Building a New Utøya; Re-placing the Oslo bombsite – Counterfactual Resilience at Post-Terrorist Sites

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Resilience strategies imagine disaster recovery through pre-emptive shock absorption capacity. They aim to build “resilience” before disasters strike. But what can we learn about resilience from responses to disasters which have already happened? This paper explores the ambiguous relationship between resilience and the enactment of post-terrorist reconstruction. It uses empirical research at post-terrorist sites in Norway to explore the application, and non-application, of resilience policy. These sites are interesting because while resilience policy develops plans for infrastructure-focused recovery after the next disaster, the curators of post-terrorist sites dedicate themselves to the architectural reconstruction of sites afflicted by a disaster which already happened. They apply a retrospective framing of the disaster event. This practice is never called resilience by policymakers or practitioners, despite enabling sites and societies to “bounce back” from horror. Why isn’t this called resilience by policymakers? And how can post-terrorist redevelopment help us to understand the conceptual borders of resilience policy? This paper draws upon fieldwork with activists, organisers and architects at the Oslo government Quarter and Utøya island to consider their “resilience” work - which is never called resilience. The paper argues that anticipatory temporalities and abstracted spatial framings make some things sit within the discursive remit of resilience policy and others not. As such, studying

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resilience through its non-application can help us to identify the borders of the concept.

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**Introduction**

How is resilience thought and applied, and to which spaces and timeframes? This article addresses these questions by analysing the remaking of the sites of the 2011 terrorist attacks in Norway. The remaking of post-terrorist space implicitly embodies a common sense understanding of what resilience *might* mean – the “bouncing back” of a site to functionality. Yet, policies of resilience do not address disaster sites, except to make contingency plans for the preparation and future restoration of networked systems of transportation, communication, business and infrastructure.¹

Currently resilience policies, and their academic study, provide no discussion of the social practices which might enable existing destroyed places to “bounce back” to “normality”. Instead these policies focus on anticipating and supposedly mediating the impact of future disasters. Given the centrality of disaster recovery to both international and national resilience strategies, this is somewhat surprising. How can disaster recovery be performed anticipatorily, and not retrospectively? Disaster recovery policy has become concerned only with the anticipation of disaster events and the consolidation of systems against the future – not the normalisation and recovery of disaster sites themselves.² This anticipatory interpretation of resilience and disaster is further confirmed across the growing academic literature on resilience. The only reference to resilience as a retrospectively evident quality is found in descriptions of post-disaster cities.³

What can we learn, then, about the meaning of resilience by extending the literature on retrospective attributions of resilience? What would we learn if we understood resilience counterfactually as the “bouncing back” of disaster space? At present, the recovery of terrorist sites is understood as reconstruction and memorialisation⁴ – not as the concern of resilience policy. This article explores the spatial and temporal discursive boundaries of the
resilience policy discourse through juxtaposition with sites of post-terrorist redevelopment. It looks to where resilience is not applied (the past event), to explore the performance of “resilience” via discursive counterfactuals. Counterfactual research in International Relations explores the contingency of events within their historical settings by considering non-linear alternatives. This, as Ned Lebow explains, poses challenges to more positivist inspired methodology which instead constructs generalizable theories from cases – holding the past stable to generate predictive theory. This type of theorising implicitly deploys the idea that “this world is the only possible world”, and through such practice IR and International History constitute hindsight bias whereby the past becomes over-determined. Counterfactuals instead open up the contingency of political decision making and of history.

This paper does not deploy historical counterfactuals to explore the contingency of events themselves, but rather uses counterfactual insights alongside discourse theory. It questions the strict association of resilience policy and anticipatory preparation. Rather than using a discourse analysis method such as genealogy to do this, the paper explores cases that could be called “resilient” but are not. These examples are discursive counterfactuals which enable one to think resilience otherwise and thus expose the contingency of its discursive formulation.

To do this, the paper discusses fieldwork interviews with parties (including architects, coordinators and concerned academics) involved with the redevelopment of sites affected by Anders Breivik’s attacks of July 2011 at Utøya island and Oslo city centre. It shows how, in the counterfactual imagination, these practices of site redevelopment could be called resilience. And yet they are instead publicly identified as memorialisation-related. Exploring where resilience is not, through discursive counterfactuals, aids the exploration of “what resilience is”.
Resilience! What Do You Mean?\textsuperscript{vii}

The discourse of resilience has come to dominate national and international approaches to the securing of life and infrastructure against threats. But what does resilience mean? Given the multiplicity of understandings within the Social Science literature, it would be unwise to insist upon a fixed definition of resilience. Despite this, many authors look to etymological roots to “fix” resilience. It is thus common to invoke the derivation of the term from the Latin “resilio” – meaning to “jump back”. However etymology does not determine the usage of terminology and this conception of elasticity after disruption and shock is predominantly linked to the engineering-discourse of resilience, relative to the capacity of materials to return to their former shape.\textsuperscript{viii} A different reading of resilience is evident in the work of ecologists and contemporary systems theorists, who conceptualise resilience not in terms of the return to an imagined equilibrium, but as the flexibility and adaptability to uncertainty evident within ecosystems.\textsuperscript{ix} Furthermore, Brassett \textit{et al.}\textsuperscript{x} have also documented the variegated understandings of resilience utilised within psychological discourse (relative to innate characteristics, learned behaviours and psychological therapy) and the contemporary management discourse which frames resilience as a capacity of a social system to proactively adapt to disturbance.

This plurality of understandings and applications has led some politics researchers to commentate that “resilience” operates as a “centrally organising” or “floating” metaphor for policymaking\textsuperscript{xi}, or a “fashionable buzzword”\textsuperscript{xii}. So, if the term has no intrinsic meaning, how does it function for politics? Contemporary research within the field of International Relations and Politics has begun to address this question. Connections are being identified between resilience policies and practices of governmentality, where programs to enhance
“resilience” actually function to conduct the conduct of populations, rendering them manageable and docile.\textsuperscript{xiii} Even more critical readings suggest that the all-encompassing and variegated deployment of resilience discourse throughout IMF and OECD documentation, national security strategies and regimes of self-help books reveals that “resilience” is the discursive means by which neoliberal citizenship and economics are reproduced in an era of austerity.\textsuperscript{xiv} The concept fills the void left by the disappearance of grand narratives of progress and certainty in the neoliberal project, revealing the twists and turns by which neoliberalism has evolved to embed crisis events within its rule.

Whether resilience is a technology of neoliberalism\textsuperscript{xv}, a governmental technique which functions to produce particular populations\textsuperscript{xvi}, or the capacity for social systems to proactively adapt to, and recover from, disturbances\textsuperscript{xvii}, it is clear that variegated academic debate precludes a simplistic definition or understanding of the resilience signifier. But outside academic contestation, policy documents eschew these concerns and articulate a common-sense framing of resilience. Here the contribution of resilience to security discourse marks a sea-change in approaches to, and formulations of, threat. Resilience signifies the acceptance of disruptive events and security breaches as inevitable, contra the previous attempts of security logics to predict and prevent.\textsuperscript{xviii} Security (in its previous formulation as protection from danger, attack and systemic failure) is now categorised as unattainable, and has been reformulated for the contemporary age as strategies for mediating systemic vulnerability. Resilience represents an explicit shift in security policy from prevention and deterrence towards the fostering of adaptive capacities of pre-emption and recovery. In the words of the UK’s National Security Strategy, only an approach focused upon attaining resilience in the face of inevitable events can provide the “radical transformation” of security policy necessary in the post-Cold War “era of uncertainty”\textsuperscript{xix} Resilience, in its policy
formulation, is situated within an epistemic break in the security climate where “uncertainty” demands that we learn to live with threat, not against it.

Several questions remain unanswered about this epistemic break, especially: why doesn’t resilience address the sites where insecurity has broken through in the form of terrorist violence? This paper is particularly interested in the spatialities and temporalities through which resilience is deployed, or more precisely, is not deployed. The resilience discourse focuses in an anticipatory manner on the preparation and restoration of infrastructure rather than addressing the recovery of sites which have already been destroyed, bombed or damaged. The policy discourse of resilience turns away from destruction and horror to instead imagine future disruptions to abstracted systems. These systems are not “places”, in the sense of locations imbued with meaning through people’s experience of them. Thus it becomes interesting to explore the spatiality and temporality of resilience, juxtaposed against the sites which are unaddressed by resilience and instead bracketed under the subject heading of memorialisation. The use of discursive counterfactuals enables us to locate the contingency, limits and boundaries of the resilience discourse.

Some academic work within IR has begun to address space and place within the resilience turn. For example, Jon Coaffee has explored the shifts in UK resilience policy which, he argues, have led away from the somewhat-spatially focused first wave of resilience – which implemented bi-steel barriers and crash-rated bollards to “design out” terrorism at high-risk sites. This “command and control” structure for the resilience roll-out has now given way, he argues, to a focus on decentralised, local structures which perform community resilience. While tracing this decentralisation of security responsibility, which has occurred in tandem with the UK coalition government’s “Big Society” plans, Coaffee refers to this localised governmentality as “place-making”. However he utilises this phrase to highlight the localised performance of contemporary resilience policy within a “more community driven social
contract between citizens and state” , contra the nationalised and securitised first wave articulation or the “crowded places” agenda of the second and third waves.

Coaffee shows how the second and third waves of UK resilience policy imagined crowded spaces as vulnerable sites, but given the anticipatory formulation of resilience these spaces are projected into potential futures. This produces a sense of abstraction which neatly parallels with the systemic-anticipatory-focus of resilience policy. Crowded spaces become imagined as part of the infrastructural fabric of cities, just like communication systems or transport networks.

Building upon Coaffee’s exploration of the localisation and decentralisation of resilience activities, it is also important to consider destroyed spaces relative to resilience – as this reworks both the temporality of resilience (forcing an exploration of the past) and its infrastructural visuality. If, as Lahoud argues, that spaces around traumatic events record their impression like a scar, how might post-traumatic practices of spatial recovery, normalisation and redesign relate to the resilience discourse? This article now turns to empirical research at post-terrorist space in Norway to explore counterfactual resilience - arguing that such practices of reconstruction function politically to mediate the disruption of events by reasserting previous conceptions of place and identity. If we understand resilience counterfactually, as the enablement of post-disaster bouncing back, then our attention is drawn to these non-abstracted places – contra resilience policy discourse and its infrastructural systems fetish.

**Taking Back Utøya: Dissipating the Sinister and Reoccupying Place**

This section discusses the author’s fieldwork visit to Utøya island and interviews with members of the *New Utøya* project to architecturally redesign the island. It explores how
populations affected by terrorist attacks frame their concerns and desires in terms of place, and how these practices are ignored by resilience policy despite their implicit relevance to disaster recovery and adaptation. Such invocations of place deploy the heritage and previous social meanings of sites – providing an important contrast with the spatial abstraction of the resilience discourse. For example, consider the “rose parade” after Anders Breivik’s bomb and gun attacks of 2011, where Norwegians walked *en masse* between symbolic political spaces in Oslo (the Parliament building and the Cathedral) to make their peaceful response. The site of the parade was not random, it was explicitly spatially selected to articulate and re-emphasise the centrality of pluralism and democratic openness to Norwegian society.

Practices which act upon event-sites to redevelop and normalise them are also explicitly framed in terms of place and history. The activism which occurs communicates a powerful sense that the attacked-place has been improperly exiled from its pre-existing situation in the public imagination through the horrors which took place there, and it will not return until it is spatially reformulated. Architectural redevelopment “normalises”, so that sites might be “taken back” and regain (some of) their previous identity. *Place* is reclaimed through practices which take place at post-terrorist sites. This could be called resilience, but it isn’t.

To situate the following discussion of the *New Utøya* project, it is important to first establish a working-understanding of what is meant by “place”. Theorisations of place are now multiple in geography, owing to the rehabilitation of the term from its previous position in obscurity by Yi-Fu Tuan. He argued that ”space” and ”place” are concepts embedded within a dualistic relationship whereby space is abstract (think of coordinates and the infrastructural spatiality of resilience policy) but place is the result of human experience of locations and their endowment with value. Space becomes place through experience and social construction, then. Tim Cresswell has built upon this argument by showing that place is not just a “thing in the world”, but a way of seeing, knowing and understanding the
world around us. In the trajectory that has followed Tuan, place is intimately connected to experience rather than to nomothetic theorising. Indeed, in the contemporary Heideggerian and phenomenological treatments of place which have followed Tuan’s impulse, the situation of human life within place actually provides the remit for intentional consciousness – where intentionality implies consciousness of something. Places are not just socially constructed then, but are so important that being-in-place also precedes consciousness.

This importance can also make them targets. On 22 July 2011, Anders Breivik targeted certain locations because they meant something. He didn’t select the Oslo Government Quarter or Utøya island randomly, rather he selected places known through their symbolic association with multiculturalism and social-democratic politics. Why? Because inscriptions of place can be wiped away by violent events, such as bombings. Places are experienced very differently after they are destroyed or associated with horror. Violence can be used to contest, destroy and counter-inscribe the meaning of space (as well as bodies). Violence changes places. Bombsites thus make uncomfortable viewing and are visually disruptive, not only because of the memories of horror which they provoke. They disrupt the scopic regimes in which they sit; for example, ten years after the Bali bombing the unmade space of the Sari Club continues to provoke activism for a “peace park” – despite the presence of a huge memorial to the bombing victims nearby. It is difficult to imagine or experience place in the same way, when post-terrorist space lingers in the background. Simultaneously, the blindness of resilience policy to practices of memorialisation and post-terrorist redevelopment is striking. These redevelopment practices seem explicitly oriented towards disaster recovery and the “bouncing back” of space, yet they are discursively framed as memory-related rather than as resilience.

The changed place-hood of Utøya is central to the plans to “normalise” and redevelop the island. Before I was allowed to set foot on the island the Project Manager for the New
*Utøya* initiative, Jørgen Frydnes, clearly articulated that I must understand the island’s history. He tutored me on the history of the place on our walk down to the ferry which makes the crossing, and during our walk around the island. Initially, I didn’t fully understand the significance of the injunction made by Jørgen. While I was happy to agree to his conditions, and grateful for the opportunity to view the island’s current condition while hearing him describe the future plans for building work, the significance of the island’s history to the New *Utøya* project only became clear to me later.

The project to normalise the space of Utøya requires, in the terms of its protagonists, a campaign to re-take its *place* – where place is constituted through the cultural history of the island – and to contest the post-Breivik public imagination of the island as a sinister massacre site. As a foreigner, it was rightly suspected that I would be unaware of the significance of Utøya’s history and thus its centrality to the restoration of the island as a functioning political site, and place. This history is important - Utøya has always been political. Before the island was given to the AUF (Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking – Worker’s Youth League), it was historically owned by Jens Bratlie. Bratlie was Prime Minister of Norway between 1912 and 1913 for the Conservative Party and used Utøya as a summer residence during his political career – which included a close affiliation with the proto-fascist manoeuvrings of Vidkun Quisling in Norway during the 1930s, prior to the installation of a Nazi puppet-regime between 1940 and 1945. After its use as a fascist island resort, Utøya was sold to the Oslo and Akershus Trade Union Movement in 1932. The trade union movement established the tradition of summer camps on the island, but during the 1930s these served the purpose of accommodation poverty-stricken children from Oslo and increasing their bodyweight during their stay. Utøya was then gifted to the AUF in 1950, who have since utilised the island for political summer camps (once referred to by current Prime Minister Stoltenberg as the “most important site for political speeches” during the Norwegian political calendar) and
who have lent the site to other organisations for their own gatherings (including the Norwegian People’s Aid Youth, the Youth Organisation for Lesbian and Gay Rights, the Red Cross and various trade unions). The island has been intrinsically connected to the development of social-democratic politicians in the contemporary history of Norway, with 8 out of 12 current ministers having attended summer camps. Furthermore, its legacy once included hosting Leon Trotsky when he fled the Soviet Union.

The island’s political history is the reason Anders Breivik selected it as a target. Utøya was a symbol for the development of left-wing politics, pluralism and multiculturalism in Norway. This quality of “place”, where Utøya is unique in its performance of Norwegian political history and identity, is also explicitly important for the plans to normalise and re-take the site. Place has become a battleground between the protagonists, but given the anticipatory temporality and abstracted spatiality of resilience policy no-one connected to New Utøya utilised “resilience” to situate the project and rejected my application of the term during interviews.

The New Utøya project developed from the immediate emotional response of the AUF to Breivik’s attacks; his actions had taken so much from the youth that it was believed that he should not also be able to claim the future of the island. The project involves architectural plans for the removal of some particularly traumatic buildings, the redevelopment of existing facilities, and changing the appearance of the built vista (as it appears from the ferry-ride over the lake – the image which has saturated media coverage of the attacks and rendered Utøya “sinister” in the public imagination). The project website describes the aims and objectives of New Utøya in the following terms:

After a comprehensive assessment AUF has chosen to move forward in the process to rebuild Utøya. We believe that this is the best way to honor the victims of 22 July
2011. By creating new Utøya - an inclusive forum for fellowship, idealism and commitment - we will also prove that the offender failed to tear down the community in cooperation built up. Utøya will again be a place of democracy, tolerance and equal opportunity.xxxvii

The re-establishment of Utøya as a place for activism, idealism and political awakenings demonstrates a clear connection between recovery and place – a counterfactual vision of resilience. Similarly, when the project manager, Jørgen Frydnes, described the project he expressed a connection between the concepts of rebuilding and reclaiming place. This was often phrased as “taking the island back”, by both Jørgen and the New Utøya architects, Fantastic Norway.xxxviii Jørgen explained that he was called to lead the project in the days after Breivik’s attacks, following the almost immediate decision of the AUF leaders that the island must be taken back as a place:

Some of the leaders already on the Friday and Saturday had these grand ideas of not losing the place; taking it back. That was the day after. There was no planning or research. It was the idea that he [Breivik] had taken so much away from us that he should not be allowed to take away this beautiful place.xxxix

The underlying motivation of the New Utøya project is place-related then. The AUF articulate an explicit concern that Breivik has not only claimed lives, but he has made a claim upon the “place” of Utøya which must be contested through a reassertion of the island’s positive meaning and historyxl. They have chosen to respond architecturally to re-take the place, where “re-take” chimes with the engineering discourse of resilience as ”bouncing back”. In the weeks and months which followed July 22nd 2011, the AUF liaised with architectural firms to slowly discuss the potential future of the island. Every two weeks since the event, the
Oslo architectural firm *Fantastic Norway* have met with survivors and the AUF planning committee. Erland and Håkom of *Fantastic Norway* described their work with the youth as a project dedicated to “reoccupying the image of the island”, clearly highlighting the importance of place in the restoration of the island. Here the architectural plans to dissipate the sinister renderings of the island take on a form which resembles resilience – they shape the “bouncing back” of the island – despite the conspicuous silence about disaster sites in the resilience discourse. Erland and Håkom described the *New Utøya* project aims as “reclaiming the image, as the final say” – serving to close the traumatic events within an architectural move to “re-occupy” the place and image of the island.\[xli\]

While Breivik serves his sentence, his actions have continued to disconnect the idyllic, leftist ”place” of Utøya from its post-2011 public representation. The lingering image of the island is sinister, dark and separated from the AUF’s experience of happy summer-camps and political awakenings. His actions damaged that place, and *Fantastic Norway* understand their brief as contesting the media images of horror which have come to “re-place” the political history of the island as its defining spatial imagination:

Håkom: One of the issues that caught our eye very early was that from being such a positive place naturally, now the island was known to the general public as a terrible, terrible horror.

Erland: Yeah, the image.

Håkom: And that image was very often represented [by the] journalists and the photographers and everyone standing ashore looking at this dark

Erland: End of days picture.
Håkom: This heavy, rainfall sky, and there might even be kids on the island while you were watching the image […] For us, I mean, this wasn’t the main entry angle for what we did but one of the important things would be for us to re-establish the image of the island, because something has happened after.

Erland: [And…] also bearing in mind that most people never go to the island, so that image would be what they know as the island. So it was important to change that image from something sinister to something that literally had gone through a change, so that was something which becoming quite clear that we needed to deal with.

Håkom: Very much about reoccupying the image of the island.

As such, the aim of the New Utøya project is to reclaim continuity with the island’s history and place-hood – in response to the traumatic break in its identity which Breivik deliberately engineered. When the island returns to functionality as a site for summer-camps, from its current formulation in public imagination as a sinister site of horror, it will have adapted to the traumatic break imposed upon it. The reclaiming of place will re-establish continuity with the island’s history, while incorporating the events of July 2011. In the counterfactual frame, we could say that resilience will have been achieved at this point – but this would be to think resilience against the grain of policy.

Instead, the resilience policy discourse is blind to the restitution of place. It considers only the anticipation of disruption to infrastructure and its mediation. And, being a small island, there is very little infrastructure on Utøya to “secure”. What does this place-blindness of resilience discourse mean, and how might architectural projects at disaster sites inform our consideration of resilience and security? Interestingly, Erland and Håkom commented at length on safety and security in their discussion of the New Utøya project. During the early phases of project development, they talked to the AUF about the various ways in which the
island could be made to feel safe again. Initially this involved trialling plans for the provision of escape boats around the island, or even a bridge connecting with the mainland, for example:

I mean there’s obviously things that come out earlier in the project like protection. Should we have escape boats on the island? Should we build a fence around it? Wouldn’t that just be the opposite of what we really want to do because in relation to the national response to this was kind of beautiful. [It was] focusing on the prospect of love and caring for each other. This was very often early on things that would be discussed like “Would we feel safe here again?”

These infrastructural components of safety and security, so prized by the resilience policy discourse, were quickly rejected in the discussions which occurred between the AUF and their architectural partners because they would not contribute to the feeling of safety required. Instead, that feeling of security would come from the restoration of Utøya as a place – in the sense that it was previously known to the youth who utilised the island. Technologies more associated with prevention (like the crash-bollards and escape routes from crowded places which are associated with resilience policy) were considered counter-productive, in that they would contribute to a sense of insecurity rather than safety:

Erland: We want to create spaces where you would feel locally safe, where your back is safe […] We wanted to look upon that to make you personally feel safe. That’s the task. You can’t protect it, it’s an impossible task […] You don’t want to meet the terror with terror.

Håkom: I think it’s important because if you respond to it [terrorist attacks], if you let that be determined by a kind of canvas that they drag you up [who knows] the sick
things that might happen? Any day, any crazy things might happen. There might be a guy standing there on the roof with a bazooka. It almost never happens. You’re supposed to prepare for that? That kind of society would be a really ugly one. I think for us it’s about how you determine safety […] It would have been a terrible place to be. You would constantly be reminded that something absolutely nightmarish might happen. That’s not safety […] If it’s safety that you’re talking about; social safety and feeling a sense of belonging. [Feeling] that it is a good place. Bring that silhouette [back] again, feeling that this is something strong. We made this as a kind of response that we want to continue here, that’s also kind of a safety […] This is our place. We took it, but not in an army way.

As such, the restoration of Utøya as a safe place has been formulated by *Fantastic Norway* and the AUF as involving the explicit rejection of the most central tenets of the resilience discourse – anticipation, preparation, and the acceptance of the inevitability of catastrophes. And yet, in focusing on restoring the island to functionality through the reassertion of place (by renovating the island’s facilities for summer-camps and gently adjusting the silhouette of the buildings as the island is viewed from shore, so that the island no longer resembles the sinister mediated image of 22 July 2011), they achieve a “resilience” that the resilience discourse is blind to: the reassertion of place-continuity. This, it is hoped, will end the traumatic disruption imposed upon the site. Rather than engineering a sense of security with escape boats or a bridge, which would necessarily fail in the opinion of the site’s curators because they would counter-productively remind of danger, a relationship with place is being rebuilt.

By exploring efforts to architecturally normalise disaster sites, we find ourselves at a fair distance from the resilience policy frame, which temporally involves the imagination and
mediation of future events and spatially invokes abstraction to the infrastructural/systemic level of space. So what does this reveal?

The curators of Utøya want to return the island to functionality and continuity, but they explicitly avoided the resilience discourse and expressed alienation from the signifier when asked if they were practicing resilience. They could not see the relevance of the concept. How, then, is it possible that a discourse supposedly dedicated to the mediation of disruptive events fails to address the recovery of disaster sites? How should we engage with this ambiguity of resilience? Given the disregard within resilience policy discourse for disaster sites and their recovery, it would seem that the governmentality critiques of resilience (introduced earlier) have some traction. Rather than fostering the “bouncing back” of traumatic sites, resilience policy ignores experiences of insecurity and disruption in favour of infrastructure and the terrain of the future. The anticipatory nature of the discourse reveals a dedication towards governing the unfolding of the future, rather than the enabling of recovery. This places resilience within the remit of those critiques which identify a managerial/governmentality approach within contemporary security towards the calculation and governance of a risky future, rather than associating security with the provision of safety.

"Re-Placing” the Oslo Government Quarter

Such anticipatory tendencies in security developed from the economisation of social policy, where economic models were applied by governments to govern life, the future (through insurance) and conduct. While the AUF’s custodianship of Utøya has allowed them to develop their plans for normalising the island, such a managerial-economic approach was initially taken with regard to the redevelopment of the Oslo bombsite at the Government
Quarter – also attacked by Anders Breivik. The agency responsible for government buildings (Statsbygg) in Norway produced an initial report which recommended the demolition of multiple damaged structures based upon a cost-analysis. In consultation with LPO Arkitektur, an Oslo–based architectural firm, Statsbygg has estimated a 400million Krone cost for the functional restoration of the existing government buildings – a cost which exceeds, they argue, the demolition of the buildings and the construction of newer, more practical and efficient facilities. Lisbeth Halset, a senior partner at LPO, explained that the financial procedures which govern the decision-making process with regard to state buildings forced a recommendation of demolition, even though she personally favours an alternative course of action which would retain the existing buildings. This application of financial-managerialism has important implications for the remaking of place at the Government Quarter and has produced heated debate.

The official ”demolition” proposal (recently revoked) for the Oslo Government Quarter focused on the importance of replacing dated facilities, the provision of designed-in security by eliminating existing structural vulnerabilities (such as the main road which currently runs underneath one of the buildings), and increasing the circulation of trade and population by redesigning the quarter. The maximisation of economic potentials and circulations of money, people and trade through the centre of Oslo all chime with the resilience agenda, given their infrastructural visuality and temporal futurity – unlike the situation at Utøya where the AUF have been able to develop their own place-based approach to the normalisation of the island (given their private ownership of the site).

During the initial consultations and research into the redevelopment of the Government Quarter, this infrastructural-managerial framing of space in the official approach became immediately apparent. Minister Rigmor Aasrud, the responsible minister at the time, publicly
cited a pre-2011 “risk and vulnerability report” which revealed “varying resistances to critical situations, especially in power and cooling” throughout the aged facilities. Prognostications of risk, vulnerability and its mediation are core features of the contemporary resilience discourse. Despite their structural integrity, Aasrud introduced the possibility of demolishing buildings (including the prominent Høyblokka – the high-rise) so that infrastructure, facilities and urban circulations might be optimised. She commented that the cultural value of the buildings, while important, should be outweighed by managerial/urban-planning perspectives on functionality, risk evaluations and the appropriate use of land in Oslo city centre – all of which frame space as a composite of infrastructural, economic and systemic features:

The current government quarter was built up over a period of over a hundred years. The requirements for equipment and standards have changed a lot along the way, [especially…] energy and universal design, functional and secure ICT infrastructure, the capacity and safe supply of water, power and cooling / heating, and last but not least, the new security requirements and security solutions have emerged […] How to shape urban space so that it is available to residents, and possible to run a business and achieve good communication through the center of town. It should be about how we can create future-oriented jobs with the help of today's technological possibilities to facilitate interaction as we know from a modern working and which also are more energy- and environment-friendly than what we had.¹

Figures 1 & 2 ABOUT HERE
Minister Aasrud’s comments clearly indicated the preference of Statsbygg and the Stoltenberg government for managerial and circulation-based solutions to the recovery of the damaged buildings. While resilience is not applied to existing (rather than anticipatory) bombsites, this technocratic-managerialism chimes with the spatial visuality and anticipatory temporality of resilience discourse. However, contra the managerial/technocratic discourse, there has been a large public backlash against the proposal to demolish sections of the Government Quarter. The Norwegian public rejected this infrastructural visualisation of recovery and instead demanded a restitution of place through the retention of Høyblokka and its culturally significant components. Crucially, this support for the retention of the site and its place-heritage occurred despite the prevailing pre-2011 public ambivalence towards the buildings. The shift in public attitudes after Breivik’s attacks is interesting with respect to the relationship between place and resilience in the aftermath of a traumatic event. The violence directed at the buildings to contest their (somewhat ambivalent) symbolic place as landmarks in the social-democratic political culture of Norway has actually provoked a public campaign to retain and celebrate them. Their “place” has been reimagined and reinvigorated after Breivik’s bombing. As such, the debate between the official managerial approach and its contestation in public activism points to the importance of retaining/reimagining place in response to traumatic events. Re-placing traumatic spaces matters after a violent event - and public discontent with the official rebuilding plans in Oslo has demonstrated this. Yet such activism remains beyond the boundaries of “resilience”, the discursive terrain which is constituted through anticipatory temporality and abstracted spatiality.

To put it bluntly, before 2011 nobody really cared about the government buildings in Oslo. Despite the collaboration of Pablo Picasso, Carl Nesjar and Erling Viksjø in the innovative sandblasting of Picasso’s sketches onto the external and internal walls of the Government Quarter, the government buildings failed to develop a symbolic identity in the same vein as
the Oslo Parliament Building or Royal Palace. They are located away from the main tourist trails in the city and their imposing concrete modernist style made them difficult for the public to love. Ekman argues that, prior to Breivik’s bomb attack, most Norwegians possessed little interest in the government buildings which were regarded as somewhat featureless bureaucratic functionaries in the state apparatus. However, since 22nd July 2011 this ambivalence has radically shifted.

Within hours of the bombing, the Government Quarter buildings became the most talked about structures in the country. Statsbygg’s own media analysis of the debate which occurred in the five months after the bombing demonstrates the huge public interest in the conditions of the Government Quarter, apparently motivated by apprehension that the Government might choose to demolish the central structures. Additional research has shown that 120 times more photographs of the Government Quarter were uploaded in the year following 22 July 2011, than in the previous year. A fifth of these (almost 2,500 pictures) were published in the week after the bombing - more than one and a half times as many as those published in the preceding ten years.

Suddenly the Government Quarter was an important place, publicly saturated with symbolic meaning. Furthermore, since public consultations revealed the plans to demolish Høyblokka and other buildings, multiple commentators have developed the framing of “place” at the Quarter to contest the proposed destruction and modernisation. The incorporation of Picasso’s sketches into the structures has become a particularly salient narrative within the spirited defence of the government quarter. For example, after the report on reconstructing the Government Quarter was published, Oslo museum directors Lars Roede and Nina Berre were quoted in an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten hailing the sandblasting technique used to integrate Picasso’s sketches into the concrete structures of
government, opining that the buildings represent a "central work of Norwegian architecture".\textsuperscript{lv} Similarly, at the time of this author’s visit to Oslo, the Museum of Architecture hosted an exhibit on this very technique, further developing the public narrative of retaining the government buildings as important features of national cultural heritage.

Simultaneously, the somewhat-bleak concrete modernism of the buildings has been reframed by commentators as a valuable statement of Norwegian egalitarian values. Roede and Berre narrate the history of the Government buildings as the “architectural centre-point for Norwegian nation-building” where the High Rise and Y-Block exemplify the “foremost examples of modernism in Norway in the 1950s”. Nina Berre further commented that:

\begin{quote}
The High-Rise can also be considered as a symbol of the social democracy that evolved in Norway, with the grid architecture which parcels the building into a series of rectangles. This equality and regularity can symbolise the democratic values the building represents.\textsuperscript{lv}
\end{quote}

Similarly Espen Johnsen, an art historian at the University of Oslo, publicly proclaimed after Breivik’s bombing that:

\begin{quote}
The architect Erling Viksjø’s government building stands as our foremost symbol of the new monumental architectural design that was recognized in the decades after the war. The goal was to create new community-symbols to be used under the reestablished democratic society. Through a revised modernist idiom the architect and the artists succeeded to integrate the architecture and the art into a new unanimity. The Government Building represents the primary structure of this architecture ideal.\textsuperscript{vi}
\end{quote}
These discussions clearly indicate a surge of interest and affection for buildings once shunned in the public imagination – a surge provoked by dissatisfaction with the government’s effacement of place in redevelopment of the Government Quarter. A powerful narrative has emerged in public discourse about the cultural value of the buildings and the artworks etched into their concrete. In the aftermath of Breivik’s bomb, the site has been “re-placed”. No longer is the Government Quarter disregarded, instead it is publicly reimagined as an important site of cultural and architectural heritage.

The Norwegian intelligentsia has always, they claim, recognised the special worth of the site – and it is they who lead the debate on the appropriate redevelopment of the Quarter. Professor Elisabeth Seip of The Oslo School of Architecture and Design, who was approached by Statsbygg to provide a report on the cultural significance of the site, articulated her concerns to me that the official perspective is “extremely limited” in focusing on financial matters, given the enormity of the event which befell Norway in 2011. Her ”astonishment” at the proposal to demolish (against the advice of her report) also incorporated her surprise at the official disregard for efforts to “list” the buildings as a heritage site, a process which was nearly complete at the time of the bombing. In the aftermath, this listing process has been disregarded as evidence for the importance of retaining the buildings. Instead the violent destruction of the Quarter has instead been interpreted as an opportunity to maximise the economic and circulatory potential of the area.

Professor Seip stated:

I think it is not understood that this [Høyblokka] is a very nice piece of work also in an international context when it comes to modernism […] And I think it quite defends itself in our architectural history […] They are people who don’t like it. They think it looks like, they don’t see the beauty of the thing. But it’s a well-made object form its period. There is not discussion about that. The interesting thing is that the office of his
Directorate or of Monuments and Sites, they were working on listing the building […] It was almost finished when the bomb spread.\textsuperscript{lxix}

Somehow the efforts to list the buildings have not impacted upon the official plans to modernise and economise the space of the Quarter. Perhaps this disregard and institutional forgetfulness reveals something about the shock of unexpected violence and resulting knee-jerk impulses to adopt policies from neighbouring states. For example, after Breivik’s attacks Norway has not only explicitly endorsed the resilience discourse in post-22\textsuperscript{nd} July White Papers on security\textsuperscript{lix} (prompted by the official enquiry into the attacks), it has also framed the country’s approach to government buildings around the security policies of states (Germany and the United Kingdom were contacted for their advice) which are considered more experienced with counter-terrorism\textsuperscript{lxi}. As such, they have turned towards the application of the international resilience paradigm.

Contra the institutional knee-jerk reaction to adopt the international resilience discourse at the institutional level, this section has shown that the Norwegian public demonstrated profound sympathy for the concrete modernist structures after they were targeted by Breivik. While the Government Quarter was previously regarded with apathy and ambivalence, public contestation of the plans to demolish the buildings reveals the central importance of place to the normalisation of post-traumatic space. A large contingent of Norwegian people are unhappy that their government proposes the demolition of important buildings which were targeted by Breivik, sometimes alluding to this as “completing the job of the perpetrator”.\textsuperscript{lxii}

As such, we are witnessing the centralisation of place, identity and heritage in debates about the recovery of post-traumatic space. However the initial official plans for the site, and the international discourse of resilience, are blind to the architectural mediation of events as efficacious and as potential (counterfactual) resilience.
Seen through the counterfactual lens, the activism to reconstitute place upon post-terrorist sites could be identified as resilience in action. People want the site to bounce-back and to reassert its significance and identity, overcoming the destruction of the bombing. Furthermore, exploring this contestation of the government’s infrastructural visuality for the Oslo government quarter exposes the contingency of the resilience discourse and its deployment of risk, anticipation, futurity and abstracted spatiality. The popular demand for disaster recovery at the site instead championed the restitution of place and utilised a retrospective framing of the terrorist event. Should this be called resilience as well as recovery and memorialisation? And how should we interpret the ambiguity and contingency of the resilience discourse such that disaster site recovery does not matter to a policy supposedly tasked with generating adaptive continuity? Why, for policy, are some things memory and others security?

The discursive division between resilience and memory relies upon temporal and spatial framings whereby security targets the potential future event and memory-work deals with the ramifications of the previous event. This is neither neutral nor arbitrary. The spatially abstracted future is productive for security as a governing technique, whereby the conduct of populations can be conducted against the spectre of impending insecurity. Resilience, like other contemporary security projects, utilises the imagination of future risk to govern the present. Given that memory and past events do not fit this frame, they are excluded from the discursive remit of resilience. The New Utøya project and the efforts to re-place the Oslo Government Quarter are not labelled as security, despite the understanding of their protagonists that such disaster recovery enables the restoration of a feeling of safety. “Security”, then, is not about safety – it is about the imagination of the future and the concurrent governance of the present. It makes claims upon the attainment of safety but is actually oriented around the productivity of insecurity for politics and governmentality.
Conclusion

Resilience strategies imagine infrastructure which can absorb and mediate the shock of events. As anticipatory modes of governance, such policies address disaster recovery through the imagination and mediation of risks to abstracted urban systems. The resilience project utilises anticipatory imagination, infrastructural visuality and risk to make claims about security. However the curators of post-terrorist sites, and large sections of the Norwegian public, articulate their desires for “bouncing back” in place-related terminology - dedicating themselves to the architectural reconstruction and normalisation of destroyed places. The non-anticipatory and place-based articulation of post-terrorist normalisation is ignored by resilience policy and by most academic treatments of the discourse.

How can we explain the ambiguity of a policy dedicated to mediating shock and enabling recovery from disruption which ignores the “bouncing back” (or otherwise) of disaster sites? This article has explored two different counterfactual examples where the reclamation of place - the reassertion of continuity through historical place-identity – has been forcefully advocated by the curators of Utøya island and the public contestation of plans to demolish sections of the bombed Government Quarter. It has been argued that these public articulations of what could be called place-based resilience expose contingency and ambiguity in policy formulations of resilience. Rather than addressing the sites of terrorism or disaster, resilience policy imagines future scenarios and implements technocratic solutions to secure systems against these anticipated futures. Resilience policy and discourse thus both align with those critiques which suggest an affiliation with governmentality and neoliberalism. Here resilience and its vision of security signify the calculation and governance of an abstract and risky future through technological incorporations of slack into tightly-coupled systems, and
the shaping of the conduct of populations towards the management of their own risk and vulnerability. Resilience is not about achieving a state of safety, but rather the consolidation of the status quo in an “era of uncertainty” whereby governments and economies require populations to live “with”, not “against”, threats.

And yet, the New Utøya project and the activism to re-place the Government Quarter could also be called resilience, through the counterfactual lens. They aim to architecturally mediate the disruption of violent events so that people may once again feel safe, and so that places might return to a continuity of function and experience. In a sense, one could potentially call them practically focused and non-anticipatory forms of resilience or security – with the qualification that resilience discourse is blind to such projects, given its own visual and temporal constitution. These practices are instead left to characterisation as memory-work.

The resilience discourse centralises inevitable danger and the preparation of systems for events, and is blind to the importance of spatially-experienced projections of national identity and heritage (which, of course, make a façade of inclusiveness and homogeneity but do not include all persons). To quote Yi-Fu Tuan, the seminal theorist of place, “place is security”\textsuperscript{lxv} and the restoration of place on sites of terrorist attack serves the interests of ontological security for populations. The security advocated by the curators of Utøya, and by the public discontent with plans for the Government Quarter, involves the restoration of a feeling of safety and identity. In the words of Erland and Hakom of Fantastic Norway, this is achieved through re-occupying the places targeted by violence through architectural plans which invoke the event, through memorialising aspects, but focus on restoring continuity with previous imaginings of space. Security here indicates a restoration of feelings of safety, comfort and familiarity, whereas the official renderings of resilience consider a pervasive climate of insecurity to situate security technologies which invoke abstract urban systems and their potential to mediate shock. Recovery and feelings of safety do no matter here, and are
abandoned in favour of the maintenance of neoliberal circulations of money, goods and people.

Through counterfactual exploration of post-terrorist space, then, more credence is given to those critical readings of resilience which identify its connections to governmentality and neoliberalism. If this were not correct, resilience would show an interest in actual practices of disaster recovery which occur in the world, and not the imagined and abstracted future.

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7 With apologies to Jeff Huysmans for paraphrasing the title of his 1998 article, ‘Security! What do you mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’.
9 Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977).
10 Neocleous, “Resisting Resilience”.
Professor of Form, Theory and History at The Oslo School of Architecture and Design, 13 August 2013, Oslo.

H. Nadesan, Selections from the Essential Works of Tuan, Space and Place.


Vibecke Ystrad, Conflict of Interest: Preserving or Demolishing the Government Building in Oslo, Dissertation
prepared for Master’s degree in Cultural Heritage Management, Department of Archaeology, University of York (2013), pp. 33-4.


lvii Berre quoted in Nipen, “Bygningene formet det nye Norge”.

lviii E. Johnsen, ”Ikke riv høyblokka,” Dagsavisen, 28 July 2011, Meninger, p. 5.

lxxxiv Tuan, Space and Place, p. 3.