Alpern, Steve (1991) Cycles in extensive form perfect information games. Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 159 (1). pp. 1-17. doi:10.1016/0022-247X(91)90217-N

Research output not available from this repository, contact author.

Request Changes to record.

Abstract

We define and analyse a new class of perfect information games. The nodes of a directed graph G are partitioned into n player sets. Starting at a fixed node of G an infinite path is created as follows: If the current node belongs to player k, then player k chooses any successor node. A local reward n-vector is assigned to every arc. The payoff corresponding to the infinite path is the long term average of the local reward vectors. Such games are called DGA games. Negative and positive results are obtained for the existence of Nash equilibria in certain types of pure strategies (e.g., stationary and automated strategies). Applications to duopoly pricing models and "surveillance games" on graphs are given.

Item Type:	Journal Article
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Operational Research & Management Sciences Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School
Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH):	Game theory
Journal or Publication Title:	Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
Publisher:	Academic Press
ISSN:	0022-247X
Official Date:	15 July 1991
Dates:	Date Event 15 July 1991 Published
Volume:	159
Number:	1
Page Range:	pp. 1-17
DOI:	10.1016/0022-247X(91)90217-N
Status:	Peer Reviewed
Publication Status:	Published
Access rights to Published version:	Restricted or Subscription Access

Request changes or add full text files to a record

Repository staff actions (login required)

View Item