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The Struggle for Democracy in Pakistan

Nonviolent Resistance to Military Rule 1977-88

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History.

The University of Warwick
Department of History
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Dedication

To my Mother - Rukshanda Kokab
For her heartiest wish receiving higher education

To my Supervisor - David Hardiman
For his exceptional consistent pursuance and guidance

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	VI
DECLARATION	X
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT	XI
ILLUSTRATIONS	XII
ACRONYMS	XIII
GLOSSARY	XV
DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION	1
SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH:	1
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY	6
MAIN ARGUMENTS	8
LITERATURE REVIEW	22
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	29
SOURCES	34
ROADMAP	39
CH. 1. THE CAMPAIGN TO SAVE ZULFIQAR ALI BHUTTO	43
IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW:	47
BHUTTO BACHAO TEHREEK:	60
UNPOPULARITY OF BHUTTO:	60
FAILURE TO CULTIVATED INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT:	67
THE CAMPAIGN:	74
ZIA'S OPPRESSION:	87
CONCLUSION	94
CH. 2. FORMATIVE PHASE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 1979-81:	95
RE-ORGANISATION OF PPP:	95
THE REGIME'S 'ISLAMIC' REPRESSION:	106
TRADE UNION MILITANCY:	111
'REAL MARTIAL LAW':	114
BUILDING AN ANTI-REGIME POLITICAL ALLIANCE	116
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT:	120
CONCLUSION:	122
CH. 3. THE MOVEMENT FOR RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY 1981-84	123
OBJECTIVE AND STRATEGIES:	123
CALL FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AUGUST 1983:	129
GOVERNMENT TACTICS TOWARDS THE MOVEMENT:	136
PROMULGATION OF PCO:	143
ROLE OF MEANS OF COMMUNICATION:	145
CIVIL SOCIETY ON BOARD:	151
SYMPATHY IN THE ARMY:	155

AL-ZULFIQAR AND PPP'S RELATIONSHIP:	158
MRD FAILURE AND SUCCESS 1981-84	165
GRADUALIST DEMOCRACY:	165
PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP AND ORGANISATION:	174
EXTERNAL SUPPORT:	179
CONCLUSION	182
<u>CH. 4. DECLINE OF THE DICTATOR'S POWER 1984-86</u>	185
BENAZIR BHUTTO'S DEPARTURE FROM PAKISTAN AND THE STRUGGLE IN EXILE:	185
RESTORATION OF ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY:	197
POST-ELECTION SCENARIO:	211
THE MRD – ITS FAILURES AND ACHIEVEMENTS	221
CONCLUSION:	228
<u>CH. 5. REVIVAL OF DEMOCRACY AND END OF THE DICTATOR 1986-88: 230</u>	
THE JUNEJO GOVERNMENT:	233
MRD: SHIFT FROM RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY TO 'PEOPLE'S SOVEREIGNTY':	241
THE RETURN OF BENAZIR BHUTTO:	248
BLACK THURSDAY (14 AUGUST 1986):	264
MRD AND PPP	270
THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE RESISTANCE:	276
CULTIVATING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT:	279
THE FINAL DAYS OF GENERAL ZIA-UL-HAQ.:	282
CONCLUSION:	287
<u>DISSERTATION CONCLUSION</u>	289
THE IMPACT OF ZIA'S MILITARY REGIME	290
CAUSES FOR THE LONGEVITY OF ZIA'S REGIME	299
THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN	307

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Tundahi Baad-i-Mukhalif se na ghabra, ai Uqab!
ye tu urti hai tujhe ooncha urane k liye
 (O Eagle! You should not be worried by the opposing wind,
 Instead, it blows you higher, higher and higher)

Declaration

This thesis is submitted to the University of Warwick in support of my application of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been composed by myself and has not been submitted in any previous application for any degree.

Dissertation Abstract

Pakistan is regarded widely today as a country in continuing turmoil, in which multiple centres of political and armed power compete with each other, using violence as much as due democratic processes to settle their differences. And yet, as this dissertation seeks to show, there is also a tradition of democracy that has been fought for and won in ongoing nonviolent movements.

For almost half its life since its creation in 1947, military dictators, of whom there have been four in all, have ruled Pakistan. Amongst these, General Zia-ul-Haq ruled the longest at more than eleven years from July 1977 to August 1988. He not only executed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's former Prime Minister but he was also able to bring about fundamental changes in the legal, political, religious, social and cultural affairs of the country. His rule is often considered a 'dark age' in the history of Pakistan. Two movements – the campaign to save Bhutto 1977-79 and the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) 1981-1988 – were launched and led by political parties, of which the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) was the leading member, against Zia's rule. Historians have generally considered both these movements to have been a failure. In this dissertation, it is argued that although MRD took much longer than the originally-envisaged three months to achieve its aim, it did not in the end fail. It should, rather, be seen as a *gradualist democratic* movement, which eventually brought the country back to democracy in 1988. The process took longer than expected for several reasons, the most important of which were a lack of unity amongst the leaders of its constituent political parties, particularly the PPP, the absence of an operational corps, and Zia-ul-Haq's ruthless response to the nonviolent resistance to his rule. Additionally, Zia's regime was supported for many years by international powers of the Western bloc, due to the war against Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Illustrations

Figure Nos.	Caption	Page No.
Front page (top)	Welcoming crowd to Benazir Bhutto in Lahore on 10 April 1986	Front page
Front page (bottom)	abandoned torture cells of <i>Shahi Qila</i> , Lahore.	Front page
Figure 1.	Cartoon Image of Zia dancing after ZAB's execution	50
Figure 2.	Zia dancing in real with his army mate after executing ZAB	51
Figure 3.	BB receiving and meeting with PPP's workers after ZAB's death	61
Figure 4.	BB chairing MRD in process meeting	78
Figure 5.	Salamullah waving his hand and a Klashinkov celebrating the successful PIA hijacking at Kabul Airport	120
Figure 6.	BB reception at Lahore airport on 10 April 1986	209
Figure 7.	14 August 1986 provincial government's violent attack on a peaceful gathering of MRD, called Black Thursday	223.

Acronyms

AI	Amnesty International
ATI	Anjuman-i-Tulabai Islam (student body of JUP-Noorani)
AJKMC	Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
APNEU	All Pakistan Newspaper Employees Union
AZO	Al-Zulfiqar Organisation
BB	Benazir Bhutto. In Urdu it is also used for an elder sister/a woman.
BBT	Bhutto Bachao Tehreek (Movement to save Bhutto)
CBA	Community Board (union) of Labourers
CEC	Central Executive Committee (of political parties, and MRD alliance)
CIA	Central Investigation Agency
CMLA	Chief Martial Law Administrator
DMLA	District Martial Law Administration
DPR	Defence of Pakistan Rules
DSA	Democratic Students Alliance
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Area
FSF	Federal Security Force
FUJP	Federal Union of Journalists of Pakistan
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IJT	Islami Jami'at Tulba (Student body of Jama'at-Islami)
ISSB	Inter-Services Selection Board
JAH	Jamaat-i-Ahle-i-Hadith (a political party)
JUI	Jami'at-i-Ulmai Islam (a political party)
JUP	Jami'at-i-Ulmai Pakistan (a political party)
KPK	Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa
KNS	Khairpur Nathan Shah (a town in Sindh)
KT	Khaksar Tehreek
MLKG	Muslim League Khair-ud-din Group
MKP	Mazdoor Kissan Party
MLO	Martial Law Ordinance
MLR	Martial Law Regulation
MP	Member of Parliament
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MQM	Muhajir Qaumi Movement (an ethnic political party in Karachi)
MRD	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
NA	National Assembly
NAP	National Awami Party (a political party)
NDP	National Democratic Party (a political party)
NWFP	North-West Frontier Province
PDM	Pakistan Democratic Movement
PDP	Pakistan Democratic Party (a political party)
PLA	People's Liberation Army

PMKP	Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party (Pakistan Labour, and Farmers' Party)
PML-C	Pakistan Muslim League-Council (a political party)
PML-Con	Pakistan Muslim League-Convention (a political party)
PMLA	Provincial Martial Law Administrator
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance (a political alliance)
PNFTU	Pakistan National Free Trade Union
PPP	Pakistan People's Party (a political party)
pl.	Plural
QMA	Qaumi Mahazi Azadi (National Front for Independence)
s.a.w	Peace Be Upon Him
SAC	Student Action Committee
SAT	Sindhi Awami Tehreek (a political party)
sin.	Singular
SMC	Summary Military Court
SpMC	Special Military Court
SST	Sindhi Shagird Tehreek (Sindh's Students' Movement)
SRD	Soldier for the Restoration of Democracy
TFJ	Tehreek-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria (a movement turned political party)
TNFJ	Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Jafria
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UDI	Union Democratica Independiente
ZAB	Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Glossary

<i>Awam</i>	public
<i>Azad</i>	independent
<i>Bhutto Bachao Fund</i>	Fund to save Bhutto
<i>Bhutto Bachao Tehreek</i>	Campaign to save Bhutto
<i>Bharo</i>	fill in
<i>Biradri</i>	caste/tribe.
<i>Chehlum</i>	fortieth day service on a Muslim's death
<i>Dastur</i>	<i>constitution/Norm</i>
<i>Dost</i>	friend
<i>Fatwa</i>	a legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader
<i>Gherao aur Jalao</i>	surrounding and burning
<i>Hari</i>	landless peasant
<i>Hartal</i>	strike (Industrial action)
<i>Iftar</i>	Time to break Muslim's Fast
<i>Jamhoori</i>	democratic
<i>Jamhuriat</i>	democracy
<i>Jiye</i>	keep alive
<i>Jyala</i>	partisan
<i>Kapra</i>	Clothing
<i>Khudai Khidmatgaran</i>	servant of God
<i>Khwateen</i>	women
<i>Kutchehry</i>	public court/gathering
<i>Lathi</i>	wooden stick
<i>Madrassah</i>	religious schools
<i>Madre:</i>	mother
<i>Majlis-i-Shoora</i>	advisory council
<i>Makan</i>	housing
<i>Mazars</i>	tombs/Shrines
<i>Mohajir</i>	immigrant
<i>Mujahid</i>	literally, 'Striver', but misunderstood with Warrior for Faith (Islam)
<i>Mursiya</i>	<i>elegiac poem</i>
<i>Musawat</i>	literally equality (PPP's newspaper)
<i>Mushaira</i>	poetic symposium
<i>Muttaqi</i>	virtuous
<i>Nizam-i-Mustafa</i>	political system of Pophet Muhammad (s.a.w)
<i>Nihati Larki</i>	unarmed girl
<i>Pasand</i>	favourite
<i>Perhaizgar</i>	pious
<i>Pir</i>	spiritual leader
<i>Quaid-i-Azam</i>	literally, the Great leader, title to Jinnah
<i>Roti</i>	bread
<i>Sardar</i>	chieftain/tribal chief
<i>Sarkar</i>	government

<i>Satyagraha</i>	non-violence, coined by Gandhi for his civil resistance movements
<i>Shagird</i>	pupil
<i>Shaheed</i>	martyr
<i>Shariat</i>	Islamic code of Law
<i>Sindhi Shagird Tehreek</i>	Sindh's students' movement
<i>Tehreek</i>	movement
<i>Ulema</i>	Muslim theologian/religious scholar
<i>Ushr</i>	Islamic land tax
<i>Wadera</i>	landlord
<i>Zakat</i>	tithe

Dissertation Introduction

Scope of the Research:

I solemnly affirm, in the presence of Almighty God, that I owe allegiance to *the Constitution and Dominion of Pakistan* and that I will as in duty bound honestly and faithfully serve in the Dominion of Pakistan Forces and go within the terms of my enrolment wherever I may be ordered by air, land or sea and that I will observe and obey all commands of any officer set over me...

(Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah quoting the oath taken by members of the Defence Forces of Pakistan in his address to the Forces in Quetta 14 June 1948. Emphasis added.)

This thesis examines civil resistance to the military rule of General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq from 1977-88. This is commonly regarded as the most oppressive of the periods of such rule in the history of Pakistan.¹ Politicians, and human rights activists have declared this period the 'Dark Ages' of Pakistan.² Under the rule of General Zia, nine political leaders were murdered,³ thirteen committed suicide,⁴ fourteen were executed,⁵ and sentences were given of a total forty-five thousand punitive lashes.⁶ This research focuses on the courageous

¹ For references see section 2, below.

² Ethan Casey, *Alive and Well in Pakistan* (London: Vision, 2004), pp.98-99; Khan Abdul Wali Khan, quoted by Khadim Hussain, Interview, 3 February 2012, Peshawar. Malik Sikander Hayat Khan Bosan, Interview, 18 February 2012, Multan; Karamat Ali, PILER, Interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi; Mairaj M.Khan, Interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi.

³ Mirza Abdul Qadeer Baig, Ch. Zahoor Ellahi, Arbab Sikander Khalil, Zahoor-ul-Hassan Bhopali, Shahnawaz Bhutto, Fazil Rahu Allama Aihsan Ellahi Zaheer, raja Meer Zaman Khan, and Ghaus Bakhsh Raisani. Cited in Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal* (Karachi, Shibbal Publications: 1988), pp.189-90.

⁴ Unpublished papers of Dr. Mehdi Hassan, Interview, 3 March 2013, Lahore; Israr Shah, 19 April 2012, Islamabad.

⁵ Israr Shah, Interview.

⁶ *Al-Fatah*, and *Jahan*; cited in unpublished work of Dr. Mehdi Hassan, Interview; few of my interviews

resistance of those who were ‘prisoners without names’, held in ‘cells without numbers’.⁷

Historians and political scientists have already noted that there was opposition to this regime by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which was at its height between 1981 and 1984, but have generally judged it to have been a failure as the dictator repressed it ruthlessly.⁸ There was opposition from a wide range of civil society groups such as progressive students against Islami-Jamiat Tulba’s association to Zia’s Islamisation process; lawyers’ for the restoration of 1973 constitution as well as against Provisional Constitutional Orders; journalists against the Press and Publication Ordinance 1963, and women rights movement against Hudood Ordinances 1979. This thesis, however, will provide the first full-length study of political parties’ civil resistance to Zia’s rule throughout his time in control, up until his sudden death in an air crash in 1988. The opposition evolved and changed over time, as will be shown in the thesis. In this, it provides an original contribution to our knowledge of the history of modern Pakistan. Furthermore, and again originally, it will be argued that far from being a failure, civil resistance paved the way for a restoration of democracy after Zia’s demise. The resistance had above all forced

stated more numbers such as Shahid Sheikh said 75,900 lashes, 17 April 2012, Islamabad; Israr Shah, Interview, 10000 lashes

⁷ Prisoners in *Shahi Qila* did not have any identity or any existence for the outer world. Comment of one of the interviewees, Javed Iqbal Mo`azzam, 23 February 2012, Lahore.

⁸ Stephen Zunes, ‘Movement for the Restoration of Democracy: 1981-84’, *International Center on Nonviolent Conflict* available at <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=24> (24 March 2013); Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), and Interview, 9 July 2013, Coventry; Stephen P. Cohen, Interview, 20 November 2013, Washington DC.; William L. Litcher, ‘Domestic Politics in the 1980s’, in Craig Baxter, and Syed Raza Wasti (eds.), *Pakistan: Authoritarianism in 1980s* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991); Shahid Javed Burki, *Historical Dictionary of Pakistan* (3rd Edition, Toronto, Oxford, Lanham: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2006). Omar Noman, *Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947*(London: Kegan Paul International, 1992). P.L.Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto: Opportunities and Challenges* (New Delhi: Yuvraj Publishers, 1989).

Zia to hold an election, albeit non-party based, in 1985 in an attempt to legitimise his rule with a parliamentary veneer, and this provided the necessary leverage to bring a transition to democracy once Zia was removed from the scene.

Pakistan, and the area covered by Pakistan before 1947, has seen a number of nonviolent struggles during the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Before independence, there was that of the Khudai Khidmatgar of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. After independence, there were strong students protest in 1968-69 that culminated in the removal of General Ayub Khan,⁹ and the successful show of people's power in the shape of the lawyers' movement against General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan has seen many such struggles in its troubled life. While the resistance of the Khudai Khidmatgar was against British imperial rule, subsequent movements have often been directed against military rule. There have, in addition, been movements for women's rights, notably the Women Action Forum against discriminatory laws.

It can be argued that the precedence for ongoing periods of military rule in Pakistan were set by Sir Sikander Mirza when he invited General Muhammad Ayub Khan to impose martial law in 1958.¹⁰ Nonetheless, following the hiatus caused by the loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the country had a chance to re-establish itself as a healthy democracy under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He was in many respects the architect of present Pakistan implementing 'Islamic Socialist Democratic' policies, based on his slogan 'Islam is our religion, socialism is our economy and democracy is our politics'. This was all negated by the declaration of martial law by General Zia in 1977, and in the following eleven years – the

⁹ M. Rafiq Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969, vol.II*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1998), p.13.

¹⁰ Roedad Khan, *Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour* (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p.46.

longest period under one ruler, military or civil, in the history of the country till today – democracy was suppressed, opponents crushed, and secular culture attacked. The damaging legacy of this period continues to the present day. Despite this, the principle of democracy was never eradicated, and a democratic polity was restored in 1988. This was in large part due to the ongoing resistance to Zia’s rule throughout his time in control, as I hope will be demonstrated in this thesis.

The study also investigates the philosophy of nonviolence and its application in Pakistan. Pakistan has inherited three types of civil resistance – that of Gandhi, Jinnah, and Baacha Khan. If the first invokes people for resistance through ‘direct action’, the second followed the Constitutional way, whereas the last started in bringing social change through education and then took up Gandhian methods. Qayyum Nizami also defines the difference between Jinnah and Gandhi’s political philosophy by stating that the former struggled to remove the British in constitutional and democratic ways while the latter believed in forging a democratic system through agitation and civil disobedience.¹¹ These three strands are visible in Pakistan’s civil resistance movements. For example, Nusrat Bhutto, the wife of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) – whilst gathering people for the mass movement like Gandhi – filed various petitions time to time to challenge the Junta. And, the other towering personality Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, famously known Bacha Khan,¹² was a deeply religious Muslim who spent

¹¹ Qayyum Nizami, *Quaid-i-Azam Behesiat Governor General: Nai Riyasat ki Tashkeel, Faisle aur Iqdamat*, (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2010), p.19.

¹² Makulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed* (Santa Fe, New Mexico: School of American Research Press, 2000); Eknath Eswaran, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, A Man to Match his Mountains* (California: Nilgiri Press, 1984); Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, ‘The 1930 Civil Disobedience Movement in Peshawar Valley from the Pashtun Perspective’, *Studies in History*, Vol.29, No.1 (2013), pp. 87-118.

his life preaching what he saw as the message of Allah and his last Messenger, Prophet Muhammad. He held that the greatest weapon of the Prophet was patience and righteousness, and he established the first modern nonviolent peace force – the Khudai Khidmatgars (the Servants of God) – in 1929 to fight against imperialism through nonviolence.¹³ This body reached in its peak of more than 100,000 members in the 1940s, with offices all over the Northwest Frontier Province. However his political affiliation with the Indian National Congress made him an arch-opponent of the demand for Pakistan, and after Partition in 1947 he became marginalised in the new nation state. The history of the Khudai Khidmatgars and their nonviolent legacy were largely written out of the mainstream histories of Pakistan. Despite this, his brother went on to form a ministry in NWFP,¹⁴ which kept alive to some extent this tradition in this particular part of the country.

Studies of the politics and history of Pakistan have largely ignored the topic of nonviolent civil resistance. Pakistani political scholarship have tended to focus either on the Pakistan Movement and its inherited problems after independence¹⁵ or the strengthening of a strong bond between Islam and the ideology of the country.¹⁶ There are a number of political autobiographies¹⁷,

¹³ Robert C. Johansen, 'Radical Islam and Nonviolence: A Case Study of Religious Empowerment and Constraint among Pashtuns', *Journal Of Peace Research*, vol. 34 no.1 (1997), pp. 53-71.

¹⁴ The new name of NWFP is Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa. From now, it'll be named as Khyber-Pukhtoonkhwa.

¹⁵ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst and Company), Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994). Recent in this series is Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India* (New York, reprinted edition 2009).

¹⁶ Akber S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Lawrence Ziring, 'From Islamic Republic to Islamic State in Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, vol.326, No.9 (September, 1984), pp.931-46; Charles H. Kennedy, 'Islamisation in Pakistan: Implementation of the Hudood Ordinances', *Asian Survey*, vol.28, No.3 (March, 1988), pp.307-316;

¹⁷ Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters* (Lahore: 2000 reprinted), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated* (online version) <http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/If-I-am-assassinated-by-Shaheed-Bhutto.pdf>;

biographies¹⁸, and memoirs that define the country's issues and remedies in terms of individual figures. Scholars have understood the truncation of democracy in Pakistan in terms of the imbalance between the civil and the military, the malign role of Pakistan army, and/or the venality of politicians, among other things. Pakistan has been portrayed as a 'failed' state between 'Allah, Army and Terrorism'¹⁹ or a 'corrupt medieval empire' ruled by *mansabdars*.²⁰ In all this, very little attempt has been made to analyse the way in which people's power has managed to restrict the continuation of military rule in the country.

Research questions and methodology

The thesis generally adopts a diachronic approach, with chapters that advance from one period to another of the Zia era. It is qualitative in nature, relying on the collection of whatever material I could access, and interviews with a wide range of actors who were prepared to meet and talk with me. There were inevitable lacunae in the material that I was able to collect, so it cannot be claimed to be exhaustive. It is however extensive, as I hope will be revealed in section 6 below on sources, and thus an adequate base for such a doctoral thesis.

One of the main research questions is that of the comparative efficacy of nonviolent and violent methods. This relates to the wider literature on civil

Benazir Bhutto, *The Daughter of the East: An Autobiography* (London: reprinted 2008); Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

¹⁸ Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993); –, *Jinnah Of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).

¹⁹ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army and The America's War on Terror* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (New York: Penguin Books, 2009); Ayesha Jalal, *Partisan of Allah: Jihad in South Asia* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010) traces the history of jihad in the region to Syed Ahmed Rai of Bareilly's declaration to this effect against British colonial rule.

²⁰ Ilhan Niaz, *The Culture of Power and Governance of Pakistan 1947-2008* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2010).

resistance and nonviolent movements all over the world. More will be said about this literature in section 4 below. In this respect this research provides a case study that sheds light on the efficacy of nonviolent methods as against violent forms of struggle. In this particular case, the comparison is between the civil methods of MRD and the terrorism of Al-Zulfiqar.

The other main research questions relate to the characterisation of Pakistan's politics and the vitality and viability of its democracy. In focusing on civil resistance in Pakistan, I challenge the widespread notion that the politics of Pakistan has almost since its foundation been characterised by violence. Also, that it is inherently unstable as a state, and in danger of collapse. Pakistan is tagged as a country 'producing terrorism' and/or of 'safe havens for terrorists', and the presence of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad (Pakistan's garrison town) has appeared to support this argument. Scholars associated with the American Intelligence community such as Stephen P Cohen and Bruce Riedle believe that the country is likely to disintegrate in the near future due to its chaos and complexity.²¹ It is the argument of this research project that both civil society and democracy have proved remarkably tenacious in Pakistan, and that this is in no small part due to an ongoing history of civil resistance by a range of social groups. Nonviolent people's power has always existed in a climate of potential and actual violence, and indeed much of its vitality has come from this, as it has provided a potent demonstration that alternative methods could be used to resolve conflicts without the use of physical violence. The task is to investigate

²¹ Bruce Riedel, 'Battle for the Soul of Pakistan', *India Today*, 4 January 2013. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/battle-for-the-soul-of-pakistan/1/240733.html> (4 January 2013). Stephen P. Cohen in his book, *The Future of Pakistan* predicts that Pakistan will collapse as a state by 2015. However, in an interview with me, he extended this by five years. Stephen P. Cohen, Interview, 20 November 2013, Washington DC.

the history of these strands, to see both how and when such nonviolence has succeeded, and also to understand the reasons why it has also failed in certain circumstances. How and in what circumstances, it may be asked, has nonviolence survived in the present world, particularly in a so-called “age of terrorism” in which military responses are generally seen as providing the only effective counter-strategy? In such a situation, the ongoing vitality of nonviolence requires us to address such convictions in a critical manner.

Main Arguments

Apart from a few exceptions,²² most observers have seen the Movement for Restoration of Democracy as a failure.²³ Against this, I shall argue that rather than being a failure, it was part of a process of ‘gradualist democratisation’.²⁴ Analysing the three major objectives of MRD – lifting of martial law *immediately*, holding of free and fair election *within three months*, restoration of 1973 constitution along with power of the four federating units – we find that all of these demands were eventually met but over a longer time-frame than envisaged initially. One immediate success was that on 12 August 1983, two days before civil disobedience was launched across the country, General Zia-ul-Haq announced a political roadmap. At the same time, the Pakistan army high command started considering a replacement of General Zia with another army leader so as to save their face before people’s power.²⁵ Chapter 3 and 6 will

²²Asif Butt, Interview, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Shahida Jabeen, Interview 26 February 2012, Lahore; Aziz Shaikh, Interview, 12 March 2012, Karachi;

²³ Ethnicity and Democracy, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol.21 No.52 (27 December 1986), pp.2236-2264; Ilyas Shakir, *MRD Kamyabian aur Nakamian* (Karachi: Shabal Publications Ltd, 1985); Aabid Zuberi, Convener of MRD 1983, cited in Ilyas Shakir, *MRD*.

²⁴ The term is used by Stephen Zunes for those movements which failed to bring down a dictator immediately, but despite this paved the way for eventual democratization. Stephen Zunes, presented in a seminar, attended via webinar on 31 March 2015 from Washington DC.

²⁵ Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), ‘Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change’, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, CIA Record Research Tool at National Archives and

examine this in detail. According to the roadmap, there was to be an election in March 1985. The regime, which had withheld its promises of such a step seven times previously,²⁶ did hold the election in 1985 as per the plan due to the ongoing pressure of MRD on the regime. Seeing his previous record of reneging on promises, Zia could easily have done the same in 1985 but for this pressure. Moreover, my research suggests that if Zia had not been killed in an air-crash, he would have had to resign from office after the dissolution of Junejo's government,²⁷ making a supposed "honourable" exit from the political scene of Pakistan'.²⁸ Chapter 6 further elucidates this argument.

Relevant to the first argument, my second argument is that the Government of the United States supported the rule of General Zia until his sudden demise in 1988. This goes against a common belief that the US administration was losing patience with Zia over his handling of the Afghan war and 'dissimulations on the nuclear issue'.²⁹ Rather than support the civil opposition to Zia, as is often argued, the Reagan government in Washington was suspicious of what they saw as allies of communists. Consulting the CIA's archives in Maryland, my research uses confidential messages and various reports sent to the US State department, as well as interviews with Stephen

Record Administration, College Park, MD-USA (NARA) CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3. Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), 'Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change', *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, NARA, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3.

²⁶ 5 July 1977, 23 August 1978 during the tour of Makkah, 23 March 1979, 16 May 1979 after six days tour of Baluchistan, 21 August 1979 on Jeddah trip, 30 August 1979 while declaring the Political Parties Act 1979, on 17 November 1979 postponement of the election for indefinite period. Collected from various media news sources.

²⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, NARA, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, p.9. Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, 15 February 1985, NARA, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6.

²⁸ *Dawn*, 18 August 1988.

²⁹ Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics* (Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2014), p.257.

Cohen and Aparna Pande. Following the ‘bleeders’ and the ‘defeaters’³⁰ school of thoughts in US administration both the sources suggests that the US government believed that it was easier to overcome the bitter legacy of the Vietnam war by dealing with a dictator in Pakistan. They distrusted the links that the civil opposition in Pakistan had with the USSR and China.³¹ CIA in its secret reports³² had discerned links between the MRD and the Soviet Union and India, and reported that both *probably* funded the party. They saw the Jama`at-i-Islami as the better option if the army was to be replaced by another group.³³ The report concluded that the best option for the USA was that the rule of General Zia or another military commander should continue. As it was, as late as 1988 President Reagan certified the unavailability of nuclear devices in Pakistan.³⁴ The weekly reports from the Pakistan embassy to the US State Department on human rights abuses were completely ignored.³⁵ The role of international powers during the period in investigation is underscored in chapters 1-5 of the thesis.

The thesis will also shed new light on the relationship between the pro-democracy movement and the armed struggle of Al-Zulfiqar that was headed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s two sons Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shah Nawaz Bhutto. The major published work on Al-Zulfiqar is by either ex-Al-Zulfiqar members such as

³⁰ Cohen explains the terminologies stating that the State department was divided into these two groups – bleeders and the defeaters, when he entered the department in 1985. Bleeders wanted to bleed and weaken the Soviet Union through its continuing military engagement in Afghanistan; whereas the defeaters wanted to break up the Soviet Empire. And for both, they needed a strong man in Pakistan. Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

³¹ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition, March 1984’, NARA, p.iv.

³² *cit.,loc.*

³³ *ibid.*, p.12.

³⁴ *Viewpoint*, XIII (24), 21 January 1988, p.34.

³⁵ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition’, March 1984, NARA, p.12.

Raja Anwer,³⁶ Asif Butt,³⁷ and Fakhanda Bukhari,³⁸ or by scholars such as B.M.Kutty,³⁹ Ilyas Shakir,⁴⁰ and K.M.Arif.⁴¹ None of this work has discerned the clandestine relationship that existed between Benazir Bhutto and Nusrat Bhutto over the launching of an armed struggle against Zia-ul-Haq. Even Benazir Bhutto completely avoided referring to Al-Zulfiqar in her autobiography covering the struggle years except stating 'All hijacking is bad, whether it is a plane or a nation',⁴² which does not categorically condemn the act either. The present research seeks to show that following the death sentence on ZAB delivered by the Lahore High Court in March 1978, PPP workers initiated the militant struggle parallel with nonviolent resistance after receiving the green signal from Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto. In this, they adhered to a common belief in the efficacy of armed struggle that was fashionable at that time at a global level.⁴³ Salman Taseer also stated that this option was on the table in the meeting of senior leaders of the party with BB in Larkana on the fortieth day anniversary of ZAB's death; but no firm decision was reached on the matter.⁴⁴ Nusrat Bhutto claimed in support of such a struggle that she could contact 'fourteen underground organisations, if we needed.' Sardar Abdul Qayum, and Maulana Abdullah Darkhwasti actually quitted the MRD after the PIA plane hijacking due to his firm

³⁶ Raja Anwar, *Dehshat Gard Shehzada (The Terrorist Prince: Life and Death of Murtaza Bhutto)* (Lahore: Classic, 2007).

³⁷ Asif Butt, *Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin* (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2013).

³⁸ Farkhanda Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2012).

³⁹ B.M.Kutty, *Sixty Years in Self-Exile: No Regrets A Political Biography* (Karachi, Pakistan Study Center, University of Karachi, 2011).

⁴⁰ Shakir, *MRD*.

⁴¹ K.M. Arif, *Working with Zia-Urdu translation* (Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2008).

⁴² Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.169.

⁴³ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview, 12 January 2013. He was the messenger between the armed group and BB due to his job in PIA.

⁴⁴ Salman Taseer, 'Around Al-Murtaza', *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.9.

opposition to the armed struggle, commenting that the PPP already knew about the hijacking.⁴⁵

Maulana Kausar Shah,⁴⁶ a PPP's worker from Lahore, approached Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya in 1978 – who had been a close ally with ZAB – and requested his support for armed resistance to General Zia-ul-Haq. Agreeing to the proposal, Col. Qaddafi asked him to bring ZAB's sons on board from London. The main purpose of establishing such an organisation was initially to save the life of ZAB, this was unsuccessful. PPP workers who had returned from a four-week trip to Libya were charged in the so-called Libya Conspiracy Case.⁴⁷ Despite this, work on this project continued, and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) was formally established during the summer of 1979. Later on, it was renamed Al-Zulfiqar.⁴⁸ The PIA hijacking⁴⁹ was organised to put pressure on General Zia. One of my interviewees quoted Benazir Bhutto as referring to the militant struggle of her brothers as 'a guarantee of her life in Pakistan.'⁵⁰ Likewise, another interviewee, Muhammad Agha Waseem,⁵¹ told me that the hijackers of the PIA aircraft had already been ordered to execute their plan at the same time as the MRD was being established as an alternative democratic platform to fight against the regime. Since it was winter, so to postpone the

⁴⁵ Sardar Abdul Qayum Khan, *Nawai-Waqt* 21 March 1981. *The Muslim*, 2 March 1981. Shakir, *MRD*, pp.118-121.

⁴⁶ Maulana Kausar Shah was already involved in sabotage of Train tracks. Agha Muhammad Waseem, Interview, 1 December 2012, Stockholm. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

⁴⁷ Kaneez Yousaf, Vice-Chancellor Quaid-i-Azam University, Kishwar Naheed, poetess and human rights activist, and Brig. Osman were the members who recruited for the training in Libya. 18 men and women were sent to learn Green Book of Col. Qaddafi. See, for example Farkhanda Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai*. interview, 27 February 2012, Lahore. Muhammad Agha Waseem, interview; Jahangir Badar, interview; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview;

⁴⁸ The name has double meaning. In Arabic, it means sword, while it was also after the name of ZAB.

⁴⁹ Many PPP workers and leaders still understand that it was the act of the army to crush the civil resistance of MRD. See, for example, Sardar Shaukat Ali, *Pakistan: Issues of Government and Politics* (Lahore: Fiction House, 2012), p.91.

⁵⁰ Javed Iqbal Mo`azam, 27 February 2012, Lahore; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview.

⁵¹ Interview, 22 February 2012, Lahore and 1 December 2012, Stockholm;

hijacking plan after seeing the outcome of MRD, Benazir Bhutto sent a code message to Murtaza Bhutto and said '*Yahan sardi kum hu gai hai, kumbulon ki abhi zarurat nahi* (cold wave had reduced here, we do not need blankets for now) which means do not act upon the plan at that juncture. The Bhutto family was no stranger to using violent means to achieve their targets, as seen in the illegal and extra-judicial killings of the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramilitary state-run actor, established by the ZAB government in 1972 that became a terror force for both his opponents and members of his own party. This is discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

It has been often argued that the MRD failed because it was only really strong in Sindh province.⁵² Indeed, Sindhi nationalists have counted this as a case of betrayal by the people of Punjab to wider cause. It is true that the Zia regime did its best to divide-and-rule by setting Punjab against Sindh, holding that Sindhis were anti-Pakistan and secessionist.⁵³ My research comes to a different conclusion in this respect. The argument for a divide focuses on the civil disobedience movement in August to December 1983. I argue that before this struggle to save ZAB from execution – *Bhutto Bachao Tehreek* (Save Bhutto Movement) – was in fact stronger in Punjab than much of Sindh. While there was a strong movement in Karachi City, other parts of Sindh hardly participated at all.⁵⁴ The main Punjabi leaders and workers had already exhausted their energies or were in prison as they had been the focus of repression by the

⁵² See, for example, Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.) and Translated by Gillian Beaumont, *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins* (London: Anthem Press, 2008). Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*; Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh: Pakistan ke Yukjehti ke Masail* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986). Ayesha Jalal, *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.106.

⁵³ Syed Munawar Hussain Shah, *Bhutto, Zia and Islam* (online at www.bhutto.org), p.222.

⁵⁴ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview, 12 January 2013, London.

regime before 1983. Reports of Amnesty International between 1977-1983⁵⁵ and in *Viewpoint* magazine estimated that during the four years before 1983 the number of political prisoners held at any one time was between several hundred and several thousand. In 1977-79 over four-fifths of the participants in protests against the regime were from Punjab. Of the seven who committed suicide between March 1978 and April 1979, all were from Punjab except Abdul Aziz from Sukher. Among nine political workers executed by the regime, four were Punjabi, while two were settlers in Karachi from KPK and the rest were from Sindh. All four of the journalists who were flogged were from Punjab. Of the total 192 sentences to floggings, all but 18 were from Punjab. Above all, of the seventy-three prisoners interned in *Shahi Qila* – the mother of all jails – ninety five per cent were from Punjab. My interview evidence suggests that out of 250 commanders of Al-Zulfiqar in Kabul, 186 were from Punjab.⁵⁶ And, then from KPK and FATA, 40-50 and 30-35 from Sindh. Likewise, among the release of political prisoners in exchange for plane hostages, the majority were from Punjab. Additionally, the majority who went into exile were from Punjab the cities of Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Gujranwala.⁵⁷ Furthermore, despite Zia-ul-Haq's open opposition to PPP in the local elections of 1979, in which he stated "*Yeh Mumlakate Khudad Hey- Roti, Kapra Makan mumlakat Nahi hai*"⁵⁸ (this is Allah's land, not the land of Bread, Cloth, and a house) PPP-Punjab under 'awam

⁵⁵ 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission To the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978', *Amnesty International*, Modern Record Center (MRC), MSS.34/4/1/pk4. 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982)', *Amnesty International*, (December 1982), MRC, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17 ASA 33/22/82. Report on Pakistan 'Human Rights violations and the decline of the rule of law', *Amnesty International*, MRC, MSS.34/4/1/Pk14. 'Arrests, Imprisonment and Flogging in Pakistan (August-September 1983)', *Amnesty International* (October 1983), MRC, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 20, ASA 33/14/83.

⁵⁶ Asif Butt, Lahore, and Muhammad Agha Waseem, Lahore and Stockholm.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Mushtaq Lasharie, Mian Muhammad Iqbal, Shahid Nadeem, Farkhanda Bukhari.

⁵⁸ Zia-ul-Haq, 24 September 1979, Lahore, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (8), 30 September 1979, p.14.

dost' title won the election. 72 of the 100 seats in Lahore were won by PPP candidates.⁵⁹ Chapter 3 examines this argument in detail.

Little has been written about the struggle of the PPP in exile at this time. The main source for information about this comes from Benazir Bhutto's autobiography in her treatment of her period in exile. Recently, Farkhanda Bukhari narrated her struggle abroad in her autobiography *Ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai*. This research underscores the importance of this aspect of the struggle as well. For example, on the day of the sentence of death on 18 March 1978 the two Bhutto brothers — Mir Murtaza and Shah Nawaz Bhutto — sped up their struggle to mobilise international support to save their father's life. From their base next to the Pakistani High Commission in London, they travelled around the world meeting government functionaries — Iran, USA, UAE and Libya — and requested them to put pressure on the Zia government.⁶⁰ After the final decision of Supreme Court, to explain the flaws in ZAB case, Bhutto brothers planned to organise an international convention of constitutionalists on 7 April 1979, however, that turned into a posthumous convention.⁶¹ Post-burial funeral prayers were held in Hyde Park on 8 April, followed by a protest demonstration of 40,000 people organised and led by the two sons, Tariq Ali and other exiled PPP workers.⁶² Later, there was a convention of exiled/immigrant party workers in London, headed by Mir Murtaza Bhutto.⁶³ The 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy-London Chapter' was launched in 1982 under the

⁵⁹ *Viewpoint*, V (8), 30 September 1979. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. Shahida Jabeen, interview

⁶⁰ Asad Munir Bhatti, *Bhutto Ka Beta* (unpublished), p.13-14.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.15.

⁶² *Viewpoint*, 15 April 1979, p. 16. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

⁶³ *Musawaat* 2 August 1979.

presidency of Afzal Bangash.⁶⁴ A 'Release and Relief Committee'⁶⁵ also campaigned to free detainees with some success, as when Khalid Chaudhry was released.⁶⁶ Most importantly, the permission of Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto to go abroad on medical grounds was mainly brought about through the work of exiled activists in London, as described well by Farkhanda Bukhari.⁶⁷ Magazines such as *Azad*⁶⁸ (Freedom) (started in 1979 in London), *Nusrat*⁶⁹ (started in London in 1982), and *Baazgasht*⁷⁰ (Echo) (started in Berlin) provided pro-MRD publicity abroad. Chapter 4 articulates this aspect of the struggle.

Besides challenging the specialist literature on Pakistan, this thesis seeks to add to the scholarship on the civil resistance in general. Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan argue⁷¹ that the percentage of a population of a country as a whole that is mobilised and the consistency of its participation has a marked impact on the success-rate of struggles. My research suggests that it is not so much the proportion of the population of the entire nation but the relative weight of particular populations that can be crucial. In the politics of Pakistan, it is above all necessary to mobilise Punjabi support. In particular the axis that

⁶⁴ Dr. Zafar Niazi, Justice Safdar Shah (General Secretaries), Shahid Nadeem (Secretary), Mushtaq Lasharie (office secretary), and Kalim Dil Khan provided a space for the office in his hotel in London. Brig Osman Khalid issued Inquilab paper, Hamraz Ahsan, Major Imtiaz, Zahir Hassan Dar, Nayyar Hassan Dar (brothers, in charge of People's Guard), Rana Shamim Ahmed Khan (ex-Deputy Speaker-Punjab), Mian Iqbal (senator), Bashir Riaz, Dr. Nasir A. Shaikh.

⁶⁵ The committee was set up by the exiled workers. Interviews with Shahid Nadeem, Fakhanda Bukhari, Asif Butt, Mushtaq Lasharie.

⁶⁶ Khalid Chaudhry got married to a German girl during his studies in Germany, whose father was the Second highest authority in German Church. Such connection also helped in his release. His wife is the same person who smuggled ZAB's jail diary along with her Swedish friend, which was later on published with the title of 'If I am assassinated'. Khalid Chaudhry, interview.

⁶⁷ Farkhanda Bukhari, Interview, A memorandum was handed in to the Indian High Commission London requesting Indira Gandhi to use her office for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on humanitarian grounds, cited in Farkhanda Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai* (Lahore, 2012), pp.147-49. Shahid Nadeem, Interview.

⁶⁸ Shahid Nadeem, Interview.

⁶⁹ Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview.

⁷⁰ Found copies from the archive of South Asian Research and Resource Center (SARRC), Islamabad.

⁷¹ Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

stretches in Punjab from Lahore to Rawalpindi along the major highway is vital in all this – it being often referred to as Grand Trunk Road politics. The province accounts for 56 per cent of Pakistan’s population, and an estimated 75 per cent of personnel in the army and the civil bureaucracy. Besides, it is the agricultural heartland of Pakistan, producing a high proportion of its wheat, cotton, and rice cash crops. People from other provinces have always struggled to achieve equal status in Pakistan’s national establishment. Sindh provides the main resistance to complete Punjabi dominance; however, according to a US intelligence report, ‘the Sindhis will have to come to terms with Punjabi dominance, perhaps surviving as the Welsh have in Great Britain as a culturally rich minority.’⁷² This bias in the politics of Pakistan has to be borne in mind in any analysis.

My research also augments our knowledge about the sort of strategies that can be adopted in nonviolent struggles to circumvent oppression. Among other methods we shall examine are political meetings under the guise of birthday parties, marriages, mock funerals, mock graves, death anniversaries, and annual ceremonies at Sufi shrines.

While Chenoweth and Stephen highlight the frequent failure of the international community to support nonviolent movements against autocrats, showing that less than the ten per cent nonviolent movements that they have recorded over the past century have received material support from foreign governments in comparison to thirty-five per cent of violent movements,⁷³ other leading authorities such as Sharp, Ackerman, and Kruegler have argued that international support is very important for a successful nonviolent movement. I

⁷² Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne’, *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, 21 November 1986, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, NARA, p.34.

⁷³ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, p.54.

shall argue that the direction from which international support comes matters most of all. MRD enjoyed support from the political left, which included the Soviet Union,⁷⁴ the International Transport Federation,⁷⁵ and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions – which funded the pro-socialist and PPP labour unions in Pakistan.⁷⁶ This support did not translate into success for the movement.⁷⁷ BB, by contrast, adopted a different tactic. She looked for support to the capitalist bloc. The problem with this strategy was that General Zia enjoyed firm support from the USA, Saudi Arabia and other important pro-capitalist powers. There will be a separate section in each chapter from 1 to 5 that deals with the issue of international support.

Furthermore, my research argues that civil resistance that is initiated and led by coalitions of opposition political parties has a much lower chance of success. The reason for this is that there is almost invariably mistrust between party leaders caused by their individual ambitions for power. This was not the case either in the Students' Movement against General Ayub 1967-8, and Lawyers' Movement against General Pervez Musharraf 2007-9, which were launched and led by civil society groups, with political parties joining and consolidating their success subsequently. Internationally, we find this is true also of movements such as that of the mothers of the 'disappeared' in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the students movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the Otpor movement against Milosevic in Serbia,

⁷⁴ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, NARA, p.12.

⁷⁵ Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview,

⁷⁶ Correspondence between International Confederation of Free Trade Union and Pakistani Trade unions in 'Trade Union in Pakistan: Historical Background', MSS 292D/954.5/4, Modern Record Center, The University of Warwick (MRC).

⁷⁷ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, NARA, p.12. *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988', 24 July 1985, NARA, p. 190. Stephen P. Cohen, Interview.

the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis. In all these cases, the protests started with civil society groups, with political parties becoming involved only when the movements were on the verge of success. In the case of Pakistan, movements that were initiated by political parties, such as the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) against General Musharraf, and the Combined Opposition Parties against General Ayub were relatively unsuccessful. This was due to the lust for power of the political leaders, leading to a lack of the unity.

My argument is informed by the literature that has burgeoned in recent years on strategies of nonviolent resistance throughout the world over the course of the past century. This field of study has been associated in particular with Gene Sharp, who has been a prolific writer on the theme. Sharp, an American, was a conscientious objector during the Korean War (for which he was jailed) who went on to study Gandhi's nonviolent movement for independence in India. His first book, published in 1960, was titled *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power*.⁷⁸ This provided an analysis of the strategy that Gandhi adopted in India, with lessons being learnt for application in future struggles. This emphasis on the strategy of protest is found particularly strongly in the seminal book that Gene Sharp subsequently went on to write – a massive study, 902 pages in length, on 'the politics of nonviolent action'. This was published first in 1973 and it is still in print.⁷⁹ In these writings, Sharp depicts Gandhi as devising an unconventional approach to politics that operates by mobilising the power of the masses nonviolently, in contrast to the top-down

⁷⁸ Gene Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960).

⁷⁹ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

form of political power that ruling elites have in general sought to impose. Many Indian nationalists before Gandhi are seen to have had such an elitist approach.⁸⁰ Sharp also brought out how Gandhi maintained discipline in nonviolent struggles. Sharp is interested primarily in ends, arguing that nonviolent resistance is preferable not out of principle but because it is more expedient in both taking on an opponent and ensuring a more lasting result subsequently. This is in contrast to Gandhi, who insisted that the means were what mattered above all, rather than the ends. For Sharp, nonviolent means are important because they get better results, not because they are intrinsically superior morally or spiritually.

Sharp only began to be taken up in a big way during the 1980s, which was a period that saw some dramatic examples of successful nonviolent protests that brought down highly oppressive regimes, as in the Philippines, Chile, and Eastern Europe. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan occurred at the same time as this, but because it was seen as a failure, it was not studied in the way that these other movement were. A growing number of scholars began to take an interest in this field.⁸¹ The focus was on post-World War II campaigns.

Until now, this field and method of study has been a relatively unknown field amongst those who study the modern history and politics of South Asia.

⁸⁰ See Sharp, *Gandhi as a Political Strategist: With Essays on Ethics and Politics* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979), pp. 43-59.

⁸¹ For example, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Connecticut, Westport: Praeger, 1994); Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2000); Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective* (Malden, Mass.: Willey-Blackwell, 1999); Mark Kurlansky, *Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

Mainstream historians and political scientists who work on the region have in general shown little interest in nonviolence as an effective force for change. In the case of India, while liberal-nationalist and Nehruvian socialists tend to admire Gandhi as the 'father of the nation', they have not in general regarded his protest techniques as having a place in the modern parliamentary democracy of India. More radical thinkers have generally acknowledged that Gandhi was a brilliant mass mobiliser, but believe that his philosophy of nonviolence ensured that he was unable to push what he had started to its logical end in a violent revolutionary upheaval, so that in the end he let his supporters down. They have therefore focused in their research and writing on the gap between popular demands and what the Gandhian movement was prepared and able to actually deliver.⁸² They have not been interested in any serious analysis of Gandhi's techniques as a guide to future action. In the case of Pakistan, Gandhi is widely regarded as the person who fought against the establishment of Pakistan, and thus an enemy. There has been and continues to be little political mileage to be gained in appealing to Gandhian values and methods in Pakistan. This is despite the existence of a particularly strong Gandhian-style movement in the North-West Frontier Province (KPK, hereafter) that was led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the period before independence. He became marginalised in post-independence politics, and indeed was at times persecuted and jailed. Civil resistance in Pakistan has therefore had to plough its own path in a situation in which more violent and militaristic forces have often been to the fore. Despite this, as I argue in this thesis, it has been at times a dynamic force that has brought real

⁸² E.g. *Subaltern Studies* Vols. 1-12.

political change. I intend to advance this argument through the lens of nonviolent resistance studies.

Literature Review

Despite the rich culture of civil resistance, both successful and unsuccessful, nonviolence and civil resistance scholars have largely ignored Pakistan, despite an ongoing history of such struggle, often against great odds. While a good deal has been written about the resistance led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the KPK in the pre-1947 period, probably the only such Pakistani resistance after 1947 that has caught the attention of the world in a major way has been that of the courageous struggle for girl's education associated with Malala Yousafzai in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Yet, there has been an ongoing resistance by Pakistani women to various forms of patriarchal oppression that stretches back many years, and which has involved women from all parts of the country. Abdul Ghaffar Khan also continued his resistance after 1947, and there have been other preachers of nonviolence of his ilk, notably Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai, also known as the Baluchi Gandhi. Most scholarship on Pakistan has focussed on topics such as partition and the legacy of the two-nation theory,⁸³ militarization-cum-military rule,⁸⁴ and Islamisation-cum-extremism.⁸⁵ In the past two decades the country has been tagged as a haven for Muslim extremists, jihadists, and

⁸³ See, for example, Venkat Dhulipala, *Creating a New Medina, State Power, Islam, and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zionism: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013); M.J.Akber, *Tinderbox, Past and Future of Pakistan* (Noida: Harper Collins Publishers, 2011); K.K.Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A study in Nationalism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); Akber S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London, New York: Routledge, 1997); Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*; Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*.

⁸⁴ See, for example, T.V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Ishtiaq Ahmed, *Pakistan: The Garrison State Origins, Evolution, Consequences 1947-2011* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁸⁵ See, for example, Peter Bergen with Katherine Tiedmann (ed.), *Talibanistan: Negotiating The Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

terrorists, and in consequence a security threat to the rest of the world.⁸⁶ While political scientists typically regard Pakistan as a country that has staggered from crisis-to-crisis and is in constant danger of a 'descent into chaos',⁸⁷ a few scholars such as Ian Talbot and Anatol Lieven⁸⁸ believe that it is above all Pakistan's vibrant civil society that has kept it alive through its many vicissitudes.

Broadly speaking, the historiography on Zia period can be divided into a number of categories. The first is that of histories written by his cronies in the military and politics. Unlike Ayub Khan,⁸⁹ and Pervez Musharraf,⁹⁰ General Zia did not himself write any autobiographical work. Instead, we have books by close associates such as K.M. Arif, Vice-Chief of the Army Staff and Chief of Staff under Zia,⁹¹ and Faiz Ali Chishti, head of 111 Brigade – who implemented martial law's order in 1977 and the Election Cell under Martial law.⁹² These two books seek to justify martial law and refer to the civil resisters as a mob. Chishti nonetheless resigned from the army in 1980 due to his personal grievances against General Zia, and criticised Zia for not holding elections and handing political power back to the politicians. He hardly mentions the political struggle, however. Ghafoor Ahmed of Jama'at-i-Islami (JI) provides a vivid account of the Zia's era through both a military and political perspective.⁹³ In his two books, he

⁸⁶ See, for example, C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, et al, *Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010); Maleeha Lodhi, *Pakistan Beyond the 'Crisis State'* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

⁸⁷ Ahmed Rashid, *Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (Allen Lane, London 2008).

⁸⁸ Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

⁸⁹ Muhammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not Masters: A Political Biography* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967).

⁹⁰ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).

⁹¹ K.M.Arif, *Working with Zia: Pakistan Power Politics 1977-88* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995).

⁹² Faiz Ali Chishti, *Bhutto, Zia aur Main* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991).

⁹³ Ghafoor Ahmed, *Aur Phir Martial Law agya* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1988) and –, *Zia Ke Akhri Dus saal* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993).

provides many facts and much description, with a focus on the *real politik* of the country. He was the first author who revealed that the agreement between PNA and ZAB had been approved on the night of the imposition of the martial law. The books are however biased by the fact that the JI worked hand-in-hand with the regime, and they are completely silent on the way that education was bent in an Islamic direction against the opposition of progressive students' groups. His main grumble against Zia is that he did not take Islamisation far enough. On the other hand, Golam W. Chaudhry – whose work was facilitated by the Zia regime – praised his Islamisation and his supposed moves towards democracy while ignoring the pro-democratic struggle of the MRD.⁹⁴

In the second main category are the memoirs of oppositional political leaders and workers. Of these, the most prominent was Benazir Bhutto (BB), whose autobiography *Daughter of the East* was widely read.⁹⁵ Previously, she had in 1983 written *Pakistan: The Gathering Storm*, but this had much less impact. *Daughter of the East* provided a complete account of the struggle for justice and democracy in Pakistan against Zia. It highlighted human rights violations, the work of PPP's *jyals* (partisan), their imprisonment and execution, and the illegitimacy of Zia's alteration of the constitution of 1973. Nonetheless, in its first edition, published when she had gained power in Pakistan, she avoided discussing some controversial issues. In her previous book in 1983, she condemned Pakistan Generals in general for the murder of her father, and she described her struggle for democracy as being against an unholy alliance

⁹⁴ Golam W. Chaudhry, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989).

⁹⁵ Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography* (London: Simon and Schuster, 1988). –, *Pakistan: The Gathering Storm* (online at www.bhutto.org, 1983).

between American imperialism allied to the Pakistan military.⁹⁶ In her later book she adopts a lenient approach towards America and the CIA, and blames General Zia primarily.⁹⁷ She is also critical about her ‘uncles’ – Mumtaz Bhutto, Mustafa Khar, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada – who had their own ambitions to take control of the party.⁹⁸ This thesis aims to fill some of the gaps in BB’s narrative; for example about her relationship with Al-Zulfiqar, the agreement that paved the way for her departure from Pakistan, and her return after an understanding or deal with the USA.

Books written by other PPP leaders and workers focus mainly on the internal differences within the party. Kausar Niazi, who broke with the PPP to forge the National People’s Party, writes about the clandestine nuclear operation of ZAB’s government, the rigging of the 1977 election, and the betrayal by Abdul Hafiz Pirzada of the PPP over the execution of ZAB.⁹⁹ Aslam Gordaspuri, besides providing comprehensive details of the workers’ opinions and their sacrifices in the anti-Zia movement, blames Niazi for his secret alliance with the army which led him to counter PPP with his newly established party.¹⁰⁰ The recently published autobiographies of PPP workers Farkhanda Bukhari and Asif Butt provide useful account of, in the first instance, a struggle by a PPP woman and her exile, while the latter mainly describes his journey from nonviolent democratic activism to a violent armed struggle.¹⁰¹ Raja Anwer has written

⁹⁶ Bhutto, *Pakistan*, pp.5-6, 60, 69.

⁹⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 85-90.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, pp.223-224.

⁹⁹ Maulana Kausar Niazi, *Aur line cut gai* (Lahore: Ahmad Publications, 2008).

¹⁰⁰ Worker of PPP from Lahore who was imprisoned during Bhutto Bachao Tehreek and the MRD. Aslam Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ki Dastan-i-hyat aur Pakistan People’s Party* (Lahore: Fiction House, 2010).

¹⁰¹ Bukhari was a woman activist who was imprisoned in the Shahi Qila, and the only woman set free

perhaps the best book on Al-Zulfiqar; being one of its members who eventually fell out with Murtaza Bhutto and the PPP, and had to flee their Kabul camp to save his life.¹⁰² It exposes the bloated ambitions of Al-Zulfiqar, with its delusions about becoming a force on a par with Palestine's Al-Fatah or the Irish Republic Army, and the constant fear of infiltration by Zia's agents among Murtaza's guerrillas.¹⁰³ Some of Al-Zulfiqar's members accused Anwer of being an agent for Zia and blamed him for its organisational leaks.¹⁰⁴ In general, these various accounts by PPP workers provide some acerbic critique of the PPP leadership, but are very self-focussed.

The third main category is that of scholarly appraisals by national and international academics of the General Zia period and the resistance to his rule. Amongst Pakistanis, the works of Ilyas Shakir, Nadeem Akhtar and Azhar Abbas utilise oral histories of key players, mainly the MRD leaders.¹⁰⁵ The interviews provide a rich contribution to our knowledge about the formation of MRD, the launching of civil disobedience, and the successful boycott of the Presidential referendum 1984 in a way that counters the distortions propagated by the Zia regime through its Press and Publication Ordinances of 1963. However, the authors do not analyse the events, leaving the judgement of their information largely to the reader. Moreover, none of the two books includes a history of the

on the exchange of PIA's passengers in March 1981, and who was then exiled in London until BB came into the power in 1988. Farkhunda Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq ki Baazi hai* (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publications, 2012); Butt was a PPP student leader in Punjab University in 1977, and was imprisoned a couple of times before joining Al-Zulfiqar in Kabul. Asif Butt, *Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin* (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2013).

¹⁰² Raja Anwer, *Dehshutgard Shehzada* (Lahore: Classic, 2007).

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp.46 and 91-111.

¹⁰⁴ Muhammad Agha Waseem, Javed Iqbal Mo`azzam, Interviews.

¹⁰⁵ Shakir, *MRD*; Nadeem Akhtar and Azhar Abbas, *Jamhuriat, Army aur Awam* (Karachi: Rine Saan, 1990).

people's resistance to the regime. Azhar Sohail and Shabbir Ibn-i-Adil analyse the civil resistance as well as the regime's harsh tactics against it.¹⁰⁶ Describing the PNA movement, and taking the circumstantial evidences, Sohail argues that the imposition of martial law was engineered by American intelligence to teach a lesson to ZAB, following Henry Kissinger's threat of 1976.¹⁰⁷ Likewise, he holds that the execution of ZAB was the joint plan of the USA and Pakistan Army. My thesis examines these claims in chapter 1.

Besides books, there have been a range of scholarly articles that have observed this history. Aijaz Ahmad examines civil disobedience over the period August-December 1983, adding some historical background on the formation of the MRD, the strategies that it adopted, and its outcome.¹⁰⁸ Ahmad, and also Omar Noman argue that Punjab played no significant role in the civil disobedience movement of 1981 and 1983 because the province benefitted economically from the Zia regime.¹⁰⁹ Scholars have in this respect noted a forty-one percent increase in income in Pakistanis that was concentrated in the Punjab, as this was the major area receiving remittances from outside the country.¹¹⁰ As it was, except for a couple of initial years in the post-Afghanistan war period when the

¹⁰⁶ Azhar Sohail, *Zia k Gyara Saal* (Lahore: year and the publisher is missing); Shabbir Ibn-i-Adil, *Zia k Dus saal* (Karachi: Shibble Publications, 1988).

¹⁰⁷ Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, pp.21-22.

¹⁰⁸ Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet', *South Asia Bulletin*, Vol. iv, No.1 (Spring 1984), pp.27-44.

¹⁰⁹ Omar Noman, 'The Impact of Migration on Pakistan's Economy and Society', in Donnan and Werbner (eds.), *Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p.90. -, *Pakistan: Political and Economic History since 1947* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1992). Ayesha Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, p.253.

¹¹⁰ Shahid Javed Burki, and Craig Buxter with contributions by Robert la Porte Jr. and Kamal Azfar, *Pakistan under the Military: Eleven Years of Zia-ul-Haq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p.107. Shahid Javed Burki, 'Politics of Power and its Economic Imperatives: Pakistan, 1947-99', in Anita M. Weiss and S. Zulfiqar Gilani (eds.), *Power and Civil Society in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.148. Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (London: Hurst and Company, 1998), pp.247-49.

regime was supported by the temporary influx of petro-dollar¹¹¹ and taxes were gradually reduced, gross rates of poverty increased for the mass of the people due to the lavish spending on the military.¹¹² Amir Ahmed Khuro, and Imtiaz Ahmed Qureshi provide a description of the movement led by BB, but do not provide useful analysis or attempt to evaluate whether or not it succeeded.¹¹³

Books by international scholars have largely focused on issues such as General's Zia's Islamisation, his firm control over domestic politics, and Pakistan's role as a front-State ally.¹¹⁴ There has by contrast been little on popular anti-Zia movements. Ian Talbot has in his book *Pakistan: A Modern History* looked at the Zia era in Chapter 9.¹¹⁵ There is a brief reference to civil resistance during this period, including the MRD and the Women Action Forum. Talbot argues that the movement failed because of Punjab's non-participation. In a later book, however, Talbot gives credit to the firmness of the resistance movement, which Zia never managed to crush completely.¹¹⁶ Moreover, referring to Tehmina Durrani's book *My Feudal Lord*, Talbot claims that the hijacking of the PIA plane in 1981 was engineered by the Inter-Services Intelligence to defame the MRD.¹¹⁷ James Wynbrandt and Stephen P. Cohen hardly mention the movement in their writing on Zia.¹¹⁸ Cohen states

¹¹¹ The term is used for the financial support to Pakistan with USA's dollar, and the Saudi Arabia's petrol during the Afghanistan war.

¹¹² Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (London: Hurst and Company, 2012), p.115.

¹¹³ Amir Ahmed Khuro, and Ishtiaque Ahmed Chaudhry, 'Benazir Bhutto's Struggle for Democracy', *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol.10, No. 1 (2009).

¹¹⁴ Rathnam Indurthy 'The Fragility of Democracy in Pakistan: the Military as the Root Cause', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991), pp. 295-326.

¹¹⁵ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.256-57.

¹¹⁶ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.141.

¹¹⁷ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.259.

¹¹⁸ James Wynbrandt, *A Brief History of Pakistan* (New York: Facts on File Inc., 2009); Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004); Stephen P. Cohen and Others, *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

erroneously that the MRD was created by the Jama`at-i-Islami.¹¹⁹ Bruce Reidle has a lot to say about the involvement of the CIA in *jihad* during the Zia era; he does not however look at the interference of the CIA in Pakistan's domestic politics.¹²⁰ Emma Duncan provides an anthropology of social change in respect to businessmen, politicians, army officers, and landlords during the period.¹²¹

To a large extent, even the scholarship on nonviolent resistance has ignored Pakistan. The much-acclaimed recent book by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan that has analysed 226 campaigns and movements against authoritarian rulers that have occurred all over the world between 1900 and 2006 has failed to mention the MRD in Pakistan.¹²² An exception to this rule is Stephen Zunes, who has looked at the MRD but has described it as a failed Movement.¹²³ He claims that it was limited to Sindh only, with no Punjab participation.

Theoretical Framework

Distinguishing between conventional warfare tactics such as guerrilla struggle and armed insurrection, Randle characterizes civil resistance as involving *collective* action which avoids violence.¹²⁴ It can be reformist – seeking redress from particular injustice – or revolutionary where the antagonists seek to topple

¹¹⁹ Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p.178.

¹²⁰ Bruce Reidle, *Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of the Global Jihad* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

¹²¹ Emma Duncan, *Breaking the Curfew* (New York: Viking, 1989).

¹²² Erica Chenoweth, and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

¹²³ Stephen Zunes, 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy: 1981-84', International Center on Nonviolent Conflict available at <https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries?sobi2Task=sobi2Details&sobi2Id=24> (24 March 2013).

¹²⁴ Michael Randle, *Civil Resistance* (London: Fontana, 1994), pp. xiii-xvii, 10; Howard Clark (ed.), *People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity* (London: Pluto Press, 2009), p.5.

an existing regime.¹²⁵ It involves mass protest that has a clear political objective, and it is characterised by street protests, non-cooperation, strike action, boycott, symbolic acts of dissent, courting arrest, and the like. It is also popularly termed ‘non-violent action’, ‘non-violent resistance’, ‘civil disobedience’, ‘people power’ and ‘satyagraha’.¹²⁶ ‘Mass civil resistance aimed at achieving a variety of political and social objectives’ has acted as a significant force for change in many parts of the world in modern times.¹²⁷ The protests have been directed against a variety of opponents, ranging from colonial rulers,¹²⁸ military-occupiers,¹²⁹ dictators,¹³⁰ the communist state apparatus,¹³¹ racial oppressors,¹³² and abusers of human and minority rights.¹³³ They may be directed against governments that abuse their power, or be waged over specific issues, such as nuclear armaments, environmental degradation, or economic ‘liberalisation’ policies that adversely impact large numbers. They are social movements that aim to build and exercise a counter-power that either persuades

¹²⁵ Randle, *Civil Resistance*, p. 10.

¹²⁶ Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash, (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp.2-3.

¹²⁷ Randle, *Civil Resistance*, p. Xiii.

¹²⁸ Nationalist movement in India (1919-47); de-colonisation struggles in the Gold Coast (Ghana) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) (1950s-1960s).

¹²⁹ The Ruhrkampf (1923), civil resistance to Nazi occupation in Denmark, Norway (1940s), Palestinian Intifada.

¹³⁰ Movements against the military junta in Argentina (1977), General Augusto Pinochet of Chile (1983), Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines (1986), El-Salvador (1944) periodical movements against dictators in Pakistan and, on-going movement of Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma. The most recent in this series is that of the Arab Spring, which is still ongoing.

¹³¹ The ‘Prague Spring’ (1968), the ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Eastern Europe (1989), Tiananmen Square in China (1969).

¹³² Civil Rights movement in USA (1950s-1960s), Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa (1940s-1990s).

¹³³ Mjaft (youth-driven movement in Albania), OCASA (Columbian Movement against corruption), CICAk (Movement against Corruption in Indonesia), Addio and Pizzo (Italian movement to say goodbye to Mafia), MUHURI (Muslims for Human Rights, A Kenyan movement against poverty), ‘Orange Movement’ (against political corruption in Kuwait), Controlarios Ciudadanas (Paraguay), ‘One Minute of Darkness for Constant Light Campaign’ (to combat systematic corruption in Turkey), Shayfeen.com (women-led campaign against political and social corruption in Egypt), Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan, and the current on-going struggle by Ana Hazare in India against bribery and corruption.

or forces powerful individuals or ruling elites to relinquish their power or reform their ways. In the process, social movements affect the balance of power, give people a sense of their own power. Theorists of civil resistance have argued that power in society lies ultimately with the 'people' and that if the masses withdraw their support, rulers can no longer maintain their control.¹³⁴

Civil resistance has become popular in the past century as it has been seen to work. In a comparative study of 285 violent and nonviolent campaigns during the twentieth century, Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephen have concluded that fifty-five per cent of the nonviolent campaigns were successful, as against only twenty-eight per cent of the violent campaigns.¹³⁵ Other studies have endorsed these findings. Adrian Karatnycky argues that 'nonviolent civic force' has been pivotal in last thirty-five years in replacing fifty authoritarian regimes with democratic regimes.¹³⁶ There has been a growing interest in the role of nonviolent civil protest and conflict resolution in the creation of strong democratic cultures. It is argued that a society that is able to express and resolve its differences in a controlled nonviolent manner is likely to be a more tolerant and better-functioning one.¹³⁷ Many scholars have also directed their attention to the actual techniques and strategies deployed in such movements. The most

¹³⁴ On this, see Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York, San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), p.44, cited in Randle, *Civil Resistance*, p.2 and Roberts and Garton Ash, *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*, p.4.

¹³⁵ Chenoweth and Stephen, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, cited in Jack DuVall, *Civil Resistance and Alternatives to Violent Struggle*, p.2, available at <http://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/images/stories/pdfs/civilresistanceandalternativestoviolentstruggle.pdf> (15 June 2011).

¹³⁶ Adrian Karatnycky, *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy* (Washington DC: online version, 2005). cited in *ibid.*, p.3.

¹³⁷ Robert Benewick and Trevor Smith, (eds), *Direct Action and Democratic Politics* (London: Benewick 1972); April Carter, *Direct Action and Liberal Democracy* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1973); John Rawls, 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience' in Bedau H, *Civil Disobedience. Theory and Practice* (Indianapolis & New York: McMillan Pub. Co., 1969); Howard Zinn, *Disobedience & Democracy, Nine Fallacies on Law and Order* (New York: Vintage, 1968).

notable theorist has been Gene Sharp, who has argued that nonviolence deployed in a strategic manner has provided a powerful and practical means to overcome even the most autocratic of regimes and most entrenched forms of social injustice.¹³⁸ Sharp's insights have been reinforced and given greater credence in several subsequent books.¹³⁹ Others have described the potential for nonviolent intervention between conflicting parties, and for mediation and conflict resolution.¹⁴⁰ These various studies have all brought out the many positive and important successes achieved by nonviolent protests and interventions during the second half of the twentieth century.

While those within the Gandhian tradition of protest stress their 'nonviolence' as an ethic and way of life, political theorists generally maintain that its strength derives from other sources. John Rawls, for example, argues that it appeals to a common sense of justice:

Being an appeal to the moral basis of public life, civil disobedience is a political and not primarily a religious act. It addresses itself to the common principles of justice, which men can require one another to follow, and not to the aspirations of love which they cannot. Moreover by taking part in civilly

¹³⁸ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973); Gene Sharp, *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: 20th Century Practice and 21st century Potential* (Boston: Extending Horizon Books, 2005).

¹³⁹ Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994); Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force more Powerful: a Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2000); Mark Kurlansky, *Nonviolence: The History of a Dangerous Idea* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2006); Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

¹⁴⁰ Adam Curle, *Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Violence* (Oxford: Jon Carpenter, 1995); L. Mahoney and L. Eguren, *Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1997); Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber, *Nonviolent Interventions across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); Michael Nagler, *The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, our Families, and our World* (Maui: Inner Ocean Publishing, 2004).

disobedient acts one does not foreswear indefinitely the idea of forcible resistance; for if the appeal against injustice is repeatedly denied, then the majority has declared its intention to invite submission or resistance and the latter may conceivably be justified even in a democratic regime.¹⁴¹

Following such an approach, Gene Sharp argues that the majority of participants in nonviolent movements and actions do not have to be believers in nonviolence as an ethical principle, but merely agree to act under nonviolent discipline for the duration of the conflict.¹⁴² It is in these two senses that the concept of predominantly nonviolent civil resistance will be understood in this research project – that is, as a form of protest and conflict resolution that seeks tactically to avoid the use of physical force and which, moreover, appeals to a strongly democratic sense of political justice.

The literature points out the serious shortcomings with violent forms of resistance. Revenge attacks on individual oppressors, for example, merely invite counter-violence by the police and army, and they rarely provoke a successful wider revolt. In terrorism, violence is generally the method deployed by small cliques that lacks popular strength and depth. This principle has been well understood by some leading revolutionaries, even those with no commitment to nonviolence. Leon Trotsky, for example dismissed terrorism, distinguishing it pointedly from the mass action seen, for example, in worker's strikes.¹⁴³ In the case of mass revolt, it is argued by proponents of nonviolence that that unleashing violence is like letting a genie out of a bottle; once released, it is not

¹⁴¹ Rawls, 'The Justification of Civil Disobedience', p. 248.

¹⁴² Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p. 455.

¹⁴³ Leon Trotsky, 'Marxists and Individual Terror', cited in *Viewpoint*, online issue 163, 8 August 2013, p.3, available online at <http://www.viewpointonline.net/archives> (10 August 2013).

easy to put back. Violent revolutions often have to be maintained by the continuing application of violence by the new rulers. Revolutionaries who have learned to settle matters using violence frequently find it hard to adapt to more peaceable means after a change of power has occurred. In this case, the means of resistance determine the eventual outcome.

Proponents of nonviolence also point out the far greater mobilisational power of the strategy. Violence is most suited to able-bodied males, with women, the elderly and very young unable, as a rule, to play much part. The need for arms and training similarly excludes many. Violence is either the method preferred by small and secretive terrorist cells that can ignore the need for mass mobilisation in its politics of terror, or it is the method of relatively isolated groups such as marginalised indigenous peoples, who may create liberated zones in their forest and mountain tracts, but have little or no capability of extending such a politics into the wider society beyond, except through terrorism – which tends to alienate that society. Nonviolence also encourages dialogue and negotiation, and does not alienate potential allies. It is thus held to be a far more effective force for building a future democracy.¹⁴⁴

Sources

I have used a variety of sources in writing this thesis, located over three continents – in Pakistan, the UK, and the USA. Pakistan yielded the largest chunk of my material. In Islamabad, I found information on the role of the Zia regime in the National Archives of Pakistan and the Cabinet Library. Files in the National Archives of Pakistan contained some copies of newspapers, such as the dailies *Jang* (Rawalpindi and Karachi editions), *Nawai-Waqt*, *Musawat* (Urdu),

¹⁴⁴ For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 594-810

Dawn (Islamabad), *Muslim* (Islamabad, in English), and a few copies of weekly magazines, such as *Me`yar*, *Al-Fatah*, and *Viewpoint* (Lahore). This press material was not however kept in any systematic order in the archives. I could not obtain much in the way of government records from the Zia material, except for a few reports on Sharia from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. The National Documentation Centre started declassifying its record of the first two years of Zia's regime only last year. The employees of the library claimed in response to my queries that there were no declassified records available from the Zia era.

Since I uncovered some appropriate material in the conventional archives, I collected government reports, conference proceedings, and newspaper files from different sources. I found useful government reports and legal documents in the library of the Establishment Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and in the National Assembly Library. These materials helped me to build a better understanding of the government's role. The library of the daily *Jang* in Rawalpindi, though in a dilapidated condition and affected severely by a flood of 2010, provided useful material. The libraries of political parties relevant for this period were generally disorganised, an exception being Jama`at-i-Islami's library in Ichra Lahore. Taj Haider, PPP's founding member, claimed that the regime was responsible for the chaos of its library. However, I was able to locate a private established archive the 'South Asian Research and Resource Center (SARRC)' run by Ahmed Salim in Islamabad, which has a huge collection of primary and rare secondary sources on the post-1947 period. I consulted the weekly *Viewpoint* magazine's copies of 1977-88, the daily *Musawat*, and *'Amal* (published from London). The Centre for Peace and

Civil Society library in Hyderabad – run by Jami Chandio, a renowned human rights activist from the city – provided me a couple of rare sources in Sindhi¹⁴⁵ and English. Being a Seraiki speaking, which is closer to Sindhi, and I understood them with the help of my Sindhi friends. I also consulted the Bacha Khan Library in Peshawar, but found little on the Zia period there.

The second major unofficial source was the collection of private papers from various stakeholders, such as ex-Army officers, members of *Majlis-i-Shura*, and opposition leaders and activists. Although many of interviewees revealed that they had to burn their private papers through fear of the regime, I was given access to the private papers of Dr. Aslam Naro of Rahim Yar Khan, a former prisoner of Shahi Qila-Lahore; Shahid S Sheikh of Lahore, a PPP member and prisoner of Shahi Qila-Lahore; Dr. Mehdi Hassan of Lahore, Professor at Beaconhouse University; Javed Iqbal Moazzam of Lahore, a member of Al-Zulfiqar; some pictures from Mairaj M.Khan's collection in Karachi, a founding member of PPP; Begum Naseem Wali Khan of Peshawar, a member of ANP; Honey Begum of Peshawar, a member of ANP; and Tahira Abdullah of Islamabad, a human rights activist. However, despite my best efforts, I could not consult Fatehyab Ali's personal archive, which is now managed by his wife, Dr. Masooma Hassan, in Karachi.

Since much of the information on the civil resistance of this period is classified or destroyed by the regime I found the best way to obtain information was through interviews with key pro- and anti-Zia figures from that period, many of whom are still alive. This presented its own set of methodological

¹⁴⁵ Jail diaries of Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo's *Kot Lakhpat ju diary*, Maula Bakhsh Chandio's *Zinda ju Qaidi*, and Tarish Ashraf's *Jail ja 22 Mahina*, Jami Chandio's own booklet on *MQM: Pusi Manzar, Paish Manzar*.

conundrums. I had to be selective in whom I interviewed due to time constraints in my time. So as to be objective, I tried to interview people representing a range of backgrounds – from different regions, sexes, professions (including administrators), political parties, and political persuasions. These are all listed in the bibliography, with brief notes on their backgrounds. In total, I managed to interview thirty-five political leaders and workers, eleven academics, three lawyers, six human rights activists, eight journalists, and one from the defence forces, one civil administrator, and an artist. Besides recording the interviews in an audio-recorder, I also made a point of observing their body language and facial expressions to see if it matched their anecdotes. Most of the political interviewees were enthusiastic about recalling what they regarded as their heroic struggle, and a few were nostalgic for the time of struggle. There were a range of people whom I would like to have interviewed but failed to respond to my telephone requests. These include Rao Irshad, Editor of *Al-Fatah* magazine, Dr. Jaffar Ahmed, Director Pakistan Study Centre-Karachi University; Prof. Amin Mughal, founding member of the exile committee in London, Pervez Rasheed, whom I was told had a role in the engineered self-immolation in Rawalpindi after the Lahore High Court had passed the death sentence on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Raja Anwer who was an active member of Al-Zulfiqar and author of a book on the subject. I was unable to interview Majid Nizami, Chief Editor of the rightist Lahore newspaper *Nawai-Waqt*, Ghinwa Bhutto, widow of Murtaza Bhutto, and Rasool Bukhsh Paleejo, leader of Awami Tehreek, who were found to be not available on the previously-arranged days for various reasons.

In the UK, I made use of the Modern Records Centre (MRC) at the University of Warwick, which holds a full catalogue of Amnesty International's

archive, copies of magazines such as *The Struggle* and *Hartal*, which were published by the exiled workers of Pakistan People's Party. These provided a source of distinctive material covering the activities of Benazir Bhutto and exiled activists abroad, none of which was available in the Pakistani archives. The MRC also keeps the records of correspondence of the Labour Union of England, which funded labour unions in Pakistan, first against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and later on against General Zia. Moreover, Mushtaq Lasharie, PPP exiled to London, and Muhammad Agha Waseem, exiled to Denmark, member of Al-Zulfiqar provided original material to me on the relationship between Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto with Al-Zulfiqar, which I look at in Chapter 3.

As I felt that international pressure, particularly from the US government, was a very important element in the politics of this period, I applied for and received a Trans-Atlantic Fellowship in 2013 to access the records of the Central Intelligence Agency for 1977-88 that are held in the National Archives and Records Administration Maryland, USA. I found a vast quantity of material in reports, confidential memoranda, and much more besides. The abundance of this information reveals the importance of Pakistan in US foreign affairs at that time. Without this excellent material that shed a light on a range of critical issues, my thesis would have been much poorer. The fellowship also gave me the opportunity to carry out interviews with some key figures residing in America, such as Professor Stephen P. Cohen – who had been in Pakistan in 1979-81 to collect information for his book on the Pakistan Army and who had praised General Zia for his statesmanship – Moeed Yousaf, who was responsible for Pakistani affairs at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) – and Dr. Aparna Pande, who worked with Hussain Haqqani on Pakistan at the Hudson Institute in

Washington DC. They all disclosed various information not documented in any archives.

Lastly, I draw widely upon published sources. Such sources, mentioned earlier in section 4, were essential to evaluate the dominant discourses on the Zia regime.

Roadmap

In this final section of the introduction, I shall briefly set out the themes of the chapters.

- Ch. 1. The Campaign to Save Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. On 5 July 1977, Pakistan witnessed its third declaration of martial law by the army (the first after the separation from East Pakistan) under the Chief Martial Law Administrator General Zia-ul-Haq. Amidst the political chaos that resulted from allegations of rigging in the General Election for the National Assembly of 7 March 1977 and the failure to come to any agreement between the winners – the Pakistan People’s Party under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – and the losing Pakistan National Alliance under Mufti Mahmood, the army seized power with the stated objective of holding free and fair elections within ninety days as given by the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. However, the election was postponed, being replaced by a policy of accountability – *phele aihesab phir itikhab* (first accountability, then election) – being then followed by the judicial killing of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 4 April 1979. This chapter analyses the resistance of the PPP to Martial Law and the efforts made to save the life of its founder.
- Ch. 2. Formative Phase of Collective Action 1979-81. The death of ZAB

was a great setback both for the PPP and for democracy in Pakistan in general. ZAB had helped restore the morale of the people after the defeat in war of 1971, and he had become known as *Quaid-i-Awam*, *Fakhr-i-Asia* through his reputation for working for the poor and depressed classes. ZAB's family could have accepted the new regime and gone into exile, but chose instead to fight the dictator. To do this, they had to build and maintain a strong opposition movement, which involved in winning over those who had initially supported General Zia but who had become increasingly exasperated by his failure to restore democracy.

- Ch. 3. New Struggle 1981-84: Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD). The year 1981 saw the start of a new struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Opposition parties and like-minded political groups or parties created a joint strategy to get rid of the dictatorship and restore democratic norms in the country. In December 1980, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy was planned by a cluster of opposition political parties to operate under one agenda for restoring democracy in the country. Announced publicly on 6 February 1981, the movement faced a ruthless reaction from the regime but it was able to inspire the citizens to struggle for their democratic rights. Most historians and political scientists have considered that this movement was ultimately a failure. This dissertation argues however that it was part of a continuum in a 'gradualist democratic' movement that eventually paved the way towards holding elections and ending martial law in 1985. This

chapter analyses the structure, strategies, and the results of the movement during the 1981-84 period, as well as, the dictator's oppression of the predominantly unarmed resisters.

- Ch. 4. Decline of Dictator's Power 1984-86. Despite the sudden calling off of the civil disobedience movement in December 1983 by Nusrat Bhutto and other MRD leaders without achieving its objectives – namely the holding of free and elections, the end of martial law, and the revival of the Constitution of 1973 – during the previous period, the grip on power of the Zia regime began to loosen during the period 1984-86. He held a controversial Presidential referendum on 19 December 1984, followed in February 1985 by a long-awaited general election in February 1985, and then the lifting of martial law in December 1985. It is argued that these developments were the consequences of the people's struggle over the previous seven years. Zia's own support within the army also began to waver. The chapter examines the struggle that was carried on in exile by some of the leading opponents of Zia, looking at its effect on the ground in Pakistan.
- Ch. 5. Revival of Democracy 1986-88. When martial law was lifted on 30 December 1985, Khan Abdul Wali Khan commented that "it is like facing a person who has not used his gun for some time but who continues to hold it in his hand and can wield it any moment".¹⁴⁶ As it was, this 'gun' was turned on the handpicked Prime Minister of

¹⁴⁶ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, at a political gathering in Lahore on 2 February 1986. cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.15.

General Zia, Muhammad Khan Junejo, when the General dismissed his government and called fresh elections after three months, in June 1988. Zia continued to oppress his opponents and stifle the press, even in the run-up to the elections. This chapter will examine the response of the MRD to these developments. On 10 April 1986 Benazir Bhutto received a mammoth welcome on her return from exile, which set off alarm bells for Zia. She asked the General 'to leave the country gracefully'¹⁴⁷, as she did not believe in revenge. Two years later, Zia was dramatically killed in a suspicious air crash.

¹⁴⁷ Benazir Bhutto, Speeches to Public gathering in Punjab. cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

Ch. 1. The Campaign to Save Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's great achievement was to restore the morale of the people of West Pakistan after the disastrous defeat in the Bangladesh War of 1971 and loss of East Pakistan. After the Pakistan Army had surrendered to the Indian Army in Dhaka, the military ruler General Yahya Khan, who held the post of Chief Martial Law Administrator, called on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then in New York defending Pakistan in the United Nations, and appointed him the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) as well as President of Pakistan on 20 December 1971. Bhutto was a very popular politician who had established the centre-left Pakistan People's Party in 1967. Its mission statement was 'Islam is our religion, Socialism is our economy, and Democracy is our politics', and had the slogan *roti, kapra aur makan* (Bread, Clothing, and Housing).¹⁴⁸

Between December 1971 and 5 July 1977, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) accomplished much. He brokered the Simla Agreement with India, arranged the repatriation of 90,000 prisoners of war from Indian's prisons, gave the first constitution approved unanimously by all political parties in 1973, held an Islamic summit, enhanced the nuclear capability of the country, and carried through economic and social reforms, among many other achievements.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ See, for example, <http://www.ppp.org.pk>, Philip E. Jones, *Pakistan People's Party: The Rise to Power* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); Aslam Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ki Dastan-i-Hyat aur Pakistan People's Party* (Lahore: Fiction House, 2010); Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgri, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: The Falcon of Pakistan* (Karachi: SZABIST, 2002); Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993). We might note that some political parties such as Jama'at-i-Islami, and a few military authors such as K.M.Arif, blamed ZAB as much as Yahya Khan for the break-up of Pakistan. See, for example, K.M.Arif, *Working with Zia Pakistan: Power Politics 1977-88* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995).

¹⁴⁹ See, for details, Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*; V.Y.Belokrenitsy, and V.N.Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, pp.210-234; Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*; Kausar Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*; Niazi, *The Last Days of Premier Bhutto* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1991); Jones, *Pakistan*

Hoping to capitalise on this, and giving very short notice to his opponents, ZAB announced in January 1977 that there would be elections in March 1977, a year before they were due. There were many vested interests in Pakistan that opposed his policies, such as land reforms, nationalisation, building nuclear capability, control over military and civilian administration, and religious issues, and there was also political jealousy.¹⁵⁰ Some of the opposition parties were already in an alliance called the 'United Democratic Front' (UDF) but it had been inactive for the past one year.¹⁵¹ Some parties had also been banned. The UDF immediately reacted to the call of election and launched a new alliance of nine parties named the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)¹⁵² along with some other parties such as the defunct NAP on 10 January 1977, within three days of the announcement of the election.¹⁵³ ZAB judged that the amalgamation of four secular parties¹⁵⁴ out of nine¹⁵⁵ to be a short-term

People's Party; Bhurgri, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto*; Kamaleshwar Sinha, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Six Steps to Summit* (New Delhi: unknown publisher, 1972); Syed Rasul Raza, *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: The Architect of a New Pakistan* (Sarhad Publications, 1977).

¹⁵⁰ Hasan Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan* (Delhi: Progressive Publishers, 1988), pp.194-217; Hasan Askari Rizvi, *Military, State and Society in Pakistan* (London: McMillan Press, 2000); Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.218-234. Belokrenitsy, and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, pp.234-254.

¹⁵¹ Established in 1973, the alliance held Jamiat-i-Ulemai Islam (JUI), Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Pakistan (JUP), Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), National Awami Party, Khaksar Tehreek (KT), Pakistan Muslim League-Council (PML-C), Pakistan Muslim League-Convention (PML-Con.) Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM). The Pakistan Democratic Movement was itself an opposition alliance established against General Ayub Khan's government under Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan on 30 April 1967. *Me'yar*, 5-12 March 1977, National Archives of Pakistan (NAP) NAP/BRR/P-2821, pp.26-27. See, For example, Akhtar Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999* [unpublished, PhD Thesis] (Quaid-i-Azam University, 2008), p. 64.

¹⁵² PNA consisted of the three religious parties – Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), Jamiat-i-Ulemai Islam (JUI), Jamiat-i-Ulemai Pakistan (JUP) – and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) Khaksar Tehreek (KT) of Modern Islamists, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal, and National Democratic Party (NDP) of secular, leftist parties.

¹⁵³ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.93.

¹⁵⁴ Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP), Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI), National Democratic Party (NDP) and National Awami Party (NAP).

¹⁵⁵ Jama'at-i-Islami (JI), Muslim Conference (MC), Pakistan Muslim League (PML), Jamia't-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), and Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Islam (JUI-Fazal)

'political honeymoon'.¹⁵⁶ PPP leaders, and workers, therefore, chanted a slogan *Nau Tare Hair Pher, Adhe Teetar Adhe Batair* (nine stars are swindles comprising of half quails, and half partridges).¹⁵⁷

Fully confident of his public popularity and party position,¹⁵⁸ ZAB allowed PNA to contest the election under one emblem so that it became a contest between two main groups, the PPP and the PNA. 7 and 10 March were set as the dates for the National and Provincial Assemblies' election respectively. PPP won the National Assembly's election by 155 out of 196 seats while PNA got only thirty-six seats.¹⁵⁹ Some of PNA's party heads were even defeated in their home constituencies. Some opposition leaders had boycotted the election on grounds that the PPP had rigged the ballot.¹⁶⁰ Two days after the results were declared, they launched a movement demanding the re-holding of free and fair elections. Their demand soon took on a religious colour when the PNA leaders demanded the promulgation of *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (System of Muhammad, the Prophet). Their agitation spread, becoming a threat to law

¹⁵⁶ ZAB's speech, March 1977, *Me'yar*, 5 March-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.6.

¹⁵⁷ *Viewpoint*, 15 April 1979, p.8.

¹⁵⁸ There were 200 seats in the national assembly, and PPP had already won 19 seats uncontested (15 from Sindh and 4 from Baluchistan). Eight seats from Tribal belts went to the winning party automatically. Therefore, PPP needed only 74 more seats for a simple majority in the National Assembly, whereas, his opponents required 101 seats out of the 169 constituencies in which its candidates were contesting the election, *Me'yar*, 5 March-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.6.

¹⁵⁹ Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto and Sultan Ahmad Chandio, Makhdoom Zaman Talib Mola (Hala-Hyderabad), Matar Mujtasa Jatoi (Nawab Shah), Matar Sultan Chandio (Larkana), Mir Mehrab Khan Bajrani (Jacobabad), Abdul Fatah Memon (Nawabshah), Noor Muhammad Lund(sukker), Mir Sikander Khan (Dado), Taj Muhammad Jamali (Sibi), Aman Ullah Gajki (Qalat), Mohiyuddin (Qalat) – in total 10 leaders – were declared uncontested winner since no one submitted application for running the coming election against them in their respective constituencies. All were from Sindh except two from Qalat and Sibi. According to the official sources, 80% voters cast their vote. Bhutto's victory was also praised in the editorial of *Jang* on 22 January 1977 for solving the crisis of the leadership in the country. Later, the same newspaper supported the unconstitutional coup of the Pakistan Army.

¹⁶⁰ In a joint press conference in Karachi, the opposition leaders Mian Mahmood Qasoori, Ch. Rehmat Ali and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad accused PPP of stopping opposition candidates submitting their papers for the election. *Jang*, 21 January 1977.

and order. It took a violent turn after ZAB imposed martial law in three big cities, Karachi, Hyderabad, and Lahore. Law enforcement agencies including the Army opened fire on the public in the March and April, killing four civilians. It was at this juncture that the army chief General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq began to consider overthrowing the government.¹⁶¹ Seeing the situation getting worse, ZAB and PNA leaders started a dialogue to resolve the political turmoil. Even after very long deliberations, they failed to produce any political solution to the issue.¹⁶² On 5 July, General Zia carried out a coup d'état that he named 'Operation Fair Play'.¹⁶³ The constitution was suspended rather than abrogated and martial law was imposed, supposedly on a temporary basis, so that free and fair elections could be held within ninety days and the government handed over to whoever won. As it was, Zia was in power for the next eleven years, continuously promising to hold an election soon.¹⁶⁴

After the imposition of the martial law, the political scenario in the country turned against ZAB and PPP. The opposition parties aligned themselves opportunistically with Zia leaving ZAB and PPP isolated. This allowed Zia to take out a case against ZAB for the alleged murder in 1974 of Nawab Muhammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri, the father of Ahmed Raza Kasuri, an ex-PPP member, and then one of the opposition leaders. ZAB was duly found guilty and executed on 4 April 1979.

¹⁶¹ Azhar Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal* (Lahore, year and publisher is missing), pp.23-26. General Zia-ul-Haq, Interview to Altaf Hassan Qureshi, September 1977. Cited in Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, (Karachi: Shabbal Publication, 1988), pp.17-20.

¹⁶² The longest, on 2-3 July 1977, lasted 13½ hours. *Jang*, 2 July 1977.

¹⁶³ Zia was at that time poorly-regarded in Pakistan, being seen as a malleable appointee of ZAB. Arif stated in his book that he was of 'moderate intelligence, dual-personality and sluggish'. Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 178.

¹⁶⁴ He did eventually hold the election in 1985 on non-party basis. For details, Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, *General Zia k Aakhri Das Saal* (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1993). This is discussed in Chapter 4 below.

This chapter examines the period between 5 July 1977 and 4 April 1979. It adds to the existing historiography on the reasons for the imposition of the martial law, the failure of the resulting protest led by PPP, and the regime's tactics to suppress the resistance. The chapter also looks at the way that the regime went ahead and hanged ZAB, despite all the mercy appeals to spare him.

Imposition of Martial Law:

At 2.30am on 5 July 1977, ZAB's valet was alarmed to see that the police guard on the Prime Minister's house was no longer there and he rushed to ZAB's bedroom to inform him. ZAB, who was still awake, tried to telephone General Zia to ask what was happening, but found the lines were dead. He managed to find one functioning line – which was the private line of his second daughter Sanam – and called Zia, who told him: 'I'm sorry, Sir, I had to do it. [...] We have to hold you in protective custody for a while. But in ninety days I'll hold new elections. You'll be elected Prime Minister again, of course, Sir, and I'll be saluting you'.¹⁶⁵ He was taken to the hill station of Murree later that day, where – though under temporarily 'protective custody' – he was provided all the facilities of his previous position.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography* (London: reprinted, 2008), p.92.

¹⁶⁶ BB mentioned he was taken to Murree at 9am (Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 96), whereas Arif said it was at 4pm (Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 147). Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 147. Protective Detention is the holding of a person or persons without trial when the evidence available is not sufficient to charge them or convict them by legal proof, but under which persons can still be confined in order to prevent them from acting in a particular way, for reasons connected with the security of the state or the maintenance of public order. This law is often found in countries formerly under British rule. It was introduced in the sub-continent during WWI and WWII, and its provisions became an integral part of Pakistan law after independence. *Amnesty International*, 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976', May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, Modern Record Center, The University of Warwick (MRC), p.33.

Why was the night of 4-5 July chosen? The post-election disturbances appeared to have died down by then after semi-martial law was imposed in the cities of Lahore, Karachi and Hyderabad. Zia was asked right after he had seized power at what juncture he had decided to impose martial law and had replied that 'he took action "after listening to the failure of the talks between Bhutto and PNA in the press conference at 5pm on 4 July"'.¹⁶⁷ However, in September 1977 General Zia answered the same question by stating that it was in May that he had started to consider the feasibility of toppling ZAB's government.¹⁶⁸

Responding to Zia's claim that negotiations had broken down on 4 July, some of those involved such as Professor Ghafoor Ahmed (represented PNA), and Maulana Kausar Niazi (represented PPP) denied that this was the case. Instead, according to Ghafoor Ahmed, they were well on the way to reaching a settlement.¹⁶⁹ Niazi stated that ZAB had already announced at a press conference at the Prime Minister Residence held at 23.30 on 4 July his readiness to sign the agreement with PNA the next morning.¹⁷⁰ The hostile slogans had been replaced with '*Mufti-Bhutto Bhai Bhai*' (Mufti Mahmood and Bhutto are brothers).¹⁷¹ Unfortunately, by next morning no agreement was possible. Instead, a satiric slogan composed after the coup declared: *Na hul aya na talwar, agai poncho wali sarkar* (Neither plough nor sword came, only a government of the moustache).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Newsweek, 19 July 1977, quoted in Arif's *Working with Zia*, p.133.

¹⁶⁸ General Zia-ul-Haq, Interview to Altaf Hassan Qureshi, September 1977.

¹⁶⁹ Ghafoor Ahmed, *Aur Phir Marshal Law aya*, (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1988), p. 249.

¹⁷⁰ Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*, p. 170.

¹⁷¹ Ashraf Shad, 'Qaumi Ittehad-Samjhote k Ba'ad', *Me'yar*, 25June-2 July, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.7.

¹⁷² Plough was the election symbol of PNA while the sword was of PPP. Whereas, General Zia had Mostache. Sometimes, the joke carries the line *agai Booton wali Sarkar* (the army of 'Black boots' has come) in the second verse.

Although, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate in depth the reasons for the imposition of martial law, we may say a little on the subject. One of the reasons was the presence of some black sheep in both parties, such as Asghar Khan and Begum Naseem Wali Khan of PNA, and Abdul Hafiz Pirzada of PPP. Asghar Khan, head of Tehreek-i-Istiqlal (TI), played a critical role, sending a well-publicised letter to the Pakistan Army on 25 April 1977 in which he emotionally and in patriotic terms exhorted it to refuse to act on the 'unlawful orders' of ZAB's 'unlawful' government.¹⁷³ According to one anecdote, Asghar Khan attended a dinner meeting hosted by Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan, one of the deal-brokers on 4 July at which he opposed the deal done with ZAB and said that they should resume the public movement to bring down the government.¹⁷⁴ Likewise, Begum Naseem Wali Khan, representing the National Democratic Party (NDP), declared the agreement was 'just a simple paper'.¹⁷⁵ For them, the main aim was to get rid of ZAB.¹⁷⁶ Interviewing her, she confessed that she was against signing any agreement with ZAB.¹⁷⁷ Although the head of the NDP, Sher Baz Mazari, was prepared to sign the agreement, she openly went against him in this. Once, the news spread that PPP and PNA had come to an agreement, she protested and said to Mufti Mahmood 'back in our province the people will not leave hair on my head and in your beard'.¹⁷⁸ When he refused to respond to her favourably, she contacted Pir Pagara and asked for

¹⁷³ For read the full letter see: M. Asghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from History Pakistan: Politics and Military Power* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 133-34. Roedad Khan, *Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

¹⁷⁴ Ahmed, *Aur Phir Marshal Law agya*, pp. 250-53.

¹⁷⁵ *Me'yar*, 25 June-2 July 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.7.

¹⁷⁶ *Me'yar*, 26 March-2 April 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2824, p.7.

¹⁷⁷ Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview, 4 February 2012, Charsadda.

¹⁷⁸ Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview.

the same help. On being asked by the researcher the reasons for her opposition to the agreement, she said that nothing was said about Balochistan or the release of Wali Khan. She confirmed that every party except TI and NDP had agreed to sign the agreement the next morning.¹⁷⁹ Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, who was negotiating for the PPP, wanted – for his part – to wrest yet more concessions from the opposition before signing the agreement.¹⁸⁰ The upshot of this was that all the political leaders lost out.

An important element in ZAB's fall that is generally ignored related to Pakistan's ambition to build nuclear weapons capability. ZAB had initially favoured such a programme, as revealed in books by himself and Niazi.¹⁸¹ The US government had opposed this strongly, with Henry Kissinger, the then US Secretary of State, threatening severe consequences if Pakistan attempted to become nuclear. Not wanting to fall out with the USA, ZAB met with the US Ambassador on 3 July 1977 and stated next day that Pakistan had no intention of developing nuclear weapons.¹⁸² Zia and other Army top brass were alarmed at ZAB's announcement, as they wanted to develop nuclear weapons in secret and felt that the Prime Minister was undermining Pakistan's security by talking about the issue in public. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema has claimed that Zia was subsequently the architect of the 'ambiguous nuclear policy' of Pakistan.¹⁸³ By

¹⁷⁹ Begum Naseem Wali Khan, Interview.

¹⁸⁰ Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*, p. 167-69.

¹⁸¹ See, Niazi, *aur line cut gai*, and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1969).

¹⁸² *Jang*, 3 July 1977; Memorandum from the White House Washington, 4 July 1977. Top Secret. 3pp. 'Shah Conversation with Bhutto', 1078, NLC-1-2-4-9-5, NARA, p.2; Memorandum for the President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, 5 July 1977. 'Information items'. Top Secret. 4pp. Department of State, 1181, NLC-1-2-4-10-3, NARA, pp.1-4.

¹⁸³ Pervez Iqbal Cheema, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Policy under Z.A.Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq: An Assessment', *Strategic Studies*, cited in Peter R.Lavoy, Douglass D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), *Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons* (New York:

seizing power on 5 July, the military forestalled any attempts by ZAB to roll back the nuclear programme.

Although, Zia did not immediately abrogate the constitution, he replaced key civilians with high-up military commanders and issued fourteen ordinances in less than a week, which indicated that he had long-term plans for his rule. To administer the country, he divided the country into four provincial zones under Provincial Martial Law Administrators (PMLAs),¹⁸⁴ with District Martial Law Administrators (DMLA) under them. Punjab was divided into five units.¹⁸⁵

Summary military courts (SMC)¹⁸⁶ and special military courts (Sp.MC)¹⁸⁷ were constituted under Martial Law Ordinances (MLO) number 4, 5, and 6 to try

Cornell Studies Press, 2000), pp.161-63.

¹⁸⁴ Zone-A Punjab Lt. General Sawar Khan, HQ, Punjab Martial Law Administration Lahore, and Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain, Acting Governor of Punjab; Zone-B (NWFP-KPK) Lt.General Fazle Haq, HQ, NWFP Martial Law Administrator, Justice Abdul Hakim Khan, Acting Governor of NWFP, Zone-C, Sindh Lt. General Sadiqur Reshid Mohammad Abbasi, HQ, Martial Law Administrator, Justice Abdul Kadir Sheikh, Acting Governor of Sind, and Zone-D Balochistan Lt. General Rahimuddin Khan, HQ Martial Law Administrator, Justice Mir Khuda Bux Marri, Acting Governor of Baluchistan.

¹⁸⁵ Sector I, Civil Division of Lahore, under DMLA Major General Ahmad Jamal Khan, HQ Lahore Cantonment; Sector II, Civil Division of Sargodha under DMLA Major General S F S K Lodhi, HQ Sargodha; Sector III, Civil Division of Multan, DMLA Major General Ijaz Azeem, HQ Multan Cantt; Sector IV, Bahawalpur Civil Division, DMLA Major General Ghulam Muhammad, HQ Bahawalpur; Sector V, Civil Division Rawalpindi and Federal Capital DMLA Major General Shah Rafi Alam, *Sitar-i-Jurat*, HQ Rawalpindi. DMLA can appoint Sub Martial Law Administrators at district levels. *Nawai-Waqt*, 10 July 1977.

¹⁸⁶ *Jang*, 11 July 1977. SMC consisted of one member only. The accused could address the courts and cross-examine witnesses, but only a memorandum of the evidence was needed to be taken down. The accused had no right of representation by a lawyer, although the accused might have a person to assist him, who could be a legal adviser. He might be present during proceedings as a "friend of the accused", and may advise him in that capacity. The friend of the accused could not address the court directly. Maximum punishment under SMC was one year, and 10-15 lashes. No provision of appeal, but the proceedings of the summary military court could be sent to the Provincial Martial Law Administrator for review. Cited in *Amnesty International*, 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978', MSS.34/4/1/pk 4, MRC.

¹⁸⁷ SpMC consisted of three persons, one magistrate, and two of the rank of a Major or a Lieutenant Colonel. Only a summary of the evidence was needed to be recorded and, if necessary, "may be dispensed with in a case and in lieu thereof an abstract of evidence may be recorded" (Martial Law Order No.5, 11 July 1977). The courts may impose all punishments, including death penalty, and amputation of a hand, however, these last two was needed to be confirmed by CMLA. Any question on the court could be referred to CMLA (MLO No.13), whose decision was final. Cited in *Amnesty*

contraventions of martial law orders and regulations and other offences.¹⁸⁸ Fourteen martial law ordinances were issued on 11 July,¹⁸⁹ such as Martial Law Regulation (MLR) 1 banning political meetings, processions, issuing any political statement, agitating at any educational institutions, with violators receiving up to five years rigorous imprisonment and/or whipping not exceeding five lashes. MLR 5 prohibited participation in political meetings or processions taken without prior permission of the martial law administration, on pain of punishments of up to seven years imprisonment and/or a maximum ten lashes. Likewise, under MLR 12 agitations and protests by trade unions could be punished with up to three years imprisonment and/or ten lashes. Financial help to political parties and attacks on civil officials or members of the military could be punished with death. Under MLR 4, publication of any material, “calculated to promote feeling of enmity or hatred between provinces, classes, sects or religious order” was liable to up to ten years of imprisonment and/or thirty lashes. On 22 July, three more ordinances were issued that made any activity that undermined the security of the country or attempted to foment rebellion by the armed forces against the government or Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) a capital offence. MLO 12, which was later augmented with MLR 23 was the most oppressive and most frequently exercised ordinance

International, ‘Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978’, MSS.34/4/1/pk 4, MRC.

¹⁸⁸ *Amnesty International*, ‘Martial Law orders and Regulations Introduced Since 5 July 1977 of Concern to Amnesty International’, October 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, p.5.

¹⁸⁹ *Amnesty International*, ‘Martial Law orders and Regulations Introduced Since 5 July 1977 of Concern to Amnesty International’, October 1977’, MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC.

of the regime enforced by the SMC.¹⁹⁰ It empowered the CMLA, PMLA and DMLA to order the detention of any person on very broad grounds:

For the purpose of the preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the purpose for which Martial Law has been proclaimed or interest, the defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of Pakistan of the efficient conduct of martial law. Initial detention: 3 months, extendable by PMLA up to 12 months as per the MLO No.27.¹⁹¹

Whipping and amputation were also introduced as legal punishments.¹⁹²

All of this indicated that Zia had plans for a long period of rule, despite his continuing promise to hold free and fair elections.¹⁹³ K.M.Arif has written that Zia was impressed by the supposed benefits of long-term dictatorial rule, as in countries such as Nigeria, North Korea and Romania.¹⁹⁴ Azhar Sohail noted that headed letter pads for the CMLA's secretariat were printed in thousands, enough to last for years.¹⁹⁵ Some analysts predicted that Zia would hold on to power for a long time, something he continued to deny.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ Issued on 21 September 1978, repealed the earlier martial law regulations no.12, prohibited any strikes or lockouts. Maximum punishment was 3 years imprisonment, and/or flogging upto 10. *Amnesty International*, 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission To the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978', MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, p.11.

¹⁹¹ *Amnesty International*, 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission TO the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978', MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, p .10.

¹⁹² MLR Nos.6, and 7, issued on 11 July 1977, introduced the amputation of one hands as possible punishment for persons convicted of theft, robbery, and dacoit (Armed robbery with five or more persons). It had to be carried out by a qualified surgeon under local anaesthetic, in public or in jail. *Amnesty International*, 'Martial Law orders and Regulations Introduced Since 5 July 1977 of Concern to Amnesty International', October 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk3, MRC, pp.3-4. Public Flogging was later abolished in all cases on 2 October 1995 by the then Federal cabinet. *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan appeal to ban public flogging', November 1995, MSS. 34/4/1/Pk120, MRC.

¹⁹³ *Jang*, 15 July 1977.

¹⁹⁴ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.177.

¹⁹⁵ Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, p.102. Nafees Siddiqui, interview with Ilyas Shakir, cited in Ilyas Shakir, *MRD Kamyabian Nakamian* (Karachi: Shabal Publications, 1985), p.74.

¹⁹⁶ *Jang*, 15 July 1977.

Initially the reaction to the imposition of Martial Law was muted, with no public condemnation by any political leaders,¹⁹⁷ businessmen, union leaders, students,¹⁹⁸ or civil society actors.¹⁹⁹ Rather people, including a few PPP members, distributed sweets in the streets while pro-democratic people remained silent.²⁰⁰ Mahmood, speaking on behalf of all political leaders asked them to obey the martial law ordinances.²⁰¹ The next day Begum Naseem Wali Khan visited the shrine of Imam Bari²⁰² and replaced her black *chaddar* with a white one.²⁰³ Tribal leaders and the people of Balochistan largely welcomed martial law. Women esteemed the act of General Zia of not arresting Begum Naseem Wali Khan. Furthermore, leading newspapers failed to condemn the imposition of martial law.²⁰⁴ Rather, the American magazine *Time* reported that the majority of opposition parties and politicians celebrated it.²⁰⁵ Even Amnesty International welcomed the new regime and its actions of abolishing special tribunals, revoking Emergency and the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) and

¹⁹⁷ Mian Muhammad Tufail, Ameer Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan, Maulana Mufti Mahmood (head of PNA's delegates), Shah Ahmad Noorani and Nawab Sher Baz Mazari. *Jang, and Nawai-Waqt*, 6 July 1977. Jamiat-i-Ulmai Islam published a press release, while Maulana Mufti Mahmood welcomed general Zia and his promise of holding election and implementing Islamic punishments.

¹⁹⁸ Siddique Al Farooq, President Punjab Student's Federation Rawalpindi Chairman (currently he is PML-N). *Jang*, 7 July 1977.

¹⁹⁹ At a time of torrential rain, the army, and the political parties especially JI provided extraordinary care to the affected people that brought approval for the regime.

²⁰⁰ *Jang*, 13 July 1977.

²⁰¹ *Jang*, 17 July 1977.

²⁰² Shrines of Sufi Saints have a sacred place in the hearts of people of Pakistan. The majority believes in asking divine help through these saints for fulfilling any wish. If fulfilled, they visit the shrine and offer prayers and money.

²⁰³ Black colour is a symbol of protest, whilst the White is for ending a protest. Her change of colour gave a welcoming message to the martial law regime. *Me'yar*, 25 June-2 July, NAP/BRR/P-2837, p.8. *Jang*, 7 July 1977.

²⁰⁴ The researcher looked at *Daily Jang*, *Daily Nawai-Waqt*, and *Daily Dawn*, the most read newspapers in Pakistan. Rather, the editorials approved the regime's martial law having the objective of holding free and fair election under the military.

²⁰⁵ *Jang*, 15 July 1977.

restoring constitutional powers to the higher judiciary and safeguarding their independence, which had been curtailed under ZAB.²⁰⁶

Zia's cunning move caused confusion in Pakistan. Firstly, since the government as well as the three chiefs of the armed forces had publicly announced their loyalty to the democratic process and government a few days before the coup; the public, and even PPP parliamentarians, were of the opinion that ZAB himself asked the army to take over so that he could force his opponents to agreement to his conditions.²⁰⁷ Lacking any forewarning, PPP workers failed to react immediately. Secondly, General Zia's invention of the term 'protective custody' lulled possible opposition. Ghafoor Ahmed stated that he had felt when put into 'custody' that it might be a tactic to lock the party leaders in one room until they solved the political deadlock, and indeed this option had been suggested by some newspaper editors few days earlier.²⁰⁸ Lastly, the stated purpose of the martial law was to hold free and fair election within ninety days, and political parties and workers did not see any reason to doubt this. Mehdi Hasan said that seeing ZAB's scornful behaviour in a meeting with General Zia on 15 July cast doubt on the idea of his blessing for the military action. Nevertheless, the unexpected declaration of martial law failed to

²⁰⁶ Those are the issues which AI raised in its report of early 1977, and recommended the then government to abolish them. However, the Military regime replaced the laws by Martial Law Order, especially MLO 12 serves the regime similarly as DPR 1972, 1973, and 1974 against the political opponents. Political prisoners including ZAB and others were arrested under MLO-12 afterwards. *Amnesty International*, 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976', May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, MRC, pp.1-2.

²⁰⁷ Interviews with Dr. Mehdi Hasan, 3 March 2013, Lahore; Shahida Jabeen, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Qazi Sultan, 17 April 2012, Rawalpindi; Aslam Gordaspuri, 6 May 2013, Lahore. And Sindh parliamentarians asked the question from Nusrat Bhutto once they met her in Clifton. Ex-Senator PPP, Kamal Azfar Alhaj Dilawar Khan was amongst the parliamentarians. *Jang*, 8-10 July 1977.

²⁰⁸ Ahmed, *Aur phir martial law agya*, pp.254-55.

provoke any immediate reaction from any believers in democracy, and especially PPP workers.

All political leaders were released from protective custody within a short period – ZAB on 27 July. He decided to launch a campaign of public speeches, political gatherings, and protest meetings, and political noncooperation.²⁰⁹ During these two months, ZAB demonstrated his clear leadership abilities and clarity of purpose, qualities that Ackerman and Kruegler hold as being extremely important in civil resistance leadership.²¹⁰

For ZAB, it was not easy to mobilise people's power in his favour, as he had alienated many people in Pakistan, as we shall see later in this chapter. It was noticeable, for example, that no one turned up to the PPP relief camps after heavy rain in the country at this time.²¹¹ A crowd did however come to receive ZAB when he reached Karachi on 27 July, which was in itself a defiance of MLO 5 banning public gatherings.²¹² This restored his confidence. He arranged a plan of public speeches and political gatherings at stops on a railway journey from Karachi to Peshawar, which again was an open violation of martial law orders. Starting from Multan on 6 August, he reached Lahore on 8 August, and he ended up in Peshawar on 11 August.²¹³ A large crowd including men, women, and children gathered at each of his stops especially outside Lahore Airport.²¹⁴ People chanted the slogan '*Sada Bhutto Awai i Awai*' (Bhutto remains

²⁰⁹ *ibid.*, pp.119 and 163-65.

²¹⁰ Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (Connecticut, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p.27.

²¹¹ *NewsWeek*, July 1977. *Jang*, 15 July 1977.

²¹² Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 97-102.

²¹³ *Nawai-Waqt*, 7 August 1977; Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 190.

²¹⁴ *NewsWeek*, July 1977. *Jang* 23 July 1977.

forever).²¹⁵ While newspapers gave no numbers for those who attended these rallies, BB later estimated that about three million people in all came out.²¹⁶ In his speeches, ZAB condemned martial law as well as the deceitful role of PNA.²¹⁷ He demanded that the regime hold free and fair elections within the stated time limit, otherwise he would boycott them.²¹⁸ In a speech in Islamabad on 26 August 1977 he responded to reports that the regime intended to arrest him on various charges by declaring that there would be dreadful consequences if it did so. In all this he appears to have forgotten what he had said to BB on the night of the coup “Armies do not take over power to relinquish it. Nor do Generals commit high treason in order to hold election and restore democratic constitutions”.²¹⁹

The regime tried to stop all this by arresting die-hard members of the PPP, known as the *Jyals* (partisans) of the party. On the eve of ZAB’s arrival in Lahore, forty-three PPP’s workers were arrested on the charge of attacking Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, Javed Hashmi and Hanif Ramay who were also at the airport at the time.²²⁰ Jahangir Badar, a student leader and the general secretary of the party later on, was among them. The next day under the SMC, the detainees were sentenced to one-year rigorous punishment and ten lashes. That was the first martial law decision in Lahore.²²¹ In Peshawar, police

²¹⁵ *Nawai-waqt*, 8 August 1977.

²¹⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 97-102.

²¹⁷ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.190.

²¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.191.

²¹⁹ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 95.

²²⁰ *Nawai-waqt*, 10 August 1977.

²²¹ Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp.277-79.

dispersed the crowd by throwing gas.²²² These punitive measures failed to stop the agitation.

Zia had calculated that ZAB had lost his popularity after the PNA movement, and was alarmed by the enthusiastic public reception on his tour.²²³ He decided that he needed to find some way to remove him from the scene for good.²²⁴ Arif considers that Zia had no option but to re-arrest him.²²⁵ So, the regime encouraged ZAB's opponents to bring cases against him, and several did.²²⁶ Zia had himself since 17 July been looking into the murder of Ahmad Khan Kasuri on the night of 10-11 November 1974 which had been alleged ZAB was involved in.²²⁷ Though an FIR had implicated ZAB, no evidence could be found to prove his culpability and the case against him had been abandoned on 1 October 1975. Rao Rashid, ex-chief of Punjab Police and Masood Mahmood,

²²² *Jang*, 12 August 1977.

²²³ Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp. 276-77. Arif, *Working with Zia*, pp. 190-91. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 103. And, print media reported as well.

²²⁴ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'National Intelligence Daily (Cable)', 14 September 1977, CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010058-1, NARA, p.7 and 19 September 1977, CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010066-2, NARA, p.7. and 29 July 1977, CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010095-1, National Archives and Record Administration, Maryland, USA (NARA), pp.16-17. I.A.Rehman, Khalid Chaudhry, Mushtaq Lasharie, Interviews. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.103. Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp. 276-77. Eamon Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan* (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), pp.85-87.

²²⁵ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.189.

²²⁶ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'International Narcotics Developments', 3 August 1977, CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010017-2, NARA, p.19. On 6 August, vice-President of PML had already unveiled his blueprint of registering police cases on the charges of illegal abduction, unsuccessful murder attempt and kidnapping against ZAB. *Nawai-Waqt*, 7 August 1977. Zafar Ali Shah registered a case of murder against Bhutto concerning the Liaqat Bagh Firing on 23 March 1973. Khalid Rasheed Hayat, honorary Deputy Superintendent of Police, Central Investigation Agency (Railways) gave a statement that under the direction of the then Prime Minister, ZAB, he was given the task of killing Pir ju Pigar, and that 'Pirzada handed over me the weapons while Tariq Waheed Butt, ex-MPA Punjab, provided me professional killers'. *Daily Nawai-Waqt*, 8 August 1977. On 30 August, four retired higher court judges — G.Z. Kekaos, Bashirud din, Muhammad Siddique and A.R. Chengez — demanded that a case be taken out against ZAB and his companions on a charge of committing crimes against the Pakistani nation, cited in Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.191.

²²⁷ *Jang*, 19 July 1977.

Director-General Federal Security Force (FSF)²²⁸, who were then under arrest, were allegedly tortured into acting as approvers in this case and agree to testify against ZAB.²²⁹ The latter in the end acted as the chief approver.

On 10 September, commandos burst into ZAB's house and arrested him on the charge of murdering Muhammad Ahmad Khan Kasuri.²³⁰ Justice K.M.A. Samdani of the Lahore High Court released him on bail on the 13th, but he was rearrested on 17 September. He was in jail from that day until his execution on 4 April 1979. The movement then became one of saving ZAB's life – known as *Bhutto Bachao Tehreek* (BBT- Movement to Save Bhutto). It incorporated the wider aim of restoring democracy, and also the style of government associated with ZAB when he was in power. From this emerged the doctrine called *Bhuttoism*, under which label the PPP has identified itself to this day. The leadership of the movement now rested with ZAB's wife Nusrat and their daughter Benazir. They had already stepped in during ZAB's first period of arrest with, respectively, Nusrat Bhutto's first meeting with ex-members of Sindh's assembly at 70 Clifton, Karachi,²³¹ and BB's maiden press conference in Karachi on 15 July.²³²

²²⁸ Federal Security Force, a paramilitary force, which was established in 1972 to assist the Federal Security Force (FSF) for maintaining law and order situation in the country without the intervention of Pakistan Army. But it had become a terror force for his opponents including for his own party's members.

²²⁹ *Jang*, 23 July 1977; Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.102-3.

²³⁰ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.105.

²³¹ *Jang*, 8-10 July 1977.

²³² On that day, she merely conveyed a message from her father to PPP workers to carry out social work during the floods. She said, 'she would not participate in politics or as my father would direct me neither her brothers since they are students. The participation in the coming election would be decided by ZAB.' *Daily Jang*, 16 July 1977.

Bhutto Bachao Tehreek:

Gene Sharp in his *Dictionary of Power and Struggle* defines a civil resistance movement as “non-cooperation with, and disobedience of, policies and practices of any level of government, based on the belief that the body is question is violating its avowed moral or political principles”.²³³ His three-volume book, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, provides a foundational text on the theory and practice of civil resistance.²³⁴ Such action is described in a number of ways by different authorities, variously ‘unarmed insurrection’,²³⁵ ‘people’s power’,²³⁶ ‘nonviolent revolution’,²³⁷ a ‘weapon of moral power and bravery’,²³⁸ or ‘nonviolent resistance’. Though each term has slightly different implications, they all refer broadly to the same phenomena. The movement launched by the PPP to save Bhutto was clearly in this broad category. It had, however, some formidable problems to overcome, as we shall see here.

Unpopularity of Bhutto:

One major problem that the two new leaders faced – and one that the movement to save ZAB never really overcame – was that he was widely

²³³ Gene Sharp, *Sharp’s Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.80. Michael Randle, *Civil Resistance* (London: Fontana, 1994).

²³⁴ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

²³⁵ Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005).

²³⁶ Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2000). Howard Clark (ed.), *People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity* (London: Pluto Press, 2009). April Carter, *People Power and Political Change: Key Issues and Concepts* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012).

²³⁷ Adam Roberts & Timothy Garton Ash, (eds.), *Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

²³⁸ Gene Sharp, *Gandhi Wields the Weapon of Moral Power* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1960).

distrusted in Pakistan. According to Ackerman, and Kruegler, objectives are the driving force for a nonviolent movement, and that they must therefore be 'well-chosen, defined, and understood'.²³⁹ In this case, the objective of saving ZAB was well-defined but not necessarily well-chosen as it failed to appeal to a wide enough spectrum of the people.²⁴⁰

ZAB was both hated and feared by many who held privileged positions in society, such as large landlords, tribal and religious heads, and capitalists.²⁴¹ He alienated the large feudal landlords when he fixed a ceiling on land-holding of over 150 acres of irrigated and 300 acres of acres of unirrigated land for individual landholders.²⁴² Although only one percent of all cultivable land was in fact distributed to tenants under this measure, the resentment remained.²⁴³ Businessmen opposed his policy of nationalisation that involved 'government control of financial and industrial assets of over Rs. 2 billion (\$200 million)'.²⁴⁴ They provided generous financial backing to the PNA opposition to ZAB.²⁴⁵

ZAB also caused great resentment amongst a wide spectrum of politicians and their followers. Khalid B. Sayed and Surendra S. Kaushik describe him as following a Bonapartist strategy in consolidating his power ruthlessly after 1971.²⁴⁶ I.A. Rehman has pointed out two reasons for the

²³⁹ Ackerman, and Kreugler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.24.

²⁴⁰ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp.60-61.

²⁴¹ Interviews with Aslam Gordaspuri; Dr. Mubashar Hasan: Taj Haider. BB states that her father's policies of nationalisation, land reforms, campaign for gender equality with a job quota for women in the civil services, and providing a democratic voice to the impoverished and depressed citizens of the country were opposed by vested interests. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.79.

²⁴² Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p.211. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.231.

²⁴³ Cited in Iftikhar H. Malik, *State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Ideology and Ethnicity* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p.92.

²⁴⁴ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p. 233.

²⁴⁵ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.79.

²⁴⁶ Khalid B. Saeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p.91. Surendra Nath Kaushik, *Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership* (New Delhi:

distrust of ZAB amongst politicians. First, when in power he had done his best to undermine the regional political parties so as to strengthen his political grip. Secondly, he had sought to extend PPP's political base by removing his political rivals through means other than political.²⁴⁷ He used the FSF to terrorise his opponents. According to an Amnesty International fact-finding report, the methods deployed included severe beatings, threats of execution, insertions of chili in the anus, assaults on sensitive parts of the body and threats to maltreat members of the prisoner's family.²⁴⁸ He ran his own party in an authoritarian way that hurt many party members. He acted discourteously towards his ministers in cabinet meetings, abusing them and giving them ill-mannered nicknames, and even humiliated them in public. Six ex-PPP parliamentarians and their family members were threatened that cases of corruption would be taken out against them. Three dissidents, including Ghulam Mustafa Khar, and Mian Mohammad Aslam, managing director of the newspaper *Musawat*, went missing in October 1975.²⁴⁹ Amnesty International declared them 'prisoner of conscience'.²⁵⁰ They were subsequently released by the military regime.²⁵¹ Later on, most of them became approvers against ZAB. Hearing one of the cases, Supreme Court Judge was shocked to learn about the brutal torture and the beating by the official agency responsible for maintaining law and order".²⁵²

Uppal Publishing House, 1985), p.168.

²⁴⁷ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, pp.259-260.

²⁴⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976', May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, MRC, pp. 62-3.

²⁴⁹ Mian Iftikhar Tari (MPA-Punjab), Mohammad Irshad (MPA-Punjab), *ibid.*, p.66.

²⁵⁰ *ibid.*, pp.68-72.

²⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.66. Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.181

²⁵² *Dawn*, 22 January 1977.

Political parties that opposed him such as UDF (United Democratic Front) experienced a reign of terror. For example, eleven persons were killed and eighty were injured when a public meeting of UDF in Rawalpindi was fired at on 23 March 1977.²⁵³ UDF was mainly an alliance of rightist parties, and ZAB's antagonism can be explained on ideological grounds. In other cases, however, he tried to crush people merely because of their independent popularity. This was the case with the revered Sindhi religious leader, Pir Pagara, whom ZAB ordered be arrested for not paying his agricultural tax.²⁵⁴ Pir Pagara was subsequently a strong supporter of Zia, as we shall see later in this dissertation. In Punjab, Ch. Zahoor Illahi was his worst enemy. He was arrested on 7 February 1976 and charged with forty-seven offences, and his family had eighty-three police cases registered against them.²⁵⁵ In a secret meeting on 30 September 1977, Pir Pagara and Illahi agreed to oppose the holding of any election so that the politicians could be kept in their place.²⁵⁶

ZAB also alienated the ruling political parties in Baluchistan and KPK. He dismissed the JUI government in Baluchistan and declared the party to be anti-Pakistan and guilty of criminal offences.²⁵⁷ The chief minister of KPK,

²⁵³ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.180. Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.80.

²⁵⁴ Arif, *Working with Zia*, pp.182-83. Pir Pagara is a title given to the family of a saint called Hurs in Sindh. Pir means spiritual leader in Persian, whilst Pagara means Chieftain in Sindhi language. Hazrat Pir Syed Sibghatullah-II fought against British rule and was hanged by the British government in 1943. The family was revered in Sindh, especially around their area near Sukker, Nawabshah, and Khairpur. During the Zia period, Syed Shah Mardan Shah II was the head of the family. In this dissertation, he is referred to as Pir Pagara.

²⁵⁵ *Amnesty International*, 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976', May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, MRC, p.64.

²⁵⁶ Ghafoor Ahmed, *Aur Phir Election nah hu sakay* (Jang Publishers, Lahore: 1990), p. 89. Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, p.36.

²⁵⁷ Between January 1973 to July 1977, the ZAB government took out one hundred fourteen cases under Section 144 of Penal Code, the High Treason Act, Prevention of Anti-National Activities Ordinance and the Press and Publication Ordinance, against the defunct leaders of NAP. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.89.

Mufti Mahmood, resigned in protest because of illegal action of the central government towards the province and its ruling National Awami Party (NAP).²⁵⁸

Dalai Camp near Kashmir, Warsak Camp (Peshawar), and Army Investigation Centre (Quetta) were major detention centres for opponents of ZAB.²⁵⁹ The Amnesty reports pointed out that 'Defence of Pakistan Rules – part of emergency law and the Article 10 (preventive detention) are the most widely applied to detain political prisoners without trial'.²⁶⁰ *The Leader* (Karachi) for 14 November 1975, as cited in this report, stated that there were 30,166 detainees in 1972, 34,547 in 1973, and 36,279 in 1974. *The Economist* of 29 November 1975 said that there were 38,000 prisoners.²⁶¹ Amnesty declared that three journalists and seven political opponents were prisoner of conscience, and recommended their release.

The final straw in all this proved to be the alleged rigging of the March 1977 election. Zia claimed that this was the main reason for his removal of ZAB. ZAB denied emphatically that he was guilty of this, though there is evidence to show that rigging was carried out by PPP party members in some constituencies. The unopposed victories for nineteen of PPP's candidates was in itself suspicious, as this never had happened before or again subsequently.²⁶²

²⁵⁸ Ian Talbot, interview, 9 July 2013, Coventry (UK).

²⁵⁹ *Amnesty International*, 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976', May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, MRC, pp.62-63.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.9.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp.12-15.

²⁶² Nineteen unopposed members were: Mr. Noor Muhammad Lund (NA-104, Sukker-iv), Mir Mehran Khan Bajarani (NA-155 Jacobabad-i), Abdul Fateh Memon (NA-157 Nawabshah-i), Ghulam Mujtaba Khan Jatoi (NA-158 Nawabshah-ii), Shabbir Ahmad Shah (NA-159 Nawabshah-iii), Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (NA-163 Larkana-i), Sultan Ahmed Chandio (NA-164 Larkana-ii), Mumtaz Ali Bhutto (NA-165 Larkana-iii), Makhdoom Muhammad Zaman Talib-ul-Maula (NA-166 Hyderabad-i), Haji Najamudin Leghari (NA-171 Badin-i), Niaz Muhammad Visan (NA-175 Tharparker-iii), Malik Sikander Khan (NA-176 Dadu-i), Allan Khan Leghari (NA-177 Dadu-ii), Liaqat Ali Jatoi (NA-178 Dadu-iii), Ata

These unopposed returns ensued that PPP had a huge advantage in the election, as after that the party only needed to win in 74 out of 172 constituencies to gain a simple majority and 105 to gain two-thirds, as under the constitution the winner gained the eight seats from tribal areas automatically. Conversely, PNA needed to win 101 seats out of 169,²⁶³ and 132 for a two-thirds majority.²⁶⁴ This all tilted the balance against the opposition. Furthermore, there were cases of intimidation of opposition candidates, such as threats of kidnapping unless they stood down.

For all these reasons, ZAB was known by many as a 'civil dictator'. Amnesty International refused subsequently to accept him as 'a prisoner of conscience', arguing that he was tried and found guilty of a criminal offence.²⁶⁵ General Zia built on the antipathy felt by many political leaders towards ZAB by reversing the discriminatory policies against them. He returned land confiscated in Baluchistan and granted a general amnesty to armed insurgents.²⁶⁶ Few political leaders or their followers were prepared to agitate to save ZAB from his sentence of death. Indeed, Mian Tufail (head of JI), commented, after meeting with Zia a day before ZAB's execution, 'once Bhutto was hanged the rest of the national would easily fall in line.'²⁶⁷ Arif quoted Wali

Muhammad Mari (NA-180 Sanghar-ii), Taj Muhammad Jamali (NA-197 Sibbi-i), Abdun Nabi Jamali (NA-198 Sibbi-ii), Prince Mohyudin (NA-199 Qallat-i), and Amanullah Gachki (NA-200 Qallat-ii). *Me'yar*, 5-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p.41.

²⁶³ PNA did not run the election from Balochistan

²⁶⁴ *Me'yar*, 5-12 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2821, p. 6.

²⁶⁵ However, they demanded that, in common with other prisoners, the Compliance of United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners should apply to ZAB. And they had concerns over his 'solitary confinement' as revealed by his daughter in a meeting with AI. *Amnesty International*, 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978, MSS.34/4/1/pk 4, MRC, pp.23-24.

²⁶⁶ Also sent Ataullah Mengal to UK for his heart surgery on Government's expense. *The Muslim*, 7 June 1979. Roedad Khan, *Pakistan*, p.86.

²⁶⁷ Mian Tufail Ahmad, cited in Ayaz Amir, 'The watershed of April 4', *Viewpoint*, 8 April 1979, p.12.

Khan as telling Zia “Had Bhutto not been buried, your body would have been the one in the grave”.²⁶⁸ Nafees Siddiqui however attributed this statement to Khair Bakhsh Marri.²⁶⁹ PNA leaders requested that the election be postponed until ZAB was out of the way under the slogan ‘*Phele Aihtsab, phir Intikhab*’ (first accountability, later election).²⁷⁰ Zia complied by announcing on 1 October, three weeks before the scheduled date, that the election would be postponed because of the law and order situation.²⁷¹

Hasan Askari Rizvi, Aijaz Ahmed, Ian Talbot, and some other scholars have shown how ZAB alienated the army by trying to control it and even humiliate it.²⁷² He allowed a film to be shown of the surrender of the Pakistan Army at Pulton Ground, Dhaka, in December 1971. He shamed the former Chief Martial Law Administrator, Yahya Khan, by publicising unsavoury details of his private life. He removed forty-three senior military officers and established a separate para-military force under FSF.²⁷³ He promoted General Zia-ul-Haq over the heads of six more senior army leaders when he appointed him as Chief of Army Staff in May 1976. This was despite negative reports about Zia by the previous Chief, General Tikka Khan. This all caused resentment among the displaced generals. According to a CIA report, General Iqbal Khan, Commander

²⁶⁸ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, 12 December 1977 cited in K.M.Arif, *Zia-ul-Haq ke Hamrah*, p.242.

²⁶⁹ Nafees Siddiqui cited Khair Bakhsh Marri in an interview with Ilyas Shakir in April 1984. Cited in Shakir, *MRD*, p.86.

²⁷⁰ PNA leaders met in Quetta on 25 September for the purpose. Subsequently, some of the leaders of PNA, Pir of Pagaro and Ch. Zahoor Illahi, met General Zia covertly on 30 September and formally requested him to delay the election for the next five years until the politicians were held accountable. Ahmed, *Aur Phir Election nah hu sakay*, p. 89.

²⁷¹ Widely reported in the media.

²⁷² Adeem Suhail, *The Pakistan National Alliance* [MA Thesis, presented at the University of Texas, Austin, 2010], p.19. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, pp.215-217; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.218-234. Belokrenitsy and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, pp.225-226.

²⁷³ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, pp.194-199.

of the Fourth Corps and General Chishti, Commander of Tenth Corps, were those who were most strongly in favour of ZAB's removal and subsequent execution.²⁷⁴ The refusal of three brigadiers to fire on PNA protestors in Lahore revealed the resentment amongst other senior officers against the government as well.²⁷⁵ Ian Talbot argues if ZAB had implemented the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report on the defeat in East Pakistan, Pakistan might not have undergone two further periods of martial law, as this would have helped to have buried the army's interference in civil government for good.²⁷⁶

ZAB similarly alienated Pakistan's civil servants. Under the guise of his socialist agenda of ending *Naukar Shahi* (civil-kings)²⁷⁷ and making them the servants of the people, he restructured the civil service in ways that brought it more firmly under his control.²⁷⁸ He also dismissed 1,300 senior civil servants.²⁷⁹

Failure to Cultivate International Support:

Ackerman and Kruegler, Sharp, and Nepstad²⁸⁰, have placed great emphasis on the need for civil resisters to secure external support for their movement. In case of Pakistan – which had remained under the influence of the USA from its

²⁷⁴ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'International Narcotics Developments, 3 August 1977', CIA-RDP79T00912A001800010017-2, NARA, p.19.

²⁷⁵ The brigadiers were Ishtiaq Ali Khan, Said Muhammad and Niaz Ahmad. Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.73.

²⁷⁶ Ian Talbot, Interview. Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (London: Hurst and Co. 2012), pp. 93-114,

²⁷⁷ cited in Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.227.

²⁷⁸ Suhail, *The Pakistan National Alliance*, p.19.

²⁷⁹ Aminullah Chaudhry, *Political Administrators: The Story of the Civil Services of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011), p.111; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.227. For civil administration in Pakistan in general, see for example Chaudhry, *Political Administrators*; Charles H. Kennedy, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1987).

²⁸⁰ Ackerman, and Kreugler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*; Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*.

creation,²⁸¹ support from the USA was vital for BBT. Such support was not however forthcoming for reasons that will be discussed in this section.

In her interview to Sunday Times on 25 July 1977, and as she stated later in her book, BB considered that the US had played a major role in encouraging the coup against her father, due to his ambition of acquiring nuclear capability.²⁸² She appears to have regarded it in a similar light to the CIA-backed coup against the Allende government in Chile in 1973.²⁸³ Most of the current historiography suggests that the US government was adopting a hard line against any possible nuclear armament by Pakistan. Henry Kissinger had threatened ‘to make him [ZAB] an example’.²⁸⁴ Despite wishing ZAB’s well on taking his oath as a President of USA,²⁸⁵ Jimmy Carter continued to pursue a zero-tolerance policy towards any nuclear expansion. A secret American diplomatic message was intercepted that said of the coup against ZAB: “the party is over! He’s gone”.²⁸⁶ The USA regarded Zia as someone whom they could work with.²⁸⁷ Zia was invited in the US Independence Day celebrations on

²⁸¹ Khan Abdul Wali Khan refers to the American National Security Council report which stated ‘no political party hostile to US interests should come to power in Pakistan and if friendly political support was not forthcoming, influence should be sought in the armed forces. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Lahore 2 February 1986. Cited in *Viewpoint*, 6 February 1986, XI (26), p.16. Rauf Klasra, ‘Raz-o-Niaz: Pakistan America k Samne Dut Sakta hai?’, *Akhbar-e-Jahan*, 9-15 April 2012, p.10. See, for example, Husain Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States and an Epic History of Misunderstanding* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Carlotta Gall, *The Wrong Enemy: American in Afghanistan, 2001-2014* (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014).

²⁸² Benazir Bhutto, *Jang*, 26 July 1977; Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 85-89.

²⁸³ *Jang*, 26 July 1977. *Me’yar*, 19-26 March 1977, NAP/BRR/P-2823, p.37.

²⁸⁴ Statesman India cited Prof. Shireen Malhar Kheli, stating that she brought the evidence of the threat of American ambassador to ZAB if he continues pursuing his nuclear ambition. Statesman-India, ‘Bhutto Ayatullah se das Guna ziada Taqatwer sabit hoon gain’, Saleem (ed), *Jis Dhaj se koi Maqtul ku Gya*, p.48. Qayyum Nizami, *Gernail aur Siasatdan: Tarikh ki Adalat main* (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2006), p. 151.

²⁸⁵ *Jang*, 21 January 1977.

²⁸⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 85-89.

²⁸⁷ Kausar Niazi narrated an anecdote about the penetration of America into Pakistan’s policies. He said that the American military attaché Colonel Billati knew the decision of elevation of General Zia-ul-Haq as a next chief of Army staff five to six months before the retirement of General Tikka Khan.

4 July 1977, and he was the last to leave the embassy.²⁸⁸ The US government was also wary of ZAB's quest to establish a strong Islamic bloc for economic and defence purposes, and take the country towards Islamic socialism.²⁸⁹ After holding a successful conference of the Organisation of Islamic Countries in 1974, ZAB had visited Arab countries in June of that year to propose a defence pact between leading Muslim countries and Pakistan. The Shah of Iran, President Daud Khan of Afghanistan, King Khalid of Saudi Arabia, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, and Zaid Bin Sultan of UAE agreed on this agenda. The western powers were alarmed by this activity.²⁹⁰

In an interview, Taj Haider compared Zia's 'Operation Fair Play' to remove ZAB with 'Operation Ajax' of the CIA and 'Operation Boot' of the SIS (MI6) to remove Mohammad Massadegh when he was about to nationalise the oil company AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) after passing a resolution in the *Majlis* (Iranian National Assembly) in 1951.²⁹¹ In August of that year, the CIA spent ten million dollars bribing politicians, soldiers, mobs, and newspapers through the British embassy in Tehran and organized a riot, which gave the Shah of Iran an excuse to remove Mosaddeq.²⁹² In the case of Pakistan,

His name was, though, not even listed among the prospective candidates. Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*, p.61. Zia had already completed his advance command courses in USA and UK in 1972 and 75 respectively. *Zulfiqar*, 15 October 1978, Vol. 15, no. 671, p. 18.

²⁸⁸ Roedad Khan, *Pakistan*, p.65. Mehdi Hassan, Private papers, referring to *Indian Magazine*, 4 July 1977, and *Weekly Sunday* (India), 28 August 1988.

²⁸⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*; Stephen P. Cohen, Interview. Dr. Mehdi Hasan, Interview. Aslam Gordaspuri, Interview.

²⁹⁰ *Me'yar*, 25 June-2 July, NAP/BRR/P-2837, pp.5-6.

²⁹¹ Taj Haider, Interview.

²⁹² Wusatullah Khan, 'Sath Bars Purani Taza Kahani', *BBC Urdu*, 1 September 2014; William Roger Luis, *End of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonisation* (online), pp.775-776,

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=NQnpQNKeKKAC&pg=PA775&lpg=PA775&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false, and, *The New York Times*, 'The CIA in Iran: Britain Fights Oil Nationalism', <http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-chapter1.html>

Naseerullah Babar, ex-Governor KPK, and PPP's leader also claimed that the USA was involved in the political chaos leading to martial law. Rafi Raza had already communicated with ZAB about the American plan to remove his government at any cost.²⁹³ A sudden transporter's strike and decrease of the dollar exchange rate in the open market from seven rupees to six rupees per dollar due to a flood of currency into the country were seen by some as suspicious in this respect.²⁹⁴ The tactics of 'operation wheel jam'²⁹⁵ was applied in Pakistan, similar to the overthrow of President of Chile Salvador Allende on 11 September 1973. Referring to Walter Schwarz's essay in the *Guardian* (UK) on 27 April 1977, Niazi stated that America was supporting the opposition parties in Pakistan to dislodge ZAB's government. The cancellation of the selling of tear gas to Pakistan by America was presented as evidence to that. The *Washington Post* disclosed the similar story.²⁹⁶ Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Afghan rebel leader operating from Peshawar, also supported the anti-Bhutto movement.²⁹⁷

Adeem Suhail in his MA thesis revealed the channel used to pour money into labour unions through the American Institute of Labour and its affiliates.²⁹⁸ The present research has found evidence of this from labour union correspondence between the Trade Union Congress (TUC) and Pakistani labour

²⁹³ Major General (rtd) Naseerullah Babar. cited in Ghafoor Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, (Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1993), p.217.

²⁹⁴ Mehdi Hassan, Interview. ZAB's speech cited in Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*, p.57. Farkhanda Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi Hai* (Lahore: Sang-i-Meel Publishers, 2012), p.61.

²⁹⁵ Benazir stated that the operation was a tactic that was taught by American agencies to Pakistani forces to jam the whole country economically through strikes. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.86.

²⁹⁶ Niazi, *Aur Line Cut gai*, p.71.

²⁹⁷ ZAB was aiding Gulbadin Hikmatyar against Daud's government instead. Therefore he was in the forefront of his removal. Cited in Near East/North Africa Report, 20 May 1980, CIA-RDP82-00850R000200080035-3, NARA, p.45.

²⁹⁸ Suhail, *The Pakistan National Alliance of 1977*, p.37.

unions that on 12 April 1977 twenty-six trade unions organisations joined together and established the Pakistan Labour Alliance against ZAB's government headed by the Pakistan National Free Trade Union (PNFTU) President Muhammad Sharif.²⁹⁹ Subsequently, Sharif and subordinate trade union leaders went missing. The union called out a procession of 600,000 people on 19 April to protest. The document states that the army kidnapped them to worsen the strikes against ZAB. They appeared again after martial law was imposed. Sharif and his companions were later on sent on a worldwide tour by the Ministry of Labour on the direction of Director General (DG) Intelligence Bureau. Moreover, Pukhton Baluch Union-London in a letter to Mr. Len. Murray, General Secretary of TUC on 26 February 1977 asked for their help against the atrocities of ZAB.³⁰⁰ The embassies not only provided financial support to trade unions to stoke disorder in the country but also offered them a place to hold secure meetings.³⁰¹

The US authorities believed that a dictator in Pakistan was more likely to stand up firmly to the Soviet Union. Robert Brister has revealed the Nixon administration plan to destabilise the Soviet-backed Kabul government with the help of CIA and Iranian intelligence agency SAVAK in early 1970s.³⁰² CIA funded the training of rebels to overthrow the government. Kunhanandan Nair stated that five thousand persons in Panjsher valley had been trained by the agency by

²⁹⁹ 'Correspondence between Trade Union Congress and Pakistan Labour Alliance', MSS.292D/954.5/2, MRC.

³⁰⁰ Chairman: Sherzada Khan, Vice Chairman: A. Razaq Khan, Secretary: M.A.Zaheer Afridi. Ibid. Four assassination plans against Wali Khan, election fraud, and 600 recent deaths in Dir were reported to the GS of TUC in the letter. A copy of *Times* (London) of 1 November 1976 was attached as well. *ibid.*

³⁰¹ Mehdi Hassan, Interview; Mubashar Hassan, Interview. Taj Haider, Interview.

³⁰² For details. See Robert Brister, "Afghanistan in Perspective", *Churchman*, March 1980. William Vornberger, "The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs", *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, NARA, p.12.

1975.³⁰³ The accession of People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in Afghanistan in a popular insurrection directed against the dictatorship of President Mohammed Daud Khan strengthened its relationship with Soviet Union, and followed similar policies to ZAB.³⁰⁴ The American State department commented on the coup against ZAB of 5 July 1977 that it was an internal affair for Pakistan and hope was expressed for future friendship between the two countries.³⁰⁵

Not a single country, including those of the Arab world, condemned the imposition of martial law. Suhail has pointed out the involvement of Arab money in implementing the creed of Islam, especially to JI, which was supported by the army.³⁰⁶ India and Turkey considered that this was Pakistan's internal affair and continued the same relationship as under civil government.³⁰⁷ General Zia met almost all-important ambassadors, including those of China and Saudi Arabia, the day after the coup.³⁰⁸ The French embassy invited him to its Independence Day ceremony on 14 July. President also wrote letters to the heads of governments of various countries inviting the continuation of friendly relations. Canada signed two loan agreements with the regime on 10 July. Agha Shahi, Secretary General of Foreign Affairs in the Martial Law government, was

³⁰³ For details. See Kunhanandan Nair, *Devil and His Darts* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1986). cited in William Vornberger, 'The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs', *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, NARA, p.12.

³⁰⁴ The PDPA government instigated a land reform program, expanded education and health programs and actively supported women's rights. Michel Chossudovsky, 'Pakistan and the Global War on Terrorism', *Center for Research on Globalisation*, 8 January 2008. [<http://www.globalresearch.ca/pakistan-and-the-global-war-on-terrorism/7746>] (28 December 2014).

³⁰⁵ *Jang*, 6 July 1977.

³⁰⁶ Suhail, *The Pakistan National Alliance of 1977*, p.42.

³⁰⁷ *Jang*, 7 July 1977.

³⁰⁸ *Jang*, 8 July 1977.

sent to tour some important countries to brief them about the political situation in the country.

International newspapers in UK, France and other countries welcomed martial law, stating that it was an unavoidable step by the army to save the country from further turmoil. They praised the General for being both a professional and competent leader and a devout Muslim and professional person, while condemning ZAB for his arrogant behaviour towards all opposition.³⁰⁹ The *New York Times* and *New York Post* published the news of martial law on their front pages on 7 July 1977 where they referred to Zia as a devotee of Islam who had no political aim.³¹⁰ Amnesty International's refusal to declare ZAB a 'prisoner of conscience' indirectly supported the regime.³¹¹ Indeed such welcoming or neutral behaviour after the coup reduced pressure on the regime, and it gave the green light for Zia to execute ZAB later on.

US interference in the politics of the region continued after Zia had seized power. Nixon's policy of getting at the Soviet Union through Afghanistan via Iran was maintained during Carter's term as President.³¹² Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor, stated "the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul was signed on 3 July 1979 by President Carter. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention".³¹³ The Carter administration did stop

³⁰⁹ The Guardian (UK), cited in *Jang*, 7 July 1977.

³¹⁰ *Jang*, 7 July 1977.

³¹¹ 'INR Weekly Highlights of Developments in Human Rights 19 January 1978', NARA.

³¹² Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.121.

³¹³ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Former National Security Advisor, Interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur* 15-19 January 1998, cited in Michel Chossudovsky, '9/11 Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and Soviet

development aid to Pakistan in April 1979 because of Zia's nuclear ambitions, but President Ronald Reagan reversed this subsequently by sanctioning the flow of \$3.2 billion funding during the 1979-85 period. Despite US's extraordinary diplomatic pressure on France to cancel the Nuclear deal with Pakistan,³¹⁴ and the celebrations of the US authorities on successfully achieving the task,³¹⁵ Cohen, quoting the opinion of the State Department, told this researcher that the main objective of the US was to defeat the Soviet Union and socialism, and in pursuit of this they kept their eyes closed to the continuous ambition of General Zia to acquire nuclear capability after 1980.³¹⁶

The Campaign:

Nusrat Bhutto with the aid of BB took charge of the scattered and panicked party after ZAB's arrest and in doing so faced all the problems of female leadership in a deeply patriarchal society, as will be discussed in chapter 2 and 3. Despite its claims to be a revolutionary socialist party, the PPP – as is often the case in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, as well as of other countries such as North Korea – was a family affair. Despite the suggestion by M.K. Gandhi after Indian independence that elections should be held within the Congress Party, the Nehru family has kept its hold on the party to this day. There are in these elements that relate to a long history of kingship, a feudal social culture, and the importance of the family as the chief unit of welfare and

Afghan War to George W. Bush to September 11, 2001', *Centre for Research on Globalisation*, 9 September 2010. [<http://www.globalresearch.ca/9-11-analysis-from-ronald-reagan-and-the-soviet-afghan-war-to-george-w-bush-and-september-11-2001/20958>] (28 December 2014).

³¹⁴ *ibid.*, p.239.

³¹⁵ 'Secretary of State Vance, wired to New Delhi "Achieving USG Non-proliferation Objective in Pakistan-14 November 1978"', Declassified, US Department of State, case no. M-2011-04016, doc no. C17668609 (Online version of NARA).

³¹⁶ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

kinship. Moreover, the control of financial assets of the party by the family, including foreign bank accounts, is crucial for running an election in such countries. Although civil resistance movements have succeeded without one charismatic leader such as in the movement of the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, and in the lawyers' movement in Pakistan; charismatic individuals are often crucial for the success of a movement.³¹⁷ In case of Pakistan, the public looked for someone from ZAB's family to lead them instead of a person such as Sheikh Rashid, the then Vice-Chairman of the party. Nusrat Bhutto was made Acting-Chairperson of the party. Before this, Nusrat Bhutto had been active in the women's wing of PPP, whilst Benazir tasted political life for the first time. Nusrat Bhutto told her: "Darling, you have to campaign. We have to divide up your father's schedule".³¹⁸ BB stated of her feelings about her maiden speech in Faisalabad that 'I was terrified [...] I did not think of myself yet as a political leader or a public speaker'.³¹⁹ BB was placed in charge of the task of mobilising support from like-minded civil society groups, labours, lawyers, students and journalists. Some individuals from these groups were already protesting in the streets or were writing against the regime, especially about the way that the judiciary was handling the case against ZAB.

The biggest task for the Bhutto ladies was to unite the party through a strong and active programme. Since PPP had already decided to take part in the proposed election in a meeting held on 3 August under the chairmanship of ZAB,³²⁰ both women continued with the rhythm of ZAB's nonviolent protest and

³¹⁷ Ackerman, and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.27.

³¹⁸ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.116.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.116.

³²⁰ *Musawat*, 4 August 1977.

persuasion strategy in this respect. Nusrat threatened Zia with dire consequences. In a gathering in Nishtar Park in Karachi on 28 September, she declared that forcing Zia to retire would be the first action of PPP government after its success in the election.³²¹ The following day in Okara, she warned the government that the “five rivers will be filled with the blood” if ZAB was hanged.³²² Such threats rang alarm bells with Zia.

To exploit the craze for cricket in Pakistan, Zia organised a cricket match at the Gaddafi Stadium in Lahore in February 1978 to give the impression of a peaceful situation in the country.³²³ Nusrat Bhutto saw that this provided a good opportunity to expose the benign image of General Zia and its regime before sixty thousand enthusiastic spectators as well as the national and international media. She secretly occupied a place in the VIP enclosure. When the spectators, as saw her, they stood up and started chanting ‘*Jiye Bhuto*’ (Long live Bhutto), *Jernal Zia Murdabad* (death to Zia). The police moved in to seize her in a baton charge, and she was knocked unconscious.³²⁴ The moment of attack on her was caught by the photographers who were there for the match coverage and next day the picture was all over the media — print and electronic — including the international press. This put the regime on the defensive.³²⁵

The Patriot Democratic Lawyers Alliance in Lahore³²⁶ was established under the direction of Nusrat Bhutto to mobilise lawyers to counter the regime’s use of the judiciary against ZAB. Although the ZAB regime had itself

³²¹ *Musawat*, 29 September 1977.

³²² Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.192-93.

³²³ The name was Lahore Stadium before 1974. It was renamed after the speech of Gaddafi of Libya in favour of Pakistan’s nuclear technology.

³²⁴ For details, see, for example, Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai*, p.65-66.

³²⁵ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 193.

³²⁶ Convener Mian Saleem Jahangir was appointed whereas, Raja Zulqarnain as a General secretary.

been guilty of harassing lawyers who took up the cases of the political opponents of ZAB,³²⁷ the lawyers of Pakistan are one of the best-organised groups in its civil society that is able to defend its own freedom and integrity. Divided into three major branches – the District Bar Councils and the High Court Bar Councils for each province, and the Supreme Court Bar Council for Pakistan as a whole, the group organise annual elections that create a tier of leadership at each level.³²⁸ Lawyers passed a resolution in favour of ZAB that regarded him as a political victim instead of a criminal and which exposed the way that the Lahore High Court was operating as a tool of the regime in the prosecution of ZAB.³²⁹ A People’s Legal Aid Society was established at district levels to provide free aid assistance to imprisoned PPP workers.³³⁰

Likewise, some individual journalists, especially in Musawat were also to the fore in reporting on the brutalities of the regime.³³¹ The Pre-Censorship Ordinance³³² promulgated by the regime demanded that all print media

³²⁷ Amnesty International, ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan: An Amnesty International Report including the findings of a mission to Pakistan 23 April-12 May 1976’, May 1977, MSS.34/4/1/Pk1, MRC, p. 27.

³²⁸ Malik Hammad Ahmad, *Nonviolent Resistance Movement of Pakistan: The Black Revolution 2007-9* [Unpublished MA dissertation for Peace, Conflict and Development], (University of Jaume-I, Spain, 2010), pp.42-43.

³²⁹ Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp. 372-375.

³³⁰ *ibid.*,

³³¹ See, for example, Zamir Niazi, *The Press under Siege* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992).

³³² Newspapers in Indian sub-continent are two hundred years old, as the *Bengal Gazette* was launched in 1780 in Calcutta. Afterwards, the *Madras Courier* in 1785, and the *Bombay Herald* in 1789 (the time of the French Revolution) commenced their publications. Laws limiting the freedom of the press soon followed. The Press Act was implemented in 1835, which was later on repealed by the Press and Registration of Books Act 1867. Based on English Law, the Act required the deposit of all published material with the government, though there was no clause that permitted action against already published material. However, the Newspaper Act 1908, and the Press Act 1910 were the first to stop the publication of news stories that reported terrorist and agitation in Bengal. Afterwards, the launching of the Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930-31, the British introduced the Press (Emergency Powers) Act of 1931. Under the act, the British government imposed the requirement of a security amount which was to be forfeited under Section 4 of the act; if the newspapers misbehaved. The Press Act of 1931 became the precursor of the Pakistan Press and Publication Ordinance 1960, and later on the West Pakistan Press and Publication Ordinance of

including private and national trust papers had to be scrutinised by someone from the office of the Chairman of the Scrutiny Committee before publication. Papers and journals that published material that was seen to be against the 'ideology of Pakistan' were closed down. The objective of imposing censorship was to bring the supposedly "irresponsible journalism" on the "right path".³³³ PTV broadcasts had to include prayer calls and the wearing of *dupattas* was banned.³³⁴ Voluptuous pictures/advertisements of women were banned. In response to the journalists' campaign for a free media, General Zia commented that 'pre-censorship, self censorship or silent censorship' was imposed to check irresponsible reporting in news media, while others were free to publish what they liked.³³⁵ The Federal Union of Journalists of Pakistan (FUJP) played a key role in a continuing protest against the ordinance throughout Zia's period.³³⁶ When the press of the PPP paper *Musawat* was closed and confiscated and its editor, deputy editor, and printer, were arrested, the FUJP and All Pakistan Newspaper Employees Union (APNEU) adopted method of nonviolent intervention by calling for a hunger strike on 1 May 1978. Twenty-six journalists³³⁷ were arrested on the same day under Martial law Regulation No.23 that prohibited strikes and locks-out, and four of them³³⁸ were

1963. The Ordinance was enforced until the time of the Junejo government, which repealed the law and freed up newspaper publication.

³³³ Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.193.

³³⁴ Mehtab Rashidi, an employee of the TV, was a conscience objector against the order. Mehtab Akber Rashidi, interview, 16 March 2012, Karachi.

³³⁵ General Zia-u-Haq, cited in Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.194.

³³⁶ Minhaj Barna, Nisar Usmani, Khalid Chaudhry, Khawar Naeem Hashmi Khalid Chaudhry, Interview, 24 February 2012, Lahore. Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, 12 January 2013, London.

³³⁷ *Amnesty International*, 'Amnesty International's Concern at Large-Scale Arrests of Journalists in Pakistan', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, p.5.

³³⁸ Nasir Zaidi, Khawar Naeem Hashmi, Masood Ullah Khan, and Iqbal Jaffry. Nasir Zaidi, interview, 30 April 2012, Rawalpindi.

subsequently flogged.³³⁹ During the next few weeks the regime rounded up seventy-one journalists, and thirty newspapermen.³⁴⁰ Amnesty declared four journalists to be a 'prisoner of conscience'.³⁴¹

Similarly, employees of PTV, the only TV station in Pakistan that was run by the state, adopted nonviolent direct action by occupying its building, and controlling transmission on 16 February 1978. Shahid Nadeem, one of the protestors, stated that on the call for a strike by PUFJ over the ban on the press, the TV union employees seized control of the TV stations in Lahore, Quetta, Peshawar and Karachi (partially), but not in Islamabad. They asked newscasters to wear black bands. Being the government vehicle of information, the protest had a marked impact at home and abroad. The government machinery was mobilised quickly and forty protestors from Lahore, twenty from Rawalpindi and a few from Karachi were arrested under Martial Law Order 10.³⁴² After summary court trials, they were sentenced one-year imprisonment and fifteen lashes. They were incarcerated in the notorious Mianwali Jail, where the British used to jail freedom fighters.³⁴³ The protest attracted global attention and helped reveal the oppressive face of the Zia regime to the outside world.

Similarly, eight thousand labourers of the Karachi Shipyard called a strike in November 1978. In Multan, many textile workers died when their

³³⁹ Nasir Zaidi, interview.

³⁴⁰ *Amnesty International*, 'Amnesty International's Concern at Large-Scale Arrests of Journalists in Pakistan', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, p.5.

³⁴¹ *Amnesty International*, 'Some cases of Arrested Journalists in Pakistan adopted by Amnesty International as Prisoner of Conscience', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, pp.23-24.

³⁴² If anyone occupied defence installation, was charged under MLO no.10. And, the maximum sentence was death sentence. Shahid Nadeem, Interview. *Amnesty International*, 'Amnesty International's Concern at Large-Scale Arrests of Journalists in Pakistan', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, p.12.

³⁴³ *Amnesty International*, 'Some cases of Arrested Journalists in Pakistan adopted by Amnesty International as Prisoner of Conscience', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, p.12.

protest was fired on in January 1978. During the Zia period 22 textile mills were shut down making 100,000 labourers unemployed.³⁴⁴ The Pakistan International Airline (PIA) labour union under its president Abdul Hasee was in contact with BB through Irshad Rao and Masroor Ahsan, who directly supported the activities of the union. Mushtaq Lasharie, a PIA union member and supporter of PPP's confidants stated that they started a campaign of 'go-slow' that was intended to ground PIA aircraft, including those with high government functionaries on board, and even Zia himself. In April 1981, they burnt the plane that had been made ready to take Zia on a foreign trip. In response, the regime promulgated MLR no.52 and banned unions in PIA,³⁴⁵ and 1,040 employees were fired from the national airline.³⁴⁶

Some supported BBT through conscientious objection. Ghulam Ali Memon, Advocate General of Sindh, and D.M. Awan, Advocate General of Punjab, resigned from their posts in protest on 7 July 1977.³⁴⁷ From the army, Brigadier Osman Khalid, Colonel Ismail Shamim, and Major Iftikhar, and one Senior Superintendent of Police Kalim Dil Khan resigned from their posts in protest against the death sentence passed on ZAB by the Lahore High Court.³⁴⁸ Later on, Brigadier Osman and Major Iftikhar tried to launch an armed struggle that fed into the campaign of Al-Zulfiqar – which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

While the case against ZAB case was being heard in the Lahore High Court, twenty to thirty women protested in front of the court on his every

³⁴⁴ Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh Pakistan ke Yukjehti ke Masail* (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1986), p.53.

³⁴⁵ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

³⁴⁶ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.53.

³⁴⁷ *Jang*, 8 July 1977.

³⁴⁸ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

appearance.³⁴⁹ Women political prisoners chanted slogan in support of Bhutto and against the dictatorship when being tried in court and also in jails so that they could differentiate themselves from criminals.³⁵⁰ Three hundred and fifty³⁵¹ women were imprisoned during the early phase of martial law, the largest such numbers in what became West Pakistan since the time of Gandhi's historic Salt March of 1930. Now it was the Pakistan army that was punishing such protestors.

While PPP was the only mainstream political party fighting against the dictatorship during this period while the rest enjoyed a cosy relationship with the regime, some small regional groups did join hands in the struggle. *Sindhi Awami Tehreek* was one of them. The Sindhi Hari Committee had been established on 9 January 1977 in response to the arrest of Rasool Bakhsh Palijo and Fazil Rahoo for championing the grievances of the *haris* (landless peasants) of the province. The committee had two main demands – the release of these two and genuine land reforms. Its first convention called for genuine land reforms from ZAB's government.³⁵² These landless peasants argued that they were kept as bonded labourers by Sindhi *waderas* (landlords) on land that their forebears had once held freely. They were treated oppressively and were prevented from speaking up against the landlords. The movement was launched to restore their right to what they claimed as their ancestral land.

³⁴⁹ For women workers role in Lahore, see, for example, Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai*.

³⁵⁰ Shahida Jabeen, interview. 26 February 2012. Lahore.

³⁵¹ David Arnold, *Gandhi: A Profile in Power* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p.149.

³⁵² Dr Feroz Jeejee, Zarina Baloch, Sher Khan Lund, Rasool Bukhsh, Jabal Detho, Ghaffar Qazi, Ali Sodho, Mohammad Hassan Rustamani, Ayaz Latif Palijo, Ismail Soho and Yousaf Keerano were some key persons among the participants. Interview with Mustafa Talpur, of Sindhi Awami Tehreek and the youngest MRD prisoner, 1 June 2012, Islamabad.

Rasool Bakhsh Palijo of Hyderabad was the chief instigator of the movement.³⁵³ Although, ZAB was the son of a Sindhi landlord, his policy of land reform had given hope to the movement of landless peasants in the province. Farmers of Naseerabad (Sindh) for example had seized land in Naseer Abad, which was being controlled by the Jamali landlord family. The police/administration could not come to the landlord's rescue due to ZAB's unwillingness to intervene. It was known as the Pat Feeder Movement of Naseerabad. However, once General Zia came in, the Jamali family took the land back from the peasants.³⁵⁴ Martial law was however imposed before the landless peasants had managed to launch a major movement. They were among the first political groups to condemn martial law. The Sindhi Hari Committee registered as a political party named *Sindhi Awami Tehreek* with the Election Commission of Pakistan to contest the election in October 1977. The party planned to field its candidates mainly near the coastal areas of Sindh.³⁵⁵ After the postponement of the election, they joined PPP's movement against the regime.

SAT played a crucial role in BBT in mobilising the public in favour of democratic rule in the coastal area of Sindh. Belonging to the lowest class, and benefiting from ZAB's nationalisation of education,³⁵⁶ their women and students' groups organised a systematic campaign. The regime considered SAT to be a major threat. Hundreds of its members – men and women – were arrested for protesting against the sentence of death passed on ZAB on 22

³⁵³ Rasool Bakhsh Palijo was one of the longest prisoners under Zia regime from October 1979 till April 1985. Amnesty International declared him Prisoner of Conscience. *Amnesty International*, 'Violations of Human Rights in Pakistan, April 1985', MSS.34/4/1/Pk31, MRC, pp. 2-3.

³⁵⁴ Aslam Khwaja, interview, 13 March 2012, Karachi.

³⁵⁵ The areas where they fielded their candidates were Golarchi, Mirpur Bathoro, Tando Mohammad Khan, Mirpur Sakro, Johi, Warah and Thatta. Mustafa Talpur, interview, 1 June 2012, Islamabad.

³⁵⁶ Aslam Khwaja, interview,

March 1978.³⁵⁷ Its founder, Rasool Bakhsh Palijo, remained in prison from 1977 to 1985 with a brief gap of only two months.³⁵⁸ In solidarity with the protests of PPP workers in Punjab, SAT activists courted arrest on 27 April 1978 in Hyderabad.³⁵⁹ The police carried out baton charges and rounded up thirty-students.³⁶⁰ *Sindhi Shagird Tehreek*, later on joined the students' struggle under the Pakistan Progressive Students' Alliance. Although SAT later joined MRD at a very late stage, it continued to struggle against the regime throughout the period under investigation.

The first exclusively women's protest was organised in Hyderabad under the leadership of Zarina Baloch, who was later honoured with the title of *Madre Sindh* (Mother of Sindh). Belonging to the famous bangle-making cottage industry of Hyderabad, these women offered bangles to policemen. In one respect this represented an attempt to shame them, as bangles are considered in South Asia a symbol of femininity. Alternatively, it could be regarded as a plea to the police to show solidarity for motherhood. The *Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo* (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo) in Argentina made a similar appeal to motherhood in their protest against the military regime, to powerful effect.³⁶¹

The movement saw some new forms of resistance by PPP *jyals* (partisans). There were cases of self-immolation – something that is regarded as the most extreme form of nonviolent resistance by authorities such as Sharp.

³⁵⁷ Mustafa Talpur, interview.

³⁵⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'Violations of Human Rights in Pakistan, April 1985', MSS.34/4/1/Pk31, MRC, pp. 2-3.

³⁵⁹ Mujahid Bareilvi, interview, 18 March 2012, Karachi; Fateh Marri, interview, 11 March 2012, Karachi;

³⁶⁰ Aslam Khwaja was one of the arrested students, Aslam Khwaja, interview.

³⁶¹ Peter Ackerman, and Jack Duvall, *A Force more Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp.273-78.

He examines ways in which self-inflicted suffering can advance a cause – for example hunger strikes and protest fasts.³⁶² For Gandhi, self-sacrifice was demanded of a satyagrahi at all levels, and he himself went on several fasts. It is thus seen as being an acceptable part of nonviolence to invite violence on oneself. April Carter has traced the history of such extreme self-suffering in the Koreans Confucian tradition, arguing that this valorised hunger strikes by South Korean against their military rulers in 1986.³⁶³ Tibetan monks have used this method since 2011.³⁶⁴ Nonviolent theorists do not however include suicide bombing in this category, as it causes harm to others in a violent way.

In Pakistan, nine die-hard PPP's followers committed suicide by burning themselves in various cities of Punjab in protest of the Lahore High Court decision.³⁶⁵ The regime held PPP responsible for such 'violence'. BB herself stated that self-immolation was not encouraged by the party; she said however that it was a reaction to the ruthless policies of the regime.³⁶⁶ As it was, evidence suggests that the People's Action Committee, which worked under Raja Anwer and some other members from Faisalabad, were culpable in this. My interviewees claimed that Anwer and Pervez Rashid³⁶⁷ encouraged some of the workers to do this, while promising them as soon as they set themselves on

³⁶² Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp.357-367.

³⁶³ April Carter, *Political Power and Political Change: Key issues and Concepts* (London, New York: Routledge, 2012), p.13.

³⁶⁴ Mail online <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2221784/Tibetan-monk-dies-setting-protest-Chinese-rule.html> (15 January 2013).

³⁶⁵ Mian Muhammad Iqbal, interview, 25 January 2013, London. Rashid Nagi and Abdul Waheed Qureshi carried out this act 2 October 1978 in Rawalpindi, and on the same day Yaqoob Pervez Masih and Abdur Rashid Ajiz did so in Lahore. A newspaper photographer, Aziz Malik, did the same in Rawalpindi, and also Munawar Hussain in Okara, and Abdul Aziz in Sukker. Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp. 340-42.

³⁶⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.148.

³⁶⁷ Both are now in Pakistan Muslim League (N). Anwer was a Chairman of Punjab Education board (2008-13) and joined Al-Zulfiqar and the group that believed in violent methods, whilst Rashid became a Senator (2008-).

fire, they would be saved by blankets being thrown over them. Unfortunately, they could not save them as the regime got to know their plans and removed the blankets from the scene.³⁶⁸

How did ZAB inspire such devotion? Aslam Khwaja, a Sindhi, told me in an interview that ZAB was revered because he had given a new sense of pride and dignity to many ordinary people. Before he came to power, it was impossible to see a Deputy Commissioner who behaved as a *naukarshahi* (official-cum-king) but afterwards they could open their office doors with a kick. Likewise, his educational policy was beneficial for laypersons. Aslam Khwaja narrated his own story 'I was a student of a private school, I used to pay seventeen rupees per month in class 6, but in class seven, I paid only one rupee due to the nationalization of schools. Along with, many new students belonging to lower class of my society entered the school'.³⁶⁹ ZAB's industrial and labour policies had a similar levelling effect.

As it was, the bravery of these activists was negated by the PPP leaders who spent their energy in jostling for position within the party. Grouping in the party was quite visible. For example, one landlord was unhappy to sit with another landlord of his province, as was the case with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Mumtaz Bhutto and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada in Sindh. Moreover, there were rivalries over becoming Chair of the party in succession to ZAB. Kausar Niazi, Ex-Federal Minister for Religious affairs, was to the fore in this, and was backed by landlords of the central executive committee. When thwarted in this, he

³⁶⁸ Mian Muhammad Iqbal, founding member of PPP and Senator (1973-77) from Anwer and Rashid's home city of Faisalabad. He was exiled during the Zia period in London. Interview, 25 January 2013; Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, 12 January 2013, London. Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 284.

³⁶⁹ Aslam Khwaja, interview.

established a new party, the National Progressive Party in 1978, which was the first split in PPP after the coup.³⁷⁰ He along with Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Abdul Hafeez Pirzada had been in secret contact with the regime.³⁷¹ Chapter 5 analyses this. Some of them³⁷² asked the election commission to postpone the election as well.³⁷³ Gordaspuri, Farkhanda Bukhari, and Asif Butt tried to augment their own power by criticising the leadership of the struggle against General Zia.³⁷⁴ In all this, the party was hoist on its own petard.

There were also ideological differences between socialists and the right in the party – and this divide continued throughout the struggle against Zia. The right-wingers, such as the traditional landlords, *pirs* and industrialists, were generally in the driving seat in the party. There was little room for ordinary *jyals* to rise up within the party. The rightists controlled the distribution of party tickets in the election promised for October 1977, but in the end not held.³⁷⁵ The only strong socialist voice was of Shiekh Muhammad Rasheed, but he was unable to get much exposure for his views. Moreover, the gradual resignations from PPP of ZAB's close associates during his period of government, such as J.A.Rahim (first Secretary General of PPP), Dr. Mubashar Hassan (co-founder of PPP), Malik Mairaj Khalid (Law Minister during ZAB's

³⁷⁰ Gordaspuri, *Sheheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*, pp. 299-300.

³⁷¹ Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet', *South Asia Bulletin*, IV(1), (Spring 1984), p.35.

³⁷² Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Kausar Niazi, Noor Hayat Noon, and Hamid Raza Gilani. Ghulam Mustaf Khar from the start a special guest at the Army's detention centre and he later submitted an affidavit against ZAB.

³⁷³ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.192.

³⁷⁴ Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto*; Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai*; Asif Butt, *Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin* (Lahore: Jahangir Books, 2012).

³⁷⁵ Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Pir Safi-uddin, Sahibzada Farooq Ali, Hamid Raza Gilani, Nwab Sadiq Hussain Qureshi, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Kamal Afsar were the panellists in giving out of tickets. Aslam Gordaspuri, *Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ki dastan-i-hyat*, p.284.

term), Mairaj Muhammad Khan (Minister for Manpower) meant that the rank-and-file party workers lost many of their socialist leaders. Instead, ZAB was encircled increasingly by traditional feudal lords and the pawns of the establishment such as Nawab Sadiq Hussain Qureishi, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Jam Sadiq, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Mumtaz Bhutto, and General (rtd) Tikka Khan.

On top of all this, Zia hounded and persecuted all prominent leaders of the PPP, jailing them or placing them under house arrest.³⁷⁶ Nusrat Bhutto and BB were either under house arrest or in jail at this time, and were also banned from entering Karachi and Lahore.³⁷⁷ This made it hard to coordinate strategy between the central leadership and the party workers.

Zia's oppression:

As discussed earlier, the promulgation of various MLOs and MLRs launched a 'reign of terror' in Pakistan. Public lashes and public executions were introduced for the first time in Pakistan. There were precedents for this that dated back to British times. The Rowlatt Acts – known as the 'Black Acts' by Indian nationalists had allowed for summary trials of nationalists by secret tribunals. Public whipping and public hangings were already established colonial punishments. The people of Punjab had been traumatised by a spate of public whippings in the aftermath of the Rowlatt Satyagraha, which was in itself a protest against the Rowlatt Acts.³⁷⁸ Zia's Ordinances and Regulations could almost have been inspired by the methods used by the British. In this way, Zia introduced public hangings, public lashing and the humiliation of alleged

³⁷⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 7,156.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.5.

³⁷⁸ On the Rowlatt Satyagraha, see Alfred Draper, *Amritsar: The Massacre that Ended the Raj* (London: Cassell 1981).

criminals. Zafar Omer in his article 'The Creed of Violence' pointed out how this dehumanised the society, with people becoming callous about the way that people were subjected to judicial violence.³⁷⁹

Amnesty International reported that 161 people were sentenced to be flogged in May 1978 alone,³⁸⁰ and a further 527 on 9-10 August 1978.³⁸¹ Likewise, the first public execution was carried out on 2 March 1978 in front of Camp Jail, Lahore.³⁸² Nineteen executions were carried out in August 1978 alone.³⁸³ Four hundred criminals were hanged during Zia's first eighteen months of rule due to the rejection of the culprits' appeals.³⁸⁴

While on the one hand the regime was releasing political prisoners who were imprisoned during ZAB's period under DPRs, on the other PPP followers were being arrested and tortured under MLRs and MLOs. For example, on 1 January 1978, 11,109 prisoners were released under general amnesty;³⁸⁵ whereas over thirty thousand were sent to prison.³⁸⁶ Many of these were tortured in jail. Likewise, the promulgation of a supposedly Islamic law to allow amputation of a hand for robbery led to three people being so sentenced in Karachi on 29 March 1978, though the sentences were never carried out.³⁸⁷

³⁷⁹ Zafar Omer, 'The Creed of Violence', *Viewpoint*, XIII (33), 24 March 1988, p.32.

³⁸⁰ *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan appeal to ban public flogging, Amnesty international November 1995', MSS 34/4/1/Pk120, MRC, p.12.

³⁸¹ Amnesty International, 'Floggings in Pakistan under Medical Supervision', MSS.34/4/1/Pk7, MRC.

³⁸² *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan appeal to ban public flogging, Amnesty international November 1995', MSS 34/4/1/Pk120, MRC, p. forward.

³⁸³ *ibid.*

³⁸⁴ Daily Telegraph, 'Zia Bhutto ku Phansi dene ka tahya kie hue hain' (4 March 1979) in Ahmad Saleem (ed.), *Jis Dhaj Se koi Muqatal main gya*, p. 175.

³⁸⁵ 'Amnesty International', 'Short Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-25 January 1978', MSS.34/4/1/pk 4, MRC, p.5.

³⁸⁶ Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet', *South Asia Bulletin*, vol. iv, No.1, (Spring 1984), p.42. *Amnesty International*, 'Amnesty International's Concern at Large-Scale Arrests of Journalists in Pakistan', MSS.34/4/1/Pk6, MRC, pp.23-24.

³⁸⁷ *Jang*, 11 July 1977.

The most contentious punitive measure carried out by the regime was the death sentence awarded to ZAB and four other co-accused, who were members of FSF, on 18 March 1978. The sentence was imposed by the Lahore High Court on a narrow margin of four votes to three. The Supreme Court of Pakistan rejected the appeal on 2 February 1979 and ZAB was executed on 4 April 1979. The eighteenth-month-long case was regarded as a travesty of justice both within and outside of Pakistan,³⁸⁸ and it was widely regarded as a 'judicial murder'.³⁸⁹ A day before the decision of the Supreme Court, the regime arrested five hundred second-tier PPP leaders and *jyals* on top of the hundreds already in jail.³⁹⁰ Even under the strictest security measures with double security checks outside the Supreme Court on 6 February, one *jyala* got inside disguised in a military uniform and shouted 'if Bhutto is hanged, I would kill all senior military Generals'.³⁹¹

Before executing him, the regime tried to diffuse his popularity within and outside of the country, especially in Arab countries. The *junta* published a 2771 page-long 'White Paper' on 25 July 1978 highlighting the alleged

³⁸⁸ See, for example, Z.A.Bhutto, *Notes from the Death Cell* (reproduced, online) www.bhutto.org; Ghulam Akber, *He was not hanged* (reproduced, online), www.bhutto.org; Sadiq Jaffery, *Was Bhutto Killed before hanging* (reproduced, online), www.bhutto.org; 'Trial, and Execution of Bhutto, Full Trial' (reproduced, online), http://archive.org/stream/TrialAndExecutionOfZulfikarAliBhutto/TheTrialAndExecutionOfBhutto_djvu.txt

³⁸⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.258. 'Judicial murder' can be defined as an illicit use of the death penalty. The term was first used in 1782 (German *Justizmord*) by August Ludwig von Schlozer in reference to the execution of Anna Goldi: "the murder of an innocent, deliberately, and with all the pomp of holy Justice, perpetrated by people installed to prevent murder, or, if a murder has occurred, to see to it that it is punished appropriately." Voltaire in 1777 used the comparable term "judicial assassins" (*assassins juridiques*). Later, Hermann Moster (1956) extended the term to include miscarriages of justice in which an innocent person suffers the death penalty.

³⁹⁰ NewsWeek, 'Murda Bhutto Zinda Bhutto ki nisbat kum khatra hain' (19 February 1979)', Saleem (ed), *Jis Dhuj se Koi Muqatal se gya*, p.156.

³⁹¹ Widely reported in national and international newspapers on 7 February 1979.

corruption and rigging of the March 1977 election.³⁹² ZAB rejected this.³⁹³ He tried to get acquiescence from political opponents in Pakistan by appointing two or three from each political party into the Federal Cabinet, which he dismissed on 2 April 1979, and declared that a general election would be held in the following November. The declaration of the election was a tactic to divert the attention of political parties, and their workers including PPP following ZAB's execution.

ZAB turned down the offer of the regime to send him into exile with the condition that he played no part in Pakistan politics for ten years, and made no appeal for mercy.³⁹⁴ Dozens of others did appeal on his behalf, including head of states,³⁹⁵ governments,³⁹⁶ international human rights organisations and civil society groups,³⁹⁷ and Pope John Paul II.³⁹⁸ These appeals were all ignored. Many were not even delivered to the President's secretariat by the foreign office, including the appeal of Shah Khalid of Saudi Arabia, which might have

³⁹² Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p.230. The committee of producing the White paper was Brig Mir Abdul Naeem, Abdul Aziz Khan (Secretary Police Foundation), N. Humayun Khan (OSD Election Commission), and Lt. Col. Muhammad Aslam Raja. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated*, (Lahore: Classic Publishers, 2006), pp.1-2.

³⁹³ For details see, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated*.

³⁹⁴ *Aman*, and *Sadaqat*, 10 June 1978.

³⁹⁵ Moammar Qaddafi of Libya, Yasir Arafat of Palestinian Liberation Army, Shah Hussain of Jordan, Amir of Kuwait, Ayatullah Khomeini of Iran, the Government of China, including Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister of China, Syria.

³⁹⁶ Government of Kuwait, Algeria, Iraq, UAE, Morocco, France, West Germany. The head of the Ma'arfi Family of Kuwait, Hussain Ma'arfi, vociferously appealed to the court and the Junta to not execute him, he said 'let the people decide about the fate of the People's leader, and not the military regime which does not have the people's legitimacy. Kuwait Times, 'Interview with Hussain Ma'arfi' (7 March 1979) in Ahmad Saleem (ed.), *Jis Dhaj Se koi Muqatal main gya*, p. 175.

³⁹⁷ Amnesty International on Humanitarian grounds. *Amnesty International*, 'Floggings in Pakistan under Medical Supervision', MSS.34/4/1/Pk7, MRC. The mercy appeal for ZAB, drafted by Mr. Rice Balm Copper of Queen's Court and a Turkish lawyer, was presented to the Supreme Court as well. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'Supreme Court k faisle per amal dramad kya jaiga' (16 March 1979) in Ahmad Saleem (ed.), *Jis Dhaj Se koi Muqatal main gya*, p. 189.

³⁹⁸ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.6.

been decisive.³⁹⁹ Zia was seen by many to be in a close contact with Saudi Arabia and that 'without the green signal, the regime cannot kill ZAB'.⁴⁰⁰ Crucially, the government of the USA was pointedly silent on the issue. ZAB was not discussed in the meeting between Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, and General Zia on 1-2 March 1979. Jimmy Carter's letter to General Zia on 21 March 1979 stated that a meeting between them at the White House would be facilitated if 'without reference to the outcome of the Bhutto affair...as a first step you suspend the program you are undertaking for uranium enrichment'.⁴⁰¹ In a telephone call between the two on 3 April 1979 the reversal of Pakistan's nuclear programme was discussed without any reference to ZAB's case.⁴⁰² As it was, no country called back their ambassador in protest against the rejection of ZAB's appeal. My interviewees saw these appeals by foreign governments as routine diplomatic ones, without substance.⁴⁰³

³⁹⁹ General F.A. Chishti, *Betrayals of Another Kind: Islam, Democracy, and the army in Pakistan* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1989), p.81; Saudi Arabia had already played its role in the release of Maulana Maududi in 1950s from the death sentence given by Lahore High Court. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'Supreme Court K faisle per 'Amal Dramad Kya Jaiga' (16 March 1979) in Saleem (ed.), *Jis dhaj se koi Muqatal Main gya*, p.189. *Daily Telegraph*, 'Zia Bhutto ku Phansi dene ka tahya kie hue hain' (4 March 1979) and *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'Tumam Parosi Mulkon ne Zia se kaha hai k wo Bhutto ku Chor dain' (9 March 1979) in Ahmad Saleem (ed.), *Jis Dhaj Se koi Muqatal main gya*, pp. 175 and 183-84.

⁴⁰⁰ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 'Supreme Court k faisle per amal dramad kya jaiga' (16 March 1979) in Ahmad Saleem (ed.), *Jis Dhaj Se koi Muqatal main gya*, p. 189.

⁴⁰¹ Ambassador Pickering, Paul Kreisberg, and Jack Miklos through Mr. Newsom and Mrs Benson to the Secretary, 'Presidential Letter to President Zia on Nuclear Issues', (21 March 1979) in Record Group 59, Records of Anthony Lake, box 17, Sensitive 1/1-3/31/79 at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc31.pdf> (21 March 2013).

⁴⁰² Qayum Nizami, interview, 28 February 2012, Lahore; US Embassy Islamabad cable 2769 to State Department, 'Nuclear Aspects of DepSec Visit Discussed with UK and French Ambassadors', 7 March 1979, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, NARA, Records of Warren Christopher, 1977-80, box 56, Pakistan II at <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb333/doc26a.pdf>> (21 March 2013).

⁴⁰³ Mushtaq Lasharie interview, Mehdi Hasan interview.

Los Angeles Times
SYNDICATE



4-16-79 PAKISTAN LEADER ZIA UL-HAQ

Figure 1 After the execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Los Angeles Times cartoon image published on 16 April 1979.

None of ZAB's political opponents condemned the sentence, but rather saw it as being in tune with a 'system of accountability'.⁴⁰⁴ Nor did they object to the inhuman treatment of the regime of PPP workers and partisans. They, rather, were looking forward to an election with ZAB off the scene.⁴⁰⁵ On 2

⁴⁰⁴ Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.34.

⁴⁰⁵ News In Brief, *Viewpoint*, 1 April 1979, IV(34), p. 16.

April, Maulana Mufti even said that PNA ministers should now resign as their objective had been achieved.⁴⁰⁶



Figure 2 General Zia-ul-Haq, dancing in real after executing ZAB. Courtesy, Shahid Sheikh Lahore

⁴⁰⁶ Maulana Mufti Mahmood, cited in *Viewpoint*, 8 April 1979, IV(35), p. 16.

Conclusion

The campaign to save Bhutto failed to generate the necessary momentum that might have saved him from execution. ZAB's overbearing style of leadership and confrontational methods had alienated many in Pakistan, and his leftist rhetoric and policies had alarmed powerful landlords, businessmen and religious leaders. Because of this, the political opposition to Zia was not united. ZAB's removal had left a leadership vacuum that his wife and daughter were unable to fill adequately at that juncture. They failed to win any significant allies in the armed forces who could bring pressure to bear on Zia. They failed to generate, also, any strong diplomatic pressure on Zia on the issue from the USA and its western allies. The Zia regime was therefore able to hang ZAB without serious repercussions at that juncture. They failed, however, to bury important aspects of ZAB's legacy. The PPP and its *jyals* now struggled in the name of 'Bhuttoism'. Nonetheless, with ZAB's death, socialism in Pakistan had had its brief day. Only left-wingers had fought to save ZAB. The opposition that subsequently emerged in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) included right-wingers who were once part of PNA.

Ch. 2. Formative Phase of Collective Action 1979-81:

Borrowing from the writings of La Boétie, Machiavelli, and John Austin, Sharp underscored the importance of removing the pillars of ‘obedience, cooperation and submission’ to a regime in civil resistance movements.⁴⁰⁷ Likewise, Ackerman and Kruegler argued that building alliances within and outside of a country against a military dictatorship, and alienating the opponents vis-à-vis an autocratic regime from its strong pillars of support – such as police, army, and political allies – by civil resisters are necessary to achieve the return of democracy in a country.⁴⁰⁸ In case of Pakistan between 1979 and 1981, PPP struggled to achieve these goals. It rallied around the memory of its dead leader ZAB under a rubric that could inspire its supporters and activists, that of ‘Bhuttoism’.⁴⁰⁹

Re-organisation of PPP:

Instead of moving abroad or adopting a quietist attitude, Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto vowed to continue their struggle after the execution of ZAB. Nusrat Bhutto asserted very clearly ‘I’ll fight until the last drop of my blood’.⁴¹⁰ This was a brave move, given that the movement was in disarray after the death of ZAB. He had been the *Quaid-i-Awam* (People’s leader) and *Fakhr-i-Asia* (Pride of Asia) in the eyes of the poor and disadvantaged people of Pakistan whom he had projected himself as standing up for when he was in office. He had restored the morale of the war-defeated Pakistani nation during his seven years in

⁴⁰⁷ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p.34.

⁴⁰⁸ Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.32-33 and 40-42.

⁴⁰⁹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.216.

⁴¹⁰ *Musawat*, 15 August 1979.

power.⁴¹¹ After he was executed, the situation of his heirs – Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto – was comparable to that of ZAB after the debacle of East Pakistan. The PPP's followers were in a big shock, just as West Pakistanis had been in December 1971.⁴¹² In the first meeting held after ZAB's execution on 25-27 May under the chairmanship of Farooq Leghari, Acting Secretary General of PPP, party workers denounced the Central Executive Committee (CEC) for failing to save their leader and demanded their resignation. As it was, only one, Malik Saeed Hassan, resigned from the committee.⁴¹³ The meeting also elected Nusrat Bhutto as the chairperson of the party.⁴¹⁴ The left-wing of the party led by Sheikh Rasheed (vice-Chairman), and Ghulam Hussain blamed the moderate leaders, many of whom were big landlords such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Farooq Leghari, for being culpable in ZAB's death.⁴¹⁵ The moderates had been uncomfortable with Nusrat Bhutto's refusal to bargain with the regime to diffuse its hostility, believing that ZAB could be saved through compromises, whilst the radicals had wanted to undermine the regime through confrontation and even violence.⁴¹⁶ Zia had also given an appearance of wanting to reach out to the moderates so as to undermine the resistance of the PPP in general.⁴¹⁷ Swallowing this bait, the moderates had suggested that Nusrat and Benazir

⁴¹¹ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p.194; Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, pp.94-96; Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, pp.207-8.

⁴¹² Farkhanda Bukhari, *Ye Baazi Ishq Ki bazi Hai* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2012), p.76. Aslam Gordaspuri, interview, 6 May 2013, Lahore; Shahida Jabeen, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Farkhanda Bukhari, 27 February 2012, Lahore.

⁴¹³ Salman Taseer, 'Around Al-Murtaza', *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.9.

⁴¹⁴ *Viewpoint*, 3 June 1979, pp.10-11, 13.

⁴¹⁵ *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.15.

⁴¹⁶ National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, pp.1-5.

⁴¹⁷ Arif, *Working With Zia*, p.216; Nizami, *Gernail aur Siasatdan*, pp.151 and 157. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.164.

Bhutto defuse the situation by leaving the country after handing over power in the party to them.⁴¹⁸

The radical-moderate divide was not the only one in the PPP. There was internal strife between the big landlords who held important positions in the party. Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, two big landlords from Punjab and Sindh respectively, were in conflict with Mumtaz Bhutto and Farooq Leghari, two landlords of Sindh and Punjab respectively.

Despite such serious internal conflicts, Nusrat Bhutto and BB successfully manoeuvred to establish a broad based alliance that bore fruit eventually in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which will be discussed in later chapters. The two leaders were faced initially with leading a fractious and disunited opposition that was faced with a highly disciplined opponent, the army under General Zia. They had to build up a movement with comparable levels of organisation and unity. As Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, famously known Bacha Khan, had always emphasised, effective nonviolent resistance requires alliances, unity, and discipline to defeat the opponent, just as an army does. His own *Khudai Khidmatgar* (Servants of God) were in this vein in their struggle against the British and their local allies in the North West Frontier Province from the 1920s onwards. They wore a uniform of red shirts, took oaths of loyalty to the cause, and divided the force into various battalions to keep discipline and unity under one command.⁴¹⁹ Although such para-

⁴¹⁸ *ibid.*, p.1.

⁴¹⁹ See, for example, D.G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan: Faith is Battle* (Bombay [Mumbai]: Popular Prakashan, 1967); S.R. Bakhshi, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1991); Syed Wiqar Ali Shah, 'The 1930 Civil Disobedience Movement in Peshawar Valley from the Pashtun Perspective', *Studies in History*, 29 (1), 2013, pp.87-118. P.S Ramu, *Badshah Khan: Indio-Pakistan Relationship* (New Delhi: S.S. Publishers, 1991).

military organisation fell out of favour amongst progressive nonviolent political activists after World War Two due to its resonances with fascism, the underlying principle was still good – namely that an ill-disciplined and disunited movement has little chance of success against a highly-discipline ruling power.

Building such an oppositional force was a daunting task in the case of the PPP, as it was so riven by internal groups and factions. Neither Nusrat Bhutto nor BB ever really managed to achieve this throughout the period covered in this dissertation. Nonetheless, they managed to restore party morale in the three years following ZAB's death and rebuild the support among the general public that had been lost during the PNA movement, all of which was a major attainment in itself.

Nusrat Bhutto was expected to observe *iddat* – the Islamic requirement of a widow to keep herself away from male strangers and going out for four months and ten days after her husband's death. As it was, she was under house arrest until 28 May.⁴²⁰ During this period, BB also spent two hours each day meeting the mourners who came to their house in Karachi.⁴²¹ This built her confidence. Though she consulted her mother on each matter, she took administrative decisions on reorganising the party. For example, she decided that the CEC should meet monthly and at every provincial capital in turns. The first meeting was held in the Bhutto residence at Clifton in Karachi on 19-20 May, which allowed Nusrat Bhutto to attend without violating house arrest. Paying homage to her husband at the first CEC meeting, she declared: 'He lived and died true to his principles. He showed how a son of the Indus, a leader of the

⁴²⁰ *Viewpoint*, 3 June 1979, p.11.

⁴²¹ *Musawat*, May 1979.

people, a symbol of liberation, an embodiment of emancipation, a soldier of Islam – lives like a mujahid, and dies a martyr'.⁴²² She reiterated her passion to carry out his mission.⁴²³

Several important decisions were taken at this meeting. Provincial legal aid committees were established to look after the cases of political prisoners and help the families of the imprisoned workers to fight for their release. A drive was launched to recruit more party members at all levels, and it was ordered that weekly meetings should be held at grass-roots level to mobilise the workers. Likewise, the meeting criticised the regime's economic policies as well as the budget which raised the prices of the basic commodities.⁴²⁴ Due to Zia's promise to hold elections before the end of the year, the environment was somehow conducive for holding corner meetings. Utilising the tradition of religious meetings in the form of *Iftar* (Muslim fast-breaking time) during *Ramadan* (9th Month of Islamic calendar), BB advised the local leaders across the country to hold *iftaris* to spread their message to the general public. Taseer stated that this was even converted into a business opportunity, as vendors sold Eid (Islamic festival at the end of *Ramadan*) cards with the images of ZAB and BB. And the most expensive card was thirty-five to eight rupees (US\$4 to \$1) per card.⁴²⁵

ZAB was buried in the family graveyard at Garhi Khuda Bakhsh, and this became a place of pilgrimage for his admirers. Soon after his death, BB herself went by rail from Karachi to the grave. Besides being an act of personal

⁴²² *Viewpoint*, 3 June 1979, pp. 13-14.

⁴²³ *Viewpoint*, 3 June 1979, p.11.

⁴²⁴ *Musawat*, 22 July 1979.

⁴²⁵ Salman Taseer, 'Rambler's diary: The Bhutto Legend', *Viewpoint*, V (4), 2 September 1979, p.10.

mourning, this also helped to raised public sympathy. Honouring a dead person in an ostentatious and public way is a form of protest often employed in campaign of civil resistance, as in Argentina in 1943 and South Africa in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre, with people gathering at the gravesides of their loved ones in an act of protest against their killings by, respectively, Perón and the apartheid regime.⁴²⁶ Visiting burial places in big groups on the death anniversary of a popular leader is another way of registering dissent in a public but peaceful manner. When BB travelled by train to her father's grave in 1979, the public came to the stations at the four stops on the way to Larkhana and shouted 'Revenge! Revenge!'⁴²⁷ She reiterated at each station: 'Now we have all been orphaned. Our father has left us. All of you are my brothers. Until yesterday it was my father who guided me; now you will guide me.'⁴²⁸ Despite attempts by the police to stop them, over a hundred thousand mourners turned up on the *Chehlum* (fortieth mourning day service).⁴²⁹ The mobilisation of such large crowds expressing such devotion to their lost leader was a set-back for Zia, showing that ZAB's execution – rather than demoralise the movement – had backfired. His loss of support was revealed in the local body elections held in September 1979, which will be discussed below.

Once her house arrest was lifted, Nusrat Bhutto ended her seclusion, though the conventional period of mourning had not yet ended. Starting in June 1979, she held public meetings at which she declared that she would never surrender and that it was only through 'people's struggle, sacrifices and

⁴²⁶ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp.155-63.

⁴²⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 25; Bukhari, *ye bazi ishq ki bazi hai*, p.76.

⁴²⁸ *Viewpoint*, 3 June 1979, p.11.

⁴²⁹ *The Muslim*, 17 May 1979. Taseer, 'Around Al-Murtaza', *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.9.

endeavour' that 'positive and people's revolution' could be achieved.⁴³⁰ ZAB's rule had raised people's consciousness as to their rights, and she reminded them of this so as to recharge their resolution in the fight against the brutal regime of Zia. JI's leader publicly admitted that the party had been revived by Nusrat Bhutto's strong intervention at this juncture.⁴³¹

This all demonstrated that despite the death of their founder, PPP was still the leading popular force in the country, and that the nation had become polarised into 'murderers' and 'mourners'. The PPP leader Qayumi Nizami divided Pakistani society at this time into those who were progressive and with the PPP, whom he called '*awam dost*' – meaning friend of the common people – and '*janta dost*' – the friend of the regime.⁴³² This divide stretched into every sphere of life including within civil society, in the media, and among students and labourers. For example, daily newspapers such as *Aman* (Urdu-Karachi), *Sadaqat* (Urdu-Karachi), *Masawat* (Urdu-Lahore and Karachi), *The Muslim* (English-Islamabad), and weekly magazines such as *Al-Fatah* (Urdu-Karachi), *Me'yar* (Urdu-Karachi), and *Viewpoint* (English-Lahore) were mainly favourable towards the PPP movement or at least found some way to report their activities despite the strict censorship of the Press. The dailies *Dawn* (English-Karachi), *Pakistan Times* (English-Lahore), *Nawa-i-Waqt* (Urdu-Lahore), and the weeklies such as *Zindagi*, and *Urdu digest* were on the other hand die-hard supporters of the regime. The government sought to control the media through its National Press Trust. Mehdi Hasan remarked on the daily *Jang* that in conforming to the

⁴³⁰ *Viewpoint*, 10 June 1979, p. 11.

⁴³¹ Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, cited in *Viewpoint*, IV (51), 29 July 1979, p.5.

⁴³² Qayyum Nizami, *Musawat*, 15 August 1979.

official diktat 'their policy is there is no policy'.⁴³³ Likewise, student bodies were classed as either liberal-progressive, such as People's Student Federation (PPP), National Student Federation (NSF), and Democratic Student Alliance (DSA), or pro-regime, such as IJT (*Islami Jamiat Tulba*, JI's student body). In a similar manner, trades unions were split along such lines, with some being in the progressive camp, such as All Pakistan Labour Representative Organisation, others in the regime camp, such as the National Labour Federation (NLF) of Pakistan. Lawyers mainly supported the progressive groups, and hardly any case was reported of a group of lawyers not supporting the anti-Zia struggle. The main reason for this appears to have been that they had a strong commitment to the rule of law, and resented the many ways in which Zia was violating the Constitution of 1973.

It is crucial for organisations engaged in nonviolent struggle to have a strong operational corps that connects the leaders with their rank-and-file supporters and which leads and guides according to an overall strategy. They are responsible for disseminating proper and accurate objectives amongst the masses, and for instructing them in nonviolent techniques and maintaining nonviolent discipline.⁴³⁴ For example, the successes of maintaining nonviolence amongst the public during Gandhi's Salt Satyagraha and in the Danish resistance against Nazi occupation were because of strong operational corps working actively throughout the movement.⁴³⁵ The violence that erupted during the 1983 MRD civil disobedience campaign in Sindh, which will be discussed in Chapter 3, was mainly due to the disruption of the operational corps.

⁴³³ Mehdi Hasan, interview; Aslam Khwaja, interview;

⁴³⁴ Ackerman and Kreugler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.27-28, 38-39 and 42.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.157-211; 213-248;

Understanding this need, BB held personal meetings, speeches, and conferences to develop a strong operational corps. She also directed provincial heads to meet regularly with union leaders and gain their support, as unions were generally relatively disciplined and well-ordered organisations.⁴³⁶ Pro-PPP unions won the unions election during the 1979-81 period and also fought courageously during MRD. For example, progressive alliance and liberal front candidate Rafique Patel defeated IJT's candidate in Karachi University;⁴³⁷ and Quaid-i-Azam Student Federation, a progressive parties' alliance, won in the Lahore educational institutions.⁴³⁸ Likewise, the pro-Jama'at union in Karachi Steel Mill lost the referendum on 7 July 1979 against the progressive labour alliance.⁴³⁹



Figure 3 BB receiving and meeting with PPP's workers after the death of ZAB in June 1979.
 Courtesy SHahid Sheikh

⁴³⁶ *Musawaat*, 21 July – 3 August 1979.

⁴³⁷ *Musawat*, 26 July 1979.

⁴³⁸ *Viewpoint*, 20 May 1979, p.13.

⁴³⁹ *Viewpoint*, IV (49), 15 July 1979, p.16.

BB also tried to reach out to the army by stating categorically that ‘the Generals [Pakistan Army high command] should not live in fear, their names won’t be on the death warrant of ZAB’. However, she added, if they did not return power to people, Pakistan would be further divided.⁴⁴⁰ She said this in an attempt to assure the Generals that she and her party did not want revenge against the army as a whole, and that they had a mutual interest in the welfare of Pakistan.⁴⁴¹

Zia allowed elections to local bodies to be held in 1979 on a non-party basis. PPP did not nominate candidates for the election but rather encouraged sympathetic people to stand as candidates under a broad *Awam Dost* rubric.⁴⁴² The pro-Zia candidates identified themselves by contrast as *Islam Pasand* (devotees of Islam). This group had strong links with Jama’at-i-Islami. Zia himself openly favoured those in the *Islam Parsand* camp in a campaign that he conducted in person all over the country voicing the slogan of ‘*Yeh Mumlakate Khudad Hey – Roti, Kapra Makan mumlakat Nahi hai*’ (This is Allah’s land, not the land of bread, cloth, and a house).⁴⁴³ Zia’s partisan campaign was an open denial of his own Political Parties Act (Amendments-PPA) 1979, passed before the holding of the non-party based elections.⁴⁴⁴ The results went strongly in favour of *Awam Dost* and a humiliation to the regime. The election did not pass

⁴⁴⁰ *Musawat*, 22 July 1979.

⁴⁴¹ National Foreign Assessment Centre, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment’, *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.7.

⁴⁴² Qayyum Nizami, interview.

⁴⁴³ Zia-ul-Haq, 24 September 1979, Lahore, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (8), 30 September 1979, p.14.

⁴⁴⁴ It was the amendment of the Political Party Act 1962. According to the amended act, the official existence of political parties was made conditional to hold intra-party election, submission of financial audit reports, and the new registration with the election commission. Receiving financial aid from abroad, refusal to the Pakistan ideology, speeches against the judiciary, army and the sovereignty of the country were set the causes of the refusal of the registration. The government had to lenient on it after the strong opposition from all the parties. And refined it on 7 October 1979.

off without violence in some places. 18 were reported killed and hundreds injured in different places in Punjab, Sindh and KPK.⁴⁴⁵

The *Awam Dost* panel won more than eighty percent seats unopposed in Sindh. More than 1000 were returned unopposed from six districts of Sindh.⁴⁴⁶ Having turnout of sixty-five per cent, the panel won 60-70 per cent of the seats in Lahore.⁴⁴⁷ Following Zia's threats during the election campaign of not handing over the government to the elected representatives if he felt 'they are not capable of maintaining national integrity,⁴⁴⁸ the regime stopped the sessions of local government bodies and did not devolve political powers at the local levels. For example, Justice Aamer Raza Khan, Lahore High Court Bench directed the Punjab Local Bodies Election authority to withhold the result of Sahiwal until it was decided whether '*Awam Dost*' came under the non-party based election's rules or not. The fact that the pro-regime elements had used the nomenclature '*Islam Pasand*' and declared a common loyalty to the post-Quaid concept of Pakistani ideology, was ignored.⁴⁴⁹ Likewise, the Governors of Sindh and Baluchistan barred the newly elected councillors from taking part in politics, which seemed oxymoronic.⁴⁵⁰ The governor of Punjab, going one step further, told the elected representatives that they had 'to justify people's confidence', immediately after they had done exactly that in an election!⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁵ *Viewpoint*, V (8), 30 September 1979, p.14.

⁴⁴⁶ *Viewpoint*, V (7), 23 September 1979, p.13.

⁴⁴⁷ Loc. cit.

⁴⁴⁸ Zia-ul-Haq, 26 September 1979, Quetta.

⁴⁴⁹ *Viewpoint*, V (8), 7 October 1979, p.5.

⁴⁵⁰ *Viewpoint*, V (20), 23 December 1979, p.15.

⁴⁵¹ Lt. General Sawar Khan, Governor Punjab, 28 October 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (13), 4 November 1979, p.16.

Despite being in a minority and using malicious tactics, candidates of JI were made Mayors of Karachi⁴⁵² and Lahore.⁴⁵³

Had *Awam Dost* not contested, the regime would have been able to demonstrate a cheerful picture of 'democracy' to observers at national and international level and claim that the public supported it.⁴⁵⁴ Cohen felt that Zia was trying to exhibit a good picture to America whilst having little change on the ground.⁴⁵⁵ Despite the regime's using every means open to them to stop those aligned with *Awam Dost* in taking their deserved positions after the elections, their victory had brought great confidence to the anti-Zia movement in the next phase.

The Regime's 'Islamic' Repression:

In an interview with *The Economist*, General Zia explained the reason for his 'Islamisation' programme: 'Pakistan is, like Israel, an ideological state. Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse'.⁴⁵⁶ A new slogan was propagated of 'enforcement of Islam first and democracy' to supplement Zia's

⁴⁵² In spite of the anti-Zia groups having an eighty percent majority, Abdul Sattar Afghani, leader of Akhwat group, and previous National Assembly candidate of defunct Jama'at-i-Islami, was declared Mayor of Karachi on 'technical grounds'; while, Abdul Khaliq Allahwala, leader of United group, and previously attached with PPP, was declared defeated, which was later challenged in Sindh High Court by the candidate. After receiving eighty votes each in the first count, the latter lost due to the rejection of three votes in the second counting. *Viewpoint*, V (15), 18 November 1979, p.12.

⁴⁵³ For the election of Lahore Mayorship and Deputy Mayorship, *Awam Dost* councillors had a majority. However, out of 110 councillors, eleven were declared ineligible to vote due to the cases pending against them. Among the rest, eight *Awam Dost* councillors were told that the Divisional Commissioner had suspended their right of vote temporarily. Furthermore, the candidate for the election, Abdul Rafi Sheikh, was declared ineligible under court orders. Eventually, the buddy to the authorities, Mian Shuja ur Rehman, became Mayor after receiving twenty eight votes out of the fifty-three councillors participating. The *Awam Dost* group chose its councillor in a separate meeting in protest. *Viewpoint*, V (20), 23 December 1979, p.13.

⁴⁵⁴ Ghafoor Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.164.

⁴⁵⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

⁴⁵⁶ Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zionism: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013), p.4.

earlier 'accountability first and election later'.⁴⁵⁷ Much has been written about the way that Zia tried to create a strong national identity through Islamisation and the repercussions of this on Pakistani society.⁴⁵⁸ Opinion is divided on this, with people like Ghafoor Ahmed claiming that Zia was too lenient in his Islamisation, while others depict it as being used cynically by Zia to perpetuate his rule. He started introducing Islamic principles, as he understood them, into every key institution of the country between 1979 and 1981. He implemented *Zakat and Ushr* in 1979,⁴⁵⁹ the Hudood Ordinances in 1979,⁴⁶⁰ the Law of Evidence in 1983,⁴⁶¹ the Ramadan Ordinance in 1979,⁴⁶² *Salat* (prayer) and *Zakat* committees at the grass roots level in 1979; and restructured the Council of Islamic Ideology.⁴⁶³ *Sharia* courts (1979) were established parallel to those that tried cases under the secular law, which was based on the British Penal Codes. Islamic punishment such as amputation and lashes were introduced. His

⁴⁵⁷ *Viewpoint*, 8 April 1979, p.14.

⁴⁵⁸ See, for example, Faisal Devji, *Muslim Zionism: Pakistan as a Political Idea* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2013); M.J.Akber, *Tinderbox, Past and Future of Pakistan* (Noida: Harper Collins Publishers, 2011); K.K.Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967); Golam W. Chaudhry, *Pakistan: Transition from Military to Civilian Rule* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1980); Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History and Pakistan: A New History*.

⁴⁵⁹ Islamic annual tax on agricultural income as well as on savings.

⁴⁶⁰ While the system of law inherited from the British was mute on the numbers of witnesses required for any case, the Law of Evidence 1983 discriminated against women. Clause 18 stated: '...particulars and the number of witnesses shall in accordance with the injunction of Holy Quran and Sunnah such as (A) in Hadood, according to Hadood Ordinance; (B) In Qisas according to the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance; (C) In other matters two men or one man and *two* women'. Shireen Mazari, 'Islamization' and The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Note', *South Asia Bulletin*, 3(1), (Spring 1983), p.79.

⁴⁶¹ Inherited from the British Legal system 1872, it was mute on the numbers of witnesses required for any case; the law of Evidence 1983 brought slightly changing in the law and implemented it. The clause 18 was made discriminatory towards women and put them into half valued citizen of the country. The clause says "...particulars and the number of witnesses shall in accordance with the injunction of Holy Quran and Sunnah such as (A) in Hadood, according to Hadood Ordinance; (B) In Qisas according to the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance; (C) In other matters two men or one man and two women. Shireen Mazari, "Islamization' And The Status of Women in Pakistan: A Note', *South Asia Bulletin*, 3(1), (Spring 1983), p.79.

⁴⁶² That ordinance prohibited eating, drinking and smoking at public places during the timing of fasts (from dawn till dusk) in the month of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month.

⁴⁶³ The council was assigned to advise the regime for implementing Islamic principles in the country.

every step and ordinance was given the tag of 'Islamic'. As it was, most of the types of judicial and extra-judicial punishments inflicted in Pakistan under Zia were a continuation of longstanding ones dating back to colonial times and earlier. Zia replaced the parliamentary cabinet with an advisory council that was selected after a search for fifty *saleheen* (the most pious) to be its members.⁴⁶⁴ Later, in 1981, he increased the number of these *saleheen* to 350. Likewise, he sought to revamp the education system according to 'Islamic' teachings.⁴⁶⁵ Religious preachers were invited to the military training centres.⁴⁶⁶ However, neither he nor his cronies tagged the repression of the people under his rule as 'Islamic', even though it was a complete negation of the Quranic injunction that the slaying one person, unless in retaliation for murder, is the slayer of all mankind.⁴⁶⁷

The incorporation of Sharia' into the legal system of Pakistan by Zia and his allies caused legal chaos in the country. There was already a plural legal system, with the co-existence of the secular law inherited from the British, military law, special tribunals, and *Jirga* (the community councils of KPK and FATA). Into this mix, Sharia' law was introduced suddenly with no proper preparation or training of judges. Instead of providing solace to the public, it rather made them more vulnerable. The Sharia' courts began to be used frequently for political and personal vendettas. They could also be used to undermine the legal rights of the poor. For example, the protection provided to tenants in ZAB's land reform law, clause D of sub-para III of para 25 of MLR 115

⁴⁶⁴ *Viewpoint*, V (14), 11 November 1979, p.12.

⁴⁶⁵ Haqqani, *Pakistan*, p.224. Ravia Kalia, *Pakistan: From the Rhetoric of Democracy to the Rise of Militancy* (New Delhi: Routledge, 2011), p.11,

⁴⁶⁶ Cohen, *The idea of Pakistan*, p.84.

⁴⁶⁷ The verse in Quran has been reiteration of the teaching in Judaism. Al-Quran 5:32.

of 1972,⁴⁶⁸ was ruled by the Peshawar Sharia't Bench in July 1979 to be incongruous to Sharia'.⁴⁶⁹

The Shia community is the second largest sectarian community group after the Sunni in Pakistan. The Shiites saw the Sharia law as an imposition on them by Sunnis, especially the deduction of a compulsory 2.5 per cent *Zakat* on every first of Ramadan from all savings banks accounts.⁴⁷⁰ They argued that the concept of *Zakat* in Islam is a voluntary one. In response, they launched a movement, *Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Jafria* (TNFJ-Movement for the Implementation of Shia Law) for the imposition of *Fiqh-i-Ja'afaria* (Shiites law) alongside the Sunni Sharia.⁴⁷¹ To register their protest after talks with the government had failed, two Shiites members of Zia's Islamic Ideology Council — Syed Muhammad Razi and Mufti Ja'afer Hossein — resigned and the following day observed Protest Day on Friday 4 May 1979.⁴⁷² Zia met with a Shia delegation assuring them that their beliefs would be respected and they would not be forced to accept any law that was against their faith.⁴⁷³ However, without concrete concessions, the Shias were not satisfied, and they reiterated their demands and continued to boycott the Islamic Advisory Council.⁴⁷⁴ Despite the opposition of Sunni clerics led by Mufti Mahmood in favour of a uniform Sunni law for all, the *Fiqh Jafarai* leaders stayed firm.⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁸ MLR 115 grants the tenant the first right to pre-empt on the sale of land.

⁴⁶⁹ *Viewpoint*, IV (49), 15 July 1979, p.7.

⁴⁷⁰ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.128.

⁴⁷¹ *ibid.*,

⁴⁷² Zia met with the delegates on 5 May, quoted in *Viewpoint*, 13 May 1979, p. 16.

⁴⁷³ *ibid.*

⁴⁷⁴ *Viewpoint*, 10 June 1979, p.16.

⁴⁷⁵ *Viewpoint*, 17 June 1979, p. 16.

Seeing how reluctant the Zia regime was to back down on this issue, the Supreme Council of the Movement for the Implementation of *Fiqh-i-Ja'fria* under Mufti Jafar Hussain, called for direct action after the announcement of the national budget for 1979-80. On the call of the Mufti on 23 June 1979 for all Shias to withdraw their money from banks before 30 June, ten million rupees (\$US0.1million) was taken out of banks in Sialkot district within two days of the call, and forty million rupees (US\$0.4million) from Gujrat districts alone.⁴⁷⁶ These two districts in northern Punjab are particularly important centres of industry. *Musawat* reported that a total sum of 250 million rupees (US\$2.5million) had been withdrawn from all over the country during these few days.⁴⁷⁷ The members of the Standing Committee of Implementation of *Sharia'* were asked to resign from their positions. Political parties, in particular TI, came forward to support these demands.⁴⁷⁸ Following a popular strategy in nonviolent resistance, they staged a two-day sit-in in front of Parliament in which tens of thousands of protestors participated.⁴⁷⁹ Eventually, Zia declared that Zakat law would be implemented only after an accord had been reached with the Shias.⁴⁸⁰ In five months, the Shia community achieved their objective through united and disciplined action by their rank-and-file. Unfortunately, the rivalry between Sunnis and Shias that gained such traction at that time stoked a

⁴⁷⁶ *Viewpoint*, IV (47), 1 July 1979, p.10; *Viewpoint*, IV (51), 29 July 1979, p.15.

⁴⁷⁷ *Musawat*, 20 July 1979.

⁴⁷⁸ Asghar Khan, 9 July 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, IV (49), 15 July 1979, p.16.

⁴⁷⁹ Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan Eye of the Storm* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002), p.22.

⁴⁸⁰ *Viewpoint*, V (15), 18 November 1979, p.16.

sectarian-based politics in the country that has remained a major problem in Pakistan to this day.⁴⁸¹

All this was not well received by some important public figures, such as the Governor of Punjab who determined that it demonstrated need for a quick return to democracy.⁴⁸² Elements in the military were also alarmed by the implications of Zia's extremism in this respect, and a few military officers under Major Tajammul unsuccessfully plotted against him in the early 1980. Instead of bringing stability to the political life of the country, the 'Islamic' ordinances and PCO-II thus backfired.

Trade Union Militancy:

Due to denationalisation and price-hikes in the country many labour unions were on strike between 1979 and 1983. For example, the All-Pakistan Banks Officers Federation's one-hour pen-down strike started in April 1979 and continued for ninety-one days. Employees of the National Bank of Pakistan, United Bank Limited, Habib Bank Limited, Muslim Commercial Bank, and Allied Bank Limited were involved in this.⁴⁸³ Inventing a new form of protest, these officers started selling 'protest *pakor*s' (traditional snack, made of gram flour which is mainly sold by impoverished hawkers). These officers remained peaceful and continued to deal with the public.⁴⁸⁴ There were also strikes by the All Pakistan Postal Employees Union (ten days),⁴⁸⁵ the Pakistan Nurses

⁴⁸¹ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, pp.128-9.

⁴⁸² Lt. General Sawar Khan, 20 October 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (12), 28 October 1979, p.16.

⁴⁸³ *Viewpoint*, 6 May 1979, p.13.

⁴⁸⁴ *Viewpoint*, 6 May 1979, p.12.

⁴⁸⁵ *Viewpoint*, 10 June 1979, p.14.

Organisation joined by doctors and surgeons (18 days),⁴⁸⁶ *Anjuman-i-Mulazimeen-i-Baldia* (Organisation of Town Council Employees) in Punjab, including small units of unions such as rickshaw drivers (Karachi) and Sahiwal's women sweepers (Punjab),⁴⁸⁷ and the Fruit and Vegetables Associations (Punjab).⁴⁸⁸ These strikes were mainly due to the price-hikes, with demands for increases in pay and improved conditions.

The most powerful of all of the strikes was by the Karachi shipyard workers led by their recognised union, the CBA, in late 1978 demanding pay rises and better allowances. The dispute was resolved initially when the labour department intervened in favour of the workers. The agreement was however later reneged on by the employers, leading to a resumption of the strike on 30 May 1979. On 18 June, six thousand workers were suddenly fired by the Labour Court and CBA was banned for its support of the earlier strike, which was held to be illegal.⁴⁸⁹ The workers staged a protest demonstration that was attacked violently by the police, with Kaniz Fatima, President of Pakistan Trade Union Federation, being arrested. This all shocked workers across the country as well as their sympathisers, and labour unions as far away as KPK protested in sympathy, and PPP expressed its support.⁴⁹⁰ The shipyard workers and the federation extended their demands to the release of Fatima and her colleagues, the reinstatement of the sacked workers, and a change of management. One

⁴⁸⁶ *Musawat*, issues of August 1979; *Viewpoint*, August 1979

⁴⁸⁷ *Viewpoint*, June 1979.

⁴⁸⁸ *Viewpoint*, August 1979.

⁴⁸⁹ *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.14.

⁴⁹⁰ The Sarhad chapter of the Federation, Peshawar Jan's Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union, Dean's Hotel Labour Union, PIA Employees Union, Mission Hospital Workers Union and Hotel Khyber Inter-Continental Employees Union sent letters to CMLA demanding their reinstatement. *Viewpoint*, IV (48), 8 July 1979, pp.14 and 16.

thousand blackleg workers were hired on contracts of Rs.20 (US\$2.00) per day to break the strike. The authorities closed their eyes to this. Many workers were forced to resume their jobs due to financial hardship, though 3,500 workers continued the boycott.⁴⁹¹ This involved a long and tiring *satyagraha* that lasted seventy-five days until finally the concerned authorities agreed to negotiate. Three leaders – Bashir Ahmad, the Central General Secretary PFUT, Anis Hashmi, Member Central Committee, and Salim Raza, General Secretary Karachi – were appointed to talk with the Federal Minister for Labour, General Faiz Ali Chishti, the Sindh Provincial Government and the shipyard management. The negotiations went in favour of the *satyagrahis*, with the authorities issuing a public notice on 7 August accepting the ‘unconditional reinstatement of the labour without any victimisation, advance payment to release their economic hardship, as well as the liberation of the detained labour leaders’.⁴⁹² The union and the general body of workers unanimously agreed to call off the strike on 12 August.

This action achieved its objectives due to it having a simple and clear set of objectives along with unity in the rank-and-file. The anti-Zia political leaders might have learnt lessons from this on how to organise an effective and compelling protest.

⁴⁹¹ *Viewpoint*, IV (52), 5 August 1979, p.28.

⁴⁹² Shaukat Hyat, Organising Secretary of Pakistan Trade Union Federation, and Karachi Shipyard Workmen Union in a Letter to the Editor of *Viewpoint*, cited in *Viewpoint*, V(5), 9 September 1979, p. 13-14. It is interesting here that a few media agencies described the strikers as *satyagrahis* – using a term associated with Gandhi.

'Real Martial Law':

The debacle inflicted on the Zia regime in the local body elections of 1979 led him reconsider his promise to hold a non-party based general election later in that year. The PPP CEC had decided to support people standing under the *Awam Dost* rubric. Following the advice of five leaders of the PNA, Mufti Mahmood, Nawabzada Nasrullah, Pir Pagara, Sardar Abdul Qayyum, and Sardar Sikander Hyat that western democracy was hostile to Islamic teaching, Zia announced that he was cancelling the general election on the grounds that there was no mention of such elections in the Quran.⁴⁹³ Instead he imposed a new phase of martial law, Provisional Constitutional Order-II under MLO no. 48, on 16 October 1979, declaring it the 'real martial law'.⁴⁹⁴ At the same time, he made it 'quite clear' that his 'is not a perpetual Martial law regime' either.⁴⁹⁵ The MLO deprived political leaders and the public of any political platform, and imposed fourteen years rigorous imprisonment, confiscation of his/her property and twenty-five lashes to those who violated it.⁴⁹⁶ On 22 October, military courts were given more power to try both civil and criminal cases without interference from any civil court under MLO 72.⁴⁹⁷ 100 military courts, including mobile courts, were established as well.⁴⁹⁸ Giving the logic of the imposition of PPA 1979, Zia said that holding free and fair elections were a

⁴⁹³ *The Muslim*, 27 May 1979, p.7; *Viewpoint*, V (10), 14 October 1979, p.13; Zia-ul-Haq, 24 September 1979, Quetta, cited in various newspapers.

⁴⁹⁴ General Zia-ul-Haq, public address, 16 October 1979, *Jang* 17 October 1979. ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.97. *Viewpoint*, V (16), 25 November 1979, p.16.

⁴⁹⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq, talk with foreign correspondence, 27 October 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (13), 4 November 1979, p.12.

⁴⁹⁶ *Jang*, 17 October 1979.

⁴⁹⁷ *Amnesty International*, 'Letter to CMLA Zia-ul-Haq', 1 November 1979, MSS.34/4/1/pk10, MRC, p.3. *Viewpoint*, V (12), 28 October 1979, p.16.

⁴⁹⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'Letter to CMLA Zia-ul-Haq', 1 November 1979, MSS.34/4/1/pk10, MRC, p.3.

threat to the 'integrity, sovereignty, and Islamisation of Pakistan'.⁴⁹⁹ Referring to the victors in the local polls, he said that the voters 'knew nothing beyond the four walls', and were illiterate and uneducated as they had shown when they had elected 'impious persons'.⁵⁰⁰ Without 'positive results', the country did not deserve to have elections.⁵⁰¹

Likewise, MLO No. 49 made the editors of print media liable to severe punishment of ten lashes and twenty-five years of rigorous imprisonment if they published any material or opinion prejudicial to Islamic ideology or sovereignty, the integrity and security of Pakistan, or morality and the maintenance of public order.⁵⁰² Not only writing, but 'caricatures, cartoons, sketches, symbols' were put under restriction also. Four-member committee were set up in every division headquarter to scrutinise print material twice before its final publication. They began work immediately on the night of 16 October, issuing letters of warning, notices, and closure orders on some publications, such as the PPP paper *Musawaat*, *Sadaqat*, and *Newsweek*. A number of editors such as Abbas Athar, President of Lahore Press Club, Salamat Ali of *Far Eastern Economic Review*, the editor of *Sadaqat*, and many other journalists were arrested.⁵⁰³

A government spokesperson told the BBC that 300 leaders and political workers had been imprisoned or put under house arrest in the three week after the promulgation of 'real martial law', including BB, Nusrat Bhutto, Farooq Leghari, General (rtd) Tikka Khan, Sh. Rafiq Ahmed, Asghar Khan. Unofficial

⁴⁹⁹ *Viewpoint*, V (11), 21 October 1979, pp.5-13.

⁵⁰⁰ General Zia-ul-Haq, 19 October 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (12), 28 October 1979, p.11.

⁵⁰¹ *Viewpoint*, V (6), 16 September 1979, p.16.

⁵⁰² *Jang*, 17 October 1979; *Viewpoint*, V (11), 21 October 1979, p.5.

⁵⁰³ Loc. Cit.

reports spoke however of several thousand political prisoners.⁵⁰⁴ There were large numbers of summary military trials. Amnesty International (AI) declared that two-hundred persons were flogged publicly in a two-week period at the start of this phase of martial law.⁵⁰⁵ The district magistrate Lahore declared that 'shouting of slogans, making demonstrations, carrying placards' were also prohibited in the city, and those found with *lathis* (wooden sticks), daggers, and loudspeakers would be considered as being in possession of 'lethal weapons' that might be used against the regime.⁵⁰⁶

Building an Anti-regime Political Alliance

Bringing the various political parties under one banner was not a new experiment in the political history of Pakistan as four years earlier the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) had shown in its opposition to ZAB. It was however difficult initially to reconcile the 'murderer' — PNA — and the 'grieved party' — PPP. The execution of ZAB in 1979 had made the relationship so fraught that it seemed impossible that they could ever come together. The hostility towards the PNA was reiterated in the PPP meeting of May 1979.⁵⁰⁷ Aijaz Ahmed argued that BB and Asghar Khan were suspicious of each other.⁵⁰⁸ Nonetheless, for the benefit of the greater good, a great leader has to forgo personal grievances. Both Nusrat Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto rose to this challenge.

⁵⁰⁴ *Viewpoint*, V (14), 11 November 1979, p.11. *Amnesty International*, 'Letter to CMLA Zia-ul-Haq', 1 November 1979, MSS.34/4/1/pk10, MRC, pp.1-6.

⁵⁰⁵ *Amnesty International*, 'Letter to CMLA Zia-ul-Haq', 1 November 1979, MSS.34/4/1/pk10, MRC, p.2.

⁵⁰⁶ *The Muslim*. 16 February 1981. NAP.

⁵⁰⁷ *Musawat*, 27 May 1979.

⁵⁰⁸ Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983: A Balance Sheet', *South Asia Bulletin*, vol.IV, No.1, Spring 1984, p.36.

The failure of PPP to save the life of its founder pushed them into the realisation that it was hard to topple General Zia alone. Not only had the regime crushed the opposition ruthlessly, but it had managed to win support from important public figures such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar, the ex-governor of Punjab, and Masood Ahmad, former head of the *notorious* Federal Security Force (FSF), who had both acted as witnesses against ZAB. Nusrat Bhutto told BB that ‘we have to outmanoeuvre Zia before he outmanoeuvres us’.⁵⁰⁹ They realised the crucial need for a united opposition front. They also saw that it would be counterproductive to fight the Pakistan armed forces as an institution and that they should, rather, focus on Zia as an individual, gradually winning over his main pillars of support.⁵¹⁰ Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto knew that they would have to take the lead, as they headed PPP, the strongest of the opposition parties.

After the execution of ZAB, most of PNA leaders had been dismissed unceremoniously from the Federal Cabinet, leaving them in a ‘political wilderness’.⁵¹¹ Many in PNA realised that they had limited power and position under the general, and that they had little to lose and much to gain from withdrawing their support from him.⁵¹² There were a few political parties in the alliance that were willing still to back the regime, such as JI, PML (Pagara), due to its Islamisation programme.⁵¹³ However, the PNA alliance was disintegrating. TI left it in October 1977, followed by JUP on 6 July 1978 and

⁵⁰⁹ *ibid.*, p.165.

⁵¹⁰ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999*, p.127.

⁵¹¹ *Viewpoint*, 22 April 1979, p.11; Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.164.

⁵¹² Kalim Bahadur, ‘A Critical Assessment of Internal Developments in Pakistan in the Post-Zia Period’, in Kalim Bahadur and Uma Singh (eds.), *Pakistan Transition to Democracy: Joint Study of Indian and Pakistani Scholars*, (New Delhi, 1989), p.5.

⁵¹³ Between the Lines, *Viewpoint*, 8 April 1979, p. 5.

NDP on 16 August 1978.⁵¹⁴ Noorani (JUP) declared PNA a 'dead horse' and his party celebrated the Day of Deliverance on 20 April 1979.⁵¹⁵

Existing histories state that the MRD was formed in early 1981.⁵¹⁶ This thesis argues that it had already in effect come into existence by late 1979, even though the alliance of parties was not described at that time as the 'MRD'. Major party leaders had shown their interest in mid-1979 in forming an anti-Zia alliance.⁵¹⁷ Smaller regional and left-wing parties were also looking for some big platform to expand their stature at national level and launch a campaign against the dictatorship.⁵¹⁸ The Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP) led by Fatehyab Ali Khan and Mairaj Muhammad Khan's QMA were key figures in bonding the left-wing forces.⁵¹⁹ On the demand of all progressive parties, a committee of four senior persons – Farooq Leghari (Punjab), Yahya Bakhtiar (Balochistan), Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao (KPK), and Abdul Fateh Memon (Sindh) – was set up to cultivate cooperation with like-minded progressive organisations.⁵²⁰ This all fed into the success of *Awam Dost* in the local elections of 1979.

On 9 October 1979, BB invited all democratic parties to forget their petty issues and come together for the cause of national integration, stating that it

⁵¹⁴ *Jang*, 7 July 1978, and 17 August 1978.

⁵¹⁵ Shah Ahmad Noorani, cited in *Viewpoint*, 22 April 1979, pp.13-14.

⁵¹⁶ Shakir, *MRD*; Aijaz Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983'; Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*; Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*; Arif, *Working with Zia*; Chishti, *Bhutto, Zia aur Main*.

⁵¹⁷ Jatoi met with Mairaj Muhammad Khan Chief of Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi (QMA) to request re-joining the party. *The Muslim*, 17 May 1979. BB and Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Chief of a newly established Pakistan National Party (PNP) had a secret meeting on 10 June 1979 in 70 Clifton. *The Muslim*, 10 June 1979. Qayyum Nizami told me that Bizenjo was the first person to contact Nusrat Bhutto and suggested that she should establish an alliance. Qayyum Nizami, interview. Khan Abdul Wali Khan, NDP leader also called for an alliance and 'unity of democratic and progressive forces on a liberal platform' and asked his workers to work to win public support to 'achieve their goal'. *The Muslim*, 10 June 1979. Asghar Khan supported the 1973 constitution as the best for the country. Asghar Khan, cited in *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.16.

⁵¹⁸ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.35.

⁵¹⁹ Both were once the part of PPP.

⁵²⁰ *Daily Musawat*, 28 July 1979. *Viewpoint*, IV (52), 5 August 1979, p.16.

was time 'for all parties claiming to be democratic to stand above party affiliation, to stand to compel the Junta to hold the promised election as per schedule'.⁵²¹ An invitation was forwarded to trade unions and peasants to evolve 'a line of action' whereby the people were enabled to have 'democratic self-rule'. The party also condemned attacks on students in Sindh University and Karachi University hostel.⁵²² It was in this atmosphere that Zia cancelled the promised general election. Zia then prevented any further moves towards opposition unity by arresting the leaders, so that they had to wait to finalise the agenda.

The process was restarted in September 1980, when PPP set out a two point agenda – to form a committee to negotiate with the former PNA parties and draft an agreement between them. The committee consisted of BB, Farooq Leghari, Yahya Bakhtiar, Mairaj Khalid and Piar Ali Allana.⁵²³ Pir Pagara and Nawabzada Nasarullah Khan took the lead in talking with PPP on these points. This was in many respects a return to the situation in 1977, when ZAB and the PNA sat round a table together to solve the crisis created by allegations that the election of that year had been rigged. Now, however, largely the same players (with ZAB's notable absence) were forming an alliance to fight for a larger cause. BB and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan both agreed to restart the dialogue that had been broken on 4 July 1977.⁵²⁴ With much hesitation and reluctances

⁵²¹ Benazir Bhutto, 9 October 1979, cited in *The Muslim*, 10 October 1979.

⁵²² Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, 10 September 1979, cited in *Viewpoint*, V (6), 16 September 1979, pp.12, 14.

⁵²³ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.127.

⁵²⁴ PPP wanted to remove the allegation on ZAB for breaking-up Pakistan in 1971, and the execution of ZAB was illegal. Nawabzada Nasrullah agreed on these points. *ibid.*, p.128.

from both parties,⁵²⁵ they finally agreed on one broad agenda 'Pakistan and martial law cannot exist.'⁵²⁶ Finally on 6 February 1981, three major demands were put before the regime under the umbrella of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy, which will be discussed in the next chapter.



Figure 4 BB chairing the MRD in process meeting in 1980. Courtesy Shahid Sheikh

International Support:

Despite suspension of US military and economic aid on 4 April 1979 due to General Zia continuing programme to acquire nuclear energy, the Western powers did not come forward to support democracy in Pakistan. There was an understanding that Zia provided a reliable ally against the designs of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The *Daily Telegraph* (UK), for instance, was predicting a Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as early as 3 June 1979.⁵²⁷ Left-wing groups in Pakistan were seen by US intelligence to be aligned with the communist bloc, particularly the radical element in PPP that Nusrat Bhutto was inclined to at this

⁵²⁵ NDP (Sher Baz Mazari) looked for more provincial autonomy than given in 1973 constitution; JUP was not willing to release ZAB on the accusation of East Pakistan debacle as well as the rigging of the 1977 election. *Loc., cit.*

⁵²⁶ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.128.

⁵²⁷ *The Telegraph*, 3 June 1979.

time.⁵²⁸ US intelligence reports had suggested that the Pakistani nuclear enrichment programme was reaching its final stages,⁵²⁹ and on 16 October 1979, a high-level US delegation that included Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, met with Zia and his government to discuss the nuclear issue. After accepting Pakistan assurance that their nuclear development was for peaceful purposes, the US government resumed aid in the form of 'humanitarian' assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan.⁵³⁰ The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union at the end of December 1979 led to more positive support being given to Zia as a front-line ally in the anti-Soviet war. The British foreign minister replied to UK journalists who had asked him whether he would shake hands with the dictator that 'he (Zia) was a son of bitch but he was our (British) son of a bitch.'⁵³¹

The PPP failed to break this nexus, as they were continuing to reach out to people who were an anathema to the Western allies. This was made clear after the party sponsored the Bhutto *Shaheed* (martyr) Memorial Trust that announced the awarding of a number of 'Bhutto Shaheed Medals of Democracy' in 1979.⁵³² The medals – in two categories of gold and silver – were given to the individuals who had raised their voices in trying to save ZAB from execution. Gold medals were awarded to President Assad of Syria, the PLO leader Yasser Arafat, Colonel Qaddafi of Libya, the President of the UAE Sheikh Zaid Bin Sultan

⁵²⁸ National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, pp. 2-3.

⁵²⁹ Richard Burt, 'U.S. Aides Say Pakistan Is Reported to Be Building an A-Bomb Site', *New York Times online*, 17 August 1979, <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B17FC385D12728DDDAE0994D0405B898BF1D3#> (21 August 2013)

⁵³⁰ *Viewpoint*, V (11), 21 October 1979, p.13.

⁵³¹ Quoted by Karamat Ali, interview, 15 March 2012, Karachi.

⁵³² *Musawat*, 8 August 1979.

Al Nahyan, and the pro-Soviet President of Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Taraki. Although some westerners who had spoken up for ZAB were awarded silver medals, they were mostly oppositional figures.⁵³³ Such gestures were hardly likely to endear the PPP with the US government and its allies.

Conclusion:

PPP not only successfully reinvigorated itself after the loss of ZAB, but it managed to win over most political parties in Pakistan to its side during this period. According to theories of civil resistance, building alliances among the opponents of a regime is crucial for any such movement.⁵³⁴ The PPP was clearly winning this particular battle. In the next chapter we shall go on to see how this all bore fruit in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

⁵³³ *Musawat*, 27 August 1979.

⁵³⁴ Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.32-33 and 40-42.

Ch. 3. The Movement for Restoration of Democracy 1981-84

The year 1981 saw the start of a new struggle for democracy in Pakistan. Opposition parties and like-minded political groups or parties created a joint strategy to get rid of the dictatorship and restore democratic norms in the country. Announced publicly on 6 February 1981, the movement faced a ruthless reaction from the regime but it was able to inspire the citizens to struggle for their democratic rights. Most historians and political scientists have considered that this movement was ultimately a failure. This dissertation argues however that it was part of a continuum in a 'gradualist democratic' movement that eventually paved the way towards holding elections and ending martial law in 1985. This chapter analyses the structure, strategies, and the results of the movement during the 1981-84 period, as well as, the dictator's oppression of the predominantly unarmed resisters.

Objective and Strategies:

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) had one major guiding principle, namely that 'Pakistan and martial law cannot exist'.⁵³⁵ It issued a statement:

We, therefore, demand that Zia-ul-Haq quit and martial law be lifted immediately; failing which they will be removed by the irresistible will of the people, that free, fair and impartial elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies be held within 3 months in accordance with the unanimously adopted Constitution of 1973 and power be transferred to

⁵³⁵ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.128.

the elected representatives of the people and the interests of the four federating units be fully restored and protected.⁵³⁶

In forming such a multi-party alliance against an authoritarian ruler, we can see parallels with campaigns of civil resistance elsewhere in the world. In the anti-Pinochet movement in Chile, for example, staunch Allende-era Socialists and Right-wingers came together in August 1985 to establish *Union Democratica Independiente* (Independent Democratic Union-UDI), and agreed on one agenda called 'National Accord for Full Transition to Democracy (*Acuerda Nacional*)'.⁵³⁷ There was a similar concord between parties of very different ideological persuasion in the anti-Milošević alliance in Serbia in 2000.⁵³⁸ In Pakistan, representatives of nine parties signed a draft declaration, which they announced publically on 6 February 1981.⁵³⁹ At first, the organisation was haphazard and inept. Bizenjo, coming from Quetta, failed to be included in the collective signing.⁵⁴⁰ Leaders of two Left parties, Mairaj M.Khan and Fatehyab Ali Khan, were brought in at the last minute before the signing.⁵⁴¹ They even failed to devise a name for their initiative, and it was left to the press reporters,

⁵³⁶ Shakir, *MRD*, cited in Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.128.

⁵³⁷ Eleven parties alliance, See Ackerman, and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp.279-301.

⁵³⁸ Initially, Otpor was formed in 1998 by a small group of Belgrade students to oppose Milošević's rule. Later on, the parties that were in sharp conflict were united by OTPOR for the election, with an agreed Presidential candidate, and as a result won. Danijela Nenadić and Nenad Belčević, 'Serbia-Nonviolent Struggle for Democracy: The Role of OTPOR', in Howard Clark, *People Power: Unarmed Resistance and Global Solidarity* (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp.26-28.

⁵³⁹ The signatories and their party affiliation: Nusrat Bhutto (PPP), Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan (PDP), Mahmud Ali Qasoori (TI), Fateh Yab Ali Khan (PMKP), Mairaj Muhammad Khan (QMA), Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman (JUI), Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan (AJKMC), Sher Baz Mazari (NDP) and Khwaja Khair-ud-Din (MLKG). Later on, that draft was shared with other mainstream political parties including Muslim League (Pagara Group), Jamat-i-Islami, National Awami Party (Pukhtoonkhwa) and Pakistan National Party (PNP) before making it public. Jamat-Islami and Pagara group did not become the part of it, as they had joined the cabinet under the regime.

⁵⁴⁰ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.260.

⁵⁴¹ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

after getting the impression from the objectives of the alliance, to coin the name 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy'.⁵⁴²

It is hard to determine the numerical strength of the different parties due to the regime's ban on them. Nonetheless, collating figures from interviews with people who were able to estimate figures for Lahore, it appears PPP members had up to one hundred thousand members there, as the city was divided into ten zones, and every zone had 100 units with hundred members in each. Shahida Jabeen, lady councillor on the women's seat in Lahore said seventy-two councillors out of hundred in Lahore were PPP's workers.⁵⁴³ Other parties had very few members by comparison, e.g. PDP-30, TI-1000, NAP-50, Qasim ML-12, PMKP-20 and Khwaja Khairuddin hardly a single member. Against this, JI was strong and well-organised due to the regime's support.

Between the establishment of the movement and the hijacking of a PIA plane, discussed later in this chapter, the party leaders and *jyals* demonstrated impressive enthusiasm. For example, defying the strict prohibition on any political activity or meetings, Nusrat Bhutto travelled by train to Lahore from Karachi on 27 February 1981 disguised as 'a grandmother in a *burqa* (veil), accompanied by her 'grandson', the thirteen-year-old son of one of her staff. Other members of the alliance arrived at the meeting by various convoluted routes. They agreed to commemorate every key national date with protests, and fixed the first one for Pakistan Resolution day on 23 March 1981. The

⁵⁴² Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.260. The same was the case with the Lahore resolution of 1940, which was not declared as the 'Pakistan Resolution' at the actual meeting of the Muslim League, but was described as such by the press afterwards.

⁵⁴³ Shahida Jabeen, interview, 26 February 2012, Lahore.

Lahore meeting was eventually raided by the police and the leaders were expelled from Punjab including Nusrat Bhutto after a brief arrest.⁵⁴⁴

The planned protest for 23 March was however cancelled due to the PIA hijacking, discussed below. The hijacking had an irreversible impact on the movement as it led to a severe crack-down by the Zia regime. From the date of the hijacking to 14 August 1983, MRD's attempts to organise protests were nipped in the bud time and again by the regime's harsh reactions. For instance, on the eve of Pakistan Resolution day in 1982, the top leadership of MRD, including Nusrat Bhutto, Sher Baz Mazari, Fateh Yab and Khair-ud-Din, planned to organise a public rally at Nishtar Park, Karachi, but the government was able to prevent it.⁵⁴⁵ That gap however, provided them a time to revisit their strategy; hence they added more demands into the movement's objectives.

According to Ackerman and Kruegler, it is important for a movement to have clear and unambiguous objectives.⁵⁴⁶ These not only serve to give notice to the opponent but should also be designed to marshal support from a wide range of groups in civil society, and the public both within and outside of the country. Gandhi had achieved this brilliantly in 1930 when he took up the issue of the Salt Laws despite misgivings from other nationalist leaders. Gandhi's judgement was proved correct, and millions were mobilised in an iconic nonviolent protest.⁵⁴⁷ Unlike UDI's major demand for 'free and competitive

⁵⁴⁴ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.168.

⁵⁴⁵ *Viewpoint*,

⁵⁴⁶ Ackerman, and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.24.

⁵⁴⁷ Denis Dalton (ed.), *Mahatma Gandhi: Selected Political Writing* (Indian: Hacket Publishers, 1996), pp.91-100; See for details David Hardiman, *Gandhi: In his Times and Our* (London: Hurst and Co., 2003); David Arnold, *Gandhi: Profiles in Power* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More powerful*, pp.62-110; Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp.82-87.

election' under General Pinochet,⁵⁴⁸ MRD demanded the resignation of their own Pinochet-figure, General Zia, as well as the holding of free and fair election. Later on, BB learnt by hard experience that it was advisable merely to demand that elections be conducted under the military ruler – whether this was Zia on her return to Pakistan in 1986, discussed in chapter 5, and later General Musharraf in 2007.⁵⁴⁹ The MRD leaders found that their programme was not attracting the necessary widespread support, with the educated and middle classes in particular lacking enthusiasm for their campaign. They therefore came up with a second charter of demands on 10 May 1983 that were designed to attract wider participation in the movement. Comprehending the need to mobilise students, labourers, lawyers, and women groups along with the general public, Nusrat Bhutto advised her Left partners in the alliance to bring them on board.⁵⁵⁰ The charter contained thirty-one-points, which included demands for greater provincial autonomy, assurance of an independent judiciary, guaranteeing fundamental human rights, freedom of press, addressing the issues of labour and the current discriminatory policies against women and minorities and greater accountability of the armed forces and civil bureaucracy.⁵⁵¹ The new agenda sought to demonstrate to groups such as the judiciary, lawyers, journalists, women, students, workers, and seekers of

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.289-90.

⁵⁴⁹ With Musharraf, BB signed an agreement called National Reconciliation Order in 2007. Besides removal of financial corruption cases against her and other leaders, it was agreed that Musharraf would put off his uniform after holding the election, and BB would re-enter in politics. See, for example, Condoleeza Rice, *No Higher Honor: A Memoir of my Years in Washington* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2011), pp.311-12.

⁵⁵⁰ Nusrat Bhutto advised Mairaj M. Khan, a Karachi based labour leader with strong links with radical Left students and Baluchi groups, and Sheikh Rasheed, a Punjabi lawyer to develop relationship with students, women's groups, lawyers, and labourers. Central Intelligence Agency, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the Zia Government': An Intelligence Assessment', February 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1, NARA, p.13.

⁵⁵¹ Hussain, *Politics of Alliance*, pp.129-30

provincial autonomy that the alliance was not a front for power-hungry politicians, but rather stood for democracy, civil and human rights, and greater devolution of power in Pakistan. It was also agreed that each party in the alliance should head it in monthly-rotation equally, regardless of their membership numbers. This was both a strength and a weakness. It allowed parties with small bases, or those whose main base was in the subordinate provinces, to shape the agenda. But it also meant that leadership was fractured and diffused.

The scholarship on civil resistance emphasises that every dictatorial government has its pillars of support, such as police, army, and judiciary that the opposition has to try to win them over by devising a programme that will appeal to such groups.⁵⁵² One of Zia's firmest pillars was as a self-styled defender of Islam. He built on the Nizam-i-Mustafa movement that had opposed Bhutto's secularist policies.⁵⁵³ Zia implemented one ordinance after another under the umbrella of 'Islamisation', and for this he had received handsome public support. His patriarchal agenda and his exploitation of religion to serve his own vested interests did not deceive better-informed members of the public, but many believed somewhat naïvely that he was driven primarily by his religious commitments. So, separating his regime from this support-base was important, and the MRD worked on it. Makhdoom Muhammad Zaman Talib ul Maula of Hala, a respected Sindhi *pir* from Hyderabad, provided a fierce critique of the military regime's Islamisation process and played a significant role in

⁵⁵² Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp. 11, 26, and 43-48; Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.40-42.

⁵⁵³ In response, Bhutto did amend the constitution by introducing some Islamic clauses e.g. ban on alcohol, and Friday as an official holiday.

countering Pir Pagara's alliance with the regime in Sindh. Likewise, when General Zia made plans to hold non-party based elections on the advice of the Ansari Commission,⁵⁵⁴ many Islamic parties, for instance JUI and JUP, turned against the political reforms and declared their support for MRD. While the Jaamat-i-Islami approved of Zia's plans publicly, some of its members joined the opposition.⁵⁵⁵ Preaching the MRD slogans, Mian Tufail, a member of JI, received an extradition order from Balochistan, and the student wing of JI joined hands with the Democratic Students Alliance (DSA) along with the students' wing of PML, PPP and TI.⁵⁵⁶ In this way, the demand for democracy made people choose between dictatorship and democracy. MRD rejected the regime's constitutional amendments under the auspices of *Islam* and managed to build a broad consensus on this stance.

Call for Civil Disobedience August 1983:

By 1983, the situation appeared more favourable for a campaign of civil disobedience. The MRD decided to hold protests on certain significant dates. The first was the second birth anniversary of the movement on 6 February 1983, which would be celebrated as the 'Day of Democracy'. The second was 5 July, the sixth anniversary of the declaration of martial law – to be known as the 'Dark Day'. The third was the 14 August, Pakistan Independence Day, which

⁵⁵⁴ Zia-ul-Haq assigned Maulana Zafar Ahmed Ansari to head the Ansari Constitutional Commission on Forms of Government that was tasked with drawing up a map of the future political system. This Commission recommended that there should be a non-party system in the country. This was despite the dismissal by the Federal Shariat Court in December 1980 of a petition by B.Z. Kaikaus that claimed that political parties are repugnant to Islam. Cited in Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.260.

⁵⁵⁵ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.30.

⁵⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.30.

was to be the 'Day of Renewing the Pledge'.⁵⁵⁷ On the first two such days in February and then in July, public meetings were held, black flags were flown, and black armbands worn.⁵⁵⁸ They were successful throughout the country. On 5 July, several hundred people were reported to have attempted to join a procession in Karachi and 25 MRD leaders and supporters were arrested. However, all were granted bail in a few days. In Rawalpindi, lawyers boycotted the court that day. There were no demonstrations as such, but black flags had been taken down by the police. A planned meeting was banned, so a Press Conference was held later on to publicise the banning of the meeting. Arshad Chaudhry and three journalists were arrested, and later released on bail. In Lahore, a protest meeting of some 200 people was reported as having taken place near the high court. Seven of the organisers were arrested and sent to Kot Lakhpat Jail. They were charged under Martial Law Regulation No.13 Section 124-A, and were not bailed out unlike those in Rawalpindi and Karachi. In Quetta, three students and several MRD leaders were arrested for wearing black armbands.⁵⁵⁹

The third such day, the 14 August, was selected as the occasion for the start of active civil disobedience. This was to involve offering voluntarily arrests in Lahore, Karachi, Quetta, and Peshawar, resignation from government jobs, and withholding taxes in all over the country.⁵⁶⁰ This programme was rolled out on 10 May, which gave plenty of time to publicise the aims and

⁵⁵⁷ *Viewpoint*, 11 August 1983, IX (1), p.12.

⁵⁵⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'A letter to AI on the arrest of political leaders and others on 5 July 1983' 14 July 1983 MSS.34/4/1/Pk 18, MRC, p.1; Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', pp.134-35.

⁵⁵⁹ *Amnesty International*, 'A letter to AI on the arrest of political leaders and others on 5 July 1983' 14 July 1983 MSS.34/4/1/Pk 18, MRC, p.1-2.

⁵⁶⁰ Such tactics are described by Sharp as being a strong form of civil resistance. Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp.219-346; *Viewpoint*, 11 August 1983, IX (1), p.12.

objectives. The reasons for civil disobedience were stated to be discontent with the government in its conduct both externally and internally. Externally, the major grievance was that in becoming a front-line ally of America in the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan had opened itself to being inundated with drugs, weapons and terrorists.⁵⁶¹ Internally, issues such as price-hikes, the implementation of PCO, the Ansari Commission, and lack of press freedom were cited. The MRD addressed also the specific grievances of peasants and workers. They criticised the Islamic tax on agricultural income known as *usher*, which was a severe burden in a year of poor harvests. They condemned the corruption and mismanagement in Pakistan steel mills, discussed in Chapter 1. The MRD also appealed to sympathetic government officials and members of local government bodies to resign from their posts. Nusrat Bhutto advised BB to limit her political confrontation with the regime at that juncture so as to avoid arrest and thus be available to lead the protest.⁵⁶²

After four months of organisation, publicity and propaganda, the protest on 14 August was inaugurated from the mausoleum of the Quaid-i-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in Karachi. MRD's acting convener Abid Zuberi and Secretary General Khwaja Khairuddin offered themselves for arrest on that day, and Mairaj M. Khan and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi on the next day. In all, fourteen people were arrested in Karachi on those two days.⁵⁶³ In Lahore, sixteen political leaders including Farooq Leghari and Major (rtd) Ejaz Ahmed were arrested from Minar-i-Pakistan in front of a large crowd that had gathered to

⁵⁶¹ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p. 309. The dire consequences of the drug culture and weaponisation of society will be discussed in the conclusion of the dissertation.

⁵⁶² Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.168.

⁵⁶³ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 136. *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX (2), p.13.

support their leaders.⁵⁶⁴ Lahore's working women's *Khwateen Jamhoori* Committee (Women's Democratic Committee) came out of the street in protest against the brutalities committed in Sindh against *Sindhiani Tehreek*.⁵⁶⁵ From Peshawar, seventy persons were detained at the Masjid Mahabat Khan.⁵⁶⁶ In Quetta, Ali Ahmed Kurd, former Secretary-General of PPP-Baluchistan, and Rehman Bugti, son of Nawab Akber Bugti were arrested.⁵⁶⁷

In short, there were demonstrations, protest rallies and sit-ins all around the country. A wide range of martial law regulations had been defied, including those that banned political parties, political meetings, processions, and criticism of the regime, the President and the Armed Forces.⁵⁶⁸ According to Amnesty International, there was enthusiastic support for the protest all over Pakistan in the first two days, after which the main resistance continued in Sindh. This contradicts Roedad Khan's argument that the movement lacked national appeal.⁵⁶⁹ AI also mentioned that twenty thousand protestors in Karachi who were protesting nonviolently were stoned by supporters of the regime.⁵⁷⁰ The reports that there had been growing violence in rural Sindh brought a gradual disassociation of other parts of the country from the campaign. I shall analyse this point further below.

In Sindh the movement continued from August to December. Over three hundred bureaucrats and councillors resigned their offices, including some

⁵⁶⁴ *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX (2), p.14.

⁵⁶⁵ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p. 32.

⁵⁶⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁶⁷ *Viewpoint*, 1 December 1983, IX(17), p.14.

⁵⁶⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'Correspondence 16 August 1983', 3 October 1983, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 20, MRC.

⁵⁶⁹ Roedad Khan, *Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour*, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p.89.

⁵⁷⁰ *Amnesty International*, 'Widespread arrest in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 19, MRC, p.1.

members of *Majlis-e-Shura*.⁵⁷¹ 50,000 disciples of Makhdum of Hala blocked the national highway connecting Karachi to the rest of the country.⁵⁷² Although not a member of MRD, *Sindhi Awami Tehreek* (SAT), with its student's and women's wings, still played a noteworthy role during the 1983 movement, particularly in the districts of Thatta, Dadu, Larkana and Sanghar.⁵⁷³ The peasants-followers of SAT – including women and children – went to jail. The youngest was Mustafa Talpur from Badin, who was only fourteen years when he was arrested.⁵⁷⁴ Their solidarity revealed the hollowness of the regime's claim that the masses were united with it under one banner. The name of Rasool Bakhsh Palejo, President of SAT, was well known to the Punjabi protestors, while in Sindh speakers of the Sindhi, Urdu and Punjabi languages all participated, especially in Karachi. Sindhi activists courted arrest from non-Sindhi areas in Karachi like Liaqatabad.⁵⁷⁵ SAT's workers stopped the landing of General Zia's helicopter in any part of interior Sindh.⁵⁷⁶ In short, due to the strong links of QMA with workers in Karachi, and Hyderabad, and significant mobilisation of SAT in rural Sindh along with being the home province of ZAB, the movement spread out from urban city centres to the small villages in the province.

There was however violence in Sindh from day one, and this spread all over the province.⁵⁷⁷ The supporters of Makhdoom Khaleeq-uz-Zaman of Hala turned violent after his arrest, and there was no strong leader to check this. In

⁵⁷¹ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.42.

⁵⁷² Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.126.

⁵⁷³ Hadi Butt, interview, 21 March 2012, Sukker; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.253-54

⁵⁷⁴ Mustafa Talpur, interview.

⁵⁷⁵ Aslam Khwaja, Fateh Marri, Mubarak Ali, interviews.

⁵⁷⁶ *Struggle Published from England, Holland, and Belgium*, March-April 1986, no.17 601/R/23/19, MRC, p.6; Mehtab Rashidi, Hadi Butt, interviews.

⁵⁷⁷ *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX(2), p.14.

Ghotki, protestors attacked the railway station, robbed its treasury and destroyed the railway track. In Sanghar, they attacked a police station in an effort to try to free their arrested members from the lock-up during the first week of the campaign.⁵⁷⁸

Ackerman, and Kruegler warn that the most difficult task for nonviolent leaders and their operational corps is to maintain strict nonviolence by the civilian rank-and-file.⁵⁷⁹ In their opinion, preservation of nonviolence is crucial if the violent opponent is to be wrong-footed.⁵⁸⁰ One violent event, it is argued, can derail the whole movement, as in the Non-Cooperation-Khilafat Movement in India, when violence exploded in Chauri Chaura in 1922, leading Gandhi to call off civil disobedience.⁵⁸¹ In many cases, people were accustomed to expressing their resentment against the violence of their oppressors by adopting their own counter-violence. This is an accustomed mode of resistance. Violence may also be caused by the intrusion of free riders, ill-advised enthusiasts, opportunists, 'agent provocateurs',⁵⁸² and criminals – or *goondahs*, as Gandhi called them in the case of the Calcutta riots in 1947.⁵⁸³ Such groups can easily derail the nonviolent discipline of the movement. A government may try to provoke violence so as to justify its crack-down. This was the case in Mexico City in 1968, where the government planted barrels containing rocks at

⁵⁷⁸ *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX(2), p.14.

⁵⁷⁹ Ackerman, and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.29-30

⁵⁸⁰ *ibid.*, p.38.

⁵⁸¹ Shahid Amin, *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura 1922-1992* (Oxford University Press, New Delhi 1995).

⁵⁸² Mark Kurlansky defines these as 'those who go among the nonviolent resisters pretending to be of them, and invite them to the deeds of violence'. Kurlansky, *Non-violence*, p.162.

⁵⁸³ Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action* (Columbia University Press, New York 1993), pp. 154-55.

the protestors' sites.⁵⁸⁴ In practice, as Schock points out, it is extremely hard to maintain complete nonviolence in a highly charged struggle.⁵⁸⁵ In some cases, low-intensity violence has not badly damaged a movement – as was the case with the Lawyers' Movement in Pakistan, when Lawyers beat policemen at one place and some protestors humiliated a sitting federal minister.⁵⁸⁶ In the case of the MRD movement in Pakistan in 1983, the violence in Sindh hurt the campaign as a whole, even though it was unplanned and against the wishes of the leaders.

The regime was ready to respond to violence with an iron hand. The Joint Security Committee chaired by Roedad Khan that was tasked with monitoring the law and order situation had several meetings before 14 August to make contingency plans.⁵⁸⁷ The Sindh provincial government, however, communicated to the committee that the province would remain silent and in order during the movement.⁵⁸⁸ This provides strong evidence that the MRD leaders did not engineer the violence, as intelligence officers would almost certainly have picked this up and would have issued some kind of warning. Three full army divisions were called in to crush the movement in Sindh.⁵⁸⁹ Air-gunship helicopters fired on unarmed villagers in Sakrand, Lakharot, and Punnal Chandio. Bombs were dropped on Tayyab Thaheem (Sanghar) and Khairpur Nathan Shah (KNS), and there was direct firing at protestors who were near the house of Makhdoom of Hala in Moro. In a rally taken out in protest at

⁵⁸⁴ Kurlansky, *Non-violence*, p.162.

⁵⁸⁵ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrection*, p.xvi.

⁵⁸⁶ Ahmad, *Nonviolent Resistance Movement of Pakistan*, p.63.

⁵⁸⁷ The committee was formed under all home secretaries, all heads of special branches, the Director Intelligence Bureau, and ISI. Khan, *Pakistan – A Dream Gone Sour*, p.89.

⁵⁸⁸ loc. cit.

⁵⁸⁹ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.42.

the Moro incident, the protestors who were out on the road reciting the Quran were run over by army vehicles.⁵⁹⁰ Reacting to the state violence, protestors in Moro and KNS killed 125-150 military personnel.⁵⁹¹ Houses and public buildings were burnt, banks were looted, and railway traffic was disrupted by removal of the tracks. There were large numbers of arrests, with political activists being tortured in jail. A break-out was engineered from the Hyderabad sub-jail by political prisoners in which many professional criminals also escaped.⁵⁹² While the political prisoners later turned themselves in voluntarily,⁵⁹³ the criminals took refuge in areas of *Katcha*, the dry river-beds and ravines that were densely covered by bushes, and started robbing passengers on the National Highways and in nearby towns. The government claimed that between August and December less than one hundred protestors and law enforcements personnel were killed, though independent observers put the figure three times higher than this.⁵⁹⁴ Due to this violence, the MRD leadership called off civil disobedience in December 1983.

Government Tactics towards the Movement:

Rizvi has highlighted four strategies that a military regime will commonly take to counter open opposition by its opponents.⁵⁹⁵ There will be restriction (including censorship) on the press, imposition of bans on inter-city and intra-city travel, threatening and warning politicians of the dire consequences for

⁵⁹⁰ Almost every Sindh interviewees referred to the episode during my investigation. Aslam Khwaja, Mustafa Talpur, interview.

⁵⁹¹ Aslam Khwaja, Fateh Marri, Mazhar Abbas, Mehtab Rashidi, Hadi Butt, interviews.

⁵⁹² Hadi Butt, interview, 21 March 12, Sukker.

⁵⁹³ Aslam Khwaja Interview.

⁵⁹⁴ *Amnesty International*, 'Further Information on arrests and Imprisonment in Pakistan, August-December 1983', 5 September 1984, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 28, MRC, p.3.

⁵⁹⁵ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p. 240.

them of any anti-regime statements or meetings, and lastly intermittent arrests of prominent leaders and prominent activists. General Zia followed all these strategies in letter and spirit. The only effective counter is a strong political organisation from top to bottom and a strong operational corpse. The MRD lacked such strength in 1981-83.

On 27 February 1981 MRD called for a secret meeting in Lahore in violation of martial law. The regime began arresting the main political leaders and deporting them from Punjab under the 'public safety and maintenance of public order'. On the day itself, police tightened security and carried out checks on every vehicle to catch members of the alliance.⁵⁹⁶

The PIA hijacking of 2 March 1981 was a blessing for Zia, allowing him to order a wave of arrests of so-called 'anti-social elements'. In the three weeks after the hijacking the leaders and thousands of MRD activists were arrested.⁵⁹⁷ Benazir was put in solitary confinement in Sukker Jail, and Nusrat Bhutto was jailed in Karachi. More arrests continued over the following months. After the intelligence service received information in February 1982 about a plot to murder some high officials in the following month, there were a large number of arrests. While Zia himself stated at this time that 2,132 arrests had occurred in the last couple of weeks,⁵⁹⁸ Amnesty International put the figure at some 10,000. The daily newspaper *The Muslim* reported on 6 March 1982 and the prisons and police lock-ups in Punjab and Sindh were full up, with the jail administrators refusing to take more prisoners. Although the government

⁵⁹⁶ *ibid.*

⁵⁹⁷ *Amnesty International*, 'Background to Political Arrests in Pakistan since January 1981', MSS.34/4/1/Pk12, MRC, pp.2-4. Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p. 261.

⁵⁹⁸ *Daily Dawn*, 28 February 1982, cited in *Amnesty International*, 'Number of Arrests in February and March 1982 only' MSS.34/4/1/Pk16, MRC, p.1.

stated that the arrests included political workers, drug-dealers, alcohol vendors, and weapons dealers, a senior police officer stated most of those arrested were PPP members suspected of being implicated in a 'plot of killing high officials' in March 1982.⁵⁹⁹ Likewise, the regime started its round-up campaign four days before the start of the 14 August 1983 protest, and arrested four hundred persons on the day throughout the country.⁶⁰⁰ According to AI, several thousand persons – many hundreds of whom AI considered 'prisoners of conscience' – were detained throughout Pakistan in connection with political protests.⁶⁰¹ However, on submission of a written apology, as per Zia-ul-Haq's order, three thousand were released. Other political prisoners were released gradually over the following months.⁶⁰²

Many prisoners were treated harshly, including being flogged in jail. For example, between 15-17 April 1983, 216 men were flogged in Karachi Central Jail on the order of SMC; whereas 130 prisoners were sentenced to flogging during the first week of September.⁶⁰³ In response to such cruelty, the Executive Committee of the Pakistan Medical Association-Karachi Branch passed a resolution on 9 September that flogging 'is not only inhuman, and against the dignity of man, but this can cause serious physical damage and irreversible psychological trauma specially on young people'. The Pakistan

⁵⁹⁹ *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982) MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.1-2.

⁶⁰⁰ *Amnesty International*, 'Widespread arrest in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 19, MRC, p.2.

⁶⁰¹ On 10 November 1983, Minister of Interior Mahmood Haroon stated that to date 4691 had been arrested of whom 2121 had been released since August 1983, and 61 had been killed. Other sources claimed that the numbers were considerably higher, and the death toll double that. *Amnesty International*, 'Arrest of Lawyers in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 23, MRC.

⁶⁰² *Amnesty International*, 'Further Information on arrests and Imprisonment in Pakistan, August-December 1983, 5 September 1984, p.4. MSS 34/4/1/Pk 28.

⁶⁰³ *Amnesty International*, 'Flogging in Pakistan', *Amnesty International*, 18 October 1983', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 22, MRC, pp.1-2.

Junior Doctors Association also appealed for the flogging to end. They also wrote a letter to the British Medical Association describing neuromuscular damage to the victims.⁶⁰⁴ Some *jyals* and suspected members of Al-Zulfiqar were incarcerated in long-term torture cells, the most notorious of which were in the *Shahi Qila* (the famous Lahore Fort).

Although probably not on the same level as the cruelty, torture and mass murders carried out by the Nazis in Germany or by the *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* (DINA) under the direction of General Pinochet in Chile, the methods used by General Zia were not far behind. According to Amnesty International, while torture was carried out in regular jails and police interrogation centres, the worst places for this during the Zia period were the *Shahi Qila* (also known as the Red Fort) in Lahore, *Baldia Camp* (Karachi), Attock Fort, and the military intelligence centres of Islamabad/Rawalpindi.⁶⁰⁵ The Lahore Fort had a particularly appalling reputation as the ‘mother of all prisons’. This Mughal building, with its splendid architecture, was made into an interrogation centre for nationalist rebels by the British in the 1920s. After independence, it was used for the punishment of anyone considered to be an enemy of Pakistan. Those suffering the worst punishment were placed in eight-by-ten-foot subterranean cells in the basement in constant darkness and with only a hole for bodily excretions, with no visitors or conversation with other prisoners allowed.⁶⁰⁶ Prisoners knew that it was morning only when tea and a biscuit

⁶⁰⁴ *Amnesty International*, ‘Arrests, Imprisonment and Flogging in Pakistan (August-September 1983)’, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 20, MRC, pp1-2.

⁶⁰⁵ *Amnesty International*, ‘Violations of Human Rights in Pakistan’, April 1985, MSS.34/4/1/Pk31, MRC, p.13.

⁶⁰⁶ *Amnesty International*, ‘Further Information on arrests and Imprisonment in Pakistan, August-December 1983’, 5 September 1984, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 28, pp.6-7.

were brought to their cells.⁶⁰⁷ One person who was jailed in this way was twenty-year-old Zahid Chaudhry. Arrested on 28 September 1983, he was kept in the fort for five months. He was often deprived of sleep for several days. He was tortured by being made to lie between two beds with each of his hands and feet tied to one bed – they were then pulled apart so as to cause him extreme pain. He was also suspended upside down by a bar that was passed behind his knees, to which his hands were tied, and the soles of his feet struck. Throughout the period he was kept in solitary confinement.⁶⁰⁸ Others talked of burning red chillies being put under their nose, creating a suffocating smoke, and wooden rollers placed on their thighs.⁶⁰⁹

Dr. Aslam Naro, who was being confined there for fifteen months, suffered the longest single stay in that jail amongst all of Zia's prisoners. Many women were also imprisoned in the Lahore Fort.⁶¹⁰ Shahida Jabeen spent seven months there and tried to maintain her morale by chanting '*Das Kore Khain Gain, Bhutto ku Bachain Gain*' (We will happily receive ten lashes, but will save Bhutto).⁶¹¹ Being locked up with women who were there for criminal offences, she and her companions would hold political discussion among themselves to assert their political identity. The majority were put in jail without any arrest warrant or on the basis of a fake F.I.R. (First Investigation Report).⁶¹² Those

⁶⁰⁷ Jahangir Badar, Javed Iqbal Mo'azzam, Dr. Aslam Naro, Shahida Jabeen, Farkhanda Bukhari, interviews. All were the prisoners in the Lahore fort.

⁶⁰⁸ *Amnesty International*, 'Further Information on arrests and Imprisonment in Pakistan, August-December 1983', 5 September 1984, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 28, pp.6-7.

⁶⁰⁹ Some of ex-prisoners whom I interviewed could not bring themselves to describe their imprisonment or the torture they were subjected to.

⁶¹⁰ Such as young Punjab University's students Nusrat Tarar, Summaya, Sabiha, and Hameed Apa.

⁶¹¹ Shahida Jabeen, interview. Farkhanda Bukhari, interview.

⁶¹² Javed Mo'azzam said that the army arrested him on the charge of rebellion against the State under section 211/81; however after his release he found out that the F.I.R was for a charge for theft. Javed Iqbal Moazzam, interview.

who spend time in Lahore Fort were particularly revered in the movement as *Shahi Qila Sathi* (Companion of the Fort). Many suffered life-long incapacity of one sort or the other as a result.⁶¹³

Besides imprisoning and torturing its opponents, the government also put pressure on individuals to leave the MRD. It had its first success when Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, the then convener of MRD, resigned from his position on 21 March 1981, followed by Jamiat-i-Ulmai-Islam (Fazal), who accused the Bhuttos of being devious and plotting the hijacking.⁶¹⁴ The Islamic parties, consisting of JI, JAH, KT and JUI (Darkhawasti) proposed a new alliance to counter MRD.⁶¹⁵

Army generals in uniform were appointed as governors of all the states.⁶¹⁶ By giving a generous share of power to his military colleagues, Zia hoped to limit the possibility of a military backfire against his rule. Although General Chishti did criticize him after his retirement, it had little impact. On 24 December 1981, Zia announced the expansion of his cabinet, consisting of military and civilian members, and a larger federal advisory assembly — the *Majlis-i-Shoora* — of three hundred fifty members.⁶¹⁷ As appointment to this latter body was by nomination only, Zia was able to pick only those who supported him, including sixty former members of PPP who he felt he could

⁶¹³ Jahangir Badar, Shahid Sheikh, Interview. They were rewarded with perks and privileges by the government after the restoration of democracy, and this gave rise to some false claims by people who had not been imprisoned there. Farkhanda Bukhari, interview.

⁶¹⁴ Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, p.272; Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.124; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.259-60. Christopher Jaffrelot, 'A Fruitless Search For Democracy', in Christopher Jaffrelot, (ed.), *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), p.79. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.80-81.

⁶¹⁵ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 132.

⁶¹⁶ General Iqbal Khan, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff Committee; General Sawar Khan, Governor of Punjab. Cited in Ahmad, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.37.

⁶¹⁷ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 132.

trust.⁶¹⁸ Some big political figures were appointed to the Cabinet as advisors without any power of legislation.⁶¹⁹ Maluka, Rizvi, Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko have held that the *Shoora* was appointed according to the Ansari Commission policy of Islamisation, while Talbot points out astutely that it harked back to the sort of ‘consultative assembly of nominated members’ favoured by the British in colonial times.⁶²⁰ The constitution of 1973 was still inactive; political activities and the parties were still restricted and the press was still under strict censorship that was becoming worse. Nonetheless, this action saw some dissolution of Zia’s power, just as the authoritarian rule of the British was moderated with the Minto-Morley reforms of 1909 and the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919. Such comparison shows that the politics of Pakistan repeatedly replays the history of the anti-colonial struggle in South Asia. Zia, in common with the British Viceroy, governed autocratically and repressed the opposition, with the MRD repeating the role of the Indian National Congress, with its campaigns of non-cooperation and civil disobedience. Like the erstwhile freedom fighters of India, members of the MRD took pride in their times in prison – even when the sentence was in fact imposed for corruption. It seems that Pakistan finds it hard to escape this history.

In response to the establishment of the *Majlis-i-Shoora*, MRD countered on 2 February 1982 that ‘it is an undemocratic attempt to hoodwink the nation and outside the world’ and demanded free and fair elections within ninety

⁶¹⁸ Hussain, ‘Politics of Alliances’, p.132.

⁶¹⁹ Ali Ahmed Talpur (Defence), Hoti (Railway), Mahmood Haroon (Interior), Illahi Bakhsh Soomro (Industry), Ghulam Dastgir (Labour and Manpower), Raja Zafrul Haq (Information), Niaz Muhammad Arbab (Tourism) were among them.

⁶²⁰ Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.124.

days.⁶²¹ It also rejected unanimously the proposal of Pir Pagara for setting up an interim government minus PPP under the martial law regime. Rather, they focused on reinvigorating their peaceful strategy to mount a more effective challenge to the regime.

Zia also sought to control local government bodies by banning those politicians who had been a member of any political party since 1970-1. This tactic was similar to the one used by General Ayub Khan to ensure that local boards were filled with people loyal to him. Zia remarked slyly that the parties that stood for the restoration of democracy lacked their own internal democratic culture.⁶²² Some groups in Karachi, mainly Urdu speaking, started a *Zia Himayat Tehreek* (Zia Support Movement) to strengthen the hands of the government at the local level, mainly to counter QMA and Noorani's influence in the city. They were the group who threw stones on MRD's members on 14 August.⁶²³ Although MRD declared a boycott of the local elections in 1983, it failed to stop people voting in any numbers except in Sindh.

Promulgation of PCO:

Because their seizure of power has violated the constitution, every military dictator in Pakistan has tried to force the judiciary to accept their illegal action. After staging a coup they have each in turn met with the Chief Justice of Pakistan to inquire whether his support would be forthcoming or not. If not, he was ousted from his post. Civilian rulers have often indeed done the same. The judiciary has not always caved in, for example, the Sindh High Court gave a

⁶²¹ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 133.

⁶²² Ahmed 'The Rebellion of 1983, p.36.

⁶²³ *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX(2), p.14.

verdict against the coup of 1958 and termed it illegal. In general, however, the judiciary has conformed initially to whoever has taken control of the state. Later on, they have in some cases turned against the ruler. The most obvious example of this has been the revolt by the judiciary headed first by Chief Justice Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui, and then by Chief Justice Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry against the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf.

Despite martial law, the judiciary were considered by many to provide a door of appeal against the unlawful measures of the regime. Under Zia, there were a number of cases lodged in the courts, including the petition of Nusrat Bhutto challenging the validity of Martial Law [PLD 1977 Supreme Court (SC657)].⁶²⁴ To stop this, Zia came up with the Provisional Constitutional Order on 24 March 1981 to strengthen his hold over the country. It authorised his power to promulgate an emergency in the country and disallowed challenges in the courts to martial law.⁶²⁵ BB noted that this order overruled the verdicts given by some judges that that led to the freeing of certain political workers, and stated 'we could be arrested, tried, sentenced and executed by a military court without any legal recourse at all'.⁶²⁶ Clauses related to the 'function of the parliament, elections and fundamental rights were omitted'.⁶²⁷ Certainly, such a drastic constitutional step invited discomfort among the civil judges as they had to take fresh oath under the new order. Nineteen judges of the Supreme Court and High court resigned from their posts rather than do so. Justice Anwar-ul-Haq, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan who was the head of the

⁶²⁴ Maluka, *The Myth of Constitutionalism*, p. 262.

⁶²⁵ *ibid.*, 263.

⁶²⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 175.

⁶²⁷ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 134.

bench who ordered the hanging of ZAB, and Maulvi Mushtaq Ahmad, Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, who sentenced Bhutto to death initially, were not even asked to take oath. Many lawyers also denounced the order and organised meetings to protest against it in Karachi and Lahore, and JUI (Fazal) also opposed the diktat.⁶²⁸ International law associations and Amnesty International protested against the law but all in vain. That ordinance removed one avenue of hope for the protestors during a reign of terror.

Role of Means of Communication:

One of a regime's methods of repression, Sharp underlines, is the control of communication and information.⁶²⁹ Theoretical work on nonviolent resistance that focuses on the sources of power,⁶³⁰ stresses the importance of the media and communications,⁶³¹ as discussed in previous chapters. The newspapers in Pakistan were censored by Zia. Initially, as per the regime's order, they were forced to leave a space blank when there was censored news. The blank space soon became a symbol of resistance – as people understood the reason for the empty space – and the regime, in response, ordered them to fill those spaces as well. The editor of *Hurriyat*, a daily newspaper, placed a camel's image instead, which, later on, became a sign of censored news.⁶³² The print media became under particularly severe attack by the regime after the PIA hijacking.

TV, by contrast, was under the total control of the government. Indeed, TV became an instrument of propaganda for Zia's Islamisation programme.

⁶²⁸ *Daily Jang*, 27 March 1981.

⁶²⁹ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p.538.

⁶³⁰ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, p.11.

⁶³¹ See, for example, Peter and Ackerman, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.31.

⁶³² Aslam Khwaja, interview.

From January 1984, the Pakistan Television, state-run TV, aired news in Arabic as well.⁶³³ Women presenters had to wear dupatta/hijab, and around a hundred TV advertisements, such ones for lotion and soap, were banned due to their alleged sexual appeal.⁶³⁴

Continuous with their persistent opposition to the Press and Publication Ordinances and demand for the restoration of democracy in the country, journalists kept on joining the anti-Zia political forces during 1981-84, and supported civil disobedience. Supporters of the MRD had difficulty in publicizing their objections to the regime. Sayeed's argument that there was comprehensive media coverage on the movement was based on English newspapers, *Daily Dawn*, *The Muslim*, *The Times of India*, and *The Times* (London), and the *Weekly Viewpoint* alone.⁶³⁵ These had a limited readership in Pakistan. Otherwise, as Cohen argues,⁶³⁶ the mainstream media posed a pin-drop silence over the launch of MRD during the first whole week⁶³⁷ and remained deaf to the movement in general. *Aman*, and *Sadaqat* (Karachi based daily newspapers) were somehow the provider of news in Urdu. Later on in January 1984, SAT started the publication of their own Organizational Magazine

⁶³³ C.G.P. Rakisits, 'Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government's and the Opposition's Approaches', *Pacific Affairs*, 61(1), Spring 1988, p.80.

⁶³⁴ Mehtab A. Rashidi, Interview, 16 March 2012; Karachi. *Daily Jang*, 17 July 1977. A Motion Picture Ordinance – the first of its kind – prohibited watching uncensored and obscene Indian films on a videocassette. 17 people, men and women in Multan were sentenced to 15 lashes and various other forms of punishment including fines and imprisonment for this offence. *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982)', December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, p.5.

⁶³⁵ Khalid B. Sayeed, 'Pakistan in 1983: Internal Stresses More Serious than External Problems', *Asian Survey*, 24(2), A Survey of Asia in 1983: Part-II (February 1984), pp.222-23.

⁶³⁶ Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: Staying On', *Asian Survey*, 22(2), A Survey of Asia in 1981: Part II (February 1982), p.138; Richter, 'Pakistan in 1984: Digging In', *Asian Survey*, 25 (2), A Survey of Asia in 1984: Part II (February 1985), p.148.

⁶³⁷ Hussain, *Politics of Alliances*, p.130. And, this is what I experienced during my newspapers' archive research in Pakistan. The dailies *Jang*, and *Nawai-Waqt* were blank on the news.

Parore to spread the message of the movement to the larger public in rural Sindh.⁶³⁸ The BBC was thought to be an effective source of information during this period. However, according to Anwer Abbasi, the BBC-Urdu service, the biggest source for a supposedly objective coverage,⁶³⁹ depicted the Civil Disobedience campaign as a rebellion of Sindh against the State. BBC reported that ‘four tribes of Sindh – Khoso, Jamali, and Jatoi – were revolting against the regime’.⁶⁴⁰ Such coverage generated negative propaganda for listeners outside the province and internationally.

Protest movements have historically found ways around this, such as through secret presses and cyclostyled newsheets – e.g. the *Satyagraha Patrikas* during the Bardoli *Satyagraha* of 1928, the carrying of significant symbols and signs such as a twig, by leaflets writing, or even, as in Argentina, writing ‘where are our disappeared children?’ on currency notes.⁶⁴¹ The same sort of methods were used in Pakistan. The resisters publicised their activities by word of mouth, short pamphlets and the secretly-published weekly magazines *Al-Fatah* and *Me’yar*. Irshad Rao, editor of *Al-Fatah*, and forty workers including journalists were rounded up in the wake of the discovery of what the police described as this ‘clandestine publication group’ that published anti-state literature.⁶⁴² During *Jail Bharo Tehreek*, ten journalists courted

⁶³⁸ Mustafa Talpur, Fateh Marri, interviews.

⁶³⁹ Almost every worker and leader in interviews referred to BBC for objective news and analysis.

⁶⁴⁰ Anwer Abbasi Naqvi, cited in Shakir, *MRD*, p. 108.

⁶⁴¹ Ackerman, and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, p.272.

⁶⁴² *Amnesty International*, ‘Background to Political Arrests in Pakistan since January 1981’, MSS.34/4/1/Pk12, MRC, p.2. Mushtaq Lasharie, one of the distributors, told me that Irshad Rao and the group would publish *Musawat* in the underground press, but they would stamp Dubai as its place of publication. They were the group who were part of the Al-Zulfiqar terrorists’ activities. And, most of the prisoners exchanged after the PIA hijacking were among them. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

arrest each day against the law.⁶⁴³ Responding to my question how they managed to spread the word in the face of the regime's strict surveillance, some members of PPP's occupational corps responded that they adopted various creative ways to dodge the security agencies.⁶⁴⁴ A few of the tactics used were sending invitations of a relatives' wedding to party workers, gathering for birthday parties, and visiting on the death of some worker's relatives in the guise of mourners. This was called *Seena Gazette* (chest gazette, word of mouth).⁶⁴⁵ Taj Haider⁶⁴⁶ told me that they even organised a mock death ceremony when an emergency meeting was required to organise a protest, and they met at a mock grave. That grave was also used to hide many wanted workers.

There was an ongoing struggle over the question of the Islamisation of literature. This was a long-standing issue in Pakistan. *Fatwas* had been issued against the supposedly objectionable literature written by Muslims since the 1930's.⁶⁴⁷ There was a fresh discussion on this after the establishment of Pakistan. During the 1950s, Jamat-i-Islami propagated the idea of 'Islamic literature' and people began to show their commitment to this ideal by sending greeting cards with images of date trees and camels – which were symbols of Arab culture – and so on. Zia took this agenda up with enthusiasm. The writing

⁶⁴³ Abbas Athar, Ahmad Faraz, Shahid Mahmood Nadeem, Fehmida Riaz, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Shuhrat Bukhari, Farigh Bukhari, Hamraz Ahsan, and many TV and theatre artists were among them. Journalist Rehmat Shah Afridi went to jail and was exiled later on. Waris Shah also wrote against Martial Law and faced severe repercussions. Naheed, 'Urdu Adab aur Sahafat'.

⁶⁴⁴ Sheikh Shahid, Shahida Jabeen, Javed Iqbal Moazzam.

⁶⁴⁵ Interviewed, Qazi Sultan Mahmood, 17/04/12, Islamabad.

⁶⁴⁶ Taj Haider, interview.

⁶⁴⁷ Rubaiyat of Yaas Yagana Changaizi published in Sidq-Jadeed Lakhnow, Abdul Haleem Josh's work 'Dil Gudaz', Sultan Haider Josh's 'Masawat Mard-o-Zun'. (Kishwar Naheed, Urdu Adab aur Sahafat', *Daily e-Jang*, 13 October 2012, <<http://e.jang.com.pk/10-13-2012/pindi/page6.asp>> 13 October 2012.

of *Hamd-o-Na'at* (verses praising Allah and Muhammad, the Prophet) were projected as exemplary literature, while supposedly anti-Islamic writing was censored. The latter included the seminal work of Manto,⁶⁴⁸ and even Quranic verses that talked of the rights of women and wives.

Many writers and journalists had to go to exile because of the hardship they were facing; even then, they did not stop fighting against the draconian laws in exile. On producing a cartoon of Zia-ul-Haq's and describing him as 'cruel', Dr. Abdul Hameed Khan had to flee from one place to the other from the police to save his life.⁶⁴⁹ Likewise, three lecturers of Quaid-i-Azam University,⁶⁵⁰ the President of the Karachi University Teachers' Association,⁶⁵¹ three professors of Punjab University, and two senior professors in Baluchistan University were arrested for distributing and possessing what the government called 'subversive' literature and charged with sedition and unlawful political activity.⁶⁵²

Satirical political songs and poetry are also recognised methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion. Giving the example of such songs, Sharp states that fourteenth-century France witnessed songs against prevailing corruption among the clergy and nobility of that time. In this context, he mentions the Buddhist struggle in South Vietnam in 1963.⁶⁵³ In South Asia, such

⁶⁴⁸ Sa'adat Hassan Manto (1912-1955) was a famous short stories writer, who was tried for obscenity for his writing six times in total. Last year, he was posthumously awarded the Nishan-i-Imtiaz, the highest honour that can be conferred by the State of Pakistan.

⁶⁴⁹ Naheed, 'Urdu Adab aur Sahafat'.

⁶⁵⁰ Jamil Omar, Tariq Ahsan, and Mohammad Salim in November 1983.

⁶⁵¹ Amnesty International, 'Arrest of Dr. Hasan Zafar Arif – Pakistan', 25 October 1984, p.1-2. MSS 34/4/1/Pk 29, MRC.

⁶⁵² Amnesty International declared them Prisoner of Conscience. *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Special Action-Update No.1', MSS.34/4/1/Pk 15, MRC, p.1. Rasheed Khalid, interview, 21 April 2012, Islamabad.

⁶⁵³ Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, pp.149-152.

satire has a particular emotional appeal. In Muslim culture, *Mushaira* (poetic symposium), and *Mursiya* (elegiac poem) are very important for disseminating ideas that can be adverse to social or political norms. T. Graham Bailey⁶⁵⁴ stated that *Mursiyas* historically narrate the story of the death of Imam Hussain, grandson of Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w); however, Muhammad Husain Zamir (Delhi) incorporated the historical events such as ‘accounts of battles, individual heroes, and their prowess’ with the view to increase religious fervour. Marxist poets in Pakistan, Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Habib Jalib, disseminated dissident ideas in this way during movements. The most popular poems of Habib Jalib,⁶⁵⁵ *Dastur* (Norms/Constitution), *Main Nahi manta, Main nahi janta* (I do not accept, I do not comprehend), presented during the anti-Ayub movement, and *Dunya ki Tareekh Gwah hi, adal bina jamhoor na hoga* (World’s history is witness that democracy without justice does not prevail) by Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan during the Lawyers’ Movement invigorated the supporters of that time. So did *dastur* and other poetry during MRD.⁶⁵⁶ Talbot has elaborated the Sindhi literary resistance of the MRD, Sindhi *Mursiyas* of Khaki Juyo (MRD), Jameel Somro (Fateh Mulk) or Ahmed Faraz’s Urdu poem *Paishawur Qatilo tum sipahi nahi* (Professional killers! You are not soldiers), regarding MRD were a few popular verses.⁶⁵⁷ However, portraying the struggle of BB in poetry, Jalib’s poem named *Nihati Larki* (unarmed girl) ‘*Darte hain bandooqon wale ik nehti*

⁶⁵⁴ See, for example, T.M.Grahame, *The History of Urdu Literature* (online, 1932), pp. 60-69. <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00Urduhindilinks/bailey/bailey.html>> 20 May 2014

⁶⁵⁵ He was also a member of NDP. He produced this poem during the Ayub Khan period.

⁶⁵⁶ Mehdi Hasan, Aslam Khwaja, Mazhar Abbas, Dr. Riaz Shaikh, interviews.

⁶⁵⁷ Short stories include Afzal Tauseef ‘Testimony’, Badar Abro’s ‘Furnace Days’, Siraj’s ‘The Eight Men’, Niaz Hamayooni’s ‘Love for Homeland’, and Rashid Hasan Rana’s Punjabi poem ‘Faceless People’, translated into English by H. Rahman (ed.), *Resistance Literature*, cited in Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.253 and 259.

larki se, phele hain himmat ke ujale ik nihati larki se' (armed men have a fear from an *unarmed* girl, the dawn of uprising has been spread by an *unarmed* struggle)⁶⁵⁸ became the talk of the resistance. It was a masterpiece of art that rejuvenated discontent against the dictatorship.

Civil Society On Board:

According to civil resistance scholars, defining a clear objective, as mentioned in Chapter 1, is the key to success of a movement.⁶⁵⁹ Good examples of effective demands were those of Solidarity in Poland for independent trade unions or in Argentina for 'disappeared' sons to be produced alive. Aijaz Ahmed, Hussain and the analysts at the US Embassy argued that there were too many disparate objectives in the MRD campaign, which led to a dilution of the protest movement. There was the demand of workers for nationalisation and union rights, the demand of journalists for an end to the Press and Publication Ordinances, the demand of progressive students for strong action against the hooliganism of IJT on campuses across the country, the grievances of lawyers over PCO 1979, and progressive women over the Islamisation programme. Hussain has argued that MRD needed to find a way to unite these various demands, and its failure to do so was a reason for its lack of success during its initial phase.⁶⁶⁰

It is the argument of this dissertation that such an argument is overstated. The MRD leadership was aware of the need for a clear objective and they chalked out their plan of action and deployed people to follow up these

⁶⁵⁸ Mujahid Brelvi, *Fasana Raqam Karain*, (Lahore, Jamhoori Publications, 2010), p.47.

⁶⁵⁹ Ackerman and Kreugler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.24.

⁶⁶⁰ Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p. 130; Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, p.6; Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', pp.28-36.

actions. Important dates of commemoration were marked for increasing pressure on the regime. The various demands of specific civil society groups fed into this, strengthening the movement as a whole. As it is, many powerful civil resistance movements have incorporated multiple demands under a single umbrella. The Civil Disobedience Movement led by Gandhi in 1930-31 was inaugurated, for example, with a list of eleven demands that were designed to appeal to a wide range of different groups in India. Gandhi then focused on breaking the salt laws, but his followers in various parts of India took up a range of grievances, including high land taxes and agrarian rents.⁶⁶¹ None of this weakened the movement – rather, the multiple issues that it catered for actually strengthened its power, bringing the British to the negotiating table in March 1931.

In Pakistan, a number of grievances were expressed through the movement. In the case of the lawyers, there was a strike by those in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar on 2 March 1981, in which they demanded the restoration of democracy.⁶⁶² In response, the regime promulgated ‘Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Ordinance’ that prohibited Bar Associations and Bar Council members from ‘indulging in any political activity, directly or indirectly’ on 15 July 1982.⁶⁶³ The lawyers responded by announcing a series of actions across the country. A boycotts of courts, and resignations from bar councils starting from 21 July. Two thousand lawyers attended an All Pakistan Lawyers Convention in Lahore on 7 October demanding the restoration of civil

⁶⁶¹ Arnold, *Gandhi*, pp. 144-51.

⁶⁶² *The Muslim*, 3 March 1981.

⁶⁶³ *Amnesty International*, ‘Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982), December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3.

liberties and immediate lifting of Martial Law, with transfer of power to elected representatives. This all related to key MRD demands. The convention established a National Coordinating Committee of Lawyers (NCCL) 'to implement resolutions passed during the convention'.⁶⁶⁴ Students and workers afterwards joined them in the procession.⁶⁶⁵ Several lawyers were arrested between 8 and 19 October. 19 October 1983 was organised as a day of protest by lawyers and the Bar Associations were urged to hold their own meetings and processions defying MLRs. On that day, 100 lawyers protested in Karachi and ten were arrested. The Pakistan Bar Association issued a public statement that arrested lawyers should not defend themselves before the courts due to the lack of 'facilities for justice'. Likewise, in the following year, lawyers participated in the call of MRD for civil disobedience, and many were arrested under MLR 33 and 53.⁶⁶⁶

William L. Richter has argued that religious parties – mainly IJT and Anjuman-i-Tulbai-Islam (ATI) – were growing in popularity in educational institutions at this time.⁶⁶⁷ The argument in this dissertation is otherwise. While it might appear that Richter's argument is validated by the fact that the Peoples' Student Federation (PPP's student wing) was defeated in students' bodies' election in Punjab and Sindh in December 1983,⁶⁶⁸ in the case of Punjab out of 275 seats, independent candidates stood first in winning forty per cent of

⁶⁶⁴ *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982)', December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3; *Amnesty International*, 'Arrest of Lawyers in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 23, MRC.

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⁶⁶⁶ Details in this paragraph, and quotes from *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982)', December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.5-5; *Amnesty International*, 'Arrest of Lawyers in Pakistan' MSS 34/4/1/Pk 23, MRC.

⁶⁶⁷ William L. Richter, 'Pakistan in 1984: Digging In', *Asian Survey*, 25 (2), A Survey of Asia in 1984: Part II (February 1985), p.148.

⁶⁶⁸ In KPK and Baluchistan, student unions were banned since early 1983.

the seats, whilst IJT and ATI took second and third place. PSF stood the fourth in line, winning eight presidential and vice-presidential seats.⁶⁶⁹ As it was, PSF backed independent candidates in places such as Lahore and Rawalpindi to avoid violent confrontations with the notorious 'Black Eagle squad', the weaponised group of IJT – Ghafoor Ahmed. Hence stating that the progressive students were severely defeated in these elections was only one side of the coin. Otherwise, the progressive students courageously fought the hooliganism of IJT and the oppression of the regime towards them. For example, the ordinance of 1981 that authorised tighter control by the regime over educational institutions, led to countrywide protests and strikes.⁶⁷⁰ Along lines similar to the lawyers, progressive students came together and established Students Action Committee (SAC).⁶⁷¹

Amnesty International reported of the regime's support to IJT by providing evidence that twenty seven IJT's students were arrested in Lahore in March 1984 but set free on 4 June 1984. By contrast, three students detained since March 1981 – Imdad Hussain, Sher Muhammad and Mohammad Khan -- were sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and 10 lashes by the Special Military Court in Hyderabad in November 1982.⁶⁷² Responding to the peaceful protests and strikes, the government gradually banned student unions.⁶⁷³ However, the ban on the student union later backfired as JI opposed it strongly and made it a

⁶⁶⁹ *Viewpoint*, 29 December 1983, XI(21), p.13.

⁶⁷⁰ Cohen, and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: Staying On', *Asian Survey*, 22(2), A Survey of Asia in 1981: Part II (February 1982), p.138.

⁶⁷¹ National Student Organisation, National Student Federation, People's Student Federation and various groups of Balochistan Student Organisation.

⁶⁷² *Amnesty International* 'The alleged Torture and Ill-Treatment of Students in Police Custody', 15 June 1984, MSS 34/4/1/Pk 26. MRC.

⁶⁷³ In Baluchistan and KPK in April 1983, and Punjab and Sindh in February 1984 after clashes between opposing student groups. *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982), December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3.

reason for joining the struggle of MRD at a later stage, as discussed in the next chapter.

Eleven major trade union federations formed an alliance to struggle jointly for the rights of workers on 2 August 1983. Amongst the eleven point manifesto – price-control, fixation of minimum, inflation-related wages, jobless allowances, end of feudalism, and land reforms – the chief demand was for the restoration of the 1973 constitution and fundamental rights.⁶⁷⁴

Progressive women were involved in a fight against the discriminatory ‘Islamisation’ process. This was initiated by the Pakistan Women Lawyers’ Association and it culminated in the establishment of the Women Action Front (WAF) in 1983. There was resistance to the Hudood Ordinances and the new Law of Evidence, both of which made women submissive to the regime as well as to the patriarchal society at large. Besides these campaigns, some women associated with MRD spread the MRD’s message at an international level as well.⁶⁷⁵ These women’s organisations represented, however, a relatively small elite, and they failed to bring out the mass of women into the streets.

Sympathy in the Army:

The demand for the restoration of democracy received support from some members of the armed forces. Seventeen officers, civil and military, and a lawyer were tried by the regime on an allegation that they were plotting to mount a coup.⁶⁷⁶ One of the convicted soldiers, F.M. Shahzad (Sq. Leader-Air

⁶⁷⁴ *Viewpoint*, 11 August 1983, IX (1), p.30.

⁶⁷⁵ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition’, March 1984, p.6.

⁶⁷⁶ Lt. Colonel (Col.) Khalid Mahmood; Lt. Col. M Iqbal; Squadron (Sq.) Leader, Tahir Maqsood; Sq Leader M. Ismail; Major M. Sadiq; Major Akber Niazi; Lt Col M Akhter Shirazi; Sq Leader Shehzad Khan; Sq leader Karim Khan; Major Nisar Hussain; Major Abdul Qayyum; Major Aftab Ahmed; Major

Force) denied that there was any such plot, and that they had rather launched a campaign that they called *Soldiers for the Restoration of Democracy* (SRD).⁶⁷⁷ Historians have been either silent about this episode or have treated it according to the official line of that time.⁶⁷⁸ The regime claimed that information was received of a plot by soldiers to stage a coup, and Operation Galaxy was mounted near Indian border to arrest the culprits.⁶⁷⁹ They were prosecuted under three charges — waging war against Pakistan with the help of India, conspiring to overthrow the ‘legal’ government of the country, and concealing information about the conspiracy.⁶⁸⁰ The resulting trial was called Attock Conspiracy Case-II. 17 were tried, while five of those arrested became approvers who testified for the prosecution after being subjected to torture. Amnesty International reported that ‘the officers were subject to torture to confess their crime by stuffing chillies into their anus, electric shocks, strapped

Waseem Ahmed; Major Athar Ali; Major Zulfiqar Ali; Major Munir Ahmed Parvez; Major Adul Razzaq; Major Javed; Capt. Syed Sibtain; Major M Khalid; Major Mustafa Kamal; DIG, Mian Zaheer Ahmed; Inspector Riasat Ali; Raza Kazim, an advocate. *Amnesty International*, ‘Trial of Military Officers’, 31 July 1985, MSS 34/4/1/Pk42, MRC, pp.1-2. F.M.Shahzad, interview, 22 February 2012, Lahore.

⁶⁷⁷ F.M.Shahzad, interview.

⁶⁷⁸ Rizvi, for example, highlighted their arrest in 1984 at the Indian border while attempting to smuggle in weapons with the purpose of overthrowing Zia’s regime. Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p.241.

⁶⁷⁹ Jabbar Mirza, ‘Pakistan k Tarikhi Operations’, *Daily Jang*, 20 June 2014. F.M.Shahzad claimed that they were accused falsely of smuggling arms. It was alleged that Major Nisar Bukhari, Major Sadiq and Sq.Leader Tahir, were caught at Nawan Kot, an area near the Indian border in Kasur District, with one maund of Gold and 40 maunds of silver besides arms. They were alleged to be involved in an illegal arms and goods trade. F.M.Shahzad, interview.

⁶⁸⁰ The case against 17 military officers began on 19 January 1985 in Attock fort, on the charge of Section 121(A) of PPC, ‘with conspiracy to wage or attempt to wage war or abet waging war against Pakistan, through planning the kidnap of the President and planning assassinations and bombings, and Section 124A with Section 120B of PPC with sedition, in holding meetings and publishing seditious literature in an attempt to excite disaffection against the government. And Under 123 of PPC with concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war.’

The 17 were convicted. Two, DIG Mian Zaheer and Inspector Riasat Ali, were from the police; Raza Kazim, an advocate, was a civilian while thirteen were from the army and one from the Air force. F.M.Shahzad, interview. Asia Times Online, 22 December 2004, accessed on 12-12-2012 at [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FL22Df03.html]

to blocks of ice, burned with cigarettes, beaten, deprived of food and kept in shackles...'⁶⁸¹

In an interview, Shahzad told me one of their grievances was that prices of basic commodities had increased in the border areas near Afghanistan due to the UN dispersing dollars and expensive items of daily use to Afghan refugees.⁶⁸² These Afghans would sell these goods in exchange for basic commodities. The local population held the army responsible for this problem. He said that although political parties were already agitating publicly for democracy, the hatred among civilians, friends and shopkeepers against the armed forces was the major reason to initiate the campaign within their own rank and file for the revival of democracy under Major Aftab, who was the main coordinator. The objective was the same as that of the opposition political parties, to bring democracy back in the country and get the army back to its barracks. According to him, their method was neither to join the political agitation nor to help them, but to educate and create awareness among the forces about the emergence of discontent against them by the general public. Organising talks, lobbying with their seniors and spreading the message through pamphlets and word of mouth for supporting the cause of civilian rule were some of their activities. Such activities were never intended to provoke an army coup, but were merely to persuade the army to support the restoration of democracy. In Shahzad's opinion, Ghulam Mustafa Khar and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi were used by the army to give credence to the allegation that they were working with India to overthrow the regime, and also as a means to make MRD

⁶⁸¹ *Amnesty International*, 'Trial of Military Officers', 31 July 1985, MSS 34/4/1/Pk42, MRC, p.2.

⁶⁸² He was posted in Kohat, near Peshawar (KPK) at Inter-Services Selection Board (ISSB), where the candidates are examined before recruiting them in the Pakistan Army. F.M.Shahzad, interview.

appear to be working with traitors.⁶⁸³ This episode brought out the psychological impact of Zia's unpopular rule on many lower officers and officials who were stigmatised and hated for their association with the regime. Shahzad also stated that BB, after being sworn in as Prime Minister in December 1988, immediately ordered their release.

Al-Zulfiqar and PPP's relationship:

Besides the nonviolent struggle, a violent movement was launched to remove General Zia, which was named Al-Zulfiqar, and was operated by ZAB's two sons – Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnwaz Bhutto. This dissertation not only analyses the movement but it produces new evidence that the formation of Al-Zulfiqar was executed after a green signal from PPP's high command vis-à-vis Nusrat Bhutto and BB, which has otherwise been denied or left ambiguous.⁶⁸⁴

During the late 1960s and 1970s a rhetoric of violent revolution became fashionable in progressive circles all over the world, with invocations of Mao, Castro, Che Guevara, and Ho Chi Minh.⁶⁸⁵ This had its impact in Pakistan, particularly among young members of the elite who had embraced leftist doctrines.⁶⁸⁶ Some radical young PPP activists decided to launch an armed struggle after the Lahore High Court sentenced ZAB to death. The main ones

⁶⁸³ Khar while in exile in England, had stated that he would return to Pakistan on an Indian Tank and he confessed of having relationship with SRD. Shahzad rejected his statement and accused him of being planted by the military junta.

⁶⁸⁴ Bukhari, *ye Bazi Ishq ki Bazi hai*; Butt, *Kai Soolian Sar-i-Rah thin*; Anwer, *The Terrorist Prince*; Cohen, and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981: Staying On', pp.136-134. Shahid Javed Burki, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988', *Asian Survey*, 28 (10), (October 1988), p.1098; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*; Rizvi, *The military and politics*;

⁶⁸⁵ On this, see Arendt, Hannah (1970), *On Violence* (San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), pp. 11-12, 19-21.

⁶⁸⁶ Nadeem F. Paracha, in an interview to *Viewpoint*, 'A Misguided Adventure', *Viewpoint*, online issue (163), 8 August 2013, p. 1.

were Maulana Kausar Shah,⁶⁸⁷ a PPP worker from Lahore, Nadeem F. Paracha,⁶⁸⁸ and Agha Muhammad Waseem,⁶⁸⁹ and they have subsequently provided details of the formative phase of such work. In 1978, they requested Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, a bosom friend of ZAB, for his support for a campaign of armed resistance to General Zia-ul-Haq. Agreeing to the proposal, Col. Gaddafi asked them to bring ZAB's sons on board. At the time they were leading peaceful protests in London and Washington for their father's release, and without their involvement Gaddafi was unwilling to play a very active role. He agreed however to allow the young radicals to come to Libya for training in armed struggle.⁶⁹⁰ The United Arab Emirates (UAE), another fast friend of ZAB, funded the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a Marxist guerrilla group and aided the establishment of Kabul camp base.⁶⁹¹ Noor Muhammad Tarakai, a die-hard socialist, paved the way in Kabul for this organisation and establish its main station at Ali Mardan, an industrial area of the city. Libya, Syria, KHAD (Russian Intelligence agency through Kabul),⁶⁹² bank robberies in Sindh,⁶⁹³ PIA labour unions, and Banks⁶⁹⁴ were the subsequent financiers of the organisation.

⁶⁸⁷ Maulana Kausar Shah was already involved in sabotage of railway tracks. Agha Muhammad Waseem, Interview, 1-12-2012, via Skype from Sweden.

⁶⁸⁸ Paracha, 'A Misguided Adventure', p.1.

⁶⁸⁹ Agha Muhammad Waseem, Interview.

⁶⁹⁰ Those who visited Libya for training were arrested on their return, and the case against them was popularly known as the Libya Conspiracy Case. Mushtaq Lasharie, Interview, Muhammad Agha Waseem, Interview, and See, for example, on Libya Conspiracy case Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai*, pp.85-107.

⁶⁹¹ Paracha, 'A Misguided Adventure', p.1.

⁶⁹² *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, 'The Soviet Threat to Pakistan', 12 August 1981, 342, NARA, pp.6-7.

⁶⁹³ Paracha, 'A Misguided Adventure', p.1.

⁶⁹⁴ Abdul Aziz Menon, President of United Bank Limited, Usman Ghani of (Muslim Commercial Bank, and Habib Junejo of Habib Bank's union presidents. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

India provided transit facility to Al-Zulfiqar members to travel to and from Kabul and organised the training of a few men close to the border with Sindh.⁶⁹⁵

After ZAB's execution, the PPP high command decided to launch a militant struggle.⁶⁹⁶ BB, in her book, blamed the circumstances for driving them to this.⁶⁹⁷ Strategy in this respect was discussed at the central executive's meeting on the forty-days death anniversary of ZAB in Larkana.⁶⁹⁸ Nusrat Bhutto, referred to the fourteen underground militant organisations and stated 'if we needed we can contact them'. She tried to bring other political parties on board, but failed.⁶⁹⁹ ZAB's two sons Murtaza and Shahnawaz had been campaigning in England for the reprieve of their father. Shahnawaz had studied in France – a hotbed of radical thought at that time – and then gone on to Oxford. He had been impressed by romantic forms of violence through his reading of suspense novels as a hobby since childhood. After the execution of their father, they decided to join up with the armed struggle of the young PLA radicals based in Kabul. Shahnawaz secretly joined a Palestinian camp for training and coaching in armed struggle, where he spent one and a half months.⁷⁰⁰ The two sons then went to Kabul and took over the leadership of the organisation in June 1979 and renamed it as the Al-Zulfiqar Organisation

⁶⁹⁵ *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, 'The Soviet Threat to Pakistan', 12 August 1981, 342, NARA, pp.6-7. See also *Asia Week*, 'Phansi di gai tu Nishana Khud Pakistan hu ga' (9 March 1979) in Saleem (ed.) *Jis dhuj se koi muqatal main gya*, p.186-87; Paracha, 'A Misguided Adventure', p. 2.

⁶⁹⁶ National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the Zia Government, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, February 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1, NARA, p.12. National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.12.

⁶⁹⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.283.

⁶⁹⁸ Salman Taseer, 'Around Al-Murtaza', *Viewpoint*, 24 June 1979, p.9.

⁶⁹⁹ Sardar Abdul Qayum stated of her request was 'we neither want any violent politics nor contacting with the underground organisations'. Shakir, *MRD*, p.43.

⁷⁰⁰ Benazir Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 238; Bhatti, *Bhutto ka Beta*, pp.12, 34.

(AZO).⁷⁰¹ The name has a double meaning – in Arabic it is associated with the celebrated sword captured by the Prophet Muhammad (s.a.w) in one of his early battles and it symbolises Islamic justice and militancy; and secondly, it refers to the name of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Murtaza Bhutto was the head of the organisation, whereas Shahnawaz was said to be its operational head. Karachi,⁷⁰² Lahore,⁷⁰³ and exiled PPP workers were the main recruiting ground. The CIA reported that there were 1600 to 1800 members with varying degrees of commitment to the cause.⁷⁰⁴ Despite heavy security at Pakistani airports since July 1978,⁷⁰⁵ the biggest achievement of AZO was the hijacking of Pakistan International Airline (PIA) flight 326 from Karachi to Peshawar on 1 March 1981 by Salam-Ullah Tipu along with his two aides.⁷⁰⁶ The objective was to barter the release of 55 political prisoners⁷⁰⁷ with 148 hostage passengers.⁷⁰⁸ The pilot was forced to fly to Kabul, and Murtaza Bhutto came to the airport there and declared the action to be a triumph in a press statement. The flight was then forced to go on to Damascus. The regime did not accept the hijacker's demands until they killed Tariq Rahim, a Pakistani army officer who the

⁷⁰¹ Muhammad Agha Waseem, interview. He was awarded Medal of Democracy by PPP in August 1979. Daily Musawat, 30 August 1979. See, for example, Anwer, *The Terrorist Prince*; Bukhari, *ye bazi ishq ki bazi hai*, Butt, *Kai Soolian sare rah thin*.

⁷⁰² Masroor Ahsan, Manzar Alam, (recruiters from Karachi), Mushtaq Lasharie, interview. Qayyum Nizami,

⁷⁰³ Major Imtiaz Ali, a former Military Secretary to ZAB, and PPP student activist from Faisalabad, Raja Muhammad Anwer (currently is the Advisor of Punjab Education Board under PML-N government). Cited in *Viewpoint*, V (4), 2 September 1979, p.11. Qayyum Nizami, interview, 26 February 2012, Lahore.

⁷⁰⁴ *Directorate of Intelligence*, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, p.4.

⁷⁰⁵ *Viewpoint*, IV(50), 22 July 1979, p.5.

⁷⁰⁶ Widely circulated in media. Kutty, *Sixty Years in Self-Exile*, p.447.

⁷⁰⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.174. Agha Muhammad Waseem, Farkhanda Bukhari, Asif Butt, interviews. The last two were among the exchanged prisoners.

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BBC, 15-03-1981, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/15/newsid_2818000/2818437.stm> (1-12-2012)]

hijackers wrongly believed was the son of General Rahimuddin Khan, an important member of Zia's martial law regime. Zia then caved in and released a number of PPP activists. On 15 March, the remaining passengers and flight crew were set free at Damascus airport.

In public, the PPP denied any relationship between BB and Nusrat Bhutto and the hijackers, and this is repeated in histories of this period,⁷⁰⁹ including in the memoirs of BB and others.⁷¹⁰ BB mentions an argument she had with



Figure 5 Salaullah Tipu waving his hand and a Klashinkov with the celebration of the successful PIA hijacking. Courtesy Agha Muhammad Waseem

Murtaza on adopting violent methods to remove Zia.⁷¹¹ In response to the hijacking, she made an *ambiguous* statement 'All hijacking is bad, whether it is a

⁷⁰⁹ See, for example, Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: Modern History*; Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*; Shakir, *MRD*; Ghafoor Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, Arif, *Working with Zia*, Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan*; Kutty, *Sixty Years of Exile*; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, *A Political history of Pakistan*. Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983.

⁷¹⁰ See, for example, Bhutto, *Daughter of East*, Bukhari, *ye bazi ishq ki bazi hai*, Butt, *Kai Soolian sare rah thin*.

⁷¹¹ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.282.

plane or a nation'.⁷¹² However, Mushtaq Lasharie stated that BB directly led the AZO-related activities in 1979-81 and that she knew of the hijacking plan.⁷¹³ Only once she saw how it had affected the MRD and the democratic cause did she disassociate herself from AZO. She sent a coded message to her brothers 'yahan sardi khatm hu gai, kumble ki zarorat nahi' (winter has come to its end, so we do not need blankets anymore).⁷¹⁴ She quit any involvement in AZO's activities and disowned its members in public.⁷¹⁵

Peter Ackerman and Du Vall argue that when violence is deployed alongside a nonviolent movement, victory may be compromised or delayed. For example, when Danish groups used sabotage to slow Nazi exploitation, there were harsh reprisals. Those who threw stones and Molotov cocktails compromised the Palestinian intifada.⁷¹⁶ In Chile, the Popular Democratic Front (MDP) and Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), the hardliner leftist guerrilla group fighting the regime of General Pinochet, launched ten missiles in Santiago, the capital city in September 1985, few weeks after the *Acuerda Nacional* (National Accord), which undermined it badly.⁷¹⁷ Kurt Schock argues that the anti-apartheid armed insurgency of the African National Congress (ANC) alienated many non-white supporters of the movement.⁷¹⁸ In their statistical comparison of predominantly violent with nonviolent movements since the start of the twentieth century, Chenoweth, and Stephan argue that nonviolent

⁷¹² *ibid.*, p.169.

⁷¹³ He was an employee in PIA, and was in contact with BB through Irshad Rao and Masroor Ahsan. Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

⁷¹⁴ Agha Muhammad Waseem, interview; Javed Iqbal Moazzam, Interview,

⁷¹⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.14.

⁷¹⁶ Ackerman, and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, p.495.

⁷¹⁷ Ackerman, and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp.293-94.

⁷¹⁸ Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections*, pp.158-162.

movements had a higher success-rate.⁷¹⁹ However, not all scholars agree on this. For example, Peter Gelderloos, argues that a violent wing helps nonviolent struggles as it makes the latter appear relatively moderate, so that the regime is more prepared to negotiate with it.⁷²⁰

In the case of Pakistan in 1981, the hijacking backfired badly on the movement in general.⁷²¹ General Zia took it as a 'blessing' and stated 'hijackers cannot bring democracy'.⁷²² The MRD uprising against the regime had been gaining popularity among the masses and many civil society groups had already joined the cause, as stated above. In the week following the hijacking, one thousand leaders, as reported by Amnesty International, were rounded up and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment.⁷²³ Despite the ruthless torture of those arrested, they did not provide any evidence of the involvement of either Bhutto ladies in the act.⁷²⁴ The alliance cancelled the demonstration planned for 23 March. Sardar Abdul Qayyum and two other parties quit the alliance in protest, stating that the Bhutto ladies believed in the 'politics of revenge'.⁷²⁵ Even pro-movement elements in the army 'pulled strongly behind Zia and strengthened

⁷¹⁹ See, for example, Chenoweth, and Stephan, *Why Civil resistance works*.

⁷²⁰ Peter Gelderloos, *How Nonviolence Protects the State*, Cambridge Mass: South End Press, 2007).

⁷²¹ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan*, p.240.

⁷²² Hussain, *Politics of Alliances in Pakistan*, p.132. Indeed, many opponents believed that it was engineered by General Zia's regime itself to excuse his actions in front of the people within and outside of the country. However, I interviewed some of the Al-Zulfiqar members mentioned here; and they proudly declared that they alone took the initiative in the hijacking.

⁷²³ *Amnesty International*, 'Background to Political Arrests in Pakistan since January 1981', MSS.34/4/1/Pk12, p.2. The Peshawar Special military court sentenced ninety-eight workers to long terms of imprisonment and fines for anti-state activity *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.22. For details see Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 170-173, Kutty, *Sixty Years of Exile*, pp.447-448.

⁷²⁴ Asif Butt, Farkhanda Bukhari, Javed Iqbal Mo'azzam, interviews, Arif, *Working with Zia* (urdu), p.

⁷²⁵ Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, *daily Nawai-Waqt*, 21 March 1981. Shakir, *MRD*, pp.118-121. *Amnesty International*, 'Background to Political Arrests in Pakistan since January 1981', MSS.34/4/1/Pk12, p.2; National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.7.

his position.⁷²⁶ The moderate group in PPP openly started defying the policy of the radicals in the party, and called on the ladies to resign their leadership and leave the country.⁷²⁷ In short, it led to a hiatus for the movement between 1981 and 1983. It undermined all that MRD had been working for, allowing the regime to regain the initiative.

MRD Failure and Success 1981-84

Gradualist Democracy:

Stephen Zunes has used the term 'gradualist democracy' in cases of movements that failed to bring down a dictator immediately, but despite this paved the way for eventual democratization.⁷²⁸ Existing histories see the MRD as a failure as it did not achieve its major objectives while it was at its height – namely the end of martial law, holding of free and fair election within three months and transfer of power to the elected representative under the Constitution of 1973. The martial law regime continued and the restoration of democracy seemed as far away as ever. A number of reasons can be underlined for this failure.

Concerned scholars⁷²⁹ and almost all those engaged in the movement who were interviewed highlighted as a major reason the absence of fervour and

⁷²⁶ National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'The Pakistan People's Party: Search for Power, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.7.

⁷²⁷ National Foreign Assessment Centre, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the Zia Government, An Intelligence Assessment', *Central Intelligence Agency*, February 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1, NARA, pp.11-13.

⁷²⁸ Stephen Zunes presented this argument in a seminar, attended via webinar on 31 March 2015 from Washington DC.

⁷²⁹ Omar Noman, 'Pakistan and General Zia: Era and Legacy', *Third World Quarterly*, 11(1), (January 1989), p.36. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp. 249-48. Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', pp. 42-43. Ritcher, 'Domestic Politics in the 1980s', p.79.

commitment to the cause in Punjab.⁷³⁰ Shakir, quoting Anwer Abbas, stated if all those who took part had been from Punjab alone, the outcome of the movement would have been different.⁷³¹ Not only was Punjab the home of seventy per cent of Pakistan army personnel,⁷³² but also Zia, being an immigrant from East Punjab was the first Punjabi ruler.⁷³³ Likewise, Talbot argues that Punjab was the largest receiver of remittances from Middle East labourers, and the chief beneficiary of economic aid in lieu of Pakistan's status as a front-line ally in the war in Afghanistan.⁷³⁴ There is no doubt that Punjab is the driving force in the life of Pakistan. Analysis by US diplomats carried out during Zia time, argued that the Pakistan Army was not only the controlling authority in the country, but that its power rested above all from the support of conservative social groups in Punjab. It further stated that 'no government is likely to long survive if it ignores either's opinion.'⁷³⁵ When the defence and stability of the country and the interest of the conservative groups in Punjab was secured, and economic prosperity continued, all regimes (civilian or military) could be confident that they would retain power.⁷³⁶

In their work on civil resistance, Chenoweth and Stephan give great significance to the degree of support a movement enjoys from the population as

⁷³⁰ Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), 'Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change', *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3.

⁷³¹ Anwer Abbas Naqvi, cited in Ilyas Shakir, *MRD*, p.104.

⁷³² Cohen, *The Pakistani Army* (Berkeley: University of California, 1984), pp. 44-45.

⁷³³ Ruthnam, 'The fragility of democracy in Pakistan', p.313. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, p.249.

⁷³⁴ Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp. 248-250.

⁷³⁵ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, 24 November 2013, (document no) CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.12.

⁷³⁶ Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), 'Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change', *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3. CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

a whole. They find that when about 1.5 per cent or more of the population participated in a resistance movement, the success-rate was eighty per cent or over.⁷³⁷ Unfortunately, no accurate figures are available of this type for MRD. Historians have struggled to appraise any such figures, even at the regional level, and the obstacles to doing so are formidable due to the strict press and publication ordinance. According to the Census of 1981, Sindh made up almost twenty-two per cent of the Pakistani population.⁷³⁸ Much of this population in Sindh was rural. A major chunk of the population of every district of rural Sindh, from Sukker to Badin, was actively on the streets in support of MRD at one point or another, with a lower degree of support coming from the people of Karachi and Punjab. The ruthless reaction by regime in rural Sindh that has already been mentioned provides evidence of this. Thus, well over one-and-a-half percent of the population of Pakistan was mobilised in support of the movement. Yet, the regime was not toppled. Against this, a few killing of civilians by the police in Lahore on 9 April 1977 during the PNA movement was provided as a reason for the army to topple ZAB' government. This dissertation thus questions Chenoweth and Stephan's argument in the case of Pakistan in the 1980s. There, the overall percentage of the population that was mobilised was less significant than the relative importance of that population in a country as a whole.

This dissertation argues, however, that the support for the movement from Punjab has been greatly underestimated. Despite the top leaders being

⁷³⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, pp.39-40.

⁷³⁸ Sindh accounted for 19 million out of the total Pakistani population of 87 according to the 1981 Population Census report. Quoted in *Population Census Report 2006*, Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan, 2006.

based in Sindh, large numbers from this province, according to various Amnesty International reports, stood firm against the regime even during 1983 Civil Disobedience.⁷³⁹ Owing to the imprisonment of ZAB in the Punjab cities of Lahore and Rawalpindi, the province was a focus of the resistance. Amnesty International reported in 1981 that between 1977 and 1979 more than eighty percent of the participants in protests were from Punjab, mainly from Lahore and Rawalpindi.⁷⁴⁰ 150 journalists were arrested when they went on hunger strike in protest of the closure of the pro-PPP daily newspaper, *Musawat*, in May 1978 and four of them were flogged – all from Punjab. Women,⁷⁴¹ lawyers,⁷⁴² and students⁷⁴³ all participated in Punjab. Several hundred to several thousand political prisoners were held at any one time between 1977 and 1981. Furthermore, six of those who committed suicide in protest at the execution of ZAB between March 1978 and April 1979 were from Punjab, and only one – Abdul Aziz – from Sukker in Sindh. Among nine political workers executed by the regime, four were Punjabi, while two were settlers in Karachi from KPK and the rest were from Sindh. Of 192 people flogged, all except 18 times were from Punjab.⁷⁴⁴ The notorious Shahi Qila prison contained seventy-three prisoners including seven women, of whom ninety-five percent were from Punjab. Dr.

⁷³⁹ *Amnesty International*, 'Arrests, Imprisonment and Flogging in Pakistan (August-September 1983)', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 20, MRC; *Amnesty International*, 'Widespread arrest in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 19, MRC; *Amnesty International*, 'Arrest of Lawyers in Pakistan', MSS 34/4/1/Pk 23, MRC.

⁷⁴⁰ *Amnesty International*, 'Special Report on Pakistan: Human Rights Violation and Decline of the Rule of Law', May 1981, MSS34/4/1/Pk14, MRC, pp.17-18.

⁷⁴¹ Shahida Jabeen, Nasira Shaikat (wife of Rana Shaikat Federal Minister during ZAB government), Zubeda Malik, Aman Pathani from Sanawan-Lahore, Naheed Saeed from Multan Road-Lahore, Sardaran Begum

⁷⁴² *Viewpoint*, IX (3), 25 August 1983, p. 12.

⁷⁴³ Special Report on 'Pakistan: Human Rights Violation and Decline of the Rule of Law', *Amnesty International*, MRC, University of Warwick, MSS34/4/1/Pk14, pp.21.

⁷⁴⁴ *Amnesty International*, 'Special Report on Pakistan: Human Rights Violation and Decline of the Rule of Law', May 1981, MSS34/4/1/Pk14, MRC, pp.38, 48-49.

Aslam Khan Naru, who was arrested on 24 February 1981 and spent fifteen months in solitary confinement in Shahi Qila – the longest such spell recorded for such confinement – was also from Punjab. The figures for those arrested who were from Punjab over this entire period are impressive.⁷⁴⁵ Likewise, the majority of the exiled workers were from urban centres of Punjab such as Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, and Gujranwala, and they continued struggling against the regime when abroad.⁷⁴⁶ We shall return to these exiles in Chapter 4. Besides contributing handsome support to the nonviolent movement, Punjab was to the fore also in the violent activities of AZO. Agha Muhammad Waseem and Asif Butt, who were guerrillas of AZO, told me that among 250 commanders of the organisation, 186 were from Punjab, whilst 40-50 were from KPK and FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Area), and 30-35 from Sindh. In the hostage-exchange deal, the majority of those political prisoners released were

⁷⁴⁵ For example, between 5-10 January 1981, thirty PPP activists from Lahore were arrested. Special Report on 'Pakistan: Human Rights Violation and Decline of the Rule of Law', May 1981, *Amnesty International*, MSS34/4/1/Pk14, MRC, p.21. On 24-25 February 1981, one hundred second-tier leadership was arrested in Punjab including from Lahore, Rawalpindi and other big cities. *Amnesty International*, 'Special Report on Pakistan: Human Rights Violation and Decline of the Rule of Law', May 1981, MSS34/4/1/Pk14, MRC, p.22. Khawja Khairuddin, Sheikh Rasheed, Nawabzada Nasrullah, who were MRD leaders from Punjab, were placed under house arrested or exiled from Punjab. Punjab MRD Secretary Rao Irshad along with five others were arrested on 19 December 1982. Sixteen prominent MRD leaders from Punjab including Farooq Legari (Secretary General of PPP), Rana Shaukat Mahmood (Secretary MRD) Major Ejaz Ahmad (Punjab President ML Khairuddin) Dr. Israr Shah, Student leader, Suleman Khokar and Abdul Qayyum (TI), Anjum Rashid (QMA), and second tier of leadership like Jahangir Badar, Aabid Hassan Minto, Begum Mehnaz Rafi mainly from Lahore were also put behind bars before the launching of civil disobedience movement in Punjab, cited in *Viewpoint*, IX(2), 18 August 1983, pp. 13-14.

⁷⁴⁶ Qayyum Nizami in Canada and USA, Sardar Mazhar Ali, Mian Iqbal, Mukhtar Rana, Khadim Nasir, Mushtaq Lasharie, Ali Jaffar Zaidi, Shahid Nadeem, Prof. Amin Mughal, Qayyum Butt, Rao Raza Hashim in UK, (Qayyum Nizami, Shahid Nadeem, Mushtaq Lashari, Mian Muhammad Iqbal., interviews); Likewise, Farooq Tariq, Tanvir from Faisalabad, Ayub Goraya (those four who carried the banner 'Accelerate the Struggle in Pakistan against the Zia-ul-Haq dictatorship in the hockey stadium Amsterdam during Pakistan versus Netherland match, in June 1982) were a few names in a long list. All were from Punjab. Nusrat Bhutto's permission to travel abroad for her medical treatment in November 1982 was as a result of the untiring efforts of the exiled workers of PPP, cited in *The Struggle*, the exiled PPP's workers journal founded in 1980-81, published from the Netherlands, UK, and Belgium, No.7, January 1983, 601/R/23/19, MRC.

Punjabis. Most Punjabi activists refused, however, to join this militant movement.⁷⁴⁷

After the hijacking, six thousand political workers were arrested within three weeks, a large number of whom were from Punjab. The movement then lost its intensity in Punjab, with Sindh becoming the epicentre thereafter. Despite this, many Punjab activists came forward in the *Jail Bharo Tahreek* (Voluntary Courting Arrest Campaign) 1983, including from smaller cities, and were incarcerated by the regime.⁷⁴⁸ When Sindhi villages were attacked by air force planes and shot at and bombed during this campaign, there was not however any significant protest in sympathy in Punjab. However, the claim made by Aijaz Ahmed, and Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko that the upsurge in Sindh at this time was fuelled by secessionist sentiments and that the Pakistan army – still smarting from the loss of East Pakistan – crushed it so ruthlessly because of this is misplaced.⁷⁴⁹ As Lawrence Ziring has shown, none of the political parties involved in the civil resistance in Sindh at that time were

⁷⁴⁷ Agha Muhammad Waseem and Asif Butt, interviews.

⁷⁴⁸ On 10 August 1983, four persons including secretary MRD-Multan from Multan and Five MRD leaders from Pakpattan were detained even before the protest was formally launched for distributing the pamphlet 'Lahore Chalo' (let's go to Lahore). *Viewpoint*, IX(2), 18 August 1983, p.16. Besides a big show of strength at Quaid-i-Azam Mazar, Karachi on 14 August 1983, there were protests in Lahore at Lakshmi Chowk and Lohari Gate. Volunteers courted arrest there, and also in the cities of Gujranwala, Sargodha, Bahawalpur, D.G.Khan, Multan and Faisalabad. In its issue of 25 August 1983 *Viewpoint*, gave the following numbers of the arrest for the previous few days. On 15 August: 13 leaders were arrested including Aitzaz Ahsan (TI) from Lahore. On 16 August: 11 were arrested. 17 August: Syed Imtiaz Ali Shah President PNP, 18 August: Syed Manzoor Gillani (TI), 19 August, despite heavy rain and walking through the streets knee-deep water, Aslam Gordaspuri and Ch. Liaqat Hussain courted arrest at Lakshmi Chowk. And SMC No.2 sentenced twelve persons under MLRs 13 and 33 to one-year rigorous imprisonment. Federal Information Secretary presented the data on arrested persons to the Federal Cabinet on 21 August, and said that seven hundred arrests were made in total since 14 August, composed of 117 from Punjab, 335 from Sindh, 209 from KPK and 54 from Balochistan. *Viewpoint*, IX (3), 25 August 1983, p. 33.

⁷⁴⁹ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan*, p.287.

secessionist.⁷⁵⁰ Only later did such parties emerge – namely Jiye Sindh in 1985⁷⁵¹ and the Sindh, Pukhtoon, Baluch Front (SPBF) in 1986. These were established to fight the economic disparity between the smaller provinces and Punjab.⁷⁵² According to a CIA report, Zia manipulated the ‘Jiye Sindhudesh’ slogan in an attempt to divide and rule the country.⁷⁵³ Zia, visited the home of G.M.Syed, the Jiye Sindh leader, and supported him as a counter strategy to PPP in rural Sindh. Syed in turn tried to manipulate this support to accelerate the separation process of Sindh from Pakistan.⁷⁵⁴ ZAB, BB and PPP never used any Sindhi separatist slogans, fighting only in the name of Pakistan. Even, after the assassination of BB in the Punjab city of Rawalpindi, her husband and successor Asif Ali Zardari ordered PPP partisans to refrain from any *Sindhu desh* slogans and cry only ‘*Pakistan Khappe*’ (long live Pakistan).

The outbreak of violence in Sindh in 1983 damaged the movement in Punjab, and divided its MRD leaders. TI Acting President, Mr. Fazal Husain Samra said that ‘violence would be fatal for the passive resistance’.⁷⁵⁵ Sympathisers in other provinces were similarly put off, so that the movement became more obviously a regional one after this. On top of it, as Burki has

⁷⁵⁰ Lawrence Ziring, ‘Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan’s Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq’, *Asian Survey*, 28 (8), (August 1988), p.806.

⁷⁵¹ Dr. Hameeda Khoro was appointed Chairperson of the movement. G.M.Syed was amongst few who raised the issue of Sindhudesh. Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, pp.71-74.

⁷⁵² They argued that the judges, who sentenced ZAB to death in the larger bench hearing, were Punjabis and those who were against of the verdict, were non-Punjabis. Sindh shared only two per cent in the armed forces while; local Sindhis ran five hundred out of two thousand industrial units in the province. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 249; Omer Noman, *Pakistan and Zia: era and legacy*, p. 53 also mentioned the imbalance division of resources between Sindh and Punjab. See also, for example, Shahid Javed Burki, ‘Zia’s eleven years’, in S.J.Burki, and Craig Baxter (eds.), *Pakistan under the military*; Sayeed, ‘Pakistan in 1983’, pp.219-228. Though, K.M.Arif denied this disparity by saying sixty per cent of industrial units were set up in Sindh, cited in Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 313.

⁷⁵³ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition’, March 1984, p.1.

⁷⁵⁴ Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.72. G.M.Syed, cited in *weekly Takbeer*, 20 April 1984. Shakir, *MRD*, p.117. Fateh Mari, Mustafa Talpur, interviews.

⁷⁵⁵ Mr. Fazal Hussain Samra, *Viewpoint*, IX (3), 25 August 1983, p. 12.

argued, Indira Gandhi's statement that 'Indians would support all democratic movements in Pakistan', the organisation of an International Sindhi Conference in New Delhi under Congress's auspices, and Moscow's hue and cry in favour of MRD's demands through its media all fed into Zia's propaganda that the movement threatened the security and national integrity of Pakistan and was the interest of its main enemy, India.⁷⁵⁶ Faced with all this. The MRD leadership including Nusrat Bhutto had to call off the movement before it had achieved its goals.

One popular argument on the Punjab's relative lack of response to the protest in 1983 has been that there was good economic growth there and as a result satisfaction with Zia's rule.⁷⁵⁷ An influx of remittances from 1.5 billion workers sending \$25 billion between 1975 and 1985, an increase of exports by 16.7 percent, and a growth rate of 8.5 percent in 1984-85 with \$390 per capita increase, are some of the figures presented in support of this argument.⁷⁵⁸ Shrewdly, Zia's inclusion of economic heavyweights into the Federal cabinet built his ties with the economically dominant class, so that they were not attracted to MRD.⁷⁵⁹ Nonetheless, besides the economic growth, the country was laden with a 'burgeoning foreign debt, decreasing overseas remittances,

⁷⁵⁶ Burki, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988', *Asian Survey*, 28, (10), (October 1988), p.1098. See also Hussain, 'Politics of Alliances', p.138; Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj ka Sindh*, (Lahore, Progressive Publishers: 1986), p.1. Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, 24 November 2013, (document no) p.4.

⁷⁵⁷ Burki, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988', pp. 1082-1100; Richter, 'Pakistan in 1985: Testing Time for the New Order', *Asian Survey*, 26 (2), A Survey of Asia 1985: Part II (February 1986), pp. 207-218; Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, p.118; Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, pp.249 and 277-279. Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981', pp.142-43.

⁷⁵⁸ Burki, 'Pakistan under Zia, 1977-1988', p.1093; Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*, p.118; Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981', pp.142-43; Richter, 'Pakistan in 1985', pp.214-15.

⁷⁵⁹ Ali Ahmed Talpur (Defence), Hoti (Railways), Mahmoud Haroon (Interior), Ilahi Baksh Soomro (Industry), Ghulam Dastgir (Labour and Manpower), Raja ZafrulHaq (Information), Niaz Muhammad Arbab (Tourism), Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.37.

and the uncertain social consequences of the continuing privatization of the economy'.⁷⁶⁰ \$200 million was spent on the Afghan refugees⁷⁶¹ On top of it, expenditure on the military increased by fourteen times, which was a big burden on Pakistan's economy.⁷⁶² The Zia regime failed to ensure that the mass of the people benefited much from all this. Talbot has argued that the low investment in human capital led the 'youth bulge' towards extremist politics.⁷⁶³

Ahmed Rashid held that the skewed nature of the economic policy was a major cause of criminal activities in Sindh, where the economic situation was particularly dire. Even graduates became involved in crimes such as robbery and kidnapping for ransom.⁷⁶⁴ Therefore, the employed and working classes, as discussed briefly in Chapter 2, protested intermittently against the regime during this period.⁷⁶⁵ For instance, rallies of striking teachers and doctors took

⁷⁶⁰ Richter, 'Pakistan in 1985', p.207; Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981', pp.142-43.

⁷⁶¹ The social and economic impact of the Afghan refugees was the major reason of the launching of Soldier for the restoration of democracy's movement, as aforementioned.

⁷⁶² Cohen and Weinbaum, 'Pakistan in 1981', pp.142-43.

⁷⁶³ Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*, p.117.

⁷⁶⁴ Quoting a graduate's testimony, Ahmed Rashid narrated 'Ghulam Husain, with a Master degree, who has been jobless for eight years, says some of his MA friends are dacoits.' The writer further revealed the figures that during 1986-88, five thousand kidnap cases and murdering of one thousand common persons and fifty policemen occurred in dacoit-related violence in Sindh. Ahmed Rashid, *Unrest in Sindh*, *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 14 August 1988, p.10.

⁷⁶⁵ The strikes and protests organised between 1979-83 by an immense numbers of unions and groups requires separate research, especially the Karachi Shipyard Workers' successful *Satyagraha* for seventy-five days to reinstate their six-thousand employees. For example, All-Pakistan Banks Officers Federation's 'one-hour pen down strike' started in April 1979 and lasted ninety-one days, affecting the National Bank of Pakistan, United Bank Limited, Habib Bank Limited, Muslim Commercial Bank, and Allied Bank Limited. Cited in *Viewpoint*, 6 May 1979, p.13. There was the All Pakistan Postal Employees Union ten days strike, *Viewpoint*, 10 June 1979, p.14, the Pakistan Nurses Organisation 18-days strike, joined by Doctors, and Surgeons, *Daily Musawat*, *Viewpoint*, August 1979, the Karachi Shipyard workers seventy-five days long strike, *Viewpoint*, June-September 1979, the *Anjuman-i-Mulazimeen-i-Baldia* (Organisation of Town Council Employees) in Punjab, including small units of unions such as Rickshaw drivers(Karachi), the Sahiwal's women sweepers strike (Punjab), *Viewpoint*, June 1979, and the Fruit and Vegetables Associations (Punjab) stike, *Viewpoint*, August 1979. All these strikes were mainly due to the price-hikes, with demands for increases in their pay and packages.

place at various locations.⁷⁶⁶ In Lahore, 20,000 teachers carrying banners protested against price-hikes shouting 'Give us Bread, not Islam', which was similar to the slogan of the Lenin Shipyard workers in Poland 'we want bread! Down with Gomulka' (Władysław Gomułka).⁷⁶⁷ Moreover, USA's military and economic direct aid to the Budget of Pakistan meant that the government placed less emphasis on the culture of tax-paying,⁷⁶⁸ which was to be a big problem for future governments of Pakistan. Taking all this evidence, it is hard to sustain an argument that the people of Punjab were soothed by any great economic prosperity. The real reasons for their stepping-back from the MRD protest in 1983 were political ones.

Problems of Leadership and Organisation:

The scholarship on civil resistance places a lot of emphasis on the importance of good leadership. In some cases this has come from a charismatic leader such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, or Aung San Suu Kyi. Nonetheless, in cases in which these leaders have been jailed, it is important that there be a dynamic subordinate leadership that can step in. Thus, although Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for twenty-seven years, the African National Congress (ANC) was able to generate a succession of subordinate leaders who maintained the strength of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, until it

⁷⁶⁶ In Peshawar on 14 March, in Lahore on 18 March, and Peshawar again on 24 March. *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan Update (since January 1982-December 1982), December 1982, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 17, MRC, pp.2-3.

⁷⁶⁷ Solidarity Movement 1980s', See, for example, Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp.113-174.

⁷⁶⁸ Asma Jahangir, Interview. USA financed fifty per cent of the trade gap and fifty per cent of total investment through the period 1978-88. Asad Sayeed, 'State-Society Conjunctions and Disjunctions: Pakistan's Manufacturing Performance', in S.M.Naseem and Khalid Nadvi (eds), *The Post-Colonial State and Social Transformation in India and Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), cited in Ian Talbot, *Pakistan*, p.227.

eventually achieved its ends.⁷⁶⁹ In other cases there have been successful movements that lacked any obvious single leader of this sort. This was true of the movement by the mothers of the 'disappeared' in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the students movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the *OTPOR* movement against Milošević in Serbia, the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis. Such movements were not led by charismatic leaders but by coterie of leaders who generally adopted a low profile in the media while they directed the protest on the ground.⁷⁷⁰

In South Asia, however, there has been a tendency to elevate particular charismatic figures, as discussed in Chapter 1. In the MRD, leadership was however dispersed and rotating. Leaders at all levels were arrested and jailed or put under house arrest, and thus removed from the scene.⁷⁷¹ There was a lack of good leaders at the secondary and tertiary levels. Local people ended up by adopting their own methods of protest that came into conflict with the principles of the movement as a whole. This caused the movement to fracture. Thus, when Sindh turned to violence, Punjab disassociated with it. Eventually, the leaders failed to bring a 'positive culmination' to the movement at this juncture.⁷⁷²

Aijaz Ahmed has advanced a further reason for the failure of the protest of 1983. He argues that discontented groups failed to unite properly, so that

⁷⁶⁹ See Nelson Mandela, *Long Walk to Freedom* (Kindle Edition, 2013); Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp.336-368.

⁷⁷⁰ Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.27.

⁷⁷¹ Nusrat Bhutto, Benazir Bhutto, Asghar Khan, Nasrullah Khan, and Wali Khan, were in jail from 1979 except a brief period of out of the imprisonment, in which they tried to mobilise people.

⁷⁷² Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.261.

Sindhi protested as a Sindhis, workers as workers, women as women, while students were interested only in their 'corporate politics'.⁷⁷³ While this is all true, we have to seek a deeper reason for this state of affairs. The argument of this dissertation is that there could have been a unity of all these groups that would have fed into and strengthened the movement as a whole, but that the leadership required for this was lacking. The leadership was, rather, fractured by political rivalries and mutual mistrust. The individual ambitions for power of the leading politicians held back the return of democracy for several years. If the leaders had been more united, there might have been the sort of unity seen in the Students' Movement against General Ayub Khan in 1967-8 and the Lawyers' Movement against General Pervez Musharraf in 2007-9. This would have placed much greater pressure on the regime and greatly enhanced the chances for its success.

Internal differences, couple with the Pakistan People's Party's desire to be the largest and most powerful party in the coalition, all delayed the return of democracy in the country. In contrast to the unity that was forged among KOR's diverse groups,⁷⁷⁴ or in the anti-Milošević movement,⁷⁷⁵ the movement in Pakistan was undermined by internal strife in MRD and PPP, as well as refusal by PPP to follow MRD decisions. As an example of this internal strife, Farooq Leghari, the acting chairman of PPP at that time, stated that the party was prepared to participate in local elections in defiance of a collective

⁷⁷³ Aijaz Ahmed define the term in the Gramscian sense where each group stands for their own particular interest, even after a formation of one larger group. Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.33.

⁷⁷⁴ The first fourteen founding members were historians, sociologists, lawyers, writers, philosophers, and priests having their ideology on Catholic intellectuals, social democrats, and liberals. Ackerman and Krueger, *A Force More Powerful*, p.127.

⁷⁷⁵ Danijela Nenadić and Nenad Belčević, 'Serbia-Nonviolent Struggle for Democracy'.

decision to boycott all election taken by MRD.⁷⁷⁶ NDP's Punjab President, Rao Mehroz Akhtar declared this 'a conspiracy against the MRD mass movement'.⁷⁷⁷ The radical wing of the party reacted similarly.⁷⁷⁸ Although PPP rescinded the decision a week before the launching of the 14 August campaign, the party workers wasted crucial time in preparation for the election.⁷⁷⁹ Leghari had hardly helped his own cause when he made a demoralising statement comparing the 210 million rupees of the PNA election funds to the less than 2.1 million for MRD's campaign.⁷⁸⁰ This was criticised harshly by his colleagues in PPP. US consulate correspondence disclosed that Nusrat Bhutto had advised Farooq Leghari to boycott the elections; which contradicts the claim of Leghari himself that the decision to participate was taken 'on the advice of Begum Bhutto'.⁷⁸¹ The consulate further notes how Zia-ul-Haq used his influence to put pressure on moderate and conservative politicians in the local areas to disassociate themselves from the election boycott.⁷⁸²

Leghari's attempt to fight the election, though abandoned, widened the gap between the radicals and the moderates of PPP in Punjab. On the complaint of the workers to the chairperson on the 'refusal to delegate power'

⁷⁷⁶ *Viewpoint*, 28 July 1983, VIII (51), p.13.

⁷⁷⁷ *ibid.*, p.12.

⁷⁷⁸ Sheikh Rasheed had almost declared the boycott the election. PSF and labour unions come out against the party. *ibid.*, p.12.

⁷⁷⁹ The decision was followed by the rejection of 1200 nomination papers out of 1409 of PPP's allied candidates in Baluchistan on the ground that they were associated with PPP. *Viewpoint*, 'Grapes are sour', 11 August 1983, IX (1), p.12. The moderate Punjabis wanted to control the local development funds for funding grass roots activities, whereas the Sindhis, on the basis of the 1979 local bodies election, argued that they could hardly control such resources through such means. US Consulate General Lahore, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', *Directorate of Intelligence*, March 1984, p.8.

⁷⁸⁰ Husain Naqi, 'Grassroots essential', *Viewpoint*, 28 July 1983, VIII (51), p.11.

⁷⁸¹ Farooq Leghari announced that the five out of twelve steering committee members present at the meeting held in Lahore on 15 July decided 'on the advice of Begum Bhutto', who, according to Leghari, held that taking part in the local elections would be preferable to doing nothing under the prevailing conditions. *Viewpoint*, 28 July 1983, VIII(51), p.12.

⁷⁸² Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', March 1984, 24 November 2013, (document no) p.8.

to lower level by the acting heads, a twelve-member steering committee was set up to look into the matter, but it failed to achieve anything of significance.⁷⁸³ Some key party leaders who had organised the mobilisation of urban areas resigned.⁷⁸⁴ The house arrest of BB and the sickness-based exile of Nusrat Bhutto, left a further vacuum in the conduct of party work. Every major leader wanted to put the party crown on his head.⁷⁸⁵ Party workers aligned themselves with one leader or another, causing rival grouping to develop within the party. There was no democracy in the party, with even Zia criticising it for its lack of internal elections.⁷⁸⁶

The role of the ninety-three year-old Baacha Khan in shaping events in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) at this time has been ignored, except for a brief passing reference by Aijaz Ahmed in his discussion of the Afghan refugees factor, and the fear of USSR's invasion.⁷⁸⁷ Although the National Democratic Party (NDP) leader Begum Nasim Wali (who had made history in 1977 as the first woman to be elected from KPK province) had condemned the execution of ZAB as the revenge of the tribunal,⁷⁸⁸ Zia-ul-Haq had made friendly overture towards Baluchis and Pushtuns, including Baacha Khan,⁷⁸⁹ since the imposition

⁷⁸³ US Consulate General Lahore, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', *Directorate of Intelligence*, March 1984, p.8.

⁷⁸⁴ Malik Azmat Hayat Khan of Tumman, Malik Salim Iqbal of Talagang, Malik Muhammad Aslam of Shamsabad, Ex-Advisor to ZAB Malik Muhammad Hayat Khan of Tumman were among them. Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.37.

⁷⁸⁵ Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, known as the Father of Socialism, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Generals Tikka Khan were in this category.

⁷⁸⁶ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.36

⁷⁸⁷ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', pp. 33 and 37.

⁷⁸⁸ Begum Nasim Wali Khan, interview.

⁷⁸⁹ From the start of martial law, Baacha Khan was given special respect by Zia-ul-Haq, and allowed free movement between the Durand and Radcliff Lines vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India respectively.

of martial law. NDP had, however, joined MRD.⁷⁹⁰ Baacha Khan held a controversial Press Conference on 12 August 1983, just two days before the launching of the civil disobedience movement, that gave an irreversible setback to the movement in the two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan. He appealed to Pukhtoons to reactivate their energies for a course of action 'in the light of the Bannu Resolution of 1947'.⁷⁹¹ Despite his inactivity in politics by then and his advanced age, his long-standing political struggle for the community in the form of *Khudai Khidamatgar* was still highly respected in these two provinces. At a time when the movement needed the sort of inspired leadership that he was remembered for, his intervention had a demoralising impact not only in KPK and Baluchistan, but for MRD as a whole. The NDP leaders Ghulam Ahmed Bilour and Abdul Khaliq resigned from MRD. Even though Bacha Khan's son, and the head of NDP, Khan Wali Khan and Begum Naseem Wali Khan courted arrest in Peshawar, Baacha Khan's statement kept many of those loyal to him away from the protest. In general, the protest had little impact in these two provinces.

External Support:

Chenoweth and Stephen highlighted the skewed behaviour of the international community towards nonviolent movements by revealing the fact that less than ten percent of nonviolent movements throughout the world have received

⁷⁹⁰ In reaction to the killing of Arbab Sikander Khalil, the former Governor of Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa, on 7 March 1982, NDP led by Wali Khan became more militant. Wali Khan and Naseem Wali Khan organised a protest rally on 14 March 1982 at Yadgar Chowk in Peshawar, but the police disrupted the crowd by tear-gas and baton charges and arrested thirty-eight persons. *Nawa-i-Waqt*, 9 March 1982.

⁷⁹¹ The Bannu Resolution was adopted in the wake of Pakistan's creation in June 1947 to hold a referendum for the Pukhtoons to choose between Pakistan and Independence, instead of Pakistan and India as the British had intended. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Press Conference, Peshawar, cited in *Viewpoint*, 18 August 1983, IX(2), p.15..

material support from foreign governments in comparison to thirty-five percent of violent movements.⁷⁹² This dissertation argues that this was the case also in Pakistan. Western governments poured money into the war in Afghanistan, and alongside it a vast amount of funding for the Pakistan Army. BB criticised the \$525 million aid given annually for military and economic purposes to Pakistan during 1980s as a violation of the principle that ‘No assistance may be provided [...] to the government of any country which engages [...] in gross violations of internationally recognised human rights, including torture [...] prolonged detention without charges’.⁷⁹³ Despite MRD’s appeal to link US\$3.2 billion military and economic aid to Pakistan to the restoration of democracy,⁷⁹⁴ the MRD failed to attract international backing from the Western governments. It received some irregular support from the Soviet Union, Libya, and UAE.

The international political situation in Asia led to support being channelled mainly to the Zia regime. The anti-western revolutions in Iran (1978) and Afghanistan (1979) left the Western nations looking to Zia as an ally in the region.⁷⁹⁵ Incidents such as the shooting down of the scheduled airplane KAL-007 (Korean Air lines) by the Soviet Union without warning due to it entering their no-fly zone route on 1 September 1983 all added to the tensions. They had a vested interest in opposing any movement to dislodge Zia, as it was

⁷⁹² Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, p.54. For state support to violent campaigns, see Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). For international support for both violent and nonviolent movements, see Clifford Bob, *The Marketing of Rebellion: Insurgents, Media and International Activism* (New York: Cambridge University press, 2005). For transnational advocacy networks in supporting local nonviolent campaigns, Schock, *Unarmed Insurrection*; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press 1998).

⁷⁹³ The Nation, cited in Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.257.

⁷⁹⁴ *Amnesty International*, ‘Pakistan Special Action-Update’, no.1, MSS.34/4/1/Pk 15, MRC, pp.2-3.

⁷⁹⁵ *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988’, 24 July 1985, p. 190.

felt it might destabilise the region and bring a less dependable government to power in Pakistan. In an interview, Stephen Cohen stated that ‘we (the Republicans), as well as Mr. Wolson, leader of the gang in Congress want to defeat Soviet Union. Pakistan’s nuclear programme was troublesome but not central. And Pakistan’s Army ruling in Pakistani politics itself was not central’.⁷⁹⁶ Instead, US benefited from ‘the [Pakistan] Army’s good relations with the United States’ and it attempted to preserve its rule.⁷⁹⁷ CIA reports suggested that the radical element in PPP, mainly worked under direct command of Nusrat Bhutto, would have been a threat to Islamabad’s policy towards Afghanistan, and eventually to the US government, as it was feared that a PPP-led government would re-establish ties with the Soviet Union and India.⁷⁹⁸ Although, the Bhutto ladies had agreed to withdraw their accusation that the US had been involved in ZAB’s removal, US intelligence reports indicate that even if Zia been removed through civil resistance, the USA would still have pressed for him to be replaced by someone from the army.⁷⁹⁹ Washington’s geo-political interests in this region ensured that the US authorities were deaf and blind to the crimes against humanity committed in Pakistan.

From the perspective of the Arab world, which had once pleaded with Zia to spare ZAB’s life, the fear of expansion of Shia Islam after the Iranian revolution saw them change their stance and support Zia rather than the

⁷⁹⁶ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

⁷⁹⁷ *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition’, March 1984, p.12.

⁷⁹⁸ *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘Pakistan: The Succession Problem’: An Intelligence Assessment’, April 1982, CIA-RDP83B00232R000100070006, NARA, p. iv and 9; *Directorate of Central Intelligence* ‘Zia’s Divided Opposition’, March 1984, pp. iv and 12. *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘The Pakistan People’s Party: Search for Power’: An Intelligence Assessment’, September 1981, CIA-RDP06T00412R000200490001-5, NARA, p.10. *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘The Soviet Threat to Pakistan: Special National Intelligence Estimate’, 12 August 1981, 342, NARA, p.6.

⁷⁹⁹ *Directorate of Central Intelligence*, ‘Pakistan: The Succession Problem’: An Intelligence Assessment’, April 1982, CIA-RDP83B00232R000100070006, NARA, p.4.

movement led by ZAB's daughter. Shia Islam was seen to challenge the Wahabism of the Al-Saud ruling house of Saudi Arabia. They favoured the autocratic rule of a Sunni General in Pakistan hoping it would keep the expansion of Shiaism in check. The gender of the two main PPP leaders counted against them in Wahabi circles, and also the Shia identity that was commonly attributed to Nusrat Bhutto. The religious parties in Pakistan, hitherto marginalised in the politics of the country, saw their chance to assert themselves in alliance with Zia. They supported the war against the 'atheist' Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and benefited from the financial largesse that was showered on them in support of this agenda.⁸⁰⁰

Conclusion

Its critics claimed that MRD achieved little.⁸⁰¹ Yet, despite all the repression and the setbacks, Zia did respond to it with some concessions – albeit small ones. Such concessions helped gradually to remove Zia's pillars of support. Zia's position up until 1983 was that Pakistan was not ready for any democracy at all. In that year, faced with the reinvigoration of the MRD movement, he set out a roadmap towards a gradual restoration of electoral politics.

Anticipating a strong response to the call of civil disobedience for 14 August 1983, General Zia declared a political roadmap on 12 August, just two days beforehand, in an attempt to defuse the agitation. He announced that there would be multi-tiers election in three stages. Within one-and-a-half years, there would be local elections to local bodies, and later on provincial and then

⁸⁰⁰ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.261.

⁸⁰¹ Ahmed, 'The Rebellion of 1983', p.37.

national elections.⁸⁰² Following the recommendation of the Ansari Commission report, Zia announced these multi-tiers elections would be on a non-party basis. The pro-Zia parties, ML (Pagaro) and JI, welcomed the announcement and these conditions. However, MRD reminded the public of his previous broken promises of holding elections. The promise to hold elections in 'ninety days' that he made on seizing power in 1977 had been forgotten and there had instead been six years of dictatorship. They threatened to boycott the election if there was no preceding lifting of martial law. Though the political plan of 12 August made no mention of a referendum on his rule, the pressure of MRD drove General Zia to seek legitimacy both inside and beyond Pakistan by later holding a referendum in support of his policies and to give himself some constitutional standing.⁸⁰³ Cohen commented on this that Zia was doing 'enough' to show them [USA] for democracy but less on the ground in Pakistan.⁸⁰⁴

Ruthnam Indhurthy and Ritcher argue that the declaration of 12 August 1983 was *perhaps* due to the pressure from MRD.⁸⁰⁵ Roedad Khan is more certain that Zia was forced into these concessions by the campaign of MRD, as it caused him anxieties about the legitimacy of his position and he came to believe that his rule could be stabilised by democratic concessions, however small.⁸⁰⁶

After the declaration of 12 August, the next task of the MRD was to ensure that General Zia did not turn back from this roadmap and also at the same time lift

⁸⁰² Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.313.

⁸⁰³ *ibid.*, p.326.

⁸⁰⁴ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

⁸⁰⁵ Ruthnam Indurthy, 'The Fragility of Democracy in Pakistan: the Military as the Root Cause', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July - Sept., 1991), pp. 314-315. William L. Ritcher, 'Domestic Politics in the 1980s, in Baxter, Craig, and Wasti, Syed Raza (eds.), *Pakistan: Authoritarianism in 1980s* (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), p.76. Khan, *Pakistan*, p.91.

⁸⁰⁶ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.261.

martial law. By the beginning of 1984, BB was in exile in London after her request to go there for ear surgery was accepted. While the opposition to Zia was now driven by others within Pakistan, she now set about winning international support for her cause. The next chapter analyses these developments.

Ch. 4. Decline of the Dictator's Power 1984-86

After the sudden calling off of the civil disobedience movement in December 1983, MRD's protests started declining without any clear announcement of any further programme, which suggested to their opponents that the alliance had gone into the political wilderness. Many political scientists concluded that the MRD had failed to achieve its objective and dissolved discreetly. For example, not a single protest was taken out by MRD against martial law on the eight anniversary of its imposition on 5 July 1984.⁸⁰⁷ On his release from jail in January 1984, Mazari, one of the core leaders of MRD, stated that the movement had failed.⁸⁰⁸ Despite this, the MRD did not die away, as we shall see in this chapter.

Benazir Bhutto's departure from Pakistan and the Struggle in Exile:

Having been under house arrest since March 1981 (after the plane hijacking case), BB was allowed to leave the country for her ear treatment on 10 January 1984 after immense international pressure.⁸⁰⁹ Since late 1982, Nusrat Bhutto had already been in Europe for cancer treatment. Her departure was also through international pressure. Some of my exiled interviewees, Farkhanda Bukhari, and Shahid Nadeem⁸¹⁰, told how they struggled for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on medical grounds. Even Indira Gandhi, besides writing a letter to General Zia, in her letter to President Reagan dated 28 October 1982

⁸⁰⁷ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.158.

⁸⁰⁸ Sher Baz Mazari, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.167.

⁸⁰⁹ It was not an exile, as she stated herself in her book. She was sent to London for an operation on her ear. However, the title of the chapter in the book suggests otherwise. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp.251-52.

⁸¹⁰ Farkhanda Bukhari, interview; A memorandum was handed in to the Indian High Commission London requesting Indira Gandhi to use her office for the release of Nusrat Bhutto on humanitarian grounds, cited in Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai*, pp.147-49. Shahid Nadeem, interview.

requested his good office for her release.⁸¹¹ So did BB.⁸¹² Her departure was kept secret until she had left Pakistan. On her arrival at Heathrow airport BB told journalists that she had not been sent into exile but had come to the UK for medical treatment.⁸¹³ PPP's sources denied that she had pleaded with Zia in this respect, though Zia stated otherwise.⁸¹⁴ General (rtd) S.M.Abbasi,⁸¹⁵ ex-Governor of Sindh, claimed that her departure was allowed after she had agreed that though she might struggle while abroad for democracy and seek help from foreign sympathisers, she would not criticise Zia or the armed forces directly.⁸¹⁶ He failed to provide any documentary evidence for this claim, though it is significant to note that BB refrained from criticism of the Pakistan army's political role during her trip to USA right after her arrival in UK. She supported USA's military aid to Pakistan instead.⁸¹⁷ PPP and BB, though, kept denying any secret deal with Zia. The advantage to Zia was that he could rule without the presence of any strong internal opposition. It nonetheless allowed BB to promote the struggle for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan and expose

⁸¹¹ In a letter to President Ronald Reagan, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi updates him on news that Nusrat Bhutto, wife of the late Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, is seriously ill and has been denied the right to leave Pakistan for necessary medical treatment. Gandhi has written to Pakistani President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq requesting him to consider this matter on purely humanitarian grounds. Letter. WHITE HOUSE. Issue Date: 28 Oct 1982. Date Declassified: 23 May 2000. Complete, p.1. <<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&slb=KE&locID=warwick&srchtp=basic&c=5&img=.25&ste=4&txb=Nusrat+Bhutto&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349710948>> (19 March 2014) In a letter to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, President Ronald Reagan assures her that Nusrat Bhutto, Pakistani President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's wife, will be allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment for her life-threatening illness. Letter. White House. Issue Date: 29 Nov. 1982. Date Declassified: 23 May 2000. Complete, p.1. <<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?txb=Nusrat+Bhutto&slb=KE&vrsn=1.0&locID=warwick&srchtp=basic&ste=3>> (19 March 2014).

⁸¹² Farkhanda Bukhari, interview; also cited in Bukhari, *Ye Bazi Ishq Ki Bazi hai*, pp. 147-49.

⁸¹³ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.252.

⁸¹⁴ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.167.

⁸¹⁵ General (rtd) S.M.Abbasi, 17 November 1985, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.217.

⁸¹⁶ Mushtaq Lasharie, interview.

⁸¹⁷ *The Struggle*, No.12, May-June 1984, 601/R/23/19, MRC.

the brutality of Zia's regime.⁸¹⁸ In this, BB was building on initiatives that had dated back to the campaign to save ZAB from execution. Little has been said about this campaign in the literature, though it was behind the release of BB and Nusrat Bhutto themselves. We shall start by saying more about it here.

On the day of the sentence of death on 18 March 1978, the Bhutto brothers — Mir Murtaza Bhutto and Shah Nawaz Bhutto — sped up their struggle to mobilise international actors and media for saving their father's life. From their base next to the Pakistani High Commission in London they travelled to Iran, USA, UAE and Libya meeting government functionaries and requesting them to put pressure on the Zia regime to save their father.⁸¹⁹ After the final decision of Supreme Court, the Bhutto brothers planned an international convention for 7 April 1979 to expose the flaws in the case against ZAB case, it however became a posthumous event.⁸²⁰ The Netherlands chapter of PPP workers organised a Bhutto day in Amsterdam on 19 August 1979 in which Mustafa Khar, Mir Murtaza Bhutto, Shamim Ahmad Khan, and Mukhtar Rana gave speeches demanding a return to democracy.⁸²¹ After experiencing a cold response from the international community, and with the failure of the nonviolent campaign to save their father, the Bhutto brothers launched the violent Al-Zulfiqar movement, as mentioned in the previous chapter.

Practically underground after the many unsuccessful attempts to murder General Zia, the brothers took shelter in France. Tragically, Shah Nawaz Bhutto died in July 1985 whilst the Bhutto family were on holiday in Cannes. His death

⁸¹⁸ Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.18.

⁸¹⁹ Bhatti, *Bhutto Ka Beta*, p.13-14.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.15; *Musawaat*, 2 August 1979.

⁸²¹ *Musawaat*, 20 August 1979.

was mourned widely in Pakistan, irrespective of people's party affiliations. PPP workers put out condolence messages and held protest rallies around the country. Students were to the fore in this. The Zia regime tried to discredit him by claiming that he had died from acute alcohol poisoning. The Bhutto family countered this by alleging that it was a murder committed by agents of the Zia regime.⁸²² A massive crowd turned up to receive his dead body in Pakistan. SIPAF called a complete strike and boycotted the educational institution in Sindh. In Lahore, despite warning from the college administration, and the regime, PSF (Pakistan Student Federation) summoned all Punjab students to a mourning session in Dyal Singh College with the hoisting of PPP's flag along with a black flag over the building. Similarly events were held in Okara, Gujrat, Rawalpindi, Sialkot Bahawalnagar, Qasur and Multan including in the jails in these cities where PPP workers were imprisoned.⁸²³

International groups campaigned with some success also. There was for example a strong demand for the release of Khalid Chaudhry, a Pakistani journalist from Lahore arrested in April 1978.⁸²⁴ Miss Mybret of Amnesty International, who was based in Sweden, established a Khalid Chaudhry Release Committee and the campaign was backed by some leading human rights activists in Germany, France and the UK.⁸²⁵ They contacted the Government of Pakistan and took the issue up with journalists in various countries. They also

⁸²² Bhatti, *Bhutto ka Beta*, p.45; Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.218-9; the French police failed to find any evidence of murder.

⁸²³ *ibid.*, p. 53-56.

⁸²⁴ Khalid Chaudhry had married a German woman while studying in Germany, and her father was the second highest authority in German Church. This connection also helped in his release. Her wife is the same person who, with her Swedish friend, smuggled ZAB's jail diary out of Pakistan that was later published with the title 'If I am assassinated'. Khalid Chaudhry, interview.

⁸²⁵ *Musawaat*, 17 August 1979; Khalid Chaudhry, interview.

prepared a report on the persecution of journalists by the Zia regime over the previous two years. The committee included the cases of other journalists such as Hussain Naqi, and Mazhar Ali Khan.⁸²⁶ Due to this pressure, Chaudhry was kept in Shahi Qila jail for only two months and then released.

At the same time, the PPP workers held marches and the rallies in key European capitals. In Belgium, over eighty members marched through Brussels waving PPP flags. In London hundreds demonstrated outside the Pakistan embassy. In the Netherlands, there was a Black Day march by hundreds of protestors to the Pakistani embassy in The Hague in response to the detention of Qayum Butt for five months as an illegal immigrant.⁸²⁷

Seeing so much pressure built by such tiny groups and organisations, the Zia regime sought to counter this through diplomatic channels. This extended to feeding false information to foreign governments so as to harass anti-Zia activists. For example, 2500 planned to demonstrate in Bonn in August 1982 to highlight Zia's human rights abuses in Pakistan. Having failed to stop the demonstration, the Pakistani authorities misinformed the German police about their legal status in that country. Coaches taking them to Bonn were diverted to police stations and their right to be there was investigated. Only the production of a special order from a judge forced the authorities to allow the march and a rally addressed by Dr. Ghulam Hussain.⁸²⁸ The Dutch police were similarly fed false information about an alleged plot to hijack a PIA plane from Schiphol airport on 17 October 1981. 500 plain-clothed and heavily armed Dutch police raided houses in various cities in the Netherlands and arrested eighteen PPP

⁸²⁶ *Musawaat*, 3 August 1979.

⁸²⁷ *The Struggle* (England, Holland, and Belgium, January 1983), No. 7, 601/R/23/19, MRC, p.4.

⁸²⁸ *ibid.*

workers, who were stripped and interrogated on the charge of the plot a hijacking. Tanks ringed Schiphol Airport. Some members of the Dutch Labour Party were also held for questioning. An elderly Dutch woman and her husband were picked up and stripped naked in a police station in the Hague as well. Sixteen of them were soon set free because of a lack of any evidence from the Pakistan government, but two were kept in custody as they were found to be in the country illegally. They later sought political asylum on the advice of human rights activists, and thus avoided being deported. These people later sued the Dutch Government for damages of fl. 18 million (over £4 million).⁸²⁹ The exiled resisters failed however to save six people from being arrested and detained in Vienna, which was a real failure for their campaign.⁸³⁰

The MRD established an office in London in 1981, and Ghulam Mustafa Khar was made President of the organisation in the UK.⁸³¹ A PPP convention was held in London on 16-17 October 1981, with resolutions being passed for an end Zia's dictatorship, permission to be granted for Nusrat Bhutto to travel abroad for medical treatment, and for party organisation elsewhere in Europe.⁸³² After Khan Abdul Qayum's resignation from MRD Pakistan in March, however, the Kashmiri diaspora quit the movement. Later on, the unpopularity of Khar, and rifts among the PPP's overseas leadership weakened the British organisation.⁸³³ So, when BB arrived in London in 1984, she had to revive this body, which she managed to do quite quickly.

⁸²⁹ *Hartal*, No.1, April 1983, 601/R/23/19. MRC, p.10.

⁸³⁰ Rafiq Babar, Yaqoob Cheena, Ashraf Manawa.

⁸³¹ Anwer Abbas Naqvi, cited in Shakir, *MRD*, pp.110-111.

⁸³² *The Struggle* (England, Holland, and Belgium, January 1983), No. 7, 601/R/23/19, MRC.

⁸³³ Anwer Abbas Naqvi, cited in Shakir, *MRD*, pp.110-111.

Ackerman and Kruegler have observed that ‘just as generals need adequate supplies of bullets, boots, and bandages’, financial, human and infrastructural resources are crucial for a nonviolent movement.⁸³⁴ BB was well aware of this as she rebuilt the opposition to Zia in London. She rented a flat in the Barbican complex, which soon became the ‘de facto command center’ of the party for England and the units abroad.⁸³⁵ She established an efficient management structure, with political workers-cum-volunteers being assigned a range of responsibilities. She ensured that their communication system was effective, with a good-quality fax machine, phone-lines, and audio and video cassette players operated by young volunteers.⁸³⁶ Bashir Riaz, a journalist, acted as a spokesperson and disseminated information and arranged media interviews. The former information minister Naseem Ahmed was put in charge of the lobbying of British MPs to support their call for an end to British aid to the Zia regime.⁸³⁷ In 1985, PPP established a young wing of the party with the objective of providing ideological training in preparation for future party activities.⁸³⁸

Despite this, publicity was never easy, as in those pre-internet times there was no easy way of disseminating a point of view through the mass media. Access to television channels and the national press was very hard to obtain. One way round this was to self-publish material that could then be distributed. *Pakistan Today*, for example, was written by Qayum Nizami in Ottawa and

⁸³⁴ Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.30-31.

⁸³⁵ Outside of UK, Germany, Austria, Netherland, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, Canada, France, Australia, Saudia Arabia, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.260.

⁸³⁶ Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.31.

⁸³⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp.260-61.

⁸³⁸ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne’, *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, 21 November 1986, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, NARA, p.29.

photocopied for distribution among interested persons in North America.⁸³⁹ The magazine *'Amal* (Action) was launched in London under the direct supervision of BB and sent to political workers and prisoners in Pakistan to keep their morale high.⁸⁴⁰ The regime managed to put obstacles in the way of printing of such magazines abroad. For example, the calligrapher of *'Amal* suddenly quit the job on the instigation of Pakistani embassy in London. Nevertheless, the magazine continued to be published as the editor retained a pool of calligraphers to replace them in such an emergency.⁸⁴¹

In order to convincingly demonstrate the regime's brutality to the outside world, documentary evidence was necessary. So the party in exile established a secret network of sympathetic jail guards, policemen, post office workers, airline workers, and relatives of exiled activists who helped smuggle such evidence out of Pakistan to London, from where it was disseminated internationally.⁸⁴²

BB stated that 'I decided to mount an international campaign to expose the regime's maltreatment of the 40,000 political prisoners still in jail in Pakistan.'⁸⁴³ She travelled extensively in the UK, Europe and North America demanding the release of political prisoners in Pakistan. She met parliamentarians, executive heads of governments, and leaders of non-governmental organisations. She strengthened and expanded the movement's

⁸³⁹ Qayyum Nizami, interview.

⁸⁴⁰ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.264.

⁸⁴¹ Bashir Riaz, currently, Chairman Bhutto Legacy Research Foundation; Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.265.

⁸⁴² Interviews with Aslam Khwaja (Karachi), Mushtaq Lasharie (London), Qayyum Nizami (Lahore); Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.262.

⁸⁴³ *ibid.*, p.255.

network of foreign offices. According to Qayyum Nizami, ex-Minister of Information:

BB made me representative of North America. I established party units in New York, Detroit, Montreal, Washington DC and Toronto and kept in contact with BB from London. [In] 1984, BB came to USA and I visited with her. I invited her to Canada, but [she] could not come due to the murder of Shahnawaz in the following year.⁸⁴⁴

BB lobbied to save the lives of opposition activists sentenced to death by the Zia regime. She failed to achieve this in the cases of Nasser Baluch and Ayaz Samoo, who were executed in March and June 1985 despite strong international mobilisation against their sentences, with mercy letters, diplomatic pressure and Amnesty International pleas to Zia.⁸⁴⁵

Two weeks after going into exile, BB travelled to the USA. The USA was the main international supporter of the Zia regime, providing financial aid while being blind to its abuses of human rights.⁸⁴⁶ Speaking before an audience of State and Defence department officials, members of Congress, former Ambassadors and members of the press at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace she stated: 'We in Pakistan are confused and disappointed by the backing given to Zia's illegitimate regime'.⁸⁴⁷ She recalled her participation in protests against the American involvement in Vietnam a decade before, and said that she was now in the USA to protest to them about another injustice, namely US support for a regime in Pakistan that was committing

⁸⁴⁴ Qayyum Nizami, Interview.

⁸⁴⁵ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp.274-77.

⁸⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁸⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p.259.

atrocities against its own people. BB found that US newspapers were eulogising General Zia as a 'benign dictator'.⁸⁴⁸ She met as many influential politicians and persons as she could.⁸⁴⁹ For example, she Directed the attention of US Congressman Solarz's to the execution of four political activists – Nasser Baloach, Essa Balaoch, Malik Ayub, and Saifullah Khalid – for their alleged involvement in the hijacking of the PIA plane in 1981. He was unaware of the military's brutal policy against political activists, and he took immediate action after confirming the report from Amnesty International by sending a confidential telegram⁸⁵⁰ to the Assistant Secretary Elliot Abrams to take action against the execution. Likewise, she drew the attention of Senators Kennedy, and Moynihan to the cases of Raza Kazim⁸⁵¹, who was charged on the attempt of assassinating General Zia-ul-Haq, and Rasool Bakhsh Pallejo,⁸⁵² General Secretary Sindhi Awami Tehreek and under arrest since 1981. When asked by these US political leaders, the US embassy officials in Islamabad professed ignorance of the events. BB already personally knew some leading figures in the US establishment, such as Peter Galbraith – then a staff member for the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations – whom she had befriended earlier at Harvard. Galbraith lobbied for her cause at that time.⁸⁵³ She also contacted the

⁸⁴⁸ *ibid.*.

⁸⁴⁹ Meeting with Senator Claiborne Pell, Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator McGovern, Senator John Glenn, and Alan Granston, Peter Galbraith, Former Attorney General Ramsay Clark, Meetings with the top editors of the *Time Magazine*, cited in Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp.256-59.

⁸⁵⁰ From US Embassy London to Secretary of State Washington DC, 'Possible Human Rights Violations in Pakistan', in November 1984, CIA-RDP90B01370R00081110016-4, NARA.

⁸⁵¹ Confidential Correspondence of US Embassy Islamabad to Secretary of State Washington DC, 'Raza Kazim Case: Senator Kennedy Interested', in April 1984, CIA-RDP90B01370R000801120108-1, NARA.

⁸⁵² Confidential Correspondence between US Embassy Islamabad to Secretary of State Washington DC, 'Rasul Bakhsh Pallejo: Senator Mdynihan', in April 1984, CIA-RDP90B01370R000801120094-7, NARA.

⁸⁵³ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

UN Secretary General. Not only did these activities help make the US government accountable to its covert-cum-overt operation in this region, but they put pressure on the Pakistani regime as it knew that it was now being scrutinised for its activities.

US Senators John Glenn and Alan Cranston presented an amendment to the Foreign Relations Committee on 28 March 1984 that required the President of the United States to assure in writing that Pakistan 'neither had a "nuclear explosive device" nor was acquiring material to manufacture or detonate one"⁸⁵⁴ before releasing aid to Pakistan, which was passed in the committee unanimously.⁸⁵⁵ BB expressed her concerns about this to Senator Percy, the head of the committee, stating: 'Senator, cutting off the aid will only create misunderstandings between our two countries'. She argued that aid should, rather, be linked to the restoration of human rights and democracy in the country.⁸⁵⁶ The amendment – due to immense pressure from the Reagan's administration – was changed into a requirement of a certificate from the US President stating Pakistan did not have the nuclear bomb, after which aid was continued.⁸⁵⁷ Some opposition leaders in Pakistan were critical of BB in this respect. Sh. M. Rashid condemned strongly BB's support of military aid to Pakistan.⁸⁵⁸ He wanted to 'stop aid to army dictatorship completely', the continuation of the class struggle, and a dialogue between Afghan and Pakistan to solve the refugee issues. BB also called for the withdrawal of the Soviet army

⁸⁵⁴ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.258.

⁸⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p. 260.

⁸⁵⁶ *ibid.*, pp.258 and 260.

⁸⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p.260.

⁸⁵⁸ BB gave an interview to Denmark Radio stating that she had asked Senator Charles Percy, head of the Foreign Relations Committee, to continue military aid to Pakistan.

from Afghanistan, contrary to Nusrat Bhutto's decision in a party meeting in 1980. Moreover, the party workers had been chanting slogans against imperialism vis-à-vis USA since 1967, as had ZAB.⁸⁵⁹ BB was thus working for a radical change in direction for her party and the opposition in Pakistan.⁸⁶⁰

BB also campaigned in Europe. She sent case histories and photograph of political prisoners who were under sentence of death in Pakistan to Members of Parliament in the UK, European foreign ministers, lawyers, syndicates and international trade organisations, and to Amnesty International, appealing to them to put pressure on the Pakistan government to lift the sentences. It was through her campaigning in these respects that many influential politicians and activists in the USA and Europe began to question their governments' support for the Zia regime. Her work led to pressure being brought to bear by the European Parliament on Prime Minister (PM) Junejo regarding the political detainees. Commissioner Claude Cheysson of the European Economic Community discussed the matter with Junejo and reported back to the European parliament in January 1986, stating that Junejo assured him that 'all political sentences passed by the special military courts will be referred to the civil courts...In my opinion it represents the best guarantee possible in a country returning to democracy'.⁸⁶¹ The Voice of America reported the protest of a New York based Human Rights organisation, which accused Reagan's administration of underplaying cases of human rights violations in Pakistan.⁸⁶²

⁸⁵⁹ *The Struggle*, No.12, May-June 1984, 601/R/23/19, MRC.

⁸⁶⁰ BB herself stated the differences inside the party on her trip to USA. Marxists group was active in that regard who wanted to send her to Soviet Union. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 267-68.

⁸⁶¹ Claude Cheysson, European Parliament Speech, January 1986, cited in 'Pakistan: Special Military Courts, Unfair Trials and the Death Penalty', Amnesty International, MSS34/4/1/Pk64, MRC, p.4.

⁸⁶² Voice of America, cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.12.

This work of BB abroad played an important role pressurising the regime to restore some elements of democracy in the coming years. On a visit to Pakistan in early 1984 – before she began this work – George Bush, the then Vice-President of USA, had not uttered a single word in MRD’s favour during a four-day official trip. Afterwards, when during her brief visit to Pakistan for the burial of Shah Nawaz Bhutto BB was placed under house arrest, the US State Department stated that this punitive action provided a hurdle towards the ‘restoration of constitutional government’.⁸⁶³ The British parliamentarians Max Madden, and Lord Avebury also expressed their concerns directly to General Zia on her house arrest.⁸⁶⁴ Moreover, five-hundred protestors gathered against the action in Bradford. Unfortunately PPP’s newly nominated CEC refused to launch a campaign to free her. They claimed it could delay the lifting of Martial Law promised for the beginning of the year – a ‘Wait for January 1st 1986’ policy. BB also responded to the demand of a movement by the workers to ‘wait for January 1986’. So did the CEC.⁸⁶⁵

Restoration of Elements of Democracy:

Zia had reneged on his promise to restore democracy on 12 August 1983, though as a token gesture on 4 March 1984 he appointed some civilians as ministers in charge of departments that dealt with civil affairs. Zafarullah Jamali and Sirtaj Aziz replaced General Rao Farman Ali and General Abbas Khan Abbasi as Federal Ministers, and thirty-nine new non-military members were nominated for the *Majlis-i-Shoora*. When Lt. General Jahandad Khan was made

⁸⁶³ US State Department’s Spokesman, cited in Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.302.

⁸⁶⁴ *ibid.*

⁸⁶⁵ *The Struggle*, No.6, Winter 1985-6, p.2.

Governor of Sindh, twelve members of the cabinet appointed from the Sindh assembly were from political parties, including five ex-PPP members.⁸⁶⁶ Already, in January 1984, Zia had allowed BB to leave Pakistan. During the course of the next four months between January and April 1984, 288 political leaders and activists were set free.⁸⁶⁷

Zia had been making ambiguous statements about the future for a time. Despite promises that the censorship of newspapers under the Press and Publications Ordinance would soon be lifted; he continued to clamp down on freedom of expression throughout 1984.⁸⁶⁸ He hinted that he might hold a general election and then retire and play golf. In an interview with the *Financial Times* of 4 August 1984 he changed his stance and said when asked that he would accept the post of President if offered it. Right after that, Baluchistan passed a resolution to request him to be a candidate in the Presidential election.⁸⁶⁹ He then took the public by surprise when he suddenly announced on radio and TV on 1 December 1984 that a referendum was to be held on 19 December.⁸⁷⁰ During a whirlwind tour of the country in the following days, Zia played the Islamic card in an attempt to whip up support for his candidacy. He advocated the principles of the Quran and promised to promulgate *Zakat* and the *Ushar* system, the Hudood Ordinances, *Nizam-i-Salat*, and the end to the paying of interest on debt. He maintained that casting a vote

⁸⁶⁶ Qazi Abdul Majeed, Dost Muhammad Faizi, Abdul Ghafoor Bhurgari, Ghulam Muhammad Mahr, and Syed Muzaffar Ali Shah.

⁸⁶⁷ These included Nazwabzada Nasrullah Khan, Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Mazari, Piyar Ali Alana, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, and Begum Naseem Wali. Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.167-8.

⁸⁶⁸ *ibid.* p.151.

⁸⁶⁹ General Zia-ul-Haq, interview with *Financial Times*, 4 August 1984, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.159.

⁸⁷⁰ General Zia-ul-Haq, *New York Times*, 18 August 1988.

in his favour was basically a vote for *Sunnah*. The state-run TV and Radio propagated him as the saviour of Islam and champion of an Islamic nation. He was projected by his cronies as *Mard-i-Momin*, or 'the pious man' for his 'services to Islam'. JI supported the referendum, as did the Shia Ulemas, who had supported civil resistance against his Zakat Ordinances during 1979-81.⁸⁷¹ The question posed in the referendum was:

Do you agree with the actions of General Zia-ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, which he has started to strengthen the ideology of Pakistan by the implementation of Islamic laws of the country according to true spirit of Quran and Sunnah? And, do you support the idea of the continuation of the process of handing over the powers of the government to the elected representatives of the country?⁸⁷² In this underhand way, the notion that Zia would now rule Pakistan as President was slipped onto the ballot paper without that being the actual question posed.

All parties except JI and ML Pagara opposed the referendum.⁸⁷³ On the call for a boycott by MRD, the regime tried to counter their opposition by promulgating three ordinances on 5 December. Anyone inciting boycott or even refusing to vote could be punished with up to three years imprisonment and/or five-hundred thousand rupees fine. Such persons would also be banned from running for any elected public office for the next seven years. Zia also demanded that the one million councillors and 35,000 members of the *Zakat* and *Ushr* committees turn out to vote, as he expected them to vote in his

⁸⁷¹ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.172.

⁸⁷² Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 328. Roedad Khan, *Pakistan*, p.89.

⁸⁷³ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.78.

favour.⁸⁷⁴ Despite all government's efforts and General Zia's whirlwind tour of twenty-four major cities of the country in eight days 8-16 December, the boycott ensured an embarrassingly low turnout.⁸⁷⁵ Independent sources including US embassy's reports⁸⁷⁶ indicate less than thirty per cent cast valid votes. Government officials rectified this by filling the ballot boxes with fake votes. Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, (ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan, who was at that time with General Zia) exposed the rigging in his book by stating that on his visit to one polling station in Shujabad, Multan, he found it out that numbers of the votes were more than the registered voters.⁸⁷⁷ Fazal Ullah Marwat commented on the referendum that his father, who was a lawyer, was told that his vote had already been cast when he went to the polling station on the day of the referendum.⁸⁷⁸ General Fazl-i-Haq also commented that it was due to the MRD boycott that they could fill in the empty boxes with votes.⁸⁷⁹ Ghafoor Ahmed, a member JI – a party then supporting Zia – expressed surprise at the declaration of the result the very next day by the regime, which seemed impossible due to lack of time to collect the returns from far-flung areas.⁸⁸⁰ According to the official figures put out by the Election Commission, of the 62.17 per cent of the electorate that cast a vote, 97.21 per cent voted in favour of Zia's resolution.⁸⁸¹

Political commentators saw it as a twofold success for MRD. Firstly, the pressure of MRD and the people's power had pushed General Zia to try to

⁸⁷⁴ General Zia-ul-Haq, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.154.

⁸⁷⁵ Roedad Khan, Pakistan, p.89.

⁸⁷⁶ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA. p.1.

⁸⁷⁷ Syed Raza Gilani, *Chah-i-Yusaf se Sada*, (Lahore: Nigarshat Publishers, 2006), p.76.

⁸⁷⁸ Dr. Fazal-ullah Marwat, interview.

⁸⁷⁹ Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, p.82.

⁸⁸⁰ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.177-78.

⁸⁸¹ Chief Election Commissioner announced the result on 20 December, cited in Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.111.

legitimise his position with a public poll, and secondly the success of the boycott proved the public's loyalty to the forces of democracy. Should the MRD have campaigned for a 'no' vote instead? In Chile, for example, when General Augusto Pinochet held a plebiscite in 1988 that was aimed at perpetuating his rule, the opposition successfully mobilised the public to vote 'no'.⁸⁸² While failure to vote could be interpreted as being due to apathy or laziness rather than the result of an active boycott, it was only by putting 'no' on the ballot paper that the full extent of the opposition to the dictator could be revealed. The crucial difference in Pakistan was that 'Islam' was the candidate rather than a secular leader, and asking the public to vote 'no' to Islam would have been a non-starter for the opposition. Despite this difference between Chile and Pakistan, the oppositions in both countries were similar in that they kept up their opposition by one means or other despite reverses until they eventually prevailed. The same was true of the opposition to General Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina.⁸⁸³

Following the referendum, with resistance to his rule continuing and under growing international pressure, the General decided to hold a general election, as promised originally on 12 August 1983. Khalid B. Sayeed⁸⁸⁴, though, doubted on the General's intention to hold the election once the General unfurled his political roadmap on 12 August 1983. In public, he had kept stating that holding of the election on party-basis or without parties would be a

⁸⁸² Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*, pp. 85-86.

⁸⁸³ Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp. 267-79.

⁸⁸⁴ Sayeed, 'Pakistan in 1983', p.219.

decision of the Federal Cabinet, and Majlis-i-Shura.⁸⁸⁵ On the query of the mechanism and characteristics of the election, General Zia always responded that everything was in *my head*.⁸⁸⁶ This was a cover for him to do whatever he wanted according to circumstances as they arose. As it was the decision to hold the election on a non-party basis had in fact been taken before 19 January 1984, according to the US consulate secret documents.⁸⁸⁷ The decision was made public on 12 January 1985. Zia also issued a MLO 65, which permitted him to allow the participation in the election of any member of a defunct political party.⁸⁸⁸ This was designed for the pro-Zia parties such as JI rather than anyone else.

Zia sought to create a parliamentary system that would be entirely malleable to his strong control. Contrary to his previously stated objective of creating a balance of power between the Executive and the Head of the State, he ensured that most power was held by President. The Revival of Constitutional Order of 1973 in 1985⁸⁸⁹ (RCO), later on the Eighth Amendment, promulgated by Zia even before the oath-taking ceremony of the newly-elected Assembly was even held. Twenty-five per cent⁸⁹⁰ (67 out of 280 articles⁸⁹¹) of the 1973 constitution was changed through this amendment. The notorious clause 2(b) of article 58 of the Amendment put the major decisions including the appointments of chiefs of the armed forces in the hands of the President. The

⁸⁸⁵ Zia-ul-Haq, interview with All India Radio, 25 May 1984, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 157.

⁸⁸⁶ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.153.

⁸⁸⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Position Talking Points for the DCI', on 19 January 1984, CIA-RDP85T00287R001300270001-0, NARA.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.112.

⁸⁸⁹ Also named 14th Presidential Order.

⁸⁹⁰ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.78.

⁸⁹¹ Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86*, p.249.

incoming Prime Minister was made a puppet in the hands of the President. The notorious Article 58-2(b)⁸⁹² strengthening the authority of the President over the elected Prime Minister by providing the power to remove him. Zia was to use this power on 29 May 1988.⁸⁹³ In all, this provided for a radical shift of power in favour of the President.

Besides assuming these new constitutional powers, Zia also sought to turn Pakistan into an Islamic state, with him in the role of Caliph. Following his 'Islamisation' programme, the words 'Muslim' or 'Islam' were inserted into legislation. For example, 'Muslim' was added before the word 'members' in article 51 of the constitution, with people of minority religions being given separate seats. Many legal experts including Zia's former Chief Justice, Anwar-ul-Haq, criticised such legislation, stating that it changed the genre of the constitution.⁸⁹⁴ As it was, such measures satisfied hardly anyone. The opposition questioned Zia's authority to make such changes, while Islamic groups, such as JI, felt that he had not gone far enough in the Islamization programme.⁸⁹⁵

Zia rejected the multi-party democratic systems of the UK and USA, stating that Pakistan required a form of Islamic Caliphate in which there were no political parties.⁸⁹⁶ After the exit of BB, and the waning position of MRD, he became increasingly arrogant and contemptuous towards the opposition, as

⁸⁹² Due to that article, three national and provincial assemblies were removed from the offices between 1990-1997 at various occasions.

⁸⁹³ It was used again subsequently, by President Ishaq and President Farooq Leghari in 1990, 1992, and 1996 – twice against BB, and once against Nawaz Sharif respectively.

⁸⁹⁴ Justice (rtd) Anwar-ul-Haq, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.188-9.

⁸⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.189.

⁸⁹⁶ *ibid.*, p.153.

shown by Ghafoor Ahmed.⁸⁹⁷ Despite his declared commitment to an election, political parties continued to be banned in 1984. Zia appointed a Constitutional Amendments' Commission chaired by Maulana Zafar Ansari to review the issue, which obediently reported in favour of a non-party based system. The American authorities bent over backwards to accommodate him in this, with Vice-President George Bush implicitly accepting the legitimacy of a non-party system when he stated during his trip to Pakistan: 'America, though, does not take non-party election as a democratic norm; however, many countries around the world follow it'.⁸⁹⁸ By contrast, Zia's own hand-picked Chief Justice for the Federal Sharia Court, Justice Aftab Hussain Sheikh, stated that there was nothing in Islam that forbade a party-based polity and that 1973 constitution could be considered Islamic as many *Ulama* (Muslim scholars) had put their signature to it.⁸⁹⁹

The elections for the national and provincial assemblies were held on 25 and 28 February 1985 respectively, with no political parties being allowed to contest as such. The election to the upper house involving 83 seats was held subsequently in mid-March. No party symbols, public gatherings or criticism of the regime was permitted.⁹⁰⁰ 1,093 individuals fought for 237 seats (which included ten reserved for minorities and twenty for women) of the National Assembly and 3,631 for the four Provincial Assemblies.⁹⁰¹ There was no debate on major issues such as policy towards the war in Afghanistan and problems

⁸⁹⁷ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.169.

⁸⁹⁸ George Bush, Vice-President USA, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.164.

⁸⁹⁹ Justice Aftab Hussain Sheikh, Interview to a Daily newspaper November 1984, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.163.

⁹⁰⁰ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp.272-73.

⁹⁰¹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *North East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

caused by the influx of Afghan refugees, the powers of state governments within the federation, or various major social problems. Instead, the candidates generally focused on local issues such as 'sanitation, education, and property right.'⁹⁰² The government propagated the idea of a 'divine' agenda, which meant creating a polity and society that accorded with Islamic principles. Candidates were meant to be selected on the basis of their supposed '*Muttaqi aur Perhaizgar*' (virtue and piety), with Zia stating that 'I did not want to flood the efforts of last seven years to make the country Islamic' by allowing previous corrupt politicians back into parliament.⁹⁰³ Zia limited the expenses for the national and provincial assemblies to 40,000 rupees (US\$2600.00), and 25,000 rupees (US\$1620.00)⁹⁰⁴ respectively.⁹⁰⁵

Of the 237 members elected to the national assembly, most were moderates or conservatives. Of them, 176 were from the traditionally privileged classes – 117 were rural landlords, 42 were businessmen, and 17 were tribal chiefs. Among the rest, twenty-one women and ten non-Muslims elected from the reserved seats.⁹⁰⁶ Rather than being a sweeping away of the supposedly discredited old political order, two-thirds of the new MNAs were found to have had previous political careers.⁹⁰⁷ Ghafoor Ahmed,⁹⁰⁸ a die-hard

⁹⁰² Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Election at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹⁰³ Zia stated that alcohol abusers and smugglers would not be allowed to seek election. General Zia-ul-Haq, 12 March 1984 in Peshawar Political gathering, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.151 and 161.

⁹⁰⁴ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *North East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹⁰⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the delegates of Convention on the Implementation of Islam, 30 January 1985, Islamabad, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.182.

⁹⁰⁶ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in November 1986, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, NARA, p.1.

⁹⁰⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, NARA, p.2.

member of the JI, found that over eighty per cent of the MNASs were former elected politicians or belonged to the same families.⁹⁰⁹ Only thirty-six per cent had twelve years of education. Despite the rules that specified imprisonment and/or fine for anyone who exceeded the specified financial limits, the regime spent lavishly on the election. No one was prosecuted for this, and Zia then ruled that no newly-elected MNAS had to submit their expenses to the Election Commission.⁹¹⁰ The so-called 'Islamic' election was, so far as Zia was concerned, a show that he had put on to consolidate his rule.

The election helped to worsen social and religious divisions in Pakistan, as candidates exploited every difference in society based on gender, sex, class, and religion to whip up support, rather than appeal to party loyalties. Zia had anticipated that he could control the Assembly through a divide-and-rule policy, though after the election was over he was faced with the daunting task of having to win support on an individual basis.⁹¹¹ He tried to do this through financial inducements, horse-trading⁹¹² and/or arm-twisting. He used such measures to ensure the passage through parliament of the Eight Amendment to the Constitution and the annual budgets.⁹¹³ He also handed out a five million

⁹⁰⁸ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.184.

⁹⁰⁹ Almost all the previous politicians including the members of Federal Advisory Council and the municipal councils stood for the election, despite being previously tagged as morally and financially corrupt. Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Election at Last", *Near East and South Asia Review*, on 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹¹⁰ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *North East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA. Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.78.

⁹¹¹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.3.

⁹¹² The term was coined after the 1985 election when MPs were offered money to vote in favour of the regime's candidates for ministerial offices. This practice continued whenever any legislation promoted by the regime required their approval. Votes tended to be cast for money rather than through ideological commitment.

⁹¹³ Javed Hashmi, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, interviews. Hashmi, *Han Main Baghi Hoon*, pp.93-107; M.B.Naqvi, 'Pakistan in 1985 – a retrospect', *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.9.

rupees development fund to each member of the National Assembly without any effective audit. This all served to further corrupt the polity.

The MRD boycotted the election in protest at its non-party form. Previously, BB had rejected proposals for a boycott of the local elections in 1979. 'Electoral fields should never be left open', as her father told her.⁹¹⁴ In July 1984, now in exile in the UK, BB had set out a nine-point election manifesto that demanded a general amnesty for all political prisoners (resumption of the activities of political parties; handing over the government to the largest winning party after holding the election; and smooth participation in the election).⁹¹⁵ BB stated her intention of running in the election being promised at that time by Zia. She had also expressed interest in returning to the country if the party had decided to fight the election.⁹¹⁶ She welcomed, however, the call of the MRD to boycott the referendum, and told US diplomats that 'they would win two-thirds of the vote in a fair election.'⁹¹⁷ She now threatened expulsion from the party of any members who partook in the election.⁹¹⁸ And, later on, she endorsed the decision of the Abbotabad meeting giving the reason that the election was not being held under the 1973 Constitution.⁹¹⁹ The MRD wanted to use the boycott to put more pressure on the regime to declare party-based elections; however, it did not work out like that.⁹²⁰ BB hoped that a successful boycott would encourage junior Army officers to demand that the regime hand

⁹¹⁴ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, pp. 25 and 271.

⁹¹⁵ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The Pakistan People's Party Braces for Elections', *Near East and South Asia Review*, on 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002-0, NARA.

⁹¹⁶ *ibid.*

⁹¹⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The Pakistan People's Party Braces for Elections', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002-0, NARA.

⁹¹⁸ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The Pakistan People's Party Braces for Election', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002-0, NARA.

⁹¹⁹ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.272.

⁹²⁰ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.78.

over government to the largest civilian party. And in her vision, the largest party was the PPP. However, a poll suggested where ‘twenty-four per cent said PPP is the most popular party, forty-nine per cent made the party they disliked the most.’

As it was, BB and Nusrat Bhutto, living abroad, could not comprehend the realities on the ground in the country, and accepted the advice of the party’s core committee, especially Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, to boycott the election.⁹²¹ In interviews, Taj Haider, and Mazhar Abbas told me that Jatoi was being controlled by the army, and that his return from self-exile in 1984 had resulted from an agreement he had made with the army.⁹²² US intelligence reports noted that Jatoi made a special trip to Lahore to discourage any possible participation by the Punjab PPP in the election, as it would ‘undercut his leverage with Zia.’⁹²³ Moreover, General Zia told Mir Khalil-ur-Rehman, Editor-in-Chief of *Jang*, that he was in a constant contact with Jatoi during the meeting in Abbotabad at which the boycott was discussed, and when the decision went in favour of boycott, Zia offered prayers of thanksgiving.⁹²⁴ It appears that Jatoi thus played a duplicitous role. There were severe rifts between the Punjab and Sindh PPPs over the boycott. Seventy per cent of former Punjab PPP parliamentarians from Punjab were estimated to have stood for election despite the boycott.⁹²⁵ The boycott was thus ineffective. Fifty three per cent of voters turned out for the

⁹²¹ Taj Haider, interview.

⁹²² Taj Haider, and Mazhar Abbas, interviews.

⁹²³ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: The People’s Party Braces for Election’, *North East and South Asia Review*, in 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

⁹²⁴ Wajid Shamsul Hasan was among the panel of the journalists who went to interview General Zia after the boycott of the election in which General Zia said that he had offered prayers. Wajid Shamsul Hasan, Interview, and Mazhar Abbas, interview.

⁹²⁵ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: The People’s Party Braces for Election’, *North East and South Asia Review*, in 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

National Assembly election, and fifty eight per cent for the election to the provincial assemblies, which was only slightly, lower than the previous two elections of 1970 and 1977.⁹²⁶ Anti-Zia candidates mostly won, with four out of five of Zia's former ministers being defeated. The assemblies were thus elected, but the MRD was now out of the picture. BB subsequently regretted her decision to support the boycott.

The other political parties in the MRD held that Zia's constitutional package was intended to create pliant assemblies so that he could get constitutional cover for his illegitimate rule.⁹²⁷ They denounced any attempt to make him a democratic head of the state since their whole struggle sought to present the General as unfit for such a role. In response to the MRD boycott, the regime turned its full weight against the leadership. 3000 political opponents were held under house arrest or behind the bars.⁹²⁸ The CIA's monthly review that was based on reports from US diplomats in Pakistan described the repressive measures at that time.⁹²⁹ The media was not allowed to say that there was any boycott or publish statements by 'individuals not participating' in the election. Anyone who violated these rules was threatened with grave consequences. PPP members were targeted in particular. The opposition resorted to circulating handbills or encouraging the boycott by word-of-mouth. In an attempt to divide the opposition, Zia allowed members of any political

⁹²⁶ Independent Press Officials, and US diplomats. cited in Directorate of Intelligence 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.1.

⁹²⁷ This was the analysis of US diplomats. Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Election at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹²⁸ *Time* (London), cited in Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p. 273.

⁹²⁹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Election at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

party including the MRD to participate in the election, so that he could gain the people's admiration for his supposed statesmanship and political generosity.⁹³⁰ Members of parties who did compete filled many seats at the cost of those parties that remained in MRD, and particularly PPP. Members of JI won fifty-three seats, and PML (Pagara) sixty-eight.⁹³¹

Boycotting the election in 1985 was a blunder for the MRD's blunders as it changed the whole face of the political struggle in Pakistan. Later on, BB confessed that they had made a mistake. Being in exile, the control and command of the party was loose; therefore they followed the decision to boycott of MRD's central committee meeting held on 19 January in Abbottabad. Moreover, if the party had gone for the election, BB and her close aides feared that it could have been hijacked completely by politically strong members such as Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi. The worst immediate outcome of the decision was the further division among the leaders and the rank and file of the parties of MRD, which further diminished their attractiveness to the public after their boycott call. US diplomats of Lahore and Karachi identified the concerns in a report sent to their government. A few leaders tried to engage themselves with the regime⁹³², including Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi⁹³³ of PPP. MRD failed to expose the false propaganda of the regime over its supposedly effective economic policies, or its cynical use of Islam. This all left the field open for those who opposed the

⁹³⁰ General Zia-ul-Haq, Talking to the Foreign Journalists in Lahore, 19 May 1984, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.156-7.

⁹³¹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Election at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹³² Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Election at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA.

⁹³³ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The Pakistan People's Party Braces for Elections', *Near East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002-0, NARA.

radical politics associated with the PPP. Many anti-PPP landlords felt that they needed to participate in the election to safeguard their interests.⁹³⁴

Chile's resistance against the Pinochet regime's referendum in 1988 and the defeat of the regime's candidate in subsequent election provides a good example for civil resisters against dictators of the advantages of participation in the electoral process.⁹³⁵ The election in Pakistan had the potential to strengthen democracy in the country and undermine military rule. Although the party-less format of the election made it hard for campaigning by parties, MRD candidates could have fought as individuals and then worked to unseat Zia from the Presidency. After the removal of Chilean dictator by people's power, Chile has yet to see a return to military rule in the country. Pakistan, conversely, had seen nine years of another military rule afterwards.

Post-election Scenario:

Hoping to gain credibility in Sindh, Zia decided to designate Muhammad Khan Junejo, who came from that province, as his new Prime Minister.⁹³⁶ Zia soon found that some of the new MNAs were less malleable than he had anticipated. An Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG) emerged through the efforts of few MNAs.⁹³⁷ This opposed the regime's candidate for speaker – Khawja Safdar – and put up instead Syed Fakhar Imam, who won the election. Moreover, the group demanded the lifting of martial law as well as inviting party leaders such as BB and Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan to their gatherings.⁹³⁸ As US diplomats

⁹³⁴ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.86.

⁹³⁵ Ackerman and Duvall, *A Force More Powerful*, pp.289-302.

⁹³⁶ Ramu, *Badshah Khan*, p.137.

⁹³⁷ Hashmi, *Han Main Baghi Hon*, p.92.

⁹³⁸ *ibid.*, p.92.

had anticipated before the elections, a significant number of MNAs refused to act as Zia's lackey, adopting the attitude of 'You are stranger in the House'.⁹³⁹

Rather than acting as a rubber stamp, the government benches went through 'line-by-line' reviewing the regime's internal and external policies before passing the first budget.⁹⁴⁰ Designated Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Khan Junejo made clear to the regime that civil government could not perform well under martial law; therefore, the sooner martial law was removed, the better the government would perform for the country.⁹⁴¹ He, at once, established a special committee of delegates to examine the post-martial law legal repercussions; so that on the advice of the committee, he could advise the Chief of Army Staff-cum-President of Pakistan to abrogate martial law.⁹⁴² US intelligence feared the Army generals would take action if the civilian setup challenged the army's interests in foreign policy, the supply of new weapons, and the ongoing penetration of the army into the bureaucracy, diplomatic corps, and state corporations.⁹⁴³ As it was, Junejo started confronting the Army in these respects from the very first day. In his maiden speech, he called for simplicity in public life, and demanded that the generals, bureaucrats and politicians replace their Toyota Coronas with Suzuki cars.

⁹³⁹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *North East and South Asia Review*, in 15 February 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, NARA; Hashmi, *Han Main Baghi Hon*, pp.242-243.

⁹⁴⁰ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.3.

⁹⁴¹ Muhammad Khan Junejo, Address to Senate of Pakistan, 6 July 1985, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.198-9.

⁹⁴² Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.3.

⁹⁴³ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *North East and South Asia Review*, on 15 February 1985, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD; Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, CREST, NARA, p.8.

In May 1985, MRD announced as its objective a comprehensive reform programme in the areas of economic, political and foreign affairs.⁹⁴⁴ This was devised in April by a Karachi-based Central Action Committee under the convener ship of Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo.⁹⁴⁵ The committee opposed Zia's constitutional amendments and demanded greater provincial autonomy. Observing the rhythm of the newly National Assembly, especially during the Speaker's election, and Junejo's concern about the martial law, the MRD built oppositional pressure to weaken the General's grip on the government. Owing to the fresh civilian government, and the relaxation of repression, the opposition leaders held many public gatherings and meetings throughout the country to solicit public support for their new demands.⁹⁴⁶ The alliance built a relationship with the IPG.

Despite all this, Zia ensured that his Eighth Amendment Bill was passed in October 1985. It skipped some of the proper constitutional process before being presented to the National Assembly.⁹⁴⁷ The IPG made a big hue and cry about this, to no avail. A Ninth Amendment was promised for the future that would implement supposed 'Islamic principles', but this never happened. The military junta's programme for Islamisation was thus not altogether fulfilled.

⁹⁴⁴ Cited in, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, pp.6-7.

⁹⁴⁵ Attended by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Abdul Wali Khan, Asghar Khan, Khwaja Khairuddin, Sardar Mazari, Syed Qaswer Gardezi, Malik Muhammad Qasim, Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Abdul Khaliq Khan, Musheer Pesh Imam, Fateh Yab Ali Khan, Asif Virdug, Iqbal Haider, and Mahmood ul Haq Osmani. Whereas Nusrat Bhutto, and BB were out of the country at that time.

⁹⁴⁶ *ibid.*

⁹⁴⁷ The Bill was not presented to the National Assembly Standing committee for reviewing it thoroughly. One hundred and eighty eight members voted in favour of the bill, and forty-six members were absent from the session.

Before 1985, Zia had taken advice from regular Martial Law Administrators (MLA) conferences that had discussed foreign and internal policy. After the 1985 election, with civilian governors taking charge of the provinces, there were fewer MLA conferences on provincial issues.⁹⁴⁸ Responding to the opposition's taunts that he was a 'puppet and disabled Prime Minister', Junejo empowered civil representatives in the cabinet and made them the decision-making body rather than the MLA conferences. He further asked Zia to remove two of his caps – Chief Martial Law Administrator and the Chief of the Army Staff (C-in-C) – and become a full civilian President as promised earlier. The revival of the political parties in the country was another of his demands.

Zia argued in response that it was an advantage if he held multiple offices, as he was 'playing a role like a bridge between the civilian government and the military.'⁹⁴⁹ He promised to retire as C-in-C in 1990, when the next election was due. He refused to allow party politics.⁹⁵⁰ The National Assembly had a heated discussion on the issue on the grounds that it was unconstitutional for the President to hold military office as well. On 1 June 1985, the Provincial Assembly of KPK including the handpicked Chief Minister, Arbab Jahangir, was the first to pass the resolution demanding Zia's resignation from military office. They were followed by the Punjab and Baluchistan assemblies on the same day, and the Sindh assembly on 16 June. The Senate established a committee to discuss the restoration of political parties in July 1985 that recommended that they should be restored after registration with the government on the condition

⁹⁴⁸ Arif, *Working with Zia*, pp.349-351.

⁹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p. 354.

⁹⁵⁰ Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.128.

of not receiving any funds from abroad and not proclaiming any anti-Islamic or anti-Pakistan sentiments.⁹⁵¹ On 2 June 1986, the opposition group in the assembly protested against Zia's extension as COAS.⁹⁵² General K.M. Arif also asked for a fulltime and professional COAS instead.⁹⁵³

During the celebrations at Minar-i-Pakistan on Pakistan's day of independence on 14 August 1985, Junejo declared that 'citizens of Pakistan would not wake up on 1st January of the next year under martial law but Islamic democratic country. Pakistan was not made to live under martial law.'⁹⁵⁴ Both the National Assembly and Senate followed him by passing resolutions supporting his statement. This pressure, combined with the ongoing MRD opposition, led Zia to announce that martial law would be lifted on 1 January 1986, and he promised to hold talks with all those, including the MRD, who had been struggling for the restoration of democracy.⁹⁵⁵ Right at the end of December 1985, he declared: 'The Declaration of 5 July 1977 is cancelled; all powers to the Chief Martial Law Administrator has been confiscated, and the military courts have been dissolved.'⁹⁵⁶ Martial law offices were closed and all martial law orders except those which were passed under the Eighth Amendment were annulled as well. Punjab and KPK got civilian governors on 29 December. In this way, Pakistan emerged from martial law after eight-and-a-half years. The leading politicians all tried to claim credit for this. BB, in her

⁹⁵¹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.4.

⁹⁵² *ibid.*, p.128.

⁹⁵³ Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, p.83.

⁹⁵⁴ Muhammad Khan Junejo, 14 August 1985, Lahore, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 200.

⁹⁵⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Joint Session of Parliament 30 December 1985; General Zia-ul-Haq, Talking with journalists, Hyderabad 17 November 1985.

⁹⁵⁶ General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to the Joint Session of Parliament 30 December 1985.

book, stated 'on the eve of my departure from Zurich to Pakistan with my brother's body'⁹⁵⁷ the regime took the decision to uplift martial law to silence the thousands of protestors who came to greet me on my arrival. Conversely, Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, Minister of Railways in Junejo's government, stated that it was he who advised the Prime Minister Junejo to declare 'the end of martial law and the emergency' on the 38th Independence Day of the country.⁹⁵⁸

Cohen has pointed out how these political developments provided a face-saver to the USA in its support of Zia, although they hardly brought major changes on the ground.⁹⁵⁹ Zia continued to manipulate political developments as best he could. He followed a carrot and stick policy, rewarding those who went along with him and punishing those who did not. Opponents continued to be thrown in prison, tortured and killed.

Even after declaring a non-party based election, and the MRD's decision to boycott it, draconian actions continued to be taken against those loyal to the opposition parties. BB states that when she left the country; 40,000 political prisoners were still in jail.⁹⁶⁰ Eighteen were under trial in Rawalpindi military court, accused of conspiring against the government; fifty-four were being held in Kot Lakhpat jail in Lahore, charged with criminal conspiracy and sedition for their alleged involvement with Al-Zulfiqar.⁹⁶¹ MRD leaders were rounded up on various occasions: for example, on 21 October 1985 when they were heading towards 70 Clifton for a meeting.⁹⁶² When the notorious Eighth Amendment

⁹⁵⁷ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.296.

⁹⁵⁸ Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, Interview; Gilani, *Chahye Yousaf Se Sada*, pp.95-99.

⁹⁵⁹ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

⁹⁶⁰ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.255.

⁹⁶¹ *ibid.*, pp.255-56.

⁹⁶² *ibid.*, p.303.

was being debated in parliament, MRD activists came on the streets in protest. The government responded by placing the leaders either under house arrest or banned them from entering Punjab province. The government made the holding of MRD's session in Lahore on 23 September 1985 impossible owing to the arrests of many leaders.⁹⁶³ 200 persons including twenty women were arrested when they tried to participate in the MRD public meeting outside Mochi Gate on 25 December 1985.⁹⁶⁴ Amnesty International estimated that at least 100 persons were detained as a result of their 'nonviolent political beliefs and peaceful political activities'.⁹⁶⁵ It also recorded that sixty other political prisoners were tried in Haripur, Attock, and Karachi jails in 1985. A few hundred prisoners were sentenced by military court to terms of 10-25 years. The government failed to provide any evidence to refute this claim by Amnesty International.⁹⁶⁶ Rather, Zia responded by stating that 'political prisoners are as less in numbers as paisa in a rupee', and that these few would be freed before the election, and that they were being basically being allowed a period of rest to rethink their misguided attitudes.⁹⁶⁷

Despite a national and international outcry, political activists continued to be executed during the period. Ignoring protests by Amnesty International, the Bar Association, and international human rights activists mobilised by BB, three young men were hanged in August 1984 after being found guilty of

⁹⁶³ Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Malik Qasim, Mairaj Muhammad Khan, Khursheed Mahmood Qasuri, and many more, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.204.

⁹⁶⁴ Amongst Jahangir Badar, Salman Taseer, and Malik Mukhtar Awan, *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.16.

⁹⁶⁵ *Amnesty International*, Background Note on Arrest in Pakistan: December 1984/Early 1985, MSS.34/4/1/Pk30, MRC, p.3.

⁹⁶⁶ *Amnesty International*, Violation of Human Rights in Pakistan, MSS.34/4/1/Pk31, MRC.

⁹⁶⁷ General Zia-ul-Haq, cited Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp. 152-3.

charges of murdering a police officer and involvement in Al-Zulfiqar. They were Usman Ghani aged 19 – who was reported to have been *under 18* at the time of the commission of the offence – Idrees Khan aged 20, and Idrees Beig aged 21. The regime described them as terrorists.⁹⁶⁸

Among civil society groups, students remained the worst hit. They were persecuted regardless of political affiliation. The ban on students' unions initiated in early 1983 in KPK was gradually imposed on the rest of the country.⁹⁶⁹ Reacting to the ban, students' bodies launched countrywide protests, which were answered brutally by the regime. Students were jailed on a wide-scale in 1984, especially after the eight blasts in Punjab University in March. Ghafoor Ahmed suggested that after muting the voice of MRD, the regime took more severe actions against the students. They even took into custody parents, including the mothers⁹⁷⁰ of those students who were not caught in the police raids on their homes. A procession of the Sindh Students Federation on 17 October 1984 was fired on, with several students being killed and many injured.⁹⁷¹ Bashir Qureshi, leader of *Jie Sindh Mahaz*, was imprisoned many times during the reign of Zia.⁹⁷² On 18 October 1985, police attacked the students of Sindh University Jamshoro and killed five persons including three students. Eighty-eight people including fifty-one students were arrested on charges of speaking against the government, burning the Pakistani flag, and

⁹⁶⁸ Tony Benn, a labour Member of Parliament of UK, was amongst who wrote letters to the Pakistani regime against the action. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.261-62; *Amnesty International*, 'Violation of Human Rights in Pakistan', MSS.34/4/1/Pk31, MRC.

⁹⁶⁹ The ban is imposed on the student union till today. PPP promised to remove the ban before coming to the power; however it was failed to do so.

⁹⁷⁰ Two mothers remained in prison for some days, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 166.

⁹⁷¹ Nazir Leghari, 'Bashir Quereshi Buhat Yaad Aain Gain', *Akhbar-i-Jahan*, 16-22 April 2012, p.10.

⁹⁷² On 23 March 2012, he led a large procession of Sindhis in Karachi to seek independence of Sindhu Desh from Pakistan.

robbery.⁹⁷³ This incident enraged students across the whole province and invigorated their movement.⁹⁷⁴

Zia continued to implement his policy of Islamisation. Before the referendum, he had introduced *Nizam Salat* Ordinance on 14 August 1984, which required all adult men to have prayer breaks during their working time. Salat committees were set up under *Nazimin Salat* in each district who directly reported to the Governor of the concerned province. The committees lost this power when some of the *Nazimin* abused their authority, and the President issued a clarification that these *Nazimin* did not have any political authority. Zia ordered in October 1984 that anyone standing in future elections would have to take an oath of allegiance to the policy of implementation of Islamic teaching in the country.⁹⁷⁵ In December 1984, *Sharia* Law (Islamic jurisprudence) was established in Pakistan. In 1985, Zia put pressure on the new civilian government to establish a 'true Islamic system' in the country.⁹⁷⁶ Twenty-five members of the National Assembly responded with a declaration on 16 June that the President of the country had the responsibility to execute Islamic principles in the country since he was given a vote in the referendum for that purpose.⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷³ Mahmood Mirza stated the story quoting the Karachi High Court Bar's report that two buses of students were going to Chandka Medical College Larkana to attend a seminar without permission from their university administration. The police were informed that two 'wanted dacoits' were travelling in the bus, and they stopped it at Thori and opened fire, cited in Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.54; Ghafoor Ahmed mentioned 15 killings. Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.164.

⁹⁷⁴ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.54.

⁹⁷⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq, Address to Punjab Provincial Council on 25 October 1984, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 162.

⁹⁷⁶ General Zia-ul-Haq, at Quetta Airport, 12 May 1985, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 193.

⁹⁷⁷ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 195.

Zia was well aware of how the Western powers were trying to use Islam to their advantage in countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and sought to turn this to Pakistan's advantage. Barely a few months after the implementation of *Sharia* Law in Pakistan, President Ronald Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 166 (NSDD 166) in March 1985, which authorised 'stepped-up covert military aid to the Mujahideen' as well support for religious indoctrination. Michael Chossudovsky assessed the imposition of *Sharia* in Pakistan and the promotion of "radical Islam" as serving American geopolitical interests in South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Many present-day 'Islamic fundamentalist organizations' in the Middle East and Central Asia, were directly or indirectly the product of US covert support and financing, often channeled through foundations from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. Missions from the Wahhabi sect of conservative Islam in Saudi Arabia were put in charge of running the CIA sponsored madrassas in Northern Pakistan.⁹⁷⁸

Because of all this, US diplomats stationed in Pakistan continued to consider Zia the person most likely to support American interests in the region.⁹⁷⁹ Although they appreciated the strength of the opposition to Zia,⁹⁸⁰ they were suspicious of what they saw as the close ties that the MRD had with Soviet Russia and China. There appeared to be too many risks involved in either

⁹⁷⁸ Michel Chossudovsky, '9/11 Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and Soviet Afghan War to George W. Bush to September 11, 2001', *Centre for Research on Globalisation*, 9 September 2010. [<http://www.globalresearch.ca/9-11-analysis-from-ronald-reagan-and-the-soviet-afghan-war-to-george-w-bush-and-september-11-2001/20958>] (28 December 2014).

⁹⁷⁹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The People's Party Braces for Election', *North East and South Asia Review*, in 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

⁹⁸⁰ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.10.

replacing Zia with another General or the coming to power of an MRD-led civilian government.⁹⁸¹ They thus ignored the ongoing human rights abuses of the regime.

The MRD – its Failures and Achievements

The MRD was undermined at this time through intense internal divisions. There were ongoing tensions between Punjabis and Sindhis, and also amongst Sindhis after the departure of BB from Pakistan.⁹⁸² In a report of March 1984, the CIA judged that ‘the parties are badly fragmented, and have little leverage’.⁹⁸³ Zia of course did his best to foment such splits in the opposition. One such divide related to the sentence of death passed on ZAB in which the regime played Punjabi and non-Punjabi judges off against each other to get a judgement in its favour. Forgetting the stance that many Punjabi political workers took in agitating to save ZAB’s life, the blame game was initiated on the provincial basis. In Punjab, Farooq Leghari, a moderate PPP secretary general and a prominent landlord of Southern Punjab caused a big setback to the party by tendering his resignation from the position as well as the party membership to make a deal with General Zia.⁹⁸⁴ Some years later, Ghulam Mustafa Khar stated that he used to meet with the regime on the advice of ZAB and that the

⁹⁸¹ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System’, *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.11.

⁹⁸² Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: The People’s Party Braces for Election’, *North East and South Asia Review*, 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

⁹⁸³ Asghar Khan talked with the US diplomats. cited in Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Zia’s Divided Opposition’, *Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analyses*, March 1984, CIA-RDP84S00927R000300100002-9, NARA.

⁹⁸⁴ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: The People’s Party Braces for Election’, *North East and South Asia Review*, 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

PPP could have saved his life if they had acted more cautiously.⁹⁸⁵ At the time, BB had been highly suspicious of Khar, and later, instead of designating him as President of PPP-Punjab, appointed Jahangir Badar – a person who proved ‘too small a man for his post.’⁹⁸⁶ The divide became particularly apparent at the time of the elections in 1985, when many MRD members from Punjab wanted to fight the election, while the majority of Sindhi members did not.⁹⁸⁷ Significant elements of Punjab’s PPP disobeyed BBs orders despite her threat to expel the ‘rebels’.⁹⁸⁸

To counteract the influence of BB and PPP in Sindh, the regime sought to use three leaders whose support-base was in rural areas – Mumtaz Bhutto, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, and Mukhdoom Amin Faheem. The regime was less concerned about the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad as they were dominated by non-Sindhis and non-PPP constituencies. Except for Mukhdoom Amin Faheem, the other two leaders fell into the trap. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi was already unhappy with certain decisions of BB.⁹⁸⁹ He enjoyed considerable authority in rural Sindh because of his longstanding association with ZAB, his opposition to the Zia regime, and his fifteen months in detention. He was now prepared to adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the Zia regime. He stated in a private meeting with a US diplomat in 1984 that ‘the 1973 Constitution is

⁹⁸⁵ Ghulam Mustafa Khar, London, November 1985, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p. 216. Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.268.

⁹⁸⁶ Bhutto, *Daughter of the East*, p.268. *Viewpoint*, XI (25), 30 January 1986, p.18.

⁹⁸⁷ Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.83.

⁹⁸⁸ Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System’, *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, in September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, CREST, NARA, p.5.

⁹⁸⁹ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.166-67. Later on both leaders established their own political parties. Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Pakistan: The People’s Party Braces for Election’, *North East and South Asia Review*, in 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA. *Viewpoint*, XI (25), 30 January 1986, p.18.

not sacrosanct',⁹⁹⁰ and he was ready to shrink the power of Prime Minister in favour of the President. He also promised that not a single army man would be castigated for deposing ZAB and his government. He had however to be cautious over his relationship with Zia as being seen to be too close to the dictator would have lost the respect of many of the PPP workers.⁹⁹¹ Though both Jatoi and Zia denied any agreement between them, there were rumours circulating of a secret deal - '*Jatoi Wazir-i-azam na manzoor, Bhutto family hero hero, baqi sub zero zero*'.⁹⁹² The PPP expelled both Jatoi and Mumtaz Bhutto on the grounds that they were associating with the Sindhi, Baluchi, and Pashtun Front (SBPF), and both have remained in the political wilderness until today.

BB's position in PPP was also challenged by the so-called 'uncles' who had been prominent in the party under ZAB.⁹⁹³ Once in exile, BB had time to reflect on her strategy and devise ways to reinvigorate the party. This was a time when the old *jyalas* were being replaced with the fresh blood, such as Jahangir Badar, who was appointed Party President for the Punjab instead of Khar. Likewise, Jatoi's brand of compromises was abhorred by the rank and file of the party. Moreover, 'the failure' of anti-Zia protest movement made these leaders reconsider their strategy towards the regime.⁹⁹⁴

Regionalism gathered strength during the Zia period, which also weakened the over-arching national cause of restoration of Democracy in the

⁹⁹⁰ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The People's Party Braces for Election', *North East and South Asia Review*, 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

⁹⁹¹ *ibid.*

⁹⁹² Mazhar Abbas, interview.

⁹⁹³ The term 'uncle' was coined for those who were old party members, and who had held privileged positions under ZAB's tenure. These old members resented BB's Chairpersonship of the party, and wishing to drive her out, were a focus for intrigues within the party.

⁹⁹⁴ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The People's Party Braces for Election', *North East and South Asia Review*, 18 January 1985, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301290002, NARA.

country. A *Muhajir* students' group formed *Muhajir Qaumi* Movement (MQM) in 1984 in Karachi to fight for the rights of this community of immigrants.⁹⁹⁵ A Sindhi, Baluch, and Pashtun Front (SBPF) was set up by Mumtaz Bhutto and Hafeez Pirzada to represent people from these regions who were living in Karachi. Wali Khan, President of the Awami National Party that had its main base in NWFP, focused mainly on local issues, such as renaming the province as PukhtoonKhwa, and the devolution of economic power and foreign trade to the local government. There were other linguistic and sectarian divides, particularly in Karachi – a city populated by people from all parts of Pakistan. These antagonisms could flare up violently at times. For example, the killing of a college girl by a speeding bus driven by a Pushtun in Nazimabad (*Muhajir* area) was turned into a communal clash between *Muhajirs* and Pushtuns. Pamphlets, and handbills were distributed to instigate the hatred between the communities. During the subsequent riots, 51 people were killed, and 117 injured in less than a month.⁹⁹⁶ Likewise, on the basis of political ideology, the Left-wing parties of MRD – Pakistan Musawat Party, the Pakistan National Party, and the Mazdoor Kissan Party – merged into a single party in January 1986.⁹⁹⁷ Such division further limited the power of MRD.

The MRD missed a good opportunity to expose the failures of the regime's so-called economic development. From the start, Zia had maintained that his rule would lay the basis for a new economic prosperity in Pakistan. Initially he was fortunate, as there were bumper crops during the early years of

⁹⁹⁵ *Muhajir* means immigrant, and refers to people who migrated from India after the formation of Pakistan.

⁹⁹⁶ Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, pp.220-222.

⁹⁹⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.34.

his rule. Zia claimed that his regime was being blessed by God for his Islamisation of the country. The main beneficiaries were nonetheless the elites of the Punjab, merchants and businessmen, rather than the peasantry. Government expenditure increased by 300 percent during the period of martial law, from Rs. 20,197.4 million in 1977-78 to Rs. 69,717.9 million in 1984-85. The defence budget increased from Rs. 4 million in 1977-78 to Rs. 14 million in 1984-85. In 1984-85 the budget deficit was Rs.3.8 billion. Despite the 400 per cent increase in workers' remittances from \$577.74 million to \$2,450 million, and the US war aid of \$3.2 billion, there was a balance of payment deficit, rising from \$941 million in 1976-77 to \$1928 million in 1984-85.

The situation became critical in the mid-1980s, when there were disastrous harvest failures that in particular affected cotton – Pakistan's main cash crop. Nothing was said now by Zia about divine judgement. There was a decline in remittances from overseas labourers. Although considerable sums were coming from aid for jihad from USA and Arab Countries, much of this was used to purchase the support of politicians or manufacture new political cronies.⁹⁹⁸ By 1985, the economy was in disarray.⁹⁹⁹ The government asked for an IMF stand-by loan to stabilise the economy, which was given on condition that the rupee was depreciated, and the subsidies on exports, wheat, fertilisers and edible oils were eliminated.¹⁰⁰⁰ Asma Jahangir pointed out that widespread and growing tax-evasion as one of the causes of the economic crisis.¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁹⁸ Imran Khan, *Pakistan: A Personal History* (London: The Bantam Books, 2011), p.90; Hashmi, interview.

⁹⁹⁹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.9.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, pp.11-12.

¹⁰⁰¹ Asma Jahangir, interview.

Therefore, the expansion of the domestic tax net was one of the conditions IMF imposed in 1986.¹⁰⁰² The government cut subsidies on basic items such as foods, fertiliser, and reduced spending on defence. This all hit the poor hard. Zia tried to blame the newly elected government for the economic deterioration.¹⁰⁰³ The opposition could have made much more about the economic failures of Zia's government.

Despite these various failings, MRD also had its successes. Although still banned after the election of 1985, with many of its leaders remaining in jail or under house arrest, the fact that elections of any sort were held and martial law lifted can be judged as an achievement for the movement. Also, on 10 March 1985, 252 out of 280 articles of 1973 constitution were restored. The extremist parties – Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Jamaat-i-Ahle-i-Hadith (JAH), Tehreek-i-Fiqh-i-Jafaria (TFJ)¹⁰⁰⁴, and most importantly JI – gradually stepped back from supporting the regime as well. According to the well-known aphorism that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend', JI eventually publicly declared it would work with MRD for the restoration of democracy in the country.¹⁰⁰⁵

The scholarship on civil resistance reveals how important it is for opponents to remove the main pillars of support for an authoritarian regime. One of the main such pillars is that of the army and security forces. The success of civil resistance in Chile, East Germany and the Philippines during the 1980s can be attributed above all to defections from the regime by the security forces.

¹⁰⁰² *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.12.

¹⁰⁰³ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.9.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Ayaz Amir, 'Dubious means and noble objectives', *Viewpoint*, X (22), 3 January 1985, p.9.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Mian Tufail Muhammad, addressed a public gathering in Karachi on 27 September 1985, cited in Ahmed, *General Zia K Akhri Dus Saal*, p.204.

In Chile, for example, many navy, air force and police commanders refused to impose martial law after the plebiscite vote, which paved the way for Pinochet's downfall.¹⁰⁰⁶ BB eventually realised that her hitherto strong anti-army stance in which she blamed the military as a whole for the killing of her father was unlikely to undermine Zia, and began working to build allies against him within the armed forces. Neither BB nor the PPP leaders were prepared to admit this in public – it would have been political suicide for them to have done so.¹⁰⁰⁷ Nonetheless, after meeting a close colleague of BB, a US diplomat reported to the CIA in March 1984 that after the 'unsuccessful' struggle against Zia-ul-Haq, BB began believing that 'the PPP must cultivate Army support against Zia'.¹⁰⁰⁸ The fact that the US government was prepared to put pressure on Zia to allow BB's return to Pakistan also suggests that they were confident that she would not try to undermine an army that supported the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan.

Although there were some weak attempts by army officers to dislodge Zia from early on in his period of rule, their discontent was becoming far more serious by the mid-1980s. Eight years of authoritarian rule had undermined respect for the army among citizens and increasing numbers of military men resented the way that they were losing support within the wider society. Few officers had gained personally from martial law, and they resented the 'dishonest policies' associated with those who administered martial law.¹⁰⁰⁹ They could see that a relatively small group that had vested interests in

¹⁰⁰⁶ Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions*, pp. 128-9.

¹⁰⁰⁷ PPP members whom I interviewed still refuse to accept that such a shift occurred, taking it as a criticism of their commitment to their long struggle against military rule.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Zia's Divided Opposition', *Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analyses*, in March 1984, CIA-RDP84S00927R000300100002-9, NARA, p.7.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, pp.6-9.

perpetuating a system that protected their personal power. Consequently, for them, the end of martial law was necessary to regain the esteem of the people. The politician Ayaz Amir noted that there was pressure by the Army generals on Zia to relinquish his post as army commander.¹⁰¹⁰ The tussle, indeed, had created a disciplinary issue in the *sole* disciplined organisation of Pakistan. Politically, the low turnout in the referendum, and the defeat of key players of Zia's cabinet in the recent election indicated the unpopularity of the General. His hand-picked candidates and three hundred members of *Majlis-i-Shoora* all failed to be elected.¹⁰¹¹ These sentiments were reinforced by similar feelings amongst many US intelligence agents. They saw that the US support for Zia was being criticised publically by some army officers and officials in the Pakistan Foreign Office.¹⁰¹² In an interview, Stephen P. Cohen responded in a laconic way to my question in this respect: 'well, yea we were getting tired of Zia by that time.'¹⁰¹³

Conclusion:

The New York Times wrote that 'simply ending emergency rule did not end oppression in Poland, Chile, and the Philippines'.¹⁰¹⁴ Similarly, in Pakistan the lifting of the martial law did not mean an end to military rule. Democracy is not a gift that falls from heaven, it is rather achieved through the exertion of sweat and tears. General Zia-ul-Haq was not removed from power during the period covered in this chapter; however, the continuing pressure of the MRD, and

¹⁰¹⁰ Ayaz Amir, 'The Lifting of Martial Law', *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.18.

¹⁰¹¹ Ramu, Badshah Khan, p.137.

¹⁰¹² Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Near Eastern and South Asia Office*, September 1985, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, NARA, p.10.

¹⁰¹³ Stephen P. Cohen, interview.

¹⁰¹⁴ *The New York Times*, 4 January 1986.

particularly PPP, forced the regime to hold an election, which brought parliamentary politics back to life in the country. One great achievement was that of the mobilisation of external pressure through meetings with foreign parliamentarians, and holding of public meetings, press conferences and seminars. After hearing from the exiled leaders of the PPP of the human rights abuses perpetuated by the Zia regime, several American senators raised questions in public about US support for Zia. Although American intelligence had at that time little confidence in the ability of MRD to mount an effective challenge to Zia, their opinion began to change as a result of the work of Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto.

Nonetheless, Zia did his best to hang onto his power. On 29 December 1985, the day before he announced the lifting of martial law, he issued two MLOs. MLO 106 transferred power from the Chief Martial Law Administrator to the Prime Minister, while MLO 107 transferred cases that were pending before the military courts to the ordinary courts. Zia anticipated that the new prime minister would be in his pocket, and that the ordinary courts would inflict similar punishments on dissidents as had been passed by the military courts.¹⁰¹⁵ Commenting on this, the renowned jurist Abid Hassan Manto remarked that there had hardly been a restoration of fundamental rights in Pakistan since the 30 December order only revoked the Proclamation of 5 July 1977; whereas the Provisional Constitutional Order of 24 March 1981 was standstill.¹⁰¹⁶ Such legal and political issues drove the movement forward to its final phase.

¹⁰¹⁵ Cited in Mahmood Zaman, 'Rights, Parties stand Restored', *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.12.

¹⁰¹⁶ *ibid.*

Ch. 5. Revival of Democracy and End of the Dictator 1986-88:

On the declaration of the annulment of martial law on 30 December 1985, Khan Abdul Wali Khan made the prophetic comment, “it is like facing a person who has not used his gun for some time but who continues to hold it in his hand and can wield it any moment”.¹⁰¹⁷ This ‘gun’ was turned towards Zia’s handpicked Prime Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo when he removed him from office along with the national assembly in June 1988 and called a fresh election in three months’ time. MRD, the alliance for a democratic Pakistan had condemned the so-called ‘democratisation’ process in 1985 and had declared the elections illegitimate at a meeting held in January 1986. Despite the revocation of martial law, Zia continued to oppress his opponents and curb the freedom of the press. On 10 April 1986 Benazir Bhutto received a mammoth welcome on her return from exile, which set alarm bells ringing in the house of the dictator, suggesting that people were still demanding their right to democracy, and not just the political leaders. Benazir Bhutto asked the General ‘to leave the country gracefully’ as she did not believe in revenge.¹⁰¹⁸ The MRD failed, however, to put adequate pressure on Zia, and failed to bring him down before he was killed suddenly in an air-crash. This meant that he was never strongly discredited with either the military or foreign supporters. This chapter analyses the history from the end of martial law to Zia’s death.

After the establishment of Muhammad Khan Junejo’s government with the 1985 election, the political landscape had changed. One of the major

¹⁰¹⁷ Khan Abdul Wali Khan stated this at a political gathering in Lahore on 2 February 1986. Cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.15.

¹⁰¹⁸ Benazir Bhutto, Speeches to Public gathering in Punjab. Cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

demands of the opposition parties including MRD was fulfilled. Due to the party-less election under the Political Parties (Amendment) Act 1979, MRD and JUP boycotted the election. Many political scholars such as R.B Raees¹⁰¹⁹, Babar Ali¹⁰²⁰, and Hasan-Askari Rizvi¹⁰²¹ were of the opinion that the post-martial law period saw the civilianisation of the martial law, and that the Junejo government did have reasonable freedoms. Freedom of the Press, liberty of political opposition, and protests were permitted. Rather it was the 'most open, and in a sense, most democratic government'¹⁰²² in the history of Pakistan. However, before the oath-taking ceremony for the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies General Zia issued the 'Revival of the Constitution 1973 Order' which had altered the basic face of the constitution and shifted the power into the hands of the forthcoming President of the country, as examined in the previous chapter. On 23 March 1985, the day the members took their oaths, they also elected General Zia-ul-Haq as the sixth President of Pakistan as per the pre-poll conditions to elected members. In its first session, the assembly passed the notorious Eighth Amendment to the constitution of 1973 – 'granting constitutional protection to the military take over of 1977, the Presidential Referendum, and the RCO' –and thus cut its sovereignty in favour of the President. Declaring the abrogation of martial law from the country, the General stated however that they were not in a period of transition from one regime to another but were continuing the previous system – enforcing Islamic principles,

¹⁰¹⁹ Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', *Asian Survey*, 29(2), A Survey of Asia 1988: Part-II (February, 1988), pp.199-206.

¹⁰²⁰ Babar Ali, 'Where is the Opposition in Pakistan?', *Economic and Political Weekly*, XXII (47), 5-12 September, 1987, pp.1538-1539. Babar Ali, 'Aftermath of MRD Movement', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 21 (46), 15 November 1986, pp.1985-86.

¹⁰²¹ Hasan-Askari Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan-1947-86*, (Delhi, 1988).

¹⁰²² Babar Ali, 'Aftermath of MRD Movement', *Economic and Political Weekly*, p. 1571.

continuing domestic and foreign policies, and maintaining the advisory role of Parliament.¹⁰²³ The General's own original 'power-sharing formula' sought to constrain the power of the Junejo government. Junejo did not however prove to be as malleable as Zia had anticipated when he had hand-picked him as Prime Minister.

However, the opposition (mainly MRD) questioned the legitimacy of both Zia and Junejo and rejected the 'controlled' democracy as a sham, with Zia still holding a gun to their head. I.A. Rehman stated that all parties except two boycotted the election, so, under the universal conventions, the victorious party could hardly claim to be the democratic and representative government of the country, particularly as it was held under a dictatorial regime with restricted voting rights.¹⁰²⁴ Hence, they continued to call for civil resistance until the holding of a 'free and fair' party-based election, with full ruling power being transferred to the newly elected government. Sharon E. Nepstad has noted five key factors in any campaign of civil resistance. They are: widespread grievances, such as economic failure, material deprivation, rigged elections, and restrictions on freedom; the winning over of an opponent's strong pillar of support in your favour; highlighting the injustice of the regime to the public; unity among the civil resisters; and the recruitment to the cause of civil society groups – all of which together provide the necessary strength.¹⁰²⁵ The civil resisters in Pakistan of that time could have turned the situation to their favour strongly at

¹⁰²³ General Zia-ul-Haq *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.5.

¹⁰²⁴ I.A.Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, (Lahore, 1990), p.275.

¹⁰²⁵ Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*, (New York, 2011), pp.5-6.

this time, as many of these elements were in place in Pakistan. They failed, however, to do this.

The Junejo Government:

The people of Pakistan's continuing thirst for democracy never allowed their dictators to rule unchallenged. Although they might have either welcomed martial law or stayed quiet when it was declared initially, they invariably turned against despotic rule after a time. As a result, the dictators tried to manipulate the democratic system to win support from politicians and provide a veneer of democracy to their autocratic rule. As it is, time and again in Pakistan, those in power have selected seemingly humble and harmless people for key subordinate roles, anticipating that they will be easily-controlled, who then suddenly show their teeth. In this way Bhutto selected General Zia, Nawaz Sharif selected General Musharraf, and Musharraf in turn selected as Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry – all of whom turned against the ruler who had promoted them. In the case of Zia, he selected Junejo as his Prime Minister – a seemingly nondescript and malleable politician. Junejo was proposed by Pir of Pagaro and Zia selected him in preference to a stronger candidate, Illahi Bukhsh Soomro, on 18 March 1985.¹⁰²⁶ General Zia met him for the first time on 20 March 1985 and informed him that he had accepted the proposal that he be appointed Prime Minister. Junejo, without thanking him, asked when he was going to lift martial law, and 'Zia was shocked.'¹⁰²⁷ Zia allowed him, however, to be sworn in on 23 March.

¹⁰²⁶ Arif, *Working with Zia*, pp. 334-7.

¹⁰²⁷ Arif, *Working with Zia*, pp.335-6.

Junejo's biggest challenge was to restore democratic culture, with the General being the biggest hurdle to this. What started as petty differences between the two gradually turned into a wider gulf. During the first year of controlled civilian government, rifts between Junejo and Zia surfaced.

First of all, Junejo made it his mission to bring an end to martial law. He promised the nation on 14 August 1985 that it would welcome the sunrise on the New Year of 1986 free from martial law. He made this announcement on the suggestion of Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, who himself later served as Prime Minister from 2008 to 2012. Gillani revealed to the researcher that in the Cabinet meeting held to organise the celebration of Independence Day 1985 in Lahore, he suggested that Junejo could make the occasion memorable by declaring the date for the end of martial law; otherwise it would have been better to cancel the political gathering. Junejo later called Gillani on the official phone line and told him that he was going to do this.¹⁰²⁸ In taking cover under the electoral process, Zia was manoeuvred into lifting martial law.¹⁰²⁹ However, the President reneged on his pre-poll agreement to cease wearing his uniform. After the removal of martial law, the next challenge to Junejo was to restore democratic culture in the country. Laying down five points – establishment of an Islamic democratic system in the country on the basis of Pakistani ideology, a just economic system, an end to illiteracy, scientific progress, *jihad* against corruption and bribery, and following a non-aligned foreign policy in favour of strengthening national sovereignty – as per his government policy statement, he began to work on them. Moreover, right after the establishment of the

¹⁰²⁸ Syed Yousad Raza Gillani, interview 26 July 2014, Multan.

¹⁰²⁹ Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', p.199.

truncated democracy, the MNAs began to demand greater parliamentary powers, and a parliamentary group was set up to address constitutional issues on 3 June 1985. 190 out of 207 MNAs participated in the meeting to organise this, which was a shock to Zia. A special committee was set up to look into the matter of the legal position post-martial law and examine the issue of restoring party politics.¹⁰³⁰ Likewise, to create a British-style democratic structure, some members set up an Independent Parliamentary Group (IGP) under Haji Saifullah as an opposition to the government's group.¹⁰³¹ Prompted by the criticism of General Zia regarding the functioning of National Assembly, Haji Saifullah moved a privilege motion in the assembly.¹⁰³² Similar demands for greater democracy were heard in the provincial assemblies as well.

Junejo declared the Pakistan Muslim League to be the governing political party, and in June 1985 the General reluctantly began to work towards this goal.¹⁰³³ Zia, who earlier had publicly denounced political parties as being contrary to Islamic political principles, amended the law to allow this. Junejo had joined the Pakistan Muslim League before it was registered.¹⁰³⁴ 170 out of 237 MNAs and 50 out of 87 Senators joined the official Muslim League.¹⁰³⁵

¹⁰³⁰ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System", in September 1985, 24 November 2013, p.3. CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹⁰³¹ Javed Hashmi, *Han Main Baghi hun*, p.

¹⁰³² *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.22.

¹⁰³³ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System", September 1985, 24 November 2013, p.4. CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹⁰³⁴ Directorate of Intelligence, "Junejo and Zia: Uneasy Partners in Democracy", 24 June 1986, 24 November 2013. CIA-RDP88-00434R000400970009-8, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹⁰³⁵ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.5.

There was now a ruling party headed by Junejo.¹⁰³⁶ Parties had to register under new rules provided by the government – they had to have a distinctive name, register their financial transactions, and submit their accounts and audit reports. Nonetheless, the General was still sitting in the President's house wearing military uniform, and MLR-48 of 1979 still remained in place. This regulation required all new political parties to register themselves with the election commission before contesting elections held under the Electoral Commission of Pakistan. BB subsequently challenged these rules in the Supreme Court, which decided in her favour in June 1988 by ruling that the registration requirement was null and void in any future election.¹⁰³⁷ Despite all this, Zia's cronies still controlled the key federal ministries. Dr. Mahboob-ul-Haq was Finance minister, Iqbal Ahmed Khan, ex-Shura council member, was the minister of Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Aslam Khattak, an ex-Shura member, was the Interior minister, and so on.¹⁰³⁸ Junejo, however, gradually reduced the numbers of the Zia-backed ministers to two alone – Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan and Planning Minister Mahboobul Huq – in the Federal Cabinet. The rest were now his supporters.

To reduce the government's expenditure, Junejo successfully adopted the policy of 'simplicity' following the principles of Islam. He announced this policy in his first address in 1985, and he was keen to demonstrate this by ordering that everyone, including ministers and generals travel in Pakistan-made Suzuki cars.¹⁰³⁹ Such an 'Islamic' simplicity was hard to stomach for the self-styled

¹⁰³⁶ *Viewpoint*, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.16.

¹⁰³⁷ *Viewpoint*, XIII (46), 23 June 1988, pp.12-13.

¹⁰³⁸ Azhar Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal* (Lahore, year is missing), pp.91.

¹⁰³⁹ Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, *Chah-i-Yousaf se Sada*, pp.101.

'preacher of Islam' for the last eight years – General Zia. Junejo's most provocative act was placing the Defence Ministry in his own hands. The Defence Cabinet Council – the top policy making body on defence and internal security issues¹⁰⁴⁰ – on which General Zia-ul-Haq sat as Chief of Army Staff, now came under Junejo's signature. Within the first year of his government, Junejo ordered all military personnel that had already spent three years in civil departments on deputation back to the barracks;¹⁰⁴¹ he appointed a new Navy Chief of Staff who was not Zia's candidate; and his efforts to control military assignments and retirements showed him to be more than just a ceremonial Defence Minister.¹⁰⁴² In this role, Junejo also established a good working relationship with General Arif, which alarmed Zia. Later on, General Arif was sent to Beijing as an Ambassador. To replace Arif, Junejo named the most senior General without consulting General Zia on the matter.¹⁰⁴³ Also, according to the US embassy, Junejo took the political decision to open the Khokrapar-Munnabao Southern Rail service between India and Pakistan 'almost overruling security officials'.¹⁰⁴⁴

The breaking-point was reached in 1988 over two issues. The first concerned the negotiations then going on to resolve the Afghan issue which culminated in the Geneva Accord of 14 April 1988, in which the Soviet Union agreed to start its withdrawal from Afghanistan and Pakistan agreed not to

¹⁰⁴⁰ The Council consists of three services chiefs of forces, the Ministers of Interior, and Foreign Affairs, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Director of Inter-Services Intelligence.

¹⁰⁴¹ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 342.

¹⁰⁴² Directorate of Intelligence, "Junejo and Zia: Uneasy Partners in Democracy", 24 June 1986, 24 November 2013. CIA-RDP88-00434R000400970009-8, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹⁰⁴³ Azhar Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal* (Lahore, year is missing), p.88.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.4.

interfere in the internal affairs of that country. Junejo organised an All Parties Conference (APC) of all political leaders to discuss the issue, including BB but excluding Zia. Seven MRD leaders were in favour of signing of the accord, as were the other political parties. BB was in favour of setting up an interim government to resolve the local feuds to avoid bloodshed in the country.¹⁰⁴⁵ Zia did not want to end the war until Russia was on its knees, and in R.B. Raees's opinion, Junejo was acting here in an 'unauthorised' manner, and it caused a fissure between the two.¹⁰⁴⁶

The second issue was that of the explosion on morning of 10 April 1988 of the Pakistan army ammunition stockpile at Ojhri, Faizabad. More than 100 died and thousands more were injured in the blast. Junejo set up two committees – one military and one parliamentary – to probe the cause of the disaster.¹⁰⁴⁷ Although the reports have yet to be published to this day, it was said that the military report recommended that General Akhtar Abdur-Rehman, the right hand of General Zia, and then ISI chief, be court marshalled. The parliamentary committee that was led by the Defence Minister concluded on the other hand that 'no one was responsible, it was the Act of Allah.'¹⁰⁴⁸ However, the Minister of State for Defence, Rana Naeem Mahmood accused the senior generals including General Akhter Abdur Rehman of being involved in and mishandling the incident, and recommended they be court martialled. Dr. Kamal Hussain stirred things up by arguing that the money spent on the

¹⁰⁴⁵ *Viewpoint*, XIII (30), 3 March 1988, p.34.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', p.200.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Amir Waseem, '20 years on, Ojhri Camp truth remains locked up', *Daily Dawn*, Islamabad, 14 April 2008.

¹⁰⁴⁸ The Indian Express, 'Ojhri disaster saw end of Junejo's Government', 14 April 1988, [<http://archive.indianexpress.com/Storyold/27939/>] (25 December 2014).

armaments that were lost at Ojhri should have been used for social and economic uplift of the country instead. According to the report, published in *The Nation* on 20 April, Rs.6.75 billions- worth of weapons were burnt in the disaster, along with the loss of life, injuries and destruction of surrounding properties and materials. Dr. Hussain argued that with this money 25.44 million people could have been provided with clean drinking water and 50.94 million with health cover, 0.228 million people could have lived in their own houses, and 4.4 million children could have gone to schools to brighten their futures.¹⁰⁴⁹

Therefore, the protest rally against the existence of the ammunition dump in Ojhri that was led by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and attended by all political parties in opposition, including MRD, brandished slogans such as “Send Ojhri to the Pentagon”, “Peace, not Bombs”, and “Food, not Ammunition.” The committee set up by Junejo, and its statement ‘to punish the culprit whoever they are’¹⁰⁵⁰ was the final nail in his government’s coffin. Zia ul Haq could never have thought his hand-picked Prime minister would cause him so much difficulty.¹⁰⁵¹ So, on 29 May 1988 he ordered the dissolution of the government and the national assembly, which was followed by the dissolution of provincial assemblies by their respective Governors, and the chief Election Commissioner was told to hold a general election in ninety days. There was no

¹⁰⁴⁹ Dr. Kamal Hussain, ‘Political Arithmetic of Ojhri’, *Viewpoint*, XIII (38), 28 April 1988, p.12.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Muhammad Khan Junejo, speech in the Parliament, *Viewpoint*, XIII(38), 28 April 1988, p.34.

¹⁰⁵¹ BBC Urdu report 29 May 2013
 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/urdu/multimedia/2013/05/130529_junejo_dismissal_revisited_uk.shtml] 29 May 2013.

declaration of Emergency.¹⁰⁵² Zia established an accountability board to review cases of corruption against 140 MNAs of the defunct parliament.¹⁰⁵³

Zia's allegation that the government had not made the implementation of Islam a priority was one of the publicly-stated reasons for the dissolution. Religious leaders such as Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (JUP) in addresses at Mochi Gate on 10 April 1986 were still looking for a Nizam-i-Mustafa system to solve Pakistan's problems.¹⁰⁵⁴ So too did Zia, who in his speech to Parliament on 7 April 1988 criticised the apathy of the government on its implementation of Islam. He further clarified his powerful role in the government by stating 'he is neither Chaudhry Fazal Ellahi nor Queen Elizabeth'¹⁰⁵⁵ who sat idly by whilst their governments performed poorly. In response, the Independent Parliamentary Group in the National Assembly brought a motion against the General, which further provoked him. General Zia had himself admitted that he had failed to establish a complete Islamic system in Pakistan in all the years that he had ruled absolutely, and asking the limp democracy to implement it in a shorter period was clearly unreasonable. After the dissolution of the assembly, he issued the Sharia Ordinance.

According to CIA and the US embassy reports, the dissolution of the Junejo's government had already been mooted before all this, with the Afghan agreement and the Ojhri Camp disaster being used as excuses. General Arif quoted General Fazal-i-Haq on the issue of the gulf between General Zia and Junejo, who forecasted that by the end of 1987 "Mr Junejo has completed his

¹⁰⁵² General Zia-ul-Haq, Dissolution Statement, *Viewpoint*, XIII (43), 2 June 1988, pp.13-14.

¹⁰⁵³ *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.22; R.B. Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', p.200.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.16.

¹⁰⁵⁵ General Zia-ul-Haq, Speech in the Parliament, Daily Jang, Rawalpindi, 8 April 1988.

days.”¹⁰⁵⁶ US embassy reports claimed that ‘should Zia use his authority against Junejo, we believe the military – by all accounts still loyal to Zia – would side with him’.¹⁰⁵⁷ The absence of the army’s resistance to the dissolution of Parliament shows that this was the case.

MRD: Shift from Restoration of Democracy to ‘People’s Sovereignty’:¹⁰⁵⁸

Publically, the MRD leaders categorically rejected the claimed ‘new dawn’ for democracy in Pakistan. BB’s statement issued from Cannes (France) was in this vein:

Gen. Ziaul Haq’s latest moves are nothing more than a cunning act of political camouflage, designed to dupe the people of Pakistan and placate political and opinion leaders in the Western countries whose support and economic assistance are vital for his regime.¹⁰⁵⁹

American intelligence claimed that this opposition was only a façade.¹⁰⁶⁰ Whatever the truth of this, the repeal of martial law gave the MRD a breathing space. On 29-30 January 1986 the MRD Action Committee met to revisit its policy and decide on a course of action for the post-martial law era. It was the first open gathering of the MRD after the end of 102 months of martial law. Every party in the MRD marched towards the Mochi Gate in a big procession carrying the symbols and placards of their respective leaders and parties. The workers of the Khaksar Tehrik let off firecrackers, and the others chanted

¹⁰⁵⁶ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p. 351.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, “Junejo and Zia: Uneasy Partners in Democracy”, 24 June 1986, 24 November 2013, p.3. CIA-RDP88-00434R000400970009-8, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹⁰⁵⁸ In January 1988, Central Executive Committee of MRD launched a ‘public contact campaign’ for bringing People’s Sovereignty in the country.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Benazir Bhutto, *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.16.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Directorate of Intelligence, “Pakistan: The Opposition since the Election”, *Near East and South Asia Review*, on 7 June 1985, 24 November 2013, pp.11-12. CIA-RDP85T01184R000301490002-8, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

slogans against the government.¹⁰⁶¹ This provided not only a show of strength to their opponents but to the fellow parties in the alliance as well.

One major issue that came up for the MRD was that of the balance of power between provinces. Weak provincial self-determination and an imbalance of power between provinces have always been major issues in the politics of Pakistan. Although a federal system, crucial powers have been held by the centre. The same problem was found in the 1980s also in India, where the Congress Government practised an overbearing and centralised form of rule. This was a legacy of British imperial rule, which had always had a highly centralised authority. The proposals under the 1935 Government of India Act for a federal system were not realised in a genuine way, as the centre could always dismiss governments. The same issue has also plagued Pakistan. This led to demands for secession. The failure of handling this issue had already resulted in the separation of East Pakistan in 1971, which further set back the legitimate demands of the smaller provinces as the centre became more vigilant in protecting its power citing security risks to the state as its justification. The national leaders, and their parties including ZAB and his party's government who had witnessed the break-up of the country, missed the chance to solve the issue for good. S. Akber Zaidi divided them into two groups. The former is liberal, and the latter right-wing.¹⁰⁶²

In the aftermath of martial law, the issues of the status of the federated units was made paramount. The MRD working body recommended reserving six subjects to the national government while representatives of the smaller

¹⁰⁶¹ Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p13.

¹⁰⁶² S.Akber Zaidi, 'Regional Imbalances and National Question in Pakistan: Some indications', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 24 (6), 11 February 1989, pp.300-314.

provinces wanted only four in this category – defence, foreign affairs, currency, and communication. NDP rejected this, as it felt that the MRD was dominated by the larger provinces, and particularly Punjab. After prolonged discussions, it was eventually agreed on 3 August 1986 that there would be full provincial autonomy, with only the four subjects centralised, with other powers devolved to the provinces.¹⁰⁶³ Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, the current convener of the MRD, declared in the press conference that:

...the document is a commitment to the people of Pakistan that when the Alliance or any single party in it comes into power, it will amend the 1973 constitution suitably to ensure that the Autonomy Declaration is implemented in letter and spirit so that undue interference in provincial affairs ends once for all.¹⁰⁶⁴

However, the declaration could not be implemented until 2009 following the Charter of Democracy (CoD), signed in 2006 in London. Interestingly, the MRD declaration proposed compulsory military training for ‘all adult citizens’, which seems to include girls and boys.¹⁰⁶⁵

The alliance partners had to resolve the internal issue of turning the movement into an electoral alliance. The smaller parties pressurized the partners to provide a joint programme to mobilise the general public.¹⁰⁶⁶ It was argued that this would strengthen them against the regime and its allies. The smaller parties reminded the bigger parties, like the PPP, of the support they gave them during their lowest moments, and the debt of gratitude they were

¹⁰⁶³ C.G.P. Rakisits, ‘Centre-Province Relations in Pakistan Under President Zia: The Government’s and the Opposition’s Approaches’, *Pacific Affairs*, 61(1), Spring 1988, p.91.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12.

¹⁰⁶⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.264.

subsequently owed.¹⁰⁶⁷ Their demand for a disproportionate electoral share caused problem. For example, TI asked for forty per cent. Opponents of a joint electoral pact argued that this might be counter-productive, especially at the local level, where the candidates of each party had their own various personal preferences and levels of public approval.¹⁰⁶⁸ They argued that the election could resolve the issue without the need for joint electorates. Thirdly, the joint election agenda would diminish the individual identity of each party, which was unacceptable for the big parties.¹⁰⁶⁹ PPP, for example, insisted on maintaining its separate electoral identity. BB however gave an assurance that cooperation would continue with the MRD both “in struggle and the government.”¹⁰⁷⁰ Drafting a joint declaration, overhauling the existing policies either in favour of smaller nationalities or removing their historical grievances and dealing with the socio-economic deprivation of federating units, while maintaining the integrity of the nation as a whole were all issues that had to be addressed by the political parties.¹⁰⁷¹ Because of all these competing agendas, the MRD was unable in the end to build a joint platform to contest the election, and later on, the PPP having a simple majority in 1988 election had to kneel down before the terms and conditions of the establishment and took the oath of a ‘truncated’ democratic government.

Of all the parties, Tehreek-i-Istiqlal proved hardest to integrate within the alliance. It declared that it would associate with the MRD only at the

¹⁰⁶⁷ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.264.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.265.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.266.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Benazir Bhutto, *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

¹⁰⁷¹ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.265.

national level.¹⁰⁷² The party later on declared its opposition to 'Bhuttoism' in a way that damaged the alliance.¹⁰⁷³ In the party's views stated in an open letter to the Secretary General of the MRD, Malik Qasim, in August 1986, it was alleged that Bhuttoism 'meant conspiring some Generals to break up Pakistan in order to gain power...the killing of factory workers and the murders of political opponents...strangulation of the promises of the Press and a betrayal of the promises made to the "kisans" and the poor of the country.'¹⁰⁷⁴ Moreover, it rejected BB's assertion that the 1977 elections were not rigged and that the PNA movement was financed by the USA. TI also criticised BB's alleged understanding with USA and Saudi Arabia for her to win power in Pakistan.¹⁰⁷⁵ The ANP's leader's provocative statement that the establishment of Pakistan was 'a sin' was condemned as well.¹⁰⁷⁶ Because of these issues, TI eventually quit the alliance at the time when unity was needed to oust the regime.

Since the beginning of the MRD, having a woman as a potential head of state remained controversial. This was despite the fact that most of the parties including JUI, Jama'at-i-Islami's, had supported Miss Fatima Jinnah in the Presidential election against General Ayub Khan. However, the parties in the alliance were reluctant to place any woman as head of the state during the anti-Zia movement. JUI (Fazal-ur-Rehman group) refused to accept BB as Pakistan's

¹⁰⁷² Mahmood Zaman, 'Decisions deferred as differences surface', *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.14.

¹⁰⁷³ *Viewpoint*, XI (30), 6 March 1986, p.22.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Asghar Khan, Open letter to Malik Qasim, *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16.

¹⁰⁷⁵ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16.

¹⁰⁷⁶ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16.

future leader on grounds of her gender.¹⁰⁷⁷ Women's rights group such as Punjab Women Lawyers' Association declared the stand 'a hypocrisy.'¹⁰⁷⁸

Except for the submission of financial accounts to the Election Commission to fulfil constitutional requirements, the meeting of 29-30 January 1986 could not decide unanimously on the burning political issues – provincial autonomy and the conversion of the movement into an electoral alliance. But, the committee wisely agreed to let the issues remain open for discussion in their particular party's committees and to re-meet after two months.¹⁰⁷⁹ However, the alliance re-pledged their stance on the rejection of the 1984 Presidential Referendum, the illegitimacy of the 1985 General Election, and the instalment of the civilian government afterwards. In front of a mammoth crowd at Mochi Gate, the alliance declared its opposition, and its continuous struggle against the regime. The action committee also passed resolutions to strengthen its ties with the workers as well with civil society. They demanded the release of all political prisoners including Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo, and Fazil Rahu of Awami Tehreek; the repeal of Press and Publication Ordinance, and an end to restrictions imposed on newspaper publishers requiring them to deposit advanced securities of between Rs. 500,000 (\$3333.33) and Rs. 3 million (\$20 thousand).¹⁰⁸⁰ The committee warned the government of the negative impact of the un-checked infiltration of Afghan refugees into the country's domestic economy and politics, which was overseen by Jamaat-i-Islami and the

¹⁰⁷⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (27), 13 February 1986, p.34.

¹⁰⁷⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (24), 21 January 1988, pp.15-16.

¹⁰⁷⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.5.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.5.

government.¹⁰⁸¹ They also decided to hold frequent meetings. The next two meetings were organised in the following month in Faisalabad and Multan.

At the Faisalabad meeting of February 1986, two demands were presented to government – the Resignation of General Zia-ul-Haq, and the holding of a fresh election on a party basis. A peaceful movement would be launched to achieve these objectives.¹⁰⁸² Tehreek-i-Istiqlal did not show up and registered its party independently. The Multan meeting on 21 February reiterated their demands. It also attracted hundreds of protestors. The central Action committee meeting in August in Lahore demanded a firm schedule for the election by 20 September 1986.¹⁰⁸³ The committee reaffirmed its threat of launching a peaceful movement against the regime if the election had not been held. The CEC meeting on 2 August 1986 under the convenership of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman reiterated its stand that the martial law of 1977 had no justification. The meeting also paid tribute to the sacrifices of the workers during the 1983 campaign.¹⁰⁸⁴ After the declaration, Ayaz Amir, the renowned political analyst, warned the MRD that it would need to be strong to avoid an embarrassing failure. The current conditions were favourable to be exploited by MRD.¹⁰⁸⁵ Husain Naqi on the other hand felt that the alliance had sufficient strength already. As it was, despite the issuing of the long-awaited declaration on provincial autonomy, the alliance was still not adequately united.

¹⁰⁸¹ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.13.

¹⁰⁸² *Viewpoint*, XI (28), 20 February 1986, p.12.

¹⁰⁸³ *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12.

¹⁰⁸⁴ *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Ayaz Amir, 'Adjusting to reality: better late than never', *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.18.

Individual parties in the alliance continued to squabble with each other. There was an attempt to force greater unity among parties on the Left.¹⁰⁸⁶ Five Left-wing parties – MKP, NDP, PNP, QMA, and Awami Tehreek – were eager to merge the parties into one,¹⁰⁸⁷ and finally emerged as a united Awami National Party (ANP).¹⁰⁸⁸ The parties such as SAT, and ANP who were part of the MRD established the Sindh National Alliance under the leadership of G.M. Syed, the anti-MRD leader of Jiye Sindh Mahaz. Nawabzada Nasrullah declared in an interview that this was due to the failure of MRD to keep the parties intact.¹⁰⁸⁹

The Return of Benazir Bhutto:

According to the civil resistance scholarship, the leader or group of the leaders plays a key role in the success of a movement. In the culture of South Asia, the importance of the leaders is like that of a *devta* (deity); the devotion accorded to leaders in South Asia frequently has a quasi-religious quality, with followers having a faith in their leader that is generally unrealistic about what they are capable of achieving. It also tends to preclude questions and prevents any debate about their suitability or qualities as leaders.

After a decade-long struggle against the regime, BB had become the *devta* of the majority of the Pakistani people, who considered her as a *Messiah*. The receivers and bearers of the longest and toughest punishments, the workers had built up highest expectations from her. Likewise, being the largest party and having

¹⁰⁸⁶ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo. *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.13.

¹⁰⁸⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.17.

¹⁰⁸⁸ According to a US embassy report, the alliance was supported with the help of Soviet Union and Afghanistan. On the day of its formation, several Afghan diplomats were present there. Abdul Wali Khan.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, cited in Husain Naqi, 'More Sinned against Sinning', *Viewpoint*, XIII (42), 26 May 1988, p.18.

strong public support, PPP indeed was believed to strengthen the alliance. Unlike the 1981-84 period of the anti-Zia resistance, BB mainly remained free during the 1985-88 period with the exception of a few brief arrests, so the smaller parties in the alliance had expected more from her and her party to run a successful campaign against the regime. Unfortunately, BB failed to respond to both groups for two major reasons. One was the unmanageable split in the PPP due to numerous reasons, including her undemocratic behaviour in running the party. The other was its go-it-alone policy.

On the declaration of the annulment of the martial law, BB was in exile in the UK. Seeing the Junejo government's commitment to restore the political parties and the democratic culture in the country, BB decided to return to Pakistan. Reorganising her party, securing the federation of Pakistan, struggling for holding the free and fair election under 1973 constitution and establishing a people's government in that result were her major political targets on her return to Pakistan. She had taken the lesson from her father of not being rigid and dictator in party affairs, which led to his downfall and death.¹⁰⁹⁰ She chalked out her programme to pressurize the government in three steps.¹⁰⁹¹

1. 'Seeing and meeting' the people.
2. To organize peaceful demonstrations/court arrest.
3. After December, if the regime failed to lift up the martial law as promised, then decisive struggle would be launched.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Abbas Kazim, *Benazir Bhutto Beti*, p.32.

¹⁰⁹¹ *The Struggle*, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, p4. 601/R/23/19, MRC.

Some scholars¹⁰⁹² as well as the government took the return of the BB to Pakistan as the revival of the democratic culture in the country. The concerned quarters assumed that an agreement between the General and BB paved the way smooth to her return. The current research confirms that there was a deal that was secured between the General and BB under very strong pressure from America. Junejo's push for greater democracy was not an element in this.

To check the political water in the country, Mumtaz Bhutto, and Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi returned to Pakistan after fifteen months of self-exile on 7 February 1986 and 21 March 1986 respectively. After the reshuffling of PPP in Sindh, Jatoi was believed to have become an opponent of BB's leadership. His followers planned a mammoth welcome for him and were supported in this by pro-Zia MNAs. The sources report that more than three million rupees were spent for this welcome show. Newspapers gave a figure of 50,000 who came to receive Jatoi. However, the PPP's die-hard workers took over the show chanting the slogan *wazir-i-azam* Benazir (Prime Minister Benazir) instead.¹⁰⁹³ However, the assassination of Noora, the servant of ZAB, in his house along with his niece on 3 February 1986 led BB to suspect that it was a political assassination.¹⁰⁹⁴

¹⁰⁹² Abbas Kazim, *Benazir Bhutto Beti*, p.28.

¹⁰⁹³ Viewpoint, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.29.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Viewpoint, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.22.



Figure 6 welcome receptions to BB on her return to Pakistan on 10 April 1986. Taken from *Viewpoint* 17 April 1986.

On 5 February 1986, BB announced that she would return to Pakistan. Following this, the MRD organised twenty-three public rallies in Punjab alone on 23 March 1986 demanding a fresh election and the resignation of General Zia.¹⁰⁹⁵ On BB's revealing the intentional plan of creating unrest in Punjab, the US Embassy sources¹⁰⁹⁶ stated that BB believed that blocking roads and closing down the factories would create unrest in Punjab province. To counter the unrest, the regime would call in the army, which would refuse to fire on its fellow Punjabis. Resultantly, the army would remove General Zia and hold elections.

¹⁰⁹⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.22.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.6.

BB arrived in Lahore on 10 April 1986 to a mammoth welcome. This showed that the province was still the stronghold of PPP.¹⁰⁹⁷ In the last nine-and-a-half years, the regime tried hard to root *Bhutto(ism)* out of the country using the tactics such as buying off big political families like Jatoi in Sindh and Khar in Punjab,¹⁰⁹⁸ through media and judicial trials;¹⁰⁹⁹ and the torture and the murders of PPP workers. However, the reception on her arrival rejected all their evil efforts.¹¹⁰⁰ *Viewpoint*, in its editorial, summarised her arrival stating 'Can the Phoenix of democracy in Pakistan rise again from its ashes and obtain for itself a longer span of life? ...the prospects of such a resurrection have become much brighter.'¹¹⁰¹ The stupendous reception to BB revealed the affection and adoration of the people towards their leader who had stood firm against the harsh regime for eight-and-a-half years. It was the demonstration of their reverence to the dead body but living soul of ZAB. The fifteen-kilometre passage from Lahore airport to the Iqbal Park, the place of the public gathering, took ten hours to cover the distance, in which, according to conservative counting, 700,000 persons participated.¹¹⁰² Likewise, on 5 July 1986, 100 small and large towns in Sind came to a standstill to welcome her back to her home province. Fruit, vegetables, and cigarettes were not available that day.¹¹⁰³ It demonstrated that the people of Pakistan still stood for democracy, and their right of freedom to live, think and act freely in the country.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Abbas Kazim, *Benazir Bhutto Beti*, (Ikhlq Hussain and Company, Lahore:1986), p.5. *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 10 April 1986, p.19.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Azhar Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal* (Lahore, year is missing),p.42.

¹⁰⁹⁹ Abbas Kazim, *Benazir Bhutto Beti*, p.23.

¹¹⁰⁰ Roedad Khan, *Pakistan- A Dream Gone Sour*, (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1998), p.92.

¹¹⁰¹ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.5.

¹¹⁰² *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁰³ *The Struggle*, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, p.3. 601/R/23/19, MRC.

On her arrival, every politician, friend and foe, political analysts, national and international media and the general public, were anxious to hear of her plans in the current political scenario. Amongst the domestic and foreign policies,¹¹⁰⁴ she affirmed her struggle for democracy, rejected the December referendum, asked General Zia-ul-Haq ‘to leave (the country) gracefully’,¹¹⁰⁵ and expressed her readiness to accept Junejo’s government as a caretaker to hold free and fair election on the party basis. Her action plan was “Throw Zia out, Bring in Democracy.”¹¹⁰⁶ Addressing the suppressed sections of the society – the labourers – she made her commitment to raise the minimum wages of a labour to 1,000 rupees (\$63) per month.¹¹⁰⁷ Moreover, she repudiated any policy of revenge for her father’s murder. By refraining from vengeance, she gave the message to the Pakistan army in general that her access to the power of the country would neither bring any misery to either the institution or any individual. Pakistani political analysts and workers compared her return to Pakistan with Cory Aquino’s struggle and return.¹¹⁰⁸

¹¹⁰⁴ Domestic policy: Resignation of President Zia and new party-based elections, release of all political prisoners, full restoration of 1973 Constitution, raising the minimum wage to 1,000 rupees (\$63) per month, rehiring of workers fired from government enterprises, mixed economy; no further nationalization of industries, ceiling on landholdings, reduction of taxes for small farmers while imposing agricultural taxes on large landowners. Foreign policy: genuinely nonaligned foreign policy, equally good relations with US and the Soviet union, aid with no strings attached, withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and return of Afghan refugees (PPP was publicly silent on issue of direct talks with Kabul), and gradual normalisation of relations with India on basis of 1972 bilateral Simla Accord. Cited in Near Eastern and South Asia Office, “Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne”, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.28.

¹¹⁰⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁰⁶ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, “Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne”, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27.

¹¹⁰⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁰⁸ *The Struggle*, issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, 601/R/23/19, MRC.

Revealing her three-staged strategy to achieve her objectives to a US diplomat,¹¹⁰⁹ she said that the first would be a series of political rallies across Pakistan in April and May to exhibit the popularity of the party. Boosting up the morale and enthusiasm of the party workers before the reorganisation of the party, and the call for ‘nonviolent civil disobedience movement – fasts, labour strikes, and demonstrations’ – as stated by BB were laid down the second and third strategies respectively for the campaign. Her aim was to force the government to hold a new election by the autumn of 1986.¹¹¹⁰

A deal between BB and General Zia-ul-Haq was made before her return to Pakistan, which was managed by the Americans. This was revealed both in interviews¹¹¹¹ and documented evidence. BB, who before going into exile publicly blamed the Pakistan Army vis-à-vis Zia and the USA as murderers of her father and refused any agreement with the regime and the General on any terms, now returned to Pakistan after a secret understanding with her adversaries. She had understood the realpolitik of the world.¹¹¹² Stephen P. Cohen, while denying any written agreement between the parties, saw it as an

¹¹⁰⁹ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, “Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne”, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27.

¹¹¹⁰ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, “Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne”, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.27.

¹¹¹¹ Asif Butt, the student leader of Pakistan People’s Party, and a member of the militant anti- Zia struggle from Kabul 1979-84. Interview with the researcher, 26 February 2012, Lahore; Dr. Mehdi Hassan, Professor of Journalism, and PPP worker, interview with the researcher May 2013 Lahore; Dr. Mubashar Hassan, the architecture of Socialist manifest of PPP, Federal Minister during ZAB government, ex-General Secretary of PPP, interview with the researcher 28 May 2012 Lahore.

¹¹¹² Asif Butt, interview with the researcher.

‘understanding’: ‘It was not the deal but the understanding. These are not formal agreements but probably verbal understandings between officials.’¹¹¹³

During the last decade of the Zia regime, the USA exerted a powerful influence over his regime due to their unrestricted penetration in the government’s business.¹¹¹⁴ Knowing the fact on her return, Benazir developed her strategy not to antagonise USA and its allies but Zia-ul-Haq alone during her resistance campaign. Analysing the evidence, Abdullah Malik in his book ‘*Teen Virastain*’, and Babar Ali in his article ‘Where is the Opposition in Pakistan’ stated that BB not only stopped four party workers burning the USA flag during her welcome rally but expelled the workers from the party who did that. Moreover, she clarified that her democratic struggle was not against the Pakistan Army but General Zia.¹¹¹⁵ Ian Talbot does not confirm the existence of any evidence showing an agreement; however he does not root out the possibility either. ‘I mean there is not much evidence of this. BB would probably be given the green light to return. And that’s kind of indication, do not forget that Zia has civilianised his martial law by this stage.’ He further stated that the General was looking around for some kind of exit strategy, some kind of working agreement, as long as it was on his terms, with BB and PPP.¹¹¹⁶

However, her trip to Washington and Saudi Arabia before returning to Pakistan, the absence of the popular slogan, *Asia Surkh Hai*¹¹¹⁷ (Asia is red vis-à-vis communist) in PPP’s meetings before the arrival of BB in Pakistan and, on

¹¹¹³ Stephen P. Cohen, Ex-Official of State Department USA on Pakistan and the best friend of General Zia-ul-Haq, interview with the researcher, 20 November 2013, Washington D.C.

¹¹¹⁴ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, pp.277-80.

¹¹¹⁵ Abdullah Malik, *Benazir; Teen Virastain*, p.90. Babar Ali, ‘Where is the Opposition in Pakistan?’, *Economic and Political Weekly*, XXII (47), 5-12 September, 1987, pp.1538-1539.

¹¹¹⁶ Ian Talbot, Interview with the Researcher, 9 July 2013, The University of Warwick (Coventry).

¹¹¹⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14.

the day of arrival, BB's forbidding her workers from chanting slogans such as '*America ka ju Yaar hi, Ghaddar Ghaddar Hi*'¹¹¹⁸ (A friend of America is a traitor) indicated the agreement among BB, USA and the Army. The uncharitable comment from her rivals was that she was 'an Aquino'¹¹¹⁹ returning along the "old route" to political power – London-Washington-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan.¹¹²⁰ She responded that the purpose of her visit was to ensure that aid – the USA approved \$4.02 billion after her trip – was given to Pakistan conditional on the human rights situation in the country, and to thank the State Department for getting her released last summer.¹¹²¹ However she later criticised the Western aid for strengthening the Zia regime.¹¹²²

Moreover, on the eve of Libya-USA crisis, the call of the US's Seventh Fleet Ships at Karachi port, the action in Gadoon, and her own party's protest against the USA's aggression, BB's trip to Washington DC brought harsh criticism from her rivals as well as from her own party workers. Col. Moammer Qaddafi¹¹²³ of Libya was a close ally of ZAB, and it was he who had supported Pakistan financially on ZAB's request after the East-Pakistan debacle. The US intelligence reports of November 1986 clearly defined the US's cordial relationship with BB, though was still wary of her.¹¹²⁴ It stated BB would maintain cordial relationships with USA; however, her government in future

¹¹¹⁸ Mazhar Abbas, Interview with the researcher, 13 March 2012, Karachi.

¹¹¹⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14.

¹¹²⁰ Husain Naqi, 'The City waits with bated breath', *Viewpoint*, XI(33), 3 April 1986, p.19.

¹¹²¹ Voice of America, cited in *Viewpoint*, XI (33), 3 April 1986, p.14.

¹¹²² Benazir Bhutto, Interview to BBC Urdu Service, 11 May 1988.

¹¹²³ He was the Libyan leader and the USA was hostile to his regime.

¹¹²⁴ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.31.

could diverge from US policy interests on issues such as Afghanistan, narcotics, and nuclear non-proliferation.¹¹²⁵

Mazhar Abbas stated in an interview that BB had understood where power lay in the world, therefore she adjusted with it.¹¹²⁶ Her stepping away from her previous position led to a difference of opinion with Murtaza Bhutto, who claimed that she must be power-thirsty to shake hands with their father's murderers.¹¹²⁷ Her assurance to not create any problem for the civil government on her return¹¹²⁸ indicated the *Noora kushti* (fake wrestling) between the two parties. It meant that she had accepted the general election of 1985 and compromised on the demand of MRD for the reelection. Contrarily, BB asserted that 'this represented a message to the United States to stop supporting dictatorships'.¹¹²⁹ It was not always easy for BB to win support for her change of stance from the rank-and-file of the PPP workers. In the CEC meeting in Karachi from 30 January to 1 February 1988, the party passed a resolution to maintain its previous position of 'Islam is our creed. Democracy is our polity, socialism is our economy, and all power to the people.'¹¹³⁰ Senior Vice-President of the party Shaikh Mohammad Rashid reiterated that the party's manifesto for the election to come would be a socialist one.¹¹³¹

The biggest challenge for BB lay in re-organising the party and keeping it united. Despite the welcome she received in April 1986, BB's control over party

¹¹²⁵ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.31.

¹¹²⁶ Mazhar Abbas, Interview with the researcher, 13 March 2013, Karachi.

¹¹²⁷ Agha Muhammad Waseem, Skype Interview with the researcher, 2013 from Sweden.

¹¹²⁸ Husain Naqi, 'The City waits with bated breath', *Viewpoint*, XI(33), 3 April 1986, p.19.

¹¹²⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.14.

¹¹³⁰ *Viewpoint* XIII (27), 11 February 1988, p.11.

¹¹³¹ *Viewpoint* XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.16.

workers had decreased. It was visible when BB directed the party workers in Multan to vote for Yousaf Raza Gillani's group for the Chairman Multan district. All except one favoured the opposing candidate, Shah Mahmood Qureishi.¹¹³² Without unity, BB knew it would be hard to accomplish her plans as mentioned above.

M.B. Naqvi, a renowned journalist and an activist, placed two important issues before PPP after BB's return. One was to get the army to return to the barracks, and the second was to enthuse the masses for their continuous participation in politics.¹¹³³ In effect, a revolution was needed to remove the military from political power, and for this, the party needed mass enthusiasm and support. The journalist pointed out that three major steps were required to mobilise the general public: the charisma and credibility of the party leadership should be revived among the masses; the idealistic programme of the revolution that would inspire the youth should be developed; and the third capability was to guide the people on all questions as they arose from day to day.¹¹³⁴

BB did not act democratically in her nominations of office-bearers for the party. She depended on names given to her by her close aides. These were often based on personal friendship or companionship in jail.¹¹³⁵ Names that the aides disapproved of were absent from the list handed over to BB.¹¹³⁶ A dissident group in PPP accused her of violating party procedures in this respect. This so-called 'Gang of Four' – Malik Meiraj Khalid, Rao Rashid, Afzal Sandhu, and Mian

¹¹³² Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani, *Chah Yousaf Se Sada*, p.109.

¹¹³³ M.B.Naqvi, 'PPP's Dilemma-IV: The Ultimate Test', *Viewpoint*, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.20.

¹¹³⁴ M.B.Naqvi, 'PPP's Dilemma-IV: The Ultimate Test', *Viewpoint*, XI (33), 27 March 1986, p.20.

¹¹³⁵ Jahangir Badar, interview with the researcher, 5 May 2012, Islamabad. Shahid Sheikh, interview with researcher, 5 May 2012, Islamabad

¹¹³⁶ Asif Butt, Interview with the researcher, 26 February 2012, Lahore.

Ehsanul Haq – resigned from the CEC of the party in protest. One of their major grievances concerned the appointment of Rana Shaukat Mahmood as the President of PPP-Punjab. Undoubtedly many of the nominations were based on merit such as those of Salman Taseer, Malik Hakmeen Khan, Gen (rtd.) Tikka Khan; however such nomination not only strengthened the rifts between the dissident group and the Co-Chairperson, but it also set the undemocratic tone of nominating the office bearers of a democratic party, which has continued ever since. Sh. Rashid, the Senior Vice-Chairman of PPP, in his interview accused the party of abandoning its socialist principles and acting in a neo-imperial way in this respect. To back this up, he stated that his party workers were beaten in the party meeting of Qilla Gujjar Singh on the ‘charge’ of raising socialist slogans. His membership was also suspended.¹¹³⁷ Dr. Mubasher Hassan, a member of the Principles Committee, reiterated the demand for holding of intra-party elections from the levels of Chairperson down to union councils so as to strengthen the party throughout the country.¹¹³⁸ This all revealed that BB and other senior leaders had not learnt from their own experiences during eight years of harsh struggle and exile and were continuing in the old authoritarian and unjust ways. Furthermore, BB failed to reconcile the right-wingers and left-wingers in the party. Right-wingers of PPP eventually made BB remove Dr Ghulam Hussain, a left-winger, from the Secretary General position of the party, being replaced by General Tikka Khan.¹¹³⁹ Workers formed a committee against the action. 3000 workers in Pakistan marked the first anniversary of the hanging of Irdees Toti,

¹¹³⁷ Shaikh Rashid, interview with Viewpoint. Cited in Viewpoint, XIII (33), 24 March 1988, p.29.

¹¹³⁸ Dr. Mubashar Hassan, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.17.

¹¹³⁹ *The Struggle*, 7 (Winter 1986-7), p.10. 601/R/23/19, MRC.

Idris Beg, and Usman Ghani in Lahore to show solidarity with Dr. Ghulam Hussain.¹¹⁴⁰

Moreover, she failed to apprehend the emerging circumstances in Sindh. The weekly magazine *Viewpoint* reported similar reasons behind the resignations –‘lack of democracy in the party, top-down decision making, and the enforcement of these decisions without the active involvement of the cadre and the absence of a responsive organisational structure.’¹¹⁴¹ In less than two years, Sindh saw three provincial heads of the party: Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, President of the party in Sindh was dismissed on grounds that he had enjoyed a suspiciously long and firm relationship with the Zia regime; his successor, Makhdoom Khaliq-uz-Zaman, was then removed; and his successor, Mir Hazar Khan Bajrani, resigned in January 1988 after his failure in the local election in December 1987. An MNA told US diplomats that Zia had contacted Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi and Ghulam Mustafa Khar as potential partners to break the power of PPP and to campaign against BB.¹¹⁴² After some time, Jatoi and Khar from Punjab had established National People’s Party¹¹⁴³ in August 1986 in retaliation, collecting the moderate and anti-Bhutto elements of PPP.¹¹⁴⁴ The government continued hounding PPP-Sindh leaders to join Zia’s party, and

¹¹⁴⁰ *The Struggle*, 6 (Winter) 1985-6, p.3. 601/R/23/19, MRC.

¹¹⁴¹ *Viewpoint*, XIII (24), 21 August 1988, p.14.

¹¹⁴² Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, “Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government”, November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.10.

¹¹⁴³ The opposing group of PPP named it National ‘Puppet’ Party due to its split done by the establishment.

¹¹⁴⁴ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, “Pakistan People’s Party: Pretenders to the Throne”, *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.29.

achieved this when Talib-ul-Maula of Hala joined the official Muslim League in March 1988.¹¹⁴⁵

The rivalry of the SPBM of Mumtaz Bhutto – who also shared ZAB's legacy – and the rise of ethnic-based politics in the shape of MQM dramatically altered the course of politics in the province. The major reason of the change of BB's policy was the defeat of PPP in local elections December 1987 throughout much of the country including Punjab and Sindh, with further divisions in the election between urban and rural politics. The recently-emerged Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM)¹¹⁴⁶ swept the election in Karachi and Hyderabad, whereas Sindh-Baluchistan-Pukhtoon Front (SBPF) won in Northern Sindh as well as in the majority of Karachi District councils.¹¹⁴⁷ The only major exception to this was in victories under Aftab Sherpao in Peshawar. In general, PPP, vis-à-vis BB, was outclassed in the local body elections of 1987.

PPP was now at the lowest ebb in its decade-long struggle against the regime. The optimism felt when the mammoth crowd received BB at Lahore airport less than a year before vanished as the results of the polls came in, caused by the party's (and BB's) missteps. Seeing the defeat of his archrival, General Zia – on 29 December 1987 – firmly rejected holding a general election before the term of the existing parliament expired in 1990. On the other hand, the civic polls led to a change in BB's demands, from re-election to the 'guarantee for free and fair elections in 1990', and she appealed for renewed struggle for justice and people's rights in the new year of 1988.¹¹⁴⁸ In her

¹¹⁴⁵ *Viewpoint*, XIII (35), 7 April 1988, p.34.

¹¹⁴⁶ MQM represents Urdu speaking migrants from India except those who came from East Punjab.

¹¹⁴⁷ *Viewpoint*, XIII (23), 14 January 1988, pp.9-10.

¹¹⁴⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.34.

interview to a Karachi Daily,¹¹⁴⁹ BB confessed that 'wherever the party was divided...we did not do well.'¹¹⁵⁰ She attributed it in part to the employment of untrained political workers in the elections instead of those who had experienced 'jail, street and back'. Equally, she also pointed out the conspicuous role of money: 'a minimum of Rs.100,000 per constituency were needed by the PPP to give a decent fight' in the election, which also worked against them. Not only was it a setback to the party itself, but also to the MRD, as the party represented a large chunk of the alliance's strength.

Reorganisation of the party was sorely needed after this debacle. BB called for a complete overhaul of the party's office bearers, and she appointed a new team in Punjab under Rana Shaukat Mahmood, President of PPP-Punjab.¹¹⁵¹ She held an internal party election in Punjab in June 1987. According to the US consulate to Lahore, the elections resulted in a stronger and more unified PPP in Punjab.¹¹⁵² However, the most conspicuous outcome of the new team was the lack of focus on the struggle to remove General Zia and demand for fresh elections. BB was now accused by radicals of adopting a quietist approach. *The Struggle*, a bi-annual journal, criticised her policy of 'wait and see' and talked of 'Benazir's Gandhism', as BB refrained from deploying any violence to achieve her objectives.

¹¹⁴⁹ Benazir Bhutto, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (23), 14 January 1988, pp.15-16.

¹¹⁵⁰ Benazir Bhutto, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (23), 14 January 1988, p.16.

¹¹⁵¹ Provincial General Secretaries Gen. (rtd) Tikka Khan, and Mumtaz Ahmad Kahlon, Vice-Presidents Arif Iqbal Bhatti, Pervaiz Saleh, Fakhar Zaman, and Chaudhry Mohammad Ikram, Additional General Secretary Malik Hakmeen Khan, Finance Secretary Syed Nazim Hussain Shah, Information Secretary Salman Taseer, Public Relations Secretary Col. (rtd) Sarwar Cheema, Secretary Records Begum Rehana Sarwar, Secretary Events Ghulam Abbas. Cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (32), 17 March 1988, p.14.

¹¹⁵² Near Eastern and South Asia Office, 'Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan', *Directorate of Intelligence*, October 1987, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP88T000700920001-4, p.7.

In all of this, there were tensions between the strategies of BB and the MRD. This had started when BB was still in the USA, when she stated the Junejo government was the first step towards democracy. Her statement received heavy criticism in the Central Action Committee's meeting of MRD in March 1986 in Karachi.¹¹⁵³ This committee described the Junejo's government as a 'gimmick'; democracy was yet to come. The committee condemned the continued incarceration of hundreds of political workers and demanded their immediate release. One resolution also demanded the release of workers of other parties such as Rasool Bakhsh Paleejo of Sindhi Awami Tehreek. The meeting, nonetheless, seemed to be confronted with its own internal conflict, as it also said the emergence of factions would not be tolerated.¹¹⁵⁴ The party held a public meeting alongside this in which 15,000 party workers participated. The meeting asked the unconstitutional government to quit, and re-hold the election according to the 1973 Constitution.¹¹⁵⁵

Seeing the stupendous reception on her return to Pakistan, BB wanted to exploit the situation in her favour in an early election.¹¹⁵⁶ She was at that juncture reluctant to enter into an electoral alliance with MRD, whereas the smaller parties of the alliance were well aware of their fate in the proposed immediate election. According to the US consulate in Lahore's cable, they were reluctant to support the PPP's demand, and asked for a 'prearranged

¹¹⁵³ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.17.

¹¹⁵⁴ *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.15.

¹¹⁵⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.17.

¹¹⁵⁶ Mahmood Mirza, *Aaj Ka Sindh*, p.86.

apportionment of parliamentary seats' between the PPP and the other MRD parties.¹¹⁵⁷

In the Central Action Committee meeting of MRD on 6 August, PPP agreed upon collective action against the regime if the government did not meet the election demand by 20 September. However, snubbing the collective decision, PPP called on a civil disobedience campaign on 14 August. The party asked the workers to be peaceful and disciplined during the continuous course of struggle against the post-martial law regime.

Black Thursday (14 August 1986):

The unilateral decision by PPP to launch a campaign of civil resistance on 14 August was a humiliation for the MRD, which had agreed that individual parties should not act on their own in this respect.¹¹⁵⁸ The MRD had already planned a public meeting at Mochi Gate in Lahore on 14 August 1986, and PPP took the lead in turning this into the launch of the civil disobedience movement. PML had also planned to organise a public gathering at Minar-i-Pakistan on the same day, to be addressed by Prime Minister Junejo.¹¹⁵⁹ TI and JUP decided not to participate, but its local organisations were involved individually in the campaign. This all created an explosive situation on that day. The MRD leaders tried to maintain peace. When Junejo and the MRD had their public assemblies in Lahore not very far from each other, the senior leaders of MRD took quick

¹¹⁵⁷ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, 'Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan', *Directorate of Intelligence*, October 1987, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP88T000700920001-4, p.5.

¹¹⁵⁸ Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, pp.132-33.; *Viewpoint*, XI (52), 7 August 1986, p.12.

¹¹⁵⁹ I.A. Rehman stated that Junejo was on USA trip and he was not asked before the finalisation of the public gathering, which was mainly PML-Punjab planned to do so. Junejo did not want to confront with MRD at this stage, therefore, he called a halt to the gathering on 11 August. (Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.270.)

action to stop its workers from engaging themselves with the government's supporters who were tearing down their posters.¹¹⁶⁰ They were unable however to stop the violence that then exploded throughout the city.




Figure 7 Provincial Government's violent response to the MRD's peaceful protest on 14 August 1986 in Lahore. Taken from Viewpoint 19 August 1986

The Shaheen Squad of the Punjab police took charge of dealing with the protest of 14 August at Mochi Gate. One of the accounts of the day stated that 'in the morning the situation was deceptively calm. A group of us pundits who toured the city confidently said that nothing "much" would happen. A few hours later we were eating our words as the Circular Road and the innumerable lanes feeding it erupted into the worst street battles the city has seen since the height

¹¹⁶⁰ *Viewpoint*, XII (1), 14 August 1986, p.5.

of the PNA agitation in 1977.¹¹⁶¹ The Lohari Police Station, on the way to the Mochi Gate, was besieged and attacked by protestors. According to a Government Press note, 'the police used tear gas shells and fires in the air to disperse the mob which was bent upon setting the police station on fire'.¹¹⁶² The press, however, accused the police of the embattled garrison of using excessive force: 'Forget about *lathis* and teargas...Bullets were used with an abandon rare ever by our permissive standards. Shaheen Squad toughs were firing their Chinese-made Kalashnikovs at the slightest provocation'.¹¹⁶³ Four people were killed at the spot. A joint press conference of District Magistrate Lahore and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police agreed that 'none of the processionists was found carrying firearms'.¹¹⁶⁴ Nonetheless, Shabbir Ibn-i-Adil stated in his book that it was policemen who were killed on the day by the mob.¹¹⁶⁵ The media reported that undoubtedly the protestors had brick-batted the police from two sides, from Bansanwala Bazar and Shah Alam Market. But the arrival of the reinforcements to rescue them altered the power in favour of the police. Firing with Lee Enfield rifles, they killed a protestor on the spot, followed by three more.¹¹⁶⁶ These four were PPP workers, and were named as Sheikh Muhammad Sarwar, Secretary PPP Okara Tehsil, Muhammad Zafar Iqbal of Kharian, Azmat Butt of Akbari Mandi Lahore, and Babu of Seetla Mandir Lahore. The government press note on the day did not mention the killing of any policemen during the attack on the police station but stated rather that

¹¹⁶¹ Ayaz Amir, 'Courage at the Barricade', *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18.

¹¹⁶² Government of Punjab Press Note, cited in *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁶³ Ayaz Amir, 'Courage at the Barricade', *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18.

¹¹⁶⁴ District Magistrate Lahore and Deputy Inspector General of Police Lahore, Press Conference, cited in *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁶⁵ Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, pp.133-34.

¹¹⁶⁶ Ayaz Amir, 'Courage at the Barricade', *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18.

'twenty-six members of law-enforcement agencies received injuries of various description...' ¹¹⁶⁷ Ayaz Amir in his article blamed Nawaz Sharif, the then-Chief Minister of Punjab and his advisors for being culpable in the killing of the protestors. ¹¹⁶⁸ And Husain Naqi, a journalist, described it as revealing the 'power and might of the rising strength of Muslim League under Nawaz Sharif'. ¹¹⁶⁹ The use of violence against the demonstrators, the large majority of whom were peaceful, validated the MRD's belief that the country was still under martial law.

Already on 13 August a major crackdown had started all over the country, including in Multan, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore in Punjab. The People's Lawyer forum took out a procession on 13 August in favour of MRD's recent agenda as well to demand the release of political prisoners that was baton charged by the police, with seventeen being taken into custody briefly. On 14 August, it was reported that magistrates of the areas were asked to be in the police station with ready-made orders of detention from three to fifteen days for the political arrestees. ¹¹⁷⁰ There were similar measures in Sindh also. BB was arrested in Karachi and sent to the Central Jail for thirty days. Later on, the government registered a case of rebellion against her; however she was released from the jail on 8 September. Two deaths occurred after street clashes in the city. ¹¹⁷¹ In Peshawar and Quetta arrests continued before and after the 14 August. Police carried out *lathi* (wooden stick) charge and tear-gassed crowds

¹¹⁶⁷ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.13.

¹¹⁶⁸ Ayaz Amir, 'Courage at the Barricade', *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.18.

¹¹⁶⁹ Husain Naqi, 'Independence Day with a difference', *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.19.

¹¹⁷⁰ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16.

¹¹⁷¹ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.22.

in Peshawar.¹¹⁷² On 29 December during the question hour in the Senate, it was stated that 37 persons were killed and 217 were injured in total during the campaign¹¹⁷³, whereas 150 political leaders and workers were detained on 14 August alone for fifteen days, according to the government functionary's press conference.¹¹⁷⁴ Thirty deaths, mainly in Karachi and rural Sindh, were recorded over a two-week period of the movement. Thirteen people were killed on 14 August alone.¹¹⁷⁵ The regime banned the public rallies, and rounded up five thousand political leaders and workers including BB,¹¹⁷⁶ as claimed the Sind PPP leaders.¹¹⁷⁷ The violence mainly initiated by the regime was contrary to Junejo's stated policy of respecting the opposition's right to protest. The regime blamed the MRD protestors for the disturbances, but this lacked credibility.

This attempted campaign of civil disobedience failed. The MRD leaders except those of PPP were reluctant to launch such a campaign at an immature stage, and there was a lack of overall coordination. The gathering of over a million to welcome Benazir had led her to have inflated hopes of such a protest, which was a miscalculation. As it was, she could not even make the most of the five deaths in the police firings of 14 August. According to US embassy sources, BB blamed Punjab for the failure of the campaign.¹¹⁷⁸ She asserted that she felt deceived by the local Punjabi leaders who kept away from the campaign. This

¹¹⁷² *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.22.

¹¹⁷³ Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, p.134.

¹¹⁷⁴ District Magistrate Lahore and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police Lahore, Joint Press Conference, cited in *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p. 13.

¹¹⁷⁵ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.6.

¹¹⁷⁶ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.1.

¹¹⁷⁷ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.22.

¹¹⁷⁸ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, pp.30,33.

was unfair, as there was strong Punjabi involvement. From Sialkot to Multan, party workers, lawyers, student bodies of MRD including Tehreek-i-Istiqlal's Sialkot President Mr. Khurshid Alam, and Mr Khudai Nur of Quetta were arrested.¹¹⁷⁹ Workers were on the streets chanting slogans against the regime. More than 500 were arrested or injured. This all reveals that BB's accusation against Punjab was wholly unjustified. Although BB publicly stated that the removal of Makhdoom Khaliq-uz-Zaman from his post was because of his failure to mobilise the people during this campaign, the American embassy reported that it was due to his public criticism of PPP's Punjab President Jahangir Badar for his failure to bring 'Punjabis' out in support of the campaign.¹¹⁸⁰ BB's ambitious plan to win over Punjab had faltered badly.¹¹⁸¹

PPP resumed public rallies in Sind and Punjab after the failure of the August civil disobedience in an attempt to restore the morale of the party's workers. However, according to the US consulate in Lahore, she attracted only relatively small crowds.¹¹⁸² A peasant rally was held at Toba Tek Singh by PPP in October 1986 that BB addressed. Due to the less mobilisation by the PPP's workers 30,000, fewer than expected came to the gathering.¹¹⁸³ Later, BB confessed that the opposition movement was unprepared for the August

¹¹⁷⁹ Viewpoint, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.15.

¹¹⁸⁰ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.30.

¹¹⁸¹ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.6.

¹¹⁸² Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.30.

¹¹⁸³ *The Struggle*, Issue no.7, Winter 1986-7, 601/R/23/19, Modern Record Center, The University of Warwick (MRC)

confrontation¹¹⁸⁴, and her political party direly needed (re)organisation to transform its popularity into a force that could remove the general.

MRD and PPP

Smaller parties in MRD complained of the highhandedness and ignoring of their opinions by PPP. TI left the coalition on the issue of the registration with the election commission as well as the *Bhuttoism* preaching by PPP. Moreover, the muted criticism by BB towards the USA made for a hostile relationship with the far-left parties of the coalition, which wanted to have a more radical approach to the political events in the country especially given the role of the USA in 'prolonging the Afghan war and endangering Pakistan's security'.¹¹⁸⁵ PPP condemned the resolution proposed by the six leftist parties in MRD's meeting in June against the US's policy towards the war.¹¹⁸⁶ Likewise, PPP had strained relations with the ANP on the issue of provincial autonomy.

In mid-August 1987, MRD held the conference of opposition parties including those outside of the MRD, but PPP walked out over the issue of the signing the declaration of the conference at the end, leaving the meeting in disarray. MRD was inactive over the next few months, holding only insignificant meetings. A *Viewpoint* editorial of January 1988 stated of the MRD that 'the setback has not resulted from their inability to achieve the results promised but more from their

¹¹⁸⁴ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, 'Evolving Party Politics in Pakistan', *Directorate of Intelligence*, October 1987, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP88T000700920001-4, p.7.

¹¹⁸⁵ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.29.

¹¹⁸⁶ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.29.

failure to make earnest efforts to do so.¹¹⁸⁷ In February 1988, for the first time in the history of the struggle, the families – sisters, wives, mothers, brothers, and friends – of the political workers of PPP and NPP demonstrated in front of residence of Sheikh Rafiq Ahmad where the meeting of Central Committee of MRD was going on, to push the alliance to agitate more strongly for the release of their loved ones.¹¹⁸⁸ There was a strong feeling that the party leaders were not doing enough for the workers who had suffered much for their party work over the past decade.

Nevertheless, it did keep pressurising the government. Realising the diminishing participation from the common persons, the Central Executive Committee announced the launch of a ‘public contact campaign’ in the meeting in Rawalpindi, and set 12 February 1988 as the date to initiate a struggle for ‘People’s Sovereignty’, starting in Lahore. The objective was to pressurise the government to hold an election under the 1973 Constitution. The meeting, however, did not come up with any timeframe to the government for holding the election. That was the results of the failure of earlier campaigns and thus a face-saving device for the alliance. Nawabzada Nasruallah Khan, head of PDP, was also furious at the ‘state of dormancy’ of the alliance; he rather stated it should be disbanded, if it could not lead the masses against the Zia’s puppet government.¹¹⁸⁹ For political analysts, the alliance looked as if it was ‘waiting for Godot’ instead.¹¹⁹⁰

¹¹⁸⁷ *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.6.

¹¹⁸⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (31), 10 March 1988, pp.12, 34.

¹¹⁸⁹ Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, interview to Ashraf Mumtaz, *Viewpoint*, XIII (37), 21 April 1988, p.10.

¹¹⁹⁰ *Viewpoint*, XIII (41), 19 May 1988, p.7.

A resolution of the Afghan issue had also become a matter of urgency, and the MRD considered how this could be brought about in a way that brought peace and benefited Pakistan. Junejo's invitation to MRD for an all-political party's roundtable discussion on solving this problem focussed their minds in this respect.

Besides these internal divides, MRD was faced with a continuing onslaught from Zia. This took several forms.¹¹⁹¹ One was an ongoing campaign of propaganda against the alliance. It was alleged that MRD was in alliance with the Soviet bloc and that if it gained power it would damage the interests of Western powers. The agitation in Sindh was said to be steered by India.¹¹⁹² The opponents of PPP also spread rumours that a victory for the party would lead to martial law. It was also alleged against the alliance that party-based elections would create political anarchy and a return to power of criminals.¹¹⁹³ PPP was said to be financed by some foreign hand such India, Iran, Libya or the Soviet Union. General Zia publicly insinuated that India backed the movement financially. However, he could not produce any proof of it. A close friend of Zia told US officials that Iran supported Nusrat Bhutto due to her being Shia.¹¹⁹⁴ The US embassy reports, however, could not find any evidence supporting this; rather, they found that funding was coming from Pakistanis sympathetic to the

¹¹⁹¹ Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.276.

¹¹⁹² Rehman, *Pakistan under Siege*, p.280.

¹¹⁹³ Abbas Kazim, *Benazir Bhutto Beti*, p.33.

¹¹⁹⁴ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.30.

movement at home and abroad as well as the Bhutto family assets.¹¹⁹⁵ Khwaja Alqama, son of the Khwaja Khairuddin (founding General Secretary of MRD) revealed to the researcher that PPP asked the Ahmadis – a sect which was declared to be non-Muslim by ZAB – for funding.¹¹⁹⁶ Such rumours were spread tactically to discredit the PPP and MRD in the eyes of the public.

The government also threatened the large landowners and businessmen who funded the campaigns of PPP.¹¹⁹⁷ The Junejo government announced a \$120 million National Employment Fund for unemployed youth and they raised the lowest wages in an attempt to counter the BB's popular slogan of *Roti, Kapra aur Makan* (food, clothes and housing).

Besides this, the martial law courts continued punishing the political workers on the basis of their ideology. The Peshawar Special military court sentenced ninety-eight workers including Murtaza Bhutto to long terms of imprisonment and fines for anti-state activity.¹¹⁹⁸ Karachi Prisoners Aid Committee expressed misgivings about the government's declared intent to release detained political prisoners.¹¹⁹⁹ The Political Prisoners' Release Committee, comprised of talented lawyers, had been working to lessen the miseries of the political prisoners. For example, in the Libya Case, in which five persons were awarded life imprisonment, and two fourteen years, the committee's lawyers managed to get the terms reduced to a maximum of seven

¹¹⁹⁵ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, p.30.

¹¹⁹⁶ Dr. Syed Khwaja Alqama, Vice Chancellor Bahauddin Zakarya University Multan, September 2014, Multan.

¹¹⁹⁷ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, Directorate of Intelligence, "Pakistan: Prospects for the Junejo Government", November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000380002-4, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD. p.9.

¹¹⁹⁸ *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.22.

¹¹⁹⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1986, p.22.

years as per the law.¹²⁰⁰ Its secretary general Mr Liaqat Warraich released a list of seventy-seven persons in Punjab¹²⁰¹, forty-five in KPK¹²⁰², and 143 in Sindh and Baluchistan¹²⁰³ who were still in jail after the declaration of the government that it had released all the prisoners in 1986, whereas the World Movement for the Restoration of Human Rights reported 1,112 political prisoners in Pakistan by January 1988.¹²⁰⁴ Amnesty International also urged the government to release 150 political prisoners who were convicted after unfair trials under martial law, and asked it to respect the assurances given to the European Parliament that 'all political prisoners convicted by military tribunal would either be released or have their judgements referred to civilian courts'.¹²⁰⁵ However, the government categorically rejected the former claim, and stated that military courts had convicted those claimed as political prisoners for crimes other than political.¹²⁰⁶ Negating their own statement, the Punjab Home Department allowed a team of nine advocates to interview twenty-four political prisoners in the following weeks.¹²⁰⁷ Moreover, the national government also disclosed that it was keeping seventy political persons on exit-control-list.¹²⁰⁸ In February 1988 the government offered a conditional amnesty to political prisoners who could be considered 'hardship cases', which included those tried in absentia and those persons aged under eighteen or over sixty-five who were

¹²⁰⁰ *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.4.

¹²⁰¹ *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.12.

¹²⁰² *Viewpoint*, XI (23), 16 January 1986, p.17.

¹²⁰³ *Viewpoint*, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.7.

¹²⁰⁴ South Africa topped the list with 24,338 political prisoners in its jails. Bangladesh with 19,324 and Israel with 15,292 fell into second and third places respectively. *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.31.

¹²⁰⁵ *Amnesty International*, 'Pakistan: Special Military Courts, Unfair Trials and the Death Penalty', MSS 292D/954.5/4, MRC, p.5.

¹²⁰⁶ *Viewpoint*, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.7.

¹²⁰⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (27), 13 February 1986, p.16.

¹²⁰⁸ *Viewpoint*, XI (27), 13 February 1986, p.22.

sentenced to death who should never been awarded capital punishment in the first place, or those who could prove themselves as the sole bread-winner of their family.¹²⁰⁹ There was however a difficult procedure required to be classed as a 'hardship case'. The prisoners had to submit their application within two months of the declaration of the amnesty after collecting all the relevant documents. 300 applications were submitted by March 1988, mostly by the families of the prisoners.¹²¹⁰

Speeches against the regime were prohibited and thirty PPP workers were registered in a Police Case under the charge of making objectionable speeches (MPO-16 and Section 188 of the Cr.PC).¹²¹¹ Likewise, Pakpattan Police, one of the districts of Punjab, arrested political workers of ANP, PPP, PNP, and several others under section 144 on the charges of speaking against the police atrocities in the city.¹²¹² BB was attacked at night at the house of a PPP leader whom she was staying with in Lahore by Major (rtd) Abdul Qayyum who said that he was looking for BB with a weapon. He was caught red-handed, but the police later declared that he was mentally ill.¹²¹³

At this time, the Punjab government carried out public hangings of five persons.¹²¹⁴ Civil society organisations such as the Movement for Service of Humanity protested against this inhumane act. Prime Minister Muhammad

¹²⁰⁹ Linesman, 'between the lines', *Viewpoint*, XIII (31), 10 March 1988, p.7.

¹²¹⁰ *Viewpoint*, XIII (35), 14 April 1988, p.14.

¹²¹¹ *Viewpoint*, XI (28), 20 February 1986, p.15.

¹²¹² *Viewpoint*, XIII (41), 19 May 1988, p.16.

¹²¹³ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, pp.14,19.

¹²¹⁴ The five persons were Lalu (Sahiwal), Dost Muhammad (Mianwali), Muhammad Amin (Multan), Muhammad Din, Mohammad Ahmad Ilyas.

Khan Junejo nonetheless came forward to support the Punjab government's action.¹²¹⁵

The Role of Civil Society in the Resistance:

Civil society groups also agitated against the regime during the period of the Junejo government. Despite the removal of martial law, student unions were still banned – as they had been since 1983. There were protests about this in Lahore and other towns in Punjab.¹²¹⁶ The Pakistan Democratic Students Federation (Lahore Branch) held its annual convention on 29 March 1986 to demand the release of the student leaders, the end of the ban on student unions, and the end to violence at the educational institutions.¹²¹⁷ The student body disclosed in 1988 that 61 students were killed, and 587 were injured during the past four years in student-police encounters on various universities campuses of the country.¹²¹⁸

Progressive writers came together to organise a four-day conference for the establishment of freedom, peace, justice and humanism in the country. Along with their other demands, the writers asked the government to release political prisoners and repeal the Press and Publication Ordinance and restore freedom of speech. The declaration of the conference also rejected the Presidential Referendum 1984, the General Election 1985, and demanded fresh polls under the 1973 constitution.¹²¹⁹ Two poetry books on the resistance against the regime and the deaths of ZAB and Murtaza Bhutto – *Khushboo ki Shahdat*, and

¹²¹⁵ *Viewpoint*, XIII (29), 25 February 1988, p.13,15.

¹²¹⁶ *Viewpoint*, XI (27), 13 February 1986, p.22.

¹²¹⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, pp.15-16.

¹²¹⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (29), 25 February 1988, p.12.

¹²¹⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (31), 13 March 1986, p.11.

Jue-i-Khoon – were published in August 1986. The Chair of the launching ceremony Ms. Alys Faiz commented that these publications ‘give new hope and courage to the people.’¹²²⁰ The banning of books continued during this period as well. The Punjab Government banned books such as *Haq ki Talash* (In search of Truth) by a Shia scholar, the pamphlet *Shia Mazhab ki Kahani Shia kutub ki zuban* (The Story of Shia Religion through the Sources of Shia’s books) and the Netherlands-based magazine ‘*The Struggle*’ amongst others.¹²²¹

Civil Society groups, including poets, jurists, intellectuals, opinion makers, leaders and women activists, raised their voice for the release of political prisoners, and the rescinding of military court sentences on political workers. They also demanded a declaration of a general amnesty to those who opted to go into exile due to the regime’s atrocities on them. Mrs. Tehmina Khar, the wife of Ghulam Mustafa Khar, organised a seminar on the issue in February 1988.¹²²² After two years of consistent struggle, the government gave some niggardly relief to certain political prisoners.

The establishment of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan as an institution was another hallmark of the civil society campaign against the injustice prevailing in the country. The declaration of the commission stated its aim to be the repeal or amendment of unjust and discriminatory laws based on gender, religion, and sect. Moreover, it also demanded the repeal of the Political Parties Act, and the Press and Publications Ordinance.¹²²³ After the Ojhri camp disaster, more than 500 lawyers of Lahore under the ‘Zia-ul-Haq resign

¹²²⁰ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.16.

¹²²¹ *Viewpoint*, XIII (25), 28 January 1988, p.16.

¹²²² *Viewpoint*, XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.14.

¹²²³ *Viewpoint*, XIII (35), 7 April 1988, p.5.

Committee', which was led by the PPP activist Mansoor Ahmed Malik, signed a document urging Zia to quit.¹²²⁴

The Pakistan Socialist Party held its workers conference on 28 March 1986, attended by 600 delegates. It had an anti-feudalism and anti-imperialism agenda. Goodwill messages were received from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian Communist Party, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and read out.¹²²⁵ However, it faced the same fate as the other political parties by having rifts and groupings in its two years of existence. A divide opened up between the party chief C.R Aslam and the Secretary General Abid Hasan Manto, with the latter ending up organising separate meetings of the party.¹²²⁶

Political analysts such as Babar Ali and Hasan Askari have claimed that there was greater freedom for the press after the 1985 election. The International Press Institute (IPI) expressed satisfaction 'with the quantum of Press freedom' in Pakistan, though this was a view from far away.¹²²⁷ A few minor steps were indeed taken in lieu of the annulment of martial law. The Sindh Governor allowed the revival of the Urdu daily *Amn* and weekly *Meyaar* which had been banned since 1983. However, the Press and Publication Ordinance was still in existence. CPNE (Council of Pakistan Newspapers' Editors) and PFUJ voiced their grievances in their meeting in January 1986 against the ordinance and demanded its repeal.¹²²⁸ The abolition of the National Press Trust was among the demands of the Action Committee of the

¹²²⁴ *Viewpoint*, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.15.

¹²²⁵ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.16.

¹²²⁶ *Viewpoint*, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.14.

¹²²⁷ *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 7 January 1988, p.8.

¹²²⁸ *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.6.

MRD.¹²²⁹ Newspapers and magazines – *Time* (USA), *Lahore* (Lahore) – were still proscribed on a charge of publishing objectionable material.¹²³⁰ The Punjab police arrested four ANP workers on the charge of distributing anti-Zia pamphlets.¹²³¹ The press thus continued to be subservient to the administration in all important respects.

Cultivating International Support:

Although US President Reagan welcomed the change in Pakistan, congratulating Prime Minister Junejo, and President Zia-ul-Haq,¹²³² for the first time ever during Zia's rule the international community broke its long-term silence over the regime's inhumane reaction to the peaceful demonstrations for democracy. The US State Department Spokesman 'regretted' the arrest of political leaders in Pakistan on 14 August 1986, and stated that it was 'unfortunate' given the moves towards democracy: 'the recent arrests negated the principles expounded by the Pakistan Government'.¹²³³ Moreover, the protest of Libyan President Col. Moammer Qaddafi, and West German Foreign Minister's appeal against the arrest of BB showed that BB's hard work in cultivating foreign support for her struggle was paying off.¹²³⁴ That was the biggest achievement of her period in exile.

Furthermore, for the first time ever in the Pakistan-USA relationship, the Left circles in the USA requested the release of Jam Saqi from his long imprisonment. Eugene Newport, the Mayor of Berkeley and globally known for

¹²²⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.13.

¹²³⁰ *Viewpoint*, XI (35), 10 April 1986, p.19.

¹²³¹ *Viewpoint*, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.34.

¹²³² *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.22.

¹²³³ US State Department Spokesman, cited in *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p. 14.

¹²³⁴ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p.22.

being a strong critic of the Reagan Administration on its support to dictators all over the world, sent a telegram to Prime Minister Junejo 'requesting him to release Jam Saqi from imprisonment and any further torture immediately'.¹²³⁵ Others who demanded his release were Pedro Noguera, the then-President of Berkeley's Student Union, a Professor of Economics and Computer Sciences of Berkeley University, Line of March – a pro-labour organisation, East Day Women for Peace, the youngest, Iranian People's Fedaian North California, and Council of Muslim Association. Line of March was particularly vigorous in this campaign for his release, publishing a report on the 'plight of Jam Saqi' in their fortnightly newspaper '*Frontline*'.¹²³⁶

Various international pressure groups made their voices heard as well. Cambridge University Amnesty International Group campaigned against the continuation of imprisonment of political prisoners after the end of martial law.¹²³⁷ The Organisation of Progressive Pakistanis (OPP) in Berlin (West) condemned the Zia's regime for its oppressive policies and undemocratic actions and expressed its solidarity with the Pakistan working class.¹²³⁸ The Federation of German Trade Union (DGB), along with the OPP, distributed pamphlets about the labour unions' struggle in Pakistan at the May Day celebration in 1988.

Although BB's trip to Washington DC before returning to Pakistan in 1986 was seen as a betrayal by those in Pakistan who were committed to an

¹²³⁵ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, p. 24.

¹²³⁶ *Viewpoint*, XII (2), 21 August 1986, pp.24-25.

¹²³⁷ Steven Russell, Sean Carroll, Rachel Bavidge, Emma Krasinska (President of Cambridge University Amnesty International) were leading persons behind the campaign. Cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (31), 10 March 1988, pp.3-4.

¹²³⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (43), 2 June 1988, p.26.

anti-imperialist revolution, she succeeded in gaining Reagan's support for her democratic struggle. He declared that 'he would now support popular leaders in the Third World rather than corrupt dictators.'¹²³⁹ It was a big shift from his previous policy towards countries like Pakistan, which had until then remained unfavourable to BB and PPP in their opposition to Zia. Despite welcoming the 1985 elections, the US government recognised that BB enjoyed widespread support in Pakistan. Non-alignment and bilateral relationship would be the goal in the foreign policy for BB.¹²⁴⁰ Before returning to Pakistan, BB visited two other centres of power that were critical for Pakistan at that time. After the USA, she visited Saudi Arabia and briefly Moscow, from 30-31 March, where it was reported that she met with the representatives of Soviet Women's Committee, the Peace Committee and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

Once the Geneva Accord on Afghanistan was about to be signed, BB reiterated her appeal to USA to support the restoration of democracy in Pakistan.¹²⁴¹ She feared that the USA might ignore this issue once The Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan.¹²⁴² After the dissolution of Junejo's government, Charles Wilson, an American Democrat, stated in response to Zia's promise to hold the election in 90 days, 'I am a very good friend of the President's and when he says we will hold elections I believe him...There is no question that it will be devastating as far as close Pakistan-US relations such as military programmes, etc. are concerned if the elections are stretched out.'¹²⁴³ Likewise, the US Secretary of State reminded him of the friendship between two

¹²³⁹ *Viewpoint*, XI (34), 3 April 1986, p.14.

¹²⁴⁰ *Viewpoint*, XI (36), 17 April 1986, p.13.

¹²⁴¹ Benazir Bhutto, London 18 April 1988, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (37), 21 April 1988, p.34.

¹²⁴² Benazir Bhutto, 30 April 1988, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (39), 5 May 1988, p.34.

¹²⁴³ Cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.14.

countries while hoping not to thwart the political process in the country.¹²⁴⁴ Clearly, the US government was putting firm pressure on Zia to hold the election.¹²⁴⁵ Moreover, the approval of Stephen Solarz's resolution 'to hold "free and fair party-based elections not later than November 16"'¹²⁴⁶ that was voted for in the House of Representatives added to this pressure on Zia from the USA. This was all in no small part due to BB's constant pursuit of the USA to ensure that the election was held.¹²⁴⁷

The Final Days of General Zia-ul-Haq:

Following the dissolution of the Junejo government, BB set up an eight-member committee consisting of two members from each province to liaise with the MRD and the other political parties and referred to the PNA-PPP agreement of 1977 for the guidelines for holding a free and fair election. At this juncture, Zia lost a strong pillar of support when the Jama't-i-Islami for the first time joined hands with the MRD in protest at the imprisonment of its political workers.¹²⁴⁸ The JI *Naib Amir* (vice-Chairman) Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed categorically supported the demand to hold a free and fair election under an autonomous Election Commission within 90 days.¹²⁴⁹ JI-PPP's agreement meant that support for Zia was limited to the Pir of Pagara's faction of Muslim League, whom the General took into the caretaker cabinet to run the government.¹²⁵⁰

¹²⁴⁴ George P. Shultz, US Secretary of State, *Daily Dawn* (Islamabad), 17 June 1988.

¹²⁴⁵ Michael Armacost, US Under Secretary of State, *Daily Dawn* (Islamabad), 25 June 1988.

¹²⁴⁶ *Economic and Political Weekly*, 'Pakistan After Zia', 27 August 1988, p.1771. [http://0-www.epw.in.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/system/files/pdf/1988_23/35/pakistan_after_zia.pdf] 28 December 2014

¹²⁴⁷ Benazir Bhutto, 21 June 1988, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (47), 30 June 1988, p.34.

¹²⁴⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (32), 24 March 1988, pp.21-22.

¹²⁴⁹ Prof. Ghafoor Ahmed, *Zia Ke Akhri Dus saal*,

¹²⁵⁰ Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', *Asian Survey*, 29(2), A Survey of Asia 1988: Partt-II (February, 1988), p.201.

MRD convener Mairaj Muhammad Khan called a meeting to evaluate the current situation. MRD was the only alliance which had a national image and had all mainstream regional parties as its members. On 6 June, all the party leaders except Wali Khan, who was abroad, met together for three days after a long time to work out a strategy. The biggest challenge was to replace the alliance with an electoral alliance for the upcoming election. MRD decided to take part in the election called by Zia and issued twenty demands, such as holding the election under the 1973 constitution within 90 days, and according to the 1973 rules without registration conditions, and under the supervision of a supervisory council with half of its members nominated by the government and half by the joint political parties.¹²⁵¹ Despite agreeing on the post-election scenario and the required political steps,¹²⁵² MRD could not manage to form a united electoral alliance, but 'decided to contest election almost jointly.'¹²⁵³ PPP, however, declared its support for the MRD's leaders in the coming election by not fielding its candidates against them. Except PPP, JUI, and ANP, the rest of the political parties established electoral alliances¹²⁵⁴ mainly against PPP.¹²⁵⁵ The reason was said by Wali Khan to be that PPP was assured of landslide victory in three provinces — Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan. However, many of the political leaders such as Wali Khan, Abid Hassan Minto, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh

¹²⁵¹ *Viewpoint*, XIII (44), 9 June 1988, p.34.

¹²⁵² *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.12.

¹²⁵³ *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.12.

¹²⁵⁴ Islami Jamhuri Ittehad(IJI) comprised of nine parties: Pakistan Muslim League, National People's Party, Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (Darkhwasti Group), Jamiat-i-Mashaikh, Jamiat-i-Ahle Hadith, Independent Political Group headed by Fakhr Imam (ex-Speaker), Nizam-i-Mustafa Group, and Hizb-i-Jihad. The second alliance called Pakistan People's Alliance was Tehreek-i-Istaqlal, Jamiat-Ulema Pakistan, Muslim League (Junejo). The Junejo at the eleventh hour moved to IJI, though.

¹²⁵⁵ Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', *Asian Survey*, 29(2), A Survey of Asia 1988: Part-II (February, 1988), p.202.

Bizenjo, and Asghar Khan were sceptical about Zia's promise to hold elections in 90 days.¹²⁵⁶

BB seemed quite optimistic for the election, but raised questions on the selection of the caretaker government, which showed 'old wine with the new tag'.¹²⁵⁷ However the rest of the political leadership was still bleak about the prospect of holding the election on time. MRD convener Mairaj Muhammad Khan feared that there would be a 'presidential form of the government in the country' after seeing the names in the caretaker government.¹²⁵⁸ Despite holding the commitment to the election as per the 18th Amendment of the Constitution, the steps taken by General Zia after the dissolution suggested that it would be held only on certain conditions. These included continuing to promulgate Islamic principles such as Sharia law and Islamic economics. M.B. Naqvi, a political analyst, commented that this emphasis on Islam 'on the one hand undercuts democracy and on the other, perpetuates the military's untrammelled and unaccountable power.'¹²⁵⁹ Also, to adhere to the principle of 'Accountability First, and Election Later', the regime issued a list of one hundred forty MNAs of the defunct parliament whose sources of income were to be checked due to allegations against them of corruption.¹²⁶⁰

Zia's track record gives little confidence that he really intended to hold the election on time. Despite the promise to take off his uniform after the abrogation of martial law, Zia had continued to wear it. Political analysts such as Babar Ali and R.B. Raees suspected if the general could not control the

¹²⁵⁶ *Viewpoint*, XIII (44), 9 June 1988, pp.12-13.

¹²⁵⁷ Benazir Bhutto, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.15.

¹²⁵⁸ Mairaj Muhammad Khan, cited in *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.15.

¹²⁵⁹ M.B.Naqvi, 'After President's new Initiative', *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), p.9.

¹²⁶⁰ *Viewpoint*, XIII (45), 16 June 1988, p.22.

supposedly malleable Prime Minister Junejo how could he accept BB or Wali Khan or Rasul Bakhsh Palijo as his Prime Minister after holding a 'free and fair election'?¹²⁶¹ The prospect for a free and fair election seemed bleak.

As it was, before his promise was put to the test, Zia died in a mysterious air-crash on 17 August 1988. Along with him several high-profile officials of Pakistan and US were also killed, including the US Ambassador Arnold L. Raphel, Brigadier General Herbert Wassom, the head of the military assistance advisory group at the US embassy, and Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of Pakistan General Akhter Abdur Rehman. The daily newspaper *Dawn* suggested that the death of General Zia-ul-Haq was 'an "honourable" exit from the political scene of Pakistan.'¹²⁶² The US and Pakistani agencies both declared after a joint investigation that a mechanical fault was the reason for the accident.

Many refused to accept this, with conspiracy theorists pointing accusing fingers at Mossad, KGB, KHAD, RAW and, in particular, the Pakistan armed forces. US confidential reports indicate that there had been dissatisfaction with Zia in army circles for many years.¹²⁶³ Observing the unsuccessful attempt of MRD during 1981-84 to remove the general, the CIA report concluded 'if Zia is ousted, this will most likely be done by the army high command.'¹²⁶⁴ Reports until 1984 forecasted the bloodless ousting of the general by 'the army high

¹²⁶¹ Babar Ali, 'Dim Prospects of "Fair and Free" Election', *Economic and Political Weekly*, 23 (31), 30 July 1988, pp.1571-72. And, Rasool Bakhsh Raees, 'Pakistan 1988: Command to Conciliation Politics', *Asian Survey*, 29(2), A Survey of Asia 1988: Partt-II (February, 1988), pp.200-01.

¹²⁶² *Dawn*, Daily (Islamabad), 18 August 1988.

¹²⁶³ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: Elections at Last', *Near East and South Asia Review*, 15 February 1985, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301330001-6.

¹²⁶⁴ Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), 'Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change', *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3.

command plus most or all of the seven army corps commanders',¹²⁶⁵ and intelligence analysts in South Asia had started to think of the implications if General Zia was to be assassinated in/during 1985. The low turnout in the referendum and the defeat of key players of Zia's cabinet in the following election indicated to other soldiers the unpopularity of the general. A report had spoken of how the unhappy military was ready to remove the general if 'Zia's Constitution' was unable to mute the political unrest, and if a foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan was not pursued according to the Army's wishes.¹²⁶⁶ The signing of the Geneva Accord, and the setting up the judicial inquiry to the Ojhri Camp disaster were both decisions converse to 'the wishes of the Army'. The removal of Junejo's government augmented the political instability in Pakistan. Mian Tufail Muhammad of JI had just before Zia's death tried to provoke the subordinate generals, General K.M. Arif, and General Rahimuddin, into taking control of the country.¹²⁶⁷ Although no proof has ever been produced of an army conspiracy behind the air crash, it was observed that as soon as he heard of the disaster, the then-vice-Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg flew immediately back to Rawalpindi rather than visiting the site of the crash, even though he was only a few miles from it at the time. This was seen as a suspicious move. Despite all this, the army did not seize power. It would easy to have been used the air crash as a reason to declare martial law

¹²⁶⁵ Robert M. Gates (Deputy Director for Intelligence), 'Pakistan: Scenario for Dramatic Political Change', *Directorate of Intelligence*, 7 March 1984, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP89B00423R000100030045-3.

¹²⁶⁶ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, 'Pakistan: Prospects for the New Political System', *Directorate of Intelligence*, September 1985, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP86T00587R000300380002-4, p.9.

¹²⁶⁷ Mian Tufail Muhammad, Addressing a rally at Liaquat Bagh on 21 March 1986. Cited in *Viewpoint*, XI(33), 3 April 1986, p.14.

once more. There was strong pressure on the Pakistan Army from the democratic forces such as MRD and the other power brokers within and outside of the country to hold the election as Zia had scheduled it.¹²⁶⁸ Bowing to this pressure, the generals allowed the elections to go ahead on 16 November 1988, and for democracy to be fully restored in Pakistan.

Conclusion:

A US report of late 1986 summarised the performance of BB and the PPP after BB's return to Pakistan in April of that year. It stated that she received a tumultuous welcome in Punjab and that she reestablished the PPP as the primary and largest political party in the country.¹²⁶⁹ The turn-out demonstrated that the party still held on to its vote bank in urban and rural areas of the province. Nonetheless, she managed very quickly to fall out with the MRD, and the failure of the PPP's civil disobedience movement in August 1986 and the accompanying violence revealed serious weaknesses. The PPP organisation in Punjab was seen to lack the capacity to sustain a confrontation in the streets. Despite having a strong student wing – the People's Student Federation – the party failed to mobilise the students to any extent. By allying with the left wing of her party, BB abandoned the middle ground in Pakistani politics and frightened off the urban middle class in Punjab and Karachi. The parties in the alliance other than PPP softly protested at various times against her attitude, but by trying to go it alone, she isolated herself from the wider

¹²⁶⁸ The meeting in GHQ at 1830 on 17 August – attended by three forces chiefs, Joint chief of Staff Committee and Chairman Senate – decided to hold the election. Azhar Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal* (Lahore, year is missing), p. 12.

¹²⁶⁹ Near Eastern and South Asia Office, "Pakistan People's Party: Pretenders to the Throne", *Directorate of Intelligence*, 21 November 1986, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP05S02029R000300850001-0, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD, pp.35-36.

alliance. Failure had however brought her back to it. BB also failed to keep in check the dissident groups in her party, and the replacement of leaders of her father's generation brought serious divides. The emergence of the National People's Party of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi in Sindh, and the rift with Ghulam Mustafa Khar in Punjab, were symptomatic of this.

Indeed, MRD in general and PPP in particular let down the people who had suffered for their ongoing support of the opposition. These were the rank-and-file activists who had mobilised votes in elections, and who had put themselves on the line in the struggle against a ruthless dictator. It was they who kept alive the memory of ZAB and revered BB as his rightful heir, with their slogans of '*Zinda hi Bhutto Zinda*' (Bhutto is still alive), '*tum Kinte Bhutto maroge?, hur ghar se Bhutto nikle ga*' (How many Bhuttos will you kill? Bhutto would come out from every house of the country). They were badly served by the fractious leadership and damaging divides. In all this, Zia was able to hold onto power until his sudden death.

Dissertation Conclusion

Pakistan is regarded widely today as a country in continuing turmoil, in which multiple centres of political and armed power compete with each other, using violence as much as due democratic processes to settle their differences. It has an unenviable reputation for being a dangerous place to be, especially for foreigners. This impression is reflected in one American commentary:

It has become a violent state, with attacks on its core institutions, notably the police, the army, and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, and assassinations of Benazir Bhutto, its most important politician; Salmaan Taseer, a serving governor; and Shahbaz Bhatti, the only Christian minister in the Cabinet. Moreover, Pakistan has the dubious distinction of being the most unsafe country in the world for journalists and diplomats.¹²⁷⁰

U.S. President Barack Obama has argued that Pakistan's border region is "the most dangerous place in the world" for the United States. The head of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, noted that "it is the headquarters of the al Qa'ida senior leadership," which is planning attacks in the West.¹²⁷¹

It is common to trace this state of affairs back to developments during the time of General Zia-ul-Haq's rule. This is the period in which Islamic extremism¹²⁷², sectarianism¹²⁷³, ethnic violence¹²⁷⁴, and the problems

¹²⁷⁰ Stephen P. Cohen and Others, *The Idea of Pakistan*, p.xi.

¹²⁷¹ Cited in, Seth G. Jones, and C. Christine Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), p. xi.

¹²⁷² See, for details, Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan*; Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan 1947-2007*, pp.263-308; Viewpoint Special Edition, 'The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009', *Middle East Institute* (Washington DC) www.mei.edu; Marc Gaborieau, 'Islam and Politics', in Christophe Jaffrelot (ed.), *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*, pp.237-252; Peter Bergen with Katherine Tiedmann (ed.), *Talibanistan: Negotiating The Borders between Terror, Politics, and Religion*; C. Christine Fair, Keith Crane, Christopher S. Chivvis, et al, *Pakistan: Can the*

associated with hosting Afghan refugees¹²⁷⁵ came to the fore, and a culture of violence was fostered and non-state actors gained huge power. Ian Talbot has argued that the lack of investment in human capital, coupled with underemployment during a time of a “youth bulge” all helped stoke religious and ethnic extremism in the country during this era and subsequently.¹²⁷⁶

In this conclusion we shall start by examining the impact of the military rule of Zia, then go on to look at the reasons for his longevity in power, and then the struggle for democracy in Pakistan.

The Impact of Zia’s Military Regime

When seizing power, the Pakistan military has claimed to be the saviour of the people from the venality of elected party politicians and the attacks of external enemies. Every imposition of martial law in Pakistan has been declared valid under the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ or the Roman doctrine ‘Salus populi suprema est lex’. However, as Justice Aftab Farrukh remarked during the hearing of a murder case this principle should be invoked only to frame but not to break the law.¹²⁷⁷ As it is, the army has saved neither the people nor territory of Pakistan. The loss of East Pakistan, the failure to repatriate the prisoners of war, and the continuous casualties since 1980s due to sectarian and extremist culture are

United States Secure an Insecure State?; Maleeha Lodhi, *Pakistan Beyond the ‘Crisis State’*; Roedad Khan, *Pakistan*, p.82.

¹²⁷³ See, for details, Murphy, *The Making of Terrorism in Pakistan*. Belokrenitsky, and Moskalenko, *A Political History of Pakistan 1947-2007*. Ishtiaq Ahmed, ‘Reclaiming Pakistan’s Pacifist Religious Creed’, in Viewpoint Special Edition, ‘The Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009’. Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*. Shabbir Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*, Senator Pervez Rasheed, ‘Jirga’, *Geo TV Network*, 16 November 2013. Accessed on 16 November 2013.

¹²⁷⁴ Talbot, *Pakistan*. Ibne Adil, *General Zia k dus saal*

¹²⁷⁵ Arif, *Working with Zia*.

¹²⁷⁶ Talbot, *Pakistan*, p.117.

¹²⁷⁷ Justice Aftab Farrukh, Lahore High Court. *Viewpoint*, V (17), 2 December 1979, p.12.

proof of that. Military rule has if anything brought greater insecurity within Pakistan by its fostering of militant extremist movements that have been designed as a counter to political opposition, such as the militant Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) that was backed by Zia in Sindh after 1983.¹²⁷⁸ Unlike Argentina, where the Supreme Court sentenced two generals to life imprisonment on 10 December 1985 on the charges of illegal arrest, and torture to death of thousands of Argentinians, Pakistan has still failed to effectively punish those who have imposed martial law and similarly persecuted, imprisoned, tortured and even killed its opponents. Khwaja Asif, who became Minister for Defence in 2013, whilst speaking in the National Assembly has asked for a thorough inquiry on the Pakistan Army and its legacy since 1947.¹²⁷⁹ This has yet to take place.

Although, martial law was imposed supposedly to make politicians accountable for their corruption, the military itself was corrupt. For example, the Zia regime took out eight-nine corruption cases against politicians while at the same time illegally distributing seventy-six plots of land in Islamabad to cronies of the regime.¹²⁸⁰ The Punjab Assembly was later informed that 450,000 acres of land were allotted to military officers between 1977 and 1988 for supposed services to the country. While the penetration of the military into the economy of the country had been started during the Ayub era, it was consolidated during Zia's period. In a book, Ayesha Siddiqi has set out

¹²⁷⁸ Mirza Aslam Beg, Interview, *Daily Times* (Islamabad), 5 September 2009.

¹²⁷⁹ Khwaja Asif, 14 November 2014. <http://www.zemtv.com/2014/11/14/khawaja-asif-barking-on-pakistan-army-old-video-real-face-of-khawaja-asif/> (14 November 2014).

¹²⁸⁰ Ashraf Sharif, *Aao Pakistan ku Lootain Siasatdano, Bureaucrats and Military Generals ka Munshoor* (Lahore: Dar-ul-Ilm Publications, 2000), pp.49-51.

thoroughly the facts and figures of businesses controlled by members of the military, a situation she calls '*Milbus*'.¹²⁸¹ The Army Welfare Trust – established originally in 1971 with a value of Rs.700,000 (US\$ 12,000) – became the wealthiest amongst the army's business ventures – being worth Rs.17.45 billion (US\$ 30,086 million) by 2001. The trust has penetrated all three major sectors of the economy with 31 projects in agriculture, manufacturing and the service sector.¹²⁸² Mazhar Aziz has argued rightly that the intervention of military into politics was never really aimed at improving governance but 'for the preservation of institutional control.'¹²⁸³ This has all been supported by the external world, particularly the USA. There are many both in Pakistan and abroad who have a vested interest in the maintenance of the economic power of the Pakistan military.

Even civilian rulers, once they have regained power, have hardly dared attack the military as an institution, and instead focus on the misdeeds of individual generals, who they blame for the imposition of martial law. Both BB and Nawaz Sharif individualised such cases, while rewarding other generals. The ISI carries on a continuing public relations exercise designed to boost the popularity of the army by highlighting its achievements. It publicises the hard life of soldiers who secure the borders in miserable conditions such as at Siachen. When 24 Army personnel were killed by NATO helicopters at the *Salala* Check Post in November 2011 strong action was taken against NATO; however the continuing civilian casualties in such attacks goes largely unregistered.

¹²⁸¹ See, for details, Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*.

¹²⁸² Siddiqa, *Military Incorporations*, p.220.

¹²⁸³ Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: A Parallel State*, p.66.

Besides the ongoing repression of all opposition – which has been examined in detail in this thesis – the period of Zia’s rule is also considered a ‘dark age’ for Pakistan as this was a period during which a new culture of violence, drug addiction and political venality came to the fore.

There was for example the growth of the so-called ‘Kalashnikov culture’. The tribal peoples of northwest and western Pakistan already had a strong gun culture, but this became much worse at this time. This was brought about almost entirely through the impact of the war in Afghanistan that began with the Soviet invasion of late 1979 and the counter-promotion of an anti-Soviet ‘Jihad’ by the Afghan Mujahidin. \$75 million a year flowed from the so-called ‘petro-dollar alliance’ into the purchase of ammunition for this ‘Jihad’ under the cover operation of the CIA and ISI.¹²⁸⁴ The tribal areas of Pakistan became an open market for weapons such as rifles, pistols, automatic weapons, hand grenades, and landmines.¹²⁸⁵ In 1985, a Kalashnikov rifle could be purchased for the price of Rs. 17000 only. In KPK there are now an estimated 300,000 Kalashnikovs.¹²⁸⁶ Andrew Eiva of the Federation for American Afghan Action estimated that eighty per cent of the arms intended for the Afghan Mujahidin sent via Pakistan never reached them, with most slipping into the Pakistani market either with the connivance of the Pakistani authorities or through the selling of the weapons by the Mujahidin themselves.¹²⁸⁷ Some drug smugglers,

¹²⁸⁴ ‘Caravans on Moonless Nights: How the CIA supports and supplies the anti-Soviet gue’, *The Time*, 11 June 1984, 21 May 2014, (CIA doc no.) p.1; Coll Steve, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2004), pp.42-43.

¹²⁸⁵ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.344.

¹²⁸⁶ M.B.Naqvi, ‘Pakistan in 1985 – a retrospect’, *Viewpoint*, XI (21), 2 January 1985, p.10.

¹²⁸⁷ *Time Magazine*, 9 December 1985. Edward Girardet, *Afghanistan: The Soviet War* (New Delhi, 1986), p.67.

as reported by The Washington Post, even had an anti-aircraft gun mounted on the roof of their house in KPK.¹²⁸⁸ It was alleged in the US Congress in 1987 that the ISI supported the manufacture of weapons, with factories in Dara Adamkhel making copies of Russian and Chinese Kalashnikovs and pistols that sold at about a third of the price of the originals.¹²⁸⁹ Shopkeepers even provided a home delivery service for weapons – long before they ever provided such a service for groceries. Arms licenses were issued freely,¹²⁹⁰ leading to growing numbers being killed or injured by these automatic weapons in various disputes. There was a general wave of violence that was often attributed to new forms of sectarianism, extremism and ethnic conflict.¹²⁹¹ The sense of panic was reinforced by rumours about killings inflicted by the so-called *Hathora* (hammer) group.¹²⁹² Young unemployed men found that they could earn big money through robbery and kidnapping for ransom. According to Ahmed Rashid, those even with Master's degrees became involved in such crime. This author further revealed that in the years 1986 to 1988, there were five thousand kidnap cases and murder of one thousand civilians and fifty policemen in dacoit-related violence in Sindh alone.¹²⁹³

¹²⁸⁸ Cited in, William Vornberger, 'The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs', *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. p.12.

¹²⁸⁹ Cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.97.

¹²⁹⁰ The Government of Punjab issued two hundred thousands arms licence in 1985 alone, under the scheme allowing legislators monthly quotas of chits that are converted into permits to buy guns – without the customary police check. *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.7.

¹²⁹¹ Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.449 and 464.

¹²⁹² There was a wave of fear throughout Pakistan over the killing of people with hammers while they slept at night. Their activities were believed to stretch all over the country. I remember this from my childhood in the 1980s. At that time, the origin of this group was unknown. In an interview, one Pakistani intelligence officer informed me off-the-record that the KGB was behind this group.

¹²⁹³ Ahmed Rashid, 'Unrest in Sindh', *Viewpoint*, XIII (22), 14 August 1988, p.10.

This was also a period in which drug trafficking and heroin addiction became a major problem for Pakistan. In 1979, there were only two registered heroin addicts, whereas there were over 300,000 regular users by 1984,¹²⁹⁴ and 700,000 by 1989.¹²⁹⁵ Most of them were in the 15-35 years age group.¹²⁹⁶ This was despite the claim of the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board to have reduced the production of opium in Pakistan from 800 tons in 1979 to 40 tons in 1984.¹²⁹⁷ The notorious history of CIA's involvement in drug trafficking during the wars in Nicaragua, Laos, and Vietnam was replicated in Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the anti-communist war being funded in part through opium smuggling.¹²⁹⁸ The tribal areas of Pakistan became a major area for the refinement of opium into heroin. The region as a whole, which included Iran, became known as "the Golden Crescent". About 75 per cent of heroin in Western Europe and 50 per cent in the USA was smuggled from this region.¹²⁹⁹ In 1983, 4.5 tons of heroin valued at \$9 billion was shipped to the USA.¹³⁰⁰ The closure of the Iranian and Russian borders with Afghanistan made Pakistan the

¹²⁹⁴ *Viewpoint*, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.6. Alfred McCoy mentioned 1.2 million drug users in Pakistan, the highest steep increase in any country of the world. Alfred McCoy, 'Drug Fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade', *The Progressive*, 1 August 1997, cited in Michael Chossudovsky, *America's War on Terrorism* (Quebec: Global Research, 2005), p. 26.

¹²⁹⁵ Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Heroin Trail-1: Zia's 'adopted son' was Drug Ring Leader," *Times of India* (New Delhi), 24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p. 90. Alfred McCoy, *Drug Fallout*.

¹²⁹⁶ BBC in its report of January 1986 stated that Pakistan had 40000 large-scale smugglers, and about 5000 heroin smugglers were in jail. *Viewpoint*, XI (26), 6 February 1986, p.34; *Viewpoint*, XI (24), 23 January 1986, p.6.

¹²⁹⁷ *Viewpoint*, XI (22), 9 January 1986, p.3.

¹²⁹⁸ For details, see Vince Bielski and Dennis Bernstein, 'The Cocaine Connection', *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987); Alfred McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade* (Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, and Columbia) (Chicago: 2003).

¹²⁹⁹ William Vornberger, "The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs", *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, pp.91-92.

¹³⁰⁰ United Press International, 15 December 1983.

main route for this illegal trade.¹³⁰¹ Drug enforcement authorities in the USA admitted that CIA-backed Afghan rebels were responsible for the heroin trafficking from Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹³⁰² This all had political implications. It was observed in 1987 that 'it is really very simple, if you control the poppy fields, you will be so rich that you will control Pakistan.'¹³⁰³ Once the Soviets were about to withdraw from Afghanistan, the USA changed its stance, threatening to halve aid to Pakistan worth of \$650 million a year unless the country cracked down on the growing of opium and export of heroin.¹³⁰⁴

The Pakistani army encouraged this trade as well as the CIA. General Hamid Gul, the Director of ISI, asked permission from BB – once she came into the power in 1988 – to permit him to smuggle drugs to finance military expenditure. *Viewpoint* claimed that 'several Pakistani army officers had become millionaires overnight.'¹³⁰⁵ Lawrence Lifschultz, an American journalist working for *The Nation* of New York exposed in a sensational story the links between heroin smugglers and the army high command in Pakistan. He revealed that Hamid Hasnain, an adopted son of General Zia-ul-Haq and his wife Shafiq, was arrested on a charge of heroin smuggling in a raid by the Federal Investigation Agency of Pakistan with the Norwegian police on 27 October 1985 in Islamabad.¹³⁰⁶ Hamid Hasnain was one of the vice-Presidents of the Habib Bank, and was posted during the early eighties at the Army GHQ Branch of the

¹³⁰¹ Sohail, *General Zia ke Gyara Saal*, p.16.

¹³⁰² William Vornberger, "The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs", *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. P.12. Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Heroin Trail-1: Zia 'adopted son' was Drug Ring Leader," *Times of India (New Delhi)*, 24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.95.

¹³⁰³ *Herald Monthly*, January 1987.

¹³⁰⁴ *Washington Post*, 16 June 1988.

¹³⁰⁵ *Viewpoint*, 27 October 1988, p.20. Cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.94.

¹³⁰⁶ His name was disclosed by Raza Qureshi who was arrested at Oslo airport in December 1983.

bank. Investigators even went into the house of the Governor of KPK, according to the Norwegian police.¹³⁰⁷ Likewise, one Pakistan Air Force officer along with nine others was caught at Heathrow airport trying to smuggle heroin into the UK.¹³⁰⁸ Although the Zia government claimed that the problem was greatly exaggerated by the enemies of Pakistan,¹³⁰⁹ it made a show of taking some measure by targeting a few drug dealers and heroin processors in areas such as the Kyber Agency and Karachi City. This was all largely cosmetic, as the industry was in fact being backed by Lt. General Fazal-i-Haq, the Governor of KPK.¹³¹⁰ It was estimated in 1986 that 'three-fourths of the anti-smuggling staff has been corrupted by the drug peddlers.'¹³¹¹ This all contributed to a deterioration in law and order throughout the country.¹³¹²

The effect was to greatly add to levels of corruption in the politics in Pakistan. Although foreign aid to pursue the war in Afghanistan brought a six percent growth in the economy of the country, much of this money was used to purchase political support and win elections.¹³¹³ In 1985, large sums were deployed to buy support for the regime from politicians, with housing plots, government contracts, lucrative licenses and bank loans being offered to those

¹³⁰⁷ Lawrence Lifschultz, "The Heroin Trail-1:Zia 'adopted son' was Drug Ring Leader," *Times of India (New Delhi)*, 24 October 1988. Cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.92. Michel Chossudovsky, '9/11 Analysis: From Ronald Reagan and Soviet Afghan War to George W. Bush to September 11, 2001', *Centre for Research on Globalisation*, 9 September 2010. [<http://www.globalresearch.ca/9-11-analysis-from-ronald-reagan-and-the-soviet-afghan-war-to-george-w-bush-and-september-11-2001/20958>] (28 December 2014).

¹³⁰⁸ *Viewpoint*, XIII (40), 12 May 1988, p.34.

¹³⁰⁹ The Interior Minister of Pakistan from 1978 to 1984, Mahmood Haroon, claimed that such reports were aimed by its enemies to give a "bad name to Pakistan". Mahmood Haroon, cited in Bhola, *Benazir Bhutto*, p.96.

¹³¹⁰ Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin, CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade*, (Chicago, 2003), p. 477.

¹³¹¹ *Jang*, 29 January 1986.

¹³¹² Arif, *Working with Zia*, p.344.

¹³¹³ Khan, *Pakistan, A Personal History*, p.90, Javed Hashmi, interview.

who sided with Zia. Fifty lac rupees (Rs. 5 million) was said to be the rate of purchase for a member of the Upper House of Parliament. The Chief Minister of Punjab distributed Rs. 340 million amongst 177 members of the Provincial Assembly for their services to the government. Tehreek-i-Ittehad-Qabail (The Tribal Unity Movement) accused wealthy smugglers of buying the vote of members of the National Assembly from the tribal areas.¹³¹⁴ While the Pir of Pagara estimated that the cost for a Senate seat in Sindh would be Rs. 700,000, the cost in the end turned out to be Rs. 10,500,000.¹³¹⁵

In 1970, the elections had been contested on the basis of popularity – it was said at the time that a street light booth of ZAB would have won. Money was not then a part-and-parcel of participating in the election. Now, it is impossible to think of an election in Pakistan in which money is not to the fore. Khan Abdul Wali Khan said in 1990 that with 200 crore (Rs. 2000 million) a person could become the owner of Pakistan.¹³¹⁶ During the Senate election of 2012, millions of rupees were paid to the members of Electoral College to buy their votes.¹³¹⁷ Electoral corruption on such a scale is widely held to have started with the efforts made in 1985 by Zia to get his non-party based supporters elected.¹³¹⁸

¹³¹⁴ *Viewpoint*, XIII (28), 18 February 1988, p.21.

¹³¹⁵ *Viewpoint*, XIII (32), 17 March 1988, p. 16; *Viewpoint*, XIII (41), 19 May 1988, p.7.

¹³¹⁶ Quoted in Nadeem Akhter and Athar Abbas, *Jamhoriyat, Army and Awam*, p. 66.

¹³¹⁷ *The Pakistan Spectator*, 7 March 2012, [<http://www.pkhope.com/biggest-lesson-learned-from-senate-elections/>] accessed on 10 June 2013.

¹³¹⁸ Mushahidullah, interview quoted in *Dawn*, 24 February 2012. Shahida Jabeen, interview, 26 February 2012, Lahore.

Causes for the longevity of Zia's Regime

Although it is the argument of this thesis that the MRD realised its aim of restoring democracy in the long term in 1988, the struggle took much longer than hoped for, and at times appeared as if it would fail. This was in contrast to 1969 when the first dictator General Ayub Khan was removed quickly from office through nonviolent resistance, and 2009 when the same fate befell General Musharraf as a consequence of the nonviolent Lawyers' Movement.¹³¹⁹ Ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani told the researcher that the blame for the longevity of martial law in Pakistan under Zia can be attributed largely to the failures of his political opponents.¹³²⁰ It is this issue that will be addressed in this section.

As I hope that this thesis has brought out, a lack of unity and mutual mistrust among politicians and their parties was a major reason for the lack of success of the anti-Zia movement. Scholars who have written on civil resistance have emphasised the great importance of strong and effective leadership.¹³²¹ This was lacking in Pakistan. The nine parties of the MRD spent more time fighting among themselves than in working on a comprehensive strategy to force Zia's removal and new elections. The return of BB only widened the cleavages within the MRD by reinforcing the PPP's dominance. It was a widespread complaint by the smaller parties of the alliance that the PPP, by far the largest of its parties, tended to ignore the opinions of the other leaders and were interested primarily in their own power. Almost every other

¹³¹⁹ For the latter movement, see Malik Hammad Ahmad, 'Quest for Peace and Justice in Pakistan: Lawyers' Non-violent Resistance', in Priyankar Upadhyaya, and Samrat Schmiem Kumar (eds.), *Peace and Conflict: The South Asian Experience*.

¹³²⁰ Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, interview.

¹³²¹ Ackerman, and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, pp.26-27

party in the alliance registered their complaints against its dominance. Moreover, the political parties lack solidarity within and outside of their parties. The fourteenth-century Arab scholar Ibn-e-Khaldun stated that a lack of *asabiyyah* (the spirit of kinship) can lead to the defeat of a large and wealthy group by a poorer and smaller group. While the PPP and its *jyalas* (partisans) struggled hard against the regime and were in large numbers, the sort of cohesion and solidarity that Ibn-i-Khaldun was talking about was conspicuously lacking. There was too much individualism and not enough collectivism. The unity amongst the leadership was the key in the success of other civil society movements in Pakistan such as the Lawyers' Movement and the Students Movement in Pakistan, and elsewhere in the case of the mothers of the 'disappeared' in the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, the students movement against Pinochet in Chile, the Solidarity Movement in Poland, the Otpor movement against Milosevic in Serbia, the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe, and the youth movement of the Arab Spring in Egypt and Tunis. Nevertheless, the MRD survived the demise of its opponent General Zia. The most persistent problem in MRD since its establishment was the complaint of the smaller parties that the PPP – being the largest party in the alliance – often ignored them.

Ackerman and Kruegler have emphasised the importance in nonviolent struggle of the existence of what they call an 'operational corps'. By this, they mean a group analogous to the officers of an army who provide leadership in depth under the command of the overall leaders. They state that this group '...must instruct, nurture, and support the general population in the performance of nonviolent conflict', and that it is 'the organisational glue that

holds a nonviolent movement or organisation together'.¹³²² In the case of the MRD, this sort of leadership-in-depth was generally lacking. Because this was the case, it was relatively easy for Zia to subdue the opposition by arresting the main leaders. Zia's undeniable comment on the parties-on-struggle whose leaders never have held elections in their own parties based on the bitter truth, which he exploited quite well. In part, this was because local democratic government had not been nurtured in Pakistan, with the result that local leaders could not cut their teeth in local affairs. Instead, they derived their power from direct relationships with the top leaders. Although Zia held elections to local bodies in 1979 and 1983, those who were elected tended to be sycophants – so that this was not a forum for the growth of any dynamic opposition movement.¹³²³ In this respect, we may attribute the success of the more recent Lawyers' Movement in part to its internal democracy, with annual bar council elections generating a multi-tiered structure of leadership.¹³²⁴ This sort of internal democracy was conspicuously lacking with the MRD. And local bodies leaders can be a vanguard of democracy. It, however, remains a problem with party politics in Pakistan to this day.

Instead, parties were highly centralised; often revolving around a dominant family. This was the case with the PPP, which was controlled, and indeed still is controlled, by the Bhutto family or after his name. Benazir Bhutto thus willed that her son Bilawal Bhutto Zardari should follow her as party leader after her death. The party revolved around the idea of the *jyala*

¹³²² Ackerman and Krueger, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, p.28.

¹³²³ Stephen P. Cohen, Interview.

¹³²⁴ Hammad Ahmad, 'Quest for Peace and Justice in Pakistan', pp.166-67.

(partisan) whose allegiance to the party is absolute. ZAB had projected himself as the saviour of the common people. When I questioned lower level party workers on the reason for their great loyalty to the party, they replied that ZAB had made us regard ourselves as human beings; he had taught us what humanity means and being human is. Otherwise, they said, we were *kohlu k bail* (blind-followers) of our masters.¹³²⁵ In promising the three basic necessities of '*Roti, Kapra aur Makan* (bread, clothing and housing) and in recognising humanity of his followers ZAB instilled a cult of Bhuttoism. This was especially true after the disclosures about the way that twenty-two families had enriched themselves at the expense of the people under the rule of Ayub Khan. Such loyalty ensured that the *jyals* were able to withstand extreme forms of repression by Zia. This mentality underpinned the dynastic politics of the Bhutto family. Unfortunately, the PPP has so far failed to provide the basic three necessities, despite it being in power for sixteen years in all between 1971 and 2013.

Because of its over-dependence on the leadership of members of the Bhutto family, it was hard for the PPP to carry on the struggle after they were arrested or went into exile.¹³²⁶ Realising this fact during her period of exile, BB instructed the party to hold the long-awaited election for the party offices¹³²⁷ – which had never been conducted during the entire existence of the organisation – after seeing the dismemberment of the party through serious internal strife due to the boycott of the 1985 election. However, such an election has never

¹³²⁵ Shahida Jabeen, Shahid Sheikh, interviews.

¹³²⁶ Musthaq Lasharie, interview.

¹³²⁷ Directorate of Intelligence, 'Pakistan: The Opposition since the Election', *Near East and South Asia Review*, 7 June 1985, 24 November 2013, CIA-RDP85T01184R000301490002-8, p.11.

been held, even to this day. Once she gained power, BB employed thirty-six thousand *jyals* during her first twenty months of government.¹³²⁸ This has all led party workers towards bribery (financial, moral), buttering-up, backbiting against intra-party rivals, and claiming devotion to the leader so as to obtain political rewards. The biographies of party workers and leaders provide a way to eulogise their leader and swear allegiance to whoever heads the family. In this way, sycophants are selected for party offices at all levels, rather than people who have vigorous local support. As it is, the 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution that was passed in 2010, and which was designed to strengthen the power of parliamentary government in Pakistan and to prevent any future military dictatorship, also strengthened the power of party heads. Opposing a party leader and casting a vote in the legislative assembly against the party's wish can lead to the disqualification of an elected member from the Assembly as well as the party.¹³²⁹ This has consolidated the cult of party leadership with all of its drawbacks.

Democratic government is based on a social contract between ruler and people, in which the people confer power on the ruler but expect to receive in return the basic necessities of life. The continuing failure of the PPP to fulfil their promise to provide '*Roti, Kapra aur Makan*' when in power has seen the wider society turn against it, paving the way for fresh periods of military rule. This was the case in 1990, when the then President of Pakistan Ghulam Ishaque Khan – whom BB had thanked on her maiden speech as a Prime Minister –

¹³²⁸ Khan Abdul Wali Khan, interview cited in Nadeem Akhtar and Athar Abbas, *Jamhoriyat, Army and Awam*, p. 71. Ashraf Sharif states 26 thousand instead. Ashraf Sharif, *Aao Pakistan ku Lootain*, pp.86-91.

¹³²⁹ Mahboob Hussain, and Rizwanullah Kokab, 'Eighteenth Amendment in the Constitution of Pakistan: Successes and Controversies', *Asian Social Sciences*, vol.8, No.1 (January 2012), p.86.

removed her from power. Stating the reason for martial law in country, Raza Kazim metaphorically argued that democracy is like a “political contract” between a King and his people, and that after the civilian rulers failed to fulfill their side of the contract, military rulers stepped in with promises to do so instead, and that they have at the time enjoyed considerable public support.¹³³⁰ Of course, the same has applied to military rulers as they have in turn failed in this task, leading to campaigns for their removal from power.

Strategically, it is important for civil resistance campaigns to maintain strict nonviolence. This is another area in which the opposition to Zia failed. The hijacking of the PIA aircraft in March 1981 by Al-Zulfiqar just two weeks after the establishment of the eleven parties’ alliance of the MRD brought a split when Sardar Abdul Qayyum of the Muslim League (Qayum) quit in protest. It also, predictably, legitimised a ruthless crackdown on the nonviolent movement. Despite BB publicly denounced the hijacking, all the political leaders including her were rounded up, and the workers were tortured. The regime made international capital from the fact that three Americans, one Canadian and one Swede were among the passengers. This single incidence of violence badly undermined the MRD. This was followed two years later in 1983 by violence related to the movement in Sindh – such as the burning of bank buildings, the killing of law enforcement agency members, and bomb explosions at railway stations – which furthered this process of decline.

The literature on the strategy of civil resistance has discussed in depth the issue of international assistance for campaigns for democracy and human

¹³³⁰ Raza Kazim, *Dawn*, 29 September 2014. <<http://www.dawn.com/news/1134879/herald-exclusive-in-conversation-with-raza-kazim>> 2 October 2014

rights in authoritarian and oppressive societies. In general, it seen as being extremely important for movements to cultivate such support both in terms of bringing external pressure to bear on a regime in a diplomatic sense, as well as in the provision of material help through either financial assistance or advice on good strategy. The opposition to Zia, whether by the PPP or the MRD, sought to obtain such external support for its cause. They received strongest backing from left-wing organisations in the west as well as from the Soviet Union. This was not however adequate, as neither were able to have much influence on the Zia regime. Realising this, BB astutely stopped blaming the USA and CIA of complicity in her father's execution and instead sought Western assistance for her cause. She had some limited success in this, through the US administration continued to have a vested interest in keeping in the good books of the Pakistan military and in the continuation of Zia's rule. They were prepared on the whole to overlook the violation of human rights by the regime and the lack of any real democracy.

As elsewhere in the world, the USA was prepared to support authoritarian regimes and military dictators so long as they were seen as a bulwark against its numerous enemies – whether left-wing and communist groups within such countries who represented a threat to US capitalist interests or to its international rivals who threatened US security. In Pakistan, according to Iftikhar Malik: ‘...the army's dominance, buoyed up by US support, has become stronger over the decades’.¹³³¹ The USA remained the highest aid-giver – providing approximately US\$30 billion to Pakistan since its creation. Fifty

¹³³¹ Iftikhar Malik, *Pakistan: Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation*, p.114.

percent of this aid was for military purposes or given in periods of military rule.¹³³² During General Zia's period Saudi Arabia increased its aid from US\$100 million dollar in 1979 to US\$300 million in 1980. But in 1985, when a controlled democracy was restored in Pakistan, it reduced this to less than 40 million dollar.¹³³³ However, the kingdom deposited \$250 million in 1985 and \$275million in 1986 in a secret Swiss account on the request of the CIA to use it for Afghan mujahidin, as the doubled amount of aid given by the Reagan administration to Afghanistan was not enough.¹³³⁴ In 1988, by contrast, the Pressler Amendment was imposed in a way that cut aid to the civilian governments in the following years.

Moreover, under National Security Decision Directives number 166 of 1985, which was titled 'US Policy, Programs, and Strategy in Afghanistan', the Reagan administration provided support for the publication of textbooks from the University of Nebraska at Omaha for students of *jihadi* schools that emphasised the supposed Islamic justification basis to such warfare.¹³³⁵ A team of three or four agents was financed to the tune of between \$300,000 to more than \$1million to train Islamic insurgents. During the Afghan war, Islamabad had the largest CIA station in the world. It funnelled growing amounts of paramilitary support to the rebels in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviet-dominated government.¹³³⁶ America therefore contributed significantly, if not

¹³³² Noushad Mahmood, 'US Aid, Pakistani Anger', *Times*, 3 August 2014.

¹³³³ Directorate of Intelligence, "Saudi Economic and Military Bilateral Aid", 29 August 1986, 24 November 2013. CIA-RDP05S02029R000300820001-3, CREST, NARA, College Park, MD.

¹³³⁴ Washington Post, 20 June 1986, p. A30. Cited in William Vornberger, "The CIA and Heroin: Afghan Rebels and Drugs", *Covert Action Information Bulletin*, 28 (Summer 1987), CIA-RDP90-00845R000100170001-8, CREST, NARA, MD. P.12.

¹³³⁵ Khan, *Pakistan: A Personal History*, p.89.

¹³³⁶ For details, See Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of CIA, 1981-87*, (Simon and Schuster

wholly, to a state of affairs that undermined democracy in Pakistan. Interestingly, CIA reports between 1977 and 1988 invariably accused the Soviet Union and India for the domestic unrest in Pakistan, while ignoring US culpability.

The Struggle for Democracy in Pakistan

In contrast to many anti-imperial struggles in different parts of the world in the twentieth century, the nationalist movements of pre-1947 South Asia were largely nonviolent and democratic in nature, even though there were times during which violence came to the fore, as in the mass killings of 1947. This has left a legacy in which there has been a firm relationship between the building and maintaining of democratic rights and freedom and ongoing traditions of civil resistance. This has been the case in Pakistan. Democracy in Pakistan, though often challenged, has reasserted itself time and again through the struggle of its people in campaigns of civil protest. Many have sacrificed themselves for this ideal.¹³³⁷ Because of this legacy, every military dictator in Pakistan has had to pay lip service to democracy. As Cohen has stated, it has been either General Ayub's 'basic democracy', General Zia's formation of *Majlis-i-shura* in disguise a 'death knell'¹³³⁸ to democracy, or Pervez Musharraf's

Paperbacks: New York: 2005) cited in 'Casey's Active Counterterrorism', CIA-RDP90-00965R000807540050-6, NARA, pp.5-6.

¹³³⁷ Unfortunately, not a single memorial or monument has been erected in Pakistan to those who have suffered in the struggle for democracy, nor is there any day of commemoration for those killed for the cause.

¹³³⁸ Indurthy, 'The Fragility of Democracy in Pakistan', p. 313.

controlled democracy; each have tried to legitimize their rule in this way before the public.¹³³⁹

In the case of the movement against Zia, there were many serious problems with the campaign for democracy. There was disunity amongst the political leaders, a failure to build an organised operational corps, and a lack of effective external support. Despite this, Benazir Bhutto demonstrated a commendable courage and firmness in the struggle. Over time, and with persistence, she gradually removed the major barriers, which included forging alliances with other political parties, reorganising her own party, and cultivating international support for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Her continuous engagement with civil society groups in Pakistan as well as abroad helped to increase pressure on the regime. Eventually, after the death of General Zia-ul-Haq, the army could not replicate General Yahya's formula, and agreed to hand over power to the victors in the elections of 1988, the Pakistan People's Party. America's outward approval of this change came in a letter from President George H.W. Bush that stated: 'We are following with great interest your bold moves in restructuring your government, and are confident you will build a solid working relations on which democracy depends.'¹³⁴⁰ The victory of BB was not only a victory for democracy but also for the women of Pakistan. This was in a country in which the evidence of a woman in a court of law was

¹³³⁹ Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan*, p.4.

¹³⁴⁰ Letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto from President George H.W. Bush thanking her for her desire to seek a replenishment of funds for the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA). Bush assures Bhutto that the U.S. will assist Pakistan and other developing countries to strengthen their economies. Letter. WHITE HOUSE. OMITTED. Issue Date: Nov 27, 1989. Complete. 1 page(s)
<http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&slb=KE&locID=warwick&srchtp=basic&c=1&img=.25&ste=4&txb=Benazir+Bhutto&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349634691> (19 March 2014)

deemed to be worth only half that of a man. Some political parties, such as JUI that was one part of the MRD, questioned whether a woman should be allowed to lead. In this, her victory was two-fold.

Nonetheless, instead of accepting the conditions imposed by the Pakistan military after winning the election of 1988, Benazir Bhutto should have looked to public support to impose her own terms and run the country without having to constantly look over her shoulder towards the military. Rather than focus on the structural evils of military rule, she treated Zia as an aberration. This was a let-down for her supporters in the pro-democracy movement. She also failed to curb corruption and vote-rigging.

Despite the many failings of its democratic leaders, leading to the reassertion of military rule by General Musharraf in 1999, this tradition of civil resistance continued. The Lawyers' Movement that started in 2007 culminated in Musharraf's fall from power in 2008 and the restoration of a democracy that lasts to this day. Since then, there have been ongoing civil protests against various controversial actions of the elected governments. Although Pakistan faces some extremely difficult and seemingly intractable problems, we may hope that the spirit that has come to the fore time and again in such struggles will provide a way forward in time towards a more equitable and less violent future for the country.

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Interviews

Political Leaders

Jahangir Badar, 5 May 2012, Islamabad. Lahore (Punjab). He was a student leader during MRD, and was the first who was flogged in Lahore in 1978. Currently, he is a General Secretary of PPP.

Honey Begum, 1 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar. She was a Senior Vice-President of ANP and President of its Women's Wing. Now retired

Haji Ghulam Ahmed Bilour, 24 April 2012, Islamabad. Peshawar, a very senior politician. He is a senior Vice-President of ANP, and former Federal Minister (Railways). He was associated with Bacha Khan's anti-MRD group.

Malik Sikander Hayat Khan Bosan, 18 February 2012, Multan. Multan, He was a Local Body member Multan in 1983, and MPA during Junejo's tenure. Currently, Federal Minister for Food Security and Research 2013 to date.

Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani, 26 July 2014, Multan. Multan (South Punjab) a senior politician. He was the youngest member of Junejo's Federal Cabinet in 1985. In 1990, joined PPP, and was made Prime Minister 2008-2011. Still associated with PPP.

Dr. Mubashar Hassan, 28 May 2012, Lahore. Lahore (Punjab), a senior politician. Founding member of PPP. Ex-Federal Minister, and General Secretary of PPP. He resigned from the party in 1977. Currently, he is General Secretary of PPP-Shaheed Bhutto, the party named after Murtaza Bhutto.

Javed Hashmi, 18 February 2012, Multan. From Multan (South Punjab), a senior politician. A student leader, who was in the federal cabinet of General Zia-ul-Haq from Jama'at-i-Islami platform. Latterly, he was the President of PTI.

Taj Haider, 14 March 2012, Karachi. From Karachi (Sindh), a senior politician, Founding member of PPP. During the movement, he helped many party workers find safe places, and helped them into exile. Currently, he is a PPP Senator.

Begum Nasim Wali Khan, February 2012, Charsaddah. Charsadda (KPK), a senior politician. She was wife of Khan Abdul Wali Khan, and daughter-in-law of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan (Baacha Khan), General Secretary ANP 1977- 4, and one of

the major players in the downfall of ZAB's government. Remained active during MRD against Zia later on. Currently, she is living in retirement in her hometown.

Shazia Aurangzeb Khan, 2 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar, ex-MPA (KPK) and General Secretary Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) Women Wing.

Mairaj M. Khan, 15 March 2012, Karachi. Karachi (Sindh), a senior politician. He was the founding member of PPP, and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). He resigned from PPP in 1974.

Altaf Ali Khokar, 14 May 2012, Multan. Multan (South Punjab), member of PPP, and imprisoned during Zia's period.

Mian Iqbal Mohammad, 25 January 2013, London. Faisalabad (Punjab), He was a PPP MPA from Faisalabad. During MRD, Zia's actions forced him to leave the country for UK.

Dr. Aslam Naro, 22 March 2012, Rahim Yar Khan. Rahim Yar Khan (South Punjab), He held a doctorate in Chemistry from USA, and was a very close associate of ZAB due to his expertise in Science. He was the longest-serving prisoner of Shahi Qila, Lahore during MRD. Currently, he is a philanthropist.

Qayum Nizami, 28 February 2012, Lahore (Punjab). From Lahore, Ex-Central Information Secretary-PPP, and elected MPA from Lahore in 1977. He went into exile in Canada due to the General Zia's atrocities. Currently, he is a columnist.

Mehnaz Rafi, 28 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore. She was a part of Women Action Forum Lahore who struggled against the discriminatory laws against Women during the Zia period.

Mehtab Akber Rashidi, 16 March 2012, Karachi. Hyderabad (Sindh). She was a conscientious objector against Zia's policy that women on television must cover heads. Currently, she is MPA in Sindh from Pakistan Muslim League-Pagara group, and head one of the private TV channels.

Syed Ali Nawaz Shah, 16 March 2012, Karachi. From Sukker (Sindh), He was Minister of Agriculture 2008-2012, and participated in MRD as PPP worker from interior Sindh. Still associated with PPP.

Shahid Sheikh, 17 April 2012, Islamabad. Lahore (Punjab). Son of a PPP MPA in 1977 election. Struggled during MRD as a core member of the Lahore branch of

PPP, and had to go into exile to UK. Still associated with PPP.

Syed Aqil Shah, 1 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar (KPK), He belongs to Awami National Party. Ex- Provincial Minister for Sports and Culture 2008-2012.

Political Workers.

Jan-i-Alam, 13 March 2012, Karachi. Karachi, one of the prisoners exchanged after the PIA hijacking. However, he was not active in Al-Zulfiqar group before.

Asif Butt, 26 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore PPP-student leader of Punjab University. One of the prisoners exchanged after the PIA hijacking against his wishes.

Farkhanda Bukhari, 27 February 2012, Lahore. A Lahore PPP *jyala* since the arrest of ZAB in September 1977. She was part of the Libya training group, and imprisoned in *Shahi Qila*. She was the only woman who was exchanged with the PIA passengers in March 1981.

Shahid Chohan, 17 April 2012, Islamabad. Rahim Yar Khan. He was a PPP worker, and imprisoned.

Nazir Hussain Dhoki, 25 April 2012, Islamabad. Sukker. PPP political worker, and imprisoned.

Sadrud Din, 2 February 2012, Peshawar. President ANP Lakki Marwat District, President Pukhtoon Student Federation 1981-85.

Aslam Gordaspuri, 6 May 2013, Lahore. Lahore. He was the President of Punjab-PPP chapter during MRD. Imprisoned many times.

Dr. Khadim Hussain, 3 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar, ANP and Director Bacha Khan Trust and Educational Foundation.

Shahida Jabeen, 26 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore (PPP). Worker and elected local councillor in 1979 election from Lahore. She was imprisoned in *Shahi Qila*.

Aslam Khwaja, 13 March 2012, Karachi. Hyderabad. SAT political worker, and imprisoned.

Mushtaq Lashari, 12 January 2013 London. Jhang, He was an employee of Pakistan International Airline, and was the one of the intra-city messengers for

PPP leaders and workers.

Muqtidda Masood 12 March 2012, Karachi. Jamshoro (Sindh)

Javed Iqbal Moazzam, 23 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, he was a member of Al-Zulfiqar, and PPP *jjala*. Nawaz Sharif government released him since BB had disowned the Al-Zufliqar members.

Dr. Mushtaq, 3 February 2012, Peshawar. Peshawar, ANP and former Khudai Khidmatgar member.

Israr Shah, 19 April 2012, Islamabad. Rawalpindi, MRD Joint Secretary Student Affairs-Punjab from PPP. Currently, he is a central executive committee member of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf.

Qazi Sultan, 17 April 2012, Rawalpindi. Rawalpindi, A hotel porter turned politician. He was hardly 76 centimeters tall, and was imprisoned in *Shahi Qila*. Currently, he is a Central Executive Member of PPP.

Mustafa Talpur, 1 June 2012, Islamabad. (Badin), the youngest MRD arrested during the 1983 movement from Badin.

Hidayat Ullah, 1 February 2012, Peshawar. Dir (KPK), ANP member who was Provincial Minister for Livestock 2008-2013.

Muhammad Agha Waseem, 25 February 2012, Lahore, Stockholm. Lahore, served in Al-Zulfiqar with Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnwaz Bhutto through the life of the organisation.

Academics

Dr. Rafique Ahmed, 27 February 2012, Lahore. He was the President of *Nazria-i-Pakistan* Center (Pakistan Ideology Center) Lahore.

Dr. Mubarak Ali, 22 February 2012, Lahore. Hyderabad, He is a very renowned historian of Pakistan.

Prof. Stephen P. Cohen, 20 November 2013, Washington DC. USA. He worked on the State Department, South Asia desk in the late 1980s. He is a Security Advisor on South Asia. Currently, he is a Fellow of Brooklyn Institute, Washington DC.

Dr. Mehdi Hasan, 3 March 2013, Lahore. He is a professor of Journalism at

Beaconhouse University, Lahore. He is also a brother of Dr. Mubashar Hasan.

Rasheed Khalid, 21 April 2012, Islamabad. Islamabad, Associate Professor at Defence and Strategic Studies of Quaid-i-Azam University, who had political affiliation with PPP. Three lecturers of the university were flogged under the Zia regime.

Dr. Fazal Rahim Marwat, 1 February 2012, Peshawar. Lucky Marwat (KPK). He was the Chairman KPK Text board, and currently a vice-Chancellor of Bacha Khan University, Mardan (KPK).

Ashfaq Saleem Mirza, 8 February 2012, Islamabad. Islamabad, he is a President of Islamabad Cultural Forum.

Prof. Muzaffar Mirza, 27 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, he was the head of Allama Iqbal Academy, Lahore.

Dr. Aparna Pande, 20 November 2013, Washington DC. (India/USA), She is a fellow at Hudson Institute, Washington DC, and worked under Husain Naqi.

Dr. Hafeez-ur-Rehman, 19 April 2012, Islamabad. Lodhran (South Punjab) Head of the Anthropology Department of Quaid-i-Azam University, who had political affiliation with Jama`at-i-Islami. Three lecturers of the university were flogged under the Zia regime.

Dr. Riaz Shaikh, 12 March 2012, Karachi. He is a head of Social Science department of Shaheed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology.

Prof. Ian Talbot, 9 July 2013, Coventry (UK). Coventry, he is a professor at the University of Southampton and a renowned historian of South Asia, especially Pakistan.

Moeed Yousaf, 22 November 2013, Washington DC. Pakistan/USA, he looks after South Asian Desk at United Institute of Peace Studies (USIP), Washington DC.

Lawyers.

Haddi Butt (Sukker), 21 March 2012, Sukker. He was the General Secretary of MRD-Sukker in 1983.

Asma Jahangir, 27 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, she is a renowned human

rights activist and a lawyer. She is the founding member of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and Women Action Forum. She was the leading woman protesting for judicial freedom as well as women's rights.

Hafiz Allah Ditta Kashif, 12 February 2012, Multan. Multan, he is an advocate and President of Multan District Bar Council.

Human Rights Activists.

Tahira Abdullah, 30 April 2012, Islamabad. Very active member of Women Action Forum (WAF).

Karamat Ali, 15 March 2012, Karachi. Karachi, he heads Pakistan Institute of Labour and Research (PILER), working for labour rights.

Jami Chandio, 19 March 2012, Hyderabad. Hyderabad. He is a philanthropist, academic, as well as human rights activist working for democratic rights in Pakistan.

Zafarullah Khan, 23 April 2012, Islamabad. Jhang (South Punjab), he was the *Jyala* of PPP, and currently he heads the Centre for Civic Education. He has established Pakistan's first Museum of Democracy in Islamabad.

Fateh Marri, 11 March 2012, Karachi. Hyderabad, he was one of the political workers from his city.

I.A.Rehman, 22 February 2012, Lahore. Multan. He is head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and a very renowned human rights activist.

Journalists

Mazhar Abbas, 13 March 2012, Karachi.

Mujahid Barelvi, 18 March 2012, Karachi. Karachi.

Khalid Chaudhry 24 February 2012, Lahore. He was an employee of daily *Musawat*, and was arrested by the regime. AI declared him a Prisoner of Conscience in 1979.

Saeed Khan, 23 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, He was an activist in the journalist's movement throughout the Zia period. Currently, he works with daily *Mashriq* (Urdu).

Syed Wajid Shamsuddin 25 January 2013, London. Karachi.

Nasir Zaidi, 30 April 2012, Rawalpindi. He was one of the journalists among four who was flogged in 1978.

Civil Servants/Military Officials

Dr. Safdar Mahmood, 26 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, He was a civil servant during the Zia era. Now in retirement.

Fazal-Ullah Qureshi, 25 April 2012, Islamabad. Sukker (Sindh). He was a civil servant during Zia era. Now in retirement.

F.M.Shahzad, 24 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore. He was court martialed due to his involvement with the anti-Zia movement in the armed forces. He was a Squadron Leader in the Pakistan Air Force.

Artist

Shahid Nadeem, 25 February 2012, Lahore. Lahore, he was an employee of Pakistan Television, and was involved in occupying the TV building in Lahore in 1978. He had to go into exile. Currently, he runs the theatre group Ajoka in Lahore.

Periodicals

Dailies

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The Muslim (Islamabad) 1980-83
The New York Times (New York) Occasionally

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