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Transition unbound
De-Fragmentation of students‘ learning ‘momenta’

by

Georgios Kleanthi Zarifis

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the degree of
PhD in Continuing Education

December 1999
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Acknowledgements

I want to express my gratitude to the Greek State and the State Scholarship Foundation (Ιδρυμα Κρατικών Υποτροφιών - IKY) for their financial support from October 1994 until March 1998. I want to thank my supervisor Dr Rosemary Preston for her continuous support and acknowledge Dr Loraine Blaxter for her assistance during the summer of 1996. I thank all the people who in various ways made the completion of my thesis possible.
Abstract

This thesis is based on an empirical study of ten post-graduate students of human and social science at University of Warwick. It aims to re-conceptualise transition with reference to the way students discuss their personal experiences. The thesis has the form of a narrative that is based on the post-modern idea of creating the conditions that describe what cannot be represented. The central argument of the thesis is that either we always learn in transition or that learning is always transitional. Based on this argument the thesis takes the form of a journey in which the author traces issues relevant to transition, such as behavioural changes, emotional and cognitive in/stability, work and identity, learning and personal development. In this context transition is described as a spiral approach of constant reference to experiences of the past and the present, as well as expectations of the future. Methodologically, the thesis introduces a case-oriented comparative model for empirical research that is based on the deconstruction and reconstruction of personal experiences that appear as text. This defragmentation creates a story in which some of the components of transition become part of a lifelong learning process. In the analysis transition is treated as a feature of life, far more complex than a simple passage from one situation to another, punctuated by two points in time and space. It is also an evaluation of personal experience that refers to the development of self, in relation to the other, and to the roles and responsibilities people have in an educational environment or expect to take on in their attempt to reach stability.
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<td><strong>Case-oriented comparison</strong></td>
<td>Case-oriented comparison is the comparison among different cases or clusters of cases. According to Ragin (1987), who introduced the term, qualitatively oriented comparativists, seek to interpret specific experiences and trajectories of specific cases or categories of cases. Case-oriented comparativists are interested in questions that are limited, substantively and historically. They study how different conditions or causes fit together in one setting and contrast that with how they fit together in another setting (or with how they might fit together in some ideal-typic setting). Case-oriented comparativists tend to analyse each observational entity as an interpretable combination of parts, as a whole.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive stability</strong></td>
<td>Stability that relates to the way we perceive ourselves in the present. It allows us to know where we stand.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commodification</strong></td>
<td>In social science commodification is the process of monitoring, calculating and quantifying values and concepts such as time, space, learning or reality in order to turn them into exchangeable units (commodities).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conceptual input</strong></td>
<td>The process of creating definitive and sensitising concepts that refer to paraphrased sentences.</td>
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<td><strong>Connectionist approach to occupational choice</strong></td>
<td>A psychological approach to occupational choice that was first introduced by Skinner (1978). This approach connects the developmental and the differentialist approaches to occupational choice with social-learning theory by recognising the effect that the environment and the differences in reinforcement have on behaviour.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual deconstruction</strong></td>
<td>The process of reducing the number of words in a text by paraphrasing it in order to create dialectical pairs (also see contextual dialectics and dialectical pairs).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual dialectics</strong></td>
<td>Contextual dialectics is a pattern of designing a number of interlocking ‘cycles’ which spread a net over what is analysed. These multiple cycles have the form of pairs that give more choices and more flexibility to what we analyse. They can be used concurrently, approaching the same phenomenon from a number of different angles, in effect triangulating it or knitting a pattern of cycles. This pattern of connecting ideas, aims at seeking knowledge, not as a thing we can have, but rather as a process of involvement in a personal, circular, contradictory process of knowing, it has its philosophical basis on Rowan's (1981) ‘dialectical paradigm of qualitative research’.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual reconstruction</strong></td>
<td>The process of reviewing a contextually deconstructed text. Reference is made to the paraphrased sentences of the deconstructed text in order to locate the definitive and sensitising concepts that create its dialectical pairs (also see contextual deconstruction, contextual dialectics and dialectical pairs).</td>
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<td><strong>De-fragmentation of learning momenta</strong></td>
<td>The process of bringing together in one story the pieces of text that refer to similar dialectical pairs, as they appear in contextually reconstructed texts. The new story represents the author's learning experience and ability in locating the commonalities of different texts. It is based on the use of visual and verbal metaphors, pieces (fragments) of transcribed texts and literature to create a vivid and stimulating dialogue. It is an artificial discourse that is characterised by an equally artificial consensus and dissensus among those who participate in it.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Definitive concepts</strong></td>
<td>Definitive concepts identify the individual instance in terms of the concept. These concepts provide prescriptions of what to see (see Bulmer, 1977).</td>
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<td><strong>Developmental approach of occupational choice</strong></td>
<td>The majority of developmental approaches explain personal behaviour and attitudes during transition to work in terms of the maturation of the innate capacities of individuals. Ginzberg (1951), who was the first to emphasise the developmental aspects of occupational choice, conceptualises it as sequence of developmental stages that lead to entry into an occupation. He describes occupational choice as taking place over a period of six to ten years and involves a process of irreversible decision-making. This leads to a crystallisation of occupational choice which inevitably has the quality of compromise.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Dialectical pair</strong></td>
<td>Dialectical pair is a set of two words separated by a dash (binaries). It refers to definitive and/or sensitising concepts that oppose, correspond with or depend on each other (for example: self-other, male-female, time-space, stability-movement).</td>
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<td><strong>Dialectical paradigm of qualitative research</strong></td>
<td>Rowan (1981) describes a 'dialectical paradigm of qualitative research’ as something that is based on the assumption that research is a process of systematic inquiry that leads to knowledge stated in propositions. This inquiry involves an element of observation or interaction with persons in order to offer empirical evidence for the research conclusions. For Rowan dialectics can be explained as ‘the more visible independence of opposites’. They can also be explained as the interpretation of opposites or as the unity of opposites.</td>
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<td><strong>Didactic talk</strong></td>
<td>In didactic talk the speaker’s intention is to hold forth rather than to share ideas (see Belenky, et al, 1986). Each discussant may report experience, but there is no attempt by discussants to integrate their thinking to arrive at some new understanding.</td>
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<td><strong>Differentialist approach of occupational choice</strong></td>
<td>This is a psychological approach that was introduced by Super (1952). It accepts individual differences in abilities and interests as a factor that enables free occupational choice.</td>
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<td><strong>Ecology of the self</strong></td>
<td>Is what Hormuth (1986) presents as a concept of self where others, objects and environments are involved and reflected in self-related cognitions.</td>
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<td><strong>Educational dialectics</strong></td>
<td>Belenky et al, (1986) in their attempt to analyse and explain women's life experience in relation to self, knowledge and voice, used a paradigm that is grounded in processes through which voice, mind and self develop. These processes may be listening and speaking, personal or impersonal, discrete or related. They may involve a degree of loneliness or being with others. The categories that they create by using this paradigm they call them ‘educational dialectics’ (for example: means-ends, compartmentalisation-synthesis, constructed knowledge-received knowledge, collaborative-solitary, dilettantism-narrowness, etc.).</td>
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<td><strong>Emotional stability</strong></td>
<td>Emotional stability is the ideal form of stability that relates to the expectations of the future.</td>
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<td><strong>Explanatory units of comparison</strong></td>
<td>These are the results of comparison (what is to be explained after the comparison).</td>
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<td><strong>Female essentialism</strong></td>
<td>A naturalistic approach to the female identity that relates to the reconstruction of the female body (see Modleski, 1991).</td>
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**Feminist anti-essentialism**  
A feminism without women where the term ‘gender’ substitutes the term woman (see Nicholson, 1995).

**Fittingness**  
This concept emphasises analysis of the degree to which the situation observed matches other situations in which the researcher is interested. It provides a more realistic and workable way of thinking about the generalisability of research results than other classical approaches. A logical consequence of this approach is an emphasis on supplying a substantial amount of information about the entity studied and the setting in which that entity is found (see Guba & Lincoln, 1981).

**Fragmentation of self**  
This refers to breaking down of the concept of self to its components, namely objects, others and environments.

**Interiorisation**  
A phase of self-search that is very important for being on good terms with ourselves and achieving emotional stability (see Pieper, 1964).

**Learning instance**  
A learning instance is the learning that takes place between two spatio-temporally defined points where we make conscious decisions about initiating or terminating a phase of our lives. Many learning instances together constitute experience.

**Learning momentum/a**  
A learning momentum is a component of a learning instance. A learning instance may consist of many different learning momenta (also see learning instance).

**Liminality**  
A transient condition or stage of instability that relates to our positioning at the periphery of a situation. It is evident at the moment we initiate something new and when we terminate something else.

**Observational units of comparison**  
The entities that we compare (what is compared).

**‘Package’, the**  
The ‘package’ is a term that is used metaphorically by students to express their ideal image of what they want to do in the future. It is something that is supposed to take shape in the future when students enter the world of work, although it does not necessarily relate to work per se. It relates to stability and the future image of self within employment. The package is a group of social images that associate to employment that are frequently updated and propagated and for some students originate from the media.

**Philosophy of the limit**  
Cornell (1993) argues that the role of deconstruction as the transformation of women’s experience to theory, must be re-examined. So, she renames deconstruction, as it is developed by philosophers of language and calls it ‘philosophy of the limit’. Through ‘philosophy of the limit’ she argues that the affirmation of the feminine, within sexual or physical difference need not involve an appeal to a self-identical female subject.

**Real talk**  
According to Belenky (1986) real talk reaches deep into the experience of each discussant and draws on their individual analytical abilities. It requires careful listening because it implies agreement that together with the discussants, researchers can create the optimum settings in which emergent ideas can grow.

**Rites of passage**  
In any society people’s lives may be seen as a series of passages from one situation to another (i.e. from one age to another or from one occupation to another). These passages may be accompanied by special acts that anthropologists define as rites. Rites differ in terms of the society in which they are located and the situations to which they relate.
Rites of the threshold or initiation rites

At whatever age, people are constantly in the process of passing through or passing between, being stable and being on the move. Sometimes they are trapped in spatial images that they cannot control. Then they are stable. At other times these spatial images operate as doors that lead them somewhere else and they begin to move. Van Gennep (1960) described these doors as the boundaries between foreign and domestic worlds. The rites that relate to crossing these boundaries are also classified as rites of transition. Van Gennep calls them rites of the threshold or initiation rites. To cross the threshold is to unite oneself with a new space and regain stability.

Sensitising concepts

Sensitising concepts are the alternative solution to the problem of concept-formation. They refer to the development of concepts which are both more adequate theoretically and also more faithful to the empirical social world than definitive concepts. Bulmer (1977) argues that many of the concepts used in the social sciences are sensitising concepts. Sensitising concepts lack specification and attributes and do not permit the user to move directly to the instance. Sensitising concepts merely suggest directions along which to look.

Social learning theory

A psychological theory of learning that is based on Sears (1957) idea that learning is an association of sense impressions and actions, between stimulus (S) and response (R).

Spatio-temporal attributes

Time and space characteristics that are attributed to a personal experience, a rite of passage, a condition or a situation.

Spiral or Helix

The concept of the ‘spiral’ (helix) is used by many theorists to represent the process of development or to refer to the form and direction and duration of life cycles (see Dewey, 1938; Piaget, 1970; Kolb, 1984). There has been no attempt as yet to explain the way the spiral or helix operates in relation to time, space and learning, as components of personal development. In this complex relation, the spiral or helix refers to the spatio-temporal direction of learning cycles that depends on where the individual is placed when making a decision. Individuals move from one learning instance to another, in the same space at different points in time or in different spaces at different points in time. In this context, transition is the learning instance that takes place in between two spatio-temporally defined decisions.

Time-space compression

According to Harvey (1990), time-space compression relates to the general acceptance that time and space are perceived as a unity. This is marked in the literature by the almost obligatory use of terms and phrases such as speed-up, global village and overcoming spatial barriers. Massey (1993) claims that the concept of time-space compression remains curiously unexamined. She sees it as a concept with little social content, or no more than a restricted, one-sided, social content.

Transference of personality

According to Van Gennep (1960) transference is the relation between the passage through the door (rite of the threshold) and the preparation for union as a form of communication which brings the person to the centre of the community in which they incorporate.

Transition

Transition is a perpetual cycle of learning instances punctuated by emotional and cognitive controversies. These controversies not only refer to the way we look at our relation to time and space. They also refer to the way we relate ourselves to stability, movement and change.
Translatability

The term refers to the degree to which components of a study - including the unit of analysis, concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings - are sufficiently well described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as a basis for comparison (see Goetz & LeCompte, 1984).

Visual metaphor

Visual metaphors (the mind’s eye) operate in the text like a camera that is passively recording a static reality and promotes the illusion that disengagement and objectification are central to the construction of knowledge.
Part One: Contextualising Transition
1. Making a case for research

The world today changes fast. Some people believe that this change is the result of technological achievement. The use of advanced technological products in every day life has made us more aware of the developments that happen around us and has expanded our knowledge about the world in which we live. From the popularisation of the idea that our world is one place to the simpler facts of life like the birth of a child, the death of someone we know, the beginning of a new relationship or the end of another, our lives are punctuated by change.

Social scientists see these changes from one condition to another as transition. Nevertheless, the meaning of transition is not clear, especially when we think of the variety of changes that happen within us. A physicist could claim that the transformation of water to ice is transition. An aeroplane passenger could say that the three hours of flight from one country to another is transition. An economist could suggest that the transformation of the former socialist states of Eastern Europe to capitalist economies is transition.

One definition of transition as an instance of change relates to the general notion of development. This means that transition may be a change to the better and a move forward. On the grounds of this assumption complex questions arise: moving forward in relation to what? Changing for the better in reference to what? A simple answer to these questions would be that it is the world as we know it that moves and changes in relation to particular points in time and space. This could reveal another assumption, that the world changes in reference to the past. In this context transition is the movement to a different point, stage or level in relation to the point, stage or level where we were before.

It is difficult however, to isolate instances of change in our lives and to define them in either a spatial or a temporal context because everything happens
simultaneously in time and space. It is equally difficult therefore to define which change and which movement is a transition, unless we relate it to our own experience, perhaps as a continuous learning process that causes change, but it is also caused by change. Psychologists would say that changes affecting our minds and our bodies and influence our feelings, desires, habits and attitudes towards learning may be called transitions. Does this make it legitimate for transition to be perceived as learning? We may say that the expansion of information technology, which has undoubtedly changed our world, affects the way we learn about the world. We may agree with the idea that the growth of knowledge about our planet develops better understanding because it changes our perceptions of the world in which we live. We may say that understanding human nature relates to transition because it may change our perceptions of ourselves and others. If we assume that all these are examples of changing through learning or learning through change, can we claim that learning is always transitional or that we always learn in transition?

This question has become a personal issue. Initially I related transition to my uncertainty about the future. I decided that transition was a phase of instability and insecurity that would pass as soon as I finished my studies. My feeling of instability was a result of my decision to study in the United Kingdom. This meant that I had to spend a considerable amount of time in another country from my own. My decision caused many changes in my life and made me wonder if all these changes, that seemed to happen so fast, were parts of a much longer transition that had started at some point in the distant past or if they were many quite separate transitions. From the moment I came to England to do postgraduate research, until now when I am seriously thinking about my future in employment, perhaps for many years to come, I realise that my experience has changed the way I see
myself and the world around me. It is as if I had pulled my past and present experience and future expectations into one single point in time, in my attempt to make sense of myself. Gradually I started to develop new questions and concerns that among other things related to the way I learn. I came to realise that the move from my home country to my country of studies caused a dislocation of my old self. This realisation helped me to re-locate my new self in time and space and to understand that I continuously change the way I see myself and the way I see others.

This was the first time that I experienced consciously what I thought to be transition. My growing awareness of transition in everyday life made me hypothesise that there must be other people with similar experiences. I became interested in what students from other parts of Europe who come to Britain for studies had to say about their own transitions. Before I decided the subject of my thesis, in January 1996, I talked to people who I thought were similar to myself. Most of them were students who came from other European countries to the same university to do Masters and Doctoral degrees in human and social sciences, of a similar age to myself. It was too early for me to know that our common experiences would become my thesis, but I knew from the beginning that they could help me to learn more about transition and to come into terms with the changes that were happening to me. This initial interest became a passion. In the end, I decided to make transition the key concept of my doctoral research, to explore its meaning and identify the factors that indicate its continuity. I do this through case studies of young people, through an analysis of learning experiences as they are described by students from different countries in the European Union (EU). All were completing higher degrees in England and coming to terms with what this meant, during their time at the University of Warwick. My initial
questions about change and movement helped me to develop the central argument of the thesis. This is that transition is a continuous process of evaluation of learning experience with a spatio-temporal outlook. I hypothesise that transitions are inevitable and generally relate to a large variety of issues that I identify as learning instances.

In my research I approach transition as an expandable concept sociologically and psychologically, an indispensable part of our evolution. On this basis I try to visualise transition within a spatio-temporal context and I argue that transition may be conceptualised as a cyclical process that consists of instants of learning about stability and change, and of different moments of personal development, at which we review and evaluate our self-images in relation to others and re-frame them at different points in time and space. My argument is supported by the deconstruction and reconstruction of transcribed conversations held with ten students, and their bringing together into a single story that integrates the common issues about which we talk. This approach enables me to locate transition in a narrative and to describe it within a specific context.

I believe that the thesis makes three significant contributions. Theoretically, it re-conceptualises the concept of transition as a continuous learning process by presenting new research categories of what I define as transitional learning. Empirically, it enhances my self knowledge and promotes better understanding of the way students live, act and react to situations, which for many people who work in academic environments are normal to the extent that they pass almost unnoticed. Among these people are members of staff, career advisers, higher education practitioners who work with higher education students and employers of all kinds who may benefit from becoming more aware of the was students think and perceive their worlds. Methodologically, it is one of the rare cases where
deconstruction of transcribed texts is used as the basis for comparison at such a micro-level to reconstruct personal experiences with reference to the concept of transition. This may be an incentive for further research in the comparative field by emphasising the commonalities in larger samples or national and international experience in order to create new contexts in which transition can be represented.
2. Is it art or is it science? The author’s imagination, the reader’s perceptiveness, the journey and the rules of the ‘language game’

Despite the very general description of the factors that led me to choose my research topic, there is an issue that any reader who wishes to understand the logic of my thesis should consider. Although I am sceptical of the use of the term post-modern or post-modernity in my thesis, I am deeply influenced by post-modern thought - as it appears in the writings of J. F. Lyotard - as a way of knowing. The way I construct the research hypothesis, the methodology and the way I interpret transition, coincides with the post-modern principle of using not just logical arguments, but also our imagination and all our abilities in order to create, construct and deconstruct our own images of the world. In this respect the post-modern as it is expressed in my thesis shows how a researcher like me can come to terms with his limits and the process of creating a narrative: a language game the rules of which I make myself.

Although my thesis is not about post-modernism or post-modern thought, I think that I must explain to the reader what is post-modern and how it relates to my thesis. The book of the French philosopher and theorist Jean Francois Lyotard *La Condition Postmoderne: Rapport sur le savoir* (1979), was the basis on which the international debate on the post-modern started. This debate concerns the reconsideration of the social, economic and scientific values and conditions as they have been dictated so far by those who represent what is called ‘the modern condition’.

Modern thought or modernism began during the period of Enlightenment with the appreciation of the human as a dynamic, creative and energetic being. After World War II and mainly during the 1960s, when industrialisation reached its peak, modern thought stressed the importance of representing human beings as
functioning at two levels. According to this new appreciation, humans think (res cogitans) and feel (res extensa). Efforts were made to subordinate *res extensa* to *res cogitans* (see Georgiou, 1993). Logic and truth were thought to have more value than feelings, personal will or aesthetics. Therefore, modern thought suggests that the cognitive performance of the subject (the human being) is based on its ability to be conscious of its cognitive activities (see Horkheimer & Adorno, 1947). As Georgiou (1993) puts it, the cognitive subject of the modern condition is the ‘cogito’, hence it is exclusively the human being as a rational being. This approach means that modernity suspends a number of other creative human abilities, such as imagination or critical thought (Urteilskraft).

Heidegger (1977) was one of the first to consider the inability of the modern condition to fulfil Enlightenment’s ideal of the human being. He believes that in modern thought the world exists inside the subject which creates the world, in the sense that it represents the world to the extent that it reconstructs the world’s image (p.31). The result of this representation, in which the relation between the world and the subject is organised, is to reject anything that cannot be depicted or represented with logical argument. The heterogeneous elements of the world are degraded and a final position is taken, not by the subject, but by the object as a ‘fact’ (Faktizität). The object is a cognitive construction. This legitimises rationality (Logos) as the ultimate human ability, while at the same time it degrades all other human abilities (cited in Castoriadis, 1981: 192). Rationality, objectivity and ‘Logos’ determine the *res cogitans*. Other human values that the Enlightenment tried to encourage, such as creativity, free choice, aesthetics or personal consciousness, are below and under the general, impersonal and measurable truth of the modern condition.
Post-modern thought as it is introduced by Lyotard (1979), comes to reinstate the human being in its full, live and creative condition. Whether it succeeds or not is irrelevant to the thesis. In other words, post-modern thought comes to redeem the cost that humans have to pay for the recognition of rationality and logic as the exclusive, governing ideas of their lives. In order to do this it attempts to put right the two ‘faults’ of modernity. These faults are the ascension of the human being to a transcendent being, and the degrading into the level of the non-existent of anything that cannot be logically projected, measured or represented. Lyotard (1979) suggests that the post-modern relation between the subject (the human being) and the object (world) has its starting point in these two structural deficiencies of the modern relation.

For Lyotard the unity of logic as it is represented by the modern condition does not exist. Neither does the human being exist as the transcendent being that regulates the way language is used to express the general and objective truth. This is because according to Wittgenstein (1977), the truth is constructed within what he calls ‘language games’ that represent the innumerable ‘forms of life’ that constitute our societies. For Lyotard each ‘language game’ is a unique reality with its own regularities and characteristics and it is constituted by the behaviour and the activities of those who participate in it, - that is to say the speakers. The language behaviour of the speakers however, is not arbitrary, but it follows the rules of the ‘language game’ in which they participate. These rules are constructed ‘ad hoc’ during the process of the ‘game’ and they do not accept changes from the possibly objective, generalisable, transcendent regulations that construct human behaviour. In the ‘language game’ humans participate not as ‘cogito’ or as transcendent subjects, but as live beings with all their powers: mind, body and soul, and all the abilities that they have developed through time.
For Lyotard the ‘language game’ is governed by the active and efficient speaker who develops their cognitive abilities and language performance to the full. It is the speaker who does not disempower the ‘willingness for power’ that is hidden in the ‘language game’ by transforming it into intellect. It is the speaker who reinforces it and enriches it by bringing it out as ‘language efficiency’ and imagination. The rules of the ‘language game’ differ completely from the rules of logic in the sense that they do not distort the regime of existence of the speaker, and they do not limit their creative abilities, under the plea of the fulfilment of a general, prescriptive framework. Lyotard suggests that in order to win the ‘language game’ we have to reach a level of practising the idea of justice, but not in terms of bounding it to the idea of consensus as something that brings together different subjects, in order to reach the objective truth. Consensus cannot be the purpose of the ‘game’, but it can probably represent a phase of its historical development.

He concludes that in the modern condition the boundaries between scientific and the pre-theoretical, pre-scientific knowledge or the knowledge of the ‘grand narratives’ (1985) as he calls it - like the theoretical, philosophical narrative that concerns the development of the mind, and the practical, political narrative of the emancipation of humans - are suppressed. He suggests a revived cognitive relation between the human being (subject) and the world (object) that also embodies the aesthetic position. This position has two characteristics. The first is that the cognitive abilities can be organised without the constraints of what is rational and logical, and without being dependent on empirical facts (cited in Adorno, 1973: 46). The second is that the level at which the object is articulated, is engaged with the level of its aesthetic appreciation (the duality of ‘res cogitans’ and ‘res extensa’ is cut out) (cited in Foster, 1983: 129). In this respect the mission of the post-modern cognitive relation between the subject (humans) and the object
(world) is not to suppress what is not representable, but to invent or make up images of what is conceivable, but cannot be represented (cited in Lyotard, 1985: 38).

All the characteristics of the post-modern condition that I have summarised above, the elimination of formalism, the acceptance of plurality of values, the recognition of the human being (subject) as a live speaker with an aesthetic criterion, and the tendency to reveal the non-represented, show the close relation of the post-modern condition to what Nietzsche calls ‘happy science’ (see Davidson, 1975). Based on these characteristics, I try to develop in my thesis my own ‘language game’ in which I participate and I play according to certain rules. In order to succeed in this, I initially employ a model to construct my hypothesis that refers to the schematic representation of transition as a learning condition with spatio-temporal attributes. This helps me to create a ‘platform’ on which my ‘game’ is played, or, to be more specific, it helps me to create a narrative in which I describe transition. This approach may be problematic for the reader who is not familiar with terms such as ‘schematic representation of transition’ or ‘spatio-temporal attributes’. It may blur the line that separates what can be seen as art, as a form of expressing myself through images not represented in the real world (such as spirals and time curves) from science, as a way of explaining the complexities of transition based on logical arguments. To resolve this difficulty, the reader should consider the way I construct my hypothesis and later my research paradigm, in terms of the influence of the post-modern thinking as it is expressed by Lyotard and described above.

What I do initially in order to construct the images that represent the hypothesis on which my ‘language game’ is based, is to read the literature that relates to transition in general: transition as form of change and development, and
liminality. Then I use the different interpretations of transition, anthropological, psychological, social, and I combine them within a framework that also reflects my own knowledge, my imagination and my personal experience of transition as it was developed and internalised through the years. This leads me to the construction of what O’Neill (1975) calls a ‘conscious building’ that I integrate in the hypothesis.

The role of imagination as a form of representing the world is very important in this respect and my understanding of post-modern thought as a way of knowing helps me to realise that imagination along with the use of logical arguments, can help me to identify what Jameson (1992) describes as shifts and irrevocable changes in the representation of a situation and the way it changes. For this reason, for someone who looks at the thesis in retrospect, it might seem that it would have been more legitimate, and perhaps more accessible to the average reader, to explain transition as the result of a series of logical arguments following the literature. The use of imagination however, which in my thesis takes the form of complex figures and metaphorical language, gives the reader the opportunity to create what Benjamin (1968) calls ‘aesthetization’ of reality (p.78). This means that the ‘language game’ or the narrative that I create, constitutes the representation of my reality, which in my thesis relates to transition. The narrative reflects on an historical sequence of events - reading the literature, constructing the hypothesis, choosing the research sample, deciding on the methods, interpreting the results of the research - that are shaped by other events that reflect my own knowledge and experience of the world. This personal knowledge and experience is visualised in my thesis as a spiral that grounds the perception and interpretation of the events to be narrated.

Some readers may think that this process creates complexity and does not help them to understand a situation. In my view the world (object) as it is, is
chaotic and tends to be disorganised by its nature. It is up to the subject to put it in order. In this respect it would not be a misunderstanding if the reader believed that I intentionally organise a chaotic narrative. Nevertheless, I prefer to see my thesis as a logical construction that is based on imagined and real events, that do not relate to any specific, recognisable social or theoretical order. The interpretation of these events is not based on any theory neither does it constitute theory by itself. It just represents the fundamental principle of the post-modern condition which is the reflection of a live, able, and imaginative human being that struggles to create a narrative in which transition is interpreted.

For this reason the reader must consider that the logic of my thesis is expressed by the combination of the different ways in which I visualise transition in relation to learning, time, space, self, other - and science that is represented by the use of comparative method, the quantitative logic behind the analysis and the symmetry that characterises my research paradigm (deconstruction-comparison-reconstruction). The question is to what extent I make this combination between the two successful in terms of producing new knowledge, and to what extent this comes out to the reader as a coherent whole.

As the reader will discover, in some cases the connection is successful. In other cases less so. The essence of this approach however, is that I make an attempt to show that science as it is perceived to be - thorough analysis that is based on empirical, preferably measurable facts, accompanied by critique on previous theoretical approaches of similar situations - does not necessarily have to involve clear rationales that justify the researchers’ choice of literature, construction of hypothesis, research questions and methods. In this respect the reader may come to the conclusion that I act as an anti-scientist who tries to reshape the meaning of what is ‘more scientific’ by experimenting on what is ‘less
scientific’. Some readers might think that the contradictory, anti-fundamentalist, non-traditional way in which I approach my prefabricated, artificial reality, creates a system of interpreting a situation that eschews all foundations altogether, and that this has as a result the generation of a parasitary theory on other systems (most often on modernism itself). This is not always the case. What I try to do and the way post-modern thought comes to justify it, is what Jameson (1992) calls the reflex and the concomitant of yet another systematic modification of a situation (p.xiv).

In my thesis this modification takes the form of a ‘theoretical hybrid’ that is characterised by the logic of calculated confusion, and it is expressed through the relation between the artistic, in the sense of giving an aesthetic appreciation of what is not represented by modern approaches, and the scientific, in the sense of thoroughly organising the steps that lead to this representation. This relation is always present in any research. Unfortunately, it is not always clear probably because most social researchers try to cover it with the facade of rationality (see Douglas, 1977).

For this reason the reader should take seriously into account that although my thesis might look and read as raw art or as an unfinished scientific piece of work, it is neither. It is neither art nor science in the conventional meanings of these words. It is a melange of both, a narrative that consists of artificial hypotheses, visual representations, prefabricated research questions and willingly chosen scientific methods, such as case-oriented comparison, that have been used by other social researchers. It is a piece of work that lies between art and science. It is raw art that intends to take scientific form, but it is also science that struggles to be artistic. It is not a conventional piece of work that follows generally accepted rules. It is a ‘game’, an artificial narrative - just as any other narrative - that does not
aim at finding the truth or putting a logical order in the confusion. On the contrary, it aims at revealing the confusion and chaos that characterises what cannot be represented in the modern condition, and therefore it is rejected and degraded.

This brings me to the final issue. So far I have explained the post-modern logic behind the thesis. Now I would like to make the reader part of this logic. For this reason I want the reader to consider the thesis as a virtual ‘journey’ into my own transition and try to visualise this journey. My purpose is to take the reader on this journey and experience its confusion and inconsistency, along with its rationality and system. The fact that I consider this thesis to be a virtual journey into my own transition is best expressed through the de-construction and re-construction of personal experience in order to create the framework in which I interpret transition. This framework is part of the greater narrative which is represented by the last part of the thesis. It is what I call de-fragmentation. Borrowing the term from the command ‘defrag’ that is used in the Microsoft Windows software package, it means to bring together lost pieces of files so the files are not corrupted, and are easily accessible.

My attempt to ‘genealogize’ as Nicholson (1995: 9) calls it - or ‘defragment’ as I call it - personal experience in order to interpret such a general category as transition, may sometimes seem to turn away from ‘the social’. It is true that in many cases in the last part of the journey, my interpretation narrows into a critique of representations or knowledges, leaving relatively unattended their social and historical contexts. This however, does not contradict my initial intention to create the conditions in which I do research, although in the process I realise that there is a variety of other factors that affect me deeply in terms of constructing those conditions. It is exactly this process of constructing those conditions that I call ‘the journey’. In this journey I am active and I operate in relation to my knowledge,
experience and imagination. I expect the same from those who read this work. I expect them to be active, perceptive and free to interpret the narrative in any way they wish. I also expect them to experience the confusion, complexity, anxiety, annoyance or happiness, fulfilment and satisfaction that I go through, from the moment I decide to create the conditions/rules, according to which the ‘language game’/narrative takes place. One of these rules for example, is the use of the present tense at all stages because I want to give the sense of continuity. This journey does not start from a specific point in time and end at another point in time. It expands in many directions and covers many issues and the use of the present tense makes it more interesting. All the other rules appear during the journey and are explained at the beginning of a new chapter. The journey is clearly signposted to help the reader understand its different historical phases, to make it more accessible and motivate participation in what Derrida (1978) calls the ‘power dynamics in the play of discourse’.
3. Overview of the Thesis

The issues in my thesis unfold in a gradual way. The thesis has six parts. All parts are divided into chapters and some chapters are subdivided into smaller sections. The first part is this introduction where I describe how I decided to do an empirical study on transition and explain the logic of the thesis based on the theme of the post-modern as a way of knowing, and the relationship between art and science.

The second part of the thesis provides a background to the research. Here I submit a number of different approaches which I think relate to moments or periods of change that may be called transitions. In the first chapter I describe the ways in which the literature on transition is disparate and fragmented, and the processes that were engaged in determining a relevant literature for the thesis. In the second chapter I refer to socio-anthropological views of transition as a cosmic conception, developmental approaches to occupational choice, personal development and learning, and the way some feminist theory has questioned the legitimacy of the deconstruction of women’s experience to describe their identities. This helps me to understand better the effects of the distribution and formulation of spatio-temporal patterns of transition as students in higher education discuss it, and the effects of change on patterns of self-appraisal and learning as components of personal development. In the third chapter I bring together all these approaches to contextualise the concept of transition and relate it to learning in order to create the hypothesis. Based on a general appreciation of the approaches in this chapter I talk about the ‘commodification’ of time and space as factors that may relate to learning as a transient process. I then describe the relation between time and learning and space and learning in order to illustrate the way in which I develop my argument that learning is always transitional or that we always learn in transition.
In the third part I go on to refine my methodology and to describe the methods that I use to collect and analyse the conversations with ten EU post-graduate students of human and social science at Warwick University. Here I present a model of micro-analysis that is based on case-oriented comparison and employs a dialectical paradigm of contextual deconstruction and reconstruction.

![Figure 1](image-url)

**Figure 1**

**Overview of the thesis**

The thesis begins with the contextualisation of the concept of transition and its relation to personal and global changes. It goes on to show how anthropologists, sociologists and psychologists approach transition, and how feminism looks at transition as a process that relates to the construction of self-identity. This leads to the main argument which is that transition is a series of learning instances that can be studied through the commodification of their components. It continues with the description of research methods, giving examples of the way the evidence is collected and the way the transcribed text from the conversations with ten post-graduate students is analysed and compared. Then it goes on to show how transition is discussed by putting together the results of the empirical research to form a single story. The thesis finishes by redefining the concept of transition as a cyclical learning process that is characterised by cognitive and emotional controversies.

In the fourth part I discuss the results of the analysis. It is the main part of the narrative. Here I suggest that transition is a continuous cyclical process, the direction and duration of which is punctuated by different approaches to personal development at different points in time and space. It is the product of unplanned
change, opposed to stability and highlights personal anxieties about the future. It relates to the way in which students and perhaps a large majority of other people contextualise their roles as they develop an ecology of self that involves others and extends to the way transition is conceptualised, as a process of self-evaluation that I identify as learning. The whole approach is refined with the use of a research diary that I keep while I do the research, feedback reports from the students, references to the transcriptions and a large number of metaphors that in many cases students use in our conversations.

In the fifth part I bring the thesis to some form of closure. I consider the importance of the new research categories that I create (the significance of time, space, change and stability) for further research on transition, learning and development. I also make some suggestions about what the research on transition implies for higher education institutions and for employers.

In the final part I submit an alphabetical list of my bibliographical and interactive resources (books, articles, World Wide Web pages and News Group addresses). My sources highlight the fact that my interest in transition has grown and expanded with post-modern thinking and the introduction of new interdisciplinary theories that attempt to cast new light on issues pertaining personal and global development.
Part Two: Studying Transition
1. Fragmented theory: The intellectual location of a thesis on transition

The journey begins with references to theories that relate to transition both as a concept and as a learning and development process. Before I present them, I want to refer to two important issues. The first concerns the processes which determined my decisions on the intellectual positioning of a thesis on transition. The literature on transition is disparate and fragmented, but it helps me to create a theoretical melange that constitutes the basis on which I construct my hypothesis. The second is the presentation of a clearly stated rationale, for being selective in my engagement with different debates relating to transition and not using more fully the literature on learning and identity, something that may disappoint the reader.

The first difficulty that I encountered when I decided to look at how to re-define transition as a socio-psychological condition, was that there is no literature that refers specifically and exclusively to transition. Nor was there any specific reference that could help me to construct my own research framework on transition. The literature that implicitly refers to transition is basically the literature that relates to issues of personal development, individual change and learning. This literature is diverse and comes from different areas and disciplines. They include psychology, sociology, philosophy and anthropology. Gradually, I realised that it is impossible to look at transition as an isolated issue, unless I create a context in which to locate it. In order to create such a context, I decided to look at the literature that refers to transition as a condition that constitutes part of a long process. I believed that this would help me to find my way and create a narrative in which I could submit my own definition of transition. In the beginning I intentionally avoid seeing transition in terms of a specific learning theory or theory
of individual development. I believe that if I had located transition within the framework of a specific learning theory from the beginning, I would not have had the opportunity to create the rules of my own ‘language game’.

At this stage of the journey, I am unaware of the nature of transition and to what it relates. I am working through the bibliography to create my own channels of thinking. So far, my limited personal involvement into a socio-psychological situation that I identify as transition, does no more than enable me to speculate on its contexts, but it is this speculation which determines the bodies of literature that I use to create a substantial background for the development of my research hypothesis. The fact that I do not refer to the same body of literature in relation to the expression of my thoughts on transition, does not mean that I ignore its significance for my analysis. Nevertheless, I intentionally avoid critiquing that literature in the light of my later observations. Instead, at each successive stage of the thesis, a new body of literature serves to construct the platform of the argument being developed. This is a tactic that I follow throughout my journey. As I progress with the research I realise that I cannot go back to the previously examined literature without taking account of. At the stage I am describing now, I do not know what my findings will be. Therefore, I cannot determine a literature that will only be relevant as they become known. In this first part of the thesis for example, I am only describing the body of literature that helps me to become more familiar with some of the theoretical contexts in which transition can be located. In the next part, I use a different body of literature to create a research framework, and in the last part I use another body of literature in order to fit my definition of transition into a narrative, the context of which is determined by the results of the empirical research.
I do not choose four different bodies of literature in the thesis according to a pre-set plan. It is something that I find I have to do as I progress with the research. This process is complex and in some cases difficult to be understood. It is worthwhile because it helps me to test the limits of my thinking in so far creativity and language efficiency allow me to see if my own definition can be incorporated within a new narrative about transition, and also if it can be represented with visual schemes. For this reason, each time I move to the next stage of my journey, I give an overview of the literature to which I refer, so that the reader can have a general idea of what to expect.

Now, I look at the different approaches to transition in the four bodies of literature and I synthesise them in order to create the basis on which I construct my research hypothesis. They are disparate and fragmented. In most cases transition is not seen as a unique condition that characterises every aspect of human life, but as an edging issue. It would be practically impossible to refer separately to all the existing theories of learning, development, change and identity that implicitly refer to transition. In this respect I have decided in the following chapter to look at transition from three angles and create a blend of anthropological, sociological, psychological and feminist approaches that make a more explicit reference to it. The purpose is to bring transition forward as a meaningful issue by attempting to isolate it from other issues to which these approaches may refer. Transition therefore is looked at as:

a. a \textit{spatio-temporal condition} that relates to phases or cycles of life including death,

b. a \textit{socio-psychological condition} that relates to decision-making, un-learning, emotional instability, construction of identity and cognitive change,

c. a \textit{learning condition} that relates to the deconstruction and reconstruction of personal experience.
The three perspectives are related, but in order to connect the different approaches to transition and produce a coherent result where transition appears to be the central issue, I give some research examples that relate to the way higher education students approach transition to work. I do this in order to create some consensus between the different approaches and stronger links between the theories of transition and my research. From the anthropological point of view where transition is seen as a spatio-temporal condition that involves participation in celestial processes, to the feminist approach where transition is seen as part of the deconstruction of the female identity, I will show that there are many similarities in the way theorists from different disciplines approach transition. At this stage, I do not use fully the literature on issues of identity, development or learning because I am primarily interested in work that will help me in the construction of the research hypothesis. The reader should bear in mind that any lack of critique to learning theories or issues pertaining the construction of personal or social identity, is not because I ignore their significance, but because they do not immediately conform to the purpose of the thesis.

Before I continue with the presentation of the body of literature that refers to transition, I must make clear that using different theories that come from different disciplines with application in different contexts, and synthesise them in a way that results in a coherent research hypothesis, is a demanding task. The effort is worth it because it gives me the opportunity to discover more concepts through which to visualise my thoughts and integrate them schematically, by reconstructing a number of theoretical fragments and ideas that appear to be peripheral to transition.
2. Theorising on transition as a learning and developmental process

Transition is difficult to define in terms of a specific theory of learning or development. Initially transition can be seen as a spatio-temporal condition that relates to phases or cycles of life, including death. In any society people’s lives may be seen as a series of passages. These passages may be accompanied by special acts that anthropologists define as rites. Rites differ depending on the society in which they are located and on the situation to which they relate. Van Gennep (1960) observes that the purpose of rites becomes more explicit in special ceremonies where people consciously participate in order to adjust their lives to what is determined by their tradition and their knowledge of the past.

“We encounter a wide degree of general similarity among ceremonies of birth, childhood social puberty, betrothal, marriage, pregnancy, fatherhood, initiation into religious societies, and funerals. In this respect, a person's life resembles nature, from which neither the individual nor the society stands independent. The universe itself is governed by a periodicity which has repercussions on human life, with stages and transitions, movements forward, and periods of relative inactivity. We should therefore include among ceremonies of human passage those rites occasioned by celestial changes, such as the change over from month to month (ceremonies of the full moon), from season to season (festivals related to solstices and equinoxes) and from year to year (New Year’s Day). All these rites should, [...] be grouped together” (Van Gennep, 1960: 3-4). [Italics mine]

Based on Tyler's views Van Gennep (1960) divides rites of passage into three types. Rites of separation, transition and incorporation. As he explains rites have spatial and temporal attributes and they are not developed to the same extent by all people or in every ceremony (p.9). A complete scheme of rites of passage theoretically includes pre-liminal rites (rites of separation), liminal rites (rites of transition), and post-liminal rites (rites of incorporation). In specific instances however, these three types of rite are not always equally elaborated because they are characterised by spatio-temporal contrasts.

Moran (1979) claims that these contrasts are evident in rites of transition. In transitional rites time is considered as a spatial image, insofar as time is imagined...
to be a series of points along a line. He also suggests that there is no escape from spatial images (p.24). Mack (1984) notes that certain transitional rites may relate to spatial, non-physical movements. For Mack transitional rites have the character of a magico-religious movement between two worlds that may be characterised by emotional instability (see Moran, 1979). This emotional effect is obvious when we enter a new, unknown territory.

«Whoever passes from one to the other finds himself [sic] physically and magico-religiously in a special situation for a certain length of time: he wavers between two worlds. It is this situation which is designated a transition that this symbolic and spatial area of transition may be found in more or less pronounced form in all the ceremonies which accompany the passage from one social and magico-religious position to another». (Van Gennep, 1960: 18). [Italics mine]

For Pieper (1964) the emotional effect of the movement between two different worlds may be seen in the passage from middle to old age. He calls it ‘interiorisation’ (cited in Moran, 1979: 36). It is when people enter a phase of self-search that is important for being on good terms with themselves and achieving emotional stability. This rite of passage may also be interpreted as a rite of separation by means of which one world is left behind and a new one is entered. At whatever age, people are constantly in the process of passing through or passing between, being stable and being on the move. Sometimes they are trapped in spatial images that they cannot control. Then they are stable. At other times these spatial images operate as doors that lead them someplace else and they begin to move. Van Gennep (1960) concludes that these doors are the boundaries between foreign and domestic worlds. The rites that relate to crossing these boundaries are also classified as rites of transition, but Van Gennep prefers to call them rites of the threshold or initiation rites because they have a different assignment. To cross the threshold is to unite oneself with a new space and regain stability (p.19). Moran (1979) identifies this relation between the passage through the door and the preparation for union as a form of communication which brings the person to the
centre of the community in which they incorporate. Van Gennep calls this process ‘transference of personality’.

For anthropologists like Van Gennep who stress the importance of liminal rites, death as an unavoidable puncturing of human independence, relates to the rites of the threshold. For Stevenson (1971) death is a journey to the other world and entrance to it is associated with a series of rites of passage whose details depend on the distance and topography of that world. Death is the entrance to the other world that relates to the rites of separation and integration that apply both to the deceased and to the people they leave behind (cited in Prickett, 1978: 88). For the deceased separation is from the world of the living, a time passage where the deceased crosses the threshold of integration into the world that of the dead. For the bereaved separation is from the person they have lost and a time passage when they cross the threshold of integration into the world without the deceased. Separations and integrations of this kind do not only relate to rites of death and mourning. Van Gennep (1960) believes that they are particularly visible then because they involve all categories of rites (separation, transition, incorporation), they have a magico-religious character and they involve physical loss that has an emotional effect.

Social anthropology puts the individual at the centre of the process of transition where the most important elements are those of space and time as they are defined in celestial and magico-religious ceremonies or everyday life acts. It gives to individuals the ability to monitor and time their transitions. Moran (1979) believes that the timing of transition, is based on individual calculations rather than legitimate, widely accepted patterns of timing, such as utility of putting oneself into a phase of transition, or evaluation of former and present status in people’s lives.
present state as against the quality of future state, discounted for the uncertainties of attaining the desired state in the future. (Moran, 1979: 247). [Italics mine]

By accepting the spatio-temporal character of celestial rites the individual is placed in various sections of society, synchronically and successively. To pass from one situation to another and join individuals in other social spaces, people must submit, from the day of their birth to that of their death, to ceremonies whose forms vary, but whose function is to facilitate their transitions. This is closely connected with the different ways people adjust to similar situations, the way they develop their self-images and the way they learn. This is best illustrated by those who recognise that submission to rites of passage involves a high personal cost (cited in Scott & Ruddock, 1989). This means that understanding of the fact that we form ourselves out of the elements of our total experience involves many factors, that the individuals identify them, and express them in terms of their emotions, their bodies and their language.

As for the validity of anthropological claims about the nature of transitional rites and their spatio-temporal attributes, it seems that what anthropology does is to highlight the fact that the meaning we give to new happenings in our lives is drawn from the past. This means that there are strong links between time and the way we interpret these happenings. Moran (1979) suggests that we literally stand on the shoulders of the past and the future is what comes from gently reshaping the past through rites of passage. The present is all there is, but present does not mean a moment always disappearing. Present is what a person is to other humans and non-humans. Our presence to others enables us to discover the riches of our past and the possibilities of our future. All of us have been partly formed and partly deformed by that through which we have lived. To the extent to which we have been deformed, the stream of new events will be perceived, understood and
remembered in false terms. Experiences are differently experienced, largely in accordance with our psycho-biography.

In conclusion some social anthropologists recognise that transitional periods sometimes acquire a certain autonomy that is crucial for the development of self-identity in terms of people becoming aware of where they stand. Life is a series of transitions that are associated with celestial processes, the revolutions of the planets, the phases of the moon, physiological and behavioural change, initiation, incorporation, separations, exchanges and passages of all kinds. These however, are different in every society and they are differently experienced by individuals. On these grounds transition is perceived as a cosmic conception that is also characterised by pre-scientific divination and implies some kind of change that explicitly relates to time and space and it may have the form of separation, initiation, termination or incorporation. Transitional change, therefore, is related to contradictions and challenges that have temporal and spatial repercussions. Whether this change is forced from without or grows from within, it can be threatening or frightening. It always involves a personal cost.

What anthropologists do not fully explain in terms of this personal cost and its psychological effects on transitional situations, is discussed by developmental psychologists who refer to transition in the context of occupational choice and social learning theory. Transition is not only a spatio-temporal condition that implies some kind of behavioural change. It is also a socio-psychological condition that specifically relates to decision-making, un-learning, emotional instability, construction of personal identity and cognitive change. Many developmental approaches from the early 1950s until the late 1980s explain personal behaviour and attitudes during transitions to work, for example, in terms of the maturation of the innate capacities of individuals. In this respect transition, although not a central
issue in psychological research, is approached within the context of behavioural change as a temporal phase or as series of different stages in which young people make decisions that relate to the choice of a job or lifestyle. Ginzberg (1951) who is credited with being the first to emphasise the developmental aspects of occupational choice (cited in Gothard, 1985: 22), conceptualises occupational choice as sequence of developmental stages that lead to entry into an occupation. He describes occupational choice as a long process that takes place in a period from six to ten years and involves a process of irreversible decision making. This leads to the crystallisation of occupational choice which inevitably has the quality of compromise. For West & Newton, (1983), Super whose arguments on occupational choice are based on Ginzberg’s developmental stages, observes that the self-concept has crucial influence in the process of occupational choice.

«One of the most influential theorists in the field of occupational choice is Donald Super, whose formulations have drawn heavily upon the work of Ginzberg, upon the life stages concepts employed by Buehler (1933) and upon the idea of life stage tasks requiring completion which has been developed by Havighurst (1953). Super regarded the whole of life as comprising five major stages of 1: growth, 0-15 years of age; 2: exploration, 15-25 years of age; 3: establishment, 25-45 years of age; maintenance, 45-65 years of age and 5: decline of occupational choice, 65 years and over». (West & Newton, 1983: 4).

The idea of a stage divided life seems to be popular during the 1950s and 1960s and its value is still accepted by many researchers today. Cross (1981) for instance, argues that the literature on developmental research is strewn with loose terminology and mixed images of two streams of research and theory. She calls the first stream research on the life cycle or phases of life (p.168). Within this stream of research, a number of writers (Levinson, 1978; Neugarten, 1968; Weathersby, 1978), stress the importance of social expectations in the way people of different ages change their behaviour towards a job or a lifestyle. The other branch of study falls under the general rubric of adult development (p.168) and is represented by names such as Erickson (1950), Perry (1970, 1981) and Kohlberg (1969). Some of
them like Erickson work on ego development and they define specific stages or periods of development. Others like Kohlberg and Perry, work on the more tightly defined domains of intellectual and moral development and they suggest stages or levels of stages that set a hierarchy of moral development.

Not all development studies adopt a stage-sequence approach. Tennant (1988), suggests that there are innumerable problems and methodological difficulties in establishing phases or stages of adult life (p.122). It may be obvious that most approaches have a stake in making comparisons between different ages, phases or stages of life. Leaving aside however, methodological problems such as deciding what type of data to gather, the common problem that characterises studies that adopt a stage-sequence approach is to construct a research design which generates comparative data (on whatever dimension) which indicates the effects of age changes only (where the effects of other factors, such as history, and time measurement are neutralised).

A number of studies are based on the idea of generating comparative research on the effects of age changes on occupational choice. Others indicate that there are inventoried vocational interests that relate to aspects of work such as job satisfaction. Levine & Wallen (1954) find significant relationships between the inventoried interests of teenagers and subsequent choice of occupation. They claim that trainees have goals and that young people learn with objectives in view. These goals and objectives may be task-specific, as being able to mend a fuse or master a theory. They may also be more general and relate to earning a living or to personal development (cited in Morea, 1972: 266). Studies such as these lead many researchers to argue that if individuals learn with specific objectives in mind, they must have different abilities, interests and personalities. Occupational choice is
seen as a process of matching these attributes (matching theory) with the requirements of available jobs (cited in West & Newton, 1983: 43).

This approach accepts individual differences in abilities and interests as factors that enable free occupational choice. Developmental psychologists who use this approach, are concerned with the examination of individual differences in terms of traits and factors, and the ways individuals organise their lives in terms of their capabilities and potentialities (Gothard, 1985). These traits are correlated to the requirements of different jobs and testing is the best means of predicting future job success. In this respect transition can be experienced differently since each individual attempts to identify their own traits in order to find a way of working and living, which will enable them to use their capabilities effectively. In this context Roberts (1983) suggests that transition is a socio-psychological situation that relates to occupational choice, develops in ways that are dictated by the opportunity structure, and is a matter of individual adjustment to the opportunity structures to which they have access (p.7). This view is shared among other researchers.

Holland (1966) concludes that people develop occupational choices after a search for work situations which provide outlets for their particular life-style (in Ball & Ball, 1979: 89). He sees choice as a matching process between personal hierarchies and the demands and satisfactions of particular jobs and he suggests that individuals differ according to the arrangement of the hierarchy of their preferred orientations. In this way he places the transition to work as the temporal
period between the moment that young people try to prioritise their lives in early childhood, and the moment they make a decision on a particular job.

«A youth is strong enough, able enough and knows enough to do things which earn either money, respect or both. He or she may not be able to do them as well or as quickly as an adult, but they can do them. Youth begins when we stop the child from doing useful and harmless things. That is, when we make decisions on behalf of a person who is capable of deciding things for themselves. Youth should be about making decisions, but usually it isn’t. We prefer to pretend that youth has not arrived. It seems easier for childhood to continue; and the growing child often finds this easier too, for a while and acquiesces., but as capabilities become more obvious, friction develops with those who treat the youth as child». (Ball & Ball, 1979: 7).

Based on this idea Brennan et al (1993) expose the need for more longitudinal data to reveal the relation between education, that to a certain extent helps young people to set their priorities, and the labour market which sets the criteria demanded to enter a job. His research focuses on the ways in which higher education students choose a job and the factors that are involved in the process of this decision-making. For this reason he develops a model for analysing the higher education-labour market (HELM) relationship centred in the higher education to employment transition and subsequent career, as experienced and viewed by graduates themselves. This model suggests that higher education courses have both a shaping influence on student/graduate orientations, expectations and demands and a preparatory influence on student/graduate skills and competencies (p.23). It does not explain why this happens and in what ways it affects students’ perceptions about working life. He concludes that students who have had the opportunity to do a period of work experience are satisfied with it, although he notices that there is a great difference between students from different subject areas in the way they perceive the employment-related value of their period of work experience. This does not explain the variety of the attitudes or values that develop at that time and the way in which they relate to learning.

«Whereas many students choose a subject content primarily because of personal interest rather than its direct employment relevance, they see, the usefulness to employment of their degree course lying in the opportunities offered to develop more personal and general kinds of skills. If that is the case, it becomes important to
establish the extent to which such skills are perceived as improved by the higher education experience, no matter what the particular subject or course.» (Brennan et al, 1993: 116-117).

Lindley & Hunter (1981) adds that this is more obvious in PhD training because it is too narrow and specialised, and seems to produce a cultural effect which makes industrial employment unattractive (p.19).

«The role of the higher education system in preparing for professional work is quite distinctive, in that the graduate entry-route is not usually the only one though there are signs that it is growing in importance. Professional formation is also distinctive in that it generally recognises three stages in the process: the academic, the vocational and the build-up experience. The problem then is quite explicit, that these phases need to be complementary and to be articulated one with another.» (Lindley & Hunter, 1981: 32).

The recognition of the agency or the medium that affects transition to work, concern many theorists who realise the importance of the HELM relationship in terms of the adjustment to new learning situations. On the basis of the significance of adjustment Sears (1957), who developed the social-learning theory, following Hull's behavioural approach of S-R (stimulus-response) relation, approaches transition as a learning period that is demonstrated whenever a later activity shows some after-effect of earlier activity (see Gothard, 1985). This means that the basis of learning is an association of sense impressions and actions, between *stimulus* (S) and *response* (R). King (1964) adds to the S-R approach by suggesting that to learn is to gain knowledge, skill or ability. He fails to indicate however that acquiring an inefficient performance or the wrong answer or a bad habit is also learning, according to social-learning theory (cited in Gothard, 1985: 187). As Gothard (1985) further explains, Skinner (1938) who remains probably the best known of contemporary thinkers in the social-learning tradition, recognises the effect of the environment and differences in reinforcement on behaviour. He claims that the individual organism tends to perceive and react to phenomena in terms of significant and meaningful wholes. Tolman (1967) who was the first to adopt this approach, observes that behaviour is characterised by
purpose. Therefore any explanation of learning and behaviour as part of a period of transition, should attempt to incorporate this apparent ‘purposiveness’ (purposive behaviourism).

Boys et al (1988) for example, who look at the way in which students from many disciplinary areas, evaluate the knowledge they gain from what they study, and relate it to what they do as a job later, use purposive behaviourism to explain the relation between graduates' academic choices and expectations and their evaluation of the course in which they participate. Their respondents reflect the notion of a hierarchy between sectors. This hierarchy determines the purpose for which they choose a specific course. As they observe, students’ academic choices appear to have been most strongly influenced by the academic content of the course rather than the way the course was provided (pp.124-125). They conclude that in no subject area does enhancement of employment factors compete with the students’ desire to follow personal interests, and that in all cases except business studies it is less influential than the desire to choose options which would help gain a better degree (p.127). Most graduates irrespective of the subject they study attach importance to work which is continually challenging and an opportunity to use special skills and abilities.

For Kirkland (1988) purposive behaviourism does not only relate to personal hierarchies that determine course choices. It also relates to the development of a personal and a student identity that depends greatly on the boundaries that are set by the academic community (p.149). Henkel (1988) believes that the sense of development of a strong personal and student identity that leaves no space for external influences, is more obvious in social and human science, but he does not explain whether this resistance constitutes a part of the students'
occupational orientations or whether and how it relates to the way they develop their identities and attitudes towards education, learning or work.

«It is assumed that the stronger the sense of identity felt by members of a subject community, the more able they will feel to resist unwelcome external influences. However, what they perceive to be unwelcome, or indeed external, is likely to vary with the locus of that identity.» (Henkel, 1988: 189).

Another issue that relates to transition as the phase between setting priorities and choosing or developing an attitude towards an occupation as part of developing a personal identity, is that of disaffection. Swandon, Pelican & Tucker (1981), who recognise the effect of disaffection as a factor that may impede decision-making and control over occupational choice, observe that social and education systems pre-allocate young people in proximity to broad bands of occupations by gradually modifying their aspirations to expectations and consequently to the job eventually obtained. They maintain that adjustment comes quickly (p.4).

Some research has shown that there are groups of young people who feel scared when it comes to make an occupational choice. Some are not ready to deal with issues that concern employment. Feeling threatened, they deploy their imagination in order to make a decision. Roberts (1983) believes that this feeling of threat and insecurity during the transition to work must be seen in relation to the way in which students evaluate their educational experiences and develop their values and attitudes towards higher education and work. Rudd & Hatch (1968), after extensive research on students working in different areas of knowledge in higher education, observe that the values and attitudes derived from graduate school, and those which scientists begin to absorb in their undergraduate years. These values establish research as the one supremely worthwhile activity, and the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, as better than its pursuit in any hope of sordid gain. Those students who enter an occupation dissonant with these values
are more likely to be disaffected (cited in Rudd & Hatch, 1968: 185). Corbett (1990) indicates that listening to what individuals have to say and feel is essential if we are to understand the nature and the length of their transition to work and whether this transition results in disaffection. For many people today, planning toward predictable outcomes in the labour market is increasingly difficult. That it may become even more difficult in the future, is likely to exacerbate disaffection during the transition to work. Hutchinson (1990) suggests that this is an oversimplification and that disaffection as part of the process of developing attitudes and values during the transition from education to work, takes several forms that may relate to positive learning (cited in Hannan & Shortall, 1991: 143).

More (1974) relates disaffection to life experience and learning. His definition is based on individual differences in learning experiences. Some people may come out happy and satisfied with a boosted self-esteem, while others undergo a re-orientation of their self-esteem. This destabilises the balance of their feelings about their achievements. The subtle modification of attitudes and values sends ripples of repercussion pulsing through the whole system, making them question their motivation and goals in education, and makes them open to change at that level in order to achieve equilibrium. This process goes on quietly behind the individual’s normal exterior, not interfering at all in normal expected behaviour. Few people would guess that the individual is experiencing the labour pains of a new self, the growing pains of personal learning, and the agonising grief of colluding in the death of someone whom they know to be themselves. It is no surprise that many people cannot cope at this level. They are overtaken by the trauma and pain of the experience. It affects their rationality and their adjustment to life. They are in the grip of crippling emotions. This is when transition becomes a traumatic period (p.124).
It would seem easy to suggest that an individual in such a state should simply deny the new learning, and return to the old balance and adjustment where there was happiness and contentment (i.e. childhood). This is something they cannot do because they are finding out too much about themselves as they suffer, and this new knowledge and feeling is too real to be denied. They have to go on, they have to cope and achieve adjustment, stability and re-orientation. New learning and experience have the power to pitch people into this kind of transitional situation. Learning coupled with new experience can be a powerful weapon against stability and security and cause disaffection at any stage of people’s lives. Experience can produce a particular life-style, and learning can come along to threaten not only the life-style, but the whole base, cognitive and emotional, from which it has grown. This is because in learning we are constantly referring the unknown to what we know, the new to the old, the future to the past. Then we have to undertake the process of unlearning. Unlearning refers to the process of transforming negative experience to positive in order to re-appraise ourselves. All our behaviour is an expression of what we are and of what life has made us, and this includes the attitudes which we have developed. So it is probably true to say that at some level learning within transition involves a reappraisal of self. This operates cognitively and emotionally. For Morea (1972) this concept is comprehensive because it embraces a variety of abilities and aptitudes. Change is the reference point. We can only know that change has occurred if it manifests itself in a change of behaviour that shows our readiness to undergo learning.

«[...] the learner has a large amount of input as to what is taught and when it is taught. If this can be extended so that attention is paid to the readiness to learn from earliest days then we will find that, rather than being turned off from education and learning there will be a continuing readiness to undergo the learning experiences. (Long, 1990: 49). [Italics mine].

I believe that the last phrase portrays a reality of transition which relates to the degree of autonomy that individuals have during their learning experience. In
effect occupational choice as well as aspirations for a certain type of job are conditioned by those aspirations nurtured in school and in the social environment, both of which seem to be divorced from reality (Long, 1990: 54-55). Inevitably disappointment and disillusion are the outcome of this decompression period.

Socio-psychological approaches to occupational choice and the transition to work underlie the rapid and almost universal expansion of educational provision which affects considerably the relation between education and working life. What seems to be problematic is that whilst selected aspects of learning that result in attitudinal change have received careful attention, few studies have been carried out in which the relation of learning to transition as a period of change, instability, disaffection, unlearning or reconstructing personal identity is considered. Of those few, some have concentrated on individual descriptions or case studies with a consequent neglect of revelations about overall trends. Others have been somewhat rigidly tied to the reporting of statistical data. This makes it evident that there is a need to integrate all the different approaches, using individual reports to provide supplementary information, as an aid to the understanding of an area as complex as this.

The transition from one situation to another, such as that from education to work, is not only characterised by emotional and cognitive instability. Approaching transition within the context of theorising, analysing, interpreting and describing behavioural changes, as part of what is called personal development, relates to the construction of personal identity. This involves the use of stereotypical language - for example students, young people - that in most cases represents a very narrow view on how someone who is located within a social group may be identified. Although I have not described fully so far the methods that psychologists, anthropologists or sociologists have used in their work in order
to justify their opinions on how identity is created within a context of constantly changing experiences, I believe that the language that they use and the way they use it, determine to a great extent the way identity is created. Transition therefore, cannot be seen only as a spatio-temporal, socio-psychological condition that relates to behavioural changes that determine to some extent the decisions that young people make as far as occupational choice is concerned. From what I have seen so far transition is also a condition of learning about oneself and relates to the deconstruction and reconstruction of personal experience that in research appears as text. This however is not always very obvious. It is important therefore, to cast some light on the issue of the use of language since my initial intention is to create a language game in which I will give my own interpretation of transition based on personal experiences.

In order to do this I will refer at this stage of my journey to the way contemporary feminist theorists and respondents analyse women’s identity and what this implies for the legitimacy of lingually de-constructing personal experience in general in order to analyse, describe or interpret identity or identities, not as something static, but as something that changes constantly depending on the quality of the experiences that are de-constructed.

'Ma'am, I want you to know about my closest friend, Madeline. You are a princess. Perhaps the day will come that you can help us poor Filipino women'.

(Sasson, 1992: 125)

According to Morgan (1982) the most logical place for the contemporary researcher to begin, if they are to refer to women’s identity, is where each of us began, with the body. For a woman who seeks to understand her own body image however, this is as paradoxical as the child who longs to see its own face when

1 : The boxes include passages of women’s writings that refer to transition from a situation to another. They also work as an introduction to the final story in which passages from the transcriptions are put together to create a collage of ideas on transition.
asleep. Such longing is not answered by the presentation of a photograph or by any other two dimensional representation of the self (p.42). Morgan believes that nowadays more than at any other time feminist literature tries to give an image of a woman that has been trying for centuries to speak her own voice. (p.50).

>“Many of my foreign friends have been stunned by the plunging necklines and skimpy clothing hidden under our dowdy ‘abaaya’. I have been told that we Saudi women resemble bright exotic birds with our choice of attire under our black veils and ‘abaayas’. Without a doubt, we women in black take more time and effort with our individual clothing under our cloaks than do Western women, who are free to flaunt their fashionable clothes.”

(Sasson, 1992: 153)

The debate between how women define themselves with reference to the way they speak and think about their bodies and sexuality seems to be a common agenda for contemporary feminist researchers. Women with a sexual preference, colour and origin - other than that which has been used to refer to what Brooks (1997) claims as ‘modern feminist thought’ (heterosexual, white, Western) - see themselves through their body images. This debate started in the sixties and strengthened in the seventies and eighties, shows that the theory that was supposed to be made by women for women turns into a theory of gender. In the nineties, the deconstruction of the female body by literary critics causes conflict amongst theorists in regard with the role of feminism. The introduction of the term gender as a substitute of the term woman is leading many theorists to talk about a feminism without women.

**ME**

I've got a big bum,  
Likewise my tum.  
Thunder thighs,  
But I quite like my eyes.  
I'm too fat,  
Hide my hair in a hat.  
Hands quite small,  
Why wasn't I born tall.  
Freckles splashed all over my nose,  
No earthly point trying to pose,  
Time of the month covered in zits,  
P.M.T. my life in bits.  
Open the bottle, pour out the wine,  
Not too much, the control is mine.
Second glass gone life’s bad,
Not when you compare it to what I had.

(Modleski, 1991) and Nicholson (1995) believe that feminist theory today and its references to the development of women’s identity reveals a position of female anti-essentialism. Nicholson (1995) argues that gender is a strange word within feminism that is used in at least two different ways. On the one hand gender was developed, and is still used, as a contrast to the term sex, to depict that which is socially constructed as opposed to that which is biologically given. On the other hand gender is used to refer to any social construction having to do with the male-female distinction, including those constructions that separate female bodies from male bodies (p.39). The latter usage emerged when many came to realise that society shapes not only personality and behaviour, but the way the body appears.

Modleski’s critique on the use of the term gender, relates to what Nicholson identifies as social post-modernism. Social post-modernism has challenged the approaches taken towards gender by attempting to deconstruct women’s experience, and then bring together all these deconstructed experiences with references to the politics of the body, race, geographical origin and sexuality (see Morgan, 1982). It succeeds in integrating the micro-social concerns of the new social movements, as these are expressed through different clusters of people that do not necessarily represent ‘A’ culture although they do have ‘A’ voice. This is done with an institutional and sometimes cultural analysis in the service of a transformative political vision.

From my brief encounter with post-feminist theory and women’s literature that refers to sexuality and the body, I realise that there is still a silent conflict between what the theory argues and what is depicted in the literature. In other words what women say about themselves by referring to their bodies, sexuality or
origin is not always how feminist theory interprets their sayings. I use the term silent conflict instead of a term like diversity, because I have noticed an undercurrent of confusion in the way feminist thought and especially feminist positioning towards gender is being conveyed to the public. I believe that this antithesis between different approaches of feminist theory regardless of whether it is defined as modern or post-modern, is best represented in some feminist descriptions of women’s development of self-identity.

Paris (1994) presents an interesting case-study of how a woman’s life experience brings together the social and the physical aspects of the feminist and post-feminist approaches. He shows how transition associates to self-understanding by relating it to the work of Karen Horney. Horney (1885-1952) is regarded by many as one of the most important psycho-analytic thinkers of the 20th century who died 45 years ago of cancer. Her early work, in which she quarrelled with Freud’s views on female psychology, established her as the first feminist psycho-analyst. In her later years, she developed a sophisticated theory of her own which provided powerful explanations of human behaviour that have proved to be widely applicable. Paris (1994), argues that Horney’s inner struggles, her willingness to get close to her disease and the way the disease deteriorated her physical appearance, induced her to embark on a search for self-understanding, which she recorded first in her diaries and then in her covertly autobiographical psycho-analytic writings. Paris examines the various stages of Horney’s thought, showing how her negative life experiences influenced positively her ideas.
In many cases the passages from one stage of development to another can manifest themselves in a negative form of experience. The stress that may affect women’s development of identity and their adjustment to a new environment, like that of work, shows how this can happen. Feminists like Hart (1992), argue that it may be that women are more disillusioned in their transition to work for the first time, if the world of work is less rewarding and more confining for women than for men. For Hart, the chief developmental task of entering work is the achievement of a sense of autonomous identity. This may be harder for women than for their male counterparts. The combination of such influences can be expected to lead to radical differences in the methods and routes of women’s transitions. Gove (1972) concludes that the status accorded to women in working life can have harmful effects not only upon their self-image, but on their mental and physical health as well (cited in West & Newton, 1983: 17).

“The possibility that socialising processes and work practices are contributing to ill-health among women is disturbing, and more research attention is now being devoted to this question (for example, Kopp, 1979). The transition from school to work is an opposite phase in development at which to examine sex differences in working life, since it usually marks the first entry into work. Initial reactions and expectations can be measured to provide a more accurate picture, largely uncontaminated by previous experiences. Examining the experience of females alone, of course, provides little information about the relative importance of findings, and it is therefore vital in a study of this kind to compare data gathered for both males and females”. (West & Newton, 1983: 15). [Italics mine]

Although my study does not concern feminist issues, it does draw from personal experience. The question that concerns me is to what extent personal experiences that consist part of the learning process for women can be deconstructed as many theorists believe. I was not so surprised when I discovered that most feminists that identify themselves as post-modern grew out of the critique of Husserl’s phenomenology. This means that the whole idea of deconstructing women’s experience in terms of theories of language or psycho-analytical terms, is based on an essentialist (as opposed to anti-essentialist) and naturalist account of the feminine that have been philosophically rejected by post-
modernism as inconsistent. Cornell (1993) argues the significance of deconstruction of women’s experience and suggests that the role of deconstruction as a basis on which women’s experience is transformed to theory must be re-examined. She denotes deconstruction as it is developed by Wittgenstein, Derrida and other philosophers of language as the fragmentation of a single word to related concepts, as ‘philosophy of the limit’ because she wants to explain that the affirmation of the feminine within sexual or physical difference need not involve an appeal to a self-identical female subject (p.5). This approach shows how deconstruction may be used in a way that reveals what and how we learn from different women and what are the components of this learning that are depicted through women’s experiences of their bodies, their emotional and cognitive world. As Modleski (1991) comments, the phrase ‘women’s experience’ masks the likelihood that these experiences have accrued to women, not by virtue of their womanhood alone, but as traces of domination, whether natural or political (p.17).

The deconstruction of women’s experience in work, for example, raises the issue of language and the way language is used to explain and interpret women’s development. Studies of women’s work and the sexual division of labour cast some light on the anti-essentialist position on the use of language to interpret women’s experience of political oppression and the historical variability of definitions of women in terms of race and social class. Work relations affect women’s, as well as men’s, development of identity during their transition to work, although they usually single out this aspect as the most important characteristic of the sexual division of labour and what it infers for women’s life development in general.

'I discovered that all these rulers were men. What they had in common was an avaricious and distorted personality, a never-ending appetite for money, sex and unlimited power. They were men who sowed corruption on the earth, and plundered their peoples, men endowed with loud voices, a capacity for persuasion, for choosing sweet words and shooting poisoned arrows. Thus, the truth about them was revealed only after their death, and as a result I discovered that history tended to repeat itself with a foolish obstinacy.'
Among feminists nowadays there seems to be a broad agreement that opportunities should be open to men and women alike in the context of the transition to work for example. Research shows that although some employers (particularly those offering craft apprenticeships), have been sufficiently impressed with their female employees to instigate publicity drives encouraging girls to apply for what is thought to be a man’s job, others have little knowledge of the difficulties women experience in taking up non-traditional occupations and tend to explain the minimal number of women in technical employment in terms of individual motivation, rather with reference to a lack of organised training initiatives (Hart, 1992). Other employers appear to be unaware of the domestic demands women and girls may have to meet and of the ways in which this can impose restraints on their actions, something that may cause instability. I think that this may be expressed in characterisations of women’s jobs as dead-end, unstable and among the lowest paid (Fox & Hesse-Biber, 1984, cited in Hall 1986). Such characterisations may encourage employers to offer less variety, diversity, interdependence, and impose more control both within and across employing organisations (Hall, 1986).

“Throughout history Chinese scholars and mandarins had traditionally taken up fishing when they were disillusioned with what the emperor was doing. Fishing suggested a retreat to nature, an escape from the politics of the day. It was a kind of symbol of disenchantment and non-cooperation.”

(Chang, 1991: 313)

These are only a few among many of the ways in which women’s transition to employment is presented through deconstruction of their experience, with a negative effect on their personal development in emotional, cognitive and physical terms. Hewitt (1993) observes that discrimination on the job relates primarily to time and the way time patterns develop both in social and individual environments.
She claims that women realise that their domestic work and employment in relation to the distribution and formulation of work and working time patterns as these develop between men and women, varies greatly. This affects the way they consume working time, and individual time and contradicts the ‘normality‘ of the working day and the working week with repercussions to the type of transition working women experience. She concludes that this is due to individual changes and time priorities between the two sexes both at home and work something that refers to the differences between the role of men and women in their rites of passage. Women have an extended time schedule that includes domestic work, something that does not necessarily apply to men.

«The changes [...] are transforming full-time, life-time - male - employment into new patterns of flexible employment [...] they have made the ‘normal’ working day in a ‘normal’ working week a minority pursuit». (Hewitt, 1993: 165). [Italics mine]

Hart (1992) believes that unawareness of what women go through during this phase of their lives rather than being considered as prime indicator of the underlying sexual division of labour it should be investigated as an example of discrimination on the job. I would add that because of this unawareness we should investigate what people learn as they make their transition to work, what are the components of this learning and how these components could become exchangeable in order to understand each other.

Trying to relate feminist thought to transition as a socio-psychological condition, I have come to see that the role of transition in developing an identity does not only relate to participation in magico-religious ceremonies, decision-making, occupational choice, changes in lifestyle, education or work. It also develops in terms of the way language is used. Feminists have managed to explain this by capturing different moments in women’s lives. They give the essence of a situation, which Modleski (1991) believes was always there, but has gone through
its own developmental stages to end at this point of time. This suggestion leads to the debate over female ‘essentialism’ along with the rise of the gender studies is the major contextualising event that depicts the triumph of a male feminist perspective that excludes women. This has created a feminist anti-‘essentialism’ so radical that every use of the term woman, however provisionally it is adopted, is disallowed. What Modleski does not recognise is that this ‘disallowment’ does not mean to deny any socio-biological reality. Here is where the use of language is involved. Accepting the term ‘woman’ to identify a body, a biological body, a way of thinking or even a social identity made many theorists attribute false presuppositions of what is different and what should be different in terms of what the term represents. Could this be the case for the way we use terms such as ‘gay’, ‘western’ or ‘black’? Is it simply an issue of how we use language to deconstruct our experience? If it is just a language issue however then I believe that with the deconstruction of women’s experiences, feminism has created its own victimising language in order to interpret women’s passages to life as periods of conflict, stress and in many cases trauma. The question is whether this should always be the case for a theory that nowadays claims to go beyond identity politics. It is my appreciation that the whole idea of deconstructing women’s experience is about the language that is used to express the experience and not the experience itself. The experience appears as text and it is always the text that is deconstructed or reconstructed through language. For this reason I would like to conclude with a reference to a study that seems to have passed the level of deconstructive description by reconstructing women’s experience that appear as text.

Field Belenky et al (1986) worked for three years with women of different social backgrounds, colour, origin and sexual orientation in order to look at how these women learn about themselves and how they construct their identities not
only with reference to their bodies and their personal, intimate experiences, but to the way they make themselves heard. Their analysis is based on a categorisation that was developed for similar research that was conducted with men in the late 1960s by Perry. They use blind coding in order to eliminate the effect of variables that for other researchers may have been significant like, age, social class, origin, colour etc. They deconstruct the transcribed interviews by fragmenting phrases and words to their meanings and they create a large number of categories that show how women learn, speak and think. Based on these categories they reconstruct the interviews by creating a story that refers to what they learn from women’s stories. Their research shows how reconstruction can be used in order to reveal what is behind the words that are deconstructed. What are the components of those instances in women’s lives, how do they realise that they learn or, depending on the nature of their experience, unlearn in terms of transforming their negative experience to positive experience. Belenky’s reconstructive approach shows how women’s behaviour is an expression of what they are or, even better, of what language has made them, and this includes the attitudes that they have developed towards others and towards themselves. Putting this idea in a post-modern context, it is probably true to say that the reconstruction of personal experience involves a reappraisal of oneself through language and that this reappraisal operates cognitively, emotionally as well as bodily.
3. Transitional learning: Personal development and learning momenta

Despite the differences in the way social anthropologists, psychologists and feminists approach personal development, my encounter with their views on issues that relate implicitly or explicitly to transition such as rites of passage, occupational choice, change and identity, helped me to realise that transition whether it is part of personal development, whether it relates to learning or whether it is represented by psychological or physical change, it is a continuous process that is grounded in experience. Strangely enough Kolb (1984) observes the same for learning (p.145). The implications of this process seem to have been widely ignored in research on learning or practice in education. Instead the research on transition as a component of human development, has been replaced by a person-centered psychological view of change as a learning process. Social anthropology, psychology and feminism may not refer to it by definition, but it is clear to me that learning, whether it leads to attitudinal, emotional or physical change, whether it is the result of rituals and celestial processes, or whether it relates to occupational choice, HELM relation or sexuality, is common to all cases. In this chapter I try to relate these different approaches and, based on this relation, I develop my hypothesis on transition. The result of this process is to create a context that has the form of a spiral in which I locate transition as my starting point.

Initially I recognise that learning is an important part of the multi-variant process of personal development. As an experiential mechanism, learning relates to change. Some theorists adopt a developmental framework that looks at personal development as series of stages where the process of learning is linear (see Cross, 1981). Others stress opportunity structure and individual differences in the way young people learn about how to choose their future occupations (see Gothard,
1985). Others recognise the importance of learning and the role of stimulus and response in the development of skill and ability. Others look at personal development as a total process, acknowledging the limitations of learning as a consequence of disaffection. Others show that learning is affected by knowledge about the role of the body, self-conflicts or the sexual division of labour.

They refer to fractions of time that pull together past and present experience and future expectations, but not to the transitory character of learning and its relation to the expansion of personal experience. I see these fractions of time as instances of learning that refer to and at the same time are components of personal experience. They are so integrated into our decisions on learning that they are almost imperceptible. When we go to university, for example, we think that we know why. We do not know what is going to happen once we arrive there. The moment when we move house to live in a different neighbourhood or different city we are very aware of the depth of this change, but we cannot control it because we do not know what we will learn once we go there. The first thing I think about when I try to think of learning instances as components of transition as a process that relates to change, is decision-making. Decision-making is a process that punctuates the critical changes of our lives. In most cases we decide to do something based on our the past and present learning, but also based on our expectations of the future. In this context decisions may be defined as learning instances. These learning instances are not independent. They are located in time and space and they can be controlled. They are the result of the fusion between the past, the present and the future, and they are expected to bring change. The question is that, if decisions can be located and measured spatio-temporally, does this mean that the changes that they will bring can be predicted, measured, and controlled?
Undoubtedly, changes may be defined spatio-temporally if we look at them in retrospect. In this respect many theorists (see Van Gennep, 1908; Ginzberg, 1951; Super, 1952; More, 1974) believe that change can be controlled because it is the result of decision. Any personal decision that leads to a new experience can be seen as change and can therefore be measured in spatio-temporal terms, but is it really possible to control change? If it is, can we claim that the learning that is involved in this process may be controlled?

What I previously identified as a learning instance, whether it is a decision, the cause of a decision or the result of a decision, relates directly to change and is set in time and space. There may be a confusion about its precise timing or spacing (Modell & Hareven, 1980; Ankarloo, 1983), but its spatio-temporal attributes are always present. Nevertheless, there are some learning instances whose relation to change does not seem to be direct. At the moment we decide to go to a different country to study, for example, we put ourselves into a process of change, although the learning effects of this are unknown at the time we make the decision. We may define chronically the moment of the decision to start or to finish our studies, but there is still an infinity of other instances in between these two points. Initially, these instances cannot be measured spatio-temporally and therefore they may seem to be out of control. Imperceptible, these instances are still the result of our initial decision. They are the products of our experience of change. At the same time I believe that they constitute experience (Figure 2).
Figure 2

Our life is punctuated by a large number of learning instances that cover the area between a decision to do something and the change/s that this decision may bring. These learning instances (blue area) that constitute the components of experience are unseen because they are perceived as self-evident.

According to this assumption our lives are punctuated by a large number of similar instances that cover the area between the moments we decide to start something new or finish something else. These instances lie between the decisions and the changes that the decisions bring. All these instances together constitute experience. This is to say that once we define our decisions spatio-temporally, the changes that may come as the result of those decisions define our experiences. Experience therefore is the product of a learning process that is not obvious, but it is always present, just like the time and the space in which the change occurs. This learning process relates to the transformation of change to experience in spatio-temporal terms. This explanation however, does not reveal the nature of this transformation. It does not reveal the nature of the form of its components, namely the learning instances of which experience consists. Neither does it show the new learning instances that change may create. This is probably because these learning instances are so deeply embedded in our experience that they are perceived to be as self-evident as the time and the space in which they take place. To some extent this explains the objectivity with which social and psychological
theories approach the relation between learning and change. This objectivity probably comes from the assumption that time and space are objective and therefore the relation between change and learning is self-evident, but if time and space are seen as objective and self-evident, could we claim as easily the same for the relation between change and learning?

So far I have hypothesised that learning causes change and at the same time it is affected by change. This is because learning experienced from the past present and expectations of the future affect our decisions. I am also claiming that decisions are located in and counted by time and space. Following the same thread of thought I am claiming that decisions bring change and change is always transformed into experience that can also be controlled and measured spatio-temporally. Nevertheless, experience consists of a plethora of learning instances that cannot always be defined spatio-temporally in an accurate way. These learning instances may lead to new decisions that will bring about future change. The cycle will continue until yet more change is transformed into experience. This recycling always takes place in time and space. All these assumptions lead me to the question of what happens between the time we decide to do something, and the moment when we define as experience the change incurred by that decision. Is it possible to define spatio-temporally the learning instances that lie between a decision and change? For me the learning that takes place between decision and change is imperceptible. The question is whether it can be located spatio-temporally or not.

Space and time are basic categories of human experience in all societies. Harvey (1993) claims that we rarely debate their meanings because we tend to take them for granted and give them common-sense or self-evident attributions (p.201). The argument is that individuals utilise or consume time and space and that in one way or another they contribute to the elaboration of the human potential and
personal development. This may cause disparities in the way learning is seen in relation to time and space because it is individuals who assess the type of activity in which they are involved and it is individuals who measure the time and the space that they consume. Hence, the relation of time and space to learning depends initially on the society which modifies its agents according to the conditions that are offered by those agents as individuals, or by the groups in which they participate. This leads me to my next hypothesis, that learning after all is a spatio-temporal condition. If this is so, it does not mean that learning relates to what we perceive as objective time and space in any direct way, because this depends on the way we perceive and internalise our own personal experience in time and space.

The theory behind the relationship between time and learning shows that they develop in many, but not necessarily converging ways (see Lengrand, 1986). This could mean that there is no single way to time a period of learning, even if that learning takes place in a controlled environment (family, school, university). Or is there any other way of thinking learning instances that constitute experience and which lies between decision and change? In everyday life we record the passage of time as if everything has its place upon a single objective scale. This objectivity with which we normally approach time tends to become confused when we start to recognise the complexity of our own mental processes and perceptions of time. Time can play tricks and make us feel the seconds like years or make pleasurable hours pass so fast that we hardly notice them (Harvey, 1990: 202). This means that there are many different senses of time and therefore one objective perception of time although desirable in many cases does not necessarily represent reality. Lengrand (1986), who looked at the relationship between time and lifelong learning observes that,

«The relations between lifelong education and time are so close that they develop in many, not necessarily convergent, directions. They may even be conflictual, as is
illustrated by the gangers of perpetual schooling (Verne and Dauber, 1977), the diffident attempts at rearranging social times, and the vital, often losing, battles fought by each member of society to be the author of his own history in time and counter-time. Time is a limited resource necessary both to the development of the trading society [...] and to that of every social agent, be it an individual or a group.» (Lengrand, 1986: 95).

Learning instances may be identified at many points on the time line if we consider personal development as a linear process. Different learning instances may emerge at different points in the time line. Some of these instances (black curve) can be measured temporally because as many theorists believe it is enough to place them on an objective time scale. For example a decision (learning instance) we take at a specific point in time leads us to a change. This change can be measured temporally once it is transformed into experience. These learning instances are perceived and obvious. There are some learning instances however that are imperceptible. These instances emerge during our movement from one experience to another. How do we time the learning instances (blue curve) that emerge during our movement from one experience to another (black curve)? For example how do we time the multiple learning instances that emerge during our movement from point one to point two and from point two to point three?

Time plays a significant role in the way learning takes place even when it increases the conflict between the socio-psychological state in which we happen to be and the particular learning instance that happens to take place at that time. This position gains more significance if we consider Harvey’s assumption that the time horizon is materially implicated in a decision and affects the kind of learning we experience.

In a temporal context, this raises the question of whether learning is a material decision and, if it is, what are the repercussions of this for its relation to change? The idea that time is a commodity (‘time is money’, ‘waste of time’, ‘spending time’, etc.) suggests that time is a viable resource both for the way we function and the way we evaluate our decisions.
Based on the above assumptions, when the question comes as to whether learning as the result of our decision to change can be timed we need to understand that it is ourselves who play a catalytic role in the way we adjust to different patterns of time (time-scales) and in the way we spend, create, save or waste our time. It is difficult to measure the amount of time that we will spend once we are engaged in a learning process. It is more feasible to measure it approximately, before it happens or after it happens, and only then if we are conscious of it in terms of our decision. It is not feasible to measure time while it happens. As I claimed earlier, decisions as learning instances bring changes that may be identified at many points in time. These changes can also be identified as learning instances that constitute the components of our experience (Figure 3).

What happens to the possibility of learning instances that emerge during our movement from one experience to another? What if we decide to learn at a certain point in time and this learning leads us without any conscious decision to a new learning instance? Can we measure this process temporally as well? Can we say that we have changed at point one and now we move to point two, based on the experience of the change in point one, knowing that we will experience a change there as well, but without considering the learning significance of the temporal period between the two points?

The learning instances between these two points are not as temporally-evident as the changes that cause them or the experiences into which they are transformed, but they are temporally imperceptible because they cannot be controlled. For this reason I believe that these learning instances constitute transitional experience. This means that the timing of any learning period considered to be transitional (many theorists talk about the transition of the 14-19 or 16-19 years old to work for example) cannot relate directly to time. It has no
temporal value unless the individuals that are involved in that process identify and commodify its temporal attributes. We are the ones who value it and convert its value depending on the way we relate it to our experience. The time that is involved in this process is also exploited, consumed and utilised in order to assist us to make new decisions that concern our lives and consequently our development.

For Lengrand (1986: 96) Marx’s point that ‘time is the space of human development’, shows that outside time, space is a central stake in the social and individual struggles for life, survival and development. Harvey (1990), argues that space like time is treated as a fact of nature. Space is naturalised through the assignment of common-sense everyday meanings just time is. In the context of change, the relation between space and learning - as it is in the case of the relation between time and learning - is not direct although it might seem to be. Learning may take place in one space (home, school, summer-camp), but it may take place in more than one space at the same time (school and classroom, summer-camp and a common lounging area, the super-market and the area where the dairy products are) depending on the level of consciousness or the way we approach the notion of space and internalise it through language. Our subjective experience can take us into realms of perception, imagination, fiction, and fantasy, which may produce mental spaces and maps and so many mirages of the supposedly real thing (Harvey, 1993: 203).

Relating Harvey’s approach to the imperceptible learning instances that lie between two hypothetical spatially defined points, I believe that we can experience learning simultaneously in many different places that may or may not be physical in the ordinary sense of the word. They may not have to relate to each other. They can be created or constructed on the spot, or imagined. They can be expanded or
compressed. If learning relates in any way to space, then this space may not be seen and understood only in the physical sense. The relation between learning and space therefore is not direct. Lengrand (1986) however believes that,

«Our relation to space is a direct one. Everybody lives in space, every object finds its place in it. The first ability that is socially developed, together with language, is knowledge and experience of space. Psychologists such as Piaget have shown that the stages of structuration of an individual’s psyche are also the stages of his structuration of space. This knowledge of space is acquired through processes so ancient and internalised that they appear to be «natural». For centuries little attention was paid to it. Societies with a stable structure pay no attention to it either; they rely on the immense knowledge of space they have acquired through the ages, without, however, being able to analyse it clearly». (Lengrand, 1986: 121).

What is this space with which we have a direct relationship? The relation between space and learning as the base for development and change may be observable and perhaps more obvious than the relation between learning and time, although prioritisation of time over space has been a central feature of theories of modernity. Our decisions on learning may appear to be direct by located in space, but learning is not direct by related to space in any way because space changes in relation to the way we internalise it at the moment we experience it and each of the moments at which we experience it is different from each other. This argument forms part of a highly sophisticated debate on the ways in which we conceptualise space, infiltrate it and perceive it, so as to relate it to our own learning instances. Contemporary, the views on the meaning of globalisation supports my argument.

Many post-structuralists believe that our world is not one place, but a sum of an infinite number of localities that may have or may have not similarities. Featherstone (1993) argues that the world is being increasingly organised around sets of shifting definitions of the global circumstance. This assumption that the world is one place and that the globe has been compressed into a single locality. This process of compression must be understood as the process of commodification of the local. The local is commodified in order to be unified or,
at best, to be blended with different localities to create what is perceived as global (pp.173-175).

In this context, I hypothesise that it takes more than one space and more than one moment in time to create a single learning instance. Space can be defined as the unification of specific physical or non-physical territories where a learning instance as a component of experience, and subsequently decision, change and personal development, is created (Figure 4). Space may be the family, the classroom, the university, the super-market as places we learn the location of desired products, of advertising poster coverage, of magnetic waves that bring information to our computer screens and televisions (cyberspace). On top of this the multiplicity of roles that we play, and the ways in which we conceptualise our roles in any spatial context, affect the spacing of our learning instances, which in turn has an effect on our socio-psychological state. Space cannot be defined in an absolute manner in the same context that determines the relation between learning
and time. Therefore, the relation between time, space and learning depends on the individuals who operate as catalysts in this relationship. This means that this relationship cannot be accurately defined, measured or controlled unless learning is also seen as a commodity. The question is who commodifies learning and for what reason.

Until the late 1960s there was a tendency to think in terms of moving from traditional to modern societies. This move was seen as accountable in terms of range of specific processes such as industrialisation, urbanisation, commodification, rationalisation, differentiation, bureaucratisation, and the expansion of the division of labour (cited in Featherstone, 1993: 170). Within this context initially space and time are commodified because economic and institutional conditions affect the timing and spacing of social life and individual life-course transitions as they affect the position of the individual in the society (see Moran, 1979). At the same time there are social, demographic and economic circumstances, war situations, changes in the political status or regime, that may effect an imbalance between roles and their potential occupants. The idea of progress and change therefore, which for many modernists implies a direction to history and the eventual arrival at a better or ideal social life, is challenged by post-modernists who argue that we should expand awareness of the flawed assumptions of modernity (Featherstone, 1993). How does the relation between commodification of learning and change fit into this discourse?

The relationship between time, space and imperceptible learning instances justifies the socio-anthropological concept that we are bound to spatio-temporal images (see Moran, 1979). Anthropologists believe that we experience, decide, change, live, develop and create while we are trapped in spatio-temporal images that we create ourselves. These images define the context in which we learn, but
they are also defined by our learning experiences. The fact that these images are called spatio-temporal does not mean that time and space are their only attributes.

The objectivity however, with which time and space are approached in our everyday lives affects the way we perceive the relation between learning and change as self-evident. By the same token, does the commodification of time and space mean that imperceptible learning instances with spatio-temporal attributes can be commodified although they are not perceived as self-evident?

Learning instances are the components of our experience. Learning instances consist of many learning momenta. These momenta set the context in which we learn (spatio-temporal images). This context is always transitional.

My idea is that learning can be commodified. Since learning instances constitute the spatio-temporal images in which our experiences are located, I believe that if their attributes are commodified, so are they. If spatio-temporal images are deconstructed to their component parts, then we might create countless of unseen new learning instances and reveal infinite unseen experiences. This process will cause a cycle of events that will eventually expose the infinite character of learning as a liminal spatio-temporal condition. If we relate the above assumption of learning as a spatio-temporal commodity to change (social, political, demographic, economic, personal), we will see that a single learning instance does
not only consist of time and space. The components of a single learning instance are so many that it is almost impossible to refer to one, without considering all the others. Can these components (momenta) be commodified? I believe that they can. They can be measured and quantified in the same way as we commodify and value time and space based on our own experience. They can be turned into exchangeable units or commodities. How can we commodify the components of a learning instance, namely the learning momenta? Some post-modernists have shown that this can be achieved by deconstructing personal experiences (see Belenky et al, 1986). Our experiences consist of learning instances. At the same time these instances define the context in which our experiences are located.

So far I have hypothesised that space and time are only two of the components of this context. If we deconstruct a learning instance we will find that it consists of time and space. By deconstructing a learning instance however we instantly turn space and time into commodities based on our personal perceptions of them. If time and space, as components of our learning instances, are commodified then their value might as well be transferred to other people’s learning instances. The same can apply for all the components of which a single learning instance consists. This will not only help us to understand how learning functions as a commodity and the repercussions of this ‘commodification’ for personal and perhaps global change. It can help us to reveal the liminal character of learning and define transition as a learning process (Figure 5).

Researching the temporality and spatiality of individual life experience leads to questions on learning as a component of personal development and change. As well as the time and space of individual experience, such research should embrace issues of self and social consciousness, changing roles, relations with others, self-orientation and life choices. These issues then become components of our learning
instances as well. They can be commodified in the same way that time and space are commodified. Once they are commodified, learning instances become exchangeable units. If learning instances become commodities then our experiences become commodities as well and our personal development becomes an exchangeable item. If personal development becomes a commodity then change as something that affects, but also as something that is affected by learning, may be understood as a global process. This is because it is something that can happen to anybody, anywhere, anytime. If change is understood as a global process, it will promote better understanding among individuals. The more learning momenta we commodify the more we expand the knowledge about ourselves and the closer we move to others.

In order to give a generalisable character to the learning momenta we commodify, we should work collectively and synthetically in terms of the theories and practices we employ to deconstruct our learning instances and the spatio-temporal contexts in which our experiences are located. If we investigate the series of learning momenta that relate to the move from education to work as a learning instance, we will see that we have good reason to work collectively and synthetically in terms of the theories and practices we use to deconstruct learning instances. Apart from describing how developmental theorists or differentialists or feminists approach the transition from school to work - a mere description of one single factor that can determine change is always misleading - we might consider the effect of school as commodified space on students’ lives.

«How do [...] people [...] see that life? What is done to make this so-called transition come about? Who are the people managing it? What are the roles of these people? What should these roles be? We use the word role to mean a useful function, And we have said so-called transition because it seems to us to be a misleading word suggesting a limited period of time. Talk about transition and many people, especially professional, people, will assume that you are talking about transition from school to work. [...] It will also be assumed that transition refers to a period immediately before and immediately after leaving school to go to work, as opposed to going to college». (Ball & Ball, 1979: 2). [Italics mine]
We may assume that transition from education to work relates to a specific time in young people’s lives in a specific environment. We may claim that it relates to emotions and feelings of failure or success, describes the relations with teachers and peers, the development of sexual behaviour, attitudes towards families, and so on. If we want to proceed with the deconstruction of specific learning instances that relate to this period we might ask young people themselves to tell us how they conceptualise this transitional period, how they discuss it and what they believe to be the factors that make it emerge. We might isolate instances of their learning in our own spatio-temporal images and we could ask how time or space relate to these instances or if there is any relation between transition as school students discuss it and personal development as many developmental psychologists or social anthropologists approach it. This can cast new light on the way we approach transition as a cycle of multiple repeating events or as a series of learning instances. This way we will show that the variety of the factors that either describe or cause change are identified as a series of learning instances that have spatio-temporal attributes and are brought together in time and space. These instances can expand further if we consider the different types of socialisation that people of any age and in any society have to undertake.

The variety of factors involved in this chaotic process can be envisaged as a spiral or helix where time and space are a unified commodity, and decision and change come in to play in order to create new spatio-temporal images that consist of infinities of learning instances that expect to be identified, deconstructed and commodified to infinities of learning momenta (Figure 6). The issues that we associate with change and its relation to time, space, and learning as part of personal development are innumerable. Just as are the repercussions of the way we see ourselves and our relation to others, or set our goals and modify them.
If we relate learning as a process that is affected by change, but also causes change, to time and space, we could create a spiral (helix) that represents the process of personal development as this takes place in time and space (black curves). In the spiral the relation between change and learning instances (blue curves) as components of our experience (e) is conceptualised as moving upwards or downwards (transition) depending on where the individual is placed when they make a decision. Individuals move from one experience (e) to another in the same space at different points in time or in different spaces at different points in time.

This may cause some confusion to the reader in terms of the motives of those who decide to deconstruct and manage with the deconstruction and commodification of learning instances. The literature, gives some valuable approaches and reference points, although in many cases it lacks the interdisciplinary base on which these issues should be studied.

«Influencing the performance of these tasks is a wide variety of social forces shaping [...] expectations, attitudes and experiences. Schools, parents, peers, the media, careers teachers, national and local economic factors and past experiences are among these forces, and an understanding of how these social agents and the individual interact, and how attitudes and experiences are shaped [...]» (West & Newton, 1983: 1).

Based on the above assumptions which describe learning as part of our personal experience in a general way, we might argue that although it is a spatio-temporal condition, learning has no direct relation to time and space as objective scales. If we consider the fact that any decision is based on previous learning then we could even claim that our decisions have no direct relation to time or space.
although they are spatio-temporally conditioned. The same applies to change and experience if we consider that experience is what we consciously conceptualise as change, based on a decision that is based on learning. This process sets the transitional spatio-temporal context in which we learn, and describes this context generally. It does not, because it cannot, explain the spatio-temporal character of learning in objective terms. Learning may relate in a direct way to time and space only if it is commodified or when experience as a conscious form of change is seen as a series of many learning instances that are comprised of a larger number of learning momenta that can become exchangeable, but only by the person who consciously decides to visualise it as such.

This process involves the isolation and fragmentation of a single learning instance to its components (learning momenta) within a spatio-temporal image that is created. Social researchers have been creating their own spatio-temporal images in which they did research for years. It may contribute to better understanding of how we learn while we change by fusing or pulling together past and present experiences and future expectations. This will show that personal development is nothing else, but the experience of change within a continuous learning process, or learning within a continuously changing experience.

Although my visualisation of the relation between change, decision-making and learning instances does not develop into a thesis at this stage, since the spatio-temporal image in which deconstruction of learning instances has not as yet been created, conceptually has points in common with Kolb’s theory of experiential learning. The most common thing between Kolb’s theory and my spiral representation is that they are both based on a non-rational, non-idealist view that learning relates to the transformation of knowledge.
In my research I look at the components of a single learning instance (dark grey spot). This instance represents past and present experiences and future expectations as they are brought together in discussions that I have with 10 postgraduates students of human and social science at Warwick University.

There is a large number of learning instances between the instances we decide to undergo learning (light grey spots). These learning instances are the components of transition (light grey arrows).

Figure 7
In my research I isolate one learning instance and I look at it in the context of students’ stories about their transitional experiences.

The form of this knowledge varies. Kolb’s position is established as a theory. Mine can go no further than a ‘theoretical hybrid’. Learning and cognitive researchers like Dewey (1938), Piaget (1970) and Kolb (1984) have developed learning theories that relate to personal development based on personal experience in order to offer a working definition of learning as the process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation of experience (cited in Kolb, 1993: 155). Kolb’s ‘multiple circles’ approach is based on previous approaches of the same kind. His interesting interpretation of learning as a process where the subject is active and has the ability to evaluate their experience before they transform it to knowledge came as the result of his meticulous study of previous theories of learning. In my case this is practically impossible because there are no theories of transition. Within this context I want the reader to understand that in the three-dimensional spiral that I have created I am looking at the process of transition as the transformation of personal experience to knowledge. I am not
looking at the process of learning and this is the reason why I do not use theories of learning as fully in the literature as I might have. Learning, whether it is experiential, cognitive, managerial or otherwise, is something that is incorporated into this process in the form of learning momenta. Although I could claim here that each learning momentum could be visually represented as a Kolb’s circle, I prefer not to make any reference to this because the central issue to my case is transition. If transition as a process happens to relate to personal experience as it does, there is not necessarily a direct link between my hypothesis of transition and Kolb’s theory of experiential learning. I have to acknowledge however, that in the hypothesis lies the idea that transition is a learning process or that learning is a transitional process which relates to a continuous change. This does not make the learning experiential or whatever else.

In this respect my research hypothesis is that the process of isolating a learning instance as a component of experience and the ‘commodification’ of learning momenta as components of that learning instance may present any learning instance as no more than a fraction of a perpetual cycle of events with spatio-temporal attributes (Figure 7). These attributes define the learning context in which we integrate gradually (spatio-temporal images). My thesis, which develops gradually as a spatio-temporal image only takes its final form after empirical research within a narrative. This I describe as ‘defragmentation’. Its context is transitional and it is constantly reconstructed to become what Hormuth (1986) calls the ecology of self. In the ecology of self we decide upon specific issues that concern us deeply and we evaluate ourselves in relation to others (people, objects, environments). We develop our self-images and we re-frame them in different learning instances. In this transitional context what I defined initially as learning instance, is a spiral within the spiral that represents personal development. In this
spiral, time and space are fused to create other spirals that refer to other learning instances. Within this spiralling process of personal development, change as the result of our decision means to learn in transition, and learning as the result of our decision to change is always transitional.

My argument therefore although it may seem difficult to understand, is that learning cannot relate directly to time and space, as many theorists such as Lengrand claim. For this to be possible, it has to be seen as transitional. Alternatively, if transition has to be seen as a series of learning instances comprised of learning momenta that can be commodified and exchanged. I believe this because as many theorists suggest transition has spatio-temporal attributes. Having in mind this idea I begin the construction of my thesis by isolating and fragmenting a single learning instance to its components (learning momenta). This process leads me later to the creation of a narrative that represents nothing, but a fraction of learning as a continuous process that relates to our personal development. I show how this occurs at a micro-level. I look at ten learning instances which are represented by the conversations I have with ten post-graduate students of human and social science at Warwick University. These conversations which I define as learning instances take place at a specific point in time and in a specific space. When I have deconstructed the conversations to their components, I build a story (narrative) in which I redefine transition as the continuous reconstruction of the ecology of self in relation to past, present and future.
Part Three: Researching Transition
1. From methodology to method

In the previous part I described the processes involved in conceptualising and constructing the research hypothesis. I present fragments of theoretical approaches that refer directly and indirectly to transition as a learning and development process, and to the deconstruction and reconstruction of personal experience. I claim that although transition, as a learning and development process, is a spatio-temporal condition, it cannot relate directly to time or space as objective measurement scales, unless we create ourselves the context in which we want to locate it. I call this context spatio-temporal image. My aim is to create this kind of spatio-temporal image, represented through this thesis as narrative or a story (defragmentation), in which I give my own interpretation of transition. I decide to deconstruct learning instances to their basic components, which I call momenta, and then reconstruct and commodify them. I hypothesise that this will lead me to a redefinition of transition as a continuous reconstruction of our self-ecology, in the present, past and future. Based on this hypothesis I argue that this continuous reconstruction is nothing, but learning and so I conclude that we either learn in transition or that learning is always transitional. This argument constitutes the data on which the thesis is built.

In the present chapter I discuss the way I conceptualise the methodology and describe that which forms my data collection and analysis. In the outset of the research I act perceptively. I do not have a clear idea of the methods that I will use to collect and analyse my data. The area before me is so fragmented that it is difficult to identify a method adequate to expand knowledge about transition. Competing feelings of dissatisfaction, curiosity and doubt lead me gradually to construct the methodology. I am aware that not everyone has experienced these
feelings, as a beginning for their research. For most sociologists the world is more manageable in pieces.

«Analysis is their soul or else a methodology of indifference that separates and reduces the world so pitifully that a man can empty the world.» (O'Neill, 1975: 7). [Italics mine]

I start by being conscious of others, whether these are my family, friends or colleagues, and willing to learn. For this reason I return to first things, to place, time, communication thought and pattern. In thinking and speaking I choose paths to resolve the history and geography of my life (cited in O'Neill, 1975: 10). In this broad context the methodology evolves in accordance with a variety of socio-psychological metamorphoses that take place while I progress with the choice of the research methods. Its aim is not to simplify a situation, or describe it in either sociological or psychological terms, but to test my limits.

«The aim of the method [...] is to test in us that strange distance between our work and those for whom we intend it. Sociologists are particularly attached to methods for the sake of their claim to scientific status; I am concerned with the poetic claims of method. I think these two belong together in our working lives. Method plays the music in what is of interest to us; it shapes our sensibilities, determines our passions, and defines our world. Method is our practical idealism; it is the opening in things and of ourselves toward them. This is possible because we are able to convert our private enthusiasms into objective enterprises that, in turn, are never accomplished once and for all and so require of us a constant response according to our own need.» (O'Neill, 1975: 12).

The knowledge that I gradually gain while I do the research is a knowledge of metamorphosis. I see my roles changing day after day. I become the reader and the writer, the researcher and the researched. It is I who is the substance and form of what I describe and who comments upon its logic and matter.

My approach is not a solo effort. It may seem to involve the emotions, but it encourages a way of looking at things and talking about things. It is something that matures with its own practice. It assumes hierarchy of ideas and concepts, but it does not command the first word and it does insist upon the last. It is found in the dialogue that is entirely rooted in the aspirations of self development, temporal and spatial change and stability. It does not thrive where some have the right to
speak and others only the obligation to listen. I aim to re-construct an approach that enables better understanding of transition as a form of learning and evaluation of personal experience. As a process this is frustrating. This frustration is alleviated with the general assumption that the method is based on a hypothetico-deductive model of scientific approach. In its principle this model is concerned with causal relationships and the way these are established (see Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). The emphasis is placed on an a priori theory that is assumed to direct the processes of data collection, analysis, and interpretation.

Although I do not fully specify my theoretical concerns in advance of the study, what I do in the research is to move from data towards theory. I develop a theoretical concern that later leads me to a quite unorthodox result. The research questions, the hypothesis, the strengths and weaknesses emerge only vaguely in the beginning, but more clearly later. The methods I use to collect and analyse the evidence do not produce a standardised set of results that any willing researcher in my situation or someone who studies similar issues would be able to produce. It presents a coherent and illuminating perspective of a situation that is based on a detailed analysis of the way the factors that are involved in it consent and dissent. It explains and argues on the basis of personal experience that is re-framed in a new context.

The choice of methodology is not that far from what Lyotard suggests in reference to ‘freedom of thought’. For Lyotard (1985), consensus is the end of freedom and of thought. Dissensus allows us to experience freedom and to think and extend our possibilities. Emancipation of knowledge depends on the perpetuation of dissensus, on a permanent crisis in representation, on an ever greater awareness of the contingent and localised. The unstable nature of all norms for representing the world. Consensus in this respect is only a particular state of
discussion, not its end (cited in Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992: 163). This belief in the emancipation of thought brings me closer to what Fischer (1985) calls post-modern deconstructionism. In accordance with further reading in the area of post-structuralism and the way it influences social science today, I develop the research methods.
2. Data collection

I collect my data through informal conversations. There are 10 postgraduate students of human and social science that participate in the research. Five are men and five are women. They all are EU nationals aged between 22 and 27 and they are students at the University of Warwick in United Kingdom (Table 1). The fact that the students I interview are EU nationals relates to my previous familiarity with issues pertinent to the EU and my interest in the way the EU is structured, not as a type of common market-place where certain rules and policies apply, but as a common geopolitical space from which the students that participate in the research originate and which influences their access to various aspects of social, economic, political and cultural life. The study of their national culture as a factor that relates to the construction of their identities would demand my previous familiarity with the political, cultural and social history of different nations. For this reason, and because it is not salient in our conversations about transition, I avoid references to nationality or national differences. This does not mean that I ignore the fact that the students have nationality. I do not consider nationality or national culture as a factor that will help me develop the research framework. Nor do I believe that nationality serves as a reference point in interpreting a general concept such as transition. Therefore, in accordance with Lyotard's (1979) logic of consensus in, as irrelevant to the development of a research framework that constitutes an historical stage of this journey, I choose not to use national differences during comparison. I am well aware of the fact that comparativists do use nationality and national differences as reference points in order to describe, explain or critique existing diversities between national systems. In my case the comparison is not between people from different countries. I choose to compare
the conversations that I have with people who come from different countries - the transcriptions of these conversations to be more precise - and not their nationalities.

The conversations are made in a period of ten months, between March 1996 and December 1996. The normal process of arranging a meeting for a conversation is to contact the students and ask them if they are interested in participating. When the person approached agrees, we arrange to meet at a time and a place that is convenient to both of us. The conversations are all recorded and take about an hour. Before the conversation the discussants are told about the nature, and the type of the inquiry and about the way the conversation is going to take place. After the end of each conversation I tell the discussants that when I transcribe our conversations I will make a list of comments for each one and then I will give it to them to make their own remarks and alterations. All conversations are transcribed verbatim.

<table>
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<th>No</th>
<th>NAME</th>
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<th>TYPE OF DEGREE</th>
<th>SUBJECT OF STUDIES</th>
<th>WORK EXPERIENCE</th>
<th>DATE OF DISCUSSION</th>
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<td>Analytical Philos</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Erika</td>
<td>27</td>
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<td>4-12-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gregorio</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Colonial Literature</td>
<td>part-time &amp; full-time</td>
<td>14-7-1996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

All research participants are EU nationals, students of human and social science at the University of Warwick in United Kingdom. With most of them (Vicky, Vangelis, Sylvie, Justin, Andreas, Justina) I spent more than a year sharing the same house in Leamington Spa, a town that is close to Warwick University. I got to know the rest of them through friends and other students living in the house.

This gave us the opportunity to familiarise with each other and develop friendships.

In general data collection with conversations or non-structured interviews requires interaction with the participants and it is not an easy process. In the research I use non-structured interviews to collect my data. I do not have any

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2: The average age at which EU students begin their postgraduate studies is 22 while the average age at which they finish is 27 (European Commission, 1996).
past experience of this kind of work in the field. For this reason, in the beginning of the research I look at what other researchers have to say on the way non-structured interviews are designed. For Webb & Webb (1932) the centrality of conversation in empirical work lies on the fact that the investigators must find their own witnesses, induce them to talk, and then embody the gist of this oral testimony on their sheets of notes (cited in Burgess, 1982: 107).

I adopt a process of communication, reflection and learning in my conversations with the students. Conversation is a commonly used method of data collection in empirical research that enhances communicative learning process and interaction. Communication about learning is vital throughout the interview process, both as an aid to internalising and personalising learning and potential obstacles to learning, and as an aid to decisions, for the researcher and the discussants (see Firth & Goffey, 1996).

Before my conversations with the students I experiment with some pilot interviews to see the way people respond to what I am researching and to refine the method of data-collection. I hold ten pilot conversations in a period of three months (January 1996-March 1996) with people from my immediate environment. To the extent to which my aim at this stage is not the provision of a description of what may occur in a particular setting over a certain period of time, I believe that there may be positive advantages to be gained from subjecting people to verbal stimuli different from those prevalent in the settings in which they normally operate. Interviews are artificial when they are compared with normal events. They may allow the researcher to understand how discussants would behave in other circumstances, for example when they move out of a setting or when the setting changes (cited in Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983: 119). This artificiality can be explained in many ways. From the way people present themselves in the
conversation and the way they feel towards the researcher, to the way the conversations are deconstructed or reconstructed in order for the learning experience to be contextualised.

**Figure 8**

The above arrangement represents the first step towards gathering learning instances from the informants. The spirals represent the process of development as I visualise it for all the participants. The blue arrows represent part of this process that I hypothesise they represent our experiences. The conversations I have with the students constitute experience and they can be visualised as small fractions of our personal development. These fractions are represented by what I identify as learning instances and they can be located in the spirals as red spots. The next step is to isolate these instances of personal development, analyse them, find their components and then put them all together in a story in which I give my own interpretation of transition.

The beginning is always intimidating. From thinking of how to utilise the space in which the conversations take place to organising my time schedule around the time that the discussants are available. What I do in the conversations is to compress the time and the space - not in the physical sense, but in terms of the situation in which I and the discussants are engaged - to access specific concepts and meanings that relate to the research. Within this context time and space are a unity. It is as if the conversations are conducted in a virtual environment where the discussants refer constantly to time and space, but they do not consider them as factors that affect the real time of our conversation. They do affect the process of communicative learning and interaction during the conversation (Figure 8). The actual time does not come into play unless it relates to retrospective thoughts that need extra time to be analysed. This gives a sense of control over what I ask, what I hear, and what I note as important for further explanation. For Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias (1992), one major advantage of the interview is that it allows greater control over the interviewing situation (p.228). They suggest that discussants feel less obliged to answer questions that they can see as irrelevant to the theme of the conversation, and they avoid verbalism because they compress their experience in order to fit it to the temporal and spatial boundaries of our conversation.

During the conversations, I do not always have control of the situation despite my familiarity with them. We all are students, most of us living in the same house sharing a common space and time. For those who know me well enough to demand certain things before or during the conversation, lack of control from my side is obvious. I do not consider it a weakness. It shows the ability of the discussants, to the in many cases, of losing awareness of themselves as research informants.

The aims of the conversations are to give to me the opportunity to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts from the discussants, based on their personal experience. A standard set of questions would be far too narrow and would restrict my perspective. The unstructured interviews assume the appearance of a naturally interesting conversation. At the same time they are controlled conversations which are guided to the service of my interest.

«The unstructured interview may, [...] appear to be without a structure, but nevertheless the researcher has to establish a framework within which the interview can be conducted; the unstructured interview is flexible, but is also controlled. Palmer suggests that the researcher must keep the discussant relating experiences and attitudes that are relevant to the research problem and encourage the discussant to discuss these experiences naturally and freely.» (Burgess, 1982: 107). [Italics mine]

Palmer (1979) claims that the conversations are governed by a variety of cultural conventions and expectations which are learned in the process (cited in Burgess, 1982: 110). The use of language and the codes and registers in which the
interviews are conducted are carefully decided. This is obvious in my conversations with students whose first language is not English. Not being English myself, I put considerable effort into understanding what was being said. The use of a common code is always helpful, but the interpretation of that code may prove problematic. This is the case, for example, in the process of transcribing recorded conversations in which certain words and phrases have to be heard more than once before they can be transcribed.

Language problems are generally expected when people are communicating in foreign languages, but they are also present in one’s own language - although not nearly so apparent. Such irregularities have serious methodological implications (cited in Deutscher, 1977: 226). In three cases when students ask me to hold the conversation in Greek, my first language, I am in a dilemma as to whether I should translate the conversations or not. In the end I transcribe the conversations as they are in Greek. Later I translate selected passages of the transcriptions into English for the purpose of my thesis. In this case, as in any other case, I work as the mediator rather than the translator because what I do is not transfer of students’ words, but reproduce the substance of what they discuss with me.

There are cases where students have difficulties in expressing themselves in English, either because they do not feel comfortable with their English or because they cannot understand my English. In our conversations I record vocabulary and syntactical or grammatical errors as they are made, including my own and those made by the discussants whose first language is English. In most cases efforts are made for both sides to use a common code of communication the best way we can. The fact that we all identify ourselves as students and that we all are expected to have communicative skills to a given standard is an advantage for the conversations. Shared time, space, certain values, roles and language skills help us
to discover our own strengths and weaknesses in terms of our own personal culture.

For Burgess (1982) researchers have to be able to share the culture of their discussants, ascertain meaning and get access to unspoken elements of social life. Strauss (1964) maintains that researchers need to become members of the social settings they study - if they are not already - in order to understand the positions that discussants adopt in certain situations (cited in Burgess, 1982: 108). At the same time conversation includes discourse and exploration, questions, argument, speculation, talking, listening and sharing. From my experience I realise that it is more helpful to listen more than to talk, and listen with a sympathetic and lively interest.

«To some extent listening to others is self-serving. It is a way of learning about the self without revealing the self; however, good listeners draw others to learn. Watching, listening subjectivists attract other persons’ trust, in part because they listen and in part because they seem non judgmental. Many of our [discussants] told us about this important skill and how it kept them connected to others. Yet some also clearly indicated that it was the knowledge they gained about themselves that they valued rather than the mutual exchange of experience.» (Belenky, et al, 1986: 85).

I am influenced by Belenky’s distinction between real talk and didactic talk. In didactic talk the speaker’s intention is to hold forth rather than to share ideas (see Belenky, et al, 1986). Each discussant may report experience, but there is no attempt in part of discussants to interact or share experiences to arrive at some new understanding. I am not interested in this type of didactic talk. Instead I am tempted by the idea of real talk. Real talk reaches deep into the experience of each discussant. It draws on the analytical abilities of each discussant. This requires careful listening because it implies a mutually shared agreement that together researchers and discussants can create optimum settings in which emergent ideas may grow.
All this requires the development of general insights and social perceptiveness. This non-directive approach is commonly used in interviews with the influential, the prominent and the well-informed than is the standardised survey interview. For Whyte (1982) the whole point of not fixing an interview structure with pre-determined questions is that it permits freedom to introduce materials and questions previously unanticipated.

«The non-directive interview has a therapeutic development based on a theory that a patient would make progress best, if he were left free to express himself on his problems as he wished, stimulated by an interested and sympathetic listener. While the good research interview may have a therapeutic side-effect, it is structured in terms of the research problem. The interview structure is not fixed by predetermined questions, as it is in the questionnaire, but it is designed to provide the discussant with freedom to introduce materials that were not anticipated by the Researcher.» (Whyte, 1982: 111).

What I find helpful occasionally is to rephrase what the discussants seem to express and to summarise the remarks as a check on understanding. I cannot avoid giving advice and passing moral judgements on responses, but at the same time, in many instances I accept statements that violate my own ethical, political, or other standards, without showing disapproval. Although I try not to interrupt, the nature of the conversations is such that in many instances I have to interrupt in order to ensure they fit the conversation within the boundaries of the research.

During the conversations, I do not stay passive in any respect and the same applies to the discussants. Although this might seem as an authoritarian attitude in my behalf this is not the case. At all times I reflect upon what is being said, ask myself what each statement means and how I can encourage the discussant to clarify a certain point or give detail on an item only hinted at. As Smith (1975) concludes, in depth researchers usually give non-directive feedback to respondents on what they seem to be stating or feeling, as a means of showing that the researcher is listening and as a means of encouraging the respondent to expose themselves more (p.192).
The role of the Researcher in non-directive interviewing appears to be passive. This is misleading though. The Researcher must be an active listener, he or she must listen to what is being said in order to assess how it relates to the research focus and how it may reflect the circumstances of the interview. Moreover, this is done with a view to how the future course of the interview might be shaped. While the aim is to minimise the influence of the researcher on what the interviewee says, some structuring is necessary in terms of what is and is not relevant. And even where what is said is highly relevant, it may be insufficiently detailed or concrete, or some clarification may be necessary if ambiguity is to be resolved. (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983: 114). [Italics mine]

In doing my best to work in accordance with these technical rules, I resolve ambiguities, let certain remarks pass, allow propriety to constrain lines of questioning, hold meanings in reserve. In sum I use my own common-sense knowledge of social structures to make sense of the replies, the coding task, and later, of the categories that I create. In addition to learning strategies appropriate to the conversations, I adopt the same care when it comes to details of arranging context, times and other preparations. It is feasible to construct a technical self-guide to informal methods of interviewing, but doing so may be restrictive and miss the point of much of this kind of investigation and disguise the underlying issues in its employment and relative merits of the data yielded. Figure 9 maps out the way in which I move towards the discussants.

Figure 9


The figure gives the impression of a smooth deductive evolution, from the general to the specific. For me this transition from general attributes that
characterise my position as the researcher, for the discussants this journey to the final product of the interview, is not so smooth. While we have our own roles and ‘interactional’ rights, the conversations are not impervious to outside influences. How the roles are played depends considerably upon the latent identities that we invoke and those we attribute to one another. In some cases it seems better to let some of the nuances of conversation go, to make shorter, more limited written records, and so be able to spend more time talking. In this way, a relevant data are eventually discovered and retained, together with a better appreciation of their generalisability and the extent of their variation.

After I transcribe a number of conversations, I go through the written texts noting those points that I find more interesting or more relevant to the research. Then I write my comments in a summarised form, suggesting that this is not the final product of the conversation. A paper with these comments along with a copy of the full transcript of each conversation and a blank page are sent to the discussants. The discussants are asked to read through our conversation and make changes or additions to the transcript. They are asked to read the text with the comments and then write their own comments, their thoughts or their ideas on the conversation in a form of a feedback report on the blank page. These reports are then returned to me.

I do this because I believe that the students must have access to our conversations. Their feedback reports help me to assess and evaluate the conversations in a way that enables me to think about how to create a basis for comparing the transcriptions and for them to reflect upon what we say in the conversations. In returning to a discussant for further clarification and development, researchers confirm their interest in the subject and in the discussant,
and may gain access to the discussant’s own doubts and uncertainties which would never be revealed in a single ‘hit and run’ interview.

In the process I discover that there is a problem with the past. Students read and think and know what they are saying in the conversations, but they react to the way I pass comments. Some change their minds on certain issues. Others are driven to action by their inner voice (see Belenky et al, 1986). In those few cases I am prompted by the discussants to have an off-the-record conversation about the changes that they had gone through since the time of the interview. This is because some of their views in the present are contradicting what they claim in the past, at the time of the conversation. This helps me to realise that what I do has only a limited period of validity. What I explore is a specific moment in time. It is just what the students are passing to me at a specific moment in time and not first hand experience. This makes me look at the issues of objectivity and generalisability of the research from a different angle.

In conclusion the process of discussing transition with a number of students constructs a form of temporal life history with retrospective fragments of our personal experience. For this reason I keep a diary during the research. In the diary I record my ideas, feelings and emotions relating to things, people and situations that affect me, help me to construct my thoughts, and provide me with evidence to go further with the analysis. I use this diary at many points, throughout the process of building up the method of data collection and analysis, and of conceiving and working on specific ideas. The research diary helps me to reflect on my daily work. It helps me to think about the previous day’s work, and schedule the next one.

Collection of data does not stop with the last conversation or when I receive the last feedback report from the students. It is a longitudinal process that
helps me to contrast my thoughts with those of the discussants and to contrast my
own thoughts at different points in time. To schedule and re-schedule a timetable
for the research and create a positive impression of the outcome of the research.
To get a positive feed-back in the case I encounter difficulties and create a sense of
discipline and systematic work.
3. Data analysis

The process of analysis is long and laborious. In this chapter I reveal the logic behind the method of analysis which is based on a comparative model of contextual deconstruction.

My research method is pertinent to the requirement of my sponsors - the Greek State - to do comparative research. Any familiarity with comparative methods in general would lead one to anticipate that the comparative interpretation of my data is not easy. I work comparatively all the way through from the beginning of the research. This does not mean that I put comparison in a framework that enables me to use it productively from the beginning. Comparison demands units that reveal what is to be compared. This is virtually impossible in my case considering the number of words in each conversation (approximately 10,000 words). Comparing whole transcriptions with each other is not what is generally seen as comparison. It is technically complex unless there is a pattern that enables the researcher to create comparative units. The only way to overcome this problem is to reduce the number of the words in the transcriptions and extract the units to be compared. In the process of creating these units I am not alone.

Although the discussants make no direct contribution to formulating the propositions that purport to be about them or to be based on their sayings and doings, they contribute indirectly to formulating the final conclusions. Heron (1981) believes that this contribution may be strong, in the sense that the discussant is co-researcher and contributes to creative thinking at all stages of analysis. It may be weak, in the sense that the discussant is thoroughly informed of the research propositions at all stages and is invited to assent or dissent, and if there is a dissent, then the researcher and discussant negotiate until agreement is reached (pp.19-20).
In the complete form of this approach, not only do the discussants become fully fledged co-researchers, but I become a co-subject, participating in the action and experience of being researched. There is a reciprocal relation in all possible directions. In this relation I am the mediator. It is difficult to put the discussants in the process of interacting with each other. Interpersonally there is full reciprocity. The exchange of ideas, the mutual experiential encounter, the two-way corrective interaction between ideas and experience both within each person and between each other - it is all there. As the mediator I see the co-subjects encountering each other and everything else that is going on within the actual realities of the research situation. That is why I call the research experiential, because it is based on the experiential knowledge of persons in relation to their situation, their world and in relation to the experience of others.

My method of analysis initially deploys a process of reducing the number of words in the transcriptions, but in the end it puts our experience into a new context. This is the result of the process of deconstruction and concept formation. My attempt to deconstruct the given discourse relates much to identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise (cited in Culler, 1983: 86). My ideas are enforced by what Jarvis (1997) claimed in a seminar to be about the process of learning in late modernity. As he suggests, learning is signified by the artificial de-construction and re-construction of our experience in temporal and spatial terms.

Atkins (1983) observes that although deconstruction has come under frequent and determined attack in scholarly journals as well as in the popular media, it is lead by a desire for unity and order to find out more about the text’s system. The deconstructive reader seeks the moment in the text which harbours the unbalancing of the equation, the sleight of hand at the limit of a text which
cannot be dismissed simply as a contradiction. Deconstructionists are aware of the
differential quality of language and they seek the moment in any text when its
duplicity, its dialogical nature, is exposed (p.24).

In the analysis the notions of deconstruction and comparison are expressed
with reference to the transcriptions. My model of analysis is based on three
interdependent stages (Figure 10). The first stage of the analysis is the contextual
deconstruction of the transcriptions. Contextual deconstruction is the preliminary step
that leads me to the creation of observational comparative units. These are units
that I compare. These units are in the form of pairs (two words that refer to
concepts divided by a dash) that I call dialectical pairs. The next stage is comparison
of the observational units. This leads me to the final product, explanatory units.
These are the units that I use to create the context in which I construct my own
interpretation of transition.

Figure 10
This is the case-oriented comparative model that I use in my analysis. This model employs a
dialectical paradigm of contextual deconstruction and reconstruction.

Comparison of the observational units echoes upon the similarities and not
the differences among the discussants, because it is more economical in terms of
using a smaller number of units to construct my story. Comparison reflects on the
deconstructed version of the transcriptions and supports the interpretation of the
results. The last stage is contextual reconstruction of the final product with reference to the transcriptions. Contextual reconstruction of the explanatory units helps me to refer to specific pieces of text in the transcriptions (learning momenta) that I put together in order to complete the final stage of the research, that is ‘defragmentation’.

The problems of making comparison work for the research are obvious in the beginning. As I progress with the analysis I adopt many ideas from other sociologists. The work of Belenky et al (1986) on women’s self, voice and knowledge is a significant influence. In their attempt to analyse and explain women’s life experience in relation to self, knowledge and voice, Belenky et al, used a dialectical paradigm in their analysis. Their qualitative analysis and categorisation is grounded on processes through which voice, mind and self develop. These processes may be listening and speaking, personal or impersonal, discrete or related. They may involve a degree of loneliness or of being with others. Their categories are based on these processes as well as on the need for comparison of the different cases they researched. What Belenky et al, do is to read the conversations carefully, and locate the most representative pieces of text. After that they create their own categories which they call educational dialectics (means-ends, compartmentalisation-synthesis, constructed knowledge-received knowledge, collaborative-solitary, dilettantism-narrowness, etc.). This idea of educational dialectics helps me to create my comparative units. Nevertheless, I do not choose at random what I compare. Based on the general idea of educational dialectics, I create a pattern of constructing comparative units, that allows me to revisit the text at any stage of the analysis. The observational units that I make, constitute the basis of the comparison and prepare the ground on which I interpret transition.
After the initial stage of conceptualising and forming the type of analysis my first concern is to identify its method. Although I avoid labelling the research as qualitative or quantitative, I feel that I have to explain the logic of the analysis because apart from its qualitative character there is a quantitative element to it. My method of analysis has many similarities with conversation analysis. It concentrates on the discussants’ own methods of producing and integrating social interaction. It traces the ways in which they themselves are making sense of this interaction. For Levinson (1983) the major concern of the conversation analysis research lies in the demonstration of the discussants’ own orientation and interpretation of conversational actions, and thereafter in the validation of what is suggested by the analysis. In practical terms, this concern constitutes the first path in conversation analysis-style investigation. As Levinson puts it ‘we should attempt to locate some particular conversational organisation, and isolate its systematic features, by demonstrating participants’ orientation to it’ (cited in Bozatzis, 1993: 319). This kind of analysis addresses questions concerning particular inter-actions that are of the analyst’s interest.

The second methodological concern deals with the interconnections between different conversational organisations and the way they are interwoven in the overall conversational network. As Oakshott (1962) suggests, what is at issue, is the ability to participate in the conversation, and not the ability to reason conjointly, to make discoveries about the world, or to contrive a better world (cited in Bozatzis, 1993: 199). My engagement in the conversations gives an initial form to the analysis. It is this involvement which in the end confers a qualitative character to the final product. As for the quantitative element, this is justified by the fact that I deal with a large number of concepts that are categorised and compared at different stages during the analysis. The number of words is reduced,
the new concepts are categorised and the emerging categories are assessed and compared. Quantification of the processed evidence is done at two stages. The first stage is during contextual deconstruction and the other is during comparison.

My next concern during the analysis involves a weighing of the validity of statements made by the discussants and of how I can make use of them. What do I do when someone tells me in a conversation about how they feel, or when they just tell me what happened? All interviewing methods necessarily deal with this problem. My method encourages a rich dialogue with the transcriptions. This helps me to understand the way the discussants think - whether they think abstractively, constructively, dependently or independently, and the way they feel. At the same time it helps me to recognise what is important in the conversation and what is not, depending on the gravity the discussants put on their words. This is more obvious when they express their emotions about a situation.

Too much emotion however can be a problem in the analysis. A researcher dealing with a questionnaire or interview schedule can only seek to put into the same instrument several questions bearing upon the same topic, thus bringing to light possible inconsistencies in response which may indicate ambivalence of feelings - or confusion as to the meaning of the question. The problem in my case is how to assess the discussants’ feelings about some subject under investigation. Based on Whyte’s assumption (1982), in research there are four different types of data: the discussant’s current emotional state; the second is the values of the discussant; the third is the discussant’s attitudes or sentiments; the fourth is the discussant’s opinions or cognitive formulation of ideas on a subject.

My data do not fit together consistently in these four categories each time. I encounter any of the above types of data as I inform my categories with new evidence. In case of a conflict, which is obvious in most cases, I do not try to
determine which data represent the discussant’s real feelings. I simply record both real and conflictual feelings and emotions. Discovery of the conflict is the most important subjective information the researcher can obtain, but in my case there is neither consistent well-thought-out attitudes and values from the students, nor rational and consistent pictures of their sentiments and behaviour.

Gradually, while the analysis goes to the next stage, I realise that the difficulties in interpreting subjective data are increased when the discussant is recollecting past feelings or attitudes. Recollections of feelings are generally selected to fit more comfortably into one’s current point of view. The major consideration that complicates the assessment of evaluative data is that it is so highly situational.

«To minimise the problems of interpretation, the interview situation should be carefully structured and the interview itself should be carefully handled. Some distractions can be avoided by pre-arranging an appropriate time and place for interviewing. Ulterior motives can sometimes be counteracted by pointing out that the researcher has no position of influence. Barriers to spontaneity can be reduced by assurances to the discussant that his remarks will be kept confidential. The confidence that develops in a relationship over a period of time is perhaps the best guarantee of sincerity, and important participants should be cultivated with care and understanding. Idiosyncratic factors of connotation and meaning are difficult to account for, but a good precaution is to ask questions in many different ways, so that the complex configuration of sentiments can be better understood.» (Whyte, 1982: 115). [Italics mine]

I cannot claim that what I do is something that has a longitudinal effect in temporal terms. It is something static and momentary because I simply isolate a moment of the lives of the discussants by referring to it in relation to the issues that concern me. My research does not look at real life situations neither does it claim to bring out real life experience or to speak with the voice of the discussants. I look at a temporal appreciation of past experience of real life that is passed to me verbally and in which I intervene in order to underline its temporal and spatial effect in the research. My task is not simply to discover or describe a particular sentiment, but to relate that sentiment to the events and interpersonal relations out of which it arises. This is not as the discussants pass them to me at the time of the
conversation, but as I later think they fit the analysis. I translate and place those events in a specific space and time that I can only imagine in relation to what the discussants say.

«Interpreting answers requires, if anything, even more care than asking questions. Even unsolicited statements require interpretation. To begin with, an ethnographer must always bear in mind the limitations of linguistic competence and, no less important, cultural competence. Meaning, after all, resides ultimately in cultural context, and is only expressed transiently and situationally in language. Certain answers may owe more to courtesy than to a desire for accuracy (e.g. Jones 1964), others to impatience, others still to political, moral and other social constraints. At all times you must be on your guard for figurative, rather than literal expression. One way of approaching the problems of interpretation is systematically to envisage all the possible questions, or interpretations of a question, which might have elicited the actual answers which you get.» (Ellen, 1984: 234-235).

My analysis is by no means objective, because one of the meanings of objectivity is that people do not project the contents of their own heads into an external object, whether this is the transition to work or their experience in education. Both separate and connected knowers are wary of projection, but they avoid it by different means. Separate knowers avoid it by suppressing the self, taking as impersonal a stance as possible toward the object. Similarly language and the way I use it is not simply a mode of description in the analysis, a means of symbolising and communicating experience and ideas. I am concerned with the way I deal with language because it does not reflect changes in certain underlying realities. Instead, through classifications, categorisations and codes, it helps me to constitute these realities, shape the experience and the judgements about the nature of phenomena, providing not merely the currency of circulation and exchange, but the values symbolised by that currency.

In the analysis, feelings and personal beliefs are commodified through language. Some of the terms I analyse are based on what appears to be simple and direct observations: the report of a dream, the use of a metaphor, a nervous breakdown, confidential information about family record of mental illness or the marking of someone’s life by their first sexual encounter. There are however,
theoretical terms that students use which I cannot define, even in principle, in terms of what I observe. These terms are commodified as well. Concepts such as the ‘Protestant ethic’, ‘conscious pressure’ or ‘territorial expansion’ derive their meaning from the part they play in the theory in which they are deployed, and from their role in that theory. In most cases I try to see only what the discussants are saying, fitted to the time and the space to which they are referring. I elicit those concepts that I think that they are the most important or relevant to transition and personal development.

A final issue of concern is that of generalisability of the findings of the analysis and whether this can be considered a problem. I improvise many times and I try many different approaches in order to avoid mindless generalisations. Although I avoid the use of such terms as generalisability and objectivity in this research, I strongly believe that the method of analysis has the potential for the generalisability of its explanatory context. It is in the nature of the research that simply does not allow generalisability of its findings. It embraces a number of categories that constitute a basis for further research. The variety of the emotional states, values and ideas which I examine creates a soft shell that can be penetrated. Rather than leave the shell tightly closed and inaccessible, I create a surface that makes the interior easily accessible, but without breaking the exterior. My intervention in the way the material is chosen and presented is not irrelevant in this case.

As Guba & Lincoln (1981) suggest, it is virtually impossible to imagine any human behaviour that is not heavily mediated by the context in which it occurs (cited in Schofield, 1993: 62). For this reason they replace the concept of generalisability with that of fittingness, and argue that this concept with its emphasis on analysing the degree to which the situation studied matches other
situations in which one is interested, provides a more realistic and workable way of thinking about the generalisability of research results than do more classical approaches. A logical consequence of this approach is an emphasis on supplying a substantial amount of information about the entity studied and the setting in which that entity is found. Without such information, it is impossible to make an informed judgement about whether the conclusions drawn from the study of any particular site are useful in understanding other sites.

Goetz & LeCompte (1984) place similar emphasis on the importance of clear and detailed description as a means of allowing decisions about the extent to which findings from one study are applicable to other situations. Specifically, they argue that qualitative studies gain their potential for applicability to other situations by providing what they call comparability and translatability (cited in Schofield, 1993: 228). The former term refers to the degree to which components of a study - including the unit of analysis, concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings - are sufficiently well described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as a basis for comparison.

One can easily conclude that generalisations that are intended to be context free have little that is useful to say about human behaviour. My research is not context free, neither do I claim to create something that has an overall objective and generalisable character because this is not my intention. My intention is to encapsulate knowledge in a series of working hypotheses that describe the individual case. Generalisations are impossible since phenomena are neither time - nor context-free although some transferability of my hypothesis may be possible from situation to situation, depending on the degree of temporal and contextual similarity.
3.1. Contextual deconstruction

Deconstruction, as it is used in this thesis, is not a new idea. The term is met in the writings of Foucault (1978) and Derrida (1981), and of theorists of the post-modern like Cohen (1985), Cooke (1990) and Featherstone (1993) who use it to describe the notions of progress and globalisation. In contemporary deconstructive writings, Derrida’s position is a commanding one. For Ellis (1989), who questions the use and the validity of deconstructive criticism, there is a growing tendency to assume that an interest in theory of criticism automatically means an interest in the work of Derrida. Derrida’s position on deconstruction, although ambiguous at some points, can be summarised as a mode of textual theory and analysis. Many critics of deconstruction believe that for Derrida, contemporary deconstruction subverts almost everything in the tradition, putting in question received ideas of the sign and language, the text, the context, the author, the reader, the role of history, the work of interpretation, and the forms of critical writing. Deconstruction undoes the comforts of mastery and consensus that underlie the illusion that objectivity is situated somewhere outside the self. It is the active antithesis of everything that criticism ought to be, if one accepts its traditional values and concepts. Ultimately deconstruction effects revision of traditional thinking (p.153).

The advocates of deconstruction believe that deconstruction is a bold, provocative, and innovative movement, which challenges the status-quo with radical, disturbing ideas and that it is a new mode of criticism far more sophisticated than anything in criticism heretofore. The opposition to deconstructive criticism claims that if we attempt to abstract the most persistent and widely held conceptions of the character of criticism and critical activity, the
results will be anything, but the belief in a single, clear, statable textual meaning that is deconstruction’s target.

Norris (1983) suggests that the most frequent charge against deconstruction is that it merely takes texts apart in a spirit of perverse and negative zeal (p.21). Ryle suggests an analogy between deconstruction and a structural engineer whose tests are carried out at the physical limits of tolerance exhibited by their material. Engineers stretch, twist, compress and batter bits of metal until they collapse, but it is through such tests that they determine the strains which the metal will withstand. In somewhat the same way, philosophical arguments bring out the logical powers of the ideas under investigation, by fixing the precise forms of logical mishandling under which they refuse to work. Ryle’s procedures are built upon this sense of language as a multiform and tensile medium, and deconstruction as the lever which raises that tension to breaking-point (see Ellis, 1989).

At this stage of the research I use deconstruction in its practical form to compress, stretch, collapse and dismantle the transcriptions in a way that enables me to create comparative units. Perhaps deconstruction is not an appropriate term to use, but since the literature around concept formation and the critique on issues that concern reading of the text lead me there, I cannot avoid using it. Reduction or fragmentation would be better terms since I initially reduce the number of words in each transcript.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussants</th>
<th>Vicky</th>
<th>Eleni</th>
<th>Miguel</th>
<th>Yvangelis</th>
<th>Sylvie</th>
<th>Justin</th>
<th>Andreas</th>
<th>Justina</th>
<th>Erika</th>
<th>Gregorio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of words in the transcribed text</td>
<td>11,589</td>
<td>7,162</td>
<td>9,917</td>
<td>8,079</td>
<td>8,254</td>
<td>9,973</td>
<td>11,784</td>
<td>9,043</td>
<td>7,083</td>
<td>7,870</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Total number of words in the transcriptions*

In the analysis I do not deconstruct students’ experiences. I deconstruct the transcriptions. I find many similarities in terms of how deconstructionists take texts apart and the way I reduce the number of words in the transcriptions.
This process helps me to break-down the text to its ultimate stage of reduction, in a way that brings out new ideas and new concepts for investigation. This is why I call the first stage of the analysis contextual deconstruction, because it is the way in which I use the reduced text to extract ideas, opinions and concepts which are verbally expressed in the conversations. Reduction of the number of words in the transcriptions is not something that is done on the spur of the moment. It is developed systematically and it is done with a quantifiable precision (Table 2 & Graph 1).

The text is divided in paragraphs, the paragraphs are broken down to sentences and then to single words. I keep an hierarchy in the whole process. I begin with the longest and more elaborate phrases and end with the minimum amount of words in a sentence. Verbs, adjectives and nouns constitute separate entities in each sentence. Isolating a single word from a phrase may change the whole meaning of it. I do not overlook this change since I revisit the text at a later stage, but my aim is to create new meanings from those entities. I do this by breaking down this first level of analysis into three stages (Figure 11). Each stage is a further step to deconstruction and aims to create the comparative units. Deconstruction takes place in the background, but it helps me to categorise my evidence in order to reach the final product. I do that not just because I want to create a basis for comparison, but because I want to follow the logic behind every phrase that is used by the students to express their emotions ideas and opinions.

As Lofland (1970) suggests, much social research suffers from analytic interruptus. This means that in their development of categories many analysts fail to follow through to the implied logical conclusion to reach the initially implied climax. Taking the example of typologies of strategies, Lofland argues that the
investigator must take the time and trouble to assemble self-consciously all the materials on how a problem is dealt with by the persons under study.

![Graph 1](image)

To tease out the variations among the assembled range of instances of strategies. To classify them into an articulate set of types of strategies, and to present them to the reader in some orderly preferably named and numbered manner (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983: 42-43). For Hammersley & Atkinson (1983) however, there is a little point in developing highly systematised typologies and models if they provide little purchase on the evidence. My typology is not a purely logical or conceptual exercise. It is a constant recourse to the evidence. This is further justified with the use of reconstruction. As the categories of the analysis are clarified and develop in relation to one another, so the links between concepts and the transcribed text are specified and refined. This applies in the perspectives from which postgraduate students of human and social science view the world.

In many cases the number of words in a transcription is reduced from nearly 12,000 words (Graph 1) to only 200 (Graph 2). The reduction is done in a simple way that I call contextual representation (Tables 3 & 4). At this stage of deconstruction I number each paragraph of each transcription individually. Then I make a numbered list of the paragraphs in each transcription. There are
transcriptions which have 100 paragraphs and others with more than 300 paragraphs.

Figure II
Contextual deconstruction of the transcriptions takes place at three stages: contextual representation where I rephrase the transcribed text to shorter phrases, conceptual input where I choose the most representative words and concepts that relate to an emotional or psychological situation and contextual dialectics where I create pairs of these concepts based on the opposite or corresponding qualities which they represent.

Numbering each paragraph separately is not an easy task. The conversations are transcribed verbatim and in many cases the paragraphs are interrupted by words like ‘yeah...’ and ‘mmm...’ or short phrases like ‘I see...’ or ‘I know what you mean...’. In cases like these I read the whole paragraph again to see to what these words refer. In other cases I listen to the recorded conversation again to recall the voice and the manner of the discussants as they speak and decide if they mean anything by using single words or short phrases. Some of these words and phrases just confirm what we discuss previously. In many cases the discussants are trying to avoid a question while in others they are just giving time to themselves to think or they imply that they agree with what I say.

After this the paragraphs are divided into smaller sentences that are numbered individually in relation to the paragraph to which they belong. For example the first sentence of paragraph §4 in a transcription, is numbered as §4a (Table 4).
Paraphrasing demands great control of the text. When I read each transcription separately I realise that it is not only I who is in control over what it is said and how it is said. The experience of the discussants as it appears in the text contributes greatly as well. The suggestion that the author cannot be in control of the text is resolved in my case by interpreting the ‘dialogical’ mode of the text in a dialectical way. The text is envisaged as the product of multiple voices. This activity provokes an interrogation of the world through the word (Okely, 1992: 13).

For Barthes (1982), addressing the question of ‘how’ to write about the world is not solely a matter of experimentation with style, it is a rediscovery of the world (cited in Hastrup, 1992: 118).

This is much what I do simply by mediating between the transcription and its analysis by paraphrasing or rediscovering the experience of the discussants. I simply fit what the students say in the conversations to the analysis. I do not transfer their voices, but I translate their experience by rephrasing the transcriptions. I gradually come to terms with my new role as the mediator between the discussants’ words in the transcriptions and the new paraphrased text that I create. In the next stage of contextual deconstruction I realise that I
intervene in the cultures of the discussants, but at the same time I feel that they intervene in mine.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXTUAL DECONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>Name of Discussant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual Representation</td>
<td>Conceptual Input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Definitive and Sensitising Concepts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextual Dialectics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Dialectical Pairs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§1: she hates the people in part-time jobs because they never show respect to what you are doing and the fact that you are a student.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2: people in part-time jobs only think of the money they get which is not different from what she used to get working part-time, although she had a degree.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3a: professional is something like her dad did.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3b: being professional means to manage your own work.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3c: she will be a professional when she will get her PhD and she will be a professional historian.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3d: right now she is trying to become professional.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3e: only a bachelor's degree does not make you professional.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3f: having a job and publishing books as well makes you professional.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3g: you are a professional when what you have to say targets to the whole world and not just the university.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4a: you are a professional when you are open to criticism and you look for an approval from others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4b: to be professional means to expand your own territory and make money as well.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4

In contextual representation I paraphrase the transcriptions and I create smaller sentences.

Tedlock (1983) believes that due to the fundamental simultaneity between discovery and definition, the reality experienced in the field is of a peculiar nature. It is not the unmediated world of the others, but the world between ourselves and the others (cited in Hastrup, 1992: 120). This means that my results are deeply marked by this 'betweeness', and there is no way, epistemologically, to overcome its implications.

«Once we realise that ‘othering’ is part of the anthropological practice (Fabian 1986), and that the identity of the others, as such, is relational, we are ready to acknowledge that they have their own self-referential discourse. They have their own project of self-realisation alongside our project of self-transcendence (Dwyer 1977: 48). As participants they may actually be in search of an outside observer to whom they can recount their troubles and reflections (Rabinow 1977: 19).» (Hastrup, 1992: 121).

What I listen to is not only the discussants’ voices, but what they say as their own cultural truths and circumstantial responses to my presence and
questioning. What the discussants say (their ‘others’) in the dialogue is spoken not from the centre of their world, but from the liminal space of the cultural encounter. For Rabinow (1977), there is self-reflection in this space which is based on a ‘doubling of consciousness’. This means that discussant responses to my questioning is an externalisation of inner (cultural) experience. The language that the discussants use is important. Human language and the power to conceptualise it, is a function of certain features that are basic to all human perceptions of ourselves and our environment and, whether we describe these as being fixed in time, space, quantity, quality modality and relation, or based on colour, spatial extension, natural dimensions and substance, the outcome is the same (cited in Aspin, 1984: 31). There are certain fixed points that are the basis of all appraisals of our reality, and these have to do, I believe, with our experience of spatio-temporal extension that provides us with a persistant principle of consciousness and a permanent point of reference - a touchstone against which all further extensions of ourselves and our capacity to communicate our awareness of our situation can be measured.

These fixed points are represented in the next stage of contextual deconstruction by what I call conceptual input (Table 5). The paraphrased text is reduced to single words. These words refer to almost anything. They may refer to emotions and feelings such as desire, melancholy, love or hate, ideas and opinions like empowerment, experimentation, growing-up or development, values like God, money, gentility or generosity and certain attitudes like laziness, arrogance, indifference or concern.

The concepts I use reflect to a large extent the language that is used by many post-structuralists. Ellis (1989), who openly denounces deconstructive criticism, or Fischer (1985) who questions the viability of deconstruction as a mode
of analysis that is credited with the power to disrupt and subvert hierarchical distinctions, like cause/effect, philosophy/literature, man/woman, signified/signifier, serious/non-serious, unity/heterogeneity, central/marginal, etc.

### Contextual Deconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Representation (The informant says that...)</th>
<th>Conceptual Input (Definitive and Sensitising Concepts)</th>
<th>Contextual Dialectics (Dialectical Pairs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§1: she hates the people in part-time jobs because they never show respect to what you are doing and the fact that you are a student.</td>
<td>§1: Self-Hate-Other- Causality-Respect-Activity- Role-Education-Time</td>
<td>1. ACHIEVEMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§2: people in part time jobs only think of the money they get which is not different from what she used to get working part-time, although she had a degree.</td>
<td>§2: Other-Employment- Thought-Money-Similarity- Self-Work-Time-Education- Achievement</td>
<td>2. ACTIVITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3a: professional is something like her dad did.</td>
<td>§3b: Profession-Similarity- Other-Activity</td>
<td>3. APPROVAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3c: she will be a professional when she will get her PhD and she will be a professional historian.</td>
<td>§3d: Time-Self-Attempt- Profession</td>
<td>4. ATTEMPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3e: right now she is trying to become professional.</td>
<td>§3f: Education-Achievement- Inefficiency-Self</td>
<td>5. CAUSALITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3g: only a bachelor degree does not make you professional.</td>
<td>§3h: Employment- Publication-Profession-Self</td>
<td>6. CRITICISM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3i: you are a professional when what you have to say targets to the whole world and not just the university.</td>
<td>§3j: Self-Time-Profession- Role-Target-World-Totality- Space-Education</td>
<td>7. EDUCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3k: you are a professional when you are open to criticism and you look for an approval from others.</td>
<td>§3l: Self-Profession-Time- Openness-Other-Criticism- Approval- Expectation</td>
<td>8. EMPLOYMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3m: to be professional means to expand your own territory and make money as well.</td>
<td>§3n: Self-Profession-Role- Meaning-Expansion- Territory-Achievement- Money</td>
<td>9. EXPANSION</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5

In conceptual input I break down the sentences to concepts that I believe are most representative. These concepts are then singled out and listed alphabetically.

Singling out the concepts is a complex process. Some are more abstract. Others are more explicit. Bulmer (1977) argues that many of the concepts of the social sciences are sensitising concepts. For him sensitising concepts are more adequate theoretically and more faithful to the empirical social world than definitive concepts which satisfy both of these criteria. Definitive concepts provide definitions which serve as to identify the individual instance in terms of the concept. Sensitising concepts lack such specification and attributes and do not permit the user to move directly to the instance. Definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see (family, school, country of studies). Sensitising
concepts merely suggest directions along which to look (others, education, space). Concepts such as social structure, culture and personality rest on a general sense of what is relevant rather than on a clear-cut specification. The sensitising concept is more responsive to empirical data. One of the justifications for its use at this level of this analysis is my need to be attuned to the distinctive characteristics of the discussants' experience. Sensitising concepts provide a means of moving from the concept to the concrete distinctiveness of a particular empirical case, rather than (as with definitive concepts) embracing the instance within the abstract framework of the concept.

The use of sensitising concepts is a bit problematic. In many cases the discussants use words like satisfaction, dissatisfaction, desire, etc. that may express a feeling or an emotion that has a sensitising attribute. At the same time they use words like uncertainty, ability, politeness, rudeness or more common terms like man, woman, interest or knowledge that refer to the definitive of a person, emotion or sentiment. It is not easy to distinguish the definitive from the sensitising or the sensitising from the definitive because all concepts can be definitive or sensitising depending on the way I look at them. Desire may be a sensitising concept, but what is desired, like stability, power or money can be seen as definitive. When students refer to what they believe provides them with stability, a job or a family, then stability is the sensitising concept. To categorise my concepts in order to look to what they refer I read between lines. This helps me to see how of the some concepts that I perceive to be definitive, refer to other concepts that are sensitising. The problem in this case is that the number of concepts that I can produce is so many that it is impossible to record all of them. For this reason this type of categorisation demands a great deal of concentration.
There is always the danger of allocating inappropriately a sensitising concept to a definitive concept and this might result in later misunderstanding.

This problem, as in the case of contextual representation, relates to the anthropological recognition of the other and the way the discussant, as the other, is involved in this process. According to Hastrup (1992), at the level of the dialogue, the individual interlocutors are equals. ‘You’ and ‘I’ are engaged in a joint creation. We are both subjects engaged in a process of objectifying our reciprocal identities. The fact that there are selves and others does not mean that there are absolute and exclusive categories of ego and alter. Difference is continually transcended. At the level of discourse, the others are textually fixed (p.129). The discussants who are absent in my case are recognised as embodying an alternative culture.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discussants</th>
<th>Vicky</th>
<th>Eleni</th>
<th>Miguel</th>
<th>Vangelis</th>
<th>Sylvie</th>
<th>Justin</th>
<th>Andreas</th>
<th>Justinia</th>
<th>Erika</th>
<th>Gregorio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of words in the transcribed text</td>
<td>11,589</td>
<td>7,162</td>
<td>9,917</td>
<td>8,079</td>
<td>8,254</td>
<td>9,973</td>
<td>11,754</td>
<td>9,043</td>
<td>7,083</td>
<td>7,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Concepts</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6
Total number of the concepts that I create after contextual representation of the transcriptions.

This leads me to consider using the concepts I create in the conceptual input in a way that promotes dialectical modes. The concepts are not useful in themselves unless I use them in a way that enables me to see how the concepts correspond to each other, how the other responds to the other, and how the product of this dialectical process can be used to make my comparative units. I extract 1,236 concepts when I single out the 3,156 concepts from all the transcriptions (Table 6 & Graph 2). Some of them appear only once, in one transcription. Others appear several times in all conversations. This means that these concepts are more commonly used. Reducing the number of words from approximately 90,724 words - the total amount of the words in the ten transcriptions - to about 3,156 is a hard process. To see how these concepts correspond to each other for each case separately is even more elaborate.
In the third stage of contextual deconstruction I create a dialogue between the discussants. I stop looking at each case separately and I try to bring all the cases together. I do not see truth as something attached firmly to the person, the time, the place, and the system as I do in the first stage of contextual deconstruction. I look instead at truth as something impersonal, as something that gives the impression of consensus. I utilise the discussants words from the transcription and I relate them. In Rowan & Reason’s words (1981) what I do is to promote an interpersonal character to the analysis. I achieve this by moving from the role of mediator between the transcribed text and the paraphrased, fragmented text to being the co-ordinator and convenor of a dialogue between the informants, by putting together the concepts that I extract from the reduced text. This process of integrating experience from different people is not new.

Ball (1986) believes that this integration is exerting a constant pressure, sometimes strong, to see the world in certain ways rather than in others. For Madison this is because we are looking less for facts and more for illumination. This is based on a view of science which does not want to replace common-sense ideas with scientific ones, or take the laboratory as more real than the everyday world (p.316). For Rowan (1981) who is committed to the idea of repeated
research cycles, where we repeatedly check and recheck our theory against reality, this requires a degree of assertion or even aggressiveness on the researcher’s part.

«Any [...] study on such a personal level, is by definition, action research. One influences, inevitably, while observing even though such influence is unintentional. A good subject does not persist for years in such work unless the association with the investigator has meanings for him beyond his very real desire to contribute to science. Ideas gathered under [...] complex circumstances are bound to be biased to some extent. The [...] data [...], therefore, is neither objective nor unbiased., but it is highly illuminating. Once a process is revealed in a special case it becomes evident, although in a much less conspicuous form, in more everyday ones.» (Rowan, 1981: 315-316).

Paraphrasing is useful and the idea of communication between the concepts can prove helpful. I start designing a number of interlocking cycles which spread a net over what I analyse. Multiple cycles that have the form of pairs give more choices and more flexibility. They can either be used sequentially, to go deeper into what I analyse, thus turning the cycle into a spiral or helix. I can use them concurrently, approaching the same phenomenon from a number of different angles, and in effect triangulating it or knitting a pattern of cycles. It is what I call contextual dialectics. The term contextual dialectics is inspired by Belenky et al (1986) educational dialectics in their research on women’s ways of knowing.

Contextual dialectics is a pattern of connecting ideas. It aims at seeking knowledge not as a thing that we can have, but rather as being involved in a personal circular, contradictory process of knowing, of inquiry. This is the philosophical basis for what Rowan (1981) calls a dialectical paradigm of qualitative research. It is based on the assumption that research is a process of systematic inquiry that leads to knowledge stated in propositions. In sociological research this inquiry involves an element of observation or interaction in order to offer empirical evidence for the research conclusions. For Rowan dialectics can be explained as the independence of opposites. This is the easiest form to discern. Opposites demand each other. It wouldn’t make sense to talk about darkness if...
there were no such thing as light. They can be explained as the interpretation of opposites. Here one sees that opposites can be found within each other. Because light is relative to darkness there is some light in every darkness, and some darkness in every light. Finally dialectics can be explained as the unity of opposites.

Dialectics goes on to say that if we take an opposite to its every ultimate extreme, if we make it absolute, it becomes its opposite. Thus if we make darkness absolute, we are blind, we cannot see anything. If we make light absolute, we are equally blind and unable to see (cited in Rowan & Reason, 1981: 130-131).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTEXTUAL DECONSTRUCTION</th>
<th>Name of Discussant</th>
<th>Conceptual Input (Definitive and Sensitising Concepts)</th>
<th>Contextual Dialectics (Dialectical Pairs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>§2: people in part-time jobs only think of the money they get which is not different from what she used to get working part-time, although she had a degree.</td>
<td>§2: Other-Employment-Thought-Money-Similarity-Self-Work-Time-Education-Achievement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3a: professional is something like her dad did.</td>
<td>§3a: Profession-Similarity-Other-Activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3b: being professional means to manage your own work.</td>
<td>§3b: Profession-Management-Work-Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3c: she will be a professional when she will get her PhD and she will be a professional historian.</td>
<td>§3c: Self-Time-Profession-Role-Achievement-Education-History</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3d: right now she is trying to become professional.</td>
<td>§3d: Time-Self-Attempt-Profession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3e: only a bachelors degree does not make you professional.</td>
<td>§3e: Education-Achievement-Inefficiency-Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3f: having a job and publishing books as well makes you professional.</td>
<td>§3f: Employment-Publication-Profession-Self</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§3g: you are a professional when what you have to say targets to the whole world and not just the university.</td>
<td>§3g: Self-Time-Profession-Role-Target-World-Totality-Space-Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4a: you are a professional when you are open to criticism and you look for an approval from others.</td>
<td>§4a: Self-Profession-Time-Openness-Other-Criticism-Approval-Expectation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§4b: to be professional means to expand your own territory and make money as well.</td>
<td>§4b: Self-Profession-Role-Meaning-Expansion-Territory-Achievement-Money</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

After conceptual input I go a step further than singling out the concepts I create and I look at how the concepts correspond to each other. Following the same pattern with every single concept I create pairs (binaries) that I call 'dialectical pairs' because they refer to opposite or corresponding meanings.

Being based on Fischer's (1985) assumption of the role of dialectical hierarchies in deconstructive criticism, I find concepts for each case that seem to have opposite meanings, like employment and unemployment, absurdity and logic,
or autonomy and collaboration. Later I become more flexible with the meanings and I start using concepts that do not infer opposite qualities, but rather correspond to or depend on, each other. Like self and other, time and space, adjustment and alienation or control and ignorance. For each case I make a list of dialectical pairs that represent the observational units of that case (Table 7).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the Discussants</th>
<th>Vicky</th>
<th>Eleni</th>
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<td>341</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Dialectical Pairs</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8

Total number of the dialectical pairs I create with contextual deconstruction of all the transcriptions.

I single out 1,074 different dialectical pairs from a total of 2,159 dialectical pairs that appear in all cases (Table 8 & Graph 3). These pairs are what I compare at the next level of the analysis where I examine their similarities in the ten transcriptions.
3.2. Comparison

At this level of the analysis I use a case-oriented comparative model to extract the explanatory units (Figure 12). This model is oriented toward comprehensive examination of historically defined cases and phenomena. It emerges clearly from one of the central goals of comparative social science: that is to explain and interpret the diverse experience of societies, nations, cultures, and other significant macro and micro-social units.

Comparison in general provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical criteria. Lieberson (1985) believes that all social research, in one form or other, is comparative research (cited in Ragin, 1987: 10). At a general level this is true, but for Ragin (1987), most comparativists, especially those who are qualitatively oriented, seek to interpret specific experiences and trajectories of specific cases or categories of cases (p.11). They are interested in questions that are limited, substantively and historically. When qualitatively oriented comparativists compare, they study how different conditions or causes fit together in one setting, and contrast that with how they fit together in another setting (or with how they might fit together in some ideal-typic setting). They tend to analyse each observational entity as an interpretable combination of parts - as a whole. Thus, the explanations of comparative social science typically cite convergent causal conditions: causes that fit together or combine in a certain manner (pp.13-14).

Those who use case-oriented methods are more concerned with determining when a cause is important and when it is not - they are more interested in determining the different contexts in which a cause has an impact. A cause may be important or significant only in a certain context or in a delimited set
of contexts. To the extent that a case-oriented investigation is oriented more toward limited historical generalisation, contrary evidence is typically used as a basis for refining, not rejecting, theory. Investigators use contrary evidence to delineate subtypes of the phenomenon of interest, which, in turn, provide a basis for elaborating theories.

Although my analysis cannot be classified as comparative in the traditional meaning of the term, there is an ever present pressure to take into account and to explain the particularity of specific cases that in my research are represented by the transcriptions. This requires the use of case-oriented methods sensitive to time, place, agency and process.

![Figure 12](image)

The process of comparison takes place in two stages. The observational units that are created by contextual deconstruction of the transcriptions, are compared one-to-one. The results of each one-to-one comparison are listed alphabetically in separate tables. Then all the results of the one-to-one comparisons are put in one single list where I separate only those which appear 45 times. These new dialectical pairs comprise the explanatory units on which reconstruction is based.

According to Ragin (1987), investigators who use case-oriented methods combine causal analysis, interpretative analysis, and concept formation. This method is relatively insensitive to the frequency distribution of types of cases. A single case can cast doubt on a cause-effect relationship established on the basis of many observations. Thus, notions of sampling and sampling distributions are less relevant to this approach, because it is not concerned with the relative distribution
of cases with different patterns of causes and effects. More important than relative frequency is the variety of meaningful patterns of causes and effects that exist.

Case-oriented methods force investigators to consider their cases as whole entities. Researchers examine cases as wholes, not as collections of variables. An interest in interpreting specific cases and in pin-pointing the combination of conditions, the causal complexes that produce specific outcomes, encourages investigators to view cases as wholes. Thus the different parts or conditions that make up a case are understood in relation to each other. Finally case-oriented methods stimulate a rich dialogue between ideas and evidence. These methods are flexible in their approach to the evidence - few simplifying assumptions are made - they do not restrict or constrain the examination of evidence and they do not force investigators to view causal conditions as opponents in the struggle to explain variation. Instead, they provide a basis for examining how conditions combine in different ways and in different context to produce different outcomes.

«The case oriented approach works well when the number of relevant cases is relatively small. The comparison of two to four positive cases with the same number of negative cases is manageable. As the number of cases and the number of relevant causal conditions increase, however, it becomes more and more difficult to use a case-oriented approach. When there are only as few cases, as is the rule in many comparative historical investigations, it is not difficult to identify similarities because the researcher usually has (or tries to establish) an intimate familiarity with relevant cases.» (Ragin, 1987: 49-50).

One of the most valuable features of the case-oriented approach, is the fact that it engenders an extensive dialogue between the investigator's ideas and the data. This makes it possible to address causal complexes - to examine the conjunctures in time and space that produce the important social changes and other phenomena that are in the interests of the social scientists and their audiences. I think that the case-oriented strategy is best suited to this analysis because I have a relatively small set of cases. I see, each case as a whole - as a total situation. Each case is compared and contrasted with all the other relevant cases,
and then all the cases are compared together as an ordered and meaningful combinations of parts.

The whole process is again elaborate and demands a high degree of concentration. In the beginning I do a table where I put the lists with the dialectical pairs of each case (Table 9). These pairs constitute my observational units: the entities that I compare. My conversations from now on are considered as cases for comparison. Then I compare each list of dialectical pairs with all the others (the first list with the second, the first with the third, the second with the third, the second with the fourth, the third with the fourth, etc.). I locate the dialectical pairs that are similar in the two cases (Table 10), until I complete 45 comparisons (all the possible combinations among the 10 discussants).

The comparison of the dialectical pairs one-to-one is done by putting all the dialectical pairs of the two cases that I compare each time together in one single list (for example I make a list with the dialectical pairs of the first and the second cases). Then I categorise the dialectical pairs in the new list alphabetically. Then I read the list carefully and each time I find a dialectical pair that appears twice I take it out of the list and put it in a new one. This process is difficult because there are several cases in which spelling mistakes (for example space-time instead of space-time or stability-continuity instead of stability-continuity) or in cases where the dialectical pairs appear with the concepts reversed (like other-self instead of self-other or work-unemployment instead of unemployment-work) can lead to the wrong results. In these cases I go through the lists again and correct all the spelling mistakes and adopt a single form of appearance for all the cases.

After I finish all 45 one-to-one comparisons, I proceed to the next stage of comparison. That is to integrate the dialectical pairs from the 45 comparisons in a single list. The lists with the dialectical pairs from each case are put under each
other so to create a long list that has 2,015 dialectical pairs. These dialectical pairs do not appear only one time. Some of them do, but some of them appear more than once, but no more than 45 times. The dialectical pairs in the new long list are categorised alphabetically in order to locate them and count them easily.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>Vicky</th>
<th>Eleni</th>
<th>Miguel</th>
<th>Vangelis</th>
<th>Sylvie</th>
<th>Justin</th>
<th>Andreas</th>
<th>Justin</th>
<th>Erika</th>
<th>Gregorio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2-9</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Miguel</td>
<td>222</td>
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<td>3-5</td>
<td>3-6</td>
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<td>3-8</td>
<td>3-9</td>
<td>3-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Eleni</td>
<td>219</td>
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<td>Miguel</td>
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<td>Gregorio</td>
<td>Erika</td>
<td>Erika</td>
<td>Gregorio</td>
<td>Gregorio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9

The dialectical pairs in each conversation are compared one-to-one.

After I count them I single out the dialectical pairs that are common in all cases. This can be done initially by making a similar list of the dialectical pairs that I created for the ten cases separately. Then I count the dialectical pairs that appear 10 times and this counting gives my final result. I do this counting at the end to double check the final result. The dialectical pairs in the new list can appear 1, 3(1+2), 6(1+2+3), 10(1+2+3+4), 15(1+2+3+4+5), 21(1+2+3+4+5+6), 28(1+2+3+4+5+6+7), 36(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8) or 45(1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9) times.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE</th>
<th>Vicky</th>
<th>Eleni</th>
<th>Miguel</th>
<th>Vangelis</th>
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<td>62</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10

The table shows the total number of dialectical pairs for each case (grey boxes) and the number of common dialectical pairs after the comparison one-to-one (white boxes).
This counting is based on Table 9 that shows the initial one-to-one comparisons (counting one extra comparison each time starting from the box which represents the first comparison between cases 1 and 2). Then I read through the new list carefully. I double and triple-check the times that each dialectical pair appears in the list. I finally count 6 dialectical pairs that appear 45 times. Time-Space, Self-Other, Initiation-Termination, Unemployment-Work, Change-Stability and Movement-Stability. This is my final result. This result is checked again by making a list of all the dialectical pairs that I create for each case separately. The common dialectical pairs appear 10 times each (ten pairs for each case).

The whole process of counting checking and double checking the numbers is demanding for two reasons. The first reason is that there is not a software package that can help me with the counting of the pairs. My only tool for the counting is the word counter in the word processor. The second reason is that this process demands a high degree of concentration. A small mistake that might seem insignificant in the beginning of the analysis, like missing out a concept or forgetting to do the spelling check, can cause a disaster at the end (domino effect). Checking and double checking the number of the concepts in the lists of conceptual input, and the lists of the dialectical pairs takes an enormous amount of time.
3.3. Contextual reconstruction

In this chapter I discuss how I go back, and check the transcriptions, to find those phrases in which the common dialectical pairs are located. So far, the importance of the contribution of the other in the analysis remains fairly asymmetrical, regardless of my attempt to replace the monologue with dialogue. In order to show that the similar dialectical pairs among the ten cases relate to students' personal experiences, I do what Asad (1986) suggests: re-frame that, which is appropriated, by bringing together the similarities in a story (Okely & Callaway, 1992: 78). The first step towards this direction, is done by re-framing the ten deconstructed texts under the light of the comparative results. This whole process of reconstruction is done as in deconstruction, only this time I move backwards (Figure 13).

![Contextual reconstruction diagram]

Contextual reconstruction takes place at three stages. This time I move backwards as I did in deconstruction. Based on the explanatory units of the comparison, I choose those paraphrased sentences in which I record the concepts that appear in the similar dialectical pairs (explanatory units).

Starting from the comparative results that now are put in question or as Culler (1983) suggests they have to be exposed as rhetorical strategies by the texts that rely on them for support, I reconstruct the deconstructed texts in the following stages. First I locate in each deconstructed text the similar dialectical
pairs as they appear after the comparison. Then I break the similar dialectical pairs to their concepts and then I locate the sentences in which these concepts appear (Table 11). I refer to the paraphrased sentences (§1, §5a, §6, §7, §17b, etc.) where I locate these concepts (Table 12). Finally I go back to the transcribed text where I refer to the number of the paragraph by quoting to the words of the discussant (Table 13). The procedure of reconstruction completes the circle of analysis of my evidence, within the context of the deconstructed transcriptions.

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Dialectics (Dialectic Pairs)</th>
<th>Conceptual Input (Definitive and Sensitising Concepts)</th>
<th>Contextual Representation (The informant says that...)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attempt-Achievement</td>
<td>§1: Self-Hate-Other-Ignorance-Respect-Activity-Time</td>
<td>§1a: Self-Space-Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Criticism-Respect</td>
<td>§2: Other-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§2a: Other-Space-Other-Ignorance-Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Openness-Hate</td>
<td>§3: Self-Achievement</td>
<td>§3a: Other-Space-Self-Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Openness-Ignorance</td>
<td>§4: Self-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§3b: Self-Time-Achievement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Respect-Ignorance</td>
<td>§5: Self-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§3c: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Self-Other</td>
<td>§6: Self-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§3d: Self-Time-Space-Profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Time-Space</td>
<td>§7: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
<td>§3e: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession-Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Achievement</td>
<td>§8: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
<td>§3f: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Attemp</td>
<td>§9: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
<td>§3g: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession-Time-Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Openness</td>
<td>§10: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
<td>§3h: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession-Time-Other-Criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Space</td>
<td>§11: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession</td>
<td>§3i: Self-Time-Ignorance-Profession-Time-Other-Criticism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the first stage of contextual reconstruction I locate the concepts of the similar dialectical pairs. From this point forward I begin to think about how to re-frame the reconstructed evidence within a story. The story that I intend to create must be based on references to the transcriptions that relate to the six common dialectical pairs. These pairs constitute the base on which the narrative is constructed. Geertz (1983), believes that in re-framing our evidence in ethnographic writing, we must not blur this major responsibility with the rhetoric of many voices and multiple authorship (p.122).

«Fieldwork experience has become memory before it becomes text; the relics are embellished to pass for the ethnography (cf. Boon 1986). The source is inexhaustible. The actual dialogues feed the discourse infinitely. Although fieldwork took place some time in an autobiographic past, the confrontation continues. The past is not past in autobiography; it is ethnographic present. The referential discourse of realism gradually fades when we realise that it was built upon a confusion between genre and epistemology, a confusion which also implied that representation was taken for reality.» (Hastrup, 1992: 123).
Although in my analysis I do not utilise a method of linguistic interpretations of the transcriptions, language plays a significant role. In this final stage of the analysis I start looking at the text again and I see how the students express themselves through language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contextual Dialectics (Dialectical Pairs)</th>
<th>Conceptual Input (Definitive and Sensitising Concepts)</th>
<th>Contextual Representation (The informant says that...)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Attempt-Achievement</td>
<td>§1: Self-Hate-Other-Ignorance-Respect-Activity-Time</td>
<td>§1: she hates the people in part-time jobs because they never show respect to what you are doing and the fact that you are a student.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Criticism-Respect</td>
<td>§2: Other-Self-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§2: people in part-time jobs only think of the money they get which is not different from what she used to get working part-time, although she had a degree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Openness-Hate</td>
<td>§3a: Other</td>
<td>§3a: professional is something like her dad did.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hate</td>
<td>§3b: Self</td>
<td>§3b: being professional means to manage your own work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ignorance</td>
<td>§3c: Self-Time-Achievement</td>
<td>§3c: she will be a professional when she will get her PhD and she will be a professional historian.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Openness</td>
<td>§3d: Time-Self-Attempt-Profession</td>
<td>§3d: right now she is trying to become professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other</td>
<td>§3e: Education-Achievement-Inefficiency-Self</td>
<td>§3e: only a bachelor degree does not make you professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Respect</td>
<td>§3f: Employment-Publication-Profession-Self</td>
<td>§3f: having a job and publishing books as well makes you professional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Self</td>
<td>§3g: Self-Time-Space</td>
<td>§3g: you are a professional when what you have to say targets to the whole world and not just the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Space</td>
<td>§4a: Self-Time-Openness-Other-Criticism</td>
<td>§4a: you are a professional when you are open to criticism and you look for an approval from others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Time</td>
<td>§4b: Self-Achievement</td>
<td>§4b: to be professional means to expand your own territory and make money as well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The concepts that appear in the similar dialectical pairs refer to paraphrased sentences.

I begin to think about issues that relate to the philosophy of the text that follows the analysis. I realise that the process of interpreting the explanatory units is even more difficult than before. I come across issues that relate to language both as a medium of expressing personal experience and ideas and as a way for me and others to gain access to information that is not accounted at the previous levels of the analysis. For one more time language is not neutral nor it is transparent in any respect.

«Language is always ambiguous. [...] each of us has idiosyncratic frames of reference which may confuse the communication process. We saw the need, thus, for incorporating specific frames of reference into some question designs; however this
may not be enough. Sometimes the Researcher will be required to supply a frame of reference for the subject. This is particularly true of questions which tap retrospective data." (Smith, 1975: 188).

Discussant: Yeah, the weird...oh what I hate in those part-time jobs. The thing is that they're so menial that people don't ever give you respect. Oh! bloody expect my respect...you know... hmmm, you know people look at you working in a bar and I just got my bachelors and I knew that all these hours I was coming in all I was interested in was to do some research work...so...

Researcher: And they don't care about it?

Discussant: Come on I don't get paid more than you are the last couple of years love...

Researcher: I see, I see...

Discussant: So...I don't know...professional...professional for me is something like my dad did which is managing your own work. You know. I think the professional bit is when I will have my doctors and I can be a professional historian. Right now I'm trying to be...maybe will be one day, I mean...only the bachelors in history; it doesn't make you a professional historian to have a doctorate it does now! And to actually have the job and writing books and publishing. Maybe it's the publishing as well. You know, but it's official, this is you, it isn't just something to tell to the university, it's out to the world what you have to say about history that makes you professional.

Researcher: You mean that you are professional when you're exposed...

Discussant: Yeah! It's out...you have a book...this is out for the historical community, at large, to meet not just the internal tutors within your own space, that's like you long for an approval, you know going like, oh, that was nice dear or oh God that was a bit terrible wasn't it? It is about being out to the world. Open to criticism. That's my professional there's money, there's...expanding I think your territory...expanding...

Table 13

The paraphrased sentences refer to the transcriptions.

My reflection, thought and criticism in bringing together in one story the contextually reconstructed texts is initially based on comparison and analogy. It is based on comparison because I interpret the explanatory units that are the result of comparison. It is based on analogy because I look at how different opinions on common issues correspond to each other in a way that they can make a full story. I begin to realise however, that it is also based on metaphor, because the language the discussants use and the way I intend to transfer this language to a new text are to a large extent metaphorical. Before this final stage of the analysis I do not see clearly the importance of metaphor in the way in which the conversations with the students are organised. Metaphor governs the language I use to talk with the students. It helps me to acquire the knowledge that I want to pass to the reader. Metaphor is to be understood or explained as some sort of semantic extension or transference that shows how a familiar object can be seen in a new light.

It is only when I start building up the story that I realise the role of the metaphors in the research. Before the contextual reconstruction I can simply spot metaphors in the text. Some of them are visual. They are like a camera that is
passively recording a static reality and promoting the illusion that disengagement and objectification are central to the construction of knowledge. Some are verbal metaphors. The whole process of bringing together the contextually reconstructed texts would be incomplete otherwise (we talk about something by referring to the same words the discussants use). The role of the discussants is once again invaluable because the discussants use both types of metaphors to express themselves.

«Metaphorical use of language differs in significant ways from literal use, but is no less comprehensible, no more recondite, no less practical, and no more independent of truth and falsity than its literal use. Far from being a mere matter of ornament, it participates fully in the progress of knowledge: in replacing some stale 'natural' kinds with novel and illuminating categories, in contriving facts, in revising theory and in bringing us new worlds...Metaphorical truth and falsity are as distinct from - and as opposite to - each other as are literal truth and falsity. (Goodman, 1979: 175-6).» (Taylor, 1984: 6).

Many researchers believe that the use of metaphor, visual or verbal, may be a bar to clear communication in thinking, speaking and writing (Aspin, 1984). In Aristotelian terms the command of language should involve an ability to use metaphor happily and effectively. For Taylor (1984) the contemporary sociological and psychological stress on such command derives from the value attached to awareness of the motives of self and others. In the words of Quine (1979) ‘it is a mistake to think of linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body and metaphorical in its trimming’ (cited in Taylor, 1984: 160). Rephrasing Johnson’s (1993) words when he refers to Benjamin who speaks of translation as surviving the original or as giving to the text a second life (p.195), what I do at this final stage of the analysis is reproduce the sense of the content of the original transcriptions. This rite of passage, the transition begins with the crude transcribed text to its deconstructed form of dialectical pairs. These are then compared to find similarities between them. Finally, the refined, coherent story that I present in the next part of the thesis, is achieved by contextually re-framing the observed similarities. It is what
Part Four: Discussing Transition
1. De-Fragmentation of students’ learning momenta

In this chapter I explain the conditions under which I construct a story, based on references to the transcriptions, that relates to the six common dialectical pairs: Time-Space, Change-Movement, Movement-Stability, Initiation-Termination, Self-Other and Work-Unemployment. This process is described as de-fragmentation of students’ learning momenta. The term defragmentation, as I explained in the first part of the thesis, is borrowed from the command ‘defrag’ that is used in computer software packages. It refers to the process of bringing or pulling together pieces or clusters of lost and broken files in order to retrieve, replace, or reconstitute the information they contain and make it accessible in new files. De-fragmentation in my thesis is the process of bringing together in a story those pieces of text from the transcriptions that refer to common dialectical pairs, in order to construct a story about transition. Going back to my hypothesis, these dialectical pairs can be visualised as the components (learning momenta) of student learning instances, since I hypothesised that the conversations I had with the students, represent learning instances. These momenta are used as commodities. Building a story that is based on them, is a case of experiencing other people’s experiences, at a level that enables me first to portray it as my learning instance, and secondly to convey it to others. As I explained earlier, learning instances are nothing more than a series of momenta that involve others, objects and environments, and they are reflected in self-related cognitions. It is what Hormuth (1986) calls the ‘ecology of the self’ in terms of what they involve as an experience. This lets me and hopefully it will enable the reader to contemplate on as large a variety of issues that relate to the components of what I identify as my learning instance.
I invite 10 students to conversations about transition. These conversations are transcribed and become text. In these conversations we all talk about our experiences. These experiences consist of many learning instances. The students talk about instances of learning from the past, the present and the future. These instances of learning take place in many different spaces (family, school, work, home country, university, country of studies). Each learning instance consists of many different learning moments. To find these moments I deconstruct the learning instances to their conceptual components and then I compare them for similarities. These similarities are used to reconstruct each learning instance separately. Then fragments of those learning instances (pieces of text from the transcriptions) are brought together in one story. This story has the form of a vivid dialogue between me and the other students.

For the reader this can be a superficial approach of personal experience and therefore it might sound unconvincing. Nevertheless, the reader should consider first of all that this thesis has a certain context in which the narrative in which I present my interpretation of transition is located. This is identified as the students’ learning momenta or the transcribed conversations. It also has a topic on which it focuses. This is transition. Transition is interpreted only in terms of this context. In the research I do not look at each student individually as a person, but at the conversations I have with each one of them. These conversations appear as text.
and they are identified as the learning instances in the spirals that represent personal development. This gives a broader spectrum of defining transition and the possible ways it relates to learning.

Figure 14 shows the logic behind what I call de-fragmentation of students’ learning momenta. As I explained before the term de-fragmentation comes from the command ‘defrag’ as it is used in computer languages and refers to the bringing together in the same space different clusters of information that do not necessarily fit together in terms of the information they contain, but without them, that space cannot be created. In the case of a normal computer this space is the file or the files in which we can find the information we need. In my case I use a similar logic. The only thing that is different is the type of information that I pull together. The process is the following: I initially isolate from the spirals that represent the process of personal development, one learning instance (ten students-ten conversations-ten learning instances). These instances of learning are represented by the transcriptions of our conversations. Initially, before the analysis of the transcriptions, I hypothesise that these instances are the components of their transitions. In the conversations, students discuss with me many issues, some of them more personal than others. The picture I have after each conversation is that students tell me how they learn about things, how they learn more about themselves, how this learning is not something that they decide and therefore they consider it as a change. This change relates to transition. Then I look at each learning instance separately as if I put them under a microscope to find their consistence. I do this by deconstructing the transcriptions to their components that I call dialectical pairs. These components are the learning momenta. The next step is to compare the learning momenta and find which of them are similar in the ten learning instances. The comparison shows that there are only six of them that are
similar. Based on these similar momenta I contextually reconstruct the transcriptions. Contextual reconstruction helps me to locate in the contextually deconstructed texts those pieces that refer to the similar learning momenta. These pieces (fragments) are the base on which I build my story (de-fragmentation of students’ learning momenta). The learning momenta create the context in which I de-fragment those clusters of information that fit to the ‘space’ (narrative, story) that I initially wanted to create. This space is something virtual. It does not really exist in physical terms. It is artificial and it is constructed in order to serve the purpose of my thesis which is to redefine transition.
2. The Story

The de-fragmentation of learning momenta is contextualised within a story that involves a variety of characters and issues that correspond to each other. This story is constructed on the basis of the similar dialectical pairs (learning momenta) that came from the comparison. In other words, the narrative that refers to my interpretation of transition, is constructed on the common dialectical pairs that emerged from the comparison among the ten transcriptions. The story aims to give the illusion of a continuous discourse. It gives the sense of a dialogue with many controversies that is characterised by an equally artificial consensus and dissensus among those who participate in it. The story has five parts that relate to each other. Each part of the story refers to a learning momentum. The first part for example refers to the way students discuss the significance of time and space. It concerns the way transition is seen as a cognitive and emotional phase which initiates and terminates at different points in time and space (when a learning experience begins somewhere it must come to an end somewhere else). The story carries on with reference to the concepts of stability, movement and change that come to highlight the time-space relation (change, movement and stability are the three sides of the same coin). Within this context the story expands even further to embrace issues that relate to the construction of self-identity in relation to the other (growing-up together) and explicate the way students construct their ideas on work and unemployment in relation to their future expectations (the ‘package’).

The issues in the story unfold in a way that enables the reader to get a full picture of the emotional and cognitive complexity of the author. The realisation of this complexity helped me to construct my own learning instance that I identified in the previous chapter as ‘de-fragmentation of students’ learning momenta’. This learning instance which is summarised in the final part of the story, occurs with
reference to the conversations and the literature that is relevant to time, space, self, work, unemployment, change and stability. The story is graphically highlighted by metaphors that students use in the conversations, references to the transcriptions (framed boxes) and figures that give a schematic interpretation of how learning instances as commodified components of transition are explained in relation to the above issues.

The logic behind the use of the boxes that frame students’ responses in the conversations, is to create the basis of a dialogue between me, the respondents and the literature. The framed boxes are not analysed in any way, neither do they relate specifically to an idea or a theme from the literature as it is expressed in the story. They are pieces of different texts and are treated as independent fragments in the dialogue. They are different pictures of the same situation, or parts of pictures that create a virtual collage that represents the multiplicity and the complexity of a situation. They are used as stimuli for further thinking on the issues on which I base my own interpretation of transition. The reader therefore, should not expect to find any coherence or historical continuity in the way these fragments are presented or used. They are part of the story as much as the transcribed conversations are part of the analysis, and their purpose is only to give emphasis to the dialogue and stimulate further discussion. They are examples of the conflicts, contradictions and controversies that I encountered while I was deconstructing, comparing and reconstructing the transcriptions. They alert the reader to these controversies and what they imply for the way students structure their self-images in relation to their past, present and future, but they are not analysed, deconstructed, described or explained in any way in the story.

Similarly, the use of the present tense, that constitutes the main condition of the language game, or the virtual journey, that I have created, aims at placing the
reader into the logic of the story as a continuum, that does not begin anywhere in
the past, nor finish anywhere in the future. It carries on forever in the present.
Since the story aims to give the illusion of a continuous dialogue in which I am
personally involved, I use only the first person except when I refer to the literature.
The use of personal pronouns such as ‘I’, ‘we’ and ‘us’ and possessive pronouns
such as ‘ours’ or ‘our’, refers to the participants and me as part of the group of
people that actively participated in the research. The use of the personal pronouns
‘they’ and ‘their’ refers to the authors in the literature. The varied usage of these
pronouns aims to show that the continuity of the illusive dialogue that takes place
in the story that follows, is between me, the students and the references from the
literature.
2.1. The direction and duration of transition in time and space: From initiation to termination and back again

"Transition is a strange thing because you have to ask where your linear process ends and your circular process begins and what's the direction and why it is like that and why you are involved is such an emotional situation" (Andreas, 1996)

In this section of the story I look at two learning momenta, Time-Space and Initiation-Termination, and at the way they are brought together to explain the spatio-temporal character of transition. The first impression I get from the transcriptions, is that we always quote time and space as an undercurrent of our transitions. The quality, direction, placement, conceptualisation of time and space vary in relation to the way we act, move, speak, create and grow. It is hard to define time and space using everyday language, but the fact is that they are always there determining, undermining, shaping and witnessing our thoughts and actions.

| VICKY §10a: Being at school changes your time pattern. |
| ELENI §4a: A summer job in a hotel is boring. |
| MIGUEL §87: Transition relates to time conceptions and mainly with the natural concept of time which implies movement |
| VANGELIS §1a: I worked for a year in a private school. |
| SYLVIE §34: The first time I went to a foreign country I felt lost. |
| JUSTIN §101c: When you go out of campus is as if you go back to the world. |
| ANDREAS §49: Before I came to university I had an attitude and I didn't have a conception of depression or of fluctuation of emotional change. |
| JUSTINA §50: I was in an estranged environment in my first year in secondary school. |
| ERIKA §24a: University students back home are a bit older than the students here. |
| GREGORIO §31d: I don't want to stay in a foreign country because I am bound to my own home country. |

Within the bounds of these two properties we envisage transition as a condition, or perhaps a series of conditions, that relate to our initiation into something and the termination of something else.

Conversation with ELENI §76
Eleni: Look, I believe that transition is...of two kinds. I mean that from the one hand you finish something and that's it and then you go and do something like you go and get a job, because you got the chance at the time and you want to go to work immediately after you finish your degree, or...you just...do the other thing when you sit and analyse everything and see what sort of opportunities you have and analyse your horizons and see what you are capable of...and your chances...
Some of us, are used to the fact that everything must have a beginning and an end. Questions such as how life began and what happens after we die are quite common. These are issues that have concerned thinkers for many years. It is quite strange however, the fact that although we cannot explicitly define when a situation begins and when or where it ends, we always refer to obscure and abstract concepts such as time and space to bound them.

Eliade (1975) argues that initiation is a rite through which people come to know and assume their images. Obviously there are numerous types and countless variants of initiation, corresponding to different social structures and cultural horizons. In this regard initiation reveals the almost awesome seriousness with which we assume our responsibility of receiving and transmitting our values.

These values are taught. We learn what to do and how to do it, what represents the society in which we live and what are the rules within it at different times and in different places. Some of the students believe that this happens from
the moment we begin school. At that time we are too young to decide for ourselves. There are others who decide for us. We follow those others and comply with their rules.

As many of us admit the beginning is always hard and there are situations that are difficult to accept. There are certain things that may violate or be irrelevant to our values at that time. Particularly when we go somewhere new, when we change space and time. Going from one situation to another, as from education to work, is an initiation that we know in advance that it is going to have an end at some point in time. This termination is always marked by a change.

Prickett (1978) believes that the initiator must monitor their techniques so that we, the initiated, are prepared for the change. If they fail to do this they are left without candidates for initiation (p.23). Our initiations involve a number of other initiations that may take place at the same time and they are expressed as emotional and cognitive changes. An initiation to something new always involves a large number of other initiations to other situations. This is more obvious when we discuss our current position in higher education and the way our roles change from day to day.
or October, I think that I want to get some rest and I wouldn't like to think about what I've been through, although I could still look at thinks, last year let's say I was going to Thomas's place...and Thomas has all these Dali pictures in his room...they are hanging in each wall...and last year I was in this course about deconstruction of social roles and while I was looking at the Dali pictures I could see so many things, let's say, I could translate them...in relation to what I had read, and I realised how helpful this was to understand Dali's pictures. This year looking at the same pictures again...I don't...I believe that I had lost this...attitude...towards...yes...because I was not as devoted at that time to what I was doing....

Being with others and having a certain role is part of the initiation process. It may last some seconds, hours, days, years or even generations. We are always aware and consciously prepared for what follows. This is something we learn every time we enter into a new space. After primary school comes secondary school and after that comes university. After university comes the job. It is as if we know every single move of what is to come after the previous stage is finished. Besides the fact that we know what follows we are still unprepared to face the effects of a new initiation. This is because we are not fully aware of it when it happens.

Some students believe that every time something finishes and something new begins, it is as if 'a circle is appropriated'. After the circle is appropriated then a new initiation takes place and a new circle begins. On these grounds we realise the significance of time and space that determine the ‘when’ and ‘where’ an initiation and a termination take place. The realisation of initiation and termination provide us with the knowledge that every experience has some spatio-temporal direction and duration. Whether they have a cyclical or a linear direction or whether they have a long or short duration, time can be the future, the past and the present and space can be everywhere.
There are moments however, when I feel that more than our realisation of the spatio-temporal character of transition, it is the way we construct our language around the concepts of time and space. When we go out of the university campus, while we were at school, being in a foreign country, the summer we spent working in a hotel, the year we spent working in a private school, before we went to the university, our first time in school, the older students in the home country are phrases that represent the spatio-temporal conditioning of the experiences that constitute our transitions.

It is the way in which we use language to refer to the spatial and temporal characteristics that represent the conditioning of our experience. For Harvey (1993) concepts like space and time, are initially social constructs. To a large extent these social constructs relate to the way we use a common communicative code to refer to something that has a common-sense value for us, such as our transitions. Space and time have to be read and understood as communicatively constructed references that relate to our social experience that in this case reflects on the way we discuss our transitions. It seems that the relation between language, time and space goes further than the mere suggestion that space and time are socio-linguistically constructed and therefore they should be seen as such.
Conversation with MIGUEL Feedback Report 3

Miguel: Language has always a double nature, and by virtue of this it can play a role in transition both as a facilitator and as a guide: the dynamicity of language (its changeable nature) is of the same kind as the changes that we experience, but the reliability of meaning, on the other hand, helps us to conceptualise and provides us with order. This is why verbalising an experience need not kill its essence.

Although what we say is not much representative of, or justified by, what many post-modernists would say about time and space, the way we use terms like these is not far from what geographers like Massey (1993) call, a new phase in what Marx once called ‘the annihilation of space by time’. This is a phenomenon which Harvey (1990) calls time-space compression. The general acceptance that something of the sort (time-space compression) is going on is marked by the almost obligatory use in the literature of terms and phrases such as speed-up, global village, overcoming spatial barriers, the disruption of horizons and so forth (p.59).

**Figure 15**

Transition is a spatio-temporal condition. Within transition a learning instance begins at one point in time and space and ends at a different point in time and space. Initiation to one learning instance means termination of another and vice versa. The spatio-temporal character of our initiations and terminations is always seen as a unity.
We use similar terms such as ‘out of campus’, ‘back to the world’, ‘first time in the secondary school’, ‘beyond me’, ‘I’m lost’ or ‘belonging somewhere’. Massey (1993) claims that the concept of time-space compression remains curiously unexamined. It is a concept which remains without much social content, or with only a restricted, one-sided, social content. She believes there are many aspects to this. Such as these depicted through the overlaps in the way we refer to time and space.

Our references to time and space relate to our roles, our feelings, our emotions and attitudes. What we do now, in the present, in terms of conceptualising situations like our transitions in the place in which we locate ourselves (present), relates to our awareness that there is always some process that has been going on before (past). This reveals our awareness about time (future).

Lucas (1973), who believes that time is related to consciousness, claims that the account of time depends on a distinction between the instances that mark the beginning and end of isochronous intervals and the intervals that lie between these instances. In the transcriptions, the past and the future are the instances that compose our present as the interval that lies between these instances. Brentano (1988) argues that the differences between present, past and future and the numberless differences within the past and the future are not differences of the object, but rather different modes in which we present something (p.87). We are all relative determinations in relation to the speaker. Present means at the same time
as the speaker. Past means that the speaker is later. Future that the speaker is earlier. Teichmann (1995) shares to some extent Brentano’s views, but he prefers to turn his attention to other kinds of expression. These of ‘earlier’, ‘later’, ‘before’ and ‘after’. He claims that if we can talk of time at all, we talk of ‘before’ and ‘after’. These relations are essentially asymmetrical. If we cannot order events as they occur, before or after one another, we cannot regard them as really temporal. Directionless time is not time at all (p.43).

The emotions, feelings and attitudes that we seem to develop because of our consciousness, give direction to our initiations and terminations. They are justified by memory and perception as causal notions, which according to Brentano (1988), lie at the heart of past-tense discourse (pp.165-166). For Kolaja (1969) there is affinity between past and structure and future and change. This relates Moran’s (1979) suggestion that we stand on the shoulders of the past and the future is what comes from gently reshaping the past. The past is irretrievably gone, and in that sense the future whether it is determined or structured by others is potentially here and in that sense is bound to contain properties of change (p.16). If place is a fundamental aspect of our existence in the world, if we are sources of security and identity for ourselves and for others, then it is important that the means of experiencing, creating and maintaining significant places are not lost (see Relph, 1976).
acting, but a difference anyway, the ability to compare two different situations. Since you go from country A to country B, I am certain that there is an evolution, because B is different from A. Then if you come back to A, it is not different from when you left: A=A. It’s only you that changed meanwhile because of your life in B, not because you came back to A. Get it? Therefore I would think that you evolve when you go somewhere different. Any question?.. For Newton space is where things can be, sometimes were, and in fact were not. Newtonian space has the conceptual merit of enabling us to identify and re-identify things, especially point particles, the fundamental things, and of giving us room to move around, and move things around in accounting well for what he calls cause and change (p.193).

Harvey (1993) discussing the problem of place, suggests that there are all sorts of words that refer to it, such as milieu, locality, location, locale, neighbourhood, region, territory. All these terms refer to the generic qualities of space. There are other terms such as city, village, town, metropolis and state that designate particular kinds of places; and there are still others such as home, hearth, community, nation and landscape that have such strong connotations of space that it would be hard to talk about one without the other (p.4).

We refer to space by using words that relate to specific places. The school is a specific place that always refers to a broader space; that of education. Harvey
(1993) believes that place has an extraordinary range of metaphorical meanings. The place of art in the social life, the place of women in society, our place in the cosmos. These metaphorical meanings of space are internalised psychologically in terms of knowing our place, or feeling we have a place in the affections or esteem of others.

“We express norms by putting people, events and things in their proper place and seek to subvert norms by struggling to define a new place from which the oppressed can freely speak. Place has to be one of the most multi-layered purpose and multi-purpose words in our language.” (Harvey, 1993: 4).

This metaphorical sense of place is where we locate ourselves. It sets the boundaries within which we learn each time. For Heidegger (1962) this place is the locale of the truth of Being. He suggests that all distances in time and space are shrinking. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness.

**Conversation with ANDREAS §38b**

George: ...or... I mean how far you feel that you have progressed...

Andreas: ...right...well... I suppose it depends on what kind of meaning one gives to progression, there are two types of meaning basically...

George: ...mmm...

Andreas: ...you could say that... ...in terms of empathy and in terms of understanding other people's predicaments... and in terms of...ehmmm... reducing the size of my ‘ego’ and of my...mind... my arrogance... which is not probably what most people do... especially in the 1990s...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...and the fact that you can reach a level of empathy and that you can understand people is a sign that you have achieved an awful lot...

George: ...mmm...

Andreas: ...and I think that I am a better person because of that...

George: ...what do you mean better...

Andreas: ...ehmmm... ... ... more able to have friendships...

George: ...mmm...

Andreas: ... to be close to... in intimate with people....

Massey (1993) observes that if we take Heidegger's idea that all distances in time and space are shrinking, then places do not have to have boundaries in the sense of divisions which frame simple enclosures. Boundaries however, may be necessary for the purpose of certain types of studies, for instance, but they are not necessary for the conceptualisation itself (p.67). This means that places do not have single, unique identities. The elimination of spatio-temporal barriers results in a
terror that Harvey calls the terror of the time-space compression. This terror is present in our daily life.

For Heidegger (1977) this terror is a product of commodification and market exchange. He seeks ways to uncover the truths of human existence and meaning through meditation and contemplation. The concept on which he focuses is ‘dwelling’. For Harvey (1993), ‘dwelling’ is the capacity to achieve spiritual unity between humans and things (p.11). Time and space are properties that relate to the way we move in physical, bodily terms and in terms of virtual movement. In this case time and space are approached as a unity and not separately as in linguistic terms.

Hinckfuss (1975), discussing the kinematic and dynamic properties of space in relation to time, argues that according to relationalism space is not like a flowing line at all and he believes that time is like space in many respects and in many more respects than it is commonly realised (p.13). He argues that space and time can be as much together as they are separate according to the way we use them in our language. He suggests a principle according to which there is a ‘point-instant’. By this point-instant he means a point in space at some particular time. Given any two point-instants within an object, for example the two hands that are part of the body, there is a spatio-temporal curve from one point-instant to the other, such that every point-instant on the curve is within the object (p.69).
got anymore that accent...but I hear the others speaking there that they have a strong accent...

George: ...yeah...
Erika: ...so, it's a sort of...it's more well...I am here, but I am also there as well...

---

Most of us seem to acknowledge that transition relates to a process of initiation and termination of what takes place in certain spatio-temporal boundaries (Figure 15). In this one-to-one relation between conditions - or learning momenta - that initiate and terminate and which we implicitly refer to as transitions, time and space are significant, both in the way we take our own decisions about the way we let ourselves initiate new conditions or the way we want to terminate others.

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Conversation with ANDREAS §221

Andreas: ...ehmm...even though you have this idea of human values that you put on the top...it is nature that in fact plays the most important role...
George: ...yeah...
Andreas: ...when we want to look back to ourselves...
George: ...mmm...
Andreas: ...er... ...I think it is a circular process in a way...
George: ...yeah...
Andreas: ...but...I think it’s strange because I think that you have to question where...your actual linear progress stops and the circular starts and what's the direction and why is it like that...and why you are involved in such an emotional situation...and it is in fact nature that does not go in a line...
George: ...yeah...
Andreas: ...in a straight line I mean...

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Time and space are definitive parameters of our experiences. They have the form of a circle, a line or a geometrical object. They may be seen separately or they may be fused. They have weight, shape and gravity as much they are light, invisible or shapeless. They have many directions. They can be linear or they can evolve in a non-linear way. They may be absolute and relative, real or virtual. They can be patterned and unpatterned. They can even have a material quality. They can never be placed only in a straight line. This relates to my initial hypothesis that transition is a continuous, process with spatio-temporal attributes.
2.2. Movement-Change-Stability: The three sides of the same coin

‘Life is what is defined as movement, change and constant flux. The problem is to what extent we can embrace life without any reference to stability’

(Miguel, 1996)

In this section I discuss the dialectical pairs of Change-Movement and Movement-Stability. I initially look at time and space as components of our learning instances that can cause movement and change, and later I relate the concepts of movement and change, to the concept of stability. The most interesting aspect of looking at the way we discuss transition in terms of initiation and termination at a specific point in time and space, is that we see it as an essentially vital or dynamic concept.

Conversation with MIGUEL Feedback Report 3

Miguel: I take transition to be an essentially dynamic concept.

Most of us believe that transition relates to time conceptions and mainly with the natural concept of time which implies movement. If we take any learning experience in our lives we will see that it is not static, but that it changes and moves in many different directions at different times. Laban believes that there is a strong link through all its aspects between life as a dynamic movement and pattern (see North, 1972). How is this movement expressed, and how does it relate to the spatio-temporal character of transition?

North (1972) believes that it is common knowledge that we are all observers of movement. She suggests that movement reveals the inter-relationship of body and mind (p.26). Our movement can be physical or bodily, conceptual or virtual. Some believe that transition is essentially vital insofar as it is movement, and that transition relates to all movements whether these are identified as physical or conceptual. For many of us, the fact that our transitions are vital, insofar as we relate them to movement, raises a question. To what extent can we embrace
transition, as movement, without any reference to its opposed tendency which is that of stability?

**Conversation with MIGUEL Feedback Report 3**

*Miguel:* For me stability and movement are the poles of a tension that ought not to be broken...

Time is again important in the way we rationalise movement and stability. Stability and movement are not only two opposed tendencies. They are characterised by a balance that must not be broken. Time is significant in the way we look at movement and stability.

**Conversation with ELENI Feedback Report 2**

*Eleni:* ...I think that time helps us to see where we stand...

The same applies for space. This is because as we talk about movement in relation to stability we always refer to space as a factor that relates to change. This spatio-temporal change, that many of us define either as emotional or cognitive in terms of our experience, is discussed in relation to transition.

**Conversation with MIGUEL Feedback Report 3**

*Miguel:* Space has been more important than time in my experience as a student, since I had always been convinced that a change of space was very necessary to find an environment more suitable for my intellectual preferences. I don’t regret those spatial changes, but now I’ve given up the idea of an idyllic space, as I think that as a norm displacement is not advisable.

Change is realised during initiation and termination of a period of transition and it can be either instant or gradual, depending on how fast or how slowly we move.

**Conversation with JUSTINA §77**

*Justina:* ...and then I went to university...and in the university I was kind of...I made up my mind and I was going back to Africa and I was to work in Africa for a longer time this time...

*George:* ...yeah...

*Justina:* ...and...again...just when I got there...I just suddenly felt really sure that that’s where I wanted to be...

In either case we believe that change, even if it is not planned - and in most cases we believe that it is not planned - must happen regardless of how cost-effective it can be. This is because we always relate our life changes to stability. We
realise that if we are to obtain stability, or what we perceive as stability, then we
must change.

Conversation with VICKY §117b

Vicky: You can't be the person you were at 16. You know, you adapt to a lot of
circumstances, you don’t make a decision that you are going to do...you don’t
make a decision that you’re going to change. You make a decision that you’re
going to get this job, to do this job, and then there are things that would go
along with this job, and things, circumstances that would go along and do the
masters there are certain traits you know, things that will happen. And when
you move, you can’t say that you’re going to be a vile person in a night, but it
means that you’re not, you know, now I’m going to use again my bachelors,
you can be a frivolous person and suddenly you do things and then you go to
do your masters and you realise that you can’t because the circumstances you
are in and the decision you made means that you can’t. I didn’t realise this at
the time, you don’t make this conscious decision to yourself that you’re never
gonna have a social, life because you’re gonna have too much work. You
make a decision that, you want to do this degree and then when you do this
degree you change and adopt to whatever that decision entails and what it
means. And you grow, I mean we’re all very different we’re all very versatile...

Stability is placed on the top of an evolving process of cognitive and
emotional change as we gradually realise that change is inevitable regardless of
where or when it occurs. It is not as if we do not want it, nor that we do not expect
it to happen. We cannot avoid it because most of the time we cannot plan it.

Conversation with JUSTINA §90a

Justina: ...yeah, definitely...I had a very strong sense about all the choices in my life
so far...[...]...and it's probably the first point in my life that I am not so sure of
the choices that I've got ahead of me...
George: ...excellent...! so, you're conscious of that...
Justina: ...yeah...
George: ...you're conscious of the fact that...what you're going through...you don't
know where...it might lead you...
Justina: ...no, no...yeah...[...]...I'm conscious of that...I am in transition, and it's the
first time that it's a transition that I haven't necessarily planned...

In this context learning instances, as components of experience, can be
seen as a series of unscheduled changes that aim at one thing. That is stability. The
relation of stability with change is not direct. In general stability and change or
stability that causes change or change that aims to stability is discussed in relation
to other issues that unveil gradually, and to a large extent they are characterised by,
a degree of controversy and emotional or cognitive conflict.
Discussing stability as the result of change, some of us express a spatial and
temporal insecurity. This insecurity leads to a controversial description of the way
we evaluate ourselves. This can be partly explained because of the differences
between the way we express our ideas on stability in the future and the way we
express our emotions about specific experiences of the past. Diggory (1966) argues
that the meaning of the word ‘self’, is its reference to any situation in which the
purpose of the agent is simply to exercise any function of which organisms are
capable: thinking, loving, caressing, tricking, smelling, conceiving, classifying and
evaluating. These functions are the acts to which past experiences and future
expectations refer. To be an object of an act is merely to be that which is thought
about, caressed, loved, or evaluated, etc. The implication of this view is that any act
in which actor and object are the same, is a self-relevant act, regardless of how
trivial or global, how central or peripheral the act and its outcomes may be. It
should not come as a surprise that we discover the possibilities of change of self, as
we reach a stage of stability, at which we have to think in retrospect about our past.
Time plays a major role in the way we change, destabilise and balance ourselves in
different situations.
Sylvie: ...we went out together, and...it wasn’t as hard as it could have been.
George: ...yeah.
Sylvie: It was still hard, but not hard...
George: Yeah...
Sylvie: I suppose at the time it wasn’t that hard...huh...
George: Yeah...
Sylvie: Mmm...mmm...  
George: And you get through this...  
Sylvie: Mmm...yeah...it’s only a question of a month to get through it...
George: Yeah...
Sylvie: And as soon as you get used to it,...

Realisation of changing times and the fact that we realise that we change, describes in a primal way our movement towards stability. The controversy relates to the distrust with which most of us approach change.

Discussion with JUSTINA §186

Justina: ...I don’t think that I can do otherwise even if I force it...
George: ...I don’t know...I am a bit confused...sometimes I feel negative...definitely...
Justina: ...yeah...
George: ...and sometimes I feel positive...
Justina: ...yeah...
George: ...I feel negative...and positive probably because...well, you see it’s my choice...but on the other hand...it’s out of control...!
Justina: ...yeah...mmm...and basically there is a kind of...I can’t say that I find it quite frightening...but it’s the first time that I associate fear with it...and for the rest of the transitions that I have been in my life even with this one now...as well...although this time as well there is an association, a relation like...something is going to happen...
George: ...yes...
Justina: ...whatever it is...
George: ...yeah...
Justina: ...something it’s gonna happen, it’s gonna be different, it’s gonna be new, it’s gonna be exciting...
George: ...yeah...
Justina: ...but I’m not sure what is gonna be...

Stability in this sense relates to what is provided in a secure, spatio-temporally bound social setting that enables us to accept certain norms or perform a particular type of behaviour. This can be easily shaken when we realise that we are moving towards a different space.

Conversation with VICKY §26b

Vicky: Yeah. It’s...in a way it’s something you really look forward to, but you go...you’re at school. In a way it’s quite weird because, I...I know...I don’t remember because it’s a long time ago...but it had been like I don’t want to be apart from my mum, but if you do it’s only for few hours,. but is...obviously it’s a definite change of life more than usual... suddenly there is Monday to Friday and you have to be in this building...
Similar types of change are the product of what Van Gennep (1960) defined as separation. Our separation from a familiar environment to a different unknown space normally results in integration in the new environment. For Proshansky (1978) the environment or settings provide the place for a person’s experiences or actions and can be symbols of one’s identity (Hormuth, 1986: 44). As we discuss this initial movement is undesirable and weird. Later it becomes essential and unavoidable in order to achieve stability in a new environment whether this is the university, the workplace or the country of our studies. This partly explains stability as the outcome of the spatial integration to a new environment which is the result of separation (Figure 16).

**Figure 16**

Within transition change and stability are seen as the products of spatio-temporal movements that refer to our separation from a stable situation or a role and our integration to a different one.

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**Conversation with SYLVIE §18a**

*Sylvie:* ...you have to split with someone going somewhere. It's different from college where you are in the same class and where you see each other everyday. So I think that maybe from that point...I don’t know how it made me...

*George:* ...hmm...

*Sylvie:* ...well...the thing is...I can’t remember what I wanted to say, well...something is going wrong something seems to be changing...
Separations and integrations, as they are described by anthropologists like Van Gennep (1960), are not merely temporal or spatial. Separation involves a degree of separation from past roles that the person replaces with different ones. The changing space can help us to understand that our separation from something and our integration into something else results in adjustment to new roles.

For Hormuth (1986) adjustment to new roles implies social interactions that are thought to be central to the dynamics of our self-concept.

**Conversation with VICKY §40c**

*Vicky:* ...and [my mother] is very supportive of what I do and we have, I mean there are still sometimes when I go back home and we clash, and we just yell to each other about it, and we say what we feel and it's OK. You know. I mean there was more problems there when my dad died and the whole family unit changes and relationships change, and you know, again that she's totally on her own in the house you get even more selfish and you know there is a whole load of emotional problems on the side that...just not get resolved, or will get resolved eventually, but that's a whole world aside and...that's a change...

Change comes as something that, although we are aware that it is part of our lives, it is still not under control. Change is a situation beyond control. This reflects both on the way we adjust or integrate to a new situation or a new role.

**Conversation with JUSTINA §109c**

*George:* ...yeah...but...at the stage...you know when you think about it...
*Justina:* ...mmm...
*George:* ...you realise that...is this really what I wanted to do?
*Justina:* ...mmm...yeah...definitely...
*George:* ...and...at the end of the day...I... ...I jump to the conclusion...no, it's not...
*Justina:* ...mmm...
*George:* ...but, I'm doing it...
*Justina:* ...mmm...
*George:* ...and there is no way to get away with it...
*Justina:* ...mmm...yeah...and then suddenly you all feel that you're not in control again...
*George:* ...exactly...
*Justina:* ...not being in...not having the power to get away from it...
*George:* ...yes, exactly...

Most of us believe that change of personal roles is more obvious when we move to a new environment whether this is school, higher education, a new relationship or in some cases relocation of the family.
Change through movement cannot be avoided, but this does not mean that it cannot be prevented. Consciousness of movement and possible emotional defences may impede or even prevent change from taking place. This causes another controversy. Planning not to change implies stability.

Stability through change may not be wanted, but at the same time it is desirable because the outcome of this change is learning. This learning is seen as the reference point of the relation between stability and change. Learning about the way we change helps us to see where we stand. Sometimes however, learning about stability may have a negative effect in the way we perceive ourselves.
it...for me it’s not a nice...because doing something, I don’t want to...I don’t wanna go further...

George: ...yeah...
Sylvie: ...and I want to...to, leave what I got behind...
George: ...yeah...
Sylvie: ...maybe it’s fear or something...
George: ...yeah...
Sylvie: ...and I’m not helping it by realising that things are changing in my life...
George: ...yeah...
Sylvie: ...and my friends, don’t see me as I was...and I don’t want to grow older...and...

Averill (1980) explains this negativity as the result of a transitory social role that causes paucity of our positive emotions (p.42). We are aware that regardless of how unwanted change is, stability cannot be achieved without change. Even if this change is not under control or relates to negative learning about ourselves, stability is impossible without it. This establishes movement, stability and change as the three sides of the same coin and justifies my initial argument that transition is component of personal development can be understood through change and movement. This complex relationship between stability, change and movement can be located at two levels. At the first level stability is seen in relation to the way we realise how our self-image changes through movement. In order for the self-image to change and reach stability, we understand that we have to make certain movements. It is a compromise. This compromise has to be made if we are to obtain cognitive stability. Most of the time compromise refers to the way we relate ourselves to others.

Conversational with VANGELIS §162

Vangelis: ...we all function in relation to our interests, but at a level where we can be accepted by others.

At the second level we realise that we have to compromise if we are to obtain emotional stability. This compromise refers to the way we relate ourselves to the threat of unemployment and to the pleasures of work. Some of us call this form of compromise ‘the package’.
Conversation with SYLVIE §50a

_Sylvie:_ ...I think that having a job, having a boyfriend and living on your own is all a package.
2.3. Selfing the other: A new ecology of the self

‘As long as you got the main point of ‘self’ you always got this ‘other’ undercurrent always coming up to undermine it’

(Andreas, 1996)

In this section I look at the way the self stabilises and destabilises in relation to others. Learning about the self is a series of experiences that involve more than the person. According to Hormuth (1986) stability and change in a person’s answer to the question ‘Who am I?’ vary throughout the life cycle. While at some point continuity may prevail, at others this question requires radically new answers (p.1). The loss of another person, a change in living conditions, or our initiation into higher education, can change the self-concept. The constituents of the self, namely others, environments and things that provide, mediate and perpetuate our social experience, are described by Hormuth as the ‘ecology of the self’.

Hormuth (1986) believes that the self both shapes this ecological system and is a reflection of it (p.2). Development and change happen within the ecology of the self which we define spatio-temporally, cognitively and emotionally. To understand change in this context, the stabilising and the changing forces have to be understood not only as existing within us, but as encompassing our surroundings. These are expressed with the use of concepts that have a symbolic and in some cases general character. For Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934)
constituents of the ecology of the self are others as the sources of direct social experience (cited in Hormuth, 1986: 37). Others can be anyone. Our family, our colleagues, the people in the house in which we live, our employer or our sexual partner. The first function of the others for the concept of self is the reflection and reaction to our actions. The reactions of other’s to one’s own action provide a mirror for the self.

Hormuth (1986) acknowledges that others do not necessarily have to be physically present to provide social experiences nor do they have to exist as a concrete person. Social experiences are commodified and, as we realise through the conversations, they are symbolised in various forms, not in rules and expectations, for instance, but in physical objects. It is individual stability that is the target behind all that. In reality we know well that independence relates to the power of the other which influences our choices. This is best expressed when we talk about freedom of choice and to what we think this freedom relates.

**Conversation with GREGORIO §151a**

Gregorio: I compared myself with other people in the same situation as me and I saw what I know and what they know. I compared my aspirations with those of other people and I developed connections with people from the university and I met tutors and renowned people in their area that I believe that they will help me in the future.

**Conversation with VICKY §19h**

Vicky: [...] And then there is this big discussion can I get to University, can I do it? And again, from as far as I can remember I was always expected to go. And after that you just...you have this pattern...you know, you just form this lap-up, you will make these changes you will do this you will go through school, you will go to college, you will go to University and then you will make...you are free to do what you want. And my choice was to carry on and go to another University, but you just...ah...I know there was a moment when I thought I don’t know if I want to do this. I was really tired and bored of education. And it wasn’t going great. And I didn’t want to do it, but, then again, I have no idea what else I would do. For me the idea of going out and getting a job, working in a super-market permanently was all a haunt. I mean for other people, to get out of education is best. Freedom of choice...I don’t know...I think...I don’t know if I had a lot of pressure put on me. I think it was conscious pressure,, but again I had an older brother who was going ahead and getting brilliant grades, and all of this, and I was...you can’t do else, but you have to do it as well.

George: You mean he worked as an example, a positive example in a sense.

Vicky: It is, it’s also negative. Once he’s got it they want you to get it.
This causes another controversy as we recognise the power of the other on whom we might depend as a factor that assists us to achieve our own independence. In other words we see our dependence on the other as the reason for achieving independence and to a larger extent stability (Figure 17).

Epstein (1979) who shares Hormuth’s views on the ecology of self, suggests that the individual theory of reality has three major functions that relate to the way we perceive ourselves and develop our self-esteem. The first function is to maintain itself as a system for assimilating the data of experience. The second is to maximise the pleasure-pain balance over the foreseeable future. The third is to maintain a favourable level of self-esteem. These three purposes of reality are in conflict with each other and therefore require that compromises be made (p.49). In this interrelation we never take ourselves as a constant fact. Cotton (1968) believes that according to Royce (1910) selfhood is borrowed (p.16). What we really mean by the self is an inward flux of conscious experience which we may call ‘ours’.

Conversation with ERIKA §186

Erika: ...and I always remember Tony Bruger...it’s a book of that guy and it talks about the development of life...and when I think about him...Tomas Mann...I mean Tomas Mann, her mother was Spanish and the father was German so he had two different cultures in one person and he can give to the person more sensibility in certain aspects.

George: ...yeah...

Erika: Anyway I read in the book a sentence about...make me think in a different way than what I think...and basically this guy was living in a community that everyone had blond light eyes, and really clear skin...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...er...physical...aspect and he was small, dark eyes, dark skin...and he said that you depend on what you want from the life if you want to live from your life...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...if you want to live...as a blond one then you live at the surface of your life...you, have fun and you don't think about the future your past or yourself...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...and it was a sort of «dark» guy if you want...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...he was talking and analysing everything of himself...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...and he was...wanted deeper and deeper in his life...so it depends on what you want and if you feel some sort of stranger in that community...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...and I don’t know sometimes when I read that phrase sometimes you can say that there is something that could change your life, but on the other hand you
feel that there is something more that you learn and that you could use and live it in your everyday experience...

George: ...yeah...
Erika: ...I am not a person that wants to live in the surface of the things...
George: ...the surface...yeah...
Erika: ...I want to go deeper...
George: ...yeah, I think you are right...[,]...but...you know we have to find them somewhere written...oh! it’s there and it was something I though or I had as well in my mind...
Erika: ...exactly...
George: ...but you couldn’t express it properly...maybe you can’t find the right words to say...
Erika: ...exactly...
[...]
George: ...and I think that books normally maybe they don’t change our lives...
Erika: ...maybe they do sometimes...
George: ...what they can actually do is that they can confirm...
Erika: ...that’s it...
George: ...what we think and that makes us feel better and makes us bring out what we have inside and maybe it will bring a change after that...yeah...I think that you are absolutely right about that...

Self is feelings, ideas and passions together with whatever unity we may have. It is not surprising, therefore, when we talk about self-stability and change, we use metaphors that refer to controversies and conflictual interpretations of situations of past learning momenta: initiations and terminations that happened many years or few months ago. We are aware of the fact that like time and space, change and stability can be virtual as much as they are real. Talking about our own experience it seems that sometimes we cannot decide what we want them to be. This begins from the moment we separate from our parents. We gradually come to terms with the feeling of being separate from our families. Most of us claim that being away from the family or the already familiar environment of our own countries relates to positive as well as negative feelings.

Conversation with ERIKA §98
George: ...one single instance that made you change your attitude towards yourself or towards others...
Erika: ...yeah...
George: ...that particular instance...what would that be?
Erika: ...er...a change...I change my attitude to myself and the other...?
George: ...yeah...
Erika: ...I think that basically I could say...to...to synthesise just one instance...well...I can tell you then a more recent if you want...coming here to England...
George: ...yeah...
Erika: ...mmm...coming here to England...I changed...
Integration to a new space normally relates to change. This change can be initially interpreted as change of self in relation to others. This change in relation to the other refers to what we see as independence. This initiation to a new environment and therefore to a new transition cannot pass unnoticed. For most of us it is the first time we go away from our families. We separate from our friends. For some of us it is separation from both our families and our home countries.

**Conversation with SYLVIE §33c**

George: ...er...well that...besides the fact that you lost your friends...you lost...I mean, you've all been...you all took separate ways...

Sylvie: ...yeah...

George: ...besides this, er...was there anything different or anything new or anything that made you change, change your behaviour, change your expectations, and change your image, your physical image...

Sylvie: Change of behaviour...sure...well, not behaviour, but...the way of thinking maybe...being more independent I would say...

George: Yeah...

Sylvie: ...I was driving my car to the university, do what ever you want, choose what ever lecture you want, those you at least didn't want to go...er...yeah...I suppose it's a feeling of independence...

George: Independence...

Sylvie: ...more...well...nothing really changes, you still went back home everyday, every night to my family in the weekends...

George: ...yeah...

Sylvie: ...you're just with you once...

George: ...yeah...

Sylvie: ...well, that's about it...

George: And now you are here...

Sylvie: Indeed...

Being separate from what we know helps us develop a feeling of independence. This feeling of independence becomes stronger when we relate it with the fact that we integrate to the university. The university is the place for us to do what we want to do ‘our own way’. This boosts our self-esteem and makes us feel mature.

**Conversation with VICKY §47c**

Vicky: And you have to...you know, there are certain stages in your life where things are very-simple and then it's about getting independence as well. When you're six you're so dependent you have nothing with you, you have no job, no respect, anything, but when I think for me when you hit university is when you sorta go BANG! everywhere and you know you have home, you have university, you're having your friends at university who live in other parts of the country you change, you know, I mean, I think there is people who go two miles away from home to the university that's kind of defeats the purpose., but I wanted to go a hundred miles away and of course for you being here in a completely different country...
This independence is virtual. This is because in the face of the change of social and physical environment another factor contributing to self-related evaluations and processes can be identified. Being a stranger in a new environment or generally being separated as a figure from a new ground focuses attention on oneself. A theory of self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972) identifies conditions and consequences of self-focused attention (cited in Hutchings & Wutzdorff, 1988: 116).

**Conversation with SYLVIE §35c**

*Sylvie:* ...but obviously, for those who are here, for those who are living here, foreigners ones...er...as soon as you leave a place where you used to live...
*George:* ...yeah...
*Sylvie:* ...and you go to somewhere very different, it's automatically...an evolution and you are gonna change your behaviour according to the new rules and the new way of...reacting.
*George:* Yeah.
*Sylvie:* So, of course I think I evolved since I first came to England...
*George:* Yeah...
*Sylvie:* ...since I...all right...
*George:* ...oh...that’s very interesting then. Because I’m a foreigner...and...er...we start from the beginning. You said that as a foreigner you came from a different country, and you felt like...well a sort of evolution.
*Sylvie:* Yeah...well, actually the most of thinking...the most I think about it...it’s got something to do with the fact that I’m not with my friends anymore. It’s mostly because I’m living alone right now. Whereas when I was student back home, it was my mother, and it was my friends around...
*George:* ...yeah...
*Sylvie:* ...a cozy thing that you don’t have to care about the daily...
*George:* ...yeah I see, what you mean...
*Sylvie:* ...yeah...
*George:* When you were back home in France, I mean what was your first transition, if you want, what was the first time that you felt like...er...you’re going from one stage or from one situation to another?
*Sylvie:* ...mmm...
*George:* I mean, I’m asking you now to go back and think about something that really intrigued you and made you feel that I’m going from one situation, from one condition to another.
*Sylvie:* It's hard to say it like that. I can’t think of a short period where I can say that right there...
*George:* Yeah...
*Sylvie:* ...I’ve changed...

Hormuth (1986) suggests that in a new environment the self-concept is made salient until the once new environment becomes familiar. A familiar environment is one where the self-concept and its ecological system are stabilised. While this is not meant to imply that all conditions leading to self-focused attention
are those eliciting self-concept change, it can be stated that changes in the ecology of the self-concept lead to self-focused attention and thus facilitate self-concept-related processes such as change or maintenance, whichever is required by the current evaluation of the self concept.

Conversation with SYLVIE §83

Sylvie: ...when I got this waiting job you see... I was feeling very different from the others...being me a student and being these...er...sort of low class women...

George: Yeah...

Sylvie: ...you know low education, and...

George: ...being French as well?

Sylvie: ...being French, yeah...I must admit...being absolutely...er...I felt...like a bit superior...

Krech, Crutchfield & Ballachey (1962) argue that attitudes towards dependence and independence develop in response to problem situations - in trying to satisfy specific wants (p.181). We realise that we gain independence gradually. We think that we gain more independence when we move to school, and then again we think that we get more independent when we go to the university. This is because we perceive university to be the space that gives us the opportunity to envisage ourselves in the future, and a place that gives us the opportunity to adjust to different life situations. This is partly explained as the result of having a social life and being able to deal with different people in and out of the university.

This makes us dependent on the space in which we move.

Conversation with VICKY §109

Vicky: Hmm...No, but what I mean is that I went to Geneva and I learned more things in three days than he learned in nine months and, what I mean is that Lawrence is a very insular. He knows what he likes. You know, he found his English pub in Geneva, and drunk there, you know, but as for me, I found the most French place I could get and I think you have to get to...I don't know I think you do change when...while you live there... you take a little bit of your Englishness with you back hopefully you know, and a little bit of this culture and you know I think this is also a really nice experience to live in a multinational house and that you learn more about different cultures. And I think that if you're not insular and xenophobic that you can cope with it, but it's such an experience it's such a change, but of course, there is a different in that we have no choice than to live all together, but we seem to be managing it. And this is it if you don't go through all these stages you don't have a control over, and you know you learn more, it's compromise it's change and everything it's sort of, it's you see, back. In three years time I will look back at this year and realise things differently...
We are not really independent and we know that. We only feel independent within a certain space. This is the space in which we locate ourselves and which bounds our activities. When we go back to our family environment and spend some time with our parents then we realise that what we think of as independence is dependence.

**Conversation with JUSTIN §112d**

George: ...I mean if I haven’t seen my parents for quite a long time, but they are still part of my life, it’s the same with life partners in some cases as well...but I think that this relates a lot to this transition from higher education...I want to see this as part of higher education more than anything else I think it’s a n essential part of the transition both the life transition and...and the one from higher education to work...

Justin: ...mmmm...

George: ...and education...

Justin: ...yes...I quite agree with that...it’s not just...just...er...that sort of routine from the family it is also that one you get from the school and the other institutions we are associated as well...

George: ...yeah...

Justin: ...the formative interest is of whether you go to the stage where you actually have to go to the university...

Georger: ...yeah...

Justin: ...and then of course you might have all these feelings...er...[laughter]...I can see what you mean...particularly with the parents...it is that you feel that you change and you grow, but they change and they grow as well...but also they are trying to keep the relationship that they had with you at the level it was...

Independence is not freedom. It is not being on our own or having our own life. It is more like a feeling of ‘growing up’ that begins when we move from family to school and evolves when we go to university.

**Conversation with JUSTINA §141c**

Justina: ...for the last two years at school I was a boarder...

George: ...oh, fine...

Justina: ...so it was kind of just weekly so I was school all week except the weekend...

George: ...yeah...

Justina: ...so, I kind of let into the university life quite gently...

George: ...yeah...how did you feel about that...when this thing happened...?

Justina: ...I really enjoyed it...I loved it...[laughter]...I didn’t start boarding until I was...sixteen seventeen...[...]...and...I had some very good friends during the week we were going back to out homes in the weekends anyway...[...]...er...so it’s kind of...in the beginning it was really tough though...we didn’t know what was going to happen how it was like...

George: ...yeah...

Justina: ...but basically we were just sharing apartments...

George: ...yeah...did it help you in terms of self confidence...being on your own...

Justina: ...yeah...

George: ...yeah...
Being independent does not only mean that we have a social life. It further implies integration to a new and more stable self. This is more obvious when we refer to our socialising with students from other countries.

Conceptualising the self relates to the need to reveal more to others. According to Jourard (1971) mutual disclosure is important (p.17). In cases when we share a house or another common space, mutual disclosure through dialogue and partnership is important for us to understand ourselves interacting with each other. The importance of the others becomes more apparent then. Others used to be our parents, our brothers or sisters, our school fellows and our teachers. Now there is a larger variety of others involved. There are students from other countries, there are sexual partners, there are people with different attitudes and views about life. In these new others we reflect ourselves.

What are the elements of dependence and independence in this case and how do they relate to obtaining self-stability? In this case we seem to approach dependence and independence on the grounds of maturity in the context of relating ourselves to others. Maturity is not just the realisation of changing roles or
realising where we stand, but it relates to growing up, in terms of making decisions for ourselves, and being responsible based on the reactions of others. It means looking back to our past and seeing what we got out of it.

**Conversation with VICKY §69**

**Vicky:** And you become aware of how much everything costs. You didn't know this before. You go to the supermarket with your mum and you just take the things from the shelves, and then you realise how much your shopping bills are coming through. I mean I have very good parents, and very generous, and they took good care of me and I didn’t have a lot of money worries, but you do have an awareness of what’s going on. And you have more responsibilities, that, you know, if you wanna go out up to four o’clock, do it, it’s up to you when you get home and then you can go over the border and then you can enjoy it, and it makes it hard sometimes to go back, because when you’re back and you’re still the child and they are the adults. And then...this is again it’s a quite hard thing.

**George:** Yeah, it is.

**Vicky:** And you have to reach a compromise and then you get on their side. They get used in having the house for themselves and they change and develop in their way, and you change over here, and when you get back together, it is quite like...bang! You know. They don’t want you out until three o’clock in the morning. You go out until three o’clock in the morning normally. You know. You don’t see, why they put your dirty washing out of your room. That’s not the way it is normally. You know!

This process is not easy and in many cases it can cause distress. As some of us say, when we feel that we mature, we go ‘backwards and forwards, up and down and around’. This process demands a degree of loneliness as we believe something that causes another controversy. Being on our own does not necessarily mean that we are lonely. It just means that we can make decisions for ourselves thinking about the reactions of the others. To be alone means to get older, to be mature and therefore to be independent.

**Discussion with ERIKA §90c**

**Erika:** ...sometimes when you see yourself from the outside is not always what you want to see, but then you have some experience and it’s natural that, when you have to observe yourself and the other the more that you do the more that you can...understand...and the more that you can you haven’t got to feel strange or different or whatever so...you grow up with it...

**George:** ...mmm...

**Erika:** ...and at a certain point of your life...that I think basically it’s strange because for instance before I came here in England I never had a lot of...how do you say that...I never considered myself really good...you see?

**George:** ...yeah...

**Erika:** ...and...then when I started to because I had to deal with lot of other problems and you think that you are not and you shouldn’t be so self centred then you’re just starting to see what’s maybe right about yourself...you see. I
mean when you start to do something just alone and you get some result and then at the end of the day you say well, I was not that bad after all...and sometimes for instance if you observe even the children they can be nasty to each other...I mean I remember that children at school they can be nasty for your accent I mean...they were with me...or for your...physical body...

George: ...the way you look, the way you behave, whatever...

Erika: ...whatever, exactly...so, I think that...when you start to think about the feelings as a sort of challenging...challenging opportunities you have in your life then you think that these are the things I have with me and I will try and make the best of it with those things...

At the other end lies dependence. Dependence is a situation that has to change. Most of us suggest that we can hardly stand anyone above our heads telling us what to do and how to do it. This causes another controversy if we think about the way we obtain independence.

In higher education we enjoy a large degree of social independence. This gives us the opportunity to build up a personal image and reassess our expectations, which is enhanced by the fact that we identify to a certain role. The role with which we normally identify ourselves and which offers us a degree of conditional independence, is that of the student. Being a student is a temporary, unstable role with which we compromise (Figure 17). According to Hormuth (1986) the centrality of a social role to the way we conceptualise ourselves, is defined through a number of other social relationships that are influenced or tied into place by commitment, compromise and dependence on others. As long as the central social commitment stays in place, a larger network of social role identities that define the self-concept is stable (p.4).

Compromise or the commitment to a role goes further than helping us to conceptualise ourselves. Compromise has a more general effect. It relates to our dependence on others. Many of us believe that we have to compromise in many situations in our lives. Learning to compromise comes with maturity. Dependency,
as Day (1992) argues, is not a thing with an easily definable size and boundaries. It is continually being defined, modified, and reformed in social processes (p.105). Once we compromise then we have to look at those things that will help us make the situation in which we are involved better for ourselves and our life more pleasant.

**Conversation with SYLVIE §137b**

**Sylvie:** ...and my friends, don’t see me as I was...and I don’t want to grow older...and...

**George:** ...yeah...who does...I mean I don’t want to grow older either...

**Sylvie:** ...yeah...

**George:** ...but I think...it’s a kind of compromise, isn’t it? I mean...it’s...it’s sort of compromise with time...with our attitudes, with ourselves first and then with the others...it’s a sort of a compromise with society, and its expectations, it’s a sort of a compromise...with...what we expect...

**Sylvie:** ...compromise with yourself as well...

**George:** ...yes...it is...

**Sylvie:** ...in the sense that...’ok, okay, I can’t be like that anymore...

**George:** ...mmm...

**Sylvie:** ...so I’ll try to make the best of what’s to come in the future...

Being students we are prepared to gain or to lose. We are prepared to change and be different from before, to accept the challenge of movement and change. The controversy here lies in the fact that, although we seek stability, we believe that we will lose sight of our former insecurity and dependence. We may feel this already, because we realise suddenly that the end of our student life is close.

**Conversation with VICKY §54b**

**Vicky:** You know I don’t think I realised a lot about my bachelors until I was here. Now, you know I look back and I realise that it was such a good experience I had and which I still have and that I’m still very close, I still have a very close bunch of friends and it’s a very secure time you know. And if this security wasn’t there is still a lot of security in this house in terms that it is still someone here, you know, at least there is someone to talk if I want to which is again good. I don’t know I feel in a way that when you actually grow old there are sometimes you get used to be on your own. And when you’re eventually get your own job and your own house, that would be very weird. There must be loads of advantages, but it will be odd as well...you know.

Others can now be seen as threats. This is probably because that which some people in the university environment helped us to realise, in terms of our independence, is now going to be taken away by other others. This makes us feel
threatened and gives us a sense of instability of what is going to happen in the future.

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**Conversation with JUSTIN §200b**

Justin: ...so in a way it was some sort of...I had to keep my head in a stable environment in a way so to feel as much pleased as I could in the particular environment...

George: ...yeah, pleased...

Justin: ...and feel peaceful and that I can operate without feeling threatened or worried...[...]

George: ...but outside of that environment there are certain places, that I just sort of...drive me mad...and the office environment for example is totally unappealing to me...

George: ...mmm...

Justin: ...I mean it's just a huge bureaucratic shirk in my mind...[...][laughter]...that can be as threatening and alienating as feeling threatened and worried of what is going to happen to you next...[...][...]as a...living in a city...so...I am afraid I am sort of full of fears...

George: ...mmm...yeah...

Justin: ...hmmm...as for...sort of the space inside my head...again I suppose I could...use the word reserved...but in a way that although I like to spend time with people I also like spending too much time by myself...

George: ...yeah...

Justin: ...to get feedback from my self...in the sense that I am not obliged...to...to...to...get that from other people...

George: ...yeah...

Justin: ...although I feel that this is difficult in the sort of...the reality you live in a way is sort of...it's...

George: ...mmm...

Justin: ...you just have to be surrounded by people...

George: ...mmm...yeah...

Justin: ...although I think I can’t do without people...

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To the extent to which we realise our dependence on others, whether the others are the family, our teachers, our friends or the society in general, we realise the need for recognition in terms of what we have achieved. This becomes more obvious when we are close to the end of our studies. As postgraduates, we agreed that the closer we get to the termination of this transition the more we start worrying about what to do next. This causes us a negative feeling of anxiety.

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**ELENI §3**: I am in doubt about the future in employment.

**VANGELIS §129a**: the next stage of transition is the stage of pursuit. In the stage of pursuit you are in between what you got out of education and the workplace.

**JUSTIN §5**: At the moment thinking about what to do next is something unpleasant.

**JUSTINA §90a**: Probably for the first time in my life I didn’t have any fixed kind of plan of what I am to do next.

**ERIKA §40e**: You realise that you must do something after your academic career or your university and when I start doing that I feel a bit lost and scared about my future.
Within transition we see ourselves changing and stabilising in relation to our independence from or dependence on others. Change of our self-concept relates to the strength of the influence of the other (not always a concrete person, but also generalised and symbolised social experiences, objects and environments) and to what extent we are free to do our own thing as we want to do it (being alone). In this context our separation from one situation and our integration to another is marked by the fact that we see ourselves maturing and compromising.

This is the time we start to realise that we have to initiate a new situation. With the termination of our learning instance in higher education and our adjustment to the stable role of the student, we start getting worried about what is to come next. Although we know what follows we are still insecure and that some of us are threatened. It is when we start feeling the pressure of the new situation. For Schachter (1965), there is a physiological element involved in the way we develop our attitudes towards what comes next. He believes that apart from the cognitive aspect of what we believe we are or how we see ourselves in the future, there is some sort of emotional arousal involved that although it is not sufficient enough to induce an emotion it plays a significant role (p.77).

**MIGUEL Feedback Report 3:** There a certain amount of pain involved in transition. Transitions involve an amount of pain and suffering as they are part of life and natural processes.

**JUSTIN §211:** I understand that sometimes for some people a transition may result in pain and be traumatic. In my case transition is something closer to a
This means that the termination of one central social commitment destabilises our self-concept and opens the way for changing it (Hormuth, 1986). At this stage we develop what Krech, Crutchfield & Ballachey (1962) call ‘congruent change’. Congruent refers to the possibility of increasing an existing negative attitude (e.g. going to work) (p.216). This interesting approach justifies the role of movement, change and stability as the three sides of the same coin. Metaphorically, when cognitive stability ends, a new change of our self-concept begins. This change leads to another phase of cognitive stability. Change and self stability in relation to the other, can be seen as learning in terms of defining our limits and in defining other people’s limits as well.

A learning momentum as part of what we identify as a learning instance in our transition makes us more than conscious about ourselves, and makes us more aware of where we stand in relation to the other. This is because when we learn we believe that we become more aware of the process and we know that there is some
process that has been going on before. Based on this process that to a large extent relates to maturity, we conceptualise transition as evolution.

Evolution is that moment when we suddenly realise that we have changed from something that we were in the past to something else in the present. It is the moment when we realise that we have crossed a critical threshold in our lives, but yet again it is our ability to recognise that it is something continuous and it will not be long until another critical threshold will be crossed and then transition will be no more.
2.4. The threat of un-employment: Unpacking the ‘package’

‘I am always thinking of my future as in a dream, as if one day I will have all the package’

(Sylvie, 1996)

In this section I look at the way the self-concept changes and stabilises in relation to our expectations of the future. The pursuit of self-knowledge in terms of independence, maturity and evolution does not only relate to the way we discuss transition as a process of the past and the present. It is not only the result of our compromise with situations in the past and the present. When we discuss dependence and independence in the context of being committed to something or compromising with something or the expectations of others, we do it with reference to the future. Dependence and independence relate to the way we see ourselves in the future not only in relation to the others, but in relation to our own expectations in terms of employment and the degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction we expect to achieve in the future.

Conversation with ERIKA §6a

Erika: well...I think that it was hard in the beginning, but as you know for me as you may know my subject which is literature means that you have to study and think about all the social problems as well in the literature and that you have to study socially those problems to understand them even if you want to express a problem that relates to the meaning of identity...

George: ...yeah...

Erika: ...and that means that I think that I am interested in social work for instance...

George: ...mmm...

Erika: ...but on the other hand I think that could this preparation...this theoretical preparation could help you to deal with your problem. Or other problems.

George: ...yes...

Erika: ...so...I am quite optimistic about my future in a way., but on the other hand I am quite pessimistic about it because I don’t know either my future in the real...err...work situation...

The degree of optimism or pessimism about the future relates to having a job that gives us the opportunity to discover whether our expectations of independence can be fulfilled. We like to look at the job as a learning space that plays an important role in order to come in terms with the nature and the demands of the working environment. This way we feel more prepared to adjust to the working space. Coming from an environment were learning is put first in our
priority list it is difficult to look at any future space as a non-learning space or as a learning-free zone where all we have to do is to be bored. If this environment is not perceived as a learning environment then we would have to face a great dilemma: ‘If our transition does not relate to learning then what does?’

VICKY §104b: After you get your bachelors you can either go over the bridge to the adult world and get a job, or you can go through the swamp, through the transition and then you come out to the adult world.

ELENI §43c: Work is a way of learning.

MIGUEL §70c: There is some sort of sacredness in work.

VANGELIS §21b: We learn many things at work.

SYLVIE §79a: When I started working I was a bit excited, but I think that it’s normal.

JUSTINA §84b: I am working a bit now, but it’s different because for a person like me last year was just learning many things and I had a lot of experiences that I think that I couldn’t have learned anywhere else.

GREGORIO §115: The university is the space in which I think, work, produce and try to achieve certain goals.

The significance of the environment both as a working and learning space generates a whole new issue about the relation between education and work in spatio-temporal terms. Work is education and education is learning. Therefore, work is learning.

Conversation with VANGELIS §81

Vangelis: Unfortunately things are like that...unfortunately for me.....I mean the others or...maybe it’s the society in which we live. In general...globally...besides the environment is something universal...it is simply that education adjusts to the needs of the labour market, it cannot be separated from that and it cannot operate outside that...

George: ...mmm...

Vangelis: ...education has been adjusted...there...to the needs of work...therefore...in the educational environment is adjusted there in a way so to satisfy completely the needs of the working environment. Because as you may also realise our environment is also a working environment...I mean as teachers...it is totally...exactly the same, only the conditions change...

George: ...mmm...

Vangelis: ...and it operates like that...you may ask me why...well...why? Because subconsciously when you are in education...all right...you operate yourself as being the student. You cannot realise this sort of connection otherwise then. You realise it later.

George: ...yes...

Vangelis: ...and this operation...this process begins at school...Primary, Secondary, University...it pushes you at some sort of specialisation, which will be necessary later for you to go to the workplace, under the...exactly the...this perspective...and the prospects that the school has provided. As I said before for example, with the teachers OK? With the sort of the behaviour you develop and about your relationships and the way you communicate with others and you co-operate and how this process should be related to production. This is it...the outcome, the product, production and all that...the
relations we develop in the education environment are exactly the same as the ones we develop in any working environment...

Work does not always relate to future employment somewhere outside the university. Work may well relate to what we do inside the university, since we identify ourselves as students. Being a student means having a job, being busy, being a serious and hard worker. For most of us, being a student instantly implies that we have work to do. The nature of this work can vary, but it is serious work, and we feel that the fact that we are working hard is something that people rarely acknowledge, because the role of the student as most of us believe, relates to stereotypes, like being ‘pissed’, ‘spoiled’, or having a ‘debauched’ lifestyle.

Conversation with VICKY §74c
George: And the other thing is that, as you say, there are many connotations being a student...
Vicky: It's the debauched lifestyle...
George: Exactly. The thing is though...
Vicky: If it is I want it back. Where is it?
George: …but there are all these stereotypes that work negatively, and most of the time, people have the negative view of what being a student is. And that's why I hate to call myself a student...
Vicky: Don't do that. The term that you should use is, I'm a researcher or I'm a postgraduate., but don't use the word 'student' if you can help it.
George: Exactly. You know, that, what I use now, even in my correspondence, I don't want to be called a student or a researcher, I want to be called ‘mister’. And the thing is, I don't know why...but probably it is because I feel a 'mister'.
Vicky: Yeah, you know where you stand.
George: Exactly., but being a student has nothing to do with misters and ladies, has it? And mister means that I am independent.
Vicky: The student is the youth thing. It's only that you don't feel that young anymore. You know, we are still relatively young, but you are not youth.
George: We are still relatively students.
Vicky: Of course we are officially 'the students', but we are not 'students'. We are 'working students'. And it's different. You want the respect of it all.

We gradually realise the seriousness and the significance of our commitment to being students and we want some recognition from others. In order to achieve this recognition, we prefer to refer to ourselves with any other word, but student. We realise that our roles still remain the same. Being postgraduates does not change the fact that we are students. It changes however
the nature of our work and therefore the way we approach the whole concept of work and our expectations of others.

The problem of defining work, either as something materialistic or as something idealistic, causes one more controversy. The enigma of work is probably one of these perennial questions that it is so hard to answer, because the nature of work changes all the time. Argyris (1964) attempts to resolve the enigma of the meaning of work by arguing that people want whatever it is that the job supplies in the greatest quantity. People rationalise their position vis-à-vis their job, but the meaning of work for any ‘worker’ is not simply job-determined (cited in Grint, 1991: 27).

**Conversation with JUSTINA §100**

George: ...I want to ask you whether this is your...ehmmm...vision or your image about what really employment is...

Justina: ...ehmmm...I think that might be one of the reasons of my sense of confusion...now...

George: ...yeah...

Justina: ...because coming back to England, it may be part of the culture shock...[...]

George: ...yeah...

Justina: ...and speaking to my friends that they have been working for the last couple of years since graduation it just hit me really strongly...but in this culture in this environment...you can’t really...afford to be relaxed and...

George: ...mmm...

Justina: ...it’s very hard to find yourself a job and do your own thing in your own time...and enjoy what you’re doing because there is such a competitive ethos here...and is such a kind of...

George: ...mmm...

Justina: ...just very hard, very hard to define your own workspace...in your own terms...[...]

George: ...yes...

Justina: ...and the kind of area that I am interested in...in terms of development, education sort of secondary education...is a really small part of that big industry and probably the least profitable area in this industry...

George: ...yeah...

Justina: ...because the industry is so big it has to cover the whole thing...

George: ...all of this...

Justina: ...cater for the whole thing...

George: ...yes...
Justina: ...it’s just a very small part of that...and that’s why I started having few doubts about it...few...and also quite a few fears to angle my career in this small area that I am interested in instead of getting sort of sucked in to the whole kind...of this sort of industry...

The fear of unpacking the package, as some of us say when we refer to having a job, is a common experience in our approach to transition to work. In this new context space and time relate to a specific job experience even if this job relates to our role as students. This fear is not just the fear of the unknown future. It is the fear of others and the way they define what we realise as work. When we discuss our emotional experience in terms of our stability to work we feel dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction relates to the way we see work as opposed to education and this causes an internal conflict.

Conversation with ANDREAS §155b

Andreas: ...uhmmm... ...I mean when I was working last year...I also worked with people who have never been in the university, and in some sense it was better because...they never had any hang-ups...if you want, I think...I don’t know...

George: ...right...

Andreas: ...I don’t know...

George: ...are they more naive in this sense?...

Andreas: ...yeah...

George: ...aren’t they?

Andreas: ...yeah...yeah...they are not...

George: ...so sophisticated?...

Andreas: ...exactly, exactly...so...but in another sense you can see that they have missed out and especially... ...in terms of human, male and female relations or something like that... ...ehmmm... ...because they’ve never had the opportunity to meet that...in a social environment which isn’t the relationship...[...]...it’s just a social environment...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...and an equal social environment...[...]...then...then, still, they are incredibly...how do they call this... ...misogynists, chauvinists...

George: ...yeah, yeah...

Andreas: ...whatever...[...]...so...I think university in a way is a very good preparation for life, but the paradox is that the work itself does not cater for... ...that sense of experience...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...and it’s not provided for...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...it’s not even, come into the equation...so...at all...

George: ...so...I suppose maybe this is what causes the fear...

We make a fine distinction between work and employment that is interesting to look at. Initially work is something of which we are much aware. It is something we expect to do and it relates a lot to whatever we are, including being
students. Work is something that can happen anywhere and anytime. Whereas employment relates to the material outcomes of work for which to a certain extent even the university caters, as the space that helped us to gain our independence and self-esteem.

This interesting distinction causes too much controversy in the way we appreciate and value work. As Grint (1991) believes what counts as work cannot be separated from an objective analysis of specific activities because the meaning of work is not immanent to activity (p.47).

Some of us argue that such meanings of work and employment are socially constructed and socially maintained. As will time and space, or change and stability, the meaning of work and employment is not an exception to this rule. The fragility of the meaning of work is depicted in our words.
We are aware that our views on work are inflicted by others on us. Being higher education students with anxieties and questions that relate to work, we gradually realise that the term has a ‘sacredness’ as some of us claim. The undercurrent of material satisfaction comes to spoil the whole image. For most of us, this occurs when work turns into employment. To be employed means to have a job. The whole prospect of having a job or being employed fills us with pleasure and optimism about the future.
The image of what we want is destabilised when we see beyond the ideal of the successful employee. This is when we unpack the package and we discover what is inside it. It is when another critical threshold is crossed and we realise that we have to take new responsibilities and adjust to new roles. This package is not something new. It is something that is supposed to take shape in the future when we get a job. It relates to the future image of self within employment. It is a group of social images that are frequently updated. Some of us suggest that it derives from the media. Onto this package we stick the label of the ideal vision of what we want to be in the future. It is like a target to achieve or an aim. It is something in which we identify ourselves. It is what we want to carry through and has a beautiful exterior. It is our badge. It is what the university has given to us. This ideal label which we put onto the package is ripped apart when we open it. It is when we realise that what we took from higher education, is claimed back by employment.
constraint, maybe a limitation to our freedom that follows our obligation to compromise. Any divergence from this norm is strange even abnormal.

**Conversation with VANGELIS §152b**

**Vangelis:** ...people like us move between education and employment and the way we move is like a circle that is vicious and infinite. Social recognition is the extent to which you become accepted, rejected or used by others.

**George:** ...can you explain this to me please?

**Vangelis:** ...for example when you are on the one side and your interests are on the other side you move in a space and you go backwards and forwards.

**George:** ...what do you mean?

**Vangelis:** ... I mean that you use your interests in a specific space. Society either accepts or rejects the way you use your interests in a specific space.

**George:** ... I see what you mean...

**Vangelis:** ...you move within a certain framework...when you cross the line of your interests and what you know best, then society rejects you... ...when you cross the line of your interests and what you know best, then society pushes you back to your limits.

**George:** ... I see...

**Vangelis:** ...society minimises your movements in a specific space.

**George:** ...mmm...

**Vangelis:** ...when you move within certain limits you always have to think of social pressure. Social pressure is there to let you know that when you cross your limits then you are instantly rejected and you have nowhere to go. When you cross your limits you are hanging in the void.

This is more obvious for those of us who have some work experience. We feel more than ever that we have to break our defences and emotional barriers in order to feel stable in our future working environment, regardless of whether this barrier breaking may cause us distress or disaffection. We realise that because work is something important, whereas employment is more money-led, we have to make some sort of concession again in order to obtain self-stability. What counts as work depends greatly upon the social context within which that transformative activity occurs (see Grint, 1991).

**Conversation with JUSTINA §186**

**Justina:** ...I think there is something... ...which you can’t avoid...because as well as your interest you want the money... [...] ...and I think that that’s what we intend to do...it’s some kind of being in between some kind of capitalist ethos...on the one side... [...] ...it’s this polarity...which I don’t think I like that much...and our intention to get out of all these things that we don’t want to be part of... [...] ...on the other side...

**George:** ...yeah...

**Justina:** ...and I think that this polarity between the two is to a large extent artificial...

**George:** ...it is, isn’t it?

**Justina:** ...I think it is...and impossible...but on the other hand it seems that the only think that you could do is to work...within...this capitalist culture... [...] ...and...making something positive from it...
Some of us doubt whether we have any choice to do what we want. What we refer to as ‘the capitalist ethos’ is something that characterises work and perhaps work relations in terms of competition with our colleagues. We realise that this ethos is artificial. This artificiality is what leads us to change our desires and relocate our needs. If the work ethos complies with capitalism, and if we have no choice but to compromise with this ethos, then we have to change our attitude towards work and try and make the best of it, whether we like it or not. This is when we cross another critical threshold.

**Conversation with ANDREAS §187e**

Andreas: ...I’d say that any relation state is always idle until we reach another emotional state...

George: ...mmm...

Andreas: ...that contradicts that and that’s when you pass to another emotional state...[...]...I mean...you never know...right... ... ...you pass through a phase that you are unhappy...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...and maybe depression doesn’t look too far...[...]...and unhappiness is seen as something redundant...

George: ...yeah...

Andreas: ...and you are constantly working through your desires...[...]...because desire is the emotion as primal as any other...

Discussing work in the emotional context in terms of stability shows its relevance to change. Change is not only change of space, time, attitudes and roles. It is change of desires. It is what gives us or what we expect to give us satisfaction in the future. Satisfaction is important and relates to the degree of happiness or fulfilment we expect to get out of work. As Warnock (1977: 144) suggests work is and must be an important ingredient in the good life (see Hyland, 1995).

**Conversation with ERIKA §26**

Erika: ...I think that at least if you are into what you’re doing you can always find something that really gives you satisfaction or...[...]...into whatever you are doing...and...and...I’d like for instance to be in constant contact with the public and that’s why I’d like to work as I worked...but that...I don’t...I never thought that me...doing this I am going to gain that much money or whatever...

George: ...I see...

Erika: ...or because here I can become bigger...probably a problem that I will have to think about is that...when I get to the work life then I will have the possibility to think about that, but I will not die because of that...
There seems to be a controversy however in the way we approach what we want to do as work and whether we expect to get any pleasure from it. This again relates to the way we perceive the relationship between being a professional and having a job.

**Conversation with ELENI §66c**

*Eleni:* …I think that work relates to our identities. It is what do and gives us pleasure and satisfaction. Employment...I think is what we do to 'make a living'... I don’t know... maybe it’s... it has to do with professions...profession is what we do and is the result of what we have studies and is something on which we have a talent as well...I believe that when work and profession co-exist then we are happy and satisfied and fulfilled. When however, work and profession do not go together then we search for something more satisfying.

*George:* …I see...

*Eleni:* …I’ll tell you this! Ehmm… I asked my father once ‘Dad if you win the lottery will you carry on working?’ and he said, ‘Of course I will carry on working’, and I said, ‘But why? You will have lost of money what else do you want?’ and he said, ‘if you are not working, there is no life in you. You have nothing to expect from life, something to cherish and something to aim for tomorrow. Everything’s about having targets in your life and trying to fulfil them. That’s all about working’ he said...

In general we want to see ourselves as working professionals regardless of what we are going to do in the future. This sense of professionalism relates - perhaps justifiably - with our notions of skill and talent. Horne (1987) suggests that skill is believed to involve some kind of learned experience in a variety of action or procedures, plus the mental ability to apply it effectively and resourcefully (p.47). We regard our qualifications highly and we want people to recognise us. Along the same line, we believe that this effectiveness should be reflected in the degree of satisfaction we expect to get from what we will do or what we expect to do in the future as a job. The term profession serves this tendency. Being a professional does not only relate to the type of qualifications we have. It relates to the way we see ourselves within a job in terms of the values we represent and which we expect to deliver. We expect, the successful delivery of values in the job to bring us satisfaction.
Conversation with VICKY §101c

Vicky: [...]...you have this piece of paper that says Victoria Bryant, Bachelor of Arts in History, and that opens a lot of gateways into an employment world.

George: That’s true...

Vicky: So...I don’t know...professional...professional for me is something like my dad did which is managing your own work. You know. I think the professional bit is when I will have my doctors and I can be a professional historian. Right now I’m trying to be...maybe will be one day, I mean...only the bachelors in history, it doesn’t make you a professional historian to have a doctorate it does now! And to actually have the job and writing books and publishing. Maybe it’s the publishing as well. You know, but it’s official, this is you, it isn’t just something to tell to the university, it’s out to the world what you have to say about history that makes you professional.

George: You mean that you are professional when you’re exposed...

Vicky: Yeah! It’s out...you have a book...this is out for the historical community, at large, to meet not just the internal tutors within your own space, that’s like you long for an approval, you know going like, oh, that was nice dear or oh God that was a bit terrible wasn’t it? It is about being out to the world. Open to criticism. That’s my professional, there’s money, there’s...expanding I think your territory...expanding...

Satisfaction is the result of coexistence between what we want from work and how we want to identify ourselves in the future, in terms of employment. Satisfaction relates to what we know we can achieve from what we will do because we know our skills. It does not derive from the amount of money we will earn. This is expressed by the fact that we talk about expansion of our own territory. It is again some kind of controversy that shows that satisfaction is an imperative in this relation between time, space and individual stability within a job. Satisfaction does not come from work itself. It comes from our ability to use our skills efficiently. This is obvious when we discuss the changes that we expect to occur in the future workplace especially when the type of job we might have is not fulfilling.

Conversation with ELENI §57a

Eleni: I will change my job if it is not fulfilling.

Dissatisfaction therefore is not something that relates only to dissatisfaction in a job. It is not always a reaction towards change, as it is with integration to a different role at the cognitive level. Looking closer to what we mean by dissatisfaction we find another controversy that relates to the fact that spatial and temporal movements can relate to the pursuit of achieving satisfaction (Figure 18).
Conversation with SYLVIE §73

George: Oh! And how do you feel about this job Sylvie, besides the fact...
Sylvie: ...are you going to ask me if it made me...evolve or something...[...]...or something like that...
George: Did it make you change, or did it make you think about yourself more? Did it change your image? I mean...both physical image and er...emotional image.
Sylvie: It did change something about my perception of work in general...
George: Tell me...
Sylvie: ...because I was...and I know that I'm not only one to think like that because I've talked about it with Ben and he said...and you'd agree that...somehow, some days I can imagine myself doing that job my whole life...I know it's all right...it's not that bad...[...]...and then I think...oh god...you spent ages of studying going to University, and you imagine...and you see, yourself in the counter serving students for a lifetime...
George: ...no!...
Sylvie: Well. I actually...I saw that and I don't feel that...
George: It did cross your mind though...
Sylvie: ...yeah...I'm not going any further...[...]...and I don't like it anymore, anyway...it's getting...bored, you know...

The fact that we desire difference and change in terms of the job we want to do reveals one more controversy. We do not want to spend too much time in the same place even though we suggest that changing spaces can cause dissatisfaction. This is because staying in one place, although it may imply stability, instantly relates to boredom.

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**Figure 18**

Within transition we see ourselves changing and stabilising in relation to the degree of satisfaction and dissatisfaction we expect to get from the work we do now or we expect to do in the future, and the threat of unemployment.
For some of us change and movement are essential, although having only one job can promote stability. Dissatisfaction can be the reason behind the pursuit of satisfaction from a job and to some extent of achieving a degree of stability. What comes as a surprise is that dissatisfaction relates to our fear of unemployment. A fear that is an undercurrent and well hidden. A possibility that spoils the whole image of a productive and fulfilling life.

Many of us are conscious of unemployment and the way it might relate to our lives in the future. We feel threatened. This is because unemployment has to do with idleness, boredom and un-productivity. A situation that we definitely want to avoid.

Here lies another controversy because at the same time we discuss our fears about unemployment, we think that we have nothing to fear of it. This is because
we believe that it is something that is more likely to affect others because we have the skills to do any job and to feel productive in doing it. The fact that for so many years education has been seen as a way to avoid unemployment, both in terms of generating the myth of getting a stable job afterwards and of being occupied with something while being a student, makes us to forget about this possibility that can shatter our dreams (see Watts, 1983). We hide our fears of unemployment by suggesting that it is a word out of our vocabularies and that it does not stand a chance in our lives as long as we feel productive with a job regardless of its nature. Wringe (1991) argues that any job is welcome as long as we stay away from unemployment. Work does not have to be sublime or spectacular to be worthwhile. Many relatively mundane jobs can be challenging and varied and involve standards of logic, efficiency, integrity, judgement and so on (cited in Hyland, 1995: 38). We know that we can do any job, even a job that is low on the scale of what we perceive as sublime. At the same time we are acting as if what we perceive as mundane jobs are not really for us. We seem to have our self-esteem boosted probably because all of us are post-graduates and the fact that we will complete a higher degree. This makes us feel even more stable in this sense. Winefield et. al (1993) recognise the importance of self-esteem in terms of the individuals identifying themselves as employed or unemployed. This is why we refuse to see ourselves as debauched, irresponsible, unskilled students. We prefer to see ourselves as hard working, responsible, committed and serious postgraduates who will not be affected by unemployment.

Conversation with ERIKA §63b
George: ...yeah, yeah...have you, ever felt, you know threatened by unemployment?
    Well, I mean nowadays, there is always there is this debate about how young people are unemployed and how young people can’t find a job...
Erkax: ...yeah...
George: ...but...ehmm...has this thing, unemployment, concerned you?
Erkax: ...mmm...I think that...at the end of the day, it depends on your approach. I mean I wouldn’t mind being sometime unemployed before I find what I want to find...
George: ...mmm...
Erika: ...or before someone judge me if I am good enough for them...but at the end of the day I think that if you don’t want to be unemployed you have so much possibility to be employed...
George: ...mmm...
Erika: ...I mean, I know what I want to do and that means that I am not scared to be...er...an extreme example a cleaner...[...]. For a little while time...surely I don’t want to be that definitely...I don’t want to be an unemployed. I can be whatever...
George: ...sure...
Erika: ...I can be, a cashier in a supermarket, I can be a shop assistance as I was, I can be a cleaner...it’s not that the point. I know that I would be expected to get a job right after I finish my studies comparing here the standard in England...for example, but for the rest of Europe...and all of Europe my age is not that old to start with a career. I know what I want to do and if I start it now I know where it will lead me. If I have to wait a year before I get I will wait a year. And in the meantime, I can have an accommodation until I will get a stable job...[...]. So, I am not concerned about unemployment...

Unemployment seems not to be an issue of immediate concern because we believe that we are qualified enough to get a job anywhere. In the extreme case that we do not get any job at all, we are prepared to compromise again in order to avoid unemployment. It is the whole attitude towards the way unemployment is projected, and not the actual phenomenon itself that makes us sceptical about our future and the extent to which unemployment can shake our plans for stability. Most of us think that unemployment is not an issue, but it appears to be an issue because of the way the media presents it. There is a big danger of approaching unemployment as a problem with huge repercussions on society in general, unless employment rates are available both in terms of the nature of employment (full-time, part-time, marginal, etc.) and in terms of social indicators (age, gender, social class, etc.) (OECD, 1979). We seem to by-pass the whole issue of statistics on unemployment as being unreliable. This is another way of hiding our insecurities.
George: No...now you said something very-very interesting and very important, because...er...you proved...I mean it’s common sense isn’t it?
Sylvie: ...hmm...
George: When you want to exaggerate something you always show the bad side of it [...] I mean they’re always talking about...er...9% unemployment...but how about the...
Sylvie: 90%!
George: 90%...
Sylvie: I know...
George: ...that is in employment then? I don’t know if this is to scare people or whether it is...
Sylvie: ...make them concern...
George: ...or make them to think about it...
Sylvie: Oh, well it’s just the same as marriage when you take a divorce and people say ‘uh! Look at them they are getting a divorce...’ this is true, but there are people who stay together all their lives...
George: You see...
Sylvie: ...I don’t want to think about it...but still...there is nothing to worry about...

We believe that unemployment is not an issue for us, as long as we feel productive in the future workplace, and as long as this is something that comes gradually and therefore it is not realised from the beginning (Figure 18). I believe that, with maturity at a cognitive level, at an emotional level productivity relates to our expectation of integration into a working environment. This expectation eliminates our fears about unemployment.

Conversation with ELENI Feedback Report 2
Eleni: Productivity relates to life. Of course it relates to employment and work, and learning and it also relates to stability, but most of all productivity relates to ourselves. Productivity is gradual. It begins with learning and carries on and enhanced with the stability from one situation to another. In each transitional stage productivity depends on what the stage relates to but it is also autonomous. In relation to learning productivity develops in relation to what we achieve gradually through learning and improves as we apply this learning in the workspace. As for learning itself, it can reach its ultimate stage in relation to productivity when it is applied to work. So productivity is not defined only in relation to what we offer to others, but also in relation to what we can offer to ourselves.

Within transition self-stability in the present is perceived to be the result of the satisfaction we expect to get from the future both in terms of being and feeling productive (work) and earning money (profession). Satisfaction is the desire to identify ourselves in a working environment that offers us both money and productivity. Dissatisfaction is what stays at the bottom of the package. It is the fear of unemployment regardless of the fact that most of us try to ignore it. In this
respect unpacking the package is the controversy between what we think we want and what we think we can get. It is when the ideal versus the real and the result is the ‘average plus’. It is what Robinson (1956) suggests as the interaction between the desire to save and the desire to invest (p.4). Not in real capital, but in our own skills and abilities.

Conversation with SYLVIE §99

*Sylvie*: ...but...I can’t be bothered and I haven’t got a clue what I want to do...and...I don’t know...probably find...I’ll tell you the ideal and probably what is going to happen to me.[...] The ideal is er...it’s all that package again...it’s er...a very ambitious and independent woman....she has a mobile goes to power lunches, with my suitcase and everything.[...] That’s the image, travelling around...er...that’s the ideal...er...what’s...I’m gonna probably get...is by the end...get not such a low job because...I want something, being something...it’s sort of like...do it and put heart in it...[...]

*...er...I don’t think that it is going to be so powerful, I don’t think that I have all these capacities and...good points for being...higher sits...it’s probably going to be something like an average, average plus...
Part Five: Re-Defining Transition
1. Moving on the ‘Monopoly board’

...you know the monopoly board. You have one go and you go one step forward and then play again and then you go step two, and then you score and this carries on for a while, and then you're at college and you're here and then you go to university and you just go one step. You go. You take about six steps in five different directions...

(Vicky, 1996)

In this chapter I bring together all the similar components of the learning instance that I created in order to give a general appreciation of transition. I have shown that the process of isolating a learning instance, as a component of transition, and putting similar learning momenta together in one story as components of that learning instance, reveals a new learning instance. This approach however, shows that these learning instances are only a fraction of a perpetual cycle of events that is punctuated by many emotional and cognitive controversies. These controversies refer not only to the learning instances that I have isolated, and which are represented by the transcriptions, but to the relation of these instances to the new learning instance that I have created. This relation is based on similar learning momenta that are represented by the similar dialectical pairs identified in the comparative analysis. These momenta are brought together to create a new learning context that is constantly reconstructed and represents the new ecology of ourselves. In the new ecology of ourselves described in the story, we decide upon specific issues that concern us deeply, and we evaluate ourselves in relation to others (people, objects, environments). We develop our self-images and we reframe them in different spatio-temporal images. In this context however, what is initially defined as a learning instance - a small part of the spiral which I hypothesised represents personal development - is a new spiral within the spiral. In this new spiral, which also has spatio-temporal attributes, there are other, smaller spirals that refer to other learning instances. Within this spiralling process of
development, transition is defined as a learning experience, learning is always transitional and experience is always liminal.

**Conversation with MIGUEL §142a**

*Miguel*: ...transition is er...something inevitable...it’s a...it’s a...
*George*: ...it’s that thing you said...em...it’s something vital you said...
*Miguel*: ...yes...yes...it’s a necessary element of experience that does not constitute experience itself...
*George*: ...experience...yeah...
*Miguel*: ...but the point is...er...that knowledge even to see, it as transition...you’ve got to...put it into play an eminent role that smoothes transition, or that in a certain sense...er...it makes transition less intense in order to be able to go through it...
*George*: Hmm...fine...
*Miguel*: ...so, it’s...we...once you asked me about my experience...I have experience in transition...[...]...but I think...in two parts I have been able to make certain sense of that. I think it is a worthwhile process...[...]...In the sense...em...related to life...
*George*: Yeah...that’s what I think...
*Miguel*: Not that it is crucial or anything...
*George*: Yeah I know...it's...that's what I think. It's essentially vital. And everything that is essentially vital in our lives, is education more or less. Em...because this is what makes us develop. This is what makes us come into grips with the world. This is what makes us learn. Therefore, transition, is nothing more and nothing less than learning., but...unfortunately, because of all these things we’ve discussed, [...] we just can't see it this way. Maybe we don’t because sometimes transition is so much embedded into life and maybe we don’t talk much about life itself and the concept of learning itself and maybe that’s why we can’t think of transitional experience as something...you know, learning power., but...hmm...
*Miguel*: Now, you reminded me a former lecturer of mine...well it’s not exactly the same...but a bit similar...he said that...we come to a point where, when we reach the end of the cycle, where the ‘logos’ has been appropriated... [...]...it is secured...and there is nothing else to appropriate. So we forget about life, we have forgotten about life. We have forgotten about the concepts of what we call it...er...nature, natural...in a certain sense that transitional aspect of life...

Metaphorically, the story that I create in order to describe transition, and which represents my own learning instance, constitutes a new locality. In this locality I draw images of other localities that represent to some extent students’ cultures, and reflect on the liminal, spatio-temporal character of different ecologies of self. These images however, change because the times at which we conceptualise them and the spaces in which we employ them change. As many of us suggest, our experiences and expectations overlap and ideal and real situations contradict, as learning in the present becomes a prospect for the future.
If we look at the way these images change in spatio-temporal terms, we will discover that they do not really change. They just accumulate to create a global, multi-faced and multi-identity individual that uses different pieces of these images in different ways. The spatio-temporal context in which we locate these images is transformed, as it is defined by our desire to obtain stability. This image is just another spatio-temporal image which involves a large number of others on which we depend to achieve independence. Independence has many material facets and qualities which we cannot deny and on which we depend in our attempt to obtain stability.

In this broad context of liminality, spatio-temporal images, learning instances and learning momenta, transition is to realise what is different and what remains the same every time we cross a critical threshold and create a new spatio-temporal image. It is a continuous process of participation in the present and decision-making for the future that demands a degree of compromise and change. This change is seen as something that shakes our sense of stability. It is on this basis that we suggest that movement, whether this is spatial or temporal, is minimised due to social pressure. We are aware of social compromise which is the reason for change. Complying with social rules and values is important in order to be accepted and eventually reach stability. Public acceptance is a reason for changing our ecologies of self. As we compromise, we prepare ourselves to accept
change as something inevitable. This way we learn how to adjust to new environments.

Figure 19
‘THE MONOPOLY BOARD’
Within transition learning how to obtain self-stability is the result of the degree of self-instability we experience at different times and spaces. Each time we experience stability, a cycle in the spiral is appropriated, but a new cycle of instability begins.

We expect that this learning will help us to obtain a degree of emotional and cognitive satisfaction that relates to the ideal interpretation of stability. We expect to change in a new environment and we expect that our perception about it will change as we integrate into it. What seems to be stable in this case is the knowledge we gain, or we expect to gain, through learning in that space, and not the space itself.

Conversation with VANGELIS §63c
Vangelis: I learned from all the jobs I did so far. Certainly... I understand that this learning is something permanent. Not permanent from the point of getting a stable job. No...! Learning does not relate to learning in a job or just because a job will give you money in the future, but it relates to the fact that I would
do something that I am interested in and something I wouldn’t be bored of. Because the jobs I did then did not interest me. They were boring...

The more images we accumulate, the more experience we have to control our decisions and understand what it means to learn in a spatio-temporal image where different ecologies of self are brought together. Each time we cross a critical threshold we reach a stage where we decide more selectively. This does not mean that we are not aware that even then, learning still stays beyond our control. It is as if all this process of transition from one spatio-temporal image to another is like chasing after learning; and each time we think that we finally achieve it, a new cycle begins, a new ecology of self is created, and a new spatio-temporal image is entered. We are framed in the new spatio-temporal image and we destabilise.

Conversation with VANGELIS §66
George: [...] Could you define learning then as something that happens all way through from being in education until you go to work.
Vangelis: ...Exactly...
George: ...How would you describe learning then? Is it a way to create your own personality, is it a way...
Vangelis: ...It is all these things together...
George: ...you mean our behaviour and all this...
Vangelis: Sure it is. It is everything...but about the way we behave in the sense...what I can tell you is that learning is not just what you read in a book. It is the experience you’ll get from what you do...it’s experience...

This imbalance between what we gain in terms of learning and what we expect to gain in terms of stability is necessary because it reveals our limits. As we try to come in terms with this, we constantly create our own ecological systems of self that involve many different others, objects and environments from previous spatio-temporal images, brought forward into the new spatio-temporal image. These others affect our decisions and the way we evaluate ourselves. They influence the way in which we adjust or we expect to adjust to new spatio-temporal contexts. This re-cycling of our ‘ecological self’ happens each time we initiate a new experience or each time we terminate another. It is when a new threshold is crossed or when a cycle in the spiral is appropriated. Each time this process takes
place, we experience transition. Transition sets the limits within which we move, and determines the factors that will eventually contribute the change that will come in the future. Changes may be gradual or sudden, depending on our abilities and qualifications, versatility and willingness to learn. In this respect transition is the continuous pursuit of learning how to learn about learning. It is like moving on the ‘Monopoly board’, which defines transition as a necessary element of learning experience that does not constitute experience itself while it happens, but it is based on experience and at the same time it supports experience (Figure 19).

**Conversation with VICKY §106b**

**Vicky:** It’s a two way thing in a way, it’s sort of, like because you start here... point x and then you move... or you know the monopoly board you have one go and you go one step forward and then play again and then you go step two and then you score and this carries on for a while and then you’re at college and you’re here and then you go to university and you just go one step you go you take about six steps in five different directions so it’s sort of like you go forwards and you go out you expand in different ways and different directions, in that, you know...there isn’t just the education, it’s a social thing, financial thing, intellectual thing...
2. Conclusion

Researching transition and its relation to learning, has been a demanding, but stimulating task for two reasons. It has helped me to understand that the nature of transition, as a concept that is broadly discussed, is chaotic. It has also helped me to define my own limits as a researcher, in terms of learning and creativity. With this thesis I have tried to put some order into this ‘chaos’ that I call transition. I have addressed transition as a central research issue, and created a theoretical model that explains transition not as a general, abstract concept with spatio-temporal attributes, but as a specific, multi-dimensional, spatio-temporal function defined as learning. Placing the whole project within the context of the post-modern as a way of knowing, divided into stages, gradually I was able to introduce transition as an experiential, liminal, learning condition that goes on forever.

Initially I look at transition as a spatio-temporal condition within the context of personal development and change. I assume that it relates to the process of decision making that leads to, or is produced by, some form of change. I condense this context, arguing that transition relates to learning based on the assumption that the cycle, decision-making→change→experience, constitutes learning. Then I construct the research hypothesis. Based on the argument that learning relates directly to time and space, I visualise the process of development as a spiral, and I assume that decision-making and change as components of experience are represented in the spiral as small instances, that I call learning instances. Many learning instances together constitute experience. I assume that there are learning instances that do not relate in a direct way to time and space as many theorists claim. These learning instances are seen as transitional. In this context I see transition as a series of many imperceptible learning instances that are
comprised of a large number of learning momenta. Then I hypothesise that if I isolate one imperceptible learning instance and break it down to what I metaphorically call ‘learning momenta’, I could create a new, more concrete context, in which I would define transition.

In order to fulfil the hypothesis, I develop a strategy for empirical research. I create a dialectical paradigm for comparison that uses contextual deconstruction and reconstruction to analyse my conversations with ten EU students of human and social science at Warwick University. This model was initially based on the concept of deconstruction of text. Deconstruction helps me to reduce the number of words in each conversation, now seen as learning instances, and produce a series of concepts that I put in pairs that I call dialectical. These pairs constitute the observational units of the comparison. After I compare the dialectical pairs of each transcription with each other, I produce a list of six similar dialectical pairs that I use to reconstruct the transcriptions. Reconstruction leads me to the final stage of the thesis that I called defragmentation. With defragmentation I create a story, a narrative in which I redefine transition within the framework that I create from the similar dialectical pairs that came from the comparison. This narrative describes transition not as a unitary integrated system, but as an accumulation of fragments, disparate elements and events that relate to students’ experiences. These fragments are chosen on the basis of the similar learning momenta: time-space, initiation-termination, change-movement, movement-stability, self-other and work-unemployment. The process of defragmentation leads me to specific conclusions that relate to the chaotic nature of transition.

The initial assumption that transition is a spatio-temporal condition that initiates at some point in time and space, and terminates at another point in time and space, includes another aspect of transition that I identified as the movement
between change and stability. Change and stability are defined as the two poles of a tension that cannot be broken. Going deeper into this finding, I explain that every time something seems to be changing there is a need for stability and vice versa. Stability is defined as cognitive when it relates to the way students perceive the changes that happen to themselves in relation to others, or as emotional when it relates to changes that refer to the process of finding a job. The movement between change and stability, as a tension that cannot be broken, has a strong element of learning in it. This element gradually becomes more obvious, as students related the movement to issues of maturity and compromise, independence or dependence on others, and their feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, productivity or boredom about the workplace. This leads me to the final conclusion of the thesis, that students, whether they want to achieve emotional or cognitive stability, always learn in transition in terms of the way they experience change and stability, or that learning is always transitional.

Having in mind the logic that lies behind my choice of method and the nature of this project, I believe that my thesis contributes at three levels. It has produced a theoretical model which describes transition as a learning condition, and introduced new categories for its interpretation. The relation of transition to learning has not previously been researched. Earlier, writers have related transition to negative emotions, and normally seen it as peripheral to theories of learning and personal development. My model has helped me to create new research categories that give more flexibility to the interpretation of a concept that is so commonly used by many researchers. In the context of the theories of lifelong learning and continuing education, the thesis expands an existing area of learning theory, by suggesting a model of learning that is also identified as transitional.
Methodologically, the introduction of a new paradigm for comparison, offers new opportunities for comparative research. Comparative research in education is mainly associated with the systematic description and interpretation of educational systems in different countries, and aims at highlighting the diversity among these systems. The dialectical paradigm for comparative research, creates a new base for the description and interpretation of different systems of culture, thought or practice, without restricting the comparative context at national level, but expanding it and deepening it in the personal and interpersonal level. This may suggest a radical process of comparison. It is legitimised by the clarity it achieves when identifying comparative units, and system and its capacity to define the cultural diversity between localities, highlighting their similarities and recognising their differences.

At a meta-theoretical level, the way the thesis is written and presented, has introduced a foundationless, non-traditional mode of working with and reflecting on views, ideas and thoughts from many disciplines. This thesis is not the product of a single discipline or a single theory. It is characterised by constructivism, fragmentation, ‘fuzzy logic’, diversity, and neo-pragmatism in the sense that it accepts the post-modern position that there is no body of knowledge that can be based on an objective appreciation of the world, unless we define the conditions under which this body of knowledge is constructed. In my case this is represented by the narrative that I have created, by the ‘defragmentation’ of students’ learning momenta, that constitute, along with views from physics to psychology, a continuous discourse aimed at the creation of what I call ‘theoretical hybrids’ capable of expanding interdisciplinary theories, and casting new light on issues pertaining the development of new models of theory construction. This cannot be the result of work that unconditionally accepts logic and objectivity, as the only
ways of theory development. It is the product of a work that at least identifies the need for free creation and ‘happy science’, aided with the use of methods that expose the ways we use cognitive, linguistic and other codes to interpret contextualised experience. The use of research paradigms based on the deconstruction of different ‘spatio-temporal images’ and representing different localities, can create the basis for the commodification and representation of anything that cannot be represented. Although this cannot be perceived as a solution in terms of working on issues that relate to learning, it can promote better understanding of the liminal spatio-temporal context in which we all develop.
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