On the stability of cooperation structures
UNSPECIFIED (2003) On the stability of cooperation structures. In: ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications, AUG, 2002, QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA.Full text not available from this repository.
This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell . We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.
|Item Type:||Conference Item (UNSPECIFIED)|
|Subjects:||Q Science > QA Mathematics|
|Journal or Publication Title:||ICM MILLENNIUM LECTURES ON GAMES|
|Editor:||Petrosyan, LA and Yeung, DWK|
|Number of Pages:||17|
|Page Range:||pp. 167-183|
|Title of Event:||ICM Satellite Conference on Game Theory and Applications|
|Location of Event:||QINGDAO, PEOPLES R CHINA|
|Date(s) of Event:||AUG, 2002|
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