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Merger, partial collusion and relocation
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UNSPECIFIED (2004) Merger, partial collusion and relocation. JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE, 83 (3). pp. 243-265. doi:10.1007/s00712-004-0091-9
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-004-0091-9
Abstract
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers' transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the "merger paradox".
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR NATIONALOKONOMIE | ||||
| Publisher: | SPRINGER WIEN | ||||
| ISSN: | 0931-8658 | ||||
| Official Date: | December 2004 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 83 | ||||
| Number: | 3 | ||||
| Number of Pages: | 23 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 243-265 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00712-004-0091-9 | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published |
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