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Bounded rationality in taking risks and drawing inferences
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Oaksford, M. (Mike) and Chater, Nick (1992) Bounded rationality in taking risks and drawing inferences. Theory & Psychology, 2 (2). pp. 225-230. doi:10.1177/0959354392022009
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354392022009
Abstract
This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision.
| Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology | ||||
| Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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| Library of Congress Subject Headings (LCSH): | Decision making | ||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | Theory & Psychology | ||||
| Publisher: | Sage | ||||
| ISSN: | 0959-3543 | ||||
| Official Date: | May 1992 | ||||
| Dates: |
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| Volume: | 2 | ||||
| Number: | 2 | ||||
| Page Range: | pp. 225-230 | ||||
| DOI: | 10.1177/0959354392022009 | ||||
| Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||
| Publication Status: | Published | ||||
| Access rights to Published version: | Restricted or Subscription Access |
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