PATTERNS OF CONFLICT IN THE ENGLISH MORALITY PLAYS

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Abstract

The dissertation considers the English morality plays as explorations of inner conflict. The pre-Reformation moralities use personification-allegory as a means of analysing the conflict which takes place within the soul of man between his attachment to this world and his other-worldly aspirations. The social ethic of Reformation theology, however, introduces a new interest in social relationships. The moralities of the post-Reformation period retain allegory to analyse the inner processes which lead to ethical choice, but they also incorporate literal dramatis personae in order to express social themes, and the proportion of personification-allegory correspondingly decreases.

The early popular Elizabethan "tragedies" are predominantly literal, but they tend to retain personified abstractions as a means of expressing inner conflict. It is suggested that in the transition from this hybrid form to purely literal tragedy, the allegorical technique of the earlier plays is absorbed rather than discarded, that the deliberative soliloquies of later tragic heroes are a development of the analysis of inner conflict leading to ethical choice which is central in the morality tradition.
Acknowledgments.

I am indebted above all to Professor G.K. Hunter who supervised this dissertation. His abundant wit and science are the basis of its virtues: its vices are my own. Dr. N. Jardine kindly provided information on the history of science. I am grateful to Miss M. Wright who typed the manuscript. Andrew Belsey, who drew figure 1, has been a constant source of sympathy and incisive criticism.
Notes on Presentation.

I have modernised the titles of plays, the names of characters and, where appropriate, the typography of printed texts (i, u, vv, etc.)

In order to reduce the number of footnotes, I have incorporated references into the text, giving the name of the author or editor and the page number. Where it is necessary to differentiate between works by the same author, I have added the date of the edition cited. Full details of the work concerned are given in the bibliography, which lists authors or editors alphabetically, followed immediately by the dates of the editions cited. The works of an individual author or editor are listed in chronological order.

As far as the dates of the plays are concerned, unless I indicate otherwise, I have accepted the dates given by Harbage in Annals of English Drama, revised by S. Schoenbaum (1964).
# Patterns of Conflict in the English Morality Plays

## Introduction

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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to consider the English morality plays as forms concerned with the exploration of inner conflict, to trace the changes in the nature of this conflict with the consequent developments in the morality form, and to suggest the influence on some Elizabethan tragedies of the patterns of analysis of inner conflict in the earlier drama.

In Part I I discuss the moralities which, as far as we know, were written before 1535. I have called them "medieval" because they have in common the Catholic theology of the pre-Reformation period, and because I wish to argue that they are all to varying degrees concerned with the expression of a form of asceticism which is associated primarily with the middle ages. The medieval moralities explore the conflict within the soul of man between his attachment to this world and his otherworldly aspirations. The conflict is expressed in personification-allegory.

Part II deals with the influence of the Reformation on the morality themes. While otherworldly values are not discarded, the importance of this world increases. The social ethic of Reformation theology introduces a new interest in social relationships and the morality form is broadened to include this new concern. Social themes begin to be expressed by literal dramatis personae and the proportion of personification-allegory correspondingly decreases. At the same time, the theory of predestination modifies the importance of inner conflict. According to Calvinist beliefs, salvation is the result of divine grace and cannot be freely chosen. Nonetheless, thanks to the eclectic nature of the English Reformation, allegorical accounts of psychological conflict do continue, and remain one of the constituents of the later moralities. Allegory and the literal drama coexist, sometimes uncomfortably, with the morality form.

In Part III I consider the emergence of the tragic form. The early
Elizabethan "tragedies" are secular plays based on literal narratives dealing with social relationships. Many of them, however, retain morality features, specifically the use of personified abstractions to express inner conflict. I hope to show that in the transition from this hybrid form to purely literal tragedy the allegorical technique is absorbed rather than discarded, that the deliberative soliloquies of later tragic heroes are indebted to the analysis of inner conflict developed in the morality plays.

Before I attempt to analyse the medieval moralities in detail, it is necessary to limit the terms of this investigation by explaining in general how I understand certain concepts which recur within it. First, the morality plays themselves. Though it will not be possible entirely to ignore other contemporary forms, my central concern is with moralities and plays with certain morality features. I take a morality to be a play in which the central dramatis persona are personified abstractions. More specifically, these tend to consist of a hero who represents man in general (Everyman, for instance) or a particular type of man (Magnificence, Worldly Man, Lusty Juventus), and in addition a series of personifications representing moral, social, spiritual or psychological forces exerting an influence on the hero. Principally these are internal attributes (Courage, Revenge, Knowledge), social pressures (New-Guise, Cloaked Collusion) or external forces which stir an impulse or response in the hero (World, Fortune, God's Mercy).

The plays make no formal distinction between external and internal forces because their central concern is with the soul of the representative hero. In the case of World, for instance, the stimulus is external and the response obviously internal, but a single figure personifies both. Lechery, equally, is an inner response to an external stimulus. The plays dramatise the relationship between the soul and the influences on it, a
relationship which is finally one of submission or rejection. The sources of these influences make no structural difference. Thus the morality stage represents the spiritual cosmos, in which the distinction between "internal" and "external" has little meaning. The central action of the plays takes place within the soul and can thus be regarded as essentially psychological.

In late moralities in which allegory is adapted to express an entirely sociological or political theme a similar definition of the morality form may be applied. The central figure is then understood to be England, for instance, or London, but the remaining dramatic personae are attributes of the state, or forces exerting pressure on it (Wealth, Policy). Isolated examples of such sociological personifications occur in plays showing the social implications of individual choices.

Although the typical morality play is a sermo corporeus (Thompson, 1910, pp.293-312), it seems to me that W.R. Mackenzie is misleading when he offers as part of his definition the fact that the morality invariably "has for its main object the teaching of some lesson for the guidance of life" (1914(i), p.9). It is true that many of the plays include a good deal of homiletic address to the audience, but these moral admonitions are not confined to the moralities, and so are not a defining characteristic. Like other plays of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the moralities are didactic, of course, but often in a very general way. The lesson of The Castle of Perseverance, for instance, can be reduced to the fact that a man may sin with impunity as long as he remembers to ask for mercy on his death-bed. Undue emphasis on the didactic element seems to me to lead attention away from the central characteristic of the moralities. This is the analysis of the processes of ethical choice through the technique of personification-allegory, which isolates the abstract agents involved in these processes in order to display the nature of the conflict between them.
The specifically medieval moralities are consistently concerned with the conflict between worldly and spiritual values, the struggle within the soul to achieve an attitude of \textit{contemptus mundi}. This conflict is not, of course, confined to the middle ages. The contempt for material objects and the elevation of purely spiritual values is a recurrent element of Western thought. It is a dominant theme in Plato's philosophy (Cornford, p.4) and can be traced through the Neoplatonism of the Church Fathers well into the Renaissance. The rise of science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries weakened its dominance, but in the nineteenth century, the great age of materialism, a modernised form of asceticism maintained a powerful hold on literature. The isolated, visionary Romantic poets, and the heirs of the Romantic tradition, especially Tennyson, Arnold and Yeats, torn between the values of art and the material world, share something of the conflict of medieval asceticism. The twentieth century, too, has its escape routes from the intolerable materialism of society. But asceticism as the prevailing orthodoxy is a specifically medieval phenomenon. The following brief account of medieval otherworldliness is based on a number of non-dramatic writings by St. Bernard, Innocent III, Bernard of Morlaix, Richard Rolle and Thomas à Kempis.

Contempt of the world was essentially an expression of Christian dualism. It is within the framework of a view of fallen man torn between body and soul, and of a fallen world poised between heaven and hell that the concept is to be understood. The danger was that this precarious balance might at any time be upset, that man might fall still further into sensuality and sin, the world disintegrate into chaos. The soul looks upwards, the body naturally turns towards the earth of which it is made. "For the corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthy tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things". (Wisd.9, 15). St. Paul lays much emphasis on the conflict between body and soul,
"For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." (Gal. 5, 17; cf. Rom. 7, 22-5; I Peter 2, 11).

This is perhaps an inevitable development in a religion which promises eternal life. It is evident that the body dies. It must therefore be the soul which survives. The mortal body is thus inferior to the immortal soul. The soul, which is to live in heaven, must be essentially pure, so sin is the province of the flesh. Obedience to the flesh is death; life in obedience to the spirit is eternal (Rom. 8, 6 and 13; Gal. 6, 8). Man, because he is compounded of flesh as well as spirit, is inevitably subject to sin.

Thus Christian doctrine avoids the Manichaean view that matter is evil in itself but succeeds in retaining a dualism which despises the body. The medieval tendency was to think in hierarchies rather than in antitheses (Howard, p. 28). The flesh was not antithetical to the spirit but a lower attribute of man, and the highest way of life was that which, by the practice of asceticism, gave the fullest freedom to the soul. Monasticism, the relinquishing of all material cares, was conceived by its founders as a way of perfection (Flew, pp. 159-61; Bloomfield, 1957, pp. 231-2).

The monastic life was a rejection of the world. Like the flesh, the world is not intrinsically evil. It is the work of God and the manifestation of his glory (Rom. 1, 20). But "the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial is another" (I Cor. 15, 40). The rhetoric of contempt of the world gradually comes to pay less attention to the beauty of the visible creation and more to the danger that the transitory world may come to be preferred to its eternal Creator. God himself and not his creation is the true objective of the soul. Life in this world is a preparation for life in heaven, and is frequently described allegorically as a pilgrimage through an alien territory in
which the soul is in constant search of its true home.

As earth's blessings are transient, so are its sorrows. The life of the pilgrim, because he is in exile, and because he must deny himself any attachment to the solaces the journey offers, is of necessity a sorrowful one. But the remembrance of his objective can mitigate his sufferings. Only death can end the earthly pilgrimage and the restless striving of life in this world. In St. Augustine's phrase, "inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te" (Confessions I,i).

This world is not wholly negative, however, since it is in the world that man makes his choice of future life or death. The world through which the pilgrim travels, morally neutral in itself, is a threat to him because it contains the sources of temptation. It is filled with spurious delights, ready to turn him from the true path, which are in reality pitfalls to secure his eternal damnation. Contempt of the world springs not from a loathing of the world itself but from fear of its enticements. The aim of the exponents of contempt of the world is to denounce the folly of attachment to the apparent sources of pleasure in the world so that in proportion as these are recognised as "false felicities" the spirit may be free to experience the joys of heaven. Their writings dwell on the miseries of this life, the mutability of worldly goods, the corruption of fallen man, death and impending judgment. The rejection of the hollow pleasures of this world is a preparation for the joys of the next.

But this rejection requires a constant battle against worldly values. Christianity has consistently employed the imagery of warfare. The Christian story begins with the revolt and defeat of the angels and ends with the final war in heaven. In the interim, man himself is the battle-field on which the Devil perpetuates the conflict between good and evil. The New Testament account of Christian warfare uses imagery which surely suggested the form of the Psychomachia of Prudentius:
Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the Devil. For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world .... Stand therefore, having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of righteousness; And your feet shod with the preparation of the gospel of peace; Above all, taking the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked. And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.

(Eph.6, 11-17).

The fourth century poem of Prudentius turns Christian warfare into an allegorical battle between personified vices and virtues, and though the English moralities largely abandon full-scale physical battle after The Castle of Perseverance, they retain the concept of an allegorical contest for the soul of man.

Coleridge's contempt for allegory because it retained an intellectual and interpretative distance between the object and its meaning (Miscellaneous Criticism, pp.30-31) has had a profound influence on subsequent criticism, and even recent defences of allegory have had little to say about the morality plays (e.g. Tuve), and sometimes specifically exclude them (e.g., Murrin, p.14). But C.S. Lewis's analysis of The Romance of the Rose in The Allegory of Love seems to me to have demonstrated the power of personification-allegory to display the complexities of inner experience, and the moralities, though they are concerned with the impediments to divine rather than human love, are in the same tradition and are capable of a similar degree of psychological subtlety. Obviously personification-allegory was the only way to dramatize the inner experience of a single man, unless the
audience was to be content with dramatic monologue, but the form itself was to become an increasingly subtle means of exploring and analysing the nature of this experience.

Further, it is not, I think, a mere accident of chronology that determines the form of the medieval morality plays. There is a fundamental connection between contempt of the world and allegory itself. The changes subsequently effected in the form of the drama are not simply technical. The history of the development from allegory to literal drama is not merely the history of gradual changes from the abstract to the concrete and from the universal to the particular. These changes do occur, but they are themselves the reflection of a movement of thought away from asceticism. The allegorical form of the medieval moralities is intimately related to their otherworldly themes. The philosophy of contempt of the world treats this world as important only because it is a place in which temptation occurs, the setting in which man determines his eternal future. Allegory too reveals a lack of interest in the external world. Characters and objects are introduced into the moralities primarily in order to represent states of mind. As I have suggested, the psychomachia, the traditional material of moral allegory and the essential form of most of the medieval morality plays, is concerned exclusively with what takes place within the soul. The outside world is of no significance in itself; it is important only in so far as it threatens the soul's stability of purpose. Place and time (except in so far as time involves mutability and mortality), the appearance of the external world, and social relationships are relevant to the kind of allegory that is presented in the plays only as pressures exerting an influence on the mind of the protagonist. This is the inevitable consequence of the prevailing otherworldly attitude. If it is only man's immortal soul which has real value, then only the soul is truly worthy of investigation. Social relationships and social situations are of little interest since they
belong to the world and the world is contemptible. Observation of the 
externals of life is therefore at a minimum in the plays. We see 
Humanum Genus experiencing internal conflict; we do not see how he 
behaves at home or in the tavern.

Allegory of the purest kind is perhaps confined to The Castle of 
Perseverance. Later an element of social satire is introduced to display 
the ways in which vice manifests itself in the world. In Medwall's 
Nature Pride is proud, Gluttony a glutton and so on. Mind, Will and 
Understanding introduces the social evils of Maintenance and Perjury 
(Sevington, 1963). But the development of "realism" of this kind is 
not incompatible with contempt of the world. Sermons on the evils of 
the times consistently employ social satire (Owst, 1961, pp.210-470). 

By the fifteenth century satirical descriptions of social types are as 
conventional as the psychomachia itself. The element of satire in the 
plays cannot be taken as evidence of a new interest in the social order. 
The observation of the world which was required to portray a rogue or a 
glutton was minimal at a period when such figures featured prominently 
in popular sermons. The portrait of Pride as a dandy has the double 
function of making him more readily recognizable to the audience and 
providing the opportunity to ridicule extravagant dress. It also makes 
him more amusing and thus sugars the pill of homily with entertainment.

At a time when Shakespearean critics were beginning to call in 
question the value of judging his plays according to the criteria of 
realism, plausibility, their representation of what might happen in 
actuality, writers on the morality plays still tended to see allegory 
as an impediment to dramatic success. In their view the moralities 
of the sixteenth century were marching resolutely forward towards 
realism, gradually discarding the shackles of allegory in order to 
represent life and character mimetically.
Before Elizabethan drama could go far upon the road toward tragedy it needed to learn that the poetic discovery of life's inner nature is not dependent on abstracting and allegorising. It needed to learn that the dramatic poet's most severe but most rewarding task is the revelation of human universality by the very act of creating human individuality. (Parnham, p. 212; cf. Gayley, pp. 293 ff.; Mackenzie, 1914 (i), p. 9; Ramsay, pp. cxci-cxcvii).

In Parts II and III I hope to suggest that the process was not one of simple technical evolution, that allegory gradually gave way to the literal drama as a result of broad theological changes which affected the subject matter of the moralities, and that the insights which allegory had made possible influenced the deliberative soliloques of purely literal Elizabethan tragedy.

The most successful recent studies of the moralities and their influence have been concerned with specific areas, staging (Craik, 1958), the Vice (Spivack) and structure (Bevington, 1962). I wish to investigate another specific area in this field, namely the morality analysis of inner conflict and its heritage.
PART I

THE MEDIEVAL PATTERN
Chapter I  
THE WORLD AND GOD

Man has free will but he is flesh as well as spirit. His flesh inclines towards the world, his soul aspires to heaven. This conflict is the central theme of the medieval morality plays, and it is presented in various closely related but distinct forms. The plays analyse the conflict between divine and worldly values, the struggle between reason on the one hand and sensuality, folly or the will on the other, and man’s conflicting attitude to death, the inevitable moment of separation from the world. I shall deal with each of these forms of inner conflict in turn. In this chapter I hope to demonstrate that one of the central concerns of these plays is the divided predicament of man in this life, impelled by his divine aspirations towards God, but driven by his fallen nature to adopt the values of the world.

In order to show the consistency with which this theme is presented in the plays it is necessary to give a brief account of background material, some of which is already familiar.

Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world. If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. (I John, 2, 15-16).

The three sins of the world, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the pride of life are repeatedly identified in medieval writings with the three deadly sins, lechery, avarice and pride. Donald H. Howard has demonstrated the wide currency of this connection in patristic and later Latin literature (Howard, pp. 43-75), but he does not discuss the extent to which in popular works too the three concupiscences had come
to represent worldliness and to stand for all sin. The fifteenth century author of The Mirror of our Lady sees pride, avarice and the lust of the flesh as the source of all sin, and refers to the passage from St. John (p.99). The three sins and the Biblical passage provide the structure of a middle English sermon on the text, "Quia ibit ad rogandum pro pace?" (Ross, pp.206-14). Another is similarly constructed: men are spiritually drunk with the three drinks of pride, avarice and lechery, which lead men to hell (Ross, pp.228-41). When Fortune shows Langland's dreamer the land of longing in a mirror called Mylerid, she is accompanied by three worldly ladies, Concupiscencia-carnis, Covetise-of-eyes and Pryde-of-parfyte-livyng. Thd dreamer follows the first of these and then the second, until old age brings poverty (B XI, 1-61). Chaucer's Parson explains that though baptism purges original sin, the inclination to evil remains in men in the form of the three concupiscences of the flesh, of possession of worldly goods, and of "hynesse by pride of herte", (Pars.T., 335). Lechery, avarice and pride are consistently synonymous with St. John's three sins of the world. To be guilty of these sins is to submit to worldly values.

Pride, avarice and the lust of the flesh were the three sins of Adam which were resisted in the wilderness by Christ, the second and antithetical Adam (E.M.Pope, pp.51 ff.; Howard, pp.47-53). This connection, with its implications for the Lenten fast, is expounded in a sermon by John Mirk (p.83). The Expositor in the Chester Play of The Temptation explains that Christ has overcome Adam's gluttony, vainglory and avarice (11.161-208).

Riches, honours and delights, the three sources of worldly pleasure, conventionally satisfy the three concupiscences. Thomas à Kempis insists that true wisdom lies in despising the world and drawing nearer
to God, and "It is therefore a great vanitie to labour inordinatlie for worldly riches, which shortlye shall perishe, and to covet honor, or any other inordinate pleasures or fleshlie delightes in this lyfe" (à Kempis, fol.iv.). Chaucer's Parson, too, sees the distractions of the world as "honours, delices and richesses" (Pars.T., 185).

The three sins are no less commonly identified with man's three great enemies in this life, the World, the Flesh and the Devil. (Howard, p.62). The World, as one of this trio, is specifically connected with avarice (while the world which is to be despised incorporates all three sins), the Devil is naturally associated with pride, and the Flesh primarily with lechery. Worldly men are those who love these three enemies more than God (Ross, pp.107-8). Piers Plowman describes the tree of charity which springs in man. It is threatened by the wind of the World, which breeds covetousness, and the wind of the Flesh, which is the source of lust and pleasure. The Devil shakes the tree and carries off its flowers (B.XVI, 21-52).

Often the three adversaries are associated with all seven deadly sins. A tale in the Gesta Romanorum, "De septem peccatis mortalibus", tells how a man enters a grove of seven beautiful trees. Three men help him to collect more leaves than he can carry and lead him to a bog in which he sinks. The trees are the seven deadly sins and the helpers are the World, the Flesh and the Devil (Bloomfield, 1952, p.131). When the three powers are seen as the sources of all seven sins, the Devil is usually associated with envy and wrath as well as pride, the World with avarice, and the Flesh with lechery, gluttony and sloth (Ross, pp.31-2; Bloomfield, 1952, pp.141, 149, 168, 203, 213).

In general, then, in popular works, the most probable analogues of the morality plays, avarice, lechery and pride are the respective provinces of the World, the Flesh and the Devil, whose objective is to turn man from the love of God towards the desire for transitory worldly
pleasures. References to the three adversaries come to suggest the three concupiscences, and by implication all the deadly sins. Deadly sin, service to the three powers, or subjection to the three concupiscences represents the rejection of God in favour of the world. Man, because he is in the world, because he is flesh as well as spirit, is particularly susceptible to the temptations of the world. His salvation depends on his escape from the World, the Flesh and the Devil, and his pilgrimage through life is a battle against these three sources of worldliness.

This conflict is the central theme of The Castle of Perseverance (1405-25). The play, which gives an account of man's life from birth to Judgment, is the archetype of the extant moralities in terms of its vast scope, the purity of its allegory, and the unmitigated seriousness of its presentation. Several of the later plays have a similar moral structure, but none reveals its ethical purpose with more clarity.

Humanum Genus is born naked and helpless, with the gift of free will, accompanied by a Good and a Bad Angel. After a dispute he yields to the Bad Angel's arguments and is led to commit the seven deadly sins. He reforms and enters the Castle of Perseverance, which is inhabited by the seven virtues. The sins besiege the Castle and the virtues defeat them with roses, emblems of Christ's Passion. Humanum Genus, however, succumbs to the persuasions of Covetousness and chooses to leave the Castle. He dies in sin but calling on the mercy of God. His death is followed by a debate in heaven between Justice and Truth, who condemn him, and Peace and Mercy, who plead for his salvation. Mercy prevails and his soul is saved by the Atonement.

A more detailed examination of the play reveals that it concerns a series of choices between the world and God. The action opens with the World, the Flesh and the Devil seated on their respective scaffolds. The World announces that his object is to control men until they die (11.168-9). He boasts of his universal power, listing the countries
which have been seized for him by his treasurer, Covetousness (170-82). The Devil claims that Pride is his prince, Wrath and Envy his fellows (209-11). The Flesh, "florochyd in flowrys" (237), is dedicated to mirth and melody (240). He is unabashed by his awareness of his own mortality (241-2). Gluttony, Lechery and Sloth, his three noble companions, will assault Humanum Genus (248-53). And he concludes triumphantly:

Behold þe Welld, þe Devyl, and me!

Wyth all our mythis we kyngys thre

Nyth and day besy we be

For to distroy Mankende. (266-9).

The three adversaries are ready for the destruction of Humanum Genus. He enters, feeble and naked (278-9), complaining that he is born of earth (297) to a life of "woo and wepyng" (289). There immediately follows a dispute between the Good and Bad Angels, who represent the conflicting aspects of his nature. The Bad Angel is eager that he should "hym drawyn to þe Welds servyse" (342), but the Good Angel insists that worldly goods are worthless and only heavenly treasure endures (350-62). The Bad Angel offers the three worldly pleasures, a fair lady, rich rents, and fine clothes, the last a recurrent emblem of pride (Owst, 1961, pp.404-11), and advises him to "late bedys be" (363-70). If he once tastes "a gobet of þe welld" he will find it "good and sweete" (364-5). Humanum Genus is perplexed, torn between the opposing impulses of his dual nature, but he makes it clear that he understands the nature of the choice he must make: "þou woldyst to þe Welld I me toke,/ And he wolde þat I it forsoke" (380-81). He finally chooses to commit all his trust to the World (398), despite the Good Angel's warning that he must die at last (405-11).

Humanum Genus goes to the World's scaffold and undertakes to serve him. The World has promised him the three pleasures, wealth, power and
lovelyladies, on condition that he is willing to forsake God's service (588-94). Humanum Genus readily accepts this condition: "why I dwelle here in worldly wyse,/ I recke nevère of hevene wonde/ Nor of Jhesu..." (602-4). The nature of his choice is clear. In adopting worldly values, Humanum Genus has rejected God and his salvation. The World sends Humanum Genus to Covetousness, advising him to make the treasurer his steward (766-7). After instructing him on how to prosper, Covetousness summons the Devil's children, Pride, Wrath and Envy, and the Flesh's associates, Lechery, Sloth and Gluttony. The Flesh is exultant:

\[\begin{align*}
&\text{pe Welt, pe Flesch, and pe Devyl are knowe} \\
&\text{Grete lordys, as we wel owe,} \\
&\text{And porwe Mankynd we settyn and sowe} \\
&\text{pe dedly synys sevene. \qquad (1006-9)}
\end{align*}\]

The ethical scheme is thus maintained with great consistency. Humanum Genus chooses worldly values and rejects God. He commits himself initially to the World, associated specifically with covetousness, as is conventional, but seen as the means to the other worldly values, power (pride) and fleshly delights (lechery). As a result of this submission he falls victim to the Flesh and the Devil, who bring in their train all the remaining deadly sins.

In the midst of his worldliness, however, Humanum Genus repents. Confession urges him to go into the Castle of Perseverance, where he will be safe from sin and where, in order to win heaven, he must keep "fro werldyly dystaunce" (1551). The allegorical stronghold to which the hero withdraws from the world to be instructed by the virtues seems to me to suggest the monastic ideal. The Castle is a metaphorical monastery only, of course; Humanum Genus is all men, not a monk. But monastic withdrawal was the ultimate ideal of otherworldliness. It has been suggested that the religious vows of poverty, chastity and
obedience are a specific rejection of the three worldly sins, avarice, lechery and pride (Collins, p.8; Molloy, pp.82-3; Howard, pp.55-6).

It is thus perhaps natural that the author of The Castle of Perseverance should present virtue in these terms. An unidentified medieval treatise (rather incongruously translated by Gascoigne for his Elizabethan readers) recommends the monastic life in similar terms:

What therefore can be better advysed unto us, yea what can be safer or more for our health and salvation, then to seeke a place of refuge, to go into some strong walled town, and therein to seeke some mancion of rest & quyet? In the which there maye be founde as many defenders & protectors as there are inhabytors. All armed with the right syprituall armour, and most redye to fight agaynst sinne. And where is this place? Or this stronge walled Towne and Cytie? Forsooth even in the congregation of the devout and relygious.... Which using vertue for an armour doe set opposytely synguler and competent vertues against everye perticuler and neglygent vyce.... And to conclude even as in this world, one doth drawe another unto sinne and vyce, even so in the congregation of ye devout and faithfull one doth drawe and entye a nother unto vertues. And even as worldly society doth much hynder, so this doth very much further & advaunoe the perfection of godly life. (Gascoigne, p.381).

The perfection of the godly life was to be achieved by the renunciation of the world in favour of the cloister, a kind of earthly paradise, a foretaste of heaven. Gascoigne’s fortified refuge, where a man’s companions urge him to virtue and defend him against vice, presents a conception which is clearly similar to the dramatist’s metaphor of a castle in which the virtues instruct Humanum Genus and defend him against the forces of the world. While he remains within the Castle
he is as secure as a man may be in this life, free from worldly values and thus as close as his dual nature permits to the true freedom which is attainable only after death. Humility states that Humanum Genus "hauntyth now hevene halles/ bat schal bryngyn hyn to hevene" (1709-10)

The Castle of Perseverance is a popular play, clearly written for laymen, but the imagery of the monastic ideal is present here, just as it is in the treatises on contempt of the world.

The World, the Flesh and the Devil summon the seven deadly sins and the psychomachia follows. Humanum Genus makes it clear that he knows where safety lies (2017-21). Nonetheless, when the sins fail to win the battle, he readily succumbs to the arguments of Covetousness. He agrees that his purse is likely to be his best friend in old age. The virtues are powerless to save him if he chooses to leave the Castle. They lament for him: transient worldly goods are no use in death; they will bring him to damnation (2598-643).

At his death Humanum Genus, like Everyman, appeals to the World for help. The appeal is in vain. The World rejoices that their bond will soon be broken and his victim will lie in torment. Thus he has served many (2869-81). The remainder of the play makes it clear that Humanum Genus, by his subjection to sin, itself the result of his initial submission to the World, has incurred damnation. His soul is carried off to hell, reproaching the body for giving way to its lusts (3012-20), and it is finally saved only through the mercy of God.

J. Wilson McCutchan has pointed out that avarice is the central sin of the play (McCutchan, 1951). Covetousness has his own scaffold. Avarice is emphasised by the Vexillatores, and stressed as the source of evil in the hero's first fall. In the attack on the Castle Covetousness is the only vice who is not defeated, and thereafter he controls Humanum Genus until his death. McCutchan sees the play as a sermo corporeus
against avarice, and goes on to argue that the author intended to present four forces bent on the hero's destruction, but because he "dared not" alter the traditional trio of the World, the Flesh and the Devil, he compromised by making Covetousness the World's treasurer. But his argument ignores the conventional alignment of the three sins, in which the World and Covetousness are so closely associated that there is no need to add Covetousness to the trio. The World and the Sin work together to accomplish the destruction of the protagonist. It is the World that Humanum Genus originally chooses, and it is the World's scaffold that he goes to initially, until he is passed on to the treasurer. Certainly Covetousness then becomes central in the action, but it is to the World that Humanum Genus turns in death, and the World who rejoices in his downfall. Thus the World is the *force* which drives him to the sin of avarice.

Further, avarice is not the only sin of which the protagonist is guilty. It is presented as the source of all other sins (2456-6; cf. I Tim.6, 9-10) and it is made quite clear in the play that service to the World involves all the other deadly sins (893-905). Wealth is to be the means especially to vainglory and lechery (584-96). Thus the play is a sermon not only against avarice but against the three sins of worldliness, and the three sources of the three sins, the World, the Flesh, and the Devil.

The m.s. includes a stage plan which is printed in most modern editions of the play. The plan shows a circular area with the Castle in the centre. On the ground below the Castle is a bed. The circle is to be surrounded by water "if any dyche may be mad". At various points on the circumference of the circle are the scaffolds of the World, the Flesh and the Devil, Covetousness and God. While the plan is clearly of great interest from the point of view of medieval techniques of staging (Southern; Fifield), as far as I know it has not been generally
FIGURE 1.
Interpretation of the Stage Plan
of The Castle of Perseverance
recognised that it bears a close relationship to the moral theme of the play. The stage plan precisely reflects the dramatist's conception of the relationship between man and the world (see fig.1). The circle surrounded by water is a "world" in which Humanum Genus is born and walks about accompanied by the two Angels. It is a populous world, since it probably contained the audience too (Southern, pp.52-8). Humanum Genus is free to choose the direction of his journey. Only one way leads to God. On all other sides are the scaffolds of the adversaries who offer worldly enticements to ensure his damnation. The distribution is appropriate, "for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat: Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it". (Matt.7, 13-14).

If Southern's reconstruction of the performance is accurate, the disposition of the audience according to sight-lines would automatically provide paths to the scaffolds (Southern, pp.74-8). One would lead to God, the remaining four to the forces of evil. The circle itself is morally neutral. It represents the area of decision and conflict, the place in which the World, the Flesh and the Devil exercise their powers to draw Humanum Genus to their scaffolds. The Castle to which the repentant protagonist withdraws is in the centre of the circle, but presumably raised above the level of the ground, since it must be supported on posts if the bed below it is to be visible (Southern, pp.17,22).

The Castle is not outside the circle--only death can release man from the world--but it is at a higher level than the bed, which is presumably the place of birth and death, the major physical events of the play. In order to regain their prey the powers of evil besiege the Castle, no doubt converging on it from their four scaffolds. Humanum Genus is lured out once more into the "world", returning to the bed in the centre to die. Finally, his salvation secured, his soul mounts the scaffold of God.²
The stage plan also reflects and reinforces the pattern of conflict which is at the centre of the play. Humanum Genus is born into a circular "world" which is itself morally neutral but where temptation instantly besets him. Possibly he rises rather unsteadily from the bed to find that he is surrounded by powerful and bewildering figures. Immediately on either side of him are the Good and Bad Angels, personifications of his own conflicting desires. Towering above him on their scaffolds are the World, the Flesh and the Devil, offering immediate pleasures and ultimate destruction. By comparison Humanum Genus is a small, helpless figure. We can imagine the moment of choice. He turns first to the east, towards God's scaffold. But God has not yet shown himself. The substance of what he has to offer is for the future, not in this life but the next. Meanwhile, the World in all his wealth and power stands directly opposite God on the other side of the circle. Humanum Genus gradually turns his back on God to face the World. As he allows the Bad Angel to lead him forwards, perhaps reluctantly at first and then gathering determination, he moves further away from God. It is a moment of quite considerable tension.

The visual pattern reflects the antagonism between the Angels and the broader antithesis between the World and God. Humanum Genus, whose Angels constantly urge him towards the one or the other, cannot stand still. He is obliged to choose the direction of his journey. But no choice is final until the moment of death. Repentance is possible, but temptation inevitably recurs and man, whose will is free, is subject to perpetual inner warfare.

I have dwelt at some length on The Castle of Perseverance because it presents so clearly and in such detail an image of man's life as a period of recurrent conflict between the love of God and the sins of the world. The Digby Mary Magdalene (c.1480-1520) is essentially a mystery play, but the temptation, fall and redemption of Mary, the type
of the repentant sinner, are accomplished in an allegorical episode which bears a striking resemblance to *The Castle of Perseverance.*

As in the earlier play, the episode begins as the King of the World, the King of the Flesh and the Devil assemble their forces for the destruction of the central figure. The World boasts of his power and wealth (11.305-25) and Pride and Covetousness flatter him. Pride appears to be aligned with the World here, and in fact the distinction between avarice and vainglory was sometimes blurred, since riches, power and honour are in practice closely related (Howard, p.54). Later, however, it is made clear that the Devil is the prince of pride (358, 562). The Flesh, "florychyd in my flowers" (334) is accompanied by his friend, Sloth, his spouse, Lechery, and his knight, Gluttony (347-50). The Devil has Wrath and Envy in his train.

Thus the distribution of the seven deadly sins is very similar to that in *The Castle of Perseverance.* So indeed is the action. The Devil suggests to the World that they make Mary their servant (381-4) and the World sends Sensuality to summon the Flesh, who proposes that Lechery shall seduce their victim (422-5). The Devil instructs the other six sins "to entyr hyr person be pe labor of lechery" (432) and a stage direction indicates that they besiege the Castle of Maudley, while Lechery and the Bad Angel tempt Mary. Lechery flatters her (440-44) and asks to become her servant (446). Mary agrees and Lechery takes her to Jerusalem where they buy wine in a tavern. Curiosity, a gallant, joins them, boasting of his fine dress and concluding:

> I love mych pleyying;

> that makyt me Ile3ant and lusty in lykyng;

> thus I lefe in pis wor[l]; I do it for no pryde. (504-6).

Mary is delighted with his company, and she leaves with him, promising to go with him to the world's end (544-5), while the Bad Angel rejoices that she has fallen into the clutches of "pryde callyd coriosty" (550).
The Good Angel then appears to Mary in a dream, accusing her of fleshly lust and pride, and reminds her of the pains of hell (593-99). She repents and finds Christ who tells her that her contrition and faith have saved her, and at this point the seven devils leave her and go with the Bad Angel into hell with thunder (691 S.D.)

The close similarity of the episode to The Castle of Perseverance would seem to suggest either that it is derived directly from the earlier play or, more probably, that both are representative of a much larger group of plays now lost. The pattern of temptation is very similar except that here it is Lechery who first gains access to Mary, as the traditional story demanded. Here again one sin leads to all the others, and Mary is specifically accused of two of the sins of worldliness, lechery and pride. The third, avarice, is perhaps irrelevant in this case since Mary is her father's heir and so already rich, and also because as a woman she is unlikely to become involved in extortion, bribery, dishonest commerce and the other mercantile sins of Humanum Genus. Pride and lechery are the conventional sins of women in the period.

In all other ways the episode presents the familiar account of the soul besieged by the deadly sins and threatened by the forces behind them, the World, the Flesh and the Devil. The central figure succumbs to one of the three major sins, and this submission leaves her open to every other kind of corruption. Allegory is introduced in an otherwise literal drama to demonstrate the nature of an inner conflict which leads to ethical choice.

Wisdom who is Christ, or Mind, Will and Understanding (c.1460?), on the other hand, is quite differently constructed. It contains no castle, no personifications of the World and the Flesh and no mankind-hero. Nonetheless its central concerns have much in common with those of the two plays I have discussed. The play is essentially an account of the
processes of temptation, sin and repentance, prefaced by a theological exposition of the nature of the soul and its proper relationship with God. These processes are analysed in some detail, and the grouping of the three attributes of the soul, their three functions, their three sins, inspired by the three adversaries, is developed with almost mathematical precision. Though man himself does not appear, the play dramatises the conflict between his aspiration to love God and his fallen readiness to choose the world.

Wisdom (Christ) explains to Anima the relationship between them, her true purpose, which is to love Him, and her composition. She has under her control five wits (the five senses) and three "mights", Mind, Will and Understanding. Their respective functions are to know, to love and to understand God. Tempted by Lucifer, the mights are corrupted from this purpose and their functions transformed to the three worldly sins, pride, lechery and avarice, until Wisdom shows them how they have disfigured Anima, and they repent. The soul is then restored to virtue through confession, contrition and satisfaction.

The play opens with an analysis of the proper relationship between the soul and God. Anima is clothed in a white dress and a black mantle to show her dual nature, fair and foul (1.151), knowing both God and sin. Wisdom, the image of God's surpassing love, is "better than all worldly preciosnes" (1.33). The man who tastes his love "All lustys and lyKyngys worldly xall lett; They xall seme to hym fylthe and ordure" (51-2). He gives the certainty of life and joy after death (59-60). Anima has only to keep her heart pure to preserve the love that is between them (81).

The structure of the soul itself is then analysed. Mind, Will and Understanding in turn explain their proper functions. Mind is the image of God in man (184, 211); thus he comes to know God through self-knowledge (210). Will is the means to virtuous action (215-20); God is the only
source of this virtue since of himself man is weak and sinful (229-36). Understanding is the means to "beholde wat Gode ys" (246). He recognises that God is essentially incomprehensible to human reason (249-51) but he ascends from self-knowledge, and the knowledge of creatures and of the visible creation, to the apprehension of the attributes of God himself. Thus the properties of the soul, when rightly ordered, are the means by which man is united with God and the "fair" aspects of Animas nature are asserted. Wisdom explains that Animas has free will to preserve the order and purity of her nature, but "yff pat perverte, all pis dothe spyll" (292), and he concludes by warning her against her three enemies, the World, the Flesh and the Devil (294).

The second and major section of the play shows how the mights allow their true function to be perverted. Of man's three adversaries in this life only the Devil is personified, but as in Perseverance the inner conflict is presented in terms of a choice between virtue and the world. The process of temptation is explored in considerable detail. Clearly the dramatist was much concerned with the complex nature of the struggle between spiritual and worldly values. An analysis of Lucifers techniques of persuasion shows the psychological subtlety of which the more sophisticated moralities are capable.

Lucifer begins by discussing the Mind the merits of his contemplative life, ironically insisting that his idleness must be the devil's doing (394-6). Mind very properly replies, "He ys not ydyl pat wyth Gode ys" (398). Prayer, fasting and labour have their proper times, Lucifer continues; surely a man with a wife and children should not abandon them for a life of prayer? (401-12). Martha pleased God greatly (413). Here the devil shows himself capable of quoting patristic discussions of scripture to his own purposes. Martha and Mary were conventional symbols of the active and contemplative lives (Butler, pp.200-202, 214-5, 245).
Again Mind makes the correct response: Mary pleased God more (414). Lucifer changes his ground slightly: Christ, after all, was not a contemplative; he lived the mixed life (418-28). Here Mind hesitates. His reading of the Fathers and of the English mystics ought to have taught him that the mixed life is indeed the ideal, the form of existence in which the fruits of contemplation are manifested in charity. Apparently, however, he fails to recognise that contemplation is the basis of the mixed life. Lucifer presses home his advantage. The difficulties of the life of discipline may lead to folly and madness; it would be better not to try; be ordinary, he urges,

Be in be worlde, use thyngys nessesse.

The comyn ys best expres.

Who olymyt hye, hys fall gret ys. (442-44).

Mind is convinced, and Lucifer delivers his final irony: "Thynke þerwppon, yt ys your salvacyon" (450).

He then turns his attention to Understanding, advising him to free the senses, buy clothes, win honour, secure riches and get children—all for compelling reasons (453-60). Will is to leave his studies, his prayers and penances, and lead a common life. What harm can be in wealth and fine clothes? These things were ordained by man for God. He must leave his foolish chastity and take a wife (469-76). Will agrees that the five wits are pleased with this advice (479-80). After all, it seems, "Man q be in be worlde and be ryght goode" (486). Lucifer warns them against preachers (488-90), urges them to be merry (494, 505) and repeats his advice to go into the world (501). The mights agree and Lucifer rejoices in his success. The soul is in his power; he can do as he likes with it and will finally bring it to destruction (519-26). Further,
The soul is to be destroyed by its commitment to the three sins of the World.

This is certainly the cleverest piece of temptation I have found in the early morality plays. The mightes are taught to provide rationalizations of their naturel sinful impulses. Strangely, early critics followed Pollard in finding the play "intellectually ... weak" (Furnivall and Pollard, p.xxii), spectacular, but containing "nothing whatever of any permanent consequence" (Brooke, p.62), and "remote from the analysis of theological writers" (Chambers, 1945, p.61).

Fr.J.J.Molloy, however, has demonstrated that the play is a subtle exposition of orthodox theology, showing in particular how it conforms to the teaching of Aquinas. Certainly the temptation scene alone ought to dispel any assumptions that Mind, Will and Understanding is lacking in intellectual subtlety. Clearly the mightes are presented as monks (Smart, 1912, pp.78-81), though their monasticism is metaphorical (Molloy, pp.82-3, 186-7), just as the Castle of Perseverance is a metaphorical monastery only. The presentation of the mightes as religious does not necessarily indicate that Anima represents the soul of a monk but only that the properly ordered soul is a stronghold against sin. The metaphor does, however, serve to emphasise the nature of the choice made by the mightes. Vowed to the exclusive service of Wisdom who is Christ, they are persuaded to abandon their stronghold and go out
into the world where Lucifer will introduce them to the three worldly sins, pride, avarice and lechery. It is a more detailed presentation of the choice made by Humanum Genus between the world and God. It is worth noting that at this stage Lucifer suggests little that is evil in itself. The active life in the world is not sinful, merely less perfect than the contemplative life. What he achieves is the suggestion that the world has pleasures to offer; the mights, however, become dominated by the delights of the world, and it is their total submission to the three sins which involves the rejection of God and the corruption of the soul.

The life of the nights in sin follows the pattern that Lucifer has described. Mind turns to maintenance, assistance in bringing false action in law. This brings him great power and worldly honour (629-36). Understanding makes money by perjury. And Will resorts to the lusts of the flesh. The form of corruption each adopts is particularly appropriate (Malloy, pp.102-10). Mind, the image of God (184, 211), sets himself up as a great lord, sought out and dreaded by many (629-36). Understanding, who knows how temporal goods should be used (145-6), devotes himself exclusively to their acquisition. Will, whose specific duty is to love God (281-2), turns to lechery. In this remarkably schematic play each particular form of the relationship between the soul and God is perverted as each faculty turns to the world.

The newly corrupted Mind glories in his fine dress, but like Curiosity and Mary Magdalene he denies that this is a symptom of pride (555). He has won greatness through his eloquence and his noble kin (574-80). Understanding delights in counting his riches (581-8). Will has discovered the pleasures of love (566-73). The world does not condemn them but admires the courtly, the rich and the lecherous (597-608). Indeed, Mind claims that "In us be worlde hathe most affyance" (657), and no wonder, for "be worlde ys thus" (660). The subjection of the mights to the three sins and thus to the world could
not be more clearly presented.

In the dance with which they celebrate their new success the alignment of sins follows the pattern of *The Castle of Perseverance*. Each might summons six dancers. Mind, who has succumbed to pride, calls Indignation, Sturdiness, Malice, Hastiness, Vengeance and Discord, all manifestations of wrath and envy, the associates of the Devil in *Perseverance*. Understanding is supported by sins connected with avarice, Wrong, Sleight, Doubleness, Falsehood, Ravine and Deceit. Will's dancers are Recklessness, Idleness, Surfeit, Greediness, Adultery, Fornication, manifestations of sloth, gluttony and lechery, the companions of the Flesh in *Perseverance*. Thus, just as in the previous plays, subjection to the three concupiscences becomes the gateway to all sin.

The moral teaching of the play is made extremely clear. The faculties of the soul, however aware of their true purpose, are in danger of being diverted by the sophistries of the devil. The world is the source of temptation, and submission to the three sins means conformity to the world. The reformed Mind instructs Anima: "*Nolite conformari huic seculo,/ Sed reformamini in novitate spiritus sensus vestri*" (1119-20; Rom.12, 2). The central theme of the play is the antagonism between Lucifer and Christ, manifested in a conflict for the human soul. The imagery of physical warfare has given way entirely to ethical argument and the debate between Lucifer and the mighty is a subtle delineation of the inner struggle between worldly values and the love of God.

*Mankind* (1471?) presents a very different treatment of what is in some ways a similar theme. The play has generally been regarded as a debased morality whose purpose is entertainment rather than edification (Furnivall and Pollard, p.xi; Thompson, 1910, p.388; Brooke, p.63; Smart, 1916-7, pp.311-12; Chambers, 1945, p.62). Sister Mary Philippa Coogan has argued for the seriousness of its moral teaching, pointing out
that the comic elements reinforce the main theme by parody and negative example (Coogan, pp. 93–5), and though I cannot accept her view that Mankind is more subtle than The Castle of Perseverance, (p. 89), it is certainly true that a case can be made for the play's serious moral purpose, despite a large element of horseplay, a good deal of rather unsophisticated humour and an avowedly commercial intention (11.456-71).

The plot is fairly simple. Mercy expounds the basic theology of the Atonement, rejects the mockery of Mischief, and refuses to join the dance of Nought, New Guise and Nowadays. Mankind enters, lamenting the power of the flesh over his spirit, and appeals to Mercy for guidance. Mercy counsels him to control his flesh (226-44) and warns him especially against Nought, New Guise and Nowadays (293-6), and the devil Titivillus, who will attempt to distract him from virtue (301-4). The lusts of the flesh conquered, Makind begins to dig, resists the taunts of the three gallants, and finally beats them with his spade. Titivillus, invisible behind a net, hides a board in the earth to induce Mankind to abandon his labours, interrupts his prayers with physical needs, and finally tells him in a dream that Mercy is hanged. Mankind, his good intentions defeated and his hope of salvation apparently vain, decides that he must find a mistress and seek comfort in the tavern with Nought, New Guise and Nowadays. Mischief makes him promise to indulge in lechery, steal, kill and forgo church services (702-17), and, when Mercy returns, Mankind, realising his own unworthiness, calls for a rope to hang himself. The vices are ready to help hang him but are frightened away by Mercy. Mankind insists on his own wickedness but Mercy prevails and he repents.

The basic moral structure is thus the familiar one of temptation, sin and redemption through the mercy of God. Though the pattern of conflict is not developed in the schematic detail of the earlier plays,
there are hints of the concept they present. In his final sermon Mercy tells Mankind that he has three enemies, the World, represented by Nought, New Guise and Nowadays, the Devil, Titivillus, and the Flesh, the "uncleane concupissens" of his body (883–8). His sin has been to put his trust in these three adversaries who have brought him to Mischief (889). Smart and Bevington regard this explanation of the play's moral lesson as an afterthought (Smart, 1916–17, p. 311-12; Bevington, 1962, p.137), and certainly these distinctions are not emphasised during the course of the action. Nought, New Guise and Nowadays are certainly worldly, but they are not notably avaricious. Rather, they are presented as fashionable young men given to revelry and insanities. The Flesh is not personified, and Titivillus has no particular connection with pride.

The play is not, however, a "sham morality" as Smart describes it (Smart, 1916–17, p. 312). Sister Coogan confirms Smart's suggestion that this is a Shrovetide play, demonstrating that Mercy is a priest, and that the action represents confession, followed by injunctions to abstinence, a lapse from virtue and a further confession. The theme is particularly appropriate to a Lenten play: confession is especially requisite at the beginning of Lent since fasting and good deeds are invalid (cf. Everyman) if performed by man in a state of sin (Coogan, pp.1-21).

Within this structure the play lays great emphasis on Mankind's inner conflict between his flesh, which leads him to worldly values, and his duty to God. At the beginning of the play he describes his pedicament:

I have my composycyon

Of a body and of a soull, of condycyon contrarye.

Betwyx þem tweyn ys a grett dyvisyon;

He þat xulde be subjecte, now he hath þe victory.
Thys ys to me a lamentable story

To se my flesch of my soull to have governance. (194-99)

He laments that his soul is thus at war with his flesh, "bat stynkyng dungehyll" (204). Mercy urges him to control the flesh:

The temptacyon of pe flesch ye must resyst lyke a man,

For yeys ever a batell betwyx pe soull and pe body:

'Vita hominis est milicia super terram.'

Oppresse your costly enmy and be Crystys own knyght...(226-9).

He must spend the brief interval of this life in temperance (233-44).

As a result, Mankind suppresses the rebellion of his flesh (313) and hangs round his neck a reminder that he is ashes and will return to ashes (321; cf.Gen.3, 19). As the descendant of Adam, he very properly embarks on the labour of digging the soil. This exercise is not only penitential, but a means of controlling the unruly flesh, made prone to temptation by idleness. When Nought, New Guise and Nowadays, the embodiments of idleness, taunt him, it is appropriately with his spade that he puts them to flight. Titivillus, however, diverts him by guile from labour and prayer, and the conviction that Mercy is dead leads Mankind to seek the delights of the flesh and the pleasures of the world in the company of Nought, New Guise and Nowadays. His submission to sin leads to despair which springs from the rejection of God's mercy.

For salvation he must mortify his carnal desires and cast himself on the mercy of God, acknowledging his own wretchedness and the vanity of the world (905-12). The play dramatises his struggle to do so.

Thus the World, the Flesh and the Devil are subsidiary to the main theme, which is the frailty of man himself. It is perhaps for this reason that the flesh is not personified but internalized, that Nought, New Guise and Nowadays are presented as manifestations of worldliness in operation, rather than of the psychological impulse towards the world, and that Titivillus makes only a brief appearance as the agent of temptation.
Mankind has become a more dominant figure than the protagonists of the earlier plays, since here the emphasis is on the inner antagonism which makes him prone to sin rather than on the psychological processes, externalized in allegory, which lead him to make the wrong choices. 

Humankind is the victim of his three adversaries; Mankind is the victim of his own wretchedness, and his enemies are important only in so far as they take advantage of his perpetual state of conflict to lead him to sin.

This theme, of course, is no less familiar in the contempt of the world tradition. Before he can look upwards man must recognise his weakness and his corruption. The purpose of Mankind is above all to show how the frailty of fallen man leads him to choose the world and to forget that God is the only true source of comfort and salvation. Though the choice between the world and God is a common theme of the early moralities, the wretchedness of man's divided condition receives a unique emphasis in Mankind.

The main theme of Henry Medwall's Nature (c.1490-c.1501) is the conflict between Reason and Sensuality, which requires separate treatment, but the play also deals with the consequences of Man's choice of the world, and the theme of the three adversaries and the three sins is present, though not central.

At the beginning of the play Nature explains to Man her responsibility for generation as God's vicegerent, a theme familiar from The Romance of the Rose and the works of the School of Chartres as well as Chaucer's Parliament of Fowls and Lydgate's Reason and Sensuality. Man is attended by Innocency and by Reason, who controls Sensuality. Reason presents Man to the World, who dismisses Innocency, puts Sensuality on an equal footing with Reason, and introduces the protagonist to Worldly Affection, who will explain to him the ways of the world. Worldly Affection encourages him to buy land, and Pride joins Man's retinue and overthrows Reason. Sensuality then leads him to the tavern where he meets a whore called Margery. Thus
committed to pride, avarice and the lusts of the flesh, Man employs the remaining deadly sins, who adopt false names to mask their true natures. Further conference with Reason, however, induces him to repent. Here the first part of the play ends. In the second part Sensuality tells Man that his servants are in mourning and Margery is overcome with grief at his absence. Man summons Bodily Lust and reinstates his former companions. They assemble for a battle against Reason, but meanwhile Age brings the hero to repentance, Reason instructs him in the seven virtues and he does penance for his sins. Reason tells him that he is now the "chyld of salvacyon" (fol.36) and the play ends with "some goodly ballet".

In Nature, as elsewhere, the physical world is not essentially evil. Nature is a "worldly goddesse" (fol.2) and she orders life in accordance with the will of God. Thus the world is a place of beauty and harmony:

Who taught the nyghtingall/ to recorde besyly
Her strange entunye/ in sylence of the nyght
Certes I nature/ and none other wyght. (fol.2)

Indeed, Nature has wrought many marvels but she will not describe them in detail. Man can find them out in the works of Aristotle, her "phylosopher electe" (fol.2). Man is free to enjoy her works. He alone of all creatures walks upright, therefore he should always look upwards and keep heaven in his sight on the long voyage that he is to undertake through the world (fol.2). With further advice on the relationship between Reason and Sensuality, Nature sends him out to begin his journey.

But though it is not evil in itself, the world is clearly a place in which temptation occurs. The juxtaposition of Nature's speeches and the characterization of the World emphasises the distinction between the world as a morally neutral testing place and the World as one of the three adversaries. But in this play the difference is not an entirely simple one. The fact that it is Reason, a wholly virtuous figure, who presents
Man to the World indicates that the World is not necessarily destructive but only a potential source of danger. Its gifts are requisite for man if he is to live in the world; it is obedience to the World's instructions, the submission of the will to its values, which is sin.

The play demonstrates the complexity of a concept in which the same word conveys the world as a physical entity, the world as a source of corrupt values and the World as one of the three adversaries, specifically associated with avarice. In this play there is a sense in which the personified World stands for all three closely related meanings. The World welcomes Man and advises him to put on the clothes he offers. His natural garment of innocence is not enough; he is not in paradise and must obey the ways of the world or he will be a laughing stock (fol.6v). The instruction seems harmless enough, but the reference to paradise points the implication that Man is to conform to the ways of a fallen world. Man gratefully accepts the clothes and the possessions that the World gives him. So far all is well as long as he uses them according to right reason, and Innocency reminds him that he must remain pure in thought and deed. The World, however, gradually begins to assert the corrupting aspects of his nature, objecting that this is "an hard worde surely/ and an hevy sentence" (fol.7v). A man cannot worry about trifling sins; he must concentrate on maintaining his estate by worldly prudence (fol.7v). Worldly Affection will initiate Man in the ways of his new dwelling place (fol.6v). In the meantime he had better dismiss Innocency (fol.9v), and acquire goods and servants (fol.9v).

That man must choose between the World and virtue is thus gradually indicated, and the specific association between the World and avarice is made clear. Man succumbs to the World's arguments and thereafter appears as a great lord. Since he has chosen the World, his retinue
consists of the seven deadly sins, commanded by Sensuality, who acts as a kind of steward. The first to apply to serve him is Pride. He is a great nobleman of excellent lineage, magnificently dressed, and known as Worship (fol. 10). Sensuality welcomes him as "radix viciorum" which he translates as "Rote of all vertew" (fol. 11v). Pride regards it as one of his first duties to insist that Man must buy new clothes—the ones he is wearing are two days out of date (fol. 13v). As soon as Pride is properly installed Sensuality takes Man to the tavern and returns triumphantly to describe how his master has spent an hour or two alone with the whore, Margery (fol. 15). He then explains to the jubilant Worldly Affection how Man has employed the seven deadly sins (fol. 16).

Here too, then, just as in The Castle of Perseverance, Man's decision to obey the World leads to avarice, and this in turn leads to all the sins, with special emphasis on pride and lechery. At the beginning of the second part of the play Reason explains that mortal life is like a siege against a town or castle. While man dwells in the "frayll carcass and carynouse body", the World, the Flesh and the Devil plot against him incessantly. The World makes him covet riches and renown and other earthly vanities, while the Flesh strives against the spirit and provokes sensual appetite. Without grace man cannot hope to survive this siege (fol. 19). Apart from the alignment of renown (honours) with the World, which is not entirely unusual (cf. p. 24 above), the scheme Reason describes is precisely that of the previous plays. The siege itself is not dramatised (though the psychomachia is suggested when the sins prepare for a battle against Reason which never takes place) and the Flesh and the Devil are not personified, but the scheme that underlies the moral teaching of the play is the conventional one. The personification of the World without his usual associates lends further emphasis to the theme of worldliness as the source of all sin.
The second half of the play adds little of thematic importance, except that, as in *Perseverance*, avarice is the specific vice to which Man turns in old age (fol.31). Like its predecessors, *Nature* shows how submission to the World leads Man to the three sins of worldliness, and so to all sin, until repentance enables him to arise.

From the vale of syn/ whyche is full of derknes
Toward the contemplacyon/ of lyght that ys endles. (fol.25v)

The World and the Child, Otherwise Mundus et Infans (c.1500-22) was printed in 1522. The resemblances between The World and the Child and *The Castle of Perseverance* have been noted by E.N.S. Thompson (1910, p.336) and Bevington describes the latter play as a rewriting of *Perseverance* for two characters (Bevington, 1962, p.117). There is also a close similarity between *The World and the Child* and *Nature*. Here too the hero presents himself to the World, who gives him food and clothes in return for his service. This submission leads to a life of sin until Conscience persuades him to repent. His virtue is short-lived, however, and he falls victim to Folly until age brings him to a more lasting repentance.

Like *The Castle of Perseverance* the play begins with the World's account of his own widespread influence. He is, of course, the source of wealth - "all rychesse redely it renneth in me" (sig.A lv). Indeed so great is his power that he regards himself as divine:

Me thynketh I am a god of grace
The floure of vertu foloweth me
Lo here I sette semely in se
I commaunde you all obedient be
And with fre wyll ye folowe me. (sig.A lv).

The religious parody ("grace", "vertu", "fre wyll") sets up a clear opposition between the World and God, as does the later scene where the
hero becomes the World's knight, in parody of the Christian knight who wears the whole armour of God.

Infans presents himself to the audience, telling them that he was conceived in sin and born with danger (sig.A 1v-2). Like Mankind, he is aware of the wretchedness of his condition. He has come into the world poor and naked, and now he must begin to seek death, when body and soul, so lately joined together, must part again (sig.A 2). Helpless in his poverty, he will ask comfort of the World (sig.A 2). The World agrees to take care of him while he is young on condition that Infans is obedient to him. He changes his name to Wanton and instructs him to return when he is fourteen (sig.A 2v).

Wanton is delighted with his new name, and describes with considerable realism the pleasures of beating other boys, fighting with his brothers and sisters, stealing pears and plums on his way to school, and bird-nesting (sig.A 2v-3). At fourteen his name is again changed, this time to Lust and Liking, and his sources of pleasure change accordingly. He is now proud of his appearance and his fine clothes, "freshe as flourys in may", and he would risk damnation for love (sig.A 3v).

At twenty-one he becomes Manhood and the World gives him new instructions. He is to be sure to avoid shame by beating all who criticise him - power, presumably, is to be the source of worldly honour. He must worship the deadly sins whom the World introduces as his seven kings (sig.A 4). He is made a knight and is endowed with grace and beauty, and also with money "of the wronge to make the ryght", and thus equipped he goes off to seek fame and adventures in the service of the World.

On his return he boasts of his might and his conquests. He has killed and injured many; ladies have sorrowed for love of him; he is famous and richly dressed, and afraid of none (sig.A 5). This Herodian monologue reveals Manhood as guilty above all of the pride of life. Having devoted
his youth to lechery, he spends his manhood in pride. He has now reached the peak of worldly achievement through the seven kings who serve the World.

So far his worldly success has been gained without ethical conflict. At this point, however, he is confronted by Conscience. Manhood, the only morality hero hitherto who has not previously been instructed in virtue, accosts him proudly, but Conscience succeeds in arousing his curiosity, and though Manhood is reluctant to forgo the service of the seven kings, he agrees to follow his teaching when Conscience tells him that he may keep Covetousness. He must covet the bliss of heaven and the service of Christ through obedience to the ten commandments (sig.B2). He must use measure in mirth, avoid Folly, remember his last ending and have God always in mind (sig.B3).

Manhood's response to all this when he is left alone on the stage is of some interest. He decides that he must reject the kings of sin and the World's teaching, and become the knight of Conscience. The World is full of boasting but his teaching is worthless since he is at odds with Conscience. Manhood continues, however:

But yet wyll I hym not forsake
For mankynde he dothe mery make
Though the worlde and conscience be at debate
Yet the worlde wyll I not despyse
For bothe in chyrche and in chepynge
And in other places beynge
The worlde fyndeth me thynge
And dothe me grete servyse. (sig.B 4).

Pollard and Bevington interpret this as vacillation (Pollard, p.lii; Bevington, 1962, p.120). If they are right this is an extraordinarily early example of the expression of conflict in soliloquy rather than in dialogue between abstractions. It seems to me, however, more probable
that the speech is a single-minded and orthodox statement of the properly "measured" attitude to the world. Conscience has counselled not abstinence but moderation. Manhood need not abandon all "game and gle", all mirth, "honest" clothing and "sportyng of play", so long as he uses these pleasures with discretion (sig.B 3). This is not unusual. Measure is one of the virtues personified in Magnificence; Everyman's Goods tells him that he would not have endangered his salvation if he had loved him only "moderately" (1.431); and Mercy tells Mankind that he must drink ale and wine temperately:

Mesure ys tresure. Y forbyde yow not pe use,  
Mesure yowsylf ever; be ware of excesse, 
pe superfluouse gyse I wyll þat 3e refuse, 
When nature ys suffysyde, anon þat 3e sese. (Mankind, 11.237-40)

Most of these plays, after all, are written not for ascetics, but for popular performance before men who lived active lives in the world. Their moral teaching, therefore, while conforming to the central principles of contempt of the world, modifies the more extreme forms of asceticism prescribed in the treatises. To forbid the audience the use of worldly goods would clearly have been futile. Man needs the world: it is Reason who introduces the hero of Medwall's play to the World. But the world must serve man, not man the world; it is subjection to worldly values which endangers his soul. Manhood's speech, then, is not only perfectly in order, but a revealing account of the proper relationship between man and the world.

The second part of the play deals with Manhood's submission to Folly and therefore requires separate treatment. The first half, however, follows the moral structure of Nature in showing how easily man's necessary dependence on the world becomes servitude to worldly values, the source of the seven deadly sins. Here the ethical conflict which is dramatised in detail is the debate with Conscience. It is a reversal of the usual conflict, the temptation to worldliness, and analyses the process of repentance which was more frequently taken for granted.
Repentance, rather than temptation, is also the central action of *The Interlude of Youth* (1513-29). This play was printed between 1530 and 1535 and reprinted with minor alterations after the Reformation (1555-8 and c.1562-9). *Youth* is far less schematic than some of the earlier plays, and contains a higher proportion of horseplay than theology. Nonetheless it is of some interest in that it reveals what appear to be vestiges of the traditional ethical structure. Its main theme is the contention between the vices and Charity (the love of God) for the soul of the worldly hero. Youth's companions are Pride, Riot and Lechery. The character of Riot is sufficiently indicated by his name, and if we may take him to be a manifestation of worldliness in the same sense as Nought, New Guise and Nowadays in *Mankind*, who behave in a very similar way, then Youth is presented as subject to the three sins of the world.

Youth's chief characteristic, however, is the pride of life. At the beginning of the play he boasts that he is peerless in his beauty and strength. He has just inherited his father's land and cares for nothing (sig. A. lv-2). Charity reasons with him, but in vain. Pride becomes his servant, promising to bring him to high degree and encouraging him to despise all men (sig. B. 2). Thus confirmed in sin, Youth claims that he is "king eternall" and that all men are subject to him (sig. C. Iv). He mocks his spiritual advisers and puts Charity in the stocks, and it is only when Charity and Humility together urge him to save what God has bought (sig. C. 3) that he becomes curious, listens to Charity's account of God's purchase of salvation, repents and forsakes his former companions.

The play is related to the moralities which analyse the conflicting impulses towards the world and God in *that it is made clear that Youth's failure to recognise the insubstantial nature of this world's goods leads him to submit to the three sins of pride, riot and lechery. The central action of the play is the conflict between Charity and the worldly vices for the soul of the hero.*
There remains John the Evangelist (c.1520-c.1557). This play presents a number of problems. The date is not known with any certainty, the play is exceptionally loosely constructed, and the names of the characters seem to bear little relation to their behaviour. It is probably an awkward fusion of mystery and morality, so that John, Eugenio and Actio are literal characters, while Idleness and Evil Counsel are allegorical. It may be, however, that "Actio" is a misreading of "Accidia", so that Actio and Idleness are one person (Bradley, pp.350-52). There is also the problem of "Iridision" who opens the play.

As far as the date is concerned, the play was printed some time before 1557 by Waley, but Greg notes in his edition of the play (p.vi) that there exists a record of the sale of "1 saint jon evvaunngeliste en trelute" by an Oxford bookseller in 1520. Since Waley reprinted Youth it seems possible that John the Evangelist is also a revival of an old play. Henry Bradley suggested that the misprints in Waley's edition indicated that the printer was working from an old manuscript (Bradley, pp.350-51). Since the mystical emphasis of the play seems to me to suggest an early date, and since there is no clear evidence to counteract this, I have included John the Evangelist among the medieval moralities.

The play has two heroes, Eugenio, whomocks the spiritual teaching of "Iridision", and the slothful Actio, who is an adulterer and a liar. I am inclined to accept Carl E.W.L. Dahlstrom's argument that "Iridision" means "messenger of heaven" (Iris di Sion) and is to be identified with John the Evangelist, a man sent from God (Dahlstrom, pp.44-6). After hearing "Iridision", Eugenio tells Actio that a preacher has promised him eternal joy if he will forsake worldly riches, but Actio insists that only those who sport and play have joy. Evil Counsel becomes the servant of Idleness (Actio?) and undertakes to secure for him a certain artificer's wife with the aid of Temptation and Wanton Youth. Subsequently, however, Eugenio persuades Actio to listen to John's sermon on the parable of the
pharisee and the publican, and as a result they both repent.

Earlier interpretations of the play credit it with no structure and no obvious ethical purpose. Mackenzie describes it as "formless", commenting that though it is strongly moral in tone "there is not the slightest attempt (or, if there is, it cannot be detected) to teach one connected lesson for the guidance of life" (Mackenzie, 1914(i), p.244). Tucker Brooke complains that "there is no real purpose either in the symbolism or in the religious teaching" (Brooke, pp.104-5). Bevington acknowledges that "the play evokes an atmosphere of intense and even mystical religiosity" (Bevington, 1962, p.57), but goes no further. Spivack comes closer to an interpretation: "It contrasts spiritual love (with a strong emphasis on chastity) and its heavenly hope against the misdirected love toward self and pleasure which takes one 'downe to the dongyon where the devyll dwelleth!'" (Spivack, p.255). If Spivack is right, the play is in the tradition of the moralities dealing with the conflict between the world and God.

This contrast is certainly the main theme of the initial exchanges between "Irisdision" (or John) and Eugenio (11,1-191). The preacher describes the joys of mystical contemplation (1-25) and then, despite Eugenio's mockery, explains the choice before him. The via recta will lead him to life (105) and the city of Jerusalem, walled with twelve precious stones (81-3), while the via obliqua (125) leads to death (129) and hell (168). Those who go that way work the devil's will (134) and follow a path hedged about with the seven deadly sins (158-63). Here, then, though in a form unconventional in the morality plays, is portrayed the choice which confronts Humanum Genus at the beginning of The Castle of Perseverance, the mights in Mind, Will and Understanding, and the heroes of all the plays I have considered so far.

Eugenio rejects the narrow way of those who are inspired by the Holy Ghost and the contemplation that ravishes the soul in favour of
"some fayre wenche to lye in myne armes" (203), describing at length the pleasures of lechery, which is so delightful that it is deadly sin (226-7). St. John then gives a brief sermon on avarice. The true love that men owe to God is given to "rychesse that is mutable" (251-2). He will soon return to give "rychesse goostly" (255). His exchanges with Eugenio emphasise the opposition between the love of God and the love of the world.

Actio, meanwhile, boasts of his sloth and his adulterous pleasures (275-82). Evil Counsel announces that he is seeking a master (397). He is well qualified to lead him into lechery and avarice (386-400), the two sins stressed in the dialogue between Eugenio and the preacher, and two of the three sins of the world. Idleness (Actio?) employs Evil Counsel and they go off together in search of pleasure (541-2).

John's promised sermon follows. It deals with all three sins of the world. Beginning, "O men unkynde/ wretched and mortall" (569), the Evangelist tells the parable of the pharisee and the publican. The pharisee's pride led him to accuse the publican of extortion, which is avarice, injustice, which is pride, and adultery, which is lechery (604-6). In these three kinds of sin "all synnes be comprehended expresse" (602-3). For his boasting the pharisee went to hell, where Lucifer fell for his pride, and where all sinners must go (616-29). Eugenio and Actio repent at once, and John concludes by reiterating the dangers of pride (637-53).

The interpretation of the parable in terms of the three sins can hardly be accidental. The story occurs not in John's gospel but Luke's (18, 9-14), where it is clearly an attack on pride, the centre of the sermon in the play. But there is no scriptural warrant for the attention to all three sins apart from the pharisee's phrase, "extortioners, unjust, adulterers" (v.11). But it is in one of St. John's epistles that the reference to the three sins of the world occurs (I, 2, 15-16). As author of these verses, and as the mystical writer of the Apocalypse, St. John
must have seemed to personify the ideal of otherworldliness. Egenio and Actio, presented in the tradition of Nought, New Guise and Nowadays, are obviously worldly young men. In addition, they boast of their lecherous pursuits, while Evil Counsel, the vice of the play in so far as it had one, leads men to lechery and avarice. There is no emphasis on pride until the final sermon, but presumably the young men are by implication guilty of pride since they deliberately reject spiritual counsel and mock preachers.

The choice before the heroes, then, is between mystical other-worldliness which leads to salvation, and worldly pleasures, the three sins of the world which lead to hell. It is true that this scheme is not made nearly as clear as it is in the earlier plays, but if I am right in supposing that the three sins provide the central themes of a good many of the extant morality plays, and that many more of a similar kind must now be lost, it is probably not unreasonable to assume that by 1520 a schematic presentation was no longer necessary, and that the references to the sins, the characterization of Egenio and Actio, and the final sermon were enough to make the point for an audience thoroughly familiar with the theme.

Thus the three sins of worldliness, which stand for all the deadly sins, are important to the moral structure of eight of the pre-Reformation morality plays. In two of them worldliness is explicitly presented as the source of sin: in Mind, Will and Understanding Lucifer persuades the mights to abandon their otherworldly ideals, and in Mankind the emphasis is on the rejection of the vanities of the world. In The Castle of Perseverance and Mary Magdalene the World is personified with his associates, the Flesh and the Devil. In this context the World is associated specifically with avarice, and in Perseverance the World and the sin are the dominant sources of the downfall of Humanum Genus. In Nature and The World and the Child the World is personified without his associates and is seen as the main source of temptation; the hero's
downfall is the result of his inability to use with moderation the comforts his human condition compels him to accept from the World. In Youth and John the Evangelist youthful gallants steeped in worldly pleasures are brought to repentance by their spiritual teachers. In each case subjection to the world or to one of the sins of the world leads to all the deadly sins.

The world, then, is a source of temptation. Morally indifferent of itself, and harmless if its goods are used with discretion, it invites a degree of attachment which diverts man from virtue and from his true purpose, the quest for heaven. Only by asserting the values of the next world can man achieve a proper contempt for the transitory values of this one, and so become assured of salvation.

In each of these plays the protagonist has free will to choose between the world and God. But in accordance with the essential dualism of medieval Christianity, a choice must be made. Because he is in the world, because he is flesh as well as spirit, the protagonist is readily susceptible to the pressures exerted by the world. The conflict between this susceptibility and his otherworldly aspirations is a central concern of the medieval moralities. It is embodied in physical warfare or ethical dispute. The emphasis of the plays is not usually on the wavering mankind-hero himself but on the struggle for supremacy between the personifications of his conflicting attributes. Temptation, sin and repentance follow one another as flesh and spirit alternately win control. Man's life as it is presented in the moralities is a perpetual conflict between opposing values.
Man's inner conflict in this life is also analysed in terms of a struggle between his godlike reason and those elements of his nature which attempt to supplant it. The inner warfare between reason and its opponents is intimately related to the conflict between the world and God, another way of expressing the struggle between man's worldly impulses and his divine aspirations. Both are based on the Pauline concept of the warfare between flesh and spirit. In the medieval moralities reason's struggle for supremacy is allegorised in a series of different but closely related forms, as a conflict between reason and sensuality, between reason and the will, or between reason and folly. In each case reason seeks God, its opponent temporal values.

In the Aristotelian and Augustinian conception of the soul the choice of good is possible only when the reason is in control. The concept is familiar and a brief summary of it will suffice. The tripartite structure of the soul is as much a commonplace in the Renaissance as it is in the middle ages, and it is clearly described in that compendium of medieval and Elizabethan learning, Bateman upon Partholome. At the lowest level in the soul's internal hierarchy the "vegetable" soul, which man shares with plants and animals, controls the senses and preserves life. The "sensible" soul distinguishes man and beasts from plants, giving them feeling, memory, and above all, will. In the well-ordered soul it interprets the experience of the senses and controls the impulses of the "vegetable" soul, the desires of the flesh. It also obeys the instructions of the "rational" soul, the capacity for reasoned thought and the knowledge of God. The rational soul is the divine element in man, and it distinguishes him from the beasts. It
recognises the distinction between good and evil, teaching man to seek God. It alone survives the death of the body (Batman, fols.14-16).

While reason, or the rational soul, dominates the other faculties, man chooses the good, divine values. Sin occurs when the proper hierarchy of the soul is overthrown, when reason becomes subject to sensuality or the will (Collins, pp.137-9; W.D. Harris, pp.49-51.)

In these circumstances the will takes its instructions from the senses and chooses the values of the world and the flesh. Chaucer's Parson describes the hierarchic pattern:

For it is sooth that God, and resoun, and sensualitee, and the body of man been so ordeyned that everich of thysse foure thynge sholde have lordship over that oother;/ as thus:

God sholde have lordship over resoun, and resoun over sensualitee, and sensualitee over the body of man./ But soothly, whan man synneth, al this ordre or ordinaunce is turned up-so-doun./ And therfore, thanne, for as muche as the resoun of man ne wol nat be subget ne obeisant to God, that is his lord by right, therfore leseth it the lordship that it sholde have over sensualitee, and eek over the body of man./ And why? For sensualitee rebelleth thanne agayns resoun, and by that wazy leseth resoun the lordship over sensualitee and over the body./ For right as resoun is rebel to God, right so is bothe sensualitee rebel to resoun and the body also. (Pars.T., 260-65).

When reason rebels against God it invites the rebellion of sensuality. In several of the plays the overthrow of reason is facilitated by pride. As in Mind, Will and Understanding where, as I have suggested (pp.27-9 above), Lucifer (prince of pride) encourages Mind to rationalize his impulse towards sin in terms of his own worldly reasoning processes, the sinful heroes of the medieval moralities
frequently pursue false reasoning in order to provide an excuse to submit
to the government of sensuality and so to the desires of the flesh.
When the reason refuses to acknowledge its dependence on God and asserts
its own self-sufficiency through pride, it makes wrong choices and gives
sinful instructions to the will. C.N. Cochrane's account of St. Augustine's
analysis of this process illuminates a number of the morality plays:

Intellectually, this bad will finds expression in an effort
'to make one's own truth', i.e., to justify one's conduct by
rationalizations which are blindly and stubbornly adhered to
for the very reason that they cannot stand the light of day.
Such rationalizations are the involuntary tribute which vice
pays to virtue. They are pernicious precisely because they
normally embody an element of truth, since absolute falsehood
is absolute nonsense and thus incapable of deceiving any but
the veriest dupes. From this standpoint, pride is the devil's
own sin, and the devil himself is the first in the field as an
ideologist. (Cochrane, pp. 448-9).

The relatively complex psychological process represented here is
dramatised or at least implied in the recurrent emphasis in the
moralities on an alliance between pride and sensuality.

I shall consider the treatment of reason and sensuality in the
medieval moralities before going on to discuss the closely related
conflict between reason and folly.

Mind, Will and Understanding presents a schematic analysis of the
structure of the soul. Wisdom tells Anima that she consists of
sensuality, whose function is to rule the five wits (senses) and reason,
the image of God (11.135-42). Sensuality, poised between reason and
the flesh, occupies a critical position. If the five senses are not
adequately ruled, sensuality "Ye made the ymage of synne then of his
foly" (140). It is sensuality which is subject to "sterynge of synne
pat cummyth all-day" (153). Anima's white dress and black mantle express her condition: she is black through sin which springs from the corruption of sensuality, and white because her reason apprehends God (149-56). The "selynge of synne" makes her like a beast, but "knowynge of Gode" through reason makes her fair as an angel (157-60).

Within this hierarchy is yet another. Reason has two parts, the higher, which knows God, and the lower, which understands the use of earthly things (141-8). It seems that these are equivalent to Mind, who knows God, and Understanding, who ascends to the knowledge of God through temporal things. The higher part of reason must control the lower. There is also Will, who appears to be aligned with sensuality, since he too has nothing of himself but sin, wretchedness and folly (229-36) but does well if he obeys reason (227-8).

Lucifer's temptation is to be an attempt to overthrow the proper hierarchy of the soul so that both parts of reason become subject to sensual appetite. He will tempt the flesh and persuade the soul to submit to its desires (361-4). This is to be achieved through the traditional medieval pattern of suggestion, delectation and consent (365-7; see Howard, pp.56-65). As I have described, Lucifer succeeds in diverting the mights from the contemplation of God (the function of the reason) towards the pleasures of the world (the satisfaction of sensual appetite). He perverts Mind first through false reasoning, pride in his own intellectual capacity, and, the suggestion planted, he turns to Understanding, who feels delectation (462), and then to Will, who agrees that the senses are pleased by his advice (479-80). Lucifer urges Will to assert his freedom and not to dispute the matter with reason (481-2). If the three faculties agree all will be well (495-6). He then rejoices in his victory: "Resone I have made both deff and dumme." (523).

His purpose is achieved, reason is silenced, sensuality is supreme
and the mights have given themselves over to the pleasures of the world. Mind, the higher part of reason, seeks temporal lordship, rejecting all thought (661) and thereby reaching the nadir of corruption (Molloy, p.113). An attempt to assert his superiority even in temporal matters (761) leads immediately to a quarrel. Will has rejected his sovereignty and cares nothing for him (764). But the mights rapidly agree to join forces again, in accordance with Lucifer's advice, for their greater worldly profit (779-88): worldly success requires that the faculties should be united in its pursuit. This reconciliation is initiated by Will in a parody of the proper order of things.

Wisdom, like Lucifer, appeals first to Mind (873) but the higher part of reason is no longer in control. Mind turns for advice to Understanding (884). The lower part of reason, steeped in sin, has rejected his own nature: "I wyll no understandynge xall lett my pley" (887). He asks Will's opinion but Will refuses to consider repentance while he is young (889-92). The overthrow of the hierarchy is here very clear. Each asks advice of the faculty which should be subordinate to him and it is Will, the lowest, whose obduracy in sin prevails. It is only when the appearance of the deformed Anima and Wisdom's complaints force him to recognise that he has disfigured his godlike nature that Mind is able once again to adopt a tone of command (929-32). Through Mind Understanding realises that they have offended God and instructs Will to return to him (933-40).

The proper order of the soul is now restored. When Anima comes back from confession with her powers, the order of the procession indicates the restoration of the hierarchy. Preceded by the five senses (the means of contact with the outside world), Anima has Mind on one side and Understanding on the other. Will is firmly behind her (1064 S.D.).

Mind, Will and Understanding gives a detailed analysis of the precarious position of reason in its conflict with sensuality for mastery
of the soul. Man turns from the contemplation of Wisdom to the love of the world through the assertion of that element in him which belongs to the world. The process of temptation involves the corruption of the rational faculty by false reasoning, and the assertion of the will for the sake of sensual pleasure. Lucifer's subversion of right reason disfigures Anima, and it is only when Mind recognises his own sin that the proper hierarchy of the soul, and thus its proper relationship with God, is restored.

The conflict between Reason and Sensuality is the main theme of Nature. At the beginning of the play Reason is in control, but as the action develops Sensuality begins to assert himself and Man becomes guilty of the seven deadly sins. He repents and Reason is temporarily restored to his proper place, but once again Man is diverted by Sensuality from the recognition of virtue, and he degenerates until old age brings repentance and a return to Reason.

Early in the play Nature tells Man that he has Reason and Sensuality to lead him on his journey through the world, but Reason is to be his chief guide (fol.2v). Man recognises that Nature has given him a common ability with plants to sustain himself (the vegetable soul), the knowledge he shares with beasts of what is good for him (the sensible soul) and, "surmountyne all other/ in hygh perfeccyon", virtue, that is understanding (the rational soul) (fol.3). Medwall's leisurely play goes on to explain that in addition to this hierarchy of attributes, Man has free will, and thus he is "halfe aungelyke", although unlike the angels he must die (fol.3).

Nature warns him of the dangers of disobeying Reason. Sensuality is natural to him and ordained for him, but it must be subject to Reason. He is free now but he will lose his liberty if he becomes subject to sensual passions (fol.3). Sensuality is immediately resentful. As the capacity for movement, the source of sensation and all "lyvely quyknes",...
he is indispensable. Man can achieve nothing without him (fols. 3 & 4). Nature agrees that he is entitled to a place, but it must be a subordinate one. Reason leads Man in the way of virtue and grace; Sensuality, by seizing control, has brought many men to a wretched end (fol. 4).

Sensuality is silenced, but only temporarily. He is sure that the World will support him; the World has long been his master and will not see him thus cast away (fol. 4). Nature leaves the stage and there follows a dispute about sovereignty (fols. 4v-5v). Reason claims that man's dignity rests in his mind, which is the image of God and the source of his ability to distinguish between good and evil. God has sent Reason to guide him in the world. Sensuality argues for a more democratic arrangement: they can be autonomous in their own spheres. Reason can have complete control after Man is forty, when his lusty youth is spent. But Reason refuses. He knows Man's frailty. The body is disposed to fall unless it is aided by a higher power.

The World, as Sensuality had expected, gives him support. When Sensuality complains of his subjection to Reason the World is indignant:

Thou hast had great wrong/ and that ys pyte
For yf thou be the parson/ that I take the fore
Thou sholdyst be/ as honorable as he. (fol. 6).

The World's advice to Man that he need not live like an angel (fol. 8v) indicates that he has no need to obey the rational soul that he shares with the angels but may behave in accordance with his lower nature. Worldly Affection advises Man to let Sensuality choose his servants, since he knows where to find the people who are most apt to do him worldly service.

The World and Sensuality, then, are clearly in alliance. With the support of the World Sensuality is allowed a large measure of control. It remains only to overthrow Reason. This is accomplished
by Pride, who gains access to Man through Sensuality and then flatters him into agreeing to trust his own wit. Man concedes that Reason was a source of constraint; without him he will be free (fol.13-14v).

As in Mind, Will and Understanding, Pride, the assertion of the merely human wit, the setting up of the image of man where the image of God should reign, blinds the hero to the true nature of sin. He adopts the remaining six sins, disguised by false names. Meanwhile Sensuality takes him to the tavern where, when Reason remonstrates, Man beats him with his sword. The overthrow of Reason is thus achieved by Sensuality in conjunction with Pride.

Here, then, as in Mind, Will and Understanding, the ethical conflict is analysed in some detail. Though it corresponds in general terms to that of the earlier play in that sin follows the overturning of the hierarchy of the soul, Nature places more emphasis on the connection between Sensuality and the world. Earlier interpretations of the play have laid much stress on Nature's admission that Sensuality is necessary to Man (fol.4). This is taken as evidence that Medwall, who as chaplain to Cardinal Morton must have known the young Thomas More, rejected on humanist grounds the asceticism of his predecessors. Tucker Brooke's is the most extreme view. The play is written from "a purely ethical, not a religious standpoint" and, since Nature takes the place of God, the religion of the earlier morality plays is replaced by "semi-pagan, renaissance ethics" (Brooke, p.73). According to Willard Farnham sensuality has become respectable (Farnham, p.200), and A.P. Rossiter comments that "the contrast with the earlier Morality is marked in the way sin is made the result of unreason..." (Rossiter, p.104). Similar views are implied by E.N.S. Thompson (1910, p.378), H.K. Russell (p.4) and Pearl Hogrefe (pp.259-60). According to Spivack, "This sort of moral program appears in its time as altogether a new thing in the moralities" (Spivack, p.215).
In my view, however, Sensuality's actions in the play are far from "respectable", and I hope to suggest that sin is consistently the result of unreason in the pre-Reformation moralities. Further, there is nothing in the least "pagan" about Nature, who administers the world in accordance with the will of God (fol. 2), just as she does in a number of other medieval works (see p. 35 above). Sensuality, "the sensible soul", is consistently regarded as necessary to man. Created by God, he has no attributes which are evil in themselves. As man's motive power, sensuality is his means of survival in the world. Equally, it is consistently thought necessary to control sensuality, which is a worldly and mortal attribute, by reason, which is divine and therefore eternal. The ethics of Medwall's play are perfectly medieval and entirely orthodox.

John Rastell's *The Nature of the Four Elements* (c. 1517-c. 1518), printed c. 1526-30) requires some attention in connection with Medwall's play, if only because here is a genuine break with the morality tradition in that the author's preoccupation is primarily with secular learning rather than with ethical analysis. The play's resemblances to *Nature* have frequently been noted (Thompson, 1910, p. 378-9; Reed, p. 104; Collins, pp. 162-3; Rossiter, p. 106). Humanity, the hero of the play, is instructed by Nature, who tells him that while plants are insensate, and beasts have memory and the five senses, man is unique in having a "soul intellective" (p. 9). But unlike Medwall's hero, Humanity is to devote this to the pursuit of learning, and though he is to ascend from the knowledge of the world to the understanding of its creator (pp. 5-6, 12), making the conventional sixteenth century "use" of natural philosophy as the handmaid of theology (Kocher, p. 25), it is clear that Rastell is interested in his play primarily as an exposition of geography, cosmology and the prospects for development in the New World.

Nonetheless, here as previously, the protagonist is torn between
reason and sensuality. He undergoes periods of instruction by Studious Desire and Experience, but in the intervals between lectures he gives himself over to Sensual Appetite and Ignorance, who take him to the tavern. Possibly this conflict is included in deference to the morality tradition of dramatising inner warfare. Having adopted the form, Rastell found himself committed to its traditional theme. On the other hand, the play gives a perfectly plausible picture of human nature, unable to sustain its high intellectual ideals without bouts of submission to sensuality. Learning has its own form of asceticism, and the play includes complaints about the abuse of reason for worldly purposes. Too many who can read and write are led by their lower impulses to waste these skills on flattery, empty rhetoric or, worse, "love or other matter not worth a mite". Many more use learning as a means to wealth, not virtue (pp.4-5).

The play is not complete and we cannot know in what terms Humanity would have achieved "salvation". It would, of course, be of great interest to discover whether this was envisaged as a purely intellectual or a spiritual matter. The material that we have, however, provides another example of the conflict for supremacy between man's sensual nature and his aspiring reason. The Nature of the Four Elements is thus an interesting example of an adaptation of the traditional morality structure to a new, humanist moral purpose.

The fragment which remains of The Four Cardinal Virtues (c.1528?) suggests that this play also dramatised a fall into sin through the overthrow of reason. The eight concluding pages of The Four Cardinal Virtues are extant. They concern the repentance of Fortitude, who has fallen from prosperity through his wilful disobedience and pride.

As the fragment begins Wilfulness is held captive by Justice and Temperance, while Prudence explains that man becomes the victim of sin through submission of his own will (11.25-30). Temperance says that
Wilfulness was given great authority (38) but his own rebellion has brought him to his present captivity (40-41). He has subdued Reason, brother of Temperance (52). The paradox that the will is truly free only if it submits to reason is also expressed in Nature (fol.3).

Cochrane's analysis of this Augustinian concept is again illuminating:

... strictly speaking, the definition of will as 'an uncoerced movement of the mind' applies only to the will of Adam before the fall; i.e., before he deliberately transgressed the divine command. As for the will of the natural man, it cannot properly be described as free, since its determinations are throughout vitiated by his refusal to acknowledge his dependence upon the creative and moving principle. He may thus be described as a slave to sin, that is, to his own aberrations of mind and heart. (Cochrane, p.449).

Deliverance is possible only when man realises that he is alone responsible for his blindness through his own pride and wilfulness (Cochrane, pp.449-50).

In the play Wilfulness is then sent to fetch Fortitude, who is his lord (70). Fortitude appears, poorly dressed, and explains that he was once royal, and called Prosperity (128-9). He confesses his wilful disobedience (132-4), the result of pride (160-73). In his sinful condition he supposed himself secure from adversity (189), and ambition caused him to reject prudence, temperance and reason (195-6). All this has a secular flavour and it is possible that like the analogous Magnificence (see below, pp.71-3), The Four Cardinal Virtues deals in the worldly consequences of wilfulness. On the other hand, it may be that the concepts of poverty and prosperity are to be understood allegorically as demonstrations of the hero's spiritual condition. The fragment provides no clear evidence on this point.
Fortitude kneels and acknowledges his sins, and explains to the audience that though our sensual nature is frail, reason, with the help of grace, counsels virtue and controls the erring will (227-33). Worldly prosperity is fickle (241) and man should put his trust only in "that wealth promised from above" (243-5). Through submission to his own will and to transitory material values Fortitude was reduced to (spiritual?) poverty. As in the earlier plays, repentance and the assertion of reason restore virtue rather than material prosperity.

Reason, then, is subject to constant threats from sensuality, which attempts to mislead the will. Reason's other opponent in the plays is folly, irrationality which prevents man from knowing God and recognising the good. Folly too is a concomitant of pride. When man asserts himself against God his reason, unaided by grace, becomes mere foolishness.

Barbara Swain has pointed to the increasing use in the fifteenth century of the term "fool" to mean "erring man". Folly was an impediment to the assertion of the reason and thus to the achievement of virtue. "Fool" became a synonym for "sinner" (Swain, pp. 52-3). Heywood in Witty and Witless (c. 1520-33) is less harsh, but he too makes it clear that "wit" is profitable to the soul when it leads to wisdom, which secures the highest place in heaven.

"The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God" (I Cor. 3, 19). Erasmus, in the brilliant reversal with which he concludes The Praise of Folly (pp. 115-28), interprets this to mean that only through a kind of suprarational folly which transcends the wisdom of this world can the saints come to know God. But in its more conventional interpretation the quotation points the association between folly and conformity to the values of this world. It is clearly foolish to prefer the fleeting pleasures of this transitory world to the external joys of the next. Success in the terms of this world requires a kind of wisdom, the abuse of true reason, which is folly sub specie aeternitatis. Barbara Swain
quotes Salonius: the fool is unable to look upwards and seeks only to satisfy his carnal desires. Further,

Odit enim coelesta, et ideo non potest, sicut vir sapiens,
ad coelum oculos suos erigere, quia non cogit at ea quae Dei sunt, sed quae huius saeculi. (Swain, p.24).

The fool can see nothing beyond the values of this world. Worldly wisdom which is spiritual folly leads to damnation.

Folly is, of course, a general characteristic of vice figures, especially in the later morality plays where the role of the Vice becomes more central. Here sin manifests itself as grotesque and ludicrous rather than horrifying, though the vices display a sinister kind of cleverness among the nonsense as they entrap their victim. In vice comedy the exigencies of performance - the difficulty of embodying evil as a source of terror to the audience without complex costume and lighting effects, and the need to amuse as well as to edify - combine with the traditional association of folly with sin.

In the medieval moralities the struggle between folly and reason offers an allegorical analysis of yet another aspect of man's inner conflict. In The Castle of Perseverance folly and sensuality combine to drive Humanum Genus to worldly values. Among the attendants of the World are Voluptas, or Lust, and Stulticia, Folly. Lust is presumably to be distinguished from Lechery, companion of the Flesh, and as an associate of Folly and servant of the World he almost certainly represents sensual appetite in general, unbridled sensuality. The function of Lust and Folly is to seek out men willing to serve the World, their master. Lust states that anyone who is willing to be ruled by Folly is worthy to serve the World. Through falsehood and covetousness he will succeed in the world; 'his worldys wysdom gevyth not a louse/ Of God nyn of hye hevene' (11.484-90).
Folly is even more explicit about the nature of the worldly man:

3a, covetous he muste be

And me, Foly, muste have in mende,

For whoso wyl alwey folly frye

In pis world schal ben unthende.

þorwe werldys wysdom of gret degre

Schal nevere man in werld moun wende

But he have help of me

þat am Foly fer and hende.

He muste hangyn on my hoke.

Werldly wyt was nevere nout

But wyth folly it were frawt. (504-14)

It is made clear that the wisdom of the world, which leads to worldly success, is foolishness with God. Folly's insistence that the worldly man must have him always in mind (505) stands in direct contrast to the Good Angel's instruction to Humanum Genus to have Christ always in mind (336).

There is no conflict at this point since Humanum Genus has already made his choice of worldly values. The role of Folly and Lust is to embody the spiritual and psychological forces which now dominate his way of life. Reason is not personified. We must assume that it was overthrown at the moment when Humanum Genus chose the world. Folly will blind man with riches (557); Lust will provide the pleasures of the flesh and so bring him to hell (550-56). Agreeing to follow them, Humanum Genus promises to take no account of God so long as he is rich and successful. They present him triumphantly to the World with the assurance that they will bring about the death of his soul (635-46).

Elsewhere in the play sin is consistently associated with foolishness, (450; 1026; 1033). Folly and sensual pleasure both serve the World.
Though reason is not mentioned it is clear that the sinful man devotes his mind to folly and sensual pleasure and not to its proper object, the knowledge of God. In failing to resist these impulses Humanum Genus seals his commitment to worldly values. For salvation he must turn away again from the wisdom of this world to a higher understanding.

In *The World and the Child* Manhood's second fall into sin is dominated by Folly. Conscience tells him that Folly is equivalent to the seven deadly sins (sig. B 3), and a source has been found for the play and for this particular concept in a fifteenth century poem, the "Mirror of the Periods of Man's life, or Bids of the Vices and Virtues for the Soul of Man" (MacCracken, pp. 486-96). The concept, however, as I have argued, is something of a commonplace in the period. Lust in *The Castle of Perseverance* makes a similar point:

> Whoso wyl wyth foly rewlyd be
> He is worthy to be a servaunut here
> pat drawyth to synmys sevne. (484-6).

In *The World and the Child* the conflict between Folly and virtue is explicit. Manhood submits to Folly only after a protracted struggle. "Folly and Shame", whose fellow is Covetousness and whose brother is Lechery, passes his time in the taverns and stews (sig. C Iv). He applies to serve Manhood but the hero remembers Conscience's teaching and tries to drive him away. Since the play is designed for two actors, Conscience and Folly do not meet on the stage, but it is in the light of his instructions from Conscience that Manhood fights with Folly. The physical struggle is inconclusive: the battle is a psychological one. Folly wins by argument. He urges that it is proper for Manhood to cherish him, "for falve is felowe with the worlde", and the World will be angry if Manhood refuses him (sig. C 2). Once again the connection between unreason and worldliness is made explicit. Manhood continues
to resist until Folly agrees to drop "Shame" from his name, and then succumbs (sig.C 2). Subsequently Manhood changes his own name to Shame to avoid recognition by Conscience (sig.C 3v).

The servant rapidly becomes the master. Folly offers to take his employer to the taverns of London. Manhood is impatient: "Folye go before and teche me the waye" (sig.C 3v). He prepares to go, declaring, "The worlde and folye counseylleth me to all gladnes" (sig.C 4). Conscience is ready to give advice but Manhood will have none of it (sig.C 4). Conscience, the inner consciousness of the will of God, a subdivision, presumably, of the reason, is overthrown by Folly. As Folly himself explains, "where conscience cometh with his cunningge/Yet folye full fetely shall make hym blynde" (sig.C 3v).

Age brings Manhood to despair (sig.D 1). He has given himself to Folly who has ruined him, and he will kill himself. The subversion of reason leads to ignorance of the nature of God and thus of God's mercy. It is Perseverance who teaches Manhood the twelve articles of his faith, forgotten in his folly, and restores him to the repentance and virtue with which the play ends.

The World and the Child, then, offers a further example of the defeat of reason, which leads to sin, shame and worldliness. It is only by rejecting his former companion in favour of the knowledge of his faith that Manhood is able to secure salvation.

Hickscorner (c.1513-16) seems to deal with a similar theme, but the problems of interpretation are so great that my conclusions are very tentative. The play is loosely constructed, dealing mainly with the riotous activities of Freewill and Imagination, and offers no single obvious moral lesson. Hickscorner himself, whose name may indicate an association with the devil, Old Hick (Rudwin, pp.31-2), and Pity, who appears to be his virtuous opponent, disappear before the conclusion
as a result of the exigencies of doubling (Bevington, 1962, pp.138-9).

The action of the play concerns Pity, Perseverance and Contemplation, who lament that they are held in disrepute, and Freewill, Imagination and Hickscorner, worldly rogues who boast of their sinful achievements. Pity remonstrates with them and they put him in fetters. Finally Perseverance brings Freewill to repentance, and Freewill helps Contemplation to convert Imagination.

A schematic interpretation of the play has been put forward by Ramsay, who compares it with Mind, Will and Understanding. According to his theory, Pity represents the virtuous condition of the mind, Perseverance the proper function of the will, and Contemplation the virtuous purpose of the understanding. Hickscorner, Pity's opponent in the play, is the rebellious mind, Freewill the rebellious will and Imagination the rebellious understanding. This does not necessarily imply that the author of Hickscorner knew the earlier play, but only that he was familiar with the scheme it presents. Ramsay acknowledges, of course, that if this was the author's scheme, he did little to develop it (Ramsay, p.clxxxv).

Though I cannot entirely accept Ramsay's interpretation, since Contemplation must surely be the function of Mind, the higher part of reason, and not of Understanding, whose province is the visible creation as a means to the apprehension of God (cf. p.52 above), I feel sure that he is right to see the play as showing a direct and specific opposition between the three vice figures and the three virtues, and the whole as a demonstration of the abuse of human faculties. All the characters are individual attributes of the whole man, who is not presented.

Freewill and Perseverance are clearly linked in this way. Submission to the unbridled will leads to sin, the will properly directed is the source of perseverance in virtue. Hickscorner, whose
predominant characteristic, as his name perhaps suggests, is scorn and scoffing, is antithetical to Pity, though this relationship is less clearly developed. Imagination, I suggest, is a contemplative faculty, though when corrupted it leads to evil. The term in this period can have its modern meaning, "forming a mental concept of what is not actually present to the senses" and is often preceded by "vain" or "false" (OED 1). Properly used it can contribute to the contemplative activity, but it is easily corrupted and then used only to invent idle fictions.

According to Benjamin, an English treatise based on the Benjamin Minor of Richard of St. Victor by a fourteenth century follower of Richard Rolle, printed by Pepwell in 1521, man's soul has two powers, reason and love. Imagination is the servant of reason. It is necessary, since "without imagination reason may not know", but it is subject to corruption, producing fantasies and vain thoughts which interrupt prayer (E.G. Gardner, pp.3-4). Imagination, then, is necessary to the knowledge of God (in the play the converted Imagination is renamed Good Remembrance), and to prayer whose highest form is contemplation, but when perverted it leads to the rejection of both. Freewill is the means to virtue, but when abused it becomes the source of sin.

Despite the title, Freewill is apparently the central figure. His power to do as he likes (p.152) is the cause of sin in the whole man. His conversion, similarly, is the basis for the conversion of Imagination. When the will is devoted to virtue the other faculties follow suit. (Hickscorner and Pity do not reappear at this stage in the action).

Reason is not discussed, but one of the characteristics of the sinful Freewill is folly. When Perseverance and Contemplation dispute with him he insists on talking nonsense, and deliberately refuses to understand what they say (150-54). At his repentance Perseverance explains that "By his own freewill he must forsake folly,/ Then is he sure and safe" (155).
Here, too, then, at least in vestigial form, is the doctrine of the earlier plays. The will, steeped in folly, and thus rejecting rational control, corrupts the other faculties of man so that he becomes preoccupied with worldly values. Imagination, while properly controlled, is the means to the knowledge of God, but corrupted by the will it becomes the source of vain thoughts which destroy the possibility of contemplation.

It must be admitted that this scheme, if it was indeed in the author's mind, is not clearly developed. But there is enough material to show that the play is concerned with the corruption of the other faculties induced by the erring will. The recurrence in the morality plays of the period of the theme of the assertion of the will, which overthrows reason and devotes itself to folly, lends support to the theory that this was one of the concerns of the author of Hickscorner.

Godly Queen Hester (c.1525-9) is primarily a Biblical rather than a morality play, but the inclusion of the allegorical figures, Pride, Adulation and Ambition, connects it with the moral plays, and the role of the fool, Hardydardy, who is not, of course, mentioned in the Biblical narrative, establishes a relationship specifically with those plays in which folly is presented as a cause or concomitant of sin.

The play concerns King Ahasuerus who appoints Aman as his chancellor. Aman becomes proud and ambitious and secures increasing power, finally deluding the king into agreeing to slay all the Jews in his territory. Hester, whom Ahasuerus has married for her wisdom and virtue, persuades him to spare her countryman and exposes the deceits of Aman, who is executed.

Aman's corruption reaches its climax in the employment of Hardydardy to amuse him, and the fool unequivocally rejoices in his downfall (11.1047-52). Here, then, as previously, it appears that a character becomes progressively more corrupt through pride, and finally surrenders to folly which contributes to his destruction. Pride and folly are closely associated; the overthrow of reason leads to ignorance of the will of God, and thus to
This theme is not developed in any great detail, but it may be that in this relatively late play the author was following a familiar allegorical structure without feeling it necessary to explain in detail the ethical implications.

In Skelton's *Magnificence* (1515-23) the relationship between Liberty (will) and Circumspection (reason) dramatises "the lifelong creed manifest throughout Skelton's poetry" that the essence of virtue consists in the establishment of the proper relationship between these two faculties (W.D. Harris, p.48). Further, Fancy, the natural fool, and Folly, who assumes stupidity (Swain, p.163), are largely instrumental in causing the downfall of the protagonist. The play unites the themes I have discussed in this chapter. Reason is overthrown by folly and this leads to the assertion of the will and sensual appetite, and finally to adversity and despair.

Magnificence, a prince, maintains Felicity (or wealth) while he is governed by Measure, who restrains Liberty. When Magnificence adopts Fancy and Folly, and succumbs to the flattery of his courtiers, Counterfeit Countenance, Cloaked Collusion, Courtly Abusion and Crafty Conveyance, he rejects Measure and frees Liberty. As a result he falls victim to Adversity and Poverty, who bring him to Despair. Mischief is ready with a rope and a knife, but Good Hope intervenes, and Sad Circumspection, who has long been absent, returns to the court. Redress and Perseverance give a sermon on the transitory nature of the world and the folly of trusting in worldly goods, and the repentant Magnificence is restored to his palace and Felicity.

The play begins with a debate between Felicity (wealth) and Liberty (will). Felicity introduces the theme of the play in the first line, "Al thyng ys contryvyd by mannys Reason" (1.1), asserting that the ability
to handle wealth is the true test of wisdom (4). Liberty must be ruled by reason (37-8, 46-7). Free will is good in itself, but unrestrained it blinds man to danger (52-4). Like Sensuality in Nature, Liberty insists that life is worthless without him (75-8); what is the use of wealth if there is no liberty to "sporte at your pleasure, to ryn, and to ryde" (79)? To settle the dispute, Measure claims supremacy over both. Liberty must indeed by governed:

have ye not herde say that Wyll is no Skyll?

Take Sad Dyreccyon, and leve this Wantonnesse. (148-9)
Magnificence accepts this order of affairs (174-6), though Liberty remains reluctant to be ruled (232, 235).

Fancy, who calls himself Largesse (270), interrupts the discussion. Falsely claiming the authority of the absent Circumpection (311-12), he argues, as the vice figures so consistently do, that the hero needs his services. Measure is all very well for merchants (382), but Largesse "becometh a state ryall" (383). In admitting Fancy Magnificence is accepting the services of ungoverned impulse. As Fancy describes himself (968-1043), he is capricious, now merry, now sad for no reason, and foolish: "Frantyke fansy-Servyce I hyght;/ My wyttys be weke, my braynys are light" (1024-5). He represents "wilfulness, caprice, or fantasticalness" (Ramsay, p.xxxix), uncontrolled and irrational desires.

Fancy joins forces with Magnificence's corrupt courtiers, all of whom adopt false names to blind the hero to their true nature. They conspire to reinstate Liberty and oust Measure. Folly, the sixth conspirator, is the artificial or professional fool, and thus represents the deliberate rejection of reason. He teaches men to be idle and then stirs them to sin (1221-34). Fancy, who makes men mad (1301), brings them to Folly (1295-6), and Folly reduces them "from qui fuit aliquid to shyre shakynge nought" (1304). When Folly joins the court Measure will be gone and Liberty will be free (1315-18).
Under the influence of this retinue, Magnificence reinstates Liberty, despite Felicity's warning, "It is good yet that Lyberte be ruled by Reason" (1387). Fancy is jubilant (1414-16), and Magnificence rejects Felicity's counsel, telling him, "ye shall folowe myne Appetyte and Intent" (1420), and sending for "Lusty Pleasure" (Courtly Abusion) (1453). He then delivers a Herodian monologue (1457-1514) which indicates again the close connection between pride and the overthrow of reason. Subject to folly, sensuality and will, he has lost all remembrance of God and the teaching of the Church, and believes himself secure in the pleasures of this transitory life, asserting, "I drede no daunger; I dawnce all in delyte" (1492).

Courtly Abusion encourages him to become acquainted with Carnal Delectation (1547), and urges him above all,

What so ever ye do, folowe your owne Wyll;
Be it Reason or none, it shall not gretely skyll;
Be it ryght or wronge, by the advyse of me,
Take your Pleasure and use fre Lyberte. (1595-8).

The psychomachia is conducted entirely through argument and the hero is effectively persuaded to submit to his lower impulses. Convinced by his flatterers that his behaviour is reasonable (1381) and thus brought by pride to trust his own wit, like the hero of Nature, Magnificence dismisses Measure, and tells Cloaked Collusion that he has set his "hole Felycyte" in his courtiers (1788). He reaches the depths of irrationality in his delight in an inane conversation with Folly, who calls himself Conceit, until Fancy tells him that his wealth has gone and reveals the conspiracy.

The inner conflict is now conducted in reverse as circumstances begin to require that the prince's better nature should assert itself. Magnificence becomes the victim of Adversity, God's retribution for his
pomp and pride (1875-80). In his vainglory the hero had lost all rationality - "He knewe not hymselfe, his harte was so hye" (1888). Thus Adversity afflicts all "That folowe theyr Fansyes in Foly to fall" (1896-7). Warming to his theme, Adversity delivers a reproach for parental negligence; the wills of children must be controlled from the beginning so that the will learns early to submit (1920-30; cf.2136-50). He hands the prince over to Poverty who advises him to submit his will to God's (1997) and to remember the instability of worldly prosperity (2022-39). Magnificence recognises the source of his fall, "Alasse my Foly! alasse my wanton Wyll!" (2062), and while he laments Despair tells him that he has no hope of God's mercy (2303). Rescued from Despair by Good Hope, Magnificence repents, and welcomes the returning Circumspection, whose absence has been responsible for his downfall (2444-5). He acknowledges his submission to wilfulness (2432) and after a sermon on the transience of worldly goods he is restored to his former position.

Here, then, is a close analysis of the nature and consequences of unreason in princes. Reduced by submission to irrational impulses to the depths of folly, the hero becomes subject to pride and sensual appetite, and thus to poverty and despair. Only the recognition of the true nature of the world and its goods and the return of self-knowledge and reason can restore him to his former state.

The connection with the themes of the earlier plays is sufficiently clear. What is remarkable about Magnificence, however, is that its purpose appears to be predominantly this-worldly. The prince is taught to assert his reason not to secure his eternal salvation through a rejection of the world, but to maintain his worldly wealth. The play's editor, R.L.Ramsay, regards it as "our first example of a moral play written with a secular and literary instead of a theological aim" (Ramsay, p.xi; cf.Collins, pp.5-6). The issue, he suggests, is no longer between good and evil but between prudence and folly (Ramsay, p.lxxi), and the play is a not entirely successful adaptation of the traditional
morality plot to the new material, so that the otherworldly conclusion is merely conventional (Ramsay, pp.xiii, cvii).

That Magnificence combines the medieval structure with the new and secular theme was the general critical view (Thompson, 1910, p.360; Rossiter, pp.115-7; Spivack, pp.215-7; Hogrefe, p.310) until William O. Harris demonstrated that, like its analogue, The Four Cardinal Virtues, the play is based on the tradition of Fortitude, self-restraint in property and patience in adversity on the basis of a proper contempt for material things. The play thus shares the otherworldly concerns of its predecessors. The ethical scheme is not taken directly from Aristotle (Harris, pp.46-70; 139-44) as Ramsay had supposed (Ramsay, pp.xxxiii-xliv; lxxii-lxxviii), but from a medieval tradition derived originally from Cicero's De Officiis. According to Harris, the cardinal virtues, and fortitude in particular, are specifically the kingly virtues, and the play concerns the salvation of the prince (W.O.Harris, pp.127-39).

Harris's arguments are very convincing. The fact remains, however, that at the end of the play what is emphasised is not that Magnificence is saved from damnation, like the earlier heroes, but that he is restored to his former wealth and good government, and this alone constitutes a notable break with the tradition. It must be remembered, of course, that the theme of kingship immediately makes the play a special case. The prince's handling of his wealth is not a private matter but one which affects the public weal. His adversity may be the national adversity: according to a fifteenth century prose translation of the pseudo-Aristotelian Secreta Secretorum, the foolish and extravagant king "destrueth his roialme whate he may" (Ramsay, p.lxxvi). Further, the prince is not a private man who may withdraw from the world: in his case there is a kind of avarice which is lawful, "whanne he gaderyth good ryztfully & in mesure, to pat entent to rewle him-self & his meyne
Like the play, the sermon from which the quotation is taken emphasises the need for measure in dealing with worldly goods. This, I have argued (p.42 above), is a recurrent theme of the morality plays. Their heroes are taught not abstinence but restraint. It is subjection to worldly goods, not their use, which brings damnation. This general truth is applicable particularly to the prince, who has responsibilities in the world, and who therefore has a duty to handle his wealth with measure in order to rule "in resonable manere".

But when all this has been said, it is still true that the choice of the theme of kinship is itself a new departure in the morality tradition. However "medieval" the treatment of the duties of the prince may be, the introduction of the theme itself into this hitherto otherworldly genre shows a broadening of the conception of the morality play and perhaps indicates the imminence of the Reformation. The tendency towards a new social ethic is also revealed in Godly Queen Hester and Roe's lost play about Lord Governance and Lady Public Weal, performed in 1526 (E.Hall, p.719), and reaches its culmination after the Reformation in the social moralities like Wealth and Health (1553-7). In Magnificence the emphasis has shifted from the assertion of reason for the sake of an otherworldly ethic to self-restraint in order to preserve the common good here and now. Though still stressing the worthlessness of worldly goods, Skelton appears to admit the possibility and value of happiness in the world.

Clearly, then, the presentation of sin as the destruction of the proper hierarchy of man's faculties is a dominant feature of the medieval moralities. While all its powers are necessary, the soul must maintain degree within itself if it is to choose the good. Sin, as I have argued, is predominately the setting up of worldly values in the place of God. The overthrow of reason, which is the source of sin, is explicitly connected
with worldliness. The assertion of sensuality, the will or the flesh is the direct consequence of man's predicament in the world. Since he possesses a body as well as a soul, man is dependent on material things, and this dependence all too easily becomes submission to material values. Folly leads man to prefer worldly pleasures before God. Reason is the means by which man is able to know and love God. Only the assertion of the reason over his lower nature can ensure the establishment of the proper relationship with both the world and God.

The overturning of degree within the soul is frequently allegorised in terms of the relationship between servant and master. Personified sins present themselves to the heroes as servants, and then rapidly take control. The overturning of degree in social terms expresses the overthrow of the internal spiritual hierarchy. This is particularly noticeable in *The World and the Child* where Folly, the servant, quickly becomes the master, and in *Magnificence* where the prince is dominated by his fools and his courtiers. In the same way Lechery begins as Mary Magdalene's servant, but soon comes to direct her actions. Pride gains control of Man in *Nature* by entering his service, and in the same play Sensuality achieves dominance by acting as a steward. Covetousness becomes the steward of Humanum Genus. Pride joins Youth as his servant, and Idleness employs Evil Counsel in *John the Evangelist*. The implication in each case is that though initially man chooses to make use of sin, it rapidly comes to dominate him. The godlike reason is thus submerged in worldly and sensual pleasures.

The emphasis on free will, which is the basis of the *psychomachia*, is essential to this concept of man's conflicting impulses. Torn between reason and sensuality, naked and weak though he is, man is nowhere totally helpless. He may be perplexed by the choices he must make or deceived by the sophistries of the vices but invariably the
powers of good return to the stage in an attempt to reclaim him. In other words, his aspiration to good is temporarily suspended but never totally destroyed. If the attempt fails this too is through the hero's own choice. Right reason has the opportunity to assert itself.

Though Magnificence and The Four Elements begin to reveal an interest in the things of this world, the account of man presented by most of the medieval moralities is largely in accordance with the orthodoxy of contempt of the world. He is part angel, part beast; his incorruptible soul is weighed down by his corruptible sensuality, the "garment" he must wear on his pilgrimage through the world. For salvation he must choose to obey the impulses of his immortal reason, and reject all pleasure which is merely transitory. By asserting that which belongs to heaven he becomes assured of heaven itself. But a choice must be made, and the process consistently involves a struggle between his conflicting faculties.
Chapter 3

LIFE AND DEATH

In the medieval moralities the hero finally repents and is saved. The counterpart, however, of the promise of heaven is the threat of death. Like the treatises on contempt of the world, the plays lay much stress on the mutability of worldly goods, the brevity of this life, and the inevitability and imminence of death. According to J.S. Blench, mutability is the most characteristic theme of sermons in the period 1450-1547 (Blench, pp. 228-37). The cry of respice finem, which has sich wide currency in the religious writings of the fifteenth century, is echoed in The Pride of Life (1.391), The Castle of Perseverance (11,407, 3646-9), Mind, Will and Understanding (1.875), Nature (fol. 3), Everyman (11,10-11) and The World and the Child (sig.B 3v).

The pride of life leads to worldly "security", defiance of the threat of death. Magnificence in the depths of depravity asserts his superiority to Alexander, Cyrus, Caesar, Cato and the other heroes of the ubi sunt tradition (Magnificence, 11.1459 ff.). The irony cannot have been lost of the audience. Youth, too, boasts of his physical beauty and strength, and scorns Charity's reminder that his body is like a tree which flourishes now and will be cut down at last (Youth, sig.A lv-2). The orthodox answer is familiar. Death is imminent and then what use is worldly prowess? Many have trusted in the delights of the flesh, the glory of this life, and nothing remains of them but ashes.

Old age is the gateway to death and acts as a warning to sinners. Vivid accounts of the miseries of old age are numerous in the period.7 Innocent III (in Gascoigne's translation) portrays the old man:

his hart is afflicted, his head is troubled, his spirites languishe, his breath stinketh, his face is wrinckled, his body is bowed, his eyes are daealed, his feelings faylleth, and his quicknesse quayleth, his teeth become rotten, and his eares are closed up. (Gascoigne, p. 222).
Young men should look upon the old as a lesson to them: "We shall one day be as they are now" (Gascoigne, p.222). In the plays too the miseries of old age are presented in some detail. The aging Humanum Genus describes his condition in traditional terms:

I gynne to waxyn hory and olde,
My bake gynnyth to bowe and bende,
I crulle and crepe and wax al colde.
Age makyth man ful unthende,
Body and bonys and al unwolde;
My bonys are febyl and sore,
I am arrayed in a sloppe,
As a 3onge man I may not hoppe,
My nose is colde and gynnyth to droppe,
Myn her waxit al hore. (Perseverance, 11. 2483-91).

Everyman at the point of death is abandoned by Beauty, Strength, Discretion and the senses. Similar symptoms bring the hero of Nature to repentance: he has lost his capacity for sensual pleasures (fol.30v). In The World and the Child age brings Manhood to despair which is the prelude to repentance.

Death itself forms the subject of The Pride of Life and Everyman, and is an important theme in The Castle of Perseverance and Hikkscorner. It is also allegorically presented in the N,town play of TheDeath of Herod. Like the exponents of contempt of the world the dramatists emphasise the inevitable separation of man from this transitory world. By seeing this life in its true perspective, and by realising how little the world can help him in death, he learns the worthlessness of all worldly attachments.

In the cosmic Christian conflict God is ultimately victorious. In the warfare within the soul of man, too, resistance to God is finally vain. If man rejects God to the last and clings to worldly values his
soul is damned for eternity. To be saved he must submit to the divine will. God's inevitable victory over man's sinful impulses is secured by his messenger, death. Death with his dart strikes all men down and delivers them to the divine Judgment. This fell sergeant cannot be resisted; the wise man prepares for his summons.

In a number of the medieval moralities the advent of death provides the climax of a life of inner conflict between worldly and spiritual values. To the wise man death is gain (Phil.1, 21), putting an end to the miseries of life and ensuring final union with Christ, for "we dye alwaies, as long as we lyve, and then (at length) we leave dying, when we leave to lyve any longer" (Gascoigne, p.232). But to the morality heroes, committed to the transitory values of this world, death is a source of terror, the prelude to the final reckoning. Their ethical struggles are presented as conflicts between the awareness of mortality and the pride of life, worldly security, the irrational conviction that this life will never end. The moment of death itself is one of conflict between a continued clinging to the values of earthly life and a recognition that "all thynge fayleth, save God alone" (Everyman, 1.841). The protagonists struggle in vain against their opponent, Death personified, until they are forced to recognise his supremacy and cast themselves on the mercy of God. The conflict in the medieval moralities between worldly security and the awareness of mortality is a reflection of the central struggle between the world and God and provides a parallel to the Psychomachia.

Worldly security is the theme of the late fourteenth century fragment, The Pride of Life. Enough material is extant to give us an outline of the action of the play. The prologue describes the plot. The King of Life, dreaded by his nobles, has no fear of death (11.27-8). He devotes his time to the sins of the world, "pride and likinge" (25), mirth and
sweetness (30-31). His Queen warns him to beware of Death who "do not spar/ kyntis, cayser ne king" (55-6) but he ignores this "womanis tal" (60) and the Bishop's warning sermon, and sends his messenger to challenge Death to a duel. (The inclusion of the messenger who bears the challenge of God's "messenger" indicates the extent of his pride. The King of Life in his ignorance claims a Satanic equality with God). They fight and the King of Life falls. His soul, recognising that "be bodyis pride is dare a bo3t" (95), is carried away by fiends. After a dispute with the body the soul is weighed and saved by the intercession of the Virgin.

The play itself adds little to the material provided by the prologue and the fragment ends at the point where the King sends his messenger to challenge Death. The speeches of the King of Life develop the theme of pride and security in the values of this world. Supported by his knights, Strength and Health, he boasts that he rules the world (122, 141). Mirth, his messenger, assures him that he is indeed supreme. None will dare to challenge him for he has no equal "Of gold & silver & robis riche/ & hei hors on to ryde" (289-90). The King promptly gives him a castle and makes him earl of Kent. He is deaf to the warnings of the Queen and he ignores the Bishop's account of the pains of hell (375-82) and his injunction to do deeds of charity to save his soul.

The King of Life is secure in his worldly attributes, believing them immutable. Trusting in the powers of the body, he ignores the fate of his soul. Pride and folly lead him to reject the promptings of wisdom. The implication for the audience is that only the constant remembrance of death protects man from the pride of life.

In the fragment we have the King himself shows no signs of wavering. The conflict between worldly security and the awareness of mortality is entirely externalized by the allegorical form, first in the arguments and
counter-arguments of his faculties, Strength, Health and Mirth, set against those of the Queen and the Bishop, who presumably represent his rational powers, and finally in the duel with Death recorded by the prologue. In fighting against Death the King is blindly resisting the will of God. The battle is analogous to the psychomachia in that it represents man's conflict between attachment to the world and the recognition that he must die. Unlike the psychomachia, however, this battle takes place once only, and the King of Life has no chance of victory, since Death represents simultaneously his own inner awareness of the fact of death and an external force, God's messenger who cannot be defeated. The King of Life can choose only between resistance, which is sin, and submission. He chooses to resist and the intercession of the Virgin is necessary to save his soul.

Humanum Genus, too, is saved by divine mercy. His death, though presented in a different form, is also a lesson in humility and contempt of the world. Reduced to physical helplessness and abandoned by the World, he is threatened with damnation and his soul is carried off triumphantly by the Bad Angel. The World summons a boy called "I Wot Nevere Whoa" (Perseverance, 1. 2968) to seize his heritage. The body is left to decay and worldly goods fall to a stranger (cf. Ecclus.11, 19) while the soul prepares to face judgment. Naked he came into the world and naked he must return (Job 1, 21; Ps. 49, 17; Ecc. 5, 15; I Tim. 6, 7). Here too Death prevails over all men, rich and poor, powerful and weak (2791-814). These days he is almost forgotten: men devote themselves to avarice. But his stroke will abase their pride and their wealth will not save them (2819-29). No man can protect Humanum Genus from the new lesson that Death will teach him (2830-42).

The episode stresses the misery and isolation of death, and the final worthlessness of worldly goods. Humanum Genus has spent his life in
heaping up wealth which he must leave to a stranger and in pursuing
pleasures which can only weigh down the scales against his salvation.
His carelessness of death has brought him to this pass. The remembrance
of death makes clear the true purpose of life, and the concluding lines
of the play confirm the importance of the moral lesson of this episode:

To save you fro synnyenge
Every at he begynnynge
Thynke on youre last endynge! (3646-8)

When Humanum Genus makes his initial choice of the world, the Good
Angel makes a last desperate bid for his soul by reminding him that he
must die:

þou schalt levyn but a whyle.
What covetyst þou to wynne?
Man, þynke on þyn endynge day
Whanne þou schalt be closyd undyr clay,
And if þou thenke of þat aray,
Certys þou schalt not synne.

Homo, memento finis et in eternum non peccabis. (405-11)

The Bad Angel advises him to wait until he is sixty and his nose grows
cold before he allows his mortality to alarm him (417-9). The hero is
ready to accept his advice - "I am but zonge" (423). Throughout the play
there is a recurrent emphasis on mortality and damnation in the triumphant
speeches of the evil characters (11.261-5; 545-7; 637-8; 1041-4). But in
conversation with the protagonist they stress the length of life.

Covetousness, for example, assures him that "his loffly lyfe may longe leste"
(855). In fact his victim needs no persuasion to forget his last ending:

Of my sowle I have non rewthe.
What schulde I recknen of domyaday
So þat I be ryche and of gret aray?
I schal make mery whyl I may. (605-8).

At his repentance the Virtues tell him that "Qui perseveraverit usque in
"finem, hic salvus erit" (1706), but when he leaves the Castle with Covetousness all such lessons are forgotten. Only the arrival of Death himself teaches him the truth that he is now dependent on the mercy of God: "To helle I schal bothe fare and fle/ But God me graunte of hys grace" (3001-2). The hero's inner conflict between worldly security and the fear of death, allegorised in the advice of his good and bad attributes, is a concomitant of his struggle between sin and virtue.

A similar conflict is touched on in *Mind, Will and Understanding* where the corrupted Mind is reminded by Wisdom that he must die (875-8). He experiences a moment of doubt: "To my mynde yt cummyth from farre/ That dowtles man xal dey" (881-2). But Will reassures him: there will be plenty of time to repent when they are old (889-92).

The theme is not developed here but in *Hickscorner* the same conflict is more central to the action of the play. Though death is not personified, the threat of death forms the basis of the repentance of both Freewill and Imagination and the play concludes with a sermon on the promised bliss of heaven. While the awareness of mortality is a constant factor in the medieval morality plays, it is made more explicit in *Hickscorner* than in any of the plays in which death is not actually presented.

Contemplation and Perseverance dispute in vain with Freewill, whose mind cannot be made to rest on a single argument until his attention is suddenly captured by the words of Perseverance:

Freewill, bethink thee that thou shalt die,
And of the hour thou are uncertain,
Yet by thy life thou mayest find a remedy;
For, and thou die in sin, all labour is in vain,
Then shall thy soul be still in pain,
Lost and dammed for evermore.\(^8\) (p.154).

Freewill at once undertakes whatever penance is necessary.
The conversion of Imagination follows. Imagination is guilty of the same security as the King of Life: "When shall I perish? I trow, never;\ By Christ, I reck not a feather" (155). He has reached the peak of worldly success: he has been dubbed a knight and made controller of the stews (156). Freewill, Contemplation and Perseverance attempt to induce him to repent and this time Contemplation's warning that death will steal upon him unawares goes unheeded (157). He gives a series of flippant replies until Freewill urges:

Beware! for when thou are buried in the ground,
Few friends for thee will be found,
Remember this still. (159).

Imagination is convinced: "No thing dread I so sore as death,/ Therefore to amend I think it be time" (159). It is true that the psychology here is not very subtle, but it is equally clear that we are to understand that it is the recognition that he must die which makes Imagination see his worldly values in their true perspective.

Among the medieval moralities it is surely *Everyman* (c.1495-1500) which makes the most detailed, complex and subtle analysis of the inner struggle which occurs at the moment of death. Several characteristics make *Everyman* unusual among the English morality plays, a fact which perhaps lends support to the belief that the Dutch version is the original.\ The play is concerned only with the hours immediately before death. We know nothing of the hero's birth and very little of his life. The personifications represent his inner attributes and those things which cause his attachment to the world, but there are no vices and virtues. In fact, most of the "characters" are morally neutral. As a result, there is no psychomachia. But there is conflict. The play presents the defeat of blindness by Knowledge. It records Everyman's struggle against Death followed by his gradual submission to the will of God. There is no
emphasis on the corruption of the hero. Everyman is not presented as a
vain boaster, like the King of Life, nor is he shown immersed in a
round of trivial worldly pleasures, like Mankind or Mind, Will and
Understanding. His sin is blindness, failure to recognise the nature
of the world and forgetfulness of God, rather than a deliberate rejection
of virtue. As a result, he is both more universal and more sympathetic
than most of the morality heroes and this, in combination with the
austerity of the dramatic presentation, makes the play extraordinarily
moving.

Nonetheless, there is nothing unusual about the moral lesson of
Everyman. Its theme is the worthlessness of worldly friends, kindred
and goods, and worldly attributes, strength, beauty, discretion and the
senses at the moment of death. The play shows Everyman abandoned by all
these in turn, descending into the grave with only Good Deeds to support
him at the Day of Judgment. The purpose of the play is to show "How
transitory we be" (1.6) and to stress the folly of dependence on fleeting
worldly pleasures and disregard of the immortal soul. A section of the
Middle English translation of the Orologium Sapientiae (c.1480) presents
a worldly young man at the point of death. A part of his complaint
summarises the lesson of Everyman:

Oo, ye alle ’pat seen my wrecchednesses, havith compassyone of
me and mercy upon me! and alle the while yow strengbes suffysen
and the tyme helpith, gederith into hevenly bernes hevenly
tresoures, ye whiche mowen resseyve and take yow into ever-
lastynge tabernacles what-tyme ’pat 3ee failen, and ’pat 3ee ben
not lafte voyde in suche an houre ’pat is to come to yow, as 3ee
seen my now voyde and of alle goodis dispoyllde. (Horstmann, p.361).10

The plot of Everyman is well known and requires only a brief summary.

God sends his messenger, Death, to summon Everyman to a reckoning. Everyman
pleads in vain for time, and then begs Fellowship, Kindred and Cousin to keep him company. But when he tells them the nature of his journey they find excuses to abandon him. He appeals to Goods, who tells him that he will only worsen his case. Finally he turns to Good Deeds, weakened and bound in sin. Good Deeds cannot stand, but gives him his sister, Knowledge, to help him. Knowledge leads him to Confession and penance, so that Good Deeds is liberated, and gives him the garment of contrition. She then sends him to receive the sacrament. Discretion, Strength, Beauty and Five Wits join him but leave him again on the brink of the grave. Only Good Deeds descends into the grave with him, and an angel receives Everyman's soul into heaven.

The play is brilliantly constructed. Thomas van Laan has drawn attention to its two-part movement - downwards to near despair and then upwards to salvation through Everyman's recognition of his sin. The play opens with God's justice, which leads to despair, and closes with his mercy, which makes salvation possible. Time, initially a threat, becomes a redemptive force in the second part of the play (van Laan, passim).

The double movement has a further aspect which van Laan does not discuss. It represents the double process of education by which the hero first learns the falsehood of all that he had believed, and then discovers the truth for the first time. It shows Everyman's descent into suffering as he realises the instability of worldly values and then his relief and happiness as this knowledge enables him to establish the proper relationship with God. Everyman's sin is his blindness. God complains that men have forgotten him. Encumbered with worldly goods, steeped in wealth, they live "without drede" (24), thinking themselves secure in this life. Above all, they are ignorant of God, blinded by material values:

Of ghostly syght the people be so blynde,
Drowned in synne, they know me not for theyr god. (25-6)
It is the knowledge of God that Everyman lacks, and it is this, in all its implications, that he has to learn. Death accosts him asking, "Hast thou thy Maker forgete?" (86), and it becomes clear that this is what Everyman has done. Such is his ignorance that he does not even understand the meaning of death. Not only is he unprepared (119, 134), but he fully expects that he will return when he has completed the journey that Death commands (149). He is surprised to learn that his life and goods were only lent him (161-4). By the end of the play he has learnt the central truth that "all thynge fayleth save God alone" (841), and it is this realization which makes possible his salvation. The double movement of the play represents the misery which his blindness brings at the approach of death, and the joy which replaces it as Knowledge drives out ignorance.

The first part of the educational process is the refutation of all that the world has taught him. He has to reject all that a life devoted to worldly values has led him to believe. Realising that he cannot depend on friends and kindred, he turns to wealth, supposing, like Humanum Genus, that the World can support him in this crisis. Goods, whom he loves best (472), like the World in The Castle of Perseverance, tells him that his function is to bring him to hell (429-30, 475). It is at this point that Everyman arrives at the recognition of his total isolation, and this brings him to self-knowledge and self-contempt:

Than of my selfe I was ashamed,
And so I am worthy to be blamed;
Thus may I well my selfe hate. (476-8).

So far his education has been a negative one. The upward movement of the play begins with Everyman's introduction to Knowledge, who provides the positive instructions which enable him to move from the depths of self-contempt to the assurance of salvation. My interpretation of the play depends on the significance of Knowledge. Several critics have taken
if that Knowledge stands for acknowledgment of sin, or contrition (de Vocht, pp. 59-64; Ryan, p. 728; van Leen, p. 470), and Cawley assumes that she represents self-knowledge as a means to the knowledge of God (Cawley, pp. xxi-xxii). I am inclined to believe that Knowledge incorporates both contrition and self-knowledge and perhaps stands for a still wider concept, that she represents a full cure for Everyman's blindness, the knowledge of God, the only means to the proper relationship with God, the product of reason, Everyman's highest faculty (cf. Kolve, pp. 78-9). "Knowledge" in the fifteenth century commonly had its broad modern meaning of the fact of knowing, understanding (OED II, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12).

Knowledge does not appear until Everyman has realised the worthlessness of his worldly attachments. As in so many of the other morality plays, right reason is overthrown by worldly values, but reinstated by their rejection. Knowledge leads Everyman to Confession who dwells in the house of salvation (540). This reconciliation with the Church is the first stage in the adjustment of his relationship with God. She urges him to fulfil his penance and promises to counsel him (577-80), and gives him the garment of contrition. She sends him to receive the sacrament (706-9), and at his death it is Knowledge who remains to hear the angels sing as his soul is received into heaven (891-3). Knowledge, then, is more than the acknowledgment of sin, and more even than self-knowledge. She is Everyman's counsellor from the moment of his repentance to his death, controlling the series of actions which ensure his salvation. She is thus surely no less than the fruits of his rational faculty, the element in man which enables him to recognise goodness and truth, liberated by his rejection of unstable worldly values, and directing him in the way of virtue.

It has been suggested that Everyman is unusual in emphasising good
works (rather than grace or mercy) as the means to salvation (Chambers, 1945, p.64; A. Williams, p.161). But this is to ignore or to misunderstand the crucial role of Knowledge. Certainly only Good Deeds goes into the grave with Everyman, but this is presumably because only Good Deeds can be weighed in the scale against his sins at the last Judgment. But Good Deeds alone is helpless until Everyman carries out the instructions of Knowledge so that he is free from the sin which has rendered Good Deeds powerless. Good works alone, without the proper relationship with God, which includes the recognition of grace and mercy, are of no avail.

The introduction of Knowledge initiates the rising action of the second part of the play. Until this point Everyman's condition has been one of increasing isolation, increasing despondency. Knowledge not only brings contentment (524-5) and urges him to rejoice (636-7); she also introduces Everyman to his own attributes, Beauty, Strength, Discretion and Five Wits. It is true that these must leave him on the edge of the grave but this time Everyman's response is a positive one - God does not fail (841). Instead of pleading for time, as he did at the beginning, Everyman now goes forward with a new eagerness (776, 780). The upward movement concludes as the angels welcome him into the heavenly sphere (894-901).

We are left, then, to conclude that nothing is here for tears. Death is a source of terror to the sinner but of joy to the redeemed. Everyman dramatises both responses. Its double movement is closely similar to that of so many of the treatises on contempt of the world, which urge upon the reader his own weakness and the instability of the world in order that he may be the more aware of his dependence on God and the lasting joys of heaven.

Despite its unusual form, Everyman includes by implication most of the central themes of the morality plays. Though its action is confined
to the moment of death, and though the psychomachia in its traditional form is omitted entirely, the play dramatises Everyman's choice between the world and God, and shows the need for the assertion of the reason as the means to the establishment of the relationship with God which is the prelude to salvation. It demonstrates the essential instability of worldly values. Everyman's wealth forsakes him, his flesh is chastised in penance and his pride is humbled to self-contempt. Thus the three worldly values are put in their proper perspective. Abandoned by the world and by his own faculties, Everyman is forced to the realization that God alone does not fail.

The play is an extraordinarily effective analysis of the inner struggle between worldly security and the awareness of mortality. Everyman's initial reaction to Death is one of mounting terror. He pleads and reasons in vain, only to be greeted by Death's inevitable and repeated "Nay". The episode dramatises the conflict between his growing realization that he must die and his blind and irrational conviction that there must be some escape. In his perplexity he turns for comfort to those sources of happiness which sustained him in this life. When they abandon him he is close to despair in his apparent helplessness, until Knowledge drives out the blindness of this world and offers the promise of the next. The recognition of the inevitability of death brings the victory of divine over worldly values. Though its theme is fairly common in the moralities of the period, the play's form is unusual, and its analysis of the triumph of Knowledge over the pride of life is uniquely impressive.

The Death of Herod (c.1400-1450) forms a brief allegorical episode in the Ludus Coventriae. Here, as elsewhere, death is God's retribution for the pride of life. Herod, steeped in vainglory, and feasting to celebrate the security which results from his slaughter of the Innocents (11.207-24), is struck down with his companions by Death, God's
A devil carries them away, rejoicing in the pains they will suffer (233-45).

The moral implications of the episode are left in no doubt. Death describes his power over all things (182-8). Once he has delivered his stroke, man has no further chance to make amends (189-93). Herod in his presumption "wenyth to leve evyr-more" (195) but Death will "cast down his pride" (206). He warns all men to beware of Herod's "pompe and pryde" (247). Death makes all men equal in the grave (255). As always in the plays which present the summons of death, Herod is taken unawares. Wholly devoted to worldly values, he has forgotten their transitory nature. For Herod death is a punishment for pride in worldly success; for the audience the play is a lesson in humility, a reminder that worldly glory is unstable and that worldly values are finally of no avail. Power achieved through sin leads to damnation and the proudest men are ultimately no more than meat for worms (291-3).

But the episode is treated differently from the advent of death in the moralities and reveals the significantly different concerns of the miracle plays. Herod has undergone no ethical conflict. He is simply a moral exemplum of the proud man. None of his court has suggested that he must die or that he ought to be aware of his own mortality, and he makes no attempt at resistance. Death simply carries him off in the midst of his apparent triumph over his rival, Christ: "Hic dum buccinant mors interficiat herodem et duos milites subito et diabolus recipiat eos" (232 S.D.). Death himself is the only allegorical figure. The episode points a moral: it is not concerned with Herod's ethical struggles but only with the emptiness of the pride of life.

Ethical struggles are the central concern of the medieval morality plays. They dramatise the inner warfare of a single typical individual between the values of this life and the next. This warfare takes several
forms, among them the conflict between the recognition of death and the pride of life, but with certain exceptions the central battle can be said to be between worldly and otherworldly values. The currents of thought of the Reformation were to alter the otherworldly orthodoxy of the middle ages and so to change the patterns of conflict within the morality plays of the later period.
PART II

THE CHANGING PATTERN OF THE POST-REFORMATION PERIOD
Chapter 4
MODIFICATIONS OF THE MEDIEVAL PATTERN

The dramatists of the Reformation period inherited with some modifications the dominant themes of their medieval predecessors. Although Reformation theology laid considerable emphasis on the importance of social life in the world, otherworldly values survived alongside this new concern. Accordingly the dramatists, while introducing new social themes into the plays, sustained at the same time something of the medieval analysis of the three main areas of conflict which I have discussed in Part I, the antagonism between the World and God, the overthrow of reason, and the struggle for supremacy between worldly "security" and the threat of death. My concern in this chapter is the survival of these otherworldly themes in the post-Reformation moralities. Some treatment of Reformation theology is necessary in order to account both for the survival, and for the modifications of the medieval pattern.

The English Reformation was a complex revolution. Protestantism was adopted slowly and gradually, and for a wide variety of reasons. Even when the Anglican Church was finally established under Elizabeth it included men of very divergent views on many subjects. English Protestantism incorporated a wide spectrum of beliefs ranging from pure Calvinism to Hooker's moderate and conservative Anglicanism. On a number of issues English Protestants seem to have been united by little more than a common rejection of Rome.

In the absence of a general synthesis of ideas it is difficult to define precisely the place of contempt of the world in Protestant thinking. Generalizations, always suspect, become doubly questionable when they concern a period when ideas are in ferment. It is not, however, impossible to consider general tendencies, to formulate a tentative
pattern from statements which recur in a variety of sixteenth century Protestant writings.

A consideration of the specific problem of otherworldliness is made easier by the fact that many of the areas of disagreement within the English Church concern matters of clerical dress, ceremonial or church government, and have little bearing on doctrine. In order to simplify the situation further it seems best to ignore the label "Puritan". The word is so widely used by contemporaries and so variously defined by modern writers that it seems impossible to apply it consistently to a specific body of doctrine (George, pp.65-6).

According to Professor Dickens, most thinking Anglicans of the sixteenth century were "Puritans", and from the outset they formed a large proportion of the members of the established Church (Dickens, pp.426-9). In the context of an investigation of otherworldliness I have therefore dealt with English Protestantism without attempting to distinguish between Anglicans and the Puritans who remained within the Anglican Church.

Anglican theology was eclectic. The English Protestants produced no central theologian of their own before Hooker and were much dependent on the theories of the continental reformers. Luther exerted considerable initial influence, but from the 1540s onwards Calvin became increasingly important as a source of English theory (Dickens, p.273). It has seemed best, therefore, in discussing early Reformation theology, to examine the writings of the English reformers for confirmation or repudiation of the views of Luther and Calvin.

In considering Reformation theory I have made no real attempt to show a chronological development. Such an undertaking would require a much more detailed analysis than is relevant to a study of the morality plays. I am concerned with Reformation theology as a background to and
partial explanation of the themes of the moralities of the period from 1535 to the end of the century. The plays themselves rarely show any clear chronological pattern of development, and in many cases their dates are so uncertain that it would be dangerous to attempt to trace any pattern of this kind. I have therefore considered Protestant writings from the whole period in an attempt to build up a general account of the theories which the plays dramatise, and I have included references to William Perkins and John Downmane, writing at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, when these writers confirm what seem to me to be general tendencies in the period.

With all these reservations, then, it is possible to state in general terms that contempt of the world did not disappear with the Reformation. The central Christian concern with the dichotomy between body and soul, time and eternity, continued to be expressed in terms of the antithesis between this world and the next. Though the Reformation meant certain modifications in the Catholic view of the world and its values, "there was no real break... with the universal Christian assumption that those who wish truly to live with God must, to some extent or in some way, live separate from the world; that even while they are in the world, they cannot be entirely of it. The world still remained, in the Protestant view, primarily a place of trial and sojourn for the God-directed soul" (George, p.30).

This Augustinian view remained that of Luther and Calvin. Calvin introduces the familiar rhetoric of contempt of the world. This life is unhappy, its goods vain and fleeting; the Christian must not therefore allow himself to be bound by intemperate love of it. Though the world is not evil in itself, a gift of God whose benefits must not be rejected, we should constantly compare this life of exile and death with the life of bliss which is to come, and look forward to the death of the body which
is union with Christ (Calvin, III, ix, 1-6). The pilgrim-Christian in this world should "mediate, amid earth's filth, upon the life of the angels" (Calvin, III, vii, 3).

Among the English reformers Bradford echoes the most violent rhetoric of the medieval exponents of contemptus mundi, condemning the world as a place of exile, mutable, wretched, and the flesh as repugnant and filthy (Bradford, pp.273-5). Traditionally, death is gain, an escape from the brevity and misery of life. Meditation on death is of value to the Christian, because it "helpeth much to the contempt of this world" (Bradford, pp.332-49). Thomas Becon asks, "What is it to despise worldly things?", and answers in the manner of his medieval predecessors:

Wholly to set our mind upon heavenly things, not regarding the transitory and uncertain vanities of this world, according to the words of St.Peter: "All flesh is as the grass, and all the glory of man as the flower of the grass", &c; knowing and acknowledging with St.Paul, that "we have here no certain abiding place, but seek for one to come": again, that "as we brought nothing into the world, so we shall carry nothing out of it" ... (Becon, p.620).

Latimer insists that the world and Christians cannot agree, for Christians "love godliness, and the other love wickedness". But true Christians are few, "for every man will rather apply himself after the world, and have quietness and a merry life, than to forsake the same, and to have trouble with Christ and his flock" (Latimer, 1845, p.184). According to Perkins, a recognition of the wretchedness of existence, the vanity of worldly things, the mutability of the world and our separation from Christ in this life, combined with a consideration of the joys of heaven, will make us, "though living in the world, yet to use it, as if we used it not: to have our conversation in heaven: to thinke with Paul, that to be loosed, and be with Christ, is best of all for us" (Perkins, II, 35). In the
sixteenth century and well into the seventeenth works like Gascoigne's *The Droome of Doomes Day* (1576), Godfrey Goodman's *The Fall of Man* (1616) and Jeremy Taylor's *Holy Dying* (1651) echo many of the traditional themes and much of the conventional rhetoric of the medieval treatises on contempt of the world.

Such examples could be multiplied until it might be assumed that the otherworldly ideal had remained unaffected by the Reformation. The position, however, is not so simple. In the next chapter I hope to show that the Protestant attitude to the world was profoundly affected by the new social ethic which replaced the ideal of monastic withdrawal. Protestantism required all men to live in the world and to display the fruits of their faith in their daily lives. The world, whose pleasures continued to provide a distraction from the path of virtue, was not the only possible arena for the practice of good works. This change affected the Protestant concept of Christian warfare and so altered the patterns of conflict dramatised in the Protestant moralities. Nonetheless, a strong strand of asceticism is evident in post-Reformation thought, and in a form which clearly displays its medieval heritage. It is this survival of otherworldly values in Protestant theory and in the Protestant morality plays that I shall discuss in this chapter.

As an example of the survival of medieval values, it is possible, despite the dissolution of the monasteries, to find cases of English Protestants hankering after the ideal of withdrawal from the world. So powerful a concept as this, the origins of which are considerably older than Christianity itself, does not lose its hold on civilization all at once. Lancelot Andrewes, perhaps in an unguarded moment, told the imprisoned separatist, Henry Barrow, in 1589, "For close emprisonment you are most happie. The solitarie and contemplative life I hold the most blessed life. It is the life I would chuse" (Andrewes, 1967, pp.xvi-xvii). It may be, too, that the increasing interest in Neo-Stoicism in England
in the second half of the sixteenth century is connected with a widespread impulse of this kind. Neo-Stoicism provided an ideal of rising above earthly concerns, whether these were in themselves good or bad, of withdrawing into meditative solitude. Kirk and Hall find that all the translators of Stoic works during this period were Protestants, and attribute this to the "more rationalistic thought" of Protestanism (Lipsius, pp.21-2). On the other hand, Protestantism in general did not share the Stoic elevation of reason (see below, pp.113-6) and it may be rather that some of the English Protestants welcomed a justification of withdrawal from the world which had no taint of popery.11 Such a hypothesis would be difficult to prove. What is clear, however, is that the Protestant attitude to the world is a paradoxical one. Contempt of the world remains an ideal although a new social ethic has arisen beside it.

In my analysis of the medieval moralities I argued that the central choices of their heroes were between worldly and ascetic values, and that the dramatic expression of the accompanying inner conflicts took three main forms, first the struggle between devotion to God and the three worldly pleasures, riches, honours, delights; second, the battle between reason and sensuality or folly; and third, the antagonism between the awareness of mortality and worldly security, the pride of life. Each of these themes survives in the post-Reformation morality plays, though in many cases it has been much modified in form, or has ceased to be the dramatist's sole or central concern. In this chapter I shall discuss the Protestant treatment of each of these themes in turn. The dramatists were rarely independent theologians, and I shall give brief accounts, where necessary, of the Reformation theory which is reflected in modifications of the medieval morality pattern.

First, then, the three temptations of the world. Though Protestantism retained the association between worldly values and the three sins of
pride, avarice and lechery, it discarded the connection between the three sins and the World, the Flesh and the Devil. Previously these adversaries stood for avarice, lechery and pride respectively, and these sins between them represented the sum of the seven deadly sins. Each was an aspect of worldliness. The choice between sin and virtue was the choice between the world and God (see above, Chapter I). The equation between these three sins and the three adversaries disappeared with the Reformation, and with it the concept that worldliness was the dominant sin which incorporated all others. Among the three adversaries, the World alone continued to stand for worldliness, overattachment to transitory and material values (e.g., Downname, pp.1-39). According to Perkins, the Christian warfare is the battle against the Devil, who is assisted by the World and the Flesh. The Devil makes three major assaults, the temptation to neglect the word of God (security or presumption), to despair of salvation, and to continue in sin despite regeneration. The Flesh works by begetting sin and suppressing good intentions and the World by providing external distractions from the path of virtue (Perkins, I, pp.85-8).

According to the medieval analysis, avarice (curiositas), the lust of the flesh and pride were the sins of Adam in response to the promptings of the World, the Flesh and the Devil, and these were resisted in the wilderness by Christ, the second and antithetical Adam (above, p.13). Calvin, however, rejected the notion that Adam's sin could have had its roots in anything so childish as gluttony, the lusts of the flesh. Its source was arrogant neglect of God's word, lack of faith, which in turn led to pride in his own discernment, ambition to be equal with God, ingratitude and self-indulgence (Calvin, II, i, 4). Christ's first temptation, to turn stones into bread, was also a temptation to lack of faith rather than gluttony, the failure to trust in God's providence.
Calvin's interpretation became common among the English reformers (E.M. Pope, pp. 57-8). Here too, then, in the Reformation analysis of the supreme examples of temptation, the schematic equation between the three sins and man's three adversaries has been abandoned, and with it the equation of worldliness with all sin.

Now that salvation is by faith alone, and unbelief the major root of sin (Dillenberger, pp. 22, 127-8), hindrances to faithful obedience become the dominant preoccupations. Worldliness is among these hindrances, but distrust or despair and presumption or security also come to the fore. Security, the presumptuous neglect of God's word, is the supreme sin of the reprobate, but for the regenerate too there is a danger of assuming that the battle is already won, and thus of yielding to temptation through overconfidence. Both security and despair, of course, received considerable attention in medieval writings and in the medieval morality plays. The Reformation, however, leads to a new emphasis on these dangers. The theory of predestination tends to lead the regenerate either to recurrent doubts of the truth of their own election or to overconfidence in it. The struggle against sin comes to seem futile in the first case, unnecessary in the second. Calvin analysed in some detail the problem of the relationship between a proper fear and hope (Calvin, III, ii, 15-43).

Presumption and distrust were to be the themes of innumerable treatises as the Reformation became firmly established in England (Haller, pp. 154 ff.). They are also, I suggest, the central temptations of Spenser's Knight of Holiness. The House of Pride (worldly glory) is not a severe temptation for the Red Cross Knight and he escapes easily, but when Orgoglio (spiritual pride, earth puffed up with wind, seeming to threaten the sky, FQ I, vii, 8-10) finds him disarmed, relaxing his vigilance in the company of Duessa (false faith), he is able without real struggle to cast him into a hellish dungeon from which only Arthur as
divine grace can rescue him. Equally, Despair is close to victory until Una reminds the Red Cross Knight of God's mercy and grace, and his own election ("Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art?", I, ix, 53). From the beginning the Red Cross Knight wears the whole armour of God as a sign that he is among the faithful. His story is that of the Christian pilgrim-warrior struggling to achieve holiness, sanctification which is the fruit of regeneration. Orgoglio (presumption) and Despair bring him closest to defeat.

As the dangers of presumption and distrust receive more emphasis, worldliness as a source of sin is correspondingly relegated to a less dominant position. The medieval analysis of the nature of worldliness is not, however, entirely repudiated. One of the incidental advantages of the new alignment of the World, the Flesh and the Devil is that the old confusion between the world as the source of all sin and the World as one of the trio of sources associated specifically with avarice (The Castle of Perseverance, Nature, The World and the Child) has disappeared completely. The World is now identified with worldliness in all its manifestations, and its central temptations are the original three, pride (or ambition), avarice and lechery, or the sensual lusts. Calvin notes that the heart of man, preoccupied with avarice, ambition and lust, cannot rise above the values of this world (Calvin, III, ix, 1). Tyndale gives the traditional interpretation of I John 2, 15-16:

The love of the world quencheth the love of God .... By the lust of the flesh is understood lechery, which maketh a man altogether a swine; and by the lust of the eyes is understood covetousness, which is the root of all evil, and maketh to err from the faith. And then followeth pride: which three are the world and captains over all other vices .... (Tyndale, 1849, pp.176-7).

The Sermons or Homilies Appointed to be read in Churches in the Time of Queen Elizabeth assure the congregation that men should not fear death,
considering the nature of the world, "the intolerable pride, covetousness
and lechery in time of prosperity ..." (p.107). Lancelot Andrewes
explains that it is hard to turn our steps invariably towards God in
this life when the tempter constantly offers "Pleasure, Profit or
Preferment" to divert us (Andrewes, 1967, p.125). He exhorts his hearers
to self-criticism because they have offended God "for some lying vanitie,
some trifling pleasure or pelting profit" (Andrewes, 1967, p.140).
According to Perkins, who quotes I John 2, 15-16, the world brings men to
disobedience through "pleasure, profit, honour and evil examples"
(Perkins, I, p.88). Hooker maintains that to make a finite value our
objective is to do evil, "even as they who placed their felicity in wealth
or honour or pleasure or anything here attained" (Hooker, I, xi, 2).
Downname explains that in order to distract men from God the world offers
"the watreish vanities of pleasures, honours and riches" (Downname, p.33). 14

Just as in the medieval moralities, intended for laymen living in the
world, moderation, not total rejection, is the key to the proper attitude
to riches, honours and pleasures. Calvin states that God's gifts may be
used for the purposes for which they were created, and we are permitted
to rejoice in the beauty of the world (Calvin, III, x, 2). Downname
argues that pleasures, honours and riches are to be used in so far as they
are God's benefits and do not hinder man from righteousness (Downname,
pp.550-52). Temporal goods are in themselves morally neutral; they
are a source of danger only if they are sought for their own sake, or for
evil purposes (Jewel, 1831, pp.463-4; George, pp.123-5; Haller, p.123).
But commitment to the values of the world, subjection to pride, avarice
and lechery, inevitably distracts man from God.

In the plays too these temptations represent the worldling's impulse
to resist the will of God. They are clearly central in The Cradle of
Security, which must have been played about 1570. This play is not
extant but R. Willis's account of a performance in Gloucester in his
childhood records the action as he remembers it in 1639. A prince is
lured away from his grave counsellors by three ladies who provide delights and pleasures and then sing him to sleep. Finally two old men appear on the stage and one strikes the prince, whose companions vanish, leaving him to be carried away by wicked spirits. As Willis explains, "This Prince did personate on the morall, the wicked of the world; the three Ladies, Pride Covetousnesse, and Luxury, the two old men, the end of the world, and the last judgement" (R. Willis, pp.110-14). The prince's failure to resist the three sins of the world leads to his damnation.

The victims of Courage, the Vice of Wapull's *The Tide Tarrieth No Man* (printed in 1576) fall into three groups representing the three main kinds of sinners. In this play, though inner conflict leading to ethical choice is the theme, the medieval pattern of the action is reversed. As in a number of the post-Reformation moralities, it is the Vice who is the central figure, and he has not one victim but several, who represent various social or moral types. Courage provokes or reinforces the sinful impulses of his victims in order to bring them to damnation. Submission to the Vice brings ruin or despair; only those who resist him are redeemed.

Courage's consistent method of persuasion is to stress the transience of worldly goods. His victims are encouraged to seize pleasure before it is too late. Thus Greediness, whose sin is avarice, is induced to continue his practices of extortion and usury, and to buy a house from No Good Neighbourhood, although it means turning out the honest tenant who has occupied it for forty years. Willing to Win Worship, whose failing is pride, is persuaded to borrow money in order to stay at court for the sake of the esteem which is accorded to courtiers. And Wilful Wantonness is encouraged to wait no longer but to give way to her lecherous impulses and marry Wastefulness against her mother's will. Each victim succumbs after a brief struggle. The last two embark on a life of pleasure which brings them to poverty until they repent, the
courtier is ruined, and Greediness commits suicide in despair. Though the moral is to some extent prudential, the theme of the play is clearly the danger in this world and the next of succumbing to the three worldly sins, avarice, pride and lechery.

The hero of Wager's *Enough is as Good as a Feast* (c.1559-70) is called Worldly Man. The plot is in many ways close to that of *The Castle of Perseverance*. Worldly Man is converted briefly by Heavenly Man, but Covetous, the Vice of the play, succeeds in persuading him that wealth would enable him to be more charitable. As he grows rich again he rapidly forgets his charitable intentions. His tenants and servants complain of his oppression and appeal to him for relief, which, of course, he refuses. Finally, God's Plague strikes and he dies, concerned to the last with the disposal of his worldly goods. Satan triumphantly carries him off to hell, and in this case there is no redemption.

Worldly Man delights above all in his riches, and extols them with the enthusiasm, though perhaps not the poetry, of a Jew of Malta or a Volpone: "Oh, me thinks it is a very pleasant thing, / To see a great heap of Olde Angels and Crownes" (sig.B 1). As in *Perseverance*, the covetous man can never be content with enough. Also, as in the early plays, he chooses between the world and eternal values. There is a prolonged struggle for his soul, but he finally succumbs to the ingenious arguments of the vices (see below, pp.118-9) and decides, "The best heaven is me thinks is rich for to be" (sic. sig.D 4v).

It is made clear that riches are to be the means to the other two worldly pleasures, sensual delights and power. Worldly Man devotes some of his wealth to building a new banqueting house, and determines to evict a tenant whose house would make an excellent buttery (sig.F 3). Satan lists drunkenness and lechery among his other sins (sig.G 1v). His pride, too, is clearly displayed. Newly successful, he comes on to the stage "all brave" (sig.E 3v), in accordance with the usual identification of pride with fine clothes: (above, p.16 etc; Craik, 1958).
His wealth will enable him to satisfy his worldly ambitions, since money "winneth bothe Citties and townes" (sig.B1). Having dismissed Tenant and Hireling from his presence, he exults in his power, "Ha, ha, ha, I must laugh, so God me save:/ To see what a sort of su ters now a dayes we have". Covetous immediately follows this up by telling him that if he will be ruled by the Vice and his companions he will have all the world to sue to him before long (sig.E4). Deciding to evict the Tenant for the sake of his buttery, Worldly Man explains that "it is not meet that such a beggar as he:/ should dwell so neer under the nose of me" (sig.E 4v). The neighbours cannot compete with his establishment: "...how glorious my buildings doo shine?/ No gentlemans in this contrey like unto mine" (sig.E 4v). Within the conventional framework of the three worldly sins Wager presents a conflict of conscience in which the victory of Covetous produces a successful and unscrupulous landowner who is finally carried off to hell.

The Trial of Treasure, printed in 1567, possibly by Wager too (Oliver,.1945-6), also treats avarice as central among the three sins of the world. The protagonist, Lust, is "the image of all wicked men,/ Which in seeking the world have all delectation" (p.275). Encouraged by the Vice, Natural Inclination, Lust marries Treasure who is his whole delight (p.291). Like Worldly Man's, his love is "insatiate, it keepeth no measure" (p.288). Inclination observes that all men love Treasure and her brother, Pleasure, so well "that their God they do hate" (p.291).

Despite the role of the Vice, and although there is a fight between Lust and Just early in the play (see below, p.177), there is no real struggle for Lust's soul. It is clear that he is of the reprobate from the beginning. His good counterpart, Just, demonstrates the possibilities for the elect. The youthful Lust, therefore, is already accompanied by three vice figures. There is no temptation but only retribution. Lust's companions represent the three impulses of worldly men, Elation (pride),
the avaricious Greedy-Gut, and Sturdiness, who gives him confidence in the power of the flesh.

But Lust's worldly values bring him in the end to dust, while Treasure is turned to rust. Just, who has always had Trust and Contentation as his companions, and who therefore enjoys happiness in this world and confidently expects a still richer crown of felicity in the next (p.298), recognises the worthlessness of the three worldly values:

Alas, what availeth it riches to enjoy,
Though as much in comparison as Croesus the king?
What helpeth it to have Helen in Troy,
If the conscience of man continually sting?
Elation and Pride no commodity doth bring,
But is often known the forerunner of shame,
And the blot of immortal memory and fame. (p.276).

(It is perhaps worth noting here that these lines precisely summarise the lesson that Marlowe's Faustus was to learn).

The absence of conflict in the reprobate is in accordance with strict Reformation theory. In the medieval conception of Christian warfare all men were victims of the antagonism between flesh and spirit, body and soul. But for the reformers both body and soul are corrupt, able to be redeemed only by an influx of divine grace. The natural man is entirely carnal; the spirit is that which is regenerated by grace, the new man seeking divine values (Dillenberger, pp.25, 53). Within the regenerate individual the inclinations of the "old man", the sinful Adam in all men, are at war with the godly impulses of the repentant and sanctified saint. It is in this sense that "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal.5, 17); but it does so only within the faithful. The reprobate feel no stirrings of conscience since of themselves they are entirely corrupt.

In other words, in Protestant theory "flesh" and "spirit" have
changed their meanings. For Calvin the flesh represents the total corruption of the natural man, while the spirit is to be understood as the Holy Spirit working in the regenerate (Calvin, II, iii, 1-2; II, iii, 6-14; II, i, 8-9). Tyndale explains the position clearly:

FLESH and SPIRIT mayest thou not here understand as though flesh were only that which pertaineth unto unchastity, and the Spirit that which inwardly pertaineth unto the heart: but Paul calleth flesh "all that is born of flesh"; that is to wit, the whole man, with life, soul, body, wit, will, reason, and whatsoever he is or doth within and without; because that these all, and all that is in man, study after the world and the flesh . . . . Call flesh also all works which are done without grace, and without the working of the Spirit, howsoever good, holy and spiritual, they seem to be . . . .

And as thou callest him flesh which is not renewed with the Spirit, and born again in Christ, and all his deeds . . . . so contrariwise, call him spiritual who is renewed in Christ, and all his deeds which spring of faith, seem they never so gross . . . .

(Tyndale, 1848, pp.494-5).

In consequence, the concept of Christian warfare has changed. In the natural man there is no conflict between flesh and spirit, between inclinations towards this world and aspirations to the next. His carnal understanding is worthless and even good works achieved before justification are repugnant to God. The conflict can begin only with regeneration. Wager's Worldly Man is initially converted by Heavenly Man, and the conflict which forms the centre of the action follows his regeneration. But Lust in The Trial of Treasure is the natural man, and his vices are his perpetual companions.

Another play which introduces the three sins of the world and also illustrates this distinction between the medieval moralities and the
strictest of their post-Reformation successors is Lewis Wager's Mary Magdalene (c.1550-66). Like the medieval play (see above, pp.24-5), this shows Mary guilty of the three worldly sins, but in the Protestant morality she is not tempted, and there is no inner conflict. The Vice of the play is Infidelity (lack of faith), the central sin of the reformers, but his minions are Pride of Life, Cupidity and Carnal Concupiscence, pride, avarice and the lusts of the flesh. Their role is not to lure Mary from the path of virtue, but merely to confirm her worldly impulses and to invent ways in which they can be given their full scope. Mary enters, already displaying pride in the traditional way, "triflynge with her garmentes" and complaining that her tailors do not do justice to her appearance (sig.A 4). When Infidelity flatters her she asks him to advise her on how best to pass her life in pleasure (sig.B lv). She asks merely for information: her impulses are already clearly defined:

A lusty disposition from me doth ensue:


Pride of Life and Cupidity recognise that there is no need to tempt her:

Pride. It is a pretie wenche that it is in dede,

Muche to intreate her, I thynke we shall not nede.

Cup. No, for I thynke she is yll inough of hir selfe,

She seemeth to be a proude little elfe. (sig.C 2).

They proceed to give her instructions on how to satisfy her inclinations. She must have no gods but herself, despise the Scriptures, hold the poor in contempt, live in lechery, and so on (sig.C 3-D 3).

Nor is her repentance portrayed as an inner struggle. Christ banishes Infidelity and his "seven devils", "For to salvation I have hir dressed" (sig.F 3v). She is of the elect and her salvation is by grace alone, the free gift of God. She neither seeks it nor merits it. In this strongly Calvinist play the will is no longer free, and consequently
salvation and damnation are determined by God without any inner conflict in the protagonist.

Such a strictly Calvinist treatment, however, is rare among the sixteenth century moralities, perhaps because it fails to take full advantage of the form and so leads to relatively unexciting dramas. But three further plays treat pride, avarice and lechery as their central themes without being concerned with inner conflict. They are exemplary "estates" plays, displaying the effects of the three sins of the world on various social types, and their purpose is to warn the audience against worldliness and its consequences. It is perhaps worth giving a brief account of them here in order to show one of the ways in which the morality form was to develop.

The Pedlar's Prophecy (1561-c.1563) is not strictly a morality play since its characters are not abstractions, and its form perhaps owes something to the debate plays of Medwall, Rastell and John Heywood. The play consists largely of an attack by a humble Pedlar on the social corruptions of the various estates. Since the Pedlar deliberately obscures his own meanings for political reasons (Pineas, 1968), the central themes are difficult to disentangle with any certainty, but the structure of the play seems to be based on the three sins, the lusts of the flesh, avarice and pride.

In the first episode the Pedlar's theme is lechery. This, he says, is not proper for old men, who should remember the proximity of death, (11.489-520), but the Pedlar's main concern is the vain sensual pleasures of the young, "Their feasting, disguising, their kissing and clipping" (292). Idleness, fine clothes, painting and dancing bring the young to shame (180 ff). Soon there will be few maidens left in England (265-73). In the second episode the Pedlar reproaches a Merchant "whom all the world could not satisfie" (645), and prophesies that he will suffer for his "pride, covetousnesse and excesse" (763, cf.744). Avarice is here the
root of all three evils. A Mariner is accused of bringing great numbers of unwelcome foreigners into the country for money (817-31, 889-99). A landlord demands double rent until the Pedlar prophesies that he and his family will be turned into animals (1121 ff.). The third episode concerns unjust judges (1228-35, 1499-1502) and corrupt clergy (1285 ff.). Their pride is a recurrent theme, especially in terms of their contempt for the unlearned (1271-2, 1338-41). Essentially the episode deals with the abuse of power and authority. Thus the three classes against whom the Pedlar rails are the pleasure-loving young, those who do harm for the sake of riches, and those who have achieved a position of honour but abuse it.

The Pedlar's Prophecy was not printed until 1595, and perhaps appeared in print as a result of the success of Robert Wilson's The Cobbler's Prophecy (1589-93), printed in 1594. This is also an attack on the worldliness of contemporary England. The play uses several modes, pageantry and debate as well as allegory, as a vehicle for social comment. The theme is secular: Wilson's proffered solution is war, as it is in his Three Lords and Three Ladies of London, but the problem is the familiar one of "security" which leads to the three worldly evils of ambition, extortion and sensuality. The gods are disgusted by the immorality of Venus; a country gentleman describes his rackrenting procedures; the Scholar would gladly leave his learning for courtly pleasures; a Courtier plots to murder the Duke, marry his daughter and seize his dignities, displaying the aspirations (though not the rhetoric) of a Tamburlaine:

0 soveraigne glory, chiefest earthly good,
A Crowne! to which who would not wade through blood. (11.726-7).

The Vice, Contempt, represents "the envy and dissension among the several estates" (Spivack, p.210) which can be united only when Venus is exposed and abandoned, and private greed and ambition submerged in hatred of a common enemy.
Another late estates play with morality features, *A Looking Glass for London and England* (1587-91) by Greene and Lodge, was also printed in 1594, and this too contains vestiges of the pride-avarice-lechery structure. The play consists of a series of episodes displaying the corruptions of various classes, interspersed with comments by the prophet, Oseas, who warns that at the Last Judgment Christ will "doom the worldlings to eternall fire" (1.1287). Rasni, the king of Nineveh, who sets himself up in opposition to the God of the Jews (27-30), is flattered by his viceroys for his three worldly attributes, beauty, military glory and wealth, until he believes himself a "god on earth" (30, 38, 47). He is thus above all law and can seize any worldly pleasure he desires. Rasni's sister and bride exults similarly in her beauty and rich dress - "Can any Goddesse make compare with me?" (442) - and is struck by lightning, while Oseas comments, "Pride hath his judgment..." (558). Rasni takes Alvida as his paramour, and when her husband objects Alvida poisons him. The prophet exclaims, "Foresee in time the warning bell doth tolle;/ Subdue the flesh, by praier to save the soule" (945-6). Meanwhile a series of Rasni's subjects display on a less extravagant scale their preoccupations with drinking and wenching, extortion and ambition, until Jonah arrives and prophesies the impending destruction of the city. Pride, avarice and lechery are not the only sins of the Ninevites, but in a play which is far from schematic this particular trio of sins tends to predominate and recur.

Lyly's *Midas* (1589-90) is in many ways remote from the morality tradition, but this sophisticated and courtly play also points the danger of subjection to the three worldly values. Midas's three counsellors, Eristus, Mallacrites and Martius, urge on him respectively the pursuit of love, wealth and military glory. His wise and virtuous daughter, Sophronia, wishes they might be driven from Phrygia, turning the kingdom into an example of "chastitie, not luste; liberalitie, not covetousnes; valor, not tyrannie" (II, i, 104-5). It is only when Midas learns to...
surrender his worldly values that he and his realm achieve peace and harmony.

Thus in a series of post-Reformation plays the medieval tradition of presenting pride, avarice and lechery as the three sins of the world survives. Even where the medieval pattern of inner conflict has disappeared, the worldling continues to be presented as the man who devotes himself to the pursuit of riches, honours and pleasures. In all these plays dealing with worldly values the proper attitude to worldly goods is one of moderation. This is the meaning of the title of *Enough is as Good as a Feast*. Here Heavenly Man is accompanied by Contentation and Poorly Arrayed Enough. He tells the hero that Christ rejects the rich not because they have much, but because they are not content with their wealth and do not use it to good ends (sig.A 4). Worldly Man, temporarily converted, promises that he will love treasure "But as he ought to loove it, that is in due measure" (sig.E 1). Worldly goods are there for man's use. It is only subjection to worldly values which is dangerous: "Make not that thy God, which should be servant unto thee" (sig.G 2). Just, in *The Trial of Treasure*, is similarly accompanied by Contentation. God's Visitation reproaches Lust by quoting Thales, "Who willeth men in all things to keep a measure,/ Especially in love to uncertainty of treasure" (p.293). Lupton's *All for Money* (1559-77) includes a debate on the proper relationship between money and learning (11.508-809). The argument is conducted by four figures representing all the possible permutations, Learning-with-Money, Learning-without-Money, Money-without-Learning and Neither-Money-nor-Learning. In accordance with Humanist convictions, the learned characters claim that learning leads man to the virtuous use of money. The proper employment of worldly goods, not poverty, is the ideal. Thus Money-without-Learning is churlish and self-centred, but Learning-with-Money uses his wealth for its true purpose, giving alms to Neither-Money-nor-Learning and offering hospitality to
Learning-without-Money.

There has been a tendency to view this recurrent emphasis on moderation as a Renaissance rejection of the asceticism of the medieval moralities (Farnham, p.245; Spivack, pp.214-17). In fact, however, in this context the Tudor moralities demonstrate clearly their medieval heritage (see above, p.42). Even medieval asceticism recognised that to forbid a lay audience the use of worldly goods was hopelessly unrealistic. The Protestant attitude was very similar. Temporal goods are in themselves morally neutral; they are a source of danger only when man permits them to distract him from God.

The post-Reformation plays, then, inherit with certain modifications the medieval morality theme of the conflict between God and the three sins of the world. The second theme of the medieval plays was the overthrow of reason by sensuality or folly. This too is to some extent echoed in the post-Reformation plays, but with certain important differences.

One strand of Reformation theory modified considerably the medieval attitude to reason. In Scholastic theory, and in the medieval moralities, reason is that which is God-like in man. It has no necessary connection with secular knowledge but leads to the true wisdom which directs man in the way of virtue and grace. Sin is the consequence of the overthrow of reason by folly or sensuality. Hooker and other less radical Protestants tended to accept a view of reason which is very close to the medieval one, and their attitude is familiar in the twentieth century because it has echoes in the work of Spenser and Sidney, Shakespeare and Milton. The post-Reformation morality writers, however, seem rather to reflect the beliefs of the more extreme Reformers. These replaced the high medieval concept of reason by faith and relegated reason itself to mere rational thought. Such carnal reason is dangerous because it can so readily be abused by an unscrupulous tempter. Thus misdirected it becomes either "curiosity" or "the wisdom of this world" which is "foolishness with God"
(I Cor. 3, 19). This kind of "folly" is particularly sinister because in merely human terms it has the appearance of rationality. Ultimately, however, it leads to damnation.

The early Reformers rejected the belief that the unregenerate man had within himself any impulse for good. Thus human reason could lead only to carnal wisdom, the wisdom of the world. For Luther salvation is by faith alone, the result of grace. Man himself contributes nothing. Grace helps the regenerate to recognise the nature of good. Reason has become irrelevant (Hoopes, pp. 100-106). In its carnal form it is a danger, the source of doubt and distrust of God's word and thus ultimately of all evil (Dillenberger, pp. 127-8). In the faithful it has no place.

Calvin modifies Luther's view to the extent that he recognises that some vestiges of reason remain in man from before the Fall (Calvin, I, xv, 6), but these are so darkened that they are almost extinguished, and man is incapable of finding and pursuing the truth unaided (Calvin, II, ii, 12). Human reason is capable of applying itself to earthly matters, government, household management, the liberal arts and sciences (Calvin, II, ii, 13-16), but it can contribute nothing to salvation. Spiritual discernment is wholly lost until man is regenerate, and he cannot seek regeneration on his own initiative since it is the gift of God through grace (Calvin II, ii, 22-5).

In the medieval concept reason directs man to seek the knowledge of God and the nature of the good. Virtue is the result of action dictated by the will in obedience to the dictates of right reason. Reason and faith thus work jointly to secure salvation. The Reformers repudiated this synthesis. Reason, since it is a property of the natural man, is deprived of its God-like qualities. No longer a divine faculty, reason is at best nothing more than a capacity for recognising the force of evidence or following a logical argument, and at worst the assertion of corrupted human thought processes against an incomprehensible God. It
thus becomes antithetical to faith which is the mysterious gift of a God
who is inscrutable.

The specific concept of a conflict between reason and sensuality
largely disappears (though T.W. Craik has drawn attention to the survival
of the theme of distraction from virtue by transient sensual pleasures
in the plays dealing with education (Craik, 1952, pp.23-48)). With the
redefinition of flesh and spirit (see above, pp.106-107) sensuality in
itself ceases to be a serious threat. Calvin considered it childish
to regard Adam's sin as gluttony (Calvin, II, i, 4) and Luther attacked
the medieval emphasis on the repression of lechery (Dillenberger, p.147).
The flesh must be understood as something much wider that this, not
simply physical lusts but the totality of the "old man", body and soul,
reason and sensuality.

The views of the continental Reformers were widely echoed in England.
Thomas Becon summarises the whole complex of relationships between reason
and faith, flesh and spirit, the old man and the new:

What is the spirit? It is a heavenly sense or understanding,
springing out of the word of God (or else the self word of God),
exceeding the sense of the flesh and reason. "The words that I
speak unto you they be spirit and life"; meaning, they amount
and pass the flesh and sense of reason; they be spiritual and
heavenly ....

What is the flesh? Every affection, the heart, the mind,
and thought of man, and whatsoever else man doth or can do by all
the powers of his reason, destitute of the word of God. For
Christ saith: "That which is born of the flesh [is flesh]";
that is, it understandeth not things that be spiritual. Flesh
otherwhile betokeneth the letter and fleshly understanding.
"The flesh profiteth nothing: it is the Spirit that quickeneth."

What is the new man? It is the man that is renewed and born
again by faith and the word, through the Spirit of God.

"Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of heaven." To be born anew, he calleth, where as before we were but carnal and fleshly, not understanding the mysteries of the Spirit, we must be born again in spirit, that is, to become spiritual and more meet to understand spiritual things.

What is the old man? Our affections, appetites, and understanding, according to reason, without faith ....

(Becon, pp.606-7).

Although reason could not lead man to God, folly could lead him still further towards the devil. Becon defines the fool as "He that rashly is carried hither and thither with every motion, that considereth nothing, regardeth nothing, nor suffereth himself to be corrected and warned of his evil doing; but headlong runneth as he began, forcing not whether he sink or swim, or what becometh of him; and who, as he knoweth not the word of God, so he passeth not on it" (Becon, p.607). Folly is carelessness of salvation, neglect of God's word, and the assertion of merely human reason which is so easily corrupted by the devil. John Downname explains:

... if we neglect God's word, and voluntarily give our selves over unto sin and disobedience, we shall be so besotted with folly, that Satan will easily deceive and circumvent us.

An example whereof we have in our first parents, who though they were more wise by creation then ever were any living (Christ excepted) yet when they cast the word of God behind their backe, giving more credit to Satans suggestions, and withall transgressed God's commandement; their wisedome was turned into ignorance and folly, and they became an easie pray to their malitious enemie. And whereas they thought by that meanes to have gone beyond the Lord in policie, and
to have obtained a farre greater measure of knowledge and glory, they were in stead thereof besotted with follie, and overwhelmed with ignominie and shame, by being made the bondslaves of sinne and Satan. (Downame, pp.44-5).

Folly and carnal reason are synonymous, and lead man headlong into further folly and so to damnation.

Thus, despite changes in the theological concept of reason, the post-Reformation moralities were able to inherit without much practical modification, and then to develop, the medieval association of folly with worldliness. It will readily be recognised that both folly and the abuse of weak human reason are supremely characteristic of the post-Reformation Vice-figures. Most of the comedy in the plays, and there is much, comes from the wit, nonsense, satirical commentary and buffoonery of the Vices (Cushman, pp.85-90; Spivack, pp.193-205), to the extent that it has been argued that the ancestors of the Vices are the folk fools of popular games, mummers' plays and morris dancing (Tiddy, p.96; Mares). But the central characteristic which lies behind this folly is the brilliant cunning of the Vices, which enables them to ensnare their human victims by deception (Spivack, pp.155-76). They achieve control of the heroes by attacking erring human reason at its weakest points or by reinforcing its most serious errors. In the Protestant plays the Vices tend to be Catholic and to bring their victims to damnation through false doctrine. (Fineas, 1962, pp.168 ff.). The conflict the Vices generate is frequently one between carnal reason and submission to the will of God.

The deceptive cunning of the Vices is not new in the post-Reformation plays, but it is often more complex and more subtle. Covetousness wins Humanum Genus in Perseverance not by force but by persuading him that he will need money for his old age; Lucifer works on Mind, Will and
Understanding by theological argument. But none of the medieval Vices displays the ingenuity of Covetous in Enough is as Good as a Feast.

To bring about the downfall of Worldly Man he first extinguishes the few sparks of reason which he retains and then persuades him to adopt plausible and false arguments. Covetous is assisted by personifications of the hero's irrational, reckless and hasty impulses, Inconsideration, Temerity and Precipitation. The plan is to persuade him to ignore his true but long-term interests in favour of the wisdom of this world. As Precipitation explains:

My nature is to rage where haste dooth reign.

And what causeth haste? but onely Temeritie:

That maketh fooles Hardy with Securitie.

Precipitation forth dooth this worldly man leade:

So that all his affaires be doon rudely on hed.

Then Inconsideration bothe night and day:

Shall promp him forward nothing at all to way.

Neither to consider his beginning:

Neither at the end what shall be the winning,

So that if all we doo our proper nature and kinde:

He shall not regarde who shall the profit finde.

(sig. C 3v).

To confuse Worldly Man further, Covetous calls himself Policy, Inconsideration Reason (the name is chosen by Covetous because "men now a dayes to reason doo trust", sig. C iv), Precipitation Ready Wit and Temerity Agility. In combination with their "love" for him, this change of names persuades the hero that in taking their advice he is not only pursuing his own true interest but also being very clever in doing so. In order to separate him from Heavenly Man the Vices first create a conflict between his new pattern of Christian behaviour and the world's opinion of him, telling him that his voluntary poverty, the result of
charity and self-denial, is making him a laughing stock. They weep for him because he is generally accused behind his back of keeping low company. In order to bring him to covetousness the Vices persuade him that the world believes him covetous (sig. D 1v). When Worldly Man is still reluctant to abandon Enough and Contention they urge that if he were rich he could be more charitable (sig. D 3). Worldly Man is instantly won over by this true but misleading argument and, of course, he makes no subsequent attempt to remember his purpose in becoming rich.

The process of seduction is initiated by Inconsideration who calls himself Reason. The Vices work by telling Worldly Man that it is more reasonable to grow rich, which is true, of course, in terms of the wisdom of this world, while in fact they obscure rational consideration and replace it with rationalisation, the true abuse of the rational faculty. Precipitation urges Worldly Man to be ruled by Reason (sig. D 4v) and Covetous tells him "that a man should make what he can of his owne it is reason" (sig. E 3). When Worldly Man refuses to hear the plea of Tenant, Covetous comments, "me thinketh he speaketh very reasonably". Worldly Man's victim, however, sees the situation more clearly: "This resonable speaking cometh from an unreasonoble minde" (sig. E 4). In the last analysis what the Vices teach is folly, but it looks remarkably like reason.

The Trial of Treasure also equates worldly self-interest with folly. The Prologue observes that in contrast to the wise and otherworldly Diogenes, "some men of this age ought as fools to be blamed" (p. 262). Lust is such a fool (265), "worldly-wise" (292) but lacking all true wisdom. While Just is accompanied by Sapience, who represents "heavenly document" (278), Lust's companion, Sturdiness, cannot read or write (270), a serious deficiency in view of the central importance of the Scriptures. Just condemns the low comedy of the foolish reprobates:
It is better in the house of mourning to be
Than in the house of laughter, where folly hath residence,
For lightness with wisdom cannot agree.

(p.264; cf. Ecc.7, 2-4).

Just's heavenly wisdom brings him happiness in this world as well
as a crown in the next. The victims of Courage in The Tide Tarrieth
No Man must expect to suffer in this life as well as the next for their
folly. Here, too, according to the Vice, it is "foolish", in view of
the proverb which forms the title, not to put one's own (worldly)
interests first (sig. B1), to distrust riches or to sacrifice one's
profits (sigs. B2, F 4v), to consider leaving the court (sig. C2). Thus
Courage plays on the conflict already existing in the minds of his victims
between the mistaken dictates of carnal reason and the true good, and
his success brings them to worldly as well as spiritual disaster. But
the play as a whole corrects Courage's interpretation of its title.
Carnal wisdom is the true folly since the "tide" is the tide of God's
grace, and man should not tarry to amend his life.

In the fragment which remains of Love Feigned and Unfeigned (c.1540-
60) Falsehood and Love Feigned display an ingenuity almost worthy of
Wager's Covetous in persuading Fellowship that his generous impulses are
totally unreasonable. In order to separate him from Love Unfeigned and
Samiliarity they employ "pollicyes" (1.135) which include much learned
Scriptural quotation. Falsehood boasts, "all worldyle men and wyse hav
me in admiration" (84) and promises to make Fellowship "a man of
Intelligences" (144). Like Covetous, he weeps to find how all men
despise Fellowship's present folly. They assume that he is a beggar
(153-5). He advises Fellowship to change his ways, avoid low company
and stop giving all he has to the poor, adding, "yf ycuse accord with
solomon my counsales Imbrace/ for he all fooles disdane the as men devoyd
of grace" (175-6). All learned men would agree.
His argument proves irresistible. Fellowship is not wise enough to know how Solomon's concept of folly differs from Falsehood's. He does realise, however, what expense his charity would have put him to. As far as he can see, the reasoning powers of Love Feigned and Falsehood make it clear that they know chalk from cheese (200-207). Leah Scragg (1966) has pointed out that Love Feigned actually demonstrates his own nature in feigning love to Fellowship. Falsehood, too, demonstrates the nature of the vice he stands for, presenting wisdom as folly and folly as the true wisdom.

An Interlude of Minds (c.1574), translated from a play by Henrik Niklaes, founder of the Family of Love, presents a more Faustian account of the dangers inherent in the assertion of carnal reason. The play is essentially a plea for an end to sectarian strife and takes the form of an allegory of the Fall. Plain-and-Just and his wife, Cogitations, plant and till the soil in paradise, at liberty and in peace, until Searcher persuades Cogitations to eat of the Tree of Knowledge in order to become as gods, supreme among men. She shares the fruit with Plain-and-Just, and Truth drives them away to tribulation. Good-Thinking and Unregarding give them garments of Self-will and encourage them to assert their own ideas against anything they may hear from others. Good-Thinking delights in strife and envy, hatred and persecution (fol.21). Understanding, however, assures Lamentation that Plain-and-Just can be restored to grace if he will only acknowledge his ignorance and cast himself on God's wisdom (fol.22v). Together they read the ten commandments to Plain-and-Just and his wife, who at once repent and dismiss Unregarding and Good-Thinking, and become truly wise in the knowledge of the Atonement.

Although the Family of Love was regarded as heretical, this particular play seems to me to contain nothing that Elizabethan Anglicans would have found objectionable. Knowledge is dangerous if it is separated from truth (fol.12v). God's will requires unquestioning obedience. The
assertion of carnal reason against it leads to damnation. It is worth noting that like so many English dramatists of the period the author is concerned not only with the fate of the individual soul but also with the need for social unity. Here the assertion of a corrupted reason brings dissension as well as damnation.

The hero of Wager's *The Longer Thou Livest, the More Fool Thou Art* (c.1559-68) is a fool of a different kind, blind, thoughtless, ineducable. He is like Bacon's fool, "that considereth nothing, regardeth nothing, nor suffereth himself to be corrected and warned of his evil doing" (see above, p.116). Wager's Moros is the type of the natural man, wholly corrupt in his stupidity. He displays the folly of unregenerate carnal reason and his condition leads to damnation. In his youth he wilfully rejects the precepts of his teachers but readily learns the habits of the tavern. In manhood he is exalted by Fortune, becomes proud and oppresses his tenants. God's Judgment offers him a chance of mercy but Moros is too blind to recognise his predicament and faces instead

Confusion, poverty, sickness and punishment;
And after this life, eternal fire
Due for fools that be impenitent. (11.1848-50).

Moros's sinful nature manifests itself from the beginning in his ready mastery of gaming, quarrelling and lechery. The play makes explicit the connection between folly and sin: "Grace will not enter into a foolish heart" (217). Moros responds to the fleeting pleasures of play, dancing and singing, but he has no understanding of matters which concern his immortal soul. Instead he devotes himself to the three sources of worldly delight, pleasures, riches and honours. Sensual pleasures occupy his youth. In manhood Fortune brings him riches and Cruelty undertakes to "seek narrowly" for his profits and rents (1355-6). He must be "strange and nice;/ That will cause men humbly to bow" (1303-4), and one of the results of this lesson in pride is seen when Moros demands a feather for his hat and stumbles about the stage as he tries to look
up to it. The episode provides an amusing variation on the familiar association of pride with fine clothes. As in the medieval moralities, folly leads to the sins of worldliness, lechery, avarice and pride.

Most of the action concerns Moros's state of mind, the means by which the Vices prevail upon him to sin, his ready response, and the nature of his sinful behaviour. All this is expressed in quite complex allegory. The Vices provide an elaborate example of the familiar practice of adopting virtuous names to mask their true natures. Wrath calls himself Manhood, Impiety is known as Philosophy and Cruelty as Prudence, the last two disguises suggesting the deceptive nature of what looks like reason. Even though, as Wrath rightly points out, such subtlety is wasted on Moros (739-40), who refers to them throughout the play as "Robin-hood", "Pild-Lousy Boy" and "Fip-pence"; the device is evidence of the playwright's concern with the kind of self-deception which finds a rational excuse for sin. The implication is that though the fool simply cannot tell the difference between good and evil, sin presents itself even to wise men (the spectators) in guises which may appear morally indifferent or even admirable.

Nonetheless, like Lewis Wager's Mary Magdalen (above, pp.108-9), W. Wager's The Longer Thou Livest is not much concerned with ethical inner conflict. The Vices are internal attributes, but Moros's good counsellors are presented as external figures, teachers who can make no impression on their pupil and have no influence on his state of mind.

What we see is an exemplum of the foolish man moving from one excess to another and finally damned in consequence. A strictly Calvinist treatment of the natural man excludes the possibility of ethical conflict. Such denials of free will are rare, however, in the morality form, which traditionally deals in inner warfare.

The wisdom of this world ignores eternity. The worldly man in his folly forgets that he is mortal and that his goods are subject to mutability. The post-Reformation dramatists inherited this third theme,
the conflict between commitment to this life and the remembrance of death, more or less without alteration from their medieval predecessors. R. Wever's *Lusty Juventus* (1547-53, printed c. 1565), even though it contains a great deal of Reformation propaganda, is very close to the medieval tradition in this respect. *Lusty Juventus*, a young man dominated by his natural appetite for transitory sensual pleasures, is converted to rigorous Protestantism and embarks on the Christian life. Satan at once instructs Hypocrisy to win him back. This is to be achieved through a combination of Catholicism and sensual indulgence, and Hypocrisy effects the downfall of Juventus with the aid of Fellowship and Abominable Living. The reproaches of Good Counsel bring him to despair until God's Merciful Promises provides comfort. Juventus then forsakes the transient pleasures of the flesh in favour of virtue and knowledge.

The unregenerate Juventus devotes himself only to present delights (11.37-88), and his conversion is represented as a recognition that regeneration is the way to joy and peace passing all the transitory pleasures which he has been accustomed to seek (11.308-11). His downfall is secured by means which include promises of pies and puddings as well as an introduction to the whore, Abominable Living. Despite its intense Protestantism, the play expresses an entirely otherworldly scheme of values, with the mortification of the flesh as a major virtue and mutability and mortality as a major theme.

In *The Trial of Treasure* Lust cares only for transitory worldly pleasures and fails to recognise that these cannot endure. The Vice, Natural Inclination, is ready to silence any doubt, assuring him that his beloved Treasure will live "For ever and forever, man, she is immortal" (p. 282). Treasure herself promises never to leave him (291). But her brother, Pleasure, is taken away as a warning to Lust, and finally Treasure herself is tried by Time, found wanting and turned to rust, while
Lust himself is turned to dust. Only heavenly treasure endures (275-6, 284-7). Sapience urges Just to seek only those things which are permanent, "For treasures here gotten are uncertain and vain,/ But treasures of the mind do continually remain" (275).

The Tide Tarrieth No Man also turns on the conflicting claims of this life and the next. The Vice, constantly reiterating the proverbial title of the play, induces his victims to believe that since life is fleeting they must make haste to secure the pleasures of the world. The proper attitude to the mutability of worldly goods is, of course, to despise them and pursue eternal values. Courage's teaching depends on the explicit denial of the dual nature of man:

Tushe what meane I thus, of soule for to speake,  
In vayne with such talke, my braynes I doe breake,  
For soule there is none, when the body is dead,  
In such kinde of doctryne, my schollers I leade,  
Therefore say I, take time, while time is,  
For after this life, there is nothing but blisse.  
There is no soule, any payne to abide,  
The Teachers contrary, from truth are far, wide. (sig.C lv).

Finally, the barge of Courage, packed with worldly men, takes the tide without tarrying and sails straight to hell (sig.A 3). Only Christianity and Faithful Few recognise that the tide of the title is the tide of God's grace which will not tarry for men to amend (sig.G 2v).

Heavenly Man in Enough is as Good as a Feast bases his very proper attitude to worldly values on a constant awareness of mortality. He gives a long list, in the ubi sunt tradition, of those whom treasure could not save (sig.B 1), and urges that only heavenly treasure endures. As far as Worldly Man is concerned, even his Tenant is wiser than he is, and knows the Scriptures better: "thou foole (saith Christ) this night
wil I fetch thy soule from thee:/ And then who shall have the things that thine be?" (sig.E 2v). We must die and we can carry nothing with us (sig.C 4v). As in The Castle of Perseverance, strangers inherit the hero's goods (sig.F 1v).

Worldly Man's end must have made a profound impression on the audience. First a prophet off stage cries:

0 thou Earth, Earth, Earth, hear the word of the Lord:
Know thyself to be no better than Clay or dust ...
For from the earth thou camnest and to earth thou must.

(sig.E 4v).

The hero is terrified, but Covetous steps into prevent any possibility of inner conflict at this late stage, insisting in the traditional way that there is plenty of time: "Dead? body of me, doo you reckon to dye this yeer?/ Holde your peace I warrant you, ye need not to fear" (sig.F 2). But priests and physicians can give no protection, God's Plague strikes while Worldly Man tries in vain to write his will, unable to formulate the name of God, and Satan carries him off to hell.

Death comes suddenly too and, surprisingly, in the morality manner, to the worldly Bailiff in A Knack to Know a Knave (1592, printed in 1594). In this play the main plot, a historical romantic intrigue, alternates with episodes of the estates morality kind, in which Honesty exposes the corrupt and worldly sons of the Bailiff of Hexham. The moral point is made early in the play. The Bailiff instructs his sons in his own this-worldly ethic:

Carve to your selves, and care not what they say,
That bid you feare the fearfull Judgment day.
Live to your selves while you have tyme to live ...

(11.359-61).

But in the middle of the speech he suddenly breaks off, seeing "pale Death" standing before him, accompanied by Revenge with an iron whip.
Unable to repent, he dies and, according to the stage direction, a devil comes on and carries him away (373).

The medieval ancestry of these plays is clear. It remains only to mention the anomalous Impatient Poverty (c.1547-58), printed in 1560. Here the only possible explanation of the confusion of values is that "the playwright's ascetic left hand is largely ignorant of what his very worldly right hand is doing" (Spivack, p.211). In the first episode a struggle issues in the hero's choice of virtue, but he subsequently gives way to temptation until his final repentance. Thus the play follows the traditional pattern of ethical conflict, but the precise nature of the ethic in question is left in some doubt. Initially Peace overcomes Envy and turns Impatient Poverty to Prosperity. Envy succeeds, however, in despoiling Prosperity of his wealth through gambling, so that he once more becomes Poverty, and gives the audience a heartfelt warning against "unmeasureable spendynge" (1.934). He does penance and Peace reinvests him with the garment of prosperity, and then turns to the audience to deliver the moral:

Soveraynes here may ye se proved before you al
Of thys wanton worlde the great fragilyte
Ever mutable of the turning as a bal
Now flode of ryches nowe ebbe of povertwe
What shuld men set by this worldes vanyte
Thynke on this lesson and do it not forget
The gayest of us al is but wormes meate. (1070-76).

The fact that certain of the characters are probably later satirical interpolations (p.x) does not entirely account for the confusion between religious and secular values in the theme of the play. It seems clear that the playwright set out to write a purely prudential play about war and peace, cooperation and competition, thrift and extravagance. But it appears that the otherworldly tradition of the morality form got the
better of him so that from time to time he reverted to ascetic type.
The conclusion indicates that he recognised the opposition between
mortal and eternal values as one of the staple themes of the morality
tradition.

With certain exceptions, then, the moralities of the post-Reformation
period continue the medieval tradition of analysing allegorically the
ethical conflicts of their heroes. In some cases the precise nature
of these conflicts has been considerably modified by the influence of
Protestant theology, but each of the three main medieval analyses of
Christian warfare survives in some form. Protestant heroes on the whole
continue to struggle against the three sins of the world, to be distracted
from virtue by folly, the wisdom of this world, or to be tempted to
submerge their awareness of mortality in worldly security.

But these struggles are rarely the sole or central preoccupations
of the dramatists, and the post-Reformation plays consistently lack the
schematic clarity and allegorical purity of the medieval moralities.
One reason for this, of course, is that many of them devote a good deal
of attention to theological polemic. Plays like _Lusty Juvenus_ and
_Mary Magdalene_, for instance, contain a great deal of Protestant
propaganda, and the spiritual condition of the central figure is ignored
while the virtues deliver sermons on the role of faith in salvation or,
less elevated themes, the corruption of the monasteries and the hypocrisy
of the Pope.

Protestant polemic in itself, however, rarely obliterates entirely
the theme of inner conflict. But the major change wrought by the
Reformation, the emphasis on the social ethic, was to have important
consequences for the morality form. Despite a certain amount of social
satire, the medieval moralities were, with certain late exceptions like
_Magnificence_ and _Godly Queen Hester_, little concerned with man's social
role in the world. In the post-Reformation period this concern came to
the fore. The social ethic of the Reformation moralities is the theme
of my next chapter.
Charity has always been a central Christian virtue. But the other-worldly themes of the medieval moralities left little room for concern with the love of one's neighbour in the world. The dissolution of the monasteries, however, set the struggle of the faithful firmly in the world, and tended to lead to an emphasis on the supremacy of charity among the virtues. As a result, while the central concern of the medieval moralities had been the relationship between the individual soul and God, the post-Reformation dramatists showed an increasing interest in the relationship between man and his fellow men. As this theme became prominent, concern with inner conflict diminished correspondingly, and a new external form of conflict began to emerge. I think it would be true to say that very few of the post-Reformation moralities preserve medieval contempt of the world in a pure form. Almost all of them show some sort of concern with this world, with the proper use of money, the sufferings of the oppressed or the need for social unity. Some of them are completely secular and frankly prudential. In this chapter I shall discuss the Protestant interest in the social aspects of ethics and then go on to consider the influence of this on the plays of the period.

One source of the sixteenth century concern with society was clearly Humanism, with its strong interest in education, government and the common weal (Hogrefe, passim). But the spread of Humanist ideals was initially hindered rather than encouraged by the Reformation, and few traces of strictly Humanist thought are to be found in the popular moralities of the period. The Reformation itself, however, brought one major change which called for a reconsideration of the simple dichotomy
between this world and the next. Catholicism had made possible the practice of ascetic withdrawal in the monastic life; Protestantism rejected the monastic ideal. Monasticism stood at the centre of the orthodox Catholic rejection of the world. It provided an ideal of perfection and a way of life for those who aspired to the ideal.

Protestantism rejected the notion of different levels of perfection and required all men to live in the world. It involved, therefore a radical shift of emphasis in the concept of the kind of perfection to which the Christian ought to aspire. Protestantism condemned practical withdrawal from the world in favour of a kind of simultaneous aloofness and involvement. The world could not be ignored. Worldly values were still to be despised but action, not contemplation, was the Protestant ideal.

The reformers could not praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue. Max Weber exemplifies the change of ideals by comparing the conclusion of The Divine Comedy, where the poet stands in ecstatic contemplation of the secrets of God, with Milton's final picture of Adam moving forwards into the world where, through virtuous action, he will learn to possess a paradise within him (Weber, pp. 87-8). He might equally have cited Spenser's Red Cross Knight, who may not remain in contemplation of the heavenly Jerusalem but must return to the world where his duty is to free Una from the dragon (Fq I, x, 63). One suspects that it is not only modern audiences of Measure for Measure who find Isabella's conventual notion of virtue ("More than our brother is our chastity", II, iv, 185) austere and abstract. One of the major objections of the reformers to the monastic ideal was that it provided inadequate opportunity for the exercise of charity.

This is Luther's central argument against monasticism. Monastic vows have no Scriptural warrant; and to attempt to excel Christ in perfection is not faith but pride; such vows cannot contribute to
salvation which depends on faith, not works; but above all they are contrary to the ideal of charity, the love of one's neighbour in the world (Luther, pp.243-400). True obedience is to all men, true poverty the result of giving to all men. Monasticism limits the circle of charity to the community:

If a monk sees anybody who is hungry, thirsty, naked, homeless, captive, and all the rest, he is warned that he cannot leave the monastery to visit the sick and comfort the sad. He just lets perish what is going to perish. He shuts his heart to compassion, even if he can help. Afterwards he is likely to say that he did not do the charitable thing because he did not want to offer sacrifice before obedience. He would do the same if his father and mother needed his help to look after them and care for them. What an unheard-of madness! (Luther, p.329).

Such an ideal contravenes the central Christian principle of love, and "whatever is contrary to love can in no circumstances be imposed" (Luther, p.393). The true opportunity for good works, the fruits of repentance, is in the dutiful and charitable exercise of one's calling in the world. "Much holier and more excellent than the obedience of monks is that of a wife, of children, servants, prisoners...." (Luther, p.363).

This belief in the social nature of virtue is recurrent throughout Luther's writings. Troeltsch gives a summary of the Lutheran view that the Christian's joy in his faith expresses itself as love which, since it cannot give anything to a God already perfect, pours itself out on his neighbour:

"loving one's neighbour as oneself" implies that all the duties and tasks which life naturally brings in its train, especially those connected with the family, the State, the labour and vocational organization, are to be filled with this spirit of love, which makes these forms into methods and means of expression of the
Christian love of mankind. The mysticism which centres in love to God and man pours itself into the existing forms of human life: into the life of class and guild, into family and domestic life, into the life of the State and the administration of justice. Sublime religious feeling is clothed in the garb of the most ordinary and everyday forms of service within the home and the ordinary duties of citizenship. (Troeltsch, vol.2, p.525).

Good works have no merit; it is faith alone which justifies; but the inevitable consequence of regeneration is the desire to please God in the imitation of Christ whose life was one of love.

I will therefore give myself as a Christ to my neighbour, just as Christ offered himself to me; I will do nothing in this life except what I see is necessary, profitable and salutary to my neighbour, since through faith I have an abundance of all good things in Christ. (Dillenberger, p.89).

Thus those who exercise charity in the performance of their vocation are the true saints, not those who withdraw from the world, practise abstention, perform miracles (Dillenberger, pp.159-61).

Calvin, though his tone is more cautious, expresses similar objections to the monastic ideal. It is an obstinate attempt to do more than the Scriptures require (Calvin, IV, xiii, 3), and its claim to be the way of perfection has no Scriptural basis (Calvin, IV, xiii, 11-13). Calvin's admiration for St. Augustine leads him to acknowledge that the ancient forms of monasticism were not wholly misguided, but St. Augustine saw the monastic life as one of active piety, often a preparation for the performance of a clerical vocation, not as a means of separation from the main body of the Church (Calvin, IV, xiii, 8-10). But for Calvin too, monasticism is to be condemned above all because it leads men to neglect their social responsibilities:
Meanwhile, I frankly admit that even in that ancient form which Augustine commends there is something that I do not like very much. I grant that they were not superstitious in the outward exercise of a quite rigid discipline, yet I say that they were not without immoderate affectation and perverse zeal. It was a beautiful thing to forsake all their possessions and be without earthly care. But God prefers devoted care in ruling a household, where the devout householder, clear and free from all greed, ambition, and other lusts of the flesh, keeps before him the purpose of serving God in a definite calling. It is a beautiful thing to philosophise in retirement, far from intercourse with men. But it is not the part of Christian meekness, as if in hatred of the human race, to flee to the desert and the wilderness and at the same time to forsake those duties which the Lord has especially commanded. Though we grant there was nothing else evil in that profession, it was surely no slight evil that it brought a useless and dangerous example into the church. (Calvin, IV, xiii, 16).

In England the dissolution of the monasteries was probably primarily an economic measure, and its main justification was the corruption of the ideal in practice. The reformers lay much stress on this corruption, but they too condemn monasticism for its lack of charity. Tyndale echoes the Lutheran position with considerable vigour:

God's law is pure and single, "Love thy neighbour", whether he be good or bad: and by love God meaneth to help at need. Now when God biddeth thee to get thy living, and somewhat over to help him that cannot, or at a time hath not wherewith to help himself; if thou, and thirty or forty with thee, get you to [the] wilderness, and not only help not your neighbours, but also rob a great number of two or three thousand pounds yearly, how love ye your neighbours? Such men help the world with prayer, thou wilt say to me. Thou wert better to say, "they rob the world with their hypocrisy", say I to thee; and it is truth indeed that
they so do. For if I stick up to the middle in the mire, like to perish without present help, and thou stand by and wilt not succour me, but kneelest down and prayest, will God hear the prayers of such an hypocrite? (Tyndale, 1849, p.41; cf. ibid., pp.24-5; Tyndale, 1848, pp.279-80).

William Perkins at the other end of the Reformation period makes a detailed analysis of whether monastic vows are binding (Perkins, II, pp.99-101). He concludes that they are not since they are "flat against the law of God" (p.99). The whole conception of monastic vows is against the Protestant belief in liberty of conscience in "things indifferent" (pp.99-100), matters on which the Scriptures make no specific pronouncement. Indeed, "to dream of a state of perfection beyond the Law of God, is to make the Law it selfe imperfect (p.100). For Perkins too monastic life means neglect of social responsibilities, "because the law of God is practised, not apart by it selfe, but in and with the love of our neighbour" (p.100). Each man must therefore have a vocation in which he serves his fellow men. Monks fail in this respect because they "cannot bee serviceable to man, either in Church or commonwealth" (p.100).

There is considerable emphasis in the sermons of the period on the necessity for good works, perhaps precisely because works could no longer purchase salvation. With predestinarian theory in the ascendent there was a real danger that the practice of virtue would come to seem immaterial. English Protestantism responded to this danger by emphasising the value of works as evidence of regeneration. Sanctification, the love of God and one's neighbour, was the only real proof of true faith. The Homilies Appointed to be Read in Churches in 1562 lay much emphasis on this point. Faith without works is meaningless, of no avail (Sermons or Homilies, pp.29-46). The importance of good works as evidence of election is a recurrent theme in the period (George, pp.47-8). And the virtue which
above all shows regeneration to be sure and stable is charity. He who setteth his mind to serve God for God's own sake and for his sake also to love all his neighbours, whether they be friends or adversaries, doing good to every man, as opportunity serveth, and willingly hurting no man; such a man may well rejoice in God, perceiving by the trade of his life that he unfeignedly hath the right knowledge of God, a lively faith, a steadfast hope, a true and unfeigned love and fear of God. (Sermons or Homilies, p.43).

It would probably be true to say that medieval sermons tend to point to social abuses primarily as evidence of the corruption of the times rather than in any strongly reforming spirit. I derive this impression in particular from Owst's analysis of a great number of medieval sermons dealing with social themes (Owst, 1961, pp.287-470).

There is, for instance, more emphasis in these sermons on the wickedness of the rich than on the sufferings of the poor, on the final punishment of oppressors than on the nature of the misery they cause. The Protestant preachers, on the other hand, seem to insist on the importance of charity for its own sake. The difference is perhaps only one of emphasis, but I am inclined to accept the fairly cautious statement of C.H. and K. George that "the requirement of love for one's fellows is somewhat more strictly and broadly stated in English Protestantism than in Roman Catholicism..." (George, p.90).

This stress on the social nature of virtue inevitably affects the Protestant attitude to the world. The Christian is no longer concerned only to reject the temptations of worldliness, to withdraw from corruption into strongholds of private virtue; he must go out into the world and do battle against this corruption on its own ground. He cannot confine his attentions to the relationship between the soul and God but must also concern himself with his relationship with his fellow men, since it is the latter which assures him of the stability of the former. In order
to practise virtue he must involve himself in the world even while he rejects its values.

As a result of this new emphasis, Protestantism becomes to some extent a creed of social reform. This is to be understood, of course, not in terms of a concern for the radical revision of society, but as an interest in such matters as social stability, the preservation of order, and the individual's fulfilment of his role in society. Like Luther and Calvin, the English Protestants stress the importance of working diligently in one's vocation (George, pp.126-36; Haller, pp.124-7). Perkins, who devotes a whole treatise to this topic, argues that while the efficient cause of this diligence is God, the final cause is the common good (Perkins, vol.1, pp.747-79). Here again is a concept which is not much stressed in the middle ages, and a concept which involves the acknowledgement that this world is worthy of some attention in its own right. This life is not merely a preparation for death but a period in which the common good, however transitory, is worth striving for. Hooker, like the earlier Humanists, goes so far as to offer as one of the justifications for Christianity its desirable social consequences, "the force which religion hath to qualify all sorts of men, and to make them in public affairs the more serviceable, governors the apter to rule with conscience, inferiors for conscience' sake the willinger to obey" (Hooker, V, i, 2). Civil obedience, a matter of concern to Calvin, who rejected the "fanatical notion" that such worldly problems are of no importance to Christians (Calvin, IV, xx, 1-32), is given considerable emphasis in the established English Church (P.E.Hughes, pp.225-62; Blench, p.273). Civil justice, too, and the reform of social abuses, receive much attention (Blench, pp.263-73, 312-13; Knappen, pp.404-12; George, p.84).

Latimer's sermons provide an excellent example of the outgoing ethic of the Reformation. Latimer is profoundly concerned with social injustice,
condemning corrupt magistrates and judges, extortionate landlords, the
failure of the rich to exercise charity, and the neglect among the clergy
of their duty to preach. Powerful in their vigorous simplicity, his
sermons convey an impression of genuine concern for the victims of
injustice of all kinds. But it is not merely a question of sympathy
with the plight of the oppressed. Latimer demands practical remedies
for practical problems. His last sermon preached before Edward VI in
1550 discusses as an example of avarice the enclosures, which he blames
for the recent rebellions in Norfolk and Devon. It displays a character-
istic mixture of the practical anxiety to avoid insurrection with a real
knowledge of the lives of the poor. It is typical, too, of Latimer's
directness. He tells the court:

They in Christ are equal with you. Peers of the realm must needs be. The poorest ploughman is in Christ equal with the greatest
prince that is. Let them, therefore, have sufficient to maintain
them, and to find them their necessaries. A ploughland must have
sheep; yea, they must have sheep to dung their ground for bearing
of corn; for if they have no sheep to help fat the ground, they
shall have but bare corn and thin. They must have swine for their
food, to make their veneries or bacon of: their bacon is their
venison, for they shall now have hangum tuum, if they get any
other venison; so that their bacon is their necessary meat to
feed on, which they may not lack. They must have other cattle:
as horses to draw their plough, and for carriage of things to the
markets; and kine for their milk and cheese, which they must
live upon and pay their rents. These cattle must have pasture,
which pasture if they lack, the rest must needs fail them: and
pasture they cannot have, if the land be taken in, and inclosed
from them. So, as I have said, there was in both parts rebellion.

(Latimer, 1906, p.215).
Latimer is concerned not only with the salvation of souls but with the application of Christianity to real issues in the world. Helen C. White argues that the preachers of the period are more interested in calling sinners to repentance than in pointing to the actual miseries of the poor (White, pp.192-3, 226). Certainly the preachers are not inflammatory since for religious reasons they are anxious to avoid rebellion. But several of her own examples seem to me to show considerable compassion for the victims of poverty and a real attempt to understand their situation (e.g., White, pp.197, 247-8, 279-80).

The Protestant cannot retreat from the world but must join battle against its corruption from his position within it. He cannot practise virtue in a solitary castle of perseverance but must persevere against evil in a social context. Troeltsch states clearly the distinction between the Catholic and Protestant attitudes:

Catholic ascetism was, and still is, a form of life which existed alongside of and above the average conditions of life in the world, cultivated in monasteries and confraternities and among the clergy.

Protestantism, however, discarded that dualism, and laid upon all alike the duty of permeating the life of the world with the spirit of world-renunciation and victory over the world. Its ideal was one of spiritual detachment from the things of this world, combined with victory over the world, while remaining within it. (Troeltsch, vol.2, p.605).

One cannot secure victory without being forced to inspect the enemy at close quarters, nor do good to one's neighbour effectively without examining his situation to see what form that good must take.

Protestantism, while still insisting on detachment from worldly values, obliges its adherents to concern themselves to some extent with the nature of the world.
The social ethic was inevitably reflected in the post-Reformation morality plays. The new social and political themes of the late moralities have been widely recognised (Thorp, pp.8-16; McCutchan, 1958, pp.405-10; Spivack, p.208 ff.; Bevington, 1968, passim.; F.P. Wilson, pp.55-9) and variously explained. From the reign of Henry VIII onwards the question of salvation was intimately related to that of political allegiance (Thompson, 1910, p.375; L.B. Wright, 1930 (ii), pp.107-8; Belbow, p.xiii) and it was an easy step from the drama of religious polemic to the drama of social and political controversy (Rossiter, pp.114-15; Ribner, 1954, p.23). Further, questions of statecraft and civil obedience were widely discussed by non-dramatic writers of the sixteenth century from the Humanists to Calvin (Rossiter, p.118).

But while all this is true, and while it explains the occurrence in the moralities of religious polemic and explorations of the role of princes and the problem of tyranny, it does not seem to me to account for the apparent preoccupation of these dramatists with the evils of usury, bribery and injustice, or for their concern with the sufferings of the victims of oppression, rack-renting and extortion. Nor, I believe, can the phenomenon simply be explained as "increasing secularization", or accounted for by making distinctions between "religious" and "ethical" or "moral" themes (Thorp, pp.9-13), especially since the most anti-social figures in the plays frequently incur damnation as well as disapproval. It seems, in fact, that the increasingly secular themes are a result rather than a cause of the concern with social relationships, which is in turn a product of the religious ethic of the Reformation.

Since the new social content of the plays has been so widely discussed a brief account of the predominant social themes of the plays
will suffice. Social unity is a matter of concern to the author of Minds. **Wealth and Health** (1554-5) shows how easily the wealth, health and liberty of the realm can be destroyed by cunning and self-seeking individuals. The attempts of Injury and Division to prevent the marriage between Albion (England) and Plenty is the plot of the fragmentary **Albion Knight** (1537-65), printed in 1565. The threat of civil disobedience is the theme of another fragment, **Temperance and Humility** (1535?), probably printed in 1537.

The need for strong and virtuous government is also a recurrent theme. Lindsay's **Satire of the Three Estates** (1540; revised 1552, 1554) deals with the obligations of the king and the effects of the corruption of the various estates of the realm on the common weal. Similarly (?), Udall's **Catholic Respublica** (1553) concerns the sufferings of People when Respublica allows the work of government to be done by Avarice, Adulation, Insolence and Oppression.

Friction between the estates is another common theme. R. Wilson's **Three Ladies of London** (c.1581), printed in 1584, shows the miseries of the estates when the love of Lucre overcomes Conscience and Love. In the sequel, **Three Lords and Three Ladies of London** (1589-90) printed in 1590, a solution is proffered in the form of war with Spain. The differences between the estates are submerged in hatred of a common enemy. War is also the solution in Wilson's third play, **The Cobbler's Prophecy**, to the problem of "envy and dissension among the several estates and ... the resultant turmoil and injustice in the realm" (Spivack, p.210). (?), Marston's **Histriomastix** (1589-99), which has the structure of an estates morality, shows the effects on various representative social groups when Plenty, the heir of Peace, is displaced by Pride, who is succeeded by Envy and then by War, accompanied by Ambition, Fury, Horror and Ruin. Finally Poverty reigns, with a train of Famine, Sickness, Bondage and Sluttishness, until Peace returns with Astraea (Elizabeth).
Social concerns are not confined, of course, to the post-Reformation moralities. There is a certain amount of social satire in Mind, Will and Understanding (Bevington, 1968, pp.28-34) and Mankind (ib., pp.39-40). Magnificence is probably concerned with a topical crisis as well as presenting a mirror for princes (ib., pp.55-63), and Godly Queen Hester concerns Catherine of Aragon as well as the Biblical heroine (ib., pp.87-95).

John Roo's lost play, written in 1527, dealt with the dangers to Lady Public Weal when Lord Governance submitted to Dissipation and Negligence (ib., p.7). These last three, however, belong to the sixteenth century, and probably reflect something of the Humanism of their period.

Social satire and topical allegory are not wholly new, but one feature which does seem to me to be new in the post-Reformation plays is their emphasis on the extent to which private and individual sin has anti-social repercussions. In the medieval plays the harm which is done to the individual by the seven deadly sins is shown as having consequences primarily for the sinner himself. But later it is made very clear that the sinner causes not only his own damnation but also great suffering for his innocent victims. This, I suggest, is a direct consequence of the Reformation emphasis on the demonstration of the faith in the love of one's neighbour and the responsible exercise of one's calling. The reprobate, by contrast, do much damage to their neighbours as well as to society as a whole.

In the plays considerable effort is made to arouse pity for the victims of oppression in this world as well as fear for the fate of the oppressor's soul in the next. In A Satire of the Three Estates John the Common Weal tells stories of extortionate vicars and poor cottagers to display the corruptions of the Church. The effect of this is reinforced by the appearance of Pauper, who tells how as his father, his mother and then his wife died, the vicar laid claim to one of the family cows. When all three cows were gone, "I micht mak na debeat/ Bot with my bairns past
for till beg my meat" (p.109). Though these is no evidence that Lindsay ever abandoned the Catholic Church, the presentation of Pauper as one of its victims gives some indication of the reason why subsequent reformers so readily accept him as one of themselves.

Many such figures were to appear on the stage in England, often less vigorously presented and more paternalistically drawn, but always exciting pity in themselves as well as disgust at oppression and extortion. In The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art "People" complains of Moros's cruelty. After giving a list of the now rich and successful hero's corrupt officers, People exclaims:

With these and such like many moe,
We in his circuit be oppressed;
For remedy we wot not whither to go
To have our calamity redressed. (1735-8).

Wager is no Latimer, and the element of pathos could be more pronounced, but it is clear that we are asked not only to be shocked by Moros's wickedness, but also to be stirred to pity for his helpless victims. In The Castle of Perseverance the behaviour of Humanum Genus inspires disapproval of the sinner, and requires the audience to recognise that he is endangering his own salvation. Wager's hero also endangers the well-being of innocent people, and their presentation on the stage excites a concern for the suffering he causes as well as for the fate of his woul.

In Wager's Enough is as Good as a Feast Worldly Man's victims, Servant, Hireling and Tenant, are all portrayed with some pathos. Servant looks as if he is starving (sig.E 2). Tenant is about to be turned out of the house where he has lived for forty years, and pleads:

Oh Landlord me thinksthis is to much extremitie:
Alas upon mine age take you some pitty,
Cham olde & have many Children and much charge. (sig.E 4).

Tenant is apparently something of a standard figure. Wapull's version
In *The Tide Tarrieth No Man* is very similar:

What cruel chance, like to mine hath beene,
Both my house and my living, I must now forgoe.
What neighbour is he, that hath served me so?
Thus crewelly to take my house, over my head,
Wherein these forty yeares, I have beene harbored and fed,
And now being aged, must thus be thrust out,
With mine impotent wife, charge, and famely:
Now how I shall live, I stand in great doubt,
Leading and ending, my life in misery ... (sig. D 1).

His oppressor is called No Good Neighbourhood.

In *All For Money* Neither-Money-nor-Learning is similarly pathetic (11.715-18, 750), and even poor Moneyless-and-Friendless, who stole rags from a hedge, elicits sympathy when it is made clear that he is the only criminal who is unable to bribe the magistrate, All-for-Money, to acquit him. The Poor Man in *A Looking-Glass for London and England* is too late to redeem his cow from the usurer, and laments the loss of "Butter, Cheese, Whay, Curds, Creame, sod milk, rawe-milke, sower-milke, sweets-milk, and butter-milke" and the other delicacies which he and his family used "to banket our selves withal" (11.371-3). And *A Knack to Know a Knave* includes a whole list of innocent victims. Two old men are threatened with prison by the worldly Farmer because they cannot pay their debts. (A Knight, who preserves the old virtues of charity and hospitality, pays the Farmer on their behalf.) Piers Plowman at eighty is reduced to wearing a threadbare coat. Neighbour cannot afford the increases in rent demanded by the hypocritical Priest, who will give nothing to Beggar, lame and blind as he is, on the basis that he ought to work for his living. Such themes do not occur in the medieval plays. The Reformation moralities deal with a wider subject than the ethical
conflicts of the individual soul. They are concerned also with the social consequences of ethical choice.

It is difficult in these plays to draw a strict borderline between social responsibility and social prudence. Heroes who offend against the social ethic are frequently punished by society as well as by God. This tendency began to manifest itself in Magnificence and becomes increasingly prevalent in the post-Reformation period. Secular concerns lead easily to prudential ethics.

This development may be illustrated by a consideration of a number of plays dealing with education. Education is, of course, essentially a secular topic in that it is only rarely linked directly with the central religious question of salvation and damnation. It can, however, be connected intimately with morality, and this connection is made repeatedly in the plays. The ethic concerned, however, becomes less strictly religious during the course of the period, less connected with man's spiritual welfare, more related to his behaviour and well-being as a citizen. This tendency is strongly evident in the plays loosely dependent on the Prodigal Son story.

The dramatisation of the parable originated among French, German and Dutch Humanists eager to apply the style of Terence to material more suited to the education of the Christian young. The plays generally emphasise the value of education, the dangers of parental indulgence and the need for discipline (Dover Wilson, 1909, p.338; Campbell, 1959, pp.194-5; F.P. Wilson, pp.96-7). Among the continental versions of the story, the Acolastus of Philonius (or de Volder, or Gnaphus) was "translated" into English by Palsgrave in 1540. Palsgrave was clearly concerned with the interpretation of Latin rather than with offering a play for production, since his translation or 
ophrasis consists of a number of alternative versions of each phrase of the original. Nonetheless, by this very means he may have drawn particular attention to Acolastus in England, and since
it offers an interesting point of comparison for the native English plays, it seems proper to include it here.

Acolastus, encouraged by Philautus, demands his inheritance from his father, Pelargus. Eubulus advises Pelargus to agree in order that Acolastus may learn to know himself. Acolastus sets off triumphantly on his travels but rapidly falls into the clutches of two parasites, a courtesan and a dishonest innkeeper. He loses all his money at dice and is reduced to keeping swine. The recognition of his folly brings him close to despair, but he hesitantly decides to return to his father who welcomes him with full forgiveness.

In other words, the play is a straightforward dramatisation of the Biblical story with the addition of a certain amount of Terentian detail. At the same time, however, it follows its original source by offering itself for allegorical interpretation. The Prologue announces that this is a play "Cuius sub involucro habes mysterion" (Atkinson, Prologue, 1.14) and the Epilogue explains that it shows how man rebels against God and deserves death, but that God forgives the repentant sinner and welcomes him to himself. The spectators may share the welcome of Acolastus if they repent and ask God's forviveness (Atkinson, Peroratio, 24-7).

The double level of meaning is preserved within the play. Some of the names are clearly symbolic (Campbell, 1959, p.170: Acolastus is Aristotle's intemperance, Philautus self-love (Atkinson, p.52). While at the literal level Pelargus is a timid and pathetic old man, there is a sense in which he represents the mercy of God, while Eubulus, who foresees the whole, stands for the divine wisdom (Atkinson, p.53).

Though the parasites, innkeeper and courtesan work for their own financial gain rather than the hero's damnation, their behaviour reveals their affinities with Riot and Lechery in Youth or Nought, New Guise and Nowadays
Philautus is still closer to a Vice-figure since he is given no motive for the corruption of Acolastus at the literal level. The play as a whole follows closely the structure of the medieval moralities, and can be interpreted consistently as allegory. Acolastus, allowed free will by a benevolent God, and encouraged by self-love, rejects obedience to the Father who has made him his heir, takes his inheritance (his natural gifts) and goes abroad in search of the pleasures of the flesh and admiration on the strength of his riches (Atkinson, II, iii, 17-37) which make men equal with gods (II, iii, 76-7). (Echoes of the Fall are appropriate, of course. Adam's sin was the type of all sin).

In other words, like Humanum Genus and his successors, Acolastus undergoes a conflict between God and the world with its three traditional sources of delight, pleasures, riches and honours. Again like the morality heroes he chooses the world and learns through adversity the transitory nature of worldly values, acknowledges his sin and, inspired by a sudden conviction of his Father's mercy (grace), decides to return "Ex inferis et morte, ad vitam et gaudia" (V, v, 87). Pelargus welcomes him and tells him, "Una salute felix convives mihi" (V, v, 95).

Among English plays in the Prodigal Son tradition Lusty Juventus also requires primarily allegorical interpretation. The hero is seduced by the transitory delights of the world and relinquishes them when he repents. Subsequently, however, interpretations of the original story move further away from the Biblical parable and become increasingly literal, social and prudential. Nice Wanton (1547-53), printed in 1560, displays an ambivalence towards the value of education which is fairly characteristic of the period. The play is modelled very loosely on the original parable. Xantippe has three children, Barnabas, whom she beats regularly, and Dalila and Ismael, whom she spoils. Barnabas goes regularly to school, but Dalila and Ismael play truant, and are encouraged by Iniquity to sample
the pleasures of the tavern, wantonness and gaming. Almost at once Dalila reappears on the stage, consumed by the pox, confesses her sins to Barnabas and dies repentant. Ismael, having lost his money and become a thief, is condemned to be hanged for "fellony, burglary, and murther" (sig.B 3v), and convicts Iniquity of leading him astray. Worldly Shame tells Xantippe of this in an attempt to bring her to despair, but Barnabas comforts her, urging the mercy of God.

The value of education appears to be both moral and practical: learning induces the fear of God and simultaneously provides a means to an honest vocation. As the Prologue explains, children ought:

To be taught to fear god, and theyr princes obey
To get learning and qualities, therby to maintain:
an honest quiet lyfe, correspondent alway,
To Gods law and the Kings, for it is certain
If children be mused in idlenes and il,
And brought up therin it is hard to refain:
And draw them from naturall wunt evyll ...

No clear distinction is made between God's law and the king's. Lack of education and lack of discipline lead inevitably to the infringement of both. The unchecked natural tendencies of these children will work "To Gods displeasure and theyr hurt" (sig.A 3v). Barnabas urges the young among the spectators to pursue learning and obey their elders, adding, "It wil be your profitt an other day" (sig.C 2). The play as a whole leads to the assumption that both the hurt and the profit are simultaneously spiritual and material.

It is made quite clear that while sincere repentance can prevent retribution in the next world, punishment is inevitable and severe in this one. Dalila's detailed account of her shrunken sinews, aching bones, baldness and dim sight ("Crooked I creep to the earth again", sig.B lv-B 2), is strongly reminiscent of the complaints of the miseries
of old age in the medieval moralities (above, pp. 76-7). But whereas these were melancholy reminders of the mortality of all men, warnings that the proud flesh is of this world and therefore transient, Dalila is not old but diseased, and her symptoms are a direct punishment for her sin (sig. B2). The ungodliness of both children is seen as synonymous with social disgrace, and Ismael is punished directly by society. The lesson of the play is as much prudential as religious.

Two other Prodigal Son plays are based on a Humanist dialogue, the Juvenis, Pater, Uxor of Ravisius Textor. Only a fragment remains of the English Pater, Filius et Uxor, printed c.1530-34. Strictly according to my chronology this belongs with the "medieval" plays, but I include it here because of its obvious affinities with the group of post-Reformation plays I am discussing. The fragment concerns a foolish son who has rejected his father's advice that he should become a clerk. Instead he has married a shrew and is forced to sell faggots. We may probably assume that the rest of the play makes clear the value of education in relation to employment and the wise conduct of life, possibly with some reference to the need for discipline in youth, and that the moral is largely prudential. If so, this is a surprisingly early example (in English drama) of what was later to become the norm.

Thomas Ingelend's The Disobedient Child (c. 1559-70) was probably printed in about 1569. This tells a similar story of a son who argues plausibly against going to school and insists on getting married. His father reasons with him in vain and finally banishes him, lamenting his own over-indulgence. The son marries a shrew and returns to his father, but is told that he must stay with the wife he has chosen, though his father undertakes to help with his expenses. Here too the moral is purely prudential:
by knowledge, science and learning,
Is at the last gotten a pleasant life,
But through the want and lack of this thing
Is purchased poverty, sorrow and strife. (p. 270).

The father assures his son that through education he may "get a gentleman's living,/ And with many other bear a great sway" (p. 278).

Gascoigne's The Glass of Government (1575) provides a further example of a play loosely modelled on the story of the Prodigal Son. Briefly, the play concerns two pairs of brothers. These are educated by Gnomaticus in their duties first to God and then to the prince, the magistrates, their country and their parents. The two elder brothers, Philosarchus and Phylautus, learn easily and forget fast, and are lured to concupiscence by a parasite and a harlot. The younger brothers take their lessons to heart and thus obtain posts, one clerical and the other legal, in Geneva. The younger brothers watch while Phylautus is hanged for robbery and Philosarchus is whipped almost to death for fornication. The play clearly identifies learning and virtue with social success, and does not deal in questions of salvation or damnation. It is concerned entirely with this world, with the treatment of sin by the community.

Here, then, in this particular development of the morality tradition, is a radical difference between the post-Reformation plays and the medieval moralities. This world has become the arena for the performance of good works, and as a result in a number of plays good works come to be judged not by God but by the world.

It is worth noting that the last three plays I have discussed are not strictly moralities since they contain no abstract figures (with the exception of the Devil in The Disobedient Child). Their dramatis personae are exemplary social types. This is also partly true of Nice Wanton in which the central figures are representative social or moral types,
but here the morality tradition is evident in Iniquity, the Vice, and Worldly Shame. Further, the wholly prudential plays contain very little analysis of inner conflict. They work instead by showing contrasting examples of virtuous and evil behaviour, dwelling on the origins and consequences of each. They deal primarily in social relationships and in consequence tend to abandon the conventional morality pattern of ethical struggles between abstractions. The relationship between otherworldly values, social themes and allegory is the concern of my next chapter.
Chapter 6
THE ROLE OF ALLEGORY

I have suggested (above, pp.8-9) that there is a close connection between the form of the medieval morality plays and their otherworldly subject matter, that personification-allegory permits the dramatist to analyse and explore the inner experience of a single typical individual without reference to his social role in the external world. At their best these analyses show considerable understanding of the complexities of inner conflict.

We have been accustomed to regard allegory with some suspicion ever since Coleridge rejected it, and although Coleridge's influence has been recognised and his attitude accounted for in terms of his more general theories (Honig, pp.44-50), even recent literature in defence of allegory does not seem to me to do justice to the morality plays. 16 Coleridge offers a clear definition of allegory:

We may then safely define allegoric writing as the employment of one set of agents and images with actions and accompaniments correspondent, so as to convey, while in disguise, either moral qualities or conceptions of the mind that are not in themselves objects of the senses, or other images, agents, actions, fortunes, and circumstances, so that the difference is everywhere presented to the eye or imagination while the likeness is suggested to the mind; and this connectedly so that the parts combine to form a consistent whole. (Coleridge, p.30).

This account of what allegory is seems to me to be admirable, but the separation which it is alleged to require between the mind and the imagination is a clear indication of Coleridge's suspicion of the form, and perhaps a source of our own. Later in the same note his reservations are made still clearer; allegory "... is incapable of exciting any lively
interest for any length of time ..." The reason for this is that "the allegoric personage" is either entirely uninteresting or else so "strongly individualized" that he ceases to be allegorical, and Coleridge instances Bunyan, whose characters are "real persons" and not allegorical at all (Coleridge, p.31).

This is probably true of Bunyan whose characters are so frequently exemplary social and moral types. Obstinate and Pliable are examples of men who fail to persevere, and too readily turn back to the City of Destruction. Mr. Blind-man, Mr. Love-lust, Mr. High-mind and the rest of the jurors in Vanity Fair are those who are prejudiced and thus unable to recognise true Christianity. Their vigorous conversation is drawn from the observation of life and it is true that they talk like "real persons". But they are not in Coleridge's own sense allegorical since as types they cannot be described as abstractions "that are not in themselves objects of the senses".

But to take up the more general point, Coleridge appears to assume that allegory works only by equating the individual image or personification with the individual abstraction or concept that it represents, and his complaint is twofold. First, this equation is available only to the mind. If, for instance, a bad angel represents man's evil impulses, a woman lechery, only the intellect recognises the likeness between the personifications and what they stand for; the eye and the imagination are conscious only of the difference, the incongruity of the concrete representation of what we know to be abstract. Lechery does not look like a woman; evil impulses do not imaginatively resemble bad angels. And secondly, Coleridge would argue, Lechery is uninteresting until she begins to behave like an individual lecherous woman, and then she ceases to be allegorical.

The weakness of this argument seems to me to be that, in spite of Coleridge's concession to consistency, it deals only with the parts and
ignores the whole. The real meaning of an allegory lies in the pattern of interaction which it develops and not, I suggest, in the ingenuity with which individual characters are presented. Perseverance is not visually and imaginatively like a castle, it is true, but there is an analogy between the experience of persevering and the experience of going into a castle which is strongly but not impregnably defended. The allegorical representation of perseverance is not the individual symbol, the castle, but the whole network of relationships between the soul, the virtues, the castle and the vices which attack it.

Morton W. Bloomfield has pointed out that the creative element in personification-allegory lies not in the figures but in the verbs. In the example, "truth treads down error", it is the verb which does the work of conveying the relationship between the personifications (Bloomfield, 1970, pp.250-51). The verbs carry the pattern of relationships which establishes the meaning of the allegory; they indicate the nature of the interaction between the figures.

If this is true the pattern of "agents and images" may be more closely related to their meaning than Coleridge seems to allow. Allegory need not be purely intellectual, and the "likeness" may be available to the eye and the imagination as well as to the mind. Everyman offers a clear example. In the final episode when Everyman stands on the brink of the grave his faculties desert him one by one (11.794 ff.). If the purpose of the scene is to display the nature of Beauty, Strength, Discretion and Five Wits, it is utterly unremarkable and justifies Coleridge's strictures. And if this was his intention, the dramatist has failed: the personifications are barely characterised. But if we keep Everyman firmly at the centre of a pattern of action and watch the process of desertion, we see the scene as showing him degenerating helplessly into old age, and the episode becomes imaginatively impressive. We miss the point if we suppose that the scene is about the qualities of
strength or beauty; it is about the experience of losing beauty and
physical prowess, becoming senile, and finally losing the capacity for
sensation altogether. In other words, the meaning of the episode is in
the verbs, in the interaction of the figures. The dramatist uses allegory
to analyse this experience into its component parts, to show the
personifications leaving the stage one by one so that Everyman is finally
deserted. The consequence of the technique is that we see the process of
desertion taking place and we share imaginatively the horror of Everyman's
situation.

In The Castle of Perseverance the impact is still more obviously
visual, and it is essential to see the action as a whole, not to concentrate
on individual personifications. Rosamond Tuve makes the distinction
between moral allegory (*quid agas*) and spiritual allegory (*quid credas*).
The former deals with the conquest of individual sins, the latter with
the position of man in the spiritual cosmos. (Tuve, pp.35–55 and passim).
The Castle of Perseverance is not only a moral allegory, showing how man
ought to behave, but also a spiritual allegory, a timeless image of man's
condition in this life (see above, pp.22–3), and at both levels the
characterisation of individual personifications is subordinate to the
total pattern of the relationships between them.

Literature records, interprets and orders experience. The medieval
moralities use allegory to analyse and give pattern to the inner conflicts
of their heroes. Though they treat it in various ways, their central
concern is consistently the relationship between the individual soul and
God. They isolate the agents in the processes of temptation and repentance
in order to display the nature of the conflict which is the heritage of
fallen man, the perpetual warfare within the soul between the claims of the
world and God. Their strength is their consistent concern with the inner
world of their heroes and their relative disregard of the phenomenal world.
The social ethic of the Reformation period, however, brings an interest in a different kind of experience, a concern with social behaviour and social relationships, and as a result the dramatists begin to introduce new kinds of figures on to the stage. These are representative social figures who display the typical attitudes and characteristics of their class, profession or moral kind. These are not abstractions but literal figures, to be distinguished from the representations of Pride as a dandy, for instance, in that in their disputes with the hero they represent separate individuals rather than inner attributes or ethical forces.

They are new only in the moralities, of course, since social types are perfectly familiar in the literal tradition of the miracle plays (Mrs. Noah, Mak the shepherd) and in the debate plays of Medwall, Rastell and John Heywood. But the miracle plays and the debate plays do not (with certain rare exceptions) contain abstractions. When literal figures begin to appear within the morality form the action has to take place on two planes at once, one allegorical, psychological and internal, the other literal, behavioural and external. This compromise continues for some time until finally the literal prevails and the personifications are internalised in soliloquy. In this chapter I hope to demonstrate that in the post-Reformation moralities, while inner conflict tends to continue to be analysed allegorically, social relationships are expressed literally, and that in some plays there is a tendency for the combination of these two forms to lead to confusion and inconsistency.

First, then, the survival of allegory. Wager's Enough is as Good as a Feast provides an example. I have argued (above, pp.104-5, 118-19 ) that the central concern of the play is the conflict within the mind of the hero, Worldly Man. The Vice, Covetous, is the personification of his avaricious impulses, and a large proportion of the play is devoted to a subtle psychological analysis of the means by which Covetous prevails over the hero's better instincts, teaching him a reckless contempt for the fate
of his immortal soul, and then the means by which he can rationalise his submission to worldly values. Thus the central part of the action concerns the process of temptation and an analysis of Worldly Man's state of mind at the point of death. The central characters, therefore, are abstractions, and the play is mainly allegorical. A relatively brief episode deals with the social consequences of Worldly Man's avarice, and for this purpose the literal type-figures of Tenant, Hireling and Servant are introduced. A certain amount of low comedy is provided by Physician in the final scene, while the fact that Ignorance is a Catholic priest as well as an abstraction provides an opportunity for satire. The prophet, who speaks off stage, warning Worldly Man of his mortality, has a psychological role. His purpose is to frighten the hero and in another play he might have been called Conscience or Horror. The main action, which deals with inner conflict, is in the hands of Covetous, Temerity, Inconsideration and Precipitation.

**Lusty Juventus** concerns a young man who is converted from his natural preference for transitory sensual pleasures to the Scriptures and good works. He is tempted by Hypocrisy, falls, and is finally reconverted by Good Counsel. The play thus dramatises inner conflict and the method is allegorical except in so far as the play shares the Protestant tendency to externalize the virtuous figures. The Calvinist assumption that man is wholly depraved and has no impulses to good often leads to the presentation of figures like Good Counsel as preachers and teachers rather than as internal impulses. Since man is "naturally prone, / To evil from his youth" (11,1-2) and only "by grace and good counsell traynabe to vertue" (T.P.), it is only the Vice figures who are fully psychological.

The process of temptation is, however, wholly allegorical, and it is handled very successfully in this play. Hypocrisy sets out to ensnare his victim by disguising himself as Friendship (1,576). When Juventus
explains that he cannot keep him company because he is going to a preaching, the Vice pretends to suppose that this is a euphemism for something quite different (588-90). He mocks his theological "learning" (614-20) and then goes on to argue that Juventus ought to obey his (Catholic) elders; it is presumptuous of the young to attempt to teach their own fathers (637-62). Juventus abandons the sermon he had meant to attend but is afraid to be seen with Hypocrisy. This provides an opportunity for the Vice to teach him to be a hypocrite (681-94). He is then a ready victim for Fellowship and Abominable Living.

A fairly subtle psychological process is here represented. His newfound seriousness leads the young man to suppose that he is probably slightly ridiculous among his friends. Producing the rationalization that the young ought not to instruct their elders (almost certainly true in any sixteenth century context except that of the Reformation), he is ready to slip back into his old ways, but before he dares to do so he must learn to deceive his instructors and perhaps himself as well. The episode is evidence that allegory is still able to be used to good effect when the theme is inner experience. Like the medieval moralities, *Lusty Juventus* deals with the mind of a single protagonist who must choose between the world and God. The theme is the internal processes which lead to damnation. Allegory is the traditional and obvious method of displaying these on the stage.

*The Trial of Treasure* is concerned entirely with the state of mind of Lust, its central figure, and the other characters, with the exception of Just, who represents the elect, and Treasure herself, are all abstractions. Similarly, *An Interlude of Minds*, which reinterprets the Fall, is concerned almost entirely with the process of temptation, fall and regeneration, and is wholly allegorical.

John Bale's *Three Laws of Nature, Moses and Christ, Corrupted by the*
Sodomites, Pharisees and Papists (c.1547), though very different in form from the medieval moralities, also seems to me to deal allegorically with inner warfare. Like his better known play, King John, Bale's Three Laws operates on a series of levels at once. Mrs. Blatt argues that there is little left of the psychomachia in the play (Blatt, pp.63-4), and it is true that it lacks the traditional structure of a human hero flanked by personifications of his conflicting impulses. But her own account of the play (Blatt, pp.65-86) seems to me to concede that although the human hero does not appear on the stage, the eternal conflict between the laws of God and man's evil impulses is central to Bale's theme.

Bale's three laws - of Nature, Moses and Christ - are conceived as having a historical relationship to each other, dividing Biblical history into three major periods, from the Creation to the giving of the Law, from the Old Covenant to the New, and from the Atonement until the present. Simultaneously, however, these laws exist within all men born since the Atonement. Their corruption is manifest in the play in Biblical history, in a series of individuals of all times, and in man as he is in the contemporary world. The Vice of the play is Infidelity, lack of faith, the supreme sin of the Reformers, and he encourages his minions to destroy the three Laws one by one. The Law of Nature is overcome by Sodomy, a distorted form of the lusts of the flesh in general (pp.21-3), and Idolatry (superstition). The Law of Moses, which shows what sin is and so leads men to Christ through the recognition of their own inadequacy (28), is crippled and blinded by Avarice and Ambition, and the Law of Christ is burnt as a heretic by Hypocrisy and False Doctrine, until Vindicta Dei pursues Infidelity with water and drives him out with fire. God then reinstates the three Laws and Christian Faith is instructed to keep them in his heart. The Law of Nature will teach him to know God, the Law of Moses to worship him and the Law of Christ to love him (75).
Bale is using the allegory to present a spiritual history of humanity through God's three dispensations, culminating in Christ's New Covenant of love and mercy, and simultaneously to analyse man's relationship with God — through his own corrupted nature, through the Law of Moses, which he cannot keep unaided, and through the Atonement, from whose true meaning he is so easily led astray by the false teaching of a hypocritical (Catholic) church. Only by the defeat and banishment of Infidelity can man's proper relationship with God be restored. Though his technique of presentation is in many ways different from theirs, Bale, like his medieval predecessors, is concerned with the impulses which distract the soul from its true purpose of loving and obeying God, and so like theirs his method is allegorical.

Love Feigned and Unfeigned appears an exception to the general rule that a social theme tends to be expressed by literal characters, since here the theme is love and the dramatis personae are all abstractions. In fact, however, the fragment deals not with love in action, but with Fellowship's choice between true and false love. The real theme, then, is abstract and internal rather than social and behavioural.

When social behaviour and social relationships are really central to the dramatist's concerns, however, the dramatic method is predominantly literal. The contrast may be illustrated by a comparison between two plays in the Prodigal Son tradition, Acolastus and Misogonus. Acolastus provides a spiritual and allegorical interpretation of the Biblical story, very much in the ascetic tradition of the English medieval plays. Misogonus, though it concerns the benevolent father and the erring son of the parable, is strongly social and prudential in its treatment, and its dramatis personae are entirely literal and often very realistically drawn. Where conflict occurs it is external and takes the form of disputes between individuals. Moral character is defined from outside, not through abstractions but by
contrast with other figures.

_Acolastus_, written in 1529 and "translated" into English in 1540, like the original parable, works on two levels at once. It is both an exemplum of the folly of youthful self-will and extravagance, and an account of the wayward and erring human soul, reduced to wretchedness until it learns to cast itself on the mercy of God (see above, pp. 145-6).

_Misogonus_ (1560-77) works only at the literal level. _Philogonus_ has been an over-indulgent father. He has failed to insist on the education and discipline of his son, _Misogonus_, who has therefore grown up to flout his authority and to be encouraged by _Cacurgus_ to drinking, dicing, quarrelling and lechery. The situation is saved, however, when _Codrus_, a rustic who is in danger of starvation because he has lost his sow, sets out to secure the protection of _Philogonus_ by revealing that _Misogonus_ has an older brother, born without his father's knowledge and brought up by his uncle in Poland. The new heir, _Eugonus_, is sent for and identified as the son of _Philogonus_ by _Codrus's_ wife, _Alison_, who was present at his birth. _Misogonus_, deserted by his corrupt companions who have no longer anything to gain from him, despairs and repents, and is on the verge of reconciliation with his father when the manuscript ends.

Perhaps because of its literate style, as well as the similarities of its plot, _Misogonus_ seems to invite comparison with _Acolastus_. It shares some of the earlier play's sophistication, including the Greek type-names of the central figures, and it follows the same pattern of sin, repentance, despair and forgiveness. Here, however, the resemblance ends. Though _Misogonus_ has all the machinery for allegory, the play itself offers no support for an allegorical interpretation. _Philogonus_ is not God but a thoroughly earthly father, helplessly wretched in a situation to which he can see no solution. _Cacurgus_ resembles a Vice-figure (Spivack, pp. 328-30; F.P.Wilson, p.99), but _Misogonus_ requires no persuasion to sin, and _Cacurgus_ acts as an organiser of his revels rather than as a tempter.
When Pelargus complains that he has lavished good things on Acolastus it is clear that this is an allegory of God giving the benefits of this life to ungrateful man; Misogonus is simply a spoilt child, and his father's indulgence is a cause for self-reproach.

The play, then, makes little of the allegorical meaning of the parable on which it is based, but it develops instead the theme of providence. Philogonus turns to God for help in an apparently hopeless situation and Codrus promptly appears on the stage to begin the account of the birth of Eugonus. When the story has been told Philogonus is willing to believe it on the grounds that God never fails those who put their trust in him (III, i, 229-32). The providential return of Eugonus frustrates his brother's evil plans, and the dominant theme of the play is the futility of human scheming when the future is in the hands of an inscrutable but benevolent God.

But while the moral point is made, it seems that the main energies of the dramatist are devoted to the development of various kinds of realism. A good many of the tavern scenes and episodes of rustic comedy are wholly extraneous to the moral theme, but they are in themselves "the most vivid of their kind before the great age of the drama sets in" (Spivack, p. 328). A breakdown of the play shows that the longest scene of 296 lines (II, iv), which concerns a game of dice, advances the plot not at all and the moral very little. Most of the third act, which reveals the existence of Eugonus, is devoted to low-life comedy. In the first scene Codrus and Alison tell their story with much malapropism, repetition, a quarrel and a reconciliation (280 lines). Cacurgus then tells Misogonus of this discovery (72 lines), and in the third scene Isbell Busbey prepares to go to Philogonus to support Alison's story. Madge Carow would go too but she stammers, and anyway she has toothache. Isbell therefore borrows her red cap and belt for the occasion, but at the last moment Cacurgus appears pretending to be a magician and frightens her out of going (160 lines)
All this is extremely entertaining and most of it has no bearing at all on the moral theme. Equally, it is completely remote from the morality tradition. Its success depends on the observation of external behaviour and mannerisms, not on the analysis of psychological processes, and the play as a whole is much more concerned with how people actually behave than with the inner impulses that prompt them to behave as they do. *Misogonus* exemplifies the tendency away from the drama of inward processes and towards the presentation of the way in which social types, profligates, over-indulgent fathers and rustics, actually conduct themselves. It is part of the movement away from otherworldly concerns to the investigation of the ways in which particular kinds of people behave in the world.

The three "wit" plays, dealing with the process of education, demonstrate in a rather different way how an increasing concern with the nature of the world is expressed in increasingly literal drama. These three plays are closely related to each other and provide a rare example of a clear chronological development away from allegory. The ethic propounded becomes increasingly this-worldly and increasingly prudent, and as it does so the form becomes progressively more literal.

The group consists of John Redford's *Wit and Science*, written between 1531 and 1547, the anonymous *Marriage of Wit and Science*, printed about 1569, and *The Contract of a Marriage between Wit and Wisdom*. The last is probably by Francis Merbury and the manuscript is dated 1579 (Lennam, p.x). Redford's play, written while he was master of the choir-school of St. Paul's (F.P. Wilson, p.43), deals primarily with the inner struggles involved in the process of education, and it is entirely allegorical. *The Marriage of Wit and Science* preserves much of the framework of Redford's original, but its values are more prudent and its form creates greater interest in the events of the story than in their allegorical significance. *Wit and Wisdom* emphasises the social and practical value of education, and here the form is only intermittently allegorical.
In Redford's play Wit, son of Nature, wishes to marry Science, the daughter of Reason and Experience. Science's parents favour the match on condition that Wit overcomes the giant, Tediousness. Wit eagerly attacks this enemy, with the help of Study and Diligence, but is defeated because he has not yet spent sufficient time in submission to Instruction. He is revived by Honest Recreation, but readily succumbs to the whore, Idleness, who blackens his face and dresses him in the fool's cap and coat of Ignorance. Science fails to recognise him, and Wit is restored to himself only by the chastisement of Shame. He then climbs Mount Parnassus and, counselled by Instruction, Study and Diligence, he defeats Tediousness and wins Science.

The play is a subtle account of the difficulties encountered in the acquisition of learning, and its dominant values are to a large extent otherworldly. Unfortunately the beginning of the play, which might have included statements about the worth and purpose of education, is lost, but it is possible to extract from what remains some account of the attitudes involved. The play as it stands contains no suggestion of the idea which is central to The Nature of the Four Elements (c.1517-c.1518) and Heywood's Witty and Witless (c.1520-33) that learning leads directly to God through an ascent from the knowledge of the creation to an understanding of the Creator. Science is not called Wisdom, and she appears to stand for knowledge acquired by natural reason through human effort. But although science has no transcendental connotations there is a clear association between learning and virtue. Experience warns Wit that it is his duty to use Science, God's gift, for the honour of God and the benefit of himself and his neighbour, "whych goth/ in her of kynd to do good to all" (11.1077-81). Redford was acquainted with the theories of Sir Thomas More and his circle (Hogrefe, p.33) and it is clear that the play expresses the Humanist belief in learning as the source of virtue manifested in service to the community (see Bush, p.78; Charlton, p.66;
The central figure of *Wit and Science* is evidently a youthful version of Gaius Flaminius, virtuous scholar and soldier, the humanist hero of Medwall's *Fulgens and Lucret*. Despite this outgoing ethic, the tradition of contempt of the world retains a strong influence even in this relatively secular play. Learning has its own asceticism: the harlot, Idleness, who offers the temptations of the flesh, is one of the major sources of distraction and a direct rival to Science. Further, Science rejects the services of Fame, Favour, Riches and Worship, emissaries of the World (641-81).

The play is ambiguous on this last point, however, and it is not clear whether she rejects them only on her own behalf or on Wit's as well. Fame, Favour, Riches and Worship offer themselves to Science at the stage of Wit's submission to Idleness. Science dismisses them, explaining that she has no need of their services, "beyng as I am alone wooman" (668). She praises God that the world shows such love to Science (664-5), but she has little cause at the moment to care for the World's favours, "seeyng the wytts of [the] worlde be so waveryng" (681). Later, when Wit realises his folly, it is one of his chief regrets that instead of the services of these four gallants, he is likely to have won "hatred beggry & open shame" (856-63).

Perhaps, then, we are to suppose that worldly success is useless to learning itself, but belongs to the man who attains her. This rather pedantic distinction, however, seems a curious reason for introducing a whole episode of this kind. I am inclined to conclude that we are to understand that while the values learning inculcates are in themselves other-worldly, the educated man can be sure of remunerative employment and hence success. This would probably have been the case in practice. Latin, the main subject of grammar school education, was a necessary basis for careers in law, medicine and theology, and it was also valuable in
diplomacy (Watson, p.6) and in international commercial correspondence (L.B.Wright, 1930 (i), p.275). Elsewhere in the play Redford shows that he is not oblivious of the practical value of learning. Reason explains that he is content to bestow his daughter thus basely: Wit's devotion is what is important; Science has enough for them both to live on (13-30).

Thus it appears that the central assumption of the play is that education leads to virtue and incidentally to an income and social respect. Without it a man may be reduced to beggary and contempt. Redford's synthesis of the ascetic and the practical offers a standard by which the values expressed in the subsequent Wit plays may be measured. In general terms the ascetic element decreases as social and prudential considerations are increasingly stressed.

The Marriage of Wit and Science follows fairly closely the central plot of Redford's play, with the addition of introductory exchanges between Wit and his mother (here Nature), and the inclusion of Wit's servant, Will, who shows some reluctance for the marriage to take place, but whose assistance is finally necessary for the defeat of Tediousness. The play also retains some of Redford's Humanist values. According to Will, Wit's love is based on his good will and Science's virtue (11.450-51). Reason urges Science to marry for the benefit of the community: "How shall the common wealth by you advanced be/ If you abide enclosed here where no man may you see" (400-401).

But there is considerably more stress on the practical then on the moral value of learning. When Nature explains that she can give the love of knowledge but not knowledge itself, Wit is resentful that God has not given him "connyng", which is "the key and well of worldly blisse" (119, my italics). Nature replies that praise or blame would not then be a matter of merit and education would lose its worth: "Vertue should lose her price, and learning would abound" (136). Her identification of
learning with virtue seems to be largely a matter of lip service and the concept of "price" is apparently to be taken literally. Nature goes on to explain her meaning: great and rich men would no longer need the services of the learned so that those born poor would have no means of improving their position (138-43).

The ambiguous imagery which tends to be applied to learning reaches its peak in Wit's address to Science:

O pearle of passing pryse, send downe from god on hye,
The sweetest beauty to entise that hath bene sene with eye.
The wel of wealth to all, that no man doth annoye:
The kaye of Kingedomes & the steale of everlasting joye.
The treasure and the store, whom all things good began,
The nurse of Lady Wysedom's lore, the lincke of man & man.

(799-804).
The last line is conventional, but the rest of the speech, and indeed the play as a whole make it impossible to decide for certain whether the wealth, the kingdoms and the treasure are figurative or real. The play concludes, however, with a great deal of rejoicing and much emphasis on the fact that Wit has secured worldly recognition. Science tells him, "The world shall know doubt not, and shall blow out your fame" (1536). The general impression is that the moral associations of education are predominantly rhetorical and traditional while the playwright's real values are largely prudential.

Protestant theory weakened the Humanist link between education and virtue and led instead to a strong emphasis on education as a preparation for the performance of one's vocation in the world. It was but a small step from this to the recognition of its material advantages as a means to success in the world. The Reformation view is still more clearly reflected in Wit and Wisdom. This popular play makes certain fairly radical alterations to Redford's original school play. In accordance with the Calvinist concept of natural depravity, Wit has no spontaneous
urge to marry Wisdom, but when his father, Severity, instructs him to do so, Wit dutifully agrees. As a result the play contains much less inner conflict. Discipline, Study and Instruction, previously internal forces, are replaced by Good Nurture, an external figure of authority. Part of the action concerns the invariably successful attempts of Idleness (now male) to distract Wit from his purpose, and Wit has repeatedly to be rescued by Good Nurture from his own folly. In addition, however, the play contains a great deal of low comic material, apparently introduced for its own sake (Spivack, pp.332-3; Bevington, 1962, pp.23-5; Habicht, p.87; Lennam, 1968). This concerns Idleness picking Wit's pocket and stealing a porridge pot, disguised as a quack doctor, a ratcatcher and then a priest, outwitted by Snatch and Catch who are cleverer criminals, and finally rejected when Wit marries Wisdom. These episodes are clearly introduced at least in part for their entertainment value, but I cannot agree that they are entirely "innocent of any moral aim" (Spivack, p.332). There is a sense in which Idleness is not an allegorical Vice-figure but an idle man, and here he is an exemplum and his behaviour is a warning. His exploits display the lengths a man must go to to gain a living without education. He has to have recourse to a great deal of ingenuity and in the end he loses nonetheless. Though he claims to have "a mother wit" (1.297) and is convinced that he can "find shifts whereby to get mony" (532), he is a ready victim for Snatch and Catch with their superior cunning, and finally he becomes an outcast.

Thus, despite incidental references to the connections between wisdom and virtue (15-16, 41-4), the central moral of the play is almost entirely prudential. Wisdom is "rich" (72), while the failure of Idleness provides sufficient warning of the fate of those who reject education. The play sets out to teach that idleness in youth leads to enforced idleness and so to crime in adult life. In spite of its debt to Redford's plot, Wit and Wisdom has in reality closer affinities with the prudential and...
exemplary Prodigal Son plays of this later period (see above, pp.146-50).

The thematic changes within this group of "wit" plays are accompanied by a gradual slackening of the allegorical form. **Wit and Science**, which analyses the psychological impediments to learning, is a perfect allegorical account of the inner experience of a single typical man. In this respect it has much in common with the medieval moralities. Redford's theme, too, has clear affinities with the otherworldly themes of the earlier plays. Education is, of course, an essentially secular matter, but as I have suggested, **Wit and Science** lays some stress on learning's own asceticism. Further, it is clear that the relationship between man and learning in Redford's play is analogous to the relationship between the soul and God as it is presented in the medieval moralities. Both are described in metaphors of pilgrimage, conflict and conquest. Nor is it simply that Redford is forcing new material into the old forms. The formal analogy reflects a thematic one. Learning, like salvation in the medieval plays, demands the conquest of lower impulses towards transitory objects in the pursuit of lasting values. Wit, like Mankind, must resist distraction from the narrow path by fleeting pleasures if he is finally to attain his goal. Thus Redford, like his predecessors, represents an ethical conflict in terms of confrontations between personified inner impulses and characteristics.

In **The Marriage of Wit and Science** both asceticism and allegory have a looser hold. Many of the scenes contain much talk and little action, (Hogrefe, p.325), and psychological analysis recedes behind a good deal of Petrarchan rhetoric (F.P.Wilson, pp.73-4). The romantic story assumes a more independent interest than in Redford's play (Habicht, pp.82-5) and, as Spivick points out, the rhapsodic final union of apparently very earthly lovers produces an impression which is far removed from the otherworldliness of the earlier moralities (p.222). This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult to discover the play's dominant values. It is as if the
meaning has disappeared behind the plot. What was a metaphor for Redford has become the primary level of interest here. The literal events of the play have become relatively independent of any abstract significance. Like the play's concessions to asceticism, the concept of a pattern of literal relationships which reflects an abstract pattern seems merely conventional. The concrete medium has become the message.

*Wit and Wisdom* displays still more clearly the connection between declining asceticism and diminishing allegory. The play seems to work on two separate levels. At the first of these it is an imitation of Redford's original, an account of the conflict between the hero's desire for learning and those impulses which distract him from it. At this level the play is allegorical. But a good deal of the action is devoted to the exploits of Idleness, and demonstrates the social problems encountered by the uneducated. These episodes have ceased to be allegorical: instead Idleness is a social type and we see him in relation to other social types, rogues, honest citizens, the constable. At this level of his existence Idleness is not an inner impulse but a separate individual, an idle man. What is new here is that for much of the time Idleness is considered in isolation from Wit, with his own separate network of relationships. And these relationships are with further literal figures, not personifications—Search, Doll and Lob, Mother Bee and so on. These episodes show the dangerous consequences in this world of laziness at school. The point is a social one and it is made through the presentation of social types. The personification of abstractions has become irrelevant.

The two levels, literal and allegorical, do not coexist very satisfactorily in this play. In terms of plot the literal episodes have no relationship to the allegorical ones: Mother Bee, Search, Snatch and catch have no connection with the Wit story. The consequence is that the play has two central characters, Wit and Idleness, and though these appear from time to time as internal attributes of one man, even Wit tends to be
presented inadvertently not as a faculty but an independent individual. The boredom and desire for recreation which one would expect to be personified are sometimes expressed in monologue (e.g. 1.259-77), and at one point Wit so far forgets what he is that he talks of "the thing the which/ My witt cannot attaine" (718-9). His father and mother, Severity and Indulgence, are types rather than attributes of the hero, representing real parents who must preserve a balance between kindness and discipline in order to ensure the success of their son (Mackenzie, 1914 (i), p.177).

As a result, the main impression is of a play which deals with the contrasting fortunes of two contrasted central figures. Idleness is hard put to it to make a living: Wit's struggles culminate in success. At this level they are individuals in a social situation not abstractions in a psychological one. Success and failure occur in this world rather than the next. Asceticism has almost entirely disappeared, and with it much of the allegory.

*Wit and Wisdom* is an interesting example of the attempt to force what is partly new material into an old form. As a result, the stage is occupied by a mixture of literal and allegorical characters, and some hybrids. This situation is not uncommon at this period. Wager's two plays, *Enough is as Good as a Feast* and *The Longer Thou Livelst* are predominantly concerned with the inner states of their heroes, but literal figures are introduced to show the social consequences of their ethical choices. Conversely, *Nice Wanton*, as I have suggested, (above, pp.146-8), is to a large extent social and literal, but the psychological process of temptation is carried out by Iniquity, an abstraction, and a further abstraction, Worldly Shame, attempts to reduce Xantippce to despair. *Nice Wanton* is fairly characteristic of the post-Reformation moralities. Frequently the dominant theme is social and the mode therefore literal,
but where inner conflict survives as one of the dramatist's concerns it is expressed through allegory.

This is the case in Lindsay's Satire of the Three Estates. The play dramatises the temptation, corruption and repentance of the King, and the consequent social decline and recovery of Scotland. The opening episodes show how Rex Humanitas, whose attendants are Wantoness, Placebo and Solace, gives way to Sensuality. When the King is thus weakened by submission to sin, Flattery, Deceit and Falsehood become his counsellors. The rejection of Verity, who is put in the stocks, and Chastity, who is refused hospitality by the estates, then shows the spiritual condition of Scotland as a whole. (This, of course, may be described as a social theme, but the episode concerns the states of mind of a series of individuals, not their relationship with one another). Divine Correction and Good Counsel rescue Verity and Chastity and dismiss Sensuality. Rex Humanitas then receives Good Counsel, Verity and Chastity, and embraces Correction.

So far the play deals mainly with the internal conflicts of the King and, to some extent, of the estates, and the form is allegorical. In the second part of the play a series of literal and type figures complain of the injustices practised by Spirituality (a representative type), and finally, when Temporality unites with John the Common Weal, the false courtiers are banished and Scotland reformed. The technique employed depends on Lindsay's theme. To display the kinds of clashes which occur between the estates he employs representatives of each. The satire of the Church is presented quite literally when, for instance, with an effrontery worthy of Chaucer's, a Pardoner displays his relics (the snout of St. Anthony's sow, and so on), after explaining that since the translation of the New Testament pardoners have lost all credit with the laity. There is no allegory here because there is no interest in the Pardoner's inner state of mind. What is satirised is his behaviour. Nor are we shown the motives of John the Common Weal. His role is to point out the
corruptions of society, the Pardoner's to provide an instance which substantiates his accusations. Both figures are social types.

Lindsay's concerns are predominantly social. His play isolates the allegorical episodes from the literal ones and there is no difficulty in the shift from one mode to another. Thomas Lupton's All for Money (1559-77), on the other hand, is much more complicated and confusing. In this play the title links a series of separate treatments of contemporary avarice. Lupton's concerns are also largely social. In the first episode Theology, Art and Science lament the fact that men now pursue them only for gain. This is followed by an allegory of the dangers to the soul which the possession of riches may involve: Money gives birth to Pleasure, Pleasure to Sin and Sin to Damnation. There then follows a debate about the proper relationship between money and learning. In the fourth episode All-for-Money, a magistrate, accepts bribes to acquit a series of criminals, and finally Judas and Dives lament their sins and the torments of damnation.

Challenged by Willard Farnham's comment on the play's "rambling diffuseness", T.W. Craik (1954) has given an account of its ingenious structure. He takes the allegorical episode to be central and the others to expand its separate stages, money, pleasure, sin and damnation. Thus in his view the first episode deals with the evils of money; the debate concerns the relationship between money and happiness; the corruption of the magistrate shows the connection between money and sin; and the final episode presents damnation.

There can be no doubt about the final episode. Judas and Dives offer an awful warning to the audience. But I should prefer to see the rest of the play as a treatment of the theme of avarice on a series of separate planes of experience. Thus, the first episode shows how avarice threatens intellectual life, the second how it affects the soul, the third is a debate
on social ethics, the proper use of money by virtuous men, the fourth concerns behaviour in social relationships, the power of money to prevent the punishment of sin by a representative of society, and the fifth shows the punishment of avarice by God in the next world. In other words, the playwright is concerned to inculcate in his audience the proper attitudes to money at a series of levels, intellectual, spiritual, moral and behavioural.

Because they are concerned with different planes of activity the episodes very widely in technique. The first, in which Theology, Art and Science are personified, is a kind of rudimentary allegory. But since the separate personifications simply take it in turns to complain, and there is no interaction between them, Lupton gains nothing by the use of allegory except a variety of speakers. The second episode, which deals with the spiritual dangers of avarice, is properly allegorical. When Pleasure is seen as the child of Money, Sin of Pleasure, and Damnation of Sin, and when the births actually take place on the stage, the audience is shown an analysis of an inner process in a way which makes the point vividly and immediately. The remaining episodes, dealing with social relationships in theory and in practice, present literally a series of social types, until the conclusion which shows, again literally through Biblical types of sinners, the fate of the damned. Intellectually the play makes its point, but dramatically it seems an uneasy mixture of modes, allegorical, literal and contemporary, Biblical.

All for Money is a predominantly social play. Allegory survives to deal with inner experience as in so many plays of the period. The estates moralities, however, appear to be something of an anomaly since here allegory is used to analyse the condition of society, the state or the realm. This is, of course, an easy development from the medieval moralities where, in the same way, personification—allegory is used to analyse the separate forces within an individual. What is perhaps surprising is that the estates moralities so frequently continue the tradition of psychological
analysis. The hero is no longer Mankind but England or, more often, the English, represented by a series of social types, members of the various estates of the realm, a soldier, a courtier and a country gentleman in *The Cobbler's Prophecy*, or a merchant, an artificer and a lawyer in *Three Ladies of London*. It is worth noting how frequently in these plays there are vestiges of the psychomachia, in which the Vice works on a representative of the realm, like Respublica, or a series of social types (Dessen). Here too, personification-allegory tends to preserve its traditional association with inner experience.

This is not inevitable. Social abuses can perfectly easily be attacked without the use of allegory, as in Rastell's *Gentleness and Nobility* or *The Pedlar's Prophecy*. Equally, personifications can stand for properties of society which are not simultaneously inner attributes of the individuals who compose the society. Liberty and Peace, for instance, seem to me to be exclusively social abstractions, while Fraud, Usury, Hospitality are exclusively behavioural. And there are plays which contain only social or behavioural abstractions. In *Albion Knight*, for instance, Justice, Injury, Division and Peace cannot be interpreted as inner forces in individuals.

This makes it all the more interesting that allegory is so frequently used for specifically psychological interpretation of socialills in the estates moralities. The fragment which we have of *Temperance and Humility* concerns obedience to the sovereign. The central *dramatis personae* are Temperance and Humility themselves and Disobedience, whose defeat of the virtuous figures in argument is essentially an analysis in the tradition of inner conflict of the ethical choice which leads to rebellion. It is only Disobedience's claim to prevail in court, country and church which makes it clear that the playwright's concern is not with a single mankind-figure but with the state of England. *Liberality and Prodigality* (perhaps a revival of *Prodigality*, 1567?), acted in court in 1601 and
printed in 1602, in which Prodigality murders Tenacity in order to carry away Money, reenacts a crude version of the *psychomachia*. In *Respublica* People's difficulties arise when Respublica submits to Avarice, the Vice of the play, and in *Wealth and Health*, though Wealth, Health and Liberty stand for political and economic conditions, their destruction is accomplished by Shrewd Wit and Ill Will, the driving impulses of certain individuals in the realm. In *The Cobbler's Prophecy* it is Contempt who destroys social unity. The traditional use of allegory to analyse inner impulses and their conflict in the processes of ethical choice is preserved in these plays which are primarily concerned with social themes.

One extraordinarily interesting example of a mixture of abstractions, social types and historical individuals should be mentioned here. Bale's *King John* (1538, revised 1558-62) uses history as Protestant propaganda and introduces abstractions for the purpose of analysing the forces at work in the contest between King John and the Pope. England complains to the King that she is widowed and improverished by the corrupt Clergy. As a result, John opposes Rome and becomes the first Protestant martyr. After his death Imperial Majesty (Henry VIII) suppresses Sedition and imposes the Reformation.

Three main kinds of characters occupy the stage. The first are literal historical figures, John himself, Stephen Langton, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Cardinal Pandulphus, the Paper emissary, and two monks, Simon of Swinsett, who poisons the King, and Raymundus. The second kind are representative historical types, Widow England and the Estates, Commonalty, Nobility, Clergy and Civil Order (law). Thirdly, a series of allegorical figures are introduced as a means of analysing the political situation. These are Sedition, Dissimulation, Private Wealth and Usurped Power. With Sedition at their head as the culmination of their combined forces (Spivack, p.144), these seduce the Estates, oppose the King and finally bring about his death.
The allegorical figures enable Bale to make his point in conceptual terms, while the literal ones enact the specific historical events he is dramatising. Bale cleverly weaves these two strands together by fusing the central literal and allegorical roles. Sedition becomes the seditious Stephen Langton, Usurped Power the Pope, Private Wealth the Cardinal, and Dissimulation Simon of Swinsett who deceives the King into drinking poison. In an allegory concerned with the processes of temptation these would have been the separate figures: Sedition would win over the Archbishop, Usurped Power would persuade the Pope to action, and so on. But in Bale's play this would merely multiply the number of characters to no real purpose. Bale is concerned not with psychology but with a political situation, and his method enables him to identify at an analytical level the conflicting forces in the realm which lead to the specific historical events of the play. The problems of King John's reign are thus seen as simultaneously historical and timeless. Stephen Langton is dead but Sedition remains a perpetual threat. All these characters appear first in their allegorical roles and subsequently as specific historical figures. Thus it is clear that their primary significance is the timeless one. "It is evident that Bale thinks of the evil characters as being first and foremost perennial representatives of evil; their occasional appearance as historical characters in a specific situation is used by way of exemplum to lend credence to their existence on a 'higher' plane" (Blatt, p.112). Through his use of allegory Bale is able to do more than show the parallels between the historical situation and the contemporary one. He makes it clear that the same perennial evil forces must be contained by Henry VIII.

Bale's mixture of literal and allegorical figures leads in this isolated instance to clarity, not confusion. His example, however, was not imitated, and not all the partial moralities are as successful, as King John. The mixture of literal and abstract figures leads frequently to a certain awkwardness, and in Wit and Wisdom and All for Money it is
simply bewildering. The dramatists themselves sometimes seem uncertain in their handling of the relationship between the inner and the outer worlds. As Humanism and the Reformation attached increasing importance to the outer world the traditional morality pattern of the allegorical analysis of inner conflict could not always be adapted successfully to incorporate the new concerns.

The decline began early. In Rastell's *The Nature of the Four Elements* there is a moment when Humanity withdraws to the tavern with Sensual Appetite while Experience continues to instruct Studious Desire. Since the latter is an attribute of the central figure the situation is an impossible one. But it is clear how it arises. Rastell is using personification-allegory to show the conflict between Humanity's studious desire and his sensual appetite, and this is certainly part of the theme of the play. But the author's real interest is clearly in the information which Experience has to offer not just to his pupil but to the audience. Rastell is excited by the cosmology and Geography which he has to describe, by the nature of the world, in fact, and he momentarily forgets the inner conflict which provides the structure of the play.

The author of *The Trial of Treasure* lapses into inconsistency over the relationship between his two central figures, Lust and Just (Mackenzie, 1914(1) pp.121-26). Early in the play they fight and Just explains, "The just against lust must always contend" (p.265). He emerges victorious, of course. At this point it would appear that Lust is an abstraction and that Just has vanquished this impulse in himself. Later, however Lust becomes an independent sinner with his own set of vices and temptations, representing the reprobate exactly as Just represents the elect. As in *Wit and Wisdom*, the traditional pattern of inner conflict between abstractions gives way during the course of the play to contrast between moral types.

Wapull has a similar problem of consistency in *The Tide Tarrieth No Man*. Here there is some uncertainty about whether Greediness is a
type or an abstraction. Essentially the play has the pattern of an estates morality in which Courage leads astray a series of social types, including Greediness, a landlord and moneylender. For most of the play it is clear that Greediness is a representative type-figure, but after he has killed himself in despair the Vice suddenly turns him momentarily into an abstraction: "Why foole, Greedinesse will never dye, / So long as covetous people do live ..." (sig.G 3). Courage's victims are so consistently social types, moving in a real world of loans, tenants and evictions, or alternatively marriages, debts and poverty (contrast the abstractions of Perseverance) that it seems quite clear that Wapull's true concern is with the behaviour of people in the world around him (and with their motivation, of course, shown through the machinations of Courage). The momentary doubt about the standing of Greediness shows only that the habit of personification of inner qualities dies hard.

But it does die eventually. There are other plays where it is still clearer that the form of allegory survives without the substance. In Ulpian Fulwell's Like Will to Like (1562-8) Nichol Newfangle is called the Vice of the play on the title page (p.305) and in the stage direction concerning his first entrance (p.309), and he receives instruction from his godfather, the devil. But the play contains no psychomachia and Nichol Newfangle has no role as a tempter. He apparently stands for pride in fine and fashionable dress (310, 312), a weakness which has nothing to do with the various kinds of crimes committed by the reprobates whose friendships with each other he cements, and his main function in the play seems to be to provide a great deal of buffoonery, addressing comic remarks to Lucifer and to individual members of the audience as well as to the assorted villains whose depravity and punishment are the theme of the play.

Honesty in A Knack to Know a Knave has an allegorical name. In practice, however, he is not an attribute (whose?) but an honest man commissioned by the king to seek out and expose the corruptions in the
realm. He is a kind of ombudsman who could have been given a literal name but whose abstract name indicates his character and function as do the names in *The Revenger's Tragedy* or Jonson's comedies.

These plays retain the traditional allegorical nomenclature but have ceased to be allegorical in any real sense. In other plays personification survives but becomes weighed down by its own complexity or ingenuity. In Wilson's *Three Lords and Three Ladies of London*, for instance, it seems improbable that the audience could have grasped the distinctions between Policy, Pomp and Pleasure, with their three pages, Wit, Wealth and Will, especially in relation to the three Spanish lords, Pride, Ambition and Tyranny, with their pages, Shame, Treachery and Terror. The three ladies, Love, Lucre and Conscience are discovered sitting on the three stones, Charity, Care and Remorse, which are finally presented to the three Lords of Lincoln, Delight, Desire and Devotion. It cannot be necessary to recount more of the plot in order to make it clear that the play must have been sustained almost exclusively by its pageantry and made its point by its generally nationalistic atmosphere. In this case allegory has ceased to be a vital form of analysis and has become merely an opportunity for alliterative ingenuity.

One late survival of the estatestradition is the anonymous *Nobody and Somebody* (c.1592?, revised 1603-6), the subplot of which plays cleverly on the contradiction inherent in the personification of Nobody. Thus Nobody does good while the envious Somebody tries to prevent him. Nobody is blamed for the crimes that are committed, is claimed as their master by vagabonds, is all spirit, and so on. Finally Somebody accuses him before the king of oppression and extortion, but Nobody neatly turns the tables by demonstrating that Somebody must be responsible. All this is delightful and a part of that preoccupation with the possibilities of linguistic ingenuity which characterises this period, but the play neglects the central possibility of allegory, the analysis of a situation through the presentation of interacting abstractions.
Allegory as a mode of analysis flourished in the medieval plays because the exploration of the interaction and conflict of ethical forces was the central concern of the otherworldly dramatists. In the post-Reformation plays allegory survived where such analysis was among the dramatist's concerns. Where social relationships between types or individuals became the dominant theme, personifications at first existed alongside literal figures but were finally ousted by them. Their incompatibility issued eventually in the irretrievable breakdown of the morality form, but not before its tradition of analysing inner conflict had influenced the development of tragedy.
Part III

THE EMERGENCE OF A TRAGIC PATTERN
Tragedy consists not only in the events of the plot but in the tragic hero's experience of these events. In certain of the great Elizabethan tragedies, notably Faustus, Julius Caesar, Hamlet and Macbeth, an important part of this experience is the inner conflict which precedes or accompanies the hero's actions. Brutus hesitates to kill Caesar, Macbeth is torn between duty and ambition. Faustus is tormented by doubt, and at the centre of Hamlet's dilemma is his need to determine whether it is nobler to suffer or to take arms, to remain passive or to act. It is my belief that these plays and others reveal the influence of the morality tradition in their analysis of the inner conflict of their heroes.

The morality heritage of Elizabethan tragedy has long been recognised, of course, but this specific influence has not been examined in detail. Early studies tended to stress the gradual emergence of the theme of retribution for sin, the rudiments of "realistic" characterisation and the accurate observation of everyday life (Farnham, pp.213-70; Adams, pp.54-74). Allegory was seen primarily as a hindrance to the mimetic presentation of life and character (Farnham, p.212). More recently J.M.R. Margeson has argued that the tragic potential in the morality tradition lies in the pattern of the action. The hero rebels against the will of God and earns retribution, remorse and despair in consequence (Margeson, pp.29-59). Margeson too is much concerned with the evolution of "concreteness" in the sixteenth century moralities (pp.41, 47).

The limitation of such a view is that it deals only with the external events of what is essentially an internal drama. It confines itself to the "plot" of the play, as if the morality were an inferior kind of
exemplum, and ignores the allegorical analysis of inner experience which is the centre of the genre. As a result, *Nice Wanton* is highly valued for its literal qualities (Adams, pp.69-71; Margeson, pp.40-41), though in fact this play has little of the subtlety of *The Castle of Perseverance*, *Everyman* or even *Enough is as Good as a Feast*.

A further consequence of this tendency to ignore the role of allegory is the suggestion that the miracle plays which deal with temptation and fall are the real progenitors of Elizabethan tragedy (Margeson, pp.6 ff.; Roston, pp.127-8; Wickham, 1969, pp.45-6). It is certainly true that Adam, Cain and Judas have tragic potential, but it is surely the morality plays which, using allegory to analyse the mental and spiritual processes of temptation and remorse, prepare the way for the struggles and sufferings of Faustus, Hamlet and Macbeth. It is true that Adam is the ancestor of many of these later tragic heroes, but it is not specifically Adam as he is presented in the miracle plays. It is rather Adam as the archetype in the Christian tradition of all tempted, sinful and suffering men. Adam's experience is equally the experience of the hero of *The Castle of Perseverance*, and it is in the morality tradition that the analysis of this experience consistently provides the substance of the play.

So far I have attempted to show that allegory in the morality plays provides the technique for defining and expressing inner experience, specifically inner conflict. It isolates the elements of choice, sometimes very simply, sometimes clumsily, but in several cases with considerable insight. In this chapter and the next I hope to be able to show that in the course of the development of early tragedy allegory is gradually absorbed rather than discarded, so that in later tragedy, while all traces of personification have disappeared, they have done so because in many cases they have been incorporated into the mimetic form and not because their function has been rejected. In this chapter
I shall discuss the early popular "tragedies" which seem to me to provide a bridge, both formal and chronological, between the moralities and fully developed Elizabethan tragedy. I hope to show that while their analysis of inner conflict looks back to the morality tradition, in the sense that it often employs the conventional personified abstractions in what is otherwise literal drama, it also looks forward to tragedy proper as the deliberative soliloquy begins to emerge. It seems to me that there is a direct line of descent from the psychomachia of the morality tradition to the deliberative soliloquies of Shakespeare's tragic heroes.

I do not mean to argue, of course, that inner conflict is the informing principle of Elizabethan tragedy as it is of the morality plays. The interest in social and interpersonal relationships is of central importance in the later drama. Hamlet, for instance is clearly more than a study of hesitation and doubt, and the hero's deliberative soliloquies are not the play. In Julius Caesar social and political themes are very important, and the social implications of Macbeth's deed are stressed as well as the personal ones. Nonetheless, in certain plays the deliberative soliloquy is more than an occasional technical device and merits attention in isolation. In this and the following chapter I confine my attention to the relationship between the psychomachia and the deliberative soliloquy without attempting to confront the more complex problems of Elizabethan tragedy as a whole.

In arguing my case it is necessary to consider other possible influences on the dramatic soliloquy. At the end of this chapter, therefore, I shall discuss very briefly the relevance of the expression of inner conflict in the works of Seneca, Ovid and Petrarch.

The plays which I have called early popular "tragedies" are neither strict morality plays nor fully-fledged tragedies. They differ from the moralities in that the central dramatis personae are not abstractions but literal figures, although the plays do include personifications.
To distinguish them formally from tragedy proper is more difficult. They do not invariably have unhappy endings but, more important, they lack what I can only describe as the "grandeur" of tragedy. Their heroes are not larger than life, autonomous in Northrop Frye's sense (see below, chapter 8), and their language is often crude and clumsy, an inadequate means of conveying what we recognise as the tragic experience. But they provide a transition between morality and tragedy in that they dramatise a specific narrative. The moralities, of course, tell a story, but it is the story of mankind's inner life. Even when they deal with a particular type of hero, like Worldly Man, or with a specific period of his life, like Lusty Juventua, their narrative is conceived in the most general terms, with little or no reference to time and place. The early "tragedies", however, set out to tell a specific story, and often one which is well known, like that of Orestes or Griselda. The central figure is a particular individual, and there is a specific situation located in the phenomenal world of time and place. As a result these plays are predominantly literal. The fact that they use allegory at all is therefore of some interest.

Of course, this could be simply a matter of habit. I have discussed earlier cases where the form of allegory survives without the substance (above, pp. 77-9). This is not, I think, true of the early "tragedies", but before examining these I should like to give an account of two plays which, though they share some of the characteristics of the "tragedies", seem to me to follow blind alleys because they fail in different ways to integrate the allegorical elements with the literal narrative. King Darius, printed in 1565, and Thomas Garter's The Most Virtuous and Godly Susanna (1563-6), printed in 1578, are both dramatisations of Biblical stories.
King Darius confronts the problem of dealing with two separate planes of reality, the literal and the allegorical, by keeping them entirely distinct. The function of the allegory is to supply a psychological analysis of the hero, a classification of the characteristics of Darius (Bevington, 1962, p.176), but the text on the whole leaves the audience to discover this for itself. In the first episode Charity disputes with Iniquity (the Vice), Partiality and Importunity. This is followed by a literal (if rather hurried) feast in which the king displays charity. Next Equity disputes with Iniquity, Partiality and Importunity, and finally drives them out with the aid of Constancy and Charity. In the final episode Darius judges the speeches of two flatterers and Zorobabel. He chooses to award the prize to Zorobabel, despite his refusal to flatter, thus showing equity and impartiality in the face of importunity. As his reward, Zorobabel demands that Darius should rebuild Jerusalem. This time the text makes it clear that Zorobabel has displayed constancy (11.1556-7, 1568).

As an intellectual exercise the allegorical interpolation is ingenious. The Biblical version gives no hint of the abstractions (I Esdras, 3 and 4). But because the play fails to make it clear that the abstractions are disputing over an individual there is a certain lack of tension in the action. The dilemma of Humanum Genus, torn between his Good and Bad Angels, is very real, and we know that his salvation is in balance. The ethical choices of King Darius are dramatized on two different levels, in separate episodes, and there is a resulting absence of suspense.

Nonetheless, in one sense the play is using allegory in the conventional way, to isolate the impulses which conflict in the process of choice. At the same time, however, it includes a number of minor characters who have abstract names but who cannot be said to have an abstract significance (Spivack, p.261). The King's servants are called
Agreeable and Preparatus, and his counsellors are Perplexity and Curiosity. The names perhaps identify their characters, though the text gives no evidence for this, but they are certainly not true abstractions in the traditional morality manner.

Carter's Susanna also preserves some of the forms of allegory, but it is in fact much closer than King Darius to pure exemplum. The plot follows the Apocryphal History of Susanna fairly closely, with certain additions which emphasize the exemplary character of the narrative. Susanna and Joachim provide a model of domestic bliss (Spivack, p.224). Further, Susanna charitably cares for the poor and needy (11.811-12), while Joachim, in accordance with the Reformation vocational ethic, worries about the difficulties of being a just ruler (287 ff).

The corrupt judges, Voluptas and Sensualitas, are in no real sense abstractions. They, with the Vice, Ill Report, provide the vestiges of allegory. Ill Report is instructed to win Susanna for the Devil, but he has no role as a tempter. Susanna has no weaknesses, and the judges devise their plot without any assistance from the Vice. Ill Report's role is largely that of a buffoon, and in addition, as his name would suggest, he takes every opportunity of spreading scandal about Susanna (565 ff., 923 ff.) As in the case of Darius's servants, the abstract names are used to identify social types. They have no connection with inner conflict.

The secular "tragedies" provide a more direct link between the morality tradition and later tragedy. Cambises (c.1558-69), Patient Grissell (1558-61, pr.1566?), Appius and Virginia (1559-67, pr.1575) and Horestes (pr.1567) are predominantly literal, but retain certain abstract figures, including the Vice, in their traditional morality role of internal attributes. But here the uneasiness about the relationship between the two separate planes of experience leads to a tendency to
internalize some inner characteristics or impulses while personifying others, and the result is the beginning of deliberative soliloquy. In these plays we see the rudiments of a new technique for conveying the experience of the mind in conflict with itself, and this technique clearly evolves, in part at least, from the *psychomachia*.

Lest the development should appear more clear-cut than it really is, it should be acknowledged that in *Cambises* the technique is very rudimentary indeed, while the uneasiness about the relationship between abstractions and literal figures is considerable. Thomas Preston's *Cambises, King of Persia* derives its plot from *The Second Book of The Garden of Wisdom* by Richard Taverner, printed in 1539 (Farnham, pp. 263-7).

The source material is pure exemplum and Preston follows it very closely. Cambises does one good deed which is followed by a series of bad ones. When the king goes to war he leaves Siammes in control of the realm, but finding that he has accepted bribes, Cambises has him flayed before his son who is to succeed him. Clearly we are to admire the justice of this deed (Craik, 1952, p. 138), but Cambises fails to live up to the promise of his early performance. When Praxaspes tries to persuade him to abandon his drunkenness, Cambises shoots the counsellor's young son through the heart as a demonstration of his sobriety. Suspecting that his younger brother hates him, he has him executed. He then improperly marries his cousin, but has her killed when she reproaches him for his brother's death. In conclusion Cambises accidentally falls on to his own sword, and dies on the stage.

In dramatizing this material Preston introduces a number of figures who, as in *King Darius* and *Susanna*, have allegorical names but cannot be said to have abstract roles (Spivack, pp. 225, 286; Martin, pp. 169-70; Bevington, 1962, pp. 186-7). Execution, Attendance, Preparation, Cruelty and Murder might well have been given literal names since they are all officers of Cambises. Trial and Proof provide a shorthand method of
indicating that Sisamnes has been justly tried. Commons Cry, Commons Complaint and Small Hability are all representative social types.

There remains, however, the Vice of the play, Ambidexter.

His role is by no means clearly defined. He is anxious to explain his nature to the audience: "I signifie one/ That with both hands finely can play..." (11.150-51; cf. 321, 609, 701, 744), and he seems to stand for deception and double-dealing in general. But during much of the action his role seems to be choral rather than integral. He addresses the audience a good deal, drawing delighted attention to any mischief which is in progress (693-705, 732-53, 1133-58). He comments on the behaviour of Cambises:

He professed vertue - but I think it was fained.

He plaies with both hands, good deeds and ill. (608-9)

These lines make it sound as if Ambidexter is an internal attribute of the king, but we do not see him tempting Cambises, and his behaviour does little to explain in psychological terms the king's sudden shift from virtue to vice. After the first episode it is clear that "the King needs no Vice to spur him on in cruelty and tyranny"(F.P.Wilson, p.144).

And though Ambidexter incites the rustics, Hob and Lob, to utter treasonable statements, and then induces them to quarrel with each other, there is little here but his name to distinguish him from a literal mischief-maker (Spivack, pp.289-91).

But in one exceptional instance Ambidexter does seem to fulfil the traditional role of the Vice as tempter. Sisamnes, newly appointed governor in the king's absence, exults in his power and prestige:

Now may I abrogate the law as I shall thinke it good;

If any-one me now offend, I may demaund his blood. (117-8).

But then he hesitates:

But oftentimes the birds be gone while one for nest doth grope.

Doo well or il, I dare avouch some evil on me wil speake.
No, truly - yet I do not meane the kings precepts to breake; 
To place I meane for to returne my duty to fulfil. (122-5).

Despite this resolution, he begins to accept bribes, but later hesitates again:

Now and then some vantage I atchive; much more yet may I take,
But that I fear unto the king that some complaint will make.

(309-10).

On this occasion Ambidexter appears and hastens to reassure him, and urge him on to greater excesses:

Ye are unwise if ye take not time while ye may;
If ye wil not now, when ye would ye shall have nay.
What is he that of you dare make exclamation,
Of your wrong-dealing to make explication?
Can you not play with both hands? (317-21).

Sisamnes is convinced ("Believe me, your words draw deepe in my mind." 322) and proceeds to give a display of his determination when Small Hability cannot afford to bribe him in order to obtain his rights.

Sisamnes, then, is the real double-dealer of the play, and in this context Ambidexter appears as an internal impulse. But I have quoted at such length in order to show that it is Sisamnes himself who takes the initiative in expressing his state of hesitation, while the Vice merely takes the opportunity which is offered him. Conventionally the debate was conducted entirely by the abstractions, while the mankind-hero merely listened and finally made his choice between them. The Vices made elaborate plans to create the opportunity for temptation, adopting false names and inventing complex arguments. By gradual stages they created a state of doubt in the minds of their victims as a prelude to ensnaring them in sin. In Cambises most of this process has been internalized. Ambidexter is a subordinate figure in the temptation. The dialogue
between good and evil is conducted at least partly by Sisamnes himself ("now may I abrogate the law ... But oftentimes ... No, truly yet I do not meane the kings precepts to breake", 117-25), and though some of the forms of dialogue remain to suggest the ancestry of the technique, Sisamnes is debating with himself in soliloquy. Very similar patterns are to be found in the remaining popular "tragedies".

John Phillip's The Play of Patient Grissell is again an exemplum ("Let Grissills Pacience swaye in you ..." Preface, 1.17), and the play contains much direct homily on the frailty of the flesh and the mercy of Christ (325-33), filial duty (551-64, 597-611) and the discipline of children (782-819), as well as a discussion of the dangers of civil war when princes remain unmarried (117-81), a topic familiar in the early years of Elizabeth's reign (Bevington, 1968, pp.141-50).

Like the other plays I have been discussing, Patient Grissell includes a number of semi-abstractions. Gautier's knights, Fidence, Reason and Sobriety are barely distinguishable from one another, and behave like courtiers rather than qualities. It is they who persuade Gautier to marry, and though it may be that they are to be understood as his inner characteristics, it seems possible that Phillip gave them these virtuous names primarily in order to add weight to their arguments. On the other hand, this episode contains vestiges of the psychomachia in that the Vice, Politic Persuasion, does his best to induce Gautier to resist the virtuous arguments, insisting on the miseries of marriage (164-9, 182-93).

But though there is room for doubt about how far this episode is to be understood allegorically, Indigent Poverty, the friend of Grissell's father, is clearly an abstraction, as are Patience and Constancy who are put to strengthen Grissell in her final trial. Indeed, Grissell herself calls the Biblical passage which provides the origin of the psychomachia ph.6, 13-17);
Pacience is the Buckler wherwith I contend,
And Constancie in combat, stayeth me upright,
These so arme mee, that I can not be vanquisht in fight (1905-7).

Here again it is the Vice who is the most enigmatic and yet the most interesting figure. It appears that his victim is Grissell herself ("as I have begon so will I afflict hir still" 1229, cf. 1482-3) and when he fails to breed resentment among the courtiers on the score of her humble birth, he suggests to Gautier that he should try her patience. But like Susanna, Grissell has no weaknesses and the relationship between them is like the relationship between Job and Satan rather than between a Vice and his victim. There is no sense in which Politic Persuasion is an internal attribute of Grissell.

In fact it appears to me that his role exists as an attempt to provide a psychological explanation of Gautier's inhumanity. This does not become clear until fairly late in the play when Gautier adopts the Vice's suggestion that he should try Grissell's patience (992-1001). Politic Persuasion disappears from the play once the final test has been imposed. Gautier, an otherwise exemplary ruler, is persuaded by the Vice that it would be "politic" to test Grissell's fidelity, meekness and devotion. Though the introduction of the Vice is not a profoundly satisfactory solution to the psychological problems which the story has always presented it is evidence of the dramatist's interest in the state of mind of a man who behaves wickedly. Here, at the very point at which the play is closest to the morality tradition, it is also closest to the kind of tragedy which explores the experience of a tyrant.

The concern with Gautier's state of mind continues, and when he is on the point of sending Grissell home to her father, he is suddenly assailed by doubt:
Oh hart now reave and rend, nowe breake thou cleane in sonder
The heavens and lumiving stars, at this attempt may wonder (sic)
All livinge wights that heare thys fact will me reward with shame
No condinge praise, but ill report, shall thunder forth my Fame
Shall I forgoe my wedded wife, whose wiflye troth is such,
That aye to do hir husband good, hir life thinketh not much,
What though from simple stocke, hir nature be deryvde,
Hir vertues yeld such equall dome, that honors she atchivde,
And shall I then rejeckt, as abjeckt from my sight,
My Lady deare, whose vertues all, my sences much delight,
No no not so, plucke backe thy feete, such actes exile thy thought,
Let no such sinne against thy love in any wyse be wroughte.

(1568-79).

Politic Persuasion rallies at once: "What bodie a me, my Lord plucke up your hart ..." (1580) and convinces him that he must be stern. Gautier determines that he will go on with his plan after all, "Followinge the mosyons of Polliticke Perswasion" (1588).

Here too, then, is an example of the early stages of deliberative soliloquy. Like Sisamnes, Gautier has begun on a course of action but is suddenly assailed by doubts, and he too takes the initiative in expressing them. The Vice's function is to reassure him that his evil course is the right one. It is as if the psychomachia continues but the Good Angel has been internalized.

Neither Gautier nor Sisamnes approaches the stature of a tragic hero, and in both plays the language is too blunt an instrument to project the tragic experience, but structurally these episodes have something in common with Macbeth's hesitation before killing Duncan (I, 7). Macbeth too has envisaged a course of action but is suddenly assailed by doubts. Like Gautier he is momentarily subject to pity and to a sense of the horror which the outside world would feel. Like Sisamnes he is suddenly afraid of the
consequences. And like both he seems to have decided against the deed. The parallel extends even to the entry of Lady Macbeth who, like the Vice, comes in pat to provide the wanted spur. Her persuasions to evil are as cogent and as relentless as those of any Vice. These similarities may suggest a pattern of development from the morality plays to tragedy proper, and I mean to give a more detailed account of this development at a later stage.

R.B.'s *Appius and Virginia* has received more critical attention than *Patient Grissell*, and Spivack has noted that Appius soliloquizes in the manner of Angelo, Macbeth or Richard III (p.271). The play, based on Chaucer's *Physician's Tale*, concerns a judge, Appius, who is overcome by lust for the virtuous Virginia. Rather than allow her to be corrupted, Virginius cuts off his daughter's head. Appius summons his officers, Justice and Reward, but they assist Virginius to arrest him and later he kills himself.

The play contains much passionate rhetoric (ll.499-539, 672-99, 764-70) and Virginia is killed with considerable pathos, but one of the main centres of interest is Appius's state of mind. At his first appearance, alone on the stage, he expresses his passion for Virginia, comparing himself to Apelles, Pygmalion, Salmacis, Iphis, Jove (345-83). The language asserts rather than conveys his love and Virginia's beauty: "Oh perelesse dame, Oh passing piece" (351). The paradox of the ruler suddenly made subject to a greater power seems no more than conventional when Appius exclaims, "I, setled ruler of my realme; inforced am to love" (346), but when he adds, "By beauty of Virginia my wisdome all is trudged" (350), there is a hint of the situation of Sidney's Astrophil, Shakespeare's Antony or Racine's Titus, distracted by love from social and political obligations. The conflict between love and social obligations is intensified by the Reformation. The conclusion to
Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde* offers a choice between temporal passion and the devotion of the soul to God. The social and vocational ethic of the Reformation creates a different kind of dilemma. Appius is aware of the dangers of his position:

> But I, a judge of grounded yeeres, shall reap to me such name
> As shall resounde dishonour great with trump of careless fame.
> Oh that my yeeres were youthfull yet, or that I were unwedded! (381-3)

Nor is the danger purely to his reputation, if his reference to the power of love can be taken ironically:

> Is love so great to cause the quicke to enter into Hell,
> As stout Orpheus did attempt...? (377-8)

The Vice of the play, Haphazard, personifies a spirit of recklessness. Since consequences are unpredictable and strange things happen by chance, man might as well hazard everything in pursuit of his desires (323-44). The moment Appius has given expression to his state of hesitation, Haphazard urges him with a scheme for making Virginia a ward of court. His allegorical nature is confirmed when Appius, eagerly grasping at this prospect of relief, exclaims, "in my judgement see that thou do enter./ Hap life or hap death I surely will venter" (413-4).

So far Appius and Virginia follows the pattern of Cambises and Patient Grissell in its analysis of hesitation before final commitment to a course of action which the character knows, at least momentarily, to be wicked. Appius's resolution falters yet again, however, and this time there can be no doubt of a debt to the psychomadia:

> Here let him make as thogh he went out and let Conscience and Justice come out of him, and let Conscience hold in his hande a lamp burning, and let Justice have a sworde and hold it before Apius brest
But out, I am wounded; how am I devided?
Two states of my life from me are now glided:
For Conscience he pricketh me contempned,
And Justice saith Judgement wold have me condemned;
Conscience saith crueltye sure will detest me,
And Justice saith death in thende will molest me;
And both in one sodden me thinkes they do crie,
That fier eternall my soule shall destroy. (429-36)

Appius is "devided". Conscience and Justice are silent, but in order to express his state of conflict Appius attributes dialogue to them ("Conscience saith ... Justice saith ..."). What they have to tell him finally is the traditional message of the morality plays, that the price of his sinful course is damnation.

At once the Vice exclaims contemptuously, "Why, these are but thoughts, man! Why, fie, for shame, fie!" (437). Thus restored, Appius renews his determination:

Let Conscience grope, and Judgement crave, I wil not shrink one whit.
I wil persever in my thought, I will deflower hir youth,
I will not sure reverted be; my hart shall have no ruth.
Come on, proceede, and wayte on me; I will hap woe or wealth. (451-4).

Conscience and Justice remain behind and complain that they are overruled by will and lust (462-3, 472-3). They are parts of Appius (478,566). Later Conscience "within" tries once more to restrain him, but in vain (560-79).

In Cambises Sisannes is a minor character who appears only in the first episode. His psychological struggles are dramatized briefly. Cambises, who has none, is clearly the central figure. Gautier shares the centre of the play with Grissell, who has no inner conflicts, but Gautier's state of mind is of sufficient interest to the author to justify
the invention and inclusion of Politic Persuasion. In *Appius and Virginia* it is Virginius who elicits most of the sympathy (Virginia's appearances are brief, though poignant), but Appius receives a good deal of attention and may make some claim to be the real central figure of the play, if only because more than 200 lines in a total of 1032 are devoted to the exploration of his tortured state of mind.

In Pickering's *Horestes* the central role is undoubtedly that of the prince himself, his ethical dilemma occupies the major part of the play, and it is more complex than any of those I have already discussed because the distinction between right and wrong is no longer clear. Previously the heroes have known what they ought to do but have allowed themselves to be blinded by the attractions of sin. Horestes, like Hamlet, does not know what he ought to do.

Apart from the parody subplots, quarrels between ruffian soldiers, Halter sick and Hempstring, and yokels, Hodge and Rusticus, the centre of the play concerns the question of whether or not it is right for Horestes (Orestes) to avenge his father by killing his mother. Despite Eleanor Prossir's conviction that Pickering regards revenge unequivocally as a sin (pp.41-4), I feel that the issues are treated as complex and the author's attitude is finally ambivalent.

The debate is not confined to the mind of Horestes. When he consults Idumeus (Idomeneus) about his plans, the king summons Counsel, who urges that murderers ought not to escape punishment lest others should be encouraged to imitate them (11.311-14). Later he repeats this argument for revenge as a deterrent, and adds that it is right for Horestes to avenge his father since a corrupt ruler (Clytemnestra) sets a bad example to the people and must be removed (617-38). This seems to be orthodox Elizabethan theory: a rightful ruler must not be resisted, but a usurper ought to be removed from office by the true heir, especially if he has
attained his power through murder (Armstrong, 1946).

After the event, however, Fame compares the cruel Horæstes to Nero (1072-6), and Menelaus also condemns him, arguing that Horæstes has been ruthless in war as well as towards Clytemnestra (1134-51). Nestor, however, maintains that his action was just:

> It was the parte of such a knyght, revengyd for to be;
> Should Horæstes content him selfe, his father slayne to se [?] (1183-4).

Menelaus replies that he too would have been avenged, but he would have spared his mother (1188-91), a comment which seems to summarise the ambivalence of the whole play. It is then decided that Horæstes shall marry the daughter of Menelaus, and the new king reappears, accompanied by his Nobles, Commons, Truth and Duty, clearly a just and worthy ruler.

The major part of the discussion about revenge, however, is conducted by Horæstes and abstractions who are understood to be elements of his nature (223, 235-6). Here, too, the problem is raised initially by Horæstes himself, and his first speech is a deliberative soliloquy which shows him perhaps more fully aware of the complexity of his situation, and more in command of the arguments, than some of the figures I have previously discussed:

> To caull to minde the crabyd rage of mothers yll attempt
> Provokes me now all pyttie quight, from me to be exempt:
> Yet lo dame nature teles me that, I must with willing mind
> Forgive the faute and to pytie, some what to be inclynd.
> But lo be hould thad alltres dame, on hourdome morder vill
> Hath heaped up not contented, her sponsaule bed to fyll:
> With forrayne love but sought also, my fatal thred to share
> As erst before my fathers fyll, in sonder she dyd pare.
> O paterne love why doubtest thou so, of pytety me request,
> Syth thou to me wast quight denied, my mother being prest:
When tender yeres this corps of mine, did hould alas for wo
When frend my mother shuld have bin then was she chefe my fo
Oh godes therfore sith you be just, unto whose pour and wyll,
All thing in heaven, and earth also; obaye and sarve untill.
Declare to me your gracious mind, shall I revenged be,
Of good Kynge Agamemnones death, ye godes declare to me
Or shall I let the, adulttres dame, styll wallow in her sin...

The Vice, Revenge, as usual comes in at once. He says that he is called
Courage, and claiming to be the messenger of the gods, he urges Horestes
to go to war against Clytemnemstra. Horestes is quick to respond to his
persuasions. "My thinkes I fele corrage provokes, my wil for ward
againe" (249).

Horestes is clearly the central figure of the play and his opening
speech is an account of an inner conflict. Pity struggles with natural
filial piety, and although "dame nature" later appears on the stage, at
this point she speaks from within Horestes himself. His mother's murder
and adultery, as well as her threat to his own life, are powerful
arguments for action, but instead of being uttered by personified
abstractions they are put forward by the hero himself in a deliberative
soliloquy. He concludes with a question to the gods, and the question
is promptly answered by an allegorical figure who clearly represents an
internal impulse to revenge, which the hero calls "courage". As in the
"tragedies" I have previously discussed, this is a clear transition
between allegorical and literal expression of inner conflict.

What is not clear, however, is our attitude to Revenge. He is
called the Vice throughout the play but his moral standing is ambiguous.
Other characters seem to feel that in obeying him Horestes is performing
the will of the gods. Counsel, who seems a responsible figure, says so
(637-8), and Nestor justifies the deed on the same grounds, with the
result of convincing Menelaus (1178, 1186). At the end of the play Revenge is driven out, as the Vice always is when good triumphs, but here there is a feeling that it is because his mission is now accomplished.

The opposite position is put forward by Dame Nature, who later appears on the stage to urge that Clytemnestra is the hero's mother: she gave him birth and food (498-502); even the beasts to not kill their own kind (509-13). Here the hero's doubts are externalised in the traditional morality manner. This time, however, Horæstes is not persuaded. He insists that the law of gods and men requires that justice should be done (504-7, 518-23, 530-33). Nature withdraws lamenting and thereafter Horæstes is firmly resolved on revenge.

Again Shakespearean parallels suggest themselves. Coriolanus, steeling himself to resist his mother's plea, personifies Nature almost in the manner of the earlier play: "Great nature cries 'Deny not!'" (V, iii, 33). Hamlet, urged to a morally ambiguous revenge by his father's ghost, just as Horæstes is driven on by "paterne love" (1.208), is also impelled not to behave unnaturally towards Gertrude:

Soft! now to my mother.

O heart, lose not thy nature; let not ever
The soul of Nero enter this firm bosom.

Let me be cruel, not unnatural ...

(III, ii, 382-5).

The situations are by no means identical, but there are certain similarities, especially since Fame compares Horæstes to Nero (1072-6). I do not, of course, mean to suggest that Shakespeare knew Horæstes. Such a hypothesis is not necessary. The parallels in the three situations are a product of a way of thought, a way of analysing the impulses which influence action. It is a way of thought to which the long popularity of the morality dramatisations of the psychomachia must have contributed.
When Horestes encounters Clytemnestra he is firmly resolved. She pleads, but he replies calmly that licence must be bridled and murder punished (967-82). Revenge leads her out to execution. Bevington argues that the existence of Revenge in the play exonerates Horestes. "The hero's character is cleansed by the transfer of his avenging nature to an allegorical abstraction" (Bevington, 1962, p.179). Eleanor Prosser disputes this on the basis that the abstraction represents an internal characteristic (p.43, n.9). She is right, of course, and yet the personification of revenge does seem to alter the situation. The effect of personifying impulses and characteristics is to isolate them from one another and from the hero, so that we see Revenge as only a part of the nature of Horestes. He has pity, too, and can reject his avenging impulses once the deed is accomplished. The hero's total character is complex. Shakespeare achieves mimetically an effect which is in some ways similar by showing the heroism of Macbeth at the beginning and end of the play, or Hamlet's courtesy to the players, and his friendship with Horatio.

Horestes, then, is a play with a clear central figure who finds himself in an ethical dilemma. He argues out his problem both with abstractions, in the manner of the psychomachia, and in soliloquy, in a manner which approaches that of fully-fledged Elizabethan tragedy. The now vestigial abstractions help to convey the complexity both of the problem and of the nature of the hero himself.

Deliberative soliloquies do not, I think, occur in the morality plays which are fully allegorical, where it is the abstractions who articulate the nature of the hero's choice. The Castle of Perseverance offers an instance of the traditional division of roles. At the beginning of the play the Good and Bad Angels compete for the soul of Humanum Genus. After they have put forward the respective claims of the World and God, Humanum
Genus describes his dilemma:

Whom to folwe wetyn I ne may.
I stonde and stodye and gynne to rave.
I wolde be ryche in gret aray
And fayn I wolde my sowle save.
As wynde in watyr I wave,
þou woldyst to þe Werld I me toke,
And he wolde þat I it forsoke.
Now so God me helpe and þe holy boke,
I not wyche I may have. (375-83).

The protagonist describes the experience of wavering; the arguments are confined to the abstractions. Though this is not in itself a deliberative soliloquy, it is easy to see how the internalization of the abstractions in the literal drama can produce the form.

The seeds of later soliloquies can be seen in a slightly different form in Mankind. Here the protagonist at his first appearance describes his dual nature:

My name ye Mankynde. I have my composycyon
Of a body and of a soull, of condycyon contrarye.
Betwyx þem tweyn ys a grett dyvisyon;
He þat xulde be subjecte, now he hath þe victory.

Thys ys to me a lamentable story... (194-8).

Mankind is not attempting to make an ethical choice like Hamlet or Macbeth, but he is giving an account of a state of inner conflict. It is a perpetual condition, and one common to all men. The function of Mankind's speech is, of course, homiletic. It describes a divided state but it does not record the struggle itself.

The hero of Medwall's Nature also gives a long expository account of his dual composition (sig.A 3). He shares his immortal soul with the angels and his body with plants and animals. He has "fre eleccyon/
Do what I wyll/ be yt evyll or well". Like The Castle of Perseverance this is a leisurely play which consistently comments on its own action, and after a long debate between Reason and Sensuality, Man exclaims,

O blesseyd lord / what maner stryf is thys
Atwyxt my reason / and sensualyte
That one meneth well / and that all other amyssse.


He goes on to explain that he is "wonderously / entryked in this case /
And almost brought / into perplexyte" (sig. B 2). Here too the argument itself is conducted by the personifications. The hero merely draws attention to his own confusion. Later and briefer moralities tend to take for granted the wavering and perplexity of their heroes. Debate is confined to the abstractions and the protagonist resists or capitulates without giving an account of his feelings.

One Elizabethan morality contains several instances of rudimentary soliloquies. In Wapull's The Tide Tarrieth No Man it is the Vice, among others, who comes on to the stage "reasoning with himselfe". Greediness has killed himself in despair and Courage reflects on this fact:

Why but is Greedines dead in good sadnesse,
Me thinkes these newes are not true which you tell:
Yes truely he dyed in a great madnesse,
And went with the Tyde boate straight into hell.
Why, foole, Greedinesse will never dye,
So long as covetous people do live... (sig.G 3).

This is not precisely an ethical conflict: Vices do not undergo such experiences. But it does record a wavering state of mind. At another stage Courage similarly reproaches himself for mentioning the soul when there is no such thing (sig.C lv). But perhaps the most interesting example occurs at the entry of Greediness. He has been disturbed by listening to a preacher and now he quells his own doubts: "Tushe talke
not of that, for in vayne you do prate,/ For there are none but fooles, that welthiness do hate" (sig.B 2). Greediness is addressing no one but himself: the conflict has been internalized.

This play, however, printed in 1576, is probably later than the popular "tragedies" I have been discussing, and may well have been influenced by them. On the other hand it may be an independent and isolated instance of the emergence of the soliloquy within the morality tradition. Later examples of partial moralities containing soliloquies reflect Marlowe's influence and are too late to be quoted as part of the chronological transition from allegory to soliloquy. They are worth mentioning, however, if only because they show how easy it was to slip from one to the other. The Usurer in A Looking Glass for London and England (1587-91) undergoes spiritual struggles which are expressed in a mixture of allegory and soliloquy. According to the stage direction, an evil angel offers a knife and a rope, but mercy has become internalized:

Mee-things I heare a voice amidst mine eares,
That bids me staie: and tells me that the Lord
Is mercifull to those that do repent.
May I repent? oh thou my doubtfull soule?
Thou maist repent, the Judge is mercifull. (11.2069-73).

The influence of Faustus is clear here as earlier in the Usurer's despair ("Hell gapes for me, heaven will not holde my soule./ You mountaines shroude me from the God of Truth...", 2054-5). A Knack to Know a Knave (1592) also owes something to Marlowe. The Bailiff's fears are expressed through a mixture of personifications (presumably visionary) and internalized doubts:

Ah see my sonnes, where death, pall Death appeares,
To summon me before a fearfull Judge:
Me thinks revenge stands with an yron whip,
And cries repent, or I will punish three:
My heart is hardened, I cannot repent.
Ah hark, me thinkes the Judge doth give my doome,
And I am dammed to everburning fyre:
Soule, be thou safe, and bodie flie to hell. (He dyeth.

Enter Devil, and carie him away. (11.365-73).

I have been arguing for a direct development from the psychomachia
to soliloquy, but at this point it is necessary to examine the case for
finding a source in other traditions for the deliberations of Elizabethan
tragic heroes. Seneca, Ovid and Petrarch all explore inner states of
doubt and conflict, but it seems to me that while their influence may
be present in Elizabethan tragedy, it is by no means paramount. I shall
consider briefly each of these possible sources of influence in turn.

Strong claims have been made for Seneca. It has been suggested
that the early "tragedies" are influenced by Seneca (Spivack, pp.115, 269),
and since Seneca's plays contain deliberative soliloquies (e.g. Troades,
11.641-62; Medea,11.895-977; Agamemnon, 11.108 ff.) it might be argued
that their influence was profound. Chronology would tend to support the
argument. Jasper Heywood's English Troas appeared in 1559 and was
followed in the 1560s by translations of six more plays of Seneca. The
popular "tragedies" belong to the first decade of Elizabeth's reign.
Clemen in English Tragedy Before Shakespeare makes a brief reference to
the morality plays (p.53), but his main thesis is that Seneca provides
the source of set speeches revealing states of mind and feeling.
B.L.Joseph finds a parallel between Senecan and Shakespearean vacillation,
and finds the sources of both in rhetorical theory (pp.308-9, 326-7).
Reuben A. Brower's Hero and Saint reiterates the case for Seneca's
influence: "However far short Seneca may have come from creating true
speech for the inner life, he gave a cue and a direction that was not
lost on his Elizabethan translators and imitators": (p.168). After all,
"It is hard to believe that the Elizabethans would have found a medium
appropriate for dramatizing the private life of the soul merely by continuing the narrative tradition of the *Mirror for Magistrates*” (167-8). It would seem to me remarkable that the Elizabethans should be expected to look to the narrative tradition for such a medium after some two centuries of morality plays, but Brower is presumably taking up the argument of Howard Baker, whose claim that the "Senecan" elements in Elizabethan drama can all be found in the popular native tradition also largely ignores the moralities.

The question of "influences" is complex, and the truth is probably that the characteristics of Elizabethan drama are derived from many sources, Seneca among them. But it might be profitable to look more closely at Senecan vacillation before adopting this solution to the problem. When deliberation forms a substantial part of a Senecan play, it is most often expressed in terms of a debate or discussion between the protagonist and a nurse (*Medea*, *Hippolytus*, *Hercules Oetaeus*) or an attendant (*Thyestes*, *Octavia*). Though this bears a superficial resemblance to the exchanges I have been discussing between the heroes and the Vices, its effect is in fact quite different. In the English tradition the Vices represent the promptings of inner impulses and they are generally obeyed. In Seneca the *nutrix* or the *satelles* presents a rational norm against which the passion of the central figure is measured. The rational arguments are overruled, and the supreme effect of the episode is to emphasise the driving power of this passion and the horror of the deeds it perpetrates. The role of the confidant is thus antithetical to that of the Vice.

A similar effect is achieved when the dispute is internalized. *Medea* provides an example. On the whole her hesitation has an effect very like Lady Macbeth's "unsex me here..." (I, 5, 37-51) in that it stresses the extreme unnaturalness of her state of mind and her deeds (cf. Ewbank, pp. 83-5). The language, too, is similar: *pelle femineos metus*
Medea's emotions are the centre of the play. Resolved on vengeance (25-55), she is subject to a tumult of feelings (116 ff.). Can Jason be so cruel? Does he think her powers of evil are exhausted? These are rhetorical questions. 

\textit{incerta vaecors mente vaesana feror} \[\text{partes in omnes; unde me ulcisci queam?}\] (123-4).

She is perplexed, frenzied, insane, tossed about on all sides, but the only real doubt is how to be avenged. In a long soliloquy (895 ff) she steels herself to kill her sons. She begins, \textit{quid, anime, cessas?}, but again the question is apparently rhetorical, and almost at once she continues, \textit{fas omne cedat...} ("let all right give way", 900). Her rage and her determination mount. The crimes she has committed already are as nothing. \textit{Medea munc sum}, (910). But before she can destroy her children there is a moment of real hesitation (926 ff.). She is torn between love for her sons and rage against Jason (938-44). But the furies, sent by the brothers she has killed, impel her onward (958 ff) and she is resolved on destruction.

It is a portrait of madness. Reason is suspended and Medea is helpless before a driving passion. Only another passion, love for her children, can restrain her, and the restraint is momentary. We have no real doubt of the outcome, but Medea's hesitation serves to stress its horror.

This is not quite the case with Appius, Horestes and the other English heroes. Their hesitation is ethical, and part of its effect is to show that they are neither mad nor helpless. When they choose evil it is a deliberate choice made in defiance of reason, not in its absence. The corrupt will overrules reason's promptings for good. The moment of decision is one of tension because we feel that the choice is real. And this is a product of the morality tradition, where ethical choice is at the centre of each play and the abstractions are conventionally balanced.
against one another. If Medea were allegory, the giant figure of Furor would lash her on throughout the play, and only in the final episode would a frail figure of Motherhood step momentarily across her path.

B.L. Joseph finds the source of deliberative soliloquy, both Senecan and Elizabethan, in the rhetorical figure, dubitatio (pp.145, 308-15). This occurs in classical rhetoric (Rhetorica ad Herennium, I, vi, 10; IV, xxix, 40; cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, II, xxiii, 26 and 27), and appears in Abraham Fraunce's Arcadian Rhetorike as "addubitation" (sig.G, 7 r). Fraunce describes it as "a kind of deliberation with our selves" in which "we ask and enquire in consultation wise: then when we have thus for a while held the auditors in suspense, we determine of somewhat eyther more or lesse contrarie to their expectation".

The doubt, of course, is purely a matter of form. The orator is not thinking aloud, though he may wish to give the impression that he is doing so. Wilson, who gives examples in his Arte of Rhetorique of "doubtfulness" (p.185) and "Reasoning a matter with our selves" (p.207), specifically makes the point that the function of the deliberative oration is to persuade, and not "to determine any matter in controversie" (p.29). Palsgrave's "translation" of Acolastus (1540) draws attention in the margin to instances of dubitatio. In one case Acolastus exclaims that he is so surrounded by afflictions, that he does not know where he is, where to go or what to do (p.147, 11.1-3). In another he wonders whether to blame himself or those who misled him for his miseries (pp.148, 11. 6-8; 149, 11.1-2). In both instances the primary effect is emphatic, stressing the helplessness and bewilderment of his situation. He is not at this point seeking answers to his questions or choosing a course of action. In wondering whom to blame he is inviting the audience to provide the answer for themselves.

B.L. Joseph's attribution of the deliberative soliloquy to the rhetorical tradition leads him to stress the emphatic element in the
soliloquies of Macbeth (pp.326-7) and Hamlet (pp.354-99). Though he concedes that there is a degree of hesitation in both cases, their deliberative soliloquies are primarily expository. Macbeth (I, 7, 1-28) makes the audience aware of the horror of the crime he is about to commit; Hamlet is unwilling to act until he has proof of Claudius's guilt, and so he repeatedly reminds the audience that he has not forgotten his mission.

But it seems to me that while this would be true of Seneca, it does less than justice to Shakespeare. Hamlet's "To be or not to be ..." gives the impression of being a real question, and there is a strong sense throughout the play of a conflict between "resolution" and "thought" in the mind of the hero. Similarly, Macbeth's jerky and elusive syntax conveys the quality of a mind divided between good and evil. Ethical decisions are at the centres of these plays, and any attempt to account for this in terms of influence cannot ignore the native morality tradition.

Since there is no need to isolate drama in this period, another possible source of tragic conflict is Ovid, whose Heroides offer a series of dramatic monologues in the form of letters from women to their lovers. The Heroicall Epistles appeared in Turbeville's translation in 1567. Ovid is portraying states of mind in which separate impulses, love, nostalgia, resentment and regret, for instance, displace one another in rapid succession. Deainira's fear turns to doubtful hope, her hope to fear again (IX, 42). Medea fears Jason's mockery, vows vengeance, implores him to return (XII, 175-98). Hero both hopes and fears that Leander will swim to her through the storm, and her letter alternates between challenging him to do so and urging caution (XIX). Helen both desires and fears to give way to Paris (XVII), and hints that she will surrender while she ostensibly discourages him.

While Ovid's heroines are in doubt about which emotion predominates,
they are generally not in a state of ethical conflict. Medea's questions are rhetorical, "Why did you come?", "Why did I love you?" (XII, 9-12). Her feelings fluctuate wildly, but there is no sense of a debate between them, or reasoning which leads to a decision. Dryden attributes tragic genius to Ovid on the grounds that "he had a way of writing so fit ... to show the various movements of a soul combating betwixt two different passions" (Dryden, p.53, my italics). But this combat of the passions which Ovid explores so minutely differs fundamentally from the deliberative soliloquy of Elizabethan tragedy. The latter shows a mind attempting to order its own experience, to analyse a situation, to control it and to decide what ought to be done. The resulting choice, however mistaken, is a conscious attempt to dominate experience, to determine the future. Ovid's heroines, on the other hand, submit to their own inner experience without making any attempt to order it. Like Seneca's Medea, they are the helpless victims of their own passions. Ovid records not the processes of choice but the unwilled fluctuations of divided feeling.

Helen is a possible exception to this. She would like to give in to Paris, but she fears his inconstancy, her isolation in Troy, the danger of ensuing war (XVII, 177 ff.). But the irony of this letter is lost if it is treated as a record of Helen's private thoughts. It is very much a communication to Paris, encouraging him while appearing to repel his advances. We may assume a conflict in the writer of the letter, but the letter itself is not an exploration of the conflict. And the subject matter is so remote from the problems of the figures I have been discussing (again Helen's conflict is not an ethical one) that Ovid seems unlikely as a main source of the deliberative soliloquy in Elizabethan drama. The Heroides undoubtedly had an influence on Chaucer's Criseyde (Shannon, pp.157-68) and Pope's Eloisa, but it is
difficult to believe that they are directly related to Hamlet or Macbeth.

The problem of Petrarch is more complex. As an heir to the tradition of Christian warfare, he has a stronger claim to be considered as a source of soliloquies expressing ethical conflict, and his influence in England in the sixteenth century was very considerable. Petrarch's presence certainly includes evidence of a degree of vacillation between the conviction that to love Laura is to love virtue, and the belief that love is fleshly desire, a sin because a distraction from virtue. In general the former conviction predominates, but isolated poems seem to indicate an opposing point of view. Rime I "Voi che ascoltate in rime sparse il suono" serves as a kind of retraction of the whole work. In it Petrarch rejects his youthful folly now that in age he has realised the vanity of all earthly things. In LXII ("Padre del ciel; dopo i perduti giorni") he prays to God to release him from a passion which has lasted eleven years, so that he may turn his mind to higher concerns. This impulse recurs at intervals, notably in sonnets CCLXXIII, CCCLXIV and CCCLXV.

But these poems, though they are evidence of Petrarch's own conflicting attitudes to love, do not in themselves record conflict. They simply state single-mindedly a conviction which is antithetical to that of most of his poems. Very occasionally, however, conflicting attitudes are held in balance within a single poem, and here there is a degree of similarity with the soliloquies of Shakespeare and his predecessors. In Rime CI ("Lasso, ben so che dolorose prede") the poet records his awareness of impending death and recognises that he has little hope of mercy, enslaved as he is by the magic of love. For fourteen years "La voglia e la ragion combattut' hanno" (will and reason have struggled with each other) and perhaps the better part will win. LXVIII ("L'aspetto sacro de la terra vostra") is an account of a real psychomachia. The sight of the sacred city of Rome points him
the way to heaven, but at the same moment he remembers that it is time
to attend his lady. Each thought drives out the other, and he hesitates
uncertainly between them.

This is like Humanum Genus, torn between the world and God, or like
Appius in soliloquy, torn between passion and conscience. On the other
hand it is rare in Petrarch. His much more characteristic concern is
the paradoxical nature of love itself, the icy fire of doubtful hope,
the freedom and servitude of submission to the "dolce nemica" (Forster,
pp.1-17), and on the whole it is this theme which is taken up and imitated
by the English Petrarchists of Tottel's Miscellany and the later sixteenth
century. Love creates discord, contrary passions in the lover:

I find no peace, and all my warre is done:
I feare, and hope: I burne, and frese like yse:
I flye aloft, yet can I not arise ... (Wyatt, Tottel, 49)

This poem is a translation of one of Petrarch's most characteristic
sonnets (Forster, p.4), Rime CXXXIV ("Pace non trovo e non ho da far
guerra") and it is also highly characteristic of the earliest English
Petrarchists. Three versions of it occur in Tottel's Miscellany alone
(49, 187, 301). Though it records a state of discord, it has nothing
to do with ethical choice. The lover contemplates no action, but
confronts the extraordinary nature of love, "that lockes nor loseth",
so that neither death nor life contents him. The theme of the poem is
the paradox that "my delight is causer of this strife". This theme is
one of the main preoccupations of the English Petrarchists. They
"Wepe and syng,/ In joye and wo, as in a doutfull ease" (Surrey, Tottel,
10), poised "Twixt wo, and welth" (Wyatt, Tottel, 51), while the lady
destroyes their liberty with her "gentle crueltie" (Wyatt Tottel, 41).
Action is not in question because they are tossed helplessly by waves
of fluctuating emotion.
On the other hand, one of Wyatt's translations of Petrarch (Rime CCCLX) bears superficial resemblances to the morality tradition. Tottel 64, "Vyne olde dere emmy", records a debate between the poet and Love conducted before Queen Reason. The poet complains that Love has brought him nothing but pain and has distracted him from virtue;

And, where I had my thought, and mynde araced,
From earthly frailnesse, and from vayn pleasure,

Me from my rest he toke, and set in errour. (vol.1, p.45, 11.30-32).

Love defends himself by explaining that on the contrary he has taught the lover virtue. He has instructed him in honour, "gentlenesse", fidelity, patience, for the sake of a woman peerless for her "wisdom, womanhood, and ... discretion" (vol.1 p.47, 1.18). And he has given him wings to fly "above the starry skie" (p.48, 1.11). Reason cannot at once resolve their dispute: "lenger time doth ask a resolucion" (p.48, 1.28).

Here an inner conflict is dramatised allegorically. But there are certain fundamental differences between the poem and the deliberative soliloquies of Elizabethan tragedy. In the plays the hero chooses between conflicting impulses: in the poem the poet and Love dispute while Reason judges between them, or rather, significantly fails to judge. Here again there is no question of an ethical choice leading to action. The lover distrusts his own irresistible passion and the poem is essentially a debate about whether love leads to error or to virtue. The poet's concern is largely speculative and his doubt is not resolved. Again the real theme is not moral choice but the paradoxical nature of love which both ennobles the lover and distracts him from virtue. Neither the lover nor Love is a vice-figure putting forward spurious arguments. Both claims are true but apparently contradictory.
I have quoted from Totell's Miscellany because of its widespread influence on the Elizabethan period (Rollins, Totell, vol.2, pp.107-8). At least nine editions appeared during the sixteenth century (Rollins, Totell, vol.2, pp.20-37). The whole collection, including the poems of Grimald and the Uncertain Authors, contains poems dealing indiscriminately with love, epitaphs, moderation in all things and the vanity of the world. Frequently unrequited love alternates with contempt of the world in separate but adjacent poems, but there is very little genuinely ethical conflict within individual poems. This remains true for many of the subsequent Petrarchists, with the exception of Sidney, who develops Petrarch's struggle between reason and desire and makes it a major element of Astrophil and Stella.

Astrophil's ethical conflict has been thoroughly analysed (Lever, pp.72-85; Montgomery) and a brief account of it indicates its general nature. Sonnet 4 records the debate between his "will and wit", virtue and "vaine love". Sonnet 5 concedes that reason ought to guide him, that love is folly, that earthly beauty is a mere shadow, but concludes, "True, and yet true that I must Stella love". Sonnet 10 is an account of a battle between reason on the one hand and "love and sence" on the other, until reason submits to Stella. In sonnets 21 and 30 love interferes with his social obligations. Sonnet 71 appears to resolve his doubts in the Petrarchan manner: Stella herself represents virtue, reason, the good; and yet, "Desire still cries, 'give me some food'". According to Montgomery's analysis, roughly one-third of the sonnets in Astrophil and Stella are concerned with serious moral reflection on the nature of passion (Montgomery, p.128, n.5). Many of them dwell traditionally on Stella's beauty, or record specific events, but "When Astrophel pauses to reflect, the battle between reason and passion is renewed". (Montgomery, p.134).
Reason, virtue, love are consistently personified, and Lever's account of the sequence alludes to the morality tradition (p.84). It is clear that there are some similarities. Sonnet 18 aligns Astrophil with Acolastus, Lusty Juventus and the other heroes of the Prodigal Son tradition. He knows himself "a banckrout .../ Of all those goods, which heav'n to me hath lent"; he has no excuse "But that my wealth I have most idly spent./ My youth doth waste, my knowledge brings forth toyes..." But unlike the Prodigal Son he does not return to ask forgiveness:

I see my course to lose my selfe doth bend:
I see and yet no greater sorrow take,
Then that I lose no more for Stella's sake.

Sonnet 21 records a dialogue with a "friend" who reproaches him for having read Plato in vain if such great promise in youth leads to "a traine of shame". And sonnet 47 is a fully-fledged "dramatic" soliloquy:

Vertue awake, Beautie but beautie is,
I may, I must, I can, I will, I do
Leave following that, which it is gaine to misse.
Let her go. Soft, but here she comes. Go to,

Unkind, I love you not: 0 me, that eye

Doth make my heart give to my tongue the lie.

The sonnet has a startling immediacy. Astrophil's two conflicting "voices" speak in dialogue within the poem. The present tense, the imperatives, the exclamations, the speech rhythms of the verse help to create an illusion of drama. The string of verbs borders on a hysteria which is simultaneously slightly comic. (The hysteria is Astrophil's: Sidney's wit is perfectly in control in the next line: "that, which it is gaine to misse".) It culminates in resolution: "Let her go". And at once, as if we were watching the event, "Soft, but here she comes". Resolution falters, but only momentarily: "Go to ..." It gives way
entirely, however, before the power of Stella's eyes.

The immediacy and the tension are characteristic of *Astrophil and Stella*. They are characteristic too of the best of the deliberative soliloquies I have been discussing, though these lack Sidney's wit and irony. *Astrophil and Stella*, probably composed in 1582 (Sidney, p.xliv), is too late to have influenced the early "tragedies". The influence, if there is one, is more likely to have been the other way round. If it is true that the popular morality tradition influenced the courtly and sophisticated Sidney, its influence was widespread indeed. This is a hypothesis. But it is possible that Sidney influenced Shakespeare's soliloquies.

On the other hand, *Astrophil*'s inner conflict is of a very specific kind. It is confined to the predicament of the lover and to the traditional Platonic and Aristotelian struggle between reason and passion, virtue and the will. There is a sense, of course, in which in this period all conflict between good and evil can be reduced to these terms. But *Astrophil* consistently uses the terms themselves, while *Shakespeare*s heroes on the whole do not. Thus there is no clear thematic connection between the conflicts of *Shakespeare*s heroes and *Astrophil*'. There is, however, something of an analogy between *Shakespeare*s heroes and their much cruder predecessors in the popular "tragedies". Like Macbeth, Sisamnes is restrained by fear of the consequences of his ambitious greed; Gautier hesitates to torture Grissill as Othello hesitates to kill Desdemona, held back by love and pity; Appius and Angelo succumb, in spite of public position, to the same weakness; and Horestes, like Hamlet, has to confront the moral paradoxes of revenge. I do not, of course, suggest a direct debt in these cases. But it is clear that Sidney's range is narrow compared with that of *Shakespeare* or the early tragedians. The moralities took all ethical conflict between birth and death as their province: Sidney is concerned only with the plight of the lover.
In any case, it is evident that Shakespeare did not need Sidney to introduce him to the allegorical drama. His own Sonnets include an analysis in an ironic development of the morality tradition which owes nothing to Sidney or to Petrarch:

Two loves I have, of comfort and despair,
Which like two spirits do suggest me still;
The better angel is a man right fair,
The worser spirit a woman colour'd ill.
To win me soon to hell, my female evil
Tempteth my better angel from my side ... (Sonnet 144).

The question of the precise extent of Petrarchan, Senecan or Ovidian influence can almost certainly not be satisfactorily settled, but I suggest that as far as the deliberative soliloquy is concerned, these traditions did not provide more than the structural framework. If the Elizabethans needed to learn that it was possible for a man to display his doubtful state of mind without the introduction of personified abstractions, they could have discovered this fact in Seneca, in Ovid or in Petrarch. But the transitional examples I have discussed seem to me to suggest that the Elizabethans may well have discovered the form for themselves in the course of their experiments in combining the literal and the allegorical in drama. And the subject matter of their soliloquies, a real hesitation to act which is the product of an ethical conflict between a wide range of powerful inner forces, owes much to the representations of the psychomachia in the morality tradition.
Chapter 8

THE TRAGIC HERO

There remain two more transitional plays which are separated from the early popular "tragedies" both by chronology and by the fact that in terms of their themes and mode of presentation they are, superficially at least, much closer to the morality tradition. The Conflict of Conscience (1570-81, pr.1581) and Doctor Faustus (1588-92) resemble earlier morality plays in many respects, and yet like the "tragedies" they each dramatize a specific story which is firmly located in the external world (though the second issue of The Conflict of Conscience goes to some lengths to disguise this fact). Above all, however, they reverse the conventional relationship between abstractions and protagonist, so that the latter acquires in formal terms the stature of a tragic hero. The personifications begin to be presented as subordinate to the hero himself so that the form allows him a role which is not merely central but dominant.

Faustus has the autonomy of a tragic figure, "authority, passions, and powers of expression far greater than ours" (N. Frye, p.34, cf. pp.207-8). In a sense this autonomy is an illusion: in terms of the meaning of the play Faustus, for all his intelligence, is no more free than Humanum Genus, and not only because there is a degree of irony in the presentation of Marlowe's hero. The dramatic figure of Humanum Genus looks more like a victim than a hero because the battle is waged on his behalf by abstractions. But these abstractions are largely the components of his own nature, personified for the sake of the allegory. In Faustus the abstractions have been to some extent internalized, so that the hero appears to dominate them. This is not necessarily a product of Marlowe's rebellious and overreaching atheism. It is at
least in part a result of the kinds of formal development in the drama
which I have been discussing, developments which were an indirect
product of the social ethic of the Reformation, and which made possible
the emergence of the tragic form as we know it.

Nathaniel Woodes's Conflict of Conscience is very much a transitional
work, and in many ways closer to the morality tradition than to tragedy.
It is a conventional account of Christian warfare between spiritual and
worldly values, and much of the action is conducted by abstractions.
The hero, Philologus, is tempted by the Catholic authorities to renounce
his Protestant faith. He resists theological error and threats of
punishment, but falls because he feels the claims of worldly ties,
particularly "lands, wife and children" (1.1317). Sensual Suggestion
shows him a glass in which he sees the three traditional worldly delights,
"Pleasure, pomp and wealth" (1473), and like Humanum Genus, he resolves
to place his whole trust in these values in spite of hell (1404-8).
The consequence is despair, and despite the arguments of his friends
he dies convinced that he is beyond the reach of the mercy of God.
The second issue of the play adds an alternative ending in which the
hero finally repents and dies saved.

At the beginning of the play Satan appears in order to instigate the
psychomachia (1-111). He gives the story its conventional place in the
cosmic warfare between God and the Devil, complaining that his "mortal
foe, the carpenter's son" is gaining ground on him (8), referring back
to his own previous unfallen state (36), and explaining that his son,
the Pope, also aspires to be equal with God. Satan tempted Eve, Moses
and Christ, and he will send the vices of the play to win back the world
for himself and the Pope.

All this follows closely the pattern of earlier moralities, as does
the psychological role of several of the abstractions. Conscience
attempts to recover the fallen Philologus, telling him of the mutability
of worldly goods (1545-7), that true joys are to be found only in heaven (1565), and that we are strangers in this world (1571). When he fails, he exclaims, "Oh cursed creature! Oh frail flesh! Oh meat for worms! Oh dust..." (1656). Conscience is entirely traditional. Subsequently Horror appears while Philologus is rejoicing with his children, and brings him to despair. Horror seems to be invisible to the children who ask in amazement what has moved their father (1733, 1740). In this episode Woodes treats the allegorical and literal planes of reality as distinct.

At the same time the hero's story is firmly located in the real world. Unlike Humanum Genus, he has a wife and children. The central temptation takes place in a long trial scene which resembles those described by Foxe (Oliver, 1949, pp.1-9). The trial is apparently a perfectly literal event and is conducted by a literal Cardinal.

The roles of several of the other characters, however, are more doubtful. The play opens with a discussion between Philologus and his friend Mathetes. Mathetes asks why God permits affliction, and Philologus explains that adversity encourages prayer, faith, patience and hope, and tests man's constancy (11.203 ff). Mathetes means "disciple" in Greek, and presumably he has a literal but typical role. The function of the episode is, of course, ironic. Philologus shows that he knows the right answers, but he proves unable to act on what he knows when he himself faces affliction.

In V, iii, two more of his friends appear and try in vain to prevent his despair. These are Eusebius (piety?) and Theologus (religiousness?) They urge God's mercy and try to help Philologus to pray. There is nothing in what they say to indicate clearly whether they are internal impulses or pious friends. As far as the plot is concerned it does not matter.
The standing of the Vices is still more problematic. These are Hypocrisy, Avarice and Tyranny, who plan the hero's downfall, and Sensual Suggestion, who finally achieves it. In the trial there is little to distinguish the first three from literal inquisitors. They function dramatically not as internal impulses of the hero but as members of the Catholic establishment. Hypocrisy advises Philologus to recant for his own good, Avarice threatens to confiscate his possessions and Tyranny offers to imprison him. In other areas of the play they seem to occupy that hinterland between social abstractions and social types which is characteristic of the late estates moralities. When Hypocrisy claims that he and his cronies will bring men to desolation (732-6) he is clearly allegorical. But when he and Tyranny question an ignorant priest on the articles of his faith and the names of local heretics, they are much more like the literal emissaries of a police state. Their names are primarily an indication of Woodes's opinion of Catholic officers.

On the whole the literal elements seem to predominate. Some of this mingling of allegory with the literal world had already occurred, of course, in plays like Nice Wanton, but what distinguishes The Conflict of Conscience from plays of this kind is the clear and independent role of the hero. At the moment of temptation Philologus is no longer passive in the hands of the Vices. Sensual Suggestion precipitates his fall by showing him the glass of worldly pleasures, but not before the hero has fully articulated his own dilemma in terms of a conflict between flesh and spirit:

Mine estate, alas, is now most lamentable,
For I am but dead whichever side I take;
Neither to determine herein am I able
With good advice mine election to make,
The worse to refuse, and the best for to take.
My spirit covets the one, but alas, since your presence
My flesh leads my spirit therefor by violence.

For at this time, I being in great extremity,
Either my Lord God in heart to reject
Or else to be oppressed by the Legate's authority
And in this world to be counted an abject;
My lands, wife and children also to neglect,
This latter part to take, my spirit is in readiness,
But my flesh doth subdue my spirit doubtless.

(1306-19).

Neither flesh nor spirit is personified at this point. The conflict is fully internalized.

This comes as no surprise. Philologus is modelled on Francisco Spira, an Italian whose story had a wide currency in the sixteenth century and later (Wine, 1935). The author has changed the hero's name because he feels that the audience will find it difficult to identify with the situation of "one private man" (Prologue, 11.29-42). In the second issue of the play (in the same year) Woodes moves further in the direction of generality, omitting all reference to Spira from the Prologue and substituting a happy ending. But for all that, the play gives every indication that it is dealing with literal events, and the hero dominates the action. He displays at considerable length his knowledge of theology (112-252, 697-731) and several times gets the better of the Cardinal in the argument during his trial scene. Unlike the morality protagonists, he does not allow himself to be blinded by the Vices, but goes open-eyed to his damnation. In his despair his language achieves a certain dignity which, though it perhaps owes more to the author's acquaintance with the Scriptures than to Woodes's own genius, gives Philologus the beginnings of tragic stature:
God is against me, I perceive. He is none of my God Unless in this, that he will beat and plague me with his rod.

And though his mercy doth surpass the sins of all the world, Yet shall it not once profit me or pardon mine offence. I am refused utterly; I quite from God am whirled; My name within the Book of Life had never residence; Christ prayed not, Christ suffered not my sins to recompence, But only for the Lord's elect, of which sort I am none. I feel his justice towards me, his mercy is all gone.

(1752-60).

The language of the tragic hero must be precise enough to communicate the nature of the tragic experience, flexible enough to express the contrasts of feeling which define this experience, and grand enough at moments of heightened emotion to convey the stature of the hero. Philologus achieves dignity; his natural successor, Doctor Faustus, achieves tragic standing partly in consequence of the energy, the imaginative range, and above all the grand scale of Marlowe's language (Levin, pp.26-42).

Faustus presents a good many problems. There is uncertainty about the date, the text, and the extent of Marlowe's authorship. A clear account of these difficulties is given in Greg's edition of the play in parallel text, and some qualifications are offered in J.B. Steane's critical study of Marlowe (pp.117-26). Since I have nothing to contribute to their solution, and am not here concerned with Marlowe's personal vision but with the emergence of a dramatic form, I shall ignore the problems, and work from W.W. Greg's conjectural reconstruction of the text.

It is a commonplace of criticism that Doctor Faustus owes much to the morality tradition. The single central figure, flanked by Good and
Bad Angels, Lucifer, and the parade of the Seven Deadly Sins give it obvious affinities with The Castle of Perseverance and its immediate successors. It is remarkably similar thematically to The Conflict of Conscience (Campbell, 1952), and Spivack draws attention to verbal resemblances which may indicate that Marlowe was familiar with Woodes's play (p.474, n.9). The hero's inner conflict, the account of his life from birth to death, and the pattern of alternating psychological struggle and low comedy place Faustus squarely in the morality tradition (Bevington, 1962, pp.257-8).

Theologically, too, the play is surprisingly close to the medieval pattern of choice between the world and God. Though there is some critical tendency to see Faustus's aspirations and disappointments as a reflection of his author's (Levin, pp.156-61; Steane, p.164; Knights pp.96-8), it seems now to be generally accepted that the play presents an orthodox account of the consequences of the sin of pride. Faustus, "swollen with the cunning of a self-conceit" (Prologue, 1.20), turns his back on God, like Humanum Genus, and chooses the Devil because the Devil can give him the world. Overconfident in the power of his own reason, and so blindly leaving incomplete two central Christian texts, he confounds hell in Elysium and becomes convinced that his necromantic books are "heavenly" (I, i, 48). He commits the sin of Lucifer and of Adam, seeking "a deity" (I, i, 61), and sacrifices his soul in order to gain "a world of profit and delight/ Of power, of honour, of omnipotence" (I, i, 51-2).

The sins of the world are pride, avarice and lechery (see above, pp.12-48, 98-112), and Faustus's objectives are the conventional trio of worldly delights, power, riches, pleasures. These are the joys which he envisages (I, i, 76-95) and which Valdes promises (I, i, 117-31). At moments of doubt the devils produce one of the trio to distract him, dreams of wealth (II, i, 21-2), "crowns and rich apparel" (II, i, 80 S.D.),
and finally Helen, type of all pleasures. At last the "fond worldling" learns, like Humanum Genus, that his "riches, pleasures, pomps" are of no avail (V, ii, 101-2).

In the medieval analysis of Adam's sin curiosity becomes a branch of avarice (see above, p. 14). For Faustus, too, the knowledge which will make him equal with God is at the centre of his temptation. Ironically the knowledge he gains from Mephistophilis is as insubstantial as the figure of Alexander, the supreme example of worldly power, or the spirit of Helen, worldly pleasure. Faustus sacrifices his eternal felicity for a series of shadows. It is the central lesson of the medieval moralities that power, riches (or knowledge) and pleasures are of no substance compared with the true reality of heaven.

I have argued that the theology of the Reformation, while it retains the traditional trio of sins of the world, places presumption and distrust or despair alongside worldliness itself, to form a new trio of sins committed by Adam and overcome by Christ in the wilderness (above, pp. 98-101). Here again Marlowe is entirely orthodox. Faustus presumes to be more than man (I, i, 23 and 54-61), and distrusts, exactly as Adam does, God's threatened punishment: "This word 'damnation' terrifies not me" (I, iii, 58); "I think hell's a fable" (II, i, 125). Experience changes his mind more rapidly than he realises. He enters the damned state by rejecting God (Cole, pp. 192-3), since "All places shall be hell that is not heaven" (II, i, 124). In this hell of the mind he continues to distrust God's word, but now it is God's mercy that he doubts. It is widely recognised that it is finally his despair which damns him (Bradbrook, 1935, p. 151; Gardner, pp. 323-4; Mahood, pp. 106 ff. etc.), and it has been convincingly argued that despair lies behind his presumption from the beginning (Westlund, Sachs.) The false syllogism which leads to his rejection of Christianity is conventionally used as a means of inducing despair (Sachs, p. 635). The texts which Faustus reads from the Bible,
(Rom. 6, 23; I John, 1, 8.) which is open in front of him if Mephostophilis is to be believed (V, ii, 92-4), point to God's justice. In each case Faustus ignores the subsequent Biblical sentence which invokes God's redeeming mercy to the faithful. He is left with a religion which is just, logical and utterly without hope: "Why, then belike, we must sin, and so consequently die. / Ay, we must die an everlasting death" (I, i, 42-4). Thereafter he is never quite able to believe in the power of God's redeeming mercy, but accepts instead the devil's reasoning: "Christ cannot save thy soul, for he is just" (II, ii, 85). Presumption (trust in his own reasoning powers) and despair of God's mercy work together, leading him to cling ever more desperately to the values of the world until he faces eternal damnation.

Theologically Faustus is more precise and more schematic than most of the sprawling, clumsy moralities of the period after the Reformation, but it is clearly in the same tradition. But as far as its impact on the audience is concerned, it is more than a morality play, and in terms of the emerging tragic pattern the differences are more significant than the similarities.

Douglas Cole has drawn attention to some of these differences (pp.235-42). The Angels do not debate with the hero or with each other. The Seven Deadly Sins conduct no psychomachia but are limited to one ironic pageant. The melancholy Mephostophilis has little in common with the traditional Vice, and in any case the hero needs no tempter. Instead of adopting a disguise to deceive Faustus, Mephostophilis does so in obedience to the hero's instructions. Apart from the choruses, there is no homiletic address to the audience.

All this, in Cole's view, makes Faustus "radically" different from the moralities (p.235). It is different, certainly, and all the differences point in the same direction. The shrunken personifications, the pliant Mephostophilis are diminished in proportion to the dominance of a
primarily literal hero, whose conflict is largely internalized, and there is no address to the audience because the literal drama is self-contained, creating the illusion that the world of the play is the world of external reality. The moralities make no attempt at mimesis: Faustus is firmly located in the real world.

Faustus has achieved the dramatic and formal autonomy of Northrop Frye's tragic heroes. In a typical morality, as in a bas-relief, the central figure is seen very much as part of the design of the whole, even when he forms the centre of the pattern. But Faustus has become a free-standing figure, and the play creates the illusion that he could exist without it, that the hero would retain his force even if the rest of the pattern were lost. He first appears alone in his study, and though later Mephostophilis claims to have turned the pages of the Bible to lead him to the false syllogism (V, ii, 92-4), the text gives no evidence that he appears on the stage at this point. Faustus is apparently entirely alone, and it is in soliloquy that he makes his decision to reject divinity and seek a deity. When the Angels appear and address him, Faustus gives no impression that he has heard them.

In an ironic reversal of the morality tradition, Faustus summons his own destroyer, and is disappointed to hear that his conjuring was only the accidental cause of Mephostophilis's appearance (I, iii, 45). The irony is intensified when Mephostophilis draws the hero's attention to Lucifer's similar "aspiring pride and insolence" (I, iii, 67) and pleads with him to renounce "these frivolous demands/Which strike a terror to my fainting soul" (I, iii, 80-81). Faustus advises him to imitate his own "manly fortitude" (I, iii, 84), ironically drawing attention to the "security" which is the product of human ignorance and presumption, and goes on to dictate the terms of his contract with Lucifer.
Faustus's autonomy affects the audience's experience of the abstractions. In the morality tradition these are the dominant figures. Humanum Genus is feeble and helpless before the powerful figure of the World. Later the Vices control the action. The audience experiences no doubts of their reality or their moral standing. They are solid, substantial, central and evil. But in Faustus the abstractions have become relatively peripheral. The Good and Bad Angels are shadowy figures whose very existence might be an illusion. Mephostophilis, despite his denial, might be only the product of a conjuring trick. As a result, the audience shares something of the hero's uncertainty. We participate in the process of choice. The morality audience remains relatively objective as this process is analysed; its judgments are clear. The audience of Faustus is profoundly involved in the experience of its hero (a fact which may help to explain the continuing critical dispute about its orthodoxy).

Faustus is a tragedy, but the morality tradition which lies behind it is evident in the wavering of the hero which dominates the rest of the play. Remorse strives with resolution until the great final speech in which terror alternates violently with despair. When the process of conflict begins Faustus is alone in his study, and his first speech is a remarkable instance of a monologue in which the separate voices of the allegorical tradition are still clearly audible. It is as if the Bad Angel addresses him - by name and in the second person - while Faustus himself hesitates, hearing the voice of the Good Angel urging him in the opposite direction. I give the speech with the "voice" of the Bad Angel underlined to show the effect of dialogue:

Now Faustus, must thou needs be damned, canst not be saved?
What boots it then to think of God or Heaven?
Away with such vain fancies, and despair;
Despair in God and trust in Beelzebub.

Now go not backward: no, be resolute;

Why waverest? Something soundeth in mine ears,

"Abjure this magic, turn to God again!"

Ay, and Faustus will turn to God again.

To God! He loves thee not... (II, i, 1-10).

The "voice" of the Bad Angel combines reasoning, coaxing and imperatives, like the traditional Vice. Meanwhile the "voice" of the Good Angel sounds in his ears and Faustus responds. The three figures of the traditional morality dispute have clearly differentiated roles within this soliloquy.

Subsequently the Angels themselves appear on the stage, but in response to the hero's internalized hesitation. They remain psychological personifications but they have become subordinate to Faustus himself. The wavering of the hero summons the Angels, but the initiative comes from him (II, ii, 11 and 79).

Echoes of the psychomachia abound in subsequent soliloquies.

Voices thunder, "Faustus, thou art damned" (II, ii, 20), and the imagery presents the conventional instruments of personified Despair: "guns and knives,/ Swords, poison, halters, and envenomed steel/ Are laid before me to despatch myself" (II, ii, 20-22). The inner dialogue continues:

"What art thou, Faustus, but a man condemned to die? ... Tush, Christ did call the thief upon the cross" (IV, 5, 21-5). There is nothing to equal this in the moralities. Its power is a product of Marlowe's genius. But the mode in which that genius operates is strongly indebted to the morality tradition.

The inner conflict is perpetually before the audience. This owes little to Marlowe's source, The Darnnable Life, which, though it makes reference to the hero's inner doubts (Palmer and More, pp.151-2, 223-5),
is essentially an exemplum, enlivened by adventures, travel and "merry conceits". Marlowe's play is much more than its surface moral, an awful warning to magicians. Its centre is the exploration of the hero's state of mind, and it is greater and more tragic than its source precisely because it is a conflict of conscience in the morality tradition. Except when he is absorbed in his progressively more absurd and ineffectual displays of magic, Marlowe's Faustus is torn with remorse and fear.

"I do repent, and yet I do despair./ Hell strives with grace for conquest in my breast" (V, 1, 70-71). There is no resolution. He determines to burn his books in the very moment that Mephostophilis appears, again in the morality tradition, to carry him off to hell.

The last great soliloquy is itself a psychomachia between despair and repentance, certainty that he must die and longing for escape. Its closest analogue in the morality plays is the dialogue between Everyman and Death. I quote a section of this in order to show how close the similarities are:

Everyman. Alas, shall I have no lenger respyte?

I may saye Deth gyveth no warynyge!
To thynke on the, it maketh my herte seke,
For all unredy is my boke of rekenyng.
But xii. yere and I myght have a-bydynge,
My countynge-boke I wolde make so clere
That my rekenyng I sholde not nede to fere.
Wherfore, Deth, I praye the, for Goddes mercy,
Spare me tyll I be provyded of remedy.

Dethe. The avyleth not to crye, wepe and praye;
But hast the lyghtly that thou were gone that journye,
And prove thy frendes yf thou can.
For wete thou well the tyde abydeth no man,
And in the worlde eche lyvynge creature
For Adams synne must dye of nature.

Everyman. Dethe, yf I sholde this pylgryme take,
   And my rekenynge suerly make,
   Shewe me, for mynt charyte,
   Sholde I not come agayne shortly?

Dethe. No, Everyman; and thou be ones there,
   Thou mayst never more come here,
   Trust me veryly.

Everyman. O gracyous God in the hye sete celestyall,
   Have mercy on me in this moost nede!
   Shall I have no company fro this vale terestryall
   Of myne acqueyntaunce, that way me to lede?

Dethe. Ye, yf ony be so hardy
   That wolde go with the and bere the company.
   Hye the that thou were gone to Goddes magnyfycence,
   Thy rekenynge to gyve before his presence.
   What, wenest thou thy lyfe is gyven the,
   And thy worldly gooddes also?

Everyman. I had wends so, veryly.

Dethe. Nay, nay, it was but lende the;
   For as soone as thou arte go,
   Another a whyle shall have it, and than go ther-fro,
   Even as thou hast done.
   Everyman, thou arte made! Thou hast thy wyttes fyve,
   And here on erthe wyll not amende thy lyve;
   For sodeynly I do come.

Everyman. O wyll I sethe caytyfe, wheder shall I flee,
   That I might scape this endiles sorowe?
   Now, gentyll Deth, spare me tyll to-morowe,
   That I may amende me
With good advysement.

Deth. Naye, thereto I wyll not consent,
Nor no man wyll I respyte;
But to the herte sodeynly I shall smyte
Without ony advysement.
And now out of thy syght I wyll me hy.
Se thou make the redy shortly,
For thou mayst saye this is the daye
That no man lyvyng may scape a-ways.

Everyman. Alas, I may well wepe with syghes depe!
Now have I no maner of company ...
And also my wrytyng is full unrede.
How shall I do now for to excusse me?
I wolde to God I had never be gete!
To my soule a full grete profyte it had be,
For now I fere halfe and grete.

The tyme passeth ... (11.131-92)

Everyman's terror mounts gradually. Time is central. He begs for twelve years to repent, and later, pleads, "spare me till tomorrow". As the dialogue develops he comes to recognise the meaning of death. It is eternal, irrevocable, solitary. He turns to flee, but in vain. Death stands stern and implacable, preventing all escape. Finally, Everyman reaches the verge of despair, wishing he had never been born, terrified and helpless.

It is a remarkable piece of writing, powerful and austere, partly because of the lack of metaphor. But it does not lack imagery, because like all dramatic allegory its impact is partly visual. Death is a solid and material figure, a physical embodiment of the futility of all struggle. He comes from an alien plane of experience, calm, immovable, aloof. As Everyman becomes more hysterical and more human, the visual
and physical contrast between them is intensified.

Faustus's final soliloquy is an internalized dialogue with Death. Here again two "voices" are distinguishable, one cold, rational, certain, the voice of the hero's reason; the other, like Everyman's, pleads and bargains with increasing terror. I underline the part of the dialogue which belongs to reason or "Death":

Fau. Ah Faustus,

Now hast thou but one bare hour to live,
And then thou must be damned perpetually.

Stand still, you ever-moving spheres of heaven,
That time may cease and midnight never come;
Fair nature's eye, rise, rise again and make
Perpetual day; or let this hour but be
A year, a month, a week, a natural day,
That Faustus may repent and save his soul.
O lente lente currite noctis equil!

The stars move still, time runs, the clock will strike,
The devil will come, and Faustus must be damned.
Oh, I'll leap up to my God! Who pulls me down?
See see where Christ's blood streams in the firmament!
One drop would save my soul, half a drop. Ah my Christ!-
Rend not my heart for naming of my Christ;
Yet will I call on him: oh, spare me Lucifer!-
Where is it now? 'Tis gone: and see where God
Stretcheth out his arm and bends his ireful brows,
Mountains and hills, come, come and fall on me
And hide me from the heavy wrath of God!

No, no:

Then will I headlong run into the earth.
Earth gape! O no, it will not harbour me.
You stars that reigned at my nativity,
Whose influence hath allotted death and hell,
Now draw up Faustus like a foggy mist
Into the entrails of yon labouring clouds,
That when they vomit forth into the air,
My limbs may issue from their smoky mouths,
So that my soul may but ascend to heaven.

Ah, half the hour is passed: 'twill all be passed anon.
O God,
If thou wilt not have mercy on my soul,
Yet for Christ's sake, whose blood hath ransomed me,
Impose some end to my incessant pain;
Let Faustus live in hell a thousand years,
A hundred thousand, and at last be saved!
Oh, no end is limited to damned souls.
Why wert thou not a creature wanting soul?
Or why is this immortal that thou hast?
Ah, Pythagoras' metempsycosis, were that true
This soul should fly from me and I be changed
Unto some brutish beast: all beasts are happy,
For when they die
Their souls are soon dissolved in elements;
But mine must live still to be plagued in hell.
Cursed be the parents that engendered me!
No Faustus, curse thyself, curse Lucifer
That hath deprived thee of the joys of heaven. (V, iii, 131-80).

Here the language is much richer than that of Everyman, but the ideas are remarkably similar. There is the same plea for time to repent, the same appeal, "spare me ..., the same hopeless casting around for refuge.
Finally Faustus too wishes he had never been born. Like Death in *Everyman*, Faustus's reason knows that there is no escape. Death is perpetual, damnation certain, and time will not stop. There is a strong sense of inevitability in the length produced by so many stressed monosyllables: "The stars move still, time runs, the clock will strike". When Everyman argues, Death patiently puts him right. The Death-like voice in Faustus's monologue also corrects him: "No, Faustus, curse thyself ..."

The internalization of the dialogue makes one major and significant difference. Faustus's intelligence makes him intolerably aware of the meaning of death, and of the juxtaposition of passing time and the eternity of damnation. In contrast, Everyman is blind and foolish; he understands only gradually. In terms of "character" the two figures are thus antithetical. Faustus is not Everyman precisely because his intellect makes him singular and exceptional (Levin, p.133).

But I think that the approach through character is not necessarily the most illuminating. The difference is a product of the different techniques of expression. If one takes as a criterion the state of mind conveyed, rather than character, the perspective alters. In *Everyman* the total experience is conveyed by the conjunction of two voices. It is only at the surface level that the episode concerns a foolish man and a figure called Death. If the allegory is properly understood what is conveyed is the experience of confronting death, the recognition of its inevitability in conjunction with the struggle to escape. In reality the state of mind which is analysed is one of combat between the intolerable awareness of imminent death and the self-deception which is a product of present panic. *Everyman* and Death are separate components of the same mind, and like Faustus, "Everyman-Death" is simultaneously self-aware and self-deluded. It is the allegorical form which makes the central figure a victim and a fool.
But the form, of course, affects the experience of the audience. In the moralities the central figures are viewed ironically because they are not heroic. We watch and judge as they blindly make wrong choices. The audience experiences pity mixed with a certain amount of moral superiority: we should not be so foolish. The Vices are clever, but in a sense we are cleverer, because we can see the falsity as well as the plausibility of their arguments. Our judgment is paramount. In tragedy, however, the position is reversed. Judgment is not necessarily suspended (we are able to see the folly of Faustus's decision), but it is as if the play works on two levels, and at the primary level of response the hero's experience dominates the audience as it dominates the play. Tragedy creates a world which is larger than our own. We enter into the world of the hero and are thus involved in his choices. We share his experience. In tragedy it is sympathy which is paramount.

This is why tragedy could not exist within the morality tradition. The tragic hero involves the audience in his experience because he appears autonomous. Allegorical figures in the morality tradition cannot be heroic. While their separate characteristics are isolated in personifications any admirable qualities, endurance, for instance, or courage, are separately personified, and the central figure remains formally passive. But if inner conflict was to be a part of tragedy, the techniques for analysing it developed in the morality plays had to be incorporated into the literal drama. This is what happens in Faustus.
Conclusion

This is not the place to reopen in detail the question of Shakespeare's morality heritage, but it is difficult to resist suggesting briefly and tentatively the influence of the *psychomachia* on Shakespearean tragedy.

Shakespeare's explicit expositions of the inner warfare of abstractions are largely comic. Lancelot Gobbo gives a detailed account of the debate between his conscience and the fiend on the question of whether to stay in Shylock's service (*The Merchant of Venice*, II, ii, 1-27, noted by Craik, 1966, p.52). Clarence's two murderers are much hindered by conscience until the second exclaims, "Take the devil in thy mind and believe him not", and they fall resolutely to work (*Richard III*, I, iv, 120-50).

But the deliberative soliloquies of the tragic heroes, though they make no explicit reference to the *psychomachia*, can frequently be analysed in terms of dialogue between abstractions, Hamlet's "resolution" and "thought" (III, i, 56-88), Macbeth's ambition and fear (I, vii, 1-28) or Othello's love and justice (V, ii, 1-22). These states of mind are complex and the pattern of dialogue is less obvious than it is in *Faustus*, but something of the form of the *psychomachia* remains. Brutus's soliloquy in his orchard provides a relatively clear example (*Julius Caesar*, II, i, 10-34). Brutus, "with himself at war" (I, ii, 46), later describes his state of mind in terms of a kingdom which suffers "The nature of an insurrection" (II, i, 67-9). This inner warfare is between the public and political impulse to prevent tyranny and private reluctance to assassinate Caesar. It is the political voice which insists, "It must be by his death ...", and the private voice which hesitates, "I know no personal cause to spurn at him ...". The debate continues, with the arguments of friendship becoming more abstract and more negative, and so tending to carry less conviction:
Th'abuse of greatness is, when it disjoins
Remorse from power; and to speak truth of Caesar,
I have not known when his affections sway'd
More than his reason.

It is the strident political voice which uses powerful images of the adder's dangerous sting, and of young ambition scorning the ladder by which he reached the clouds. Subsequently the same voice, consistently strong and deliberate, become assertive, "So Caesar may", and then imperative, "Then, lest he may, prevent ... Fashion it thus ... think him as a serpent's egg ... And kill him in the shell".

The soliloquies, however, only reflect the larger patterns of the action. Shakespeare is consistently concerned in the great tragedies with the hero's choice of a course of action, and the consequences of that choice. This concern appears strongly in the Henry IV plays, where the Prince chooses between external figures which reflect his inner impulses. In Part I the choice is between Falstaff and Hotspur, "riot" and honour; in Part II Falstaff continues to provide one pole, while the Lord Chief Justice represents the other (Dover Wilson, 1943, passim). Brutus is perhaps the first hero to internalize the conflict. The process of choice forms the centre of Hamlet, and here the hero's conflict centres on the difficulty of determining which is the "nobler" course, revenge or passivity. The problem is resolved only when Hamlet submits to Providence. Lear's choice is presented briefly at the beginning of the play. It initiates the tragic suffering which follows. Antony is torn between luxurious Egypt and calculating Rome, Othello between the angel, Desdemona, and the Vice, Iago.

In each case there is a strong structural resemblance to the moralities, which deal above all in the processes and consequences of ethical decision. Shakespeare's plays are greater than their structures, of course, but an awareness of the morality tradition may in turn illuminate
something of the nature of that greatness. Macbeth is perhaps the closest of all the tragedies to the morality structure. The central figure errs from the true path and then faces retribution (Craig, 1950, pp. 71-2). Here the hero stand isolated between the Witches (who equivocate like Wives) and Lady Macbeth on one side, and Banquo and Duncan on the other. The ethical norms of loyalty, kinship, hospitality and affection are set against the "black and deep desires" of the hero, which seem to come to the surface at the beginning of the play, and which he cannot resist though he knows that they will bring him to damnation.

Much of this conflict is expressed in soliloquies, which are no longer isolated set pieces, as they tend to be in Hamlet, but spring organically out of the action. It has become more difficult to identify the separate "voices" in these soliloquies. Each doubles back on the one before, reflecting the intense confusion and disorder of Macbeth's state of mind. But these speeches condense the themes and imagery of the rest of the play. They lead up to the central action of Duncan's murder and they express its consequences for the hero's state of mind.

The true but misleading prophecies of the Witches generate an inner warfare which cannot be resolved until the deed is done. In the great soliloquy in I, vii, Macbeth explores the antithetical impulses of his nature, setting the act against its consequences, this life against the next, cosmic pity against ambition, and invoking the traditional iconography of the Last Judgment as Duncan's virtues "plead like angels, trumpet-tongu'd, against/ The deep damnation of his taking-off" (I, vii, 19-20). It seems that he has concluded against the murder, and at once Lady Macbeth comes in like the traditional Vice to provide the wanted "spur". In the early part of the play Macbeth's dual nature works on him as, in the Porter's analysis, drink works on lechery: "it provokes and unprovokes ... it makes him, and it mars him; it sets him on, and it takes him off; it persuades him, and disheartens him; makes him stand to,
and not stand to ..." (II, iii, 27-33).

Curiously, the language of the soliloquies consistently isolates the "agents" - of temptation, and then of the deed itself - from the consciousness of the hero, which registers what is happening with increasing horror. When Macbeth exclaims, "Why do I yield to that suggestion/ Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair ...?" (I, iii, 134-5), it is as if the "suggestion" and the "image" were somehow external to him. In the same way, "My thought ... / Shakes so my single state of man ..." (I, iii, 138-9), and "I ... bend up/ Each corporal agent to this terrible feat" (I, vii, 79-80). The "corporal agents" are isolated from the consciousness of the "terrible" nature of the deed. The language dividing these agents from Macbeth himself reaches a culmination in his exclamation after the murder, "To know my deed, 'twere best not know myself" (II, ii, 75). He adds, "Wake Duncan with thy knocking! I would thou couldst!", and it is ironically true that the self which he must reject wishes that Duncan still lived.

As he becomes steeped in evil, this conscious self becomes diminished, shrivelled. The "year, the yellow leaf" of the imagery (V, iii, 23) suggests not only old age but an insubstantial quality in his experience of life. He hardly responds to his own new deeds: "Direness, familiar to my slaughterous thoughts,/ Cannot once start me" (V, v, 14-15). Life is a shadow, not the thing itself; Macbeth is like an actor divorced from the part he plays (V, v, 24). Because of the separation of actions and experience from the consciousness which interprets them, life is "a tale told by an idiot ... signifying nothing" (V, v, 26-8). The self has retreated from its own experience until the experience itself seems unreal, insubstantial, incomprehensible.

The morality tradition, too, isolates the self from its impulses, the agents of temptation and action. Macbeth, like Humanum Genus, is the victim of desires which the language externalizes, which come to the surface and act, to the horror of the conscious mind. At the same time,
however, he is not only a victim. Because he is not surrounded by personifications we also see him as self-determining, heroic, tragic. Sympathy prevails over judgment so that Malcolm's moral evaluation, "this dead butcher" (V, viii, 69) seems inadequate to an audience which has participated in Macbeth's conflict and despair.

Macbeth displays an extraordinary insight into the complexity of experience, but it is one which owes much to the allegorical tradition. The moralities, of course, did not achieve anything so subtle, but it is my hypothesis that without the morality tradition Shakespeare would not have done so either.
NOTES

1. I have quoted the Authorized Version of the Bible throughout since ideas rather than language are my primary concern.

2. I find it difficult to accept the view of Natalie Crohn Schmitt who argues that the ditch should be regarded as a moat symbolising purification, and enclosing an area immediately surrounding the castle which is free from sin. The text seems to give no compelling evidence for this interpretation, and it seems unlikely that the allegorist would fail to draw attention to so significant a symbol. The doctrine of original sin would seem to render it improbable that Humanum Genus would be born within the sacred enclosure (p.139). Further, I take it that he returns to the bed to die, still a sinner. This area free from sin seems an even more unlikely location for "Coveytyse copbord", which the diagram places at the foot of the bed, and which Miss Crohn Schmitt herself interestingly suggests is where the aging and covetous Humanum Genus keeps his money (p.130, n.4). Surely the "lake" into which the World's Boy threatens to throw the hero's body (1.2913) cannot be the water of purification (p.142). It is more probable that if a specific lake is intended, it is the water which surrounds the "world" of the play's action. The body is to be thrown over the edge of the world, hurled into oblivion.

3. The geographical positions of the World and God are not, I think, accidental. God's scaffold is in the east. The altar is at the east end of the church. Effigies on medieval tombs, like the bodies beneath them, generally await the resurrection of the body facing east, the source of Christ's second coming. Langland places heaven in the east (C-Text, II, 133). The scaffold of the World is to the west, directly opposite the throne of God. The C-Text of Piers Plowman sets the Tower of Truth, the abode of the Trinity, in the east. To the west is the dale of death,
and between them is the fair field of the world (I, 14-19). Skeat notes
the resemblance of this scheme to the stage plan of The Castle of
Perseverance (vol.2, p.4). Nature in Lydgate's Reason and Sensuallyte
locates celestial values in the east and transient worldly values in the
west. The man governed by Reason will travel towards the east (11.665-82).
(The devil conventionally dwells in the north, Rudwin, pp.63-5).
4. Butler cites Augustine, Gregory, Bernard of Clairvaux (Butler,
pp.198-200; 217-18; 248). See also Rolle, 1921, p.27.
5. Henry Bradley suggested that "Irisdision" was a misreading of
"Joch Evan", and though his argument is less convincing than Dahlstrom's,
it would support the contention that the two characters are to be
identified. W.H.Williams, however, rejected this on the grounds that
"Irisdision" is obviously a mystic. But St.John, as author of the
Apocalypse, was equally obviously a mystic (Mirk, pp.32-4; Hilton, pp.23-4),
and "Irisdision's" references to Revelation (11.81-8, 147-8) would seem
to support Dahlstrom's argument.
6. For a history of the concept of right reason to the middle ages see
Hoopes, pp.1-95. Cochrane gives a detailed analysis of the Augustinian
theory (pp.400-507). For a popular Middle English analysis of the
relationship between reason and sensuality, of particular interest in
relation to the medieval moralities, and specifically Mind, Will and
Understanding, see Femebyng.
7. See Davies, Nos.17, 81; Owst, 1926, p.342. The tradition may owe
something to Juvenal (Satire X, 11.188 ff.) who was well known during the
middle ages (Shannon, p.361), but Blench suggests that its origin is
Jerome, Epist. LIV, MPL 22, 557 (Blench, p.234, n.18).
8. I have amended Farmer's punctuation of the last two lines of the
quotation (... in pain./ Lost ...
9. According to de Vocht, however, Elkerlijk is even more unusual in Flemish literature, and he maintains the priority of the English version (de Vocht, pp.164-214). For a recent discussion of the relations between Everyman and Elkerlijk see Gawley, pp.x-xiii.

10. Other analogues of Everyman are cited by Arnold Williams, p.161.

11. In Justus Lipsius's Two Books of Constancie (Englished by J. Stradling, 1595) Langius exhorts Lipsius to the Stoic ideal of constancy amid the variableness of the world. He explains to him the values and use of the garden in which he studies, namely,

quietness, with drawing from the world, meditation, reading, writing .... So soone as I put my foote within that place, I bid all vile and servile cares abandon me, and lifting up my head as upright as I may, I contemne the delights of the prophane people, & the great vanitie of humane affaires. Yea I seem to shake off all thing in mee that is humaine, and to be rapt up on high upon the fiery chariot of wisdome .... I am guarded and fenced against all externall things, and setled within my selfe, carelesse of all cares save one, which is, that I may bring in subjection this broken and distrest mind of mine to RIGHT REASON and GOD, and subdue all humaine and earthly things to my MIND. (Lipsius, pp.136-7).

12. E.M. Pope notes that physical lusts are subsumed under World in the Protestant analysis of the World, the Flesh and the Devil, but it seems to me that she fails to distinguish between worldly pride and presumption, so that I cannot entirely accept her interpretation of Paradise Regained (see n.13 below).

13. The nature of worldliness and its relation to the two other major sources of damnation is displayed in two accounts of the temptation of Christ, widely spaced in time, but products of the same fundamental Reformation tradition, Bale's The Temptation of our Lord (1538) and
Milton's *Paradise Regained*. In Bale's play the temptation to turn stones into bread is to be resisted because it is God's will that Christ should fast. God is able to provide food and Christ prefers to rely on this providence. The temptation is to distrust and disobedience, not gluttony (pp.157-9). The temptation of the pinnacle is put in the form of a test of identity. Satan tells Christ that he is deceived in supposing that he is the Son of God, but if his supposition is right he can throw himself down in the certainty that God will save him. Christ replies that God's promises are not thus recklessly to be put to the test. It is possible to climb down in safety; "What need I then leap to the earth presumptuously?" (pp.159-61). The kingdoms of the world offer the three familiar sources of satisfaction, honour and pomp, riches, beautiful women and rich foods (p.164). The play shows Christ proof against distrust and presumption as well as the three traditional sins of the world.

*Paradise Regained* is a much more complex and subtle work, but in my view its underlying structure is similar. Christ recognises the temptation of the bread as a suggestion that he should distrust God's promises, (I, 349-56). Satan then turns to the pleasures of the world and offers a series of temptations to the three worldly values. The banquet (I, 340 ff) represents the pleasures of the senses, and when this fails he offers riches as a means to greatness (II, 411 ff.), and then renown and worldly glory (III, 21 ff.). The vision of the kingdoms of the world then amplifies these temptations to sensual pleasures, avarice and pride. Parthia is military power (III, 269 ff), Rome empire, including wealth and the pleasures of the flesh (IV, 44 ff.), while the secular learning of Athens (IV, 221 ff) is traditionally associated with avarice (cf. Adam's *curiositas*) and is thus a further temptation to worldly values. A second attempt to induce despair through fear fails (IV, 394-431), and finally Satan transports Christ to a pinnacle of the temple, scornfully inviting him either to stand or to cast himself down in the assurance of safety
(IV, 549-59). As in Bale's play, Satan puts the temptation in the form of a test of identity ("Now shew thy progeny", 554, cf.538-9), but the real choice is between presumption, reckless action as a result of overconfidence in election, and trust, the willingness to do what is perilous when necessary, without assuming a special immunity from the natural consequences. Christ as the Son of God, atoning for Adam's submission to Satan, stands by divine power; Christ as representative man stands through divine grace, trusting the consequence to God. Ironically, it is by refusing to make unnecessary trial of God's promise that Christ reveals his identity and exposes Satan's. Having failed to show Christ guilty of distrust, worldliness or presumption, the proud tempter himself falls, cast down a second time to "Ruin, and desperation, and dismay" (579).

In Milton, as in Bale, worldliness is only one of the three temptations employed and resisted in this the supreme example to the faithful of the nature of Christian warfare.

14. For literary examples of the implicit equation between worldliness and the three sins of pride, avarice and lechery see Fulke Greville, "An Inquisition upon Fame and Honour", 1; Love's Labours Lost, I, i, 31; Vaughan, "The World"; Marvell, "A Dialogue between the Resolved Soul and Created Pleasure", 11.51-78.

15. Cranmer, for instance, regards natural reason as much inferior to faith but not utterly irrelevant to it. It is revealed truth which is essential to salvation, but its confirmation by human reason can "help our infirmity". Christ himself appealed to natural reason, providing visible evidence of his human nature through the agony in the garden, and of his resurrection by appearing to the disciples. We ought not therefore utterly to reject reason which is "of great moment to confirm any truth" (Cranmer, p.252) and thus the handmaiden of faith (Cranmer, p.371).
Cranmer's claims for reason are modest by comparison with those of Aquinas. Hooker, however, goes a long way towards re-establishing the medieval attitude. He rejects the Calvinist conception of man's total depravity. All things in the world incline towards perfection, the imitation of God. Man seeks to imitate both God's knowledge of truth and his virtue (Hooker, I, v, 1-2), and reason is indispensable to both kinds of imitation. Virtue consists in the obedience of the will to the dictates of reason, and the function of the reason is to recognise the good (Hooker, I, vii, 1-4). "Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding. And the light of that eye, is reason". (Hooker, I, vii, 2). Hooker adopts the hierarchic conception of human nature, dividing the soul into two parts, the "diviner" and the "baser", and, as in medieval theory, the higher should control the rest. Thus, "the soul ... ought to conduct the body, and the spirit of our minds the soul" (Hooker I, viii, 6). He does not, of course, reject the universal Christian belief in the necessity for grace (Hooker, I, viii, 11), nor for faith attainable only through supernatural revelation (Hooker, I, xi, 5-6). Reason, made slothful by the Fall, needs grace to quicken it so that it is able to discern the good, just as the will needs the aid of grace to pursue virtue (Hooker, Appendix to V, i, 8). In his fallen condition man must battle against sensuality, the law of the corrupted flesh, which is antithetical to reason (Hooker, App. to V, i, 9), and against the tendency to abuse reason as "an instrument of iniquity" (Hooker, App. to V, i, 5).

Thus Hooker modifies considerably the extreme Protestant attitude to reason. For Lutherans and Calvinists reason is irrelevant; salvation and virtue are achieved through grace alone. But in Hooker's conception, though reason unaided cannot save, man himself, through reason, his highest faculty, can be instrumental in seeking salvation. Natural reason too, is necessary in the interpretation of the Scriptures. Things
essential to salvation are plainly revealed by God, but where more obscure issues are concerned, God appoints wise men to study the Scriptures, and their judgments should be accepted (Hooker, Preface, iii, 2).

Hooker's influence on subsequent Anglicanism was profound (Marshall, p.1 ff.) but I have found few traces of similar ideas in the post-Reformation moralities.

16. See e.g. Bernheimer; Bloom; Bronson; Fletcher; Frank; Honig; MacQueen; Silverstein; Tuve.

17. The role of Experience has been taken to indicate the play's affinity with the Renaissance and to suggest that Redford anticipates Bacon (Withington, 1942). In fact it appears that the concept of knowledge as a product of reason and experience, which can include intuition through divine illumination, is a medieval commonplace. N. Jardine, of King's College, Cambridge, has written to me as follows:

"The passage in Roger Bacon's *Opus Majus* ... goes,
For there are two modes of acquiring knowledge, namely by reasoning and by experience. Reasoning draws a conclusion and makes us grant the conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, nor does it remove doubt so that the mind may rest on the intuition of truth, unless the mind discovers it by the method of experience ..."


"A similar passage appears e.g., in Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, so there is clearly nothing particularly experimental about the attitude to *scientia* involved. The source for this cliché is ultimately Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* (especially II, 19). But even before the *Posterior Analytics* became widely read and commented in the West the distinction between experience of a fact and reasoned knowledge of a fact was commonplace through the "old logic" of Boethius..."
and Porphyry. It is worth noting that well into the sixteenth century Boethius was used as an elementary text, and the Posterior Analytics was only for advanced students.

"It is also worth noting that "scientia" often included law and theology and that the distinction between reasoned and experienced conclusions is commonplace here (e.g., in St. Augustine). Here experientia has no empirical connotation, although the source is still ultimately Aristotle via Porphyry and Boethius."

18. I do not agree with Velz and Daw that Redford is prescribing a middle way between Tediumness, who is all work (or "working too hard", p.639) and Idleness, all play (p.636). Tediumness surely represents boredom, the student's response to the preliminary hard work and painstaking detail involved in learning (Latin). Wit is too impatient to bear with this. When he does overcome Tediumness it is through careful and thorough study in obedience to his teachers.

19. Although the Humanist synthesis of use and virtue survives in the views of men like Ascham, Protestant theory led to a general weakening of the close link between learning and morality. Education was a means to reading the Scriptures (Watson, pp.9, 173), and was encouraged as part of the attempt to secure religious conformity (Watson, p.25; Charlton, pp.93-5), but the extreme Protestant separation of reason and faith meant that reason could not contribute directly either to salvation or to good works, and that education, therefore, could not lead to virtue. According to Calvin, human reason is perfectly capable of applying itself to purely earthly matters, government, the liberal arts and sciences (Calvin, II, 2, 13-16), and the result is a tendency to associate education primarily with the Protestant concept of vocation, and to justify it on the basis that it is a preparation for the performance of
Even if few educationalists adhered rigorously to the theories of the Reformers, the wide currency of their ideas probably had considerable influence. And one would expect that once education is relegated to earthly concerns it would become perfectly acceptable to point out its earthly benefits. When learning loses its transcendental associations it becomes less improper to discuss its material advantages.

Thus, though the inculcation of manners and morals continues to be regarded as an important part of education throughout the sixteenth century (Watson, pp.90-136), there is an increasing tendency to stress its material advantages. Mulcaster praises education for the Humanist reasons that it benefits the community (Mulcaster, pp.5, 25-6) and it teaches discernment between good and evil (pp.28-9), but he does not hesitate to add that "To write and read well which may be jointly gotten is a pretie stocke for a poore boye to begin the world with all" (Mulcaster, p.34). Francis Clement in his Petie Schole (1587) tells the story of Dionysius, the tyrant of Sicily, who lost his kingdom but was able to avoid poverty and contempt, thanks to his education, by becoming a schoolmaster at Corinth. "Welfare thercfore this worthy learning, which doth not only support, but exalte: not availe, but advance unto a wonderfull height of magnificent and pompous honour" (Pepper, pp.90-92).

20. F.P. Wilson describes it as pure and excellent allegory (pp.43-4). Spivack notes the romantic and chivalric metaphor which provides the framework for all three "wit" plays and draws a connection with Lyly's romantic comedy (pp.219-23). The danger of confusing the metaphor with the theme, however, is displayed by Velz and Daw, who describe Wit and Science as "a successful attempt to apply the traditional plot of the soteriological moralities to a love story" (p.632), and then go
on to see the fact that Science is "shallowly characterized" and "passive" as "a major limitation of the play" (p.645). The romantic element is, of course, allegorical. Learning does not have a "character" in this sense; nor does it make overtures towards the student.
1. Abbreviations

Adams
Joseph Quincy Adams ed., Chief Pre-Shakespearean Dramas, New York, 1924.

Brandl
A.Brandl ed., Quellen des weltlichen Dramas, Strasbourg, 1898.

Eccles

EETS, E.S.
Early English Text Society (extra series).

EETS, O.S.
Early English Text Society (ordinary series)

FQ
The Faerie Queene, see Spenser.

Happe

H-D

Materialien

MPL

MSC
Malone Society Collections

MSR
Malone Society Reprint

S and S

TFT
J.S.Farmer, Tudor Facsimile Texts, London.

Periodicals are cited in accordance with standard abbreviations.
2. Editions of plays cited, listed by title.


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_All for Money_, Thomas Luton. S and S.

_Appius and Virginia_, R.B. Happé.

_Cambises, King of Persia_. Adams.

_The Castle of Perseverance_. Eccles.


_The Conflict of Conscience_, Nathaniel Woodes, S and S.


_The Four Cardinal Virtues_. MSC IV, 1956.


An Interlude of Minds, Henry Nicholas (Niklaes). Comedie. A Worke in Rhyme, containing an Enterlude of Myndes, c.1574.


King Darius. Brandt.


Like Will to Like. Ulpian Fulwiler. H-D, vol.3.


Love Feigned and Unfeigned. MSC I, i, 1907.


Mankind. Eccles.


Mary Magdalene (The Life and Repentance of), Lewis Wager. TFT, 1908.


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