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Cognitive science as an interface between rational and mechanistic explanation
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Chater, Nick (2014) Cognitive science as an interface between rational and mechanistic explanation. Topics in Cognitive Science, 6 (2). pp. 331-337. doi:10.1111/tops.12087 ISSN 1756-8757.
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/tops.12087
Abstract
Cognitive science views thought as computation; and computation, by its very nature, can be understood in both rational and mechanistic terms. In rational terms, a computation solves some information processing problem (e.g., mapping sensory information into a description of the external world; parsing a sentence; selecting among a set of possible actions). In mechanistic terms, a computation corresponds to causal chain of events in a physical device (in engineering context, a silicon chip; in biological context, the nervous system). The discipline is thus at the interface between two very different styles of explanation--as the papers in the current special issue well illustrate, it explores the interplay of rational and mechanistic forces.
Item Type: | Journal Article | ||||||||
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Divisions: | Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School > Behavioural Science Faculty of Social Sciences > Warwick Business School |
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Journal or Publication Title: | Topics in Cognitive Science | ||||||||
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc. | ||||||||
ISSN: | 1756-8757 | ||||||||
Official Date: | April 2014 | ||||||||
Dates: |
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Volume: | 6 | ||||||||
Number: | 2 | ||||||||
Page Range: | pp. 331-337 | ||||||||
DOI: | 10.1111/tops.12087 | ||||||||
Status: | Peer Reviewed | ||||||||
Publication Status: | Published | ||||||||
Access rights to Published version: | Open Access (Creative Commons) |
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