UNSPECIFIED (2003) On the stability of cooperation structures. In: ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications, AUG, 2002, QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA.

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Abstract

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [13]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.

Item Type:	Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Journal or Publication Title:	ICM MILLENNIUM LECTURES ON GAMES
Publisher:	SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
ISBN:	3-540-00615-X
Editor:	Petrosyan, LA and Yeung, DWK
Date:	2003
Number of Pages:	17
Page Range:	pp. 167-183
Publication Status:	Published
Title of Event:	ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications
Location of Event:	QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA
Date(s) of Event:	AUG, 2002
URI:	http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/id/eprint/7666

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