Nearly fifteen years after 9-11, the question of whether or not migration is the subject of securitisation appears to be a question worth interrogating. Is the linkage between migration and security a stable and enduring feature of contemporary society and politics? Or is the assumption of migration’s securitisation misplaced and lacking the appropriate evidence? Some scholars have suggested that migration has, indeed, been addressed as a security issue in both the pre- and post-9/11 period (Huysmans, 2006; van Munster, 2009). Others, by contrast, question whether it is appropriate to claim that migration has been securitised in a context marked by intensified concerns over terrorism (Boswell, 2007a).

Christina Boswell (2007a) suggests that it would not do to simply presume the securitisation of migration, nor would it do to automatically assume that 9/11 led to an intensification of such processes. Rather, she claims that it is important to pay attention to institutional interests and cognitive factors conditioning processes of securitisation (or non-securitisation), if we are to better understand whether or not migration has become articulated and addressed as a security problem in a post-9/11 context. I concur here with Boswell’s suggestion regarding the importance of unpacking processes of securitisation rather than assuming their presence. However, I also want to suggest that her challenge to the claim that migration has been securitized post-9/11 falls short, because it fails to take on board some of the key insights of scholars in the field of critical security studies.
Rather than simply ask whether migration has or has not been securitised post-9/11, I contend that it is more appropriate to pose this as a question regarding as to how far, in what ways, and with what consequences migration been has securitized over the past fifteen years and more. I suggest that this can facilitate appreciation of the securitisation of migration is neither absent nor present in any straightforward way. By contrast, this chapter argues that raising these broader questions can help us to develop appreciation of the securitisation as an absent presence in the contemporary European context.

**An entrenched divide**

This chapter suggests that divergent responses to the question of whether or not migration is securitised not only reflects divergent conceptualisations of securitisation, but also the entrenchment of a disciplinary divide over recent years between scholars of migration studies and scholars of critical security studies. In order to develop such an argument, I examine key dimensions of Boswell’s argument regarding the absence of securitisation, in order to set out some of the elements of critical security studies that I suggest she fails to take seriously.

Boswell argues that, although there is evidence of the securitisation of migration in the US, this is not the case in the European context (2007a: 590). Specifically, she argues that there is no evidence of a direct causal linkage between migration and terrorism at the level of political discourse or rhetoric in the European context, and that at the level of practice there is evidence of the transportation of migration control instruments into anti-terrorism practice, but not of the transportation of anti-terrorism practices into the field of migration control (Ibid). Drawing on neo-institutionalism
and systems theory, she argues that there is no evidence that 9/11 led to the securitisation of migration. This, she suggests, is a finding that is demonstrative of the deficiencies of scholarship in the field of critical security studies.

I will come back later in this chapter to question some of the assumptions that Boswell imports through her reading of critical security studies as primarily exploring how “public discourse can legitimise security practices” (Ibid.). For now, however, I want to reflect on what I understand to be the broader academic context within which her intervention is situated. In particular, I want to emphasise the significance of a series of differences, which arguably explain the entrenched divide between scholars of migration policy and critical security studies scholars. I understand this divide primarily as reflecting the different emphasis or focus of each body of literature, which also reflects a different political orientation and a different account of what serves as an important analytical intervention in the related fields of migration and/or border studies.

For scholars of migration policy, the emphasis has often been orientated more toward explaining the development, persistence and/or significance of liberalised immigration policies, particularly in light of the strength of popular anti-immigration sentiment. This reflects an orientation toward consideration of the ‘liberal constraints’ on government policy, such as liberal institutional norms or interests and the legitimacy of civil or human rights claims (e.g. Freeman, 1995; Joppke, 1998). Such a focus often entails an analytical intervention that explores the relationship between interests or institutional structures/norms and the development of policy and practice (see Boswell, 2007b). In the broader literature in this area, liberal im/migration
policies appear to stand in a relation of opposition to processes of securitisation (e.g. see Gibney, 2004).

By contrast, scholars of critical security studies do not assume a distinction between liberalisation and securitisation, but instead focus attention on the illiberal practices of liberal states (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). A key focus of critical security studies scholarship over recent years has been the development of border controls as manifestations of an (il)liberal rationality or form of governmentality. This includes consideration of the relationship between bordering practices and restrictive migration policies more broadly, as well as consideration of the development of techniques of surveillance and data management in particular. For example, critical scholars have focused on the exclusionary political effects of security discourses and practices in relation to the politics of mobility, particularly though not exclusively in the European context (e.g. Aradau et al, 2010; Guild, 2003; Jones, 2012; Lazaridis, 2011; Squire, 2009). Others have focused in more detail on the problematic implications of governing migration or mobility through risk-based biometric technologies (e.g. Ajana, 2013; Amoore, 2006; Epstein, 2007; Huysmans and Buonofino, 2008; Lewis, 2005; Lyon, 2005; Muller, 2005, 2010, 2011) and through digital forms of data management and surveillance (e.g. Balzacq, 2007; Bellanova and Fusster, 2013; Bonditti, 2004; Rygiel, 2011, 2013; Salter, 2008). This reflects a critical orientation toward the ways in which mobility or migration is governed. For some scholars, this is conceived of in terms of an exceptionalist politics marked by sovereign power and the violence of the decision (e.g. Salter, 2003, 2012). For others it is seen as the result of the ordinary law and practices of liberal states (see Basaran, 2008). The latter in
particular contributes to what Didier Bigo (2002) has called the production of a ‘generalised unease’.

It is not my aim here to interrogate how the different strands of critical security studies address the issue of migration (see Huysmans and Squire, 2015). Nor is it my aim to pose either liberal migration studies or critical security studies scholarship as more important than the other. Rather, I want to draw attention to the differences in the focus, approach and orientation of migration studies and critical security studies scholarship, in order to emphasise the ways in which these lead to differing assessments of the securitisation of migration. I develop this as a means to argue for the importance of a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between liberalisation and securitisation, as well as for a critical understanding of securitisation as a much more complex process or set of practices than Boswell assumes it to be. This chapter thus highlights the significance of a critical perspective, without dismissing the important insights that scholars of migration policy such as Boswell develop.

In other words, I want to make the case for a more careful consideration of the logic, practices and effects of security practices (or processes of securitisation) here, as a means to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the securitisation of migration both pre- and post-9/11. I seek to do this by developing three lines of argument. First, I want to set out a more nuanced understanding of what it means to analyse the securitisation of migration. Second, I want to argue for an understanding of what Boswell suggests to be the ‘absence’ of securitisation as an absent presence. Third, I want to emphasize the importance of understanding the coexistence of ‘liberalisation’
and ‘securitisation’ in terms that do not discount the important insights that a range of critical security studies scholars have developed over recent years. I do this by engaging in further detail with the various dimensions of Boswell’s argument.

**The securitisation of migration**

The first line of analysis that Boswell develops emerges from her focus on the rhetorical or discursive dimensions of securitisation. She refers to this as the “non-securitisation of migration control” at the political level (2007a: 598). Boswell argues that migration is not correlated with terrorism in political debate in the European context, and that there are three key cognitive and practical reasons for this. First, she argues that this represents a case of non-securitisation because terrorism and migration present incongruous images, such as that of the destitute asylum seeker versus that of the organised terrorist cell (Ibid: 598). Second, she claims that migration is not causally related to terrorism because the links between terrorism and migration are not held up by empirical evidence, with many terrorists found to be European nationals (Ibid: 598-600). Third, she argues that a causal linkage is absent because of a clash between securitisation and more liberal policies toward labour migration that have been predominant in Europe in the 2000s (Ibid: 600).

Boswell clearly highlights some important points here in assessing securitisation understood as a discursive or rhetorical process of articulating migration as a security issue. In particular, her insights are important for an analysis of the securitisation of migration as a ‘speech act’, because it facilitates an assessment of the ways in which the process of securitisation can fail without statements being accepted by key audiences (see Balzaqc, 2005). That Boswell pays attention to the specificity of the
institutional context, as well as to the way in which a ‘speech act’ of security involves cognitive processes that are important to the issue being accepted by an audience, is thus helpful here.

Nevertheless, questions arise as to whether these insights support the argument that Boswell makes regarding the non-securitisation of migration control. For example, that the asylum seeker and the terrorist represent ‘incongruous images’ does not necessarily lead to non-securitisation. Even if there is no direct and explicit link made between terrorism and migration, these can still be articulated as mutual threats. For example, migration and terrorism were flagged up by the UK rotating presidency of the European Union in 2005 as equivalent challenges in an increasingly ‘interconnected’ world: “Many of the issues faced by governments today, such as terrorism, asylum and immigration, and organised crime can be tackled most effectively through increased cooperation between member states” (Statement of the UK rotating presidency, 2005: 65). This is indicative of a mode of securitisation that does not presuppose the need for a direct or causal link between migration and terrorism, but rather that involves the presence of associational links as dimensions of the process of securitisation (see Squire, 2009).

Indeed, associational links between migration and terrorism have become commonplace in political and popular discourse over recent years, and might be understood as evidence of an intensification of the securitisation of migration, rather than as its absence. We can go further here in drawing on Boswell’s analysis to show how such associations in the absence of evidence of any direct empirical linkage between migration and terrorism is precisely indicative of the extent to which
securitisation has become a key way of framing migration (or articulating migration as an issue to govern) over recent years. To say that there is an absence of securitisation at a rhetorical or discursive level in this regard would seem to miss processes of securitisation that have become increasingly prevalent over recent years.

Moreover, if we move on to the second line of argument developed by Boswell regarding the linkages between migration policy and counter-terrorism at the level of practice, it would appear that her intervention may inadvertently further support the suggestion that securitisation has become key to the framing or governing of migration over recent years. She suggests that at the level of practice there is a clearer linkage of migration control and anti-terrorism measures (Ibid: 600). For Boswell, however, the direction in which these travel is posed as indicative of the absence of migration’s securitisation, with there being little change in migration practices post-9/11 but significant use of migration measures in the field of counter-terrorism in this context (Ibid: 600-601). By contrast, I want to suggest that the institutional or practical links that Boswell points to are precisely indicative of the securitisation of migration, regardless of the direction in which such practices travel. That migration was securitised prior to 9/11 (see Huysmans, 2006), and that the use of migration control measures in the field of counter-terrorism could be interpreted as indicative of this, is an argument that Boswell would appear to overlook.

As a brief aside, it is interesting to note Boswell’s jump here from what she calls the absence of securitisation at the level of discourse/rhetoric or political debate, to the absence of securitisation at the level of practice. Although Boswell couches this in terms of functional systemic or institutional differences between politics and
administration (2007a: 591-2), this is also suggestive of an analytical distinction between discourse (or rhetoric) and practice. The latter distinction has been problematized within critical security studies over recent years (e.g. see Squire, 2009). While securitisation theory as a ‘speech act’ has led to assumptions regarding a distinction between discourse and practice, many scholars within the field of critical security studies engage discourse more broadly in relation to an appreciation of the constitutive role of knowledge or rationalities of government (e.g. Huysmans, 1998). This lies in contrast to what might be defined as ‘thinner’ constructivist approaches that conceive discourse more narrowly in relation terms such as rhetoric, narrative or speech. Indeed, scholars of securitisation as a speech act have focused attention on the contextual dimensions that render any separation of discourse and practice problematic (Balzaqc, 2005). This clearly has implications for an argument regarding the absence of securitisation that begins with discourse understood simply in terms of speech or political debate. Nevertheless, I don’t want to dwell on these differences here, but rather I want to take from Boswell the invitation to think more carefully about the various dynamics that play into the development of migration policy and practice, taking this as important in understanding how migration is constituted as an issue to govern and in particular addressing this problematic in relation to the question of securitisation.

As indicated above, Boswell’s argument regarding the absence of securitisation at the level of practice hinges on the direction in which control instruments travel between the diverging areas of anti-terrorism and migration policy (2007a: 601). Here, she draws on more scholarship focused more on security professionals and institutionalised practices, and in particular on the ‘transversal’ dimensions of such
practices (Bigo, 2000; Huysmans, 2000). Focusing on data collection and management during the post-9/11 period, she challenges what she interprets to be the assumptions of critical security studies scholars by contending that it is more accurate to understand the interoperability of migration and security tools in terms of the use of migration control instruments for anti-terrorist purposes, rather than the extension of anti-terrorist instruments for migration control (Ibid: 601-5). She interprets this as corroborating her claim that securitisation has not occurred post-9/11, and out of her analysis produces a range of important insights regarding the divergent goals of security professionals and administrators as these relate to matters of institutional complexity and organisational goals or objectives (Ibid: 603-5).¹

When it comes to the question of the securitisation of migration, however, Boswell’s analysis potentially lends itself to a divisive reading of the differences between scholars of migration policy and critical security studies scholars. This is because the question remains a reductive one as to whether or not securitisation occurs, rather than the more pressing one of how far and in what ways securitisation occurs, and with what effects. This reflects a limited understanding of securitisation, which Boswell conceives in narrow terms as the correlation of migration to terrorism, or the transfer of counter-terrorism policy to migration control. Such a definition overlooks the broader sense within which securitisation has been interpreted in the critical security studies literature, where this refers to a process of governing through the production of ‘threats’ or ‘unease’ (Huysmans, 1998; Bigo, 2002).

Taking this broader definition as a starting point, we can understand securitisation as part of a wider process of ‘threat’ production through which migration (or specific
forms of migration) are linked or associated with various forms of in/security. This contrasts to a narrow understanding of securitisation in terms of a direct correlation of migration and security and/or in terms of a uni-directional relationship between the practices of controlling terrorism and those controlling migration. The claim that I want to make here, then, is that this broader conceptualisation may allow for an understanding of the ways in which processes of securitisation feature in the governing of migration, even where a direct or causal linkage of terrorism with migration (or a transfer or anti-terrorist measures to migration control instruments) appears to be absent.

**Securitisation as an ‘absent presence’**

To go back momentarily to the opening question of whether or not migration has been securitized post-9/11, I would agree with Boswell that the impact of 9/11 is less important than it might be (or have been) assumed. The association of migration and terrorism has a much longer and more varied history than an emphasis on 9/11 would imply, going back to the 1980s in the European context with the Trevi Group addressing security and policing concerns in the context of free movement (see Huysmans, 2006; Squire, 2009). More recently, the interoperability of migration and security instruments to which Boswell points have often been made sense of at the public or political level through a narrative regarding emergent threats in ‘an age of globalisation’, as indicated above. 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ may have added fuel to the fire of this narrative. Meanwhile, anti-terrorist measures may in more or less identifiable ways have been invested in practices of governing migration that are exceptionalist in their orientation (such as the Frontex Rapid Border Intervention Teams) and/or in terms that are orientated more toward the more general
production of unease (such as intensified surveillance and databases) (see Neal, 2009). Even where such developments are carefully evidenced, it is still not clear that 9/11 was a moment of marked change that marks the introduction or intensification of securitisation. As Boswell and others have suggested, the picture is more complex in the European context.

Nevertheless, this insight regarding the questionable significance of 9/11 to migration debate, policy and practice does not directly translate to an argument regarding the absence of securitisation following 9/11. Indeed, it seems to me important to acknowledge that processes of securitisation have continued to play an important role in the governing of migration over recent years. It is here that I want to come back to a point that Boswell brushes over rather briefly in her article. She claims that migration policy debates and practices were primarily framed in three ways prior to 9/11: with reference to the problems of irregular entrance, with reference to social and economic pressures (such as the pressure on welfare, housing and jobs), and with reference to the smuggling and trafficking of peoples (2007a: 594-5). Importantly, Boswell notes that each of these ways of framing the ‘problem’ of migration conditions the development of exclusive or exclusionary policies. Going further, I would stress the importance of understanding the presence of these ‘problems’ in the sphere of migration policy as indicative of the very the dominance of processes of securitisation to contemporary practices of governing mobility, not only prior to but also in a post-9/11 context (Squire, 2009). This rests on an understanding of securitisation as a divisive process that governs subjects (here: migrants) with reference to ‘risky’ or ‘threatening’ behaviours that are bound up with insecurities of various forms.
The argument that I want to make here is, however, slightly different from one that in any simple sense emphasises the presence of securitisation. Specifically, I want to consider whether what Boswell interprets as an absence of securitisation might be better understood as an ‘absent presence’. In other words I want to pose an alternative question, as to whether the very ‘absence’ of the direct or explicit dimensions of securitisation that Boswell highlights may imply that migrations (or particular forms of migration) are already assumed to pose a threat or to provoke various insecurities, and are thus governed as such. Far from the absence of securitisation, this might be understood as implying the relative success of securitisation. From the perspective of the ‘Copenhagen School’ of securitisation theory (Buzan et al. 1998), one might say that the audience already takes as given the truth of the securitising speech act, and thus the latter becomes superfluous. From a broader critical perspective, one might say that migration is already understood and governed within a frame of security according to a paradigm of threat (or risk), and thus the causal linkage of migration and security need neither to be directly articulated in debate nor to be directly traceable in practice in order for securitisation to be said to occur.iii Nevertheless, rather than simply focus on the presence or success of securitisation, I want to make the case for a more nuanced and multidimensional account of securitisation in order to address the questions of how far, in what ways, and with what consequences migration is securitised. This is an important shift away from Boswell’s focus on whether or not migration is securitised.

In light of this discussion, I want to emphasise the importance of developing appreciation not only of the differences between what Boswell calls political and
administrative functions, but also of the intertwinement of policy and practice with public, political and popular debates. I clearly cannot do this comprehensively here, but I hope to provide some insight as to the importance of doing this, particularly with reference to the three policy ‘problems’ of irregular entrance, social and economic pressures, and criminal smuggling and trafficking to which Boswell refers. I don’t want to refute the importance of the work of migration and critical security studies scholars who engage in the analysis of institutional and practical dynamics here, which importantly draw attention to the limitations of an analysis that focuses solely on public or political debate. However, I do want to suggest that more work needs to be done to address the ways in which securitisation can become a self-legitimating and self-fulfilling form of governing migration, which precisely demands an analysis that is sensitive to the ways that debates around migration and its control interrelate with practices in the constitution of migration as a ‘threat’. What I am trying to get at here is that what some might conceive of as the absence of securitisation may in fact be an ‘absent presence’ if we understand (a) securitising narratives and practices in a relatively broad sense as entailing the production of ‘threat’ and (b) an absence of direct and causal links between migration and insecurities such as terrorism as indicative both of the success of securitisation as well as the absence of evidence to support such a linkage.

Let’s thus briefly unpack the ‘absent presence’ of securitisation to which I refer here in relation to irregular entrance, social and economic pressures, and the smuggling and trafficking of migrants. I want to suggest that these policy problems can be understood as produced or reproduced through the very practices that are engaged to address them, when viewed from a broader perspective focusing on the
The intertwinment of discourse and practice. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the very problem of irregular entrance is one that needs to be understood as constituted as such through the development of restrictive measures that prevent authorised entrance in the first place, rather than a problem that is simply addressed by policy (Squire, 2009; see also Dauvergne, 2008). Similarly, I have argued that pressures on housing and services are often provoked through the ways in which policies such as dispersal are put into practice (Squire, 2009). Other scholars have pointed to the problems or insecurities associated with smuggling and trafficking as provoked by state policies that create certain migrants as vulnerable in the first place (for example, on the migration of sex workers to European Union see Andrijasevic, 2010). The securitisation of migration, in other words, can be understood as bound up with the constitution of policy problems that become self-perpetuating in effect.

Going further, it is important to stress that the ways in which these policy problems are engaged do not only constitute migration (or particular migrations and migrants) as ‘threatening’, but so also do they shift the burden of insecurity onto migrants in ways that foreclose different understandings of such issues. For example, irregular entrance might be alternatively conceived of as reflecting a problem whereby political and social arrangements are ill-suited to contemporary migratory dynamics, while social and economic pressures might be conceived of as a reflecting a problem of growing global and localised inequalities that serve as conditions under which migration occurs. The association of migration with different problems might in this regard be conceived of as a particularly effective way of constituting migration as a ‘threat’, because it invokes the presumption of ‘guilt’ without exposing the limitations of making the direct linkage between migration and a range of wider concerns. At the
same time, however, I have suggested that policies and practices that rest on an assumption that such a linkage is founded can produce the very problems that they are purportedly designed to resolve, because in taking for granted the implication that such a link exists they reproduce such an assumption and thus recreate this in the practices that they enact. Securitisation in this regard would seem to be present precisely through what Boswell refers to as its absence, which in my terms is better understood as an absent presence. In the very absence of its direct articulation securitisation thus marks its presence, just as in its presence we find an absence of evidence by which to ground securitisation.

**Securitisation and liberalisation**

I would now like to return briefly to Boswell’s final claim regarding the reason for an absence of the securitisation of migration at the level of political debate, which I suggest reflects her problematic assumption regarding the distinction between processes of liberalisation and processes of securitisation. Boswell argues that a causal linkage between migration and terrorism is absent because of the clash between securitisation and more liberal policies toward labour migration predominant in Europe in the 2000s (2007a: 600). It is here that the political differences between – or differing political diagnosis of – scholars of migration policy and scholars of critical security studies are most evident. Boswell’s critique would seem to rest on an assumption that critical security scholars fail to acknowledge the liberalisation of migration policy. Yet this in turn would seem to me to rest on a misreading (or limited reading) of the critical security studies literature, while at the same time overlooking the critical importance of understanding how liberalisation and securitisation play into one another in the development of ‘managed migration’ or liberal labour migration.
policies. In turn, this reflects the limitations of Boswell’s opening question of whether or not migration is securitised post-9/11. Not only do the continuities between the pre- and post-9/11 period show this question to be problematic, but so also does the coexistence of liberal and securitized policies suggest that there is more at play here than simply different institutional pressures or aims that render particular organisational units ‘incoherent’.

For critical scholars, the processes of liberalisation to which Boswell refers are less distant from securitisation than she assumes. Indeed, I would argue that ‘managed migration’ has never been simply a project of liberalisation, but rather it has always held the opening of migration routes as conditional on the closure of others (or has held the acceptance of some migrants as conditional on the refusal of others) (see Squire, 2009). Going further, scholars of critical security studies challenge the distinction between liberalisation and securitisation that is so central to a liberal perspective. Instead, they focus attention on the normalisation of exceptionalist politics to liberal politics, and/or on the illiberal practices of liberal states (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). What Didier Bigo (2002) has called the production of a ‘generalised unease’ in this regard is integral to the liberal dimensions of European policy, which Boswell assumes as a factor that explains the non-securitisation of migration. Far from evidence of non-securitisation, developments such as ‘managed migration’ might in this regard be interpreted as indicative of the absent presence of a form of securitisation that is difficult to directly evidence but that nevertheless haunts contemporary migration and border control.
We might conceive managed migration in different ways: whether as an institutionalised mode of ‘governing through freedom’ as Foucauldian critical security scholars such as Didier Bigo might conceive it, or as a compromise solution between liberalism (or neoliberalism) and restrictionism as an analysis focused on ‘liberal constraints’ might suggest. Whichever our preferred interpretation, to engage in an analysis of managed migration as refuting the significance of processes of securitisation would seem to me to risk undertaking an analysis that writes out some of the most pressing political considerations that emerge with regard to questions of governing migration in contemporary Europe.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have undertaken a sustained engagement with Christina Boswell’s argument regarding the non-securitisation of migration since 9/11 in order to suggest that the securitisation of migration remains an ‘absent presence’ in the European context. My argument regarding the ‘absent presence’ of the securitisation of migration has two key dimensions. First, I suggest that the association of migration with a series of ‘problems’ is so well embedded in the European context that migration is successfully constituted (i.e. broadly accepted) as a ‘threat’, and thus we can effectively understand securitisation as conditioning the very assumptions under which migration policy and practice is developed. Second, I suggest that the very assumption of migration as a ‘threat’ effectively becomes self-fulfilling in practice, where policies fail to resolve problems associated with migration as a ‘threat’ and thus in effect reproduce the problems associated with the ‘threat’ of migration. In order for securitisation to occur, migration (or specific forms of migration) in this
regard does not need to be explicitly articulated as a security threat (although it sometimes is), nor does it need to be directly and causally linked to issues such as terrorism (though it sometimes has been). From this perspective, it is not the unidirectional relation between terrorism and migration policy that is relevant in assessing processes of securitisation. Rather, what is of most concern is the process by which migration or specific types of migration become bound up with concerns over in/security, and the effects of such processes in circumventing alternative engagements with migration in terms that escape such processes of securitisation.

The differences between my reading of the securitisation of migration and Boswell’s reading of migration’s non-securitisation reflect differing political, methodological and analytical concerns. While Boswell seeks to examine divergent institutional and systemic functions within an administrative framework, I seek to develop a broader political sociological analysis of the governing of migration. Boswell distinguishes discourse from practice, while I do not accept such a division. Moreover, Boswell identifies a difference between processes of securitisation and processes of liberalisation, while I suggest that the two are less distinct than it is often assumed. Yet the aim of this chapter is not to further entrench existing divides, rather it is to penetrate more carefully the question of how, in what ways, and with what effects migration is securitised. This is not to assume the securitisation of migration, nor is it to privilege 9/11 in the history of this process. Rather, it is to unpack securitisation more fully, to consider the benefits and limitations of its differing operationalization, and to open the scope for alternative ways of engaging migration. Such a focus need not divide scholars of migration studies and critical security studies, but can also bring
them together as a means to explore how security features in debates and practices around migration and its control.
Bibliography


I don’t want to go into the details of this here, since it takes us in a somewhat different direction from the one I want to take in this article. However, I do want to indicate that the issue of contradictory goals or pressures to which Boswell points in her discussion of organisations or institutions (such as the Home Office in the early-mid-2000s) is important. Indeed, this may be particularly the case when it comes to the issue of the coexistence of securitisation and liberalisation in the field of migration policy, which is a broader issue with which this paper engages. Boswell’s intervention provides some important insights that may allow us to consider further how this coexistence might be understood in relation to what she conceives as ‘conflicting’ institutional norms and organisational goals. As I suggest later in this chapter, the extent to which the norms of securitisation and liberalisation conflict is questionable from a critical perspective.

The securitisation of migration in this regard is not necessarily clearly distinguishable from the criminalisation of migration, since the production of threats entails modes of governing in relation to problems of criminality as well as security. For this reason, I elsewhere find it more appropriate at a general conceptual level to address such processes in terms of the broader concept of irregularisation (see Squire 2009, 2011).

Going further, one might say that the successive criminalisation of migrants such as through the increase of workplace raiding and the development of irregular entrance as a criminal offence is indicative of the ways in which criminality has increasingly featured in the governing of migration over recent years. This in turn might be understood as indicative of the success of securitisation in the broader sense of its meaning as governing migration through the production of ‘threat’.

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(Abingdon: Routledge).