly ordered, ranged and co-ordinated, making it as solid as possible, in order that it can be more easily a subject. Is it any wonder that the Subject has recently been pronounced Dead?

To turn now to our second consideration, Kant's notion of the construction of the unified subject can be undermined by other philosophical concerns;
namely, his own æsthetic theory. Briefly, in the Third Critique, Kant explains that upon contemplation of the Beautiful, its intuition either, cannot be brought into synthesis with a concept, or, can be brought into synthesis only temporarily - whereupon the intuition pulsates around the imagination unable to be unified. In both cases this mental state is termed: Free-Play of the Imagination. Now, if the Kantian subject - upon which so much in the Critical system depends - is that which signifies, and is signified by, the synthetic unification of intuitions with concepts, what happens to it when such a synthesis is impossible? Any attempt to subjectify the imagination under free-play, obviously requires stronger oppressive tactics than are normally employed. (Kant's "oppressive tactics" were the ones readily available given the precepts not only of his own Critical System, but of the Enlightenment tradition too, those of Reason.)

The concerns of the rest of this thesis, then, push further the slight opening in the analysis of the subject given to us by Kant's æsthetics. I will explore the ways in which a notion of subjectivity can be discussed without entailing its oppressive control, thereby opening out the possibilities of its multiplicitous expansion. Combined with this is a revivifying of space - along the lines depicted at the outset of this chapter - which seeks to close the door on Kant's derelict room and present another, more inspiring prospect. The mutual understanding of both a new space and a new subjectivity, will also contain the proposal for a particular type of critical practice.
PART ONE.

'TFORM'...

This, the first part of my thesis, will consist of two chapters. The first will elucidate the notion of Cartography that I have mentioned already. It will do so by reading closely the opening "plateau" of Deleuze and Guattari’s *Mille Plateaux*. As I will make clear in the course of this chapter, my project is merely to set the scenes under which a Cartography will work, and, indeed, what necessitates its usage.

The second chapter of this part performs a similar function, but the object of study this time is Bachelard's notion of Topo-analysis. This chapter, rather than further delimiting the boundaries of Cartography, or expanding our knowledge of Cartography by showing it at work, makes a lateral move, so to speak, which, by analysing another notion, will allow our move into the work-space of Cartography to be much smoother.

In both cases, therefore, the thrust of the first part of this thesis is to determine the method according to which the project of the thesis will made; hence "form..."; the material space is inferred, it exists throughout these chapters as the result and desire of charting, only later will it be described. Thus, only later will the distinction between "form" and "content" of a material space be seen as not only arbitrary, but it will represent a serious attack upon that space.
CHAPTER ONE.

'CARTOGRAPHY.'

Introduction.

We left the preceding chapter with a brief glance away from the fetid space of Kant's subject, towards the fecund space of...something else. This 'something else' had been described as another room, a space capable of working against the oppressive organisation dictated by Kant's epistemological/metaphysical system. The description of such a space was left, deliberately, vague. Our task is, paradoxically, made clearer by such opacity; for all we have to do now, is to push open the door we have noticed is slightly ajar, walk into the space we find and describe it.

It seems so easy. But the motive force taking us from one space to another, the pressure needed to force our way from one place to another, even the strength needed to look around and describe the situation, all this requires more than the narrative used to explain it shows. There is a way of characterising the force, strength, or pressure of motivation and description which, in fact, does more in the end than merely describe. This force of desire can be called 'Cartography'. Cartography not only charts (and, I hope to show, thereby creates) the, so far, unknown space we have intimated, but it articulates the way of moving from one to another.

What is Cartography? This is the first question I deal with in this chapter. In order to provide an account of it I look at Deleuze and
Guattari's opening section of *Mille Plateaux* (1980) ([*A Thousand Plateaus* (1987)]); for they are two of very few contemporary thinkers, who take the problem of space seriously. This text is the second part of their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes, and deals more lyrically and positively, than the first volume, with the relationships between subjectivity, signification, capital, family and society. Next, I pose the question: What sort of space does Cartography chart/create? This question is not so much answered as more finely asked. For the possibility of dealing with the creation of another type of space will come in a later chapter. In this section, however, I will show that cartography has a double movement of charting and creating. The final question to be posed is this: How does cartography work/how can it be used? How can we answer this question? For in order to do so, we would have to see Cartography at work, and such a programme covers the scope of this thesis as a whole. Suffice it to say now, that this question will come closer to being answered, in a later chapter called 'Subjectification', which deals with the notion of subjectivities as given in Félix Guattari's *Les trois écologies* (1989) ('The Three Ecologies' (1989)), together with his own characterisation of Cartography. This chapter, then, will be restricted to the areas covered by the first two questions, given above.

Once all this has been completed, we will not only know how to move from one space to another, but we will have an idea of the desire which is articulated by the movement, and the methods, which will allow us to talk about the other space.

So, then, what is Cartography?...
Mapping Deleuze+Guattari.

In the work of Deleuze and Guattari one of the most sustained uses to which the related notions of mapping, tracing and cartography are put, is in the introductory "plateau" (a word Deleuze and Guattari use to get away from the organisational concept of 'the chapter') of their *A Thousand Plateaus*, entitled 'Introduction: Rhizome'. In order to understand the importance of such interrelated notions, I will endeavour to examine this Rhizome plateau in some detail.

Deleuze and Guattari identify two terms which form the axes upon which all organisation takes place: signification and subjectification. A quotation from a later plateau shows the alliance of these terms:

You will be organised, you will be an organism, you will articulate your body - otherwise you're just depraved. You will be signifier and signified, interpreter and interpreted - otherwise you're just a deviant. You will be a subject, nailed down as one, a subject of enunciation recoiled into a subject of the statement - otherwise you're just a tramp. (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.159)*

Here, a rational authority is firing/launching imperatives at a cowering subject. Upon the axes already mentioned, the subject, soul, mind &c. is pinned down like a dead animal in an exhibition of dissection. Like a super-ego described by Freud, this rational authority ascribes ethical import to its commands for order so that its organisational demands will
have a stronger hold. Deleuze and Guattari articulate such a scenario in terms of space.

Think of a vast expanse of space: an arctic or antarctic tundra; the rolling, shifting dunes and ripples of sand; the softly undulating grasses of wild meadows. Over this space, these spaces, flows - what Deleuze and Guattari call - the plane of consistency, the plane upon which a myriad of different flows can form, and flee; taking flight in whatever direction they choose. Over this space pours all the matter that is necessary for life; there are no intrinsic hierarchies and, especially, no rigidity of organisation. Yet.... This territory has, however, been organised. Descartes made a thorough job of it, not only with his innovations in co-ordinate geometry, but also - and probably more importantly for my thesis - with his cogito. Such an organisation, or "reterritorialisation," I have already examined with respect to Kant. I have characterised Kant's space as co-ordinated and co-ordinating, Deleuze and Guattari would describe the same feature as "stratified" and "striating". Upon this organised space all hierarchical co-ordinations take place, its axes are subjectification and signification. According to these axes, obedient, properly speaking, subjects are organised. Any type of bodily flow is properly channelled, whether it's a desire, a scream, a grab or a think. A bit like potty-training. Another formation Deleuze and Guattari have of the plane of consistency is the Body without Organs. Such an assemblage obtains its initial characterisation in Anti-OEdipus (1984), the first volume of the Capitalism and Schizophrenia collection. Here, Deleuze and Guattari make no secret of their debt to Artaud; he wrote, "The body is the body/it is alone/it has no need of organs/the body is never an organism/organisms are
the enemies of bodies." ['Le théâtre de la cruauté', p.287; my translation]. For Artaud the organisation of the body was a superfluous oppressive imposition; for Deleuze and Guattari the production of the Body without Organs is necessary in order to revitalise the smooth space of the plane of consistency, to deterritorialise the reterritorialisations performed upon it.

Deleuze and Guattari begin A Thousand Plateaus by writing about writing, by writing about how 'the book' fits into their schizoanalytical project. The book, they write, is an "assemblage" (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.4) [an "agencement machinique", Mille Plateaux, pp.9-10] whose faces can turn either towards the strata of organisation, or the Body without Organs. Turned towards strata, the book comprises a unity, a totality which is connected not only to the Author as Subject but to the World as Signified. The Body without Organs, towards which another of the assemblage's sides may be turned,

is constantly dismantling the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate, and attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the trace of an intensity. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.4)

The book either tends towards the unity of the organon, or passes endlessly over a plane whose organisation has been disrupted by the Body without Organs (in which case it cannot be said to exist as such). The book as Unity, then, has two disguises: the root-book; and the radicle-, or, fascicular root-, book (cf. p.5 [pp.11-12]). In both cases the book has a
definite relationship with the world and the author-subject as its producer: either the genetic, hierarchised unity of the Realist book; or the fragmentary, multiple unity of the Romantic, or (Post-)Modernist book. Rhizomatic writing, however, doesn't even try to produce a book.

All we talk about are multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and selection, the plane of consistency, and in each case the units of measure. Stratometers, deleometers, BwO units of density, BwO units of convergence: Not only do these constitute a quantification of writing, but they define writing as always the measure of something else. Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even come. (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.4-5; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

As Deleuze and Guattari write, rhizomatic writing has nothing to do with any form of signifying structure. It has nothing to do with the production of a unity, an homogeneous whole, finding its meaning in a graded relation-structure with the world/subject. Writing becomes, not merely the simulacrum of the rhizome, but rather a particular formation of the rhizome. It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari give a list noting six characteristics of the rhizome; these are: 1. & 2. Principles of Connection and Heterogeneity; 3. Principle of Multiplicity; 4. Principle of Asignifying Rupture; 5. & 6. Principles of Cartography and Decalcomania.
The principles of connection and heterogeneity\textsuperscript{11} show that a rhizome can, at any of its points, be connected to any other rhizome; and that in so doing, it can perform so many decentrings, so many dissolutions, that either it or that which it is studying, can never be self-enclosed. There is no structure to a rhizome/rhizomatic. Structuration is a function, Deleuze and Guattari contend, of "arboreal" or root-thought.

The principle of multiplicity states that a multiplicity has,

neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitude and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows). (\textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, p.8)\textsuperscript{12}

The rhizome as multiplicity operates one step ahead of that which seeks to unify it. The production of any type of a unity which will always be supplementary to any multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari call "overcoding" [\textit{surcodage}]; the point about a rhizome/multiplicity, they say, is that it never admits of overcoding in any form. Furthermore,

All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of the 'plane' increase with the number of connections that are made on it. (\textit{A Thousand Plateaus}, p.9; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)\textsuperscript{13}

The multiplicitous rhizome spreads across the space it occupies; if/when it
transgresses its dimensions, its nature changes. In order to spread, the rhizome must access (in computerate terms) multiple points of multiple connections; always moving, always heterogeneous.

The principle of asignifying rupture acts as a correlate to that of connection. It states that the rhizome can, at any point, shatter and either restart along an old line (a line being that which describes a segment of the rhizome) or start on a new line. This notion introduces a rhizomatic motif that is of recurring interest: the line of flight (la ligne de fuite). Deleuze and Guattari explain that the line of flight constitutes the 'outside' of a multiplicity; for it is via such a line of flight that the multiplicity can change, flee, swarm. In the paragraph dealing with the principle of multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari write:

The line of flight marks: the reality of a finite number of dimensions that the multiplicity effectively fills; the impossibility of a supplementary dimension, unless the multiplicity is transformed by the line of flight; the possibility and necessity of flattening all of the multiplicities on a single plane of consistency or exteriority, regardless of their number of dimensions. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.9)

So, each line of flight occurs at the breaking of the rhizome - the rupturing of its movement - and thus articulates, simultaneously, the area upon which the multiplicity will move, and the flattening of the multiplicity into the plane of consistency. Lines of flight, then, can enact any form of territorialisation; not only can it deterritorialise, but
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it can reterritorialise, subjectify, signify and stratify too. The rhizomatic movement includes within the sum of all its possibilities the possibility of its turning back into the root, the possibility of its arborialisation. Even though multiplicities do not admit of overcoding, it is quite possible for strata, boundaries, limits to be drawn upon the plane of consistency, in the hope of producing a nexus of organisation which aims at the control of all the particular flows which animate the rhizome. In the Introductory chapter to this thesis, we saw Kant produce a Subject, which was a conglomeration of multiple particles upon a plane of consistency he called, the imagination. If the various intuition/concept configurations are read as rhizomatic flows (the kind of movement Kant makes in his aesthetic theory)\(^{16}\) then his imposition of a subject can be seen as a recoding of, or reterritorialisation of, the fluctuating space. Subjectification, and signification, are both investments of specific lines of flight, whose only profit is the restriction of the heterogeneous into a controllable whole. Nevertheless, lines of flight, being what they are, will always incorporate a way out of the reterritorialised configuration. (It is these questions of territorialisation etc. - especially with respect to smooth and striated space - that will form Chapter Three of this thesis.)

The rhizome, to recap, is that which ruptures to spread; fleeing along any line that appears along with any break, connecting, changing, and rupturing as it goes. Deleuze and Guattari impeach us: "Write, form a rhizome, increase your territory by deterritorialisation, extend the line of flight to the point where it becomes an abstract machine covering the entire plane of consistency." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.11)\(^{16}\)
In order to describe the form rhizomatic writing takes, Deleuze and Guattari ease us into the final two principles: of cartography and decalcomania. They begin,

a rhizome is not subject to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to any idea of genetic axis or deep structure. A genetic axis is like an objective pivotal unity upon which successive stages are organised, a deep structure is more like a base sequence that can be broken down into immediate constituents, while the unity of the product passes into another, transformational and subjective, dimension. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12; translation modified.)

Evolution, genealogy and structuralism all subscribe to (are under written by) tree-logic. As such, the rhizome has no form of exchange with them. Furthermore, for Deleuze and Guattari the genetic axis and deep structure are both articulations of tracing (le calque). The logic of the trace-structure is that of the tree-root system, and of reproduction; in the same way that the root-, radicle-book imitated the world via the subjectivity of the author. So, tracing provides the co-ordinates according to which the processes of reproduction and imitation are drawn in reterritorialised space. If a line of flight is used for overcoding and reterritorialisation, then it is with the help of, or under the command of, the practice of tracing. Against — and we will see later why it is not strictly adequate to use the term 'against' — tracing Deleuze and Guattari place mapping, cartography. "The rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing. Make a map, not a tracing." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12; Deleuze and
Guattari's emphasis.) The map does not reproduce, it does not imitate. The map does not outline; it charts. The map constructs the field it covers as it charts.

It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto the plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12)

I have already noted the rhizome's characteristic of multiple possible ruptures, exits and regroupings; so too does the map - insofar as it shadows the rhizomic-multiplicity as to become indistinguishable from it - have multiple entryways. A map can be accessed at any point, and at each new entry a new charting can be undertaken, unlike tracing "which always comes back to 'the same'." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.12) ("qui revient toujours « au même »." (Mille Plateaux, p.20) Mapping, or cartography, is undifferentiable from the movement of the rhizome, its ruptures and subsequent lines of flight, and the plane of consistency in its multiplicity. Tracing outlines, and therefore is necessarily bound up with the organisational axes of subjectification and signification and the need for unification. "The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing always involves an alleged 'competence'." (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.12-13)
It was this type of performance that Artaud envisaged for his theatre. A performance which was not confined to the conventions, or outlines of discursive drama, but one which flowed along the lines of flight that burgeoned from the ruptured body politic. Like the plague that attacked those to whom it was susceptible, Artaud's theatre would perform in the running sores of society. He was adamant that it was not necessary for society to change in order for his theatre to be set up; equally so, nor was it necessary that the motive force for change would come from his theatre. Artaud's cruel theatre was not bound up in such crude schematisms linking performance and the world. The theatre doubled society/the world. It was not an imitation or a reproduction, nor was it an outlining. But as a mapping, the theatre exacerbated ruptures on the plane of consistency (like the plague) and dismantled the bonds placed by the double movement of signification and subjectification. "Now I say that the present state of society is iniquitous and fit for destruction. If concern with this is a characteristic of the theatre, it is even more that of machine-guns." *Le théâtre et son double*, p.50

But are we, following Deleuze and Guattari, not merely presupposing another dichotomy - mapping/tracing, rhizome/root - thereby retritorialising our own discourse back within ancient philosophical organisations? Deleuze and Guattari pose the following rhetorical questions:

Does not a map contain phenomena of redundancy that are already like tracings of its own? Does not a multiplicity have strata upon which unifications and totalisations, massifications, mimetic mechanisms, signifying power takeovers, and subjective attributions
take root? Do not even lines of flight, due to their eventual divergence, reproduce the very formations their function it was to dismantle or outflank? (A Thousand Plateaus, p.13)\(^\text{23}\)

In short, the fluxes on the plane of consistency, the movements of the rhizome, are always in danger of transforming into the processes which amount to their repression. This has already been mentioned by Deleuze and Guattari, with respect to the formation of the lines of flight:

There is a rupture in the rhizome whenever segmentary lines explode into a line of flight but the line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines always tie back to one another. That is why one can never posit a dualism or a dichotomy, even in the rudimentary form of the good and the bad. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.9)\(^\text{24}\)

It is always possible for any given line of flight to take the path of reterritorialisation; it is always possible for a rhizome to become rooted, for a multiplicity to become bounded or a map merely to start tracing. These possibilities exist only because of the performatory nature of the rhizome, map, etc. That is, if the plane of consistency was not multiplicitous in its openings, if the rhizome was already stratified, organised and limited, then there would never be any possibility of change, even for the worse. Moreover, tracings, roots and trees may also disrupt into maps or rhizomes. Indeed, if it is true, Deleuze and Guattari write, that maps etc. have multifariously entrances, then it is possible for them to be entered by way of tracings, roots etc., "assuming the necessary precautions are taken..." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.14) ["compte tenu des
précautions nécessaires..." (Mille Plateaux, p.23).}

Roots and branches may break into rhizomes; rhizomes may be organised into roots and trees. There is no final, authoritarian and idealistic structure that calls itself "Dichotomy", or "Dualism", that co-ordinates the relationship between the two assemblages. If there is anything that orders the relation between the two, it is merely a point of flux that is itself rhizomorphous. "To be rhizomorphous is to produce stems and filaments that seem to be roots, or better yet connect with them by penetrating the trunk, but put them to strange new uses." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.15)

The important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models: the first operates as a transcendent model and tracing, even if it engenders its own escape; the second operates as an immanent process that overturns the model and sketches a map, even if it constitutes its own hierarchies, even if it gives rise to a despotic channel. ... It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.20)

The important point is that there is no point at which one can look down upon this agonism and name it, or organise it (which amounts to the same thing). Mapping contra Tracing - does not serve as a transcendentally ideal form according to which various and particular flows can be organised. Rather, it serves as a pragmatic making-of-a-diagramme which seeks, itself, to construct mapping; especially if the mapping begins as that of
hierarchies, roots, trees and tracings... which is precisely the point. Traces etc. are ripe for mapping, just as Artaud's society was/is ripe for plaguing/theatrification. Which is why I have chosen to provide a cartography of subjectification; not in order to jump on the post-structuralist bandwagon, announcing with glee the advent of the Subject's death. But, rather, to follow the blockages which abound in the production of the subject, in order that they can be ruptured. Deleuze and Guattari write, in the opening paragraph of 'Introduction: Rhizome', a sentence which appears to me to sum up the project\(^2\) of my thesis: "To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I." (A Thousand Plateaus, p. 3)\(^2\)

Such, then, is Deleuze and Guattari's characterisation of the rhizome; from this characterisation we have noticed the part played by mapping, or cartography. It is necessary, now, to investigate in more detail, the types of space that a cartography creates simultaneously with its movement of charting.

Making Space Mapping.

Kant's space was the space of the subject, organised, ranged and coordinated. To give Kant his due, though, we must say that at least he emphasised the space-subject link. Yet that's all he left us, a linkage, a distribution of points of tethering, which identified the subject as it described a space. This much is not new to us. Deleuze and Guattari, as we have seen from all that has gone before, have also examined such a link. They, however, affirm that it is only a certain type of space in which, or
according to which, a subject can be made. Subjectification happens along
the roots and branches of the tree, it is outlined by a tracing, and stands
upright in its hierarchised space. This type of space Deleuze and Guattari
call "striated space"; to this, and the related movements of
territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, I will
return in a later chapter. So, the fact that Kant's subject is ordered,
organised etc. is not merely because that is the type of subject that met
his epistemological, metaphysical and ethical requirements, it is also
because there was no choice given the kind of space Kant - and the rest of
the late Eighteenth Century - was in. And we are still in it.

Cartography does not merely outline what it finds sitting on the surface,
it does not trace; if it did either of these, Cartography would articulate
nothing more than another method of organisation, which I've shown -
following Deleuze and Guattari - to be alien to it. Cartography fills,
feels, the space it moves in. It ties up no loose ends, and constructs no
ultimate frames. Cartography glides over the surface it maps, slithers and
slides across the contours of a space which does not order the movement of
the mapping. The space that allows mapping is therefore articulated as much
by the movement of such a mapping, as the Cartography is by the surface
over which it works. Even if its original surface is one which is
oppressive and co-ordinating, cartography will act as that which transforms
space into what Deleuze and Guattari call "smooth" space. Cartography
eliminates blockages and announces breaks in the movement of the rhizome.
Cartography establishes lines of flight.
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The classic comic line, "Walk this way..." is thus a cartography: flee and create. Do not merely imitate, but articulate - according to your own rhizomic movement - a line of flight I am mapping.

There was a point in Kant's critical system where such an announcement was made, we have seen that this point was in his aesthetic writings. To refer to an image I used earlier, he opened the door and entreated us to "Walk this way...". A rhizome was formed and a line of flight created. Kant nearly became a cartographer. I write "nearly" because the rhizome was blocked, the line of flight stifled. To recap on his aesthetic/epistemological system: an intuition either, can never be subsumable under any given concept, or is presented to a concept, and the concept proving inadequate is cast aside in favour of another, which also proves inadequate... and so on; when this happens, Kant said, the imagination and the cognitive faculties are in "free-play". The synthetic unity of consciousness, typified in Kant's First Critique by the work of the imagination, is - in the least - rocked, or - at the most - destroyed during this free-play. The overt structuration of the sensibility-imagination-understanding system, becomes slightly deranged. When experiencing free-play, the subject finds the boundaries that identify itself as such, begin to dissolve, rapidly, into the movement of the experience. So, Kant appears to offer salvation from subjective oppression via his aesthetic theory. He appears to provide the rhizomic derangement of his archetectonic. But the Cartography is short lived. For no sooner is the line of flight announced, than it is directed back into the original, hierarchical system. The deterritorialisation of the imaginative (and, therefore, subjective field) is soon reterritorialised by
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the invocation of the Ästhetic Idea. In his Critique of Judgement, Kant explains Ästhetic Ideas thus:

by an ästhetic idea I mean that representation of the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility of any definite thought whatever, i.e. concept, being adequate to it,... It is easily seen, that an ästhetic idea is the counterpart (pendant) of a rational idea, which, conversely is a concept, to which no intuition (representation of the imagination) can be adequate. (Critique of Judgement, p.175-176; Kant's emphases.)

Now, it seems, that what once went under the name "free-play of the imagination" is now restricted by the name "ësthetic idea". (It is ironic that the text with which I replaced ellipses in the quotation above, specifically mentioned the inability of language to "render completely intelligible" and thereby get "on level terms with" imaginative free-play, and yet such a process is subsumed under the epistemological structure announced by the First Critique, merely by giving it the name "ësthetic idea". Kant opens the door and slams it in our face, in the same movement.) The possibility of an ästhetic mapping is re-traced according to the outline already presented by the sensibility-imagination-understanding-reason hierarchy.

It has already been mentioned that a line of flight always carries within its projection the possibility of its reterritorialisation into an arboreal system. Where any tree or branch or root can break out into a rhizome, so too can any rhizome plant itself in the root-space; maps, too, can become
tracings. This is why Deleuze and Guattari warned us to be careful when map-making, to take the necessary precautions when mapping from a tracing, or breaking a rhizome from a root.

That Kant nearly produced a cartography along the lines of æsthetic experience, does not necessarily imply that cartographies are, in all cases, to be driven according to æsthetic desires. Nor is the identification of such an almost-becoming-cartography of the Kantian archetectonic subsumable under a Derridian-type deconstruction. Such a deconstruction, as I understand it, examines a text, pulling at its loose threads in order to allow it to unravel. It, however, never allows the text to be dislocated from the space in which it works, nor does it chart a different space upon which the text could move. The Derridian move is one of tracing, of outlining the paradigms according to which a text fails to work as it wishes. This leaves us either abandoning a text which has been unpicked and no longer functions as it hoped, or congratulating ourselves on a particularly fine outlining. There is no outside to any text; there is no escape from any system of subjectification or signification to another place.

Cartography follows the articulation of a line of flight, it operates according to the movement of the rhizome. It glides over the smooth contours of a space it opens up as it charts. Deconstruction has the appearance of cartography, but is merely a tracing, or re-tracing; it seems to cause breaks or rhizomes, but always only outlines. The conservativism of deconstruction could be the subject of the following passage from *Mille Plateaux*.
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It [the tracing] has generated, structuralised the rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. That is why the tracing is so dangerous. It injects redundancies and propagates them. What the tracing reproduces of the map or rhizome are only the impasses, blockages, incipient taproots, or points of structuration. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.13)³¹

Heidegger's work on language sought only to get back to where it started.³² Its journey appeared to flow along a myriad of paths, but only ever announce the direction of a single way: one that allowed the traveller to find his/her way through the language-wood, back to the journey's starting point. Deconstruction makes a similar move. It performs a critique of a text which outlines a journey, through the various wooded wilderesses the text has constructed (accidentally or otherwise), only to cut a neat path, trace a way, which allows us back to the beginning of the text. So when the text, as trace-structure, has been re-traced/deconstructed, we are left with a nicely unravelled/unravellable bundle of threads still operating in the same space. Cartography's first move, however, is to wrench a text out of its normal space, and then thrust it into overdrive to see what rhizomes can be made from its breaks. As these breaks occur, Cartography maps them; as a map is made, so the possibility of further breaks is apparent. In this way, too, a new space is made. Mapping, and making a new space, are simultaneous.

As I have already said, I will enter into more detail about the type of space Cartography charts/makes in a later chapter, wherein I will discuss smooth and striated space and the relative movements of territorialisation,
reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen in what ways such a notion of Cartography can be used, or maybe, how it can be made to work. But, like the hackneyed reply given to the question, "How do you define philosophy?" - that, to define it is to do it - I will say that the best description of how Cartography works, is to do it. Therefore, I will postpone, for now, the description/doing of cartography; and note that this doing, will be the Cartography of Subjectification itself.

Conclusion.

So far, then, we have been given a guided tour of the spatial parts of Kant's First Critique, and we have seen that there are spaces - as yet uncharted - which could provide an antidote (or a plague) to Kant's. We have also been shown the various growths sprawling over Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus. These growths - Bodies without Organs, Rhizomes and Maps - have erupted from the space that was bequeathed us by Kant, and spread towards the other space that is now becoming-charted. I hope to have shown the way in which the movement towards Cartography is simultaneous with, if not indistinct from, the realisation of the foetid nature of the space (and its subject) we have been left with. The presentation of Cartography has, however, been rather passive; that is, the power of Cartography as a critical tool has hardly been mentioned. In order to develop this aspect of Cartography, I think it is necessary to examine Bachelard's critical tool, 'Topo-analysis', as expounded in his La Poétique de l'espace (4th edition, 1964). As we will see, Bachelard's Topoanalysis
operates in the same way as Deleuze and Guattari's Cartography, and as such I think it will aid us towards making a Cartography of Subjectification.
CHAPTER TWO.

'TOPO-ANALYSIS'.

Introduction.

In 1957 Gaston Bachelard published the first edition of *La Poétique de l'espace* (the fourth edition came seven years later, two years after his death). This text is more widely known in the English speaking world either, as a French exponent of a late-Fifties brand of literary theory/criticism called New Criticism; or, as essential reading for architecture students; as, therefore, merely a work on literature/poetry for those hoping to criticise it, or one on the importance of lived-in-spaces for those hoping to design them. In English philosophy, Bachelard's work - that of a professor of philosophy and science at the University of Dijon and the Collège de France, and honorary professor at the Sorbonne - is very rarely read as philosophy. Whether, or not, such a feat will be accomplished here, is not for me to say - the question of whether a reading is philosophical, or produces philosophy, just because it comes in an essay submitted for examination to a Philosophy Department of an educational institution, lies beyond the scope of this thesis. My project concerning Bachelard's *The Poetics of Space* (1969), however, is to provide a reading of it that will 'add to' our understanding of the role of Cartography, already adduced. I have placed 'add to' in inverted commas: I do not want to infer that we will have made a progression, dialectically or otherwise, from one notion to another; I would rather think of this process of addition as one would a grafting on a plant, or the exacerbation of a
disease. Deleuze and Guattari's rhizomatic movement could describe the relationship between Cartography and what happens in *The Poetics of Space*. An addition that does not necessarily destroy or surpass what has been added to - although, of course, it could - but proposes the possibility of another direction, or, wealth of directions.

I should add, that the one particular notion upon which I will focus in reading *The Poetics of Space*, is that of topo-analysis...as the title of this chapter suggests. So, the 'addition' problem - if indeed it is one - becomes one of the relationship between Cartography and Topo-analysis. Hopefully, this relationship, and my purpose for suggesting it, will become clearer by the time I reach this chapter's concluding section.

In essays that are constructed around the exegesis of a particular work, it is usual for the reading to be given fairly and relatively uncritically, the majority of the criticism of the work and thought of the text under review to be given in concluding sections. I will, on the other hand, provide my criticism of Bachelard's approach in this introduction. In order that this can be undertaken, it is necessary for me to begin with Bachelard's 'Introduction' to *The Poetics of Space*.

More than the word "topo-analysis", more even than the word "space", is the phrase "phenomenology of the imagination" used in Bachelard's introduction. He explains, for example, that:

> In order to clarify the problem of the poetic image philosophically, we shall have to have recourse to a phenomenology of the imagination. By this should be
understood a study of the phenomenon of the poetic image when it emerges into the consciousness as a direct product of the heart, soul and being of man, apprehended in its actuality. (The Poetics of Space, p.xiv)²

The poetic image will be the object of Bachelard's study. From this, he believes, he will be able to experience the productive nature of the imagination as it produces; and in so doing, he will be able to witness consciousness in action. But what is it that Bachelard understands by both "phenomenology" and "imagination", let alone "consciousness"?

In Phenomenology Bachelard sees a practice whereby one can strip from the object of study all historicism, all notions of cause and progress, in an attempt to experience the object of study in its purity.³ Given that Bachelard's object of study - and we really should not use the term 'object' here, but rather 'object and subject' - is the poetic image, not any author or literary movement in particular, it is understandable why Bachelard adopts such an approach. To Phenomenology Bachelard opposes Psychology and Psychoanalysis; both of which, he says, involve strict causal structures under which their objects of study are subsumed, both of which he had given critical weight in some of his earlier works.⁴ These critical practices carry their interpretive systems with them like a gladiator carried his net - the outcome of such practices can only be stifled or dead. Bachelard's phenomenology will be a method which allows the poetic image to "resonate"⁵ in the mind of the reader, thereby showing that the reading⁶ of poetry is as imaginatively productive as its writing,
and provides the same account of consciousness (this will be made clearer below).

As we have seen, Bachelard prioritises the productive imagination over a merely reproductive one. Such a move is a classic one in the history of the philosophy of the imagination; it has its roots in Kant, and the Romantics, finding its most well known English articulation in Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria*. For Bachelard, this imagination has direct links with, what he calls, the soul, and what we can therefore understand as the Subject. The production of an image, the creation of a poetic image, is the outpouring of a resonance of the poetic-subject; the reading of such an image, is the production-again of the image, the re-resonation of it in the subject-reader. This is the basic schematisation of Bachelard's "phenomenology" and "imagination"; yet, there is more to be done, for both ideas come together in the person of the subject. Bachelard's notion of the subject* will be elucidated below, during this introductory section and after, but at the "phenomenology of the imagination" we must look just a little closer.

Bachelard explains the method, "phenomenology of the imagination", more elaborately in his later work, *La Poétique de la rêverie*. In its 'Introduction' he writes that the benefit of the phenomenological approach "lies in the complete illumination of the awareness of a subject who is struck with wonder by poetic images." (*The Poetics of Reverie*, p.1) 10 Phenomenology shines a spotlight upon the poetic image as it is bathed in emotion by the reading/imagining-subject; and as such, the subject in its purity is identified. But the poetic image is a fluid beast (coupled with daydreaming - the idle sport of leisure - as Bachelard does in *The Poetics*
of Space and more overtly in The Poetics of Reverie) it therefore proves too vapid an object for a concrete phenomenology based upon a paring away of that which takes root in (and thereby constructs) consciousness. Bachelard is not interested in the common consciousness analysed by run of the mill psychoanalysts, psychologists and phenomenologists; he has nothing to do with the consciousness which operates according to the apprehension of ordinary, everyday objects. His project he explains as follows:

And thus it is that I have chosen phenomenology in hopes of re-examining in a new light the faithfully beloved images which are so solidly fixed in my memory that I no longer know whether I am remembering or imagining them when I come across them in my reveries. (The Poetics of Reverie, p.2)"

The poetic images which, for Bachelard, articulate subjectivity in itself, are those which trigger, or are accompanied by (Bachelard is not interested in bickering over psychic cause and effect), emotions: wonder, awe, love....The interest Bachelard has in phenomenology, is that in a method which allows him to examine images alone,

it returns to putting the accent on their original quality, grasping the very essence of their originality and thus taking advantage of the remarkable psychic productivity of the imagination. (The Poetics of Reverie, p.3)"

The problem he has with other philosophical attitudes - which we have already come across - he details thus:
A philosopher remains, as they say, "in a philosophical situation": occasionally he pretends to begin everything at the beginning, but, alas! he continues. ...

He has read so many books of philosophy! Under the pretext of studying and teaching them, he has deformed so many "systems!" And when evening has come and he is no longer teaching, he believes he has the right to shut himself up in the system of his choice. (The Poetics of Reverie, p.2)'

Against this will to systematise Bachelard proposes a way of reading that allows him constant movement: movement from one image to another, movement across the otherwise unsurmountable, boundaries of authorship, Cultural Values, disciplines.... This is the beauty phenomenology has for him; it allows (maybe even constructs) a critical attitude animated by fluidity of movement and the ability to dissolve boundaries.

The gain from such poetic, phenomenological wanderings, is the isolation of the image - as such - in every act of poetic production, thus displaying for Bachelard, the imaginative consciousness in all its productive essentiality. In this respect, Bachelard has a lot in common with Kant. We have seen Kant's philosophy articulate a synthesising, knowledge/experience-producing, Subject-constructing imagination; an imagination which fuses the raw data of perceptual representation with the forms of thought in general. Bachelard, then, adopts premises which could thus be called Kantian; for him, the productive imagination provides the site for, and the content of, his notion of subjectivity/consciousness. As we have seen, he reaches these premises via the back way, so to speak, via the poetic image and the day-dream, rather than either consciousness of
empirical objects, or awareness of rational cogitation. I will quote a long passage from *The Poetics of Reverie*, which sums up all that has gone before:

In our view any awareness is an increment to consciousness, an added light, a reinforcement of psychic coherence. Its swiftness or instanteneity can hide this growth from us. But there is a growth of being in every instance of awareness. Consciousness is in itself an act, the human act. It is a lively, full act. Even if the action which follows, which ought to have followed, remains in suspense, the consciousness-as-act is still completely positive or kinetic. In the present essay we shall study this act only in the realm of language and more precisely yet in poetic language when the imaginative consciousness creates and lives the poetic image. (*The Poetics of Reverie*, p. 5)"
have followed him. This is why reading Bachelard sometimes leaves something like a funny taste in our mouths; we sigh patronisingly, look aside at our image of naïve Bachelard eagerly writing his easy-going books, and say "its a very nice idea Gaston, but I'm afraid we can't be doing with any of that nonsense any more".

What is the point of using Bachelard's work, if my criticism of the unified subject has already been put with respect to Kant? Why mention him at all if all he provides is another dusty old phenomenology, for which we can go to Heidegger anyway?

I think that Bachelard has provided an irreplacable text in the philosophical history of the spaced-subject. It is this move into space, with the aid of his Topo-analysis, that I now want to examine more closely. Hopefully, too, we will be able to elucidate those Bachelardian notions of space which will help us explode his otherwise uncritical acceptance of traditional philosophical themes, and allow us to map the idiosyncracies of his "phenomenology" in such a way that we are forced to acknowledge the lines of flight which transgress the limits placed upon our understanding of his work by such an epithet.

Topoanalysis...

It is important for Bachelard that the subject of productive imagination exists in space, in the spaces it inhabits in its productive capacity. In order to flesh-out such a claim, I will quote a few lines from Bachelard's 'Introduction' to The Poetics of Space:
Indeed, the images I want to examine are the quite simple images of happy space. In this orientation, these investigations would deserve to be called topophilia. They seem to determine the human value of the sorts of space that may be grasped, that may be defended against adverse forces, the space we love. For diverse reasons, and with the differences entailed by poetic shading, this is eulogised space. (The Poetics of Space, p.xxxi; Bachelard's emphasis; translation modified.)

We have seen that anything imagined is productive of consciousness for Bachelard, and also, that the day-dreaming subject provides the best paradigm of subjectivity in general. Insofar as particular spaces are instrumental in allowing subjectivity to be constructed - that is, when subjectivity becomes the product of imaginative space - any subjective power that once existed over objects etc. is undermined. Whereas traditional phenomenology validates the reciprocal importance of object and consciousness in the construction of consciousness, when the space of the Bachelardian dreamer is acknowledged to permeate the "consciousness of..." dialectic, then the biunivocality of that relationship is dispersed. The Kantian type hierarchy that Bachelard seemed, at first, to endorse: subject-imagination-poetic image-space; is now inverted, if not exploded. Bachelard's phenomenology has now become a vehicle for riding across the multiplicitous spaces that are valorised in poetry/literature. It, itself, becomes decentred in that space and flattened across a wider plane than at first appeared...and is renamed "topo-analysis".
Apart from a brief mention in the 'Introduction', topo-analysis gets its first, and only, extensive description in Chapter One, 'The House. From Cellar to Garret. The Significance of the Hut.' It will only be with respect to the image of the house, as Bachelard presents it, that the full force of topo-analysis will be felt. However, with the hope of being able to defer comprehensibility to a later section, I will now attempt to outline the basic movements of Bachelard's topo-analysis.

We have seen that Bachelard's object of study is the poetic image; and we have seen that he takes this object as worthy of study because it designates the essential workings of the productive imagination (and therefore, the Subject). Bachelard then shows that the imagination - in its productivity - is also always already ordered according to space; that is, the site of the synthesising, or poeticising, subject is constitutive of the subject. This is the basic Kantianism that we encountered above (and will be more fully explored in Bachelardian terms, with reference to particular images, below). In keeping with his project to examine images which are imbued with emotion, Bachelard says that his *The Poetics of Space* will be oriented towards studying images of "happy space" (quoted above). Seeing as subjective-images (in all senses of the phrase) are always localised, Bachelard believes that the psychoanalyst, for example (in dealing with memories, images etc.) should be constantly respectful of the psyche's indebtedness to space. He gives "to this auxilliary of psychoanalysis" (*The Poetics of Space*, p.8; cf. *La Poétique de l'espace*, p.27) the name: Topo-analysis. Topo-analysis names that philosophical/psychoanalytical method which not only takes account of the spatialisation of our thoughts (memories or images) but insists upon such
an importance of space. In the following, lengthy, passage Bachelard explains the role of topo-analysis and the importance of space in the construction of subjectivity:

Topoanalysis, then, would be the systematic psychological study of the sites of our intimate lives. In the theatre of the past that is constructed by memory, the stage setting maintains the characters in their dominant roles. At times we think we know ourselves in time, when all we know is a sequence of fixations in the spaces of the being's stability - a being who does not want to melt away, and who, even in the past, when he sets out in search of things past, wants time to "suspend" its flight. In its countless alveoli space contains compressed time. That is what space is for. (The Poetics of Space, p. 8)"}

If the most important factor in an examination of the construction of subjectivity is space, then such an examination, Bachelard contends, must be a topo-analysis.

One of the many striking elements in this passage, is the assumption of the fluidity of the subject. It is with the complicity of space, Bachelard says, that the subject situates itself, stops itself from melting away. This propensity to dissolution is assumed to be a basic characteristic of subjectivity, and as such, comes from the nature of space itself. The sorts of space Bachelard pours over are themselves fluid; the myriad topophilic spaces of as many different poets; spaces in which memories of childhood, adolescence... or whatever, flow and return, in any order and at any time. The journey in search of times past, and of things that have
passed, is a flowing wandering at the behest of unification. But Bachelard's text never seems to give in to unification, even though it often proposes it; his words themselves flow in and out of quotation, sometimes acknowledged, and at other times just slipped in to his own text. The very page lets itself become fluid, even when it is trying to impose a single, simple subject. Bachelard also flows between methods and disciplines; he seems to write psychologies and psychoanalyses; his method is supposedly a phenomenology, yet he gives it another name, topo-analysis: "Descriptive psychology, depth psychology, psychoanalysis and phenomenology could constitute, with the house, the corpus of doctrines that I have designated by the name of topo-analysis." (The Poetics of Space, p.xxxii)\textsuperscript{17}

If spatial considerations are of primary importance in the construction of subjectivity, and one wants to define the unity of the subject, then the imposition of an ordered space is necessary; this describes what we have seen at work in the Kantian system. It could be said that topo-analysis is therefore a method which, in subsuming others under its system, is unificatory, and thereby provides organised spaces; but the contrary is the case. Topo-analysis is a method that allows others either to be picked up or rejected, it moves according to its own desires, and it certainly never geometrises.

We have, however, approached a point in our examination of The Poetics of Space, at which the dichotomisation of spaces is implied: either a geometric, co-ordinated, striated space, loving and beloved of unification and identification; or a fluid, disorganised, smooth space which allows constant movement. This implicit dichotomisation becomes more explicit in
Bachelard's later sections dealing with the dialectics of inside and outside, to which I will return below.

Topo-analysis is a method which not only allows various types of psychology, psychoanalysis and phenomenology to be done, as the quotation above shows, it also incorporates "the house". It seems, then, that topo-analysis designates the name of a method according to which one can approach and criticise various texts, or even various spaces themselves, and articulates a method through which the spaces of subjectivity can be created. At first topo-analysis merely traced the meanderings of the poetic image of space, in order to construct a system whereby the happy spaces of our intimacy could be examined. It could only feel the soft reverberations of the poetic-subject as they faded - like a kind of fall-out. Now, on the other hand, topo-analysis produces its own resonances, insofar as it constructs the spaces which, in turn, construct subjects. We can see this at work in Bachelard's first chapter.

...and the House...

Why does the house - its image in poetry and remembered in the course of our lives - occupy such an important place in Bachelard's work? Why devote two chapters to the study of its images? Bachelard explains:

On whatever theoretical horizon we examine it, the house image would appear to have become the topography of our intimate being. ... Not only our memories, but the things we have forgotten are "housed". Our unconscious is "housed". Our soul is an abode. (The
Poetics of Space, pp.xiii, xxxiii; translation modified)

The house not only mirrors but orders the construction of subjectivity. Without it, Bachelard writes, "man would be a dispersed being" (Poetics of Space, p.7) ["l'homme serait un être dispersé." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.26)] In our remembering and in our dreaming, in both as they are articulated in poetry/literature, the house allows a subject to be safely constructed. In fact, as the preceding quotation shows, for Bachelard the house becomes our selves: the soul, the unconscious, the sites of our intimate being are houses. This takes us a stage further from Kant in the history of the spaced-subject, for in a more material way than we saw in Kant's system is the space-subject relation constructed. But we are jumping ahead, this discussion has its own place a little further on in this thesis.

Bachelard's tone, however, is a semi-mystical one - par for the course, it seems, if a phenomenology is to be done - it approaches that of Heidegger's, when mentioning dwelling, Being etc. But whereas Heidegger's mystical dwelling is the Greek Temple bringing together the Fourfold, Bachelard's is a little more homely. Bachelard seeks to explore the resonances of various existentially valorised spaces; as we have seen, his project in this text, revolves around happy space. (Bachelard does acknowledge the equal importance of antagonistic space, though reserves such a project for another book - a book he never wrote.) As well as the image of space, Bachelard valorises day-dreaming in The Poetics of Space.
(even more so in The Poetics of Reverie). The space of the dreamer is the space in which poetic, productive imagination is in effect. But this only mentions half of Bachelard's proposals for dreaming. We have seen him admonish other philosophers and their oppressive philosophical systems, this approbation is coupled with the advocacy of dreaming. If one is to appreciate the existential importance of the house in particular, of space in general, Bachelard says that we must dream; the philosophers "who discover a universe by means of the dialectical game of the I and the non-I" (The Poetics of Space, pp.4-5) ["qui trouvent un univers par le jeu dialectique du moi et du non-moi" (La Poétique de l'espace, p.24)] and fail to dream, or even read poetry, will be too stiff to resonate. At the end of the chapter dealing with corners, Bachelard writes one of the best passages in the book, it runs as follows:

To go upstairs in the word house, is to withdraw, step by step; while to go down into the cellar is to dream, it is losing oneself in the distant corridors of an obscure etymology, looking for treasures that cannot be found in words. To climb and to descend in the words themselves - this is the poet's life. To climb too high or descend too low, is allowed in the case of poets.... Must the philosopher alone be condemned by his peers always to live on the ground floor? (The Poetics of Space, p.147; translation modified.)

Throughout the book Bachelard implores the philosopher to dream, to read poetry, to break out of the restricting dialectics of systems, to be topophilic and topo-analyse.
So far, topo-analysis has moved through houses delimiting their boundaries in an effort to unify the subject; this is the subject of repose, the subject at rest. Topo-analysis accrues a further use when Bachelard moves out of the house. Furthermore, Bachelard makes such a move in analysing those spaces which announce this move. He writes that up till now topo-analysis has moved through the house as the space of happiness, of rest; psychoanalysis, he continues, in its salutary role, encourages movement outside. "To accompany psychoanalysis in its salutary action, we should have to undertake a topo-analysis of all the space that has invited us to come out of ourselves." (The Poetics of Space, p.11) So if at first the subject valorised by Bachelard seemed to be that which exists in/as a house, that which is unified by Bachelard with the use of walls, roofs and doors, then insofar as we now see this subject being called outside we can see another validation taking place. Topo-analysis moves not only up and down the storeys of repose, but in and out of the spaces of movement. Bachelard writes: "Each one of us, then, should speak of his roads, his cross-roads, his roadside benches; each one of us should make a surveyor's map of his lost fields and meadows. Thoreau said that he had the map of his fields engraved in his soul." (The Poetics of Space, p.11)

Topo-analysis becomes a practice which involves wider-reading. It maps these lost countries and houses; with topo-analysis the philosopher can dream, can not only cease to be confined on the ground-floor, but can explode the limits of the house itself.

By the close of his first chapter, Bachelard has done what his introduction set out for him to do. He has examined, through the reading of
Chapter Two

poetic/literary images, those instances of topophilia, those happy spaces of our memory. Through the workings of topo-analysis we have seen the different types of subject that space can allow. One the one hand, we saw the same old Kantian subjects: fixed in space, centralised, stable, static between the cellar and the roof of an immobile structure. Is it any wonder that Kant's own image for the structure of his critical project - especially with reference to the Critique of Pure Reason - was "architectonic"? that which gives the outlines for the safe-housing of the subject. Space is important, but it must be stagnant. Bachelard's phenomenology appears at first just to outline the primal prison of subjectification. The house = the house of incarceration, of correction.

On the other hand, Bachelard provides the contrary reading. A topo-analysis moves through the spaces of the house, it encounters many different emotions dreamed and imagined in as many different places. Then topo-analysis moved outside, thus showing that the walls of the house of the subject are supple, if not liquid. To topo-analyse is to enhance this liquification of the house, while moving through it and recognising its importance. This movement is so far only hinted at.23

His second chapter, 'Maison et Univers', examines this movement in more detail; Bachelard writes: "At whatever dialectical pole the dreamer stands, whether in the house or in the universe, the dialectics becomes dynamic. House and space are not merely two juxtaposed elements of space." (The Poetics of Space, p.43)24 For Bachelard the term "dialectics" signifies a unifying movement in one direction only; but when one considers the subject's relationship to the house and the universe - from whatever
position one stands - any dialectical relation begins to resonate. It reverberates in many directions. What had seemed a dialectical relationship which upheld unity now begins to be pushed in many directions at once. Deleuze and Guattari, in their *Anti-Oedipus*, write of machines; in some instances these machines are revved-up to the point of breakdown. Topo-analysis revs the dialectical-machine, mentioned in the quotation above, to the point of breakdown, to the point where its juxtaposition and delimitation of different spaces is seen as inadequate.

From Bachelard's talk of the house as the symbol of the resonance of being, of the house as the site for the upsurge of singular *phusis*, his description moves to one which identifies it as a particular locus for the cathecting of multiplicitous energies of desire; he explains:

> Come what may the house helps us to say: I will be an inhabitant of the world, in spite of the world. The problem is not only one of being, it is also a problem of energy and, consequently, of counter-energy. In this dynamic rivalry between house and universe, we are far removed from any reference to simple geometrical forms. A house that has been experienced is not an inert box. Inhabited space transcends geometrical space. (*The Poetics of Space*, pp.46-47)

It is ironic that Bachelard should write that inhabited space *transcends* geometrical space, since it has been thought that geometry - as *a priori* - is itself a discipline that is already transcendent. It would have been clearer had Bachelard written, "Inhabited space has no need of geometrical space, and therefore our topo-analysis will dispense with its
organisation." When the problem, as Bachelard constructs it, admits of multiplicitous energies - for we have seen that there are as many ways of imaginatively validating space as there are spaces to love - the earlier positing of a unified and unifying being, thrusting to dwell in its purity, becomes redundant. If the only guarantor of unity is the house, then once we have dispensed with its geometrical organisation as a mode of orienting our subjects to it, then the unified subject dissolves along with the walls and ceilings of the house. The house was the abode of the soul; now that the house has a dynamic relationship with what was ordered as its outside, the abode, and its occupant, becomes dissipated. With this in mind, Bachelard explains, "The house really is an instrument of topo-analysis; it is even an effective instrument, for the very reason that it is hard to use." (The Poetics of Space, p.47) And why is topo-analysis thus difficult to use? because the house is always moving into what was its outside! The house appears geometric, it is philosophically safe, it is easily given to rationalisation, philosophers, poets and others can be freed or condemned according to its structure. But if we can dream, Bachelard says, if we can desire topophilia, then topo-analysis should follow; he quotes Georges Spyridaki, as follows:

My house...is diaphanous, but it is not of glass. It is more the nature of vapour. Its walls contract and expand as I desire. At times, I draw them close about me like protective armour ... But at others, I let the walls of my house blossom out in their own space, which is infinitely extensible. (The Poetics of Space, p.51)

Spyridaki obviously knows how to topo-analyse. A couple of pages further on
Bachelard writes, what can be seen as, a commentary upon this passage: "The space we love is unwilling to remain permanently closed. It deploys and appears to move elsewhere without difficulty; into other times, and on different planes of dream and memory." (The Poetics of Space, p.53) Now we see the true extent of Bachelard's topo-analysis. It is not that which enforces unity in the building of an archetype (the house); it neither produces just the outlines of a structure, like a geometrician, nor is its product the closed-in cell of perpetual organisation. Topo-analysis dissolves the boundaries of the house that it sets up, in producing the dream-house for analysis. It moves. It fragments unities and upholds multiplicities. "But my commentary is becoming far too precise." Bachelard explains, "Concerning the different characteristics of the house, it is inclined to be hospitable to fragmentary dialectics, and if I were to pursue it, I should destroy the unity of the archetype." (The Poetics of Space, p.53) Bachelard cannot help but break archetypes during topo-analysis, he cannot help but precisely map the house(-image) to the point of fragmentation.

Our topo-analysis now becomes easier to use as it has become more supple. But the images, of intensity, intimacy, even outside and inside, that have entered our text need to be examined further.

...and trees, outsides and insides.

Bachelard's eighth chapter of The Poetics of Space, he names 'Intimate Immensity'. In it he deals with day-dreamed images of immensity, in order
to provide a direct phenomenology of the imagination; for, he explains, immensity not being an object of thought or perception, puts us in touch with the imagining consciousness in itself. Superficially, such a thesis appears to be a re-working (if that) of the late-Eighteenth/early-Nineteenth Century treatises on the Sublime - Edmund Burke's and Kant's, to name the two most well known. But, whereas Burke's sublime was merely thought of something big without any significant subjective consequences, and Kant's was subsumed under the Faculty of Reason, whose subjective consequences involved the further restriction of the Subject under the diktat of Reason; Bachelard's, however, intimates something else.

He writes: "It then becomes clear that works of art are by-products of this existentialism of the imagining being. In this direction of daydreams of immensity, the real product is consciousness of enlargement." (The Poetics of Space, p.169; Bachelard's emphases.) For Bachelard, apprehension of immensity - it is interesting that he is not moved to call it "sublime", thereby involving a whole moral/religious schema - is the transgression of the normal boundaries of the self. If the real product of imagining the immense is consciousness of enlargement, rather than consciousness of something that is large or being enlarged, then immensity has the result - a most intimate result - of expanding the limits of the self. One of Bachelard's favourite images of intensity is the forest. Now die-hard Deleuze-and-Guattarians will scream (in a multiplicity of voices) "Aha, trees, arboriality...we've done that one to death." But they would be missing some interesting intensities.
Bachelard talks about trees. He talks well of trees: in order to experience an intensity of grandeur and immensity of being, contemplate - poetically, of course - trees. Trees, he says, are completed beings [there you are!], he continues, "a tree is always destined for grandeur, and, in fact, it propagates this destiny by magnifying everything that surrounds it," and he quotes Rilke, "These trees are magnificent, but even more magnificent is the sublime and moving space between them, as though with their growth it too increased." (The Poetics of Space, p.201) At the moment, the Deleuze-and-Guattarians are nodding their heads in satisfaction. We have already seen what types of space arboreality induces: organisation, oppression and order. Yet, is this the force of Bachelard's text? His powerful, vast, tree-images initially seem to be in concordance with those that Deleuze and Guattari criticise. The tree puts us in our places - next to it we mimic its homogeneous, unified, singularity.

But it isn't that simple. Bachelard's trees begin to perform another function. First, our primitive arboreal-reaction of signification and subjectification - as announced by the tree's assertion of subject/object positions - are exploded: "whenever space is a value - there is no greater value than intimacy - it has magnifying properties. Valorised space is a verb, and never, either inside or outside us, is grandeur an object." (The Poetics of Space, p.202) The intense space, the space of existential validation, with which Bachelard is dealing does not allow itself to be positioned or pinned down. Immensity and grandeur move; if an outside or inside to 'us' can be posited, then intimacy and grandeur occupy both, and in so doing they must be said to move, like a verb. Bachelard's desired, validated space extends in all directions ("magnifies", "reverberates") it
is constantly in motion. So even the tree's grandeur begins to destroy its upright boundaries when we topo-analyse it.

Second, such a space Bachelard describes with a quotation from Joë Bousquet: "Space is nowhere. Space is inside it [the tree] like honey in a hive." (The Poetics of Space, p.202) ["L'espace n'est nulle part. L'espace est en lui comme le miel dans la ruche." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.183)] When honey is inside, it is never just 'inside'. Honey always oozes; when it is inside the hive, it always has the possibility of oozing out. A topo-analysis of honey would show its movement through cracks and fissures in the containing body, thus showing that it at once articulates and transgresses the boundaries of its container. Space is honey, Bousquet says. Especially the 'inner' space of the tree. The grandeur of the tree allows the honeyed space 'within' ooze out of every crack in the craggy bark; to grow - that is, to spatially validate its surroundings, to become a verb - is to ooze through every branch and twig, out of every leaf and root. Bachelard's immense tree is that which would move as a becoming-rhizome of Deleuze and Guattari. The eruption of lines of flight upon the organised body of the trunk, is the oozing of honey-space in the immense intensity of a Bachelardian tree. It is a becoming that must be encouraged. Bachelard writes:

Even a philosopher of space starts to dream. And if we like words of composed metaphysics, one might say that here Joë Bousquet has shown us a space-substance, honey-space or space-honey. May all matter be given its individual place, all sub-stances their ex-stance. And may all matter achieve conquest of its space, its power of expansion over and beyond the surfaces by means of
which a geometrician would like to define it. (The Poetics of Space, pp.202-203)

Bachelard here seems to use two notions of space. One insists upon the materiality, oozing, honey-ness of space; a space which does not only allow dreams/images to flow through it, but urges them forth. The other space is that of the geometrician, well-defined, cold, empty, co-ordinated. This is the space that Bachelard says must be conquered. Deleuze and Guattari said that one can make mappings from tracings, and force rhizomes from roots; in the same way, Bachelard has topo-analysed a material space from a tree.

Where, then, does Bachelard turn when he has finished with the tree? or, rather, when he has announced the materiality of space? He turns to the plain and the plateau! In order to map various reactions to images of immensity, in the shape of plains/plateaus, Bachelard proposes a "plains test". The two poles of which he describes as follows.

The first, is typified by a quotation from Rilke: "The plain is the sentiment that exalts us." (The Poetics of Space, p.203) ["La plaine est le sentiment qui nous grandit." (quoted, La Poétique de l'espace, p.184)]

Bachelard's commentary on this sentence proceeds as follows:

This theorem of aesthetic anthropology is so clearly stated that it suggests a correlative theorem which could be expressed in the following terms: any sentiment that exalts us makes our situation in the world smoother. (The Poetics of Space, p.203)
In this case, the plain is that type of space - smooth space - which encourages such feelings of exaltation, that our corresponding intensity flows out across the space, validating it.

The second pole, is typified by a quotation from Henri Bosco: On the plain, "I am always elsewhere, in an elsewhere that is floating, fluid. Being for a long time absent from myself, and nowhere present, I am too inclined to attribute the inconsistency of my daydreams to the wide open spaces that induce them." (The Poetics of Space, p.203) Bosco knows that the smooth space induced by the plain, flows through him, dissolving and dispersing all organised notions of unified subjectivity. The relations between here and elsewhere become nonsensical on a plain which will not allow the co-ordinations of the geometrician.

These two poles of the plains test are, it should be added, as mobile and untetherable as the here and there of Bosco's reverie. We can see that this intensity of immensity, that happens with the image-movement of the plain, is commensurable with the oozings announced in Bosco's daydream and in Bachelard's honey-space. We have seen Bachelard's space, itself, begin to move - like a verb - so far in this section. We have also seen it destroy our traditional concepts of outside and inside, subject and object, here and there. These concepts are dealt with in more detail in Bachelard's ninth chapter, 'The Dialectics of Outside and Inside'.

The opening section of this ninth chapter expresses many of the problems with which we have already dealt - both in and out of our encounter with Bachelard. Outside and inside: these, for Bachelard, constitute two poles
of a dialectical organisation which is "cancerous" to philosophical thought. It is on the basis of this metaphysical opposition - this co-ordinated, organisational opposition - that geometricians/metaphysicians seek to determine philosophical knowledge. And yet it is an opposition that is bound up in spatiality: "The most profound metaphysics is rooted in an implicit geometry which - whether we will or no - confers spatiality upon thought; if a metaphysician could not draw, what would he think?" (The Poetics of Space, p.212) Such an analysis brings us very close, again, to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason; in that Bachelard's depiction of the formal nature of space/spatiality is as a sort of pre-organising function which allows thought to become knowledge. Bachelard continues:

The dialectics of here and there has been promoted to the rank of an absolutism according to which these unfortunate adverbs of place are endowed with unsupervised powers of ontological determination. Many metaphysical systems would need mapping. But in philosophy, all short cuts are costly, and philosophical knowledge cannot advance from schematised experiences. (The Poetics of Space, p.212; Bachelard's emphases; translation modified.)

This is a crammed, and opaque, passage. In the beginning, we seem to know where we are: the unsubtle transcendental idealism of the terms 'here' and 'there' in (Bachelard's) contemporary philosophy, has weakened philosophy's relationship with experience - especially, and ironically, at a time when such a relationship is seen as most important. This is where the term 'spatiality' enters - notice, I do not use 'space' here. Spatiality describes exactly that which ontologically orders, organises, co-ordinates,
in order that we are left with a site for possible knowledge/experience. This is what Kant did, and what Bachelard rails against, as we can see from his conclusion, "philosophical knowledge cannot advance from schematised experiences [expériences]." But what is the force of the middle six-word sentence, "Many metaphysical systems would need mapping"? Is a cartography necessary to be able to read such spatialised metaphysics; or, is a cartography necessary to diffuse these metaphysics? Whether Bachelard emphasises one over the other, is not clear — if, indeed, the two readings are mutually exclusive — and I am sure that it does not matter how we read it. Nevertheless, what remains interestingly unclear — in the context of this passage in particular, and the whole chapter in general — is the question of the role and outcome of this cartography. But it is this question we have been answering all along, for this method is topo-analysis.

The above passage ended the first section of Bachelard’s chapter; the next section begins thus, "I should like to examine a little more closely, this geometrical cancerisation of the linguistic tissue of contemporary philosophy." (The Poetics of Space, p.213) Bachelard shows exactly what he thinks of the spatialisation of dialectics-metaphysics; and he does this by criticising the term "being-there" ["être-là"]. For him, anything that can be called being cannot be given a spatial localisation, either here or there. As we have seen, his valorisation of the House, and its images, is no such determination of being — Bachelard never imagines an "être-maison". For the spatial co-ordination of the subject is contrary to everything he wants to propound. It was shown above, that the image of the house is one which not only serves to produce a fluid subject, but it is itself moving.
As was the honey-space which was eventually emitted by the tree. The dialectics of outside and inside have no bearing on the plane/plateau images already mapped. Indeed, topo-analysis is an anathema to outside/inside thought; it just moves over whatever space it wants. Bachelard wants to multiply images, not restrict them to outside and inside; but, wherever! everywhere!

The problem with outside/inside, is that it is a biunivocal expression of unification which only allows of the production of singularity. Bachelard goes on to say: so we do sometimes still use images of outside and inside, even in topo-analysis; what we should do, then is multiply these images, amplify them. If singularities are made, then make sure that they don't stay in one place, make them move, make them occupy different positions or the same position — any position. If movement is allowed, if reverberation/resonance is forced form these images, then their geometrism will collapse, the outside-inside relation will become smoother, more fluid. Bachelard says that poets do this; it is a constantly emphasised entreaty of Bachelard's, that philosophers should do it too. Following a quotation from Henri Michaux's prose-poem, *L'espace aux ambres*, Bachelard comments:

> If we examine closely the lesson in philosophy the poet gives us, we shall find in this passage a spirit that has lost its "being-there", one that has so declined as to fall from the being of its shade and mingle with the romours of being, in the form of a meaningless noise, of a confused hum that cannot be located. (The Poetics of Space, p.217; Bachelard's emphases)"
and, "What Michaux gives us as an a priori of being is the entire space-time of ambiguous being. In this ambiguous space, the mind has lost its geometrical homeland and the spirit is drifting." (The Poetics of Space, p.218) These poetic thoughts, Bachelard says, confer a darker, shadier realm of being than what is left to us by the "philosophers of anguish". By way of an aside, it is interesting to note that for Bachelard, the production of the image of the anguish-of-being (in keeping with his beliefs about the relation of imaginative production to consciousness, already shown) is the simultaneous manifestation of that anguish. Not a very original thought; but Bachelard continues his analysis thus:

What strikes us here is that the metaphysical aspect originates on the very level of the image, on the level of an image which disturbs the notions of spatiality commonly considered to be able to reduce these disturbances and restore the mind to a statute of indifference to space that does not have to localise dramatic events. (The Poetics of Space, p.219)

Again Bachelard exemplifies that which goes against classic philosophical thought on space. As well as the quotations Bachelard gives from Henri Michaux, he quotes, Jules Supervieille and Rilke. All these passages incorporate images of space which derange the outside/inside dialectic.

Bachelard's topo-analysis has come a long way. It has shown us constantly moving subjects, oozing in space, skimming along the surfaces of their constitution, muddying the spatial distinctions according to which geometric thought seeks to rigidify:
For it is dangerous, in expressing oneself, to be "all roots."

The phenomenology of the poetic imagination allows us to explore the being of man considered as the being of a surface, ... (The Poetics of Space, p. 222; Bachelard's emphasis)\textsuperscript{44}

Conclusion.

It is here that we must leave this part of my thesis. First of all, we watched Deleuze and Guattari map a Cartography. Its movement announced the desire for an escape from spatiality, from a space that was ordering and organised, to a space that was smooth. Its movement articulated the description of those spaces in the same movement as it constructed the latter. Bachelard's topo-analysis we have seen perform a similar function. Although it was couched in terms which seemed to hold it back in the space of order - so that it could not be anything other than a tracing - it soon moved away, onto another plateau.

That Bachelard began with a "phenomenology of the imagination" and ended with a topo-analysis of the spaces of subjectivity, is useful (for me) but not particularly amazing. We should not see in Bachelard's work merely a pre-run of Deleuze and Guattari's, or even my own. It is noticeable, when reading a text like The Poetics of Space, that it can be put to many different contemporary philosophical uses. A modern phenomenologist, deconstructionist, literary theorist/critic, psychoanalyst, or whoever, can find a fruitful branch on which to graft their own texts. Indeed, there are
many points at which *The Poetics of Space* falls into such outmoded assumptions, that one could cry: when, for example, Bachelard eulogises over the sanctity of the poetic image, and the power of the poet. Maybe, though, this proves that Bachelard's *The Poetics of Space* is rhizomatic writing, of the kind advocated by Deleuze and Guattari. It is a text whose tubers, and feelers twist and turn all over its appointed area of study, and as we have seen, they can take flight into many other areas.

The line of flight I have pursued is one which has begun its journey with Deleuze and Guattari's Cartography, and broken away with Bachelard's topo-analysis. Throughout the course of the study, we have reached impasses and deferrals. Nevertheless, the grafting of topo-analysis onto Cartography has been one which has, itself, produced the possibilities of new lines of flight. The first chapter of the next part of this thesis, will examine Deleuze and Guattari's notion of territorialities, in an attempt to chart, or topoanalyse, the honeyed oozeings of a material space.
As the title of this part suggests, the two chapters it contains will seek to explore the ways in which a notion of a material space will affect our understanding of subject-making. In the previous chapters we saw the ways in which cartography works, the critical promises a cartography makes and the relationship it had with other practices. Now, we will be shown in more detail, the types of space that a cartography charts.

First, Chapter Three - 'Spaces' - examines the territories discussed by Deleuze and Guattari in their *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* volumes; most notably their differentiation between smooth and striated space as made in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Secondly, Chapter Four - 'Subjectification' - provides an account of Guattari's *The Three Ecologies*, relating our previous methodological discussions with questions of subjectivity, in order that a Cartography of Subjectivity can - finally - be undertaken.

Where the former chapter maps a material space in the abstract terms gleaned from the discussion of the Deleuze and Guattari texts, the latter's description of a material space will articulate such notions more concretely. The project of this part of the thesis, then, is to refine our understanding of a possible material space so that we can reorient our accepted notions of what it takes to make subjectivity, in order to pave the way for a criticism of contemporary critiques of the subject.
We were introduced to many terms, in the previous chapter dealing with Deleuze and Guattari, which abound in their philosophy: plane of consistency, multiplicities, lines of flight, to name a few. The introductory section of the present chapter will re-articulate these ideas, in such a way as to provide a brief account of Deleuze and Guattari's notions concerning territorialisation, reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation. This chapter will then proceed to make an account of the types of space constructed according to these movements - the smooth and the striated. It must be emphasised, however, that though I will be taking account of these spatially oriented movements, an account which necessarily relies upon a reading of Chapter Three, 'Savages, Barbarians, Civilised Men', of Deleuze and Guattari's *L'Anti OEdipe,* I will be unable to follow the intricacies of this chapter. This chapter is over one hundred and twenty pages long and notoriously complicated; the intricate fluctuations of its many plots and sub-plots (anthropological, political, spatial, psychological...) would necessitate an examination longer than this thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, given the paradigms in which this thesis is working, the notions borrowed from this text of Deleuze and Guattari's, should not appear either out of place or obscure.
Towards the beginning of Chapter One above, we were entreated to think of a vast expanse of space - an arctic tundra or shifting desert; this space flows according to what Deleuze and Guattari term the plane of consistency. The plane of consistency is motivated by the various flows of desire that constitute it, in such a way that the flows of desire and the plane of consistency cease to be differentiable. Upon this plane, in, across or through this space, there is no need of organisation, no restriction or delimitation of the directions taken by the particular flows, and no hierarchisation. This much we have already encountered with respect to the discussion of Rhizomes and Cartographies, and even witnessed at work in the honeyed oozings of Bachelard's material space of Topoanalysis. Now, however, we can provide a further articulation of such a plane of consistency, in terms which relate to the direction taken by this chapter.

In Chapter One, we referred to the example of Cartesian philosophy - especially his geometry and cogito - in an attempt to illustrate systematic blockages on the plane of consistency and the prevention of lines of flight erupting from an organism, that this philosophy promoted in order to give structure and hierarchy to questions of subjectification. In just the same way (though not necessarily according to the same means) this plane/space can be organised in terms relating directly to the surfaces of the earth. The production of a Territory, a territorialisation, comes about when the various flows on the plane of consistency are organised into the body of the earth. This does not equate with the apportioning of land in administrative terms, but rather is constituted by the inscription, upon the plane, of hierarchies of those that live on it, or flow across it. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is at this point that social and spatial
formations intertwine. If we refer to the language already used with respect to Deleuze and Guattari, i.e. that of the rhizome, we can see that the movement of territorialisation is equivalent to the spreading of a root-structure, or the growing of an arboreal system. Blockages are enforced and stock taken of the spaces thus inscribed. The desired outcome of such a process is increased order. This is precisely the way Kant organised the construction of his subject; the spatial element of its constitution was important as a territorialisation, as that which promoted the safe construction and constriction of a unified Subject. The subject may have been cultivated as the centrepiece of the Kantian critical system, but its growth was as tightly arranged as the ornamental garden viewed by Bachelard.

Deterritorialisation, quite simply, describes the dissolution of these territorial growths. To deterritorialise is to disrupt the general movement towards territorialisation in such a way as to promote the free-flowing nature of the plane of consistency that had been hitherto constrained. The eruption of a line of flight from the arboreal structure, or the breaking out of a rhizome from a root, are movements of deterritorialisation. Similarly, reterritorialisation is the making root of a rhizome, or the turning back onto the organised structure of the Territory of a line, or lines, of flight.

Territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are therefore movements of great importance in the production of organisation and subjectification on the plane of consistency. They can be seen as operations upon vectors (the importance of this 'vector' terminology will
become apparent in the following chapter), thus determining their directions and their productions. It is according to these movements/operations that the plane of consistency flows or freezes. Furthermore, the relation between the movements of territorialisation etc. and lines of flight/rhizomes is indicative of the types of movements thereby described. Though I have here used the language of the rhizome to describe the operation of territorialisation etc., it should not be inferred that these terms operate with respect to a system of general equivalence - to do so would involve the positing of an hierarchical, mimetic structure according to which one can order one's own understanding of the terms. Such a mimetic structure is what is promoted by the forces of re/territorialisation to enhance and enforce the boundaries of their hierarchical social formations. The relation between these two types of discourse, however, is one of mapping, not of tracing. I have endeavoured to describe territorialisation etc. using familiar terminology as a map; indeed, in the same way that we saw the map/thing mapped distinction disappear in earlier chapters, we will see the distinctions between the terms used dissolve. Mapping, rhizomes and deterritorialisations will all flow into, and out of, each other when we encounter smooth and striated spaces. What is needed now, however, is a short exposition of the relations that Deleuze and Guattari identify between their discussions of the occupation and understanding of space - territorialisation etc. - the formation of Capitalism and the role of the State.

Throughout their works Deleuze and Guattari articulate many types of flows. Furthermore, many types of machine are described providing for the diversion, consummation and speeding up of fluctuation of these flows; yet,
in all cases they can be called: desiring-machines. We can say, therefore, that the movements of territorialisation etc., as well as those of rhizomatisation, arborealisation, cartography and representation, are all machinic functions operating on the myriad flows on the plane of consistency. The plane of consistency invoked not only at the beginning of this chapter, but at the outset of the previous one which dealt with Deleuze and Guattari, has yet another characterisation: the flows that pervade the plane of consistency are also those of Capital.

Capitalism, then, refers to a particular way of relating to the general flow of capital: on the whole, capitalism tries to slow down these flows, in order to agglomerate, congeal, order capital in the hope of maximising, or realising its own ends. Though the Capitalist Machine appropriates the organisations of the machines that have already worked at the codification of these flows on the plane of consistency, it adds its own organisation by redefining their processes. The Capitalist Machine deterritorialises and decodes what were merely territorialised, coded as the body of the earth by the Primitive Territorial Machine, or overcoded as the body of the despot by the Barbarian Despotic Machine. Now the capitalist decoding of the flows of/as capital becomes the pure space constitutive of capitalism; the decoding of flows on the plane of consistency provides the territory of capitalism as the full body of capital.

This, however, is only part of the story. If it wasn't, and capitalism was purely a motor of deterritorialisation and the decoding of flows, then it would be nothing more than commensurate with the plane of consistency
itself. Capitalism would equal the full body of capital and be nothing other than another schizophrenia. But there is more to this story. Inasmuch as it decodes and deterritorialises, the Capitalist Machine overlays an axiomatic whereby the full body of capital is penned in, organised as its inner limit. Deleuze and Guattari explain it as follows: "The flows are decoded and axiomatised by capitalism at the same time. Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death." (Anti-OEdipus, p.246; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis)³ It is thus that the Capitalist Machine reterritorialises, remarks its internal organisation in an attempt to constrain those forces which lead only to its dissolution upon the general flows of the plane of consistency.

Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhibit this tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting for it its own immanent relative limits, which continually reproduces on a wider scale. It axiomatises with one hand what it decodes with the other. (Anti-OEdipus, p.246; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases)⁴

We should now be able to understand Deleuze and Guattari's characterisation of the formation, propagation and continual upkeep of the Capitalist Machine, in the terms with which we are familiar. If we are to incorporate an understanding of the role and formation of the State, in this analysis of the Capitalist Machine, we must take the following points into consideration. The State is not capitalist by definition. In the myriad of
concepts introduced by Deleuze and Guattari into the chapter from *Anti-Oedipus* with which we have been dealing, that of the State occupies many positions. On the whole, its primary formation - the *Urstaat* - has links with the Barbarian Despotical Machine. The State Machine, then, is set to the overcoding of flows into the body of the despot or Imperial formation. Insofar as the Capitalist Machine decodes the flows of the Despotical, it also deterritorialises the territory of the State. However, as it increasingly reterritorialises this territory, and axiomatises the full body of capital, so the State formation is squeezed back into the service of the Capitalist Machine. Thus, we cannot ascribe the characterisation Deleuze and Guattari offer as a mere history of the development of capitalism, having passed through various temporally prior stages. There is evidence of many, more primitive, social structures in the workings of the Capitalist Machine than a stagist view will allow. Furthermore, the State apparatus is particularly helpful to the axiomatisation of the Capitalist Machine because it has a ready-made organisational structures of police and army. As Deleuze and Guattari write, "The State is thus induced to play an increasingly important role in the regulation of the axiomatized flows, with regard to production and its planning, the economy and its 'monetarization,' and surplus value and its absorption (by the State apparatus itself)." (*Anti-Oedipus*, p.253) We shall see these particular structures become important in the following discussion of the Nomads' relation to smooth and striated space.

**Spaces Smooth and Striated.**

To recap: We will remember that a rhizome could break along any point of
its progression and flow in any direction it desired. Furthermore, an arboreal structure could itself break and form a rhizome. If we regard the growth of the arboreal structure in the terms I have described above, we shall see that its movement is one of general territorialisation and reterritorialisation. Insofar as a branch forms, or a root advances, it does so in order to code (or overcode) the territory in which it grows: structuring and organising as it goes. (The same goes for the production of a trace/tracing.) Now, whenever a branch or root becomes a rhizome, or tracing starts to map, we can say that a deterritorialisation is taking place, or that the previous codifications are being decoded. If, however, this deterritorialisation (whether as the breaking of arboreal movement, or as the acceleration of the rhizomatic) tends back towards organisation, structuration or root-thought, we can see that it has reterritorialised.

The main object texts for study throughout this section, are the two "plateaus" from Deleuze and Guattari's *Mille Plateaux* entitled, '1227 - Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine,' and '1440 - The Smooth and the Striated.' These two sections of the book are two of the longest and I am not endeavouring to provide a detailed account of the theses adopted therein. As I have stated above, my project is to provide an account of the ways in which we can construct a material space; in order to do so, it is necessary to map the ways in which Deleuze and Guattari detail their distinction between the smooth and the striated. (Again, as we saw with the 'distinction' between the root and the rhizome, we will come to see why the assertion of a 'distinction' between the smooth and the striated is, at the best misleading, and at the worst reactive.)
Chapter Three

In a long quotation from '1440 - the Smooth and the Striated', Deleuze and Guattari detail three distinctions between smooth space and striated space, as follows:

The smooth and the striated are distinguished first of all by an inverse relation between the point and the line (in the case of the striated, the line is between two points, while in the smooth, the point is between two lines); and second, by the nature of the line (smooth-directional, open intervals; dimensional-striated, closed intervals). Finally, there is a third difference, concerning the surface or space. In striated space, one closes off a surface and "allocates" it according to determinate intervals, assigned breaks; in the smooth, one "distributes" oneself in an open space, according to frequencies and in the course of one's crossings (logos and nomos). (A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 480-481)

Straight away we can see that the space Deleuze and Guattari call striated corresponds to that which I have called co-ordinated, via Kant and following Bachelard. It is a space of boundaries and ranges, limits and allotments, and is cross-hatched like graph paper for ease of co-ordination. Striated, metric, space - Deleuze and Guattari explain with a quotation from Pierre Boulez - "is counted in order to be occupied." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.362) ("on le compte pour l'occuper" (Mille Plateaux, p.447)). Territorialisation and reterritorialisation, coding and overcoding, are movements which establish the power of organisation by the occupation of space; indeed, successful organisation is concordant with successful occupation.
Chapter Three

We have seen the Capitalist social formation produce, and repress, the very forces capable of destroying it (indeed, Deleuze and Guattari often refer to these deterritorialisations, in *Anti-OEdipus*, as "schizophrenisations") through the axiomatisation of the decoded flows of capital that constitute its formative space. These "dark forces" of deterritorialisation and decoding lurk at its perimeters like wild animals outside an encampment. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari articulate this schematisation further, with reference to the State's relationship to Nomads. To use another crude dichotomisation: the State is articulated on grounds of the validation of interiority and the construction of subjects; the Nomadic (or Nomad War Machine) is articulated on exteriority and speed. In a way similar to that we have encountered in defining striated space, the State promotes a general tendency towards secrecy and closetedness - and like Bachelard's geometric space, relishes its use of the inside-outside dialectical system to these ends; whereas the Nomadic promulgates a constant movement into the 'outside', disorganising any prior stratification in order to promote the constant production of its own flows. Nomads ooze.

It is in this way that we can understand some of the rather cryptic terms used by Deleuze and Guattari in making their simple distinctions between smooth and striated space, especially in the passage cited above. The space of the Nomad is always fluid; if a nomadic movement is described in terms of points and paths (or lines), then the attainment of a point does not mark the end of a line, but the possibility of further paths to take. Such a movement also describes the lines of flight discussed in an earlier chapter. So, the lines of smooth space are not point-directed, they are
Chapter Three

open to take any possible direction. Smooth space is Nomad space. "The nomadic trajectory...distributes people (or animals) in an open space, one that is indefinite and noncommunicating. ... The nomad distributes itself in a smooth space; it occupies, inhabits, holds that space; that is its territorial principle." (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.380, 381; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis; translation modified.)7 The nomad rides space like surfers ride waves; or rather, like skateboarders ride pavements - their speed and movement being in a proportional relation to the making fluid of the environment by the occupants. Sedentary space (i.e. not Nomad space), Deleuze and Guattari explain, "is striated, by walls, enclosures, and roads between enclosures," (A Thousand Plateaus, p.381) ["est strié, par des murs, des clôtures et des chemins entre les clôtures," (Mille Plateaux, p.472)]. This is also the space of the State; whose 'join-the-dots' mode of organisation delimits the occupied space, closing itself within boundaries and making the fear of an 'outside' into a vocation.

What, then, is the relationship between the occupants of a (type of) space and that space? Do the occupants forge their lived-in space, or are they only capable of living in a space that they find receptive? That is, is their relationship to space active or passive?

The answer to these questions - though, in part, already alluded to - could be said to be the motor for this thesis as a whole. Nevertheless, an answer given in terms that relate directly to those dealt with in this chapter, should also clear up any problems we may have with our adoption of - what I have called - crude distinctions. (For it could, rightly, be argued that a piece of work that purports to be a cartography, by promoting such
dichotomies and announcing their factual rigidity, is indulging in the type of tracing that it condemns as arboreal, or striated, or co-ordinated.)

To begin with, however, we must note that it is at this point that the introduction of the terms adumbrated at the outset of this chapter, become useful. Deleuze and Guattari write, "The smooth always possesses a greater power of deterritorialisation than the striated." (*A Thousand Plateaus, p.480*) ["Le lisse dispose toujours d'une puissance de déterritorialisation supérieure au strié." (*Mille Plateaux, p.599*)] The Nomadic movement over smooth space is one that decodes and deterritorialises its flows:

If the nomad can be called the Deterritorialised par excellence, it is precisely because there is no reterritorialisation afterward as with the migrant, or upon something else as with the sedentary (the sedentary's relation with the earth is mediatised by something else, a property regime, a State apparatus). With the nomad, on the contrary, it is deterritorialisation that constitutes the relation to the earth, to such a degree that the nomad reterritorialises on deterritorialisation itself. It is the earth that deterritorialises itself, in a way that provides the nomad with a territory. (*A Thousand Plateaus, p.381; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.*)

The deterritorialising and decoding movement of the Capitalist Machine, especially insofar as it has co-opted the powers of the State formation, is one geared to the production of striated space; for it is according to this schema that the (decoded &c.) flows of capital constitute the co-ordinated formations according to which all organisation takes place. This is
reterritorialisation par excellence. The Nomadic Machine reterritorialises nothing in the capitalist sense, for it has no prior axiomatisation of territory on which to fall; if it can be said to perform a reterritorialisation it is only upon the deterritorialising movement itself, as this quotation makes clear, and as such the term "reterritorialisation" is redundant. Nevertheless, it is also quite clear that the Nomad Machine can be appropriated and set to work by the State Apparatuses it opposes. We have seen that the deterritorialising flows can be recoded by the Capitalist Machine; such a fate can befall the Nomad Machine - the dis-organising forces of destruction and dissipation (those which smooth) can penetrate the State defences only to become overwhelmed and reworked by those very forces threatened by dissolution. The perfect example of such an occasion, is the movement of the mad/homeless. The edges of society - defined, so often, as mad or irrational - never cease to threaten that social structure. The village idiot has always been a source of fear and therefore fun; and has always been forced into a protective space. However, with contemporary 'care-in-the-community' programmes these 'irrational' elements are again forced onto the streets of cities, where their destructive power is simultaneously exacerbated and neutralised. The movement onto the streets of the tramp smooths the otherwise rigid structure delineating society, and yet is plugged back into this structure through the invocation of charitable organisations/collective conscience. (Witness the contemporary role of the homeless of New York. In a city where recycling is almost forcibly encouraged, where every Coke can is worth 5¢ at the recycling depot, the homeless have been co-opted by the State's environmental departments as a vast, transient can-collecting machine, whose constituent parts consist of a trolley and a black, plastic bin-
In the end, the homeless and the mad occupy the same position as when they inhabited the hospital or the workhouse, it is just that the flow of capital underpinning this position enters from a different angle. The Capitalist Machine has a necessary relationship with the smooth.

What such a discussion shows, is the mutual dependency of the machine and the space over which it moves. A machine is defined not only by the relative distribution of its parts (the distribution of particular flows on the plane of consistency) but also by its position with respect to its production. The desire-producing Desiring machine, the map-making Cartography machine, or the Smooth space making Nomad War Machine. All of these assemblages on the plane of consistency do not exhibit a stultifying one way, or univocal, relationship between the machine and product; but rather they are articulated by, as well as articulate, the product. A nomad, then, is such because of the space over which it moves, and because it smooths the space over which it swarms. Therefore, the active-passive distinction crumbles alongside the others.

There is another aspect of this relationship that must be examined. We are already aware of the types of space-production in which the smooth and the striated partake. Smooth space distributes its occupants over its surface; striated space is allocated by its occupants "according to determinate intervals" (see the quotation from *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp.480-481, above p.95). We have also seen the results of various deterritorialisations and reterritorialisations, with respect to space construction. Quite simply, then, we can say that: a nomadic movement can smooth a striated space, in the same way that a rhizome can break out from a branch or root; and,
similarly, a smooth space can be overran and ordered to form a striated space. The Nomad Machine can be appropriated and worked by the State; the State can be overran and smoothed by the Nomads. No one space, or spatial organisation, exists independent of any other; each type of space - as with each type of machinic construction - has a necessary and constitutive relation with an other. To believe otherwise would be idealist. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari write (at the close of this plateau) that smooth space alone won't save us. But I shall return to this below.

Deleuze and Guattari make this simple schematisation of the discussion of types of space much more complex. In the section of the "plateau" in which the smooth and the striated are related in terms of a mathematical model, Deleuze and Guattari write:

We are always, however, brought back to a dissymetrical necessity to cross from the smooth to the striated, and from the striated to the smooth. ... Translating is not a simple act: it is not enough to substitute the space traversed for the movement; a series of rich and complex operations is necessary.... Neither is translating a secondary act. It is an operation that undoubtedly consists in subjugating, overcoding, metricising smooth space, in neutralising it, but also in giving it a milieu of propagation, extension, refraction, renewal, and impulse without which it would perhaps die of its own accord. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.486; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)"
Deleuze and Guattari explain that—in terms of the mathematical model they are using, at least—the translation of the smooth into the striated can result in the possibilities of creating openings, as often as it produces closure. And vice versa, of course. Major, State science has need of the innovations and inspirations that come via minor, nomad science; and minor science, without the structure afforded by major, would not progress. "Perhaps we must say that all progress is made by and in striated space, but all becoming occurs in smooth space." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.486)

"Peut-être faut-il dire que tout progrès se fait par et dans l'espace strié, mais tout devenir est dans l'espace lisse." (Mille Plateaux, p.607)

It is not enough merely to equate the negative, or bad, with the striated and the positive, or good, with the smooth. Our description of the smooth-striated distinction can say that, on the whole, that which striates does so in order to organise and oppress, and that which smooths does so in order to liberate and flow. Both formations, however, can use both methods in their creation of space. The movement between the smooth and the striated becomes far more complex than it was first proposed. Deleuze and Guattari write:

In each instance, then, the simple opposition "smooth-striated" gives rise to far more difficult complications, alternations, and superpositions. But these complications basically confirm the distinction, precisely because they bring dissymmetrical movements into play. For now it suffices to say that there are two kinds of voyage, distinguished by the respective role of the point, line, and space. (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.481-482)"
We are, thus, led down another line of flight. It has been stated throughout this chapter - in keeping with the common sense notion of the nomadic - that the nature of the Nomad Machine lies in its particular movement. Indeed, speed was said to be one of its characteristics. But Deleuze and Guattari articulate something different; they write:

We can say of the nomads, following Toynbee's suggestion: they do not move. They are nomads by dint of not moving, not migrating, of holding a smooth space that they refuse to leave, that they leave only in order to conquer and die. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.482; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

Throughout the "plateaus" with which we have been dealing, Deleuze and Guattari present us with nomadic images of fluctuation and movement. Nomads that swarm over the desert and the steppe, lining up one point of vegetation with another (vegetation that is as fluid as the nomad). But we are now assured, such nomadic voyaging is not really movement. Movement describes what the migrant does: the migrant leaves spaces ordered, organised according to the aim or end of its journey. It striates space by reterritorialisation. Nomad points, we have seen, are always directional or vectoral; its points are not oriented towards another, fixed point. The smooth space the nomad makes, folds back onto the nomad and occupies it. The Nomad's voyage is a sort of non-moving picaresque; or, rather, the nomad has more to do with a mode of voyaging than with any movement-destination axis. For Deleuze and Guattari this denotes a way of being in space - a way of being, a becoming, that constructs and is constructed by
that space. Deleuze and Guattari further distinguish between movement and speed, thus:

Movement designates the relative character of a body considered as "one," and which goes from point to point; speed, on the contrary, constitutes the absolute character of a body whose irreducible parts (atoms) occupy or fill a smooth space in the manner of a vortex, with the possibility of springing up at any point. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.381; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

Considering that our reading of Deleuze and Guattari's "plateaus" operates as a cartography, it is possible for us to articulate the various complicated voyages that Deleuze and Guattari make, in such a way that does not thereby force them under the auspices of another mode of discourse. Their territory appears at first simple, then more complex as the various dimensions of its surface are mapped, then more simple again as the various and particular lines of flight recede into the distance. A cartography is the only way in which such spaces can be charted; for a mere tracing would structure the plateaus in such a way as to obfuscate, or even stifle, their intricate interlacings. And yet a cartography, such as this, itself provides ample example of the ways in which the smooth is infiltrated by the striated in order to be understood. This follows the problematic charted in the introductory chapter of this thesis, wherein the possibility of the revolutionary thinker (or writer, or whatever...) writing, and therefore identifying itself as revolutionary, something new, was discussed. At that point I concluded that the revolutionary was not a visionary - able to step out of his/her linguistic, social, cultural
milieu, in order to observe it, criticise it and then press forward. Now, we can see that the forces that strive for change - the smooth spaced Nomad War Machine - will always have been articulated within the State system as organised by the Capitalist Machine. The various ways of proceeding interlock. Such a discussion, however, is preemptive of this conclusion.

Conclusion.

What we must consider now, is the effect this examination of Deleuze and Guattari's smooth and striated space has in furthering my own exposition of a material space. To begin with, we must chart the ways in which the fruits - or, maybe I should say, rhizomes - of the preceding discussion, lead our understanding of space to be a material one.

Kant's space remained ideal; subjectively ideal. Moreover, we have seen that the positing of such a space and the concomitant positing of such a subject, produced a mutually idealist outcome. I mentioned in an earlier chapter that Kant nearly became a cartographer with respect to his "free play of the cognitive faculties/imagination"; but I was led to conclude that Kant blocked the lines of flight his almost-energetic system started to take, and reterritorialised them all under the Faculty of Reason. He recoded all the possible flows back onto the "body" of the Idea.

Cartographies, and Topo-analyses, we have seen produce something else. They follow - not trace - the flows on the plane of consistency, they follow the voyages on the various plateaus and surfaces they become attached to. They
follow lines of flight wherever they are produced - and may even encourage them. We saw, further, that cartography/topo-analysis had a mutually constructive relationship with the spaces over which they moved. And now, we have seen that the movement of Cartography is concurrent with that of the Nomadic Machine. Both are productive of smooth space; both smash the blocks installed by the Capitalist Machine's organisation of striated space; and both can be overrun, and put back to work, by that very Machine.

At this point we must take heed of the warning Deleuze and Guattari make at the close of the 'Smooth and Striated' "plateau". They write: "Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.500) ["Ne pas croire qu'un espace lisse suffit à nous sauver." (Mille Plateaux, p.625)]. The proposition that merely a move into smooth space will allow us to free ourselves from the organisations and oppressions of, otherwise, everyday existence, is far too idealistic. It makes of smooth space something into which we can float during an "out-of-body-experience"; or, it makes smooth space into merely another astral plane, spiritualising it, and certainly ignoring its connections with the striated.

In order to appreciate the value of smooth space, we must not ignore these connections, and interflows, with striated space. Indeed, it was precisely these that our discussion of rhizomes showed must be charted and smoothed. What does have the possibility of "saving us", however, is the active production of smooth spaces - by whatever means.

Nevertheless, the space of the nomad is material space par excellence. It is not something which exists merely to be owned, nor is it something which
is empty until filled with its subject. For the nomad, space is that which permeates its very body - it is sucked, sipped, stroked and swum through. In a section of the "plateau" devoted to "nomad art", Deleuze and Guattari explain that the nomad-line (as opposed to the "rectilinear" line) is abstract in an entirely different sense (than that of the rectilinear, negatively motivated Egyptian line announced by Worringer), precisely because it has a multiple orientation and passes between points, figures, and contours: it is positively motivated by the smooth space it draws, not by any striation it might perform to ward off anxiety and subordinate the smooth. The abstract line is the affect of smooth spaces, not a feeling of anxiety that calls forth striation. (A _Thousand Plateaus_, p.497; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis)

The line the nomads take on their voyages is the "affect" of smooth spaces; for the nomad, space is as material as the desert wind that drives their wandering, or the watering holes through which they pass. The Nomad Line and the Nomad do not exist in a representational relation, but as part of the whole Nomad Machine - which also functions (or not) according to its connections with other types of machine - they are cartographic. The Nomad Machine is the Cartographic machine, just as nomad space is smooth space. And if, on the one hand, these machines partake of the materiality of space, then, on the other, we can see that the co-ordination and striation, organisation and geometrisation of space, is a machinic function which always idealises space. Therefore, to believe that smooth space alone will help us, insofar as it idealises the notion of smooth space, is to perform
a reterritorialisation on the plateau that will thereby cause it to be striated.

So far, the notion of a material space has been one that has been mapped using only the most abstract outlines. We have witnessed the meanderings of Rhizomes, Houses, Honey, Nomads as well as Cartographies and Topo-analyses. What a material space now needs, is for the present analyses to be plugged back into a discussion concerning contemporary forms of subject-production. This, then, is the project of the following chapter: 'Subjectification'.
CHAPTER FOUR.

'SUBJECTIFICATION'.

Introduction.

Not since the introductory chapter and its discussion of Kant, has the question of subjectivity been raised in any detail - give or take a few references in 'Chapter Two'. What is needed now, by way of preparing for our cartography of Guattari's *Les trois écologies*, is a recapitulation of all the forms of subjectification so far encountered.

Kant's position on the construction and role of the subject within his critical system has been charted throughout every turn of this thesis. The conclusion we have drawn, can be summarised thus: Kant's spatial subject is the organised, oppressed subject *par excellence*. The possible escape from such oppression, within the Kantian system - that is, the ramifications *esthetic* experience has on the body of the subject - has also been outlined above. Nevertheless, we would now benefit from another explanation of the Kantian 'escape' precisely because *esthetic* experience has an important role in what follows with respect to Guattari's ecologies.

It is in Judgement that Kant provides the thread connecting all the Faculties within his Critical System. In the *First Critique*, Judgement describes that act which can only be based upon the unity of synthesis and self-consciousness; that is, judgement links the Faculties of Sensibility
and Understanding. In the Second Critique, Judgement - moral judgement - describes that which brings the idea of a final purpose to the realm of knowledge, thereby ordering subjects to realise their will to existence as moral beings; here Judgement links the Faculties of Reason and Understanding. In the Third Critique, there are two characteristics of Judgement: Ästhetic and Teleological. Ästhetic Judgement is the one we have encountered more often in this thesis and describes that situation in which the Cognitive Faculties (Sensibility and Understanding) are in free-play. As we have seen, æsthetic experience (of which we can make æsthetic judgement) is not left as a mêlée of intuition and concept, mixing and separating at will and without order, for Kant introduces the æsthetic idea - the mirror of the First Critique's rational idea - to keep the free-play on a tight reign. Of this judgement, he writes:

The spontaneity in the play of the cognitive faculties, the harmony of which contains the ground of this pleasure, makes the above concept [of the purposiveness of nature] fit to be the mediating link between the realm of the natural concept of freedom in its effects, while at the same time it promotes the sensibility of the mind to moral feeling. (Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, 'Introduction' §vi.)

It is thus that Kant introduces the rational within the æsthetic, the moral in art, and simultaneously shores up the leaks his highly organised, well-wrought subject sprung while the cognitive faculties and the imagination were in free-play. This rational injection is boosted by his account of Teleological Judgement; he writes, "the judgement teleologically employed furnishes conditions determinately under which something (i.e. an organised
body) is to be judged according to the idea of a purpose of nature." (Col, 'Introduction' Sxxii, p.31) This type of judgement, then, is purely reflective; and though it adds nothing to the a priori understanding of an object, it provides for tighter control of the subjective conditions under which such understanding is made. Thus, Kant links the faculties of Reason and Sensibility.

That Kant provided innovative ways of investigating and understanding the orientations of subject-construction, has never been doubted in this thesis; that he provided - in the same breath - the means with which to retrench such a revolution according to the philosophically hackneyed auspices of God, Reason and Ethics, has also been emphasised. Kant's subject may be spaced, but like the obsessive or the addict, it can only thrash around in a space that has been built to constrain it.

Bachelard's subject was also spaced. But for him the construction of the subject in a space was momentary and singular. Furthermore, the subject's validation of a space constituted such a moment in its construction. According to Bachelard, and in contradiction to the system propounded by Kant, neither subject nor space provides the organisational datum according to which either one or the other can be measured. New spaces equal new subjects - and if any thread is to be made to tie various space-subjects together, the outcome is more like a map than a string of beads. The Bachelardian subject is as soft and oozing as the space it moves through, or, which moves through it. (It was this double movement which allowed us to connect the space-subject production in Bachelard, with the critical process of Cartography, as announced by Deleuze and Guattari.) Where Kant
plugged leaks in his subject, Bachelard let them flow. Bachelard's subject did not thus become so dissipated as to have disappeared entirely - such an outcome would presuppose an ordered whole. No, Bachelard's subject was already leaky; and being so is not necessarily a negative situation. Bachelard and Kant begin at the same place - in the same space, almost. Both realise the importance space has in the construction of subjectivity. But where Kant reacted by returning to the traditional bonds of the subject (rationality, morality and religion) Bachelard pushed the boundaries of space and the subject further. It could even be said that Bachelard's accomplishment was to have exacerbated the disintegration of these boundaries.

Unlike the philosophers already mentioned, Deleuze and Guattari provide no single, uninterrupted analysis of subjectivity in itself. What makes their texts particularly difficult to read, is their ability to condense a multiplicity of theses into a single passage. This would probably account for the fact that (English) commentaries on their work are thin on the ground. However, in his short text Les trois écologies, Guattari does provide both a relentless critique of contemporary subjectivity and an elucidation of a type of cartography.

Guattari's text discusses the impact of world political, economic and social systems upon subjects and their cultural, "existential" space(s). Ecology, thus defined, is more than merely loving trees, whales, deserts or badgers - such that, in an attempt to rid his project of associations with various pressure groups, or small bands of nature lovers, Guattari often employs the term "ecosophy"; though ecosophy, to be more precise, describes
that which provides the cure, whereas ecology often is that which describes the symptoms. However, to overcome - or even to preempt - any niggling questions concerning the prioritisation or denigration of one practice over another, Guattari often mixes the terms together (or uses "schizoanalysis"), so that I shall sometimes refer to Guattari's practice as "ecology/ecosophy".

In general, following the turns of ecology's etymology, ecology is the logics of the house, the natural milieu or habitat, the logics of the types of space that Bachelard called "happy" and those, more widespread - that he left out and that Guattari focusses upon - which can only be called "agonistic". The three ecologies that fall under Guattari's gaze are social ecology, mental ecology and environmental ecology; three ecologies that will provide him with - to use a phrase that serves as a title for another of his essays - a plan for the planet. In order to adumbrate such a plan (an analysis that will be the result of identifying the moves Guattari makes not only in performing a critique of subjectivity, but in elucidating three ecologies too) it will be necessary for me to map each section of the book as it arises. This will be done in two sections; the first outlining the themes and methodology Guattari uses in this text; and the second analysing, in detail, the ways in which Guattari describes the three ecologies. A third section will examine the themes of aesthetics and scientificity, raised during this discussion of Les trois écologies, by remarking upon similar themes in Guattari's Cartographies schizoanalytiques.
Ecologies 1. The Theory.

The current world situation, Guattari explains - a situation that is co-ordinated along political, economic, informational, and social parameters - is one in which subjectivity is so tightly organised, so rigidly bound, so highly pressured that it has ossified. He writes, "The relationship of subjectivity with its exteriority - social, animal, vegetable, cosmic - finds itself compromised in a kind of general movement of implosion and regressive infantilisation. Alterity tends to lose all harshness." (Les trois écologies, p.12) The space and its subject have been so finely ordered, so firmly pushed in on themselves in the name of individualism, that like an asthmatic in a smog filled city, the subject lives an insular, striated, and oppressed life. The subject has lost any sort of edge, any abrasive surface against which it can rub and stick to any other. The reason for this is the space in which it is constructed. What can ecology define if not a habitat in which subjects can be constructed at ease and without any forms of oppression - self or other? The current concern with ecology must take such subjectificationary questions into consideration.

Adding to these considerations, Guattari writes, "The only true response to ecological crisis will be on a planetary scale; with the condition that it operates an authentic political, social and cultural revolution, and reorients the objectives of the production of material and immaterial goods." (Les trois écologies, pp.13-14) For Guattari, ecological well-being will come about only through wide ranging change to the global economic, social and political structures. If it is space in which subjects are constructed, and it is ecology which identifies the condition of such
spaces, then insofar as such structures order spaces on a global scale, only on the same global scale will the squashed subject be ecologically revivified. Guattari continues, "This revolution must not be concerned with the relations of visible forces on the grand scale alone, but equally with the molecular domains of sensibility, intelligence and desire." (Les trois écologies, p.14) Just as Bachelard's subject eschewed a dialectical relationship linking itself with a space, tying its psyche to a place and, on the contrary, promoted the oozing of spatial considerations within the make up of the imagination itself, so too does Guattari not forget the importance of the particular construction of a subject. So far then, we have the outlines of what will become the social and mental ecologies. The responses to these critiques, Guattari explains thus:

Social ecosophy will consist of the development of specific practices that tend to modify or reinvent those ways of being at the heart of the couple, at the heart of the family, the urban context, work etc. ... it will, literally be a question of reconstructing the set of modalities of 'group-being', not only by 'communicational' interventions, but by existential mutations at the heart of subjectivity. (Les trois écologies, pp.21-22)*

On its side, mental ecosophy will be brought about to reinvent the relationship of the subject to the body, to fantasy, to the past, and to the 'mysteries' of life and death. It will be brought about to look for the antidotes to mass-mediatic and telematic uniformity, to the conformism of fashion, to the manipulation of opinion by advertising, opinion-polls, etc. (Les trois écologies, pp.22-23)*
Environmental ecology is not such a different matter. Indeed, Guattari always relates such environmental considerations in existential terms. He writes, "The long term institution of immense zones of misery, famine and death, seem to be an integral part of the monstrous system of 'stimulaton' of Integrated World Capitalism." *(Les trois écologies, p.17)* Capitalism, that finely honed system we encountered above with respect to deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, has strictly ordered the movements within its boundaries (boundaries which, considering the whole face of the globe is so structured, can be said to be non-existent), has produced the areas of famine, drought, deforestation and displacement, all in response to increased reterritorialisation in terms of the flows of capital. Such deterritorialisations are not, however, restricted to the third world - one only has to witness the growth in inner city poverty, homelessness and unemployment within the developed, industrial countries to notice this.

We can see, then, that the three ecologies operate in many directions at once: inside and outside, social and political, cultural and environmental. Yet in all cases, subjectivity and space constitute the thrust, the themes and the aims of the discourse. In fact, Guattari ends his explanatory, introductory section by stating that the essay as a whole will study "a little closer, the implications of such an ecosophic perspective on the conception of subjectivity." *(Les trois écologies, p.23)*

Having now glanced at Guattari's outline of his project in *Les trois écologies*, we are able to make a few observations upon it before we follow
him into making a finer account. Guattari takes for granted the intimate relationship between space and subjectivity - a relationship I have sought to explain throughout this thesis - and makes it the starting point for his essay. Given such an intimacy, there is no wonder that an ecology must always have a mental, or psychological, vector; moreover, there is even less wonder that an ecology will be socially oriented. (Indeed, these statements could be made in reverse order: given such intimacy, there is no wonder that any account of the psychological make up of any subject will be an ecology, and so on.) An ecology - and an ecosophy - becomes a critical project which splits the seams of one's ordinary understanding of the term, 'ecology'. Furthermore, I think it is apparent that ecology and ecosophy will become critically indistinguishable from cartography, if not explicitly in Guattari's text, then certainly in this one; the relation between these terms will become apparent as they are more thoroughly examined.

Guattari begins his text proper (it is here that the translation provided in New Formations begins) by stating that the subject is not as straightforward as Descartes thought it was. That is, Descartes was wrong to equate being with thinking, for such an account situates the subject firmly in its place as an individual, thinking thing. "We should perhaps not speak of subjects," Guattari explains, "but rather of components of subjectification, each of which works more or less on its own account." ('The Three Ecologies' p.131; my emphases.) This would lead to an untying of the common sense link between subjectivity and an individual - a link that is emphasised in Descartes' account - and allow for the performance of an ecology of the two; Guattari writes,
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The individual would appear in his/her actual position, as a 'terminal' for processes involving human groups, socio-economic ensembles, data-processing machines: a terminal through which, of course, not all the vectors of subjectification necessarily pass. Interiority would appear as a quality produced at the meeting-point of multiple components which are relatively mutually autonomous - in certain cases, openly discordant. ('The Three Ecologies' p.131; my emphasis)

The term subjectivity will announce that which contains a multitude of possibilities as to its formation and construction. It will be like a Hydra, arms flailing, at the end of which are plugs which can be hooked up to any kind of social, cultural or communal formation. In the end it will become impossible to identify a terminating point (the body of the Hydra) to these constructs; or, rather, if such an identification is made, it will be impossible to contain it within that simple space, for such a point will be merely another form of coupling the assemblage. Where subjectivity is concerned, a cartography or ecology will be that which charts these various vectors - and chart them free from the need for the result to be subsumed under a prevailing scientistic paradigm.

The dominant scientific stricture within which subjectivity has been discussed throughout this century, Guattari argues, is Freudianism. Such a structure is not to be transcended, or superseded, however, but like the root-structure of arborealism it can be re-oriented and re-articulated. The natural breakage points of psychoanalysis (points which have arisen, often, in an attempt to prove its foundation as a scientific practice), the places
in which it is revved-up so that its motor gives out, these are the points at which the lines of flight of the three ecologies will erupt. The cultivation and maintenance of an archaic dogmatism ("like an ornamental garden") is not the project that Les trois écologies wishes to follow - whether the archaism is philosophical, psychoanalytical or political. For Guattari any re-orientation of psychoanalysis (we could add, philosophy etc.) will be rhizomatic.

Thus the necessary precondition for any regeneration of analysis - through schizoanalysis, for example - is to acknowledge the general principle that both individual and collective subjective assemblages have the potential to develop and proliferate far beyond their ordinary state of equilibrium. By their very essence, analytical cartographies reach far beyond the existential territories to which they are assigned. Like artists and writers, the cartographers of subjectivity should seek, then, with each concrete performance, to develop and innovate, to create new perspectives, without prior recourse to assured theoretical foundations or the authority of a group, school, conservatory or academy. ... Work in progress! An end to psychoanalytical, behaviourist, or systemist catechisms! ('The Three Ecologies' p. 133)

The three ecologies will proceed, as Guattari says a cartography of subjectivity should, steamed up on their own fuel, navigating according to their own - ever changing - paradigms, passing through points which they feel are necessary at any one time. In the face of all the informational, computerate and syntactic revolutions, and in spite of the reterritorialisations demanded by various conceptual schemes
(psychoanalysis, etc.) but according to their deterritorialisations, this is the direction in which Guattari's three ecologies will go.

Guattari sets out the area for his three ecologies as follows:

If today, human relationships with the socius, the psyche, and 'nature' are increasingly deteriorating, then this is attributable not only to objective damage and pollution but to the ignorance and fatalistic passivity with which those issues are confronted by individuals and responsible authorities. ('The Three Ecologies' p.134)

Furthermore,

It is quite wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius, and the environment as separate. Indeed, if we continue - as the media would have us do - to refuse squarely to confront the simultaneous degradation of these three areas, we will in effect be acquiescing in a general infantilisation of opinion, a destruction and neutralisation of democracy.... we need to apprehend the world through the interchangeable lenses of the three ecologies. ('The Three Ecologies' p.134)

These, then, are the parameters of Guattari's project. He proposes a reorientation of the fields according to which contemporary ecological deterioration has occurred; insofar as these (three) ecologies are interwoven, no action taken in the name of any one of them alone will be effective. The replanting of a tree in a rainforest will not remove the machinery which caused the deforestation in the first place. The
apprehension of contemporary problems with respect to the three ecologies, and the subsequent changes made according to such analyses, will therefore have multi-oriented repercussions. For example:

If we are to reorient the sciences and technology toward more human goals, we clearly need collective management and control - not blind reliance on technocrats in the state apparatuses, in the hope that they will control developments and minimise risks in fields largely dominated by the pursuit of profit. ('The Three Ecologies' p.134)"

A re-ordering of the fields according to which subjectivities are constructed, needs to be undertaken not only on a worldwide scale, but by those very groups whose subjectivities are at stake. An ecology's outcomes may be multi-oriented, but they are ones which will always involve - somewhere along the line - intervention upon vectors of subjectification.

It should be emphasised that scientific discourses are not essentially delimiting (the points at which such things were touched upon in our discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's smooth and striated spaces, shows as much), they merely need their arboreal structures smoothing out. The result of this type of rhizomatisation will also lead to a redirecting of such discourses to more human goals. Furthermore, the doing of Ecology/Ecosophy - in Guattari's terms - will break through the impasses currently experienced by another form of scientific discourse. Guattari laments:

There was a time when international solidarity was a major concern of trade unions and left parties; today it is the sole province of humanitarian associations.
Marx's writings remain of enormous value; but Marxist discourse has gone into qualitative decline. ... We live in a time when it is not only animal species that are disappearing; so too are the words, expressions, and gestures of human solidarity. ('The Three Ecologies' p.135)²⁰

We can begin to see the territory over which Guattari's text will move. Like the machine that generates smooth space, Guattari's Les trois écologies skims many surfaces and outlines many vectors - thus orienting its own movement. The political and social concerns announced early on in the text have been bent to accommodate other, more personal, cultural and environmental concerns. Or, maybe it would be more accurate to say that, the political and social themes have had the personal, cultural and environmental within them highlighted. Whichever way we articulate it, we can see the network of areas with which Guattari is dealing. An ecology - that critique which necessarily links the subjective with space - of contemporary existence, provides the critical motor for an examination not only of human situations but of the established methods of describing them too. For Guattari, once the Ecological/Ecosophical motor has been started, there will not be a single established, or traditional, mode of providing contemporary critique that will escape its path.

Guattari's next move is to describe the motor which drives his ecological practice; that is, to elucidate the logic according to which ecology works. The three ecologies, he explains, "happen to be implied under a different logic than that which simultaneously governs ordinary communication between speakers and listeners, the intelligibility of
discursive sets and the interlocking of fields of signification." (Les trois écologies, p.36; Guattari's emphasis; my translation) Their logic is

a logic of intensities, the logic of self-referential existential assemblages, engaging non-reversible duration; it is the logic, not of the totalised bodies of human subjects, but of part-objects in the psychoanalytical sense.... Whilst the logic of discursive sets seeks to delimit its objects, the logic of intensities - or eco-logic - concerns itself solely with the movement and intensity of evolutive processes. ('The Three Ecologies' p.136)

This logic we have already seen at work with respect to rhizomes and lines of flight (in our discussion of Cartography) and to the movement of nomads (in our discussion of smooth and striated space). It is a logic that breaks subjectivity out of the systems and structures which order and organise it, and sets it to proliferate in many different directions. Directions which announce themselves at every turn of the Cartographic/Ecologic/Ecosophic process; directions which, like rhizomes and lines of flight, draw subjectivities outside of any unifying totality and with multiplicities and singularities. "Ecological praxes might, in this light, be defined as a search to identify in each partial locus of experience the potential vectors of subjectification and singularisation." ('The Three Ecologies' p.136) Such cartographies have an intimate relationship with the flows that deterritorialise, so that they begin at those points where, so-called, normal processes of signification and subjectification break down (hence,
Deleuze and Guattari's interest in schizophrenia: "At the heart of all ecological praxes is an a-signifying rupture, in a context in which the catalyses of existential change are present, but lack expressive support from the enunciative assemblage which frames them." ('The Three Ecologies' p.136)24 What could be a more precise explanation of deterritorialisation?

Guattari explains this in more traditional psychoanalytic terms. Left to themselves, these processes towards asignification/asubjectification, these processes which thrust subjects outside all normal structures of meaning and expression (structures which, ironically, have produced them), lead only to guilt, anxiety, neuroses etc. When cartographised, or schizoanalysed, or outlined ecologically/ecosophically, these processes can create new existential assemblages. Thus, again, we have a further articulation of the rhizomatic movement, or of the movement towards deterritorialisation.

(Interestingly, given our earlier examination of Bachelard's concerns and our more recent revival of the æsthetic question, Guattari goes on to cite the "poetic text" as an example of a "catalytic segment" of these ecological processes/cartographies. However, our discussion of the relevance of æsthetics in Guattari's texts will come later.)

Eco-logic pervades every existential territory imaginable; it can burgeon in every moment of subjectivity and in every, singular, vector of subjectification. Guattari continues the discussion thus:

It is of course true that existential cartographies which assume certain existentialising ruptures of
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meaning have always sought refuge in art and religion. But the subjective void produced today by the accelerating production of material and immaterial goods is both unprecedentedly absurd and increasingly irremediable; it threatens both individual and group existential territories. ('The Three Ecologies' p.137)25

For example, the Death of the subject - in all possible ways - has produced this existentialising rupture. The corresponding rise, and global entrenchment, of Capitalism has also produced this rupture. Yet the response of such capitalist formations has been to reterritorialise the ruptured flows back onto the hierarchical structures already in place. In so doing, the aged systems of organisation only recreate (the conditions for) dead subjects: "This resurgence of what might be called subjective conservatism is not simply attributable to an intensification of social repression; it is connected, too, with a kind of existential rigidification of actors in the domain of the social." ('The Three Ecologies' p.137)26

Given this state of affairs, and given Guattari's earlier stated position with regard to intellectual archaisms (i.e. that they should be used and re-oriented, rather than merely followed), it is no wonder that he should encourage us to refer to the ways that early forms of capitalism worked, in order to better understand the present capitalist constructions. Unlike the Postmodern, post-Marxists, Guattari does not dismiss the importance to a contemporary analysis, of the relation between contemporary capitalism and capitalism at its birth (hence his insistence that the works of Marx are still of importance). He explains,
In a situation in which post-industrial capitalism — which I myself prefer to call integrated world capitalism (IWC) — is tending to increasingly move its centres of power away from the production of goods and services, and towards structures of production of signs, of syntax, and — by exercising control over the media, advertising, opinion-polls etc. — of subjectivity, we would do well to examine the modes of operation of earlier forms of capitalism, since they show the same tendency towards the accumulation of subjective power, both at the level of the capitalist elites, and in the ranks of the proletariat. ('The Three Ecologies' p.137; Guattari's emphasis.)

Guattari goes further to say that the ecological praxes he will outline, will also redefine the modes of production of subjectivity in renegotiating the link between capital and human activity: "Social ecology should never lose sight of the fact that capitalist power has become de-localised, deterritorialised, both in extension — by extending its grasp over the whole social, economic and cultural life of the planet — and in 'intension' — by infiltrating the most unconscious levels of subjectivity." ('The Three Ecologies' p.138) Social ecology, then, should never forget that it must operate hand in hand with a mental ecology. So in striving towards its aims (outlined by Guattari thus: "The hope for the future is that the development of these three types of ecological praxis...will lead to a redefinition and refocussing of the goals of emancipatory struggles." ['The Three Ecologies' p.138]) Ecology/Ecosophy should not merely set itself in opposition to the structures promoted by capitalism, but it should attack the subjective formations engendered through I.W.C., by redefining all
forms of subjectificatory relation: conjugal, ethical, familial, individual, creative, etc.

Capitalistic subjectivity, no matter in what dimension or by what means it is engendered, is manufactured to protect existence against any event intrusive enough to disturb and disrupt opinion. Singularity is either evaded, or entrapped within specialist apparatuses and frames of reference. The goal of capitalism is to manage the worlds of childhood, love and art: to control the last vestige of anxiety, madness, pain and death, or the sense of being lost in the cosmos. From the most personal - one might also say infra-personal - existential data, integrated world capitalism forms massive subjective aggregates, which it hooks up to notions of race, nation, profession, sporting competition, dominating virility, mass media stardom. Capitalism seeks to gain power by controlling and neutralising the maximum possible number of subjectivity's existential refrains; capitalist subjectivity is intoxicated with and anæsthetised by a collective sense of pseudo-eternity. ('The Three Ecologies' pp.138-139)

However much any capitalistic movements may be seen to operate according to modes of deterritorialisation, such modes are always reactive in purpose, they always access a drive towards reterritorialisation, which is thus folded back within the original structure. The edges of capitalism - the worlds of art, madness etc - therefore contain vectors which point away from the capitalist structure (in which they are born) and those which point back within it. Where capitalism creates subjects, its subjects, Guattari proposes that Ecology/Ecosophy activates singularities.
'Singularity' is an important term for Guattari; but should not be confused with 'individual'. If we remember the earlier passage from the opening to Guattari's text, we were presented with the subject being exploded into an assemblage having a myriad number of access/connection points, all described as vectors of subjectification. A singularity can be any one of an accumulation of various vectors, with the built in possibility of its being able to change, to access other assemblages. So singularity and multiplicity (as encountered elsewhere in this thesis) are conceptually linked. Guattari, then, does not advocate the subsumption of a multiplicity of singularities under the auspices of a unified banner; he does not advocate the homogeneity of all struggles. But rather their heterogeneity - each process urging its own becoming in a struggle that does not have to conform to the paradigms of any other. "Our objective should be to nurture individual cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singularity, exceptions, and rarity coexist under the least oppressive possible conditions." ('The Three Ecologies' p.139) Contrary to the dominant ideology of political/social struggle - which calls for a dialectical synthesis of opposites - Ecology/Ecosophy will call for the affirmation of a multiplicity of singular struggles while at the same time elucidating the widest possible space of/for struggle. (Guattari concurs, however, that there will occasionally be the need for particular strands to come together, to "set common objectives and act 'like little soldiers'" [ 'The Three Ecologies' p.139] [se fixer des objectifs communs et à se comporter « comme des petits soldats » - (Les trois écologies, p.47)] Nevertheless, there will always come a time when such conglomerates will be broken by acts of re-singularisation.)
What we have been shown, so far, in this text, is: the relationship between space, subjectification and dominant political, social, cultural and economic constructs; the ways in which such constructs can be criticised; the ways the three ecologies - proposed by Guattari - relate to each other and to the themes in question; and the hopes Guattari has for such analyses. Before I follow Guattari into making a detailed account of the three ecologies themselves, I will quote a passage summing up the nature of his project:

The principle common to the three ecologies is therefore the following: each of the existential territories with which they confront us is not in and of itself \( \textit{en soi} \), closed in on itself, but as a precarious, finite, finitised entity for itself \( \textit{pour soi} \); it is singular and singularised; it may bifurcate into stratified and death-laden reiterations; or it may open, as process, into praxes that enable it to be rendered 'inhabitable' by human projects. ("The Three Ecologies" p.140)\(^32\)

Ecologies 2. The Detail.

Guattari begins his detailed description of the ecologies under examination, by outlining Mental Ecology. He writes, "Specific to mental ecology is the principle that its approach to existential territories derives from a pre-objectal and pre-personal logic: a logic evocative of what Freud described as a 'primary process'." ("The Three Ecologies" pp.140-141)\(^33\) This is logic which imbeds all objects in the territory with equal emotional vigour, a logic which cannot be compressed into a single,
individual subject. As already stated, a cartographic description of any mental/psychic event accentuates a framework that singularly articulates that event. There is no all encompassing story, no overriding interpretive system in mental ecology/cartography, that homogenises such events into a single subject (unlike that told in Kant's Critical System). An individual - and collections of individuals - must therefore be read as a particular aggregate of heterogeneous flows; not as the original spring of the production of such flows. "Mental ecology has the capacity to emerge at any given moment, beyond the boundaries of fully formed ensembles or within the bounds of individual or collective order." ('The Three Ecologies' p.141)³⁴ Emphasis is laid, by Guattari, on ecology's respect of singularities - unlike other disciplines, ecology does not subsume particularities under a unified mode of discourse. All existing brands of psychoanalysis, Guattari argues, involve the understanding of (psychic/mental) fragments in terms of a possible, unified whole. They certainly do not allow expression of the creative potential of such fragments.

In a section not included in the New Formations translation of Les trois écologies, Guattari explains that his proposed mental ecological praxis grafts new ways of proceeding within the terms laid down by psychoanalysis. It is not so much a question of taking account of this ecological practice in terms of scientific verifiability, but rather, "according to their esthetico-existential efficiency." ["en fonction de leur efficace esthétïco-existentielle." ] (Les trois écologies, p.53) Furthermore, "The crucial objective is the seizure of the points of asignifying rupture...from which a certain number of semiotic chains put themselves to
work in the service of an effect of existential auto-reference." *(Les trois écologies*, p.53)* It is thanks to such breaking-points in chains of meaning (verbal, cultural, moral or political) that traditional psychoanalysis has been able to recognise symptoms of psychic illness, and in which Freudians have detected - along with objects like faces, sexual organs, the mother's breast - generators of "dissident" subjectivities. Guattari explains:

> But these objects - generators of 'dissident' subjectivity - are conceived by them (Freudians) as remaining essentially adjacent to instinctual pulsions and a corporealised imaginary. Other institutional, architectural, economic and cosmic objects, equally support, by right, such a function of existential production. *(Les trois écologies*, pp.53-54)*

What Guattari regards as essential to his analytical logic/praxis is the importance placed on that which any representative, semiotic system of meaning-production finds it impossible to constrain. The most creative aspect of subject-production (or rather, the production of vectors of subjectification) is this excess, this break-down. Moreover, as Guattari states in the passage quoted immediately above, the productive objects of such subjectivities are not solely the ones that psychoanalysis traditionally identifies. Existential production operates on many levels - only some of which are explored via traditional analytic methods. What Guattari endeavours to show throughout this section, is that a mental-ecological praxis maps territories of subject-production normally either left unknown or bracketed as deviant by other practices.
A mental ecology raises many questions - specially when conducted rhizomatically with respect to traditional psychoanalysis - and the answers it offers all move in the direction of singular creativity, rather than in that of stifling, moralistic superciliousness. An ecosophy accesses many territories for possible existential validation, rather than forcing subjects into easily manageable modes of existence. Given this, we should not forget that ecology/ecosophy is not a universal panacea which automatically guarantees the destruction of the structures and institutions instantiated by I.W.C. - particularly when we remember the entreaty, at the end of Plateau 14 of Mille Plateaux, that smooth space alone will not save us.... "But it does seem to me," Guattari writes, "that a generalisation of the experiences of institutional analysis (in the hospital, the school, the urban environment...) could profoundly shift the terms of the problem of mental ecology." ('The Three Ecologies' p.142)

The territory under examination now shifts slightly to introduce areas normally under the jurisdiction of, 'the social'. For Guattari the relation between society at large and the society of the mad is one that interacts on many levels. To an extent, and it seems rather trite to state it, madness is a socially defined label that in turn names that society which uses it; moreover, the movement of flows on the surface of I.W.C., are themselves productive of neuroses, anxieties etc., as described in the preceding chapter. Therefore, in providing an ecological critique of the realm of the mental - particularly those areas in which the 'normal' breaks down into the 'abnormal' - its paradigms of operation will continually be shifting into that of the social. Guattari continues, thus:
A fundamental reconstruction of social mechanisms is necessary if we are to confront the ravages produced by integrated world capitalism - a reconstruction which cannot be achieved by top-down reforms, laws, decrees or bureaucratic programmes. What it requires is the promotion of innovative practices; the proliferation of alternative experiments which both respect singularity, and work permanently at the production of a subjectivity that is simultaneously autonomous, yet articulates itself in relation to the rest of society. ('The Three Ecologies' p.142)³⁸

Mental ecology is an important part of this process, insofar as it has an intensive relation with general drives towards singularity. Guattari next gives an account of social ecology. He writes, "The principle particular to social ecology is that of affective and pragmatic cathexis of human groups of various sizes. The 'group Eros' presents itself, not as an abstract quantity, but as a qualititively specific reorganisation of primary subjectivity as constituted in the order of mental ecology." ('The Three Ecologies' p.143)³⁹ So the more simple subjective construction pointed to by mental ecology becomes complicated in terms of social ecology. In the closing stages of the description of mental ecology, it was mentioned that the social had an important role in the construction of vectors of subjectivity analysed by/in mental ecology; we will now see that this role takes shape as a remodelling of those vectors.

Guattari explains that there are two types of social organisation of subjectivity:
1. the "personological triangulation in the I-YOU-HE, Father-Mother-Child mode";
2. the "constitution in the forms of subject-groups open to the broader spectrum of the socius and the cosmos." ('The Three Ecologies' p.143; Guattari's emphasis; translation modified)

The former followed the tracks of the familiar, traditional psychoanalytic description of subjective formation - identifications and imitations. In the latter:

identificatory systems are replaced by features of diagrammatic efficiency. In part at least, these allow the subject to escape semiologies of iconic modelling, and to engage instead with processual semiologies (which I will refrain from terming symbolic for fear of falling back into the bad old ways of structuralism). ('The Three Ecologies' p.143)

The processes of subjective formation are distinguished from each other, Guattari says, by their degrees of deterritorialisation; by their capacities to transcend their recognised subjective limits and follow their own lines of flight. Both of these types of the social organisation of subjectivity are at work in capitalist social formations.

At a time when the technological advances made with respect to trans-global communication, the media - Guattari recognises - becomes a potent tool in the constitution and construction of subjectivity. And insofar as the world is organised in capitalist terms, the connections between media and the contemporary construction of subjectivity can only follow the capitalist model. Both the forms of subject-production outlined above can be seen to
fit into this, more media biased, analysis. The techno-scientific advances made in the production/s of the media, constitute the deterritorialisations such practices effect within the capitalist system. Either greater or lesser deterritorialisation, and we have exhibited the corresponding line of flight operated by the vectors of subjectification. But because we are working within the paradigms of integrated world capitalism, such deterritorialisations will be folded back within either the familial system of mimetic subject-production, or the group system of processual subject-production. This type of reterritorialisation highlights the media's links with capitalism (a formation which has already been seen to exhibit the Deterritorialisation Reterritorialisation movement, par excellence).

(By way of emphasising this point, Guattari cites the relationship Third World countries have with 'post-industrial' technologies. Third World countries graft highly advanced, technological, 'post-industrial' systems on their "medieval" subjectivities, which serves to contemporarise ancient ways of repression and reaction. All forces of deterritorialisation involve the risk of becoming reactive and reterritorialising: "we should remember that the fascism of the ayatollahs was introduced only on the back of a profoundly popular revolution in Iran." ('The Three Ecologies' p.145) What should also be remembered, is that it is precisely this relation between advanced technology and ancient forms of subjective assemblage that Guattari is intent upon identifying in the whole world capitalist system. Capitalism reterritorialises on these "medieval" subjectivities as a rule; the Third World could, therefore, be seen as a microcosm of the World in Full under Capitalism.)
Social and mental ecologies are subject to the same risk, "Spontaneous social ecology works towards the constitution of existential territories which substitute themselves, so far as they can, for the old religious zoning of the socius." ('The Three Ecologies' p.145) Once, the subject announced the upsurge of an energy known, to the religious, as the soul, or to the capitalist as the individual; now this subject is distorted by the processes of social and mental ecology and set free of this zoning to ooze into its own space. But Ecologists and Cartographers must be careful that this praxis does not redraw the same old boundaries: "Clearly, then, social ecology must be opened up to the politically coherent collective praxes; if it is not, it will in the end always be dominated by reactionary nationalism, the oppression of women, children and minorities, and those hostile to innovation." ('The Three Ecologies' p.145; translation modified.) However strong the Capitalist deterritorialised flows are, their drives towards reterritorialisation are equally strong. The dead subject is a safe subject; the obsessional neurotic takes pains to validate its space by cleaning it, washing it with the detritus of its own neuroses, marking its territory with the musk of the repetition of the primary conditions of its illness. This space is hard to give up. This space is easier to defend against intrusions bent upon breaking up the ritualised moves that pass for existence.

However, wherever deterritorialisation once was, there will always be a rhizome ready to ooze. Guattari is not an advocate of Fatalism - especially media fatalism:
Any social ecological programme will have to aim therefore to shift capitalist societies out of the era of mass media and into a post-media age in which the media will be reappropriated by a multitude of subject-groups. This vision of a mass media culture redirected towards the goal of resingularisation may well seem far beyond our scope today; yet we should recognise that the current situation of maximal media-induced alienation is in no sense an intrinsic necessity. ('The Three Ecologies' p.144)45

However it is stated, ecology sets out to perform a critique of space; and if this space is one in whose construction the media has an important role, then this role can be overrun by the vectors produced by this critique. Deterritorialisation can be enhanced in the media, as much as it can be enhanced anywhere.

Guattari continues his discussion of social ecology by stating that it does not prioritise any one system of values over any other, it does not champion a single cause under which all others have to be subsumed. Those modes of social, territorial struggle/praxis whereby a multiplicity of causes are subordinated to A Single Cause, are particularly rife within the capitalist mode of social organisation. He writes:

> We live now under a capitalist system of valorisation, in which value is based upon a general equivalent. What makes that system reprehensible is its crushing of all other modes of valorisation, which find themselves alienated from capitalist hegemony. That hegemony, however, can be challenged, or at least made to incorporate other methods of valorisation based on
Guattari is constantly emphasising the multiplicitous nature of the praxis he is instantiating, free of universalisation and generalisation, free of subordination and subsumption under a unified doctrine. The analyses he provides/initiates cover a wide area of study and includes many ways of proceeding; but this area and these procedures are never forced into a single analytic programme. Guattari's Ecology/Ecosophy, schizoanalysis, or even, Cartography merely describes that process of plugging-into a variety of territories. The capitalist system does not proceed in this way, as the quotation above shows. It forces flows to co-operate, rather than allow them to proliferate. Guattari's social and mental ecologies, are praxes which seek to engender heterogeneous modes of valorisation, based - as he explains - on "existential productions"; productions which necessarily involve the inter-relationship/inter-reliance of space and subjectivity. If we can, carefully, cartographise (provide mental and social ecologies/ecosophies) the shifting planes of subjectification, or the heterogeneous vectors productive of subjectivities, then those principles according to which such praxes would have proceeded will also have produced the deterritorialisation of capitalist modes of (subject) production. That is, this deterritorialisation will be performed without the reterritorialisation that capitalism requires. Insofar as a social/mental ecology accesses a multiplicity of modes of valorisation, insofar as a cartography of subjectification frees the subjective space from all constraints, then the redirecting of the forces productive of
subjectivities will be an undoing of the bonds of capitalism. How, then, does this relate to the environment?

The principle according to which environmental ecology will operate is, that everything is possible, either the "worst catastrophes or developments in smoothness." (The Three Ecologies' p.146) ["les pires catastrophes comme les évolutions en souplesse." (Les trois écologies, p.68)] In the same way that we saw during the description of the preceding ecologies, environmental ecology cannot be viewed in isolation. The problems of deforestation, or of the imminent extinction of animal species, are to be solved not on a single issue basis. This would appear, at first glance, to contradict the earlier assertion of the singularity and multiplicity of issues, incapable of being brought under a single, authoritarian discourse. This, however, is not the case. It is one thing to subsume movements under a whole in an attempt at unification; another to recognise the inter-relation of issues/symptoms. Social, mental and environmental ecologies all operate according to the same, eco-, logic; they are all instances of a particular assemblage of an analytic machine called, 'ecology'. That they can be discussed separately does not detract from their inter-relation; nor should their singularities preclude us from interweaving their continuation and resolution. Guattari explains:

Increasingly in future, the maintenance of natural equilibria will be dependent upon human intervention; the time will come, for example, when massive programmes will have to be set in train to regulate the relationship between oxygen, ozone, and carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere. In this perspective, environmental ecology could equally well be renamed
'machinic ecology,' since both cosmic and human practice are nothing if not machinic.... ('The Three Ecologies' p.146)\(^7\)

The subjective assemblage we saw constructed in the opening pages of *Les trois écologies*, we can now see being plugged in to an eco-system of cosmic proportions. The vectors of subjectivity now have a component directed by the atmosphere of the planet. Any equation of subject with individual, appears increasingly arbitrary and forced. Environmental ecology, understood even in the most everyday sense, has become a practice that it is impossible to separate from the other two ecologies.

In the concluding pages of the text (not included in the New Formations translation) Guattari brings together all the themes so far analysed. He writes,

An ecosophy of the new type - at once practical and speculative, ethico-political and aesthetic - must, it seems to me, replace ancient forms of religious, political and associative engagement....It will be neither a discipline of withdrawal into interiority, nor a simple renovation of ancient forms of 'militancy'. Rather, it will be a question of a multi-faceted movement deploying proceedings and mechanisms simultaneously analytic and productive of subjectivity. (*Les trois écologies*, p.70; my emphasis.)\(^8\)

What could provide a better answer to our problems concerning the possible contradiction between keeping a discourse/struggle singular, and recognising its inter-relatedness with respect to other
discourses/struggles? Guattari's ecosophy will proceed along many fronts, covering many territories. It will not produce mind-numbing conformism, nor stifling uniformity. The multiplicitous struggles and critiques it accesses, will produce singular — though connectable — programmes of change. To approach environmental ecology, for example, without recognising its relation with other issues, is as blinkered as subsuming political, cultural and social issues under a single banner. Such philosophical/political praxes as the ones proposed by Guattari throughout this text, have the necessary conclusion of promoting a change in those paradigms that organise our notions of subjectivity: individual as well as collective; machinic as well as organic; scientific and aesthetic; etc. In all cases ecological/ecosophical praxes disturb the comfortable articulative structures of traditional subject-construction; and in all cases it is done — as the name suggests — in space. Yet it seems somewhat hypocritical to identify only one ramification of such ecological/ecosophical praxes (viz. subjectification), when, throughout, we have been stressing the importance of the interdisciplinary effect of these praxes. Indeed, Guattari explains,

the three ecologies must be conceived, simultaneously, as being a matter for a common ethico-aesthetic discipline, and as distinct from the point of view of the practices which characterise them. Their registers come under what I have called a heterogenesis, that is, a continual process of re-singularisation. (*Les trois écoologies*, p72; Guattari's emphasis)49

Though the link between all discourses announced by these ecologies is a necessary one, and all such discourses have equal validity, my purpose in analysing this text has been to provide a cartography of modes of
subjectification. The three ecologies construct a multiplicity of singular vectors of subjectification, inclusive of solidarity and difference.

Probably the most striking part of the three ecologies' praxes, is the insistence upon the formation of "creative" subjectivities, that is, what Guattari terms his esthetic edge (to which I will return below). The spaces mapped by Guattari provide the means by/through which singular subjectivities can forge their own stories. It is in this vein that Guattari concludes this text:

The recovery of a degree of creative autonomy in a particular domain calls for other recoveries in other domains. Thus there is forged, step by step, the whole catalysis of a renewal of the confidence of humanity in itself - sometimes from the smallest means. However little it may have been achieved, this essay hopes to arrest dullness and pervading passivity. (*Les trois écologies*, pp. 72-73)*

If the main thrust of the three ecologies has been to provide a cartography of subjectification, then in so doing, we will have redefined the linguistic paths according to which the discourse of human solidarity can be reawakened; we will have reoriented the reliance such vectors of subjectification have on the environment. What I would like to do now is, with the aid of another of Guattari's texts, re-examine the notions of esthetics and scientificity announced in *Les trois écologies* in their relation to the analysis of mental ecology.
Ecologies 3. The Postscript.

There is a section in another of Guattari's texts, *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* - which was published contemporaneously with *Les trois écologies* - which is titled, *Les Cartographies de la subjectivité* (pp.47-52). This section covers, as we might expect given its title, a great deal of the same ground as we have already with respect to *Les trois écologies*. The main concern of *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* is to provide a detailed account of Guattari's proposed schizoanalysis, according to four points of reference: material and descriptive (or, Economies of) Flux; existential Territories; the abstract, machinic Phylum; and the incorporeal Universe. Though these four points are of particular importance to an understanding of the text as a whole, I propose to ignore them, in order to promote the themes relevant to my analysis of *Les trois écologies*.

In a manner similar to that undertaken in his unfolding of the principles of mental ecology, Guattari explains the concerns of this section of *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* thus:

Our principle worry, is the development of a conceptual frame that protects schizoanalysis from any temptation to abandon itself to an ideal of scientificity - an ideal which usually dominates psychoanalytic domains like a super-ego. We will, rather, look for a foundation which allies schizoanalysis - through its mode of self-actualisation and its type of truth and logic - with aesthetic disciplines. (*Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, p.47)
Guattari, here, continues his assertion that his analytic praxes - ecological or schizoanalytical, or, we could add, cartographic - should be free of the need to be subsumed under the constraints of being a science. He identifies three ways according to which psychoanalysts (specifically) seek to scientifically organise their discourse(s). The first he calls, the way of the ascetic.

This way is distinguished by the image of the solitary scientist, striving to further the scientific boundaries he has been stricken with according to his times. This scientist is, therefore, set-up at the apex of his scientific discovery as an authority according to whom a whole procedure can be attributed. Guattari cites the psycho-physicist Fechner as the prime example of such a way (pp. 48-49), who has given his name to a law still referred to in textbooks today. We can cite here the discussion we had in the 'Introduction' to this thesis, concerning the role of the revolutionary viz. Kant's Copernican Revolution.

Of the second way, Guattari writes, "I have qualified the second way as hysterical identification, because it consists in a mimetic appropriation of scientificity, with little concern for 'sticking' to reproducible experimental procedures, or of relying (as Popper would have it) upon testable and falsifiable theories." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p. 49) This way is exemplified by the system of psychoanalysis as a whole, Guattari argues; whose doctrines, and even the possibility for cure, can only be understood by the initiated, by those allowed within the hallowed circle.
Finally, "the third way, that of support [l'étayage]," Guattari explains, "will make lateral use of science. Its utterances will either be characterised by an exteriority with relation to the discipline under consideration, or will be used only under the name of metaphor." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.49) Guattari exemplifies such a practice, by citing Freud's reference to the principle of the Carnot Cycle in order to justify the economic system presented in his drives of Eros and Thanatos. These three modes of appropriation of scientificity, or of validation of one's own practice in the name of science, define the ways down which Guattari does not want schizoanalysis to go. Furthermore, in affirming that the schizoanalytic project will have nothing to do with scientific pretensions, Guattari provides another against these desires that do; he writes:

In fact, these scientific methods are even less in a position to give help to the analysis of the psyche. From the moment at which they engage themselves in a systematic putting-into-parentheses of questions relative to their enunciation, to idiosyncratic modes of self-actialisation, and thus to irreducibly singular processes - otherwise called, essential dimensions of subjectivity - they only succeed in 'unsticking' themselves. (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.50)

When it comes to a question of subjectivity - or of the psyche (as it is, specifically noted here, in terms of psychoanalytic praxes) - the scientific method neglects to come to terms with precisely those areas we have seen to be essential to it. "Not only do cartographies of subjectivity have nothing to gain from mimicking science, but this one may have a lot to
attend to in the wake the problematics churns up." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.51) It will be in those areas that scientific psychoanalysis both marginalises, and tries to bend, stretch and twist material into its analytical structure, that a cartography will be needed. Just as we saw with reference to the three ecologies, the required analysis will graft itself onto the point at which the other analyses break down; whether this breakdown comes from trying too hard to incorporate something within its own system of beliefs, or whether it comes from totally ignoring an issue. Such is the movement of the rhizome, and of unfettered deterritorialisation.

Guattari now pushes further from a negative critique of science, into discussing his areas of interest. He begins by reintroducing the question of capitalism. However far various forms of religiosity have swept through contemporary culture, Guattari explains, it is the capitalist notion of subjectivity which "persists in presenting itself as an historical accomplishment." [persiste à se présenter comme un accomplissement historique.] (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.51) And why shouldn't it have, considering all other recent historical accomplishments have been achieved according to the capitalist schema. (Indeed, it could be argued that even the forms of First World religiosity operate in upholding capitalist structures of power relations: television evangelists, and the 'marginal' Unification Church - with its hold on media, news and other information systems -, come immediately to mind.)

The relationship between integrated world capitalism and the contemporary production of subjects, has been well documented in our examination of Les
trois écologies. In *Cartographies schizoanalytiques* Guattari relates this whole discussion to that of science. Wherever science has confronted subjectivity, it has not questioned its position with respect to subjectivity's capitalist context and origins. He explains further, "The subjectivity at work in the heart of the most elaborate scientific paradigms still functions, for its part, in animist and transcendental-abstractionist terms." (*Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, p.51) It is according to these parameters that subjectivity has found itself, simultaneously, an object of science, and a capitalistic construct.

For Guattari "the cartographies of unconscious subjectivity must become the indispensable complements of systems of rationality, having currency in the sciences, politics and all other regions of knowledge and human activity." (*Cartographies schizoanalytiques*, p.51) This is quite a different prospect than subsuming one discourse under the auspices of another. Earlier, we saw the subject exploded into vectors of subjectification, having multiple connections, and the individual placed as a mere - and fleeting - assemblage of such vectors, we can now see that a cartography can be connected into the sciences without striving to be one. A line of flight can be forced from a root-structure, in just the same way as one can follow the rhizome. Any temptation to rationality will be constructed - once a cartography has been started-up - in terms of that cartography. Any system calling itself rational will only be so if it has already allowed its boundaries to be permeated by what has traditionally been placed outside it. Deterritorialisation without Reterritorialisation; rational systems connected to irrational systems - this is what cartographies will
produce. If, however, the systems of rationality are not satisfied with the parasitical conjoining of the cartographic, then they will be destroyed.

The logic governing this cartography will not be a logic that operates conventionally. Guattari says that the map he wants to make, loses its primary function of having to represent a territory. In a footnote he explains, "As Alfred Korzybski has seen, not only does the map put itself to indefinite referral [return/suspension] with respect to its proper cartography, but the distinction between map and territory (the map and 'the thing mapped') tends to disappear." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.51 n.1; parenthesis in English in the original)69 This is exactly the same point that was made throughout Chapter One of this thesis. Guattari dismisses the mimetic relation between the map and a territory, a relation that was insisted upon by arboREAL thought. He emphasises the creative aspect of cartography, its way of directing and constructing the spaces that it maps while it maps them. The ordinary relation between map and thing mapped is not merely inverted, but opened at both ends. Cartography's questioning and transformative nature is emphasised by Guattari, as it was emphasised in the chapter mentioned above.

The positioning of singularities and of those processes which construct singularisation - this is the programme of cartography. Guattari further describes cartography as operating according to the zones of semiotisation that organise, construct, allow understanding of, and oppress subjectivities. Indeed, how can this not be the case? If a cartography of the processes, or vectors, of subjectification is to be made, then it will have to work - to begin with at least - within those paradigms which order
the Subject as we know it. But, like the disturbance of the relation between the map and the thing mapped already announced, this cartography soon begins to construct lines of flight disruptive of the organised subject. It will constitute a multiplicity of vectors of subjectification which will ooze from the sores of the dying Subject. Where the zones of semiotisation operate on the functions of representation and denotation, Guattari's analysis will add a further function - existentialisation:

At this stage, it is enough for me to emphasise that the intensive indexes, the diagrammatic operators - implied by this existential function - are not characterised by universality; this will lead schizoanalysis to be distinguished, in spite of certain similarities, from the 'partial objects' of Kleinianism, and 'l'objet a' of Lacanianism. (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.52)

The vectors of subjectification distinguished by cartography's addition of an existential function to those usual operators of subjectivity, are those which wrench it from the concomitant orders of organisation.

This, then, announces the æsthetic aspect of the cartographic function. The emphasis placed upon the importance of space in identifying an existentialisation of the paradigms constitutive of subjectivity, is an emphasis of that which allows creative expansion of such subjectivity. When the religious, capitalistic and scientistic relationship between the Subject and the Individual has been torn asunder and all the co-ordinates productive of subjectivity have been multiplied beyond these restrictions, then the space allowed for in/by Cartography will be that which encourages
the singularisation, the multiplication and the creation of an infinite variety of connections according to which vectors of subjectification can pass. The Subject may be dying a death it deserved - asphyxiated by obsessively binding itself tighter and tighter in the web of co-ordinates that produced it - but the lines of flight along which the vectors of subjectification can flow are, nevertheless, still being generated. An æsthetic response, or assemblage, as used by Guattari in discussing the direction his analysis should take, is one which could describe the movement of ecologising, or cartographising, the Subject, itself. In a passage that was quoted above (see p.114), Guattari explained that the cartographer of subjectivity should proceed like the artist or the writer, and "should seek...with each concrete performance, to develop and innovate, to create new perspectives..." ('The Three Ecologies', p.133). Furthermore, at the beginning of Les trois écologies Guattari states that many of "the best cartographies of the psyche - or, if you will, the best psychoanalyses - are after all surely to be found in the work of Goethe, Proust, Joyce, Artaud and Beckett, rather than Freud, Jung, or Lacan." ('The Three Ecologies' p.132)  

What I am left with, then, is to state the following: a cartography of subjectivity, or an ecology/ecosophy of the vectors of subjectification, or a schizoanalysis, operates upon the Subject first, by analysing the territories over which it moves, by examining those areas, those spaces whereby its existential function is effective. It is then a question of mapping further expanses, of creating thereby, new vistas of existentialisation according to which extra vectors of subjectification can be accessed. Like Kant's æsthetic experience, the material constituitive of
subjectivity is set into motion, into perpetual fluctuation; the flows of this material are quickened by/in cartography. Unlike Kant's aesthetic experience, such flows are not trapped, tethered or unified into a whole, moral, rational and easily manageable Subject. Where aesthetic escape from the pressures and pains of organised subjectivity have usually taken the form of a universalisation, or generalisation of experience, Guattari offers only a widespread singularisation and multiplication. Cartography etc. does not have a necessarily artistic, or aesthetic function; rather, it can assemble its maps in an artistic way, it can follow aesthetic outlines. It is important to ensure that this aestheticism does not become the equivalent of the scientistic super-ego we witnessed dominating the psychoanalytic domains above...remember Deleuze and Guattari's entreaty, with respect to the active burgeoning of rhizomes, that "the necessary precautions are taken" (A Thousand Plateaus, p.14 [Mille Plateaux, p.23]) to ensure that the new rhizomatic formations do not fall back under the command of an arboreal structure.

In order to conclude this chapter, I will re-introduce the notion of a material space - discussing it in relation to the themes articulated not only within this chapter, but throughout the thesis as a whole.

Conclusion.

This chapter has concentrated upon the problem of the constitution of subjectivity in relation to a cartographic programme; the question of the role, or even the more fundamental one of the construction, of a material
space has therefore been suspended. Throughout this chapter we have observed the factors prominent in the constitution and organisation of subjectivity, and taken for granted the importance therein of space (an importance examined at other intervals of this thesis). What we must examine now, in concluding this chapter, is the type of space left by the performance of cartographies themselves.

Probably the most important factor to remember in providing such an account, is the cartographic interruption of the map-thing mapped dialectic. Both in the chapter of this thesis devoted to examining the role of cartography as a critical tool, and in the section above dealing with Guattari's reference to the dialectic, have we seen that the relation between cartography and its territory cannot be described as merely one of representation. We have seen that once the mimetic relation between map and thing-mapped has been broken, the act of creating a map also describes the act of creating the thing-mapped. If, up till now, we have been reading such a relation insofar as it has a bearing upon a description of cartography, then we should now examine this relation insofar as it tells a story about space.

Bachelard gradually built a description of the space that interested him - first by moving around the house and describing its insides; he then ventured immediately outside; then further still into fields, woods, deserts and oceans. In the end, Bachelard could not help but to agree with Joë Bousquet's comment that space oozed like honey. The space of cartography is one that is filled, like a honeycomb is with honey, with that cartography's objects. This space has penetrated subjects and borne
the lines of flight that allow for the assemblage of vectors of subjectification. When a materialist account of the factors describing the construction of subjectivities uses, as its main drive, the relevance of space in this construction, then that space must itself be materialised. When the distinction between the map and its territory was exploded, then the space according to which both were articulated became materialised in that moment of mutual creation. The space which oozes like honey from a beehive is precisely that material space through which lines of flight, rhizomes and vectors of subjectification move; they erupt from the forms of subjectivity already organised. That the dominant forms of subjectification can be dislocated according to a particular critical practice, we have already shown; that this practice also constitutes a material space cannot now be avoided.

The space of cartography, of ecology/ecosophy, and of schizoanalysis, can only, therefore, be understood as a material one. At each instance when these praxes articulate the creation of a vector of subjectivity with reference to the importance thereto of space, then the concurrent creation of a new space has also been undertaken. Space can do nothing now but ooze. It must be sipped like tea, stroked like fur or pinched like skin. Without this type of space, there would be nothing upon which the vectors of subjectivity could flow, there would be no wave for the subjective-assemblage-surfer to ride. If the organisations of subjectivity are to be deterritorialised, then the relevant space cannot escape.

Kant's space was empty and fetid. Bachelard's began to ooze out of its stringent co-ordinates. Deleuze and Guattari's spaces striated and
smoothed, until a cartography came to materialise them. And now, with each cartographic turn establishing the possibility of the creation of new rhizomes of subjectification, we witness a viscous space permeating every crack and filling every subject with the possibility of making another cartographic turn, thus establishing the possibility of the creation of new rhizomes of subjectification and showing a viscous space permeating every crack and filling every subject with the possibility of making another cartographic turn...
We are about to redraw the map of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Such were the words of an officer in the irregular Serbian Militia, as quoted in 'The Guardian' (10/4/92). As the once Yugoslavian republics of Slovenia and Croatia before it, the newly independent republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is gripped with violent map-makers, eager to outline the boundaries of their respective national governments. "One of the causes of this conflict is that the frontiers haven't matched the people. Now the people are being made to match the frontiers." (BBC News, 17/5/92) Nothing gets in the way of these cartographers; not even the land, over which they fight, can escape the imposition of the will of myriad groups of mappers. The past few years have seen the most prolific cartographies, announced, halted, and revamped, that Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War; the most violent reterritorialisations have occurred in the Balkan region. Furthermore, these conflicts have rendered the territorialisations made in the years since the Second World War at least, and since the late nineteenth century at most, cartographically irrelevant. Whether this tension has only recently flared up, or whether it has only recently been worthy of reporting in the Western media, is of little consequence to the fact that these reterritorialisations are made using the most virulent processes of desire. At the time of writing, bands of marauding gunmen are
roaming through Bosnia-Herzegovina, seeking to implement their own cartographies. So-called Serbian forces, regular and otherwise, have overrun many border villages - villages normally containing Muslim majorities - and the coalition of Croatian and Muslim militias are busy fighting them. Yet this simplistic description has been complicated by the various groupings of the forces fighting for the control of the Bosnian capital Sarajevo. Here, the conflict appears to be between the town-dwellers (Croat, Muslim and Serb) eager to fend off the imposition of 'ethnic' boundaries upon the city by outsiders. The Hungarian majority in Transylvania are continuing their antipathy to being part of Romania - the change from Ceausescu's reign to that of the Romanian Popular Front has made no difference to their struggle. The various republics that once constituted the U.S.S.R. now contain many different warring factions: Moldovan Rumanians and Russian speakers in the Dnestr region; Armenians and Azerbaijanis in Nagorny Karabakh; and the Georgians versus South Ossetians and Abkhazians. (These name only a few current conflicts; for a more thorough explanation of the territorial struggles in the area, see Tom Barber's article, 'Nations battle for Moscow's lost empire,' in The Independent on Sunday [5/7/92].) Moreover, Russia and the Ukraine are beginning to squabble over the government of the Crimean region - not to mention various other, not so immediately obvious as territorial, claims to the Black Sea fleet. The territorial problems, however, are not confined to the central-eastern part of Europe, though these are - at the moment - particularly violent.

The most prominent use of cartography in contemporary society is by nationalist groups. Such an outcome was envisaged by Guattari in Les trois
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Écologies (1989); there he writes, "Clearly, then, social ecology must be opened up to politically coherent collective praxes; if it is not, it will in the end always be dominated by reactionary nationalism, the oppression of women, children and minorities, and those hostile to innovation." ('The Three Ecologies', p.145; translation modified.) The cartographic process is important to the militiamen in the war-torn zones of Yugoslavia, for example. To redefine the boundaries of the state in such a way as to engulf the most prosperous, or merely the largest, portions of land for a particular nation is a process of cartographic dimensions. But it is cartography at the behest of a reactionary reterritorialisation. New spaces are being forged, according to which the inhabitants are being forced to redefine their lifestyles; in the countryside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in Slovenia and Croatia last year, this redefinition is articulated along the lines of flight of the refugee; in Sarajevo, the fight seems to be to fend off such a redefinition, in favour of the integrated cosmopolitanism they have enjoyed for centuries. These new spaces, however - according to any territory distinguished along purely nationalist lines - are dead spaces of hatred.

What could be more descriptive of the movement from deterritorialisation to reterritorialisation than the present situation in Yugoslavia? Maybe only the rise of reactionary nationalism throughout the whole of Europe: from the neo-nazis burgeoning in the now unified Germany, to the Leagues of Northern Italy demanding their separation from the poorer southern regions, to the right-wing groups in Belgium, France and Scandinavia, and the so-called leftist groups in Ireland and Spain. In all of these cases Guattari's claim concerning social ecology (in particular, but we could
add, cartography, or the three ecologies, in general) is seen to be vindicated.

Yet the problem of making a "politically coherent collective praxis" is one that has dogged contemporary thinkers, since the rise of postmodernism. It may be the case that the stranglehold that postmodernism has had on the cultural, social and political thought of recent times, has added fuel to the nationalists' cause (at worst) or to the reterritorialisation of deterritorialised flows (at best). Whatever outcome the fluctuation between these best and worst cases produces, it still appears necessary that we should take stock of the present condition of postmodernism. For the fragmentation of old orders, and the increased trend towards fragmentation of the new, could be viewed as practices defined well within the postmodern framework. Add to this the increased role of the media within these moments and movements of fragmentation - where we are shown refugees from the Serbian putsch through Bosnia-Herzegovena applauding the arrival of Western news-crews, because they are news-crews, or the Serbian recommendation that Radio Sarajevo plays more pro-Serbian music - and, it appears, that questions concerning the postmodern condition are not merely academic ones.

Before I can return to the questions concerning cartographies and contemporary politics, I feel that it is necessary to take a detour through these problems of postmodernity. For once we have oriented our discussion of cartographies (and hence of space and subjectification) to, what is called, postmodernism, we shall find it easier to embark upon making Guattarian type "politically coherent collective praxes". First, then, we shall refer to subjects and postmodernism.
The Subject and Its Death.

Postmodernism has become the metaphysics of contemporary cultural theory. Such a statement may seem odd, seeing as postmodernism does not aim to provide an all-encompassing, totalising structure according to which our particular position in the world can be understood...at least, that is its claim. But if we take a brief look at the construction, and the function, of the terms 'postmodernism' and 'metaphysics,' we find a striking similarity between them. As is well known, the word 'metaphysics' was used by Aristotle to designate the work in his corpus which followed that called, 'Physics.' The 'metaphysics' described not only that which came after the 'physics' but also that which theoretically underpinned it. The term 'postmodernism' has had a similar genesis: literally describing a school of thought following that known as 'Modernism' (wherever the historical limits of this practice may fall). Furthermore, postmodernism has sought to give a more thorough description, than that provided by modernism, of contemporary events and contemporary experience, even whilst theoretically advancing the impossibility of the universality of its conclusions. Such paradoxes, however, are the meat and drink of the postmodern aesthetic (encompassed in the title of Hilary Lawson's book, Reflexivity. The post-modern predicament, (1985)²). Ever since its inception, 'metaphysics' has felt the incessant wrath of philosophers throughout the ages; that against 'postmodernism' seems to be just starting.

The most concise and yet all-encompassing attempt to provide a critique of postmodernism as a theoretical structure and a cultural event, has been
made by David Harvey in his *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1990). Harvey's account of the birth and life of this structure/event is particularly interesting (given the parameters of this thesis) in that he provides an assessment of the postmodern relation to space and time (though, with respect to the theme of postmodernism, space and Harvey's text, I would like to defer an analysis until later in my conclusion). In short Harvey's attitude to postmodernism, though open enough to provide an excellent analysis, is, in the end, not a sympathetic one. "There are some who would have us return to classicism and others who seek to tread the path of the moderns." Harvey concludes, "From the standpoint of the latter, every age is judged to attain 'the fullness of its time, not by being but by becoming.' I could not agree more." (Harvey, p.359) It is with respect to the relative merits of Being and Becoming that Harvey constitutes one of the paradigms for his critique of postmodernism and modernism.

Harvey explains the relationship between postmodernism and modernism, being and becoming, as follows: Being = stasis, the aesthetics of place and the politics of the fascist, and can be thought of as fitting into a postmodern schema; Becoming = ethics of time and space and the politics of change, and can be broadly described as modernist. Being is the static effect of a particular way of responding to contemporary culture; Becoming identifies a response which Harvey finds far more suitable for providing an historical materialist critique of contemporary existence. It is with Becoming, as the above quotation shows, that Harvey "could not agree more." Towards the end of his book, Harvey offers a summation and explanation of these theses. He writes:
Fordist modernity is far from homogeneous. There is much that is about relative fixity and permanence—fixed capital in mass production, stable, standardised, and homogeneous markets, a fixed configuration of political-economic influence and power, easily identifiable authority and meta-theories, secure grounding in materiality and technical-scientific rationality, and the like. But all of this is ranged around a social and economic project of Becoming, of growth and transformation of social relations, of auratic art and originality, of renewal and avant-gardism. Postmodernist flexibility, on the other hand, is dominated by fiction, fantasy, the immaterial (particularly of money), fictitious capital, images, ephemerality, chance, and flexibility in production techniques, labour markets and consumption niches; yet it also embodies strong commitments to Being and place, a penchant for charismatic politics, concerns for ontology, and the stable institutions favoured by neo-conservatism. (Harvey, pp.338-339)

Harvey's concluding point—describing the theoretical alliance between neo-conservatism and postmodernism—seems to articulate the same concerns I voiced at the outset to this chapter. Nevertheless, his romantic attachment to the authority a modernism now past would have afforded his discourse (unfortunate as he is to find himself articulated in a postmodern age), seems not only lacklustre but empty. On the face of it, Harvey's account of—and preference for—Becoming over Being also appears worth applauding; for at many points in this thesis have we positively accounted the merits of the nomad and even the chaotic subjectification offered by Kant's aesthetic theory. In these cases constantly moving, shifting
planes or vectors of subjectification have been advocated over a static, organised notion of Being-Subject. "Becoming" in this passage from Harvey's book, however, seems to owe much to the concept of "dialectical progress"; a concept which has also, at various points of this thesis, been adversely criticised. I would prefer, then, to advocate the becomings described by Deleuze and Guattari in *Mille Plateaux* (1980), whereby any attempt at linking becoming with progress, evolution, or even imitation, is thoroughly repudiated. They explain:

Becoming is a rhizome, not a classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying with something; neither is it regressing-progressing; neither is it corresponding, establishing corresponding relations; neither is it producing, producing a filiation, or producing through filiation. Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not reduce to, or lead back to, "appearing," "being," "equalling," or "producing." (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p.239)

Harvey's becoming is precisely that "classificatory or genealogical tree" Deleuze and Guattari say it should not be. For Harvey becoming brings order through the possibility of change; this change occurs hand in hand with the authority of an avant-garde. The becoming Harvey identifies as modernist, is that which identifies a unifying response to a world experienced as fragmentary and disintegrating; and as Harvey adeptly shows throughout his book, the modernist response to such fragmentation (whether in architecture, literature or philosophy) is to butress it with ever more
sturdy rational systems. For Deleuze and Guattari becoming renounces such attempts at organisation and actively seeks to destroy not only the structures of authority, but also the moral high ground occupied solely by an avant-garde. Becoming is deterritorialisation; deterritorialisation is becoming. It could be said, then, that it is with Becoming that this thesis has been dealing all along. Cartography, ecologies/ecosophies, topo-analyses and rhizomes have all been shown to "produce" the affects that we now see described as "becoming."

We saw in Chapter One how the movement of the rhizome accessed multiplicitous lines of flight, simultaneously mapping and creating the plane of consistency; we saw in Chapter Three how the Nomadic hordes proliferated by deterritorialising multiplicitous flows, thereby mapping a smooth space which simultaneously provided for their deterritorialisation. Given that these references have now been reactivated, notice the following passage from Deleuze and Guattari's "plateau" on becoming:

A line of becoming is not defined by points that it connects, or by points that compose it; on the contrary, it passes between points, it comes up through the middle, it runs perpendicular to the points first perceived, transversally to the localisable relation to distant or contiguous points. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.293; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

It was precisely in this way that Deleuze and Guattari described smooth space, and "opposed" it to striated space; and the "movement" of the nomad against the stasis of the sedentary. Indeed, it is with respect to this type of "movement" that Deleuze and Guattari introduce the pack and the
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swarm. For Deleuze and Guattari any becoming - initially, but not primarily, a becoming-animal - "always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.239) A swarm and a pack announce a becoming which cannot help but deterritorialise, cartographise, smoothe, disorganise and rhizomatis the space constitutive of, and constituted by, the swarm and the pack. Becoming operates in the same way as the vectors of subjectification of Chapter Four. And, if we remember Bachelard's account of a verb-producing space (as told in Chapter Two), we can see becoming burgeoning there too.

What does this digression into Deleuze and Guattari's becoming tell us about the relation between modernism and postmodernism? Furthermore, where does it leave us with respect to the postmodern subject? Concerning the first of these questions, I think we can say that the becoming Harvey identifies as modernist is as productive of reaction and of oppressive organisation, as the Being-Postmodernist he ranges against it. Harvey's becoming articulates a channeled response to contemporary capitalist fragmentations, a response which many thinkers now say is one accommodated well within the ranges of the capitalist system. Deleuze and Guattari's becoming does not identify a single-track system of change. The relationship between Deleuze and Guattari's becoming and postmodernism can be articulated by examining the schizophrenic, as found in their work and as criticised by Harvey. Indeed, such an analysis should also provide us with the answer to the second question posed above.

Harvey continually derides Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy: in general in terms of its status, that he describes, as postmodern; and in particular,
insofar as it includes an articulation of the contemporary subjective
attitude that can be described as 'schizophrenic.' He writes:

Deleuze and Guattari..., in their supposedly playful
exposition *Anti-Oedipus*, hypothesize a relationship
between schizophrenia and capitalism that prevails "at
the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and
the same production process," concluding that "our
society produces schizos the same way it produces Prell
shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that
the schizos are not saleable." (*Anti-OEdipus*, p. 245)
(Harvey, p.53)

The problem Harvey encounters with this formulation offered by Deleuze and
Guattari can be described as follows: according to the current trend of
postmodernism, the subject has been riven to shreds by the combined
 attentions of linguists, psychoanalysts and philosophers (and others no
doubt), in such a way that the only possible subjective-construct we have
today is one that is necessarily fragmentary, that is, schizophrenic.
Deleuze and Guattari, Harvey says, identify this schizo production as a
fundamental part of contemporary capitalist production. He concludes that
without a unified subject - which can thereby be described as alienated in
the traditional Marxist sense - there can be no possibility of providing a
base for change of this (capitalist) mode of production; therefore the
postmodern schizo-subject as "playfully" described through the work of
Deleuze and Guattari, offers no solution to the oppression of individuals
and groups by capitalism in contemporary society.* It is at this point that
the injection of a pair of sentences from Frederic Jameson's essay
'Cognitive Mapping'* would suffice:
You should understand that I take such spatial peculiarities of postmodernism as symptoms and expressions of a new and historically original dilemma, one that involves our insertion as individual subjects into a multidimensional set of radically discontinuous realities, whose frames range from the still surviving spaces of bourgeois private life all the way to the unimaginable decentring of global capital itself. Not even Einsteinian relativity, or the multiple subjective worlds of the older modernists, is capable of giving any kind of adequate figuration to this process, which in lived experience makes itself felt by the so-called death of the subject, or, more exactly, the fragmented and schizophrenic decentring and dispersion of this last (which can no longer even serve the function of the Jamesian reverberator or "point of view").

(Jameson, p.351)

Here the terms "the death of the subject" and "the fragmented and schizophrenic decentring" of the subject, serve as signposts indicating the onset of a particularly postmodern way of looking at contemporary existence. In just the same way as was shown viz the claims made by Kant's Copernican Revolution, the postmodern realisation of the dead-subject attests to the production of a radically alternative, and more correct, way of reorienting contemporary thought. Unfortunately Jameson's, and Harvey's, historical analyses of the development of space discover nothing other than such subjective facts; that is, their analyses of space produce nothing more than the dead subject (it is to the relation between this subjective analysis and postmodern space that the following section will refer). This fragmented and decentred notion of subjectivity - especially insofar as it is designated as a Dead Subject - becomes the precise the site of what the
older modernists described as a point of view. The Dead Subject, and the Schizo are either valorised (Jameson) or denigrated (Harvey) in the name of the production of a unified and totalised critique of contemporary capitalism. We shall see that Deleuze and Guattari's schizo propels us along another line of flight.

That Deleuze and Guattari identify the production of schizos as the production of capitalism, *par excellence*, cannot be doubted - this aspect of Harvey's criticism appears correct. Schizophrenia is a condition whose status is articulated well within the bounds of capitalism. Yet it is a condition which - though produced by capitalism - is simultaneously suppressed by capitalism. At one level, as we saw in Chapter Three above, the movement of capital is one which must necessarily be described as schizophrenic itself. Capitalism defines that space which is constituted by the axiomatisation of flows of capital. As these flows are schizophrenic and therefore needful of intense, well supervised organisation, we can see that capitalism's fear is that, untamed, these flows are likely to destroy capitalist organisation itself. (What could have more of a traditional Marxist ring to it? "That which is produced by and constitutive of Capitalism, also articulates the means of (the possibility of) its own destruction."..."Yet it would be a serious error," Deleuze and Guattari warn, "to consider the capitalist flows and the schizophrenic flows as identical..." (Anti-OEdipus, p.245; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis) ["Et pourtant ce serait une grande erreur d'identifier les flux capitalistes et les flux schizophréniques..." (L'Anti-OEdipe, p.291)]...for precisely the reason that the flows which can be called schizophrenic are those which have to be tamed, appropriated and organised by the Capitalist Machine.
"The flows are decoded and axiomatised by capitalism at the same time. Hence schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death." (Anti-OEdipus, p.246; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis) ['C'est en même temps que les flux sont décodés et axiomatisés par le capitalisme. La schizophrénie n'est donc pas l'identité du capitalisme, mais au contraire sa différence, son écart et sa mort." (L'Anti-OEdipe, p.293)] We have already come across a similar relationship of constitution-production-suppression in our reading of Kant's production and control of a rational subject; particularly insofar as this rational subject is threatened by the anti-production of the chaotic aesthetic "subject." Furthermore we have also seen this process, viz Capitalism, defined in the Deleuze and Guattarian terms of territorialisation, deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Deleuze and Guattari's valorisation of schizophrenic processes, is not a championing of the clinical schizophrenic as a universal panacea, or as a force for change. Rather, it is a valorisation of a force (a force of desire), a flux which is necessarily disruptive of capitalism. It is only under the contemporary conditions of Integrated World Capitalism that these flows are repressed and become productive of a clinical condition."

Harvey's citation (p.352) of a news report describing the mass murder, by a schizophrenic, of his family, seems rather naïve (or contradictory, given that in the prelude to the passage quoted above, he recognises that the schizophrenics the "postmoderns" identify, should not be understood in the "narrow clinical sense" [Harvey, p.53]). For Deleuze and Guattari - and, possibly, Guattari in particular - the liberation of those flows which are blocked in the formation of schizophrenics (a practice that describes the field of schizoa...
geographical (etc.) whole that is capitalism, is akin to the classical Marxist endeavour for the working class to break free of their chains and rise up in revolutionary fervour. This, indeed, was the theme permeating Guattari's *Les trois écologies* (1989). Schizoanalysis, ecology/ecosophy and cartography all identify the ways in which the blockages in the schizo-flows, or the reterritorialisation of deterritorialised flows, undertaken under capitalism can be identified and destroyed. Deleuze and Guattari exemplify three responses that the schizophrenic - purely within the bounds of capitalism - can give. The first arrests the schizophrenic processes and pours them into the mould of OEdipus. This amounts to a neuroticisation. Second, this neuroticisation by OEdipus is resisted, but nevertheless lays seige to the schizophrenic flows so that the schizo "is led to take itself as an end" (*Anti-OEdipus*, p.363) ["est amené à se prendre lui-même pour fin" (*L'Anti-OEdipe*, p.435)]; and so a psychotic is produced. The final response is described as follows:

the process sets to turning round in the void. Since it is now a process of deterritorialization, it can no longer search for and create its new land. Confronted with OEdipal reterritorialization - an archaic, residual, ludicrously restricted sphere - it will form still more artificial lands that, barring an accident, accommodate themselves in one way or another to the established order: the pervert. (*Anti-OEdipus*, p.363)**

In all cases the capitalist axiomatic is directing the flows of the schizophrenic. The true schizophrenic response, that which becomes-schizo,
is that which actively destroys the axiomatising powers of the Capitalist Machine, and directly harnesses the pure deterritorialising and decoding pulsions. This will amount to the dismantling of the Capitalist Machine by the inter-oozing of its insides with its outsides.

To reiterate, and redirect, the second of the questions asked above: what relevance does the discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming and schizophrenic have with respect to our discussion of postmodernism and the subject? For Harvey, Deleuze and Guattari epitomise the postmodern approach to, and analysis of, subjectivity under contemporary capitalism. We have seen, however, that Deleuze and Guattari are not easily assimilable into the Being-Postmodern/Becoming-Modern distinction Harvey uses as a critical tool. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari's becoming appears to move outside the paradigms of modernity and postmodernity that Harvey constructs; or, given their own descriptions of such a movement, it moves through such a critical construct. Deleuze and Guattari's becoming has little to do with points, points of view, or the stasis of Being that is supposedly postmodern; and also with progress and avant-garde becoming that is supposedly modern. In terms of the becoming that they announce, the distinction that Harvey makes itself appears static. Becoming, schizoaanalysis, rhizomatics, ecologies, ecosophies and cartographies have little to do with Cultural Movements and more to do with the relative speeds and slownesses, the flows and the fluctuations which can be directed and organised to constitute these movements. Moreover, to identify the schizophrenic as a purely postmodern construct is to arborealise an otherwise rhizomatic articulation; it is to forget the blockages and repressions used to form a particular subjective-construct and particular spaces.
Space and Postmodernism.

It should be emphasised at the outset, that the question of the architectural spaces postmodernism describes and prescribes, will not outline the area of study of this section. Such themes have been explored in great detail, and with greater ability than I could evince, in other works.¹²

The best way of mapping the areas of study of this section, is in the description of various definitions of postmodern space: to start with, who better than Frederic Jameson? In his 'Cognitive Mapping' from which I have already quoted, Jameson identifies three types of space, or, to be more precise, three stages of capitalist space: "I have tried to suggest that the three historical stages of capital have each generated a type of space unique to it,... These three types of space I have in mind are all the result of discontinuous expansions or quantum leaps in the enlargement of capital, in the latter's penetration and colonization of hitherto uncommodified areas." (Jameson, p.348) The three stages of capitalism Jameson identifies are: classical, or market capitalism; the passage from market to monopoly capitalism, Lenin's "stage of imperialism" (p.349); and late capitalism. It is to this final capitalist category that postmodern space refers. Jameson, in two more massive sentences, writes:

I want to suggest that the new space [postmodern space] involves the suppression of distance...and the relentless saturation of any remaining voids and empty places, to the point where the postmodern body - whether wandering through a postmodern hotel, locked into rock sound by means of headphones, or undergoing
multiple shocks and bombardments of the Vietnam War as Michael Herr conveys it to us - is now exposed to a perceptual barrage of immediacy from which all sheltering layers have been removed. There are, of course, many other features of this space one would ideally want to comment on... but I think that the peculiar disorientation of the saturated space I have just mentioned will be the most useful guiding thread. (Jameson, p.351)

Postmodern space is characterised not by a new conception of space as such, but by a new conception of the way space is filled. According to this passage of Jameson's the "new space" differs from the old space (a modernist space say) in that the elements that pass through it, or occupy it, are no longer orderly and evocative of rationality, but are disorderly and evocative of fragmentality. Before I remark upon the Kantianism such a story resembles, I would like to insert a discussion of some of Harvey's findings viz postmodernism and space. For Harvey postmodernism identifies the process of 'Time-space compression... ' - as the title one of the chapters of his The Condition of Postmodernity (1990) puts it. Not dissimilar to Jameson's saturated space, this compressed space Harvey describes as follows:

Disruptive spatiality triumphs over the coherence of perspective and narrative in postmodern fiction, in exactly the same way that imported beers coexist with local brews, local employment collapses under the weight of foreign competition, and all the divergent spaces of the world are assembled nightly as a collage of images upon the television screen. (Harvey, p.302)
Conclusion

It is easy to see from where Harvey formulates his Being=Postmodernism, Becoming=Modernism dichotomy. Using a cinematic metaphor, postmodern space provides the backdrop against which many types of image can be projected; Being, then, would describe the backdrop as the only possibility for unification of these images, which is very postmodern and reflexive; whereas Harvey's Becoming would define the narrative structure (if there was one) of the images presented, and is thus very modernist. In any case, space is seen simply as an all pervading emptiness punctuated intermittantly by coagulations called "place". We may be able to understand this further, by referring to the space/place distinctions we encountered in the introductory chapter with respect to Kant.

In that Chapter we followed Ivor Leclerc's article, 'The Meaning of "Space" in Kant,'13/chart the movement from a "concrete" articulation of space, to an "abstract" one; a movement which was concurrent with the movement from Renaissance philosophy through the Enlightenment into the work of Kant (and beyond). We saw that the sixteenth, seventeenth and early-eighteenth century notions of space adhered to the Aristotelian definition, linking it with place as the "innermost bounding surface of the containing body - which of course coincided with the outer boundary of the contained body."

(Leclerc, p.88; quoted above, p.18) Descartes began the abstraction of space by tying it more with the idea of magnitude, and place with situation; Leibniz carried it further by identifying space not only with all places in their totality, but with the abstracted order of all such places too (see above p.19). We saw, too, that Kant's space was abstract, formal, totalising and organising. A foetid space, where subjects were born to be constrained; the type of space Beckett defines in Waiting for Godot.
(1965)" in the following suitably macabre and cynical way: "They give birth astride a grave, the light gleams an instant, then it's night once more." (Act II, p.89) But maybe Beckett's description is too optimistic, with his gleaming light flashing for an instant...perhaps this is due to the modernist in him.... Jameson's saturation bombing of postmodern space by fragmentary images, delimits a type of space which he calls "disorientating" and which we can recharacterise as the dead space ordered along Kantian lines. For Jameson the "new space involves the suppression of distance," the consequent conglomerates of fragmentary stuff can therefore be determined according to our understanding of "place." Whatever way Jameson approaches this space, his account never strays far from the idea of an abstract, totalised space that can be saturated in the postmodern manner. Harvey's postmodern space seems to borrow from both the Aristotelian and the Enlightenment traditions, in that the totalising and abstract formulation of a global space articulated according to the transcendental movements and relations of Capital, is filled with various places articulated according to the diversion and solidification of capital at a point. Harvey's map is a highly organised representation of a single empty space that is, however, occupied by fragmentary places. He writes, Capital, in short, continues to dominate, and it does so in part through superior command over space and time, even when opposition movements gain control over a particular place for a time. The 'otherness' and 'regional resistances' that postmodernist politics emphasize can flourish in a particular place. But they are all too often subject to the power of capital over the co-ordination of universal fragmented space and the march of capitalism's global historical time that lies
outside of the purview of any particular one of them.
(Harvey, pp.238-239)

So what Harvey describes here as the "universal fragmented space" of postmodernism should be interpreted as merely another series of places under the overpowering gaze of a truly universal spatialisation of capitalism. There is fragmented space and a space that drives towards homogenisation.

In his monumental book *The Production of Space* (1991) Henri Lefebvre describes the constitution and proliferation of a material (or, maybe it would be more precise to say "a materialist's...") space, under the auspices of - as the title suggests - its "production". He never tries to transplant any of his theses into faddish cultural organisations - remaining true to his lifelong adherence to Marxism. His project, similar to those promoted by both Harvey and Jameson, is stated as follows:

> Our present analysis will not attain its full meaning until political economy has been reinstated as the way to understand productive activity. But a new political economy must no longer concern itself with things in space, as did the now obsolete science that preceded it; rather, it will have to be a political economy of space (and of its production). (Lefebvre, p.299)

Indeed, it is an economics of space, of the spaces productive of subjectivities, and of space as produced according to a political economy (Guattari's ecology/ecosophy) that will interest Lefebvre. What is more important, given the discussion currently underway concerning the
production of various histories of space (by Harvey and Jameson), is the
history of space given by Lefebvre. He characterises it in terms similar to
those adopted by Leclerc; for Lefebvre, the understanding/production of
space has changed from an Absolute to an Abstract one. The former Lefebvre
describes thus:

Absolute space was made up of fragments of nature
located at sites which were chosen for their intrinsic
qualities (cave, mountain top, spring, river), but
whose very consecration ended up by stripping them of
their natural characteristics and uniqueness. Thus
natural space was soon populated by political forces.
Typically, architecture picked a site in nature and
transferred it to the political realm by means of a
symbolic mediation; one thinks, for example, of the
statues of local gods or goddesses in Greek temples, or
of the Shintoist's sanctuary, empty or else containing
nothing but a mirror. (Lefebvre, p.48; Lefebvre's
emphasis)

This space is the space produced and invested by magical and religious
symbolism. It is not wholly supplanted by abstract space, for it forms the
basis for what Lefebvre terms (and we shall describe later)
"representational space." Absolute space seems a naïve space, the space
which Bachelard would have loved as productive of dreams, like an opiate
(in Bachelard's case, more like Brandy). Nevertheless, this space is not
devoid of its organisations and political affiliations. This is the space
of Imperial Rome, the cathedrals of the Holy Roman Empire and the
commercial squares of the early mercantile town. It is in terms of these
facets that abstract space is taken over by absolute space.
Abstract space functions 'objectally', as a set of things/signs and their formal relationships: glass and stone, concrete and steel, angles and curves, full and empty. Formal and quantitative, it erases distinctions, as much those which derive from nature and (historical) time as those which originate in the body (age, sex, ethnicity). (Lefebvre, p.49)

Abstract space is not homogeneous; it simply has homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its 'lens'. And, indeed, it renders homogeneous. But in itself it is multiform. Its geometric and visual formants are complementary in their antithesis. (Lefebvre, p.287; Lefebvre's emphases)

Abstract space is thus slightly different to that introduced by Leclerc (though Lefebvre does adorn another of his descriptions of it with a philosophical lineage from Descartes to Hegel [see p.308]). The most interesting notion introduced here by Lefebvre with respect to abstract space, is its drive to homogenise. In this way we can understand abstract space in the terms we have borrowed from Bachelard, as "geometricising", from Deleuze and Guattari, as "reterritorialising", and from Kant as "organising". Throughout this thesis, these terms have been used to characterise that space which is productive of the most repressed, neurotic and oppressed forms of subjectivity. In this chapter alone, we have seen that it is this type of space that provides the conditions according to which the Subject Dies. Indeed, "abstract space", with its "multiform" fragmentations being forcibly brought under a unified political control, is that space we have been describing as postmodern.
Jameson's "new space", which I have characterised as abstract following Leclerc's analysis of Kant, we can now see as abstract in the terms offered by Lefebvre. Abstract space is that space which is defined, delimited and policed by global capitalism; it is constituted, or, rather, poly-sected (rather than merely bisected) by fragmentary spaces/stuff which it must bring under control. In so doing it provides for the Jameson-type saturated places particular of postmodernism. Where Lefebvre's analysis transgresses Jameson's is in the more fluid history that it writes. We saw above that for Lefebvre abstract space did not merely supercede absolute space, but that the latter remained underground, so to speak. Jameson's formulation, however, relates and regulates different spaces to different stages "in the enlargement of capital," (quoted above p.165). His history is far more rigid than Lefebvre's, and anything overflowing from a previous stage of capital is soon dissipated, or subsumed by the (term) postmodern. It is at this point that we should return to a point intimated at the outset of the description of Lefebvre's absolute/abstract distinction.

Like Guattari, and even like Jameson, Lefebvre provides a tripartite structure according to which an economics of space can be oriented; he provides the following co-ordinates: 1. Spatial Practice; 2. Representation of Space; and 3. Representational Space. The first of these, spatial practice, can be broadly understood as social space. It describes the space(s) produced and provided in everyday life: "It embodies a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and networks which link up the 'places set for work, 'private' life and leisure')." (Lefebvre, p.38) Bachelard would have called this "lived-in space", my emphasis.
Representations of space describe "conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived." (Lefebvre, p.38) This we have termed geometric(ised) space, space which can be cut-up and apportioned separate roles.

Finally Lefebvre introduces representational spaces. This space is lived space, lived "through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of 'inhabitants' and 'users', but also of some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe." (Lefebvre, p.39; Lefebvre's emphasis) This is the space of the imagination, the space which symbolically overlays real-perceived space. This is the re-entry point for Lefebvre's Absolute space into the Abstract. Representational space describes in more detail the type of space which promotes Bachelard's dreams, and in so doing becomes defined by them. (It is interesting to note that for Lefebvre some philosophers are allowed into this space, whereas we noticed that Bachelard constantly lamented the philosopher's exclusion from such practices.) Having used Bachelardian terms to embellish Lefebvre's description of this type of space, I think we should note that Lefebvre's description appears far colder than Bachelard's; that is, Lefebvre does not allow himself to be carried away on the wings of reverie as does Bachelard, indeed, Lefebvre's analysis seems to contain mild approbation of such activities. Nevertheless, I think the comparison still stands.
These three axes provide the co-ordinates according to which Lefebvre produces his space-productive histories/economies. Absolute and abstract underpin and interact with each other in terms of these three axes. On the whole, abstract space may have supplanted absolute insofar as we take the perspective of perceived and conceived space; but, as was stated above, with reference to representational, lived space, or even dreamed space, the absolute still lingers. What this shows us, is that though Lefebvre's desire to institute a new kind of "political economy" along the lines of an analysis of the production, or types of production, of space appears on one level just another archaic, systematised, unificatory machine, on another level it introduces many points of dislocation which undermine any attempt at totalisation or systematisation. Perhaps the best citation of his project that Lefebvre gives in his *The Production of Space* (1991) comes in the final paragraphs; he writes:

The creation (or production) of a planet-wide space as the social foundation of a transformed everyday life open to myriad possibilities - such is the dawn now beginning to break on the far horizon. . . .

I speak of an orientation advisedly. We are concerned with nothing more and nothing less than that. We are concerned with what might be called a 'sense': an organ that perceives, a direction that may be conceived, and a directly lived movement progressing towards the horizon. And we are concerned with nothing that even remotely resembles a system. (Lefebvre, pp.422-423; Lefebvre's emphasis)

Here Lefebvre's three axes, that have provided him with a sometimes immovable critical co-ordinates, now open out towards a realm in which they
are used to determine the production of a new space. Lefebvre's absolute space → abstract space movement that we have described as the formation of postmodern space is not only circumvented but poly-sected by the triadic critique of the production of space. Indeed, when this triadic critique begins to oscillate itself - as the quotation above shows - then any semblance of critical rigidity in Lefebvre's work must disappear.

To recap: Jameson provides a historical reification of space-production in terms of the changes in capitalism since the late-eighteenth, early-nineteenth centuries. Harvey provides an excellent analysis of the contemporary postmodern space and its relation to capitalism. In both cases the contemporary space - according to which we must articulate and constitute subjectivities - is one which is sickeningly putrid...a theme which has been present throughout this thesis. Yet neither Jameson nor Harvey offer us any alternative. Jameson is content to try to forge a political praxis from within this space; whereas Harvey yearns for the good old days of the Modernist space, before the subject died (or had the life-support machine's plugs pulled on it) and when the future was one that could be forged. As the quotation immediately above (and the one below) shows, Lefebvre does offer us an alternative. To the type of Marxist nostalgia that Harvey exhibits Lefebvre has the following advice:

The hypothesis of an ultimate and preordained meaning of historical becoming collapses in face of an analysis of the strategies deployed across the surface of the planet: ...

The transformation of society presupposes a collective ownership and management of space founded on a permanent participation of the 'interested parties',

...
Conclusion

with their multiple, varied and even contradictory interests. It thus also presupposes confrontation - and indeed this has already emerged in the problems of the 'environment'.... (Lefebvre, pp.418, 422)'

It is the alternative view of space that Lefebvre (along with all the others this thesis has mentioned) offers that will provide us with an articulation of the "politically coherent collective praxes" intoned at the beginning of this chapter.

Final Remarks.

As the preceding chapter closed we witnessed a prolonged advocation for the proliferation of a material space. Such a line of flight must be briefly re-accessed in order to continue with the cartography of Guattari's "politically coherent collective praxes." A material space, a space which oozes, is a necessary production of both the dislocation of the map/thing-mapped dialectic - such that the map and its territory are instances of mutual and immanent production - and the promotion of the myriad vectors constitutive of subjectification. In the terms used throughout this chapter: the advocation and burgeoning of schizophrenic becomings do not only transgress the boundaries inflicted in the production of a (dead) Subject, but they also ensure the deterritorialisation of striated space. I hope to have shown how postmodern space, its abstraction and coagulation/compression into different places, has its roots within the tradition I have described using Kant ("organisation"), Bachelard ("geometricisation" and "co-ordination"), Deleuze and Guattari ("deterritorialisation"
reterritorialisation"), and Lefebvre ("homogenisation").

Therefore, it is in the creation of a material space, in the schizophrenisation of the flows constructive of capitalism, in the final destruction of the Dead Subject (and the postmodern charnel house which has protected not only those watching over the corpse, but has provided the site for those offering various theoretical libations to it), in the rhizomatic burgeoning of vectors of subjectification, in short, in cartography, that "politically coherent collective praxes" can proliferate. Given the terms in which this thesis has been couched, what are the consequences of such "politically coherent collective praxes"?

1. Politically coherent. It would seem that these two words - maybe "coherent" especially - consign the whole of this project back into the realms of systematic, totalising and homogenising discourse. Yet this is not the case. In keeping with the constant entreaty throughout this thesis to multiply the vectors constituting subjectivity, to proliferate the material swarm according to which such vectors are put into motion, Guattari's invocation of "political coherence" must not be viewed as a call to unification. In his *Les trois écologies* (1989) he explains:

Not only is it necessary not to homogenize the various levels of practice - not to join them under the aegis of some transcendent insistence; we have also to engage them in processes of *heterogenesis*. Feminists will never be involved enough in a becoming-woman; and there is no reason to ask the immigrant population to renounce the cultural features of its being, or its
membership of a particular nationality. Our objective should be to nurture individual cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singularity, exceptions, and rarity coexist under the least oppressive possible conditions. ('The Three Ecologies', p.139; Guattari's emphasis; translation modified.)

We have seen singularities function within the terms of the production of subjectivities, as particular points of saturation of subjective vectors; the passage quoted above gives these singularities a concretely political complexion. Marginalised groups and cultures will benefit from the proliferation of subjective vectors in that such vectors have already expunged any notions or structures of hierarchy. This was the project of the rhizomes. When subjectivities replace Subjects, the margins will be multiplied so that any one grouping will not be oppressed by any other. A new "contract of citizenship" will merely be a cartography: the definition and construction of a territory according to which such unimpeded vectors of subjectification/singularities can operate without fear of oppression; that is, a map of the possibilities of deterritorialisation without reterritorialisation. In the end - or in the beginning - membership of any one group, in other words, the ability to occupy any one margin/territory, will be as fluid as the subjectivities which orient it. It is in this respect that such "politically coherent" vectors intimate towards "collective praxes."

2. Collective praxes. Once more must we quote from *Les trois écologies* (1989):
The aim of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics was the "resolution" of opposites. This is no longer the objective of eco-logic. Certainly, in the field of social ecology in particular, there will be times of struggle in which all men and women feel a need to set common objectives and act "like little soldiers" - by which I mean good activists. But there will also be periods of resingularisation, in which individual and collective subjectivities will "reclaim their due", and in which creative expression as such will take precedence over collective goals. ('The Three Ecologies', pp.139-140; my emphasis)

Under any circumstances will it be possible to hook up various subjective assemblages, to synchronise vectors of subjectivity, to congregate singularities to achieve particular goals; goals which can occur at any time and in any place, without prior prescription. Assemblages and collectives can be created and destroyed without fear of being slapped by some ideological super-ego. Indeed, collective action will be easier to achieve without the forbidding structure of a hierarchy of subjects, or privileged groupings. It is exactly this type, and possibility, of action which describes Deleuze and Guattari's "molecular revolutions". In his essay 'The Proliferation of Margins' Guattari explains, "What characterizes the 'molecular' here is the fact that the lines of flight merge with the objective lines of deterritorialization of the system and create an irreversible aspiration for new spaces of liberty." (p.109; Guattari's emphasis.) Thus, the never ending smoothing of space, the constant burgeoning of a line of flight comprising a vector of subjectification, an ongoing cartography, are all "productive" of such molecular revolutions.
It appears, then, that Guattari's "politically coherent collective praxes" can be articulated using another phrase, "cartography of subjectification". This is all very easy to write, but what relevance does it have (if any) to the cartographic problems I articulated at the opening of this chapter? that is, how does my "cartography of subjectification" relate to the problems of reactionary nationalism cited above?

The boundaries currently being marked across Europe are almost entirely those drawn by nationalist groups with the aim of outlining national territories. The Sarajevo experience is one which best describes such cartographies. As was written above, the town-dwellers are resisting the imposition of divisions with ethnic titles being imposed upon them by outsiders. In a way which muddies the Western media's characterisation of the conflict as one purely between Serb and Muslim/Croat, the town-dwellers appear to comprise all of these people, and maybe some others too. Yet to name their conflict as one which proceeds cartographically goes against everything that I have advocated for such a practice. However, as we have seen over and over again throughout this thesis, even the most positive flows for liberation can be retrenched within an oppressive framework. Remember Deleuze and Guattari's warning that smooth space alone will not save us? The same warning must be voiced viz cartography (and its attendant practices: schizocanalysis, topoanalysis, ecology/ecosophy...).

It is for this reason that the cartographic concern must be a global one. Complaining about the vision of the world in which human intervention is irrelevant - a perspective outlined for us by structuralism and postmodernism - Guattari in *Les trois écologies* (1989) concludes:
It is quite simply wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius and the environment as separate. Indeed, if we continue...to refuse squarely to confront the simultaneous degradation of these three areas, we will in effect be acquiescing in a general infantilization of opinion, a destruction and neutralization of democracy.... ("The Three Ecologies", p.34; Guattari's emphasis)21

There is not an area of contemporary life which is not affected by change - or indeed stagnation - in any other. If such a situation is not a recent occurrence, then certainly contemporary capitalism - integrated world capitalism - has accentuated it. In a world co-ordinated according to the flows of capital (the organised flows of capital) any manifestation upon it has links with capital. This is why Guattari emphasises the interrelatedness of his analyses. A cartography must cast its gaze globally: otherwise its use for outlining particular territorial boundaries constitutes a falling back under the control of reactionary nationalism; and it must spread itself following the routes of capital: revving it up so that capitalist co-ordination has no affect.

It is according to this global (though not homogenising) view that a cartography of subjectification will provide for the pullulation not only of material spaces but of their attendant subjective possibilities. When the blinkers of nationalism have been wrenched from the cartographic process, its violence can be directed towards that which has been productive of the empty spaces and dead subjects with which we have become accustomed.
The beauty of cartographic virulence is that it has been born of the knotting of Kantianism and Capitalism (at least). As we have seen, the usual fate of such a coupling has been sunk straight into a grave. Yet, as soon as cartography glimpses the cemetary's milky daylight, it proliferates. This is not optimism (of the modernist kind) but awe. Capitalism endeavours to constrain it with talk of nationalities, natural boundaries and ethnic superiority; indeed, it is according to these stories that Capitalism seeks to inhibit its own blind workings. (We should remember, at this point, the lengths to which Kant went in order to shackle his aesthetic subjectivity to his critical system.) Localised skirmishes - whether nationalist wars like those erupting in central-eastern Europe and the Middle-East (with their structuration of the flow of surplus weaponry), or drug related, user v. power structure clashes, which can reterritorialise particular neighbourhoods in particular cities (that is, constrain such areas to the ghettos) - can only aid the retrenchment of the global capitalist network. Even the transport-artery blockades by lorry-drivers, taxi-drivers, farm workers and air-traffic controllers in France and Italy in early summer 1992, though threatening to European commerce in toto, worked wonders for the tourist trades of the Low Countries. (The nature of the road-blockade in France has exhibited true cartographic potential, however, coming from the extreme irrelevance of its targets to its problems: indiscriminately, any major road and any type of transported goods have been targeted without the need to shackle the action to particular spaces.)

The assertion of a "dead subject" exemplifies the conservatism and apathy of the postmodern condition; a condition where political action is, at
least, useless. This must be the conclusion reached from reading the work of
Deleuze and Guattari. To this conclusion we must add a cartography of
subjectification.

Kant's subject was always constrained to be, at least, an obsessional
neurotic: neatly arranging its organs, its constitutive pieces, into ever
cleaner, rational spaces in order that it can function on a level of the
most numbing normality. The subject - whose brief affirmation of sunlight
as it plopped into the grave, provided it with a story about consciousness
to range against the assertion of it being still-born - now provides the
site for cartographic exacerbation. Like Artaud's plague-theatre attacking
and infecting the body-politic worthy of it, a cartography of
subjectification will disorganise the pieces that have constituted this
subject. Like the rhizomes sprouting from the organised branches of an
arboreal structure, the cartography of subjectification will burgeon in the
spaces emptied or compressed under capitalism. Like Bachelard's dreamed
topoanalysis, oozing throughout (in and out, up and down) the house of
reason, its movement - rather its relative speeds and slownesses - will be
utterly indiscriminate, fluctuating, disruptive and enjoyable...
PREFACE:


2. In his book, The Story of Modern Art, 2nd edition (Oxford, Phaidon Press Ltd.: 1989), Norbert Lynton uses as an epigraph to the second chapter (titled, 'Reality Questioned and Answered') the following lines from Yeats, "The close of the past century was full of a strange desire to get out of form...I now feel an impulse to create form." (quoted p.55) In 1912 the art critic Roger Fry wrote of the Post-Impressionist exhibitors (in exhibitions held at the Grafton Galleries in 1910 and 1912, which included Picasso, Braque and Matisse), that they "do not seek to imitate form, but to create form; not to imitate life, but to find an equivalent for life" (quoted by Peter Faulkner in the 'Introduction' to his anthology, A Modernist Reader, Modernism in England 1910-1930 [London, B. T. Batsford Ltd.: 1986], p.19). In both cases we can see the growing urge of the artists at the outset of the present century, to break away from the ossified ideas of the previous century, and forge those necessary to understand the experiences that seemed so different. Norbert Lynton goes on to describe, in The Story of Modern Art, the move the artistic avant-garde made into Synthetic and Analytic Cubism, Futurism, Neo-Plasticism, Suprematism, Constructivism and Expressionism in the early part of this century; in the second chapter he writes:

In his Reminiscences (1913) Kandinsky wrote that 'the disintegration of the atom was to me like the disintegration of the whole world.' ... Mass, location, space, and time could no longer be received as the absolutes they had once seemed to be. The artist could respond to this in a variety of ways: he could try to find images for this discontinuity and complexity; he...
could seek to build models of man-made order and offer them as metaphors for the new social order that was needed in this much changed world; he could turn inward to explore unconscious area that are permanent and inalienable; he could ignore change and continue to give his attention to natural beauty, making truer and possibly more energetic representations than before; and he could attach himself to the comforts of past art, offering his public a sense of security by upholding time-honoured values and screening it against the new. (p.65)

Whatever course was taken, whatever style of art was followed, it appears that each one offered a (particular?) way of understanding and reacting to the immense upheavals of the early part of this century, and further that this understanding was based upon the sensible, conceptual or rational structures of an individual subject - most notably the figure of the artist itself. Such problems were not the sole province of the plastic or figurative arts. In his novel What Maisie Knew (1897), Henry James orders the events which make up its contents according to the "perceptual register" of a little girl. In his 'Preface' to the 1909 edition he explains:

The one presented register of the whole complexity would be the play of the child's confused and obscure notion of it, and yet the whole, as I say, should be unmistakably, should be honourably there, seen through the faint intelligence, or at the least attested by the imponderable presence, and still advertising its sense. (What Maisie Knew [Harmondsworth, Middx., Penguin Books Ltd.: 1966], p.9)

Writing about the artist, novelist, bombardier and occasional fascist Wyndham Lewis, Frederic Jameson provides what could be seen not only as a gloss on James's passage (above), but also as an elucidation of literary Modernism in general; he writes:
The modernist gesture is thus ideological and Utopian all at once: perpetuating the increasing subjectivization of individual experience and the atomization and disintegration of the older social communities, expressing the anxiety and revulsion of intellectuals before the reification of social life and the ever intensifying class conflicts of industrial society, it also embodies a will to overcome the commodification of late nineteenth-century capitalism, and to substitute for the mouldering and overstuffed bazaar of late Victorian life the mystique and promise of some intense and heightened, more authentic experience. (Fables of Aggression. Wyndham Lewis. the Modernist as Fascist [Berkeley and Los Angeles, Ca., The University of California Press: 1979], p.39)

These are just a few examples of the reactions of organisation around a subject to the fragmentations felt by 'modernist' artists at the beginning of the twentieth century.

INTRODUCTION: 'A SPATIAL REVOLUTION, KANT, SPACE AND THE SUBJECT.'

1. Kant, I., Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd Impression (London, Macmillan: 1933). When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, following the convention of citing both the first and second edition page numbers, in the form: (A.../B...).


3. The bracketting of "time" in this passage will be the nearest this thesis comes to dealing with it theoretically. This is not a political move - my aim is not to marginalise the problem of time because I think it has had its philosophical day - but merely a move designed to keep this thesis within its word-count boundaries. However, the reappraisal of the notion of time across the area(s) mapped by this thesis, would not present an
impossible task: to thrust time into the muddy realms of the material, as I will do with space, could provide the paradigms for another research project. Furthermore, what would history after cartography look like? Suffice to reiterate, that there is no space in this thesis for an adequate examination of these problems.

For one of the most recent discussions of the role of time in relation to contemporary Continental philosophy, see David Wood's, *The Deconstruction of Time* (Atlantic Highlands N.J., Humanities Press International: 1989); and for a contemporary philosophical account of the questions of history and historiography, see David Ashby's thesis, *Foucault, Ricoeur and the Narrative of History* (unpublished), Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick.


6. In Part II of the *Principles of Philosophy*, titled 'Principles of Material Things', Descartes writes:

XIV. The terms place and space differ in that place signifies position more expressly than size or shape, and these features, conversely, are rather what we have in mind when we speak of space. ... (p.204)

thus explaining the difference he observes between place and space. The following principle explains his relation to the Aristotelian definition of space, with respect to bounding surfaces (that we have already encountered in this chapter), as follows:
XV. Thus we always take a space to mean an extension in length, breadth, and depth. Place is considered sometimes as intrinsic to an object that is in a place, and sometimes as extrinsic to it. Intrinsic place is just the same as space; extrinsic place may be taken to mean the surface immediately surrounding the body that is in the place. It should be noted that surface here does not mean a part of the surrounding body, but only the common boundary of the surrounding and the surrounded bodies, which is a mere aspect of them; at least, what is meant is the surface as a common property, which is not part of one body rather than the other, and is deemed to be always 'the same' so long as it keeps the same size and shape. For even if the body, and the surface of the body, surrounding a given object, should completely change, yet the object so surrounded is not considered as changing its place, provided that it meanwhile retains the same position relatively to the bodies that are taken as unmoving. (pp.204-205)

We can see that Descartes' definition of space is still couched in the Aristotelian terms peculiar to his historical context; however, as Leclerc shows, Descartes' Principle XIV announces a considerable shift from the Aristotelian norm.

7. Kant, I., 'Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space' [1768], in Kant: Selected Pre-Critical Writings and Correspondence with Beck, translated by G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford (Manchester, Manchester University Press: 1968) pp.36-43. When quoting from this essay, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Kant, p....).

8. Some of Kant's examples are: the right and left hands; the right or left hand and its mirror image; the right and left sides of the body; and various species of snail and types of screw.
9. Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book One [1739], Fontana Library, Sixth Impression (Glasgow, William Collins Sons & Co. ltd.: 1982). When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Hume, p....).

10. One of the most striking similarities between both Hume and Nietzsche's analyses of subjectivity, can be noticed in comparing the two following passages; Hume's first:

The whole of this doctrine [of personal identity] leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile [sic] questions concerning personal identity can never be properly decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties. ... All the disputes concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except so far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of union, as we have already observed. (Hume, pp.311-312)

With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a small terse fact, which these superstitious minds hate to concede - namely, that a thought comes when "it" wishes, and not when "I" wish, so that it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the predicate "think." It thinks; but that this "it" is precisely the famous old "ego" is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an "immediate certainty." After all, one has even gone too far with this "it thinks" - even the "it" contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here according to the grammatical habit: "Thinking is an activity; every activity requires an agent; consequently -" (Nietzsche,
In both cases, we can see that any idea of subjective identity is described merely in terms of it being nothing more than a grammatical exigency.

CHAPTER ONE: 'CARTOGRAPHY'


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p. ... ). The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note.


3. Strictly speaking, the production of the organism - "organisation" - constitutes, for Deleuze and Guattari, a third axis, as the quotation that follows in the text shows. However, I will not be as precise as Deleuze and Guattari in this chapter and will equate both the movements towards signification and subjectification as modes of organisation.

4. I am here adopting the convention used by the English translator of Mille Plateaux in using the term "signification". In his Glossary, Brian Massumi explains this usage as follows:

   I have followed the increasingly common practice of importing signification and interprétance into English without modification. In Deleuze and Guattari these
terms refer respectively to the syntagmatic and paradigmatic processes of language as a "signifying regime of signs." They are borrowed from Benveniste....

(A Thousand Plateaus, p.xviii.)

5. "Tu seras organisé, tu seras un organisme, tu articuleras ton corps - sinon tu ne seras qu'un dépravé. Tu seras signifiant et signifié, interprète et interprété - sinon tu ne seras qu'un déviant. Tu seras sujet, et fixé comme tel, sujet d'énonciation rabattu sur un sujet d'énoncé - sinon tu ne seras qu'un vagabond." (Mille Plateaux, p.197).


8. In an early section of Anti-OEdipus, Deleuze and Guattari explain the nature, especially the non-productive nature, of Bodies without Organs. They write:

The full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. Antonin Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right there where he was at the moment. ... To the machine-organs, the body without organs opposes the sliding, opaque and taut surface. To the linked, connected and interrupted flows, it opposes its amorphous and undifferentiated fluid. To phonetically articulated words, it opposes gasps and cries that are sheer unarticulated blocks of sound. (Anti-OEdipus, pp.8, 9; translation modified.)
It should be noted, then, that the "production of the Body without Organs" does not refer to what it produces, precisely because it produces nothing, but rather to the making of a Body without Organs. We shall see that though the BwO produces nothing, it does chart, or map the sliding surface/smooth space it opposes to the co-ordinated space.

9. "qui ne cesse de défaire l'organisme, de faire passer et circuler des particules asignifiantes, intensités pures, et de s'attribuer les sujets auxquels il ne laisse plus qu'un nom comme trace d'une intensité." (Mille Plateaux, p.10)

10. "Nous ne parlons pas d'autre chose: les multiplicités, les lignes, strates et segmentarités, lignes de fuite et intensités, les agencements machinique et leurs différents types, les corps sans organes et leur construction, leur sélection, le plan de consistance, les unités de mesure dans chaque cas. Les stratomètres, les délémètres, les unités CsO de densité, les unités CsO de convergence ne forment pas seulement une quantification de l'écriture, mais définissent celle-ci comme étant toujours la mesure d'autre chose. Écrire n'a rien à voir avec signifier, mais avec arpenter, cartographier, même des contrées à venir." (Mille Plateaux, pp.10-11; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.)

11. The principle of Connection, Deleuze and Guattari describe thus:
any point of a rhizome can be connected to any other, and must be. ... A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organisations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.7)

They explain the principle of Heterogeneity with reference to language, as follows:

Language is, in Weinreich's words, 'an essentially heterogeneous reality.'... A method of the rhizome type, can analyse language only by decentring it onto other dimensions and other registers. A language is never closed upon itself, except as a function of impotence. (A Thousand Plateaus, pp.7-8)

We can see that in both cases, both principles extend and expand upon each other. The possibility of a rhizome's multiple connections must involve its open-endedness. Language is merely an example of the rhizome's ability to connect various semiotic chains.
12. "ni sujet ni objet, mais seulement des déterminations, des grandeurs, des dimensions qui ne peuvent croître sans qu'elle change de nature (les lois de combinaison croissent donc avec la multiplicité)." (Mille Plateaux, p.14)

It is interesting to note further elaborations Deleuze and Guattari give of the term "multiplicity" in the later "plateau" named, '1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...'. Therein they write,

a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, not by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions it encompasses in "intension." (A Thousand Plateaus, p.245)

and,

a multiplicity is defined not by its elements, nor by a centre of unification or comprehension. It is defined by the number of dimensions it has; it is not divisible, it cannot lose or gain a dimension without changing its nature. Since its variations and dimensions are immanent to it, it amounts to the same thing to say that each multiplicity is already composed of heterogeneous terms in symbiosis, and that a multiplicity is continually transforming itself into a string of other multiplicities, according to its thresholds and doors. (A Thousand Plateaus, p.249; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.)

13. "Toutes les multiplicités sont plates en tant qu'elles remplissent, occupent toutes leurs dimensions: on parlera donc d'un plan de consistance de multiplicités, bien que ce «plan» soit à dimensions croissantes suivant le nombre de connexions qui s'établissent sur lui." (Mille Plateaux, p.15; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis)

14. "La ligne de fuite marque à la fois la réalité d'un nombre de dimensions finies que la multiplicité remplit effectivement;
l'impossibilité de toute dimension supplémentaire, sans que la multiplicité se transforme suivant cette ligne; la possibilité et la nécessité d'aplatis toutes ces multiplicités sur un même plan de consistance ou d'extériorité, quelles que soient leurs dimensions." (Mille Plateaux, p.16)

15. These themes are discussed in a commentary on a passage from Kant's Introduction to his third Critique, in Spring 1991 edition of PlI [formerly the Warwick Journal of Philosophy]. They are dealt with, again, in the following section.

16. "Ecrire, faire rhizome, accroître son territoire par déterritorialisation, étendre la ligne de fuite jusqu'au point où elle couvre tout le plan de consistance en une machine abstraite." (Mille Plateaux, p.19)

17. "un rhizome n'est justiciable d'aucun modèle structural ou génératif. Il est étranger à toute idée d'axe génétique, comme de structure profonde. Un axe génétique est comme une unité pivotale objective sur laquelle s'organisent des stades successifs; une structure profonde est plutôt comme une suite de base décomposable en constituants immédiats, tandis que l'unité du produit passe dans une autre dimension, transformationelle et subjective." (Mille Plateaux, p.19)

18. The motif of 'the trace' has an important role in contemporary Continental philosophy. Derrida uses the terms "trace" and "trace-structure" in his De la Grammatologie, collection « Critique » (Paris, Les éditions de Minuit: 1967) (Of Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1976)). These, however, translate la 'trace'; which refers to: the track, trail, weal, scar, or mark. The type of trace that one observes in a particle chamber; the tracks a wolf makes across the snow. Le calque refers to a tracing, a traced design; the type of tracing that a draughtsman makes of his design. Although the two terms seem to be slightly different in meaning, they come together in this description, for la trace becomes the outline of which le calque is the whole.
Derrida writes that, "The trace is in fact the absolute origin of sense in general. Which amounts to saying once again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general. The trace is the différence which opens appearance and signification." (Of Grammatology, p.65; Derrida's emphasis) In the understanding offered by Derrida, trace becomes valorised even in its production (and veiling of such production) of signification, and its attendant systems of heirarchy and order. The movement of the rhizome over that of the trace, will circumvent - or destroy - such hierarchies.

19. "Tout autre est le rhizome," they write, "carte et non pas calque. Faire la carte, et pas le calque." (Mille Plateaux, p.20; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

20. "Elle [la carte] concourt à la connexion des champs, au débloquage des corps sans organes, à leur ouverture maximum sur un plan de consistance. Elle fait elle-même partie du rhizome. La carte est ouverte, elle est connectable dans toutes ses dimensions, démontable, renversable, susceptible de recevoir constamment des modifications. Elle peut être déchirée, renversée, s'adapter à des montages de toute nature, être mise en chantier par un individu, un groupe, une formation sociale. On peut la dessiner sur un mur, la concevoir comme une œuvre d'art, la construire comme une action politique ou comme une méditation." (Mille Plateaux, p.20)

21. "Une carte est affaire de performance, tandis que le calque renvoie toujours à une "compétance" prétendue." (Mille Plateaux, p.20)


23. "Une carte ne comporte-t-elle pas des phénomènes de redondance qui sont déjà comme ses propres calques? Une multiplicité n'a-t-elle pas ses strates où s'enracinent des unifications et totalisations, des massifications, des mécanismes mimétiques, des prises de pouvoir signifiantes, des attributions subjectives? Même les lignes de fuite ne vont-elles pas reproduire, à la
faveur de leur divergence éventuelle, les formations qu'elles avaient pour fonction de défaire ou de tourner?" (Mille Plateaux, p.21)

24. "Il y a rupture dans le rhizome chaque fois que des lignes segmentaires explosent dans une ligne de fuite, mais le ligne de fuite fait partie du rhizome. Ces lignes ne cessent de se renvoyer les unes aux autres. C'est pourquoi on ne peut jamais se donner un dualisme ou une dichotomie, même sous la forme rudimentaire du bon et du mauvais." (Mille Plateaux, p.16)

25. "Etre rhizomorphe, c'est produire des tiges et filaments qui ont l'air de racines, ou mieux encore se connectent avec elles en pénétrant dans le tronc, quitte à les faire servir à de nouveaux usages étranges." (Mille Plateaux, pp.23-24)

26. "Ce qui compte, c'est que le arbre-racine et le rhizome-canal ne s'opposent pas comme deux modèles: l'un agit comme modèle et comme calque transcendants, même s'il engendre ses propres fuites; l'autre agit comme processus immanent qui renverse le modèle et ébauche une carte, même s'il construit sa propre biérarchies, même s'il suscite un canal despotique. ... Il s'agit du modèle, que ne cesse pas de s'ériger et de s'enfoncer, et du processus qui ne cesse pas de s'allonger, de se rompre et se reprendre." (Mille Plateaux, p.31)

27. The idea of a "project" has an ambiguous role in recent philosophical thought; an ambiguity that is encaptured in Georges Bataille's L'expérience intérieure, OEuvres complètes V (Paris, éditions Gallimard: 1973). For Bataille, the notion of a project involved order, homogeneity, and oppression, or in the terms employed by Deleuze and Guattari, subjectification, signification and organisation. A project - or, to project - embraces the notion of a determining end, or aim. Bataille's exhortation of the inner experience is designed to destroy such dialectical thinking. But - and it is at this point that Derrida's critique of Bataille takes hold - it could be argued that the urge to embrace inner experience (as opposed to discursive experience) is merely another project. Artaud's cruel, screaming theatre (as opposed to discursive drama) could suffer the same criticism. Bataille, however, has already encountered such criticism,
"Néanmoins l'expérience intérieure est projet..." he writes (*L'expérience intérieure*, p.35). He explains further:

> Elle l'est, l'homme l'étant en entier pas le langage qui par essence, exception faite de sa perversion poétique, est projet. Mais le projet n'est plus dans ce cas celui, positif, du salut, mais celui, negatif, d'abolir le pouvoir des mots, donc du projet.  
> (*L'expérience intérieure*, p.35)

The projection of Bataille's experience is based upon, again in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the possibility of the multiplicity of connections of that experience; his project does not define the aim of such experience, but, rather, articulates the myriad lines of flight that it can take. It is the same with Artaud's theatre: a cry does not represent a dramatic construction of a bodily function, but the written theatrification of such a function. What is the difference? The former is the empty production of paradigms, set to control and repress; the latter is the articulation of the destruction of such oppressive power. Bataille explains, "Car le projet est le prison dont je veux m'échapper (le projet, l'existence discursive); j'ai formé le projet d'échapper au projet!" (*L'expérience intérieure*, p.73)

Deleuze and Guattari make a similar move in *Mille Plateaux* in discussing their use of dualisms; they write, "Nous ne nous servons d'un dualisme de modèles que pour atteindre à un processus qui récuserait tout modèle." (*Mille Plateaux*, p.31). For Bataille and Deleuze and Guattari, not to mention Artaud, their projects, or models, serve as a type of user's manual. Not as a transcendent outline which thereby organises the contents, but as a type of map.

My cartography operates in the same way, as a sort of "walk this way...", which does not serve to show the dead Subject in all its rotting splendour, but which maps subjectivities whereby we no longer have to say The Subject.

28. "Non pas en arriver au point où l'on ne dit plus je, mais au point où ça n'a plus aucune importance de dire ou de ne pas dire je." (*Mille Plateaux*, p.9)
29. This notion of the role and power of æsthetic experience, is similar to that expounded by Schopenhauer. For him, to engage in æsthetic experience is to suspend all those psychological, epistemological and metaphysical mechanisms which perform individuation; thereby relieving the experiencing being from the pain which necessarily accompanies it as an individual subject.

30. Kant, I., Critique of Judgement, translated by J. C. Meredith [1928] (Oxford, Oxford University Press; 1952). Cf. also the following passage, wherein Kant elucidates the theory of the imagination under free-play, and the grounds for its summation under the critical structure:

If...we attach to a concept a representation of the imagination belonging to its presentation, but inducing solely on its own account such a wealth of thought as would never admit of comprehension in a definite concept, and, as a consequence, giving æsthetically an unbound expansion to the concept itself, then the imagination here displays a creative activity, and it puts the faculty of intellectual ideas (reason) into motion - a motion, at the instance of a representation, towards an extension of thought, that, while germane, no doubt, to the concept of the object, exceeds what can be laid hold of in that representation or clearly expressed. (Critique of Judgement, p.177)

31. "Il a généré, structuralisé le rhizome, et le calque ne reproduit déjà que lui-même quand il croit reproduire autre chose. C'est pourquoi il est si dangereux. Il injecte des redondances, et les propage. Ce que le calque reproduit de la carte ou du rhizome, c'en sont seulement les impasses, les blocages, les germes de pivot ou les points de structuration." (Mille Plateaux, p.21)

This is why we ponder the question, "What about language itself?" This is why we ask, "In what way does language occur as language?" We answer: Language speaks. Is this, seriously, the answer? ('Language', p.190)

and:

"Language is language." This statement does not lead us to something else in which language is grounded. Nor does it say anything about whether language itself may be a ground for something else. The sentence, "Language is language," leaves us to hover over an abyss as long as we endure what it says. ('Language', p.191)


CHAPTER TWO. 'TOPO-ANALYSIS':


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (*The Poetics of Space*, p. ...). The equivalent passage from the French edition will be quoted in the corresponding note.

2. "Il faut en venir, pour éclairer philosophiquement le problème de l'image poétique, à une phénoménologie de l'imagination. Entendons par là une étude du phénomène de l'image poétique quand l'image émerge dans le conscience comme un produit direct du coeur, de l'âme, de l'être de l'homme saisi dans son actualité." (*La Poétique de l'espace*, p.2)
3. In using this word, "phenomenology", and in dealing with the term throughout this chapter, I am interested neither in it as a Movement in the History of Philosophy, nor in Bachelard's relationship with such a Movement. Any criticism of Bachelard's "phenomenological" approach, will refer purely to Bachelard, as far as possible. For Bachelard's reaction to the phenomenological reduction, see notes 11 and 39, below.


5. Bachelard quotes the phenomenologist and psychologist, Eugène Minkowski, in the opening pages of *La Poétique de l'espace*. As a note in the translation of this text explains, Minkowski - following Bergson - described the vital force of human life, not as a feeling of existence, but "a feeling of participation in a flowing onward." (The Poetics of Space, p.xii, n.1) The editor/translator quotes the following passage from Minkowski's *Vers une Cosmologie*:

> If, having fixed the original form in our mind's eye, we ask ourselves how that form comes alive and fills with life, we discover a new dynamic and vital category, a new property of the universe: reverberation (retentir).... (loc. cit.)

Reverberation, then, exemplifies the dynamic quality of consciousness, not only for Minkowski, but for Bachelard too. My choice of the term "resonate" in this passage, reflects the sonic quality of Minkowski's metaphor quoted by Bachelard.

6. Bachelard interweaves many themes in *The Poetics of Space*, one of which is the nature of reading/writing. The relationship between poet and reader is referred to in the most detail in §iv of the introduction to *The Poetics of Space*; and is a major theme in Bachelard's *The Poetics of Reverie* (for edition details see note 9 below). A proper investigation of such a theme in Bachelard's work calls for more space than this thesis has to offer.

The imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still, at all events, it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. (p.167; Coleridge's emphases.)

It is easy to witness the influence of Kant (whom Coleridge calls "The venerable Sage of Koenigsberg..." at the beginning of this chapter) throughout this passage.


Although some of the themes I am dealing with in the present work, were present in the one mentioned above, they are now differently oriented and more thoroughly examined.

When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (*The Poetics of Reverie*, p....). The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note.

10. "il s'agissait de mettre en pleine lumière la prise de conscience d'un sujet émerveillé par les images poétiques." (*La Poétique de la rêverie*, p.1)

11. "Et c'est ainsi que j'ai choisi la phénoménologie dans l'espoir de réexaminer d'un regard neuf les images fidèlement aimées, si solidement fixées dans ma mémoire que je ne sais plus si je me souviens ou si j'Imagine quand je les retrouve en mes rêveries." (*La Poétique de la rêverie*, p.2)

12. "elle revient à mettre l'accent sur leur vertu d'origine, à saisir l'être même de leur originalité et à bénéficier ainsi de l'insigne productivité psychique qui est celle de l'imagination." (*La Poétique de la rêverie*, p.2)

13. "Un philosophe reste, comme on dit aujourd'hui, « en situation philosophique », il a parfois la prétention de tout commencer; mais, hélas! il continue... Il a lu tant de livres de philosophie! Sous prétexte de les étudier, de les enseigner, il a déformé tant de « systèmes »! Quand le soir est venu, quand il n'enseigne plus, il croit avoir le droit de s'enfermer dans le système de son choix." (*La Poétique de la rêverie*, p.2)

14. "Pour nous, toute prise de conscience est un accroissement de conscience, une augmentation de lumière, un renforcement de la cohérence psychique. Sa rapidité ou son instantanéité peuvent nous masquer la croissance. Mais il y a croissance d'être dans toute prise de conscience."
La conscience, à elle seule, est un acte, l'acte humain. C'est un acte vif, un acte plein. Même si l'action qui suit, qui devait suivre, qui aurait dû suivre reste suspendue, l'acte conscienciel a sa pleine positivité. Cet acte, nous ne l'étudierons, dans le présent essai, que dans le domaine du langage, plus précisément encore, dans le langage poétique, quand la conscience imaginante crée et vit l'image poétique." (La Poétique de la rêverie, p.5)

15. "Nous voulons examiner, en effet, des images bien simples, les images de l'espace heureux. Nos enquêtes méritereraient, dans cette orientation, le nom de topophilie. Elles visent à déterminer la valeur humaine des espaces de possession, des espaces défendus contre des forces adverses, des espaces aimés. Pour des raisons souvent très diverses et avec les différences que comportent les nuances poétiques, ce sont des espaces louangés." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.17; Bachelard's emphases)

16. "La topo-analyse serait donc l'étude psychologique systématique des sites de notre vie intime. Dans ce théâtre du passé qu'est notre mémoire, le décor maintient les personnages dans leur rôle dominant. On croit parfois se connaître dans le temps, alors qu'on ne connaît qu'une suite de fixations dans des espaces de la stabilité de l'être, d'un être qui ne veut pas s'écouler, qui, dans le passer même quand il s'en va à la recherche du temps perdu, veut « suspendre » le vol du temps. Dans ses mille alvéoles, l'espace tient du temps comprimé. L'espace sert à ça." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.27)

17. "Psychologie descriptive, psychologie des profondeurs, psychanalyse et phénoménologie pourraient, avec le maison, constituer le corps de doctrines que nous désignons sous le nom de topo-analyse." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.18)

18. "Examinée dans les horizons théoriques le plus divers, il semble que l'image de la maison devienne la topographie de notre être intime....Non seulement nos souvenirs, mais nos oubli sont « logés ». Notre inconscient est « logé ». Notre âme est une demeure." (La Poétique de l'espace, pp.18,19)
19. With respect to the notion of day-dreaming and the house, as articulated in \textit{The Poetics of Space}, please note the following passage: "If I were asked to name the chief benefit of the house, I should say: the house shelters daydreaming, the house protects the dreamer, the house allows one to dream in peace." p.6 ["si l'on nous demandait le bienfait le plus précieux de la maison, nous dirions: la maison abrite la rêverie, la maison protège le rêveur, la maison nous permet de rêver en paix." \textit{(La Poétique de l'espace}, pp.25-26)]

20. "Monter l'escalier dans la maison du mot c'est, de degré en degré, abstraire. Descendre à la cave, c'est rêver, c'est se perdre dans les lointains couloirs d'une étymologie incertaine, c'est chercher dans les mots des trésors introuvables. Monter et descendre, dans les mots mêmes, c'est la vie du poète. Monter trop haut, descendre trop bas est permit au poète qui joint le terrestre à l'aérien. Seul le philosophe sera-t-il condamné par ses pairs à vivre toujours au rez-de-chaussée?" \textit{(La Poétique de l'espace}, p.139)

Such a passage has reverberations in a recent commentary on the work of Deleuze (and Guattari). In his examination of délire and language, \textit{Philosophy through the Looking-Glass. Language, nonsense, desire} (London, Hutchinson & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.: 1985), Jean-Jacques Lecercle writes the following:

Satire is concerned with the depth of primary order, it deals with insults and obscenities, and regresses to oral aggressive sex, to excrement and food: it is the art of regression, and Swift, the famous satirist, is also the author of the infamous poems to Stella. But irony is the art of heights: its game of equivocation and metaphor is controlled by an all-mastering subject; it is a form of domination where the subject is placed in the elevated position of a God. Humour, however, forces the subject to creep along the ground, on the surface: not going down to the satirical incoherence of depth, where objects are dismembered, but clinging to
the discreet absurdity of surfaces, where sense rules over the serious game of paradoxes, and negation no longer denies but only confuses: the place where Alice can no longer say whether meaning what one says and saying what one means are two different acts, where time has stopped and little girls forget their names. (p.112)

Though the spaces of this passage do not fit those of Bachelard's like a template, I think that where they do ooze into each other provides an interesting reading. Lecercle provides another territorialisation in terms of depth-surface-height schema introduced above, but this time with reference to philosophers (and following Deleuze):

Pre-socratics = Philosophers of Depth = language of desire and primary order;
Megarics and Stoics = Philosophers of Surface = language is organised but not tied to signification and communication, therefore more poetic;
Platonists = Philosophers of Height = tertiary order of language, where signification, communication and expression rule.

Yet translated into the terms of Bachelard's house, we can see that such a schema still exhibits a rigid reterritorialisation. Each group is allowed its own space in the rational system - even if it is outside or on the margins of that system. The Platonists merely steal a glance up the stairs and say, "Oh, look up there! You can almost see the sun shining through the skylight. I think that the attic looks like this...." The Pre-Socratics only chance a peek into the cellar; the odd madman has taken the plunge - Empedocles for example - but their fear of the dark becomes philosophically valorised as such. The Stoics, however, are content to roll around on the dusty floorboards, without the need to imagine depths or heights, with only the comfort of surface events. Bachelard's dream is for free movement throughout the system, and eventually beyond the limits of such a system. Lecercle proposes the destruction of the system of language/philosophy along the lines of flight of the madman, of the delirious. Bachelard begins his dissolution of the rational boundaries of the house with an elitist
vision of imaginative power, but we will come to see his destructive aspects take on those of the delirious.

21. "Pour accompagner la psychanalyse dans cette action salutaire, il faudrait entreprendre une topo-analyse de tous les espaces qui nous appellent hors de nous-mêmes." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.29)


23. In my 'Spaced-out Subject', (see note 8 above) I analyse the house of George Perec's La Vie mode d'emploi (Paris, Hachette: 1970). It is as fluid and soft as Bachelard's becomes under topo-analysis, and its subject-construction becomes accordingly fluid.

24. "Quel que soit le pôle de la dialectique où le rêveur se situe, que ce soit le maison ou l'univers, le dialectique se dynamise. La maison et l'univers ne sont pas simplement deux espaces juxtaposés." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.55)

25. "Envers et contre tout, la maison nous aide à dire: je serai un habitant du monde, malgré le monde. Le problème n'est pas seulement un problème de l'être, c'est un problème d'énergie et par conséquent de contre-énergie.

Dans cette communauté dynamique de l'homme et de la maison, dans cette rivalité dynamique de la maison et de l'univers, nous sommes loin de toute référence aux simples formes géométriques. La maison vécue n'est pas une boîte inerte. L'espace habité transcende l'espace géométrique." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.58)
26. "Le maison est donc bien un instrument de topo-analyse. C'est un instrument très efficace précisément parce qu'il est d'un usage difficile." (La Poétique de l'espace, pp.58-59)

27. "Ma maison [...] est diaphane, mais non pas de verre. Elle serait plutôt de la nature de la vapeur. Ses murs se condensent et se relâchent suivant mon désir. Parfois, je les serre autour de moi, telle une armure d'isolation... Mais parfois, je laisse les murs de ma maison s'épanouir dans leur espace propre, qui est l'extensibilité infinie." (quoted, La Poétique de l'espace, p.61)

28. "Les espaces qu'on aime ne veulent pas toujours être enfermés! Ils se déploient. On dirait qu'ils se transportent aisément ailleurs, en d'autres temps, dans des plans différents de rêves et de souvenirs." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.63)


30. "Il apparaîtrait alors clairement que les œuvres d'art sont les sous-produits de cet existentialisme de l'être imaginant. Dans cette voie de la rêverie d'immensité, le véritable produit, c'est la conscience aggrandissement." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.169; Bachelard's emphasis.)

31. "L'arbre a toujours un destin de grandeur. Ce destin il le propage. L'arbre agrandit ce qui l'entoure". And the quotation from Rilke: "Ces arbres sont magnifiques, mais plus magnifiques encore l'espace sublime et pathétique entre eux, comme si avec leur croissance il augmentait aussi." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.183)

32. "Dès qu'un espace est une valeur - et y a-t-il plus grande valeur que l'intimité? - il grandit. L'espace valorisé est un verbe; jamais en nous ou
hors de nous la grandeur n'est un « objet »." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.183)

33. "Le philosophe de l'espace se met lui-même à rêver. Si l'on aime les mots de métaphysique composée, ne peut-on pas dire que Joë Bousquet vient de nous révéler un espace-substance, le miel-espace ou l'espace miel? A chaque matière sa localisation. A chaque substance son existence. A chaque matière la conquête de son espace, sa puissance d'expansion au delà des surfaces par lesquelles un géomètre voudrait la définir." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.184)

34. "Ce théorème d'anthropologie esthétique est énoncé avec une telle netteté qu'on sent poindre un théorème corrélatif qu'on pourrait exprimer en ces termes: Tout sentiment qui nous grandit planifie notre situation dans le monde." (La Poétique de l'espace, pp.184-185)

35. "Je suis toujours ailleurs, un ailleurs flottant, fluide. Longuement absent de moi-même, et présent nulle part, j'accorde trop facilement l'inconsistance de mes rêveries aux espaces illimités qui les favorisent." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.185)

36. "La métaphysique la plus profonde s'est ainsi enracinée dans une géométrie implicite, dans une géométrie qui - qu'on le veuille ou non - spatialisé la pensée; si le métaphysicien ne dessinait pas, penserait-il?" (La Poétique de l'espace, p.191)

37. "On fait passer au rang d'absolu la dialectique de l'ici et du là. On donne à ces pauvres adverbes de lieu des puissances de détermination ontologique mal surveillées. Bien des métaphysiques demanderaient une cartographie. Mais, en philosophie, toutes les facilités se paient et le savoir philosophique s'engage mal à partir d'expériences schématisées." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.192; Bachelard's emphases.)

38. "Étudions d'un peu plus près cette cancérisation géométrique du tissu linguistique de la philosophie contemporaine." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.192)
39. The role of expansion and amplification have important consequences for Bachelard's notion of phenomenology. Note the following passage from the chapter in question:

Aussitôt, le gain phénoménologique apparaît: en prologuant l'exagéré, on a en effet quelque chance d'échapper aux habitudes de la réduction. A propos des images de l'espace, on est précisément dans une région où la réduction est facile, commune. On trouvera toujours quelqu'un pour effacer toute complication et pour nous obliger de partir dès qu'on parle d'espace - que soit d'une manière figurée ou non - de l'opposition du dehors et du dedans. Mais si la réduction est facile, l'exagération n'en est que phénoménologiquement plus intéressante. (La Poétique de l'espace, p.197; Bachelard's emphases)

Even though, on one hand Bachelard performs a reduction - in his desire to treat the poetic image in itself, as a cypher for consciousness in itself - the outcome of such a treatment is expansion, not only of his philosophical method, but of his notions of consciousness and subjectivity too.

40. Coincidentally, this is the same Henri Michaux who describes the schizophrenic table, quoted in the opening section of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-OEdipus, (pp.6-7) [L'Anti OEdipe, (pp.12-13)].

41. "Prenons toute la leçon philosophique que nous donne le poète. De quoi s'agit-il dans une telle page? D'une âme qui a perdu son « être-là », d'une âme qui va jusqu'à déchoir de l'être de son ombre pour passer, comme un vain bruit, comme une rumeur insituable dans les on-dit de l'être." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.195)

42. "C'est tout l'espace-temps de l'être équivoque que Michaux nous donne comme a priori de l'être. Dans cet espace équivoque, l'esprit a perdu sa patrie géométrique et l'âme flotte." (La Poétique de l'espace, pp.196-197)
43. "Ce qui est frappant ici, s'instruit par le brève même de l'image, au niveau d'une image qui trouble les notions d'une spatialité communément considérée comme susceptible de réduire les troubles et rendre l'esprit à son statut d'indifférence devant un espace qui n'a pas localiser les drames." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.197)

44. "Il est dangereux quand on s'exprime de « travailler de la racine ».
Précisément, la phénoménologie de l'imagination poétique nous permet d'explorer l'être de l'homme comme l'être d'une surface...." (La Poétique de l'espace, p.199; Bachelard's emphasis.)

CHAPTER THREE: 'SPACES'.


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (Anti-OEdipus, p....). The equivalent passage from the French edition will be quoted in the corresponding footnote.

2. Deleuze and Guattari explain such a movement in anthropological terms. The Primitive Territorial Machine, they say, is a machine for declining alliances and filiations. Filiation and alliance are described thus:

Filiation is administrative and hierarchical, but alliance is political and economic, and expresses power insofar as it is not fused with the hierarchy and cannot be deduced from it, and the economy insofar as it is not identical with administration. Filiation and alliance are like two forms of primitive capital: fixed capital or filiative stock, and circulating capital or mobile blocks of debts. (Anti-OEdipus, p.146)
(La filiation est administrative et hiérarchique, mais l'alliance, politique et économique, et exprime le pouvoir en tant qu'il ne se confonde pas avec la hiérarchie ni ne s'en déduit, l'économie en tant qu'elle ne se confonde pas avec l'administration. Filiation et alliance sont comme les deux formes d'un capital primitif, capital fixe ou stock filiatif, capital circulant ou blocs mobiles de dettes. (L'Anti OEdipe, p.172))

We can see that filiation and alliance are explained in terms of processes that take place on the plane of consistency: Stocks and Blocks describe ways of organising the flows on the plane. All in all, the Primitive Machine territorialises by organising filiative and alliance systems, thus compounding the full body of the earth - blocking and taking stock of the flows on the surface of the territory, works also to this end. The relevance this has with respect to our discussion, is in the relationship Deleuze and Guattari show exists between the movement of territorialisation and the entrenchment of certain forms of hierarchical structures.

3. "C'est en même temps que les flux sont décodés et axiomatisés par le capitalisme. La schizophrénie n'est donc pas l'identité du capitalisme, mais au contraire sa différence, son écart et sa mort." (L'Anti OEdipe, p.293; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

4. "La schizophrénie au contraire est bien la limite absolue, qui fait passer les flux à l'état libre sur un corps sans organes désocialisé. On peut donc dire que la schizophrénie est la limite extérieure du capitalisme lui-même ou le terme de sa plus profonde tendance, ou de repousser et de déplacer cette limite, en y substituant ses propres limites relatives immanentes qu'il ne cesse de reproduire à une échelle élargie. Ce qu'il décide d'une main, il l'axiomatis e de l'autre." (L'Anti OEdipe, p.292; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.)

4a. "L'Etat est alors déterminé à jouer un rôle de plus en plus important dans la régulation des flux axiomatisés, tant à l'égard de la production et
de sa planification que de l'économie et de sa « monétarisation », de la plus-value et de son absorption (par l'appareil d'État lui-même).” (L'Anti OEdipe, p.301)


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p....). The relevant passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding footnote.

6."Le lisse et le strié se distinguent en premier lieu par la rapport inverse du point et de la ligne (la ligne entre deux points dans le cas du strié, le point entre deux lignes dans le lisse). En second lieu, par la nature de la ligne (lisse-directionnelle, intervalles ouvertes; strié-dimensionnelle, intervalles fermé). Il y a enfin une troisième différence concernant la surface ou l'espace. Dans l'espace strié on ferme une surface, et on la « répartit » suivant des intervalles déterminés, d'après des coupures assignées; dans le lisse, on se « distribue » sur un espace ouvert, d'après des fréquences et le long des parcours (logos et nomos)." (Mille Plateaux, p.600)

In a later section of this "plateau" Deleuze and Guattari provide a mathematical model for the determination of smooth and striated space. They write:

(1) we shall call striated or metric any aggregate with a whole number of dimensions, and for which it is possible to assign constant directions; (2) nonmetric smooth space is constituted by the construction of a line with a fractional number of dimensions greater than one, or of a surface with a fractional number of dimensions greater than two; (3) a fractional number of
dimensions is the index of a properly directional space (with continuous variation in direction, and without tangent); (4) what defines smooth space, then, is that it does not have a dimension higher than that which moves through it or is inscribed in it; in this sense it is a flat multiplicity, for example, a line that fills a plane without ceasing to be a line; (5) space and that which occupies space tend to become identified, to have the same power, in the anexact yet rigorous form of the numbering number or nonwhole number (occupy without counting); (6) a smooth, amorphous space of this kind is constituted by an accumulation of proximities, and each accumulation defines a zone of indiscernibility proper to "becoming" (more than a line and less than a surface; less than a volume and more than a surface). (A Thousand Plateaus, p.488; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis)

(1) on appellera strié ou métrique tout ensemble ayant un nombre entier de dimensions, et où l'on peut assigner de constantes directions; 2) l'espace lisse non métrique se constitue par construction d'une ligne de dimension fractionnaire supérieure à 1, d'une surface de dimension fractionnaire supérieure à 2; 3) le nombre fractionnaire de dimensions est l'indice d'un espace proprement directionnel (à variation continue de direction, sans tangente); 4) l'espace lisse se définit dès lors en ce qu'il n'a pas de dimension supplémentaire à ce qui le parcourt ou s'inscrit en lui: c'est en ce sens une multiplicité plate, par exemple une ligne que remplit en tant que telle un plan; 5) l'espace lui-même et ce qui occupe l'espace tendent à s'identifier, à avoir même puissance...; 6) un tel espace lisse, amorphe, se constitue par accumulation de voisinages, et chaque accumulation définit une zone d'indiscernabilité propre au "devenir"
Notes

(plus qu'une ligne et moins qu'une surface, moins qu'un volume et plus qu'une surface). (Mille Plateaux, p.609; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

Though this passage is resplendent with references to the mathematical theory of "fractals", I think that its importance viz. the smooth-striated distinction is still apparent.

7. "Le trajetnomade...il distribue les hommes (ou les bêtes) dans un espace ouvert, indéfini, non communiquant ... Le nomade se distribue dans un espace lisse, il occupe, il habite, il tient cet espace, et c'est là son principe territorial." (Mille Plateaux, p.472; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis)

8. Notice the following quotation from Henri Lefebvre's The Production of Space, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford UK and Cambridge USA, Basil Blackwell: 1991), concerning the relationship between the State and space:

What, then, is the state? According to the 'politicologists', it is a framework - that of a power which makes decisions in such a way as to ensure that the interests of certain minorities, of certain classes or fractions of classes, are imposed upon society - so effectively imposed, in fact, that they become indistinguishable from the general interest. Fair enough, but we must not forget that the framework in question is a spatial one. If no account is taken of this spatial framework, and of its strength, we are left with a state that is simply a rational unity - in other words, we revert to Hegelianism. Without the concepts of space and of its production, the framework of power (whether as reality or concept) simply cannot achieve concreteness. We are speaking of a space where centralized power sets itself above other power and eliminates it; where a self-proclaimed 'sovereign' nation pushes aside any other nationality, often
crushing it in the process; where a state religion bars all other religions; and where a class in power claims to have suppressed all class differences. The relationship between institutions other than the state itself (for instance, university, tax authority, judiciary) and the effectiveness of those institutions has no need of the mediation of the concept of space to achieve self-representation, for the space in which they function is governed by statute (and regulations for their enforcement) which fall within the political space of the state. By contrast the state framework, and the state as framework, cannot be conceived of without reference to the instrumental space that they make use of. Indeed each new form of state, each new form of political power, introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes; and the fact that space should thus become classificatory makes it possible for a certain type of non-critical thought simply to register the resultant 'reality' and accept it at face value. (p.281; Lefebvre's emphases.)

This passage has many resonances with the structure of the state we have already encountered viz. Deleuze and Guattari - not to mention many dissonances. The most striking similarity must be the conception of the state as a spatial framework, whose primary function is the classification (overcoding) of its constituents in the name of an imperialist despotism.

9. "Si le nomade peut être appelé le Déterritorialisé par excellence, c'est justement parce que la reterritorialisation ne se fait pas après comme chez le migrant, ni sur autre chose comme chez le sédentaire (en effet, le sédentaire a un rapport avec la terre médiatisé par autre chose, régime de propriété, appareil d'Etat...). Pour le nomade, au contraire, c'est la déterritorialisation qui constitue le rapport à la terre, si bien qu'il se
reterritorialise sur la déterritorialisation même. C'est la terre qui se
déterritorialise elle-même, de telle manière que le nomade y trouve un
territoire." (Mille Plateaux, p.473; Deleuze and Guattari's emphases.)

10. "Et pourtant nous retrouvons toujours une nécessité dissymétrique, de
passer du lisse au strié, comme du strié au lisse. ... Or traduire n'est
pas un acte simple: il ne suffit pas de remplacer le mouvement par l'espace
parcouru, il faut une série d'opérations riches et complexes.... Traduire
n'est pas un acte secondaire. C'est un opération qui consiste sans doute à
dompter, à surcoder, à métiriser l'espace lisse, à le neutraliser, mais
aussi bien à lui donner un milieu de propagation, d'extension, de
réfraction, de renouvellement, de poussée, sans lequel il mourrait peut-
être de lui-même." (Mille Plateaux, pp.606-607; Deleuze and Guattari's
emphasiS.)

11. "Chaque fois donc, l'opposition simple « lisse-strié » nous renvoie à
des complications, à des alternances et à des superpositions beaucoup plus
difficiles. Mais ces complications confirment d'abord la distinction,
justement parce qu'elles mettent en jeu des mouvements dissymétriques. Pour
le moment, il faudrait seulement dire qu'il y a deux sortes de voyage, qui
se distinguent par le rôle respectif du point, de la ligne et de l'espace."
(Mille Plateaux, p.601)

12. "C'est à propos de ces nomades qu'on peut dire, comme le suggère
Toynbee: ils ne bougent pas. Ils sont nomades à force de ne pas bouger, de
ne pas migrer, de tenir un espace lisse qu'ils refusent de quitter, et
qu'ils ne quittent que pour conquérir et mourir." (Mille Plateaux, p.602;
Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

13. This notion of a "picaresque-in-place" is especially well exemplified
Where the adventures described throughout the novel are articulated
according to the structure of the house in which the story is based. This
does not attest to a striation of the space of the novel, for as we saw in
the chapter in which I discussed the image of the house with respect to
Bachelard, a topo-analysis of the house explodes the limits of the house.

14. "Le mouvement désigne le caractère relatif d'un corps considéré comme « un », et qui va d'un point à un autre; la vitesse au contraire constitue le caractère absolu d'un corps dont les parties irréductibles (atomes) occupent ou remplissent un espace lisse à la façon d'un toubillon, avec possibilité de surgir en un point quelconque." (Mille Plateaux, p.473; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

15. In his book, Philosophy through the Looking-Glass: Language, nonsense, desire (London, Hutchinson and Co. (Publishers) Ltd.: 1985), Jean-Jacques Lecercle - writing of Deleuze's Logique du Sens, collection « Critique » (Paris, éditions de Minuit: 1967) - states, "The only adequate instrument for an assessment of Deleuze is pastiche." (p.113) Pastiche does for the criticism of literature what the rhizome does for root-systems. Pastiche follows the twists and turns of a way of writing, breaking out of those turns to follow a different course, all the while creating another form of writing. The machine productive of pastiche also produces maps; pastiche and cartography operate on/in a common space.

16. "est abstrait en un tout autre sens, précisément parce qu'elle est d'orientation multiple, et passe entre les points, les figures et les contours: sa motivation positive dans l'espace lisse qu'elle trace, et non dans le striage qu'elle opérerait pour conjurer l'angoisse et se subordonner le lisse. La ligne abstrait est l'affect des espaces lisses, et non le sentiment d'angoisse qui appelle au striage." (Mille Plateaux, p.620; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)

CHAPTER FOUR: 'SUBJECTIFICATION'.

When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the form: *(Les trois écologies, p....).* The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note. The English translations thus cited are *my own* (for references to the English translation of part of this text, see note 12 below).

2. Kant's *Critique of Judgement* is discussed in a special issue of the journal *Elle* (Spring 1991). The section, "Snapshots" of Kant's *Critique of Judgement*, provides short commentaries on section ix of the Introduction to this text, by Will McNeill, Diane Beddoes, Jamie Brassett, Douglas Burnham, Nicholas Blincoe. The comments made in this chapter of my thesis concerning Kant's Judgement, are a précis of those made in the above mentioned article.


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the form: *(Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p....).* The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note. The English translations thus cited are *my own*.

5. "C'est la rapport de la subjectivité avec son extériorité - qu'elle soit sociale, animale, végétale, cosmique - qui se trouve ainsi compromis dans une sorte de mouvement général d'implosion et d'infantilisation régressive. L'altérité tend à prendre toute aspérité." *(Les trois écologies, p.12)*

6. "Il n'y aura de réponse véritable à la crise écologique qu'à l'échelle planétaire et à la condition que s'opère une authentique révolution politique, sociale et culturelle réorientant les objectifs de la production des biens matériels et immatériels." *(Les trois écologies, pp.13-14)*
7. "Cette révolution ne devra donc pas concerner uniquement les rapports de forces visibles à grande échelle mais également des domaines moléculaires de sensibilité, d'intelligence et de désir." (Les trois écosologies, p.14)

8. "L'écosophie sociale consistera donc à développer des pratiques spécifiques tendant à modifier et à réinventer des façons d'être au sein du couple, au sein de la famille, du contexte urbain, du travail, etc. ... Mais il s'agira littéralement de reconstruire l'ensemble des modalités de l'être-en-groupe. Et cela pas seulement par des interventions « communicationnelles » mais par des mutations existentialles portant sur l'essence de la subjectivité." (Les trois écosologies, p.22)

9. "De son côté, l'écosophie mentale sera amenée à ré-inventer le rapport de sujet au corps, au fantasme, au temps qui passe, aux « mystères » de la vie et de la mort. Elle sera amenée à chercher des antidotes à l'uniformation mass-médiaétique et télematique, au conformisme des modes, aux manipulations de l'opinion par la publicité, les sondages, etc." (Les trois écosologies, pp.22-23)

10. "L'instauration à long terme d'immenses zones de misère, de famine et de mort semble désormais faire partie intégrante du monstrueux système de « stimulation » du Capitalisme Mondial Intégré." (Les trois écosologies, p.17)

11. "de serrer d'un peu plus près les implications d'une telle perspective écosophique sur la conception de la subjectivité." (Les trois écosologies, p.23)


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the form: ('The Three Ecologies', p....). The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note (any modifications of the translations, will be noted in the reference given in the text).
13. "Mais plutôt que de sujet, peut-être conviendrait-il de parler de composantes de subjectivation travaillant chacune plus ou moins à leur propre compte." (Les trois élogies, p.24)

14. "Ces vecteurs de subjectivation ne passent pas nécessairement par l'individu; lequel, en réalité, se trouve en position de « terminal » à l'égard de processus impliquant des groups humaines, des ensembles socio-économiques, des machines informationelles, etc. Ainsi, l'interiorité s'instaure-t-elle au carrefour de multiples composantes relativement autonomes les unes par rapport aux autres et, le cas échéant, franchement discordantes." (Les trois élogies, p.24)

It is interesting to note that, as we saw with respect to Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari have much to say on the relevance of vectors in their philosophy.

15. Guattari's discussions of the scientistic super-ego occur not only in Les trois élogies but in Cartographies schizoanalytiques as well. As such, an examination of this concept appears later in this chapter.

16. "Le préalable à toute relance de l'analyse - par example, la schizoanalyse - consiste à admettre qu'en règle générale, et pour peu qu'on s'attache à les travailler, les Agencements subjectifs individuels et collectifs sont potentiellement aptes à se développer et à proliférer loin de leurs équilibres ordinaires. Leurs cartographies analytiques débordent donc par essence les Territoires existentiels auxquels elles sont affectées. Aussi devrait-il en aller, avec ces cartographies, comme en peinture ou en littérature, domaines au sein desquels chaque performance concrète a la vocation d'évoluer, d'innover, d'inaugurer des ouvertures prospectives, sans que leurs auteurs puissent se prévaloir de fondements théoriques assurés ou de l'autorité d'un groupe, d'une école, d'une conservatoire ou d'une académie... Work in progress! Fin des catéchismes psychanalytiques, comportamentalistes ou systématistes." (Les trois élogies, pp.29-30)
17. "Les rapports de l'humanité au socius, à la psyché et à la « nature » tendent, en effet, à se détériorer de plus en plus, pas seulement en raison de nuisances et de pollutions objectives mais aussi du fait d'une méconnaissance et d'une passivité fataliste des individus et des pouvoirs à l'égard de ces questions considérées dans leur ensemble." (Les trois écoLOGIES, p.31)

18. "Il n'est pas juste de séparer l'action sur la psyché, le socius et l'environnement. Le refus de regarder en face les dégradations de ces trois domaines, tel qu'il est entretenu par les médias, confine à une entreprise d'infantilisation de l'opinion et de neutralisation destructive de la démocratie... il conviendrait désormais d'appréhender le monde à travers les trois verres interchangeables que constituent nos trois points de vues écologiques." (Les trois écoLOGIES, p.32)

19. "À l'évidence, une prise en charge et une gestion plus collective s'imposent pour orienter les sciences et les techniques vers des finalités plus humaines. On ne peut s'en remettre aveuglément aux technocrates des appareils d'État pour contrôler les évolutions et conjurer les risques dans ces domaines, régis, pour l'essentiel, par les principes de l'économie de profit." (Les trois écoLOGIES, pp.32-33)

20. "La solidarité internationale n'est plus assumée que par des associations humanitaires alors qu'il fut un temps où elle concernait au premier chef les syndicats et les parties de gauche. De son côté, le discours marxiste s'est dévalué. (Pas le texte de Marx qui, lui, conserve une très grande valeur.)... Non seulement les espèces disparaissent mais les mots, les phrases, les gestes de la solidarité humaine." (Les trois écoLOGIES, p.35)

21. "Au fait que s'y trouve impliquée une logique différente de celle qui régit la communication ordinaire entre locuteurs et auditeurs et, du même coup, l'intelligibilité des ensembles discursifs et l'emboîtement indéfini des champs de signification." (Les trois écoLOGIES, p.36; Guattari's emphasis.)
22. "Cette logique des intensités, qui s'applique aux Agencements existentiels autoréférents et engagement des durées irréversibles, ne concerne pas seulement les sujets humains constitués en corps totalisés mais aussi tous les objets partis, au sens psychanalytique .... Alors que la logique des ensembles discursifs se propose de bien cerner ses objets, la logique des intensités, ou l'écologique, ne prend en compte que le mouvement, l'intensité des processus évolutifs." (Les trois écologies, p.36)

23. "À chaque foyer existentiel partiel, les praxis écologiques s'efforceront de repérer les vecteurs potentiels de subjectivation et de singularisation." (Les trois écologies, p.37)

24. "Là est le coeur de toutes praxis écologiques: les ruptures a-signifiantes, les catalyseurs existentiels sont à portée de main, mais en l'absence d'Agencement d'énonciation, qui leur donne un support expressif,..." (Les trois écologies, p.37)

25. "En tous lieux et à toutes époques, l'art et la religion ont été le refuge des cartographies existentielles fondées sur une assumption de certaines ruptures de sens « existentialisantes ». Mais l'époque contemporaine, en exacerbant la production de biens matériels et immatériels, au détriment de la consistance des Territoires existentiels individuels et de groupe, a engendré un immense vide dans la subjectivité qui tend à devenir de plus en plus absurde et sans recours." (Les trois écologies, p.39)

26. "Une telle remontée de ce qu'on pourrait appeler un conservatisme subjectif n'est pas uniquement imputable au renforcement de la répression sociale; elle tient également à une sorte de crispation existentielle impliquant l'ensemble des acteurs sociaux." (Les trois écologies, p.40)

27. "Le capitalisme post-industriel que, pour ma part, je préfère qualifier de Capitalisme Mondial Intégré (CMI) tend de plus en plus à décentrer ses foyers de pouvoir des structures de production de biens et de services vers les structures productrices de signes, de syntaxe et de subjectivité, par
le biais, tout particulièrement, du contrôle qu'il exerce sur les médias, la publicité, les sondages, etc.

"Il y a là une évolution qui devrait nous amener à réfléchir sur ce que furent, à cet égard, les formes antérieures du capitalisme, car elles n'étaient pas non plus exemptes d'une telle propension à capitaliser du pouvoir subjectif dans les rangs de ses élites aussi bien que dans ceux de ses prolétaires." (Les trois écologies, pp.40-41)

28. "Elle ne devrait jamais perdre de vue que le pouvoir capitaliste s'est délocalisé, déterritorialisé, à la fois en extension, en étendant son emprise sur l'ensemble de la vie sociale, économique et culturelle de planète et, en «intension» en s'infiltrant au sein des strates subjectives les plus inconscientes." (Les trois écologies, pp.43-44)

29. "Espérons qu'une recomposition et un recadrage des finalités des luttes émancipatoires deviendront, au plus tôt, corrélatifs du développement des trois types de praxis éco-logiques évoqués ici." (Les trois écologies, p.43)

30. "La subjectivité capitaliste, telle qu'elle est engendrée par des opérateurs de toutes natures et de toute tailles, se trouve manufacturée de façon à prévenir l'existence contre toute intrusion d'événements susceptibles de déranger et de perturber l'opinion. Selon elle, toute singularité devrait soit être évitée, soit passer sous la coupe d'équipements et de cadres de référence spécialisés. Ainsi elle s'efforce de gérer le monde de l'enfance, de l'amour, de l'art aussi bien que tout ce qui est de l'ordre de l'angoisse, de la folie, de la douleur, de la mort, du sentiment d'être égaré dans le cosmos... C'est à partir des données existentielles le plus personnelles - on devrait même dire infra-personnelles - que le CMI constitue ses agrégats subjectifs massifs, accrochés à la race, à la nation, au corps professionnel, à la compétition sportive, à la virilité dominatrice, à la star mass-médiatique... En s'assurant du pouvoir sur le maximum de ritournelles existentielles pour les contrôler et les neutraliser, la subjectivité capitaliste se grise, s'anesthésie elle-même, dans un sentiment collectif de pseudo-éternité." (Les trois écologies, pp.44-45)
31. "Il convient de laisser se déployer les cultures particulières tout en inventant d'autres contrats de citoyenneté. Il convient de faire tenir ensemble la singularité, l'exception, la rarité avec un ordre étatique le moins pesant possible." (Les trois éco Logies, p.46)

32. "Le principe commun aux trois élogies consiste donc en ceci que les Territoires existentiels auxquels elles nous confrontent ne se donnent pas comme en-soi, fermé sur lui-même, mais comme pour-soi précaire, fini, finitisé, singulier, singularisé, capable de bifurquer en réitérations stratifiées et mortifères ou en ouverture processuelle à partir de praxis permettant de le rendre « habitable » par un projet humain." (Les trois éco Logies, p.49)

33. "Le principe spécifique à l'éco Logie mentale réside en ce que son abord des Territoires existentiels relève d'une logique pré-objectale et pré-personnelle évoquant ce que Freud a décrit comme étant un « processus primaire »." (Les trois éco Logies, p.50)

34. "A tout moment, en tous lieux, la question de l'éco Logies mentale peut surgir, par-delà des ensembles bien constitués, dans l'ordre individuel ou collectif." (Les trois éco Logies, p.51)

35. "L'objectif crucial est la saisie des points de rupture a-signifiantes... à partir desquels un certain nombre de chaînons sémiotique se mettront à travailler au service d'un effet d'autoréférence existentielle." (Les trois éco Logies, p.53)

36. "Mais ces objets, générateurs de subjectivité « dissidente », ils les ont conçus comme demeurant essentiellement adjacents aux pulsions instinctuelles et à un imaginaire corporéisé. D'autres objets institutionnels architecturaux, économiques, cosmiques, supportent également de plein droit une telle fonction de production existentielle." (Les trois éco Logies, pp.53-54)

37. "Mais il m'apparaît qu'une généralisation des expériences d'analyse institutionnelle (à l'hôpital, à l'école, dans l'environnement urbain...)"
pourrait modifier profondément les données de ce problème." (Les trois écoologies, p.57)

38. "Une immense reconstruction des rouages sociaux est nécessaire pour faire face aux dégâts du CNI. Seulement, celle-ci passe moins par des réformes de sommet, des lois, des décrets, des programmes bureaucratiques que par la promotion de pratiques innovantes, l'essaimage d'expériences alternatives, centrées sur le respect de la singularité et sur un travail permanent de production de subjectivité, s'autonomisant tout en s'articulant convenablement au reste de la société." (Les trois écoologies, p.57)

39. "Le principe particulier à l'écologie sociale se rapporte à la promotion d'un investissement affectif et pragmatique sur des groupes humains de diverses tailles. Cet « éros de groupe » ne se présente pas comme une quantité abstraite, mais correspond à une reconversion qualitativement spécifique de la subjectivité primaire relevant de l'écologie mentale." (Les trois écoologies, pp.58-59)

40. "la triangulation personnologique de la subjectivité sur un mode JE-TU-IL, père-mère-enfant... la constitution de groupes-sujets autoréférents s'ouvrant largement sur le socius et le cosmos." (Les trois écoologies, p.59; Guattari's emphases.)

41. "...systèmes identificatoires se trouvent mis en œuvre des traits d'efficience diagrammatiques. On échappe ici, au moins partiellement, aux sémiologies de la modélisation iconique au profit de sémiotiques processuelles que je me garderai d'appeler symboliques pour ne pas retomber dans les errements structuralistes." (Les trois écoologies, p.59)

42. "le fascisme des Ayatollahs, ne l'oublions pas, ne s'est instauré que sur la base d'une profonde révolution populaire en Iran." (Les trois écoologies, p.64)
43. "L'écologie sociale spontanée travaille à la constitution de Territoires existentiels qui suppléent tant bien que mal aux anciens quadrillages rituels et religieux du socius." (Les trois écologies, p.65)

44. "Il paraît évident que, dans ce domaine, tant qu'un relais ne sera pas pris par des praxis collectives politiquement cohérentes, ce seront toujours, en fin de compte, les entreprises nationalistes réactionnaires, oppressives pour les femmes, les enfants, les marginaux, et hostiles à toute innovation, qui prendront le dessus." (Les trois écologies, p.65)

45. "Un point programmatique primordial de l'écologies sociale sera de faire transiter ces sociétés capitalistiques de l'ère mass-média de vers une ère post-média; j'entends par là une réappropriation des médias par une multitude de groupes-sujets, capables de les gérer dans une voie de résingularisation. Une telle perspective peut paraître aujourd'hui hors de portée. Mais la situation actuelle d'optimum d'aliénation par les médias ne relève d'aucune nécessité intrinsèque." (Les trois écologies, p.61; Guattari's emphasis.)

46. "Ce qui condamne le système de valorisation capitaliste, c'est son caractère d'équivalent général, qui aplatit tous les autres modes de valorisation, lesquels se trouvent ainsi aliénés à son hégémonie. A cela, il conviendrait, sinon d'opposer, à tout le moins de superposer des instruments de valorisation fondés sur les productions existentielles qui ne peuvent être déterminées ni en fonction uniquement d'un temps de travail abstrait, ni d'un profit capitaliste escompté." (Les trois écologies, pp.66-67)

47. "De plus en plus, les équilibrés naturels incomberont aux interventions humaines. Un temps viendra où il sera nécessaire d'engager d'immenses programmes pour réguler les rapports entre l'oxygène, l'ozone et le gaz carbonique dans l'atmosphère terrestre. On pourrait tout aussi bien requalifier l'écologie environnementale d'écologie machinique puisque, du côté du cosmos comme du côté des praxis humaines, il n'est jamais question que de machines ..." (Les trois écologies, p.68; Guattari's emphasis.)
48. "Une écosophie de type nouveau, à la fois pratique et spéculative, éthico-politique et esthétique, me paraît donc devoir remplacer les anciennes formes d'engagement religieux, politique, associatif... Elle ne sera ni une discipline de repli sur intérieurité, ni un simple renouvellement des anciennes formes de « militantisme ». Il s'agira plutôt d'un mouvement aux multiples facettes mettant en place des instances et des dispositifs à la fois analytiques et producteurs de subjectivité." (Les trois écologies, p.70)

49. "Les trois écologies devraient être conçues, d'un même tenant, comme relevant d'une commune discipline éthico-esthétique et comme distinctes les unes des autres du point de vue des pratiques qui les caractérisent. Leurs registres relèvent de ce que j'ai appelé une hétérogenèse, c'est-à-dire de processus continu de re-singularisation." (Les trois écologies, p.72; Guattari's emphasis.)

50. "La reconquête d'un degré d'autonomie créatrice dans un domaine particulier appelle d'autres reconquêtes dans d'autres domaines. Ainsi toute une catalyse de la reprise de confiance de l'humanité en elle-même est-elle à forger, pas à pas, et quelquefois à partir des moyens les plus minuscules. Tel cet essai qui voudrait, si peu que ce soit, endiguer la grisaille et la passivité ambiante." (Les trois écologies, pp.72-73)

51. "Notre souci principal est de développer un cadre conceptuel qui prémunisse la schizoanalyse contre toute tentative de s'abandonner à l'idéal de scientificité qui prévaut ordinairement dans ces domaines «psy» à la manière d'un Surmoi collectif. Nous chercherons plutôt à lui trouver un fondement qui l'apparante, par son mode de valorisation, son type de vérité et sa logique, aux disciplines esthétiques." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.47)

52. "J'ai qualifié la seconde voie d'identification hystérique parce qu'elle consiste en une appropriation mimétique de la scientificité, peu soucieuse de « coller » à des procédures expérimentales reproductibles, ou de s'appuyer sur des théories testables et falsifiables, au sens de K. Poppers [sic]." (Cartographies schizoanalytiques, p.49)
53. "La troisième voie, celle de l'étayage, fera un usage lateral de la science, dont les énoncés conserveront un caractère d'extériorité par rapport à la discipline considérée, ou qui ne seront utilisés qu'à titre de métaphore." (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.49)

54. "De fait, les méthodes scientifiques sont d'autant moins en mesure de porter secours à l'analyse de la psyché, qu'elles ne sont elles-mêmes parvenues à « décoller », en tant que Phylum sémiotique spécifique, qu'à partir du moment où elles se sont engagées dans une mise entre parenthèses systématique des questions relatives à leur énonciation, aux modes idiosyncrasiques de valorisation, ainsi qu'aux processus irréductiblement singuliers, autrement dit à des dimensions essentielles de la subjectivité!" (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.50)

55. "Non seulement les cartographies de la subjectivité n'ont rien à gagner à singer la science, mais celle-ci a peut-être beaucoup à attendre des problématiques qu'elles drainent dans leur sillage." (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.50)

56. "La subjectivité à l'oeuvre au sein des paradigmes scientifiques les plus élaborés fonctionne encore, pour partie, en termes d'animisme et d'abstractionnisme transcendental." (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.51)

57. "les cartographies de subjectivité incosciente devraient devenir les compléments indispensables des systèmes de rationalité ayant cours dans les sciences, la politique en toutes autres régions de la connaissance et l'activité humaine." (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.51)

58. "Non seulement la carte se met ici à renvoyer indéfiniment à sa propre cartographie, comme l'a bien vu Alfred Korzybski, mais c'est la distinction entre la carte et le territoire (the map and « the thing mapped ») qui tend à disparaître." (Cartographies schizooanalytiques, p.51 n.1)

59. "Qu'il me suffise, à cette étape, de souligner que les index intensifs, les opérateurs diagrammatiques, impliqués par cette fonction existentielle, n'ont aucune caractère d'universalité: c'est ce qui conduira la
schizanalyse à les démarquer, malgré certaines similitudes, des "objets partiels" du kleinismes ou de "l'objet a" du lacanisme." (Cartographies schizanalytiques, p.52)

60. "D'ailleurs les meilleures cartographies de la psyché ou, si l'on veut, les meilleures psychanalyses n'ont-elles pas été le fait de Goethe, Proust, Joyce, Artaud et Becket, plutôt que de Freud, Jung et Lacan?" (Les trois écologies, p.25)

CONCLUSION: 'THE SUBJECT, POSTMODERNISM, SPACE AND BEYOND'.

   - 'The Three Ecologies', translated by Chris Turner, Material World, in New Formations, no.8 (Summer 1989), pp.131-147

When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, to the English translation in the form ('The Three Ecologies', p....). The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note. Where translations are entirely my own, the French edition will be cited in the text and the French passage noted.

"Il paraît évident que, dans ce domaine, tant qu'un relais ne sera pris par des praxis collectives politiquement cohérentes, ce seront toujours, en fin de compte, les entreprises nationalisantes réactionnaires, oppressives pour les femmes, les enfants, les marginaux, et hostiles à toute innovation, qui prendront le dessus." (Les trois écologies, p.65)


In this book, Lawson gently elucidates the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, emphasising the motif of "reflexivity" in them all. "Reflexivity, as a turning back on oneself, a form of self-awareness..." (p.9) Lawson recognises, has been abundant in philosophy since its birth, what marks its "contemporary" usage is the way it underlines the
problematic of the reader's relationship to a text. The project of his book, however, is to examine those philosophical writings in which "the destructive aspects of reflexivity" (p.10) are taken to their limit. Consequently, "they can be seen to open up the postmodern world - a world without certainties, a world without absolutes." (loc. cit.)


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Harvey, p....).


When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (A Thousand Plateaus, p....). The equivalent passage from the French edition, will be quoted in the corresponding note.

5. "Devenir est un rhizome, ce n'est pas un arbre classificatoire ni générique. Devenir n'est certainement pas imiter, ni s'identifier; ce n'est pas non plus correspondre, instaurer des rapports correspondants; ce n'est pas non plus produire, produire une filiation, produire par filiation. Devenir est un verbe ayant toute sa consistance; il ne se ramène pas, et ne nous amène pas à « paraître », ni « être », ni « équivaloir », ni « produire »." (Mille Plateaux, p.292)

6 "Une ligne de devenir ne se définit ni par des points, qu'elle relie ni par des points qui la composent: au contraire, elle passe entre les points, elle ne pousse que par le milieu, et file dans une direction perpendiculaire aux points qu'on a d'abord distingués, transversale au rapport localisable entre points contigus ou distants." (Mille Plateaux, p.359; Deleuze and Guattari's emphasis.)
7. "Dans un devenir-animal, on a toujours affaire à une meute, à une bande, à une population, à un peuplement, bref à une multiplicité." (Mille Plateaux, p.292)


- Integrated world capitalism does not aim at a systematic and generalized repression of workers, women, youth, minorities... The means of production on which it rests will indeed call for a flexibility in relationships of production and in social relations, and a minimal capacity to adapt to the new forms of sensibility and to new types of human relationships which are "mutating" here and there (i.e. exploitation by advertising of the "discoveries" of the marginals, relative tolerance with regard to the zones of laissez-faire....) Under these conditions, a semi-tolerated, semi-encouraged, and co-opted protest could well be an intrinsic part of the system. (p.108, Guattari's ellipses.)

According to this passage, IWC has already reterritorialised those forms and even the contents of oppositional politics which seem to be advocated by Harvey. This does not mean that all forms of "opposition" to capitalism are always already bound up within its system; merely that many of the more traditional modes of opposition have been outmanoeuvred, or reterritorialised, by IWC. Indeed, the project of this concluding chapter - if not the thesis as a whole - is to map the directions new forms of "opposition" can take.

9. In his The Production of Space, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford, Basil Blackwell Ltd.: 1991), Henri Lefebvre writes of Marxism:
The best way to get Marx's thinking into perspective is to reconstitute it, to restore in its entirety, and to look upon it not as an end point or conclusion but rather as a point of departure. In other words, Marxism should be treated as one moment in the development of theory, and not, dogmatically, as a definitive theory. (p.321)

It seems to me that Harvey's work seeks to bend everything into his idea of a Marxist theory; rather than using Marx's works - as I think Deleuze and Guattari do -, as Lefebvre says, as a point of departure.


When quoting from this article, references will be made in the text, in the form: (Jameson, p....).

Jameson sets out his project for this article before its opening paragraph - in white text on black background -, thus:

Without a conception of the social totality (and the possibility of transforming a whole social system), no properly socialist politics is possible. It involves trying to imagine how a society without hierarchy, a society that has also repudiated the economic mechanisms of the market, can possibly cohere. (p.347)

Jameson then outlines the fulfilment of such a project in terms of the aesthetic critique of contemporary cultural space. Hence, "cognitive mapping". In any event, this mapping is the production of a unificatory critique (or, "totalising" as Jameson puts it) as a response to the current globally entrenched capitalist system. The "poor person's" cognitive mapping - i.e. Conspiracy Theories - are denigrated by Jameson for their
"slippage into sheer theme and content" (p.356); whereas "achieved"
cognitive mapping occur as matters of form, as Utopias.

11. Notice the following passage from Anti-OEdipus:

What makes the schizophrenic ill, since the cause of
the illness is not schizophrenia as a process? What
transforms the breakthrough into a breakdown? It is the
constrained arrest of the process, or its continuation
in the void, or the way in which it is forced to take
itself as a goal. We have seen in this sense how social
production produced the sick schizo: constituted on
decoded flows that constitute its profound intensity or
its absolute limit, capitalism is constantly
counteracting this tendency, exorcizing this limit by
substituting internal relative limits for it that it
can reproduce on an ever expanding scale, or an
axiomatic of flows that subjects this tendency to the
harshest forms of despotism and repression. It is in
this sense that contradiction installs itself not only
at the level of flows that traverse the social field,
but at the level of their libidinal investments, which
form the flows' constituent parts — between the
paranoiac reconstruction of the Urstaat and the
positive schizophrenic lines of escape. (Anti-OEdipus,
pp.362-363)

[De quoi est malade le schizophrène, puisque ce n'est
pas de la schizophrénie comme processus? Qu'est-ce qui
transforme la percée en effondrement? C'est au
contraire l'arrêt contraint du processus, ou sa
continuation dans le vide, ou la manière dont il est
forcé de se prendre pour un but. Nous avons vu en ce
sens comment la production sociale produisait le schizo
malade: construit sur les flux décodés qui constituent
sa tendance profonde ou sa limite absolue, le]
11a. "Le processus se met à tourner dans le vide. Processus de déterritorialisation, il ne peut plus chercher et créer sa nouvelle terre. Confronté à la re-territorialisation oedipienne, terre archaïque, résiduelle, ridiculement restreinte, il formera des terres plus artificielles encore qui s'arrangent tant bien que mal, sauf accident, avec l'ordre établi: le pervers." (L'Anti OEdipe, pp.435-436)

12. Examples of these works are not only Lefebvre's The Condition of Postmodernity and Harvey's The Condition of Postmodernity, but also C. Jencks, The Language of Post-modern Architecture, (London, 1984).

I am indebted to John O'Reilly (Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick) for this information. The Introduction to O'Reilly's thesis, Jean Beaudrillard: From Value to Object (unpublished), in order to give an outline of philosophical postmodernism, makes reference to theories of postmodern architecture as announced in the works of Harvey and Jencks.


15. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*. For edition details please see note 9 above. When quoting from this book, references will be made in the text to the English translation, in the form: (Lefebvre, p....).

16. For an instance of Lefebvre's attitude to Marxism - as shown in *The Production of Space* - please see note 9 above.

17. I think there is a striking similarity between this passage and several in Guattari's *Les trois écoologies*. For example:

If we are to reorient the sciences and technology towards more human goals, we clearly need collective management and control - not blind reliance on technocrats in the state apparatuses, in the hope that they will control developments and minimize risks in fields largely dominated by the pursuit of profit. ('The Three Ecologies', p.134; quoted above p.121)

Our objective should be to nurture individual cultures, while at the same time inventing new contracts of citizenship: to create an order of the state in which singularity, exceptions, and rarity coexist under the least oppressive possible conditions. ('The Three Ecologies', p.139; quoted above p.128)

A fundamental reconstruction of social mechanisms is necessary if we are to confront the ravages produced by integrated world capitalism - a reconstruction which cannot be achieved by top-down reforms, laws, decrees or bureaucratic programmes. What it requires is the promotion of innovative practices; the proliferation of alternative experiments which both respect singularity, and work permanently in the production of a subjectivity that is simultaneously autonomous, yet articulates itself in relation to the rest of society. ('The Three Ecologies', p.142; quoted above p.133)
While it is a facile exercise merely to slot various passages from various authors side by side and say, "aren't they similar...", in this case I think that such a remark serves to orient our reading of Lefebvre with respect to that of Guattari (and even Deleuze). Thus, we are left with a version of Lefebvre which wrenches it out of any "pure", or "traditional", or "dogmatic" Marxist doctrine and thrusts it deep within the cartography written here.

18. "les divers niveaux de pratique non seulement n'ont pas é être homogénéisés, raccordés les uns aux autres sous nue tutelle transcendante, mais il convient de les engager dans des processus d'hétérogenèse. Jamais les féministes ne seront assez impliquées dans un devenir-femme et il n'y a nulle raison de demander aux immigrés de renoncer aux traits culturels qui collent à leur être, ou bien à leur appartenance nationalitaire. Il convient de laisser se déployer les cultures particulières tout en inventant d'autres contrats de citoyenneté. Il convient de faire tenir ensemble la singularité, l'exception, la rarité avec un ordre étatique le moins pesant possible." (Les trois écologies, p.46; Guattari's emphasis.)

19. "L'éco-logique n'impose plus de « résoudre » les contraires, comme le voulaient les dialectiques hégéliennes et marxistes. En particulier dans le domaine de l'écologies sociale, il existera des temps de lutte où tous et toutes seront conduits à se fixer des objectifs communs et à se comporter « comme de petits soldats » - je veux dire, comme de bons militants, mais, concurremment, il existera des temps de resingularisation où les subjectivités individuelles et collectives « reprendront leurs billes » et où, ce qui primera, ce sera l'expression créatrice en tant que telle, sans plus de soucis à l'égard des finalités collectives." (Les trois écologies, pp.46-47)

20. For edition details please see note 8 above.

21. "Il n'est pas juste de séparer l'action sur la psyché, le socius et l'environnement. Le refus de regarder en face les dégradations de ces trois domaines, tel qu'il est entretenu par les médias, confine à une entreprise
d'infantilisation de l'opinion et de neutralisation destructive de la démocratie." (Les trois écologies, p.32)
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